The Europeanization of national foreign policy? The role of the EU CFSP/ESDP in crisis decision-making in Macedonia and Afghanistan

Eva Gross

London School of Economics and Political Science
Department of International Relations

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Chapter 1. Introduction.

I. Aim of the Thesis
This thesis analyzes British, French and German policies with respect to the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in two specific crises. In recent years much has been made of the ongoing Europeanization of national foreign policy, including security and defence policy. Since the end of the Cold War, and informed by the experience of the conflicts in the Balkans throughout the 1990s, EU member states have created European security institutions in order to be able to act independently from NATO and the US. Two countries in particular, Britain and France, have adjusted their national positions in order to make possible the creation of the EU ESDP in the first place. While there is more than one institutional tool at EU member states’ disposal in matters of international security, the broad question this thesis seeks to address is what circumstances, national preferences and crisis situations determine the choice and the extent of the use of political and military instruments located in the EU CFSP and ESDP as opposed to other institutional venues or bilateral initiatives.

II. Research Question
The two cases analyzed in this thesis are national policies towards the crisis in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and the war in Afghanistan in 2001. These were the first two crises to occur after the creation of ESDP in 1999 that prompted significant political and military involvement on the part of EU member states. However, national responses towards the two crises with respect to the

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1 For the most recent academic studies see Wong (2006), Miskimmon (2004), Irodenelle (2003).
involvement of instruments located in EU CFSP/ESDP were very different. Whereas the EU CFSP in the persona of EU High Representative Javier Solana was very active\(^2\) in the political mediation of the crisis in FYROM, initial suggestions for an ESDP take-over of the NATO Operation were rejected by EU member states. It was not until March 2003 that the first ever military ESDP mission, Operation Concordia, took over from NATO. In Afghanistan, on the other hand, the EU CFSP and ESDP both appeared to be eclipsed by the national considerations of member states, prompting concerns over a re-nationalization of foreign policy after 11 September (see Hill, 2004). Similarly, the suggestion by then-Belgian Foreign Minister Louis Michel that EU member states’ contributions to the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) constituted ‘EU’ rather than national contributions was rejected. Moreover, NATO—not ESDP—assumed ISAF command in 2003.

Unlike FYROM, the role of the EU CFSP and ESDP in Afghanistan has not fundamentally changed since the beginning of the political and military activities by the EU and its member states since the assumption of military tasks in Afghanistan 2001\(^3\), and the further evolution of instruments located within CFSP/ESDP. Reactions towards the two crises, then, appear to contradict conclusions about the ongoing ‘Europeanization’ of national foreign policy, particularly when it comes to the application of military instruments located in the EU ESDP: although the EU is in possession of military instruments, it did not employ them—or at least not immediately, in the case of FYROM—in two significant crises. The crises were significant for different reasons: FYROM threatened to de-stabilise once more the

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\(^2\) And, as the analysis presented in chapter 3 will demonstrate, successful.

\(^3\) Although the EU has played an important role in the post-conflict reconstruction of Afghanistan (Smith and Steffenson, 2005: 354) and although Javier Solana has recently stated that ‘the EU stands ready to do even more to contribute to the collective effort and I think that an ESDP police operation could be of great value’ (see Council of the European Union, 2006a), at the time of writing of this thesis the nature of the EU’s engagement has not been expanded from economic and political to include military or civilian crisis management tools under the ESDP.
Western Balkans and to demonstrate the EU’s inability to act; and the war in Afghanistan represented a systemic shock where member states quickly had to formulate and adopt policies on the US-led war on terror and the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

This raises the following question that will be addressed in this thesis: What was the role afforded to the EU CFSP/ESDP in the management of the crisis in FYROM and the war in Afghanistan in national foreign policy decision-making in Britain, France and Germany, and why did it stop short of a military operation under the EU ESDP - initially in the case of FYROM and altogether in the case of Afghanistan? Focusing on decisions taken with regard to the EU CFSP and ESDP during these two crises promises to shed light on the underlying attitudes towards the European security institutions in the three countries when it comes to the application of available crisis management instruments. It will also allow me to draw broader conclusions on the role of CFSP/ESDP in national decision-making, and to determine whether and to what extent national foreign policies exhibit evidence of Europeanization in the sense that existing EU security institutions exert influence on individual governments to adapt their decision-making in favour of a larger role for the EU - or whether other considerations, such as the position or preferences of the US and the transatlantic alliance are more pertinent to explain specific policy outcomes in these two cases.

4 The inclusion of the US in addition to NATO is justified both on account of the US’ central role in the management of the two crises as well as on account of the fact that the US ‘certainly has a privileged position in terms of access to European decision-making, with some particularly ‘special’ relationships with member states and individuals (...) it often succeeds in dividing and ruling the Europeans, as well as over-shadowing them in high politics’ (Hill and Smith, 2005: 394).
III. Contribution to Literature

This particular research undertaking is situated on the cusp of traditional International Relations (IR) and European studies, but potentially makes a contribution to both by contrasting the 'Europeanization' approach that arises out of integration studies with that of alliance politics. 5 The hypotheses derived from the two approaches are integrated in a Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) model of governmental politics. Its purpose in this thesis is to analyse the domestic context of foreign policy decision-making in the two crises in order to derive conclusion as to the explanatory value of the two conceptual approaches, Europeanization and alliance politics.

For scholars of international relations in general and of European foreign relations in particular, the question of how to analytically approach the role of the individual member states in the EU decision-making process and how to best capture the nature of this interaction has been a contentious one. As EU foreign policy cooperation has been argued to be 'less than supranational but more than intergovernmental' (Wessels, 1982), theoretical approaches found in the mainstream IR literature have not always been entirely useful in addressing or explaining the processes of European foreign policy making more generally. Similarly, CFSP is too intergovernmental to fit comfortably within the framework of integration theories (Øhrgaard, 2004). The existing literature on CFSP more generally has been dominated by empirical accounts of case studies that more often than not lack an explicit theoretical framework, leaving the study of CFSP at the pre-theoretical stage.

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5 There is a longstanding debate over the extent to which European Studies and IR have theoretical or practical insights to give one another (Warleigh, 2006). European Studies, the argument goes, is located at the intersection between IR and comparative politics (Wæver, 2004), has an interdisciplinary basis (Calhoun, 2003) and can 'act as a transmission belt for ideas concepts and approaches between the study of 'domestic politics' and the study of 'international relations'' (Warleigh, 2006: 32). The Europeanization framework applied in this thesis has its roots in integration studies, and is combined here with traditional IR approaches; and the argument that emerges from the analysis of the individual policy decisions taken is that neither of the two approaches alone can adequately explain national policy decisions towards the two crises.
Because of the intergovernmental nature of decision-making in the EU CFSP (including ESDP), the policies and attitudes of national governments towards CFSP remain relevant as they are crucial not only for the institutional evolution of CFSP but also for its application: if CFSP is sidelined by national policy priorities, it cannot be expected to be an effective policy instrument. This research therefore proceeds from the assumption that member states policies and preferences are crucial in the formulation of policies adopted under CFSP. This in turn warrants a study that focuses solely on the national decision-making processes and the resulting decisions.

This research locates potential explanations for national decision-making in three separate levels of analysis (see Singer, 1961). The impact of European institutions on national foreign policies as a result of Europeanization privileges the regional level of analysis and therefore regional institutions. Alliance politics, and the enduring relevance of NATO and US preferences to European security locates the explanation primarily at the systemic level6; whereas a focus on domestic politics based on a governmental politics approach focuses on the domestic level of analysis and assumes that domestic preferences and policy processes involving government agencies and ministries, elected government officials as well as the elite public sphere, determine policy outcomes. For the purpose of this thesis, the analysis of the underlying preferences and bargaining games among the different domestic actors is to draw conclusions on the explanatory power of Europeanization or alliance politics with respect to national decision-making in the two crises.

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6 To be sure, NATO is a regional rather than a global alliance, and membership in NATO and the EU overlaps in the case of the three countries analysed in this thesis. Moreover, the analysis of the two crises will show that some of the considerations over the use of NATO rather than ESDP instruments were motivated by utilitarian considerations over the availability of military assets rather than systemic considerations. However, the preference of the US, both a NATO member and the remaining superpower in a unipolar system after the end of the Cold War, and preferences on the part of the three states to keep the US involved in European security through the transatlantic alliance, point towards the relevance of the systemic level of analysis.
Europeanization focuses on the impact of the EU institutions on national politics, both as a potential platform to export policy preferences and as a constraint that influences national foreign policy making. The Europeanization approach conceptualizes EU institutions as exerting influence on national foreign policy through separate processes: the projection of national preferences, the adaptation of national policies, or the emergence or change of national preferences that privilege a European approach (Wong, 2005). Alliance politics and the preferences and attitudes towards and relations within the transatlantic alliance, on the other hand, assumes that the role of NATO along with US hegemony as a broader response to an anarchical international system plays a central role in the decision-making process that leads states to seek the preservation of existing alliances. Central within this alliance framework, of course, is also the role of the US in European—and global—security. The model of governmental politics, lastly, focuses on the domestic political conditions in the individual countries, and the way key participants in the political process bargain successfully to implement their policy preferences. In this context, the perception and preferences of key officials and bureaucracies, as well as the elite public sphere are important in assessing the choices for or against a larger role of the EU CFSP and ESDP in crisis decision-making. This in turn permits drawing some conclusions over which approach, Europeanization or Alliance politics, is more appropriate for explaining national foreign policy choices.

The contribution of this particular research is two-fold. First, it applies approaches originating in the European integration and the IR paradigms, Europeanization and alliance politics as well as an FPA approach that focuses on domestic policy processes, to member states foreign policies to analyze the influence exerted by the EU CFSP/ESDP on policy decisions taken during two crises. And, it
does this in a case that involves ‘hard’ politics: foreign security and defence policy, the bastion of state sovereignty (Howorth, 2005). If it can be shown that even in this area integration mechanisms are at work in the sense that existing EU institutions result in policy adaptation on the national level, this would weaken state-centric, liberal intergovernmentalist analyses (see Moravcsik, 1993) that argue that outcomes of bargaining between member states are determined by the preferences and bargaining power of states. Applied to the EU CFSP/ESDP, this approach attributes the major decision-making power to the member states, and assumes that domestic preferences are fixed and unaffected by normative concerns and interstate bargaining processes. Alternatively, if there is no or only weak evidence of Europeanization, then this would strengthen the state-centric approaches located in the IR paradigm. Lastly, both approaches located in a systemic theory (alliance politics) and regional integration theory (Europeanization) would be weakened if it were to be shown that specific domestic political considerations that do not point towards systemic or regional preferences conditioned policy responses in these two crises.

The second contribution of this research lies in the actual cases selected. There is a small but growing literature on the activities of the EU CFSP and ESDP in FYROM and the Western Balkan region in general (Piana, 2002; Ioannides, 2006; Juncos, 2006) to which this research adds. Little has been written on member states’ policy towards Afghanistan from the perspective of the EU CFSP (Gross, 2006), and this research therefore stands to make an original contribution in this respect. While there have been some academic analyses of the Europeanization of national foreign policy (Keatinge, 1983; Torreblanca, 2001; Tonra, 2001; Wong, 2006), these have tended to focus either on smaller member states (Keatinge, 1983; Tonra, 2001), the

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7 Although Moravcsik does not concern himself with EU foreign and security policy, his theoretical approach has been applied to the analysis of policy-making in EU CFSP/ESDP (see Gegout, 2004).
impact of EU accession on national foreign policy (Torreblanca, 2001), or have not focused exclusively on foreign and, importantly, security policy of the bigger member states (Wong, 2006). The original contribution this research makes, therefore, is to apply the Europeanization approach to an analysis of the policies of the ‘big three’ member states in the area of security and defence – and to do so in a comparative framework.

Based on the empirical analysis undertaken, this thesis demonstrates that while policy decisions taken with respect to the two crises show evidence of Europeanization in all three countries, considerations of alliance politics both with a view to the role of NATO as well as US preferences, have tended to take precedence when it came to the application of military instruments - with the exception of the French position towards an ESDP take-over from NATO in FYROM, which shows evidence of Europeanization. The governmental politics approach, finally, highlights domestic and intra-governmental processes that reveal not only internal divisions and differences of opinions with respect to preferences that would point towards Europeanization and alliance politics, but also the extent to which national priorities have influenced these policy decisions. While there is evidence of the Europeanization of foreign policy, then, this does not apply to security and defence policy with respect to the two crises analysed in this thesis.

IV. Case selection, Research Design and Methodology
This is a qualitative research project that analyzes the impact of the EU CFSP/ESDP on the national policies of Britain, France and Germany. Britain and France naturally lend themselves as country case studies for this thesis. Not only are they the two biggest military powers in Europe, Paris and London also adapted their long-held
policy views to make the creation of ESDP possible in the first place. The inclusion of Germany as a third case is justified both by the fact that Germany is the biggest country in the EU and by the fact that significant military operations are unlikely to take place without Berlin’s approval and increasingly also participation. The ‘big three’—Germany, Britain and France—are also the three countries expected to take the diplomatic lead on policy matters pertaining to the EU CFSP, and have been the driving forces behind the policy’s creation and evolution.

The end of the Cold War presented a strong impetus for improving European security and foreign policy coordination. Although European Political Cooperation (EPC), created in 1970, had the aim of establishing the EU as a foreign policy actor, policy means available were of a declaratory nature, and policy implementation took place using Community instruments, such as aid programmes or economic sanctions.⁸ The 1992 Treaty of Maastricht institutionalized EPC mechanisms in the new Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Reforms outlined in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam included the provision for a High Representative, and the establishment of a CFSP Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit. The wars in the Balkans starkly underlined the EU’s shortcomings in the field of foreign and security policy (see Gow, 1997; Howorth, 2005; Lucarelli, 2000), although the first Gulf War in 1991 had already demonstrated the degree of dependence of the participating EU states on the US and NATO, further underlining the need for the incorporation of a security and defence component to the EU structures (Duke, 1999).

The EU ESDP, created in 1999, represents a new security institution that has moved the EU into a policy realm previously reserved for NATO. The purpose of

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⁸ Defence and military security issues were explicitly excluded. A second strand of European foreign policy, security politics, included the creation of the Western European Union (WEU) in 1954, even if the WEU was throughout the Cold War neglected in favour of the transatlantic defence structure (Duke, 1999).
ESDP is to complete and strengthen the EU's external ability to act through the development of civilian and military capabilities for international conflict prevention and crisis management. Although the idea of a European foreign and defence policy preceded the end of the Cold War, the creation of corresponding institutions was precluded by conflicting positions of member states on the purpose and the existence of European security and defence institutions. The changing positions of member states towards the creation of a European security and defence policy thus makes the analysis of member states' positions towards the application of instruments located in the CFSP/ESDP an important subject for further research.

The changing positions of Britain, France, and Germany towards the evolution of European security institutions were crucial in the evolution of CFSP and ESDP instruments as well as their future application. Throughout the Cold War, efforts at creating mechanisms for coordination in the areas of security and defence stalled on account of the lack of support for a European foreign policy independent of NATO among atlanticist member states–Britain in particular–and French unwillingness to consider foreign policy cooperation that excluded defence issues (Smith, 2004). This makes this particular research endeavour of dual interest: for one, it analyzes the positions of those member states that had been furthest apart from one another with respect to the creation and purpose of the EU CFSP/ESDP; with one (France) rooted in the Europeanist camp and the other (Britain) in the Atlanticist camp–with the third (Germany) situated somewhat uneasily between the two.

The election of a Labour government under Tony Blair in 1997 proved to be a key factor for the future development of CFSP and ESDP (see Whitman, 1999). Along with Blair's commitment to a greater British role within Europe to counterbalance French-German dominance and the recognition that European
autonomy did not have to mean emancipation from NATO but improvement of
European means inside the alliance, London dropped its objections to an autonomous
European defence for the first time and made possible the creation of ESDP

In contrast, German attitudes to the use of force have undergone a significant
transition since the end of the Cold War. This makes Germany an interesting case on
purely domestic grounds: Germany’s international engagement since the end of the
Cold War had been guided largely by the principles of German post-World War II
foreign policy – multilateralism and a culture of restraint with regards to the use of
military force (Maull, 2000). However, the historical taboo against the use of force
increasingly eroded in light of post-Cold War realities, starting with allies’
expectations in the first Gulf War, and increasing doubts over whether Germany
could remain a credible partner in the transatlantic alliance without military
participation. On a normative level, the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding in the
Balkans raised the question of whether pacifism was the only, and the most
appropriate, historical lesson to draw from the experience of World War II (Janning,
1996). The conflict in Kosovo crystallised these conflicting pressures, and German
reactions to the crisis marked a watershed in post-war German policy as Berlin for
the first time since the end of World War II took part in offensive military operations
against a sovereign state. In addition to a changing view on the use of military force,
Germany also moved from its traditional post-World War II transatlanticist
orientation to one that increasingly accommodated the emergence of CFSP/ESDP.9

9 It should be noted here that Germany’s position vis-à-vis the two other member states is best
categorized as fence-sitting: not as fiercely transatlanticist as the UK, but not as keen on European
autonomy in security and defence matters as France, Germany has traditionally tried to balance the
two positions (Interview with German official, 19 October 2005).
For France, the end of the Cold War and changed geopolitical realities raised the issue of the EU’s role in European security and the preservation of France’s status, particularly in light of a reunified Germany and resulting concerns over the geo-strategic marginalization of France. Bosnia demonstrated to France that its European partners not only lacked the political will but also the confidence for Europe to act alone in security matters (Treacher, 2001: 33). To avoid marginalization in Europe, France modified its vision of the European security architecture, particularly with regard to NATO. Although this did not mean the abandonment of the idea of building an autonomous European defence structure (see Howorth, 2000), it did signal a more pragmatic approach. At the Anglo-French summit at St. Malo in December 1998 Britain and France issued a ‘Joint Declaration on European Defence’ that called for the establishment of ‘autonomous’ capacities backed by credible military force.

The German EU presidency in the first half of 1999 worked to turn the British-French bilateral initiative at St. Malo into a European reality and to create the EU ESDP. At the European Council of Cologne in 1999, Javier Solana was appointed as the first CFSP Secretary General/High Representative, and leaders agreed to limit the defence capacity of the EU to the ‘Petersberg Tasks’. The WEU as an organisation was considered to have completed its function, and its assets were transferred to the EU (Gnesotto, 2004). At the European Council of Helsinki 10-11 December 1999, EU leaders agreed on the Headline Goal (60,000 troops by 2003, deployable within 60 days and sustainable for one year), to set up a new institutional structure, and to agree on the modalities for cooperation between the EU and NATO.

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10 The Petersberg Tasks include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.
At the Laeken European Council 14-15 December 2001, finally, EU leaders declared the EU capable of conducting some crisis management operations.

Decision-making in the EU CFSP and ESDP proceeds along intergovernmental lines. This makes the study of individual countries’ foreign policies rather than policy processes at the institutional level a pertinent approach for addressing the research question formulated in the preceding section. The selection of Britain, France and Germany as country case studies is motivated by a number of considerations in addition to the three countries’ changing positions vis-à-vis the EU ESDP. Given the evolution of the EU foreign and security policy instruments since the creation of CFSP and ESDP, and the increasing demands placed on the EU and its member states in matters of external relations and international security, the ‘big three’ member states occupy a central position in the formulation and the putting into practice of EU foreign and security policy. Britain and France enjoy a foreign policy lead based on the size of their military contributions and engagements world wide. Together with Germany, although it is not on par with Britain and France in the military arena, the three are indispensable in diplomatic terms (Everts, 2000:19). The three countries also contributed significantly in military and diplomatic terms in FYROM and Afghanistan. Lastly, the substantial change in all three countries’ national positions vis-à-vis the development of CFSP and ESDP but the conflicting positions when it came to questions of these instruments’ application in the two crises makes the analysis of the foreign policies of the three countries highly topical. The two crises analyzed in this thesis highlight differences among the three member states

\[\text{It is important to note that agreeing on the modalities of EU-NATO cooperation in the final stages in}
\[\text{the preparation for the use of military instruments located in the EU ESDP did no longer hinge on}
\[\text{member states’ different conceptions on the role of NATO or the EU, but on differences between}
\[\text{Greece and Turkey on the use of NATO assets on the part of the EU that precluded the finalization of}
\[\text{the so-called ‘Berlin Plus’ agreements that give the EU access to NATO assets.}

with respect to the EU's global and regional role and different national positions over where the instruments located in the EU CFSP/ESDP should be applied.

The selection of the two crisis case studies is motivated by the following reasons: first, they were the first two crises prompting significant involvement on the part of EU member states to occur after the further development of CFSP after the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and the creation of ESDP in 1999. They were also the first two crises to occur after the Kosovo conflict, which was widely cited as a 'catalyst for Europe' (Pond, 1999). After the traumatic events in the former Yugoslavia throughout the 1990s and the failure on the part of the EU to act, there was an expectation that the EU would play a stronger role in future crises. The cases of FYROM and Afghanistan thus constitute test cases in the sense that they show to what extent EU member states involved the EU CFSP and ESDP in crisis responses, and to what extent they sought to provide 'European' responses (rather than 'national' or 'NATO' responses) to these two crises. Second, although both crises occurred during roughly the same time period -2001- they seemed to elicit a very different policy response in terms of the involvement of the EU CFSP and ESDP on the part of EU member states. This makes the two cases an interesting contrast, and highlights the regional as well as the global dimension in which foreign policy decisions of the three EU member states take place. Lastly, the two crises also occurred during the late stage of the institutional set-up of CFSP and ESDP. This makes policy reactions to the crises with respect to the involvement of EU policy instruments relevant for drawing broader conclusions about the place occupied by these institutions in national foreign policy and the constraints that act on their use.

This thesis uses the comparative method of structured, focused comparison (George, 1979) to study the impact of CFSP in Britain, France and Germany. It
addresses the 'many variables, small n' problem by focusing the analysis on 'comparable' cases that are similar in a number of important characteristics, but dissimilar as far as the explanatory variables are concerned, and by focusing on key variables (Lijphart, 1971). Britain, France and Germany, while similar with respect to their size and expected contribution to and expected lead in the formulation of decisions taken under CFSP/ESDP, are dissimilar in their historic military and strategic role, their attitude towards the use of force, and their policies towards the creation and the use of the EU CFSP and ESDP instruments. Whereas Germany since the end of World War II has conducted its foreign policy through multilateral channels and conceives of itself as a civilian power (Maull, 2000), British and French foreign policies in contrast have been characterized by a strong transatlantic relationship and emphasis on national sovereignty in the case of Britain, and a by a desire to maintain the status of a world power, and French exceptionalism, in the case of France (Howorth, 2004). Due to their size and influence in the European setting, the three countries also represent 'hard cases', as preferences that point towards Europeanization observed in these countries will be more relevant for the future development of CFSP and ESDP than in countries less influential in the integration process. The comparison of the three countries stands to provide an assessment of the influence of the EU level on national decision making and to what extent it has changed policy preferences in favour of a larger role for the EU in foreign and security policy. If such influences can be shown in all three countries this would support a conclusion that integration process are at work that lead towards convergence of preferences, and to an increasing role and application of EU CFSP/ESDP instruments in future crises. The thesis will analyze and compare policy responses by the three individual countries along three separate aspects that required
policy responses and a choice between the EU and other institutional settings in each crisis. These aspects will be identified in chapter 3.

This thesis is based on five kinds of sources: 1) academic literature on the conceptual approaches to the study of EU foreign policy, the foreign policies of EU member states, and EU-NATO relations; 2) think tank publications; 3) newspaper articles; 4) official documents; and 5) interviews carried out at the Foreign Offices and the Ministries of Defence in the capitals, the Permanent Representations of the EU member states in Brussels, think tanks and the EU institutions.

Interviews in particular are important for a number of reasons. First, the official documents are insufficient as far as they show the result of policy decision-making but do not reveal policy negotiations or disagreements among the member states (as well as their solution). Foreign and security policy is also a special realm as diplomatic activities take place behind the scenes and away from the public realm. Interviews also provide the researcher with a clearer picture of the policy-making process, in particular if conducted with eyewitnesses – officials who were directly involved in the political decisions taken at the time. At the same time, data/evidence derived from interviews is insufficient as interviewees may be biased, or not fully understand or remember a process. It is therefore necessary to supplement the data gathered from the interviews with official documents as well as the available secondary literature.

Data derived from these five sources is then used to test the hypotheses formulated in section VI through the method of process-tracing. Process-tracing makes possible to trace the links between possible causes and observed outcomes resulting in an analytical explanation. That is, it transforms a historical narrative into an analytical causal explanation (George and Bennett, 2005: 211).
V. Hypotheses generated from the conceptual approaches; some definitions

Having briefly introduced the conceptual approaches that will be used to analyze national policy decisions with respect to the two crises, and having provided the historical context on the creation of the EU CFSP/ESDP, this section formulates hypotheses generated from the two conceptual approaches. These hypotheses will then be ‘tested’ in the individual country chapters. To recall, the specific question this research addresses is: what was the role afforded to the EU CFSP (including ESDP), in the management of the crisis in FYROM and the war in Afghanistan in national foreign policy decision-making in Britain, France and Germany, and why did it stop short of an EU military operation under ESDP- initially in the case of FYROM and altogether in the case of Afghanistan?

The dependent variable in this research is the national foreign policy decision with regard to the use of EU CFSP and ESDP instruments in the crisis in question. Two competing independent variables – considerations derived from Europeanization and alliance politics – have been suggested as likely relevant explanations that emerge from the analysis of domestic policy processes. These will be applied to the empirical evidence presented in later chapters in order to ascertain their explanatory power in the decisions in the two crises.

An inquiry into the nature of the role afforded to the EU CFSP in national foreign policy decision-making also necessitates a closer definition of the meaning of the term. For the purposes of this research, ‘role’ will be taken to mean the nature of the task assigned to the EU CFSP/ESDP, including the nature of the mandate for either HR/SG Javier Solana or a EU Special Representative (EUSR) appointed to deal with a specific issue area; and the application of ESDP instruments.
A ‘significant’ role for the EU CFSP/ESDP can be expected to entail a mandate for a representative of the EU CFSP to negotiate on behalf of EU member states in a given crisis; the deployment of military instruments located in the EU ESDP; the adoption of joint actions and common position as well as joint policies in response to a crisis in addition to a high profile for the EU CFSP/ESDP in national foreign policy discourse. This could mean, for instance, that EU political and military tools are suggested and supported as the most appropriate instruments for dealing with the crisis in question.

In contrast, a ‘small’ role for the EU CFSP/ESDP can be expected to include the adoption of joint actions and common positions but without the corresponding high profile in national foreign policy discourse; no exclusive mandate for a representative of the EU CFSP to negotiate on behalf of EU member states in a given crisis; and the refusal to seriously consider the use of all instruments located within the EU CFSP/ESDP, or to block or delay decisions. Lastly, ‘no’ role for the EU CFSP/ESDP would mean that the application of instruments located in the EU CFSP/ESDP, although it may be discussed, does not lead to the adoption of policies that involve EU CFSP/ESDP instruments.

A second definitional matter concerns the distinction between a ‘significant’ and ‘small’ influence of either EU security institutions or the transatlantic alliance on national foreign policy decisions. Following from the definition of Europeanization adopted in the thesis (see Wong, 2005), ‘significant’ influence of EU security institutions is conceptualized here as either adaptational pressures acting on policy makers to utilize EU institutions; as the potential for policy projection and the export of national preferences on to the European level; or a reflexive preference for

12 In the case of the transatlantic alliance, this applies both to preferences of the US and national policy preferences.
the utilization of policy instruments located within the EU CFSP and ESDP. These can arise from the nature and location of the conflict as well as the EU’s past involvement in a geographic area; the existence of EU political and military instruments that have yet to be put to use; the desire to maximize national influence on a given policy area by means of the EU; or an inherently strong European orientation in national foreign policy. ‘Small’ influence by contrast can be expected to manifest itself as the opposite: weak or nonexistent adaptational pressures; no potential or perceived advantage to export national preference on to the European level; and the absence of preferences for the utilization of policy instruments located within the EU CFSP and ESDP.

‘Significant’ influence of considerations of alliance politics on national policy decisions, by contrast, is taken to mean that US involvement is deemed crucial by policy makers; that the US objects to the application of instruments other than those located in NATO; or that policy makers regard NATO as the most appropriate forum for the resolution of the crisis, either out of a transatlantic preference or because the necessary military tools are located in NATO. A ‘weak’ influence of alliance politics considerations, on the other hand, is defined to mean the absence of US objections or that policy makers do not view NATO as the only or most appropriate forum for the resolution of the crisis.

Having defined the terms, as well as the dependent and independent variables in this research endeavor, it is now possible to formulate a number of hypotheses that will be tested in the empirical chapters. The governmental politics approach is concerned with analyzing the decision-making process in a particular instance rather than with the formulation of a grand theory. Two competing assumptions can
nevertheless be derived from this approach that tie together the analysis of Europeanization versus alliance politics:

(1) if key government officials, bureaucrats and/or the elite public sphere favor the utilization of EU CFPS/ESDP over other institutional venues, and if they succeed in implementing their preferences, this results in a significant role for the EU CFSP/ESDP and points towards evidence of Europeanization; whereas

(2) if the reverse is true – that key officials either do not favour the utilization of the EU CFSP/ESDP, or favour the utilization but do not succeed in implementing their preferences, then this results in a small role for the EU CFSP and ESDP and disproves the Europeanization hypotheses that are formulated below.

The **Europeanization thesis** generates the following hypotheses:

(1) if there is a significant influence of EU security institutions on national foreign policy, then one would expect to find national governments to advocate a significant role for the EU CFSP and ESDP in both crises.

(2) if there is little evidence of an influence of EU security institutions on national foreign policy, then one would expect to find a small role afforded to the EU CFSP/ESDP in both cases.

(3) if there is significant influence of EU security institutions but this influence is weighed against other factors, then one would expect to find a role afforded to the EU
CFSP/ESDP in specific cases only, or only a partial role afforded to policy instruments located in CFSP/ESDP.

According to the alliance politics approach, one can formulate these hypotheses:

(1) if there is significant influence of the transatlantic alliance, both in terms of US preferences against an EU role, or other pressures to keep NATO in play and adjust policy preferences accordingly, then one would expect to find a small role afforded to the EU CFSP/ESDP

(2) if there is little influence of the transatlantic alliance on member states, or if there is little interest of (or perceived threat towards) the alliance in a particular region or conflict, then one would expect to find a significant role afforded to the EU CFSP/ESDP.

Lastly, with regard to military operations in particular there is also a utilitarian argument to be derived from alliance politics that focuses on the availability of military assets:

(3) if NATO assets are required for carrying out an operation that are not available to the EU, then one can expect to find a small role afforded to the EU CFSP/ESDP.

VI. Thesis Outline

The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 introduces the conceptual framework, the competing theoretical approaches that generate the working hypotheses presented in this chapter, and develops specific indicators by which to judge the empirical data. Chapter 3 analyses the two crisis case studies, highlights the relevant decisions with respect to the involvement of the EU, NATO and the US in the two crises, and identifies aspects of the political response to the two crises that crystallize decisions taken with respect to the research question posed in this introductory chapter. Chapters 4 and 5 consist of the empirical study of German policy towards the two crises. Chapters 6 and 7 apply the same structure to French policy towards the two crises, and chapters 8 and 9 do the same for the British case. Chapter 10 summarises the empirical findings and draws conclusions from the evidence established in Chapters 4 through 9. It will do so particularly with a view to the explanatory power of the Europeanization hypotheses in the two cases.
Chapter 2. Conceptual framework.

I. Introduction

This chapter presents in more detail the three conceptual approaches — Europeanization, alliance politics, and governmental politics — and their application in this thesis to explain national policy decisions in the two crises. It also situates them in the broader literature of International Relations (IR) and European integration. Finally, it presents the indicators that will be applied in the empirical chapters that follow to test the hypotheses formulated in chapter 1. By focusing on the application of CFSP/ESDP policy instruments in specific crisis situations, this thesis addresses the conceptual question of the nature of the interaction between the national and the European level. It takes the nation-state as the unit of analysis and assumes that member-states are the main actors in the EU CFSP/ESDP as far as decisions to employ political and military instruments located in CFSP/ESDP are concerned. It also assumes that existing EU institutions and the transatlantic alliance, and the preferences that national decision-makers hold vis-à-vis one or the other, influence the outcomes of national decision-making. This chapter is structured as follows: the first section introduces the problem of applying IR theory to the EU’s external relations with a view to placing the conceptual approaches applied in this thesis in a broader theoretical framework. The second section introduces the individual conceptual approaches that are applied to the empirical material in the individual country chapters. Section three outlines the potential contributions of a traditional FPA approach to the analysis of decision-making in the two crises. Section four critically assesses the Europeanization approach and its applicability to the research question this thesis sets out to answer. Although EU foreign policy challenges traditional IR approaches, the enduring choice between NATO and ESDP/CFSP in
the formulation of foreign policy in crisis decisions suggests that alliance politics and the role of US hegemony continues to play a significant role in national decision-making. The conceptual framework –alliance politics- resulting from these assumptions arises from traditional IR approaches of balancing, bandwagoning, and cooperation under anarchy. The fifth section will therefore analyze this literature and develop indicators that help test the empirical data in a more traditional IR framework. Based on the indicators developed in the two sections, the final section will restate the hypotheses introduced in chapter 1, and present possible outcomes.

II. International Relations Theory and EU Foreign and Security Policy

Although the EU CFSP since its inception has been criticized for its incoherence and ineffectiveness (Stavridis, 1997; Zielonka, 1998), EU member states have made continuous efforts to create effective institutional structures and to formulate common policies. This challenges realist assumptions about the limits of cooperation. A European foreign policy not only exists but is a dynamic and ongoing process in which EU member states play a defining role. What is more, the creation of CFSP and ESDP has also raised expectations of further foreign policy activities on the part of the EU, and the increasing application of these instruments provide evidence that the Capabilities-Expectations Gap (CEG), identified some years ago by Christopher

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13 The term ‘European foreign policy’ is somewhat contested on account of the fact that the EU is not a state and does not implement policies the way states do. As for the nature of the EU as an international actor, it has been argued that the concept of ‘presence’ permits explanations of the international impact of the EU without having to define the international activity of an actor that is not a state (Allen and Smith, 1990) and gives weight to outside perceptions of the EU and its effects on the psychological and operational environments of third parties (Hill, 1993). Conceiving of European foreign policy as an external relations system that reflects ‘parallel sets of activity, increasingly intermeshed and easy to confuse (...) but still essentially distinct’ (Hill, 1993: 322) offers a more neutral conception that stays clear of debates over whether the EU can have a foreign policy or be regarded as an actor in foreign policy (Ginsberg, 1999). However, in the definition of foreign policy as ‘the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor in international relations’ (Hill, 2003:3), the EU as an independent actor does qualify as having a foreign policy. As for the specific types of European foreign policy, one can identify the following (White, 1999): Community foreign policy, Union foreign policy, and national foreign policy. In the context of this typology, this thesis focuses on national foreign policy and analyses the ways in which national and Union foreign policies interact.
Hill, is diminishing (Hill, 1993 and 1998). This makes the impact and the interaction between the national and the European level a fruitful line of inquiry. It also raises the question of the theoretical approach best suited for explaining the nature of these interactions.

For mainstream IR theory, the creation of CFSP/ESDP presents a challenge as it puts into question the notion of state sovereignty – the European Union is ‘neither a state, nor a traditional alliance, and (...) presents a heterodox unit of analysis’ (Andreatta, 2005: 19); and is unique in the nature of its international cooperation and integration (Wallace, 1994), even if the area of foreign and security policy is intergovernmental and likely to remain so. Theories and concepts found in the literature on European integration generally have not been applied to foreign and security policy, but have instead concerned themselves with the problem of economic and political integration. Theories of regional integration, particularly functionalism (Mitrany, 1966) and later neo-functionalism (Haas, 1964) were more specifically concerned with processes of European integration and, in their supranational focus, form the antidote to liberal intergovernmentalism within the liberal paradigm. Neofunctionalism in particular conceptualizes the process of integration as proceeding via ‘functional spillover’ between issue-areas or ‘political spillover’ involving the supranational actor (Caporaso, 2001). Neofunctionalism assumes that integration brings ‘loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over pre-existing ones’ (Haas, 1958: 16). In this reading, the pursuit of common interests is ultimately assigned to a supranational authority.

14 One exception is the concept of ‘security communities’ that was first explored by Karl Deutsch (1957) and systematically studied in an edited volume by Adler and Barnett (1998).
that over time extends its policy reach. As a theoretical explanation, however, functionalism is better suited to explain economic integration: political spillover in particular does not serve as a potent explanatory tool as EU institutions have played a much more limited role in EPC/CFSP than in other policy areas (Smith, 2004).

The two main theories of international relations, realism and liberalism both show weaknesses with respect to their explanatory power of European integration and European foreign policy, including the EU CFSP/ESDP. Given its emphasis on the constraints of anarchy, realist approaches are sceptical about the possibility of international cooperation or European integration, and generally more useful to explain why co-operation fails rather than why it succeeds or how it functions. Accordingly, 'the interests displayed by the European countries in the EU creates a problem for realist theory' (Grieco, 1997: 184). Filipo Andreatta (2005:25) also emphasizes that although Waltz, a key proponent of neo-realism, takes note of integration taking place, he nevertheless argues that this would merely alter the distribution of power among the different units, but not the basic characteristics of the international system and the constraints on the individual units within it. Other realist thinkers allow for cooperation— and, by extension, European integration— as either a result of US hegemony (Gilpin, 1981) or the bipolar structure (Gowa, 1989) in its ability to provide order; or conceptualise European integration as a means to constrain Germany, particularly after unification (Art, 1996). Neither of these thinkers, however, allow for the possibility of changing preferences or policy impact on national foreign policy as result of European integration.

Theoretical approaches based on the liberal paradigm are better suited to explain European integration and the emergence of the EU CFSP because they do allow for the emergence of supranational organizations. Interdependence theories,
most closely associated with theories of international political economy but equally applicable to other areas of international politics, focus on mutual sensitivity and vulnerability that in turn leads to increased cooperation as autonomy becomes harder to sustain and states recognize the potential for joint gains (Keohane and Nye, 1977). Regime theory, as developed by liberal institutionalism, focuses on potentials for cooperation between states (see Krasner, 1983). Neoliberal institutionalism in particular allows for the emergence of international institutions in order to reducing uncertainty and mistrust in interstate relations (Keohane, 1984; Axelrod and Keohane, 1985). Applied to the EU CFSP, European institutions can serve the purpose of ameliorating collective action problems that emerge from cooperation in the military field (Tams, 1999). In contrast, liberal intergovernmentalism emphasises domestic structures and holds that states remain the basic unit in world politics and privileges the role of national governments in defining their interests. Andrew Moravcsik, a prominent proponent of liberal intergovernmentalism, thus argues that 'the primary source of (European) integration lies in the interests of the states themselves and the relative power they each bring to Brussels' (Moravcsik, 1998: 75). Accordingly, governments negotiate those issues at the supranational level that favour their domestic constituencies. Integration only happens when governments judge it in their interest to resort to supranational strategies. The pooling of sovereignty serves to enhance the credibility of member states' commitments (Moravcsik, 1998); and the process of EU foreign policy making in EU CFSP can be expected to remain intergovernmental (Wagner, 2003). However, the limitations of the liberal approach is that it is too narrow to account for the development of EU foreign policy as EU foreign policy has not always enjoyed a convergence of view on the goals of the institution, and as it is difficult to conceive of EU foreign policy as a
distinct issue-area in international relations (Smith, 2004). And, liberal intergovernmentalism assumes that the demands of society will always be clear when, particularly in the case of foreign policy, they may either not exist or may not be heard by policy makers.

Whereas realism and liberalism assume the rationality of actors, reflectivist approaches question the assumption of objectivity in social science (Hollis and Smith, 1991). Social constructivism in particular views interests and identities as endogenous to social interaction and conceptualizes agents and structures as mutually constitutive (Wendt, 1992). Reflectivist approaches to the study of international relations are potentially fruitful approaches to the study of EU foreign policy because they focus on issues related to governance, norms and identity that are largely outside the grasp of a more traditional, positivist rationalist research tradition. The EU, not as a supranational organ but as socially constituted by the states and in the states as a converging national policies and identities, increasingly takes on its own political logic. In a reflectivist reading, the construction of an identity (particularly in the post-Cold War era) requires the presence of an ‘Other’ to define oneself (Neumann, 1998). In the case of Europe, a constructivist reading of European identity has argued that Europe ‘is not primarily built as a political category through the nation-state imitating rhetoric of cultural identity and shared ancestry, but rather through a peculiar security argument: Europe’s past of wars and divisions is held up as the other to be negated, and on this basis it is argued that Europe can only be if we avoid renewed fragmentation’ (Waever, 1996).

Reflectivist approaches thus focus on the normative and ideational aspects and motivations not only of the EU’s international actions but also the EU itself toward democracy, peace and the rule of law, for instance (Manners, 2002).
Exclusive emphasis on CFSP’s intergovernmental character, understood as
intergovernmental cooperation, also neglects processes of socialization and
institutional dynamics. Possible starting points for a communitarian conception of
CFSP include focusing on informal rules of the game that constrain actor behaviour,
socialisation processes and organisational dynamics (Jørgensen, 1997). Evidence of
such socialisation or processes of change at the national level across a range of states
and issues includes the internationalisation of norms and expectations (Tonra, 2001),
or the development of a ‘consultation reflex’ (Nuttall, 1992), or policy networks and
epistemic communities influence decision-making in an institutional context (Haas,
1960). Tonra (2003) suggests that a cognitive approach that focuses on rules that
build on the conception of CFSP as a cognitive regime, resting on shared
understandings of acceptable norms of behaviour (Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986) can
offer insights into the reciprocal relationship between CFSP and national foreign
policies and the transforming capacity of the CFSP vis-à-vis national foreign policies
beyond those offered by a rationalist approach. This includes role perceptions, a set
of norms of foreign policy behaviour and action orientation that serves as a ‘road
map’ that foreign policy-makers rely on to simplify and facilitate an understanding of
a complex political reality (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993). In the context of Europe,
Aggestam (1999) distinguishes between several and sometimes overlapping role
conceptions, each of which carries its own normative implication as to an actors’
likely policy behaviour.

This albeit brief overview of existing approaches to analyzing the EU’s
foreign policy has demonstrated that existing theories of both IR and European
integration are ill-equipped to explain either the emergence of the EU CFSP/ESDP,
the process under which policies are adopted, or the nature of the impact and
influence of the European on the national level and vice versa. It has also shown that research on the interaction between the EU CFSP and national foreign policies has yielded some results that point towards change in national foreign policy practice (Nuttall, 1992) as well as policy outcomes (Tonra, 2003). This justifies the use of the Europeanization concept to analyze the question posed in this thesis: based on the brief overview of the existing literature and its limitation, the EU CFSP can be expected to have some influence on the formulation of national foreign policy. Still, the question remains whether changing practices result in a change of preferences, and in national governments advocating a qualitatively different role for the EU CFSP/ESDP as a result. The Europeanization concept is a promising one because it allows a detailed study of the nature of the interaction between the national and the European level. Before analyzing the Europeanization approach in more detail, however, the next section introduces the governmental politics model. The analysis of national policy decision-making based on this model will be used in this thesis as a framework that allows drawing conclusions on the degree of Europeanization and/or alliance politics, as well as the explanatory value of the two approaches, in national foreign policy towards the two crises.

III. Governmental Politics

The governmental politics model, which is to provide a basis from which to draw conclusions as to the validity of the alliance politics and Europeanization frameworks, is located in the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) paradigm. It differs from the two conceptual lenses applied in this thesis in that it does not offer a theory-driven explanation in the sense that it does not aim to derive an explanation for a policy decision from a general theory of IR. FPA in general aims at formulating
middle-range theories, which offer explanations of particular, limited phenomena rather than more general explanations of state behaviour (Merton, 1957). The advantages of an FPA approach for this project are that it 'enquires into the motives and other sources of the behaviour of international actors, particularly states...by giving a good deal of attention to decision-making, initially so as to probe behind the formal self-description (and fictions) of the processes government and public administration' (Hill, 2003:10). The particular approach adopted in this project is closely modelled on Allison's bureaucratic politics model (Allison, 1999), which seeks to open the 'black box' of policy-making in order to identify the chain of decision-making and the different players involved policy decisions about the two crises under investigation in this thesis. It stands to offer a detailed explanation of the decision-making process, and will make it possible to draw conclusions over whether considerations that would point towards Europeanization or alliance politics drove policy decisions in the three countries in the two crises. Before outlining the governmental politics framework as it will be applied in this thesis as well as its applicability to this particular research project, the following section briefly addresses the problem of applying a FPA framework in a European context.

a. Applying FPA to the European context

Although a potentially fruitful line of inquiry, FPA approaches have been criticized for their state-centric outlook and the exclusive focus on US foreign policy (Smith, 1994; Brown, 2001). More generally, and partly as a result of these criticisms, the FPA approach itself has suffered from neglect as a separate field of investigation even if it has generated a large body of scholarship (Light, 1994). However, the criticism of state-centrism can be effectively countered by the argument that FPA
itself grew out of reactions to realist assumptions of the state as a unitary actor, and is fundamentally pluralist in orientation (Hill, 2003). As outlined in preceding sections, the study of European foreign policy in general and CFSP/ESDP in particular sits somewhat uneasily within IR theory due to the specific nature of the EU and its foreign policy. Traditional IR theories assume that systemic conditions determine state behaviour and/or that states are rational, unitary actors. In holding on to assumptions of the state as a unitary actor, these theories have resulted in a simplified view on the policy process in general, and in the European context in particular. An analytical focus on the state itself, and policy processes that take place at the domestic level promises a more nuanced analysis of policy decisions and outcomes than structuralist theories can provide. It is also a promising approach in the context of foreign policy making in the CFPS/ESDP context. There is a gap in the scholarship on the EU's impact on member states' foreign policies, which also points towards the applicability of FPA in a European context. Accordingly, it has been argued that the existing foreign policy literature has 'under-explored the distinctiveness of the foreign policies of European states who are members of the EU and the issues that this membership raises' (Manners and Whitman, 2000:3).

Much of the literature on European foreign policy and, by extension, CFSP is implicitly occupied with the study of policy-making with attention to the relationship between the decision-making process and policy outcome—in other words, foreign policy analysis (Peterson, 1998). FPA can be regarded as the most prominent approach when it comes to probing the processes of decision-making in European foreign policy. FPA perspectives, adapted to the European context, offer a useful framework for the study of European foreign policy, even if the *sui generis* nature of the EU context means that traditional FPA categories should not just simply be
transported to a European context (White, 1999). This in turn points towards the degree of modification necessary for FPA approaches to accommodate European foreign policy.

Although traditional FPA approaches and the majority of the literature on the subject have focussed predominately on US political processes, they can be adapted to fit the European context. Accordingly, Christopher Hill and Michael Smith suggest that ‘bureaucratic politics within the Commission and the Council Secretariat, distinctive ‘domestic’ constituencies for leaders to defer to, and serious problems of coherence and legitimacy all demand the attention of the middle-range theories generated within FPA’ (2005: 393). Although the subject of this thesis is member states’ foreign policies as they related to the formulation of policies in the second intergovernmental pillar, some amendments to an FPA framework are nevertheless required in order to analyze the interplay between national foreign policy and Union foreign policy. The following section will analyze the application of a specific FPA approach, that of governmental politics, to the European setting as well as the necessary amendments in order to make the approach applicable to this particular research project.

b. **Governmental politics in the EU CFSP/ESDP framework**

The framework and application of governmental politics\textsuperscript{15} was conceptualized by Graham Allison in *Essence of Decision*, his influential study of the Cuban Missile Crisis, and focuses on the ‘competing preferences and processes for aggregating among them’ (Allison, 1999: 11). Originally published in 1971, Allison’s study built on the work of first generation foreign policy analysts who focussed on the ‘political

\textsuperscript{15} Allison originally called the model ‘bureaucratic politics’ but changed the name in the 2\textsuperscript{nd} edition of his study, which this thesis adopts.
process' approach to foreign policy (Huntington, 1960, Neustadt, 1960; Schilling et al., 1962). The governmental politics model conceives of government behaviour and policy outputs as the results of bargaining games among decision-makers and departs from assumptions of states as unitary actors and of government actions as partially coordinated by leaders. The players in this model include in the first instance political leaders as well as officials occupying positions on top of major bureaucracies. In addition, other actors might play a role, including lower level officials, the press, NGOs, and the public. The model assumes that policy-makers positions derive from the department or agency they represent; that their preferences and beliefs are related to the different organizations they represent; and that their analysis accordingly yields conflicting recommendations (Allison, 1999:256).

Another basic and crucial assumption underlying this approach is that power is shared, and that the foreign policy process is inherently a political one. As a result, policy outcomes are not guided by a rational course of action, but according to the power and performance of proponents and opponents of the action in question. Allison suggests that the organizing concepts of the governmental politics model can be arranged along four interrelated factors: who plays; the factors that shape players' perceptions, preferences, and stance on a particular issue; determinants of a player's impact on results; and the combination of players' stands, influence and moves to yield governmental decisions and actions (Allison, 1999: 390).

While there has been a continuing interest in the influence of governmental politics that has gone hand in hand with increased attention to the impact of domestic politics on foreign policy more generally (Light, 1994), the governmental politics model has also met with significant criticism. Governmental politics has been criticized for underestimating the power of the executive in the context of US politics.
(Art, 1973; Rosati, 1981); the failure to specify assumption and formulate testable hypotheses (Art, 1973; Wagner, 1974); for being inapplicable to the non-US setting (Wagner, 1974; Caldwell, 1977); for assuming too close a fit between roles and positions and for ignoring the images and beliefs that are shared cross role positions (Art, 1973; Krasner, 1971; Steiner, 1997; Welch, 1992); and for being ineffective as a model because it requires researchers to analyze too much detailed information about a foreign policy decision in order to draw conclusions — and therefore does not simplify the task of analysis (Ripley, 1995). Allison himself conceded that while his model stands to yield a detailed and nuanced picture of decision-making, the amount of detail the data collection and analysis required to carry out a study on government decisions means that accurate accounts of the bargaining processes involved pose a challenge for the researcher (Allison, 1999). Much of the necessary information must be obtained from the participants themselves. This in turn can pose a problem as memories of past events are not only unreliable, but access to the players in question may not always be possible. The model also presupposes a level of knowledge and familiarity of governmental processes that is difficult to obtain for an outside observer who has not been able to immerse him- or herself in the government process, either as a practitioner or as a participant observer. On the other hand, it is precisely the distance to the policy process that enables abstraction. And, government processes and outcomes can be reconstructed not just through partial interviews, but also through the use of public documents, newspapers, and discussion with close observers of the relevant participants.

As a result of these criticisms, but also of other trends in social science research, such as the apolitical bias in foreign policy scholarship and the focus on grand theory and its emphasis on parsimony and hypothesis testing, relatively little
theoretical progress has occurred since the mid-1970s (Kaarbo, 1998: 72). At the same time, the enduring finding of the model, that policy makers are influenced by ingrained bureaucratic habits even under extraordinary circumstances, continues to apply to present day conditions. As a result, despite the criticisms and despite the lack of theoretical development of this approach (Welch, 1992), the governmental politics model remains a useful analytical approach. It also continues to be applied in FPA scholarship, albeit with modifications. The governmental politics model has been adjusted in particular by combining it with new theoretical development in FPA that includes research on organizational culture and social cognition (Ripley, 1995). Ripley’s amended approach thus focuses on the analysis of three related concepts: bureaucratic roles (how participants see themselves and others contributing to the decision process), procedural scripts (the structures, strategies, and premises that make pragmatic sense in a decision process), and cultural rationales (the attempt by participants to define appropriate behaviour and invoke symbols to help give meaning to their decisions) (Ripley, 1995:90). A second approach that argues in favour of the relaxation of assumptions in the original model focuses on the more general notion of political power as dispersed and of conflict as deriving from incentive structures (Kaarbo, 1998:91). It therefore advocates dropping overly strict assumptions and predictions in favour of using governmental politics to inform a research question—as is the case in this research—and of taking the concepts of power, conflict and institutional structures as a backdrop for the investigation of specific question in foreign policy. Taken together, the suggested modifications result in an explanatory approach or perspective rather than a strict model, and include the individual players’ views and beliefs on their role in the decision-making process, the appropriate behavioural structures, and their views on appropriate behaviour.
The criticism that the model is not applicable in a non-US setting is, I would argue, overstated as the model is not inherently US-centric but has been applied by Allison to a case in US foreign policy, and can thus be amended to explain non-US policy outcomes (Allison, 1999). It is possible to apply the governmental politics model in the European setting and to specify the key players and identify the relevant policy processes that lead to a policy decision. Policy-making in the area of the EU CFSP/ESDP is distinct because of the ongoing growth in this particular policy field. Beyond specific governmental processes and the beliefs and preferences with regard to the EU CFSP/ESDP that may span across bureaucracies, the model should therefore be mindful of the wider governmental process, such as the role of parliaments, political parties and the elite public sphere, defined as outputs from think tanks, and the press: in other words, the public debates that form and reflect participants' preferences and opinions with respect to the applicability of instruments located in the EU CFSP/ESDP in the two crises.

