

**Electoral Institutions in Non-Democratic Regimes:  
The Impact of the 1990 Electoral Reform on Patterns of Party  
Development in Mubarak's Egypt**

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## Abstract

This PhD researches the development of political parties in Egypt between 1981 and 2000 under the presidency of Husni Mubarak. The starting point of this investigation is the failure of Egypt's parties to develop into politically-relevant organisations with strong constituency support in society. What we find instead are parties that – since the inception of multipartism in 1977 - remain characterised by their marginal role within the polity and politics of the state, that are little entrenched in society and that expose an underdeveloped and oftentimes fragmented internal structure.

What is more, not only have these parties remained persistently weak, but since the early 1990s they experienced a further weakening of their position in the Egyptian polity. Essentially, this weakening was evident at both the electoral and parliamentary level. In both these domains of politics parties were far more vocal and visibly present during the 1980s than during the 1990s. During the latter decade, in fact, the country's main parties had become entirely marginalized actors in the electoral and parliamentary arenas.

This PhD argues that the marginalisation of Egypt's parties was critically influenced by the 1990 reform of the parliamentary electoral law. This reform entailed a shift from a PR list-based regime to an absolute majority two-round system. Following the electoral connection literature, it is demonstrated that this particular inter-system change, rather than supporting the development of strong mass-based organisations, actually contributed to the further weakening of Egypt's parties as collective actors in the electoral arena. This was the case because the new electoral law created an institutional environment that adversely affect the capacity of party headquarters to control the nomination and placement of candidates and the willingness of party candidates to pursue a party over a personal reputation-seeking strategy in the elections. Both these factors together, it is maintained, severely undermined the capacity of parties to enhance levels of *internal unity* and *visible representation* in the electoral arena, and as such contributed to their observed marginalisation in the Egyptian polity.



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## **List of Acronyms**

ACPSS	Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies
ACRT	Almishkat Centre for Research and Training
ADNP	Arab Democratic Nasserite Party
AM	Absolute Majority
ASEP	Arab Socialist Egypt Party
ASU	Arab Socialist Union
AUC	American University in Cairo
CEDEJ	Centre d'Etudes et de Documentation Juridiques et Sociales
CHRLA	Centre for Human Rights and Legal Aid
CP	Centre Party
DGP	Democratic Generation Party
DPP	Democratic People's Party
EGP	Egyptian Green Party
ENISCR	Egyptian National Institute for Sociological and Criminological Research
EOHR	Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights
ERC	Effective Recruitment Control
FP	Future Party
FSCP	Free Social Constitutional Party
GDD	Group for Democratic Development
ICER	Independent Commission for Electoral Review
IDEA	Institute for Democracy and Election Assistance
MB	Muslim Brotherhood
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MMD	Multi-Member District
NAP	National Accord Party
NDP	National Democratic Party
NWP	New Wafd Party
PFT	Party Formation Threshold
PPC	Political Parties Committee
PR	Proportional Representation
RCD	Rassemblement Constitutionel Democratique
SCC	Supreme Constitutional Court
SJP	Social Justice Party
SLP	Socialist Labour Party
SMD	Single-Member District

<b>SNTV</b>	<b>Single Non-Transferable Vote</b>
<b>SP</b>	<b>Solidarity Party</b>
<b>STV</b>	<b>Single Transferable Vote</b>
<b>UDP</b>	<b>Union Democratic Party</b>
<b>UP</b>	<b>Umma Party</b>
<b>YEP</b>	<b>Young Egypt Party</b>

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This PhD is dedicated to my parents, Hillegonda Magaretha and Paul Bernd Krätzschar, without whose continuous support and encouragement this project would have ever materialised. It is also written in memory of my grandmother, Hendrika Alberts-Mulder, who I miss so dearly.

The idea to this project was born on a hot Egyptian summer day in 2000, when I was driving to Alexandria in a packed car together with Mohamed Sherdi, a prominent Wafdist, his entourage and an *Ahrar* journalist. Throughout the journey we were discussing the upcoming leadership contest at the NWP, which was necessitated by the sudden death of their long-time leader Fouad Serrageddin. In the midst of our conversation, which also lead us to discuss the electoral history of modern Egypt, Sherdi asserted that the position of parties in Egypt, and particularly that of the opposition, had been far stronger in the 1980s than in the 1990s. According to him this was by and large the result of the 1990 changes in the electoral law. Whilst his argument seemed plausible, I was at first hesitant to think that electoral institutions should matter at all in a regime that is little democratic and that is known for its blatant manipulation of elections. At the same time, however, I was intrigued by the argument itself and decided to look into this ‘proposed’ correlation in my further research. Little did I know at the time that I would be spending the next four years investigating precisely this relationship between electoral institutions and party development in Egypt. Its results are finally present here in this PhD.

There are many people who were directly involved in this project or who, by virtue of their friendship, supported me throughout the past five years. I particularly like to extend my gratitude to Simon Hix who, as my supervisor, guided me with excellent academic advice throughout all stages of this PhD. His persistent encouragement and keen interest in the project have helped me over the years to push ahead with this research. My gratitude is also extended towards Patrick Dunleavy and Hugh Roberts, who kindly agreed to supervise me during the initial stages of my PhD. In this vein, I would also like to thank the institutional sponsors of this PhD, most notably the LSE Ernest Gellner Memorial Fund and the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies (BRISMES).

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## Introduction

This PhD explores the development of political parties in Egypt between 1981 and 2000 under the presidency of Husni Mubarak. The starting point of this investigation is the failure of Egypt's parties to develop cohesive organisations that carry strong electoral constituencies in society. What we find instead are parties that – since the inception of multipartism in 1977 – remain characterised by their marginal role within the polity and politics of the state, that are little entrenched in society and that expose an overall underdeveloped and often fragmented internal structure.

What is more, not only have these parties remained persistently weak, but since the early 1990s they experienced a further weakening of their position as collective actors in the Egyptian polity. Essentially, this weakening was manifest at both the electoral and parliamentary levels. This becomes apparent when exploring their development across time, which reveals that Egypt's parties were far more vocal and visible in the electoral arena and the legislatures of the 1980s than in those of the 1990s. During the latter decade, in fact, the country's main parties had become completely marginalised actors within these two domains of politics.

As shall be illustrated below, this marginalisation was both numerical and substantive in character. Numerically it was evident in two developments. First, it was manifest in a rather significant decline in the number of political hopefuls that actually entered the electoral fray on a party ticket and with it a simultaneous rise in the number of candidates who sought their fortunes as so called 'independents'. Second, it was observable in parliament, where the number of MPs elected as independents rose significantly against the total number of MPs that were elected on a party ticket. At a more substantive level this marginalisation of the 1990s was evident in the emergence of election campaigns that were characterised by a preponderance of political entrepreneurship and a virtual absence of any meaningful references to party labels, slogans and programmes. Together these developments were in fact so pronounced that they prompted local commentators and scholars alike to describe the current party system as being 'in crisis'.

The little development of Egypt's parties since 1977 stands, of course, in rather stark contrast with the advance of party pluralism in other transitional contexts around the world. Here the introduction of a formal multiparty framework in the course of democratic change usually also brought about the gradual emergence of parties that are entrenched in society and that dominate the political institutions and processes of the state. Cases in point are the democratic



transitions that took place during the 1980s and 1990s in the south and east of Europe, some parts of South East Asia and most of Latin America. In most countries in these regions the introduction of democracy and its consolidation over time bore witness to a gradual strengthening of the role of political parties within the polity and society.

The question that hence arises is why the development of Egypt's parties differed so significantly from that observed in other transitional contexts worldwide. In other words one is left to wonder why the introduction of a multiparty system in 1977 failed to bring about the emergence of electorally-relevant and socially-entrenched parties. Instead we are left pondering about the persistent weakness of these parties in general and their political marginalisation of the 1990s in particular.

Leading on from there we also ought to explore, of course, what this marginalisation actually means for the prospects of future political change in Egypt. Does it mean that in the near future we cannot expect any push towards democracy in Egypt, given that its principal agents are too weak to induce such changes? Or does it mean that we simply have to look elsewhere when exploring the prospects for further democratic change, such as for example to the governing *National Democratic Party* (NDP) and the generational struggles within it, to other civil society organisations or even to the international community? In this case then, parties as agents for further political change would have to be discarded, and it is highly questionable whether Egypt's parties as they exist today would actually survive any democratic transition, given their lack of involvement in it.

According to the transitional literature, political parties, and particularly those in opposition, can of course play a pivotal role in fostering democratic change. Depending on their political strength, this can either be achieved by pressuring the incumbent regime from outside the institutional structure, for example through mass demonstrations and strikes, or through entering negotiations with the moderate forces of the regime. This presupposes, of course, that opposition parties have been allowed to operate in the polity and that they have attained some bargaining leverage which enables them to push for such change.

In the Egyptian context, opposition parties have been allowed to participate in the political process of the country at both the national and local level of government. In fact, since the introduction of party pluralism under President Anwar Al-Sadat in 1977, a vast number of multiparty elections have been held for the two chambers of the Egyptian legislature and for the country's local councils. In these elections opposition parties have participated vigorously, even gaining some political representation. However, as just mentioned, this participation

never actually translated into a strengthening of their position within the political institutions of the state and in society. Instead, since 1990 this participation was actually characterised by a further weakening of parties in both these domains.

When reviewing the literature on current Egyptian politics, we encounter numerous explanations as to why the country's main political parties have remained so weak ever since 1977. By contrast, we come across little substantive research on why precisely their position as collective actors has deteriorated so markedly in the course of the 1990s. As regards their overall weakness, three explanations feature prominently. To begin with, it has been shown that this weakness is a direct consequence of the highly restrictive political and legal environment within which Egypt's parties have been operating since 1977. It is pointed out that the introduction of a multiparty system here – in contrast to other democratic transitions – did not take place within the confines of a broader political transition towards fully fledged democracy. Instead Egypt underwent a highly state-controlled and limited process of political liberalisation that – whilst broadening some political and civil liberties – was never intended to challenge the ultimate power of the incumbent elites. In this vein then, the emergence of strong political parties and the prospects of power alternation between them were never actually envisaged by the incumbent regime. Rather it sought to create a multiparty framework that featured a majority regime-supportive party and a number of minor 'docile' opposition forces that were never meant to become strong political competitors in their own right. To achieve this objective, the authorities essentially employed two tactics. First, they put a plethora of legal restrictions in place that enabled them to control the licensing of new parties and virtually all the operational activities of the existing ones. Second, and as is widely known, they did not shy away from using extra-legal means to contain opposition inroads. This, of course, is particularly apparent during election times, during which the Egyptian authorities have regularly resorted to various forms of electoral fraud and intimidation.

In addition to this regime variable, two further explanations have been put forward in the literature to account for the current weakness of Egypt's parties. These concern the nature of political affiliations among the Egyptian electorate on the one side and the internal functioning of the country's main political forces on the other. Regarding the former explanation, for instance, it was found that voting patterns in Egypt have remained highly personalised and little structured around functional party affiliations. In other words, the electoral choice of voters, rather than being based on the ideological-programmatic proximity between the elector and a certain party, tends to revolve around such personal factors as the candidate's membership of a certain local community, his or her professional background and the capacity to deliver constituency services. Under these conditions, so runs the argument, it

has been very difficult for Egypt's parties to build up strong electoral constituencies along ideological-programmatic lines among the country's electorate. Consequentially then parties are faced with not only institutional but also severe societal obstacles to build strong mass-based organisations.

This failure has finally also been attributed to a number of internal troubles that have been plaguing the day-to-day operations of virtually all parties in Egypt. These concern most notably their overall poor record in practiced internal democracy, their scarce programmatic clarity and their lack of cohesive internal structures. Together, these 'internal illnesses' so to speak have constituted a major stumbling block for parties to strengthen their position in society. This is the case because, above anything else, they have reinforced a perception among the electorate that the country's parties are not effective players in the political arena and that they can hence not be treated as meaningful political alternatives to the incumbent regime.

When it comes to explaining the further marginalisation of Egypt's parties since 1990, we are by contrast, confronted with a far less cohesive body of literature. To begin with, we should acknowledge that little systematic attention has been given to this specific phenomenon, albeit the fact that it is widely recognised within both the scholarly and political communities. Second, when reviewing the existing literature we are also confronted with the fact that to this day virtually no micro analysis has been conducted on the marginalisation of Egypt's parties. In fact, the most comprehensive studies on this subject matter can be found within larger investigations of the socio-political and economic developments under the Mubarak presidency. Within these studies the so called 'deliberalisation hypothesis' features prominently. Basically this hypothesis posits that, whilst the 1980s saw a gradual expansion of civil and political liberties, the 1990s were characterised by a significant contraction of these liberties. According to the 'deliberalisationists', this contraction was regime-induced and a consequence of two developments. First, it was caused by the Islamist insurgency of the 1990s, which the state sought to curtail with an iron fist. Second, it was caused by the need to reform the Egyptian economy, which involved painful cuts into the social welfare system of the state and which the authorities sought to push through with as little opposition as possible.

In concrete terms the regime-induced deliberalisation manifested itself in two domains. Legally, it was manifest in a far more vigorous application of the existing restrictive legal system by the Egyptian authorities and in the introduction of new restrictions on civil and political liberties. Extra-legally in turn it was noticeable in an increasingly heavy-handed

management of local and national-level elections and a far more intolerant attitude towards opposition activism.

For Egypt's parties, this deliberalisation was of course of bitter consequence. Indeed, as the proponents of this hypothesis have shown, it further undermined their capacity to manoeuvre within the political and societal spheres and thus to enhance their position as viable mass-based parties in the Egyptian polity. What is more, the increasingly heavy-handed approach taken by the state during election times, and its need to sustain crushing majorities in the legislature, also reduced the country's opposition representation in the chamber to negligible levels. Consequentially, during the 1990s, Egypt's parties became marginalised both at the electoral and parliamentary levels.

This thesis agrees with the overall position taken by the deliberalisationists that the regime-induced reduction of political and civil liberties severely undermined the capacity of parties to develop into mass-based political organisations and that it significantly reduced their presence within the central institutions of the state. In this sense then, the argument presented here should be read within this train of thought. I argue, however, that we cannot sufficiently understand the marginalisation of Egypt's parties, if we look solely at the regime-induced restrictions imposed on their operations and the more heavy-handed approach taken by the authorities. Introducing the electoral system variable, this research will show instead that the marginalisation of Egypt's parties is in large measure also attributable to the changes that occurred in the rules of the electoral game under the presidency of Mubarak. Put differently, I claim here that electoral institutions mattered in the development of Egypt's parties, and this even under the restrictive regime conditions. As will become apparent below, this very fact has received only scant attention by the deliberalisationists, who across the board seem to have attached little significance to the role of formal electoral institutions in their analysis of political developments under the Mubarak presidency.

Occurring in 1990, the institutional changes referred to here, basically entailed a shift from a PR list-based regime in multimember constituencies to a two-round AM system in two-member districts. In contrast to the other legal developments, this change was not however directly regime-induced and hence not necessarily intended to aid the authorities in containing opposition inroads. Rather, and as we shall see below, it was the result of a court-ruling that challenged the constitutionality of the 1986 electoral law and that forced the authorities to revert back to the majoritarian electoral slate that had been in use prior to 1984.

Particularly interesting in this regard is the fact that this challenge had been brought about and strongly supported by Egypt's main opposition forces, which had never shown any enthusiasm for the list-PR regimes of the 1980s in the first place. In fact, throughout the 1980s there had been repeated calls by the country's opposition to abolish the existing system and to introduce a majoritarian electoral regime instead. They not only maintained that the list-PR system was unconstitutional, but that in fact it was biased towards the ruling party and that it hence left the opposition with no chance to gain any meaningful representation in parliament (Al-Shaab, 19/07/1983; Koszinovski 1984: 347; Al-Wafd, 27/02/1986; Al-Ahali, 24/12/1986). Little did they know at the time that it was precisely under list-PR that the opposition obtained its biggest electoral victories.

What is more, even the Egyptian authorities themselves believed at the time that the newly introduced majoritarian electoral regime would have virtually no bearing on the nature of party politics in general and the hegemony of the ruling party in particular. They hence saw no dramatic effects in altering the rules of the electoral game. As Kassem writes:

‘...the reversion to the old electoral system was perhaps also the result of President Mubarak's eventual realisation that electoral laws were of little significance when his consolidation of power provided him with other means, such as patronage and electoral malpractice, to ensure that entry to the Assembly remained stringently controlled’ (Kassem 1999: 61).

Drawing on the electoral connection literature, this thesis posits that neither Mubarak's zero-effect assertion, nor the opposition's claim that they would fare better under a majoritarian system were in the end correct. Instead it will demonstrate that the 1990 electoral system change significantly altered the course of party development in Egypt and not for the better. Rather than strengthening the role of parties in the electoral and parliamentary arenas, this reform in fact contributed to a further weakening of their already feeble position in both these domains of politics.

In concrete terms, this reform exerted two effects on patterns of party development. First, it undermined the capacity of Egypt's parties to foster an *internally unified* appearance at the electoral level. In short, it damaged *internal unity*. Second, it also severely reduced the parties' prospects to enhance levels of *visible representation* during election times. *Internal unity* is here understood as the absence of any political behaviour by either party candidates or cadre that is damaging to the appearance of the party as a collective actor. At the electoral level such damaging behaviour can take various forms, but is most commonly associated with

the occurrence of internal dissent, campaigning methods that are conflictual rather than cooperative and forms of electioneering that are personality - rather than party-driven. *Visible representation* is in turn defined as the extent to which there are agents and markers in place that convey party image and message during the election campaign. In the context of this research, these agents and markers are identified as party candidates and their campaigning materials.

As just mentioned, the reduction in both these dimensions of party development since 1990 was largely facilitated by changes to the Egyptian electoral law. In fact, it will be theorised below that these changes altered the existing institutional framework in such a way that it became far harder for party cadre to control their rank and file and for them to sustain a nationwide presence in the electoral arena. By the same token, these changes also adversely affected the capacity or willingness of party candidates to collectivise their activities under a party umbrella and to campaign along partisan rather than personal lines. In so doing, these changes thus significantly undermined the prominence of parties as viable collective actors in the electoral arena, and consequentially contributed to their marginalisation in the Egyptian polity.

It is important to emphasise however that, whilst the 1990 electoral reform is thought to matter in the way alluded to above, it is certainly not treated here as the sole bearer of all the illnesses that have been plaguing Egypt's parties since 1977. In fact, doing so would overstretch the explanatory capacity of this particular variable and undervalue the potency of the other explanatory variables given in the literature. Without doubt the fundamental weaknesses of Egypt's parties should in the first instance be traced to the nature of the Egyptian regime and the unstructured nature of society. It is also not claimed that this institutional variable constitutes the only factor that has caused the observed marginalisation of Egypt's parties at the electoral and parliamentary levels. As mentioned above, this marginalisation was probably the cause of a multiplicity of factors, most of which have been succinctly discussed by the deliberalisationists. It is argued here, however, that too little attention has been paid to the force of formal institutions and that of the electoral law in particular; and that in fact this variable greatly contributed to the electoral marginalisation of Egypt's parties in the course of the 1990s. In this sense then, the argument presented here ought to be read as an expansion of the deliberalisationist theory, rather than as a refutation of it.

This latter fact leads on to another theoretical limitation that needs to be addressed here. Whilst exploring the effects of electoral institutions on patterns of party development at the

electoral level, this thesis refrains from investigating their effects on the nature of political representation in the Egyptian legislature. In other words, it focuses on the so called *psychological or distal effects* of electoral institutions, whilst discarding their *mechanical or proximal effects*. According to Lijphart ‘...the mechanical or proximal effects are simply the immediate effects of the translation of votes into seats in a particular election’ (Lijphart 1994: 70). The psychological effects by contrast relate to the strategic behaviour of party cadre, candidates, activists and voters in the electoral arena. In other words, they concern the manner in which electoral institutions affect the strategic decisions taken by this set of collective actors. The collective actors of interest here are of course the party cadre and candidates.

The absence of any further investigation into the *proximal* effects of electoral institutions at this stage is justified by two considerations. To begin with, one should remember that the claim presented here that electoral institutions matter even under non-democratic conditions is both novel and daring. It is novel, because very few micro-analyses have hitherto explored the relationship between electoral institutions, elite strategies and party development, certainly not in the Egyptian case. It is daring, because there are so many imponderables that can interfere in the proposed relationship, particularly within the context of illiberal regimes. As mentioned above, these include most prominently the various legal restrictions imposed on the operations of parties and the prevalence of outright electoral malpractice and fraud. Any investigation of this kind thus has to carefully devise a theoretical framework that takes these potentially intervening factors into consideration. Whilst it seems possible to contain the distorting influence of these regime factors when exploring the distal effects of electoral institutions, it seems far more difficult to do so when it comes to any analysis into their *proximal* effects. In fact, the rampant use of electoral fraud and malpractice during parliamentary elections in Egypt renders it rather doubtful whether the analysis of election results will deliver any meaningful results.

What is more, any analysis into the *proximal* effects of electoral institution is quantitative in nature. This means it requires a large number of *N* in order to make any meaningful inferences between the type of electoral provisions in place and levels of parliamentary fractionalisation. Given that Egypt’s multiparty system has only experienced a total of six parliamentary elections, it would have been necessary to investigate a larger number of regional polities in order to increase the external validity.<sup>1</sup> Whilst this is certainly conceivable – and possibly even a promising avenue forward – it exceeded by far the scope of this research the primary objective of which is to explain patterns of party development in Egypt.

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<sup>1</sup> As will be discussed below, since the introduction of multipartism in 1977, Egypt has held parliamentary elections in 1979, 1984, 1987, 1990, 1995 and 2000. The next parliamentary poll is scheduled for 2005.

It is for these two reasons then, that the following investigation will bracket out any further investigation of the proximal effects of electoral institutions, and focus on the impact of the distal effects on patterns of party development only.

The research thus defined is expected to contribute in two ways to the discipline of Comparative Politics in general and that of Middle Eastern Studies in particular. In the first instance it seeks to explain, of course, in longitudinal perspective, the electoral marginalisation of Egypt's parties under the presidency of Mubarak. In fact, by focusing on the relationship between electoral institutions and party development, this PhD offers a rather unique view into the workings of Egyptian party politics at the electoral level. To my knowledge, it is the first study of its kind that, at the micro level and in comparative perspective, explores the strategic behaviour of different party actors during the crucial phases of the election calendar and their bearings on patterns of party development. Looked at from this perspective, we are dealing with a rather classic single-case analysis, in which the onus of investigation lies with the political phenomenon under scrutiny.

Although based on a single case, this thesis also claims, however, to carry broader theoretical significance. Being exploratory in character, it seeks to test, in fact, whether we can expand the existing electoral connection literature beyond the confines of western liberal democracies to non-democratic regime contexts. In other words, it seeks to explore whether the hypotheses developed in this field would yield any explanatory power when tested against evidence drawn from these types of regimes. To my knowledge very few systematic attempts have hitherto been undertaken to employ the wealth of theoretical knowledge that is available on the *distal* and *proximal* effect of electoral regimes outside the democratic framework. In fact, as far as the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is concerned, I came across not a single such attempt.

The reluctance within the discipline to explore the propensities of electoral institutions probably has several root causes, two of which reign prominently. To begin with, scholars have repeatedly uttered serious doubts that electoral institutions can develop their full structuring potential under regime conditions that are non-democratic and fraudulent. Because the electoral environment is not free and fair and the elections but a charade they see little value in researching an institutional framework that in the end has no formal bearing on the actual outcome. This is not to say, of course that there is no academic interest in elections within the region. Yet these elections are usually explored through the prism of authoritarian politics, their functions within non-democratic regimes and their implications for the future of political democratisation.



Second, this overall scepticism is also paired with the fact that it is difficult to obtain viable and reliable data. As most scholars point out, in many countries of the MENA region it is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain authoritative election results or to assess the extent to which electoral malpractice distorted the outcome. What is more, given the difficult research conditions in place and particularly the sensitivities of Arab regimes concerning electoral matters, it has not been easy for scholars to generate reliable knowledge on the subject matter. Indeed, in many Arab regimes, a plethora of restrictions are in place that make it very difficult for academics to carry out large-scale interviews and surveys, which are of course necessary to explore the distal effects of electoral institutions.

Viewed in this light then, this research provides a first testing ground for the possible expansion of institutional analysis to the study of socio-political processes in the Arab world. What is more, if successful, we may become far more inclined to expand such analyses to other non-democratic regimes in the Arab region or even elsewhere in the world. In other words, it would then be possible to verify the theoretical propositions developed here against evidence drawn from a wider cross-national comparison.

The research itself is composed of nine substantive chapters. Chapter two provides the necessary background information to comprehend the narrative at hand. To this end it recounts the history of multipartism and of parliamentary elections in Egypt under the presidencies of Sadat and Mubarak. It also gives an overview of the major parties in the country and the various weaknesses that have been plaguing their existence ever since the inception of multipartism in 1977. Most importantly however, this chapter substantiates the central phenomenon under investigation, namely the further electoral marginalisation of Egypt's political parties after 1990. It thus discusses in greater detail the various empirical manifestations of this marginalisation.

Reviewing the existing literature, chapter three then critically reflects upon the different explanations that have been put forward within academia to account for the weakness of Egypt's parties in general and their electoral marginalisation in particular. It will hereby be shown that of all explanatory variables discussed, the 1990 electoral reform has received dismally little systematic attention in explaining the phenomenon under scrutiny.

Chapter four establishes the theoretical argument in support of the central proposition made here, namely that the marginalisation of Egypt's parties was greatly influenced by the 1990 electoral system change. To this effect, a number of hypotheses are developed that link the prospects for party development to the type of electoral provisions in place. Chapter five then

presents the design and methodology used as well as the empirical data generated for the subsequent hypotheses test.

The actual empirical investigation and its findings are presented in chapters six, seven, eight and nine. Together these chapters hence verify the electoral connection hypotheses established in chapter four, testing whether – as anticipated - the 1990 electoral reform indeed contributed to the marginalisation of Egypt's parties. Drawing together the essential findings of this research, the conclusion then presents a number of possible avenues for further fruitful research in this direction, both within Egypt and across other countries of the MENA region.

## **PART I: BACKGROUND, THEORY AND METHODOLOGY**

### **Chapter Two. Patterns of Party Development under the Mubarak Presidency**

As in most Arab polities, the turn to multiparty elections in Egypt and the evolution of party politics since then took place within the confines of a political regime that never transgressed the stage of limited political liberalisation towards fully fledged democratisation. Under this regime, the emerging parties – and particularly those in opposition – were never meant to become the principal players in the political process of the country. Instead it was the regime's intent to retain these forces at the margins of the political spectrum, granting them only a bare minimum of political participation and institutional representation. So for instance, whilst a plurality of parties have been allowed to enter the electoral fray, it has always been clear that their participation would never challenge the hegemony of the regime and its vassal party, the ruling NDP, let alone produce the possibility of power alternation. What is more, the Egyptian regime has ensured that all major executive institutions of the state remain entirely off-limits for any form of party political competition. These include most notably the presidency of the country, the national executive and the governorate and local administrations.<sup>2</sup>

To sustain this marginal role of parties within the polity – and particularly that of the opposition – Egypt's authorities have resorted to various legal and extra-legal means that effectively bar parties from developing strong mass-based organisations. As will be illustrated elsewhere, to this day numerous legal restrictions are in place that impede the licensing of new political parties and that severely hamper the operations of the existing ones. As regards the operations of parties, for instance, numerous restrictions are in place that delimit the activities they can pursue, the political issues they can address in public and the types of gatherings they can organise outside party premises. They also render it very difficult for parties to create any associational linkages with other sectoral groups in society. In addition to these legal restrictions the Egyptian authorities have regularly resorted to various extra-legal means to keep the political opposition at bay. These include most notably the use of electoral intimidation and malpractice during election times and outright electoral fraud on polling day. Given this regime context, it is hardly surprising that in the course of the past two decades Egypt's parties have not been able to develop into cohesive mass-based organisations as we

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<sup>2</sup> In Egypt the president is nominated by the People's Assembly. The candidate who wins a two-thirds majority of the votes in the assembly is declared official candidate and then referred to the people for a referendum. The candidate is then elected, if he or she wins an absolute majority of the popular vote. The entire national cabinet is in turn appointed by the President and so are the provincial governors and local majors (Nohlen 1999: 334). The governors of Egypt's twenty-six governorates are directly appointed by the President (Kassem 1999: 43; Kienle 2001: 73).

have come to know them in liberal democracies. What we encounter instead are parties that remain politically marginalised, as intended by the Egyptian authorities, that carry no roots in society and that remain organisationally underdeveloped. This applies of course particularly to the country's legalised opposition, which has been the primary target of these regime restrictions. As we shall see it also applies, however, in some measure to the ruling party itself, which was never meant to become a political force in its own right. Instead it was conceived of by the regime as a vassal organisation that serves little purpose but to create the legislative majorities necessary to control access to the executive institutions of the state and to ensure the smooth passage of parliamentary legislation.

Having said this, however, it would be incorrect to assume that this overall weakness precluded any party political developments since 1977. In fact, as posited in the introduction, a closer observation of developments since then reveals that Egypt's parties experienced significant changes in their performance as collective actors between the 1980s and 1990s. These changes concerned primarily their visibility and appearance at the electoral level, yet they also concerned their representation in the national legislature, henceforth referred to as the *Majlis al-Shaab* (People's Assembly).

This chapter examines the empirical evidence that informs precisely this latter observation. To this effect it explores in greater detail the quantitative and qualitative changes that characterised the performance of Egypt's major parties at the electoral and the parliamentary levels between the 1980s and 1990s. Before doing so, however, this chapter will provide a brief historical recount of the turn to and evolution of multiparty politics since 1977. It is the purpose of this exercise to provide sufficient contextual information in order to inform the narrative of the analysis at hand. The chapter will then move on to discuss the overall state of Egypt's main political parties, pointing at the various weaknesses that have been plaguing their existence since the inception of multiparty elections in 1979. This is done to clearly identify the parameters within which one is to understand the observed changes in the development of Egypt's parties over time.

The chapter is divided into three sections. Section 2.1 recounts the historical evolution of party and electoral politics since 1977. Section 2.2 then sketches a preliminary picture of the overall state of party politics in the country. Section 2.3 finally fleshes out the so called 'marginalisation' hypothesis, thus providing the empirical evidence that informed the observed deterioration in the performance of political parties between 1990 and 2000.

Finally, because this chapter contains various electoral statistics it is necessary to briefly comment on the sources of data used here. A more extensive elaboration of the primary data used within the overall framework of this research will of course be given in the methodology chapter. The electoral data presented in the subsequent sections is drawn from a number of secondary sources and this because there are no reliable official publications that one could draw upon. This fact applies to both the election results presented in Section 2.1 and the number of parliamentary candidates presented in Section 2.3. Moreover, because the available data is often contradictory - and this particularly concerning the number of candidates by elections - it is also important that the numbers presented here should be read as approximations of the real figures, rather than as authoritative data. The secondary sources of literature employed here and in the subsequent chapters are listed below the respective tables.

## 2.1 Multiparty Politics since 1977

The introduction of a multiparty system in Egypt essentially took the shape of a state-orchestrated process, in which not only the pace and magnitude but also the very nature of the emerging party system were determined by the then President Sadat. Looking back, it is fair to say that the early multiparty configuration was entirely Sadat's creation, designed on the political drawing board of the president, rather than being the expression of emerging societal cleavages. Indeed, between 1977 and 1981 all but one out of the five parties legalised at the time were established either by presidential decree or with his personal encouragement (Zaki 1995: 76; Kassem 1999: 40-42). As we shall see, it was only under his successor Mubarak, who ascended to power in 1981, that further parties emerged which had not been directly created from above.

As of today, Egypt's multiparty system is composed of eighteen legalised political parties.<sup>3</sup> Most of them are, however, minor forces that lack any organisational structure outside the capital city, that carry no constituency base whatsoever, and that have never actually attained any representation in parliament. Only six of the currently existing parties can claim to have gained some prominence in the political arena since 1977, and this primarily because they have at one point or the other been represented in the *Majlis al-Shaab*. They include all five parties established under the Sadat presidency and another party that came into existence in the early 1990s. The five parties established under Sadat are the ruling NDP, the *National*

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<sup>3</sup> See table 2.2.

*Progressive Union Party* (commonly referred to as *Tagammu*<sup>4</sup>), the *Socialist Liberal Party* (commonly referred to as *Ahrar*<sup>5</sup>), the *Socialist Labour Party* (SLP) and the *New Wafd Party* (NWP).<sup>6</sup> The sixth party with some political clout is the *Arab Democratic Nasserite Party* (ADNP), which was legalised in 1992. In addition to these six parties one also ought to add the Islamist *Muslim Brotherhood* (MB) to the forces with some political influence, despite the fact that the authorities have repeatedly refused the group legal status as a political party. Nevertheless, as we will see below, during the Mubarak presidency the MB was allowed to participate in electoral politics alongside the established parties and also made some inroads into the legislatures of 1984, 1987, 1995 and 2000.

Politically these seven main political forces represent vastly different ideologies, which have been graphically depicted in the two-dimensional axes presented below. This axis, although not exhaustive, carries the two fundamental dividing lines of Egyptian politics. On the horizontal axis it features an economically-defined left-right divide and on the vertical axis the secular – Islamist divide. In line with its ‘catch-all’ character the NDP radiates around the centre of the two-dimensional axis (Kassem 1999: 77). Both Tagammu and the ADNP must in turn be positioned in the upper left-hand field of the axis, whilst the liberal Ahrar and the NWP are to be positioned in the upper-right hand field of the axis. Classified as an Islamist party with socialist roots, the SLP is currently probably best positioned in the lower left-hand field, whilst the MB must be placed in the lower-right hand field of the two dimensional axis (Tachau 1994: 116, 118, 123, 124, 129).


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<sup>4</sup> ‘Tagammu’ is the Arabic term for grouping.

<sup>5</sup> ‘Ahrar’ is the Arabic term for liberal.

<sup>6</sup> With the emergence of the tripartite Alliance in 1987 and its Islamist political outlook, both the *Socialist Labour Party* and the *Socialist Liberal Party* decided to drop the adjective ‘socialist’ from their names. Henceforth the former party was known as the Labour Party and the latter as the Liberal Party, or Ahrar (Munoz 1992: 401; Howeid, Al-Ahram Weekly, 26/10 – 01/11/1995).

Graph 2.1: Egypt's Main Political Forces by Ideological Position



Source: Own elaboration on the basis of Tachau's discussion of party platforms in Egypt. See: Tauchau, Frank, ed. 1994. *Political Parties of the Middle East and North Africa*. Mansell, pp. 103-132.

It is important to keep in mind however that, whilst indicative of the parties' ideological position, this graph represents little more than a crude sketch of the party political spectrum as it has presented itself under the Mubarak presidency, and this for two reasons. First, and as will become apparent in chapter three, several of the parties are ideologically far more heterogeneous than can be depicted here. Take for instance Tagammu or the NDP which are known to incorporate a diverse spectrum of political currents. Tagammu for that matter contains amongst others a Marxist, Socialist, Arab nationalist and enlightened Islamist trend (Hendriks 1983: 262; Tachau 1994: 118). Also, as indicated in the graph, some of Egypt's parties have shifted in ideological position over time. This, for instance, has been the case with the SLP, which in the mid-1980s shifted from a socialist to an Islamist political outlook (Singer 1993: 25-31).

The return to multiparty politics itself and the dissolution of the *Arab Socialist Union* (ASU) was triggered off in 1974, when Sadat announced major economic and political reforms in what came to be known as the 'October Paper' (Waterbury 1983: 365). According to Zaki, the introduction of a multiparty framework was essentially viewed by Sadat as a means to channel:

'...growing participatory demands, while still maintaining control. Besides lending greater legitimacy to his regime and enhancing its stability, a multiparty system also served to improve his image in front of his new Western friends. The

political opening was not brought about as a consequence of mass pressure from below, but by a deliberate decision from above by the ruling elite who believed that they could indefinitely maintain a monopoly of power by way of a hegemonic party' (Zaki 1995: 77).

This viewpoint is also shared by Tachau, who further elaborates on the restrictive conditions within which the newly established party system was to function. Discussing Sadat's reasoning behind the dissolution of the ASU and the creation of a multiparty system, he maintains that:

'Sadat's purpose seems to have been to construct a loyal opposition. This would bring dissent out into the open where it could be observed. The opposition would be robbed of a common focus for its complaints, and the latent divisions among Marxists, Islamists and nationalists would quickly manifest itself. The ability of these groups to organise a mass following would be sharply restricted. They would be allowed a voice but no influence. Should they become either too strident or too popular [then] the repressive tools of the state could be brought to bear once again' (Tachau 1994: 99).

Between 1974 and 1976 Sadat then encouraged a vigorous public debate on the future of Egypt's political system and with it that of the ruling ASU. Essentially, it centred on the question of whether or not the one-party state should be dismantled all together in favour of a multiparty system or whether, less drastically, the ASU itself should be opened to some form of internal pluralism. In March 1976 the ASU Committee charged with discussing political reform, opted against the creation of political parties and in favour of the establishment of so called platforms, or *manabir*, within the framework of the ASU. Although around forty tendencies requested legal recognition as *minbar*, Sadat eventually allowed only three platforms to be legalised and to contest the subsequent parliamentary elections in late 1976 (Waterbury 1983: 365-366; Tachau 1994: 98 - 99).<sup>7</sup> A centrist platform, called the *Egyptian Arab Socialist minbar* was to become the dominant political force, supported by the president and led by then Prime Minister Mamdouh Salem. The two opposition platforms were located to the right and left of the ruling centre respectively. Mustafa Kamel Murad was to lead the so called *Socialist-Liberal* platform to the right and Khaled Mohieddin a *National-Progressive* platform to the left. Shortly after the elections Sadat then decreed the transformation of these platforms into political parties and the dissolution of the ASU. The leftist platform came

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<sup>7</sup> 'Minbar' is the singular in Arabic for 'manabir'. As indicated in the text, 'minbar' is the Arabic term for platform.



henceforth to be known as Tagammu, the right as Ahrar and the centre as the *Arab Socialist Egypt Party* (ASEP) (Al-Din & Khalil, Al-Ahram Weekly, 12 – 18/10/1995).

The formal transition from a single- to a multiparty framework then followed in 1977 with the enshrinement of ‘party pluralism’ into Article five of the Egyptian constitution and the enactment of the Political Parties’ Law No. 40/77.<sup>8</sup> This law also stipulated the creation of an essentially government-controlled body, the Committee for the Affairs of Political Parties, or the so called *Political Parties Committee* (PPC). Essentially the PPC was established by the regime in order to regulate and control the licensing of new political parties and the operations of the existing ones (Zaki 1995: 75-76; Kienle 2001: 28 – 29; Kassem 2004: 54).<sup>9</sup>

On the basis of Law No. 40/77 three new political forces entered the Egyptian political scene in 1978. First, the PPC granted legal status to the NWP. Immediately after its legalisation, however, this party had to freeze all its activities, due to a presidential decree prohibiting pre-revolutionary politicians from playing any active role in politics. Obviously, this decree targeted primarily the Wafdist leadership and thus the newly found NWP, which Sadat came to view as a major challenge to the political pre-dominance of the ASEP (Waterbury 1983: 369; Baaklini et al. 1999: 228). The party only sprang back to life in 1983, after an Administrative Court ruling discharged the PPC’s demand that the NWP should re-apply for an operating licence.

The two other parties formed at the time were again presidential creations. Dissatisfied with the performance of the ruling ASEP in the face of mounting opposition challenges from Tagammu and the NWP, Sadat established his own political party, the NDP. Hereby the president sought to tighten his power over the former single party and ensure its dominant position within the polity. Immediately after its creation an overwhelming majority of MPs, originally voted in on an ASEP ticket, rallied behind the new presidential party, turning it virtually over night into the hegemonic parliamentary force it has remained ever since.<sup>10</sup> At the same time Sadat decreed the merger between the two centrist parties. Salem, who had resigned as ASEP chairman in protest of this merger, filed a lawsuit in 1981 to re-establish

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<sup>8</sup> Article five of the 1977 Egyptian Constitution states: ‘The political system of the Arab Republic of Egypt is based on pluralism of political parties’ (Ministry of Interior 1999, The Arab Republic of Egypt Constitution and its Main Supplementary Laws).

<sup>9</sup> The PPC is a subsidiary of the Upper House of Parliament, the so called *Majlis al-Shura* (Consultative Chamber). According to article eight of the Political Parties’ Law No. 40/77 it is composed of three government ministers – the Ministers of Parliamentary Affairs, Justice and Interior - and three senior judges, who are appointed by the President. It is presided over by the speaker of the *Majlis al-Shura* (Political Parties’ Law No. 40/77).

<sup>10</sup> Of the 280 MPs elected on the ASEP ticket no less than 250 switched to the NDP, after its creation (Kassem 1999: 41).

the independence of the ASEP, which he won after a lengthy court battle with the NDP in 1991 (Allam, Al-Ahram Weekly, 23 – 29/11/1995).

Next to the formation of the NDP, Sadat also encouraged his then Minister of Agriculture Ibrahim Shukri to establish a further regime-supportive opposition party to the left, the SLP.<sup>11</sup> The president had deemed this step necessary after relations between him and Tagammu had deteriorated in the wake of the 1977 bread riots for which he blamed the party alongside Communist and Nasserite forces. Following its creation however, the SLP developed a dynamic running counter to the role of a 'loyal opposition', as envisioned by Sadat. In fact the party quickly established itself as a vocal critic of Sadat's administration, denouncing the 1979 Peace Treaty with Israel and other government policies (Waterbury 1983: 370, 372). By 1987, hence under the tenure of President Mubarak, the party had shifted even further in ideological outlook from a socialist to an Islamist party. The increasing radicalisation of the SLP under its Secretary-General Adel Hussein, and a subsequent rift between Islamist and leftist members of the party eventually caused the PPC to freeze its activities shortly before the 2000 parliamentary poll (Singer 1993: 25-31; Khalil et al. 2003).

During the tenure of Sadat a total of two pluralist elections were held for the *Majlis al-Shaab*. The first of these elections took place in 1976 and the second in 1979. Both of these elections were conducted under a two-round absolute majority (AM) system in 175 two-member districts. The chamber itself was composed of 350 directly elected seats in 1976 and 372 seats in 1979. Under both assemblies an additional ten seats were appointed by the president (Nohlen et al. 1999: 332, 343). Finally, in what may best be described as a socialist legacy of the Nasser era, the Egyptian law since 1964 also mandated that half of the assembly be composed of 'farmer' and 'worker' representatives.<sup>12</sup> To facilitate this demand, both the 1976 and 1979 electoral codes, as well as all subsequent electoral laws, put provisions in place that ensured that half of the elected deputies are drawn from these two professions. Under the two-round AM system of the 1970s, this was done by reserving one of the two district seats for these professional categories (Munoz 1992: 272-273). Political hopefuls entering the electoral race hence had to decide under which professional category, and hence for which district seat they were contesting the election. They then had to provide evidence to the registration authorities that they indeed qualified to run under the selected professional category.

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<sup>11</sup> The party was actually created with the active involvement of President Sadat, who 'borrowed' twenty MPs of his own political party to Shukri and who signed its founding documents (Waterbury 1983: 364ff.).

<sup>12</sup> See article one of People's Assembly Law No. 158/63.

As will become apparent below, this particular provision of the Egyptian constitution and its application in each of the past electoral laws is of relevance because it significantly affected the nature of election campaigning in the 1990s.

The 1976 elections took place shortly after the creation of the three political platforms within the framework of the ASU. They were hence contested by these platforms and a host of independent candidates, which for the first time since 1952 had been allowed to run for parliamentary elections. As table 2.1 illustrates, these elections produced a sound majority for the centre platform, which won a total of 280 seats. Ahrar won seventeen seats and Tagammu two, whilst independents gained fifty-one seats.<sup>13</sup>

Table 2.1: Results of the 1976 & 1979 Majlis al-Shaab Elections

Platform / Party	1976		1979	
	Seats	% Seats	Seats	% Seats
Egyptian Arab Socialist Platform - NDP	280	80.0	330	88.7
Independents	51	14.5	10	2.7
National Progressive Platform – Tagammu	2	0.6	0	0.0
SLP	-	-	29	7.7
Socialist – Liberal Platform – Ahrar	17	4.9	3	0.9
<b>Total<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>350</b>		<b>372</b>	

<sup>1</sup>Excluding the 10 members of parliament that are appointed by the president.

Sources: Zaki, Moheb. 1995. *Civil Society and Democratisation in Egypt*. Cairo: Konrad Adenauer Foundation & Ibn Khaldoun Centre, p. 80. Nohlen, Dieter, Michael Krennrich, and Bernhard Thibaut. 1999. *Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook*. Oxford University Press, p. 343.

The second *Majlis al-Shaab* elections were then organised in 1979, hence after the transformation of the political platforms into distinct political parties and after the formation of the NDP and the SLP. Again they were contested by all legalised political parties in addition to a large number of independent candidates. And as in 1976, the ruling party won a resounding victory, claiming this time a total of 330 out of the 372 parliamentary seats. The newly founded SLP became the second strongest parliamentary force with twenty-nine seats, followed by independent candidates with ten and Ahrar with three seats only. Tagammu, which had also contested the elections, failed to gain any representation in parliament (Zaki 1995: 80). Shortly after the 1979 elections, in 1981, Sadat was assassinated and succeeded by his Vice-President Husni Mubarak, who has been ruling the country since then.

<sup>13</sup> According to Waterbury, most of the fifty-one elected independents were unaffiliated with any of the legalised platforms. Most of them were prominent individuals, who represented different political currents, including the Socialist, Nasserite and Communist currents (Waterbury 1983: 366-367).

The Mubarak presidency can basically be divided into two distinct periods up to the present day. During a first period, lasting from 1981 to 1990, there were few changes to Egypt's party political scene, which remained dominated by the four political formations that had emerged under the rule of Sadat. The only exceptions worth noting here are the legalisation of the *Umma party* (UP), the resumption of activities by the NWP and the emergence of the outlawed Islamist MB in the electoral arena. The UP was the only political party that gained legal status during this period. It was granted an operating licence in 1984 by court order, after its initial application had been rejected by the PPC. The same happened with the NWP, which had suspended its activities in 1978 and was seeking to resume its political activities after the changes in the Egyptian presidency. The resumption of activities was, however, initially rejected by the PPC, which claimed that the NWP had not only frozen its activities but in fact dissolved itself and thus required a new operating licence. However, shortly before the first elections under the Mubarak presidency in 1984, the PPC's position was successfully rejected in court, enabling the NWP to return to the fold of legalised political parties (Munoz 1991: 350-351). Finally, this period was also marked by a more permissive attitude of the incumbent regime towards the MB, which – albeit without legal recognition – was for the first time since the return to multiparty politics tolerated as a political force in the electoral arena (Springborg 1989: 215-216).

The second period in the development of multiparty politics under Mubarak commenced in 1990 and was essentially characterised by a significant rise in the number of political parties operating in the polity. Indeed, between 1990 and 2001, twelve new political parties managed to enter the political arena, raising the total number of legalised parties to the current number of eighteen. Again, virtually all of these parties gained legal status by court order, successfully challenging initial rejections by the PPC. Only four of them, the *National Accord Party* (NAP), the *Democratic Generation's Party* (DGP) the *Future Party* (FP) and most recently the *Free Social Constitutional Party* (FSCP) gained legal recognition by the PPC. The NAP was legalised in 2000, the DGP in 2001 and the FP and the FSCP both in 2004 (Middle East Times 10/03/2000; Youssef & Youssef, Al-Ahram Hebdo, 02/11/2004; Al-Nahas, Al-Ahram Weekly, 02 – 08/12/2004).

Many more political parties have of course attempted to gain legal status in the course of the past ten years but their applications had been rejected by both the PPC and the courts.<sup>14</sup> Table

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<sup>14</sup> Since coming into existence, the PPC is said to have rejected about sixty-three party applications. The overwhelming majority of rejections issued by the PPC were justified with reference to article 4.2 of Law No. 40/77, which demands new parties to be distinctive from those already in existence (Political Parties' Law No. 40/77; Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights (EOHR), 2000 Annual Report; Al-Din, Al-Ahram Weekly, 29/05 – 04/06/2003; Al-Nahas, Al-Ahram Weekly, 04 – 10/11/2004).

2.2 lists all eighteen legalised political parties currently operating within the Egyptian polity, the year of their legalisation and whether or not they were granted legal status by the PPC or by court order.

*Table 2.2: Egypt's Legalised Political Parties, 1977-2004*

Party	Year of Legalisation	Legalised by PPC	Legalised by Court	Current Status
Socialist Liberal Party (Ahrar)	1976		√	Legalised
National Progressive Unionist Party (Tagammu)	1976	√		Legalised
Socialist Labour Party (SLP)	1977	√		Frozen
National Democratic Party (NDP)	1978	√		Legalised
New Wafd Party (NWP)	1978/1983	√	√	Legalised
Umma Party (UP)	1983		√	Legalised
Egyptian Green Party (EGP)	1990		√	Legalised
Young Egypt Party (YEP)	1976/1990	√	√	Legalised
Democratic People's Party (DPP)	1992		√	Frozen
Arab Democratic Nasserite Party (ADNP)	1992		√	Legalised
Egyptian Arab Socialist Party (ASEP)	1991		√	Frozen
Social Justice Party (SJP)	1993		√	Frozen
Union Democratic Party (UDP)	1993		√	Legalised
Solidarity Party (SP)	1995		√	Legalised
National Accord Party (NAP)	2000	√		Frozen
Democratic Generation Party (DGP)	2001	√		Legalised
Future Party (FP)	2004	√		Legalised
Free Social Constitutional Party (FSCP)	2004	√		Legalised

Sources: Zaki, Moheb. 1995. *Civil Society and Democratisation in Egypt*. Cairo: Konrad Adenauer Foundation & Ibn Khaldoun Centre, pp. 78-79. Kienle, Eberhart. 2001. *A Grand Dillusion: Democracy and Economic Reform in Egypt*. London: I.B.Tauris, pp. 68-69. Stacher, Joshua. 2004. "Parties Over? The Demise of Egypt's Opposition Parties" *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, pp. 215-234. Youssef & Youssef, Al-Ahram Hebdo, 02/11/2004.

Despite this rise in the number of parties little has changed, however, substantively on the party political scene in Egypt since the early 1980s. This is because most of these new parties have failed to gain any political clout in Egyptian electoral and party politics, which remains dominated by the ruling NDP and the four major opposition forces created in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The only exception to this assessment constitutes the ADNP which came into existence after a lengthy court process in 1992 and which has since then gained some, albeit limited, representation in parliament and which can claim some constituency support among the Egyptian electorate.

It must finally also be noted that up to the present day the PPC, with its power to legalise and supervise the activities of political parties, has suspended the activities of seven of the eighteen parties in Egypt. These include most prominently the SLP and Ahrar, but also some of the minor forces, such as the ASEP, the NAP, the *Social Justice Party* (SJP), the *Young*

*Egypt Party* (YEP) and the *Democratic People's Party* (DPP) (Al-Muslimany 1999: 13; EOHR Report 2002; Stacher 2004: 220).<sup>15</sup> In virtually all of these cases, the PPC justified its decision by either citing internal disputes or leadership struggles as the principal reasons for their suspension.

Over the past two decades of the Mubarak presidency a total of five multiparty elections have been held for the *Majlis al-Shaab*, and a similar number for the *Majlis al-Shura* and the country's local councils. The first *Majlis al-Shaab* elections were held in 1984, hence three years after Mubarak's ascent to power. They were followed by parliamentary polls in 1987, 1990, 1995 and most recently in 2000.

Prior to the first parliamentary elections of 1984, Mubarak decided to abrogate the previously used two-round AM system in favour of a closed-list PR regime. This new PR system divided the country into 448 multi-member constituencies and carried a national 8 percent threshold, which parties had to surpass in order to take part in the distribution of parliamentary seats.<sup>16</sup> The new system also required the votes of all parties failing to surpass the 8 percent threshold to be automatically transferred to the parties winning most votes, in other words to the ruling NDP.<sup>17</sup> Thus, in this regard the newly introduced electoral regime retained a strong majoritarian bias. In order to ensure that half the assembly is composed of workers and farmers the new law finally also mandated that at least half the candidates on each district list must be drawn from these two professional categories (Munoz 1991: 212).

Officially the electoral regime change was justified by President Mubarak as a step towards democracy and towards promoting the strengthening of political parties in Egypt. According to Kassem however, other more powerful political calculations lay behind this particular reform. First, the president sought to block the participation of the outlawed MB, by rendering it impossible for independent candidates to run in the elections. Second, he also sought to prevent other opposition parties from making significant parliamentary inroads by introducing a high national electoral threshold and by preventing party notables from campaigning on a highly individualised basis, as had been possible under the previous candidate-based system (Kassem 1999: 95-96).

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<sup>15</sup> In January 2005 the PPC decreed that Ahrar can resume all its legal activities under a newly appointed leadership (Al-Nahas, Al-Ahram Weekly, 06 – 12/01/2005).

<sup>16</sup> Initially this threshold was set at 10 percent of the national vote but was then lowered to 8 percent after opposition protests (Tachau 1994: 100).

<sup>17</sup> See articles five and seventeen of Electoral Law No. 114/83.

The elections themselves were contested by the ruling NDP, SLP, Ahrar and Tagammu, whilst the tiny UP decided to boycott the poll. They were also contested by the NWP, which in the end entered into a tacit list alliance with the MB.<sup>18</sup> According to representatives from both sides, the creation of this alliance had little to do with their programmatic-ideological proximity but was rather based on their shared interest to enter the legislature. To this effect, the list alliance provided the MB with the necessary means to place candidates in the elections, whilst it enabled the NWP to draw more extensively on the mobilisational capacity of the brotherhood in order to broaden its own chances of electoral victory (Al-Mikawy 1999: 82).

As table 2.3 illustrates, only the NDP and the NWP-MB alliance eventually managed to surpass the 8 percent threshold and win representation in the 1984 legislature. The NDP won a crushing two-thirds majority with 390 of the 448 parliamentary seats. The alliance together captured the remaining fifty-eight seats. Of these the MB held eight and the NWP fifty seats. None of the other political parties managed, by contrast, to surpass the high electoral threshold in place, thus leaving most opposition forces without any representation in the legislature. The situation was particularly painful for the SLP, which with 7.1 percent of the national vote just failed to pass the threshold. Both Tagammu and Ahrar mustered only 4.2 and 0.7 percent of the national vote respectively.

*Table 2.3: Results of 1984 & 1987 Majlis al-Shaab Elections*

Party	Alliances	1984				1987		
		% Votes	List Seats	% Seats	% Votes	List Seats	District Seats	% Seats
Independents		-	-	-	-	-	4	0.4
NDP		72.9	390	87.3	69.9	308	40	77.4
SLP	Islamic ('87)	7.1	0	0.0		16		3.6
Ahrar		0.7	0	0.0	17.0	3	4	1.3
MB	NWP –MB		8	1.6		37		8.4
NWP	('84)	15.1	50	11.1	10.9	36	0	8.0
Tagammu		4.2	0	0.0	2.2	0	0	0.0
UP	boycott		-	-	0.2	0	0	0.0
<b>Total<sup>1</sup></b>			<b>448</b>	<b>100.0</b>		<b>400</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>100.0</b>

<sup>1</sup>Excluding the ten members of parliament that are appointed by the president.

Sources: Munoz, Gema M. 1992. *Política y Elecciones en el Egipto Contemporáneo (1922-1990)*. Madrid: Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional, Instituto de Cooperación con el Mundo Árabe, pp. 385, 415. Zaki, Moheb. 1995. *Civil Society and Democratisation in Egypt*. Cairo: Konrad Adenauer Foundation & Ibn Khaldoun Centre, p. 80. Nohlen, Dieter, Michael Krennrich, and Bernhard Thibaut. 1999. *Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook*. Oxford University Press, p. 343.

<sup>18</sup> Initially, Egypt's main opposition forces (NWP, SLP, Tagammu, Ahrar and the MB) had sought to sustain the 'wall-to-wall' alliance they had forged during their boycott of the 1983 *Shura* Council elections and the 1984 by-elections in Alexandria. The attempt to sustain this alliance faltered, however, prior to the poll, due to differences over whether or not to boycott the parliamentary elections (Al-Mikawy 1999: 81-82).

The next parliamentary elections under the Mubarak presidency took place only three years into the legislative period in April 1987. This early poll became necessary once it was apparent that the 1984 electoral law was in breach of the Egyptian constitution. The pending court ruling by the *Supreme Constitutional Court* (SCC) itself was the result of a legal challenge brought against the 1984 electoral law by a Wafdist lawyer, Kamal Khaled, who claimed that the closed-list PR system violated the right to political participation enshrined in the constitution, and this because it prohibited independent candidates from participating in national parliamentary elections. To avoid the embarrassment of an illegal legislature, Mubarak thus in 1986 decided to prematurely dissolve the sitting assembly and formulate a new electoral law that would allow independent candidates to run alongside district level party lists (Munoz 1991: 212; Ezzat, *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 21 – 27/12/1995; Al-Mikawy 1999: 84). According to Kassem, the haste with which the assembly was dissolved can be explained by the fact that Mubarak's re-nomination as president was scheduled for 1987 and that he dreaded the constitutional limbo caused by an illegitimate assembly, should the court have ruled the electoral law unconstitutional (Kassem 1999: 61, 99).

In order to accommodate the constitutional challenges levied against the 1984 law, a revised mixed electoral code was swiftly enacted that distributed 400 seats on the basis of the existing PR formula and the remaining forty-eight seats on the basis of simple plurality in single-member constituencies.<sup>19</sup> According to this new law voters were hence accorded two votes; one for a party-list and the other for an individual candidate. The new law also abrogated the automatic vote transferral to the largest party which had been in place under the 1984 law, but retained – to the dismay of all opposition forces – the 8 percent national threshold.<sup>20</sup> Finally, it again stipulated that at least 50 percent of each district list must be composed of candidates from the worker-farmer profession. However, this stipulation was only applied to the district lists and not to the individual candidacies. According to Munoz, this was the case because in practice it proved rather difficult to devise a means to split the forty-eight individual seats along professional lines (Munoz 1991: 214).

The elections themselves were again contested by the same political parties that had already participated in 1984, this time however in a different political constellation. Because of the high electoral threshold in place and the failure of most parties to surpass it in the preceding elections, there was initial agreement among Egypt's opposition to file a single opposition

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<sup>19</sup> The forty-eight individual seats were elected on the basis of simple plurality. However, the law prescribed that the winning candidate had to at least obtain 20 percent of the total votes in a constituency to be declared winner. In case no candidate obtained the required 20 percent of the votes, a second round would be held between the top two contenders. In this round, the candidate obtaining a plurality of votes would win the seat. See article five and seventeen of Electoral Law No. 188/86.

<sup>20</sup> See article five of Electoral Law No. 188/86.



slate under the banner of the NWP (Al-Mikawy 1999: 88). Shortly before the poll, however, the NWP unilaterally pulled out of the proposed 'wall-to-wall' alliance, officially claiming that such alliances were in violation of the electoral law and that they would threaten the unity of the NWP itself (Munoz 1992: 400). The real reason, whilst hard to establish, probably lay in the realisation that the NWP could enter the legislature on its own strength without any third party support. With a unified opposition slate thus unravelling, Tagammu also decided to run the elections unaligned, whilst the three remaining forces - the SLP, Ahrar and the MB - pushed ahead and formed a so called '*Islamic Alliance*' under the banner of the SLP. In comparison to the NWP-MB slate of 1984, this alliance showed far greater ideological discipline, primarily because the SLP had gradually shunned its socialist credentials in favour of a more Islamist orientation (Al-Mikawy 1999: 88-89).

In terms of results the 1987 poll probably produced by far the most fragmented parliament Egypt has ever seen in the period since 1979.<sup>21</sup> As indicated in table 2.3, due to the tri-partite alliance, a total of five opposition forces managed to pass the 8 percent electoral threshold and thus gain representation in the *Majlis al-Shaab*. Together the *Islamic Alliance* captured fifty-six list seats and four of the forty-eight individual seats. Of the list-seats, the SLP held twenty, Ahrar three and the MB the remaining thirty-eight seats. Attaining its lowest ever parliamentary representation, the NDP mustered in turn only a total of 348 of the 448 available seats. This total included 308 list seats and forty of the forty-eight individual seats. The NWP, whilst losing some ground, nevertheless retained its status as the single most prominent legal opposition force, winning this time thirty-six list-seats. In contrast, neither Tagammu nor the UP, which had both decided to contest the poll, managed to enter the legislature. The vote share of Tagammu fell to 2.2 percent, whilst the UP mustered a dismal 0.2 percent of the national vote. Finally, in spite of their strong presence during the 1987 campaign, only four political independents were in the end able to capture one of the forty-eight individual seats.

After the poll, the 1987 electoral law awaited the same fate as its predecessor. Again it was challenged by the same lawyer who had already contested the 1984 law on the grounds that it was unconstitutional. This time it was argued that the dismal number of seats under the second tier of the electoral regime violated the principle of equality enshrined in the Egyptian constitution. After the SCC declared any law unconstitutional that limited the rights of independent candidates to run in elections, the government decided to revert back to the two-

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<sup>21</sup> As Zaki remarks, the 1987 legislature contained the second largest number of opposition representatives any elected assembly has ever held in the history of parliamentary elections in Egypt. Levels of opposition representation were only once higher in 1950, during the so called first liberal experiment, when their total seat share stood at about 29 percent of all seats (Zaki 1995: 81).

round AM system that had been in place for the 1979 parliamentary elections. In so doing, it thus brought to a close the brief interregnum in Egyptian electoral politics with PR-based regimes (Munoz 1991: 215). According to the new electoral law the *Majlis al-Shaab* is composed of 444 directly elected seats selected from 222 two-member constituencies (Nohlen et al. 1999: 333-334). As in the 1970s, the law also stipulates that at least one of the two district seats is reserved for candidates from the 'worker-farmer' profession.<sup>22</sup>

All subsequent parliamentary elections held since then have been conducted on the basis of this electoral regime. The first such election took place in 1990, after the premature dissolution of the sitting assembly. For various reasons however several major opposition forces, including the NWP, the SLP, Ahrar and the MB, decided to boycott this poll.<sup>23</sup> In a common declaration they justified their decision by the fact that the enactment of the new law had been surrounded by secrecy, had not involved any opposition participation and was devoid of any legal guarantees that the elections would be free and fair.<sup>24</sup> The only parties participating in the poll alongside the ruling NDP were hence Tagammu, the UP, the *Young Egypt Party* (YEP) and the *Egyptian Green Party* (EGP). The latter two parties had come into existence by court order just prior to the 1990 elections (Kienle 2001: 52-53).

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<sup>22</sup> Until 1995 voters were asked to vote for one candidate from each professional category. In 1995, this stipulation was dropped and voters were thus able to cast a ballot for two candidates from the professional category. In terms of elections, the law also stipulates that if two candidates from the worker-farmer category are elected in the first-round of voting, then they win the seat. The same applies if one professional and one worker candidate win an outright absolute majority. If, however, two professionals either win an absolute or a relative majority, only the one with the larger majority is elected or enters the second round of voting. The second candidate to enter the run-off is the one who from among all worker's-farmer's candidates has mustered the largest number of votes. See Electoral Law No. 201/90.

<sup>23</sup> Initially again the opposition took a common stance towards the authorities in its demand that the new electoral law be accompanied by further guarantees that would ensure free and fair elections. This common front collapsed, however, over the decision whether or not to boycott the upcoming poll. Whilst the NWP, SLP, Ahrar and MB took a hard stance towards the regime and boycotted the poll, Tagammu and other minor parties took a more moderate view and decided to participate. According to Tagammu any opposition boycott would have only further isolated Egypt's opposition from the political process and was hence not desirable (Al-Mikawy 1999: 93-94).

<sup>24</sup> More concretely, they strongly criticised the manner in which the new electoral boundaries had been drawn, the fact that the electoral register had not been updated and that the emergency law was still in place (Farak, 1991: 21).

Table 2.4: Results of the 1990, 1995 & 2000 Majlis al-Shaab Elections

Party	1990 <sup>3</sup>		1995		2000	
	Seats <sup>2</sup>	% Seats	Seats	% Seats	Seats	% Seats
ADNP	boycott	-	1	0.2	2	0.4
Ahrar	boycott (1)	0.2	1	0.2	frozen (1)	0.2
Independents	-	-	19	4.3	21	4.7
MB	boycott	-	1	0.2	17	3.8
NDP	348	78.4	317	71.6	172	38.8
NDP Independents	~ 60	13.5	99	22.3	218	49.1
NWP	boycott (14)	3.2	6	1.4	7	1.6
SLP	boycott (8)	1.8	0	0.0	frozen (0)	0.0
Tagammu	6	1.4	5	1.1	6	1.4
<b>Total<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>444</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>444</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>444</b>	<b>100.0</b>

<sup>1</sup> Excluding the ten members of parliament that are appointed by the president.

<sup>2</sup> The numbers in brackets indicate the number of candidates who – despite the boycott of their parties – ran in the 1990 elections and entered the assembly as independents.

<sup>3</sup> Seven seats remained unoccupied because of electoral irregularities.

Sources: Nohlen, Dieter, Michael Krennrich, and Bernhard Thibaut. 1999. *Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook*. Oxford University Press, p. 344. Auda, Gehad, Nedad Al-Borai and Hafez Abou Seada. 2001. *The Egyptian Parliamentary Elections of 2000: Cause, Dilemmas and Recommendations for the Future - Political and Legal Study*. Cairo: Friedrich Naumann Foundation & United Group, pp. 51, 58. Stacher, Joshua. 2004. "Parties Over: The Demise of Egypt's Opposition Parties" *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, pp. 215-234.

Against the background of this virtual absence of any meaningful opposition, the NDP won a crushing electoral victory, winning 360 of the 444 directly elected parliamentary seats. As can be seen in table 2.4 the only other party represented in the chamber was Tagammu with six seats, whilst none of the other minor forces participating in these elections gained any representation. Another thirty parliamentary seats went to various so called 'party independents' that had defied their parties' directives to boycott the elections and had run as independents. They included approximately fourteen members of the NWP, eight members of the SLP and one representative from Ahrar. The remaining sixty seats went to so called NDP independents (Nohlen et al. 1999: 345).

The two latest parliamentary polls took place in 1995 and 2000 respectively and were again contested by a majority of political parties. Despite their forceful return to the electoral arena, however, most opposition parties were not able to regain the strong presence they had held in the 1987 legislature. In 1995, the NDP again won an overwhelming majority of 416 seats, whilst independents captured another fourteen seats. The five opposition parties that entered the legislature together shared amongst themselves the remaining fourteen seats. During the latest 2000 parliamentary poll, which for the first time was conducted under full judicial supervision, the NDP again won a resounding parliamentary majority with 388 seats. The

legalised opposition won sixteen seats, the outlawed MB as many as seventeen and politically independents twenty-one seats.<sup>25</sup>

## 2.2 The Weaknesses of Egypt's Parties

The period between 1977 and 2000 thus saw the development of a multiparty system in Egypt. As we have just seen, at the nominal level this development was characterised by the formal recognition of party pluralism in 1977 and the gradual expansion of political parties from initially five to currently eighteen. It was also characterised by the regular holding of parliamentary elections and - formally at least - by the competition of a plurality of political parties within them.

Upon closer examination one must acknowledge, however, that the past two decades of multiparty politics have failed to catapult Egypt's parties to the fore of the political spectrum and to turn them into strong mass-based political organisations. Instead we encounter parties that to this day remain politically inept, societally irrelevant and organisationally highly underdeveloped. As mentioned above, this observation holds particularly true for the country's legalised opposition but - as will become apparent below - also applies in some measure to the ruling NDP.

Probably most apparent to outside observers is, in this regard, the marginal role political parties, and the opposition in particular, have been playing within the Egyptian decision-making institutions. Numerically, this marginalisation has been manifest in a complete lack of access to the central executive institutions of the state, including most prominently the presidency, the government ministries and the governorate administrations. Over the past two decades, none of these institutions has seen any power alternation between the governing NDP and any of the opposition forces. The marginalisation of opposition parties has furthermore been manifest in their dismal representation within the elected assemblies of the country, including the local councils and both the *Majlis al-Shura* and the *Majlis al-Shaab*. Their virtual absence in both the local councils and the *Majlis al-Shura* is hereby particularly striking. At the municipal level for, instance, opposition representatives have together never held more than 5 percent of all council seats, with virtually all remaining seats going to the

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<sup>25</sup> Prior to 2000, the entire electoral process was supervised by the Ministry of Interior, including the voting operations and the vote count. In 2000 the Egyptian Supreme Court declared, however, that this practice was not in accordance with the 1971 Constitution, which mandates the complete judicial supervision of national elections. It hence ruled that the 2000 parliamentary elections, as all subsequent elections, had to be held under judicial supervision. Conceding to the ruling, the Egyptian authorities placed the voting operations and the vote count under judicial supervision (Kassem 2004: 63-65).

ruling NDP (Kienle 2001: 74-75). The same picture characterised the partial elections to the *Majlis al-Shura*, which have either been boycotted by the political opposition or, whenever they participated, failed to allow them to capture any significant number of assembly seats.<sup>26</sup>

Whilst the picture is less grim for the *Majlis al-Shaab*, this minimal opposition representation has also been a feature of its composition. Given its powers to nominate the presidential candidate for (re-)election, to extend the emergency law and to alter the constitution, parliament has never been a source of opposition strength either. Indeed, since 1979 the total opposition share in parliament has never exceeded one-third of all elected seats, as the regime requires a two-thirds majority to sustain its control over these legislative powers. As indicated in the preceding section, in the 1980s opposition representation in the legislature fluctuated between 12 and 21 percent. In the 1990s, moreover, their combined share of seats in the assembly fell to as low as 7 percent.<sup>27</sup>

In more substantive terms, the dismal political representation of opposition forces has also of course left its imprint on the political decision-making process itself. This is made apparent by Zaki, who argues that the dominance of the NDP in the legislature:

‘...permitted prompt approval of government budgets as presented, as well as all legislation demanded by the executive. It also made it possible to summarily deny almost all opposition demands whenever raised, especially those which involved limitation of executive powers such as putting an end to executive rule by emergency law, or closer scrutiny of government activities, particularly those related to the military and other security services’ (Zaki 1995: 31).

The marginal role of political parties in Egypt has, however, not only been confined to the legalised opposition, but even haunted the ruling NDP itself. As several scholars have remarked, ever since its creation in 1979 the NDP never actually became a significant political player in its own right, and this despite its numerical domination of the country’s elected assemblies. Instead, the party has been highly dependent on its linkage to the executive authorities and the presidency in particular, which provide it with the necessary

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<sup>26</sup> Most opposition parties boycotted the partial *Majlis al-Shura* elections of 1981, 1986, 1989, 1992 and 1998. In 1989 only the MB and Ahrar participated in the elections, capturing together six of the 258 parliamentary seats. In the 1995 elections, moreover, which fell together with those to the *Majlis al-Shaab*, again a majority of opposition forces decided not to file any candidates due to the financial impossibilities of running two elections in the same year. During the *Shura* Council elections, held in 2001, most opposition parties by contrast put forward a limited number of candidates, which all failed to win any representation. The NDP won again a landslide victory, capturing 84 percent of the available seats, whilst independents took the remaining 16 percent (Engel, Middle East Times, 28/03/1998; Kienle 2001: 66-67; Al-Din, Al-Ahram Weekly, 21 – 27/06/2001).

<sup>27</sup> See tables 2.3 and 2.4.

political clout and resources to retain its electoral hegemony. The party itself, so it is argued, lacks a 'compelling ideology', an independent leadership and meaningful influence over the decision-making process, which has been entirely dominated by the president, his government and the state bureaucracy.<sup>28</sup> Devoid of any political powers, the party hence primarily serves as a rubber stamp institution that is sustained by the regime in order to provide parliamentary majorities for the government's legislation and a permanent recruitment pool for public office (Springborg 1989: 157, 162; Tachau 1994: 118; Kassem 1999: 77).

Apart from being politically irrelevant, Egypt's main parties are also known to suffer from their dismal entrenchment in society. As one high ranking Tagammu official pointed out, parties are like: 'pieces of cork floating on the surface of society (...) they do not reach the bottom, and make only slight contact with the educated elite and society's civil institutions' (Al-Ahali 20/04/1994). Historically, this lack of grass-roots support can be traced back to the manner in which parties were formed when the single-party regime was abolished in favour of a multiparty system in 1979. As mentioned above, of the five major political parties that were legalised at the time, three were carved out of the defunct ASU at the behest of president Sadat, whilst the fourth party was formed with his tacit involvement. Instead of being the result of mass movements representing different societal sectors, all these parties were thus creations from above that lacked any historically developed constituency among the Egyptian electorate. Probably the only exception to this rule is the NWP, the fifth major political party that gained legal status in the 1980s. Being historically linked to the nationalist movement of the 1920s and its subsequent status as majority party in the first liberal period of the country (1923-1952), it was to some extent able to draw on existing Wafdist allegiances among the old landed and urban bourgeoisie (Quraishi 1967: 231-233; Springborg 1989: 207; Tachau 1994: 130).<sup>29</sup>

Since then, little has changed in the societal entrenchment of these parties - that is in the lack thereof. Indeed, even after twenty years of multiparty politics there are few signs that parties have actually come to develop a sustainable and strong constituency among specific sectors of society (Zaki, 1995: 97; Nafie, Al-Ahram Weekly, 09 – 15/11/2000; Abdel-Latif, Al-Ahram Weekly, 30/09 – 06/10/2004). This is particularly apparent during election times, which best expose the mobilisational capacities of the various political forces in the country. Yet, even during this time of heightened political activism, Egypt's legalised parties have made little headway in attracting a significant electoral following based on their programmatic-

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<sup>28</sup> Under both Sadat and Mubarak the chairmanship of the NDP was held by the presidents themselves (Waterbury 1983: 370; Kassem 1999: 78).

<sup>29</sup> The only other political formation that carries some mobilisational capacity is the outlawed MB, which has been able to gradually build up a following within Egyptian society through its social services network (Zaki 1995: 110).

ideological orientations. Voter interest in party politics remains dismally low and voter turnout figures a sham by any democratic standards.<sup>30</sup> Also, wherever party candidates seem to gain some electoral support, they do so not because of their political affiliations and agenda, but because they are known to be well connected to established families, tribes and communities within their constituency and/or capable of providing tangible services to their constituents.

In addition to the aforementioned weaknesses, most parties in Egypt are finally also plagued by a host of organisational troubles. These include most prominently the absence of sufficient financial and human resources to sustain complex and nationwide party structures. Virtually all parties have been suffering this fate, bar the ruling NDP whose direct linkage to the resources of the state have enabled the party to build up and sustain offices at all layer of government and across the entire nation. Most opposition forces, by contrast, are barely present at the most crucial layer of government, namely the constituency level, and some are not even represented in the governorates of the country. This latter observation holds particularly true for the fringe parties in Egyptian politics, whose institutional presence remains essentially confined to the capital city. Yet even the larger opposition formations have failed to sustain offices across the entire country (Zaki 1995: 86). To be sure, most of them do have regional offices in a majority of governorates. The NWP, for instance, is said to be represented in twenty-four of the twenty-six governorates, the ADNP in twenty-five and Tagammu in twenty-three of the twenty-six governorates. The small EGP is in turn present in twenty governorates.<sup>31</sup> Below the governorate level however most of these parties are either only sporadically represented or not represented at all. Indeed, whilst being present in some urban centres, they usually lack any organisational presence in the rural areas of the country, which remain entirely dominated by the NDP. Also, usually parties of the opposition only tend to show their institutional presence at the constituency level during election times and, indeed, only in those districts they are actually running candidates. Throughout the legislative period, moreover, they usually only sustain offices at the local level in those districts where they have won parliamentary representation.

The weak organisational representation of these parties is finally also compounded by the lack of human resources and staff to maintain party offices. Again, this is particularly apparent within the ranks of the opposition, which is known to face serious troubles in recruiting a

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<sup>30</sup> According to IDEA the estimated number of Egyptian citizens who actually voted out of the total voting population stood at 22 percent in 1984, at 27 percent in 1987, 25 percent in 1990 and 30 percent in 1995. Other estimates see these figures even lower (Institute for Democracy and Election Assistance (IDEA), Voter Turnout Figures).

<sup>31</sup> Interviews with Abdelmonein Al-Asser (EGP), Mohamed Awad (EGP), Farouk Al-Ashry (ADNP), Mohamed Said (Tagammu) & Sayed Al-Badawy (NWP).

sufficiently large militant base in order to sustain its activities during the legislative period and particularly during election times. Moreover, given their financial limitations, most of the parties also rely heavily on volunteers rather than on full-time staff to operate their party premises. Together these organisational troubles have basically prevented Egypt's opposition parties from developing more complex organisational structures.

## 2.3 The Marginalisation Hypothesis

Although Egypt's parties have always been weak in the three domains identified above, it is only since 1990 that these forces have become completely marginalised within the polity. This marginalisation, only a little more than ten years after the introduction of multiparty elections, was in fact so apparent that it led various local commentators to describe the current state of parties as being in crisis. This conclusion was drawn, for instance, by the *Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies* (ACPSS) in its 2000 Arab Strategic Report, which spoke of the 'collapse' of parties and party politics in Egypt (in Atta, *Al-Ahram Hebdo*, 19/08/2001). It was also echoed in the press coverage of the 1995 and 2000 parliamentary elections and even noted upon by high ranking officials across all major parties of the country.<sup>32</sup> *Al-Ahram* journalist Al-Muslimany, for example, remarked prior to the 2000 poll, that: '...we are certainly facing a crisis of parties in Egypt' and that this crisis had become 'acute' in the 1990s (Al-Muslimany 1999: 12).

By describing the state of Egypt's parties as in crisis, these commentators are essentially referring to two phenomena that, albeit always present, particularly plagued the performance of parties from 1990 onwards. At the nominal level, they are referring to the drastic reduction that took place in the numerical representation of parties as collective actors in the political arena. At a more substantive level, moreover, they are referring to the preponderance of personalism and the diminishing importance of party labels and programmes that characterised the parliamentary election campaigns of that decade. As will be demonstrated below, together both these developments further exacerbated the existing weaknesses of Egypt's parties and thereby contributed to their complete marginalisation in the 1990s.

The decline in the numerical representation of Egypt's parties since 1990 was observable at both the electoral and the parliamentary levels. At the electoral level, for instance, it was

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<sup>32</sup> For further comments on the crisis of Egypt's parties consult, for examples, the articles published in *Al-Ahram Hebdo* by Al-Gamal Khoulood (22/11/2000) and Ibrahim Nafie (15/11/2000) and those published in *Al-Ahram Weekly* by Omayma Abdel-Latif (23 – 29/11/2000) and Gamal Essam Al-Din (08 – 14/03/2001).



manifest in a significant reduction in the percentage share of candidates running on a party ticket. This trend had already set in under the mixed regime of 1987, but gained momentum during the 1990s, when party candidates ceased to constitute an overall majority of all candidates in the electoral field. As table 2.5 illustrates, in the elections of 1990, 1995 and 2000 party representatives repeatedly made up only about 25 percent of all contestants. This contrasts quite markedly with the two elections held in the 1980s, both of which had been contested by a majority of party candidates. In 1984 the electoral field was entirely composed of party candidates. In 1987, under the mixed regime, party candidates still constituted a majority of all contestants, despite the fact that their overall percentage share had fallen to about 51 percent.<sup>33</sup>

*Table 2.5: The Number of Candidates by Year & Political Affiliation, 1984 – 2000*

Elections	1984		1987		1990		1995		2000	
	Cand.	%	Cand.	%	Cand.	%	Cand.	%	Cand.	%
<i>All Parties</i>	1,996 <sup>1</sup>	100.0	1,851	51.0	535	22.9	1,148	26.6	923	23.3
NDP	448	22.4	448	12.3	444	19.0	439	10.2	443	11.2
Opposition	1,548	77.5	1,403	38.5	91	3.9	709	16.5	480	12.1
<i>All Indep.</i>	-	-	1,787	49.1	1,800	77.0	3,160	73.3	3,034	76.7
NDP Indep.	-	-	(?)	(?)	~ 780	33.4	1,780	41.3	1,680	42.5
Truly Indep.	-	-	(?)	(?)	878	37.6	1,380	32.0	1,354	34.2
Opp. Indep.	-	-	-	-	~ 142	6.1	-	-	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,996</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>3,638</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>2,335</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>4,308</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>3,957</b>	<b>100.0</b>

<sup>1</sup> This number does not include the reserve candidates that by law parties had to nominate for each of their district lists. When included, the total number of candidates in the field would have been double the number presented in this table.

Sources: Munoz, Gema M. 1992. *Politica y Elecciones en el Egipto Contemporáneo (1922-1990)*. Madrid: Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional, Instituto de Cooperación con el Mundo Árabe, p. 409. Zaki, Moheb. 1995. *Civil Society and Democratization in Egypt*. Cairo: Konrad Adenauer Foundation & Ibn Khaldoun Centre, p. 96. Auda, Gehad, Nedad Al-Borai and Hafez Abou Seada. 2001. *The Egyptian Parliamentary Elections of 2000: Cause, Dilemmas and Recommendations for the Future - Political and Legal Study*. Cairo: Friedrich Naumann Foundation & United Group, p. 71. Kienle, Eberhard. 2001. *The Grand Delusion: Democracy and Economic Reform in Egypt*. London, New York: I.B. Tauris, p. 54.

The decline in the percentage share of party candidates after 1990 was essentially triggered by two opposing developments. To begin with, it was the result of a significant reduction in the number of candidates put forward by Egypt's political opposition. As can be seen in table 2.5, between 1987 and 1995 the total number of candidates put forward by these parties decreased by no less than 50 percent, from over 1,400 to a mere 700 contestants.<sup>34</sup> In 2000 this number declined even further to around 500 opposition candidates. Second, and even more crucially,

<sup>33</sup> It should be noted that, in absolute terms, there was no significant reduction in the number of party candidates between 1984 and 1987, as shown in table 2.5. The decline in their percentage share is thus solely attributable to the emergence of independent candidates in the electoral field in 1987.

