The Remaking of Identity: The Question of Normative Power in German Foreign Policy (1997-2007)

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Declaration

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Abstract

This thesis examines the dimension of normative power in Germany's foreign policy and the extent to which the contours of a changing German international identity have transformed the parameters of that normative power. It studies how foreign policy has moved between a logic of appropriateness and a logic of consequentialism in Germany's motivations for political action. The thesis is informed by social constructivism and liberal institutionalism, in that it starts from the premise that German foreign policy is inherently shaped by identity and institutions.

Whereas most academic work emphasizes continuity in foreign policy after unification, this thesis argues that Germany's foreign policy has changed significantly between 1997 and 2007. This happened because policy-makers reformulated Germany's international identity thereby shaping a new framework for foreign policy. This remaking of identity diminished the country's predominantly normative orientation and reinforced a more utilitarian approach for foreign policy-making. The thesis attempts to show how this remaking of identity was conducted and how identity change preceded the shift in the realm of foreign policy.

The empirical part of the thesis compares the foreign policies of the governments of Chancellors Helmut Kohl, Gerhard Schröder and Angela Merkel in the period from 1997 to 2007. To do so it examines four case studies which are representative of the transformation in German post-unification foreign policy: Germany's new security policy; the Europeanization of Germany's European policy regarding the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); bilateral relationships with France and the United States, and Germany's quest for permanent membership of the UN Security Council. These four policy domains all involve fundamental choices about Germany's foreign policy identity, and the nature of Germany's normative power at the beginning of the twenty-first century.
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List of abbreviations

AA    Auswärtige Amt
CDU   Christian Democratic Union
CFSP  Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSU   Christian Social Union
DGAP  German Council on Foreign Relations
DPG   Defence Policy Guidelines
EMU   Economic and Monetary Union
ERRF  European Rapid Reaction Force
ESDP  European Security and Defence Policy
EU    European Union
FAZ   Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
FDP   Free Democratic Party
KFOR  Kosovo Force
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NRF   NATO Response Force
SFOR  Stabilization Force
SPD   Social Democratic Party
SWP   German Institute for International Security
UNSC  United Nations Security Council
CHAPTER 1: The remaking of Identity and foreign policy in post-unified Germany

1.1. Introduction: Germany’s international identity and interests in foreign policy

Questions of identity and power are at the centre of the study of politics. In international politics, countries relate to other countries through their state identity and their power potential. This is done mostly through foreign policy. Between 1949 and 1990 the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany was known more for its low key international politics than for power politics, despite having achieved strong economic development and social and political stability. This suggests that measurable factors alone, such as economic, military and political capabilities are not sufficient to explain a country’s exterior actions but rather that a state’s identity also plays a role in shaping foreign policy. Thus identity indicators need to be incorporated as a significant denominator to understand the behaviour of a state towards its exterior.

While Germany has always had a complex relationship with the concept of power, it has, during the Cold War, managed to acquire normative power, a different but effective sort of power within the Euro-Atlantic constitutional order. Because this normative power was recognised as legitimate and effective, the path towards Germany consolidating itself as a state with a multilateral Europeanized and transatlanticist identity was substantially facilitated. While indicators of identity are prone to continuity and tend to evolve slowly over time they can sometimes change more abruptly. The period from 1998 to 2005 was such a path redefining moment which reoriented the contours of a changing German international identity and transformed the parameters of Germany’s normative power. This happened because policy-makers reformulated Germany’s identity thereby shaping a new framework for foreign policy. Between 1998 and 2005 the remaking of identity indicators gradually produced shifts in the sources of German foreign policy diminishing the country's predominantly normative orientation and reinforcing a more utilitarian approach to foreign policy-making.

Germany’s defeat marking the end of the Second World War was a founding moment for the construction of its post-war identity. 8 May 1945 marked not only the end of the war in Europe, but also a ‘day of liberation’ for the German people as Richard von Weizsäcker, then president of the FRG put it in a landmark speech in
Germans could now decide who they wanted to be, and define their interests in accordance with the new identity. After the Second World War ‘the choices [Germany] made were essentially about the kind of country [it] wanted to be. Interests and policies flowed from that and not the other way round’ (Cooper 2003:135). After 1949 the Federal Republic of Germany developed a new identity created through international interaction and the decisive input given by its new partners within the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community. Germany’s ‘commitment to multilateralism both as an idea and as a means to achieve specific policy goals [became] firmly embedded in German elites’ (Bulmer 1997:67). This new state identity was characterised by principles of normative multilateralism with a strong emphasis on diplomacy, institution-building and economic development.

By promoting political trust in interactions with its Western partners, the Federal Republic developed self-confidence, particularly when those interactions induced successes. Foreign policy successes were not only seen as a consequence of a ‘national’ element or the pursuit of purely ‘national’ interests. The centrality of the international element in foreign policy was a distinctive feature of the old Federal Republic. This, according to William Paterson, reflected ‘the Federal Republic’s genesis as more a foreign policy in search of a state than a state in search of a foreign policy’ (Paterson 1994:127). Therefore, in its initial years, the Federal Republic’s foreign policy was itself constitutive of Germany’s post-war identity, shaping its basic contours and paving the way for what was to transform gradually from normative constraints into normative power.

While the end of the Cold War brought structural change, the continuity of institutions and their role as ‘binding institutions’ (Ikenberry 2001) guaranteed a balanced transition to the post-Cold War world. The precondition for German unification was to reinforce the institutional continuity embedding the unified actor in NATO and EU structures and strengthening its special relationships with the US and France. Thus the formula for German unification was the continuity of its multilateralist diplomacy through multilateral institutional structures, and the consolidation of the post-1945 liberal constitutional order in an ever expanding European Union and NATO.

The double retraction from Europe of both post-Soviet Russia, and, after 11 September 2001, partially also of the United States, have put Germany, eighteen years after its unification, in a new position of power. An undefined new system falling

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1 Speech by the President of the Federal Republic of Germany, Richard von Weizsäcker, before the German Bundestag, on 8 May 1985, marking the 40th anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe. [http://www.bundestag.de/geschichte/parlhist/dokumente/dok08.html](http://www.bundestag.de/geschichte/parlhist/dokumente/dok08.html)
between global unipolarity with American preponderance and multipolarity among regional great powers succeeded bipolarity with its Euro-Atlantic core and superpower rivalry. Thus the end of the Cold War represented a dual challenge for German policymakers in that their country faced a new position as one of Europe's key powers at the same time as European unification was paving the way for the EU itself to gradually emerge as a foreign policy actor. The challenge for policymakers was how to deal with the simultaneous emergence of these apparently contradictory reflexes. To assure compatibility between them Kohl, Schröder and Merkel followed a 'two-lane policy approach' regarding foreign policy. On one 'policy lane', Germany maintained its multilateralist diplomacy of institutional continuity in the EU and NATO, promoting the institutional enlargement of both organizations. On a second 'policy lane', policymakers began to accept that the increase of Germany's new position as a potential European power placed new expectations and responsibilities upon it as an individual policy actor. The three governments have reacted differently; most of the time policymakers pursued both policy lanes, with strong momentary intersections between both; occasionally, preference of one policy lane over the other came to the fore. The question now was whether Germany would maintain normative power and multilateralism as the primary sources of its foreign policy and whether it would continue to concert its actions with its partners in the prevailing institutional structures or prefer to use a more individual policy lane.

1.2. Thesis purpose, argument and contribution

This thesis examines the dimension of normative power in Germany's foreign policy and the extent to which the contours of a changing German international identity have transformed the parameters of that normative power thereby changing foreign policy. It theorizes the dynamic articulation between identity and foreign policy through the study of normative power by focusing on how changes in foreign policy interests have been a reflection of Germany's changing identity. Hence it articulates identity as a key indicator of political change (March and Olsen 2004:11) and resorts to constructivism as a plausible theoretical framework.² The aim of the thesis is to present a theoretically

² Constructivism argues that ideational, non-material elements such as identities and norms are constitutive of state action. Because reality is socially constructed, structures are a reflection of and created through discursive practices and habituation processes. In constructivism, institutions develop a logic of their own, existing as a normative framework for a state's actions which shapes a state's political behaviour. State interests and identities are not a priori given, and are mutually constitutive of each other, coexisting in a state of anarchy shaped by states themselves. A constructivist interpretation of foreign
informed study of German foreign policy between 1997 and 2007 to understand how German identity has shaped foreign policy actions and to explain German foreign policy in a period of change. Thus it explores the extent to which policy-makers have maintained, diminished or increased Germany’s normative power.

What did Germany do with the normative power it acquired during the Cold War, when Germans had an ‘aversion to power politics’ (Wallace 2007:8)? Did normative power, between 1997 and 2007, continue to shape political actions, constrain or empower German policy-makers to pursue other avenues by facilitating the continuous recovery of more traditional attributes of power?

Whereas most academic work emphasizes continuity in foreign policy after unification, this thesis aims to explain change rather than continuity and how changes in the contours of identity and the meaning of normative power have produced changes in Germany’s foreign policy. This happened because policy-makers reformulated Germany’s international identity thereby shaping a new framework for foreign policy. This remaking of identity diminished the country’s predominantly normative orientation and reinforced a more utilitarian approach for foreign policy-making. The thesis attempts to show how this remaking of identity was conducted and how identity change preceded the shift in the realm of foreign policy.

The thesis argues that it is Germany’s identity and normative power which are at the centre of the explanation for Germany’s foreign policy behaviour after unification. While multilateral institutions paved the way for a smooth transition to a post-bipolar world in the Euro-Atlantic area, Germany’s foreign policy identity as a multilateralist and Europeanized actor mitigated the burden of expectations and reduced the unpredictability that comes at times of major power shifts. Its normative power assured the transition to become a fully sovereign state in the Western community of democracies. Thus in the case of Germany the question was not so much the paradox of continuity but rather the paradox of change. If institutions, principles of multilateralism and normative power had located Germany firmly in the Euro-Atlantic area, why did a domestic impulse lead decision-makers to change the sources of normative power and embark on a policy, after 1998, of a new self-assertiveness, claiming power parity with its peers, and risking the traditional normative multilateralism which had embedded Germany so smoothly in the institutional structures it valued?

Policy assumes that norms and identities form the ideational structure for state action and precedes, shapes and creates interests. Thus the material structure of the international system acquires meaning through its contextualisation into the social and ideational structure. E. Adler (2002). ‘Constructivism and International Relations’, in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth Simmons, eds. Handbook of International Relations, London: Sage, 95-118.
While between 1997 and 2007 Germany’s normative power continued to be one of the most important sources of German foreign policy, the purpose of normative power changed, from a traditionally value-shaped policy towards a more instrumental use. Identity and the sources of normative power were remade, on the basis of a transition from a logic of appropriateness for political action towards a logic of consequentiality.\(^3\) Chancellor Schröder acted as an agent for change, and articulated these changes initially in Germany’s European policy, later in Germany’s alliance partnerships with France and the U.S., and in Germany’s policy regarding a permanent United Nations Security Council seat, at times preferring unilateral positions to the traditional multilateral ones. After 1998 there was a shift, sometimes gradual, sometimes abrupt in the positioning of existing norms within the wider context of Germany’s normative power. Chancellor Schröder introduced a new norm of power parity into the foreign policy agenda. This new norm in itself did not contradict the traditional norm of multilateralism, and a normative conception of international politics. But it remade the policy coordinates for it relocated the importance of other norms in an overall more assertive foreign policy. While continuity prevailed in foreign policy discourse and practice, the usage, instrumentality and validity were reshuffled. Chancellor Merkel has inherited these changes and has tried to maintain some while rebalancing others.

Thus the transformation of the indicators of German state identity occurred mainly between 1998 and 2005 when domestic political actors rather than the international system (systemic change) induced a critical juncture for change (Jeffery and Paterson 2003). A critical juncture is seen here as a moment which affects the contours of interests, identities and institutions, producing transformation. In the case of Germany this change was agent induced – it occurred consciously at the level of the highest agents of the state and it was domestic in origin rather than structural. Domestic elites, starting with Chancellor Schröder himself have acted as ‘entrepreneurs for change’ (Hyde-Price and Jeffery 2001) in redefining Germany’s role in foreign policy and in pursuing what Schröder called the ‘enlightened self-interest of German foreign policy’ (Schröder 1999b).

As whom German leaders wanted to see their country perceived of – namely as an

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\(^3\) These are the two basic logic of action by which human behaviour is interpreted. In the logic of appropriateness ‘action involves evoking an identity or role and matching the obligations of that identity or role to a specific situation. The pursuit of purpose is associated with identities more than with interests, and with the selection of rules more than with individual rational expectations. (...) In the logic of consequentiality or expected consequences ‘politics is seen as aggregating individual preferences into collective actions by some procedures of bargaining, negotiation, coalition formation, and exchange’ (March and Olsen 1998:950-951).
equal country – had consequences on foreign policy actions. Alluding to Germany’s normative power, Cooper considers that Germany had ‘a considerable influence on those around it – more so perhaps than Britain or France, though both of these had a more active foreign policy in the classical sense’ (Cooper 2003:135-136). What is remarkable for someone actively involved in current EU policy-making is the suggestion that

‘Not only is identity more important than interest in determining policy when it comes to the big strategic decisions; it may also be the case that, in the long run, identity has more influence on others than foreign policy more conventionally conceived. What you are may be more important than what you do.’ (Cooper 2003:136)

While identity and interests are often mutually constitutive, there are instances when one predominates over the other. Instead of mutual constitutionality, research will show that from 1997 to 2007, changes in German identity and the redefinition of sources of identity have been decisive in shaping interests and policy decisions and in most cases interests have flown from identity rather than the other way around. While specific coordinates of foreign policy prevail, the overall strategic dimension has led to changes in Germany’s self-awareness of foreign policy. The empirical study will show how the exercise of foreign policy was intrinsically combined with the need for German political leaders to project political positions in a new international context. While Chancellor Kohl wanted to portray what remained similar to the old Federal Republic, Chancellor Schröder was keen to assert what was new about Germany’s international position. While the contrast between Kohl and Schröder was striking, Chancellor Merkel is combining more of both than at first meets the eye.

To give a comprehensive view of German post-Cold War foreign policy the period under research extends from 1997 to 2007 and presents a comparative analysis of the last two years of the Kohl government, the eight years of the Schröder government, and the first two years of the Merkel government. This is done for two reasons. First, debates on foreign policy and changes in policy-making suggest that transformations began to materialize in 1997. In European policy member states signed the Amsterdam Treaty in July 1997, opening the way for the first accession negotiations in December 1997, when the European Council meeting in Luxembourg set a time table for the enlargement process. Internally the SPD changed its party political approach on foreign policy at its party congress in December 1997. Regarding UN Security Council reform, the Razali proposal, the first reform proposal on the UN table, and which opened the
way for Germany’s successive negotiating tactics, was put forward in 1997. Secondly, the years researched juxtapose three different approaches in defining a post-Cold War German foreign policy. In the face of international change Chancellor Kohl hold on to foreign policy continuity in European and transatlantic politics; Chancellor Schröder chose to remake German identity changing basic foreign policy parameters. Chancellor Merkel is trying to balance between both continuity and change, with a bigger margin of manoeuvrability than any of her predecessors. This allows for an argument whose justification is more widely-spanned than if it were limited to only one or two chancellorships.

The thesis’ findings rest on conceptual and empirical research. They are a combination of empirical data gathered through interviews and primary sources, and through the analysis of concepts and their usage in German politics. Eighteen interviews were conducted with German politicians, diplomats and foreign policy experts in the years 1998, 1999, 2003 and 2005 in Berlin, London and Lisbon. The basis for choosing the interviewees was their political experience in German foreign policy. Through discursive analysis, interviews and by comparing the discursive contents with actual policy practice the thesis articulates changes induced by the political leadership. The analysis of major Bundestag debates highlight shared as well as contested conceptions of state identity.

The thesis’ contribution to knowledge lies in its examination of Germany’s international identity to explain change in German foreign policy from 1997 to 2007. Most analysis on German foreign policy tend to follow a dividing line between neorealism, which emphasizes policy change through structural adaptation, and liberal institutional or constructivist accounts which tend to underline policy continuity. There are few systematic constructivist accounts of a transforming state identity and its implications for foreign policy. Those which have presented an identity based explanation for German foreign policy have done so to explain continuity, often suggesting the persistence of state identity (Maull 2006a) due to a path of continuity with a highly normative foreign policy (Rittberger 2001). This thesis, by contrast, is informed by constructivism and liberal institutionalism, but rather than explain continuity it aims to explain foreign policy change. The aim is to discern change and confer legitimacy on the usefulness of the concept of a state’s identity as an addendum

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4 The primary sources are listed separately from the secondary sources at the beginning of the bibliography on p. 235.
5 A list of the interviews conducted, with the party affiliation and departmental responsibility of the interviewees is included in the bibliography of the thesis, on p. 233. When the name of the interviewee is not mentioned, confidentiality was asked for by the interviewee.
to understanding a country’s foreign policy and behavioural change. Thus the thesis aims to rescue constructivism from being confined to explaining patterns of identity continuity only.

A second element of originality is the emphasis given to domestic politics as factors to explain changes in identity. Domestic politics, Checkel has argued ‘plays a key, if undertheorized role, in any socialization dynamic or process of identity change in the EU’ (Checkel 2006:25). Given constructivisms’ relative neglect of the domestic sources of foreign policy the thesis focuses on the effects of foreign policy identity on state action rather than on the effects of the international social structure on state identity.

Finally, the thesis will contribute to the more general literature on identity and foreign policy, on the one hand, and constructivism and change on the other.

1.3. Thesis structure

The thesis is structured into eight chapters. The introduction presents the argument and contextualizes the literature review. The second chapter presents the theoretical framework of the thesis. It articulates the interaction of identity and foreign policy, problematizes the concepts of change and normative power, and analyses logics of political action. The third chapter refers to the domestic context and the ways in which it has shaped foreign policy. It focuses mostly on how German politicians debated foreign policy issues after unification and how much policy-makers, as agents for change, have assumed a transformational role.

With chapter four begins the second and more empirical part of the thesis which compares the foreign policies of the governments of Chancellors Helmut Kohl, Gerhard Schröder and Angela Merkel in the period from 1997 to 2007. To explore the substance of German foreign policy practice and how Germany’s normative power has evolved it examines four policy domains which are representative of the transformation of German post-unification foreign policy: Germany’s new security policy; the Europeanization of Germany’s policy regarding the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); bilateral relations with France and the United States, and Germany’s quest for permanent membership of the UN Security Council.

Building on both the theoretical and domestic contexts of the first part, chapter four analyses the changes which have occurred in Germany’s security policy and shows how they can be related to the question of identity and normative power. The fifth
chapter deals with the European dimension of German foreign policy and how Europeanization has affected post-unified Germany. Chapter six then analyses the Euro-Atlantic dimension of German foreign policy by focusing on Berlin’s bilateral relationships with France and the United States. The ensuing chapter takes the analysis out of the Euro-Atlantic area onto the United Nations domain and examines the motivations behind Germany’s attempt to become a permanent UNSC member. Each of these four chapters tests the possibility of a new security identity, a new Europeanised identity, a new bilateral and transatlantic identity and ultimately, a new, more global ("UN") identity. Finally, chapter eight concludes the thesis’ argument and hints at ways in which Germany’s changed foreign policy identity affects the contours of European order.

Two caveats should be established from the outset. First, studying a country’s foreign policy through its identity does not equal an idealist approach, a commitment to the idealist current of International Relations according to which states engage only in co-operative behaviour and share an identical interest in peace (Carr 1991:51). While social constructivists generally support the liberal notion of progress in International Relations (Wendt 1999:10) they posit that reality is socially constructed, and states interact not only in a materialist world, but also in an ideational world where identities and norms are constitutive of state action. Identities and interests are not given but are constitutive of one another in a neutral context of mutuality. Neither does constructivism judge that interests are ‘bad’ Realpolitik and identity ‘good’ politics, nor does it preclude a military dimension to a state’s foreign policy. It asserts, however, that states tend to follow a ‘logic of appropriateness’ according to given international norms in the pursuit of their policy aims and to standards of appropriateness which states define among themselves. This thesis takes issue with constructivisms’ overemphasis on the logic of appropriateness. While it accepts that a logic of appropriateness has shaped most of German foreign policy, it suggests that ‘ideational factors have normative as well as instrumental dimensions’ (Ruggie 1998b:33) and argues with liberal institutionalism that the ‘logic of consequentiality’ has increasingly been introduced into German foreign policy, foremost by domestic political actors who have induced these changes.

Secondly, and in a similar vein, normative power does not equate altruistic politics. Through normative power a state acts according to a given set of norms accepted by a wider community of states, and projects strategic interests. The question is not whether such strategic interests exist, but rather what the purpose and
effectiveness of such power projection is. If the state has been successful in employing its normative power to the benefit of the spread of international norms, strategic interests are only partially significant in a policy-makers consideration. However the EU itself ‘has exhibited security-conditioned specificities’ in the promotion of norms and values outside of Europe, suggesting that sometimes ‘instrumental choices are made within a range of common normative understandings’ (Youngs 2004:431). Thus focusing on normative power does not preclude that sometimes norms are projected internationally for strategic interests.

1.4. Continuities and changes in German foreign policy: a literature review

1.4.1. From unification to the Kosovo war

There was a prolific amount of publications on German foreign policy during the 1990s. In the first post-unification decade most focused on foreign policy continuity and change, on Germany’s basic strategic orientation and on suggestions as how to change (improve) Germany’s role in the world. Out-of-area military missions and the war in Bosnia confronted Germans with the need to debate their security policy. The predominant line of enquiry was to establish the parameters of institutionalised mechanisms to explain the paradox of continuity, or to suggest ways in which Germany could follow a path towards policy ‘normalization’.

The debates on foreign policy centred on proponents of policy ‘normalization’ and supporters of the path of continuity. The first group of academics focused on policy normalization. Arnulf Baring, Christian Hacke, Gregor Schöllgen and Hans Peter Schwarz considered that normalisation meant recapturing traditional great power instruments and allowing for concepts like national interest and power to be

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reintroduced into Germany's political discourse (Baring 1994; Hacke 1993; Schöllgen 1993; Schwarz 1994). Through the pursuit of a more assertive foreign policy, Germany would recover its status as a potential great power (Schöllgen 1993), as Europe's central power (Schwarz 1994) and accept international responsibilities commensurate with its regained position. They supported institutional enlargement towards Eastern Europe for stability reasons favouring widening over institutional deepening but rejected a federal Europe and were sceptical towards supranational institutions. For Germany to play a leading role ('Führungsrolle') in the European Union the Franco-German relationship would become secondary (Schwarz 1999b). These authors were critical of the Kohl period for failing to take German interest sufficiently into account and for not perceiving Germany as a great power (Hacke 1993). The main policy recommendation of this group was that due to new conditionalities and constraints, Germany should accept international responsibilities proportional to its power status and pursue a more assertive foreign policy. However, Germany's Western integration in the EU and NATO and enlargements to Central and Eastern Europe should remain the foundation of this new more assertive foreign policy.

These expectations did not resonate in the wider German society and the argument for a normalisation represented the exception in the wider academic landscape. Although these authors were historians their claims were in line with International Relations (neo)realist thinking which suggested changes in alliance allegiances, a tendency towards unilateralism and a retreat from institutionalism and integration. Neorealism saw 'the keys to war and peace (...) more in the structure of the international system than in the nature of the individual states' (Mearsheimer 1990:9). Thus the shift in the international balance of power at the end of the Cold War would free Germany to embark on a power trajectory based on a more assertive or even aggressive foreign policy. Germany would now increase its power capabilities and become a nuclear power because of structural constraints; any other outcome was improbable since 'for a country to choose not to become a great power is a structural anomaly' (Waltz 1993). Thus change in Germany's power position because of international structural transformation was the main argument for neorealist theory.

While this approach was well suited to explain part of the Federal Republic's foreign policy during the Cold War as a reflex of systemic changes in superpower

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relations, neorealism had a hard time coming up with a plausible explanation at the end of the Cold War not only for the peaceful end of bipolarity, and the absence of a hegemonic war, but with justifying the negotiated unification of Germany, the continuity of multilateralism and institutional commitments. This helps explain why Baring, Hacke, Schöllgen and Schwarz did also not find much resonance with the political elite during the 1990s.

The second group of academics and policy experts studied what most called the 'paradox of continuity'. In the face of the structural change that neorealists enumerated what explained Germany’s persistence in existing institutions, alliances and its own position as an embedded multilateralist country striving to continue deepening and enlarging European unification? Was German foreign policy impervious to change?

These policy analysts considered that there was continuity in foreign policy since Germany did not question the core foundations of its post-war diplomacy. Most German authors, particularly in the realm of political science and international relations discerned foreign policy continuity based on multilateralist and integrationist orientation and embeddedness in international institutions as two basic foreign policy principles. Gunther Hellmann, Josef Janning, Joachim Krause, Hanns Maull, Thomas Risse, Volker Rittberger, among others, started from the premise that Germany willingly pursued a strategy of self-binding based on multilateralism and European integration. Questioning the determining power of the international structure on state actions, they agreed that Germany’s strong embeddedness in international institutions had influenced the definition of state interests. During the Cold War Germany had become a multilateralist and Europeanized state, firmly embedded in the European integration process and the wider transatlantic community; after unification there was no plausible justification for why Germany should change its diplomacy.

This line of thinking was congruent with the liberal institutionalist approach. Because of limitations of sovereignty Germany’s foreign policy was conducive to being interpreted through this approach where a strong reflexive multilateralism in European policy shaped Germany’s interests (Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson 2000:52). Even Germany’s first time offensive military participation in the war in Kosovo, a NATO operation against Serbia without a UN mandate, was seen by most as a confirmation of Germany’s civilian power status (Maull 2001) rather than a negation of it.

After 9/11, however, neorealist authors felt once again vindicated by their explanations a decade earlier, and new neo-realist accounts began to emerge to explain foreign policy post-9/11 (Hyde-Price 2006). For Schwarz Germany’s participation in
the war Kosovo suggested that the arguments put forward by the normalisationists were finally being put into practice. Schwarz considered the Red-Green governments’ participation in the Kosovo war ‘conceivably the strongest confirmation of loyalty towards NATO and the United States’, and the recognition that Germany was now ‘as normal as other countries regarding questions of military interventions’ (Schwarz 1999b:6).

1.4.2. From the Kosovo war to the transatlantic crisis: The end of Germany’s foreign policy consensus

But Germany’s position regarding 11 September 2001, the US policy against international terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq launched a new debate on Germany’s international role and security policy. Berlin’s opposition to the US led military intervention in Iraq in 2002-03 was the catalyst for a new debate on German foreign policy among policy analysts for it represented an unexpected departure from established patterns of German foreign policy behaviour. More significantly, the transatlantic crisis triggered the end of Germany’s foreign policy consensus inherited from the Cold War years.

Now the debate was about policy instruments, relationships with partners and about questions of alliance allegiance, unilateralism and multilateralism. Berlin’s refusal to support Washington, its traditional alliance partner, in its decision to go to war in Iraq in 2002-2003 represented a departure from Germany’s traditional transatlantic multilateralism. Whereas during the 1990s most analysts debated the paradox of continuity, they were now confronted with the paradox of change.

The end of the domestic foreign policy consensus can be well observed in the three groups of arguments which emerged. A first group of academics and policy analysts approved of the governments’ new international position, thus applauding foreign policy change. A second group also identified more elements of change than continuity but cautioned that this was the wrong turn for German diplomacy. Finally, there were those academics and policy analysts who continued to recognize continuity in foreign policy. What is striking especially in the first two groups is the mixture of experts of different political convictions within the same group, which only reinforces

the argument of a crumbling foreign policy consensus. The next section examines the divergent positions, picking two or three representative figures of each group.

1.4.2.1. Support for Schröder’s foreign policy change: Gregor Schöllgen and Egon Bahr

The first group includes authors supportive of the Schröder governments’ new assertiveness and foreign policy normalization. Gregor Schöllgen and Egon Bahr were among the most outspoken advocates of Germany’s return of normalcy. Coming from opposite political spectrums these authors had argued during the 1990s that Germany should redefine its position in Europe and pursue a foreign policy more in tune with its national interests. Their claim for a greater leadership role internationally was closely linked to the question of whether such new assertiveness could be done through unchanged relationships with France and the US, and other allies, and whether the means for achieving such a role also remain the same.

Gregor Schöllgen argued that the end of the Soviet Union inevitably had brought about the end of the transatlantic era (Schöllgen 2003a and 2003b). Following unification and the recovery of sovereignty, Germany should become more self-confident and assertive. Part of the problem until 1998 was that the process of ‘Vergangenheitbewältigung’ (dealing with the past) had excessively concentrated on the period between 1933 and 1945 and not included the rest of German history. Hence Schöllgen approvingly termed Schröder’s foreign policy as ‘Germany’s return to the world stage’ as a European great power in what he described as an act of political emancipation (Schöllgen 2003b). The author praised Schröder’s opposition to the US policy on Iraq as a ‘radical departure from Germany’s foreign policy tradition’ allowing for an ‘unexpected German leadership role as a counterweight to the U.S.’ (Schöllgen 2003b:130). The ‘existential questions for the German nation’, as the Chancellor put it, were decided in Berlin and nowhere else, i.e. Washington (Schöllgen 2003b:129). In 2005, Schöllgen considered that Germany now had ‘the possibility to choose other partners in critical situations without serious risks’ (Schöllgen 2005:7). Schröder had revealed leadership and ‘led the Germans to the new world political reality’ taking advantage of the new margin of manoeuvrability produced by the Iraq crisis. In this the Red-Green government had followed a foreign policy commensurate with the weight of a country that could rely on the trust that the world had given it (Schöllgen 2005:7-8). That a conservative historian such as Schöllgen applauded the more assertive foreign

policy of a social democratic Chancellor as ‘Germany’s return to the world stage’ highlighted the significant change in the fault lines of the German foreign policy coordinates, and even caused for some analytical confusion (Veit 2006:47).

In a similar tone, albeit from a different political angle, former SPD ideologue Egon Bahr welcomed that the war in Iraq had finally ignited a passionate debate in German society about power and political interests (Bahr 2003:9). He qualified Schröder’s use of the expression ‘German way’ as ‘natural and normal’ in that the country now pursued its legitimate interests without feeling paralysed by its own past (Bahr 2003:137). Normality for Bahr also meant that Germans developed a normal relationship to the nation and accepted a feeling of national identity (Nationalbewußtsein), for ‘the feeling of national identity was the new European normality’ (Bahr 2003:136-37). Even though Bahr promoted a left-nationalist position he tried to justify Germany’s new national assertiveness through a European line of argumentation.

Germany’s future lied in its continuous commitment to the EU, which implied its distancing from the United States. This was a logical consequence of Germany’s new normality, and goes in line with Bahr’s traditional sceptical view of Washington’s role in German politics. ‘The idea of the West’, he stated, ‘was not the monopoly of the United States. The idea of the West can also develop in a European way.’ The unity of the West had been a priority of the old world. Now Europe and the US would gain more from a Europe capable of presenting its own alternative visions, even if still through a division of labour with America (Bahr 2003:133-134).\textsuperscript{11}

\subsection{1.4.2.2. Criticism of Schröder’s foreign policy change: Hans Peter Schwarz and Gunther Hellmann}

The second group identified change in German foreign policy but criticized the Schröder government for weakening Germany’s stance in international politics and both its traditional alliances, the German-French and the German-American, provoking the double European and a transatlantic crisis. Its proponents argued that change would imply a partial renationalisation of foreign policy and the assertion of power normality. Preference for increased unilateralism, a more selective multilateralism, and an inclination towards new bilateral relations, for example with Russia were signs of such a change. This would be most visible if Germany pursued ‘global ambitions’ (Mayer

\textsuperscript{11}Bahr’s call for a new normality was not new. Already in 1999 he argued for it in the context of a German domestic debate on the speech by the writer Martin Walser in 1998 on the handling of the question of Germany’s past. This will be dealt with in chapter 3.
1997) with the aim to become a global nuclear power (Mearsheimer 1990 and Waltz 1993).

Academics and policy analysts like Hans-Peter Schwarz and Gunther Hellmann represent the critical view of foreign policy change, even though Schwarz advocated a post-Bonn foreign policy and Hellmann, in contrast, welcomed the return to Bonn’s foreign policy foundations. While Schwarz saw Schröder follow his claims for a foreign policy of asserted national interests, he disagreed with the conduct and style the Chancellor pursued, and more importantly, criticized Schröder’s distancing from America after 2002. He suggested that because unification had been achieved ‘thanks mainly to American support’ Germany’s new role as the central power in Europe should be done in tune with the German-American alliance (Schwarz 2004:540).\(^{12}\)

Schwarz spoke of a weakened Germany in the face of Berlin’s pretension of leadership, together with Paris, against Washington. For Schwarz ‘Europe can not become a unified foreign and security actor against the United States’ (Schwarz 2003:24). Having praised Germany’s role in the Kosovo war, for breaking a security policy taboo and positioning Germany among other normal countries, Schwarz was now critical of the governments’ handling of relations with Washington and European allies and the dangers of estrangement that they produced.\(^{13}\)

Gunther Hellmann was one of the staunchest critics of the Schröder-Fischer governments’ foreign policy cautioning against what he called the “power political re-socialisation” of foreign policy and a ‘compulsion towards big politics’ (Hellmann 2004 and 2005). Lamenting the rupture with the previous government’s foreign policy and the wish to rid Germany of the constraints of the past generation Hellmann criticized the Red-Green governments’ move away from Kohl’s self-binding policy in European institutions. The traditional impulse between self-containment (Selbstbeschränkung) and self-assertion (Selbstbehauptung) (Haftendorn 2001) had been replaced by a more assertive discourse informed by words such as ‘foreign policy self-confidence’, ‘enlightened self-interest’, ‘adulthood’, and ‘normal’. Despite aspiring to be a great power Germany was no more than a middle power lacking the necessary material resources (Hellmann 1998). Hellmann identified an ‘expansive strategy’ in German

\(^{12}\) In 1985 Schwarz made the case that the ‘tamed Germans’ had made a trajectory from an obsession with power to a forgetfulness of power, unable to define national interests (Schwarz 1985). For Schwarz, Germany should maintain close security links to the United States, continue with a market economy system and learn to define more precisely the future Europe.

\(^{13}\) The political scientist Christian Hacke has argued similarly for a continued German-American relationship. His main criticism was that Germany still lacked understanding of foreign policy connections to define an overall strategy and has therefore not yet found its role in a globalised world. Christian Hacke (2006). ‘Mehr Bismarck, weniger Habermas’, *Internationale Politik*, 61(6), 68-76.
foreign policy based on new political goals and a new style (Hellmann 2002a:9) where Germany’s overall power had increased. The author argued that because Germany’s soft and hard power resources had grown, the world expected German leadership. ‘Germany is perceived to be more powerful, and because of that alone it is more powerful’ (Hellmann 2002b:7). But high flying appearances on the world stage have rarely served the substance of Germany’s interests well, like its untimely claim for a permanent UN Security Council seat (Hellmann and Wolf 2004). Considering ‘the collapse of German influence and standing in European and world affairs over Berlin’s refusal to participate in any military action against Iraq’ (Hellmann 2003), Hellmann cautioned Germany to abstain from its new power political discourse (Hellmann 2005).

1.4.2.3. The persistence of continuity: Hanns Maull and Thomas Risse

Finally, the largest group advocates foreign policy continuity. They also agreed on what continuity meant. Germany upheld its multilateral diplomacy by staying institutionally committed to the integrationist policies of the European Union and to NATO’s alliance commitments, privileging bilateral relations with France and the United States, keeping its policy focus in the euro-Atlantic area and relating to Russia in a multilateral Western framework. Even in the realm of security policy most agreed that Germany was adapting to NATO and Bundeswehr reform rather than undergoing a radical departure from established norms.

But they presented different reasons for continuity. For some, embedded institutionalism and the pursuit of milieu shaping goals best explained continuity (Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson 2000). For others continuity was due to Germany’s Europeanized identity (Banchoff 1999b; Marcussen et al. 1999; Goetz 1996; Katzenstein 1996 and Risse 2004) or its role as a civilian power (Maull 1990; Harnisch et al. 2001; Tewes 2002). Others still explained continuity on the basis of normative domestic and international frameworks, multilateral commitments and a ‘logic of appropriateness’ (Rittberger et al. 2001), or because of a stable antimilitarist culture (Berger 1998).

Hanns Maull and Thomas Risse were two policy experts arguing that continuity prevailed over change in the foreign policy of the Berlin Republic. For Hanns Maull neither unification nor the Bundeswehr’s participation in Bosnia or Kosovo had seriously undermined the civilian power concept, and power politics remained aloof to the German foreign policy establishment. In the face of the dramatic international changes, European and transatlantic institutions underwent more change than the
Federal Republic itself, where ‘change has merely represented modifications in detail’ and continuity has prevailed in Germany’s core aims and strategies (Maull 2006a:23).

Maull argued that albeit the wars in Kosovo, in Afghanistan and Iraq, Germany’s international identity remained that of a civilian power, a state which acts according to multilateral cooperation, conflict resolution and a will to civilise international politics (Maull 1990). While Maull acknowledged ‘a rhetoric of a new self-confidence and articulation of “German interests”’ he argued that Berlin’s lack of foreign policy successes did not reflect a new German ‘Machtpolitik’ (Maull 2004c:12). He persists in considering Germany a civilian power considering that its behaviour during the Iraq crisis did not amount to an end of policy continuity (Maull 2006a:10).

Thomas Risse argued that while Germany’s foreign policy goals remained on a path of continuity, the means to achieve them had changed, such as the Bundeswehr interventions in out-of-area regions (Risse 2004). Like Maull, Risse considered that Germany continued to be a civilian power whose disputes with the Bush administration were precisely an attempt by the Schröder government to re-affirm its position as a civilian power rather than turning away from it. Analysing continuity versus change in the domains of European policy, transatlantic relations and international interventions, Risse concluded that while in its European policy Germany has been a pro-active policy actor, in the latter two it has revealed a more reactive style of policy (Risse 2004).

But albeit the continuity argument, Maull was critical of the state of German foreign policy. Whereas he identified a crisis in German foreign policy, he attributed it to a weakening of the importance of foreign policy rather than a renationalisation of foreign policy as Hellmann did, criticizing a departure from foreign policy tout court rather than a return to a perceived power politics. This weakened Germany’s position due to the ‘erosion of the power to shape policies’ linked to deficiencies in conceptual originality and resources, and a lack of strategic orientation (Maull 2004b). Thus the country was slowly turning its back on world politics, and revealing a lack of engagement as a consequence of a deficit in the substance of foreign policy. Maull saw a negative evolution of German foreign policy from an active civilian power to a country gradually positioning foreign policy on a qualitatively weaker stance and withdrawing from its responsibility. This is what Maull identified as ‘the paradox of German foreign policy – of policy continuity in a different world’ where German foreign policy ‘has insisted on continuity, and has (...) determinedly stuck to its old course’ (Maull 2006b:1). This has produced ‘signs of a loss of coherence, consistency, and above all effectiveness from about 1995 onward’ (Maull 2006b:2).
But continuity did not mean that Germany managed to engage with all these areas and increase its interests and power projection. The effectiveness of German foreign policy, most authors of all three groups agreed, depended on having the necessary resources to pursue the ambitioned goals, and the skill to promote effective international coalitions and institutions. Many policy analysts identified a growing asymmetry between Germany's will to engage more assertively in international politics and the means to effectively pursue such a policy given Germany's complex internal economic situation and the willingness to project a successful image abroad. Many identified shrinking resources (Bertram 2004, Hellmann 2004b and 2007, Maull 2004b), a lack of structural power to engage in an ambitious foreign policy and face new international problems (Jeffery and Paterson 2003) and stark disagreements with the United States over the future of world order (Maull 2006b) as the new problems for German foreign policy. Others observed that under the Red-Green government Germany's international influence had continuously declined. Schröder und Fischer got entangled in a reality of their own creation, not realizing that it was illusionary to claim a place in the concert of world powers while their country's political weight was diminishing, with defence and development aid spending steadily declining (Gutschker 2005a).

What the different arguments have shown is that there is an end to the overall foreign policy consensus which had prevailed in previous years, if we take the debates over security policy and military operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq out of the equation. What is remarkable is the degree of political cross-positioning these debates produced, where a conservative historian (Schöllgen) sided with a left-nationalist (Bahr) in their support for Germany's more assertive and natural path.

1.5. Conclusion

The Kohl, Schröder and Merkel governments have responded differently to the international and domestic challenges of the post-Cold War world, and eighteen years after unification, have positioned Germany in a new position of power.

Under Helmut Kohl's leadership Germany combined the strategies of European unification with a close transatlantic relation. He promoted the deepening of the 'hard core' of the EU, through a close German-French relationship, together with the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg and Austria linked with institutional enlargement to the East. At the same time he strengthened the German-American relationship. Thus
Kohl followed a truly Euro-Atlantic strategy, attaching European integration to the transatlantic alliance. He concentrated almost fully on the Europeanist lane of policy for he believed that European unification was the best response to Germany’s new position. Thus he did not pursue the second, more individual policy lane in the pursuit of German interests, at least not more so than had happened during the cold war. But the Kohl government was also too constrained in its own policy strategy to admit that some change was inevitable.

In contrast, under Gerhard Schröder’s leadership Germany reached normality, a claim made by the Chancellor which automatically implied modification in that it presupposed a more equal treatment by Berlin’s partners and the parity of power. This new dimension of a second policy lane, while not denying Germany’s commitment to normative power and embedded multilateralism on the first lane, meant to enlarge Germany’s international policy context and strengthen its margin of manoeuvrability. To ensure these interests, Berlin accelerated on the second policy lane, at times overtaking Germany’s partners on the other lane, possibly being the first to reach the end of the policy lane, but risking isolation and uncertainty about the direction it had taken.

Thus a policy which unilaterally engaged in a recognition of ‘sameness of power’ and equality of power status in the international community risked transforming the nature of the transatlantic alliance and even the inner coherence of the enlarged EU. Schröder’s foreign policy represented a change in that he allowed for a weakening of the transatlantic link, wished to extend German influence unilaterally and instead pursued a pan-European strategy where Russia would become a privileged partner. In addition, it was an illusion for Germany to pretend that from actively clamuring a permanent UNSC seat automatically derived greater legitimacy and a ‘licence’ to engage more assertively in international politics.

The new Chancellor Angela Merkel has so far reinforced the old Euro-Atlantic strategy strengthening Germany’s embeddedness in the European Union and NATO, with a selective enlargement eastwards and a cautious partnership with Russia. This has widened Germany’s room for manoeuvring. First it allowed Merkel to prevent that the Kohleian vision of Germany’s European strategy was interpreted as a product of the Cold War conditionalities only, recovering the legitimacy of a policy of Euro-Atlantic embeddedness which had previously paid off. Secondly, it has shown in Merkel’s two years in office that Schröder’s new direction of assertiveness with a disentangled transatlanticism and a unilateral flirtation with Russia was not the inevitable course for
Germany. Finally, the generalised unease with which most capitals in Europe reacted towards Berlin's position in 2002 and 2003 only strengthened Merkel's resolve to reinforce a more Euro-Atlantic policy of embedded interests realizing that for Germany to play an increasing role in international politics this could only be done in accordance with both EU and US partners. Thus the present coalition government has tried to combine both policy lanes through a more pragmatic policy approach.

Still, we no longer live in the immediate post-Cold War world, but in a post-September 11, 2001 world, where the old predominance of the Western world has begun to crumble, and where the emergence of new world powers and forces are challenging the Westernized identity of many international institutions. Faced with these challenges no German government can evade international responsibilities, any less than the European Union. As the EU's strongest member, Germany has the power and a Europeanized identity to play a role in Europe's more global presence in international politics. This has led the present government to reinforce combining its role on the European policy lane of policy making with the more individual policy lane on specific policy issues in cooperation with other European partners. Ultimately this increased external projection also represents a challenge to the reliability of normative power as the preferred form of foreign policy-making.

As the ensuing chapters will show German foreign policy has been on a transformative path since the late 1990s. Berlin's participation in the wars in Kosovo and Afghanistan has changed the nature of Germany's international identity. And even if every military operations Germany participates in has a 'civilian power' component in terms of conflict resolution mechanisms and post-conflict reconstruction this no longer necessarily makes Germany stand out in comparison to its partners. Every European country involved in military operations abroad includes civilian power instruments as part of its strategy and wants to contribute to post-conflict reconstruction, not only Germany.14

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14 This thesis distinguishes between 'normative power' and 'civilian power', preferring the use of 'normative power'. First, in the civilian power approach, the emphasis is on 'the specific way in which military force will be applied' - never alone and autonomously, but only collectively, only with international legitimacy, and only in the pursuit of 'civilizing' international relations.' Hanns Maull (2005). 'Europe and the new balance of global order', International Affairs, 81(4) 781. (My emphasis). Through juxtaposition, Maull puts too much emphasis on the military dimension of the concept thereby setting too narrow a framework for a wider normative analysis. In other words, while the civilian power approach aims to downplay the role of military power, it becomes hostage to the same element it is most critical of. Secondly, while the civilian power approach focuses mostly on the external actions of the state, with the aim to 'civilianise' international politics, the case of Germany shows that its normative power served to consolidate Germany's own position in the Western community of states. Thus while normative power later became an important element of German diplomacy, it emerged foremost as a domestic yardstick towards measuring appropriate behaviour.
To understand how normative power has become such an effective form of power for German foreign policy within the Euro-Atlantic constitutional order and how the remaking of Germany’s Europeanized foreign policy has transformed the contours of that foreign policy, a framework is needed which articulates the question of normative power with foreign policy identity and the sources of political action. This is what the next chapter will do.
CHAPTER 2: Germany’s international identity and normative power

2.1. Introduction: The problematique

German foreign policy is shaped by Germany’s identity and Germany’s complex relationship with the concept of power. It is about what country Germany wants to be seen as internationally, and what sort of power it projects when it exteriorizes its identity. Foreign policy identity is understood as one element of Germany’s identity which develops through international policy actions of the political elite. This brings the question of power and the role of German power in international politics into the analysis and begs the question of how to establish a conceptual link between the traits understood to form a country’s identity and the content of that state’s foreign policy, and between the process of identity formation and identity projection into foreign policy practice.

With a limited margin of political manoeuvrability, the foreign policy of the Federal Republic after 1949 was conditioned by political and normative constraints. These were alliance commitments towards NATO and its partners, particularly France and the United States linked to compliance with norms of multilateralism. Building on these constraints, Germany developed a logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1998), understood as political action conducive to respecting normative policy elements previously agreed upon by German policy-makers and its allies. As a founding member of the European Community participating in the definition of institutional norms and rules the Federal Republic developed the practice of norm conforming behaviour, the assumed predictability of which translated gradually into a particular form of power, namely normative power. At the time of German unification, normative power was already a substantive element of foreign policy; since normative power has implications on the policies of states, it is an effective form of power. Considering how multifaceted power is, it was, apart from economic and institutional power perhaps the only other form of power predominant in German diplomacy.

Normative power can be defined as the capacity of the power holder to exert, through a norm conforming behaviour, influence over others which confer respect and

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15 Because this thesis rests on the argument that foreign policy is about the projection of a state identity into the international arena, the concept of national identity as an inherently domestic element is deliberately left out of the analysis. For the purposes of understanding the overall argument, it is sufficient to state that national identity is only one component of a country’s identity, which will be highlighted in the ensuing empirical chapters only when the national identity element decisively shaped Germany’s international identity.
recognise legitimacy to the one projecting power. In the case of Germany’s highly institutionalised form of foreign policy-making, normative power developed well in the wider international constitutional order. The Euro-Atlantic area is the most achieved form of a constitutional order which aims to be durable, legitimate, consensual and non-coercive. Germany’s normative power contributes to the construction of this constitutional order.

Critics argue that if Germany acts through normative power this is due to structural weakness, for purely utilitarian purposes or simply an ‘unintentional by-product of German behaviour and practice’ (Hyde-Price 2000:117). Others suggest that an analysis focusing exclusively on a normative dimension of politics to the detriment of power politics neglects ‘the strategic specificities to identity-representation dynamics’ (Youngs 2004:415).

But the case of Germany suggests that normative power developed regardless of increasing material capabilities during the Cold War. As Europe’s strongest economy with material and structural resources Germany could have weakened its normative power and strengthened other forms of power, such as military power or its international status as a potential great power. Rather, it continued to enhance normative power until the end of the 1990s. Paradoxically when structural and material power resources became weaker, the German government initiated changes in its normative power. In this case, structural weakness of the economy and dwindling resources were accompanied by the attempt to recover more traditional attributes of power, when it seemed logical to reinforce the normative power elements. The question then was, to the extent that power became more ‘normalised’ and joined by more traditional power attributes of a sovereign nation, what would happen to Germany’s normative power?

Normative power was transformed through the remaking of Germany’s international identity. Like in the cinematographic industry, the notion of a remake is the attempt to do anew something old built on its foundations without rejecting them, while attempting to improve it. A ‘remake’ allows for the inclusion of elements of continuity, but also makes the theorising of change possible. Chancellor Kohl was intent on ensuring continuity in foreign policy, particularly in European and transatlantic politics. Chancellor Schröder, by contrast, tried to reposition foreign policy sources and locate Germany on a higher international standing, adding a new source of identity – that of international parity with other powers as entitlement to a self-confident nation. Changes in the sources of foreign

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16 G. John Ikenberry defines constitutional orders as ‘political orders organized around agreed-upon legal and political institutions that operate to allocate rights and limit the exercise of power. (...) The stakes in political struggles are reduced by the creation of institutionalized processes of participation and decision making that specify rules, rights, and limits on power holders. A constitutional order is neither identified nor ensured by the existence of a constitutional document or charter (...) but by the way in which agreed-upon and institutionalized rules, rights, protections, and commitments combine to shape and circumscribe the wielding of power within the order’ (Ikenberry 2001:29).
policy therefore occurred within existing institutional frameworks and were domestically induced. This highlights the difficulty of discerning change where and when it has occurred, and of showing where and why continuity has prevailed in other instances. Thus a framework is necessary which allows us to define the parameters of change.

Such a framework rests on locating the analysis of Germany’s normative power within the foreign policy-identity dynamic. This results from the interaction between the making of foreign policy and the exteriorisation of identity into the international arena. Two elements need to be taken into account. First, it is necessary to identify the material, institutional and ideational structures in which foreign policy functions. Secondly, the normative framework which establishes the parameters for political actions of individual actors has to be assessed. The years until 1998 reveal that material, institutional and ideational structures maintained much continuity in most foreign policy areas. In contrast, the period between 1998 and 2005 shows that ideational structures were loosened, and actorness and new normative convictions prevailed over the structural context, leading to changes in Germany’s foreign policy identity and the remaking of Germany’s normative power.

Hence the aim of this chapter is to present a theoretical framework which articulates the question of normative power with changes in Germany’s international identity. Was Germany’s normative power merely circumstantial, emerging from a lack of political manoeuvrability, and structural weakness, or did it constitute a goal in itself and a logic of its own for policy-makers? Are multilateralism and the renunciation of force still the prevailing norms or did new norms enter into competition? Was Germany willing to engage in a more unilateral position at the expense of previously multilateral stances? Establishing such a framework will allow us, in the ensuing chapters, to trace the practice of normative power in German foreign policy, and establish how the remaking of German identity has transformed this power.

To outline the argument the chapter is organised as follows. The first section makes the case for constructivism to study foreign policy change and power. The second section presents a framework for articulating foreign policy and identity. Because normative power is such a major component of Germany’s international identity, the following section then expands on the notion of normative power. The fourth section combines normative power with the foreign policy-identity dynamic by introducing a logic of appropriateness and a logic of consequentiality, two logics of political action suggested by James March and Johan Olsen. Finally, the conclusion looks at the implications this framework has for understanding German foreign policy practice and sets the ground for the ensuing chapters.
2.2. Theoretical framework

This thesis is informed by elements of constructivism and liberal institutionalism. It uses insights, first, from conventional constructivism in that the socially constructed reality originates in international social interaction and produces implications on state action.\(^\text{17}\) Constructivists study the interaction between the international and the domestic processes and the overlapping norm creation that occurs within a given social order.\(^\text{18}\) The constructivist approach starts from two premises. Firstly, neorealism and liberal institutionalism see identities and interests as given and fixed. Constructivism problematizes this by suggesting that neither is ontologically prior to the other and both are mutually constitutive (Katzenstein 1996). In contrast to neorealism and liberal institutionalism, both incapable of explaining the origins of social phenomena (Ruggie 1998a:871), constructivism believes that understanding the socially constructed nature of international politics is the precondition for understanding politics, and the starting point for explaining political action.