Applied to the European context, and to this particular research, the governmental politics approach yields the following guiding questions around which to structure the analysis:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizing Concept</th>
<th>Operationalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Who are the participants?</td>
<td>Who were the individuals and departments within the relevant ministries (Foreign and Defence) involved in this issue area?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who were the executive decision-makers involved in these crises?</td>
<td>Who were the relevant actors in the wider governmental process (members of parliament, think tanks, press)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What shapes participants' perceptions, preferences and stance?</td>
<td>What, if any, were the priorities of the participants with regard to CFSP/ESDP, the transatlantic alliance and the role of the US in European security?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What determines their impact on results?</td>
<td>What were the participants' conception of how the national interest would be served by the application of CFSP/ESDP or NATO instruments (or lack thereof)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What combination of stands, influence and moves result in decisions and</td>
<td>What was the formal authority and responsibility of the participants in question?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What was the decision structure?</td>
<td>What was their degree of control over resources in order to carry out a mission?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What was their access to players with bargaining advantages?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Structuring the empirical data around these questions will result in a thorough analysis of the governmental processes involved in the decision-making towards these two crises and identify the key decision-makers as well as their preferences in both cases. Having presented the first conceptual approach, the next section introduces the Europeanization model.

**IV. Europeanization**

The concept of Europeanization has been increasingly used to study aspects of European integration and to analyze the way in which ‘Europe matters’ in a specific policy field (Börzel, 2003; Caporaso et al., 2001; Dyson and Goetz, 2003; Knill, 2001; Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). Europeanization has been conceptualized as an historic phenomenon, transnational cultural diffusion, institutional adaptation, or the adaptation of policies and policy processes - reflecting the interdisciplinary nature of the use of the concept (Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003). The broad usage of the term thus poses a number of challenges for researchers wishing to employ the concept. First, ‘Europeanization’ must be properly defined in order to delineate Europeanization from related processes and concepts, in particular that of European integration. This is also important with a view to establishing relevant indicators of Europeanization for the analysis of empirical data collected. More fundamentally, the concept’s applicability in the area of foreign and security policy must also be established, as foreign and security policy
differs from other policy areas because of the intergovernmental nature of decision-making. In addition, decision-making in matters of foreign and security policy tends to be entrusted to the national executive with less domestic parliamentary oversight than in other policy areas. As a result, any influence of the EU on the formulation of national foreign policy is not immediately apparent. And, the intergovernmental nature of EU foreign and security policy that does not generate the type of legally binding adaptation pressures policy areas in the first pillar do.

Apart from the problem of defining Europeanization, another frequently voiced concern regarding the utility of research on Europeanization is that it is an analytical concept rather than a theory. These are certainly valid reservations. However, it has been argued that Europeanization, rather than serving as an explanatory concept or theory, can be useful ‘as an attention-directing device and a starting point for further exploration’ (Olsen, 2002: 943). Thus, the potential contribution of the application of the concept of Europeanization is that it helps the understanding and the analysis of the impact of the EU on the national level. It also helps focus on processes of change (Radaelli, 2004). Europeanization thus allows the researcher to focus on puzzles beyond the cause of European integration or the nature of EU decision-making, and to inquire into the nature of the ‘reciprocal relationship’ between the European and the national level (Börzel, 2002: 195). For the purpose of addressing the research question posed in this thesis, therefore, the use of the Europeanization concept seems not only promising but also appropriate.

Decision-making in the first or 'Community' pillar policies is supranational, whereas the second 'CFSP' pillar and the third 'Justice and Home Affairs' pillar proceed by intergovernmental decision-making.
a. Applying 'Europeization' to foreign and security policy

Due to the intergovernmental nature of the EU foreign policy process in the area of foreign policy, pressures emanating from the EU level are not as strong or direct than in areas of economic and social policy. There, research has established modifications occurring in national policies and institutional structures in policy areas located in the first pillar (Börzel, 1999; Bulmer and Burch, 1999; Cole and Drake, 2000). With regard to foreign policy, therefore, the delegation of policy competences in foreign affairs has been said to have had a limited impact on domestic policy choices (Hix and Goertz, 2000). On the other hand, EU membership has resulted in an adaptation process for new and for founding EU member states, both in terms of their policies towards previously external states as they join the EU, as well as policies towards third states in order to align it with existing EU policies (Manners and Whitman, 2000). Through the institutionalisation of EPC and later CFSP and ESDP, foreign policy and security policy have become part of the integration process, despite its intergovernmental decision-making, and co-operation within the EU CFSP has been shown to reinforce shared norms of behaviour (Ginsberg, 2001).¹⁷

Although the effects of Europeanization on national foreign policy are weak in comparison with policy areas located in the first pillar, there do exist a number of documented changes in states' foreign policy as a result of national and European interactions, even if those changes are not always explicitly referred to as 'Europeanization'. Research has shown that repeated interactions and the quantity and quality of information available has changed working patterns among the diplomats of EU member states (Nuttall, 1992; Forster and Wallace, 2000), resulting in a coordination reflex going beyond calculated exchanges of information (Tonra,

¹⁷ See for instance Forster and Blair (2002) on the impact of European policy making on the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in the UK.
2003) and pointing towards a socializing dimension of Europeanization where changing practices can be expected to change preferences and interests. With the evolution of EU foreign policy coordination, some scholars have used a Europeanization approach to document changes in national foreign policy: in his study of Irish foreign policy, Keatinge (1983) referred to the ‘Europeanization’ of foreign policy to label the reorientation of Irish foreign policy as a result of EC entry, whereas Torreblanca some years later identified such a shift in the case of Spanish EU membership (2001). More recently, Tonra has analyzed the Europeanization in the cases of Holland, Denmark and Ireland (2001), Wong in the case of France (2006) and Miskimmon in the case of Germany (2004). In applying the concept to national decision-making under CFSP and ESDP, therefore, one can reasonably expect to find evidence of some degree of Europeanization even in the field of security and defence. This in turn makes the application of the concept valid for the purpose of the research question posed in chapter 1. But, the analytical challenge of delineating the ‘EU effect’ from other influences - including domestic politics, other international security institutions and the United States – in addition to the risk of overestimating the effect of Europeanization (Major, 2005: 183) by focussing exclusively on the interplay between the national and European level warrants the inclusion of alliance politics approaches in this thesis.

b. Defining Europeanization

One commonly cited definition of Europeanization focuses on domestic change caused by European cooperation and defines Europeanization as ‘an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of policies to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics
and policy making’ (Ladrech, 1994: 69). In addition to a process of domestic change, however, analysts adopting a bottom-up perspective understand Europeanization as ‘the emergence and development at the European level of distinctive structures of governance’ (Caporaso et al. 2001: 3). But, because member states initiate these EU policies that they later adapt to, the two dimensions of Europeanization are linked in practice, suggesting that Europeanization is a mutually constitutive process of change at the national and the European level (Radaelli, 2002; Börzel, 2003). In addition, socialization mechanisms and cognitive change also suggest a third dimension of Europeanization, where changes comes about through the transfer of norms or ideas.

Building on the broad definitions of Europeanization presented above, Wong (2005) subsequently suggests that three conceptions of Europeanization in particular can be useful in explaining possible changes taking place in foreign policy-making in EU member states: national adaptation (a top-down process), national projection (a bottom-up process), and identity reconstruction (changing interests and identities). The following graph illustrates the interaction between the national and the European level.
adaptation understands Europeanization as a reactive, top-down process that introduces change from the European level to the national level of policy decision-making. Europeanization as national adaptation can be defined as ‘...the process of change at the domestic level (be it of policies, preferences or institutions) originated by the adaptation pressures generated by the European integration process; a process of change whose identity and character depend on the “goodness of fit” of domestic institutions and adaptation pressures’ (Torreblanca, 2001). This definition extends to institutional processes as well as informal structures. In the context of foreign and security policy, this understanding of Europeanization runs counter to liberal intergovernmentalist conceptions of CFSP/ESDP as a forum where states try to push through individual objectives, and outcomes are the lowest common denominators (Moravcsik, 1998). It conceptualises participation in CFSP as a reciprocal relationship. It is more congruent with domestic structure approaches found in international relations and comparative politics and fits into what has been termed “the second image reversed” (Gourevitch, 1978), or the international (in this case, European) sources of domestic change.

Following Smith (2000), one can expect to observe changes in one or more of the following as a result of Europeanization as national adaptation: bureaucratic reorganisation, constitutional change, elite socialization and shifts in public opinion. In addition, adaptation can be expected to result in a more general change in policies, preferences, and institutions, increased salience of the European agenda, and adherence to common policy objectives, policies agreed to for the sake of EU unity (high price of defection) and the relaxation of traditional policy positions to accommodate progress of EU projects. In the context of decisions taken in crisis situation, or decisions that concern the application of a policy instrument located in
CFSP/ESDP in a specific instance, bureaucratic reorganisation and constitutional change are less likely to be observed as these constitute changes as a long-term response to events and the institutional evolution of CFSP/ESDP. One could expect to find, however, a high degree of salience of the European agenda, the adherence to common objectives, and the relaxation of national policy positions in order to accommodate the progress of EU policy and institutions. ‘Salience’ can be understood as a general importance or prominence of the EU CFSP/ESDP in national foreign policy. ‘European agenda’ here refers to the development of EU security institutions. In practice, this means that an increased importance of the EU CFSP/ESDP in the minds of decision-makers leads to advocating increased application of CFSP/ESDP instruments.

Europeanization as national projection (a bottom-up process), on the other hand, can be regarded as a process of where states seek to export domestic policy models, ideas and details to the EU (Bulmer, 1998). The concept of politics of scale (Ginsberg, 1989), and the benefits of collective action in conducting foreign policy actions at lower costs and risks than member states acting alone applies here as well. States are not just passively reacting to changes at the institutional level but are the primary actors in the process of policy change, and pro-actively project preferences and policy ideas and initiatives to the European level. By ‘Europeanizing’ previously national policies and generalizing them onto a larger stage, a dialectical relationship between the state and the EU level is created which in turn feeds back to the national level. The benefits of national projection are first, that the state increases its international influence; second, that it reduces the costs of pursuing a controversial policy against an extra-European power; and third, that a strong European presence in the world is potentially beneficial to all EU members as it increases individual states’
international influence (Regelsberger, 1997). Policy outcomes of national projection could see states taking advantage of the EU to promote specific national interests, states attempt to increase national influence in the world by participating in or initiating EU policies, and states using EU as cover to influence foreign policies of other member states.

In practice, these top-down and bottom-up processes are interlinked, rendering Europeanization not just a result or a consequence of policy, but also an ongoing and mutually constitutive process as the responses of member states to the EU integration process feed back into EU institutions (Börzel, 2003, Radaelli, 2002). This creates a methodological problem as far as EU policies and institutions can be regarded both as modifying policy preferences at the national level while at the same time originating at the national level, and therefore can potentially serve as a dependent or an independent variable. Nevertheless, the empirical analysis of member states foreign policies presented in later chapters shows that it is possible to analytically distinguish between the impact of the institution on a member states’ policy as well as moves of policy projection, especially when analyzing a particular policy decision, as is the case in this research project.

The third conception of Europeanization, that of changing policy preferences, moves the definition of Europeanization closer to notions of integration and suggests the possibility of eventual convergence of national foreign policy. It evokes the concept of security communities (Deutsch, 1957), and that of elite socialization previously referred to (Smith, 2000) as well as the broader literature on national identity. Such readings of European identity also focus on the redefinition and negotiation of identities within EU institutions as well as national citizenry, mirroring a neo-functionalist reading of a gradual transfer of identity and affiliation towards a
new supranational Europe (Haas, 1960), even if it should be quite obvious that Europe as an identity category is far from replacing national identity and that Europe does not enjoy the same level of legitimacy that the individual nation-states do. In the context of Europeanization, 'Europe' as an identity category co-exists and can be incorporated in a given nation-state identity, depending on the degree of resonance. The question then becomes how much space there is for 'Europe' in collective nation-state identities and how these identity constructions of 'Europe' relate to given nation-state identities and ideas about the European political and economic order (Risse, 2001). Evidence of conceptions of identity towards Europeanization includes the emergence or existence of norms among policy-making elites, shared definitions of European and national interests, increase in public support for European political cooperation, shared or overlapping definitions of the state’s and Europe’s role in the world, and of Europe’s security parameters. Identity construction also suggests convergence, and in the context of EU foreign policy and CFSP ‘prolonged participation in the CFSP feeds back into EU member states and reorients their foreign policy cultures along similar lines’ (Smith, 2000: 614).

However, Europeanization should not be regarded as synonymous with convergence or integration, even if it can lead to aspects of both. Adaptation pressures and simultaneous policy projection are both filtered through national preferences and strategic cultures. This means that it is equally likely that national foreign policy cultures, although changing as a result of CFSP, remain significantly distinct from one another. This can be expected to negatively impact the emergence of a truly common European interest, identity, or foreign policy – as research on the emergence of a European strategic culture has documented (Giegerich, 2006; Meyer, 2005). The conceptual questions aside, conceiving of Europeanization as identity
formation also points towards long-term processes of change that are not necessarily captured in single policy-decisions, as is the focus of this research. This does not mean, however, that norms and more generally the value attached to a ‘European approach’ cannot impact on national decision-making. Potential indicators for Europeanization as a result of identity formation can be expected to include the recourse to the European option as an instinctive choice, and the value attached to a European approach in a particular policy decision – in other words, similar the indicators one would expect to observe as a result of Europeanization conceptualized as national adaptation.

c. Operationalizing Europeanization

Europeanization thus promises to be a useful analytical approach as it allows for a conceptualisation of the parallel processes of adaptation and national influence exerted on the institution, as well as the potential for long-term changes in policy preferences. In the context of this particular research project, the first two definitions – national adaptation and the projection of policy preferences on to the EU level – are most directly relevant for the purposes of this particular research. Following from the discussion on the various potential observations as a result of Europeanization, the following indicators, and questions that result from them, are suggested that allow for an operationalization of Europeanization in the two case studies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator of Europeanization</th>
<th>Operationalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The salience of the EU CFSP/ESDP in national foreign policy (adaptation)</td>
<td>Was the EU CFSP/ESDP suggested as the appropriate institution?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was the application of CFSP/ESDP instruments in the decision-making</td>
<td>was the application of CFSP/ESDP instruments in the decision-making process considered important, or a priority, on the part of national governments?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>process considered important, or a priority, on the part of national</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>governments?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The adherence to EU policy objectives, especially over other</td>
<td>Did the member state compromise its national preferences in order to accommodate the use of CFSP/ESDP instruments?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>considerations and preferences (adaptation)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The use, or advocating the use of the EU CFSP/ESDP in an attempt to</td>
<td>Did the member state compromise its national preferences in order to accommodate the use of CFSP/ESDP instruments?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>increase national influence (projection)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The use of the EU CFSP/ESDP to push through policies on either the</td>
<td>Did the member state pursue national policy preferences through the EU CFSP/ESDP in this particular case?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>domestic or international level (projection)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The existence of shared definitions of national and European preferences</td>
<td>Did the member state equate national with European preferences in this particular case?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>among policy makers (changing preferences)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The existence of norms and preferences among elites that favours the application of EU instruments over other available possibilities (changing preferences) | Did policy elites, including the elite public sphere, favour the application of CFSP/ESDP instruments?
---|---
Increase in public support for the EU CFSP/ESDP (changing preferences) | Was there public support for the use of CFSP/ESDP instruments?
The relaxation of traditional policy positions to accommodate progress of EU projects (adaptation/changing preferences) | Was the EU CFSP/ESDP suggested as the appropriate institution in this case despite previously held preferences to the contrary that would have suggested the adoption of a different course of action?

If evidence for these indicators are found in the empirical evidence presented in later chapters, national foreign policy can be said to exhibit signs of Europeanization and, more generally, substantiates the claim of the impact of the regional level on national foreign policy.

V. Alliance Politics
The final conceptual approach applied in this thesis locates a potential explanation in the role of alliances in international politics, in this particular case NATO, and the way in which they influence national foreign policy. It locates the explanation primarily at the systemic rather than the regional level and assumes that states'
interest in the preservation of the transatlantic alliance and the continued involvement of the US in European security conditions their policy responses. NATO's survival after the end of the Cold War and its evolving role since the 1990s suggest that the transatlantic alliance continues to play a role in national foreign policies, even if NATO's original purpose—the defence of Western Europe against a possible attack from the Soviet Union—has disappeared. This explanatory approach thus places weight on the preferences and role assigned to NATO, as opposed to the EU CFSP/ESDP. The following sections will first analyze the literature on theoretical approaches towards the existence and purpose of alliances; apply this theoretical framework to the context of the EU member states in the context of the post-Cold War era, and discuss ways to assess the role of NATO and US preferences in national foreign policy in the two cases.

\textit{a. Alliances in international politics}

Studies of the role of alliances in international politics are generally grounded in realist thinking. This approach assumes that states are unitary actors in world politics, and that states form alliances in order to protect themselves against threats in an anarchical system. Alliance formation is thus a product of systemic anarchy, inequality of strength, and conflicts and common interests among states (Snyder, 1977). The belief that states form alliances to prevent stronger powers from dominating them lies at the heart of balance of power theory, which holds that states join alliances to protect themselves from states or coalitions whose superior resources could pose a threat (Bull, 2002; Waltz, 1979; Morgenthau, 1948). The tendency to balance will increase if a powerful state is nearby, especially if it appears to have especially dangerous intentions, such as territorial ambitions or an expansionist
ideology (Walt, 1987). Shifts in the level of threat will alter the nature of existing alliances, and the alliances formed to protect against a state that is weakened are less necessary and more likely to resolve (Walt, 1997). The absence of an overarching threat makes the disappearance of an alliance likely: thus, the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a unipolar system prompted predictions that the US and Europe would drift apart and security competition would return if the US were to withdraw from Europe (Layne, 1993; Mearsheimer, 1990).

b. NATO since the end of the Cold War

While the conceptual literature on the formation of alliances explains the origins and persistence of NATO throughout the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 posed a significant challenge not only to NATO, but also to theorists of alliances who were faced with having to explain NATO’s persistence in view of the disappearance of the Soviet threat. For one, it was argued that traditional balance of power theory in itself does not predict the disappearances of alliances but rather their becoming less coherent and more fragile (Walt, 1999). Others attribute a certain type of stability to the current unipolar system that leaves the US so powerful that other states are unlikely to challenge it. As long as the US remains willing to remain actively involved (even if its vital interests are no longer at stake), NATO is likely to persist in the future (Wohlforth, 1999; Mastanduno, 1999). From an institutionalist perspective, on the other hand, institutions encourage cooperation through reducing transaction costs and facilitating compliance with existing agreements (Keohane, 1984), and are therefore likely to endure. NATO’s highly institutionalized character and the transatlantic network of an elite community consisting of former NATO officials, defence intellectuals, military officers and researchers is more likely to keep
the institution alive, even more so since NATO’s capabilities and assets have been demonstrated to be useful in the post-Cold War world during the Gulf War 1990-91 and in the Balkans (Walt, 1999). But, this point of view is most applicable in cases where states have common interests – and when common interests decline and the number of potential points of conflicts is growing it can be expected that it is more likely that Europe and America drift apart, with negative implications for the future of NATO.

The fact that NATO did survive the end of the Cold War reinforces the argument that approaches rooted in the rationalist tradition do not suffice in explaining the creation and participation in an alliance, as they cannot account for underlying themes of institutional identity, and the socialisation effect that participation in an institutions has for members of an alliance (Williams and Newman, 1996). Constructivist approaches that understand NATO as a security community (Deutsch, 1957) focus on norms and identity issues similar to those raised in the context of the creation and participation in the EU CFSP in section II. From a social constructivist perspective, NATO did not fragment because of the shared norms and identities of its members. NATO, therefore, represents an institutionalization of the transatlantic security community based on common values and a collective identity of liberal democracies’ (Risse-Kappen, 1996: 395). In addition to having persisted, however, NATO has also embarked on a process of enlargement – demonstrating that the end of the Cold War instead of terminating led to an extension of the concept of a ‘democratic security community’ (Risse-Kappen, 1996; Schimmelfennig, 1998/99). Accordingly, NATO has since the end of the Cold War changed its identity from purely that of a military alliance, to that of an organization of cooperative security: whereas NATO during and immediately after
the Cold War was tied to 'the maintenance of an 'overall strategic balance' (Ciută, 2002: 51), it has shifted towards 'cooperative security' and regards as its fundamental security tasks the creation of partnerships, along with crisis management (NATO, 23/24 April 1999).

Although NATO has undergone significant changes since the end of the Cold War both with regards to membership as well as the definition of its main tasks, it remains a significant fixture in national foreign policy. This is both for the continuing involvement of the US in European affairs as well as for its political purpose as a permanent forum for diplomatic exchanges between member states. Arguments exist for both sides: that NATO is kept together by a shared recognition that the solution of common problems are best found through cooperation (Keohane, 1984) or that the transatlantic relationship is one essentially dominated by the US. In this reading, the creation of ESDP itself can be regarded as a response to US hegemony: even if ESDP does not quite constitute a balancing project it is certainly an effort to develop an alternative security supplier (Posen 2004). Either position in this debate, however, assigns a significant role to the role of NATO and by implication the US, in national foreign policy.

c. Operationalizing alliance politics

Applied to this research, a framework informed by alliance politics yields the following indicators:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator of alliance politics</th>
<th>Operationalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>States align with NATO or the US in order to keep the US involved in</td>
<td>Was US involvement deemed crucial in this particular case by the member states,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European security concerns</td>
<td>and did this result in alliance behaviour?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US preference leans towards the use of NATO</td>
<td>Did the US prefer (or insist) on NATO involvement, and did this result in the decision on the part of member states to use NATO in this particular case?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preference is given to NATO as institutional forum, or to US policy preferences, out of a clear transatlantic preference</td>
<td>Did the member state in question exhibit a preference towards NATO over other institutional settings? Did the member states regard NATO as the primary forum for the solution of the crisis? Did the member states regard the crisis as a platform for NATO to prove NATO's continued relevance in the post-Cold War era? Did the member state regard the use of NATO as a means to express solidarity with another member of the alliance?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preference is given to NATO for utilitarian reasons: military instruments</td>
<td>Were necessary military tools available only through NATO?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
are in possession of NATO, NATO more capable/acceptable to do the job at hand

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Was NATO considered the more appropriate resource for reasons of prior involvement in the region or case?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Was NATO the preferred option for the host country?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If evidence of these indicators is found in the empirical data, national foreign policy can be said to be determined by alliance behaviour, and by a preference for NATO. More generally, it would substantiate claims that alliance politics play a decisive role in the formulation of national foreign policy when it comes to crisis decision-making.

**VI. Conclusion**

Based on the discussion of the three approaches it is now possible to restate the hypotheses formulated in the introductory chapter in more specific terms. Significant evidence of Europeanization – manifested either as policy responses as a result of adaptational pressures, or the export of national preferences on to the European agenda – can be expected to result in a significant role for the EU CFSP/ESDP in the resolution of both crises. However, evidence of Europeanization may not necessarily result in a significant role for the EU CFSP/ESDP if alliance politics, and the presence of NATO, play a bigger role in national decision-making. National member states may prefer the use of NATO either for utilitarian reasons, for reasons of solidarity with another member of the alliance, out of preference for the involvement of the US and NATO, or because of US pressures or concern over possible negative
consequences for transatlantic relations. In this case, one would not expect a significant role afforded for the EU CFSP/ESDP, even if some evidence of Europeanization is present in both cases. Focussing on governmental politics, lastly, will open the black box of policy making and reveal what impact the preferences and influence of the individual agencies, key participants, and the elite public sphere (consisting research institutes and think tanks, the press, and the elite public) had on policy outcomes. Governmental politics will disaggregate the broader concepts of Europeanization and alliance politics by identifying preferences and bargaining positions within the national governments. In applying these conceptual approaches to the individual country case studies, this thesis will be able to arrive at a nuanced analysis of policy decisions taken both from the domestic as well as the international level. First, however, it is necessary to provide a more detailed analysis of the two crisis case studies to highlight the empirical puzzle and the contradictions between Europeanization and alliance politics impulses among the member states.
Chapter 3. The crisis in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and the war in Afghanistan

I. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide background information on the crisis in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and the war in Afghanistan for the analysis of the policy decisions taken by Britain, France and Germany that will be presented in subsequent chapters. This chapter also highlights the differences as well as the similarities of the two cases and the policy responses to the two crises, and demonstrates that their juxtaposition makes for a valuable analytical exercise. The first case, FYROM, is a regional crisis that took place in a region where the EU, NATO and individual member states had been active in the decade leading to the crisis, and was resolved peacefully. It also illustrates the politics leading to the implementation of the Berlin Plus agreement and the first military ESDP operation undertaken. The war in Afghanistan, on the other hand, took place in response to a global and systemic shock after the attacks on 11 September 2001 and the invocation of the NATO treaty’s article V. This case therefore highlights national policy initiatives in response to a fundamentally changed international environment. The nature of the application of military instruments in the two cases is also different. This applies to the nature of the peace-keeping operations required involving both low and high end Petersberg tasks and the combination of warfare and peace-keeping in the case of Afghanistan, and the goal of deterrence of violent acts in the case of FYROM. But, the cases also show remarkable similarities. This applies to the importance of the US as a political and military actor in both cases as well as stated ambitions for a greater political and military role for the EU CFSP/ESDP that were not equally shared among member states. And, it shows the aim to establish the EU
as a political actor, and the friction between transatlantic and European commitments among the member states in formulating their policy choices. Finally, this chapter identifies a number of conceptual issues raised by these cases with respect to the role of the EU CFSP/ESDP, NATO, and the influence of the US on EU foreign policy more generally; and identifies specific policy areas that highlight the Europeanization and alliance politics hypotheses. These are to provide structure to the analysis and to allow comparison of the individual policy decisions in the empirical country chapters that follow.

II. FYROM

a. The significance of the crisis for EU foreign policy

The crisis in FYROM, although smaller in scale than the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s nevertheless posed a significant threat to regional security because of the potential for a spill-over of the conflict into neighbouring Kosovo and the de-stabilization of the entire region. Another failure to act on the part of the EU would also have been quite damaging to EU credibility in the region and beyond, a threat that was taken very seriously by the EU and the individual member states (Interview with French official, 8 September 2005). The crisis in FYROM thus had a strong symbolic character for EU crisis management, and was ‘a first’ in several respects: the first time the EU made use of crisis management tools located in CFSP and ESDP; the first time NATO and the EU worked together on a practical level; and the first time a military mission for the EU was suggested and eventually realised under the EU ESDP framework. Operation Concordia, the first ever ESDP military mission, put into practice the Berlin-plus agreements and was high on symbolism even if it was a relatively small mission (Interview with EU official, 21
June 2005). This particular case, therefore, appears to validate the Europeanization hypothesis as far as the policy decisions of the member states were concerned. However, the involvement of NATO in the conflict, differences among member states with respect to the application of instruments located in the EU CFSP/ESDP, the timing of an ESDP take-over from NATO, and US interests in the region suggest that alliance politics considerations played an important part in this case as well. The conflicts among member states’ interests and policy preferences therefore justify the selection of this particular case for analysis.

b. Background. The crisis in FYROM

FYROM holds an important position in the security in the Western Balkans due to its geographic location at the southern border of Kosovo and the eastern border of Albania, and because of persistent interethnic tensions and the resulting potential for escalating violence that could result in the destabilization of the entire region. One of the poorest republics of the former Yugoslavia, FYROM is a country over which Serbs, Greeks and Bulgarians have historically asserted and maintained cultural and geographic claims. As part of the Yugoslav Federation, FYROM worked to create its own cultural identity; at the same time, the concerns of the Albanian population were not high on the agenda.\textsuperscript{18} Albanian nationalism thus took root and began to grow predominantly in Kosovo, as well as in FYROM (Liotta, 2003). The presence of the UN, OSCE, NATO and ultimately the EU in FYROM dates back to 1992, shortly after the country declared its independence, although much of the international, particularly NATO, presence has not been put in place necessarily for the benefit of FYROM but as part of the effort to deter violence in Kosovo. Following the

\textsuperscript{18} In 2002, the population profile was Macedonian (64.2 %), Albanian (25.2 %), along with Turkish (3.8 %), Roma (2.7%), Serb (1.8 %), Bosniacs (0.8 %), Vlachs (0.5 %), other (1 %) (European Commission, 2006).
declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia in June 1991, FYROM held a referendum on 8 September 1991 and declared independence on 17 November 1991. Whereas Serbia agreed to Macedonian independence and Bulgaria also quickly recognized the new state (although not its language), Greece blocked the recognition of the country.\(^{19}\) In addition to these external problems, internal challenges included the need for democratic institutions and legal and economic reforms in a bankrupt state with the potential for multiethnic tensions.

In light of the fighting in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, then President Gligorov asked the UN for an observer force that would enhance FYROM's sovereignty and international recognition, and keep the conflicts away from FYROM's borders. The mission, which was subsequently known as the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP), had as its objectives to monitor the border areas and to report any developments that could pose a threat to FYROM; to deter such threats from any source and help prevent clashes between external elements and Macedonian forces, and to use good offices to contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in the republic (Sokalski, 2003: 102).\(^{20}\) The US also deployed troops in support of UNPREDEP in order to contain the fighting south of Bosnia and to signal to Milosevic that the US considered both Kosovo and FYROM of interest. In 1999, as the situation in Kosovo was becoming increasingly unstable and the potential for spill-over of the conflict into FYROM increased, UNPREDEP lost its mandate on 25 February 1999 due to China's veto in the Security Council (United Nations, 25 February 1999). The US UNPREDEP elements remained in FYROM initially under national control with the mission to maintain,

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19 Greece used its veto power in 1991 and blocked EU recognition because of the name and symbols of the new state. Later, the country was only able to become a member of international organizations under the name 'Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia' (Schneckener, 2002).

20 The main contributors to UNPREDEP were the US (362 Troops), Norway (152 Troops), Finland (199 Troops) and Sweden (198 Troops) (United Nations 1999).
protect and preserve US infrastructure but came under NATO jurisdiction and remained in the country under a more precisely defined force protection mission and a logistical support base for NATO’s Kosovo operation (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary 26 March 1999). NATO and US forces, therefore, were already in FYROM when the conflict began in early 2001, signalling the US’ broader interests in the region.

With respect to international economic assistance, FYROM has been part of the Stability Pact since 1999 and the recipient of funds through the EU’s CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation) regional programme. FYROM also signed the EU Stabilization and Association Agreement in March 2001 (European Commission, 2006) as part of the attempt to stave of violence in the initial period of the crisis. This provided some opportunity for economic and material assistance. However, smuggling and economic criminal activity along the border between FYROM and Kosovo by ethnic Albanians further complicated interethnic tensions in an economic climate where unemployment was as high as 32 per cent (Liotta and Jebb, 2002: 73). The end of the UN mandate, coupled with NATO’s apparent lack of interest in internal Macedonian stability on account of an exclusive focus on the situation in Kosovo in turn created a window for ethnic Albanian extremists to radicalize the political agenda. Stability began to unravel as members of the ethnic Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA) led by Ali Ahmeti, many infiltrating from the US sector in Kosovo, staged several attacks along the ill-defined Kosovo-Macedonian border during 2000 and increasingly frequent as of January 2001 (International Crisis Group, 2001a). The rebels claimed to be fighting for Albanian national rights in FYROM, including citizenship, ownership, education, language and representative government, but there was concern on the part of the
international community that a second aim could include joining Albania or Kosovo, which would have reopened the question of borders in the Western Balkans region and could have led to wider regional instability (BBC News, 18 March 2001).

The history of international involvement in FYROM illustrates that a number of international actors had been active in the country prior to the outbreak of the 2001 crisis. Given the previous failures of the EU in the Western Balkans in the 1990s, the EU’s aim in the resolution of this conflict was to create a profile as an international political actor, particularly in the Western Balkan region (Interview with French official, 8 September 2005). The high stakes for regional security in the crisis also suggest that the US and the international community as a whole had an interest in the peaceful resolution of the crisis and to protect prior investments in the region. For the EU and its member states, three particular policy areas of involvement in the crisis and post-crisis intervention are of analytical importance for exploring the applicability of the Europeanization and alliance politics frameworks: EU involvement in the negotiations leading to the Ohrid Framework Agreement; the launch of the NATO operations to aid its implementation; and the politics of an eventual ESDP take-over of the NATO missions. The analysis in the individual country chapters will therefore be structured around these three policy areas in order to provide clarity and continuity as far as the structure of this thesis is concerned.

c. Policy area 1: the negotiations leading to the Ohrid Framework Agreement

As the nature of international intervention changed from preventive diplomacy to third-party mediation focused on crisis management and containment and later to a post-peace agreement intervention (Ackermann, 2005: 105-119), the involvement of NATO and EU increased considerably. For the EU in particular, the crisis in FYROM
presented an opportunity to act early and decisively to absorb the lessons from Bosnia and Kosovo and demonstrate its credibility as a global actor. With respect to the negotiations leading to the Ohrid Framework Agreement the EU quite successfully managed to do so, eclipsing the OSCE as a political actor in the crisis, for instance.21 However, the presence of the revived Contact Group22 and NATO in the negotiations also raises the question of the importance attached to the EU CFSP in this particular case given the commitment among member states to NATO, and the Contact Group as forums for coordinating positions and to conduct negotiations. Subsequent chapters will analyze to what extent considerations of the role of the EU CFSP that support the Europeanization hypothesis were in direct conflict with the use of the Contact Group and NATO as negotiation forums.

The EU was active in FYROM early on in the crisis, and successfully employed economic as well as political incentives in the resolution of the conflict and the eventual signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement on 8 August 2001. To be

21 The OSCE was continually present in FYROM with an observer mission and participated in the negotiations through Ambassador Robert Forwick, OSCE Personal Representative for the situation in FYROM (OSCE Press release, 30 March 2001), and it was not automatically given that the EU CFSP would assume a political lead role in the negotiations. In fact, German diplomats repeatedly stressed in interviews that they were concerned about introducing a new and untested actor in the conflict due to the likely ramifications of a failure of the peace negotiations and one explicitly stated that s/he had expected the OSCE rather than the EU CFSP to assume a bigger part in the political negotiations and in the post-conflict phase (Interview with German officials 9 August 2005 and 21 November 2005). This is significant because it demonstrates that despite the importance of the crisis in FYROM for the establishment of the EU CFSP as a political actor, this political objective seems to have been weighed against pragmatic considerations by at least one member state, and suggests a degree of scepticism towards the EU CFSP as a political instrument in the crisis. This in turn raises questions not only of the salience of the Europeanization hypothesis but also of potential internal divisions within member state administrations that will be analysed in subsequent chapters. For a more detailed discussion of Robert Forwick’s role in the negotiations, see International Crisis Group (2001b).

22 The Contact Group was formed in 1994 and comprised senior officials from Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and the US to coordinate policy towards the Western Balkans. On the interaction between the Contact Group and the EU’s institutional structure see Schwegmann (2000). One important change to the composition of the Contact Group in this case, however, consisted of Javier Solana, or Stefan Lehne, Solana’s representative, in Solana’s absence (Interview with German official, 21 November 2005). While the existence of directorates and the presence of the US as part of these directorates do not point towards decision-making independently from the US it does not a priori rule out processes of Europeanization as defined in chapter 2. On the one hand, the fact that the big three member states acted outside European structures in the negotiation of the crisis appears to weaken the Europeanization hypothesis. However, the fact that the EU CFSP in the persona of Javier had a place at the table affirms the Europeanization hypothesis because it shows that member states, in agreeing to give the EU a seat at the table, adapted policy processes to accommodate EU institutions.
sure, the initial discussions on the possible steps to stop the violence and to seal the border between Kosovo and FYROM to prevent the NLA to use the safety zone in Kosovo as a base from which to launch its attacks and to store weapons, had taken place between NATO and the Macedonian government. However, the crisis was discussed for the first time in the General Affairs Council on 19-20 March 2001, and support for Javier Solana’s efforts confirmed (Council of the European Union, 19-20 March 2001). Javier Solana was due in Skopje on 19 March 2001, a visit that marked the beginning of a rather intensive shuttle diplomacy, often in conjunction with NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson and/or Chris Patten, the Director of the Commission’s Directorate General of External Relations (DG Relex).\(^2\)\(^3\) Importantly, the cooperation between NATO and the EU on the crisis in FYROM took place in the context of increasingly institutionalized relations between the two organizations, including the first formal NATO-EU meeting at the level of foreign ministers on 30 May 2001, where the NATO Secretary General and the EU Presidency issued a joint statement on the Western Balkans (NATO, 29 July 2004).

This was the first time that NATO and the EU joined forces, announcing on 19 March 2001 that the two organisations would coordinate their efforts in order to prevent FYROM from sliding into a civil war (Le Monde, 21 March 2001). The role of the EU consisted in diplomatic and economic support for the Macedonian government, combining both CFSP (pillar 2) and Commission (pillar 1) policy tools.\(^2\)\(^4\) Javier Solana played a very visible and effective role in managing the crisis.

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\(^2\) Javier Solana acted on behalf of the CFSP pillar, whereas Chris Patten, the director of the External Relations directorate represented the Commission, a working relationship that proved quite effective, without a bureaucratic battle over competencies between the Council and the Commission (Piana, 2002; United States Institute for Peace, 2002).

\(^3\) As for the Commission (first pillar), the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with FYROM, proposed by the EU contingent on political dialogue on reforms between the two ethnic groups, also proved to be an important political and economic incentive for the resolution of the conflict. Also, the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM), which was created in February 2001 to allow the rapid dispatch of Community funds, was first used in FYROM (European Commission, 2001). The
through frequent visits to Skopje to put pressure on the government as well as the Albanian side to arrive at a political solution to the conflict. In turn, the Foreign Minister of FYROM visited Brussels several times and President Trajkovski attended the EU Gothenburg summit in 2001 at the suggestion of France and Germany. Solana, in conjunction with NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, played a crucial role in mediating cease-fires, establishing a government of national unity and bringing political leaders – Albanian as well as their Macedonian counterparts – to the negotiating table to work out a political agreement. Both acted as ‘trouble shooters’ keeping on track the pursuit of a negotiated settlement by softening entrenched positions and mending internal divisions within the different political parties (Ackermann, 2005: 105-119).

Importantly, Javier Solana was proactive not only in the negotiation of the crisis but also in carving out a role for himself in the negotiations in the first place. He thereby acting as what may be termed a policy entrepreneur (Roberts and King, 1991; Sabatier, 1999) in defining his role as HR/SG of the EU CFSP as well as his action radius vis-à-vis the member states.25 His role and stature also indicates the Europeanization of national foreign policy with respect to the support of the member states for an increasingly visible role for the EU CFSP. With respect to decisions by the three member states analyzed in this thesis, there are two potential indicators of Europeanization may apply that will be explored in the empirical chapters: policy adaptation, where member states supported Solana in order to accommodate the

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25 A number of interviewees mentioned Solana’s proactive stance, with one national official explicitly stating that ‘of course, if you give Solana the freedom to move into a certain policy area he will take the opportunity to do so’ (Interview with former German official, 9 February 2006).
progress of the EU CFSP; and identity formation, where member states held an inherent preference for a proactive role for the EU CFSP.

In the emerging division of labour NATO brokered security arrangements between the NLA and the government security forces and generally provided the military deterrent, whereas the EU and US encouraged political dialogue and confidence-building measures (Eldridge, 2002: 65). The urgency of the situation and the need for demonstrating unity also proved an additional incentive for the member states to act together in support of EU unity. This suggests a high degree of salience of the EU agenda, and points towards evidence of Europeanization of member states' foreign policies. As the crisis worsened under the Swedish EU Presidency, which did not have an Embassy in FYROM and thus could not represent the whole EU, British Ambassador Mark Dickinson represented Sweden's interests. The UK thus acted as the local presidency on the ground (Interview with UK official, 29 June 2006). The need for a continuous EU presence forged a consensus to create the position of an EU Special Envoy to FYROM – Mark Dickinson was appointed on 6 March 2001. In accordance with French interests (Interview with French official, 8 September 2005), François Léotard, a former French Defence Minister, was subsequently appointed as EU Special Representative (EUSR) on 25 July 2001.26 This suggests a preference on the part of at least one member state, France, to raise its profile within the EU CFSP and points towards Europeanization understood as policy projection.

In early May 2001 Solana played an important role in negotiating the creation of a government of national unity consisting of all political parties. Solana and Robertson were also actively involved in negotiating several cease-fires and,

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26 Léotard was replaced on 9 October 2001 by Alain Leroy, another Frenchman. There have been five EU Special Representatives to FYROM since: Alexis Brouhns (from 30 September 2002); Seren Jessen-Petersen (from 26 January 2004), Michael Salin (from 12 July 2004) and Erwan Fouéré (from 17 October 2005). Source: Council of the European Union, 2006b
importantly, were twice able to prevent Prime Minister Ljubco Georgievski from proclaiming a state of war, a move that would have led to a considerable escalation of the conflict (International Crisis Group, 2001b). Apart from the domestic negotiations, Solana also persuaded Ukrainian prime minister Anatolli Kinakh to end at least temporarily weapons sales to FYROM in late July 2001, which may have helped move along the negotiations leading to the Ohrid accords, and pressured the Slav Macedonian parties to incorporate ethnic Albanians concerns – such as the use of Albanian as a second language, or security sector reforms – into the political process (International Crisis Group, 2001b). The negotiations in Ohrid, in South-Eastern FYROM close to the Albanian border, took place between the leaders of the four major political parties (two Slav, two Albanian) in the presence of President Trajkovski as well as François Léotard and US negotiator James Pardew. The appointment of a US negotiator three days after Léotard’s appointment (Interview with French official, 8 September 2005) in turn highlighted the interest on the part of the US to maintain its influence on the outcome of the negotiations. Léotard also met with Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov for support of the EU’s and NATO’s initiative in FYROM. In response to diplomatic pressure from the international community, the ethnic Slav and Albanian political leaders began negotiations on 2 April 2001. Upon the signature of the Ohrid Agreement on August 13, the EU pledged an additional $42 million in aid to push the parliament to back the reform plan and ratify the Agreement – the precondition for NATO Operation Essential Harvest, which began on 27 August 2001 (NATO, 15 August 2001).

All three member states analyzed in this thesis therefore played an active role in the solution in the crisis and the support for the EU platform in supporting and/or endorsing Solana and the use of EU CFSP instruments. The UK acted as the EU local
presidency, whereas Germany and France used the EU platform to invite President Trajkovski to the Gothenburg Summit; France, lastly, lobbied for the appointment of an EUSR. This potentially serves to underline the European hypothesis as the EU appears to have been suggested and perceived as an appropriate and salient platform.

But, the EU was not the only institution active in the negotiations, and broader geostrategic issues were of salience as was the credibility of NATO on the ground. These suggest support for the alliance politics hypothesis rather than Europeanization. First, the crisis in FYROM coincided with the advent of a new US administration and doubts on the part of the EU whether the US would continue to be engaged in the Balkans. Although the US allayed fears of withdrawal from Kosovo and Bosnia at the US-EU summit in Gothenburg in June and James Pardew, the US negotiator, acted side by side with Solana, lending weight to the European effort – but also signalling that the US was not yet confident that the Europeans could manage this conflict on their own (Interview with French official, 8 September 2005), and suggested that the role of the US in member states political considerations had important weight. Another highly salient actor in the negotiations was the Contact Group, which was resurrected and first met on the crisis in FYROM in April 2001. Although the Contact Group ended up endorsing the EU’s political mediation in the crisis in FYROM and included Javier Solana or his representative Stefan Lehne, its resurrection for coordinating policy nevertheless questions the extent to which alliance politics considerations by the member states took precedence over those of Europeanization in the case of the negotiations leading to the Ohrid Accords. The conceptual implications for the Europeanization approach will be discussed in chapter 10.
d. Policy area 2: NATO Operation Essential Harvest

The second relevant policy area for the international community – the deployment of NATO to assist the implementation of the Ohrid Peace Agreement – illustrates the applicability of alliance politics considerations. The need for a NATO presence was not contested among EU member states.\(^{27}\) However, NATO Operation Essential Harvest and its follow-up operations serve as a precursor to considerations of an eventual ESDP take-over. Of interest analytically with respect to this particular policy area is also the question of what particular alliance politics considerations were at play because they highlight the points of conflict with respect to the eventual handover to the ESDP mission, and to what extent these differed among the three member states analyzed in this thesis.\(^{28}\)

Since the end of the conflict in Kosovo, about 4,000 NATO troops (KFOR rear\(^{29}\)) were based in FYROM, in addition to intelligence and training personnel stationed there since the early 1990s when NATO and FYROM signed the Partnership for Peace (PfP) agreement (Financial Times, 7 August 2001). For NATO, a peace accord in FYROM was also important from this perspective, as instability potentially could negatively impact the logistic lines to Kosovo. NATO had been active in FYROM on one prior occasion when the Extraction Force (XFOR) was assembled in 1999 to protect the first elements of KFOR in the area.\(^{30}\) At the beginning of the crisis, KFOR initially made open-ended security assurances, but came to play an increasingly activist role in FYROM. Upon the first signs of crisis,

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\(^{27}\) Although the participation in the NATO Operation was contested domestically in at least one member state, Germany, as chapter 4 will analyze in more detail.

\(^{28}\) This in turn is significant because in the case of primarily utilitarian motivations, an eventual ESDP handover can be expected to be less contested than in case of fundamental transatlantic preferences.

\(^{29}\) KFOR stands for Kosovo Force while KFOR Rear is the logistic backup for troops in Kosovo based in FYROM (NATO Notes, 27 March 2002).

\(^{30}\) The corps and commander for XFOR was provided by France, and placed under NATO (American) command, proof that France was not as hostile to NATO as is sometimes believed (Mathiopoulos and Gyarmati, 1999: 67) – and an indication that alliance politics considerations played a part in French decision-making in the crisis in FYROM as well.
President Trajovski made an immediate request to NATO to help secure borders (NATO, 20 June 2001). This shows that NATO, and in particular the US, were necessary for Western credibility in FYROM (Interview with French official, 8 September 2005), although there was no desire to extend KFOR’s mandate to FYROM, and KFOR troops were criticized for not taking a tougher stance on Albanian guerrillas. Active in the political negotiations – apart from Lord Robertson – was Pieter Feith, NATO special envoy and Senior Civilian Representative to Skopje, Ambassador Hanjorg Eiff (NATO, 20 June 2001). A NATO presence was also necessary because NATO was already in the area and had a degree of political credibility both with the Albanian as well as the Slav part of the population (Interview with EU official, 21 June 2005). The conclusion of the Ohrid Agreement was the precondition for a NATO peace keeping operation.

Operation Essential Harvest was deployed ‘in order to collect weapons and ammunitions, on a voluntary basis, from those who have been fighting government forces’ (NATO, 17 August 2001). Key tasks were the collection of weapons and ammunition from the insurgents; transportation and disposal of weapons which are surrendered; and transportation and destruction of ammunition that is turned in (NATO, 16 December 2002). Britain, France and Germany contributed sizably to the force. Soon after the launch of the NATO mission it became apparent that an international military presence would be required beyond the term of Operation Essential Harvest. About 50 EU and OSCE observers, a number that was intended to double, had entered FYROM in late August and early September 2001, and their mandate extended beyond that of Operation Essential Harvest. The EU foreign ministers soon expressed security concerns for the safety of the monitors. There were

31 The UK contributed Brigade Headquarters and one battle group; France one infantry battle group and Germany two infantry companies (NATO, 16 December 2002). The UK also commanded the 400-strong pre-deployment force to prepare for the activation of the full task force (NATO, 31 July 2003).
still potential for conflict: two further parliamentary votes were needed to pass Albanian rights into law, and rebels were still occupying areas of the country, and armed Slav Macedonian paramilitary groups were unhappy with the peace deal (International Crisis Group, 2001c). NLA commanders warned that they would remobilise and the Interior Minister, Ljube Boskovski, said he would launch a security crackdown on them (The Independent, 7 September 2001). Operation Amber Fox\textsuperscript{32}, the follow-on operation to protect OSCE and EU unarmed monitors that entered FYROM to oversee the settlement after Operation Essential Harvest ended, began with a three-month security mandate that was extended until 15 December 2002 (NATO, 31 July 2003). The next mission began 16 December 2002 – Operation Allied Harmony – which was eventually taken over by the EU ESDP.

While there is no expected evidence of Europeanization in this case as it involves member state deliberation on the size and nature of a NATO mission, the nature of alliance politics considerations behind the NATO deployment is of interest here also to better understand and analyze the next policy area. Were member state commitments to NATO as a political and military tool motivated by utilitarian considerations of NATO credibility that made a peaceful outcome in FYROM more likely, or were decisions motivated by a more fundamental transatlantic preference? These can be expected to impact member states’ considerations with respect to the third and final policy area for the crisis in FYROM.

\textsuperscript{32} Task Force Fox consisted of up to 700 troops, with 300 already in the country. The extraction force consisted of three companies with approximately 100 personnel each: one from France, one from Italy and one from Germany (NATO, 31 July 2003). The participation of France in the NATO missions in FYROM in turn suggests that alliance politics considerations played a part in French decision-making as well, affirms the argument made earlier (see footnote 8) – and further justifies the inclusion of France in this research project.
Policy area 3: The politics of the ESDP take over from NATO

Success in political mediation and EU-NATO cooperation prepared the groundwork for a ESDP take-over from NATO and the first ever EU military mission. In the case of FYROM, the risk of failure was low because the demands of the KLA – a multiethnic state where Slav and Albanian Macedonians enjoyed equal rights rather than secession - were regarded as reasonable on the part of the West (Garton Ash, 2001), and because the threat of full-scale civil war had receded with the signing of the Ohrid Agreement. Accordingly, the EU and member states expressed interest in a take-over early on, and according to EU officials and outside observers it was not so much a question of if but of when the EU would assume a more central role in the military and political process (Interview with EU official, 21 June 2005; Interview with UK academic, 17 June 2005). However, the initial suggestion for an ESDP takeover was rejected by the member states, and the actual take-over delayed on account of unresolved issues between NATO and the EU with regard to the Berlin plus agreements. This makes this particular policy area salient with respect to the Europeanization and alliance politics hypotheses. Were member states' concerns with respect to the ESDP take-over a question of principle with respect to transatlantic relations, a question of prior NATO-EU arrangements, or a matter of pushing for EU autonomy? And, to what extent were Europeanization and alliance politics considerations in conflict and how were they eventually resolved?

The debate over a potential EU take-over of the NATO mission first arose publicly out of the continuing need to fill the impending security vacuum left by the end of Operation Essential Harvest, discussed in the last decision point (see also International Crisis Group, 2001c). On 5 September, EUSR François Léotard proposed to send a 1500-strong multinational EU force to keep the peace after the
end of the NATO mission, a proposal he claimed had been discussed with the British, French and German governments, and that was said to have the backing of the French government (Financial Times, 6 September 2001). At the informal meeting of EU foreign ministers at Genval near Brussels, Javier Solana was to ask colleagues to agree on what tasks any new force in FYROM should perform before deciding on which organisation would be best-equipped to undertake it. NATO on the other hand claimed that an EU force would be ‘messy and silly’, and the emerging consensus among the EU foreign ministers was that a follow-on peacekeeping force would require UN approval, must include Russia, and should be NATO-led to ‘tie the US in’, although Skopje had by that time not consented to further NATO presence (let alone invited an EU military mission).33

At least one member state, then, had come to look for a more robust military role in FYROM in an effort to give credibility to the emerging ESDP. The operation in FYROM was as much, if not more, about its symbolic character for the EU rather than about the nature of the mission (Interview with EU official, 21 June 2005).34 At the Laeken summit in December 2001 the Belgian EU Presidency declared ESDP operational and capable of conducting some crisis management operations35, and both

33 With respect to the question of how to fill the security vacuum, an International Crisis Group report noted that ‘in principle, NATO should not be the only candidate for a security role in Macedonia after “Essential Harvest”’, but noted that ‘Léotard’s confidence may owe more to traditional French ambitions to build up European defence and security capacity than to realistic assessments of what is possible in Macedonia in 2001. Early indications are that his “initiative”, if such it was, is falling on deaf ears’ (International Crisis Group, 2001c: 14). While it is true that the initial suggestion fell on deaf ears, the idea was taken up at a later stage. This signals that the initial rejection was less a matter of principle on the part of the member states but rather one of timing — other than in the case of Afghanistan, which will be introduced next.

34 In this context, the International Crisis Group noted that ‘Brussels must recognize that it faces legitimate scepticism in Washington and in the region about both its capabilities and will in the security field, making a successful first endeavour all the more important’ (International Crisis Group, 2002: 15).

35 This was done despite the objection of the UK, who deemed declaring ESDP operational too early. While the British stance will be analyzed in more detail in chapter 8, it is nevertheless worth pointing out at this stage that member states differed with respect to the timing of this decision, and that this has implications for the validity of the Europeanization hypothesis in at least one member state analyzed in this thesis.
the Spanish EU Presidency in the first half of 2002 as well as President Chirac urged
the EU to take over the mission in FYROM (International Crisis Group, 2002). At
the European Council in Barcelona on 15-16 March the EU pledged to take over from
NATO, declaring the ‘EU’s availability to take responsibility, following elections in
FYROM and at the request of its government, for an operation to follow that
currently undertaken by NATO in FYROM, on the understanding that the permanent
arrangement on EU-NATO co-operation (‘Berlin Plus’) would be in place by then’
(cited in NATO Notes, 27 March 2002:1). With regard to Operation Amber Fox, the
operation following Essential Harvest, Secretary of State Colin Powell hinted that the
US would not object if EU wanted to take over responsibility in the Balkans. From
the part of the US, then, there seemed to be little objection in principle for the EU to
take over a security function in FYROM, including under the ESDP label (Interview
with US official, 20 October 2005). Member states reservations by that time
appeared to have been resolved in favour of an ESDP mission provided the ‘Berlin
Plus’ agreement were in place.

