

**RUSSIAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS:
WHAT ROLE FOR THE FAR EAST?**

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Russian-Japanese Relations:

What Role for the Far East?

**Thesis submitted for the degree of
Master of Philosophy (MPhil) Economics (Econ.)**

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To my family and friends

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Rahul Nath Moodgal, May 2006



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ABSTRACT

Historically, international relations texts were concerned with determining systematic approaches. Initially, it was assumed the entire system was homogeneous. Rarely were spatial differences and non-European studies considered. Over time this has changed as international relations evolved to include more actors. The rise and fall of powers has meant the epicentre of focus and literature continues to shift. Prior to the industrial revolution and European colonisation, the ancient empires of China, Mongolia and Italy took their turns in dominating the international political economy. The US replaced the European colonists. Since the end of WWII Japan has emerged as an economic superpower. Similarly, the rise of the *East Asian Tigers* and communism's collapse attracted substantial attention. Indeed, trends and issues also generate attention and literature. During the Cold War, ideology, free markets, East versus West, North versus South, non-alignment, bipolarism, hegemony, the arms race and game theory were dominant. Since the 1990s, communism's collapse, transition, democratisation, decentralisation, globalisation and multipolarity have all been in vogue. Moreover, the rise in global communications has meant international relations have become more transparent. With so much information (perhaps too much) trends are more visible. However, the end of bipolarity has meant international relations are no longer as predictable as they once were. Many theories of international relations, based around historical events, have been thrown out of the window. Similarly, theories about the state, statehood and sovereignty have changed. The domestic transition process of the former Eastern bloc has been accompanied by an international systematic metamorphosis that has made the domestic as unpredictable as the international, against a backdrop of increasing numbers of actors.

The collapse of central authority has exacerbated the rise of regions and global relations. Classical theories that revolved around the state, such as statehood and sovereignty, are now in disarray. Within the state and international political economy there has been an exponential growth in actors that are responsible for changes in the nature and structure of relations. One such actor is the subnational region. This volume focuses on one such region – the Russian Far East [(henceforth the Far East) (see Figure A1.2)] – and its role in Russian-Japanese relations (see Figure A1.1). Moreover, it looks at how roles might change. It provides the basis for

building a model, concept, theory or notion that could be used as the basis for determining and/or investigating the roles regions can play in the changing international political economy.

This volume is the culmination of ten plus years of work. Its intention is to examine the role that subnational regions, henceforth regions, can and do play in a changing international political economy. Changes in the international political economy mean regions now have the ability to play a role in international relations. In some cases they have entirely redefined the nature of relations. This raises the question as to whether regions have become actors in their own right – both within the state and the international political economy. This thesis investigates this and related issues, by using the Far East, as a case study vis-à-vis its relations with Japan (see Figure A1.3). Whether the Far East can truly be considered to play a role, in this case in shaping relations with Japan, is central to this piece of work. Indeed, although issues within Russia (local, regional, subnational, centre-periphery, national) and in North-East Asia complicate this study they do make for a more than interesting case study and one that is relevant to many themes and issues in international relations (see Figures A1.9 and A.10).

The Far East continues to be of interest to academics from all disciplines and policymakers alike. Russian-Japanese relations are a critical framework for understanding the development and the role of this region. Geographical proximity, historical interaction, complementary economics, the balance of power and the need for the resolution of a territorial dispute confirm this. Traditionally, studies about the Far East focused on the region's resources within the context of North-East Asian geopolitics. There has been a continuous debate as to whether the region is Russia's outpost or gateway vis-à-vis North-East Asia. Since Gorbachev's 1986 Vladivostok and 1988 Krasnoiarsk speeches the Far East seemed destined to be a gateway. However, post-communist transition, centre-periphery conflicts and the reality of the anti-resource thesis have thrown the region into disarray. The Far East's resources are well documented; they form the basis for the renaissance of contemporary interest with the view to potential exploitation and local decision-making. Meanwhile, contemporary studies of Russian-Japanese relations have been dominated by the Kuril Islands/Northern Territories, but perhaps needlessly so (see Figures A1.4, A1.5, A1.6, A1.7, A1.8 and Appendix 2).

ABBREVIATIONS

Amur	Amurskaia Oblast' (Amur Oblast or Amur)
APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
ASN News	Attorney Search Network News
BBC-SWB	British Broadcasting Corporation-Summary of World Broadcasts
Chukotka	Chukotskii Avtonomnyi Okrug (Chukotka Autonomous Okrug or Chukotka)
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CNN	Cable News Network
COMECON	Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (or CMEA)
CSCE	Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EIU-BR	Economist Intelligence Unit-Business Russia
EL-RFE	Economic Life of the Russian Far East
EU	European Union
Evreiska	Evreiskaia Avtonomnaia Oblast' (Jewish Autonomous Oblast' or Evreiska)
FESCO	Far Eastern Shipping Company
G7	Group of Seven
G8	Group of Eight
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trades
GNP	Gross National Product
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IWGIA	International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs
Kamchatka	Kamchatskaia Oblast' (Kamchatka Oblast or Kamchatka)
Khabarovsk	Khabarovskii Krai (Khabarovsk Krai or Khabarovsk)
Koriak	Koriaskii Avtonomnyi Okrug (Koriak Autonomus Okrug or Koriak)
Magadan	Magadanskaia Oblast' (Magadan Oblast or Magadan)
MNCs	Multi-National Corporations

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
Primorie	Primorskii Krai (Maritime Region or Primor'e)
RFE	Russian Far East
RFE/RL	Russian Far East/Radio Liberty
RIA-Novosti	Russian Information Agency-Novosti
ROTOBO	Japan Association for Trade with Russia and Central-Eastern Europe (formerly SOTOBO – Japan Association for Trade with the Soviet Union and the socialist nations of Europe)
Sakha	Respublika Sakha (Yakutia) {[Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)] or Sakha}
Sakhalin	Sakhalinskaia Oblast (Sakhalin Oblast or Sakhalin)
UN	United Nations
WEU	Western European Union
WTO	World Trade Organisation
WWI	World War One
WWII	World War Two

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INTRODUCTION

It is the intention of this volume to examine the role that regions can and do play in a changing international political economy. The author will illustrate this by using the Russian Far East as the case study of a region and Russian-Japanese relations as the framework representing the changing international political economy. This research will culminate in the dissemination of findings that will make conclusions about three key issues:

- The relationship between Russia and Japan;
- The role of regions in shaping the external relations of the Russian Federation; and
- The significance of regions for international relations in the conditions of globalisation as an indication of the changing international political economy.

Interest and Specialisation

The author's initial interest in Russia, Japan and the Far East was born out of the pull of the enigma of tsarist Russia. In the beginning, research revolved around understanding the communist system and the chronology of Russian and Soviet history. It was clear at an early stage, however, this study would include more than history. Russian and Soviet history had very much been determined by geography. Geography played a role in the Russian and Soviet systems. The addition of the Far East and Japan to the equation came as a result of initial postgraduate studies in development. Could half-a-century of development policies be applied to a vast land such as Russia to facilitate the exploitation of her resources and her integration into the international political economy? While development studies focused on the economic progress of former colonies, transition conversely focused on the economic progress of a collapsed empire and its satellites. When the Soviet Union collapsed, expectation was that the former communist bloc would be a vast new market for consumer goods, supplier of natural resources and a new partner in international relations. Very quickly this enthusiasm waned. What alternative options could be considered?

At the time of the Soviet Union's collapse there were also numerous studies highlighting Japan's desire for new sources of natural resources. This was driven by the hope to reduce dependency upon the Middle East and to cope with increasing demands for natural resources

and energy. What were Japan's options? Her distance from and the turbulent political situation in the Middle East was part of the decision to diversify lines; indeed, proximity was key. Furthermore, of all of her neighbours, it was Russia who had the resources to meet these demands. This laid the foundations for the construction of the macro framework within which relations between two states could be analysed. However, this was an incomplete framework. If Russia was going to be a source of natural resources the location of these resources also had to be considered. After all *proximity* was part of the decision to look for alternative sources and in a vast country such as a Russia this was going to be a key issue. In Russia these resources were located in the Far East.

Further investigation uncovered both theoretical and historical analyses that could be used as the basis for Russian-Japanese cooperation in the form of *the natural-fit thesis*. The idea assumed that the complementary nature of economies was the underlying reason for building relations between states and, subsequently, this would result in cooperation in other fields: Russia's vast resources and capital, with a technology and know-how deficiency; Conversely, Japan's capital, technology and know-how with a resource deficiency. Initial research questioned why there had not been greater Russian-Japanese cooperation. Moreover, Gorbachev's attempts to establish relations with North-East Asia, with special attention to Japan, had not fully exploited this potential. What were the key issues determining Russian-Japanese relations? The literature was peppered with one theme – *the territorial dispute* (see Figures A1.4, A1.5, A1.6, A1.7, A1.8 and Appendix 2). What was this territorial dispute? Why were these tiny islands so important? Given that the domestic and international frameworks had changed for both states, surely the territorial issue would have been marginalised? Well in some circles yes and in others no. In the traditional framework of bilateral relations – i.e. those between Moscow and Tokyo – the territorial issue continued to dominate. However, globalisation and decentralisation of the state meant local and regional forces had pushed an immense number of new actors onto the international stage. These new actors included subnational actors, and it was relations between subnational actors (for example, Primorie and Hokkaido), or between one subnational actor and centres of political power (for example, Sakha and Tokyo), that had started to shift attention away from the territorial issue.

Amongst these new subnational actors was the Far East – a region of immense resources that were key to the natural fit thesis’s success in Russian-Japanese relations. The Far East was an example of a region rich in resources that had gained domestic and international attention. This resource-rich region – trying to gain greater autonomy over its wealth, politicise its position vis-à-vis the centre and forge an international role – made for an interesting case study as it raised issues of centre-periphery relations, sovereignty and the role regions can play in the domestic and international political frameworks. Where these regions were located and whether or not they had resources could also affect their success in striving for greater autonomy and a heightened international role.

The framework for the study had been established – the role of a resource-rich region at the edge of a state in an economically complementary bilateral relationship: *Russian-Japanese Relations – What Role for the Far East?* The case study of the thesis would be an example of the role of a region in the changing international political economy.

The Far East

The Far East (Dalni Vostok) refers to the Russian (formerly Soviet) Far East. Once called Pacific Siberia, it is that region of the Russian Federation (and FSU) between Eastern Siberia and the Pacific Ocean. The Far East comprises ten territories (all subjects of the Russian Federation) – Amur, Chukotka, Evreiska, Kamchatka, Koriak, Khabarovsk, Magadan, Primorie, Sakha and Sakhalin (see Figure A1.2).

Under the 1993 constitution there are four different jurisdictional designations – krai, oblast, autonomous okrug and republic. The word *krai* literally means *margin*. Historically, it referred to border territories but is now applied to all types of territories. Administratively, the difference between an *oblast* and a *krai* is that the latter of the two tends to be larger in terms of area. An *autonomous okrug* is a territory with indigenous minorities that have certain privileges distinct from an *oblast* or a *krai*. There are two autonomous *okrugs* in the Far East – Koriak (home to the Koriaki) and Chukotka (home to the Chukchi) – both created in 1930. In 1928 a homeland for Russian Jews was created in the Far East. The area was designated an autonomous oblast in 1934 (originally called Birobidzhan). There is one republic in the Far

East – Sakha. A republic enjoys the most privileges due to its special constitutional status. In the case of Sakha this is due to a combination of factors, including its ethnic population, its size (about five times the size of France) and its phenomenal resources (especially diamonds and gold). An elected president heads a republic. The native Yakuti are now only a small part of Sakha's population. Russia-Sakha relations are governed by the 1993 constitution and a special bilateral treaty signed in July 1994.

The Far East is Asia's oldest region. Prior to its incorporation into the Russian state it was a melting pot of North-East Asian peoples while being home to the dozens of native groups resident in the Eurasian North. However, it is the wealth of resources that have always been the region's *fait accompli*. It is these resources that lured Russia to extend her empire and claim these lands. But is the combination of resources and geographical location that has been key to the Far East's historical role. It has been a frontier between the Russian/Soviet empires and North-East Asia. It has been a power base for the projection of military strength. It has been a buffer zone between Moscow and North-East Asia's centres of political power. It was the engine that fuelled the Soviet economic machine; the region benefited from the best the Soviet development model had to offer. Throughout its history the Far East has played numerous roles that have been determined by the dynamics of the Russian state and the international political economy.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, the debate as to what role the Far East should play resurfaced. With the end of central planning and the decline of military-industrial complexes, the Far East has had to re-consider its role within the state and within North-East Asia. Socio-politico-economic liberalisation, combined with globalisation, has resulted in the Far East becoming an actor in its own right. Indeed, the Far East exemplifies the debates over centre-periphery relations, regions and regionalism, localisation, decentralisation, federalism, sovereignty, globalisation, transition, resource-rich regions and non-state actors. Moreover, the individual territories that make up this area also have their own agendas and have also sought to establish with Moscow and internationally, independently from each other. This, in turn, raises questions over the unitary nature of the Far East as a region.

The Far East As A Unitary Region

The geographically informed are aware and understand that regions are created to interpret complexity. But regions are also socio-economic, political, strategic, cultural and administrative. In the case of the Far East she is an administrative region defining a unique socio-economic, geographical and historical area. Others use the Far East to distinguish the direction of policy and strategy. The Far East can be considered a region – in terms of geography and in terms of administration. Under the Soviet Union the Far East was the subject of large-scale planning. Some form of regionalisation usually accompanied planning. At its simplest, a region was a specified area set apart for particular attention either because of potentialities, human content, strategic importance or relative backwardness. Conceptually, planning, at its most complex, sees the entire national area subdivided into regions. But this can be confusing in that there are two types of regions – those in terms of individual territories, such as Primor'e, and those in terms of sub-national areas such as the Far East. Indeed, Russia is made up of eighty-nine regions while being subdivided into large planning regions. But this can be confusing in that there are two types of regions – those in terms of individual territories, such as Primor'e, and those in terms of sub-national areas such as the Far East. Indeed, Russia is made up of eighty-nine regions while being subdivided into larger planning regions.

There have been three attempts to classify Russia's eighty-nine regions – Hanson (1996), Lysenko and Matveev (1999), Bradshaw and Treyvish (2000). Each study identified a number of prospective roles for each region. However, each region potentially has more than one role with which it can identify. Indeed, at the subnational level, the whole Far Eastern region too had many roles with which it could also identify. The three classification studies were a starting point for developing and interpreting the Far East – its role, image and position. Though these models were broad, vague and simplistic, what they did do was highlight the fact that the individual territories of the Far East, though geographically representing an area of the Russian Federation, were difficult to classify or label. As with the individual territories, the region, as a whole, too had many roles. Moreover, it showed that it was difficult to regard the Far East as a unitary region.

Each of the Far Eastern territories has different political statuses, non-uniform relations with Moscow, varying resource endowments and distinguishing climatic features. Some of the Far East's territories can be regarded as gateways based on their geographical location. Others are resource-rich regions based on their abundance of resources, as well as their capacity and ability to exploit those resources. In terms of the concept of centre-periphery relations, each of the Far Eastern territories can be broken down into at least four dimensions – cultural, economic, political and geographical. The cultural focuses on elite-minority ethnic relations. The economic focuses on exploitation and uneven wealth distribution. The political is concerned with participation and power. The geographical is related to distance, territorial status and regional conflict. Each of these four criteria further highlighting and emphasising differences between the Far Eastern territories.

While the Far East has an extraction economy, politically it is an arena of ten regional players forming no single political entity. Despite the creation of the Association of Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal Territories, an interregional association, little progress has been made in pushing for unified autonomy and policy, in spite of common interests, shared geography and similar post-Soviet/transitional problems. Infighting and competition between the various territories have been the key negative forces. Consequently, Moscow has been able to continue to hold onto power through a policy of divide and rule. Though separatists would argue the Far East needs an association to centralise regional problems and coordinate efforts to lobby Moscow, attract foreign investment, deal with political corruption and have various regional bodies answerable to a superior authority, realistically and unfortunately, it is likely that such a body will add to existing bureaucracy and centralise political corruption. In the case of the Association of Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal Territories it has added no value whatsoever and remains very much a non-influential, non-unifying institution.

The Far Eastern political situation has been turbulent. It is anti-Moscow in character. To a considerable extent Far Eastern politics is attributable to the region's geography – both within the Russian Federation and vis-à-vis the Pacific Basin. Understanding Far Eastern politics is best done through sub-divisions of the region – the south (Khabarovsk, Primor'e and Amur) is anti-Moscow and pro-nationalist. The north (Magadan and Kamchatka) is less anti-Moscow.

While Sakhalin and Sakha are special cases given their pro-Moscow and pro-reform natures, and their immense resource endowments as well as their success at attracting foreign investment. This is a simplification and on many occasions Magadan has been conservative, while Khabarovsk has been moderate. Far Eastern politics is a battleground – federally and locally. Despite common problems, little unitary success has materialised and secession is unlikely.

Russian-Japanese Relations

Since the end of WWII, Russian (and Soviet) relations with Japan have been characterised by reticence and suspicion, mainly attributable to the overarching territorial dispute over the Northern Territories/Kurils Islands (see Figures A1.4, A1.5, A1.6, A1.7, A1.8 and Appendix 2). However, during the Soviet era there were three waves of positive engagement: 1955-1956, during the re-establishment of diplomatic relations; 1972-1974, when Siberian and Far Eastern resources were elevated as the energy crisis forced Japan to search for alternative sources; and since 1988, as Gorbachev's approach seemed to augur well for improved relations. It is only now, more than half a century on, there seems some possibility that foundations for a resolution of the territorial dispute could be established which would significantly improve Russian-Japanese relations. The Cold War's conclusion, the Soviet Union's collapse and Russia's transition brought expectations of a speedy resolution to this dispute which has, thus far, failed to materialise. Resolution of the territorial issue – the main reason preventing the signing of a post-WWII peace treaty between Russia and Japan – would bring untold political and economic opportunities, fully incorporating Russia (not just the Far East) as an actor and a power in North-East Asia. Trade is the most beneficial aspect of Russian-Japanese relations but remains to be fully exploited.

However, crises, conflicts of interest and war are not just a post-WWII phenomenon in Russian-Japanese relations. The two, along with China, have been contestants for North-East Asia, particularly the Korean Peninsula (see Figure A1.10) and Manchuria (see Figure A1.9), for much of the last two millennia. Indeed, crises, conflicts of interest and war have always been central to Russian-Japanese relations.

Contribution to the Field of Study

This study strives to make a contribution to the field of international relations by attempting to fill in some of the gaps in the literature as well as by building on existing literature in four key ways:

- Firstly, the incorporation of theory into his study – something innovative in studies about Russian-Japanese relations and the Far East;
- Secondly, by attempting to determine the socio-politico-economic role of (resource-rich) regions in international relations by using the Far East as an example. This is complicated by the fact the region's historical role has shifted many times and today it has many prospective and existing roles. Thus, the role of a region, such as the Far East, needs to include an investigation into gateway, frontier and peripheral regions – all of which raise issues about sovereignty, centre-periphery relations, decentralisation, federalism, regionalism, nationalism and cooperation;
- Next, this study attempts to understand post-Soviet Russian-Japanese relations and the Far East both independently and in the frameworks of Russian-Japanese relations and North-East Asia; and
- Finally, by using all of this research and its findings the key objective is to provide a contribution to the literature of international relations by investigating the role of regions in the changing international political economy.

Indeed, this research will make a contribution from the fact that the primary research conducted is different in terms of time, location and interviewees than that previously undertaken in this field of study (see Appendix 3).

Literature Review

The classic texts in Russian-Japanese relations focus on the territorial issue. Little consideration has been given to other aspects of the bilateral relationship. Hasegawa's *The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations* (1998) exemplifies this. Though one of the most recent texts on Russian-Japanese relations, it fails to journey beyond the territorial issue. Older texts such as Lensen's *The Russian Push Toward Japan* (1959) make more interesting reading but still focus upon territorial issues. Stephan's *The Kurile Islands*

(1974), Malozemoff's *Russian Far Eastern Policy* (1958), Connaughton's *The War of the Rising Sun and Tumbling Bear* (1989), White's *The Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War* (1964), Westwood's *Russia Against Japan* (1986) and Jain's *The USSR and Japan* (1981) are somewhat more successful in examining the aspects of Russian-Japanese relations but the territorial issue very much remains central to the discussions. Moreover, the literature highlights the nature of the relationship that has existed between Russia and Japan, one where Moscow and Tokyo have determined and executed policy.

There are, however, a number of more recent edited collections that have been successful in going beyond the territorial dispute. These include Akaha's *Politics and Economics in the Russian Far East* (1997), The UN's *Trade and Investment Complementarities in North-East Asia* (1996), and ERINA's *Japan and Russia in North-East Asia* (1997). These later texts, along with numerous articles, have examined the prospects of Russian-Japanese relations that are based around other aspects of cooperation and, moreover, they discuss relations that go beyond the traditional Moscow-Tokyo dynamic. By analysing relationships that include subnational regions, such as the Far East, as well as security, trade, resource cooperation and cultural exchange issues, the outlook for Russian-Japanese relations seems optimistic. Developments in the field provide evidence of this and the rise in numerous regional newspapers and lines of communication mean this progress is now being reported. Nonetheless, official reports, such as those from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, politically biased newspapers and texts written by natives on each side continue to focus on the territorial issue and are merely interested in attaining political support for their position on the dispute, though other issues may be referenced, rather than investigating the wider framework.

Literature about the Far East has long centred on the region's resources. The most authoritative text about the region is Stephan's *The Russian Far East – A History* (1994). The book is very successful in detailing all aspects of the Far East's history and goes far beyond what most studies do – listing resources. Other key studies, such as Armstrong's *Russian Settlement in the North* (1965), Forsyth's *History of the People in Siberia* (1992), Wood's *Siberia* and Khisamutdinov's *The Russian Far East* (1996) also make wonderful reading by providing an analysis of the region in historical, geopolitical and socio-economic contexts. Collectively they

demonstrate the multi-disciplinary approach necessary for understanding this region. Yet little literature has emerged on the region's politics. Many articles give a general overview of what is going on but none is successful in providing significant detail, building general notions of Far Eastern politics or applying political and/or international relations theory. One explanation is that there is too happening on and by the time the printer hits the press everything is dated.

Russian texts on the Far East have focused on history and economics. Professor Pavel Minakir (based at Khabarovsk Institute of Economic Research) has been key in supplying data about the economic situation in the Far East. Numerous articles in edited collections and his *Dal'nii Vostok Rossii – Ekonomicheskoe Obozrenie* (1993), *Ekonomika Dal'nego Vostoka – Reforma i Krizis* (1994), *Dal'nii Vostok Rossii – Ekonomicheskoe Obozrenie* (1995), *The Russian Far East – An Economic Handbook* (with Freeze) (1994), *The Russian Far East – An Economic Survey* (with Freeze) (1996), *Ekonomika Dal'nego Vostoka – Perekhodnyi Period* (with Mikheeva) (1995) and *Ekonomika Dal'nego Vostoka v Usloviak Reformy – Materialy Mezhdunarodnoi Konferentsii* (with Mikheeva) (1995) all confirm this. However, it should be remembered the region's economy and its location have politicised its position vis-à-vis Moscow and North-East Asia. Indeed, the region's resources and geography are key to determining its politics and future.

Methodology

The Oxford English Dictionary defines methodology as *the science of method; a body of methods used in a particular branch of activity*. In determining the methodology for this thesis, it was critical to consider all aspects of the study, so as to take account of the body of methods used in international relations. Indeed, it was critical to consider both primary and secondary sources. It was not sufficient to regurgitate all existing materials, or to reiterate an argument with some additional sources thrown in to produce a biased picture. It was about reaching conclusions through investigation of a subject and the appropriate theoretical and contemporary issues, ideas and themes. Since the seventeenth century, in Western culture the word *thinking* has become synonymous with the acts of observing, questioning, investigating, analysing and synthesising. The scientific method has moved beyond the natural sciences into the study of human beings and society (thus the birth of political science, sociology,

economics, psychology and communications). In the humanities the emphasis is also on observing, questioning, investigating, analysing and synthesising. This is what critical thinking means. Indeed, critical thinking lies at the heart of any research. Thus, when determining the research methodologies for this volume, the process involved:

- Asking questions;
- Gathering as much information as possible on the subject in an effort to find answers to key questions; and
- Carefully and systematically judging the meaning of the information gathered.

As a contractor is unable to build a house without lumber, nails, pipes and electrical wiring – the physical materials of a building – it is impossible to develop an idea, a conception of the world, without concrete facts about that world. Depending upon the type of research being undertaken, the evidence that can be gathered may be primary or secondary. In this case it involved both.

Primary research involves gathering facts or evidence by going directly to the source itself – in the case of this thesis this involved fieldwork in Russia, Japan and the US. It involved learning Russian in order to facilitate communication with appropriate individuals in the field, as well as to have the ability to read relevant local materials and understand local culture to get into the psyche and the reasoning behind decision-making. Primary research for this thesis was conducted during the period June 1995-June 1998 in Russia, Japan and the US with sixty officials, academics and business personnel at national and subnational locations (see table below for a summary and Appendix 3 for a detailed fieldwork diary).

State	City	Date	Institutional Affiliation	Activities
Russia	Moscow	Jun-Aug 1995	Moscow International University- Moscow Institute of Social and Political Studies	Russian language; Interviews
Russia	Moscow	Mar-Apr 1996	Moscow State University	Russian language; Interviews; Research
US	Boston	Jun-Aug 1996	Harvard University	Russian language; Interviews; Research
Russia	Moscow	Nov 1996	None	Interviews; Research
Russia	Vladivostok	Dec 1996	Far Eastern State University	Interviews; Research
Russia	Khabarovsk	Dec 1996	Khabarovsk Economic Research Institute	Interviews; Research
Japan	Tokyo	Jan-Feb 1997	None	Interviews; Research
US	Hawai'i	Mar 1997	University of Hawai'i; East-West Centre	Interviews; Research
US	Seattle	Mar 1997	University of Washington	Interviews; Research
US	New York	Mar 1997	Institute of East-West Studies	Interviews; Research
US	Urbana-Champaign	Jun 1997	University of Illinois at Urbana- Champaign	Research
Japan	Tokyo	Oct 1997	None	Interviews; Research
Japan	Kyoto	Oct 1997	Kyoto Institute of Economic Research	Interviews; Research
Japan	Niigata	Oct 1997	Economic Research Institute for North-East Asia	Interviews; Research
Japan	Sapporo	Oct 1997	Hokkaido University	Interviews; Research
Russia	Vladivostok	Jun 1998	Far Eastern State University	Interviews; Research

Primary research, as groundbreaking, inspiring and unique as it may be, is irrelevant and incomplete without secondary research. Indeed, secondary research is necessary prior to the conduct of the primary research. Secondary research looks at existing materials – be they prior fieldwork, newspapers, theoretical studies, articles, books, conferences or other items. It is secondary research that essentially involves using theories and hypotheses completed, conclusions reached, completed, investigations done, facts and/or evidence discovered and used. Secondary research for this volume was conducted with the help of English, Russian and Japanese publications in the form of books, articles and newspapers.

The classification of research for this volume was then split into three categories:

- Facts – pieces of information that could be objectively observed and measured;
- Inferences – statements made about the unknown made on the basis of the known; not necessary statements of truth but hypotheses that may or may not be valid; and

- Judgements – expressions of the author’s approval or disapproval of occurrences, persons or objects being described; making inferences and judgements is natural. But facts in themselves are meaningless.

The classification of research in the process of this volume’s culmination involved gathering facts to test, to reassess inferences about the themes, issues and ideas of this thesis. Indeed, it also involved the careful examination of the inferences and judgements of others to determine if those inferences or hypotheses are reasonable and, indeed, applicable.

Following on from research classification, the next stage of methodology involved evaluating the research. Though there are numerous methods to collate facts to reach conclusions, it is key to avoid, as far as possible, any biases and prejudices. Thus, it is necessary to determine some systematic, objective way to assess and examine facts. Some disciplines rely on mathematical models, like statistical analyses. Other disciplines rely on logic, or what can be termed reasonable arguments. In developing this thesis it was necessary to select some systematic methods of analysing the evidence gathered otherwise it was possible to end up simply rationalising or justifying one opinion or school of thought. Justification and rationalisation are the anti-thesis of the whole purpose of research, the main purpose of which is actually to open inferences or judgements to objective testing.

Whether undertaking primary or secondary research methodology is usually typical of that undertaken by those carrying out similar research – be it other academic work or other research conducted in similar fields of studies. It was the author’s obligation to initially gather as much evidence as possible about the area of study, and to oblige testing methods and/or evidence testing considered appropriate to the field of study. In short, undertaking research for this volume, involved questioning, searching, weighting, assessing, as well as drawing personal inferences while critically examining the inferences of others.

Research methodology is not the solution for a problem nor is it the search for the final truth. It is a quest for a solution, an answer that evidence points to. It is a conclusion.

Structure

This volume is divided into five distinct sections – theory, history, application, conclusions and appendices. The first section is a summary of all appropriate theories relevant to the thesis. It reviews international relations theories, as well as appropriate political themes and ideas such as those about regions, transition and globalisation. History is the focus of section two where there is a review of the Far East and its role in Russian-Japanese relations. This journey begins with the Russian Empire’s Eastward expansion and concludes with the region’s post-Soviet transition, emphasising interactions with Japan along the way. The third section uses the ideas from the theoretical section and the knowledge from the historical section and applies it to the case study in hand with conclusions reached from the primary research done in the field. This section essentially tests the theories of section one, reviews the impact of the history of section two, while reaching a new set of conclusions based on the author’s work in the field. The fourth section of the thesis attempts to reach some appropriate conclusions on the case study in focus and, more generally, about the role of regions in the international political economy. Finally, section five is a summary of appendices containing information about the Far East and Russian-Japanese relations from both primary and secondary sources. These appendices detail interesting facts relevant to the study but not key to the structure of the thesis.

Technical Notes

This thesis covers the period to 1998 (the pre-Putin period). Any conclusions reached and any analysis done refer to that period.

Where possible the author has refrained from using the terms *Northern Territories* and *Kuril Islands*. Instead terms such as disputed territories have been used to prevent any bias.

Russian statistics are notable for their unreliability. The two main problems are that they are either driven by political motivation or do not include unofficial trade (which usually takes the form of bartering or illegal transactions). However, what is important is a trend not statistical accuracy.

For consistency all currency references, unless stated, are in United States Dollars (US\$).

Sources referred to more than once in a chapter will be stated in full when initially quoted and then, subsequently, using *op. cit.* If the same source is used in subsequent chapters it will, initially, again be stated in full and then *op. cit.* will be used for further references in that chapter. This is to make reading and reference to sources easier for the reader.

The British Library's System of Transliteration has been used for Russian to English transliteration. Where translations have already been undertaken (such as in the case of an author's name for materials used or for the name of a journal) these have not been amended to be consistent with the British Library's System of Transliteration.

Japanese sources are based on interviews carried out in English and Russian as well as from sources translated into English or Russian from Japanese.

The bibliography has been organised into regions – Western, Russian and Japanese. The written sources are listed first – texts, journals and then newspapers – followed by human, institutional and financial resources. This has been done for the purpose of simplification. Western sources include all non-Russian and non-Japanese sources.

Chapter One:
Frameworks for Regions in the Changing
International Political Economy

1.0 Frameworks for Regions in the Changing International Political Economy

Due both to domestic and international processes and phenomenon, regions are now able to play a significant role in the changing international political economy. Regions have become international actors in their own right. This thesis illustrates this phenomenon by examining the role of the Far East in the relations between Russia and Japan. Using a case study such as this generates points of contention – theoretically and analytically. Indeed, analysing the role of a region in the changing international political economy highlights issues at the international, regional, national, subnational and local levels, but it also questions approaches and methods used in international relations.

There is a diversity of theoretical and contemporary approaches and methods used in international relations – from intricate descriptions of single events to the broad and theoretical – that seek to explain trends. All approaches add value but ideally a study combines detail with broader generalisations for the purpose of explanation. For example, if the topic of focus is Russian-Japanese relations, commentary about the underlying framework and the basis of analysis of that bilateral relationship should be made. This would include theory, actors and space, the post-Soviet environment and globalisation. However, it is critical to go beyond theoretical approaches and include empirical detail such as fieldwork.

Fieldwork, however, is not undertaken solely for constructing a predictive theory (assuming that can be done). It is done to build ordering devices or approaches that assist in making sense of the diversity of data and events in the international political economy. Whatever the device (theory, model, conceptual framework or analytical framework) its purpose is to promote understanding by ordering facts and concepts into meaningful and appropriate patterns. The gathering of facts or descriptions of events creates an understanding but, quite often, has little broader application. Only when these facts and events are placed in some conceptual framework can they illustrate recurring processes in the international political economy. Nevertheless, an organising device does more than relate facts to propositions. It provides a basis for discovering gaps or deficiencies in previous studies that cannot explain contemporary and, in some cases, historical situations. Most importantly it establishes

frameworks for analysis. This is the focus of and basis for chapter one – establishing frameworks for analysing regions in international relations and for illustrating the case study central to this volume – the role of the Far East in Russian-Japanese relations. It is not exhaustive but an introduction and a summary of relevant theories, concepts, notions and ideas.

1.1 Contending Theories of International Relations

In 1935 Zimmern suggested ‘...the study of international relations extends from the natural sciences at one end to moral philosophy at the other’. He defined the field as a ‘...bundle of subjects...viewed from a common angle’.¹ Spykman, among the first to propose a rigorous definition, used the phrase *interstate relations*. However, he later replaced *interstate* with *international*.² International relations encompass varying activities. Scholars have never fully agreed on where the boundaries of the discipline lie. Dunn suggested the ‘...subject-matter of international relations consists of whatever knowledge from any sources may be of assistance in meeting new international problems or understanding old ones...’ He added international relations may ‘...be looked upon as the actual relations that take place across national boundaries or as the body of knowledge which we have of those relations at any given time’.³ This is a fairly standard approach but is it adequate? Does it limit relations to states and governments? Or is this delineation too broad? Is it better to include relations on the basis of their political significance, for example, by focusing upon influences they exert on other political units? Political scientists are concerned with relationships amongst all actors (state and non-state, international and transnational) to the extent they contribute to the understanding of political phenomena.⁴ Conflict and cooperation both attend international relations. Scholars argue over which predominates, which constitutes the norm

¹Zimmern, Alfred, “Introductory Report to the Discussions in 1935” in Zimmern, Alfred (Ed.), University Teaching of International Relations, Report of the Eleventh Session of the International Relations Conference, International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, League of Nations, Paris, France, 1939, pp.7-9.

²Spykman, Nicholas J., “Methods of Approach to the Study of International Relations” in Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Proceedings of the Fifth Conference of Teachers of International Law and Related Subjects, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, US, 1933, p.60.

³Dunn, Frederick S., “The Scope of International Relations” in World Politics, Vol.1, October 1948, pp.142 and 144.

⁴Taylor, Philip, Non-state Actors in International Politics – From Trans-regional to Sub-state Organisations, Westview, London, UK, 1984, pp.113-142.

and from which deviations must be explained. Some see conflict as the hallmark of international relations and hold cooperation to be rare, insignificant and temporary.⁵ Others believe international relations resemble other political systems in the development of norms, rules and a generally cooperative ambience. To them, conflict appears unusual.⁶ Scholars of both persuasions concentrate on developing presumptions and relating these to patterns of cooperation or conflict. Ironically, neither school focuses on explaining departures from expected patterns. Both schools emphasise what they perceive to be the norm. Most basically, states choose between cooperation and conflict, and such decisions underlie the entire spectrum of international relations from alliances to war. When, how and why they choose between them, and with what consequences, constitute the primary foci of the study of international relations. It is not surprising international relations scholars concentrate on the extremes of conflict and cooperation. These extremes have the greatest impact upon international relations. Both are the final stages of a process. Here international relations will be viewed in a framework that shall be called the international political economy; international because it is between different states; political economy because it involves both politics and economics.

As the study of international political economy has developed, different and discernible approaches have emerged to guide scholars in tackling some central and abiding preoccupations. Viotti and Kauppi identified three *alternative images* – realism, pluralism⁷ and globalism.⁸ But discussions on the changing international political economy also need to consider the contemporary. The contemporary is most prevalent in trends and there are two trends that will be considered – the post-soviet and globalisation. These two trends, while being the most relevant to this case study, also collectively encompass the major

⁵Such as Nicholas J. Spykman. See Spykman, Nicholas J., "Geography and Foreign Policy, I" in American Political Science Review, Vol.32, February 1938, pp.391-410.

⁶Deutsch, Karl W., and Singer, J. David, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability" in World Politics, Vol.16, April 1964, pp.388-397.

⁷They identified pluralism but the focus here will be on liberalism, which is an aspect of pluralism, to be consistent.

⁸Viotti, P.R., and Kauppi, M.V., International Relations Theory – Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, Second Edition, MacMillan, London, UK, 1993.

phenomenon in the international political economy since the end of the Cold War and highlight how things have changed.

No theory monopolises either the international political economy or Russian-Japanese relations. Theories of conflict and cooperation, of bipolarity and multipolarity, of the causes of war, of imperialism and independence, and indeed more, are applicable to both but not resolute. Realism, liberalism and globalism assist in understanding and explaining specific aspects of the changing international political economy and Russian-Japanese relations, but so do contemporary trends. In order to marry the theoretical and the contemporary, each of the schools of thought will be discussed vis-à-vis the changing international political economy and then vis-à-vis Russian-Japanese relations. The intention of this line of discussion is to highlight how both the key ideas of each school of thought and contemporary trends relate to changes, themes and actors in the international political economy. Indeed, each of these also relates to Russia and Japan and their bilateral relations. How has theory tracked the changing international political economy? Have changes shifted emphasis between types and roles of actors and how they interact? As part of the themes of this thesis, the most important points to be made from this section are how domestic and international changes have affected Russia and Japan, as well as their foreign policies and interactions with each another. Both Russia and Japan, like many other powers, have faced domestic upheavals that have changed how they view and interact in the international political economy emphasising how the domestic affects the international. In a sense each state has its own international political economy – how it views the world, its role in the system, its enemies, its allies, its prospects for cooperation and development, and so on. Indeed, it shows how the domestic situations in those states has changed and affected their perceptions of the world.

1.2 Realism

Realism has, since WWII, been the dominant Western approach in the study of international political economy. It sees the inevitable tendency of the international political economy towards recurrent balances of power, as alliances and war are a consequence of anarchy. Realists argue a bipolar international political economy is more stable than multipolarity

because there are fewer conflict possibilities; deterrence is easier ‘...because imbalances of power are fewer’; and ‘...prospects for deterrence are greater because miscalculations of... power and... opponents are less likely’.⁹ Realism’s view of change is important. Change that occurs is strictly *within-system*, the most significant being shifts in the balance of power – from bipolarity to multipolarity, or vice versa, triggered by alterations in capability distribution (population, territory, economy, military and so on). Waltz doubted such change is common. Multipolarity lasted three centuries until bipolarity.¹⁰ Realists explain the *long peace* of the post-WWII era by bipolarity.¹¹

Unlike utopianism and idealism, realism connotes a hard-boiled willingness to see the world as it is. Realists begin with assumptions and emerge with a coherent perspective on international relations, using anarchy as their primary metaphor for the international political economy and stressing there exists no central authorities capable of creating and imposing order on the interactions of states. They view states as competitors and argue order emerges from competition under anarchy.¹² For realists, states are the primary actors and the international political economy where states’ policies clash. A state defines its foreign policy as a rational response to a hostile and threatening international environment where it can only ensure its survival. For both Russia and Japan, such an environment has certainly influenced their foreign policies.

Though historically dominated by conflict Russian-Japanese relations have also seen periods of cooperation. Russian-Japanese relations are a representation of classic realism – two states whose foreign policy is/was based on rational decision-making calculated in response

⁹Mearsheimer, J.J., “Back to the Future – Instability in Europe After the Cold War” in International Security, Vol.15, No.1, 1990, pp.102-108 and 163-170. (Contrast this with classical realists.)

¹⁰Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of International Politics, Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts, US, 1979, pp.97, 100, 131, 162, 176-183.

¹¹Mearsheimer, J.J., op. cit., p.11.

¹²For discussions of realism, see Thompson, Kenneth W., Masters of International Thought – Major Twentieth-Century Theorists and the World Crisis, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, US, 1980; Dougherty, James E., and Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Robert L., Contending Theories of International Relations – A Comprehensive Survey, Second Edition, Harper and Row, New York, US, 1981, chapter 3; and Smith, Michael Joseph, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, US, 1986.

to a hostile and threatening international political economy. Prior to the Soviet Union's collapse, irrespective of their political systems, socio-cultural traits or personalities of leaders, Russian-Japanese relations interacted in an international political economy where states were key actors; an international political economy where concerns over anarchy created bipolarity around security and alliance. Indeed, domestically, anarchy has historically led both Russia and Japan to self-help in the form of the Bolshevik and Meiji revolutions. However, it was clear, early on in the post-Soviet era, that in spite of changes in the international political economy as well as domestic transitions in Russia and Japan, political stalemate continued in relations between Moscow and Tokyo. This has led to liberalism defeating realism and the dynamics, actors and themes in the relationship changing.

1.3 Liberalism

With their roots in economics, liberals argue comparative advantage can lead to economic interdependence, exemplified in ideas, theories and notions such as the natural-fit thesis. It, like other ideas of international political economy, has traditionally focused on state interaction, not non-state actors. Non-state actors derive their significance on whether they are able to influence on state policies and behaviour. Moreover, location of non-state actors is critical to their impact on the international political economy. However, the liberal shift away from state emphasis offers one attempt to overcome growing anomalies in realism – for example, the growing role of non-state actors and international organisations in the post-WWII international political economy. Similarly, realism was found wanting in the face of growing evidence of international cooperation. For realists cooperation is a function of the balance of power and something that is only an expedient for states. Liberals challenge this.¹³ They believe cooperation is promoted by international organisations and regimes. Regimes exist to deal with numerous issues. For liberals, international organisations and regimes mitigate uncertain effects of anarchy. They create mutual restraint, promote trust

¹³Axelrod, R., and Keohane, R.O., "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy – Strategies and Institutions" in World Politics, Vol.38, No.1, 1985, pp.226-254; and Milner, H., "International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations – Strengths and Weaknesses" in World Politics, Vol.44, No.3, 1992, pp.466-496.

and alter expectations about how other states will act – ‘...more willing to cooperate because they assume others will do the same...’.¹⁴

Originally linked to enterprise, liberalism evolved to include international trade theory. Liberal economists treat states as the primary units and conclude cooperative arrangements emerge naturally from exchange. More generally, liberals hold that states, wanting to maximise economic welfare, allow unfettered exchanges, i.e. free trade, between themselves and other states. Since this exchange is based primarily on comparative advantage, it leads to specialisation and the growth of economic interdependence between states. Liberals also see international relations akin to social situations characterised by rules, norms and cooperative arrangements. Given that the roots of liberalism lie in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century economics, this view of the world is very much a *laissez-faire* one – order emerges as self-interested actors coexisting in an anarchic environment reach autonomous and independent decisions leading to mutually desirable cooperation. Unlike realists, who stress crises attend constant preparations for war, liberals point to peace. They see conflict as a periodic aberration that breaks tranquillity in which exchange makes it possible for states to prosper. Liberals see conflicts arising out of misunderstanding.

Despite the different conclusions drawn about cooperation and conflict in international relations, realism and liberalism share core assumptions.¹⁵ Although liberals avoid using *anarchy* to describe it, they share the realists’ vision of the international system. This, in fact, justifies specific disciplinary concentration on international relations distinct from domestic politics. The distinction between anarchy and authority differentiates foreign policy from

¹⁴Krasner, S., “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences – Regimes as Intervening Variables” in International Organisation, Vol.36, No.2, 1982, p.185. (Regimes have also been employed in neorealist analysis, but here ‘...regimes creation and maintenance are a function of the distribution of power and interests among states...’. It is the liberals who remain more convinced of their utility in promoting cooperation. See Krasner, S., “Sovereignty, Regimes and Human Rights” in Rittberger, V. (Ed.), Regime Theory and International Relations, Clarendon Press, Oxford, UK, 1993, pp.139-140.); and Kupchan, C.A., “Concerts, Collective Security and the Future of Europe” in International Security, Vol.16, No.1, 1991, p.131.

¹⁵Some, like Stein, disagree with those who suggest that realism and liberalism make different core assumptions. See, for example, Greico, Joseph M., “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation – A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism” in International Organisation, Vol.42, Summer 1988, pp.485-507.

other policies. Although realists make the most of this point, liberals accept there is no centrally mandated order in the international arena; no hierarchical government can impose authoritative decisions on states. Realists and liberals both recognise there exist no accepted enforceable legitimate and binding universal laws. Yet despite their common focus on self-interested states interacting in an anarchic environment, realists and liberals come to different conclusions about international relations. International relations involve cooperation and conflict – more cooperation than realists admit and more conflict than liberals recognise. Yet both fail to agree on who the dominant actors in international relations are and where the basis for relations lies.

In spite of recognising danger, liberals argue realist pessimism is overstated and based on false assumptions; threats to peace can be contained and ameliorated through international institutionalisation. In the post-Cold War world, liberals have accorded institutions a central role. For Keohane and Nye, post-1945 Western European stability is the result of the development of a *densely institutionalised* network of relations between states. The durability of this network ensures the gloomy premonitions of realism remain unrealised. What about elsewhere? The task in this connection is to extend the model to Eastern Europe and the FSU in order to set in motion ‘...a continuous pattern of institutionalised cooperation’.¹⁶ For advocates of this approach, it is seen as a process of co-opting successor states into existing arrangements. This serves to stabilise potentially disruptive international consequences of the Soviet Union’s collapse and the Cold War’s end. Organisational involvement in the FSU (NATO, the EU, the IMF, the World Bank, G7), preservation and extension of arms control and disarmament regimes, the UN and CSCE in conflict resolution, are all seen as germane in this regard.¹⁷ In contrast to realists, who see

¹⁶Keohane, R.O., and Nye, J.S., “Introduction – The End of the Cold War in Europe” in Keohane, R.O. (Ed.), After the Cold War – International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991, Harvard University Press, London, UK, 1993, pp.5-6.

¹⁷Archer, C., Organising Europe – The Institutions of Integration, Second Edition, Edward Arnold, London, UK, 1994, pp.281-282; Cox, R.W., “Multilateralism and World Order” in Review of International Studies, Vol.18, No.2, 1992, pp.164-165; Ruggie, J.G., “Multilateralism – the Autonomy of an Institution” in International Organisation, Vol.46, No.3, 1992, p.561; and Kegley, C.W., Jr., “The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies? Realist Myths and the New International Realities” in International Studies Quarterly, Vol.37, 1993, p.136.

international organisations weakened by the end of the Cold War, liberals argue that although the rationale of these bodies has altered, their fundamental organisational strengths remain. Indeed, in the case of the UN and CSCE they have been freed from the paralysis that gripped them previously. Liberals are keen to identify conditions where common interests arise. And, indeed, there are many common interests between Russia and Japan.

In more than a decade since the Soviet Union's collapse, significant progress has been made in improving Russian-Japanese relations, much of which is due to the impact of liberalism. During the El'tsin era (1992-1998) Russian-Japanese diplomacy manifested itself in high profile meetings, declarations and statements as efforts to resolve the territorial dispute multiplied. The framework of Russian-Japanese relations changed (domestically and internationally) materialising in increased interaction. In pursuit of a liberal legacy, this cooperation involved state and non-state actors, and institutional and regime frameworks (see Appendix 4). The Soviet Union's collapse provided great impetus to increasing the frequency, nature and levels of Russian-Japanese interaction. The behaviour of Russia and Japan, nationally and subnationally, can be explained by reference to both the international political economy and the domestic conditions affecting policymaking. The centres of political power were redefining their international roles while managing national malaise.