Secondly, constructivism holds that state behaviour is motivated by more than merely material interests. Ideational, non-material elements such as identities and norms are also constitutive of state action.\(^\text{19}\) As John Ruggie put it, 'constructivists hold the view that


\(^\text{18}\) This is different from systemic constructivism or what could be termed ‘Wendtian constructivism’ which, according to the theorising of Alexander Wendt is more concerned with the impact of social reality on the systemic structures of international politics, partially neglecting agency and the domestic dimension of the state. See A. Wendt, 1992, 1994 and 1995, op. cit.

the building blocks of international reality are ideational as well as material; that ideational factors have normative as well as instrumental dimensions; that they express not only individual but also collective intentionality; and that the meaning and significance of ideational factors are not independent of time and place’ (Ruggie 1998b:33). Because reality is socially constructed, structures are a reflection of and created through discursive practices and habituation processes. Thus ‘[t]he international and domestic societies in which states are embedded shape their identities in powerful ways. The state is a social actor. It is embedded in social rules and conventions that constitute its identity and the reasons for the interests that motivate actors’ (Katzenstein 1996:23). What matters is the social fabric of world politics and the problematizing of interests and identities of actors and how this shapes policy actions.

The constructed world combines ideational factors with instrumental rationality. Against anarchy, constructivism advocates a more ordered structure of international society. For both neorealists and liberal institutionalists anarchy is inherent to the international system, where states act as rational and unified actors with given state identities which are prior to a state’s action. Constructivists, in contrast, see the world and the state as self-reproducing systems and believe that states exist in a social dimension. Against rationalism, constructivism broadens the scope to include social conditionalism. This means that ‘a core constructivist research concern is what happens before the neo-utilitarian model kicks in’ (Ruggie 1998a:867). Thus constructivism does not reject all neo-utilitarian findings but it reaches different conclusions once it starts asking questions about social practices that neo-utilitarians take for granted.

Finally, against neorealism constructivism acknowledges the importance of domestic politics. Neorealism’s refusal to include domestic politics into the analysis, ‘perhaps the most serious flaw of neorealism’ (Hoffmann 1995:283) makes it unsuitable as a theoretical approach to study questions of identity.

Apart from social constructivism, this thesis accepts insights from liberal institutionalism which investigates how institutional structures influence the behaviour of state action and shape foreign policy interests by taking domestic preferences into account. Johan Olsen has characterised institutions as ‘rules and practices embedded in structures of

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meaning and resources’, arguing that change in a political order causes not only ‘reorganization and reallocation of resources, but also reconceptualization and change in expectations, preferences, aspirations, mentalities and identities’ (Olsen 2000). John Ikenberry has suggested that international institutions have acted as ‘binding institutions’, institutionalising limits on state behaviour which ‘can make the exercise of power more restrained and routinized, but they can also make that power more durable, systematic, and legitimate’ (Ikenberry 2001:273).

It is a central proposition of this thesis that international institutions have acted as an important source of Germany’s normative power. Germany’s normative power is closely associated with Germany’s institutional setting which allowed for the conditions for normative power to develop in the first place. Authors working in the liberal institutionalist realm have emphasised Germany’s Europeanised state identity and Germany’s embedded multilateralism (Bulmer et al. 2000).

Finally, and to a minor degree, this thesis is sympathetic to what can be termed ‘normative realism’.21 If we concede that classical realism was not averse to the notion of values in politics, a study on identity and foreign policy has to take this into account. Stanley Hoffmann early in his writings underlined the centrality of ‘men’s values, beliefs, and emotions, (...) their purposes and ideas’ (Hoffmann 1959:366). He argued that ‘state interests are not simply reducible to power and place [but] are constructs in which ideas and ideals, precedents and past experiences, and domestic forces and rulers all play a role’ (Hoffmann 1995:5). The difference between constructivism and normative realism, is that whereas the latter only acknowledges identity, norms and values to play a minor role in states’ foreign policy, constructivism puts identity, norms and values at the centre of its analysis.22

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21 I would include Stanley Hoffmann, Raymond Aron and E.H.Carr in this group of classic realists who accepted that politics in not averse to normative considerations, where questions of identity, legitimacy and justice also played a role. Still, for them identity had no independent explanatory power.

2.2.1. Constructivism, foreign policy change and power

There are two problems with constructivist analyses of German foreign policy. First, most authors tend to explain foreign policy continuity (Boekle et al. 2001; Marcussen et al. 1999; Maull 2004a; Banchoff 1999). By introducing the concept of identity, they suggest that norms and identity change only slowly, and so does, by implication, foreign policy. Since the foreign policy of the Federal Republic revealed continuity in its alliance commitments and multilateralist approach, continuity rather than change seemed to best characterise foreign policy after unification. Therefore if identities were slow to change and foreign policy was about identity, constructivism was well suited to explain continuity. In their attempt to establish constructivism as a new theoretical approach in the 1990s, constructivists often conditioned their studies to the element of continuity, potentially hindering the emphasis on studying change in identity and foreign policy, lacking in effect a neutral approach. Part of constructivisms’ credibility derived from explaining enduring state identities rather than unstable ones. At certain times in history, though, even enduring state identities can be subjected to moments of redefinition and change. Change is possible ‘when identity elements are discursively re-framed in a way that can legitimize new policy options’ (Stahl et al. 2004:439). In those situations, what has to be explained is how change occurred, and what effect that change has had on identity itself.

The history of the German state identity in the twentieth century suggests that identities are not resistant to change, and can undergo a major transformation in a relatively short period of time. In fact, in less than five decades Germany’s state identity underwent four changes. It entered the twentieth century as an ascendant European power, with a strong will to exert its new strength. After the First World War it tried to establish itself as a nascent democratic state during the Weimar Republic, in opposition to its imperial past. Shortly afterwards, National Socialism was a third attempt in less than fifty years to create a new German identity through war, against the previous two.

The German sociologist Helmut Plessner explained these identity changes through Germany’s constitution as a ‘late nation’ (Plessner 1935). The lateness of the German nation was sociological and cultural in origin and this had been a major cause for National Socialism in Germany. Not only was Germany a late nation, it also was comparatively late in arriving in the Western democratic community of states, given that its national identity

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hitherto had been intrinsically anti-Western (Winkler 2000). Although (or because) Germany was a 'late nation', and a late Western nation, it had more difficulty than others to establish a stable identity making it more prone to change.

The policy followed by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer after 1949 represented a double departure from this past. First, the FRG was now ready to embed its policies in institutional structures together with its new partners in NATO and the European Community (policy of Einbindung). Secondly Adenauer located Germany firmly in the West (Westpolitik), until then not a traditional area of German policy-making. The combination of these two elements ensured that the Federal Republic was to become more like Western Europe by acquiring a democratic and Western identity.

Thus if German state identity has been propitious to change it is problematic that many constructivist accounts of German foreign policy assume continuity as appropriate to explain German foreign policy after the end of the Cold War. Even if the two foundational pillars, a democratic and Western state identity remain solid, the foreign policy identity is still prone to change. More generally, if reality is socially constructed, this assumes a dynamic which, theoretically, suggests greater potential for change than for continuity. The fact that identities are ‘historically contingent and must be understood contextually’, as Peter Katzenstein suggests, should have made the potential argument for change in the German case even stronger (Katzenstein 1996:534). Since Germany’s international identity did not rest on firm historical foundations before 1949, one question after unification was whether the anchoring of its post-1949 identity had been conditioned by the international bipolar structure as neo-realist theory suggested, or whether Germany had developed an enduring state identity. After the end of the cold war the potential for structural changes in the European order could have led to an increase of Germany’s power position (Hyde-Price 2006). Empirically, the fear of many Western leaders to accept a unified Germany in the middle of Europe in 1990 had to do precisely with anxieties regarding this potential for change.

But Germany resisted the structural challenges and the changes in foreign policy identity that occurred were mostly domestic in origin. Apart from the changes in Germany’s security policy, which resulted from continuing alliance commitments, they were induced by policy-makers themselves. But '[s]ince foreign policy is an external projection of domestic affairs, it follows that real change in foreign policy comes from domestic change' (Cooper 2003:107-108). Agency was a willing activator for change and this was induced by the political leadership, particularly after 1998, when German diplomacy underwent significant changes which the notion of continuity within the constructivist approach does
The second problem with constructivism is that it tends to neglect the study of power. Because power figures prominently in realist and neorealist analyses as a core concept, it has often been shunned by other approaches. As a consequence ‘neoliberal institutionalists, liberals, and constructivists have attempted to demonstrate their theoretical salience by demonstrating how "power" variables are not causally consequential in their explanation of empirical outcomes’ (Barnett and Duvall 2005:40). There are only few exceptions. Within the liberal institutionalist approach, Joseph Nye introduced the concept of ‘soft power’ to account for empirical analyses of power in its non-realist dimension. Nye defined soft power as ‘the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. (...) Hard power, the ability to coerce, grows out of a country’s military and economic might. Soft power arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced’ (Nye 2004:854). Nye opposes soft power to hard power, achieved by payments and coercion, but argues that in practice the most effective use is a combination of both sources of power. Whereas Nye’s term of soft power can be linked to normative power, it leaves out two elements specific of the latter. First, Nye does not account for the significance of norms as such. Soft power rests on culture, values and legitimacy, not on norms. Secondly, soft power does not presuppose institutions to thrive; by contrast, normative power only genuinely exists within an incremental institutional context.

With regard to Germany, some authors have addressed the issue of power. William Paterson has suggested that ‘(...) the notion that power can only be viewed in the neo-realist national interest mode involves a rather narrow view of power, for the exercise of which German institutions are intentionally rather ill designed’ (Paterson 1996:182). Simon Bulmer addressed the issue of power establishing a typology of the ‘four faces of power’ to explain Germany’s European policy (Bulmer 1997). Bulmer identified, first, deliberate power, which is power as ‘forceful articulation of interests’ in the ‘neorealist perception of utilizing power in multilateral negotiations’, a form of power Germany rarely made use of. Secondly, indirect institutional power is the power to ‘influence the structure, norms and policy principles of the EU indirectly’. Because of domestic elite consensus, Germany made much use of this institutional form of power which it projected ‘indirectly and in a diffuse manner’, suggesting that it is ‘soft power’. Because norms and ideas, not only interests, are important, the European Union reflects ‘social power’ or ‘institutional power’. Unintentional power is a third form which is ‘dispositional rather than the product of
deliberate action' and 'arises from unintended consequences of domestic political and economic power'. Finally, Bulmer suggested empowerment as a fourth face of power which has a 'passive, dispositional power dimension' because of the 'close congruence between the EU's character and Germany's institutions and identity' (Bulmer 1997:73-76 and Bulmer et al. 2000:13-18). What Bulmer has suggested for Germany's European policy can be applied to other areas of policy-making, such as Germany's bilateral relationships with France and the United States, and its security policy.

Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall point out that '[a]lthough constructivists have emphasized how underlying normative structures constitute actors' identities and interests, they have rarely treated these normative structures themselves as defined and infused by power, or emphasized how constitutive effects also are expressions of power' (Barnett and Duvall 2005:40). Stefano Guzzini has tried to tackle this problem by arguing that 'the concept of power has emerged as one of the most prominent ways to link the (...) interaction between the social construction of meaning (including knowledge) with the construction of social reality' (Guzzini 2000:170; 2005). The concept of power provided 'a central, because sociologically pertinent, link between the construction of knowledge and social order (Guzzini 2000:172).

Germany has made an unconventional use of its power potentials, and it has been in the realm of normative and constitutional power that these potentials have produced the most effective results in perpetuating precisely that sort of power. In view of an overemphasis on continuity and a lack of emphasis on the notion of power, with regard to German foreign policy, this thesis suggests a framework which considers change in Germany's international identity, through the analysis of normative power in policymaking, which will be dealt with in the next sections.

2.3. The articulation of foreign policy and identity

Foreign policy functions as the arena where international state identities are defined, exchanged, transformed and consolidated. There is a mutual constitutionality between identity and foreign policy, in that an ongoing interacting process exists between identity that shapes and is also shaped by foreign policy. Hence the articulation of foreign policy and identity needs to be conceptualised as a two-way process where foreign policy can be a direct result of identity indicators such as a democratic or a multilateralist identity, and where a remaking of identity can also derive from foreign policy, through international interactions between states or institutions.
How can state identity be defined? Identity is not a given element but has independent explanatory power and is understood in a socially constructed dimension. For Peter Katzenstein ‘state identities are primarily external’ (Katzenstein 1997b:20). ‘State identity, Banchoff notes, refers to the self-placement of the polity within specific international contexts’ (1999:268). Thus the formation of state identity is an on-going process involving dimensions of inclusion and exclusion in that a double process takes place within a state’s own environment and towards other states. Katzenstein distinguishes between an intrinsic identity, such as being democratic, and a relational identity, such as being sovereign. A state is only sovereign as long as there is another entity in the international system to be sovereign against (Katzenstein 1996:59). Identity formation develops in opposition to an other, who constitutes the opponent for one’s own identity. This helps explain why borders are (still) relevant for many sovereign states.

But exceptions can occur when identification takes place more with external than internal indicators. This is what Anne Norton called the ambiguity of identification. ‘Individual and collective identities are created not simply in the difference between self and other but in those moments of ambiguity where one is other to oneself, and in the recognition of the other as like’ (Norton 1988:7). The sources of Germany’s post-unified international identity still are the combination of a former malign internal self from its National Socialist past, and a benign external other, the West, the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. National Socialism served as the constitutive imperative of what post-war Germany had to avoid at all costs, whereas the congruence which developed between Germany and politics in the Euro-Atlantic area served as a mechanism to overcome that shameful past since ‘to bury Germany in the bosom of its Western allies, such as NATO and the EC, was to bury the distrust of Germans’ (Buruma 1995:30).

In other words, the formation of state identity took place not only on a domestic level but also through international interaction resulting from the interaction with the international realm of politics, other states and international institutions (Wendt 1994). Thus choices in foreign policy are shaped by conceptions of identity resting on a set of normative principles which make the state identifiable to other states.

There are only a few studies which establish the direct connection between identity and foreign policy. While the study of identity became fashionable in the 1990s the number

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24 What makes the question of German identity even more complex is the existence of a semi-self in the figure of a second German state, the Democratic Republic of Germany during the Cold War. In both Germanys, identity building was done against the other. The enemy image became not foremost the opposed superpower but the ‘opposing Germany’ that provided part of the rationale for identity building. See Stefan Berger (2004). Inventing the Nation: Germany, London: Hodder Arnold.
of works published on foreign policy and identity has remained low. William Wallace identified a relationship between foreign policy and identity when he suggested that 'there is the 'grand strategy' definition [of foreign policy], that foreign policy is about national identity itself: about the sources of national pride, the characteristics which distinguish a country from its neighbours, the core elements of sovereignty it seeks to defend, the values it stands for and seeks to promote' (Wallace 1991). Though not referring explicitly to international identity, Wallace established a link between domestic elements of identity and the promotion of values onto the international arena.

In 1998, Ilya Prizel published *National Identity and Foreign Policy: nationalism and leadership in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine*, a 'study of nationalism and its impact on foreign policy' (Prizel 1998). He argued that nationalism and national identity are the glue that gives coherence to all polities. Identities help define values and rank priorities; these shape foreign as well as domestic politics. Prizel's analysis has the merit of laying the grounds for the study of a state's identity and foreign policy. In the particular case of Germany after 1945 the national element of identity itself was decisively shaped by external factors, so that its foreign policy identity was as much influenced by external as by domestic factors.

Since identities are not fixed their content is not a priori given. Identity spills over into the foreign policy domain, but the interaction can have a 'boomerang effect' on a state's identity: although foreign policy generally functions as an instrument of a given identity, it also serves as an identity shaper or a vehicle to transport a changing identity. Such change happens either when there is a significant historic juncture or when a political leader is prone to initiate such a change and enjoys a favourable supportive domestic setting. At this historic juncture states redefine their identities and national interests, where 'under situations of persistent stress even well-established identities can change at a remarkable rate' (Prizel 1998:8). This process of change need not, however, mean that the identity was previously unstable or volatile. Rather, this occurs in what can be termed 'potential path redefining moments', when due to externally or domestically induced circumstances a state reshapes its foreign policy identity.

New conceptions of identity are bound to affect foreign policy interests where polities 'adapt to new circumstances, develop new mythologies, and recast themselves' producing new identities and normative frames that 'can result in different concepts of the national interest and therefore new foreign policies (Prizel 1998:427). In moments of state formation, or potential path redefining moments, states often take other states' identities as a

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model to emulate. The quest of the Federal Republic after 1949 was to form a state whose identity was closely identifiable with the Western democratic community of states, for that would consolidate German identity and the newly created state (Winkler 2000).

In this identity-foreign policy dynamic, identity exteriorizing is not disinterested. It can be co-operative, obstructive, or neutral. Whether states are influenced by their friends’ or by their foes’ identities can have an effect upon their own identity. Hence the ideational component does not exclusively mean possibilities of cooperation. A state can react in a benign, hostile or neutral way. Therefore, in exercising foreign policy a state not only exteriorises identity but can also be an identity shaper of other states, producing consequences for the receiving state, which reacts and projects its own identity as a response. Consequently, through foreign policy practice the state simultaneously exteriorizes its own identity, reacts towards inputs given by the receiver of the political action and potentially changes identity indicators of the receiving state. Foreign policy serves as a vehicle which transports identity on a relational basis and is thus not only an externally but also an internally orientated action.

2.3.1. Germany’s international identity and foreign policy change

Normative power became central to Germany’s post-war identity formation. Because identity indicators were externally driven, foreign policy interaction helped shape the FRG’s identity. If having power is the ability ‘to make or to receive any change, or to resist it’ (Lukes 2005: 478), then Chancellor Kohl resisted change arising from the structural and normative changes of the end of the Cold War and refrained from becoming a change activator. Kohl’s emphasis on European integration as a matter of war and peace, and his continued commitment to both the German-French partnership and the German-American alliance served to deliberately avoid changing the parameters of his country’s foreign policy. ‘The axis of our foreign policy orientation has not shifted’, Kohl stated. ‘For unified Germany the Atlantic and European partnerships continue to be of existential significance. After unification the whole of Germany is now - like the old Bundesrepublik before it - spiritually and politically part of the West’ (Kohl 1997b). This stemmed from Kohl’s conviction that testing the robustness of alliances in a new structural context would damage European integration, the Atlantic Alliance and Germany itself. Maintaining course in the

face of change was therefore in itself a manifestation of Germany’s normative power.

Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, by contrast, engaged with the momentum for change, by remaking the contours of German identity and challenging the robustness of Germany’s international allegiances. In his first years as Chancellor, Schröder made assertions of German self-confidence and emancipation towards remaking German identity and transforming Germany’s status as a power with international parity similar to that of other powers. In his first speech before the Bundestag as the new Chancellor, Schröder spoke of Germany’s self-confidence as an ‘adult nation, which does not have to feel inferior to absolutely no one’ (Schröder 1998) revealing his confidence in Germany’s ability to change, and in steering the country towards bringing about that change.

This different approach suggests two things. First, the main impulse for initiating change came from domestic politics when the Chancellor himself became a decisive change activator. Secondly, Schröder revealed less concern with embedding decisions in a European and international context. Redefining relations with allies were not sporadic episodes but part of a larger pattern of change, suggesting that they resulted from deliberate policy options rather than from momentary circumstances. This stood in stark contrast to Kohl’s position that any decision made by Germany would have to be firmly located within European and international structures.

Moments of significant international or domestic change are thus propitious to study how identities are changed and remade. These moments, as I have suggested earlier, can be described as ‘potential path redefining moments’, or ‘historical junctures’ (Ikenberry 2001:21) when established identities are challenged and redefined. Normally, ‘barring severe crises, processes of identity formation and reinterpretation are likely to be slow’ (March and Olsen 2004:14). However, a ‘combination of critical juncture and effective entrepreneurship can (...) lead, in a shorter timeframe than is usual, to a recalibration of the normative frames’ (Hyde-Price and Jeffery 2001:693). The period between 1998 and 2005 suggests that this combination materialised, with specific incidence on the role of policy-makers as change activators. The normative contextualisation of German foreign policy is thus studied in the next section.

2.4. Normative power in German foreign policy

2.4.1. Normative power and constructivism

The question of normative power as a power dimension equally valid to political, economic
and military power has in the last decade entered the study of European politics through the realm of constructivism. Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford raised the question of whether institutionalized practice of normative power had not already become more important than material power in today’s world (Adler and Crawford 2004). It was Ian Manners who put the term ‘normative power’ on the constructivist agenda. He defined normative power as ‘the ability to shape or change what passes for normal in international relations, and which will (...) have utilitarian, social, moral, and narrative dimensions to it’ (Manners 2000:32). Manners applied the term to European foreign policy, and argued that because the EU is constructed on a normative basis, where norm diffusion occurs in the absence of physical force, ‘this predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics. (...) [T]he most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what is says, but what it is’. Consequently, ‘the ability to define what passes for ‘normal’ in world politics is, ultimately, the greatest power of all’ (Manners 2002:252-53). The EU’s normative dimension is thus a producer of political actions since it has the ‘ability to shape the ideational constitution of international relations’ (Manners 2000:44). In other words, the EU is predisposed to pursue changes in existing conventions which rule international politics.

As Helene Sjursen has noted, ‘in so far as the EU’s ‘normative’ dimension is linked to the idea of the EU as a ‘particular’, ‘novel’ or ‘different’ actor, this would suggest that it breaks with the established normative order’ (Sjursen 2006:174). As a different sort of international actor, it does not use military force as a first resort instrument in international politics, preferring the use of non-military means through institutional practice and the projection of its norms outside of its borders. As Thomas Diez has argued, ‘it is not a power that relies on military force, but one in which norms in themselves achieve what otherwise is done by military arsenals or economic incentives’ (Diez 2006:616).

What Manners argued for the EU holds in part for Germany’s role in European politics. His analysis is useful with regard to defining the EU as a ‘normative space’ where Germany exerts its own normative power. Outside of the EU normative space, Germany’s strongest form of power as a European player in international politics has also been its

normative power. After 1990, Germany has gradually acquired international significance through the projection of normative power, and in its predisposition to pursue a normative foreign policy.

There are, however, two caveats regarding the use of Manners’ approach. First, this thesis does not suggest that Germany is a Normative Power in the sense of Manners’ definition of Normative Power Europe. Were this the case it would imply that Germany’s international identity is characterised solely by normative power and Germany would exist as a Normative Power only. This thesis problematises the degree of normative power in German foreign policy; it does not argue for the idea of Germany as a Normative Power. It thus sees power as a multifaceted concept and accepts that Germany has normative power along with other forms of power such as economic and military power. What is at the centre of the thesis is the changing nature of normative power in German foreign policy.

Secondly, in 2006 Manners elaborated on the distinction between the EU as a post-national normative power and a more traditional power politics entity (Manners 2006). This thesis does not see the two forms of power as mutually exclusive, nor does it find the distinction analytically useful. Rather, it assumes that German foreign policy increasingly combines elements of normative power with other forms of power, and is interested in tracking the normative sources of Germany’s international identity.

Normative power is here understood as one form of power which emanates out of two interconnected instances. First, normative power emanates from the magnetism others feel towards the one exerting it to the extent of wanting to emulate it or develop a strategy to obtain gains from being close to the power holder. Because of the magnetic effect it has upon others, normative power is inherently relational power. Secondly, it emanates from the will of the state with normative power to perpetuate that instance and decide future policies in accordance with proven normative attractiveness. For a state to acquire and maintain normative power, it has to assure the projection of norms and benefit from compliance with them. This normative power has to be institutionalised for only institutions embody and project norms which empower the state. In times of international or domestic change that attractiveness of power runs the risk of faltering, especially when the power holder has acquired other forms of power, and the receiving states no longer acknowledge the same legitimacy and trust towards the normative power.

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28 Ian Manners has recently problematised the articulation of both sorts of power, suggesting that in the long term Europe as a Normative Power would suffer through an increasing militarization of the EU’s international actions (Manners 2006).
2.4.2. Norm creation, norm interaction and norm change

Liberal institutionalists recognize the importance of norms and attribute to them a coercive effect on state action (Cortell and Davis 1996). Constructivists, by contrast, argue that norms are constitutive of a state’s identity and its interests (Jepperson et al. 1996). Peter Katzenstein defined norms as ‘collective expectations about proper behaviour for a given identity’ (Katzenstein 1996:54). Norms themselves acquire motivational force for a certain action and shape identities and interests, thereby contributing to the creation of social reality. This suggests that norms have a powerful effect on international interaction. Spruyt has noted that ‘three factors determine the relative impact of norms: the internal consistency of a particular normative framework, the incentives for political entrepreneurs to champion certain norms over others, and the feedback from the broader environment’ (Spruyt 2000:66-67). Because this thesis is informed by both constructivism and liberal institutionalism it accepts the effects of norms as producing at times coercive effects on state action, at other times they are constitutive of a state’s identity.

To address how norms lead states to acquire specific identities and interests it is necessary to distinguish between utilitarian and constitutive norms. First, utilitarian or regulative norms are norms which ‘order and constrain behaviour’ (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:891). Utilitarian norms are those which ‘help states coordinate and collaborate so as to maximise utilities’ (...) serving ‘functional purposes: they regulate behaviour, reduce uncertainty by institutionalising conventions, signal expectations, and reveal information’ (Spruyt 2000:69). If the effect of a norm is regulative, norms ‘operate as standards for the proper enactment or deployment of a defined identity’ (Katzenstein 1996:54).

Secondly, there are constitutive norms or social norms which create something new, be it interests or identities. Constitutive norms ‘create new actors, interests, or categories of action’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:891). They are ‘constitutive of actor identity and interests’ and can be ‘understood as a matrix of constitutive principles that govern the behaviours of members of a given social group’ based on socialization (Spruyt 2000:68). Constitutive rules ‘prestructure the domains of action within which regulative rules take effect’ (Ruggie 1998b:33). Neo-utilitarianism’s profound gap, according to Ruggie, is that it ‘lacks any concept of constitutive rules’ (Ruggie 1998a:871). In terms of effects,
constitutive norms ‘specify the actions that will cause relevant others to recognize and validate a particular identity and to respond to it appropriately’ (Katzenstein 1996:54).

The distinction between utilitarian and constitutive norms depends on the state’s action. As a social process norm creation tends to develop slowly. Norms and ideas are part of the constitutive process of identity formation, creating effects which in turn shape interests. Normative frameworks shape and account for change in interests and state behaviour. This begs the question of how the norm diffusion process takes place (Checkel 1997). Norm diffusion occurs either in an implicit and unintentional manner, through the attractiveness of the norm content, or through a conscious, pro-active manner. Here, the means range from simple persuasion to economic benefits, and ultimately coercive means to enforce rules and norms.

This is a process of socialisation which consolidates identities but also subjects them to oscillations in time of major domestic or external change. At the same time as norms are contingent on social reality, they function as stable particles of the mental road map which guides political actions. Thus while norms are not immune to change, established norms are expected to produce precisely that sort of context which aims at creating sameness and normality, stability and order. ‘To the degree that institutions generate beliefs in a legitimate order, they simplify politics by ensuring that many things are taken as given. Rules and practices specify what is normal, must be expected, can be relied upon, and what makes sense in a community’ (Olsen 2007:5).

That is why the emergence of a new norm generally tends to create initial resistance. Surprisingly, Chancellor Schröder’s pursuit of a new norm of international parity did not create much domestic resistance, which might suggest that the domestic audience was ready for a change in the nature of Germany’s foreign policy identity.\(^\text{30}\)

### 2.4.3. From normative practice to normative power

If we take Ian Manners’ definition of normative power as the ability to shape conceptions of ‘normal’, then at its beginning, in 1949, the Federal Republic lacked normative power. Instead of exerting power, Germany’s new code of conduct was to act according to acceptable normative practice and strive towards being considered ‘normal’. The FRG’s actions required normative foundations, and this predisposed it to act in a normative way, respecting alliance commitments through multilateralist policies. Germany’s normative power was characterised by ‘the ability to shape and influence the structures within which

\(^{30}\) The degree of domestic receptivity regarding identity change will be dealt with in chapter three.
other political actors have to operate’ (Hyde-Price 2000:112). The continued practice of institutional multilateralism, reliability on norm compliance and alliance allegiance transformed Germany into a shaper of European norms, leading to a foreign policy in conformity with international norms and willingness to contribute to its more generalized adherence and strengthening.\footnote{Germany’s norm-compliant behaviour was ensured not only through policy-making, but also through a legal framework with effect on some foreign policy decisions, such as legal procedural rules for military operations of the *Bundeswehr*, stipulated by the German Constitutional Court.}

The exercise of normative power has two dimensions. First, for norm-compliant behaviour to lead to normative power there has to be intentionality of power. The actor is aware of the normative power potential, and is willing to use it. Consciousness of this power and willingness to use it will potentially reinforce a state’s normative power. Secondly, there is normative power which is pursued unintentionally, and which arises out of policy decisions and actions augmenting normative power. Echoing Bulmer, this form of power is projected ‘indirectly and in a diffuse manner’ (Bulmer 1997:51).

Norms functioning in the domestic space of a state can result from domestic norm creation. But often ideas do not originate domestically, as the case of Germany shows. Germany’s two most important foreign policy norms were alliance loyalty and *Westbindung* to NATO and the EC, and institutional multilateralism. First, the Westernised identity and alliance allegiances within the Western community of democratic and liberal states became a constitutive norm which every policy-maker from 1949 to the present has followed. Secondly, multilateralism, introduced into German politics as a regulative norm by its partners, was transformed into a constitutive norm of state behaviour.

Together these norms became the cornerstone of Germany’s international identity, developing into normative power through policy practice and positive receptivity by others who recognised this practice as legitimate. They reached the domestic arena through a process that Jeffrey Checkel identified as empowerment through the domestic political elite, which makes norms acceptable through discursive and social practice. Empowerment occurs ‘when the prescriptions embodied in a norm first become, through changes in discourse or behaviour, a focus of domestic political attention or debate’ (Checkel 1997:476). Distinguishing between norm compliance and norm empowerment is a first step towards establishing when normative power is at play.

**2.4.3.1. The sources of Germany’s normative power**

The sources of Germany’s normative power are mostly non-material sources of power.
During the Cold War the core principles of Germany's foreign policy identity rested on six normative elements, and two normative constraints. The first two normative elements developed in tandem: institutionalised multilateralism. Germany accepted the ‘binding institutions’ which made up the international constitutional order Germany was part of and its foreign policy developed through ‘reflexive multilateralism’ (Bulmer 1997). After 1949 Germany’s return to the community of nations was done by an externally induced socialisation process of democratic norms, which predisposed it towards multilateralist and anti-militarist policies, making the FRG more open to the acceptance of norms produced externally. Belonging to a Western security community (Deutsch 1957) was a normative element of Germany’s post-war identity.

A second source of normative power was Germany’s institutionalised Europeanness. Normative power rested on the Europeanness in Germany’s foreign policy. This commitment to community (Smyser 2003) became deeply ingrained in the German identity, to the extent that the high degree of Europeanization of its policies was idiosyncratic of Germany’s European policy. Furthering European integration, enlarging the EU to promote security and stability, and ensuring the transatlantic partnership remained the priorities of the Kohl government, pursued through a multilateralist institutional framework (Bulmer et al. 1998). The purpose of this norm complying behaviour was to prevent any recurrence of conflict between European peoples and the desire to ensure a European peace order in which Germany could best maintain its normative power and succeed economically. After 1998 Chancellor Schröder transformed this Europeanness, making it more instrumental and less normative: preserving Europeanness as a common denominator for foreign policy was no longer an absolute priority.

A third source of normative power was the trust of Germany’s allies. The capacity to create political trust towards its neighbors and allies as a resource of foreign policy became a constitutive element of Germany’s normative power. Without the recognition by others that Germany could be trusted, policy-makers would have lacked the conditions to consolidate normative power effectively. Trust and reliability regarding norm compliance, not only (mutual) interest, ensured that long established alliances and the stability deriving from them prevailed.

Good results in foreign policy and ‘the conviction that this can be turned into success for someone else’ served, in the long term, as a fourth source of normative power, for ‘if another country is felt to have the recipe [for success] and to be willing to share it’ (Cooper 2004), it will be left, potentially, with a considerable amount of normative power. As March and Olsen have noted, ‘rules of appropriateness are seen as carriers of lessons from
experience as those lessons are encoded either by individuals and collectivities drawing inferences from their own and others’ experiences, or by differential survival and reproduction of institutions, roles and identities based on particular rules. Rule-driven behaviour associated with successes or survival is likely to be repeated. Rules associated with failures are not’ (March and Olsen 2004:12).

In the case of Germany, economic success linked to a successful membership of the European Community and NATO early on set the parameters for a successful foreign policy. Because the diplomatic margin of manoeuvrability was limited, Bonn accepted a policy of low profile rather than assertiveness, complying with rules and norms considered appropriate. But because norm compliance developed into successful practice, German policy-makers managed to capitalize on these norms, gaining normative power as a result.

Fifthly, the projection of normative power is linked to the question of duties and responsibilities in foreign policy. At the centre of Germany’s normative power was the concept of responsibility: recognizing their country’s ‘special responsibility’ in foreign policy conditioned German policy-makers to act in a responsible manner internationally. Hans Dietrich Genscher, during his seventeen years as the Federal Republic’s foreign minister, pursued a Verantwortungspolitik (politics of responsibility), which he opposed to Machtpolitik (power politics) (Genscher 1997:1014-16). By implication, Germany shunned power politics, for a responsible, normative foreign policy seemed irreconcilable, until 1998 at least, with traditional power politics.

Finally, in the specific case of Germany, identity itself developed into a source of power, where normative practice evolved into normative power. If there is coherence between a country’s core normative values and beliefs and its foreign policy actions, i.e., if the policy-maker does not betray its country’s core values, then identity is a non-material source with the potential to become normative power. Hans Peter Schwarz critically noted, in the mid-1980s, that Germany’s relationship with power oscillated between obsession with power in the first half of the twentieth century and power oblivion in the years of the Federal Republic (Schwarz 1985). Because of its ambivalent relationship with the concept of power, particularly in its military dimension, Germany became predisposed towards more nuanced uses of power. Thus acquiring normative power was a useful form to circumvent the recurrence of German power in the traditional sense, and still retain some of the elements of power itself.

There were also normative constraints. The first normative constraint was that Germany should be a self-restrained actor (Selbsteinbindung), and act internationally with a limited margin of manoeuvrability. Klaus Kinkel, the successor to foreign minister
Genscher, often spoke of Germany’s foreign policy as imbued with a ‘culture of restraint’. The second normative constraint was to never again begin a war of aggression from German territory. From German soil should never again emanate a war of aggression. Thus, without becoming a pacifist state Germany’s actions were constrained by the norm ‘never again war’. Germany’s armed forces were ‘citizens in uniform’ whose military action was confined to the NATO area and only for defensive purposes, and the Bundeswehr was a parliamentary army. Initially these six core principles all functioned as normative constraints. But the more Germany complied with them, and showed its neighbours and allies that it was now a trustworthy state, the more these constraints transformed into normative power. Thus practice of norm compliance allowed the conditions for Germany to acquire normative power.

2.4.4. Potential path redefining moments

Potential path redefining moments are historical junctures when due to externally or domestically induced circumstances a state reshapes its foreign policy identity. During such a moment states can choose to alter their approach to political action, opting for more utilitarian or more normative instruments to achieve policy goals. The German case suggests that between 1998 and 2005 such a path redefining moment occurred in German foreign policy leading it evolve towards a more calculated rationale for action.

2.4.4.1. Germany’s normative power from 1997 to 2007

After unification, policy-makers continued to project normative power. While the persistence of normative power legitimized Germany’s standing as a valid member of the international community of states and helped Berlin to enhance its own power status within the Euro-Atlantic space, the purpose of normative power increased. It exercised a transformative function in that it persuaded others of the appropriateness of its own model. Through the spread of particular norms Germany engaged in the transformation of other actors. Its widespread support for Eastern enlargement of the EU and NATO produced a normative effect upon the action of others while creating stability by enlarging its own normative space (Arora 2006). What during the period of the Cold War started as a domestic code of conduct, evolved as if stencilling its inner self, through continuous legitimisation by others, into an external norm projection. Finally, normative power had a transformative function in that it enabled Germany to set standards for appropriate
international behaviour and participate in creating a normative constitutional order.

Thus the repetitious projection of norms through foreign policy, its effectiveness and legitimacy, and acceptance and emulation by others consolidated normative power. In addition, the ability to replicate the normativeness of its foreign policy, and be able to project this onto areas where such a degree of normativeness did not exist and which were receptive towards it shows how strong normative power already was. In other words, the readiness to replicate one’s own model and reproduce the setting where normative power is empowered also constituted normative power.

Still, the purpose of normative power has had different meanings for German governments. At times the normativeness was considered the appropriate end in itself. At other times Germany used its normative power as a means to obtain specific results. This raises the question whether identities and norms are used genuinely or instrumentally, and what are their underlying logics for action.

2.5. Logics of political action: the logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequentialism

James March and Johan Olsen, authors working in the realm of institutionalism, have made the case for two different logics of political action to interpret human behaviour (March and Olsen 1998). First, there is ‘action as driven by a logic of appropriateness and senses of identity.’ Social norms tend to develop within a logic of appropriateness, setting aside instrumental purposes of political action. ‘The pursuit of purpose is associated with identities more than with interests, and with the selection of rules more than with individual rational expectations’. To act appropriately is to proceed according to ‘the institutionalized practices of a collectivity and mutual understandings of what is true, reasonable, natural, right, and good. Actors seek to fulfil the obligations and duties encapsulated in a role, an identity, and a membership in a political community. Rules are followed because they are perceived to be adequate for the task at hand and to have normative validity’ (Olsen 2007:3). That an individual or a collectivity considers a rule of action as appropriate ‘may reflect learning of some sort from history, but it does not guarantee technical efficiency or moral acceptability’ (March and Olsen 2004:4).

Secondly, there is action as driven by a logic of anticipated consequences and prior preferences. A logic of consequentiality ‘sees political order as arising from negotiation among rational actors pursuing personal preferences or interests in circumstances in which there may be gains to coordinated action.’ Policy-makers pursue anticipatory action on the
basis of strategic calculus intent on producing expected advantageous results. State actions are determined by the expectation of specified consequences, responding to (national) interests. To act consequentially is to work towards an expected outcome and to anticipate future consequences, in conformity with contemporary conceptions of rationality. In practice, as Olsen has recently argued ‘political actors may subsume one logic as a special case of the other. They may establish a hierarchy among logics, or be governed by the relative prescriptive clarity of different logics. The resources available for acting in accordance with different logics may be decisive. Actors may use different logics for different purposes. There may be a sequential ordering of logics of action, and change between logics of action may result from specific experiences’ (Olsen 2007:13).

Proponents of constructivism argue that a logic of appropriateness underpins normative actions, suggesting that ‘constructivism starts from the assumption that actors follow a logic of appropriateness rather than a logic of consequentiality’ (Rittberger 2001:105). This is problematic, for if constructivism sees identity and interests as mutually constitutive in a socially constructed world, they are initially equally relevant. Identity can initially have a higher significance than interests, but at some point interests, which are considered a product of socialization, will have a boomerang effect on identity, and vice versa. Put differently, using constructivism as a theoretical approach can lead to socially appropriate results, but also to socially inappropriate results. A state can change its international behaviour from a generally cooperative stance to one of incremental non-cooperative behaviour. Therefore it is no contradiction for constructivism to focus on a logic of consequentiality as much as on a logic of appropriateness since there is no compelling reason for it to be only about the normative component of political action. Rather, a study of the role of identity in foreign policy needs to combine the normative dimension of foreign policy with the utilitarian one. In other words, by engaging with the ‘interest’ component as being mutually constitutive of identity and vice versa, constructivism is already engaging with the utilitarian logic of consequentiality.

In fact in March and Olsen’s typology there is no dominant behavioural logic since both logics are complimentary and most political actions tend to combine elements of each (March and Olsen 2004:19). This is so because political actors are formed ‘both by their interests, by which they evaluate their expected consequences, and by the rules embedded in their identities and political institutions. They calculate consequences and follow rules, and the relationship between the two is often subtle’ (March and Olsen 1998:952).

If we relate this to Bulmer’s typology of the four faces of German power addressed at the beginning of the chapter, only deliberate power, ‘a forceful articulation of interests’ is
close to the logic of expected consequences. All other three forms of power, indirect institutional power, unintentional power and empowerment suggest more closeness to the logic of appropriateness. But variation in the choice of the political logic can occur as a result of path redefining moments. Initially states can become members of institutions or engage in relationships for instrumental reasons. Over time, the motivational force can change into a logic of appropriateness through habitual practice and communication. By the same token, a state which initially pursued a logic of appropriateness can, over time, be attracted towards pursuing a more consequentialist approach in its behaviour.

2.5.1. German policy-makers, the logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequentiality

What made the normative context of the Federal Republic durable and predictable after 1949? According to March and Olsen, ‘rules and standard operating procedures are most likely to dominate when actors have long tenure, frequent interaction and shared experiences and information; when they share accounts and institutionalized memories; and when environments are fairly stable’. But sometimes the contents of the logic of appropriateness for foreign policy change, through a leadership induced discourse for change, or through generalised new legitimating practices. How, then, are changes in the motivations of political actors explained?

Accumulated experiences with a specific situation over extended time-periods, shared experience and institutionalized memories of actors who have a long tenure of power, March and Olsen suggest, tend to produce the practice of rules of appropriateness. ‘This can be replaced by the logic of consequentiality, when rule-following is defined as unsatisfactory in terms of established targets and aspiration levels.’ Defection from the logic of appropriateness tends to occur ‘in periods of radical environmental change, where past arrangements and rules are defined as irrelevant or unacceptable’ (March and Olsen 2004:22-23). The German case suggests that a state’s foreign policy can evolve towards a more calculated rationale for action. This usually occurs when there is a potential path redefining moment, or ‘critical juncture for change’ which transforms the underlying logics for action.

32 March and Olsen do not tackle this question explicitly. Because institutions are seen as the preferred context for pursuing logics of action in international politics, the authors merely consider changes in the institutional context, when ‘institutions and their constitutive rules are discredited as unworkable and intolerable and change initiatives are presented as emancipation from an order that is a dysfunctional, unfair or tyrannical relic of an unacceptable past.’ James G. March and Johan P. Olsen (2004). ‘The logic of appropriateness’, ARENA Working Papers, WP 04/09, p 16.
After 1990, the notion of appropriateness, predominant in three of the four faces of German power regarding foreign policy changed. Shortly after coming to power in 1998, the Schröder government embarked on changing the sources of Germany's international identity. Whereas normative power before 1998 was exercised mostly in an indirect institutional or unintentional manner, the Chancellor now intended to use normative power differently. For Schröder, the old normative context with its identity indicators was no longer sufficient and normative power was now to serve an instrumental purpose of enhancing Germany's international standing and make it similar to that of other powers. He therefore disagreed with the content of the established rules of appropriateness and worked towards a logic of consequentiality. He did so first, by trying to apply it to the bilateral German-French alliance. After failing to achieve such a change, Schröder embarked on pursuing the new logic with regards to the bilateral German-American partnership, European politics, and the pursuit of a permanent UN Security Council seat for Germany.33

Thus German identity embraced two new norms. First, the formula 'never again war' was transformed by the formula 'never again Auschwitz'. Berlin now accepted the principle of military intervention for the defence of human rights; because military interventions were now being fought for humanitarian purposes, Germany should assume a more interventionist stance regarding questions of regional war and peace by participating militarily. By March 1999 it was considered appropriate for Germany to participate in an offensive military operation against Serbia in Kosovo, for the defence of human rights in Kosovo.

Secondly, Berlin developed the norm of international parity by which it felt legitimated, not least by its recognised normative power, to strive for status and power parity with its peers. The aim was to raise Germany's standing internationally as a different sort of power, by pursuing new interests in European politics, enhancing Germany's international status and participating more assertively - and at times more unilaterally- in international politics. In the case of Germany's UN policy towards reform of the UN Security Council the Schröder government weakened its normative multilateralism in favour of a more utilitarian multilateralism. The run-up to the Iraq war in 2003, during the decisive year of 2002, revealed Schröder's more instrumental use of normative power. This episode revealed the extent to which the Chancellor himself was willing to change a traditional norm of Euro-Atlantic multilateralism into one of European bilateralism.

By redefining the coordinates of Germany's international identity, Schröder hoped to enhance Germany's status and locate it on a more equal level with fellow powers, while recovering more traditional power attributes. In his quest to transform Germany into a

33 These policy domains constitute the empirical part of the ensuing chapters.
European power more like other powers and elevate his country to a new status, Schröder transformed normative power by introducing a new norm into German foreign policy, that of international parity. This was to become a constitutive norm for Germany's strive towards equal standing in the international community. Contrary to most of Germany's norms, international parity was domestic and not international in origin. The price that the Schröder government was willing to pay for such a change was a lessening of Germany's normative power. This can be seen in European and transatlantic politics, be it in Berlin's attempt to decrease Germany's financial contributions to Brussels, or pursuing a unilateral position on the Iraq war. Overall, the Schröder government played an active role in pursuing a more national, and also more unilateralist agenda than had traditionally been the case. This led to a diminishing of coherence between the core normative values and foreign policy-making. As a consequence, Germany's normative power internationally decreased.

The Schröder government did not reveal disagreement over Germany's normative power and its institutional multilateralism in principle. Rather the aim was to transform Germany's international identity while hoping to maintain its normative power. From the decision-makers perspective, there was no ambiguity or conflict between different identity indicators. Rather, introducing a new norm of international power parity was legitimate and a logical step following the end of Cold War constraints, and the emancipation of German foreign policy. Schröder's aim was not so much to lessen Germany's normative power but to author that power more by Germany and ensure that it played a greater international role on the basis of an equal consultation among partners. To do that Schröder believed that more parity implied that the sources of normative power would become less Europeanised and less transatlantic, more in conformity with a German national interest.

Such a change of sequencing political logics, however, has its costs. To pursue a logic of political action with clarity depends on the available resources necessary to the policy-maker. Therefore choosing one logic of political action to the detriment of another will depend on the 'variation and change in the resources available for acting in accordance with rules of appropriateness and calculated (self) interest' (March and Olsen 2004:21). While Schröder decided to follow such a redefinition of actions, the necessary resources which would have made such a change viable, were scarce. Albeit rhetoric of a more assertive and grown-up Germany, structural and economic means were decreasing.

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34 On publishing his memoirs, Schröder has conceded that his seven years as Chancellor served to emancipate German foreign policy. Gerhard Schröder (2006). Entscheidungen, Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe.

Furthermore, a more instrumental exercise of Germany’s normative power could lead to accusations of ‘German normative hegemony’ over its partners or institutions, increasing the costs for change in logics of political action. The political cost would be the mistrust of others as to why Germany has been willing to disregard traditional norms, such as a break away from multilateralism, and why it has done so when it did.

The coalition government led by Angela Merkel has attempted to recover Germany’s normative power. While it no longer eschews leadership as during the Kohl years it makes sure there is a legitimate basis for it and the acceptance by its partners. It has also recovered the political foundation for normative power, through the centrality of the EU and NATO and the partnerships with France and the U.S. in an ever integrating Euro-Atlantic space. For that the norm of multilateralism has also been rehabilitated.

2.6. Conclusion: The weakening of Germany’s normative power?

Germany’s relationship with power remains problematic. For Kohl the foreign policy discourse was confined to post-1945 power notions, or ‘apower’ notions, which stood in contrast to a more traditional reading of power politics. By contrast, Schröder willingly engaged in a process of redefinition not only of Germany’s state identity in its foreign policy dimension, but also of its relationship with the question of German power. In her two years in office, Chancellor Merkel has put forward a pragmatic synthesis of both her predecessors’ way of articulating normative with other forms of power and new international norms.

This chapter has developed a theoretical framework from which the empirical part of the thesis will proceed. It has conceptualised German foreign policy through the combination of three theoretical concepts: the dynamic interaction between foreign policy and identity; the significance of ‘normative power’, and the differentiated use of logics of political action. The logics of political action activate the elements of power through which identity and foreign policy interact.

It seems plausible that Germany will pursue a trajectory combining elements of its normative power with more traditional power attributes, with the result being a Germany which makes policy in a way increasingly similar to that of other powers. The foreign policy of the present Grand coalition government, led by Chancellor Merkel, indicates this striving for the sum of the two logics of political action, and the persistence of normative power linked to other power attributes. A reflection of Germany’s transformed power is that in the wake of its own changes it is helping to shape the transformation of the European Union in its security dimension and strategic policy-making.
For that Germany needs to have effective material resources to support a credible normative policy. On the one hand, enlarging the context, as happened with NATO and EU enlargements, implies a wider foreign policy projection area which in turn requires larger material and ideational capabilities. On the other hand, the more the Bundeswehr participates in different areas around the world the more it needs to ensure that normative power can be supported by other means when necessary.

Finally, Germany must reveal strategic ambition to follow its policy visions. Thinking through questions of international order, and incorporating them into a political strategy is not the sole prerogative of a ‘realpolitik’ power. Any power – be it realpolitical or normative – needs to consider the wider picture of strategic order, and position itself with regard to that order. This raises the question of how to judge the behaviour of a normative power in action? Is it to be evaluated by the end results? Or by initial motivations that empower the political actor, regardless of the outcome? Can the formula ‘normative when possible, power political when necessary’ hold for Germany’s foreign policy? How well Germany has fared in dealing with these challenges will constitute the empirical part of the next five chapters. The following chapter will therefore deal with how the question of normative power was viewed domestically by the political elite.
CHAPTER 3: The domestic sources of German foreign policy identity: The government, political parties and foreign policy

3.1. Introduction: The domestic sources of German foreign policy identity

Foreign policy in the Federal Republic of Germany, traditionally, has not enjoyed a high standing in German politics. Due to constraints on its sovereignty for forty years, it was a domain which raised only occasional interest with the German people and even with its political elite. With unification, Germany’s new position in the centre of Europe and rising expectations from neighbours and allies, this foreign policy self-consciousness came under strain. The inherent ambiguities and underlying tensions in Germany’s international policies had never been squarely faced and were often deliberately avoided, forcing the political elite now to make tough choices.

This led to controversial parliamentary debates on Germany’s role in the world. The debates on foreign policy of the 1990s were as much debates between the political parties, as they were inner party debates on adjustments about the parties’ programmatic stances. The changes that occurred in German foreign policy have been accompanied by heated debates in the Bundestag which have touched upon the post-war principle of political consensus. In the present decade, debates are no longer fought excessively within the parties, centring more on the issues than before. To what extent German foreign policy is about German identity is reflected in the number of debates that were not about foreign policy per se, but which cannot be left out of discussions about the future of foreign policy. The notion of historical memory, the German Sonderweg, the concept of a German identity touched upon the question of foreign policy. The thread that runs through all of them is the question of German identity and how Germans perceive of their identity along the spectrum from a German great power on the one end to a normative power on the other.

This raised a number of questions. How did the foreign policy ideas articulated by leading politicians structure the foreign policy debate? Who or what were the sources of change and who or what were the forces of continuity? How could Germany best adapt to the post-Cold War world in a responsible manner? What did ‘responsibility’ mean in foreign policy and what sort of discontinuity in foreign policy would amount to irresponsible behaviour? How could German policy-makers convince others of the reliability of German democracy and avoid Germany’s transformation into an

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36 This was confirmed by many of the interviewees. Berlin, September 2000.
'unpredictable power' (Haftendorn 2001:388)?

This chapter discusses the role of key decision-makers and bureaucratic cultures in both perpetuating the old sense of identity and promoting a new one. In this sense, 'domestic contests over foreign policy are driven not only by the balance of contending forces, but also by the interplay of competing foreign policy ideas' (Banchoff 1999b:11). This chapter argues that the sources of German conduct derived neither, first and foremost, from a structural international change, nor from the influence of international institutions on German behavior; rather, changes were domestically induced and negotiated by domestic actors.

To assess the degree to which a domestic consensus existed in unified Germany to project foreign policy goals in search of international compatibility, the chapter analyses sources of change and forces of continuity in German foreign policy between 1997 and 2007. To do so it examines the most controversial parliamentary debates and programmatic changes of Germany's four main parties, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) together with the Christian Social Union (CSU), the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen).37 Three issue areas are examined throughout the debates: Germany's international military operations, its European policy, and transatlantic relations.

3.1.1. The past and the various German questions

Domestic debates on foreign policy are never disconnected from the past and the perceptions others have about Germany. It is impossible to discern the mood among the political elite without grasping the historical context. Particularly in foreign policy the past continued to be a burden that influenced German policy-makers (M. and S. Greiffenhagen 1995). The wider debates which had begun among historians from the 1970s onwards started to have political meaning and fed back into the domestic political debates on foreign policy.