But, the dispute between Greece and Turkey over EU access to NATO assets
prevented the formulation of a timetable for EU troops to assume the mission. After
the EU-NATO declaration on the ‘Berlin-plus’ agreement on 16 December 2002 that
gives the EU access to NATO assets for crisis management (NATO, 2 December
2004), EU foreign ministers formally approved the first EU military mission in
FYROM. Operation Concordia was launched on 31 March 2003 with Admiral
Rainer Feist, the Deputy SACEUR, as Operation Commander. Its operational tasks
were to “contribute to a stable, secure environment to allow the [Macedonian] government to implement the Ohrid Framework Agreement” (Council of the

36 The issue of EU assured access to NATO’s common assets and planning remained the major
stumbling block, although at least one EU member—France—considered a ad hoc access an acceptable
solution (NATO Notes, 27 March 2002).
European Union, 27 January 2003). EU liaison officers were working alongside their
NATO colleagues in the NATO command structure, both at the strategic level in an
EU cell at SHAPE in Mons, Belgium, and at regional level at AF SOUTH in Naples,
Italy. In the field, in Skopje, the Force Commander French Major-General Maral and
his staff were working closely with the NATO Senior Military Representative. It was
the first EU operation to draw on the 'Berlin-plus' arrangement and involved 350
lightly armed military personnel. Initially expected to last six months, its mandate
was extended at the General Affairs Council (GAC) on 21 July until 15 December
2003, after which a police operation –Operation Proxima- succeeded Concordia to
help FYROM authorities develop their police forces.

f. Conclusion: questions raised by this case

The crisis in FYROM represents a success story for the EU in crisis management.
Together with the eventual launch of the first ESDP mission this points towards the
Europeanization of national foreign policies. However, with respect to the policy
areas introduced in this chapter, it has been shown that several factors pose salient
questions that will be further analyzed in the individual country chapters that follow.
To summarize, they include the motivation on the part of individual member states to
support Javier Solana and the EU CFSP in the negotiation efforts, and the importance
attached to other institutional venues, most notably NATO and the Contact Group;
the nature of national commitments to NATO, and whether they were motivated by a
fundamental transatlantic preference in ensuring continued US presence in European
affairs or rather utilitarian motives that related to NATO's military assets; and
member states positions with respect to the ESDP take-over of the NATO mission. In
particular this concerns whether they were motivated by considerations of timing, of
a fundamental preference for ESDP (or rejection thereof), or of co-ordination with the US over sharing of NATO assets. Having provided a detailed history of the crisis in FYROM and the international response, the next section introduces the war in Afghanistan and the conceptual questions the case raises with respect to the Europeanization of member states’ foreign policies.

III. Afghanistan

a. The significance of Afghanistan for international security

The significance of the war in Afghanistan for international security in the first instance lies in the fight against terrorism following the attacks on September 11, as well as in the changing nature of international coalitions: the US, rather than calling on NATO for support in its fight against the Taliban through Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), instead relied on ad-hoc coalitions of the willing, thereby calling into question the role and purpose of military alliances in the post-11 September era (see Lieven, 2001). Military operations in Afghanistan are conducted in the framework of two separate operations. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) centres on the fight against terrorism whereas the initial role of the International Assistance and Security Force (ISAF) was to assist the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) prior to the country’s 2004 elections in providing a safe and secure environment within Kabul and its surrounding areas.37 To a varying degree Britain, France and Germany have played significant roles in each of the two operations. The coordination of contributions to both OEF and ISAF of each member state with the US as well as with each other, the domestic justifications for the deployment of troops and the extent of the involvement of the EU CFSP in these efforts raises a set of analytical questions with regard to national priorities with regards to CFSP and

37 ISAF was established by UN Security Council Resolution 1386 of 20 December 2001.
ESDP, the role of NATO in national foreign policy post-11 September, and the assertion of national influence in a transatlantic context, that will be explored in the individual country chapters.

In the context of the EU and its emerging CFSP/ESDP, responses to the attacks of 11 September brought with it the apparent re-nationalisation of foreign policy (see Hill, 2004), as individual EU member states – Britain, France and Germany at the forefront- sought to contribute to the US-led war on terror both to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)\(^8\) and to demonstrate their solidarity with the US. This in turn provoked resentment not only for compromising EU unity but also for engaging in what may be termed mini-lateralism: discussing contributions in closed meetings, often ahead of EU summits- thereby sidelining smaller EU member states, including Belgium, which held the EU presidency during the second half of 2001.

The war in Afghanistan also raises issues of reconstruction, state building and the provision of humanitarian aid to a war-torn country. The events of 11 September brought Afghanistan, one of the poorest countries in the world, once more to the fore of world attention. Located at the crossroads of Central Asia, Afghanistan’s strategic position has long made it a target for invasion by regional as well as great powers during the Cold War: the Soviet Union invaded in 1979 and was driven out by the Mujahidin in 1989 (Roy, 2004). The US, until the Soviet withdrawal, funded the Afghan war efforts and maintained strategic linkages with Afghan mujahidin who

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\(^8\) Whereas OEF is the US’ military response to the attacks on 11 September 2001, ISAF is a multinational peacekeeping operation under an UN mandate. Significantly for this thesis, EU member states, including German, Britain and France, contribute in significant numbers to ISAF: Germany is the biggest single contributor with 1816 troops, whereas France contributes 742 troops and the UK 461 (NATO, 21 February 2005). But, initially neither NATO nor EU assumed overall command. While suggestions that European contributions to ISAF could be labelled an ‘EU-force’ were roundly rejected, calls for NATO to assume command on the part of the UK and later Germany, also proved to be contentious. This makes the assembly of ISAF and the question of the force’s institutional anchoring relevant for this thesis.
came to occupy the power vacuum left behind. Soon after the fall of the Soviet-backed government in Kabul in 1992, the various Mujahidin religious, tribal and linguistic factions began a devastating civil war. The Taliban ('religious students'), under the direction of Mullah Muhammad Omar, began their ascent to power around Kandahar in 1994, took control of Kabul in 1996 and soon controlled most of the country, bringing about order through the institution of a very strict interpretation of Sharia, or Islamic law (Roy, 2004). Human rights abuses, particularly of ethnic and religious minorities and women were widespread. Under the Taliban, Afghanistan also became a haven for terrorist groups, in particular al-Qaeda. Prior to the fall of the Taliban regime, Afghanistan was one of the world’s worst humanitarian emergencies: a quarter-century of civil war had left an estimated one million people dead and over six million people displaced, many as refugees in neighbouring Pakistan and Iran (UNHCR 2005). The country was one of the most heavily mined in the world, and per capita GDP was on par with Somalia and Eritrea, estimated at $140 - $180 (Rubin, 2002; European Commission, 2003). The development task alone, therefore, was and remains a significant challenge.

The reconstruction of Afghanistan has been placed under UN auspices in order to coordinate economic and political measures on the part of the various international actors involved in the reconstruction of the country. The peacekeeping operation, also sanctioned by UNSC Resolutions, has since 2003 been placed under overall NATO command.\(^\text{39}\) NATO became formally involved in February 2003, when Germany and the Netherlands assumed ISAF command and sought NATO support for the planning and execution of the operation. EU activities are thus spread

\(^{39}\) The fact that ISAF came under overall NATO command in 2003 in turn signalled the alliance's need to reinvent itself at the same time as the EU ESDP was in the process of inventing itself (Toje 2003). This highlights the possibility for tension between ESDP and NATO instruments on the part of the member states and affirms the applicability of this particular case for a detailed study of member states preferences with respect to the two institutions.
across three dimensions and include security, political, and economic contributions. The EU and its member states have been active in all three, but with various degrees of coordination and not always under an EU-label. The EU did not assume a role in the military aspect of crisis management through ISAF – this task fell to individual nations including EU member states, and later to NATO as the institutional framework – but it did carve out a significant political and economic role with regard to Afghanistan, both in terms of the financial contributions to the country’s reconstruction as well as a political profile (and influence) for the EU in Afghanistan and worldwide through the office of the EU Special Representative (EUSR) Klaus-Peter Klaiber⁴⁰ and later Francesc Vendrell.⁴¹ The emphasis on a profile for the EU in the reconstruction of Afghanistan suggests considerations that would support the Europeanization hypothesis, despite the overwhelming influence of the US on the policies towards Afghanistan. This makes Afghanistan a worthwhile case for analyzing member states preferences with respect to the EU CFSP.

To be sure, the overriding instinct and determining factor of international policy responses to Afghanistan was solidarity with the United States and the recognition that this was a case of self-defence and that the US as a result would determine much of the military policy towards Afghanistan.⁴² However, for EU member states, the war in Afghanistan nevertheless posed the problem of what sort of a political role the EU CFSP could and should play in the reconstruction efforts, to what extent—if at all—EU member states were ready to subsume their military and

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⁴⁰ EUSR Klaiber also lobbied for increased member states contributions to ISAF both out of considerations of security measures as the most pressing item in order for economic and political reconstruction as well as efforts at providing an EU lead and voice in the political decisions surrounding Afghanistan’s reconstruction (Klaiber, 2002). Vendrell’s role has been equally important for giving the EU global visibility as a foreign policy actor.

⁴¹ Francesc Vendrell was first appointed in 2002, and his mandate has been extended until 28 February 2007 (Council of the European Union, 2006b).

⁴² This was pointed out in every interview conducted on the role of the EU as well as the individual member states in Afghanistan.
political actions under an EU label, and what sort of role the EU should assume in the
crisis management and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. The emerging
contradictions between national contributions and the simultaneous search for a
political role for the EU in response to the crisis thus make the war in Afghanistan a
pertinent case study of member states’ preferences on the role of the EU CFSP in
crisis management. Given member states fragmentation, the refusal to seriously
consider a coordinated ‘EU-force’ that was suggested by Belgian Foreign Minister
Verhofstadt, and the resulting appearance of a poor showing of the EU CFSP raises
the question of what, if any, Europeanization considerations can be observed in
member states decision making? The rejection of suggestions for a possible ‘EU
force’ as part of ISAF in particular illustrated the divergent views on the part of EU
member states as to the EU CFSP/ESDP’s global and military reach and ambitions.
More broadly, it illustrates the tension between transatlantic and European
commitments in times of a systemic shock.

With respect to decisions that would point towards Europeanization, the
Belgian EU Presidency also pushed for declaring the EU ESDP capable of
conducting some crisis management operations so as to raise the ESDP’s profile in
response to 11 September. This points towards an increasing salience of the EU
CFSP/ESDP in the minds of individual member states and the need for the EU to
have a voice in a post-11 September environment. However, although the EU played

43 These contradictions extend to the EU institutions as well. The European Union fact sheet (Council
of the European Union 2005) ‘The EU and Afghanistan’ subsumes EU member state contributions
under ‘EU’ efforts, although member states had explicitly rejected a ‘EU’ label for ISAF when the
force was put together in 2001. What is more, commitments continue to be based on national rather
than European contributions and are perceived and portrayed as such in the individual member states.
44 Discussions to this end took place in the PSC at the time (Interview with French official, 7 March
2006), which demonstrates that considerations over a potential EU force went beyond misplaced
public statements on the part of the Belgian Presidency, as one policy analyst interviewed suggested
(Interview with policy analyst, 10 June 2005). Unlike FYROM, however, these suggestions never
turned into concrete policy proposals.
45 As will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, this was not in accordance with at least one
member state’s preference – the UK (see chapter 8).
an important facilitating role at the Bonn Conference in 2001 and made substantial financial donation, its role in crisis management was negligible. But, within the broader framework of international efforts in Afghanistan, the EU did carve out a significant role through the appointment of an EU Special Representative and through the release of substantial amounts of financial aid. Even if the EU role in the management of the crisis was not centre stage, then, it was nevertheless significant.

The next three sections analyze in more detail the involvement of the EU, as well as NATO and the US, in the war in Afghanistan in order to set the context for the individual national policies analyzed in subsequent chapters. Three policy areas are of particular relevance for the analysis of member states’ policies: the military commitments as part of OEF and the war on terror; political and economic measures taken with a view to the reconstruction of Afghanistan; and the construction of ISAF including its institutional anchoring.46 While the EU did not assume a role in the military aspect of crisis management through ISAF – this task fell to individual nations, and later to NATO as the institutional framework – it did carve out a significant political role with regard to Afghanistan, both in terms of the financial contributions to the country’s reconstruction as well as the coordination, at least initially, of EU and member states contributions, including those to ISAF, through the office of the EU Special Representative. This suggests that some political considerations that would support the Europeanization hypothesis came into play on the part of the member states in addition to transatlantic preferences that support the alliance politics framework.

46 The division into the three policy areas is not as neat as the one in the case of FYROM, where developments unfolded in a more linear manner rather than parallel and under different time constraints due to the nature of the crisis. It nevertheless serves the purpose, however imperfectly, of structuring the analysis.
b. Policy area 1: OEF and the war on terror

After the attacks on 11 September, the US took steps to oust the Taliban from power. However, rather than calling on NATO for military contributions – NATO had, for the first time in its history invoked article 5 of the NATO treaty on 12 September⁴⁷ - the US instead decided to form coalitions of the willing for OEF, accepting military contributions from Britain and, to a lesser extent, France and Germany, under overall US command.⁴⁸ While military contributions on the part of the US’ allies are not surprising given the magnitude of the event and the US’ right to self defence, they nevertheless appear to contradict engrained national positions in two of the three member states analysed in this thesis: anti-Americanism on the part of France, and remnants of post-World War II pacifism on the part of Germany. These apparent contradictions in turn make this policy area of analytical interest with respect to the nature of national deliberations on the reason for military contributions.

EU policy responses towards 11 September and the war in Afghanistan have made use both of Community and CFSP instruments. The initial response to the attacks of 11 September was immediate – and common, as the EU and its member states declared solidarity with the US and established an Action Plan for the fight against terrorism at the Extraordinary European Council in Brussels on 21 September (Council of the European Union, 21 September 2001). Beyond questions of solidarity, particularly with regard to contributions to the US-led military operation as well as a peace keeping force for reconstruction, contradictions between national

⁴⁷ Correspondingly, the invocation of Article V as a response to the attacks of 11 September has been interpreted as a response to ‘NATO’s self-preservation challenge’ (Toje, 2003: 64). However, while Toje argues that the invocation of article V was an initiative on the part of NATO the institutions, information collected in interviews and secondary sources for this thesis suggests that this arose out of the initiative from a NATO member state rather than just NATO’s institutional leadership – the UK. This in turn supports the alliance politics hypothesis formulated in chapter 2 in the case of at least one member state analysed in this thesis.

⁴⁸ A total of 27 countries contributed troops to Operation Enduring Freedom. See The White House (2002).
commitments and the EU soon became apparent, as individual leaders offered national contributions to the US war effort, eclipsing not only the country holding the EU Presidency, Belgium, but other member states as well. This was true in particular for Britain and France. Tony Blair earned some resentment for his active cooperation with the US as well as his calling of a strategy meeting in London between Britain, France and Germany. Jacques Chirac was also criticized for calling a tri-lateral meeting prior to the EU summit at Ghent to discuss the national contributions to the war in Afghanistan.

Military operations against the Taliban under Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) began on 7 October 2001. While the UK contributed significant numbers of forces to OEF, the US made token use of French contributions - to the consternation of Paris (Lansford, 2002). Germany’s contributions to OEF were the smallest of the three countries, although Berlin provided a large contingent of troops to ISAF. UK Forces participated in OEF from the start through Operation Veritas, which had as its goal the capture of Osama bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders, the prevention of further attacks by al Qaeda, the end of Afghanistan’s harbouring of terrorists, their training camps and infrastructure, and the removal of Mullah Omar and the Taliban Regime (BBC News, 16 April 2002). In contrast, France had 2,000 military personnel in the region as of early November 2001. In addition to the support for the ground operations in Afghanistan, France took part in the maritime patrol. A French task force composed of soldiers from the 21st Marine Infantry Regiment was

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49 The legal basis for the operation was Article 51 of the UN Charter, which recognises ‘the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence’ and requires states to report such actions immediately (United Nations, 1945).

50 At the same time, French contributions to OEF are in fact considerably more substantial than commonly acknowledged: for instance, France played a major role in the air campaign, and was the only country to deliver air strikes alongside the US (Interview with UK academic, 17 June 2005).

51 The exact nature – and number – of German contributions to OEF was also not well publicised as contributions included Special Forces. But, Germany’s participation in OEF and ISAF was significant because it marked another step in the ‘normalisation’ of German foreign policy with respect to the end of its aversion to the use of force after the country’s defeat in World War II.
deployed on November 17, 2001 to survey the modalities of operations aimed at repairing the airfield at Mazar-e Sharif (US Department of Defence, 14 June 2002). Germany began participating in OEF on 27 November 2001 by dispatching three Transall transport aircraft in order to assist the US Air Force in its operations in Afghanistan. A few days later reconnaissance commandos flew to Bahrain to prepare for naval deployment. In addition, up to 100 troops from the Special Commando Forces (KSK), a unit specialized in covert operations, made short-term missions in Afghanistan (US Department of Defence, 14 June 2002). There were also plans for future co-operation with the German navy that included the allocation of areas of deployment of the US, French and German navies to patrol waters between the Arabian Peninsula and the east African coast. With regard to OEF, the individual national contributions were regarded as expressions of solidarity with the US and contributions to the war on terror. Although these contributions were not contentious in terms of EU unity or decision-making, the closed meetings between the UK, France and Germany ahead of the Ghent summit in November 2001 to coordinate military contributions to the war on terror raised concerns over a directorate in EU decision-making and appeared to further damage EU unity. With respect to this particular policy area, then, alliance politics considerations appear to have overwhelmingly dictated policy responses – even in countries that had historically either not appeared as being particularly close to the US, or had distinct political cultures with respect to the use of force.

c. Policy area 2: the reconstruction of Afghanistan

The UN assumed a central role in the reconstruction and the creation of an interim government in Afghanistan. In December 2001, at the Bonn Conference on the future
of Afghanistan, Afghan factions, assisted by the UN, agreed on a transitional process leading to elections for a ‘broad-based, gender-sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative government’ (United Nations, 7 December 2001). The Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) under the leadership of Hamid Karzai was established for a six-month period. An Emergency Loya Jirga met in June 2002 and elected Karzai as the Chief of State and Chairman of the Afghan Transitional Authority, which governed the country until elections could be held. After a nationwide Loya Jirga in 2002, Karzai was elected President.

As for the EU Council, and reflecting EU/EC Cooperation objectives, the 2001 and 2002 General Affairs Councils (GAC) agreed to the following overall objectives for the EU/EC in Afghanistan: to promote the Bonn Agreement; restore stability to the country; provide support for civil, social and military structures; promote democracy and human rights; give special attention to the inclusion of women; reinforce the fight against illegal drugs and terrorism; and promote cooperation with neighbouring countries. The EU played an important role in post-conflict reconstruction and the release of economic aid. Since the fall of the Taliban the Commission has set its support in the context of the provisions made in the 2001 Bonn Agreement. At the Tokyo Conference in January 2002 the EC pledged about €1 billion over five years. About €207 million were spent in 2002 on recovery and reconstruction, plus €73 million from ECHO. €400 million were earmarked for 2003-04, with continuing humanitarian assistance from ECHO, up to €55 million in 2003. The first year in particular, given the huge scale of the reconstruction task faced by the country, the need for strong political commitment and leadership lead to

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52 Commonly referred to as the Bonn Agreement, The Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions was endorsed by the United Nations Security Council on 7 December 2001.

53 See European Commission, The EU’s relations with Afghanistan, General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/afghanistan/intro/gac.htm
the creation of the Afghan Reconstruction Steering Group (with the co-chairs US, EU, Japan and Saudi Arabia) to provide strategic direction.

The Commission made effective use of its conflict prevention instrument, by drawing €4.93 million from the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) for use in Afghanistan following the Bonn Conference in 2001 in order to help legitimize the political transition; and the EC also moved swiftly to open a representative office in Kabul in February 2002 (International Crisis Group, 2005). The ministers also supported the work by the Commission to set up a strategy to rebuild Afghanistan. The EU co-chaired the first meeting of the steering group to support political renewal in Afghanistan and better coordinate donors' efforts with a view to the ministerial conference scheduled for January 2002 in Tokyo. This shows that the Commission in particular was very active.

With respect to the political aspects of the reconstruction of Afghanistan, on Germany's suggestion EU foreign ministers agreed in their meeting in Brussels on to appoint a special envoy for Afghanistan to co-ordinate humanitarian aid and the political efforts to contribute to rebuilding the country (CNN.com, 19 November 2001). Klaus-Peter Klaiber, former assistant secretary-general of NATO was appointed EU Special Representative at the 10 December 2001 foreign minister meeting. His initial mandate was due to expire on June 10, but was extended to June 30 at the Council Meeting on 27 May 2002 (Council of the European Union, 27 May 2002). The foreign ministers also welcomed the signing of the inter-Afghan agreement signed in Bonn on 5 December, stated that they were prepared to consider a contribution by the EU member states in furtherance of UNSC Resolutions, including the establishment of an international security force. The EU also re-emphasized its commitment to play a key role in the international effort to rebuild the
Afghan society and economy. Klaiber’s appointment was also to ‘help the EU speak with one voice again’, despite the shift to bilateralism in the wake of September 11 (Financial Times, 15 December 2001; see also Klaiber, 2002).

Klaiber proved pivotal in coordinating efforts of the member states and that supplied by the EU through meetings, for example, with French Foreign Minister Védrine on 7 January 2002 to discuss reconstruction. He also often spoke on behalf of ISAF, for instance he suggested that it might be necessary to broaden the mandated area of ISAF to include areas outside Kabul (Agence France Press, 10 January 2002), and lobbying among several EU capitals for an extension of the ISAF mandate beyond June 2002 and in an extended geographic focus, in light of the reluctance on the part of most European countries to commit to a longer-term operation in Afghanistan. Klaiber stated that the EU should follow through politically, not just limit itself to its financial contributions. Klaiber also travelled and dealt with neighbouring countries, visiting Pakistan in April to meet with senior Pakistani ministers and officials to assess the post-Taliban situation and its impact on the Afghan refugees living there. Klaiber stated that Pakistan’s role was crucial for the future of Afghanistan, and also distanced himself from US statements that Iran was working to destabilize Afghanistan. He also expressed reservations about President Karzai, who travelled too much rather than concentrating on the work in the country itself. In contrast to the case of FYROM, Solana’s role in Afghanistan was not as pronounced (Interview with former German official, 9 February 2006), although he did visit Kabul at the end of May 2002 to consult local leaders before the opening of Afghanistan’s emergency loya jirga, as the EU ministers had agreed on 15 April at the meeting in Luxembourg. Francesc Vendrell, a 62-year old Spanish diplomat who had served as the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s special representative for
Afghanistan from February 2000 to the beginning of 2002, was subsequently appointed EUSR after the expiration of Klaiber’s mandate.

With respect to the political and economic aspects of Afghanistan’s reconstruction, then, evidence of Europeanization among at least one of the three EU member states analyzed in this thesis appears to be pronounced as Germany pushed for the appointment of an EUSR. With respect to the three member states analyzed in this thesis, potential motivations include policy adaptation, policy projection as well as identity formation, although the different priorities among the three countries suggest differences with respect to individual motivating forces.

d. Policy area 3: ISAF and its institutional anchoring

Like OEF, ISAF, the peacekeeping force assembled under the framework of UNSC Resolution 1378 and Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN’s Secretary General’s Special Representative, is a coalition of the willing that until very recently excluded US forces.\(^5\) ISAF works closely with the United Nations and the Afghan interim government and has three principal tasks: to aid the interim government in developing national security structures; to assist the country’s reconstruction; and to assist in developing and training future Afghan security forces. Rules of engagement were to be closely linked to the terms of the military-technical agreement between the British commander, Maj. Gen. John McColl, and the interim government in Afghanistan on 31 December 2001. Under the agreement, the ISAF has ‘complete and unimpeded freedom of movement throughout the territory and airspace of Afghanistan’ (UK Ministry of Defence, 2001). Apart from the UK, a number of countries were expected to become lead nations of ISAF, including France and

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\(^5\) 12,000 US troops came under the command of NATO-ISAF on 5 October 2006, although 8,000 more troops remain under US command to train the Afghan National Army and to hunt Taliban leaders and Al-Qaeda members (BBC News, 5 October 2006).
Germany. While the UK made a significant contribution to ISAF as the first lead nation, Germany made a substantive commitment to Afghanistan with 3900 troops, which marked another major step in the country’s willingness to send troops abroad in peace keeping operations.

With respect to ISAF, several issues in particular proved contentious: the geographic extension of the mandate beyond Kabul, the temporal extension of the mandate altogether, and the strengthening of numbers. There was also a debate over US command over ISAF, and the mixing of the peacekeeping and counter-terrorism operations. While Britain was in principle in favour of a single US command for both OEF and ISAF, Germany rejected this idea partly out concern over attaining domestic consent for the sending of Bundeswehr troops to an offensive military operation. Difference in command structure of the coalition forces limited the role of Paris as well: Chirac insisted on a multilateral command structure for ISAF, but found itself sidelined by the US. Although the nature of the military mission was and remains peace enforcement, the problem of ‘warlordism’ and weak security structures made a constant political international presence on the regional level necessary - the question was under which institutional framework.

Discussions of assembling a multinational peacekeeping force had progressed by the time the EU heads of state met in Laeken. Disagreement broke out at the EU Summit when Belgian Foreign Minister Louis Michel in a press conference on 14 December 2001 termed the contributions to ISAF of the individual EU member states

55 Importantly, the list of potential lead nations also included Turkey. The inclusion of a Muslim country in ISAF was to signal legitimacy for the reconstruction of Afghanistan beyond the West (Interview with policy analyst, 10 June 2005).

56 After the fall of the Taliban a number of local military commanders, often referred to as 'warlords', were brought into government. There are still large areas of the country where the Afghan government depends on the support, or at least the sufferance, of local commanders, and this compromises the legitimacy and the power of the central government under President Karzai (House of Commons, 29 July 2004).
as an EU force, prompting speculation by the media that an ‘EU army’ was to be sent to Afghanistan. Member states, Britain at the forefront, stated that ‘there was no question of the EU being able to deploy a defence force it doesn’t have in Afghanistan’ (Financial Times, 15 December 2001). This seems to affirm the lack of Europeanization considerations in the case of ISAF as well, with alliance politics considerations paramount.

On 14 December, at the EU Council in Laeken, EU leaders agreed that member states would take part in ISAF, even if the EU was not putting together its own force for Afghanistan. While Belgian Foreign Minister Louis Michel welcomed this step as being ‘of capital importance for European security and defence policy’ and ‘an extremely significant precedent’, British foreign minister Jack Straw stressed that the EU states were still examining what forces they could offer to the international force. Solana, meanwhile, stated that ISAF would face ‘a task more difficult than other peacekeeping missions in the past’ (BBC News, 14 December 2001). The Presidency Conclusions on the European Council meeting in Laeken stated that ‘the participation of the Member States of the Union in that international force will provide a strong signal of their resolve to better assume their crisis-management responsibilities and hence help stabilise Afghanistan’ (Council of the European Union, 14/15 December 2001).

Initially at least, NATO did not play a role in OEF and ISAF, suggesting that the US after the events of 11 September viewed NATO as a political forum rather than a military alliance: the US called on individual nations, not on NATO, for support against the war against the Taliban. Given the invocation of Article 5, NATO involvement was first raised in November 2001, but blocked by several NATO countries, including France, and later the UN. Germany, on the other hand, was in
favour of NATO assuming ISAF command whereas France was not eager to see a ‘NATO flag in Kabul’ (NATO Notes, 19 December, 2002). This points towards difference with respect to the role of NATO among member states and towards the explanatory potential of the alliance politics approach for policy decision taken by at least one member state (France). On 16 April 2003 the North Atlantic Council decided to approve the deployment of NATO troops to Afghanistan to work under the ISAF mandate and on 11 August 2003, NATO assumed the lead of the International Security Assistance Force in a Transfer of Authority Ceremony in Kabul, Afghanistan (NATO Notes, October 2003). The analytical question posed by this policy area, then, is why some member states pushed for NATO to assume military command of ISAF in a case where the US had initially conceived of ISAF as a coalition of the willing rather than a NATO force, and where at least one member state—France—was not keen on placing ISAF under NATO command. What kind of alliance politics considerations were most relevant here?

e. Conclusion: questions raised by this case

To summarize, the analytical questions raised by the war in Afghanistan include motivations for national contributions to OEF and the war on terror. This also includes initiatives to fight terrorism on the EU level, including CFSP/ESDP instruments—although this is not the focus of this thesis. They also encompass national considerations on the institutional anchoring of ISAF, particularly why NATO was chosen in the absence of a clear US preference to use the institution. Lastly, the political and economic aspects in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, including the appointment of a EUSR and significant financial contributions on the

57 However, US officials reportedly later admitted ‘that they missed an opportunity to use NATO more actively’ in the fight against the Taliban (International Herald Tribune 27 November 2002).
part of the European Commission suggest considerations that would support the Europeanization hypothesis. What appeared a clear case of transatlantic solidarity and alliance politics, therefore, exhibits evidence of Europeanization in questions with respect to the political aspects of Afghanistan’s reconstruction. This justifies the inclusion of the case of Afghanistan in this thesis.

IV. Conclusion

The aim of this chapter has been to provide background information on the two crises and to identify key policy areas around which the individual country chapters will be structured. With respect to the crisis in FYROM, they are EU involvement in the negotiations leading to the Ohrid Framework Agreement; the launch of the NATO operations to aid its implementation; and the politics of an eventual take-over of the NATO mission. Whereas the first policy area highlights the important role of SG/HR Javier Solana in the negotiations and raises questions as to individual member states preferences towards the role of the EU CFSP in the crisis and the nature of the Europeanization of national foreign policy, the second policy area highlights that while a NATO operation was uncontested in principle, analyzing the nature of the preference for NATO and alliance politics on the part of the member states is of interest for member states preferences with respect to the third policy area: the handover from NATO to ESDP. Here, one of the three member states –France– initiated and pushed for an early handover, whereas the other two countries analyzed in this thesis took a more conservative stance, insisting on the conclusion of the Berlin Plus agreement prior to the take-over. It is here that Europeanization and alliance politics considerations appear to be most in conflict. With respect to Afghanistan, on the other hand, the three policy areas include member states military commitments to OEF and reactions to the war on terror; the construction of ISAF
including its institutional anchoring; and political and economic measures taken in
the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Unsurprisingly, the first two highlight alliance
politics considerations more than Europeanization, but do so in the case of one
member state (France) that is commonly perceived as having a rather difficult
relationship with the US. EU and member state activities do, however, point towards
Europeanization with respect to the political and economic aspects in the war in
Afghanistan. What at first glance may appear as a clear-cut case of alliance politics,
then, includes decisions that point towards Europeanization as well. The chapters that
follow will analyze the member states decisions and preferences in more detail and
draw conclusions on the validity of the alliance politics and Europeanization model
for explaining policy decisions. As mentioned in the two previous chapters, they will
do so against the backdrop of a governmental politics approach, which will highlight
the internal divisions and the domestic decision-making process.
Chapter 4. Germany and the crisis in FYROM

I. Introduction

This chapter analyzes German foreign policy decisions with respect to the application of EU CFSP and ESDP instruments in the crisis in FYROM. German foreign policy makers favoured the EU CFSP as a key platform in the political process leading to the resolution of the conflict. As far as the first policy area is concerned, therefore, empirical evidence supports the Europeanization hypothesis in particular with respect to the high salience of the European agenda and the adherence to common policy objectives in the political solution to the crisis. However, the emphasis placed on the Contact Group also indicates that Germany retained national influence in the negotiations. With respect to military operations Germany had a clear preference for NATO. This was both because the EU ESDP was not considered ready to carry out a mission in terms of its institutional development, and because utilizing the NATO framework ensured the continued participation of the US. US involvement was considered vital by German policy makers in particular to regain and maintain stability in the country as well as the broader region. Broader considerations concerning transatlantic relations were also important factors as Germany wanted to reassure that the US would support an eventual ESDP mission and that this would not prove detrimental to EU-US relations. The alliance politics approach, therefore, explains the decision to participate in the NATO operation and the rejection of an early ESDP take-over of the NATO mission. However, the evolution of and possibility for Germany to shape EU CFSP and ESDP instruments were frequently used in domestic debates as a justification for seeking support for German participation in NATO Operation Essential Harvest. This suggests a generally high salience of the European agenda as far as the EU CFSP or ESDP are concerned.
With respect to Germany's military participation in the NATO as well as the ESDP missions, domestic considerations are an important factor for understanding policy decisions, in particular Schröder's goal for Germany to assume increasing responsibility in the military realm and to become a more credible and influential player. This goal had to be weighed against domestic opposition based on the aversion to the use of force, reflecting unease among the members of parliament about Schröder's military commitments. German post-war foreign policy had been conducted through multilateral institutions (Garton Ash 1993; Bulmer and Paterson, 1996; Katzenstein, 1997) and the EU, including the EU CFSP, continues to represent a potential vehicle to increase German influence in foreign and security policy. The analysis presented in this chapter will demonstrate that the emphasis on multilateralism, specifically with respect to Europe's capacity to act, was indeed an important argument on the part of the government to obtain support for participation in the NATO Operation Essential Harvest. Lastly, while there is ample evidence of Europeanization expressed as high salience of the EU CFSP in German foreign policy at least in the negotiation phase, there is little evidence of a compromise of national preferences that would have pushed for the application of ESDP instruments.

II. Policy area 1: Support for the EU CFSP in the political negotiations

German policy towards FYROM after the country declared independence in 1991 centred on conflict prevention and was mainly conducted through multilateral channels, particularly the UN, OSCE and the EU. This also included bilateral relations and cooperation in support of these multilateral efforts to stabilise the Balkans such as meetings and visits between high ranking German officials and their
Macedonian counterparts. Germany was sensitive to the crisis not just on account of previous experiences in the Balkans and the failure on the part of the EU to act, but also as the danger of wider regional destabilization would have meant a threat of refugee flows and instability close to Germany’s borders. The conflict in FYROM also threatened to undermine the broader regional framework that had been put in place after the end of the conflict in Kosovo in no small part due to a German policy initiative during its EU Presidency in the second half of 1999: a comprehensive regional framework anchored in the Stability Pact for South-eastern Europe that aimed at the reconstruction of the individual countries in the region coupled with the perspective of integration and eventual EU membership (Calic, 2000). There was, therefore, a considerable sense of urgency for German policy makers based on the likely detrimental domestic ramifications mentioned above (Interview with German official, 1 September 2005). The EU was already an important platform for the political and economic process of regional post-conflict reconstruction, and given the goal of eventual integration of the countries of the Western Balkans in the EU together with the goal for a greater role for the EU as a regional political actor, the EU CFSP was a natural institutional venue for resolving the crisis from the perspective of German policy makers. For these reasons, success for the EU CFSP in resolving the crisis in FYROM was of high salience.

The key participants with respect to this particular policy area included officials in the foreign ministry as well as elected officials, primarily Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, but also Chancellor Schröder. In the Federal Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt), the key participants in the decisions made during the crisis in

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58 For example, Secretary of State Ischinger and Minister of State Zöpel visited FYROM on 21 March and 31 October 2001, respectively, whereas Foreign Minister Fischer met with Prime Minister Georgievski and Foreign Minister Kerim on 11 January 2001 (Auswärtiges Amt 21 March 2000; 31 October 2000; 11 January 2001)
FYROM, both as they concern the role of the EU CFSP/ESDP as well as the specific policies taken towards the crisis in FYROM, involved the political department (Politische Abteilung 2), and the relevant sub-department, the Balkan department. Whereas elected officials supported the application of instruments located in the EU CFSP/ESDP, the Federal Foreign Office emphasized restoring stability over the application of new instruments. This shows that although the use of EU CFSP instruments in the negotiation of the crisis was supported and deemed important on account of the symbolism for the evolution of the EU as a political actor, this position was not equally shared among all participants in the governmental process. The elite press and think tanks played a negligible role in the agenda setting and decision-making in this case.59

During the negotiating phase with the Macedonian government, Germany supported international efforts, particularly those of the EU, to contain the conflict. Berlin also conducted its diplomatic efforts through various channels. After Javier Solana had been given a mandate to conduct the political negotiations, member state officials, such as the political directors of the foreign ministries including the Federal Foreign Office, had little impact on the outcomes of the negotiating processes within the EU CFSP (Interview with German official 30 August 2005), although officials conducted bilateral meetings, or multilateral negotiations and discussions within the framework of the Contact Group (Interview with German official, 21 November 2005). Policy makers, particularly those in the Federal Foreign Office, regarded the Contact Group as an important platform as US involvement was deemed crucial in resolving the conflict, and considered it an effective platform to influence broader

59 Unlike, for instance, in the case of the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in 1991 (see Maull, 1995)
policy responses to the crisis among the major powers involved (Interview with German official, 21 November 2005).

Europeanization

The analysis of decisions taken with respect to the political negotiations of the crisis as well as press statements, interviews and the parliamentary debates show considerable evidence of Europeanization. The EU CFSP was regarded as an appropriate institution to resolve the crisis, and the application of CFSP instruments was deemed important. This supports the first conception of Europeanization of policy adaptation as German support for Javier Solana and EU Special Representative François Léotard in the negotiation of the crisis accommodated the progress of the EU CFSP. The salience of the EU CFSP agenda is reflected in the German government’s decision to agree to their mandates as well as German support for the political negotiations. Statements in the press and Bundestag debates also support this argument.

There is also some evidence of Germany conflating national with European preferences in this case, and of policy elites favouring the application of EU CFSP instruments. This supports the third conception of Europeanization, that of changing or emerging policy preferences. The application of CFSP and eventually also ESDP instruments was an important consideration in the decision-making in this case, as statements in the Bundestag demonstrate. However, not all indicators of Europeanization are reflected in German policy actions or domestic debates: for instance, there is little evidence of Germany compromising national preferences to accommodate the use of CFSP instruments. The same is true of evidence of German
policy makers using the EU CFSP as a cover to pursue national interests, or of increasing Berlin's international clout.

The fact that the EU CFSP was one of the key institutional frameworks employed in the solution of the crisis, and that Germany supported Javier Solana's role, indicates the salience of the application of CFSP instruments for EU member states, including Germany. Schröder and Fischer both publicly supported EU unity and a leading role for the EU CFSP and Solana in the political negotiation of the conflict. Support for the EU CFSP in political negotiations, and for the comprehensive concept instituted in the Western Balkans since 1999 also crossed party lines. Foreign Minister Fischer made several statements to this effect in the press, and his frequent visits to the region and meetings with Macedonian officials served to underline Germany's support for the EU CFSP negotiating positions and the European agenda more generally, rather than separate German interests (Auswärtiges Amt, 11 March 2001; 4 May 2001; 24 May 2001; 7 June 2001). In his address to the government on the situation in FYROM on 6 July, Fischer emphasized the necessity for a political solution to the crisis, and the chance for EU Special Representative Léotard to shape these negotiations. He stressed the necessity of a comprehensive regional perspective for the Western Balkans (Deutscher Bundestag, 6 July 2001, 18065D).

While the initiative for the EU CFSP's role in the political negotiations effort did not originate in Berlin but was essentially the result of a proactive approach by High Representative Javier Solana (Interview with German official, 21 November 2005), Germany did consider the EU CFSP as the appropriate political institution for solving the conflict. In particular, it was clear for Germany that the crisis in FYROM

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60 This refers to NATO and the EU – and the Contact Group, which was an important platform for negotiations, even if it does not constitute a formal institution.
was a symbolic occasion for the EU CFSP to show that it now possessed the necessary instruments to act – other than in the case of Bosnia and Kosovo, where European efforts had failed previously (Interview with German official, 30 August 2005). And, although the timing of the application of ESDP instruments was delayed on account of security concerns on the ground as well as broader policy considerations of the effect on transatlantic relations, the successful application of CFSP instruments was of high salience for German foreign policy in the crisis in FYROM.

Statements made in the Bundestag support the above argument, and demonstrate that elites favoured the application of CFSP instruments. In addition to the salience of the European agenda, then, evidence of Europeanization also points towards the existence of norms and preferences that favoured the application of EU instruments. This is reflected in public statements by members of the German parliament, which suggest a broad domestic consensus on the goal of a successful role for the EU CFSP in the negotiation efforts. In the debate surrounding German participation in Essential Harvest on August 29, Fischer explicitly stated that the main weight in the resolution of the crisis was with the Europeans, and was 'about a new role for Europe in the developing common foreign and security policy' (Fischer, Deutscher Bundestag, 29 August 2001, 18179C). This suggests high salience of the European agenda for the government; importantly, other members of the Bundestag concurred with this basic assessment. Speaking for the Christian Democrats (CDU), Friedrich Merz stated that 'it is undoubtedly valuable that NATO and the EU for the first time have jointly developed and realized a political concept for the negotiations' (Merz, Deutscher Bundestag, 29 August 2001, 18204D). Wolfgang Gerhardt, speaking for the Free Democrats (FDP), stressed 'Germany's responsibility in
shaping Europe’s security’ (Gerhardt, Deutscher Bundestag, 6 July 2001, 18071C) and emphasized that the significance of the negotiations leading to the Ohrid Agreement was that ‘for the first time a European component had been placed along the US component in the negotiations’ and that this was ‘beneficial for European self confidence’ (Gerhardt, Deutscher Bundestag, 29 August 2001, 18184 B). This demonstrates that the salience of the European agenda cut across party lines. With the exception of the former socialist party PDS, who argued for the UN and OSCE as the appropriate institutional framework for the solution of the crisis (Deutscher Bundestag, 6 July 2001, 18075 A), statements made in the Bundestag support the conclusion that the application of CFSP instruments in the negotiations leading to the Ohrid Agreements were considered appropriate and of high importance for the development of the EU CFSP.

Evidence of Europeanization also extends to the equation of European and national preferences: both were conflated in the sense that a strong Europe in the Balkans was in Germany’s interest, and that national policy objectives were shared with those of the EU CFSP. Both Fischer and Schröder framed the crisis in FYROM and future of the region as ‘central to European and therefore also German security’ (Fischer, Deutscher Bundestag, 6 July 2001, 18065D; Schröder, Deutscher Bundestag, 29 August 2001, 18201D), and members of the ruling coalition termed it ‘a test case for the emerging EU CFSP’ (Erler, Deutscher Bundestag, 6 July 2001, 18069 D). Significantly, one member of the Bundestag stated that the use of the CFSP ‘had been a goal for Germany in particularly with regards to the Balkans’ (Sterzing, Deutscher Bundestag, 29 August 2001, 18207A).

With respect to the second conception of Europeanization, that of national projection, there is little evidence of Germany attempting to increase national
influence through the EU CFSP platform. Given that member states’ influence decreased after Javier Solana had been given a mandate to conduct the political negotiations (Interview with German official 30 August 2005), the EU CFSP was not used as a means to project particular national preferences on to the European agenda in this case. If anything, national influence on EU policies decreased on account of the consolidation of the political negotiation under Javier Solana.

Although a prominent role for the EU CFSP in FYROM was considered to be in the interest of Germany, this did not mean that Germany reneged on influencing the political negotiations. The Contact Group represented an important venue where Germany could more directly influence and shape the agenda. As Germany did play a significant part in the diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis through the Contact Group there was little national influence to project through the EU CFSP in this particular case. This also reflected the preferences of the Federal Foreign Office, which did not define its policy priority as pushing or initiating the application of new institutional instruments located in the EU CFSP. Instead, the Federal Foreign Office emphasized ensuring regional stability and a speedy resolution to the conflict that would involve all major international partners, in particular the US (Interview with German official, 21 November 2005). Indeed, rather than the EU CFSP, the Federal Foreign Office regarded the Contact Group as an important venue for Germany to discuss the crisis precisely because it did serve the purpose to keep the US involved in Balkan politics and did provide a forum for negotiation among the major powers (Interview with German official, 21 November 2005).

While the growing role of the CFSP as well as the need for the EU to make up for past failings in the region was acknowledged (Interview with German official, 8 August 2005), the priority on the part of the Federal Foreign Office was to respond to
the conflict in a way that would contain the spread of violence, see the conflict to a speedy and peaceful resolution, and involve the US as one of the vital participants in the peace process and its implementation. The overall approach to the negotiations, therefore, was cautious. In this sense, the EU CFSP represented one, but not the only and not the most important, forum for the political negotiations in the minds of individual officials. And, because Germany participated in the negotiations in the framework of the Contact Group, it could retain influence on the overall negotiations of this particular crisis.

The use of the Contact Group as a forum to conduct negotiations has some implications for the validity of the Europeanization hypothesis. It shows that the EU CFSP did not have an exclusive mandate to negotiate on behalf of Germany, even if German foreign policy in this case shows evidence of Europeanization as it accommodated the developments of instruments located in the EU CFSP. In fact, several officials interviewed on the institutional actors in the resolution of the conflict used the analogy of juggling when explaining the different actors in the political negotiations and the difficulty of substituting one element (NATO) with another (EU CFSP but especially ESDP): removing one element from the negotiations at the expense of another would have led to the collapse of the entire construction (Interview with German officials, 8 August 2005; 20 October 2005). Applied to this policy area, this explains the use of both the Contact Group as well as the EU CFSP—and NATO—as platforms for negotiation.61 To be sure, the two policy objectives, of giving an increasing profile to the EU CFSP and retaining national influence in the Contact Group forum, were not in direct conflict with one another in this case. The role of the EU CFSP was strengthened at the same time that Germany retained

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61 And, applied to the third policy area, the analogy cited helps to explain German hesitations over an earlier takeover of ESDP from NATO
influence on the international negotiations with respect to FYROM. Still, Berlin’s emphasis on national influence on the outcome of the negotiations, but also on the involvement of the US but also of NATO suggest support for the alliance politics hypothesis. The reluctance on the part of the Foreign Office for the EU CFSP to assume the main responsibility in the negotiation of the conflict also weakens the Europeanization hypothesis.

Alliance Politics

Indeed, although it has been shown that there is strong evidence of Europeanization in this policy area, NATO and US involvement were deemed crucial components for a peaceful resolution of the crisis. The political negotiations not just of Javier Solana and Stefan Lehne, but also of George Robertson and Pieter Feith on behalf of NATO had the full support of the federal government. This supports several indicators of alliance politics. First, preference was given to NATO and US involvement for utilitarian reasons as both had been involved in the region throughout the 1990s, and were the preferred option for the host country. NATO enjoyed more trust on the part of FYROM than the EU CFSP on account of previous failures on the part of the EU in the Balkans (Interview with German official 21 November 2005). The cautious attitude adopted by the Federal Foreign Office on the introduction of new institutional actors in the region cited in the previous section also shows that the preference for NATO and US involvement extended to other branches of the German government and included not just NATO but also US national influence through the Contact Group as well as a US negotiator.

A second indicator of alliance politics, that of transatlantic preferences, is also supported by the empirical evidence. For its part, the US equally insisted on
maintaining influence in the negotiations in FYROM, and thus in European security more generally. This is demonstrated by the fact that the US appointed a negotiator for FYROM, James Pardew, three days after the appointment of François Léotard (Interview with French official, 8 September 2005). On the part of Germany, US involvement was not contested by members of the polity – on the contrary: in parliamentary debates a member of the Green party stated the US had gotten increasingly engaged in FYROM and acknowledged that US engagement had strengthened the political and diplomatic efforts on the part of the EU (Lippelt, Deutscher Bundestag, 6 July 2001, 18074B). The German government also considered NATO a crucial part of the Ohrid peace agreement in Macedonia and therefore as a primary forum for the resolution of the crisis (Struck, Deutscher Bundestag, 29 August 2001, 18191 D). Given that NATO and the EU CFSP worked alongside one another, there was no perceived conflict of interest between the two institutions, as the statement by the Christian Democrats in the Bundestag on the value of NATO and EU cooperation in the crisis demonstrates (Merz, Deutscher Bundestag, 29 August 2001, 18204D).

The analysis of the first policy area has shown that responses to the crisis in FYROM were marked by support for the emerging EU CFSP, as well as the involvement of the US and NATO in the political negotiations. It has also shown that although there is significant evidence of Europeanization – the CFSP agenda was of high salience, national elites favoured the application of CFSP instruments, and there was evidence of shared definitions of national and European interests – NATO and the US ‘anchored’ the negotiation efforts of the EU. This in turn supports for the alliance politics framework. As the analysis of the next policy area demonstrates,
NATO’s political involvement in the crisis was also important to Germany with a view to its later military involvement in the peacekeeping force.

III. Policy area 2: Participation in NATO Operation Essential Harvest

With respect to the second policy area, Germany’s position in the European and transatlantic security structures was significant particularly with respect to the use of military force. Despite the weakening of the taboo against the use of military force since the end of the Cold War, in the eyes of NATO allies Germany still had to prove itself a reliable partner in NATO even after the first substantial military deployment since the end of World War II during the crisis in Kosovo (Maull, 2000; Grund, 2003). For his part, Chancellor Schröder pushed for an increasing profile for Germany in NATO to demonstrate that Germany was no longer bound by its past. Although this becomes even more evident in the German response to the war in Afghanistan analyzed in chapter 5, considerations with respect to German participation in the NATO Operations Essential Harvest and Amber Fox reflect a similar goal on the part of the Chancellor. Apart from Chancellor Schröder, the elected decision-makers involved in this policy area included Foreign Minister Fischer, Defence Minister Scharping and members of the Bundestag who voted on the deployment of troops. Although contested in the Bundestag, compared to the conflict in Kosovo participation in the NATO Operation Essential Harvest but also the follow-up operation was also less of an issue in the press on account of the size of the mission and the less alarmist scenario, but also because the events of September 11 and their aftermath soon came to occupy the press and analysts alike (Grund, 2003: 114).
The US, while expecting the Europeans to take the lead in the solution of the crisis, preferred the use of NATO for the peacekeeping operation.\(^\text{62}\) US preferences and a fundamentally transatlanticist orientation in German foreign policy (Fischer, 2001) constituted important factors in German decision-making in this case. This supports the conclusion that with respect to this policy area, alliance politics considerations took precedence over considerations of Europeanization. However, in press statements and domestic debates, international responsibility and solidarity with NATO allies was often portrayed as the necessary precondition for Europe to act. This points towards some evidence of Europeanization alongside alliance politics considerations, in particular with regard to the third conceptualization of Europeanization: public debates and elite preferences reflect an emerging preference formation towards the application of EU CFSP and ESDP instruments. Importantly, however, this has to be understood in a specific domestic context where the use of force remained contested and where a comprehensive European approach was bound to be more attractive and persuasive than military deployment under NATO. Policy officials in the Federal Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence, however, were clear on the need for a NATO presence, including German participation in a NATO operation, to stabilize FYROM (Interview with German official, 21 November 2005).

Unlike the first policy area, participation in NATO Operation Essential Harvest was contested and correspondingly received more public attention. Although Germany did not take the lead in initiating a NATO Operation during the multilateral negotiations leading to the resolution of the crisis –this was left to the UK and France– Berlin did make a commitment to contribute troops to NATO Operation

\(^{62}\) This does not mean, however, that the US naturally consented to a NATO peacekeeping operation and the British chair of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting at the time faced a challenge in persuading the US of the necessity to militarily intervene in FYROM (Interview with EU official, 11 September 2006).
Essential Harvest and to its extensions, Operation Amber Fox and Allied Harmony. After the NATO Council had decided on the British-led Operation Essential Harvest on 29 June 2001 (NATO, 15 August 2001), the Bundestag agreed to the participation of 500 troops after a vote on 29 August 2001 (Deutscher Bundestag, 29 August 2001).