<sup>34</sup> As we have seen, in 1990 most opposition parties boycotted the parliamentary poll, which is why the number of official opposition candidates is so low. It is also for this reason that the 1990 elections are being left out of this comparison.

this decline was also caused by a drastic surge in the number of candidates that entered the electoral race from outside the formal party framework. This surge was impressive both in absolute terms and in relation to the total number of party candidates in the electoral race. In absolute terms we see their numbers rise from just under 1,800 contestants under the mixed regime of 1987 to over 3,000 in the late 1990s. In relation to the presence of party candidates, this surge moreover produced a situation in which independents came to persistently outnumber the total number of candidates running under a party label, and this by wide margins. As shown in table 2.5, in all elections held since 1990 the category of independents made up no less than two-thirds of all contestants in the field. Translated to the district level this meant that during any of these elections one would find on average about seven to eight independents per district seat against only about two party representatives.<sup>35</sup> This contrasts, of course, quite markedly with the 1980s, when – as we have seen - party candidates retained a numerical pre-dominance both nationally and by extension also at the district level.

In addition to the electoral level, the decline in the numerical presence of Egypt's parties was also visible at the parliamentary level. Since 1990 we here again observe a sharp reduction in the total number of MPs that entered the legislature on a party ticket. As table 2.6 demonstrates, their percentage seat share dropped steadily from 80 percent in 1990 to a mere 45 percent in 2000. Prior to the 1990s their combined seat share had stood, by contrast, at 100 percent, and this in both 1984 and 1987.

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<sup>35</sup> The averages are calculated by dividing the total number of independent and party candidates respectively by the number of directly elected parliamentary seats.

Table 2.6: Egyptian Parliamentary Election Results by Seat Totals & Seat Percentages, 1984 – 2000

Elections	1984		1987		1990		1995		2000	
	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%
<i>All Parties</i>	448	100.0	448	100.0	355	80.0	332	74.7	203	45.7
NDP	390	87.3	352	78.6	348	78.4	317	71.6	170	38.3
Legalised Opposition <sup>1</sup>	50	11.1	58	12.9	7	1.6	14	2.9	16	3.6
Islamist Current (MB)	8	1.8	38	8.5	0	0.0	1	0.0	17	3.8
<i>All Independents</i>	-	-	0	0.0	91	20.8	118	30.2	239	53.8
NDP Independents	-	-	0	0.0	60	13.5	99	22.3	218	49.1
Truly Independents	-	-	0	0.0	-	-	19	4.3	21	4.7
Opposition Indep.	-	-	-	-	~ 30	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Seat Totals<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>448</b>		<b>448</b>	-	<sup>3</sup> <b>437</b>	-	<b>444</b>	-	<b>444</b>	-

<sup>1</sup>The category of 'Legalised Opposition' excludes all those candidates officially elected as independents, but who belong to the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood.

<sup>2</sup>Excluded are the ten parliamentary seats appointed by the president.

<sup>3</sup>Seven seats remained uncontested.

Sources: Munoz, Gema M. 1992. *Politica y Elecciones en el Egipto Contemporáneo (1922-1990)*. Madrid: Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional, Instituto de Cooperación con el Mundo Árabe, pp. 385, 415. Zaki, Moheb. 1995. *Civil Society and Democratisation in Egypt*. Cairo: Konrad Adenauer Foundation & Ibn Khaldoun Centre, p. 80. Nohlen, Dieter, Michael Krennrich, and Bernhard Thibaut. 1999. *Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook*. Oxford University Press, pp. 343, 344. Al-Din, Al-Ahram Weekly, 23 – 29/11/2000. Auda, Gehad, Nedad Al-Borai and Hafez Abou Saeda. 2001. *The Egyptian Parliamentary Elections of 2000: Cause, Dilemmas and Recommendations for the Future - Political and Legal Study*. Cairo: Friedrich Naumann Foundation & United Group, pp. 51, 58. Stacher, Joshua. 2004. "Parties Over: The Demise of Egypt's Opposition Parties" *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, pp. 215-234.

The decline itself can be attributed to a number of factors. First and foremost it must be attributed to the performance of Egypt's opposition, whose representation in the *Majlis al-Shaab* was virtually cut in half between the 1980s and the 1990s. During the 1980s, these forces still made up between 13 and 20 percent of the legislature. By the end of the 1990s, however, their combined seat share had fallen to just 7.6 percent of all parliamentary seats. In 1995 this number had even fallen to a dismal 3.1 percent.

This decline can, however, also be attributed to the erosion in the majorities won by the ruling NDP on its own merit. At face value, there is of course little evidence of this erosion, given that the NDP always eventually mustered crushing majorities in the Egyptian legislature. As noted in table 2.6, in the 1990s the NDP held well over 90 percent of all legislative seats. In absolute terms these majorities hence even surpass those obtained by the NDP in 1984 and 1987, and this by a wide margin.

Upon closer examination it becomes apparent, however, that these parliamentary majorities were not won by the NDP on its own merit. Instead, they were only achieved with the help of so called 'NDP independents' who, upon parliamentary entry, (re-)joined the ranks of the

ruling party and thus helped raise its margin of victory.<sup>36</sup> In 1990 and 1995, for instance, official NDP candidates managed to capture only about 70 percent of all the legislative seats eventually accorded to the party. In 2000, this number was even further reduced to mere 40 percent of all the seats, virtually robbing the NDP of a home-grown parliamentary majority in the current legislature. During the 1980s, by contrast, the percentage number of official NDP representatives in the legislature was significantly higher. In 1984 their number stood at nearly 90 percent and in 1987 at around 80 percent of all parliamentary seats.

The numerical marginalisation of Egypt's parties at the parliamentary level since 1990 can finally also be attributed to the emergence of MPs, who had contested and won elections entirely outside the party political framework. As indicated in table 2.5, over the past decade the percentage seat share of these so called 'independents' rose drastically from about 20 percent in 1990, to 30 percent in 1995 and even to over 50 percent in 2000. In each of these elections then, their number outweighed by a wide margin the combined total of seats won by Egypt's legalised opposition parties. As mentioned elsewhere, all non-boycotting opposition parties together had won only 1.6 percent of the seats in 1990, and that this percentage was only slightly higher in the subsequent polls of 1995 and 2000. In 1995 all opposition parties together won 2.9 and in 2000 3.6 percent of all parliamentary seats. What is more, during the 2000 poll the number of independently elected MPs for the first time since 1979 even outweighed the total number of seats won by official NDP candidates. Indeed, during these elections the NDP as such had initially garnered only 38.3 percent of the seats in parliament, as opposed to the 58.3 percent won by nominally independent candidates.<sup>37</sup>

Of course, most of these formally independent MPs were in fact members of the ruling NDP, who despite being de-selected by party headquarters, had decided to contest the elections as independents. Also, as mentioned above, upon parliamentary entry most of them were re-admitted into the fold of the NDP, in order to increase the party's overall majority. In 1990 over 60 percent of all independently elected MPs decided to take this course of action. In 1995 and 2000 this number further rose to 80 and 90 percent respectively. Consequently, the group of truly independent MPs in the legislatures of 1995 and 2000 eventually decreased to around twenty MPs. In relative terms, this number is however still quite impressive, considering that it outweighed that of the combined political opposition and in fact constituted the second largest parliamentary block after the NDP in both 1995 and 2000. It is also significant in light of the fact that independent representatives were completely absent from

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<sup>36</sup> 'NDP independents' are candidates who, despite being de-selected by their party, nevertheless decided to contest the elections as independents.

<sup>37</sup> See table 2.6.

the assembly of 1984 and even more importantly in that of 1987. As indicated in table 2.3, in 1987 1,800 independent candidates had contested the elections under the individual-candidacy tier, yet only four of them managed to attain a seat in parliament.

Apart from this numerical marginalisation, it has also been maintained that Egypt's parties suffered a more qualitative decline in their overall prominence at the electoral level since 1990. Essentially, this claim emanates from the political community of the country and is based on two assertions. First, there is a common sense that parties had been far more prominent and vocal actors in the electoral politics of the 1980s than in those of the 1990s. Indeed, most party officials interviewed on this subject matter insisted that the campaigns of the former decade were far more party- and even programmatically oriented than those of the latter decade. Second, there is also widespread agreement that the 1990s were marked by an increasing 'individualisation' of the political sphere in general and that of the electoral arena in particular. In essence this individualisation of the electoral arena was manifest in campaigns that were little party-oriented and instead largely driven by the pursuit of personal entrepreneurship.<sup>38</sup>

The latter observation in particular has also received considerable scholarly attention. According to Al-Khawaga from the francophone *Centre d'Etudes et de Documentation Jurisdiqes et Sociales* (CEDEJ) for instance it is fair to say that the elections of the 1990s were basically characterised by the absence of any meaningful party political rhetoric and national level political discourse. Instead most party candidates fought election campaigns that revolved almost exclusively around their personality, professional status and constituency matters (Al-Khawaga 1995: 83). This view was also shared by Abdel Nasser from CEDEJ and Mustafa Kamel Sayed from Cairo University. Commenting specifically on the 1995 elections Abdel Nasser remarks for instance that:

‘...the presentation of the candidate's professional and social credentials, his background and personal relations predominated the electoral discourse. In all of the districts, banners and posters exposed the candidate's political positions. The electoral symbols of the NDP, the crescent and the camel, as well as the slogans of the Muslim Brotherhood (Islam is the Solution) constituted the only public and

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<sup>38</sup> In the course of this research numerous party officials and candidates have been interviewed, who all made reference to the individualisation of Egyptian electoral politics. These included most notably Awatif Wali (NWP), Mohamed Sherdy (NWP), Mounir Abdel Nour (NWP), Saad Abdel-Nour (NWP), Sayed Al-Badawy (NWP), Mamdouh Nakhla (Tagammu), Mohamed Said (Tagammu), Mohamed Tulaima (Tagammu) and Nagi Al-Shehabi (SLP/ DGP). A detailed description of the respondents interviewed and the types of interviews conducted is given in the methodology chapter.

political expressions in the proper sense of the term' (Abdel Nasser 1995: 215-216).<sup>39</sup>

In an interview given to Al-Ahram Weekly Mustafa Kamel Sayed finally gives the very same assessment for the 2000 poll. Discussing the nature of the 2000 campaign he again maintains that: '...there was no political debate. It [the campaign] wasn't fought around political platforms, but rather about local issues and what each candidate would offer in terms of services to voters in his or her constituency' (Howeidy, Al-Ahram Weekly, 26/10 – 01/11/2000).

When looked at in their entirety then, the above developments at both the electoral and parliamentary level over the past decade have done little to ameliorate the status of political parties in the Egyptian polity. Instead, they further exacerbated the weaknesses that have been plaguing these forces ever since the inception of multiparty elections in 1979. This is probably most apparent at the societal level. Here the observed reduction in the numerical presence of parties in the electoral arena and the prevalence of political entrepreneurship during the campaigns of the 1990s did little to redress their overall weak entrenchment in society. Quite the opposite, both these developments probably even further reduced the prospects of these parties to enhance their visibility among the wider electorate and thus their capacity to gradually develop a sectoral constituency basis. A similar observation can be made as regards their overall political weakness. Here again, the drastic reduction in the number of party representatives observable since 1990, and the simultaneous rise in the number of 'independent' MPs undermined the capacity of these forces, and particularly that of the opposition, to meaningfully influence the course of Egyptian politics. Indeed, left without any significant numerical presence in the legislature, the voice of Egypt's formal political opposition has been all but extinct. Finally, these developments also did little to improve the low levels of *internal unity* that have been characterising the existence of most of these parties since their inception. In fact, if anything, they further exacerbated the appearance of atomised and undisciplined party structures, particularly during election campaigns, given the prevalence of highly personalised election campaigns in which the personality of the candidate mattered far more than his or her party and its programme.

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<sup>39</sup> The quote has been translated by the author. The original text reads as follows: 'la presentation des caracteristiques professionnelles et sociales du candidat, son histoire et ses relations ont occupe l'essentiel de l'espace du discours electoral. Dans l'ensemble des circonscriptions, ses appartenances politiques se manifesterent a travers les banderoles et les affiches murales. Les symboles electoraux du PND, le croissant de lune et le chapeau, ainsi que les slogans des Freres musulmans (l'islam est la solution) constituaient les seuls indices majeurs publiques et politiques proprements' (Abdel Nasser 1995: 215-216).

As regards to the overall development of party politics in Egypt under Mubarak, two questions must hence be posed. First, there is the more general question of how one is to explain the overall weakness of Egypt's principal political parties. As the preceding analysis illustrated, ever since the inception of multiparty politics, these parties have remained politically marginalised, societally irrelevant and organisationally underdevelopment. Second, and more specifically, there is also the question of how one is to explain the further deterioration that characterised their performance after 1990.

The subsequent chapter will address both these questions. It will first discuss the prime causes that have been attributed within the literature to the overall weakness of Egypt's political parties. Comparing the party political developments of the 1980s and 1990s, it will then move on to explore the explanations that have hitherto been given as to why the electoral prominence of Egypt's parties decreased so drastically after 1990. By way of conclusion it will then illustrate that too little attention has been given to the role of the 1990 electoral regime in order to explain the observed marginalisation of Egypt's political parties.

## **Chapter Three. The Determinants of Party Development under the Mubarak Presidency**

As regards the research questions at hand the available literature on Egyptian political parties and party development is insightful but limited. It is insightful to the extent that it provides extensive coverage of the various illnesses that have been plaguing Egypt's political parties since the inception of multiparty elections in 1979. It is limited, however, in its coverage of those developments that have characterised the performance of parties under the Mubarak presidency from 1981 to present and that have been captured in the 'marginalisation hypothesis' spelled out above. Indeed, as we shall see below, to this day very few studies are available that seek to explain why the performance of Egypt's parties deteriorated in the 1990s, and this both at the electoral and parliamentary levels.

This chapter reviews the research that has been conducted on both aspects of party politics in Egypt. To this end Sections 3.1 and 3.2 review the various explanations given within the literature for why Egypt's parties have hitherto failed to develop into cohesive mass-based political organisations. For analytical purposes I have divided the available explanations into factors external and internal to the functioning of the parties themselves. The external factors will be discussed in Section 3.1 and the internal factors in Section 3.2.

Section 3.3 then reviews the available explanations that have been given to account for the observed marginalisation of Egypt's parties during the 1990s. It will show that little substantive theorising has been conducted in this field and that, with few exceptions, the explanations available have remained sketchy and mostly unsatisfactory. With a view on the central hypothesis of this research, Section 3.3 will also point at the minimal attention that has so far been given to the 1990 electoral reform in accounting for the marginalisation of Egypt's parties.

### **3.1 The External Sources of Party Weakness**

According to scholars and local politicians alike, the weakness of Egypt's parties has basically two external root causes. On the one hand it can be attributed to the restrictive legal environment in place and its discriminatory application by the Egyptian authorities. On the other hand, it can also be related to the prevalence of highly individualised patterns of political interaction among the country's elite and between the latter and the electorate. As will become clear below, both these external root causes are to some extent interrelated, given



that the restrictive legal system in place not only impedes the development of cohesive mass-based parties, but also helps sustain the highly personalised nature of politics in Egypt.

Of all the factors commonly attributed to the weakness of Egypt's parties, the various legal restrictions imposed on their operations have probably received most scholarly scrutiny and public attention. Drawing precisely on this linkage between party development and institutional constraints, Kassem notes for instance: 'with the various constraints imposed on party formation and participation, political parties in contemporary Egypt remain weak and underdeveloped entities' (Kassem 2004: 76).

Across the party political spectrum and other Egyptian civil society organisations similar remarks have been made.<sup>40</sup> Here again the thrust of the argument is that parties are weak because their activities have been persistently hampered by a plethora of restrictions imposed on them by the emergency and party laws as well as by other civil and criminal legislation. In addition there is also widespread agreement that the government's discriminatory practices against the political opposition and in favour of the ruling NDP have undermined the opposition's capacity to assert itself in the political arena. Particular reference is hereby made to the patronage the Egyptian authorities repeatedly extend to their candidates during election times, their use of state and state-related institutions to the advantage of the NDP and the use of outright electoral fraud.<sup>41</sup> As one Wafdist remarked on a rather bitter note, 'the constraints imposed on political activity in this country are immeasurable. The files of political parties have become the specialisation of [the] security, rather than [of] political authorities' (Abdel-Latif, *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 23 –29/11/2000).

As just mentioned, the Egyptian legal system contains a host of laws that in their entirety place heavy restrictions on the licensing and operation of political parties. The most prominent of these laws include the Emergency Law No. 162/58<sup>42</sup>, the Political Parties' Law No. 40/77, the two Laws on Public Assembly and on Public Demonstrations and Meetings No. 10/14 and 14/23, the People's Assembly Law No. 38/72, the Law on Public Advertisement No. 66/56, the Penal Code and Laws No. 33/78 on the Internal Front and Social Peace and No. 95/80 on the Protection of Morals and Shame.<sup>43</sup> Also included must be the host of

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<sup>40</sup> Consult, for instance, the reports issued by the Centre for Human Rights and Legal Aid (CHRLA) and the Hisham Mubarak Law Centre (Hassan 1996; Khalil & Kagan 2003).

<sup>41</sup> Interviews with Farouk Al-Ashry (ADNP), Ibrahim Abaza (NWP) & Abou Ela Maadi (Centre Party).

<sup>42</sup> The Emergency Law was invoked in 1981 after the assassination of President Sadat. Despite fierce opposition, it has never been revoked since then.

<sup>43</sup> The Law on Demonstrations and Public Meetings No. 10/14 was published in *Al-Waqa'a Al-Masriya* (Egyptian Gazette) on January 1<sup>st</sup>, 1923. The Law on Public Assembly No. 12/23 was published in *Al-Waqa'a Al-Masriya* on September 18, 1914. Laws No. 33/78 and 95/85 are published in the Ministry of Interior's 1999 publication entitled *The Arab Republic of Egypt Constitution and its Main Supplementary Laws*. Law No. 95/85 has recently

campaigning regulations that have been issued by the Ministry of Interior prior to each of the past parliamentary elections.<sup>44</sup>

Regarding the formation of parties, for instance, Law No. 40/77 strictly defines the criteria under which a license can be obtained. As already discussed, it also places the licensing of parties under a quasi-governmental body, the PPC, which is not only charged with the licensing of parties, but even empowered to suspend their activities and those of their publications.<sup>45</sup> The PPC can for instance demand the suspension of all party activities in case of internal disputes within a party. It can also do so should the party in question be in apparent violation of the principles set out in Articles three and four of the law or for reasons of 'national interest'. Finally, Law No. 40/77 also states that the PPC must be informed and approve of any programmatic changes to the party statutes or to its name.<sup>46</sup>

Concerning the licensing criteria themselves, the law sets out a vast list of prerequisites that prospective parties have to meet, in order to be legalised. As has been pointed out by Kassem and others, these prerequisites are however so broadly defined that they provide an abundance of pretexts with which the PPC can refuse the licensing of any applicant party (Kassem 2004: 53). For instance, the law demands of prospective parties that their goals are in accordance with the central principles of '*Sharia*', 'national unity' and 'public order', which are set out in the constitution.<sup>47</sup> It also prohibits the formation of parties on the basis of social class, religion, geography or sect. Finally it states that their programmes and policies must be distinct from all existing parties and that they are not allowed to entertain any organisational or financial linkages with foreign organisations.<sup>48</sup> The former stipulations in particular leave, of course, ample room for the authorities to reject the licensing of any political party that is potentially threatening to the incumbent regime. Moreover, these stipulations make it very difficult for parties to structure their very existence around a specific societal constituency. Fearful that they may violate the restrictions imposed on their programmatic orientation, they are hence forced by law to remain vague in their ideological and programmatic orientation.

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been revoked by the President. The Penal Code was first published in *Al-Waqa'a Al-Masriya* No. 71. The Emergency Law No. 162/58 is published in the volume 'Egypt and its Laws' by Bernhard-Maugiron and Dupret. Law No. 66/56 finally is published in *Al-Waqa'a Al-Masriya* No. 16.

<sup>44</sup> This research makes reference to the following campaigning regulations, issued as executive decrees by the Ministry of Interior: Decree No. 1972/79 on the 'Organisation of the Election Campaign for the *Majlis al-Shaab* Elections' which is published in *Al-Waqa'a Al-Masriya* No. 23; Decree No. 279/84 on the 'Organisation of the Election Campaign for the *Majlis al-Shaab* Elections' which is published in *Al-Waqa'a Al-Masriya* No. 76; Decree No. 1542/98 on the 'Organisation of the Election Campaign for the *Majlis al-Shura* Elections' which is published in *Al-Waqa'a Al-Masriya* No. 100 and Decree No. 13622/00 on the 'Organisation of the Election Campaign for the *Majlis al-Shaab* Elections' which is published in *Al-Waqa'a Al-Masriya* No. 218.

<sup>45</sup> See Political Parties' Law No. 40/77.

<sup>46</sup> See article seventeen of the Political Parties' Law No. 40/77.

<sup>47</sup> '*Sharia*' is the law system that is based on the Koran, the Sunna, older Arabic law systems, parallel traditions and the work of first and second century Muslim scholars.

<sup>48</sup> See article four of the Political Parties' Law No. 40/77.

That the government has made ample use of the powers granted by Law No. 40/77 and its vassal institution the PPC has already been touched upon in the preceding chapter. Indeed, the political practice in Egypt reveals that the regime has amply used the PPC to retain a firm grip over the licensing of parties, and hence the number of parties present on the multiparty scene. As we have seen, since 1977 most party license applications were rejected on the grounds that the party platforms were not sufficiently distinct from those of the already existing ones. According to the CHRLA, between 1979 and 1996 the PPC rejected no less than thirty-two applications (Hassan, CHRLA Report). As mentioned in chapter two, more recent figures place the total number of rejected parties at no less than sixty-three (Al-Nahas, Al-Ahram Weekly, 04 – 10/11/2004). Whilst several of them managed to gain legal status via court rulings, the majority of these parties never obtained an operating license.

In this connection, it is also telling that until 2000 only one political party has ever been granted a license by the PPC (Stacher 2004: 221). Finally, the PPC has not only refused most party licenses, it has also not shied away from using its powers to monitor and interfere in the activities of all legalised parties. In fact, on the basis of PPC decisions, a total of seven existing parties saw their activities frozen and their party newspapers been suspended. One prominent example of this is the SLP, whose activities were frozen in 2000 and which, despite various court rulings in its favour, has not been regained legal status. Another example is Ahrar, whose activities were suspended in 1998 after the death of its founding leader Kamel Murad and the succession crisis that followed. In both cases the PPC justified its decision by reference to the fact that these parties experienced a leadership crisis which, once resolved, would allow the resumption of party activities. In reality of course, the case of the SLP is much more complex and the party's suspension is probably better explained by its outspoken criticism of the government prior to the 2000 poll than by an impending leadership crisis (Khalil et al. 2003; Al-Nahas, Al-Ahram Weekly, 10 – 16/06/2004).

In addition to the restrictions imposed on the formation of parties, the above mentioned laws and regulations also place numerous impediments on all kinds of party activities. In fact, not only do they regulate the activities parties can pursue outside their premises, they also circumscribe the political rhetoric parties and politicians can employ, and the party materials they can disseminate. Concerning the feasible types of political rhetoric, for instance, the relevant laws lay down a rather extensive list of issues that are sensitive for the regime and thus off limits in Egyptian political discourse. According to Laws No. 38/72 and 33/78 and the Penal Code it is prohibited for any citizen to, either in word or action, challenge the principles of 'social peace', 'national unity', the belief in 'ritual and spiritual values', the protection of the 'socialist achievements of workers and farmers' and the political regime and

its laws. When in force, Law No. 95/80 also penalised any activities that sought to disseminate 'immoral messages, including public criticism of religious values' (Auda et al. 2001: 39-41). Geared more directly towards the election campaign, the same prohibitions can also be found in the various executive decrees that have been issued by the Ministry of Interior. They specifically prohibit candidates and political parties to either in word, written or visual form use election propaganda that would incite religious dissent, disrupt social peace and unity, anticipate hatred against the Arab nature of the Egyptian regime and/or propagate violence against the state. In addition they, finally, also penalise candidates who seek to spread '...false news or rumours about other candidates and their families.'<sup>49</sup>

Similarly restrictive in nature are the laws that guide the activities political parties and individuals are allowed to engage in. At the forefront of these laws stands, of course, the Emergency Law, which in Article three empowers the president to prevent the organisation of any public meetings that could threaten public order and/or security (Al-Islam 2002: 365). The two other ordinary laws regulating the right to assembly and meeting are equally restrictive. According to the Law on Public Assembly, for instance, all public meetings and gatherings must be registered with the local police departments. In fact, these departments have the right to refuse the licensing of public meeting or to halt ongoing gatherings. The same law also gives police departments the right to dissolve any group of more than five people gathering in public, irrespective of whether these have actually committed a crime. In both instances the authorities can act, should they interpret any such meetings as a threat to social peace and public order (Auda et al. 2001: 36-38).

More explicit restrictions relating directly to the election campaign can again be found in the executive decrees issued by the Ministry of Interior. Across the board, these decrees all ban the organisation of street marches and demonstrations and the holding of electoral rallies on public premises, such as in schools, universities, on factory compounds and at military installations. They also reiterated the rule that electoral rallies have to be authorised by the relevant police authorities at least twenty-four hours before the event is scheduled. Finally, all these decrees demand that candidates provide a list to the security authorities of all those persons involved in their election campaign.<sup>50</sup>

The restrictions imposed on the dissemination of political materials, including campaigning materials, have been codified in the Emergency Law, Law No.66/56 on Public Advertisement

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<sup>49</sup> See for example article one of Decree No. 13622/2000 and article two of Decrees No. 951/1979, 279/1984 and 1542/1998.

<sup>50</sup> See for example article four of Decree No. 13622/2000 and articles four & five of Decrees No. 951/1979, 279/1984 and 1542/1998.

and again the relevant executive decrees. According to Article three of the Emergency Law, the president has the right to censor and confiscate all means of written advertisement and expression that pose a threat to public order and security (Auda et al. 2001: 36; Al-Islam 2002: 365; Kassem 2004: 55). Such means of expression also include of course the party materials disseminated publicly by the candidates and parties during and outside election times. Moreover, the Law on Public Advertisement also demands that any written publications be handed to the relevant authorities for verification and approval.<sup>51</sup> This procedure is also explicitly stated in the relevant executive decrees issued since 1979, which demand that both party and candidate banners, election manifestos and leaflets be authorised by the relevant authorities. Finally, each of these ministerial decrees also mandated that no campaigning materials be posted on public buildings and that the relevant authorities can remove any campaigning materials that are deemed to disrupt public order.<sup>52</sup>

As is apparent, the legal system within which parties ought to operate is not only highly restrictive but it has also provided the Egyptian authorities with ample opportunities to interfere in the parties' internal affairs and their interaction with the Egyptian public. One only has to recall the repeated references made in these laws to such vague principles as 'national unity', 'social peace' or 'public order', which can be so easily evoked to ban any public meeting or official publication. Or, one could think indeed of the powers granted to the Ministry of Interior to control all public gatherings of political parties and its right to refuse any official permission on the grounds that they could threaten public order. Under the cover of legality, the Egyptian government has hence established a potent tool with which it can retain an essentially state-dependent and politically marginalised opposition. Its dependency on the state flows from the fact that the very existence of parties seemingly depends on the goodwill of the PPC and hence on that of the government, rather than on their support base. Their political marginalisation in turn is secured through a plethora of laws that – as we have seen – allow the regime to control how much and what types of interaction parties can engage in with the electorate.

That the authorities have actually employed these vast legal powers to the advantage of the NDP and the disadvantage of its opponents comes as no surprise. During the parliamentary election campaigns of the 1980s and 1990s for instance, numerous instances have been reported in which the laws and decrees regulating public meetings and demonstrations have been used discriminatorily against the opposition. Across the past five parliamentary election

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<sup>51</sup> See article two of Law No. 66/56.

<sup>52</sup> See for example article five of Decrees No. 951/1979 and 1542/1998.

campaigns, the patterns of discrimination have always been the same. Facing virtually no problems in obtaining official permits, local NDP offices and candidates were always able to pursue their planned campaigning activities and events. What is more, they were usually also given prime locations for their events, such as central squares, streets and public buildings. Depending on the political affiliation of the opponent, it has been by contrast rather difficult, if not virtually impossible, for opposition parties and candidates to organise similar events. In many instances they simply did not receive permission, or if they did, their events were relegated to venues that remained firmly out of the public limelight and hard to access. In other reported instances even officially sanctioned events were either cancelled at the last minute or allocated different venues. These sudden and arbitrary decisions led, of course, to confusion among the organisers and participants and hence often to the derailment of the entire event. Finally, in some instances the authorities also stepped in during such events, bringing in the security forces to dispel ongoing campaigning activities. Whilst most opposition parties in one form or the other have been subject to such discriminatory practices by the regime, they have been most vigorously employed against the 'non-conformist opposition' including the outlawed MB, its legalised but frozen twin, the SLP, and also the ADNP (Springborg 1989: 190; Kassem 1999: 135, 138; Kassem 2004: 56).

As if this were not sufficient, the regime has employed additional *de facto* restrictions to contain its political opponents. As has repeatedly been remarked upon, this applies particularly to the government's covert control over the national press and the public broadcasting system, its direct access to state resources and the use of outright electoral fraud. With regard to the Egyptian press and broadcasting system, for instance, the government has over the past two decades ensured that coverage of opposition policies and politicians remains minimal compared to that received by the ruling NDP. Again this practice is particularly striking during election times, during which NDP candidates and policies have been receiving extensive coverage in the three leading national papers, *Al-Ahram*, *Al-Gumhuriya* and *Al-Akhbar*. Opposition candidates, programs and parties, have by contrast received little or no attention in these papers. This of course is particularly troublesome for the country's opposition, given that these papers together hold the largest readership and that they hence constitute prime sites to promote party programmes and candidates amongst the wider electorate. Even more troublesome is in this context the virtual domination of the Egyptian broadcasting media by the government. Indeed, with the exception of very short time slots during the election campaign, the state run media provides virtually no substantive information on the country's opposition, its parliamentary and other activities. This fact of course highly diminishes the opposition's chances to widen their support base, given that

almost half of the Egyptian electorate remain illiterate and hence that TV and radio feature among the most effective means to target wider sections in society (Auda et al. 2001: 39).

The privileged position bestowed upon the ruling party in the Egyptian media also extends to the institutional level. Indeed, state patronage towards the governing party and its candidates has been commonplace ever since the inception of multiparty elections in 1979. This state patronage has taken many forms, but most commonly includes the channelling of financial and other resources from state coffers or public companies to the regime's vassal party and its cronies (EOHR Report 1999 – 2000). Other less overt forms include the support of NDP candidates by members of the Egyptian government, who – with the political power in hand – would usually attend their rallies and promise more financial aid and infrastructure projects (Kassem 2004: 56-57). The use of governmental power and patronage to the advantage of the NDP has of course a bad effect on the opposition, whose candidates carry little institutional support and are hence usually not able to match the electoral appeal of their regime-supported competitors.

Finally the government is also known to have used various forms of electoral malpractice and outright fraud to contain opposition inroads into the *Majlis al-Shaab*. Again these forms of political intimidation have received widespread press coverage and are at the forefront of the reasons usually given for why the country's opposition remains so weak. In fact, virtually all of the opposition figures and candidates interviewed for this research confirmed that the government and its candidates employed various forms of political intimidation and fraud against opposition candidates in order to secure the NDP's wide margin of victory. The same conclusions have been drawn by the various non-governmental organisations that have sought to monitor parliamentary and other elections in the country.<sup>53</sup> In their various reports on the issue they have repeatedly pointed to the government's fraudulent practices, which have ranged from outright ballot stuffing to fiddling with voter registration lists and the premature closure of polling stations in areas of known opposition support.<sup>54</sup> The fact that electoral fraud has been rampant in the country and used against the country's opposition is also manifest in the enormous number of electoral appeals that are regularly issued with the Egyptian courts, by candidates challenging the official election results. In 1995, for instance, about 100 such

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<sup>53</sup> In Egypt the organisation and supervision of elections is placed under the auspices of the Ministry of Interior. There is no independent Election Commission, that could monitor the poll, nor have the Egyptian authorities allowed international observers to enter the country for inspections.

<sup>54</sup> For reported cases of electoral malpractice consult, for instance, the two EOHR Statements entitled 'Monitoring the Parliamentary Elections for 2000 –2005' and 'Third Stage of the Parliamentary Elections'. Also consult the two press releases published in 1995 by the The Independent Commission for Electoral Review (ICER) and titled 'Regarding the Election Campaign and the First Round of Voting' and 'Concerning the Second Round of Voting'.

electoral appeal have been filed, which attests to the continuing use of electoral fraud at the ballot box (Shehab, *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 14 – 20/11/1995; EOHR Report 1999-2000).

The current weakness of Egypt's political parties has, however, not only been attributed to the legal and extra-legal restrictions imposed on their activities, but also to the prevailing behavioural traits found among the Egyptian electorate. Theoretically, of course, the development of strong mass-based parties hinges crucially upon the existence of an electorate that is both knowledgeable about the party system in place and willing to structure its electoral choice along partisan lines. Indeed, it is only once these two societal conditions are given that parties, as collective actors, stand any meaningful chances to emerge as the central political players in the electoral arena.

In the Egyptian case none of these conditions apply. To begin with, it has been found that large sections of the Egyptian populace remain ignorant overall of the party system in place and/or of its constituent actors and their programmes. Moreover, of those with some knowledge of the Egyptian party system, a significant proportion seems to reject it as being unrepresentative and irrelevant to the political process of the country. Both these factors can be deduced from a number of opinion polls that have been conducted over the past two decades. According to a 1984 opinion poll published in *Al-Ahali* newspaper, for instance, as many as 50 percent of the respondents apparently did not know at all that there are parties in Egypt.<sup>55</sup> The same poll also found that of those who were aware of the existence of parties only 30.6 percent could actually name some of the parties in existence at that time. Finally, of those who knew some Egyptian parties only 20.4 percent thought that these differed in their programmes, while 9.7 percent saw no difference between the parties at all. Opinion polls conducted in 1990 and 1997 provide similar figures. According to a poll conducted in 1990 by the *Egyptian National Institute for Sociological and Criminological Research* (ENISCR), for instance, no less than 33.3 percent of those polled remained completely unaware of the existence of parties in Egypt, whilst only 12 percent of the respondents were able to name up to six out of the thirteen licensed parties at the time.<sup>56</sup> In terms of programmatic awareness the poll moreover showed that only 25 percent of those polled knew that parties had programmes. Of those again only about 16 percent were actually aware that these party programmes differed. In a similar vein, the *Group for Democratic Development* (GDD) found in a poll

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<sup>55</sup> The 1984 survey polled 500 Egyptian voters from across eight governorates. The sampled population was composed of different societal categories, including students, workers, small businessmen, medium and senior employees and persons with higher degrees. The survey was conducted by researchers from *Ain Shams* and *Bankha* Universities and published in *Al-Ahali* Newspaper (*Al-Ahali*, 25/05/1984).

<sup>56</sup> The 1990 poll by the ENISCR was conducted by Salwa Al-Amry and entitled '*Istala' Ra'i al-Gomhour fil-Ahazab wal-Mumarasa al-Hisbiyya*' (Survey on the Popular Opinion about Parties and their Support). The poll was published in *Al-Migalla al-Igtamiyya al-Qawmiyya*, (*Journal of Social and National Affairs*) 1990 / 30(1).



conducted in 1997 that a staggering 73 percent of the respondents were not aware of the number of parties operating in Egypt, let alone of their titles.<sup>57</sup> When asked to name the existing parties in Egypt most respondents were only able to name between five and eight of the fourteen parties legalised in 1996 (Abou Saeda 1996: 28).

With regard to public attitudes towards the principle of a multiparty system in general and the existing Egyptian party system in particular, the figures are no less encouraging. According to the 1990 *ENISCR* poll more than half of the respondents either had no opinion of or saw no value in the existence of political parties. These figures changed somewhat according to a 1995 poll, which was conducted by the *Almishkat Centre for Research and Training* (ACRT) and published in *Al-Ahram Weekly*.<sup>58</sup> According to this poll the number of respondents that favour a multiparty system in principle stood at about 70 percent, whilst only 30 percent remained either indifferent or hostile to this principle. Yet, when asked more specifically about the current multiparty system in Egypt, a vast majority of respondents asserted that it was 'not beneficial' for the country in its current form. This fact is also reinforced by the number of respondents who thought that none of the Egyptian parties actually represented their interests. Here again a plurality of 40 percent of the respondents asserted that 'none of the political parties or tendencies in the country represented them', whilst another 20 percent had no opinion. Only about 36 percent of those polled, by contrast, felt that one of the existing parties represented them politically (Shukralla, *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 29/12/1994 – 04/01/1995).

Egypt's political parties are however not only forced to operate within a societal environment that is overall ignorant of parties and potentially even party adverse, but also within an electorate whose political attitudes and patterns of interaction remain highly individualised and little structured around functional affiliations. This observation has been made by various academics and finds confirmation in a number public opinion polls conducted on the issue.

Commenting on the overall nature of Egyptian society, Springborg asserts, for instance, that:

'...various aspects of Egypt's political culture favour face-to-face, small group interaction rather than abstract loyalties to organisations and causes. Large-scale formal institutions are little more than aggregates of kinship, friendship and

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<sup>57</sup> The GDD opinion poll was conducted in 1996 and covered a total of 5,000 Egyptians from five governorates (Hafez 1996: 8).

<sup>58</sup> The ACRT poll sampled 1,500 Egyptians over the age of eighteen and from different socio-economic backgrounds. The poll was conducted under the auspices of Nader Fergany and its results published in *Al-Ahram Weekly* (Shukrallah, *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 29/12/ 1994 -04/01/1995).

other personalistic networks, hence prone to fragmentation and vacillation' (Springborg 1989: 185).

Referring more specifically to the Egyptian electorate, Kassem and others also illustrate that personal, family, tribal or village loyalties have in the past elections mattered far more to voters than formal party organisations and their programmes. As Kassem remarks, this feature is particularly evident during election times, during which people tend to select candidates not because of their 'ideological persuasion' but '...because they believe that once the individuals in question enter the People's Assembly they will be in a position to influence the government and channel resources in their direction' (Kassem 1999: 22-25). Sharing Kassem's position, Al-Sayed Said from the ACPSS also notes with regards to the prevailing voting patterns in Egypt that: '...people are accustomed to voting for those who can provide them with services and not for their political or party affiliation' (Al-Said Said, Al-Ahram Weekly, 09-15/11/2000). Providing a specific example of this phenomenon he argues that in the countryside '...village loyalties (...) have prevailed systematically over all other considerations. Even when the candidate from the next village enjoys fame and respect for his social status or political standing, voters preferred the candidate from their own village, however unknown or insignificant (Al-Said Said, Al-Ahram Weekly, 09 –15/11/2000). This overall view is finally also expressed by Shukralla who yet again maintains:

'Patronage relations and tribal loyalties overwhelmingly determine voter behaviour and this in a highly class-stratified society where actual tribes are virtually non-existent. The bulk of candidates view parliament as a site for business, not politics and voters concur by demanding services rather than political platforms from their representatives. Tribalism thus performs the vital function of providing a non-political claim by constituents on their parliamentary representatives, and through him on the state' (Shukralla, Al-Ahram Weekly, 07-13/12/1995).

The picture just painted also emerges in a number of public opinion polls and surveys that have been conducted on this issue in 1987, 1997 and 2000 respectively. Together these polls again demonstrate how little politics, and party politics in particular, matter in the Egyptian street. According to the 1996 GDD public opinion poll, for instance, as many as 67 percent of the sampled population asserted that they do not care at all about Egyptian politics (Abou Saeda 1996: 25). This overall dismal interest in the affairs of the Egyptian state is also mirrored in two further parts of that poll that measured levels of involvement in civil society organisations, such as NGOs and political parties. Here again 88 percent of those with some

awareness of the party political scene claimed not to be affiliated with any of the existing parties. An even larger number of about 94 percent claimed that they were not actively involved with any of the country's NGOs (Abou Saeda 1996: 25).

Even more importantly, the available polls and surveys also confirm the prevalence of highly personalised voting patterns among the Egyptian electorate and with it the absence of any abstract party affiliations. Indeed, judging from the data available little has changed between the 1980s and 1990s in this regard, with voters primarily structuring their ballot around personal rather than abstract party affiliations. In a survey conducted with party candidates in 1987 by the ACPSS, for instance, it was unanimously claimed that party political considerations played little or no importance in the voter's electoral choice.<sup>59</sup> What mattered instead were the candidate's capacity to provide constituency services and his personality (Goma'a 1988: 43-55). Similar results also transpire from the 1997 GDD poll. Here again a staggering majority of 91 percent of the respondents thought that the electability of a candidate depended primarily on his or her capacity '...to render services to the residents of the area' (Abou Saeda 1998: 35, 36). Other parts of the poll confirm this prevalence of personalism in electoral politics. Asked about the prime electoral influences during the campaign, 45.7 percent of the respondents asserted, for instance, that they were mainly influenced by the direct contacts with the candidates and their personal programmes, 29 percent by the candidates' tribal and family connections, and about 40 percent by their personal knowledge of the candidates (Abou Saeda 1998: 38-39). In yet another survey conducted by Auda and Al-Boray with forty parliamentary candidates shortly before the 2000 elections the very same response patterns can be observed.<sup>60</sup> Here again a vast majority of candidates asserted that the elections were fought along personal rather than ideological lines and that persons and the provision of services mattered more than parties and their programmes (Auda et al. 2001a: 79).

The lack of interest in Egyptian politics in general and the overall absence of strong party affiliations among a vast majority of the Egyptian adult population in particular have probably various root causes. To begin with, these are undoubtedly related to the history of Egyptian authoritarian rule, which has over the past fifty years contributed to the effective disenfranchisement of the Egyptian electorate and hence its disillusionment with politics. It can also be attributed to the restrictive legal environment in place, which, as we have seen, renders it very difficult for parties to create widespread awareness of their very existence and

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<sup>59</sup> The poll by the ACPSS was conducted in the constituencies of *East Cairo* and *Suez* and covered a total of 550 respondents (Goma'a 1988: 44).

<sup>60</sup> The survey conducted by these authors covered forty candidates from all major parties (Auda, et. al. 2001a: 71).

programmes. What is more, it effectively bars parties from mobilising a broad-based electoral constituency on a wider scale and in so doing it facilitates the prevalence of highly personalised patterns of political interaction. This latter argument is also put forward by Kassem who writes ‘...the non-competitive nature of the Egyptian multiparty arena encourages voters to support electoral candidates on the basis of personal, patron-client nature rather than on the basis of party programmes and policies that have little effect on national policies’ (Kassem 2004: 80). On the basis of this observation she further maintains that: ‘...the weak ties bonding voters to political parties accentuate the significance of individual politicians within the realms of their own parties, because these individuals enter their respective parties with their followers and supporters in tow’ (Kassem 2004: 80).

Finally, this overall absence of strong party affiliations can to some extent also be attributed to the fact that large sections of the Egyptian population remain illiterate.<sup>61</sup> This means that these sections are barred from obtaining and processing the information of different party programmes and platforms and that they are hence incapable of developing lasting affinities with specific political formations.

Whatever the root causes, it is apparent that these highly personalised patterns of social and political interaction, and with them the absence of functional party affiliations, further compounded the incapacity of the parties themselves to mobilise larger sectoral constituencies of society around programmatic lines. In fact, parties to this day are left to vie for a very shallow segment of the Egyptian society, that as we have seen, has to this day been little receptive to party programmes and platforms.

### **3.2 The Internal Sources of Party Weakness**

The weakness of Egypt’s parties, whilst being primarily attributed to the external impediments in place, has also been explained with reference to a number of internal deficiencies that characterise their day-to-day operations. These include most notably the absence of internal democracy, the lack of *internal unity* and the prevalence of underfinanced party organisations. Overall, these internal deficiencies have severely undermined the credibility and effectiveness of Egypt’s parties to function as viable avenues for political representation and participation.

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<sup>61</sup> According to figures provided by UNESCO the current literacy rate in Egypt stands at 55.6 percent of the entire adult population (UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS)).

Of all the internal troubles plaguing Egypt's parties, the absence of internal democracy causes probably most serious damage to their prestige within society. As Salama remarks: '...[t]he existing parties have no democratic structures and never organise democratic elections that might allow for the emergence of new leaders' (in Dawoud, *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 25 – 31/05/2000). This point is also reiterated by Zaki who writes on a rather cynical note: 'the parties exhibit very little, if any, democracy in running their internal affairs. In fact they are micro-reflections of the political regime they condemn' (Zaki: 1995: 227).

Indeed, until fairly recently virtually none of the existing parties have organised any meaningful electoral contest to select their party leader or for that matter any other party cadre (Zaki 1995: 227). It is only in the last couple of years that some of them have pushed for greater internal democracy, including most notably the NDP, NWP and Tagammu. In 2002 for instance the NDP decided that all top party positions should henceforth be directly elected by party members (Abdel-Latif, *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 19/09 – 25/09/2002).<sup>62</sup> In similar developments both the NWP and Tagammu held for the first time ever relatively transparent leadership elections. The NWP held such elections in 2000 when the presidency of the party became vacant after the sudden death of its long-time leader Fouad Serageddin (*Al-Ahram Weekly*, 28/09 – 04/10/2000). Tagammu in turn conducted its first ever free and fair leadership contest in 2004, when Khalid Muhieddin stepped down from the party's chairmanship after twenty-eight years in office (*Al-Nahas, Al-Ahram Weekly*, 01 – 07/01/2004). However, these elections were the first of their kind, and it is yet to be seen whether they will have presaged greater internal democracy within the party political spectrum in the years to come.

The democratic gap thus described is however not only manifest in the absence of formal elections but is also apparent in the prevalence of autocratic leadership tendencies. To quote Salama again: 'all parties are run by a group of political professionals whose main interest it is to maintain the status quo' (in Dawoud, *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 25 – 31/05/2000). Within this framework, party decisions are commonly formed in a highly centralised manner and without any meaningful grass-roots participation. What is more, in several instances the decisions and actions taken by party cadre were clearly meant to serve their own personal interests rather than that of the party as a whole. Overall then we find that whilst calling on their government to introduce greater political freedoms, there have so far been little meaningful pushes within the parties themselves to move along the same trajectory.

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<sup>62</sup> In contrast to Sadat, Mubarak had never held any elections within the party. The 2002 leadership elections were hence a novelty (Springborg 1989: 159).

The weakness of Egypt's parties is also compounded by the absence of cohesive party structures. As has been widely observed, virtually all of the country's parties have at one time or the other been plagued by often severe internal divisions and conflict (Springborg 1989: 200-207). These divisions, so it has been found, have significantly undermined the capacity of parties to increase their popular appeal among the electorate and with it their chance to become viable players in the electoral arena. This point is reiterated by Abdel-Latif who, discussing the opposition's performance in the 2000 elections, asserts that their meagre achievements '...came as little surprise to many observers because several parties were plagued by internal turmoil' (Abdel-Latif, Al-Ahram Weekly, 23 – 29/11/2000). Commenting more generally on the current state of party politics in Egypt Al-Muslimany also finds that the main problem of parties in the country is their incapacity to '...manage and adequately resolve their internal disputes' (Al-Muslimany 1999: 13). This latter fact is finally also acknowledged within the ranks of the parties themselves. As one Wafdist party cadre explained 'all political parties are weak. They need to put their houses in order and revise their platforms so as to be a political force to be reckoned with' (Abdel-Latif, Al-Ahram Weekly, 23 – 29/11/2000).

In the Egyptian case, the types of internal divisions that have been plaguing the country's political parties are plentiful. First of all, to varying degrees all parties seem to suffer from ongoing power struggles between individual party cadres or between entire party fractions. Indeed, whilst not necessarily visible to outside observers, most experts in the field agree that internal struggles for power, prestige and party positions have inflicted the ruling NDP as much as its opponents. In some cases, these internal struggles have even led to the complete paralysis of the party in question and consequentially to the freezing of its activities by the semi-governmental PPC. As we know this was the fate of the liberal Ahrar which, after the death of its founding leader in 1998, experienced severe infighting between different party factions and cadre for the presidency of the party. When it became apparent that, instead of agreeing on a new leader, the party had fallen apart into different factions, each claiming sole legitimacy, the PPC moved in and suspended all its activates until the dispute had been resolved (Apiku, Middle East Times, 23/08/1998; Mursi, Middle East Times, 10 – 16/10/2002). It was only in January 2005 that the party regained legal status, when the PPC unilaterally ended the leadership struggle within the party and decided to acknowledge Helmi Salem as the party's new chairman (Al-Nahas, Al-Ahram Weekly, 06 – 12/01/2005). Other less prominent examples that involved the PPC include for instance the EGP, whose activities had been frozen between 1991 and 1995 and the ASEP (Al-Muslimany 1999: 13). The latter party had been suspended from political life after the eruption of a conflict between eleven

potential contenders for the party chairmanship in 2000 (Al-Din, Al-Ahram Weekly, 08 – 14/11/2001).

Another perennial source of division found among a majority of parties in Egypt is so called generational disputes between old and new party cadre. Most recently such generational disputes have surfaced within the ranks of the NDP and ANDP, but they equally prevail within the NWP, Tagammu and other opposition parties (see for example Apiku, Middle East Times, 11/05/1997). For instance one episode exposed such divisions within the ADNP: it took place in 1995, when a group of younger party members under the leadership of Hamdin Sabahi, Amin Iskander and Salah Al-Dessouki unsuccessfully tried to challenge the incumbent party leader Diaeddine Dawoud in a leadership contest (Al-Nahas, Al-Ahram Weekly, 12 – 18/10/2000). Dawoud, who had been a minister under President Nasser, has been president of the ADNP since its inception in 1992 and is considered to be a member of the party's old guard. Although less visible, similar divisions also prevail within the NDP. They usually tend to surface during party conferences or when it comes to selecting the party's candidates for parliamentary and other elections and tend to pit the president's son Gamal Mubarak and his younger followers against the old guard, represented by such heavyweights as Kamal Al-Shazli, the minister of state for parliamentary affairs, Youssef Wali, the Minister of Agriculture and Sawat Al-Sherif the current Secretary-General of the NDP (Al-Din, Al-Ahram Weekly, 22 – 28/08/2002; Al-Din, Al-Ahram Weekly, 26/09 – 02/10/2002).

Finally, most parties also harbour ideological-programmatic divisions, which have often prevented the parties in question from formulating clear and unambiguous policy alternatives. Again, these divisions have affected virtually all major parties in the country, but seem to have been most pronounced within the ranks of Tagammu, the NDP and the SLP. According to Springborg, for instance, the NDP is a mass movement without a clear policy orientation, being populated by a highly diverse spectrum of ideological and political trends, including amongst others Sadists, Nasserites and the 'parasitic bourgeoisie' (Springborg 1989: 157, 168). Being a coalition of different political currents, Tagammu also incorporates a rather wide range of ideological positions. According to the party leadership itself, Tagammu contains Nasserites, Marxists, Communists, an enlightened religious trend, social democrats, socialists and Arab nationalists (Hinnebush 1981: 330-331, 337; Hendriks 1983: 262). As the previous party president proclaimed 'we have our own platform that accommodates all leftist trends. Ideologically speaking Tagammu is a coalition' (Al-Ahram Weekly, 02 – 08/11/1995). Probably most apparent to outside observers is the ideological infighting that has been shaking the SLP in the wake of its alliance with the MB in 1987 and ever since. Founded as a

socialist party, the SLP soon split into two trends, one Islamist and the other socialist (Singer 1993: 17-30). When the Islamists within the party won the upper hand and formed an alliance with the MB, the party basically broke apart with most socialist-leaning members leaving the party. As has been discussed elsewhere, to this day the SLP is reeling from these internal divisions, which have also been used as a pretext by the PPC to freeze all its activities (Stacher, Middle East Times 19/11/1999; McClure, Cairo Times, 25 – 31/05/2000).

On many occasions, the weakness of Egypt's parties has, finally also been attributed to the absence of sufficient financial resources. This, it has been argued, chiefly applies to the country's opposition forces, most of which have never possessed the financial means to effectively campaign for broader public recognition, neither during nor outside the electoral period. The only parties that have been exempt from this observation are the ruling NDP and to some extent the NWP. The NDP is of course excluded, because of its 'unlimited access to the state's resources', its powerful backing by the country's business elite and its own comparatively strong resource pool (Harb & Hilal 1988: 22; Al-Khawaga 1995: 85, 92; Kienle 1995: 141; Kassem 1999: 93; Egyptian Gazette, 02/01/2000). According to Kassem the NDP currently disposes over twenty million Egyptian pounds in capital, in addition to an annual income of 250,000 Egyptian pounds from the sales of its publications and another 100,000 Egyptian pounds that each party is granted by the *Shura Council* (Kassem 1999: 77).

Although it is difficult to assess the exact extent of Egypt's parties resources, there are also indications that the NWP is financially somewhat better off than most of the other opposition parties. Being housed in a freshly renovated villa in central Cairo, the NWP has, for instance, never accepted the state funding granted by the *Majlis al-Shura*. Moreover, given its socio-political orientation as a liberal party and its historical linkage with the country's landed elite, the party has traditionally been able to fall back on a comparatively wealthy membership and support base (Harb & Hilal 1988: 22; Kienle 1995: 140). This is particularly apparent during election times, during which the party has usually been able to nominate numerous well-off candidates, who have been able to finance their own campaigns and sometimes even those of their less-well off fellow NWP contenders.

Virtually all other opposition parties have by contrast been plagued by a perennial shortage of financial resources. According to Law No. 40/77 parties in Egypt can draw on three distinct sources of income. These include the annual *Shura Council* subsidy mentioned above, the revenues generated from membership fees and private donations, as well as those generated from the sale of party publications. Except for the *Shura Council* subsidy, none of these legal sources of party revenue have however helped strengthen the financial position of Egypt's



opposition over the past two decades. To begin with, most of these parties retain both very low membership figures and fees. Ordinary Tagammu members, for instance, pay a membership fee of one Egyptian pound per year and members of the EGP six Egyptian pounds.<sup>63</sup> What is more, in contrast to the NDP and NWP, most of these parties cannot fall back on wealthy donors to sponsor their activities. Firstly, there are virtually no incentives for such donors to sponsor the opposition given the electoral predominance of the NDP. Secondly, there is always the fear that sponsoring the country's opposition could run the respective businessman into trouble with the Egyptian authorities. With regard to party publications, the picture has been equally grim. Here again most parties either cannot afford to publish their own journals and papers, such as the EGP and other marginal forces, or if they can, these papers usually suffer from dismally low readership levels and are hence a liability rather than a financial asset to the parties in question.

In terms of party development it is rather obvious that the financial troubles thus described, have severely hampered the capacity of Egypt's opposition to develop their organisational capacity and enhance their public visibility in society. The latter connection has been particularly apparent during election times, during which these parties have been hard pressed to find sufficient financial means in order to effectively compete for the public's attention alongside the ruling NDP. In fact, with only very limited resources at their disposal, most of these parties were neither able to organise any large-scale campaigning events nor to finance the campaigning expenses of their candidates.<sup>64</sup> Usually these have to rely on their own resources or on those of other donors. As a consequence, many parties were unable to nominate a large number of candidates in the past elections or could only nominate those with sufficient financial means. Moreover, in more recent years this fact has also contributed to the individualisation of electoral politics. Indeed, as we shall see below, the very fact that candidates had to finance their own campaigns made them less responsive and accountable to party headquarters and hence less prone to become effective proponents of the party as a whole.

In sum, it is not hard to see how the various internal deficiencies plaguing Egypt's parties have contributed to their low levels of societal entrenchment. As just mentioned, these parties have not only failed to broaden their support base because of the restrictions imposed on their activities but also because of their dismal record in both internal democracy and discipline.

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<sup>63</sup> According to Mohamed Awad, the Secretary-General of the EGP, the fee of six Egyptian pounds is still very high and difficult for some members to pay. This is why the party has *de facto* decided to allow Egyptians to join the EGP without paying a fee, in order to increase its membership. See interview with Mohamed Awad (EGP).

<sup>64</sup> See for example interviews with Al-Sayed Al-Badawy (NWP), Saad Abdel Nour (NWP), Mohamed Awad (EGP), Hussein Ahmed (UP) & Ahmed Sorur (UP).

This deficiency has particularly damaged the credibility of the country's opposition, whose rhetorical demands for greater democracy have been little matched by the workings of the parties themselves. Finally, and as we have just seen, Egypt's opposition forces have also failed to attain greater prominence in society, because of their precarious financial situation, which has inhibited them from expanding their organisational capacity and public visibility.

### **3.3 Explaining the Electoral Marginalisation of Egypt's Parties since 1990**

Whilst the preceding discussion examined the overall sources of party weakness, this section explores those factors that have been put forward to account for the electoral marginalisation of political parties during the 1990s. In chapter two it was argued in this regard that Egypt's parties, although weak overall, were electorally far more prominent during the 1980s than during the 1990s; and this both in numerical and more substantive terms. To recapitulate, numerically this latter period has been marked by a drastic decline in the number of party candidates at the electoral level and a simultaneous increase in the number of so called independent candidates. It has also been marked by a drastic reduction in the number of opposition representatives in the Egyptian legislature. In more substantive terms, this time period has been characterised by the decreasing willingness of party candidates to promote their party labels and programmes, and the rising resort to various forms of political entrepreneurship. The question that hence arises, is how is one to explain this quantitative and qualitative marginalisation of political parties as collective actors in the electoral arena since 1990?

At the time of writing, very few academics had dealt extensively with this precise question. Nevertheless, a number of studies are available in the field that have to some extent explored the observed decline in the electoral prominence of parties during the 1990s. Most attempts to explain this decline can be found within the literature on parliamentary elections in Egypt, and particularly in those studies that investigate the campaigns of 1990, 1995 and 2000. Other attempts to account for this phenomenon can be found within broader longitudinal analyses of the socio-political developments under the Mubarak presidency. Within this latter type of research the work of Kienle warrants particular attention, because it probably provides the most comprehensive accounts for why Egypt's parties have become so marginalised in the electoral and parliamentary arenas in the 1990s.

As will become apparent below, however, virtually none of these studies has investigated in greater detail the potential impact of the 1990 electoral reform on the marginalisation of

Egypt's political parties. As mentioned in the introduction, this academic neglect of the electoral system variable is particularly striking, given that the 1990 reform constituted the single most important event that happened prior to the deterioration of party politics in Egypt during that decade. It is also striking when consulting the political science literature on the distal and proximal effects of electoral institutions, which, as I intend to demonstrate, provides a valuable avenue to explain why in the 1990s Egypt's parties actually deteriorated electorally in the manner they did. To be sure, some of the authors discussed below have made reference to the electoral system variable in explaining this phenomenon. Yet, these accounts remain sketchy overall and provide little in-depth analysis of how precisely the changes in the Egyptian electoral law affected the behaviour of party candidates and cadre and by extension the overall performance of parties at the electoral and parliamentary levels.

Within the available literature, most commentaries on the development of Egypt's political parties address the creeping individualisation of electoral politics and the marginalisation of the political opposition in parliament since 1990. As regards the individualisation of electoral politics Abdel Fattah asserts, for instance, that Egypt has experienced a gradual 're-traditionalisation' of the political sphere since the turn to multiparty elections in the late 1970s. This re-traditionalisation has been manifest in the nature of the electoral process itself, which since 1990 has been dominated by the recourse of all political parties to tribal and traditional solidarities both during the candidate recruitment phase and the actual campaign. It has moreover been manifest in the prevalence of clientelist patterns of interaction between candidates and voters during the campaigning period. Indicators supportive of this line of reasoning are, according to her, the large numbers of businessmen and local notables among the candidates entering the 1995 race and the highly personalised campaigns fought in these elections by the party candidates themselves.<sup>65</sup> Further indicators of this overall re-traditionalisation in politics, mentioned by Abdel Fattah, are the rise in political corruption and the steady decline in the readership of party newspapers. Taken together, she proposes that these indicators be read as signalling a decline in the importance and activities of parties over the past twenty years (in Al-Khawaga 1995: 86).

In a very similar vein to the re-traditionalisation hypothesis, Al-Shubaky and others maintain that party politics in Egypt have become increasingly de-politicised over the past two decades, which has led to the marginalisation of parties at the electoral level. Again this observation rests primarily on evidence drawn from the parliamentary elections of 1995 and 2000. According to Al-Shubaky, for instance, the 1995 elections were devoid of any major debate

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<sup>65</sup> In 1995 a total of thirty-seven businessmen entered the legislature. In 2000 this number rose to seventy-seven, which constitutes a rise from about 8 to 17 percent of all legislative seats (Auda et. Al. 2000: 66).

on the socio-political issues which usually divide party political discourse. Instead they were characterised by a campaigning rhetoric that centred primarily on local issues and the personality of the candidates themselves, and little on the parties and their platforms. This observation is also shared by Makram-Ebeid who maintains with regards the 2000 poll:

‘Political life is the main loser this time around. Village loyalties prevail over all other considerations. One theory holds that the election results reflect the widespread distrust of politicians in Egypt as a result of the state’s 50-year struggle against free and independent expression. The emergence of an apolitical society is thus seen as the legacy of a specific brand of benevolent authoritarianism. Hence, the election of candidates was not the result of political preferences and on the whole the campaign was marked by a striking lack of political debate beyond the Palestinian issue’ (Makram-Ebeid 2001: 41).

According to Al-Shubaky the reasons for this ‘(de-)politisation’ reside primarily in the strategic objectives pursued by the ruling party prior to and during the 1995 elections. These objectives are directly related to the violent conflict between government and militant Islamist groups that embroiled the country in the 1990s and that threatened to seriously undermine its stability. To rid the national debate of any ideological fervour, particularly of any religious reference, the NDP pursued a dual strategy that involved both a vigorous persecution of Islamist activists and the incorporation of moderate elements of Islam into the party programme. The party also sought to forge a ‘consensus’ with the legalised political opposition on the need to fight ‘terrorism’ as a prime national objective. The forging of this national consensus, so he argues, made it very difficult for opposition parties to attack the government on different policy domains, as such criticism would have easily been perceived as anti-patriotic in times of crisis. The muted atmosphere thus created prior to and during the elections translated directly in the observed lack of any national level policy debates between the contending political parties.

The manifestations of this (de-)politisation are twofold according to Al-Shubaky. First, (de-)politisation is manifest in the types of candidates selected by the political parties for the parliamentary elections of 1995. Rather than selecting committed ‘political deputies’ these parties preferred to nominate local notables who had traditional or family ties to their constituency and the capacity to provide local services. Second, and even more crucially, it is also manifest in the emergence of strategic alliances between representatives of the NDP and the legalised opposition. According to Al-Shubaky these alliances were meant to reflect the

newly forged consensus among Egypt's main political forces in the face of political crisis. The most prominent of these strategic alliances, which is commonly referred to, took place in 1995 between the then president of Tagammu, Khaled Mohieddin, and the NDP candidate, Samir Nusayr, in the district of *Kafr Shukr* in *Qaliyubiya* and between Yassin Serrageddin, the former president of the NWP, and the NDP's worker candidate in the *Cairo* constituency of *Qasr Al- Nil* (Al-Khawaga 1995: 87-88; Al-Shubaky 1996: 67-74).

Although overall correct in their description of the 1995 elections, both these hypothesis provide, however, at best a partial and potentially even a misleading picture of recent developments in Egyptian politics. This is because the terms '(re-)traditionalisation' and '(de-)politisation' may imply that at one point in time – possibly during the 1980s – both the Egyptian electorate and party representatives were far more programmatic-ideologically oriented than in the 1990s. As mentioned before, however, empirical evidence has demonstrated that voting patterns have always remained highly parochial and that even candidates have always had a tendency to take recourse to their personal and traditional loyalties rather than to their party affiliation. To speak about a '(re-)traditionalisation' or a '(de-)politisation' of the electoral discourse in Egypt hence simply does not seem to match reality. This does not mean, however, that both these hypothesis must be completely discarded. Indeed, pitched in a slightly different manner, one could argue that the recourse actually made by party candidates to the prevailing ascriptive identities was simply more pronounced in the 1990s than it was in the 1980s. Re-conceptualised in this manner, one would then have to examine, of course, why such recourse was stronger in the 1990s as opposed to the 1980s, a question not addressed by the (re-)traditionalisation hypothesis in its present form and only insufficiently answered by the (de-)politisation hypothesis.

This latter remark leads also on to a second problem with the two hypotheses. Regarding the (re-)traditionalisation hypothesis, for instance, little mention is made of why this change in the political discourse came about, should one accept the premises around which it is constructed in the first place. In other words one is left to wonder what precisely caused this (re-)traditionalisation. The problem with the (de-)politisation hypothesis, as presented here, lies primarily with its exclusive focus on the regime's handling of the Islamist insurgency. As will become apparent below, this focus on the NDP's reaction to the Islamist insurgency provides a reductionist picture of developments on the ground, that discards a number of crucial factors which, intentionally or not, also affected the singular marginalisation of Egypt's parties at the electoral level.

Among the more comprehensive studies available on the socio-political developments under the Mubarak presidency we also find numerous attempts to explain the marginalisation of Egypt's parties since 1990. Of particular insight are here the analyses of, amongst others, Kassem, Kienle, Langhor, Brownlee, Cassandra and Stacher. In her discussion of clientalist control in Egypt, Kassem, for instance, maintains that electoral politics during the 1990s have been characterised by highly individualised campaigns, in which candidates tended to de-emphasise their party bonds and programmatic orientation in favour of their personality, the capacity to provide constituency services and their ties to the local community. According to Kassem, the pursuit of such particularistic campaign strategies has been highly damaging for the development of cohesive and politically salient parties during the 1990s. This is because '...such forms of electoral participation do little to recruit grass-roots supports for the parties', which of course is a necessary condition if parties want to gain electoral prominence and become mass-based organisations (Kassem 1999: 127).

According to Kassem the 'particularistic' nature of electoral politics has three root causes. First she asserts that it is connected to the unstructured nature of the electorate and the restrictive legal framework in place; hence to the two environmental factors that had already been held responsible for the overall weakness of political parties in Egypt. Both these factors, so she claims, bore significantly on the individualisation of electoral politics since 1990, first because they inhibited candidates from drawing on a well-defined constituency of party supporters and second because they prevented parties from organising mass-scale campaigning events to attract a wider electorate (Kassem 1999: 128, 135, 138-140).

Most interestingly, however, Kassem also attributes this personalisation of electoral politics to the limited organisational capacity of the parties themselves. As she points out with reference to the 1990 and 1995 elections, most legalised parties were financially and organisationally so constrained that they could not even support their own candidates with the necessary campaigning staff and resources to wage an effective election campaign. This was of course particularly the case within the ranks of the opposition which, as demonstrated elsewhere, has persistently been plagued by financial difficulties and dwindling numbers of party militants. To some extent this was, however, also observable within the ranks of the NDP, which in many instances did not provide direct financial or organisational assistance to its candidates. Left without any support from party headquarters, candidates were hence forced to finance their own electioneering efforts and to build up their own personal support networks and campaigning staff for the election campaign. According to Kassem this high degree of organisational independence from their parties further facilitated the adoption of highly

individualist campaigning strategies by the party candidates themselves (Kassem 1999: 128, 149, 150 - 162).<sup>66</sup>

Although compelling in its analysis, Kassem's argument can however not be entirely sustained, particularly when examined against comparative evidence drawn from both the 1980s and the 1990s. Particularly problematic is in this regard her resource variable, which according to her constitutes '... the underlying factor which leads candidates to adopt individualistic campaign strategies independent of the parties they officially represent' (Kassem 1999: 128). Once we accept this line of reasoning, however, we become hard pressed to explain the greater party orientation of candidates that can be observed during the 1980s. This is the case, because arguably, during the 1980s parties were equally if not even more starved of sufficient resources to support their candidates than in the 1990s. Indeed, keeping in mind that most political parties at the time had been in existence for less than a decade, it is hard to imagine that their resource base was sufficiently strong to fund a national election campaign of the scale demanded in 1984 and 1987. It therefore appears, that the variance in the degree of party-orientation observed across the past two decades cannot be adequately explained only by reference to the lack of organisational capacity among Egypt's legalised political parties.

In what has probably become the predominant paradigm for the Mubarak era, numerous scholars have suggested that the political marginalisation of Egypt's parties since 1990 was largely the result of a wider 'de-liberalisation' that gripped the country during that decade. According to the proponents of this so called de-liberalisation hypothesis, Mubarak's tenure in office can be divided into two distinct periods. The first of these two periods lasted from 1981 to 1990 and was characterised by a relative expansion of political and civil liberties, compared to the last repressive years of the Sadat presidency. The second period then commenced in the early 1990s and has been obvious in Egyptian politics ever since. In essence this period is notable for its significant reduction in civil and political liberties and a more heavy-handed approach by the regime towards its political opponents. Commenting on this development, Brownlee writes for instance:

'...the truth of the matter is that participation and pluralism are now at lower levels than at any time since Mubarak assumed the presidency in the wake of Anwar Sadat's assassination 21 years ago. After a tenuous period of political

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<sup>66</sup> Kassem excludes the MB from this overall assessment, because its candidates were supported during their campaigns by group militants, who had no personal relation to the candidate, but were committed members of the Islamist group and its guiding ideology (Kassem 1999: 128, 143-144).

opening in the 1980s and very early 1990s, the regime has progressively limited opportunities for the dispersal of power beyond the president, let alone for an actual alternation in power' (Brownlee 2002: 6).

Similar arguments have been presented by both Kienle and Cassandra. Being the father of the de-liberalisation hypothesis, Kienle claims that '...since the early 1990s, Egypt has experienced a substantial degree of political de-liberalisation', whilst Cassandra maintains that '...the thrust of government policy since the 1990s has been to restrict political participation' (Kienle 1998: 220; Cassandra 2004: 15).

As these academics maintain, however, the deliberalisation thus described did not destroy a fully fledged liberal democracy, which never existed in Egypt, but rather '...reversed the relative expansion of liberties' that had been evident during the 1980s and that had taken place within an overall authoritarian regime context (Kienle 1998: 220). Writing along these lines Stacher notes for instance that during the 1980s '...authoritarian mechanisms were not used as frequently as would be the case in the second decade of Mubarak's presidency, but remained available' (Stacher 2004: 218). In a similar vein Brownlee argues:

'...the freedoms that opposition activists enjoyed during the 1980s easily slipped away. And they easily slipped away because the openings of that earlier decade had no institutional basis, coming as they did solely at the discretion of the regime. Mubarak's first years in power thus never represented a genuine move towards liberal democracy but only a tactical and precarious tolerance' (Brownlee 2002: 8).

The de-liberalisation as induced by the Egyptian regime had of course many faces. As Stacher remarks, however, it can probably best be described as '...a matrix of regime crackdowns on civil and political liberties that have limited political expression; and a perpetual state of emergency' (Stacher 2004: 216). These crackdowns took various forms. On the legal front for instance, they entailed a more vigorous application of the existing restrictions on individual and collective freedoms, that can be found in the Emergency Law, the Penal Code, and other civil legislation. They also entailed the introduction of further repressive amendments to existing civil legislation, particularly to the Penal Code, the Political Parties' Law and the laws regulating the operations of syndicates and trade unions. Finally, they even contained the adoption of new restrictive laws, most notable of which were the abolition of mayoral elections in 1994 and the passage of the new Press and NGO laws in 1996 and 2002 respectively. Politically, moreover, this crackdown manifested itself in a rising recourse made



by the regime to military tribunals in order to try civilian cases and in its more heavy-handed approach towards the various regime critical elements in society, including most notably Islamist activists, journalists and even academics (Cassandra 1995: 15-16; Kienle 1998: 229; Kienle 2001: 75; Brownlee 2002: 7; Stacher 2004: 217).

The political ramifications of this larger crackdown on civil and political liberties finally also shook Egypt's political parties and their performance within the polity. Indeed, there is widespread agreement among the proponents of the de-liberalisation hypothesis that the regime pursued an increasingly heavy-handed approach towards the country's political opposition, including most notably the outlawed MB but also the other legalised opposition parties. As Stacher writes: 'while deliberalisation began in the early 1990s, it was initially directed at Islamist activism and political aspirations. When the regime successfully dealt with the Islamists, it began to curtail its own weak opposition parties' (Stacher 2004: 232).

The heavy-handed approach thus taken by the regime since 1990 contained a number of measures that were employed with little else in mind, than to block any further rises in opposition representation and participation. They entailed, amongst other things, the use of unprecedented levels of electoral fraud and other forms of regime intimidation, so as to secure the NDP's two-thirds majority in the *Majlis al-Shaab*. According to Stacher they also entailed direct assaults on the regime's most vocal critics. As is widely known, the regime was for instance, actively involved in the PPC's decision to freeze the activities of the unruly SLP and of other minor opposition forces. To prevent the MB from making any electoral inroads, the regime also started to pursue and prosecute more actively its political cadre and parliamentary candidates. Finally, the regime also started to stir up the political opposition, by infiltrating their parties with regime cronies, by fostering internal divisions and by playing the different parties off against each other (Stacher 2004: 224).

Together these regime practices were thought to have caused the further marginalisation of the country's opposition parties and their dwindling numbers in the Egyptian legislature since 1990. In addition they were also thought to have facilitated the ever widening margins of victories won by the ruling NDP in the *Majlis al-Shaab* elections of 1990, 1995 and 2000 (Kienle 1998: 224-227; Langhor 2004: 186).

Regarding the reasons behind this de-liberalisation of the 1990s, two explanations seem to prevail among the adherents to this hypothesis. First, they all agree that the erosion of political freedoms was a direct consequence of the Islamist insurgency that hit the Egyptian state in the early 1990s. As Brownlee remarks, this insurgency provided the overall pretext

for the regime's increasing resort to authoritarian practices in general and its heavy-handed approach against the country's opposition in particular. Second, they also agree that this policy shift was largely inspired by the regime's fear of increasing societal unrest in the wake of its economic reform programme (Cassandra 1995: 17; Kienle 1998: 221; Brownlee 2002: 7). As Kienle explains in this regard:

'A number of restrictions on liberties have served, and sometimes been intended, to facilitate such reforms, or at least to contain or pre-empt popular apprehension about the reforms' actual potential, or perceived consequences for the redistribution of wealth. Thus, to a significant degree political de-liberalisation was the immediate corollary of reforms that were meant to enhance property rights, increase private sector growth and otherwise liberalise the economy' (Kienle 1998: 221).

Albeit less explicit, Kienle finally also points at the unintended consequences of the 1990 electoral reform on the marginalisation of Egypt's parties. This reform, as we have seen, entailed little less than an inter-system change from a PR list-based regime to an AM two-round voting system (Kienle 1998: 221). According to Kienle the return to the two-round AM system rendered the electoral outcome, but particularly the NDP's targeted two-thirds majority, less predictable than had been the case under the previous PR list-based regimes, and this for two reasons. First, with the abrogation of the party list system, the NDP leadership had lost a vital mechanism to control its parliamentary majority. Second, the NDP also faced a sharply rising number of so called NDP independents who were running against the party's official candidates. Although most of these candidates, once elected, returned to the fold of the NDP's parliamentary group, the party doubted their partisan commitment. Both these factors together made the NDP's parliamentary majority more volatile, which consequentially forced the regime to further increase its management of the electoral process in order to secure the crushing two-thirds majorities eventually obtained in 1990 and 1995. These majorities, according to Kienle, were necessary in order to push through amendments to the constitution and secure the re-nomination of the incumbent president for another four-year term in office (Kienle 1998: 234; Kienle 2001: 140-143).

The parliamentary marginalisation of Egypt's opposition during the 1990s is thus according to Kienle attributable to both an increase in the legal and extra-legal restrictions imposed on their activities and a heightened need by the regime to manage the electoral process in order to guarantee its two-thirds parliamentary majority under the two-round AM system. In contrast to some of the aforementioned observers, Kienle does hence accord some importance

to the 1990 reform in explaining the party political developments of the 1990s. Problematic in his account is however the fact that he provides little empirical evidence for his observations on the impact of the electoral reform. Indeed, although compelling in his argument that the two-round AM system significantly reduced the discipline of the ruling NDP, he fails to show precisely how the 1990 reform contributed to this erosion. In other words, there is little micro-level analysis of how precisely the electoral reform affected the strategic behaviour of party candidates and by extension levels of party discipline at the macro-level. What is more, Kienle also fails to extend his observation beyond the confines of the ruling NDP to the entire party spectrum.

Kienle is, however, not the only observer of Egyptian politics to have made reference to the impact of electoral institutions on patterns of party development. In their volume on Legislative Politics in the Arab World, Baaklini et al. also assert, for instance, that the PR list-based regimes, introduced in 1984 and 1987 respectively, allowed the ruling NDP far more rein to control its candidates than the subsequent two-round AM system. They moreover maintain that, in comparison to the two-round AM system employed in 1979, these two list PR-based regimes with their large district magnitudes also helped reduce the importance accorded to the personality of the candidate during election campaign (Baaklini et al. 1999: 229). This latter argument is particularly interesting in the context at hand because it can also be used to help explain the marginalisation of political parties after 1990. Given that the electoral regimes of the 1970s and 1990s were identical, one could indeed conclude that the return to the two-round AM system in 1990 with smaller district magnitudes, again allowed candidates to pursue a more personalised election campaign than had been possible under the PR list-based regimes of the 1980s.

Focussing on levels of parliamentary representation, Tachau also accords significance to the electoral reform of 1990. He hereby maintains that in contrast to the two-round AM system of the 1990s, the PR list-based regimes in 1984 and 1987 guaranteed a credible showing for the political opposition in parliament, because they were based on the principle of proportionality and because they limited the political representation of independents in the chamber. Again, however, he does not verify how precisely the PR list-based regimes facilitated such higher levels of opposition representation.

Finally, most observers of Egyptian electoral politics also seem to agree that the stark rise in the number of independent candidates observable since 1990 and with it the numerical marginalisation of parties at the electoral level has essentially been facilitated by the return to the two-round AM system in 1990. As is apparent, in contrast to the preceding list-PR regime

this electoral system does not require individual contenders to register their candidacies under a specific party label, hence allowing individual politicians to enter the electoral race as independents (Salama, Al-Ahram Weekly, 25 – 31/05/2000; Al-Din, Al-Ahram Weekly, 11 – 17/01/2001; Nasreddine & Chevreuil, Al – Ahram Hebdo, 16/10/2002). Continuing along these lines, Langhor suggests, moreover, that the phenomenon of independent candidacies has also been compounded by the difficulties imposed on the formation of parties in Egypt. As she writes: ‘...almost all of Egypt’s recognised parties were initially denied recognition by the regime’s political parties committee and won recognition only through costly court battles, thus activists who share a common platform run as independents rather than fight for party recognition’ (Langhor 2004: 191).

Reviewing the existing literature, this chapter discussed the various explanations that have been put forward in order to explain the overall weakness of Egypt’s parties on the one side and their electoral marginalisation since 1990 on the other side. As regards their overall weakness both internal and external factors were named. Externally, this weakness was attributed to the restrictive legal environment in place and its discriminatory application by the Egyptian authorities, as well as to the prevalence of highly individualised patterns of political interaction among the country’s elite and between the latter and the electorate. Internally, moreover, this weakness was explained by the absence of internal democracy within the parties themselves, their lack of internal unity and the prevalence of underfinanced party organisations.

As regards the electoral marginalisation of Egypt’s parties since 1990 it was then shown that the most comprehensive analysis of this subject matter had been conducted by the so called ‘deliberalisationists’. To recapitulate, according to these deliberalisationists the electoral marginalisation of Egypt’s parties since 1990 was by and large the result of a wider ‘de-liberalisation’ that gripped the country during that decade. For parties, this de-liberalisation was manifest in a further reduction of their political liberties and a more heavy-handed approach by the Egyptian authorities towards their political opponents. Together these regime-induced measures were thought to have caused the marginalisation of the country’s parties and their dwindling numbers in the Egyptian legislature since 1990.

As has become apparent above, despite some reference to the role of electoral institutions, most of the deliberalisationists refrained, however, from investigating more carefully the impact of 1990 electoral reform on the electoral performance of Egypt’s parties. In other words, to this day we find little systematic micro-level analyses on whether, and if so how, this latter reform has contributed to the marginalisation of Egypt’s parties since 1990. This

neglect is rather striking for a number of reasons. To begin with, it is striking in light of the fact that the 1990 reform constitutes the single most important institutional change that presaged the electoral marginalisation of Egypt's parties. Theoretically then, this institutional change stands out as a potent explanatory variable. Second, and closely related, this neglect is also striking, given the fact that so much literature is available on the linkage between electoral institutions and party (system) development. Properly adjusted to non-democratic conditions, this literature could have hence been employed to explore more carefully the potency of the 1990 electoral reform in accounting for the electoral marginalisation of Egypt's parties.

The subsequent empirical analysis will set out to rectify this neglect. Whilst not discarding the restrictive socio-political and legal conditions prevailing within the country, it will demonstrate how precisely the 1990 electoral reform adversely affected the performance of parties in the country, and hence added to their weakening during the 1990s. Chapter four will lay out the theoretical framework within which the subsequent analysis will take place. Drawing on the existing electoral connection literature, it basically generates a set of hypotheses on the *distal* effects of electoral institutions that will then be verified against empirical evidence in chapters six, seven, eight and nine.

## Chapter Four. Electoral Institutions, Internal Unity and Visible Representation

In the preceding discussion of patterns of party development under the Mubarak presidency we saw that the 1990 electoral reform has received little attention when it comes to explaining the political marginalisation of Egypt's parties in the course of the 1990s. This chapter seeks to rectify this neglect by demonstrating that electoral institutions can in fact greatly influence the course of party development, even under non-democratic and unstructured conditions. To this end I will construct a theoretical framework that establishes a causal linkage between the type of electoral institutions in place and patterns of party development at the electoral level. The point of departure is hereby the existing body of literature that deals with the relationship between electoral institutions, elite behaviour and party (system) development in consolidated democracies. Most hypotheses established below will be extrapolated from the theories that have been developed in this field. At the same time, however, a number of modifications to the existing assumptions will be made that take into consideration the nature of unstructured electorates and the explicitly non-democratic character of the wider electoral environment. In so doing, a modified electoral connection model is developed that, whilst focussing explicitly on electoral institutions, remains sensitive to the potentially distortive effects of the latter two factors on the opportunity structures facing political elites and the evolving dynamics of party development.