The complexities of German identity are in part at the root of what became known as the German question. This German question was not one but several questions composed of political and identity elements. First, in its external dimension it reflected the neighbouring countries' difficulty in coping with Germany's geographical position in the middle of Europe. This goes back at least to the seventeenth century, when

37 The PDS has been left out of the analysis since, in the timeframe under analysis, it was neither a member of a governing coalition nor did it play a decisive role in foreign policy-making.
Germany was made up of various small power entities, lacking a unifying political core. The end of the religious Thirty Years War, in 1648, represented a paradoxical outcome. While it marked the birth of the modern European state system and the sovereign state, for Germans it represented the postponement, sine die, of the creation of their own state according to the same rules that had just been created. From there on Germany stood in opposition not only to other European states but also to the historic evolution of the continental state system. The great power assertion that Germany underwent after unification in 1871, under the Weltpolitik of the Prussian Emperor Wilhelm II, led to political instability in Europe. Germany’s rise to great power status after 1890 was one cause for the outbreak of the First World War. The geopolitical positioning of Germany in the centre of Europe and how its neighbours dealt with it was the traditional German question (Geiss 1997). Germany was either too weak, thus susceptible to outside intervention from the great European powers, or it was too strong, and thus a threat to its neighbours; either way this caused political instability in Europe (Joffe 1999).

Secondly, the German question is linked to the idea of the German ‘special path’ (Sonderweg). The Sonderweg thesis has not traversed a linear path. During the 19th century the German ‘Sonderweg’ thesis had a positive connotation in the German national conscience in that it represented Germany’s existence as a cultural nation. Indirectly this was already one form of compensating for the inexistence of a unified state. After 1945 the German Sonderweg came to mean the negative side of German exceptionalism (Sontheimer 1999:58). The conservative handling of the German question was challenged by the historian Fritz Fischer in 1961 when he presented a revisionist interpretation of Germany’s participation in the First World War by arguing that instead of being dragged into the war, the German Reich had initiated the war deliberately to obtain world power status (Fischer 1961). If Fischer’s thesis was right, the National Socialist years between 1933 and 1945 no longer stood as an individual German catastrophe but represented the culmination of Germany’s incompatibility with liberalism and democracy. This turned the Sonderweg thesis on its head: ‘from proud

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38 After 1957, the European Community in a very different manner became, also a form of substitute for the lack of national unity.
assertion of Germany’s differences to the West it became a sad reflection of Germany’s aberrations from the West’ (Berger 2004: 191). The culmination of these aberrations was, of course, National Socialism, in which questions of German identity, singularity, special paths were exploited to their extremes. In this sense, ‘the end of the Third Reich was also the end of a German national special conscience’ (Sontheimer 1999:60).

Thirdly, the German question reflected contradictions between ideas highlighted by Alexander Humboldt and Immanuel Kant, who represented the German Enlightenment, and those of Johann Gottlieb Fichte or Georg Friedrich Hegel, who embodied the German national idea and Romanticism. German romantic nationalism ‘was directed against the spirit of the Enlightenment, which was despised as a Western, superficial and rationalist ‘Ungeist” (Kohn 1944:556). Thus the German question linked Germany’s geographical and political location to the nature of the political regime. This is why after 1945 it was vital for the Federal Republic to become a democratic and a Western state. And it helps explain why the German question, in whatever version it is debated, is always also a question about Germany’s international identity.

This created the terrain for an unstable identity putting Germans in a continual process of identity redefinition. Most debates on Germany’s role in the world in the twentieth century were linked to the problematique of how to deal with Germany’s past, and how this past influenced Germany’s present and its policy-makers. In 1947 Dolf Sternberger wrote, ‘We do not know who we are, this is the German question. Any form of German existence is overcome by a shadow’ (Sternberger in Bolaffi 1995:92). Almost sixty years later the national sentiment was still plagued by similar doubts about German normality. As then foreign minister Joschka Fischer stated in a debate in 2005, ‘until today our country is a highly traumatised country. No one asks the question ‘Am I normal?’ if they are normal’ (Fischer 2005:36). This insecure identity also paved the way for repeated reassessments of history.

But German unification and the changed international context challenged the contours of Germany’s post-war identity, and provided the chance to deal with the seemingly ‘unfinished business’ of the German question, for it was only now that things could seriously go wrong with Germany again. As Timothy Garton Ash remarked shortly after 1990, ‘[a]lmost two hundred years after Napoleon’s comment, [that] Germany’s state of nature is becoming and not being, Germany was still in a state of becoming’ (Ash 1993:558). Now more than ever before, Germany had to prove to its neighbours and to itself that it was capable of undergoing an international political
transition towards the inevitable increase of power without affecting negatively the stability of European and transatlantic institutions or reacting in an irresponsible manner.

This brings us to the question of German interests and the concept of responsibility in foreign policy. Whether Germany could wield power responsibly depended on how Germany dealt with its historical memory (Buruma 1995 and Banchoff 1997). Most political statements underline Germany’s special responsibility and duty, more than that of other states, to provide the world with the means to achieve those goals. The special relationship with Israel and the duty towards Israel’s right of existence which all German governments, without exception, have cultivated, relate to Germany’s past and to a present notion of responsible politics. In that sense, Germany’s responsibility in foreign policy has been about ‘the awareness of acting for others as well as for oneself; it begins with perceptions and values’ (Hill 2003:251-2).

3.1.2. Germany as part of the West

What distinguishes German history from that of classical democracies is first, that ‘Germany became a nation-state much later than Britain or France’, and second, that ‘it only became a democracy much later’ (Winkler 2005:36). The difference between Germany, Britain and France is that ‘a national consensus for liberal political institutions developed much earlier in the Western countries than in Germany’ (Sontheimer 1999:59). After 1945 the transformation into both a Western and a democratic German state were thus the prerequisites for the FRG’s integration into the Western ‘pluralistic security community’ (Deutsch 1957). As a consequence Germany’s identity as a democratic Western state became constitutive of its foreign policy, for domestic reasons and as part of external influence. At the same time the constitution of German democracy and Germany’s post-war identity was intrinsically linked to the FRG’s position in the Euro-Atlantic system. As Fritz Stern suggests, ‘German democracy and German acceptance of Western traditions have been the preconditions for Germany’s gradual reconciliation with neighbours and former enemies, with Poles and Slavs; for efforts at reconciliation with Jews; for a general acceptance of the burden of the past and a collective commitment to the future’ (Stern 2005). This was part of the socialisation process that West Germany underwent since 1945 and which led it to develop a diplomacy based on foreign policy continuity.

The domestic foundation of the nascent Federal Republic was the renunciation
of power politics, and the acceptance of a culture of consensus and restraint through the Westbindung. This implied a deeper institutional focus on the inner workings of the young German democracy; the Atlantic Alliance, European integration and Germany’s ‘arrival’ in the West were thus primarily understood as a domestic fortification of democracy. Together with constraints on sovereignty this led to a political culture in which foreign policy practice initially only played a secondary role. For the German elite Germany’s post-1945 foreign policy was characterised by engaged institutionalised multilateralism, commitment to European integration and alliance loyalty. But the debates on foreign policy never reverberated in the German domestic arena as they did in France or the United Kingdom. This had to do with the limited sovereignty which as a rule led foreign policy-makers to play the role of policy executors rather than policy shapers.

One of the questions put with renewed urgency in the aftermath of unification was whether or not Germany remained a part of the West. Ralf Dahrendorf considered that ‘Germany’s external position is decided by its internal strength. If the state of law (Rechtsstaat) and democracy are well anchored, there is no longer a question of a German mischief-maker in Europe or even of the ‘Reich as a European power of order’. Fritz Stern has argued repeatedly for the new Germany to make peace with itself, because ‘peace within a country constitutes the basis for a judicious foreign policy’ (Stern 2000). In this sense, the need to remember is linked to the need to use and exercise power responsibly. To reassure its neighbours, Chancellor Kohl asserted that ‘for unified Germany the Atlantic and European partnerships continue to be of existential significance. After unification the whole of Germany is now - like the old Bundesrepublik before it - spiritually and politically part of the West’ (Kohl 1997).

Germany’s support for the EU’s policy of enlargement to the East was also an answer to that question. Through enlargement, Germany would finally be located firmly in the middle of the West. Joschka Fischer has termed this the great achievement of German democracy. Speaking before the DGAP in June 1998 shortly before becoming foreign minister, he stated that the Westbindung of the F.R.G. had been ‘Germany’s late democratic revolution’ (Fischer 1998a:80). The birth of post-1945 democracy in Germany was contingent upon the linkage to the U.S. For Fischer, ‘Germany’s Westernization was the positive dissolution of all the contradictions of our history since

the creation of the first national state in 1871.  

3.2. German foreign policy debates during the Kohl government (1997-1998)

3.2.1. Germany's role in international politics: the past and German normality

In the foreign policy debates of the 1990s there were two German elements which played a role in shaping foreign policy, representing the limits of responsible foreign policy. They can be termed the 'power politics factor' and the 'Auschwitz factor', both reminiscent of the various faces of the German question. First, there was the 'power politics factor' which came from the tradition of German Machtpolitik and which raised the question of the limits of German power and Germany as a power in the centre of Europe. The second element was the 'Auschwitz factor' which raised the question of the limits of German inaction in the face of international aggression. The political reluctance of German policy-makers to exert a more assertive role in security policy derived directly from Germany's self-understanding of its own national-socialist past. How could 'Auschwitz' allow for the more interventionist role that Germany's neighbours and its institutional commitments expected? The persistent tension between Germany's new strategic power, and the collective memory - the selective use of the past to legitimate present conditions of power - of the German past (Markovits and Reich 1998:13-15) accentuated the contours of the debates German politicians faced during the 1990s.

The contrast between a new position of power through stronger international engagement, a new discourse of national interest and a policy of alliances, on the one hand, and a persistent reluctance, for historical reasons to engage in international politics more assertively was the dividing line which ran through the German political spectrum. Politicians were split between those who intended to keep the memory alive and use history as a reminder, as did the SPD and the Greens, and those who wanted to normalise Germany's relationship with its own history and go beyond the burdens of the past, as did the CDU/CSU and the FDP. The CDU/CSU and the FDP leaned towards a more assertive international role, accepting changes in its security policy while maintaining institutional and alliance commitments. The SPD and the Greens, until the late 1990s, were more constrained, internally, to accept a new foreign policy.

assertiveness.

For Chancellor Kohl, foreign policy was more ‘a reflex of personal chemistry than an institutional process. His understanding of foreign policy and European policy in particular was shaped by a strategic normative vision. For Kohl post-unification normality meant foreign policy continuity, accepting that Germany was to become more like other states, achieving this likeness of power through the typical means of the old Federal Republic: defence of national interests but through a consensual style, and an all-inclusive multilateralism, that did not disregard smaller member states. This implied accepting more international responsibility while maintaining the main foreign policy coordinates of the old Federal Republic: compatibility between German unity and European unification; the unconditional double priority of the European and the transatlantic pillars, linked to the bilateral relationships with France and the United States; and increasing Germany’s margin of manoeuvrability within these coordinates of continuity and alliance trust. Changes in security policy were conducted within given institutional structures.

Political normality thus implied the end of any kind of Sonderwege. But this was not the same as suggesting an end of Germany’s normative power, since normality did not mean ‘Germany’s belated adoption of rational decision-making, unfettered by normative considerations’ (Hyde-Price and Jeffery 2001). Thus Germany was not casting off its normative power in order to become a rational power-maximizing actor; rather normality implied rethinking the normative foundations of German foreign policy, and reformulating norms hitherto valid but increasingly considered insufficient to position Germany before the new challenges of the post-Cold War and the post-September 11 world.

In practice this meant that ‘the era of jumping on the bandwagon [was] over’, as then president Roman Herzog alerted. ‘Germany is part of the concert of big democracies, whether it wants to be or not, and when one of these democracies decides to step aside, inevitably it damages not only the others, but ultimately also itself. (...) We should not take ourselves to be more important than we are, but neither should we pretend to be smaller than we are. (...) Increasingly we see that inaction too timid to take risks can in the long run be more risky than action ready to take risks’ (Herzog 1995:162).

The domestic post-war consensus among the ruling CDU/CSU-FDP coalition and the SPD regarding Germany’s embedded multilateralism in European and

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42 Conversation with Matthias Fischer, Lisbon, June 2003.
transatlantic institutions persisted. But Germany’s security policy was challenged by the wars in the Balkans, which fuelled parliamentary debates. Significantly, the debates were as lively between the political parties as they were inside them.

Parliamentary debates were conducted in specifically German terms, such as, for example, debates on the rights of intervention versus non-intervention. Expressions such as ‘we Germans, in particular’ were ubiquitous in the German political discourse and functioned as a reference to the special responsibility in defining Germany’s international role. This says a lot about German identity and the way Germans have dealt with their own power: it was never dissociated from their own sense of Germaness and their past. Thus while wanting to become normal again, Germans continued to underline their own particular role to behave responsibly and normatively in foreign policy.

3.2.2. Debates on German security policy: Bundeswehr out-of-area interventions

After unification, the political elite had difficulty in facing tough questions over Germany’s new security policy and reaching a consensual position. Inhibitions about the projection of military force for other than humanitarian purposes initially traversed all political parties. Debates on Germany’s security policy and Germany’s participation in international military operations centred around two positions. First, the government position, held by the CDU/CSU and FDP, favoured a gradual participation of the Bundeswehr in allied military operations which could include combat operations. Secondly, the opposition’s stance was led by the traditional left within the SPD and one faction in the Green party which cautioned against any international military participation to resist what they saw as the temptations of a renewed German militarism. For centre-right parties participation in international military operations meant the potential recovery of responsible German power; for centre-left parties it meant the inclusion of Germany in a multilateral peacekeeping structure. The middle ground was paved by liberal arguments, in favour of intervention for moral purposes and humanitarian actions only.

The coalition government favoured a gradual Bundeswehr participation in international military missions. Both foreign minister Klaus Kinkel and defence minister Volker Rühe advocated the normalisation of Germany’s military participation outside of the NATO area, particularly in humanitarian missions. The novelty and difficulty in addressing the issue of military interventionism in Somalia and Bosnia in
the years 1992-94 led political leaders to resort to the highest judicial institution of the country to resolve the controversial issue. On 12 July 1994 the German Constitutional Court stipulated that the Bundeswehr could join UN international coercive actions in NATO’s out-of-area provided the Bundestag had approved the operation by single majority before each deployment. This was a way of legitimising a political position and putting an end to the political debate over whether or not the Bundeswehr should intervene at all in such situations and under which sort of mandate.

The SPD had considerable difficulty in adjusting to the new international reality and was reluctant to change its security policy and conceptualise a new role for Germany. Rather, for historical reasons the party meant ‘to show others that it did not want to take advantage of the new situation of regained strength, and that the country would stick to the modesty it displayed since the Second World War.’ The Social Democrats favoured maintaining Germany’s low international political profile and opposed German military involvement abroad, agreeing only to German participation in UN peacekeeping missions against more muscular UN-mandated interventions.

As one SPD party member put it, ‘thinking in historical categories and [being] aware of historical burdens, the SPD was reluctant to accept a new role and its new position of power. Its priority was to make unified Germany predictable and safe for our neighbours (...) thus European integration was necessary to dispel our neighbours’ fears. However, we had to find out that our voluntary acceptance of the policy of modesty was not recognised to the degree we had expected. There were strong international expectations towards Germany playing a stronger role, and bigger responsibility, for example in the question of international interventions. While the CDU/CSU and the FDP were quick to change their positions, the SPD blocked its own internal change for years’.

There were only few exceptions. Rudolf Scharping, chairman of the SPD, argued for a more engaged position of the Bundeswehr, and SPD foreign policy experts

44 Interview with a German politician, Berlin, September 2000. The Social Democrats favoured maintaining Germany’s low international political profile and opposed German military involvement abroad, agreeing only to German participation in certain UN peacekeeping missions, which the party had decided on at its party conference in Bremen in 1991.
45 At the SPD party conference in Wiesbaden in September 1993 the delegates adopted a resolution which stated that ‘Social Democratic peace policy is based on a comprehensive security definition (...). We want that the military dimension of security continues to lose significance.’ Quoted in Uwe Nerlich, ‘Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik: Konzeptionelle Grundlagen für multilaterale Rahmenbedingungen’, in K. Kaiser and H. Maull, eds. (1997). Deutschlands neue Aussenpolitik. Band I. Grundlagen, München: Oldenbourg, p. 156.
Karsten Voigt and Hans-Ulrich Klose suggested that their party should accept German military participation in both peace-keeping and peace-making UN sponsored operations, including combat missions. But these positions were premature within the SPD. This meant that until the mid-1990s the SPD was ‘confined to the sidelines of the debate’ (Janning 1996:38) since most SPD members opposed ‘a more prominent German role in the world, opposed thinking in terms of “national interests,” disputed the need to revise Germany’s military constraints, and believed Germany’s past prohibits any notion of normalization’ (Gordon 1994:238).

The turning point came in December 1997 when the SPD changed its foreign policy position at the party conference in Hannover. In light of the coming legislative elections in the fall of 1998 the decisions adopted on foreign and security policy at this conference changed the SPD’s traditional position towards a gradual Bundeswehr participation in Alliance led military missions. The party voted in favour of international military interventions, under the following conditions: ‘NATO operations, which are not collective defence operations conducted under article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, need a UN Security Council mandate when coercive measures are used’. In addition, ‘each military intervention to end a combat situation needs to be integrated into a civilian strategy’. With these programmatic changes, the Social Democrats made peace with mainstream Atlantic Alliance positions and prepared their party for winning the upcoming federal election.

The Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) also had a hard time in adopting its security policy to Germany’s new post-unification realities. They opposed the idea of a European military superpower and what they saw as the government’s increasing militarization of foreign policy, and argued for a civilian and ecological conception of politics. Germany’s interests should be embedded in wider European interests and rest on pacifism. But the Green’s party leader, Joschka Fischer, warned that ‘if it is correct that the Westbindung is the central raison d’être of the second German democracy, domestically as well as in foreign policy, then there is the need for a very self-critical discussion with national-pacifist and neutralist “special paths” in the German Left’ (Fischer 1994:208).

This discussion began in 1995 with the war in Bosnia with its highly divisive impact on the internal debates of the Green Party. The Srebrenica massacre of Bosnian Muslims by Serbian forces in July 1995 highlighted the inner party division between the

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47 SPD party conference in Hannover, 2-4 December 1997. Beschluss zur Aussen-, Sicherheits-und Entwicklungspolitik, p. 32 and p.32, respectively.
Realos, supporters of a pragmatic, less ideological approach to foreign policy, such as Joschka Fischer, Krista Sager and Helmut Lippelt, and the Fundis, the ideological core of the party, in favour of maintaining a pacifist position, such as Ludger Volmer and Jürgen Trittin. The discussion crystallized over whether the Bundeswehr should intervene in Bosnia and for what reasons. For the Fundis, in the pacifist vein, 'never again war' was a sufficient moral reason against intervention; for the Realos 'never again Auschwitz' was a necessary moral reason for intervention.

At the Greens’ party conference in Bremen in December 1995 the majority of delegates decided against the use of force and military intervention in Bosnia. At the Greens party conference in Magdeburg in March 1998, the party delegates voiced their opposition to military combat missions and to the extension of the Bosnia mandate SFOR, making compromise impossible. The results of the vote showed a deeply divided party. Joschka Fischer, who favoured the SFOR mandate extension, saw his position within the party weakened. Six months before the general election, when the Greens stood a real chance of entering a federal governing coalition as the junior partner, the majority of members voted against the deployment of German forces abroad, and still favoured the substitution of NATO by a new security organisation in Europe. At the beginning of the election campaign, the Greens were a divided party on some crucial foreign policy issues.

While in international relations a wider debate was underway during the 1990s about humanitarian military intervention generally, the German domestic debates continued to highlight the problematique from a purely German point of view, and the responsibilities that this entailed for Germany’s new security policy in particular. Security policy remained a highly controversial domestic issue, with debates about military intervention conducted mostly in terms of Germany’s specific history and characteristics.

3.2.3. Debates on German European policy

In Germany’s European policy a cross-party consensus existed during the 1990s regarding the European Union as the preferred institution in which Germany could best pursue its foreign policy interests. At the same time, Germany’s European policy was ripe for normative change, and change was ‘purposefully sought’ (Hyde-Price and

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49 The vote, which set the party line for a Bundestag vote in June 1998, scored 275 to 274 against adopting the SFOR mandate as a peaceenforcing measure. Die Welt, 9 March 1998.
Jeffery 2001:692) by domestic actors to debate the role of normative power in German foreign policy. The debates reflected a competition among parliamentary members with each one trying to be more European than the other. ‘Europe’ was the sacrosanct word, and part of the parliamentary consensus in the German Bundestag was based on the fear of providing any misunderstanding or being branded as anti-European.

The CDU’s position on European policy was the continuation of the European integration process, strong support for EMU and EU enlargement. The party also supported the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty, and the increase of majority decisions in the EU Council to make the EU capable of action in international politics.50

The CDU argued for more assertiveness in the pursuit of German interests as long as they were embedded in multilateral European structures. In the Christian Social Union (CSU), the CDU’s sister party in Bavaria, two positions emerged regarding European policy. One was represented by economics minister, Theo Waigel, the other by Edmund Stoiber, state minister of Bavaria. Waigel was one of the main promoters of EMU, and the institutionalisation of a High Representative for CFSP, arguing that Europe was a historical mission, in which Germany had to be anchored.51 This revealed Waigel’s Kohllean credentials. Under the leadership of Edmund Stoiber the CSU followed a more nationally orientated position, which was critical of the overall goals of European unification and the creation of a European federal state.52 During the pre-campaign year of 1997 Stoiber tried to assert his position more fiercely, by criticising EMU.53 Stoiber displayed a less emotional attachment to the European Union, arguing that the Monnet method and the principle of an ever closer union as set out in the Maastricht Treaty were no longer valid. The finality of the European Union had to be newly defined, to avoid an exclusively top-down integration no longer understood by German voters.54 ‘The European Monetary Union (EMU) was a classical example, at least in Germany, that the political elites had decided for the German people.’55 This position found wide support within the CSU. As Christian Schmidt put it, ‘the German method, to solve problems through money inside Germany does not work at the European level, unless the Germans are willing to pay for it. But the Germans are no longer capable of doing so,

51 Interview with a German politician, Berlin, September 2000.
54 Interview with Edmund Stoiber, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 27 September 2000.
and neither is there a political will. That is why the European policy of the CSU is more realistic and down-to-earth; it is not anti-European, but it raises more questions’.56

The FDP had a more pro-European position. Foreign minister Klaus Kinkel argued that ‘Our interest is Europe. Europe must not regress into a community of convenience in pursuit of free trade and prosperity. ‘Europe’ has always been based on political ideas while economic integration has always been seen as a starting point for political union. We intend to retain this ‘finalité politique’.’57 For the FDP, Germany’s willingness to loose sovereignty, end the voting principle of unanimity and to appoint a general secretary for an operative CFSP was closely linked to the idea that in exchange the EU should become a more assertive actor.58

In a resolution adopted at the SPD party conference in December 1997 the delegates stated that ‘European unification remains the highest aim of German politics’.59 They argued for the development of the EU towards a political union, CFSP and majority decisions, strengthening of the European Parliament, EU reform and enlargement.60

Despite strong internal party disagreements over international military interventions, until 1998 foreign policy remained on a path of continuity. At the end of the Kohl government, Germany continued to ‘exhibit strong elements of exceptionalism. It [was] essential that its allies recognise[d] the coexistence of these two dimensions in German foreign policy and work to accommodate the tensions that will inevitably grow out of them’ (Dorff 1997:11). Thus at the end of the Kohl government the political elite in Germany continued to be essentially multilateralist and to eschew the adoption of a national interest discourse (Paterson 1996).


3.3.1. Germany’s role in international politics: the Zeitgeist of the new Berlin Republic

That a new Zeitgeist traversed the Berlin Republic was seen in the so-called Walser controversy which emerged in October 1998 over the acceptance speech by the winner of the literary Peace Prize of the German Book Trade, Martin Walser.61 The writer had always been outspoken about the need to recover the national element in German identity.62 In the speech Walser delivered at the Paulskirche on 11 October he criticized what he saw as the “‘instrumentalisation’ of the Holocaust argument for present purposes,” which produced a suffocating effect on Germany’s national identity.63 He advocated the recovery of a national normality and a different use of historical memory.64 The political elite should endorse the history of the new Berlin Republic as no longer singularised only by Germany’s guilt for the Holocaust. Instead, Germans (and the outside world) should accept that Germany had taken its place in the Western community of ‘civilized states and democratic nation states’ (Berger 2004:247).

While the speech sparked a wide public debate, Walser had hit the tone of the new Republic. His position was welcomed by the new Chancellor who saw in the literary dispute an opportunity to push forward the discursive changes for a new German normality.65 In his opening speech as Chancellor before the Bundestag on 10 November 1998 Schröder first stated that the change of government was ‘a generational change in the life of our nation. Increasingly, our country is shaped by a generation which has not experienced the Second World War directly’. This suggested that history continued to function as a reminder of Germany’s past, but no longer as a constraint on its present actions. As a consequence, Germany should act on the world stage with the ‘self-confidence of a grown-up nation which does not have to feel inferior to absolutely

on=&pagewanted=all
64 Walser’s speech was criticized by Ignatz Bubis, chairman of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, who charged Walser with wanting to erase the Holocaust from the German historical memory in order to build a new German nationalism. See S. Berger (2004). Inventing the Nation: Germany, London: Hodder Arnold.
no one and which looks ahead prepared to face its history and its responsibility'.

Secondly, the Chancellor emphasised a new rationale for EU membership. This had changed from obligation to choice: ‘we are Europeans not because we have to be but because we want to be’ (Schröder 1998). By implication, Germany was multilateral not because it had to be but because it wanted to be. This suggested that multilateralism was no longer automatic because it rested on fewer constraints. In remaking the contours of German identity and recasting the sources of identity towards a domestic legitimacy, this new premise could produce substantial foreign policy changes, since it opened the possibility for a redefinition of Germany’s European and transatlantic policies. This meant that Germany could soften Germany’s post-1945 alliances and partnerships, which no longer rested on Germany’s automatic allegiance. All this made Schröder, in the words of German philosopher, Peter Sloterdijk, the first chancellor of normality (Veit 2006:47).

The remaking of German identity was challenged each time politicians discussed Germany’s possible participation in a new international military operation. It was at the intersection of domestic political debates with foreign policy practice, particularly security policy, that the new identity was forged. The debates broke the taboo of military participation in international offensive operations, and this made possible Germany’s military participation in Kosovo and in Afghanistan. ‘It is not a question of giving the military [dimension] an undeserved space, but rather not to taboo this aspect of foreign policy, which has been done for too long.’ After September 11, 2001, Germany’s security policy paradigm was rearranged and its security perimeter extended to ensure Germany’s security ‘up to the Hindu Kush’ as defence minister Peter Struck put it.

Still, considering the controversy the Walser speech caused in German society, it is surprising how Schröder managed to lead Germany to participate in the country’s first combat mission in the Kosovo war only half a year later and how he managed to strengthen national self-confidence through the generalised anti-war feeling in 2002-03; through a pacifist, traditionally left-wing and in principle anti-national argument he reinforced the national element in German foreign policy identity.

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66 Plenarprotokoll 13/3, 10 November 1998.
67 Interview with Chancellor Schröder, Die Zeit, 18 October 2001.
3.3.2. Debates on German security policy: German participation in multilateral military interventions: the cases of Kosovo and Afghanistan

3.3.2.1. The Bundestag debate on Kosovo

On 16 October 1998 the Bundestag held a debate on a government proposal for Germany’s participation in a possible NATO led military mission in Kosovo for humanitarian purposes. To achieve a consensual position, the timing of the debate was fortunate. Shortly after the parliamentary elections and before the constitution of the new Red-Green coalition, the CDU/CSU and the FDP, as parties of the outgoing government, would hardly have criticized their previous policy on Kosovo; on the other hand, the incoming SPD/Greens coalition had to present a policy fit for governing, and ensure the foreign policy continuity both parties preached during the election campaign. The proposal of the outgoing government was adopted by 500 Bundestag members, with 62 votes against and 18 abstentions, enabling the incoming new government to instruct the Bundeswehr to participate in Germany’s first combat operation in a NATO mission.\(^6\)

In the debate, defence minister Volker Rühe considered that if NATO proceeded with the operation in Kosovo it would be Germany’s most dangerous mission so far, with the employment of 500 Bundeswehr soldiers, a contribution he considered both necessary and significant. Wolfgang Schäuble, chairman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group, argued that the military mission rested on a sound basis of international law and was indispensable to preserve peace and human rights. Foreign minister Kinkel considered the president of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, responsible for the tragedy in Kosovo, for having ignored ongoing diplomatic efforts by the international community to find a political solution. NATO’s humanitarian intervention would not create a new instrument of law, and did not open a precedent which gave NATO general authority for interventions.

Germany’s participation in the war in Kosovo marked a break in the positions of the Social Democrats and the Greens with regard to their traditional pacifist stance in international politics. Rudolf Scharping, chairman of the SPD parliamentary group, argued that continued military pressure was the only way to achieve the political goal of

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\(^6\) Drucksache 13/11469. Plenarprotokoll 13/248, 16 October 1998. The ‘no votes’ included one CDU/CSU and one FDP, 21 SPD, 9 Greens, one independent and all 29 PDS members.
granting the Kosovo Albanians autonomy in the Yugoslav federation of states. For Joschka Fischer, Milosevic’s policies represented a lasting danger of war in Europe. Fischer believed a peaceful solution was still possible, but could only be achieved through the threat of the use of force.

At the Greens’ party conference in Magdeburg in March 1998 the party had still considered that Germany’s participation in NATO missions without a UN mandate was unacceptable. A year later, at the party conference in Bielefeld, in May 1999, the Greens engaged in a fundamental debate, ‘which almost tore us apart, because of this massive contradiction between our principles – and this was for real and not the thin air of ideology’ (Fischer 2007: 213). Fischer made the ‘most important political speech’ of his life (Fischer 2007:227) in the inhospitable party conference mood. The foreign minister stated that his position rested on two principles: ‘never again war, never again Auschwitz, never again genocide, never again fascism. Both are for me inseparable’. He thus pleaded with party members to support his government’s Kosovo military mission. In a heated debate Fischer’s policy was approved by 444 against 318 votes, and the Greens had finally changed their position over the use of military force.

Thus with the Kosovo war the utility of the past was amplified: whereas until 1999 Germany’s history led it to shy away from international military engagements, the Kosovo war turned this logic on its head: because of Serbia’s human rights atrocities in the province of Kosovo Germany had the moral obligation to intervene and could no longer be a passive if paying bystander. Thus the logic of appropriateness prevailed, but the reasons for it changed. Now the past was distinguishable between aversion to the use of force and engagement with the use of force for specific (appropriate) reasons.

There was agreement among the four major parties that Germany should not send ground troops to Kosovo. This had to do with historical memory, but also with the generalised worry about Russia’s position. ‘NATO combat troops on the ground would send Russia into war’ claimed Edmund Stoiber, chairman of the CSU, who in mid April 1999 visited Moscow to ensure that Russia stayed involved diplomatically in the Kosovo issue and refrained from using force to support Serbia. Overall, German political parties managed to achieve a considerable consensus on Germany’s first effective combat operation in a NATO led mission.

70 Speech by Joschka Fischer at the extraordinary party conference in Bielefeld, on 13 May 1999.  
71 It is likely that without Fischer’s influence in the Green Party, the governing coalition would not have survived the Green’s internal debates on Bundeswehr interventions in Kosovo and Afghanistan. That is why he considered resigning from the party had his policy not been approved.  
The Bundestag debate on Afghanistan

Another decisive Bundestag debate took place over Germany’s military participation in the U.S. led ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan. As a consequence of the terror attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, the Schröder government had proclaimed Germany’s ‘unlimited solidarity’. Speaking before the Bundestag on 11 October 2001 the Chancellor stated that ‘taking over international responsibility and avoid any direct risk cannot be the guideline of German foreign and security policy’. At the same time a new military operation in a more risk-prone environment enhanced a ‘new self-understanding of German foreign policy’. This shows how foreign policy decisions and identity sources were closely intertwined. In his pledge for a more politically and emotionally sovereign country Schröder linked a more dangerous German external commitment to a more confident identity.

On 16 November 2001 the Bundestag members debated Germany’s military participation in Afghanistan. It was a debate which turned out to be as much on foreign policy as on the government’s position in domestic politics. Schröder combined the Bundestag vote on Germany’s participation in the UN military mission in Afghanistan with a vote of confidence for his government. The vote of confidence was necessary because of disagreements on the Afghanistan mission within the SPD and the Greens, rather than the opposition parties. Although all parties, except for the PDS, agreed on the Afghanistan mission of post-conflict reconstruction they disagreed on the voting procedure. A single vote on the Afghanistan mission would have produced the majority of votes of the opposition parties, enabling dissenters within the governing parties to vote against the mission, thus raising the issue of the viability of the governing coalition.

Although the CDU/CSU and FDP agreed on the mandate, they were not willing to give the government their vote of confidence, criticising the combination of both votes for preventing the Afghanistan mission from enjoying a wider parliamentary support than the voting results reflected. Some members of the SPD and the Greens were not ready to merely vote for the availability of a Bundeswehr mission and wanted

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73 Speech by Gerhard Schröder before the Bundestag regarding the attacks on the United States, 12 September 2001. Plenarprotokoll 14/186.
74 Speech by Gerhard Schröder before the Bundestag, 11 October 2001, Plenarprotokoll 14/192, p. 18683.
76 See the speeches by Friedrich Merz, CDU, and Wolfgang Gerhardt, FDP, before the Bundestag on 16 November 2001. Plenarprotokoll 14/202, p. 19860 and p. 19866, respectively.
to stipulate the concrete mandate mission, or they disagreed with what they saw a
limitation of the freedom of action by the parliamentarians to decide exclusively on the
international mandate.\footnote{77 See S. Lemke, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, Plenarprotokoll 14/202, 16 November 2001, p. 19887.}

The government’s policy for a German military participation for twelve months
in the war against international terrorism in Afghanistan was approved by a small
margin of 336 of the 662 Bundestag members. Of the 326 votes against, four were given
by the Greens, one by the SPD, together with all the CDU and FDP votes. Whereas in
the case in Kosovo the main motivation for intervention had been the humanitarian
concern to prevent a possible genocide, in Afghanistan alliance solidarity was the main
justification that produced a parliamentary majority.

### 3.3.3. Debates on Germany’s European policy

In line with the government’s new assertive tone, the old foreign policy consensus on
European policy, with a strongly Europeanised identity among Germany’s major
parties, began to crumble. As Hyde-Price and Jeffery suggest, ‘key elites in the policy-
making process have been recalibrating their approach to Europapolitik in the light of
their normative and ideational understandings of Germany’s foreign policy role’ (Hyde-
Price and Jeffery 2001:697). While Kohl’s strategy had been to formulate German
identity in line with incremental European unification - where a German identity would
at some point become superfluous in foreign policy terms, now the locus of German
identity should derive from the domestic setting. This was a significant change from the
previous policy approach. Implicitly it also suggested that Schröder saw the EU less in
integrative terms.

A more national perspective was the result of the SPD’s party congress in
Nuremberg in November 2001 where the party delegates adopted a resolution
(Leitantrag) on European policy.\footnote{78 Leitantrag E1, pp. 42-68. ‘Proposal: Responsibility for Europe’, National Conference of the Social
Part of it endorsed the traditional line towards
European integration. More significantly, the resolution set limits on the competences of
European institutions: competences which could be better fulfilled at the national level
should be returned to the member states in policy areas such as agriculture and
structural policy to widen the scope for an autonomous regional and structural policy of
the member states. A clear assignment of competences according to the subsidiarity
principle should be pursued at the Nice IGC in 2004 to delimit the political
responsibility of member states and EU. This reflected a renationalisation of the SPD’s European policy, and played into the hands of the Chancellor who, as former minister president of Lower Saxony, had voiced his scepticism towards attributing excessive competences to EU institutions, showing his reluctance, for example, towards EMU.

In the realm of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the SPD supported stronger integration. In 2003 the SPD favoured the creation of a European Security and Defence Union with a few core European countries. The ‘European Security and Defence Union should be open to all member states who wish to join and improve the military capabilities through increased military cooperation to strengthen NATO’s European pillar.’

The Green party supported Joschka Fischer’s vision for the future of the European Union. In a speech at the Humboldt University in Berlin on 12 May 2000, Joschka Fischer advocated a European federation with a German-French core, opening the debate on European institutional reform. His model supported ‘the expansion of reinforced co-operation between those states which want to co-operate more closely than others’. This rested on the creation of a centre of gravity, an avant-garde group, ‘the driving force for the completion of political integration and should, from the start, comprise all the elements of the future federation’.

This was not that distinguishable from the CDU’s pro-integrationist position on European policy. In an interview the chairman of the CDU, Angela Merkel stated that Germany should play a more important role in Europe and in the world. She rejected the idea of a ‘German way’ in foreign policy, and stated that ‘Europeans must define their interests more clearly in the future. This will mean a big responsibility for Germany. For European interests to achieve again more importance, it is necessary that Germany’s role also increases in European politics.’ The CDU thus advocated an increase of Germany’s European responsibility to act internationally.

### 3.3.4. Debates on German transatlantic policy

In a Bundestag debate on transatlantic relations on 15 March 2001, party disagreements emerged over how to deal with the foreign policy of the new Bush administration, its inclination towards unilateralism and its proposed plan to create a National Missile...
Defence (NMD) programme.82

Foreign minister Fischer characterised the United States as having a ‘global order role’. Arguing for the continued presence of the U.S. in Europe, Fischer stated that ‘if the US withdrew or diminished its presence in Europe this would push Germany into a role which it neither wants nor should strive for.’83 But ‘because of the importance of the European unification process we will have to continuously adjust the relationship with Europe and transatlanticism.’ Fischer stated that ESDP was not directed against NATO which retained its central importance for the strategic security and defence capacity for Europe and for Germany. Rather than rivalling NATO’s strategic defence, ESDP was focused on the Petersberg missions of crisis management and conflict prevention. But Fischer avoided a clear position of the government regarding NMD, because of its ‘preliminary stage’.84

Volker Rühe, CDU, argued that for the US to stay engaged in Europe, ‘Germany must become a more relevant and equal partner’ and prevent that ‘the Atlantic Alliance declines into a mere security net’. The CDU proposed that Germany join the NMD program so that it could ‘be a real partner to the U.S.’. ‘If we want to have influence on the Americans, then we have to state a clear German position’, in this ‘debate about a new security strategy for the twenty-first century’, Rühe concluded.85 Wolfgang Gerhardt, FDP, suggested that ‘the real task is to coordinate positions with the Europeans, define a European interest and to judge critically when the Americans do not take European positions into consideration.’86

Michael Glos, CDU/CSU, stated in the debate that he was ‘thankful and proud to be able to live as a German in Germany’. This, he stated, ‘we owe to the Americans’.87 Thus although both the SPD and the CDU/CSU used a similar narrative of new pride of the German national identity, the CDU/CSU retained the external identity sources, i.e. transatlanticism, whereas the SPD located them preferentially at the domestic level.

The government’s position regarding Washington’s plans to begin a war in Iraq produced two intense debates during the election summer of 2002. On 27 June 2002 Karl Lamers, CDU, argued for more German assertiveness in Europe. ‘For Europe’s

82 Plenarprotokoll 14/158.
83 Speech by Joschka Fischer before the Bundestag, on transatlantic relations, Plenarprotokoll 14/158, 15 March 2001, p. 15376.
85 Speech by Volker Rühe before the Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/158, 15 March 2001, pp. 15365, 15368 and 15367.
86 Speech by Wolfgang Gerhardt before the Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/158, 15 March 2001, p. 15371.
87 Speech by Michael Glos, CSU/CSU, before the Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/158, 15 March 2001, p. 15376.
self-assertion and its identity nothing is more important than for it to have a clear idea about its relation with the rest of the world. Europe cannot become like America to be an independent and equal partner. Europe has to develop its own specific strengths. It must not be the same as but equal to the US. In the eyes of the non-Western world Europe has to become an independent actor within the West and not only a appendage or at best a junior partner of the U.S., or else it cannot play the role, which is rightly expected of it, and which would strengthen the West as a whole.\footnote{Speech by Karl Lamers before the Bundestag on 27 June 2002, Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/245, 27 June 2002, p. 24709.}

But members of the government parties also criticized the government for not seriously attempting to pursue a common European position on the U.S. war plans for Iraq. Shortly before the election, Hans-Ulrich Klose, SPD member and part of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee, gave a speech in which he criticised the government for weakening the West’s diplomatic position by stating beforehand Germany’s non-involvement, and argued for a tough stance against Iraq.\footnote{‘Hans-Ulrich Klose kritisiert deutsche Debatte über Irak’, Kieler Nachrichten, 12 September 2002. \url{http://www.historikertag2002.uni-halle.de/artikel/p_38.shtml}} Christian Sterzing, Green Party member of the Bundestag argued that instead of going it alone, Germany should help find a ‘European way’ which would enable Europeans to have an ‘effect on the American discussion’.\footnote{Quotation taken from BBC Newsnight on 24 September 2002. \url{http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/newsnight/archive/2279050.stm} (accessed 26 July 2005).}

The opposition parties accused the Chancellor of exploiting anti-American feelings for electoral purposes. The CDU’s position on the government’s Iraq policy was vague, falling between a cautious distancing from Washington and a soft criticism of the government’s rejection of military action. Wolfgang Schäuble, CDU, voiced indirect criticism of the U.S., arguing that it would be more productive for the diplomatic work of the international community if considerations other than the return of UN weapons inspectors to Iraq were set aside. Friedbert Pflüger, CDU foreign policy expert, criticised the Iraq policy of the Red-Green government for sacrificing/giving a considerable blow to the German-American friendship for the sake of electoral tactics.

Up until mid-August the Chancellor warned Washington not to use military force against Iraq. At the end of August Schröder began to state that German soldiers would not participate in a military strike against Iraq.\footnote{At the beginning of August Schröder spoke of the ‘German way’ in election speeches, referring to domestic politics. But in the heat of the discussions over Iraq this expression became instrumental to the opposition who accused the Chancellor of proposing a new German path in foreign policy.} The foreign ministry, on the other hand, tried to downplay the disagreements with Washington, stating that a critical
position regarding an attack on Iraq had been the position of the government for months all along.

On 13 September 2002, another emotional debate took place in the Bundestag over the Iraq issue. In his speech Schröder declared that the German position rested on ‘alliance solidarity on the one hand, and [Germany’s] own responsibility, on the other.’ Germany’s alliance duties had been well accomplished. In the four years of Red-Green leadership the government had ‘proven this: in Kosovo, in Macedonia, but also with ‘Enduring Freedom’. (...) We have made [difficult] decisions, and this has increased Germany’s status in the world.’ Against his critics Schröder stated, ‘this is an ‘international policy with self-confidence and without arrogance. (...) The existential questions of the German nation are decided in Berlin, and nowhere else’. Regarding Iraq the Chancellor stated that it was not acceptable ‘that instead of the goal to reintroduce weapons inspectors to [Iraq], the goal should now be regime change by force’. This reinforced his view that ‘Germany will not participate in a military intervention’ under his leadership.

What stands out from Schröder’s speech is that he made no reference to Berlin’s cooperation with partners and institutions, such as France, the EU or the UN. Thus at the beginning of a serious transatlantic crisis over Iraq, the Chancellor justified Germany’s position on the basis of a self-confident foreign policy capable of making decisions on its own. This was not the foreign policy continuity Germany’s partners were used to, and the opposition parties let their criticism be known.

In contrast, foreign minister Fischer explained the government’s policy by placing Germany’s role into a wider international context. ‘The decisive strategic question is the creation of a new world order as President George Bush and his foreign secretary James Baker formulated at the end of the Cold War.(...) This new order has to be based on a global cooperative security system. (...) The crucial question is whether this new world order is created through a cooperative or confrontational approach.’ Fischer justified his unease over Bush’s war aims by fearing that the U.S. might not be willing to stay in the Middle East once the intervention was over and build the new regional order. This would have a negative strategic implication for Europe because ‘as a direct neighbouring region we cannot change our geopolitical situation.’

For the foreign minister, the government pursued ‘peace politics on the basis of realism. This means that we will present our decisions in the alliance, even if they are

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92 Plenarprotokoll 14/253, 13 September 2002.
93 Speech by Chancellor Schröder before the Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/253, 13 September 2002, pp. 25582-83.

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uncomfortable, in a justified manner. This was a different and more diplomatic way of handling the Iraq issue. For Fischer, it was a question of rational explanation and justification; for Schröder it was a question of German self-confidence and an increase in status.

The opposition parties criticized the Chancellor’s position as conducive to Germany’s international isolation. Angela Merkel, CDU, spoke of the Chancellor’s irresponsible u-turn from the government’s ‘unlimited solidarity’ on September 11, 2001 to ‘unlimited unilateralism’ on September 11, 2002, and argued for the continued alliance with the U.S., with democracy and freedom. Guido Westerwelle, leader of the FDP, criticised the Chancellor for the ‘state of speechlessness’ among partners, for not handling the issue in personal conversations with President Bush, and for not attempting to coordinate a position together with Germany’s EU partners. For Westerwelle, this amounted to a ‘break in one of the guidelines of German foreign policy’. Whereas the SPD and the Greens were against Germany’s participation in a war against Iraq, neither the CDU/CSU nor the FDP took a clear stance on whether Germany should participate in a military strike against Iraq.

The government’s position over the Iraq issue marked a caesura in German politics, when the old foreign policy consensus crumbled. Until 2002 the four major parties would probably have agreed that the basic continuity parameters of German diplomacy were ‘never alone, no German special path, no unilateralism, but instead a close binding in an ever integrating Europe, a stronger role with Europe in the Atlantic Alliance, and together with the Alliance and Europe assuring that the United Nations can play a stronger role for international order’. By the summer of 2002 relations with America became the key, controversial, issue between the SPD-Green governing coalition and the CDU-FDP opposition, marking the end of the traditional consensus.

3.3.5. Competing approaches: Schröder and Fischer

During the Schröder government, the most significant change occurred at the level of
the sources of identity formation and change. While until then the sources of German identity had been mostly external, Chancellor Schröder redefined this equation by trying to domesticate the sources of a modified German foreign policy identity. Starting from a new understanding of the ideational and normative components of foreign policy, the Schröder government domestically articulated policy towards change, enlarging the domain of policy action and elevating Germany onto a higher international standing. Schröder developed a new foreign policy narrative of shared meaning and helped to forge a collective intentionality and a legitimating framework for action to emerge in domestic German politics.

But the Chancellor and the foreign minister did not pursue the same foreign policy approaches. While they agreed on the big issues such as Kosovo and Iraq, a closer look revealed contending convictions regarding basic strategic foreign policy questions. This can be seen in their handling of questions of identity, history, interests, institutions, alliances and strategy.

First, for Schröder the sources of identity were national, whereas for Fischer Germany’s international identity was intertwined with European and American sources. Secondly, while a new generation of politicians no longer needed to be constrained by history, according to the Chancellor, the foreign minister often referred to Germany’s WWII history as a constraint which German foreign policy should continue to accept with responsibility. Thirdly, Schröder coined the term ‘enlightened self-interest’, according to which the country should ‘define its interests and convey them to others through rational arguments. The art lies in adjusting national interests with those of our friends so as to advocate common requests.’99 Schröder pleaded for ‘more independence and self-responsibility in foreign policy’.100 For Fischer, Germany’s interests should be pursued through a multilateral approach to German diplomacy. Fischer argued that ‘who reclaims a leadership role for Germany, immediately has more anger than leadership. Europeans react instinctively [in an] antihegemonic [way].’101

Fourthly, institutions remained important for Germany. But whereas for the Chancellor they should serve primarily German interests, for the foreign minister institutions should embed these interests in a multilateral framework. For the former, NATO remained important to enhance Germany’s status as a more equal partner at the same level as other powers. For the latter, NATO maintained the vital transatlantic unity

99 Schröder speech on 2 September 1999, in Berlin.
100 Interview with Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, Der Spiegel, 2, 5 January 2004, p. 22.
of the Western world. Fischer argued that German foreign policy was not about normality but about ‘creating a new historical reality, political Europe, which began after 1945 and which is founded essentially on the decision by the United States to stay in Europe.'

Thus Germany should avoid the renationalisation of its European policy, a position not shared by Schröder who often pursued a less Europeanist policy.

Fifthly, for Fischer Germany’s predictability towards its allies and a politics of self-restraint were the two pillars of Germany’s external actions and alliance policy (Fischer 1998a). A return to ‘power politics’ in German foreign policy ‘would be catastrophic for our country’ (Fischer 2001a). This ran counter to Schröder’s repeated proclamations of a new German self-confidence. Alliances were no longer as binding as during the Cold War and this allowed Germany to diversify its alliance policy towards other actors, such as Russia.

Finally, while the Chancellor’s strategic approach accepted changes in German foreign policy the foreign minister’s strategic approach preached institutional continuity in the face of new challenges. After September 11, 2001 Fischer began to change his concept of a core federal Europe towards the concept of a strategic Europe. Europe’s new strategic outlook meant that to maintain the unity of the West a strategic dimension for the EU in the Middle East was necessary, including EU enlargement towards Turkey (Fischer 2004a). For Schröder, the cohesiveness of the West as it had existed until 1998 was no longer the essential pillar of German foreign policy.

Parallel to these competing approaches, Chancellor Schröder’s role in foreign policy grew steadily, often at the expense of Fischer’s foreign ministry. With the creation of a European division in the Chancellorship after the 2002 elections, Schröder increasingly played a role in European policy, especially after he gave up his position as SPD party leader in 2004. Thus Fischer’s overall influence on German foreign policy diminished during the coalition’s second term (Grant 2005).

With regard to Schröder’s and Fischer’s approaches, the CDU stood closer to the foreign minister’s views, whereas in certain policies like European integration the CSU was supportive of the Chancellor’s positions. At the end of the Red-Green government, all major parties agreed that Germany’s international responsibility had grown and that it had to pursue a more assertive foreign policy. The difference lay in the sources of that new assertiveness. For the SPD, in particular Gerhard Schröder, the sources were essentially domestic, left-national: Germany’s new ‘enlightened self-interest’ derived

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foremost from the German national sentiment. For the CDU/CSU and FDP, the new assertiveness remained closely tied to Germany’s Europeanist and transatlantic allegiances. For the Greens, in particular Joschka Fischer, Germany’s new role emanated from moral responsibility and strategic vision.

3.4. Political debates and policy-making during the Merkel government (2005-2007)

Even though the immediate policy results of the Schröder years weakened Berlin’s position internationally the successor government had an increased margin of manoeuvrability if it knew how to play its cards well. The first two years of the Merkel government have revealed a willingness towards greater pragmatism in combining both elements of Kohlean continuity and of Schröder engagement for change. Chancellor Merkel has returned to a more balanced style, trying to balance divergent European and transatlantic interests, but has done so with a greater acceptance of Germany’s international role and power.

While the CDU/CSU remained the most pro-European party, the contours of its Europeanism have changed. Whereas it no longer uses expressions such as ‘United States of Europe’, it still aims for a political European Union with a common security and defence policy. But it has become more pragmatic in stating the need for the definition of external boundaries and the rejection of full membership of Turkey, preferring instead a ‘privileged partnership’. The Social Democratic Party (SPD) is not a traditional pro-European party. In addition, the SPD, unlike the CDU, has always had to struggle against ‘dissenters’, particularly on the regional level, like Oskar Lafontaine or Gerhard Schröder.

3.4.1. The role of Bundeswehr interventions: the case of Lebanon

On the issue of Germany’s international military engagement, Merkel, in contrast to Schröder, re-emphasised the importance of German and European history for Germany’s motivations. The Bundestag debate on Germany’s engagement in Lebanon was conducted in that light. In July 2006 a war began between Israel and the Hezbollah group on Lebanese soil. In a debate in the Bundestag on 6 September 2006 on Germany’s international operations Chancellor Merkel considered that because Israel’s right to existence was part of Germany’s raison d’État, Germany could no longer
abstain from intervening, in political and humanitarian terms, and also militarily. But for historical reasons, German troops would not be stationed along the Lebanon-Israel border, to avoid the possibility of German soldiers (even mistakenly) shooting Israelis. For Germany to assert its interests in the Congo and in Lebanon, it was necessary to renew the emphasis on European cooperation and joint interests and an EU capable of action after the transatlantic crisis.103 For foreign minister Steinmeier, who advocates a ‘self-confident modesty’ (Steinmeier 2006) ‘Germany has an obligation to engage in stability, peace and democracy towards the people and the regions which lack the means for conflict resolution. This is why we will engage in Lebanon and the Middle East, at the side of our European partners.’ For the foreign minister the aim of Germany’s international deployments was never to increase its power, but to monitor peace processes, ensure stability and end genocide. This is the responsibility of German foreign policy.’ 104

Former defence minister Peter Struck agreed on the extension of the Afghanistan mandate, but not on a change of the mandate towards southern Afghanistan.105 As the Chancellor, Struck argued that Germany could not deny its participation in the international fight against terrorism at the risk of being isolated in the international community and of no longer playing the responsible role in Europe expected of Germany. For that reason, and because the United Nations, Israel and Lebanon had asked Germany for help, the SPD supported the military operation and a robust mandate for the Bundeswehr.