Domestic differences, however, made the question of German military contribution to the NATO mission a significant topic of domestic debate. In particular, this applied to members of the Bundestag, the German parliament, who threatened to vote against a German NATO deployment. Domestic objection to military deployment arose out of two separate positions. The long-held taboo against the use of force was a source of reservations particularly among members of the ruling Red-Green coalition. Members of the Christian Democrats, the leading opposition party, on the other hand, argued that insufficient defence budgets and the resulting military overstretch of Germany’s armed forces would prevent Germany from playing the leadership role in Europe advocated by Chancellor Schröder (Rühe, Deutscher Bundestag, 15 March 2001, 15366C). Chancellor Schröder was constrained by allies’ expectations for Germany to provide troops on the one hand and by domestic reservations toward German deployments on the other. In a classic example of a two-level game (Putnam, 1988), Schröder pushed for Germany to assume increasing responsibility in the field of security and defence by pledging troops to the NATO Operation in response to allies’ expectations while at the same time having to negotiate domestic support; in particular, winning the support not of the opposition but his own ruling coalition – indicating a lack of support from Schröder’s own constituency.
The military operation pushed by Britain and France in the NATO framework was eyed with doubts in the beginning because domestic differences over the role of military force in German foreign policy and the role Germany should play in any NATO Operation in the minds of Germany’s allies threatened to come in direct conflict (Die Zeit, 2001). On the one hand, Schröder was under pressure from Germany’s allies to consent to a military participation, and on the other hand had to face the prospect of the Bundestag voting against a Bundeswehr deployment, leaving his government discredited internationally and weakened domestically. The promise to participate in the NATO operation was in the first instance delayed but, partly to avoid international damage to Germany’s credibility, on 28 June 2001 Schröder promised German military participation even if it would be of a ‘robust’ nature (Die Zeit, 2001). Schröder’s international commitment to military participation led to intense domestic negotiations over German participation in NATO Operation Essential Harvest. Schröder informed the Bundestagsfraktion (the section of members of the SPD in the Bundestag) about a possible Bundeswehr deployment, arguing that the government should act in the framework of the EU and NATO to enable a peaceful solution to the conflict on the basis of a peace plan. He also made clear that Germany was to participate in a NATO mission based on reasons of solidarity with Germany’s partners, and that Germany should not risk damaging its relations with its allies out of fears of a parliamentary defeat (Financial Times Deutschland, 28 June 2001). The conservative opposition consequently accused Germany of lack of international leadership on the question of the NATO operation because Berlin had missed the chance of taking the lead, possibly as a result of the lack of conviction of the military operation and consideration of domestic opposition, notably from within the ruling coalition (Die Zeit, 2001).
The Ministry of Defence (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung - BmVg) took a conservative stance in terms of the number of troops it could provide under the current budget, but was in principle in favour of military participation, for similar reasoning as the government. Defense Minister Scharping warned that Germany could at most commit around 450 soldiers. At the same time the BmVg was in favour of a German contribution. The chief of armed forces (Generalinspekteur der Bundeswehr) Harald Kujat had claimed in an interview that NATO had decided to demand troops from France, the UK, Italy, Greece and support from the US, but not from Germany (Financial Times Deutschland, 2 July 2001) – thereby putting the Schröder government under pressure to pledge German troop commitments. Apart from alliance solidarity, participation in the NATO Operation was also deemed important in view of Germany's potential weight in the emerging ESDP: if Germany did not pull its weight in NATO in FYROM, Britain and France would continue to dominate. For the government, this created a dilemma between keeping in line with the defense budget and keeping Germany's commitment within NATO and ESDP (Financial Times Deutschland, 2 July 2001).

As for the opposition, the Free Democratic Party (FDP) made its consent to Essential Harvest contingent on a stable cease-fire but had no objection to the mandate in general (Financial Times Deutschland, 16 August 2001). The FDP also supported the extension of the NATO mandate (Kinkel, Deutscher Bundestag, 27 September 2001, 18562B) and the fact that Germany assumed the role of lead nation. Not so the Christian Democrats (CDU), however: former defence minister Rühe linked consent to the increase of the defence budget by at least 500 million Deutschmark (€ 250 million) even if other members of the CDU were in favour of the

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63 A secondary aim of the claim made in this interview was, of course, to lobby for an increase in defence spending.
Rühe's gamble paid off in so far as the CDU fraction in the Bundestag did lift its opposition to the deployment after the government increased the budget for the German contingent in FYROM from DM 120 Million to DM 148 Million. This was decided after a meeting between Schäuble, Rühe, minister of the chancellery (Kanzleramtsminister) Steinmeier, Fischer and Scharping, and after the CDU increasingly threatened to isolate itself within the Bundestag, and had received significant criticism in the press (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 29 August 2001). The CDU also supported the extension of mandate amid renewed accusations that the Bundeswehr had been used to capacity (Deutscher Bundestag, 13 December 2001, 20568 B). The former Communist party (PDS) adopted an anti-military stance and rejected both NATO mandates (Deutscher Bundestag, 27 September 2001, 18563D).

In order to secure the votes of the Bundestag, the heads of both Foreign and Defence ministries as well as the Chancellor submitted an official request (Antrag), on which to Bundestag voted on 29 August 2001. As expected, Schröder could not rely on his own party to carry the vote: 20 SPD members had written an open letter opposing the NATO Operation. When Operation Essential Harvest was voted on, of 635 votes, 497 voted in favour, 130 against, and 8 abstained (Deutscher Bundestag, 29 August 2001, 18210 A). This gave the government the mandate it needed, but showed that the government's domestic support was weak.

In contrast, participation in NATO Operation Amber Fox was decided on 27 September 2001 with 528 of 578 voting yes on the mandate (Deutscher Bundestag,

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64 The emphasis on increased defence spending was in continuation of the CDU’s reasoning that 'responsibility - the politically correct synonym for foreign policy engagement - requires the exertion of influence and the use of power' (Janning, 1996: 38). To be credible, therefore, Germany must participate in military operations. However, the context of European integration is vital for the exercise of power and responsibility, and Germany should therefore not act alone but be capable of action alongside its partners in the EU or NATO (Rühe, 1994; Schäuble, 1994). Although Schröder and Fischer had come to share this assessment, many members of the ruling coalition had not, revealing a normative division within the SPD as well as the Green party first over participation in military action over Kosovo and later on in FYROM.
27 September 2001, 1857 A-D). Given the different nature of the mandate\(^{65}\), some of those members of the Bundestag who had been opposed to Operation Essential Harvest could agree to deployment for Operation Amber Fox (Associated Press, 27 September 2001). The Bundestag was in broad agreement to send 600 German soldiers to FYROM for Operation Amber Fox, and the government did receive the majority vote overall as well as from its own party (Deutscher Bundestag, 27 September 2001). For the first time Germany was lead nation in a NATO operation together with France, which was going to take the lead after six months. Germany also provided the largest contingent of troops. Britain, France and Italy had taken the lead in other Balkan operations and, according to Schröder’s foreign policy adviser Michael Steiner, it was Germany’s turn – both in terms of the changed circumstances in world politics following 11 September and because of the changed political conditions in FYROM that made escalation of the conflict unlikely (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 28 September 2001).

The above analysis has shown that the Chancellor and Foreign Minister assigned political priority to the participation in NATO on account of discussions with Germany’s allies, and solidarity with European partners in the NATO framework. This supports the alliance politics framework. Preserving German weight in the emerging ESDP was a secondary but nevertheless important concern. This indicates a general preference on the part of the German government for a leadership role in Europe, but also inside the emerging European security structures. As the next section will demonstrate in more detail, the aim for leadership within Europe and a high profile of the EU CFSP and ESDP in public discourse in turn point towards

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\(^{65}\) Essential Harvest was a weapons collection mission whereas Amber Fox was to protect EU observers in the country.
Evidence of Europeanization understood as the existence of preferences in favour of the EU CFSP and ESDP.

Europeanization

Although this policy area is concerned with the application of NATO rather than CFSP or ESDP instruments, military participation in the NATO Operation was explicitly linked to the country’s present and future role in and development of the EU security institutions – CFSP and ESDP. As a result, the public debates over participation in NATO demonstrates some evidence of Europeanization with respect to the equation of national with European preferences and the rhetorical use of the EU as a cover to pursue national policy preferences and to persuade members of the government to consent to participation in a military operation. The high profile of ‘Europe’ and the ‘emerging ESDP’ in the foreign policy discourse suggests evidence of the third conception of Europeanization, that of changing preferences.

In the debates in the Bundestag surrounding German participation in Operations Essential Harvest and later Amber Fox, members of the SPD stressed the comprehensive preventative concept as part of the EU approach (Deutscher Bundestag, 15 March 2001, 15494D) and the credibility of the still developing CFSP (Deutscher Bundestag, 29 August 2001, 18069D). 

Bündnissolidarität (solidarity with the alliance) in NATO, closely linked to Germany’s European responsibilities were key words in the Bundestag debate over the mandate to send troops to FYROM as part of NATO Operation Essential Harvest. The discussion of a NATO contribution was also frequently linked to increasing national influence in the future, also with regard to the nascent ESDP. For instance, Fischer argued on 6 July that a refusal to participate in the NATO Operation would have negative implications for the developing ESDP, particularly at a time where the barriers between NATO and the
EU were disappearing (Deutscher Bundestag, 6 July 2001, 18065D). Evidence that EU CFSP was used as a rhetoric device to gain support for German participation in the military operation also points towards evidence of Europeanization understood as the use of the EU as a cover to pursue national policy preferences in addition to adaptational pressures acting on Germany to participate in the NATO Operation for solidarity with its allies. This is evident in the linking of the NATO Operation to a comprehensive EU conflict prevention strategy towards FYROM. For instance, Peter Struck, the leader of the SPD fraction in the Bundestag argued that the NATO Operation was an ‘important part of the preventive war- and conflict prevention strategy of the EU towards Macedonia’ (Struck, Deutscher Bundestag, 29 August 2001, 18191 C). While Germany did not pursue national policy preferences as far as military tools were concerned through the EU CFSP and ESDP in the crisis in FYROM, the argument that participation in the NATO operation would help Europe play a bigger and stronger role in the future played a considerable role in shoring up support for German participation in the NATO Operation. The EU represented an important reference point, especially for members of the ruling coalition. For the opposition, which has traditionally focussed more on the transatlantic relationship, this was not as important, although the CDU and FDP also favoured European capabilities. This linkage of German participation in the NATO Operation to the overall success of the EU CFSP and ESDP, as well as Germany’s weight in these emerging European security structures, supports the conclusion that German policy exhibited evidence of Europeanization in the sense that the EU was used as a cover to push through policies on the domestic level, even if these policies did not involve EU instruments. It is also evidence of Europeanization in the sense that European and national preference overlap: the use of EU CFSP and ESDP instruments was
suggested – however not in the present but the near future. Consequently, a German
official interviewed answered the question of whether Léotard’s suggestion had come
too early with ‘no, it came at the right time’ for planning the execution of an eventual
ESDP mission (Interview with German official, 1 September 2005). This indicates
that the use of ESDP instruments was supported in principle.

Alliance Politics

While the analysis of German foreign policy towards the crisis in FYROM in the first
policy area has revealed considerable evidence of Europeanization, when it comes to
the application of military instruments German responses to the crisis support the
conclusion that preference was given to NATO out of considerations of alliance
politics. There is evidence of Germany preferring NATO as a military instrument
both for utilitarian reasons, and in order to keep the US involved in European security
concerns. Preference was given to NATO because the necessary military tools were
in the hands of NATO, because NATO was considered the more appropriate resource
due to its prior involvement in the region, and because NATO was the preferred
option for the host country.

In addition to utilitarian considerations, there is also some evidence of
Germany giving preference to NATO as an institutional forum out of a transatlantic
preference, that it considered NATO as the prime forum for the solution of the crisis,
and that Germany preferred NATO over other institutional settings. This is illustrated
by the fact that Germany wanted to ensure US support and sound EU-US relations in
the handling of the crisis. In addition, the opposition explicitly referred to NATO as a
community of shared values that should be strengthened also through this mandate
(Merkel, Deutscher Bundestag, 29 August 2001, 18193 C), suggesting an inherent
preference towards NATO. Importantly, this sentiment was expressed before 11 September and the changing role of NATO as the individual country chapters on the war in Afghanistan and the analysis in chapter 3 demonstrate. This shows that the opposition had a strong transatlantic preference.

Evidence of alliance politics as a decisive factor in deciding on policy reactions to the crisis supports the conclusion that Germany deemed US involvement of primary importance in this case and aligned with NATO in order to ensure US participation in the solution of the crisis. Germany did consider US involvement crucial in this particular case as the US was an important political player in the Western Balkans, including in FYROM. Causing a conflict with the US over the handling of the crisis, or over the application of military instruments located in ESDP would have been foolish (Interview with German official, 21 November 2005).

Alliance politics considerations were also important as the US preferred the involvement of NATO in this case, and Germany did not dispute this assessment. From the point of view of the US, the administration wanted to ensure that its interests in the Balkans were served, and that any potential ESDP take-over, or EU political negotiation stood a chance of success before handing the matter over to the Europeans. Only when the situation was deemed safe, and the EU had proved capable of conducting political negotiations and military operations according to US interests did they leave matters to the EU CFSP (Interview with French official, 8 September 2005). However, the US did signal a willingness to allow for an ESDP takeover of the NATO mandate as the conflict itself was of a smaller size than Bosnia and Kosovo had been, and the risk of resurgence of violence lower than in previous conflicts in the Western Balkans (Interview with US official, 20 October 2005).
The US was not keen on contributing soldiers and the incoming Bush administration had indicated that it intended to withdraw US troops from the Balkans and at least initially remained at the sidelines of the conflict (Agence France Presse, 22 March 2001). Nevertheless, the US had a strong interest in a peaceful resolution to the crisis and to maintain its political influence on international policies in the Balkans. For the US, NATO was the institutional venue to do so (Interview with German official, 21 November 2005). As a result, making sure that the US was involved in the resolution of the crisis in FYROM, would remain involved in regional security and would be supportive of a potential ESDP mission in the future was an important consideration for German policy makers. This consideration led to the application of NATO instruments and close coordination with the US on the resolution of the crisis.  

Empirical evidence also supports the conclusion that Germany regarded NATO as the prime forum for the military solution of the crisis. However, there is no evidence that this was a question of NATO's continued relevance in the post-Cold War era. Rather, this was a question of credibility on the ground. NATO enjoyed greater credibility with especially the Albanian Macedonians and symbolized continued US involvement; when it came to an ESDP takeover of the NATO mandate, the EU had to first convince the Macedonian government to consent to this mandate (Interview with EU official, 21 June 2005). And, the fact that President Trajkovski requested NATO assistance in the solution of the crisis (NATO, 20 June 2001) left no other choice for the institutional venue in the first instance.

Indeed, upon the first suggestion of an ESDP mandate for the NATO mission, although the US did not signal aversion to an ESDP mission in principle, Germany still insisted on US and NATO involvement and the conclusion of the 'Berlin Plus' agreement, and took a cautionary view towards the eventual handover. Although this is discussed in more detail in the next section, it shows that alliance politics consideration of wanting to ensure close coordination with the US in the resolution of the crisis were determining factors in German decision-making in this case.
The EU was an appropriate forum for the political negotiations, but NATO was the prime forum for a military operation and in general signalled US backup, and EU/US unity in the approach towards resolving the crisis. The political decisions taken with respect to NATO also reflect Germany's traditional foreign policy preference of putting the transatlantic relationship first and the EU second, a tradition that continued under the Red/Green government - as Foreign Minister Fischer was keen to point out (Fischer, 2001). However, this was not a question of continued NATO relevance, as there had been gradual moves towards the EU assuming greater responsibility in the Balkans.

IV. Policy area 3: The politics of the ESDP takeover from NATO

While German reactions towards the crisis in FYROM demonstrated a preference for a European approach to the resolution of the crisis in the first policy area and the general salience of the European agenda, military operations were conducted in the framework of NATO. An ESDP take-over was not considered expedient until much later, when the EU expressed willingness to take over the NATO mission in FYROM at the Copenhagen Council in December 2002 (Council of the European Union, 29 January 2003). This suggests that despite the high profile of the EU CFSP and ESDP in governmental debates, and despite the professed goal on the part of the Chancellor for Europe to play a greater part in matters of security, alliance politics considerations overwhelmingly determined German decision-making with respect to the timing of the handover from NATO to ESDP.

67 This is evident from an op-ed piece in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, where Schröder had written that 'in the future, the EU must be capable to make a contribution to a stable world order that is commensurate with its economic and political potential' (cited in Deutscher Bundestag, 15 March 2001).
Despite the salience of the EU CFSP in the political resolution of the crisis and the increasing role taken on by Germany in the military management of the crisis as part of the NATO Operations, military crisis management was pursued in the framework of NATO, rather than that of ESDP. Germany was not in favour of EU Special Representative François Léotard’s suggestion of an ESDP take-over of Operation Essential Harvest because it was considered too early. This was on account of timing both where the institutional set-up of ESDP and conditions on the ground in FYROM were concerned. Only when the security situation in FYROM had improved to the point where an ESDP mission was considered safe, and only on the condition that the institutional arrangements between NATO and the EU would be resolved, did Germany support the ESDP take-over of the NATO Operation (Interview with German official, 21 November 2005).

However, different players in the German government viewed the matter of the take-over, both on the question of timing and principle, differently. Whereas Chancellor Schröder and Foreign Minister Fischer -along with Javier Solana- were in favour of a handover early on (Interview with German official, 3 November 2005), the Foreign Office itself did not concur with Fischer’s position and managed to delay the process. Officials in the Federal Foreign Office were able to impact policy outcomes through the formulation of negotiating positions and the formation of broader policy attitudes and opinions. High ranking officials also had access to the foreign minister directly and could influence his stance on a specific crisis and his negotiating position internally – and, as one official interviewed remarked ‘the Foreign Minister usually listened’ (Interview with German official, 21 November 2005). This function was of particular importance in determining the timing for support of the ESDP take-over operation as the Federal Foreign Office considered the
timing of the initial suggestion premature (Interview with German official, 21 November 2005). The Ministry of Defence, on the other hand, objected to an ESDP take over for reasons both of principle and of practicality (Interview with former German official, 8 February 2006). This demonstrates that while EU assumption of military responsibility in FYROM was viewed favourably on the political level, government bureaucracies both in the Federal Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence viewed the matter of an ESDP take-over with more caution.

Based on the stated priority to preserve stability in the region, and to find a political solution based on previous lessons drawn from Balkans conflicts, NATO was considered an appropriate institutional venue both for host country credibility and for the symbolism of US involvement on the part of the Federal Foreign Office (Interview with German official, 21 November 2005). The Federal Foreign Office also did not consider the EU ESDP ready to take on such a mission in terms of its military evolution and considered an ESDP mission as too early, both where the institutional construction and the situation on the ground were concerned – there was still potential for escalating violence, which made the introduction of new instruments risky. The Balkans and the ESDP departments within the Federal Foreign Office both shared this cautious attitude, but for different reasons: the Balkans department because it considered the situation still too risky for the ESDP to assume responsibility (Interview with German official, 21 November 2005) and was not necessarily in favour of ESDP to begin with (Interview with German official, 3 November 2005), and the ESDP department because it insisted on the conclusion of the Berlin Plus agreement between NATO and the EU before launching an ESDP mission (Interview with German official, 3 November 2005). This reflects both utilitarian and transatlantic preferences within branches of the Federal Foreign Office.
The bureaucracy thus acted as a ‘retarding element’ rather than a ready facilitator of a transition to more responsibility for ESDP (Interview with German official, 3 November 2005). While there was no objection to an ESDP mission in principle, especially given the small size of the mission, it was only when stability in FYROM was guaranteed that the foreign ministry gave the green light for an ESDP mission (Interview with German official, 21 November 2005).

The Ministry of Defence, on the other hand, objected to the utilization of ESDP instruments altogether, primarily on utilitarian grounds: NATO was conducting three active operations in the Balkans at the time, and it was not considered useful to dislodge one of these operations in order to start an ESDP mission when the EU at that point had not even undertaken a crisis management exercise (Interview with former German official, 8 February 2006). With respect to the Federal Foreign Office, a former official in the Ministry of Defence stated that ‘people in the Foreign Ministry are happy to play strategist, but they do not understand the practical limitations and necessities’, indicating that where officials in the Foreign Ministry were more positive towards an ESDP mission in principle, the Ministry of Defence adopted a cautious attitude (Interview with former German official, 8 February 2006). What spoke in favour of the ESDP takeover in the minds of defence officials, however, was the chance to improve the working mechanisms with the French by arriving at a formalized agreement between NATO and the EU. This was viewed as a clear advantage because cooperation had been difficult in the past where it had ‘always been 14 against 1 where the cooperation with NATO was concerned’ (Interview with former German official, 8 February 2006). On account of

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68 The first EU Crisis Management Exercise (CME 02) took place from 22 to 28 May 2002
this reasoning, the Ministry of Defence came to view an ESDP takeover as advantageous.

The prospect of formal cooperation mechanisms between the EU and NATO, French insistence for an ESDP take-over and the absence of US opposition to the ESDP assuming the mission subsequently led to the endorsement of the proposal at the European Council of Copenhagen in December 2002. With respect to the Europeanization and alliance politics frameworks, this indicates that alliance politics considerations rather than those of Europeanization, conditioned policy responses with respect to this particular policy area.

Europeanization

Given the size and the symbolic value of a military operation, the eventual use of ESDP instruments was viewed favourably in principle, but was a question of timing: while Germany and other member states’ lack of support for Léotard’s initial suggestion delayed the application of ESDP instruments, it did not mean that Germany did not support the development or utilization of ESDP instruments in FYROM in principle. This is demonstrated by the fact that Germany did push for the application of ESDP instruments in FYROM at the NATO summit in Prague in November 2002 (Overhaus, 2003: 56). This in turn suggests, along with the early support of the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister for an ESDP mission, that policy preferences with regard to the third policy area exhibit some, albeit weak, evidence of Europeanization. This applies with respect to Europeanization understood as policy adaptation as well as changing policy preferences: ESDP came to be supported as the appropriate institution by important decision makers; a key bureaucracy adapted its
preference on the use of ESDP instruments, and policy elites generally favoured the application of ESDP instruments.

Fischer addressed the issue of the ESDP take-over for the first time publicly after the summit in Barcelona on 22 March 2002 at the Bundestag: in recognizing the broad support for such a mission he explained that the problem of not wanting to create dual structures with NATO had delayed the mission. He also stressed that the delay was a problem between Greece and Turkey rather than a ‘European problem’. At that point, then, ESDP had become considered an appropriate tool, also in terms of symbolism for a greater responsibility of the EU CFSP and ESDP in crisis management.

Although Germany did regard NATO as the prime forum for the solution of the crisis and did inhibit an inherent preference for NATO over the EU setting, early discussions of an ESDP takeover of the NATO mandate show that reservations out of concern over its impact on the transatlantic relationship in this case eroded relatively quickly, particularly as this was an operation of a small enough size – but of significant symbolic value for the EU ESDP - that the EU ESDP could take over without endangering the regional peace, and had US support (Interview with US official, 20 October 2005). The costs of supporting an EU-ization (in the sense of a change in label from NATO to EU ESDP) of the intervention in FYROM, therefore, were low and Germany could and did support the ESDP takeover at relatively low political cost (Overhaus, 2003). This shows that there is some evidence of Europeanization with respect to the third policy area; however, considerations of Europeanization were weighed against those of alliance politics. This means that the alliance politics framework represents the most appropriate framework for explaining decisions adopted with respect to the timing of the ESDP takeover from NATO.
Alliance Politics

Considerations that point towards evidence of alliance politics were present in the decisions taken with respect to this particular policy area. However, the indicators of alliance politics were of a different nature than in those in the previous policy area: rather than fundamental transatlantic preferences, German policy makers delayed the application of ESDP instruments out of utilitarian reasons, and on account of US and German preferences for a formalized agreement on EU access to NATO assets prior to the launch of an ESDP operation. Since these two considerations determined German policy decisions in this case, the alliance politics framework best explains German policy choices in this case.

Despite the high salience of the EU agenda as it applied to the EU CFSP among the German government particularly the Chancellor and Foreign Minister, an ESDP operation as suggested by François Léotard was considered too early, and of little use except for its symbolism as far as ESDP was concerned and in FYROM generally (Interview with German official, 3 November 2005). Although this symbolism as part of a growing European role was important, it had to be weighed against other factors. To be sure, Fischer had termed the NATO mission in FYROM as a test case for European capacity in crisis management, as Europe carried the main responsibility for developing a regional security structure in the Balkans (Associated Press, 3 September 2001). But, deployment was considered risky, as NATO had to rely on the goodwill of the two parties of the conflict to settle the conflict and as there was risk that the conflict could result in new violence. This precluded the application of ESDP instruments in the first instance. But, Fischer did not preclude an ESDP mission in FYROM in the future. His refusal to push for an earlier takeover came out of considerations that NATO had greater credibility on the ground and the consent of
the Macedonian government, in addition to the fact that the EU ESDP was not yet ready to assume such a mission (Agence France Presse, 9 September 2001).

V. Conclusion

The analysis of the empirical material surrounding German policy decisions in the crisis of FYROM has shown that the application of EU CFSP instruments was of high salience to the German government. Although officials in the Federal Foreign Office took a cautious stance on the application of new institutional instruments in order to ensure a peaceful solution to the crisis, and although Germany retained the use of the Contact Group as a forum to shape international policy responses to the crisis, the application of CFSP instruments was important in order to show that the EU could act in this conflict. The German government, particularly its elected officials, stressed the implications for the EU CFSP and ESDP in German participation in the NATO framework, and the importance to shape European security institutions. This leads to the conclusion that German foreign policy in this case can be termed Europeanized in so far as the CFSP agenda was of high salience and as far as national and European preferences were equated. Policy elites also favoured the application of CFSP instruments, and the EU was not only suggested as the appropriate institution but the application of instruments was also quite important. This did not extend to the application of ESDP instruments, however. Although the evolving ESDP was of some salience to the government as part of a larger role for the EU in the future, the application of ESDP instruments was not deemed appropriate at the time it was first suggested. This was on account of alliance politics considerations. Together with the fact that NATO was considered the appropriate and important institution for the military part of the solution to the crisis leads to the conclusion that alliance politics explains policy decisions of a military nature.
was both on account of ensuring continued US involvement in the Balkans as well as heeding US preferences, but also out of a transatlantic preference where Germany regarded NATO as the prime forum for the solution of the crisis: the suggestion of an ESDP operation neither originated in Germany nor was it supported until it became safe to do so. Lastly, NATO was also given preference out of utilitarian reasons due to its previous involvement in the Balkans and because it enjoyed greater credibility with the host country, FYROM. This then leads to the overall conclusion that while the crisis of FYROM shows that German policy was Europeanized as far as the political negotiations were concerned, the role afforded to the EU CFSP stopped short of a military nature due to alliance politics consideration. The Europeanization framework therefore only partially explains German decision making in this case.
Chapter 5. Germany and the war in Afghanistan.

I. Introduction

This chapter analyses German foreign policy decisions taken with regard to the war in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the attacks of 11 September. German participation and contribution in all three policy areas was significant. Berlin pledged a total of 5,100 of troops to OEF (3,900) and ISAF (1,200). Germany also played a large role in the reconstruction efforts both through the EU CFSP and through national commitments: Germany suggested the mandate and lobbied for the appointment of a German national as the first EU Special Representative, and hosted the Bonn Conference on Afghanistan from 27 November through 5 December 2001. Germany’s commitment was particularly significant with regard to the use of military force, an area where Germany had traditionally been cautious and seen the use of force as *ultima ratio*. Chancellor Schröder in particular regarded military participation in OEF and ISAF—apart from an expression of solidarity with the US—as a means to increase Germany’s independence and latitude for action in world politics. As this chapter will demonstrate, there is evidence of Europeanization in German foreign policy as far as the formulation of the EU’s political and economic role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan is concerned. There is also some evidence of alliance politics considerations in the decision to invoke article V of the NATO treaty in connection with military participation in OEF and as concerns the institutional anchoring in ISAF. The main consideration for Germany in participating in OEF was to respond to greater systemic forces and the policy preferences of the US and the desire on the part of Germany to show solidarity after the terrorist attacks on 11 September in order to use this response also to increase German standing internationally and to signal Berlin’s growing ambitions. As for policies to tackle the
I. Policy area 1: Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the war on terror

This section shows that the motivation behind Berlin’s decision to contribute military forces to OEF supports the alliance politics hypothesis as it was largely motivated by considerations of solidarity with the US. Alliance politics played a role in the commitment to contribute to OEF due to the invocation of Article V of the NATO Treaty, even though Germany’s military contribution to OEF did not take place as part of a NATO operation. Evidence of Europeanization does exist with regard to the use of instruments and initiatives within the EU CFSP in taking measures against international terrorism and as a means to demonstrate solidarity with the US. But, this did not include military operations. In addition, domestic motivation and preferences, particularly those on the part of Schröder to increase Germany’s international
standing, determined policy outcomes, which are captured by neither of the two approaches.

After the attacks on 11 September and the impending war to oust the Taliban from power, the Federal Foreign Office set up a special section (Sonderstab) for Afghanistan in order to coordinate German policy towards the war in Afghanistan and the country’s reconstruction. The Ministry of Defence planned and co-signed Germany’s military contribution to the war in Afghanistan. Apart from the chancellor and foreign minister, other relevant actors, as in the crisis in FYROM, were members of the Bundestag whose consent to Germany’s military contributions to OEF was required to enable military deployments. Chancellor Schröder in particular assumed a key position in the formulation of policy responses, going as far as linking German consent to military deployment to a vote of confidence in his government in order to ensure the support from members of the ruling coalition rather than having to rely on votes from the opposition as in the case of German contribution to NATO Operation Essential Harvest. For Schröder, the aim of increasing Germany’s action radius and global standing in security and defence policy that had been one objective in the military participation in NATO Operation Essential Harvest was a key goal in the case of OEF. Foreign Minister Fischer, in contrast, emphasized the multilateral nature of the response to the attacks; this signalled that Fischer, although not necessarily objecting to Schröder’s emphasis on Germany’s changed role in the world, emphasized a more traditional German foreign policy position by focussing on multilateral institutions and initiatives through which to pursue German responses to the war on terror.

Following the events of 11 September and the subsequent war in Afghanistan, German foreign policy exhibited potentially contradictory, but essentially interlinked,
objectives: to assert Germany's national position in a changed geo-strategic environment, and to push for a greater profile for the EU as well as the UN. This was also reflected in the debates in the Bundestag. In the first address to the Bundestag after the attacks on 19 September, Chancellor Schröder stressed the need for solidarity with the US and Germany's willingness to contribute militarily to the war against terror by stating that 'we as Germans and Europeans aim for unqualified solidarity with the US' adding at the same time that solidarity and gratitude for the US were not a sole basis for the legitimacy of any potential military deployment, but that the goal of any decision would be 'to save the future of our country in a free world, because this is the real issue' (Schröder, Deutscher Bundestag, 19 September 2001, 18302 A). Schröder also frequently emphasized Germany's increasing role and international standing, stating that the period of German post-war foreign policy where allies would expect 'something like secondary assistance' had irrevocably passed with the attacks on 11 September. Instead, Germany would have to take seriously its responsibility and commitments to the defence of freedom and human rights, to bring stability and security explicitly including contributions in military operations (Schröder, Deutscher Bundestag, 11 October 2001, 18682 C).

The decision to contribute troops to the US-led war on terror created significant unease among the German public and particularly among the ruling coalition, where Schröder faced a potential revolt from members of his own Social Democratic Party and Green coalition partner. While the Cabinet approved the plan for the deployment, and deployment met with the approval from the CDU, CSU and the FDP, members of both the SPD and Green party were against the deployment (Longhurst, 2004: 84). This put the ruling coalition under significant stress. By contrast, for the CDU/CSU the attacks of 11 September had reinforced the parties'
transatlantic leanings as well as the conviction that German security interests would have to be protected with political as well as military means – and wherever threats to German security originated geographically (Katsioulis, 2004: 227-252). The PDS, as in the case of the NATO and eventually also ESDP Operations in FYROM, opposed the deployment of Bundeswehr troops. In light of a growing level of dissent within the governing coalition and the prospect of having to rely on opposition votes to secure a parliamentary majority for military support (Financial Times, 14 November 2001), Schröder went as far as linking parliamentary approval for the deployment of 3,900 Bundeswehr troops, including by January 2002 about 100 special forces (KSK), to a vote of confidence in his government in order to secure the necessary votes in favour of Bundeswehr deployment from his own party on 16 November 2001 (Deutscher Bundestag, 16 November 2001; Financial Times, 14 November 2001). He narrowly survived the vote of confidence by a count of 334 (of 662) votes.

As had been visible in the case of FYROM discussed in the previous chapter, for Schröder the war in Afghanistan presented an opportunity for Germany to play a more assertive role in international politics, and one that was not pursued entirely through international institutions, as the contribution to OEF – which constitutes a coalition of the willing, rather than a NATO force - demonstrates. Although much of this was done also on account of solidarity with the US, the size of the contribution and the departure from previously held preferences and positions, particularly with respect to the use of military force, supports the conclusion that this was also to increase Germany’s international profile and room for manoeuvre, and arose out of national preferences.
Europeanization

While the EU agenda was of some salience to German policy makers in the war on terror, this did not apply to military participation in OEF. As a result, evidence that would support the Europeanization hypothesis is limited with respect to this particular policy area. Although the decisions on the part of Germany to initiate and support EU-level meetings and initiatives to show a united position against the war on terror and to demonstrate solidarity with the US reflect the salience of the EU CFSP as an appropriate institution in the war against terror, there was no discussion for the EU to play a military role in OEF. Of course, given the preference of the US in this matter this would not have been expected to begin with.

However, the application of EU CFSP instruments, or at least an EU Special summit and measures to combat global terrorism was important to German policy makers as they did not want to see the EU sidelined completely in the war in Afghanistan. This supports one indicator of Europeanization, that of the salience of the EU CFSP. To illustrate, Foreign Minister Fischer stated that Germany would ‘pursue a parallel policy, that of making a national contribution—in the question of the political solution, in the question of the military solidarity, in the question of humanitarian initiatives—but also not tire to strengthen European visibility and to accomplish more of a common foreign and security’ (Fischer, Deutscher Bundestag, 18 October 2001, 18993 C).

Both the chancellor and the foreign minister, therefore, would have preferred for the EU to play a bigger role, although their position was not shared by other EU member states. To illustrate, Schröder stressed the necessity for a comprehensive approach to the fight against terrorism as well as prevention and management of crises, and that the EU would have to strengthen its cooperation in this respect. With
respect to the EU, Schröder emphasized that it was at German insistence that the Belgian EU presidency had called for a special summit of the European Council on 21 September to discuss the EU’s stance on the war on terror (Deutscher Bundestag, 19 September 2001, 18302D). And, Schröder explicitly stated that ‘the terrorist threat is also a test for the EU CFSP – the diplomatic activities of the EU and its member states must lead to a cohesive foreign and security strategy (...) the successful inclusion of Russia in the alliance against terror and the important role that the German foreign minister and other European politicians play in the Middle East express the potential of the EU and its member states, a potential that has to be used more than in the past (Schröder, Deutscher Bundestag 18 October 2001: 18982D).

Members of the ruling coalition supported and acknowledged Schröder’s initiative, stating that ‘after 11 September, the European Union has become more important than ever’ (Gloser, Deutscher Bundestag, 18 October 2001, 18988A). This shows that the leading coalition supported a growing role for the EU.

There is also evidence of the third indicator of Europeanization, that of policy preferences for a European approach: partly in an effort to qualify the Chancellor’s emphasis on Germany’s national ambitions in several speeches and interviews in the German press and at the Bundestag, Foreign Minister Fischer stressed German integration in Europe and Europe’s global interests. He also stated explicitly that the EU, particularly CFSP, had to be careful of not being sidelined in the new geo-strategic landscape. The question, to Fischer, was ‘whether Europe was ready and is there a possibility to position Europe more visibly?’ Noting that there had been a common position among EU member states, irregardless of whether or not they belonged to NATO, Fischer went on to state that ‘we wish that things continue in this direction, that for example also in the post-Taliban solution for Afghanistan the EU,
and not just its member states, play a visible role' (Fischer, Deutscher Bundestag 18 October 2001, 18993 C). This reflected a European preference. Germany’s national interest and its foreign policy were to remain embedded in the European context and, more importantly, Germany’s role in Afghanistan was to be defined as a European contribution, and that the EU would be in a position to play a particularly significant role in the post-war reconstruction of Afghanistan (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 18 October 2001). Fischer, then, not sharing the chancellor’s emphasis on Germany’s national standing, emphasized Germany’s embeddedness in international institutions, particularly the EU. However, this did not touch on the specific decision to deploy forces as part of OEF or, as the analysis of the third policy area will show, to the coordination of an ‘EU force’ under ISAF. Although Germany took the position that the EU should take into account the military and political aspects of the crisis, this position that was not shared by other member states. In the end, for Fischer, the crisis demonstrated that Europe was ‘not yet built for the question of war and peace’ (Der Spiegel, 21 January 2002).

And indeed, Berlin consistently pushed for a greater profile for the EU in the war on terror as well as in the reconstruction of Afghanistan discussed in later sections of this chapter, and aimed to play a significant role in these EU initiatives. The Extraordinary European Council Meeting on 21 September 2001, a German initiative, discussed EU policies towards fighting international terrorism went beyond a statement of solidarity with the US to include plans for a European policy to combat global terrorism by enhancing police and judicial cooperation, developing international legal instruments, putting an end to the funding of terrorism, strengthening air security and coordinating the EU’s global action (Council of the European Union, 21 September 2001). The European Council conclusions also
specifically made reference to the need to develop the EU CFSP and ESDP in order to make the EU effective as a global actor.

With regard to the other indicators of Europeanization developed in chapter 2, there is little evidence that would support the indicators of policy projection, or adaptation understood as compromising national preferences to enable policies at the EU level. Given the limited role to play for the EU CFSP in this matter, Germany did not compromise its national preferences in order to accommodate the use of CFSP/ESDP instruments. Rather, as will be shown in the analysis of the second policy area, Germany pursued some national policy preferences— for the EU to play a visible role in world politics, and to underline German investments in Afghanistan—through the EU CFSP (Interview with former German official, 9 February 2006). The general salience of the EU CFSP in German foreign policy in this case suggests that the EU presented a potential vehicle for Germany to increase its influence, and that it was perceived as an appropriate political platform to formulate a response to the attacks of 11 September. The EU CFSP, therefore, presented a venue through which to reinforce German national perspectives although, importantly, this did not extend to the war against terror in Afghanistan as it concerns participation in OEF itself but instead concerned the development on an EU strategy against international terrorism.

As for the existence of shared European and national preferences, the war against terror was considered a European as well as a national concern, indicating that European and national preferences were broadly shared, at least at a rhetorical level. However, this was not with respect to the EU CFSP— the EU platform was one platform but not the most important one in this particular respect. In conclusion, therefore, while there is some evidence that supports the Europeanization hypothesis in this policy area, the evidence is very weak in that it is restricted to broader
measures to combat global terrorism and to show solidarity with the US in view of the terrorist threat. With regard to the military contribution to OEF, however, the Europeanization hypothesis has no explanatory value.

On the contrary, Chancellor Schröder also stated early on that the transatlantic partnership and solidarity with the US would frame policy responses despite the need for European solidarity (Financial Times, 3 October 2001). Thus, while the EU agenda was of some salience, this did not translate into specific policy actions where military operations were concerned but focussed on broader responses to the threat of global terrorism. It also did not preclude German participation in mini-meetings ahead of EU meetings to coordinate military action with Britain and France, which drew criticism from smaller member states and charges of ‘mini-lateralism’ to the detriment of EU unity (Financial Times, 19 October 2001). This shows that the EU was not the only, and not necessarily the most important, platform considered important by German policy makers.

Alliance Politics

While the evidence of Europeanization in this policy area is rather weak, this does not hold equally true for evidence of alliance politics and the use of NATO as a policy platform in the war against terror and OEF. The invocation of article V of the NATO treaty at the request of the US (Financial Times, 3 October 2001), and the use of the NATO Treaty as a legal basis –together with UNSC resolution 1368 and 1373- for Germany’s contribution to OEF points towards the centrality of the alliance in German foreign policy decisions in this case.

There is significant support for the third indicator of alliance politics, that of giving preference to the US and NATO as an institutional forum out of a transatlantic
preference. Germany aligned with NATO on the basis of the NATO treaty, and to show solidarity with the US—a point frequently made in public debates and speeches by members of the government as well as the opposition. For instance, speaking for the Christian Democrats, Merz positively acknowledged Schröder’s repeated emphasis on unrestricted solidarity with the US and mentioned that ‘we from the CDU fraction in the Bundestag had supported you from the start’ even when it became clear that ‘this solidarity would exceed words’ but would include military measures. Merz also stated that ‘solidarity with the US cannot be contingent on success of the operation. The solidarity with the US and our own, national interest calls for the deployment of Bundeswehr forces’ (Merz, Deutscher Bundestag, 16 November 2001, 19858D). Although this demonstrates Germany’s transatlantic preference, NATO was not considered an appropriate institutional venue for the execution of OEF, as the US did not exhibit a preference towards the use of NATO either for utilitarian reasons or in order to involve all NATO members in OEF. In this particular case, then, alliance politics refers to relations with the US rather than just relations within NATO.

Transatlantic preference is reflected in a number of domestic decisions also on the part of the ruling coalition, despite reservations voiced with respect to the use of military force by some members of the SPD and the Green Party. With the exception of the PDS, there was broad domestic support for the invocation of article V and solidarity with the US. The Bundestag voted on 19 September in favour of following up declarations of solidarity with concrete measures. Arguments with respect to the participation in OEF reflect transatlantic preference in a number of respects. Peter Struck, at the time chairman of the SPD fraction in the Bundestag, argued that solidarity with NATO and the US was justified on account of NATO’s contribution
to Germany’s post-World War II security; and one could not give up on this constant in German post-war policy ‘when for the first time solidarity is requested from us’ (Struck, Deutscher Bundestag, 16 November 2001, 19862B). In addition, normative arguments were put forward in Bundestag debates that emphasized NATO as a community of values that made solidarity a matter of more than just a contractual obligation but also a contribution to the defence of values: Schröder stated that the invocation of article V was ‘a decision of great ramifications that commits us not just formally (...) the attacks on New York and Washington were not just attacks on the American values, they were attacks on (...) the values in our Basic Law (...). We have experienced solidarity over decades. This is why it is simply our duty (...) to give back solidarity in this situation (Schröder, Deutscher Bundestag, 8 November 2001, 19287B). This confirms that the alliance politics framework is more applicable when it comes to the analysis of this particular decision point, and that it applies to policy actors across the party spectrum.

The decision to deploy troops as part of OEF was not motivated by considerations that would support the Europeanization hypothesis. But, neither is the approach of alliance politics suited to fully explain decision-making in this case as domestic considerations of a growing international role for Germany were relevant for understanding policy decisions. The alliance politics approach does not account for the fact that Germany’s motivation for military participation in OEF apart from transatlantic solidarity were also to increase Germany’s action radius and ‘normalcy’ in a post-Cold War era. Thus, German participation in OEF is best understood as an expression of transatlantic solidarity in the war against terror, which was largely determined by the preferences and requests made by the Bush administration in addition to efforts by Chancellor Schröder to do away with Germany’s post-World
War II special status (Sonderweg), which supports or can be explained by neither framework applied in this thesis.

III. Policy area 2: Afghanistan’s reconstruction: the political and economic dimension

Germany played a significant role in devising policies towards Afghanistan’s reconstruction after the fall of the Taliban, both by hosting the Bonn Conference on Afghanistan and by initiating the appointment of an EU Special Representative. Unlike the case of OEF and ISAF, the EU CFSP agenda was of importance and utility in this case, and presented an important policy platform for reinforcing national preference and to give the EU a voice more generally – something that was important for German policy makers in the war on terror and Afghanistan’s reconstruction, but that was eclipsed by other considerations in the case of German participation in OEF and ISAF. The empirical evidence presented and analyzed in this section will demonstrate that German foreign policy exhibited signs of Europeanization. Specifically, this refers to the salience of the European agenda, the use of the EU platform in an attempt to increase German influence over the policies as well as the existence of shared definitions and preferences that favoured the application of instruments located in the EU CFSP.

The relevant actors in the reconstruction in Afghanistan included the Federal Foreign Office, the Foreign Minister and Chancellor. Members of the Bundestag and the Ministry of Defence were not involved in this instance, as there was no military contribution at stake, and as the Bundestag had no authority to block or influence German foreign policy. Foreign Minister Fischer appointed Hans-Joachim Daerr as Afghanistan representative in October 2001. The Federal Foreign Office also set up a special department (Sonderstab) for Afghanistan headed by Ambassador
Michael Schmunk in order to coordinate the political questions and all aspects of the German contributions to the reconstruction of Afghanistan (Interview with German official, 30 August 2005).

German policy makers early on raised the issue of post-conflict reconstruction of Afghanistan with other relevant actors: the UN, US as well as other EU partners. In fact, there had been informal bilateral talks between the Federal Foreign Office and the British Foreign Office in early 2001 on what to do about Afghanistan (Interview with EU official, 11 September 2006); and while these talks did not lead to specific policy proposals or initiatives they show that Germany had a strong interest in Afghanistan. As in the other two policy areas, German policy makers aimed at playing a key role in this area as well – but did so through the auspices of international institutions, notably the UN and the EU. And, other than in the case of military deployment to OEF and ISAF, the German lead and European involvement in the reconstruction of Afghanistan had broad domestic support as well, as is evident from statements made in the Bundestag.

Germany hosted the Afghanistan Conference in late November 2001 at the request of UN Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi, which signified the substantial stakes and interest for Germany in the international efforts of Afghanistan. Given the positive perception of Germany in Afghanistan, Germany was a natural candidate to host the Conference and to play a leading role in the coordination of international reconstruction efforts (Interview with German official, 30 August 2005). The presence of both Chancellor Schröder and Foreign Minister Fischer at the signing ceremony signified the importance of the policy for the German government. The German concept for the international efforts in Afghanistan included support for the UN in leading the implementation of the Petersberg Agreement, to recognize the
EU as one of the pillars for economic reconstruction, and use the existing good will of the Afghani people towards Germany, which lent credibility to Germany as playing a leading role (Klaiber, 2003: 12).

Germany’s political engagement for the reconstruction of Afghanistan was also due to the fact that Germany had a historically strong interest and connection to Afghanistan, including a close relationship with Afghan exiles in Germany. Berlin therefore had the reputation as honest broker in Afghanistan. In addition, echoing the sentiments of increasing Germany’s independence and room for manoeuvre, Berlin’s political and military engagement in the reconstruction of Afghanistan was also a question of ‘no taxation without representation’, and the aim to play a significant role through and in EU efforts, given that ‘Germany is a net payer in the EU’ (Interview with German official, 1 September 2005). This signals that the EU CFSP was perceived as a much more useful political platform in the reconstruction of Afghanistan on the part of the German government than in the two previous policy areas.

The priorities with regard to the CFSP in this case were to both consolidate and make visible the EU’s efforts in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and there were no differences in view among the key participants in the German government. Given the extent of Germany’s involvement in the formulation and coordination of reconstruction efforts, the EU represented an important platform through which to pursue German national interests, and to consolidate policy efforts. The extensive use of the EU platform also suggests an inherent preference on the part of German government officials and the foreign office for the use and application of EU CFSP instruments.
Europeanization

In the policy decisions surrounding the reconstruction of Afghanistan, there is significant evidence that supports the Europeanization hypothesis particularly with regard to the salience of the European agenda in German foreign policy, as well as using the EU CFSP as a vehicle to export national preferences and to reinforce national policy efforts on the EU level: the EU platform was used to increase national influence and to pursue national policy preferences through the EU CFSP. Given that Germany exported policy preferences on to the EU and shaped EU policy to a considerable extent, there is no evidence of Germany adhering to common policy objectives over other considerations or preferences; similarly, there is no evidence of Germany relaxing traditional policy positions in order to accommodate the progress of EU projects. Policy elites favoured the application of CFSP instruments, suggesting the existence of norms and preferences that favoured the application of EU instruments over other possibilities.

Despite concerns and press commentaries about member states’ tendencies towards nationalization following the events of 11 September (Hill, 2004), the EU CFSP was suggested as an appropriate institution in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and the application of CFSP instruments was important. The European agenda in national foreign policy was salient as far as the EU CFSP was concerned. As mentioned previously Chancellor Schröder initiated the emergency European Council at Ghent on 19 September, and indicated that he would address the role of Europe and the EU CFSP in the fight against terrorism at the European Council. Foreign Minister Fischer echoed much of these statements and expressed the German preference that this would carry on in a post-Taliban solution for Afghanistan, where the EU could play a visible role and build on its strength in
humanitarian issues, economic reconstruction, and conflict management (Deutscher Bundestag, 18 October 2001, 18981 C - 18992 B). Germany also pushed for the application of EU political instruments in Afghanistan on 8 October, a proposal was rejected by the Belgian presidency (Financial Times, 9 October 2001). Earlier, Germany had presented what was later termed a 'reflection paper' on the political reconstruction of Afghanistan at a special meeting of Asia experts on 3 October that did not find favour with other EU member states on account of lacking political instruments and a not sufficiently coherent foreign and security policy (Deutscher Bundestag, 18 October 2001, 18981 C, 18992 B). Still, this demonstrates not only that Germany took an active role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan but attempted to involve EU instruments.

What is more, Berlin actively pushed for a political role for Europe, and this had broad public support. To illustrate, on 18 October in the Bundestag Schröder stated that 'together with the United Nations we will have to define and put into place a long term concept for Afghanistan’s stabilisation. Here Europe, not just the member states as allies of the US, will have to play an important role. Especially in the question of the post-Taliban-process, the voice of Europe must be heard and the activities of Europe must be visible. Europe will support the long-term inclusion of Arab and Islamic states in the anti-terror coalition. (Schröder, Deutscher Bundestag, 18 October 2001, 18983 A). This view was shared by members of the ruling coalition: a member of the Green party stated that 'the UN as well as the EU will be an important factor in the future developments of Afghanistan. It is important to remember that the EU in cooperation with other international organization has a considerable potential for conflict prevention and crisis management, and can support
stabilisation – as we have seen in the development of Macedonia (Sterzing, Deutscher Bundestag, 18 October 2001, 19002 B).

There was, therefore, the recognition of the potential for a significant role for the EU, including and going beyond financial contributions by the EU Commission/the first pillar mentioned in chapter 3. The resulting German policy initiatives strongly support the first indicator of Europeanization, that of salience. But, the EU CFSP also represented a platform through which to pursue national policy preferences and was used as a vehicle to increase Germany’s political profile internationally. This supports the second indicator of Europeanization, that of exporting policy preferences on to the EU agenda. The appointment of a German diplomat as the EU’s special envoy to Afghanistan in particular supports this conclusion. It was a German initiative to appoint an EU Special Representative, a German was nominated for the position, Germany drew up the mandate and paid for much of the expenses (Interview with former German official, 9 February 2006).

The theme of German engagement in the framework of a European effort emerged before Klaiber’s appointment both in the domestic debates as well as on the international level, as illustrated above. In an interview with Minister of State Dr. Volmer on the Afghanistan Conference in Bonn, Volmer highlighted the active German role in the ‘Afghanistan Support Group’ that had been devising policy options for a post-Taliban Afghanistan long before US air strikes, and stated that Germany would play a role within the EU, particularly in the suggestion of sending an EU-envoy to Kabul so that Europe would gain more visibility (ZDF, 30 November 2001). Berlin was of the view that the EU should have a political representative in Kabul to assist in the political process and to make the EU’s efforts in the country visible – in other words, to give the EU a voice (Interview with former German official).
Klaus-Peter Klaiber was appointed EU Special Representative to Afghanistan on 10 December 2001 and served for six months to coordinate EU actions in the country (Council of the European Union, 10 December 2001). The mandate was drafted by Germany, and there was no other candidate put forward. Funds for the EU Special Representative’s salary were made available by Germany as well, and Klaiber worked out of the embassy of the former East Germany, suggesting that Klaiber’s appointment essentially constituted a national secondment and financial contribution rather than an EU post (Missiroli 2003: 8).

Prior to leaving for Afghanistan and in discussing the limits of his appointment with an advisor to the chancellor, Klaiber was also to interpret his mandate flexibly in acting on behalf of the EU (Interview with former German official, 9 February 2006). This carte blanche from the German government to push the envelope suggests that Berlin’s interest in EU visibility in Afghanistan was strong. It also suggest that Berlin had an interest in pursuing its policy preferences through this appointment, and that other EU actors, such as Javier Solana, were eclipsed by this effort. To illustrate, one former German official interviewed mentioned that he was disappointed that Solana never paid a visit to Afghanistan during Klaiber’s mandate. He also recalled an occasion early on during Klaiber’s term where there had been a disagreement between Klaiber and Solana on account of the timing and content of a press conference where Solana afterwards accused Klaiber of going beyond the EU’s (and by extension the EUSR’s) mandate (Interview with former German official, 9 February 2006). This anecdote illustrates that German policy preferences were exported on to the European level at the expense of the visibility and ability to act on the part of Javier Solana and the Council Secretariat.
There were thus several instances in which German policy makers either initiated or suggested EU policies, or used the EU as a platform to discuss policy proposals. This highlights the argument that Germany’s policy efforts within the EU consistently pushed for a stronger EU role and points toward the salience of the EU agenda in German foreign policy. This is also evident from the German and French proposals for the EU to back a UN initiative for a national assembly of tribal and ethnic leaders on the meeting of the EU foreign ministers on 8 October (Financial Times, 9 October 2001); the demand for the inclusion of measures of how the EU could combat terrorism in its own states or what the EU could do about Afghanistan in the conclusion of the meeting on 17 October and Chancellor Schröder’s suggestion at the close of the UN Conference in Afghanistan of a potential co-ordinated EU contribution to an international force in Afghanistan (Financial Times, 6 December 2001).

These statements, along with the initiatives taken by Germany, serve to support the argument that Germany used the EU to project its national power. Germany’s evocation of the EU platform, of strengthening the EU’s capacity to act, and of policy initiatives taken within the EU also indicates that German policy makers perceived German preferences overlapping with those of the EU.

**Alliance Politics**

There is no empirical support for considerations of alliance politics having played a role in this case. For one, this was because this particular policy field was not related to military measures where NATO would have been an appropriate institution. More fundamentally, US preferences did not factor significantly in German considerations. Rather, German preferences ran counter to that of the US in formulating policies for Afghanistan’s reconstruction, for instance with respect to the question of membership.
in the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) where the US preferred to work with Afghan warlords in the hope of gaining information on terrorists' whereabouts, rather than weakening their political influence in the country (Baraki, 2004).