As mentioned in the introduction, this thesis posits that Egypt's 1990 electoral reform adversely affected two dimensions of party development, namely the parties' capacity to foster *internal unity* and *visible representation* at the electoral level. In the context of this research *internal unity* was defined as the absence of any political behaviour by either party candidates or cadre that is damaging to the appearance of the party as a collective actor. To recapitulate, at the electoral level such damaging behaviour was mainly associated with the occurrence of internal dissent, campaigning methods that are conflictual rather than cooperative and forms of electioneering that are personality – rather than party-driven. *Visible representation* was in turn defined as the extent to which there are agents and markers in place that convey party image and message during the election campaign. In the introduction these agents were identified as party candidates and their campaigning materials.

In the following theoretical discussion I will argue that the level of *internal unity* and *visible representation* parties can acquire during election times is intimately linked to the type of electoral system in place. In a nutshell, it will be theorised that both these dimensions of party development are enhanced under so called 'party-centric' electoral legislation, yet reduced under 'candidate-centric' electoral regimes. More specifically, I will theorise that these two

types of electoral regimes bear differently on five crucial domains of the electoral process, and that in so doing they produce variance in the degree to which parties appear internally unified and visibly present during election times.

Regarding the domains themselves, two of them relate to the candidate recruitment phase, whilst the other three relate to the actual election campaign. The two domains of the recruitment phase include the degree to which party headquarters can control the nomination and placement of candidates prior to the actual campaign and the types of *competitive constellations* that emerge at the national and district level.<sup>67</sup> The three domains of the election campaign include, in turn, the nature of electoral cooperation that takes place amongst the candidates at the district level, the types of campaigning rhetoric and materials they employ and the degree to which they engage in label promotion. As just mentioned, all five of these domains are expected to vary with the type of electoral regime in place, and in so doing affect levels of *party unity* and *visible representation*.

This chapter is composed of four sections. Section 4.1 reviews the existing electoral connection literature and adjusts its main propositions to conditions in which the electorate remains unstructured and the overall political environment semi- or non-democratic. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 then develop a theoretical line of reasoning that links differences in electoral design to levels of party development. Section 4.2 focusses on the two domains of the candidate recruitment phase that were identified above and discusses how these are being affected by the type of electoral properties in place. Section 4.3 then develops a similar argument, this time focussing on the three domains of the election campaign. Section 4.4 finally addresses a number of additional institutional variables that, by shaping the behaviour of individual political actors, are thought to affect the direction of party development in conjunction with the the electoral regime in place.

#### **4.1 The Electoral Connection Literature**

Linking electoral institutions to patterns of party development is nothing novel. Numerous scholars have explored this relationship within the confines of democratic polities, with most of them focussing on the propensity of electoral institutions to either facilitate or impede the emergence of internally unified parties in both the electoral and parliamentary arenas (see for instance Katz 1980, Mainwaring 1991, Shugart 1992, Cary & Shugart 1995, Montgomery 1999, Moser 1999, Kreuzer 2000). Hereby a distinction has been drawn between so called

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<sup>67</sup> A definition of the term '*competitive constellations*' will be provided in section 4.2 of this chapter.

‘candidate-centric’ and ‘party-centric’ electoral regimes. Essentially, this distinction revolves around the type of vote-seeking strategies adopted by individual party candidates and the nature of power relations that exist between party candidates or representatives on the one side and party cadre on the other. Candidate-centric electoral regimes are thought to encourage political entrepreneurship and decrease the leverage of party cadre over their rank and file. They induce party candidates to seek a personal over a collective party vote and thereby work against *internal unity* and, as I will argue, under unstructured conditions also against *visible representation*. Party-centric electoral regimes, by contrast, induce individual party candidates to collectivise their vote-seeking efforts and to promote their party’s programme and label. At the same time they provide party headquarters with more effective means to control the behaviour of their candidates and members of parliament. Consequentially, such electoral regimes work in favour of greater *internal unity* and, as I will maintain below, also in favour of higher levels of *visible representation*.

According to Cary and Shugart, the distinction made between ‘personal reputation’ and ‘party reputation’ - seeking strategies basically rests upon the type of district level cooperation candidates pursue and the type of electoral appeals they make during the election campaign. (Cary & Shugart 1995: 419-420). Thus, co-partisan contenders who coordinate their electioneering efforts and actively promote their parties’ programmes and labels during the election campaign can be labelled party reputation-seekers. Those, by contrast, who pursue an individualised election campaign and who de-emphasise their party’s programme and label in favour of a particularistic political agenda should be labelled personal reputation-seekers.

The electoral connection model itself rests on a number of simplified rational-choice assumptions, which will also find application in this research. Here individual actors are treated as consciously self-interested and instrumentally-rationally actors, capable to act on the basis of their own interests, by weighing the obtainable information about all available alternatives. They are driven by a simple cost-benefit analysis, seeking to maximise the returns of their actions with minimal effort. Whilst their preferences remain constant - for example the aim to win parliamentary representation - the actual strategy adopted to achieve this aim may vary.

The principal actors of interest here are those politicians that are directly involved in the electoral game at the district and national level. They include party and independent candidates on the one side and party cadre on the other side. All contenders holding party membership prior to or during the election campaign and who are officially nominated and supported by a party for any given election are treated here as party candidates. All other



candidates running in parliamentary elections will be treated as independents. This category also includes those candidates that have publicly proclaimed their affiliation to a specific party or a party programme. As long as the party does not officially endorse their candidacies, they remain *de-facto* independent candidates. Party cadre in turn include all functionaries at the local and national level who are directly involved in the strategic development of the party. Particularly relevant for the analysis here are those cadre responsible for electoral management, including the candidate selection process and the development of the campaigning strategy.

Both groups of actors are thought to act rationally according to the principles specified above. Their goals and strategies do not necessarily converge, however. For the sake of parsimony, individual candidates are treated here as so called ‘vote-maximisers’, whose overriding aim it is to win sufficient votes to gain parliamentary representation or to secure (re-)election (see Rae 1971, Katz 1980, Taagepera & Shugart 1989, Cary & Shugart 1995). Based on any given level of information they will hence seek to pursue the most effective strategy available to achieve this objective. Politicians will thus seek to win the largest number of votes with minimal electioneering costs involved; in other words with minimal investment in campaigning time and resources (Kreuzer 2000: 488-489). Whether or not this is guaranteed by running on a party ticket or as an independent, by emphasising or de-emphasising one’s party label, is in the first place irrelevant and solely guided by the strategic considerations of each political aspirant.

Having said this, it is apparent of course that such a view of political behaviour is rather simplistic, and that political hopefuls may very well be driven by other considerations when deciding to contest an election. Their decision may be driven, for instance, by more altruistic incentives, such as, for example, a desire to further the popularity of their party or to raise public awareness of certain local and national issues. It may also be driven by the simple desire to broaden one’s personal reputation within the local community. These considerations will probably feature rather prominently amongst marginal candidates, whose chances of electoral victory are slim to begin with. When theorising about the behaviour of candidates in the manner proposed here, it is therefore important to keep this potential plurality of considerations in mind. In other words, it is essential to understand that the aim of winning parliamentary representation, albeit prominent, constitutes probably only one of a number of considerations that prompts a politician to enter the electoral race.

This latter fact also applies to the strategic objectives pursued by party leaders. Again these are probably more multifaceted than can be discussed here. Indeed, when considering the

distinction made between so called 'electoral' and 'programmatic-ideological' parties, then it becomes rather obvious that it would be too simplistic to accord a single overriding objective to all party cadre. As we know, electoral parties are thought to be primarily driven by a desire to increase parliamentary representation and to win executive power, whilst their programmatic-ideological counterparts are thought to be more 'policy-oriented, ideological and concerned with defining policy' (Wright 1971: 7, 17-54). Irrespective of such differences it seems not unreasonable to assume, however, that all party leaders share the objective to develop unified party structures. In other words, all party cadres are 'discipline seekers' who are primarily interested in securing control over their rank and file and in boosting their parties' reputations. According to Cary and Shugart this is the case because:

'Those who control access to the party label at the district level (...) have an interest in the quality of party reputation. The careers of these party leaders are dependent on the collective electoral fate of the party rather than of individual politicians. If a coherent party label benefits the party collectively within a district, then leaders have an interest in discouraging independent action by politicians' (Cary & Shugart 1995: 419-420).

Political actors are, however, not entirely free in their choice of a utility-maximising strategy, but constrained by the very institutional givens under which they ought to operate. These may range from informal cultural norm - and value systems to formal legal, political or socio-economic institutions. According to institutionalist accounts, these institutions are not expected to influence an actor's preferences, but the strategy he or she adopts to obtain his or her preferences. Within the electoral connection literature, three institutional variables have been identified that together structure the type of electoral strategies pursued by party candidates. These include the electoral law itself and both the party and party finance legislation in place. Variance in any one of these institutions is thought to condition three crucial aspects of a politician's political ambitions and thereby affect the type of vote-seeking strategy he or she adopts. First, they structure a politician's career prospects; in words they structure those uncertainties that surround electoral entry and re-entry. Such uncertainties are primarily associated with a party's capacity to sanction the behaviour of its candidates through, for example, demotion or de-selection. As Kreuzer argues, the more electoral mechanisms increase a party's ability to regularise political careers, the more likely candidates will be to collectivise their electioneering and vice versa. Second, they also shape the overall costs involved of winning votes. Such electioneering costs are usually of a financial nature, yet they may also include the time spent on advertising, campaign management, fund raising activities and the like. Here again the argument is the same. An electoral environment

that allows parties to significantly reduce a candidate's electioneering costs is likely to facilitate a collective vote-seeking strategy and vice versa (Kreuzer 2000: 488-489). To come full circle then, in all three instances the latter scenario has been linked to the presence of 'party-centric' and the former to the presence of 'candidate-centric' electoral legislation.

### *Electoral Strategies, Unstructured Electorates & Party Development*

When it comes to the study of party development where the electorate is little structured to begin with - that is where voting patterns remain highly personalised rather than structured around party affiliations - two qualifications to the assumptions underlying the electoral connection model presented above should be made. First, we have to expand our understanding of electorally feasible candidate strategies. Within the context of established liberal democracies, the literature basically assumes that, whilst they may pursue different electoral strategies, candidates essentially operate within the party political framework. Accordingly it is reasoned that electoral institutions induce candidates to either seek a personal or a collective party vote overwhelmingly *within* the confines of a political party. Alternative forms of political entrepreneurship outside the party framework are not considered meaningful, as parties have become the principle players in electoral politics, even under electoral provisions permissive to the entry of independents.

However, as will become apparent below, wherever voting patterns remain little structured around political parties, this latter alternative remains real and needs to be incorporated into the set of feasible electoral strategies at a candidate's disposal. Under such conditions personal vote-seeking strategies thus hold two distinct meanings. They can either refer to the pursuit of political entrepreneurship *within* or *outside* a political party.

Second, under unstructured conditions one can expect that party candidates inherently favour a personal over a collective party vote, presupposing of course the primacy of the office-seeking assumption holds true. Indeed, wherever levels of party identification among voters remains low, candidates will be ill advised to campaign along partisan lines or to join a party in the first place. Electorally more promising here are vote-seeking strategies that emphasise a candidate's personal reputation and his or her capacity to deliver constituency services. As Moser writes:

'When no developed parties exist, partisanship itself is devalued in pluralist elections, and in its place there emerges the personal politics of candidate-

centred elections in which parties have little to offer [their] candidates in terms of resources of party identification (...) (Moser 1999: 62-63).

The same applies to circumstances where party and other civil legislation severely restricts a party's human and financial resource basis, organisational development and leverage to attract a significant numbers of voters, as is the case in many countries of the MENA region. Consequentially, candidates cannot necessarily rely on any significant logistical and financial support from their party to boost electoral prospects. Party membership as such therefore seems to neither improve career prospects nor reduce electioneering costs. In fact it even seems questionable why, under such conditions, candidates would choose to run under a specific party label in the first place.

With regard to the electoral connection hypotheses established here the angle of investigation thus becomes less balanced. Rather than investigating how particular electoral institutions foster either party or anti-party behaviour within the confines of a specific party, we ought to examine their propensity to facilitate or adversely affect a politician's preferred electoral strategy, namely that of political entrepreneurship. From this perspective, differences in electoral design can either reinforce a politician's anti-party behaviour or 'counter-intuitively' propel him or her to pursue a collective party vote. In other words, under unstructured conditions a candidate's optimal vote-seeking strategy is assumed to remain constant, whilst his or her actual campaigning method becomes largely influenced by variance in and changes to environmental factors.

At a higher level of abstraction, differences in electoral design also shape the prospects for any pushes towards greater party development. Indeed, under unstructured conditions little development towards internally unified and visibly present parties can be expected under electoral regimes that provide parties with no means to control the behaviour of their rank-and-file and that encourage party candidates to pursue an anti-party electoral strategy. Here the status quo, featuring parties with low levels of *internal unity* and *visible representation* will most likely prevail. Once, however, the electoral legislation enables parties to sanction the behaviour of their members and once it invariably links a candidate's electoral fortunes to being a party member, the picture will begin to change. As partisanship and loyalty pay, candidates will now be inclined to pursue a party-reputation seeking strategy, and in so doing promote their parties' *visible representation* in the electoral arena. What is more, by strengthening their relative position vis-à-vis their own members, parties will also be able to foster greater *internal unity*, at least during election times. Consequentially, we can say that under unstructured conditions so called 'party-centric' electoral legislation promises to

enhance prospects for successful party development, whilst ‘candidate-centric’ electoral legislation is likely to have the opposite effect, namely reinforce low levels of party development.

Bearing these adjustments in mind it is now possible to develop a set of hypotheses that substantiate the electoral connection drawn here between electoral institutions, elite behaviour and party development under unstructured conditions. More specifically, the following pages will spell out a number of hypotheses that link specific provisions of the electoral law to variance in elite behaviour and by extension to levels of *party unity* and *visible representation*.

## **4.2 The Candidate Recruitment Process**

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, electoral institutions are expected to shape the behaviour of political actors during two crucial phases of the electoral calendar, namely during the candidate recruitment phase and the actual election campaign. Focussing on the recruitment phase this section discusses how differences in electoral design affect the degree to which party headquarters can control the nomination and placement of candidates prior to the election campaign and the types of *competitive constellations* that emerge at both the district and the national level. Essentially it is argued that, by shaping these two domains of the recruitment phase, electoral institutions influence the level of *internal unity* and *visible representation* parties can attain in the electoral arena.

### *Nomination Control*

Wherever parties seek to push for greater *internal unity* and *visible representation* under unstructured conditions, it is imperative that they are in control of two aspects of the nomination process. First, parties need to control who and who is not able to enter the electoral fray. In other words, they need to function as so called ‘gatekeepers’ to the electoral and parliamentary arenas. Wherever parties perform this function, hence wherever their agents retain a numerical predominance in the electoral field, they are well equipped to enhance levels of *visible representation* during election times. By contrast, wherever parties fail to perform this function, hence wherever party agents are strongly outnumbered by independent contestants, they will be hard pressed to achieve this objective. Here the overwhelming presence of independents, who campaign on a particularistic agenda, will make it very difficult for the party agents on the ground to enhance the collective visibility of their parties during election times.

Second, parties also need to control the behaviour of their own rank and file, and specifically that of their de- and non-selected members. This means they must be able to prevent such members from defying party directives by means of either collective or individual forms of dissent. Collective forms of dissent basically entail the emergence of break-away party factions that seek to establish their own political party. Individual forms of dissent entail, in turn, the defiant behaviour of individual candidates who decide to seek parliamentary entry through another party or as independents. It is almost self evident then, that wherever parties are able to prevent both these forms of dissent, they are well equipped to retain a unified appearance during election times. By contrast, wherever parties fail to control dissenting party members, it will be much more difficult for them to retain *internal unity* at the electoral level.

The question hence poses itself as to how party headquarters can control both these domains of the nomination process. The answer given to this question is multi-faceted and points to a number of institutional factors that structure both a candidate's repertoire of feasible electoral strategies and a party's means to control the political career of its rank and file. Because it bears most immediately on *who* can contest parliamentary elections and *how*, the electoral regime in place hereby features prominently.

For first - and second wave party systems the existing candidate recruitment literature has presented several institutional variables that, in their variance, shape the degree of headquarter control over *who* is to run under the party label and in *which* position. Greatest explanatory power has herein been attributed to features of the electoral environment, namely to the electoral and party law, as well as to the structure of government (see Gallagher & Marsh 1988, Cary & Shugart 1995; Kreuzer 2000). As regards the electoral system, both variance in the ballot structure and the district magnitude have been linked to levels of headquarter control over the candidate recruitment process.<sup>68</sup> Regarding the ballot structure, headquarter control is thought to be strengthened under those list-PR and plurality systems, where parties can present a fixed slate that is not alterable by the electorate or candidate. It is in turn weakened under those ballots where voters may disturb the party list through, for instance, vote panachage or cumulation, or where 'candidates themselves can determine their ballot access' (Carey & Shugart 1995: 421).<sup>69</sup> Regarding the district magnitude, it has been argued that large district magnitudes reduce the number of recruitment sites, thereby facilitating greater centralisation of the candidate selection process. In turn,

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<sup>68</sup> The ballot structure subsumes all provisions of the electoral law that determine the type and number of votes cast and their translation into seats. It thus includes the ballot type, the vote entity marked on the ballot, the number of votes to be cast, vote transferral provisions and voting provisions for multiple votes.

<sup>69</sup> The latter include open- and multiple-list systems and those electoral provisions which allow individual candidates to enter a party slate through, for example, primaries or the collection of signatures.

‘... small district magnitudes reduce career uncertainty by multiplying the number of recruitment sites and eliminating safe list positions. As a result parties are limited in their ability to coordinate the recruitment process, which in turn becomes self-selecting, competitive and highly uncertain’ (Kreuzer 2000: 491).

Observable variance in headquarter control has also been associated with those aspects of the party statutes that guide the internal candidate selection procedure. Where party headquarters are spared the process of democratic selection through, for example, party conventions, they face little disturbance in the decision who to place on their ballot, in what location and on which (list) position. By contrast, where internal party regulations stipulate the grass-root selection of candidates by party members the power of party agents over exactly this process may become severely diminished. Under such stipulations party members disagreeing with their leadership’s choices then possess the democratic means to de-select those candidates they dislike and choose the ones to their liking instead (Kreuzer 2000: 489-492).

Finally, levels of headquarter control over the recruitment process are also expected to mirror the type of governmental structure in place. Unitary states, where power is concentrated in the institutions of central government, should in this regard more easily facilitate centralised party control over the recruitment process than federal states where power is dispersed between centre and periphery. In the latter instances recruitment sites are likely to become dispersed across the different layers of government, thereby undermining headquarter control and possibly even overall party discipline (Gallagher & March 1988: 8-9).

As becomes apparent, all three of these institutional variables are essentially concerned with observable degrees of headquarter control over the candidate recruitment process, yet not necessarily with whether candidates will require party backing in the first place. When it comes to the analysis of recruitment patterns under unstructured conditions, however, this latter feature must take centre stage. Rather than question how much control party headquarters can exercise over their own label and ballot ranking, we ought to take one step back and ask, under what circumstances candidates are likely to seek or require party nomination in the first place.

Why is this so? Individual candidates, as I have argued, are vote-maximisers whose principal aim it is to maximise votes with minimal costs involved. Now, where the electorate remains unstructured, a candidate’s political fortune is not inherently tied to being affiliated with a party. As discussed in the Egyptian context, under these conditions parties and their programmes, although present, are often either barely known to voters or else of little

relevance in determining their electoral choice. Crucial here are such factors as the candidate's personal reputation or professional standing, yet not primarily his party affiliation (Glosov 1997: 13). Voters, in other words, are inclined to follow politicians rather than party labels and are therefore unlikely to punish partisan dissent. For candidates facing such electorates, it is thus in the first place irrelevant whether they run in- or outside a party umbrella. Indeed, seeking a label vote will be unlikely to reduce career uncertainty and may, at worst, even undermine electoral prospects. Likewise, candidates showing any sign of partisan disloyalty need not necessarily fear negative ramifications for their future parliamentary career.

As such, unstructured electoral environments are thus essentially party-hostile. Political parties are faced with immense obstacles in establishing themselves as principal vote-channelling agencies within the electoral arena, and in fact often remain superseded by political factions, bosses and independents as the prime contenders for the voter's attention. Moreover, these conditions leave little room for the development of mass-organisational parties. As just mentioned, voters lacking in partisan affiliation will be hard pressed to actively engage in any civil activity, be they connected to political parties or other societal groupings. For parliamentary candidates, deciding on the most cost-effective winning strategy, the lack of any mass-organisational base capable of providing valuable campaigning support is most likely perceived as yet another disincentive to seek a party's backing (Glosov 1997: 14).

The above peculiarities of unstructured conditions necessitate a differentiation between two types of recruitment control, namely between so called *legal recruitment control* (LRC) and *effective recruitment control* (ERC). Whereas the former applies to both institutionalised and non-institutionalised systems, the latter only bears relevance under unstructured conditions. Where this is no longer given – that is where partisan affiliations have become relatively stable – this form of control loses its explanatory power. The term '*legal recruitment control*' relates to the regulatory framework guiding the relationship between party leadership, rank and file and the electorate. It indicates the levels of control party headquarters can exert over access to their ballot and its rank order, and is affected by the electoral variables just mentioned. The term '*effective recruitment control*', by contrast, refers to the much wider electoral arena and measures the likelihood of individual politicians to seek party endorsement in the first place, or once they have done so, the propensity to de- and re-align themselves without any ramifications for their political careers. It thereby affects the capacity of parties to enhance levels of *internal unity* and *visible representation* in the electoral arena. I assume that these two domains of party development are boosted where ERC is present, yet



unlikely to materialise where this is not the case. Moreover, in the context at hand I also expect *effective recruitment control* to outweigh *legal recruitment control* in its potential to structure the candidate selection process. In other words, here the presence or absence of effective and not of *legal recruitment control* ultimately shapes the capacity of party headquarters to dominate the selection process and by extensions observable levels in *party unity* and *visible representation*.

A crucial institutional determinant of ERC is the type of ballot structure in place and hereby specifically whether elections are run under a list- or a candidate-based system. The latter includes all those electoral provisions that enable individual candidates to participate in an election without prior party endorsement. This is the case under Egypt's current double ballot candidate system, yet equally possible under simple plurality in single-member (SMD) or multi-member districts (MMD), the Single Transferable Vote (STV) and the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV). Where any of these regimes are operative, effective ballot control over the recruitment process is most likely absent. This is the case because parties simply lack the coercive means to function as effective gatekeepers that can control the entry and re-entry of individual candidates into the electoral arena. What is more, whilst parties may still hold some control over their label - that is over *who* is running on their ticket - they certainly do not have the capability to punish partisan disloyalty through de-motion or even de-selection. The feasibility to run as an independent renders any such coercive means obsolete.

Under unstructured conditions, candidate-based ballots as such thus provide parties with virtually no institutional means to advance *party unity* and *visible representation*. By denying party headquarters any effective control over the recruitment process, these regimes in fact prevent parties from enhancing both these dimensions of party development. As we have seen, this is the case because they neither guarantee that parties become the dominant actors in the electoral arena nor do they provide party headquarters with any coercive means to secure internal unity.

List-based ballots, and particularly closed-list PR, are by contrast expected to facilitate ERC, simply because under these electoral provisions politicians cannot seek electoral entry without party endorsement.<sup>70</sup> Here then the impossibility to run as an independent provides parties

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<sup>70</sup> To be sure the category of party list ballots not only incorporates facilitators but also mitigators of ERC. The latter includes, for instance, all those open-list systems that deprive the party of any meaningful control over access to its own ballot. Two features may be responsible for such lack of control. First, voters may not only be capable of disturbing party lists internally, but also by adding candidate names that have not been previously sanctioned by party agents or a congress. Second, electoral provisions might also grant candidates the right to re-run on a party label irrespective of its backing. A case in point is the so called '*candidato nato*' clause in Basil's electoral code, which allows parliamentary representatives automatic access to the same ballot and ballot position for consecutive

with the institutional means to function as effective gatekeepers to the electoral and parliamentary arenas. What is more, it also means that the tables, in the relations between party headquarters and individual candidates, have been turned. Devoid of any feasible opt-out alternative, party candidates now become far more dependent on the goodwill of their party to enter or re-enter the electoral race. In other words, partisan loyalty and discipline both during the election campaign and thereafter in parliament become quintessential for a politician's parliamentary career, because parties are now empowered to reward candidates faithful to their label and punish those dissenting from it. Here then de-motion or even de-selection by the party become meaningful devices to discipline a politician's behaviour.

Regarding patterns of party development, these latter regimes are hence highly conducive to enhance levels of *party unity* and *visible representation*. They can be expected to enhance *visible representation* because they ensure that parties as collective actors retain a dominant position in the electoral arena. They are expected to facilitate greater *internal unity* in turn because they provide party headquarters with the coercive means to sanction dissenting behaviour.

### *Placement Control*

Differences in electoral design are, however, not only expected to affect the capacity of parties to control entry to the electoral arena, but they are also thought to influence the types of candidates a party is both willing and able to nominate. Although not mutually exclusive, in essence parties can either select so called 'local notables' or 'ordinary' party candidates for their tickets. Local notables are here defined as candidates who have attained a popularity in their locality that is independent of the party they are a member of. In other words, these candidates possess the political (and financial) capital and/or notability which would theoretically enable them to successfully pursue a career outside the party framework. Candidates of this type include, for example, local businessmen, prominent members of local tribes and extended families, popular figures in society and members of the political elite who have held public office and who have hence developed a 'reserve of political capital' over time (Ishiyama 2001: 394). 'Ordinary' candidates are in turn identified as party members that lack precisely such notability and that carry no individual political and/or financial capital

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elections (Mainwaring 1991: 24-25). In both instances ERC is thus absent despite a candidate's need to run elections under a party umbrella. This is the case because the *de facto* openness of the party list to outsiders renders meaningless any coercive instrument at a party's disposal to punish dissent or reward loyalty. Under such electoral provisions then, any leadership efforts at strengthening party unity will most likely suffer.

outside their party. In contrast to local notables these candidates are thus far more dependent on their party and its reputation in order to advance their individual political careers.

Undoubtedly, wherever large sections of the electorate retain dismally low levels of party affiliation, parties will be hard pressed to nominate candidates of the latter type, namely candidates whose sole asset it is that they are loyal party members. Because in these societies personalities and the provision of services matter far more than party labels, the chances of ordinary party members are very low to make any significant electoral inroads. Office-seeking parties are hence encouraged to nominate local notables who are not necessarily strong because of their affiliation with the party, but because of their personal reputation and popularity within the local community.

This latter fact has also been commented upon by other scholars working in the field. Discussing patterns of party development in Russia, both Glosov and Ishiyama asserted, for instance, that in past elections most parties relied heavily on the drawing powers of local notables and this particularly in the rural areas of the country. According to Ishiyama in these areas ‘... parties had to rely on the recruitment of local notables with name recognition. This requires that the parties compromise in terms of ideology in order to recruit candidates that would attract voters’ (Ishiyama 2001: 392). Similarly Glosov writes that parties, recruiting candidates in Russia, select individuals ‘... not because of their partisan affiliation but because they are well-known and well-connected within the constituency they are to be placed’ (Glosov 1997: 8).

Regarding patterns of party development, it is apparent that such reliance on the drawing powers of local notables adversely affects the capacity of parties to enhance levels of *visible representation* during election times. This is the case because such candidates will, by virtue of their local notability, most likely pursue an election campaign that is primarily, if not entirely, geared towards their personality. Their affiliation with a party and its programme will hence either be of secondary importance or even of no importance at all in the electoral race.

The fortunes of political parties would look much brighter, of course, if they could rely more strongly on ‘ordinary’ party members during the election campaign. This is the case because, by lacking any personal credentials, these candidates would most likely show greater eagerness to promote their party and its electoral platform than local notables. In so doing they would help raise their parties’ *visible representation* in the electoral arena.

Under unstructured conditions, the leverage of party headquarters to nominate ‘ordinary’ party members, without necessarily losing electoral appeal, is greatly influenced by the type of ballot structure in place. Arguably parties should be far more willing to nominate such candidates under list-based ballots with large district magnitudes than under candidate-based ballots that feature low district magnitudes. This is the case, because the list system allows parties to pursue a dual strategy in which they can place local notables at the top and ordinary party members at the lower end of their district lists. In so doing, they would be able to combine the drawing power of their top seated contenders with the loyalty of their lower tier candidates in a concerted attempt to advance both their electoral prospects and their *visible representation* in the electoral arena.

Under candidate-based ballots with low district magnitudes, by contrast, the available placement options for parties seeking parliamentary representation are far more limited. Indeed, given the limited numbers of seats available per district and the personalised nature of the election itself, few incentives remain to nominate candidates whose sole asset is that they are longstanding and loyal party members. Instead, parties are now pushed to put forward candidates that can capitalise on their personal standing within the locality and that are capable to wage highly personalised election campaigns. Under these conditions then a party’s *visible representation* is expected to suffer greatly.

### *Competitive Constellations*

So far we have seen that, theoretically at least, differences in electoral design shape the degree to which party headquarters can control both the nomination and placement of candidates during the recruitment phase. Their impact does not end here, however. In fact, as mentioned earlier, electoral institutions are also thought to shape the types of *competitive constellations* that emerge at the beginning of an election campaign.

What are *competitive constellations*? The term ‘*competitive constellations*’ refers basically to the manner in which party candidacies are distributed, either within a given constituency or across the entire nation. They are a direct consequence of the decisions taken by party headquarters with regard to where their nominees should contest the elections. When referred to at the district level, *competitive constellations* denote the ratio that exists in a given district between the total number of party candidates on the one side and the total number of non-partisan candidates on the other. When referred to at the national level, they indicate in turn

the spread of party candidacies across the constituencies of the country. In other words, they now specify the number of districts in which candidates from a given party are represented.

The manner in which party candidacies are distributed both within and across constituencies is relevant because, theoretically at least, it significantly determines the level of *visible representation* parties as collective actors can acquire during election times. Indeed, parties can only hope to acquire proper *visible representation*, once two conditions are met. First a party has to be present on a nationwide scale in order to effectively increase its name recognition. Second, political parties as collective actors also have to constitute the dominant, if not the sole competitors in the electoral arena. This means that party candidates have to outnumber the total number of district contenders that enter the electoral race outside the party framework on a particularistic agenda. Where both these conditions are met, parties, through their agents at the district level, are well positioned to enhance *visible representation* on a nationwide scale. Wherever these two conditions remain absent this possibility is by contrast greatly reduced.

Two electoral properties are thought to influence whether or not parties can meet both these conditions. These concern the type of vote entity in place and the presence or absence of legal thresholds. Together both these properties determine how parties distribute their candidates prior to an election and whether they are the sole representatives in the electoral arena. Consequentially they shape the type of *competitive constellations* that emerge at both the district and national levels.

As regards the distribution of candidates, for instance, parties basically have two options available. They can either focus on a limited number of constituencies, in which they have a reasonable chance of winning, or they can decide to contest the election on a nationwide scale. Obviously, the decision to pursue either one of these two strategies is influenced by numerous factors including, amongst others, the party's financial and human resources, the distribution of their constituency support and the electoral strategy pursued (Herron 2002: 722-723). To these factors one should also add the type of vote entity in place, which may in fact strongly influence a party's placement strategy during the recruitment phase. Consider in this regard the difference between vote entities that demand an exclusive candidate vote and those that feature an exclusive party vote. In the former scenario, votes are translated into seats on an individualised basis; that is on the basis of the candidate's vote tally. In the latter scenario, votes are translated into seats based on the collective vote a party has obtained either at the district, regional or national level. Wherever an exclusive candidate vote is used, parties are basically free to decide whether to place candidates in selected constituencies only or whether

to run on a nationwide scale. Under these rather permissive electoral provisions parties hence face little institutional constraints to pursue either one of the two strategies. Wherever an exclusive party vote is being used, however, the situation becomes less clear cut, and this particularly under electoral laws that feature legal thresholds. In fact, most countries that employ electoral regimes using an exclusive party votes have such thresholds in place, either at the regional or the national level. For parties this means that they have to surpass a certain share of the total votes cast in order to be included in the distribution of parliamentary seats.

Once parties face such legal thresholds, which typically vary between 5 and 10 percent of the total votes cast, they become far more limited in their placement strategies. This is the case, because they may now need to secure a broader geographical presence in order to muster sufficient votes to surpass either the regional or the national threshold. In fact, wherever national thresholds are in place, parties face strong incentives to spread their candidacies beyond a limited number of constituencies, even if they are hard pressed to find sufficient resources and candidates to pursue such a strategy. In this scenario then the electoral incentives in place are likely to outweigh a party's other electoral considerations, given that their chances of electoral victory become so crucially connected to a substantive presence on the ground.

As regards levels of *visible representation*, it thus becomes apparent that they should be enhanced under those electoral provisions that facilitate the nationwide presence of parties - that is under closed-list PR with legal thresholds - whilst they should suffer under electoral provisions that encourage parties to pursue a selective placement strategy – that is under candidate-based ballots.

The type of vote entity in place does, however, not only influence the spread of candidacies across the country, but it also determines the degree to which party agents come to dominate the district race. This fact has already been mentioned above, when discussing the presence or absence of *effective recruitment control*. To reiterate, essentially it was argued that under unstructured conditions parties will only hold such control wherever the vote entity stipulates an exclusive party vote. This is the case, because under these provisions independent candidacies are prohibited, which means that parties constitute the sole agents through which political activists can enter the electoral fray. Here then the district races feature *competitive constellations* that are on the whole conducive to enhance a party's *visible representation*, as party agents constitute the sole electoral competitors. This situation changes, however, wherever the vote entity in place allows independent candidates to stand in elections, hence wherever parties have lost *effective recruitment control*. Here then the district races will most

likely feature *competitive constellations* in which the numerical dominance of party agents is seriously challenged by the presence of a potentially large number of independents. Wherever this is the case, it will be much more difficult for parties to promote their *visible representation* in the electoral arena, particularly in circumstances where independents come to strongly outnumber the presence of party candidates.

It is apparent, of course, that the nationwide spread and numerical dominance of parties in the electoral arena constitutes merely a necessary rather than a sufficient condition for parties to increase levels of *visible representation*. They constitute a necessary condition, because they provide parties with agents across the nation, who can then promote the party label and programme – and in so doing raise the visibility of the party in question. They fail to constitute a sufficient condition, however, because they cannot guarantee that party candidates actually do engage in any party-conducive behaviour. For this to happen, further institutional incentives must be in place that encourage candidates to become party-reputation seekers during the actual election campaign.

As far as the recruitment process is concerned, we can thus conclude that PR list-based regimes are by and large more conducive to the strengthening of political parties as collective actors than open-list and/or candidate-based regimes. In fact, based on the theoretical argument developed above, one is almost inclined to label the latter electoral regimes as ‘no-effect’ systems, simply because they do not seem to carry any incentives that could help overall weak political parties enhance their *internal unity* and *visible representation* during election times. Indeed, by denying party headquarters any effective control over the recruitment process and by encouraging the selection of so called local notables, such regimes help reinforce existing personalism in electoral politics and low levels of party recognition among the electorate. They thereby neither serve to increase the profile of political parties in the electoral process nor to strengthen their relative power versus individual candidates.

As we have seen, the incentives created by list PR, and particularly by closed-list PR, are by contrast far more conducive to strengthening the position of parties as collective actors in the electoral arena. By providing parties with *effective recruitment control* and by enabling them to pursue a more multifaceted placement strategy, these regimes provide an institutional setting that helps reduce personalism in electoral politics and that enhances the capacity of parties to become well established and recognised players during election times. In so doing, they advance a party’s *internal unity* and its *visible representation* in the electoral field.

### 4.3 The Election Campaign

Electoral institutions are, however, not only expected to shape the behaviour of political actors during the candidate recruitment process. Indeed, according to the electoral connection literature they also crucially influence the strategies pursued by party candidates during election times. As mentioned previously, it is hereby assumed that the design of electoral institutions determines whether party candidates pursue a so called collective ‘party-reputation’ or a ‘personal-reputation’ seeking strategy.

In more concrete terms, the pursuit of a collective party vote was identified as an electoral strategy in which co-partisan contenders collectivise their campaigning activities, and in which they actively promote their party programmes and labels. The pursuit of a personal vote was, in turn, identified as an electoral strategy in which co-partisan contenders fail to collectivise their campaigning activities and in which the promotion of party labels and programmes is being superseded, or even entirely replaced, by the pursuit of personal entrepreneurship.

Based on the definition of these two electoral strategies, we can hence deduce three domains of the election campaign that can be expected to vary with the type of electoral regime in place. In the introduction to this chapter, these domains were identified as the nature of electoral cooperation that takes place amongst party candidates at the district level, the types of campaigning rhetoric and materials they employ and the degree to which they engage in label promotion. This section discusses each of these three domains of the election campaign and demonstrates how they are influenced by differences in electoral design. Drawing a theoretical linkage between the type of electoral strategy pursued and patterns of party development, it furthermore illustrates how differences in these three domains shape a party’s prospects to enhance levels of *internal unity* and *visible representation*.

#### *Forms of District-level Electoral Cooperation*

The nature of electoral cooperation that takes place amongst party candidates at the district level constitutes the first domain of the election campaign that is thought to shape a party’s *internal unity* and *visible representation* during election times. In more generic terms, electoral cooperation is defined here as any visible efforts undertaken by two or more district contenders to collectivise their campaigning activities. The two principal areas of the election campaign within which such cooperation can take place concern the actual campaigning activities these contenders organise together and the resources and utilities they use to advance their electoral prospects. Whenever such electoral cooperation takes place between



co-partisan contenders, that is between candidates from the same party or party alliance, we are dealing with 'within' - or 'intra-party' cooperation. By contrast, whenever such cooperation takes place across party lines, that is between candidates from different political formations, then we are talking of 'cross'- or 'inter-party' cooperation.

It is assumed here, that the pursuit of within-party cooperation should enhance a party's *internal unity* and *visible representation*, whilst the absence of such cooperation, or even the pursuit of so called cross-party alliances, would severely undermine the capacity of parties to do precisely so. A party's *internal unity* should be boosted, for instance, wherever candidates of the same party collectivise their campaigning activities, hence where they pursue a concerted effort to advance their electoral prospects at the district level. It should be severely undermined, however, wherever party candidates fail (or refuse) to coordinate their campaigning activities and wherever they either pursue highly individualised campaigns, or even more damaging, cooperate with candidates from rival parties. In this latter scenario voters may be confronted with a confusing array of cross-party alliances and virtually no collective party activity, which together make the parties in the electoral arena appear little unified and visibly present.

Under unstructured conditions, the willingness of party candidates to engage in within-party cooperation at the district level is influenced by two electoral provisions, namely by the ballot structure and by the district magnitude and size. Essentially, it is assumed that list-based regimes with large district magnitudes and sizes facilitate the pursuit of within-party cooperation, whilst candidate-based regimes in geographically small districts and with low district magnitudes should discourage the pursuit of such forms of cooperation. Why so? First, and relatively straight forward, under the former combination of electoral provisions there are simply enough party candidates available in the district race amongst whom such within-party cooperation could take place. What is more, given that it is the list which has to be elected and not individual candidates, there are strong incentives in place for party candidates to cooperate, if at all, with members of their own party. These incentives are further increased wherever the districts themselves are physically large or very populous, and hence where a large amount of human and material resources are necessary to wage an effective election campaign. Given that it will be very difficult for individual candidates to tour the entire constituency, let alone to finance a campaign of this magnitude, it makes sense for members of the same party to share the burden and to collectivise their campaigning activities. By pooling their financial, human and material resources and by coordinating their campaigning activities they hence create an economy of scale that promises to enhance their overall electoral prospects.

The incentives to pursue such within-party cooperation decrease, however, under candidate-based systems in small districts with low district magnitudes. Under unstructured conditions in fact, this combination of electoral provisions facilitates the pursuit of a highly individualised election campaign, and this for a number of reasons. First, under these provisions voters are asked to cast their ballot for individual candidates instead of party lists, which reinforces the importance of the contending candidates to become personally known in the constituency. In other words, a candidate's success here is de-linked from his party membership, which enables him to contest the elections completely unaligned (see also Katz 1980: 31-32). Second, wherever district magnitudes are low, there are simply fewer co-partisan contestants in the field with whom any within-party cooperation could be arranged. Coupled with the presence of physically small districts, this latter fact produces virtually no incentives for party candidates to collectivise their campaigning activities. Whilst they still may wish to do so, it is equally possible for them to run entirely unaligned, given that they now face less difficulties in touring the constituency on their own and in organising their own campaigning activities. Under these conditions then, individualised forms of campaigning are likely to prevail.

Individualised forms of campaigning are, however, not only encouraged by the presence of candidate-based ballots in small MMDs. In addition they are also encouraged by those provisions of the ballot that allow for the formation of cross-party alliances at the district level.<sup>71</sup> This is the case wherever voters are given an inter-party choice on their ballot, which is the case, for example, under open-list PR regimes that allow for external ballot disturbance and under both single - and double ballot candidate systems in MMDs (Katz 1980: 34; Ma & Choy 2003: 349). Under the latter type of provisions party candidates can theoretically pursue up to three distinct vote-seeking strategies, depending on which of these strategies are empirically conceivable and electorally most promising. For instance, individual candidates could decide to coordinate their electioneering efforts with co-partisan competitors of the same constituency and thus pursue a collective label vote. By the same token they may decide

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<sup>71</sup>The same goes for those stipulations of the ballot that potentially pit candidates of the same party and competing in the same constituency against each other. This is facilitated wherever voters are given either an intra- or inter party choice on their ballots. Intra-party preference voting is possible under open-list PR systems that feature vote panachage and vote cumulation. It is also feasible under candidate-based ballots that allow parties to nominate more candidates than constituency seats available or where voters are given less votes than the number of district seats to be elected. Under open-list PR systems this is explained by the fact that a candidate's success ceases to depend solely on the vote totals gained by the party as a whole and more on his or her capacity to attract as many preference votes as possible. Similarly, where the number of party candidates outnumbers that of constituency seats, for instance, electoral rivalry will by default also erupt between co-partisans, lest they can agree on a strategic retreat of so called 'surplus' - candidates. To gain any necessary competitive edge particularly over rivals within their own ranks, it will thus be electorally beneficial for candidates to set themselves apart from their co-partisans by waging a campaign that de-emphasises the common label and programme in favour of one's personal profile and political agenda.

to go it alone and run an election campaign that de-emphasises the party label and refrains from pursuing any intra-party cooperation at the district level. Finally, party candidates could also forge so called intra-party alliances with candidates from rival political formations or with independents. Because ERC is absent and the electorate unstructured, they could theoretically do so irrespective of whether or not such behaviour receives headquarter approval or is completed between ideologically close competitors. According to this rationale a candidate would side with politicians from rival parties or independents not because of their ideological or programmatic proximity but because of their capacity to deliver crucial votes and thus boost ones own electoral prospects and reduce electioneering costs.

Certainly, where the electorate has become structured and the party system institutionalised the two latter scenarios become inconceivable campaigning devices for prospective candidates, simply because voters with stable party identities will not tolerate any form of dissenting behaviour by individual party representatives. Neither is it likely that party headquarters will tolerate such behaviour, given that they possess ERC and hence the capacity to sanction a candidate's political career. Where party affiliations among voters and candidates remain dismally low and ERC absent the two latter options become, however, realistic alternatives to vote-maximising candidates. As we have seen, both these factors taken together - the absence of ERC and the unstructured nature of society- leave party headquarters with little coercive power over the behaviour of their candidates during the election campaign. For one thing, without any *effective recruitment control* in place, parties will be hard pressed to prevent their candidates from pursuing alliance-strategies that are potentially damaging to their collective reputation. Second, where voters are interested more in personalities than programmes, they are unlikely to punish any form of cross-party cooperation between candidates of different political formations, even if ideologically distant, as long as these serve the constituents' interests.

The consequences of any such district level cross-party cooperation on prospects for party development are not difficult to discern. Indeed, wherever actually pursued, party candidates will most likely mobilise electoral support around a 'coalition of respectable notables' rather than by emphasis on either party label or programme. Moreover, voters confronted with an array of changing intra-party coalitions will find it hard to develop stable party identities. Under such conditions any chances to increase a party's *internal unity* and *visible representation* during the election campaign are likely to be seriously undermined.

## *Campaigning Rhetoric & Materials*

The extent to which party candidates pursue a party conducive electoral strategy is, however, not only evident in the types of electoral cooperation they engage in at the district level. In fact, it is equally evident in the types of campaigning materials these candidates use and the campaigning rhetoric they employ during election times. Wherever a candidate's political rhetoric and campaigning materials are geared towards the promotion of the party's programme – that is wherever the campaign is programatically-oriented – we are dealing with party-conducive electoral behaviour. Here a party's *visible representation* should be boosted, because its agents on the ground are actively advancing the collective reputation of their party rather than that of their own. By contrast, wherever the rhetoric and materials used emphasise the personal credentials of the candidate – that is wherever the campaign is personality-driven – we are dealing with the pursuit of a so called anti-party electoral strategy. In this scenario parties will be hard pressed to enhance levels of *visible representation*, because their agents on the ground fail to propagate their party's platform and programme.

According to the electoral connection literature, the two electoral properties most immediately shaping a candidate's propensity to pursue either one of these two strategies are the ballot structure and the district size. As we know, the ballot structure subsumes all features of the electoral law that determine the type and number of votes cast and their translation into parliamentary seats. As such it influences the electoral appeal available to individual candidates seeking parliamentary representation. For instance, voters may be required to either cast a party or a candidate vote, or some combination of the two. Where voters can elect candidates only, political hopefuls are likely to employ a political rhetoric and campaigning materials that, above all, emphasise their personal reputation and credentials, particularly under unstructured conditions. They would do so because these provisions directly link a politician's electoral fortunes to his or her personal appeal and vote tally and not to that of the party. Rationally acting candidates are thus capable of wooing constituency support by means of a personality-driven campaign which, under the societal conditions given, seems, of course, electorally far more promising than the pursuit of a programmatically-oriented campaign (Katz 1980: 24, 28).

The utility of this latter strategy becomes challenged, however, wherever the electoral ballot stipulates an exclusive party vote, as is the case, for example, under closed-list PR formulas. Under these provisions, vote-maximising candidates can no longer rely on their personal vote tally and by extension on the pursuit of an election campaign solely geared towards their personality. This is the case because individual political fortunes now become invariably tied

to the vote totals obtained by either the district or the national party list. For politicians belonging to the same party it thus becomes beneficial to pursue a collective reputation seeking strategy, so as to maximise the party's overall vote tally and in turn their own chances of parliamentary entry (Katz 1980: 21-22, 28; Ma & Choy 2003: 349-350).

As mentioned above, the degree to which candidates pursue a programmatically-oriented campaign can also be linked to the district size. All other factors being equal, it is assumed that decreasing district sizes, either in geographical extension, the number of registered voters or both, should induce vote-maximising candidates to employ a personalised campaigning rhetoric and materials. This is the case because small districts increase a candidate's chances to be personally known by the constituency electorate, and thus to mobilise voters by means of campaigning materials that make exclusive reference to his or her personal and professional credentials, the capacity to provide constituency services and his or her local affiliations (Kreuzer 2000: 494).

The feasibility to use such personalised materials should decrease, by contrast, wherever the physical size of the district increases. This is the case because large districts, both in their geographical extension and in the number of voters, reduce the likelihood that candidates are personally known across the entire constituency. In terms of campaigning this means that it will be far more difficult for candidates to rely exclusively on campaigning materials and a political rhetoric that above all else emphasises their personality. By carrying little mobilisational potential beyond the confines of the candidate's local stronghold, these campaigning devices will simply not suffice to capture sufficient votes district-wide. Given the limitations of any personality-driven campaign, party candidates may thus become inclined to fall back on the materials provided for by their parties and to wage a campaign that is more programmatically-oriented, in the hope of attracting votes from among the wider district electorate (Katz 1988: 30-31, 33; Kreuzer 2000: 493).

It seems important to note, however, that this latter assumption may presuppose the presence of a reasonably structured electorate. In other words, it may require an electorate that is by and large receptive to an election campaign geared towards the promotion of party platforms and programmes. As we know, these conditions exist in most consolidated first- and second wave democracies, where voters have come to structure their votes along partisan rather than personal lines. Here then it is possible for candidates to supplement their personalised campaigning efforts with the usage of party manifestos and programmes should the electoral properties in place induce them to pursue such a strategy. Wherever the electorate remains unstructured, that is where party programmes carry no mobilisational potential, it is not so

obvious, however, that the aforementioned electoral properties would incline candidates to pursue this latter strategy. Whilst such properties may induce party candidates to enhance levels of cooperation in order to manage vast district sizes, they may not necessarily exert sufficient pressures on them to pursue a more programmatically-oriented campaign. Should this be the case, we will most likely come across alternative vote-maximising strategies. These could include, for instance, the formation of broader cross-party district alliances amongst candidates with local strongholds or the coordination of the election campaign by members of the same party, in such a way that each of the contestants focusses on the area in which he or she is personally known. Clearly, wherever this is the case, the incentives created by these electoral provisions have failed to offset a candidate's preferred electoral strategy, namely that of political entrepreneurship. Here then they simply hold no explanatory power over this particular domain of the election campaign.

### *Party Labels*

Levels of label promotion constitute the last domain of the campaigning period that is expected to influence the direction of party development at the electoral level. Label promotion is defined as the extent to which party candidates are actively promoting the party label (not to be confused with the programme), as opposed to, or at least over and above, their personality. Under unstructured conditions, it is assumed that the extent of such label promotion crucially influences the capacity of parties to become *visibly present* in the electoral arena. Where parties have sufficient agents in place who are willing to promote their respective labels, there is a real chance that the electorate will take notice of the different parties in the field and – over consecutive elections - possibly even develop some form of identification with them. By contrast, where party agents fail to link their candidacy to a particular label, parties are left without a potent means by which to enhance their visibility at the district level.

The problem is however, that under unstructured conditions, and all other factors being equal, party candidates will be little inclined to actively engage in any form of label promotion. As mentioned previously, here the structure of the electorate should predispose party candidates to pursue a personal over a collective party vote. This is the case because there is simply little value in pursuing a collective party vote within an electorate that shows little knowledge of, and affiliation to, the existing political parties. In terms of electoral strategy, party candidates are thus better off to pursue a personal vote, that emphasises their personal credentials and reputation in the district in which they are running.

Given these societal conditions, one must hence ask whether there are any circumstances in which party candidates would be inclined to (counter-intuitively) promote their party labels, either over, or in conjunction, with their personalities. In other words, are there any factors that could alter the electoral strategy pursued by party candidates?

It is suggested here that under such conditions, differences in electoral design can (theoretically at least) greatly influence the propensity of party candidates to pursue some form of label promotion. More specifically, it is expected that the level of label promotion party candidates engage in crucially hinges upon two electoral properties, namely on the vote entity used and the electoral symbol marked on the ballot. As mentioned previously, vote entities define the type of political actor for which a voter is entitled to cast his or her ballot. These actors can be political parties, individual candidates or a combination of the two, depending on the type of electoral regime in place. Electoral symbols, in turn, are abstract labels that are commonly used to denote a certain vote entity on the ballot in countries where large sections of the electorate cannot read or write. Here such symbols are added to the ballot paper – alongside the names of the candidates or parties – so that illiterate voters can identify the different political contenders in the field and cast their ballots accordingly.

How then are these two properties expected to influence levels of label promotion? Essentially, together they are expected to shape the extent to which party candidates are both willing and able to actively advance their party label during the election campaign. It is hereby assumed that party candidates should be more inclined to promote the party label, once an exclusive party vote is used. As mentioned previously, this is the case because under these electoral provisions the success of individual candidates depends on the vote tally obtained by the entire party list rather than on that of the individual contestant. In order to obtain a sufficiently large number of votes, candidates may hence want to enhance the electorate's awareness of their party by means of label promotion. Party candidates should, by contrast, see little merit in pursuing a label promotion strategy wherever voters cast their ballot for individual candidates rather than party lists (Katz 1980: 28).

What is more, the capacity for candidates to actually promote the party label should be boosted wherever parties are being accorded a single electoral symbol for all their agents in the field. In these circumstances, party candidates can use their allocated electoral symbol to promote themselves, and their political parties and to demarcate themselves from candidates running under different party labels and programmes. Moreover, wherever the electoral symbols are marked on the ballot, they constitute a potent electioneering device to encourage illiterate voters to choose their district list over others.

As regards the parties themselves, the distribution of electoral symbols also matters nationally in that they affect the capacity of party headquarters to increase levels of label recognition, at least during election times. Indeed, wherever candidates of the same party carry identical electoral symbols nationwide, parties are much better positioned to promote label recognition than under circumstances where such labels are randomly dispersed amongst their candidates at the district level. In the first instance, parties are able to draw an immediate association between themselves, their candidates and their programmes. Moreover, wherever these electoral symbols are retained over consecutive elections, the chances are high that voters will eventually come to relate specific symbols to specific parties, even under unstructured conditions. This in turn greatly enhances the overall visibility parties enjoy in the electoral arena. In the second instance, namely wherever electoral symbols are dispersed among party agents, parties cannot foster any visible linkage between themselves, their candidates and their programmes. If the candidates themselves do not actively seek to promote the party and its label, then a large section of the voting population will simply not know what party they are voting for and possibly even that the party exists in the first place.

To conclude, in section 4.2 it was shown that PR-list based regimes are overall more conducive to the strengthening of parties as collective actors than open-list and / or candidate-based regimes, at least during the recruitment phase. Based on the theoretical propositions presented here, it is possible to extend this assumption to the campaigning period. As we have seen, in all three domains of the election campaign investigated here, PR-list based regimes with large districts and high thresholds were expected to facilitate the emergence of visibly present and unified parties, whilst candidate-based regimes in small districts were thought to reinforce the status quo of weakly developed parties. Here again, the latter regimes can be labelled as a 'no-effect' system, given that it carries virtually no incentives that could help parties enhance their presence in the electoral process.

#### **4.4 Other Institutional Explanations**

In the preceding pages I developed a theoretical argument that is both deductive and parsimonious in character. Drawing on the electoral connection literature I essentially argued that, by shaping the behaviour of political actors, electoral institutions affect five crucial domains of the electoral process. Following on from this, I then assumed that variance in each of these domains has a bearing on the direction of party development at the electoral level.



Yet, whilst arguing that electoral systems matter, it is not suggested that this variable constitutes the sole institutional factor that shapes the electoral behaviour of political actors in non-democratic regimes. Obviously the political realities on the ground are often far more complex and multifaceted than can be explained by a single cause. As regards this research, for instance, we can identify at least three further institutional variables that (in theory) influence the strategic behaviour of individual actors, alongside the type of electoral system in place. These include the political parties' law, party finance regulations and, less formally, the state's spoils and patronage system. Although their overall impact appears less clear-cut than that of the electoral regime, they are nevertheless thought to influence both the strategic choices of individual actors and the coercive repertoire at a party's disposal. What is more, depending on their character, they may either reinforce or offset the effects exerted by certain electoral properties on the behaviour of these actors. It is for this reason that they have to be addressed in the context of this theoretical discussion and that they will have to be incorporated in the subsequent empirical analysis.

Why do these three institutions matter and how do they interact with the provisions of the electoral law in shaping the strategic behaviour of political actors at the electoral level? As will become apparent below, all three institutions are relevant during the candidate recruitment phase, during which they are thought to affect both the inclination of individual actors to join a political party and the parties' capacity to control access to the electoral arena. To substantiate this assertion, let me turn first to the political parties' law, before moving on to the party finance regulations and the state's spoils and patronage system.

As we know, most Western democracies have laws in place that regulate the formation and operations of political parties. What is more, reflecting the guiding principles of representative democracy, these so called political parties' laws are usually overall permissive to the formation of new political parties. When it comes to semi- or non-democratic regimes, by contrast, we rarely come across party legislation that fully endorses the notions of freedom of organisation and political participation, as is the case in Western democracies. Instead, we are confronted with party laws that often vary in their permissiveness to the formation of new political parties. Whilst some polities make it relatively easy for new parties to be formed, others again have ensured that their licensing remains fraught with insurmountable legal hurdles. In these polities, differences hence exist in the so called *party formation threshold* (PFT); that is in the extent to which the legislator has imposed restrictions on the formation of new political parties. Wherever the *party formation threshold* is high, the legislator ensures that the registration of new parties is lengthy, difficult and uncertain in outcome. By contrast, wherever it is low, the legislator produces a party law that is relatively permissive to the

licensing of new parties and in which the actual licensing procedures are simple and not discriminatory.

As regards the impact of the *party formation threshold*, it is assumed that it constrains the number of avenues political activists have at their disposal when deciding how to enter the electoral race. Recall, all other factors being equal, candidates can pursue three different strategies under unstructured conditions. They can either seek to enter the electoral fray individually as independents, on the ticket of an existing party, or by creating their own political party. Whilst the feasibility of the first two strategies is determined by the presence or absence of ERC, it is the availability of this latter strategic option that is being influenced by the type of *party formation threshold* (PFT) in place. Indeed, wherever this threshold is high, it is very unlikely that political hopefuls will consider entering the electoral fray on the ticket of a newly created party. This holds true both for first-time candidates and for party representatives who, for whatever reason, contemplate dissent. Here the uncertainty surrounding the licensing of new parties simply makes this avenue of electoral entry highly unattractive. By contrast, wherever this threshold is low, hence where it is relatively easy to form a new party, political activists may be more inclined to consider this avenue of electoral entry.

From a party developmental perspective, of course, the scenario most conducive to the emergence of internally unified and visibly present parties is given wherever ERC is present and the *party formation threshold* high. This is the case, because under these conditions it is virtually impossible for political activists to run elections outside the established party framework. In other words, the possibility to run independently or to create one's own political party is simply not given. For first-time entrants to the electoral arena this means that they will have to seek the nomination of one of the existing parties. For party members contemplating dissent, in turn, this means that they cannot pursue any collective form of dissent. For them, the only opt-out alternative available is to join the ranks of a rival party.

All other scenarios, by contrast, in one way or another reduce a party's internal unity and visible representation. For example, where ERC is present but PFT low, collective forms of dissent remain a feasible opt-out alternative for dissenting party members, and hence a potent source of disunity. Conversely, where PFT is high but ERC absent, the door remains wide open to the pursuit of individual candidacies and individualised forms of dissent. Under this scenario both *internal unity* and *visible representation* will suffer. Finally, where ERC is absent and PFT low, political activists face virtually no constraints in the entry options available to them. As with the latter scenario this situation will, however, also significantly

reduce the parties' chances of enhancing their visible representation and unity in the electoral arena.

Let me turn next to the two remaining institutional variables addressed above, namely to the party finance regulations and the state's spoils and patronage system. It is argued here that, by shaping a party's *resource capacity*, both these variables crucially influence the strategic decisions taken by political activists during the candidate registration process. This point was mentioned above, when discussing the types of vote-seeking strategies party candidates pursue under different electoral regimes. To recapitulate, basically it was proposed that the *resource capacity* at a party's disposal co-determines whether or not parliamentary hopefuls seek the nomination of a party in the first place and, if contemplating doing so, which party they are likely to join. The term '*resource capacity*' is hereby defined broadly to include both a party's financial means as well as its human resource pool, organisational reach, collective reputation and capacity to extract state resources.

In most European democracies, public finance regulations are in place that, to varying degrees, reimburse campaigning expenses and at least partially finance the daily operation of political parties. This is not necessarily so in illiberal regimes. Here it is highly questionable whether public financing of political parties is in existence, and if so, whether the resources made available are sufficient to cover a party's day to day expenses, let alone campaigning costs. Moreover, if present, any such regulations for public and private financing will most likely be restrictive in character, employed by continuist elites as a means to control the opposition's sources of income and its revenue generating activities.

For prospective candidates the type of party finance regulations in place is significant in determining how to contest an election. Where parties reside over sufficient financial means, candidates will be able to fall back on a well-equipped organisational infrastructure and campaigning support. Seeking a party nomination, even though the party label might by itself be electorally meaningless, may thus become an attractive strategic option, being associated with a significant reduction in personal electioneering costs and possibly even increased prospects of electoral victory. By contrast, parties strapped of financial resources are less likely to be positioned to provide significant campaigning support to all, or at least a large number, of their candidates. Consequentially, those running on a party label will have to seek out alternative sources of funding and may possibly even be required to tap into their own personal savings. Without the prospect of significantly reduced electioneering costs there will thus be few incentives for prospective candidates, all other factors being equal, to seek a party's nomination.

Of even greater influence than formal finance regulations is the *de facto* resource inequality often prevalent among those parties operating in illiberal polities. This is shaped by the state-controlled spoils system characteristic of such regimes and expected to result in differential push and pull incentives for those candidates contemplating to run on a party ticket.

As mentioned elsewhere, the electoral and parliamentary arena in such regimes is usually characterised by the dominance of a continuist party or party coalition and a weak, fractionalised opposition. This pattern finds its equivalent, or better even, its source in the unequal resource distribution among parties. By virtue of their political connectedness to the incumbent regime, be it as parliamentary support base, recruitment pool for regime elites or corporatist underdog gluing all major societal sectors to the state, regime (supportive) parties are equipped with a much wider resource pool than their political opponents. Abundant means are conceivable of how this resource supremacy can be secured, particularly during the election campaign. For instance, such parties might gain access to extra funding from state-coffers, receive greater, or even sole, coverage in the state-run print and electronic media or fall back on the organisational infrastructure of the public administration.

Obviously, any such unilateral benefits for regime-supportive parties not only reduce the competitiveness of the election campaign itself, but also unbalances the very nature of recruitment patterns. This is because under unstructured conditions rationally acting candidates are, if at all possible, expected to seek the nomination of those parties that can significantly reduce their electioneering costs and increase electoral prospects. Recall, this assertion presupposes conditions where most candidates and voters lack any stable partisan affiliation and where parties resemble more the 'electoral' than 'programmatic' type. Parties connected to the state's spoil system provide precisely such incentives. Indeed, gaining their nomination most likely entails significant financial and organisational backing during the election campaign and once in parliament easier access to state funding for constituency projects. Moreover, candidates might even benefit from wider label recognition than those running on opposition tickets. This is particularly apparent in former single-party states where the ruling party has been in power for several decades. Voters, aware of the benefits of regime-supported candidates, will thus be more inclined to vote for those candidates and thereby principally increase the electoral prospects of the latter.

Both the legal and *de facto* resource distribution among political parties thus matter to the extent that their variance exerts an unequal pull effect on a candidate's preferred electoral strategy. This is particularly eminent of course under candidate-based ballots, where *effective recruitment control* is absent. Here *resource capacity* becomes the most important incentive

at a party's disposal to offset the unfavourable conditions for candidate recruitment and to tip the power balance between party member and agent in the latter's favour. Where *resource capacity* is high, parties are more likely to attract candidates onto their ballot and increase control over both promotion and demotion than where it remains low. By the same token, this factor becomes only secondary in importance to the ballot in place, once effective nomination control is guaranteed.

How then are these additional institutional variables to be treated within the framework of this research? Basically, there are two ways forward. First, we could simply attempt to hold them constant across time, essentially discarding them from any further analysis. Of course, this approach only becomes feasible, if we can show that these three variables did not vary significantly during the period under investigation. Wherever this is the case we can assume that their impact remains constant across time and that hence they do not distort the primary relationship of interest, namely that between electoral institutions, elite behaviour and party development. Second, we may also decide, however, to incorporate these three institutional variables into the investigation at hand. Taking a more cautious approach, we may hence attempt to explore how in actual practice these three variables interacted with the types of electoral provisions in place in shaping the behaviour of individual actors.

The subsequent empirical investigation into patterns of party development in Egypt will adopt this latter approach. This is done because by hindsight both the *party formation threshold* and a party's *resource capacity* seem to matter greatly in the Egyptian context. As we have seen in chapter two, for instance, to this day Egypt's multiparty system remains highly imbalanced as regards the resources at the parties' disposal. Recall, that in comparative perspective, the NDP with its access to the state's spoils and patronage system, is far more resource strong than any of the country's opposition parties. It is not difficult to see, therefore, how these differences in the parties' *resource capacity* affect the behaviour of individual political actors during election times. As theorised above, these differences will most likely interfere with the level of *effective recruitment control* given, in determining the electoral strategy pursued by those political activists that seek to enter the electoral arena.

The following empirical chapters will test the set of theoretical propositions made above against evidence drawn from Egypt. Chapters six and seven will hereby focus on the candidate recruitment phase, whilst chapters eight and nine will deal with the actual election campaign. To recapitulate, in so doing I seek to explore the extent to which the electoral marginalisation of Egypt's parties during the 1990s has been caused by the 1990 electoral reform. However, prior to the actual investigation the subsequent chapter will discuss the

research design and methodology used as well as the empirical data generated for the analysis at hand.

## **Chapter Five. Research Method, Conditions and Data**

This chapter discusses the research methodology and data that have been employed to test the electoral connection hypotheses spelled out in the preceding chapter. The chapter comprises two sections. Section 5.1 discusses the research design and the rationale behind its selection. Special emphasis is given to the research conditions that prevail in the Arab world and to how they informed in large measure both the case selection and the actual approach taken. Section 5.2 then discusses the methods of data collection used during my field research in Egypt between 2001 and 2003, and the types of empirical data collected to test the hypotheses developed in the preceding chapter.

### **5.1 Research Design and Conditions**

As has become apparent in the preceding chapters, this research takes a simplified rational-choice institutional approach to investigate patterns of party development in Egypt under the presidency of Mubarak. To recapitulate, this approach basically examines how political institutions influence actors' strategies and how, in so doing, they shape political outcomes. The institutions of interest here are, of course, electoral regimes and regime change and the outcome patterns of party development. Expressed differently, this research explores whether, and if so how, differences in electoral design affected patterns of party development in Egypt between the 1980s and 1990s. The electoral regime constitutes the independent variable and patterns of party development the dependent variable.

The analysis itself rests on a single case, namely that of Egypt. As the name implies, case studies are studies that explore a single object or phenomenon such as, for example, a state, a political institution, an organisation or a singular historical event. By virtue of their focus on a single case, these studies hence contrast with broader comparative analyses that investigate and compare a larger number of cases across time and space.

Although widely used in practice, it seems that the single case analysis receives little academic acclaim in comparison to other more quantitative research methods that use a larger number of *N*. The reason for this scepticism stems in large measure from its methodological weaknesses. First, by their very nature, case studies carry dismally low levels of generalisability. This means that it is very difficult to test their external validity; that is whether the theories tested actually hold any explanatory weight beyond the case under scrutiny. What is more, the single case design may also be troubled by low levels of internal

validity. Internal validity measures whether the changes observed in the dependent variable are actually caused by changes in the independent variable. Wherever a single phenomenon is investigated without comparative reference, it becomes very difficult to prove any causal relationship between dependent and independent variables. This is the case because under such research conditions virtually every independent variable can be the cause of the difference in the dependent variable (Peters 1998: 138).

However, despite these drawbacks it would be academically unwise to discard entirely the utility of single case analyses. Indeed, as Peters argues ‘...a single case, if properly constructed and researched can be used to expand the analytic knowledge of political science and to illuminate and even test directly theories commonly used in the discipline’ (Peters 1998: 138). This means that case studies perform a vital role within our discipline, and this in two ways. To begin with, they can be used as a tool to provide in-depth knowledge about certain political phenomena or objects, which can then be drawn upon by comparativists for the purpose of broader cross-national analyses. Second, case studies can also be used as an exploratory device to generate tentative theoretical propositions and to test or even expand existing ones (Landman 2000: 32-33). In the latter scenario, a researcher may for instance want to employ a single case design in order to explore the feasibility of a given theoretical proposition. For the soundness of this test he or she could hereby choose to select a case that seems most unlikely to fit his or her theoretical proposition. If the test is nevertheless successful in that particular case, then of course the chances that the overall theory holds across other cases are considerably higher. As long as the case study is properly constructed, it hence undoubtedly constitutes a highly valuable building block in the development and verification of social science theory.

The single case study conducted here serves two purposes, both of which have already been addressed in the introduction. To begin with it seeks to explain the singular deterioration in the electoral performance of Egypt’s political parties under the presidency of Mubarak. In this sense then we are dealing with a classic single case analysis, in which the onus of investigation lies with a political phenomenon that is peculiar to the case under scrutiny. Viewed from this perspective, the added value of the study remains rather limited, resting entirely on its contribution to our understanding of electoral and party politics in Egypt.

Whilst valuable in its own right, this case study claims, however, to be of broader theoretical importance. Being exploratory in character, it seeks to test whether institutional approaches to the study of political phenomena carry any explanatory weight in the Arab world. As mentioned previously, the analysis of formal political institutions and their effects on the



politics and policies of a country have so far obtained dismal systematic attention within the political science of the MENA region. This study seeks to rectify this neglect and to verify whether and how political institutions matter under non-democratic and unstructured conditions. In the case at hand this is done by exploring the extent to which electoral institutions had any tangible bearing on the performance of parties in Mubarak's Egypt. Viewed in this light, Egypt thus serves as little else than a testing ground for the possible expansion of institutional analyses to the study of socio-political processes in the Arab world. Indeed, if successful, the theoretical propositions developed and tested here could be verified against empirical evidence drawn from other Arab multiparty regimes or possibly from a much larger cross-national comparison.

Whilst based on a single case, the research itself is, of course, inherently comparative in nature. Comparing two distinct electoral periods, it explores whether and how Egypt's 1990 electoral reform changed the behaviour of individual political actors in the electoral arena and whether in so doing it contributed to the marginalisation of party politics in the country. To recapitulate, during the 1980s Egypt ran elections under two PR-list based regimes, before shifting towards a two-round AM system in 1990. According to the electoral connection hypotheses developed in chapter four this inter-system change should theoretically have reduced both the power of party cadre over the nomination and placement of candidates and the willingness of party candidates to pursue a party reputation-seeking strategy. Consequentially, parties should have suffered in *internal unity* and *visible representation*.

The actual hypothesis test is hence based on a within-system comparison of two distinct electoral periods within a single case. These two periods are the 1980s, during which the country ran two parliamentary elections under PR-list based regimes, and the 1990s, during which the country held three elections under the two-round AM system.<sup>72</sup> It is important to note at this point, that the elections of the 1980s are here compared en bloc to those of the 1990s, despite the differences that existed in the electoral laws of 1984 and 1987. To recapitulate, in 1984 elections were held under closed-list PR in multimember constituencies and in 1987 under a mixed electoral slate. This mixed regime combined the PR-list system of 1984 with an additional plurality tier in SMDs.

The decision to combine the two electoral regimes of the 1980s is based on the fact that their essential provisions are virtually identical. Indeed, although the 1987 electoral law carried a

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<sup>72</sup> The two pluralist elections of the 1970s are left out from this investigation for a number of reasons. The 1976 elections are discarded because they were fought on a non-partisan basis. The 1979 elections are in turn discarded because they took place prior to the emergence of the NWP and the MB on the electoral scene. These elections were hence conducted without the participation of two of the major opposition parties in Egyptian politics.

second plurality tier, it still retained the overall features of the 1984 electoral law. Whilst in 1984 all 448 seats were elected by closed party lists, in 1987 this number still stood at 400 seats. In other words, in 1987 only about 10 percent of all seats were elected under a different electoral formula. In terms of incentive structure, both these systems hence promised to exert a similar constraining effect on party candidates, in stark contrast to the 1990 electoral regime.

Having said this, this does not mean, however, that the differences between these two electoral regimes will be completely neglected. On the contrary, wherever the differences in their design can be expected to bear on the behaviour of party candidates and cadre, the two electoral regimes will be investigated separately in the chapters to come.<sup>73</sup>

The beauty of any within-system comparison lies in the fact that – within the political science discipline – it is one of the few research methods that comes closest to an experimental design. Indeed, when properly conceptualised, it allows one to place the casual relationship of interest within a relatively controlled setting. This means it is possible to keep a number of potentially intervening variables constant, whilst exploring the effects of the selected independent variable(s) on the dependent variable(s). The capacity to control for potentially intervening variables is, of course, particularly important when it comes to the study of a single case. To quote Peters again: ‘... the availability of only a single case means that almost every variable has an equal chance of being a cause; without some comparison (across time or across cases) there is no means to sort out the causes of the difference’ (Peters 1998: 139). Under these conditions, the use of a within-system comparison certainly helps reduce the number of possible variables that can account for the phenomenon under investigation and enhances the credibility of the causal relationship established.

The within-system comparison conducted here will keep three variables constant across time. These concern the voting behaviour of the Egyptian electorate, the electorally-relevant legislation and the internal organisation of Egypt’s parties. In chapter two each of these variables had been identified as contributing to the overall weakness of Egypt’s parties as collective actors during the 1980s and 1990s. By the same token, however, I also illustrated that these variables experienced little variance across these two electoral periods. Voting patterns have remained by and large personality rather than party-oriented, the electorally-

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<sup>73</sup> It must also be noted at this point that this investigation will not conduct any in-depth analysis of elections to Egypt’s *Majlis al-Shura* and the local councils. The decision to omit these elections from any further investigation rests on two considerations. First, during the presidency of Mubarak most opposition parties either boycotted or refrained from participating on any significant scale in the elections to the *Majlis al-Shura*; a consultative body devoid of any powers. Second, both the *Majlis al-Shura* and the local council elections have always remained low key affairs that were never thought to matter in Egyptian politics and during which it was a forgone conclusion that the NDP would win crushing majorities.

relevant legislation equally restrictive and the political parties essentially weak and fractionalised. Because variance in the dependent variable requires variance in the independent variable, we can hence assume that, as such, these factors contributed little to the observed electoral marginalisation of Egypt's parties after 1990; and that we ought to look elsewhere to explain the phenomenon at hand.

Why, however, research a single case only instead of a broader number of Arab multiparty regimes? Admittedly, the decision to focus exclusively on a single case was in the end driven by rather pragmatic considerations. Being aware of the research conditions in the Arab world and in light of the limited resources available, I came to the conclusion that there was simply no scope for the pursuit of a cross-national comparative study. Originally I had planned to conduct a broader comparative analysis of three to four Arab regimes, possibly including Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco, alongside Egypt.<sup>74</sup> Such a broader investigation would have certainly increased the external validity of the research findings and possibly also the credibility of the research approach taken. After some careful analysis into the local research conditions and some preliminary field research in Egypt in the summer of 2000, I realised, however, that this avenue of research was unfeasible within the time frame available. Indeed, one ought to keep in mind that we are not dealing with fully-fledged democracies that carry a vibrant and considerably open research culture, but with essentially authoritarian regimes that remain highly sceptical of any independent research activity. This is particularly so when it comes to the social sciences, which by virtue of their research interests, constitute a potent challenge to the credibility and legitimacy of authoritarian regimes and their incumbent elites.

The scepticism these regimes display towards independent research activity is plainly evident in the numerous legal hurdles that visiting scholars have to surmount before commencing their actual research. To begin with, most of the MENA countries demand that foreign academics apply for a formal research permit. Typically, this application has to contain detailed information on the purpose, content, methods and findings of the research, and in some countries needs to be regularly updated. Also, it has come to my attention that in some of these countries the application procedure can be lengthy and uncertain in outcome. In a number of Arab countries, moreover, visiting academics not only require a research permit but they also need to obtain authorisation for the research methods employed. In Egypt, for

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<sup>74</sup> Theoretically each of these countries would be suitable for the analysis at hand, and this for a number of reasons. First, similar to Egypt they have all introduced some form of limited multiparty system with regular elections for parliament. Second, all of these countries also vary in the independent variable, which means they have all experienced major reforms in their electoral regimes over the past two decades. On the basis of these conditions, it would hence be possible to conduct similar analyses to the one conducted here with the case of Egypt. In other words, it would be possible to investigate across nations whether electoral regimes and their reforms have any bearing on patterns of party development as theorised in chapter four.

example, the authorities require official authorisation for the use of larger questionnaire-based surveys.

According to one UK-based Middle East scholar – whom I had contacted to enquire about the research conditions in Tunisia – the legal hurdles imposed by most of the MENA countries carry a number of practical dilemmas for visiting scholars. Referring specifically to the research conditions in that country, she asserted that foreign academics have to choose between two equally unpleasant options. First, they can enter the country on a tourist visa, and hence conduct research without a permit. This option bears the risk, however, that the authorities may discover the ‘illegal’ activities of the researcher and expel him/her from the country. Alternatively, foreign academics can go the legal route and try to obtain a research permit. This is however equally risky, first because the authorities may decline the request, and second because the permit itself may impede any interaction between researcher and respondents. Indeed, as this particular academic has pointed out, in the Tunisian scenario it is highly likely that the security authorities will trace the academic trail of the researcher, questioning the respondents on what precisely has been discussed during a meeting or an interview.

In addition to these legal hurdles visiting scholars may also encounter numerous difficulties in the field. These difficulties are a direct consequence of the authoritarian nature of the incumbent Arab regimes, which have created an atmosphere in society that is wrought by secrecy, distrust and fear. Within this environment it is very difficult to contact crucial respondents and to collect research-relevant materials. Respondents, for instance, may simply decline to partake in the research on the grounds that they will not want to get into trouble with their superiors or, even worse, with the state institutions and the security apparatus. Others may consent to being interviewed, but are reluctant to disclose information on politically sensitive issues. This also applies to the collection of any written documentation. Here again visiting scholars may face serious problems in obtaining documents, particularly if this information has to come from official sources. Depending on the nature of the research, scholars may hence struggle to collect any valuable information during their research stay.

The difficulties in the field also became evident during my two consecutive research visits to Egypt. Indeed, in numerous instances my targeted respondents declined to participate in the research, either by means of an interview or through the provision of election-relevant data. This was particularly the case with members of the ruling NDP and government officials who across the board did not volunteer to share their knowledge and information. As far as I can

see, their refusal to participate in the research was mostly driven by a concern with discussing Egyptian politics and Egyptian electoral politics in particular.

Last but not least, I also had to take into consideration the fact that my Arab language proficiency was at that time not strong enough to conduct research without the help of professional translators. In fact, despite having taken both Modern Standard and Egyptian Colloquial Arabic, I felt little equipped to read in Arabic or for that matter to conduct specialised interviews with local respondents at the beginning of my PhD. I did in the end manage to conduct several interviews in Arabic, with the help of a local translator, but I never reached the stage of reading Arabic documents. This meant that throughout my research I would rely heavily on the help of translators, a fact that had to be taken into consideration when devising the research budget and when thinking about the number of countries that could be properly investigated.

In light of the difficult research conditions in place, my limited knowledge of the Arab language and the limited financial resources available, I decided that it was unrealistic to conduct a broader cross-national comparison. Instead and as already mentioned, I decided to focus on the one Arab regime that seemed best suited for the research at hand and pursue a thorough in-depth analysis of that particular case. The decision to do so was eventually also supported by the exploratory nature of the entire research project and the little literature available in the field on Arab electoral and party politics.<sup>75</sup>

On a more practical note, I also came to the conclusion that I would neither apply for a formal research permit nor ask the authorities to approve the *Candidate & Deputy Survey* I intended to conduct in the field. This decision may have been ethically questionable and it was certainly illegal, but it proved to be the only sensible way forward in the Egyptian context. On the one hand, I knew that the application procedure was lengthy and highly uncertain in outcome, and that it could hence possibly jeopardise my entire research project. On the other hand, I also knew that in case I was granted a permit, both my respondents and I would remain under close scrutiny from the Egyptian security services, a prospect that had the potential of impeding the establishment of any relationship with my respondents and the quality of the information obtained.

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<sup>75</sup> That it is very difficult to conduct research under such conditions has also been noted upon by other scholars working in the field. As Bill writes: '...the literature concerning the Middle East political systems, however, tends to be monocontextual. The reasons for the prevalence of the case study reside in the difficult nature of the subject matter, the need for special research skills, the constraints of time and resources (...)' (Bill 1994: 519).

Finally, I thought it necessary to become a fellow at the American University in Cairo (AUC), in order to attain some formal institutional linkage with one of the leading academic institutions in the country. As anticipated, this institutional linkage proved to be highly valuable in contacting various groups of respondents, who accorded greater credibility to me and to the research project once they were informed of my association with the AUC.

## **5.2 Research Method and Data**

The empirical data collected for this investigation stems from a variety of primary and secondary sources, most of which had been collected during my field research in Egypt between October 2001 and August 2003. The three primary sources of data include a *Party Candidate & Deputy Survey*, which was conducted between 2002 and 2003, numerous in-depth interviews that were held at the same time, and a large quantity of other documentary evidence related to multiparty elections in Egypt.

The format of combining survey research with more qualitative in-depth interviews was chosen, because it promised to deliver a more comprehensive picture of the entire election process. The survey research was hereby meant to deliver in a most effective way the vast quantity of empirical data necessary to test the hypotheses spelled out above. Moreover, it was also seen as the most efficient means to approach as many party candidates as possible and hence to increase the internal validity of the research findings.

The qualitative in-depth interviews were in turn employed to supplement the empirical data thus generated with more personal accounts of the different election campaigns. They were hence meant to provide the respondents with a wider space to discuss their personal campaigning experiences and to address those issues they felt were important. In addition, these in-depth interviews were also employed to approach specific types of party candidates whose political biography seemed particularly relevant for the research. These candidates included – amongst others - party switchers, long-term candidates who had contested elections under different electoral regimes and so called ‘party-independents’, who despite being a party member ran in elections outside the party framework. Finally, I made use of this particular research method in my dealings with party cadres who, by virtue of their limited numbers, did not lend themselves to the pursuit of a larger quantitative survey.

The *Party Candidate & Deputy Survey* itself was based on a closed-ended multiple-choice questionnaire that was carefully designed to capture all principal areas of the electoral process

with which this research is concerned. It was translated into colloquial Egyptian Arabic in order to enable the greatest possible number of respondents to participate in the survey and to prevent – as far as possible - any misunderstandings caused by language difficulties. As regards their distribution, moreover, most questionnaires were completed in my presence, either at the respondent's home, his or her office or at party premises. I deemed it useful to choose this completion format, because it provided the respondent with an opportunity to obtain clarification on difficult questions or to present alternative answers.