The FDP, on the other hand, had begun to change its position regarding outside interventions. It opposed the Bundeswehr’s mission in the Congo, rejected the extension of the Afghanistan mandate and indicated that it would vote against a mandate for Lebanon. The FDP disagreed with what it saw as a change in Germany’s security policy since it was Germany’s tradition not to allow for a deployment of armed soldiers in the Middle East.106 The FDP leader, Guido Westerwelle argued that for historical reasons and the vagueness of the UN mandate Germany ran the risk that its mission in Lebanon, even if only at sea, degenerates into a combat mission. While the FDP did not stipulate a principled party position against international deployments, it increasingly questioned the validity of those actions. The FDP’s position reflected partly the changing international climate, with public opinions in many countries getting increasingly

103 Merkel speech before the Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 16/46, 6 September 2006, p. 4480-81.
104 Steinmeier speech before the Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 16/46, 6 September 2006, p.4522.
106 Westerwelle speech before the Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 16/46, 6 September 2006, p.4506.
frustrated over the direction of U.S. and Western policy in the Middle East, and not just in Germany.

The debate over Germany's military participation in Lebanon divided the political spectrum down the middle. The government coalition argued that Germany had a growing international responsibility and faced expectations by others which led it to choose a responsible involvement in many parts of the world, including Israel. The FDP argued that because of Germany's historical responsibility it should not get involved everywhere, particularly not in the Middle East. Thus the FDP's growing scepticism against outside military interventions was not a programmatic line, but taken on the basis of each individual mission. The PDS/Linke in principle rejected Germany's military engagements abroad and considered they contributed to a militarization of German foreign policy. On 20 September 2006 the Bundestag approved by large majority Germany's participation.

3.5. Conclusion

This chapter has examined the dimension of normative power in German domestic politics and the extent to which the contours of a changing German international identity have transformed the parameters of that normative power. It has studied how, particularly between 1998 and 2005, policy-makers reformulated Germany's international identity and shaped a more utilitarian approach for foreign policy-making which they make acceptable domestically, with public opinion susceptible towards change. This remaking of identity reinforced a logic of consequentialism in Germany's motivations for political action and diminished the country's predominantly normative orientation.

The remaking of German international identity by recasting the external sources of identity, locating them at the level of domestic politics, may be the most significant legacy of the Schröder government and of the Chancellor himself. In the years under analysis an active process of collective redefinition and interpretation of reality has taken place, which became institutionalized producing practical effects' (Adler and Crawford 2004). Changes in Germany's foreign policy identity were domestically induced and began shortly after Schröder became Chancellor. Berlin's new assertion on the international stage was merely reinforced by President Bush's foreign policy after January 2001, and after September 11, the most critical post-Cold War juncture. Recasting identity indicators resulted in German interests being shaped differently. The
revived activism over a German permanent UNSC seat is a good example of how the country’s new self-confidence was projected into the foreign policy domain as an interest.

It remains a paradox of German foreign policy that this remaking of identity should have come from a Social Democrat chancellor, instead of a conservative one, and that it encountered little real resistance. This reveals that German domestic politics was ready for a change in its international identity. While the parties often disagreed over the style of the Red-Green government, particularly its handling of the transatlantic crisis, all accept Germany’s more assertive role in international politics. While for Schröder this assertiveness followed mostly a logic of consequentialism, for Chancellor Merkel Germany’s assertiveness has returned to a logic of appropriateness. Thus the domestic debates have become more sober and less constrained by Germany’s history. More recent debates about the nature of Germany’s alliance commitment in Afghanistan were increasingly linked to the problem all NATO members face in international interventions, namely how to justify the cost of loss of soldiers’ lives in combat zones before their public opinions. It was no longer an exclusively German debate.

The following chapters will look at the practical implications of such identity and foreign policy transformation. The next four chapters deal with Germany's new security policy; Germany’s European policy; bilateral relations with France and the United States, and Germany's quest for permanent membership of the UN Security Council. These policy domains all involve fundamental choices about Germany's foreign policy identity, and the nature of Germany's normative power at the beginning of the twenty-first century.
CHAPTER 4: Germany’s New Security Policy

4.1. Introduction: Normative power and Germany’s new security policy

In the face of international changes after 1990 and especially after September 11, 2001, Germany’s security policy came under increasing pressure from NATO partners to adapt to a more interventionist policy. At the same time, Germany has become an active player in the development of the EU’s ESDP. Despite the centrality of NATO for German security policy, Berlin supported ESDP as an additional transatlantic security institution. But ensuring compatibility between a new NATO and the nascent ESDP proved difficult for Germany, as it did for the rest of its partners.

Taking into account Germany’s bilateral relations with Washington and Paris and Germany’s anchor role inside NATO during the Cold War, even if as a passive actor, developing a European security institution would always affect Germany’s relationship with the U.S., particularly when it emerged amidst the worst transatlantic crisis ever. With the U.S. engaged in ‘coalitions of the willing’, preventive use of force and an increasing use of unilateralism, it seemed ever more pressing for Germany to help shape a new conception of European security order, be it for strengthening its own normative power, consolidating the new norm of international parity, or creating a more multilateral cooperative order.

During the Cold War, Germany’s security policy developed according to norms of ‘multilateralism’, ‘alliance loyalty’ and a ‘reluctance to use military force’ amidst a ‘culture of restraint’ (Kultur der Zurückhaltung). These normative foundations were consolidated in NATO. Successive governments after 1990 did not question maintaining a foreign policy based on normative principles whose goals continued to be the preservation of international peace and security, stability and peace in an integrating European and a multilateralist transatlantic relationship. The changes which took place occurred amidst a continued preference for non-military means and reluctance towards the use of force. Because participation or its refusal in international military operations was justified through the normative practice underpinning identity, as were the cases of Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, normative power has remained relevant in Germany’s security policy. Despite this continuity, Germany has increased its international troop deployment considerably, and has enlarged the conceptual scope of justification. At least since defence minister’s Struck famous formula of ‘Germany’s defence up to the Hindu Kush’, the geographical dimension of interventions has been enlarged, with operations including
combat missions.

But relating normative power to military operations raises some questions. First, it questions the utility of force in enforcing norms. Before the 1990s the imposition of norms in Europe occurred through ‘the relative absence of physical force’ (Manners 2002:252). During the 1990s the international community experimented with a possible new norm of humanitarian intervention (Dunne and Wheeler 1999) through the United Nations, to prevent cases of genocide. According to the new norm a state with normative power needed military force to stop a tyrant or a massacre. Secondly, the relationship between normative power and military force raises the question of whether a state with normative power should use military force to spread (liberal) norms when this is legitimized by the international community via the UN, or simply enforce peace and stability. In the latter case, the state would intervene towards creating local conditions for peace; in the former the state would intervene to impose its particular vision of order and governance.

This chapter addresses three sets of questions. First, how has Germany adapted its security policy to this new environment? Have changes occurred at the level of instruments only or did they challenge Germany’s foreign policy identity? Was a more active role for the Bundeswehr in international military missions compatible with Germany’s normative power? Secondly, why was Germany at the forefront of promoting a European security institution, given its traditional reluctance towards the use of force and the centrality of its security relationship with the U.S. within NATO? Did this indicate a more assertive Germany in security matters, more preoccupied with a European role than with transatlanticism? Finally, how has this reflected on Germany’s relationship with the U.S. and its role in NATO? Why did the Schröder and Merkel governments pursue an active course for NATO reform?

This chapter argues that changes in German foreign policy identity have led to an incremental change in Germany’s culture of anti-militarism and reluctance towards the use of force in peace-keeping, peace-enforcing and international combat operations. The participation of Bundeswehr troops in out of area humanitarian and combat missions has not turned invalid the notion of normative power. Participation in the war in Kosovo, in Operation Enduring Freedom and ISAF in Afghanistan and the refusal to join the war in Iraq all preceded lengthy parliamentary debates about how to combine a new interventionist policy with the continuation of normative power and a culture of restraint. Military force remains an instrument of last resort of an otherwise normative state identity.
However, successive governments have now pursued a more utilitarian approach towards Bundeswehr operations abroad and have capitalized politically on Germany’s increasing participation. At the same time Germany has advanced ESDP with generalized domestic support, reflecting its will to proceed with an ever closer integration with other EU members in defence matters. This had to be accommodated with Germany’s relationship with Washington and its position in NATO where it has called for reforms and more consultations rights for itself and for Europe.

The challenge for German security policy has been to project its normative power, hitherto successfully used in most other foreign policy domains, onto the use of military force for the purpose of humanitarian interventions and post-conflict stabilization missions. Considering that these new international missions were being conducted in a normative understanding regarding the use of military force – to protect innocent lives and create conditions for regional stability – it was all the more remarkable how German policy-makers increasingly combined a logic of appropriateness with a logic of consequentialism in a highly normative set of questions.

4.2. The Kohl government 1997-1998

4.2.1. The end of the ‘culture of restraint’?

After 1990 Germany’s traditional ‘culture of restraint’ came under pressure despite the institutional continuity of NATO as the main security institutions for Germany’s Westbindung in a transatlantic security community. As then defence minister Volker Rühe put it before the Bundestag in the early 1990s, ‘the culture of restraint which has developed in Germany in the last forty years, for which we don’t have to feel ashamed, cannot simply be ordered away. But it is also right that we can no longer make use of this restraint in a world that no longer exists. That is why we have to act together with others.’

During the Cold War Germany’s security policy was constrained by a military taboo. First, Germany should not participate actively in military operations outside the NATO area, and never in combat missions. Secondly, it should not send troops to places where the German military had acted as an aggressor state during the Second World War. After 1990, the first premise was slowly surpassed by the Kohl government with

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Bundeswehr participations in Somalia and Cambodia for humanitarian and peacekeeping reasons. In April 1993 the Bundeswehr participated in the NATO AWACS mission under a UN Security Council mandate in the military enforcement of the no-fly zone over Bosnia. Because these interventions, particularly the one in Bosnia, were domestically controversial, the Federal Constitutional Court’s decision on 12 July 1994 stipulated the legality of the Bundeswehr’s participation in out-of-area operations, thus facilitating the end of the German taboo.\footnote{The decision stipulated that on the basis of Article 24 of the Grundgesetz German soldiers could join UN peacekeeping contingents. It ruled that the deployment of troops could occur even when the UN mission involved a mandate to carry out acts of military coercion. Furthermore, German troops could be assigned to NATO contingents deployed in UN missions. To ensure the democratic legitimacy of such military missions the federal government would have to seek approval by the German parliament by simple majority before deploying armed troops. Decisions by the Federal Constitutional Court: Bundesverfassungs Gerichts Entscheidung, vol. 90, 286, II., pp. 286–394.}

After 1994 the number of Bundeswehr soldiers deployed in peacekeeping and peace-enforcing missions around the globe rose steadily. At the time of change of government in October 1998, Germany had around 2800 soldiers participating in UN mandated peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Georgia. Over the next nine years the number of troops deployed reached almost 10,000 and the scope of deployment was enlarged to places like Afghanistan, Congo, Djibouti, East Timor, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Horn of Africa, Kosovo, Kuwait, Lebanon and Macedonia.

\subsection*{4.2.2. Germany and NATO enlargement}

Germany was an active participant in the transformation of the security landscape in Europe, becoming one of the staunchest supporters of the integration of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary into NATO. Defence minister Rühe had pushed for NATO extension to the Visegrad countries as early as the Spring of 1993 (Tewes 2002 and Arora 2006).\footnote{V. Rühe (1993). ‘Europe and the Alliance: key factors for peace and stability’, NATO Review, 41(3), 12-15, and V. Rühe (1993). ‘Shaping Euro-Atlantic Policies: A Grand Strategy for a New Era’, Survival, (35)2, 129-137. See also ‘Ewiger Frieden’, Der Spiegel, no. 40, 3 October 1994, 36-37.} Chancellor Kohl was at pains to balance the Central and Eastern European countries’ interest to join NATO with Russia’s unease over NATO enlargement. For then Russian foreign minister, Jewgenij Primakow, NATO enlargement ‘was possibly the biggest mistake since the end of the Cold War.’\footnote{Quoted in Karl-Ludwig Günsche, ‘Wie sich Russland die Nato-Osterweiterung vorstellt’, Die Welt, 1 April 1997.} While trying to accommodate the interests of all parties through highly personalized relationships, Kohl gave a decisive impulse towards redefining the relationship between NATO and Russia, paving the way for the NATO-Russia Act on mutual relations, cooperation and security on 27 May 1997.
At the Madrid summit on 8-9 July 1997 joint NATO membership was offered to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. For Rühe, the Madrid summit had ‘finally closed a chapter of the past’ and given NATO a new profile. The new tasks were the ‘transfer of stability, practical cooperation with non-NATO states and international crisis management in and for Europe’. ‘The new NATO will reflect the Europeans’ will for its own capacity for action. When the U.S. is not directly involved, European leadership will be possible in operations with NATO means and forces. This is because NATO reflects also a new partnership between North America and Europe, which takes shape through a new division of burden and responsibility.’ However, the relationship between the EU and NATO was ‘one of the least well-defined aspects of contemporary European international politics: rarely discussed within Governments, let alone between the two international institutions’ (Wallace 1999:203). Redefining this relationship proved to be, only a few years later, one of the main challenges for the new German and European governments.

4.3. The Schröder government 1998-2005

4.3.1. Germany’s policy for Kosovo

The approval of a mandate by the Bundestag for the Bundeswehr to participate militarily in the likelihood of a NATO intervention in Kosovo was taken on 16 October 1998, shortly before the new Red-Green government assumed office. Germany was the last NATO member country to decide its participation in the military intervention (Philippi 2001:63).

What were the reasons for Germany’s participating in NATO’s combat mission Allied Force in Kosovo? First, a general sense of shame over the human rights abuses and the mishandling of the Balkan crises in the early 1990s served as a catalyst for action in 1999, propelled by the failure of European states to deal adequately with the war in Bosnia and the dependency on the U.S. to broker a peace deal in Dayton in December 1995. The systematic human rights abuses of the Kosovo Albanians by the Serbian government’s forces led the outgoing Kohl government and the incoming Schröder government to apply the new norms, avoiding civilian casualties (Gentry 2006), and justifying humanitarian intervention. War had ‘moved from being the
epitome of failure or domination to being a necessary instrument of humanitarianism’ (Hill 2003:238).

Secondly, international expectations on Germany to assume a responsible international new role pushed political action. As Chancellor Schröder stated, ‘we cannot evade our responsibility. This is the reason why for the first time since the Second World War German soldiers are in a combat mission’. The old Genscherian ‘policy of responsibility’ of non-intervention was no longer valid. Because Germany was a responsible member of the international community a reformed version of the concept of responsibility produced a more active foreign and security policy.

Thirdly, Germany followed the norms of multilateralism and alliance commitments. On 15 April 1999 Schröder declared before the Bundestag that ‘there can be no doubts as to our reliability, our determination and our steadfastness. Germany’s embeddedness in the Western community of states is part of the German raison d’État. There can and there will be no Sonderweg with us’. Given Russia’s threat of the use of its veto, because of its traditional protective relationship towards Serbia, the issue was not voted in the UNSC, and the NATO operation occurred without a UN mandate. Here, the norms of alliance loyalty and human rights collided with the norm of respect for international law. This was so because ‘NATO is a community of values. Together with our allies we are fighting in Kosovo for our values: for human rights, freedom and democracy.’

Finally, Germany’s engagement had also ‘to do with how Europe shall look like in the next century.’ This suggests that, besides alliance motivations, a new logic of justification was Berlin’s concern with norms of (European) order, stability and alliance

113 Speech by Chancellor Schröder before the Bundestag on the situation in Kosovo, 15 April 1999, Plenarprotokoll 14/32.
114 Ibid.
115 Despite the lack of a UN mandate, the intervention was seen as legitimate by the international community. Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General, did not explicitly reject the use of force. Two months before the beginning of NATO’s operation, he stated: ‘The bloody wars of the last decade have left us with no illusions about the difficulty of halting internal conflicts - by reason or by force - particularly against the wishes of the government of a sovereign state. But nor have they left us with any illusions about the need to use force, when all other means have failed. We may be reaching that limit, once again, in the former Yugoslavia.’ Statement by Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the United Nations to the North Atlantic Council, NATO Headquarters, 28 January 1999, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1999/s990128a.htm.
116 International law itself was lagging behind the fastness of international events. The UN Charter in its article 51 only allowed for individual and collective self-defence against aggression from another state. The need for international humanitarian intervention and military action against a state is not stipulated by the Charter.
117 Speech by Chancellor Schröder before the German Bundestag on the situation in Kosovo, 15 April 1999, Plenarprotokoll 14/32.
118 Ibid.
loyalty, revealing the government's increasing manoeuvring in the utilitarian realm of political action. Creating the conditions for a more stable order in South-Eastern Europe was of interest to Germany. The ongoing human rights violations in Kosovo had already provoked an elevated number of refugees, and taking into account the Bosnia experience a few years earlier, Germany could well become the destination for many Kosovo Albanians. Thus creating stability in the Balkans was a preventive mechanism to anticipate possible domestic societal and financial implications due to the refugee question.

The limit for Germany's participation was the use of ground troops. Chancellor Schröder stated that 'the Federal Government, supported unanimously by the members of the German Parliament (...) opposes sending in ground forces and this is very much to do with the fact that NATO strategy, a strategy that we developed together, is slowly beginning to take effect, and it is supporting a political settlement.' But the main reason was that the use of ground troops would drag Russia into the war, on the side of Serbia leading the government to bind Russia to the diplomatic initiative of ending the war.

The demands of the international community remained clear: the immediate end of all acts of aggression, retreat of all military forces, stationing of international military forces and the return of refugees. On 5 June 1999 the UNSC adopted resolution 1244 to end the war in Kosovo. As one German politician put it, 'this resolution left all options open with regard to the future status of Kosovo, including Kosovo's independence, and it was signed by all Security Council members, including Russia.' On 6 June 1999 the Bundestag approved the Bundeswehr participation in KFOR, NATO's force for the stabilization of Kosovo, in a multinational contingent made up of 8500 personnel, to begin peace-enforcement in the Serbian province of Kosovo.

The war in Kosovo produced significant consequences for Germany's security policy. First, it represented a path breaking event in the gradual return to normality. It broke a double taboo. It helped Germans overcome the legacy of Auschwitz, not by its eradication from collective memory, but as a way for Germans to begin taking part in multilateral military operations for humanitarian reasons and which could involve combat missions. It was also path-breaking in that Germany's military power was no longer taboo as an effective foreign policy instrument and could even be projected

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121 Confidential interview with a German politician, Berlin, September 2000.
outside Europe. Domestically, Kosovo put into practice what Chancellor Schröder defined as ‘ending the military taboo’ in Germany’s security policy.122

Secondly, two new norms were introduced into Germany’s security policy. On the one hand, the norm of intervention for humanitarian purposes became part of German diplomacy. This did not constitute a break with the norms and values underpinning Germany’s normative power. Because the country participated through institutional multilateral means, and for humanitarian purposes, this new position was not contrary to a normative conception of foreign policy, thereby enlarging the realm of normative power. But on the other hand, Germany’s military participation in Kosovo was seen as an entitlement for a new narrative of increasing self-confidence and maturity in foreign and security policy. The Chancellor introduced a new norm of international parity, expecting, from Washington, more consultation rights over NATO issues, and to be able to look its NATO partners in the eye. This was a new form of alliance loyalty in that Germany tried to increase its margin of manoeuvrability and score diplomatic points, signalling that it was ready to assume a new position within the alliance framework. The Kosovo war coincided with Germany’s EU presidency and diplomatic initiatives for post-war Balkan stability served to reinforce Schröder’s ambition to attempt to locate Germany on a higher international standing. ‘On the Balkans – I believe this can be stated with certain pride’, the Chancellor said, ‘the Bundeswehr has stood the test and has proven that regarding its efficiency and motivation it does not need to shy away from a comparison with our allies and partners in any way.’123 As Wolfgang Ischinger, secretary of state in the foreign ministry stated after the war, ‘Germany emerged from this crisis as a partner whose voice today has more weight than before.’124

Thirdly, the experience in Kosovo reinforced Germany’s conviction to promote the ESDP, to which Britain and France had given the decisive impulse through the St. Malo declaration on defence in December 1998. Finally, the Kosovo war also highlighted the need for the Bundeswehr to transform itself from a territorial defence army to a more flexible and interventionist army. Both these points will be discussed further below. For Germany, which held the EU presidency, the priority now was to devise a post-conflict reconstruction plan.

122 Interview with Chancellor Schröder, Die Zeit, 18 October 2001.
4.3.1.1. The Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe

Proposals regarding the conceptual framework for a stability plan for the Balkans were developed within the foreign ministry as early as January 1999.\(^{125}\) For Joschka Fischer, the success of the Stability Pact was 'a question of the political reliability of Germany and Europe’s foreign policy'.\(^{126}\) The German EU presidency developed a post-conflict reconstruction plan for Kosovo, through a combination of measures of security stabilisation, economic development and respect for human rights. Part of the Stability Pact for the Balkans was the inclusion of the long term prospect of future EU and NATO membership for the countries in South-Eastern Europe.\(^{127}\) In the preparatory conference between representatives of over thirty countries and organisations on the Petersberg, in Bonn, on 27 May 1999, Fischer stated: ‘We have to do today for Southeast Europe, what was done for the West after 1945 and for the East of our continent in 1989, namely to open a way to pacify the region, through the creation of stable requisites for democracy, market economy and regional cooperation as well as lasting embeddedness of these states in the Euro-Atlantic structures’. This implies that ‘all successor states to Yugoslavia and Albania need to be given the offer of a clear EU membership perspective, even if this is achievable only in the very long term’.\(^{128}\) On 10 June 1999 the European Council in Cologne adopted the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, a long term multilateral conflict prevention strategy and an institution to promote security, democracy and social and economic growth in the region.\(^{129}\) The Stability Pact for the Balkans thus ‘opened the way to Brussels and led the region towards the Europe of integration’ (Fischer 2004a).

The Stability Pact had two dimensions: one created a system of interwoven institutions relating to Brussels; a second one created a web of relationships among states in the region (Joetze 2001:175-76). Thus the stability pact inaugurated a new approach to post-conflict reconstruction and it opened up a new strategic dimension for EU foreign policy. Not only was Europe concerned with contributing to the inner stabilisation and nation-building of the Kosovo area: the aim was to ensure stability in

\(^{125}\) Interview with Christian Sterzing, Berlin, September 2000.
\(^{126}\) Speech by foreign minister Joschka Fischer before the Bundestag on the Balkan Stability Pact on Southeastern Europe, 27 January 2000, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/6%5FArchiv/2/ir/000127a.htm
\(^{127}\) Not every EU member supported the perspective of EU membership for Albania or Macedonia. France, Holland and Spain showed their disagreement. ‘Europa will dem Balkan helfen’, Die Welt, 25 May 1999.
the Balkan region, with potential future EU membership. Europe was paving the way for the region’s future institutional order and allegiance, and by implication, shaping the region’s future foreign policy.130

The Kosovo crisis was an example of Germany’s normative power projection and active engagement in institutional multilateralism. Two instances of normative power were subsequently at play. First, Germany, along with other countries, imposed a set of norms by military force, to end genocide and create a safe environment for the projection of norms. In the second instance, and as part of the initial decision to strike military action against Serbia, the German presidency took the initiative for post-conflict civilian measures for Kosovo. In forging a diplomatic initiative, Germany displayed normative leadership inside the EU by making the case for the linkage between military and civilian instruments.

Germany had become an active player but during the crisis its preferred approach from Berlin’s perspective was to concert with only a few powers outside the CFSP framework through the so called Contact Group, created in 1994 between United States, Germany, France, Britain and Russia to deal with the crisis in Bosnia. This was seen as more effective since it allowed for the inclusion of Russia, and for a more active German position which it could not have enjoyed in the UN Security Council. Another mechanism was the Quint, the gathering of the foreign ministers of the United States, Germany, Britain, France and Italy, who through daily telephone conferences accompanied the development of the Kosovo war. As former foreign minister Fischer says, ‘the Quint quickly evolved into ‘a highly efficient, direct and also informal instrument of coordination and leadership for Western and transatlantic policy’ (Fischer 2007:168). Thus at the same time as Germany was promoting CFSP through its EU presidency it was effectively concerting its actions with a few big players in what some have described as a ‘directoire, in the sense that it appears to be a leadership group in the EU decision-making process that takes decisions affecting the interests of other EU Member States and this without their participation’ (Gegout 2002:332).

Consequently, the Kosovo war and its outcome represented a successful path defining moment and critical juncture for German security policy. Kosovo had revealed Germany’s effective crisis management capabilities, widening Germany’s margin of military manoeuvrability and catapulting Germany onto a more equal standing among the

greater European powers and the U.S. The traditional military culture of restraint had been enlarged to combat missions for humanitarian purposes, with implications for foreign policy. Germany now felt legitimized to pursue its interests more assertively. In this sense, Kosovo was Schröder’s ‘very good war’ and became a catalyst for a more assertive and self-confident Germany.  

4.3.2. The development of the ESDP and Germany’s role

While negotiations for NATO’s potential intervention in Kosovo were underway, France and Britain gave the decisive impulse for the development of the ESDP in December 1998 (Howorth 2000). The St. Malo declaration on European defence stipulated that on the basis of the Amsterdam Treaty the EU should proceed towards a common European Security and Defence Policy within the realm of CFSP.

Some argue that the St. Malo declaration was a British-French reaction against the increase of German power (Jones 2003). This would suggest that NATO’s historical function, ‘to keep the Germans down’, had been transferred to the new ESDP since NATO could no longer perform that function. It seems more plausible however, that the initiative stemmed from the wars in Bosnia in the 1990s which had a galvanizing effect towards progress in European security and defence issues (Howorth 2001). First, the war in Kosovo laid bare what Bosnia a few years earlier had revealed already: the weakness of Europe’s military capabilities had produced a situation where operations were effectively conducted mostly by the Americans. The Europeans flew only 30 per cent, according to American sources, only 20 per cent of the operations (Joetze 2001:193). St. Malo was a response to EU members’ weaknesses in acting alone and the need for greater integration of EU countries’ defence policies. Secondly, British and French policy-makers realized that increased capacity for autonomous military operation was necessary to strengthen Europe’s defence pillar within NATO against American military and political predominance.

The St. Malo initiative was well received by the German government which used its EU Council presidency to embed it in the wider EU framework. The Cologne European Council summit in June 1999 paved the way for the ESDP and a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) as the core of independent EU armed forces to be

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established at the Helsinki European Council summit in December 1999. Under the ‘Helsinki Target Goals’ EU members were to provide a collective force of 60,000 troops, deployable outside the EU area within sixty days, self-sustainable for up to 12 months, and operational by May 2003. The ERRF would operate in and outside NATO areas when NATO could not intervene, or decided against it. Berlin assured Washington that ERRF was neither a decoupling from the Atlantic Alliance nor an unnecessary duplication of NATO structures and that it should be created in close agreement with the United States and its forces deployed only as a subsidiary to NATO.\textsuperscript{134}

Why did Germany actively promote a European security institution, given its traditional reluctance towards the use of force and the centrality of its security relationship with the U.S. within NATO? First, the wars in the Balkans were the catalyst in strengthening the German and other European governments’ resolve to push ESDP forward.\textsuperscript{135} The wars in Bosnia and Kosovo had shown that Washington did not treat Europeans equally in political terms. The lack of effective co-decision strengthened Berlin’s resolve to side closer with Paris, even more so that France had signed the St. Malo treaty alone with Britain, accentuating Germany’s handicaps in the military domain.\textsuperscript{136} Britain’s active participation was important since Germany and France had not developed a defence relationship, despite their close cooperation in many other integration domains. Second, Berlin’s attempt to coordinate its moves closely with France signalled receptiveness towards Paris’s ambition of a European defence more autonomous from Washington. The irritating Brussels summit on 29 April 2003 where Germany and France, together with Belgium and Luxembourg discussed EU military capacities and the creation of independent European headquarters showed that the transatlantic crisis was not only unfolding in the UNSC over Iraq but that Berlin and Paris were serious about European defence. Schröder envisaged European autonomy in crisis management tasks, while NATO should be limited to collective alliance defence. For the German government ‘ESDP was conceived as the basis for a new Atlanticism’, where ‘only a stronger Europe would get a hearing in Washington’ (Rudolf 2005:136). Finally, Germany wanted to embed its new military role in a Europeanised framework (Jeffery and Paterson 2003:67). Germany conceived of ESDP on the basis of its position

as a ‘Friedensmacht’, a peace power, a model Germany tried to project onto European structures and to engage in long-term commitments towards post-conflict reconstruction efforts.

But Berlin’s support for the creation of a European rapid reaction force had to be backed by increasing defence expenditures. Furthermore, Germany was incapable of conducting an autonomous international military operation comparable to the operations undertaken by France in the Côte d’Ivoire or Britain in Sierra Leone (Veit 2005). Discrepancies in military structures were ‘bound to lead to disagreeable differences within the Alliance as well as between Europeans. Germany is likely to be identified as the main culprit for slow progress in this field’ (Joetze 2002:15). Others understood the ESDP ‘as a possibility for transatlantic synergy, and not as a vehicle for European emancipation. Any independent security policy or military action of the EU will only be able to deal with conflicts on the lowest end of the intensity scale. For any greater military crisis, the support of the USA remains indispensable’ (Kamp and Masala 2006).

The U.S., of course, was reluctant to accept a change of its own status within NATO, from hegemonic leadership to increasingly cooperative parity, which is what Germany’s position implied.

The new defence minister, Peter Struck, who assumed office on 25 July 2002, brought a more assertive tone than that of his predecessor Rudolf Scharping into the security discourse. ‘Germany's role and responsibility for security in Europe and peace in the world have grown still further. Our interests, our responsibility as a major and strong European state and our international commitments have resulted in a constant increase in the number, intensity, size and duration of the operations in which the Bundeswehr participates. Today, we are one of the largest troop-contributing nations with respect to international peace support operations’.137 ‘Germany has become a grown-up, also in the military dimension’ 138 ‘Therefore Germany could reclaim a right to have a say in NATO’s international operations.’

Struck argued for a redefinition of the NATO-EU relationship. ‘At least since the war in Kosovo Europeans have come to realise that conflicts in Europe will remain possible. That is why a bigger capacity for action for the EU and for the Europeans in NATO reflects the new security situation and the logic of European integration. Reducing the EU to the status of a ‘civilian power’ would not be in the interest of an

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139 Struck Interview on 14 September 2005 http://www.dradio.de/dkultur/sendungen/interview/418032/
effective policy for peace.\textsuperscript{140} The relationship between NATO and the EU was ‘not a question of European "counterweights" to a dominating superpower.’ It was a question of an efficient partnership on equal terms between democratic states which are and will remain dependent on one another to guarantee their security (Struck 2004). As Karsten Voigt, the coordinator for German-American relations in the Foreign Ministry made clear, ‘It is not in our interest to accept a global division of labour as occasionally envisaged by Washington – “the US fights, the UN feeds, the EU funds”.\textsuperscript{141}

At the height of the transatlantic crisis in 2003 defence minister Struck highlighted two questions affecting the basic concepts of security within the Euro-Atlantic community. Before a national audience he enquired, first, ‘Are we still making political and military plans for the same operational scenarios on each side of the Atlantic?’ Secondly, ‘Do we still have the same perception of the threats to our security and how far do we agree on the importance of military power to avert dangers?’\textsuperscript{142}

By 2003, the EU had developed a joint European policy for the Balkans. Considering that ten years earlier, such a policy would have been unthinkable it was an achievement for the young ESDP to have European forces taking over political and military responsibility from NATO in Macedonia and Bosnia. This produced two consequences. First, it showed that however limited, the EU had the civilian and military capabilities to engage in post-conflict peace-enforcing and reconstruction missions. Second, the transference of power and responsibility from NATO to the EU showed that the Balkans had gradually become the EU’s main responsibility.\textsuperscript{143}

4.3.2.1. The European Security Strategy

2003, the year best remembered for the transatlantic crisis, was an important year for the development of ESDP. The ‘Berlin Plus’ agreement between the EU and NATO in March 2003 set the framework for a strategic partnership between the two institutions with the aim of stipulating the realms of action, the use of NATO facilities for EU


\textsuperscript{143} This did not mean that Washington was no longer influential in the area. Its support for the independence of Kosovo and the pressure it exerted on some European capitals could be seen earlier this year before the proclamation of independence on 17 February 2008.
operations, and avoid duplication.\textsuperscript{144} In operation Concordia as in future EU operations, the agreement granted the EU access to NATO’s military assets and military planning facilities and structures. At the end of November 2003 France, Germany and Britain presented a joint paper entitled ‘European Defence: NATO/EU consultation, planning and operations’, later adopted by the Brussels European Council on 12 December 2003.\textsuperscript{145} The transatlantic crisis itself had proved a catalyst for a strong ESDP.

At the Brussels European Council, the EU also adopted Europe’s first Security Strategy (ESS). The ESS affirms Europe’s determination in ‘guaranteeing a secure Europe in a better world’, through effective multilateralism. It envisaged a preventive engagement strategy, aimed to empower the EU ‘to act before countries around us deteriorate, when signs of proliferation are detected, and before humanitarian emergencies arise.’ In the fight against terrorism the EU adopted the strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.\textsuperscript{146}

For the German government the ESS was ‘a milestone for the strategic definition of the role and the tasks of the EU in a dramatically changed security context and under the conditions of globalisation. After the Iraq conflict the ESS sends a central internal and external message: the EU has the claim to speak with one voice when it comes to face the challenges and risks of our time.’\textsuperscript{147} Some German academics and policymakers considered the ESS so important for Germany that they questioned whether Germany, which lacked a national security strategy, needed one at all. Christoph Heusgen, security and foreign policy adviser of Chancellor Merkel, and Christoph Bertram argued that the ESS covered Germany’s national security concerns, while Wolfgang Ischinger, German Ambassador to the United Kingdom, and Klaus Reinhardt, former general of the Bundeswehr, wondered that Germans even discussed the issue of whether every country needed to have their own security strategy.\textsuperscript{148} For Ischinger, the European Security Strategy was compatible with Germany’s interests not least ‘because we introduced these interests into the conception of the ESS’. But the domestic political debate and the democratic legitimization of German foreign policy would only benefit if


\textsuperscript{147} Reply of the government (Drucksache 15/3181, 21 May 2004) to a set of questions put forward by the CDU/CSU on the importance of the ESS for Germany (Drucksache 15/2888, 30 April 2004).

\textsuperscript{148} 135th Bergedorfer Round Table, ‘Interests and Partners of German Foreign Policy’, September 29 – October 1 2006, Berlin, p. 43-45.
the ESS was complemented by a German foreign and security strategy, Ischinger concluded.149

At the same time as Germany promoted ESDP it showed a preference for concerted action with Paris and London with regard to the nuclear problem in Iran. The three actors followed a strategy of containment through their joint EU-3+1 initiative (with the belated inclusion of the EU’s High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana) pursued to dissuade Teheran to proceed with its nuclear programme and engage with the IAEA. Although this was not surprising given the urgency of the question, it is nevertheless remarkable that this new positioning with Europe’s two big military powers was done outside any EU treaty framework and without domestic controversy at the level of the political elite. All major German parties accepted the new diplomatic approach of combining ESDP with a more selective multilateral policy more in line with a political conception of a European power.

4.3.3. Germany in Afghanistan and the implications for its security policy

September 11, 2001 had challenged Germany’s culture of restraint and forced politicians to make difficult decisions arising from the tensions between conflicting policy norms. It ‘changed our vision of the world. (...) For the first time Europeans have to focus more on questions of stability outside of Europe than inside of it.’150 Germany’s continuing reluctance regarding the use of military force for offensive purposes stood in contrast to increasing demands from Washington to make an effective military contribution in the new fight against international terrorism.

Following Berlin’s proclaimed ‘unlimited solidarity’, and Washington’s request for a German military contribution on 7 November the government requested the Bundestag to approve Germany’s participation in the US-led military operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan.151 The aim of the international operation was to combat the sources of international terrorism and depose the Taliban regime in Kabul, in a UNSC sanctioned military mission.152 The Bundeswehr participated militarily in

Afghanistan since November 2001 and since January 2002 the German navy was engaged in the Horn of Africa for surveillance of the sea lines of communication, as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. ISAF supports the Afghan authorities in establishing stability, while OEF serves to combat international terrorism. As part of the ensuing post-conflict policy, Germany joined the ‘International Security Assistance Force’ (ISAF) in Afghanistan in April 2003 and participated when NATO took over ISAF’s command in August 2003, its first ground operation outside Europe.  

A possible merging of the two operations, ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), has been under discussion since 2005, driven by Washington’s aim to transfer soldiers from Afghanistan to Iraq. But Germany and other NATO members have always opposed this, arguing that the ISAF and OEF missions serve different purposes and should remain separate and mutually complementary operations. Germany has been particularly engaged in the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) around Kunduz and Feyzabad and has taken over the Regional Command North.

The Afghanistan operation enlarged Germany’s security parameter, until then confined to the ‘NATO plus Balkans’ area with the exception of short term operations in Africa. Germany’s mission was presented as an extension of its security commitments worldwide in the face of a global new security threat posed by asymmetrical threats and international terrorism. Germany’s defence, as Struck emphasized, started at the Hindu Kush. Although the mission was to maintain security and assist in the reconstruction of the country, the use of large-scale troops was avoided to ensure public support (Schwarz 2004:557). The Bundeswehr participation in Afghanistan is still dealt with domestically as only a reconstruction effort. No German politician risks speaking of a German Kampfeinsatz (combat mission) in Afghanistan for fear of underlining the already increasingly sceptical German electorate towards defence along the Hindu Kush. The justification behind Germany’s participation was foremost alliance solidarity (more than alliance loyalty) rather than humanitarian intervention as had happened in Kosovo. But similar to the government’s strategy during the Kosovo war, German diplomacy paved the way for post-war reconstruction measures and promoted the Petersberg conference in Bonn on 5 December 2001 for the political stabilisation of Afghanistan.

Defence minister Struck was quick to state that ‘this broadened concept of defence does not mean that Germany and the Bundeswehr must participate in every

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1 The still ongoing ISAF mission began on 1 January 2002. NATO took over the command of the mission on 11 August 2003. As of April 2008, approximately 47,000 troops from 40 countries were stationed in Afghanistan. http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf
international operation. Every operation must still be subject to close scrutiny. It remains an undisputed fact that our responsibility for keeping peace is limited by our ability to do so. This will compel us even more to avoid sending our forces on too many missions at one time." Each new mission would continue to be scrutinised by parliamentary control in a sovereign manner every time the UN, NATO or the EU asked Germany for a new intervention. This was a clear rejection of the principle of ‘everywhere and anytime’, as Struck put it, and was meant to justify Germany’s non-involvement in Iraq. However, the mechanism to send troops abroad was substantially facilitated at the end of 2004 when the Bundestag adopted a law for sending German troops abroad (Entsendegesetz). While military operations still had to be sanctioned by the Bundestag, the parliamentary vote could now take place after the mission had already begun and after the government had sent troops. While this made the process more expedient, Germany’s net of legal impediments to the possible deployment of the Bundeswehr in combat was still upheld.

4.3.4. Germany’s participation in international military operations

In June 2003 Germany had stationed around 8000 Bundeswehr soldiers in international operations abroad participating in several post-conflict stabilisation operations, in Bosnia Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia and Afghanistan. German troops participated in operation ‘Artemis’ in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the ESDP’s first international military operation begun and conducted by the EU. But the EU operations ‘Artemis’ in the Congo and Concordia in Macedonia were limited in time and less complex than the EUFOR mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina which the EU (EUFOR) took over from NATO in December 2004. While both operations served as a test case for the EU’s military capabilities, for big military operations Europe still lacked the military resources, like adequate transport vehicles, high precision weapons and intelligence instruments.

Since 2003 Germany has participated in the following ongoing civilian, police and military ESDP operations: in the Western Balkans in EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR-Althea), to establish and maintain security in accordance with Dayton/Paris Agreement, EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina

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(EUPM); and in the EU Planning team in Kosovo. In the Middle East, Germany participates in EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS); EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point in the Palestinian Territories (EU BAM Rafah) and the EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (Eujust Lex). In Asia, it is present in the EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL AFGHANISTAN); in Africa in EUFOR TCHAD/RCA; EUPOL RD CONGO; EU security sector reform mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC RD Congo). The two biggest Bundeswehr operations are NATO led missions. Germany has up to 3500 troops in Afghanistan in operation ISAF to assist the Afghan government in providing security, and 2300 troops in Kosovo in operation KFOR to establish and maintain security in Kosovo.\textsuperscript{156}

# Table 1. Bundeswehr Deployment around the world 2002-2007

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<tr>
<td>Afghanistan, ISAF</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>1,909</td>
<td>1,860</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>3,155</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kosovo, KFOR, Joint Enterprise</td>
<td>4,600</td>
<td>3,100</td>
<td>3,900</td>
<td>2,280</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>2,279</td>
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<td>Mediterranean Sea, Active Endeavour</td>
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<td></td>
<td>240</td>
<td>250</td>
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<tr>
<td>Djibouti, (OEF, Operation Enduring Freedom)</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Kuwait (OEF) (10.2.2002-4.7.2003)</td>
<td>250</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>EU Operations</strong></td>
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<td>Bosnia –Herzegovina, EUFOR, Operation Althea</td>
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<td>Democratic Republic of Congo, EUFOR (30.7.2006-30.11.2006)</td>
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<td>Macedonia, Operation Concordia (31.3.2003-15.12.2003)</td>
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<td>40</td>
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<td>Democratic Republic of Congo/Uganda, Operation Artemis (12.6.2003-1.9.2003)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>97</td>
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<td><strong>UN Operations</strong></td>
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<td>Lebanon, UNIFIL, Maritime Task Force (begun in Sep. 2006)</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>993</td>
<td>905</td>
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Bundeswehr-Einsätze
http://www.einsatz.bundeswehr.de/C1256F1D0022A5C2/Docname/Aktuelle_Einsaetze_Home

It is not always possible to find definite data about number of troops as changes occurred during the same year.
4.3.5. The changed role of the Bundeswehr

The changed international context and Germany’s new position made a reform of the Bundeswehr necessary towards new operational requirements and a more operations-orientated force. Mostly due to budgetary constraints between 1998 and 2004 reform was slow in coming and only events in Kosovo, September 11, 2001 and Afghanistan forced the Defence Ministry to initiate the structural reform. A growing discrepancy between the new German rhetoric of engagement for peace missions abroad, and a continuous decrease in defence expenditures was evident between 2001 and 2003. More significantly, there was a gap between the effective increase of German military deployments abroad and the difficulty in providing the adequate resources which such operations entailed. The will to translate normative power and a new assertiveness into Bundeswehr participation in international peace missions clashed with the lack of resources, often linked to a lack of strategic ambition. International operations were occurring in far-away places, with longer and more dangerous missions, while at the same time there was a reduction in personnel. The conceptual process of reform lagged behind the Bundeswehr’s participation in UN or NATO sanctioned crisis management missions already underway.

In 2003 a deal was reached between the Defence Ministry and the Ministry of Finance, according to which the defence budget would not be cut until 2006 and would be raised by 800 million Euro a year from 2007 onwards.¹⁵⁷ This finally opened the way to transform the Bundeswehr into a smaller, more operational and flexible, more combatant and operations-orientated armed forces (Stelzenmüller 2004), transforming the Bundeswehr from a territorial defence army to an intervention army of global reach.

The defence ministry published a major defence review, the Defence Policy Guidelines (DPG or Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien) in May 2003. The DPG adapted the new capability profile to Germany’s new international commitments, changing operational requirements by setting up response forces, stabilisation forces and support forces. By 2010 the Bundeswehr should have 252.500 armed forces, made up of 147.500 conscription forces (support forces) as well as a 35,000-strong combat intervention force and a 70,000-strong peacekeeping and stabilisation force for rapid deployments in international missions. These new guidelines stipulated that there was

no longer a geographical limitation to the Bundeswehr’s international role.\textsuperscript{158} As the defence minister stated, ‘conventional national defence can no longer be the primary factor determining the structures and capabilities of the Bundeswehr. The task of international conflict prevention and crisis management, including the war on international terrorism, now comes first in the task spectrum. This task has key bearing on the capabilities, the command and control system, the availability and the equipment of the Bundeswehr. In other words: It is the task that should determine the structure of the Bundeswehr.’\textsuperscript{159} Against the idea of professional armed forces, conscription was maintained.

4.4. The Merkel government and Germany’s security policy (2005-2007)

4.4.1. Compatibility between EU and NATO

The Merkel government has revealed a different approach to the question of compatibility between NATO and ESDP. For the Chancellor in particular they are not two incompatible alternatives but two fundamental pillars of the Euro-Atlantic security. Thus in opposition to the predecessor government, Merkel did not see the ESDP as an emancipatory mechanism against NATO or the U.S. Speaking at the Munich security conference in February 2006 Merkel stated Germany’s regained preference for NATO, and recourse to the ESDP only as a second option. For the new Chancellor it was important to ‘give NATO a kind of primacy in transatlantic cooperation, meaning an attempt first being made by NATO to carry out the necessary political consultations and decide on the required measures - which does not mean everyone participating in everything all the time....other courses should not be explored until the Alliance fails to arrive at an agreement’ (Merkel Munich 2006). For the Chancellor, ‘the European Security Strategy, NATO’s Strategic Concept and the National Security Strategy of the United States of America provide the suitable foundation on which to conduct a more intensive dialogue on the form our common security agenda should take (Merkel Munich 2006). Revitalising transatlanticism was thus the priority of Merkel’s foreign policy. ‘Strengthening Europe's security identity, separate from the Atlantic security partnership, is not a route I want to take. Both pillars [Atlantic partnership and European


integration] are, so to speak, two sides of the same coin. For me NATO will continue to be the strongest expression of a security policy for which we are jointly responsible'.

But Berlin’s aim to play a more assertive role has produced diverging positions with Washington regarding NATO enlargement and Alliance missions. While the U.S. has been pushing for enlargement, Berlin has been hesitant regarding Croatia’s, Macedonia’s and Albania’s membership, arguing vaguely that they ‘can be justly hopeful about becoming Alliance members’ sometime in the future. With Ukraine and Georgia, Merkel was even less forthcoming stating that ‘there can be no automatic accession’ (Merkel Munich 2006). Germany is also sceptical about the idea, promoted by the Bush Administration, of a ‘Global Partnership’. ‘The covertly expressed U.S. wish to incorporate countries such as Pakistan in the circle of NATO partners has been particularly controversial’ (Kamp and Masala 2006). For Berlin it was preferable that ‘NATO establishes a dense network of partnerships with countries and international organizations with very varied priorities and objectives’ (Merkel Munich 2006). Thus the government revealed its opposition towards Turkey’s EU membership, Ukraine and Georgia’s NATO membership, and the Bundeswehr deployment to combat missions in southern Afghanistan. Her conciliatory tone has not prevented Merkel from arguing for boundaries regarding the EU’s and NATO’s enlargement.

Germany’s political assertiveness in security policy has not necessarily translated into a more assertive stance regarding military operations on the ground that Germany was reluctant to lead the Congo mission for stabilisation and democratisation in 2006. While defence minister Jung did not rule out the possibility of combat situations in the EU’s Congo mandate he was vague on the possibility that Germany should lead the Congo operation, insisting instead that it should be an overall European mission, since ‘this is a responsibility for all of Europe and not only for Germany alone’. In Afghanistan, the Bundeswehr extended its presence to the whole northern part of the country, beyond Kunduz and Feyzabad while maintaining its troop commitment of about 2500 soldiers and the continuation of the provincial reconstruction teams, which combined civilian and military instruments and which had proven successful and was

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161 At the recent NATO Bucarest summit on 2-4 April 2008 the American perspective prevailed regarding NATO enlargement towards Croatia and Albania. But Ukraine and Georgia, also because of Russia’s strong opposition, were given no long term prospect of joining.
162 Speech by defence minister Franz Josef Jung at the annual meeting of the Arbeitskreises Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik (ASP) on 20 April 2006 in Ingolstadt, Stichworte zur Sicherheitspolitik, Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 3/4, March-April 2006.
163 Interview with defence minister Jung, Deutschlandradio, 7 March 2006.
being replicated by other teams in other parts of Afghanistan. But Berlin has been reluctant to engage the Bundeswehr in the more combative southern areas of Afghanistan, in ISAF, to assist British and American forces, setting out limits for Germany’s mission in Afghanistan. In Lebanon, Germany’s military presence in the United Nations peacekeeping mission is reduced to a Maritime Task Force off the coast of Lebanon for surveillance of weapons smuggling by sea, and can be considered a low risk operation. While the UNIFIL mission is important for being Germany’s first military operation in the Middle East, it is politically significant in that Germany takes an active stance in the region towards its traditional policy of defending Israel’s right to exist.

The new White Paper on German Security published in November 2006 does not set any specific limits of Germany’s participation in international operations regarding geographical location or political action. It will be interesting to observe the justification the present or future governments will give for refusing to intervene in a future operation.

The position of public opinion is contradictory. While 71% of Germans support the EU as an autonomous superpower equal to the U.S. only 22% are willing to accept an increase in defence expenditures to support that new status. This reflects public opinion’s continued aversion to military power. In a survey conducted by the Bertelsmann Foundation in December 2005 on the powers of the twenty-first century, the Germans revealed their continuing lack of enthusiasm for military power. Enquired as to what qualities a country must possess to be considered a world power, merely 7 per cent of Germans identified military power. In contrast, 28 per cent of French and 24 per cent of British deemed it important. In another survey conducted in 2006, 73 per cent of Germans welcomed a higher German profile in maintaining peace and stability in the world, while 86 per cent of Germans considered the EU to be the international organization best placed to serve the same purpose. In contrast, only 19 per cent of

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164 Speech by defence minister Franz Josef Jung at the annual meeting of the Arbeitskreises Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik (ASP) on 20 April 2006 in Ingolstadt Stichworte zur Sicherheitspolitik, Presse-und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 3/4, March-April 2006.
167 Bertelsmann Foundation, 'World Powers in the 21st Century. The Results of a Representative Survey in Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States', Berlin, 2 June 2006.
Germans considered military power the most important quality of a world power. Thus for German public opinion Germany’s power is still seen foremost in normative, pacific, terms.

On the other hand, now that successive German governments have taken the path of international interventions they have to ensure that they opt for missions where they have the necessary number of troops available for it, and the willingness to stay engaged with the mission and its partners. Doing one or both things halfheartedly would run the risk of transforming Germany’s stance into a more irresponsible actor than one which had up front decided that it would not engage. The ongoing debate on Germany’s Afghanistan mission is a reflection of these doubts and hesitations.

4.5. Conclusion

Changes in security policy show that, between 1997 and 2007 Germany has been as much concerned with the limitations on the use of force, as with finding a European and transatlantic compromise to make the use of force acceptable domestically and in the Euro-Atlantic area. Germany’s normative power still plays a considerable role in the country’s security policy since Germany’s security policy has maintained elements of its traditional multilateralism and alliance commitments, allowing for incremental change in Germany’s military participation in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Conflict prevention and post-war reconstruction efforts became one of Germany’s security policy trademarks, as was the case of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe. But the justification for the recourse to military power changed from its use only as a residual means to a pro-active use, first, for humanitarian reasons, and second, for stabilisation and security reasons.