In the post-Soviet era, the context and parameters of the Russian-Japanese relationship changed. Ideology ceased being the main factor determining international relations, as identity has come to the fore. Geopolitical factors began to play a more important role and economics became far more salient. However, both Russia and Japan found it difficult to find a common language; at best they have found the *islands for economic aid* formula. There were two peaks in Russian-Japanese relations between 1992 and 1998 – in the period 1992-1993, with the Tokyo Declaration of October 1993; and 1997-1998, with a new wave of change, although the window of opportunity narrowed in regard to the peace treaty. In both cases, Japan was the initiator, in contrast to the Soviet period. Russia was divided on how to react to the Japanese offensive. Russian domestic factors were passive but determinant, although matters were more complex than that. After the Soviet Union's demise, ideology abruptly shifted from Sovietism to liberalism. New Russian elites,


including President El'tsin, proclaimed themselves advocates of democratisation and marketisation. Reform economist Gaidar and Foreign Minister Kozirev claimed they were motivated by this new pro-Western ideology. Amongst others, Kozirev's committed himself to Atlanticism vis-a-vis Japan. First Deputy Japanese Foreign Minister Kunadze was instrumental in formulating a new policy based on the principles of *law* and *justice*. Japan tried to use the new situation for old causes – namely, resolving the territorial dispute (see Figures A1.4, A1.5, A1.6, A1.7, A1.8 and Appendix 2). However, politics is not moved by ideology alone. Instead of ideology, identity conflict came to the fore in Russian politics. Russians had to cope with the establishment of the new state system and national ideology in a situation where the old system was dissolving. Statists and nationalists united in opposing El'tsin and his entourage's foreign policy, including their policy towards Japan. His visit to Japan was postponed twice during the period 1992-1993. On the Japanese side, post-Soviet thinking in the new context was still lacking. Policymakers only tactically radicalised the old *territory first* approach. Thus, both viewpoints met indirectly. Japan was able to obtain a new and amorphous response from El'tsin in October 1993 but her economic leverage was also limited. By December 1993, El'tsin had to cope with growing resistance from communists and nationalists – the winners of the first parliamentary election. In spite of this, liberalism had been born in Russian-Japanese relations.

Liberalism materialised in the realisation of the natural fit thesis (see Section 1.5). By 1996 Russian-Japanese relations were mutually exploiting comparative advantages – technology and know-how deficient, resource-rich Russia trading (without hindrance) with resource-deficient, technology and know-how rich Japan (see Figure 1.1). This was a separation of politics and economics. During the Cold War ideology integrated politics and economics – what was economic was viewed through political lenses. Both Russia and Japan failed to fully exploit their economic complementarity. Recognising anomalies in realism by the growing role of non-state actors (see Figure 1.2) and international organisations (see Appendix 4) in the international political economy, liberalism manifested itself in Russian-Japanese relations in attributing these actors and frameworks responsibility for interaction, cooperation and the development of mutual interests. Indeed, as can be seen from Figure 1.2 and Appendix 4 both derived their significance from their influence on policy. Evident from


Appendix 4 and Russia's accession to the IMF, World Bank, WTO, G8 observer in APEC and ASEAN, Russian-Japanese relations were also being conducted through an increasingly densely institutionalised network of relations. The Cold War split in the UN Security Council disappeared. Russia and Japan were cooperating bilaterally but also as part of larger multipolar frameworks.

Figure 1.1: The Structure of Russian-Japanese Trade, 1996

Japan's Exports to Russia, 1996



Russia's Exports to Japan, 1996



Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Secretariat of the Cooperation Committee, Japan's Assistance Programmes for Russia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Secretariat of the Cooperation Committee, Tokyo, Japan, May 1997, p.1.

Figure 1.2: Liberalism and Russian-Japanese Relations

Russian Link	Japanese Link	Form of Cross-Border Relations
-	Hokkaido/Tokyo	Hokkaido Ambassador to Tokyo appointed to highlight the island's Far East interests to Tokyo
Siberia/Far East	Hokkaido	6 th Russian-Japanese Meeting of Far East, Siberia and Hokkaido representatives (Sapporo, September 1994) concluded stable Far East-Japan relations established. No mention was made of Moscow
Siberia/Far East	Niigata	Siberia and Far East Fair held in 1994
Moscow	Niigata	Russian consulate opens in Niigata in 1994
Sakhalin	Hokkaido	Japanese Industry-94 Fair in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk sponsored by Sakhalin Entrepreneur Union and Hokkaido's Japan-Russia Trade Association
Khabarovsk/Vladivostok	Toyoma/Aomori	Direct air services established in 1994
Moscow and Far East	Tokyo	Japan-Russia New Era '95 Programme places emphasis on Far Eastern peoples in cultural exchanges
Far East	Tokyo	Japan provides special assistance to the Far East, promoting administrative reforms
Far East	Iide	Farmers from Iide involved in teaching Far Eastern minorities vegetable processing techniques
Nakhodka/Zarubino	Tokyo	Japanese foreign investment initiated Nakhodka's Free Economic Zone and Zarubino Port
Khabarovsk/Vladivostok/ Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk	Tokyo	Japan Centres and Consulates established in Khabarovsk, Vladivostok and Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk
Far East	Tokyo	Japan established a Regional Venture Fund prioritising the Far East in her assistance to Russia ¹⁸
Magadan	Tokyo	Nisso-Boeki Company opened office in Magadan
Petropavlovsk- Kamchatski	Tokyo	Progress Corporation opened office in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatski
Sakhalin	Tokyo	C. Itoh and Company becomes member of Sakhalin Entrepreneur's Union
Far East	Tokyo	Export-Import Bank of Japan guaranteed loans and credit insurance to the Far East ahead of all regions
Far East	Tokyo	By 1996, 67% of Far Eastern joint ventures involved 12 Japanese companies (Mitsui, Sumitomo, Nissyo-Iwai, Itochu, Marubeni, Nichimen, Mitsubishi, Toyota Tsusyo, Tomen, Konematsu, Tokyo Boeki and Tyori)
Far East	Japan	Vladivostok develops sister city relations with Niigata, Akita and Hakodate
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk	Aomori	In November 1996 Michinoku Bank opens offices in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk

Sources: Author's interviews with Magosaki, Ukeru, Hokkaido's Ambassador to Tokyo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Kumabe, Kensaku, Assistant Director General, Loan Department 2 (Europe, Middle East and Africa), Export-Import Bank of Japan both in Tokyo, Japan on January 23, 1997; *The Japan Times*, September 24-26, 1994; *RFE Update*, April 1994, p.9 and March 1995, pp.7-10; *The Moscow Times*, May 30, 1995; and UN, *Trade and Investment Complementarities in North-East Asia*, Papers and Proceedings of the Roundtable on Economic Cooperation through Exploitation of Trade and Investment Complementarities in the North-East Asian subregion, July 10-12, 1995, Seoul, South Korea, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP): Studies in Trade and Investment No.18, 1996, p.213.

¹⁸Initiated through the EBRD in 1996, the Daiwa Far East and Eastern Siberia Fund is assisted by the Japanese government and the Nippon Company. The fund aims to acquire shares in small and medium-sized firms.

The end of the Cold War in North-East Asia also fuelled expectations of a new, regional role for Russia and regional cooperation – multipolarity. But, these hopes have been slow to materialise. Despite considerable disparities, the macroeconomic potential of North-East Asia is significant.¹⁹ The basis of this potential lies in the perceived complementary nature of regional economies.²⁰ The UN Survey of Trade and Investment Complementarities in North-East Asia highlighted the economic complementarity between North-East China, the Far East, North Korea, South Korea, Japan and Mongolia by employing the natural-fit thesis in a multipolar framework. It focuses on labour, resources, capital, technology and management (see Figure 1.3).

Figure 1.3: Production Complementarities in North-East Asia

Area:	Labour:	Resources:	Capital:	Technology:	Management:
China	■	■	■	■	■
Far East	■	■	■	■	■
North Korea	■	■	■	■	■
Mongolia	■	■	■	■	■
Japan	■	■	■	■	■
South Korea	■	■	■	■	■

Source: UN, *Trade and Investment Complementarities in North-East Asia*, Papers and Proceedings of the Roundtable on Economic Cooperation Possibilities through Exploitation of Trade and Investment Complementarities in the North-East Asian Subregion, July 10-12, 1995, Seoul, South Korea, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP): Studies in Trade and Investment No.18, 1996, p.99.

Notes: China = Three North-Eastern Provinces of China; Far East = Russian Far East; ■ = sufficient; ■ = moderate; ■ =insufficient.

However, actors restraining regional cooperation are numerous. Previously, stagnation in Russian-Japanese relations; and now, development differences and resource endowments; trade balances; as well as obvious political scenarios. China has large trade deficits with Japan, South Korea and the Far East, but surpluses with North Korea and Mongolia. There are technological, capital and infrastructural disparities. There are also trade barriers – South Korea and Japan still maintain relatively high levels of protection. Politically, there are worries over growing Chinese economic and political power. As the US role in the region declines will China’s gain momentum? Prospects of Korean unification and worries over North Korea highlight shifting balances of power. Against this complex and changing

¹⁹This was originally apparent in the plans for the Tumen River projects.

²⁰*The Japan Times*, October 20, 1997.

backdrop Russia is attempting to gain influence and actively pursue a North-East Asian role. Japan, meanwhile, is increasingly active internationally, wishing to hold onto the label of regional leader. In so much as things have changed and will continue to change, post-Cold War North-East Asia continues to undergo balance of power shifts as globalising forces rain down.

1.4 Globalism

Globalism embraces Marxist and non-Marxist approaches. It shares common preoccupations, particularly of the international political economy and underdevelopment of the developing world, with other schools. Viotti and Kauppi in their summary on globalism identified four key assumptions.²¹ Firstly, understanding the contexts within which international actors operate. In common with realism, it is suggested the behaviour of actors can only be comprehended by grasping the structure of the international political economy. However, the nature of that international political economy is conceived of entirely differently. The existence of a capitalist international political economy, rather than anarchy, is its defining characteristic. The existence of anarchy is recognised but consequential to the degree it allows for the development and spread of capitalism unimpeded by central regulating forces. From this starting point follows globalism's second assumption – the importance of historical analysis – particularly, attention to capitalism's evolution, rise and dominance.

The assumptions, thus far, are central to Wallerstein's *world system* theory.²² For Wallerstein, the contemporary international political economy equates to the capitalist *world economy*. Globalism's third and fourth assumptions refer to the mechanisms of domination by which the developing world is prevented from developing; and the centrality of economic factors in understanding this subordination. These two assumptions are evident in

²¹Viotti, P.R., and Kauppi, M.V., *op. cit.*, p.449-450.

²²Two useful collections of essays that contain the framework of his approach are *The Capitalist World Economy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1979; and *The Politics of the World Economy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1984.

Wallerstein's work, and also that of dependency theorists.²³ This school emerged in the 1960s and 1970s partly responding to discredited US analyses of development. The developing world's failure to grow resulted in greater attention to the constraints these states faced in the international political economy. Particularly, it was argued their dependence on major industrialised states (through unequal terms of trade, MNCs, international banks and multilateral lending agencies) relegated them to being subservient and with little control over their economic fortunes. For Wallerstein, the post-Cold War era will be marked by trends that stem from two separate but coincidental developments – the end of the Cold War itself – a contest that ‘...shaped all interstate relations...’ in the post-1945 era; and the end of the ‘...US hegemonic era...’ in the capitalist world economy. Wallerstein's tentative prognosis of future trends suggests ‘...a time of great world disorder...’.²⁴

Wallerstein's two separate but coincidental developments have, indeed, been key to Russian-Japanese relations and been the direct result, as he stated, of the end of the Cold War and the end of the US hegemonic era. In Moscow, three symbolic changes took place. First, El'tsin's re-election as President decided who was in charge. Second, Russian diplomacy had undergone transition. Kozirev's Atlantic orientation had given way to the pragmatic policy of Foreign Minister Primakov, who pursued national interests in all directions, including the East. Third, the new elites (*oligarchs*) had strengthened their position on the domestic and international markets. A new era of financial capital emerged, although by August 1998 this seemed illusory. On the basis of these changes, Japan formulated a policy that considered geopolitics and economics separately, one that was less influenced by the US.

Globalism understands the context, within which Russia and Japan operate – the international political economy, North-East Asia, the shadow of an emerging China and potential conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Post-Soviet Russian-Japanese relations

²³Brown, C., “Development and Dependency” in Groom, A.J.R., and Light, M. (Eds.), Contemporary International Relations – A Guide to Theory, Frances Pinter, London, UK, 1994, pp.62-64.

²⁴The summary presented here derives from Wallerstein's “The Collapse of Liberalism” in Miliband, R., and Patich, I. (Eds.), Socialist Register 1992, The Merlin Press, London, UK, 1992 and his “The World-System After the Cold War” in Journal of Peace Research, Vol.30, No.1, 1993, pp.1-6. A similar approach is also apparent in Chomsky, N., World Orders, Old and New, Pluto Press, London, UK, 1994.

exemplify the capitalist international political economy in their relations, in their separation of economics and politics, in their realisation of the mutual benefits to be gained by comparative advantage. Indeed, both Russia and Japan, the former in the post-Cold War era and the later post-WWII era, have seen capitalism's evolution, rise and dominance in their domestic, international and bilateral frameworks; the realisation of the natural-fit thesis's application.

1.5 The Natural-Fit Thesis – A Basis For Bilateral Relations

The natural-fit thesis argues the complementary nature of two economies is the basis for developing economic cooperation in the form of mutually beneficial trade links and, subsequently, improved political relations.²⁵ However, the notion disregards non-economic factors essential to understanding the foreign policies of natural-fit economies and, thus, their trade links. Unlike the liberal school's natural-fit thesis, the realist school's anti-resource constraint (see section 1.11 and Figure 1.5) considers non-economic factors, albeit narrowly. The natural-fit thesis is a notion that was previously used by liberals to analyse German-Russian relations in the early 1900s. Though theoretically plausible, the notion encounters application problems; it uses economics as a basis for resolving political (and other) problems, given that it tries to forge *natural* links between two states. Yet while some factors facilitate trade, others hinder it. Politics can facilitate and hinder. Economics can encourage political change by being a basis for ending conflict. This change can be measured in trade. This idea has historically only been applied to states, although actors and space in international relations are no longer the monopoly of states.

1.6 Actors and Space in International Relations

In all social sciences scholars struggle to determine an initial point of investigation. Determining the *fulcrum point* is particularly difficult in international relations because of the breadth of the field. On which of many possible levels of analysis should attention be focused? Although most international relations theorists reject the notion individuals are

²⁵The natural-fit thesis is not a theory but an idea that has been used by scholars and policymakers alike. It builds on the idea of comparative advantage, which was originally developed on the basis of mutually beneficial and complementary trade between Britain and Portugal in the eighteenth century.

international actors, a classical liberal would argue the individual should be the foundation of any social theory, since only individuals are real, while society is an abstraction.²⁶ Subnational groups such as political parties and the media are organised non-governmental interest groups seeking to influence foreign policy by lobbying or shaping public opinion. Indeed, subnational regions may also be classified as international actors, as they fall into the scope of foreign policy studies, as well as national and comparative politics.²⁷ International theorists, however, while not making subnational groups the centre of attention, are obliged to recognise their relevance because of the significant interaction between domestic and international politics.²⁸ Realist theorists subscribe to the *state-centric* view of international relations.²⁹ They recognise other realities but insist all other entities subordinate to states. Non-state actors derive their significance from states or from the degree to which they can influence state policies and behaviour. MNCs, in contrast to other international actors, regard territory as irrelevant. It is this mode of operation that enhances the importance of subnational actors and borderlands in international relations.³⁰

Political geographers share this compelling interest in borders and borderlands. They focus on margins, not the core; they observe the local while being aware of the global.³¹ Political geographers consider boundaries in the traditional sense – lines marking national space and

²⁶Delanty, Gerard, Social Theory in a Changing World – Conceptions of Modernity, Polity, Malden, Massachusetts, US, 1999, pp.78-112.

²⁷Levin, Jonathan, Measuring the Role of Subnational Governments, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, US, 1991, pp.4-7; and Leach, R.H., and O'Rourke, T.G., State and Local Government – Subnational Governance in the Third Century of Federalism, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, US, 1988, pp.189-231.

²⁸Solingen, Etel, Regional Orders at Century's Dawn – Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, US, 1998, pp.113-167; and Milner, Helen V., Interests, Institutions, and Information – Domestic Politics and International Relations, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, US, 1997, pp.197-213.

²⁹Crawford, Robert M., Idealism and Realism in International Relations, Routledge, London, UK, 1999, pp.11-29; and Doyle, Michael W., Ways of War and Peace – Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism, First Edition, Norton, New York, US, 1997, pp.197-234.

³⁰Huntingdon, Samuel P., "Transnational Organisations in World Politics" in World Politics, Vol.25, April 1973, pp.57-64; and Nye, Jr., Joseph S., "Multinational Corporations in World Politics" in Foreign Affairs, Vol.53, October 1974, pp.48-62.

³¹House, J., "Frontier Studies – An Applied Approach", in Burnett, A.D., and Taylor, P.J. (Eds.), Political Studies from Spatial Perspectives – Anglo-American Essays on Political Geography, Wiley, New York, US, 1981, pp.291-312.

interfaces *linking* political units.³² Meanwhile *borderlands* are the boundaries that create a distinctive region, making it a mode of division for regional definition. Boundary characteristics, unique to either side of the line, dominate the cultural landscape. Yet these characteristics disappear further away from the borderland into the territorial domain of the adjacent states.³³ Geographers have found some distinct advantages in applying this concept of borderland. It provides a basis for a legitimate and useful subnational focus that could otherwise be overlooked – a small, local-scale dimension within an international context. At the same time the concept creates a miniature, but readable, barometer of change in the relations between the states divided when studied in a temporal setting.³⁴ Hence, analysis of the cultural landscape of the border becomes the focus of study.

House's operational model argued borderland transaction flows are integrated progressively in space and time.³⁵ With national interests dominating transboundary commerce, transactions between frontiers across international boundaries are usually discouraged and often illegal. With a borderland that evolves from an extreme conflict situation, a marked change in the nature of transactions *and* a sharp rise (often a dominance) of the local transactions is expected. For example, a pick-up in trade. The analysis of border landscapes in political geography has generally been directly related to the study of boundaries. The vast majority of these studies have traditionally emphasised stress and conflict, viewing the boundary as an interface between two or more discrete national territories, subject to problems directly reflecting relations between the states it divides. Consequently, the ebb and flow of boundary studies has tended to be associated with periods of territorial conflict and hostility.

States continue to be central political actors while maintaining structures that have evolved. Globalising and localising dynamics are sufficiently powerful to encourage supranational,

³²Minghi, J.V., "Boundary Studies in Political Geography" in *Annals*, Association of American Geographers, Vol.53, pp.407-428.

³³Minghi, J.V., "The Franco-Italian Borderland – Sovereignty Change and Contemporary Developments in the Alpes Maritimes" in *Regio Basiliensis*, Vol.22, pp.232-246.

³⁴Minghi, J.V., "Railways and Borderlands –The Rebirth of the Franco-Italian Line through the Alps Maritimes" in *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie*, Vol.75, pp.322-328.

³⁵House, J., *op. cit.*

transnational or subnational communities hoping to serve their needs and wants better than states of which they are a part. Such communities may or may not replace states. They may or may not acquire concrete, discernible form. However, the dynamics at work in the international political economy can make these nascent communities formidable contenders as engines for change, redesigners of boundaries, sources of power and/or policy. With technological advances, processes of globalisation and localisation, and the emergence of international institutions, MNCs, NGOs and other similar non-governmental phenomena, the issue of what level analysis should concentrate on in international relations has been raised. Should the focus be on actions and attitudes of *individual* policymakers? Is it assumed all policymakers act similarly when confronted with similar situations and, therefore, the focus should be on the behaviour of states? Each level of analysis leads to different conclusions, so it is essential to be aware of distinctions between them, and, indeed, to include them all.

If international relations are examined from the perspective of states, rather than from the system in which they exist, quite different questions arise. State behaviour can be explained by reference not just to the system, but also to the domestic conditions affecting policymaking. Wars, alliances, imperialism, diplomacy, isolation and other goals of diplomatic action can be viewed as the result of domestic political pressures, national ideologies, public opinion or socio-economic needs. This level of analysis has much to commend it for governments do not react just to the external environment. Their actions also express the needs and values of their population and political leaders. This is the usual approach of diplomatic historians, based on the sound premise that what is notionally considered to be *state* behaviour is really policymakers defining purposes. This level of analysis focuses upon ideologies, motivations, ideals, perceptions, values or idiosyncrasies of those empowered to make decisions for the state.

But which level of analysis provides the most useful perspective? While each makes a contribution, each also fails to account for aspects of reality. Essentially, theory is weak on the idea of regions as international actors in the international political economy. This is key to how this volume intends to be innovative. For example, Russian foreign policy cannot be understood adequately by studying only the attitudes and values of its Foreign Minister, nor

is it sufficient to analyse Russian socio-economic needs. It is imperative to be aware of other factors too; of ideology, the configuration of power, influence, domination and subordination at the international level. The main characteristics of the external environment are no less important than those of the state's domestic considerations. Therefore, all levels of analysis need to be employed at different times, depending upon the type and nature of the issue at hand. The perspectives of the international political economy are very broad and not totally comprehensive. Which provides the best approach for delineating the *main* features and characteristics of international political processes over a relatively long period of time? For example, the types of relations that existed amongst Greek city-states can be described without examining the character of each city-state or the motives, ideals and goals of each statesman in each city-state. Today, the structure of alliances, power, domination, dependence and interdependence set limits upon the actions of states and policymakers, no matter what their ideological persuasion or ideals, and no matter what domestic opinion is.

However, international relations are too often taken to be the relations between states. Other actors are given secondary importance. This two-tier approach can be challenged. First, ambiguities in the meaning given to *state* and its failure to tally with reality result in its conceptual usefulness being impaired. Greater clarity is obtained by analysing intergovernmental and intersociety relations with no presumption that one sector is more important than others. Second, it is recognised that governments are losing their sovereignty when faced with MNCs, regional energies and the assertion of ethnicity by different populations. Third, NGOs engage in such a web of global activities, including diplomacy, that governments have lost their political independence. Yet it is still quite common to find analyses of international relations that concentrate primarily on governments, give some attention to intergovernmental organisations and ignore transnational actors. Even in fields such as environmental politics, where it is widely accepted that governments interact intensely with UN agencies, commercial companies and environmental pressure groups, it is often taken for granted states are the only players. Dominant states may be actors, but exclusive arbiters they are not, and with globalisation, localisation and decentralisation, organisations at all levels have become players. It is no longer possible to ignore the activities of an oil company operating in a state where the regime does not respect human

rights; it is no longer possible to push aside activists who protest and destroy fields of experimental crops. This has all been accentuated by globalisation – a process that has questioned concepts such as sovereignty.

But is sovereignty relevant to the international political economy? It is likely to survive while shedding particular, outmoded uses? For the foreseeable future humans will live in an international political economy in which the status of political entities is far from self-evident. As Wright once noted: "[I]nstead of a world of equal, territorially defined, sovereign states we have a world of political entities displaying a tropical luxuriance of political and legal organisation, competence, and status."³⁶ In an age of subversion and extensive international propaganda, states are *penetrated* and highly permeable to external influences. This is also true in the case of federations where regions are emphasising differences, pushing for both greater autonomy and socio-politico-economic control – Canada, India and Russia the most obvious examples. Through its conventional foundations, federalism is an idea whose importance is akin to natural law in defining justice and to natural right in delineating the origins and proper constitution of political society. Although those foundations have been somewhat eclipsed since the shift to organic and then positivistic theories of politics, which began in the mid-nineteenth century, federalism as a form of political organisation has grown as a factor shaping political behaviour.³⁷

Today the local, national and international politics interpenetrate each another, reflecting structural changes such as the internationalisation of various fields of activity and technological change. Economic conditions, especially in crisis periods, have a great impact on the degree to which foreign and domestic policymaking become intertwined. These days no state can be immune to global economic events. Indeed by the 1990s, world economic crises had reached a genuinely global scale. Even the former communist bloc was effected

³⁶Wright, Quincy, On Predicting International Relations – The Year 2000, Social Science Foundation, University of Denver, Denver, Colorado, US, 1969, p.11.

³⁷Mogi, Sobei, The Problem of Federalism – A Study in the History of Political Theory, Allen & Urwin, London, UK, 1931, pp.65-79.

whereas previously they would have been somewhat insulated from worldwide developments.

1.7 Post-Soviet International Relations

The end of the bipolar international system represented a turning point in the international political economy, in the roles and functions of states and international organisations. The chief cause concluding the bipolar system was the collapse of communism. Since communism's collapse, the most obvious characteristic of the international political economy has been the absence of any clear principle of order. The events of 1989-1991, from the Berlin Wall's collapse to the Soviet Union's disintegration, represent a three-fold turning point. First, they marked the end of the broadly bipolar structure, based on US-Soviet rivalry, which the international political economy had assumed since the late 1940s. Second, at the state level, former communist states experienced serious transition problems from economic collapse, which affected them all to varying degrees, to disintegration of the state itself – most strikingly in the Soviet Union, but also bloodlessly in Czechoslovakia and explosively in Yugoslavia. Yet those states not in the throes of post-communist transition have also been forced to redefine their national interests and roles in light of the change in the balance of power. This applied as much to large states such as the US, whose policies had been predicated on Soviet threat, as it did to small states that had been *clients* of the superpowers. The general point is that the collapse of the bipolar international political economy enforced a redefinition of national interests on all states and, in some cases, a reshaping of states themselves. Thirdly, the end of bipolarity modified roles of international organisations. Most obviously, the end of the automatic Security Council split released the UN's potential. The Warsaw Pact was disbanded. NATO, WEU and CSCE struggled to reinvent themselves within Europe's new geography. The EU debated expansion to include Central and Eastern Europe, and the Baltics. In short, the Cold War's end saw changes at the system, state and international organisation levels.

An additional, often neglected, effect on international relations has been the change in space and geography of the former Communist bloc. Though rarely discussed by political scientists, politico-economic geographers have highlighted this change as a transformation of

the former Communist bloc that has materialised in shifting geographical boundaries and definitions. Herrschel stated: 'The changes to the image and perception of Eastern Europe not only apply to individual places within it, but also the whole entity as a major part of Europe. The exact form and identity of this new *Eastern Europe*, however, is not very clear. For instance, there is a synonymous use of various labels such as *post-socialist*, *post-communist* and *post-Soviet*. Additionally, there is the geopolitical distinction between *Central* and *Eastern Europe*. To overcome this confusion, Dingsdale suggested, ...four main paradigms to access the meaning and nature of *Eastern Europe*: (1) Territorial identity and its meaning; (2) The process-orientated meanings of *transition*...; (3) The inclusive European perspective...; and (4) The global context of *East* and *West*'.³⁸ Hamilton assessed '...the aspects of the debate concerning transition in Central and Eastern Europe. ...[He] argued the re-evaluation of space in the region is being articulated through the interaction of three major processes: first, progress from centralised state management towards a market economy; second, behaviour, cultures and institutions inherited from the socialist era and those more deeply embedded from pre-socialist times; and third, responses to opportunities or constraints created by the transformation itself'.³⁹ Herrschel, Dingsdale and Hamilton, mindful of the end of bipolarity, looked at regional, national and local changes of the former Communist bloc while most analyses focused on international change.

The end of the Cold War represented a turning point in the structure of international relations for the system, states, international organisations as well as geographical space. One key feature was the end of political blocs controlled by a central authority and the rise of non-state actors. These *new* actors have become key in changing political attitudes by becoming sources of foreign policy – i.e. new decision-makers – and, thus, changing international relations.

³⁸Herrschel, Tassilo, "The Changing Meaning of Place in Post-Socialist Eastern Europe – Commodification, Perception and Environment" in *The Geographical Journal*, Vol.65, No.2, July 1999, pp.130-134; Dingsdale, Alan "New Geographies of Post-Socialist Europe" in *The Geographical Journal*, Vol.67, No.2, July 1999, pp.145-153.

³⁹Hamilton, F.E. Ian, "Transformation and Space in Central and Eastern Europe" in *The Geographical Journal*, Vol.165, No.2, July 1999, pp.135-144.

1.8 Sources of Foreign Policy

The post-Cold War international political economy has given rise to increasing numbers of outputs for decision-making and policymaking. These outputs have become sources of foreign policy. Decisions are, in Easton's terminology, the *outputs* of the political system through which values are authoritatively allocated within society.⁴⁰ Whatever the decision-making structure of a state, conflicts must be resolved internally. This means making decisions about needs and goals and determining strategies for attaining them, including which goals can only be attained through interaction with others; the latter being the process for formulating foreign policy. The most fundamental source of foreign policy is the universally shared desire to ensure survival and territorial integrity. Military security is the minimum objective of foreign policy. A related need is the preservation of the economy. These are defensive objectives, but under some circumstances internal or external conditions may require offensive action to insure survival. Perhaps the single most important domestic source of foreign policy is economic need. Needs, however, are not static.

Where there is serious internal political conflict or leaders have low political legitimacy, decision-makers emphasise foreign policy goals preventing foreign intervention on the side of dissident groups. They may seek aid in preserving the system or their own place in it. Alternatively, political leadership may take advantage of, or manufacture, foreign threats to distract from domestic issues or the role of the elite in creating problems. In general, the viability of the system rests on the ability of decision-makers to respond to politically significant domestic demands. This means demands for foreign policy decisions from all quarters fall into this category. Psychological needs also generate strong pressures on foreign policymakers (for example, slow down existing actions and/or policy, change action and/or policy paths, speed up pending actions and/or policies). Theoretically, this may not have a place in rational decision-making, but is clearly a factor in foreign policymaking. Some writers argue capability considerations (*power* in Morgenthau's words) are the most

⁴⁰Easton, David, The Political System, Knopf, New York, US, 1959, pp.129-131; and Easton, David, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, John Wiley and Sons, New York, US, 1965, p.284.

important source of foreign policy, and an increase in capabilities is key to all other objectives. This is an oversimplification while containing a grain of truth.⁴¹

There are also important external sources of foreign policy. By implication, many domestic sources of foreign policy have an external counterpart. The international political economy must be considered before policy is formulated. Most foreign policies involve domestic needs, which can only be met by enlisting active cooperation or at least acquiescence of others. There are, however, also needs that arise primarily from external sources, such as threats of invasion or economic blockade. These needs create foreign policy needs for protection that can be met by alliance or membership in international organisation. Other external sources of foreign policy are opportunities created by external events. For example, local war, empire disintegration, resource discovery, two parties on the verge of war in need of a mediator and other similar changes create opportunities to increase power, size, wealth or prestige by responding with creative foreign policy. Which of these various internal and external sources of foreign policy is most important is case specific. By and large, among domestic sources of foreign policy, the political system (institutions and rules of the game) and relative power of contending groups will be major determinants.

The Soviet Union's collapse changed the international political economy, as well as the very actors. The growing number and recognition of non-state actors means international relations are no longer the sole preserve of states. Actors at every level – from the international organisation to the individual – are now sources of foreign policy. Decision-making has become localised and increasingly powerful. *Act local think global* in the current jargon. Domestic and external influences upon foreign policy and, subsequently, upon international relations, are now equally weighted in the decision-making equation. International strategic concerns are as influential as the needs of the community. Perhaps the most significant change is, as a result of the realisation of mutual concerns and interests, subnational actors conducting international relations. This has not only begun to exclude *traditional* foreign

⁴¹Morgenthau, Hans J., "Common Sense and Theories of International Relations" in Journal of International Affairs, Vol.21, 1967, pp.207-214; and see Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics Among Nations, Knopf, New York, US, 1948.

policy executors in the form of national government and its representatives but also international organisations. Moreover, the nature of these subnational relations emerged less superficially. International relations were less concerned with learning about and investigating other actors in the relationship. Why? Because links were being made between parties who shared common interests, concerns, histories, cultures, peoples and other criteria – the fruits of globalisation.

1.9 Globalisation in the International Political Economy

Smith and Baylis defined globalisation as ‘...the process of increasing interconnectedness between societies such that events in one part of the world more and more have effects on peoples and societies far away’.⁴² They argued globalisation has many features in common with modernisation.⁴³ Advocates of modernity state industrialisation brings a new set of contacts between societies, changing the socio-politico-economic processes that characterised the pre-modernised world. Very similar to how transition alters communist societies. Industrialisation alters the nature of the state, both widening its responsibilities and weakening its control over outcomes. The result is the old power politics model of international relations becomes outmoded. Force becomes less usable, states have to negotiate with other actors to achieve their goals, and the very identity of the state as an actor is called into question. In many respects it seems modernisation is part of globalisation, differing only in that it applied more to the developed world and involved nothing like as extensive a set of transactions. Indeed, the same ideas can be applied to the transition process.

The effects of globalisation on Russian-Japanese relations have already been touched on earlier in this chapter under different headings, in terms of a shift from Sovietism/realism to liberalism and globalism. Rather than repeating already covered ground the focus here will be on one particular aspect – that of increased interaction between Russia and Japan in a

⁴²Balyis, John, and Smith, Steve, “Introduction” in Baylis, John, and Smith, Steve (Eds.), The Globalisation of World Politics – An Introduction to International Relations, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 1997, p.7.

⁴³Modelski, G., Principles of World Politics, Free Press, New York, US, 1972, pp.11-23; and Morse, E., Modernisation and the Transformation of International Relations, Free Press, New York, US, 1976, pp.36-49.

multilateral framework, namely in North-East Asia; focusing on this particular aspect highlights issues of security, which thus far have not been fully addressed; it also covers more recent history highlighting how globalisation has impacted Russian-Japanese relations regionally. The US, Soviet Union/Russia, China and Japan have been major powers in North-East Asia and all have influenced the region's structure. However, their relations have significantly changed, not only between the Cold War and post-Cold War eras but also during both those periods. In 1997 and 1998, each of the six logically possible dyads amongst the four states held bilateral summit meetings, for the first time in history.

During the Cold War, and particularly, the 1950s, the US and Japan had close security ties through alliance, opposing the Sino-Soviet alliance. Competition between the two dyads was serious not only because of military competition but also because of ideological differences. The international political economy witnessed what may be termed competing bilateralism or a competing dyad system. After the US and Japan normalised diplomatic relations with China in the 1970s, the three formed an implicit triple alliance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The US forged détente with the Soviet Union in the early 1970s but their relations became bitter especially after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. China had split from the Soviet Union in the late 1950s and in the late 1960s the two clashed. The 1970s saw the Soviet Union become China's number one enemy as she began economic liberalisation. During the 1970s and 1980s Japan deepened politico-economic relations with China as she strengthened US security relations. The Soviet Union became the common enemy of all three states.

However, when Gorbachev took power in 1985 Soviet-US relations significantly improved. The Cold War's end led to the Soviet Union's dissolution and a new Russia pursuing democratisation and marketisation. China continued her own liberalisation in market socialism. The US became the sole superpower. Japan kept her status of economic giant while changing her security policies like sending Self-Defence Forces overseas as part of UN peacekeeping operations. The four states have divergent individual characteristics; their international status and individual dyads between them are also different. The US and Japan are G7 members (with Russia now G8) China is not. The US, China and Russia are

permanent UN Security Council members Japan is not. Japan is a non-nuclear state while the other three are major nuclear powers. While the US and Russia are OSCE members, Japan and China are not. (Japan is an observer.) This may imply divisions between Europe and Asia amongst these four states. These differences, however, have not created structural cleavages between them post-Cold War. Rather, they seem to have forged implicit consensus regarding the international political economy; they admit the political status quo as reality.

The second half of the 1990s saw summit exchanges between the four states to be the norm rather than the exception. Bilateral summit meetings have been frequent. However, the structure of bilateral summits has changed radically over time. Figure 1.4 demonstrates fundamental changes in configuration of bilateral summits between the four states since 1983. The figure shows the most stable and close relations have been between the US and Japan. Japan-China relations have also been close. It also reveals that it was after Gorbachev took office the US and the Soviet Union/Russia developed stable bilateral relations. However, the most important point it demonstrates is clear structural changes over time; changes in the international political economy. During 1983-1984, bilateral summit meetings were only held between the US and Japan, China and Japan, and the US and China. There was no bilateral summit including the Soviet Union. This clearly shows there was an implicit triple alliance between the US, Japan and China vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. This situation changed on Gorbachev's accession to public office. Bilateral Soviet-US summit meetings became annual; there were none between the Soviet Union and China before 1991; and there were none between China and the US during 1986-1996.

Figure 1.4: Bilateral Summit Meetings in North-East Asia, 1983-1998

	Years															
	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98
J-U	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
J-C	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
J-R									■							
U-C		■	■													
U-R			■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
C-R									■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■

Notes: J = Japan; U = US; C = China; R = Soviet Union/Russia; ■ = Meeting held.

Source: Data should be considered tentative as it is sourced from the Japanese Diplomatic Blue Books.

This might imply the US did not feel it necessary to have close relations with China because of improved relations with the Soviet Union. In a sense, the implicit tripartite alliance against the Soviet Union collapsed, and relations between the US and China deteriorated after Tiananmen Square. In addition, there was no Soviet-Japanese bilateral summit meeting. However, since all four states were directly or indirectly connected in this period, there were fewer structural cleavages between them than before. This continued until 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed and President El'tsin took power. The Cold War's end opened the way for bilateral Russian-Chinese summits – they spoke of a *strategic partnership* – while the US and Russia maintained stable bilateral relations. The post-Cold War era brought consensus amongst the four powers about fundamentals of the international political economy, about international institutions, about political compromise, about cooperation, about globalisation.

Russia and Japan do not yet have a peace treaty and the territorial issue remains to be resolved. During the first half of the 1990s, Japan faced the dilemma of helping Russia economically with the view to achieving Japanese administration of the disputed territories. While Japan held two bilateral summits with El'tsin's Russia during this period, the US did not have any bilateral summits with China. This was the result of various issues, including Tiananmen Square, human rights and Taiwan. It was in 1997 that these two dyads (the US and China, and Russia and Japan) came to have bilateral summits. Having consolidated security relations with the US in 1996, Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto began to be proactive in relations with Russia, partly because the policy circle responsible for Russia in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs changed its stance towards Russia. Hashimoto seemed to be aiming at a grand resolution in the sense both the territorial issue and the peace treaty would be solved simultaneously. He tried to achieve this through El'tsin. He visited Russia to meet El'tsin in 1997 and both agreed to a peace treaty by 2000. El'tsin returned the visit in early 1998 and Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi visited Moscow later the same year to maintain this new partnership. However, Moscow-Tokyo relations and resolution of the territorial issue and the signing of the peace treaty were marginalised as transition issues dominated.

1.10 Transition – The Theoretical and the Contemporary

Between 1917 and 1950 states containing one-third of the world's population seceded from the market economy and constructed an alternative economic system, culminating in the need for a different political system. First in the Russian Empire and Mongolia then, after WWII, in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics, and subsequently in China, North Korea and Vietnam (with offshoots and imitations elsewhere), production was centralised through state planning.⁴⁴ This experiment transformed the twentieth century. But its collapse set in motion just as radical a transformation that seeks to rebuild markets, employ democracy, reintegrate these states into the international political economy and transform the structure and culture of these states.⁴⁵ However, transition is even more than this. It is about change penetrating every aspect of society. What distinguishes transition from reforms is the systematic change involved – transition must penetrate the fundamental rules of the game, institutions shaping behaviour and guiding organisations. This is why transition is political, social and cultural, as well as economic; it affects the international as much as the domestic.

Conceptualising transition is difficult as each state involved in the process is, by the nature of their history, culture, politics, ethnicity, economics and geography, unique. Furthermore, as transition's focus tends to be on states or groups of states it fails to include regions. Rarely are regional differences considered. In a transitional state the size of Russia this is over simplistic, failing to account for regional policy, differences in territorial designations, centre-periphery relations, regions with resources and with different roles. Accession to the EU is the model upon which Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics base their transition. Prerequisites for accession to the EU are similar to the objectives of transition. Geographical proximity has been a key factor in transition. For example, the three states located closest to the EU – Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, initially, made the most progress in terms of transition and negotiations for EU accession. The experience of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary hold relevance for regions geographically proximate to more developed states or regions. The Far East exemplifies that – a transitional

⁴⁴Westby, Adam, The Evolution of Communism, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 1989, pp.95-162.

⁴⁵Koves, Andras, Central and East European Economies in Transition – The International Dimension, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, US, 1992, pp.63-79.

region on the edge of North-East Asia aspiring to integrate and be part of Asia/Pacific – an economically rich region politicising its wealth and geography with the aspiration of development.

1.11 The Development of Regions⁴⁶

Planning for development is a preoccupation of administrators. In the former command economies the principal preoccupation for administrators is transition. Under communism large-scale planning was a basic feature. The Soviet Union became noted for its many plans of varying durations, purposes and regional focus. Some form of regionalisation usually accompanied planning. At its simplest, a specified area was set apart for particular attention either because of potentialities, human content, strategic importance or relative backwardness. Conceptually, planning, at its most complex sees the entire national area subdivided into regions. Geographers use the phrase *regions – tool for action*.⁴⁷ Development regions fall under this category. They embody a dynamic concept of regions, one that is orientated more towards the future than the present. Development regions are sometimes, interchangeably, called *planning* or *administrative* regions, although these terms highlight part of what is understood by *development*.⁴⁸ Though planning leads to development, without implementation it cannot bring change.⁴⁹ Administrative measures are

⁴⁶As both development and transition are terms used to identify a process of progress and change, a lot of the discussion in this section has been drawn from the literature on development. The basis from where each process begins is the distinguishing feature in identifying the difference between the two.

⁴⁷Dziewonski, K., "Economic Regionalisation – A Report of Progress" in Berry, Brian J.L., and Wrobel, Andrzej (Eds.), Economic Regionalisation and Numerical Methods – Final Report of the Commission on Methods of Economic Regionalisation of the International Geographical Union, Geographia Polonica Warsaw, Poland, 1968, p.68.

⁴⁸Gore, Charles, Regions in Question – Space, Development Theory and Regional Policy, Methuen, London, UK, 1984, pp.198-212; Myrdal, Gunnar, Economic Theory and Under-Developed Regions, Duckworth, London, UK, 1957, pp.91-112; and Dedekam, Anders, Poor Regions in Rich Societies – Toward a Theory Development in Backward and Remote Areas in Advanced Countries, With Special Reference to Norway, Program in Urban and Regional Studies, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, US, 1977, pp.763-786.

⁴⁹Eisenschitz, Aram, and Gouch, Jamie, "Theorising the State in Local Economic Governance" in Regional Studies, Vol.32, No.8, pp.759-768; and Wong, Cecilia, "Determining Factors for Local Economic Development – The Perception of Practitioners in the North West and Eastern Regions of the UK" in Regional Studies, Vol.32, No.8, pp.707-720. In many transitional states such regions have been given a special status and termed *Free or Special Economic Zone*.

important for achieving development, but they are not the sole measures upon which the process depends.⁵⁰

In any Soviet planning period, central authorities devoted much attention to the development of particular regions and concentrated considerable resources and efforts. Such regions were usually termed territorial-industrial complexes. However, when communism collapsed all subnational regions became *equal*, while some were better advantaged than others. Moreover, when communism collapsed, these regions became elements of both a new state and a changing international political economy. The transition of these regions was domestic and international, as evidenced by events in Chechnia and in Primorie, but this was especially true of gateway and resource-rich regions.

A gateway region is an area adjacent to a national boundary whose population is affected in various ways by the proximity of that boundary.⁵¹ The concept of gateway region assumes a socio-political organisation in a given area.⁵² Though the concept of region has gained a very wide currency in geographical literature it belongs to the social sciences. To speak of gateway regions is to treat them as political actors; it makes sense to speak of cooperation or conflict with them. Most of the political issues in gateway regions of contemporary states have four potential sources of political difficulties. These relate to geographical location – boundary disputes, subversive activities across national boundaries, problems of peripheral location and penetration of activities with neighbouring regions in other states.⁵³

⁵⁰UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Planning for Balanced Social and Economic Development – Six Country Case Studies, UN, New York, US, 1964, pp.223-254.

⁵¹Anderson, Malcolm, “The Political Problems of Frontier Regions” in Anderson, Malcolm (Ed.), Frontier Regions in Western Europe, Frank Cass, London, UK, 1983, p.1.

⁵²See Turner, John R., Scotland’s North Sea Gateway – Aberdeen Harbour 1136-1986, Aberdeen University Press, Aberdeen, UK, 1986.

⁵³The notions of gateway and outpost emerged from the concept of frontierism. Frontierism conceptualised *unconquered land*. Gateway referred to conquered land with a special role. Outpost described the *conquered land* that either remained just that (without developing a special role) or a region in *post-gateway* condition. Frontierism owes its origins to the work of Frederick Jackson Turner. His work was concerned with the westward flow of settlement in the US. In 1893 he first depicted the advancing frontier line of settlement as a dynamic, determining, running through much of US history. As elaborated, criticised and revised, his frontier thesis attracted US historians and, in time, was applied elsewhere (Canada and Australia). Regions are not, by legal definitions, small states, in spite of their character. Regions are administrative units and problem-solving machinery, constitutionally geared to peaceful and cooperative goals like welfare, efficiency, development and planning, through politics.

Some gateway regions share the problems of peripheral regions. Located far from the main centres of economic activity and political decision-making, these regions suffer from marginalisation. It is possible there are no genuine solutions to their problems within existing constitutional and political frameworks. However, there are examples of marginalisation that encourage gateway regions to look beyond national boundaries for solutions. Economic disparities, particularly if an economically disadvantaged region faces a prosperous neighbour across an international frontier, are one of a number of potential sources of conflict both within a gateway region and between the gateway region and the political centre. The main political problems of gateway regions stem from the very stability of national boundaries – from the fact they are largely unchallenged and are unlikely to be modified in the foreseeable future.⁵⁴ With the view to achieving transfrontier cooperation, gateway regions can also play the role of buffer states. While some buffers have been consumed in this way others maintained their territorial integrity. Others have matured to become gateway regions. Some gateway regions have had their status further complicated by the existence of resources.

Reynolds stated abundant resources are important if there is the capacity and will to exploit them.⁵⁵ Resource-rich regions can experience problems of political control until and unless there is the development of communications and transportation.⁵⁶ This is only achievable through political organisation, bringing into question the effectiveness of national, subnational and local political structures.⁵⁷ It is from this point Brown stated regionalism and centre-periphery conflict could emerge due to differences in resource endowments.⁵⁸ However, it is clear the relevance of resources to politics is conditional upon an awareness of their utility. Whether resources are accessible is determined by location – value is dependent

⁵⁴Fischer, E., "On Boundaries" in World Politics, Vol.1, No.1, 1949, pp.32-49; and also see Orianne, P., The Legal Problems Involved in Frontier Regions Cooperation, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, France, 1972.

⁵⁵Reynolds, P.A., An Introduction to International Relations, Second Edition, Longman, London, UK, 1988, pp.70-72.

⁵⁶Kresge, David T., Regions and Resources – Strategies for Development, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, US, 1984, pp.98-117.

⁵⁷Munsi, Sunila, India, Resources, Regions and Regional Disparity, Peoples Publishing House, New Delhi, India, 1984, pp.34-45.

⁵⁸Brown, Lester R., The Global Politics of Resource Scarcity, Overseas Development Council, Washington, DC, US, 1974, pp.23-27.

on transportation costs to points of use or sale and on the cost and feasibility of the effort needed to exploit them. Indeed, based on the notion a resource is something that can be used, a resource has to be exploitable in order to be defined as such.⁵⁹ For example, through the existence of oil and gas in the Sahara and the North Sea has long been known or suspected, they were not considered resources until they were exploitable.

According to the Federal Office of Regional Development (Quebec), ‘...other things being equal, possession of extensive natural resources increases a region’s freedom to manoeuvre...’.⁶⁰ This suggests a second way in which resources are important in politics. Foreign attention is likely to be attracted towards regions where large resources are located, particularly, though not exclusively, when they do not have adequate resources. As resource-rich areas are able to attract foreign attention in this way, attention to these regions becomes an issue of strategic concern.⁶¹ Yet strategic considerations, unlikely as it may seem, are more apparent when resources are not exploited. If the domestic framework is not ready or able to exploit resources then worries over foreign participation in exploitation arise. From the international perspective, being unaware of what such unexploited resources may be used for is of equal concern.⁶² Resources can only be regarded as such when they are usable. Mote argued in some cases environmental hardships are so severe they inhibit resource exploitation; moreover, though it may be possible to exploit resources, costs are often so

⁵⁹Orrego Vicuna, Francisco, Antarctic Bibliography – With Particular Reference to the Legal and Political Issues of Co-operation and the Regime on Mineral Resources, Institute of International Studies of the University of Chile, Santiago, Chile, 1987, p.27.

⁶⁰Federal Office of Regional Development (Quebec), The Resource Regions of Quebec, Federal Office of Regional Development (Quebec), Quebec, Canada, 1990, pp.17-18.

⁶¹Arad, Ruth W., Sharing Global Resources, McGraw-Hill, New York, US, 1979, pp.143-159; and Solingen, Etel, Regional Orders at Century’s Dawn – Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, US, 1998, pp.237-241.