In terms of structure, the questionnaire was divided into three major sections. The first section covered a number of election-relevant questions that pertained to candidate personally.<sup>76</sup> Apart from his or her name, this section also covered the candidate's position within the party, the duration of his or her membership to it, as well as the parliamentary elections and the names of the districts in which they were running. The second and third section then served to test the electoral connection hypotheses spelled out in the preceding chapter. To this end they required the respondent to answer a series of detailed questions about both the nature of the candidate recruitment process and the election campaign under each of the past *Majlis al-Shaab* elections since 1979. In section two, which dealt with the candidate recruitment process, the respondents were asked various questions about where they were nominated, by whom and why. In the same section they were also asked about their behaviour in case of de-selection. Together all these questions were devised so as to unravel the power relations that existed between party cadre and nominees during the recruitment phase. In section three, which in turn dealt with the actual election campaign, the respondents were asked detailed questions about their campaigning strategies, finances and materials. This was done in order to assess the willingness of party candidates to collectivise their campaigning activities on the one side and to pursue a party over a personal reputation seeking strategy on the other.

Finally, as regards the format of the questions themselves, I decided to employ closed-ended multiple choice questions. Closed-ended questions are questions that carry a fixed set of response alternatives from which the respondent has to choose. This set can either be composed of a simple dichotomous 'yes – no' category or of a larger number of pre-determined response options. In the multiple choice format chosen here the respondents were usually confronted with a relatively large number of answer categories, which they were then asked to rank-order according to their importance.

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<sup>76</sup> Candidates were given the option to state their names or to keep the questionnaire anonymous.

In the literature, both advantages and disadvantages have been associated with closed-ended questions. For instance, it is widely acknowledged that these types of questions usually facilitate easy answers and take little time to complete. Moreover, they are also preferable to open-ended questions, because they allow easy comparability across questionnaires and are useful for statistical analysis. At the same time however, they have been criticised for straight jacketing the respondents by forcing them to select a pre-defined answer category that may not necessarily reflect their actual opinion (Johnson & Joslyn, 1995: 270-271). This fact can of course seriously impede the accuracy of the responses given and hence jeopardise the research findings.

To counter this disadvantage, I decided to devise closed-ended questions that would leave sufficient room for the individual respondent to either provide additional information or to refute all given answer categories. This was done by adding a so called 'other category' at the bottom of each question, under which the respondent was able to state his or her own opinion in writing. A sample copy of the survey questionnaire thus devised can be found both in Arabic and English in Appendix No. 1 & 2 of this PhD.

Regarding the targeted survey population, I had three selection criteria in mind. Together these criteria were meant to pre-empt any selection bias that could skew the overall results of the survey. First, I intended to cover candidates from the entire Egyptian party spectrum, including the ruling NDP and its political opponents. Second, I also sought to cover an equal number of respondents from both electoral periods under investigation. Finally, and as far as possible, I intended to draw on an equal number of candidates from the urban and rural areas and from the different governorates of the country.

As the survey information provided in tables 5.1 to 5.3 illustrates, it proved difficult to meet these three criteria. This holds particularly true for the political parties covered in the survey. To begin with, this survey covers only seven of the eighteen parties currently licensed in Egypt. These parties comprise, however, all of the major opposition forces that have been operating in Egyptian politics under the Mubarak presidency as well as several of the country's fringe parties. The former include the NWP, Tagammu the MB and the SLP. The latter include the EGP, Ahrar and the ADNP. In this sense then, the survey contains a relatively solid representation of Egypt's political opposition.



Table 5.1: Interviewed Candidates by Party Affiliation & Parliamentary Experience

Political Party	Number of Respondents	% of Sample
Tagammu	12	30.0
NWP	11	27.5
MB	4	10.0
EGP	4	10.0
SLP	4	10.0
Ahrar	2	5.0
ADNP	2	5.0
Independents	1	2.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: Party Candidate & Deputy Survey, 2001-2003, Appendix No. 3, p. 288.

Even more problematic in this regard is the fact that the sample survey contains not a single representative from the ruling NDP, and this despite the party's dominant status in Egyptian electoral politics. The reasons for this absence were twofold. First, albeit various attempts, it was in most cases virtually impossible to obtain appointments with NDP candidates and deputies. Fearful of the topics addressed and the possible implications of their interactions with a foreign academic, they usually either kindly -or not so kindly - declined my request for an interview. Second, in the very few cases I was able to meet with NDP representatives, they across the board appeared unwilling to discuss electoral politics and were certainly not prepared to complete the questionnaire.

Due to the absence of NDP candidates, the survey itself has, of course, lost significantly in representativeness. Its results must therefore be read very carefully and in conjunction with alternative empirical sources that can provide detailed information on the behaviour of NDP candidates during the past five *Majlis al-Shaab* elections. Fortunately, it was possible to extract this type of information from the Egyptian national press, and here most importantly from the *Al-Gumhuriya* and *Al-Ahram* newspapers. Both these national papers are known for their strong and outspoken support of the Mubarak regime and the ruling NDP. This fact was also apparent in their coverage of the parliamentary election campaigns of 1984, 1987, 1990, 1995 and 2000, in which they focused almost exclusively on the campaigning activities, programmes and personalities of the NDP and only marginally on those of the political opposition. Albeit problematic in its own right, in practical terms this biased press coverage provided a wealth of information on the nature of the NDP election campaign that could be used to complement the findings of the *Party Candidate & Deputy Survey*.

In terms of its geographical distribution and coverage of both electoral periods, the survey is again more representative. As table 5.2 indicates, for instance, the sample covers a significant proportion of the country's electoral constituencies and governorates. This applies to both the elections conducted under the PR list-based regimes of 1984 and 1987 and those held under the subsequent two-round AM system. Even more importantly, the sample is also relatively balanced with regard to the distribution of respondents across urban and rural constituencies. This balance is significant because it minimises any distortions that may arise because of existing differences in the behaviour of politicians under urban and rural conditions.

*Table 5.2: Interviewed Candidates by Geographical Distribution*

Geographical Units Covered	PR list-based Systems		Two-round AM System	
	Nr.	% of total	Nr.	% of total
Urban Governorates covered	3	11.5	5	19.2
Rural Governorates covered	4	15.4	9	34.6
Total Number of Governorates covered	7	27.0	14	54.0
<i>Total Number of Governorates in the Country</i>	<i>26</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>26</i>	<i>100.0</i>
Urban Constituencies covered	6	12.5	15	6.6
Rural Constituencies covered	5	10.4	11	5.0
Total Number of Constituencies covered	11	23.0	26	11.7
<i>Total Number of Constituencies in the Country</i>	<i>48</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>222</i>	<i>100.0</i>

Source: Party Candidate & Deputy Survey, 2001-2003, Appendix No. 3, pp. 288-290.

Albeit less balanced, the survey population finally also contains a sufficiently large number of respondents for each of the electoral periods investigated. As stated in table 5.3, the sample contains sixteen candidates who ran under the PR list-based regime and another thirty-five candidates who ran under the two-round AM system. Most crucially, however, it was possible to obtain completed questionnaires from a total of eleven candidates who had run under both electoral regimes. For the research at hand this category of candidates was of course of particular interest, given their experience with both electoral regime types and hence their capability to point at potential differences in the election campaigns under both these regimes.

*Table 5.3: Interviewed Candidates by Type of Electoral Regime & Parliamentary Experience*

<b>Type of Electoral Regime</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>% of Sample</b>
PR list-based	16	40.0
Two-round AM	35	88.0
Both regime types	11	28.0
<b>Parliamentary Experience</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>% of Sample</b>
Respondents with Experience	7	17.5
Respondents without Experience	33	82.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: Party Candidate & Deputy Survey, 2001-2003, Appendix No. 3, p. 288.

Overall it must be noted that with forty respondents the sampled population of the survey remains of course relatively small. At the time, however, it was for various reasons simply not possible to conduct a more representative survey with a larger number of respondents. To begin with, it was not possible given the financial and time constraints attached to this research, which was conducted without any outside help. Second, it was further hampered by the prevalence of an essentially research-hostile environment, which turned the contacting and interviewing of respondents into a highly time consuming and often frustrating experience. As with the NDP candidates, the author contacted probably twice as many opposition candidates as actually interviewed. In many other cases, moreover, the contacted respondents repeatedly failed to return their questionnaires.

In addition to the *Party Candidate & Deputy Survey* I conducted numerous in-depth interviews. Most of these interviews were again held with party candidates who had also completed the survey questionnaire. In total I interviewed twenty-four party candidates from all major parties. As intended, they mostly included candidates that - in one way or another - were of particular interest to this research. Two of the interviewees were party switchers, seven of them had participated in elections in both the 1980s and 1990s and two of them had run as so called party independents. In addition I also conducted a further thirteen interviews with selected party officials, again from the major parties. All of these officials had been selected because - in one way or the other - they had been involved in managing their party's election campaigns. They included three party presidents, three secretaries-general, two assistant secretary-generals and other members of the executive bureaus of the respective parties. A detailed breakdown of these twenty-four candidates and thirteen party officials by party affiliation is presented in table 5.4.

Table 5.4: Types & Numbers of Party Respondents interviewed

Party Cadre		Party Candidates	
Party	No. of Respondents	Party	No. of Respondents
NWP	3	NWP	9
Tagammu	3	Tagammu	7
EGP	2	MB	4
UP	2	Ahrar	2
ADNP	1	SLP	1
DGP	1	ADNP	1
SLP	1		
<b>Total</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>24</b>

Source: List of interviews provided in Appendix No. 4.

The interviews themselves were usually conducted either at party premises, the office or the home of the respondent. On average they lasted between thirty minutes to one hour and were either conducted in Arabic, English or French, depending on the foreign language proficiency of the respondent. Also, wherever they consented, the interview was recorded on a digital recording machine and later transcribed. In fact, this was the format used for virtually all interviews. Finally, all interviews that had been conducted in Arabic were later translated into English with the help of professional translators.

As mentioned earlier, the in-depth interviews basically served to capture the personal experiences of those involved in the electoral process. Candidates, for instance, were usually asked to describe the nature of their selection as party representatives and the strategies and devices they used during the election campaign. Moreover, if the candidate had participated in elections during both the 1980s and 1990s then he or she would have also been asked to make comparative references to these two electoral periods. Party officials were in turn asked to elaborate on how they nominated their candidates and supported their election campaigns during both the 1980s and 1990s. Finally, both party candidates and officials were also asked to provide their personal views on the different electoral regimes that had been in place since 1979 and their effects on party politics in Egypt. A hard copy of all the transcribed interviews can be obtained from the Government Department of the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE).

Apart from consulting various respondents, I finally also draw on a large quantity of election-related documents for my research. These documents included both primary and secondary sources of data. Thanks to CEDEJ and its excellent election archive, for instance, I managed to review the coverage of all *Majlis al-Shaab* elections since 1984 in the Egyptian press. I was

thus able to draw on numerous articles from both the national and the party political press, including *Al-Ahram*, *Al-Gumhuriya*, *Al-Ahali*, *Al-Wafd* and *Mayo*, just to name a few.

Additionally I was also able to obtain a range of election reports issued by various Egyptian and foreign NGOs, think-tanks and other academic institutions, including the GDD, the ACPSS, the *Konrad Adenauer Foundation* and the *Friedrich Naumann Foundation*. Of greatest empirical value were the election reports issued by the ACPSS, which had been available for all *Majlis al-Shaab* elections since 1984. Finally, I also consulted various election-relevant legal documents, most of which I had obtained from the *Hisham Mubarak Law Centre*. These included the electoral laws of 1984, 1987 and 1990, the Political Parties' Law and other civil legislation, as well as the numerous campaigning regulations that have been issued prior to each of the past five *Majlis al-Shaab* elections.

Together the sum of empirical data collected was employed to test the electoral connection hypotheses spelled out in chapter four. The analysis and the results of this test are documented in the following four empirical chapters. Of these, chapters six and seven investigate the candidate recruitment phase. More specifically, they deal with the two domains of the recruitment process that in the theoretical chapter had been identified as being primarily influenced by the electoral provisions in place. These concern the power relations between party candidates and cadre on the one side and the nature of the emerging *competitive constellations* on the other.

Chapters eight and nine then focus on the election campaign. Again they respectively deal with the two domains of the election campaign that were expected to be directly influenced by the electoral regimes in place. These had been identified as the nature of electoral cooperation and the types of campaigning devices and rhetoric used.

To recapitulate, by means of the following investigation this research seeks to verify whether and if so, how, the 1990 electoral system change in Egypt affected the behaviour of political actors in the electoral arena and in so doing shaped patterns of party development in the country.

## PART II: FINDINGS & ANALYSIS

### Chapter Six. Recruitment Patterns

The candidate recruitment process constitutes the first phase of the electoral calendar within which we can observe whether, in longitudinal perspective, Egypt's 1990 electoral reform caused any variance in levels of *internal unity* and *visible representation* at the electoral level. To recapitulate, during the 1980s the country ran elections under two closed-list PR-based regimes, before shifting to a two-round AM system in 1990. According to the recruitment-hypotheses developed in chapter four, this particular inter-system change should have theoretically produced a decline in both these dimensions of party development between the 1980s and the 1990s. Throughout the 1980s both levels of *internal unity* and *visible representation* should have been relatively high, given the presumed capacity of the PR-based regimes to facilitate headquarter control over both the selection and placement of party candidacies. *Visible representation* should have also been boosted under these electoral regime types first because they were thought to create strong incentives for parties to disperse their candidates on a nationwide scale and second because they were expected to retain party candidates as the dominant players in the electoral arena.

By contrast, both these dimensions of party development should have suffered greatly with the introduction of the two-round AM system in 1990. Under the unstructured conditions given, this particular regime type was expected to neither provide party headquarters with any effective means to control the selection and placement of their candidates nor with any tangible incentive to spread them beyond a limited number of constituencies. By facilitating the emergence of independent candidates, this regime type was additionally expected to severely undermine the numerical predominance of party candidates in the electoral field.

This and the subsequent chapter will explore whether, and if so, how exactly the 1990 electoral reform shaped the candidate recruitment process in the manner alluded to above, and hence affected levels of *internal unity* and *visible representation*. The analysis conducted in this chapter will hereby focus specifically on the manner in which the two different electoral regimes of the 1980s and 1990s affected levels of headquarter control over the selection and placement of party candidates. Chapter seven thereafter explores more precisely how these two electoral regimes influenced the geographic dispersion of party candidates on the one side and their overall numerical representation in the electoral field on the other. As has been discussed in chapter four, it thus deals with the types of *competitive constellations* that emerged at the district and national level during the two electoral periods under observation.

In line with the investigative focus of this chapter, the subsequent analysis is composed of three sections. Section 6.1 discusses the actual control party headquarters were able to exert over the selection and de-selection of their candidates under the two different electoral regimes. In a similar vein Section 6.2 then moves on to explore how much control party cadre actually held over the placement of candidates under the respective electoral laws. Section 6.3 draws together the evidence presented, discussing how the differences detected in these two domains of the recruitment process affected levels of *internal unity* and *visible representation*.

## 6.1 Nomination Control

In chapter four, I theorised that for parties to control all aspects of the selection process two conditions must be met. First, in order to ensure *internal unity* parties must be able to sanction the behaviour of de-selected nominees. This means they must be able to prevent such nominees from defying party directives by means of either collective or individual forms of dissent. To recapitulate, the former form of dissent is usually associated with the emergence of break-away factions that seek to establish their own political party. The latter form of dissent is in turn associated with the defiant behaviour of individual party representatives, who decide to seek parliamentary entry through another party or as independents. Second, in order to preserve their numerical predominance during election times, parties must also come to function as political gatekeepers that can control who and who is not able to enter the electoral fray. Indeed, as shall become apparent below, this particular function constitutes a vital prerequisite for parties to enhance their *visible representation* in the electoral arena.

To assess whether the 1990 electoral reform had any bearing on the capacity of Egypt's parties to meet these two conditions the following questions must be addressed. First, one must ask how effective these parties were in preventing their de-selected nominees from defying party directives under the PR list-based and AM systems respectively. Second, one also ought to ask how easy it was for these parties to function as gatekeepers to parliament under each of these electoral regimes.

In Egypt, all other factors being equal, it has never been easy for parties to meet the two conditions specified above. The principal reason for this difficulty lies in the fact that potential candidates face few incentives to join a party in the first place and virtually no meaningful sanctions if they decide to disobey the directives of the party they have joined. With regard to joining a party candidates can, for instance, neither hope to reduce their electioneering costs nor to enhance their reputation by aligning themselves with a given party

and its constituency support. They cannot hope to reduce their electioneering costs, because most parties have shown to lack the financial and human resources necessary to support their candidates' election campaigns. They cannot hope to enhance their reputation either, because parties have failed to establish any lasting constituency support among the Egyptian electorate. What is more, candidates cannot even hope that running on a party ticket will by itself advance their electoral prospects. This applies particularly to the parties in opposition which, facing severe regime restrictions and political intimidation, carry little appeal as vehicles to enter the legislature. In fact, rather than running under an opposition ticket candidates are probably far better advised to either join the ruling NDP or to run as independents, with the later prospect of entering the ruling party after electoral victory.

As regards to defying party orders, similar points can be made. Again candidates have little incentives to obey party directives or even retain their party membership given the little substantive support such membership usually carries during the election campaign. Second, and even more crucially, dissenting candidates need not fear the wrath of the electorate either, simply because voters have been shown to care little about the candidate's party affiliation and more about his or her personal credentials. In other words, as long as a candidate is personally well known and capable of providing constituency services, voters do not care whether he or she has switched party allegiances and whether he or she is running under a party ticket or as an independent.

Seemingly then, the only factor that could facilitate some headquarter control over the candidate selection process in this essentially 'party-hostile' environment is the legal stipulations that govern how and where potential candidates can stand for elections. These stipulations are usually spelled out in the relevant party and/or electoral laws and in the regulations that guide the candidate registration procedure. They can contain, for instance, provisions that require candidates to run under a party label or that prohibit them from switching political allegiances once elected to parliament. They could also make it very difficult for potential dissenters to form their own political party, and thus reduce the available opt-out alternatives to virtually zero.

#### *Effective Recruitment Control in 1984 & 1987*

Whilst the institutional provisions in place during the 1980s provided for precisely such legal headquarter control, those of the 1990s did not. To begin with, in both 1984 and 1987 the electorally-relevant legislation made it very difficult, if not impossible, for parliamentary



hopefuls of any political or ideological shade to contest elections outside the party framework. Under the closed-list PR regime of 1984, for instance, candidates had no choice but to run under a party label, given that the electoral law forbade individual candidates or lists of independents to stand in the election. What is more, the restrictive provisions of the Political Parties' Law and their discriminatory application by the authorities also rendered it virtually impossible for political hopefuls to seek parliamentary entry under the banner of their own party. Under these institutional constraints, the existing political parties were virtually in control over who and who could not enter the electoral arena.

This fact is also reflected in the empirical evidence at hand. Indeed, during the 1984 elections all of the approximately 2,000 candidates in the field were running on a party ticket (Middle East Times, 26/05 – 02/06/1984; Munoz 1984: 167). Also, thanks to the provisions in place, virtually all of Egypt's parties were able to attract a significant number of candidates for their campaigns. This fact is particularly remarkable in light of the few incentives Egypt's parties were able to offer their potential contenders. As we have seen, most opposition parties lacked both the financial and human resources to contribute significantly to the campaigns of their candidates and the popular appeal to deliver the votes necessary for electoral victory. Irrespective of these drawbacks, candidates flocked to the opposition in great numbers. Of the four opposition formations, for instance, the NWP-MB Alliance mustered as many as 442 candidates, the SLP 436, Tagammu 412 and Ahrar still remarkable 278 candidates for the 448 parliamentary seats. In fact, because the 1984 electoral law mandated that parties provide so called reserve lists of candidates in those constituencies they were running, each of them actually had double the number of candidates in place than the numbers listed above. The NWP- MB Alliance had thus nominated 884, the SLP 872, and so on. The NDP finally, with its status as the regime-supportive party, was also present with a total of 896 candidates, half of which were reserve candidates (Munoz 1984, 167; Mahmoud, Al-Gumhuriya, 08/05/1984).

Although the electoral regime changed somewhat in 1987, a similarly party-conducive environment prevailed during the selection process of that year. As mentioned previously, in 1987 a mixed regime was introduced that entailed both a party-list and an individual candidacy tier. Nominally at least, this regime provided political hopefuls with the option to run either independently or under a party label. For parties this situation therefore meant that their previously held monopoly over the recruitment process was lost.

Despite these changes in the electoral law plenty of incentives remained, however, for political hopefuls to run under a party label rather than as an independent. These incentives

were basically created by two conditions under the new law that made it highly unattractive for them to run outside the party framework. First, with only forty-eight individual seats, the chances to be elected to parliament continued to be far lower under the candidate tier than under the list-PR tier, which carried the remaining 400 parliamentary seats.<sup>77</sup> Second, because the forty-eight SMDs were so large and the candidates on their own, it was to be expected that the cost, time and effort invested in any individual campaign were far greater than those accrued under a party label, where collective modes of funding and campaigning were possible. Theoretically then, these negative elements of the SMD-tier should have produced strong incentives for politicians to retain or seek to obtain a list position on one of the party tickets.

Again the numbers seem to confirm this line of reasoning. Indeed, in absolute terms, the total number of party candidates in the field during the 1987 campaign remained almost as high as in 1984, and this despite the fact that Egypt's parties had now lost formal control over the selection process. A glance at the distribution of candidacies by party confirms this observation. The NWP, this time running on its own, mustered as many as 441 candidates for the 448 seats, the Islamic Alliance between the SLP, Ahrar and the MB 443, Tagammu 404 and the tiny UP a still remarkable 132 candidates. As expected, the NDP was again present with 448 candidates.

The ease with which party headquarters were able to fill their district lists during the 1980s is also reflected in the enormous number of political hopefuls that actually sought the nomination of a political party. In fact, many parties were confronted with a far greater number of nominees than available list positions. According to Mohamed Said from Tagammu for instance, in both 1984 and 1987 no less than 1,200 nominees applied for a place on one of its district lists.<sup>78</sup> A similar situation seems to have prevailed within the NDP and the NWP. In the *Menoufiya* governorate, for example, the NWP chairman at the time, Mohamed Abdel Halim, reported to Al-Ahram that in the first days of registration alone the party received no less than twenty-five application for its list in the first constituency and seventeen applications for the its list in the second constituency. The first constituency at the time carried eleven seats and the second constituency nine. Within a very short time span after the opening of formal applications the party in both constituencies hence already obtained double the number of applications needed (Al-Ahram, 19/02/1987).

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<sup>77</sup> This assessment was proven right during the 1987 poll, during which only four of the forty-eight seats were won by truly independents. The remaining forty-four seats were captured by party representatives. See table 2.3.

<sup>78</sup> Interview with Mohamed Said (Tagammu).

That it was comparatively easy to nominate sufficient candidates for their district lists in the 1980s was also made apparent by the interviews conducted with party officials on this subject matter. In a rather nostalgic manner most of them asserted that it was fairly easy to recruit sufficient candidates for their election campaigns, given that other avenues of political representation had been blocked. Sayed Al-Badawy, current Secretary-General of the NWP maintained in this regard that during the 1980s the party was: ‘...suffering from the number of candidates [that wanted to run on our ticket]’. He continued to claim that: ‘we had more than three or four times the number of candidates than list positions.’<sup>79</sup> In a similar vein Mohamed Abaza also asserted that in 1984 ‘...it was not difficult [to attract sufficient candidates]. By contrast we had to arbitrate between the different candidates.’<sup>80</sup> This point was finally also made by Mounir Abdel Nour who asserted: ‘we had problems in all the constituencies because the number of people who wanted to run was much bigger than the available places on the list.’<sup>81</sup>

Surely, whilst the electoral properties in place crucially facilitated the dominant position of parties in the selection process, it was not the only factor that provided parties with such a large pool of candidates during the 1980s. According to senior NWP figures, for instance, the effects of the list-PR regime coincided with the fact that the party was new to the electoral arena and hence a potential magnet for new entrants into politics. On top of that it had also entered electoral politics with a huge legitimacy bonus, as many Egyptians still associated the party with the first experiment in multiparty democracy between the 1930s and 1950s. Finally, the party at that point was also able to reinvigorate old Wafdist families and allegiances and hence able to recruit a large number of candidates in 1984 and 1987.<sup>82</sup>

Also, one ought to acknowledge that whilst the PR list-based regimes benefited a resource-weak political opposition, they did not exert the same effect on the resource-rich NDP. As we shall see below, the NDP has always been able to attract more political pundits than it needed, irrespective of the electoral regime in place. This was the case because, in contrast to the opposition, the party was able to provide state-patronage and resources to its candidates and because it was almost certain to guarantee electoral victory.

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<sup>79</sup> Interview with Sayed Al-Badawy (NWP).

<sup>80</sup> Interview with Mahmoud Abaza (NWP).

<sup>81</sup> Interview with Mounir Abdel Nour (NWP).

<sup>82</sup> Interviews with Mahmoud Abaza (NWP) & Sayed Al-Badawy (NWP).

### *De-Selection Control in 1984 & 1987*

The electorally-relevant legislation of the 1980s did, however, not only enable Egypt's parties to control who and who was not to enter the electoral race, but it theoretically also provided them with some measure of control over the behaviour of de- or non-selected candidates. This was particularly the case under the 1984 closed-list PR regime, which placed significant limitations on the number of opt-out alternatives available to potential dissenters and in so doing diminished the feasibility for de-or non-selected members to defy party orders. In contrast to the 1987 and 1990 laws, this regime precluded the possibility for candidates to run outside the party framework as independents. De- or non-selected party members, who nevertheless sought to contest the election, hence had to renounce their party membership and seek the nomination of a third party. Alternatively, of course they were also able to seek to form their own political party; a course of action that, as we have seen, promised little success given the regime's restrictive application of the Political Parties' Law.

When it comes to the empirics, the evidence is unfortunately sketchy and somewhat inconclusive. This is largely the case because it proved rather difficult to obtain sufficient information from party headquarters on the motives and scale of internal dissent during the 1980s. Most party representatives I interviewed were very reluctant to volunteer any information on this subject matter. What we do know, however, is that various attempts at both collective and individual forms of dissent were undertaken prior to the elections of 1984 and 1987 and during both legislative periods. We also know that the reasons for these desertions were numerous, and that they did not always relate to the outcome of the candidate recruitment process. Within the SLP and the NWP, for instance, the overwhelming majority of dissenters in the 1980s left because of their party's alliance strategies during the parliamentary polls of 1984 and 1987. As we know, both the NWP and the SLP had entered into an alliance with the outlawed MB in 1984 and 1987 respectively, a course of action that was contested within the ranks of both parties, and that led to serious fissions within them. In yet another incident, Al-Ahram Al-Iqtasadi reported in 1987 the desertion of a number of prominent NWP members, most of whom had apparently been fiercely critical of the leadership of then Chairman Fouad Serrageddin. According to the paper, most of these dissenters sought to establish correctionist-Wafdist parties upon leaving the NWP (Abd Al-Magid, Al-Ahram Al-Iqtasadi, 02/05/1988). For the parties in question then, these desertions were certainly harmful to the extent that they exposed serious internal fissures and with it a lack of *internal unity*. However, because these desertions were not directly related to the recruitment and placement of candidates during election times, it would be far fetched to link them to the type of electoral provisions in place.

This linkage did, however, exist wherever such desertions occurred during the candidate recruitment phase itself and where they were caused by the de- or non-selection of party nominees. Indeed, here it was assumed that the closed-list PR systems in place would have severely hampered any form of dissenting behaviour on the side of de-selected candidates, simply because doing so would have left them with no realistic alternative to enter the legislature.

In actual practice, however, various incidents have been reported in which disgruntled party members sought the nomination of other parties during the recruitment phase. As far as can be established, such dissenting behaviour was triggered by one of the following three reasons. First, on several occasions it was triggered by the de-selection of party members. Examples of this type of dissention include, for example, Sabah Awad Alla from the SLP who, after being denied a place on the party list in *Zaida Zainab* joined the UP, or Salah Tawfik an NDP deputy in the 1979 assembly, who defected to the NWP after being denied a list position in one of the *Gharbiya* constituencies (Al-Gumhuriya 12/05/1984). Although not specified, further such incidents have also been reported in *Al-Gumhuriya* and in *Al-Ahrar*. According to these sources there were numerous cases in which de-selected NDP candidates either joined the lists of the NWP or the SLP, or in 1987, decided to run as independents (Al-Ahrar, 02/03/1987; Al-Gumhuriya 23/04/1987).

Second, we also encountered dissenting behaviour that was triggered by the strategic considerations of the political hopeful themselves. Indeed, on various occasions party members seemed to have shifted allegiances, simply because they felt that their chances of entering parliament were higher on the list of another party. As Krämer remarks, in many cases these considerations were, in fact, spurred by the ruling NDP, which during the campaigns of the 1980s actively tried to lure candidates away from the NWP and the SLP, by promising them top positions on its own district lists (Krämer 1984: 370). Such incidents were, for example reported in *Al-Musawwar*, which claimed that in 1987 approximately eight Wafdist MPs left their party to run on the NDP ticket (Ahmed, Al-Musawwar, 13/03/1987). They were also commented upon by Springborg, who mentioned the case of a Sheikh of the prominent Awlad Ali family. This Sheikh had originally agreed to run on the Tagammu list in the constituency of *Marsa Matruh*, but then sided with the NDP after it had offered him a safe place on its district list in addition to 'other rewards' (Springborg 1989: 189-190).

In other reported cases, candidates shifted allegiances because they were dissatisfied with the manner in which the party had selected its candidates or more specifically with the list-positions they had been accorded by the leadership. As reported in *Al-Gumhuriya*, this was

again the case in 1987, when several dissenting Wafdists joined the SLP-Alliance or ran as independents (Mahmoud & Ayyad, Al-Gumhuriya 02/04/1987). At the time many political hopefuls perceived the SLP-Alliance as the most vocal and successful opposition force, which is why it carried greater appeal than the NWP or for that matter any other opposition party.

Although incomplete, the evidence presented above clearly suggests that partisan dissent was not uncommon during the 1980s. This in turn may suggest that the electoral provisions in place did not necessarily provide party headquarters with a potent tool to sanction any potential dissenters within their own ranks. By the same token, however, one ought to bear in mind that the data provided remains insufficient to properly assess the true extent of such dissenting behaviour. It may very well be the case that such forms of dissent were relatively minor when compared to those of the 1990s. To substantiate this claim, further research in this direction is therefore required.

Also, it is worth pointing out that, whilst damaging the parties' *internal unity*, these dissenters did little harm to the overall prominence of political parties in the electoral arena. This is the case, because in most instances these dissenters switched between political parties and party lists; which meant that they remained an integral part of the party political game. By contrast, in the 1990s, as we shall see, the picture changed dramatically, when forms of dissent became far more individualised and damaging to the *visible representation* of parties in the electoral arena.

#### *Effective Recruitment Control in 1990, 1995 & 2000*

Based on the preceding discussion we can conclude that, whilst not necessarily able to control dissenters, parties in the 1980s were in a position to control access to the electoral arena and by extension to the legislature. This power was in large measure facilitated by the electoral provisions in place, which enabled them to function as effective gatekeepers to the *Majlis al-Shaab*. When in 1990 the government introduced the two-round AM system, this institutionalised power was however completely lost for two reasons. First, the new law no longer required political hopefuls to run on a party ticket and second it also ceased to explicitly ban independents from standing for public office.

Together these institutional changes caused little more than a complete bouleversement in the power relations that had hitherto existed between parties as collective actors on the one side and individual political hopefuls on the other. This is probably most apparent with regards to

the gatekeeper function that parties had been able to perform under the PR list-based regimes. Indeed, under both these regimes individual politicians seeking parliamentary entry could only hope to do so under the umbrella of a party, and this despite the fact that there were few other incentives for them to take this course of action. In 1984 no alternative existed to running on a party label and in 1987 the option to run outside a party list had been very unattractive for the reasons given above. In this sense then, candidates were almost counter-intuitively encouraged to join one of the existing parties, although these had little to offer in terms of substantive electoral support, name recognition or actual chances of winning.

It comes as no surprise then that, once the PR-based regimes were replaced by the individual candidacy system, the situation changed dramatically to the disadvantage of political parties. Given that from then on individual politicians were free to choose between running within or outside the party framework, parties were at a loss to sustain their hegemonic position within the electoral arena. In fact, as will become apparent below, from 1990 onwards it became incredibly difficult for Egypt's parties to find sufficient candidates who were willing, let alone eager, to run under their label for the *Majlis al-Shaab*. With few incentives to join a party – particularly those in opposition – far more candidates then decided to contest the elections without any formal party backing rather than under a party label.

This fact is well reflected in the numbers and types of candidacies that emerged during the 1995 and 2000 elections.<sup>83</sup> During both these elections, independent candidates came to strongly outnumber the total number of party candidates running in the electoral arena. This fact was reflected in the numbers presented in table 2.5, which showed that during these elections party candidates made up only one-third of all candidates. The remaining two-thirds of the candidates were either independent-independents or NDP independents. During the 1980s, by contrast, party candidates had constituted the dominant force, covering 100 percent of all candidates in 1984 and 51 percent still in 1987.

The unattractiveness of political parties reflected in these numbers becomes even more apparent when discarding the ruling NDP, which through its linkage to the spoils system of the state was able to retain its appeal for political hopefuls throughout both electoral periods. Without the ruling NDP, the number of candidates running under a party label decreased from 77.5 percent of all candidates in 1984 to approximately 15 percent in both 1995 and 2000. At the same time the number of independent candidates who ran completely outside the party framework rose to approximately 30 percent of all candidates. Hence, rather than joining a

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<sup>83</sup> Because the 1990 parliamentary elections were boycotted by the majority of opposition parties, they are not representative of the overall pattern discussed here. These elections were therefore omitted.

party to advance their political careers these figures demonstrate that candidates overall preferred to run outside the party framework altogether.

That candidates shunned political parties to advance their careers is also reflected in the comments made by the party leaders interviewed within the framework of this research. Most of them asserted that it was far easier in the 1980s to recruit sufficient candidates for parliamentary elections than in the 1990s for the reasons mentioned above. This point was, for instance, emphasised by Mahmoud Abaza who, comparing the two electoral periods, asserted that the NWP faced severe problems in recruiting sufficient candidates for the 1995 and 2000 elections because it was far easier to run as an independent than as a Wafdist.<sup>84</sup> In a similar vein Mounir Abdel Nour, also from the NWP, claimed that candidates deciding whether to run under a party label or not were far more inclined to run as independents, given that in so doing they would increase their chances of electoral success and their prospects of joining the ruling NDP upon victory.<sup>85</sup>

Finally, the viewpoints expressed by these party cadres are also confirmed by the real number of political hopefuls who actually sought the nomination of a political party in 1990, 1995 and 2000. Overall, these compare dismally to the total number of party nominees in the 1980s. Again taking the example of Tagammu, it can be seen that, whilst this party attracted over 1,000 nominees in 1984 and 1987, it received, according to Mohamed Said, only forty official applications in 1990, fifty in 1995 and sixty in 2000.<sup>86</sup> Other parties fared no better. The small EGP, for instance, received only nineteen applications in 1990 and sixty-nine in 2000.<sup>87</sup> And even the NWP, the largest of all opposition forces, received less than 300 applications in 2000, compared to the more than 1,000 applications in the 1980s (Okasha, Cairo Times 09 – 15/11/2000).

As mentioned earlier, not all political parties were equally affected by this decline in the number of nominees. Whilst it severely hit the country's legal opposition it had little effect on the ruling NDP. Indeed this party never really faced any difficulties in nominating sufficient candidates for parliamentary elections. On the contrary, in both 1995 and 2000 the party had to turn down the vast majority of applications it received by party members. In 1995, the party claims to have received more than 3,000 applications for the 444 available district seats, of which it had to turn down more than 2,500. In 2000 the total number of turned-down party

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<sup>84</sup> Interview with Mahmoud Abaza (NWP).

<sup>85</sup> Interview with Mounir Abdel-Nour (NWP).

<sup>86</sup> Interview with Mohamed Said (Tagammu).

<sup>87</sup> Interview with Mohamed Awad (EGP).



nominees apparently stood at 1,000 (Al-Din, Al-Ahram Weekly, 22 – 28/06/2000; Khan, Middle East Times, 03/11/2000; Makram-Ebeid 2001: 33).

The apparent attractiveness for candidates to run under the NDP label should not be attributed, however, to the party's extraordinary popular appeal or to the greater ideological commitment of its members to the party's platform and ideology. On the contrary, it must be attributed to the fact that until the 2000 poll it was common knowledge that running on an NDP ticket nearly always guaranteed electoral victory. In this particular case then the financial resources at hand and the connections to state patronage offset the disincentives created by the electoral environment to run on a party ticket in the first place.

#### *De-Selection Control in 1990, 1995 & 20000*

The bouleversement in the power relations between political parties and individual politicians caused by the 1990 electoral reform was, however, not only apparent in the fact that parties had effectively lost their gatekeeper function to the electoral arena. In fact, it was also apparent within the parties themselves, which under the 1990 electoral regime had effectively lost any credible means to sanction the dissenting behaviour of de- or non-selected members. Whilst collective forms of dissent continued to be severely hampered by the party law in place, it now became possible and even attractive for candidates to seek out alternative avenues of political representation, namely by running as independents. Institutionally this alternative was obviously provided for by the change in ballot structure to the individual candidacy system. At the societal level, moreover, this alternative avenue of political representation was facilitated by the party-hostile environment within which parties and candidates had to operate. As demonstrated above, the Egyptian electorate has shown few signs of developing strong party affiliations across the two electoral decades. It is therefore highly unlikely that voters would have punished dissenting party members who sought to run outside the party framework. Most probably voters did not even know their candidate's party membership or, if they did, would not have considered it a crucial element in their electoral choice. Together these two factors led political parties to lose virtually all control over the behaviour of de-selected candidates.

The loss of this control under the candidate-based electoral regime is probably most apparent within the ranks of the ruling NDP. Being the governing party, it has never faced the problems most opposition parties encountered since 1990 in recruiting sufficient candidates for parliamentary elections. On the contrary, the NDP has been the only party in the country

under whose label it has been deemed beneficial to fight an election campaign. The problem for the NDP has thus not so much been to find sufficient candidates to run on its behalf, but to control those nominees who have been turned down by party headquarters. These de-selected nominees include not only ordinary party members but also outgoing or former MPs, local party bosses and other dignitaries. Over the past decade an increasing number of these de-selected nominees have sought their electoral fortunes outside the party framework, thus directly defying the decisions taken by the party leadership. In 1990, for instance, approximately 780 NDP members defied party orders and ran as independents. For the 1995 and 2000 elections this number rose even higher to 1,780 and 1,680 candidates respectively.<sup>88</sup> All these candidates were members of the NDP, yet after being de-selected, registered themselves with the registration authorities as independents (Zarhan 1991: 199-200; Al-Ahram Arab Strategic Report 1995: 382-384; Auda et al. 2001: 71).

Officially of course, party headquarters have resolutely opposed such dissenting behaviour by their de-selected NDP members and tried to quell their numbers by imposing draconian sanctions on the dissenters. In various public statements, issued prior to both parliamentary and *Shura Council* elections, high ranking party officials have persistently re-iterated their threat to expel any member who transgresses party directives and either runs in the elections as an NDP independent or supports a candidate outside the NDP framework. The latter directive has recently been codified in article sixty-three of the new NDP party statutes which states that any member of the NDP ‘...who contributes to the support of the nominee outside the party in the general elections will be expelled.’<sup>89</sup> Moreover, in an interview given to *Al-Ahram Weekly* prior to the 1995 poll, Al-Shazli warned that ‘...those who run for elections as independents against other NDP candidates should know that they will be expelled from the party’ (Al-Din, Al-Ahram Weekly, 02 – 08/11/1995). In yet another interview he took the same position, stating:

‘Let us recall the NDP’s conduct in the recent *Shura Council* elections [1994]. In these elections, those who violated party commitment were dismissed from the party. Let me emphasise that this is a basic rule that will be strictly applied in the coming parliamentary elections. I hope that all NDP members will observe this rule, whoever runs independently or outside the party’s framework will lose membership’ (Al-Din & Khalil, Al-Ahram Weekly, 12 – 18/10/1995).

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<sup>88</sup> Refer back to table 2.5.

<sup>89</sup> See article sixty-three of the new party statutes published by the NDP in 2002 (Book of the Republic - Viewing Egypt’s Future: Document of the 8th General Congress of the National Democratic Party and the Formation of the Party, September 15<sup>th</sup> - 17<sup>th</sup> 2002).

Five years later Gamal Mubarak, the son of the incumbent president and recently elected member of the party's political secretariat, was similarly outspoken on the subject, asserting that anyone who leaves the party to run as an independent will be banned permanently from re-entering the party (Cairo Times, 24 – 30/08/2000).

The severe threats directed against potential dissenters by party officials seemingly failed, however, to achieve their desired objective on the ground. As we have just seen, the number of de-selected NDP members running outside the party framework in parliamentary elections rose markedly after the introduction of the candidate-based system from approximately 780 in 1990 to no less than 1,680 in 2000. What is more, not only did the number of dissenting candidates rise, but their numbers also rose in parliament. Between 1990 and 2000 the number of NDP independents elected to the legislature rose from approximately 14 to nearly 50 percent in 2000. This rise in NDP independents came largely at the expense of the ruling party itself, which saw its parliamentary share steadily decrease to the point that it had lost the 'magic' two-thirds majority necessary to sustain the Emergency Law and re-elect the president. In order to sustain their political hegemony, the NDP was thus forced to change tactics and allow the de-selected candidates back into the fold of its parliamentary group. In fact, this practice has become a common pattern in both parliamentary and *Shura Council* elections since 1990. In 1990, for instance, the party re-admitted sixty winning NDP-independents; in 1995 the number climbed to ninety-five and in 2000 it reached as many as 218 MPs.

Facing the need to re-admit the de-selected winners in order to sustain their political supremacy, party officials thus had to change their tone quite markedly after the elections, justifying actions that they had previously deemed unacceptable. After the 1995 poll for instance Al-Shazli, who had most vehemently threatened potential dissenters, expressed this official change of heart, stating that:

‘...successful candidates will be allowed to join the ranks of the NDP again because in one way or another they are NDP candidates. They should not be accused of breach of trust because the NDP is their party and this is common knowledge’ (Al-Din, Al-Ahram Weekly, 26/10 – 01/11/2000).

In another interview conducted in 2000 the then Prime Minister Atef Ebeid expressed the same change of heart, explaining that the re-admittance of 218 de-selected NDP members was legal because they rejoined the party ranks ahead of the run-off elections (Al-Din, Al-Ahram Weekly, 02 – 08/11/2000).

Some analysts suggest that, knowing that they cannot control their members under the current electoral regime, the NDP actually actively encourages de-selected candidates to run as independents. Al-Khawaga even goes so far as to argue that NDP independents constitute an integral part of the NDP's electoral strategy and that under the conditions given they should therefore not be seen as a weakness but as a strength of the party. According to her, the strength of this strategy lies in three factors. First, it increases the likelihood of the party gaining an outright two thirds majority in parliament. Second, it also eases potential tensions within the party over the candidate selection process. Third, it allows the party to mobilise the largest possible number of militants for the NDP (Al-Khawaga 1995: 96-97). The first of these claims is also reiterated by Farag, who maintains that having both official and independent NDP candidates run in the election increases the likelihood of obtaining a hegemonic position in the legislature (Farag 1990: 159).

Whether purposefully orchestrated or quietly tolerated, the fact that the NDP is re-admitting de-selected members is a clear indication of the party's failure to effectively control its rank and file. Indeed, despite the draconian penalties imposed, NDP members have shown little inclination to bow to party directives over the past decade. The reasons for why these party directives left so little impact on their members' choices can be found in a number of factors. First, and most obviously, there is an opt-out alternative available to those candidates that have been de-selected. Candidates can simply run as independents. Second, candidates over the past decade have seen that it is actually possible to win parliamentary elections outside the NDP infrastructure. Finally, and most crucially, it has become abundantly clear to potential NDP dissenters that headquarter directives rarely meet headquarter actions and that hence renegade candidates will always be able to return to the party's fold, once they enter the legislature.

The NDP's apparent lack of *effective recruitment control* has however not only been confined to parliamentary elections, but has also been observable during elections to the *Majlis al-Shura* and to the local councils. During the *Majlis al-Shura* elections of 1998, for instance, as many as 448 NDP members defied party directives and contested the elections as independents. In 2001 this number rose further to approximately 560 NDP independents and in the most recent 2004 poll it stood at about 540. As with the parliamentary elections, party headquarters warned their members prior to each of these polls not to run against official NDP candidates, yet as the numbers demonstrate these warnings were ignored. Once again the incentive to run outside the party framework seemed to have outweighed the sanctions imposed by the party leadership (Al-Din, Al-Ahram Weekly, 06 – 12/05/2004).

It is worth remarking, however, that in contrast to the past three parliamentary elections, the party leadership in 2001 followed its own directives and dismissed 312 party members who had contested the *Shura Council* elections as independents (Al-Din, Al-Ahram Weekly, 10 – 16/05/2001). This rare enforcement of party directives can be interpreted in two ways. First, it may be interpreted as an indication that party headquarters were no longer willing to tolerate dissenting behaviour and that they would vigorously dismiss such members in future elections. The problem with this argument is, however, that it lacks empirical validation and that it constitutes a precedent against a background of failure to do so. In fact, it seems questionable whether the NDP is ever willing to risk its two-thirds parliamentary majority by strictly adhering to party directives. Judging from experience, it is far more likely that similar patterns of expulsion and re-admittance will recur in future elections. It seems therefore far more credible to argue that this singular incident of mass expulsion was pursued simply because the party had nothing to lose in terms of political hegemony. For one thing, *Shura Council* elections are far less competitive than parliamentary elections, given the very few opposition and truly independent candidates that bother to run. In the 1998 poll no opposition candidates were present due to the boycott declared by Egypt's opposition. In 2001 all participating opposition parties together only nominated twenty-nine candidates for a total of eighty-eight seats (Mursi, Middle East Times, 27/04/1998; Al-Din, Al-Ahram Weekly, 21 – 26/06/2001). Second, in both these elections very few truly independent candidates were actually running, with most of them being NDP independents. With so little competition for the *Shura Council* and the virtual guarantee of an NDP hegemony given, party headquarters had little to lose from expelling defiant candidates, since they would not significantly endanger the overall election outcome.

While it is apparent that the NDP failed to control its rank and file under the candidate-based regime, it seems far more difficult to assess whether this observation holds true for Egypt's political opposition. The problem is that these political forces, in contrast to the ruling NDP, were never actually confronted with large numbers of dissenting members who, defying party directives, sought to contest elections outside the party framework. In the cases at hand this situation simply did not arise, because most opposition parties had severe problems in finding sufficient candidates to run under their banner in the first place. Here then it is very difficult to obtain a concise picture of how de-selected opposition candidates would have behaved and how their behaviour would have been countered by the party leadership.

Despite these difficulties, however, a number of indicators can be called upon to suggest that opposition headquarters were equally plagued by a lack of *effective recruitment control*. Two incidents add credence to this suggestion, the first of which took place in 1990, when Egypt's

main opposition parties decided to boycott the parliamentary elections. The boycott, which split Egypt's opposition, was led by the NWP, the SLP, Ahrar and the MB, but rejected by Tagammu, the EGP and the UP. The reason for the boycott was made public in a joint declaration issued by the four boycotting forces together. It stated that the boycott was basically grounded on the government's failure to involve the political opposition in devising the new electoral law, on its failure to guarantee fair elections under judicial supervision and on its apparent fixing of constituency sizes (Farag 1990: 149).

Most interesting in this context is, however, the passage of the declaration that explicitly threatened to expel any member of the boycotting parties who decided to run in the 1990 parliamentary election as an independent. Supposedly the parties felt compelled to include this passage, first because they were aware that such a course of action was available to their members and second because they wanted to avoid the embarrassment of proclaiming a boycott that was not even upheld by their own rank and file (Farag 1990: 149-150).

However, as with the NDP, even the harshest penalty at the disposal of party headquarters, namely that of expulsion, failed to deter party candidates from disobeying party directives. As soon as the registration period was opened, numerous candidates from all boycotting parties broke with party directives and registered their candidacies as independents. Based on differing estimates, these dissenters included as many as thirty-nine NWP members, forty-five members of the MB Alliance, thirty-six members of the secular branch of the Labour party and twenty-two members of the Ahrar party (Zarhan 1992: 200-202).<sup>90</sup> Of these candidates, moreover, fourteen NWP members, eight from the SLP and one from Ahrar actually won a seat in parliament.<sup>91</sup>

In contrast to the NDP, however, all the boycotting parties seemed to have carried through their initial threats and expelled those members of parliament who defied their orders. Whether or not they also expelled the losing dissenters can however not be verified (Farag 1990: 151, 162). What seems important, however, in this context, is the fact that by following up on their threats these parties set a precedent that could have worked as a significant deterrent for their party members to refrain from any future dissenting behaviour. As further evidence suggests, this conclusion did, however, not hold true. By contrast, in the course of the past decade we encounter repeated incidents in which opposition members defied party orders prior to both local and parliamentary elections. Furthermore, we are also confronted

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<sup>90</sup> Bizarrely enough, the Ahrar dissenters even included their secretary-general, who had participated in brokering the opposition boycott together with the leadership of the other parties (Farag 1990: 162).

<sup>91</sup> Refer back to table 2.4.

with survey data, suggesting that a significant minority of those opposition members interviewed were prepared to defy party orders had they been de-selected. Most of these respondents had never actually been confronted with such a situation and were thus not basing their decision on existing dissatisfaction with the party leadership. This fact, it seems to me, renders their willingness to defy party orders even more significant, and demonstrates the lack of commitment to the party they are a member of.

Several further incidents can be named after the 1990 boycott in which opposition members again either defied their party's de-selection or voluntarily chose to run outside the party framework, even though they held party membership. The first such reported incident took place during the local elections of 1997 within the ranks of the NWP, which had decided to boycott these elections. Yet again, despite the boycott, various party members defied headquarter orders, running either as independents or even under the banner of the NDP. And again the ones running under the banner of the NDP were not simply ordinary candidates but included local heavyweights such as the chairman of the NWP in the *Daqahliya* constituency of *Talkha* and the chairman of the youth committee in the same governorate (Apiku, Middle East Times 11/05/1997). Whilst the party seemed to have officially tolerated those running as independents, it again expelled those members who decided to run under the umbrella of the NDP. This change of heart, particularly with regards to those running as independents, could be seen as an admission by party headquarters that they could not *de facto* control their members' decision to run. This admission of weakness vis-à-vis their members is also implied in the fact that the party leadership never categorically ruled out re-admitting its dismissed party members. Serrageddin, after the 1997 elections, asserted with regard to the dismissed members: '...if they do not do anything to hurt the image of the party because they have been fired, then they can come back after some time if they wanted to' (Apiku, Middle East Times 11/05/1997).

Other such incidents of defection, which attest to the *de facto* lack of headquarter control, occurred during both the 1995 and 2000 parliamentary polls and the latest *Shura Council* election of 2004. Although far less numerous, various cases were reported, in which opposition members preferred to seek their electoral fortunes as independents rather than under the party banner. In some of these instances they sought to do so because they had been formally de-selected by their parties. In other instances the nominees themselves again simply did not see the benefits of running under the party banner, despite the fact that by not doing so they willingly undermined the electoral cohesiveness of their party and its visibility at the district level. Examples of the former type of dissenters include, for instance, the two Tagammu candidates Sayed Abd Al-Aal and Hishab Saad who had both been de-selected by

the party leadership in 1995 but nevertheless ran as independents (Ramses 1995: 187-189). Another such example is Mohamed Kamel from the NWP who in 2000 defied the party's decision not to place any candidate against the NDP's Al-Shazli in the *Menoufiya* constituency of *Bagour* and who ran as an independent in that very constituency (Dawoud, Al-Ahram Weekly, 19 – 25/10/2000). Examples of opposition members who simply preferred to run outside the party framework altogether in turn include the Wafdists Galal Hassouna, Fawzi Samad and Mohamed Nasr Galal, who respectively ran as independents in 1995 and 2000. They also include various members of Tagammu, the ADNP, Ahrar and the NAP, such as for example Saad Zawiris (Tagammu), Mohamed Abu Al-Ali (ADNP), Mohamed Abdel-Hamid Al-Zini (Ahrar) and Adel Wali (NAP) (Al-Din, Al-Ahram Weekly, 30/11 – 06/12/1995; Al-Qadi, Al-Ahram Hebdo, 20/09/2000).<sup>92</sup> Within the minor ASEP even no less than forty-one of its sixty-seven candidates apparently decided to contest the 1995 elections outside the party as political independents (Allam, Al-Ahram Weekly, 23 – 29/11/1995).

All of the aforementioned candidates at some point since 1976 thus preferred to contest parliamentary elections outside their party and formally as independents. Finally, during the 2004 *Majlis al-Shura* elections, which were again boycotted by the major opposition parties, two incidents were reported in which Wafdists decided to ignore the boycott of their party and to run as independents instead (Al-Din, Al-Ahram Weekly, 06 – 12/05/2004).

Aside from these actual incidents, we are also confronted with survey data suggesting that a large number of opposition candidates are willing to defy party orders, should they be prevented from running on the party ticket in any of the upcoming elections. According to the *Party Candidate & Deputy Survey*, as many as fourteen out of thirty-two respondents asserted that they would run in the elections irrespective of whether their party endorsed their nomination. Whilst not representing a plurality, this number nevertheless constitutes a sizeable minority and is certainly indicative of a weakness in party affiliations among a large section of opposition members. When breaking down the types of actions these dissenters would take, most of them asserted that they would either run as independent-independents or as so called 'party independents', whilst others would seek to create their own political party. By contrast, only one respondent asserted that he would seek the nomination of another legalised party, which attests to what little appeal the existing opposition parties exert as agents to enter parliament. Finally, it should also be noted that of the eighteen respondents who actually claimed they would never contest the party's verdict, the decision of three candidates to do this was not so much a matter of party loyalty as a matter of age and electoral

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<sup>92</sup> Interviews with Saad Zawiris (Tagammu), Fawzi Samad (NWP) & Ahmed Waghi (ADNP).



tiredness. When discarding these three candidates, the number of 'loyal' opposition respondents is reduced to virtually the same number of potential opposition defectors.<sup>93</sup>

As the preceding discussion reveals, it seems that party candidates who, for whatever reason, had become embroiled in a conflict with their leadership by and large adopted individual over collective forms of dissent. To recapitulate, collective dissent entails, for instance, the grouping of de-selected members under the umbrella of a new party or a list of independents. Individual forms of dissent, by contrast, either imply that the dissenting candidates run as independents or that they seek the nomination of another legalised party. The prevalence of individual over collective forms of dissent during the 1990s is again probably most obviously manifest within the ranks of the NDP. As we saw earlier, virtually all NDP defectors sought their electoral fortunes as independents rather than in consort with other dissenters. The same can be said of the political opposition. Here again defections seemed to have been overwhelmingly of the individual rather than collective type. As just shown, a majority of known opposition defectors ran as independents outside the party framework rather than on the ticket of another party or the umbrella of a newly created political formation. Several others sought the nomination of the NDP whilst very few actually thought of creating their own political party. In fact the only three high profile cases I came across of candidates seeking to create their own political party were those of independent business tycoon Rami Lakah, Ayman Nour, a dismissed former NWP member and Abou Ela Maadi from the MB<sup>94</sup>.

## 6.2 Placement Control

As mentioned earlier, the type of electoral regime in place is, however, not only expected to affect levels of party control over the nomination of candidates for parliamentary elections, but it is also thought to influence the types of candidates parties are able to select on their respective tickets. In this regard I theorised that list-based regimes provide parties with far greater leverage to nominate 'ordinary' party members on their tickets than candidate-based regimes, which facilitate the nomination of so called 'local notables'.

To recapitulate, in chapter four 'local notables' were identified as candidates who have attained a popularity in their locality that is independent of the party they are a member of. In other words, these candidates possess the political (and financial) capital and/or notability

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<sup>93</sup> Party Candidate & Deputy Survey, Question 2.10, Appendix No. 3, p. 298.

<sup>94</sup> Ayman Nour has created his own party, the FP, which was legalised by the PPC in 2004. Ela Maadi created the Centre Party (CP), which by contrast has not been legalised by the PPC (Howeidy, *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 10 – 16/06/1999; Al-Nahas, *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 04 – 10/11/2004; *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 07 – 13/10/2004).

which would theoretically enable them to successfully pursue a career outside the party framework. Candidates of this type include, for example, local businessmen, prominent members of local tribes and extended families, popular figures in society and members of the political elite who have held public office and who have hence developed a 'reserve of political capital' over time (Ishiyama 2001: 394). 'Ordinary' candidates were in turn identified as party members that lack precisely such notability and that carry no individual political and/or financial capital outside their party. In contrast to local notables, these candidates are hence far more dependent on their party and its reputation in order to advance their individual political careers.

To be sure, wherever the electorate retains dismally low levels of party affiliation – as is the case in Egypt – parties are of course hard pressed to nominate candidates of the latter type, namely candidates whose sole asset it is that they are loyal party members. Instead, they are encouraged to select local notables, who are not necessarily strong because of their affiliation with the party, but because of their reputation and popularity within the local community.

Of course, in terms of party development such reliance on the drawing powers of local notables adversely affects the prospects for parties to enhance levels of *visible representation*. This is the case because such candidates will, by virtue of their local popularity, most likely pursue an election campaign that is primarily, if not entirely, geared towards their personality. Their affiliation with a party and its programme will hence either be of secondary importance or even of no importance at all in the electoral race.

The fortunes of parties would look much brighter, of course, if they could rely more strongly on 'ordinary' party members during the election campaign. This is the case because, by lacking any personal credentials, these candidates would most likely show greater eagerness to promote their party and its electoral platform than local notables. In so doing they would help raise their parties' *visible representation* in the electoral arena.

In chapter four I theorised that, under unstructured conditions, parties should be in a better position to nominate 'ordinary' party members under a list-based system than under a candidate-based regime. This is the case because the list system allows parties to pursue a dual strategy in which they can reserve the top list positions for local notables, whilst filling the lower tier positions with ordinary party members. Here then parties would be able to combine the electoral drawing power of their top seated candidates with the loyalty of their lower tier candidates in a consorted attempt to advance both their electoral prospects and their visibility in the election. Under the candidate-based system in single- or two-member

constituencies, by contrast, the available placement options for parties that seek parliamentary representation are far more limited. Indeed, given the limited numbers of seats available and the personalised nature of the election itself, few incentives remain to nominate candidates whose sole asset it is that they are longstanding and loyal party members. Instead, parties are now pushed to put forward candidates that can capitalise on their personal standing within the locality and that are capable of waging highly personalised election campaigns.

### *Candidate Placement Strategies in 1984 & 1987*

When exploring the recruitment process under the two PR list-based regimes, it becomes apparent that most of the parties indeed pursued a multifaceted strategy that took into consideration the lack of solid party identifications among the Egyptian electorate, the local social structure of the district, and the imperatives of the given electoral systems.<sup>95</sup> In both 1984 and 1987, for instance, most parties took great care in nominating individuals at the helm of their district lists who, by virtue of their personal standing, promised to mobilise large sectors of the local electorate. These individuals usually included heads of extended families and clans, tribal leaders, prominent businessmen, party heavyweights and even national-level politicians (Munoz 1986b: 168; Al-Gumhuriya, 29/03/1987; Al-Magid, Al-Ahram Al-Iqtasadi, 02/05/1988). This placement strategy was, of course, necessitated by the fact that in the Egyptian street personalities matter far more than party programmes and platforms. Hence, in order to attract a significant number of voters, it was crucially important for the parties to select candidates at the helm of their district lists that were popular either across the entire district or in certain areas of it. This point of view was, for example, expressed by Mahmoud Abaza from the NWP who, referring to one of the larger governorates in the country, asserted that: ‘*Sharqiya* was a very big constituency and it therefore required someone at the head of the list who was well known and who could campaign in a large district.’<sup>96</sup> This point was also reiterated by Al-Badawy, another high ranking NWP official. He argued that ‘the measures that made us decide on [the distribution of] list positions, was the political history of the candidate, the popularity of the candidate and his ability to cover the expenses of the elections.’<sup>97</sup> Finally, virtually all of the Tagammu officials interviewed also confirmed that –

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<sup>95</sup> To recapitulate, the 1984 and 1987 electoral laws mandated that at least 50 percent of the district lists be composed of candidates from the workers-farmers professions. When devising their district lists, parties thus had to structure their placement strategies around this imperative of the two electoral laws.

<sup>96</sup> Interview with Mahmoud Abaza (NWP).

<sup>97</sup> Interview with Sayed Al-Badawy (NWP).

as far as possible - in 1984 the party was trying to select popular candidates on the top of its district lists.<sup>98</sup>

In actual practice, numerous examples can be given, where parties employed precisely these placement tactics. Within the NDP, for example, in 1984 the top list position in *Ismaliya* went to probably one of the most prominent Egyptian entrepreneurs at the time; Osman Ahmed Osman (Al-Gumhuriya, 02/05/1984). In yet another governorate, that of *Gharbiya*, the NDP placed Fathallah Rifaat, a prominent Free Officer, at the helm of its district list in the first constituency. In the second constituency the party gave one of its top list positions to Ibrahim Abd Al-Salam Abu Basha, the cousin of Hassan Abu Basha, then Minister of Interior in the first Mubarak cabinet. In *Cairo* the party placed no less than four government ministers at the helm of its district lists (Al-Gumhuriya, 12/05/1984; Munoz 1992: 373).

In 1987 the same placement strategy was used. For example, during those elections the NDP nominated Mohamed Mahmoud Ali, then Vice Chairman of Arab Contractors at the top of its district list in the first *Qena* constituency. The same district list also featured a prominent NDP member, Mahmoud Sayed Badawy. Taking into consideration the tribal structures in Upper Egypt, the NDP gave prime list positions to Abu Al-Nasr Michali and Mustafa Hussein Abu Atay from the Ja'afira tribe on its district list in the *Aswan* constituency (Abu Al-Nil, Al-Ahram, 24/03/1987).

Within the opposition similar recruitment patterns can be discerned. According to Krämer, for example, in 1984 the NWP was more concerned about nominating prominent personalities at the top of its district lists than finding candidates that would adhere to the party's programme. An example of this strategy named by Krämer was Ahmed Taha who, whilst being known for his Marxist position, was nevertheless nominated by the NWP simply because he was prominent in his constituency (Krämer 1984: 372). Other prominent individuals heading local district lists included several members of the party leadership, which according to Abdel Nour had a 'natural right' to obtain prime positions on the NWP ticket.<sup>99</sup> In *Cairo* for instance, Fouad Serrageddin, then party leader and Mustafa Sherdy, then chief editor of Al-Wafd newspaper, headed the party list (Munoz 1992: 373). Moreover, in the *Qaliyubiya* constituency of *Sammansund* the party had placed Ahmed Abou Ismail, then Assistant Secretary-General of the party, at the helm of its list.

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<sup>98</sup> Interviews with Mohamed Said (Tagammu), Rifaat Said (Tagammu), Hussein Abdel Razek (Tagammu), Mohamed Abdel Aziz Sha'aben (Tagammu), Amina Shafiq (Tagammu) & Shehinda Maklat (Tagammu).

<sup>99</sup> Interview with Mounir Fakri Abdel Nour (NWP).

Similar to the NWP, most of the other opposition parties also sought to place their most prominent party members at the helm of their district lists. In 1984, for example, the SLP placed Mohamed Hassan Dora, a popular figure in the governorate of *Damietta*, at the top of its district list. In *Cairo* moreover it nominated another prominent party figure, Helmi Murad, at the top of one of its district lists (Al-Gumhuriya, 23/04/1987; Munoz 1992: 373). In 1987, moreover, under the Alliance banner, the SLP essentially pursued the same placement strategy. Again it placed high ranking party officials and prominent public figures at the helm of its lists (Al-Ahrar, 06/04/1987). This time, however, the party also had to take into consideration the other alliance partners, with whom it devised an elaborate mechanism by which the different parties were to select the top list positions in designated constituencies.<sup>100</sup>

Finally, despite its limited pool of resource-strong local notables Tagammu also managed to place a number of local heavy-weights at the top of some of its district lists. Probably the two best known examples are Khaled Mohieddin, then leader of Tagammu who headed the party's list in his home constituency of *North Qaliyubiya*, and Lutfi Waked, who headed the list in the third *Sharqiya* constituency (Hendriks 1985: 16).

It is interesting to note in this regard, however, that with the introduction of the second candidate-based tier in 1987 Tagammu - and to some extent also Ahrar - significantly altered their placement strategies. In fact, prior to the poll both these parties were torn between two options regarding the placement of their most prominent party members. They could either again nominate their few local heavyweights at the helm of their district lists or they could nominate them for one of the individual seats. Both parties eventually decided to pursue the latter strategy, knowing they would probably fail yet again to pass the 8 percent threshold. Their chances of gaining parliamentary entry, so they reasoned, were hence highest under the candidate-based tier. Following this line of reasoning Tagammu thus had its three most prominent party members Khaled Mohieddin, Lutfi Waked and Abu Al-Ezz Al-Hariri run for the individual seat rather than, as in 1984, at the head of a district list (Rose Al-Youssef 13/04/1987; Ahmed, Al-Musawwar 13/03/1987). This strategy was also pursued by Ahrar, whose president and vice-president at the time, Mustafa Murad and Syj Salah Abu Ismail, both ran for individual seats rather than on one of the Alliance lists (Munoz 1991: 408).

During the 1980s most parties hence sought to select local notables at the top of their tickets, in the assumption that the name recognition of these candidates would enhance the drawing

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<sup>100</sup> According to Essam Al-Arian, who at the time was a member of the tri-partite committee that organised the 1987 elections, the top list positions in each constituency were allocated to the allying partners according to a specific distributional key that had been agreed upon prior to the elections. See interview with Essam Al-Arian (MB).

power of the entire district party. For this purpose, most parties did however also seek to devise candidate lists that took into consideration the social givens of the constituency. These social givens could be tribal, regional or religious in nature. In the tribal constituencies of Upper Egypt, for example, most parties sought to balance their tickets by nominating candidates from different tribes and local families.<sup>101</sup> In other known cases parties deliberately nominated candidates from different localities of the constituency, so as to ensure the greatest possible popularity of their list (Munoz 1986b: 168). As Mahmoud Abaza writes:

‘...you know we have a system in which 50 percent of the list had to be [composed of] workers or farmers. So the first of the candidates was a professional from one particular area, the second a worker/farmer from another area, the third again a professional from a third area, the fourth a peasant from a fourth area and one who represents the fifth. The rest of the candidates did not necessarily have to come from one specific area of the constituency. But the head must represent all the divisions of the constituency.’<sup>102</sup>

The same distributional key was also used by Tagammu and other parties. Commenting on the candidate nominations in the 1980s Abdel Aziz Sha’aben explained for example: ‘...under list PR [the selection of candidates] was based on the popularity of the candidates in addition to the size of the constituency (...) so we took candidates from different areas in order to have their names on the list.’<sup>103</sup>

However, because the two list-based regimes demanded the nomination of a large number of candidates, virtually all parties faced immense difficulties in sustaining this recruitment pattern beyond the top list positions. Lacking a sufficiently large pool of local notables, most of them were in fact forced to tap into the pool of ‘ordinary’ party members, or even newly recruited members, in order to complete their district lists. One ought to remember that in 1984 parties wishing to contest all districts of the country had to nominate no less than 896 candidates in forty-eight constituencies. This number included 448 candidates and another 448 reserve candidates, as prescribed by Law No. 114/83. In 1987 in turn the number of candidates still stood at 448. In addition, both electoral laws at the time also prescribed that parties had to nominate complete lists of candidates in those constituencies they sought to run in.

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<sup>101</sup> In the constituency of *Sammansund*, for example, the NWP in 1984 placed Tarek Aly Al-Shishny at the helm of its list. Shishny apparently belonged to one of the prominent families of the constituency (Al-Gumhuriya, 12/05/1984). In one of the Cairo constituencies Tagammu nominated Milad Hanna, a prominent Coptic Cleric (Munoz 1992: 373).

<sup>102</sup> Interview with Mahmoud Abaza (NWP).

<sup>103</sup> Interview with Mohamed Abdel Aziz Sha’aben (Tagammu).

As just mentioned, in order to find sufficient candidates for their district lists, most parties hence had to resort to the nomination of ordinary 'rank-and-file' party members, who had often little else to offer but their membership in the given party. In other words these candidates tended to enter the campaign without any prior experience in electoral politics and without any local home constituency to draw upon. Consequentially, they were usually placed at the lower end of the district lists or, as was necessary in 1984, used to complete the respective reserve lists.

Various politicians and observers of Egyptian politics commented upon this secondary placement strategy. For instance, in an interview conducted in 2002, Shehinda Maklat from Tagammu remarked:

'...the lower tiers of the party lists, and in 1984 also the reserve lists, were usually populated with ordinary party members who were not necessarily well known in their constituency. The lower placed candidates would campaign primarily by placing emphasis on the party programme and the big names on the list.'<sup>104</sup>

In their investigation of the 1984 and 1987 *Majlis al-Shaab* elections Harb and Hilal made similar observations. Commenting on the composition of the 1984 district lists in *East Cairo* and *North Qaliyubiya* they note, for instance, that except for the top positions most candidates on the NWP and Tagammu lists were in fact little known to the wider electorate. Consequentially, these candidates had to rely heavily on the drawing powers of the better-known top-seated contenders (Harb & Hilal 1986: 214). The lack of political experience of most selected party candidates was also remarked upon by Gema Munoz. In her detailed analysis of the 1984 elections she shows that the overall age of candidates was far younger in the 1980s than in the 1970s. In this vein, she also shows that the number of first-time candidates was markedly higher in the 1984 election than in the preceding one. Both these observations suggest again that parties not only relied on the drawing power of political pundits, but that they were heavily engaged in nominating ordinary and lesser-known party members on their district lists (Munoz 1986b: 168).

Under the two list-based regimes of the 1980s, Egypt's parties hence pursued a dual strategy that included the recruitment of local notables at the top of their district lists and the

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<sup>104</sup> Interview with Shehinda Maklat (Tagammu).

nomination of ordinary rank-and file members for the lower list positions and for the reserve lists.

### *Candidate Placement Strategies in 1990, 1995 & 2000*

When in 1990 the authorities reverted back to the candidate-based system it became far more difficult, however, for Egypt's parties to sustain this dual placement strategy. This was the case because from 1990 onwards parties were not only confronted with an electorate that was little inclined to vote along partisan lines, but also with an electoral regime that ceased to encourage the nomination of 'ordinary' party members.<sup>105</sup> As we know, the two-round AM system currently in place operates under severely reduced district magnitudes and sizes and demands that voters cast their ballots for individual candidates rather than for party lists. Under this regime there are thus strong incentives for office-seeking parties to select candidates that carry some name recognition and prominence within the constituency they are to run in. Given the highly personalised nature of Egyptian politics, parties can in fact only hope to make any electoral inroads if they put forward this type of candidates. Ordinary 'rank-and-file' members, who lack the necessary resources to wage a highly individualised campaign, are hence unlikely to get the backing of their parties. This type of candidate will simply not stand any electoral chances in a district race, in which political entrepreneurship matters far more than party platforms and programmes.

When exploring the actual placement of party candidates during the 1990s, it seems that most of the opposition forces, and to some extent also the NDP, were driven by two interrelated considerations. First, most party cadre were painfully aware that in order to stand any chances in the election, they now had to nominate individuals who were above all popular in their locality. In contrast to the 1980s then, they were hence no longer able to strike some numerical balance between the nomination of local notables and 'ordinary' party members. The two-member constituencies in place simply did not permit the pursuit of such a strategy. Second, given the limited financial capacities of the parties themselves, most of them also continued to rely on the capacity of their nominees to finance their own election campaign. As we have seen, this had already been the case in the 1980s, when parties sought to nominate candidates at the top of their ballots, who were able to finance the campaign of their district

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<sup>105</sup> According to a poll conducted by Kamel Al-Qadi in 1995 and reported in Al-Ahram Weekly, the voters' electoral choice was mainly determined by the candidate's reputation, his or her family background and the capacity to provide constituency services to the district population. By contrast the candidate's political platform or his parliamentary experience was considered to be of far less importance (Abdel-Latif, Al-Ahram Weekly, 28/09 – 04/10/1995).



list. The proto-type candidate that parties hence had to look for under the AM system was a person who was both popular and wealthy enough to wage a highly individualised district campaign, in which personalities promised to matter far more than party programmes.

The realisation that under the AM system personalities mattered far more than under the PR list-based regimes is plainly manifest in the recruitment criteria set out by the different parties for the election of 1990, 1995 and 2000. Indeed, across the party political divide virtually all party leaders asserted that what mattered most in their choice of candidates was his or her personality. Prior to both the 1995 and 2000 elections Al-Shazli from the NDP asserted, for instance, that above all the selected candidates had to have a good reputation in their locality and the 'capacity to solve constituency problems'. Of secondary importance was, by contrast, his or her partisan commitment (Al-Din & Khalil, Al-Ahram Weekly, 12 – 18/10/1995; Al-Din, Al-Ahram Weekly, 21 – 27/09/2000). This fact was also commented upon by senior observers of the Egyptian political scene. According to Al-Din from Al-Ahram Weekly, for instance, it would be wrong:

‘...to say that the NDP has a platform in its technical sense of the word because the main role of NDP candidates is to absorb the adverse effects of government policies. This is why I cannot say that the NDP list [in 1995] has any particular significance, apart from the fact that the candidates are chosen on the basis of their popularity and ability to play the required role of absorbing these adverse effects (Al-Din, Al-Ahram Weekly, 02 – 08/11/1995).

In practice, the NDP's recruitment considerations thus led to the nomination of a vast number of political pundits and local heavyweights in the elections of 1990, 1995 and 2000. These included numerous government ministers, high ranking party officials and trade union representatives, prominent businessmen and members of important local and tribal families (AL-Khawaga 1995: 90-92; Al-Din, Al-Ahram Weekly, 28/09 – 04/10/1995; Al-Din, Al-Ahram Weekly, 02 – 08/11/1995; Al-Din, Al-Ahram Weekly, 27/06 – 02/07/2000; Al-Din, Al-Ahram Weekly, 14 – 20/09/2000). In 2000, for example, it was estimated that approximately 1,000 of the 4,000 candidates in the field were businessmen, many of whom had been nominated by the NDP (Abdel-Latif, Al-Ahram Weekly, 31/08 – 06/09/2000). In both 1995 and 2000 the NDP also nominated no less than ten cabinet minister and various parliamentary heavyweights (Al-Din, Al-Ahram Weekly, 02 – 08/11/1995). All of these candidates were either nominated because they were well known in their constituencies, or because through their financial means and linkage to the authorities of the state they stood realistic chances of winning parliamentary representation.

Following the lead of the NDP, most of the opposition cadre interviewed also asserted that, as far as possible, they sought to nominate local notables in the districts they were running in. Both Mohamed Said and Hussein Abdel Razek, for instance, asserted that the popularity factor weighed far more prominently than party loyalty in their selection of candidates. This position was also taken by the Secretary-General of the EGP and by Fouad Badrawi and Mounir Fakri Abdel Nour from the NWP, who all placed the personality factor at the top of their party's selection criteria.<sup>106</sup>

Finally, the importance thus accorded to the recruitment of local notables under the candidate-based system is also supported by the *Party Candidate & Deputy Survey*. In this survey, the party candidates themselves were asked to state the reasons they were running in a particular constituency. Of the twenty-five respondents who answered the question, an overwhelming majority of 84 percent asserted that their personal reputation within the locality was crucially important in their choice of constituency. Forty-eight percent moreover thought that their placement in a particular constituency was determined by their family's popularity within the area. By contrast, only 20 percent of the respondents maintained that their selection had anything to do with the popularity of the party in that constituency.<sup>107</sup>

Given their limited electoral appeal and the little resources available to finance their candidates' election campaigns, most of the opposition parties were in practice, however, severely limited in pursuing this strategy. Whilst they were able to nominate some local heavyweights, most of them could not measure up to the NDP's impressive number of local notables.<sup>108</sup> Faced with the difficulty to find sufficient candidates in the first place, most of them were forced to open their doors to party members who, despite not being very popular, were interested in running for parliamentary elections. Some of them were also actively engaged in the recruitment of prominent personalities from outside the party. The opposition party most actively engaged in such behaviour was the NWP, which in 2000 sought to recruit numerous famous personalities on its list (Shehab, *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 28/09 – 04/10/2000).

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<sup>106</sup> Interviews with Mohamed Said (Tagammu), Hussein Abdel-Razek (Tagammu), Mamdouh Nakhla (Tagammu), Mohamed Awad (EGP), Mounir Fakri Abdel-Nour (NWP) & Fouad Badrawy (NWP).

<sup>107</sup> *Party Candidate & Deputy Survey*, Appendix No. 3, Question 2.1.1, p. 297.

<sup>108</sup> Of all the opposition parties the NWP probably managed to nominate the greatest number of local heavyweights. These included a significant number of national party leadership figures and numerous prominent businessmen (*Al-Din*, *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 28/09 – 04/10/1995). Amongst the former, one could name, for example, Nomaan Goma'a, Ayman Nour, Yassin Serrageddin, Ibrahim Dessouki Abaza, Fouad Badrawy, Mohamed Sherdy and Abas Al-Tarabili. All of these candidates were not only prominent individuals within the NWP, but they also carried strong local roots in the constituencies they were running in (*Al-Ahram Weekly*, 07 – 13/12/1995; *Al-Din*, *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 07 – 13/12/1995). Tagammu also nominated various party heavyweights who carried independent notability in their constituencies. These included amongst others Abou Al-Ezz Al-Hariri, Al-Badri Al-Farghali and Mohamed Abdel Aziz Sha'aben (*Al-Ahram Weekly*, 07 – 13/12/1995; Abdelaly, *Al-Ahram Weekly* 09 – 15/11/2000).

Whether recruited from within- or outside the party, it continued to be important, however, that the nominee was able to finance his own election campaign, or at least part of it. Virtually all of the party cadre and candidates I spoke to asserted that the financing was by and large raised individually, and that the parties only contributed marginally to their campaigns.<sup>109</sup>

The importance of money in the selection of candidates has finally also received widespread attention in the Egyptian press. According to Hani Shukralla, parties in 1995 were more concerned with nominating candidates who could finance their own campaign than ‘committed political individuals’ (Shukralla, *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 07 – 13/12/1995). Linking this phenomenon to the electoral system in place, Salaam also asserts that ‘...in Egypt candidates depend on their money for success and the individual candidacy system encourages the proliferation of this phenomenon’ (Salama in *Al-Din*, *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 05 – 11/10/2000).

### 6.3 Concluding Remarks

This chapter tested whether, as anticipated, the 1990 electoral reform affected the capacity of party headquarters to control the nomination and placement of candidates for parliamentary elections, and whether in so doing, it altered the parties’ capacity to raise levels of *internal unity* and *visible representation*. In chapter four I identified such headquarter control as the first domain of the recruitment phase that should be affected by the type of electoral regime in place. I hereby assumed that closed-list based regimes should provide party headquarters with the capacity to control access to the electoral arena and to contain internal dissent, whilst candidate-based regimes should fail to do so. I also assumed that the former type of electoral regimes should encourage parties to nominate ordinary party members, whilst the latter type of regime should discourage them from doing so. Finally, in terms of party development I maintained that high levels of control over the nomination and placement of candidates would be conducive to raising the parties’ *internal unity* and *visible representation* during election times, whilst low levels of headquarter control would have the opposite effect.

To conclude we can say that by and large these theoretical propositions are supported by the evidence generated above; with the exception, of course, that there is too little data available to properly assess the constraining effects of the two PR list-based regimes on levels of party defections. Bearing this qualification in mind, we can draw the following conclusions,

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<sup>109</sup> Interviews with Ahmed Abou Ismail (NWP), Fouad Badrawi (NWP), Mustafa An-Nashirty (NWP), Ahmed Waghi (ADNP), Abdallah Abou Al-Fatah (Tagammu), Mamdouh Nakhla (Tagammu), Mohamed Abdel Aziz Sha’aben (Tagammu), Mohamed Tulaima (Tagammu) & Gamal Heshmat (MB).

however. First, the evidence clearly shows that under the two closed-list based regimes parties were far better positioned to attract parliamentary hopefuls than under the two-round AM system. To recapitulate, in both 1984 and 1987 Egypt's parties - the opposition in particular - faced little problems in finding sufficient candidates for their district list. As argued above, this was the case because the list-based regimes made it virtually impossible for political contenders to enter the electoral race from outside the party framework. From 1990 onwards, however, with the introduction of the two-round AM system, most opposition parties struggled to find sufficient candidates for their slate. With the need to run under a party label gone, political hopefuls were now far more likely to seek their fortunes outside the party framework as political independents rather than within it. This fact, as we have seen, was reflected in the number of candidates who actually sought the nomination of a party as opposed to those running as independents.

Second, the evidence also suggests that the two PR list-based regimes provided party headquarters with far greater leverage to nominate 'ordinary' party members than the two-round AM system. Indeed, although caution should be applied, it seems that the number of ordinary party members who made it on a party slate was far higher in the 1980s than in the 1990s, when parties came to realise that their chances of success depended almost solely on the political capital of their nominees. This latter observation is in fact also confirmed by those party cadre who were directly involved in the recruitment of candidates for the 1984, 1987, 1990, 1995 and 2000 elections. Referring to the 1980s, Mohamed Said from Tagammu maintained, for instance, that the party was virtually forced to nominate 'ordinary' members for parliamentary elections in order to complete its district lists.<sup>110</sup> This had to be done even though these members were not necessarily popular in their respective districts. He continued to argue that the 1990 candidate-based system mandated, by contrast, the nomination of candidates who were above all popular among the district electorate. Nagi Al-Shehabi, former SLP Assistant Secretary-General and currently leader of the DGP, made similar remarks. According to him it was far easier for the SLP to select loyal party members for its ticket in the 1980s than in the 1990s. During the latter period, in fact, the party's prime selection criteria had become the candidate's popularity in the constituency and his or her financial independence.<sup>111</sup>

Whilst the 1990 electoral reform affected the capacity of parties to function as gatekeepers to the electoral arena and their ability to nominate ordinary party members, it is far more difficult to provide a similarly convincing argument regarding levels of collective and

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<sup>110</sup> Interview with Mohamed Said (Tagammu).