At the same time, a transformation in Germany’s security policy has occurred whereby Berlin has increasingly followed a logic of consequential actions with a different logic of justification. This preference for a more utilitarian approach has been evident in the nature of Bundeswehr deployments abroad, and Berlin’s new security relationship, within ESDP, with Britain and France. First, the increasing number of NATO, UN or ESDP operations Germany is part of has served as an instrument to enhance Germany’s new position in global politics. With each new big deployment Chancellor Schröder reclaimed more consultation rights within NATO. Germany’s refusal to participate in the

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168 Bertelsmann Foundation, ‘Who Rules the World?’ The Results of the Second Representative Survey in Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States Berlin, 22 October 2007.
U.S. led war against Iraq was the apparent exception to the rule, but it was also used to demand more parity of power. Second, the utilitarian dimension is also prevalent in Germany’s selective new diplomatic approach, together with Britain and France in playing a constructive role towards the Iran nuclear problem. Berlin, London and Paris have coordinated their policies in the last few years, representing, in effect, an alternative mechanism towards handling the Iranian crisis, and have managed to exert some influence on Washington’s more robust moves towards Teheran. In both instances, the Schröder government pursued a revaluation of its status and an increase of its influence in given institutions.

This reflected the transformation of the relationship between the EU and NATO, and the EU’s role as an international actor with global pretensions. NATO is still regarded as the instrument for military operations, while the EU is perceived as using a softer approach to conflict management because of its combined use of civilian and military means. The problems of Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran have challenged the notion that Europe and America share the same vision about world order and the instruments to best ensure it. Europe’s role in troop deployment outside Europe is often the result of U.S. pressure more than the consequence of a common European position. In addition, NATO operations tend to involve EU states on the basis of their bilateral relationship with Washington. Thus former foreign minister Joschka Fischer wondered: ‘Within the EU we discuss the Common Foreign and Security Policy, but within NATO we then act as though we are voicing individual national policies, which is definitely no longer the case. So I have often asked myself and others: why is the subject of the European pillar taboo?’ Ambiguities will remain on both sides of the Atlantic. Depending on member states’ positions, ESDP will continue to swing between transatlantic synergy and the will towards greater defence and security autonomy from the U.S. Washington, on the other hand, will retain its long-held ambivalence over Europe’s pretension towards greater influence.

After the international community’s initial enthusiasm with international military humanitarian interventions during the 1990s, European states have come to realize that the consequences of such interventions are long-lasting and lead them to engage in complex post-conflict situations – as well as raising big issues of principle in the international system. First, there is no guarantee that international stabilisation efforts can perpetuate peace locally. The instability caused by the proclamation of the independence of Kosovo

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on 17 February 2008 in Serbia and Kosovo revealed the difficulties of a ten-year peace enforcement mission. Second, EU and NATO members often do not agree on the scope of the mission and its post-conflict framework. Third, EU and NATO run the risk of institutional overstretch in that neither of the two institutions is likely to be able to uphold the military and civilian commitments agreed to during this decade. After the emergence of humanitarian interventions, and the acceptance of the need to fight international terrorism through military operations in the first years of the new century, there has been a growing disenchantment of German public opinion, and more generally in Europe, has emerged towards continuing military operations abroad. This is likely to increase.

The present and future German governments face the dilemma of reconciling two contradictory positions. On the one hand, the overall willingness to continue being engaged in international military operations is likely to decrease, given public opinion’s disapproval over seeing increasing resources being spent for Bundeswehr international operations. Germany’s propensity to resort to the use of force remains unpopular, with the political elite finding it harder to justify combat operations with potential Bundeswehr soldier’s deaths to the German public. On the other hand, the Schröder but also the Merkel governments have embarked on a more utilitarian approach to foreign policy and are unlikely to relinquish the increase of power that Germany has gained in the last few years. But to remain an active player in selective power clusters such as the EU-3+1 and the P5+1, Germany will have to remain committed to projecting peace and stability abroad and to uphold its UN, NATO and EU operations for some time to come.

171 Europe split on Kosovo independence’, *EurActiv*, 18 February 2008.
172 As the previous chapter has shown, the FDP (Free Democratic Party) has opposed Germany’s more recent international operation in Lebanon in 2006 and 2007 for the reasons just indicated.
CHAPTER 5: The European dimension of German foreign policy: Germany and European Union Foreign Policy173

5.1. Introduction: The Europeanization of foreign policies

Germany’s role as an increasingly self-confident and assertive actor in international politics was achieved mostly through its membership in the European Union. Because of a strong congruence between German and European institutions, interests and identities Germany has been portrayed as a ‘Europeanized state’.174 Recently Germany’s reputation as a Europeanized state has been challenged by some (Hellmann et al. 2005), raising the question whether it is possible for a state to de-Europenize, or whether Germany has become more like other states, albeit still Europeanized in nature. Has Germany’s increasing self-confidence developed at the cost of Germany’s previous European enthusiasm? How has Germany used the normative power which it acquired through its EU membership? If Europeanization is understood as a process of ‘policy convergence’ is German foreign policy becoming immune to it? In contrast, which effects have EU policies produced on domestic positions? Have German governments attempted to coordinate policies domestically to produce a more effective policy? In the EU’s attempts to gradually emerge as a foreign policy actor, is there a nascent pan-European conception of interest and identity which has been adapted domestically by the German political elite?

This chapter examines Germany’s increasing self-confidence in foreign policy and begs the question if the conventional view of Germany as a “Europeanized state” needs to be revisited. It assesses patterns of convergence and divergence which can be traced back to the process of Europeanization by analysing both the “top-down” and

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173 This chapter is to appear as ‘Germany in the European Union: Foreign Policies on the road to Convergence?’ in a shorter version in Reuben Wong and Christopher Hill (eds), National and European Foreign Policies: towards Europeanization, forthcoming 2009.
“bottom-up” dimensions of Europeanization in German foreign policy. It examines the impact of EU membership and European institutions such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) on German foreign policy and explores how Germany has responded to changes arising from the EU’s effect on its domestic institutions and policies. Although an identity-based explanation a priori suggests a tendency towards continuity, this chapter raises the question of change in Germany’s European policy pattern.

If initially Europeanization was conceived as the influence of European institutions to overcome cross-national asymmetries and produce change in domestic politics (top down process), its scope has widened into a process whereby domestic inputs feed back onto the European level of policy-making (bottom up process). Hix and Goetz defined Europeanization as ‘a process of change in national institutional and policy practices that can be attributed to European integration’ (Hix and Goetz 2000:27). Radaelli characterized Europeanization as ‘processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ways of doing things and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourses, identities, political structures and public policies’ (Radaelli 2000:4). Featherstone and Radaelli see Europeanization as an inherently asymmetric process with a dynamic quality: ‘its structural effects are not necessarily permanent or irreversible. (...) The impact of Europeanization is typically incremental, irregular, and uneven over time and between locations, national and subnational’ where ‘profound disparities of impact remain’ (Featherstone & Radaelli 2003:4). More recently, Vink and Graziano broadened the conceptual scope suggesting that Europeanization should be theorized to answer ‘how European policies, rules and norms are affecting domestic political systems’ (Vink and Graziano 2006:12). Others consider foreign policy Europeanization not to be a vertical process at all, where uploading and downloading occur, but rather a horizontal process where supranational institutions are weak and member states remain the key actors, with Europeanization developing from a

Thus Europeanization can be understood as a twofold process by which EU member states engage in uploading their policy preferences onto the EU polity and policies, and EU institutions download their policy inputs onto domestic member states’ polities. Because these two processes are in constant flux a two-way practice of adaptation occurs, where the outcome varies between a good and a bad fit of policy projection, with implications which change the national and European dimensions of policy-making. This can produce a tendency towards convergence between national identities and interests, and a European identity, in which both are increasingly constitutive of one another. Europeanization is ‘a bi-directional process that leads to a negotiated but limited convergence in terms of policy goals, preferences and even identity between the national and the supranational levels’ (Wong and Hill 2009). As Wong and Hill suggest, the Europeanization approach ‘attempts to strike a middle path as it accepts that member states adapt to CFSP decision-making structures and norms, while at the same time recognizing that these same Member States are themselves actively involved in shaping these structures and norms’ (Wong and Hill 2009).

5.1.1. Germany in the EU: the path towards Europeanization

The Europeanization of German politics started before the term itself became fashionable in the 1990s and conceptually operational in European studies. As a founding member of the European Communities (EC), the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) developed an almost symbiotic relationship with the EC, which served as a vehicle for the FRG to regain international credibility as a valid member of Europe’s political community. Europeanization occurred in three areas which characterised Germany as a Europeanized state.

First, Europeanization occurred in the identity dimension. In the 1950s the Federal Republic began to develop a Europeanised identity. While this was not exclusive of Germany, the country had no consolidated international identity to fall back on. The experience with National Socialism and Germany’s defeat in World War II created an identity vacuum after 1945 which membership in the EC proved suitable to fill. The European Community (EC) decisively shaped German identity, at the same time as Germany herself actively participated in European integration. The EC functioned as a kind of surrogate identity for Germans. Josef Joffé identified a ‘transnational ersatz nationalism of Europeanism’ (Joffé 1992:80) in that ‘integration
was a low-cost, high-payoff policy’ which ‘merely involved trading non-existing, potential rights for actual sovereignty. Since integration was predicated on the equal subjection to common rules self-abnegation became the condition of self-assertion’ (Joffe 1992:73).

Germany developed a multilateralist identity and adopted institutional commitments in line with the EC’s evolving normative framework for policy-making (Anderson and Goodman 1993). Gradually Germany’s international identity as a ‘reflexive multilateralist’ was constructed through its European policy (Bulmer et al. 2000:52). For decades, this identity synergy between Bonn and Brussels functioned well, considering that the interaction developed mainly within the EC itself, with only a limited foreign policy dimension. In the absence of a consolidated international identity, Europeanising one’s identity predisposed Germans to accept the Europeanization of foreign policy early on and in a different manner from other member states, in particular Britain and France. Germany’s state identity (Katzenstein 1997) was thus the first feature of the country to be Europeanized.

Secondly, Europeanization grew in the domain of institutional congruence. Germany’s recovery of a semi-sovereign foreign policy (Katzenstein 1987) and power was facilitated by the institutional congruence which developed between Bonn and the European institutions. ‘Germans preferred a European institutional context for implementing their national policies, shying away from purely national justifications and trying to avoid the perception that they were striving for national independence of action’ (Hanrieder 1989:305). Paradoxically, this was a strategy of ‘sovereignty gain’ through ‘sovereignty renouncing’ (Haftendorn 2001). By delegating powers to EC institutions – powers which the FRG effectively did not have in a way comparable to that of other members – policy-makers were able to recover power, often unintentionally, ‘indirectly and in a diffuse manner’ (Bulmer 1997:51). Rather than functioning as limits on the country’s margin of maneuverability, European institutions thus provided a means for Germany to amplify its voice in European and transatlantic politics.

European institutions did not so much change Germany’s domestic institutions as they helped shape them domestically, thereby facilitating the interaction of up-and downloading practice. In other words, institutional congruence with the European Community paved the way for Germany to gradually acquire normative power and at the same time shape the contours of the European integration process in an active manner. Normative power served to project domestic institutional models onto the EU
decision-making level, thereby shaping European institutions in a decisive manner. That
the European Central Bank was moulded according to the institutional lines of the
Bundesbank was no unintended consequence but also the result of Germany’s active use
of its normative power. Bulmer and Katzenstein argued that this institutional
congruence was so significant, that Germany managed to mould European institutions
and policy-making decisively, thereby reducing adaptational pressures on domestic
institutions (Börzel 2005:51).

In this distinctly German approach to European integration ‘policy-makers span
the divide between European and domestic level forums and there is a cross-fertilisation
of norms and policies in a two-way process’ (Miskimmon 2001:87). While initially
Germany’s normative power was ‘an unconscious by-product of German behaviour and
practice’ (Hyde-Price 2000:117) the power to shape European institutions was an
intangible source of power which German policy-makers started making use of
intentionally. Institutional uploading was thus at the core of Germany’s European
policy.

Finally, Europeanization occurred in the realm of policy implementation, if only
because EPC was ‘not only the main framework for [Germany’s] diplomacy but almost
the only one’ (Hill 1983:185). Conflicting interests between the EU’s projection of
ideas onto Germany’s foreign policy making, and Germany’s exporting of identity
factors onto the European level remained remarkably low. This led to a significant
degree of Europeanization of German politics, leading one author to argue that ‘the
Europeanization of the German state makes the search for the national, as opposed to
the European interest a fruitless task. The national and the European interest have
become fused to a degree which makes their separate consideration increasingly
impossible’ (Goetz 1996:24). It was uncertain that this remained so after unification,
since ‘the Federal Republic was not institutionally bound to remain an enthusiastic
supporter of deeper integration’ (Banchoff 1999a:266). It now had the potential to
recover a sovereign national foreign policy, leading many to believe that the country
would pursue a less Europeanised path or even disentangle itself from the EU altogether
(Walts 1993).

Thus European institutions became a source of legitimacy for Germany’s
political actions. As Anderson and Goodman have argued ‘in the eyes of German
political elites, institutional memberships were not merely instruments of policy, but
also normative frameworks for policy-making’ (Anderson and Goodman 1993:23). This
normative framework has reinforced Germany’s post-45 multilateralist identity and
institutional commitments. Until 1990, Germany influenced the integration process, often decisively, 'in an unusual manner for a large member country. Germany projected its power softly, revealing a firm preference for normative and institutional over material interests, an ingrained support for multilateralism, and a greater inclination than its large European partners to delegate sovereignty to supranational institutions' (Anderson 1997:80). No 'Alleingänge' (unilateral action), only 'Allgemeingänge' (multilateral action) was traditionally the golden rule followed by all German Chancellors. From this followed Germany’s enduring support for an effective Common Foreign and Security Policy.

5.1.2. Unification and changes in German European policy

The end of the Cold War represented a dual challenge for German policy-makers. It catapulted Germany into the potential position of becoming one of Europe’s key powers. At the same time, the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union (1993) paved the way for the EU to gradually emerge as a foreign policy actor through a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The simultaneous emergence of these apparently contradictory reflexes have accompanied German policy-makers ever since. To assure foreign policy compatibility between both policy-makers followed a ‘two-lane policy approach’. In one ‘policy lane’, Germany sustained its multilateralist diplomacy of institutional continuity in the EU and NATO, promoting the institutional enlargement of both organizations. Thus in the Maastricht Treaty Germany ‘projected elements of its domestic model onto Europe’ (Anderson 1999:207). In CFSP terms, this meant that Germany supported a common European foreign policy, and favoured qualified majority voting (QMV).

In a second ‘policy lane’, policy-makers began to accept that the increase of Germany’s new position as a potential European power placed new expectations and responsibilities upon it as an individual policy actor. Therefore, amid institutional continuity, Germany’s role within these institutions changed, with implications for its foreign policy. The remaking of German identity has affected German interests in European policies and lead to a more ‘pragmatic’ reorientation of Germany’s European policy. It repositioned Germany in the EU, in its bilateral relationships with France and the U.S., and in the wider world. This, inevitably, led to contradictions and ambivalence, and the challenge was to balance both policies in such a way that Germany persisted as a Europeanized state. The key question now, as Christopher Hill
suggested, was ‘whether or not national decision makers [were] significantly reconceptualising their notions of interest and identity in European terms’ (Hill 1998:39).

While all governments pursued both policy lanes there were significant differences. Chancellor Kohl chose to reinforce the first lane maintaining a policy of continuity and the predictability of existing institutional frameworks, deepening and enlarging European integration, sometimes eschewing more international responsibility for his country. ‘The core of our foreign and European policy’, Kohl stated, ‘is the coherent continuation of the European process of unification. This is and will continue to be for Germany and for Europe a question of existential significance, and it is in reality also the question of war and peace in the twenty-first century’ (Kohl 1995:06711). Before every major European summit, Kohl government members met with most of the smaller states’ leaders in order to sound out their positions and prepare them for the German position. By stating in advance what Germany’s position would be, these leaders felt respected and involved in the process of policy-making. Kohl was skilful in handling relations with his partners and the European Commission, and approached them diplomatically so as to ensure that he would not alienate them (Smyser 2003:130).

Gerhard Schröder, in contrast, accelerated down the second policy lane, strengthening the coordinates of a changing German foreign policy, with a new sort of Europeanism. Before the Bundestag, on 10 November 1998, the new Chancellor stated what epitomized his new Europeanism: Germans ‘are Europeans not because [they] have to be but because [they] want to be.’ This touched upon the nature of Germany as a Europeanized state, for it changed its European and transatlantic policies. By stating that Germany’s embeddedness in Europe was a question of choice rather than voluntary constraint, Schröder changed not only the Kohlean formula for European policy but also the tradition of almost four decades of Germany’s position in Europe. On the surface it seemed not much had changed; Germany remained on a path of continuity as a multilateralist European country. But Schröder’s statement opened an avenue for potential discord and signalled that his country’s place in the EU as a cooperative multilateralist member was no longer inevitable. Berlin’s partners could no longer count indiscriminately on Germany’s hitherto automatic congruent behavior. Thus the EU, although maintaining its validity as one of Germany’s normative

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176 Conversation with Matthias Fischer, Lisbon, June 2003.
177 http://archiv.bundesregierung.de/bpaexport/regierungserklaerung/16/69116/multi.htm
178 http://archiv.bundesregierung.de/bpaexport/regierungserklaerung/16/69116/multi.htm
frameworks became more instrumental for German decision-makers with the source of Europeanness changing from voluntary constraint to explicit choice.

At first Schröder’s new policy of assertiveness attempted to diversify alliances to increase Berlin’s position vis-à-vis Paris, and move closer to Britain. This weakened the German-French motor without redefining relations with London. At the Intergovernmental Conference in Nice in December 2000 the Chancellor prompted an open disagreement with Paris over the allocation of number of votes in the European Council and a decrease of Germany’s net contribution to the EU’s budget. Schröder argued for a lessening of Berlin’s financial contribution to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and structural funds, a delimitation of the powers of EU institutions, and the recovery of some competencies by national institutions better equipped to deal with particular issues.179

Because of Frances’ stern opposition, Germany was unable to upload its preference for a change in the voting rights and for a new system of double majority voting. Germany ended up with 29 votes, the same number as France, Britain and Italy (Dubb and Deubner 2001). In addition Germany failed to reduce its financial contributions. Even though Berlin’s position seemed plausible, hinting at the democratic deficit and the need for a more balanced demography in voting rights among states, the proposal implied a quantitative advantage for Germany. Negotiations at Nice were so difficult that former foreign minister Fischer considered at the end that ‘Europe had lost, and national egoisms had won’ (Fischer 2007:347). Berlin had taken the initiative unilaterally instead of trying to rally behind it supporting voices, and had failed to upload its institutional preferences.

Thus a less enthusiastic strain of Europeanism, more nationally orientated, had entered the German political discourse (Schneider et al. 2001), slowing down Germany’s Europeanization path and suggesting a new ‘German-EU incongruence’ (Jeffery and Paterson 2003). Institutionally the aim was to reinforce the principle of subsidiarity of the Amsterdam Treaty by reallocating EU competencies towards the national level of policy-making with the EU acting only in instances when local and

179 Attempting to reduce financial contributions was not new. During the Kohl government both the finance minister Theo Waigel and foreign minister Klaus Kinkel had begun to argue, albeit unsuccessfully, for a lessening of Germany’s financial contributions due to the high cost of German unification and the prospect of EU enlargement. In 1994 foreign minister Kinkel warned that Germany’s paying possibilities to the EU have reached its limits. ‘Countries with similar earnings will have to take on more financial responsibility in the future than they have done in the past.’ Klaus Kinkel (1994). ‘Deutschland in Europa. Zu den Zielen der deutschen Ratspräsidentschaft in der Europäischen Union’, Europa-Archiv, 12, 25 June, p. 336.
national institutions had proven incapable of doing so.\footnote{Jeffery and Paterson identified this as the ‘shifting of tectonic plates’ indicating that the long-standing ‘virtuous circle’ between Germany and the EU was cracking down because Germany had arrived at a ‘critical juncture for change’ \cite{Jeffery2003}.

The problem with this more instrumental approach was that Schröder’s new assertiveness did not result in a European leadership role \cite{Bertram2004}. It produced too many divergences among EU member states, and indicated that the German government was more preoccupied in pursuing \textit{national} interests rather than exercising the leadership role which many expected from Germany. In negotiation tactics, Schröder stated Germany’s position at the summit meetings, without much consideration for how smaller member countries would react and for presenting them with a credible case. Furthermore, Germany seemed also to have ‘intergovernmentalised’ relations with Paris, discarding the Commission and the European Parliament.

With the Grand Coalition government led by Chancellor Merkel after November 2005 Germany returned to the centre stage of European and transatlantic politics and its two central international institutions, the European Union and the Atlantic alliance. The tectonic plates inside Germany calmed down, while the European plates are still being rearranged. Merkel galvanised European policy to insure that the EU was capable of action, but not at the price of sidelining Germany’s own interests.

Germany kept to multilateral institutional commitments but gradually pursued its interests more assertively within those institutions.\footnote{Interview with Werner Hoyer, Berlin, September 2000.} Its position in EU politics evolved from normative multilateralism to one of increasing pragmatic multilateralism balancing between its traditional normative approach and a new approach of more calculated interests. The rationale behind the same narrative was different. After 1998 the government distanced itself from the automatism of European institutional deepening towards a more assertive pursuit of Germany’s own interests which, when they could be embedded in integration goals were presented in EU rhetoric, or which, when that was impossible, were presented as German interests in EU politics through a more utilitarian multilateralism. Thus the question of continuity and change in Germany’s European policy was a question of how far Berlin would go in pursuing its interests within the EU, when other EU members disagreed with the German position.

Because of its high degree of Europeanization, Germany’s European policy has

\footnote{Schröder’s \textit{Leitamträg} presented at the SPD party congress in 2001 on European policy reflected the Chancellor’s policy of recapturing national competencies for German institutions.}
functioned like a mobile since the 1950s. A mobile has a fixed point to which several different parts are attached; but once one of them is put in motion all other parts begin to move. For over four decades Germany’s foreign policy rested on European integration and German-European synergy as the centrepiece of the mobile to which all other foreign policy domains were attached. The unspoken rule was to maintain the equilibrium between the pieces of the Europeanization mobile. After 1998 the fixed centre point of Germany’s Europeanized identity was shaken, touching upon all other individual mobile pieces and causing the construct to become unbalanced. The normative parameters were purposefully redefined by policy-makers acting as ‘entrepreneurs for change’, at times of ‘critical junctures’. These changes in Germany’s European policy have been domestically induced by key elites which have recalibrated ‘their approach to Europapolitik in the light of their normative and ideational understandings of Germany’s foreign policy role’ (Hyde-Price and Jeffery 2001:697). The ambivalence of Schröder’s European policy was that he simultaneously pursued a more assertive self-confident foreign policy without realising that Germany played a pivotal role in holding together the European Union, upon which Berlin’s new ambition to become a more pragmatic international actor itself depended.

In comparison to other member states Germany remains a Europeanized state, and elements of convergence between Berlin and the EU persist. But congruence between Germany and the EU is not an indicator of policy convergence between EU member states across the board, and divergences among them can cause a lessening of Europeanization. German policy-makers probably come closest to the “European-idealist” conception of a normative-civilian power model for European foreign policy in that both Germany and the EU support the promotion of democracy, human rights and security cooperation as common values in international politics. But as with the EU, Germany still lacks sufficient structural power, underlining the discrepancy between the stated ambition and the absence of material and financial resources allocated to foreign and defence policy (Maull 2006b).

5.2. Germany and EU foreign policy downloading

This section of the chapter analyses the impact of EU “downloading” on Germany’s foreign policy-making. It looks at how Europeanization feeds back into Germany’s domestic institutions and policies, and whether this has led to changes in them. It thus studies the transformational effects the EU has on Germany’s policy preferences, and
the pressure Germany feels to adapt to and to accommodate EU policies.

The EU’s aim in downloading is to promote growing cross-national convergence between the foreign policies of member states towards the adoption of an increasing number of common positions. Since the ability for EU institutions to download in the realm of foreign policy depends on common positions previously adopted by the member states, the record for the EU’s downloading capacities, as opposed to other policy domains remains rather poor. There is a significant lack of policy coordination at the European level of member states’ foreign policy preferences (Hüttmann 2007). It is difficult to identify policy areas where the actual *substance* of national foreign policies has been changed because of downloading. Furthermore conflicting interests abound in relations between member states. Ultimately, European institutions have only a limited capacity to change domestic structures and policy-making processes because they lack robust institutional structures themselves; thus rather than effectively changing domestic actors they are themselves subject to volatile environmental change (March and Olsen 1998). Still, for the EU to become a credible international actor, it has to promote the convergence of European interests (ESS 2003:1). But to turn the European Union into a truly effective institution ‘capable for action’, with an autonomous foreign policy and defence capability, Germany itself had to show it had the capability in its own foreign and security policy, to make the necessary changes. This was a form of indirect downloading by EU institutions onto German foreign and security policy, and constitutes a significant paradox in German foreign policy. The chapter will now examine some of the policy domains where this convergence has been attempted.

5.2.1. Downloading and the policy of enlargement

EU enlargement after 1995 produced two important foreign policy consequences. First, it was the EU’s first external projection of its normative power through the projection of norms and the expectation of compliance by EU candidate countries (Grabbe 2005). Second, as Hill pointed out in 2001, enlargement (re-)introduced a geopolitical dimension into European politics (Hill 2001). It enlarged the EU’s Eastern border enormously, and made Russia a real neighbour, towards whom the member states had to define a policy and develop a foreign policy strategy.

Both the Kohl and Schröder governments were strong advocates of the EU’s Eastern enlargement. First, enlargement was propitious to Germany’s identity as a country committed to embedded multilateralism, and provided the institutional
framework for multilateral cooperation. Second, it functioned as a conflict prevention mechanism in that enlargement represented the institutional answer to ensuring stability on the European Union’s borders, and project stability beyond these borders. As former German president Roman Herzog alerted, ‘the West must stabilise the East so that the East cannot destabilise the West’ (Herzog 1995:163). The Kosovo crisis in 1999 had a direct impact on the degree of commitment of Western leaders towards Eastern enlargement of the EU and NATO, leading them to speed up the enlargement processes for political and strategic reasons (Wallace 2002:90). Thirdly, economic reasons led Germany to prefer an institutional integration of the former communist countries to a mere bilateral economic relationship. Fourthly, enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe empowered Germany to replicate its own success and project its normative power. The EU’s enlargement policy revealed an unintentional side of the projection of norms in that ‘the European Union exercised soft power in its own neighbourhood to great effect, but without really trying. This is because the power derived from the fact of its very existence rather than from an active foreign policy’ (Freedman 2005:29). Fifthly, Germany also felt indebted to these countries since ‘it was (...) the aspiration to freedom of these countries that gave us unification’ (Kinkel 1995:06727). Finally, Germany’s pro-active position towards enlargement served as yet another example that post-unified it remained committed to its institutions and interests as a multilateral actor and to its identity as a multilateral actor with normative power.

Despite supporting enlargement policy-makers knew that it would change Europe’s international identity and challenge the EU to pursue more actively the policy of becoming an international actor. The Kohl government felt uneasy about ‘the geopolitical implications of enlargement’ in that enlargement was a process with a geopolitical knock-on effect with foreign policy consequences (Hill 2001). To the extent that, as Hill suggests, ‘each aggrandisement of the Union is inherently both territorial and communitarian [and] brings the external border into new zones of international relations’ (Hill 2000:5) Germany’s foreign policy dimension grew and forced policy-makers to deal with a bigger foreign policy arena, repositioning Germany towards a more Eastern state of mind. This hit the foundational core of its role within the EU and of its position in the world and inevitably affected Germany’s own international identity and role in the future structure of European order.

Thus, aside from the expectations which had fallen on Germany’s own foreign policy (the second policy lane), the same was now happening at the EU level, removing Germany’s possibility to cushion its arguments with EU rhetoric. Both Germany and the
EU were heading full speed towards the challenges of new and more assertive foreign policies. If for forty years the German question had been at the heart of the European construction, it was now Europe's future configuration which was at the centre of Germany's own identity. European integration had originated, in part, to help solve the German question; for that reason alone it was condemned to succeed, for failure was not an option, since it would have, once again, located the German question at centre stage in European politics. The stagnation of the integration process would have left Germany devoid of a political rationale for action which over forty years had shaped its foreign policy. On the question of what Germany's foreign policy alternatives were should the EU fail, the majority of the German political elite unanimously resisted the thought, and did not even consider worthwhile alternatives.182

In addition, opposing Eastern enlargement would have been seen as morally wrong and would have undermined the logic of appropriateness shaping German foreign policy. This was what Frank Schimmelfennig called the 'rhetorical entrapment' of the member states' own making, when on the basis of common values they followed the norm-based rather the interest-based arguments for enlargement (Schimmelfennig 2001). Opponents of enlargement were shamed into agreement by highlighting the problem of the wider use of normative power in foreign policy.

With the Merkel government Germany has become more pragmatic about further EU enlargements. The new coalition government faced the limits of the projection of European normative power towards the exterior. The incapacity to say 'no' to new potential candidates would in the long term weaken the normative power which was one of the reasons for attracting new potential candidates in the first place. Angela Merkel was the first European leader to address this question openly stating that 'Europe has borders.' By identifying the need for Europe to define its borders the Chancellor has overturned the self-inflicted moral entrapment of enlargement (Schimmelfennig 2001). Albeit in the tradition of Helmut Kohl's European policy, Merkel rejects grand visions which could hinder the effective functioning of the EU. In this sense, the Chancellor stated before the 2005 elections that her party preferred a 'privileged partnership' with Turkey rather than full membership and has steered Berlin's negotiating position within the EU in that direction as an open-ended process, excluding the automaticity of previous rounds of enlargement. This new attitude towards enlargement policy was without precedence after a decade of continuous enlargement promises towards various candidates, and is paving the way for a more

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182 This was confirmed by the majority of interviewees.
flexible EU with an increased margin of manoeuvrability.

The policy of enlargement was the EU’s first successful foreign policy. However, enlargement ‘was never presented as an act of foreign policy and the thinking through of strategic consequences never went further than a generalised belief in the stabilising effects of inclusion’ (Hill 2002:79). The characteristic style was ‘one of disjointed incrementalism, shuffling from one half-commitment to another without spelling out to a wider audience the direction in which such commitments are leading’ (Wallace 1996:3-4). From the perspective of Europeanization, however, Eastern enlargement was a successful example of the Europeanization of German foreign policy.

5.2.2. Downloading and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)

Ten years after the institutionalization of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was initiated by France and Britain in December 1998 in St. Malo, and five years after the beginning of its missions, ESDP is one of the EU’s foreign policy areas where some modest success has been achieved. The 1999 EU Helsinki summit laid out the EU’s military capabilities for Petersberg tasks and stipulated headline goals for 2003. The year 2003 was also decisive because the EU adopted its first European Security Strategy. Since 2003, the EU has held civilian-military missions in Aceh, Afghanistan, Bosnia Herzegovina, Congo, Darfur, Lebanon, Macedonia, and Rafah. In December 2006 Germany took over the military command of the EUFOR Bosnia Herzegovina mission Althea, underway since the EU took over the command from NATO forces in December 2004. In 2006 Germany also led the ESDP mission in Congo (Miskimmon 2007). The ESDP’s most recent mission was decided in January 2008, with the EUFOR military operation in Chad and the Central African Republic, as part of a regional approach in dealing with the humanitarian crisis in Darfur.

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183 The headline goal was to create a rapidly deployable force of 60,000 soldiers by 2003 to enable a more flexible force with military and civilian crisis management capabilities capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty. Helsinki European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 10-11 December 1999. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm


There has occurred some Europeanization regarding ESDP missions. Member states find it comparatively easier to agree on sporadic missions with a limited timeframe decided through intergovernmental cooperation in the Council, than on CFSP positions regarding such strategic issues as Europe’s policy on transatlantic relations, or on Iraq. They agreed on the ESS, but did so for different reasons. Germany wanted to enhance the EU’s civilian conflict and crisis management instruments; Britain understood the ESS as a bridging device in transatlantic security issues; and France aimed to strengthen the EU’s security and defence autonomy vis-à-vis Washington.

Germany accepted downloading of ESDP inputs because its own security policy was undergoing a process of reform and normalization, while ESDP served as an instrument to continue embedding its security policy in a multilateral process, and to act in out-of-area missions under a European heading. But this agreement on joint ESDP missions does not mean that EU institutions are downloading to the extent of changing the domestic structures of Germany’s security policy. Overall strategic positions and the shape of institutions such as the Bundeswehr continue to be resistant to Europeanization.

5.2.3. Downloading and European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was created in 2004 in part as a response to the limits of the EU’s big bang enlargement towards the Eastern part of Europe, and in anticipation of the potential conflicts arising in the new areas which would now border with the EU.187 As the European Security Strategy stated in 2003 ‘stability on Europe’s borders is essential for the EU to pursue an effective foreign policy’ (ESS 2003). The European Neighborhood Policy is considered a geopolitical imperative for the EU’s external action to ‘consolidate a ring of friends around its rims’.188 ENP ‘challenges the EU’s ability to develop an external policy complementary to enlargement that is effective in promoting transformation and reform’.189

Still in its early stages it is difficult to assess the domestic impact of EU downloading in the policy domain of ENP. The strength of the neighbourhood policy, as

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Charles Grant has argued, ‘is its flexibility. Some action plans are ambitious, offering the chance of participation in a wide range of EU programmes; others, designed for neighbours at a much lower level of economic development, offer much less. Thus the ENP allows the EU to treat countries that might one day join differently from others’ (Grant 2006:59).

During the German EU presidency in 2007 the German government put forward a proposal for a new EU policy on Central Asia, which the Council adopted. This indicates that Germany is pursuing a more proactive stance in ENP, than merely downloading the strategy papers on ENP put forward by the Commission. But Germany was only in part a key player, since it clearly favoured a neighbourhood policy for the post-Soviet area rather than conceptualising an ENP for both Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, and also the Mediterranean countries. This more selective approach to ENP helps explain why the ENP Plus proposal, put forward by Steinmeier during the German EU presidency in 2007, was turned down by EU members, in particular by France, Spain and Italy.

5.2.4. Downloading European policy for the Middle East

The European Union has become increasingly active in the Middle East developing different mechanisms for dealing with several ongoing conflicts. EU states have over the years forged a congruent position regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, providing financial assistance towards both sides, and supporting the creation of a Palestinian state while respecting the sovereignty of Israel. Recognizing that only a cooperative effort by the EU, the United States, the United Nations and Russia, and the countries of the region will lead to a resolution of the Israel-Palestinian conflict, the EU is a full participant in the Middle East Peace Process Quartet. European leaders accept that Europe ‘must remain engaged and ready to commit resources to the problem until it is solved’ (ESS 2003:8).

In March 2003, the Brussels European Council approved the "EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East" to promote peace, prosperity and progress in the region and build on existing institutions such as the multilateral Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona Process), or the European Neighbourhood Policy which includes some Middle Eastern states. European action has materialized

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through a concerted effort among the EU’s key members, Britain, France and Germany in an attempt to present a European position against Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Whereas the policy outcome of such policies has not often proven successful, the Europeanization among member states and the EU itself has made some acceptable progress.

Berlin has only recently developed a policy for the Middle East. While it had relations with all countries in the region, and a special one with Israel, it was part of a moral and historic tradition of German diplomacy not to play an active or independent role in the area (Fischer 2007:409). Thus without a clear definition of German interests for the Middle East, Germany was more likely to rely on European initiatives in this policy area. Germany’s infant Middle East policy became embedded in a European framework leading it to adopt an impartial position vis-à-vis all states in the region, while maintaining its special relationship with Israel (Perthes 2004). This was a consequence of Europeanization, where Germany often adapted its foreign policy to that of the EU and other member states’ foreign policies. In September 2006 the government, with the approval of the Bundestag, decided the first armed Bundeswehr mission in the Middle East as part of the UNIFIL mission, for the stabilization of the south of Lebanon.191

While consensus among the German elite exists that stability in the region is a priority for Germany and Europe, defining how Germany should position itself regarding the conflicting parties often leads to domestic divergences in the coalition governments. For example, whereas foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier believed Syria needed to be included in peace negotiations, Chancellor Merkel was more cautious on how to handle Damascus.192

5.2.5. Downloading relations with the U.S., Russia and China

Relations with the United States, Russia and China reflect the EU’s difficulties in downloading CFSP preferences onto member states. Convergence remains a problem for several reasons. Firstly, member states endorse a CFSP rhetorically but when it comes to pursuing their national interests towards great powers, they often prefer to act

191 In UNIFIL mission in Lebanon Germany leads the UN’s first maritime stabilization operation off the coast of Lebanon. In September 2007 the Bundestag extended its participation for another year, albeit reducing the number of its troops from 2400 to 1400. http://www.einsatz.bundeswehr.de/C1256F1D0022A5C2/CurrentBaseLink/W26SVK7M066INFODE
192 German Foreign Minister Criticized for Courting Syria, Deutsche Welle, 18.01.2008 http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,3073033,00.html
unilaterally, in the name of national sovereignty. Strategy papers by the Commission hardly serve as more than guiding lines for member states to follow in their many individualist approaches.\(^{193}\) Secondly, to enhance their own international status, ‘each of the leading member-states runs after the chimera of a special bilateral relationship, at the expense of supporting common policies’ (Grant 2007:27). Thirdly, member states’ interests are often simply too divergent among them or in relation to the third party to allow for a long term common strategy towards Russia and China. German-Polish tensions in 2005 over how to approach Russia, or the Polish veto regarding the renewal of the EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in 2007 illustrate this point. Finally, relating to other great powers presupposes a convergent world view. Whereas France and Germany shared a multipolar world view with anti-American undertones during the 2003 transatlantic crisis, Britain’s position was more protective of its close relationship with Washington, not to mention the position of the remaining twenty-four member states. As such ‘European policy so far originates from a congruence of interests, rather than from a convergence of the foreign policies of the individual EU member states’ (Stumbaum 2007:58). As a consequence, policy dissonances are often the result.

Germany’s relationship with great powers is thus not so much a question of adapting its national foreign policy to the EU and other member states’ foreign policies, since the CFSP’s ‘strategic partnerships’ can only be considered a ‘soft’ form of downloading. Neither is it a matter of ‘de-Europeanization’ of German foreign policy, because no Europeanization of foreign policy preceded it. Berlin predominantly defines Germany’s policies regarding relations with Russia, China, and the US bilaterally, making the ‘big issues’ fall outside the area of European foreign policy making.

The increasing number of recent conflicting issues between Russia and the EU, such as over the status of Kosovo, Russia’s energy supply to Europe, bilateral problems between Poland and Russia and the Baltic states and Russia, make the adoption of a common position towards Moscow all the more difficult and have weakened the PCA and its four ‘common spaces’ created in 2003 as a framework for EU-Russia relations on the basis of common values and shared interests.

Regarding China, the EU’s second biggest trading partner after the US, the EU

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has unsuccessfully pledged for years for China to open its markets and engage in reciprocal trading rules and fair market competition. In a 2006 paper the European Commission recognized that the litmus test for the bilateral relationship will be adjusting EU trade policy "to the competitive challenge and driving a fair bargain with China." In addition, it remains difficult to envisage the substance of such partnerships if the values upon which the EU is built – democracy, the rule of law, and human rights – are not part of Russia’s and China’s values in foreign policy (Hughes 2007).

Thus it is in the realm of Great Power relationships that Europeanization is weakest and the least effective since the substance of relations still falls outside the realm of the CFSP and ESDP framework. And occasional concerted efforts towards adopting common policies towards Moscow, Beijing, and also New Delhi are insufficient to forge a true European foreign policy. Part of the reason is that the European Union ‘has not learned to behave like a traditional great power’ (Wallace 2007:7) but so far there is no consensus among the twenty-seven member states on whether that is the role the EU should play. Rather most states seem to accept for now a tentative common vision to act internationally – as a normative-civilian power with military instruments that serve normative and civilian purposes empowering a rule-based international order through effective multilateralism (ESS 2003:9). But although power politics is no longer the rule among EU member states it does not follow that in the realm of its nascent foreign policy the EU can turn a deaf ear to it when dealing with states which define their own interests according to a power politics understanding of foreign policy (Cooper 2003). The ESS also addresses preventive engagement against threats.

Despite the growing number of ESDP missions, and the creation of the ENP the degree of policy convergence will ultimately depend on how willing member states are to converge their interests towards Europeanization at the expense of national sovereignties and their own profiling on the international stage. In addition, an increasing pressure to download foreign policy inputs domestically can lead the bigger

195 At the European Council summit in Brussels on 14 December 2007 no reference was made regarding a EU policy on Russia or China. Whereas the section on external relations deals with issues such as European Neighbourhood Policy, Kosovo, Iran and Lebanon, climate change, regional crises in Congo or Myanmar, no common strategy is mentioned with regard to Moscow or Beijing. Brussels European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 14 December 2007, http://consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=432&lang=en&mode=g
states to augment their own uploading preferences on EU foreign policy outputs. This brings us to the theme of the next section, the uploading dimension of Europeanization.

5.3. Uploading Germany’s preferences on EU foreign policy outputs

This section of the chapter assesses Germany’s impact on EU foreign policy outputs. It examines how Berlin has promoted its preferences in the formulation of EU positions in the four policy areas dealt with in the previous section by looking at the extent to which German domestic positions boomerang back onto the European stage.

In the realm of foreign policy, the lack of policy practice and the EU’s infant role as an international actor means that the member states’ room for manoeuvre is comparatively stronger than in other EU policies. Germany’s eagerness to upload onto the CFSP level blends well with its interests and traditional multilateralist approach. Traditionally, ‘Bonn’s European policies sought to create supranational and governance frameworks that would support the FR’s successful economic formula’ (Anderson 2005:79). The practice of uploading German preferences onto European policy domains existed already during the Cold War: ‘(...) in the EC, what Germany wants, it gets, especially since the German government remains determined not to want anything that would cost it the external support it deems indispensable. Basically, however, Germany does get much of what it wants, and what it doesn’t want doesn’t get done’ (Hoffmann 1995:309).

This notwithstanding Germany’s European policy rests on a highly decentralised policy-making system where ministries such as the foreign ministry, the economics and finance ministry, and the agricultural ministry participate, producing ‘the most deconcentrated’ domestic institutional structure for EU policy-making (Bulmer et al. 2000:22). The plurality of competing EU policy-coordinating ministerial departments where each ministry has its European head of department accountable to the ministry’s secretary of state can weaken Berlin’s negotiating position in Brussels, making a coordinated position difficult (Hüttmann 2007). German representatives in Brussels often fail to agree on a common position, opting to abstain in a European Parliament vote.196 German European policy thus continues to be decided mostly in Berlin at the intergovernmental level.

Germany has been an active player in seizing the initiative, and has acted as an ‘entrepreneur for change’ (Jeffery and Hyde-Price 2001). It has helped shape EU

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196 Interview with a German politician, Berlin, September 2000.
foreign policy in the Balkans and in Afghanistan, and in other EU’s international engagements. Its will to shape CFSP and ESDP also stem from the domestic consensus of the political elite regarding the EU’s role as a nascent global player. Thus Germany’s position on several European foreign policy issues is likely to prove highly influential in the coming years. This helps explain why the role of the Kanzleramt was strengthened when the Red-Green government created the European department within it thereby increasing the inputs of the Chancellor towards CFSP and ESDP (Miskimmon 2007:14).

Berlin has pursued two sorts of uploading, a normative and a policy uploading. First, there is an uploading of normative content. The most significant input Germany produced is the influence of its normative power in pursuing multilateral cooperation mechanisms and the use of civilian crisis resolution instruments in European diplomacy. When German foreign minister Steinmeier argues that one of the ‘trademarks’ of European foreign policy is regional crisis management through civilian instruments in Afghanistan, the Middle East and Kosovo this is a typically German emphasis on conflict resolution which the EU has adopted through the process of uploading of what has been Germany’s traditional post-war stance in foreign policy (Steinmeier 2007). In this sense, Germany’s normative power has contributed to the EU’s present international identity as a normative (Manners 2002, 2006) or civilian power (Telo 2006).

Secondly, there is an uploading of policy content. Germany’s capabilities to upload its interests and institutional models onto the EU have been effective in other domains, like the European Monetary Union (EMU), the configuration of the European Central Bank (ECB) or EU reform. Germany has also pursued foreign policy uploading with some effectiveness. During the 1990s it decisively shaped the contours of the EU’s Eastern enlargement, uploading its preferences for an enlargement of twelve states, and leading other member states to adopt its enlargement policy. More recently, Chancellor Merkel has acted as the quiet uploader in helping to make the EU more capable as an international actor. Her role in unblocking the financial deadlock at the Brussels summit in December 2005, and in pushing forward the EU reform treaty in 2007 has strengthened the EU’s capacity for action.
5.3.1. Uploading German preferences onto the EU and member states regarding ESDP

Germany’s record in uploading its preferences in ESDP is mixed. It shaped the civilian dimension of the ESDP which the British-French St. Malo initiative for a common defence in December 1998 had not envisaged. The German government successfully argued that an ESDP combining both military and civilian dimensions would best prepare the EU for its international operations and give it a profile abroad congruent with the normative framework applied within the EU space itself. Berlin also gave a decisive input to Europe’s foreign and security policy during the German EU presidency in the first half of 1999, claiming that ‘the European Security and Defence Policy was “born” in June 1999’, during the German Council Presidency in Cologne.\(^\text{197}\) In truth, in the defence area Germany lagged behind France and Britain, and it is clear that not having been a part of the St. Malo process, Berlin was eager to make its contribution to join and thus used the presidency to prepare the EU for the ‘Headline Goals’ adopted half a year later at the Helsinki European Council. The presidency also highlighted Germany’s role, with the Bundeswehr’s first time participation in a non-UN sanctioned military combat mission in Kosovo. The uploading of Germany’s preferences for negotiating the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe as a civilian instrument for post-conflict reconstruction shaped the ESDP in a decisive manner for the EU’s nascent security policy. Operationally, the Bundeswehr participation in NATO and ESDP missions in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Macedonia confirmed Germany’s reputation as a responsible alliance partner at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

The European Security Strategy adopted in 2003 had a strong German imprint in Berlin’s preference for effective multilateralism, civilian crisis management instruments and the use of military force as a mechanism of last resort. Germany’s exerted pressure for the wording ‘pre-emptive engagement’ to be substituted for ‘preventive engagement’ (Irlenkäuser 2004) thus differentiating the European from the American approach to threat response. In the absence of a security strategy of its own it is rather surprising that Germany managed to have an influence at all. Still, in including the case

\(^{197}\) White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr, p.34.
http://www.bmvg.de/portalPA_A_1_0_P3/PortalFiles/C1256EF40036B05B/W26UWAMT995INFO/DE/W+2006+eng+DS.pdf?yw_repository=youatweb
for preventive engagement, the EU is one step ahead of Germany in becoming a more ‘militarised’ actor.

Despite the ESDP’s modest success in its first eight years, Germany’s capability to shape European and other member states’ foreign policies towards ESDP, as opposed to normative uploading, is not linear. Political constraints in increasing defence expenditures to provide the resources necessary and the scrutiny each mandate or change in existing mandates undergoes in lengthy Bundestag disagreements about the scope of the mission continue to limit Berlin’s capacity for action as do the discrepancies between the potential for engagement and existing capabilities to deliver troops and material to act in dangerous military zone like southern Afghanistan. In addition Germany’s security engagement in Afghanistan has been built more on an accumulation of reactions towards US pressure for stronger engagement than on a German strategy itself. Germany’s refusal in early 2008 to send German soldiers to combat missions in the South of Afghanistan in support of NATO’s mission only reinforces the dilemma German security policy is facing. All this diminishes Berlin’s capacity to upload practical policy preferences for ESDP missions.

5.3.2. Uploading German preferences onto the EU and member states regarding ENP

One of the primary goals of German security policy is ‘the strengthening of the European area of stability through the consolidation and development of European integration and the European Union’s active neighbourhood policy with the states of the southern Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Mediterranean region.’ Germany’s interest in shaping CFSP towards the EU’s Eastern Neighborhood can be seen as a successor policy to the enlargement policy, even though the ENP does not envision EU accession for ENP members. During the German EU presidency in the first half of 2007 the Brussels European Council in June 2007 adopted the new strategy for a partnership with Central Asia. This was an initiative put forward by foreign minister Steinmeier,

198 In 2004-2005 Germany spent 1.4% of its GDP on defense expenditures, less than France (2.5%), Britain (2.7%), Denmark (1.8%). Fischer Weltalmanach 2008, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Verlag, p. 534.
through a new Ostpolitik for Central Asia as a way to export stability and ensure energy security after the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis in 2006 had revealed Europe’s energy vulnerability. However, Steinmeier’s additional proposal for an ENP Plus was rejected (Kempe 2007). ENP Plus would have opened up a distant perspective of future membership negotiations for Europe’s Eastern neighborhood. Other EU members saw this as an attempt by Germany to increase its influence in the region and upload again its policy preferences onto the ENP.

Because the ENP is a new area for member states to profile their interests, it is yet another area where member states’ motivations diverge. Germany’s attempt to upload its vision of a ENP refocusing on the South Caucasus and Central Asia would have increased Germany’s position in European foreign policy. French president Sarkozy’s proposal for a EU Mediterranean Union, presented in June 2007, can thus be seen as a response meant to emphasize France’s leading role in the geographical area of the Mediterranean. Unsurprisingly, Chancellor Merkel initially opposed the idea arguing it would fragment the Union, while implicitly it was seen as a challenge to Berlin’s own position in the Union. In March 2008 Merkel and Sarkozy have put forward a joint proposal for a Mediterranean Union, with Merkel having received assurances that all twenty-seven member states would be part of the initiative, and no additional funds would flow into the new institution.

5.3.3. Uploading German preferences onto the EU and member states regarding the Middle East

The Middle East is the region where both Germany and the EU are building up a political presence, and it has become a vital testing ground for the seriousness and efficiency of an evolving CFSP and ESDP, and for the EU’s assertion as a global security actor. Germany has only recently developed policies for the region and towards individual states. While it fosters its relationship with Israel and attempts to influence EU positions towards Tel Aviv, it has become more outspoken about the Palestinians’ right to establish their own state. Former foreign minister Fischer tried to play an active role in mediating the Israel-Palestinian conflict in 2001-2002, and after 11 September 2001 put forward proposals for a global strategic perspective for the Middle East.

203 Speech by Federal Foreign Minister Fischer to the Bundestag on Middle East policy, Berlin, 13
Together with Britain and France, Germany is part of the EU-3+1 initiative, with the EU High Representative, in cooperation with the United States, Russia and China, in diplomatic efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons capability. In the summer of 2006 Germany participated for the first time in the region in a maritime operation in the realm of UNIFIL mission off the coast of Lebanon. German diplomatic efforts towards the region have led to its participation in the Middle East Quartet which Berlin tried to revive during the German EU presidency in 2007.

While Germany’s role as an active player in the region has grown, Berlin’s capability to shape European and other member states’ foreign policies towards the Middle East remains limited. Because it lacks a tradition of active political engagement in the region, Germany has thus far preferred to adapt to inputs from Brussels and other member states.

5.3.4. Uploading German preferences towards great powers

Relations with great powers are too important for EU members not to pursue their own specific interests and national foreign policies. Towards Russia, German Chancellors have pursued divergent approaches. Helmut Kohl recognized Russia’s importance as a strategic partner for the EU and the West and played a decisive role in promoting the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Russia which the European Union signed with Moscow in 1997 for a ten year period. Gerhard Schröder, in contrast, pursued more uploading than downloading reflexes in his attempt to forge a bilateral strategic relationship with Moscow. But his repeated overtures towards Russian president Vladimir Putin were mostly unilateral German initiatives which occasionally included France, but which did not rest on a wider European initiative towards fomenting a stable relationship with Moscow. On the contrary, they were pursued amidst strong intra-European divisions regarding relations with the United States and its policies for Iraq.

Schröder’s pursuit of a more assertive foreign policy produced unwelcome consequences for Germany’s stance in transatlantic relations and European policy. The loosening of established alliances and lack of linkage between relations with Paris,

206 The Kaliningrad meeting between Putin, Schröder and Chirac in July 2005 to celebrate the city’s 750th anniversary revealed that Schröder perceived policy towards Moscow more on a bilateral, and great power level than on a European one.
Washington and Moscow cost Berlin influence on the international stage, leaving Germany isolated and weakened in its traditional equidistance between Europe and America (Szabo 2004). Berlin’s opposition to the US-led operation against Iraq was also the catalyst for intra-European divisions thus preventing a possible common European position on U.S. policy. Simultaneously, Schröder distanced Germany from the U.S. and did little to prevent the ensuing intra-European divisions which made a joint European position impossible. All this raised doubts as to whether Berlin’s unilateral move was circumstantial or a break from its traditional reflexive multilateralism towards a less Europeanist Germany (Schwarz 2005). Without clear priorities, Germany’s influence within the EU as well as the EU’s more general attempt at playing an international role diminished, with German capabilities to upload policy preferences severely limited between 2002 and 2005.