⁶²McConnell, John Wilkinson, Economic Security – A Study of Community Needs and Resources, Cornell University, New York State School of Industrial and Labour Relations, Ithaca, New York, US, 1951, pp.21-27; and Gutteridge, William, Mineral Resources and National Security, Institute for the Study of Conflict, London, UK, 1984, pp.12-18.

great it becomes uneconomical.⁶³ His ideas specifically relate to capital and infrastructure deficiencies necessary for resource development. Although it is probable natural constraints dominate in preventing resource development, where capital and infrastructure could assist, costs are likely to be such potential investors are discouraged. Indeed, problems of attracting labour and population settlement need consideration (see Figure 1.5).

Figure 1.5: Total Costs of Resource Development

$$TC = C1 + Ccp + (Cce) + Ci + R + (S)$$

TC = Total Costs; C1 = Labour Costs; Ccp = Capital Production Costs (including depreciation); Cce = Capital Environmental Costs (including pollution abatement, reclamation and permafrost defences); Ci = Intermediate Materials and Transportation Costs; R = Costs inherent in unforeseen layoffs and work stoppages caused by macro-scale, micro-scale and technogenic constraints [costs beyond established norms and ordinary rates of depreciation (comparable to risk)]; and S = Social Costs (not necessarily all inclusive). Outlays for Cce and S are in brackets because, depending on the priority of resources designated for development and/or the self-purification capacity of the given environment, they conceivably maybe ignored by developers.

Source: Mote, Victor L., "Environmental Constraints to the Economic Development of Siberia" in Jensen, Robert G., Shabad, Theodore, and Wright, Arthur W. (Eds.), Soviet Natural Resources in the World Economy, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois, US, 1983, p.57.

While the anti-resource thesis emerges from a realist school it is only a perspective, for understanding barriers inhibiting resource development. In analysing resource-rich regions with harsh climatic conditions it has a role to play. However, the thesis fails to recognise non-physical factors discouraging and inhibiting domestic exploitation – including federal relations, socio-politics and law – as well as possibilities of non-domestic interaction.⁶⁴ The realist approach of the anti-resource thesis does not, however, deter resource-rich regions from being driven by liberal thinking. For example, the natural-fit thesis is grounded in the complementary nature of two economies and is the basis for developing mutually beneficial trade links and, subsequently, improved political relations. Yet this liberal notion fails to

⁶³His idea was termed *The Anti- Resource Constraint*. The idea can be read about in more detail in Mote, Victor L., Prediction and Realities in the Development of the Soviet Far East, Association of American Geographers, Project on Soviet Natural Resources in the World Economy, Discussion Paper No.3, May 1978; Mote, Victor L., The Baikal-Amur Mainline and its Implications for the Pacific Ocean, University of Texas, Houston, Texas, US, 1983; Mote, Victor L., and Shabad, Theodore, Gateway to Siberian Resources (The BAM), Scripta Publishing Company, Scripta, Technica Incorporated, Washington, DC, US, 1977; and Mote, Victor L., "Environmental Constraints to the Economic Development of Siberia" in Jensen, Robert G., Shabad, Theodore, and Wright, Arthur W. (Eds.), Soviet Natural Resources in the World Economy, University of Chicago, Illinois, US, 1983, pp.15-71.

⁶⁴Kovrigina, Evgeny B., "Problems of Resource Development in the Russian Far East" in Akaha, Tsuneo (Ed.), Politics and Economics in the Russian Far East – Changing Ties with Asia-Pacific, Routledge, London, UK, 1997, pp.70-86.

consider physical factors the anti-resource thesis highlights, in the same way the anti-resource thesis fails to highlight non-physical factors in resource exploitation. Environmental constraints add to development costs.⁶⁵ In harsh environments infrastructure is determined by climate. Labour requires financial incentives to encourage resettlement to the region. However, issues of turnover and limited availability of climatically adapted technology hamper possibilities of utilising labour.⁶⁶

Resource-rich regions have emerged as political actors due to a number of reasons, including fragmenting domestic environments, globalising forces, resource scarcity and environmental destruction. Increasingly recognised as political actors, domestically and internationally, they have become a basis for political bargaining. Though challenging traditional notions of centre-periphery relations, they remain vulnerable to local geography, international markets and developments within the state of which they are sub-units. However, often, resources emerge as one of numerous facets upon which regions are able to leverage their position. Many regions with significant resources – Quebec (Canada), Queensland (Australia), and Siberia and the Far East (Russia) – when bargaining with central authorities highlight characteristics differentiating them from the parent state. Essentially, non-economic factors (as in the anti-resource thesis) are politicised and used for improving economic power vis-à-vis the centre. Resource-rich regions in transitional states, previously having been given special status under central planning regimes, have emerged as politically defined peripheral regions.⁶⁷ The disappearance of federal fiscal transfers and decline of territorial-industrial complexes have resulted in these regions emerging as subnational frontiers, gateways and international actors, overturning traditional ideas of centre-periphery relations.

⁶⁵Olsen, Edward A., Japan – Economic Growth, Resource Scarcity, and Environmental Constraints, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, US, 1978, pp.87- 116.

⁶⁶Helgeson, Ann C., “Population and Labour Force” in Rodgers, Allan (Ed.), The Soviet Far East – Geographical Perspectives on Development, First Edition, Routledge, London, UK, 1990, pp.58-82.

⁶⁷For thought provoking reading on the topic of the idea of periphery see Baldwin, R.E., The Core-Periphery Model and Endogenous Growth, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, UK, 1997.

1.12 Centre-Periphery Relations

The centre-periphery model has been used in various analytical frameworks.⁶⁸ For example, for some the model functions as a symbol of the systematic structuring of space implying inherent opposition between a dominant centre and subordinate periphery.⁶⁹ The model has been used to characterise at least two often-related types of *dominance* – socio-ethnic and politico-economic. From a socio-ethnic perspective – control is seen to be exercised by dominant groups over native peoples and/or national minorities.⁷⁰ If modernisation is unsuccessful then there is likely to be an increase in ethnic conflict. The politico-economic view of centre-periphery relations assumes an economically dominant centre to which there is a net flow of resources from weaker peripheries.⁷¹ Thus, at the international scale, the structure of capitalism comprises a *core* – the economically and technologically advanced North America, Japan and Western Europe. At the national scale, the centre generally contains the capital city, which tends to be the centre of political power. Apart from describing spatial aspects of the distribution of political and economic power, the centre-periphery model is suggestive of the likely political behaviour of those located in either the centre or the periphery that, in turn, can offer some insight into the causes of political conflict.⁷²

Rokkan stated, ‘...the concept of peripherality can be broken down into at least four dimensions – cultural, economic, political and geographical’.⁷³ The cultural is concerned

⁶⁸Some of the most diverse examples include Wright, Vincent, and Meny, Yves (Eds.), Centre-Periphery Relations in Western Europe, Allen and Unwin, London, UK, 1985; Schweizer, Peter, Shepherds, Workers, Intellectuals – Culture and Centre-Periphery Relationships in a Sardinian Village, Department of Social Anthropology, University of Stockholm, Stockholm, Sweden, 1988; and Haglund, David G. (Ed.), The Centre-Periphery Debate in International Security, Centre for International Relations, Queens University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, 1995.

⁶⁹Rumley, Dennis, and Minghi, Julian V., “Introduction – The Border Landscape Concept” in Rumley, Dennis, and Minghi, Julian V. (Eds.), The Geography of Border Landscapes, Routledge, London, UK, 1991, p.5.

⁷⁰Rokkan, S., and Urwin, D.W., Economy, Identity, Territory – Politics of West European Peripheries, Sage, London, UK, 1983, pp.11-18, 32-39, 81-97.

⁷¹Augelli, J.P., “Nationalisation of Dominican Borderland” in Geographical Review, Vol.70, pp.19-35; Cosgrove, D., and Jackson, P. “New Directions in Cultural Geography” in Asia, Vol.19, pp.95-101; and House, J.W. “Frontier Studies – An Applied Approach” in Burnett, A.D., and Taylor, P.J. (Eds.), op. cit., Wiley, New York, US, pp.291-312.

⁷²Rumley, D., “The Geography of Political Participation” in Australian Geographer, Vol.12, pp.279-286.

⁷³Rokkan, S., and Urwin, D.W., op. cit., p.134.

with conflicts between elite and minority ethnic groups.⁷⁴ The economic focuses on tensions arising from exploitation and uneven wealth distribution. The political is concerned with conflicts arising from disparities in participation and power. The geographical is related to distance and the perception of strategic territorial advantage (or disadvantage), as well as with local regional conflicts. The latter may well arise as a result of the geographical coincidence of any one or more of the other dimensions. Clearly, the potential for border landscape conflict is greatest where all four dimensions coincide.

In transitional states border regions have the least political power. Within the state they are likely to be regarded as culturally and/or economically isolated. Per capita income and state allocations are usually lower, save for special grants. Rumley and Minghi have argued ‘...peripheral inhabitants tend to be more culturally independent and more conservative than those in central locations and are, therefore, less willing to change and to adapt to national culture and a national set of norms’.⁷⁵ Strong pressure to fully adopt national norms, they have suggested, may force peripheral inhabitants into radical political action. This is even more apparent when the periphery feels subjected to a declining central authority while international processes push it towards globalisation – like in many transitional states.⁷⁶

1.13 Internal Decline Versus Foreign Expansion

In examining transition an interesting question is why a particular transition has occurred, especially where reformers within the ruling authoritarian regime have initiated the process. Traditional spurs to liberalisation include defeat in war, economic collapse and loss of regime legitimacy.⁷⁷ In the Soviet case, there was little to indicate Gorbachev, when he was

⁷⁴Gottlieb, Gidon, Nation Against State – A New Approach to Ethnic Conflicts and the Decline of Sovereignty, Council on Foreign Relations Press, New York, US, 1993, pp.47-63.

⁷⁵Rumley, Dennis, and Minghi, Julian V., op. cit., p. 34.

⁷⁶Lemco, Jonathan, Political Stability in Federal Governments, Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, US, 1991. Jonathan Lemco stated, ‘...the political elites of ...a model federation would be well advised to discourage rapid economic modernisation. The evidence suggested that where rapid economic change exceeded the adaptive capacity of the nation’s political institutions, as has often historically been the case, there has been a great deal of internal divisiveness’, (p.viii) suggesting the centre is best to ensure economic marginalisation in the periphery to avoid political confrontation.

⁷⁷Charlton, Michael, Footsteps from the Finland Station – Five Landmarks in the Collapse of Communism, Claridge Press, St. Albans, UK, 1992, pp.18-28.

named General Secretary in March 1985, would be a reformer, let alone a revolutionary.⁷⁸ True, he was younger, more vigorous than his predecessors and more impatient with Soviet inefficiencies and corruption. But he was also more anxious to solve foreign policy problems.⁷⁹ In 1985 the Kremlin was involved in states, such as Angola and Afghanistan, which were fighting counterinsurgency struggles. It was also cut out of the Middle East peace process.⁸⁰ In Europe, Andropov backed the Soviet Union into a corner by first threatening to withdraw and then actually withdrawing from talks with NATO. The deterioration of the Soviet economy prevented Moscow from competing successfully with the US in the arms race. In the economic realm, the Soviet Union was, in the words of Rutland, *living on borrowed time*.⁸¹ Central planning had led to a marked decline in Soviet GNP growth, while military expenditures were taking an increasing share of the state budget.⁸² This economic downturn had implications for foreign policy for communism's legitimacy. It may be questioned whether the Soviet regime *ever* enjoyed affective legitimacy; nonetheless, worsening standards of living certainly diminished prospects for continuing instrumental legitimisation.⁸³

⁷⁸Miller, John, Mikhail Gorbachev and the End of Soviet Power, MacMillan, London, UK, 1992, pp.13- 28. Also see Lane, David Stuart, The Transition from Communism to Capitalism – Ruling Elites from Gorbachev to Yeltsin, St. Martin's Press, New York, US, 1999; and Galeotti, Mark, Gorbachev and His Revolution, MacMillan Press, Basingstoke, UK, 1997.

⁷⁹Barylski, Robert V., The Soldier in Russian Politics – Duty, Dictatorship and Democracy Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin, Transaction Publishers, New Jersey, US, 1998, pp.405-438; Young, Elizabeth, The Gorbachev Phenomenon, Social Democratic Publications, London, UK, 1987, pp.8-15; Steele, Jonathan, Eternal Russia – Yeltsin, Gorbachev and the Mirage of Democracy, Faber, London, UK, 1994, pp.287-318; and Gorbachev, Mikhail, Mikhail Gorbachev – Socialism, Peace and Democracy – Writings, Speeches and Reports, Zwan, London, UK, 1987, pp.147-165.

⁸⁰See Noguee, Joseph L., Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II, MacMillan, New York, US, 1992.

⁸¹Rutland, Peter, "Economic Crisis and Reform" in White, Stephen, Pravda, Alex, and Gitelman, Zvi (Eds.), Developments in Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics, Duke University Press, Durham, North Carolina, US, 1992, p.202.

⁸²According to the 1996 World Development Report (p.2), 'The deep inefficiencies of planning became increasingly evident with time. Heavy industries such as machine building and metallurgy were emphasised, while development of consumer goods lagged. After posting high annual growth rates in the 1950s (averaging 10% according to official estimates), the Soviet economy decelerated – growth averaged 7% per year in the 1960s, 5% in the 1970s, and barely 2% in the 1980s, and in 1990 it contracted). This trend occurred despite high investment rates – returns to capital formation began a steady and rapid descent in the mid-1950s. A similar stagnation infected Eastern Europe. As a major oil exporter, the Soviet Union benefited from the price increases of 1973 and 1979, but severe shortages and the deteriorating quality of its manufactured goods relative to those of market economies were clear signs of stagnation'.

⁸³Smith, Tony, Thinking Like a Communist – State and Legitimacy in the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba, Norton, New York, US, 1987, pp.11-37 and 220-231.

In the history of Soviet expansion there was no greater or more important achievement than the establishment of the Central and Eastern European Empire. Leaders from Stalin to Gorbachev, despite differences in specific policies, were steadfast in their determination to preserve the empire.⁸⁴ As the 1980s progressed Central and Eastern Europe was a source of critical vulnerability for the Soviet Union. For forty years it was fortunate to confront one crisis in one *colony* at a time. However, on this occasion her luck did not hold out. Successive explosions rocked the region. The whole notion of centre-periphery relations was in disarray.

Friedmann's centre-periphery model and its reformulation in terms of a theory of conflict offered a link between Western regional development theory and some of the central issues of Marxism.⁸⁵ Models of centre-periphery relations never consider the centre collapsing. All models remain focused on the sustained progression of the centre (which is covered in the literature about end of empire). The obvious question in the transitional context is does internal decline lead to foreign expansion? Foreign expansion, not in the colonial sense but, in the sense of looking outside national boundaries. This may happen either when the centre is no longer able to guide, govern or is not recognised for its ability to do so. Moreover, it may occur when external forces are able to play such a role. In the case of Central and Eastern Europe, looking beyond the Soviet Empire was a driving force for the collapse of communism. However, in this case they were peripheral states that looked to areas such as the EU. So what about subnational regions? The same concept is certainly applicable on a smaller scale. The changing international political economy has seen subnational regions become directly involved in decision-making. In transitional states the decline of centralised planning, disappearance of fiscal transfers and elimination of special regional profiles have forced subnational regions to look to foreign partners, as the authority of central government has declined along with its *tools of unity*. In the case of subnational regions in transitional states, issues of identity, history, geography, security and trade have been the key factors

⁸⁴Volkogonov, Dmitry Antonovich, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire – Political Leaders from Lenin to Gorbachev, Harper Collins, London, UK, 1998, pp.427-458.

⁸⁵Friedmann, J., "The Spatial Organisation of Power in the Development of Urban Systems" in Comparative Urban Research, Vol.1, pp.5-42.

facilitating foreign expansion. As these regions have expanded their foreign outlook, parties external to the state, of which they are part, have become involved and, indeed, become driving forces facilitating democratisation and economic transition.

As previously stated, the geographical location of states can facilitate transition. This is a result of external involvement in facilitating transition or external factors being the foundation/model upon which transition is based. This raises a further issue – the impact of external actors on transition. Without question, the primary external factor until 1989 was the Soviet Union. Without the Soviet Union there would never have been a communist bloc. Yet, in the end, the Soviet Union played a crucial role in permitting communism's collapse; an event that can only be conceptualised retrospectively.

1.14 Conceptualising the Far East in Russian-Japanese Relations

The international political economy is the environment in which the units of international relations operate. Their goals, aspirations, needs, attitudes, latitude of choice and actions are significantly influenced by the overall distribution of power. In order to explain what conditions make states behave as they do it is essential to describe what they typically do. Theoretical frameworks include an overview of the main schools of thought in international relations and their insights into the basis and causes for cooperation and conflict, which can be applied to the understanding of Russian-Japanese relations. Moreover, given that the entire nature of the international political economy has changed, part of this theoretical framework has been built around understanding new and changing phenomenon – namely new actors, changing geography and new policy sources and processes. The *new* international political economy is the framework that has changed traditional notions of Russian-Japanese relations. As a result of the Soviet Union's collapse, its position on the domestic and international stages has shifted.

The Far East's geography – in terms of location with respect to the centre and the international system – as well as its phenomenal resource wealth and harsh environment has politicised this once subdued, isolated and protected region. Having once been the focus of intense energies, the Far East has been left to fend for itself in the post-Soviet international

political economy. Though part of the Russian state it feels detached and looks eastwards with the view to developing ties with North-East Asia. This has raised questions of its role both within the Russian Federation and beyond. The notion of complementary economies between Russia and Japan, and the Far East's position between these two actors, provides for an interesting case study of the roles of gateway, resource-rich and frontier regions in international relations that are themselves changing in nature, both at state and system levels.

1.15 The Relevance of Theory

The questions *why theorise?* and *what theory should be used?* are questions that need answering in the context of any research. Almost every thesis will have a theoretical element, but it is important not to lose sight of the original objectives while deciding what form theory should take. In a utopian world there would be no need to theorise – there would be no problems to solve. But theory stems from the fact that the world is not perfect and that problems have to be confronted. It might be argued that theory is spurred on by the failure of *common sense* to understand certain situations. The mind immediately proposes possible reasons, and so theorises in its attempt to find a solution to a problem. This is the positivist approach to theory. Positivism takes a *Sherlock Holmes* approach, using theory to aid in explanation. The positivist method might be characterised by a search for general rather than individual fact – for trends that will explain a phenomenon.

The problem of borrowed theory and consequent hypotheses is one that has pervaded the social sciences. It may stem from the way that sociology has been done in the past. The drive to be recognised as a science led to an emphasis being placed on quantification as a method – this has brought too great an emphasis on verification as the chief criterion for excellent research. The bulk of theory has been the product of sociological imagination and not always the result of investigation in the field. Hence, its relation to many areas of behaviour is at least dubious and for the most part irrelevant. Being able to show some part of a theory to be provable is no judgement of its worth. The worth of theory must be based on its relevance and that will lie in its applicability to an area of study and its ability to explain particular problems. Theory, while providing the basis for analysing such phenomenon, tends to be built around historical evidence and trends, and it is history that is the focus of chapter two.

Chapter Two:

The Emergence of the Far East as an International Actor

2.0 The Emergence of the Far East as an International Actor

When historical phenomena are analysed, not just listed as facts, common properties can be found. Events may be unique but they are also comparable. History timelines trends. It logs what has passed and offers answers to the present and future. History is often linked to geography as policy may be formulated on geographical characteristics. For example, climatic, demographic and resource characteristics can create socio-economic needs that can only be fulfilled through intra-regional or international interaction. Geographic conditions may be so obvious they are not acknowledged as crucial. However, almost every political objective and diplomatic action implicitly gives them recognition. Although technology can alter the socio-politico-economic significance of geographic characteristics, both technology and geographic characteristics can, either separately or collectively, influence policies by providing opportunities or placing limitations on what is feasible. Geographical size, population, natural resources, climate and topography all have an important bearing on socio-politico-economic development, vis-à-vis other regions and global access. Moreover, these conditions also have the greatest relevance to defence policies. Indeed, geography determines neighbours, which has influenced history.

The relevance of history to this study is key. Traditionally, international relations have been the monopoly of states, in spite of history talking of non-state actors – city-states, kingdoms, regions and political and/or economic unions. One such non-state actor is the Far East. The Far East was historically an international actor – both prior to and since its incorporation into the Russian Empire. The region was a crossroads for North-East Asia, a gateway for Eurasia vis-à-vis North-East Asia and a buffer between the Russian Empire and North-East Asia. The Far East's history is the development of a political economy based on international interaction. A history of a region with a developmental legacy of colonisation. Indeed, it is one of a political economy formed in the context of international relations, where economics and politics have taken turns to preside over each other.

2.1 Russian Conquest of the Far East

‘Wedged between China, Korea, Japan and the US, the... Far East has emerged as a volatile arena where forces that tore apart the former Soviet Union interact with dynamics energising Pacific Asia’.¹ Lying between Siberia and the Pacific Ocean, the Far East comprises the ten easternmost Russian territories (see Figure A1.2). It has brought together North-East Asia’s cultures, politics and economics, creating a unique historical dynamic.² During the last ice age the Far East was an Asian-American migration bridge.³ Priamur and Primorie Neolithic communities shared affinities with Chinese, Korean, Japanese, Siberian and North American counterparts dating back to the first millennium.⁴ This is reflected in the aspirations of regional actors to mould a special post-Soviet role for the Far East.

The Far East took shape through the successive occupation of frontiers. Ivan the Terrible’s eastward expansion began a process that brought Northern Eurasia and its indigenous peoples into recorded history. Russians and their descendants invaded one resource region after another with frontiers of fishing, fur trading, lumbering and mining. By the nineteenth century frontier growth spanned to the Pacific, implanting large regional communities that transformed the realms of sparsely populated natives.⁵ For three centuries, Russia’s Far Eastern colonisation was staged through the settlement of frontiers.⁶ Cossack forts became

¹Stephan, John J., The Russian Far East – A History, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, US, 1994, p.1.

²Tass, September 4, 1987; and Armstrong, Terence, “Introduction” in Wood, Alan (Ed.), Siberia – Problems and Prospects for Regional Development, Croom Helm Publishers Limited, London, UK, 1987, p.1. For excellent accounts see Armstrong, Terence, Russian Settlement in the North, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1965; Czaplicka, M.A., Aboriginal Siberia – A Study in Siberian Anthropology, Clarendon Press, Oxford, UK, 1914; and Forsyth, James, History of the People of Siberia – Russia’s North Asian Colony 1581-1990, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1992.

³Stephan, John J., “Curtailed or Derailed? Historical Reflections on Far Eastern Development” in Miller, Elisa (Ed.), The Russian Far East – A Business Reference Guide, 1997-1998, Third Edition, Russian Far East Update Publications, Seattle, Washington, United States, 1997, p.59.

⁴Okladnikov, Aleksey Pavlovich, The Soviet Far East in Antiquity, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, Canada, 1965, pp.148-168.

⁵For a study of the concept of frontierism, using Canada as an example, see Careless, J.M.S., Frontier and Metropolis – Regions, Cities and Identities in Canada Before 1914, The Donald G. Creighton Lectures 1987, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, Canada, 1989.

⁶See Rodgers, Allan (Ed.), The Soviet Far East – Geographical Perspectives in Development, First Edition, Routledge, London, UK, 1990; and Sumner, B.H., Survey of Russian History, Duckworth, London, UK, 1944.

cities; serving as administrative and economic centres for the Russian Empire's eastern periphery they became gateways to further expansion.⁷ By 1917 the Far East was a settlement system linked by rail, river and sea, providing a network for natural resource exploitation by the European core, securing a gateway to North-East Asia.⁸ However, the foundation of relations between what were now Russia's Eastern populations and the peoples of North-East Asia were in place centuries earlier.

The Suifen and Tumen river valleys were settled by Chinese and Koreans during the third century. Evidence of Korean and Japanese presence during the fourth and fifth centuries has been uncovered in magnificent burial mounds.⁹ The Tang Dynasty built an administrative centre curbing Korean expansion beyond the Khanka Plain. Collecting tributes from Sakhalin natives Tang officials established control points along the Amur. However, when the Tang Dynasty collapsed in the tenth century Primorie first became part of the Jurchen,¹⁰ and then Mongol Kingdoms.¹¹ After struggles with natives, the heirs of Genghis Khan crossed the border between China and Russia in the thirteenth century after conquering China south of the Great Wall. In 1368 a Han Chinese presence, in Priamur and Primorie, was re-established when Mongol rule in China was overthrown. Consequently, temples were built during the Ming Dynasty's Amur expeditions. Cossack appearances on the Amur coincided with the rise of the Manchu dynasty after the fall of the Ming dynasty.¹²

⁷Dmytryshyn, Basil, "The Administrative Apparatus of the Russian Colony in Siberia and Northern Asia, 1581-1700" in Wood, Alan (Ed.), The History of Siberia – From Russian Conquest to Revolution, Routledge, London, UK, 1991, p.17.

⁸North, Robert N., Transport in Western Siberia – Tsarist and Soviet Development, University of British Columbia Press and The Centre for Transportation Studies, Vancouver, Canada, 1979, pp.84-112.

⁹Stephan, John J., The Russian Far East – A History, op. cit., pp.12-13

¹⁰Before 1100 the Jurchen were a confederation of hunting and fishing tribes in North-Eastern Manchuria. From 1115 to 1234 they rose to power and formed the *Jiang* kingdom, occupying a large portion of Northern China.

¹¹Hermann, Albert, An Historical Atlas of China, Aldine, Chicago, Illinois, US, 1966, p.6.

¹²Stephan, John J., "Curtailed or Derailed? Historical Reflections on Far Eastern Development", op. cit., pp.59-60.

Russian settlement, five thousand miles from the imperial capital, began in the 1500s.¹³ At that time Northern Eurasia was to the Russians what the Americas were to the Spaniards – immense and rapid wealth. While the American lure was gold, the Asiatic attraction was fur. As early as 1555 Moscow was receiving annual tributes of one thousand sables from some Far Eastern indigenous communities.¹⁴ Cossack adventurers, fleeing Siberianward as the Russian Empire expanded, conquered chieftains. With these territorial prizes taken in Russia's name Cossacks purchased imperial pardons.¹⁵ Ivan the Terrible established frontiers to open up Siberia and the Far East. Afraid of Russian expansion, Ediger – Khan of the Sibir Tatars, offered Ivan the Terrible a tribute of sable pelts and became his vassal.¹⁶ In 1558, Ivan the Terrible authorised the merchant Strogonov family to open trading posts east of the Urals under the protection of Cossack mercenaries. When Ediger's successor Kuchum began plundering these settlements, Cossacks and soldiers, led by Ermak, set out to teach him a lesson. In 1582, they took the Tatar capital – Kashlik – near today's Tumen. In 1584, during a Tatar counterattack, Yermak drowned. Far Eastern settlement had begun and the next fifty years saw one of history's most explosive territorial expansions fuelled by furs, based on the notion of frontierism.¹⁷

Each stage of eastward expansion represented a frontier that became a gateway between Moscow and unconquered lands. Ermak and his successors exported their pelts to Western Europe where European fashions made them the prized possessions of the aristocracy and prosperous merchants. This pioneering advance was promoted, rather than hindered, by nationals and natives. The principle (not sole) incentive for this push eastwards was imposition upon natives for fur tributes. In theory, at least, these eastern lands became colonial enterprises, providing income. Subsequently, fur became vital to Russia's

¹³Vinacke, Harold M., A History of the Far East in Modern Times, Third Impression, Ruskin House, George Allen and Unwin Limited, London, UK, 1964, pp.392-393.

¹⁴Norton, Henry Kittredge, The Far Eastern Republic of Siberia, Allen and Unwin, London, UK, 1923, p.19.

¹⁵Kerner, Robert J., The Urge to the Sea – The Course of Russian History –The Role of Rivers, Portages, Ostrogs, Monasteries and Furs, University of California Press, Los Angeles, California, US, 1942, pp.23-24.

¹⁶Lantzeff, George V., and Pierce, Richard A., Eastward to Empire – Exploration and Conquest on the Russian Open Frontier to 1750, McGill-Queens University Press, Montreal, Canada, 1973, p.81.

¹⁷For an excellent and detailed account on Yermak, see Armstrong, Terence, Yermak's Campaign in Siberia – A Selection of Documents, Hakluyt Society, London, UK, 1975.

economy and by the 1650s half-a-million furs were being gathered annually – making-up 10% of Russia’s national income.¹⁸ This colonial legacy continues today – a European centre conflicting with a liberal, detached and neglected Asian periphery.

The local administration, military in character, sought alliance with native aristocracies to secure income from fur tributes. For utilitarian reasons the Muscovite government emphasised a benevolent attitude towards natives, trying to prevent enslavement and compulsory baptism. Yet there was considerable difficulty in carrying out these policies through local agents.¹⁹ Although the fur trade liberated the Far East the exile system populated it – becoming official punishment in 1649. This penal policy both settled and developed the eastern lands with Russians and rid society of its loathsome elements.²⁰ The 1600s saw Cossacks conquer territories from Sakha to Kamchatka. However on entering the Middle Amur Valley, they became entangled in confrontations with the Qing Dynasty.²¹ The 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk cooled tensions between Beijing and Moscow. Russia withdrew from the Amur Basin in exchange for rights to continue border trade with Mongolia. Russia lost out on rich lands between Siberia and the Pacific, but managed to extend her spheres of influence in the North Pacific, establishing footholds in Alaska and the Aleutians.²² The 1600s and 1700s saw Russians, Tatars, Poles, Swedes, Lithuanians, Germans, Chinese, Koreans and Japanese all scrambling for the territories between Lake Baikal and Kamchatka.

¹⁸ Azulay, Erik and Azulay, Allegra Harris, The Russian Far East, Hippocrene Books, New York, US, 1995, p.22.

¹⁹ For a detailed account see Lantzeff, George V., “Beginnings of the Siberian Colonial Administration” in Pacific Historical Review, No.9, 1940, pp.47-52.

²⁰ For a good overview of the exile system in Siberia and the Far East, see Wood, Alan, “Avvakum’s Siberian Exile – 1653-1664” in Wood, Alan, and French, R.A. (Eds.), The Development of Siberia – Peoples and Resources, St. Martin’s Press, New York, US, 1989, pp.89-102.

²¹ Vinogradov, A., V Dal’nykh Kraiakh, I.N. Kushnerev, Moscow, Russia, 1901, p.125; Panov, Viktor Ananevich, Amerikanskije Podlozhnye Dokumenty, Iosif Korot, Vladivostok, Russia, 1918, pp.5-37.

²² But Russian influence in Alaska and the Aleutians declined and the territories were sold to the US for US\$7.2 million in 1867. Petermann, Heiko, The Wide Country – The History of Siberia, Higrade, Cepoy, France, 1988, p.47.

2.2 Initial Contact With Japan

In the late 1600s, the Cossack peasant Atlasov set out for Siberia. His fame came in claiming the Kamchatka Peninsula for Peter the Great.²³ By 1700 Atlasov had told Moscow about the Kurils and their proximity to Japan. In 1702 Japanese sailor-adventurer Dembei welcomed Peter the Great and hired him to teach him Japanese.²⁴ Subsequently, Peter the Great ordered a collection of information on Japan for the purposes of expanding trade. Over the next quarter-of-a-century Cossacks, hunters and government agents ventured to the Kurils. Though the foundations of Russian-Japanese relations were being laid, the precise details were not recorded due to the parsimonious mercantilist approach to Russian expansion across Eurasia. Moreover, Japanese law at the time was stringent on isolationism and mercantilist control over international commerce. National policies on both sides punished individuals profiting from Siberia and the Far East. Russian and Japanese entrepreneurs had to be vague and secretive. However the Russians continued their adventures – 1713-1714 to the Kurils and Sakhalin; and 1721 to the port city of Okhotsk – established as the basis of Russia’s expedition to find Japan via the Kurils.

Initially, information the Russians had on the Japanese came from the Dutch who retained a foothold in Japan while becoming welcome guests and teachers to the Russian capital.²⁵ The government-inspired translation, into Russian, of a Dutch work – the atlas of Flemish geographer Mercator,²⁶ in 1637 – formed the basis for subsequent Russian manuscripts mentioning Japan. Russia established permanent settlements in Kamchatka around the 1600s, occupying some of the Northern Kurils in 1711.²⁷ Several attempts were made to initiate trade with Japan in the first half of the 1800s. Bering was ordered by St. Petersburg to explore the North Pacific for Japan. In 1738 Bering set out on his first expedition in

²³See Armstrong, Terence (Ed.), Yermak’s Campaign in Siberia – A Selection of Documents, Hakluyt, London, UK, 1975.

²⁴Riasanovsky, Nicholas V., The Image of Peter the Great in Russian History and Thought, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 1975, pp.113-137.

²⁵Bishop, Carl Whiting, “The Historical Geography of Early Japan” in Geographical Review, Vol.13, 1923, p.63.

²⁶Mercator was the leading mapmaker of the 1500s famed for his rounded world map.

²⁷Lensen, George Alexander, Russia’s Eastward Expansion, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, US, 1964, p.32.

search of Japan.²⁸ It was on his second expedition, a year later, that Bering discovered Japan and went ashore. However, when he reported his findings they were rubbish. Fortunately the Japanese had witnessed the expedition off Shimoda. This was the birth of documented contact between the Russians and the Japanese (including the Ainu). Though it was a time of material, scientific and human progress, continued tensions caused by imperialism, international rivalries and cultural uncertainties undermined these initiations. From the start, due both to national and international concerns, mutual distrust and hostility marked Russian-Japanese relations.

2.3 The Emergence of the Far East as a Gateway Region

Russian, Chinese, Korean and Japanese interaction contributed to the Far East's internationalisation. This was facilitated by both the gateway and buffer roles the region commanded. The initial gateway role grew into that of a buffer. The Far East's location positioned it to foster political consensus among regional actors to initiate and encourage trade. However politics became a secondary concern as prospects of economic gains took precedence.

Initial foreign contact, with China, was established through habitual and equitable trade in the early 1700s. This was not displaced by maritime trading until 1900.²⁹ Chinese traders, ginseng collectors and gold smugglers merged the Far East with Manchuria. Chinese trade with Russia through Kiakhtha, from the 1700s, saw the bartering of Chinese tea and wool for Russian furs and gold. Indeed, it was visions of trade with China and Japan that encouraged Peter the Great to send geologists to seek further information on Siberia and the Far East.³⁰ After Sino-Russian trade regularisation, through Mongolia in the aftermath of the Kiakhtha Treaty, furs and other animal merchandise found their route into the sublime realm. In the 1740s furs were still a major contributor to the Russian treasury. From the

²⁸Steller, Georg Wilhelm, Journal of a Voyage with Bering, 1741-1742, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, US, 1988, pp.45-62.

²⁹Lattimore, I.O., Manchuria – Cradle of Conflict, MacMillan, New York, US, 1932, pp.10-16.

³⁰See Russko-Kitaiskie Otnasheniia, 1689-1916, AN, Moscow, Russia, 1958.

1750s Korean immigrants settled Lake Khanka, engaging in rice farming and ginseng collecting. Japanese importers, shop owners, barbers and prostitutes settled today's Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Nikolaevsk, Chita and Blagoveshchensk in the late 1700s. This was the birth of Japan's trade with the Far East, which was initially based on the tsarist timber trade. The Far East's demographics illustrated its internationalisation. By 1897, of Vladivostok's twenty-nine thousand residents, twelve thousand were Chinese, Japanese or Korean.³¹

However, until the 1850s, Far Eastern international ties were severely curtailed. Harsh climates, measureless distances, inadequate infrastructure and the absence of an ice-free Pacific port all deterred commerce. The insignificant and widely dispersed Far Eastern populations were insufficient to initiate internal markets. Neither Japan (locked in self-imposed isolation) nor China (confined to trade through Kiakhta as Russian ships were barred from Chinese ports) presented commercial opportunities. Most Tsarist administrators, conscious of the Far East's role as a repository for exiles and convicts, as well as its remoteness and potential for unrest, discouraged international contacts. Unsurprisingly, foreigners, like Ledyard, interested in encouraging Far Eastern trade with North-East Asia, met with an icy reception.³² Circumstances in the 1850s and 1860s, however, challenged Far Eastern insularity. Innovative administrators and naval officers regarded the establishment of links with North-East Asia as fulfilling Russia's imperial destiny.³³ Mid-century North-East Asian geopolitics also coincided with growth in US commercial interest in the Far East. During the 1850s, US merchants opened import businesses at Nikolaevsk-na-Amure. In 1858 US President Buchanan commissioned a commercial agent on the Amur anticipating opportunities.³⁴

³¹Stephan, John J., "Siberia and the World Economy – Incentives and Constraints to Involvement" in Wood, Alan (Ed.), Siberia – Problems and Prospects for Regional Development, Croom Helm Publishers Limited, London, UK, 1987, p.217.

³²For a full account see Watrous, Stephen D. (Ed.), John Ledyard's Journey Through Russia and Siberia, 1787-1788, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, Wisconsin, US, 1966.

³³Symons, L., Russia and the Pacific – The Geography of Involvement, Proceedings of the Fifth New Zealand Geography Conference, Auckland, New Zealand, 1967, pp.25-31.

³⁴Bassin, Mark, "Inventing Siberia – Visions of the Russian Far East in the Early Nineteenth Century" in American Historical Review, Vol.106, No.3, June 1991, p.768.

Acquisition of one million square kilometres of North-Eastern China, between 1858 and 1860, granted Russia North-East Asia's main waterway – the Amur.³⁵ Extending Russia's eastern coastline southward several hundred kilometres along the Sea of Japan, it led to Vladivostok's creation in 1860. From the late eighteenth century, US traders began frequenting the North Pacific seaboard. Silk, spirits, tobacco, sugar and textiles dominated imports, meeting the growing demands of the great Far Eastern migratory waves.³⁶ Far Eastern international economic participation received a strong impetus from the construction of the Trans-Siberian, Ussuri and Baikal-Amur Mainline railways. The need for steel, rolling stock and bridge materials for these projects generated hefty British, German and American orders.

During the period 1848-1857, under the orders of Eastern Siberia's Governor-General Muravev-Amurskii, Russian military officers left a trail of settlements along the Amur and on Sakhalin.³⁷ Muravev secured St. Petersburg's approval for Amur expeditions, highlighting joint Anglo-French expeditions in the North-West Pacific. By emphasising precaution in dealing with the British, Muravev was able to find mutual ground with Manchu officials. Securing domestic support by informing natives they were Russian subjects,³⁸ Muravev's precaution was not in vein, for in 1858 he signed an agreement with the imperial Manchus.³⁹ Russia's gain was China's loss – access to the Sea of Japan. Muravev's final triumph came when the Manchu Dynasty signed the 1860 Treaty of Beijing.⁴⁰ Beijing requested Moscow's assistance, as she had come under Anglo-French

³⁵Stephan, John J., "The Crimean War in the Far East" in Modern Asian Studies, Vol.3, No.3, 1969, pp.257-277.

³⁶Dikov, N.N. (Ed.), Ocherki Istorii Chukotki s Drevneishikh Vremen do Nashikh Dnej, Nauka, Novosibirsk, Russia, 1974, p.111. Also see the excellent Gibson, James R., Imperial Russia in Frontier America, Oxford University Press, New York, US, 1976.

³⁷Quisted, R.K.I., The Expansion of Russia in East Asia, 1857-1860, University of Malaysia Press, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 1968, p.55; and Alekseev, Aleksandr Ivanovich, Amurskaiia Ekspeditsia, 1849-1855 gg. Mysl', Moscow, Russia, 1974, p.89.

³⁸Polansky, Patricia, "The Russians and Soviets in Asia" in International Library Review, Vol.14, 1982, pp.217-262.

³⁹The Treaty of Aigun saw China cede one million, six-hundred thousand square kilometres of territory on the Amur's left bank, including the city that later became Vladivostok.

⁴⁰Russia and China confirmed the 1858 Aigun agreement. China ceded to Russia territory north of the Amur and the Pacific coast south of the Amur, east of the Ussuri and north of Korea.

occupation, suffering from the Taiping Rebellion. In return Moscow was awarded Primor'e.⁴¹ Subsequently, Russia introduced the concept of national boundaries to North-East Asia after her gains in Priamur and Primorie, and the sale of Alaska in 1867. Excluding Sakhalin and the Kurils, these boundaries have remained in tact to the present day and are fundamental to Russia's territorial integrity.⁴² This was the birth of the Far East's role as a gateway from where Russia built and projected her power on the edge of North-East Asia, confirming her presence in the region.

2.4 The Far East – The Tsarist Colony

From the start, the Far East's role was determined by a centre not wholly aware of North-East Asian geopolitics. Being military men Priamur Governor-Generals saw Far Eastern development from a security perspective. Military and strategic concerns preceded socio-economic issues – a policy that prevailed during the Soviet era too. The imperial government subsidised huge expenditures on goods and services by her army and navy. The 1861 and 1862 imperial decrees encouraged *European* settlement in the Far East. But, confusion and disputes reigned over territorial integrity. It was not until the 1855 Treaty of Shimoda that a formal boundary was laid down between Russia and Japan (see Figure A1.5). This territorial integrity was confirmed in the 1875 Treaty of St. Petersburg that transferred control of Sakhalin to Russia in return for Japan's control of the islands at the centre of today's territorial dispute (see Figure A1.6).⁴³ However, competition for North-East Asia resurfaced with the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway.⁴⁴ Mutual distrust and hostility continued, materialising in Russia's inspiring of the Triple Intervention of

⁴¹Prokhorov, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, K Voprosu o Sovietsko-Kitaiskoi Granitse, Mezhdunarodnie Otnoshenia, Moscow, Russia, 1975, pp.255-258.

⁴²Melikhov, Georgii Vasilevich, Manchzhuri na Severo-Vostoke, Nauka, Moscow, Russia, 1974, p.195.

⁴³Stephan, John J., The Kurile Islands – Russo-Japanese Frontier in the Pacific, Clarendon Press, London, UK, 1974, pp.237-238.

⁴⁴Dallin, David J., Soviet Russia and the Far East, Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut, US, 1948, pp.1-21; and Malozemoff, Andrew, Russian Far Eastern Policy 1881-1904 – With Special Emphasis on the Causes of the Russo-Japanese War, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, California, US, 1958, pp.1-19.

1895, her seizure of Port Arthur,⁴⁵ and her 1895-1896 penetration into Korea.⁴⁶ During this time Japan bided her time, as she was not yet strong enough to protest, let alone resist.⁴⁷

Following the 1904-1905 War, Russia and Japan became virtual Allies.⁴⁸ This was through adjustments necessary for pursuing respective interests and through delimiting spheres of influence in North-East Asia.⁴⁹ There was a tacit agreement to counteract any third power, primarily the US, in Northern China and Manchuria.⁵⁰ Milestones of the alliance were the treaties of 1907,⁵¹ 1910,⁵² 1912⁵³ and 1916,⁵⁴ which sought restraint through limiting political options and deflecting hostile alliances. However, the alliance did not eliminate strategic disharmony. It was an alliance of mutual expansion and conquest based on premises of eventual conflict. Indeed, the Far East was interacting with many nationalities. Despite turning a blind eye to foreign commerce in the Far East, tsarist authorities prohibited alien property and land ownership, though loopholes existed. Foreign commerce thrived. Emery of Massachusetts introduced Detroit steamers to the Amur.⁵⁵ Hamburg merchants Kunst and Albers built a Far Eastern department store network.⁵⁶ Concessions were given to foreigners exploiting certain resources. The Tetiukhe lead mines went to

⁴⁵See Connaughton, Richard M., The War of the Rising Sun and Tumbling Bear – A Military History of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), Routledge, London, UK, 1989.

⁴⁶The 1896 Yamagata-Lobanov Agreement between Russia and Japan was considered to settle conflicts over Korea. But it was the 1905 Portsmouth Treaty that gave Japan absolute control over Korea and permitted her interests (alongside Russia's) in Manchuria.

⁴⁷Yakhontoff, Victor A., Russia and the Soviet Union in the Far East, George Allen and Unwin Limited, London, UK, 1932, p.43.

⁴⁸White, John Albert, The Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, US, 1964, p.27. Also see Westwood, J.N., Russia Against Japan, 1904-05 – A New Look at the Russo-Japanese War, MacMillan Press Limited, London, UK, 1986.

⁴⁹Lensen, George Alexander, Russia's Eastward Expansion, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, US, 1964, pp.135-137.

⁵⁰Dillon, E.J., The Eclipse of Russia, Doran Company, New York, US, 1918, pp.299-300. Also see Whiting, Allen S., Siberian Development and East Asia – Threat or Promise?, Stanford University Press, California, US, 1981 for a good study of Siberia and the Far East in the struggle for North-East Asia between Russia, Japan and China, pp.1-21, 65-71, 85-87, 112-113, 134-145, 152-159, 182-185.

⁵¹The Motono-Iwaliski Agreement maintained a status quo and mutual respect for territorial integrity.

⁵²The second Motono-Iwaliski Agreement.

⁵³This agreement divided Inner Mongolia, enabling Russia and Japan to maintain and respect each other's separate spheres of influence.

⁵⁴The Secret Convention that bound the two states into a relationship of alliance.

⁵⁵Vanderlip, W.B., In Search of the Siberian Klondike, Century, New York, US, 1903, pp.11-12.

⁵⁶Vinogradov, A.V., op. cit., p.148.

Switzerland's Julius Bryner, the Lena goldfields to a British consortium and the Komandorski Islands to the US firm Hutchinson and Kohl. The 1875 Treaty of St. Petersburg and 1907 Fisheries Convention provided Japan with extensive privileges along the Far Eastern littoral and the Lower Amur. Vladivostok's Hotel de Louvre flew the French tricolour.⁵⁷ However, tsarist authorities were discrete in determining foreign involvement.

Border trade with Manchuria was enhanced by Russia's sphere of influence there. This culminated in her occupation of Northern Manchuria in 1904 after the Boxer Revolt. At this time the Chinese-Eastern Railway provided Russia with her sole Pacific outlet via Vladivostok. The Baikal-Amur Mainline, completing the Trans-Siberian Railway on Russian territory, was not finished until 1916. With the railway's construction, movement of goods accelerated, freight costs fell substantially, and risks of loss or damage to supplies from European Russia eased. Western Siberian wheat was transported eastward, eliminating Chinese imports from the Far East.⁵⁸ Enhanced infrastructure and the establishment of an Odessa-Vladivostok steamer service facilitated peasant migrations from European Russia between 1891 and 1914.

At the turn of the century Vladivostok personified the Far East's new-found cosmopolitan exuberance. As a gateway, it welcomed cargoes and passengers travelling between Europe, North-East Asia and the US. Ships from London, Hamburg, Odessa, Hong Kong, Yokohama and San Francisco found shelter in Vladivostok's Golden Horn. Europe was accessible via the Chinese-Eastern Railway across Manchuria, which was linked to the Trans-Siberian Railway. Danish-built undersea cables secured Vladivostok's telegraphic communications with Nagasaki and Shanghai. Numerous foreign firms, such as London's Brynner and Company, who fostered Amur timber and ran the Tetiukhe lead mines, located

⁵⁷Khisamutdinov, Amir, Vladivostok – Ehudi k Istorii Starogo Goroda, Far Eastern State University, Vladivostok, Russia, 1992, pp.21-22.

⁵⁸"Pervie Shagi Russkogo Imperializma na Dal'nem Vostoke, 1888-1903gg" in Krasnyi Arkhiv, Vol.3, No.52, 1932, pp.34-124. pp.83-93; and Lensen, George Alexander, Russo-Chinese War, Diplomatic Press, Tallahassee, Florida, US, 1967, p.278.

their regional headquarters in Vladivostok. Neither the Russian-Japanese War nor revolutionary discord derailed the Far East's thriving international involvement. Merchants, manufacturers, professionals and Far Eastern peasant cooperatives all saw the advantages of freer trade and greater regional interaction with North-East Asia. There were no barriers to foreigners visiting the Far East – many of them reported enthusiastically on the potential export of agricultural produce and other raw materials, primarily gold. A great market was being inaugurated. Foreign establishments and businessmen became preoccupied with securing positions in the Far East. Two fervent supporters of Far Eastern trade, via the Kara Sea Route, were Alfred Derry (of the Kensington Emporium Derry and Toms) and the Norwegian Lied (who established his national consulate in Krasnoiarsk). Locals saluted this trade. Far Eastern farms were better supplied with agricultural equipment in 1914 than central Russian or Ukrainian farms, and the quantities of merchandise per capita surpassed those of European Russia.⁵⁹ All in all, during the period 1862-1917, the Far East had matured into what was effectively a protected free trade zone – a gateway linking Europe to Asia, a buffer where politics was suspended in order to facilitate trade, but also a region where strategic concerns overrode all others.