Instead, the initiatives undertaken by Germany with respect to this policy area show significant evidence of Europeanization. The salience of the European agenda was high, the EU CFSP was suggested as an appropriate institution, and Germany used its political and diplomatic weight to raise the EU's profile in this case. While the salience of the European agenda speaks for national adaptation to the European agenda, no other indicators that would point towards national adaptation were found to be present in this decision point. In contrast, Germany used the EU as a policy platform to export national preferences: by lobbying for the appointment of a German national as EUSR Berlin ensured not only the visibility of the EU CFSP in the reconstruction of Afghanistan but also increased German influence on Afghanistan's reconstruction: Germany took the lead, in terms of numbers at least, in ISAF, hosted the UN Conference on the reconstruction of Afghanistan and thus invested considerable resources in the country. The EU therefore represented one additional platform through which to assert national influence. In addition, Germany had expressed an interest in utilizing and giving a place for the emerging EU CFSP early on following the attacks on 11 September. This indicates the existence of a genuine German preference for a stronger and more capable EU, at least politically.

IV. Policy area 3: German participation in ISAF

This section argues that considerations of participation in ISAF, as before in OEF, were not determined by considerations that would significantly support the Europeanization hypotheses. While strengthening the European agenda was of salience to policy makers and frequently used as a rhetoric device in domestic debates
especially those that involved the use of military force- this did not translate into giving the EU CFSP or ESDP a role to play in ISAF and the suggestion of ISAF as an EU force on the part of the Belgian Presidency was subsequently rejected.

The relevant actors in the Federal Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence as well as the elected officials were the same that were involved in OEF. Whereas the chancellor and foreign minister were in favour of a significant military investment on the part of Germany that included assuming the lead function for ISAF, the Ministry of Defence cautioned against the assumption of a German lead as the Bundeswehr was not considered ready to take on such a task. This does not mean, however, that the Ministry of Defence did not share the overall objective of German military contribution to ISAF.

Given Germany’s high profile in the diplomatic engagement for the peace process in Afghanistan, the contribution to OEF as well as the country’s reconstruction, military participation in ISAF followed logically. Germany welcomed the UN Security Council Resolution stationing ISAF for an initial mandate of six months, and regarded it as a legal basis for German participation in ISAF. Moreover, members of the governing coalition such as Klose and head of cabinet Struck indicated early on that Germany should consider a lead nation position (Agence France Presse, 20 December 2001) – although Defence Minister Scharping indicated at the time that the Bundeswehr was ‘not yet capable’ to do this (Berliner Zeitung, 22 December 2001). Germany was also not in favour of an overall US command but insisted on keeping the two operations – ISAF and OEF – separate for reasons of domestic sensibilities. After a meeting of the cabinet on 21 December on the deployment of German forces, defence minister Scharping said that Germany would put at ISAF’s disposal the necessary capabilities as soon as possible (dpa, 22
December 2001). Among government officials, both in the ministry of defence, the foreign ministry as well as the chancellor and foreign minister, participation in ISAF was uncontested. This basic consensus on German participation in ISAF extended to actors in the broader political process as well.

On 22 December 2001 the Bundestag voted in favour of German participation in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which began in January 2002 and where the German contingent numbered 1200 initially and increased up to 2500 by 2003 when Germany and the Netherlands assumed the lead (Wagener, 2003: 33-49). With the exception of the former socialist party (PDS), the governing coalition as well as the opposition were in agreement on the necessity of military measures to support the reconstruction of Afghanistan – both on the initial deployment as well as the extension of the original mandate beyond 20 June 2002.

Other than in the debates over OEF, however, in the case of ISAF, the issue of an EU format for the European contributions to ISAF created some discord among EU member states, and was at least informally discussed as a possible option even if no specific plans for a concrete operation followed from these discussions (Interview with former German official, 8 February 2006). Germany did not, however, in the end support these discussions, even if Chancellor Schröder pledged support in an international force as a potential co-ordinated EU contribution at the close of the Bonn Conference on 5 December (Financial Times, 6 December 2001). This demonstrates that a preference for a more visible role for the EU existed on the part of Chancellor Schröder, although this was not appropriate in practice. For one, the appearance of a co-ordinated EU force in Afghanistan resulted in criticism from other NATO partners, in particular Canada, that the Europeans were hijacking ISAF, possibly as a dry run for the planned EU rapid reaction force, which also created
some unease among other EU member states, notably Britain (United Press International, 10 January 2002). From the perspective of a former German official interviewed ‘the CFSP/ESDP at that time was still in its infancy and not robust enough to undertake such an operation’ (Interview with former German official, 9 February 2006). Fischer subsequently rejected the Belgian claim at Laeken on 14-15 December that the ISAF force was created by the EU where eight of the fifteen EU members were included stating that it could not be an EU force due to the EU’s lack of operational structures, and that the issue would be handled by the UN Security Council instead (Financial Times, 14 December 2001).

*Europeanization*

As with the military participation in OEF, there is little evidence to support the Europeanization hypothesis in the case of ISAF. Despite initial discussions about an EU force, and statements of the possibility of an EU coordinated force on the part of the chancellor, the idea was abandoned and not taken up again. This suggests that the application of CFSP/ESDP instruments did not figure prominently enough in German decision-making in this case to move from policy suggestions to operational planning. With regards to the following indicators for Europeanization – the adherence to common policy objectives, the use of the EU as a cover or the existence of shared definitions and preferences, or the relaxation of traditional policy positions to accommodate progress of EU projects - there is no evidence in German policy decisions that would support either of these indicators of the Europeanization hypothesis.

However, the fact that a possible EU operation was initially discussed suggests some salience of the European agenda. ISAF was important to safeguard
and ensure the reconstruction of Afghanistan, which involved significant EU and member state involvement, and was therefore indirectly of salience to EU (and, by extension, German) efforts even if it was not part of the EU CFSP agenda proper. Still, the salience of the EU agenda did not reach the military contribution: although the EU as an institutional platform had been briefly discussed this did not lead to concrete plans for a military mission under an EU label as the CFSP/ESDP was not yet in possession of the necessary military instruments to carry out such a mission (Interview with former German official, 9 February 2006). As in the case of OEF and the war on terror more broadly, while there was a preference for a European approach in principle, this did not extend to the question of military force. However, in the case of ISAF, other than OEF, the use of an EU-label for a military contribution to ISAF was at least considered as the statement of Chancellor Schröder at the Bonn Conference cited earlier demonstrates. From the perspective of the Ministry of Defence, this would been pointless from an operational point of view to begin with, as a potential EU force would have had to either rely on national headquarters or on NATO structures because the EU was neither in possession of head quarter structures nor a planning room. (Interview with former German official, 8 February 2006). There was, therefore, agreement among officials in the Federal Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence that an EU force was neither practical nor desirable.

Still, there is evidence that the members of the government, in particular the Foreign Minister, in principle supported a strong EU profile in this case; and that the application of EU CFSP instruments was of high salience. Fischer, reacting to a charge from the head of the CDU fraction Friedrich Merz that the EU had been sidelined in international and German foreign policy formulation stated that "of course 11 September made clear that the EU is not prepared to make decisions on war
and peace. Of course we would have wished for a stronger European effort. The government (...) has insisted that Europe is more visible. It is not a coincidence that a German diplomat is going to represent the EU as Special Representative. This makes clear our European conviction.’ However, Fischer also stated that ‘this also makes clear how important it is that the Federal Republic of Germany engages in this’ (Fischer, Deutscher Bundestag, 22 December 2001, 20827 B). This highlights Fischer’s preference for both a European approach but importantly for a German lead in this approach. Together with Schröder’s public statement on a potential EU force, this indicates that the position of the chancellor and the foreign minister on the German role in Afghanistan were fairly close. And, an official in the Federal Foreign Office stated that ‘it all depends on how you sell something’ (Interview with German official, 1 September 2005) – indicating that although this was not an ESDP operation, the ‘EU’- label was nevertheless of salience for German policy makers.

Although the analysis of policy decisions and domestic debates shows that German policy exhibited some signs of Europeanization with regard to the salience of the European agenda, the use of the EU as a platform for Germany to increase national influence, and the preference for a European in the framework of a multilateral approach, this was confined to the political, not the military responses to the war in Afghanistan. While the European agenda, including ESDP, had become more salient on account of the events of 11 September and the changed geo-strategic environment in the eyes of German policy makers, this did not apply to policy responses to the war in Afghanistan where an ESDP mission was not considered realistic (Interview with German official, 1 September 2005).

However, the analysis of the second policy area has shown that the presence of international security forces was recognised as vital for successful reconstruction
efforts by the EU and other international actors. This went as far as EU Special Representative Klaiber calling for a broadening of the ISAF mandate outside Kabul and lobbying for its extension, going beyond his official mandate, and welcoming British offers to play a leading role in ISAF (Agence France Presse, 12 December 2001). Although Klaiber acted as EU envoy rather than a German official, the significant financial and personal support of the German government for his position suggest that he acted with the implicit consent of the German government to lobby on behalf of the EU and to set the parameters of his mandate as far as possible (Interview with former German official, 9 February 2006). This in turn speaks for a German preference for a European approach even as it concerned the peacekeeping operation. It also demonstrates the export of German national preferences on to the European agenda, even if ISAF of course was not an EU force. This was because ISAF was considered necessary for the stabilization of the country, and supported other reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan undertaken by the EU and other international actors. It also reflects the considerable commitment to Afghanistan’s reconstruction -political, economic and military- on the part of the German government. Taken together, the evidence of some salience of the European agenda and thoughts over a coordinated EU force constitute weak evidence of Europeanization, in particular when compared to the role of the EU agenda with regards to Afghanistan’s political and economic reconstruction. But, as this section has demonstrated, policy decisions and policy rhetoric with respect to ISAF demonstrate German interest in a European profile, including ‘selling’ ISAF as an ‘EU’ effort.
Alliance politics

While evidence of Europeanization is weak in this case, there is some evidence that supports the alliance politics hypothesis. This applies in particular to the indicators of giving preference to NATO for utilitarian considerations as well as for reasons of transatlantic preferences. There is no evidence to support indicators 1 and 2 – that states align with NATO in order to keep the US involved in European security concerns, and a US preference that leans towards the use of NATO. This was not a case of an explicit US preference leaning towards the use of a NATO framework as no US troops participated in ISAF, and as US Commander General Tommy Franks had overall command of ISAF to begin with (United Press International, 10 January 2002). The US, then, had an interest in overall command of OEF and ISAF with respect to the two operations’ coordination, but did not have an explicit interest in involving NATO to a greater extent.

However, NATO came to be considered as the prime institutional forum out of a transatlantic preference as well as for utilitarian reasons. To be sure, Germany did discuss an EU-coordinated force, which points against a clear transatlantic preference at least on the part of Chancellor Schröder, but did not advocate or proceed with more serious operational planning when it became clear that some European and North American NATO members were opposed to this idea – apart from the fact that it was not considered practical to begin with (Interview with former German official, 8 February 2006).

And, as in the debates over participation in OEF, Chancellor Schröder accepted if not initiated the country’s growing role internationally, including in military deployment – and did so out of transatlantic solidarity rather than merely
exhibiting a preference for a European approach. To illustrate, Schröder emphasized that ISAF ‘is a consequence of politically decisive actions. It is also a consequence of the unrestricted solidarity, which included military means’ (Schröder, Deutscher Bundestag, 22 December 2001, 20822C). In the end, NATO was regarded as the prime forum for the solution of the crisis. Given NATO’s operational capacities, rather than the EU ESDP, Germany regarded NATO as the prime forum for the solution of the crisis, preferring NATO over other possible institutional settings (Interview with former German official, 8 February 2006). This reinforces the indicator of giving NATO preference out of a clear transatlantic preference, but also for utilitarian reasons.

In conjunction with the last point, NATO was considered the most appropriate forum as the military tools were available through NATO but not through other regional or international institutions. This supports the final indicator of alliance politics, that NATO was given preference for utilitarian reasons. To be sure, NATO was not initially considered as the appropriate institutional venue, but was considered as such later on when the ‘lead nation’ model with a 6-month rotation proved too cumbersome and complicated. The use of NATO was also problematic in terms of employing NATO in an out-of-area operation in Afghanistan (Interview with policy analyst, 10 June 2005), and by restrictions on NATO’s geographic scope that had to be debated and changed by the members of the alliance before consenting to an out-of-area mission (Interview with former German official, 9 February 2006). Besides the emphasis on the individual national contributions made by Germany and other lead nations, the debate over a NATO command, and a German lead, for ISAF emerged. In practice, however, NATO had already played a supportive role during the German/Dutch lead of ISAF, and it was more a question of showing a NATO flag in
a new geographic and geo-strategic environment rather than a far-reaching change to the operation itself (Interview with former German official, 8 February 2006).

This demonstrates that alliance politics considerations also played a part in German decision-making. Minister of defence Struck did suggest a take-over of NATO after the German/Dutch lead of ISAF ended in August 2003 after a meeting of NATO defence ministers in Warsaw on 24 September 2002 (Agence France Presse, 24 September 2002), and NATO subsequently decided to lead ISAF in April 2003 and NATO assumed ISAF command on 11 August 2003. This was because the ‘lead nation’ model did not prove useful in the reconstruction of ISAF: not only was it a big job logistically but it was also hard to secure a follow-up lead nation. A former official from the Ministry of Defence stated that the UK spent 9 rather than the initial 6 months as lead nations due to difficulties in finding a replacement – and Germany had similar problems (Interview with former German official, 8 February 2006). Anchoring ISAF in NATO, therefore, was a way to provide institutional continuity.

Germany, then, insisted on the deployment of NATO as much out of utilitarian reasons as of a transatlantic preference, and against initial considerations of expanding NATO area of operations. Given the operational necessities, NATO was considered the most appropriate institutional venue for the task at hand, and the relevance of NATO in a post-11 September environment considered important. German insistence on a role for NATO in ISAF demonstrates that alliance politics considerations explain decisions taken with respect to the institutional anchoring of NATO.

In the case of German participation in ISAF, the evidence on the Europeanization and alliance politics hypotheses is mixed. There is limited evidence of Europeanization in German foreign policy decision-making and the fact that an
EU-coordinated force was discussed. This does suggest that the EU CFSP was of some salience to German policy makers. However, the salience of the EU agenda was weighed against alliance politics considerations and, given the lack of interest in an EU-coordinated mission by other EU and NATO allies and domestic objections on the part of the Federal Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence, did not lead to further attempts to push for an EU force. This suggests that the interest in an EU-coordinated force on the part of Germany was not sufficiently strong to begin with, and the tension between the EU and NATO/transatlantic alliance framework not significant enough for Germany to more forcefully push for an EU-coordinated force in ISAF. In the end, alliance politics considerations, in particular those of the utility of NATO instruments as well as a transatlantic preference, determined the outcome of the policy choices.

V. Conclusion
The argument put forth in this chapter is that German policy decisions in the case of Afghanistan were motivated by three separate and only partially linked priorities: to assert national weight ('normalisation') in the changed global landscape and to increase the scope of action where military action outside NATO borders was concerned; to show solidarity with the US following the terrorist attacks on 11 September but to also multi-lateralize policy responses especially military contributions under NATO for mainly utilitarian reasons; and to create a political space and role for the EU CFSP and to use it to advance Germany's policy positions and global standing. Other than in the case of FYROM, German policy decisions towards the war in Afghanistan exhibit signs of Europeanization understood as national adaptation as well as projection: while the European agenda remained salient for the sake of strengthening the CFSP, the EU CFSP was also used as a platform to
increase national influence on an EU level. On a political level, the EU CFSP was considered, and ended up playing a significant part in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and in coordinating the political and military contributions of the EU member states. This was done in large part at Germany’s behest, supporting the conclusion that the EU CFSP agenda was of high salience to German policy makers and that Germany projected national policy preferences on to the EU level. When it came to military contributions, however, transatlantic solidarity and pragmatism won out over giving the ESDP a military role to play, or of going as far as labelling individual member states’ contributions as an EU force. The focus instead was to show solidarity with the US, and to eventually push for a NATO mandate for ISAF in order to ease the logistical burden on the individual ISAF lead nations. Unlike in the case of FYROM, ESDP was not considered as an option in the future, both out of consideration of the lack of institutional capability but of transatlantic considerations.

This leads to the conclusion that German foreign policy decisions in the war in Afghanistan were not dominated by considerations of Europeanization where the military contributions are concerned, although empirical evidence of Europeanization exists that points to a salience of the European agenda. Alliance politics, and solidarity with the US were of primary importance in the military management of the crisis; however, responses were not located in NATO specifically. The chapter therefore concludes that the amount of space afforded to the EU CFSP, and Europeanization considerations, were restricted and largely determined by US preferences where military operations were concerned – therefore, the Europeanization framework is not appropriate to explain all major aspects of German political decision-making with regard to the war in Afghanistan, even if evidence of Europeanization exists with respect to the political aspects of Afghanistan’s
reconstruction. A role for the EU CFSP was important, and pursued by German policy makers, even if it was not the only or the first priority when determining policy choices. But, neither is the alliance politics framework and appropriate explanatory framework for all three decision points. This is because considerations of national prestige and the insistence on a broader UN framework also played a role in the decision-making in this case.
Chapter 6. France and the crisis in FYROM

I. Introduction

This chapter shows that France took a lead role in shaping the EU crisis management response in FYROM and attempted to carve out a stronger role for the EU CFSP, including ESDP. This applies both to the management of the crisis as well as the post-crisis period, where France initiated a discussion of the ESDP take-over of the NATO Operation. What was later to become Operation Concordia had symbolic value both for the application of EU crisis management tools as well as for member states vested in the development of the EU ESDP and its application, particularly in the Western Balkans. This position is consistent with past French policy behaviour and preferences towards matters relating to the development of ESDP and EU crisis management in general and in the Balkans in particular, where France has consistently pushed for greater EU involvement, and now for a greater role for the EU CFSP and ESDP. Paris pursued its influence by means of initiating discussions and suggestions for policy actions on the crisis in the framework of Franco-German summits, but also by initiating a meeting of the Contact Group in Paris. The appointment of former Minister of Defence François Léotard as EU Special Representative also indicates that France sought to increase French power and influence within the EU in the political negotiation of the crisis. Although the initial suggestion for an ESDP mission had to be abandoned because of opposition from other member states to any initiative outside the NATO framework in the absence of a formal agreement over EU access to NATO assets, it provided the impetus for a broader discussion and eventual realisation of the ESDP take-over from NATO. Finally, the lack of domestic debate on the matter of an EU force or the nature of French involvement in FYROM reflects a general French preference, and a broad
consensus, for a stronger EU role in political and military crisis management. The chapter therefore concludes that French foreign policy in this case exhibits strong evidence of Europeanization. However, France's initial emphasis on the involvement of NATO and the US in regional security matters as well as the use of the Contact Group also points towards evidence of alliance politics.

II. Policy area 1: Support for the EU CFSP in the political negotiations

The nature of French interest in FYROM stems exclusively from political considerations on the country's importance for regional stability and European security. Unlike EU member states geographically closer to the Western Balkans, such as Germany, there was little concern over a large number of refugees making their way to France in case of another outbreak of large-scale violence. French involvement in the crisis in FYROM is thus best understood in light of previous engagements in the Balkans from the early 1990s and in terms of the significance of EU crisis management instruments located in CFSP and ESDP in FYROM as well as for the future course of developments of EU crisis management in the Balkans and beyond.

France from the beginning of the crisis supported a strong role for the EU, and initially emphasized the commitment for the territorial integrity of FYROM. The key participants with respect to this policy area were President Chirac and Foreign Minister Védrine. At the Quai d'Orsay, the director of Strategic Affairs, Gerard Araud, was also an important figure as he was involved in shaping policies towards FYROM, particularly the decision to appoint a French national as EU Special Representative (Interview with French official, 8 September 2005). There was thus a
common objective for the EU CFSP to take a lead role and to establish the EU as a foreign policy actor among key participants in the French government.

Given the central role played by the US in the previous conflicts in the Balkans, coordination with the US was regarded as important on the part of Paris. This applies also with respect to the second policy area, given French military engagement in the region, but is relevant in the negotiation phase as well. Chirac also pursued political initiatives in the framework of the Contact Group, and initiated a meeting in Paris on April 11 to discuss the general situation in the Balkans. While the EU line on FYROM – favouring political dialogue – was relatively uncontroversial, other issues, such as Kosovo or the potential secession of Montenegro from Serbia had more weight. The use of the Contact Group format was sure to include Russia and the US in the discussion on the future of the region, and constituted another effort to keep the US involved. In a statement issued after the talks members of the Contact Group called for restraint on the part of the government, to condemn extremism for the ethnic Albanians, and affirmed their commitment to maintain the territorial integrity of FYROM (Washington Post, 12 April 2001). This shows that the involvement of the US, and therefore alliance politics considerations, was an important political consideration on the part of the French leadership as well.

France also pursued bilateral relations with FYROM in support of the French and European position. For instance, Macedonian President Trajovski visited France on 28 February 2001 to draw attention to his country’s situation and to demand more efforts on the part of KFOR to secure the borders between Kosovo and FYROM. On this occasion President Chirac stated that France ‘condemns, without reservation, the terrorist acts and we cannot accept these’ (Chirac, 1 March 2001). After the onset of the crisis in 2001, French officials used these visits to support the EU position on
territorial integrity and to council restraint from the part of the Macedonian
government in dealing with the ethnic Albanian rebels. In addition to a policy of
stabilization, Chirac also affirmed to President Trajkovski that FYROM should have
a European vocation, which showed a general preference for Europeanising the
Balkans and the eventual goal of EU membership stating that France ‘of course
supports the association between the Republic of Macedonia and the European
Union’ (Chirac, 1 March 2001).

This section has shown that key members of the French government sought to
play a lead role in European efforts in the negotiation of the crisis. France did so in
particular through the Franco-German relationship, through which a number of policy
initiatives were generated. In addition, Paris also sought to increase its own national
standing within the EU through the appointment of a EUSR who, on French
insistence, led to the appointment of a French national. But, France sought to play a
key role in the crisis through the Contact Group and to retain US and Russian
involvement in the crisis. With respect to this particular policy area there is no
evidence of domestic differences between the Elysee and the Quai d’Orsay as to the
nature and the means to pursue French interests in the crisis. The next section will
analyse in more detail the extent to which French foreign policy in the case can be
said to have been ‘Europeanized’.

Europeanization

This section shows that French foreign policy decisions with respect to the support
for the EU CFSP in the political negotiations exhibit evidence of Europeanization.
The EU was regarded as a platform to enhance French influence, and the EU agenda

69 This confirms the cohesion of the French policy (and intellectual) elites – and the concentration of
power and influence at the centre, the Presidency and the Quai d’Orsay in particular (see Niblett, 2001
and Blunden, 2000).
in this crisis was of high salience. French policy decisions and the underlying motivations behind them therefore support indicators of Europeanization that point towards adaptation and projection. First, the salience of the EU agenda was high in this case and policy elites favoured the application of CFSP instruments; second, the EU was used as a platform in an attempt to increase national influence; third, and related, the EU was used as a cover to initiate policies on the domestic or international level. Paris did pursue national policy preferences – to maintain a high French profile in the management of the crisis – through initiating policy through the EU CFSP.

As for the salience of the EU agenda, an official in the Quai d'Orsay stated that 'France is implicated in the EU CFSP where national action is subsumed in a European framework. Since Dayton, EU policy action in the Balkans is an illustration of what the EU should do and how it should use its instruments, civil and military tools, first and second pillar instruments' (Interview with French official, 12 August 2005). This implies a general salience of the EU agenda in French politics towards the Western Balkan region to begin with; and later conditioned French responses to the crisis itself. In practical terms this is evident from French initiatives, together with Germany, to propose policies for the EU to adopt and to use the EU as a platform for statements in support of the Macedonian government.

Within the European framework, President Chirac pursued a number of political initiatives in particular through bilateral cooperation with Germany. This is consistent with the argument that France has consistently ‘pursued the idea of Europe as a political as well as an economic force by means of a special relationship with
Germany' (Blunden, 2000: 19). The crisis in FYROM and how to respond to it was on the agenda in bilateral meetings during the French-German Herxheim summit in Germany on 20 March 2001. Both Chirac and Schröder emphasised that territorial integrity was not to be put in question, certainly not by Albanian 'terrorists', appealed to both parties to stop the violence, and to the Macedonian government to find a political solution and welcomed the fact that the government has adopted an open position with regards to minority rights (Chirac and Schröder, 20 March 2001). At the suggestion of Chirac, both countries also suggested that it would be a positive step to have the Macedonian President address the European Council on the situation in FYROM, a suggestion that was subsequently taken up by the Swedish EU Presidency, as mentioned in chapter 3. At the press conference following the European Council, Chirac emphasized that 'we (the Council), notably France, have encouraged the Macedonian authorities to deepen their political dialogue and their inter-ethnic cooperation, meaning their effort at better integration of the Albanian-speaking community in Macedonia' (Chirac, 24 March 2001). In addition to demonstrating the salience of the EU agenda in French foreign policy, this statement also serves to underline national influence on the formulation of European policies.

With respect to French-British relations, by contrast, the situation in FYROM was not discussed during the annual Anglo-French summit on 9 February 2001, although European defence was an item on the agenda: while France and Britain had pioneered the idea of a European rapid reaction force, there was a divergence of views on the degree of independence between EU decision-making and that of

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Although the French/German relationship was strongest during the Mitterand/Kohl period and has weakened since Chirac coming to power in 1996 and Schröder in 1998 (see Blunden, 2000), it nevertheless continues to serve as an important political platform, as the crisis in FYROM demonstrates.
NATO, indicating the conceptual differences between the two countries with respect to European autonomous action (BBC News, 9 February 2001).71

The salience of the EU agenda is also evident from a statement made by François Léotard looking back on his appointment where he said that ‘Europe’s leadership (in the negotiation of the crisis) is uncontested’ (Assemblée Nationale, 23 October 2001). The fact that Léotard at the same time expressed disappointment that the mainly European peacekeepers were deployed under a NATO rather than an EU label, indicates the salience of the European agenda in French domestic politics with respect to this as well as the third policy area. More generally the view on the crisis in FYROM, applied to both the first as well as the third policy area was that ‘the EU must be ready, Europe must be an actor, when possible it must act. It’s the French European method: to push the agenda, and if we can show that the EU is an actor we should show that the EU can do it alone’ (Interview with French official, 8 July 2005).

With respect to the second indicator of Europeanization, the use of the EU platform in an attempt to increase national influence is evident from the use of the Franco-German relationship to initiate EU-wide policies such as inviting President Trajkovski to the Gothenburg summit and the appointment of an EU Special Representative. It is even more evident from the lobbying for the appointment of a French national who served as Minister of Defence during the 1990s: based on his past experience and statute he was sure to be able to use the EU platform to increase

71 In addition, the Anglo-French summit to be hosted by France in December 2002 had to be postponed after a spat between Blair and Chirac at the EU summit in Brussels in October 2002 (The Guardian, 29 October 2002). This supports the argument that French suggestions for a military role for the EU fell victim to a cooling of British-French relations following the St. Malo process (Howorth 2003-04: 176). While the content of the meetings as well as the personal animosity between Blair and Chirac is more relevant to explain policy outcomes with respect to policy area 3, it is cited here because it serves to underline the strength and the centrality of the Franco-German relationship in decision-making with respect to the EU CFSP.
French visibility and influence in EU foreign policy and to pursue national as well as European efforts and policy ideas. The last point, that of initiating policies became increasingly important during the debates over ESDP, as the discussion of the third policy area will show. But, by appointing a high profile French national to work alongside Javier Solana, France was able to actively shape EU negotiations in this case. This is also confirmed by a member state official who stated that ‘Léotard had a strong personality, and frequently did manage to eclipse Solana’ (Interview with German official 1 September 2005). This suggests that Léotard did not strictly adhere to his mandate of acting ‘under the authority of the High Representative’ (Council of the European Union, 29 June 2001). Lastly, the fact that ‘given the urgency of the situation, and exceptionally, most administrative expenditure of the Special Representative shall be covered by France’ (Council of the European Union, 29 June 2001) suggest that Léotard’s, similar to that of Klaus-Peter Klaiber in the case of Afghanistan - was at least as much a national as a European appointment.

Foreign Minister Védrine and the Director of Strategic Affairs at the time, Gerard Araud, were keen on appointing a French national as EU Special Representative in order to increase French influence on EU policies (Interview with French official, 8 September 2006) – an idea that also originated in discussions between France and Germany. The emphasis on the appointment of a French national shows that strengthening the voice of the EU in the negotiation phase was a priority, but equally that national projection, and French influence in the EU negotiations, was important. At the General Affairs Council on 25 June, Javier Solana nominated François Léotard as EU Special Representative who worked alongside his American counterpart James Pardew in the political negotiation of the crisis (Council of the European Union, 18 April 2002). This was done on French suggestion and serves as
an indication of French interest in a high profile role in the crisis in FYROM. The argument that appointing a French national served to increase national influence on EU policies is supported by the fact that, the appointment of Special Representatives is important for taking national influence and to improve a deficit position in a particular policy field (Interview with German official, 8 August 2005). A member state official interviewed accordingly stated that one additional consideration in this particular case could have been –apart from a general desire for French influence in the crisis in FYROM- that the French profile in the Balkans was relatively low compared to other EU member states: Sir Paddy Ashdown, a UK diplomat, was High Representative in Bosnia, Germany had played a visible role through initiating the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe in 1999 and through the appointment of Michael Steiner as UN administrator of Kosovo and Bodo Hombach as the Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact, which meant that France had not been as strongly represented on such a high level (Interview with German official, 8 August 2005).

At the press conference following the General Affairs Council on 25 June, Védrine stated that ‘on our behalf, Javier Solana has been constantly toing and froing. So there were only two practical ways to ensure completely effective European Union action. Either Mr Solana had to spend all his time doing that (...) or we had to find a European Union representative to complement and build on Mr Solana’s efforts under his authority. This is an idea Joschka Fischer and I had, following which France took the initiative in Göteborg of proposing a name. President Chirac and the Prime Minister agreed that it should be François Léotard; the discussion of the past few days was on this point’. On the selection of Léotard, Védrine stated that he was the appropriate choice because ‘there’s a need, given the situation’s complexity, for a politician with experience of such complexity. And having been Defence Minister at
a time when the Balkans issue, in the broad sense of the term, was already very much a matter of concern, François Léotard is familiar with these issues’ (Védrine, 25 June 2001). Léotard was replaced by Alain Leroy in October 2001\textsuperscript{72}, following Léotard’s early resignation after the rejection of his proposal (BBC News, 10 September 2001).

There is little effort of policy adaptation, however: France did not adhere to common policy objectives over other considerations and preferences. Paris also did not explicitly equate national with European preferences with respect to the case of FYROM, although members of the French policy elite have on other occasions made general comments on the effect of Europe on national foreign policy and vice versa: in the view of Foreign Minister Védrine, for instance, Europe’s role is to organize the convergence of state policies and each foreign minister will have to merge national with the growing “European interest”. While Védrine does acknowledge that ‘a larger Europe will not be France writ large’ he is confident in French strength to belief that ‘this mix of national self-assertion and cooperation is satisfying’ (cited in Hoffman, 2001: 140). This in turn indicates an elite consensus with respect to France’s role in the EU and by extension, the world, which is also reflected in the academic literature on French foreign policy. For instance, Treacher (2001: 153) argues that French leaders ‘have aimed to preserve France’s international rang\textsuperscript{73} by raising the collective stock of Europe (...). Europe is required to function as a multiplier for French power’. This is reflected in French policy initiatives with respect to FYROM, where France did assume a lead role in formulating and initiating policies adopted under the

\textsuperscript{72} While Alain Leroy is also French, his appointment had less to do with increasing national influence but with Leroy’s previous experience in the Balkans following missions in Bosnia and Kosovo where he had worked with Javier Solana, who suggested his appointment (Interview with French official, 8 September 2005; Agence France Presse, 8 October 2001). Still, his predecessor was pleased ‘that it has been a Frenchman who had been chosen to succeed him’ (Assemblée Nationale, 23 October 2001) – indicating a preference for a strong French role and representation in FYROM on the part of at least one government official.

\textsuperscript{73} The pursuit of France’s international position –its rang (rank)- lies at the heart of French foreign policy; both for seeking prestige as an end in itself as well as affirming France’s influence in the international system (Macleod, 2001: 144; see also Grosser, 1995).
EU CFSP and negotiations conducted by representatives of the EU CFSP. Appointing a French national to conduct these negotiations, lastly, ensured influence on the EU CFSP.

The crisis in FYROM had symbolic value for the EU and its new crisis management tools. Given French preferences for a greater role for the EU in matters of security, the application of tools located within the EU CFSP/ESDP was quite important. In addition to taking a lead role in the EU CFSP through pushing for the appointment of a French EU Special Representative, Paris also sought to maintain national influence with respect to the management of the crisis by participating in the Contact Group, and by taking a lead within the EU in the initiation of policy proposals within the Franco-German summits. As in the case of Germany, the use of the Contact Group weakens the Europeanization hypothesis because it indicates considerations that support the alliance politics hypothesis and the role of the US in the mediation of the crisis—in addition to preserving national influence on the outcome of the negotiations.

Alliance Politics

French foreign policy with respect to this policy area also exhibits some evidence of alliance politics, in particular the aim of keeping the US involved in European security. This is evident from visits to the US where the crisis in FYROM and American commitment to the Balkans more generally was discussed, and from the initiation of meetings of the Contact Group as forum of negotiations. Rather than a fundamental transatlantic preference, however, the underlying motivation for cooperation and for involving the US best fits the indicator of utilitarian reasons for involving the US.
The crisis in FYROM coincided with the new Republican administration under George W. Bush, who had campaigned on pulling US troops out of the Balkans (Daalder, 2001). During Hubert Védrine’s visit to Washington in 26 March 2001, the first after the new administration had taken office, the crisis in FYROM was discussed. Védrine warned the US against removing troops from the region, and from disengaging from the Balkans. In press statements following his meeting with Colin Powell, Védrine emphasized that the French and the EU position were close to that of the US: to assist Macedonian armed forces, and to pursue goals unilaterally but also through NATO. This shows that there was a strong interest on the part of France in keeping the US involved in the Western Balkans in general, and FYROM in particular.

France also pushed for action on the part of KFOR to secure the borders, and initially was in favour of extending KFOR’s mandate to extend to FYROM. To illustrate, during his visit to the US, foreign minister Védrine stated that ‘we are keen to cooperate much and as well as we can in a whole series of areas’ including FYROM, and ‘we want to work together to find the solution to these problems, point by point, crisis by crisis (...). We wish to do so in a spirit of friendly, frankness and very open, intense and dynamic cooperation’ (Védrine, 26 March 2001). Other than in the case of the UK or Germany, where cooperation with the US in this case has tended to be phrased in terms of a general transatlantic preference with an emphasis on the centrality of US-German/British relations, Védrine’s phrasing does indicate neither blanket support for the US nor a fundamental transatlantic preference for resolving regional security issues. Instead, it reinforces the conclusion that the pursuit of a public profile for France the EU CFSP was of importance to French decision-makers in this case.
The analysis has shown that while there is evidence of Europeanization in this particular policy area, the use of parallel platforms of negotiations and the aim of retaining national influence mean that the pressure to adapt to any EU policy was low as France was quite influential in shaping policies both at the European level and in the framework of the Contact Group. Most evidence of Europeanization also points towards France using the EU platform for either leading in the formulation of EU responses through Franco-German summits in particular; or by successfully lobbying for the appointment as a high profile French national as EU Special Representative. France was also keen on involving and cooperating with the US in the crisis in order to ensure a peaceful outcome. This supports the alliance politics framework. Unlike Germany, however, the preference attached to the US was not framed as one of shared values or an instinctive transatlantic preference, but on account of utilitarian considerations. Continued US involvement in European security was regarded as important for stabilising the Balkans, including FYROM.

III. Policy area 2: Participation in NATO Operation Essential Harvest

This section shows that French foreign policy with respect to the involvement in NATO Operation Essential Harvest exhibits evidence of alliance politics, primarily for the indicator of utilitarian reasons. The analysis of preferences of key participants in governmental process show that, as in the first policy area, Paris was keen to build on its previous investment in FYROM and the Western Balkans more generally. With respect to French participation in NATO Operation Essential Harvest, this applies mostly to French military investment through NATO and bilateral military assistance rather than initiatives undertaken under the EU CFSP. In contrast to the two other countries analyzed in this thesis, France is not a member of the NATO Central
Military Command but under President Chirac has normalised its relations with the alliance and has begun to reintegrate into the military structure of the Alliance in order to allow for French participation in combined operations in Bosnia under NATO command (Lansford, 2002: 128). This illustrates the difficult position of France vis-à-vis NATO and indicates utilitarian rather than fundamental preferences in the choice for NATO as well as French preferences for an early (and autonomous) ESDP take-over analyzed in the third policy area. As in the first policy area, there is no evidence of a general transatlantic preference or the aim of keeping the US involved in European security beyond utilitarian reasons.

The key participants in this policy area were President Chirac, Foreign Minister Védrine and Minister of Defence Alain Richard. President Chirac participated in the international decision-making on a military intervention through NATO, EU and bi-lateral initiatives with Germany. Whereas there is no evidence of a fundamental disagreement over the use of NATO instruments as opposed to those located in the EU CFSP/ESDP, Chirac took pains to point out European cooperation within the NATO operation and to emphasize French national contributions – reinforcing the conclusion of France maintaining its rang and international status through the use of multilateral institutions (Treacher, 2003). Védrine was present in the French-German summit where Léotard’s proposal was first discussed. Richard, lastly, as head of armed forces oversaw the actual military deployments.

As in the case of the first policy area, the Franco-German relationship proved a key platform for negotiating the terms of French (and German) engagement in the NATO Operations. At the summit in Freiburg on 12 June, Chirac’s suggestion on

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74 Beyond Bosnia, Chirac’s move was also motivated by the realisation that ‘the French had to be on the inside of all aspects of NATO to have any real influence in the Europe of the future (...)' (Treacher, 2001:35). France came back to NATO because the organization had become a central security institution after the end of the Cold War. French policy makers, then, belatedly adjusted to geopolitical transformations (Menon, 1995).
military cooperation with German units within NATO was confirmed by Schröder and put in place by the foreign and defence ministers of the two countries on July 5. Both countries cooperated in NATO Operation Essential Harvest - two German, two French and one Spanish companies were placed under overall French command (NATO, 16 December 2002). The two countries at the foreign minister level also discussed Léotard’s proposal for an EU force in Berlin on 5 September, although Foreign Minister Fischer did not endorse the plan but preferred an international force backed by a UN mandate (Financial Times, 6 September 2001). As has been shown in chapter 4, Germany’s position, although in principle in favour of the creation of ESDP and autonomous capabilities as well as a gradually expanding role for the EU CFSP and ESDP in the Balkans, depended to a great extent on the position of the US and on clearly defined arrangements between the EU and NATO on the use of assets. This indicated to French officials that the timing for the ESDP takeover was too early, and required further negotiations within the Franco-German alliance as well as the EU more broadly.

Europeanization

As is to be expected, there is little evidence of the Europeanization framework as policy decisions concerning French military commitments involved NATO, not the EU. As a result, the indicators of Europeanization developed in chapter 2 do not apply to the empirical material presented with respect to this particular policy area, as the use of instruments located within EU CFSP/ESDP was not considered. As is evident from the statements of Alain Richard and Jacques Chirac cited in the previous section, however, French official frequently framed the NATO Operation as a ‘European action’ and a demonstration that Europe could act, even if an operation
under the EU label had not yet materialized. This reflects a general and fundamental preference towards an EU approach, including the application of instruments located in the EU CFSP/ESDP. This preference is also reflected in the close Franco-German coordination on a military level even if this was not subsumed under an EU label. In addition, as chapter 4 has shown, the close military coordination with the French made the German military deployment more acceptable in Berlin.

Alliance Politics

This section argues that a number of indicators of alliance politics are applicable with respect to the second policy area. First, as in the first policy area, France had an interest in keeping the US involved in European security – in particular because the incoming Bush administration had made it clear that it did not favour continued US deployment in the Balkans. This affirms the first indicator of alliance politics, where states align with NATO and the US to keep the US involved in European security. Second, and partly as a result, there were utilitarian considerations at play as well. NATO, based on its military possibilities and by virtue of already being in the area, was considered the more appropriate political and military institutions with respect to Operation Essential Harvest. However, this does not extend to the question of the extension of NATO Operation Essential Harvest, as the analysis in the third and final policy area will show.

Chirac’s input in decision-making on the international and NATO level built on previous French involvement as France through NATO, which had been active in FYROM prior to the onset of the crisis due to its commitment in KFOR. A French general, Marcel Valentin, had lead the extraction force XFOR in FYROM in 1999 that was charged with protection the first deployments of KFOR in Kosovo. General
Valentin was later given the command over KFOR, the first time a French general had been placed at the head of the entire KFOR mission rather than a particular sector – in the case of France this had been Mitrovica (Interview with policy analyst, 10 June 2005). Chirac accordingly highlighted French contributions and the situation in FYROM in his address to the NATO North Atlantic Council meeting where he stated that ‘with regard to the Balkans, and as a French general prepares to take over command of the KFOR, I would like to mention the dangers of the crisis affecting Macedonia (...). We must state clearly that we will not accept a new outbreak of violence (...) we must not preclude any form of actions needed to thwart such developments’ (Chirac, 13 June 2001). This shows that the priority of Chirac was to highlight France’s national commitments within NATO rather than moves to work outside the NATO framework. It also confirms two indicators of alliance politics: first, that of preference given to NATO for utilitarian reasons: NATO was considered the appropriate resource for reasons of prior involvement in the region. Second, that of preference given to NATO as an institutional forum – France considered NATO as the primary forum for the solution of the crisis.

With respect to specific decisions and suggestions put forward within NATO, France initially suggested KFOR’s mandate should be changed to operate in FYROM in order to resolve the crisis. Alain Richard confirmed on 27 June that France was to contribute several hundred soldiers to the British-led mission, where, on 20 June Donald Rumsfeld had let it be understood that the European could keep this operation among themselves in light of Republican opposition in the Senate against direct engagement in the conflict. Alain Richard stated that ‘the operations in Macedonia are the first ones carried out and practically led exclusively by Europeans within the Alliance (...) which shows us that Europe is both politically and militarily ready to
act’ (Richard, 2 October 2001). This again signals agreement on the part of key participants in the French government. As in the first policy area, there is no evidence of fundamental disagreement on the policy objective of French military lead in the NATO Operation with respect to NATO Operation Essential Harvest. The decision to participate in the NATO Operation, moreover, was uncontested among the participants involved.

With respect to the second policy area, the empirical evidence supports the alliance politics model more than it does the Europeanization model. France considered NATO the appropriate forum for the launch of Operation Essential Harvest, and contributed sizably to the mission. Although some members of the French government were keen to label this effort as proof of European capabilities and cooperation, these forces were under NATO command. This runs counter to the European hypothesis but confirms analyses of French post-Cold War foreign policy that stress France’s turn to multilateralism for the purpose of maintaining French influence (Macleod, 1999). It also confirms the assessment of an interviewee who stated that ‘France is more pragmatic towards NATO than it is given credit for. We will not stand in the way if NATO is the smarter solution’ (Interview with policy analyst, 10 June 2005).

IV. Policy area 3: The politics of the ESDP takeover from NATO

This section demonstrates that French policy decisions exhibit significant evidence of Europeanization, both in terms of a fundamental European preference but also by using the EU as a platform to push for the realization of national policy preferences. Consequently, the EU was of high political salience as a platform. France also adapted its policy preferences for autonomy from NATO to accommodate the
progress and eventual use of ESDP instruments. Unsurprisingly, there is little evidence of alliance politics in this case.

The key participants in this policy area involve EUSR Léotard, President Chirac, the Quai d'Orsay led by Védrine and the Ministry of Defence under Alain Richard. Within the French government structure, the Quai d'Orsay in particular was influential in pushing for an ESDP take-over. As for the Ministry of Defence, their influence is usually less pronounced in contrast to the President and the Foreign Ministry (Blunden, 2000). Within the Ministry of Defence, the Délégation aux affaires stratégiques (DAS) under Marc Perrin de Brichambaud was quite influential although subordinated to the Quai d'Orsay (Interview with former German official, 8 February 2006). But, as far as the different branches of government were concerned, they were in agreement on the desirability of an ESDP take-over.

The suggestion for an ESDP take-over from NATO first arose from a proposal by EU Special Representative Léotard. Although the EU Special Representative does not serve in a national capacity but is to act on behalf of the EU, Léotard's proposal for an EU force to take over from NATO in particular was said to have the backing of the French government. This also indicates that the motivations behind the proposal reflected France's position on the issue of an EU takeover of the NATO mission in FYROM, and towards ESDP in general. All key participants in the governmental process supported an early handover from NATO to ESDP, and did not regard prior institutional arrangements between NATO and the EU as a prerequisite for the application of instruments located in ESDP. The next section will confirm in more detail that the Europeanization approach indeed explains French foreign policy behaviour.
French actions and policy decisions confirm a number of indicators of the Europeanization hypothesis. The salience of the European agenda was high. This is demonstrated by France initiating the process through the initial suggestion in September 2001, and by the importance attached to the application of instruments located in the EU CFSP and ESDP. In fact, with respect to FYROM, the French position was to switch as much as possible over from NATO to EU, 'because we have a policy in the Balkans, the EU is active in the Balkans, so the rationale was to take over – we decided to have ESDP and should be ready for an operation in the Balkans' (Interview with French official, 20 June 2005). French interest in an ESDP mission subsequently arose because at the time there was a trend towards a step-by-step increase of EU activities in the Balkans, plus a gradual disengagement of the US (Interview with French official, 29 June 2005).

Léotard's proposal arose out of the security vacuum left by Operation Essential Harvest: a conflict that was to break out after a NATO operation expired would likely be more dramatic than the one just behind. His proposal stated that if the member states are in agreement, and NATO gives its logistical support, it should be possible to deploy a European force of between 1500 and 2000 words to protect the EU and OSCE observers (Financial Times, 6 September 2001). Léotard's proposal stemmed from a consideration that was affirmed by a French official interviewed that 'we thought it would be possible to accomplish the task without NATO as it was a very small operation. From a military point of view, in the view of France, it was not necessary to use NATO but possible to put together an ad-hoc European-led group similar to Operation Alba in 1997' (Interview with French official 20 June 2005).
The finalization of the ‘Berlin-plus’ agreement was thus a political requirement from other members, notably Britain, rather than the reliance on ad hoc arrangements that Paris had in mind. Consequently, looking back on his appointment, Léotard stated that the cooperation with his American counterpart had been productive and that the US was conceding the EU the lead role in FYROM but noted that the EU was having difficulties to make visible its financial and economic lead role. He also expressed disappointment at not having succeeded in deploying the weapons collections mission under a European label, given that the forces were exclusively European, criticising aspirations of a Headline Goal for 60,000 forces in 2003 if the EU was incapable of sending 1500 troops in 2001 (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25 October 2001). This demonstrates that the preferences of the Foreign Ministry and the EUSR leaned towards the utilization of ESDP instruments. Neither of them considered institutional arrangements between the EU and NATO a prerequisite for launching an EU Operation, but the Foreign Ministry had to relent on this question on account of British and German opposition. As for the Ministry of Defence, Alain Richard ‘had looked at the EU side especially after Colin Powell indicated that there would be no problem if the EU wanted to step in’ (Interview with policy analyst, 10 June 2005). This shows that the views of the Ministry of Defence on this matter were identical with that of the Foreign Ministry.

The consensus of the different branches of government on this issue also indicates that policy elites favoured the application of ESDP instruments and thereby confirms the indicator of the existence of norms and preferences that point towards Europeanization. The stated preference among French elite was to gain European autonomy from NATO in the case of FYROM. One official interviewed stated ‘we thought at the beginning that it would be possible to do it without NATO because it
was a very small operation. And, in fact, from a military point of view it was not necessary to use NATO. But it was, let’s say, a political requirement from the British and other members (Interview with French official, 20 June 2005). This statement was echoed by a member of the French Ministry of Defence: ‘do not overestimate that the EU wasn’t ready, Europeans were able to do the job’ (Interview with French official, 11 July 2005). Also, an outside observer confirmed the existence of a national consensus and a homogenous public opinion on this issue: from the point of view of Paris, ‘NATO was in Kosovo, France supported this because it was necessary, but really this was seen as scandalous – it’s an old reflex; France is not pragmatic like the US or the UK, but orthodox’ (Interview with German official, 8 August 2005).

Finally, French policy decisions also reflected the relaxation of traditional positions to accommodate the progress of EU projects, in this case the first ESDP mission. In the face of British and German objections to ad-hoc arrangements between the EU and NATO, France compromised on its initial preference to push for European autonomy and for making NATO less relevant - in the view of one official ‘it had always been clear that it was really about these two issues’ (Interview with former German official, 8 February 2006). Finally, deteriorating relations between the UK and France on matters of ESDP may have contributed not only to France’s early push for an ESDP operation but also to the delay in the decision altogether as well as Paris’ compromise on the timing and shape of the ESDP mission. By the summer of 2001, France had –rightly or wrongly- concluded that the UK had given up on ESDP, and Marc Perrin de Brichambaud denounced the UK for destroying ESDP in October 2001, thereby provoking London (Interview with UK expert, 17 June 2005). Relations between Paris and London with respect to ESDP, therefore,
had reached a low point also on account of the fact that some of the UK officials working on ESDP had been rotated and the formerly good working relationship between France and the UK on this matter had deteriorated (Howorth 2004).

Alliance Politics

Given the overwhelming evidence of Europeanization in this particular policy area, it is perhaps not surprising that there are there is little evidence in French decision-making that would point towards alliance politics. In addition to the general absence of a fundamental transatlantic preference on the part of France, which has been evident from policy behaviour in the first two policy areas, NATO at least initially was not considered of utilitarian value in this case. The military operation was small enough for the EU member states to manage its execution on their own.

Following the rejection of Léotard’s proposal, Foreign Minister Védrine at the foreign minister meetings in Genval near Brussels stated that there should be an international force under a UN mandate. France preferred that NATO should remain to lead a military force to protect foreign observers in FYROM, rather than a UN force, which the Macedonian government preferred in order to dilute what it perceived as a pro-Albanian bias on the part of the West. Védrine then also rejected Léotard's proposal of an EU force, stating that ‘if the new European security and defence arrangements were organized enough for this mission, it would be a good idea. But because it isn’t quite ready yet, I think it is more sensible, easier and more practical to act in a NATO framework’ (Agence France Presse, 8 September 2001). This was also the rejection of an ad hoc coalition, and concessions in favour of clearly worked out institutional structures. Still, in principle, Védrine’s statement reflects a fundamental preference for an EU mission. And, Leotard’s resignation to
Solana on 10 September signalled the existence of disagreements in the EU and the NAC on further steps in FYROM after NATO completes Operation Essential Harvest, with a news agency citing French sources as noting that ‘NATO’s leadership preserves full political control over pursuing the West’s policy in the Balkans’ (ITAR-TASS News Agency, 10 September 2001). However, US logistical support supplied via a NATO base in FYROM, mostly transport and intelligence-gathering, was still crucial (The Economist, 15 September 2001). This then supports one indicator of alliance politics, that of NATO being given preference for utilitarian reasons – in absence of a consensus on the deployment of an ESDP operation.

The preferences of individual policy makers involved in this decision as well as their stated and underlying preferences thus demonstrate that French foreign policy with respect to the third policy area exhibits strong evidence of Europeanization: the EU ESDP was considered the appropriate political and military instrument for addressing the security vacuum resulting from the end of NATO Operation Essential Harvest. The fact that this consideration had its roots in the symbolism attached to an EU-label and the overall, often stated preferences, of developing the EU into a foreign and security policy actor, underlines the fundamental preference of French policy makers with respect to the application of instruments located in the EU CFSP/ESDP. Given British and German objection to this idea, French relenting to the Berlin Plus agreement and continued engagement of NATO can also be interpreted as national adaptation to make possible the progress on a European policy, even if this did not reflect original French preferences. Evidence of alliance politics is present only insofar as NATO was considered the appropriate institutional framework for utilitarian reasons, and after the initial suggestion of an ESDP operation had been rejected.
V. Conclusion

This chapter has shown that there is strong evidence of Europeanization of French foreign policy in this case. At the time, there was a trend towards a step-by-step increase of EU commitment in the Balkans, plus a gradual disengagement of the US in the region - with the exception of Kosovo and, to a lesser extent, Bosnia. The suggestion and subsequent debate over an EU rather than a NATO mission for FYROM reveals different national perceptions and preferences on ESDP. Whereas Britain insists on ESDP being as close as possible to NATO, for France this should be done only when necessary - 'and in the case of FYROM it did not seem to be necessary' (Interview with French official, 20 June 2005). The resulting French position was that the EU must be a security actor. Therefore, France pushed the agenda to show that the EU could do so and is an actor beyond the civil-political aspect of crisis management. For France, the crisis in FYROM was an opportunity to show that the Europeans could take responsibility both in terms of the success of the mission as well as through value added: an integration strategy as opposed to a purely military approach. The EU was the most powerful tool politically in FYROM, although the US helped – this was particularly important given the limited credibility of the EU on the ground. And, the risk of failure of an ESDP operation was low, given the small size of the mission and the conclusion of the Ohrid Peace Agreement and relatively successful implementation. France was the main contributor to Concordia with 193 men out of 424 in total, which was commanded by a French General, Maral.