With the aim to repair German-American relations and Berlin’s influence in Europe, Chancellor Merkel has given a major impetus to reestablishing close European-American relations. The creation of a transatlantic free trade area in the spring of 2007 between the European Union and the United States falls back on an initiative originated in Berlin, and exemplifies the regaining of Germany’s uploading capabilities in European politics.\(^\text{207}\) The harshening of Russia’s position towards the West has led to a cooling down of EU-Russia relations. Chancellor Merkel has taken a tougher stance than her predecessor towards Russia’s disregard for human rights reflecting a policy more in tune with European human rights and democracy values. The EU-Russia meeting in Samara in May 2007 during the German presidency raised the stakes but only highlighted the tense relations between both sides and the difficulty in renovating the EU-Russia PCA which expired in November 2007, and which the presidency was unable to unblock.\(^\text{208}\)

Germany thus returned to a leading European role in the EU’s relations with both the United States and Russia. It has also tried to play an active role in the EU’s foreign policy towards China. Schröder had pursued mostly economic interests in the bilateral relations, and, together with French president Chirac unsuccessfully claimed the lifting of the European arms embargo against Beijing. Merkel, in contrast, has made human rights, democracy and the rule of law a priority of her governments’ policy towards China, which is in accordance with the Commissions’ strategy paper, but which


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does not constitute a sufficiently common basis for all member states to agree on. While the Merkel government has pursued policy initiatives to embed Germany’s approach in a European policy towards great powers, it still remains an area where Germany as much as other states pursue an active national foreign policy at the same time.

5.4. The EU as an international actor and Germany’s role

Robert Cooper defined the European Union as representing what he calls the post-modern world bound by international norms and institutionalised relationships where military power does not play a major role in international politics (Cooper 2003). This definition is in essence not very different from Manners’ definition of Europe as a normative power, in that both recognize its singularity as a foreign policy actor (Manners 2002; cfr. Youngs 2004). Normative power best develops in Cooper’s post-modern world of European states because it becomes a constitutive part of a different kind of international actor where military means are not the primary source of power. Because of the absence of physical force and the importance of cultural diffusion ‘the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is’ (Manners 2002:252). But both Cooper and Manners are aware that the EU does not live isolated in a post-modern, normative bubble. In a recent re-evaluation of his argument, Manners has conceded that it is likely that the EU will increasingly undergo a militarization the more it engages with the outside world - although this ‘need not necessarily lead to the diminution of the EU’s normative power’ (Manners 2006:183). Cooper, by contrast, does not see the EU as a military power but he is clear that as an international political actor it needs a security dimension. Yet he suggests that the EU, in its dealings with the non-post-modern world accepts that ‘in the international arena, even with its supposed anarchy and power politics, lasting change requires legitimacy, soft power that is, as well as hard power (Cooper 2004:180).

In European politics we are witnessing the development from a normatively orientated foreign policy towards a more pragmatic engagement with Europe’s more

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210 In contrast, the pre-modern world is characterized by a state with a fragile structure, with little real sovereign authority, living in a post-imperial chaos. In the modern world, on the other hand, the nation state is strong and the state system is still intact. Sovereignty is inviolable and order is assured by a hegemonic state or a balance of power, and security is ultimately guaranteed by force. Robert Cooper (2003). The Breaking of Nations, London: Atlantic Books, pp. 16-17 and p. 22.
immediate neighbourhood. In this sense, Germany’s own path partially away from a foreign policy shaped by considerations of normative power towards a more robust foreign policy parallels the European Union’s own CFSP and ESDP evolution, with hard choices required regarding the Middle East, Northern Africa, Central Asia and China.

5.5. Conclusion

Member states are likely to agree when their interests coincide – which is not the same as saying that there is an overall policy convergence. It is conceivable that European foreign and security policy will simultaneously progress down both on a Europeanization lane, as this chapter has depicted, and through a more clustered approach, of multilateral groupings which unite for a specific policy purpose, such as the EU-3+1 cluster on Iran. Still at an early stage, it is uncertain that these multilateral frameworks will produce workable results or that they can work in other domains; there is too much disagreement between the EU-3 countries regarding the scope and aim of future missions, there is a wider leadership reluctance, and there is some resentment by states like Spain, Italy and Poland as to why they were not included. Concerted action towards Iran suggests that we might see in the future a combination of CFSP together with a more power political approach which locates Germany, Britain and France at the level of the US, Russia and China. As Christopher Hill argued, ‘the paradox which now obtains is that the CFSP and some form of directorie have become interdependent’ (Hill 2006). This need not be detrimental to the EU and CFSP as such. But it presupposes that the EU’s other member states accept this new great power legitimacy, and that the EU-3 group is willing to turn efficient policy-making into a benefit for the EU as a whole.

The changes which occurred in Germany domestically in recent years do not suggest the end of Germany as a ‘Europeanized state’. But Germany has become a different sort of Europeanized state. First, while it remains more ‘Euro-enthusiastic’ than France and Britain, its Europeanism is now pursued foremost for Germany’s own political and economic interests. Secondly, the Europeanization dynamic reveals a stronger tendency for Germany to upload than the other way round. Germany has decisively shaped the contours of European Monetary Union and Eastern enlargement. In CFSP and ESDP Germany has managed to successfully upload its normative and some institutional preferences. With the Treaty of Lisbon signed in December 2007, awaiting member states’ ratification in 2009, the EU will have adopted Berlin’s
preference for a double majority voting system (after the French political rejection in Nice in 2000) thus strengthening Germany’s position, since population is now an important factor in EU decision-making. German policy-makers have increasingly moved towards a logic of consequentialism in their European policy more in tune with the new German foreign policy of international assertiveness.\textsuperscript{211}

EU foreign policy remains intergovernmental. If ratified by all member states, the Treaty of Lisbon strengthens the intergovernmentalist dimension, reinforcing the role of the member states and stipulating a partial transfer of competencies back to national governments, while keeping the rule of unanimity for key decisions. It states that CFSP and ESDP provisions “do not affect the responsibilities of the member states, as they currently exist, for the formulation and conduct of their foreign policy nor of their national representation in third countries and international organisations”; neither do they “prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of the member states” or “the primary responsibility of the Security Council and of its members for the maintenance of international peace and security”.\textsuperscript{212} Although functional borders between the competencies of the national governments and the European Commission and the Council are likely to become increasingly blurred, member states tend to hold on to what they perceive as their sovereign domains. Power, institutions and ideas are thus not only subject to Europeanization, they are also ‘permeated by strong residual claims of freedom of action particularly by the larger member states’ (Smith 2007:440).

This notwithstanding, there are some encouraging signs for the continuation of Europeanization of foreign policy. First, of the big three EU member states Germany is still the one where a nascent pan-European conception of interest and identity stands the best chance of playing a role in the pursuit of national foreign policies of member states, and the strengthening of the EU’s CFSP and ESDP. The desirability of shared norms and notions of European interests is consensual among the German elite and embedded in its foreign policy discourse. The future of German foreign policy is still dependent on the success of EU foreign policy. Secondly, when the EU-3+1, Germany, Britain and France act together towards countries like Iran, they are helping to forge what is perceived from the outside as a European approach. This in turn feeds back into the intra-European space, promoting the commonality of interests vis-à-vis other


\textsuperscript{212} The Treaty of Lisbon
international issues.

Thus Europeanization of foreign policy will lead to an increase of the areas where EU outputs will enter the member state space. At the same time, however, the more the EU moves closer to CFSP and ESDP integration, and the EU acquires an international role, the more the EU’s big three and others will strive to retain elements of state sovereignty and make their own national inputs and upload their preferences onto the EU level. The stronger the institutional mechanisms for the EU to become an effective foreign policy actor, the more complexities of convergence and divergence will emerge in member states’ attitudes regarding international politics. Paradoxically, success in ESDP missions can also increase the uploading reflexes of the EU’s leading states. Thus there is a tendency towards increasing Europeanization, particularly in the fields of ESDP and joint military operation; at the same time, there is no automaticity in the degree of Europeanizing convergence since an effective European foreign policy is still much dependent on the strength most member states are willing to empower it with.

Ultimately, both Germany and the EU are facing the pressure to act as international actors and may face the challenge of doing so in a less ‘European’ way and act, in some circumstances, more like other great powers. To summarise the interconnectedness between Germany and Europe with regard to questions of power, both Germany and the EU are on a path from a Europe-idealistic conception of their role in the world to the gradual realization that for both to play a significant role they have to undergo a gradual transformation of the nature of that power. As we have seen, a European foreign policy identity has not only promoted but created European common interests in ESDP and ENP. Thus combining elements of normative with more traditional attributes of power shows that the two are not mutually exclusive, and may both be necessary in determining what constitutes an effective international power.
CHAPTER 6: The Euro-Atlantic dimension of German foreign policy
Redefining bilateral relations: Germany’s partnerships with France and the United States

6.1. Introduction
Germany between Paris and Washington: sources of compatibility and dissent

Changes in Germany’s normative power have come to the surface in the realm of Germany’s bilateral relationships with France and the United States. For over forty years both were vital for the Federal Republic. After unification, it was no longer given that these bilateral relationships were essential for Germany or that they could remain on the path of continuity advocated by Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Because of changes in the structural context in the Euro-Atlantic area, and Germany’s enhanced power position within it, these two bilateralisms became increasingly difficult to reconcile. In light of this, Germany tried to renegotiate relations with both partners. This took many forms. For Chancellor Kohl it meant that Germany assumed a more active international role in its security policy within the Atlantic Alliance. For Chancellor Schröder it meant transforming Germany’s normative power into a more utilitarian form of power to assert a new foreign policy. For Chancellor Merkel it means reconciling differences after the transatlantic rift over the war in Iraq and recovering political and institutional cohesion in the Euro-Atlantic area.

During the Cold War, maintaining close relations with both Paris and Washington was the cornerstone of Germany’s post-war multilateralist strategy and its normative commitment to Westbindung. In Europe, France was the necessary partner in a ‘privileged partnership’ (Simonian 1985) for a stable post-war reconciliation in Western Europe, and Germany’s European policy. In the Euro-Atlantic area the United States was the indispensable partner to guarantee democracy consolidation in Germany, provide a security umbrella against the Soviet Union and ease suspicion against Western Germany by guaranteeing that its security policy was embedded in the wider transatlantic community. Germany’s strategy meant to balance these two poles trying to accommodate French anxieties and American expectations. Trapped between these two, it was one of its successes to avoid antagonizing France or the United States. For
German policy-makers, both were ‘essential partnerships’, not least because the Federal Republic had no other options.

Despite the centrality of both relationships for Germany ‘a post-war record of recurrent mutual unfriendliness’ (Wood 1998:16) existed between France and the U.S. and mediating the dilemmas this produced was part of the FRG’s post-war diplomacy. In times of transatlantic crises, it was frustrating for Bonn to take sides because ‘neither the American nor the French design for Europe fully accommodated German interests. Opting for Washington meant supporting a strategic posture that the German government no longer viewed as fully serving German security interests; opting for Paris meant supporting a European order that fell far short of Bonn’s preferences’ (Hanrieder 1989:12-13).

After the end of the Cold War, Germany’s position became increasingly difficult to maintain, first, because its own potential power had risen, and secondly because the Maastricht treaty laid the foundations for a European common foreign and security policy (CFSP). Germany could neither renounce further integration with France, which touched on a common foreign and security policy, nor could it alienate the United States from Europe whose role was still essential for a stable European peace order. In addition, Bonn needed to soothe fears of smaller European countries of a German hegemonic position over Europe.

Paris and Washington envisaged almost opposite projects regarding German unification. France was the EC member state with the biggest difficulties over coming to terms with German unification. It reinforced its policy of benign containment hardly disguising the fact that it had no interest in seeing Germany play a more powerful role. The U.S. took the opposite view in that president George Bush perceived Germany as capable of a leadership role in Europe, alleviating what would become a diminished American involvement in Europe. Paris expected restraint, paying too much attention to history, fearing that an unrestrained unified Germany would act more unilaterally because of its increased power. Washington suggested international engagement, paying too little attention to the constitutive elements of European integration which had shaped Germany’s political identity and which located Germany firmly in the EU. Still, their common objective was to retain some sort of control over Germany’s actions. While France deepened European integration, the United States strengthened the NATO transatlantic alliance.

France’s fear of Germany’s accession to a predominant power in Europe was linked to its own declining role in world affairs and its predicament as a medium sized
power with pretensions to being a great power in world affairs and a leading power in Europe (Hoffmann 1999). While on the international arena France acted through the channel of sovereignty, it accepted some sovereignty pooling in EU politics, if only to allow for a greater control of Germany’s actions (Sauder 1995a:36). In contrast, the United States’ support for German unification and a stronger Germany was linked to America’s position as the victorious power in the post-Cold War order. Washington believed that the emergence of Germany as a stabilising power in Europe depended on Germany’s definition of national interests and which relationships and institutions it found most conducive to pursuing those interests (Asmus 1991:546).

Between 1997 and 2007 Germany’s normative behaviour in foreign policy underwent changes in the realm of bilateral relations towards increasing pragmatism and a changing German identity. The context for change was created by a combination of a critical juncture for change, entrepreneurs willing to forge change and a discursive reframing and renegotiation of status in bilateral relations. This change did not reflect a ‘return to traditional power politics’, but the adaptation of a pattern of foreign policy which increasingly combined the logic of appropriateness with a logic of expected consequences.

Change also occurred in the realm of European and transatlantic relations. If after the end of the cold war, ‘the most striking characteristic of the relationship [was] continuity rather than change (Wallace 2001:16), after 11 September 2001 a strategic competition between the US and Europe set in. In a wider sense, the dual enlargements of NATO and the EU were meant to replicate and enlarge the post-1945 liberal constitutional order. At the same time, they revealed an underlying strategic competition between Europe and the US, underway since the mid-1990s. For Washington, NATO enlargement to the East extended its security web closer to the regions of the Caucasus and the Middle East. For Germany, and to a lesser degree France, EU enlargement meant projecting Europe’s stability order into a wider European neighbourhood. In addition, changes in transatlantic relations were also a consequence of transformations occurring in European politics, such as EMU and an embryonic European defence.

The chapter addresses a series of questions. Has there been a significant departure from the norms which have guided German foreign policy identity and interests towards its two essential bilateral relations? How much is Germany’s changing identity shaping new interests and have new norms been created to redefine Germany’s relations with France and with the U.S.? Has Germany’s traditional approach towards Paris and Washington been transformed into a more instrumental logic of expected
consequences? How have France’s expectations been articulated by its policy-makers? How has the US reacted towards Berlin’s unilateral rejection of its Iraq policy in 2002-2003? Which role did Germany play in the connection between the transatlantic crisis in 2003 and the European crisis in 2005?

This chapter argues that the dissonances which occurred in Germany’s two bilateral relations and which undermined the cohesion of NATO and the EU resulted to a great extent from the normative shift which occurred in Germany and which clashed with the power conceptions of other institutional members. It examines Germany’s changing alliance behaviour towards Paris and Washington to show when and where the logics of appropriateness and consequentiality were at work, and how Kohl, Schröder and Merkel have remade German international identity sources to reframe bilateral relations. It analyses how Germany has coped with the EU and the wider transatlantic area as two overlapping structures acting as ‘constraints and temptations’ (Hoffmann 1995:282) vis-à-vis Kohl’s goal to ensure continuity, Schröder’s aim of asserting change and Merkel’s policy of refurbishing both special relationships. The chapter examines cases of both convergence and dissonance of interests to show how Germany positioned itself between France and the United States, and how, from 1997 to 2007 it navigated, mediated or chose between them. Section one analyzes German-French and German-American relations in the last two years of the Kohl government. Section two examines how the two relationships were renegotiated during the Schröder governments. Section three reflects on two years of the present Merkel government and assesses how it has succeeded thus far in its aim to recover both relationships after the transatlantic and the European crises.

6.2. The Kohl government and bilateral relations

6.2.1. Germany and France: the persistence of the resilient partnership

The German-French relationship of the post war years is to be distinguished from the project of European economic integration and the need for German-French reconciliation. For Germany the attractiveness of the bilateral relation lay ‘more in its ability to heal historical wounds, build a peaceful partnership and form a strong basis for the European negotiation process, than in the possibility that it might elevate the German nation-state - along with France - above the rest of the EU members’ (Deubner 1997:17). After unification this institutionalised bilateralism continued to be Germany’s preferred
strategic partnership (Bulmer et al. 2000). Its strength came from the legitimacy recognised by other EC members, which accepted that European integration progressed through German-French initiatives.

Germany’s capacity to develop its normative power was closely linked to the stability of the German-French partnership during the Cold War years. The German-French relationship turned into a normative framework which conditioned and empowered Germany’s European policy. Because the relationship ‘had a strong symbolic content as emblematic of a new type of relationship between European states’ (Bulmer et al. 2000:52) it often functioned as a barometer for convergence and divergence on policy issues among EU members. This led some to suggest a German-French ‘co-operative hegemony’ (Pedersen 1998) as the motor for integration initiatives or the brake on initiatives one of the partners did not agree with.

French motivations for European integration were closely linked to France’s strategic visions regarding its neighbour, in an attempt to forestall a more powerful Germany. European integration was thus ‘an imaginative and profoundly innovative leap beyond the traditional methods of interstate relations’ as ‘a construction of friendly containment’ of Germany’ (Hoffmann 1999:78) and of enhancing France’s position, both within the European Community and outside of it. The French were inherently realist in that they found it ‘difficult to believe that once a state becomes measurably more powerful - as Germany has since unification - it will not throw its weight around’ (Friend 2001:57). France linked its approval of German unification to deepening European integration for it feared that Germany might be tempted to go it alone if both failed to progress on integration. For Paris, ‘the one thing worse than domination by the Germans within the EC would be domination by them outside of the EC’ (Pond 1999:42).

6.2.1.1. The EU dimension

Despite the traditional German-French core in the EU, both countries pursued contrasting projects for European integration. France sought three goals. First, it sought to preserve French sovereignty. A strong, intergovernmental Europe of sovereign nations is not incompatible with French sovereignty. Secondly, it aimed for a leadership role in Europe. The German-French tandem served this purpose, in that it helped France to quietly contain German ambitions and promote French leadership in a more Europeanized framework. Finally, France envisaged the EU as a ‘Europe-puissance’,
with autonomous defence capabilities in a multipolar world and a CFSP moulded by French design.

In contrast, for the Kohl government the integration logic affected the sovereignty of the member states themselves. ‘The notion of the inviolable sovereignty of the [nation state] still carries weight, although this sovereignty has long since become an empty shell’ (Schäuble and Lamers 1998). Germany’s voluntarism to surrender sovereignty to supranational institutions was typical of the Cold War years (Sauder 1995a). Germany conceived of a German-French leadership in coordination with other member states’ positions. It supported EU majority voting in CFSP, initially, as ‘the best guarantee against a new German question’. At the same time, however, Germany projected its own normative conception onto the EU. Finally, Kohl did not share the idea of an international role for Europe independent of the United States, preferring to think only in terms of alliance with Washington.

Most steps taken on integration preceded a negotiation between Germany and Paris and were then presented to other EU members. On some occasions this functioned as a face-saving exercise for the French, as was the case with European Monetary Union. EMU resulted out of a common strategy between Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand, but the location and structure of the European Central Bank were decisively influenced by Germany. French decision-makers knew that EMU enhanced Germany’s power and laid bare France’s decreasing influence and status because of the strength of the German economy.

The Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 set the ground for the EU to prepare itself for eastern enlargement. It institutionalised a flexibility clause, but in practice, this amounted to a slowing pace of integration. Deepening integration through flexible cooperation would allow some member states to proceed with closer integration at a quicker pace than others. The result was that flexibility was a way to avoid more institutional binding commitments from the member states thus the integration speed decreased. But Germany and France did not give the treaty the necessary impulse for further integration (Guerot 2007).

Enlargement, the EU’s big foreign policy project, did not rest on a joint German-French enlargement strategy. Because of German-French differences it advanced only slowly and on an ad hoc basis rather than through a common strategy. Whereas Germany was pro-active, France pursued the EU’s policy towards institutional enlargement to ten new member states in 2004 reluctantly. Paris was not a keen

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213 Interview with a German politician, Berlin, September 2000.
supporter of Eastern enlargement for it faced the inevitable shift of the EU's centre of gravity towards the East and an enhanced German position within Europe. Finally, enlargement weakened the centrality of the German-French partnership. Part of Kohl's imperative to make enlargement the other side of the coin of institutional deepening was to accommodate and soften shifts in the German-French relationship. But enlargement brought a new foreign policy dimension into EU politics where Germany rather than France was bound to become the leading player and where the centre of gravitation would be 'Easternised'.

This was France's new predicament in the face of the inevitability of enlargement: while it had to continue on the path of European integration as the best guarantee for preventing potential German unilateral action, either way German influence on the continent would rise, much to the chagrin of France's own position.

Thus the commonality of German and French interests produced effects mostly within the internal dynamics of the institution and did not lead to joint German-French foreign policy actions outside the EU.

6.2.1.2. The security dimension

Germany and France had different views, of long-standing, on America's role in the future security structure in Europe. Germany wanted a European defence embedded in transatlantic structures, to fortify the European capacity for action and strengthen NATO. France, on the other hand, wanted Europe to develop its own independent defence capability, and the WEU to become NATO's European pillar.

While the Kohl government appealed to continuing U.S. engagement with Europe, including the Balkan region, President Chirac favoured a European security policy increasingly independent from Washington which would ultimately have an anti-Atlanticist dimension (Haftendorn 2001:395-396).

There were also different approaches regarding NATO enlargement. While Germany strongly advocated NATO enlargement, France's position was contradictory (Kamp 1998). Faced with the inevitability of enlargement, France changed its position in 1997, at a time when it was considering re-joining NATO's military structure. At the Madrid summit on NATO enlargement in July 1997, US-European divisions came once

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214 Differences over policies regarding Eastern Europe were not new. During the Cold War, 'neither Washington nor Paris pursued Eastern policies that satisfied Bonn and that could have allayed Bonn's suspicions that the German viewpoint was insufficiently represented by its major allies' (Hanrieder 1989:12-13).
again to the surface. Americans rejected the French claim that NATO enlargement should include Bulgaria and Romania, besides Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic whose entry NATO members had already agreed on (Kamp 1998). The Germans positioned themselves in a mediating position, accepting both the American proposal for only three members, and the French one for five new members. Rühe preferred the US position, Kohl and Kinkel accepted also the French one (Kamp 1998: 177). In the end, the American position prevailed. This short-lived episode revealed the complexities of French-American relations and the difficulty for Germany to play a mediating role.

Part of the European legitimacy of the special German-French relationship during the Kohl years was that the bilateralism was integrative, attracting other European states into respecting this core European relation and not feeling threatened by it. Germany acted traditionally as a mediator between the interests of smaller and larger member states (Jopp 2002). But it avoided establishing ad hoc coalitions which might stimulate an anti-France core, which would gravitate around Germany. Thus the bilateral relationship in the EU has ‘acted as a decompression chamber’ for the French elite to deal with Germany’s increased power after unification (Bulmer et al. 2000:127) and served to ‘contain the tensions potentially occasioned by the changing power balance’ (Bulmer et al. 2000:71).

When the bilateral relationship was under strain, joint initiatives failed to materialise. Until the end of the 1990s Germany was more willing to subordinate to French design for European unification than to try to put forward a unilateral German stance (Haftendorn 2001). But at the turn of the century a growing unease emerged between Berlin and Paris over Germany’s role in EU institutions.

6.2.2. Germany and the United States: the continuity of an enduring alliance

6.2.2.1. From protected ally to partner: ‘Partners in leadership’?

In the immediate post-cold war world, the United States put high expectations on unified Germany expecting it to assume a leadership role in Europe (Wallace 1995) and to become the preferred anchor for America’s strategy in Europe through a ‘new special

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216 The Madrid Declaration included the compromise statement that ‘the Alliance expects to extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership (...) No European democratic country whose admission would fulfil the objectives of the Treaty will be excluded from consideration.’
relationship’ (Tamoff 1990). In May 1989, shortly before the fall of the Berlin wall, President George Bush proposed a joint US-German leadership role in NATO during his visit to Mainz, on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the Federal Republic. The U.S. attempted to lure Germans into a privileged position through the rhetorically attractive formula of ‘partners in leadership’ (Zelikow and Rice 1995:31). This was new for during the Cold War the German-American relationship functioned in a multilateral institutional setting where ‘neither the United States nor the Federal Republic was ever able or willing to give primacy to bilateral relations in its foreign policy’ (Schwarz 2004:539).

The U.S. proposal, of course, was not innocent. First, it signalled that for Washington transatlantic relations were changing and Europe was no longer fundamental to U.S. security; Germany had lost the geopolitical significance it had during the Cold War (Koopman and Stark 2004). Secondly, Germany would share its part of the transatlantic security and exercise leadership, through a more assertive projection of power and pave the way for the U.S. to begin its gradual retreat from Europe. Thirdly, it could suggest that Germany would become increasingly disentangled from the integration process, thereby weakening the German-French relationship, and ultimately the integration process itself. Finally, the scenario of a German hegemony in Europe led Washington to anticipate this by proposing a joint leadership initiative which would forestall unilateral actions and position Germany as America’s junior partner. Ultimately, then, for Washington, ‘the quality of German-American partnership largely depended on whether Germany would take on more global responsibilities, or would remain predominantly a European power’ (Mayer 2001:74).

The German government deliberately did not engage with the American proposal. First, it meant that Germany would have to redefine its alliance with America repositioning the bilateral relationship on a qualitatively higher level than the German-French one. Such a change would have implied, first, German-American leadership within the Atlantic Alliance, and secondly a German leadership role within the EU, congruent with American interests in Europe. This could have pressured Germany to perform unpleasant tasks in Europe, probably weakening European integration, and would have represented a break in the traditional German policy of equidistance, not to mention the less positive reactions it would have produced in some European capitals.

Secondly, and as a consequence, an increased international German assertiveness would unbalance the European integration process, which relied on joint German-French leadership. Germany did not want to jeopardize relations with Paris which would have
found such a change unacceptable. Thirdly, the proposal suggested a misperception from the American side in the belief that by luring one of its members outside of the EC, stability on the continent would increase allowing the US to withdraw. Fourthly, Germany’s security policy was still too constrained domestically and internationally to facilitate a joint leadership. Even if Germany was then at ‘the height of its international influence’, according to former foreign minister Hans Dietrich Genscher (Genscher 1997:626), it lacked the means and the political will to guarantee the assertive act that Washington expected from it. Finally, it is likely that any German government in the 1990s would have encountered fierce domestic resistance towards the American idea.

6.2.2.2. The security dimension

Instead Kohl strengthened the German-French relationship. European integration was accelerated, through the Maastricht Treaty, whereas with Washington relations remained much the same. Kohl manoeuvred diplomatically not to offend the Americans, but preferred to deepen European integration instead of taking on a leadership role for which Germany was ill prepared and which would have weakened its integrative stance in Europe. Still, Germany attempted to continue to play the role of mediator between France and the U.S. and keep its twin bilateralism intact. While this revealed diplomatic skill by the Kohl government in attempting to perpetuate the fragile equilibrium without alienating allies who had different visions of world order the constraints of such policy became evident because they conditioned Bonn to keep precisely that balance.

Germany and the U.S. had a similar position regarding NATO enlargement to the East. The Americans took the lead in paving the way for the first group of countries to join NATO through the Partnership for Peace in early 1994 and Europeans were relieved to follow (Pond 1999:68-69). Germany supported the U.S. and took an active stance in acting as one of the main driving forces of NATO expansion towards Eastern Europe. Initially, German defence minister Volker Rühe pressed harder for enlargement than his American counterpart (Tewes 2002 and Arora 2006).  

Germany and the United States worked closely together towards institutionalising a new strategic partnership between Russia and NATO, signed with the NATO-Russia Declaration, in May 1997 (Hyde-Price 2000). Germany wanted to assure

217 In the German government Rühe was the strongest advocate of NATO enlargement, with Chancellor Kohl careful of NATO’s relations with Russia, and foreign minister Kinkel concerned with security worries of those countries which were left out. But Rühe opposed the idea of a Russian membership in either NATO or the EU.
Russia that it would not be excluded from the European security architecture, and the U.S. knew it had to create an institutionalised relationship with Russia, not least for that very reason.

For Chancellor Kohl ‘reliability and alliance capability are the basis of German foreign policy. German special paths in Europe and in the world inevitably lead into isolation’ (Kohl 1997b). Renegotiated relationships thus took many forms and were conducted following a logic of appropriateness of action. During the 1990s it became increasingly difficult for Germany to maintain the defiant balancing act of pursuing the Europeanisation of its diplomacy and maintaining a close security relation with the United States, and, by implication, the primacy of NATO. American ambivalence regarding an independent European defence pillar also contributed to the uncertainty of transatlantic relations. If Washington was not truly interested in a EU with its own defence capabilities to become a potential future competitor, a Europe incapable of becoming an international actor would become increasingly irrelevant for the United States.

6.3. The Schröder government and bilateral relations

6.3.1. The German-French relation, 1998-2002

Chancellor Gerhard Schröder started his Chancellorship on the basis of a different self-understanding of his country’s international role. Schröder wanted to free Germany’s foreign policy from the constraints of the previous sixteen years of political leadership under Helmut Kohl and its excessive reliance on continuity. Schröder made assertions of German self-confidence and emancipation towards transforming Germany’s new status as a power with international parity similar to that of other powers. In his first speech before the Bundestag as the new Chancellor, Schröder spoke of Germany’s self-confidence as an ‘adult nation, which feels inferior to absolutely no-one.’ This suggests that after 1998 the established logic of appropriateness was gradually substituted by a new legitimacy for appropriateness and by a reinforced logic of consequentiality.

Paradoxically, it was the decision over the use of military power which pushed Schröder’s agenda. The Kosovo war in the spring of 1999, shortly after the Red-Green coalition came to power, marked a watershed in German foreign policy, not only in terms of the military operation but because this was the transition to adulthood in

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218 Gerhard Schröder, speech before the Bundestag (Regierungserklärung), 10 November 1998.
German security policy, with obvious political implications. For the first time since the Second World War, Germany fought offensively in a NATO operation, alongside its allies, in an operation not sanctioned by the United Nations.

For the Chancellor Germany’s successful participation in the operation and the subsequent diplomatic handling of the aftermath handled by the German EU presidency in the first half of 1999 empowered him to begin redefining Germany’s relationships with Paris and Washington. Schröder made no effort to conceal that the Kohlean premise “to be everybody’s darling” by being as Europeanist as France and as Atlanticist as Britain so as not to have to choose between the United States and its European partners’ (Haftendorn, quoted in Peters 2004: 395), was not in Germany’s best interest. Schröder sought to emancipate Berlin from ‘decisions made elsewhere’, accepting the costs of relinquishing its traditional multilateralism. This transformed Germany’s normative power because it loosened the constraints on the instrumentality and consequentiality of its political actions. His striving for a new norm of international power parity meant that Germany’s new self-confidence required equality within the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union, and to a raising of international status.

6.3.1.1. Germany and France: Two equal partners?

The Chancellor pursued two steps in dismantling Germany’s logic of appropriateness and its alliance constraints. Recognising the importance of both the German-French and the German-American relationships, he envisaged repositioning Berlin’s position within the existing frameworks. During Schröder’s first emancipation moment, between 1999 and 2001 the Chancellor contested France’s EU co-leadership and tried to free Germany from the institutionalised bilateralism. During Schröder’s second emancipation moment in 2002-2003 he turned to Washington and liberated himself from the American alliance. These emancipatory moves in European and transatlantic relations were accompanied by a more global ambition, the assertive claim for a German permanent UNSC seat, and by repeated overtures towards Russia, conducted on a bilateral basis between the Chancellor and president Vladimir Putin.

Schröder’s first emancipation moment also led him to attempt a closer relationship with Britain. That the Chancellor’s first visit took him to London instead of Paris was not well received in France, as was his initiative for a joint publication on
European social democracy with British prime-minister Tony Blair in June 1999.\textsuperscript{219} Although the much publicized initiative did not mark the beginning of a new German-British leadership in Europe, it would have hit the German-French relationship at its core had it done so. Naturally, it displeased the Socialist French prime-minister Lionel Jospin, at a time when German-French relations were not the warmest, as the Berlin summit in March 1999 had shown with German-French disagreement over renegotiation of the EU budget and the future of the CAP (Gloannec 2004:37).

6.3.1.2. The Nice Intergovernmental Conference in 2000

A year later, in 2000, German-French bilateralism became a hindrance to progress on integration. At the Nice European Council in December 2000, Berlin and Paris were unwilling to coordinate their positions and make a coherent proposal on EU policies. They failed to present a joint strategy on the creation of the financial and institutional structures, engaging in open disagreement over the reweighing of national votes in the Council of Ministers. Schröder argued for an increase of Germany’s number of votes because of its higher population number, which Chirac opposed on the grounds that such an increase would cause an imbalance between the EU’s strongest member countries. In the end institutional reform was postponed to another intergovernmental conference in 2004.

Whereas Chirac meant to re-establish the traditional German-French motor as a means of improving France’s position, Schröder aimed to locate Germany on a higher standing within that same relationship, to obtain power parity with France. The inbuilt mutual containment mechanism against tensions in the German-French relationship had begun to crumble. This was a consequence of the logic of expected consequences which increasingly prevailed in the bilateral relationship from the German side.

At the end of negotiations, Schröder’s plan to create a precedent and quantitatively increase Germany’s voting rights failed because of vehement French resistance.\textsuperscript{220} The compromise did not reflect a joint concern to advance European integration but rather the defence of purely German and French interests. Significantly, it was no longer guaranteed that in the future the German-French duo would automatically be willing to make an effort to unblock negotiations and proceed with integration. Thus


\textsuperscript{220} Germany had to accept the same 29 votes attributed to France, Britain and Italy. Schröder managed to negotiate a higher number of German members to the European Parliament, and guaranteed, against Chirac’s initial position, that Poland got the same 27 votes as Spain.
the Nice conference showed that ‘when France is grandstanding alone, to the
disapproval of most other countries, Germany finds it easy to make ad hoc coalitions and
shows its strength without offending others. But in the vast majority of cases, Germany
does not wish to show its power to the Europeans at large, and while it may have
difficulties with France, Germany prefers the partnership to a series of shifting
coalitions’ (Friend 2001). In addition, Nice revealed politically that France’s European
policy had turned defensive (Schild 2001).

The German-French relationship thus did not pursue a common strategy for
furthering integration at this crucial point. This could also be seen in the lack of
conceptual initiatives. A much debated speech foreign minister Joschka Fischer gave on
the future of Europe in Berlin, in May 2000 produced little reaction in Paris (Fischer
2000b). French foreign minister Hubert Védrine reacted coolly. ‘I would no longer say
that Europe is automatically an influence enhancing factor for [France]. This was the
case of the early 1990s when it had fewer members (...). Today we have a more
complex and unstable system where the balance between influence and institutions is
defined less clearly, where relations are less harmonious, the roles less clearly defined,
the results less predictable and less in tune with [France’s] own line. And this will only
grow stronger’ (Védrine, quoted in Schild 2001:9).

Germany and France traditionally shared a long-term commitment to a strategic
project of internal European integration. But the more the European Union develops
positions in its external domain the less capable the German-French tandem seems of
being its driving force. CFSP, together with European security, has been the policy field
where the Franco-German relationship ‘does not dominate to the same extent as in other
policy fields’ (Miskimmon 2001:89).

6.3.1.3. The security and defence dimensions

This is partly because of Germany’s and France’s different security visions regarding
America’s and NATO’s role in Europe’s security. Germany is not a traditional
Atlanticist country like Britain, Portugal, Denmark, or the Netherlands, but the German-
American security pillar gives its security policy a strong Atlanticist component.
Germany is also not the traditional Gaullist country in favour of an autonomous ‘Europe
puissance’ dear to the French, but German-French security cooperation gives its security
policy a European dimension. This has strengthened Germany’s mediating role between
the U.S. and France but made a German-French security policy more difficult.
While Germany wanted to see Washington remain committed to European security and defence, and was willing to develop European defence structures as part of NATO, France was traditionally more ambiguous on America’s role, and has continuously argued for Europe’s strategic defence autonomy from Washington. For France to be critical of US security involvement is part of its raison d’État. The will to create an autonomous European defence is reinforced by the wish to diminish Washington’s role in Europe. For Berlin ESDP should have an additional function to NATO, but for Paris it should represent a credible alternative.

Another reason which explains the difficulties in advancing German-French security cooperation is that France enjoys more affinity with Britain, which has a similar defence capability and is also a nuclear power. Germany was not France’s preferred partner for defence cooperation, and Paris sided with London on security and defence matters. The French-British bilateralism on defence and security matters culminated in the Franco-British St. Malo declaration in December 1998 about the initiation of a European Security and Defence Policy. But with regard to the strategic outlook France remained in an isolated role. At Nice in December 2000, Paris aimed at convincing the EU to consider ESDP as an institution for European security autonomy. The Germans, together with the British held the view that the strengthening of a European pillar of defence could not be done against the Atlantic Alliance.

In its fear of German predominance over Europe, Paris faces the dilemma of wanting a stronger European autonomy from the US at the same time as it wishes to avoid a strong German role in a European defence structure. France’s pursuit of a ‘Europe-puissance’, however, is only a viable alternative if Germany is willing to participate. This has increased Germany’s leverage vis-à-vis France.

However, a departure from Germany’s traditionally pro-Atlantic outlook was Schröder’s empathy towards the French concept of ‘Europe-puissance’, which he laid out as early as 1999. In a speech before the French National Assembly on 30 November 1999 the Chancellor engaged with what had hitherto been a typically French interpretation of Europe’s role. ‘The French concept of ‘Europe puissance’ aptly defines our common goal (...) and our common vision for Europe’s future. We want a Europe that represents its interests in a self-confident and successful manner’ (Schröder 1999b). He referred to the ‘Europe-puissance’ concept with respect to CFSP and ESDP (Meimeth 2003). This European independence, which was to be the basis for an equal cooperation with the United States, presupposed close German-French cooperation. Schröder lamented that the expression had not yet found resonance in the German debate.
This acceptance of a German conception of ‘Europe-puissance’ fits Schröder’s wider claim for more German self-confidence and assertiveness in foreign policy. That seems to have been the main reason for the endorsement, rather than the end of Germany’s traditional transatlantic understanding of security. Nevertheless, four years later, during the transatlantic crisis, this position was no longer so clear-cut.

While the German-French relationship remained ‘institutionally robust’ (Hyde-Price and Jeffery 2001:702), with regular bilateral meetings between the prime ministers (and meetings between the foreign ministers institutionalised in 2001 as the Blaesheim process), the quality of the partnership had become less strategic to Germany, and now served primarily a tactical purpose. At the 2001 European Summit in Gothenburg, Germany, backed by France, imposed a seven year delay on the free circulation of persons coming from the new EU member states and, in exchange, Germany accepted France’s position against the liberalisation of electricity (Guerot 2006). German-French deals were now perceived as pursuing foremost national interests provoking a growing dissatisfaction with other members.

During the first term of the Red-Green government the German-French relationship came under strain because of Schröder’s attempt at redefining the partnership. This changed during the governments’ second mandate when Berlin and Paris stood together in their joint opposition to the U.S. led war in Iraq. Germany’s exposed and direct opposition to the US limited its freedom of action and put France again in a more significant position since Berlin now needed French support to sustain the credibility of its anti-war opposition.

6.3.2. The German-French relation, 2002-2005

6.3.2.1. The revitalisation of the German-French relation

In the summer of 2002, during the German election campaign Chancellor Schröder managed to capitalize on German anti-American sentiment to guarantee his governments’ re-election. Contrary to general expectation he did not change the government’s position after electoral victory. But Germany risked isolation in the EU and NATO. Recognising

\[\text{For the French perspective see Jacques Chirac’s speech on European security and defence to the Presidential Committee of the WEU Assembly, in Paris, on 30 May 2000: “The multipolar world that France is seeking will provide balance and harmony. But it will not be feasible unless Europe is organised and able to play its role on the international stage”.} \]


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the limits of defiance and realising that its unilateral stance isolated Germany internationally Schröder conceded that internationally France still enjoyed a higher standing than Germany and acquiesced in French leadership in the Iraq question.222

This ranking of positions ensured the revitalisation of the German-French tandem in EU politics. Thus it was no surprise that Schröder’s turn to Chirac for French support in the Iraq question in the summer of 2002 coincided with the revitalisation of the German-French European motor.223 In both situations, transatlantic politics had given a decisive impulse for a new dynamic in German-French relations.224

Before the Copenhagen European summit in December 2002, Berlin and Paris reached an agreement to solve the differences on the EU’s common agricultural policy (CAP) and the amount of agricultural subsidies to the EU’s new members, opening the way for EU enlargement.225 In November 2002 Schröder and Chirac presented a joint initiative to the European Convention on economic policy, justice and home affairs, defense and institutional reform. The paper on institutional reform proposed a new formula on voting weights. On defence, foreign ministers Fischer and Villepin presented a joint initiative for the creation of a European Security and Defense Union (ESDU) and a European armaments agency.226 The development of ESDP towards a ESDU should be achieved through the mechanism of ‘reinforced cooperation’ and through the strengthening of the European pillar in the Atlantic alliance (Meimeth 2003).

In a display of policy coordination both capitals concerted their action towards a more flexible approach to the Stability and Growth Pact, which the EU adopted in November 2003. This, however, responded to German and French national worries since both countries had been unable to stick to the budget deficit criteria of maximum 3 per

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222 On 8 September Chirac met Schröder in Hannover. While Germany and France agreed on a critical stance towards a unilateral American action against Iraq, Chirac did not rule out France’s military participation against Iraq. ‘Deutsch-französisches Treffen wegen Irak-Frage’, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 8 September 2002.

223 President Chirac gave his impression of the Iraq issue in an interview: ‘It isn’t so much "Schröder and me" on one side and "Bush and Blair" on the other; what I’m seeing right now is "Bush and Blair" on one side and everyone else on the other. Which is a little bit different. To my knowledge, the EU has clearly come out against any unilateral action.’ Interview, New York Times, 8 September 2002. http://www.elysee.fr/elysee/elysee.fr/anglais_archives/speeches_and_documents/2002-2001/interview_of_president_jacques_chirac_by_the_new_york_times-elysee_palace-sunday_september_8_2002.14617.html

224 French domestic politics also played a role in the revitalisation of the bilateral relationship. Parliamentary elections in May 2002 had given Chirac’s party the majority, thus ending six years of ‘cohabitation’ of two different political parties in government and the presidency. This had limited the President’s margin of manoeuvrability in foreign policy, or at least given him the opportunity to pretend.

225 The EU agreed a transitional period for the integration of central and east European countries into the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) stipulating that the new European members would receive their farming subsidies progressively, with a phased reduction after 2007.

cent of the GDP. In December 2002 Schröder and Chirac proposed that accession negotiations with Turkey should begin in 2005.

This new élan in the German-French motor for European integration showed that through common action Berlin and Paris could shape EU decision-making more effectively than any EU member on its own or any other alliance in the EU (Klau 2003). From the German perspective, it reflected Schröder’s calculus in not contradicting France and risk disagreement at a time when the German opposition to the Bush administration’s policy on Iraq lacked European support. The 40-year anniversary of the Elysée Treaty on 22 January 2003 coincided with tough negotiations underway in the UN Security Council about a second resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq, making it, from the German perspective, all the more pressing to show German-French unity on the international stage.

This bilateral revitalisation momentarily recovered the German-French motor for integration. However, EU members resented what they saw increasingly as a German-French directoire aimed at their own national interests such as their joint disregard for the rules of Stability and Growth Path. As one observer put it, ‘Europe’s motor was becoming a “locomotive without a train” as the smaller EU countries were consistently neglected’ (Guerot 2007:63). Especially candidate members, more Atlanticist, felt offended by Chirac’s dismissive language. This has affected the bilateral relationship for ‘even if the Franco-German couple continues to re-emerge at critical junctures in EU affairs, its continuity, its gravity and its power have been weakened not least because it appears to be driven more by the pursuit of national interest or status than by a sincere commitment to Europe’ (Janning 2005:829). Furthermore, EU members were already deeply divided over the controversial prospect of a war in Iraq and its consequences for transatlantic relations.

At the height of the transatlantic row over American unipolarity, French multipolarity and a ‘Europe puissance’ concept, Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg gathered for a summit in Brussels on 29 April 2003 to discuss EU military capacities separate from NATO with independent European headquarters in Tervuren, under the banner ‘European Security and Defence Union’ (Rudolf 2005:138).227 That this meeting, derisively termed the ‘chocolate summit’ by American commentators, united the European anti-Iraq war group showed how American foreign policy in Iraq

was closely connected to European plans towards a greater European defence identity.\textsuperscript{228} For most other EU and NATO member countries it was a demonstratable Franco-German act of defiance against Washington and NATO. First, it signalled German-French disregard for European multilateralism; this was seen as an attempt of German-French hegemony rather than a tentative CFSP position. Secondly, for the majority of EU members, transatlantic cohesion and the Atlantic Alliance were still the foundation for their own security. Thus any attempt to create an ESDP would have to be built in close coordination with the United States. Finally, the majority rejected turning the European Union into a counterweight of the United States and the idea of a ‘Europe puissance’. This unsuccessful German-French initiative marked a break from traditional German multilateralism and contributed to NATO and EU inner divisions, leading some to suggest that the meeting will ‘enter into the textbook of German diplomatic failures’ (Schmidt 2005).\textsuperscript{229}

In practical terms the proposal made little sense without Britain, taking into account the Helsinki headline goals of December 1999. In September 2003 the Chancellor hosted a meeting in Berlin with president Chirac and British Prime Minister Blair. This signalled that Britain had been charmed into participating more actively in European defence, and that Berlin, Paris and London had agreed to proceed jointly on common European defence plans. ESDP was dependent on the inclusion of Britain, with its much stronger military capabilities than Germany. France - or at least its foreign minister - had come to the conclusion that ‘there will be no Europe without European defence and no European defence without Britain’ (Villepin 2003). This brought Britain on board and showed that NATO should not be sidelined.

Thus progress was made on ESDP at the Naples meeting of EU foreign ministers in November 2003, which settled the dispute over European defence headquarters and opened the way for ‘structured cooperation’ in ESDP.\textsuperscript{230} ESDP could not replace NATO but only be its complement. A German-French leadership role in ESDP seemed set aside for lack of military capabilities and recognition by other EU members. This showed that Berlin had to proceed with a reconciliatory move towards Washington, since the EU

\textsuperscript{228} Joint communique by Germany, France, Luxemburg and Belgium on European Security and Defence Policy, 29 April 2003, published in \textit{Internationale Politik}.

\textsuperscript{229} Especially the timing and the way in which the four country initiative for a separate European defence headquarters in Tervuren was put forward were badly received, more than the content of the Brussels declaration, since it included a transatlantic declaration of solidarity and objectives which had previously been agreed on in the conven on the constitution, like the instrument of ‘structured cooperation’ and the development of Petersberg tasks (Koopman and Stark 2004).

members’ message had been the need to maintain the transatlantic alliance and not weaken NATO.

Although these examples suggest a sequence which hints at a strategy, it is more likely that the Schröder government proceeded in an ad hoc manner without an underlying strategy, making up the policies as events went by rather than pursuing an elaborate foreign policy strategy. The way in which the German Chancellor conducted the opposition to US policy in Iraq also highlighted his lack of international strategic vision for German foreign policy and revealed that policy towards the US was based more on a succession of positions than on a coherent long term strategy. Germany took the initiative unilaterally to oppose Washington, and risked isolation if France had not jumped on board. Until early 2003 president Chirac had not ruled out a French participation in the American planned intervention in Iraq.231 Had France not opposed the American policy Germany would have been left isolated in both the EU and NATO. This would have severely damaged German-French relations, Germany’s normative power and quest for more assertiveness, not to mention the already fragile German-American relation. Despite Schröder’s claim for more assertiveness and a more calculated logic of action, Germany could not stand alone.

In the long term Germany did also not increase its freedom of action by pursuing unilateral overtures towards Russia’s president Putin.232 These were mostly German initiatives, which included France, for regular meetings among the three leaders, but which did not rest on a wider European initiative towards fomenting a stable relationship with Moscow.233 The Chancellor’s position on the prospect of Russian NATO membership was also clear. ‘The existing NATO-Russia Council cannot be the last word in relations between NATO and Russia. Those who think in longer historical dimensions cannot exclude a Russian NATO membership in the long-term.’234 More recently, the German-Russian plans for a joint oil pipeline project which would be built under the Baltic Sea and thus circumvent the passage through Ukraine was seen as another German display of power which showed little concern over neighbours’ worries or any desire to coordinate efforts towards a joint EU policy for Russia, least of all on

231 According to Der Spiegel France only officially opposed the U.S. after secretary of state, Colin Powell’s speech in the UNSC on 5 February 2003.
232 Schröder’s affinity with Russia was not new. Some German politicians had warned before September 11, 2001 that the Chancellor was pursuing a pro-Russian course at the same time as he was distancing Germany from the US. ‘Bildet sich ein Riss zwischen Berlin und Washington?’ Die Welt, 29 April 2001.
233 German, French and Russian opposition brought the three leaders together in UNSC meetings on the war in Iraq. But Schröder, Chirac and Putin met regularly afterwards, as happened in August 2004 in Putin’s summer residence in the Black Sea resort of Sochi, or in July 2005 for the 750th anniversary of Kaliningrad, with Polish and Lithuanian leaders not being invited.
234 Schröder interview to Der Stern, 9 August 2001.
the increasingly important issue of energy supplies. This partial disengagement from established alliance policies was unprecedented in the unified Germany and struck a sour note with many EU member states.

Contrary to what is argued the German-French motor had slowed down for longer than is usually suggested. Ever since German unification, integration has progressed slowly through the bilateral cooperation, if we exclude the Maastricht Treaty and EMU, both negotiated in the early 1990s by Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand. EU enlargement was also not the result of the German-French motor. This may suggest a ‘German shift to multiple bilateralism alongside a continuing though weakened Franco-German relationship’ (Paterson 2005:272). Thus despite assertions that Europe only progresses through German-French cooperation, an analysis of the last fifteen years suggests that while Europe does not move forward without Germany and France, the opposite is not true; while it only moves forward if Berlin and Paris are on board, this no longer necessarily presupposes a German-French leadership core. As we have seen the so often hailed German-French motor has not often produced expected results.

6.3.3. Germany and the United States: The political emancipation

6.3.3.1. The bilateral relationship between Germany and the United States

In his second act of emancipation, Chancellor Schröder tried to change Germany’s status and position within the transatlantic partnership. This was done in defiance of the US and of Germany’s traditional diplomacy of multilateralist transatlanticism. The Chancellor increasingly followed a logic of expected consequences, hoping to provide Berlin with new international status of power parity with other great powers.

To be fair on Schröder’s quest for assertiveness, successive U.S. administrations had empowered Germany to become more assertive and exert leadership, if not ‘in America’s name’ than in close partnership with it. Washington had given Germany a ‘license to lead’ Europe as long as Berlin’s leadership was exercised towards, and not against, the U.S. itself. Schröder, however, only followed the first part of the American equation, leaving the second part open to a case-by case analysis, as the wars in

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235 That France felt uncomfortable with enlargement was shown in ‘October 2001, when then French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine mounted a last-minute effort to block the German-inspired initiative to open the EU to ten new member states at once in 2004 the so-called “big-bang-scenario.”’ (Klau 2003).
Afghanistan in 2001, and in Iraq in 2003, would demonstrate.

As a new government, the Schröder-Fischer team needed to establish its own power legitimacy in German foreign policy. The United States had pressed for enlarging NATO's out-of-area domain for international interventions and had suggested that military operations could be established 'with or without a UN mandate' (Peters 2004:392). This positioned Germany close to the US regarding a policy for the Balkans. Thus the Kosovo war provided the context in which that legitimacy became effective.

When George W. Bush became America’s new president in January 2001 Berlin revealed a growing unease with the foreign policy of the new administration, for its new tone, its disinclination towards multilateralism and its increasing unilateralism towards issues like the International Criminal Court, climate change and a new missile defence system. Various German politicians took a critical view of America’s ‘new paradigm of hegemonic unilateralism: the preservation of unipolarity’ (Rudolf 2005).