Local East Asians, whose reputations had become tarnished by vibrant regional smuggling, could be seen in all aspects of Far Eastern life. The Chinese dominated retail food markets, they were the majority in the Amur goldfields, the Baikal-Amur Mainline's construction and Vladivostok's shipyards. In 1914 there were sixty-four thousand officially registered Koreans in Southern Primor'e – the majority being tenant farmers for Russian and Ukrainian landlords. The Chinese were less communal than the Koreans. Some of the latter became Russian Orthodox. However suspicion toward East Asians exploded after Russia's defeat in the 1904-1905 war against Japan. A number of local Japanese spies emerged. The Chinese welcomed Japan's victory.⁶⁰ This suspicion materialised in Priamur Governor-

⁵⁹Ford, W.C. (Ed.), Letters of Henry Adams, Vol.1, Houghton-Mifflin, Boston, Massachusetts, US, 1930, p.511; and Lied, Jonas, Return to Happiness, MacMillan and Company Limited, London, UK, 1943. Lied spoke of the prospects of Siberian and Far Eastern economic development in the pre-WWI era.

⁶⁰Beveridge, Albert J., The Russian Advance, Harper, New York, US, 1904, pp.128-129.

Generals' encouraging mass Chinese deportation but this was unsuccessful as St. Petersburg officials and local mine operators were unwilling to cooperate.⁶¹ The final years of imperial authority in the Far East were dominated by such phrases as *New America* and *Amur California*. Notions of Vladivostok being a northern Shanghai were conjured up. The Norwegian explorer Nansen, while attending the three-hundredth anniversary celebrations of the Romanov Dynasty in Khabarovsk, expressed his belief that Priamur faced a vibrant future.⁶² He supported General Kuropatkin's 1909 prediction that one hundred million Russians would be living on Russia's Pacific coast by the year 2000.

All of the Far East's roles were driven by its geographical location, especially its distance from Moscow, most notably as a base for projecting power. As the final frontier of the Russian Empire, St. Petersburg wanted to firmly cement its accomplishment. It grew into a gateway and a buffer between Russia and the political centres of North-East Asia. The trade relations that emerged between the Far East and surrounding regions were a sign of political compromise. The Russian periphery's resources were a driving force in achieving this political compromise and also served to release the forces that lead to what would today be considered globalisation – international free trade, telecommunications lines, cultural exchanges and diluting of politics to achieve economic progress. Yet this soon turned into autarky as revolution was waiting in the wings.

2.5 The Far Eastern Republic

During the first decade of Soviet rule the Far East's value was certainly appreciated.⁶³ By not destroying the vestiges of pre-revolutionary capitalism, Tsarist-style policies towards

⁶¹Popov, Nikita Aleksandrovich, *Oni c Nami Srazhalis' za Vlast Sovetov – Kitaiskie Dobrovol'sty na Frontakh Grazhdanskoi Voiny v Rossi, 1918-1922*, Lenizdat, Leningrad, Russia, 1959, pp.12 and 17; and Siegelbaum, Lewis H., "Another 'Yellow Peril' – Chinese Migrants in the Russian Far East and the Russian Reaction Before 1917" in *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol.12, No.2., April 1978, pp.323-324.

⁶²Nansen, Fridtjof, *Through Siberia – The Land of the Future*, Heinemann, London, UK, 1914, pp.346-349.

⁶³The Communist movement, which found fertile ground in Western Russia, received much less support in the Far East. Far Eastern urban centres were smaller and with fewer proletariats. Moreover, Far Eastern peasants were richer with larger land holdings than their western counterparts. The shortages that plagued western cities causing unrest were unfelt in the Far East.

the periphery continued.⁶⁴ However, for pragmatic reasons, ideological modifications ensured Far Eastern dependence on European Russia. This was particularly true during Stalin's reign when investment and settlement were concentrated in European Russia.

A world war, two revolutions, civil war and foreign intervention buffeted the Far East between 1914 and 1922, modifying its prosperity but not interrupting its international economic ties. By immobilising Baltic and Black Sea ports, the European war made Vladivostok one of Russia's principal gateways through which vast volumes of commodities and military supplies from the US and Japan flowed to European Russia. The 1918-1922 Allied intervention energised the Far Eastern economy by attracting US and Japanese investment and commercial enterprises.⁶⁵ Soviet allegations notwithstanding, it is debatable whether the US sought to impose economic control over the Far East between 1918 and 1920. Some concessions were awarded to US firms by anti-Bolshevik authorities but were ineffective. The 1905 Portsmouth Treaty (see Figure A1.7) guaranteed Japanese access to Far Eastern fisheries, but between 1918 and 1925 they increasingly came under Japanese domination.⁶⁶ The Far East emerged as a buffer between the centres of Soviet and Japanese power – a confrontational, yet vulnerable middle ground between two empires.

Soviet rule was proclaimed in Far Eastern settlements soon after the revolution but in spite of numerous dissidents exiled under the tsarist regime this was not fertile Bolshevik ground. Cossacks, merchants and peasants were uneasy about Lenin's promises. Once the civil war ended and Bolshevik rule was established, Far Eastern development became a matter of strategic concern.⁶⁷ Development and further exploration of Far Eastern resources reduced raw material imports and created a stronger shift towards autarky. The early

⁶⁴Hauner, Milan, What is Asia to Us? Russia's Asian Heartland Yesterday and Today, Unwin Hyman, Boston, Massachusetts, US, 1990, pp.165-190.

⁶⁵White, John Albert, The Siberian Intervention, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, US, 1950, pp.194-195.

⁶⁶Morley, James William, The Japanese Thrust into Siberia, 1919, Columbia University Press, New York, US, 1957, p.219.

⁶⁷Dibb, Paul, Siberia and the Pacific – A Study of Economic Development and Trade Prospects, Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development, Praeger Publishers, London, UK, 1972, pp.1-20.

globalisation the region had experienced and the gateway role the Far East had played in forging and, indeed, buffering local international relations ended. A policy of isolation was actively pursued in a series of Five Year Plans, curtailing, but not eliminating, Far Eastern participation in the international economy. For pragmatic reasons, Moscow allowed trade connections with Manchuria, Japan and the US, suggesting the new government was aware of the gateway and buffer roles the Far East could play. Moreover, they were willing to compromise certain political concessions for economic gain. To some extent political ideology was overcome by economic logic. From the Far East, coal, oil and fish exports were made to Japan during the 1920s and 1930s. Japan was also awarded Northern Sakhalin oil and coal concessions in 1925. By allowing restricted Far Eastern trade with surrounding regions, Bolshevik authorities limited the Far East's gateway role, while reaffirming the role of political compromise and generating trade and hard currency essential to the Soviet economy. However, within the Far East there were different plans being constructed – those of an independent republic.

The Far Eastern Republic's story is one of a struggle for independence against a Bolshevik drive for unification. Despite obstacles, placed by militarists of neighbouring states and national reactionaries, various separate and disconnected territories aimed to form a new state based on democratic principles.⁶⁸ The republic became a model for a possible independence movement – an appeal derived from history and myth. Its character, however, quickly emerged to resemble a buffer. The difference was that this was now a characteristic intentionally pursued, in theory, by regional authorities to enable them to achieve both compromise with Moscow and to develop independent international relations. In reality Moscow agreed to the Far Eastern Republic for tactical reasons.

Created on April 6, 1920, the republic was a nominally independent nation-state encompassing most of the Far East between Soviet Russia and Japanese-occupied

⁶⁸The Special Delegation of the Far Eastern Republic to the United States of America, A Short Outline of the History of the Far Eastern Republic, Washington, DC, US, 1922, p.7.

Primor'e. Lenin intended the Far Eastern Republic to be a tactical vehicle to effect Japanese withdrawal. Indeed, the republic liquidated soon after the last Japanese troop ship steamed out of Golden Horn Bay in October 1922. Though communist in content, officials – non-communist, socialist and regionalist – hoped the republic would become genuinely democratic and independent.⁶⁹ With the view to rekindling the globalisation and gateway roles that had been central to the region's development previously, Far Eastern Republic representatives went to New York and Los Angeles to solicit investment. Such initiatives worried Moscow and the republic's President Krasnochekov was removed in 1921 for being unmanageable. From here on in the foundations for regional unruliness were laid. The republic appealed to patriotism, anti-Japanese animosities and sympathies for international communism. It had a *bourgeois democratic character* – its constitution had no Soviet provisions, but provided for national assembly elections. The republic's flag discarded the hammer and sickle for an anchor and pickaxe crossed over a wheatsheaf.⁷⁰ There were no *People's Commissars*, only *Ministers*; no *Red Army*, only a *Revolutionary People's Army*.

Disputes emerged amongst Far Eastern communists regarding the republic's capital. Those for greater independence suggested Vladivostok where contact with the non-Russian world was most intimate. Moscow, realising the dangers inherent in such a move, ruled the capital be in the very Russian Chita, not cosmopolitan Vladivostok. Accordingly, the republic's government exercised nominal sovereignty over certain provinces. Paradoxically enough the Japanese presence was not only the chief source of weakness but also its principal *raison d'être*. The Far Eastern Republic's creation enabled Far Easterners, particularly peasant colonists, to support Soviet foreign policy and fight foreign

⁶⁹A Declaration of Independence was made to the governments of the US, Britain, Japan, China, France, Italy and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, as well as internationally, on April 6, 1920. Chicherin – People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic – sent a letter in recognition of the Far Eastern Republic to Krasnochekov – Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Far Eastern Republic – on May 14, 1920. On April 17, 1921 the Constitution of the Far Eastern Republic was drawn up. See Elesh, Viacheslav Mikhailovich, *Na Beregakh Volgi e Tikhogo Okeana*, Sovietskaiia Rossia, Moscow, Russia, 1970, pp.100-101; and Smith, Canfield F., *Vladivostok Under Red and White Rule*, University of Washington Press, Seattle, Washington, US, 1975, p.54.

⁷⁰Nikiforov, Peter Mikhailovich, *Zapiski Prem'era DVR*, Politizdat, Moscow, Russia, 1968, pp.118-120.

intervention without identifying with the Communist Party and its economic aspirations. On October 25, 1922, the last Japanese soldier left the Russian mainland and the Far Eastern Republic's viability ceased. The republic's constituent assembly, where communists had 80% of seats, handed over to *Dalrevkom*⁷¹ – a Soviet body.⁷² The communists constituted a minority in the Far East; smaller than anywhere in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. Early in 1922 there were only seven thousand members in the republic and this was on the eve of a purge intending to reduce membership by 15-18%.⁷³ The party relied on the support of the forty thousand member *Far Eastern Trade Union Congress*. In view of numerical weaknesses and isolation, the Far Eastern communist movement had to tread carefully, making concessions to regionalist tendencies. Many Far Easterners continued to favour a special status for their homeland hoping the republic's abolition would not mean it becoming just another Russian region.

In spite of the Far Eastern Republic's collapse the region remained removed from Moscow (and not just because of distance). The Japanese occupied Northern Sakhalin and anti-communist nationalism percolated in Sakha. Regional authorities turned to foreign investors and private enterprise. While the Far Eastern Republic held a special status in communist Russia, its conclusion did not end the region's special status. The region's melting pot nature, its distance from Moscow and its historical gateway role had already become part of the Far East's culture and character. The Far East, as recognised by Moscow, was a buffer while being under their jurisdiction.

2.9 The Soviet Far East

Having barely thrown off the tsarist autocrats, Russians found themselves in the throes of Stalinist terror. Concentration camps were full to overflowing – this was Stalin's contribution to Far Eastern development. The command system's great claim was that the

⁷¹The Far Eastern Revolutionary Committee.

⁷²Mukhachev, Boris Ivanovich, Sovety Severo-Vostoka SSSR v Period Sotsialisticheskoi Rekonstruktsii Narodnogo Khoziaistva, 1926-1936 gg, MKI, Magadan, Russia, 1987, p.7.

⁷³Zhizn' Natsionalnostej, March 22, 1922.

Far East's potential belonged to the people and, thus, it was viable to utilise forced labour.⁷⁴ The importance of foreign commerce for capital accumulation in the Far East clarifies why the New Economic Policy was licensed to proceed there even after the birth of the first Five Year Plan.⁷⁵ Indeed, the Far East was recognised – not for the first time, but officially – for its potential to play the role of a resource base to fuel the Soviet machine, as well as to generate revenues from exports. Gosplan's first president – Krizhizhanovskii – stated, as early as 1930, the question of Far Eastern resource exploitation and development was not one just for the Soviet Union, but for the whole world.⁷⁶ However the changing international political economy, accompanied by Soviet ideology and planning, meant that this role would be postponed for yet another role – that of a base for projecting power.

The 1930s induced Far Eastern global seclusion. Flanked by antagonistic and expansionist regimes in Germany and Japan, Stalin opted for rearmament and autarky. The Japanese haunted Stalin. He believed, or pretended to believe, unspecified party oppositionists were conspiring with Japan to remove the Far Eastern maritime region. There were, however, such real deliberations amongst Japanese military and civilian leaders at the time – Japan's Foreign Minister Yosuke, writing to US President Roosevelt in 1938, suggested a Japanese-American purchase of the Far East.⁷⁷ The forced resettlement in 1937, of two-hundred and fifty thousand Koreans from Primorie to Central Asia, underlined Moscow's nervousness about unofficial communications with neighbouring states.⁷⁸ No longer was the Far East a land of compromise, but a region of strategic importance to be shielded from the domestic and international communities. The Far East's insulation from foreign commerce during the 1930s was also due to the Soviet authorities' desire to shield harsh

⁷⁴For an excellent study of Stalinist Siberia and the New Economic Policy see, Hughes, James, Stalin, Siberia and the Crisis of the New Economic Policy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1991.

⁷⁵Raikhman, E., The Economic Development of the Soviet Far East, American Russian Institute, New York, US, 1936, p.3.

⁷⁶Kirby, Stuart, Siberia and the Soviet Far East, The Economist Intelligence Unit, The Economist Publications Limited, London, UK, Special Report, No.177, 1984, p.44.

⁷⁷Abend, Hallet, Pacific Charter, Doubleday, New York, US, 1943, pp.241-256.

⁷⁸Suh, Dae-Sook (Ed.), Koreans in the Soviet Union, Centre for Korean Studies, Honolulu, Hawai'i, US, 1987, p.40.

domestic reality from the international community. Although hundreds of youths from the US and Europe offered to participate in the construction of the Magnitororsk metallurgical complex in the early 1930s in Norlisk, Eastern Siberian and Far Eastern projects were secured against foreigners. Only involuntary footings, such as Polish deportees who laboured in Kolima's mines, were accepted. They were subjugated to the authority of *Dalstroj*⁷⁹ – a *Narodnyi Komitet Vnutrennikh Del* agency.⁸⁰

Construction work on the Baikal-Amur Mainline, temporarily suspended after the 1941 German invasion, involved thousands of forced labourers and no discernible foreign participation.⁸¹ However, it also forced the Soviet authorities to re-expose the Far East slightly. As during WWI, the Far East became an important gateway for vital materials and foodstuffs. 75% of US lend-lease to the Soviet Union, between 1941 and 1945, proceeded through Vladivostok. Additional cargoes were flown from Alaska to Yakutsk. The Far East's economic and geopolitical significance in a new air age, dramatised by lend-lease and US Vice-President Wallace's visit in 1944, gave birth to a new Pacific era.⁸² Some American writers envisioned a trade boom between the Far East and the US West Coast after WWII, but what emerged was the Cold War. The Far East became a ground for projecting Soviet military power. The Soviet Union faced Japan, which fell under American influence, with the annexation of Southern Sakhalin and the islands at the centre of today's dispute. The two annexed regions, subsequently, became part of the Far East. The latter of the two annexed regions went on to dominate Soviet and post-Soviet Russia's

⁷⁹The Far Eastern Construction Trust. A state corporation in Magadan and North-East Sakha. Between 1930 and 1957 it exploited mineral resources.

⁸⁰The People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. During the period 1934-1943 it was the Soviet security service in charge of the police, the civil registry and labour camps. In 1943 it was divided into two commissariats – *Narodnyi Komitet Vnutrennikh Del* (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs) and *Narodnyi Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti* (People's Commissariat for State Security), the latter more commonly known as *Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti* (KGB).

⁸¹Lamin, Vladimir Alexandrovich, *Kliuchi k Dvum Okeanam*, KKI, Khabarovsk, Russia, 1981, p.145.

⁸²Wallace, Henry A., *Soviet Asia Mission*, Reynal and Hitchcock, New York, US, 1946, p.32; Lattimore, Owen, "New Road to Asia" in a compilation by Isono, Fujiko, *China Memoirs*, The University of Tokyo Press, Tokyo, Japan, 1990, p.657; and Hazard, John A., *Recollections of a Pioneering Sovietologist*, Oceana, New York, US, 1984, p.67.

relations with Japan. The two regions also became an issue of contention during the Cold War, placing the Far East in a special position during the post-WWII ideological conflict.⁸³

Soviet-Japanese rivalry for North-East Asia was replaced by the Cold War.⁸⁴ The US rejected Moscow's suggestion of Soviet occupation of Northern Hokkaido.⁸⁵ Japan came under US occupation. Consequently, the Soviet Union sought to minimise US influence on Japan by controlling the occupation policy.⁸⁶ Trying to weaken Japan – economically and politically – Moscow insisted surrender terms be strictly applied and the emperor be tried as a war criminal. These policies were calculated with the belief that a weak Japan would turn to communism. Soviet objectives were, however, frustrated because of changes in US policy towards Japan during the period 1948-1949.⁸⁷ The US began to treat Japan as a potential ally in its confrontation with the Soviet Union.⁸⁸ A policy that continued until 1991.

2.7 The Far East Between the Soviet Union and Japan

In February 1918 the Bolshevik regime cancelled all obligations and debts. This damaged Japanese enterprises, like Mitsui and Mitsubishi, who had had a Far Eastern presence

⁸³Upon Stalin's death, in 1953, a new role for the Far East emerged. Large-scale uses of forced labour in construction projects ceased and shortages of free labour became a constraint. Soviet planners realised that it was easier to transport energy and raw materials from the Far East to European Russia, than to induce eastward migration to foster economic development. The Far East's role of resource base, as during the Far Eastern Republic, was reinaugurated. Under the resulting geographical division of labour, manufacturing activities with large labour requirements were located in European Russia – where population and markets were concentrated – while power-intensive industries were located, to a greater extent, in the Far East.

⁸⁴Saturday Evening Post (San Francisco), November 23, 1946. Also see Swearingen, Rodger, The Soviet Union and Japan – Escalating Challenge and Response, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, California, US, 1978.

⁸⁵The Japan Times, January 1, 1997. In a secret message, on August 16, 1945, to President Truman, Stalin proposed Hokkaido be divided. [See Truman, Harry S., Memoirs, Vol.1 (Years of Decisions), Harper Collins, New York, US, 1955, p.440.]

⁸⁶Pravda, October 20, 1946; and The New York Times, September 1, 1946.

⁸⁷Feis, Herbert, Contest Over Japan, Columbia University Press, New York, US, 1967, p.6.

⁸⁸Hoffman, Stanley, "Revisionism Revisited" in Miller, Lynn H., Pruseen, Ronald W. (Eds.), Reflections on the Cold War – A Quarter Century of American Foreign Policy, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, US, 1974, pp.3-26. Also see McCauley, Martin, The Origins of the Cold War, Seminar Studies in History, Longman Group Incorporated, New York, US, 1983.

during Tsarist times.⁸⁹ Japanese fishery rights in the Amur Delta, along the coast of Primor'e and in the Sea of Okhotsk, were also cancelled. This situation motivated Japan to take part in the Allied intervention in Eastern Siberia and the Far East in 1918. Japan alone, however, provided nearly four times the combined forces sent by the rest of the Allies.⁹⁰ In spite of the success in securing the withdrawal of Japan's presence from the Soviet landmass by 1922, Lenin authorised the sale of Northern Sakhalin to Japan in 1923 for US\$1billion.⁹¹ In 1925 the *Convention on the Main Principles of the Relationship between the USSR and Japan* was signed in Beijing. The convention restored the functioning of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty and gave Northern Sakhalin back to the Soviet Union. Later that year the last Japanese soldier left Northern Sakhalin and Soviet power firmly controlled the whole of Sakhalin. Lenin had called Japan's bluff and succeeded.

In view of the Soviet fear of Japan, the Soviets concentrated their energies on the Kurils and Sakhalin. Sakhalin was controlled by the KGB as the search for enemies (real and perceived) started with the departure of the Japanese. With every year the intensity of this search increased and eventually became devastating. Between 1932 and 1938 in excess of two hundred thousand people were shot. The KGB paid most attention to the representatives of the local population, the workers of Japanese concessions, persons of *capitalist* nationalities (Japanese, Chinese, Koreans, Poles, Germans, Latvians and so on).⁹² Such a policy of distrust continued until the Soviet Union's collapse, especially in the disputed territories. From 1925 Southern Sakhalin and the Kurils carried extreme strategic importance, and allowed Japan to control the main shipping routes connecting the Far East

⁸⁹Author's interview with Nakagawara, Sunsukey, Manager, Overseas Coordination and Administration Department, Corporate Planning Division, Mitsui and Company Limited, Tokyo, Japan, October 30, 1997.

⁹⁰Silverlight, John, *The Victors' Dilemma* *The Victors' Dilemma – The Allied Intervention in the Russian Civil War*, Barrie and Jenkins, London, UK, 1970, pp.104-137; and Mints, I.I., *Angliiskaia Interventsiia i Severnaia Kontrevoliutsiia*, Gosudarstvennoe Sotsialna-Ekonomicheskoe Izdatel'stvo, Moscow, Russia, 1931, pp.65-79.

⁹¹Stephenson, M., *The Kurile Islands*, Conflict Studies Research Centre, Partnership For Peace Information Management System, No.E98, London, UK, 1998, p.9. Stephenson has said Volkogonov, a Russian historian, made this claim in 1990.

⁹²Kantorovich, Vladimir I., *Soviet Sakhalin*, Cooperative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the USSR, Moscow, Russia, 1993, pp.17-32.

with the world. It was on these islands that Japan built numerous military bases and stationed comparatively large military forces. But Japan only once used the disputed territories for a huge operation of strategic importance – the bombing of Pearl Harbour.

In 1951 the peace treaty between Japan and the Allied Powers was signed in San Francisco (see Figure A1.8). The Soviet Union participated in the conference but did not sign the treaty. As a result, there are two important points regarding the disputed islands in the context of the San Francisco Peace Conference and Treaty.⁹³ First, Japan's renunciation of all rights to the Kurils and Southern Sakhalin in accordance with the treaty. The Kurils that Japan renounced did not include those at the centre of today's territorial dispute. Secondly, the Soviet inclusion of Southern Sakhalin and the Kurils into her territory did not receive international recognition. The Soviet Union made efforts, including submitting proposed amendments to the draft treaty, to have her sovereignty over these areas recognised, but this was not accepted by the conference, and was not included in the San Francisco Peace Treaty. For this, and for other reasons, the Soviet Union did not sign the treaty. The San Francisco Peace Treaty expressly stipulates that the treaty shall not confer any benefits on any non-signatory. Taking both these two points into consideration Japan sees that there is only one inevitable conclusion. Within the terms of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, it is quite natural for Japan to maintain that the disputed islands are Japanese territory.

Khrushchev established diplomatic ties between Moscow and Tokyo.⁹⁴ He promised to give up Shikotan and the Habomai group of islands only after the two states had signed a peace treaty (see Appendix 2).⁹⁵ Some fifty years later there is still no treaty. Since the Soviet Union did not sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan and the Soviet Union

⁹³Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi, The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations, University of California, International and Area Studies, Berkeley, California, US, 1998, pp.38-64.

⁹⁴The 1956 Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration: '...Japan and the Soviet Union were fully agreed that the restoration of diplomatic relations between them would contribute to the development of mutual understanding and cooperation between the two nations in the interests of peace and security in the Far East....'.

⁹⁵This is a key point, as it could be argued it illustrated that the Soviet Union did not see the islands are part of her sovereign territory. She was, after all, willing to return some of the islands.

negotiated for the conclusion of a separate peace treaty. During these negotiations, Japan claimed territorial rights to Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and Habomai, and demanded the return of these islands. However, the Soviet Union maintained that they would return Shikotan and Habomai, but could not return Etorofu and Kunashiri.⁹⁶ Thus, the negotiations did not reach a satisfactory conclusion. Consequently, in place of a peace treaty, the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration was signed which provided for the termination of the state of war and the resumption of diplomatic relations. This treaty stipulates, in Article 9, that after diplomatic relations have been established, the negotiations shall be continued and the Soviet Union shall hand over the Habomai and Shikotan islands to Japan after the conclusion of a peace treaty. The Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration was ratified by both states and registered with the UN.⁹⁷ In principle, the issue of Habomai and Shikotan had already been resolved by this declaration. So, in theory, only the question of Etorofu and Kunashiri remains to be resolved in the peace treaty negotiations. Of course, the conditions under which negotiations originally took place have somewhat changed.

From the mid-1960s onwards Japan focused her policy towards the Soviet Union in order to achieve two objectives – a general improvement in relations (with special emphasis on economic cooperation) and the conclusion of a peace treaty (including settling the territorial issue).⁹⁸ Trade Payment Agreements were the foundation for the development of Soviet-Japanese relations in the 1960s.⁹⁹ Subsequently, bilateral trade grew during the 1960s and 1970s, in spite of the Cold War and the territorial dispute (see Figure 2.1). 1965

⁹⁶Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Japan, The Position of the Japanese Government on the Northern Territorial Issue, Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Japan, Tokyo, Japan, 1965, pp.3-4.

⁹⁷McGuire, Sumiye O., Soviet-Japanese Economic Relations, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, US, 1990, pp.35-57.

⁹⁸Tikhvinsky, Sergei, “Normalising Relations with Japan After the Second World War” (continued from Far Eastern Affairs, No.4, 1995) in Far Eastern Affairs, No.5, pp.15-39.

⁹⁹News and Views from the Soviet Union, March 5, 1960.

saw *Dal'intorg*¹⁰⁰ mount a commercial exhibition of coastal trade goods on Japan's Western coast and the establishment of the Japan-Soviet Economic Committee and the Soviet-Japan Economic Committees.¹⁰¹ These committees were first to establish a cooperative agreement on Siberian and Far Eastern development which were key in expanding Soviet-Japanese trade and economic relations during the 1960s and 1970s, see Figures 2.1 and 2.2. Despite trade growth, the Soviet Union failed to account for more than 2% of Japan's trade. From the 1960s to early 1970s, Soviet exports to Japan outstripped Japanese exports to the Soviet Union.¹⁰² This situation did not sustain. From the early 1970s Japanese exports to the Soviet Union grew slowly, while Soviet exports showed few signs of expanding.¹⁰³ Large-scale resource development projects in Siberia and the Far East contributed to improved Soviet-Japanese relations, and were key in economic terms.¹⁰⁴

In the 1970s, though post-WWII principles remained unchanged, a new approach, owing much to practical political pressures at home and abroad. This was most apparent in Japan. Domestic pressure on the government to exercise more foreign policy initiatives independent of the US, without compromising vital security and economic ties and changes

¹⁰⁰The formation of *Dal'intorg* was important in Soviet regional trade thinking. It provided machinery for expanding, albeit modest, coastal trade with Japan. Recognising the Far East's distance from European Russia's markets, it admitted to regional consumer good and industrial equipment shortages. It did not remove central control of Far Eastern trade from the Ministry of Foreign Trade (Moscow). *Dal'intorg* recognised the worsening trade situation with China and the complementary nature of the Russian and Japanese economies, emphasising the Far East. *Dal'intorg* was given the right to work directly with Japanese firms.

¹⁰¹These two committees were responsible for the first cooperative agreement on Siberian development. Between 1966 and 1979 these committees held eight sessions.


¹⁰²Mendl, Wolf, "The Soviet Union and Japan" in Segal, Gerald (Ed.), *The Soviet Union in East Asia – Predicaments of Power*, Heinemann, London, UK, 1983, pp.50-69.

¹⁰³Dibb, Paul, *op. cit.*, pp.227-231. The committees recognised the complementarity between the Soviet and Japanese economies, placing special emphasis on the Far East and Siberia.

¹⁰⁴The first Soviet-Japanese Siberian development cooperation project involved the first Far East Forest Resources Development Project, agreed in 1968. This project, commonly known as the KS Project (in respect of Kawai and Sedov – the chiefs of the original Soviet and Japanese delegations), significantly expanded Soviet-Japanese trade; almost 25% of Japanese exports to the Soviet Union between 1969 and 1970 were accounted for by products related to the KS Project. In 1969, 52% of Japanese machinery and metal goods exports to the Soviet Union were related to the project, 63% in 1970.

in world economic relations during the 1970s all encouraged Japan to be more independent. Subsequently, Japan turned to the Soviet Union for some of her resources.¹⁰⁵

Figure 2.1: Soviet-Japanese Trade, 1965-1986



Source: Bradshaw, Michael J., "Japan and the Economic Development of the Soviet Far East" in Liebowitz, Ronald D. (Ed.), *Gorbachev's New Thinking – Prospects for Joint Ventures*, Ballinger Publishing Company, Cambridge, Massachusetts, US, 1988, p.192.

Note: Figures are in millions of foreign trade Roubles (1987).

¹⁰⁵Fukushima, Akiko, *Japanese Foreign Policy – The Emerging Logic of Multilateralism*, St. Martin's Press, New York, US, 1998, pp.162-187; and Bunker, Stephen G., and Ciccantell, Paul S., "Restructuring Markets, Reorganising Nature – An Examination of Japanese Strategies for Access to Raw Materials" in *Journal of World-Systems Research*, Vol.1, No.3, 1995, pp.1-55.

Figure 2.2: Major Soviet/Russian-Japanese Projects in the Far East

Year:	Project:	Credit/Capital (US\$m):	Principal Exports:	Duration of Exports:
1967	First KS Far Eastern Forest Development Project	163	Timber and Lumber	1969-1973
1971	Wood Chip and Pulp Development Project	50	Pulp and Wood Chip	1972-1981
1971	Vostochni Port	80	(Seven-Year Deferred Payment)	<i>To Be Determined</i>
1974	Second KS Far Eastern Forest Development Project	550	Timber and Lumber	1975-1979
1974	South Yakutian Coal Development Project	540	Coking Coal	1983-1998
1974	Yakutian Natural Gas Development Project	50	Exploration	<i>To Be Determined</i>
1975	Sakhalin Continental Shelf Project (Sakhalin 1)	185	Exploration, Crude Oil and Gas	<i>To Be Determined</i>
1981	Third KS Far Eastern Forest Development	910	Timber and Lumber	1981-1986
1985	Wood Chip Agreement	200 loan	Wood Chips	1981-1995
1991	Fourth KS Far Eastern Forest Development Project	1,400	Timber and Lumber	<i>To Be Determined</i>
1992	Sakhalin Continental Shelf Project (Sakhalin 2)	<i>To Be Determined</i>	Exploration, Crude Oil and Gas	<i>To Be Determined</i>

Source: Carlie, Lonny E., "The Changing Political Economy of Japan's Economic Relations with Russia – The Rise and Fall of Seikei Fukabun" in *Pacific Affairs*, Vol.68, No.3, Fall 1994, pp.411-432.

Notes: The Yakutian Natural Gas Development Project (1974) involves US firms; The Sakhalin 1 (1975) and Sakhalin 2 (1992) Projects involve US and/or European firms.

While economic relations accelerated, Japan and the Soviet Union continued intermittent peace treaty negotiations, but no substantive results were achieved. One particular reason for this political stalemate was that the Soviet Union was adamant that no territorial dispute existed. After the US and Japan signed the 1960 Security Treaty, Khrushchev retracted the Soviet Union's offer as laid out in the 1956 Joint Declaration.¹⁰⁶ However, Japanese leaders once again sought to cultivate relations with the Soviet Union in the 1970s, as part of a move to keep Japan involved in Far Eastern diplomacy during this period of great flux. In 1971 the Japanese government was alarmed at the surprise decision by the Nixon administration to normalise relations with China. The *Nixon Shock* left the Japanese feeling

¹⁰⁶Slavinsky, Boris, *The Soviet-Japanese Postwar Peace Settlement – Historical Experience and Present Situation*, An unpublished paper presented at the conference: Japan and Russia – Postwar Relations, Mutual Influences and Comparisons, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, US, 1997.

betrayed.¹⁰⁷ Consequently, Japan's Tanaka was the first Japanese politician to attempt to negotiate a land-for-money deal with the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁸ During his 1973 Moscow trip, Tanaka dangled the carrot of economic aid, in the hope a deal could be reached over the islands. Tanaka was also interested in gaining access to Siberian and Far Eastern resources. The 1973 oil crisis and easing East-West tensions generated more substantive Soviet-Japanese agreements.¹⁰⁹ In 1973, after a Moscow summit, Japan agreed to finance Siberian and Far Eastern development projects by extending credit through the Export-Import Bank of Japan.¹¹⁰

As the 1970s came to a close the rise in Soviet-Japanese trade resulted from credit availability and Soviet profits from resource exports.¹¹¹ However the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan saw Japan cancel credit of US\$1.4 billion while enforcing sanctions and suspending discussions.¹¹² Despite this, Soviet-Japanese trade continued to expand.¹¹³ Figure 2.1 shows growth in Soviet-Japanese trade from 1965 (when Soviet-Japanese Economic Committees were established) until 1986 (the year before Gorbachev's reforms were implemented).

¹⁰⁷Tanaka, Kakuei, Building a New Japan – A Plan for Remodelling the Japanese Archipelago, First Edition, Simul' Press, Tokyo, Japan, 1972, pp.113-119.

¹⁰⁸Kusano, Atsushi, Two Nixon Shocks and Japan-US Relations, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, US, 1987, pp.21-26.

¹⁰⁹Sen Gupta, Bhabani, Soviet-Asian Relations in the 1970s and Beyond, Harper and Row, New York, US, 1976, pp.286-287.

¹¹⁰Author's interview with Kumabe, Kensaku, Assistant Director General, Loan Department 2 (Europe, Middle East and Africa), Export-Import Bank of Japan, Tokyo, Japan, January 23, 1997.

¹¹¹Author's interview with Ogawa, Kazuo, Director General, Institute for Russian and East European Studies, Japan Association for Trade with Russia and Central-Eastern Europe, Tokyo, Japan, January 13, 1997 and October 29, 1997. These large-scale projects were a kind of economic diplomacy, see Bryant, William E., Japanese Private Economic Diplomacy – An Analysis of Business-Government Linkages, Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and Government, Praeger Publishers, New York, US, 1975. Brezhnev is reported to have openly stated his high expectations from Japanese participation in Siberian resource development projects at the 1976 special Soviet-Japanese economic conference held in Yalta.

¹¹²Dienes, Leslie, Soviet Asia – Economic Development and National Policy Choices, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, US, 1987, p.512.

¹¹³Ogawa, Kazuo, "Japan-Soviet Economic Relations – Present Status and Future Prospects" in Journal of North-East Asian Studies, Vol.2, No.1, 1983, pp.3-15; and Smith, G.B., "Recent Trends in Japanese-Soviet Trade" in Problems of Communism, Vol.36, No.1, 1987, p.62.

2.8 The Far East – The Cold War Years

China and the US required, and still require, consideration due to their ability, separately or jointly, to impede or facilitate Far Eastern development. The Far East's potential international prospects withered in the face of Soviet-US rivalry. The termination of lend-lease, the Cold War, the Korean War, the Vietnam War and Japan's emergence as a US ally, while reinforcing Far Eastern insulation, secured the region's role as a base for projecting power. Sustained pressure from senior naval officers compelled Vladivostok to develop as a military port closed to foreign commercial traffic. The Japanese and US consulates there were closed. A new commercial port was developed at Nakhodka, but its facilities remained limited. Throughout the 1950s Far Eastern international ties centred around communist Mongolia, China and North Korea, despite increasing trade with Japan. In 1954, Khrushchev and Mao discussed the possibilities of one million Chinese settling and working in the Far East.¹¹⁴ The Far East, in spite of being internationally secluded, was becoming a buffer between the motherland of communism and other (communist and non-communist) states. Not only was trade with other communist states developed through the region, the Far East was once more a land of political compromise. Though no consensus was reached between Khrushchev and Mao, the issue of mixing Chinese labour and Soviet resources re-emerged in 1985 on Moscow's initiative, with the possibility of Japanese capital.¹¹⁵

Border trade with China flourished in the 1950s but regressed in the 1960s and during the cultural revolution.¹¹⁶ Purchasing Chinese commodities rather than those from European Russia reduced transportation costs. The deterioration in relations between China and the Soviet Union severely reduced Far Eastern-Manchurian links. However, this brought with it awareness of the potential of commercial intercourse with North-East Asia (especially Japan) again emphasising the Far East's role of buffer. Notwithstanding this deterioration

¹¹⁴Talbott, Strobe (Ed.), Khrushchev Remembers, Little, Brown, Massachusetts, US, 1974, pp.249-250.

¹¹⁵The Japan Times, June 13, 1985.

¹¹⁶Turkin, Vladimir, Moskva-Pekin – Stikhi, Primizdat, Vladivostok, Russia, 1951, p.17; and Klopov, Sergei Vaselevich, Amur – Reka Druzhbi, KKI, Khabarovsk, Russia, 1959, p.78.

in relations between China and the Soviet Union, and the resulting breakdown in trade between the two, the Far East's international economic ties continued to develop throughout the decade. Soviet-Japanese economic cooperation, negligible in the 1950s, assumed a much more prominent profile in the Far East. Bilateral trade with Japan progressed with significant mutual gains due to the Soviet appreciation of Japan as a possible provider of manufactures and equipment. In turn the Far East offered Japan access to natural resources. Geological exploration during the 1960s unearthed vast quantities of minerals, oil and gas. This all enhanced the region's global visibility as a prominent resource base, while rejuvenating its gateway role. Moreover, it highlighted the complementary nature of the Far Eastern and Japanese economies.

1963 saw the birth of Far Eastern-Japanese coastal trade in the form of regional bartering peripheral to official bilateral trade. In 1967 Trans-Siberian shipments began operating between the Far East and Europe. 1968 saw Japan begin participating in five major Far Eastern projects – the exploitation of Amur timber, wood chip production, the construction of a container port at Vostochni, the exploration of Sakhalin's offshore petroleum and the mining of South Yakutian coal.¹¹⁷ A coastal trade accord was concluded with North Korea. Largely due to the Vietnam War, maritime traffic between Vladivostok and Hanoi swelled during the 1960s, developing both solid economic links between the Far East and North-East Asia, and the Far East and the Pacific.¹¹⁸ There was, however, no significant expansion of trade with South-East Asia,¹¹⁹ despite the Soviet Union signing trade agreements with Singapore (1966), Malaysia (1967) and Thailand (1970). The establishment of an Export-Import Research Institute at Khabarovsk in the mid-1960s signalled mounting interest in North-East Asia. In 1971 an Economic Research Institute was established in Vladivostok to examine the trade policies of Japan, Canada, Australia,

¹¹⁷Shipov, Y., "Economic Relations Between the USSR and Japan" in International Affairs (Russia), December 1969, pp.90-91.

¹¹⁸The Japan Times, May 27, 1967; and The Mainichi Daily News, May 16, 1964.

¹¹⁹With the exception of India who made her first shipment of goods (steel line and tea) to the Far East in 1971.

North Korea, Mongolia and Latin America.¹²⁰ All Far Eastern economic research was coordinated by this latter institute, in conjunction with the Pacific Geography Institute, which, upon its opening, assumed the role of assessor of natural resources in North-East Asia. These developments highlighted changing Soviet policy towards North-East Asia, specifically, and Asia Pacific broadly. Vladivostok's Far Eastern Science Centre made significant international contributions to economic research in many fields. The Far East's role as a buffer separating communism and liberalism, and a gateway between Europe and Asia was being reasserted.

There were few Far Eastern export products to sell outside North-East Asia. It was unlikely, for instance, that timber, fish or minerals would be exported to the West coasts of Canada and the US due to the parallel nature of production there. However, Canadian wheat, Australian and New Zealand meat, as well as trial quantities of Australian fruit, were sent to the Far East in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In December 1966, Soviet Agricultural Minister Matskevich said it was sensible, in his opinion, to purchase wheat abroad on a continuing basis for the Far East. There were also prospects for timber sales to Australia, but the Japanese market was, and remains, larger and more proximate. All this was key in establishing Far Eastern resource base and gateway roles, along with a realisation that Japan was first and foremost in confirming this status. Soviet trade with North-East Asia more than doubled in the late 1960s and early 1970s, as a result of the war-induced exports to North Vietnam. The Chinese impeded shipments of Soviet aid and arms through their territory. Upon the Suez Canal's closure in 1967 most Soviet aid went through the Far East – the region becoming central/pivotal to Soviet power projections, global aid programmes and significant trade. The Far East had achieved the status of compromise by simultaneously playing both the political and economic cards. In 1970 three-hundred thousand tonnes of dry cargo and large quantities of oil products were sent from Nakhodka to North Vietnam. The Far East concentrated on directing natural resources to North Vietnam with twenty Soviet ships operating between Vladivostok/Nakhodka and

¹²⁰BBC-SWB, October 8, 1971, p.5.

North Vietnam. The Far East was becoming an outlet for communism in Asia. It was a power projecting base from where Moscow's foreign policy decision making could take root.

2.9 The Far East – International Relations Through Resources

During the 1970s, as the Soviet Union shifted from autarky towards global economic integration, the Far East began to shed its isolation, though by North-East Asian standards, she remained detached. Numerous events and policies underlay this move but most markedly, Soviet planners realised Far Eastern resource exports could generate hard currency to acquire of Western technology and equipment imperative to sustain the pace of Soviet economic development. The advent of *détente*, signalled by the 1972 Vladivostok Nixon-Brezhnev Summit, resultant arms control, trade, as well as scientific and technical agreements, all created a political backdrop conducive to Soviet and Far Eastern international economic integration. Further, it emphasised the Far East's buffer role. North-East Asia's dynamism boosted Far Eastern resource prospects – attracting wider international attention due to soaring natural resource prices in light of the 1973 Arab oil embargo as well as 1973 and 1979 oil price hikes. In 1974 resumption of work on the Baikal-Amur Mainline committed the Soviet Union to making Eastern Siberia's untapped resources available to international markets. The Far East was being prepared for more active economic participation in North-East Asia – a limited form of regional integration. However this was driven by economics while being conceived as a political compromise (without intending to be so).

Disintegrating Sino-Soviet relations saw trade being diverted to Mongolia, North Korea, North Vietnam and Japan, consisting mainly of fruit and clothing. From North Vietnam came tea. From North Korea, agricultural products and cement. Mongolia supplied the beef deficit. Soviet trade with China was only a small proportion of that with Mongolia or North

Korea.¹²¹ North Korean building materials, electrical and chemical goods were imported into the Far East in exchange for fish and oil products. Flourishing border trade followed Soviet-North Korean railway freight agreements. The Soviet Union became North Korea's major trading partner and these cross-border exchanges were important to the Far East. However, though regionally significant, this local trade was minor by international standards.¹²² Yet what was important was that the Far East had become a regional actor again.

During the period 1974-1975, Beijing's protests contributed to Tokyo's reluctance to assist in the construction of a pipeline-railway network for shipping Western Siberian oil to the Far East. Although China subsequently overcame her concerns over the ventures, the renewal of pressure on Japan to refrain from additional cooperation confused affairs significantly. Deepening ties between China and Japan afforded Beijing new channels of influence aimed at reducing, if not eliminating, Tokyo's participation in Moscow's programmes. Japan, meanwhile, set limits of 20% for overall imports that were allowed from the Soviet Union. However, by 1976 the Soviet Union was providing 28% of Japan's imported coal; and by 1977 24% of its imported asbestos and 20% of its imported nickel.¹²³ Furthermore, joint Soviet-Japanese joint development of South Yakutian coal and Sakhalin oil and gas, initiated in the mid-1970s, began to advance. The importance of Japan as a trading partner was being realised.

Unsurprisingly, large proportions of Soviet technology imports were destined for the Far East. During the 1970s the region received about 15% of all foreign investment in the Soviet Union – some forty contracts for major projects were concluded with European,

¹²¹Dienes, Leslie, "Soviet-Japanese Economic Relations – Are They Beginning to Fade?" in Soviet Geography, Vol.26, No.7, September 1985, p.517; and North, Robert N., "The Soviet Far East" in Pacific Affairs, Vol.101, No.2, Summer 1978, p.214.

¹²²Ekonomika i Zhizn, various 1972 issues.

¹²³Edmonds, Richard L., Siberian Resources and Development and the Japanese Economy – The Japanese Perspective, Association of American Geographers, Project on Soviet Natural Resources in the World Economy, Discussion Paper No.12, August 1979, pp.24-25.

Japanese and US firms. Historically, Eastern Europe had worked closely with the Soviet Union to develop Far Eastern energy, contributing labour, equipment and hard currency. And now Soviet-US rivalry was curbing Far Eastern economic links with the Americas and Japan. Washington's embargoes on capital and technology transfers, in light of events in Afghanistan (1979) and Poland (1981), slowed the momentum of Soviet-Japanese cooperation in the Far East. Despite these restraints, Soviet-Japanese trade still managed to remain relatively steady, during the period 1980-1985.

By 1984 the Soviet Union had become the leading global energy exporter. This accomplishment was largely due to Far Eastern (and Siberian) oil, gas and coal exports. The Soviet Union exported about 15% of its primary energy – 27% of oil, 12% of gas and 4% of coal¹²⁴ – most exports going to COMECON states. Nonetheless, significant exports also went to Europe. However, the Far East's international economic role was not solely that of energy exporter; regional factories also manufactured an assortment of goods. Offering comparatively rapid delivery and favourable freight rates, the Trans-Siberian landbridge became an essential international artery accounting for 15% of shipments between Europe and Japan in 1980.¹²⁵ The Far East became a gateway for Siberian resources destined for North-East Asia.

The Far East also assumed growing significance in international aviation offering the fastest route between North-East Asia and Europe. In 1985 Japan and the Soviet Union agreed to allow Japan Airlines to fly from Tokyo to Western Europe non-stop over the Far East (and Siberia), covering in twelve-and-a-half hours what takes fifteen hours via Moscow and seventeen hours via Alaska.¹²⁶ Japan, the US and the Soviet Union agreed, in late 1985, to link Khabarovsk air controllers to North Pacific flight monitor systems to help avert recurrence of September 1983's Korean Airlines disaster.¹²⁷ By the mid-1980s the

¹²⁴Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), *USSR Energy Atlas*, GPO, Washington, DC, US, 1985, p.6.

¹²⁵Mote, Victor L., *The Baikal-Amur Mainline and its Implications for the Pacific Basin*, University of Houston, Houston, Texas, US, 1983, p.135.

¹²⁶*The Japan Times*, February 11, 1985.

¹²⁷*The New York Times*, November 22, 1985.

Far East's potential political, economic and geographic roles (domestic and international) were being recognised and reinvigorated to aid an ailing Soviet system.

2.10 The Gorbachev Factor

Soviet-Japanese relations under Gorbachev were like a pendulum – a positive development was always pulled back by a negative one.¹²⁸ In the end, neither side was willing to make a leap to settle the territorial dispute (see Figures A1.4, A1.5, A1.6, A1.7, A1.8 and Appendix 2). As soon as Gorbachev assumed power in March 1985, he met Prime Minister Yasuhiro at Chernenko's funeral and signalled his intention to thaw Soviet-Japanese relations. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's visit to Japan in January 1986 was an important turning point. Later, in his 1986 Vladivostok speech, Gorbachev declared his intention to *see a more conciliatory Asian policy and to join the Asia-Pacific region as a constructive partner*. Both sides began preparations for Gorbachev's visit to Japan in late 1986/early 1987. However the trip never materialised. Instead, after the Japanese government tightened certain technology regulations under US pressure as a result of the 1987 Toshiba incident (where the Toshiba Machine Company admitted selling highly sensitive technology to the Soviet Union) the Soviet government expelled a Japanese diplomat, prompting the Japanese government to retaliate with a similar action. Soviet-Japanese relations returned to the deep-freeze again. It was not until mid-1988 that both sides began to mend fences again. Prime Minister Nakasone met Gorbachev in July, and a frank exchange of opinions created a momentum for improvement.