<sup>111</sup> Interview with Nagi Al-Shehabi (previously SLP/ currently DGP).

individual dissent. Here we clearly lack sufficient data on the elections of the 1980s to establish whether or not levels of dissent were lower under the two PR list-based regimes than under the two-round AM system. By the same token it is worth mentioning however that, as expected, we find significant levels of individual dissent under the two-round AM system; and this among all major parties. Clearly these forms of dissent, whilst being motivated by a plethora of reasons, were greatly facilitated by the candidate-based regime in place, which opened the door for individual hopefuls to step outside the party framework and seek their political career as independents. Also, although it is impossible to unravel the impact of the PR list-based regimes on levels of internal dissent during the 1980s, it is still fair to say that whatever dissent happened, in 1984 it took place within the party political framework. Candidates may have defected, but these defections mainly involved their realignment with other parties. Whilst individual parties hence suffered, these forms of dissent did not necessarily diminish the overall visibility of Egypt's parties in the electoral arena. The defections that took place during the 1990s, by contrast, were far more damaging to the *visible representation* of Egypt's parties, because in a vast majority of cases they involved de-yet no realignment. Candidates, in other words, simply decided to run outside the party framework altogether, thereby further diminishing the number of party candidates in the electoral field and in so doing their parties' *visible representation* in the elections.

How then did the changes observed since 1990 in the recruitment of candidates affect levels of party development? In a nutshell, they essentially worsened the preconditions under which parties could hope to push for greater *visible representation* and a more *unified appearance* during election times; and this in three ways. First, because these changes involved a significant reduction in the number of party candidates, there were now simply far fewer agents in the electoral field who could actively promote their party's platform and label and thus enhance its overall visibility. Second, the loss of their gatekeeper function to the electoral arena also rendered it far more difficult for parties to encourage their candidates to pursue some form of label promotion during election times. Indeed, from the candidate's perspective there were few incentives left to do so, now that parties could no longer sanction their electoral behaviour and given the fact that the electorate would not be receptive to any such label promotion in the first place. The prospects to observe further rises in levels of political entrepreneurship among party candidates were hence significantly enhanced. This prospect was also reinforced by the fact that from 1990 onwards political notability and financial independence had become the parties' two overriding recruitment criteria. Candidates, as we saw earlier, were now elected primarily because they carried political capital and popularity independent of their parties. Sometimes they were in fact not even party members. Under the unstructured conditions given, it is hard to see how this type of candidates would be willing to

squander its personal political capital in favour of a party-oriented campaign that promised little else but electoral defeat.

Finally, because parties had lost their gatekeeper function, it also became far more difficult for them to sustain a unified appearance during election times. Given the possibility to run outside the party framework, most parties were now plagued by numerous occurrences of dissent, which added to an appearance of *disunity* rather than of *unity*.

Surely, whilst the changes in the recruitment patterns of the 1990s worsened the preconditions under which parties could push for greater *visible representation*, they certainly do not tell us anything as yet of the actual behaviour that party candidates espoused during the campaign. In other words, we are left to wonder, whether the increasing resort to local notables in the electoral field actually also translated into an election campaign that was devoid of any party politics and dominated by political entrepreneurship. As mentioned earlier, this latter investigation will be subject in chapters eight and nine. However, before turning to the election campaign, the next chapter will address the remaining domain of the recruitment process that was thought to have been affected by the 1990 electoral reform. I am referring here to the types of *competitive constellations* that emerged during the 1980s and 1990s and that significantly affected the physical presence of political parties in the elections of these two decades.

## Chapter Seven. Competitive Constellations

The *competitive constellations* that emerge at the beginning of an election campaign constitute the second and final domain of the candidate recruitment phase that is thought to bear directly on levels of *visible representation* at the electoral level. In chapter four '*competitive constellations*' were defined as the way in which party candidacies are distributed either within a given constituency or across the entire nation. They are a direct consequence of the decisions taken by the central party leadership with regard to where their nominees should contest the elections, and thus of relevance here. When referred to at the district level, *competitive constellations* denote the ratio that exists in a given district between the total number of party candidates on the one side and the total number of non-partisan candidates on the other. When referred to at the national level they indicate in turn the spread of party candidacies across the constituencies of the country. In other words, they now specify the number of districts in which candidates from a given party are represented.

In chapter four it was argued that the manner in which party candidacies are distributed both within and across constituencies significantly affects the parties' prospects to increase levels of *visible representation*. It was hereby expected that *visible representation* would be boosted under two conditions. First, a party had to be present on a nationwide scale in order to effectively increase its name recognition. Second, political parties as collective actors also had to constitute the dominant, if not the sole competitors in the district race. Where both these conditions are met, parties, through their agents at the district level, are well positioned to enhance *visible representation* on a nationwide scale. Wherever these two conditions remain absent this possibility is by contrast greatly reduced.

Chapter four finally also theorised that the presence or absence of these two conditions hinges significantly on the type of electoral system in place. PR list-based regimes were thought to promote *visible representation*, by encouraging parties to spread their candidacies beyond a limited number of constituencies. Candidate-based regimes were in turn expected to have the opposite effect. Under the societal conditions given and considering the weakness of Egypt's parties, these regimes were thought to provide no incentives for individual parties to spread their candidacies on a nationwide scale.

It is of course apparent that the nationwide spread and numerical dominance of parties in the electoral arena constitute merely necessary rather than sufficient conditions for parties to increase levels of *visible representation*. They constitute a necessary condition, because they provide parties with agents across the nation, who can then promote the party label and

programme – and in so doing raise the visibility of the party in question. They fail to constitute a sufficient condition, however, because they cannot guarantee that party candidates actually do engage in any party-conducive behaviour. For this to happen further institutional incentives must be in place that encourage candidates to become party-reputation seekers during the actual election campaign. How this incentive structure is created and whether the types of *competitive constellations* in place coincide with it, will be examined in chapters eight and nine.

This chapter focuses on the institutional prerequisites established by the types of *competitive constellations* in place to enhance a party's *visible representation*. To this end the subsequent analysis has been divided into three sections. Section 7.1 explores how precisely the PR list-based regimes shaped the types of constellations that emerged in 1984 and 1987. Section 7.2 in turn conducts the same analysis for the 1990, 1995 and 2000 elections, which were run under the two-round AM system. Juxtaposing both these electoral periods, Section 7.3 then discusses how the different *competitive constellations* of the 1980s and 1990s influenced the prospects of parties to enhance levels of *visible representation* at the electoral level and across the entire nation.

### **7.1 The District – and National Level Constellations of the 1980s**

In Egypt the *competitive constellations* that emerged during the elections of the 1980s and 1990s differed markedly from one another and this is essentially due to the different electoral incentives in place. During the 1980s, for instance, both PR list-based regimes contained electoral provisions that facilitated the nationwide presence of all major parties and their dominant position in the electoral field. First, as we know they both carried an 8 percent national-level threshold, which parties could only hope to surpass by spreading their presence beyond a limited number of constituencies to the entire nation. Second, they were both essentially closed-party list systems, in which independents were barred from contesting the election. To recapitulate, the initial PR list-based regime of 1984 was entirely closed to independent candidacies, whilst the 1987 regime opened the electoral field to a mere forty-eight individual candidacies out of 448.

Given these electoral incentives, the *competitive constellations* that emerged during the 1980s were highly party-conducive in the manner alluded to above. To begin with, most parties followed the directives set by the 8 percent threshold and managed to nominate district lists in nearly all of the forty-eight constituencies and in a vast majority of the country's twenty-six



governorates. The only party present in all governorates and constituencies of the country during the 1984 and 1987 elections was the ruling NDP. During these elections, most opposition parties were, however, present in the major regions of the country, bar the sparsely populated desert governorates of *North and South Sinai*, the *New Valley*, *Marsa Matruh* and the *Red Sea*. In fact, with the exception of Ahrar they all managed to nominate district lists in the densely populated Delta and the Nile Valley governorates (Munoz 1992: 372-376, 407-408). In terms of percentages, the NDP thus covered 100 percent of the constituencies in both 1984 and 1987, whilst the major opposition formations managed to cover between 90.0 and 98 percent of all constituencies. The only two parties falling significantly below this margin were the two smallest opposition forces, the UP and Ahrar. The latter in 1984 covered only 58 percent of all constituencies whilst the UP covered approximately 35 percent in 1987. Table 5.1 provides a detailed breakdown by constituencies and governorates of the number of district lists nominated by the five legalised parties in both these elections.

The fact that all Egypt's major parties decided to spread their candidacies across a vast majority of constituencies and governorates is of course particularly striking, considering the limited financial and human resources they had at their disposal. Indeed, by significantly reducing the capacity to finance and staff a nationwide campaign, these limitations constituted a strong counter-incentive against the parties themselves waging a parliamentary election campaign on the scale they eventually did. That they nevertheless did so - with enormous efforts - shows how powerful the incentive structure created by the PR list-based regimes had been, and that it overrode all other considerations. In other words, parties understood that, despite their limited capabilities, they needed to wage a national campaign to obtain sufficient votes in order to gain parliamentary representation.

*Table 7.1 Distribution of Party Lists by Political Party & Electoral Districts*

Party	1984		1987	
	No. of District Lists	No. of Governorates	No. of District Lists	No. of Governorates
Islamic Alliance	-	-	46 out of 46	n.a.
SLP	46 out of 48	25 out of 26	-	-
Ahrar	28 out of 48	17 out of 26	-	-
NDP	48 out of 48	26 out of 26	48 out of 48	26 out of 26
NWP- Alliance	44 out of 48	22 out of 26	-	-
NWP	-	-	47 out of 48	25 out of 26
Tagammu	43 out of 48	23 out of 26	46 out of 48	n.a.
UP	-	-	17 out of 48	n.a.

Sources: Munoz, Gema M. 1992. *Politica y Elecciones en el Egipto Contemporáneo (1922-1990)*. Madrid: Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional, Instituto de Cooperación con el Mundo Árabe, p. 409.

When it comes to the local level, the almost near to nationwide electoral presence of Egypt's main parties during the campaigns of 1984 and 1987 also meant that the same party constellations could be found in a vast majority of the country's forty-eight electoral constituencies. A closer look at the placement of party lists by constituencies for the 1984 election exemplifies this observation. As becomes apparent in table 5.3, during these elections the same five political parties were present in a total of twenty-six out of forty-eight constituencies, thus in approximately 54 percent of all electoral district. The only party failing to nominate candidate lists in a majority of constituencies was Ahrar. When discarding this party, the number of constituencies in which we find the same party constellations, including the NDP, the NWP-MB alliance, Tagammu and the SLP, even rises to thirty-eight. In terms of percentages, these four parties thus covered about 80 percent of all districts. Different party constellations, both in terms of their composition and the number of parties present, hence emerged in only seven constituencies of the country.

*Table 7.2 Elections of 1984: Competitive Constellations by Party, Governorate & District*

Governorate	District	Party Lists					Total Party Lists
Urban – Industrial							
Alexandria	1 <sup>st</sup>	NDP	NWP/MB	Tagammu	SLP	Ahrar	5 out of 5
	2 <sup>nd</sup>	NDP	NWP/MB	Tagammu	SLP	Ahrar	5 out of 5
	3 <sup>rd</sup>	NDP	NWP/MB	Tagammu	SLP	Ahrar	5 out of 5
							15 out of 15
Cairo	1 <sup>st</sup>	NDP	NWP/MB	Tagammu	SLP	Ahrar	5 out of 5
	2 <sup>nd</sup>	NDP	NWP/MB	Tagammu	SLP	Ahrar	5 out of 5
	3 <sup>rd</sup>	NDP	NWP/MB	Tagammu	SLP		4 out of 5
	4 <sup>th</sup>	NDP	NWP/MB	Tagammu	SLP		4 out of 5
	5 <sup>th</sup>	NDP	NWP/MB	Tagammu	SLP	Ahrar	5 out of 5
							23 out of 25
Giza	1 <sup>st</sup>	NDP	NWP/MB	Tagammu	SLP	Ahrar	5 out of 5
	2 <sup>nd</sup>	NDP	NWP/MB	Tagammu	SLP	Ahrar	5 out of 5
	3 <sup>rd</sup>	NDP	NWP/MB	Tagammu	SLP	Ahrar	5 out of 5
							15 out of 15
Ismaliya	1 <sup>st</sup>	NDP	NWP/MB		SLP		3 out of 5
Port Said	1 <sup>st</sup>	NDP	NWP/MB	Tagammu	SLP	Ahrar	5 out of 5
Suez	1 <sup>st</sup>	NDP	NWP/MB	Tagammu	SLP	Ahrar	5 out of 5
Delta							
Buhariya	1 <sup>st</sup>	NDP	NWP/MB	Tagammu	SLP		4 out of 5
	2 <sup>nd</sup>	NDP	NWP/MB	Tagammu	SLP		4 out of 5
	3 <sup>rd</sup>	NDP	NWP/MB	Tagammu			3 out of 5
							11 out of 15
Damietta	1 <sup>st</sup>	NDP	NWP/MB	Tagammu	SLP	Ahrar	5 out of 5
Daqahliya	1 <sup>st</sup>	NDP	NWP/MB	Tagammu	SLP	Ahrar	5 out of 5
	2 <sup>nd</sup>	NDP	NWP/MB	Tagammu	SLP	Ahrar	5 out of 5
	3 <sup>rd</sup>	NDP	NWP/MB	Tagammu	SLP	Ahrar	5 out of 5
							15 out of 15

Gharbiya	1 <sup>st</sup>	NDP	NWP/MB	Tagammu	SLP	Ahrar	5 out of 5
	2 <sup>nd</sup>	NDP	NWP/MB	Tagammu	SLP	Ahrar	5 out of 5
	3 <sup>rd</sup>	NDP	NWP/MB	Tagammu	SLP		4 out of 5
							14 out of 15
Kafr Al-Sheikh	1 <sup>st</sup>	NDP	NWP/MB	Tagammu	SLP	Ahrar	5 out of 5
Menoufiya	1 <sup>st</sup>	NDP	NWP/MB	Tagammu	SLP	Ahrar	4 out of 5
	2 <sup>nd</sup>	NDP	NWP/MB	Tagammu	SLP	Ahrar	4 out of 5
							8 out of 10
Sharqiya	1 <sup>st</sup>	NDP	NWP/MB	Tagammu	SLP	Ahrar	5 out of 5
	2 <sup>nd</sup>	NDP	NWP/MB	Tagammu	SLP	Ahrar	5 out of 5
	3 <sup>rd</sup>	NDP	NWP/MB	Tagammu	SLP	Ahrar	5 out of 5
							15 out of 15
Qaliyubiya	1 <sup>st</sup>	NDP	NWP/MB	Tagammu	SLP	Ahrar	5 out of 5
	2 <sup>nd</sup>	NDP	NWP/MB	Tagammu	SLP		4 out of 5
							9 out of 10
<b>Upper Egypt</b>							
Assiut	1 <sup>st</sup>	NDP	NWP/MB		SLP		3 out of 5
	2 <sup>nd</sup>	NDP	NWP/MB	Tagammu	SLP		4 out of 5
							7 out of 10
Aswan	1 <sup>st</sup>	NDP	NWP/MB	Tagammu	SLP	Ahrar	5 out of 5
Beni Suif	1 <sup>st</sup>						
Fayoum	1 <sup>st</sup>	NDP	NWP/MB	Tagammu	SLP	Ahrar	5 out of 5
Miniya	1 <sup>st</sup>	NDP	NWP/MB	Tagammu	SLP	Ahrar	5 out of 5
	2 <sup>nd</sup>	NDP	NWP/MB	Tagammu	SLP		4 out of 5
							9 out of 10
Sohag	1 <sup>st</sup>	NDP	NWP/MB	Tagammu	SLP	Ahrar	5 out of 5
	2 <sup>nd</sup>	NDP	NWP/MB	Tagammu	SLP		4 out of 5
							9 out of 10
Qena	1 <sup>st</sup>	NDP	NWP/MB	Tagammu	SLP		4 out of 5
	2 <sup>nd</sup>	NDP	NWP/MB	Tagammu	SLP		4 out of 5
							9 out of 10
<b>Desert</b>							
Marsa Matruh	1 <sup>st</sup>	NDP		Tagammu	SLP		3 out of 5
New Valley	1 <sup>st</sup>	NDP		Tagammu	SLP	Ahrar	4 out of 5
North Sinai	1 <sup>st</sup>	NDP	NWP/MB	Tagammu	SLP		4 out of 5
Red Sea	1 <sup>st</sup>	NDP			SLP		2 out of 5
South Sinai	1 <sup>st</sup>	NDP					1 out of 5

Sources: Munoz, Gema M. 1992. *Politica y Elecciones en el Egipto Contemporáneo (1922-1990)*. Madrid: Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional, Instituto de Cooperación con el Mundo Árabe, pp. 375-376.

Based on the evidence available, a similar observation can be made for the PR list tier of the 1987 poll.<sup>112</sup> Under this tier, again an overwhelming majority of constituencies featured identical party constellations, this time involving district lists from the ruling NDP, the NWP, Tagammu and the Islamic Alliance. As table 5.2 indicates, during the 1987 election all four political formations managed to place candidate-lists in at least forty-six of the country's forty-eight constituencies. The NDP was again present in all forty-eight constituencies, the NWP in forty-seven and Tagammu in forty-six. The newly formed Islamic Alliance between

<sup>112</sup> Unfortunately for these elections no detailed breakdown of party lists by constituencies was obtainable.

the SLP, Ahrar and the MB was present in forty-six constituencies. The only party not represented with party lists in a majority of districts was the UP, which had boycotted the 1984 poll but participated with seventeen candidate lists in 1987. In terms of *competitive constellations*, and discarding the UP, we thus again find the same four party lists present in between forty-three to forty-six constituencies, which equals around 90.0 of the country's electoral districts. Moreover, it is worth noting that this percentage even constitutes a rise compared to the 1984 poll, which, as we have just seen, saw the emergence of identical party constellations in 80 percent of the country's constituencies.

The *competitive constellations* that emerged under the candidate-based tier were by contrast, far more heterogeneous than those under the PR-tier, and in that sense already a forbearer of what was to come when Egypt shifted to the two-round AM system in 1990. The reason for this difference lay, of course, with the possibility of independent candidates to run for one of the newly introduced forty-eight individual seats, which resulted in a strong representational imbalance between party and independent candidacies. Out of 1,938 candidates running under the candidate-based tier, only 151 belonged to the five participating parties (Munoz 1992: 408-409). Despite this large number of independents, parties nevertheless managed to retain a strong physical presence both nationally and at the district level. As we saw earlier, in 1987 a total of 1,851 party candidates were contesting the *Majlis al-Shaab* elections against 1,787 independents.<sup>113</sup> Moreover, they were present in virtually all districts of the country. Finally, in most of these districts party candidates still retained a numerical supremacy over their independent counterparts. This becomes apparent when gauging the district data that is available. Except in eight governorates, the district magnitudes across the country ranged from seven to thirteen list seats.<sup>114</sup> Given the almost near to nationwide presence of the four major political forces at the time, this means that a majority of districts carried at least thirty-five and at best sixty-five list candidates, as opposed to about thirty-seven independent candidates.<sup>115</sup> Whilst in some districts then the number of list candidates matched those of the independents, most constituencies in fact continued to be numerically dominated by party representatives.

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<sup>113</sup> Refer back to table 2.5.

<sup>114</sup> The eight governorates that included districts with on average less than seven list seats include the *New Valley*, *North* and *South Sinai*, the *Red Sea*, *Marsa Matruh* and the urban governorates of *Ismaliya*, *Suez* and *Port Said* (Munoz 1986a: 274-275).

<sup>115</sup> Of the eighteen governorates containing districts with seven or more list seats, only three included districts with on average seven list seats. The remaining fifteen governorates contained districts with on average between eight and thirteen list seats.

## 7.2 The District – and National Level Constellations of the 1990s

When in 1990 the regime reverted back to the two-round AM system it altered with it the entire incentive structure that had hitherto encouraged Egypt's parties to spread their candidacies across the vast majority of the country's constituencies and governorates. In fact, since 1990 there were virtually no incentives left for parties to retain the almost near to nationwide presence they had held during the elections of the 1980s. In terms of resources there have of course never been any such incentives during the 1980s and the 1990s. As we know, the organisational and financial means at the parties' disposal have always been very limited and hardly sufficient to sponsor large-scale election campaigning. The same holds true for their human resource pool, which – with the exception of the NDP – has also remained dismally low. Together both these factors have constituted and continue to constitute severe limitations for the parties when it comes to the nomination of candidates and the financing of their election campaigns. Within this environment then, the PR list-based regimes of 1984 and 1987 with their high national thresholds constituted basically the only significant counter-incentive for Egypt's main parties to push their capabilities to the limit and nominate candidates in as many constituencies and governorates as possible.

In 1990, however, with the introduction of the two-round AM system, even this institutional incentive was lost, and this for three reasons. First it was lost because the new electoral code no longer carried a nationwide 8 percent threshold, which had previously induced parties to spread their candidates across a significant number of districts and governorates. What counted now was the vote tally a candidate received at the district level. Second, because of the candidate-based regime in place, parties also no longer saw any need to retain the list-alliances build up from previous years, which had enabled them to pool their financial and human resources and thus to contest elections on a near to nationwide basis.<sup>116</sup> Finally, and most crucially, because candidates were no longer required to run on a party ticket, parties had also lost their capacity to attract significant numbers of candidates for parliamentary elections. Together with the parties' dismal resource situation, both these disincentives to retain a nationwide presence thus facilitated the emergence of *competitive constellations* that in their composition were hardly conducive to the promotion of party recognition among the wider electorate.

In actual practice, the 1990 reform altered the emerging *competitive constellations* in two significant ways. First, it brought about a significant contraction in the physical presence of

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<sup>116</sup> As discussed in chapter two, none of the opposition parties has been pursuing a cohesive nationwide alliances strategy in the elections of 1990, 1995 and 2000.

most political parties in the electoral arena, both in numerical terms and regarding the constituencies they were running in. Second, and resulting from this contraction, it also facilitated the emergence of *competitive constellations* that were highly heterogeneous in character and that relegated Egypt's parties, as collective actors, to the margins of the electoral game.

As regards the national distribution of party candidacies during the 1990s unfortunately no data was available on precisely where parties had placed their contenders. In order to obtain this information it was therefore necessary to operationalise 'informed estimates' on the number of constituencies that parties had a presence in. These estimates were deduced from the available data on the total number of candidates by party for the 1990, 1995 and 2000 elections. Moreover, because the 222 electoral districts used since 1990 are two-member districts, the estimates thus calculated entailed both upper and lower averages. The upper average assumes that the party in question had placed one candidate per district. The lower estimate in turn assumes that the relevant party had placed two candidates in each constituency. As parties will have most likely used a mixture of placement strategies, the actual number of constituencies a given party was present in will hence most likely lie somewhere between these two values. The data just described can be found in table 7.3.

Table 7.3 Elections of 1990, 1995 & 2000: Number of Candidates by Party & District

Candidates	1990 <sup>2</sup>		1995		2000	
	Total	Average % all of districts <sup>1</sup>	Total	Average % of all districts <sup>1</sup>	Total	Average % of all districts <sup>1</sup>
ADNP	-	-	43	9.7 – 19.4	33	7.4 – 14.8
Ahrar	-	-	60	13.5 – 27.0	37	8.3 – 16.7
DPP	-	-	n.a.	n.a.	1	0.4
EGP	11	2.5 – 4.6	2	0.4 – 0.9	7	1.5 – 3.2
MB	-	-	149	33.6 – 67.0	70	15.7 – 31.5
NAP	-	-	-	-	6	1.4 – 2.7
NDP	444	100.0	439	~ 100.0	443	~ 100.0
NWP	-	-	180	41.0 – 82.0	224	50.4 – 100.0
SLP	-	-	120	27.0 – 54.1	29	6.5 – 13.1
SJP	-	-	n.a.	n.a.	3	0.9 – 1.4
SP	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	4	0.9 – 1.8
Tagammu	28	6.3 – 12.6	40	9.0 – 18.0	58	13.1 – 26.1
UP	33	7.4 – 14.8	n.a.	n.a.	1	0.4

<sup>1</sup>In most cases the averages given include both the highest and lowest possible percentage number of districts the respective party had placed candidates in.

<sup>2</sup>In 1990 most political parties officially boycotted the *Majlis al-Shaab* elections.

Sources: Auda, Gehad, Nedad Al-Borai and Hafez Abou Seada. 2001. *The Egyptian Parliamentary Elections of 2000: Cause, Dilemmas and Recommendations for the Future - Political and Legal Study*. Cairo: Friedrich Naumann Foundation & United Group, pp. 69, 71. Kienle, Eberhard. 2001. *The Grand Delusion: Democracy and Economic Reform in Egypt*. London, New York: I.B. Tauris, p. 54

When examining the data provided in this table, several observations can be made. First, the NDP is virtually the only party that – given its secure human resource pool – managed to retain a nationwide presence during the elections of 1990, 1995 and 2000. None of the opposition forces, by contrast, came anywhere near to matching this presence. As we can see, most of the minor forces that sprang up in the 1990s, such as the DPP, EGP, NAP, SJP and SP, were incapable from the outset from entering the electoral race with a significant number of candidates. On average they were present in less than 5 percent of all constituencies. What is more, none of the parties and party alliances that had been on the electoral scene during the 1980s, managed to retain the almost near to nationwide electoral presence they had attained in 1984 and 1987. Indeed, most of these parties/ party alliances had been present in over 90 percent of all constituencies during the 1980s and thus in virtually the entire country. According to the estimates provided in table 7.3 this was, however, neither the case in 1995 nor in 2000. During both these elections, most of these parties placed candidates in barely half of the country's 222 electoral districts. Tagammu, for instance, which had on its own merit been present in forty-six out of the forty-eight constituencies in 1987, saw its geographical presence drop to on average one third of all constituencies. The same happened to the SLP, which under the Alliance label had presented candidates in all forty-eight constituencies in 1987. In 1995 by contrast the party's electoral presence dropped to half of the 222 constituencies, and possibly even below that. Even the NWP, which was seemingly least affected by this general trend, saw its electoral presence decline to levels that lay well below those of the 1980s.

The significant reduction that took place in the geographical distribution of party candidates - and with it the emergence of independents - also left their imprint on the *competitive constellations* that emerged at the district level. To begin with, they completely altered the ratio that existed between party and non-partisan candidates. Whilst party representatives had dominated the district races of the 1980s, they now lost their numerical control to the vast number of formally independent candidates that pushed into the electoral arena since 1990. In fact during the elections of 1990, 1995 and 2000, party candidates seem to have been completely marginalised in the electoral battle field. The numbers listed in table 7.4 speak for themselves. According to the estimates given in this table, in both 1995 and 2000 between nineteen and twenty candidates were on average running in a given constituency. Of these candidates, however, only about five contenders belonged to a political party, and of these again between three and four belonged to one of the country's eighteen opposition forces. The remaining fifteen candidates were either 'independent independents' or so called NDP independents, who decided to contest the elections despite being de-selected by their party. This means that approximately 75 percent of all district contenders were not officially running

under a party label. As we have just seen, in both 1984 and 1987 by contrast party candidates had virtually monopolised the district campaigns.

Table 7.4 Elections of 1990, 1995 & 2000: Candidates by Party & District

Candidates	1990		1995		2000	
	Total	Average per District	Total	Average per District	Total	Average per District
All Candidates	2.335	10 – 11	4.308	19 – 20	3.957	19 – 20
All Party Candidates	535	2 – 3	1.148	~ 5	923	~ 4
Opposition Candidates	91	0 – 1	709	~ 3	480	~ 2
All Independent Candidates	1.800	~ 8	3.160	14 – 15	3.034	13 – 14
NDP Independent Candidates	780	3 – 4	1.780	~ 8	1.680	7 – 8

Sources: Auda, Gehad, Nedad Al-Borai and Hafez Abou Seada. 2001. *The Egyptian Parliamentary Elections of 2000: Cause, Dilemmas and Recommendations for the Future - Political and Legal Study*. Cairo: Friedrich Naumann Foundation & United Group, p. 71. Kienle, Eberhard. 2001. *The Grand Delusion: Democracy and Economic Reform in Egypt*. London, New York: I.B. Tauris, p. 54. Zaki, Moheb. 1995. *Civil Society and Democratisation in Egypt*. Cairo: Konrad Adenauer Foundation & Ibn Khaldoun Centre, p. 96.

The fact that on average only three to four opposition party candidates ran per constituency not only exposes the marginal role parties have come to play at the district level. It also implies that the *competitive constellations* that emerged at the district level across the country were no longer identical but highly heterogeneous, with different party constellations emerging in different constituencies. In contrast, during the 1980s the almost near to nationwide presence of all major forces had also led to the emergence of fairly similar district level party constellations across the country.

### 7.3 Concluding Remarks

This chapter examined whether the 1990 electoral reform caused any variance in the type of *competitive constellations* that emerged during the 1980s and 1990s, and, if so, whether this variance had any bearing on the parties' capacity to enhance levels of *visible representation*. In chapter four I had identified these *competitive constellations* as the second domain of the candidate recruitment phase that should be affected by the type of electoral system in place. In essence it was theorised that PR list-based regimes with high nationwide thresholds should produce *competitive constellations* that are conducive to raising levels of *visible representation*, whilst candidate-based regimes with no such thresholds in place should have the opposite effect.

Based on the evidence presented above we can conclude that the *competitive constellations* that emerged during the 1980s indeed differed substantially from those of the 1990s, and this



largely due to the changes in the Egyptian parliamentary electoral system. As we have seen, during the 1984 and 1987 polls the electoral incentives in place had – as anticipated – induced parties to spread their candidacies across virtually the entire country. In 1984 all major political formations had been present in at least forty-four of the forty-eight constituencies and in 1987, in no less than forty-six of them. Moreover, in both of these elections party candidates had constituted the dominant, if not the hegemonic, political force at the district level.

In terms of party development, the *competitive constellations* that emerged at the time were overall conducive to enhancing the party's *visible representation*, and this in two ways. To begin with they provided political parties with agents across virtually the entire nation, which could then carry the party label and programme to the wider electorate. Parties hence had an essential medium in place to effectively promote their visibility on a wider scale. This fact is particularly important, given the regime context within which Egypt's parties have been operating, and which has left them with few opportunities to raise their public profile outside election times. Within this context, parliamentary elections have been proven to constitute the only effective avenue for parties to achieve precisely this objective – provided of course that the parties in question have agents in place to do so. In the 1980s, as we have just seen, this was the case.

Second, the need to retain such a nationally extensive presence under the PR list-based regimes of the 1980s also had a significant mobilisation effect. Indeed, parties now had to actively reach out to their members and constituents in order to find sufficient candidates for their districts lists and sufficient militants to help them organise the actual election campaign. New party cadre and supporters thus had to be recruited and local party organisations re-invigorated. In many instances, it also meant that entirely new party offices and structures had to be established in those constituencies in which the parties had previously held no political presence. This was particularly crucial for the NWP, which for the first time in thirty years participated in parliamentary elections and which was thus forced to re-invigorate old Wafdist allegiances and support networks throughout the country. Other such examples include, for instance, Tagammu and the SLP, which are known to have opened a number of new local party offices and/or to have mobilised different support groups for their campaigns in various governorates across the country.<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>117</sup> According to Harb and Hilal, for instance, the presence of Tagammu in the governorate of *Qalyubiya* was limited to certain districts. In the other districts of the governorate the party was, however, able to mobilise different groups of youth and other leftist groups in support of its candidates and election campaign. Along similar lines the authors also mentioned the opening of new party offices by both Tagammu and the SLP in the governorate of *Cairo* (Harb & Hilal 1986: 166, 172, 215, 225).

During the 1990s, under the candidate - based system, the incentive structure for parties changed drastically, however. Essentially, there no longer existed any need for them to spread their candidacies across the entire nation in order to win parliamentary representation. Given their often severe resource constraints, parties had thus lost the only significant incentive to place party agents throughout the country. As we have seen, these agents were now scattered across the country, being placed in only those constituencies that parties saw any hope of electoral success. Usually the number of such constituencies never surpassed more than 25 percent of all electoral districts. What is more, in the few constituencies party candidates were present they were usually strongly outnumbered by independent contenders, who had been allowed to contest parliamentary elections under the 1990 electoral law.

As regards the development of parties, the *competitive constellations* of the 1990s were hence hardly conducive to increasing *visible representation*, both at the district and the national level. In fact, considering their position in the 1980s, the 1990s constituted little else than a complete reversal in the fortunes of parties to push for greater label recognition. With only a few candidates scattered across the country, parties were now deprived of probably their most potent political agents at the district level. What is more, not only were parties deprived of sufficient agents to spread their message, these agents were moreover competing in an electoral arena that was virtually monopolised by the presence of independent candidates, who carried no party affiliations.

Finally, the reduction in the number of party candidates across the country also adversely affected the mobilisational capacities of parties. In fact, the retreat of most of them from vast areas of the country in the elections of 1990, 1995 and 2000 also meant that the tentative party structures and offices that had come into existence during the 1980s, either lapsed into inactivity, or even worse, were completely dissolved.

In contrast to the 1980s then, the electoral regime of the 1990s, rather than promoting greater *visible representation*, significantly decreased the prospects for parties to do precisely that and hence contributed to a reversal in the direction of party development.

## Chapter Eight. Forms of Electoral Cooperation

According to the electoral connection model established in chapter four, the type of electoral system in place significantly shapes the strategic behaviour of party cadre and candidates and in so doing influences levels of party unity and *visible representation*. The model also assumed that, in operationalised terms, this causal relationship is at work both during the recruitment phase and the actual election campaign. Following this theoretical line of reasoning, chapters six and seven then demonstrated precisely how the 1990 electoral reform in Egypt altered the nature of the candidate recruitment process and with it the two dimensions of party development mentioned above.

Moving beyond the recruitment process, this and the following chapter will investigate the effects of the 1990 electoral reform on the strategic behaviour of party candidates during the actual parliamentary election campaign. More specifically they will explore whether, and if so how, the shift from list PR to a candidate-based electoral regime adversely affected the capacity and willingness of party candidates to campaign along partisan rather than personal lines. To recapitulate, in chapter four it was hypothesised that under unstructured conditions PR-regimes are far more likely to induce candidates to pursue a party-reputation seeking strategy than candidate-based regimes. In fact, the latter regime can be labelled a ‘no-effect’ system, because it is not expected to significantly alter the prevalent mode of interaction under unstructured conditions, namely the pursuit of personal entrepreneurship. Note also that any such observable variance in the behaviour of party candidates was expected to occur in three domains of the district campaign. These domains had been identified as the nature of electoral cooperation, the types of campaigning devices and rhetoric used and the levels of label promotion engaged in during the actual campaign. This chapter explores in greater detail the effects of the 1990 reform on the nature of electoral cooperation at the district level, whilst chapter nine does so with regards to the two remaining domains of the election campaign.

In chapter four I defined electoral cooperation as any visible efforts undertaken by two or more district contenders to collectivise their campaigning activities. The two principal areas of the election campaign within which such cooperation can take place concern the actual campaigning activities these contenders organise together and the resources and utilities they use to advance their electoral prospects. Whenever such electoral cooperation takes place between co-partisan contenders, that is between candidates from the same party or party alliance, we are dealing with ‘within’- or ‘intra-party’ cooperation. By contrast, whenever such cooperation takes place across party lines, that is between candidates from different political formations, then we are talking of ‘cross’- or ‘inter-party’ cooperation. Whilst the

former type of electoral cooperation was expected to promote *internal unity* and *visible representation*, the latter type of cooperation was expected to exert the opposite effect.

The subsequent analysis into patterns of electoral cooperation at the district level is divided into two sections. Section 8.1 explores whether, as expected, the electoral incentives of the 1980s encouraged candidates to collectivise their campaigning strategies with co-partisan contenders at the district level. Section 8.2 examines whether, and if so how, the 1990 reform destroyed the hitherto existing incentives for collective action and fostered the emergence of cross-party alliances instead. Section 8.3 then draws together the evidence presented, discussing how the differences detected in this domain of the election campaign affected levels of *internal unity* and *visible representation*.

### 8.1 Intra-Party Cooperation of the 1980s

As discussed previously, the first two parliamentary election campaigns held under the Mubarak presidency of 1984 and 1987 were conducted on the basis of two relatively similar PR list-based regimes. Under both these regimes parties had to nominate a list of candidates for each of the districts in which they intended to run. Depending on the constituency, the number of candidates on these party lists would range from four to fourteen in 1984 and from three to thirteen list positions in 1987. The electoral competition between the party lists then took place in forty-eight multimember constituencies. These constituencies were usually many times the size of the two-member constituencies previously in place, with some of them even stretching across entire governorates. Examples of constituencies that equalled the size of entire governorates are *Al-Fayoum*, *Aswan*, *Beni Suif*, *Damietta*, *Ismaliya*, *Kafr Al-Sheikh*, *Marsa Matruh*, *Port Said*, *Suez*, *South and North Sinai* and the *New Valley*.<sup>118</sup>

The institutional structure thus created by the two list systems and the vast district sizes in place provided a number of incentives for individual candidates to collectivise their campaigning efforts. To begin with, there were simply enough party candidates in the district race with whom it was possible to share the burden of the election campaign, both in terms of resources and the actual campaigning. Moreover, given that it was the list which was to be elected and not individual candidates, there were also strong incentives on the side of the candidates themselves to cooperate with members of their own party list. As will become apparent, both these conditions changed markedly with the introduction of the candidate-

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<sup>118</sup> See Electoral Laws No. 114/83 and 188/86.

based system in 1990, which did little to facilitate within-party cooperation and was even permissive to the pursuit of cross-party alliances. Second, the need for some form of electoral cooperation was also promoted by the large district sizes in place and the immense resources necessary to wage an effective election campaign across the entire constituency. Given that it was hardly possible for one candidate to tour the entire constituency, let alone to disburse of the campaigning costs, it made sense for candidates on the party list to share the burden by coordinating the campaigning activities and by pooling their financial and human resources. The need for such coordination finally becomes even more apparent, when considering that most candidates on the list - whilst being rooted in some localities of the district - could not necessarily rely on being known across the entire constituency. In most instances the drawing power of individual candidates based on their personal reputation and name recognition remained, if at all present, highly localised. In order to attract a sufficiently large section of the district electorate, it was therefore useful for candidates of the party list to coordinate their campaigning tours throughout the constituency, with candidates visiting those areas in which they had most electoral appeal. As already discussed in chapter six, this very fact had also been taken into consideration by most party leaders during the candidate recruitment process, in that they tried to devise electoral lists that represented, as best as possible, all the major societal, tribal and family groups in a given constituency.

The conducive elements of the immediate electoral environment in place have to be read, however, against the persistence of a socio-political background that was hardly conducive to the pursuit of any such collective action. Probably the factor least conducive to any collective action was the voting behaviour of the electorate itself, which, as we have seen, remained in large measure structured around the reputation of the individual candidate rather than his or her party affiliation. Under the newly introduced list-PR regime candidates were thus torn between pursuing their preferred and optimal vote-seeking strategy, namely personal entrepreneurship, and the need to collectivise their electioneering efforts.

In addition, none of the parties running in the 1984 and 1987 elections had actually had any prior experience with list-PR. Throughout Egypt's entire electoral history, that is under the constitutional monarchy, the single-party state and the first years of the political opening, parliamentary elections had been held under a candidate - based regime either in single or two-member constituencies (Nohlen et al. 1999: 332). The 1983 changes in the electoral design were hence rather far reaching in their implications. For one thing, parties and candidates alike had no prior experience as how to collectivise their campaigning activities so as to most effectively capture the vote under the new system. This fact was even more pronounced by the very absence of such cooperation and the pursuit of personal reputation

seeking strategies under the previous candidate-based regimes. Second, apart from the NDP, none of the parties had a sufficiently strong organisational infrastructure in place to support their party lists in all the districts in which they were running. As we have seen, during the 1984 election campaign most parties were opening new local headquarters, or wherever they refrained from doing so, they relied heavily on outside support to sponsor their election campaign (Harb & Hilal 1986: 125, 169, 215). One also ought to remember the fact that the 1984 elections were the very first elections in which the NWP participated after being banned for over thirty years. Moreover, it was the first parliamentary election in which most parties had actually managed to place party lists in nearly all districts of the country, including those districts they had had no organisational presence in before.<sup>119</sup> In the preceding elections of 1979, for instance, the participating parties had only placed candidates in a fraction of the 175 constituencies of the country. For the 372 seats in parliament, Ahrar had nominated a mere ninety-two, the SLP eighty-seven and Tagammu only thirty-four candidates (Munoz 1992: 335).

Finally, and as we have seen, numerous legal restrictions were in place that rendered collective campaigning appearances very difficult to organise and entirely dependent on the goodwill of the state authorities. To recapitulate, parties were usually barred from holding any large-scale events outside party premises and at public institutions. Moreover, wherever party rallies were held these had to be registered with the local security authorities and could be barred at any time if they were perceived to pose a threat to public order and security.

Viewed in this light the 1984 elections, and to some extent also those of 1987, should be regarded as *experimental* elections in which party candidates and their leaders had to discover how to wage a most effective election campaign, given the limited resources available and the societal and legal constraints in place. They should also be seen as experimental elections, because they were the first elections under the Mubarak presidency and candidates and party leaders simply did not know how far the newly installed regime would permit the contesting parties to employ large-scale campaigning tactics.

Any visible efforts at within-party cooperation during the campaigns of the 1980s thus have to be assessed within this particular context. Whilst there were certainly strong institutional incentives for political actors to collectivise their campaigning activities, these had arisen within an overall socio-political environment that was hardly conducive to precisely such collective action. Most likely then, the election campaigns provide an ambivalent picture, in

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<sup>119</sup> Refer back to tables 7.1 & 7.2.

which forms of individual campaigning took place alongside efforts to coordinate the various campaigning activities at both the district and national level and in which different forms of collective campaigning strategies were used both across constituencies and among the parties involved. This also means that any differences detected between the election campaigns of the 1980s and 1990s should be viewed as a matter of degree and not of principle. In other words, given the context, one should not expect to see a fundamental change in the campaigning tactics employed, but changes in the extent to which collective electioneering efforts gained prevalence alongside individualised campaigning strategies.

### *Individual Campaigning in 1984 & 1987*

When examining the actual parliamentary elections of 1984 and 1987, we can discern a number of common characteristics that marked the constituency campaigns of all major party lists. To begin with, all these campaigns seemed to have revolved around a combination of distinct electoral strategies, involving both collective and more individualised forms of action. In most instances these latter forms of campaigning complemented the collective action taken by the party list as a whole and were usually planned in advance by the entire team. Only in a few cases did these individual campaigns utterly replace any form of visible collective action. This happened whenever political infighting amongst the members of the party list itself, or between them and the district party leadership hampered the organisation of collective campaigning events. An example of such a breakdown in electoral coordination occurred, for instance, among the NDP candidates campaigning in the constituency of *North Qaliyubiya* in 1984. Because some candidates on the list were dissatisfied with their list position, virtually no collective action took place. Instead most of the candidates on the list pursued highly personalised election campaigns outside the framework of the party list (Harb & Hilal 1986: 216).

Apart from such incidents, however, most of the individual election campaigns seemed to have been part and parcel of the broader campaigning strategy of the entire district party in order to deal with the immense size of their constituency and the structure of the electorate. To do so, members of the district list split-up during specified intervals in the election campaign and ventured out to different areas of the constituency, where they would campaign both on their own behalf, and on behalf of the entire party list. Usually, candidates would visit those areas of the district with which they were personally or professionally most affiliated and thus best positioned to draw a significant number of voters. These constituencies could either be defined by their ascriptive or functional composition, depending on how the

candidates themselves would relate to them. So for instance, among many Tagammu lists, the individual candidates divided themselves along functional rather than ascriptive lines, particularly in the more urban constituencies of the country. Al-Assaal for instance, running in the constituency of *East Cairo* in 1984, explains in this regard:

‘...each of us goes to one particular district, sit in the café and gather people. For instance, in one district there are 10 sheikdoms and we divide ourselves and the one who nominated themselves for the worker’s seat goes to the factories and the professionals go to the journals and magazines. And the other ones go to the traders and to the craftsmen. And we split and go around the district, I for instance, go to the girl schools to talk to female teachers and head mistresses and the students (...) When there are 10 in a district we divide ourselves like this: women, workers, peasants and traders. When we enter the elections, we divide ourselves each one according to his specialisation. And because I am a women and a writer I go to the cultural centres and journalists, to studios, the TV with two other candidates. And the rest, the workers, they go to the factories and the craft men to the shops, the politicians to the newspapers and magazines.’<sup>120</sup>

Other district lists, particularly those of the NDP and NWP, split in turn along more ascriptive lines, with candidates venturing out to those areas of the constituency in which they had family or tribal connections. This type of campaigning was particularly widespread in the rural constituencies of the country, where local affiliations and the personal interaction between candidates and the electorate is far more prevalent than in the urban centres. In the two *Gharbiya* constituencies for instance, the NDP district lists featured several local heavyweights who each campaigned on behalf of the party list in their respective electoral strongholds (Al-Gumhuriya, 12/05/1984). The same pattern was observable within the ranks of the NWP, where again individual candidates made heavy use of their connections to prominent local families or tribes in order to lure the electorate (Abu Al-Nil, Al-Ahram, 24/03/1987; Ali, Al-Ahram, 23/03/1987; Harb & Hilal 1988: 26). The campaigns themselves would usually involve various visits to the heads of these local communities in an attempt to gain their and subsequently their community’s support for their district list. As in many other rural societies, rather than campaigning for individual votes it was here necessary to obtain the explicit support of local dignitaries who would then secure the vote of the larger community they were representing (Harb & Hilal 1986: 121; Al-Gumhuriya, 29/03/1987; Zaki 1995: 86).

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<sup>120</sup> Interview with Fathiya Al-Assaal (Tagammu).



### *Collective Campaigning in 1984 & 1987*

The personalised campaigning activities pursued by individual candidates at the district level were usually complemented by various collective forms of action organised by the members of the district party lists themselves, the local party leadership or by headquarters. A number of characteristics marked these collective campaigning strategies. First, whilst these strategies seemed to have enjoyed widespread use in the organisation of common campaigning events, they appear to have been less significant with regards to the collectivisation of the campaigning resources. Second, it also seems that to some extent the degree to which collective action took place varied according to the composition of the district lists themselves. Collective action was perceived as much more important and also more actively pursued wherever the district lists were overwhelmingly composed of so called 'weak' candidates, which could not necessarily draw on any local basis of support (Harb & Hilal 1986: 117, 121). By contrast, where a significant number of 'strong candidates' were present collective action, while not absent, became less significant during the election campaign. Also in this scenario, the weaker candidates on the party list would usually pursue a dual strategy in which they would equally promote their membership of a certain party and the fact that they were part of the team led by this or that local notable.

As just mentioned, the organisation of various campaigning events constituted the most common form of collective action observable at the district level. These events ranged from locally organised seminars at private dwellings and street marches to the holding of large-scale electoral rallies. The latter type of events would either be organised by the local party lists themselves, the district party or directly by party headquarters. In terms of organisation, they usually took place in large tents, on party premises or other rented venues and would involve the district candidates and prominent members of the party leadership. Indeed, most of the rallies investigated across all major parties were attended by various party dignitaries, who took to the stage in order to promote their local candidates, the party's historical achievements and its election manifesto or programme. Most importantly, however, they were generally attended by either the entire team of candidates or by a large number of them. Sitting on stage, these candidates would often each receive the opportunity to directly address the audience to promote their local agendas. The rallies thus organised probably constituted the most cohesive moment of the election campaigns, in which the party leadership and the candidates interacted in a concerted effort to promote both the district list and the larger party.

Various examples of such electoral rallies can be given, the most prominent of which were probably those organised by the NDP. In 1987 it was said, for instance, that the party

organised around 2,500 rallies at the district and governorate level, in addition to other party meetings (Harb & Hilal 1988: 21). It was usual for all major NDP rallies to be attended by the candidates of the district lists, who were then given the chance to state their policy agendas, albeit briefly. They were often also attended by various NDP and government dignitaries, in order to illustrate the immediate linkage between the party and the executive. In terms of the political issues addressed these rallies mainly emphasised the achievements of the president and the preceding five year plans and the government's future projects (Harb & Hilal 1986: 176-177; Mayo 15/09/1986; Al-Gumhuriya, 29/03/1987; Harb & Hilal 1988: 46; Munoz 1992: 409-410).

The NWP was also highly active in organising larger party rallies in major regions of the country. According to Harb and Hilal, for instance, in 1984 the party had organised on average two such rallies in those constituencies in which it was present. Again these rallies were usually attended by all district candidates and in most cases by the most senior party figures, including then Chairman Fouad Serrageddin, his deputy Wahid Ra'fat and the Secretary-General at the time Ibrahim Farag.<sup>121</sup> Addressing the audiences, these leadership figures sought to promote their local party lists and the party at large, by dwelling on the past of the Wafd, its historical legacy, achievements and political objectives (Harb & Hilal 1986: 120-122, 173-174; Harb & Hilal 1988: 21, 26; Al-Magid, Al-Ahram Al-Iqtasadi, 13/06/1988).

In addition to these larger rallies, Wafdist candidates would also organise smaller scale events, such as seminars or street marches. In the constituency of *North Qaliyubiya*, for instance, the party list held ten additional seminars in 1984, which were usually attended by several but not necessarily all members of the party list (Harb & Hilal 1986: 218). Other reported forms of collective action took place during the same elections in the constituency of *East Cairo*. Here according to Wali from the NWP, the candidates '...had meetings in the mornings with people [they] know in the district and then in the evenings [they] all went together, all [those who] could come (...) [They] walked in the street and to public places.'<sup>122</sup>

It must be noted, however, that the cohesive appearance of the NWP, promoted by these large-scale rallies, was somewhat tainted in 1984, the year the NWP entered into a strategic alliance with the MB. Indeed, there was serious disagreement within the ranks of the NWP as to the benefits of this alliance, particularly since the NWP had historically been popular among the country's Coptic community. In many constituencies then, rifts within the party

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<sup>121</sup> According to Al-Magid, reporting in *Al-Ahram Al-Iqtasadi*, Serrageddin attended nineteen larger conferences in various districts during the 1984 campaign and twelve such conferences during the 1987 campaign (Al-Magid, Al-Ahram Al-Iqtasadi, 13/06/1988).

<sup>122</sup> Interview with Awatif Wali (NWP).

lists themselves occurred due to the presence of MB candidates at their rallies. In others, such as in Alexandria, MB and NWP candidates simply campaigned independently of each other, holding separate electoral rallies and distributing their own election manifestos (Harb & Hilal 1986: 120). Due to the relatively small number of MB candidates on the NWP's list and because they were only present on a small number of district lists, this factor did not play largely into a vast majority of district campaigns.

The collective campaign organised by Tagammu was probably the most cohesive and well organised. It too held a vast number of rallies and other campaigning events which were usually attended by all district candidates and in some cases by the party leader at the time Khaled Mohieddin. Amina Shafiq, contesting the 1984 elections in the constituency of *East Cairo*, remarks in this regard:

'...usually we were always together. [We were] sitting there on the podium, on stage, because we were to present ourselves. Some people of us used to talk, some people did not prefer to talk, but we usually were there to present each one of us. I mean we would say, this is Mr. 'so-and-so' and this is a worker and this is a professional, this is a teacher and so on.'<sup>123</sup>

According to Hendriks the party held hundreds of such electoral meetings nationwide (Hendriks 1985: 14). In the home constituency of Mohieddin, who in 1984 headed the local party list, for instance, election rallies constituted the main form of electoral propaganda. In total the party held fifteen such rallies, which were attended by all party candidates and apparently by on average between 2,000 to 6,000 voters. In the constituency of *East Cairo* the party organised fourteen electoral rallies which were organised by a team of party supporters and again attended by all members of the district list. Other forms of collective action alluded to by various party members entailed personal visits to local dignitaries and representatives of different sectoral groups, electoral marches and the touring of coffee shops (Harb & Hilal 1986: 166-168, 217-218).<sup>124</sup>

Both the SLP campaign of 1984 and that of the Islamic Alliance in 1987 also made recourse to large-scale electoral rallies and other means of collective campaigning, such as street marches or meetings at public places. So for instance, the SLP apparently organised fourteen such rallies in *East Cairo* during the 1984 elections and two in the constituency of *Giza* in

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<sup>123</sup> Interview with Amina Shafiq (Tagammu).

<sup>124</sup> Interviews with Amina Shafiq (Tagammu), Fathiya Al-Assaal (Tagammu), Mohamed Said (Tagammu), & Hussain Abdel Razek (Tagammu).

1987 (Harb & Hilal 1986: 172).<sup>125</sup> According to Al-Arian the Alliance rallies organised in *Giza* were attended by between 5,000 and 10,000 people. Commenting on further forms of collective campaigning Arian also remarked with regards to the Giza constituency:

‘...the campaign covered the full day, because of the big area. We gathered in some places and go with cars and our supporters, 500 maybe 1,000, to the places suitable for meeting us by the slogans, by the collection of people. We go to pray with people at prayer time. If we have a chance to speak with the people at the mosque, we spoke with them. Sometimes the authorities prevented us from doing so. We have of course to shake hands with people. We visited the famous families, because it is a rural area, the majority is rural.’<sup>126</sup>

Although less widespread, we also find evidence suggesting that efforts were undertaken by some district lists to pool the various resources needed for the campaign. This is particularly apparent with regards to the financial resources used. These resources were usually composed of the direct financial contributions made by the candidates themselves and the financial support they received from both private donors and party headquarters. Across the board the pooled resources seemed to have been used primarily to finance the collective campaigning activities of the party list, such as the renting of campaigning venues, the printing of various local campaigning materials and the hiring of cars to tour the constituency. In some cases they were also used to finance the various campaigning efforts undertaken by individual candidates from the party list. Moreover, it seems that in most cases the pooling of resources remained a highly local affair, being directly arranged at the district level with little or no headquarters’ involvement.

As regards the manner in which local party lists have pooled their resources differences can be detected across constituencies and parties. According to senior figures within the NWP, for instance, the financing of the 1984 and 1987 campaign was left almost entirely to the district lists themselves and involved almost no headquarter support, neither in organisational nor in financial terms. They also asserted that at the district level variance existed in the degree to which the campaigning expenses were pooled. In some districts no pooling of financial resources took place whatsoever, while in others some or even all of the resources were pooled for the purpose of the election campaign. In those districts where candidates pooled their resources, this was usually done according to a distributional key that took into consideration the financial capabilities of the individual candidates on the party list. Al-

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<sup>125</sup> Interview with Essam Al-Arian (MB).

<sup>126</sup> Ibid.

Badawy, current Secretary-General of the NWP, asserts in this regard that it was not uncommon for the heads of the NWP lists to cover the bulk of the election expenses, including both those used for their personal campaigns and those used for the organisation of collective events. They would do so because they were best placed on the district list to win a parliamentary seat, and thus had the most to gain from an active and successful election campaign. The remaining candidates on the list would then each contribute to the campaign as much as they could.<sup>127</sup> Mahmoud Abaza, also from the NWP, asserts that the pooling of resources usually took place in some, yet not in all domains of the election campaign. Asked whether candidates would pool their resources in the 1980s he answered: 'to a certain degree yes. The banners and posters were all organised together. But the cars used to tour the district were organised by the candidates individually. So, one part of the expenditures was communal and the other part individual.'<sup>128</sup>

According to senior members of the MB and the SLP, a similar situation prevailed during the Alliance campaign of 1987. Again it seems that little or no headquarter support was given by the allying parties to their local district lists. Instead, the district lists were largely left to raise their own campaigning resources and to decide upon the means in which to dispense them. Heshmat remarks on this issue: '...the financing of the campaign was organised by each constituency and not in general. As a result there was very good cooperation.'<sup>129</sup> Al-Arian, himself an Alliance candidate in 1987, also asserts that: '...all candidates participated financially, and some of our supporters provid[ed] us with materials such as for example cars, chairs [for meetings], their time and cloth for banners.'<sup>130</sup> Similar to the NWP, the manner in which these resources were dispensed at the local level seems to have revolved around a mixture of both individual and collective financing. For some campaigning activities candidates would dispense their own resources, whilst for others these were pooled across the district list.<sup>131</sup>

Of all opposition parties Tagammu probably had the most coherent campaign finance organisation in place, being composed of both contributions from the central party leadership and the members of the district lists. According to the various members of the party's General Secretariat, headquarters dispensed the financial resources available to the local party organisations, which would then administer their usage during the election campaign

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<sup>127</sup> Interviews with Sayed Al-Badawy (NWP) & Awatif Wali (NWP).

<sup>128</sup> Interview with Mahmoud Abaza (NWP).

<sup>129</sup> Interview with Gamal Heshmat (MB).

<sup>130</sup> Interview with Essam Al-Arian (MB).

<sup>131</sup> Interviews with Essam Al-Arian (MB), Gamal Heshmat (MB) & Nagi Al-Shehabi (previously SLP/ currently DGP).

(Mahmoud, Al-Gumhuriya, 08/05/1984).<sup>132</sup> The same would happen with the financial resources collected at the district level by the candidates themselves or by local donors. These resources would also flow to the local party for collective use and distribution.<sup>133</sup> With regards to the distribution itself Sha'aben, a prominent party representative and candidate for the 1984 and 1987 elections, remarks: '...there were things we candidates needed money for, like conferences, and so the [local] committee gave us the money. The committee was in charge of the campaign finances.'<sup>134</sup>

Finally, whilst it is very difficult to discern precisely how NDP candidates financed their election campaigns in 1984 and 1987, there is evidence suggesting that the manner in which the available resources were actually managed at the district level was not too dissimilar from that of the opposition. According to Saad Al-Din Wahaba, then Information Secretary of the Cairo branch of the NDP and NDP candidate in 1984, each candidate on the party list had to contribute a specified sum of money, in addition to the money given by the central party. The money itself was then managed by a local treasurer, who had been selected specifically for the election campaign. Another NDP candidate, Ahmed Fathy Omar, who contested the 1984 elections in the Sharqiya constituency of *Abu-Hamad*, also asserted that the candidates on the list shared all campaigning expenses, both financial and material. He specifically describes that he contributed five to fifteen cars and financed sixty-five members of the campaigning team, while other members of the list took care of other aspects of the campaign (Mahmoud, Al-Gumhuriya, 08/05/1984).

## 8.2 The Emergence of Cross-Party Alliances in the 1990s

When juxtaposing the campaigns of the 1980s with those of the 1990s, it becomes apparent how drastically the nature of constituency campaigning had changed between these two decades and with it the direction of party development in Egypt. Whilst the former decade had seen significant strides towards collective action, little such efforts can be detected during the 1990s. Instead we now encounter highly personalised election campaigns that featured minimal to no within-party cooperation and in many instances even the emergence of so called strategic cross-party alliances at the district level. The collective element of partisan campaigns had become virtually non-existent.

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<sup>132</sup> Interviews with Rifaat Said (Tagammu) & Mohamed Said (Tagammu).

<sup>133</sup> Interviews with Fathiya Al-Assaal (Tagammu), Amina Shafiq (Tagammu) & Mohamed Abdel Aziz Sha'aben (Tagammu).

<sup>134</sup> Interview with Mohamed Abdel Aziz Sha'aben (Tagammu).

The reasons for these changes in the behaviour of party candidates can in large measure be attributed to the 1990 changes in electoral design. In contrast to the 1980s party candidates now found themselves in a position in which there were neither societal nor institutional constraints in place that could have seriously hampered the pursuit of a highly individualised election campaign. To begin with, since the early 1980s few changes had taken place in the voting behaviour of the electorate itself. As was suggested in chapter three, during both electoral decades, voters principally structured their electoral choice around personal rather than party affiliations. This in turn meant that in the 1990s candidates were still better off using a personal over a party reputation seeking strategy as the optimal vote-seeking device. What is more, there were no longer any electoral incentives in place that could have (counter-intuitively) propelled candidates to collectivise some of their campaigning activities, as had been the case during the 1980s. First, under the new electoral law voters were asked to cast their ballot for individual candidates rather than for party lists, which reinforced the importance for the contending candidates to become personally known in their constituencies. Second, the new law also reduced the number of district seats from between three to thirteen seats to two seats per constituency, which significantly reduced the scope for any extensive within-party cooperation.<sup>135</sup> Third, the new law also reduced the size of the electoral districts to on average one fifth of their size in the 1980s. Accordingly, it became far easier for candidates to tour the entire constituency and to be known to a significant proportion of the constituency population. Finally, both the institutional incentives in place and the societal environment not only facilitated the pursuit of highly individualised election campaigns, but they theoretically also opened the door for candidates to engage in so called cross-party alliances at the district level. The two factors that facilitated such strategic behaviour are the ballot structure in place and the absence of *effective recruitment control* (ERC). As mentioned elsewhere, the current electoral law categorises the two district seats into a ‘workers-farmers’ and a ‘professional’ seat and mandates that candidates file their application under one of the two professional categories. It also provides voters with two votes each, which they can either split between contenders from the two professional categories, or give to candidates running under the same category.<sup>136</sup> For the election campaign itself this categorisation of district seats thus created a competitive constellation in which candidates had to compete for votes within, yet not across, professional categories. Under these circumstances, it became possible, theoretically at least, for candidates to forge electoral alliances with any of the contenders running respectively under the other professional category. Hence ‘worker-farmer’ candidates could cooperate with ‘professional’ candidates and vice versa.

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<sup>135</sup> See Electoral Law No. 201/90.

<sup>136</sup> The provision that voters can vote for two professional candidates was introduced in 1995 (Paradelle 1995: 45).

The other factor that facilitated the pursuit of cross-party alliances was the absence of ERC, which enabled candidates to cooperate with virtually any other contender in the electoral arena, should they wish to do so. Indeed, should a candidate decide to defy the party line and cooperate with rival party representatives or independents not approved by their party, little sanctions are available to the parties themselves to punish such dissenting behaviour. To recapitulate, this is the case because the electoral prospects of candidates are more dependent on the contender's personal reputation, family or tribal background and on the capacity to deliver constituency services than on his or her commitment to a specific political party. In other words, voters will most likely neither punish a candidate's dissenting behaviour nor will candidates find any serious impediments to their future electoral prospects when being de-selected from or even expelled from the party.

The actual decline in within-party cooperation during the 1990s manifested itself in various forms. First, and particularly among opposition candidates, it was evident in the absence of co-partisan district competitors. As mentioned elsewhere, under the new electoral regime, parties were no longer bound to place candidates across most constituencies of the country, nor were they required to nominate the maximum possible number of candidates per district. Instead, they could choose in which constituency to place candidates and whether or not to nominate one or two. As we have seen, incapable of sustaining a nationwide presence, virtually all opposition parties nominated candidates only in a selected number of constituencies. Even more importantly, in a majority of cases opposition parties only nominated one candidate per district. Left without any co-partisan competitor, it was thus no longer possible for these opposition candidates to coordinate their various campaigning activities amongst themselves. Instead, they were left to organise and contest the district campaign entirely on their own. Moreover, with little help from the party leadership, these candidates were basically in a position in which they had to set up their own campaigning headquarters and teams, devise their own campaigning materials and organise their own campaigning activities.

Second, and even more importantly, the absence of any meaningful within-party cooperation was also apparent in the emergence of so called 'cross-party' district level alliances. As the term indicates, such cross-party alliances are forms of electoral cooperation that take place at the district level either between candidates from different political parties or between party candidates and formally independents. In the Egyptian case, this type of strategic behaviour gained rapid prominence and widespread acceptance among the candidates competing in the parliamentary elections of 1990, 1995 and 2000. This is not to say that within-party cooperation between candidates was entirely absent during these elections or even overtaken



by various forms of cross-party cooperation. Yet, given that all parties but the NDP failed to nominate candidates in all constituencies of the country, let alone two candidates in those constituencies they were represented, there have in fact been very few instances where such electoral cooperation was actually possible.<sup>137</sup>

In general, the cross-party alliances that emerged during the past three elections tended to be highly volatile and instrumental in character. First, they were volatile because they proved to be rather short-lived, extending sometimes little beyond the first round of voting let alone consecutive elections. Moreover, they have also been shown to fluctuate during the election campaign, with candidates de-and re-aligning themselves in-between and within the two-rounds of voting. Second, these alliances have been instrumental in character for the simple reason that they were usually forged with no other objective in mind, than to increase a candidate's vote tally. To achieve this objective candidates have sought to ally themselves with other popular district contenders, irrespective of their ideological and/or programmatic proximity. The necessity to do so must in large measure be attributed to the vast number of candidates contesting the district race and to the high electoral threshold in place during the first round of voting. As we have seen, the field of competitors has usually been highly congested, reaching in some constituencies more than twenty candidates for the two district seats.<sup>138</sup> In order to obtain a sufficiently large number of votes in the first round of voting candidates could thus not necessarily rely on their own electoral appeal. Rather they had to forge such strategic alliances to augment their vote tally and thus make it to the second round of voting. Moreover, wherever such alliances were forged during the second round of voting, the same underlying rationale was at work. Again, they were basically forged with little else in mind than to increase the prospects of the candidate in question to obtain the relative majority necessary to enter parliament.

#### *Cross-Party Cooperation in the Absence of Co-Partisan Competitors*

The most prominent type of cross-party cooperation observable at the district level occurred in the absence of first and/or second round co-partisan contenders. In these cases, parties had either nominated a single candidate only or had lost one of their two district candidates in the first round of voting. Without any running mate, it now became possible for party candidates

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<sup>137</sup> As discussed elsewhere, the NDP was the only political party with sufficient resources to place candidates in all of the country's 222 electoral districts.

<sup>138</sup> In 2000, for instance, the average number of candidates running per district stood at: sixteen in the governorate of *North Sinai*, eighteen in *Gharbiya*, twenty-three in *Daqahliya* and twenty-seven in *Kafr Al-Sheikh*. In the city constituency of *Aswan* a staggering thirty-nine candidates were running in 2000 (Al-Din, Al-Ahram Weekly, 26/10 – 01/11/2000; Ibrahim, Al-Ahram Weekly, 02 – 08/11/2000).

to coordinate their campaigning activities with contenders from rival parties or independents in order to improve their electoral prospects.

Examples of such electoral alliances can be found in abundance across the country, involving candidates from virtually all political parties. Within the ranks of the NWP, for instance, a number of high ranking members engaged in such cooperation. Fouad Badrawy, the grandson of the late Party Chairman Fouad Serrageddin, refused to accept a running mate in his constituency of *Markas Talkha*, in the *Daqahliya* governorate, during both the elections of 1995 and 2000. He did so for apparent 'tactical' considerations, leaving him with the option to freely select the most suitable running mate from amongst the candidates of the other professional category. In 1995 he sided with independent Ibrahim Omar and in 2000 with the NDP independent Khaled Abu Al-Maaz. Similarly, in 1995 Ahmed Abou Ismail, Secretary-General and NWP candidate for the professional seat, cooperated with the official NDP candidate for the worker's seat in the *Gharbiya* constituency of *Sammansund*. Another interesting example of such cross-party cooperation occurred in the *Qaliyubiya* constituency of *Tukh*. Here the NWP had initially nominated Al-Guni as its official candidate for the professional seat. In the midst of the election campaign the party decided, however, to ask Mohamed Farid Hassanein to become its official candidate for that very seat. Hassanein, a previous Nasserite who had entered the 2000 elections as an independent, accepted the NWP offer, creating an unusual competitive scenario, in which two Wafdists were running against each other for the professional seat. Although not confirmed, it is likely that the NWP's change of mind in its support for Al-Guni should probably be attributed to the comparatively little support he enjoyed in the constituency compared to Hassanein, who enjoyed widespread support within the district. Hassanein then entered the second round of the campaign while Al-Guni failed to muster enough electoral support. During this second round Hassanein then forged a tactical alliance with the official worker's candidate of the NDP, Mohamed Marouf. This alliance was purely tactical and involved only public pledges of mutual support.<sup>139</sup>

Within Tagammu similarly high profile cases of cross-party alliances at the district level can be detected. In line with its leftist political platform and given its limited capacity to finance a large-scale election campaign, the party had selected only a limited number of candidates, who in most cases were running for the 'workers-farmers' seat. This in turn provided Tagammu candidates with the option to enter into strategic alliances with candidates from the professional category. Several examples of precisely such alliances can be named. In the *Giza* district of *Imbaba*, Fathiya Al-Assaal, a long-term party member and prominent Egyptian

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<sup>139</sup> Interviews with Ahmed Abu Ismail (NWP), Fouad Badrawy (NWP) & Mohamed Farid Hassanein (former NWP, Independent, and ADNP).

writer, apparently coordinated her election campaign with Nomaan Goma'a, the current leader of the NWP during the 1995 poll and with an independent professional candidate in the subsequent 2000 poll. In the *Cairo* constituency of *Masr Al-Qadima* Abdallah Abu Al-Fatah, member of the central party committee also cooperated with the Wafdist professional candidate Assam Shiha. In the *Cairo* constituency of *Bulaq*, Al-Ahram journalist Amina Shafiq, running for the professional seat, publicly sided with NDP independent Ahmed Bayoumi. In yet another *Cairo* constituency, *Haddayek Al-Qubba*, the Tagammu candidate and a current MP Abdel Aziz Sha'aben also has a proven a track record of allying himself with various independent candidates from the professional categories. Without giving details of his allies, he asserted that he had been forging district level alliances during the 1990, 1995 and 2000 elections.<sup>140</sup> Probably the most prominent Tagammu candidate to have ever engaged in such strategic behaviour is the former party leader Mohieddin. In both 1995 and 2000 Mohieddin was contesting the professional seat in the *Qaliyubiya* constituency of *Kafr Shukr*. In 1995 he sided with the NDP worker's candidate, Samir Nusayr, and in 2000 with another NDP worker's candidate, Ahmed Seif (Al-Khawaga 1995: 88, 125; Saad, Al-Ahram Weekly, 09 – 15/11/2000).

#### *Cross-Party Cooperation in the Presence of Co-Partisan Contenders*

In addition to these types of cross-party alliances, we can also point to numerous instances during the campaigns of 1990, 1995 and 2000 where party candidates engaged in electoral cooperation, despite the presence of second category co-partisan contenders. In these cases then, a political party had filed two candidates in a given district, yet these candidates felt little inclined to coordinate their campaigning activities or to promote their common political platform. Instead, in a sizable number of instances, either one or both of them were found to ally themselves with third candidates from rival political forces or with independents. Depending on the degree of third party cooperation, these candidates were hence *de facto* campaigning directly against members of their own political family, a scenario not conducive to improving *internal unity* and *visible representation*.

The party most severely plagued by such intra-party competition among the ranks of its candidates was the ruling NDP. This intra-party competition took three forms. First, it happened virtually by default in all those constituencies in which official NDP candidates were competing alongside 'NDP independents' or directly against each other. As we have

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<sup>140</sup> Interviews with Fathiya Al-Assaal (Tagammu), Mohamed Abdel Aziz Sha'aben (Tagammu), Abdallah Abu Al-Fattah (Tagammu) & Mohamed Koroum (ADNP).

seen, since 1990 the phenomenon of NDP independents has been sharply on the rise. In 1990, for instance, on average three to four NDP independents could be found per constituency, whilst in 2000 this number had risen to on average between seven and eight candidates.<sup>141</sup> Although these NDP candidates had defied the party line and stood as independents, they nevertheless retained their party membership, and often even their positions within the party itself (Al-Din, Al-Ahram Weekly, 02 – 08/10/1995; Al-Din, Al-Ahram Weekly, 26/10 – 01/11/2000; Youssef, Al-Ahram Hebdo, 22/11/2000).<sup>142</sup> Being members of the same party, both NDP independents and official NDP candidates thus waged a campaign that carried all the trademarks of within-party competition.

In addition to this form of within-party competition by default there was the odd incidence in 2000, in which the party – due to tribal considerations - formally endorsed four instead of only two district contenders in one of the *Marsa Matruh* constituencies. Here then within-party competition was directly engineered by party headquarters (Al-Din, Al-Ahram Weekly, 05 -11/10/2000).<sup>143</sup>

Apart from these incidents of involuntary within-party competition, we also encounter more active forms of within-party competition, in which official NDP candidates decided not to cooperate with each other but to ally themselves either with NDP independents or with candidates from the political opposition. In the first scenario, either one or both official NDP candidates would seek to forge electoral alliances with NDP independents and thus campaign against one another. In the second scenario official NDP candidates would seek to cooperate with party candidates from the political opposition. Several such cases can be reported. As already mentioned this happened twice in the *Qaliyubiya* constituency of *Kafr Shukr*. In both 1995 and 2000 the NDP's worker's candidate had sided with the professional Tagammu candidate against his own running mate. It also happened in the *Cairo* constituency of *Al-Tibbin* where, during the 1995 elections, the NDP's official worker's candidate, Mohamed Mustafa, sided with Ahrar's candidate Mustafa Bakri. His running mate Mohamed Ali Maghoub, then Minister of Religious Affairs, in turn was in a rare move cooperating with the MB-SLP candidate Ali Fattah Al-Bab (Abdel Nasser 1995: 214-215; Saad, Al-Ahram Weekly, 09 – 15/11/2000).

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<sup>141</sup> Refer back to table 2.5.

<sup>142</sup> Interview with Asmat al-Merghany (NDP Independent).

<sup>143</sup> Similar incidents of both these scenarios were not only confined to the parliamentary elections but also took place during the *Shura* Council races. In both 1998 and 2001, for instance, a large number of de-selected NDP candidates ran as independents against the official NDP candidates (Apiku, Middle East Times, 14/06/1998). In the 2001 elections, moreover, there was also one reported incident in the press in which the party had officially nominated four instead of only two candidates (Al-Din, Al-Ahram Weekly, 07 – 13/06/2001).

The reasons why NDP candidates have actually forged such alliances against their official running mates are hard to assess, given the difficulties in approaching this category of respondents. However, based on the incidents reported, a number of reasons, although probably not exhaustive, can be given. In some cases for instance, rivalries between the official NDP candidates, their families or local communities caused them to ally themselves with third candidates. In other circumstances the reasons were more trivial and based on discontent on either side with the party's choice of running mate. Finally, there have been a number of cases where the local party leadership in defiance of headquarters, supported one of the NDP independent candidates against the official candidate and it was thus beneficial for the other NDP candidate to side with the local party (Frag 1990: 177; Al-Khawaga 1995: 98).

Occurrences of cross-party district level alliances were however not only detectable within the ruling NDP, but also within the ranks of the major opposition parties. Here again there are several instances in which running mates either simply did not cooperate with each other or, even more dramatically, forged alliances across party lines with members of rival parties or with NDP independents. Within the NWP, for instance, both types of anti-party behaviour were observable. In *Port Said* governorate, one of the party's traditional strongholds, there were no traces of within-party cooperation during the 2000 elections in the constituencies of *Al-Manakha*, *Al-Arab* and *Al-Sharq*, despite the fact that the party had nominated two candidates in each of these districts. In both *Al-Arab* and *Al-Sharq*, the candidates running for the worker's seat did not agree with the party's nomination for the professional seat, and subsequently declined any form of cooperation with their official running mates.<sup>144</sup> In *Al-Manakha* constituency, moreover, the Wafdist candidate for the professional seat, Mohamed Sherdy, did not only refuse to cooperate with his lesser known running mate, Ehab Sarou, but actively engaged in cross-party cooperation with two different rival candidates in the two rounds of the election campaign. During the first round of the campaign Sherdy sided with the NDP independent Hesham Kamel against Ehab Sarou. According to Sherdy this alliance broke down, however, because Kamel had made a secret deal for the second round with the official NDP candidate for the professional seat, long-term MP Abdel-Wahib Qouta. In return Sherdy sided with the other remaining contender in the field of worker's candidates, the official NDP candidate Ali Al-Alfi.<sup>145</sup>

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<sup>144</sup> In *Al-Sharq* district Seifeddin Mahmoud ran for the worker's seat and Mohamed Leheta for the professional seat. Mahmoud originally expected to run together with the NWP leader of *Port Said*, but was then confronted with little known Leheta, who he flatly refused to cooperate with. In *Al-Arab* district Mossaad Melagi ran for the workers seat and Safat Abdel Hamid for the professional seat. See interview with Mohamed Sherdy (NWP).

<sup>145</sup> Interview with Mohamed Sherdy (NWP).

Further high profile cases of such essentially anti-party behaviour within the ranks of the NWP occurred in the *Gharbiya*, *Qaliyubiya* and *Cairo* governorates during the 2000 campaign. In the *Gharbiya* constituency of *Sammansund*, for instance, the NWP's Secretary-General and professional candidate for the 2000 elections, Ahmed Abou Ismail, disagreed with the choice of running mate, Mohamed Al-Shebini, and demanded the party drop its support for the latter. The party leadership complied, dropping its support for Al-Shebini, who nevertheless continued to run under the NWP label. When Al-Shebini, yet not Ismail entered the second round of the campaign, the party leadership changed strategy, and resumed its support for the previously discredited candidate (Okasha, *Cairo Times*, 09 –15/11/2000). In another high profile case, Yassin Serrageddin, the brother of the late party president Fouad Serrageddin, sided with the NDP worker's candidate in the *Cairo* constituency of *Qasr Al-Nil* against his own party colleague (Al-Khawaga 1995: 88; Kienle 1995: 145). In the neighbouring constituency of *Menial Al-Roda* Awatif Wali also cooperated with a worker's candidate against the worker's candidate from her own party in the 2000 campaign.<sup>146</sup> A similar situation occurred during the 1995 elections in the same constituency. This time the NWP had nominated Mustafa An-Nashirty for the worker's seat and Abdel Saad for the professional seat. According to An-Nashirty no cooperation took place between the two candidates. An-Nashirty also did not cooperate with his fellow NWP running mate during the following 2000 poll. During these elections he was running in the *Giza* constituency of *Dokki & Aguza*, again for the 'workers-farmers' seat. Instead of cooperating with the professional NWP candidate he was supporting Mamoun Hodeibi, the previous leader of the MB, who at that time was running for the professional seat.<sup>147</sup> Finally there is the case of Mounir Abdel Nour, the current leader of the NWP parliamentary group, who ran in the *Cairo* constituency of *Wayli* in the 1995 and 2000 elections. During the 1995 elections he was running for the 'professional' seat together with his NWP running mate Jahiya Al-Irsh, who was contesting the 'workers-farmers' seat. According to Nour there was coordination between the two candidates, yet at the same time they both met with and expressed pledges of mutual support for their respective rival candidates. As Nour explains: 'I met people, they met me, he [Al-Irsh] met others, he met my major opponents. Everybody was meeting everybody; everybody was making promises (...).'<sup>148</sup>

As with the NWP, similar incidences of cross-party district level alliances also seemed to occur within the ranks of Tagammu, although this research can detail only one such incident. This took place in the *Cairo* constituency of *Masr Al-Qadima* and involved Mamdouh Nakhla,

<sup>146</sup> Interview with Awatif Wali (NWP).

<sup>147</sup> Interview with Mustafa Al-Nashirty (NWP).

<sup>148</sup> Interview with Mounir Abdel Nour (NWP).

running for the professional seat and Said Abdel Radi, running for the worker's seat. According to Nakhla both candidates initially supported each other until in the midst of the campaign Radi decided to side with another worker's candidate against Nakhla.<sup>149</sup> The fact that so few occurrences can be detected is probably best explained by the fact that Tagammu rarely nominated two candidates per district during any of the past elections. Hence there was simply no possibility for Tagammu candidates to compete against each other at the district level.

### *Forms of Cross-Party Cooperation*

The types of electoral cooperation that actually took place between allying candidates varied quite markedly, ranging from tacit backroom deals to the collectivisation of the actual election campaign. Usually, these alliances entailed the expression of public pledges of mutual support by the allying candidates. Such pledges were usually uttered at various campaigning appearances in cafés, during street marches, in seminars or at rallies and were either made by the two allying candidates together or separately. During these events either one or both of the allying candidates would appear in front of the assembled electorate and publicly proclaim their support and acknowledgement for the other candidate, asking voters to cast their ballot for both of them.<sup>150</sup> Other forms of active cooperation mentioned by those candidates interviewed entailed the use of common party headquarters and campaigning teams, the distribution of common election manifestos or even the pooling of financial resources. Overall however, it seems that the latter two types of district level cooperation were not that widespread, particularly among the political opposition.<sup>151</sup>

In terms of the motives behind such district level alliances, the available evidence suggests that these were primarily based on pragmatic and instrumental considerations and less so on ideological or programmatic considerations. Indeed, most of the candidates surveyed on this issue reasoned that the other candidate's electoral popularity in the constituency was the prime consideration for their alliance, followed by the other candidate's programmatic proximity and the party's encouragement to engage in such an alliance.<sup>152</sup> In other words, what seems to have mattered most in the choice of political ally was the selected candidate's capacity to muster widespread electoral support and votes. This line of reasoning was echoed

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<sup>149</sup> Interview with Mamdouh Nakhla (NWP).

<sup>150</sup> Among the opposition candidates surveyed a majority of 36.4 percent said that they had actually engaged in this type of cooperation. See Party Candidate & Deputy Survey, Appendix No. 3, Question, 3.1.3, p. 321. See also interviews with Fathiya Al-Assaal (Tagammu), Abdallah Abu Al-Fattah (Tagammu), Mohamed Abdel Aziz Sha'aben (Tagammu), Mohamed Koroum (ADNP), Fouad Badrawy (NWP), Mohamed Farid Hassanein (former NWP) & Mustafa An-Nashirty (NWP).