6.3.3.2. The impact of September 11, 2001

The terror attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 produced ‘the end of the transatlantic routine’ (Voigt 2002) with implications for transatlantic relations and the German-American partnership. What had already started after the Cold War with the widening of the American security perimeter and the importance of outer European regions was intensified after September 11. The Bush Administration consolidated its preference for unilateralism, floating coalitions and a doctrine of preventive war. This amounted to a paradigm change in US foreign policy (Ikenberry 2002), and an implicit redefinition of America’s institutional commitments and alliances. By sidestepping the use of NATO Charter’s article 5 on collective defence to launch a joint response to the terrorist attacks, the Bush administration was quick in restating its initial propensity towards unilateralism. NATO now lost its vital role in U.S. security policy and European partners had to re-establish their own security priorities in the transatlantic alliance.

Reacting to the attacks on America, Chancellor Schröder stated in a speech before the Bundestag on 12 September 2001 that September 11 was not only a war against America, but against the whole civilized world. He pledged Germany’s

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236 'While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting pre-emptively.'
‘unlimited solidarity’ with its ally. But a week later he was quick to assert that this solidarity came at a price. ‘Our alliance obligation is consistent with a right, and this right is called information and consultation. As Germans and Europeans we want to assure unlimited solidarity with the United States regarding all necessary measures. I stress: Germany is ready to take risks – also military ones – but not to participate in adventures.’

The terrorist attacks did not shake policy-makers’ convictions over Germany’s normative approach. But they changed the understanding of the international framework in which this normative power could work. The Chancellor saw this as an opportunity for Germany to play the more assertive role he advocated since 1998. September 11 reinforced Schröder’s idea that German foreign policy had to become more utilitarian and consequential. In a speech before the Bundestag on 11 October 2001 on the situation in Afghanistan he stated, ‘I believe there are reasons for us to change the formulation and implementation of our foreign policy in one or the other part, (...), reasons which have to do with Germany’s position in the future’ (Schröder 2001). For Schröder, ‘September 11, 2001 changed the world. For Germany this meant the end of one phase of German post-war history. In an unprecedented way, Germans had to face their new responsibility and they have done so’ (Schröder 2002a:23113).

The German reaction to September 11 also highlighted the different approaches between the Chancellor and the foreign minister. While both agreed in their condemnation of the attacks, for Fischer September 11 was a ‘defining moment’, one which could ‘mark the beginning of a new era of cooperation and multilateralism’ (Fischer 2001b). Acknowledging it as one of America’s greatest achievements to have stayed in Europe in 1945, Fischer considered the transatlantic relations remained ‘the central pillar for peace and stability in the 21st century’. The problem was not ‘too much US’ but ‘too little Europe’ (Fischer 2002a). For Europeans to have a clear vision of their role in the world the main challenge was to create ‘more Europe’, not ‘less US’. In a Bundestag debate on transatlantic relations on 27 June 2002, Fischer stated that ‘without transatlantic relations in Europe (...) Germany would assume a role which we should not even strive for. This would put too much strain on us. The US provides not only a global balance; it also provides a balance in Europe up to this day’ (Fischer 2002b:24716). For Germany this meant it should follow a ‘policy of wise self-restraint’

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237 Speech by Gerhard Schröder before the Bundestag regarding the attacks on the United States, 12 September 2001. Plenarprotokoll 14/186.
238 Speech by Gerhard Schröder before the Bundestag regarding the attacks on the United States, 19 September 2001. Plenarprotokoll 14/187.
(Fischer 2001a), not the policy recommendation the Chancellor was to follow in the coming months.

6.3.3.3. The disagreement over Iraq

The disagreement over Iraq was not the beginning but the culmination of a series of attempts undertaken by Germany to redefine its relationship with the U.S. It was the most visible episode of disagreement and it revealed the limits of Germany’s alliance loyalty and the will to emancipate from Washington. The dispute over America’s policy regarding Iraq and the possibility of war marked the beginning of Berlin’s open contestation of American foreign policy. It produced a ‘tectonic fissure in transatlantic relations’ reinforcing the already existing ‘polarization between Berlin-Paris and Washington-London’ (Schwarz 2004:558).

After January 2002, when Bush first made public America’s new preventive and pre-emptive strategy to combat international terrorism, and suggested that Iraq, as one of the ‘axis of evil’ states was a target for military action, reluctance emerged in Berlin towards continuing German support for Washington’s war on terror. Even so, Berlin signalled that it would not interfere in Washington’s moves on Iraq. This, the Americans argue, was the agreement that came out of the Schröder-Bush meeting in May 2002. American military action against Iraq would not happen before the German election in September, thus Iraq need not become a campaign issue in Germany. But in late spring the German government adopted a pro-active stance against a potential military US engagement in Iraq. By stating that Germany would not participate in ‘military adventures’, Schröder presented an anti-war stance which paved the way for a growing anti-Americanism in Germany, exploiting a deep-seated public scepticism towards American military interventions. While this had obvious electoral appeal, it left little room for diplomatic manoeuvring.

239 Germany’s criticism of America and its call for more equal treatment were not new. In a speech at Harvard University in June 1972 Chancellor Willy Brandt called upon the US to treat Europe as a ‘partner of equal rank’. However, the international and the German domestic context were then very different, and such a claim after German unification and the end of bipolarity caused a different reaction in Washington. Brandt speech quoted in Bundestag debate 15 March 2001 on the future of transatlantic relations, Plenarprotokoll 14/158, p. 15364.
240 However, a possible German opposition to attacking Iraq was discussed already in November 2001. See Michael Naumann, ‘Ein Krieg wider Willen, Mit Amerika gegen den Terrorismus, aber nicht gegen den Irak: Die deutsche Bündnistreue hat ihre Grenzen’, Die Zeit, 8 November 2001.
242 This is why Bush took it personally when, at the height of the electoral campaign during the summer, Schröder made his opposition to the war public, apparently violating the verbal agreement.
In an interview on 9 August 2002 the Chancellor regretted that ‘consultations over when and how but also over if did not take place’, and therefore ‘one has to keep freedom of action to take decisions in one’s own interest, in the German interest, when these decisions are due.’\(^{243}\) Shortly before elections, on 13 September Schröder stated before the Bundestag that ‘under my leadership Germany will not participate in a military intervention’ against Iraq.\(^{244}\) When most observers believed that his position was mere electoral tactic, Schröder pursued it after the second Red-Green coalition government took office. At a speech in Goslar, in Lower Saxony, on 21 January 2003, the Chancellor reiterated that ‘Germany will not support a [UN] resolution which legitimizes war.’\(^{245}\)

It seems unlikely that in the row over Iraq Schröder made a miscalculation regarding the reactions of Germany’s European neighbours, hoping that most countries would side with Berlin’s approach. Rather research shows that the Chancellor aimed to follow his unilateralist stance regardless of potential European disagreement and made no prior consultations with EU members to ensure a concerted position. This confirms the German government’s disregard for the norm of normative multilateralism and the Chancellor’s aim of pursuing a more national course. In that, Berlin’s opposition to the US led war in Iraq in 2003 was a consequence rather than a catalyst for Germany’s emancipation from Cold War constraints on German power.

Thus the most serious transatlantic crisis was principally a German-American crisis. The American administration pursued a strategy of ‘coalitions of the willing’, which amounted to a weakening of America’s own commitment towards traditional allies and alliances. Germany’s policies were more than merely reactive towards changes induced by President Bush. The Chancellor demanded more rights of consultation for Germany at the same time as he claimed that Germany would not participate in a war against Iraq even if the United Nations Security Council approved it in a resolution. The German-American crisis became a transatlantic crisis when French president Jacques Chirac joined Schröder in openly opposing Washington’s policy on Iraq in the fall of 2002.

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\(^{243}\) Schröder insisted on consultation rights, and argued the President had promised them himself. On the occasion of his visit to Germany, Bush in fact stated before the Bundestag on 23 May 2002, ‘Our response will be reasoned, and focused, and deliberate. (...) America will consult closely with our friends and allies at every stage.’ Remarks by the President to a Special Session of the German Bundestag, 23 May 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/print/20020523-2.html


\(^{245}\) Der Spiegel, 13, 24 March 2003.
Foreign minister Fischer's logic of justification for Germany's refusal to participate in the war against Iraq was not the logic of consequentiality but the logic of appropriateness of international actions. Opposing plans for a military attack on Iraq on the grounds that war would cause instability in the wider Middle East region, the foreign minister stated that only the UN had the international legitimacy and credibility to define and tackle new threats (Fischer 2002b). The foreign minister believed Germany should follow the norm of multilateral institutionalism and take the stability of the broader Middle East into account (Fischer 2002b). He justified Berlin's position as that of an ally forced to warn a friend who is about to make a mistake, as was the case of the US in Berlin's perspective (Fischer 2005c). It was the first time that Germany had been defiant of America's arguments, openly stating that Berlin was 'not convinced' about Washington's motives for military action against Iraq, as Fischer put it in early 2003 (Fischer 2003). His argumentation logic, however, would not have prevailed had the UNSC adopted a second resolution legitimising the use of force against Iraq.

Why did Germany oppose the US on Iraq? First, Germany had participated in two wars between 1999 and 2002, making it very difficult to undertake any additional military commitments. In 2002 Germany had about 8500 Bundeswehr soldiers stationed around the world, representing the second biggest contingent of troops stationed in peace missions abroad after the US. Secondly, a strong German pacifist and anti-US feeling existed in German society. The government believed that the majority of Germans would hardly have supported a third war involving the Bundeswehr in yet another offensive mission shortly after the Kosovo and Afghanistan wars. The near miss outcome of the vote of confidence in the Bundestag on 16 November 2001 on Germany's participation in the war in Afghanistan had shown how fragile Germany's support was, and convinced Schröder not to risk such a narrow Bundestag vote again. Thirdly, the government was disenchanted with what it saw as insufficient recognition for Germany's previous war and alliance efforts in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Germany's position at the side of the US from Kosovo to Macedonia and Afghanistan had shown Germany as a trustworthy ally which had grown up in terms of participation in military operations. Whereas until then the multilateralist alliance norm had been sufficient, Schröder now wanted recognition for Germany's new status in the alliance, that is, a 'right to information and consultation'

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246 However, it seems plausible that if a lack of military capability was the main reason it would have been presented as such to the US. Also, the amount of military participation expected from Germany was not clear.
247 The government's policy for a German military participation in the war against international terrorism in Afghanistan was approved by 336 of the 662 Bundestag members. The CDU and the FDP, four Green Party members and one SPD member voted against.
derived from alliance obligations, as he stated on 19 September 2001.

Finally, Germany was motivated by new identity dynamics. The split over the Iraq war was also a discussion over Germany’s post-unification identity in that it represented a step further in remaking German identity. It meant to transform the nature of Germany’s normative power and to emancipate foreign policy from previous constraints. If Kosovo had been an emancipation act in German domestic politics Iraq was an emancipation act in German-American relations.

This produced consequences for Germany’s position. Berlin’s opposition in the run-up to the Iraq war represented a departure from Germany’s traditional normative multilateralist diplomacy and the European-transatlantic articulation aspect of Germany’s foreign policy identity.248

First, Schröder risked sidestepping a traditional norm of German diplomacy, that of alliance loyalty. Berlin adopted almost the opposite position to that adopted four years earlier. While in the Kosovo war in 1999 alliance solidarity prevailed over international law, in Iraq questions of international legality initially prevailed over alliance commitments.

Secondly, German-French bilateralism had triumphed over German multilateralism. This new ‘bilateral unilateralism’ (Frankenberger and Nonnenmacher 2004) in early 2003 suggested that Schröder and Chirac saw themselves as the new ‘leadership duo’ of Europe (Schwarz 2003:23). Bilateral relations with France predominated over Germany’s traditional European multilateralism and furthermore Iraq served to revitalise the German-French relationship. Ironically, this crisis highlighted the dwindling legitimacy of the German-French motor. The bilateral motor was only efficient as long as it did not raise suspicion of a joint hegemony and was seen as empowering the integration process.

Thirdly, European unity was another casualty of Germany’s position. Berlin did not consult with its European allies - at a time when it was claiming more consultation rights from Washington, in a unilateralist claim for multilateralism. The government also seemed not to try to get other Europeans on board until the end of 2002. When France finally sided with Berlin no joint effort was made to enlarge the anti-war coalition towards a common European stance. But by then a fierce division had already settled down between a group

248 Not everyone agrees that this represented a foreign policy change. See P. Rudolf, ‘German Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Relations’, SWP Working Paper, FG4, 2004. H. Maull claims Germany’s position on Iraq reflected its aversion to the use of military force, one of the civilian power concepts’ main characteristics. As I have stated elsewhere in the thesis, German foreign policy will not only lose its continuity when it loses its aversion to military force. The change in various other characteristics of German foreign policy continuity such as multilateralism and alliance loyalty make the claim for continuity difficult to sustain.
led by Germany and France, and a pro-American group made up of eighteen countries.\textsuperscript{249} One would have expected Germany to make a strong effort to get general support within CFSP, but its position was anything but Europeanist, and challenged European unity. Instead of arguing for a European stance together with France and Britain, as was to be the case later in dealing with Iran over its nuclear ambitions Berlin was the main initiator in polarizing the EU into Europeanists and Atlanticists. Germany hindered the development of CFSP which it had always advocated. Without apparent quid pro quos Berlin loosened the institutional frameworks, the essential foundation of its foreign policy.

Fourthly, in the EU, Germany grew increasingly isolated in the run up to the war in March 2003. While not the only culprit, it did not manoeuvre diplomatically to prevent the falling out between EU members. At the time when many Eastern European countries were preparing to join the EU and NATO as full members, the transatlantic rift catapulted them into Washington’s arms. Berlin, once the main advocate of Eastern European integration, was now pro-active in attracting Russia into the anti-Bush coalition. Eastern European countries felt alienated and insecure by the conjectural alliance between Chirac, Schröder and Putin. This momentary triangular alliance did not produce benefits for Germany’s European policy. When the war against Iraq began on 20 March 2003, Germany’s traditionally multilateralist foreign policy had the backing only of France, Belgium and Luxemboug.

Fifthly, the transatlantic crisis became also a European Union crisis for it highlighted the lack of European consensus and the limits of the German-French EU leadership. The constitutional crisis in 2005, set out by the rejection of the French and Dutch referenda on the European Convention were a blow to the German-French attempt at EU leadership. Both crises signalled the limits of Germany’s and France’s attempts at transforming Europe into a counterweight to the US.

Finally, Berlin’s position weakened its possibility for a permanent UNSC seat, and not only because the US withdrew its support. The implicit lack of interest in international law, i.e. SC resolutions, suggested that Germany considered the UNSC irrelevant – at least as long as Germany itself was not a permanent member. Such a

\textsuperscript{249} A letter of support for Washington’s position was published by eight European countries which sided with the U.S. in this emerging transatlantic rift, eight days after the German-French Elysée Treaty anniversary. This letter was signed by Britain, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal and Spain, and was published in Wall Street Journal on 30 January 2003. On 6 February 2003 another ten European countries, some of them NATO candidates, signed a letter supporting Washington. The reason for the letters was twofold. First, they feared that antagonising the U.S. could weaken the US security engagement in Europe, which they deemed essential for Europe’s and their own security. Secondly, they wanted to send a signal that they opposed perceived attempts of German-French hegemony on the continent, both in terms of political leadership and what seemed to develop into German-French hubris.
position was all the more paradoxical considering that at the same time Berlin was insisting on becoming a permanent SC member. By indicating that France, Russia and Germany, which was a non-permanent UNSC member in 2003-2004, would block a second UN resolution authorising the use of force against Iraq, Germany was contributing to the issue being withdrawn from the UN institutional framework altogether.

Taken together, these factors amount to a weakening of Germany’s normative power, brought about by a departure from alliance norms and the articulation of European and transatlantic affairs. The Chancellor seemed to miscalculate the key role Germany played in holding together the Euro-Atlantic area’s two vital international institutions, the Atlantic Alliance and the EU. By initiating a revisionist attempt of Germany’s position in each of them Berlin wasted valuable political and institutional capital, which handled differently could have raised German influence in both institutions at a much lower cost.

Schröder believed that enlarging Germany’s margin of manoeuvrability entailed loosening the traditional policy of linkage between allies and policy issues. In that sense, he revitalized relations with Russia, and did so outside the wider transatlantic strategic relation. At the height of the transatlantic crisis in 2003, Berlin seemed therefore closer to Moscow (and Paris) than Washington, joined by the aim of a counter-hegemonic coalition against the U.S. ‘Unable to balance American military power, France, Germany, Russia, and China created a coalition to balance American soft power by depriving the United States of the legitimacy that might have been bestowed by a second UN resolution’ (Nye 2003).

The transatlantic divide over the war in Iraq represented an unsuccessful critical juncture for German diplomacy which failed to widen Berlin’s margin of political manoeuvrability and negotiating power. Schröder’s aim to transform the nature of German power and Berlin’s need for recognition (Geltungsbedürfnis) was not acknowledged by its allies. In transatlantic relations, instead of enhancing its international status Germany lost influence (Gloannec 2004). Germany contributed to the worse NATO crisis since its creation, damaged the German-American relationship by opening a precedent of alliance disloyalty. The German government threw away valuable trust capital which the FRG had painstakingly accumulated after 1949. This raised doubts over Germany’s credibility as a reliable ally and weakened its source of normative power. In this transformed multilateralism, the price to pay for a unilateralist policy was the weakening of Germany’s normative power and ‘the political power re-
socialisation of German foreign policy’ (Hellmann 2005).

6.4. The Merkel government and bilateral relations

When Angela Merkel became Chancellor in November 2005, the conceptual framework she envisaged for her country was significantly different from that of her predecessor. Rebuilding the transatlantic relationship and regaining the dynamic of European integration were the main objectives of the grand coalition government.\(^{250}\) To achieve this Merkel had to restore Germany’s traditional linkage diplomacy between the German-French relationship, embedded in the European Union, and the transatlantic partnership, where Germany would once again become Washington’s main partner. Berlin would re-emphasise its reflexive multilateralism and work towards strengthening the Euro-Atlantic community within a liberal constitutional order. This coordination imperative was stated by Merkel in February 2005 before she became Chancellor, ‘Germany has to align its foreign policy to four coordinates: ‘Germany’s efficiency’, ‘European integration’, ‘transatlantic alliance’ and ‘workable international community’. Then we can represent German interests as a reliable partner. On the other hand, a policy which balances between multilateralism, bilateral initiatives and unilateral action (...) would not represent German interests’ (Merkel 2005).

Merkel’s conception of Germany’s place in international politics is an interesting combination of ideas of Konrad Adenauer, Helmut Kohl and Joschka Fischer. From Adenauer and Kohl, Merkel inherited the importance of European integration combined with the transatlantic relationship. Influenced by Fischer, Merkel conceptualises the Middle East in a similar fashion, the need for a strategic vision which emphasises the region as a fundamental challenge for Germany and the European Union. In this the search for stability in the Middle East will decisively influence the future of transatlantic relations, and the European Union’s international role. The Merkel government grasped the strategic importance of this region when Germany decided to participate in the UN military mission in Lebanon after the Israel-Hezbollah war in the summer of 2006, and when the German EU presidency in the first half of 2007 made efforts to revive the international quartet for the Middle East.

6.4.1. The German-French realignment

As Germany becomes a more vocal international actor and as CFSP progresses, it is possible that German and French interests will become less and not more convergent. The German-French opposition to the U.S. over the Iraq war should not be seen as the result of a joint German-French foreign policy vision. Rather we are likely to see cases where German and French interests coincide, and where this can initiate a common European position; at the same time, though, situations will occur where interests will diverge, making a European position more difficult. It is plausible that the Franco-German relationship will ‘persist as the alliance of first resort’, but the future shape of the EU, with a shrinking core and an enlarging periphery ‘will tend to reduce an exclusive reliance on ‘the privileged partnership’ (Paterson 2005:272).

At the EU Brussels summit in December 2005 Angela Merkel was praised for her mediating role in solving the financial deadlock over the EU budget, and for showing German willingness in recapturing the aim of institutional deepening and solving the constitutional crisis. In 2006 not much dynamism could be expected from the traditional duo, given that France was then at the end of an era, with parliamentary elections in the spring of 2007, whereas Germany was at the beginning of a new one (Picaper 2006:35). But on a deeper level the German-French relation had been stagnant for years in putting forward joint initiatives for integration. The failed European constitution project had never been a German-French passion. Enlargement proceeded because of German insistence in the face of French reluctance. But although France has traditionally stood critically vis-à-vis America’s security involvement in Europe, it gains more from contextualising its approach with Germany than from attempting to play a more unilateral transatlantic policy. Thus the new French president, Nicolas Sarkozy has shifted the French approach after May 2007 towards a less anti-American position, but has not done so in a coordinated approach with Berlin.

The recent French proposal for a Mediterranean Union was initially a French reply in 2007 to the German initiative for a new Ostpolitik towards Central Asia. The German Chancellor agreed to the constitution of a Mediterranean Union in March 2008, but there should be no illusion as to any joint German-French leadership, since the Mediterranean is traditionally seen as a French area of interest. The more the European Union asserts its influence internationally, the less the German-French duo

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seems capable to act as the motor of integration.

6.4.2. The German-American rapprochement

Despite the transatlantic rift, Germany still remains America’s most important ally in continental Europe and plays a central role in shaping EU-U.S. relations. As a committed transatlanticist Merkel accepted Washington’s role as that of an ordering power rather than display pretensions of Germany as a new international power with order shaping capacities. The new Chancellor was aware of the key role Germany played in holding together the inner and intra-cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. From this linkage between transatlantic and European issues she defined the foreign policy strategy of the new coalition government together with foreign minister Frank Walter Steinmeier. The recovery of transatlantic relations and of the momentum of European integration were closely interconnected and had to be recovered in an all-encompassing strategy to re-establish trust within the Euro-Atlantic area. This rested on the strategic conviction that Europe could not be created as a counterweight to the U.S.

Despite the seemingly Kohlean approach the Merkel government was freer in its dealings with Washington. Merkel stated during her first trip to the US in January 2006 that she tolerated no human rights abuses, and opposed the American prison at Guantánamo Bay. The government has also not held back from criticizing U.S. policy on Iran or the U.S. nuclear treaty with India. But the Chancellor has not exploited this criticism to her advantage, nor did she display it excessively in the public domain but rather through private telephone conversations with the president or personal meetings between political leaders of both countries (Kamp and Masala 2006).

Almost two and a half years after the Grand Coalition came to power in November 2005 the Merkel government has worked to recover the transatlantic alliance and re-establish a German-French partnership that is not seen as an attempt at counter weighing American power. Considering the seriousness of both transatlantic and European crises the Grand Coalition has managed to recover a considerable margin of political manoeuvre both in its bilateral relations and within the Euro-Atlantic area. More decisively, Germany’s two special relationships have reached an unprecedented normalisation in that Germany feels increasingly less inhibited to use either ideational, normative or consequentialist justifications for its actions, not because it wants power parity but because the policy situation actively demands one particular option.
6.4.3. Re-establishing the Euro-Atlantic area

The Merkel government grabbed the ‘window of opportunity’ presented by weakened European leaderships between November 2005 and spring 2007 to underline the changes which would set the new government apart. This gave the new government the chance to present initiatives which reversed some of its predecessor governments’ policies. Thus during her first foreign trip as Chancellor Merkel made the symbolic gesture of visiting Paris and NATO headquarters on the same day, signalling that German-French and German-transatlantic relations were again equally important.

Thus far Merkel has managed to recover the alliance relationship with Washington. This has been achieved in 2006 and 2007 through her leadership role in the EU in restablishing close ties with Washington and promoting a common Euro-Atlantic liberal constitutional order, which will appeal to both the US and the European transatlanticists, and set aside the German flirtation of the ‘Europe-puissance’ concept of her predecessor. After the German-American row and Berlin’s relative isolation in Europe, the new Chancellor has managed to turn the bilateral relations favourably for Berlin, upgrading Germany’s role in transatlantic relations.

In the EU the Merkel government has rebuilt Berlin’s relations with central and eastern European countries, taking their interests again more into consideration. This was well received by most, even if Poland tried to exploit this by an anti-Russian and anti-German diplomacy in 2006 and 2007. And it re-established a good working relation with the European Commission, and its president, José Manuel Durão Barroso, whom Merkel had supported in his candidacy for the post in 2004.

In her pragmatic approach the chancellor has maintained a close economic and energy security cooperation with Moscow, but has distanced Berlin from the political unilateral overtures her predecessor had pursued. In 2006 foreign minister Steinmeier put forward plans for a new European Ostpolitik with regard to Russia and Central Asia which were partially negotiated during Germany’s EU presidency (Kempe 2007).

With the present government Germany has entered a more pragmatic phase of its emergence as a European power through a foreign policy of ‘self-confident modesty’ in the words of foreign minister Steinmeier (Steinmeier 2006). It softened the pressure of reconciling integration deepening with institutional enlargement and the automatism of the ever increasing Europeanization of the Kohl years. And it rejected the emancipation politics of the Schröder years, which had risked eroding the traditional pillars of a
successful foreign policy, reaffirming Germany’s imperative towards Euro-Atlantic coordination. At the same time a more assertive German foreign policy is taking shape through a strengthening of the instruments of multilateralism; while Berlin maintains a highly multilateral policy approach with other countries and powers, it is gradually enlarging its typically Europeanised policy with a more power political understanding.

6.5. Conclusion: German foreign policy in Euro-Atlantic relations

The period from 1997 to 2007 has witnessed a strategic rebalancing in Germany’s position in Europe and the wider Euro-Atlantic area, affecting bilateral relations with France and the United States. Negotiating compatibility between the German-French and the German-American relationships was always more than mere bilateralism; it was also about the compatibility between European integration and the Atlantic Alliance. When Berlin and Paris revitalised their relation and jointly opposed America during the transatlantic crisis, this caused the first serious foreign policy crisis of the European Union. Thus the legitimacy of the German-French motor is decisive for the manoeuvring of Berlin’s and Paris’ diplomacies and for the EU’s attempt at forging a European foreign policy.

From the perspective of German foreign policy, the Iraq war was a critical juncture in transatlantic relations which, together with Schröder’s willingness towards emancipation created the context for change. This occurred through a discursive reframing of Germany’s ‘enlightened self-interest’ and a renegotiation of status in bilateral relations. This change did not represent a ‘return to traditional power politics’, but the enlargement of the uses of normative power and the adaptation of Germany’s foreign policy pattern which increasingly combines a logic of appropriateness with a logic of expected consequences. Germany has become a more independent player in the transatlantic relationship, and its position within the German-French relationship has suffered a significant qualitative change.

Germany’s actions have become increasingly pragmatic and consequentialist towards its two partners. Whereas previously the aim for more power parity was often done at the expense of Germany’s normative power, the Merkel government has recovered normative power and is pursuing German interests determinedly through additional power attributes. This has located Germany in a new position. That it has become the stronger player in the German-French relationship is in part an inevitable consequence of the end of the Cold War, but also the result of a remaking of identity.
Institutional reform went ahead according to Germany’s design of double majority voting as stipulated in the reformed Treaty of Lisbon signed in December 2007 and awaiting member states’ ratification.

If during the 1990s the Balkans was the testing ground for NATO alliance cohesion, it now is the Middle East and how to deal with conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Israel-Palestinian problem and, more decisively, the problem of Iran, are also challenging the future of the Atlantic Alliance. While the Merkel government has contributed to the recovery of intra-alliance normality, alliance members do not share the same interests and strategic perceptions. This affects NATO but it also affects the European Union’s nascent foreign policy. In this sense, both German-American and German-French relations remain vital partnerships for German foreign policy and the Euro-Atlantic area the privileged context for Germany’s normative power to be complemented by a more pragmatic approach to foreign policy identity.
CHAPTER 7: The international dimension of German foreign policy: the quest for a permanent UN Security Council seat

7.1. Introduction: Germany as an international player: From reluctance to assertiveness

The international dimension of German foreign policy can be illustrated in the unusual perseverance with which successive German governments have pursued the claim for a permanent seat in the Security Council (SC) of the United Nations. Support for a UNSC reform and a permanent seat has been the policy of Chancellor Kohl’s foreign minister Klaus Kinkel, Chancellors Gerhard Schröder and Angela Merkel. In September 1992 Germany first stated its wish to become a permanent member of the Security Council. The new foreign minister Klaus Kinkel presented this goal before the annual meeting of the 47th UN General Assembly. The SC was considered by many states an anachronism for its outdated composition and need for a structural reform. Germany was willing to participate in this process, and if the SC’s composition would be changed, Germany would ‘make known [its] intention to seek a permanent seat’ (Kinkel 1992).

This announcement represented a departure from foreign policy objectives under foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher who had never advocated a permanent SC seat for Germany (Genscher 1997). While it appeared, at first, a decision of mere institutional importance, aiming for permanent Security Council membership suggested a major shift in Germany’s wider foreign policy pattern, international strategy and identity. The goal in itself became representative of the change in German post-unification foreign policy for it involved a fundamental choice about Germany’s international identity, with implications for the country’s future international standing.

Until the 1990s Germany was not perceived as a major global foreign policy actor either by its neighbours and allies or by itself. Non-military involvement in world politics was founded on a notion of responsibility for maintaining good diplomatic relations with countries in Asia, Africa and Central and South America and on promoting economic development. Thus German foreign policy outside of Europe and North America was founded mainly on development policy and diplomatic and

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economic cooperation. In former foreign minister Genscher’s perception, Germany’s presence in the world was a question of responsibility, not of the projection of global power (Genscher 1990 and 1997:1016).

In contrast, Kinkel’s wish for Germany to aspire to permanent SC membership touched upon the category of world power. But Germany lacked a benign great power tradition and this raised the question of whether Germany had the necessary global foreign policy strategy which a permanent seat implied. Such a strategy would have to rest on solid principles and interests, with decision-makers aware of the policy consequences of such a global strategy. To be operational it would need the capacity to mobilise resources and produce results for long term policies. By simply announcing its wish for permanent membership and stating that it was ready to assume global responsibilities, Germany had not assured others that it had weighed the consequences of supporting a greater international role, and that it had the means to become a global player, let alone a global power. On the contrary, when the proposition was first put forward, Germany was still constitutionally prevented from participating in global peace operations and no experience of a military role in distant places. In other words, to become a global power Germany would have to make constitutional changes and learn to think of foreign policy in world category terms and act as a country with global interests, instead of merely employing a continuous rhetoric of global interests. This also presupposed that Germany knew what kind of player it wanted to be and what it wanted to be recognised as.

This chapter presents a norm-based analysis of Germany’s foreign policy identity in the international dimension of German diplomacy. The case study of Germany’s pursuit of a permanent SC seat emphasizes Germany’s new utilitarian multilateralism, and the new narrative of shared meaning which was introduced into the German foreign policy discourse. It examines to what extent Germany’s international behaviour has been conducted by principles of ‘normative multilateralism’, that is, a predisposition to act normatively (Manners 2002) and identifies when Germany has resorted to what can be termed ‘pragmatic or utilitarian multilateralism’, or unilateralism as a predisposition to act on the basis of a purely national interest approach. The chapter addresses three sets of questions. The first one concerns empirical questions, and examines the actions undertaken by the Kohl, Schröder and Merkel governments. The second set is linked to strategic questions, such as the notion of global power and implications for Germany. The last set raises questions about constructivist assumptions and German behaviour.
With regard to the empirical dimension, how successful was Germany's UN policy between 1997 and 2007? Which means were at the disposal of German politicians to pursue these goals? What role did German representatives play in the UN Working Group on Security Council reform? Were German diplomats pro-active or passive, assertive or cautious, and strategic in their handling of the issue? Was there domestic consensus on the goal of permanent membership? What distinguishes the Merkel government from the Schröder and Kohl governments in its bid for a permanent seat? Why did Germany not pursue a common EU seat? Why did it pursue a campaign for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council knowing that it never had much chance of succeeding (Grant 2005)?

The second set of questions relates to the wider foreign policy pattern and the strategic implications. Was the quest merely a question of prestige and international power recognition or did it echo a new will to play a greater role in world affairs? Did Germany's existing diplomacy justify a permanent UNSC seat? Or did policy-makers pursue the seat for the purpose of legitimising the increasing number of military peacekeeping operations, and a strategy of projecting multilateralism more assertively towards an outer-European arena? How would a permanent membership be useful?

The last set of questions addresses the constructivist framework used along the thesis and relates it to the case study. Have new norms been created in the foreign policy discourse? Have conflicting norms emerged concerning Germany's discursive and implementation practices? If identity functions as a key indicator of political change has this affected Germany's position on Security Council reform? Does Germany aspire to become a global power in the traditional sense pursuing its own interest according to the utilitarian logic of expected consequences (March and Olsen 1998)? Or would it continue to follow a logic of appropriateness, even if it became a permanent member (March and Olsen 2004)? Finally, is this representative of a larger foreign policy change in Germany?

The chapter is divided into five parts. The first part presents the arguments behind Germany's bid. First, it examines the normative reasons, following the logic of appropriateness. Secondly, it suggests utilitarian reasons, following the logic of expected consequences. The second part of the chapter then presents Germany's position, and how the Kohl, Schröder and Merkel governments have dealt with the issue. The third part examines the incongruence between advocating a permanent German seat and a European foreign policy. The fourth part focuses on international reactions, such as the American and French positions, and Italy's opposition, in the
context of the wider Security Council reform proposals. In its last part, the chapter analyses conflicting norms between Germany’s prospective new international role and contextualises this with Germany’s position in Europe.

7.2. The quest for a permanent UN Security Council seat

7.2.1. Logics of appropriateness and consequentiality

There are two ways of understanding Germany’s logics for political action. The first is to see it as normative multilateralism which rests on assumptions of appropriateness for political actions. Germany participates in the international community in a responsible manner projecting its normative power through foreign policy decisions. For that it needs to become a permanent member of the Security Council to fulfil increasing international obligations and ensure respect for international law.

The second interpretation is to see Germany’s actions as a sign of a utilitarian multilateralism (or even unilateralism) on the basis of actions taken because of expected consequences. For Germany to achieve new international status as a global power, permanent SC membership would be the best power enhancing mechanism. In this case, Germany’s position revealed its ambition to exercise an assertive role as a global power to emulate other, ‘normal’ powers, and be treated by them as a peer state. The next section sums up the arguments by distinguishing between normative and utilitarian reasons for Germany’s quest.

7.2.2. Logic of appropriateness and normative argumentation

Among the normative reasons for Germany to become a permanent SC member, five seem plausible. First, Germany feels ready to assume duties and responsibilities on a global scale. Germany’s participation in a number of UN peace operations reflects its stance as a reliable multilateral partner willing to engage pro-actively to ensure international peace and security and oppose human rights violations. Permanent membership would ‘induce Germany to grow into a responsible global role’ (Kaiser 1993/94:1016).

Secondly, in the eyes of its policy-makers, Germany would contribute to strengthening international norms of multilateralism. They see the United Nations as the
international organisation that activates Germany's normative foreign policy conceptions, through a multilateral framework for policy-making. As a permanent member the country could reinforce its tradition of 'normative multilateralism' in European politics, and translate this into effective policy-making on a global scale.

Thirdly, permanent membership would enhance the legitimacy of the Security Council. On the one hand, Germany enjoys a fairly unproblematic colonial past which would allow it to establish (or maintain) good relations with previously colonized states since it had 'no positions of power or zones of influence to protect' (Kinkel 1996a:20). On the other hand, it would become a non-nuclear permanent member, thus enlarging the Security Council’s legitimacy ‘by separating nuclear status from international influence’ (Kaiser 2004).

Fourthly, Germany would respond to what it sees as increasing expectations from a high number of member states, which, for the aforementioned reasons, see Germany as a country inclined to take other countries’ concerns more into consideration than the old SC permanent members.

Finally, a change of Germany’s position within the UN would represent a way to overcome Germany’s war past on an international scale, and to render the ‘enemy state clauses’ still contained in the UN Charter devoid of meaning. According to articles 53, 77 and 107 of the Charter, countries which were aggressor states during the Second World War were enemies of the signatories of the Charter. Contrary to Japan, Germany has not campaigned actively for the removal of these clauses, for it feels that they became obsolete when the two German states joined the UN in 1973. German representatives have not abandoned the issue but sidelined it and expect the articles to be removed as a natural consequence of a Charter revision.

7.2.2.1. Normative reasons against a German permanent seat

The most significant argument to oppose Germany’s intention on normative grounds is that it would have to learn to think and act as a world power. It would not be sufficient to increase financial and material resources. The political cost would be a stronger leadership willing to shoulder greater international responsibilities and the definition of a global foreign policy strategy that such a new role implied.

Secondly, this would over-stretch Germany's post-war identity and submit it to a

254 They are articles 53, 77 and 107 of the UN Charter. As a SC reform the removal of these clauses requires a charter amendment. For the articles see Appendix on p. 234.
sudden change from an Europeanised identity to the role of a global power, affecting Germany’s position within the European Union, Germany’s most important foreign policy arena and identity source.

Thirdly, a German seat by definition prevents a European seat. Contrary to the logic of the EU which strives towards converging member states’ with European interests, permanent SC membership reflects the willingness and capabilities of national positions only. How can Germany, simultaneously, encourage a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to give the EU its voice in international politics and, in the United Nations, argue for a purely German seat? That both aims were contradictory showed the wider incoherence and lack of an overall German foreign policy strategy.

Fourthly, by wanting a seat like France and Great Britain, Germany helped perpetuate traditional great power politics. Striving for the permanent seat with a possible veto power showed that Berlin would use it in a similar manner as the other permanent five members, as a political tool for blocking decisions, or influencing non-permanent members’ positions before a vote is taken (Nahory 2004). The veto power is also an invitation for permanent members to go against rather than ensuring compliance with international law if they believe it serves their interests. This reflects a hierarchical vision which goes against much of Germany’s foreign policy approach of normative multilateralism.

Fifthly, Germany’s ideational or normative attractiveness towards the outside world could be affected as a consequence of decreasing capabilities to materialize its promises to the international community. Its international credibility as a state which can deliver would be compromised, if it presented too ambitious an agenda with no follow-up deeds.

Finally, by joining the SC as a permanent member it does not follow that Germany could contribute to the strengthening and effectiveness of international norm application, and to the UN as a whole, any more than as an occasional SC member since a permanent seat was not a *sine qua non* for participating effectively in international lawmaking. The Schröder-Fischer government participated in codifying international law through advocating the constitution of the International Criminal Court, and made an important contribution to multilateralizing international relations by leading the initiative for the Petersberg conference in Bonn on the reconstruction of post-war Afghanistan in December 2001. Both cases happened *without* Germany being a permanent member.

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255 This was one of former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt’s arguments against a German seat, as quoted in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, ‘Zurückhaltung aus Amerika’ 24 September 2004.
permanent SC member.

7.2.3. The logic of consequentiality and utilitarian argumentation

There are also utilitarian reasons concerning Germany’s aspiration to a permanent seat. First, as the third largest world economy and third contributor to the UN budget, Germany sees itself as a rightful candidate to participate in the decision-making process of the world’s most global international institution. The former German ambassador to the UN, Gunter Pleuger, stated in 2002 that it was only ‘appropriate’ that Germany should join the SC since to shape policy it was necessary to co-decide. ‘If you are not in the SC, you cannot co-decide. But if you are a member of the SC, you can introduce German policy, and if you represent it well, you may even do so successfully’ (Pleuger 2002).

Secondly, the increased number of UN operations involving the Bundeswehr showed that Germany was capable of participating in global politics. Germany increasingly made a linkage between its financial contributions, its participation in UN mandated peace operations and its demand for a permanent seat. The utilitarian aspect was obvious: because Germany has contributed, it had the legitimacy to ask for what it believed to be its rightful place in the international community. In 2004, Gernot Erler, deputy chairman of the SPD parliamentary group suggested that because Germany had accepted bigger responsibility in the Balkans and in Afghanistan, it could now reflect this in a reformed United Nations, implying that Germany had already shown why it deserved a new place in a new UN (Nass 2004).

The third argument is linked to the expected increase in power. A permanent membership would reinforce traditional state powers and perhaps give Germany the veto right, one of the attributes of a great power. Permanent membership was thus the ‘inevitable consequence’ of Germany’s increased power (Kaiser 1993/94) making it impossible for Germany to eschew its global responsibilities (Altenburg 1994). The recognition as a global power would give it a new status and rank in the international

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256 'With a share of 8.577% Germany is the third largest contributor followed by other EU partners - e.g. the United Kingdom (6.127%), France (6.030%) and Italy (4.885%). Together, the 27 member states of the EU contribute over a third of the overall UN budget.' Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations New York. [http://www.new-yorkun.diplo.de/Vertretung/newyorkvn/en/01/GermanyUNMission.html](http://www.new-yorkun.diplo.de/Vertretung/newyorkvn/en/01/GermanyUNMission.html)

257 Together, the United States, Japan and Germany provide half of the UN budget, with 22 percent, 19.5 percent and 8.7 percent, respectively.

258 Although in the various reform proposals of the last years, the issue of granting the veto to new permanent members is not consensual and there is not yet a final proposal on how to handle the question of the veto right.
community, with additional prestige and lead other states to court Germany for support, and be consulted by others in relevant decisions.

Fourthly, it could be argued that during the transatlantic crisis in 2003 another motivation for the Schröder government to pursue a permanent seat was the possibility of using the Security Council in the future to check American power. It was a fortunate coincidence for Berlin that it was a non-permanent SC member at the time managing to create the quasi-alliance between Germany, France, Russia and China in early 2003 which functioned as a blocking force against the United States’ policy in Iraq and hegemonic pretensions. A permanent seat would make that possibility less dependent on the attribution of the occasional non-permanent seat.

Finally, more than pursuing an apparently unrealistic seat for the European Union, a German seat could ensure German and European interests. In contrast to France or Great Britain Germany would be more suitable to ensure the inclusion of EU interests, since it has followed the integrationist stance in the EU more than any other of the big states, and could translate this experience into a reformed Security Council. And since it is not a nuclear power it would change the apparent rule for qualification as a permanent member.

7.2.3.1. Utilitarian reasons against a German permanent seat

The first utilitarian argument against a new German role in the SC is that it would be too costly. At the time the claim was pursued most vigorously the necessary increase in German foreign policy and defence expenditures worldwide could hardly be matched at a time of dwindling capabilities and resources. Germany’s financial capabilities and post-unification economy were declining, making it difficult to empower a global role financially (Hellmann and Wolf 2004). Diminishing resources would over-stretch Germany’s capabilities and lead to inefficiency and lack of success as a global foreign policy actor.

Secondly, there were political costs such as involvement in controversial military interventions. The fact that Schröder combined the Bundestag vote on Germany’s participation in the UN military mission in Afghanistan in November 2001 with a vote of confidence in his government shows the extent to which a greater
international role brought with it greater domestic political costs.²⁵⁹

Thirdly, Germany’s international credibility was on the line. There was only a gain in Germany assuming more responsibility if, as Tono Eitel, former German ambassador to the UN said in 1999, ‘the initiatives it makes in the SC are followed, if need be, by material deeds on the German part’ (Eitel 1999:130).

A fourth plausible reason was that a regional imbalance would emerge with permanent memberships of three European states. Geographically Europe was already well represented by Britain and France, and a logical consequence would be to give the European Union a seat. This has been Italy’s position not least because it would feel more empowered by a European seat and not as ‘left out’ as it would were Germany to get one. Rome even orchestrated a high profile campaign to obstruct German entry and find a new way of reforming the UNSC.

Finally, the problem of effective decision-making in the Security Council prevailed making it difficult to see how augmenting the number of its members would make it more efficient.

7.3. The positions of the Kohl, Schröder and Merkel governments: From normative multilateralism to pragmatic multilateralism

If these are the lines of argumentation regarding a German permanent SC seat, what have been the policies of the German governments? Between 1997 and 2007 three approaches can be identified in Germany’s position regarding UN SC reform and the aim of gaining a seat. While the position of foreign minister Kinkel lacked a wider government strategy, the Schröder government pursued the goal through a more coherent approach in itself. The present CDU-SPD coalition government under Chancellor Merkel has upheld the claim, albeit with less stamina.

7.3.1. The position of the Kohl government

In the first years after unification, German policy-makers had difficulty in translating their countries’ interest into a strategy. Germany only became a full UN member through unification, suggesting that before 1990 the UN was not a privileged arena for policy-making (Schwarz 2003). Domestic foreign policy discussions centred on the

scope of Germany's international role, its inhibition to lead a more assertive foreign policy and its reluctance in participating in out-of-area military operations. When foreign minister Klaus Kinkel first spelled out Germany's wish to become a permanent member of the Security Council before the General Assembly in September 1992, he stated that Germany would not take the initiative, but that in case the Security Council composition underwent reforms his country would put forward its desire for a permanent seat (Kinkel 1992). In 30 June 1993 Germany presented its position to the General Assembly. 'The Federal government is prepared to assume the responsibilities which permanent membership of the Security Council entails.'

Kinkel's approach to the membership bid was normative. Germany's increased international responsibility after unification meant that it could not just pay 'lip service' to the international community but had to be willing to assume greater international responsibility and use its membership in a restrained way, institutionally bound and through a 'culture of restraint' (Kinkel 1995). That the composition of the Security Council needed to be updated was, for Kinkel, 'a question of legitimacy, credibility and effectiveness' of the Council (Kinkel 1996b). His ministry supported the creation of one permanent and one non-permanent seat for each of the three large regions of the Third World, in addition to two new permanent seats for Germany and Japan, and a further non-permanent seat for the eastern European countries. Kinkel was not explicit on whether Germany's quest involved the right to a veto power but rather suggested elusively that Germany was 'willing to embrace any adjustment of the voting regulations, including the veto privilege, which the present permanent members are prepared to accept for themselves' (Kinkel 1996a:21).

While Kinkel's initiative was not much noticed at home, the foreign minister felt vindicated through the large support Germany received from a majority of UN member states. He often framed the argument for a seat as a response to the wishes and trust that the international community placed in Germany's maturity and political responsibility (Kinkel 1997). 'We want to become a permanent member of the Security Council', Kinkel stated. 'We do not stand in front of the door and try to run in, but we have - as I believe - the justified impression that this is more or less automatically approaching us. We have time. And we can afford to wait. We do not need to push. And I do not want to

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261 For the purpose of initiating work on UN reform resolution 48/26, 3 December 1993 created the Open-ended Working Group.
either.262

In the UN itself, Kinkel was supported by Tono Eitel, the German Ambassador to the UN who used multilateral diplomacy based on active engagement, and personal input to promote Germany’s readiness to ‘take on all responsibilities of a permanent member of the Security Council.’263 Eitel was more outspoken than the foreign minister when he stated that this should include the veto right for new permanent members which had to be equipped ‘with the same armour the other permanent members have’ (Eitel 1996).

Whereas the foreign minister was keen on campaigning for a German seat he did not pursue a seat for the European Union. While desirable, he had no illusions that neither France nor Great Britain would give up their membership, and furthermore, SC membership by an international organisation had not been envisaged by the UN Charter. It is also conceivable that the possibility of a European seat would have opened an avenue for the Chancellor to get involved, one of the few areas where Kinkel had managed to find a policy niche for himself.

In 1997 negotiations on the UN reform began in earnest both at the UN and in Germany. In January the Auswärtige Amt laid out its position regarding the Security Council reform before the Bundestag.264 It stated that Germany and Japan should be considered as potential candidates for a permanent seat in a SC reform aimed at strengthening the UN’s legitimacy, effectiveness and credibility. A well-balanced SC composition would be achieved through the increase of up to twenty-six permanent and non-permanent members (these last should get have the possibility of getting re-elected), thus avoiding the creation of a third category of SC members. Of the suggested five new permanent members, one each should come from Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean, and one seat for Germany and Japan. The four non-permanent members should come from the first three regions mentioned above, and one from Eastern Europe. The German government considered the abolition of the veto to be right, and the creation of a European seat as unrealistic, at the same time as it had no problem with the equity of the UNSC having three European members.

As a compromise solution the Kohl government was not opposed to the model of ‘permanent rotating regional seats’ to solve regional disputes over which state would

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best represent a region. While the veto right was not a goal as such, Germany expected equal treatment for any new permanent members, including the veto right. This proposal was in line with other proposals under discussion in the UN reform process negotiations.265

In March 1997, UN General Assembly president Razali Ismail put forward a reform proposal to change the Council in accordance with the new balance of global power in the 1990s. The Razali proposal suggested an increase of nine members, elevating the number of SC members to twenty-four. Of the nine, five should become permanent members, two from the industrialized countries and three from the developing regions. Of the four new non-permanent members, one each should come from the three developing regions and one from Eastern Europe.266 The proposal rejected an expansion of the veto right to new permanent members. Germany’s Ambassador to the UN, Gerhard Henze, tried to downplay its significance. ‘We have always made clear that we are not interested in the veto power itself’, Henze argued. ‘What we want is non-discrimination. That is to say, Germany should not have a lesser status compared to other permanent members of the Security Council.’267 But the Razali proposal, the first realistic proposal in years was not submitted to a vote, mainly because the US opposed outright expanding the SC to more than twenty-one members.

While within the UN the proposal was thus stalled, there were also domestic reasons which hindered the bid. Traditionally Germany has advocated a European permanent UN Security Council seat in the event of the reform of that institution. The Bundestag decision of 11 November 1992 indicated that position.268 Joining the UNSC had been Kinkel’s initiative, thus lacking overall assertiveness and wider government support.269 The foreign minister turned this into his ‘personal campaign’, which meant he was isolated within the government and unable to step up a lobbying campaign behind the scenes.270 This was his attempt to carve out for himself an area where he knew Kohl would not get actively involved making the Auswärtige Amt the protagonist in a domain where the Kanzleramt had little interest, and it gave Kinkel the opportunity to transform his limited margin of manoeuvrability on the European stage into more visibility on the international stage.

267 Ibid.
270 Interview with a German politician, in Berlin on 26 September 2000.
Before 1998 the bid was hardly discussed by any other German politician, mainly because it was considered a non-issue for most.\textsuperscript{271} Some colleagues in other ministries did not conceal their uneasiness, considering Kinkel’s claim ‘rather embarrassing’.\textsuperscript{272} In early March 1997, Development Minister Carl-Dieter Spranger publicly criticized Kinkel’s campaign, and accused the German Mission in New York of sending the ‘wrong signals’ about German policy and calling its approach ‘tasteless and ultimately counter-productive’.\textsuperscript{273}

Chancellor Kohl was less outspoken about Germany’s quest for a permanent SC seat. In May 1992, the month when Klaus Kinkel became Foreign Minister, Kohl said: ‘The question of a seat for Germany in the Security Council (...) is a question which does not worry me. For the moment, I feel very well represented by our partners, and particularly by the Europeans, of which France is a good example.’\textsuperscript{274} In January 1993, Kohl reiterated that the pledge for a permanent seat was not an issue of the moment, and only when reform negotiations in the UN started, would Germany deal with the question.\textsuperscript{275} The Chancellor acknowledged the rising expectations of others towards Germany and recognized that the UN was the appropriate institution to fulfil them. But Kohl never dropped a hint over a German permanent SC seat and was ‘very restrained’ on the issue.\textsuperscript{276}

Whereas Kohl accepted that Germany could play a larger role in the UN, he was not interested in a permanent seat because it did not fit his wider European vision of German foreign policy, and, considering Italy’s and Spain’s resistance, he felt uneasy about the consequences for European integration. In contrast to Kinkel the Chancellor was not searching for new identity indicators. The Euro-Atlantic area remained Kohl’s privileged domain for political action. Still, the rationale behind the same narrative was different: while formerly Germany sought refuge in a European rhetoric, after unification it turned into a more decisive protagonist in order to defend its interests more assertively, but always \textit{within} the given parameters.\textsuperscript{277} The Chancellor accepted

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{271} Interviews with German politicians in Berlin, September 2000.
\item \textsuperscript{272} Interview with a German politician in Berlin, September 2000.
\item \textsuperscript{274} Joint press conference given by Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterand during the 59th German-French consultations at La Rochelle on 22 May 1992, \textit{Politique Étrangère de la France}, May-June 1992, p. 72.
\item \textsuperscript{275} Chancellor Kohl on the occasion of a television interview with President Mitterand in Bonn jointly to the ZDF, TF1 and France 21 January 1993. \textit{Textes et Documents, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères}, January - February 1993, pp. 57-58.
\item \textsuperscript{276} Interview with Friedbert Pflüger, CDU, Berlin, 26 September 2000.
\item \textsuperscript{277} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
that ‘Germany was too big and had too large a claim on its conscience to abstain in the world’, but involvement should be limited to participation in UN peacekeeping operations (Schoenbaum and Pond 1996:186). Kohl felt uncomfortable with the question of a permanent membership and instead of openly supporting his foreign minister, Kohl distanced himself and let Kinkel pursue his goal.  