In September 1988, Gorbachev delivered his Krasnoiarsk speech in which he declared his intention to improve relations with Japan. In December that year, Shevardnadze made his second trip to Tokyo. One of the major achievements at the ministerial conference was the creation of the Working Group for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty. For the first time since diplomatic ties were re-established, in 1956, both sides had established a mechanism

¹²⁸Carlie, Lonny E., "Changing Political Economy of Japan's Economic Relations with Russia – The Rise and Fall of Seikei Fukabun" in *Pacific Affairs*, Vol.67, No.3, Fall 1994, pp.411-432.

through which to create a favourable environment for the conclusion of a peace treaty. Nevertheless, the creation of the Working Group did not settle the territorial dispute. On the contrary, negotiations revealed irreconcilable differences. During 1989-1990, when revolutions swept away Communist regimes and Germany reunified, the Soviet Union and Japan stood still, unable to resolve the territorial dispute.¹²⁹ By the time Gorbachev finally went to Japan in April 1991, his authority within the Soviet Union had deteriorated to such an extent that he was not in a position to offer any compromise that would satisfy Japan, even had he been inclined to do so. Moreover, El'tsin had mobilised Russian nationalism against concessions.

Traditionally, Soviet interest in North-East Asia was to be heavily biased towards military and political concerns despite economics and commercial interests being the greatest source of potential mutual gain. In the mid-late 1980s economic interest in Asia developed rapidly after Gorbachev assumed office, confirming a new role for the Far East. Gorbachev's advisers argued Far Eastern international participation was minor and excessively resource-export dependent. The importance of the Far East's links with the world economy could be gauged from the fact that its exports (along with those of Siberia) accounted for 75% of the former Soviet Union's hard currency earnings by the time Gorbachev came to power. Gorbachev's advisers counselled that Far Eastern imports were excessively biased towards grain and metal manufactures, and imported machinery and equipment was often inappropriate for the region. The need to reduce Far Eastern resource-export dependency was made more urgent by three critical factors early in Gorbachev's reign – a dramatic fall in Russian crude oil output, collapsing world crude oil prices, and new oil discoveries, such as in the North Sea, meant some international demand would shift away from the region.¹³⁰

¹²⁹*Ibid.*

¹³⁰See Manezhev, Sergei, *The Russian Far East*, Post-Soviet Business Forum (PSBF), The Royal Institute for International Affairs (RIIA), Chatham House, London, UK, 1993.

The *Government Statement on Measurements to Expand the Scope of Cooperation with the Asian and Pacific Regions* was made in April 1986. And, in July 1986 Gorbachev honoured Vladivostok with the Order of Lenin by making a speech about the Far East's potential and relations with North-East Asia. These events attracted substantial attention in Japan. In July 1987 the Central Committee adopted a *Comprehensive Far East Plan* to the year 2000 aimed at Far Eastern economic revitalisation. This intended to raise industrial output, power generation, petroleum and gas production, and forest and fishery resource development by 250%. The plan stipulated that over two-hundred and thirty billion roubles were necessary for the plan's implementation (the equivalent to tens of millions of US\$ at the time).¹³¹ In March 1988 the *Soviet Domestic Commission on Economic Cooperation with the Asia-Pacific Region* was established. And then, in May 1988, Director of the Research Institute of the World Economy and International Relations – Primakov – was an observer at the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference held in Osaka.

Gorbachev's September 1988 Krasnoïarsk speech alluded to both *détente* in North-East Asia and to activating Far Eastern development. A month later an international conference was held in Vladivostok under the banner *Asia-Pacific Region – Dialogues, Peace and Cooperation*.¹³² A Far Eastern role, emphasising a position vis-à-vis North-East Asia, was being reborn. Growing Soviet interest in Asia was largely due to a shift to economic interests/concerns away from military/strategic/political/ideological matters, as well as changes in Far Eastern (and Siberian) policies, and the phenomenal growth of North-East Asian economies. Gorbachev was aware of the emergence of Japan as a world economic leader, her need for resources, as well as the necessity to reach a political compromise over the bilateral territorial dispute by placing emphasis on trade and economics. This new Soviet policy towards the Far East was geared to developing the region. By promoting the region as a gateway to the east, Gorbachev hoped to once again rekindle the historical role

¹³¹Kanamori, Hisao, "Future Prospect of Economic Relations Between the Far Eastern Region of the Soviet Union and East and South Asian Nations" in ROTOBO's Joint Japan-US Symposium on the Russian Economy, No.10, 1989, pp.11-26.

¹³²The Japan Times, various October 1988 issues.

the Far East had played. Despite this international outlook, the Far East was still not immune from the economic and political shocks that were about to hit the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union did dissolve on December 26, 1991, Far Eastern resources ceased being Soviet in terms of ownership, strategy and geography. Indeed, they had only theoretically been Soviet. In reality they had always been Russian.

2.11 The Far East and Russian-Japanese Relations – Some Historical Conclusions

Apart from her Alaskan and brief Hawai'ian and Californian ventures, Russia did not participate in European colonisation. Instead she colonised territories adjacent to the motherland. By encouraging waves of exploration followed by settlement, Russia consistently established frontiers until she reached the Pacific. The motives for expansion were akin to those that impelled the European powers to colonise – wealth and natural resources. State planning and administrative policies played a decisive role in encouraging or inhibiting Far Eastern international relations. Soviet commentators generally tended to be optimistic about the Far East's future international participation in the region's development in the form of compensation agreements. Considerable attention was accorded to projects enhancing the Far East's international profile – pipelines, the Baikal-Amur Mainline and the construction of Vostochni Port. Soviet writers described these international ties as *helpful* but not *indispensable* to Far Eastern development. The Far East was, and is, portrayed as having significant potential for economic interaction with North-East Asia, as Gorbachev's 1986 Vladivostok and 1988 Krasnoiarsk speeches suggested.

The history of the Far East's political economy has been dynamic and international. In many ways it is akin to that of a state. Though the region has been seen as an important gateway at one end of the spectrum and as an outpost at the other, there has never been any argument about its special status. From being an epicentre of North-East Asian geopolitics, it became the focus of Russia's quest for economic growth. Politically, the region was the focus of the tsarist and Soviet developmental models. The Far East was also represented a buffer zone between European Russia and Japan under the guise of the Far Eastern Republic, as well as a base for the projection of Soviet power within the region. When the

Soviet Union collapsed, a new Russia, keen to find her feet and adjust to a changing international political economy, re-opened the debate over what role a new Far East should play. But this was further complicated by changes at the local, subnational, national, regional and international levels, as well as the region's resources, geography, distance from Moscow and strategic location politicising all aspects of the Far East's interactions and situation.

The Far East was, historically, a crossroads between the major powers of North-East Asia, as well as a lure for wealth by Moscow. Before the Sovietisation of the Far East it was a frontier, a gateway and a buffer between Moscow and North-East Asia. The region was key to Russian-Japanese relations – it was the location of economic cooperation, it was the conference centre for meetings, and it was the focus of political and territorial issues. Today the Far East has shifted attention away from the territorial dispute. Along with other subnational regions, the Far East has changed the entire nature of Russian-Japanese relations. It has diluted the traditional structures of relations in this bilateral framework and it is building cleavages based around the many aspects of international relations. In many ways the Post-Soviet Far East is recreating its pre-Soviet role – one of an actor in a changing international political economy. Russian-Japanese relations are older than most textbooks. Relations existed between regions that now form parts of both states prior to them being parts of their respective states. Russian-Japanese relations will always exist simply based on the geographical proximity of the two states. Indeed, the Japanese have been key in the economic development of the Far East. The Far East was the initial point of contact for Japan with the territories that are part of Russia today. Moreover, the Far East remains key to Japan's interest in Russia, and illustrates the roles regions can play in the international political economy.

The Far East exemplifies – both now and previously – both sides of the debate for communism and capitalism. It has benefited from both and been the victim of both also. However, its resources, geographical location, strategic importance and history mean the region will always be political – both nationally (intra-territorially in the Far East and in

relations with Moscow) and internationally (vis-à-vis North-East Asia). Much like when the imperial centre collapsed and the Far East sought to assert its identity and establish a special status with the new Soviet centre, similarly the post-Soviet Far East tried to achieve a similar status for the region under El'tsin.

During the Cold War political ideology was key in determining economic relations. There existed international blocs with different political and economic systems. To talk of regions was to talk of areas within states not as international actors. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the processes of globalisation, there has been a rise in the interconnectedness of politics and economics as there has, indeed, been a growth in non-state entities as international actors – such as regions. However, the role of the Far East in Russian-Japanese relations demonstrates that regions were international actors long before the onset of the Soviet Union's collapse and globalisation. Indeed, Russia and Japan, traditionally thought to interact based either on politics or economics, managed to interact combining politics and economics in a new subnational political economy.

Having analysed the theoretical and the historical, the third piece of the jigsaw is to introduce the contemporary. Using both primary and secondary resources the focus of the next chapter is to analyse the contemporary nature of the Far East and how that can change and has changed Russia's relations with Japan. The chapter will focus more on how regions have changed as analysis of the changing international political economy has carried out in chapter one. Then, conclusions from the fieldwork undertaken will be introduced to emphasise local change and its impact on Russian-Japanese relations.

Chapter Three:

Regions in the Changing International Political

Economy – The Case of the Far East

3.0 Regions in the Changing International Political Economy – The Case of the Far East

It is in the context of post-communist transition the Far East must be analysed – through part of Russia it is isolated from the heartland; faces West politically, East economically; five million people overshadowed by China's billion plus to the South-West; the world's second economic power (Japan) to the East; and a delicate Korean Peninsula to the West. In the context of such a fragile, strategic, dynamic and changing international political economy advocacy of independence for this wealthy, yet peripheral, region is low priority. Yet the quest for greater autonomy continues. The Far East's natural resources furnished the immense Soviet (previously tsarist) military, a sizeable portion of which were stationed there. The region's natural resources were the engine driving the Soviet development model. Intra-territorial and intra-regional intercourse was limited; formidable politico-ideological barriers inhibited international contact. Today these barriers have largely gone. However of those remaining the greatest has been the decline of the economy – due to military cuts and the massive costs of exploiting or utilising resources. Nonetheless, the Far East is an eminently logical candidate for growing economic interaction with neighbouring states. It is a region susceptible to both the domestic and the international. Indeed, it is a region emerging as an actor in the changing international political economy.

This chapter will reach some conclusions on the changing role of regions in the international political economy, with the view to determining the role of the Far East in Russian-Japanese relations. The changing international political economy has given rise to and been affected by new phenomena – one of which is the rise of regions as actors. The Far East is such a region. It has been key in developing Russian relations with Japan. The region's rise is the consequence of changes domestically and internationally. Having already examined how the international political economy and the Far East have changed, this chapter looks at domestic changes within the Russian state and how they have affected regions. The aim is to better understand how regions, such as the Far East, have been able to play a *significant* role in the international political economy, and in particular with Japan. What factors contribute to the rise of this role? Is this role a new aspect of politics, of international relations, of the domestic framework of the state, of the international political economy? Has the role changed? Is this a model for other or similar regions?

3.1 Introduction

'No country, including those of vast territory and rich resources, can afford to isolate itself from extensive interstate exchanges and develop its economy behind closed doors. ...while fully exploiting its own resources... – it should actively make use of foreign investment and advanced technology abroad to speed up its own economic development'.¹ Robinson's statement, though referring to China, holds true of all resource-rich territories. Russians, like the international political economy, are aware of Far Eastern potential. However unlike parallel American and European lands, the region remains backward and unable to fully exploit its immense wealth.² Evidence shows foreign investment remains at the edge or on the shelf; inland investment is perceived as risky; foreign investment tends to be in projects with direct access to infrastructure or, as in oil and gas, is located offshore. Being peripheral, and a well endowed resource frontier, it is both a gateway and borderland, the Far East is deeply involved with bordering states – Japan, China, South Korea, Canada and the US. Japan, China and South Korea are the largest trading partners but in foreign investment no state dominates. Japanese, South Korean and US investors eye timber. Mining has US and Canadian capital. Japanese, US and European consortia are involved in oil and gas; fishing is the most internationalised industry. Moscow's influence is substantial. Understanding the Far East means understanding its relationship with Moscow.³

The Soviet Union's collapse and subsequent liberalisation of the Far East rekindled hopes of prosperity with an international flavour. However the Far East faces numerous obstacles – domestically, regionally and internationally. In spite of her huge expanse, difficulties in settlement and resource extraction are key obstacles. Soviet industrial planning forced the Far East to send much of her wealth to European Russia for processing while she relied on imports. Communist Moscow's focus on the Far East was based around resource extraction and security. Today her relationship with the region is, to say the least, uncertain. The latter's location suggests a future

¹Robinson, Richard D. (Ed.), Foreign Capital and Technology in China, Praeger Publishers, London, UK, 1987, p.xiii.

²See Bothe, Michael, Kuzidem, Thomas, and Schmidt, Christian (Eds.), Amazonia and Siberia – Legal Aspects of the Preservation of the Environment and Development in the Last Open Spaces, International Environmental Law and Policy Series, Graham and Trotman Limited, London, UK, 1993.

³RFE Update, October 1997, p.1.

orientated towards North-East Asia. However transition problems and dependency upon Moscow mean the Far East is unable to integrate into either the Russian or international economies. Each of the Far East's ten territories has different relations with Moscow as well as different levels of economic development, industrial production, infrastructure, natural resources and political problems, all of which are affected by territorial assignation.⁴

Following Gorbachev's policy gestures, El'tsin pushed for Russia to become an Asia/Pacific power. Part of this process involved redirecting the Far East's role. However, at the same time came de-industrialisation; in the Far East this was associated with the collapse of defence-related production and resource production restructuring.⁵ Further, the loss of *traditional markets* produced a desire to increase processing levels in key resource industries. These initiatives occurred regionally, not nationally, as regionally orientated market mechanisms replaced the centralised system. Moreover, inter-territorial competition has prevented unified Far Eastern economic policy. New regional development strategies prioritise processing capacity in forestry, minerals, fishing, transport, arms conversion, tourism, food-processing and socio-industrial infrastructure. Local or regional authorities and businessmen have established agencies promoting trade and investment.⁶ However obstacles remain, including high levels of disclosure required by local government, legal difficulties and issues in the anti-resource thesis. Inadvertently, when the Soviet Union was trying to deal with these issues, Russia's second revolution came and redefined the concept of region.

3.2 The Concept of Region

The geographically informed are aware of and understand regions are created to interpret complexity.⁷ According to *Geography for Life – National Geography*

⁴Minakir, Pavel A., and Freeze, Gregory L. (Ed.), The Russian Far East – An Economic Survey, Second Edition, Revised and Supplemented, Russian Academy of Sciences Far Eastern Branch Economic Research Institute, with the sponsorship of The Sasakawa Peace Foundation, RIOTIP, Khabarovsk, Russia, 1996, p.185.

⁵Bradshaw, Michael J., and Lynn, Nicholas J., The Russian Far East – Russia's Wild East, Post-Soviet Business Forum (PSBF), Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA), Chatham House, London, UK, 1997, p.2.

⁶Pravda, October 23, 2001.

⁷Stoddard, Robert H., "The World as a Multilevel Mosaic – Understanding Regions" in Social Studies, Vol.88, No.4, 1997, p.167.

Standards 1994 understanding and appreciating geography inevitably confronts the concept of regions. Yet regions are also socio-economic, political, strategic, cultural and administrative. ‘A region has certain characteristics that give it... cohesiveness and distinctiveness that... set it apart from other regions. As worlds within worlds, regions can be used to simplify... [based] on the... presence or absence of selected... characteristics. As a result, regions are human constructs whose boundaries and characteristics... derive from sets of specific criteria. They vary in scale from local to global; overlap; are mutually exclusive; exhaustively partition; ...or capture... selected portions...’⁸

It is within the context of regions that humans organise themselves spatially, though the basis may be geographic, social, religious, economic or other. An administrative region may not always be the most suitable entity for examining trends, issues or ideas; but it is convenient, in a scholarly science, for gathering data and for organising information. Regions of the international political economy that form states contrast with those used scholastically (the Mediterranean) or those used in common communication (the Middle East); these regions typically have imprecise boundaries and do not carry regulatory importance. Indeed, most political regions are also expressed as areas with well-defined boundaries and are associated with specific jurisdictional control. In the Far East’s case she is an administrative region defining a unique socio-economic, geopolitical and historic area. Others use the Far East to distinguish the direction of policy and strategy. How political regions effect varies with levels of government. Locally, taxes and public services can differ. Division of the international political economy into regions, each defining a state’s territory, has tremendous effects. However this was not always the case. Prior to the modern state, humans identified with groups on the basis of kinship or other non-territorial relationships. Today humans are citizens of states subject to rights and obligations. Russia is one such state – a state with eighty-nine separate regions. Moreover, there are divisions amongst those regions.

⁸Geographic Educational Standards Project, Geography for Life – National Geography Standards 1994, Geographic Educational Standards Project 1994, US, 1994, pp.70-71.

In 1996 Hanson economically classified the diversity that is Russia's regions. Though his classification was simple (see Figure 3.1), he confirmed that more than one classification might be relevant to each region. Moreover, in spite of being economic classifications, they highlight how regions can politicise their position. For example, of the five types of region identified, three were applicable to the Far East. Moreover, within the Far East individual regions had different roles, while the area as a whole had several roles – resource, gateway and ordinary. In 2000, based on the identification and classification of regional strategies, Bradshaw and Treyvish identified six types of regions (see Figure 3.2). Using Bradshaw and Treyvish's typology four roles can be identified for the Far East – urbanised, gateway model, searching for federal support and separatist. But these roles are politically biased and do not consider the economic. Similarly, Lysenko and Matveev classified regions on the basis of economic interests and market orientations (see Figure 3.3). Nonetheless, these three typologies are a starting point for developing and interpreting the Far East – its role, image and position. Though these models are broad, vague and simplistic, they do highlight the fact that the Far East cannot and does not fit into any box. To use the three models, a region can, for example, be a resource region *and* a gateway region (Hanson). Primor'e is a prime example. Indeed, there are also regions that are international liberal *and* separatist (Bradshaw and Treyvish). Sakha is the perfect example. And, regions can also be mining-export regions interested in liberal and open policy and relative independence *and* border regions in favourable positions interested in most liberal trade policy and an offshore model of development (Lysenko and Matveev). Amur is such an example.

A further point that can be made is that all models talk of regions and not territories. Is not the Far East a region and Primorie a territory in that region? Each of these models looks at the local (territories) and not the subnational (administrative regions). This is important because it realises local differences (for example, say Primor'e and Sakhalin in the Far East). However, it maybe less useful when attempting to classify subnational regions (such as the Far East, Eastern Siberia and Western Siberia). What is certain is that the Far East is an area (composed of ten regions) with many roles. Yet, for the purposes of this study the Far East will be considered a region comprising of ten territories. The region has no one role. Indeed, as history has shown, it has had many roles and often simultaneously. However, what is central to this chapter is the

region's role in Russian-Japanese relations. Furthermore, as has been seen from history and will be seen from analysis here, those different roles are key to the Far East's role in Russian-Japanese relations. Later in this chapter the conclusions from the fieldwork will also provide perspectives on different roles of the Far East as a region.

Figure 3.1: Hanson's Typology of Russian Regions

Region Type	Description
Rural	Where at least 45% of population is rural; 11 regions in the south accounting for 10.9% of population
Resource	Regions where fuel-energy, non-ferrous metal and timber industries account for at least 50% of 1993's industrial output; 8 regions – Karelia, Komi, Leningrad Oblast', Tumen, Krasnairsk, Sakha, Magadan – collectively 17.8% of population
Gateway	Regions that had major ports and/or foreign currency exchanges in 1994, with a total population of 30.2%; 13 regions – most important (in descending order of 1994 foreign exchange market turnover) are Moscow, St. Petersburg, Sverdlovsk, Novosibirsk, Primorie and Samara. Nizhny Novogorod, the region with the most conspicuous reform profile, ranks 10 th on this list
Hi-Tech	Regions with numerous factories and research institutes in the radio, electronics, communications and aerospace sectors; 10 regions – Moscow City, St. Petersburg, Moscow Oblast', Nizhni Novogorod, Novogorod, Samara, Voronezh, Sverdlovsk, Novosibirsk and Kaluga, containing 26.3% of population
Ordinary	The rest, comprising 36% of the Russian population

Source: Hanson, Philip, "Russia's 89 Federal Subjects" in *Post-Soviet Prospects*, Vol.4, No.8, August 1996, pp.1.

Notes: Hanson added these categories are not mutually exclusive. One rural region, Krasnodar, is also a gateway region. Several gateway regions are also in the hi-tech category.

Figure 3.2: Bradshaw and Treyvish's Typology of Russian Regions

Political Region Type	Description
Conservative-Communist	Basically agrarian
National-Liberal	Urbanised
International Liberal	Gateway model
Lobbyist	Searching for federal support
Separatist	Strong republics bargaining with Moscow
Paternalistic-Clientalistic	Moscow-biased

Source: Bradshaw, Michael, and Treyvish, Andrey, "Russia's Regions in the *Triple Transition*" in Hanson, Philip, and Bradshaw, Michael (Eds.), *Regional Economic Change in Russia*, Economies and Societies in Transition, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2000, p.39.

Figure 3.3: Lysenko and Matveev's Typology of Russian Regions

No.	Description
1	Mining-exporting regions interested in liberal and open policy and relative independence
2	Manufacturers interested in a large and unified national market and state protectionism, but protesting against anti-inflationary policies
3	Self-sufficient agro-industrial regions interested in internal development and often isolationist
4	Republics whose elites the ethnic card and enjoy exclusive economic regimes
5	Border regions in favourable positions interested in most liberal trade policy and an offshore model of development

Source: Lysenko, V.N., and Podoprighora, Matveev (Eds.), *Ekonomicheskie Reformy v Regionakh Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, Institut Sovremennoi Politiki, Moscow, Russia, 1999, p.99.

3.3 The History of Regions in the International Political Economy

The history of regions in the international political economy has its origins in centralisation. Centralisation in Western Europe can be traced to the development of European states, which displaced and defeated autonomous cities, feudal principalities, Roman Catholic Church claims and the confederal impotence of the Holy Roman Empire. State formation from Western Europe accelerated from the sixteenth century. In 1500, there were five hundred (semi-)independent political units in Western and Central Europe. By 1900, there were only twenty-five.⁹ State formation in Western Europe was stimulated by factors contributing to centralisation through expansion. Expansion was achieved through military conquest at the expense of feudal principalities bordering the state building centralising core. To maintain military strength, it was necessary for centralising monarchs to raise and supply large standing armies.¹⁰ Certain socio-economic factors had to be present for military expansion and centralisation to be feasible. By the sixteenth century, a growing merchant class in Western Europe, inhabiting a network of prosperous urban commercial centres, ensured financial resources would be available for extraction.¹¹

During the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, numerous self-governing political communities chose to unite to form federal systems. These systems were often described as alternatives to centralised unitary systems. Yet their formation represented a centralising tendency as opposed to the separate existence each member states or provinces previously enjoyed. A sizable body of literature has formed around federalism. Numerous authors raise questions over what factors are responsible for establishing federations. In many instances, factors cited are similar to those contributing to centralisation. For example, one factor frequently mentioned is

⁹Tilly, Charles, "Reflections on the History of European State-Making" in Tetlock, Philip E., Husbands, Jo L., Jervis, Robert, Stern, Paul C., and Tilly, Charles, Behaviour, Society and International Conflict, Vol.3, Oxford University Press, for the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, New York, US, 1993, p. 15.

¹⁰Badie, Bertrand, and Birnbaum, Pierre, The Sociology of the State, Translated by Arthur Goldhammer, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, US, 1983; and Tilly, Charles, "Sinews of War" in Torsvik, Per (Ed.), Mobilisation Centre-Periphery Structures and Nation-Building, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, Norway, 1981.

¹¹Friedrich, Carl J., Limited Government – A Comparison, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, US, 1963, pp. 549-550.

the desire to attain protection or greater military security.¹² Another attributed cause is the existence of an interdependent economy, with convenient transportation and communication networks linking prospective federation members. This type of interdependence suggests certain economic advantages probably result from the establishment of a federal union.

In the twentieth century, growing complexity and increasingly acute problems confronting industrial and post-industrial governments, and newly aroused appetites of former colonies, combined to generate additional pressures for expanding centralisation. With the welfare state's emergence, there has been a rise in expectations regarding services governments are supposed to provide.¹³ This growing clamour for governmental assistance placed public authorities under financial stress and imposed weighty burdens on local and regional governments – burdens rendering them increasingly dependent on central government aid in the form of grants and direct expenditures. As possessor of superior fiscal resources, particularly more broadly based powers of taxation, central government was bound to become a primary dispenser of services and carve out positions of apparent superiority of intergovernmental relations. The cost of defraying expenses of two world wars has even compelled central federal governments to expand their tax base and amplify their taxing powers at the expense of regional and local authorities.¹⁴

As is readily discernible, a formidable combination of socio-historical factors favoured expanding central government powers over the periphery. These factors included centralising effects of burgeoning bureaucracies; fiscal impositions that military conquests of absolute monarchs brought; support monarchs obtained from

¹²Birch, Anthony H., "Approaches to the Study of Federalism" in Political Studies, No.14, February 1966, pp.15-33; Dikshit, Ramesh Dutta, The Political Geography of Federalism – An Inquiry into Origins and Stability, Wiley, New York, US, 1975; Riker, William H., "Federalism" in Greenstein, Fred I., and Polsby, Nelson W. (Eds.), Handbook of Political Science, Vol.5 – Governmental Institutions and Processes, Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts, US, 1975, Chapter 2; Sawyer, Geoffrey, Modern Federalism, Watts, London, UK, 1969; and Wheare, Kenneth C., Federal Government, Fourth Edition, Oxford University Press, New York, US, 1964.

¹³Friedrich, Carl J., Limited Government – A Comparison, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, US, 1974, pp.62-63; and La Palombara, Joseph, "Penetration – A Crisis of Governmental Capacity" in Binder, Leonard, Crises and Sequences in Political Development, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, US, 1971, pp.222-23.

¹⁴Livingston, William S., "Canada, Australia, and the United States – Variations on a Theme" in Earle, Valerie (Ed.), Federalism – Infinite Variety in Theory and Practice, Peacock, Illinois, US, 1968, pp.125-139.

wealthy and powerful merchant classes; impacts of democratic and industrial revolutions; advent of the welfare state; and purposeful, self-generated initiatives of central government seeking to extend their domains. Central government historically succeeded in centralisation due to its relative power, its need to hold onto power and its tools for exhibiting power, vis-à-vis regions. This is illustrated in the history of the Far East's international political economy, and especially relevant where the centre is worried about foreign influence on regions.

3.4 Decentralisation and Power

To understand politics, the distribution of power needs consideration. This means grasping the dynamics of political processes and to understand how power is exercised, in what ways and to what degree it is restrained. The positions adopted by various actors in the domestic and international political economies in regard to such questions provide insight into material interests involved in key controversies in political philosophy. Also, normative aspects of power cannot be overlooked. It is impossible to meaningfully speculate about the nature of good society and the political system without considering the values at stake when power is wielded. What methods of distributing and checking power are most likely to advance certain values while neglecting or threatening others? Where power is concerned, hard choices amongst competing values are often inescapable. The study of political power tends to confine itself to the national level, to relationships amongst various functional agencies of national government, and between agencies, parties and interest groups attempting to influence their decisions.

Except for the flourishing literature on federalism, little attention has been paid to central government and local or regional authority interactions. Yet this territorial division of power has always constituted an important problem. It has spawned continuing debate over respective virtues of centralisation and decentralisation. This debate has intensified recently in modern industrial democracies; doubts about efficacies of central power and decision-making have become increasingly audible. Moreover, the issue has taken on strong normative overtones. The centralisation-decentralisation controversy is more than a disagreement over questions of efficiency and administration; it involves conflicts amongst fundamental values as well. One form of decentralisation is federalism, where the constitution divides power between

national and regional government; authority retains some exclusive powers. Another is from regional devolution where national power is paramount over regional powers; central government agents intervene directly to block regional legislation. Regional devolution is a response by numerous unitary states, such as Italy, Spain, and to a lesser degree, France and Russia. It is a system possessing unitary and federal features.

What seems to emerge from this array of pleas for greater participation through decentralisation is a certain underlying normative consensus. Federalism and other forms of decentralisation result in greater freedom for those being governed and also, by expanding participation, promote socio-political unity.¹⁵ Another normative consideration raised by advocates of decentralisation is the need to restrain abuses of power by central government. Thomas Jefferson regarded local self-government as an essential bulwark against corruption and tyranny.¹⁶ Others have elaborated this thesis, pointing to the desirability of providing minorities with local and regional power bases as a means of establishing a countervailing force at the subnational level to check central encroachments on human liberty.

3.5 Transition – Systematic Transformation and Regional Change

Tocqueville stated revolutions do not occur when regimes are most repressive but when they are self-adjusting. He stated in striving to reform, regimes give way to opponents and subsequently weaken their power base.¹⁷ Gorbachev's reforms confirm Tocqueville's philosophy. Aware of Soviet stagnation, Gorbachev implemented socio-politico-economic reforms. In doing so, he sympathised with liberals and democrats, eroding the powers of his office and governing institutions across the entire former

¹⁵Teune, Henry, "The Future of Federalism – Federalism and Political Integration" in Earle, Valerie (Ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 220-33.

¹⁶Huntington, Samuel P., "The Founding Fathers and the Division of Powers" in Maass, Arthur (Ed.), *Area and Power*, Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, US, 1959, pp. 173-179; and Tarlton, Charles D., "Symmetry and Asymmetry as Elements of Federalism – A Theoretical Speculation" in *Journal of Politics*, No.27, November 1965, pp. 864-65.

¹⁷Tocqueville, Alexis Comte de, *The Phenomenon of Revolution*, Dodd, Mead, New York, US, 1974.

communist bloc.¹⁸ Gorbachev's reforms had specific regional policies that put emphasis on certain Russian regions, such as the Far East. Gorbachev highlighted the Far East in his 1986 Vladivostok and 1988 Krasnoyarsk speeches, but his step-by-step reforms were derailed by changes that destroyed the Soviet Union. Central planning's deep inefficiencies became evident.

The Soviet Union's collapse was greeted with boundless optimism, but hope was less sincere than history. Communism's legacy was too substantial to break overnight. Eastern and Central Europe and the Baltics have been more successful than the rest of the former communist bloc; Russia – centre of the former tsarist and Soviet empires – has been less successful. Eastern and Central European and Baltic success has been driven, partly, by a sense of belonging to a particular geography (for example, the EU) as Duchesne and Frogner stated. And, partly because of proximity to the EU as Van Brabant and Pinder have argued. For Russia neither of these theories holds true – the largest state in the world, covering one-seventh of the earth's land surface, stretching ten time zones, and belonging to Europe and Asia. She dominates Eurasia; while being phenomenally wealthy in resources she has been unable to establish effective national political mechanisms to fully exploit her wealth. Instead political energies have been focused elsewhere. Faced with the loss of superpower status and empire, Russia is trying to re-determine her international role. Simultaneously, however, globalising energies have resulted in domestic fragmentation, creating additional pressures giving rise to subnational actors and local politics. These local energies are trying to establish frameworks that can establish political mechanisms better able to cope with the plight of regions and associated issues – ethnicity, autonomy, policy, international relations or resource exploitation.

Communism's dissolution resulted in the loss of state control, faith in government and legitimacy. Furthermore, because relative levels of centralisation and decentralisation have important effects on state control, the scope and effectiveness of central and

¹⁸Kochan, Lionel, The Making of Modern Russia – From Kiev Rus' to the Collapse of the Soviet Union, Penguin Books, London, UK, 1987, pp.32-47; Matlock, Jr., Jack F., Autopsy on an Empire – The American Ambassador's Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union, Random House, New York, First Edition, 1995, pp.2-9; Strayer, Robert, Why Did the Soviet Union Collapse? – Understanding Historical Change, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York, US, 1998, pp.11-13; and Grachev, A.S., Final Days – The Inside of the Collapse of the Soviet Union, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, US, 1995, pp.37-41.

regional control are important considerations. Secondly, socio-politico-economic sovereignty could no longer be ignored. Is Moscow still responsible for protecting ethnic communities and managing transition? Finally, Russia's regions are forging links internationally; they were new actors in the domestic political framework and the international political economy.

Initially, in March 1991, El'tsin's reaction to regionalism in Russia was: '...autonomous formations [of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic] can take as much sovereignty as they can administer... But they will independently have to answer... for the well being of their people. We make only one condition: they will not let anyone pull Russia down'.¹⁹ However, El'tsin's early support of regional sovereignty, short of independence and secession, cannot be understood outside his battle for authority. Acceding to these regional demands reduced Gorbachev's authority and bolstered regional support for El'tsin. After the Soviet Union collapsed and El'tsin became president he was no longer so tolerant of regionalism; it came at a high price – a loss of his authority. By August 1993 El'tsin was declaring: '...the Russian Federation is not a piece of Swiss Cheese...'.²⁰ Ironically, El'tsin's strategy for dealing with mounting centre-periphery tensions was similar to Gorbachev's. But El'tsin's efforts to establish a Russian Federal Treaty were more successful than Gorbachev's for a Soviet Treaty.

Differing initial conditions and economic policies waged by regional authorities increased disparities between socio-economic development and political cooperation of various federal units. For its part, the federal government supports regions through federal transfers and the Federal Fund for Support of the Regions.²¹ Clearly, Russia's centre-periphery crisis is not reducible to demands for *self-determination* or ethnic political independence. This is not to deny *the ethnic factor* is important in some cases (for example, North Caucasus, Tartarstan, Bashkortostan, Tuva and, off course, Chechniia). In most instances, however, challenges to the centre and decentralisation are driven not by ethnic consciousness but by specific politico-economic interests. For

¹⁹Checkel, Jeffrey T., Institutional Dynamics in Collapsing Empires – Domestic Structural Change in the USSR, Post-Soviet Russia and Independent Ukraine, ARENA Working Papers, Working Paper 99/2, ARENA, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway, p.11.

²⁰The New York Times, August 14, 1993.

²¹This body was established to direct funds from Moscow to the regions on the basis of need.

those advocating a less centralised Russia, federalism means divided or dual sovereignty; sovereignty shared by regions and the centre. For those advocating a more centralised Russia, sovereignty cannot be divided.

3.6 Centre-Periphery Relations – Moscow and the Far East

There are a myriad of definitions of federalism, all emphasising shared, joint or equal authority between central and regional authorities. Elazar defined federalism as a ‘combination of self-rule and shared rule’.²² Friedrich said federalism was a ‘process by which a number of separate political communities enter into arrangements for concluding solutions, adopting joint policies, and making joint decisions by which a unitary political community becomes differentiated into a federally organised whole’.²³ Davis described federalism as an ‘intricate and varied network of interrelated ideas and concepts of contract, of partnership, of equity, of trust, of sovereignty, of constitution, of state, of international law’.²⁴ These definitions suggest that beyond the balance between central and regional authority, federalism involves government structure and process; federalism is directed to achieving and maintaining unity and diversity; federalism is socio-political; federalism concerns means and ends; federalism is pursued for limited and comprehensive means.²⁵

Related to federalism is sovereignty which also has numerous definitions. Perhaps the most popular is Hinsley’s. Sovereignty means ‘final and absolute authority in the political community...and no final and absolute authority exists elsewhere...’.²⁶ Thompson argued ‘...with sovereignty, states do not simply have the ultimate authority over things political; they have the authority to relegate activities, issues and practices to the economic, social, cultural and scientific realms of authority or to the

²²Elazar, Daniel J., Exploring Federalism, University of Alabama Press, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, US, 1987, p.5.

²³Friedrich, Carl J., Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, US, 1968, p.7.

²⁴Davis, Rufus S., The Federal Principle – A Journey Through Time in Quest of a Meaning, University of California Press, Berkeley, California, US, 1978, p.5.

²⁵Elazar, Daniel J., The Ends of Federalism – Notes Toward a Theory of Federal Political Arrangements, Working Paper No.12, Centre for the Study of Federalism, Temple University, Philadelphia, US, 1976, p.2.

²⁶Hinsley, F.H., Sovereignty, Second Edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1988, p.26.

states' own realm – the political'.²⁷ Krasner noted, '...assertion of final authority within a given territory is the core element in any definition of sovereignty'.²⁸ Comparing meanings of federalism and sovereignty suggests the two concepts are intimately connected, if not contradictory. Federalism is about shared, equal, or joint authority. Sovereignty is about final and absolute authority. However, if sovereignty represents absolute authority, can there be shared rule and joint policies between central and regional governments? What is sovereign – central or regional government? Federalism implies sovereignty, while sovereignty suggests it cannot be divided because there can only be supreme authority. This contradiction led Elazar to conclude that the '...federal principle represents an alternative to (and a radical attack upon) the modern idea of sovereignty...'.²⁹

These issues are particularly important in culturally plural transitional Russia. In the context of federalism, is the centre or are the regions primarily responsible for protecting ethnic communities and managing marketisation? Russian regions have been active in the international political economy, signing treaties with foreign companies and states. Whether regions have the authority to conduct foreign policy is important to the type of federalism Russia is constructing. However Russia is a post-Soviet state and Soviet notions of federalism and sovereignty differ to Western ideas. Soviet conceptions of federalism and sovereignty are unique for several reasons – class permeating sovereignty; federalism and sovereignty are tightly linked; greater discrepancy between theory and practice of federalism, or to use Elazar's terminology, between structure and process; an explicit theoretical right to secede; and federalism based on ethno-territory. Jones described Soviet concepts of sovereignty as having internal and external aspects. The internal refers to supremacy within a territory and the external to independence in the international political economy.³⁰ The relationship between federalism and sovereignty is complex. Western concepts of sovereignty disagree as to whether it can be shared between the centre and regions. Soviet concepts

²⁷Thomson, Janice E., Sovereignty in International Relations – Is Empirical Research Possible?, Working Paper, Political Science Department, University of Wisconsin, Wisconsin, US, 1992, p.5.

²⁸Krasner, Stephen D., "Sovereignty – An International Perspective" in Comparative Political Studies, Vol.21, No.1, 1988, p.86.

²⁹Elazar, Daniel J., The Ends of Federalism – Notes Toward a Theory of Federal Political Arrangements, op. cit.

³⁰Jones, Robert A., The Soviet Doctrine of "Limited Sovereignty" from Lenin to Gorbachev – The Brezhnev Doctrine, St. Martin's Press, New York, US, 1990, p.20.

of sovereignty and federalism are contradictory, though in practice both subordinate to the party. So how did Soviet concepts of sovereignty and federalism negotiate post-Soviet Russia? It linked Western and Soviet concepts.

Declarations of sovereignty by Soviet republics obscured those by Russian regions. However regions were no less aggressive than union republics. By the time the last union republic – Kyrgyzstan – declared sovereignty in October 1990, of Russia's territories, ten autonomous republics, two autonomous oblasts and four autonomous okrugs had declared sovereignty. Even more notable was the fact all declarations occurred over two months. Sovereignty declarations continued apace throughout 1991, until virtually every (ethno-)territory Russian unit declared sovereignty. There were many differences amongst sovereignty declaring regions. Due to discrepancies between Soviet theory and practice, with respect to territorial status, regions felt a need to formalise and expand their authority. An example of expanding sovereignty has been the precedence of regional over Soviet/Russian laws, an example exemplified by the Far East.

The Far East exemplifies issues central to the plight of other regions while being unique. Historically, resources and geographical proximity to North-East Asia have determined for the Far East the roles of gateway, frontier and power projection. During the Soviet era the Far East was a fuel line for the economy projecting politico-military power at the edge of North-East Asia. Problems highlighted in the anti-resource thesis were all, to some extent albeit for a limited time, overcome through Soviet capital investment. The region had numerous territorial-industrial complexes, based around its resources, that the state supported through federal transfers, as well as labour and settlement programmes.

Since the Soviet Union's collapse the Far East has been thrown into a state of chaos. The lifelines that fed the Far East disappeared overnight. The vast territorial-industrial complexes were no longer guaranteed state subsidies. The markets of the communist bloc disappeared. The introduction of economic reform and accompanying political confusion brought recession. Transformation of military-related production failed. Local, subnational, national, regional and international energies emerged, pulling the region in different directions. Each had their agenda. Though the Far East's geography

politicised the region, Moscow had always been the trigger puller. The Soviet Union's collapse, the processes of globalisation, the Cold War's end and transition all meant the Far East was once again politicised – domestically *and* internationally. Not only was the region's distance from Moscow determining relations with the centre, it was also determining relations with North-East Asia. Resources and ethnic minorities became central to moulding Far Eastern relations with Moscow. Soviet technology and settlement and labour incentives became outdated. Territorial assignments became an issue within the Far East and in building domestic and international relations.

Easton's definition of decisions being *outputs* of the political system by which values are authoritatively allocated within society is apparent.³¹ However, these outputs are no longer the preserve of political centres. Socio-politico-economic needs have led subnational actors to place values on their requirements. These requirements determine outputs of the subnational political system that, in many cases, differ to those nationally. Experience and tradition have collectively, along with basic values and norms, created a set of relatively inflexible principles that, at least in part, originated as a means to achieve certain objectives. And while the domestic arena and international political economy may have changed, these principles take on a life of their own and tend to persist even after they have ceased to serve.

Due to the nature of Russia's central politics, regional and local politics remain unstable. The local *duma* has significant powers, but these are answerable to the governor. The separation of powers, stated in Russia's constitution, have never been detailed in supplementary legislation. Constitutional statute No.71 details areas where federal authorities have oversight and competence (constitutional amendments, federal organisation, human rights and the federal budget). Statute No.72 lists areas where joint competence is expected – for instance, natural resource utilisation, federal and non-federal property delineation, environmental protection, tax policy, the judiciary and foreign economic relations. However, just how this joint competence manifests itself is determined by legislation remaining to be drafted or passed. Without specific laws, matters are left ambiguous. In sum, local *duma* powers and functions depend on constitutionally allocated authority, which is sketchy on such matters. A more

³¹Easton, David, The Political System, Knopf, New York, US, 1959.

important local issue is the *duma's* role in selecting a governor. Without a clear mandate over whether the local *duma* is able to cast a no confidence vote in the governor and call new elections, local *dumas* remain weak.

Though politically and economically apart from the centre, the Far East does participate in Russian politics through national legal and administrative structures. Russia has two chambers in its national legislative body (the Federal Assembly) – the Federal Duma (lower chamber) and the Federation Council (upper chamber). In December 1996, Russia elected deputies to the federal *duma* – eighteen are Far Eastern (4% of seats). The *duma* has 450 seats in two sections – those determined by political parties and those by political districts (defined geographically with proportional representation). Far Easterners occupy five of the 225 federal *duma* seats allocated to political parties or blocks. The other 225 federal *duma* seats are assigned primarily on a proportional basis, based on population. All voting regions, including autonomous oblast's and okrugs, have a minimum of one seat. The Far East has thirteen single-seat constituencies (5% of the total)³² – Primor'e has three seats, Khabarovsk two and the remaining territories one each. These seats are occupied by *odnomandatniki* (single-seat deputies). Each territory also has two seats on the Federation Council – one to the governor and one to the chairperson of the territorial *duma*. In principle this could represent a significant bloc in the *duma* but party or faction loyalties and differences have destroyed ideas of a coherent regional grouping. Moreover, exploiting regional wealth in the form of resources has been negligible.

3.7 Resource Politics and Regions – The Case of the Far East

Many of the post-Soviet Far East's economic problems are the direct result of the region's role during the Soviet era. The centrally planned economy gave the Far East the role of resource periphery. The region had a highly specialised economic structure emphasising resource extraction, utilisation and development that fed the Soviet economy. The Far East's geostrategy was further aggravated by Moscow's policy of development at any cost. The massive costs of infrastructure construction, labour incentives, settlement development and capital investment were incurred by Moscow, overcoming socio-economic, socio-political and environmental issues as highlighted

³²Corresponding to its share of the national population.

in the anti-resource thesis, all of which built a regional export-led economy. By the time the Soviet Union collapsed the region had become a neglected colony; a dependent periphery with incomparable potential, immense wealth and intense geopolitics struggling to define its role.

The literature of economics, geography and development studies highlights the problems faced by developing states wealthy in natural resources. The 'greatest advocate of resource-curse thesis'³³ was Auty who argued inefficiencies are bred by rent extraction and their wasteful reapplication by natural resource price volatility in the international political economy and by Dutch disease effect (shrinking agriculture and underdevelopment of manufacturing in natural resource economies).³⁴ Simultaneously, several analyses of post-Soviet economic collapse have highlighted the role played by resource industries. Gaddy and Ickes argued the key problem in the Russian economy is that it remains driven by resources.³⁵ Economic wealth, growth, trade and progress continue to be driven by resource extraction, utilisation and associated export industries (including energy). Large resource enterprises like Gazprom and LukOil remain central to the national economy. The resource-curse has numerous implications for understanding Far Eastern economic development. Consensus amongst policymakers, politicians, scholars and think-tanks claim regional natural resources could fuel tremendous growth, especially in view of the complementary nature of the Far East and North-East Asia (especially Japan); a natural-fit that history and economics both confirm.

³³Lynn, Nicholas J., "Resource-Based Development – What Chance for the Russian Far East?" in Bradshaw, Michael J. (Ed.), The Russian Far East and Pacific Asia – Unfulfilled Potential, Curzon Press, Richmond, Surrey, UK, 2001, p.10. His notion of resource-curse thesis was similar to the anti-resource thesis.

³⁴Auty, R.M., "Multinational Resource Corporations, Nationalisation and Diminished Viability – Caribbean Plantations, Mines and Oilfields in the Seventies" in Dixon, C., Drakakis-Smith, D., and Watts, H.D., Multinational Corporations and the Third World, Croom Helm, London, UK, 1985, pp.160-187; Auty, R.M., Resources Based Industrialisation – Sowing in the Oil in Eight Developing Countries, Clarendon, Oxford, UK, 1990; Auty, R.M., Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies – The Resource-Curse Thesis, Routledge, London, UK, 1993; Gelb, A.H., Oil Windfalls – Blessing or Curse?, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 1988; Roemer, M., "Dutch Disease in Developing Countries – Swallowing the Bitter Medicine" in Lundahl, M. (Ed.), The Primary Sector in Economic Development, Croom Helm, London, UK, 1995, pp.234-252; and Wheeler, D., "Sources of Stagnation in Sub-Saharan Africa" in World Development, No.12, 1983, pp.1-23.

³⁵Gaddy, C.G., and Ickes, B.W., "Russia's Virtual Economy" in Foreign Affairs, Vol.77, 1988, pp.53-67.

Covering 36% of Russia, the Far East, though the world's largest untapped resource base, is only responsible for a mere 6% of national industrial output.³⁶ Economically, it is extraction based. Politically, it is an arena of ten regional players forming no single political entity. Legally it does not have an administrative status. Administratively, its origins are in Gosplan. These regions were used for strategic long-term planning. Nonetheless, these regions have come to take on their own identity. Politicians, planners and population recognise these regions and the fact they serve as focus for the development of inter-regional economic associations. In spite of the creation of the Association of Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal Territories, an interregional association, little progress has been made in unifying autonomy and policy due to infighting and competition. Moscow has held onto power through a policy of *divide and rule*.³⁷

Despite economic turbulence of the early 1990s, Far Eastern mineral and mining industries have not suffered to the extent other industries have.³⁸ Minerals have been successfully exported and have attracted foreign investment.³⁹ Khabarovsk's Governor Ishaev proclaimed his belief the Far Eastern military-industrial complex would progress to profit-making production.⁴⁰ Prior to 1991, Moscow prioritised military production for the Far East. During 1988-1990, defence enterprise re-tooling was endorsed and the 1991-1995 Defence Industry Conversion Programme adopted.⁴¹ However, the programme was unrealistic and conversion became chaotic – limited federal funding was distributed amongst excessive enterprises, while restructuring was delayed and military production declined. The 1995-1997 Federal Defence Conversion Programme aimed at reducing company and plant numbers entitled to competitively

³⁶Miller, Elisa (Ed.), The Russian Far East – A Business Reference Guide, 1997-1998, Third Edition, Russian Far East Update Publications, Seattle, Washington, US, 1997, p.121.

³⁷Hughes, J., "Regionalism in Russia – The Rise and Fall of the Siberian Agreement" in Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.46, No.7, pp.1133-61.

³⁸Topливо-Energeticheskii Balans po Kraiam, Oblastiam DVER Otchety za 1990 god, Moscow, Russia, 1992.

³⁹This has been facilitated by presidential decrees, tax incentives and so on, suggesting federal authorities are aware of potential exports and hard currency earnings the Far East can bring to Russia.

⁴⁰Itar-Tass, October 14, 1997.