<sup>151</sup> Party Candidate & Deputy Survey, Appendix No. 3, Question 3.1.3, p. 321.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid, Question 3.1.2, p. 320.

by candidates across all major opposition parties, but was particularly prominent amongst members of the NWP. Explaining his motives for cooperating with Ibrahim Omar in 1995, Fouad Badrawy from the NWP argued, for instance, that he engaged in such cooperation: '...because his village carried 22,000 votes. It is a big village and my village is [so too], so I must cooperate with him.'<sup>153</sup> The same line of reasoning was presented by Abdel Nour, who similarly asserted that such electoral cooperation basically revolved around the exchange of votes between the allying candidates. According to Nour such alliances constitute a universal phenomenon in Egyptian electoral politics and usually occur when candidates realise that their running mates stand little chance of electoral victory and that they are better off aligning themselves with other more popular candidates in their district.<sup>154</sup> In fact, this was precisely the motive that drove the two Wafdists Sherdy and An-Nashirty to drop their running mates in the 1995 and 2000 elections in favour of a more popular third party candidate.<sup>155</sup> It was also the motive given by Awatif Wali for why her running mate sided with another candidate in the district, instead of cooperating with her.<sup>156</sup>

Candidates from both Tagammu and the MB also confirmed the importance of electoral popularity in the choice of political allies at the district level. At the same time they did, however, also place greater weight on other considerations. Both MB candidates interviewed asserted that the personal integrity and Muslim credentials of a candidate played a crucial role in choosing with whom to cooperate. Members of Tagammu in turn stressed the programmatic proximity of the candidates they sought to align themselves with. Abdel Aziz Sha'aben maintained for instance:

'...for me the campaign involves two stages. In the first stage, because there are a lot of candidates, no one takes a majority of votes. In the second round there is competition between four, two workers and two professionals. In the second round I engage in coordination with the politically closest candidate, whether he is a party member or not.'<sup>157</sup>

A similar position was taken by both Zawiris and Al-Assaal, who asserted that they would only cooperate with candidates that carried political ideas similar to their own. With the exception of the MB, these candidates could however hold vastly different party memberships which indicates that the programmatic proximity Al-Assaal and Zawiris were talking about

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<sup>153</sup> Interview with Fouad Badrawy (NWP).

<sup>154</sup> Interview with Mounir Abdel Nour (NWP).

<sup>155</sup> Interviews with Mohamed Sherdy (NWP) & Mustafa An-Nashirty (NWP).

<sup>156</sup> Interview with Awatif Wali (NWP).

<sup>157</sup> Interview with Mohamed Abdel Aziz Sha'aben (Tagammu).



referred to the local political agendas of the candidates and not necessarily to that of their parties. Proving yet again the importance of electoral popularity in the choice of electoral alliances, Zawiris also claimed that he was not required to cooperate with other candidates because his popularity in the constituency did not require him to do so.<sup>158</sup>

The secondary role verbally accorded to the ideological stance by those candidates interviewed, is also manifest in the types of alliances that actually occurred at the district level in 1995 and 2000. Indeed, in both these elections a significant number of these alliance constellations involved political parties holding vastly different and sometimes even incompatible ideological and/or programmatic positions. Take for instance the examples given above. Even here we can discern seven different types of cross-party alliances, spanning across almost the entire ideological spectrum in Egyptian politics. For the purpose of illustration table 8.1 summarises these alliance constellations by party and ideological position. Given that it is very difficult to extrapolate the true extent of such cross-party district level alliances from the examples at hand, it may very well be the case that these were even more colourful and diverse than those presented here.

*Table 8.1 Examples of District Level Alliance Constellations by Party & Ideological Position*

Candidate No.1		Candidate No.2	
Party	Position	Party	Position
NWP	Centre – Right	MB	Right – Islamist
NWP	Centre – Right	Independent	Diverse
NWP	Centre – Right	NDP	Centre
NWP	Centre – Right	Tagammu	Left
NDP	Centre	MB	Right – Islamist
NDP	Centre	Independent	Diverse
NDP	Centre	Tagammu	Left

Sources: Author Interviews with NWP, Tagammu, MB, ADNP, SLP and Ahrar respondents.

### *Party Political Positions on Cross-Party Cooperation*

These examples thus indicate that such alliances were widespread and broadly acceptable to various types of party candidates. For one thing, they clearly demonstrate that such alliances were not only common among the rank-and-file of those parties observed but even pursued by high ranking party officials. As we have seen, in the case of Tagammu even the party chairman engaged in such strategic behaviour. Second and most crucially, these examples

<sup>158</sup> In her interview Al-Assaal explicitly referred to the possibility of allying herself with Wafdist and independent candidates, yet never with those of the MB. See interview with Fathiya Al-Assaal (Tagammu).

show that cross-party alliances have not been the trademark of one particular party, but actually inflicted all major political forces in Egypt, affecting the leftist Tagammu as much as the centre-right NWP. This fact is particularly noteworthy because it is usually assumed that leftist parties, by virtue of their members' stronger ideological commitment, are generally more cohesive than other political parties.

How widely accepted such cross-party alliances were also transpires from the *Party Candidate & Deputy Survey*, in which asked three specific questions were asked in this regard. The first question asked whether, under the candidate-based electoral regime, candidates had actually cooperated with their running mates during the election campaign. Of those who responded to the question only 25.8 percent confirmed that they had done so. A majority of 74.2 percent, by contrast, asserted that they had not cooperated with any other party candidate. This percentage includes, of course, instances in which the party had nominated two district candidates and instances in which it had only nominated one candidate. When excluding those cases in which only one candidate was nominated, we still find that 48.4 percent of the sampled candidates did not cooperate with their running mates. These numbers contrast quite starkly with the levels of intra-party cooperation prevailing in the 1980s. To recapitulate, all candidates that had been asked the same question in the 1980s, namely whether they had actively engaged in intra-party cooperation, had asserted that this was the case.<sup>159</sup>

The two remaining questions on this issue asked whether, and if so what types of cross-party alliances the party leadership would be willing to tolerate at the district level. The first question was specifically directed at those party candidates who had already pursued such electoral cooperation, whilst the second question was addressed to those candidates who had not yet done so. Among those candidates who had already entered such cross-party alliances, it is significant to note that none actually thought that their activities had been prohibited by the party leadership. By contrast all of them asserted that in one form or the other the party leadership consented to the formation of such district level alliances. Fifty percent of the respondents even argued that the party leadership had not imposed any restrictions whatsoever on the types of electoral cooperation their candidates could engage in.<sup>160</sup>

Although these responses were somewhat more diverse, a similar picture prevailed among those candidates who were asked to identify their party's stance on any future cross-party cooperation. Again an overall majority of respondents thought that the party would allow some form of district level cooperation between their candidates and third party contenders.

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<sup>159</sup> Party Candidate & Deputy Survey, Appendix No. 3, Question 3.25, pp. 317-318.

<sup>160</sup> Ibid., Question 3.2.1, p. 322.

Moreover, within this category a majority of 33.4 percent assumed that the party leadership would impose no restrictions whatsoever on the types of electoral cooperation pursued. Only a minority of 13.4 percent asserted that the party leadership would under no circumstances allow any type of third party cooperation.<sup>161</sup>

Finally it is also interesting to note that in both instances the candidates who assumed that their party leaders would agree in principle to such cross-party cooperation represented virtually all major opposition forces. They included members of the NWP, Tagammu, the SLP, Ahrar, the MB and the EGP. This fact again demonstrates that such cross-party alliances were not confined to specific political parties, but occurred across Egypt's party political spectrum.

Overall the candidates interviewed thus overwhelmingly asserted that the forging of cross-party alliances constituted a highly useful campaigning device. Furthermore, most of these candidates also thought that such alliances were in one way or another acceptable to party headquarters. This latter finding seems, however, rather unusual, given the damaging effects such district level alliances can have on levels of *internal unity* and *visible representation*. Indeed, from a purely party developmental perspective, one would expect headquarters to prohibit rather than accept these alliances in order to strengthen their coercive power vis-à-vis their own candidates and thus to sustain a semblance of party discipline during election times. Moreover, they should also want to do so out of concern that any such alliances would further erode the party's programmatic purity and the visibility of their candidates' partisan affiliations. If, on the other hand, party headquarters reason more short term instrumentally, then their rationale would be more in line with those of their candidates. They would thus support the pursuit of district level alliances as the only feasible means to gain some parliamentary representation. This latter reasoning applies particularly to those parties in opposition, which under the conditions given stand little chances of obtaining any meaningful parliamentary representation.

In the Egyptian case, the opposition leaders are probably torn between both these strategies, which under the given conditions are hard to reconcile. Certainly, from a party developmental perspective, political parties would have to prohibit any such district level alliances. By the same token, however, party leaders know very well that their candidates often stand little chance of winning elections unaligned. This is particularly the case for those parties in opposition and where parties have nominated only one district candidate. These parties know

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<sup>161</sup> Ibid., Question 3.1.4, p. 321.

very well that their candidates can only win a significant share of the vote in a highly congested field of contenders and against a predominant party if they allow them to rally around well known contenders of the other professional category.

A closer examination of the positions expressed by party officials on the matter of district level alliances reveals this dilemma quite strikingly. Indeed, here we find an array of opinions expressed not only among political parties but within the ranks of many of the party leaders themselves. What is more, in many cases the directives given by the central leadership stood in stark contrast to their actual behaviour. So for instance, high ranking party officials have been found to engage in district level cross-party alliances themselves or have not dealt with instances where such alliances took place. Taken together, these apparent discrepancies may suggest that, whilst there is explicit condemnation of such alliances, implicitly parties have come to acknowledge and accept their importance in the electoral race under current conditions.

Probably the most outspoken opposition to the formation of district level alliances came from the NWP and the EGP. Leaders of both parties denied that such alliances were tolerated let alone actively encouraged, and that they hence constituted part and parcel of their vote-maximising strategy. Instead, they claimed that they would not accept such strategic behaviour by their candidates and that they would punish any straying candidates by expelling them from the party. In an interview given to *Al-Ahram Weekly* prior to the 2000 poll the newly elected leader of the NWP Nomaan Goma'a asserted, for instances, that '...there is no cooperation between us and other candidates' (Shehab, *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 28/09 – 04/10/2000). In another interview given to *Al-Ahram Hebdo* he reiterated this position, claiming: '... we have decided long ago that we will no longer arrange any coalitions with other parties, including the NDP' (*Al-Ahram Hebdo* 30/08 – 05/09/2000).<sup>162</sup> The same line of reasoning was also presented by the current Secretary-General of the NWP, Al-Badawy who I had interviewed in June 2003. He argued that the party would not tolerate any form of cross-party cooperation and that wherever it did happen the party would expel those candidates who engaged in such cooperation. Al-Badawy continued to admit that there had been instances of cross-party cooperation involving NWP and NDP candidates, but added that these candidates would be '...fired from the Wafd party, even if [they] succeed.'<sup>163</sup>

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<sup>162</sup> The quote has been translated into English by the author. The original quote reads: '... nous avons décidé depuis longtemps de ne plus faire de coalitions avec d'autres partis, y compris le PND'.

<sup>163</sup> Interview with Sayed Al-Badawy (NWP).

The current leadership of the EGP, a minor opposition force in Egyptian politics, also explicitly prohibited its candidates from entering into any form of cross-candidate electoral cooperation - either with independents or other party candidates. According to Mohamed Awad, the Secretary-General, such alliances would damage the image of the EGP, which seeks to establish itself as a new alternative next to the discredited NDP and the remaining opposition forces. As Awad remarks: ‘...during 2000 we did not want to coordinate, cooperate or do any sort of alliances. From day one our target was basically to increase the reputation of the Egyptian Green Party in the street.’<sup>164</sup>

Whilst the few EGP candidates running in the 2000 poll all seem to have adhered to their party’s directive, this was hardly the case for the NWP. Within its ranks the official policy directives and actual campaigning reality diverged quite markedly. First of all, many of the candidates interviewed were not even aware of their party’s directives on the formation of cross-party alliances. Indeed, of those Wafdists interviewed, none actually thought that such alliances would be entirely prohibited by their party leadership. Accordingly, and as we have seen, cross-party alliances were forged among Wafdist candidates in both 1995 and 2000, none of which resulted in the actual dismissal of the candidates in question. Finally, even high ranking party officials – including the party’s current president - did not adhere to their own policy directives and engaged in such cross-party alliances.<sup>165</sup>

In contrast to the NWP and the EGP, the positions taken on this issue by both Tagammu and the MB were far more pragmatic, although sometimes rather diverse. Most high ranking Tagammu officials, for instance, acknowledged the necessity for their candidates to foster such district level alliances, particularly because these candidates were frequently campaigning without any running mates. At the same time, however, differences existed among them regarding the types of cross-party alliances deemed feasible. A most restrictive approach to such alliances was taken by Mohieddin and Rifaat Said who ruled out any cooperation with the governing NDP and the Islamist current (Dawoud & Nawawi, *Al-Ahram Weekly* 02 – 08/11/1995; Farag, *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 21 – 27/09/2000).<sup>166</sup> Both Rifaat Said and Abdel Razek also restricted the use of cross-party alliances to circumstances in which the party had nominated only one district candidate.<sup>167</sup> A more permissive approach was, by contrast, taken by Mohamed Said. In an interview conducted in November 2002 Said argued

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<sup>164</sup> Interview with Mohamed Awad (EGP).

<sup>165</sup> As we saw earlier, these included amongst others Yassin Serrageddin, the former president’s brother, Fouad Badrawy, a sitting MP, Ahmed Abu Ismail, former secretary-general of the party, and Mounir Abdel Nour, the current parliamentary leader of the NWP.

<sup>166</sup> As mentioned in chapter three, in 2004 Khaled Mohieddin stepped down as chairman of the party and Rifaat Said was elected as the new party leader.

<sup>167</sup> Interviews with Rifaat Said (Tagammu) & Hussein Abdel Razek (Tagammu).

that: ‘...the candidates can choose to cooperate with a Wafdist, a Nasserite or an independent, or even with the NDP. If you cooperate with the NDP candidate, the NDP candidate has to be less popular.’<sup>168</sup>

Among members of the outlawed MB a similarly permissive attitude seems to have prevailed. Both Mohamed Mursi, a sitting MP, and Gamal Heshmat, a former MP, acknowledged that such district level cooperation is crucial for candidates to succeed in the elections and that they are hence permitted. According to Heshmat, however, such alliances would only be allowed in those districts that have only one MB candidate. Wherever two MB candidates ran in the same constituency, no third-party cooperation at the expense of either one of the two candidates could take place.<sup>169</sup>

### 8.3 Concluding Remarks

This chapter tested whether the 1990 electoral reform had any impact on the nature of electoral cooperation that took place at the district level in between the 1980s and 1990s. In chapter four the nature of electoral cooperation had been identified as one of three domains of the election campaign that should vary with the type of electoral regime in place. I hereby assumed that list-based regimes in physically large multimember districts should facilitate within-party cooperation, whilst candidate based-regimes – such as the one used in Egypt today - should encourage the pursuit inter-party cooperation. Connecting the nature of electoral cooperation to patterns of party development, I also maintained that the presence of within-party cooperation should boost a party’s *visible representation* and *internal unity*, whilst the absence of such cooperation or even the pursuit of cross-party alliances should have the opposite effect.

As has become evident above, in longitudinal perspective we can indeed discern rather marked differences in the nature of electoral cooperation that took place at the district level during the two decades under observation. Under the two PR-based regimes of the 1980s, for instance, significant steps had been undertaken by the party candidates themselves to collectivise their electioneering efforts. In fact, probably for the first time in Egyptian electoral history, there was a collective element in the district level campaign itself. To recapitulate, across the board we encountered considerable cooperation in the organisation of common campaigning activities among the candidates of the various party lists. Also,

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<sup>168</sup> Interview with Mohamed Said (Tagammu).

<sup>169</sup> Interviews with Gamal Heshmat (MB) & Mohamed Mursi (MB).

wherever such cooperation took place, it usually did not only revolve around the collective activities of the entire party list, but also involved the campaigning activities pursued by the candidates themselves. Finally, we also encountered some collective action with regards to the pooling of financial resources. Taken together these various attempts at collective action undoubtedly enhanced the appearance of *unified parties* at the district level.

This latter observation becomes even more cogent in light of what happened in the subsequent decade after the shift to the candidate-based AM system in two-member constituencies. As we know, this system was expected to produce virtually no incentives for within-party cooperation at the district level. In line with this assumption we then saw that the campaigns of the 1990s had become far more individualised than those of the 1980s and virtually devoid of any meaningful within-party cooperation. Instead, on numerous occasions these campaigns were now characterised by forms of district level cooperation that arbitrarily cut across party and ideological lines, and that as such were not at all conducive to raising a party's *internal unity* and *visible representation*.

It is not difficult to see, of course, why such forms of inter-party cooperation were so damaging to these two dimensions of party development. In essence, they were damaging because they produced a scenario in which party candidates became actively involved in the promotion of representatives from rival parties, and this oftentimes even at the expense of their co-partisan competitors. Whether willingly or not, in so doing these party candidates hence destroyed any credence of *internal unity* at the district level and severely undermined the capacity of the parties themselves to enhance levels of *visible representation* during election times.

The differences thus detected in the nature of electoral cooperation are, finally, also confirmed by the personal accounts of those party representatives interviewed across all major parties. These accounts are again drawn from both the *Party Candidate & Deputy Survey* and those in-depth interviews conducted for this research. Within the survey, for instance, we come across marked differences in the responses given to the question whether or not party candidates cooperated with each other during the campaigns of the 1980s and 1990s. As mentioned previously, during the 1990s only eight of the thirty-one candidates interviewed actually engaged in such cooperation, while the remaining 74 percent did not do this. This was either because there was no second category co-partisan contender to cooperate with or because they engaged in some form of cross-party alliance. During the 1980s the picture was markedly different. Of the thirteen candidates interviewed across the major

opposition parties and who contested those elections, all asserted that they had cooperated with their co-partisan competitors.<sup>170</sup>

What is more, when asked more specifically about the role of the electoral system in promoting within-party cooperation, 91 percent of the respondents maintained that ‘under the party-list system constituency-level cooperation among candidates of the same party was far more important than under the candidate-based system.’ Only 25 percent of the respondents thought that such cooperation was equally important under both electoral regimes. Finally, none argued the reverse case, namely that within-party cooperation was more important under the candidate-based regime than under the party-list system.<sup>171</sup>

The findings presented above were also confirmed by the personal accounts given by those candidates interviewed more intensively on the subject. In retrospect, most of them found major differences in the election campaigns of the 1980s and 1990s. One of the principal differences remarked upon was the degree to which district level cooperation took place among party contenders. Overall, it was thought that the campaigns of 1984 and 1987 were far more team-spirited and cooperative than those of the 1990s. This is reflected in various comments made by both party leaders and candidates across the opposition. Ibrahim Abaza, NWP candidate in both 1987 and 1995, claimed, for instance, that ‘there is cooperation between the candidates under the list system with regards to the promotion of the party. There are also less financial burdens and efforts for individual candidates, than under the candidate-based system.’<sup>172</sup> In a similar vein Mustafa At-Taweel, candidate in 1984, 1987 and 2000 pointed out that ‘it is very difficult to be alone in the campaign and to pass by all the places, because the district is very large. It is better to have fellow candidates with you, so that you can pass by all the meetings together. Campaigning as a group is better and easier.’<sup>173</sup> Elaborating on the nature of within-party cooperation Awatif Wali from the NWP argued, when comparing the 1984 to the 2000 campaigns in her constituency:

‘...really we were very well organised. In the mornings we had meetings with people we knew in the district and then in the evenings we all went together, all that could come (...) we walked in the street and to public places. So I think it was very, very interesting, because you know, running elections as a group makes you feel that you are responsible for everybody. Nobody runs against another. For

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<sup>170</sup> Party Candidate & Deputy Survey, Appendix No. 3, Question 3.5, p. 303.

<sup>171</sup> Ibid., Question 3.9, p. 305.

<sup>172</sup> Ibid., Question 3.6, pp. 303-304.

<sup>173</sup> Ibid., pp. 303-304.



instance under this [current] system the worker and professional [candidates] are sometimes from the same party and they run against each other.’<sup>174</sup>

Amina Shafiq, Tagammu candidate in 1984 and 2000, explains that the difference in the two electoral periods lies in the ‘real efforts done by candidates’. She remarks in this regard that ‘...[the candidate-based system] depends on the personal effort of the candidate, whereas the list system demands a group effort.’<sup>175</sup>

The view that within-party cooperation was far more prevalent under the list than the subsequent candidate-based regime was also shared by leadership figures across the political divide. Both Abdel Nour and Al-Badawy from the NWP confirmed this position in their respective interviews. Asked whether the election campaigns differed between the 1980s and 1990s, Al-Badawy for instance, answered:

‘...yes of course. In the elections of 1984 and 1987 the promotion of the (party is shared). Even the campaigning of the candidates was done in a group and not as individuals. The same goes for the conferences. The candidates were together most of the time, because the people have to see them all (...). So, that is how the list system differed from the individual system.’<sup>176</sup>

Comparing the types of election campaigns to a sports game, Saad Abdel Nour asserts that:

‘...the candidate today is by himself and he is less strong than when he was (amongst) ten. I would like to compare it to a sport: if you play in a football game you are eleven. It is much easier for eleven to play than for one to play squash. Squash depends on your own merits, and the football game depends on that of the group.’<sup>177</sup>

Taken together with the empirics presented above, the survey results and quotations demonstrate that within-party cooperation was far more widespread in the 1980s than in the 1990s. They also indicate that in comparison to the 1990s, such within-party cooperation was positively remembered as helping considerably in the organisation and pursuit of the election campaigns of the 1980s.

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<sup>174</sup> Interview with Awatif Wali (NWP).

<sup>175</sup> Interview with Amina Shafiq (Tagammu).

<sup>176</sup> Interview with Sayed Al-Badawy (NWP).

<sup>177</sup> Interview with Saad Abdel Nour (NWP).

## Chapter Nine. Campaigning Devices

The extent to which candidates engage in party-conducive behaviour is not only manifest in the types of electoral cooperation they engage in at the district level. In fact, and as argued elsewhere, it is equally manifest in the types of campaigning materials party candidates use, the campaigning rhetoric they employ and the level of label promotion they display. This chapter explores whether, across the two electoral periods specified, we can detect any variance in these three domains of the election campaign and, if so, whether this variance can be related to the 1990 electoral reform.

To recapitulate, in chapter four it was theorised that the PR list-based regimes used during the 1980s created powerful incentives (counter-intuitively) for party candidates to promote their party's political platform and label. In so doing, these regimes were therefore expected to boost levels of *visible representation* at the district level. By the same token, it was also argued that the two-round AM system in use since 1990, facilitated the use of highly personalised campaigning devices and rhetoric and induced party candidates to pay minimal attention to party labels. Under these conditions then *visible representation* was expected to suffer greatly.

Section 9.1 of this chapter explores whether, and if so, how precisely the 1990 reform affected the types of campaigning materials used and the campaigning rhetoric employed by party candidates during the parliamentary election campaigns of the 1980s and 1990s. Section 9.2 then conducts the same analysis, this time with regards to levels of label promotion. Juxtaposing the two electoral periods observed, Section 9.3 summarises the principal findings of this chapter, discussing how the differences detected in these two dimensions of the election campaign affected levels *visible representation*.

### 9.1 Campaigning Materials and Rhetoric

As discussed in chapter four, under the two PR list-based regimes of the 1980s, three electoral incentives were in place that facilitated the pursuit of a more party-oriented election campaign, both in terms of the materials used and the campaigning rhetoric employed. First, and as already mentioned, voters in both 1984 and 1987 were asked to cast their ballots for party lists and not for individual candidates. In order to be elected it was hence important for candidates to identify themselves as members of a specific district list and consequentially to use materials that did not only relate to themselves but to the party to which they belonged.

Second, party candidates were now confronted with very large geographical districts in which they could not necessarily rely on their personal reputation in order to draw sufficient votes for the district list to win. Resorting to broader political issues with potential appeal to a wider electorate thus presented an attractive campaigning strategy to these candidates. Finally, because parties had to present district lists in virtually all constituencies of the country in order to stand any chance of passing the 8 percent threshold prescribed by the 1984 and 1987 electoral laws, there was a real chance for party headquarters to economise their campaigning expenses by producing identical materials for all districts. Moreover, this almost near to nationwide political presence also meant that they could spread these materials beyond a circumscribed number of locations to the entire nation.

As with the opportunities for within-party cooperation these incentives operated, however, within a socio-political environment that was hardly conducive to the pursuit of a programmatic-ideological campaign and greater label promotion. To begin with, one has to take into consideration the unstructured nature of the electorate and its bearing on the district campaigns of 1984 and 1987. Indeed, where abstract party affiliations remain largely absent among the wider electorate, it seems unreasonable to wage an election campaign that is entirely structured around the programmatic-ideological differences of the contesting parties. These differences will simply not matter in the electoral choice of most voters and will thus be of little strategic use to the candidates in their electioneering efforts. Second, in terms of legalities, one also ought to remember the multiplicity of campaigning restrictions that have been imposed by the authorities, and the ensuing host of issues deemed off-limits in Egyptian political discourse. Because this list of issues is so extensive and vaguely formulated, it is virtually impossible for the contesting parties and candidates to assess whether or not the topics they raise during the campaign are in violation of the campaigning regulations or not. In so stifling an environment, a campaign waged entirely around programmatic-ideologically issues can not therefore be expected.

#### *The Campaigning Materials and Rhetoric of 1984 & 1987*

With regards to the campaigning materials used during the elections of 1984 and 1987 several observations can be made. These observations are drawn from the personal accounts given by various party representatives and from selected newspaper coverage of the time. First, and in line with the dual campaigning strategies pursued, it seems that two types of campaigning materials were employed at the district level. On the one side one would find locally devised materials promoting individual candidates of the district list or, as in 1987, promoting the

individual candidates. On the other side one would also find, however, election materials that had been devised and distributed by party headquarters. In fact, in the absence of sufficient resources, this latter material often constituted the major or even the sole contribution given by the party leadership to their district lists. As previously mentioned, during the campaigns of 1984 and 1987 party headquarters rarely transferred any direct financial support to their local branches or district lists. What is more, according to various accounts, these centrally devised campaigning materials seemed to have constituted the most important and visible campaigning devices during the elections, particularly the party banners and leaflets. This was the case because it was very hard for (opposition) parties to organise any mass rallies under the restrictive regulatory framework in place (Krämer 1984: 370). Sha'aben from Tagammu explains for instance, that during the campaigns of the 1980s there were:

‘...posters of the party in all districts. Also, in the district you could find a poster of one individual candidate, someone important in that given area. Another candidate, famous in another area, also had his own poster, or there were no posters of individuals at all. But the most important thing was the poster for the party, because people vote for the party. It stated Tagammu, our symbol and it did not state the individual candidates.’<sup>178</sup>

Other members of Tagammu made similar comments and so did several representatives of both the NWP and the MB. In essence, they all asserted that the campaign featured both locally devised materials, which would propagate individual candidates, and the campaigning materials distributed by headquarters, which would focus in turn on the respective party and its programme.<sup>179</sup> The latter types of materials would usually be composed of cloth banners and posters, short election manifestos and pamphlets, stickers and various small gifts.<sup>180</sup> Across the party political divide, the cloth banners used would either state all the names of the district list, the party's name and its electoral symbol, calls to support a certain district list and party or a brief slogan capturing the main programmatic points of the party. Some of the banners would even contain explicit attacks on rival parties and their policies. The pamphlets distributed would in turn either be used to introduce a specific candidate to the electorate, give a brief outline of the central programmatic points and the historical legacy of the party or simply carry a portrait of the party leader (Krämer 1984: 370; Al-Gumhuriya, 12/05/1984;

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<sup>178</sup> Interview with Mohamed Abdel Aziz Sha'aben (Tagammu).

<sup>179</sup> Interviews with Essam Al-Arian (MB), Amina Shafiq (Tagammu) & Awatif Wali (NWP).

<sup>180</sup> These gifts would usually include plastic bags, pencils, calendars or school books and they would be distributed among the electorate. Also, most of these gifts would carry the name of a given candidate, that of the party and the party's electoral symbol (Al-Magid, Al-Ahram Al-Iqtasadi 13/06/1988).

Harb & Hilal 1986: 117, 119, 123, 215, 217; Darwish, Al-Ahram 09/03/1987; Al-Gumhuriya, 29/03/1987).

Most remarkable in the context of this research, however, is the fact that all parties seemed to have distributed their centrally devised campaigning materials in each of the constituencies they had placed a district list.<sup>181</sup> Voters during both these elections would hence be confronted with the same Tagammu, NWP, NDP or SLP materials across the entire nation from *Marsa Matruh* to *Aswan*. Essam Al-Arian from the Islamic Alliance explained that in 1987 ‘...the same programme [was] not only used for our constituency, but for the whole Alliance throughout the country.’<sup>182</sup> This point was also emphasised by Amina Shafiq from Tagammu, who asserted that in the 1980s:

‘...you [could] find the same slogans everywhere. It was the same slogan in all the districts. Now in 2000 I can go to them [party headquarters] and say ‘no I will not use the party slogan, I want mine’. And they would appreciate it. But in 1984 and 1987 (...) the same slogans used to be distributed everywhere.’<sup>183</sup>

The use of common campaigning materials across the entire nation was of course fundamentally new compared to previous elections, and certainly significant because in virtually all these constituencies the major parties were now physically present with their name, slogans and electoral symbol. Indeed, in none of the post-1990 elections did the materials distributed by the parties obtain such a prominent role during the election campaign, and never again would they reach such a nationwide audience.

Whether the widespread use of party materials also translated into a more vigorous programmatic-ideological debate at the district level is, by contrast, harder to assess. Indeed, it is very difficult to reconstruct the nature of the political debate that took place during these two parliamentary elections; and the evidence generated in this regard remains ambiguous. On the one side we come across various party officials and candidates who claim that party programmes and platforms played a much more prominent role in the electoral debates of the 1980s than in those of the 1990s. This assertion was reiterated across the party political divide. Abdel Aziz Sha’aben from Tagammu, for instance, claims with reference to 1984 and 1987 that: ‘...the focus of the campaign was on the programme of the party, on the party and on the party symbol (...). All candidates of Tagammu talked about the party itself, its political

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<sup>181</sup> Interviews with Essam Al-Arian (MB), Amina Shafiq (Tagammu), Mohamed Sherdy (NWP), Mohamed Abdel Aziz Sha’aben (Tagammu), Mohamed Said (Tagammu).

<sup>182</sup> Interview with Essam Al-Arian (MB).

<sup>183</sup> Interview with Amina Shafiq (Tagammu).

opinions and positions.’<sup>184</sup> This claim was also reiterated by Mounir Abdel Nour from the NWP who argues that:

‘The mere fact that the elections were [based on] party lists made the elections a confrontation between parties and not between individuals. And this pushed the parties to formulate a platform that was different from each other. In 1984 the platform of the Wafd [revolved around] major changes to the constitutions and electoral institutions, (...) the democratic process and militarism, freedom of the press, freedom of speech - you know the liberal idea.’<sup>185</sup>

This position was also articulated by Abu Tawila, another NWP member and candidate in 1987, who asserted that: ‘...the party and its candidates exposed a collective and coherent ideology’ during those elections.<sup>186</sup>

Similarly, both Hussain and Al-Shehabi, at the time members of the SLP, asserted that party programmes mattered more during the 1980s than during the 1990s. Hussain explains, for example, that ‘under the list system the central element of the campaign was the political and ideological programmes and aims [of the party]. When you run independently these elements of the campaign are reduced.’<sup>187</sup> This point was also made by Al-Shehabi, who remarks that:

‘...the election campaign was a party campaign. Voters voted for parties not for individual candidates. There were conferences with people and the candidates presented the programmes of their party and the people voted according to those programmes. The candidates presented the party programme and how it could be implemented. So competition centred on parties and not candidates. And the slogan of the Labour party in these elections was ‘Islam is the solution’. There was a big response to the slogan in the Egyptian street’<sup>188</sup>

The overall claim presented by these party representatives on the pre-eminence of party programmes during the 1980s have to be read, however, against evidence suggesting that these elections actually showed little programmatic-ideological fervour. The most that can be conceded in this regard is probably the fact that socio-religious divisions gained significant prominence during the 1984 and 1987 campaigns. According to Munoz these issues gained

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<sup>184</sup> Interview with Mohamed Abdel Aziz Sha’aben (Tagammu).

<sup>185</sup> Interview with Mounir Abdel Nour (NWP).

<sup>186</sup> See Party Candidate & Deputy Questionnaire, Appendix No. 3, Question 3.6, pp. 303-304.

<sup>187</sup> Ibid., pp. 303-304.

<sup>188</sup> Interview with Nagi Al-Shehabi (previously SLP/currently DGP).

importance due to the presence of the MB in both these campaigns and its demand to turn Sharia law into the principal source of Egyptian legislation, a proposition that was hotly contested at the time (Munoz 1992: 378, 381). Leaving the religious divisions aside, however, most commentators at the time portray a picture of the 1984 and 1987 campaigns that shows little or no indication that party programmes and positions actually mattered. As Munoz remarked with reference to the 1984 campaign:

‘In a country like Egypt, that for more than thirty years has had no multiparty system and where levels of a-politisation and clientelism are harmful factors, especially among the rural population, the vote depends more heavily on the popularity and personal sharm of the candidate than on his political orientation’ (Munoz 1986b: 168).<sup>189</sup>

Various indicators have been evoked to demonstrate that these two campaigns were in fact devoid of any programmatic-ideological debate. To begin with, it has been noted that these elections lacked any substantive party programmes around which both candidates and parties could have structured their electoral battle. In fact, with the exception of Tagammu, which devised its own electoral manifesto, none of the parties in the electoral race presented distinctive electoral programmes. Instead they all more or less relied on vaguely formulated programmes that featured little more than general and abstract slogans on a number of socio-political and economic issues. The NDP, for instance, did not even develop its own programme for the 1987 campaign, asking its candidates instead to base their campaigns solely on the achievements of the government and the upcoming five year plan. Both the NWP and the Islamic Alliance also lacked clearly structured programmes, with the former making recourse to its general party programme only. The Alliance in turn presented a programme that was widely labelled as politically vague and devoid of any substantive policy propositions. (Krämer 1984: 349; Munoz 1986: 403; Al-Ahali 11/03/1987; Al-Baluti, Sawt Al-Arab 05/04/1987).

The vagueness of these programmes was also manifest in the slogans that could be read on the party banners and posters. On the NDP banners, for instance, one could read such vague statements as ‘*Democracy, Development and Stability*’, ‘*For Stability and Economic Development*’ or simply ‘*Long Live Mubarak*’ (Krämer 1984: 363; Munoz 1992: 403). Similarly nebulous were those slogans presented by the NWP, the SLP in 1984 and the

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<sup>189</sup> The quote has been translated by the author. The original text reads as follows: ‘ya que en un país como Egipto, que no ha conocido un sistema pluripartidista desde hace mas de treinta anos y donde la apolisziacion y el clientelismo hacen estragos, especialmente entre la población rural, los factores de popularidad y simpatía rigen mas que la orientación política del candidato al que se vota’.

Islamic Alliance in 1987. The SLP's main banner in 1984, for instance, simply stated '*God is almighty, Long Live the People*' or '*The SLP is the Hope*' (Krämer 1984: 363, 367). The Alliance banners showed little greater programmatic sharpness either, stating for example '*Islam is the Solution*' or '*Mohamed is our Leader and the Quran our Constitution*' (Forstner 1988: 400). The NWP banners, as the programme itself, played heavily on the democratic credentials of the pre-revolutionary party and its historical legacy, brandishing such slogans as '*For Real Democracy Vote Wafd*', '*The Father is Wafdist, the Son is Wafdist, We are All Wafdists*' or the '*Wafd is the Fortress of Freedom*' (Harb & Hilal 1986: 119 – 120).

Finally, and in comparative perspective, it has been noted that these programmes were not only vague in content, but also devoid of any clear-cut programmatic and ideological differences. In fact, according to most observers at the time, more than anything else these programmes, and particularly those of the opposition, were similar in their political, social and economic demands (Middle East Times 26/05 – 02/06 1984).

So, how is one to explain this discrepancy in observations? To some extent it seems that both positions can claim some credibility. First, and most crucially, party political positions certainly mattered more during the 1980s than during the 1990s, simply because in the latter decade they ceased to play any noticeable role in the election campaign. In fact, during the 1980s the political discourse led by party dignitaries and candidates at various party rallies and seminars seems to have involved some recourse to programmatic issues and demands. Moreover, during these and other events the political attacks fired at rival parties usually revolved around their political record and programmes. The NDP for instance would attack the NWP on its pre-revolutionary record and Tagammu in turn the NDP on its perceived betrayal of the Nasserite principles after 1976 (Munoz 1984: 164-165). In this sense then, party programmes mattered and, more crucially, the parties as collective actors mattered as principal agents in the political discourse. These various recourses to programmatic issues have to be seen, however, in the larger context of the campaign, which at the district level seems to have remained highly localised. In fact, as in the elections of the late 1970s and those of the 1990s, the campaigning rhetoric used by party candidates continued to revolve mainly around local issues, the provision of constituency services and their personal credentials, rather than around their party's programme and principles.

The fact that the two PR list-based regimes failed to encourage candidates to engage in a broader programmatic discourse is probably best explained by the non-necessity to do so under unstructured conditions. In fact, even under list PR the candidates on the party list were not impeded in pursuing a personal reputation-seeking strategy in the parts of the constituency



they were particularly well-known. Nor were they as a collectivity impeded in doing so during the rallies at the district level, in which the individual candidates were able to refer to both programmatic and local issues. In other domains of the campaign the provisions of the PR regimes did, by contrast, encourage candidates to adapt their strategies towards a more collective and party-oriented campaign, particularly in those areas that directly affected the chances of winning sufficient votes at the district level. So, for instance, it was imperative for candidates to collectivise their campaigning activities, in the face of the large districts they had to campaign in and the few resources at their disposal. As will be demonstrated below they were also virtually forced to place greater emphasis on their party label (not the programme), simply because voters had to view the district list as a collective entity associated with a certain party label, which they then had to vote for at the ballot box.

### *The Campaigning Materials and Rhetoric of 1990, 1995 & 2000*

Did the campaigns of the 1990s differ then in both these aspects of the election campaign as would be anticipated with the change from list PR to a candidate-based regime? The answer must involve both a 'yes' and a 'no'; a 'yes' with regards to the campaigning materials used, yet a 'no' with regards to the campaigning rhetoric employed. With regards to the types of campaigning materials used we find that these changed quite markedly with the introduction of the candidate-based electoral regime. In fact, being highly conducive to the pursuit of political entrepreneurship, this new regime ceased to exert any significant pressure on the party candidates to make use of centrally devised campaigning materials. Instead it became far more important for candidates to devise and distribute materials that above all emphasised their personal reputation and their connectedness to the locality. This was crucial for various reasons. First, it was crucial because candidates were now directly elected rather than via a party list and second because they were confronted with an electorate that showed little interest in abstract party programmes and politics. Third, it was crucial for party candidates to devise localised campaigning materials because of the immense number of non-partisan candidates contesting the district races since 1990. These latter contenders, who constituted the overwhelming majority of candidates in most constituencies, virtually forced the political debate to the local level, a factor party candidates had to take into consideration when attempting to successfully compete for the voters' attention.

What we see then are election campaigns that were characterised by a personalisation of the campaigning materials used and a significant de-emphasis of the candidate's party connection. Whilst most parties continued to contribute banners and leaflets to the districts campaigns, it

seems that their numbers and particularly their importance declined sharply since 1990 (Farak 1990: 170; Abdel Nasser 1995: 215-216). In fact, wherever such banners appeared in the district, they usually no longer promoted the party as such but focused attention on the candidates running in a given constituency. For example, they would either ask the district electorate to vote for their district candidates or name the different societal sectors and groups that supported their election campaign.<sup>190</sup> What is more, given the limited campaigning resources available, it also seems that most parties were actually quite keen to have their candidates devise all the necessary campaigning materials, either in coordination with headquarters or entirely on their own. According to most party candidates interviewed for this research, this practice could be found across the entire party political spectrum, with candidates being encouraged or even left to devise their own materials.<sup>191</sup> This point was, for instance, made by Olfat Al-Araby from Ahrar who maintained that: '[she] didn't receive any support, financial, material or psychological from the party [she] belong[s] to.'<sup>192</sup> Similar points were made by Mohamed Koroum and Hamdin Sabahi from the ADNP and Mohamed Sherdy from the NWP. Referring to the 2000 poll Sherdy asserted that 'in the elections you depend on yourself and on your moves'<sup>193</sup>, whilst Koroum argued 'all election costs were covered by myself and it was very limited.'<sup>194</sup>

As a consequence, the streets were now littered with highly personalised billboards, cloth banners and posters, which had been devised by the candidates themselves and which often carried little more than their picture, name and electoral symbol.<sup>195</sup> In addition they would usually also contain short political slogans, name the qualities of the given candidate or a call to vote for this or that candidate (Longuesse 1995: 242). According to Farag, for example, the totality of slogans used in 1990 seemed to have '...preached the values of the individual candidates and not their programmes' (Farak: 1990: 170). This was also commented upon by Dina Ezzat, a political correspondent from Al-Ahram Weekly, who followed the 1995

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<sup>190</sup> In 1995, for instance, Tagammu devised two such general party banners, which combined several programmatic positions with a call to vote for their candidates. The first banner stated: 'Vote for the Tagammu Candidate – Change is achieved by the will of the masses - Against terrorism - For liberty and Human rights - Against normalisation and for a just and lasting peace - Against corruption and for development, democracy, social justice and the national union'. The second banner stated: 'Vote for the Tagammu Candidate – Change is achieved through the will of the masses - Against unemployment, high living costs and poverty - For genuinely free education and health care' (Ramses 1995: 194).

<sup>191</sup> Interviews Mustafa An-Nashirty (NWP), Fawzi Al-Samad (NWP), Mamdouh Nakhla (Tagammu), Amina Shafiq (Tagammu), Mohamed Tulaima (Tagammu) & Saad Zawiris (Tagammu). See also Party Candidate & Deputy Questionnaire, Appendix No. 3; Question 3.17, pp. 311-312.

<sup>192</sup> Ibid., pp. 311-312.

<sup>193</sup> Interview with Mohamed Sherdy (NWP).

<sup>194</sup> Interview with Mohamed Koroum (ADNP).

<sup>195</sup> Interviews with Mustafa An-Nashirty (NWP), Mohamed Sherdy (NWP), Asmat Al-Merghany (NDP-independent), Mamdouh Nakhla (Tagammu), Amina Shafiq (Tagammu), Mohamed Tulaima (Tagammu) & Saad Zawiris (Tagammu).

parliamentary poll, and who maintains that in 1995 most banners and posters simply asked voters to cast their ballots for ‘this or that candidate’. Voters would hence typically read such slogans as ‘Support the Honest and Articulate Candidate’, ‘Vote for the man who fears God alone’ ‘Vote for Getting the Right Man to the Right Place’ or ‘The Teachers of the Constituency of Manyala support Momahed Dumzri’ (Ezzat, Al-Ahram Weekly, 16 – 22/11/1995; Ramses 1995: 191).

Illustration 9.1: Examples of Candidate Posters



Campaigning poster devised by Dr. Mohamed Gamal Heshmat from the MB for the 1995 *Majlis al-Shaab* elections in the constituency of Damanhour – Gharbiya.

Content: The top of the poster carries the slogan of the MB ‘Islam is the Solution’.

The centre of the poster carries a picture of the candidate. On the right the professional category of the candidate is indicated. The left side of the picture carries the electoral symbol of the candidate.

Below the picture is the candidate’s name. Text: ‘The Islamic Elections in the Elections to the *Majlis al-Shaab* of 1995. Renaissance – Consultation – Creation’

Picture taken by author.



Wall carrying posters by different candidates for the Local Council and Regional elections of 2002.

Poster to the Left: Picture of Candidate, his electoral symbol, ballot number and name: Ahmed Mohamed Ahmed Sultan. Text: ‘NDP Candidate for the Regional Council - Markas Al Wahaat Al Buhariya – Giza (Regional Council Elections 2002)

Poster in the Centre: Qur’anic Verses at the top. Electoral Statement of candidate, followed by electoral symbol, ballot number and the name of the candidate: Salah Ab Al-Rusul Mohamed - Worker. (2002 Local Council elections in Buhariya - Giza)

Poster to the Right: Picture of Candidate, his ballot number and his name: Slah Khalifa Saleh. Text: ‘Your candidate for the Regional Council’. (2002 Regional Council elections Buhariya – Giza)

Picture taken by author.

In addition to these placards and posters most party candidates also devised their own localised programmes, newsletters, stickers and other materials, which would carry information about their person, the particular local problems and issues facing the

constituency and how they intended to solve them. Increasingly these leaflets would be used for direct and personal attacks on political opponents. As Auda observes:

‘...the parliamentary elections of 2000 witness in almost all districts an unprecedented wave of leaflets of slanderous nature, in which candidates exchanged personal accusations against each other. While the slanderous leaflets increased, there was a marked decrease in the political leaflets that presented the political and social platforms of the candidate’ (Auda et al. 2001: 54).

The predominance of highly individualised campaigning materials in the elections of 1990, 1995 and 2000 is also emphasised in the numerous interviews conducted for this research. Here again most of the respondents asserted that they devised their own posters, leaflets and other campaigning materials, and this often without any headquarter support. As far as can be discerned, two reasons explain this course of action. To begin with, party candidates simply could not hope to obtain any meaningful financial or material support from party headquarters in light of the latter’s often dire financial situation. Second, most of the candidates were also plainly aware that broader party materials were of little use in the election campaign and that instead they would have to devise materials which focused on the local conditions and their capacity to resolve them.

Various examples can be given where candidates employed such campaigning devices. Within the ranks of the NWP, for instance, virtually all the candidates interviewed had developed their own materials. Cases in point are the materials used by Mohamed Sherdy, Mustafa An-Nashirty and Fawzi Samad. Both Sherdy and An-Nashirty employed posters in their district campaigns that would above all emphasise their personal reputation and connection to the locality in which they were running. Sherdy sought to establish this connection by skillfully exploiting his family’s reputation in *Port Said*. This he sought to achieve with posters depicting himself and his famous father Mustafa Sherdy, who had been the founder of Al-Wafd newspaper. Other Wafdist, including An-Nashirty and Fawzi Samad, also devised their own campaigning leaflets or newspapers, which stated their personal programmes for the constituency. Samad’s leaflet, which is depicted below contained information on the candidate and a detailed description of his programme.



Illustration 9.2: Example of Candidate Leaflets & Fliers



Campaigning flier distributed by NWP Candidate Fawzi Al-Samad during the 2000 *Majlis al-Shaab* elections in the constituency of Helwan 25 – Cairo.

Right Side: the candidate's name, his picture, electoral symbol and ballot number. It also states his membership in the NWP, the district he is running in and the reasons why people should vote for him.

Left Side: the detailed program of the candidate (not that of the NWP).

Picture taken by author.

The materials used by SLP, Ahrar and Tagammu candidates were also highly personalised. Here again most of the candidates interviewed asserted that they relied primarily on their own campaigning materials, rather than on those devised by party headquarters. This applied in fact as much to the parties' 'rank-and-file' candidates as to their local notables. During the 1995 and 2000 campaigns, for instance, both Ragab Hemeida from Ahrar and Ibrahim Shukri from the SLP prepared campaigning materials that made virtually no reference to the parties they were representing.<sup>196</sup> One ought to remember in this context that Hemeida was probably one of the most prolific members of Ahrar at the time and in 1995 its sole representative in the *Majlis al-Shaab*. Shoukri in turn has been the figurehead and leader of the SLP since its creation in 1978. Yet despite his prominence within Ahrar, Hemeida's programme and posters made no mention of the party itself. According to Abou Al-Maged from Al-Ahram Weekly his re-election posters simply stated '*We Love you Ragab*', whilst his election manifesto had nothing in common with the party's overall political platform (Abou Al-Maged, Al-Ahram Weekly, 12 – 18/10/2000).<sup>197</sup> Shoukri's election campaign was similarly personalised. Like Hemeida in 2000, Shoukri also seems to have relied primarily on his own reputation and that of his family's rather than on his political party. Indicative of this are the campaigning leaflets he devised during the 1995 campaign, which showed a picture of the SLP leader sitting in-between both Sadat and Mubarak, hence in between the biggest rivals of his own party (Al-Ahram Weekly, 30/11 – 06/12/1995). As with their leader most of the other SLP candidates running in 1995 and 2000 also seemed to have used highly personalised campaigning materials. This was emphasised by Nagi Al-Shehabi, who until 2000 was

<sup>196</sup> In late 2004 Heimda left Ahrar to join the newly found FP (Al-Nahas, Al-Ahram Weekly, 11 – 17/11/2004).

<sup>197</sup> Other Ahrar candidates pursued similar strategies. Hoda Afifi, for instance, claimed that she relied solely on her own campaigning materials. Party materials, she argued, were virtually absent from her campaign. See interview with Hoda Afifi (Ahrar).

responsible for electoral affairs within the SLP and who asserted that the materials used during the past campaigns essentially centred around the history of the candidate, his or her achievements and personal programme rather than around the party and its platform.<sup>198</sup>

Within the ranks of Tagammu, finally, a similar picture prevailed. During the 1995 and 2000 campaigns, for instance, the Tagammu leader himself focused his entire election campaign on his personality rather than on the fact that he was leading one of the major opposition forces. Reflecting this emphasis on his personality were the various campaigning materials he used, including the posters and leaflets that were distributed. In 1995 his posters simply stated '*Khaled Mohieddin, Leader of the Opposition*' or '*For Egypt's Sake: vote Khaled Mohieddin*' (Al-Ahram Weekly, 30/11 – 06/12/1995). His handouts in turn featured a picture of the candidate and the slogan '*Hero of the Revolution of 23<sup>rd</sup> of July*', yet they did not carry any reference to his party (Saad, Al-Ahram Weekly, 09 – 15/11/2000).

Most ordinary 'rank-and-file' candidates pursued the same strategy, using their own local programmes and posters. Commenting on the diversity of materials used within Tagammu, Mohamed Tulaima explains that:

'...[the] slogans, symbols and posters differed from one another. The type of programme depends on the type of constituency; e.g countryside or city. I for example have a rural constituency and Amina [Shafiq] an urban constituency, and [so] we had different programmes.'<sup>199</sup>

In line with Tulaima's observation most of the other Tagammu candidates also maintained that they devised their own materials. Abdallah Abu Al-Fatah, Abdel Aziz Sha'aben, Saad Zawiris and Attiya Al-Safari all asserted that they produced their own programmes and slogans for the district races of the 1990s and that these materials, rather than those provided by the party, constituted their principal campaigning devices.<sup>200</sup>

The fact that so many members of Tagammu, including its leader, were forced to rely almost entirely on personally-devised campaigning materials, demonstrates most strikingly the force of personalism in Egyptian electoral politics during the 1990s. This is particularly so if we accept the commonly held proposition that members of leftist parties are more ideologically committed than those on the right. As we have seen, even in the Egyptian case the candidates

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<sup>198</sup> Interview with Nagi Al-Shehabi (previously SLP/currently DGP).

<sup>199</sup> Interview with Mohamed Tulaima (Tagammu).

<sup>200</sup> Interviews with Mamdouh Nakhla (Tagammu), Mohamed Abdel Aziz Sha'aben (Tagammu), Mohamed Tulaima (Tagammu) & Saad Zawiris (Tagammu).

of the left down-played their party platforms and focused on local issues and their personalities instead. This fact was also re-iterated by Hussain Abdel Razek in an interview with Al-Ahram Weekly prior to the 2000 poll. In this interview Abdel Razek maintained that Tagammu was the only party that had actually developed its own election manifesto for the election. By the same token he acknowledged, however, that this platform was certainly not a viable basis for the 'success or failure' of its candidates. As he remarks:

'The election process is still very much governed by traditional factors, such as patronage and the candidate's potential to deliver services to his constituents, in addition to another very important factor - money. The political factor is very weak' (in Farag, Al-Ahram Weekly, 21 – 27/09/2000).

Continuing along these lines Abdel Razek admitted that many Tagammu candidates had actually told the party leadership that it was futile to devise a comprehensive programme and that they would probably not make use of it, simply because ordinary voters would show no interest in it (Farag, Al-Ahram Weekly, 21 – 27/09/2000).

The predominance of highly personalised campaigning materials in the district races of 1990, 1995 and 2000, and the corresponding unimportance of party materials, is finally also evident in the *Party Candidate & Deputy Survey*. In the survey party candidates had been asked to rank-order the types of campaigning devices they employed during the district campaigns of the 1990s. Of the thirty-three respondents who completed the question only twelve, that is only approximately 37 percent, thought that the distribution of party manifestos/leaflets and newspapers constituted crucial elements of their campaigns. Moreover, even fewer candidates thought that the posting of party banners carried any significance. In fact, of those interviewed only eight respondents thought that this was the case. A similar picture also transpires from another question that was put to the candidates which asked them to rank-order the types of issues to which they wanted voters to pay attention. Here again, of the thirty-three respondents who answered the question, only six (18 percent) thought that the party's electoral manifesto was important.

In sum then, the diversity and personalisation of the campaigning materials used during the 1990s created a highly heterogeneous campaigning environment in which the prominence that parties had to some degree attained in the 1980s completely evaporated in a sea of banners and placards that were solely geared to promote the individual candidate.

In contrast to the differences observed in the campaigning materials used it is not easy to detect, however, any significant difference in the nature of the political debate that took place at the district level during the 1980s and 1990s. As already mentioned, most political observers thought that the campaigning rhetoric used during the 1984 and 1987 elections was overall devoid of any ideological fervour, programmatic clarity and debates of national-level issues. Instead these campaigns were found to revolve primarily around local issues, the provision of constituency services and the personal credentials of those candidates on the district list.

When it comes to the campaigning rhetoric employed during the 1990s, little changes can be observed in the emphasis on local as opposed to party programmatic issues. In fact, given that under the individual candidacy system candidates depended heavily on their personal reputation and local connections, there were virtually no incentives for candidates to engage in a programmatically-oriented debate. Instead candidates seemed to have structured their campaigns exclusively around the local problems and issues facing their constituencies, the capacity to deliver goods and services to the constituents and on their personal and professional credentials. To this one must add the fact that party candidates were now outnumbered by a wide margin by independent candidates, whose campaigns were solely structured around a highly localised agenda. Under these conditions it became of course even less appealing for party candidates to engage in an electoral battle which against the nature of the district debate, sought to promote the party programme and platform. This point was succinctly made by Auda who claims that the individual candidate system constituted:

‘...a blow to political parties, because the candidates of the parties themselves no longer needed the political power of their parties, nor to be placed in a list with other candidates on the basis of political programmes. Individual tendency began to flourish. Candidates disregarded political programmes, focussing on offering direct services to voters. They began to depend on their personal abilities and skills, stressing personal and family ties and creating a network of mutual interests, even allying themselves with candidates of other parties against candidates of their own party (Auda 2000: 52-53).

In other words then, during the 1990s party candidates essentially promoted themselves and not their party programmes.



## 9.2 Party Labels

Levels of label promotion constitute the last domain of the election campaign that were expected to shed light on potential variance in *visible representation* at the electoral level. To recapitulate, label promotion has been defined as the extent to which party candidates are actively promoting the party label, as opposed to or at least over and above their personality. It has been introduced as one of the domains of the election campaign that captures variance in levels of *visible representation* during election times. Little effort on the part of party candidates to promote the party label have thus been linked to low levels of *visible representation*, and vice versa.

In the Egyptian case, the empirical evidence gathered suggests that the individual and collective attempts undertaken by candidates to advance their party label were far more pronounced during the campaigns of 1984 and 1987 than during any of the subsequent parliamentary campaigns. A first indication of this variance is provided in the *Party Candidate & Deputy Survey*. When asked, for instance, whether under the list-PR regime the list position affected the type of vote-seeking strategy pursued, 50 percent of the respondents asserted that they sought to promote the party label over their personal reputation, despite the top positions they held. This is a significant observation, given the knowledge that parties in the 1980s usually placed local heavyweights at the top of their lists, who could heavily draw on their personal reputation within the constituency.<sup>201</sup> Even more telling in this regard are the differences unearthed in the rank-order of campaigning devices used during the 1980s and 1990s. When asked what types of campaigning devices candidates used to attract the voters' attention, label promotion ranked highest for the campaigns of 1984 and 1987, but only fourth for the 1990, 1995 and 2000 elections. During the latter elections, personalised forms of campaigning topped the list, with emphasis placed on the political achievements of the candidates and their personal skills and reputation.<sup>202</sup>

The observed variance in levels of label promotion between the two electoral decades to some extent has been perpetuated by changes in two particular electoral system variables, namely in the *vote entities* used and the electoral symbols marked on the ballot. As previously mentioned, vote entities define the type of political actor or actors for which a voter is entitled to cast his or her ballot. These actors can be political parties, individual candidates or a mixture of the two, depending on the type of electoral system in place. Electoral symbols in

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<sup>201</sup> Of the remaining respondents 25 percent asserted that their list position did not affect the campaigning strategies pursued and 16 percent claimed that they sought to promote the heads of the party list due to their lower list position. See *Party Candidate & Deputy Survey*, Appendix No. 3, Question 3.7, p. 304.

<sup>202</sup> *Ibid.*, Question 3.3, pp. 300-301.

turn are abstract labels commonly used to denote a certain vote entity on the ballot in countries where large sections of the population cannot read or write. Here such symbols are added to the ballot paper – alongside the names of the candidates or political parties – so that illiterate voters can properly identify the different political contenders in the field and cast their ballot accordingly.

In Egypt electoral symbols have been used for all five parliamentary elections since 1984. As in many other developing countries, the Egyptian government has made use of these symbols in order to enable the country's illiterate voters to participate in the electoral process. As mentioned in chapter two, illiteracy levels still remain relatively high among the adult population in Egypt. The use of electoral symbols itself for the election campaigns of 1984, 1987, 1990, 1995 and 2000 was regulated by the respective Electoral Laws and their supplementary decrees and placed under the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior. Prior to each of the past five parliamentary polls the Ministry's Election Department organised and administered the distribution of these symbols to the relevant political actors. On Election Day, the ballot papers displayed these symbols alongside the parties' or candidates' name on the ballot paper.

In chapter four it was assumed that the vote entity and the electoral symbol together shape the extent to which party candidates are both willing and able to actively advance their party label during the election campaign, and thus positively affect levels of *visible representation*. To recapitulate, it was expected that party candidates should be more inclined to promote the party label wherever the voters' choice is structured around party lists rather than individual candidates. By contrast, party candidates should see little value in pursuing a label vote in those circumstances where voters cast their ballot for individual candidates. The capacity for party candidates to actually promote the party label should in turn be boosted wherever a single electoral symbol is used for all competing candidates across all constituencies. In these cases the party candidates can use their allocated electoral symbol to promote themselves and their party platforms, and to differentiate themselves from those candidates running under a different party and programmatic outlook. Where these electoral symbols are marked on the ballot, they moreover constitute the most powerful electioneering device available to influence the electoral choice of illiterate voters.

Finally, it was also theorised that electoral symbols not only affect the election campaign at the district level, but also the capacity of the central party leadership to increase levels of label recognition at the national level, at least during the campaign itself. Indeed, wherever candidates of the same party carry identical electoral symbols nationwide, parties are much

better positioned to promote label recognition than under circumstances where such labels are randomly dispersed amongst their candidates at the district level. In the first instance, political parties are able to draw an immediate associational linkage between themselves, their candidates and their programmes during the election campaign. Moreover, wherever these electoral symbols are retained over consecutive elections, the chances are high that voters will eventually come to relate specific symbols to specific parties, even under unstructured conditions. This in turn greatly enhances the overall visibility parties enjoy in the electoral arena. In the second instance, namely wherever electoral symbols are dispersed among party representatives, parties cannot foster any visible linkage between themselves, their candidates and their programmes. If the candidates themselves do not actively seek to promote the party, its programme and label, then a large section of the voting population will simply not know what party they are voting for and possibly even that the party exists in the first place.

#### *The Use of Electoral Symbols in 1984 & 1987*

When in 1983 the Egyptian government decided to replace the candidate-based electoral system with closed-list PR, it also changed the mode by which electoral symbols were distributed. Instead of distributing these symbols to individual candidates, the Ministry of Interior now allocated them nationally to the competing political parties. According to the new mode of allocation, each legalised party was asked to choose one electoral symbol among an official list of twenty symbols published by the Ministry. Once selected the parties would carry their symbol in all the districts in which they were placing lists of candidates (Munoz 1986b: 164).

As previously mentioned, the four political parties that contested the 1984 parliamentary elections were the ruling NDP, the newly legalised NWP in alliance with the MB, the SLP, Ahrar and Tagammu. For the election campaign itself each of these parties selected one electoral symbol, which was to be placed on the ballot paper alongside the list of candidate names in each district. The NDP obtained the *Crescent*, the NWP-Allinace the *Palm Tree*, the SLP the *Star*, Ahrar the *Key* and Tagammu the *Watch* (Munoz 1992: 376-377).

Three years later, with the introduction of the mixed electoral regime in 1986, the distribution of electoral symbols was altered slightly so as to accommodate the newly introduced candidate-based tier. The mode of distribution remained the same for the list-PR-tier, which still accounted for 400 out of the 448 seats. For this tier the electoral symbols were again assigned collectively to the parties at the national level. What is more, the Ministry of Interior

decided to re-allocate the same symbols to those parties that had already participated in the 1984 elections. The NDP hence again ran under the banner of the *Crescent*, the NWP under that of the *Palm Tree*, and so forth (Al-Gumhuriya, 21/02/1987). The distribution of electoral symbols across both parliamentary elections for the PR-tier is listed in table 9.1.

*Table 9.1 Distribution of Electoral Symbols by Party / Party Alliance in 1984 & 1987*

Party	Party List Symbols	
	1984	1987
Ahrar	Key	-
NDP	Crescent	Crescent
NWP - Alliance	Palm Tree	-
NWP		Palm Tree
SLP	Star	-
SLP - Alliance	-	Star
Tagammu	Watch	Watch
UP <sup>1</sup>	-	Hand

<sup>1</sup>The Umma Party boycotted the parliamentary elections of 1984.

Sources: Munoz, Gema M. 1986. "Las Elecciones Legislativas del 27 de Mayo de 1984 y la Apertura Democrática Egipcia." *Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas* 35. p. 164. Al-Gumhuriya, 'The Fish, the Camel, the Glasses and Hammer in the Elections', 21/02/1987.

However, in contrast to the PR-tier no uniform distribution of electoral symbols was employed for the newly introduced candidate-based tier. For this tier the Ministry of Interior devised additional electoral symbols, which were to be distributed on a 'first-come first-serve' basis to those candidates running for one of the forty-eight individual seats. This mode of distribution applied to both party and independent candidates, which meant that party candidates would not obtain the same symbols as their running mates on the district list (Al-Gumhuriya, 21/02/1987).<sup>203</sup>

With the exception of the forty-eight individual candidacies introduced in 1987, parties thus retained their electoral symbols for two consecutive parliamentary elections. During these campaigns party headquarters and the candidates themselves made vivid use of their respective electoral symbols, being aware that these symbols constituted one of the most potent means to mobilise a largely illiterate and unstructured electorate. Across the board all major parties placed their electoral symbols on virtually all of the campaigning materials they distributed at the district level (Krämer 1984: 370; Harb & Hilal 1986: 119, 166, 172, 176). They could be found, for instance, on party banners, next to a party's slogans and list of candidates, on electoral pamphlets and on the placards used during electoral processions. They were also added to the various campaigning goodies distributed in the streets by the party candidates themselves or their staff, such as for example on bags, prayer calendars and

<sup>203</sup> See article five of Electoral Law No. 188/86.

school books (Al-Magid, Al-Ahram al-Iqtasadi, 13/06/1988). In 1984 some members of the Tagammu campaigning team even wore t-shirts that carried the *Watch* and pictures of both Mohieddin and Abdel Nasser (Harb & Hilal 1986: 167). Finally, these symbols could also be found on the additional fliers, pamphlets and stickers distributed by the candidates themselves.

Electoral symbols were, however, not only placed on the various campaigning materials, but were also frequently verbally promoted at numerous campaigning events. Al-Arian from the Islamic Alliance asserts in this regard that its candidates used a number of proverbs that directly referred to the Alliance symbol of the *Star*. These proverbs were usually chanted during party processions, at rallies and seminars.<sup>204</sup> According to Sha'aben from Tagammu the same method was used during various campaigning events by his party in order to inform voters which party to vote for at the ballot box.<sup>205</sup>

In sum then, a vast array of both visual and verbal markers were employed in order to promote the respective electoral symbols and with it the parties they were representing. When adding to this observation the fact that all major political parties at the time were physically present in nearly all forty-eight constituencies, it becomes apparent how widely exposed voters across the nation were to these symbols and thus how potentially beneficial their use was to enhance levels of *visible representation*.<sup>206</sup>

That the widespread use of common electoral symbols indeed facilitated greater *visible representation*, as predicted, was also confirmed by those party representatives interviewed in the framework of this research. Both Said and Abel Razek from Tagammu claimed, for instance, that the appearance of the *Watch* on virtually all their election materials and across most districts of the country helped party headquarters to promote their political agenda. As predicted, they moreover asserted that the common symbol also encouraged Tagammu candidates to promote their party label during the election campaign.<sup>207</sup> A similar line of reasoning was presented by Al-Badawy from the NWP, who argued:

‘...the central [campaigning] materials that we delivered to the governorates – it was a great amount of material - was speaking about the Wafd. Our newspaper was daily speaking about the Wafd party. Our symbol was a [palm] tree. All of our candidates were speaking about the Wafd and the history of the Wafd and the future of the Wafd in their conferences, their meetings. This happened only

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<sup>204</sup> Interview with Essam Al-Arian (MB).

<sup>205</sup> Interview with Mohamed Abdel Aziz Sha'aben (Tagammu).

<sup>206</sup> For the distribution of party lists by district in 1984 and 1987 refer back to table 7.1.

<sup>207</sup> Interviews with Rifaat Said (Tagammu) & Hussain Abdel Razek (Tagammu).

during the elections of 1984 and 1987. But it was very different in the elections of 1995 and 2000, (when the campaign) took the personal and not the party shape.<sup>208</sup>

The assertion that electoral symbols mattered in promoting party visibility was additionally confirmed by those candidates who took part in the *Party Candidate & Deputy Survey* and who had contested the 1984 and 1987 elections. Here again a vast majority of candidates confirmed that the use of such symbols at the national level ‘facilitated greater party recognition among the electorate’ and ‘helped candidates promote their common political platform’.<sup>209</sup> By contrast, far fewer candidates thought that these symbols also encouraged greater within-party cooperation, both within and across constituencies. Finally, none of the candidates interviewed thought that the electoral symbol did not exert any significant affect on the election campaigns of 1984 and 1987.<sup>210</sup>

#### *The Use of Electoral Symbols in 1990, 1995 & 2000*

The situation changed rather dramatically in 1990. Indeed, when in 1990 the Egyptian government reverted back to the two-round AM system, the capability of party candidates to foster label recognition by means of a common electoral symbol was no longer available. This was the case because the new electoral regime altered the hitherto used mechanism by which the distribution of electoral symbols had been organised. Instead of ascribing a single symbol to all candidates of the same party, as had been the case in the 1980s, these were now given directly to individual candidates by the local registration authorities under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior. Officially these authorities possessed over a list of 100 electoral symbols, which they would allocate on a ‘first-come-first-serve’ basis to the individual candidates at the district level (Ezzat, *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 16 – 22/11/1995).<sup>211</sup>

In practice this new mechanism of distributing electoral symbols carried a number of implications that severely hampered any attempts to improve label recognition and visibility among a largely illiterate electorate. First of all, because each electoral symbol was accorded only once at the district level, it became legally impossible for candidates of the same party and running in the same constituency to share a common symbol. Wherever a party had placed two candidates in a district, these would hence automatically campaign under two

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<sup>208</sup> Interview with Sayed Al-Badawi (NWP).

<sup>209</sup> See *Party Candidate & Deputy Survey*, Appendix No. 3, Question 3.14, p. 308.

<sup>210</sup> *Ibid.*, Question 3.8, p. 307.

<sup>211</sup> See article seven of the People’s Assembly Law No. 38/1972.

different symbols. Furthermore, there was no longer any guarantee that members of the same party would at least be accorded the same two electoral symbols nationwide, given that these were now distributed according to the ‘first-come-first-serve’ principle at the local level. In fact, since 1990 party candidates have been forced to campaign under vastly different symbols both across constituencies and consecutive elections. Examples of this within-party diversity in the distribution of electoral symbols for the elections of 1990, 1995 and 2000 are provided in table 9.2.

*Table 9.2 Types of Electoral Symbols by Opposition Party & Elections*

Candidate	Party	Label			
		1987	1990	1995	2000
Hoda Afifi	Ahrar	-	-	-	Telephone
Hamdin Sabahi	ADNP	-	-	Bicycle	Bicycle
Mounir Riz’allah	Green	-	-	-	Sun
Mohamed Hassanein	Ind. / NWP	Horse	-	-	Flag
Fawzi Samad	Ind. / NWP			Pistol	n.a.
Abu Ela Maadi	MB	-	-	-	Fish
Gamal Heshmat	MB	-	-	Flower	Lantern
Abdel Fatah Risq	MB	-	-	Spectacles	Umbrella
Ma’amoun Hodeibi	MB	-	-	Sword	-
Mohamed Abdel Ghani	MB	-	-	-	Pistol
Mohamed Mursi	MB	-	-	?	Hand
Mounir Abdel Nour	NWP	-	-	Flower	Palm Tree
Mustafa Al-Tawil	NWP	Lantern	-	-	Palm Tree
Fouad Badrawy	NWP	-	-	Fish	Palm Tree
Mohamed Sherdy	NWP	-	-	-	Palm Tree
Awatif Wali	NWP	-	-	-	Key
Adel Hussain	SLP	-	-	Pistol	n.a.
Saad Zawirus	Tagammu	-	--	Lamp	Pistol
Mamdouh Nakhla	Tagammu	-	-	Star	Star
Khaled Mohieddin	Tagammu	n.a	n.a	Boat	n.a.
Abdel Mohi Abu Tawila	Tagammu	-	-	-	Watch

Source: Party Candidate & Deputy Survey & Author Interviews.

The consequences of the newly introduced distribution mechanism were felt by the party candidates themselves, but probably even more so by party headquarters. Indeed, the sheer fact that party candidates now carried different electoral symbols no longer made it possible for party headquarters to foster any immediate associational linkage between themselves and their representatives in the electoral field. By the same token they were also no longer capable of waging a nationwide election campaign that could make use of a common electoral symbol as a means to identify themselves, their candidates and programmes. In essence, after the 1990 electoral regime change, parties lost one of the most potent tools available to promote greater label recognition among large sectors of the Egyptian electorate.

The dispersion of electoral symbols also adversely affected the party candidates themselves, although less dramatically than it did the party leadership. To begin with, because their entire campaign no longer depended on promoting any associational linkage with a certain party list, it did not affect the candidates so significantly. Nevertheless, two negative effects can be discerned. First, because party candidates were no longer able to choose their electoral symbol, there was no guarantee that they would be able to fall back on a certain degree of label recognition that had developed throughout the 1980s. This fact was particularly emphasised by Wafdist candidates, who maintained that over the past decade many voters had come to associate the *Palm Tree* with the NWP, but that according to the new distribution system they were now deprived of retaining this direct associational linkage.<sup>212</sup>

Another problem directly affecting the party candidates and their campaigns concerned the connotations many of the 100 electoral symbols carried among the electorate. Whilst some of these symbols were thought to carry positive connotations, others again were seen as having negative meanings. In Egyptian society for instance, the *Crescent*, *Camel*, and to some extent also the *Palm Tree*, have all come to carry positive connotations. The first two of these symbols are usually associated with the Arab Islamic tradition of society and more specifically with the ruling NDP, while the latter symbol has come to be associated with the historical legacy of the NWP and pre-revolutionary Egypt. Symbols carrying negative connotations are the *Sword* and *Pistol*, which are broadly associated with political violence and militancy (Ezzat, Al-Ahram Weekly, 16 – 22/11/1995). Other symbols again are simply perceived as ridiculous, such as the *Fish*, *Tea Pot* or the *Bucket*. Finally, there are also a number of symbols that are easily confused with each other, such as the *Oil Lamp*, the *Lantern* and the *Light Bulb*. Other Symbols are difficult to memorise because they do not carry any specific connotations, such as for instance the *Spectacles*, the *Flower*, the *Ladder*, the *Bicycle* or the *Umbrella*.

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<sup>212</sup> Interview with Mohamed Sherdy (NWP). See also Party Candidate & Deputy Survey, Appendix No. 3, Question 3.14, p. 308.



Illustration 9.3: Examples of Electoral Symbols & their Use



Pamphlet used by Mustafa Abd Al-Ghaffar for the 2000 *Majlis al-Shaab* elections in the constituency of Helwan 25 – Cairo.

**Content:** Text: 'The Voice of the Workers of Helwan'. Next to the candidate's picture, the pamphlet also contains his name, electoral symbol, the constituency and his professional category.

Picture taken by author



Campaigning poster of Khairi Badawy Kilany for the 2002 Regional Council elections.

**Content:** Next to the picture of the candidate, the poster contains his ballot number and electoral symbol, his name and the date of the poll.

Picture taken by author



Picture taken by supporter of Mustafa Abd Al-Ghaffar of his 2000 *Majlis al-Shaab* campaign in the constituency of Helwan 25 – Giza.

**Content:** Picture depicts crowd of supporters upholding the electoral symbol of the candidate, the fish.

Precise date, time and location of picture are unknown.

The symbolic importance of and the different values attached to these electoral symbols became apparent in their 'de-facto' distribution during the elections of 1990, 1995 and 2000. According to Electoral Law No. 201/90 and its supplementary decrees, electoral symbols are to be distributed on a 'first-come-first-serve' basis among the candidates of a given constituency.<sup>213</sup> However, because of the NDP's close relations with the regime and hence with the local registration committees, this process has in practice never been as impartial as intended. Indeed, in all three elections the distribution of electoral symbols has been heavily biased in favour of those candidates running under the NDP umbrella. In contrast to their political opponents, these candidates all obtained the same two electoral symbols across the entire country, namely the *Crescent* for those who were running for the 'professional' seat and the *Camel* for those who ran for the 'workers-farmers' seat.<sup>214</sup> Being the numbers one and two symbols on the official list of electoral symbols, these two symbols should have

<sup>213</sup> See article nine of Electoral Law 201/90.

<sup>214</sup> This distributional pattern had in fact already been in place during the 1987 elections, during which all NDP district lists received the crescent and those NDP candidates running for the individual seats the camel (Staff, Al-Gumhuriya, 29/03/1987).

theoretically been given to the two candidates, arriving first at the registration offices. It is very unlikely, however, that for all three elections and in all 222 electoral districts of the country these happened to be NDP candidates. Serrageddin from the NWP reasons in this regard: ‘...it is rather hard to believe that all NDP candidates, in every electoral district in Egypt’s twenty-six governorates managed to arrive ahead of all other candidates and arrive at the same time to get the number one and two symbols.’<sup>215</sup> According to other opposition representatives I spoke with, the NDP candidates were not necessarily the first to register, but were the ones who benefited from state patronage and favouritism and were thus accorded the *Crescent* and the *Camel*.<sup>216</sup>

The fact that all NDP candidates retained their electoral symbols across the country and for over two decades has, of course, hugely benefited the party’s political profile among a largely illiterate electorate. As of today, most voters have come to associate the *Crescent* and the *Camel* with the ruling party, perceiving the candidates running under these symbols not only as the most effective providers of constituency services but also as the likely electoral winners. This latter assertion is poignantly summarised by Zawiris from Tagammu, who claims:

‘...in general signs (...) create impressions with the people, so they relate the *Camel* and the *Crescent* to victory. For example, when the illiterate [voters] see that the NDP wins between 90 and 95 percent of the seats, they associate the victory with these signs. Because they do not have any awareness of the different political parties in the country, as they can only relate to individual candidates, when they go to vote, they choose the crescent and the camel, since these are seen as the signs of victory.’<sup>217</sup>

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<sup>215</sup> Interview given by Yassin Serrageddin from the NWP in Al-Ahram Weekly (Ezzat, Al-Ahram Weekly 6 – 22/11/1995).

<sup>216</sup> Interviews with Saad Zawiris (Tagammu) and Mohamed Sherdy (NWP).

<sup>217</sup> Interview with Saad Zawiris (Tagammu).

Illustration 9.4: Examples of NDP Electoral Symbols



Campaigning posters of two NDP candidates for the 2000 *Majlis Al-Shaab* elections, posted in one of the Cairo constituencies.

Content: Pictures of candidates with their electoral symbols – the crescent and the camel. The candidates' names are written below the picture and Qur'anic Verses at the top.

Picture taken by author.

Whilst the authorities thus actively intervened to provide NDP candidates with identical symbols, no such efforts were undertaken with regards to the country's opposition. As we have seen, during the campaigns of 1990, 1995 and 2000 none of the opposition parties was able to obtain the same electoral symbols for all its candidates. This fact was, of course, particularly painful for those opposition parties that had participated in the elections of the 1980s and that had been able to forge some associational linkage between themselves and a certain electoral symbol. These parties were hence deprived of further increasing their label recognition through the continued usage of a nationwide electoral symbol. Also, not only were opposition candidates given different symbols, but some of them also claimed that they purposefully received electoral symbols carrying negative connotations or that they were actively prevented from obtaining symbols historically associated with their party. Wherever these candidates did complain about their assigned symbols or tried to obtain the electoral symbols historically associated with their parties, their attempts were usually frustrated by the lack of cooperation from the registration authorities. Mohamed Sherdy from the NWP claims, for instance, that the authorities purposefully downgraded the traditional symbol of the party, the *Palm Tree*, from number fifteen to number sixty-eight on the official list of symbols. By means of this downgrade the authorities were hoping that NWP candidates would not be able to obtain their historical symbol.<sup>218</sup> Sherdy himself also asserted that for the 2000 elections he was initially accorded the *Umbrella* and had to fight with the local authorities to obtain the *Palm Tree* instead.<sup>219</sup>

<sup>218</sup> It should be noted that the historical symbol of Al-Wafd, used during the pre-revolutionary period, was the *Crescent* and the *Cross*, which meant to symbolise the unity between the Christian and Muslim populations in Egypt. Hence when referring to the *Palm Tree* as the NWP's historical symbol, reference is only made to the period after the party had re-emerged as a legal force in 1984 (Munoz 1992: 377).

<sup>219</sup> Interview with Mohamed Sherdy (NWP).

The negative effects of such diversity in electoral symbols on the capacity to foster greater label recognition are finally also confirmed by evidence drawn from the *Party Candidate & Deputy Survey*.<sup>220</sup> In this survey two questions regarding the use of electoral symbols were put to the respondents. A first question asked whether under the current candidate-based system the use of a common electoral symbol would significantly affect the election campaign and electoral prospects of party candidates. The second question asked how the use of a common electoral symbol would benefit party candidates during the election campaign. Of the thirty-six respondents who answered the first question, twenty-nine asserted that the use of a common symbol would be beneficial to their campaign, while only seven candidates thought it would have no impact on their campaign whatsoever. Moreover, of those who answered in the affirmative a majority thought that a common symbol would principally benefit levels of party visibility, yet less so levels of party discipline. Of all respondents, 82.7 percent asserted that common symbols would facilitate greater party recognition among the electorate and another 62 percent thought they would greatly facilitate voters to identify members of the same party. By contrast, comparatively few respondents thought that common symbols would promote greater cooperation among contending candidates. Approximately 42 percent expected these symbols to increase intra-party cooperation at the district level, whilst only 34.4 percent thought they would encourage such cooperation across constituencies.<sup>221</sup>

### 9.3 Concluding Remarks

This chapter explored whether party candidates campaigned any differently under the electoral laws of the 1980s than under that of the 1990s. It hereby focussed on the two remaining domains of the electoral campaign that were thought to vary depending on the type of electoral regime in place. In chapter four these domains had been identified as the type of campaigning materials and electoral rhetoric employed and the degree of label promotion engaged in during election times. Essentially, it was assumed that closed-list PR would induce party candidates to pursue a more party-conducive election campaign, both in terms of the electioneering materials used and the rhetoric employed, and that it would encourage them to promote their party labels. Candidate-based regimes in turn were expected to dissuade party candidates from using party materials and labels during the actual campaign. Instead they were thought to encourage party candidates to pursue a highly personalised campaign that would make little to no reference to party platforms and labels. Finally, it was theorised that

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<sup>220</sup> Various party officials from the EGP and Tagammu have also claimed that the usage of common symbols under the AM candidate-based system would above all facilitate greater label recognition among the electorate. See interviews with Mohamed Awad (EGP), Hussain Abdel Razek (Tagammu) and Rifaat Said (Tagammu).

<sup>221</sup> Party Candidate & Deputy Survey, Appendix No. 3, Question 3.14, p. 308.

levels of *visible representation* should rise wherever candidates pursue a party-conducive campaign, yet that it should suffer greatly wherever the campaign remains highly personalised.

When reviewing the evidence presented above, it becomes apparent that to some extent the 1990 electoral reform affected the behaviour of party candidates in both domains of the election campaign investigated here, namely the types of election materials used and the levels of label promotion engaged in. Against our initial anticipation the reform did not exert, however, any meaningful impact on the nature of the campaigning rhetoric employed. Here the evidence remains highly ambiguous, given that local issues and the promotion of personalities superseded the promotion of party platforms and programmes both during the 1980s and 1990s. The absence of any meaningful variance in this domain of the election campaign has been attributed to the nature of the electorate, which would simply not respond to a campaign that is solely geared towards the promotion of national issues and party programmes. Here then the structure of the electorate overruled any other variable that could have pushed party candidates towards the pursuit of a more party-oriented election campaign.

Regarding the other two domains of the election campaign, the picture that emerged was by contrast more in line with the predictions made in chapter four. Overall, it appears that, at the electoral level, the campaigns of party candidates were far more team-spirited and party-oriented under the PR list-based regimes of the 1980s than under the two-round AM system. This observation had of course already transpired from the preceding analysis of patterns of electoral cooperation, but finds confirmation in the variance that is detectable in the campaigning materials and party labels used across the two electoral periods investigated. To recapitulate, it was found that the electoral properties in place under the PR-based regimes greatly facilitated an economy of scale both in the spread and use of party materials, including party banners, posters, leaflets and manifestos. It was also found that once these institutional prerogatives ceased to exist under the candidate-based system, the campaigning devices used by party candidates became far more individualised and less party-based. Indeed, under the 1990 electoral regime, the election campaigns became highly individualised, with candidates relying almost exclusively on personally devised campaigning pamphlets, posters and other materials.