In conclusion, France did use the EU CFSP in the crisis in FYROM as a platform to further its agenda for a larger role for the EU that would include military
operations, and to shape EU policies towards FYROM. The aim was also to capitalize on the St Malo process to hurry along the process - therefore the suggestion of an EU operation under ESDP. Also, the European perspective including eventual EU membership for the individual countries in the Western Balkans was gradually emerging for the region and broad parameters for region were thus being set. France tried to influence EU policy and increase its own profile in particular through the appointment of a Special Representative. Thus, there was a clear and early choice for Europe, including a military dimension, with broader regional view and the EU’s role in the region that affirms the applicability of the Europeanization concept to explain French policy choices.
Chapter 7. France and the war in Afghanistan

I. Introduction

This chapter argues that unlike the case of FYROM, where the Europeanization model offers a convincing explanatory framework for French decision-making, this does not apply in the case the war in Afghanistan. Instead, French reactions to the terrorist attacks on 11 September and the resulting military measures against Afghanistan were marked by a set of interrelated themes: military participation in the war in Afghanistan as a show both of solidarity with the US but also as an assertion of national influence and personal prestige on the part of President Chirac; a central role assigned to the UN and a fundamentally multilateral conception of the appropriate response to the fight against terrorism, the war and reconstruction of Afghanistan; the need for a broader ‘European’ counterterrorism strategy that involved EU CFSP and ESDP instruments; and domestic concerns over the impact of a war against Islamic terrorism in light of the size of the French Muslim population and French vulnerability to Islamic terrorism previous to 11 September (Assemblée Nationale, 12 December 2001: 47). The nature of the conflict, the privileged position of the UN as a multilateral forum to sanction the use of military force and to coordinate the reconstruction of the country, and the primacy of US preferences in what was perceived as a legitimate case of self-defence against a terrorist attack meant that the EU CFSP and ESDP did not hold as privileged a position in French political considerations as it did in the case of FYROM. As far as the European security architecture was concerned, the effects of 11 September were perceived as reinforcing the developments put in motion by the St. Malo process. However, ESPD was not advocated on the part of the French government or used as a political or military tool in the war against Afghanistan. There was no appetite for pushing for an
EU label in what was, essentially, a transatlantic moment and a conflict where a European approach was regarded as of little added value. Although the Europeanization approach does not lend itself for an explanation of France’s military contribution to the war on terror, it goes some way to explain decisions taken in the wider anti-terrorism campaign and in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Formulating an EU response to international terrorism and the war and reconstruction of Afghanistan was of salience, although these considerations do not apply to the military measures taken in the war in Afghanistan per se. While this weakens the Europeanization hypothesis in favour of the alliance politics model, neither of the two approaches can adequately account for the privileged role of the UN and the strong multilateral impulse in French national foreign policy in this case.

II. Policy area 1: OEF and the war on terror
This section argues that French contributions to OEF were motivated first and foremost by considerations of solidarity with the US. The alliance politics framework, understood as the recognition of the US’ right to self-defence in light of the terrorist attacks as well as the need for a transatlantic stance against international terrorism that included a military component, offers a strong explanation for French policies in this case. However, the alliance politics framework does not account for the strong multilateral impulse in French foreign policy in this case, which accorded a central role for the legal sanctioning of the intervention as well as measures against international terrorism more broadly to the United Nations. The role and visibility of the European Union did hold a prominent place in French political considerations as well, demonstrating that French moves to have the EU play a part in the political response to international terrorism support the Europeanization hypothesis – even if this does not apply to decisions concerning the military contributions to OEF itself.
Domestically, the impending elections in the first half of 2002 made the war in Afghanistan an important opportunity for elected members of the French government, notably President Chirac, to show public leadership in order to increase chances of re-election.

The key participants in this policy area involved President Chirac and Prime Minister Jospin as well as the foreign ministry under Hubert Védrine. Unlike in the case of FYROM, where there was broad consensus among the different branches of government on a strong French role, participation in OEF and the war on terror provided a key opportunity for Chirac to increase his personal profile vis-à-vis the centre-left government under Prime Minister Jospin in light of the impending elections in 2002. Domestic electoral concerns thus played a role in the presentation if not the formulation of these policies for the President, especially where military participation in OEF was concerned.

There were nuances among the key players in the French government in accenting the relative weight of the UN, solidarity with the US and the use of the European platform to negotiate solutions to international terror and coordinate military responses with its major EU allies. President Chirac equally highlighted French solidarity with the US and initiated the French lead in drafting a UNSC Resolution. Foreign Minister Védrine, on the other hand, emphasized multilateralism and the geographic restriction of military measures to Afghanistan. The Jospin government, lastly, was more critical of the US and military operations and highlighted the societal implications of the war on terror on the French Muslim population. However, the basic position of the centrality of the UN for legal sanctioning of the military measures against Afghanistan and for coordinating the subsequent reconstruction of the country; and of the need of solidarity – also due to
Invocation of Article V of the NATO treaty – with the US and the participation in military measures were shared among the relevant members of the French government and there was no significant friction.

While opinions on the appropriate response to the attacks, military participation in OEF sanctioned by a UN Security Council Resolution, was broadly shared among members of the French government, there were nuances in the positions and preferences of the key government figures. Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine in particular drew attention to concerns over US multilateralism à la carte and the potential geographic expansion of the military strikes to include Iraq, whereas president Chirac initially highlighted French solidarity with the US and military contributions to the US-led war on terror. This supports the argument that while France remains a strong ally of the US, it is equally ready to contest US domination and to assume the costs associated with such a policy (Tardy, 2003: 107). The importance of the UN as a means to multilateralize the war on terror and the significance of French efforts to that effect as a permanent member of the UN Security Council was shared by all members of the government, however, and reinforces the argument that maintaining global influence by means of multilateral institutions represents a key goal for France (Treacher, 2003).

Preferences on the part of the President, on the other hand, focussed on gaining personal clout domestically and internationally, and were weighed differently from that of the foreign minister, who was more vocal in his concern about formulating a multilateral approach to the fight against terrorism. Chirac’s personal standing through high profile visits and meetings also suggest that in addition to concerns over France’s global standing with respect to the US and the formulation to a political response to the war on terror, at least one initial instinct on the part of the French
President was to increase his personal standing publicly as well as internationally with regards to the US in addition rather than the preference for a particular institutional venue. Although the need for solidarity with the US was shared across the political spectrum and military contributions to the war against terror broadly supported domestically, the show of solidarity on the part of President Chirac resulted in accusations that Chirac was using this as a photo-op in light of impending elections, sideling other actors in the French government and the EU, including the EU Presidency, Belgium (BBC Monitoring Europe, 19 October 2001).

Prime Minister Jospin stated that while France would not ‘shirk its responsibilities’ it would reserve the right to make ‘a free judgment about French participation in a military engagement’ (cited in Gordon and Suzan, 2002:1). This also shows that while Jospin’s socialist government also broadly supported the war against terror, Jospin was more nuanced with respect to solidarity with the US. The French government was therefore careful not to frame the conflict as a clash of civilizations (Assemblée Nationale, 3 October 2001). For France, the future of Afghanistan and the international policy towards Afghanistan was also explicitly contingent on the broader geopolitical conditions that included Pakistan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia (Assemblée Nationale, 12 December 2001: 66).

France put 22 combat aircraft at the disposal at the US, and was the only other country besides the US to operate combat aircraft in Afghanistan, carrying out bombing missions as part of ‘Operation Anaconda’. France also made available the Charles de Gaulle carrier battle group (US Department of Defence, 14 June 2002). France also, together with Britain, provided special forces – but made clear in meetings with Blair that a wider war against terrorism involving Iraq and Egypt would be difficult to maintain in light of France’s historic links in the Middle East
and North Africa (The Observer, 23 September 2001), hinting early on French opposition to US plans to widen the scope of military attacks to Iraq, for instance. Accordingly, a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the question of US attacks on other countries said that ‘if the US asks for a strike elsewhere, we will have to retain our authority to consider it’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9 October 2001).

Following the change of government after the presidential elections in April and May 2002, French leadership became more outspoken against the geographical extension of the ‘war’ on terror to Iraq. The new foreign minister de Villepin stated that ‘no military action can be conducted without a Security Council decision. That's a principle from which France can't depart’ (de Villepin, 27 August 2002). Chirac explained the French position in an interview with the New York Times as based on the importance of multilateralism; prevention rather than preventative action; and emphasis on the negative repercussions of a war in Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Chirac, 8 September 2002). Although this does not apply to the war in Afghanistan directly, the two statements do illustrate that the President and the Foreign Ministry had come to pursue a similar political line on the war on terror following the presidential elections that emphasized the need for multilateral measures and a broader conception to the war on terror rather than a continued emphasis on solidarity with the US.

In addition to the military contributions to the war on terror and relations with the US, France also pursued policies through the UN, which was a vital platform for Paris to formulate multilateral policies towards OEF and the war in Afghanistan. The UNSC resolution 1368 sanctioning OEF and the toppling of the Taliban regime was a joint initiative of France and the UK (Chirac, 16 November 2001), initiated by Chirac.
in response to the attacks on 11 September as France held the rotating presidency in the UN Security Council that month (New York Times, 8 September 2002). This reflected the preference for a multilateral approach on the part of France and the search for a political solution to the fight against terrorism. It also affirms that the political priorities beyond solidarity with the US were a fundamental preference for multilateral solutions.

*Europeanization*

With regard to the military participation in OEF, there is only weak evidence of Europeanization of French foreign policy. As demonstrated in the preceding section, the primary impulse for French policy makers was that of solidarity with the US and the importance of a multilateral approach to the conflict. The UN constituted the most important multilateral forum to sanction military action against Afghanistan as well as political actions in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Considerations of the EU CFSP were subordinated to these fundamental impulses.

The use of the EU as a political platform resulted in charges of increasing Chirac’s personal profile in the run-up to the mini-summit in Ghent between France, Germany and Britain. The meeting was called by Chirac in order to discuss military contributions to the war on terror, a meeting that was also attended by Prime Minister Jospin. The tri-lateral meeting did not directly result in a policy proposal, and did nothing to further the appearance of EU unity: rather, the Ghent summit ‘was a disaster, with the Union appearing both marginalised and crippled by internal bickering. After the summit, the UK, France and Germany all insisted that the Taliban government had to be toppled, thus effectively disowning a common EU declaration advising that the West should not impose a government on Afghanistan’ (Peterson, 2002: 6). The Belgian EU Presidency was disappointed at the meeting and
critical of President Chirac who, 'presumably for electoral reasons' had publicized
the separate meeting – and in fact, since the attacks of 11 September and statements
and US visits by Chirac, his popularity had increased, while that of his rival, Lionel
Jospin, had fallen (BBC Monitoring Europe, 19 October 2001). Chirac attending
Blair’s Downing Street Dinner in early November 2001 similarly gave the impression
of EU disunity, although Peterson (2002: 6) notes that 'what matters most about the
meeting was its original purpose –to agree the essential points of a common European
line ahead of Chirac’s visit to Washington- and its success in agreeing such a line.'
Chirac did communicate to Bush that Europe supported two basic positions with
respect to Afghanistan: Europe would support the military campaign as long as it was
limited to Afghanistan, accompanied by a humanitarian aid effort and a post-Taliban
scenario agreed collectively by the Western allies; and the UN had to play a leading
role in post-war Afghanistan (Peterson 2002). This demonstrates that Chirac aimed
to speak for Europe, but also that formulating a European position was of importance
for the President. Nevertheless, this did not result in policies adopted under the EU
CFSP and illustrates the difference between a 'common' and a 'single' foreign policy
(Patten, 17 October 2001).

As in the case of FYROM, the Franco-German relationship as a means to
initiating policy proposals was a second platform for formulating French policy
responses within the EU CFSP. France together with Germany brought an action plan
to the Foreign Minister’s meeting in Luxemburg on October 8 with the aim to define
a EU position and to initiate an common political strategy for the EU. The final
statement subsequently read that ‘the military action being taken is one part of a
wider multilateral strategy in which the European Union is committed to playing its
part. This involves a comprehensive assault on the organisations and financing structures that underpin terrorism' (General Affairs Council, 8 October 2001).

This shows that the EU platform was used to submit proposals previously formulated with Germany, highlighting the role of bilateral relations with another member state. With respect to the underlying motivations these moves do serve as evidence of one indicators of Europeanization: that of the salience for the European agenda, where the application of EU CFSP instruments is deemed important on the part of policy decision makers.

Apart from these instrumental considerations with respect to the EU's role in the fight against terrorism, there is also some evidence of norms and preferences among elites that favoured if not the application of EU instruments then at least the progress of those instruments in light of the war in Afghanistan. This is apparent from concerns voiced over the fate of ESDP in light of changed geo-strategic realities: for instance, the fate of the nascent ESDP and the concept of l'Europe de la défense was of concern in the National Assembly insofar as the British contribution to the war in Afghanistan and the close position to the US in the emerging question of a conflict with Iraq could potentially put in question the concept of a European defence – an interpretation the government denied with reference to the Laeken summit where ESDP had been declared operational (Assemblée Nationale, 18 February 2002). The existence of such sentiments in turn demonstrates the centrality of ESDP and the concept of an autonomous defence in the wider governmental process, and the value and preferences attached to a European approach to security and defence.

However, the fact that EU action towards the war on terror did not go beyond statements of solidarity with the US and the conceptualization of a larger multilateral strategy in the war on terrorism through judicial means that were taken up by the
Spanish EU presidency in the first half of 2002, do not demonstrate evidence of the other indicators of Europeanization developed in chapter 2. Similarly, the mini-summits, although intended to co-ordinate activities of the big three member states, did not result in policies adopted under the EU CFSP. There is no evidence of France compromising on national considerations or preferences in order to adhere to common objectives, and the EU did not constitute a cover through which to pursue national objectives. Instead, while the European agenda was of some salience for French policy makers, and while the EU CFSP constituted an institutional platform through which to reinforce French national preferences, the EU was not considered the central political platform. Rather, this fell to the UN.

**Alliance Politics**

In contrast, alliance politics considerations, expressed as solidarity with the US and the recognition that this was essentially a US-led war, offer a convincing explanatory framework for French policy actions as they concern participation in OEF. The professed solidarity with the United States supports one indicator of alliance politics: that of states aligning with the US out of a transatlantic preference and solidarity with the US, which was reinforced by the invocation of article V. Importantly, however, this does not restrict itself to NATO as an institution exclusively but to US preferences on the nature of allies' contributions and French-American relations more broadly. The invocation of Article V of the NATO treaty made this a case of collective defence and a matter of alliance politics in the first place. It also made the military contribution to OEF uncontested. To illustrate, Mr. Valero of the Foreign Ministry was cited in the press as stating 'it's a case of legitimate self-defence, the Americans call the shots here' (The Irish Times, 6 March 2002).
Meetings between French and US officials following the attacks on 11 September provided one platform for negotiating French participation in the war on terror. President Chirac was the first head of state to visit Washington on 18 September where he declared French solidarity and offered military contributions to a US-led war against terrorism in Afghanistan. The emphasis on military assistance without 'a blank cheque' and the condition of France being consulted in advance about the objectives of military action (Gordon and Suzan, 2002) signalled that France was unwilling to go along with a geographic expansion of the military operations against terrorism to other countries or regions. Significant military participation in OEF was, however, not in question and justified to the public as the need for solidarity and the price for freedom and dignity in the face of terrorism (Chirac, 7 October 2001). France played a major role in the air campaign and contributed substantially to OEF, although there was some consternation among the educated public and intellectual policy circles about the relatively minor military role assigned to France on the part of the US (Moïsi, 9 October 2001; Lansford, 2002), with Britain being called upon to a much greater extent.

In addition to military measures, the solidarity with the US was also expressed on a public level, with the French newspaper Le Monde declaring in response to the attacks of 11 September that 'we are all American' (Le Monde, 13 September 2001), and Chirac affirming that 'France has placed itself at the side of the American people. Out of friendship, out of solidarity. But also because we know that all democracies are in danger when one of them is struck in the heart like this.' (Chirac, Paris, 16 November 2001). Védrine stated that the French government approved of the American reaction not only out of solidarity but because of the shared political objectives 'to cut the terrorist network of Bin Laden.' (Védrine, Assemblée
Nationale, 9 October 2001). Although foreign minister Védrine later criticized the US for a post-11 September ‘simplistic attitude’ following Bush’s state of the Union address on 29 January 2002 that included the ‘axis of evil’ metaphor, and emphasis on the ‘war’ on terrorism and the need for ‘pre-emptive action’, the initial preference on the part of the French government was solidarity with the US, visibility for French military contributions, and a public profile for President Chirac.

US preference towards requesting assistance from individual NATO allies supports the alliance politics indicator of states adhering to US preferences, even if the US did not choose to involve NATO as a whole in the military operation. With respect to specific French actions, France’s offer at a NATO Ambassadors’ meeting on 8 October 2001 to provide increased support by French AWACS aircraft in Bosnia-Herzegovina as backfill in order to facilitate the deployment of five NATO AWACS aircraft requested by the US to assist with counterterrorist operations (NATO Press Release, 8 October 2001) illustrates France’s practical military support for the US. This also means that conceptually, alliance politics understood as NATO the institution only does not suffice but must be extended to include individual countries’ relations with the US. The fact that Chirac pledged military assistance out of solidarity with the US in light of the terrorist attacks and shared military goals with respect to OEF Afghanistan also indicates that participation in OEF was based on more than merely the legal obligation due to the invocation of article V.

While offering a convincing explanatory framework for France’s military participation in OEF, the alliance politics framework is less applicable with respect to broader political measures to combat international terrorism in the case of the war against Afghanistan. There is no evidence of France regarding the crisis as a platform

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75 Védrine was cited as stating that ‘today we are threatened by a new simplistic approach that reduces all the problems in the world to the struggle against terrorism (reported in International Herald Tribune, 7 February 2002).
for NATO to prove its post-Cold War relevance or of an inherent preference towards NATO over other institutional settings. For one, NATO as a primarily military alliance was not considered the appropriate platform for political measures. Secondly, although cooperation with the US, including an increase in intelligence sharing (Shapiro, 2002), in broader measures against international terrorism and the capture of Taliban leaders was not contested, the UN in particular was considered vital for launching multilateral measures and policies — indicating the fundamentally multilateral conception of the best way in which to combat international terrorism.

III. Policy area 2: Afghanistan’s reconstruction

This section demonstrates that with regard to Afghanistan’s reconstruction there is some evidence of Europeanization in French foreign policy decisions, although the Europeanization approach only partly accounts for French policy decisions in this case. Given the primarily political rather than military nature of the reconstruction of Afghanistan and the decisions pertaining to it, the alliance politics model has little value in explaining policy decisions in this particular policy area.

The key participants in this policy area are President Chirac and the Foreign Ministry. With regard to the reconstruction of Afghanistan, the political approach taken — an overall UN umbrella to organize the reconstruction with a political role for the EU to raise its political and economic profile in Afghanistan — was uncontested among the branches of the French government. On 1 October the government through Foreign Minister Védrine presented a plan on the humanitarian and political aspects of reconstruction of Afghanistan that contributed to the international effort in these matters and helped orient and define the work of the UN as set out later in UNSC Resolution 1378 (Assemblée Nationale, 21 November 2001), which was also highlighted by the President (Chirac, 6 November 2001). At the 8 October foreign
minister meeting in Luxembourg, France pushed a detailed option that involved setting up an 'interim structure' under the UN to tackle the most urgent consequences of the crisis, after which a transitional administration representing all Afghan factions should be set up. According to this plan, the EU would help with the reconstruction programme, coordinated by a group set up under the UN and bringing together all the countries bordering Afghanistan (Press Association, 8 October 2001). The UN thus had a central role in French conceptions of a political solution for Afghanistan’s reconstruction, although the European Commission was considered to play a central role in the reconstruction of the country.

As for bilateral relations between Paris and Kabul, France hosted President Karzai on his first official visit to a European country, and the first visit of an Afghan official to France since 1965 to underscore Afghanistan’s close relations with Europe (Agence France Press, 27 February 2002). France also pledged significant bilateral aid for Afghanistan’s reconstruction: €27.5 million were pledged in Bonn, targeted specifically towards projects of education and agriculture and supplemented by €20 million also for saving Afghanistan’s cultural heritage (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 2 March 2002). France also undertook bilateral assistance and assumed leadership for setting up the Afghan parliament.

Europeanization

For France, the EU CFSP represented an important and relevant platform through which to give the EU a voice in Afghanistan and through which to highlight the EU’s efforts in the country’s reconstruction. This included both economic and political efforts and thus the application of instruments located in pillar 1 and pillar 2 were concerned. As in the case of OEF and ISAF, however, the involvement of the UN
held a central place in French political considerations under which EU involvement was subsumed. This, in addition to a number of national contributions to Afghanistan’s reconstruction that did not serve to underline a common EU line, such as taking responsibility for helping to set up a parliament, and bilateral financial aid as a basis of French assistance, means that the Europeanization hypothesis is not an all-encompassing explanatory approach in this case but only accounts for parts of French political considerations in this case.

France did not object to but supported the German proposal on the appointment of a EUSR, and did highlight the substantial financial contributions of the EU Commission. Together with early proposals on action plans for Afghanistan that were brought to the Foreign Minister meeting and European Council following the attacks on 11 September, this also suggests a salience of the EU agenda and can be argued to reflect a French preference in favour of a strong political profile for the EU in this case. Unlike Germany, where the EU platform constituted an important institutional venue through which to ‘upload’ German policy preferences and to increase Germany’s clout in this particular policy area, however, uploading specific policy preferences, or ensuring a strong national influence on the formulation of EU politics was not as important a consideration for France.

The EU, meanwhile, also represented an important platform to push for and propose political actions for the EU CFSP, again through the formulation of policy proposals through the Franco-German relationship. At the EU summit, France and Germany proposed that Afghanistan’s former king become a national figurehead and called for UN role in reshaping of Afghanistan (CNN.com, 17 October 2001). The UN was thus perceived as the prime multilateral institution to oversee the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Chirac agreed with Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN Special
Representative about ‘absolute priority must be given to putting in place a political solution and to take into account the humanitarian drama that risks unfolding if we do not do all that is necessary to prepare all that is essential’ (Chirac, 8 November 2001). Chirac also stated that the solution prepared by France and the UK that was to be voted on 15/16 November was important not because it would solve everything, but because it ‘will confirm the authority of the United Nations to put in place a political solution to the Afghan problem.’ (Chirac, 8 November 2001). This call for a UN role was repeated Prime Minister Jospin, who urged quick action by the UN for a peaceful transition in Afghanistan following the fall of the Taliban (Agence France Presse, 13 November 2001). Subsequently, France fully supported the Bonn process and the political state building process that this necessitated and that the international community, France included, would support.

Importantly, however, the reconstruction of Afghanistan was organized under an UN umbrella, and the UN therefore represented for France the prime multilateral forum under which the international community should act, even if the EU was to play a part in this. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, moreover, France had more latitude to influence the UN’s response and as a result also the global approach to the conflict and the country’s reconstruction. As this was considered a global rather than a regional problem – both terrorism and the reconstruction of Afghanistan – that to a significant extent involved non-European powers (unlike FYROM, which essentially represented a regional crisis), the UN was the natural forum for resolving questions of the reconstruction of Afghanistan and there was no conflict between the UN and the EU in this case but the primacy of the UN was not contested.
French policies towards the post-war reconstruction in Afghanistan built on previous engagement in Afghanistan and were not all conducted through multilateral channels. And, the fact that France took on the lead in setting up parliament – a national, rather than an EU endeavour – means that there was also a national profile apart from the roles of the UN and the EU that had importance in this case. This was also due to the fact that countries taking a lead in a particular field of specialisation reflected a pragmatic approach rather than developing separate EU -or multilateral- policies for these cases, which would have been time-consuming and would have delayed the dispersal of aid – in addition to the factor of national prestige and signalling national commitments to Afghanistan on the part of the French government. The fact that not all economic and political assistance was subsumed under an EU label but was publicly highlighted and explicitly framed as national contributions to the reconstruction of Afghanistan does not support the Europeanization approach: the EU was one political tool among many, and there is no evidence of national preferences being compromised or adapted in favour or in light of EU adaptation pressures.

Alliance Politics

One recurring theme with respect to this policy area was that of a division of labour and burden sharing between the US and other industrial countries and the EU - the US had borne responsibility for providing security and expected others to take the lead in the economic reconstruction of Afghanistan (Balaj, 2002: 44). This meant that the EU, but most importantly the UN, was afforded a more significant place in national decision-making where the reconstruction of Afghanistan was concerned than was the case in the military operations OEF and ISAF. This has served to
reinforce the Europeanization hypothesis both in terms of the salience of EU economic instruments and the political goal to highlight and make visible the EU’s contribution in order to increase the EU’s political visibility and room for influence. At the same time, this means that the alliance politics framework has no explanatory value in this case.

IV. Policy area 3: French participation in ISAF

This section argues that alliance politics considerations, understood both as French-US relations and bilateral relations with other NATO members, go a long way in explaining French policy decisions in this case. The question of an ‘EU force’, while attractive for policy makers in principle particularly as a way to ‘sell’ ISAF politically as an EU action, did not result in policy actions in reality or even in concrete policy proposals to that effect. Instead, this question did not go beyond initial discussions that arose out of considerations brought forward by EUSR Klaus Klaiber on ways to raise the EU’s political profile in the war in Afghanistan.

As in the first policy area, key participants include the President, Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Defence. Compared to French participation in OEF, military contributions to ISAF were comparatively small, as Paris agreed to a force of 550: headquarters staff, battalion HQ, infantry company and others (United Press International, 10 January 2002). Having secured a UNSC Resolution for setting up ISAF, French support for the construction of the force itself was not in question. However, among allies there were diverging positions on the question of the institutional anchoring of ISAF, its geographic scope and the role of NATO in overall ISAF command.
On the question of an EU force, this was discussed informally, and there were some differences between the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Defence: 'whereas the military favoured an EU format for practical reasons, the Quai d'Orsay from a political standpoint was towards NATO' - albeit cautiously due to 'the geographic reach of the mission and the signal it would send towards the Muslim world to have NATO operating in Afghanistan' (Interview with policy analyst, 10 June 2005). In contrast to the crisis in FYROM, where two branches of government, the foreign ministry and the ministry of defence, were in agreement that an EU force was expedient and appropriate but compromised the idea on account of the preferences of Britain and Germany, there did exist differences of opinion within the French government on this question. But, importantly, for the foreign ministry the war in Afghanistan was not regarded as a European conflict where the EU could make a difference politically through an EU-force (Interview with policy analyst, 10 June 2005). The aim of coordination with the preferences of the US and other allies as well as the nature of the conflict itself meant that an EU format was not considered practical in this case and the foreign ministry prevailed in the question of institutional format for ISAF.

France also took the position that ISAF should not expand beyond Kabul, signalling differences with the UN as well as EUSR Klaiber on the nature of the mandate as well as the geographical scope of ISAF as both Brahimi and Klaiber were in favour of an expansion beyond Kabul. As part of ISAF, France was in charge of securing the main road from Kabul to the airfield in Bagram (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 2 March 2002) and agreed that its 500-strong detachment in ISAF would stay beyond the planned end of the mission on April 30. Like Britain and Germany, France was opposed to a radically altered mandate beyond Kabul (Agence France
Press, 28 February 2002). France, ahead of the presidential election in April and weary of increasing troop commitments, rejected calls for an expanded presence with Chirac stating that he was 'not convinced that [expansion of ISAF] is the right solution.' (Human Rights Watch, 2002:47).

On the question of the construction of ISAF, then, there existed some differences in preferences among branches of the French government. Whereas the Ministry of Defence looked at an EU format, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from a political standpoint was not in favour of an 'EU-force', a view that was shared by the President. However, Chirac did make efforts to 'sell' ISAF as well as the contribution of Eurocorps in leading ISAF as a proof of l'Europe de la défense, suggesting a preference on the part of the President for Europe to show face in the military peacekeeping operation as well. Similarly, German preferences for a NATO mandate for ISAF were not shared by the French government for reasons both of the out of area nature of the mission as well as concern over potential demands made on the French military.

Europeanization

With respect to the construction of ISAF as well as the question of its institutional anchoring, there is little evidence of Europeanization. The EU CFSP/ESDP did not constitute a platform to launch policies or to export national preferences or influence. Neither is there evidence of policy adaptation, as there was a low salience of the CFSP/ESDP agenda and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not in favour of pushing for the ESDP agenda. Similarly, Paris did not compromise on national policy preferences or positions to accommodate the progress of EU policies in this case.
There is some evidence, however, of the existence of preferences for an EU label, and a general value attached to ‘European’ efforts.

The swift dismissal of the suggestion of an ‘EU force’ was mainly on account of the fact that the ESDP had not sufficiently evolved in its capabilities for France to consider the application of EU instruments in peace-keeping in Afghanistan. Unlike the case of FYROM, there was no ‘added value’ for an EU label in the construction of ISAF (Interview with French official, 28 June 2005), in particular given the sensitive nature of the operation and concerns that a NATO -or EU label, for that matter- for ISAF would invoke concerns over a ‘clash of civilizations’, and a battle between the West and Islam (Interview with policy analyst, 10 June 2005). While discussions of an EU force and efforts to portray this multinational force as a European effort demonstrate the salience of the ESDP agenda in French foreign policy in general, they do not confirm any additional indicators of Europeanization formulated in chapter 2, such as adaptation pressures acting on French policy makers, or of the EU CFSP and ESDP representing a vehicle to increase national influence.

In addition to the ‘value added’ of an ESDP operation or a coordinated ‘EU-force’, officials in the Foreign Ministry were clear that ESDP and the EU would not have been ready to assume an operation in Afghanistan. According to one official ‘and it was before Macedonia, so it was not possible to have an EU operation, and I guess that we would not have been ready for that. It was more logical to begin with the Balkans. I remember also that when we decided to launch Artemis some, even the Germans, were not ready to do it’ (Interview with French official, 20 June 2005).

This demonstrates that for France ESDP was not perceived as an appropriate tool to

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76 Operation Artemis was a short-term ESDP military mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo launched in June 2003. France acted as the framework nation and provided the bulk of the personnel with contributions from both EU and non-EU nations. Artemis was the first autonomous EU military mission outside Europe and therefore an important milestone in development of ESDP (see Gnesotto, 2004).
undertake a peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan, and this for a variety of reasons: the fact that ESDP had not sufficiently evolved, reluctance on the part of other EU member states, and the centrality of the US in this case. And, in the long run, the situation in Afghanistan remains volatile: 'violence is still going on, the political process is too fragile, and it is not a job the EU can do on its own' (Interview with French official, 11 July 2005).

France, therefore, did not find it expedient to push for an EU-force or the utilization of ESDP instruments. The utility of such a move was considered negligible, both in terms of the value added of a potential ESDP operation and a EU approach as well as in terms of the insufficient progress of the institution to undertake such a military endeavour. While the issue was discussed in the Political and Security Committee (PSC), French policy makers were clear on the fact that this was neither the appropriate time or occasion of an ESDP mission with a French official stating that 'yes, I remember it being discussed in the PSC especially with reports from the EUSR on the need to cooperate and enhance the visibility and the effectiveness of the EU, and the suggestion of the EUSR for the EU to do this, the usual suspects, but it never led to a proposal' (Interview with French official, 7 March 2006). There was, in other words, no political will for a common European approach.

French political decisions with regard to participation in ISAF as well as ISAF's institutional anchoring show evidence of Europeanization only insofar as the popular portrayal of the multinational force as a 'European' if not under an actual EU label demonstrate a preference on the part of the government to show that the EU was capable of acting. Even if it was not considered practical operationally to conduct ISAF in an EU format it was nevertheless expedient for Chirac to label this if not an EU force then at least as a European endeavour: at a joint press conference on the
European Council of Laeken, Chirac in conjunction with commenting on the declaring operational ESDP highlighted the EU’s capacity to respond to crises, conflated the national and the European contributions to ISAF by stating that ‘as you are aware, they (the countries of the European Union) have announced their willingness to participate in an international force that will be deployed in Kabul, Afghanistan, under the mandate of the UN and made up essentially, and also in totality, in any case in terms of the actual numbers, of European soldiers. They act as national contributions, to be sure, but they act as a clear sign of the place taken by the EU on the international scene’. (Chirac, 15 December 2001). Pressed on the issue of the Belgian statements that national contributions contributed a multinational European force, Chirac retracted part of the statement and indicated that this, despite the ‘spectacular result’ of the ESDP since the declaration at St. Malo, would have been a premature move, stating that ‘Yes, effectively one could have quickly made a uniform for Mr. Solana, a General’s uniform, and place him at the head of our troops over there. But things did not work out that way.’ (Chirac, 15 December 2001) and that ISAF constituted a multi-national force under UN authority, and contributions of the member states did not constitute the European army - that are probably the British, the Germans, the French.’ (Chirac, 15 December 2001). Despite efforts to portray European contributions to ISAF as signaling the EU’s ambitious role in the world, then, it was clear that national contributions, and nation states rather than the EU itself were in charge and constituent of ISAF.

Still, there is some evidence of the salience of the European agenda in French attempts to sell member states contributions to ISAF as a European effort, as statements by President Chirac cited in the previous section demonstrates – although no policy actions with regard to an ESDP operation resulted from or took place on the
basis of this. This demonstrates that despite the general salience of the EU in French policy discourse the preference for the EU to ‘show face’, and the existence of autonomous European military and defence capability in French foreign policy in the case of Afghanistan and the construction of ISAF, French foreign policy in this case exhibits scant evidence of Europeanization: apart from the rhetoric of a European effort, French decision-makers showed little appetite for, or interest in, advocating the deployment of an ‘EU-force’ in Afghanistan.

On the whole, then, the Europeanization approach is of limited value in explaining French positions towards the construction of ISAF. With respect to the indicators developed in chapter 2, this leads to the conclusion that the EU CFSP/ESDP played a small role in this particular decision point.

Alliance Politics

While the Europeanization approach is of limited utility to explain French actions, the alliance politics framework does account for some French decision making in this case. The analysis of the conflict was broadly shared with the US and other NATO members as far as there existed consensus on the idea of the historical importance to stabilize the country in order to foster stability in the region. There was, therefore, little appetite or perceived need to insist on an EU operation, and NATO as an appropriate military tool came therefore to be accepted as a pragmatic choice despite initial objections. However, French objections to the use of NATO also show that the alliance politics model does not serve as a convincing explanation of French policy preferences in this case.

French decisions confirm two indicators of alliance politics: preferring NATO for utilitarian purposes, and preferences of the other alliance members. However, this
was not a case of a transatlantic preference. Rather, it was a case where the preferences of other alliance members impacted the French position on this matter. NATO’s operational capabilities and therefore utilitarian and pragmatic considerations played a role as well. France initially was in agreement with having ISAF be a multinational force under UN leadership with partial NATO involvement: ISAF from the beginning relied on some NATO operational capabilities, but there was reluctance on the part of France to operate under a NATO label so as to not evoke suspicions that this was a clash of civilization, or a Western effort in a Muslim country (Interview with policy analyst, 10 June 2005).

The question of substantial NATO involvement in the sense of NATO officially taking over ISAF command was not initiated nor initially supported by France. Instead, France held that the out-of-area nature of the Afghanistan mission exceeded NATO’s legal and institutional framework and was therefore not in favour of giving NATO overall command over ISAF. France did acquiesce to both in the end, however, for both pragmatic reasons and because of the German initiative to anchor such an operation multilaterally in NATO. A combination of utilitarian reasons of NATO’s operational capabilities as well as the preference of the US and other alliance members, help explain French decision-making in this case and the relenting of a previously held position with regards to NATO involvement in Afghanistan.77

The evolving nature of NATO involvement initially proved to be a contentious issue as France blocked a greater role for NATO after Lord Robertson’s

77 Some commentators have also made the link between France’s relenting on the question of NATO command in Afghanistan and the political fall-out with the Bush administration over the war in Iraq (San Francisco Chronicle, 16 April 2003; The Economist, 1 May 2003). This is a plausible explanation that would affirm the alliance politics framework of member states yielding to US preferences. Because this link has not been corroborated with evidence collected in research interviews or the academic literature, however, it will not be used as evidence in favour of the alliance politics model in this thesis.
initial suggestion in April 2003 for a take-over of NATO command in the summer of 2003 (Tagesspiegel, 16 April 2003). With respect to NATO taking command of ISAF, France reluctantly accepted a wider NATO role after blocking initial attempts by NATO to play a greater role in Afghanistan, where Germany and the Netherlands were taking over joint command in the beginning of 2003 (Financial Times, 10 February 2003). And, with regard to NATO expanding its role to take control of ISAF ran counter to French conception of NATO’s core mission of defending its members rather than an extension of NATO’s mandate. France initially opposed NATO taking over command of ISAF in Afghanistan on account of the out-of area nature of the mission (Associated Press, 15 March 2003) – in addition to concerns that a NATO commitment would place a greater burden on French troops (San Diego Union-Tribune, 27 February 2003). Chirac later reflected on the changing circumstances of NATO and was cited as stating that ‘you have to be realistic in a changing world. We have updated our vision, which once held that NATO had geographic limits. The idea of a regional NATO no longer exists, as the alliance’s involvement in NATO demonstrates’ (Washington Post, 4 February 2004).

Chirac also suggested that Eurocorps take command over ISAF ahead of the NATO summit in Prague. And, upon the take-over of ISAF command of NATO and the assumption of lead nation by Eurocorps under the command of a French General, Chirac labelled the assumption of Eurocorps command under NATO a proof of *l'Europe de la defense*, showing that this was not only compatible but also necessary for a military organisation like NATO (Chirac, 28 June 2004). This

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78 The decision to deploy Eurocorps was taken in June 2003 at a NATO ministerial meeting. With respect to the question of symbolism of Eurocorps for European defense, an official in the foreign ministry emphasized that Eurocorps capabilities are interoperable for EU and NATO and do not constitute the Europeanization of NATO or a sign of ‘EU-isation’ (Interview with French official, 6 July 2005); an official in the ministry of defence pointed out that it was a test of credibility for European nations as partners for NATO and the international community (Interview with French official, 11 July 2005) – highlighting a subtle but important difference.
statement also indicated the importance of a ‘European’ label for domestic purposes and signalled continuous French commitment to an autonomous European defence capabilities. It also demonstrated France’s contentious relationship with NATO, and constituting another case of the constant ‘französische Nadelstiche’ -French needle marks- (Interview with German official, 1 September 2005) against NATO. This confirms France’s ambiguity towards NATO and its place in the global and European security architecture and the way in which French contributions were ‘sold’ domestically and internationally.

As in the case of OEF, the Europeanization approach constitutes a weak explanatory framework for French decision-making. Alliance politics, despite the difficult and often strained relationship between the US and France and the French position in NATO, is better suited to explain French decision-making – although French objections to NATO command of ISAF indicates that alliance politics does not offer a convincing explanation for French policy preferences. Importantly, however, neither approach accounts for the central role of the UN in French political considerations in this case. While this is not to suggest a degree of institutional competition or tension, it nevertheless demonstrates that the conception of this conflict in French decision-making was global rather than regional, accounting for the centrality of the UN. As the analysis in the second policy area has shown, this holds true also for the question of the reconstruction of Afghanistan: although there was some evidence of Europeanization, the UN framework, and French national participation (along with its EU contributions) within this framework demonstrate that the Europeanization model is not able to adequately explain French decision-making in this case.
V. Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that French responses to the war in Afghanistan demonstrate a fundamentally multilateral conception of an appropriate policy response to international terrorism that emphasized the shared analysis and coherence of efforts between the US, France and other international partners under the UN umbrella. Within this multilateral preference for actions towards the war on terror, the war in Afghanistan and the reconstruction of the country, the French contribution to the war on terror first of all constituted a demonstration of solidarity with the US immediately after the attacks on 11 September and the centrality of the UN in the sanctioning of military measures and as a foundation for the political and economic reconstruction of Afghanistan. This policy evolved to include European and NATO contributions rather than just national ones vis-à-vis the US. It has been demonstrated that, in line with a weak 'European' conception of the national response where OEF and ISAF were concerned, ESDP itself was not considered as an appropriate tool for ISAF both for reasons of capabilities, the security situation on the ground as well as the shared analysis of the appropriate response that precluded a decision to launch a peacekeeping operation under an EU label. Although the attacks of 11 September and the incipient war on terror were perceived as an impetus for a speedy development of ESDP in order to meet future security challenges, this did not extend to the responses towards the war in Afghanistan. This in turn suggests that the Europeanization approach is not suitable for explaining French foreign policy decision-making where military action in Afghanistan, both as part of OEF and in the construction of ISAF, is concerned. The Europeanization framework, however, has some validity where the political and economic aspect in the reconstruction of Afghanistan and broader measures in the war on terrorism is concerned. But,
significantly, even with regard to the reconstruction of Afghanistan, French national contributions outside the EU framework suggest that the EU was one tool among many that came to bear in Afghanistan, and not the most important and significant one.
Chapter 8. Britain and the crisis in FYROM

I. Introduction

This chapter demonstrates that British decisions towards the crisis in FYROM, particularly those concerning the political negotiation of the crisis, show some evidence of Europeanization. The UK actively supported the negotiation efforts of Javier Solana and thus the establishment of the EU CFSP as a political actor in the negotiation of a regional crisis. With respect to the involvement of NATO and the deployment of British troops as part of NATO Operations Essential Harvest and Amber Fox, however, British policy decisions reveal evidence of alliance politics because the appropriate military tools were located in NATO, on account of the trust enjoyed by NATO in FYROM among both Macedonians and Albanians, and out of preferences for a transatlantic approach. As for the third policy area, the ESDP takeover of the NATO operation, evidence of Europeanization is weak. Although there was no objection in principle among parts of the UK policy establishment on an eventual ESDP takeover of the NATO operation, decisions as to the operation’s timing were determined by alliance politics considerations. These included US reactions towards ESDP and relations with the incoming Bush administration in 2001 in addition to delays in the conclusion of the Berlin Plus agreements resulting from Turkish reservations about EU use of NATO assets. Domestic politics played a role as well, less so on account of Blair’s staff changes following the June 2001 elections but because of negative public opinion of the EU and ESDP in particular that the UK government did not address. These were in direct conflict with Blair’s professed goal of giving the UK leadership in Europe and for pushing for a stronger and more united EU foreign policy and policy capabilities after taking office in 1997.
II. Policy area 1: Support for EU political negotiations under the EU CFSP in the resolution of the crisis

This section demonstrates that the UK supported Javier Solana and the EU CFSP in the political negotiations of the crisis in FYROM, and took a lead role in this area due to its privileged position on the ground. As a result, this particular policy area confirms the Europeanization hypothesis in so far as the salience of the European agenda and a preference for the application of CFSP instruments is concerned. However, national influence on policy formulation through the Contact Group and bilateral initiatives shows that the EU CFSP was not given an exclusive mandate in the negotiation. Alliance politics considerations were not negligible, therefore. Close cooperation with the United States through the Contact Group as well as bilateral coordination between Prime Minister Blair and President Bush show that US involvement in regional security impacted British policy choices with respect to the handling of the crisis in FYROM. In addition, NATO formed the second pillar in the negotiation of the crisis, and the UK viewed NATO as vital for the resolution of the conflict. The close cooperation between NATO and the EU does not necessarily diminish the Europeanization hypothesis. To be sure, this was the first time the two organisations worked closely together in the solution of a crisis and NATO provided an important security guarantee for the EU CFSP to establish itself as a political actor in the resolution of the crisis. However, the importance of NATO and the Contact Group points towards evidence of alliance politics as well.

The key participants in this policy area include the Foreign Office headed, until June 2001, by Robin Cook and by Jack Straw thereafter; and Prime Minister Blair. The role of Prime Minister Blair in the negotiation of this crisis was not as

79 This was undoubtedly facilitated by close personal links – and weekly working meetings – between Javier Solana and George Robertson (see Gegout, 2004); these links can be expected to have been made easier also because Javier Solana was NATO Secretary General prior to his appointment as SG/HR for the EU CFSP.
active or visible as it was during the Kosovo war. This was due in part to the fact that the crisis was resolved peacefully but, more importantly, to the events of 11 September and Blair’s shifting policy priorities as a result, which will be discussed in more detail in chapter 9. However, Blair’s professed preference for a united Europe in foreign and security policy was being achieved, at least where this particular policy area is concerned. With respect to Blair’s preference for a strengthened EU and Britain’s place in it, Hill argues that following Blair’s Chicago speech (see Blair, 24 April 1999), and in particular during Blair’s second term ‘an ambitious form of internationalism was developing in Blair’s outlook, whereby he wished to reconnect Britain to its European destiny, to help modernize the EU so that it would be fit for the era of globalization and above all to stay close to the United States, as the ultimate guarantor of British security’ (Hill, 2005: 387). This is reflected in Blair’s speech to the European Research Institute in Birmingham where he not only stated that ‘Britain’s future is inextricably linked with Europe (...) to get the best out of it, we must make the most of our strength and influence within it (...) we want to be fully engaged in a united Europe, working with an internationalist USA’, but also that ‘Europe is in Britain’s international security interest (...) a more effective common foreign and security policy, together with making a success of the European defence initiative, is vital’ (Blair, 21 November 2001).

With respect to domestic politics there was broad agreement among the branches of the UK government on the overall goal of the political negotiations and on the appropriate political institutions: the EU CFSP, NATO, and the Contact Group in order to include Russia and the US in the formulation of policy. Britain also took a lead role in the early months of the crisis, demonstrating London’s interest and proactive approach in shaping the international response to the crisis. This applied
both to local support of EU negotiation efforts, bilateral efforts between the UK and FYROM and the use of institutional platforms—both the UN and EU—to submit and initiate policy proposals.

Upon the outbreak of the crisis in March 2001, the UK was concerned first and foremost with applying the main lesson learnt from Kosovo: to act rapidly to prevent the outbreak of full-scale violence that could de-stabilize the Balkan region. This is illustrated by a statement of the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Commons, which read that ‘Macedonia has been a model in the region of a multi-ethnic and democratic government, which has not so far been the subject of widespread ethnic violence. If Macedonia should disintegrate into another Kosovo, Bosnia or Croatia, it would be a massive reverse for the United Nations, the EU and NATO. We recommend that the British government take the most urgent steps to galvanize the international community into giving both the UN and NATO a clear remit to bring the situation in Macedonia under control and to counter Albanian extremist violence against Macedonia’ (House of Commons, 27 March 2001b:2).

With respect to the Foreign Office, Foreign Secretary Robin Cook pledged full support for the Macedonian government, insisted that there was no prospect of the redrawing of borders towards a greater Albania (Press Association, 20 March 2001) and urged both ethnic Albanian opposition parties to attend the signing of Macedonia’s Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU (Financial Times, 6 April 2001). In the Foreign Office, the head of the Macedonian section in the Eastern Adriatic Department coordinated policy from London in close cooperation with the UK embassy in FYROM. Importantly, the UK embassy held a key position in the initial management of the crisis as it was the main diplomatic mission among the EU member states in FYROM. Sweden, which held the EU presidency in the first
half of 2001, did not maintain diplomatic representation in FYROM and the British embassy assumed its role (Piana, 2002). Mark Dickinson, the UK ambassador at the time, thus took on a key position by encouraging negotiations and setting up meetings with Macedonian officials for Solana. On a very practical level, then, the UK embassy supported Solana’s role in the negotiation of the crisis starting in mid-March, when Solana first visited Skopje (Interview with UK official, 29 June 2006): a demonstration that the UK supported the proactive role taken by Javier Solana (and Chris Patten) in the crisis. The Foreign Office’s support for Solana also confirms the argument that the British approach to European integration is pragmatic and based on a case-by-case analysis rather than on a particular idealism towards the EU (Forster and Blair 2002: 180). Although the UK on a very practical level supported both the role of the EU in the political negotiation of the crisis and the development of the EU CFSP and the persona of SG/HR Javier Solana as a political actor, London was nevertheless careful not to consent to an early ESDP deployment before the conclusion of negotiations with NATO, as the analysis of the third policy area demonstrates.

The UK through the Foreign Office and the Prime Minister was also active in terms of bi-lateral and multi-lateral forums. These forums included the Contact Group, the UN, and EU Summits. With respect to the broader geopolitical picture, there was agreement among the UK government that a united stance on the part of the international community was important, including having Russia on board (Interview with UK official, 29 June 2006). This included meetings with the Contact Group in order to coordinate the broader response as well as common statements with the US. The EU and the US agreed to coordinate their efforts to promote a political solution.

Mark Dickinson was subsequently appointed special envoy to FYROM by the EU on 16 May prior to the appointment of François Léotard as EU Special Representative on 29 June 2001 (Council of the European Union, 29 June 2001).
to the crisis, as Bush confirmed at the US-EU Gothenburg summit (Europe Report, 16 June 2001). The UK also used its position as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, together with France, to submit a resolution on the crisis asking the international community to pledge support for FYROM and for strengthening the current mandate of NATO forces stationed in Kosovo (Agence France Presse, 20 March 2001). At the Stockholm Summit on 23 March, the UK together with the other member states reaffirmed the EU’s political support for the Macedonian government (Agence France Presse, 23 March 2001). These activities reinforce the argument that the UK supports greater European cooperation, albeit on intergovernmental lines (Forster, 2000: 45). Despite the key role played by the British government in addressing the crisis, there were concerns within the UK government that London was not doing enough to stop the violence: as the crisis identified in mid-June, Prime Minister Blair made efforts to co-ordinate policy action bilaterally with French President Chirac and US President George Bush after shadow foreign secretary Francis Maude said that Britain must be ‘far more active in helping suppress those forces still willing to use violence to achieve their ends’ in FYROM and Kosovo (Press Association, 29 June 2001).

The broad goals in the crisis in FYROM – preventing the outbreak of large scale violence and a speedy resolution of the crisis - were thus shared among the different branches of government. This was irrespective of changes in personnel following the June 2001 election when Robin Cook was replaced by Jack Straw as Foreign Secretary. Compared to Robin Cook, a ‘born-again European’, Jack Straw was more sceptical towards Europe. But, the Prime Minister’s office could play a leading role on European policy through the creation of a senior European post, thereby reducing the Foreign Office’s influence (Riddell, 2005: 367). Rather than
European credentials, then, Hill (2005: 385) asserts that Cook fell victim to Blair’s aim at taking foreign policy leadership as Straw seemed ‘a more pliable partner’ than Robin Cook. These changes were not a sign of a fundamental departure from Blair’s policy position with respect to the EU CFSP/ESDP or the crisis in FYROM. Britain assuming and active role in support of EU CFSP activities in the resolution of the crisis in FYROM reinforced Blair’s stated objectives for Britain’s role in the EU cited earlier. It also demonstrates that the policy actions and preferences on the part of both the Foreign Office and the Prime Minister in the case of the first policy area reflect Britain’s goal to play a lead in European security undertakings as well as a strong interest in resolving the crisis in FYROM in order to restore security in the region. To underline the continuity of the Foreign Office’s preference with respect to FYROM following the June elections, Jack Straw’s visit to Skopje following the General Affairs Council in Luxembourg on 25 June, was for the purpose of underlining ‘along with other European leaders (...) the Government’s commitment to the search for political stability’ (Downing Street Press Briefing, 25 June 2001).

**Europeanization**

The analysis in the preceding section serves as an initial indication that there is evidence of Europeanization in British foreign policy with respect to this particular policy area. This section demonstrates that evidence of Europeanization applies with respect to a number of indicators outlined in Chapter 2: there is evidence of the salience of the European agenda, the projection of national policy preferences; and the existence of norms and preferences that favoured the application of EU instruments.
British actions in support of the EU CFSP in the political solution of the crisis in FYROM show that the British goal of a ‘more effective joint EU voice and capability’ under the Blair premiership took shape (Riddell, 2005: 376) as Javier Solana came to play an increasingly active role overall and in the case of FYROM in particular. Blair’s stated aim of a more capable European foreign and security policy (Blair, 21 November 2001), with Britain as a leader thus supports evidence of the salience of the European agenda. It also supports evidence of Europeanization understood as the projection of national policy preferences. Projection is reflected by the fact that Blair was keen on having Britain play a lead role in the emerging CFSP; and to assume responsibilities for regional security on the part of the EU more generally. These two objectives represent another ‘lesson’ of the experience of the conflicts in the Balkans throughout the 1990s: not only were the Europeans ill-equipped militarily and had to rely on US military capabilities in Bosnia and Kosovo, which necessitated a re-thinking on the part of EU member states to be able to take responsibility for peace-keeping and peace-making operations (Quiles, 1999: 26). But, there were also policy disagreements between the UK and the US, and this in turn suggested to European countries that US policies after the Cold War would be less predictable (Jopp, 1994: 36) - and persuaded the UK on the necessity to change its position with respect to the creation of the ESDP. This can also be observed by the policy decisions leading to the handover to from NATO to ESDP, as will be discussed in a later section in this chapter.