⁴¹The main goal was to increase non-military production. In 1992 a defence industry conversion law was adopted, followed by governmental decrees and orders. The 1993-1995 Federal Programme was to manage defence diversification and restructuring. Both programmes (1991-1995 and 1993-1995) assumed new defence orders, sustained employment and investment for restructuring, though limited, would be available. The plans suggested defence conversion would not negatively affect enterprise potential to produce military goods, as research and development would be maintained.

participate in defence contracts, emphasising non-military goods.⁴² This has been key in politicising the state of the Far East's economy to Moscow. The Far East and Trans-Baikal Association for Economic Cooperation attempted to forge trade development and economic links with North-East Asia. A string of committees, commissions and working groups was being established within the association framework to facilitate strengthening ties between Russian regions and North-East Asia.⁴³ In June 1995 Chernomyrdin established a programme to develop the Far Eastern economy placing priority on cooperation with North-East Asia, emphasising resource utilisation with technology. In terms of socio-economic reform, targets were set to accommodate expansions in relations with North-East Asia.⁴⁴ On April 11, 1997, El'tsin elevated the programme to presidential status, setting ten-year priorities. A figure of US\$65bn was set to implement the federal programme,⁴⁵ but Moscow said it would finance no more than 30%. Regions and local enterprises, and domestic and international investors had to shoulder the balance.⁴⁶ Russia's laws and socio-politico-economics doubt the programme's implementation.⁴⁷ With legal deficiencies, federal programmes fail to attain legal status, making failure unaccountable and all issues political.

In a region, like the Far East, understanding politics has the added complication of geography. Socio-economic concerns have rendered Far Eastern politics hostile towards Moscow and receptive to external actors. Ishaev summarised this scenario in 1995 by highlighting regional economic decline and Moscow's inability to support the Far Eastern economy was encouraging rises in localism and regionalism: 'Although

⁴²High inflation (1992-1993) and anti-inflationary measures undermined viable defence enterprises. In the following years, sharp reductions in defence contracts, huge federal arrears and rising energy costs, contributed to undermining production capacity in military and non-military goods. As Khabarovsk housed 60% of Far Eastern defence, Primorie 35% and Amur 4%, these regions suffered heavily. Gudkova, Evgenya G., "Defence Enterprises in the Russian Far East – Problems of Conversion and Economic Crisis (Summary)" in *ERINA Report*, Vol.19, October 1997, pp.33-34.

⁴³*EL-RFE*, October 8-14, 1995, p.16. For example, Association for Cooperation between the Far East, Siberia and Korea; Far East Committee for Economic Cooperation with Japan supporting the Japanese Federation of Economic Organisations; Far Eastern Working Group for Economic Cooperation with the US West Coast. For China and Hong Kong there is the Far Eastern Committee for Economic Cooperation with China.

⁴⁴*EL-RFE*, March 17-26, 1996, p.3.

⁴⁵Of that total, US\$45bn has already been included in adopted federal programmes that directly pertain to the Far East. There are sixty-eight such programmes.

⁴⁶*EL-RFE*, April 21-27, 1997, pp.3-4.

⁴⁷Priorities were split into three periods: 1996-1997, 1998-2000 and 2001-2005. The first emphasised eliminating fuel and power shortages, repairs to natural resource damage, protection from floods and earthquakes, and resolving transportation problems. The second targeted economic recovery and industrial growth. The final period looked at resolving power problems and the intensive development of export-orientated processing, machine tool and high technology enterprises.

Far Eastern succession seems highly unlikely, the idea is becoming more popular. ...people are disappointed by Moscow's empty promises to help the Far Eastern economy'.⁴⁸ The political chaos Russia faced after the Soviet Union's collapse was most devastating in the Far East. Each of the region's ten territories has approximately equal stature as a federal subject, except Sakha; and, Evreiska, Chukotka and Koriak have only existed as separate entities since the early 1990s. In the early 1990s Far East regionalism grew with some local activists supporting the Far Eastern Republic's recreation. In September 1990, for example, the Far Eastern Republic Freedom Party was established. In 1995 Ishaev called for the Far Eastern Republic's recreation to counter, what he described as, unfair federal tax policies.⁴⁹ Ishaev said a Far Eastern Republic would not be created for secessionist purposes, but to solve problems independently from Moscow.⁵⁰

In April 1995 Far Eastern governors met to form a political organisation to lobby Moscow and represent regional concerns – the Association of Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal Territories – but inter-territorial conflict has ensured little success.⁵¹ The association's formation strengthened the region's position prior to December 1995's federal assembly elections.⁵² With these foundations laid, the association met in late October 1997 to discuss a draft law creating a special status for the Far East (which remains to be considered by the federal duma), draft budgetary and taxation codes and a 1998 federal budget bill.⁵³ In relations with Moscow, the association stated its intention to adopt an address to the President, Government and the Federal Assembly (parliament) in view of the ill-conceived and hasty privatisation of Far Eastern oil-extracting and oil-processing enterprises. Further, the association emphasised its intention to deal with threats to socio-economic security, brought on, they claim, by increases in crimes connected with natural resource thefts.⁵⁴ However, rather than unite, the inter-territorial association has simply highlighted regional concerns to Moscow and resulted in regional fragmentation.

⁴⁸Izvestiia, November 29, 1995. Quote taken from an interview with Khabarovsk's Governor Ishaev.

⁴⁹EL-RFE, November 26-December 2, 1995, pp.2-3.

⁵⁰Izvestiia, November 29, 1995.

⁵¹EL-RFE, April 16-23, 1995, p.3.

⁵²Itar-Tass, April 14, 1995.

⁵³RIA-Novosti, November 1, 1997.

⁵⁴Itar-Tass, October 31, 1997.

3.8 The Wild East – Far Eastern Politics

The Far Eastern political situation has been turbulent. It is anti-Moscow in character. To a considerable extent Far Eastern politics is attributable to regional geography – within Russia and vis-à-vis North-East Asia. Despite a regional political association, Far Eastern territories fail to cooperate and generate effective autonomy. Understanding Far Eastern politics is best done through broad regional sub-divisions – the south (Khabarovsk, Primorye and Amur) is anti-Moscow and pro-nationalist. The north (Magadan and Kamchátka) is less anti-Moscow. Sakhalin and Sakha are special cases given their pro-Moscow and pro-reform natures, and their immense resource endowments and success in attracting foreign investment.⁵⁵ However, this is a simplification; occasionally Magadan has been conservative while Khabarovsk has been moderate.

Far Eastern politics tend to be anti-Moscow, while being North-East Asia focused, autonomy driven and generally more Asian, rather than Soviet, Russian or European. During the 1990s, Moscow's inability to guarantee basic socio-economic rights to regional populations, forced subnational authorities to expand their functions and powers. Polishchiuk said a model of 'negotiated federalism' has emerged in Russia, which results in 'the relationships between central and regional authorities taking a cyclical shape'.⁵⁶ In the Far East these cyclical relations have revealed themselves as a struggle between local authorities and the federal government over the conclusion of bilateral agreements demarcating powers and competence. These power-sharing agreements have normalised relations between individual federal subjects and the federal government.⁵⁷ The provisions within the agreements are designed to meet the specific needs of that region. These agreements have supported a tactic of divide and rule; but in the Far East the notion of autonomy still finds currency. Despite the attempts by Moscow to defuse the situation, Far Eastern separatist tendencies remain

⁵⁵This is probably due to Sakha's republic status of a republic and, thus, it's greater political and economic status vis-à-vis Moscow. Sakhalin has been successful in foreign investment attraction and has the status of a free economic zone – presenting Russian economic reforms as successful.

⁵⁶Polishchiuk, L., "Rossiskaiia Model 'Peregovornogo Federalisma'" in *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, Vol.6, 1998, pp.68-86.

⁵⁷Hughes, James, "Moscow's Bilateral Treaties Add to Confusion" in *Transition*, September 20, 1996, Vol.2, No.19, pp.39-43.

largely as a response to Moscow's failure to deliver on its promises. Based on a number of regional research findings through secondary sources.

Two themes characterise Far Eastern politics – tense relations with Moscow and growth of authoritarian executive power at the legislature's expense. Both are also national trends.⁵⁸ The first was due partly to lack of a strong sense of Russian statehood. Russia was more a collection of eighty-nine mini-fiefdoms than a cohesive state; the ability of Moscow to impose will over the federal units was uncertain. This was evident during 1992-1993 when many federal units did not transfer tax allocations.⁵⁹ The second trend reflected El'tsin's attempt to assert presidential rule over parliamentary rule. This resulted in the violent closing of the Russian parliament in October 1993. In the Far East, regional governors became increasingly powerful, as El'tsin closed Soviet councils and replaced them with less powerful dumas. Several regional soviets had previously managed to remove governors unfavourable to them – including Kuznetsov in Primor'e, Fedorov in Sakhalin and Krivchenko in Amur.⁶⁰

The amount of taxes remitted to the federal budget caused considerable resentment in the Far East. This was exacerbated by advantages the twenty-one ethnic republics appeared to enjoy. Sakha, the only Far Eastern republic, did not have to remit taxes. It was able to develop a degree of self-financing due to its diamond wealth. The Far East sought concessions from Moscow in the form of subsidies and grants. Despite the rhetoric of integration with North-East Asia, the Far East was still highly dependent on external supplies. In addition, Moscow could not be relied upon to safeguard Far Eastern interests. After natural calamities in 1994, both Sakhalin and Primor'e looked internationally for help. This concerned Moscow as evidenced after the Northern Sakhalin earthquake (May 1995) when Moscow refused Japanese aid based on the fear that Tokyo was flexing its political influence.⁶¹

⁵⁸Rossiiskie Vesti, December 25, 1993.

⁵⁹Lapidus, Gail W. and Walker, Edward W., "Nationalism, Regionalism and Federalism – Centre-Periphery Relations in Post-Communist Russia" in Lapidus, Gail (Ed.), The New Russia – Troubled Transformation, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, US, 1995, pp.79-114.

⁶⁰Nezavisimaia Gazeta, April 7, 1994.

⁶¹Chugov, Sergei, "Russia and Japan – Drifting in Opposite Directions" in Transition, Vol.2, No.19, September 22, 1995, pp.12-16.

The question of the division of powers between the Far East and Moscow contributed to regionalism where regional elites sought to gain greater powers at the expense of the centre. Far East regionalism has been closely linked with political activities of governors. Two examples of this are Fedorov (Sakhalin Governor, 1990-1993) and Nazdratenko (Primor'e Governor, 1993-2000). Both were able to exert political leverage over Moscow ensuring regional interests were considered.⁶² Fedorov, an Economics Professor from Moscow, gained national and international attention with his programme to establish *capitalism on one island*. The results were ambiguous. Detractors said the programme failed.⁶³ But by 1993, more than 70% of firms were privatised which in turn were responsible for 93% of regional production.⁶⁴ Fedorov also gained prominence as opposition leader to return the disputed islands to Japan. (With the view to seeking Japanese investment and establishing a new area of foreign policy Moscow appeared ready to transfer the islands.) Initially a *democrat*, Fedorov aligned himself with the patriotic-nationalist wing, demonstrating the fluidity of post-Soviet politics. Fedorov lobbied Moscow to retain the islands. His policy of seeking economic development on the islands aggravated Japan. Fedorov tried to abrogate federal powers to the regional level. He sought Japanese participation in the region, independent of Moscow. He proposed his *fourth way* – a Foreign Economic Zone spanning the entire Kuril chain and Hokkaido.⁶⁵

Fedorov's regionalism was successful. He managed to gain extra resources. In December 1992 El'tsin decreed the Kuril Islands a Special Economic Zone, giving Sakhalin control over the islands' fishing resources. In August 1993 Moscow launched the federal programme for the socio-economic development of the Kuril Islands for 1993-1995 and then to 2000. The programme's long-term viability was uncertain. Moscow had pledged to pay an annual amount of 100bn roubles in subsidies to Sakhalin, but by September 1994 she had only received 5bn roubles.⁶⁶ Fedorov also pressured Moscow in an attempt to gain control of the considerable oil and gas

⁶²Wade, Richard, Regionalism and the Russian Federation, The Far Eastern Perspective – Primorskii Krai and Sakhalin Oblast, Working Paper, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia, 1996.

⁶³Moskovskie Novosti, August 9, 1992.

⁶⁴Kommersant, 24 February 1993

⁶⁵Komsomol'skaia Pravda, 23 October 1992.

⁶⁶Several officials in Moscow favoured Nazdratenko's proposal to merge Sakhalin and Primorie in order to strengthen Russia's position in the area, and to reduce the amount of subsidies that Moscow had promised to pay.

deposits located on the Sakhalin shelf. He was vocal about which level of government had rights to determine who would exploit deposits. In 1991, El'tsin granted control of the shelf to Sakhalin but retained control over oil and gas exports. Fedorov countered Moscow's attempt to control the tendering process by concluding his own arrangements with foreign firms. This contributed to El'tsin's decision not to support Fedorov when the regional Soviet sought his removal in early 1993. The consortium eventually chosen was not that preferred by Fedorov.

The most overt form of regionalism in the Far East has been in Primor'e under Nazdratenko. An authoritarian leader, he suppressed all opposition. He removed Vladivostok's Mayor, Cherepkov, by force in February 1994.⁶⁷ Nazdratenko also capitalised on Chinese resentment, introducing restrictions on their movements. Primor'e differed from other regions in the extent to which it was able to successfully demand greater economic assistance from Moscow. This regionalism was closely connected with safeguarding interests of the traditional political elite. These former senior communist party officials, directors of industrial enterprises and state agricultural concerns, and senior military personnel formed an organisation, PAKT.⁶⁸ They smoothed the path to power for Nazdratenko. The latter ensured PAKT benefited from privatisation at the expense of outsiders. This regionalism also served Moscow's interests. Although the exact nature of the links between Moscow and lower government levels are not fully clear, it is evident regionalism developed in Primor'e because many Moscow officials supported the presence of a hardline governor on Russia's periphery. Although the support Nazdratenko enjoyed was conditional, it ensured regionalism continued to develop with relative impunity.

Nazdratenko's regionalist policies took several different forms, including demands for economic assistance (subsidies and soft credits), calls for creating a special economic regime, and for governors to be elected rather than be appointed by El'tsin. Nazdratenko first gained national attention through supporting the regional Soviet

⁶⁷Cherepkov challenged various vested interests when he exposed offences in the distribution of Vladivostok's lands, operations with real estate and distribution of assets. Moscow's response was mixed. El'tsin approved the action, whereas a working group of deputies of the State Duma declared the dismissal illegal and recommended Moscow's intervention.

⁶⁸Primor'e Joint Stock Corporation of Commodity Producers.

declaration (July 1993) that the region's status be raised to national republic.⁶⁹ Nazdratenko sought greater political and economic autonomy. His economic demands were most successful. Moscow regularly allocated new subsidies to the region, despite the problems it created for the federal budget. A distinguishing factor of such regionalism was that territorial interests were paramount over the Far East as a region. Primorie and Khabarovsk, for example, were not averse to seizing for their own use oil bound for Sakhalin. Nonetheless there were signs of a Far Eastern regional consciousness. The Far Eastern Republic, which existed as a buffer state between Soviet forces and Western interventionist powers (1920-1922) served as an attractive regionalist symbol. As the power of the Soviet state declined, the idea of an independent Far East proved attractive to many. Longer-term, however, the Far Eastern Republic proved to be a chimera. Elites were more intent on following their own interests than pursuing joint demands. A Far Eastern Regional Association of Economic Cooperation was established, but it did not have the influence of its prominent neighbour – the Siberian Agreement.⁷⁰ Its first director, Daniliuk, complained that the major problem arose when regions followed their own interests rather than joining forces.⁷¹ Nonetheless, there were signs of a common cause. In February 1995, deputies from Far East regional legislatures demanded Moscow improve their situation through regulation of fuel and energy tariffs, grant compensation for the costs of goods transportation, grant payments to military industries for state orders from 1994, and adopt a state rehabilitation programme.

Far Eastern politics must consider historical and contemporary developments as they have, do and will shape Russia. The post-Soviet project in Russia is ostensibly one of establishing democracy and a market economy. Both of these factors rest on private property and the rule of law, yet neither of these basic factors of modernity has deep roots in Russian culture. This means the development of such institutions is a long and difficult task, the success of which is not yet guaranteed. Absolutism characterised tsarism and communism, and is still present in post-Soviet Russia. The notion of a state in which law is supreme over both sovereign and subject is relatively new in Russia. Although representative institutions have existed in Russia since the

⁶⁹RFE Update, August 1994.

⁷⁰Hughes, J., "Regionalism in Russia – The Rise and Fall of the Siberian Agreement" *op. cit.*

⁷¹RFE Update, March 1993.

nineteenth century, their ability to act as a major restraint on absolute power has been circumscribed due to central control over the entire state. However, decentralisation has significantly complicated the foreign policymaking process. In the Soviet Union the constituent republics and regions had no part of play in policymaking processes and regional leaders were unlikely to question Moscow's policy direction. In post-Soviet Russia Moscow has had to be sensitive to the interests of regions, particularly regions that border the international political economy – like the Far East. It is these regions that are most likely to forge international ties.

3.9 The Internationalisation of Russia's Regions – The Example of the Far East

Kaiser stated there were three concepts of the internationalisation of subnational politics – para-diplomacy, multi-layered diplomacy and multi-level governance.⁷² Para-diplomacy refers to the international relations of subnational actors. Such relations can be coordinated with and complement activities of the centre or be pursued in conflict or concurrence with traditional macro-diplomacy.⁷³ Multi-layered diplomacy stresses the domestic dimension of diplomacy. The traditional distinction between domestic and foreign policy is also dismissed by the concept of intermestic affairs that refers to subnational actors who link international relations with domestic competencies.⁷⁴ Multi-level governance argues for the interconnectedness of subnational, national and regional (regional within the international political economy as opposed to subnational) arenas as well as for highly complex decision-making procedures involving actors without exclusive authorities.⁷⁵

There can be little question the processes of systematic transformation (which includes the internationalisation of the economy and regionalisation in Russia) are taking place in an increasing globalised political economy. Globalisation poses a fundamental

⁷²Kaiser, Robert, Subnational Governments as Actors in International Relations – Federal Reforms and Regional Mobilisation in Germany and the United States, paper presented at the International Workshop on Regional Governance in the Age of Globalisation, Research Committee 17 of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) in collaboration with the Centre for Technology Assessment, Baden-Wurtemberg, Stuttgart, Germany, March 8-9, 2002.

⁷³Michelmann, Hans J., and Soldatos, Panayotis (Ed.), Federalism and International Relations – The Role of Subnational Units, Clarendon Press, Oxford, UK, 1990; and Keating, Michael, Plurinational Democracy – Stateless Nations in a Post-Sovereignty Era, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 2001.

⁷⁴Hocking, Brian, Localising Foreign Policy – Non-Central Governments and Multilayered Diplomacy, MacMillan, London, UK, 1992.

⁷⁵Kohler-Koch, Beate, and Eising, Rainer (Ed.), The Transformation of Governance in the European Union, Routledge, New York, US, 1999.

challenge to governments who now find themselves unable to fend off speculative attacks of the global financial system and some cities and regions are finding their fortunes tied to the international political economy.⁷⁶ Moscow has emerged as Russia's node in the international political economy, but other cities and regions are also seeking a place in the hierarchy. In Russia the vertical relationship between the global and the local transects the relationship between centre and periphery. Regions are seeking to develop economic and political links with the international political economy to compensate for failings in the Russian federal system. Equally, regions are seeking to shape their own international relations with bordering states. At the same time, foreign assistance programmes and the investment strategies of MNCs are seeking to bypass the federal authorities in Moscow to deal directly with the governments in Russia's regions.⁷⁷

At the level of non-central governments there is recognition that local needs cannot be satisfied without greater involvement in the international political economy. This is particularly true when it comes to attracting foreign investment. Here, regions within states see themselves competing with one another to attract investment. By the same token, national governments may seek to divert some pressures by delegating their responsibilities. This may occur in specific functional areas. The combination of local domestic problems and broader international relationships can create significant problems for foreign policy managers. There are many issue-specific groupings, such as environmental organisations, whose strategies involve the internationalisation of the domestic and the domestication of the international. The rise of social activism at the local level is symptomatic of a new form of politics, which is bypassing legal and territorial definitions. In such a context, there are two ways in which Russia's regions can interact with the international political economy. First, they can try to influence the decision-making process of the central state from within. Second, they can establish and develop their own networks of transitional contacts and start to develop their own foreign policy.

⁷⁶O'Brien, Richard, Global Financial Integration – The End of Geography, Council on Foreign Relations Press, New York, US, 1992.

⁷⁷Stoner-Weiss, Kathrin, Local Heroes – The Political Economy of Russian Regional Governance, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, US, 1997.

The political decentralisation of Russia has significantly complicated the foreign policymaking process. In the Soviet system the constituent republics and regions had no part to play in policymaking and regional leaders were unlikely to question Moscow's policy direction. Increasingly foreign policy formulation involves consultation with regional authorities. Governors are now invited to joint diplomatic visits as official members of the Russian delegation. For example, when former Prime Minister Primakov attended the APEC summit in Malaysia in December 1998 Primor'e's Governor Nazdratenko accompanied him. Similarly, Sakhalin's Governor has been part of Russian delegations visiting Japan. Regional representatives are also gaining access to discussions between the federal government and international organisations. At the same time, such interventions are not always constructive. For example, Nazdratenko, was openly critical of the agreement reached between Moscow and Beijing to demarcate the Sino-Russian border in the Far East. The Foreign Ministry criticised some regions for bypassing Russian embassies in their dealings with foreign partners. Despite these positive developments, it is still the case necessary legal arrangements and procedures to enable the incorporation of regional interests in Russian foreign policymaking have yet to be created.

The development of a legal framework to coordinate the international activity of Russia's regions is still in its infancy. Part of the reason for this lies in the lack of a coherent *regional voice* in Moscow that might coordinate with government ministries. The impact of regions upon Russia's international relations takes many different forms, but most of them are informal and non-institutionalised. In many fields the regions share the same problems in their dealings with the federal government, but in many respects regions have divergent and even competing interests. For example, regional authorities lobby for foreign economic decisions, such as control over oil and gas quotas and taxes or revision to product sharing legislation. The struggle between regional elites over discontinuing the state's diamond and gold export monopolies is also an example of issues with a strong regional dimension. An example of this in the Far East is Sakha. Sakha extracts 90% of Russian diamonds, its interests are marginalised with Moscow's negotiations with DeBeers and the division of export revenues. In the aftermath of the August 1998 economic crisis, Sakha sought to restrict gold exports beyond its borders. Regions have also challenged the federal taxation of their export operations. For example, Khabarovsk Governor Ishaev challenged the

imposition of federal export taxes on the grounds that they damage established links with the region's foreign partners.

The second form of regional participation in international relations is through the creation of para-diplomacy with foreign partners, skirting the regulations of central authorities. On the one hand, these communications might take the rather benign shape of transborder cooperation between neighbouring territories, sister relations between cities and municipalities, cooperation between NGOs within the framework of people's diplomacy or global micro-diplomacy concepts. On the other hand, regions might promote their own foreign policy independent of Moscow. The latter is potentially far more damaging to the centre, especially when regional policy contradicts and undermines central policy. For example, Sakha has a trade mission in Tokyo; Sakhalin has signed various agreements with Alaska and Hokkaido as well as having trade offices in Seattle.

The problem of regionalisation, the shifting of power from the centre to the regions, is one of Russia's biggest challenges. Apart from national interests, the Russian state must now also consider the interests of subnational actors such as economic groups or economically influential regions of Russia. Russia's internal stability and its performance in international relations will depend largely on the impact of interests pursued by important domestic actors – including Russian regions. Globalisation and regionalisation describe the two most important trends that states are subject to. Politics is characterised on the one hand by accelerated socio-economic integration, on the other hand by an increasing demand for more autonomy and a greater voice in events subnationally or locally. Looking ahead, the two forces will probably permanently influence international trade, decentralisation or the development and determination of the function of regions.⁷⁸

In many post-Soviet societies the state has yet to succeed in defining its post-Soviet role. After the revolutionary upheavals and the discrediting of old ideology the state forfeited its legitimacy as the unifying centre. Particularly in Russia, where the state traditionally held a dominant position in the economy, society and politics, change

⁷⁸Sergounin, Alexander A., Russia's Regionalisation – The International Dimension, Working Paper No.20, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, Copenhagen, Denmark, 1997, pp.11-16.

produced convulsions across all structures. In order to retain or regain the state's dominant position, the state leaders of states of the post-Soviet area have been greatly tempted to look for new ideological justifications for preserving their power. In that respect nationalism in particular, which evokes strong emotions in those states, can be highly exploited politically by the state's ambitions to retain its power.

Together with the internal prerequisites and the situation of the region in the federal union, the international political economy has become increasingly important for regional interests.⁷⁹ External factors can be grouped according to the political (military-strategic factors, territorial disputes), the economic (proximity to economic zones and investment activity of foreign economic forces) and social factors (ethnic, religious and cultural). Thus, there are domestic and international aspects of a region's position, policy, relations and prospects.

3.10 The Far East – A Domestic and International Actor?

In foreign policy Russia rides two horses – one is Russia as a unified federal state and the other constituent units of the federation. The former has a unitary temper, but the latter, a federalist, has begun to assert itself. The two horses supplement each other when pulling in the same direction. But complications arise when they pull in opposing directions. The biggest stakeholder in foreign policy is the Russian Federation, which believes all authority of Russia's foreign policy belongs to the federation and resides in Moscow. In its dealings with other states, Russia's sovereignty is as indivisible as it would be if the state were unitary. Yet the second horse also roams, increasingly claiming a federated state has a stake in Russia's international relations, especially with her neighbours.⁸⁰

For a decade or so now, Russia's regions have been active in the international political economy. The Far East's promotion in North-East Asia is not unfamiliar. Indeed, its international relations are often tied to aspirations for independence, greater autonomy and integration into North-East Asia.⁸¹ Yet it is important to put these relations, and

⁷⁹Nicholson, Martin, Towards a Russia of the Regions, Adelphi Paper No.330, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oxford University Press, London, UK, 1999, p.64.

⁸⁰Bradshaw, Michael J. (Ed.), The Russian Far East and Pacific Asia – Unfulfilled Potential, *op. cit.*, pp.182-277 (section on Bilateral External Relations).

⁸¹Blank, S., "The New Russia in the New Asia" in International Journal, No.49, pp.74-97.

those of other regions, in a larger context. This multilateral governance need not be conflictual and can often be complementary and cooperative. Typically, foreign policy, particularly treaty making, is a central government task. More usually, federal government has unambiguous legal control over international relations. However, the world of federalism has evolved from an emphasis on divided jurisdictions, to one of shared jurisdiction in practice.

Increasingly, policymaking is an interdependent exercise. All governments are now involved and the trend is intensifying. In Russia there are three intersecting arenas of multilevel governance. The largest and most significant is foreign policy, conducted by federal government, with only the indirect involvement of the regions. This policy reflects the usual competitive mixture of regional, national, socio-economic and partisan considerations. A second arena, intersecting the first, is the direct international activities of the regions. Third is the arena of domestic intergovernmental relations between the federal government and regional governments. This often involves international issues. This third arena overlaps significantly with the first, and a little with the second. The third arena is the most familiar – the day-to-day relationships between central, federal and regional governments.

Here international issues increasingly arise. There is no single agenda; issues arise across a variety of forums and sectors. There is little effort to coordinate all three arenas. Indeed, such an attempt would be counter-productive and just about impossible. The most formal of these relationships is in fields of exclusive provincial jurisdiction, such as education or labour relations. The federal government has no choice but to follow regions in terms of determining what Russia's foreign policy will be. However the more common pattern is of an emerging shared responsibility for international matters, reflecting the effect of regional or international integration on domestic sovereignty.⁸² The second arena is the direct involvement of Russia's regions in the international political economy. The main objective is to promote trade and investment. In the case of the Far East for the purposes of resource exploitation and utilisation. The resources deployed vary enormously because the ten territories and three levels of government (local, regional and federal) vary greatly in size and in

⁸²Kaiser, Robert, *op. cit.*

fiscal clout. The Far East has had the most consistent effort. It is the only one with a separate Ministry of International Political Economy and maintains over thirty offices abroad. The third arena is Russian foreign policy. Thus, the Far East is both a domestic and international actor. Indeed it has a role both within the Russia and the international political economy.

The Far East is a unique example of Moscow's relations with regions. It reflects a peculiar set of circumstances, not least given its distance from the centre. However, some regard the problems in centre-periphery relations in Russia as being clearly exemplified in the Far East. For example, Sakha has continually negotiated its position vis-à-vis Moscow in regard to economic rights, the payment of taxes and revenue retention for the region's natural resources – namely diamonds. Meanwhile, Primor'e Governor Nazdratenko's populist politics and rhetorical defiance of the government's reform programme long provoked central authorities. However, although these maybe examples in the Far East that typify centre-periphery relations in Russia, the region's distance from Moscow, its resource endowment, its history, its complementarity to and its focus upon North-East Asia differentiate it, especially in regard to its relations with Japan and its ability to act as an actor in the international political economy. Indeed, this can be better understood by undertaking primary research in the field to understand both aspects of the relationship – Russian-Japanese relations and the Far East.

3.11 Russian-Japanese Relations – Conclusions From the Field

Attempting to determine the Far East's role in Russian-Japanese relations required the conduct of fieldwork. The aims of this fieldwork were to determine how decision-makers viewed Russian-Japanese relations and the Far East – both independently and as two parts of a relationship. Evidence of interaction at subnational levels clearly indicates that perceptions of bilateral relations differ from those at the national level, than those in the literature and than those in the popular press. Thus, one of the objectives of the fieldwork was to further investigate non-official relations. To this end, fieldwork was conducted in Russia, Japan and the US. The US was included due to its geopolitico-economic and strategic significance for both states and because many key academics specialising in both Russian-Japanese relations and the Far East are based there. Moreover, US-Japan ties – strategically, politico-economically cannot be

ignored. Indeed, half a century of Soviet-US ideological conflict was key in shaping perceptions, forming policy and developing decision-making processes for Russia and Japan, as well as the international political economy.

Analysis of Russian-Japanese relations at the national and subnational levels is insufficient. It is apparent from the literature that though different schools of thought exist on international relations generally and Russian-Japanese relations specifically the basis and decision-making factors, processes and actors differ at the national and subnational levels. Indeed, the impact of the changing international political economy needs to be considered. Were schools of thought on both sides a product of central government policy? Was geography key in determining difference of opinion? Were subnational actors regurgitators of central government policy? Was location correlated to marginalisation? How had the changing international political economy impacted Russian-Japanese relations?

Sixty interviews were conducted with officials, academics and businessmen (details on the interviewees are given in the bibliography by region). These were sources and analysts of policy, Russian-Japanese relations and the international political economy. The coverage of each source differed between locations due to accessibility, time and resources. From a location perspective it was insufficient to visit just the centres of political power. It was also necessary to interview individuals located in subnational regions of both states. Regions were where it was more apparent that efforts to initiate and/or improve bilateral relations were being made with the state retreating and local, regional and global forces energising non-state actors, these interviews were an avenue for confirming this. Indeed, it was primary evidence for determining the role of regions in a changing international political economy. All interviewees were extensively interviewed; each of them was asked the same set of questions. A succession of additional questions were asked to specifically gauge individual interviewee thoughts, as well as the motivation for and the sincerity of their responses. Occasionally interviewees steered discussions, often tactically to avoid responding to questions or to deviate from issues provoking *emotional* or *expected* responses. The results were mixed but based solely on the same set of questions asked of all interviewees. Responses expected from certain geographical locations were skewed by

the fact individuals interviewed were based elsewhere. In some cases it was not location but institutional affiliation that determined responses.⁸³

Ten questions in regard to Russian-Japanese relations were asked of all interviewees. These questions were essential for gauging how the changing international political economy has affected Russian-Japanese relations. How were Russian-Japanese relations being perceived beyond the Soviet Union's collapse? Were pre-Soviet issues still alive after the Soviet Union's death? The list of questions posed can be seen in Figure 3.4. A summary of the results can be seen in Figure 3.5. Detailed analysis follows thereafter.


Figure 3.4: The Changing International Political Economy and Russian-Japanese Relations – Fieldwork Questions

No.	Question
1	How do you view Russian-Japanese relations?
2	Has the nature of Russian-Japanese relations changed since the Soviet Union's collapse?
3	Is the territorial issue the main reason preventing progress in Russian-Japanese relations?
4	Are other issues important in Russian-Japanese relations?
5	Have new issues emerged in Russian-Japanese relations since the Soviet Union's collapse?
6	Can Russian-Japanese relations progress without the territorial dispute's resolution?
7	Do Moscow and Tokyo have the monopoly on Russian-Japanese relations?
8	Are Moscow and Tokyo necessary to good Russian-Japanese relations?
9	Are Russian-Japanese relations key to greater cooperation in North-East Asia?
10	Does the future look bright for Russian-Japanese relations?

The results of these questions are summarized in Figure 3.5.

⁸³Sixty interviewees were carried out in eleven locations (Russia – five in Moscow, one in Khabarovsk, nine in Vladivostok; Japan – twenty-one in Tokyo, one in Kyoto, three in Niigata, three in Sapporo – six in Hawai'i, seven in Seattle, one in New York, one in Boston). A full list of interviewees and dates are detailed in the bibliography by location.

Figure 3.5: The Changing International Political Economy and Russian-Japanese Relations – Fieldwork Summary



Notes: MO = Moscow; KH = Khabarovsk; VL = Vladivostok; TO = Tokyo; NI = Niigata; SA = Sapporo; HI = Hawai'i; SE = Seattle; NY = New York; BO = Boston; Numbers on X axis refer to question number as in Figure 3.6; +1 was assigned to positive responses; -1 was assigned to negative responses; +0.5 and -0.5 was assigned to undeterminable responses. The disadvantages of using this numerical system are that where there are more positive responses than negative the negative responses are not identifiable they simply contribute to the positive number by reducing the total.

Summarising the results in Figure 3.5, there are two distinct observations – where Tokyo responded negatively, the majority of the other interviewees responded positively; where there is consensus it is consensus across the board. However it should be noted the negative responses are skewed, as they are counted as a reduction of the overall responses. Tokyo was most negative on Russian-Japanese relations and the most sceptical as to whether the Soviet Union's collapse has had any real impact on relations. Where as the majority of the rest of the respondents felt the territorial issue was not the main issue preventing progress in Russian-Japanese relations, Tokyo believed it was. Moreover, Tokyo felt no other issues were important in Russian-Japanese relations unlike the majority of the rest of the interview set. The majority agreed new issues had emerged since the Soviet Union's collapse. Surprisingly, on whether Russian-Japanese relations could progress without the territorial dispute's resolution the majority of negative answers appeared in Hawai'i. Tokyo overwhelmingly responded positively to the question as to whether Moscow and Tokyo are necessary to Russian-Japanese relations. In view of wider cooperation in North-East Asia and the future most responses were positive. Detailed interview results follow below.

On the general question of Russian-Japanese relations, all Russians gave positive responses – regardless of location. In Tokyo there were four positive responses – three from the Japan Association for Trade with Russia and Central-Eastern Europe,⁸⁴ and one at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation;⁸⁵ (responses probably motivated by a need to justify their work.) Moreover, all these four positive respondents commented on the Far East's role as a *ground for compromise* – recognition of how the changing international political economy had impacted Russian-Japanese relations in recognising non-state actors. The stance of the academic interviewed in Tokyo was unclear – he was extremely negative on Russian-Japanese relations, continuously referring to the territorial dispute, but was positive on prospects for Russian-Japanese relations.⁸⁶ Being an economics scholar he insinuated economics was now the lens through which relations would be viewed rather than politics. He emphasised the separation of politics and economics in the post-Soviet international political economy – the defeat of realism by liberalism.

Once again, negative responses on whether the nature of Russian-Japanese relations had changed since the Soviet Union's collapse were Japanese – regardless of location. The Consul-General of Japan in Boston was surprisingly positive.⁸⁷ Russian respondents believed the end of Soviet ideology was key to improving Russian-Japanese relations. Japanese responses were more negative. Though recognising the *end of the Soviet Empire*,⁸⁸ transition difficulties were emphasised.

Though the territorial dispute is the most prevalent issue in Russian-Japanese relations questions in regard to it produced the most surprising response sets – notably in Tokyo. All subnational responses – Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, Kyoto, Niigata and

⁸⁴Ogawa, Kazuo (Director General), Hochi, Tadayuki (Research Development Department) and Yoshida, Shingo, all from the Institute for Russian and East European Studies (IREES), Japan Association for Trade with Russia and Central-Eastern Europe (ROTOBO), Tokyo, Japan, who were interviewed on January 13, and October 29, 1997.

⁸⁵Lau, Sim Yee (Programme Officer) from the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Tokyo, Japan, who was interviewed on January 1, 16 and October 29, 1997.

⁸⁶Mizobata, Satoshi (Associate Professor of Comparative Economics) from the Kyoto Institute of Economic Research (KIER), Kyoto University, Japan, who was interviewed on October 24, 1997.

⁸⁷Kawato, Akio (Consul-General of Japan), Boston, Massachusetts, US, who was interviewed on July 18, 1997.

⁸⁸Yusa, Hiromi (Russia and Eastern Europe Section) from the Overseas Research Department at the Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO), Tokyo, Japan, who was interviewed on January 8 and 9, 1997.

Sapporo – concluded the territorial issue was not preventing progress in Russian-Japanese relations. The territorial dispute was a peripheral issue; interviewees felt significant progress had been made in building bilateral ties. The notion of cooperation for mutual economic benefit overrode the stance of political stalemate; economics overrode politics. Regional responses insinuated central government policy was stagnant. Both Russian and Japanese responses in Tokyo focused on the territorial dispute as central to preventing progress in Russian-Japanese relations. For the Tokyo-based or Tokyo-visiting Russians,⁸⁹ their location politicised their stance on the issue. It was geography not institutional affiliation that influenced attitudes and policy. With the exception of Tokyo, all interviewees recognised and validated how the changing international political economy had impacted Russian-Japanese relations – an appreciation of subnational actors and the depreciation of the territorial issue in Russian-Japanese relations.

To the question as to whether other issues prevailed in Russian-Japanese relations, besides the territorial dispute, all Japanese interviewees gave an affirmative regardless of location. They emphasised the importance of the territorial issue. All Russian respondents spoke of assistance with transition, the need for de-militarisation of North-East Asia, formation of trade links and necessity of Japanese investment. Regional Russian respondents spoke of hope for Japanese assistance in their drive for independence from Moscow.⁹⁰ For the Japanese politics emerged as the basis for future relations; for Russians the focus was on economics. It was clear the domestic situation on both sides was key to influencing responses. Following on, interviewees were asked whether new issues had emerged in Russian-Japanese relations since the Soviet Union's collapse, all agreed. Only the Consul-General of Japan in Boston stated the sole issue that needed resolution was the disputed territories. It was clear the Soviet Union's collapse realised a bubble of optimism for Russian-Japanese relations, but that this bubble required popping to release full potential.

⁸⁹Kazakov, Igor (Deputy Trade Representative) from the Trade Representation of the Russian Federation in Japan, who was interviewed on January 21, 1997; and Minakir, Pavel (Director), Russian Academy of Sciences Far Eastern Branch Economic Research Institute (Khabarovsk, Russia), Tokyo, Japan who was interviewed on January 22, 1997.

⁹⁰The most memorable advocate of this stance was Saprikin, Vladimir (Chairman) from the International Relations Committee, Municipality of Vladivostok City, Vladivostok, Russia, who was interviewed on December 12, 1996.

On the issue of whether the territorial dispute was key to progress in Russian-Japanese relations, responses were mixed. The Japanese Attaché in Vladivostok⁹¹ did not respond to this question. Meanwhile the two Japanese interviewees in Moscow⁹² and Consul-General of Japan in Boston were adamant the territorial issue had to be resolved prior to progress in Russian-Japanese relations. In Tokyo it was a combination of commercial and governmental organisations that believed resolution of the territorial dispute was not the basis for progress in Russian-Japanese relations. Indeed, it was a realisation on one hand of then separation of economics and politics. On the other, it was a denial changes in the international political economy had had any impact on decision-making and policy.

Taking the issue of Russian-Japanese relations back to their respective centres of political power, all interviewees were asked whether Moscow and Tokyo monopolised Russian-Japanese relations. It was striking to see the negativity of the majority of responses. This was clearly recognition of subnational relations between the two states. Only the Boston interviewee and the government organisations in Tokyo⁹³ discarded this idea. Staying with political centres, interviewees were asked whether Moscow and Tokyo were key to good relations. In all cases Tokyo was emphasised; Moscow was not regarded as critical. Many respondents on both sides highlighted the Far East emphasising linkages between Tokyo and Russia's regions were key to good relations.

In view of the wider regional cooperation, prospects for Russian-Japanese relations leading to multilateral cooperation in North-East Asia were proposed. All round, with the exception of six parties in Tokyo and the Consul-General of Japan in Boston, the response was positive. Those who responded negatively seemed to believe bilateral

⁹¹Koji, Ishihara (Attache) from the Consulate-General of Japan at Vladivostok, Vladivostok, Russia, who was interviewed on December 4, 1996.

⁹²Okada, Kunio from the Institute for Russian and East European Studies (IREES), Japan Association for Trade with Russia and Central-Eastern Europe (ROTOBO) and Ohashi, Iwao (Chief Representative) from the Moscow Liaison Office, Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO), respectively interviewed November 16-17, 1998.

⁹³Including Maejima, Akira (Division for Assistance to the Newly Independent States) from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, Japan, who was interviewed on October 17, 1997; Miyashita, Tadayuki [Newly Independent States (NIS) Division] from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, Japan, who was interviewed on January 17, 1997; and Tateyama, Akira (Senior Research Fellow) from the Centre for Russia Studies, The Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA), Tokyo, Japan, who was interviewed on October 15, 1997.

reconciliation was necessary prior to multipolarity. Future prospects were the final question. As with the previous question the same respondents answered negatively, as did the two Japanese officials based in Moscow. The subnational regions of all states and the Russians, generally, appeared to be more positive on the prospects for Russian-Japanese relations than those in or representing Tokyo. The building of subnational relations has been key in diluting old conflicts and building ties outside a framework (Moscow and Tokyo) overshadowed by the territorial dispute.

Fieldwork provided an important insight into the thinking of key players in Russian-Japanese relations at all levels. As well as being striking it was a confirmation exercise. Confirmation of attitudes can only be made in person. From a US perspective all parties were positive and hopeful about Russian-Japanese relations. Most noticeable was the change as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The mere fact there was access to sixty individuals on all sides was evidence of this. It is probable responses given to questions posed would have differed prior to 1991. The broad conclusions from fieldwork can be seen in Figure 3.6. Coincidentally, all relate to distance from the political centre.

Figure 3.6: The Changing International Political Economy and Russian-Japanese Relations – Broad Conclusions

	First Parameter	Factor	Second Parameter	Effect
1	Distance from political centre	Increases	Attitudes to Russian-Japanese relations	More positive
2	Distance from political centre	Increases	Significance of territorial dispute	Diminishes
3	Distance from political centre	Increases	Prospects for Russian-Japanese relations	More positive
4	Distance from political centre	Diminishes	Russian-Japanese relations regarded important in North-East Asia cooperation	Increases
5	Distance from political centre	Increases / Diminishes	Moscow's role in Russian-Japanese relations	Negative

It can be concluded from the fieldwork that location is key to determining attitudes to Russian-Japanese relations. Indeed, the changing international political economy has succeeded in changing attitudes, altering lenses through which centuries of conflict have been viewed, and in separating economics and politics with the view cooperation is mutually beneficial. There is clear evidence of the success of liberalism over realism

as subnational regions have emerged as actors in the international political economy. Indeed, globalism has too succeeded.⁹⁴

3.12 The Far East – Conclusions From the Field


Interviewing individuals at all locations was key to understanding differing interpretations of the region – Moscow, Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, Tokyo, Kyoto, Niigata, Sapporo, Hawai'i, Seattle, New York and Boston. The literature on regions, centre-periphery relations, federalism and decentralisation continually emphasise conflict, treaties, agreements and political struggles. The Far East was different though. It presented an interesting case study of a region that was part of a state but simultaneously separate from it. Having been the focus of intense Soviet energies it now turned to those states against which it had previously projected an image of an all powerful empire. Simultaneously, as a region, it had Russia's largest untapped resource base while being the most distant from Moscow. Moreover, its geography and history labelled it as a frontier; a gateway. What were the perceptions of this region? What was its role? Was it a frontier? A gateway? Another Russian region in decline? An international actor? A land bridge between Siberia and North-East Asia? In order to answer these questions it was necessary to assess what the region's problems were perceived to be. Without understanding and clarifying these problems it was impossible to determine whether these problems were real. If they were how were they affecting perceptions and relations?

As with Russian-Japanese relations each interviewee was asked the same set of questions, as well as a number of additional questions to gauge their sentiments on various issues. The aim was to assess views on the Far East from different locations. Was geography going to be key in determining viewpoints on the Far East? What were the key issues affecting centre-periphery relations? What were considered to be the

⁹⁴After the author's fieldwork the building of subnational relations continued with Hashimoto's July 1997 Address to the Japan Association of Corporate Executives where he stated, when talking about *Japan-Russian Federation Economic Issues*: '...The ideas I would like to outline here consist of efforts... to promote development and foster cooperation, especially in the energy sector in Siberia and the Far East region'. Later than year in November, El'tsin and Hashimoto met in Krasnoiarsk and once again the Far East was focused upon: *Exploit energy resources in the Far East and Convene in the Far East a meeting of the Intergovernmental Economic Commission's Sub-Committee on Economic Relations between the Far East and Japan, and to strengthen ties between this sub-committee and business circles*.

greatest problems for the Far East? Below are the results of the key questions asked. The results will be presented first followed by an analysis of the findings.

Figure 3.7: What Role For the Far East? – Fieldwork Conclusions



Notes: MO = Moscow; KH=Khabarovsk; VL = Vladivostok; TO = Tokyo; KY = Kyoto; NI = Niigata; SA = Sapporo; HI = Hawai'i; SE = Seattle; NY = New York; BO = Boston; Frontier = Resource Frontier; Landbridge = Landbridge between Siberian resources and North-East Asia; Buffer Zone = Land of compromise between Russia and North-East Asia; Peripheral = Peripheral region unimportant to either Russia or North-East Asia; and Decline = Just another Russian region in decline. The disadvantages of using this percentage system are that answers to the breakdown of results by location may be swayed by the number of interviewees. For example, in Boston there was only one interviewee who accounts for 100% of the answer, whereas in Tokyo there was numerous interviews and only four results.

The first question was: "How do you view the Far East?" Frontier was the most popular response regardless of geographical location. Only in Vladivostok were all categories of response used. Negative responses – periphery and decline – came from the US Department of Commerce and the Consulate-General of Japan, respectively. In the case of the US Department of Commerce the response was based on the region's difficulty in obtaining foreign investment.⁹⁵ In the case of the Consulate-General of Japan the region was considered to be in decline for a number of reasons, including difficulty in attracting foreign investment (territorial and regional political conflicts),

⁹⁵Author's interview with Kapelush, Tatyana, Commercial Assistant, United States Department of Commerce, Vladivostok, Russia, December 9, 1996.

Moscow's unwillingness to promote and assist the region, high crime rates and heavy bureaucracy in the Far East, as well as the *region's distance from Moscow*.⁹⁶

In Vladivostok (as stated above), Moscow, Kyoto and Boston was the Far East considered to be in decline. In each case it was Japanese respondents who reached these conclusions.⁹⁷ Each of the respondents pointed to the same issues the Consulate-General of Japan (Vladivostok) highlighted. But all respondents also mentioned the territorial issue. *Non-resolution of the territorial dispute was key to the Far East's unattractiveness for Japan*. Each of the respondents commented that in Moscow's absence in terms of assisting in the region's development only Japan was able to take on this role. Moreover, this role could only be fulfilled if the territorial issue was resolved. Thus, the trigger to releasing the Far East's economic potential was dependent upon resolution of political issues. No mention was made, however, of other potential partners who could take on such a role individually or collectively, such as South Korea, China, the US or Canada.

The rest of the respondents saw either a gateway, frontier, landbridge or buffer zone role for the Far East. The region's economic potential and unique geographical position were emphasised by all respondents. The Far East was a resource base that could link Russia with North-East Asia, whose economic complementary nature could be exploited, and whose unique history and position could be a focus for political compromise between Russia and North-East Asia, especially Japan. Geography had not really been key in affecting judgements of the Far East. All in all, all interviewees were aware of the Far East's potential as well as its problems. Political persuasion and institutional affiliation is key in affecting attitudes.