As predicted, it was also found that party candidates far more willingly engaged in the promotion of their respective party labels under the two PR list-based regimes than under the two-round AM system. Indeed, once introduced, the 1990 electoral law ceased to exert any pressures on the party candidates themselves to promote their party label as vigorously as they had done during the 1980s. This finding is also supported by evidence drawn from the



*Party Candidate & Deputy Survey.* In this survey the respondents were asked to directly relate levels of label promotions to the type of electoral regime in place. Of those respondents answering the question, an overwhelming majority of 83.3 percent thought that ‘under the party list system candidates were more encouraged to emphasise the common party label than under the candidate-based system’.<sup>222</sup> Only 8.3 percent, by contrast thought that levels of label promotion were equally important under the two different electoral systems, whereas none thought that this form of party-conducive behaviour ‘was more important under the candidate-based system’.<sup>223</sup>

How then did these observed changes in the behaviour of party candidates across time affect the level of *visible representation* political parties attained during election times? Overall, it seems fair to say that Egypt’s parties were far more visible in the electoral arena during the 1980s than during the 1990s, and this largely because during the 1980s they were able to profit from their candidates’ willingness to employ party materials and labels as a means to raise their public profile among the greater electorate. During this period of time parties thus not only had a sufficiently large number of agents in the field, but they were also blessed with the fact that these agents were actually willing to promote their parties’ platform and labels in the Egyptian street. In so doing, party candidates helped Egypt’s parties to enhance their *visible representation* in the electoral arena.

As we have seen since 1990, with the individualisation of the electoral game, the fortunes of parties changed quite dramatically. Not only were most of them now deprived of sufficient agents in the field, but they were also confronted with a situation in which the candidates themselves saw little need to promote their party labels and programmes during election times. Having lost a most potent means to propagate their existence among the Egyptian electorate, parties were hence no longer able to sustain the level of *visible representation* they had attained during the 1980s.

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<sup>222</sup> Ibid., Question 3.9, p. 305.

<sup>223</sup> Ibid, p. 305.

## Conclusion

This PhD set out to explore a relatively simple observation; namely the fact that, in comparative perspective, Egypt's parties fared much better electorally during the 1980s than during the 1990s. The thesis reviewed the various academic explanations that have been put forward in order to explain this phenomenon. Particular attention was given to the 'deliberalisationist' train of thought, which has emerged as the dominant analytical framework to explain contemporary Egyptian politics. Whilst agreeing with their overall propositions I argued, however, that across the board these deliberalisationists accorded too little importance to the 1990 electoral reform when explaining the electoral marginalisation of Egypt's parties between 1990 and 2000.

Drawing on the electoral connection literature, this PhD then showed that the different electoral regimes in place during the 1980s and 1990s significantly affected the direction of party development in Egypt at the electoral level. I demonstrated that parties were far better positioned to enhance levels of *internal unity* and *visible representation* under the two list-PR regimes of 1984 and 1987 than under the subsequent two-round AM system. *Visible representation*, for instance, was promoted under list-PR, because this regime empowered parties to function as gatekeepers to parliament and because it encouraged them to spread their candidacies beyond the confines of a limited number of constituencies to a large area of the country. *Visible representation* was also enhanced because list-PR induced party candidates to employ centrally-devised campaigning materials and to actively promote their party labels alongside their personal reputation. Under the two-round AM system, by contrast, *visible representation* deteriorated dramatically, because it was no longer possible for parties to control access to the electoral arena and because they were no longer forced to spread their candidacies on a nationwide scale. *Visible representation* was also reduced because this electoral system did not encourage party candidates to engage in any form of label promotion. Levels of *internal unity* in turn were boosted under the PR list-based regimes, because these regimes induced party candidates to collectivise their campaigning efforts at the district level. They were, however, minimised under the two-round AM system, which precluded any effective forms of intra-party cooperation and facilitated the pursuit of so called cross-party alliances instead.

The fact that a single event mattered so greatly in shaping the development of Egypt's parties raises the intriguing question of what would have happened if the 1990 electoral reform had never taken place. In other words, one may wonder how Egypt's parties would have fared electorally if either one of the two list-PR regimes had been retained throughout the 1990s.

Would their retention have facilitated a further strengthening of the parties' position in the electoral arena or would they have failed to do so?

Whilst interesting in its own right, this question remains, of course, hypothetical in character and therefore difficult to answer. In fact, we could only reach a satisfactory answer to this question if the Egyptian authorities decided to return to some form of list-PR. Only then would it be possible to examine in longitudinal perspective whether the declining prominence of Egypt's parties under the two-round AM system could be rectified by the introduction of a more 'party-conducive' electoral system.

In light of the research findings presented here it seems reasonable to assume, however, that Egypt's parties would have fared much better electorally had the country retained one of its two list-based electoral regimes. In fact, it is rather illogical to suggest that the 'party-conducive' environment created by both these regimes during the 1980s would have suddenly ceased to exist during the 1990s. Instead, one would expect that the retention of list-PR would have enabled Egypt's parties to sustain or even enhance the levels of *visible representation* and *internal unity* they had attained in the electoral arena during the 1980s.

In more concrete terms a number of propositions can be made in support of this latter assertion. To begin with, there is little doubt that the retention of a list-based electoral system would have sustained the parties' capacity to function as gatekeepers to the electoral and parliamentary arenas. In fact, the continuation of either the 1984 or the 1987 electoral regimes would have either made it very difficult for political hopefuls to seek parliamentary entry outside the party framework or completely barred them from doing so. This means that in numerical terms parties would have been able to retain their dominant position within the electoral arena and by extension in parliament. It also means that the significant rise in the 1990s of the number of independent candidates would never have materialised.

Second, it seems plausible to argue that the retention of a high national electoral threshold - like the one in existence during the 1980s - would have placed continuous pressures on Egypt's parties to spread their candidacies beyond a limited number of constituencies to large areas of the country. As we have seen, the need to do this was recognised during the 1980s in spite of the fact that parties had little human and financial resources at their disposal to campaign on a nationwide scale. It is therefore not unreasonable to assume that parties would have continued to pursue precisely this placement strategy; and this either on their own or, as in 1984 and 1987, by means of electoral alliances.



Finally, one would also suggest that the retention of list-PR in large multimember districts would have continued to affect the behaviour of party candidates in the manner described in chapters eight and nine. To recapitulate, during the 1980s the institutional incentives in place induced candidates to promote their party labels and to collectivise their campaigning efforts at the district level. All other factors being equal, there is no reason to assume that this behaviour would have altered significantly had the list system been retained. In fact, one may argue that the forms of collective action and label promotion employed during the 1980s would have become even more efficient and effective in the course of the 1990s. This seems plausible, because by then party candidates would have become accustomed to the existing system and hence better equipped to work within its incentive structure.

What then would the retention of list-PR have meant for the long-term development of parties in Egypt? Whilst it is difficult to hypothesise on this subject, it seems that this electoral regime would certainly have helped Egypt's parties enhance their standing in the Egyptian street and possibly even helped them improve levels of *internal unity*. It would have helped enhance their standing in the Egyptian street because this regime would have enabled them to gradually build up levels of name recognition amongst the wider electorate. As we know, to this day Egyptian voters remain either totally ignorant of the party political scene or little inclined to develop partisan affiliations. The sustained dominance of party agents in the electoral field and the continuous promotion of party labels over consecutive elections would have pushed parties as collective actors to the core of the voters' attention. In so doing, voters would have gradually come to recognise the different parties and programmes competing in the electoral field.

In addition to this, one could argue that the retention of list-PR would have helped Egypt's parties to enhance levels of *internal unity*. This argument could be derived from the fact that list-PR enables parties to function as primary agents for political participation and representation. Indeed, as mentioned above, the retention of such a system would have made it very difficult for political hopefuls to seek alternative avenues of participating in Egyptian politics. In the long run this gatekeeper function could have provided Egypt's parties with a powerful tool to sanction partisan dissent and in so doing foster a more unified appearance during election times.

Although this account of counter-factuals is illuminating in its own light the fact remains that the country has been running parliamentary elections under a candidate-based system for over a decade now, and that this system contributed to the marginalisation of Egypt's parties in the electoral arena. We are hence left with a situation in which the country's parties, instead of

gradually strengthening their position in the electoral arena, have in fact become completely marginalised actors within the Egyptian polity. From a transitological perspective these developments are, of course, rather disconcerting given that they bear negatively on the future of democratic change. Indeed, it seems unlikely that at this current stage Egypt's parties – and the opposition in particular – are in any position to shape future political developments in the country. Being politically marginalised and organisationally inept, they simply do not possess the necessary bargaining leverage to push for changes to the status quo.

Any push for political change will hence either have to emanate from other organised groups in society or from the Egyptian authorities themselves. However, given the current weakness of Egyptian civil society and its organisations, it is probably best to discard these forces as likely agents for change. As with political parties, all of these groups operate within a severely restricted legal framework and an oppressive state machinery that has shown little interest in a strong and vibrant civil society. Seemingly then, the only potent force to alter the current status quo is the Egyptian government itself which – with the necessary political will – has all the power at its disposal to make far-reaching changes to the structure of government and the legal framework, and hence to create a political environment that is truly open and competitive.

So far, however, the authorities have shown little appetite to liberalise the polity. In fact, rather than widening the scope of political participation and representation, the Mubarak government has over the past two decades used all possible means to expand its political power and to curtail that of the opposition. This has been achieved in large measure by sustaining the restrictive legal framework inherited from Sadat and by imposing new restrictions on various civil liberties. As we know, to this day the Emergency law remains in place and so do the notoriously restrictive Political Parties' Law, the Law on Demonstrations and Public Meetings and the Law on Public Assembly. To these restrictions one could also add the host of restrictive civil laws that have been passed under the Mubarak presidency itself and the various extra legal means that have been employed by the authorities to stifle any independent political activity in the country.

Amidst this gloom there are some indications, however, that conditions may improve for Egypt's political parties. Prior to the October 2000 poll, for instance, the authorities finally introduced full judicial supervision of voting operations, a measure long demanded by the country's opposition. Whilst not guaranteeing a fully free and fair election, this measure nevertheless significantly improved the overall credibility of the election process and as such the opposition's willingness to participate in it. Hailing this reform as a significant step

forward, most opposition leaders believed, in fact, that judicial supervision would significantly enhance their electoral chances. This opposition euphoria is probably best encapsulated in the over-ambitious comments made at the time by Nomaan Goma'a who, linking the introduction of judicial supervision to the NWP's electoral prospects, asserted that the party was set to win 100 seats in parliament. As we have seen, in the end the party managed to obtain only a fraction of this number (Shehab, Al-Ahram Weekly, 28/09 – 04/10/2004).

More recently, the government has also announced its intention to reform a number of civil laws, most notably the 1977 Political Parties' Law and the 1972 People's Assembly Law (Al-Din, Al-Ahram Weekly, 04 – 10/11/2004). Although the precise content of these reforms had not been disclosed at the time of writing, it is widely assumed that they are intended to broaden the scope of opposition representation in the political process of the country, albeit of course only marginally. So for instance, it has transpired that the revised Political Parties' Law will open membership of the notoriously restrictive PPC to opposition representatives.

Speaking of which, it is worth noting that in recent months the PPC has also seemingly adopted a more permissive attitude towards the licensing of parties. Indeed, in late 2004 alone the committee granted licenses to two parties that had only recently filed their applications. Looked at in longitudinal perspective this fact seems rather striking given that between 1979 and 2000 the PPC only licensed a total of six parties and rejected more than sixty others. As we know, the majority of the parties operating in Egypt today was legalised by court order, overturning initial rejections by the PPC. Whether this greater permissiveness truly reflects a change in the operations of the PPC or whether it constitutes a mere ploy by the government to ward off rising international concerns about Egypt's democratic credentials remains, however, to be seen.

The same may be said about the regime's most recent attempt to call for yet another 'national dialogue' with the country's opposition. This dialogue was proposed by the NDP at its latest national congress and is meant to commence in early 2005. According to NDP sources, this dialogue will, however, neither address substantive reform proposals nor the opposition's demand to amend the Egyptian constitution. Instead it is purely meant to focus on 'general political issues' and on an ethical code of conduct for the upcoming parliamentary poll (Al-Din, Al-Ahram Weekly, 02 – 08/12/2004). Given its limited objective, it is therefore doubtful that this reform dialogue will bring about any substantive changes to the status quo. As mentioned above, these changes will, if at all possible, only emanate from the Egyptian government and will most likely be without any opposition involvement.

Finally, and probably most crucial for the immediate future of Egypt's parties, there is also renewed talk of reforming the current electoral law (Al-Din, Al-Ahram Weekly, 04 – 10/11/2004). This debate flared up shortly after the 2000 parliamentary poll and has not receded since. Emanating from the ruling party, it is being suspected that this reform debate has been nourished by the NDP's weak performance in the last elections and its increasing reliance upon independently elected MPs to sustain its two-thirds majority in the *Majlis al-Shaab*. In 2000, for instance, Fathy Sorur, the speaker of parliament, indicated for the first time that the president was unhappy with the current electoral regime and that he was considering amending it to a more proportional system. Although Sorur had to retract his statements, it became apparent at that point that electoral reform had been catapulted back on the agenda of the ruling party (Al-Din, Al-Ahram Weekly, 06 – 12/01/2000). Developments on this front then gained momentum in 2001 and 2002 when it became known that various parliamentary and governmental committees had been exploring the possibilities of electoral reform. In early 2001 it transpired, for example, that the *Shura Council's* Legislative and Constitutional Committee had been discussing the possibility of introducing a 'mixed' electoral regime. In the committee's recommendations it was argued that the individual candidacy system was to blame for the current stagnation of political activity in the country, and that moving towards greater proportional representation would help reverse this trend (Al-Din, Al-Ahram Weekly, 11 – 17/01/2001). In 2002 moreover, Al-Shazli officially announced at the NDP's annual conference that the president was contemplating the introduction of a new electoral law, and that a special committee had been established by the government to examine a possible reform (Nasreddine & Chevreuil, Al-Ahram Hebdo, 16/10/2002).

Although at the time of writing the government had not tabled any bill to amend the existing electoral law, there is a widespread rumour that the 2005 parliamentary elections will be run under an amended electoral regime. Given the constitutional hiccup that was caused by the PR regimes of the 1980s, it is also widely assumed that the government will opt for some form of 'mixed' regime that provides equal opportunities for independents and party lists. What seems certain, however, is that any new electoral law will be more proportional than the existing one, yet most likely not as proportional as the 1984 and 1987 regimes.

This is good news for the country's opposition which - as we have seen – fared so much better under the PR regimes of the 1980s than under the candidate-based system of the 1990s. It comes as no surprise then that the government's consideration of amending the existing electoral law received universal acclaim from opposition ranks. Indeed, in contrast to the mid- and late 1980s, when most opposition leaders fiercely opposed the introduction of PR, most

of them have come around to favour the return to some form of list system. In part at least this change of heart can be explained by the opposition's realisation that the candidate-based system, rather than strengthening their position within the polity, in fact facilitated their marginalisation in both the electoral and parliamentary arenas. With this realisation in mind, virtually all opposition figures I spoke to asserted that they would support any government moves towards a more proportional system. Moreover, when asked about their preferred electoral system, most of them in the end favoured the introduction of list PR. According to Mahmoud Abaza from the NWP, for instance, such a system 'would make parties more important' whilst Rifaat Said, from Tagammu, maintained that it would encourage 'people to choose according to programmes and not for individual candidates'. Nagi Al-Shehabi from the DGP, pointed out that the list system would enhance the chances of the opposition to enter the legislature<sup>224</sup>.

What is striking about these comments is that, in one way or the other, they all refer to precisely those properties of PR that have been operative during the 1980s and that at the time have greatly helped Egypt's parties to enhance their *visible representation* in the electoral arena. This also means that the implications of this research – namely that the PR regimes of the 1980s strengthened the position of parties whilst the candidate-based system of the 1990s had the opposite effect – have become widely accepted in political circles. In fact, it seems that Egypt's parties have come to realise that electoral reform constitutes a crucial stepping-stone out of the crisis they are currently facing.

Having said this, this does not mean, of course, that electoral reform constitutes the sole cure for all the weaknesses plaguing Egypt's parties. As mentioned in chapter two a variety of factors have contributed to the marginalisation of the country's opposition during the 1990s, including the more restrictive application by the authorities of the existing civil and criminal legislation and its more heavy handed approach towards its opponents. In this sense then, any electoral reform towards greater proportionality and the return to a list-based regime will not redress all the weaknesses of Egypt's parties, unless of course it is accompanied by a further liberalisation of the civil code and the abolition of emergency rule. Irrespective of whether these latter reforms will be initiated, and there is little evidence that the NDP is willing to do so, reforming the current electoral regime should nevertheless benefit the country's political parties, in that it would help them regain some level of *visible representation* in Egyptian electoral politics. Considering their complete marginalisation within it, such a development

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<sup>224</sup> Interviews with Mahmoud Abaza (NWP), Rifaat Said (Tagammu) & Nagi Al-Shehabi (previously SLP/ currently DGP).

would surely constitute a crucial stepping-stone for Egypt's parties to overcome their current crisis.

Where does this research lead from here? There are several directions in which this research into the political consequences of electoral institutions can be extended. To begin with, there is clearly a need to expand this research beyond the confines of the Egyptian case and to verify the theoretical propositions put forward here against a larger number of cases. As has become apparent above, this thesis illustrated that the *distal effects* of electoral institutions have been at work in Egypt during the 1980s and 1990s. In so doing it hence provided some credibility to the assumption that electoral regimes matter, even under non-democratic conditions. At the same time we ought to remember, however, that this research rested on a single case only, which means that the conclusions drawn here carry virtually no external validity. In order to enhance levels of external validity it is therefore necessary to test the propositions of this thesis against a larger number of cases. Put differently, it seems worthwhile exploring whether occurrences of electoral reform elsewhere in the region carried similar effects on patterns of party development, as did those detected in the Egyptian case. Such research could, of course, either be conducted by means of a broader cross-national comparison of several Arab polities or by means of further single case analyses. Judging from my experiences in Egypt, I suspect that at this stage it may be more practical to pursue the latter avenue of enquiry rather than the former. As mentioned in chapter five, conducting research in the Arab world remains fraught with numerous difficulties, which render the task of data collection very tedious, and both resource and time consuming. The pursuit of further single case analyses, similar to the one conducted here, may hence constitute the most feasible way forward to verify the theoretical propositions offered here.

Regional polities that would lend themselves to such research include Algeria and Morocco, both of which experienced far reaching electoral reforms in the course of the past decade. Algeria switched in 1997 from a two-round AM system, which had been used for the aborted parliamentary elections of 1991, to a closed-list PR regime. Morocco switched in 2002 from a simple-plurality system in SMDs to closed-list PR in medium size multimember constituencies. In both countries it would hence be possible to explore more carefully the effects of these reforms on patterns of party development. At the time of writing none of the other polities in the region had experienced similarly far-reaching changes to their parliamentary electoral systems.

Apart from investigating their *distal effects*, it may be worthwhile to explore more carefully the *proximal* effects of electoral institutions on levels of parliamentary representation. Given

that we are dealing mostly with hegemonic party systems in the region, one could hereby focus, for instance, on the chances of minor (opposition) parties gaining a foothold in parliament. According to the electoral connection literature, these chances are higher under systems of proportional representation than under plurality or majoritarian electoral regimes. As mentioned in the introduction, this avenue of research is, of course, somewhat contentious, given that the prevalence of electoral fraud and the absence of reliable electoral data will most certainly cast doubts on the credibility of any results obtained. Nevertheless, if carefully designed, such research may prove to yield fruitful insights into the prospects for minor parties to gain parliamentary representation in hegemonic party systems.

That this may be the case is in fact suggested by evidence drawn from Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia. In all three countries a preliminary reading of election results suggests that opposition forces made far bigger inroads into parliament under systems of proportional representation than under plurality or majoritarian electoral regimes. In Egypt, for example, opposition representation in the *Majlis al-Shaab* was significantly stronger under the list-based regimes of the 1980s than under the subsequent two-round AM system. This fact becomes apparent when revisiting tables 2.3 and 2.4, which illustrate that the number of seats won by the combined opposition was far higher during the 1980s than during the 1990s. Similar observations can be made in Algeria and Tunisia. Here again moves towards greater proportionality coincided with a rise in the number of parties that entered parliament. In Algeria for instance, the 1997 shift from a two-round AM system to list PR resulted in a significant increase in the number of political parties that gained a foothold in the legislature. In 1991 the estimated total number of parties in parliament that would have entered the legislature stood at six, whilst the estimated effective number of parties reached only 1.0. In 1997, by contrast, the total number of parties in parliament rose to ten and the effective number of parties to 4.0. In Tunisia the evidence is even more telling. Here it was only after the introduction of a PR top-up tier in 1994 that opposition parties managed to gain a foothold in the Tunisian legislature. Indeed under the closed-list plurality system used until 1989 no other party except for the ruling *Rassemblement Constitutionnel Democratique* (RCD) had won seats in parliament. After 1994, however, four of Tunisia's six legalised opposition parties gained parliamentary representation for the first time since the turn to multipartism.

Last but not least, this research may spur further interest not only in the political consequences of Arab electoral regimes, but also in their political origins. Indeed, once we establish that Arab electoral regimes matter, it may be interesting to take a step back and explore how particular electoral regimes come about and why they are being reformed. Put differently, we may want to scrutinise more carefully the actors involved and their motives for

introducing a certain electoral regime or for changing an existing one. In so doing we may be able to unearth the rationale behind the choice of a particular electoral regime, the timing of electoral reform and the possible incentives to push for institutional change. What is more, we would also be able to examine the level of congruence that exists between the intended and the actual consequences of electoral institutions and their reforms. We could hence explore whether the designer's intentions were actually matched by the electoral reality on the ground.

It seems to me that this latter line of investigation is particularly interesting, given that we are dealing with authoritarian regimes, in which the power relations between incumbent elites and opposition remain firmly tilted towards the former. Under these conditions, both the design and reform of electoral institutions remains, of course, the exclusive domain of the regime elite. Considering that these regimes have over the past two decades shown little interest in creating a truly competitive environment, one must wonder how much value they actually attach to the type of electoral regimes in place, and in the case of reform, what induced them to alter the existing institutions.

Again there are plenty of polities within the MENA region that lend themselves to such analysis. Between 1977 and 2003 in fact the region experienced a total of eleven electoral reforms. These reforms included both 'inter-system' changes within regime types, and so called 'intra-system' changes between different electoral regimes. They took place in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. In all these cases then, it would be possible to explore and compare the regime's motives behind these reforms and their actual impact on electoral and party politics.



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Appendices

Appendix No. 1. Party Candidate & Deputy Survey Questionnaire (Arabic Version)

الجامعة الأمريكية بالقاهرة

قسم العلوم السياسية

استطلاع رأي

عن طرق الترشيح الحزبي والاستراتيجية الانتخابية في مصر

المصادر: مرشحي الأحزاب والنواب الحاليين

تصميم وإعداد:  
الأستاذ/ هنريك جان  
زميل الجامعة الأمريكية بالقاهرة  
مدرس غير متفرغ بالجامعة الأمريكية بالقاهرة  
دارس للنكتورة في جامعة لندن للاقتصاد والعلوم السياسية

### مقدمة:

- 1- برجاء الإجابة علي استطلاع الرأي هذا بأحسن ما تعرفه من معلومات وبدون أي مساعدة خارجية
- 2- برجاء اتباع التعليمات الموجودة مع كل سؤال
- 3- إذا لم ينطبق السؤال علي حالتك، برجاء تجاهله وكتابة العبارة التالية (لا ينطبق علي حالتي) وشكراً علي تعاونكم معنا

### القسم الأول

الاسم
اللقب
عضوية الحزب الحالية
تاريخ الانضمام للحزب
تاريخ ومكان المقابلة

س 1-1 برجاء توضيح أسباب انضمامك للحزب، (ضع علامة علي ما يناسبك من الاختيارات التالية)


توافق فكرك السياسي مع مبادئ الحزب

علاقته العائلية بهذا الحزب

شهرة الحزب داخل دائرتك

طموحاتك السياسية

إذا كانت هناك أسباب أخرى ، برجاء توضيحها فيما يلي:

س 1-2 هل حدث وكنت عضواً في أكثر من حزب سياسي منذ عام 1977؟

لا
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نعم

إذا كانت الإجابة بنعم، برجاء استكمال الأسئلة المدرجة بقسم 1.1، وإن لم يكن كذلك، فابدأ بالقسم الثاني

### قسم 1-1

س 1-1.1 برجاء التكرم بتوضيح أسماء الأحزاب السياسية التي كنت عضواً فيها مع توضيح مدة الانضمام للحزب وهل تم ترشيحك عضواً حزبياً في أي منها أم لا؟

مرشح حزبي	مدة العضوية

الحزب الوطني الديمقراطي

حزب الوفد الجديد

حزب العمل

حزب التجمع

الحزب الناصري

حزب الأحرار

حزب الأمة

حزب الخضر

الحزب الاجتماعي العربي المصري

حزب مصر الفتاة

الحزب الاتحاد الديمقراطي

حزب الإخوان المسلمين

حزب التكافل

حزب الوفاق القومي

س 1-2 ما الذي دفعك إلى تغيير عضوية الحزب الذي تنتمي إليه؟ نرجو توضيح الإجابة الصحيحة ومسموح بتعدد الإجابات:


تحالف الحزب مع حزب آخر لم تكن تتفق معه  
لم تكن توافق علي وضع القيادة المركزية أو المحلية بالحزب  
لم تكن تتفق مع الاتجاهات السياسية والمنهجية للحزب  
لم يكن الحزب ليعيد ترشيحك عضواً رسمياً له مرة أخرى  
كنت تظن أنه لديك فرص أكبر لتحقيق طموحاتك السياسية مع حزب آخر  
إذا كانت لديك أسباب أخرى، برجاء توضيحها فيما يلي:

#### القسم الثاني

س 1-2 برجاء توضيح في أي من انتخابات مجلس الشعب التالية كنت مرشحاً حزبياً مع توضيح الدائرة الانتخابية في كل منها

المحافظة	الدائرة الانتخابية	
		1984
		1987
		1990
		1995
		2000

س 2-2 كم من الوقت قضيت في الحزب قبل أن يتم اختيارك كمرشح حزبي له في أي من انتخابات مجلس الشعب التي شاركت فيها؟ نرجو توضيح الفترة الصحيحة. إذا كنت عضواً في أكثر من حزب يمكنك استخدام جداول إضافية.

الحزب الأول	الحزب الثاني	الحزب الثالث	
			منذ نشأة الحزب
			أكثر من خمس سنوات
			ما بين 3-5 سنوات
			ما بين 1-3 سنوات
			أقل من سنة
			حديثاً

س 2-3 من أول من قام بتشجيعك علي السعي وراء منصباً حزبياً في أي من انتخابات مجلس الشعب التي شاركت فيها؟ برجاء ضع علامة علي ما يناسبك من الاختيارات التالية، وغير مسموح بتعدد الاختيارات.

1984	1987	1990	1995	2000

شجعني بعض الأصدقاء لتبني مبادئ الحزب  
اتصلت بي القيادة المحلية للحزب  
اتصلت بي القيادة المحلية التابعة للمحافظة  
اتصلت بي القيادة المركزية للحزب  
سعت لهذا المنصب بنفسني  
إن لم يكن أي من الاختيارات السابقة، نرجو التوضيح

س 2-4 لماذا قام الحزب باختيارك ممثلاً رسمياً له في أي من انتخابات مجلس الشعب السابقة؟(برجاء ترتيب الاختيارات التالية حسب أهميتها).

برجاء تجاهل هذا السؤال إذا لم يكن ينطبق علي حالتك

2000	1995	1990	1987	1984

لأنك معروف بتشجيعك للفكر السياسي الذي يتبناه الحزب  
لأنك خدمت الحزب لفترة طويلة  
لأن لديك شهرة واسعة داخل الدائرة الانتخابية  
لأنه لديك أعمالاً واسعة وعلاقات عائلية قوية بالحزب  
لأنك تتمتع باستقلالية مالية  
إذا كانت لديك أسباب أخرى، برجاء توضيحها فيما يلي:

س 2-5 لماذا قمت بالسعي وراء منصب المرشح الحزبي في أي من انتخابات مجلس الشعب التي شاركت فيه (برجاء ترتيب الاختيارات التالية حسب أهميتها)

برجاء تجاهل هذا السؤال إذا لم يكن ينطبق علي حالتك

2000	1995	1990	1987	1984

الشهرة التي يتمتع بها الحزب داخل دائرتك الانتخابية  
قدرة الحزب علي تقديم الإمدادات المالية لحملتك الانتخابية  
علاقة الحزب ببعض الهيئات المركزية والحكومية  
هناك إلزام قانوني لالتحاقك بالحزب أثناء القيام بحملتك الانتخابية  
تبنيت لمبادئ الحزب في انتخابات سابقة  
إذا كانت لديك أسباب أخرى، برجاء توضيحها فيما يلي:

س 2-6 في ظل نظام الترشيح بالقائمة الحزبية، من الذي قام بتقرير القائمة الانتخابية في الدائرة التي كنت مرشحاً فيها خلال أي من انتخابات مجلس الشعب التي شاركت فيها؟ برجاء توضيح الإجابة الصحيحة وغير مسموح بتعدد الإجابات.

1987	1984

المساندة الجماهيرية للمرشح داخل دائرته هي التي قررت المناطق التي ينوب عنها كل من الأعضاء  
القيادة المحلية هي التي تتولى هذا الأمر  
الأمانة العامة للحزب في المحافظة  
القيادة المركزية للحزب  
المرشحون أحرار في اختيار الدائرة الانتخابية التي ينوبون عنها  
إذا كانت لديك أسباب أخرى، برجاء توضيحها فيما يلي:

س 2-7 إذا كنت قد نافست في الانتخابات تحت نظام القائمة الحزبية، فما الموقع الذي حصلت عليه داخل القائمة الحزبية وكم كان عدد المرشحين معك داخل هذه القائمة؟

برجاء تجاهل هذا السؤال إذا لم يكن ينطبق علي حالتك

1987	1984
	X

موقعك في قائمة المرشحين  
مجموع عدد المرشحين في القائمة  
كنت تسعى وراء مقعد للمستقلين



س 2-8 إذا كنت قد نافست تحت نظام القائمة الحزبية في عامي 1984/1987 فما هي أشد العوامل تأثيراً علي تحديد موقع المرشحين داخل قائمة الترشيح في أي من انتخابات مجلس الشعب التي شاركت فيها سابقاً؟ برجاء ترتيب العوامل التالية حسب أهميتها.

1987	1984

المدة التي قضاها المرشح داخل الحزب  
الرتبة القيادية التي يتمتع بها المرشح داخل الحزب  
مدى ولاء العضو للحزب  
السمعة الشخصية للعضو داخل المحافظة  
العلاقات الشخصية بين المرشح وبعض كبار رجال الأعمال أو العائلات الكبيرة

إذا كانت هناك عوامل أخرى، نرجو توضيحها فيما يلي:

س 2-9 في ظل النظام الحالي للانتخابات، من الذي قام بتحديد الدائرة الانتخابية التي سترشح عنها في أي من انتخابات مجلس الشعب التي شاركت فيها من قبل. (برجاء اختيار ما يناسبك من الإجابات التالية ، ومسموح بتعدد الإجابات)

2000	1995	1990

المساندة الجماهيرية للمرشح هي التي تقرر المناطق التي ينوب عنها كل من الأعضاء  
القيادة المحلية هي التي تتولى هذا الأمر  
الأمانة العامة للحزب في المحافظة  
القيادة المركزية للحزب  
المرشحون أحرار في اختيار الدائرة الانتخابية التي ينوبون عنها

إذا لم يكن أي من الإجابات السابقة، نرجو التوضيح فيما يلي:

إذا كنت أنت من قام باختيار الدائرة الانتخابية، برجاء استكمال الأسئلة الموجودة بقسم 2-1 أو برجاء الانتقال إلي السؤال رقم 2-10

## قسم 2-1

س 2-1-1 في القائمة التالية بعض من الأسباب التي يرجع إليها اختيار المرشح لدائرة انتخابية بعينها. لماذا قمت باختيار الدائرة الانتخابية التي كنت مرشحاً فيها في أي من انتخابات مجلس الشعب السابقة التي شاركت فيها؟ نرجو ترتيب الاختيارات التالية حسب الأهمية.

2000	1995	1990	1987

شهرة حزبك في الدائرة الانتخابية  
ضعف المنافسين لك في هذه الدائرة الانتخابية  
لأنك من أهل هذه الدائرة  
لأنك كنت مشهور بصفة شخصية في هذه الدائرة الانتخابية  
لأنك عائلتك لها شهرتها واحترامها داخل هذه الدائرة الانتخابية  
كانت لديك علاقات وثيقة بمجتمع الأعمال المحلي  
لأنك كنت مرشحاً عن هذه الدائرة الانتخابية من قبل  
إذا كانت هناك أسباب أخرى، برجاء التوضيح فيما يلي:

س 2-10 في حالة عدم ترشيحك مرة أخرى من قبل الحزب التي تنتمي إليه، ما من الحلول الاستراتيجية التالية تفضل في ظل النظام الحالي للانتخابات في مصر؟ (برجاء وضع علامة علي الاختيار الذي يناسبك ، وغير مسموح بتعدد الإجابات).


ستقوم بترشيح نفسك كمرشح مستقل ولن تعاود الانضمام للحزب بعد انتهاء الانتخابات  
ستقوم بترشيح نفسك "مرشح حزبي مستقل" وستحاول الانضمام للحزب بعد انتهاء الانتخابات  
ستسعى للانضمام إلي حزب آخر  
ستحاول إنشاء حزب سياسي خاص بك  
ستمتنع عن الاشتراك في الانتخابات القادمة  
إذا كانت لديك أسباب أخرى، برجاء توضيحها فيما يلي:

إذا كان قد تم ترشيحك كمرشح مستقل في أي من انتخابات مجلس الشعب لعام 1987 برجاء استكمال الأسئلة الموجودة بقسم 2-3 أو برجاء الانتقال إلي قسم 3:

#### قسم 2-2

س 2-2-1 إذا لم يكن قد تم إعادة ترشيحك من قبل الحزب، هل قمت بالفعل بترشيح نفسك كمرشح مستقل؟

☐ نعم ☐ لا

س 2-2-2 إذا كانت الإجابة بـ "نعم"، هل تعتقد أن ترشيحك كمستقل أقل فائدة من ترشيحك من قبل الحزب؟

☐ نعم ☐ لا

س 2-2-3 هل سعت للانضمام مرة أخرى للحزب الذي لم يعيد ترشيحك في الانتخابات؟


نعم، لقد سعت للانضمام إلي الحزب وقد تم الموافقة لي علي ذلك  
نعم، لقد سعت للانضمام إلي الحزب وقد تم رفض الطلب  
نعم، عرض علي الحزب إعادة الانضمام له مرة أخرى وقد قبلت  
نعم، عرض علي الحزب إعادة الانضمام مرة أخرى ولكنني رفضت  
لا، لم أسعى للانضمام مرة أخرى  
لا، فقد قمت بالانضمام إلي حزب آخر

#### القسم الثالث

س 3-1 ما مدى أهمية كل من العوامل التالية في التأثير علي اختيارات المصوتين خلال انتخابات مجلس الشعب التي شاركت فيها من قبل (برجاء ترتيب الاختيارات التالية حسب أهميتها)


عضوية المرشح في حزب معين  
الوضع الأيديولوجي للمرشح وبرنامج  
سمعة المرشح داخل الدائرة الانتخابية (تاريخ العائلة- روابط العمل)  
إقامة المرشح في الدائرة الانتخابية التي سينوب عنها  
قدرة المرشح علي تقديم الخدمات لأهل دائرته  
إذا كانت هناك أسباب أخرى، برجاء توضيحها فيما يلي:

س 2-3 في رأيك، ما أكثر العوامل التالية إفادة بالنسبة لك في أي حملة انتخابية تحت النظام السياسي والاجتماعي الحالي للانتخابات في مصر (برجاء ترتيب الاختيارات التالية حسب أهميتها)


البرنامج الانتخابي للحزب الذي تنتمي إليه  
الإنجازات التشريعية التي حققها الحزب  
التاريخ السياسي للحزب وسمعته  
الروابط التي يتمتع بها الحزب ببعض الاتحادات التجارية  
موقفك السياسي  
الإنجازات التشريعية التي قمت بتحقيقها بصفة شخصية  
السمعة التي تتمتع بها كمرشح حزبي  
تاريخ العائلة وسمعته  
الجنود العائلية داخل الدائرة الانتخابية  
عضويتك في الاتحاد أو النقابة  
إذا لم يكن أي مما سبق، برجاء توضيح ذلك فيما يلي:

س 3-3 ما هي أهم النقاط التي كنت ترغب في جذب انتباه مرشحيك إليها تحت أي من النظامين الانتخابيين أثناء القيام بحملاتك الانتخابية السابقة؟ (برجاء ترتيب الاختيارات التالية حسب أهميتها)

نظام الترشيح المستقل	نظام الترشيح بالقائمة الحزبية

الإنجازات السياسية التي سبق لك تحقيقها  
خبرتك السياسية السابقة  
جدول أعمالك السياسي  
مهاراتك الشخصية والسمعة  
علاقاتك ببعض الهيئات السياسية المحلية منها والقومية  
علائقك ببعض العائلات السياسية الكبيرة وقطاع الأعمال  
اسمك  
أسماء جميع المرشحين داخل القائمة الحزبية  
مبادئ الحزب الذي تنتمي إليه  
جدول الأعمال السياسي للحزب  
إذا لم يكن أي مما سبق، برجاء توضيح ذلك فيما يلي:

س 3-4 ما هي النشاطات التي قمت بها أنت أو الحزب الذي تنتمي إليه من أجل الترويج لحملتك الانتخابية تحت أي من النظامين الانتخابيين السابق ذكرهما؟ (برجاء ترتيب الاختيارات التالية حسب أهميتها).

نظام الترشيح المستقل	نظام الترشيح بالقائمة الحزبية

إعلانات الإذاعة والتلفزيون  
إعلانات الجرائد  
حفلات الرالي الكبيرة  
الاتصال المباشر بالمصوتين  
حملات المقاهي  
توزيع منشورات تحتوي علي جدول أعمال الحزب أو الجرائد التي تصدر عنه  
تعليق لافتات تحمل اسم الحزب  
إذا كان هناك مزيداً من الأنشطة ، برجاء توضيحها فيما يلي:

س 3-5 إذا كنت قد شاركت في الانتخابات تحت كل من النظامين السابقين، هل ترى أن هناك فرقاً بين الحملة الانتخابية التي قمت بها أو الحزب الذي تنتمي إليه في ظل نظام السابق للقائمة الحزبية عن ما قمت به من حملات انتخابية في ظل النظام الحالي للانتخابات؟

نعم ☐ لا ☐

س 3-6 إذا كانت إجابتك بنعم، برجاء استوفاء موجز للفروق التي تميزت بها الحملات الانتخابية من حيث الاستراتيجية والقضايا المطروحة في ظل كل من نظام الانتخابات بالقائمة الحزبية ونظام الانتخابات الحالي (برجاء استخدام السطور التالية في شرح تلك الفروق) رجاء تجاهل هذا السؤال إذا لم يكن ينطبق علي حالتك

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س 3-7 إذا كنت ممن خاضوا الانتخابات تحت نظام القائمة الحزبية في أي من انتخابات مجلس الشعب السابقة أذكر كيف أثر ترتيبك في القائمة علي خطتك الانتخابية؟ (الرجاء وضع علامة أمام الإجابة المناسبة. يسمح بتعدد الإجابات)

برجاء تجاهل هذا السؤال إذا لم يكن ينطبق عليك:

1987	1984
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

لأنك كنت علي قمة القائمة قمت شخصك علي شعار الحزب  
بالرغم من أنك كنت علي قمة القائمة قمت شعار الحزب علي شخصك  
لأنك كنت في أدنى القائمة قمت شعار الحزب علي شخصك  
لأنك كنت في أدنى القائمة قمت مرشحي قمة القائمة علي الآخرين  
موقعك في القائمة لم يؤثر علي خطتك الانتخابية إطلاقاً  
إذا لم يكن أي من الإجابات السابقة، برجاء ذكر تأثير حجم الدائرة الانتخابية عليك

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س 3-8 إذا كنت خضت الانتخابات تحت نظام القائمة الحزبية من قبل، كيف اثر استخدام الشعار العام للحزب علي الحملات الانتخابية لكل المرشحين بكافة الدوائر الانتخابية؟

برجاء تجاهل هذا السؤال إذا لم يكن ينطبق عليك:

<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>

يسر هذا الاستخدام تعاوناً أكبر بين المرشحين الذين يدخلون الانتخابات  
ساهم هذا الاستخدام في زيادة التعريف بالحزب بين جمهور الناخبين  
ساهم هذا الاستخدام في تعاون أكبر بين المرشحين من نفس الحزب عبر الدائرة الانتخابية  
ساعد في تعرف الناخبين علي المرشحين من نفس الحزب  
ساعد المرشحين علي ترويج الاتجاه السياسي العام للحزب  
لم يكن له أي تأثير علي الحملة الانتخابية بأي شكل من الأشكال  
إذا كان له تأثير من أي منطلق آخر، برجاء التوضيح فيما يلي:

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س 3-9 إذا كنت ممن خاضوا الانتخابات تحت نظام القائمة الحزبية برجاء توضيح ما يوافقك من العبارات التالية (ترجو وضع علامة علي ما يناسبك من الاختيارات التالية . يسمح بتعدد الإجابات)

برجاء تجاهل هذا السؤال إذا لم يكن ينطبق عليك:


كان التعاون بين المرشحين من نفس الحزب في الدائرة الانتخابية أفضل في نظام القائمة منه في النظام الفردي  
كان المرشحون تحت نظام القائمة أكثر حماساً للتركيز علي شعار الحزب العام عنه في النظام الفردي  
كان التعاون بين المرشحين في الدائرة الانتخابية تحت نظام القائمة الانتخابية مساوياً لمثيله تحت نظام الانتخاب الفردي  
لم يكن الشعار العام للحزب مؤثراً في أي من النظامين السابقين  
كان لمستوى التعاون بين المرشحين في الدائرة الانتخابية تحت نظام الانتخاب الفردي أكثر أهمية منه في نظام القائمة  
كان لشعار الحزب أهمية أكبر تحت نظام الانتخاب الفردي منه تحت نظام الانتخاب بالقائمة

س 3-10 إذا كنت ممن خاضوا الانتخابات تحت نظام الانتخاب الفردي من قبل، فما هي أهم النقاط التي أردت لفت نظر الناخبين لها في الدائرة الانتخابية التي كنت مرشحاً فيها خلال أي من انتخابات مجلس الشعب التي شاركت فيها؟  
(برجاء ترتيب الاختيارات التالية حسب الأهمية: (1-2-3-4)

2000	1999	1995

الإنجازات السياسية التي سبق لك تحقيقها  
خبرتك السياسية السابقة  
جدول أعمالك السياسي  
مهاراتك الشخصية والسمعة  
علاقاتك ببعض الهيئات السياسية المحلية منها والقومية  
علاقاتك ببعض العائلات السياسية الكبيرة وقطاع الأعمال  
اسمك  
أسماء جميع المرشحين داخل القائمة الحزبية  
مبادئ الحزب الذي تنتمي إليه  
جدول الأعمال السياسي للحزب  
إذا كانت هناك أية استراتيجيات أخرى، برجاء توضيحها فيما يلي:

س 3-11 إذا كنت ممن خاضوا الانتخابات تحت نظام الانتخاب الفردي، إلى أي مدى بلغ اهتمامك بالموضوع الآتي في أي من الانتخابات التي خضتها؟ (رتب الاختيارات التالية حسب أهميتها بالنسبة إليك بحيث يكون 1 هو الأكثر أهمية، 2 مهم إلى حد ما، 3 ليس على درجة كبير من الأهمية وهكذا..)

الرجاء تجاهل السؤال إذا كان لا يناسبك

2000	1995	1990

خلق فرص عمل جديدة في منطقتك  
تحسين البنية الأساسية (الصحة - المواصلات - الإسكان - الخ)  
التعديلات السياسية الداخلية (قانون الأحزاب - قانون مباشرة الحقوق السياسية - قانون الطوارئ)  
المشاكل الداخلية (الاقتصاد - الرعاية الصحية - الضرائب - البيئة - الخ)  
المسائل الدولية (الصراع العربي الإسرائيلي - التعاون بين الدول العربية)  
إذا كانت لديك مواضيع إضافية الرجاء تحديدها :

س 3-12 إذا كنت ممن خاضوا الانتخابات من قبل تحت النظام الفردي فكيف أدت حملتك الانتخابية؟ وما هي الأنشطة التي قمت بها للتعريف بأهدافك ومبادئك في أي من انتخابات مجلس الشعب السابقة؟ (الرجاء رتب الاختيارات التالية وفقاً لأهميتها بالنسبة لك بحيث يكون 1 هو الأكثر أهمية، 2 مهم، 3 ليس بالأهمية الكبرى، 4 غير مهم)

الرجاء تجاهل السؤال إذا لم يكن ينطبق على حالتك

2000	1995	1990

الإعلان في الإذاعة و التلفزيون

الإعلان في الجرائد و المجلات

جولات حزبية على نطاق واسع

حملة دعائية من بيت لبيت

حملات المقاهي

توزيع برنامج الحزب و جرائده ومنشوراته

تعليق ملصقات الحزب

إذا لم يكن أي مما سبق الرجاء تحديد أي الوسائل اتخذت!

س 3-13 تحت النظام الانتخابي الفردي -وهو النظام الحالي- هل يؤثر اتخاذ كل المرشحين من الحزب الواحد لنفس الرمز الانتخابي بشكل كبير في حملتك الانتخابية

نعم ☐ لا ☐

س 3-14 إذا كانت إجابتك بنعم على السؤال السابق الرجاء تحديد كيف يمكن أن يؤثر الرمز الانتخابي على حملتك الانتخابية (الرجاء وضع علامة أمام الاختيار المناسب، يسمح بتعدد الإجابات)


قد تسهل تعاوناً أكبر بين المرشحين على مستوى الدائرة الانتخابية

قد تسهل تعريفاً أكبر بالحزب بين جمهور الناخبين

قد تسهل تعاوناً أكبر بين المرشحين من نفس الحزب بين الدوائر المختلفة

قد ترفع من فرصة نجاح الاثنين المرشحين من نفس الحزب معاً في نفس الدائرة

قد تساعد الناخبين على التعرف على المرشحين من نفس الحزب

قد لا تساعد على الإطلاق في أي من الاحتمالات السابقة تأثيراً في الحملة الانتخابية

إذا لم يكن أي من الاحتمالات السابقة الرجاء توضيح كيف يمكن أن تؤثر وحدة الرمز الانتخابي على الحملة الانتخابية للمرشح!

س 3.15 في النهاية أي العوامل التالية حددت النتيجة النهائية للانتخابات في دائرتك في أي من المرات التي خضت فيها انتخابات مجلس الشعب؟ (الرجاء ترتيب الاختيارات التالية بحيث يكون 1 هو الأكثر أهمية، 2 مهم نوعاً ما، 3 ليس مهماً بالدرجة الكافية، 4 غير مهم)

2000	1995	1990	1997	1984

عضوية الناجح في حزب و دعم هذا الحزب له في حملته الانتخابية

برنامج الحزب المنتمي إليه المرشح الناجح

قدرة المرشح الناجح على تحقيق خدمات لدائرته الانتخابية

السمة الشخصية للمرشح الناجح و كفاءته المهنية

دعم المرشح الناجح من خلال طبقة رجال الأعمال و العائلات

علاقات المرشح الناجح بالسلطات سواء المحلية أو المركزية

للدولة

الموارد المالية للمرشح الناجح

التزوير

المزيد من العوامل الرجاء الإيضاح!

س 3-16 خلال أي من انتخابات مجلس الشعب التي خضتها كيف كان تأثير علاقات المرشحين بالسلطات -سواء المحلية أو المركزية للدولة- مؤثرة في النتيجة النهائية للانتخابات؟(الرجاء وضع علامة أمام الإجابة المناسبة ،لا يسمح بتعدد الإجابات).

2000	1995	1990	1987	1984

ساعدتهم كثيراً  
عاونتهم إلى حد ما  
لم يكن لها تأثير على الإطلاق  
آنتهم إلى حد ما  
آنتهم كثيراً  
صعب التحديد

س 3-17 ماذا كانت نوعية المساعدة في الحملة الانتخابية التي تلقيتها من الحزب في أي من انتخابات مجلس الشعب التي خضتها من قبل؟(الرجاء رتب الاختيارات التالية وفقاً لأهميتها بحيث يكون يمثل الرقم 1 "الأكثر أهمية" و الرقم 2 "مهم نوعاً ما" و الرقم 3 "ليس مهماً على الإطلاق" و الرقم 4 "لا علاقة له بالأمر")

2000	1995	1990	1987	1984

أمدني الحزب بدعم نقدي مباشر  
أمدني الحزب بالمكان و الأدوات  
قام الحزب بطباعة المنشورات و الملصقات اللازمة للحملة الانتخابية  
تنظيم اللقاءات الجماهيرية و الجولات الحزبية  
الدعم من خلال قيادة الحزب  
الدعم من خلال شخصيات معروفة  
لم يقدم الحزب أي دعم من أي نوع

للمزيد من وسائل المساعدة ،الرجاء الإيضاح

س 3-18 أي من مصادر التمويل التالية مثلت الأهمية الكبرى لملكك الانتخابية في أي من انتخابات مجلس الشعب التي خضتها؟(الرجاء رتب الاختيارات التالية وفقاً لتواجدها من عدمها بحيث يمثل الرقم 1 "لم يكن لدي مثل هذا المصدر" و يمثل الرقم 2 "كان هذا المصدر هاماً للغاية" و الرقم 3 "هام" و الرقم 4 "غير مهم" و الرقم 5 لا علاقة له بالأمر).

2000	1995	1990	1987	1984

مدخراتك الشخصية  
الدعم المالي من الحزب  
المساعدة من الكيانات التجارية المحلية  
مساعداات الأصدقاء  
المساعدة من الاتحادات التجارية ، المنظمات غير الحكومية،؟؟؟  
مساعداات الأسرة

س 3-19 أين كان مقرك الانتخابي؟(الرجاء وضع علامة أمام الاختيار المناسب ،لا يسمح بتعدد الإجابات )

2000	1995	1990	1987	1984

في منزلك  
في مقر عملك  
في المقر الإقليمي للحزب  
في مؤسسة اجتماعية أخرى  
لم يكن لك مقر انتخابي

إذا لم يكن في أي مكان مما سبق ،الرجاء الإيضاح

من 3-20 وبالتقريب كم كان عدد الأشخاص الذين شاركوا في حملتك الانتخابية الحزبية في أي من انتخابات مجلس الشعب السابقة التي خضتها؟(الرجاء وضع علامة أمام الاختيار المناسب)

2000	1995	1990	1987	1984

صفر  
من صفر إلى 30 شخص  
من 30 إلى 60 شخص  
من 60 إلى 100 شخص  
أكثر من 100 شخص

من 3-21 في أي من انتخابات مجلس الشعب السابقة التي خضتها ممن تكون فريق العمل الخاص بحملتك الانتخابية؟(الرجاء رتب الاختيارات التالية وفقاً لأهميتها حيث يمثل الرقم 1 "شديد الأهمية" و الرقم 2 "هام" و الرقم 3 "غير هام" و الرقم 4 "لا علاقة له بالأمر").

2000	1995	1990	1987	1984

أعضاء الحزب  
متطوعون من جهات أخرى مساندة لك  
أفراد أسرته  
أصدقاءك

إذا لم يكن أي مما سبق،الرجاء الإيضاح؛

من 3-22 من وجهة نظرك ماذا كان تأثير دعم الحزب لك في أي من انتخابات مجلس الشعب السابقة التي خضتها؟(الرجاء وضع علامة أمام الإجابة المناسبة، لا يسمح بتعدد الإجابات)


ساعذك كثيراً  
علونك قليلاً  
لم يكن له تأثير على الإطلاق  
أذاك قليلاً  
أذاك كثيراً

من 3-23 إذا كنت ممن خاضوا انتخابات مجلس الشعب السابقة تحت نظام الانتخاب الفردي،ماذا كان نوع الدائرة الانتخابية التي جرى ترشيحك فيها؟(الرجاء وضع علامة أمام الاختيار المناسب،يسمح فقط باختيار واحد لكل انتخابات)

2000	1995	1990	1987

مساحة جغرافية واسعة وعدد كبير من السكان  
مساحة جغرافية كبيرة و عدد متوسط من السكان  
مساحة جغرافية كبيرة و عدد قليل من الناخبين المقيدون في الجداول الانتخابية  
مساحة جغرافية متوسطة و عدد كبير من السكان  
مساحة جغرافية متوسطة و عدد متوسط من الناخبين المقيدون  
مساحة جغرافية متوسطة و عدد قليل من السكان  
مساحة جغرافية متوسطة و عدد كبير من الناخبين المقيدون في الجداول  
مساحة صغيرة و عدد متوسط من الناخبين المقيدون في الجداول  
مساحة صغيرة و عدد قليل من الناخبين المقيدون في الجداول



س 3-24 بناء على خبرتك الشخصية،الرجاء وضع علامة أمام ما توافق عليه من العبارات التالية(لا يسمح بتعدد الإجابات)


الدوائر الصغيرة تتيح فرصة أكبر للحملات الانتخابية المركزة على الأشخاص  
الدوائر الانتخابية الصغيرة تتطلب قدراً أقل من الموارد اللازمة للحملة الانتخابية و الوقت اللازم للاتصال بالناخبين  
حجم الدائرة الانتخابية لا تأثير له على شكل الحملة الانتخابية  
حجم الدائرة الانتخابية لا تأثير له على الموارد المطلوبة للحملة الانتخابية و لا الوقت اللازم للاتصال بالناخبين

إذا لم يوافقك أي مما سبق،الرجاء إيضاح كيف يؤثر حجم الدائرة الانتخابية على الحملة الانتخابية

س 3-25 في أي من انتخابات مجلس الشعب السابقة التي خضتها،هل سعت للتعاون مع مرشح أو أكثر من نفس الحزب الذي تنتمي إليه و المرشح أو المرشحين في نفس دائرتك؟

2000	1995	1990	1987	1984

نعم،تعاونت مع المرشحين من نفس الحزب  
لا، لم أتعاون

س 3-26 إذا كانت إجابتك بنعم ما هو نوع التعاون قمت به؟(الرجاء ضع علامة أمام الاختيار الذي يناسبك وفقاً لأهميته حيث يعني الرقم 1 "هام جداً" و الرقم 2 "هام" و الرقم 3 "ليس مهماً جداً" و الرقم 4 "لا علاقة له بالأمر" و الرقم 5 "صعب الإجابة")

2000	1995	1990	1987	1984

تنظيم الجولات الانتخابية العامة  
الاشتراك في المقار الانتخابية  
الاشتراك في الموارد المالية  
توحيد البرنامج الانتخابي و المنشورات و الملصقات  
توحيد الدعاية الانتخابية  
فريق موحد للعمل على الحملة الانتخابية

س 3.27 تحت نظام الانتخاب الفردي،هل سبق لك أن تعاونت مع أحد المرشحين من حزب آخر أو مستقل ؟

نعم ☐ لا ☐

إذا كانت إجابتك بنعم الرجاء إكمال القسم 3-1 و إذا كانت إجابتك لا أكمل القسم 3-2

### القسم 3-1

س 3-1-1 خلال هذه الانتخابات،هل قدم حزبك مرشحين لكل المقعدين في الدائرة الانتخابية؟

نعم ☐ لا ☐

س 3-1-2 ما الذي دفعك لإجراء هذا التعاون مع مرشحين من حزب آخر أو مستقل؟ (الرجاء وضع علامة أمام الذي يناسبك، يسمح بتعدد الإجابات)


كان المرشح الآخر يتمتع بشعبية عالية في دائرتك  
كان المرشح الآخر متقارباً معك أيديولوجياً  
المرشح الذي رشحه حزبك معك للمقعد الآخر كان يفتقد الشعبية  
المرشح الذي رشحه حزبك معك للمقعد الآخر لم يكن معروفاً بالمرّة  
البرنامج الانتخابي للمرشح الآخر كان مقارباً لبرنامجك  
شجعك حزبك على هذا التعاون  
إذا لم يكن أي مما سبق، الرجاء إيضاح السبب الصحيح

س 3-1-3 كيف كان شكل هذا التعاون (الرجاء وضع علامة أمام الرأي الذي يناسبك، يسمح بتعدد الإجابات)

2000	1995	1990	1987

تأمين الدعم من قبل الحزب الآخر و مرشحيه  
نوع من توحيد مظاهر الحملة الانتخابية  
استخدام برنامج انتخابي مشترك  
الاشتراك في المقار الانتخابية بين كل المرشحين المتعاونين  
فريق عمل مشترك خاص بالحملة الانتخابية  
الاشتراك في الموارد المالية  
انسحاب أحد المرشحين من الدائرة الانتخابية

لإضافة أشكال أخرى من التعاون، الرجاء الإيضاح

س 3-1-4 إلى أي مدى سمح لك حزبك بالتعاون مع مرشح من حزب آخر أو مستقل في نفس الدائرة الانتخابية (الرجاء وضع علامة أمام الإجابة المناسبة، لا يسمح بتعدد الإجابات)


كنت حراً تماماً في التعاون مع أي مرشح آخر في دائرتك الانتخابية  
كنت حراً في التعاون مع أي مرشح مختلف معك في الصفة الانتخابية  
كنت حراً في التعاون مع أي من المرشحين المستقلين المختلفين معك في الصفة الانتخابية  
كنت حراً في التعاون مع مرشحي الأحزاب الذين تتقارب برامجهم الانتخابية مع برنامجك  
كنت مضطراً للتعاون مع مرشحين من الأحزاب المتحالفة بشكل رسمي مع حزبك  
لم يكن هناك مجال للتعاون مع حزب ثالث قدم مرشحين للصفين معاً  
لم يكن هناك مجال للتعاون مع حزب ثالث تحت أي ظرف من الظروف

### القسم 2-3

س 3-2-1 تحت نظام الانتخاب الفردي إلى أي مدى قد يسمح لك حزبك بالتعاون مع مرشحين من حزب آخر في ذات الدائرة؟ (الرجاء وضع علامة أمام الإجابة المناسبة، لا يسمح بتعدد الإجابات)


ربما ستكون حراً في التعاون مع أي مرشح آخر في دائرتك الانتخابية  
ربما ستكون حراً في التعاون مع أي مرشح مختلف معك في الصفة الانتخابية  
ربما ستكون حراً في التعاون مع أي من المرشحين المستقلين المختلفين معك في الصفة الانتخابية  
ربما ستكون حراً في التعاون مع مرشحي الأحزاب الذين تتقارب برامجهم الانتخابية مع برنامجك  
ربما ستكون مضطراً للتعاون مع مرشحين من الأحزاب المتحالفة بشكل رسمي مع حزبك  
لن يكون هناك مجال للتعاون مع حزب ثالث قدم مرشحين للصفين معاً  
لن يكون هناك مجال للتعاون مع حزب ثالث تحت أي ظرف من الظروف

س 3-28 إذا كنت قد خضت الانتخابات تحت نظام القائمة الحزبية ، هل سبق أن حدث أي نوع من التعاون بين حزبك و بين أي حزب آخر؟

نعم ☐ لا ☐

إذا كانت إجابتك "نعم" الرجاء القسم 3-3، و إذا لم تكن فالرجاء إكمال الإجابة بالسؤال 3-29

### القسم 3-3

س 3-1-1 كيف كان هذا التعاون منظماً لانتخابات مجلس الشعب التي شاركت فيها؟(الرجاء وضع علامة أمام الإجابة المناسبة،يسمح بتعدد الإجابات ).

1987	1984

قوائم انتخابية مشتركة في كل المحافظات  
قوائم انتخابية مشتركة في بعض المحافظات  
تنظيم جولات مشتركة  
الاشتراك في المقار الانتخابية  
الاشتراك في الموارد المالية  
الاشتراك في الدعايات الانتخابية  
مندوبين مشتركين للمراقبة في اللجان الانتخابية

س 3-1-2 الرجاء توضيح أي الأحزاب تعاونت معها؟

الحزب/الأحزاب


1984

1987

س 3-29 أي من الأنظمة الانتخابية الآتية يناسبك أكثر كنظام لانتخاب مجلس الشعب؟


نظام القائمة الحزبية المغلقة  
نظام القائمة الحزبية المفتوحة  
نظام الانتخاب الفردي  
تصعب الإجابة على هذا السؤال

### القسم الرابع

س 4-1 أي الانتخابات كانت عامرة أكثر بالمنافسة بين الانتخابات التي شاركت فيها؟

2000	1995	1990	1987	1984

الأشد منافسة  
على قدر من المنافسة  
ليست على أي درجة من المنافسة  
تصعب الإجابة

س 4-2 من وجهة نظرك ، إلى أي درجة وصلت الحرية و العدالة في أي من انتخابات مجلس الشعب التي خضتها؟

2000	1995	1990	1987	1984

الأكثر عدالة و حرية  
مزورة إلى حد ما  
مزورة بالكامل  
تصعب الإجابة على ذلك

Appendix No. 2. Party Candidate & Deputy Survey Questionnaire (English Version)

Introductory Remarks:

Complete the following questionnaire to the best of your knowledge and without any outside help. Follow the instructions given for each question. If the question does not apply to your circumstances, DO NOT answer it and mark the question with the following statement: *“not applicable in my case”*.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND EFFORT!

SECTION ONE

First Name:	
Last Name:	
Current Party Membership:	
Year of Party Entry:	
Date & Place of Interview	

Question 1.1: Why did you become a party member? (Please tick the appropriate answer. Multiple answers are possible).

Your ideological affiliation with the party	<input type="checkbox"/>
Your family linkage with the party	<input type="checkbox"/>
The party’s popularity in your locality	<input type="checkbox"/>
Your personal political ambitions	<input type="checkbox"/>
For additional reasons please specify:	

-----

Question 1.2: Have you ever been a member of, or affiliated with, more than one political party/formation since 1977?

YES ☐ NO ☐

If you answered with YES please complete section 1.1. Alternatively continue with Section 2.

Section 1.1

Question 1.1.1: Could you please indicate the parties you have been a member of, the duration of your membership and whether you have been a party candidate for that particular party.

	Period of Membership	Party Candidate?
National Democratic Party (Hisb al-Watani)		
New Wafd Party (Hisb al-Wafd al-Gedeed)		
Socialist Labour Party (Hisb al-Amal)		
Nationalist Progressive Unionist Party (Hisb al-Tagammu)		
Arab Democratic Nasserite Party (Hisb-al-Nassri)		
Liberal Democratic Party (Hisb al-Ahrar)		
Umma Party (Hisb al-Umma)		
Green Party (Hisb al-Khudr)		
Populist Democratic Party		
Egypt Arab Socialist Party (Hisb al-Masri)		
Young Egypt Party (Misr al-Fatah)		
Social Justice Party		
Democratic Unionist Party		
Muslim Brotherhood (Ikwahan)		
Solidarity Party (Al-Takaful)		
National Concordance (Al-Wifaq Al-Qawmi)		

Question 1.1.2: What motivated you to change your party membership? (Please tick the appropriate answers. Multiple answers are possible).

Your party entered into an alliance with another party with which you did not agree	
You did not agree with the position of the central /local party leadership	
You did not agree with the programmatic / ideological direction of the party	
The party would not re-select you as its official candidate	
You thought you had greater political career prospects with another political party	
For additional reasons, please specify:	

SECTION TWO

Question 2.1: Please indicate for which of the following Majlis al-Shaab election and in which constituency you ran as candidate?

	Constituency	Governorate
1984		
1987		
1990		
1995		
2000		

Question 2.2: How long have you been a party member before being nominated as party candidate for any of the past Majlis al-Shaab elections you participated in? (Please tick the appropriate time span. If you were a member of more than one party, please use additional columns)

	1 <sup>st</sup> Party	2 <sup>nd</sup> Party	3 <sup>rd</sup> Party
From its very foundation			
More than 5 years			
Between 3-5 years			
Between 1-3 years			
Less than a year			
Since recently			

Question 2.3: Who first approached you to seek a party nomination for any of the past Majlis al-Shaab elections you participated in? (Please tick the appropriate answer. Multiple answers are NOT possible).

	1984	1987	1990	1995	2000
Friends encouraged me to run on a party label					
The local party leadership approached me					
The governorate party leadership approached me					
The central party leadership approached me					
I sought the party nomination myself					
If none of the above, please specify:					

-----

Question 2.4: Why did the party seek to nominate you as its official candidate for any of the past Majlis al-Shaab elections you participated in? (Please rank the following motivations in order of their importance with 1 indicating ‘very important’, 2 ‘somewhat important’, 3 ‘not very important’ and 4 ‘irrelevant’).

*Please ignore the question if it doesn’t apply to you!*

	1984	1987	1990	1995	2000
You were known to sympathise with the party’s ideology					
You had been a long serving party member					
You were popular in the constituency					
You had well established business / family connections					
You were financially independent					
Any further reasons, please indicate here:					

-----

Question 2.5: Why did you seek the party's nomination for any of the past Majlis al-Shaab elections you participated in? (Please rank the following motivations in order of their importance with 1 indicating 'very important', 2 'somewhat important', 3 'not very important' and 4 'irrelevant').

*Please ignore the question if it doesn't apply to you!*

	1984	1987	1990	1995	2000
The party's popularity in your constituency					
The party's capacity to support your election campaign					
The party's connections to local/central state authorities					
A legal obligation to run under a party label					
Your sympathy with the party's political platform					
You had run on the party ticket in previous elections					
Any further reasons, please indicate here:					

Question 2.6: If you competed under the party-list system of 1984 / 1987, who determined the constituency list for which you were to run for any of the past Majlis al-Shaab elections your party participated in? (Please tick the appropriate answer. Multiple answers are NOT possible).

*Please ignore the question if it doesn't apply to you!*

	1984	1987
A candidate's grass-roots support decided where candidates were to run		
The local party leadership decided where candidates were to run		
The governorate party leadership decided where candidates were to run		
The central party leadership decided where candidates were to run		
Candidates were free to choose his/her district		
If none of the above, please specify:		

Question 2.7: If you competed under the party-list system of 1984 / 1987, which list position did you hold out of how many list candidates?

*Please ignore the question if it doesn't apply to you!*

	1984	1987
Your list position		
The total number of candidates on the list		
You campaigned for the individual seat	X	

Question 2.8: If you competed under the party list system of 1984 / 1987, which factors determined, according to you the list position candidates were assigned in any of the past Majlis al-Shaab elections you participated in? (Please rank the following options in order of their importance, with 1 indicating 'very important', 2 'somewhat important', 3 'not very important' and 4 'irrelevant').

	1984	1987
The duration of his/her party membership		
His/her seniority within the party		
His/her party loyalty		
His/ her personal reputation within the governorate		
His/her connections to local business elites and families		
For additional reasons please specify:		

Question 2.9: Under the current candidate-based electoral systems, who determined the constituency you were to run for any of the past Majlis al-Shaab elections you participated in? (Please tick the appropriate answer. Multiple answers are possible.)

	1990	1995	2000
A candidate's grass-roots support decided where candidates were to run			
The local party leadership decided where candidates were to run			
The governorate party leadership decided where candidates were to run			
The central party leadership decided where candidates were to run			
Candidates were free to choose his/her district			
If none of the above, please specify:			

If YOU chose your own constituency, please complete Section 2.2. Alternatively continue with Question 2.10.

### Section 2.1

Question 2.1.1: Listed below are several reasons why a candidate would choose a particular constituency. Why did you choose to run in that particular constituency for any of the past Majlis al-Shaab elections you participated in? (Please rank the following options in order of their importance, with 1 indicating 'very important', 2 'important', 3 'not important', 4 'irrelevant' and 5 'hard to say').

	1987	1990	1995	2000
Your party was popular in the constituency				
Your political opponents in the constituency were weak				
You lived in that constituency				
You were personally well known and respected in the constituency				
Your family is well known and respected in the constituency				
You were well connected to the local business community				
You had run in the constituency before				
For additional reasons please specify:				



Question 2.10: Under the current candidate-based electoral system, in case of non- or de-selection by your party, which of the following strategies would you pursue? (Please tick the appropriate option. Multiple answers are NOT possible).

You would run as independent and not rejoin the party after the elections	<input type="checkbox"/>
You would run as so called 'party independent', seeking to rejoin the party after the elections	<input type="checkbox"/>
You would seek the nomination of another party	<input type="checkbox"/>
You would try to create your own political party	<input type="checkbox"/>
You would not run in the upcoming elections	<input type="checkbox"/>
If none of the above, please specify:	

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*If you ran as INDEPENDENT for any post-1987 Majlis al-Shaab elections, please complete Section 2.3. Alternatively continue with Section 3.*

**Section 2.2**

Question 2.2.1: If you were deselected did you actually run as an independent?

YES ☐ NO ☐

Question 2.2.2: If 'Yes', did you perceive running as an independent a disadvantage compared to running on a party ticket?

YES ☐ NO ☐

Question 2.2.3: After the elections, did you rejoin the party you were initially de-selected from?

Yes, I sought re-admittance to the party and was accepted	<input type="checkbox"/>
Yes, I sought re-admittance to the party but was rejected	<input type="checkbox"/>
Yes, the party invited me to rejoin and I accepted	<input type="checkbox"/>
Yes the party invited me to rejoin but I declined	<input type="checkbox"/>
No, I did not rejoin my party	<input type="checkbox"/>
No, I joined another party instead	<input type="checkbox"/>

SECTION THREE

Question 3.1: How important were each of the following factors in determining the order in which voters preferred the candidates in your constituency in those Majlis al-Shaab elections you participated in (Please rank the following options with 1 indicating ‘very important’, 2 ‘somewhat important’, 3 ‘not very important’ and 4 ‘irrelevant’).

The candidate’s membership of a particular party	
The candidate’s ideological position & programme	
The candidate’s reputation within the constituency (family background, business ties prof. standing)	
The candidate’s residence within the constituency	
The candidate’s capability to provide constituency services	
For additional reasons please specify:	

-----

Question 3.2: Which of the following vote-seeking devices would best serve your electoral prospects during any given parliamentary election campaign under the current socio-political conditions? (Please rank the following strategies in order of your preference with 1 indicting ‘ very important’, 2 ‘somewhat important’, 3 ‘not very important’ and 4 ‘irrelevant’).

Your party’s election manifesto	
Your party’s legislative achievements	
Your party’s historical legacy and reputation	
Your party’s links to interest groups (e.g. trade unions)	
Your ideological position	
Your our personal legislative achievements	
Your personal reputation	
Your family background/reputation	
Your locality / local rootedness	
Your own union/syndicate membership	
If none of the above, please specify	

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Question 3.3: If you campaigned under BOTH the candidate and party list system, what did you want voters to pay attention to under the two electoral systems? (Please rank the following strategies in order of their importance with 1 indicting ‘very important’, 2 ‘somewhat important’, 3 ‘not very important’ and 4 ‘irrelevant’).

*Please ignore the question if it doesn’t apply to you!*

	Party-List System	Candidate-Based System
Your past legislative achievements		
Your prior political experience		
Your political agenda		
Your personal skills and reputation		
Your connections to local and national political authorities		
Your connectedness to important local families and business		
Your name		
The names of all candidates on your party list		
Your party label		
Your party’s electoral manifesto		
For further strategies, please specify:		

Question 3.4: If you campaigned under BOTH the candidate and party list system, what activities did you or your party organise to promote your election platform under the two electoral systems? (Please rank the activities in order of their importance with 1 indicating ‘very important’, 2’ important’, 3 ‘not very important’ and 4 ‘irrelevant’).

*Please ignore the question if it doesn’t apply to you!*

	Party-List System	Candidate-Based System
TV/ Radio advertisement		
Newspaper advertisement		
Large-scale party rallies		
Door-to-door campaigning		
Coffee house campaigning		
Distribution of party manifestos/leaflets/newspapers		
Posting of party banners		
For additional activities please specify:		

Question 3.5: If you campaigned under BOTH the candidate and party list system, according to you, did the type of election campaign you and your party pursued differ under the previous party-list system compared to the current candidate based system?

YES ☐ NO ☐

Question 3.6: If you answered with YES, please provide a brief outline of how the election campaigns differed in terms of strategy and issues addressed between those elections run under the party-list compared to those run under the candidate based system. (Please use the space below to briefly outline your argument).

*Please ignore the question if it doesn't apply to you!*

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Question 3.7: If you campaigned under the past party-list system, how did your list position affect the vote-getting strategy you pursued in any of the past Majlis al-Shaab elections you participated in? (Please tick the appropriate answer. Multiple answers are possible)

*Please ignore the question if it doesn't apply to you!*

Due to your top list position you promoted your personality over the party label

Despite your top list position you promoted the party label over your personality

Due to your lower list position you promoted the party label over your personality

Due to your lower list position you promoted the party's top candidates above all else

Your list position did not affect the vote-seeking strategy at all

If none of the above, please specify how district size mattered:

1984	1987

-----

Question 3.8: If you campaigned under the party-list system, how did the usage of a **common party symbol** for all candidates across all constituencies affect the election campaign?

*Please ignore the question if it doesn't apply to you!*

It facilitated greater cooperation among the candidates running under the constituency list

It facilitated greater party recognition among the electorate

It facilitated greater cross- constituency cooperation among candidates from the same party

It helped voters identify members of the same party

It helped candidates promote their common political platform

It had no effect whatsoever on the election campaign

If it affected any other aspect of your election campaign please specify:


-----

Question 3.9: If you campaigned under the party-list system, please indicate with which, if any, of the following statements you would agree. (Please tick the appropriate statement. Multiple answers are possible).

**Please ignore the question if it doesn't apply to you!**

Under the party-list system constituency-level cooperation among candidates from the same party was more important than under the candidate-based electoral system	
Under the party-list system candidates were more encouraged to emphasise the common party label than under the candidate-based electoral system	
Constituency-level cooperation among candidates was equally promoted under the candidate-based and the party-list electoral system	
The party label was equally insignificant under the candidate-based and party-list electoral system	
Constituency-level cooperation among candidates was more important under the candidate-based than under the party-list electoral system	
The party label was more important under the candidate-based than under the part-list electoral system	

Question 3.10: If you campaigned under the candidate-based electoral system, what did you want voters to pay attention to in the constituency you were running for any of the past Majlis al-Shaab elections you participated in? (Please rank the following strategies in order of your preference with 1 indicting 'very important', 2 'somewhat important', 3 'not very important' and 4 'irrelevant').

**Please ignore the question if it doesn't apply to you!**

	1990	1995	2000
Your past legislative achievements			
Your prior political experience			
Your political agenda			
Your personal skills and reputation			
Your connections to local and national political authorities			
Your connectedness to and support of local families and business			
Your name			
The names of all candidates on the party list			
Your party label			
Your party's electoral manifesto			
For further strategies, please specify:			

Question 3.11: If you campaigned under the candidate-based electoral system, how much importance did you accord to the following issues in any of the election campaigns you participated in? (Please rank the following options in order of your preference with 1 being 'very important', 2 'somewhat important', 3 'not very important' and 4 'irrelevant').

**Please ignore the question if it doesn't apply to you!**

	1990	1995	2000
Creation of local employment opportunities			
Improvements to local infrastructure (health, traffic, housing etc.)			
Domestic political reform (party law, electoral law, emergency law)			
Domestic problems (economic, healthcare, tax, environment etc.)			
International issues (Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Pan-Arab cooperation )			
For additional issues please specify:			

Question 3.12: If you campaigned under the candidate-based electoral system, how did you run your campaign? What activities did you organise to promote your platform for any of the past Majlis al-Shaab elections you participated in? (Please rank the following campaigning activities in order of their importance, with 1 being 'very important', 2 'important', 3 'not very important' and 4 'irrelevant').

*Please ignore the question if it doesn't apply to you!*

	1990	1995	2000
TV/ Radio advertisement			
Newspaper advertisement			
Large-scale party rallies			
Door-to-door campaigning			
Coffee house campaigning			
Distribution of party manifestos/leaflets/ newspapers			
Posting of party banners			
If none of the above, please specify:			

-----

Question 3.13: Under the current candidate-based electoral system, would the usage of a common symbol for all candidates of your party significantly affect your election campaign and electoral prospects?

YES ☐ NO ☐

Question 3.14: If you answered with YES, please indicate how a common candidate symbol would affect your election campaign. (Please tick the appropriate answer. Multiple answers are possible)

It would facilitate greater cooperation among your candidates at the constituency level	<input type="checkbox"/>
It would facilitate greater party recognition among the electorate	<input type="checkbox"/>
It would facilitate greater cross-constituency cooperation among candidates from the same party	<input type="checkbox"/>
It would increase the electoral chances for both partisan candidates in your constituency	<input type="checkbox"/>
It would help voters identify members of the same party	<input type="checkbox"/>
It would not benefit any of the above aspects of an election campaign	<input type="checkbox"/>
If it would effect any other aspect of your campaign, please specify:	<input type="checkbox"/>

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Question 3.15: In the end, what factors determined the outcome in your constituency for any of the past Majlis al-Shaab elections you participated in? (Please rank the following options in order of their importance with 1 indicating ‘very important’, 2 ‘somewhat important’, 3 ‘not very important’ and 4 ‘irrelevant’).

	1984	1987	1990	1995	2000
The winner’s party membership and campaigning support					
The winner’s party manifesto					
The winner’s capacity to deliver constituency services					
The winner’s personal reputation and professional integrity					
The winner’s backing by local business elites and families					
The winner’s connection to the local/central authorities of the state					
The winner’s financial resources					
Vote rigging					
For additional factors, please specify:					

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Question 3.16: During any of the past Majlis al-Shaab elections, how beneficial were a candidate’s connections to state authorities (either local or central) in determining the election outcome? (Please tick the appropriate answer. Multiple answers are NOT possible).

	1984	1987	1990	1995	2000
Helped them a great deal					
Aided them somewhat					
Made no difference at all					
Hurt them somewhat					
Hurt them a lot					
Hard to say					

Question 3.17: How did the party support your election campaign during any Majlis al-Shaab elections you participated in? (Please rank the following options in order of their importance with 1 indicating ‘very important’, 2 ‘somewhat important’, 3 ‘not important at all’ and 4 ‘irrelevant’).

	1984	1987	1990	1995	2000
Provision of direct financial support					
Provision of office space and staff					
Printing of campaign newspapers, leaflets and posters					
Organisation of public meetings and rallies					
Support by party leadership					
Support by prominent public figures					
No campaign support at all					
For additional means of support, please specify:					

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Question 3.18: Which of the following sources of financial help were most important for your campaign during any of the past Majlis al-Shaab elections you participated in? (Please rank the following options in order of their adequacy with 1 indicating that there was 'no such source', 2 the source was 'very important', 3 'important', 4 'not important' and 5 'irrelevant').

	1984	1987	1990	1995	2000
Your own earnings					
Party financial support					
Help from local commercial structures					
Help from friends					
Help from trade unions, NGOs, PVOs					
Help from family					

Question 3.19: Where were your campaign headquarters located? (Please tick the appropriate answer. Multiple answers are NOT possible).

	1984	1987	1990	1995	2000
At home					
At your place of work					
At the local party headquarters					
At another social organisation					
You had no election headquarters					
If none of the above, please specify,					

Question 3.20: About how many people were actively involved in your party's election campaign during any of the past Majlis al-Shaab elections you participated in? (Please tick the appropriate option.)

	1984	1987	1990	1995	2000
0					
0 – 30					
30- 60					
60-100					
Above 100					

Question 3.21: How was your campaign team composed for any of the past Majlis al-Shaab elections you participated in? (Please rank the following options in order of their importance, with 1 indicating 'very important', 2 'important' 3, 'not important' and 4 'irrelevant').

	1984	1987	1990	1995	2000
Party members					
Volunteers from other support organisations					
Family member					
Friends					
If none of the above, please specify:					



Question 3.22: Overall, what effect do you think did your party's support have on your election prospects for any of the Majlis al-Shaab elections you participated in? (Please tick the appropriate answer. Multiple answers are NOT possible).

Helped you a great deal	<input type="checkbox"/>
Aided you somewhat	<input type="checkbox"/>
Made no difference at all	<input type="checkbox"/>
Hurt you somewhat	<input type="checkbox"/>
Hurt you a great deal	<input type="checkbox"/>

Question 3.23: Under the **candidate-based electoral system**, please indicate what types of constituencies you were running for any of the past Majlis al-Shaab elections you participated in? (Please tick the appropriate options for each of the following elections. Multiple answers per election are NOT possible)

	1987	1990	1995	2000
Geographically large district with large number of registered voters	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Geographically large district with medium number of registered voters	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Geographically large district with small number of registered voters	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Geographically medium district with large number of registered voters	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Geographically medium district with medium number of registered voters	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Geographically medium district with small number of registered voters	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Physically small district with large number of registered voters	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Physically small district with medium number of registered voters	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Physically small district with small number of registered voters	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Question 3.24: Based on your own experience, please indicate with which, if any, of the following statements you agree (Please tick the appropriate statement. Multiple answers are NOT possible).

Small districts allow for a more personalised election campaign than large districts	<input type="checkbox"/>
Small districts require less campaigning resources and time to reach voters than large districts	<input type="checkbox"/>
District size bears no influence over the style of election campaign	<input type="checkbox"/>
District size bears no impact on the time and resources spend in the election	<input type="checkbox"/>
If none of the above, please specify how district size mattered:	

Question 3.25: During any of the past election campaign you participated in did you seek to cooperate with candidate(s) of your own party running in the same constituency?

	1984	1987	1990	1995	2000
YES, I cooperated with candidates from my party	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
NO, I did not cooperate	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Question 3.26: If you answered with YES, what form of cooperation did you engage in? (Please mark the appropriate tactics in order of their importance with 1 being 'very important', 2 'important', 3 'not very important', 4 'irrelevant' and 5 'hard to say').

	1984	1987	1990	1995	2000
Organisation of common rallies					
Common campaign headquarters					
Pooling of financial resources					
Common electoral manifesto / leaflets/newspapers					
Common electoral advertisement					
Common campaign support team					

Question 3.27: Under the current candidate-based system did you ever engage in cross-party cooperation with candidates from other political formations or independents?

YES ☐ NO ☐

If you answered with YES please complete Section 3.1. Alternatively complete Section 3.2.

Section 3.1

Question 3.1.1: During those elections, did your party present candidates for both district seats?