More specifically, evidence of Europeanization understood as the salience of the European agenda is also supported by the practical support for Solana’s negotiating position on the ground. Rather than the UK being indifferent to, or making efforts to curtail Solana’s and Chris Patten’s proactive stance with respect to
the crisis in FYROM, London actively supported Solana’s role in the negotiations – in part on account of its privileged position in FYROM in the early stages of the crisis, in part out of a preference for the EU showing face in the crisis and the development of Europe as a security actor in the region more generally. The key role played by the UK ambassador in the early part of the crisis equally confirms national projection: by playing such a central role, and through the subsequent appointment of Mark Dickinson as special representative to FYROM, the UK increased its profile in the management of the crisis in the European arena. A general preference on the part of the Blair government to increase its national profile through a lead status in European affairs, including European security, is further affirmed by the fact that the Labour government, upon taking power in 1997 had stated that making the UK a leading player in Europe was one of the priorities in for the new government (Wickham-Jones 2000: 8; Deighton 2000).

The fact that the Blair government has played a leading role in promoting EU diplomatic efforts, as illustrated in the crisis in FYROM, also points towards Europeanization understood as a general policy preference. This is underlined by the argument that ‘Britain has tended to see itself as part of a possible three-sided ‘directorate’ in key areas of EU diplomacy’ (Smith 2006: 169). It also shows that British policy preferences for a European approach are understood to mean British leadership within such an approach. This underlines that Europeanization understood as a fundamental policy preference and national projection both apply and are not easily separable empirically. The fact that the UK’s preference towards Solana’s role and success overlaps with the preference of the EU CFSP itself also suggests that the definitions of national and European preferences overlapped in this case: a success for the EU CFSP and Javier Solana as well as a peaceful outcome of the peace
negotiations meant a success both for the EU as well as the UK – and confirms the (instrumental) notion that ‘Britain continues to pursue the ‘politics of scale’, collaborating at the EU level for the sake of greater effectiveness in the pursuit of shared and common international goals’ (Smith 2006: 169). The fact that elites – including officials in the foreign office and the Prime Minister- favoured the application of CFSP instruments in this case also supports the existence of norms and preferences that favour the application of EU instruments. With respect to the UK’s place in European diplomacy more generally, Smith also concludes that under the Blair government ‘the diplomacy of international institutions and regimes, a key area of EU activity, has seen the British playing an active and often a leading role’ (Smith 2006: 169). This in turn supports the Europeanization hypothesis for the first policy area. Importantly, however, the overlap in preferences did not extend to the application of military instruments located in the EU ESDP to the same extent than it did to the political negotiations of the crisis.

Nevertheless, the support for the EU CFSP as an institutional venue and British efforts at the establishment of its credibility runs counter to arguments of Britain lacking a European identity or preference (Garton Ash 2001) and the avoidance of a full commitment to European cooperation (Wallace 2005: 57), even if the tensions in British foreign policy as they relate to the EU CFSP, particularly as they apply to Britain’s traditional attachment to NATO and the evolving CFSP and ESDP (Hill, 1996: 85) can be clearly observed in the handover to ESDP as well as in London’s policy towards Afghanistan, the subject of chapter 9.

Alliance Politics

In addition to evidence of Europeanization, there is also some evidence of alliance politics in this particular policy area. Rather than a fundamental transatlantic
preference that can be observed in the third policy area, however, the indicator of alliance politics that best explains UK support for NATO in the negotiation of the crisis is that of preference given to NATO for utilitarian reasons. NATO was considered an appropriate resource for reasons of prior involvement in the region, and because NATO was the preferred option for the host country, FYROM, where NATO enjoyed a high level of trust among the political elite as well as the Albanian guerrillas (Interview with EU official, 21 June 2005). By contrast, the EU CFSP had yet to establish itself as a trusted negotiator and there were practical concerns that made the presence of NATO indispensable, both in the political and military part of the negotiation of the crisis. Any EU effort, and potential military operation undertaken under ESDP had to succeed – and the biggest concern on the part of the British Foreign Office was thus over buying time to resolve the crisis (Interview with UK official, 29 June 2006) rather than the introduction of new policy instruments. This supports the conclusion that the emphasis on a NATO presence arose out of utilitarian considerations rather than out of a fundamental transatlantic preference.

The fact that NATO through its presence and its close coordination with the EU CFSP and Javier Solana in effect supported the development and the establishment of the EU CFSP as a political actor in FYROM at the same time demonstrates that transatlantic preferences were not a vital political consideration in the sense that there was no direct competition between NATO and the EU. On the part of the US, there was no clear preference for NATO as an appropriate institutional venue to support the negotiations. Rather, the US had a clearly stated preference for the Europeans to assume responsibility for the security of their immediate neighbourhood (Interview with US official, 20 October 2005). And, with respect to
the political negotiation of the crisis, the EU and NATO were not in direct competition over political action or the application of military instruments.

In addition, the US had ceased to voice any principled objections to the creation of CFSP/ESDP. Madeleine Albright at the time of the St. Malo agreement had stated that 'it is very important for the Europeans to carry a fair share and have a sense of their own defence identity' (Albright 1998) although of course there were concerns in the US on the exact nature of EU-NATO relations and the degree of autonomy from NATO. This equally applies to the incoming Bush administration in 2001 and US concerns were an important element in the decisions on the ESDP handover from NATO, as will be shown in the third policy area. As a matter of principle, however, the UK was aware that the US would not act against the UK as a consequence of the creation of the ESDP (Heisbourg 2000) – even if the devil lay in the details, as will be discussed later in this chapter. With respect to FYROM it ‘meant one less NATO mission for the US and was small in scale, anyways’ (Interview with US official, 20 October 2005). There was thus no objection in principle on the part of the US for the EU to assume responsibility – both in terms of the political negotiations as well as in due course the military operations. However, as will be shown in the next two sections, when it came to military commitments, the alliance politics framework yields a more convincing explanation than the Europeanization framework in the analysis of British decision-making.

III. Policy area 2: Participation in NATO Operation Essential Harvest

This section argues that considerations that support the alliance politics rather than the Europeanization hypothesis account for British foreign policy with respect to the involvement and preparation of NATO Operations Essential Harvest and Amber Fox.
The UK lead in the military operation reflects British interest both in a lead role in NATO, and the stabilisation of FYROM more generally but also the UK’s lead among EU member states in terms of military capabilities. The emphasis on NATO – rather than ESDP- was also partly a result of the effect of 11 September on British foreign policy priorities. Blair focused on global rather than European security priorities, de-emphasized the project after 11 September, and made clear on various opportunities that ESDP was ‘essentially about the consolidation of NATO’ rather than an autonomous project (Howorth, 2004: 228) – and thus gave preference to NATO as an institutional forum. Howorth also notes that the initial discourse created in the UK presented ESDP as a means to strengthen NATO and ‘make the world fit for democracy and human rights’ (Howorth, 2004: 229). Still, ESDP was not abandoned entirely and the continued relevance of the project were clear to the UK government even if the war on terror and later the war in Iraq took precedence over European security integration (Howorth, 2004: 230). This in part explains the delay in British consent to the eventual ESDP operation, which will be discussed in more detail in the next policy area.

The Europeanization hypothesis does not apply to the planning and participation in the NATO Operations in FYROM. This is because the discussion on a possible ESDP mission in FYROM arose in earnest only after an initial NATO presence had been agreed upon, despite the fact that there is some evidence that an eventual EU take-over of NATO was regarded as desirable early on in the process of negotiating a post-conflict security presence, which points towards Europeanization.

The key participants in this policy area were the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign Office and the Prime Minister. With respect to the UK’s participation in and support for the NATO Operations in FYROM, there was broad consensus in the
different branches of the British government that NATO should assume a security function in post-crisis FYROM and that the UK should actively participate in these operations. This in turn led to the decision on the part of the UK to initiate the launch of NATO Operation Essential Harvest and to assume the lead role in this operation.

Direct NATO involvement in the eyes of the UK was not to extend to military commitments during the crisis, however, but involved only the post-settlement stage. While the UK in FYROM acted in support of NATO, which set up an intelligence cell in Skopje as a response to the escalating crisis in March 2001, London initially had no plans to reinforce its 5,500 strong KFOR contingent in support of stability in the region. This reflected domestic concerns over mission-creep and British military commitments elsewhere, such as Sierra Leone (Press Association, 20 March 2001) and suggests that the Ministry of Defence was cautious over committing a large number of troops. As the previous section has demonstrated, however, the UK supported NATO as a central actor in the negotiations and as a guarantor of the peace after the signing of the Ohrid Agreement, which suggests an overall priority given to the involvement of NATO in FYROM. Blair accordingly was reported to have underlined that ‘the history of our engagement in the Balkans had taught us that it was better to make preparations sooner and to stabilise the situation rather than wait and let the situation deteriorate. That was why British troops were in Macedonia. It was a precisely defined operation. Our aim was to help achieve a political settlement there’ (Government Press Briefing, 28 August 2001).

Blair, in line with his professed aim at bolstering Europe’s responses to regional crisis in particular after the ineffectual attempts to address the conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990s and in line with his commitment and readiness to intervene militarily during his premiership (see Kampfner, 2003), was keen for the UK to take
a military lead in this operation. The UK role in FYROM thus also served to reinforce London's claim to be the lead nation in security discussions and to set an example for the rest of Europe in an area where Britain is strong to help make up for Blair's inability to take Britain into monetary union (Financial Times, 18 August 2001). Equally important, the UK due to its military capabilities was the natural candidate among EU member states to provide much of the operational support as well as force components. Although the UK took a lead role among NATO member states in the initial stages of the management of the crisis and the preparation and participation in the NATO operations, there were some domestic concerns over the UK's and NATO's military capabilities in particular in light of the UK's growing military commitments elsewhere – an issue that became increasingly urgent after the attacks of 11 September and the UK's growing military commitments in the war on terror.

Upon the launch of Operation Essential Harvest, Gen. Barney White-Spunner commanded the pre-deployment force of Operation Essential Harvest and Britain provided the headquarters and up to 1,800 troops of the 3,500 strong Operation Essential Harvest, although the command of the operation was given to Danish General Lange (NATO, 17 August 2001). The deployment also played to British strengths –of providing the initial deployments- and Britain was also one of the few NATO countries able to supply an operational headquarter (Financial Times, 18 August 2001). The successful completion of Operation Essential Harvest demonstrated to those concerned over mission creep and insufficient capabilities that despite these deficiencies in capabilities even among NATO 'there are quite a considerable strengths that (...) come together at points of international or localised crises and that is a lesson that politicians have to learn' (Ingram, House of
But, the initial restriction of the operation to 90-days and Whitehall’s determination to have a clear exit strategy for British troops (The Guardian, 18 August 2001) did not turn out to be realistic, and the question over how to best fill the security vacuum after the end of Operation Essential Harvest arose. And, given the increasing military commitments in Afghanistan and later Iraq, the UK did not aim to maintain its lead status among NATO and EU members in this particular NATO operation. This does not mean, however, that the decisions with respect to participation in the NATO operations and them taking place in the first place were fundamentally contested with a view to the relatively low risk involved in the operation and the consensus on the importance of peace in the Balkans.

**Europeanization**

With respect to this particular policy area, there is no evidence that would confirm the Europeanization hypothesis. For the UK, this was a policy area that involved NATO and the US only. The main challenge for Britain was to maintain US involvement in the country, including the consent to NATO deployment. And, unlike France or Germany, there was no effort to ‘sell’ British contributions to NATO Operation Essential Harvest to a domestic audience, which reflects Britain’s close transatlantic ties. This also means that the alliance politics framework is most applicable to explain policy decisions in this case.

**Alliance Politics**

With respect to NATO and its engagements in the Balkans in general and FYROM in particular, the continued engagement of the US in the region –both as part of NATO and to add political weight unilaterally- was deemed of vital importance across the spectrum of UK foreign policy actors. This demonstrates the explanatory potential of
the alliance politics framework. Several indicators of alliance politics are relevant with respect to this decision point: the alignment with NATO in order to keep the US involved in European security concerns, a fundamental transatlantic preference on the part of the UK, and preference given to NATO for utilitarian reasons.

The importance of keeping the US involved in European security concerns, particularly as they relate to FYROM and the broader Balkan region was recognized by the UK government. This was of particular concern as the US was reluctant to commit troops to FYROM to begin with (Financial Times, 14 June 2001; Interview with EU official, 11 September 2006). To illustrate, with respect to the British Parliament, the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Commons noted that ‘a greater danger for the Balkan states would lie in US political disengagement from the region, followed by a military withdrawal’ (House of Commons, 18 December 2001b:18). While it was acknowledged that there was little prospect of such a disengagement in the short term, or without full consultation with its allies, the Committee went on to warn that ‘the eyes of the United States are presently turned elsewhere, and history serves as a reminder of the folly of relaxing vigilance over the Balkans. We recommend that during the ongoing war against terrorism, the Government act to avoid any loss of momentum for reconstruction in the Balkans, by working for the continued full involvement and active participation of the United States in the Balkans’ (House of Commons, 18 December 2001b:18). This insistence on continued US presence symbolized through the NATO operations in FYROM and Kosovo, in turn confirms the alliance politics hypothesis.

With respect to a clear transatlantic preference on the part of the British policy establishment, evidence includes the fact that while the early 1990s ‘saw the acceptance in the British defence establishment that they were becoming part of an
EU defence structure (...) this was not seen in exclusive terms, and priority was still given in many respects to NATO as the keystone of Britain’s contribution to collective defence in such places as the former Yugoslavia’ (Smith, 2006: 168). The following statement by Blair illustrates this position ‘what we want is a situation where NATO is the basis and cornerstone of our defence, where by preference NATO where it wants to be engaged, in other words where the Americans want to come in on an operation, NATO is going to be the body that we use (...) And I think if we approached it in that way we preserve the strength of the Transatlantic Alliance but we also give ourselves the option, where we want to, to make sure that Europe has its own capability’ (Blair, 17 October 2003). This means that despite considerations that would point towards and support the Europeanization hypothesis –mostly relevant to the next policy area – NATO remained a focal point in British policy making. Evidence of the utilitarian reasons for NATO operations, lastly, includes those cited prior – the recognition that NATO was the more credible actor on the ground, and the need to project capability and continued US as well as European involvement (Interview with former UK official, 23 September 2006).

IV. Policy area 3: The politics of the ESDP takeover from NATO

This section shows that with respect to the question over an ESDP take-over from NATO, the British position reflects some considerations of Europeanization but mostly alliance politics considerations. The Europeanization hypothesis is supported by evidence that the eventual take-over was not contested in principle – after all, the creation of ESDP and the application of the new CFSP instruments in the crisis meant that the EU military instruments would be deployed in some theatre, and presumably close to the EU’s borders. The logical place to do this, both on account of the EU’s previous failures in the 1990s and on account of shifting preferences and burdens.
after 11 September, was in the Balkans (House of Commons, 5 December 2001). Alliance politics considerations, however, came to bear with respect to the timing of the take-over itself. This had to be weighed against US concerns over ESDP generally, the British requirement for a NATO-EU agreement over the EU use of NATO capabilities, and the conclusion of the Berlin-Plus agreement following a dispute between Turkey and Greece over the issue of involvement of non-EU NATO members. These matters in turn delayed the date of the first ESDP operation.

The key participants in this policy area, as in the previous one, were the Prime Minister, the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence. Although EUSR Léotard’s suggestion in September 2001 for an EU take-over of the NATO operation was roundly rejected by the UK, this was on account of timing rather than on account of principled objection to ESDP on the part of the British government as to the timing of the first ESDP operation. Although there existed disagreement over the timing of the operation as well as over its effect on transatlantic relations within the British government, there were no fundamental objections on the part of the Foreign Office to the creation or application of ESDP instruments (Interview with UK official, 29 June 2006) – but there were differences among the branches of British government.

While the Foreign Office was in principle in favour of an ESDP operation, the Ministry of Defence regarded an early handover as hazardous (Financial Times, 4 March 2002). Together with Blair’s shifting policy priorities with respect to NATO as well as Europe and Britain’s global role after 11 September, moreover, this meant that decisions over the timing of the ESDP handover from NATO were contested within the British government. Concerns over timing for the UK arose both from ESDP not having been declared formally operational and from the absence of a formal agreement of NATO over the use of assets for an ESDP operation. With
respect to the assumption of peace-keeping tasks from NATO, then, interest in using
ESDP came early on, but with hesitation because the operation had to succeed – there
were thus concerns as to the practical considerations but no opposition to ESDP in
general (Interview with UK official, 29 June 2006). The biggest concern was buying
time in the negotiations of the peace agreement and in the hand-over from NATO to
ESDP (Interview with UK official, 29 June 2006). To be sure, after ESDP was
declared operational at the Laeken Summit in December 2001 the Seville European
Council in June 2002 signalled EU willingness to take over the responsibility for
peacekeeping from NATO. With respect to declaring ESDP operational without
having capabilities to carry out the full spectrum of Petersberg tasks, however, the
‘UK tried hard to persuade its EU partners that premature statements were not only
meaningless but potentially dangerous’ (Howorth, 2003-04: 179). Blair in turn stated
that ‘once the EU-NATO links are in place, I am keen to see an ESDP operation in
Macedonia, to show that Europe can play its part in bringing security and stability to
this part of the continent’ (Blair, 25 November 2002).

This affirms the argument that British concerns were over appropriate
capabilities and principles, and that the British approach to ESDP was essentially one
of caution. It also demonstrates that even with respect to the UK, the takeover of
ESDP was not objected to in principle: rather, in the words of a former UK official
‘the UK was determined that the first EU military operation should be a success; it
was concerned therefore that all the right 'bricks' should be in place before it was
launched’ (Interview with former UK official, 23 September 2006). The conclusion
of the Berlin Plus agreement over the use of NATO assets came to be the UK’s
prerequisite for the first ESDP military operation in FYROM (Financial Times, 30
October 2002), even if the mission itself was small and devoid of substantive risk.
The requirement of sufficient capabilities and an agreement with NATO and the US was also often cited domestically as a prerequisite for ESDP action – to illustrate, the European Union Committee stated that ‘what is imperative is that the EU must not lead an operation before it has achieved the full range of capabilities necessary to conduct it or can rely on the assistance of NATO’ (House of Lords, 29 January 2002: 86). The actual take-over of the mission and conclusion of the Berlin Plus agreements was then again delayed on account of Turkey’s attitude towards allowing the EU ‘assured access’ to NATO planning capabilities.81

Nevertheless, agreement in favour of an –eventual- ESDP mission confirms the notion of a paradigm shift on the part of the UK policy establishment towards ESDP (Howorth, 2000) although the overall goal for the UK is to strengthen NATO by building up a genuine EU capacity in the defence and security field rather than choosing between the US and Europe, as has been the French emphasis: two positions that in 2000 at least –and prior to 11 September and the war on terror- were not mutually exclusive (Howorth, 2000: 389). British decisions with respect to FYROM and Afghanistan, however, reveal some friction between these two positions.

There were also some concerns over domestic opposition to ESDP. This applies in particular to the Conservative Party over concerns that ESDP would lead directly to the collapse of NATO (Howorth 2000: 383). More generally, in the UK there is widespread opposition to the idea of a ‘European Army’ (Grabbe and Münchau, 2002: 28) – a concept with which the other two countries analysed in this thesis have less difficulty. Howorth notes that ‘the absence in Britain of any significant communicative discourse on security and defence during the general

81 For an analysis and overview of the issues involved with respect to Turkey prior to the conclusion of the Berlin Plus agreements, see Missiroli (2002).
elections reflected (...) concern not to muddy further parliamentary waters that were already sufficiently murky. In the case of the UK, the Conservatives (...) decided not to play this particular card – much to the relief of Prime Minister Blair, who, for his part, was happy (yet again) not to have to attempt to explain to the electorate what ESDP actually amounted to’ (Howorth, 2004: 227).

Europeanization

Despite hesitations over the timing of the first ESDP mission, the British policy stance with respect to an ESDP operation supports a Europeanization hypothesis. It does so with respect to a number of indicators, although this was not shared among all branches of the UK government: the salience of the European agenda, the adherence to common policy objectives to allow for the progress of EU projects, and the existence of preferences among elites that favoured the application of ESDP instruments.

The salience of the European agenda in the case of the first ESDP operation is illustrated by the fact that interest in using ESDP instruments arose early on during the crisis, despite practical hesitations in light of the fact that an ESDP mission would have to succeed both on account of the situation in FYROM as well as the success of the emerging policy (Interview with UK official, 29 June 206). And, although the delay of the Berlin Plus agreement meant that ESDP could not be applied in FYROM after the Seville European Council, repeated efforts made particularly on the part of British diplomats to resolve the differences with Turkey (Missiroli 2002: 10) in order to conclude the Berlin Plus agreements demonstrates that the UK was not only keen on arriving at a formal delineation of tasks between NATO and ESDP, but by

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82 On public support – or the absence thereof – for the EU, see Wallace (2005) and Forster and Blair (2002).
extension also to be able to employ the military instruments located in ESDP in FYROM.

More importantly, British interest in an ESDP mission in FYROM and attempts to resolve the conflict with Turkey over Berlin Plus confirms the notion of a paradigm shift on the part of the UK policy establishment and, in terms of the indicators developed in chapter 2, of the existence of preferences among the elites that favoured the application of ESDP instruments: although the St. Malo Declaration was very much a Blair initiative, Howorth notes that ‘the Whitehall teams which have been working on (...) CESDP have become personally much more committed to the project (...); there has clearly been a cultural shift both in the MOD and in the FCO and all the evidence suggests that the UK government and the Whitehall machine are in this for the long haul’ (Howorth 2000: 383). This in turn reflects a general salience of the EU ESDP in the British foreign policy establishment.

The indicator of policy adaptation, and of Britain giving up on traditionally-held policy objectives is demonstrated by the fact that the UK, once the Berlin Plus agreements had been concluded, gave up objections against the deployment of an ESDP mission and thus made possible the progress of ESDP in general. A foreign policy official from another member state put it more directly: ‘well, after St. Malo, they had to agree to an ESDP mission’ (Interview with French official, 27 April 2006). Thus, the UK, by agreeing to the development of the ESDP in principle and by having been one of the drivers of that process, put themselves in a situation where they had to agree to the application of the instruments. This is also evident from leaked documents that show a split in opinion between the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Office: whereas the Ministry of defence argued ESDP was not ready to
undertake such a mission and endanger the lives of British troops, the office of foreign secretary Straw wrote on 17 January that ‘if we do look like becoming isolated we would be better to accept an EU mission and shape it to our specifications. We would also need to consider whether the UK should contribute some forces to take part in this, first, ESDP mission. The political case for doing so would be strong’ (cited in The Guardian, 4 March 2002). This in turn serves as evidence of policy adaptation in order to accommodate the use of ESDP instrument.

In addition, preference among elites leaning towards ESDP is illustrated by Foreign Secretary Straw’s statement at the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs on what the EU had learned about its capacity to act in a crisis situation from its role in FYROM. In terms of defence forces, he stated that ‘Essential Harvest and the work that followed (...) had to be put together on a bilateral/multilateral basis, in a rather ad hoc manner. The ESDP, with the very active support of NATO, would provide a better focus for all of this, and a better means of decision making. It also ensures that the burden of providing these forces did not always fall to two or three countries’ – an indicator of the salience of the EU agenda, even if Straw simultaneously issued a word of caution in saying that despite Europe having to shoulder a greater burden in regional/Balkan security as a result of 11 September and the likely evolution of the role of forces under the ESDP, ‘one of the reasons why the language of Laeken is likely to be careful is that we do not want to run before we have learned to walk in terms of the practical sides of the ESDP’ (Straw, House of Commons, 5 December 2001: 23).83

Evidence of policy adaptation and the adherence to common policy objectives even in light of domestic reservations is supported by the fact that the UK consented

83 Support for ESDP also extended to the Ministry of Defense, with the House of Lords the one government institution to publicly raise the issue of a ‘European Army’ as a potential destination for the CESDP and therefore –unwanted- competition for NATO (House of Lords, 29 January 2002).
to declaring ESDP operational and attempting to accelerate the handover to ESDP from NATO despite the professed reservations as to the timing of both decisions. It is also illustrated by a quote by Blair on ESDP and the difference among member states where Blair stated that ‘if we do not get involved in European defence, it will happen without Britain. Then those people who really may have an agenda to destroy NATO will have control of it’ (cited in House of Commons, 27 March 2001a).

Finally, there is an element of projection of national preferences in the ESDP mission as well, as Straw stated that an ESDP operation in FYROM (and the Balkans in general) would also ensure ‘that the burden of providing these forces did not always fall to two or three countries. It is flattering that everybody turns to the United Kingdom first but if we are talking about the defence of Europe it is not a good idea’ (Straw, House of Commons, 5 December 2001:22). This demonstrates that ESDP also constituted a practical goal for the UK. More generally, the UK’s position on ESDP serves as evidence of national projection as ‘the Blair government’s re-think on European defence was also aimed at maximizing the potential of the UK’s influence in Europe. This was of crucial importance to the government with the (...) the birth of Economic and Monetary Union on 1 January 1999, with the UK remaining outside’ (Whitman, 2004: 436). In conclusion, despite the hesitation on the timing of the ESDP takeover, and the condition on a previous agreement with NATO, there was interest in the EU assuming a military security function under ESDP in FYROM, which confirms the Europeanization hypothesis.

Alliance Politics
The politics of the handover process from NATO to ESDP were impacted by broader geopolitical considerations that confirm the alliance politics hypothesis rather than
that of Europeanization. With respect to indicators of alliance politics, the timing of the ESDP handover in large parts reflects British concerns over US preferences leaning towards NATO – or at least a negotiated agreement over the relationship between NATO and ESDP – in addition to utilitarian reasons for preferring to keep NATO in place. As a result, a second indicator of alliance politics, that of preference given to NATO out of transatlantic preference, can also be observed in this case.

The US, particularly the incoming Bush administration, continued to express caution to the ESDP project – as did the British public. To illustrate, the Second Report on British-US relations states that ‘the United States government is clear that its ‘bottom’ line on ESDP is that European countries’ commitments to NATO must take precedence over any to ESDP’ (House of Commons, 18 December 2001b:17). Together with changing overall priorities with respect to national security and defence policy (see Howorth, 2003-04: 176), this meant that ESDP as a policy priority moved in the background. And, the impact of 11 September shifted London’s priorities from regional to global issues, and made the task of transatlantic solidarity paramount. With respect to NATO and ESDP, the crisis in FYROM illustrated differences over NATO’s ‘right of first refusal’ as the UK took the position that the EU should not take on missions in the absence of any agreement on Berlin Plus. To illustrate, the European Union Committee stated unequivocally, that ‘there may be a temptation, if the political need for an operation arises, to conduct an EU-led mission for symbolic purposes before the EU is ready to do so. What is imperative is that the EU must not lead an operation before it has achieved the full range of capabilities necessary to conduct it or can rely on the assistance of NATO’ (House of Lords, 29 January 2002: 86).
With respect to transatlantic relations more generally, however, despite European disagreement and discomfort at the incoming US administration with respect to the withdrawal from the Kyoto protocol and plans for a nuclear missile shield (Whitman, 2004: 443), Blair was determined to ensure the continuity of the UK’s relationship with Washington – and Hill notes that ‘it was not implausible that Robin Cook was moved from the FCO because he was seen as having become ‘Europeanised’ and insufficiently pro-American’ (Hill, 2005: 388). Apart from the staff changes following the June 2001 elections, then, Blair was careful not to antagonize the US over the ESDP mission – further confirmation of a clear transatlantic preference in British politics that spoke for the primacy of NATO in British foreign policy thinking. However, with respect to transatlantic relations more generally, Whitman notes that ‘the ESDP has only been one component in a difficult transatlantic relationship that has developed under the Bush administration. It has not been the central issue of dispute across the Atlantic but has added to the mix’ (Whitman, 2004: 445). Domestically as well the UK government was careful to underline that the EU would only be involved where NATO is not engaged, and faced a number of questions on the perseverance of NATO’s right of first refusal (Hoon, House of Commons, 28 March 2001a: 39). At the same time, however, Hoon was careful to underline that the ESDP process would considerably strengthen ‘the arrangements because the Americans have long argued understandably that they want to see a much greater contribution to military capability from European nations than they have in the past’ (Hoon, House of Commons, 28 March 2001b:76). In conclusion, it has been shown that alliance politics considerations determined British preferences with respect to the timing of the ESDP takeover. This applies less to the UK heeding to US preferences, however: rather, it was on account of domestic
transatlantic preferences that favoured an agreement between NATO and the EU prior to an ESDP takeover that delayed an agreement on the first military EU mission.

V. Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated that British policy towards the crisis in FYROM shows considerable evidence of Europeanization, particularly with respect to the support for the political support for the resolution of the crisis. Although the decision to launch and participate in the NATO operations does not reveal evidence of Europeanization, the decision processes in the actual handover from NATO to ESDP shows that the alliance politics approach does not fully explain British policy decisions with respect to the handover from NATO to ESDP. Objections to an ESDP operation arose not as a question of principle but as a question of timing and prior arrangements with the US, which points towards the presence of considerations that support the Europeanization hypothesis. Evidence of alliance politics exists with respect to utilitarian motivation, but also with respect to an enduring transatlantic preference. Considerations of US preference and the role of Britain in moderating between Europe and the US became increasingly important on account of the events of 11 September and caused a shift in Blair’s policy priorities as a result – as is evident more starkly in British policies towards the war in Afghanistan, the subject of the next chapter.
Chapter 9. Britain and the war in Afghanistan

I. Introduction

This chapter argues that Britain's foreign policy decisions with respect to the political and military contributions to OEF and ISAF were motivated above all by the UK's close ties with the US. Tony Blair in particular sought to not only demonstrate solidarity with the US but also to try to use his influence to shape US policy in Afghanistan towards using multilateral institutions - most importantly the UN, particularly where the reconstruction of Afghanistan was concerned - and to coordinate the contributions of other EU member states to that end. This use of the EU platform was met with criticism from other, particularly smaller, member states, including the then EU Presidency, Belgium. While the first point - transatlantic ties - demonstrates the validity of the alliance politics framework, the second - attempts to shape an EU response and to influence other EU member states using the EU platform - point towards some evidence of Europeanization understood as policy projection, even if, importantly, this did not result in a co-ordinated EU military action either as part of OEF or ISAF. Instead, Blair's attempt to shape and coordinate EU diplomacy illustrates the importance attached to British influence over EU policy in this case. When it comes to the political and economic reconstruction of Afghanistan, the UK supported the EU pillar in the country's reconstruction as well as the appointment of a EUSR in Afghanistan. This indicates the importance of a European profile in this policy area and supports the Europeanization hypothesis as the UK consented to EU policy initiatives for the sake of EU unity and a political profile for the EU. But, significant bi-lateral developmental cooperation with Afghanistan as well as the central co-ordinating role played by the UN also suggests...
that in the eyes of London, the EU was one of a number, and not necessarily the most important, political institution to tackle the reconstruction of Afghanistan. This demonstrates that national rather than European commitments were of high salience. While there is some evidence of Europeanization even in light of Britain’s strong transatlantic ties and its ‘special relationship’ with the US, the Europeanization model does not offer a convincing framework to explain the UK’s policy actions in the three policy areas.

II. Policy area 1: OEF and the war on terror

This section argues that in the war in Afghanistan, in particular where the coordination of military and political support and EU measures to combat international terrorism are concerned, Blair made efforts to place himself at the centre of European diplomacy while at the same time being steadfastly supportive of the US — indicating that the European agenda constituted an important political platform through which to increase national influence and to pursue national preferences. Although this by no means eclipsed the central role of the US position in British foreign policy, it shows that British decision-making aimed not only for the traditional role for the UK as a bridge between the US and the Europe, but also as a decision-maker within the EU — and to thereby put Britain at the heart of Europe (Wallace 2004). It also demonstrates that the two sets of interests were not regarded as mutually exclusive. These actions support the Europeanization in addition to the alliance politics model.

With respect to an analysis of the key players and their positions in the case of OEF and the war on terror, Prime Minister Blair occupies a central role in the decision-making and the shaping of UK policy preferences among elected officials —
this on account of both what has been referred to as a presidential style\textsuperscript{84} of decision-making (see Foley 2000, 2002, 2004) and his strongly-held moral views. On taking office, Blair, who was inexperienced in foreign policy, developed a strongly-held vision of Britain's global responsibilities and a more interventionist foreign policy that was exemplified in the 1999 Chicago speech (Blair, 24 April 1999) which spoke of moral values, just war, and the belief that the European and American dimensions of British foreign could be reconciled and that there was a continuing community of values across the Atlantic where Britain was well placed to hold the two sides together in promoting those shared values in an unstable world (Wallace and Oliver, 2004: 7; Little and Wickham-Jones, 2000, Miskimmon, 2004). On the domestic side, Blair had sought to increase his own influence in foreign policy prior to the events of 11 September. The June 2001 staffing changes reinforced the Prime Minister's hold over foreign policy by appointing full-time advisors for European (Sir Stephen Wall) and world affairs (David Manning), respectively, thereby weakening the role and influence of the Foreign Office (Kampfner, 2003:92). With respect to the war in Afghanistan, Blair also appointed a personal representative for Afghanistan. Paul Bergne held the position until December 2001 and Robert Cooper, the former Director of Asia in the Foreign Office assumed the post until mid-2002. This means that, irrespective of conceptual debates over the merits of the 'presidential style' label to the analysis of prime ministerial leadership in Britain, Blair's central role in British foreign policy in the case of the war in Afghanistan supports the argument that his

\textsuperscript{84} The conceptual literature on the role of the Prime Minister in British government, in particular the core executive model (see Heffernan, 2003) takes issue with the portrayal of a presidential approach while at the same time emphasizing the growing role of individual leader. This literature speaks of 'prime ministerial dominance' (Heffernan, 2003: 350) or emphasizes 'the structurally advantageous position' of the prime minister in government (Smith, 1999:77).
hold over key foreign policy decisions in the case of OEF was strong. In fact, Blair held only two meetings of his cabinet between 11 September and the first missile strikes as part of OEF on 7 October, and neither contained debate (Kampfner, 2003: 129). In addition, the close personal connection between Bush and Blair was an important factor in shaping Blair’s policy responses to the war on terror. This also means that the role and influence of the Foreign Office was less instrumental in determining policy outcomes even if the formulation of policy was developed with the support of the Foreign Office (Interview with EU official, 11 September 2006) — as was the role of the Ministry of Defence that did, however, support the military measures in Afghanistan and close coordination with the US.

Prior to the attacks of 11 September, Blair’s determination to play the traditional role of bridge between the US and the EU appeared to be made difficult by the advent of the Bush administration in 2001. Blair had been worried about isolationist tendencies in US foreign policy following the elections in 2001 with the US making moves to disengage from the former Yugoslavia, the Northern Ireland as well as the Middle East Peace process (Riddell, 2003). Adding to this concern was that the US seemed to be looking elsewhere for special relationships without much interest in European affairs — whereas the fact that Jacques Chirac was the first European leader to meet the new President added fears of the deterioration of the ‘special relationship’ (Kampfner, 2003: 86). The Bush administration’s attitude

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85 With respect to Blair’s role, however, one official interviewed nevertheless stressed the role and importance of political advisors thereby highlighting that an emphasis on Blair alone is overstated (Interview with EU official, 11 September 2006).
86 Foreign Minister Straw consequently stated that the policy was ‘set by President Bush and our Prime Minister in terms of the overall objectives of this military action’ (Straw, House of Commons, 20 November 2001).
87 This is illustrated by Defence Minister Hoon’s remark that ‘I do not believe that in the period since 11 September two countries could have worked more closely together than the United States and the United Kingdom’ (Hoon, House of Commons, 18 December 2001a: 363)
88 On the ‘special relationship’ between the UK and the US, Peter Riddell has rightly noted that it is a somewhat misleading term because it obscures the fact that while ‘Britain’s relations with the United
towards defence, the environment, international law, disarmament, free trade and diplomacy further antagonized US allies.

In addition to the transatlantic priorities in British foreign policy, to members of the Foreign Office but also the Prime Minister the attacks of 11 September represented an opportunity to 'fix' Afghanistan. The stabilisation of the country had been a concern for the UK prior to the attacks on the United States (Interview with EU official, 11 September 2006). There had been attempts to formulate a policy towards Afghanistan in 2000, amid signs that Pakistan was getting nervous about its policy towards the Taliban. Robert Cooper, then-director of the Asia Directorate in the Foreign Office, had raised the issue with the Prime Minister to attempt to formulate a strategy for a UN coalition to reach a peace agreement, but not to recognize the Taliban regime. The resulting talks involved German officials, and there was a general agreement to do more on Afghanistan although any initiative needed the support from the new US government (Interview with EU official, 11 September 2006). The issue was subsequently raised with Richard Haas, the director of the policy-planning staff at the US State Department in May 2001 and there was agreement on the need for a more rigorous effort although this did not result in policy initiatives at the time (Interview with EU official, 11 September 2006). This shows that there was a preference among policy makers in the UK to engage in Afghanistan prior to September 2001.

After the attacks of 11 September, the first instinct on the part of Blair was that the US should not feel isolated, and he called the Presidents of France, Germany, Russia, and Belgium, and dispatched Defence Minister Hoon to NATO and Foreign

States are unusually close (...) the relationship is inherently asymmetrical as London has a far greater interest in affecting what Washington does and says, than vice versa' (Riddell, 2003: 26). As a result 'the most consistent feature of transatlantic relations (...) has been the desire of other prime ministers to be insiders in the Washington policy debate' (Riddell, 2003: 27) - which UK foreign policy priorities with respect to this policy area aptly illustrate.
Minister Straw to prepare for an emergency EU session (Kampfner 2003: 115). In a conversation with Bush the next day, the two agreed to support from NATO and the UN for a legal and political basis for a military response. This shows that Blair effectively did act as a bridge between the US president and the international/European community, supporting the US while at the same time coordinating EU actions, as well as regional diplomacy with Afghanistan’s neighbouring states: Blair called on Pakistan’s leader on 18 September, for instance, and it was announced that Straw would visit Iran (see House of Commons, 12 June 2002a). Kampfener also notes that, importantly, initially there was no resentment towards Blair’s role internationally or inside the UK even if Blair did not consult with all but his inner circle (Kampfner, 2003: 121). Through Britain’s military participation in the war on terror and the close links with the US Blair was able to wield influence in the EU-15 (The Spectator, 27 October 2001), although the later events surrounding the Iraq war and Blair’s unwavering support for the war in Iraq and US policies threw off the fine balance and accounted for a loss of influence in Europe and the collapse of the ‘transatlantic bridge’ (Wallace and Oliver, 2005; Riddell, 2003). For the purpose of the time period of concern in this analysis, however, there was no contradiction between European integration and the Atlantic alliance in the mind of the Prime Minister. Along with being a partner to the US, Blair was ‘acting as Europe’s primary envoy to the US, and America’s primary envoy to the rest of Europe’ (Peterson, 2002: 4).

8 Blair underlined this point in his speech to the Lord Mayor’s Banquet on 12 November 2001 where he stated that ‘we have buried the myth that Britain has to choose between being strong in Europe or strong with the United States. Afghanistan has shown vividly how the relationships reinforce each other; and that both the United States and our European partners value our role with the other. So let us play our full part in Europe, not retreat to the margins; and let us proclaim our closeness to the United States and use it to bring Europe closer to America’ (cited in Riddell, 2003: 172).

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This shows that a European response was of importance to Blair, including agreeing on a common European line that included supporting the military campaign as long as it was restricted to Afghanistan; a collectively agreed upon ‘post-Taliban scenario’ with a lead role for the UN in post-war Afghanistan; and a settlement of the Israel-Palestine conflict. But, the ‘Downing Street Dinner’ also gave the impression that London had become the centre of European policy making, and that Blair ‘made virtually no concessions to Brussels along the lines of stepping aside to let Solana, Prodi or Verhofstadt present a truly common EU stance to Washington. Blair showed little sympathy for EU leaders of small states who complained of being cut out of decisions taken in mini-summits of the ‘big three’ (Peterson 2002: 7).

Domestically, Blair by and large had support for the military action in Afghanistan, even if cracks appeared among some MPs voicing concerns about the nature and frequency of the bombing campaign – some Labour MPs expressed concerns over the length of the bombing while the Liberal Democrat front bench was divided between foreign affairs spokesman Menzies Campbell who backed the government’s approach and Jenny Tonge, shadowing international development, who joined the call by aid agencies to pause military actions (The Times, 18 October). Clare Short also called for a halt to the bombings. Differences between Blair and other MPs also arose with respect to the geographic expansion of the war against terrorism to include countries beyond Afghanistan (Kampfner, 2003: 102), foreshadowing the domestic and international divisions over Iraq. In connection with this, there was concern over Britain’s standing in the Arab world, even if Blair tried to give the message to other Arab nations that the UK would not back military action beyond Afghanistan while at the same time remaining steadfastly supportive of the

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90 A report issued by the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs in June 2002 explicitly approved Blair’s decision to support the US and to take a lead role in coordinating allies’ military contributions (House of Commons, 12 June 2002).
US (Kampfner, 2003: 132). This came to create more severe tensions within the UK’s position as Blair – in vain - attempted to persuade Bush to deal with the Middle East Peace process (see Riddell, 2003 and Kampfner 2003). For the purposes of decisions to participate in OEF, however, support for the US in the war in Afghanistan as well as UK military participation in that war was uncontested in British government.

*Europeanization*

As the preceding section has shown, Blair sought to shape EU policy in response to the attacks on 11 September in line with his commitment to the bridge function between the US and Europe. A number of initiatives and policy positions were subsequently taken by the UK that support the Europeanization hypothesis; it should be noted, however, that this refers mainly to policy projection – that is, the export of national preferences to the EU agenda and the use of the EU platform to further national goals – with the salience of the EU agenda in this case also attesting to indicators of national adaptation. This did not only apply to the Prime Minister, however: with respect to the CFSP, the Committee on Foreign Affairs noted that the immediate response to the 11 September attacks ‘was impressive, but progress became bogged down in the following months (...) nonetheless, the habits of intergovernmental co-operation created through the EU proved valuable in this crisis’ (House of Commons, 12 June 2002a:59). This in turn supports the argument that the EU was regarded as a useful and salient policy platform among several branches of the UK government. But, as in the other two countries analyzed in this thesis, the EU CFSP was not the only platform considered and the three states, rather than predominately acting through the institution, acted ‘in concert with EU institutions, as opposed to working at cross purposes’ (Peterson 2002: 9).
With respect to policy decisions that point towards national projection of policy preferences on to the EU, the British lead in setting EU policy was evident from a number of actions. At the 8 October General Affairs Council, Britain took the lead in organizing military contributions and welcomed pledges from France, Italy, Germany and Spain. And, Britain, together with the countries named above insisted on the phrasing that the EU was 'in total solidarity' rather than 'perfectly in solidarity' with the US, and spelling out the post-Taliban future of Afghanistan in the EU document – with Jack Straw taking a diplomatic lead in explaining how the air strikes were steadily weakening the Taliban (The Independent, 18 October 2001). The suggestion and use of the EU to coordinate action suggests that the CFSP constituted an institutional platform through which to increase national clout. But, the strict adherence to US solidarity also indicates that the European framework was also used to strengthen the UK policy position vis-à-vis both its European allies as well as the US, rather than develop a joint response out of a reflective European preference. The first instinct was to turn to the US. This means that the third indicator of Europeanization, that of preference formation, is not applicable in the British case.

This, therefore, points towards Europeanization understood as national projection rather than policy adaptation, even if EU unity was a declared policy goal of the UK -as it was for other member states as well. Blair’s general statements on the UK’s role in Europe, particularly with respect to the EU CFSP in late 2001 further support this argument, for instance that ‘Britain’s future is inextricably linked with Europe; that to get the best of it, we must make the most of our strength and influence within it (...) we will not have influence if we only ever see Europe as in opposition to Britain (...) in some areas Europe should do more – in foreign and security policy’ (Blair, 23 November 2001).
At the Laeken summit, Britain forced the EU to drop a drafted warning to the US not to extend its self-declared war on terrorism beyond Afghanistan, which had stated that ‘approval of the international community must be sought prior to any geographical extension of those operations’ (Agence France Presse, 15 December 2001). This is again an indication that the EU policy platform served to reinforce the UK position vis-à-vis the US rather than the EU acting as an adaptation influence or a normative goal. In this sense, it reinforces the notion of Europeanization of that as increasing international influence (Regelsberger, 1997) and of exporting policy ideas to the EU (Bulmer, 1998).

However, the use of the EU as a platform to promote national interests and influence was compromised with respect to the attendance and organizations of mini-summits, which gave Blair (as well as the other two European leaders as analyzed in Chapters 5 and 7, respectively) increased clout in the conduct of the war against terror. With regard to the meeting between Blair, Chirac and Schroeder before the Ghent summit, Blair defended the meeting as necessary and would not make excuses for this – except for pointing out that it had essentially been Chirac’s initiative. But, a month later on 4 November 2001 Blair hosted a dinner for the ‘big five’ leaders to co-ordinate policies, raising anger among the smaller EU nations (The Times, 5 November 2001) which –after having been expanded to include Spain and Italy in addition to France and Germany to avoid the same resentment from Chirac’s mini-meeting- had to be expanded to include Belgium and the Netherlands as well as Javier Solana. This illustrates that while a common stance among EU member states was a declared policy goal for the UK, the execution of this goal was not necessarily conducive to EU unity in this charged political climate, and did not necessarily result in policies adopted under the EU CFSP. While Blair’s policy actions point towards
policy projection as the EU represented a means to increase national leverage and to prove national influence within the EU, the selective use of the EU platform shows that the EU was of limited value for projecting UK power, that the appearance of EU unity was not considered important in this respect, and that mini-lateral measures proved more useful for shaping Britain's influence over policy towards Afghanistan. As a result, the participation and organization of the mini-summits do not point towards Europeanization, understood either as policy preference or national adaptation, but instead weakens the evidence of Europeanization presented in this section.

In conclusion, therefore, although there is evidence that points towards Europeanization understood both as national adaptation and the salience of the CFSP agenda and policy projection, the close link to the US as well as the participation and initiation of mini-summits to co-ordinate selected member states' contributions to OEF indicate that transatlantic policy priorities impacted British decision-making in this case first and foremost.

Alliance Politics

The alliance politics framework provides a strong explanatory model for British decisions taken with regards to OEF and the war on terror. However, this does not refer solely to NATO as an institution: on the question of the role of NATO, or military alliances in general after 11 September, US Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld famously stated that 'the coalition must not define the mission' (Rumsfeld, 23 September 2001) indicating that the role of NATO in the war on terror was going to be negligent. And, the fact that the US declined NATO and NATO Secretary General George Robinson's offer of help raised the bar for NATO to prove that it was not
redundant in the post-11 September world (Kampfner, 2003: 131; Toje, 2003). Alliance politics in this case, therefore, refers to UK relations with the US and other participating allies in addition to that of the use and attitudes towards NATO as an institutional framework.91

Several aspects of UK politics point towards alliance politics. British support for the invocation of NATO article V demonstrates the recognition that the US in the first instance at least had the right to retaliate against the attacks on its territory and that NATO was the appropriate institution for legitimizing such decisions. This demonstrates that the initial reaction from the UK government was not just solidarity with the US, but also to revert to NATO as a multilateral forum for a political and military response to the attacks. This is illustrated by the fact that Defence Minister Hoon was sent to NATO immediately following the attacks on 11 September (Kampfner 2003: 115), which demonstrates the centrality of NATO in policy considerations. More than just supporting the invocation of article V, however, Britain played an 'active role' in promoting the NATO decision to invoke Article V, and 'pushed forward the deployment of joint NATO assets' and the decision that 'NATO AWACS were sent to patrol US airspace on 9 October in an operation code names "Eagle Assist"' (House of Commons, 12 June 2002a: 48).92 More generally, Blair's policy initiatives - the aim to show absolute solidarity with the US in order to influence American foreign policy also - demonstrate a strong transatlantic reflex

91 The fact that NATO was not used did not render it unimportant in the view of the UK military establishment, either. Rather, 'in many ways NATO acts as a glue in military terms. The fact that we are used to working together, have common procedures, common doctrine, we know a lot of the people involved personally, means that even if we are operating (...) without NATO, NATO still acts as a very powerful binding mechanism to enable us to operate more effectively' (Major-General Milton, House of Commons, Committee on Defence, 7 November 2001: 24).

92 However, Toje (2003) makes the point that the idea to invoke Article V came from the institution itself rather than the member states. While the actions on the British government contradict this reading of events and attest to the centrality of NATO as a security institution in British foreign policy, NATO leadership undoubtedly also had an interest in the utilisation of NATO - which supports the conclusion that 'the invocation of Article V can be seen as a response to NATO's self-preservation challenge' (Toje, 2003: 71)
inherent in British foreign policy. The decision to invoke Article V and the investment on the part of Blair and Straw were also positively noted and supported in the House of Commons (House of Commons, 12 June 2002a) supporting the conclusion that this policy priority was shared among other branches of the government as well. More fundamentally, the attacks of 11 September shifted the UK’s emerging focus on ESDP and the evolution and direction of the European security institutions to the emphasis on NATO. This reinforces the alliance politics framework at the expense of considerations that could serve as evidence of Europeanization. For one, combating terrorism became a new mission for the alliance and as a result the UK would be in the vanguard of NATO ‘going global’ in this new mission in line with its transatlantic ties (Howorth, 2003-04). While these tendencies do not necessarily take away from the evidence of Europeanization presented in the preceding sub-section, they do illustrate that the transatlantic framework, and alliance politics in general, were strengthened and reinforced by the events of 11 September.

Blair’s alignment with the US in order to influence US political decisions certainly proves a strong indicator of alliance politics. The first consideration on the part of the UK was to co-operate and show solidarity with the US, even if, with regards to Britain’s role in OEF and the broader war on terror in the framework of the UK’s bridge function between the two continents, close co-operation on military and intelligence matters with Washington complemented rather than competed with closer links with EU institutions on other matters (The Times, 19 October 2001). A

93 In this respect Riddell (2003: 305) notes that while the Blair government had come closer to European defence, ‘Afghanistan (...) reinforced the natural tendency of the Ministry of Defence to work alongside the Americans’. And, after the Iraq war, Secretary of Defence Hoon stated that ‘it is highly unlikely that the UK would be engaged in large-scale combat operations without the United States, a judgement born of past experience, shared interest and our assessment of strategic trends’ (cited in Riddell, 2003: 306)
report issued by the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs on British-US Relations noted that 'the UK’s prompt actions immediately after the events of 11 September were regarded by the Americans not only as significant symbolic acts of solidarity, but also as very concrete expressions of the special relationship. The very spontaneity of the reaction illustrated perfectly the instinctive nature of the relationship' (House of Commons, 12 June 2002a: 31).

In sum, although the application of instruments located in NATO was not favoured by the US, British moves towards, and support for the invocation of NATO article V demonstrate evidence of alliance politics. And, although NATO did not play a significant role in the Afghanistan campaign and military action did not ultimately involve NATO command structures, the UK was active in encouraging the US to respond positively to the offer by allies, particularly the European ones (House of Commons, 12 June 2002a) and did support the deployment of NATO assets. Moreover, the strong transatlantic orientation in British foreign policy in this case shows that alliance politics – understood as the transatlantic relationship more broadly rather than just NATO – was the primary political concern of the UK government in response to the attacks of 11 September, and that other policy aims were subordinated to the goal of transatlantic solidarity. This does not mean that these political considerations were unimportant, or that the EU did not represent an important political function for the UK – but that Europeanization considerations were dependent and subordinated to, as well as used as a means to reinforce, the UK’s transatlantic ties.

III. Policy area 2: The reconstruction of Afghanistan

This section argues that the UK did not occupy a leadership position in Afghanistan’s reconstruction to the same extent that it did in the coordination of military
contributions for ISAF and OEF. This was because the task of reconstruction was placed in the hands of the UN, involved more than one national and institutional actor, and because coherence and support for the UN effort represented a policy objective for the UK. In addition, the involvement of a number of actors in the reconstruction effort as well as the fact that another EU member, Germany, hosted the Bonn Conference, meant that visibility for the UK was correspondingly lower in this particular policy area. As the primary objective in the reconstruction of Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban was support for the multilateral effort under the UN umbrella this section argues that the European agenda did not have a substantive profile in UK policy coordination although Britain did support the appointment of an EUSR and therefore a political role for the EU in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. In addition, the UK took a national lead in the area of drug eradication, further raising its national profile in one aspect of Afghanistan’s reconstruction and co-ordinating on a bilateral basis with the country taking the lead in policy reform, Germany. As a result, the explanatory power of the Europeanization approach is of limited value in this case.

With respect to the reconstruction of Afghanistan, the relevant branches of government active in this policy field were the Foreign Office as well as the Department for International Development (DFID) headed by Clare Short, the UK Secretary of State for International Development (1997-2003), particularly in the area of providing humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan. No. 10 was also active and involved (Interview with EU official, 11 September 2006), with Blair sending an observation delegation to the Bonn talks. With respect to Blair’s preferences on the war and the reconstruction of Afghanistan, Blair preferred to finish the war quickly.

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94 The EU, represented by the Commission and the Presidency together with the US, Japan and Saudi Arabia co-chaired the Afghanistan Reconstruction Steering Group (ARSG).
and was dubious about Brahimi's 'light footprint' approach\textsuperscript{95} and 'would have preferred someone like Paddy Ashdown' who was more forceful (Interview with EU official, 11 September 2006). Robert Cooper, Blair's special representative for Afghanistan, had to reign Blair in who wanted to 'try and hasten things along' when it came to liberating Afghanistan – this was in order to prevent a bloodbath and to sound out the potential political leadership before the fall of the Taliban as well as not to apply too much pressure on UN envoy Brahimi (Kampfner 2003: 144). This demonstrates that the international constraints acting on the Prime Minister in this policy area did not permit the same personal leadership style – or impact on policy decisions - than did the decisions on OEF and the war in Afghanistan.