Having concluded geography was not key to determining perceptions of the Far East, the rest of the fieldwork on the Far East was done on an issue by-issue basis rather than a geographical basis. When each of the sixty interviewees was asked what they

⁹⁶Author's interview with Koji, Ishihara, Attache, Consulate-General of Japan at Vladivostok, Vladivostok, Russia, December 4, 1996.

⁹⁷Author's interviews with Okada, Kunio, Institute for Russian and East European Studies (IREES), Japan Association for Trade with Russia and Central-Eastern Europe (ROTOBO), Moscow, Russia, November 16, 1998; Mizobata, Satoshi, Associate Professor of Comparative Economics, Kyoto Institute of Economic Research (KIER), Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan, October 24, 1997; and Kawato, Akio, Consul-General of Japan, Boston, Massachusetts, US, July 18, 1997.

considered to be the biggest problem in centre-periphery relations (Moscow and the Far East), economics topped the list accounting for 45% of responses. Politics was second (25%), then legal issues (18%) and finally by an array of miscellaneous issues collectively identified under the label *other* (12%).

Under the label *economic*, the issues highlighted were: a lack of federal support, high inflation, unstable and unconvertible currency, and lazy and technology unfamiliar labour. All these problems needed resolving but it was really political and legal infrastructures that are the basis for resolving these issues. Indeed, it is the political and legal issues that tolled 42% of responses. As has always been the case in Russia, politics has complicated the uncomplicated, blurred the clear-cut and politicised the non-politicisable. Indeed, in the Far East, politics has added vigour to the region's distance from Moscow, its resources, ethnic minorities, geographical location and proximity to North-East Asia, especially Japan. Given the Russian political system, central politics are key to affecting local and regional politics. At the legal level, confusion arises over which set of laws has seniority. At the federal, regional and local levels, interpretations conflict while infrastructures remain to be built, while others need moulding and other dismantling.

Many interviewees commented on how politics was necessary to resolve economic and legal problems. *Politics was dominated by power struggles rather than resolution of key issues essential to transition.*⁹⁸ Indeed, the Soviet Union's dissolution has resulted in power struggles and diverted attention away from issues key to transition. In the Far East this was exacerbated by the region's isolation and position vis-à-vis North-East Asia and its resources. This has resulted in *the creation of local laws and the regional interpretation of national laws.*⁹⁹ However what about other issues? Crime, bureaucracy and psychological uncertainty were also mentioned as other factors in centre-periphery relations. Indeed, these were issues that emerged

⁹⁸Author's interview with Maejima, Akira, Division for Assistance to the Newly Independent States, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, Japan, October 17, 1997.

⁹⁹Author's interview with Nakagawara, Sunshuke, Manager, Overseas Coordination and Administration Department, Corporate Planning Division, Mitsui and Company Limited, Tokyo, Japan, October 30, 1997

principally from the Soviet Union's collapse.¹⁰⁰ While there was previously a strong authoritative bureaucracy, in the new Russia external (and internal) parties are unsure with what, whom and how to interact. The Soviet regime had a systematic infrastructure of bureaucracy with clear rules and procedures. Crime was virtually non-existent and there was psychological fear rather than psychological uncertainty. Given all these issues in centre-periphery relations, the next obvious question was how the Far East could improve its position vis-à-vis Moscow?

Having looked at varying geographical perspectives of the Far East and the key issues in centre-periphery relations (Moscow-Far East), all interviewees concluded by giving their thoughts on how the Far East could better improve its position vis-à-vis Moscow. Of the responses given, deeper international ties was the most popular conclusion accounting for 54% of answers. All of these interviewees talked of the Far East's need to develop international ties with North-East Asia, primarily with Japan. Some mentioned resolution of the territorial dispute was necessary for this to happen.¹⁰¹ It was clear from the responses the Far East was low on Moscow's agenda. Considering this, many commented that the region's peripheral location as well as the distance and resources, should be exploited to push for greater autonomy and closer ties with North-East Asia, especially Japan.¹⁰² Other responses given, in descending order, were investment, structural and autonomy. As with the need to pursue closer international ties, these responses highlighted the region's need to separate itself from Moscow, pursue policies and strategies that attract foreign investment, create and implement economic, political and legal infrastructures, as well as push for autonomy. All the interviewees considered Moscow an obstacle to improved relations, although not all of them stated so explicitly.

¹⁰⁰Specific issues mentioned in the author's interviews with Nakamura, Motoya, Russia and Eastern Europe Section, Overseas Research Department, Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO), Tokyo, Japan, October 17, 1997; Ninomiya, Koichi, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Middle East Team, Development and Coordination Department, Mitsubishi Corporation, Tokyo, Japan, October 31, 1997; and Minagawa, Shugo, Professor in Comparative Politics, Slavic Research Centre, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Hokkaido, Japan, October 20, 1997.

¹⁰¹Author's interviews with Tateyama, Akira, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Russian Studies, The Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA), Tokyo, Japan, October 15, 1997; Yoshida, Shingo, Institute for Russian and East European Studies (IREES), Japan Association for Trade with Russia and Central-Eastern Europe (ROTOBO), Tokyo, Japan, January 13, 1997 and October 29, 1997; and Yusa, Hiromi, Russia and Eastern Europe Section, Overseas Research Department, Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO), Tokyo, Japan, January 8, 1997 and January 9, 1997.

¹⁰²Author's interview with Minakir, Pavel, Director, Russian Academy of Sciences Far Eastern Branch Economic Research Institute (Khabarovsk, Russia), Tokyo, Japan, January 22, 1997.

These fieldwork results confirmed many of the conclusions in the centre-periphery literature and exemplified that the Far East, despite its differences to other regions, is a classic example of centre-periphery relations in Russia. However, many of these conclusions were, as in the literature, of a socio-political and socio-economic nature. The issues highlighted in the anti-resource thesis had hardly been considered. Furthermore, while it was important socio-political and socio-economic issues were resolved prior to geo-environmental issues, it was essential not to discount the latter. Hence, an awareness of the socio-political and socio-economic issues of the Far East highlights the problems that need resolving in order to realise the region's full potential. However, the additional problems as highlighted in the anti-resource thesis also need to be considered as these are really the underlying problems. Essentially, there is a need to politicise the issues highlighted in the anti-resource thesis.

3.13 The Far East, A Changing Region – A Summary

This chapter has focused on the changing role of the Far East using concepts, contemporary phenomenon and fieldwork (including Russian-Japanese relations in the case of the later). Since the Soviet Union's collapse Russia has undergone a turbulent transition that has affected it as a state, a collapsed empire and a dynamic geographical region. Subsequently, post-Soviet Russia's constituent regions have been subject to the same changes. However the changes that have affected the Far East are more substantial than those to hit most regions due to its Soviet role, geographical location, resource endowment and historical ambience. However, as the Soviet Union collapsed the international political economy underwent significant changes and regions elevated from domestic to international actors. This was a result of changes within the international political economy and as a result of changes within the state.

The Soviet Union's collapse and subsequent liberalisation of the Far East brought great expectations of the region's prospects, role and position within the Russian Federation and North-East Asia. Soviet central planning forced the Far East to send much of her wealth to European Russia for processing while she relied on imports. However transition problems and economic reliance on Moscow mean the Far East has had difficulties integrating into the Russian and international economies. Taking on Gorbachev's gestures, El'tsin pushed for Russia to become an Asia/Pacific power.

Aware of Soviet stagnation, Gorbachev implemented socio-politico-economic reforms that penetrated the entire communist bloc and subsequently in its collapse. His reforms had regional specific policies; one such region was the Far East. A former centralised state began dealing with regionalism for the first time. In the Far East this was exacerbated by the fact the region was the focus of intense energies. As relative levels of centralisation and decentralisation have important effects on state control, the scope and effectiveness of central and regional control are important considerations. Secondly, socio-politico-economic sovereignty could no longer be ignored. Was Moscow still responsible for protecting ethnic communities and managing transition? Finally, Russia's regions were forging international links; they were new actors domestically and internationally. In most instances challenges to the centre or decentralisation are driven not by ethnicity but by specific politico-economic interests. To those advocating a less centralised Russia federalism this means divided or dual sovereignty shared by regions and Moscow. For those advocating a more centralised Russia, sovereignty cannot be divided; federalism means the centre must be supreme.

Russian regions have been active in the international political economy, signing treaties with companies and states.¹⁰³ Whether regions have the authority to conduct foreign policy is important to the type of federalism Russia is constructing. Communism's collapse saw declarations of sovereignty by both Soviet republics and Russian regions. The Far East exemplifies issues central to the plight of other regions while being unique. Historically, resources and geographical proximity to North-East Asia, especially Japan, have determined for the Far East roles of gateway, frontier and power projection. Under communism the Far East was a Soviet fuel line projecting politico-military power at the edge of North-East Asia. Problems highlighted in the anti-resource thesis were overcome through Soviet capital investment. The region had numerous territorial-industrial complexes based around resources the state supported through federal transfers, and labour and settlement programmes.

Many post-communist Far Eastern economic problems are the direct result of the region's Soviet role. The centrally planned economy gave the Far East the role of resource periphery. Far Eastern politics have been turbulent. The region is anti-

¹⁰³Melvin, Neil J., Regional Foreign Policies in the Russian Federation, Post-Soviet Business Forum (PSBF), Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA), Chatham House, London, UK, 1995.

Moscow in character. To a considerable extent Far Eastern politics is attributable to regional geography – within Russia and vis-à-vis North-East Asia and Japan. Two themes characterise Far Eastern politics – tense relations with Moscow and growth of authoritarian executive power at the legislature's expense. The question of the division of powers between the Far East and Moscow contributed to regionalism where regional elites sought to gain greater power at the expense of the centre. Far Eastern politics must consider historical and contemporary developments that have shaped and do shape Russia. In the Soviet Union constituent republics and regions had no part to play in policymaking processes and regional leaders were unlikely to question Moscow's policy direction. In post-Soviet Russia Moscow has to be sensitive to the interests of regions, particularly regions bordering the international political economy – like the Far East. It is these regions that are most likely to forge international ties.

Russian foreign policy has two dimensions – one is the unified state and the other constituent federal units. The former has a unitary temper, but the other, a federalist, has begun to assert itself. The two horses supplement each other when pulling in the same direction. For a decade or so, Russia's regions have been active in the international political economy. The Far East's promotion in North-East Asia is not unfamiliar. Indeed, its international relations are often tied to aspirations for independence, greater autonomy and integration into North-East Asia. Yet it is important to put these relations, and those of other regions, in a larger context. This multilateral governance need not be conflictual and can often be complementary and cooperative. Increasingly, policymaking is an interdependent exercise. All governments are now involved and the trend is intensifying. In Russia there are three intersecting arenas of governance – federal, subnational and intergovernmental (federal-regional). Previously the federal monopolised all relations. Today subnational and intergovernmental drive to increase their roles. Indeed, the role of regions in the international political economy, as exemplified by the Far East in Russian-Japanese relations, is the central theme of this work, and in the final chapter some conclusions on these roles will be made.

Chapter Four:

Conclusions:

Russian-Japanese Relations

– What Role for the Far East?

4.0 The Concept of Roles in the International Political Economy

According to Holsti all actors in the international political economy exhibit one of three traditional orientations.¹ These orientations reflect the system's structure, perceptions of threat, level of involvement, radical-conservative attitudes, and so on. Many actors in the contemporary system, although proclaiming or displaying an interest in the system, do not see themselves as playing distinct roles in the international political economy. Conceptions of roles are considered to define the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to the status of actors, and the functions they should perform in a variety of geographic and issue settings.

The idea of roles has traditionally been considered in the context of states being the actors in the international political economy – whether individually, collectively, regionally or supranationally. These national roles have been closely related to orientations. Roles, too, reflect predispositions, fears and attitudes towards the international political economy, as well as systematic, geographic and economic variables. However, these are more specific than orientations because they suggest or lead to more discrete acts. While the majority of the literature on such roles has focused around states, today non-state actors are of increasing importance and influence and, thus, their roles also need considering. Indeed, non-state actors have increasingly become sources of foreign policy and now play a part in the international political economy.

Holsti conducted a study about international roles and their conceptions based on the content of speeches by high profile policymakers in 71 states during 1965-1967. He revealed there were at least sixteen types of roles that were components of foreign policies of states.² The conclusions of his study can be seen in Figure 4.1 in order of the level of activity implied by the conceptions of role. Those at the top generally reflect high involvement, usually of an active, radical and strong character; those at the

¹Holsti, K.J., *International Politics – A Framework for Analysis*, Fifth Edition, Prentice-Hall International, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, US, 1988, pp.110-115.

²Holsti, K.J., "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy" in *International Studies Quarterly*, No.14, 1970, pp.233-309.

bottom refer to states whose orientations tend to reflect non-involvement, few foreign policy actions, conservatism, passiveness and weakness.

Figure 4.1: Types and Conceptions of Roles

Type and Conception of Role	Details
Bastion of the Revolution, Liberator	Duty to organise/lead revolutions abroad; liberate others
Regional Leader	Duties government perceives for itself in relation to states in a region with which it identifies
Regional Protector	Special responsibilities on a regional or issue area placing emphasis on providing protection for adjacent regions
Active Independent	Supporting non-alignment as affirmation of independent foreign policy; involvement through diplomacy
Liberation Supporter	Sympathisers not liberators; no formal responsibilities
Anti-imperialist Agent	Agents against imperialism
Defender of the Faith	Where foreign policy defends certain values
Mediator-Integrator	Capable of fulfilling or undertaking special mediation tasks to reconcile other (groups of) states; they are fixers
Regional-Subsystem Collaborator	Commitment to cooperative efforts with other state to build communities, coalesce, cooperation and integrate
Developer	Special duty or obligation to assist developing states
Bridge	Vague and stimulates no action; unique geographic location or multiethnic culture positioning a state in a unique position to create understanding amongst others
Faithful Ally	Policymakers declare themselves supporters of fraternal allies; not concerned in receiving aid; committed to aid
Independent	Pursuit best interests; do not imply any particular tasks or functions in the international political economy
Example	Emphasises importance of promoting prestige and gaining influence in the international political economy by pursuing certain domestic policies
Internal Development	Government efforts directed towards problems of internal development; suggests desire for non-involvement in international political economy
Other Role Conceptions	Balancer; anti-revisionist agents; anti-Communist role

Source: Holsti, K.J., *International Politics – A Framework for Analysis*, Fifth Edition, Prentice-Hall International Editions, Prentice Hall – A Division of Simon & Schuster, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, US, pp.111-114.

The first conclusion about national role conceptions and foreign policy is that most governments, and especially those that have a reasonably high level of involvement in the international political economy, see themselves as performing several roles, in different sets of relations, simultaneously. In his sample of 71 states, Holsti found the average number of national roles per state referred to in speeches, press conferences and the like, for the two-year period, was 4.6. Some of the most active states – like Egypt, the US, China and the Soviet Union – saw themselves as playing seven or eight national roles in various international contexts. Smaller and less involved states, such as Sri Lanka and Burma, Niger or Portugal, had only one role conception. Most small states would have none. The study concludes there is a positive correlation between

the activeness of a state and the numbers of role conceptions it develops. If this is true, then expectations of national role conceptions accurately reflect different sets of relations in which a state is involved. However states no longer monopolise the international political economy and there are different sets of relations in which state and non-state actors are both involved. This is the result of the changing international political economy. Yet the relevance of role conceptions is appropriate and essential for background to determining the role of regions within the international political economy and specifically the role of the Far East in Russian-Japanese relations.

4.1 Russian-Japanese Relations – A Changing Framework

Both Russia and Japan, like other powers, have faced domestic upheavals that have changed how they view and interact in the international political economy – emphasising how the domestic affects the international. Each state has its own international political economy – how it views the world, its role in the system, its enemies, its allies, its prospects for cooperation and development, and so on. Unsurprisingly then, the Russian-Japanese bilateral framework has changed both as a result of these domestic changes, as well as changes in the international political economy framework. As with all states, Russia and Japan have both impacted and been impacted by the international political economy. Indeed, what is domestic and what is international are increasingly blurred. This blurring has come from changes in the international political economy – emerging new actors, the demise of other actors, the location of politics, policymaking decisions, the relevance of sovereignty, federalism and globalisation. Russia and Japan both have their own international political economies – their socio-politico-economic and strategic realities, geography and cultures that influenced lenses through which they saw other international actors, interacted with them, and essentially determined policymaking. This was the domestic aspect of international realities.

As with all disciplines, international political economy has theoretical schools of thought. Like with all theory, it captures some of the contemporary, some of the historical as well as being central to critical analysis. Theorising international political economy has captured the contemporary since 1945 – realism and bipolarity; liberalism and international institutions, the separation of politics and economics and multipolarity; globalism and new international actors, the spread of capitalism,

international disorder and further economic development divisions. Coincidentally all of these schools of thought capture certain aspects of Russian-Japanese relations – historically and contemporarily – too. However, neither of them monopolises the framework and neither is fully able to account for regions, like the Far East, as international actors.

4.2 The Far East – An International Actor

During the Cold War, political ideology was key in determining economic relations. There existed two or more international blocs with different political and economic systems. To talk of regions was to talk of either regions within states or groups of states, not as international actors. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the onset of the processes of globalisation, there has been a rise in the interconnectedness of politics and economics as there has, indeed, been a growth in non-state entities international actors. The Far East's history proves regions were international actors long before the onset of the Soviet Union's collapse and globalisation.

The Far East was historically an international actor – both prior to its incorporation into the Russian Empire and since. The region was a crossroads for traders in North-East Asia, a gateway for Eurasia vis-à-vis North-East Asia, a buffer between the Russian Empire and North-East Asia and a conference centre, during the Cold War, between the Soviet Union and Japan/US. The history of the Far East is the development of an international political economy based on interaction with neighbouring states. The region received an impetus through Russian colonial expansion and later through the Soviet developmental model. The history of the Far East is very much that of a region with a developmental legacy of colonisation. Indeed, it is one of a political economy formed in the context of international relations.

The Soviet Union's collapse and subsequent liberalisation of the Far East rekindled hopes of prosperity with an international perspective. Soviet industrial planning forced the Far East to send much of her wealth to European Russia for processing while she relied on imports. Communist Moscow's focus on the Far East was based around resource extraction and security. Today her relationship with the region is, to say the least, uncertain. The latter's location suggests a future orientated towards North-East

Asia. Taking on Gorbachev's gestures El'tsin pushed for Russia to become an Asia/Pacific power. Part of this process involved redirecting the Far East's role. Gorbachev's reforms had specific regional policies that put emphasis on certain Russian regions – one such region was the Far East. The Soviet leader's intentions for the Far East revolved around linking the region to North-East Asia, the Pacific and beyond, but most critically in Japan. But fast approaching Gorbachev's step-by-step reforms were high-speed changes that destroyed the Soviet Union. Communism's dissolution resulted in the loss of state control, faith in government and legitimacy. Furthermore, because relative levels of centralisation and decentralisation have important effects on state control, the scope and effectiveness of central and regional control are important considerations. Socio-politico-economic sovereignty could no longer be ignored. Russia's regions were forging links internationally; they were new actors in the domestic political framework and the international political economy.

The Far East exemplifies issues central to the plight of other regions while being unique. Historically, resources and geographical proximity to North-East Asia have determined for the Far East roles of gateway, frontier and power projection. The Far East's geography had always politicised the region but for a time these politics were the monopoly of Moscow. The Soviet Union's collapse, globalisation, the Cold War's end and transition all meant the Far East was once again politicised – domestically and internationally. Not only was the region's distance from Moscow determining relations with the centre, it was also determining relations with North-East Asia, especially Japan.

The Far East and Trans-Baikal Association for Economic Cooperation attempted to forge trade development and economic links with North-East Asia, especially Japan. A string of committees, commissions and working groups have been and continue to be established within the association framework to facilitate strengthening ties between Far Eastern territories and North-East Asia. During the life of the Soviet system the constituent republics and regions had no part to play in policymaking and regional leaders were unlikely to question Moscow's policy direction. Increasingly foreign policy formulation involves consultation with regional authorities. For example, Far Eastern governors are now invited to joint diplomatic visits as official members of the Russian delegation. Regions are also able to participate in the international political

economy as actors through the creation of their own para-diplomatic contacts with foreign partners, skirting the regulations of central authorities. On the one hand, these communications take the form of transborder cooperation between neighbouring territories, sister relations between cities and municipalities, and cooperation between NGOs. On the other hand regions promote independent foreign policy.

For a decade or so, Russia's regions have been active in the international political economy. The Far East's promotion in North-East Asia is not unfamiliar. Indeed, its international relations are often tied to aspirations for independence, greater autonomy and integration into North-East Asia. Yet it is important to put these relations, and those of other regions, in a larger context. This multipolarity need not be conflictual and can often be complementary and cooperative. Typically, foreign policy, particularly treaty making, is a central government task. More usually, federal government has unambiguous legal control over international relations. However as the state and the international political economy change so do dynamics, structures, procedures, sources, policies, but most of all it is the predictability of relations that changes. What was once static becomes dynamic.

4.3 Theorising a Changing Framework for Relations

Static frameworks are easy to theorise about. Theorising change is more difficult. Yet it is necessary to consider existing frameworks before theorising change. Political scientists are concerned with relationships amongst all actors (state and non-state, international and domestic) to the extent they contribute to the understanding of political phenomena. International relations, like all politics, represent the reconciliation of perspectives, goals and interests – the decision between cooperation and conflict. Conflict and cooperation both attend international relations. Scholars argue over which one predominates, which constitutes the norm and from which deviations must be explained. Realists see conflict as the hallmark of international relations and hold cooperation to be rare, insignificant and temporary. Liberals believe international relations resemble other political systems in the development of norms, rules and a generally cooperative ambience. To them, conflict appears unusual. Scholars of both persuasions concentrate on developing presumptions and relating these to patterns of cooperation or conflict. Ironically, neither school focuses on explaining departures from expected patterns. Both schools emphasis what they

perceive to be the norm. Most basically, states choose between cooperation and conflict, and such decisions underlie the entire spectrum of international relations from alliances to war. When, how and why they choose between them, and with what consequences, constitute the primary foci of the study of international relations.

It is not surprising international relations scholars concentrate on the extremes of conflict and cooperation. These extremes have the greatest impact upon international relations. Both are the final states of a process and both fail to agree on who the dominant actors in the international political economy are and where the basis for relations lies. The natural-fit thesis argues the complementary nature of two economies is the basis for developing economic cooperation in the form of mutually beneficial trade links and, subsequently, improved political relations. The notion uses economics as a basis for resolving political (and other) problems, given that it tries to forge *natural* links between the two states as some factors facilitate trade while others hinder it. Politics can facilitate and hinder. Economics encourages political change by being a basis for the ending of conflict and the birth of cooperation. This change is measured in trade. This idea has historically been applied to states but actors and space in international relations are no longer the monopoly of states.

States continue to function as the central political actors while maintaining the structures that have evolved through history. Globalising and localising dynamics are sufficiently powerful to encourage supranational, transnational or subnational communities hoping to serve their needs and wants better than the states of which they are a part. Such communities may or may not replace states. They may or may not acquire concrete, discernible form. However, the dynamics presently at work in the international political economy can make these nascent communities formidable contenders as engines for change, redesigners of boundaries, sources of power and/or policy. With technological advances, the processes of globalisation and localisation, and the emergence of international institutions, MNCs, NGOs and other similar non-governmental phenomenon, the issue of what level analysis should concentrate on in international relations has been raised. Should the focus be on actions and attitudes of *individual* policymakers? Is it assumed all policymakers act similarly when confronted with similar situations and, therefore, the focus should be on the behaviour of states?

Each level of analysis leads to different conclusions, so it is essential to be aware of the distinctions between them and, indeed, to include them all.

If international relations are examined from the perspective of states, rather than from the system in which they exist, quite different questions arise. State behaviour can be explained by reference not just to the system but also to domestic conditions affecting policymaking. Wars, alliances, imperialism, diplomacy, isolation and other goals of diplomatic action can be viewed as the result of domestic political pressures, national ideologies, public opinion or socio-economic needs. This level of analysis has much to commend it as governments do not react just to the international political economy. Their actions also express needs and values of their population and political leaders. This is the usual approach of diplomatic historians based on the sound premise that what is notionally considered to be *state* behaviour is really policymakers defining purposes. This level of analysis focuses on ideologies, motivations, ideals, perceptions, values or idiosyncrasies of those empowered to make decisions.

The main characteristics of the international political economy are no less important than those of the state's domestic considerations. Therefore, all levels of analysis need to be employed at different times, depending upon the type and nature of the issue at hand. The perspectives of the international political economy are very broad and not totally comprehensive. Which provides the best approach for delineating the *main* features and characteristics of international political processes over a relatively long period of time? Today, the structure of alliances, power, domination, dependence and interdependence set limits upon the actions of states and policymakers, no matter what their ideological persuasion or ideals, and no matter what domestic opinion is.

Yet international relations are too often taken to be the relations between states. Other actors are given secondary importance. This two-tier approach can be challenged. First, ambiguities in the meaning given to *state* and its failure to tally with reality result in its conceptual usefulness being impaired. Greater clarity is obtained by analysing intergovernmental and intersociety relations with no presumption that one sector is more important than the others. Second, it is recognised that governments are losing their sovereignty when faced with MNCs, regional energies and the assertion of ethnicity by different populations. Third, NGOs engage in such a web of global

activities, including diplomacy, that governments have lost their political independence. However it is still quite common to find analyses of international relations that concentrate primarily on governments, give some attention to intergovernmental organisations and ignore transnational actors. Even in fields such as environmental politics, where it is widely accepted that governments interact intensely with UN agencies, commercial companies and environmental pressure groups, it is often taken for granted that governments are the only players. Dominant states may be actors, but exclusive arbiters they are not, and with the continuing processes of globalisation, localisation and decentralisation, parties at all levels have become players. It is no longer possible to ignore the activities of an oil company operating in a state where the ruling regime has no respect for human rights. Similarly, it is essential not to discount the role of regions in the international political economy – economically, politically and so on. This has been accentuated by globalisation – a process that has thrown into disarray concepts such as sovereignty, sources of foreign policy, frameworks of relations, actors, processes, issues and trends.

New trends, issues and phenomenon in politics, international relations and the international political economy all make theorising a changing framework for relations difficult. Indeed, it is not always possible to theorise, and, quite often, it is not always necessary to theorise. Usually a theorising activity is undertaken not for the purpose of constructing a predictive theory of international political economy, but for creating ordering devices or approaches that assist in making sense of the diversity of data and events. Whatever the name of that device, its purpose is to assist in creating an understanding by ordering facts and concepts into meaningful trends and frameworks. Gathering facts or descriptions of events creates an understanding of those facts and events that otherwise do not have broader application. Only when these facts and events are fitted against some framework of concepts can they essentially be seen as illustrations of general and recurring processes in the international political economy. However, an organising device does more than just relate facts to general propositions.

Historians use the organising devices of time, place and subject matter as means of assisting them select appropriate data, for the purpose of relating data and determining the boundaries of their subject. Without such organising devices there would be no place to begin, no limits to assist in research and description, and no way to determine

what facts, conditions or events are relevant. Social scientists also use organising devices; but because they are often interested in classes of social phenomena and processes rather than specific events bound by time, place and subject, their devices will be more abstract than those historians use. For instance, when defining the essence of international relations the term power politics may be used. However the boundaries of international relations based on the use of the term power politics depends on the assignment of the words power and politics. Power and politics are very abstract concepts, more difficult to deal with than concepts relating to time and place. If international relations are defined as power politics or the quest for power then some sort of framework, approach or quasi theory has been established. This provides the boundaries for the subject. It designates key variables that assist in explaining the behaviour of states in their international relations. In this case, power (how it is wielded and how much is available) is posited as the key explanatory variable to the understanding of a state's foreign policies. There are, of course, certain dangers in employing any approach, theory, model or framework in analysis. Although these devices assist in selecting data and relate concepts and variables, they may also act as blinders to other significant facets of the subject. In the case of changing frameworks it is necessary to test existing theories and concepts. However, it is essential to highlight trends and issues as theories or concepts are unlikely to have emerged. In changing frameworks theories tend to emerge retrospectively. One change in the framework of international relations (the international political economy) has been the emergence of new actors.

4.4 The Concept of New International Actors

In diplomacy, international law, journalism and academic analysis, it is widely assumed that international relations consist of the relations between coherent units called states. However, states no longer monopolise international relations as the international political economy has changed. One possible approach to understanding political change can be obtained by analysing the relations between governments and other actors. Indeed, international relations also include companies and NGOs. While there are over 200 states in the international political economy it should not be forgotten there are also some 40,000 MNCs with parent companies with more than 250,000 foreign affiliates. There are 15,000 NGOs with significant international activities and 300 intergovernmental organisations such as the UN, NATO and the EU.

All these actors play a regular part in the international political economy and interact with governments. In addition, even though they are not considered to be legitimate participants in the international political economy, guerrilla groups and terrorists also have their impact. Very many more companies and NGOs only operate in a single state, but have the potential to expand internationally.

There can be no denial of the number of these organisations and their range of activities. The controversial question is whether this non-state international political economy has significance in its own right and whether it makes any difference to the analysis of international relations. It is possible to define international as the relations between states. This is the state-centric approach (realism). Then it is only a tautology to say non-state actors are of secondary importance. A more open-ended approach (liberalism) is based on the assumption that all types of actors can affect political outcomes. Non-state actor implies that states are dominant and other actors are secondary. It also puts into a single category actors that have very different structures, different resources and different ways of influencing politics. The great advantage of the state-centric approach is that the bewildering complexity of international relations is reduced to the relative simplicity of interactions of some 200 units. States are changing, but they are not disappearing. State sovereignty has been eroded, but it is still vigorously asserted. Governments are weaker, but they can still throw their weight around. At certain times the population are more demanding but at other times they are more pliable. Borders are still barriers but they are also more porous. Landscapes are giving way to ethnoscapes, mediascapes, ideoscapes, technoscapes and finanscapes, but territoriality is still a central preoccupation.

The interests of a region in the area of policy result from an interaction of various factors. First, the general political situation within a region, the various developments in the state, as well as socio-economic structures. Regional players and institutions can exert an influence on a region's interests, as can the socio-economic situation. Secondly, the situation of the region within the state it forms part of must be considered. Together with the constitutional status of the region, the region's relations with the federal centre are of particular importance. Distinction must be made between the region's legal-formal relations to the structures of state power and the informal relations that are based upon personal associations. According to the nature of these

relations, a region can enjoy special rights and privileges that positions it more favourably over other regions. A third category of factors is concerned with the region's situation in the international context. These factors acquire an important and increasing significance in the formation of policy interests. Amongst these factors are the geographical proximity of a region to prosperous or crisis-ridden zones, the military strategic situation of a region or the existence of ethnic and territorial disputes. Finally, the investment activity of foreign businesses and states is of significance for the determination of regional interest. All these factors collectively considered are responsible for the progress of regionalisation. Weightings of individual factors depend on specific situations of the federal constituent and must be applied individually in each case.

In post-Soviet Russia the regions exploited the weakness of the centre in order to test the limits and possibilities for extending their spheres of influence and to call into question the nature of the existing dependencies. Regional elites filled the vacuum created by the destruction of the state structure and were able to extend their control over territory and resources during the initial years after communism's collapse. At the same time they set about consolidating the political, economic and legal structures in their own areas. In recent years the region has developed into the real centre of gravity of socio-political life. In view of the centre's weakness and the lack of a strong national identity, the periphery takes control of its direction and is a model for reform designed to meet regional situations.

Regionalism is primarily a concern of regional elites and represents the driving political force in regions. The regional elite is made up of state and non-state players. In view of the concentration of political power within the regional executive, the elected chief executive (the governor or president of the republic) and the bureaucratic or ministerial apparatus that is answerable to them are important for an analysing regional policy. Accordingly, the socio-political orientation of the authoritative political players must be considered. The worldview and the basic political situation of regional political elites may, but not necessarily, influence the policy of a region. Of course, conflicts can arise within a region amongst the various main players and institutions. Regions exemplify the nature of new non-state international actors. But

while regions are one type of actor in the international political economy there are different types of regions.

4.5 Different Types of Regions as Actors

In the post-Soviet international political economy there are different types of actors. Taking the primary example of states it is easy to identify different types of states based on different criteria – for example, geography, wealth, population, size, resources, ethnicity, political systems or type of government (republics or monarchies). Similarly, it is also possible to distinguish different types of regions. Taking the example of the types of regions in Russia, it is possible to determine numerous types of regions – landlocked, border, gateway, landbridge, peripheral, power projection base, resource base, strategic, ethnic, industrial, agricultural, krai, oblast', republic, autonomous okrug and so on. Different types of regions give rise to different roles. Indeed, the nature of a region will determine the type of role it can play. Usually, certain regions are also able to play more than one role. Yet just considering the nature of a region is insufficient to determine the type of entity a region is. It is essential to consider numerous other factors as these determine the nature of a region.

An analysis of a region should include a brief survey of its general socio-economic situation. This includes a description of economic potential (natural resources, infrastructure and trade structure); a survey of regional economic policy; the activities of regional businesses; and a review of the social situation (unemployment, poverty, GNP per capita, life expectancy, education, and so on). It should be possible on the basis of this information to draw conclusions about the type of region a space is.

The existence of certain socio-economic conditions within Russian regions is usually seen as a legacy of the Soviet system. Regions were not only territorial, but also functional units within the national economic complex. The uniform national economic complex of the Soviet Union was based on a specific division of labour and a specialisation of the regions in the manufacture of specific products. After the breakdown of the single economic unit this system collapsed. Thereafter the region was, for the most part, left to its own devices, and the previous division of labour no longer functioned. The products of the region were often no longer in demand within

the internal market, partly because they were seen to be inferior in comparison to foreign products and were, therefore, not competitive. After the Soviet Union's collapse those Russian regions that were rich in natural resources, had a diversified trade structure, well-developed infrastructure and had links with important traffic junctions, were better able to adapt to the post-Soviet environment.

Corresponding to the varying degrees of socio-economic development, there is a pronounced regional variation in regard to the general standard of living in the regions. There are similar imbalances in respect of the unemployment quota and the degree of poverty. It is interesting at this point to see whether a connection can be established between the socio-economic situation and the political orientation of the political elite and population. The analysis of regional patterns of Russian elections 1991-1996 highlights that a correlation exists between economic strength and political orientation. While the population and the elite of poorer areas were motivated to vote either conservative or nationalist, regions with economically more promising perspectives tend to be more liberal and open to reform. After 1996 (the second wave of elections of governors) this pattern either ceased or was less relevant. Nonetheless, regions cannot simply be divided into pro- and contra-reform camps. Regional economic policy presents a much more complex and uneven image and does not always correspond to the policy that might be expected on the basis of a given socio-economic situation.

Apart from elections, the population is hardly involved in political processes in the regions. Active participation – through political parties – exists only to a limited extent (the only party with mass membership in Russia is the communist party) and a regional party system only exists in embryo. In most regions, parties are created for short-term goals – namely the achievement of electoral success. The role of the population in regional processes, however, should not be underestimated. The vital fact is that increasing sections of the population feel a basic affinity with their region and not with the state or any higher concept. Opinion polls confirm the orientation away from the state towards the regions. In regions where the majority of the population harbours secessionist desires, the regional political elite is likely to devise its political programme accordingly. Policy can also be influenced by fear of threats or images of the enemy that predominate the social strata of certain regions. Regional

leaders can be tempted to deliberately stir up fear amongst the population and present the argument of an external threat in order to win imminent elections or exact more support from Moscow. It must be established whether regionalism is based only in the political consciousness of representatives, i.e. of the regional elites, or whether a regional consciousness can be found amongst the population. Following on from that, it is of interest to establish which factors constitute regional awareness. In particular, it is necessary to examine the role external factors play in the formation of social awareness and what influence these exert on regional policy.

A region's range of interests is substantially determined by their legal status within a state and its relations with the centre. These factors determine what possibilities the region has to articulate its interests and put these into practice. The relationship of the region to the centre takes on individual forms. The nature of the relationship is dependent upon the constitutional status of the region within the state, the bilateral contractual relationship and the informal relationships based on personal contacts. In Russia the 1993 constitution lays down, in Article 5, the equality of all the constituents of the federation both to one another and in their relationship with the federation, the asymmetric structure was to remain the determining element of Russian federalism. Some oblast's and krajs were not allowed to retain the status of national republics. The leaders of the republics struggled violently against the removal of distinguishing between Russian and non-Russian areas, which had been demanded by the other regions, because they feared they might lose possibilities of national aspirations to the right of self-determination and, thus, the independent legitimisation of their claim to statehood. Russian federalism is still based on the ethnic principle of a hierarchical division into national and territorial entities carried over the Soviet period.

To deal with post-Soviet difficulties Moscow had no option but to treat national republics with preference, relative to other regions, and to grant them special rights – particularly on the subject of international relations. These rights are guaranteed to republics in bilateral treaties. Since 1996 these treaties on the limitation of powers have been concluded not only with national republics, but also with a number of other regions of mainly economic importance. The centre felt itself forced to take into account not only ethno-national factors, but also the economic potential of a region. For financial reasons Moscow is dependent upon economically and financially strong

regions. As republics have the right to function internationally, to establish relations with other states and to conclude international treaties with them, the question arises as to how far a given bilateral relationship influences the possibilities of the region to act more or less independently in the sphere of the international political economy.

4.6 Prospects for Regions in the International Political Economy

Together with internal prerequisites and the situation of the region in a state, the international political economy has become increasingly important for regional interests in the fields of policy. External factors can be grouped according to the political, the economic and the social. The geographical factor also has particular significance, especially for border regions. The proximity of a region to foreign states can have a significant influence on the policies of regional elites, not only in respect of their international orientation, but also with regard to their relations with the centre. Tensions can arise between the centre and a region when conflicts occur between the centre's international strategy and the region's interests. Such differences can be observed particularly often, although not exclusively, in the case of border regions. As a consequence of growing activity of border regions, the contours of cross-border regional contact are gradually becoming clearer.

In all the regional case studies (especially the studies of border regions) it is important to note the special features of the new geopolitical situation and the implications for a region's international orientation that arise thereof. Each region needs to be assessed according to the importance of strategic security factors, the proximity of prosperous economic zones, the proximity of crisis areas, territorial disputes, cross-border cultural/ethnic factors and so on.

There are two possibilities for subnational regions in pursuing international relations – it can influence the decision-making process of the political centre of the state of which it is part in international relations and it can try to develop foreign policy independently by means of its own network of transnational contacts. While in the first case the difficulty for the region consists of choosing the proper channels and gaining the appropriate participants for the concerns of the region, in the second case the challenge consists of implementing regional foreign policy in such a way as to avoid conflict with the centre as far as possible. Political fragmentation makes decision-

making processes much more complicated. As a result of changing balances of political power, state politicians are increasingly forced to consider the interests of regions, not only in the formation of but also in the implementation of national policies. The centre involves regions more closely in decisions that deal with international problems and also considers regional interest in multilateral affairs, such as international regional agreements and forums. The second form in which regions deal with their international activities is by creating their own networks of para-diplomatic contacts with foreign partners. Due to its weakness the centre fulfils its function as coordinator less and less efficiently, and so this form of regional international relations has increased in importance.

The participation of the Far East in the international political economy is an example of regional actions that have consequences for the internal stability for a state. Increasing numbers of regions are closely integrated into the international political economy and are, therefore, interested in liberalisation. This process, however, does not proceed symmetrically but is limited to a relatively small group of regions; most regions hardly participate in these developments. While uncoupling from the international political economy would have far reaching negative consequences for a small (but important) group of regions, the vast majority of regions are scarcely affected by the changing international political economy. Occasionally, they are only aware of the repercussions that follow in the form of widening internal gaps and increasing competition from outside as from within. Two scenarios can be envisaged from this situation – it could well be that the population and regional elites of those regions which are not linked into the international political economy increasingly tend towards isolationist solutions and see their interests best guaranteed through disconnecting the domestic from the international political economy. It would be just as conceivable that leaders of less successful regions realise that their participation in the international political economy is only possible if comprehensive structural reforms are introduced in their regions. The enactment of such reforms is indeed painful and involves high social costs. Long-term, however, the prerequisites for participation in the international political economy, and thus a change in fortune for the region, can only be achieved in that way.

For the centre it is apparent that economically strong regions, such as those with immense natural resources, eventually become more irreplaceable economic locomotives. The centre approves the integration of regions into the international political economy and tries to promote this development. Not all regions are treated equally, however. Sometimes economically strong regions are granted privileges that place them in an advantageous position in comparison to other regions. By virtue of the freedoms and decision-making powers granted to them, privileged regions have a better starting point.

The Far East exemplifies the role of regions within the state and within the international political economy. The findings from the research conducted for this volume reveals that regions are not new actors in the international political economy. Regions have played a role in international relations throughout history. As the international political economy has changed so has the role of regions. Moreover, different types of regions have played different roles. These different roles have been determined by changes within the state and within the international political economy. Other factors too have affected regions and their role such as history, geography, natural resources, location, proximity to other states, regional politics, security and ethnicity. The role of regions in the international political economy is not determined by one factor. It is the combination of the domestic and the international. Indeed, changes in both affect the role a region has, does and can play. The processes of globalisation, regionalisation, localisation and decentralisation have too contributed to the rise of regions as actors. In the case of the Far East its role has been determined by its geographical location, its strategic importance, its natural resource wealth, as well as its proximity and complementarity to North-East Asia.

4.7 Russian-Japanese Relations – What Role for the Far East? –Future Scenarios

The Far East has always played a role in Russian-Japanese relations. The Far East is an example of the role a region can, does and could play in the international political economy. Its historical and contemporary roles have been detailed in this volume. However, what does the region's future role hold? Many historical and contemporary roles for the Far East depend on the same criteria – the domestic and the international.

Future scenarios for a Far Eastern role depend initially on changes in the international political economy – changes in the international political economy affects actors, how they interact, key issues and trends, the basis of domestic and foreign policy, partners for cooperation and conflict, alliances and so on. In Russian-Japanese relations this means changes in Russia and Japan are key. In Russia this means the success of transition, the nature of politics, legal frameworks, economic growth, the ability to exploit nature's resources, stabilisation of socio-politics, macroeconomic control, infrastructure development, foreign investment attracting parameters, bureaucracy, crime and much more. In Japan this means managing domestic economic decline, the role of the territorial dispute, foreign policy, the separation of politics and economics, other actors in North-East Asia's balance of power – China and South Korea, Japan's search for a new international role, the direction of Japan's international relations (bias towards Asia or the West), and more.

At the domestic level, as well as existing criteria such as natural resources, geographical location and proximity to North-East Asia, hostile centre-periphery relations, the future prospects of Russia will be key in determining the Far East's role. Indeed, it is assumed the region's geographical location and its natural resources are key to its future. Based on these assumptions, the other key domestic criteria that will be key in determining the Far East's role are the national socio-politico-economic situation, Russia's position in the international political economy and trade policies, international commodity market prices, inter-regional cooperation, centre-periphery relations and Russia's relations with North-East Asia. However, as Bradshaw states all of these factors will collectively depend on whether Russia's economic situation proves to be stable, successful or dire.³ Indeed, the same can be said for Japan and for the international political economy. In determining the role of the Far East in Russian-Japanese relations, it is necessary to include all factors – domestic and international, on all sides – Russia, Japan and the international political economy.

³Bradshaw, Michael J., "The Russian Far East – Prospects for the New Millennium" in Bradshaw, Michael J. (Ed.), The Russian Far East and Pacific Asia – Unfulfilled Potential, Curzon Press, Richmond, Surrey, UK, 2001, p.281-284.

4.8 Conclusions

The international political economy is the arena where the units of international relations operate. Their goals, aspirations, needs, attitudes, latitude of choice and actions are significantly influenced by the overall distribution of power. In order to explain what conditions make states behave as they do it is essential to describe what they typically do. Theoretical frameworks include an overview of the main schools of thought in international relations and their insights into the basis and causes for cooperation and conflict, which can be applied to the understanding of Russian-Japanese relations. Moreover, given that the entire nature of the international political economy has changed, part of this theoretical framework has been built around understanding new and changing phenomenon – namely new actors, changing geography and new policy sources and processes. The *new* international political economy is the framework that has changed traditional notions of Russian-Japanese relations. As a result of the Soviet Union's collapse, the position of regions, such as the Far East, has shifted on both the domestic and international stages. The Far East's geography – in terms of location with respect to the centre and the international political economy – as well as its phenomenal resource wealth and harsh environment have politicised this once subdued, isolated and protected region. Having once been the focus of intense energies, the Far East has been left to fend for itself in the post-Soviet international political economy. Though part of the Russian state it is politically detached and veers eastwards with the view to developing ties with North-East Asia. This has raised questions of its role both within Russia and internationally.

The complementary nature of the Russian and Japanese economies, and the Far East's position between these two actors, provides for an interesting case study of the roles of gateway, resource-rich and frontier regions in international relations that are themselves changing in nature, both at a state and systematic level. Theory, while providing the basis for analysing such phenomenon, tends to be built around historical evidence and trends. The history of the Far East's political economy has seen a shifting role for the region. Though debates have centred around whether the region is an important gateway or just an outpost, there has never been any argument about its special status. From being the epicentre of North-East Asian geopolitics, it became the focus of the Russian state's quest for economic growth. Politically, the region was the focus of the tsarist and Soviet developmental models. The Far East also represented a

buffer zone between European Russia and Japan under the guise of the Far Eastern Republic, as well as a base for the projection of Soviet power within the region. When the Soviet Union collapsed, a new Russia, keen to find her feet and adjust to a changing international political economy, re-opened the debate over what role a new Far East should play. However, this was further complicated by changes at the domestic, regional and international levels.

The Far East was, historically, a crossroads between the major powers of North-East Asia, as well as a lure for wealth by Moscow. Before the Sovietisation of the Far East it was a frontier, a gateway and a buffer between Moscow and North-East Asia. The region was key to Russian-Japanese relations – it was the location of economic cooperation, it was the conference centre for meetings between the two states, and it was the focus of political and territorial issues between the two powers. Today the Far East has shifted attention away from the territorial dispute between Russia and Japan. Along with other subnational regions, the Far East has changed the entire nature of Russian-Japanese relations. It has diluted the traditional structures of relations in this bilateral framework and it is building cleavages based around the many aspects of international relations. In many ways the Post-Soviet Far East is recreating its pre-Soviet role – one of an actor in a changing international political economy.

Russian-Japanese relations have, like relations between other states, tended to be built around or dominated by one historical issue. In this case it is the territorial dispute. Like relations between other states Russian-Japanese relations have seen both periods of cooperation and conflict. However, there are two things that differentiate Russian-Japanese relations from relations typical of that between two states. Firstly, relations have always existed between these geographical areas. These geographical regions initially had no nationality (i.e. they were not affiliated either with the Russian or Japanese states), and then became part of states that unified all the territories adjacent to their motherland. These territories then became parts of expansionist empires – the tsarist succeeded by the Soviet empire and the Japanese empire. Today relations still exist between these same geographical regions while the states they form part of are undergoing domestic transitions and trying to determine their international roles. The second differentiating factor is that the two states have seen both mutual economic gain and political ideology be the key determinants of relations. Officially these have

not existed simultaneously. Unofficially they have. State level relations – those between Moscow and Tokyo – have used politics as the basis for bilateral relations. Non-state level relations – those between sub-national regions – have used mutual economic gain as the basis for bilateral relations. Consequently, conflicts of interest between the centre and the periphery have emerged both in regard to domestic and international relations and are, in Russia as elsewhere, a driving force of globalisation.

4.9 Russian-Japanese Relations – What Role for the Far East?

In the introduction it was stated that this study would strive to make a contribution by attempting to fill in some of the gaps in the literature as well as by building on existing literature by:

- Firstly, the incorporation of theory into this study – something innovative in studies about Russian-Japanese relations and the Far East;
- Secondly, by attempting to determine the socio-politico-economic role of (resource-rich) regions in international relations by using the Far East as an example;
- Next, by attempting to understand post-Soviet Russian-Japanese relations and the Far East both independently and in the frameworks of Russian-Japanese relations and North-East Asia;
- And, finally, by using all of this research and its findings the key objective was to provide a contribution to the literature of international relations by investigating the role of regions in the changing international political economy.

This study has incorporated theoretical ideas relevant to this study. This theoretical application has been multi-disciplinary in its approach, something that is uncommon to such studies. Most theoretical applications tend to focus on one discipline. This thesis has included ideas from politics, international relations, economics, geography and Soviet studies. It is the first time theory has been applied to any studies on Russian-Japanese relations. Application of theory to the Far East is not new, but a multi-disciplinary approach is. Theory has been used to understand the relationship between Russia and Japan, and the Far East as an actor. It has been applied to assist in showing how the relationship has changed over time and, indeed, has been key to understanding how the entire framework of the international political economy has changed. It has also been key in explaining how and why new actors, such as regions like the Far East, have entered the international political economy.