YES ☐ NO ☐

Q 3.1.2: What motivated you to pursue cross-party cooperation? (Please tick appropriate motivation. Multiple answers are possible)

The other candidate was very popular in your constituency	
The other candidate was ideologically close to your own position	
Your co-partisan for the second constituency seat was unpopular	
Your co-partisan for the second constituency seat was too unknown	
The other candidate's programme was closest to your own	
Your party encouraged this cooperation	
If none of the above, please specify:	

Question 3.1.3: How did such cross-party cooperation look like? (Please tick the appropriate options. Multiple answers are possible).

	1987	1990	1995	2000
Pledges of support for the allied party and its candidates				
Common campaigning appearances				
The usage of a common electoral manifesto				
The fusion of campaign headquarters among allied candidates				
A common campaign support team				
The pooling of financial resources				
The retreat of one candidate from the constituency				
For additional forms of cooperation, please specify:				

Question 3.1.4: Overall, under the candidate-based electoral system, how much leverage did the party allow you to engage in district level cooperation with candidates from other parties? (Please tick the appropriate answer. Multiple answers are NOT possible).

You were free to cooperate with any other candidate in the constituency	<input type="checkbox"/>
You were free to cooperate with any other candidate from the second category	<input type="checkbox"/>
You were free to cooperate with independent candidates from the second category	<input type="checkbox"/>
You were free to cooperate with candidates of parties programmatically close to your party	<input type="checkbox"/>
You were bound to cooperate with the candidates of those parties your party formally aligned with	<input type="checkbox"/>
No third party cooperation was allowed, where candidates were running in both categories	<input type="checkbox"/>
No third party cooperation was allowed under any circumstances	<input type="checkbox"/>

Section 3.2

Question 3.2.1: Under the candidate-based electoral system, how much leverage would the party allow you to engage in district level cooperation with candidates from other parties? (Please tick the appropriate answer. Multiple answers are NOT possible).

You would be free to cooperate with any other candidate in the constituency	<input type="checkbox"/>
You would be free to cooperate with any other candidate from the second category	<input type="checkbox"/>
You would be free to cooperate with independent candidates from the second category	<input type="checkbox"/>
You would be free to cooperate with candidates of parties programmatically close to your party	<input type="checkbox"/>
You would be bound to the consent of your party to such cooperation	<input type="checkbox"/>
No third party cooperation would be allowed, where candidates were running in both categories	<input type="checkbox"/>
No third party cooperation would be allowed, under any circumstances	<input type="checkbox"/>

Question 3.28: If you ran under the party-list system, did your party ever engage in any form of electoral cooperation with other parties?

YES ☐ NO ☐

If you answered with YES please complete Section 3.3. Alternatively continue with Question 3.29.

Section 3.3

Question 3.1.1: How was such cooperation organised for the Majlis al-Shaab elections you participated in? (Please tick the appropriate answer. Multiple answers are possible).

Common electoral lists in all governorates	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Common electoral lists in some governorates	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Organisation of common rallies	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Common campaign headquarters	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Pooling of financial resources	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Common electoral advertisement	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Common observers at polling stations	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
For additional forms of cooperation, please specify:		

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Question 3.1.2: Please indicate the party or parties you cooperated with?

Party / Parties
1984
1987

Question 3.29: Overall, which of the following electoral system would best serve your election or re-election prospects for national level parliamentary elections?

Closed party list system	
Mixed candidate and party list system	
Individual Candidate-based System	
Hard to say	

SECTION 4:

Question 4.1: Overall, how competitive would you say, where those past Majlis al-Shaab elections you participated in?

	1984	1987	1990	1995	2000
Overall competitive					
Partly competitive					
Not competitive					
Hard to say					

Question 4.2: Overall, how free and fair would you consider those past Majlis al-Shaab elections you participated in?

	1984	1987	1990	1995	2000
Overall free and fair					
Partly fraudulent					
Very fraudulent					
Hard to say					

## Appendix No. 3. Party Candidate & Deputies Survey Results

### 1. Sample Information

#### 1.1 Parties and Election Years Covered

##### Candidates by Party:

Tagammu:	12	30.0%
Wafd:	11	27.5%
MB:	4	10.0%
Green:	4	10.0%
Labour:	4	10.0%
Liberal:	2	5.0%
ADNP:	2	5.0%
Ind.:	1	2.5%

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Total No. of Candidates:	40	100.0%
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##### Candidates by Year of Elections:

1984:	9	22.0%	1979:	1	3.0%
1987:	13	33.0%	1990:	3	7.5%
			1995:	16	40.0%
			2000:	25	63.0%

Total number of candidates campaigning under the PR list-based regime:	16	40.0%
Total number of candidates campaigning under the AM candidate based regime:	35	88.0%
Total number of candidates campaigning under both electoral system types:	11	28.0%

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Total No. of Candidates Interviewed:	40	100.0%
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##### Candidates by Parliamentary Experience

Total No. of Candidates with Parliamentary Experience:	7	17.5%
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ADNP:	2
MB:	1
Tagammu:	1
Wafd:	3

Total No. of Candidates without Parliamentary Experience:	33	82.5%
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ADNP:	1
MB:	3
Green:	4
Labour:	4
Liberal:	2
Tagammu:	11
Wafd:	8

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Total No. of Candidates Interviewed:	40	100.0%
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**Candidates by Sex:**

Total Number of Female Candidates:	7	17.5%
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Green:	1
Liberal:	2
Tagammu:	2
Wafd:	2

Total Number of Male Candidates:	33	82.5%
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ADNP:	2
MB:	4
Green:	4
Labour:	4
Liberal:	0
Tagammu:	10
Wafd:	9

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Total No. of Candidates Interviewed:	40	100.0%
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**Governorates - Constituencies under List-PR Regime:**

Urban	Rural
1 <sup>st</sup> District - Giza	Mahala Al-Kubra – Gharbiya
Imbaba – Giza	Gharbiya – Gharbiya
Duqqi / Aguza – Giza	Damietta - Damietta
East Cairo – Cairo	1st District – Menoufiya
South Cairo - Cairo	Kafr Shukr – Qaliyubiya
Raml – Alexandria	

***Constituencies:***

Total urban constituencies covered:	6	15.5%
Total rural constituencies covered:	5	10.4%

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Total number of constituencies covered:	11	23.0%
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Total number of constituencies:	48	100.0%
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***Governorates:***

Total urban governorates covered:	3	11.5%
Total rural governorates covered:	4	15.4%

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Total number of governorates covered:	7	27.0%
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Total number of governorates:	26	100.0%
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**Governorates – Constituencies under AM-Candidate Regime:**

Urban	Rural
Bulaq al-Dakrur (17) - Cairo	Tookh – Qalyubiya
Misr al-Qadima (22) – Cairo	Kafr Shukr – Qaliyubiya
Al-Tebeen (25) – Cairo	Beltin / Hamoul – Kafr Sheikh
Sayda Zaynab – Cairo	Bandar Damietta - Damietta
Al Basateen – Cairo	Banruh – Daqahliya
Matariyya – Cairo	Mit Ghamr (16) – Daqahliya
Hada'iq al-Quba (10) – Cairo	Tala – Minufiya
Zawiyya al-Hamra (5) – Cairo	Shebeen Al Kom (1) - Minufiya
Dhahir / Azbakiya – Cairo	Markaz Malawi – Miniya
Duqqi / Aguza (2) – Giza	Al-Mahala Al-Kubra (5) – Gharbiya
Imbaba (5) - Giza	Damanhour – Gharbiya
Mazghuni District (12) - Giza	
Ossim (6) – Giza	
Raml - Alexandria	
Manhka – Port Said	

***Constituencies:***

Total urban constituencies covered:	15	6.8%
Total rural constituencies covered:	11	5.0%
<hr/>		
Total number of constituencies covered:	26	12.0%
Total number of constituencies:	222	100.0%

***Governorates:***

Total urban governorates covered:	5	19.2%
Total rural governorates covered:	9	34.6%
<hr/>		
Total number of governorates covered:	14	54.0%
Total number of governorates:	26	100.0%

**2. Survey Results*****2.1 Candidate Affiliation***

*Question 1.1: Why did you become a party member? (Please tick the appropriate answer. Multiple answers are possible).*

Your ideological affiliation with the party	35	100.0%
Your personal political ambitions	9	25.7%
Your family linkage with the party	5	14.3%
The party's popularity in your locality	4	11.4%
<hr/>		
<b>Total Response Frequencies:</b>	<b>53</b>	

**Total Candidates: 35**

### Individual Comments:

Comments by Shehinda Maklat (Tagammu Candidate 1976, 1979, 1984): Tagammu was the only real legal opposition party and the closest to her ideological leaning.

Comments by Hoda Afifi (Ahrar Candidate 2000): The then president of the party, Kamel Murad, was a very respectable person. ASU or later NDP members are thinking according to their leaders, and she wanted to develop her own ideas.

*Question 1.2: Have you ever been a member of, or affiliated with, more than one political party/formation since 1977?*

No	32	86.5%
Yes	5	13.5%
No answer	0	0.0%

**Total Candidates: 37**

*If you answered with YES please complete section 1.1. Alternatively continue with Section 2.*

### Section 1.1

*Question 1.1.1: Could you please indicate the parties you have been a member of, the duration of your membership and whether you have been a party candidate for that particular party.*

National Democratic Party (NDP)	Ahrar: 1 (3 years) Ahrar: 1 (1963-1976)
New Wafd Party (NWP)	ADNP: 1 (1 year)
Socialist Labour Party (SLP)	SLP: 1 (29) ADNP: 1 (2 years)
Arab Democratic Nasserite Party (ADNP)	ADNP(always)
Liberal Democratic Party (Ahrar)	Ahrar: 1 (13 years) Ahrar 1 (since 1976-)
Democratic Generation Party (DGP)	SLP: 1

**Total Candidates: 5**

### Individual Comments

Comment by Hamdi Sabahi (ADNP Candidate 1995): He joined the ADNP in 1992 and left the party after the 1995 parliamentary elections. He then ran as a Nasserite independent in the 2000 parliamentary election and is currently considering the establishment of a rival Nasserite Party.

*Question 1.1.2: What motivated you to change your party membership? (Please tick the appropriate answers. Multiple answers are possible)*

Your party entered into an alliance with another party with which you did not agree	1	75.0%
You did not agree with the position of the central /local party leadership	1	75.0%
You thought you had greater political career prospects with another political party	1	75.0%
You did not agree with the programmatic / ideological direction of the party	0	0.0%
The party would not re-select you as its official candidate	0	0.0%

**Total Response Frequencies: 3**

**Total Candidates: 4**



### Individual Comments:

Comments by Hoda Afifi (Ahrar Candidate 2000): The ASU was stifling the independence of my thoughts.

Comments by Mohamed Hassanein (Party Switcher, NWP Candidate 2000, Nasserite Ind. in 1987): I was not comfortable with the administration of the party (absence of democracy in the party)

## 2.2 The Candidate Recruitment

*Question 2.2: How long have you been a party member before being nominated as party candidate for any of the past Majlis al-Shaab elections you participated in? (Please tick the appropriate time span. If you were a member of more than one party, please use additional columns)*

### 1<sup>st</sup> Party

From its foundation	18	46.1%
More than 5 years	9	23.1%
Less than a year	4	10.3%
Between 3-5 years	3	7.7%
Between 1-3 years	3	7.7%
Since recently	2	5.1%

**Total Candidates:** 37

### 2<sup>nd</sup> Party

From its foundation	1	50.0%
More than 5 years	1	50.0%
Less than a year	0	0.0%
Between 3-5 years	0	0.0%
Between 1-3 years	0	0.0%
Since recently	0	0.0%

**Total Candidates:** 2

**Total Candidates:** 39

### Individual Comments

Comment by Mustafa Al-Taweel (NWP Candidate in 1984, 1987, 2000): I worked as a judge until 1984. When I resigned I joined the Wafd party, because my father was a prominent Wafdist and one of the Ministers under the previous Wafdist government.

*Question 2.3: Who first approached you to seek a party nomination for any of the past Majlis al-Shaab elections you participated in? (Please tick the appropriate answer. Multiple answers are NOT possible).*

#### **1984 & 1987 Elections**

The central party leadership approached me	7	63.3%
The local party leadership approached me	2	18.2%
The governorate party leadership approached me	3	27.3%
I sought the party nomination myself	3	27.3%
Friends encouraged me to run on a party label	1	9.1%

---

**Response Frequencies:** 16

**Total Number of Candidates:** 11

#### **1990, 1995 & 2000 Elections**

The central party leadership approached me	18	56.3%
I sought the party nomination myself	9	28.1%
The local party leadership approached me	4	12.5%
Friends encouraged me to run on a party label	3	9.3%
The governorate party leadership approached me	1	3.1%

---

**Response Frequencies:** 35

**Total Number of Candidates:** 32

#### **All Elections Together**

The central party leadership approached me	20	54.1%
I sought the party nomination myself	10	27.0%
The local party leadership approached me	5	13.5%
The governorate party leadership approached me	5	13.5%
Friends encouraged me to run on a party label	4	10.8%

---

**Response Frequencies:** 44

**Total Number of Candidates:** 37

#### **Individual Comments:**

Comments by Shehinda Maklat (Tagammu Candidate 1976, 1979, 1984): In 1976 her village encouraged her to run. In 1979 initially Gehaan Sadat considered to run in Tala, which is Shehinda's constituency. So Shehinda nominated herself as an independent from Tagammu because she knew that Mrs. Sadat would run. When Gehaan declined to run, the governorate-level minbar asked her to run as a Tagammu candidate. In 1979 there was a concerted opposition effort in Raml to nominate a number of strong candidates (Tagammu, Independent and MB) to have the NDP candidate fight on many fronts (Sheikh Mahallawy, Abdel Fid (independent) Abu Al-Aziz Al-Hariri and Shehinda Maklat (Tagammu)).

Comments by Nagi Shehabi (SLP Candidate, 1987, 1995, 2000): What encouraged me to run was my popularity in Al-Mahala al-Kubra and my role as a responsible leader in the Labour party, as I was the Assistant General Secretary of the party.

Comment by Mohamed Gamal Heshmat (MB Candidate 1995, 2000): He was nominated after the first candidate was imprisoned and tried by a military court.

Comment by Olfat Al-Araby (Ahrar Candidate 2000): It was her own ambition to become a candidate under the name of Ahrar, because during this period the old president had died and the party was split. Until now there is no new president.

Comments by Essam Al-Arian (MB Candidate 1987): The establishment of an alliance between MB, which I belong to, and Labour. I was nominated on the Labour list.

*Question 2.4: Why did the party seek to nominate you as its official candidate for any of the past Majlis al-Shaab elections you participated in? (Please rank the following motivations in order of their importance with 1 indicating 'very important', 2 'somewhat important', 3 'not very important' and 4 'irrelevant').*

#### **1984 & 1987 Elections**

	<b>YES</b>		<b>NO</b>	
You were known to sympathise with the party's ideology	11	78.5%	1	7.1%
You were popular in the constituency	10	71.4%	0	0.0%
You had been a long serving party member	4	28.6%	0	0.0%
You had well established business / family connections	2	14.3%	1	7.1%
You were financially independent	1	7.1%	1	7.1%
<b>Response Frequencies:</b>	<b>29</b>		<b>3</b>	

**Total Number of Candidates: 14**

#### **1990, 1995 & 2000 Elections**

	<b>YES</b>		<b>NO</b>	
You were popular in the constituency	21	67.8%	2	6.4%
You were known to sympathise with the party's ideology	20	64.5%	2	6.4%
You had been a long serving party member	9	29.0%	3	9.7%
You had well established business / family connections	4	12.9%	1	3.2%
You were financially independent	3	9.7%	3	9.7%
<b>Response Frequencies:</b>	<b>58</b>		<b>10</b>	

**Total Number of Candidates: 31**

#### **All Elections Together**

	<b>YES</b>		<b>NO</b>	
You were popular in the constituency	27	75.0%	2	5.5%
You were known to sympathise with the party's ideology	25	69.4%	2	5.5%
You had been a long serving party member	9	25.0%	3	8.3%
You were financially independent	5	13.9%	2	5.5%
You had well established business / family connections	5	13.9%	2	5.5%
<b>Response Frequencies:</b>	<b>71</b>		<b>11</b>	

**Total Number of Candidates: 36**

#### **Individual Comments:**

Comments by Essam Al-Arian (MB Candidate 1987): Because I am an MB candidate and this party has its popularity in the constituency.

Comments by Hoda Afifi (Ahrar Candidate 2000): Hoda was one of the more active members and famous in the party.

Comments by Dr. Fawzi Samad (NWP Candidate 2000): Also because I am a doctor/ professional.

Comments by Mohamed Hassanein (Party Switcher, NWP Candidate 2000, Nasserite independent in 1987): I have always been politically active.

Comments by Mohamed Koroum (ADNP Candidate 2000): Unfortunately the party did not support me with any money at all.

Comments by Hamdin Sabahi (ADNP Candidate 1995): Because he was a member of the leadership he was able to nominate himself.

*Question 2.5: Why did you seek the party's nomination for any of the past Majlis al-Shaab elections you participated in? (Please rank the following motivations in order of their importance with 1 indicating 'very important', 2 'somewhat important', 3 'not very important' and 4 'irrelevant').*

#### **1984 & 1987 Elections**

	<b>YES</b>		<b>NO</b>	
Your sympathy with the party's political platform in the past elections	3	42.3%	0	0.0%
A legal obligation to run under a party label	3	42.3%	0	0.0%
The party's popularity in your constituency	2	28.6%	1	14.3%
The party's capacity to support your election campaign	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
The party's connections to local/central state authorities	0	0.0%	0	0.0%

<b>Response Frequencies:</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>1</b>
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**Total Number of Candidates: 7**

#### **1990, 1995 & 2000 Elections**

	<b>YES</b>		<b>NO</b>	
The party's popularity in your constituency	8	50.0%	1	6.3%
Your sympathy with the party's political platform in the past elections	7	43.8%	0	0.0%
A legal obligation to run under a party label	4	25.0%	2	12.5%
The party's capacity to support your election campaign	1	6.3%	0	0.0%
The party's connections to local/central state authorities	1	6.3%	0	0.0%

<b>Response Frequencies:</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>3</b>
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**Total Number of Candidates: 16**

### ***All Elections Together***

	<b>YES</b>		<b>NO</b>	
The party's popularity in your constituency	8	44.4%	1	5.6%
The party's capacity to support your election campaign	1	5.6%	0	0.0%
The party's connections to local/central state authorities	1	5.6%	0	0.0%
A legal obligation to run under a party label	7	38.9%	1	5.5%
Your sympathy with the party's pol. platform in the past elections	9	50.0%	0	0.0%
<b>Response Frequencies:</b>	<b>26</b>		<b>2</b>	

**Total Number of Candidates: 18**

### **Individual Comments**

Comments by Shehinda Maklat (Tagammu Candidate in 1976, 1979, 1984): Another reason was that she was a female candidate (not major reason though). Generally the main criteria for choosing a candidate is who wins in the elections, every other issue is secondary.

Comments by Essam Al-Arian (Islamic Alliance / MB Candidate 1987): Because of the Alliance between the MB and the party.

Comments by Nagi Al Shehabi (SLP Candidate 1987): I nominated myself for many reasons that I mentioned in 2.4. The most important reason is my commitment to go through the elections as a responsible party leader.

Comments by Kamilia Shukri (NWP Candidate 2000): To increase the political prominence of women and particularly of Wafdist women.

Comment by Mustafa Al-Taweel (NWP Candidate 1984, 1987, 2000): I was nominated because the party wanted it.

Comment by Sayed Al-Badawy (NWP Candidate 1984, 1987): My belief in the party's principles and my desire to develop the party.

Comments by Mohamed Sherdy (NWP Candidate 2000): My relations with the people in the district and my belief in defending this relation. And the party is part of this process.

*Question 2.6: If you competed under the party-list system of 1984 / 1987, who determined the constituency list for which you were to run for any of the past Majlis al-Shaab elections your party participated in? (Please tick the appropriate answer. Multiple answers are NOT possible).*

The central party leadership decided where candidates were to run	7	63.6%
The governorate party leadership decided where candidates were to run	4	36.4%
The local party leadership decided where candidates were to run	3	27.3%
A candidate's grass-roots support decided where candidates were to run	0	0.0%
Candidates were free to choose his/her district	0	0.0%

**Response Frequencies:** **14**

**Total Number of Candidates:** **11**

### **Individual Comments**

Comments by Nagi Al-Shehabi (SLP Candidate 1987, 1995, 2000): I was responsible for choosing the candidates in these elections.

*Question 2.7: If you competed under the party-list system of 1984 / 1987 , which list position did you hold out of how many list candidates?*

Your list position out of how many candidates:

1984: Tagammu: 3/11, 2/12 1/??  
Wafd: 1/20  
Wafd: last position (women seat), 5/8, 3/9

1987: Tagammu: 3/11,2/12, 2/10  
MB: 1/10  
Labour: 2/??, 1 /11, 4/8  
Wafd: 1/??, 1/8, 1/9

**Total Response Frequencies: 16**

**Total Candidates: 13**

You campaigned for the individual seat in 1987:

**Total Candidates: 2**

*Question 2.8: If you competed under the party list system of 1984 / 1987, which factors determined, according to you the list position candidates were assigned in any of the pas Majlis al-Shaab elections you participated in? (Please rank the following options in order of their importance, with 1 indicating 'very important', 2 'somewhat important', 3 'not very important' and 4 'irrelevant').*

	<b>YES</b>		<b>NO</b>	
His/ her personal reputation within the governorate	6	50.0%	1	8.3%
His/her seniority within the party	5	41.7%	1	8.3%
His/her party loyalty	5	41.7%	2	16.7%
The duration of his/her party membership	3	25.0%	0	0.0%
His/her connections to local business elites and families	1	8.3%	1	8.3%
<b>Response Frequencies:</b>	<b>20</b>		<b>5</b>	

**Total Number of Candidates: 12**

**Individual Comments:**

Comments by Essam Al-Arian (MB Candidate 1987): a) agreeing on the distribution of the percentages among the three alliance parties b) agreeing on the distribution of top list positions c)personal reputation.

Comments by Awatif Wali (NWP Candidate 1984, 2000): I am the president of the Women's committee and the a member of the High Committee of the party.

*Question 2.9: Under the current candidate-based electoral systems, who determined the constituency you were to run for any of the past Majlis al-Shaab elections you participated in? (Please tick the appropriate answer. Multiple answers are possible.)*

	<b>YES</b>		<b>NO</b>	
The central party leadership decided where candidates were to run	18	52.9%	0	0.0%
A candidate's grass-roots support decided where candidates were to run	12	35.3%	0	0.0%
Candidates were free to choose his/her district	12	35.3%	1	5.9%
The local party leadership decided where candidates were to run	2	5.9%	0	0.0%
The governorate party leadership decided where candidates were to run	9	26.5%	1	5.9%

**Response Frequencies:** 53 2

**Total Number of Candidates: 34**

#### **Individual Comments:**

Comments by Shehinda Maklat (Tagammu Candidate in 1976, 1979, 1984): Normally candidates are nominated by the local party leadership and the final decision is then being made by the central leadership.

Comments by Mohamed Gamal Heshmat (MB Candidate in 1995, 2000): The constituency is specified according to where the candidate himself is registered.

Comments by Fouad Badrawi (NWP Candidate 1995, 2000): I have chosen the constituency.

Comments by Dr. Fawzi Samad (NWP Candidate 2000): Because it is my place of birth and in the constituency are my people and family.

Comments by Mohamed Koroum (ADNP Candidate 2000): Bulaq is the district I was born, lived in and currently have my work.

*If YOU chose your own constituency, please complete Section 2.2. Alternatively continue with Question 2.10.*

#### **Section 2.1**

*Question 2.1.1: Listed below are several reasons why a candidate would choose a particular constituency. Why did you choose to run in that particular constituency for any of the past Majlis al-Shaab elections you participated in? (Please rank the following options in order of their importance, with 1 indicating 'very important', 2 'important', 3 'not important', 4 'irrelevant' and 5 'hard to say').*

	<b>YES</b>		<b>NO</b>	
You were personally well known and respected in the constituency	21	84.0%	2	8.0%
You lived in that constituency	14	56.0%	4	16.0%
Your family is well known and respected in the constituency	12	48.0%	7	28.0%
Your party was popular in the constituency	5	20.0%	3	12.0%
You were well connected to the local business community	5	20.0%	7	28.0%
Your political opponents in the constituency were weak	1	4.0%	1	4.0%
You had run in the constituency before	1	4.0%	3	12.0%

**Response Frequencies:** 59 27

**Total Number of Candidates: 25**

### Individual Comments:

Comments by Mohamed Hassanein (Party Switcher, NWP Candidate 2000, Nasserite independent in 1987): The people of the district asked me to nominate myself because they wanted to get rid of the Al-Fayoumi family.

Comments by Mohamed Koroum (ADNP Candidate 2000): Because I offer a lot of services for the residents of my constituency. I held conferences and seminars.

*Question 2.10: Under the current candidate-based electoral system, in case of non- or de-selection by your party, which of the following strategies would you pursue? (Please tick the appropriate option. Multiple answers are NOT possible).*

You would not run in the upcoming elections	18	6.2%
You would run as independent and not rejoin the party after the elections	5	5.6%
You would try to create your own political party	5	15.6%
You would run as so called 'party independent', seeking to rejoin the party after the elections	3	9.4%
You would seek the nomination of another party	1	3.1%

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<b>Total Number of Candidates:</b>	<b>32</b>
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### Individual Comments:

Comments by Shehinda Maklat (Tagammu Candidate 1976, 1979, 1984): In her case it never happened, so the answer remains theoretical.

Comments by Mohamed Naggar (Tagammu Candidate 2000): There has to be party commitment and I have to be nominated through the party.

Comments by Essam Al-Arian (MB Candidate 1987): I am legally banned from participating in elections because of the verdict in the military case. But if it were lifted, I will participate as an independent.

Comments by Mohamed Heshmat (MB Candidate 1995, 2000): There is no party for the MB and for the nomination I have to run as an independent.

Comments by Awatif Wali (NWP Candidate 1984, 2000): She will not run anymore in any of the upcoming elections.

Comments by Ibrahim Abdeen (EGP Candidate 1990, 2000): I would be committed to the decision of the party.

Comments by Mohamed Sherdy (NWP Candidate 2000): No one ever knows what is going to happen in the elections, because they are decisions that are taken in the actual event of an election

Comments by Mohamed Hassanein (Party Switcher, NWP Candidate 2000, Nasserite independent in 1987): I do not intend to run again in the elections (until real democracy is attained).

Comments by Mohamed Koroum (ADNP Candidate 2000): I would not nominate unless I have a lot of money to cover the election expenses.

Comment by Abu Ela-Maadi (MB Candidate 1995): Actually left the MB and is seeking to create his own Wasat (Centre party).

Comments by Abbas Al-Tarabili (NWP Candidate 1995): Will not seek any new party nomination to run for parliamentary elections, because he wants to devote his entire energy on running the party's newspaper.



### 2.3 The Election Campaign

*Question 3.1: How important were each of the following factors in determining the order in which voters preferred the candidates in your constituency in those Majlis al-Shaab elections you participated in (Please rank the following options with 1 indicating 'very important', 2 'somewhat important', 3 'not very important' and 4 'irrelevant').*

	YES		NO	
The candidate's reputation within the constituency (family background, business ties professional standing)	27	75.0%	6	16.7%
The candidate's capability to provide constituency services	23	63.9%	7	19.5%
The candidate's ideological position & programme	10	37.8%	7	19.5%
The candidate's residence within the constituency	10	37.8%	11	30.6%
The candidate's membership of a particular party	8	22.2%	12	33.0%

**Response Frequencies:** YES 77 NO 43

**Total Number of Candidates: 36**

#### Individual Comments:

Comments by Shehinda Maklat (Tagammu Candidate 1976, 1979, 1984): In 1976 it was not enough to be popular. Voters would make different calculations: largest village in the constituency was thought to tick the balance between her and the official Sadat nominee. Village (elders, political leaders, business, teachers) wanted her to step down in favour of third independent candidate but she refused to do so. In the second round she decided to back the independent against the Sadat nominee and the independent won. People win because the government allows them to win (for example Khaled Mohieddin) = in general the government allows for real competition only in certain constituencies, which is also why people don't vote.

Comments by Hoda Afifi (Ahrar Candidate 2000): Handing out money to the voters is the most important. Help from the government through the police.

Comments by Mohamed Hassanein (Party Switcher, NWP Candidate 2000, Nasserite independent in 1987): The people want a person who helps rid them eliminates dictatorship and corruption.

*Question 3.2: Which of the following vote-seeking devices would best serve your electoral prospects during any given parliamentary election campaign under the current socio-political conditions? (Please rank the following strategies in order of your preference with 1 indicting 'very important', 2 'somewhat important', 3 'not very important' and 4 'irrelevant').*

	YES		NO	
Your personal reputation	22	62.9%	4	11.4%
Your locality / local rootedness	14	40.0%	0	0.0%
Your party's historical legacy and reputation	14	40.0%	7	20.0%
Your ideological position	13	37.1%	9	25.7%
Your family background/reputation	12	34.3%	5	14.3%
Your party's election manifesto	10	28.5%	12	34.3%
Your own union/syndicate membership	9	25.7%	3	8.6%
Your our personal legislative achievements	8	22.8%	3	8.6%
Your party's legislative achievements	8	22.8%	5	14.3%
Your party's links to interest groups (e.g. trade unions)	2	5.7%	2	5.7%

**Response Frequencies:** YES 92 NO 50

**Total Number of Candidates: 35**

## Individual Comments

Comments by Essam Al-Arian (Islamic Alliance/MB Candidate 1987): My membership in the MB.

Comments by Fouad Badrawi (NWP Candidate 1995, 2000): The achievements made for my constituency.

Comments by Hoda Afifi (Ahrar Candidate 2000): I also emphasised my professional career and my work in NGOS, such as in the Egyptian Women's League.

*Question 3.3: If you campaigned under BOTH the candidate and party list system, what did you want voters to pay attention to under the two electoral systems? (Please rank the following strategies in order of their importance with 1 indicating 'very important', 2 'somewhat important', 3 'not very important' and 4 'irrelevant').*

## All Candidates Participating in Both Elections

### Party-List System

	YES		NO	
Your past legislative achievements	3	50.0%	0	0.0%
Your prior political experience	3	50.0%	0	0.0%
Your party label	3	50.0%	0	0.0%
Your name	2	33.3%	1	22.2%
The names of all candidates on your party list	2	33.3%	1	22.2%
Your political agenda	2	33.3%	2	33.3%
Your connectedness to an important local family or business	1	22.2%	0	0.0%
Your personal skills and reputation	1	22.2%	1	22.2%
Your party's electoral manifesto	1	22.2%	0	0.0%
Your connections to local and national political authorities	0	0.0%	0	0.0%

**Response Frequencies:** 18 5

**Total Number of Candidates: 6**

### Candidate-Based System

	YES		NO	
Your past legislative achievements	3	50.0%	0	0.0%
Your prior political experience	2	33.3%	0	0.0%
Your political agenda	2	33.3%	1	22.2%
Your personal skills and reputation	3	33.3%	0	0.0%
Your connections to local and national political authorities	1	22.2%	0	0.0%
Your connectedness to an important local family or business	2	33.3%	0	0.0%
Your name	2	22.2%	0	0.0%
The names of all candidates on your party list	0	0.0%	1	22.2%
Your party label	2	33.3%	0	0.0%
Your party's electoral manifesto	1	22.2%	0	0.0%

**Total Response Frequencies:** 18 2

**Total Number of Candidates: 6**

## All Responding Candidates

### Party-List System

	<i>YES</i>		<i>NO</i>	
Your party label	4	50.0%	0	0.0%
Your prior political experience	3	37.5%	0	0.0%
Your personal skills and reputation	3	37.5%	0	0.0%
Your past legislative achievements	3	37.5%	1	17.2%
The names of all candidates on your party list	3	37.5%	1	17.2%
Your political agenda	2	25.0%	0	0.0%
Your name	2	35.5%	1	17.2%
Your connectedness to an important local family or business	1	17.2%	0	0.0%
Your party's electoral manifesto	1	17.5%	1	17.2%
Your connections to local and national political authorities	0	0.0%	1	17.2%

**Response Frequencies:** 22 5

**Total Number of Candidates: 8**

### Individual Comments:

Comments by Essam Al-Arian: a) The urge for change b) The political programme of the alliance

### Candidate-Based System

	<i>YES</i>		<i>NO</i>	
Your past legislative achievements	6	46.2%	1	7.8%
Your personal skills and reputation	5	38.4%	2	15.4%
Your political agenda	5	38.4%	3	23.0%
Your prior political experience	4	30.8%	1	7.8%
Your party label	4	30.8%	3	23.0%
Your connections to local and national political authorities	3	23.0%	0	0.0%
Your connectedness to an important local family or business	3	23.0%	3	23.0%
The names of all candidates on your party list	2	15.4%	1	7.8%
Your name	2	15.4%	2	15.4%
Your party's electoral manifesto	1	7.8%		

**Response Frequencies:** 35 16

**Total Number of Candidates: 13**

Question 3.4: If you campaigned under BOTH the candidate and party list system, what activities did you or your party organise to promote your election platform under the two electoral systems? (Please rank the activities in order of their importance with 1 indicating 'very important', 2 'important', 3 'not very important' and 4 'irrelevant').

#### All Candidates Participating in Both Elections

##### Party-List System

	YES		NO	
Distribution of party leaflets manifestos /newspapers	6	75.0%	1	12.5%
Door-to-door campaigning	5	62.5%	1	12.5%
Posting of party banners	4	50.0%	3	37.5%
Coffee house campaigning	3	39.1%	1	12.5%
TV/ Radio advertisement	1	12.5%	0	0.0%
Newspaper advertisement	2	25.0%	0	0.0%
Large-scale party rallies	2	25.0%	0	0.0%

**Total Response Frequencies:** 23 6

**Total Number of Candidates:** 8

##### Candidate-Based System

	YES		NO	
Door-to-door campaigning	5	71.4%	1	14.3%
Distribution of party leaflets manifestos /newspapers	5	71.4%	2	28.6%
Coffee house campaigning	4	57.1%	1	14.3%
Posting of party banners	3	42.8%	4	57.1%
Newspaper advertisement	1	14.3%	0	0.0%
TV/ Radio advertisement	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Large-scale party rallies	0	0.0%	0	0.0%

**Total Response Frequencies:** 18 8

**Total Number of Candidates:** 7

#### All Responding Candidates

##### Party-List System

	YES		NO	
Door-to-door campaigning	8	72.7%	1	9.0%
Distribution of party leaflets manifestos /newspapers	8	72.7%	2	18.2%
Coffee house campaigning	5	45.4%	2	18.2%
Posting of party banners	4	36.4%	6	54.5%
Newspaper advertisement	3	27.3%	0	0.0%
Large-scale party rallies	3	27.3%	0	0.0%
TV/ Radio advertisement	1	9.0%	1	9.0%

**Response Frequencies:** 32 12

**Total Number of Candidates:** 11

### ***Candidate-Based System***

	<b>YES</b>		<b>NO</b>	
Door-to-door campaigning	12	92.3%	1	7.7%
Distribution of party leaflets manifestos /newspapers	10	76.9%	4	30.7%
Coffee house campaigning	8	61.5%	2	15.4%
Posting of party banners	7	53.8%	7	53.8%
Newspaper advertisement	1	7.7%	0	0.0%
Large-scale party rallies	1	7.7%	0	0.0%
TV/ Radio advertisement	0	0.0%	1	7.7%

**Response Frequencies:** 38 15

**Total Number of Candidates: 13**

### **Individual Comments**

Comments by Kamilia Shukri (NW Candidate 2000): Holding electoral meetings in tents (nadwa) in my constituency.

Comments by Nagi Shahabi (SLP Candidate 1987, 1995, 2000): Most important issue: mass rallies in public places and gathering areas.

Comments by Olfat Al Araby (Ahrar Candidate 2000): Services for the people of the constituency and the continuous presence in the constituency.

*Question 3.5: If you campaigned under BOTH the candidate and party list system, according to you, did the type of election campaign you and your party pursued differ under the previous party-list system compared to the current candidate based system?*

### **Yes:**

Candidates: 7 70.0%

### **No:**

Candidates: 3 30.0%

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**Total Number of Candidates: 10 100.0%**

*Question 3.6: If you answered with YES, please provide a brief outline of how the election campaigns differed in terms of strategy and issues addressed between those elections run under the party-list compared to those run under the candidate based system. (Please use the space below to briefly outline your argument).*

### **Individual Comments**

Comments by Amina Shafiq (Tagammu Candidate): The political issues were the same. But what differed is the real effort done. Individual nominations depend on the personal effort of the candidate, whereas the list system demands a group effort.

Comments by Mohamed Abdel Aziz Sha'aben (Tagammu Candidate 1984, 1987, 1990, 1995, 2000): In the election campaign under the list system, the focus is on the party name and the programme and the symbol on the ballot and only then follows the names of the candidates. The focus is on mass elements and public figures.

Comments by Mustafa Al-Taweel (NWP Candidate 1984, 1987 and 2000): It is very difficult to be alone in the campaign and to pass by all the places, because the district is very big. It is better to have

assistants (fellow candidates) with me, so that we can pass by all the meetings. Campaigning as a group is much better and easier. In 1984 the Wafd party was still relatively well known. Since then a long time has passed and the party has lost appeal, its older generation members have died and the young people don't really know anything about the party.

Comments by Ibrahim Abaza (NWP Candidate 1987 and 1995): Under the list system, voters concentrate on the programmes of the parties, its principles and achievements more than on the personality of the candidates. Also, there is cooperation between the candidate under the list system, with regards to the promotion (of the party) and that decreases the financial burden and efforts that a candidate faces under the current individual candidate-based system.

Comments by Awatif Wali (NWP Candidate 1984 and 2000): Working in a group is the best and cooperation among the same party and the financing (of the campaign) is less individualised.

Comments by Abu Tawila (Tagammu Candidate 1987 and 2000): First point: the party and candidates exposed a collective and coherent ideology in 1987 Second point: there is a difference in the financial support: in 1987 the financial support needed for a personal campaign was little compared to under the candidate-based system.

Comments by Mohamed Hassanein (Party Switcher, NWP Candidate 2000, Nasserite ind. 1987): In 1987 I ran as an independent, however without any help from the Nasserites. In 2000 I ran as an independent, however during the elections I joined the Wafd party without further commitment.

Comments by Magdi Hussain (Islamic Alliance Candidate 1987, 2000): Under the list system the central element of the campaign are the political and ideological programmes and aims. When you run independently, these elements of the campaign are reduced.

*Question 3.7: If you campaigned under the past party-list system, how did your list position affect the vote-getting strategy you pursued in any of the past Majlis al-Shaab elections you participated in? (Please tick the appropriate answer. Multiple answers are possible)*

Despite your top list position you promoted the party label over your personality	7	58.4%
Your list position did not affect the vote-seeking strategy at all	3	25.0%
Due to your lower list position you promoted the party's top candidates above all else	2	16.7%
Due to your top list position you promoted your personality over the party label	0	0.0%
Due to your lower list position you promoted the party label over your personality	0	0.0%

**Total Number of Candidates:** 12

#### Individual Comments:

Comments by Shehinda Maklat (Tagammu Candidate 1976, 1979, 1984): The personality of a candidate is crucial. Under the list PR system the top of the party list was headed by strong candidates, because party political experience is short (i.e. party recognition low). For the other candidates selected on the list party affiliation was more important than personality. Parties were not given the chance to function as such (Tagammu candidates had been imprisoned, so there was not time to build the party). Lower placed candidates would campaign primarily by placing emphasis on the party programme and the big names on the list The list ballot looked as follows: It showed all the names on the list in addition to the party's name and logo.

Comments by Awatif Wali (NWP Candidate 1984, 2000): In all parties women were at the end of the list (1984).

*Question 3.8: If you campaigned under the party-list system, how did the usage of a common party symbol for all candidates across all constituencies affect the election campaign?*

	<b>YES</b>		<b>NO</b>	
It facilitated greater party recognition among the electorate	10	77.0%	0	0.0%
It helped candidates promote their common political platform	8	61.5%	1	7.7%
It facilitated greater cooperation among the candidates running under the constituency list	6	46.2%	0	0.0%
It facilitated greater cross- constituency cooperation among candidates from the same party	5	38.5%	0	0.0%
It helped voters identify members of the same party	3	23.1%	0	0.0%
It had no effect whatsoever on the election campaign	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
<b>Response Frequencies:</b>	<b>33</b>		<b>1</b>	

**Total Candidates: 13**

#### **Individual Comments**

Comments by Shehinda Maklat (Candidate 1976, 1979, 1984): The abstract party label was very crucial in the 1984 elections. In these elections Tagammu had the Crescent.

*Question 3.9: If you campaigned under the party-list system, please indicate with which, if any, of the following statements you would agree. (Please tick the appropriate statement. Multiple answers are possible).*

Under the party-list system constituency-level cooperation among candidates from the same party was more important than under the candidate-based electoral system	11	91.2%
Under the party-list system candidates were more encouraged to emphasise the common party label than under the candidate-based electoral system	10	83.3%
Constituency-level cooperation among candidates was equally promoted under the candidate-based and the party-list electoral system	3	25.0%
The party label was more important under the candidate-based than under the part-list electoral system	1	8.3%
The party label was equally insignificant under the candidate-based and party-list electoral system	0	0.0%
Constituency-level cooperation among candidates was more important under the candidate-based than under the party-list electoral system	0	0.0%
<b>Response Frequencies:</b>	<b>24</b>	

**Total Candidates: 12**

*Question 3.10: If you campaigned under the candidate-based electoral system, what did you want voters to pay attention to in the constituency you were running for any of the past Majlis al-Shaab elections you participated in? (Please rank the following strategies in order of your preference with 1 indicating 'very important', 2 'somewhat important', 3 'not very important' and 4 'irrelevant').*

	<i>YES</i>		<i>NO</i>	
Your personal skills and reputation	20	60.6%	2	6.1%
Your past political achievements	16	48.5%	1	3.0%
Your prior political experience	15	45.4%	2	6.1%
Your political agenda	14	42.4%	4	12.1%
Your party label	13	39.4%	7	21.2%
Your connectedness to and support of local families and business	10	30.3%	0	0.0%
Your connections to local and national political authorities	8	24.2%	0	0.0%
The names of all candidates on the party list	8	24.2%	1	3.0%
Your name	7	21.2%	3	9.1%
Your party's electoral manifesto	6	18.2%	2	6.1%

**Response Frequencies:** **117** **22**

**Total Number of Candidates: 33**

**Individual Comments:**

Comments by Hoda Afifi (Liberal Candidate 2000): She wanted voters to select the best possible MP and not the one who is best in handing out local benefits and in making promises.

*Question 3.11: If you campaigned under the candidate-based electoral system, how much importance did you accord to the following issues in any of the election campaigns you participated in? (Please rank the following options in order of your preference with 1 being 'very important', 2 'somewhat important', 3 'not very important' and 4 'irrelevant').*

	<i>YES</i>		<i>NO</i>	
Improvements to local infrastructure (health, traffic, housing etc.)	22	66.7%	6	18.2%
Domestic political reform (party law, electoral law, emergency law)	20	60.1%	8	24.2%
Domestic problems (economic, healthcare, tax, environment etc.)	19	57.6%	12	36.4%
Creation of local employment opportunities	16	48.5%	6	18.2%
International issues (Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Pan-Arab cooperation)	9	27.3%	8	24.2%

**Total Number of Candidates: 33**

**Individual Comments:**

Comments by Shehinda Maklat (Tagammu Candidate 1976, 1979, 1984): In her case international issues were important because of the family connection to the Arab-Israeli wars (loss of members).

Comments by Hoda Afifi (Ahrar Candidate 2000): I can only work within the political framework of the government programme. Here I can try to make amendments and other proposals, but I cannot propose infrastructure projects in the constituency that have not been planned by the government.

Comments by Dr. Fawzi Samad (NWP Candidate 2000): The electoral programme focused explicitly on the people of my constituency of Helwan under the shadow of the Wafd party.



*Question 3.12: If you campaigned under the candidate-based electoral system, how did you run your campaign? What activities did you organise to promote your platform for any of the past Majlis al-Shaab elections you participated in? (Please rank the following campaigning activities in order of their importance, with 1 being 'very important', 2 'important', 3 'not very important' and 4 'irrelevant').*

	<b>YES</b>		<b>NO</b>	
Door-to-door campaigning	24	72.7%	4	12.1%
Coffee house campaigning	24	72.7%	4	12.1%
Large-scale party rallies	21	63.6%	4	12.1%
Distribution of party manifestos/leaflets/ newspapers	12	36.7%	14	42.4%
Posting of party banners	8	24.2%	8	24.2%
Newspaper advertisement	6	18.2%	1	9.1%
TV/ Radio advertisement	1	3.0%	3	9.1%
<b>Response Frequencies:</b>	<b>96</b>		<b>34</b>	

**Total Number of Candidates: 33**

#### **Individual Comments**

Comments by Shehinda Maklat (Tagammu Candidate 1976, 1979, 1984): In 1979 party rallies were banned, but she and her campaign team defied the ban. The distribution of campaign manifestos, party papers were important for promoting party recognition in general but not specifically in the elections.

Comments by Hoda Afifi (Ahrar Candidate 2000): She printed her own little leaflet and had no posters. Her sign was the telephone. Her leaflet contained: a) a picture of her b) the slogan "you have to know to whom you are going to give your vote" c) a description of her career d) her work in the social domain & professional life e) her programme.

*Question 3.13: Under the current candidate-based electoral system, would the usage of a common symbol for all candidates of your party significantly affect your election campaign and electoral prospects?*

#### **Yes:**

Total Candidates: 29 80.5%

#### **No:**

Total Candidates: 7 19.5%

**Total Number of Candidates: 36 100.0%**

*Question 3.14: If you answered with YES, please indicate how a common candidate symbol would affect your election campaign. (Please tick the appropriate answer. Multiple answers are possible)*

	<b>YES</b>		<b>NO</b>	
It would facilitate greater party recognition among the electorate	24	82.7%	1	3.4%
It would help voters identify members of the same party	18	62.0%	1	3.4%
It would increase the electoral chances for both partisan candidates in your constituency	16	55.2%	1	3.4%
It would facilitate greater cooperation among your candidates at the constituency level	12	41.4%	1	3.4%
It would facilitate greater cross-constituency cooperation among candidates from the same party	10	34.4%	0	0.0%
It would not benefit any of the above aspects of an election campaign	0	0.0%	0	0.0%

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**Response Frequencies:** **80** **4**

**Total Candidates: 29**

**Individual Comments:**

Comments by Saad Zawiris (Tagammu Candidate 2000): The NDP is the only party that has the symbols of the crescent and the camel. This gives the impression to people, that these two symbols are going to win all the time.

Comments by Mohamed Sherdy (NWP Candidate 2000): Voters and candidates relate the palm tree to the Wafd party.

*Question 3.15: In the end, what factors determined the outcome in your constituency for any of the past Majlis al-Shaab elections you participated in? (Please rank the following options in order of their importance with 1 indicating 'very important', 2 'somewhat important', 3 'not very important' and 4 'irrelevant').*

**1984 & 1987 Elections**

	<b>YES</b>		<b>NO</b>	
Vote rigging	6	54.5%	0	0.0%
The winner's connection to the local/central authorities of the state	3	27.3%	1	9.0%
The winner's financial resources	3	27.3%	1	9.0%
The winner's party membership and campaigning support	2	18.2%	0	0.0%
The winner's personal reputation and professional integrity	2	18.2%	1	9.0%
The winner's party manifesto	2	18.2%	2	19.2%
The winner's backing by local business elites and families	1	9.0%	1	9.0%
The winner's capacity to deliver constituency services	0	0.0%	2	18.2%

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**Response Frequencies:** **19** **8**

**Total Number of Candidates: 11**

### 1990, 1995 & 2000 Elections

	<i>YES</i>		<i>NO</i>	
The winner's connection to the local/central authorities of the state	19	54.3%	2	5.3%
Vote rigging	16	45.7%	1	2.8%
The winner's financial resources	12	34.3%	7	20.0%
The winner's personal reputation and professional integrity	11	31.4%	2	5.7%
The winner's capacity to deliver constituency services	11	31.4%	5	14.3%
The winner's backing by local business elites and families	6	17.1%	4	11.4%
The winner's party membership and campaigning support	5	14.3%	5	14.3%
The winner's party manifesto	5	14.3%	7	20.0%

**Response Frequencies:** **85** **33**

**Total Number of Candidates: 35**

### All Elections Together

	<i>YES</i>		<i>NO</i>	
Vote rigging	17	44.7%	1	2.6%
The winner's connection to the local/central authorities of the state	16	42.1%	5	13.2%
The winner's personal reputation and professional integrity	13	34.2%	2	5.2%
The winner's financial resources	12	31.6%	7	18.4%
The winner's capacity to deliver constituency services	11	28.9%	5	13.2%
The winner's party manifesto	7	18.4%	7	18.4%
The winner's backing by local business elites and families	6	15.8%	4	10.5%
The winner's party membership and campaigning support	5	13.2%	5	13.2%

**Response Frequencies:** **87** **36**

**Total Number of Candidates: 38**

### Individual Comments:

Comments by Saad Zawiris (Tagammu Candidate): Joining the ruling party.

Comments by Essam Al-Arian (MB Candidate): Cooperation between the Islamic alliance members and the ability of encouraging people to vote.

Comments by Mohamed Sherdy (NW Candidate 2000): Money buys votes. The authority forces voters in villages to vote for the government candidate.

Comments by Mohamed Koroum (ADNP Candidate 2000): The one who wins does so because he is supported by the system and because he is a government nominee. He (NDP supported candidate in Bulaq) has great power because he was a general at the police.

*Question 3.16: During any of the past Majlis al-Shaab elections, how beneficial were a candidate's connections to state authorities (either local or central) in determining the election outcome? (Please tick the appropriate answer. Multiple answers are NOT possible).*

#### **1984 & 1987 Elections**

Helped them a great deal	11	84.6%
Hurt them a lot	2	15.4%
Aided them somewhat	0	0.0%
Made no difference at all	0	0.0%
Hurt them somewhat	0	0.0%
Hard to say	0	0.0%

**Response Frequencies: 13**

**Total Number of Candidates: 13**

#### **1990, 1995 & 2000 Elections**

Helped them a great deal	28	90.3%
Aided them somewhat	3	9.7%
Made no difference at all	1	3.2%
Hard to say	1	3.2%
Hurt them somewhat	0	0.0%
Hurt them a lot	0	0.0%

**Response Frequencies: 33**

**Total Number of Candidates: 31**

#### **All Elections Together**

Helped them a great deal	29	82.8%
Aided them somewhat	5	14.3%
Made no difference at all	1	2.8%
Hurt them somewhat	0	0.0%
Hurt them a lot	2	5.7%
Hard to say	1	2.8%

**Response Frequencies: 38**

**Total Number of Candidates: 35**

#### **Individual Comments**

Comments by Essam Al-Arian (MB Candidate 1987): The harm was for the opposition parties, because the elections are fraudulent against them. For NDP candidates the authorities help them a lot.

*Question 3.17: How did the party support your election campaign during any Majlis al-Shaab elections you participated in? (Please rank the following options in order of their importance with 1 indicating 'very important', 2 'somewhat important', 3 'not important at all' and 4 'irrelevant').*

**1984 & 1987 Elections**

	<b>YES</b>		<b>NO</b>	
Organisation of public meetings and rallies	8	53.4%	0	0.0%
Printing of campaign newspapers, leaflets and posters	8	53.4%	2	13.4%
Provision of direct financial support	7	46.7%	1	6.7%
Support by party leadership	7	46.7%	1	6.7%
Support by prominent public figures	6	40.0%	1	6.7%
Provision of office space and staff	5	33.3%	0	0.0%
No campaign support at all	1	6.7%	0	0.0%

**Response Frequencies:** 42 5

**Total Candidates: 15**

**1990, 1995 & 2000 Elections**

	<b>YES</b>		<b>NO</b>	
Printing of campaign newspapers, leaflets and posters	23	67.6%	3	8.8%
Provision of direct financial support	15	44.1%	2	5.9%
Support by party leadership	13	38.2%	1	2.9%
Organisation of public meetings and rallies	11	32.4%	1	2.9%
Support by prominent public figures	7	20.6%	3	8.8%
Provision of office space and staff	6	17.6%	0	0.0%
No campaign support at all	5	14.7%	0	0.0%

**Response Frequencies:** 80 10

**Total Candidates: 34**

**All Election Together**

	<b>YES</b>		<b>NO</b>	
Printing of campaign newspapers, leaflets and posters	23	58.9%	3	7.7%
Provision of direct financial support	17	43.6%	2	5.1%
Organisation of public meetings and rallies	15	38.5%	1	2.5%
Support by prominent public figures	12	30.7%	2	5.1%
Support by party leadership	12	30.8%	3	7.7%
Provision of office space and staff	7	17.9%	0	0.0%
No campaign support at all	5	12.8%	0	0.0%

**Response Frequencies:** 91 11

**Total Number of Candidates: 39**

**Individual Comments:**

Comments by Shehinda Maklat (Tagammu Candidate 1976, 1979, 1984): In 1979: allocation of financial resources differed between candidates and was determined by their needs (small/ large districts). In 1984: the money in her constituency was not allocated to individual candidates, whether important or not, but to geographically important areas of the district.

Comments by Olfat Al Araby (Ahrar Candidate ): I didn't receive any support, financial or material or psychological from the party that I belong to.

Comments by Sayed Al-Badawy (NWP Candidate 1984, 1987): The party newspaper.

Comment by Mohamed Sherdy (NWP Candidate 2000): In elections you depend on yourself and on your moves.

Comments by Mohamed Koroum (ADNP Candidate 2000): All election costs were covered by myself and it was very limited.

Comment by Hamdin Sabahi (ADNP Candidate 1995): The party supported Sabahi with in printing some of his campaigning material, but not much.

Comments by Abbas Al-Tarabili (NWP Candidate 1995): Spend approximately 120.000 LE on his campaign.

*Question 3.18: Which of the following sources of financial help were most important for your campaign during any of the past Majlis al-Shaab elections you participated in? (Please rank the following options in order of their adequacy with 1 indicating that there was 'no such source', 2 the source was 'very important', 3 'important', 4 'not important' and 5 'irrelevant').*

#### **1984 & 1987 Elections**

	<b>YES</b>			<b>NO</b>	
Your own earnings	11	68.8%		1	6.3%
Party financial support	9	56.3%		2	12.5%
Help from friends	8	50.0%		3	18.7%
Help from family	4	25.0%		3	18.7%
Help from local commercial structures	1	6.3%		1	6.3%
Help from trade unions, NGOs, PVOs	0	0.0%		1	6.3%
<b>Response Frequencies:</b>	<b>33</b>			<b>12</b>	

**Total Number of Candidates: 16**

#### **1990, 1995 & 2000 Elections**

	<b>YES</b>			<b>NO</b>	
Your own earnings	29	85.3%		2	5.9%
Party financial support	16	47.0%		6	17.6%
Help from friends	14	41.1%		7	20.0%
Help from family	10	29.4%		5	12.8%
Help from trade unions, NGOs, PVOs	0	0.0%		3	8.8%
Help from local commercial structures	0	0.0%		3	8.8%
<b>Response Frequencies:</b>	<b>69</b>			<b>26</b>	

**Total Number of Candidates: 34**

**All Election Together**

	<b>YES</b>		<b>NO</b>	
Your own earnings	30	76.9%	2	5.1%
Party financial support	22	56.4%	6	15.4%
Help from friends	17	43.6%	8	20.5%
Help from family	12	30.7%	6	15.4%
Help from local commercial structures	1	2.5%	3	7.7%
Help from trade unions, NGOs, PVOs	0	0.0%	3	7.7%

**Response Frequencies:** **82** **28**

**Total Number of Candidates: 39**

*Question 3.19: Where were your campaign headquarters located? (Please tick the appropriate answer. Multiple answers are NOT possible).*

**1984 & 1987 Elections**

At the local party headquarters	11	73.4%
At home	4	26.7%
At your place of work	1	6.7%
At another social organisation	0	0.0%
You had no election headquarters	0	0.0%

**Response Frequencies:** **16**

**Total Number of Candidates: 15**

**1990, 1995 & 2000 Elections**

At home	16	48.5%
At the local party headquarters	10	30.0%
At your place of work	6	18.2%
At another social organisation	1	3.0%
You had no election headquarters	1	3.0%

**Response Frequencies:** **34**

**Total Number of Candidates: 33**

**All Elections Together**

At home	16	44.4%
At the local party headquarters	14	38.9%
At your place of work	6	16.6%
At another social organisation	1	0.0%
You had no election headquarters	1	0.0%

**Response Frequencies:** **38**

**Total Number of Candidates: 36**

**Individual Comments:**

Comments by Olfat Al Araby (Ahrar Candidate ??): My campaign headquarters were rented by myself in the Zayda Zainab constituency.

Comments by Essam Al-Arian (MB Candidate 1987): My campaign headquarters were on the move all the time because of police intimidation.

Comments by Mohamed Heschmat (MB Candidate 1995, 2000): Shops that have been rented.

Comments Kamilia Shukri (NWP Candidate, 2000): I rented a place during the elections.

Comments by Amina Shafiq (Tagammu Candidate ??): I rented a small place.

Comments by Samah Al Schaal (Tagammu Candidate ??): My friends helped me and provided a place for me.

Comments by Mohamed Hassanein (Party Switcher, NWP Candidate 2000, Nasserite ind. 1987): In 1987 I rented an apartment for the elections

Comments by Abu Ela Maadi (MB Candidate 1995): Rented a flat with his running mate Mohamed Abdel Ghani.

Comments by Abbas Al-Tarabili (NWP Candidate 1995): Although the party had a local office in his constituency, he preferred to have his campaigning headquarters at his home/office, claiming that it was better located.

*Question 3.20: About how many people were actively involved in your party's election campaign during any of the past Majlis al-Shaab elections you participated in? (Please tick the appropriate option.)*

#### **1984 & 1987 Elections**

Above 100	12	75.0%
60-100	3	18.7%
0	1	6.3%
0 – 30	0	0.0%
30- 60	0	0.0%

**Response Frequencies: 16**

**Total Candidates: 16**

#### **1990, 1995 & 2000 Elections**

Above 100	16	45.7%
30- 60	8	22.8%
0 – 30	7	20.0%
60-100	6	17.1%
0	2	5.7%

**Response Frequencies: 39**

**Total Candidates: 35**



**All Elections Together**

Above 100	21	55.3%
60-100	8	21.1%
30- 60	8	21.1%
0 – 30	7	18.4%
0	2	5.3%

**Response Frequencies: 46****Total Number of Candidates: 38****Individual Comments:**

Comments by Shehinda Maklat (Tagammu Candidate 1976, 1979, 1984): In 1976 the whole village was supporting her election campaign. In 1984 she could draw on a larger number of supporters because of the PR list system in place.

*Question 3.21: How was your campaign team composed for any of the past Majlis al-Shaab elections you participated in? (Please rank the following options in order of their importance, with 1 indicating 'very important', 2 'important' 3, 'not important' and 4 'irrelevant').*

**1984 & 1987 Elections**

	<b>YES</b>		<b>N0</b>	
Party members	11	68.7%	1	6.3%
Volunteers from other support organisations	8	50.0%	2	12.5%
Family member	8	50.0%	2	12.5%
Friends	8	50.0%	6	37.5%

**Response Frequencies: 35 11****Total Number of Candidates: 16****1990, 1995 & 2000 Elections**

	<b>YES</b>		<b>N0</b>	
Friends	22	64.7%	6	17.6%
Party members	21	61.7%	6	17.6%
Family member	20	58.8%	5	14.7%
Volunteers from other support organisations	11	32.3%	7	20.6%

**Response Frequencies: 74 24****Total Number of Candidates: 34****All Elections Together**

	<b>YES</b>		<b>N0</b>	
Friends	25	67.5%	6	16.2%
Family member	23	62.2%	5	13.5%
Party members	23	62.2%	7	18.9%
Volunteers from other support organisations	13	35.1%	8	21.6%

**Response Frequencies: 84 26****Total Number of Candidates: 37**

## Individual Comments

Comments by Shehinda Maklat (Tagammu Candidate 1976, 1979, 1984): She said she is a special case because usually the family plays an important role in the election campaign. She was actually campaigning against the will of her family.

Comments by Essam Al-Arian (MB Candidate 1987): Members of the MB.

Comments by Hoda Afifi (Ahrar Candidate 2000): She received campaigning support from the voters themselves.

Comments by Mohamed Sherdy (NWP Candidate 2000): A group different from all of the above.

*Question 3.22: Overall, what effect do you think did your party's support have on your election prospects for any of the Majlis al-Shaab elections you participated in? (Please tick the appropriate answer. Multiple answers are NOT possible).*

### 1984 & 1987 Elections

Helped you a great deal	3	100.0%
Aided you somewhat	0	0.0%
Made no difference at all	0	0.0%
Hurt you somewhat	0	0.0%
Hurt you a great deal	0	0.0%

---

**Total Candidates:** 3

### 1990, 1995 & 2000 Elections

Helped you a great deal	6	25.0%
Aided you somewhat	13	54.2%
Made no difference at all	2	8.3%
Hurt you somewhat	1	4.2%
Hurt you a great deal	2	8.3%

---

**Total Candidates:** 24

### All Elections Together

Aided you somewhat	17	43.6%
Helped you a great deal	15	38.4%
Made no difference at all	4	10.3%
Hurt you somewhat	2	5.1%
Hurt you a great deal	1	2.5%

---

**Total Candidates:** 39

*Question 3.23: Under the candidate-based electoral system, please indicate what types of constituencies you were running for any of the past Majlis al-Shaab elections you participated in? (Please tick the appropriate options for each of the following elections. Multiple answers per election are NOT possible)*

Geographically large district with large number of registered voters	24	70.1%
Geographically large district with medium number of registered voters	3	8.8%
Geographically large district with small number of registered voters	3	8.8%
Geographically medium district with large number of registered voters	3	8.8%
Physically small district with large number of registered voters	2	5.9%
Physically small district with medium number of registered voters	2	5.9%
Geographically medium district with small number of registered voters	1	2.9%
Geographically medium district with medium number of registered voters	0	0.0%
Physically small district with small number of registered voters	0	0.0%

**Response Frequencies:** 38

**Total Number of Candidates: 34**

*Question 3.24: Based on your own experience, please indicate with which, if any, of the following statements you agree (Please tick the appropriate statement. Multiple answers are NOT possible).*

Small districts allow for a more personalised election campaign than large districts	27	77.1%
Small districts require less campaigning resources and time to reach voters than large districts	22	65.1%
District size bears no influence over the style of election campaign	0	0.0%
District size bears no impact on the time and resources spend in the election	0	0.0%

**Response Frequencies:** 49

**Total Candidates: 35**

*Question 3.25: During any of the past election campaign you participated in did you seek to cooperate with candidate(s) of your own party running in the same constituency?*

#### **1984 & 1987 Elections**

YES, I cooperated with candidates from my party	13	100.0%
NO, I did not cooperate	0	0.0%

**Total Candidates: 13**

#### **1990, 1995 & 2000 Elections**

YES, I cooperated with candidates from my party	8	25.8%
NO, I did not cooperate	23	74.2%

**Total Candidates: 31**

(8 Candidates asserted that there was no second party candidate in the district to cooperate with, which is still 48.4%)

### ***All Elections Together***

YES, I cooperated with candidates from my party	21	60.0%
NO, I did not cooperate	23	65.7%

---

**Response Frequencies:** 44

**Total Candidates: 35**

### **Individual Comments:**

Comments by Shehinda Maklat (Tagammu Candidate 1976, 1979, 1984): Shehinda only cooperated with candidates from her party in 1979 and 1984.

Comments by Dr. Abdel Fattah Risq (MB Candidate 1995, 2000): In 1995 he cooperated with the other MB candidate for the workers seat, called Mohamed Mansour. In 2000 there was no second MB candidate. In that year he tried to cooperate with an NDP-independent candidate, whose name he refused to tell me.

Comments by Abdallah Abo El Futuh (Tagammu Candidate 1995): I didn't cooperate because there was no other (Tagammu candidate) in my constituency.

Comments by Hoda Afifi (Ahrar Candidate 2000): She did not cooperate because there was no other Liberal candidate running in her constituency

Comments by Dr. Fawzi Samad (NWP Candidate 2000): He cooperated with Al-Haqq Shawqi from the NWP.

Comments by Magdi Hussain (SLP Candidate 1987, 2000): There were no other candidates on the Labour ticket.

Comments by Mohamed Koroum (ADNP Candidate 2000): Because there weren't any other candidates from my party in the district and in all Cairo, except for me and another candidate in the Gamaliya district (Heidar Baghdadi).

Comments by Waleed Abu Al-Magid (Tagammu Candidate 2000): No cooperation because he was the only Tagammu candidate in the district.

Comments by Abu Ela Maadi (MB Candidate 2000): He cooperated with worker MB candidate Mohamed Abdel Ghani. His symbol was the fish and his running mate's symbol the pistol. Originally he had the pistol, but as it had a negative connotation and because he was more famous than Ghani, the latter agreed to swap symbols, to take the pistol and Maadi the fish.

Comments by Hamdin Sabahi (ADNP Candidate 1995): There was no second ADNP candidate to cooperate with.

Comments by Abbas Al-Tarabili (NWP Candidate 1995): he was the only NWP candidate for the professional seat in the district.

*Question 3.26: If you answered with YES, what form of cooperation did you engage in? (Please mark the appropriate tactics in order of their importance with 1 being 'very important', 2 'important', 3 'not very important', 4 'irrelevant' and 5 'hard to say').*

#### **1984 & 1987 Elections**

	<b>YES</b>		<b>N0</b>	
Organisation of common rallies	11	91.7%	0	0.0%
Common electoral manifesto / leaflets/newspapers	9	75.0%	2	16.7%
Common electoral advertisement	9	75.0%	2	16.7%
Pooling of financial resources	8	66.7%	2	16.7%
Common campaign headquarters	7	58.3%	0	0.0%
Common campaign support team	4	33.3%	1	8.3%

**Response Frequencies:** **39** **7**

**Total Number of Candidates: 12**

#### **1990, 1995 & 2000 Elections**

	<b>YES</b>		<b>N0</b>	
Organisation of common rallies	10	76.9%	0	0.0%
Common campaign headquarters	6	46.1%	1	7.7%
Common electoral manifesto / leaflets/newspapers	5	38.4%	2	15.4%
Common electoral advertisement	4	30.7%	2	15.4%
Pooling of financial resources	3	23.1%	2	15.4%
Common campaign support team	3	23.1%	0	0.0%

**Response Frequencies:** **46** **7**

**Total Number of Candidates: 13**

#### **All Elections Together**

	<b>YES</b>		<b>N0</b>	
Organisation of common rallies	16	80.0%	2	10.0%
Common electoral advertisement	13	65.0%	4	20.0%
Common electoral manifesto / leaflets/newspapers	12	60.0%	4	20.0%
Common campaign headquarters	10	50.0%	1	5.0%
Pooling of financial resources	8	40.0%	4	20.0%
Common campaign support team	7	35.0%	0	0.0%

**Response Frequencies:** **66** **15**

**Total Number of Candidates: 20**

#### **Individual Comments**

Comments by Mohamed Sherdy (NWP Candidate 2000): I had to help the workers Wafd candidate a lot because he did not have anything.

*Question 3.27: Under the current candidate-based system did you ever engage in cross-party cooperation with candidates from other political formations or independents?*

Yes:

Total Candidates: 13 37.1%

No:

Total Candidates: 23 65.7%

---

**Total Number of Candidates: 35**

#### Individual Comments

Comments by Mohamed Nagger (Tagammu Candidate ??): Cooperated with independent Ahmed Fawi Al-Dabb'a.

Comments by Dr. Fawzi Samad (NW Candidate 2000): Because there were two candidates from the Wafd party he did not cooperate.

Comments by Dr. Abdel Fattah Risq (MB Candidate 1995, 2000): Cooperated in 2000 with an NDP independent, whose name he refuses to mention.

*If you answered with YES please complete Section 3.1. Alternatively complete Section 3.2.*

#### Section 3.1

Question 3.1.1: During those elections, did your party present candidates for both district seats?

Yes:

Total Candidates: 1 6.3%

No:

Total Candidates: 15 93.7%

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**Total Number of Candidates: 16 100.0%**

*Question 3.1.2: What motivated you to pursue cross-party cooperation? (Please tick appropriate motivation. Multiple answers are possible)*

	YES		NO	
The other candidate was very popular in your constituency	7	58.4%	1	8.4%
The other candidate's programme was closest to your own	5	41.6%	0	0.0%
Your party encouraged this cooperation	4	33.4%	0	0.0%
The other candidate was ideologically close to your own position	4	33.4%	0	0.0%
Your co-partisan for the second constituency seat was unpopular	1	8.4%	0	0.0%
Your co-partisan for the second constituency seat was too unknown	1	8.4%	0	0.0%
<b>Total Response Frequencies:</b>	<b>22</b>		<b>1</b>	

**Total Candidates: 12**

**Individual Comments:**

Comments by Mohamed Koroum (ADNP Candidate 2000): The majority of candidates cooperated with each other formally = but there was backstabbing at the ballot box.

*Question 3.1.3: How did such cross-party cooperation look like? (Please tick the appropriate options. Multiple answers are possible).*

Common campaigning appearances	4	36.4%
A common campaign support team	3	27.3%
The fusion of campaign headquarters among allied candidates	2	18.2%
Pledges of support for the allied party and its candidates	1	9.0%
The usage of a common electoral manifesto	1	9.0%
The pooling of financial resources	1	9.0%
The retreat of one candidate from the constituency	0	0.0%

---

**Response Frequencies:** 12

**Total Number of Candidates: 11**

**Individual Comments:**

Comments by Mohamed Sherdy (NW Candidate 2000): To cooperate together against the government and its candidates.

Comments by Mohamed Koroum (ADNP Candidate 2000): Making complements to the other candidates because all of them are from the same district.

*Question 3.1.4: Overall, under the candidate-based electoral system, how much leverage did the party allow you to engage in district level cooperation with candidates from other parties? (Please tick the appropriate answer. Multiple answers are NOT possible).*

You were free to cooperate with any other candidate in the constituency	7	50.0%
You were free to cooperate with independent candidates from the second category	2	14.3%
You were bound to cooperate with the candidates of those parties your party formally aligned with	2	14.3%
You were free to cooperate with any other candidate from the second category	1	5.1%
You were free to cooperate with candidates of parties programmatically close to your party	1	5.1%
No third party cooperation was allowed, where candidates were running in both categories	1	5.1%
No third party cooperation was allowed under any circumstances	0	0.0%

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**Total Candidates:** 14

### Section 3.2

*Question 3.2.1: Under the candidate-based electoral system, how much leverage would the party allow you to engage in district level cooperation with candidates from other parties? (Please tick the appropriate answer. Multiple answers are NOT possible).*

You would be free to cooperate with any other candidate in the constituency	10	35.7%
You would be bound to the consent of your party to such cooperation	5	17.8%
You would be free to cooperate with independent candidates from the second category	4	14.3%
No third party cooperation would be allowed, under any circumstances	4	14.3%
You would be free to cooperate with candidates of parties programmatically close to your party	3	10.7%
You would be free to cooperate with any other candidate from the second category	2	7.1%
No third party cooperation would be allowed, where candidates were running in both categories	2	7.1%

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<b>Total Number of Response Frequencies:</b>	<b>30</b>
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**Total Candidates: 28**

#### Individual Comments:

Comments by Shehinda Maklat (Tagammu Candidate 1976, 1979, 1984): She said that in general party candidates were not allowed to engage in any third party cooperation. The only exception was Khaled Mohieddin in 2000, who was allowed to cooperate with Labour in his district. This was however because he was the party leader and it was agreed by the central party committee.

Comments by Dr. Fawzi Samad (NWP Candidate 2000): If there is only one candidate there is no obstacle against cooperation with others.

Comments by Awatif Wali (NWP Candidate 1984, 2000): It is allowed in case there is no other candidate of the same party in the constituency.

Comments by Ibrahim Abaza (NWP Candidate 1987, 1995): It is allowed to cooperate with any other candidate, except with the NDP, which is the ruling party.

*Question 3.28: If you ran under the party-list system, did your party ever engage in any form of electoral cooperation with other parties?*

#### Yes:

Total Candidates:	5	41.7%
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#### No:

Total Candidates:	7	58.3%
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<b>Total Number of Candidates:</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>100.0%</b>
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*If you answered with YES please complete Section 3.3. Alternatively continue with Question 3.29.*



### Section 3.3

*Question 3.1.1: How was such cooperation organised for the Majlis al-Shaab elections you participated in? (Please tick the appropriate answer. Multiple answers are possible).*

	YES		NO	
Organisation of common rallies	3	75.0%	0	0.0%
Common campaign headquarters	3	75.0%	0	0.0%
Pooling of financial resources	3	75.0%	0	0.0%
Common electoral lists in all governorates	2	50.0%	0	0.0%
Common electoral advertisement	2	50.0%	1	25.0%
Common electoral lists in some governorates	1	25.0%	0	0.0%
Common observers at polling stations	1	25.0%	0	0.0%
<b>Total Response Frequencies:</b>	<b>15</b>		<b>1</b>	

**Total Candidates: 4**

*Question 3.29: Overall, which of the following electoral system would best serve your election or re-election prospects for national level parliamentary elections?*

Open / mixed party list system	15	37.5%
Individual Candidate-based System	14	35.0%
Closed party list system	8	20.0%
Hard to say	3	7.5%

**Total Candidates: 40**

#### Individual Comments

Comments by Mohamed Koroum (ADNP Candidate 2000): Under the list system the parties will nominate all candidates who are not popular and who are just talking in parliament = these people will be at the top of the list while the most popular ones will be at the bottom

### 2.4 Electoral Malpractice

*Question 4.1: Overall, how competitive would you say, were those past Majlis al-Shaab elections your participated in?*

#### 1984 & 1987 Elections

Overall competitive	11	78.6%
Partly Competitive	6	42.9%
Not Competitive	0	0.0%
Hard To Say	0	0.0%

**Total Response Frequencies: 17**

**Total Number of Candidates: 14**

***1990, 1995 & 2000 Elections***

Overall competitive	23	67.6%
Partly Competitive	7	20.6%
Hard To Say	6	17.6%
Not Competitive	3	8.3%

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**Total Response Frequencies: 39****Total Number of Candidates: 34*****All Elections Together***

Overall competitive	31	83.8%
Partly Competitive	12	32.4%
Hard To Say	6	16.2%
Not Competitive	3	8.1%

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**Total Response Frequencies: 52****Total Number of Candidates: 37**

*Question 4.2: Overall, how free and fair would you consider those past Majlis al-Shaab elections you participated in?*

***1984 & 1987 Elections***

Partly Fraudulent	7	43.8%
Very Fraudulent	7	43.8%
Overall free and fair	2	12.5%
Hard To Say	1	6.6%

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**Total Response Frequencies: 17****Total Number of Candidates: 16*****1990, 1995 & 2000 Elections***

Very Fraudulent	14	42.4%
Partly Fraudulent	13	39.4%
Overall free and fair	5	15.1%
Hard To Say	4	12.1%

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**Total Response Frequencies: 32****Total Number of Candidates: 33**

***All Elections Together***

Partly Fraudulent	19	52.7%
Very Fraudulent	19	52.8%
Overall free and fair	7	19.4%
Hard To Say	4	11.1%

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**Total Response Frequencies: 49**

**Total Number of Candidates: 36**

**Individual Comments:**

Comments by Shehinda Maklat: (Tagammu Candidate 1976, 1979, 1984): There are different types of fraud, but basically fraud was the decisive factor in all elections.

#### **Appendix No. 4. In-Depth Interviews with Party Candidates & Deputies**

Abaza, Ibrahim: Assistant Secretary-General of the NWP. 27. 08. 2000 & 22. 04. 2003, Party Headquarters Cairo (French).

Abaza, Mahmoud: Central Party Leadership of NWP & Candidate in 1987. 19. 11. 2002, Respondent's Cairo home (French).

Abdel Nour, Mounir: Businessman, Member of Parliament (2000 – 2005), Leader of the NWP Parliamentary Group & Candidate in 1995, 2000. 23. 04. 2003, Respondent's company office in Cairo (English).

Abdel Nour, Saad: Lawyer, Secretary-General of the NWP & Candidate in 1984. 01. 12. 2002, Respondent's office Cairo (French).

Abdel Razek, Hussein: Secretary General of Tagammu. 28. 03. 2002, Party Headquarters Cairo (Arabic).

Abu Al-Fattah, Abdallah: Member of Tagammu Central Committee & Candidate in 1995. 04. 11. 2002, Party Headquarters Cairo (Arabic).

Abu Ismail, Ahmed: NWP Member of Parliament (1984-1987, 1995-2000) & Candidate in 1979, 1984, 1995, 2000. 17. 01. 2003, Respondent's Cairo home (English).

Al-Arian, Essam: Assistant Secretary-General of the Doctor's Syndicate – Giza Branch & MB – Islamic Alliance Candidate in 1987. 11. 12. 2002, Headquarters of the Doctor's Syndicate Giza (English).

Al-Ashry, Farouk: Executive Board Member of the ADNP. 28. 08. 2000, Party Headquarters Cairo (English).

Al-Assaal, Fathiya: Writer & Tagammu Candidate in 1984, 1987, 1990, 1995 & 2000. 05. 11. 2002, Respondent's Cairo home (Arabic).

Al-Asser, Abdelmonein: President of the EGP. 22. 08. 2000, former Party Headquarters in Giza (English).

Al-Badawy, Sayed: Businessman, Secretary-General of the NWP & Candidate 1984 & 1987. 09. 04. 2003, Respondent's company headquarters in Daqahliya governorate (English).

Al-Merghany, Asmat: Lawyer & NDP Independent Candidate in 2000. 13. 11. 2002, Respondent's office in Heliopolis (English).

Al-Shahabi, Nagi: President of the DGP (since 2000) / Assistant-Secretary General for Election Affairs at the SLP (until 2000) & Candidate in 1987, 1995 & 2000. 01. 11. 2002, Party Headquarters Cairo (Arabic).

An-Nashirty, Mustafa: Professor of Management at Masr University, Lawyer & NWP Candidate in 1995 & 2000. 13. 11. 2002, Respondent's Cairo office (English).

Awad, Mohamed: Lawyer & Secretary General of the EGP. 15. 06. 2003, Respondent's Cairo office (English).

Badrawi, Fouad: NWP Member of Parliament (2000 - 2005) & Candidate in 1995 & 2000. 25. 01. 2003, Respondent's home in Cairo (Arabic).

Bakri, Mustafa: Chief Editor of Al-Usbua Newspaper, Ahrar Candidate in 1995 & Independent Candidate in 2000. 10. 11. 2002, Al-Usbua Headquarters Cairo (English).

Hassanein, Mohamed Farid: Engineer & Businessman, Member of Parliament (2000 – 2005) & Candidate in 1987 & 2000, NWP (2000) / ADNP (currently). 22. 06. 2003, Respondent's Company office in Ramadan City (English).

Heshmat, Gamal: Doctor of Medicine, former MB Member of Parliament (2000 – 2002) & Candidate in 1995, 2000. 25. 01. 2003, Office of MB Parliamentary Group (Translated from Arabic).

Hussain, Ahmed: Member of the UP & Journalist. 02. 09. 2000, Party Headquarters Cairo (Arabic).

Hussain, Magdi: Chief Editor of Al-Shaab newspaper, SLP Leadership & Candidate in 1987 & 2000. 24. 06. 2003, Egyptian Press Syndicate Headquarters (English).

Koroum, Mohamed: Engineer and ADNP Candidate in 2000. 08. 07. 2003, Greek Club Restaurant Cairo (English).

Maadi, Abu Ela: General Manager of the International Centre for Studies, Co-Founder of the Centre Party (illegal), & MB Candidate in 1995. 03. 09. 2000, International Centre for Studies Premises Cairo (English).

Mursi, Mohamed: MB Member of Parliament (2000 - 2005) & Candidate in 1995 & 2000. 17. 02. 2003, Office of the MB Parliamentary Group (English).

Nakhla, Mamdouh: Lawyer & Tagammu Candidate in 1995 & 2000. 06. 02. 2003, Groppi Café in Cairo (Arabic).

Said, Mohamed: Assistant Secretary General of Tagammu. 09.11.2002, Party Headquarters Cairo (Arabic).

Said, Rifaat; President of Tagammu. 21. & 22. 08. 2000, Party Headquarters Cairo (English).

Samad, Fawzi: NWP Candidate in 1995 (Independent) & 2000 (NWP), New Wafd Party. 20. 05. 2003, NWP Helwan offices (English).

Sha'aben, Mohamed Abdel Aziz: Tagammu Member of Parliament & Candidates in 1979, 1984, 1987, 1995 & 2000. 07. 11. 2002, Party Headquarters Cairo (Translated from Arabic).

Shafiq, Amina: Al-Ahram Journalist & Tagammu Candidate in 1984, 1987 & 2000. 01. 11. 2002, Al-Ahram Headquarters (English).

Saurur, Mohamed: Member of the UP & Journalist. 02. 09. 2000, Party Headquarters Cairo (Translated from Arabic).

Sherdy, Mohamed: Businessman & NWP Candidate in 2000. 29. 08. 2000 & 19. 06. 2003, Respondent's company office in Cairo (English).

Shukri, Ibrahim: President of the SLP. 02. 09. 2000, Party Headquarters Cairo (English).

Sultan, Essam: Lawyer & Co-Founder of the Centre Party (not legalised). 02. 02. 2003, Respondent's office in Giza (English).

Tulaima, Mohamed: Tagammu Candidates in 2000. 02. 11. 2002, Party Headquarters Cairo (Arabic).

Waghi, Ahmed: ADNP member of the Cairo branch of the party. 08.11.2000. Respondent's home.

Wali, Awatif: NWP Candidate in 1984 & 2000. 07. 04. 2003, Party Headquarters Cairo (English).

Zawiris, Saad: Doctor of Medicine Greek Hospital Cairo & Tagammu Candidate in 1995 and 2000. 04. 02. 2003, Party Headquarters Cairo (English).