The provision of humanitarian aid and the future shape of the Afghan interim administration were the two primary poles of international support for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and the British government did not play an active but rather a supportive role in negotiating the post-Taliban interim administration for Afghanistan under UN auspices. But, the UK was the first donor country to pledge assistance, even prior to the UN inter-agency donor alert and thus took the lead in the international aid effort in Afghanistan. DFID set aside £1 million to support the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi and the Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF) to consult the Afghan Diaspora (Short, House of Commons, 20 November 2001).

The UK government did however establish an observer delegation to the Bonn negotiations led by Robert Cooper; and Blair sent Paul Bergne as his personal envoy to support the UN’s lead role who in turn tried to move Northern Alliance

\textsuperscript{95} A report by the International Development Committee noted that 'Lakhdar Brahimi's request for a "light footprint" approach is connected to a recognition by the international community of the importance of Afghan involvement in setting policy and spending priorities' (House of Commons, 14 2003:37).
members towards accepting concessions to form a post-Taliban government (House of Commons, 12 June 2002b). Foreign Minister Straw in turn played a more active role than the delegation through ‘a series of conversations’ with Abdullah Abdullah, the Foreign Minister of the Northern Alliance, as well as the Russian and Iranian foreign ministers to ensure that members of delegations other than those of the Northern Alliance would be accommodated within the constitution (House of Commons, 12 June 2002a). Stephen Evans, finally, acted as the British Government’s representative in Kabul in talking to members of the Northern Alliance and making contact with other members of the Northern Alliance ‘to help meet the objective (...) of producing a broad-based multi-ethnic government (Straw, House of Commons, 20 November 2001:6). His efforts were not integrated with those of UN Special Representative Brahimi on behalf of the UN and his tasks were thus more hands-on than that of the observer delegation to the Bonn talks: ‘although it is important that UN Ambassadors like Mr Brahimi should have our full support, which they do (...) was also provide them with a perspective from a bilateral relationship with one of the great parties involved in the military coalition which he may not get for himself’ (Straw, House of Commons, 20 November 2001:6).

Europeanization

Given the inherently multinational nature of the UN lead in the reconstruction effort, the Europeanization does not convincingly explain British policy decisions in this case. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Britain had more influence and leeway on the UN, and the EU therefore did not present a useful platform for the projection of national policy preferences. However, the EU did represent an important institutional venue through which to discuss and coordinate
financial contributions. This in turn points towards the salience of the European agenda and can be used as evidence of national adaptation: informal meetings of EU Development Ministers including Clare Short took place on 10 October and 8 November, and the UK contributed 19 percent of the overall EU humanitarian aid commitment of €44 million in 2001 (House of Commons, 23 November 2001). At the same time, DFID was equally in contact with other governments through the Afghanistan support group of major donors, including the USA, Japan and European member states (House of Commons, 23 November 2001) – and, DFID saw the role of the EC in the release of funds to ‘support infrastructure repair, de-mining, and local policing; humanitarian aid delivery; and administrative support to interim government’ (DFID, 13 November 2001) rather than a useful political platform in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. While the EU constituted a useful platform to hold meetings on the release of foreign aid, and a mechanism and resource for the delivery of humanitarian aid and to lay the foundation of long-term reconstruction of Afghanistan, this did not involve CFSP instruments but referred to the first pillar and thus resources of the European Commission.

This leaves little evidence of Europeanization as far as the EU CFSP was concerned. With respect to the EU CFSP the UK did, however, support German policy initiative to appoint a EU Special Representative both as a response to another member states’ policy initiative and out of some value attached to giving the EU a political profile in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. This points towards evidence of policy adaptation, where a policy was agreed to for the sake of EU unity (see Wong, 2005) even if there was no apparent UK preference in favour of such an appointment and the UK consented to the appointment in response to German political lobbying.
Alliance Politics

While the evidence of Europeanization is weak with respect to this policy area, neither is the alliance politics framework suited to explain British policy choices. To be sure, there were differences between the US and European member states in the question of Afghanistan's reconstruction that included the policy towards warlords (United States Institute for Peace, 2003) or the need for nation-building and to fight drugs where member states had pointed out to the US that there was a need to look at this sooner (Interview with Commission official, 26 July 2006). However, given that the UN had taken the lead in overseeing and coordinating reconstruction efforts, the alliance or US-British relations were not used to initiate or harmonise policies towards the reconstruction of Afghanistan. As a result, the alliance politics framework is not applicable in this policy area.

IV. Policy area 3: British participation in ISAF

This section argues that British participation and military lead in ISAF arose out of Britain's preferred military leadership role alongside the US, and that British policy preferences show a continuation of the basic impulses and policy preferences that shaped British responses towards the attacks on 11 September and UK participation in OEF. They were, essentially, close co-ordination with the US, and a British leadership role in the construction of ISAF within the EU as well as with non-EU contributing forces. A coalition of the willing rather than a proper NATO (or EU, for that matter) force, the military planning under UK lead took place in close cooperation with the US. This supports the alliance politics framework – the UK leaned towards consultation with the US and its NATO allies both for utilitarian reasons as well an inherent preference to coordinate military action in a transatlantic
framework. In addition, the UK in no uncertain terms distanced itself from suggestions that ISAF constituted an EU force, which suggests that the Europeanization framework is not applicable for explaining this policy area with respect to the war in Afghanistan, and that any considerations with respect to European coordination in ISAF were subordinated to transatlantic cooperation. Consequently, the analysis in this section will show that the Europeanization model is of limited use in explaining British policy decisions in this case.

As in the decision surrounding participation in OEF, Blair continued to have a strong preference on the formation and role of the UK in ISAF – although the military planning took place in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in close coordination with the US. Unlike decisions on the participation in OEF, there were more disagreements and deliberations that shaped the policy process, both in terms of domestic opposition to US military strategy as well as disagreements between the US and the UK over military planning. Initial discussions on ISAF took place with the US before the Bonn talks. The UK thought the US should not participate in the multinational force, and Blair's advisor pushed for the MOD to get involved (Interview with EU official, 11 September 2006). Blair maintained a high and public profile with respect to ISAF and Afghanistan not just by means of agreeing to troop deployments and coordinating international (in particular European) contributions, but also through high profile visits to British troops in Afghanistan in a context of a mission to Bangladesh, India and Pakistan to defuse regional tensions and to influence Pakistan to reject international terrorism (Agence France Presse, 8 January 2002). While Blair emphasized the British lead in ISAF, the MoD did decide on the strategic part of ISAF and the geographic scope of the mandate. However, there were reservations on lengthy British military involvement in Afghanistan: in his evidence
to the House of Commons, special envoy Bergne stressed that British forces should be succeeded as rapidly as possible by a multinational force given the history of Britain’s relations with Afghanistan\textsuperscript{96} – even if ISAF appears to have been welcome in Kabul (House of Commons, 12 June 2002b).

Given the British lead in co-ordinating military contributions to ISAF and in acting as lead nation for the first six months, the MoD took a larger role in the planning and decision-making than it did in the case of OEF, where the US essentially determined the targets and operations. Although some seventeen other countries also declared their willingness to participate in ISAF, Britain was very much in the lead. This was important to Blair as it demonstrated his willingness to show off the peacekeeping role of the military, even after 11 September (Kampfner 2003: 146). The British lead also resulted from the fact that the UK and Germany were the two European countries with the strongest level of interest and engagement in Afghanistan (Interview with EU official, 11 September 2006). To guard against accusations of overstretch – and out of consideration of Britain’s history of military engagement in Afghanistan and the resulting legacy (House of Commons, 12 June 2002a) – it was agreed that leadership of the force would be handed over to Turkey the following April. The negotiations and deliberations on the construction of ISAF took place on a bilateral basis and in the UN Security Council, and the UK Representative was unaware of any EU initiative with this regard – but did brief the Coasie group\textsuperscript{97} at the Council (Interview with EU official, 11 September 2006). The EU, while not the locus of policy making, was thus kept informed of policy developments.

\textsuperscript{96} During the 19th century, Britain, looking to protect its Indian empire from Russia, attempted to annex Afghanistan. This resulted in a series of British-Afghan Wars in 1838-42, 1878-80 and 1919-21 (Rubin, 2002).

\textsuperscript{97} COASIE is one of the Council’s specialized working groups that deals with policy towards Asia.
With respect to ISAF and the reconstruction of Afghanistan, there were differences between the US and UK as well as within the UK government on the political and military decisions with respect to ISAF and its role in Afghanistan’s peacekeeping and reconstruction. For instance, Clare Short complained that the US were not taking the aid situation seriously enough, and the Foreign Office and US State Department wanted to extend ISAF’s remit beyond Kabul but were overruled by the Pentagon and Ministry of Defence, whereas Blair did not see this as essential, although desirable (Kampfner 2003: 146). Robert Cooper also tried to persuade the US to agree to a geographic extension of the mandate, and to think about involving NATO, but the Pentagon did not take up this suggestion (Interview with EU official, 11 September 2006). The key for the UK was whether or not the US would back ISAF in case of crisis – with no affirmative response from the US, however, the UK did not proceed with this initiative (Interview with EU official, 11 September 2006). From the viewpoint of the MOD, Britain made it clear that it would lead the force only if it came under overall command of the US, citing the risk and impracticality of running two operations – the peacekeeping and offensive missions – separately (The Times, 15 December 2001).

Domestically, there were some concerns and reservations over the need to establish Afghan consent to the British presence, the danger of “mission creep” and the need for US support for the stabilisation of the mission – these were voiced publicly by Ian Duncan Smith and repeated in the Commons by Conservative Defence spokesman Bernard Jenkins. Blair responded to these concerns that it was vital that Britain bolstered the political agreement for Afghanistan and that it was ‘the country best placed to lead that force’ (The Irish Times, 20 December 2001), which
illustrates that domestic reservations over the size and strength of ISAF did not impact policy decision-making.

Still, the promise of 'limited deployment' of British troops under a 3-month ISAF lead in particular raised confusion and concerns domestically that the UK could get drawn into a more lengthy deployment. The opposition in particular wanted assurance that British troops would not be left in Afghanistan beyond their 90-day tour of duty, but with Turkey seeking assurances over the cost and guarantees from the US that their troops would be evacuated if unrest broke out in Kabul the change in lead nation status took an extra 90 days to take place (Turkish Daily News, 26 February 2002). With respect to the number of British troops deployed as part of ISAF, on 19 December 2001 Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon announced the dispatch of up to 1,500 British soldiers, the bulk of them paratroopers, to Kabul, with an advance party of 200 Marine commandoes flying in immediately to head the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). There were some differences with the US, who tried to keep the numbers and remit of ISAF to a minimum, fearing that the force would 'confuse the battlefield' and not wanting other countries to interfere with the US anti-terror operation. In the end, ISAF was to be confined to guarding Bagram and other strategic sites, and all activities were subject to veto by the US administration (Kampfner 2003: 146). The agreement of troop numbers eventually led to the following contingent: Britain assumed the organization and command of first six months (rather than the three months planned initially) and supplied force headquarters, brigade HQ, an infantry battle group, explosive ordnance demolition (EOD) and others (United Press International, 10 January 2002).
Europeanization

There is little evidence of Europeanization in this particular policy area, particularly as it refers to the absence of any decision that would have given an EU label for a coordinated contribution to ISAF. While those EU member states that contributed to ISAF did co-ordinate their commitments under British lead, not all EU member states offered troops; in the end, of the 15 countries attending a London conference to offer troops to the proposed force, eight were not from the EU98 (The Times, 15 December 2001). The outright rejection of the 'EU force' indicates instead that the EU platform was not of salience in this particular policy area but rather considered inappropriate to begin with, and that the EU CFSP/ESDP did not represent a means through which to project any national preferences. On the contrary, the strong reaction on the part of the government as well as the domestic opposition suggests that in the case of ISAF, the idea of a coordinated 'EU force' invoked a direct threat to NATO and the UK's transatlantic credentials.

The issue of an 'EU force' flared up at the Laeken Summit in December 2001 when Belgian Foreign Minister Michel in the view of the British press at least presented 'the force as some sort of embryonic army' and SG/HR Solana stated that the force would be 'basically an EU force led by one country of the EU' (The Times, 15 December 2001). British ministers and spokesmen rebuffed these statements, with Jack Straw saying that 'there's no question of the EU having a defence force, still less being able to deploy one it doesn't have in Afghanistan', whereas Peter Hain, Foreign Office Minister, stated that the 'EU rapid reaction force is not even walking yet, let alone running and able to run an operation like that.' Downing Street issued a statement saying that ISAF was 'an UN-mandated international force which will have

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98 These were Turkey, Malaysia, Jordan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Norway and the Czech Republic.
EU members. It will also have a range of other countries. Quite clearly it is not an EU
force’ (The Times, 15 December 2001). The Conservatives in turn interpreted
Michel’s comments as a sign that the creation of the ESDP had led to a political
momentum where the threat to NATO had become quite real. The EU force, then, not
only touched on issues of military practicalities but also on fears on some parts of
British government that ESDP was eclipsing NATO.

The question of a EU-force was therefore also a topic of political tension and
debate domestically. Charges of a political fix arose in early 2002, when Defence
Secretary Geoffrey Hoon distanced himself from the Canadian charges that the EU
had deliberately limited ISAF to European units (United Press International, 10
January 2002) as representatives from ISAF signed up formally to their contribution
at a meeting at the MOD on 10 January 2002. Canada in return withdrew the offer to
join ISAF and accepted a US invitation to join its campaign in Kandahar. British
Conservative Party defence spokesman Bernard Jenkin’s repeated and expanded on
these accusations saying that they were an embryonic Euro-army in all but name, but
these were also rejected by Geoffrey Hoon, as the countries contributing troops under
the UK’s (in the persona of General McColl) three-month leadership excluded
Canada, but included Britain, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Turkey,
Belgium, Portugal, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Romania, Norway, Greece and New
Zealand (The Times, 9 January 2002).

The sizable national contributions of EU member states to ISAF could serve
as evidence of Europeanization in terms of the co-ordination with other EU member
states, however. This could be interpreted as reflecting a preference towards
coordination among EU member states, particularly in regard to the sizable European
– albeit not under a EU label- commitments in the area of security and defence at
present (Giegerich and Wallace, 2004). However, the reluctance on the part of the British government, including the ministry of defence, to own up to such a European effort and in essence rejecting a EU label for the military operations, does not make for a convincing case of Europeanization. It neither demonstrates a preference for a European approach (policy adaptation), or the use of the EU platform (policy projection): after all, similar national constellations have been deployed under NATO command before, and the overall chain of command of ISAF ended with the US, and NATO assets were used. And, Britain’s leadership in setting up the ISAF peacekeeping force did not take place within a EU framework, but a national one, and built on the transatlantic relationship and Britain’s national military capabilities instead.

Alliance Politics

With respect to the creation of ISAF, there is considerable evidence of alliance politics in British foreign policy. This holds true with respect to the military planning as well as the rejection of a coordinated EU force, and points towards some of the indicators of alliance politics outlined in chapter two. The first is that of utilitarian motives of coordinating the OEF and ISAF military efforts with the US, who had overall command of military operations in Afghanistan. Beyond pragmatic reasons however, there was also a clear and instinctive preference towards a transatlantic framework. While internal differences within the British government – mainly the objections of members of the Conservative party – precluded decisions towards a co-ordinated EU force, there was no appetite for such a move even in the government, as the statements issued by No. 10 and the Foreign Office in rejection of

99 Note that due to US preferences, ‘alliance politics’ refers to transatlantic relations and relations with other NATO members as much as it does to NATO as an institution.
such a force cited in the previous section illustrate. The future of NATO and the transatlantic alliance more generally, which were important considerations in the first policy area, strongly weighed in on British policy decisions in this case.

Several policy decisions taken by the UK support this conclusion. Britain stated early on that it would only agree to lead ISAF if the force came under overall US command, with MoD forces cited as saying that it would be impractical and risky to run two operations, the peace-keeping and the offensive missions, separately (The Times, 15 December 2001). This shows that from a military planning standpoint, the UK – the MoD in particular – was leaning towards an alliance politics framework for ISAF. But, attitudes towards the utility of the ESDP or an ‘EU label’ for military operations were not confined to questions of the make-up of the ISAF force but preceded the events of 11 September altogether – thereby linking into broader strategic priorities and preferences: the UK’s strategic priorities by early 2001 were seen as geographically beyond Europe. The appropriateness of the ESDP and the Helsinki Headline Goal for meeting those security challenges was therefore not readily apparent (Clarke and Cornish, 2002). The UK’s changed priorities meant that NATO was deemed a more important and more relevant institutional framework than ESDP (Howorth, 2003-04). While this does not mean that the UK did not continue to support the ESDP project, it means that London had changed its priorities – and, with respect to ISAF, the changed strategic priorities and the value attached to NATO in transatlantic cooperation in meeting the security challenges identified and reinforced by the events of 11 September, meant that the EU CFSP/ESDP was not considered an appropriate institution in this case – or that ISAF presented an opportunity to hurry the development of ESDP along.

100 Instead, security challenges now seemed to come from regions beyond Europe, including Iran, Iraq, Korea, China, South Asia and the Middle East (see Howorth, 2003-04).
More fundamentally, the ‘special relationship’ and the strong value placed on the UK’s close ties to the US as a result determined much of the UK’s policy response in this case. In conjunction with the UK lead in coordinating European contributions to OEF, a transatlantic emphasis in the construction of ISAF was a logical corollary to the UK’s goal that the US should not feel isolated following the attack of 11 September, but that influence on US policies was best achieved through partnership rather than competition: US reservations towards the ESDP project, particularly prior to the conclusion of the Berlin Plus agreements meant that any moves towards an EU force were likely to be perceived on the part of the US to weaken NATO and transatlantic ties more generally (see Toje 2003). In a crisis that called first and foremost for a demonstration of solidarity with the US in the minds of British decision-makers, then, such a move was hardly appropriate.

V. Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that British foreign policy decisions in the case of Afghanistan were overwhelmingly driven by the objective to show solidarity with the United States and to influence US policies towards Afghanistan as much as possible — this applied particularly to the policy area on participation in OEF but also to the construction of ISAF. However, one has to bear in mind the nature of the war in Afghanistan and the fact that it arose as an act of self-defence on the part of the US in response to the terrorist attacks on 11 September — which makes the subordination to US leadership unsurprising. Still, the EU was of some salience to the UK as a policy platform for co-ordinating military contributions and the UK subsequently took a leadership position among other EU member states on this matter. While this points towards evidence of Europeanization as policy projection, the UK leadership position
was sought and used as a means to help shape US policies, and the value placed on EU unity did not extend to the mini-summits initiated by Jacques Chirac ahead of the Ghent summit or the Downing Street Dinner convened by Prime Minister Blair. The outright rejection of the suggestion that ISAF constituted an 'EU-force' further weakens the Europeanization hypothesis. Instead, alliance politics played a decisive role in British decision making where the priorities of the US, and the objective to shape these priorities towards the use of multilateral institutions, particularly NATO and the UN, were of foremost importance to British policy makers. With respect to the reconstruction of Afghanistan, the UK did support the appointment of an EU Special Representative, but its first policy priority extended to support for the UN lead in coordinating reconstruction and humanitarian aid, with the bilateral measures taken towards Afghanistan, in particular the assumption of lead nation in the effort to eradicate drugs in the country, further attesting to the fact that the EU was not the most salient institutional platform even in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. In conclusion, therefore, the Europeanization model has limited explanatory value in this case.
Chapter 10. Conclusion

I. Introduction

This chapter summarizes the findings of the empirical analysis of the two crisis case studies by comparing the three countries’ decisions with respect to each of the three policy areas in the crisis in FYROM and the war in Afghanistan. A ‘horizontal’ comparison, in addition to analyzing the empirical evidence of the preceding six chapters, allows for a nuanced conclusion on the degree of Europeanization of national foreign policies and highlights the obstacles to further integration in the field of foreign and security policy. Whereas all three countries’ policy decisions revealed some evidence of Europeanization, this evidence has tended to be more pronounced when it came to decisions involving a political and economic role for the EU. As far as ESDP is concerned, however, two of the three countries analyzed, although not in principle against an ESDP mission, deferred to NATO and the US and prioritized institutional arrangements between the EU and NATO in the case of FYROM. In Afghanistan, a military mission under ESDP was not considered seriously enough for a policy proposal to emerge from initial discussions. This leads to the conclusion that alliance politics rather than Europeanization is better suited to explain decision-making with respect to the question of the application of ESDP instruments in the two cases.

II. Findings: the Europeanization of national foreign policy?

1. The crisis in FYROM

National decisions towards the crisis in FYROM reveal substantial evidence of Europeanization, particularly regarding the first policy area. While there is no evidence of Europeanization with respect to the second policy area, the third policy
area reflects tensions between the EU CFSP/ESDP and NATO/US preferences. The table below summarises the findings with respect to the three indicators of Europeanization—adaptation, projection, identity formation—that are analysed in more detail in the sections that follow.

### Policy area 1: support for the political negotiation of the EU CFSP

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### Policy area 2: participation in NATO Operation Essential Harvest

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### Policy area 3: the politics of the ESDP take-over from NATO

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**Policy area 1: support for the EU CFSP in the political negotiations**

With respect to the support of the EU CFSP in the political negotiations of the crisis, all three countries exhibited signs of Europeanization, both in the sense of projecting as well as adapting national policies to the EU CFSP. All three countries made efforts...
to align their statements on the crisis with a common EU line, and all three were explicit that this was a crisis where the EU should take a lead in the political negotiation, which points towards adaptation. Moreover, two of the three countries analyzed in this thesis actively influenced the negotiations. France projected national preferences by successfully lobbying for the appointment of a EU Special Representative, while Britain through its embassy in Skopje played an instrumental part in facilitating Solana's local impact. Germany, although more cautious on account of the geographic proximity of FYROM, also endorsed Solana assuming a role in the negotiation of the crisis. This shows that all three countries viewed the EU CFSP as a legitimate and important tool in the solution of the crisis and means that national foreign policies in the three member states were Europeanized insofar as the EU CFSP was accorded a significant role in the solution of the crisis: Javier Solana had a mandate to negotiate on behalf of the EU member states, and the EU CFSP held a high profile in the national discourse, particularly in France and Germany. The EU CFSP was suggested and supported as the most appropriate institutional platform to deal with the crisis. Of course, the fact that all three member states retained a crucial role in setting the overall political framework through the Contact Group demonstrates that Britain, France and Germany were equally keen to retain national influence in international intervention and shows the importance attached to the inclusion of the US as well as Russia in the solution to the crisis. However, the application of EU CFSP instruments in all three countries was deemed important, and supported through practical measures. This confirms the first hypothesis for the Europeanization thesis formulated in chapter 1: in the case of the political negotiation in the crisis in FYROM, there was a significant influence of the EU
CFSP on national foreign policy, which resulted in governments advocating a significant role in the crisis.

Evidence of alliance politics was present in this policy area insofar as the presence of NATO in FYROM and the involvement of the US in the resolution of the crisis were deemed important for a peaceful outcome of the crisis. This in turn points towards the indicator of relying on NATO for utilitarian reasons rather than out of a fundamental transatlantic preference that would have made the application of instruments located in the EU CFSP contentious. The advancement of the EU CFSP and the application of political instrument located within the EU CFSP was uncontested and not regarded as competition to NATO. This in turn supports the conclusion that there is strong evidence of Europeanization in this particular decision point particularly with respect to the second hypothesis of alliance politics: the fact that there was little perceived threat towards the alliance allowed for a significant role afforded to the EU CFSP. In the case of this particular policy area, then, NATO and the EU CFSP were perceived as complementary rather than competing institutions by policy makers in the three countries.

Policy area 2: participation in NATO Operation Essential Harvest

With respect to the decision to launch and participate in NATO Operation Essential Harvest, the Europeanization approach is not relevant as the EU CFSP/ESDP was not suggested in the first place. NATO was considered the relevant military actor both on account of its previous involvement in the area, the trust enjoyed by the local population as well as the continued involvement of the US in the Balkans (Interview with EU official, 21 June 2005) a view that was shared by all three member states. Keeping the US involved in European security, and convincing the US of the
continued need for NATO in the region as well as in FYROM in particular, represented a policy goal for the UK in particular (Interview with EU official, 11 September 2006), a view that was shared by France and Germany as well. This in turn confirms the alliance politics hypothesis formulated in chapter 1: there was a significant influence of the transatlantic alliance both in terms of the goal of keeping the US involved in European security and utilitarian considerations, and this resulted in a significant role for NATO. Policy makers in all three countries regarded NATO as the most appropriate forum for supporting the Ohrid Framework agreement following the resolution of the crisis. A degree of variance can be observed in the German case where, although policy makers did not push for military instruments located outside NATO, Europe's capacity to act was frequently invoked to justify German participation in the military operations conducted. This demonstrates that some amount of Europeanization understood as identity formation can be observed in the sense that military participation was linked to the EU rather than national unilateral preferences or NATO and transatlantic ties exclusively; and that this made military participation more easily acceptable domestically.

Policy area 3: the politics of the ESDP takeover from NATO

The analysis of the third policy area has revealed the greatest variance between the three countries. France was the only case where the application of ESDP instruments was suggested early on, and the only country that did not consider institutional rather than ad hoc arrangements between the EU and NATO as necessary to launch an ESDP operation in FYROM. This reflects the underlying attitude towards NATO, and the conception of the EU ESDP as autonomous and an alternative rather than a complementing political and military tool to NATO. The French position also reflects the belief that the operation was small enough for the EU ESDP to take on this
challenge without major risk of violence breaking out anew (Interview with French official, 20 June 2005). French decisions in this case therefore reveal strong evidence of Europeanization and confirm the first Europeanization hypothesis: significant influence of EU security institutions result in governments advocating a significant role for the EU CFSP/ESDP in a particular crisis.

Britain, by contrast, while not opposed to the eventual application of ESDP instruments in FYROM in principle (Interview with UK official, 29 June 2006), insisted on a prior agreement with NATO. This reflects the privileged position of NATO in British foreign policy thinking as well as strong ties with the US, and therefore confirms the third hypothesis of Europeanization: EU security institutions exerted some influence on national foreign policy, but this influence was weighed against other factors. This led to the UK advocating a partial role for the EU CFSP/ESDP that included political, but not military tools in the absence of institutional arrangements between NATO and the EU. The fact that the EU CFSP/ESDP as an alternative platform for policy action existed, and the fact that another member state pushed for the application of ESDP instruments means that British policy adapted to consent to an ESDP takeover from NATO. As a result, British policy actions with respect to the third policy area support the alliance politics hypothesis formulated in chapter 1: significant influence of the transatlantic alliance, both in terms of US preference against a European role, and pressures to keep NATO in play resulted in a small role afforded to ESDP when it comes to military matters. The German case, finally, exhibits similar evidence as that of the British case: the eventual application of ESDP instruments was not contested, but the prior agreement with NATO was a precondition for consent to such a mission. In addition, German policy makers also emphasized regional stability: apart from
transatlantic relations, then, concern over the impact of an ESDP take-over on regional stability left the Federal Foreign Office cautious on the change from NATO. But, the high value placed on the ESDP and Europe's ability to act in national rhetoric demonstrates that domestic norms leaned towards the application of policy tools in ESDP, pointing—in addition to similar adaptation pressures facing the UK—towards Europeanization understood as identity formation, where an ESDP operation was presented as desirable and domestically acceptable. In the case of the UK, there was little evidence that would point towards a shifting preference towards ESDP in general, although the preference for NATO was on account of utilitarian reasons rather than exclusively transatlantic leanings.

Conclusion

The analysis of the decisions taken with respect to the crisis in FYROM show that the role afforded to the EU CFSP was initially a political one as all three countries were in agreement that the EU CFSP should play a crucial part in the political negotiations. The application of EU CFSP/ESDP instruments stopped short of the application of military instruments, however, on account of the difference of positions vis-à-vis the need for an agreement between NATO and the EU on the sharing of NATO assets before the launch of an ESDP military operation. This confirms the importance of alliance politics considerations in the case of Germany and Britain, although none of the three countries were opposed in principle to the eventual ESDP take-over from NATO. The fact that an eventual take-over from NATO was not contested but that this was a question of timing rather than principle in turn confirms the salience of the European agenda in the case of FYROM and the Europeanization approach more generally, even as it applies to military instruments located in ESDP. French moves towards the appointment of an EUSR demonstrate the uploading dimension of
Europeanization, and Javier Solana’s proactive stance in the crisis meant that national foreign policies in all three countries adapted to changes in the institutional set-up of the EU CFSP.

2. The war in Afghanistan

National decisions towards the war in Afghanistan reveal some evidence of Europeanization, although this evidence is confined to the second policy area exclusively. The table below summarises the findings along the three indicators of Europeanization that are analysed in more detail in the sections that follow.

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<th>Policy area 1: OEF and the war on terror</th>
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<th>Policy area 3: ISAF and its institutional anchoring</th>
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Policy area 1: OEF and the war on terror

The participation in OEF confirms the alliance politics framework in all three countries, but shows little evidence of Europeanization in national foreign policy formulation. Britain, France and Germany regarded the military participation in OEF as a matter of solidarity with the US, with Germany and Britain in particular keen on disposing of the Taliban regime and the opportunity to work towards the elimination of security threats emanating from Afghanistan through the country’s reconstruction. As emerged from the analysis in the individual country case studies, both Britain and Germany had attempted to initiate international consensus and a strategy to do more about Afghanistan the year prior to the attacks of 11 September, although the terrorist attacks and the invocation of Article V meant that the US took a pronounced lead on military measures in Afghanistan.

To be sure, leaders used the opportunity for electoral purposes in Paris and to push the country towards assuming more responsibility internationally in Berlin, but the fundamental impulse in this policy area was transatlantic solidarity in response to the terrorist attacks. This was most apparent in the case of Britain, where Blair seized the occasion to not only get close to the US but also play the role of a mediator between Europe and the US. All three countries also placed a high emphasis on the use of the UN and NATO in terms of the invocation of article V of the NATO treaty to legitimize the military action in Afghanistan and to place the country’s reconstruction, the second policy area in this case study, on a multilateral footing. Variance in transatlantic solidarity between Britain and France also emerged with respect to the geographic restriction of the war on terror on Afghanistan, although this is not the subject of the analysis in this PhD thesis. Evidence of Europeanization in this case is weak as the application of CFSP instruments was not considered
beyond statements of solidarity with the US; British, French and German efforts to co-ordinate their actions in order to forge a European line does not serve as evidence of Europeanization as this did not result in the application in instruments located in the EU CFSP. Still, this coordination — and the goal for the EU to be a visible platform even if this did not include SG/HR Solana but was confined to the member states — shows that the European agenda, defined as acting in concert rather than through the EU CFSP, was of some salience even in this case. As a result, policy actions in the three member states confirm the following hypotheses for Europeanization and alliance politics formulated in chapter 1: there was little influence of EU security institutions on national foreign policy which resulted in a small role afforded to the EU CFSP; by contrast, there was significant influence of the transatlantic alliance and US preferences, which resulted in a small role for the EU CFSP.

Policy area 2: The reconstruction of Afghanistan

The analysis of the second policy area yields some evidence of Europeanization, but there is variance among the three countries. Germany successfully projected its national preference for a visible role for the EU CFSP and lobbied for and succeeded in appointing a German national as EUSR. With respect to Germany, then, policy decisions confirm the Europeanization thesis: there was a significant influence of EU security institutions on national foreign policy in the sense that the EU CFSP provided a platform through which to enforce national policy preferences of a high political profile for the EU. Britain and France supported this move, indicating that they were in agreement on the need for a visible role for the EU CFSP, and adapted to the preference of another member state. Neither Britain, which was very active in Afghanistan both in the military as well as the political and economic aspects, nor
France, which did not take a lead role in Afghanistan or exhibit a strong interest in Afghanistan prior to 11 September (Interview with EU official, 11 September 2006), regarded the EU as a similarly vital platform. This leads to the conclusion that with respect to the second policy area, the degree of Europeanization in France and Britain was low. For all three countries, however, the UN was the most important platform to co-ordinate the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Alliance politics was not applicable in the case, as the UN rather than the US took the lead in shaping the political and economic parameters of the reconstruction of Afghanistan. With respect to Germany, then, the second policy area confirms the first Europeanization hypothesis: **significant influence of EU security institutions resulted in Germany advocating a significant role for the EU CFSP in Afghanistan’s reconstruction.** With respect to Britain and France, it confirms the second Europeanization hypothesis: **little influence of EU security institutions on national foreign policy resulted in a small role afforded to the EU CFSP.**

**Policy area 3: ISAF and its institutional anchoring**

The participation in ISAF confirms the role of alliance politics rather than Europeanization in the policy decisions in two of the three countries. Britain and Germany were in favour of NATO command against initial US preferences (Interview with EU official, 11 September 2006). This was for operational and utilitarian reasons, as NATO command meant that the lead-nation model could be abolished, although multilateral preferences in the case of Germany and the UK constituted a secondary motivation. For France, NATO was not regarded as an appropriate institutional framework, although Paris came to relent on this question in view of allies’ pressures and out of the recognition that transatlantic preferences and therefore the US were to prevail in this policy area. None of the three countries
advocated an ESDP operation or a EU label for the European contributions for ISAF. This shows that despite the publicly stated intention for Europe to play a role in the military aspect of Afghanistan’s reconstruction on the part of the German chancellor, in the end considerations that reflect the Europeanization hypothesis were not sufficiently strong as to result in a policy proposal to employ ESDP instruments, or to push for a coordinated EU force. Instead, each of the three countries made efforts to coordinate its overall position with the other two as well as the US, although France and Germany attempted to sell this coordination as a European rather than national effort domestically. Still, as in the case of military contributions to the NATO Operation in FYROM, the European rhetoric adopted by French and German leaders points towards a preference if not for the EU ESDP, then at the very minimum for a co-ordinated European approach subsumed under an EU label. With respect to the institutional anchoring of ISAF, then, member states’ foreign policies confirm the following hypotheses formulated in chapter 1: while there was little influence of EU security institutions on national foreign policy there was significant influence of the transatlantic alliance and US preferences. This therefore resulted in a negligible role afforded to the EU CFSP.

Conclusion
The analysis of the decisions taken with regard to the war in Afghanistan show that as in the case of FYROM, the role afforded to the EU CFSP/ESDP was primarily a political one, with the Commission playing a large financial role as well. Importantly there was no fundamental disagreement on this role among the three member states. The role for the EU CFSP stopped short of a military one, however, because the EU ESDP was not considered ready for assuming such a task, and because member states had different conceptions on the appropriate institutional framework to begin with.
Britain favoured NATO from early on and Germany likewise preferred NATO. France, finally, did not initially favour the use of NATO in Afghanistan, but adjusted its position in light of allies' preferences.

III. Theoretical implications: Europeanization as a useful framework?

The analysis of member states foreign policies in this research has yielded some insights that refute arguments that the term ‘Europeanization’ ought not to be used as an organizing concept to begin with (Kassim, 2000: 238). For the purpose of this thesis, the Europeanization approach has proven useful in highlighting the influence of EU on national foreign policy, even if the two crisis case studies have shown that the influence of the EU security institutions and, by extension, the explanatory value of the Europeanization approach itself, is limited especially when it comes to the application of military instruments under the EU ESDP and uneven when it comes to the two crises. This in turn highlights the conceptual limitation of the Europeanization framework.

Focussing on processes of Europeanization has been valuable in the case of Afghanistan, which at first glance appeared to be determined exclusively by transatlantic considerations. The Europeanization approach has highlighted that the EU CFSP presented a useful political forum for member states in particular with respect to the political and economic aspects of the reconstruction of Afghanistan. It also shows the extent to which one member state, Germany, used the EU CFSP as a political platform for formulating policy. But, when it comes to the application of military instruments, Europeanization has shown to be of limited explanatory value. US preferences and member states' aim to utilize NATO, in addition to the nature of the crisis, determined the responses of two of the three countries analyzed. The third
country, France, resisted NATO assuming command of ISAF in the case of Afghanistan in large part out of concern over the consequences of showing a Western flag in a Muslim country – and did not take a similarly large interest in Afghanistan when it came to matters of political and economic reconstruction as the two other countries analyzed in this thesis did (Interview with EU official, 11 September 2006).

With respect to the crisis in FYROM, on the other hand, where all three countries were expected to exhibit a European preference based on Europe’s previous engagement in the Balkans, adopting the Europeanization approach yields a less surprising finding. Here, Europeanization highlighted the extent to which all three countries reacted and adapted to Javier Solana’s proactive stance and the recently created office of the SG/HR. While all three countries retained national influence on the negotiations through the Contact Group – in addition to ensuring US support in the negotiations - France in particular used the EU CFSP to project national preferences by lobbying for the appointment of a EUSR. Although this did not lead to institutional change in national systems of governance as a result of voluntary agreements among member states (Olsen, 2002: 923), it does show that member states adapted to existing institutions within the EU CFSP as a major component in the political negotiation of the crisis by either supporting Javier Solana directly, as in the case of Britain, or by adopting a unitary political line with respect to the EU’s negotiation position as in the case of France and Germany. Europeanization in this case did include the strengthening of the EU CFSP’s organizational capacity for collective action (Olsen, 2002; Checkel, 2001) and therefore the development of institutions at the EU level. National policies on FYROM, therefore, confirm the existence of Europeanization processes in national foreign policy.
The limitation of the explanatory value of the Europeanization approach relates to the use of military force under the EU ESDP, and conflicting views among the member states as to the role of the US in European security. Here, the utility of the Europeanization approach – in particular by contrasting Europeanization with alliance politics - lies in the ability to delineate the tension between NATO and transatlantic relations more generally, and the goal to build up the ability for the EU CFSP/ESDP to act. Strengthening the organizational capacity of the EU in FYROM came into conflict with transatlantic preferences and priorities, and the professed wish for both a successful first ESDP mission and the preservation of regional stability on the part of Britain and Germany. This resulted in a delay of the assumption of the military operation under ESDP.

As expected, given the sizable US interest in both cases and the influence of transatlantic relations in the individual countries, there are limitations of the explanatory potential of the Europeanization approach. This is particularly the case when it comes to the application of military instruments located in ESDP, where in both cases member states consideration of US preferences determined policy outcomes. The exception is France in FYROM, although its acquiescence to the application of NATO in ISAF as well as its transatlantic solidarity in OEF shows that the transatlantic relationship was of importance in France as well.

These findings have implications with respect to the potential contributions of this research formulated in chapter 1 - the utility of the Europeanization framework to explain national decision-making in foreign security and defence policy. Although the comparison of the three cases has yielded some results that point towards the applicability of the Europeanization framework to explain policy decisions, Europeanization does not serve as an overall explanation for national policy
decisions. Integration mechanisms in the sense that existing EU institutions exert influence on national foreign policy that results in policy adaptation were not observed when it came to the application of military instruments under ESDP, with the exception of France's preferences with respect to an ESDP take over from NATO in FYROM. This means that the utility of the Europeanization framework is limited on account of the influence of the transatlantic alliance in national foreign policy. In addition to the limitation of the explanatory value of Europeanization when it comes to the empirical evidence presented in this thesis, there is also a fundamental conceptual limitation when it comes to the applicability of Europeanization.

As has been noted in chapter 2, one criticism of research utilizing Europeanization is that it does not have a precise or stable meaning and the definition, and that the operationalization of the concept presents a challenge to researchers. Europeanization represents an analytical concept rather than a theory. This means that research on the Europeanization of foreign policy, even if it does document processes of Europeanization, does not provide a theoretical explanation on the origins of these processes that are reflected in the policy decisions of member states.

A fundamental weakness of the Europeanization framework adopted in this thesis, therefore, is that it does not explain why countries prefer EU instruments over those located in NATO (and vice versa). The variance observed in the three member states' reactions in the two different crises raises the question of what explains these preferences. This limitation of the Europeanization concept in explaining the long-term trends behind national foreign policy decisions in turn points toward avenues of research that could fill this gap. For instance, a focus on national strategic cultures (see Giegerich, 2006) could complement the findings of this thesis and highlight the
origins of national predispositions towards the EU or NATO. Such research on the long-term trends in national foreign policy preferences would also complement and strengthen the third dimension of Europeanization, that of identity formation. The nature of the cases selected – two crises where decision had to be taken in a short time span – has not permitted a detailed exploration of changing member states’ preferences. As a result, evidence gathered from the empirical analysis of changing policy preferences towards the EU CFSP/ESDP has been slim in the two case studies analysed in this thesis. Although a research focus on long-term aspects of member states’ foreign policies towards the EU CFSP/ESDP could document changes in the third dimension of Europeanization, the question of what explains these preferences nevertheless remains.

Also, the Europeanization framework adopted in this thesis under-explores the impact of 11 September on fundamental policy priorities on the part of the member states. To be sure, with respect to FYROM, this research has shown that 11 September at most delayed rather than negated the application of ESDP instruments\textsuperscript{101} and therefore has little bearing on the decision to deploy ESDP instruments on the part of member states. However, with respect to Afghanistan, some member states’ emphasis on the strengthening of NATO after 11 September (see Howorth, 2003-04), and NATO’s eventual deployment in Afghanistan indicate that the events of 11 September may have pushed the development of ESDP as a military actor in the background.

\textsuperscript{101} To be sure, evidence gathered from research interview is somewhat contradictory: an EU official interviewed stressed that ‘there had been no collateral damage in FYROM on account of 11 September’ (Interview with EU official, 21 June 2005), whereas a policy analyst said that ‘priorities with respect to an ESDP operation in FYROM shifted on account of 11 September – other things came up’ (Interview with policy analyst, 10 June 2005). The fact that Léotard’s proposal was rejected before 11 September, however, gives credence to the first statement and indicates that the fundamental objection towards ESDP on the part of the UK and Germany were independent of the impact of the events of 11 September.
IV. Conclusion.

The analysis presented in this thesis has shown that adopting a Europeanization approach that conceptualizes a number of institutional and national processes of change and the way in which EU CFSP/ESDP institutions are utilized, strengthened (or sidelined), demonstrates that specific European dynamics exist that influence and shape member states foreign policy. Focussing on the effects of Europeanization processes on national foreign policy has permitted the delineation of national commitments to the EU CFSP/ESDP and commitments and preferences that lean towards the use of NATO and that are mindful of the preferences of the US.

Beyond the Europeanization and alliance politics dichotomy, however, the two cases also show that the scope of applications of the instruments in CFSP/ESDP was not clearly defined in the minds of member states. Apart from the military limitations of ESDP at the time, resistance on the part of the US/NATO and member states preferences for avoiding transatlantic conflict, the two cases also highlight that there is no clear conception of where and to what end ESDP instruments should be employed. Whereas the Balkans were uncontested as a terrain for EU civilian and military crisis management instruments on the grounds of previous EU involvement, Afghanistan was not an area where the application of EU military crisis management instruments was perceived to be appropriate tools for the task of reconstruction, although the EU made substantial commitments to Afghanistan.

Contrasting the two case studies has yielded a surprising finding: whereas in the case of FYROM, the eventual use of ESDP instruments was not contested in principle and achieving co-ordination and coherence as part of strengthening the EU’s collective action capability (Olsen, 2002:3) was delayed rather than precluded, the case of Afghanistan has shown that the use of CFSP/ESDP instruments on the
part of EU member states was determined by considerations that go beyond considerations of putting the EU on the map as a global security actor. Instead, these considerations included the nature and intensity of the crisis in question; the role of the US and the transatlantic alliance more broadly in the conflict; the geographic scope of the crisis; and considerations over a Western/EU label in a Muslim country.

Events since 2001 have highlighted that questions over the EU’s military reach have yet to be resolved: implicitly the EU appears to be a regional security actor, although the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) lists terrorism and failed states among the key threats facing Europe (Council of the European Union, 2003): both are global in nature, and points toward global rather than regional ambitions for the EU as a security actor. Indeed, ESDP has gone global with missions ranging from Aceh, Indonesia to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Geographically, this goes beyond the immediate neighbourhood of potential member states. But, the EU’s global reach so far has been selective, both geographically as well as in the nature of the missions (Biscop, 2006; Cox, 2006). This raises the question of whether the reluctance to deploy military instruments under the EU ESDP is merely a matter of transatlantic friction and the lack of ‘Europeanization’ of national foreign policy, or whether at bottom this is a matter of deliberate or unintentional ambiguity as to the EU’s global role.
The Crisis in FYROM - Chronology of Events

2001

January
January 21 – One policeman killed and four injured by rocket fired at the village of Tearce. Albanian guerrilla group National Liberation Army (NLA) admits to the attack on January 26.

February
February 28 – NATO delegation arrives in FYROM for crisis talks with Macedonian officials.

March
March 4 – FYROM calls for an emergency session of the UN Security Council to discuss setting up a buffer zone between FYROM and Kosovo.
March 19 – EU foreign ministers meet in Brussels to discuss the crisis. Javier Solana due in Skopje.
March 26 – NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, in talks with President Trajkovski and some of Macedonia’s party leaders. Javier Solana also present.
March 27 – Solana calls on ethnic Albanians rebels to start talking to the government during high profile visit to Tetovo.

April
April 2 – President Trajkovski chairs talks aimed at ending the grievances of Macedonian’s ethnic Albanians. Chris Patten and Javier Solana travel to Skopje for more talks.
April 9 – Stabilisation and Association Agreement between FYROM and the European Union signed in Luxembourg.
April 11 – Contact Group meets on FYROM

May
May 6 – Solana visits FYROM after an informal meeting of EU foreign ministers in Sweden.
May 7 – Robertson and Solana meet with Trajkovski and Georgievski.
May 13 – New government of national unity is elected.
May 16 – The EU Troika visits FYROM. EU appoints British Ambassador Mark Dickinson Special Envoy to Macedonia.
May 28 – Javier Solana visits Skopje, gives backing to Georgievski's government of national unity.

June
June 8 – President Boris Trajkovski presents a partial amnesty to break the country's military and political deadlock. NATO offers help in disarming the rebels. Javier Solana arrives in Skopje for two-day visit.
June 9 – Solana expresses satisfaction with the outcome of the discussions, invited Macedonian political leaders to participate in the EU Summit in Luxembourg on June 25.
June 12 - Macedonian government adopts a peace plan which provides for amnesty for the rebels.

June 13 - US, France, Britain and other European allies advocated bolder action by NATO at an informal NATO summit

June 14 - Lord Robertson and Javier Solana meet with Macedonian government: NATO members strongly support FYROM and the plan for disarmament. The EU is ready to deploy its mission for monitoring the disarmament process. Solana, Anna Lindh and Chris Patten meet with Colin Powell and call to Albanian rebels to lay down their arms.

June 15 – President Trajkovski attends Gothenburg summit

June 20 - Macedonian peace talks collapse amid mutual recriminations. NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson warned that FYROM was on the brink of civil war.

June 21 - Javier Solana makes an unscheduled stop in Skopje on his way to the Middle East.

June 22 - NATO officials order preparations for the alliance's third mission in the Balkans.

June 25 - Francois Léotard is appointed as EU Special Representative (EUSR) to FYROM.

July

July 2 – US special envoy to FYROM, James Pardew, joins Francois Léotard in a mission to negotiate a general ceasefire

July 10 – NATO's plans to send about 3,000 peace-keepers to FYROM are thrown into doubt by fears that the mission may be too small to defend itself if a ceasefire breaks down.

July 19 - Lord Robertson Javier Solana are due to travel to Skopje for a two-day visit to meet President Boris Trajkovski and leaders of the country's Slav and ethnic Albanian political parties.

July 26 Lord Robertson and Javier Solana arrive in Skopje to jump-start suspended negotiations.

August

August 13 – Ohrid Peace Accord signed.

August 27- NATO troops begin the task of collecting weapons.

August 29 - Lord Robertson visits FYROM to inspect Operation Essential Harvest. German Bundestag votes in favour of participation in Operation Essential Harvest.

September

September 5 – Léotard proposes to send EU force after end of NATO mission.

September 10 – Léotard resigns from his post

September 26 – Operation Essential Harvest ends. Follow-up operation Amber Fox under German lead approved

September 27 – German Bundestag votes in favour of participation in Operation Amber Fox

October

October 29 – Alain Le Roy assumes post of EUSR
December
December 7 – NATO decides on extension of Operation Fox until 26 March 2002

2002
March
March 15-16 - Barcelona European Council. Presidency Conclusions on FYROM (paragraph 61) " ..expresses EU's availability to take responsibility, following elections in FYROM and at the request of its government, for an operation to follow Amber Fox, on the understanding that the permanent arrangements on EU-NATO co-operation ("Berlin plus") would be in place by then. To this end, the EC requests the relevant political and military bodies of the Council to develop as of now, in consultation with NATO, the options to enable the EU to take the appropriate decisions."

June
June 4 - NATO extends Operation Fox until 26 October 2002
June 21/22 - Seville European Council EU Heads of State and Government take the view that the Berlin Plus arrangements had to be in place before any EU follow-on mission in FYROM

November
November 25 - UNSC agrees on new mandate for NATO in FYROM. France pushes for EU takeover.

December
December 14 - NATO Operation Allied Harmony, a smaller security and training mission, begins.

2003
January
January 18 - President Trajkovski officially makes his request to the EU for ESDP mission
January 21 - EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) approves the General Concept for the EU's actions towards FYROM February 6: NATO decided that DSACEUR could be offered to the EU as the Operation Commander.

March
March 31 - Operation Concordia is launched
The war in Afghanistan – Chronology of Events

2001

September
September 11 - Terrorist attacks on the US
September 12 - NATO invokes Article 5
September 21 - Extraordinary European Council
September 26 - NATO defence minister meeting. US does not request NATO-wide military action but makes clear the intention to build ad hoc coalitions in order to preserve military flexibility

October
October 7 - beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom
October 8 - EU foreign minister meeting. Germany and France present position papers on political strategy on Afghanistan do not make it into the final statement. October 12 - Lord Robertson briefs EU defence ministers on steps NATO had taken in response to US requests or recommendations by NATO military authorities. Ministers call for accelerating the setting up ESDP to enable the EU to play a role in the global fight against terrorism, and conclude that the EU should consider getting more involved in the peace-keeping operations in the Balkans to close the security gap left by the involvement of US forces in Afghanistan. October 19 - EU summit in Ghent. Chirac holds talks with Blair and Schroeder at the eve of the meeting.

November
November 4 - Downing Street Dinner provokes anger among other EU members
November 13 - Fall of Kabul.
November 14 - UN Security Council resolution 1378 affirms the central role of the UN in helping to establish a transition administration in Afghanistan.
November 19 - French marines arrive in Uzbekistan, but are prevented from moving into Afghanistan due to a conflict with the Uzbek authorities.
November 20 - Meeting of Defence Ministers in Brussels
November 22 - Meeting of Defence Ministers in Brussels
November 20 - Washington conference for putting in place the steering committee for reconstruction in Afghanistan, with four joint presidencies: United States, European Union, Japan and Saudi Arabia.
November 22 - Hamid Karzai is sworn in as head of interim, power-sharing government.
November 23 - Franco-German summit in Nantes, declaration on Afghanistan, calling for a new start with the UN conference in Bonn.
November 27 - Inter Afghan meeting in Bonn under the auspices of the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the UN, Mr Lakhdar Brahimi.
November 29 - Anglo French summit, Blair and Chirac express solidarity with US-led war in Afghanistan, and indicate willingness to supply troops for a stabilisation force in Afghanistan.
December
- Advance contingent of some 40 French marines arrive in Afghanistan and begin securing the airport of Mazar-e-Sharif in northern Afghanistan.
- Heavy fights as Northern Alliance seeks to capture Kandahar.
- Inter-Afghan Agreement (‘Bonn Agreement’) signed
- UN Security Council resolution 1383, endorsing the Bonn agreement.
- Capitulation of the Taliban in Qandahar.
- EU foreign minister meeting. Klaus-Peter Klaiber is appointed as EU Special Representative.
- EU Summit at Laeken. Dispute over nature of multinational peace force arises as Belgian Foreign Minister Michel claims that the force was created by the EU. Member states distance themselves from this statement.
- UNSC Resolution 1386 authorises an international security assistance force (ISAF) to be put in place in Kabul and the surrounding area. UK under Major General John McColl assumes command of ISAF
- Fall of Taliban regime
- Meeting in Brussels of the steering committee for reconstruction, EU presides.
- Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) inaugurated and takes up its role

2002

January
- Tokyo Conference on reconstruction in Afghanistan.

March
- Security Council resolution 1401, creating UNAMA (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) for 12 months.

May
- Security Council resolution 1413, extending the ISAF mandate for a further 6 months from 20 June.

June
- Emergency Loya Jirga meets under interim administration of Hamid Karzai, forms ATA with elections to be held on 7 December 2004
- Election of Mr Hamid Karzai, President of the transition government.
- ISAF command taken over by Turkey under Major General Hilmi Akin Zorlu.
- Transition government takes up its role.
- Francesc Vendrell is appointed as EUSR

2003

February
- Germany and the Netherlands assume command of ISAF.

August
- NATO assumes ISAF command.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIA</td>
<td>Afghan Interim Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSU</td>
<td>Christian Social Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUSR</td>
<td>European Union Special Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>Free Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
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<td>GAC</td>
<td>General Affairs Council</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security and Assistance Force</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>OEF</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>Party of Democratic Socialism</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>SG/HR</td>
<td>Secretary General/High Representative</td>
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