In determining the socio-politico-economic role of (resource-rich) regions in international relations by using the Far East as an example, this study has looked at regions. It has seen how the international political economy has changed and how regions have become actors in their own right. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union it has looked at decentralisation, centre-periphery relations, globalisation and post-Soviet transition and how they have all given rise to the role of regions in the international political economy. It has also further examined the role of regions that are peripheral (located on the edge of a state), those that are geographically proximate to other more developed states and those that are rich in resources. The research findings have detailed how regions, especially those that are resource-rich, have been able to establish roles for themselves independent of the political centre of the state of which they are part – notably the Far East. Research into regions leveraging their geographical position and resources to improve their socio-politico-economic position is not new, what is new is:

- The application of a multi-disciplinary approach;
- The recognition of the influence of history and of geography;
- The realisation of the harsh socio-politico-economic realities that impact regions both from within a state and as a result of the changing international political economy;
- And, an emphasis that a region's role can, does and has changed.

In attempting to understand post-Soviet Russian-Japanese relations and the Far East both independently and in the frameworks of Russian-Japanese relations and North-East Asia, this thesis fully examined pre-Soviet and Soviet relations between the two states. It combined relations of three separate periods and was able to analyse and draw a picture of how relations were built, grew and have developed. It looked at Russian-Japanese relations in terms of bipolarity and multipolarity (the later in the context of North-East Asia). It applied theory to Russian-Japanese relations and emphasised how theory related to the changing dynamics of the relationship, based on theories and ideas of international relations. More than that, fieldwork was carried out in the field with key individuals who were impacting and analysing Russian-Japanese relations at the national and subnational levels. Research findings rubbished the myth that Moscow and Tokyo dominated relations. It also looked at how subnational relations were impacting Russian-Japanese relations. The thesis's contribution to the field of study of Russian-Japanese relations was:

- Understanding Russian-Japanese relations at the subnational and national levels;
- Time-lining and analysing the birth, emergence and development of Russian-Japanese relations;
- Taking into consideration the changing domestic and international frameworks and how they impact Russia and Japan, their foreign policy decision making and their mutual relations with each other directly and within the context of North-East Asia; and
- Interviewing key figures in Russian-Japanese relations both at the national and local levels.

In attempting to understand the Far East, detailed analysis of regions as actors was undertaken. Attempts to examine different types of regions based on their location, resources and historical roles were pursued. Theory was applied both to the ideas of regions as part of a state as well as to the idea of regions as actors in the international political economy. In terms of examining the history of the Far East, this was done from the Russian Empire's expansion and incorporation of the region up and until the collapse of the Soviet Union. This was key in determining how the Far East had grown as an actor and the key influences upon its development – politically (the centralised tsarist and Soviet empires, as well as relations with North-East Asia), economically (its phenomenal resource base), and socially (its interaction with North-East Asia, its location and its relations with Moscow). In contributing to understanding the Far East, this research has:

- Undertaken original fieldwork and interacted with local, national and foreign parties;
- Applied theory, history, geography and contemporary knowledge to the Far East;
- It has understood that the Far East has always been an international actor, that its post-Soviet role is as much determined by Moscow as it is by interaction with surrounding states;
- And, taken a multi-disciplinary approach to the study of the Far East whereas most studies tend to be either one of economic, political, historical or geographic.

With the view to combining primary and secondary research, and its dissemination, the key objective of this thesis was to make a contribution to the literature of international relations by investigating the role of regions in the international political economy. This study has investigated this role by applying theory to this study, by using a unique case study – the Far East in Russian-Japanese relations, by undertaking

a multi-disciplinary approach and by analysing pre-Soviet, Soviet and post-Soviet phenomenon that have impacted the frameworks of this study.

4.10 A New Role for the Far East – Potential and Reality

As a final piece to this study, this last section, “A New Role for the Far East – Potential and Reality” will critically reassess the author’s argument in relation to the aims of the thesis and the nature of the Far East region, recognising that the:

- Far East has not been a unitary actor and this has prevented it having a cohesive role in the areas researched;
- Documentary and interview material cited in the thesis only establishes the *potential* and not the *actuality* of an autonomous regional role; and
- Political developments under Putin since the end of the research timeframe have reversed most of the trends towards regional autonomy on which the author has based this study.

The Far East, in spite of attempts, has not been a unitary actor and this has prevented the region from having a cohesive role in the areas researched, namely in Russian-Japanese relations. What defines a region is that it has certain characteristics that give it a cohesiveness and distinctiveness setting it apart from other regions. Regions can be geographical, administrative, political, economic, social, cultural and so on. In the case of the Far East the region is both geographical and administrative. But geography and administration do not imply unity. Indeed, in terms of the political, economic, social and cultural, there are similarities but political and economic differences have culminated in little unity in the Far East. Indeed, the Far East not being a unitary actor has been central to the region having a cohesive role in Russian-Japanese relations. What have emerged, instead, are generalisations about the role that the region did, can, does and could play. In reality different roles are played by each of the individual territories that make up the region. Each has differing relations with the centre, varying degrees of economic development, industrial production, infrastructure, natural resources and political problems, which are all affected by their territorial assignation. The Far Eastern resource endowment and, thus, its economic potential are not uniformly distributed across the region. Primor’e and Khabarovsk compete for the title of gateway territory. Khabarovsk City (the capital of Khabarovsk) was the key Far Eastern centre during the Soviet era while Vladivostok (the capital of Primor’e) was

closed for forty-five years until 1992. But the territories have struggled to unify and capitalise on their shared interests, due to politics.

The lack of unity can be partially explained by the split of the territories into two broad groups – the republics versus the oblasts, krajs and various autonomous okrugs. The rivalry was focused on the question of the 1993 constitution. Early drafts gave the republics more privileges and a larger share of the power by virtue of having more seats in the upper chamber of parliament. The krajs and oblasts objected because there were more of them in most cases they were more populous and wealthier. The difference between the two types of territories has been festering since 1991. It had led to a series of precipitant actions, many, but not all, of them with examples in the Far East – the abortive movement for a republic (Enisei Republic in the summer of 1991), threats to declare republics (Tomsk and Irkutsk Oblasts), actual declarations of republics (Urals Republic, Amur Republic), postponed declarations of a republic (Eastern Siberia), declaration of intention to declare a republic (Primorskii Republic), discussion of a declaration of a republic (Kamchatka Republic), and even rejection of a republic (the Far Eastern Republic).

The organisation around which any independence or regional autonomy movement would have to be based in the Far East is the Association of Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal Territories. It was created in August 1990 by the Soviets in the territories of the Far East. Its purpose was to help the Soviets coordinate their activities and allow them to protect the interests of the region. Like other regional associations its original interest was, and remains, economic. It has worked independently and in cooperation with other regional associations to wring various economic concessions from Moscow. It has even drawn up a development plan for the Far East as a means of providing a road map for a better, brighter future. However, as with all things Russian it, too, has been politicised. When Sakhalin Governor Fedorov brought up the question of the disputed territories before the group there was little choice. He told the other representatives at a meeting that if Moscow could not defend Russia from national betrayal, then a Far Eastern Republic must save Russia and Moscow itself from a territorial repatriation of the disputed territories. The Association of Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal Territories was not willing to accept the proposal to create a Far Eastern Republic, but it did send an appeal on the disputed territories issue to Moscow.

In terms of economics the Far East can be treated as a region in that it has common features – an abundance of resources, the drive to leverage resources as a mean to make political gains from Moscow, and that economics to key to cooperation with North-East Asia. The most common feature of all the Far Eastern regions it that they all seek drastic means for their survival. But coordination of these territories into a unitary region in terms of policy certainly does not exist. From an economic point of view, there have emerged three broad sub-units in the Far East: the southern Far East that shares borders with China (Primor’e, Khabarovsk and Amur), the Okhotsk rim with fishing monoculture (Sakhalin and Kamchatka) and the northern Far East which relies on the extraction of diamonds and gold (Sakha and Magadan). The strategy for integration with North-East Asia is different for each Far Eastern territory. Given the deepening differentiation and conflicts of interest amongst these territories, it is difficult to imagine that an organisation similar to the Association of Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal Territories that comprises all the territories of the region will be created in the near future. Moreover, political conflicts in the Far East could become more complex and more severe, further driving away any unitary prospects, namely:

- The continuing tug of war between Moscow and the territorial leaders for control over resources and the distribution of taxes;
- Competition amongst various territories could intensify; both intra-territorially and in terms of centre-periphery relations;
- Political struggles within territories could become further complicated with various factions seeking support from various political influences in Moscow and abroad;
- A serious gap between economic necessity and political/psychological reaction to this economic intensity has developed amongst the populace, making the situation politically volatile and uncertain. When the survival of the region depends on integration into North-East Asia, and indeed such integration is proceeding with tremendous speed, it becomes clear that the most important agent to make important decisions is the local government. And yet, the local interest in local self governance has sharply declined; and
- Forced integration with North-East Asia has created political and psychological tensions.

While this study has investigated the potential role regions can play in the international political economy as exemplified by the example of the Far East in Russian-Japanese relations, it exemplifies issues central to the plight of other regions while being unique. However, what all studies, including that undertaken by the author here, have done is not look deeply at the non-unitary elements of the region being investigated. This volume has made conclusions based on cooperation amongst the individual ten territories of the Far East. But the Far East is not and has not been a unitary actor and this has prevented it having a cohesive role in Russian-Japanese relations. As highlighted by the classifications made by Hanson, Bradshaw and Treyvish, and Lysenko and Matveev, each of the Far East's territories has different roles to play. Indeed, each territory has more than one role it can play. This, in turn, is a further contributing factor to the non-unitary nature of the Far East as a region.

And, now to the second point of this final section – the documentary and interview material cited in this thesis establishes only the potential and not the actuality of an autonomous role. This study strove to make a contribution to the field of international relations by attempting to fill in some of the gaps in the literature as well as by building on existing literature in four key ways: the incorporation of theory into studies about Russian-Japanese relations and the Far East; by attempting to determine the socio-politico-economic role of (resource-rich) regions in international relations by using the Far East as an example; to understand post-Soviet Russian-Japanese relations and the Far East as an example; to understand post-Soviet Russian-Japanese relations and the Far East both independently and in the frameworks of Russian-Japanese relations and North-East Asia; and by using all of this research and its findings the key objective is to provide a contribution to the literature of international relations by investigating the role of regions in the changing international political economy. Indeed, this research makes a contribution from the fact that the documentary and interview material cited is based on primary research conducted in different times, locations and with interviewees than that previously undertaken in this field of study.

As previously cited the primary research for this thesis involved gathering facts or evidence by going directly to the source itself – fieldwork in Russia, Japan and the US. The research conducted for this volume involved collecting facts that could be

objectively observed and measured. It made inferences about the unknown made on the basis of the known; not necessary statements of truth but hypotheses that may or may not be valid. But the documentary and interview material cited only determined the potential or prospective role of the Far East in Russian-Japanese relations. It only used the Far East as a case study for the role of regions in the international political economy and was not concrete actuality. It made inferences about the potential based on the primary research conducted and, thus, is not a detailed study of the actual role of the region whether it is autonomous or not. Conclusions drawn are based on the culmination of primary research findings as well as secondary materials. They use hypothetical studies and scenarios to reach conclusions that are based on best practice and not necessarily material ones. Indeed, they make conclusions based on a specific time period – to 1998, which does not consider developments since. This leads to the third and final part of this last section: the political developments under Putin since the end of the research timeframe have reversed most of the trends towards regional autonomy on which the author has based this study.

Regarded as intelligent, tough and hardworking, Putin was chosen by El'tsin to succeed Stepashin as Prime Minister in August 1999. Putin quickly became popular with many Russians for his September invasion of Chechnia in response to terrorism and the invasion of Dagestan by Chechen militants. After parties aligned with Putin won solid support in the December 1999 parliamentary elections, El'tsin resigned and Putin became Acting President. Putin quickly moved to reassert the central government's authority over all territories and sought to exert control over elements of the independent media. He won enactment of liberal economic reforms and ratification of international arms agreements, while also renewing ties with former Soviet client states and maintaining Russia's strong opposition to proposed US ballistic missile defences.

December 11, 2004 saw the war in Chechnia officially enter its second decade, three months after the terrorist attacks on School Number One in Beslan, Northern Ossetia. The incident brought to the fore the fact that after ten years of war in Chechnia, the situation in the Northern Caucasus had become desperate. Russian has to contend with the potential resurgence of ethno-political and inter-communal conflicts that marked the collapse of the Soviet Union, including the conflict between the Ossettian and

Ingush communities around Beslan, and the further deterioration of the region's economy, social conditions and political structures. Putin and other Kremlin officials saw all this as a product of the 1990s. For them, the 1990s were not years of emerging political pluralism, as they are generally viewed in the West, but a decade of chaos. From their perspective, regional leaders took El'tsin's famous exhortation to *take as much sovereignty as you can swallow* as a signal to create their own fiefdoms. These leaders defied Moscow, produced a myriad of new regional regulations, and both reduced and diverted revenue flows away from the federal government into inappropriate hands. Electoral politics in the regions became irremediably corrupt as local mafias and business interests emerged as the primary backers of gubernatorial candidates and their campaigns. They were very much in charge, not local publics and not even Moscow.

From Putin's point of view, decentralisation under El'tsin served to fragment the federation and encouraged the kind of moves toward regional separatism that Chechnia embodied in its worst form. In his opinion, the self-interest of corrupt local elites, in Chechnia and elsewhere, came to replace the purported principles of self-determination that had led to the creation of Russia's federal system in the Soviet era. Putin and those around him became increasingly frustrated at the growth of regional problems and disparities and at their inability to exert control over key parts of the federation. As a result, the Kremlin became convinced that restoring Moscow's firm grip over Russia's regions was necessary to preserve national unity and public security from the twin threats of secessionism and terrorism. This conviction was bolstered by the tragedy of Beslan and the inability of local authorities to either prevent or respond to the attack.

In ending the direct election of regional governors, Putin has made it clear that his purpose is to ensure that governors will now answer to him – the President. They will serve the Russian state not regional mafias. In sum, from Putin's perspective, his centralising reforms are directed at rooting out the widespread corruption that facilitated the Beslan attack, at halting the manipulation of regional elections and politics that made regional leaders beholden to local interests rather than Moscow, and at making local leaders personally responsible to the President for the outcome of developments in their regions.

Although Putin's administrative changes may have their own internal logic, they seem, from the outside – in specifically and deliberately removing local participation in decision-making through the electoral process – destined to complicate Moscow's ability to govern the country effectively in the future. This is not least because the changes raise the question of whether or not Russia can ultimately continue to be designated as a federal state, where powers are delimited between the centre and the territories. The short answer to this question seems to *no it cannot*. And if this is, indeed the case, then Russia's demise as a federation will constrain Moscow's efforts both to manage the affairs of the North Caucasus and to re-integrate Chechnia into the state as a distinct territory. The administrative changes also seem likely to increase political tension in republics like Tatarstan, where pro-independent movements in the early 1990s were defused by developing authority over certain aspects of economic, social and political life from Moscow to Kazan.

In essence, under Putin, Moscow is moving away from the conception of Russia as a multi-ethnic/multi-territorial state. Nationality issues – which were a dominant feature of politics in the North Caucasus and Russia's Volga region (including Tatarstan) under the Russian Empire as well as the Soviet Union – are being concealed under the more neutral label of *regional issues*. National territories, like Tatarstan and the republics of the North Caucasus, are being demoted to *regions*. The autonomy of Tatarstan outlined in a February 1994 landmark treaty with Moscow has been diminished since Putin came into power in 2000. And Moscow has stopped concluding similar power-sharing treaties with other regions and begun to roll them back. The Russian Nationalities Ministry, which was essentially abolished as a ministerial structure in March 2004, was reinstated after Beslan as the Ministry of Regional Development. And during Moscow debates on the appointment of regional governors, further proposals were put forward to curtail the authority of regional assemblies, directly appoint mayors, and even to abolish autonomous republics and regions all together by returning to a modified form of the tsarist-era provinces.

The idea of federalism from the bottom-up, which was championed by Tatarstan and its President Shaimiyev, and which promoted political parity between the centre and the regions, has been rejected by Moscow. Putin has made it clear that federalism, if it is to exist at all, will be created from the top-down. It will not be based on mutual

agreements between the centre and regions, but on what Moscow decides is appropriate to delegate to the regions.

This is particularly problematic as just after Beslan (in a September 6, 2004 meeting with Western analysts at his residence in Novo-Ogarevo) Putin promised *more flexibility* in dealing politically with Chechnia and North Caucasus, and *more autonomy* for Chechnia. But if the political framework for autonomy is removed, and Russia becomes a unitary state, is it possible to create and sustain Chechnia as a *special case*? Elites in Russia's traditional autonomous republics, like Tatarstan and the republics of the North Caucasus, have consistently opposed the formation of a unitary state (not least because this would undercut their own power base). Furthermore, in moving to build a new political and administrative system in Russia entirely from the top down, Putin is also trying to create a new cadre of regional leaders by inserting people from outside – essentially those from Moscow. In appointing presidential representatives and governors he has abandoned the task of developing and cultivating new leaders at the local level who can eventually win genuine popular support. Indeed Putin does not trust local elites who are not closely tied to Moscow (or to St. Petersburg). Too much local *initiative* and *leadership*, not too little, has been Russia's problem in Putin's mind.

The approach of imposing regional leaders from outside will also put a strain on Moscow's own personnel resources. Putin's vertical of power is not a conventional pyramid with a broad base of support. It is a narrow column extending down from the Kremlin. This is because, unlike the secretary-generals or presidents of the Soviet period, Putin does not have a party structure or a system of collective leadership to rely on. Since coming to power in 2000, Putin has improvised with an informal system that has drawn on a coterie of colleagues from his service in the KGB and in St. Petersburg's municipal government. The new governance reforms will tax the limited pool of competent people at his disposal. Dmitrii Kozak's appointment illustrates Putin's dilemmas. Kozak is a close associate of Putin's from his St. Petersburg days. He has already had a number of appointments in the Russian government apparatus and the Presidential Administration, and was formerly in charge of modernising the federal government bureaucracy.

In essence, Putin has replaced power-sharing agreements with Russia's regions and direct elections with a network of his own emissaries or viceroys, like Dmitrii Kozak. International precedents, as well as Russia's own historical experience of the tsarist and Soviet period, indicates that this approach will do little to resolve Russia's long-term and deep-rooted problems in regions like North Caucasus. It can provide a temporary fix at best. Trusted aides like Kozak cannot be shifted around from position to position indefinitely as new challenges arise. As a consequence, governance reforms based on central appointments run the risk of creating a hollow, watered-down state, rather than a strong or effective one at either the federal or local level.

In essence, since Putin's accession to power in 2000, he has done more to reverse most of the trends towards regional autonomy upon which this study has been based. His strong arm has seen a shift to centralise power back to Moscow by reducing the willingness to negotiate with territories as well as by ensuring central government is key to determining who the key players in local politics are. Putin has, thus, reduced the role of regions, such as the Far East, and their ability to be considered part of the international political economy.

Appendices

Appendix 1:

Maps


Appendix 1: Maps

Figure A1.1: Russia and Japan




Source: <http://www.thedoramaps.co.uk>

Figure A1.2: The Far East



Source: RFE Update, Seattle, Washington, US, 1996

Figure A1.3:
The Far East Between Russia and Japan



Source: <http://www.theodora.com/maps>

Figure A1.4:
The Disputed Islands Chain



Source: <http://www.maps.com>

Figure A1.5:
The Disputed Territories and the 1855 Shimoda Treaty



Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, Japan

Figure A1.6:
The Disputed Territories and the 1875 St. Petersburg Treaty



Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, Japan

FigureA1.7:
The Disputed Territories and the 1905 Portsmouth Treaty



Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, Japan

Figure A1.8:
The Disputed Territories and the 1951 San Francisco Treaty



Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, Japan

Figure A1.9:
Manchuria



Source: <http://www.comptons.com>

Figure A1.10:
The Korean Peninsula/North-East Asia



Source: <http://www.maps.com>

Appendix 2:
Territories and Treaties
– The Origins of Russian-Japanese Conflict

Appendix 2: Territories and Treaties – The Origins of Russian-Japanese Conflict

Between the Sea of Okhotsk and North Pacific there sit a tiny chain of islands the Russians call *the Kurils* and the Japanese *the Northern Territories* (see Figure A1.4). Normally these ancient volcanic peaks would be of little interest to most, aside geologists and anthropologists. Along with Sakhalin Island they form Sakhalin Oblast – a Far Eastern territory. Russian exploration of these territories began in the 1600s. By the 1700s, Japan was exploring and settling Sakhalin and the Kurils too, establishing factories and fishing communities. It was this co-exploration and settlement that gave rise to the Russian-Japanese territorial dispute. Russian-Japanese relations have long been explained to the territorial dispute. But this explanation is more rhetoric than reality, more symbolism than substance, more excuse than explanation.¹ The issue dominates Russian-Japanese relations. The territorial dispute has been central to Russian and Soviet relations with Japan. The issue has rendered full amity all but impossible, preventing a post-WWII peace treaty.² Japan believes normalising relations with Russia would benefit both sides, North-East Asia and more. She sees a positive correlation between the territorial dispute's resolution and normal relations.³ Historically, both Russia/Soviet Union and Japan were concerned with ownership claims rather than the truth, law or justice.⁴ The principal effort of Soviet historians was to claim Sakhalin and the Kurils by rights of earliest settlement and assimilation. Regrettably, this obsessive search for ownership left little room for objectivity. Japanese historians have been just as successful in dismissing myths about

¹Moodgal, Rahul N., "Russia/Japan – Closer Links" in *Oxford Analytica Daily Bulletin*, August 13, 1997, pp.8-9; Katori, Yasue, "Japanese-Soviet Relations – Past, Present and Future" in *Japan Review of International Affairs*, Vol.4, No.3, Fall/Winter, 1990, pp.127-141; Kawato, Akio, "Beyond the Myth of Asian Values – Is a Clash of Cultures Inevitable?" in *Chuokoron*, December 1995, pp.1-11. The territorial dispute concerns three main islands (Kunashiri, Etorofu, Shikotan) and the Habomai group of three smaller islands, lying of the tip of Hokkaido. Japan accuses Russia (and previously the Soviet Union) of illegally occupying the islands since the end of WWII. Claims for (southern) Sakhalin have also been made, but these have, largely, ceased. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Japan documents still highlight the disputed islands *and southern Sakhalin* in the same colour as Japan in maps showing Russia and Japan.)

²Matsumoto, Shun-ichi, *Northern Territories and Russo-Japanese Relations*, Northern Territories Policy Association, Tokyo, Japan, 1970, pp.1-2.

³*Izvestiia*, April 21, 1992 and May 5, 1992; See Allison, Graham, Kimura, Hiroshi, and Sarkisov, Konstantin (Eds.), *Beyond the Cold War to Trilateral Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region – Scenarios for New Relationships Between Japan, Russia and the US*, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, US, 1992, Appendix F.

⁴Kamiya, Fuji, "The Northern Territories – 130 Years of Japanese Talks with Czarist Russia and the Soviet Union" in Zagoria, Donald S. (Ed.), *Soviet Policy in East Asia*, Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut, US, 1982, pp.121-151.

early assimilation.⁵ But it remains unclear when Japanese exploration of these territories exactly commenced.⁶

Japan claims the islands have never been under the jurisdiction of any other state.⁷ Supporting this contention, Japan cites two treaties with tsarist Russia – the 1855 Shimoda Treaty (see Figure A1.5) and the 1875 St. Petersburg Treaty (see Figure A1.6) – as the initial point of her argument that the islands are part of Hokkaido. Japan also holds that the 1951 San Francisco Treaty (see Figure A1.8) provides no legal basis for Russian control of the territories. The contention is the interpretation of the San Francisco Treaty (see Figure A1.8). Under Article 2, section (c), *Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kuril Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905* (see Figure A1.7). The peace treaty does not specify to whom these territories were relinquished; it also does not define what territories compose the *Kuril Islands*. What's more the Soviet Union refused to sign the treaty.⁸ The Portsmouth Treaty (see Figure A1.7) marked Russia's decline and Japan's emergence. Article 2, section (c) can be interpreted as a symbolic manifestation of this double character.⁹ Russia's claim to these islands is based on law and history. She states she landed and conquered the islands before Japan, and the island's residents were Russian first.¹⁰ Indeed, wartime allied agreements and the San

⁵Japanese Embassy, *Severnie Territory Yaponi*, Japanese Embassy, Moscow, Russia, 1992, pp.3-11.

⁶Geographical features of the disputed islands suggest closer links with Hokkaido than the rest of the Kurils. According to botanists, flora found on Hokkaido and the disputed islands favours Japanese botany, while the rest of the Kurils are more Sub-Arctic – closer to Russia's geographical character.

⁷Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Japan –Public Information Bureau, *The Northern Islands – Background of Territorial Problems in the Japanese-Soviet Negotiations*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Japan, Tokyo, Japan, 1955, p.7.

⁸Treaty ending the Russian-Japanese war. Germany, the US and Britain were instrumental in forcing reconciliations. Russia was compelled to recognise Korea's independence and Japan's *paramount political, military and economic interests* in Korea. Russia also agreed to place Manchuria under China's sovereignty again and all foreign troops removed. Railways in South Manchuria, constructed by Russia, were ceded to Japan without payment. The disputed Liaotung Peninsula, containing ports Dalian and Arthur, and southern Sakhalin, became Japanese, as did Far Eastern fishing rights.

⁹Tsuyoshi, Hasegawa, "Rethinking the Russo-Japanese Territorial Dispute" in *Japan Echo*, Vol.22, No.4, Winter 1995, pp.4-11.

¹⁰*Izvestiia*, November 13, 1970: '...Russian explorers [learned] of the Kurils as early as 1632, when no one on the... islands... knew... Japan existed. When they were discovered by Russia, the Kurils and Sakhalin were inhabited by the Ainu and Siberian nationalities... Even much later, in 1726, Russian navigators [failed to see Japanese] on the Kurils. [It was impossible for] Japanese to be [on the islands], since the laws of that time, under the rule of the Tokugawa Shoguns, forbade... Japanese to leave their [homeland]... Japanese historians... wrote... Sakhalin, ...the Kurils... [and] even the islands of Ezo (now Hokkaido), were not regarded as possessions of Japan until the middle of the nineteenth century'.

San Francisco Treaty are also used to confirm Russian claims.¹¹ Japan disputes Russia's historical facts, arguing the issue is not initial discovery but whom effectively *ruled*. Russia rejects Japan's claims based on the Shimoda and St. Petersburg Treaties; the reason being Japan initiated war against Russia in 1904 so violating these treaties. Japan also invaded northern Sakhalin, the Far East and Siberia in the 1920s, violating the 1905 Treaty.

The Shimoda Treaty (see Figure A1.5) initiated exchanges between Russia and Japan, establishing a boundary between Etorofu and Uruppu, but not for Sakhalin.¹² Subsequently, there was mixed Russian and Japanese settlement of the island. The St. Petersburg Treaty (see Figure A1.6) established boundaries – making the Kurils Russian and Sakhalin Japanese. However, the treaty did not state the Kurils were a chain of eighteen islands north of Uruppu and excluded today's disputed islands.¹³ The Postdam Declaration confirmed the disputed islands were not Japanese.¹⁴ In August 1945 the Soviet Union violated a neutrality agreement with Japan and entered into war. After seizing southern Sakhalin the Soviet military seized the disputed territories.¹⁵ They were incorporated into Soviet territory in 1946;¹⁶ Soviets replaced the island's Japanese inhabitants.¹⁷ The subsequent San Francisco Peace Treaty (see Figure A1.8) saw Japan renounce her rights to Sakhalin and the Kurils although the *Kuril Islands* she renounced excluded the disputed territories.

¹¹Kim, Young C., Japanese-Soviet Relations – Interaction of Politics, Economics and National Security, The Washington Papers, Vol.2, The Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Sage Publications, Beverley Hills, California, US, 1974, pp.29-47.

¹²See Stephan, John J., Ezo Under the Tokugawa Bakufu, 1798-1821 – An Aspect of Japan's Frontier History, Unpublished PhD thesis, University of London, London, UK, 1969.

¹³The Asahi Evening News, June 7, 1978.

¹⁴The Postdam Declaration (Scpain No.677): General Headquarter Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (January 29, 1946) – Memorandum for Imperial Japanese Government through Central Liaison Office, Tokyo. Subject – Governmental and Administrative Separation of Certain Outlying Areas from Japan: 3. For the purpose of this directive, Japan is defined as her four main islands (Hokkaido, Honshu, Kyushu and Shikoku)... and excluding ... (c) the Kuril (Chishima) Islands, the Habomai and Hapomaze Islands... (including Suisho, Yuri, Akiyuri, Shibotsu and Taraku...) and Shikotan.

¹⁵The Mainichi Daily News, September 26, 1979.

¹⁶On February 25, 1947, the Soviet Presidium amended Article No.22 of the constitution by detaching Sakhalin and the Kurils from Khabarovsk and making them into an independent unit – Sakhalin Oblast.

¹⁷See Panov, Alexander N., Beyond Distrust to Trust – Inside the Northern Territories Talks with Japan, Simul' Press, Tokyo, Japan, 1992.

In June 1955, the Soviet Union and Japan began negotiations for the termination of a state of war, the signing of a peace treaty and the restoration of diplomatic relations.¹⁸ In September 1956, Japan's Plenipotentiary Representative Matsumoto and Soviet First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Gromyko exchanged letters, agreeing to continue peace treaty negotiations, including the territorial issue, after the re-establishment of diplomatic relations.¹⁹ On October 19, 1956, the Soviet Union and Japan signed the Joint Declaration – determining post-war processes ending the state of war.²⁰ The declaration clearly stated two islands (Habomai and Shikotan) would be returned to Japan, following the conclusion of a peace treaty (*the two-plus-two solution*). The 1960 renewal of the Japan-US Security Treaty saw the Soviet Union demand all foreign military be eliminated from Japan as a prerequisite to returning two of the islands. But the US military had been stationed in Japan prior to the declaration, and as the declaration had been ratified by both states and submitted to the UN, it was impossible to change its content. In October 1973 Prime Minister Tanaka went to Moscow to meet Brezhnev. The two leaders confirmed the territorial issue remained unresolved. Aware of this, the Soviet Union almost agreed to returning two of the disputed islands, hinting others could follow. However, after bellicose demands from Tanaka for a return of all islands, an angry Brezhnev retracted the offer. After the meeting, the Soviet Union refused to acknowledge the territorial issue's existence.²¹

It was in this atmosphere Japanese Foreign Minister Sonoda visited the Soviet Union in January 1978 to conduct negotiations on a peace treaty. During these negotiations, Sonoda repeatedly stated that Japan's position regarding the signing of a peace treaty was expressly based on resolving the territorial issue in Japan's favour.²² But no

¹⁸Garthoff, Raymond L., "A Diplomatic History of the Dispute" in Goody, James E., Ivanov, Vladimir I., and Shimotamai, Nobuo (Eds.), "Northern Territories" and Beyond – Russian, Japanese and American Perspectives, Praeger Publishers under the auspices of the US Institute of Peace, Westport, Connecticut, US, 1995, p.17.

¹⁹Interestingly, at the request of Japanese Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, the US sent a memorandum confirming support for Japan (September 7, 1956); they stated the islands had always been Japanese.

²⁰Frankland, Noble (Ed.), Documents on International Affairs, Oxford University Press, London, UK, 1959, p.751. '...In this connection, the Soviet Union, desiring to meet the wishes of Japan and taking into consideration the interests of the Japanese nation, agrees to transfer to Japan the Habomai Islands and the Island of Shikotan, the actual transfer of these islands to Japan to take place after the conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Japan and the Soviet Union...'

²¹Author's interview with Muakami, Takashi, Professor of Economics, Slavic Research Centre, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Hokkaido, Japan, October 20, 1997.

²²Nakagawa, Toru, "Japan's Northern Territories in International Politics" in Japan Review of International Affairs, Vol.2, No.1, Spring/Summer 1988, pp.3-24.

resolution was reached. Subsequent pre-1991 attempts to resolve the territorial disputes also resulted in stalemate.²³ Indeed, to the end of the Pre-Putin period the issue remained unresolved.

²³Hiroshi, Kimura, "Money for Moscow – A Test Case for Japanese Diplomacy" in Japan Echo, Vol.20, No.3, Autumn 1993, pp.64-67; and Hiroshi, Kimura, "Reluctance About Aid to Russia" in Japan Echo, Vol.20, No.3, Autumn 1993, p55.

Appendix 3:
Fieldwork Diary

Figure A3.1: Fieldwork Diary			
Interviewee	Date	Affiliation	Type
Moscow			
Anatoli Chubais	Jul 11, 1995	Russian Government	Official
Victor Pavliantenko	Nov 15, 1996	Centre for Japanese Studies	Academic
Kunio Okada	Nov 16, 1996	Japan Association for Trade with Russia and Central-Eastern Europe (ROTOBO)	Official
Iwao Ohashi	Nov 17, 1996	Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO)	Official
Victor Snegir	Nov 18, 1996	British Embassy	Official
Khabarovsk			
Alexander Sheingauz	Dec 11, 1996	Khabarovsk Economic Research Institute (KERI)	Academic
Vladivostok			
Elena Danish	Nov 28, 1996	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)	Official
Irina Boiko	Nov 29, 1996	Far Eastern Centre for Economic Development (FECED)	Academic
Alexander Abramov	Nov 29, 1996	Far Eastern Centre for Economic Development (FECED)	Academic
Gennadi Nesov	Nov 30, 1996	Primor'e Territory Government Committee for Shipping, Sea Ports, Communications and Transportation	Official
Vladimir Kojevnikov	Dec 3, 1996	Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography of the Peoples of the Far East	Academic
Ishihara Koji	Dec 4, 1996	Consulate-General of Japan at Vladivostok	Official
Evegeni Zharikov	Dec 4, 1996	Pacific Economic Development and Cooperation Centre (PEDCC)	Academic
Tatiana Kapelush	Dec 9, 1996	United States Department of Commerce	Official
Vladimir Saprikin	Dec 12, 1996	Municipality of Vladivostok City	Official
Tokyo			
Sim Yee Lau	Jan 1, 1997 Jan 16, 1997 Oct 29, 1997	Sasakawa Peace Foundation	Academic
Takeo Ishino	Jan 8, 1997	Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO)	Official
Hiromi Yusa	Jan 8, 1997 Jan 9, 1997	Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO)	Official

Tadayuki Hochi	Jan 13, 1997 Oct 29, 1997	Japan Association for Trade with Russia and Central-Eastern Europe (ROTOBO)	Official
Kazuo Ogawa	Jan 13, 1997 Oct 29, 1997	Japan Association for Trade with Russia and Central-Eastern Europe (ROTOBO)	Official
Shingo Yoshida	Jan 13, 1997 Oct 29, 1997	Japan Association for Trade with Russia and Central-Eastern Europe (ROTOBO)	Official
Tadayuki Miyashita	Jan 17, 1997	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)	Official
Mikoto Katagiri	Jan 21, 1997	Mitsubishi Corporation	Business
Igor Kazakov	Jan 21, 1997	Trade Representation of the Russian Federation in Japan	Official
Pavel Minakir	Jan 22, 1997	Khabarovsk Economic Research Institute (KERI)	Academic
Kensaku Kumabe	Jan 23, 1997	Export-Import (EXIM) Bank of Japan	Official
Ukeru Magosaki	Jan 23, 1997	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)	Official
Akira Tateyama	Oct 15, 1997	Japan Institute of International Relations (JIIR)	Academic
Akira Maejima	Oct 17, 1997	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)	Official
Motoya Nakamura	Oct 17, 1997	Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO)	Official
Takashi Shirasu	Oct 29, 1997	Sasakawa Peace Foundation	Academic
Sunsuke Nakagawara	Oct 30, 1997	Mitsui and Company	Business
Hisao Kanamori	Oct 31, 1997	Japan Centre for Economic Research (JCER)	Official
Osami Kanno	Oct 31, 1997	Sakhalin Oil and Gas Development Company Limited (SODECO)	Business
Koichi Ninomiya	Oct 31, 1997	Mitsubishi Corporation	Business
Kazuya Sato	Oct 31, 1997	Sakhalin Oil and Gas Development Company Limited (SODECO)	Business
Kunio Okada	Nov 6, 1996	Japan Association for Trade with Russia and Central-Eastern Europe (ROTOBO)	Official
Iwao Ohashi	Nov 12, 1996	Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO)	Official
Kyoto			
Satoshi Mizobata	Oct 24, 1997	Kyoto Institute of Economic Research (KIER)	Academic
Niigata			
Vladimir Ivanov	Jan 22, 1997 Oct 22, 1997 Oct 28, 1997	Economic Research Institute for North-East Asia (ERINA)	Academic

Hisako Tsuji	Oct 27, 1997	Economic Research Institute for North-East Asia (ERINA)	Academic
Karla Smith	Oct 28, 1997	Economic Research Institute for North-East Asia (ERINA)	Academic
Sapporo			
Hayashi Tadayuki	Oct 20, 1997	Hokkaido University	Academic
Shugo Minagawa	Oct 20, 1997	Hokkaido University	Academic
Takashi Murakami	Oct 20, 1997	Hokkaido University	Academic
Hawai'i			
John Stephan	Feb 2, 1997	University of Hawai'i at Manoa	Academic
Patricia Polansky	Feb 3, 1997	University of Hawai'i at Manoa	Academic
Robert Valliant	Feb 3, 1997	University of Hawai'i at Manoa	Academic
James Dorian	Feb 4, 1997	East-West Centre (EWC)	Academic
Mark Valencia	Feb 5, 1997	East-West Centre (EWC)	Academic
John Tichotsky	Feb 6, 1997	University of Hawai'i at Manoa	Academic
Seattle			
Jay Baird	Feb 11, 1997	Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESCO)	Business
Kathryn Terry	Feb 11, 1997	Foundation for Russian-American Cooperation	Official
Elisa Miller	Feb 12, 1997	Russian Far East (RFE) Update	Academic
Craig ZumBrunnen	Feb 12, 1997	University of Washington	Academic
Judith Thornton	Feb 12, 1997	University of Washington	Academic
Arland Tussing	Feb 13, 1997	Arland R. Tussing and Associates (ARTA)	Business
Alice Anderson	Feb 13, 1997	Sunmar Shipping Incorporated	Business
New York			
Nathan Shklyar	Feb 19, 1997	Institute of East-West Studies (IEWS)	Academic
Boston			
Akio Kawato	Jul 18, 1996	Consul-General of Japan	Official

Notes: Positions refer to those at the time of interview and these may have since changed.

Listings are done on a date basis.

Where meetings were held more than once, the listings have been ordered based on the date of the first meeting.

Figure A3.2: Interview Sample Categorisations

Interview Type		
Interviewee Type	Number of Interviews	% of Interview Sample
Official	25	41.7%
Academic	27	45%
Business	8	13.3%
TOTAL	60	100.0%
Interview Geography		
Interviewee Location	Number of Interviews	% of Interview Sample
Russia	15	25%
Japan	30	50%
US	15	25%
TOTAL	60	100.0%
Subnational/National Composition of Interviews		
Subnational/Location	Number of Interviews	% of Interview Sample
Subnational	32	53.3%
National	28	46.7%
TOTAL	60	100.0%

Appendix 4:
Major Events in Russian-Japanese Relations,
1992-1998

Figure A4.1: Major Events in Russian-Japanese Relations, 1992-1998

Year	Major Events	Other Events
1992	September Joint Compendium Document on History of Territorial Problems Between Russia and Japan released	September El'tsin cancels visit to Japan
1993	October El'tsin visits Japan	November Japanese consuls in Vladivostok and Khabarovsk opened
1994	March Foreign Minister Hata visit Russia September Russian-Japanese Foreign Ministers meet at UN General Assembly November First Deputy Prime Minister Soskovets visits Japan	February First Trilateral Forum on North Pacific Security (Tokyo)
1995	March Foreign Minister Kozyrev visits Japan August Russian-Japanese Foreign Ministers meet in Brunei at ASEAN forum	March First round of negotiations on a framework for fishing operations in waters around the Northern Territories April State Duma Speaker Ribkin visits Japan
1996	March Foreign Minister Ikdea visits Russia April Russian-Japanese bilateral summit (Nuclear Safety Summit, Moscow) June Russian and Japanese Foreign Ministers meeting (Lyons Summit) July Russian-Japanese Foreign Ministers meet in Indonesia at ASEAN forum September Russian-Japanese Foreign Ministers meet at UN General Assembly	April Defence Agency Director General Usui visits Russia June–July Presidential election in Russia July Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force visits Vladivostok

	<p>November Foreign Minister Primakov visits Japan</p>	
1997	<p>January Tokyo meeting on Russian-Japanese relations</p> <p>May Foreign Minister Ikeda visits Russia</p> <p>June First Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov visits Japan Russian-Japanese bilateral summit (Denver Summit) Russian-Japanese Foreign Ministers meet at ceremony returning Hong Kong to China</p> <p>July Russian-Japanese Foreign Ministers meet in Malaysia at ASEAN forum Prime Minister Hashimoto addresses Japan Association of Corporate Executives</p> <p>September Russian-Japanese Foreign Ministers meet at UN General Assembly</p> <p>October Russian-Japanese natural resource projects announced</p> <p>November Russian-Japanese bilateral summit in Krasnoyarsk Foreign Minister Primakov visits Japan</p>	<p>May Defence Minister Rodionov visits Japan</p> <p>June Russian naval vessel visits Tokyo</p> <p>October Federation Council Speaker Stroyev visits Japan</p> <p>November Opening of Japanese consular office in Sakhalin</p> <p>December Essential agreement reached in negotiations on framework for fishing operations in disputed territories waters</p>
1998	<p>February Prime Minister Obuchi visits Russia</p> <p>April Russian-Japanese bilateral summit in Kawana</p> <p>May Russian-Japanese Foreign Ministers meet at G8, London Russian-Japanese bilateral summit, Birmingham</p>	<p>March Prime Minister Chernomirdin replaced by Kiryenko</p> <p>May Joint Staff Council Chairman Natsukawa visits Russia</p> <p>July Joint exercise by the Japanese Self-Defence Forces and Russian military for search and rescue operations</p>

<p>June Russian-Japanese Foreign Ministers meet at G8, London</p> <p>July Prime Minister Kirienko visits Japan Russian-Japanese Foreign Ministers meet in Manila at ASEAN forum</p> <p>September Senior Foreign Policy Advisor Hashimoto visits Russia Russian-Japanese Foreign Ministers meeting (UN General Assembly)</p> <p>October Foreign Minister Koumura visits Russia</p> <p>November Prime Minister Obuchi visits Russia Sakhalin-Hokkaido Cooperation Agreement</p>	<p>August Prime Minister Kirienko dismissed Russian financial markets collapse</p> <p>September Primakov appointed Prime Minister</p> <p>December Chief of Staff Kiashnin visits Japan</p>
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Boston

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- Michelle Hubert

Seattle

- Erlendson, Elena – Marketing and Circulation Manager, Russian Far East Update
- Turnbull, Deborah – Marketing and Research Manager, Russian Far East Update

Vermont

- Tate, Charlotte – Development Coordinator, Geonomics Institute

Urbana-Champaign

- University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign – Centre for Russian and East European Studies Research Associateship

New York

- Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO)
- Diane, Lillian and Robert Feiler

²Positions of the human resources refer to those at the time of interview and may have since changed.

Boston

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- Bobrov, Anna – Slavic Department, Harvard University
- Oleincheuko, Ludmila – Slavic Department, Harvard University

Connecticut

- Jenkyn, Alexander – Law Faculty, Yale University

Keele

- University of Keele – Department of International Relations Invited Visiting Tutorship in the Politics of International Economic Relations

Birmingham

- Bradshaw, Michael Bradshaw – Senior Lecturer, School of Geography, University of Birmingham
- Sutherland, Douglas Sutherland – Research Fellow, Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham
- University of Birmingham – School of Geography's Economic and Social Research Council Pacific-Asia Programme Post-Doctoral Research Fellowship

Oxford

- University of Oxford – Russian Studies Programme Russian Studies Scholarship

London

- Binns, Chris – Lecturer, Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science
- Hunter, Janet – Reader, Department of Economic History, London School of Economics and Political Science
- Lieven, Dominic – Professor, Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science
- Light, Margot – Reader, Department of International Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science
- Stapleton, Ludmila – Language Centre, University College London
- Stern, Jonathan – Independent Consultant
- The Anglo-Japanese Daiwa Foundation

- The British East-West Centre
- The British Library
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- Institute of International Education in London (IIEL)
- The Japan Information and Cultural Centre (JICC)
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- Lau, Sim Yee, Programme Officer, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Tokyo, Japan, January 1, 1997, January 16, 1997 and October 29, 1997
- Maejima, Akira, Division for Assistance to the Newly Independent States, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, Japan, October 17, 1997
- Magosaki, Ukeru, Hokkaido's Ambassador to Tokyo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, Japan, January 23, 1997
- Minakir, Pavel, Director, Russian Academy of Sciences Far Eastern Branch Economic Research Institute (Khabarovsk, Russia), Tokyo, Japan, January 22, 1997
- Miyashita, Tadayuki, Newly Independent States (NIS) Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, Japan, January 17, 1997
- Nakagawara, Sunshuke, Manager, Overseas Coordination and Administration Department, Corporate Planning Division, Mitsui and Company Limited, Tokyo, Japan, October 30, 1997
- Nakamura, Motoya, Russia and Eastern Europe Section, Overseas Research Department, Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO), Tokyo, Japan, October 17, 1997
- Ninomiya, Koichi, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Middle East Team, Development and Coordination Department, Mitsubishi Corporation, Tokyo, Japan, October 31, 1997
- Ogawa, Kazuo, Director General, Institute for Russian and East European Studies (IREES), Japan Association for Trade with Russia and Central-Eastern Europe (ROTOBO), Tokyo, Japan, January 13, 1997 and October 29, 1997
- Ohashi, Iwao, Chief Representative, Moscow Liaison Office, Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO), Moscow, Russia, November 12, 1996
- Okado, Kunio, Institute for Russian and Eastern European Studies (IREES), Japan Association for Trade with Russia and Central-Eastern Europe (ROTOBO), Tokyo, Japan, November 6, 1996

- Sato, Kazuya, General Manager, Administration Department, Sakhalin Oil and Gas Development Company Limited (SODECO), Tokyo, Japan, October 31, 1997
- Shirasu, Takashi, Chief Programme Officer, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Tokyo, Japan, October 29, 1997
- Tateyama, Akira, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Russian Studies, The Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA), Tokyo, Japan, October 15, 1997
- Yoshida, Shingo, Institute for Russian and East European Studies (IREES), Japan Association for Trade with Russia and Central-Eastern Europe (ROTOBO), Tokyo, Japan, January 13, 1997 and October 29, 1997
- Yusa, Hiromi, Russia and Eastern Europe Section, Overseas Research Department, Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO), Tokyo, Japan, January 8, 1997 and January 9, 1997

Kyoto

- Mizobata, Satoshi, Associate Professor of Comparative Economics, Kyoto Institute of Economic Research (KIER), Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan, October 24, 1997

Niigata

- Ivanov, Vladimir Ivanov, Senior Researcher, Economic Research Institute for North-East Asia (ERINA), Niigata, Japan, January 22, 1997, October 22, 1997 and October 28, 1997
- Smith, Karla, Research Division, Economic Research Institute for North-East Asia (ERINA), Niigata, Japan, October 28, 1997
- Tsuji, Hisako, Senior Researcher, Research Division, Economic Research Institute for North-East Asia (ERINA), Niigata, Japan, October 27, 1997

Sapporo

- Hayashi, Tadayuki, Director, Slavic Research Centre, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Hokkaido, Japan, October 20, 1997
- Minagawa, Shugo, Professor in Comparative Politics, Slavic Research Centre, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Hokkaido, Japan, October 20, 1997
- Murakami, Takashi, Professor of Economics, Slavic Research Centre, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Hokkaido, Japan, October 20, 1997

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Tokyo

- Julia Gould
- Kinji Ishiguchi
- The Japan Foundation
- The Japan Institute for Social and Economic Affairs
- Japan Times Newspaper
- The National Diet Library
- The Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund
- The Russia-Japan Library
- The Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and Industry
- The Tokyo Trade Centre
- The United Nations University

Sapporo

- Srinivasan, Ancha – Senior Researcher, Regional Science Institute

⁷Positions of the human resources refer to those at the time of interview and may have since changed.