Thus during the period of the Kohl government Germany was unsuccessful in its bid. Until 1998 the desire for a permanent UNSC seat was an exception to the given identity parameters of Europeanism and Atlanticism, and pursued only by the foreign minister. It failed, because of bad international timing, generalised international opposition – which was not anti-German, per se - and because there was no underlying narrative to support it. The claim sat uneasily with Germany’s normative multilateralism. In light of this Kinkel’s repeated statements of a German ‘culture of restraint’, seemed more like a rhetorical device designed to allay fears of a new German predominance than a practical guideline by which he shaped the foreign policy of his ministry.

7.3.2. The position of the Schröder government

With the Schröder government, the aim of making Germany a permanent member took on a new dimension, and became the official government position with a more coordinated approach between the Chancellor’s office and the foreign ministry. The coalition programme of November 1998 stated that Germany would pursue a common European seat if feasible but it would also ‘use the opportunity’ of Germany’s admission as a permanent member of the UN Security Council ‘if a European seat [did] not appear feasible and if, at the same time, the Security Council [could] be reformed to achieve greater regional balance.’ The formula of the 2002 coalition programme of the second Schröder/Fischer was more assertive. In case the desired European seat did not materialize, Germany would ‘strive for’ its own seat.

Chancellor Schröder and foreign minister Fischer approached the issue differently. Whereas Schröder presented utilitarian justifications, Fischer sought normative ones. But the foreign minister had not always favoured a seat for Germany. In 1994 he had warned the Germans against a ‘return to a foreign policy with a militarist pillar’ where the ultimate goal of a “completely” sovereign Germany was to be among the world great powers, with a permanent seat in the UNSC, and with nuclear

278 Frankfurter Rundschau, 26 July 2004.
sovereignty (Fischer 1994:229). Considering that only Europe, not Germany had global interests, Fischer advocated that his country strive for the Europeanization of the British and French permanent seats.

Four years later, shortly before the parliamentary elections in September 1998, Fischer changed his position and argued for a German permanent seat. Speaking about the foreign policy of the Berlin Republic in June, he stated that he preferred a European seat, but a German seat would be the second best option (Fischer 1998a:94). In an interview with the German weekly Die Zeit Fischer, already foreign minister, suggested that although it went against the logic of European unification, a permanent seat for Germany and Japan made sense since both were non-nuclear countries and major economic powers (Fischer 1998b).

The foreign minister used the normative argument underlining Germany’s willingness to accept more responsibility in a reformed Security Council. Fischer’s vision for German foreign policy rejected any sort of unilateralism and was instead based on what he termed the ‘multitaleral imperative’ (Fischer 2000). This multilateral imperative was founded on ‘a world belonging to the politics of responsibility based not on hegemonic claims but on cooperation, solidarity and multilateralism’ (Fischer 2001). To ensure greater legitimacy of action, Fischer attempted to make the permanent five more accountable, proposing that the use of the veto be linked to a statement of reasons before the UN GA (Fischer 1999).

After the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, Fischer reinforced what he saw as the need to accelerate the reform of the UN and particularly the Security Council. Speaking before the UN General Assembly on 12 November, Fischer suggested that one of the consequences of the terrorist attacks was the need for a clear definition of the UN’s reform priorities, and a more representative and efficient SC, to make the UN more capable to act.

Given Fischer’s credentials as a ‘committed European’, it was paradoxical that he should lobby for a national seat, without attempting to work towards a European one. Germany did not follow a parallel strategy of combining both and limited its actions to rhetorical commitments to a European seat.

Soon after becoming Chancellor in October 1998, Gerhard Schröder began to introduce new accents into the Republic’s foreign policy discourse. He was assertive about Germany’s interests, stating that if his country were to become normal, it should act like any other country, in a self-confident manner. In his first major speech before the Bundestag after taking office, Schröder stated that ‘Germany will realize the
opportunity to become a permanent UNSC member, provided a European seat is not attainable’ (Schröder 1998). In a major foreign policy speech at the opening of the Berlin office of the German Society for Foreign Policy in September 1999, Schröder introduced a policy of ‘enlightened self-interest’ as a guiding principle for conducting foreign policy. Part of this enlightened self-interest was the linkage between Germany’s contribution to the UN and its aspiration to status promotion. Schröder underlined that Germany was ready to accept ‘responsibility commensurate with its contribution and political capacities’ in an enlarged Security Council (Schröder 1999a). A year later, in September 2000 the Chancellor set out the guidelines for German policy at the beginning of the new century, where he reiterated the efficiency argument, and the inclusion of the member states with the greatest performance in the Security Council adding that Germany was ready to assume more responsibility in that institution (Schröder 2000a). A few days later, before the 55th UN General Assembly in New York, Schröder stated his country’s readiness to assume responsibility, equivalent to a permanent seat in the SC (Schröder 2000b). The fact that it was the Chancellor himself speaking before the GA was also indicative of the importance he attached to Germany’s bid.279

To justify his more assertive stance, Chancellor Schröder introduced the concept of international parity as a new international norm into German political discourse. His desire to project onto the international stage a more self-confident Germany led him to seek parity with the other international powers, such as France and Britain, and aspire to the role they represented abroad, insisting on being treated by Washington ‘at eyelevel’ (‘auf gleicher Augenhöhe’) in the biggest international institution. This new norm of becoming a peer power shaped political actions, the pursuit of a permanent SC seat being only the most visible one in the international dimension of German diplomacy.

The discursive practice of both Fischer and Schröder shows that their motivations for a German seat diverged considerably. Whereas Fischer represented Germany’s post-war commitment to normative multilateralism Schröder made no secret of his wish to introduce a more utilitarian multilateralism. Fischer’s role changed significantly between 1998 and 2005. While initially he approached the issue reluctantly, the foreign minister grew into the role of an active advocate for a German permanent seat. And whereas initially the motivations in the first term of office seemed to coincide with Fischer’s wider vision of normative multilateralism, as opposed to

279 Former Chancellor Kohl, by contrast, has never addressed the GA’s annual meetings, revealing the lesser significance he attributed the GA.
Schröder’s more utilitarian understanding of it, in the second mandate Fischer’s stance evolved towards a more utilitarian reading of Germany’s role in the world. Their positions gradually converged, especially after the transatlantic crisis in 2003. The norm of international parity was embedded in a broader social discourse of ‘growing international responsibilities’ linked to more German self-confidence. It came to fruition since both the Chancellor and foreign minister managed to use arguments which were legitimated by this new political discourse (Checkel 2004).

At the height of the US-led war in Iraq (and Germany’s consistent opposition to it) Germany was a non-permanent member of the Security Council - i.e. from 2003 to 2004. The German-American disagreement over the war on Iraq in 2002-03 thus further highlighted the contradictions of Germany’s bid. The new norm of international parity was developing at the cost of embedded multilateralism in European and transatlantic diplomacy. Berlin’s stance was ambivalent. Schröder demanded a permanent SC seat for Germany and simultaneously declared that Germany would not participate in any military operation in Iraq even if legitimated by a second UNSC resolution. This signalled the government’s lack of interest in a legitimating role for the SC and more importantly revealed a departure from Berlin’s traditional multilateralism and transatlanticism. Why insist on permanent membership if Berlin stated a priori that some UNSC resolutions on such crucial issues as Iraq bore no relevance for its foreign policy with Germany?

On 24 September 2003, Schröder stated that ‘the Council must be reformed and enlarged. First and foremost, it must also include more representatives of the developing countries. Let me reiterate that in the context of such reform Germany is ready to assume greater responsibility’ (Schröder 2003:24). Pleuger stated a few days later before the GA that Germany believed that reform of the Security Council was ‘indispensable in order to maintain the credibility and legitimacy of the Council’s decisions.’ But ‘the legitimacy of the Security Council is based on its representativeness.’ Pleuger’s sustained his argument also on an arithmetical logic: In 1945 the UN had 51 members, eleven of which where SC members, adding up to ‘more than 20 per cent of the total membership’. ‘When the number of seats on the Security Council was increased from 11 to 15 in 1963, the United Nations had 112 Members’ (Pleuger 2003:24).

Germany’s bid for permanent membership gained momentum in 2004 as Berlin’s goal to become more assertive about obtaining a permanent seat coincided with the UN’s SC reform debate. After the Iraq debacle in 2003 Kofi Annan, the UN’s
General Secretary, became more forceful in pushing forward a United Nations reform to solve what he termed ‘the crisis of multilateralism’.280 For the German government this was viewed as a window of opportunity. Gernot Erler from the SPD considered it ‘foolish’ if Germany would not seek to obtain a seat then at a time when Germany’s standing in the international community was high.281 The government’s confidence ran so high in 2004 that it even considered striving for a seat in the event that the United States - whose support was now lukewarm, at most --did not explicitly support it.282 Foreign minister Fischer justified Germany’s claim as a response to Kofi Annan’s call for a UN reform after the Iraq war. ‘A multilaterally engaged country such as Germany could hardly have denied its participation’, argued Fischer. ‘Particularly after the Iraq war a [German] ‘no’ would have been wrong, because Iraq had shown that the UN is indispensable, and in need of reform’ (Fischer 2005b).

Schröder justified the claim in the following unconcealed terms of utilitarian multilateralism: ‘It would be irresponsible for us not to say now just exactly what we want’, which was understandable given that post-war reconstruction and cheque book diplomacy were Germany’s comparative advantages.283 Consequently, in the spring of 2004 the Chancellor presented Germany as a candidate for permanent membership to a domestic audience (Schröder 2004).284 He reiterated Germany’s candidature in the Bundestag on 25 March 2004. ‘Germany is ready to take on responsibility as a permanent member of the Security Council’, he stated at the end of a lengthy speech on the state of Germany for 2010.285 For Gernot Erler, this was ‘a conscious signal’ that Germany saw itself as a natural candidate for an enlarged UNSC.286 It was also a signal for the SC itself, since Germany took over the monthly presidency of the SC in April 2004. During the summer 2004 Germany stepped up its lobbying campaign to vow for international support. Lobbying for this seat became instrumental in Schröder’s meetings with leaders all over the world during that year.287 Fischer engaged in a ‘shuttle diplomacy’ in Asia in July and the Middle East in August vowing for support

282 This was suggested by the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine on 11 May 2004.
283 Berlin steps up push for UN seat’, 26 March 2004, dpa.
and reminding those countries of the high amount of development aid Germany had poured into those countries. Thus the logic of consequentiality was also being used outside the United Nations in Germany’s bilateral relations.

To strengthen its case, Germany enlarged the context of its strategy through a coordinated approach with other potential candidates for permanent membership. In September 2004, Germany, Japan, India and Brazil, the so-called G4 group, launched a joint campaign presenting themselves as ‘legitimate candidates’. At the 59th UN General Assembly the G4 put forward a joint declaration of their intentions ‘based on the firmly shared recognition that they are legitimate candidates for permanent membership in an expanded Security Council, support each other’s candidature.’ During a visit to Japan in December the Chancellor and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi called for both countries to be granted a permanent seat and receive the veto right to ensure equality among old and new permanent members. This stood in contrast to Secretary General Kofi Annan’s own two models of reform models neither of which envisaged a veto right for new members.

But the 2004 momentum had dissipated by the summer of 2005. On 16 May 2005 the G4 submitted their draft resolution. The consistency of the G4 was already problematic for the sympathies and dislikes the group caused. Although China had no problems with Germany’s bid, indicating its support when Schröder visited China in December 2004, it opposed Japan’s claim and could therefore not support the G4 claim as a whole. In addition, China had indicated a month before that it supported India’s claim to permanent membership (Gutschker 2005b), signalling to New Delhi that it might gain more from pursuing the objective on an individual basis, a position shortly afterwards endorsed by Washington. The US no longer endorsed the German bid, but clearly stated its support for Tokyo’s quest. Berlin’s attempt to use the Iraq war had resulted in a weakening of the international support of its claim for a permanent seat.

On 6 July 2005 the G4 presented the draft resolution on SC expansion

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291 Kofi Annan’s two proposals for SC reform envisaged first the enlargement to six permanent and three rotating members. The second model proposed nine rotating members. FAZ, 16 May 2005.
292 The draft resolution suggested enlarging the SC by ten members, six permanent and four non-permanent members. The new composition of 25 members would be made of eleven permanent and fourteen non-permanent members.
293 India has also been engaged in other regional groupings such as the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum which was formed in 2003 as ‘a trilateral, developmental initiative between India, Brazil and South Africa to promote South-South cooperation and exchange’ and to discuss specific proposals to reform the United Nations and especially the Security Council. http://www.ibsa-trilateral.org/
(A/59/L.64) to the GA for debate.\textsuperscript{294} The G4 hoped that its draft resolution would be voted before the annual GA meeting on 14-16 September but the controversial debate dragged on and chances for the draft resolution even being discussed at the annual GA meeting on 14-16 September looked increasingly slim.\textsuperscript{295}

During the German parliamentary election campaign in the summer of 2005 the government continued to argue that as the third largest financial contributor to the UN’s budget, and as the second largest country to send troops abroad after the U.S., with Bundeswehr deployments in Afghanistan and the Balkans Germany had the right to participate in the decisions of the Security Council and be treated equal to other powers.

7.3.3. The Merkel government and a permanent Security Council seat

After the September 2005 parliamentary elections, the new ruling coalition included the claim for a German permanent seat in the coalition agreement in November 2005. The agreement stated that Germany continued to endorse a permanent seat for the European Union, but would also be ready to assume greater responsibility through a German permanent seat (Coalition Treaty 2005:136). It is probable that the aim was put in the coalition treaty more at foreign minister Steinmeier’s insistence, than because of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s own preferences. During the election campaign Merkel had endorsed a German seat but she did not count it as one of her priorities.\textsuperscript{296}

Thus the grand coalition was far from having a consensual position on what Berlin’s position should be. In mid-November Merkel’s foreign policy adviser Christoph Heusgen called a permanent seat for Germany ‘an illusion’, challenging foreign minister Frank Walter Steinmeier, who as SPD member and former chief of staff of Gerhard Schröder was pursuing a permanent seat with the same commitment as the previous government.\textsuperscript{297}

But it embarked on a new initiative. In January 2006 Thomas Steg, the government’s spokesman reiterated Germany’s willingness to assume greater responsibility worldwide. ‘This includes a permanent seat in the Security Council.’\textsuperscript{298}

On 6 January Germany, India and Brazil submitted a second proposal for the Security Council座椅.

\textsuperscript{297} ‘Auch die neue Regierung will einen Dauersitz’, \textit{Der Spiegel}, 6 January 2006. http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,393840,00.html
Council reform to the General Assembly. The SC should be composed of 25 countries, eleven permanent and fourteen non-permanent rotating members, with the question of the veto for new members postponed for fifteen years. This was the same proposal the G4 had submitted to the UN in July 2005 and which had not been voted. Even though this was the most consensual proposal it again lacked the necessary two thirds majorities in the GA and the agreement of all five permanent members. Even if the group was successful in wooing smaller countries into casting their votes favourably and achieving the necessary majority for a UNSC reform, through the approval of 128 of the 192 member countries, the reform process could still be vetoed by any one of the five present permanent members. Additionally, the crumbling of the G4 as a lobbying group had begun in mid 2005, which explains why Japan refrained from joining this second proposal together with the other G4 countries opting instead to pursue its claim on an individual basis. Tokyo knew that Washington still endorsed its bid, whereas American support for a German seat was still unclear.

When foreign minister Steinmeier gave his first speech before the 61st UNGA session in New York in September 2006, it was all the more striking that he did not mention a permanent seat for Germany. He addressed the need for a wider UN reform but abstained from making the SC the centre of his speech (Hellmann and Roos 2007b). Rather he emphasized Germany’s duty to support the UN in contributing towards a more peaceful and just world (Steinmeier 2006b).

A German seat no longer seemed the pressing aim for the SPD. Kurt Beck, SPD chairman, refrained from pronouncing the policy at the first speech he gave on foreign policy as the new social democrat leader in November 2006 in Berlin. While he welcomed the enlargement of the SC, he made no reference to Germany’s own claim. This showed that while a German seat was not eliminated from the SPD’s policy agenda, it no longer ranked as high a priority as it had been during the Schröder years.

Merkel’s visit to Japan at the end of August 2007 signalled a renewed interest in Berlin and Tokyo pursuing a permanent seat jointly again. A few days later at the 62nd UNGA session in New York in September, Merkel stated that Germany still pursued a

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300 The General Assembly resolution 53/30, adopted in November 1998, stipulated that any resolution or decision on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters would require the affirmative vote of at least two thirds of the members of the Assembly, in conformity with Article 108 of the Charter.
permanent seat (Merkel 2007). Romano Prodi, Italian prime minister, reiterated Italy’s position opposing Berlin’s pretensions. Thus while the new grand coalition government continued to pursue a national policy more interest than promoting the CFSP dimension in UN politics, the intra-European divisions were also not mitigated, separating those member states which supported Germany, such as France and Britain, from those who argued for a European seat or simply opposed a German one, like Italy, Spain and Sweden.

At the end of 2007, the German position at the UN was one of revitalizing the initiative, on the basis of the G4 proposal. As Thomas Matussek, German Ambassador to the UN stated on 12 November 2007, Germany is open-minded towards an intermediary approach as long as it brings about ‘real change. We cannot simply settle for the lowest common denominator. We must create a formula for a Council that will reflect today's political realities and truly change the balance of power in the Council right from the start of the intermediary period.’ For that ‘a mandatory review within a clear timeframe and a clearly defined mandate’ had to be ‘an integral part of the solution’ (Matussek 2007).

7.3.4. Domestic elite support for Germany’s bid

Domestically, Schröder and Fischer were successful in constructing a powerful narrative of shared meaning accepted by the majority of the German political elite on the basis of a perceived legitimacy to be treated like other powers. As with the war in Kosovo in 1999 the Red-Green government had touched upon a nerve that was ideologically sympathetic to centre-right parties and which they therefore tended to support. In March 2001 the Foreign Affairs Committee (Auswärtiger Ausschuss) presented a motion to the Bundestag for a solid German UN policy. Politicians of the four major parties considered that the UNSC should adapt to present day reality and make it more representative. It was implicit in the resolution that the coalition parties, the CDU/CSU and the FDP endorsed the view that Germany should become a new permanent member in a SC enlargement. Support cut across party lines. CDU member Volker Rühe, defence minister in the previous government supported the government’s position for a German seat. Friedbert Pflüger, foreign policy spokesman for the CDU supported a German seat but was sceptical that this would be well received by

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Germany’s neighbours. Werner Hoyer, former state secretary of the Foreign Ministry under Klaus Kinkel advocated a European seat, without rejecting one for Germany.\textsuperscript{304} Wolfgang Gerhardt, from the FDP advocated a seat for Germany but warned that it was not enough to claim a seat because of ‘the country’s status as Europe’s biggest civilian power. The civilian power concept in itself is insufficient to promote peace in the world. Diplomacy needs to be complemented by military capacities’ (Gerhardt 2004). Hans Ulrich Klose, deputy chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee and SPD foreign policy expert was sceptical of the chances for success.\textsuperscript{305} Karsten Voigt, coordinator for German-American Cooperation in the Foreign Office argued for a German seat to counter its ‘moralising provincialism’.\textsuperscript{306}

Few openly argued against a German seat, with most criticism coming from the CDU. Wolfgang Schäuble, CDU member and interior minister of the Merkel government favoured only a European seat, considering the Schröder government’s bid for a German seat ‘backwards looking’ and paving the way for a return of nationally orientated foreign policies by European states.\textsuperscript{307} Germany lacked the material means that a global power role implied (Schäuble 2003). Andreas Schockenhoff, of the CDU considered that the quest for a German seat divided Europe.\textsuperscript{308} Karl Lamers, CDU member, argued that ‘the quest for a national seat not only stood little chance from the start, it did little to promote Europe. This divided Europe. Germany should therefore accept France’s offer and send a German representative to the French UN delegation using its position there to work towards common European positions and a formal procedure within EU institutions for that purpose’ (Lamers 2006). But former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, SPD, has also continuously criticized the Schröder and Merkel government’s argument that Germany is ready to accept more responsibility through a permanent UN Security Council seat (Schmidt 2004 and 2007).

7.4. The dilemma of a European seat: between CFSP and a permanent seat

Judged by financial contributions, the EU states together, make up almost 40% of the UN budget and peacekeeping operations, constituting its biggest financial contributor, ahead of the US and Japan. In the General Assembly they represent 27 of the 192

\textsuperscript{305} Deutschlandfunk, 23 September 2004.
\textsuperscript{308} Interview with Andreas Schockenhoff, Berlin, September 2000.
member states which make up more than one-eighth of all votes in the UN General Assembly. According to the EU, ‘EU candidate, potential candidate, and accession countries usually align themselves with EU statements. Commonly, almost one-sixth of UN Member States now align themselves with EU statements at the UNGA. This suggests that a common position between the twenty-seven member states could strengthen the EU’s role in the world.

The pursuit of a permanent UN Security Council seat highlights the contradictions of Berlin’s foreign policy. It illustrates a persistent EU-German incongruence, accentuating the incompatibility between arguing for a single European Union foreign policy and pursuing a German seat unilaterally. On the one hand the aim for a European seat is repeatedly stated in German government coalition agreements, suggesting the use of a logic of ‘European’ appropriateness of action; on the other hand, Berlin sustains its claim for a German seat on the basis of Germany being the second largest country to send troops abroad after the US, and the third largest contributor to the UN’s budget, arguing then according to a logic of consequentiality. In UN politics German policy-makers have been using the second policy lane (German interests and role as a key player in global politics) while discarding the first one (Germany as a Europeanized state with multilateral interests towards CFSP). Stating, as the German UN Ambassador Gunter Pleuger did in 2002, that with a permanent German seat Berlin would ‘be as much European as possible in its SC membership (...) and coordinate everything that we do, plan and present with our [European] partners’ (Pleuger 2002) was a shallow promise, because in case of serious disagreement there would be no means of preventing Germany from following its own interests, and the UK and France from doing exactly the same.

It was also a paradox that at a time when countries were slowly empowering the EU with effective CFSP instruments, and adopting the first European Security Strategy in December 2003, Germany was raising its voice to obtain a national seat in the Security Council. Ultimately, German policy does not promote European foreign policy at the level of UN politics since it intrinsically discredits possibilities for a European seat, and the EU’s image as a global foreign policy actor. As one observer noted, ‘by campaigning for its own accession, Germany has demoted to insignificance any serious prospect for the European Union’s long-held hope of representation on a Security Council made over to reflect the geopolitics of the new century’ (Vinocur 2004).

Finally, Germany’s insistence on its own seat affects the inner cohesion of the

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EU itself since states like Italy, Spain and Sweden criticize Germany’s claim, and view Berlin’s goal as incompatible with a CFSP, a view shared by the European Commission and the European Parliament. Javier Solana, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, have both argued for a common seat for the European Union. The dilemma for German foreign policy may grow stronger as Germany’s continuous refusal to participate in combat missions in southern Afghanistan with other NATO partners only highlights the contradictions of its wish to become a power with global responsibility.

While from 1997 to 2007 there was much rhetoric in favour of a common European seat, Germany did not pursue it. If Germany were serious about elevating the EU as a credible international actor in international relations with a coherent approach in foreign policy, it had significant credibility within the EU to present a policy initiative instead of pursuing its own individualist goal. This would have raised the support of many EU countries, with the exception of Britain and France and Berlin’s profile within the EU and contributed to a stronger Europeanization. Furthermore, considering that Italy had been a staunch supporter of a European seat and had repeatedly campaigned for one in the UN Germany and Italy could have launched a joint initiative within the EU. Thus it was a considerable difference between not pursuing a strategy for a European seat at all, and retreating into a national strategy aiming for a German seat. This reveals a unilateralist policy, which goes against its foreign policy tradition of institutionalised multilateralism, and suggests a path more inclined towards power politics and a realist reading of German diplomacy. It was thus hardly convincing that Gerhard Henze, German Ambassador to the UN in 1997, tried to downplay the significance of the veto right for Germany by saying that he could ‘not imagine a situation in which there would be the necessity for Germany to use the veto power, at least not on [its] own.’\textsuperscript{10} Certainly the will to make use of the veto right is decisive, but the legal possession of such a right in itself is already a powerful policy mechanism.

In fairness to Germany’s position it must be said that there are several obstacles to the EU becoming a serious contender for a permanent seat and which help explain why there has been no joint proposal for a UNSC reform. First, there are the obvious complexities of the EU acting as a global foreign policy actor. To have an effective international voice, a European seat would presuppose a convergent if not common

\textsuperscript{10} Quoted in Andreas Zumach, ‘Reform or collapse: Is there a future for the UN in a unipolar world order?’, 29 June 1997, http://www.globalpolicy.org/reform/radiorep.htm
position on issues of international peace and security and a consensual voting position. That a common EU seat in the Security Council remains highly implausible derives first and foremost from the lack of political will on the part of the EU member states.

Secondly, France and Britain are unwilling to relinquish their national seats. They enjoy a status as nuclear powers making it highly unlikely that they would hand over national control of their nuclear weapons to a European command, in which they would not retain some sort of veto power. Since a UN Charter amendment needs the vote of all permanent members, it was always possible for France and Britain to veto any decision they considered harmful to their interests as permanent SC members.

Finally, there is the technical-legal obstacle in that the UN Charter does not allow for an international organization becoming a UN member.311 That is why in the foreseeable future, a European seat seems unlikely. This suggests that German governments conveniently hid behind the formula of a European seat in order to buffer their own claim for an increase in status and power, well aware of the obvious improbability of such a seat. It is thus no surprise that the contradictions inherent to a common European seat are noted by outside observers such as Kishore Mahbubani who recently argued that the SC lacks legitimacy considering that the U.S., Britain and France, three Western states with just 15% of the world population retain 60% of the voting rights within the SC (Mahbubani 2007:55).

This shows that despite the degree of Europeanization of German politics in the Euro-Atlantic area shown in chapter 5, at the level of global politics German governments opt to assert German as opposed to purely European interests.

Still, the recently signed Reform Treaty of the EU has tried to further a more coherent European approach towards future SC votes. The Treaty of Lisbon has reformed article 19 of the TEU whose approach had not been far-reaching enough because of British and French reluctance to see other EU members constrain their status as permanent SC members.312 The added paragraph to article 19 states that "[w]hen the Union has defined a position on a subject which is on the United Nations Security Council agenda, those Member States which sit on the Security Council shall request that the High Representative be asked to present the Union's position."313 If Germany

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311 This notwithstanding, the EU has a presence at the United Nations. It is represented by the European Commission, which has permanent observer status at the General Assembly. [http://www.europa.eu-un.org/articles/articleslist_s30_en.htm](http://www.europa.eu-un.org/articles/articleslist_s30_en.htm)

312 "Member States which are also members of the United Nations Security Council will concert and keep the other Member States fully informed. Member States which are permanent members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of the union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter."

313 "Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European
remains as Europeanist in the European foreign policy as it proclaims, it now stands a better chance to upload a European position into the Security Council.

7.5. The German quest for a permanent UN Security Council seat: transatlantic and European reactions

7.5.1. The position of the United States

After German unification, the United States was the first of the Security Council’s permanent members to support Germany’s bid for a permanent seat. According to Gunter Pleuger, Germany’s Ambassador at the UN from 2001 to 2006 it was the US under president George Bush Senior, not Germany, which first put forward the idea that Germany should become a permanent SC member in the early 1990s (Pleuger 2002 and 2006). This goes in line with the overall bilateral approach of US of the Bush administration for a leadership role for Germany. The Clinton administration also supported Germany’s quest for a permanent seat (Gordon 1994:239). In 1993, the American Ambassador in Germany, Richard Holbrooke, said the U.S not only supported a greater world role for Germany, but also wanted it to join the Security Council as a permanent member.

For the United States, the inclusion of Germany and also of Japan was a sine qua non for the enlargement of the SC’s permanent membership not least because of the financial input that both were expected to produce as permanent members. However, this did not mean that the United States accepted a change in the existing veto right. As Cameron Hume, US minister for political affairs, stated in 1996, a change in the veto right was ‘not a matter [the United States was] prepared to submit to negotiation or vote in a general conference or other venue.’ Because the veto right was considered sacrosanct, successive American administrations refused to address the issue of granting it to new members.

In April 2000 the United States agreed to a larger membership than the twenty-one seats it had previously advocated. The US maintained that Germany and Japan
should be given permanent Council seats and also backed seats for nations from Africa, Asia and Latin America.\textsuperscript{318} No progress was made on the American position regarding the veto right.

In the wake of the transatlantic disagreement over the handling of the war in Iraq in 2002-2003, President George W. Bush stopped endorsing Germany’s accession, while continuing to favour Japan’s entrance. During the crisis both the American and the German-French sides tried to manipulate the Security Council to develop a blocking force against each other. The countries which had prevented a second resolution authorizing the use of force in Iraq, in February 2003, Germany, France, Russia and China, valued the Security Council as a blocking instrument against Washington forming a tentative diplomatic alliance (Schwarz 2003:23). But it was naive for the Red-Green government to believe that Germany could try to turn the United Nations into a counterforce to the US without expecting US reprisals. Washington’s withdrawal of its hitherto support was a reaction to Germany’s lack of support for US policies in Iraq but also indicated the wider US approach towards European politics in an attempt to isolate Germany and France in their bilateral opposition to the war.

In the debate on the reform of the Security Council in July 2005 the United States rejected the proposal of the G4 for SC enlargement and any veto rights for new members.\textsuperscript{319} This was a setback for Germany. Russia, which in 2003 had backed all four countries, China, Italy, Pakistan and Mexico opposed the G4 proposal.\textsuperscript{320} The German newspaper \textit{Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung} noted the irony of the Bush administration’s siding with Beijing’s leadership in their joint opposition to including Germany and Japan in the Security Council as permanent members.\textsuperscript{321} This was a change in China’s position, since in December 2004 during a visit of Chancellor Schröder to Beijing the Chinese prime minister Wen Jiabao had explicitly supported Berlin’s quest.\textsuperscript{322} China’s changing position is best explained by the deteriorating diplomatic relations between Beijing and Tokyo during the summer of 2005 due to Japan’s intransigence in

\textsuperscript{319} \textit{Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung}, 16 May 2005.  
\textsuperscript{320} In 2003 the Russian Ambassador to the United Nation Sergej Lavrov had given Russia’s support: ‘the Russian Federation believes that Germany, Japan, India and Brazil, as well as a State representing Africa, would be worthy candidates for any additional permanent seats as might be created in the Security Council.’ On the question of attributing the veto right to new permanent members Lavrov said that ‘it would be wise to leave any such consideration until after agreement has been reached on the specific membership of an expanded Security Council.’ S. Lavrov (2003). Speech before the 58th General Assembly of the United Nations, 30th plenary meeting, 14 October, p. 21. UN Document A/58/PV.30.  
recognizing its aggressive role towards China in the Second World War.

On 10 November 2005 the US Ambassador to the UN John Bolton stated that the US would not support the attempts of Germany, Brazil and India to enlarge the Security Council. This was addressed to the new German coalition government and signalled that Merkel and Steinmeier would have to make an effort to regain American support.

7.5.2. The position of France

France has been supportive of Germany joining a restructured Security Council as a permanent member, albeit evading the question of whether a veto right should be part of that restructuring. At the German-French summit in Nuremberg in December 1996, Chancellor Kohl and French president Jacques Chirac adopted the ‘common strategic concept’ regarding a common defence policy. According to Alistair Cole, as a quid pro quo for Germany’s acceptance of the French objectives, France indicated that it would support Germany’s claim for a permanent seat (Cole 2001:120). In June 2000 recognising Germany’s successful participation in the NATO-led Kosovo intervention and willingness to play a decisive international role Chirac stated that France favoured a permanent seat on the Security Council. ‘Germany's engagement’, he said before the Bundestag, ‘its ranking as a great power, its international influence - France would like to see this recognised with a permanent seat on the Security Council’. But again, whether the veto right should be given to Germany was not tackled. During the transatlantic divide Chirac kept his support for a German seat. Before the GA in September 2003, Chirac reiterated France’s support for Germany and Japan to become permanent SC members.324

France kept its support during the 2005 election campaign.325 With the new German coalition government in November 2005 France continued to express its support, with Chirac and also with the new French president Nicolas Sarkozy after May 2007. In reality, in light of the ever more distant possibility of true UN Security Council reform, and the hypothesis of a German permanent Security Council seat France is in no need of changing its position and can use this pro-Berlin stance to barter on another diplomatic matter, knowing that any amendment of the Charter and a reform of the SC composition depends on the votes (and vetoes) of the present permanent members.

323 Jacques Chirac before the German Bundestag, 27 June 2000.
7.5.3. The case of Italy’s continuous opposition

As early as September 1990, Italy’s foreign minister De Michaelis, proposed that the EC should become a UN and a SC member. Italy wanted to prevent unifying Germany from becoming a permanent member, which would risk a demotion of its own international standing to a secondary ranking. Thus Italy was in the forefront of making proposals for the reform of the SC and has taken an active stance against the creation of new permanent seats. 326 Paolo Fulci, the Italian Ambassador to the UN opposed Germany’s quest very effectively. 327 When the Razali proposal for an increase of nine members, was voted in December 1997, it was rejected by Italy, because of its opposition to Germany’s bid. Italy’s foreign minister Lamberto Dini asserted that permanent seats were not ‘up for sale’, and there could be no link between member states’ contributions and the granting of a permanent seat (Drifte 2000:167). While it was not eager to reform the composition of the Security Council, Italy supported a limited increase of non-permanent members only, and a seat for the European Union. This proposal appealed to developing countries, which would be the main candidates for non-permanent membership, but was rejected by France and Britain, which would lose their veto rights. Overall, however, Italy’s active stance in the Working Group on SC reform, most visibly through Ambassador Paolo Fulci, should be understood as a continuous attempt to avoid a change of Germany’s status. This concern over status had, of course, to do with Italy’s own status. A permanent seat would have meant a relative loss for Italy’s own diminished rank internationally. The problem was that ‘there is always someone coming next’, argued foreign minister Fischer, and Italy’s objection was due to it considering itself closest to a permanent seat after Germany (Fischer 2004). Ultimately, within the European Union it would have upgraded Germany to become one of the big three inner group of the CFSP worldwide and on the European stage, thus reinforcing the notion of the directoire without Italy, as had happened with the Contact Group in the Balkans in the mid-1990s.

In 2003 the Italian Ambassador to the UN, Marcello Spatafora, was clear in his criticism. He argued that Italy believed that ‘the creation of new permanent seats would (...) create new centres of privilege. This would go against the tide of history [of] an ongoing process of democratization in the handling and the management of

326 For example, Britain and France should be replaced by an EC seat and Japan, thus solving the problem of over representation by countries of the Western world. The Economist, 29 August 1992.
international relations through multilateral institutions (...) New permanent members endowed with veto power would undoubtedly make it more difficult for the Council to swiftly define and implement collective actions, impairing the effectiveness of the Council’s decision-making process and increasing the risk of inaction.’ Spatafora continued: ‘the proposal aired by some to add new permanent members without the right to veto also entails serious drawbacks and would not increase the cohesion of United Nations membership. It would create further division in the Council membership and establish a new layer of hierarchy that would be detrimental to the United Nations. Do we really want to have a first-class membership, a second-class membership and a third-class membership?’ The Italian representative concluded that ‘the only realistic formula would be a limited increase in the number of non-permanent members’ (Spatafora 2003:18).

On 26 July 2005 Italy again criticized the G4’s behaviour. In Spatafora’s blunt words it was unethical for the G4 to resort to ‘financial leverage and to financial pressures in order to induce a government to align, or not to align, itself with a certain position, or to cosponsor or vote in favour of a certain draft.’ Together with eleven other states Italy made a counter proposal which foresaw an increase of ten new states, all of which should become non-permanent members thus rejecting any additional permanent members.

More than fifteen years after discussions on Security Council reform began the difficulties in getting agreement between 192 member states and the acceptance of reform by the current permanent SC members make the prospect for UNSC reform in the near future remain bleak. So it is likely, as Paul Kennedy suggests, that ‘the U.N. will limp along, caught between the ambitiousness of its original design and the blunt fact that the world order remains one in which egotistical great powers still play a disproportionate role, especially in protecting their own interests (Kennedy 2006).

Part of what makes a permanent seat so appealing is that prestige comes with little responsibility. As one observer noted regarding SC reform

‘The one great mistake (...) made in 1945 was to give away the privilege of the veto power without attaching any responsibilities to that privilege. Consequently, we face a very strange situation today. When there is a crisis in the world and one turns to the major Powers and the middle Powers to ask them to help resolve it, they tend to run away; very few of them will volunteer to help to resolve it. On the other hand, when one says that there

are permanent seats available on the Security Council - which gives one primary responsibility for handling threats to international peace and security - there are many volunteers. The reason why there are many volunteers for permanent membership is that there are no responsibilities attached to permanent membership' (Mahbubani 2003:20-21).

7.6. Conclusion: The pursuit of a permanent SC seat and Germany’s transformed multilateralism

Germany’s quest for permanent membership still lacks embeddedness in a wider global foreign policy strategy. Such a strategy, if it is to be coherent with a permanent SC seat, cries out for a political concept of global leadership and a clear perception of world order. Instead, German policy-makers have developed their arguments around the size of Germany’s material and financial contributions and linked them to the question of the effectiveness of the Security Council. Whereas Germany has at times revealed a strategy for European leadership, it lacks the necessary global strategy for its foreign policy to assert any kind of moral global leadership it seems to aspire to. As a result, Germany’s diplomacy is still shaped by an Europeanised and transatlanticised identity, whereas the sources of a more global identity emerged in the domestic political discourse only recently. It lacks the necessary linkage concept between its European role and its ambitioned global role, and this lacuna only weakens its legitimacy and credibility as a power with European leadership potential, let alone with global pretensions. But the Schröder government was unable to provide Germany with the necessary global strategy to ensure that German foreign policy remained credible and effective. As Volker Rühe, CDU member and previous defense minister noted ‘should Germany obtain a permanent seat in the Security Council it would have to adopt a fundamental position on every conflict in the world and could not be as selective as before’ (Lohse 2005).

Germany’s quest for a permanent SC seat has revealed an intricate dialectic of two contrasting foreign policy narratives. Schröder’s more assertive policies on the global stage were the antithesis of Kohl’s more voluntarily constrained policies on the European arena. By doing so Schröder, more than Fischer, moved away from the ‘aversion to power politics and active diplomacy’ (Wallace 2007:8) which characterised Germany’s behaviour during the Cold War, since the permanent UNSC membership and the veto right that goes along with it are (still) considered one of the few prerogatives of power politics.
This led to ambiguities in Germany’s foreign policy identity, based on a loose set of foreign policy principles and goals which were sometimes hard to combine. While Kohl clung on to continuity in the face of inevitable change, Schröder often induced it in an unusually assertive manner. All of Schröder’s foreign policy discourse about German self-confidence (Selbstbewusstsein) gave Germany a false sense of security in that the normality which he claimed Germany had already achieved was artificial, leading him to make decisions on the basis of the expected consequences rather than on their appropriateness. Kohl was eager to maintain the self-contained behaviour and loosen constraints only through gradual Europeanization and in coherence with Germany’s partners. This led him to misjudge the changing international context and the expectations of its neighbours for Germany to play a more assertive international role. Schröder, by contrast, was conditioned by the thought of releasing Germany from its constraints that he often went ahead unilaterally, failing to take partners’ doubts and anxieties sufficiently into account. These contrasting positions have allowed Chancellor Merkel to follow a more balanced approach even though her government has not relinquished the demand for a German seat. But its pursuit has been less pressing and it can be argued that the Chancellor herself has not defined this as a priority between 2005 and 2007.

On the question of how this change has affected the logics for political action, the appropriateness of the rules that Germany follows has evolved from 1997 to 2007. Schröder has coded the foreign policy experiences of the previous government into a new set of rules. As March and Olsen have argued, ‘appropriate rules, in both technical and normative terms, are assumed to evolve over time as new experiences are interpreted and coded into rules, or less attractive alternatives are eliminated through competition’ (March and Olsen 2004:12). The German Chancellor deliberately initiated a new public discourse and a process of change in Germany’s foreign policy identity, presenting the norm of international parity as legitimate to claim a permanent Security Council seat. Schröder believed it appropriate for Germany to act on the world stage with the ‘self-confidence of a grown-up nation which does not have to feel inferior to anyone and which looks ahead despite its preparedness to ‘confront its history and its responsibility’ (Schröder 1998). The result of this Schröderian formula was an ongoing learning process aimed at achieving international parity and peer power category.

However, developing a new discursive narrative to support the aim of international parity was not the same as having achieved a new position of power in real terms. Germany was far from becoming the global power in material terms. Its
economic situation in 2004/2005 indicated that it lacked the necessary resources to sustain the global role it was claiming, risking over-stretch between ambitions and real capabilities. An expectations-capabilities gap (Hill 1998) opened between the claim for greater international responsibility and an effective willingness, linked to means, for proportional action. This had to do with Germany’s dire domestic economic situation, the corresponding dismal national mood and a slowing down of the trend for Germany’s military participations.

The case of a permanent German UNSC seat shows how Schröder’s deliberate attempt to change German foreign policy identity was projected into the international dimension of German foreign policy in what was the pursuit of German interests on the second policy lane as an individual policy actor. The old Genscherian dichotomy between Machtpolitik (power politics) and Verantwortungspolitik (politics of responsibility) had been blurred. While during the Kohl government, Kinkel’s pursuit of a permanent seat stood out against Kohl’s wider foreign policy design, and seemed the exception to a multilateral European and transatlantic foreign policy, with the Schröder government this blurring occurred consciously. The simultaneous use of these concepts revealed the ambiguities among alternative concepts (March and Olsen 2004) of German identity. Chancellor Schröder chose to evoke international parity as a new norm for German foreign policy. This change was largely unopposed, showing that the terrain was ripe for Germany to look for new parameters for action. The Schröder/Fischer government was successful in making this new norm socially acceptable in domestic politics, and the pursuit for a seat was supported by the broader German spectrum. It revealed that for policy-makers the question of power status had become as valid for Germany as it was for France and Britain (Frankenberger and Nonnenmacher 2004). This in part also explains why the Merkel government, even if it has handled the issue thus far less enthusiastically, has not set it aside restating the claim for a German seat in the 2005 coalition government treaty and why the Chancellor herself, despite following a different foreign policy approach has supported it.

More significantly, Germany’s normative power was weakened. Berlin, together with Paris (and looking towards Moscow) challenged America’s preponderance in shaping international order. In this as in other policy domains like Berlin’s bilateral relations with Paris and Washington and its European policy the Schröder government raised the stakes too high, was too loud in putting its demands forward – acting more like the elephant in a china shop than Kohl had ever done – and got too little in return. In the end, therefore, after eight years of Red-Green foreign policy the insistent pursuit
for a national seat had weakened Germany’s normative power and sat uneasily with the
country’s traditional logic of appropriateness as a foreign policy guideline.

More recently, Germany’s domestic debate on the nature of the Bundeswehr’s
mission in Afghanistan with repeated hints by members of the grand coalition
government that Germany is not prepared to fight combat missions in southern
Afghanistan is revealing of how difficult all political parties find it to engage the
Bundeswehr in offensive military operations at the same time as maintaining broad
public support for them. This reluctance would not sit well with the status of permanent
membership whose main purpose is to act responsibly according to a power with global
commitments. A global power does not have the ‘pick and choose’ options for peace
operations which Germany currently still enjoys. This dilemma also highlights the
practical difficulties in projecting a civilian-normative power conception into the realm
of international politics and the limits on Germany’s ability to introduce a new power
conception among great powers and international institutions.

At the same time, however, Germany had raised its voice and demanded to be
part of a more exclusive group of states acting in international politics. Albeit having
been unsuccessful in the bid, and despite the untraditional foreign policy style that
Schröder pursued, Berlin’s increased logic of consequentially did bear some fruit.
Berlin has unofficially become part of the P5+1 group dealing with Iran. The cases of
the Iran nuclear crisis and the war in Lebanon in the summer of 2006 have shown that
Germany has become the sixth power at the negotiating table even if it lacks a veto
power. Without UN reform, Germany has been unofficially promoted to a higher power
status. The Merkel government has managed to locate Germany on a higher
international standing and perhaps this would not have happened without the Schröder
governments’ at times unilateral insistence. In its striving to join other powers
Germany’s participation in groups like the P5+1 will increasingly constrain its room for
maneuvering normative power in international diplomacy. This reinforces the initial
argument of the chapter that Germany’s United Nations diplomacy is increasingly
moving towards a more pragmatic multilateralism, only occasionally turning back to its
normative power.
CHAPTER 8: Germany’s foreign policy identity and European order

'Some say foreign policy is essentially about the defence of your material and security interests around the world. Others say that, to explain how countries behave, you just need to look at their place within the structure of the international system. There is truth in both points. First, we do have European interests to defend. Other countries defend theirs as well, so there is no need to be apologetic about this. And second, given the distribution of power in the world today, Europeans can only make an impact if they work together. But this is not the whole story. These 'realist' and 'structuralist' accounts miss out one crucial factor. And that is the impact of identity on foreign policy. For what you do on the international stage is surely also a function of your identity – of how you define yourself and the values you seek to promote abroad.'

8.1. Germany’s changed foreign policy identity: the enlargement of the faces of German power

Germany’s second unification was not brought about by Realpolitik. The first one, in 1871, was based on calculations of power and the national interest and achieved through war and change (Kissinger 1994:137). In contrast, in 1990, Germany had a considerable amount of normative power. This was the opposite of classical power politics in that Europe’s new security system was ‘able to incorporate large and potentially powerful states. The peaceful reunification of Germany is in itself a proof that the system has changed’ (Cooper 2003:32). In the last eighteen years Germany has changed its foreign policy significantly, and normative power has facilitated Germany’s changing international identity and its new standing in international politics as one of the main powers. This shows that a country’s rise in power need not rely exclusively on a power politics approach.

This thesis has argued that Germany’s international identity has been characterised by normative power, a different and less onerous but effective sort of power within the Euro-Atlantic constitutional order. This, in turn, has decisively shaped Germany’s foreign policy. Because normative power is seen as legitimate by others, it will remain a substantial resource for Germany. But the role of power has been enlarged by more utilitarian elements of multilateralism and the odd recourse to unilateralism,

with foreign policy increasingly being driven by a logic of consequentialism. The gradual transformation of the nature of German power, combining the normative with such traditional attributes as 'deliberate' power, according to Bulmer’s typology, shows that the two forms of power are not mutually exclusive, and have both accompanied Germany’s changing position in international politics. As a consequence, on some occasions, foreign policy decisions reflected instances where normative power was the primary reason for action. On other occasions, new motivations led German policymakers to behave differently. In other words, the path towards Germany asserting itself as a European power was substantially facilitated by keeping normative and more deliberate power closely intertwined.

This concluding chapter summarizes the empirical findings of the thesis as a whole and emphasises the implications of Germany’s normative power for the existing European order.

First, as chapter 3 has shown, the sources of German conduct and its changing foreign policy identity derived mostly from domestically induced changes by policymakers and from a new foreign policy discourse, particularly between the years 1998 and 2005. The Schröder government practised a more utilitarian multilateralism supported by a new foreign policy identity, so as to enhance Germany’s international status through parity with other powers. This has produced a less normative foreign policy, with conflicting norms explaining the end of the old German foreign policy consensus.

Secondly, while Germany’s security policy has adapted to major changes in the realm of international security it has done so by keeping, to a large extent, to the logic of appropriateness in the conduct of international military operations, as examined in chapter 4. Still, participation in peacekeeping, peace-enforcing and post-conflict reconstruction missions was also politically instrumental, in that the Schröder government expected international recognition and claimed political returns on its new security commitments.

Third, Germany’s foreign policy identity as a multilateralist and Europeanized actor mitigated the burden of expectations and reduced the unpredictability that comes at times of major power shifts. Germany’s European policy showed the increasing use of a more deliberate articulation of interests when it began to conceptualise integration much more from the point of view of Berlin rather than of Brussels. Germany is increasingly combining its Europeanism with a more clustered approach, using multilateral groupings which unite for a specific foreign policy purpose, such as the EU-
3+1 approach regarding Iran.

Fourthly, in Germany’s bilateral relationships with France and the United States, examined in chapter 6, Berlin attempted to increase the margin of manoeuvrability of its diplomacy, challenging some of its traditional parameters. The double bilateral dissonances undermined NATO’s and the EU’s internal cohesion and was in part the result of Germany’s new assertiveness. Because the United States stands with one foot in the ‘liberal world’ and with the other in the ‘realist world’, it was inevitable that a more assertive Germany would at one point clash with Washington. The renegotiation of status with France also led to temporary intra-European disagreements with Paris, albeit that Berlin emerged, in the long run, as the more powerful player in the bilateral relationship.

Finally, Berlin has been assertive in its pursuit of a permanent UNSC seat, not shying away from the manifest exposure of a more forceful articulation of its interests. With regard to the UN’s reform and the composition of the UN Security Council Berlin pursued a logic of consequentialism through a strong emancipatory impulse, claiming Germany’s right to sit at the top table as an independent player.

The context was propitious for change due to the combination of a critical juncture for change, of policy-makers willing to forge change in institutional memberships and renegotiate Germany’s power status. This change did not reflect a return to traditional power politics, but the adaptation of a pattern of foreign policy which increasingly combined the logic of appropriateness with a logic of expected consequences. Thus from 1997 to 2007 Germany’s commitment to the principles of an international constitutional order, to European integration and to the transatlantic community oscillated between normative and deliberate power, and between normative allegiance, an emancipatory impulse and a pragmatic reorientation.

8.2. The policy of de-linkage

The remaking of Germany’s foreign policy identity was intimately linked to Chancellor Schröder’s dissatisfaction with the post-1990 status quo Germany was locked into, and his determination to rearrange the basic coordinates of foreign policy. This partly reflected the unprecedented emotional disentanglement between Europe and the U.S. during the 1990s. Germany was no longer strategically or emotionally dependent on the United States. Step by step Schröder tried to de-link Germany’s carefully-knit web of a multilayered foreign policy so as to achieve power parity within the Euro-Atlantic area.
In so doing, Germany has come of age and lost its normative innocence.

First, the Schröder government loosened the traditionally close German-French relationship. Germany’s attempt at a new leadership role in Europe was done at the expense of the Franco-German relationship. Secondly, Schröder set about disentangling Germany from what he perceived to be its subservience to the United States. But in the summer of 2002, when Germany began to contest Washington’s plans for Iraq, Schröder began to back-pedal. He found it impossible for Berlin to pursue open disagreements simultaneously with Washington and Paris, over different issues and in the acknowledgment that Germany alone did not have the diplomatic weight to oppose Washington. It thus fostered a joint Franco-German approach, proposing a multipolar international order instead of the perceived American unipolarity. This was, of course, close to France’s own traditional foreign policy. Yet however much the German-French position tried to assert its anti-hegemonic position with regard to Washington, the fact that CEE countries shortly afterwards joined the EU and simultaneously sided with Washington not only revealed the fragility of the German-French position, but also the continuous influence the United States has on Europe.

Thirdly, while shaking up the contours of its two most important bilateral relationships, the government did not maintain the intensity of the European integrationist policy of previous governments, and voiced its opposition to Berlin’s continuous role as a net contributor to the EU’s finances, seeking a redistribution of power to the national level. Fourthly, the Chancellor attempted to forge a closer bilateral relationship with Russia, engaging in symbolic acts of rapprochement which annoyed several European partners, apart from not helping to forge a European common approach to Moscow. The government’s willingness to advocate lifting the EU arms embargo against China, together with France, also stood in stark contrast to a more normative foreign policy.

Finally, Germany underwent its worst economic recession, certainly a consequence of the high burdens of unification, but which stood in contrast with the will towards a more assertive foreign policy, since the latter required the necessary means to empower its new ambitions. Shrinking foreign policy resources raised the gap between the lack of financial and human resources at the Foreign Ministry and the increased expectations towards a new foreign policy role. Germany’s foreign policy ministries, viz. the Foreign Office, the Defence Ministry and the Ministry of Development have seen resources decrease sharply from 21.5 percent of the federal budget in 1990 to 12 percent in 2006. (Kamp and Masala 2006). In addition, Germany had ‘a very limited
potential in terms of foreign policy expertise. The Bundestag, the Auswärtige Amt and the think tanks all lack a sufficient number of experts.\textsuperscript{330} In other words, the transformation of Germany’s normative power into a more consequentialist player only made sense if it had a high international approval rate, i.e. if it had the necessary allies, and if it had the economic and financial means to deploy. As it happened, Germany had little of the former, and even less of the latter.

Thus the remaking of identity was more successful in dismantling the old parameters of that identity than in forging a new one. Such a significant attempt to redefine German identity, however, presupposed a strategic vision in which to embed such major changes. While Chancellor Schröder began by opening political construction sites regarding the bilateral relationships with France and the U.S., European and transatlantic politics, a German permanent UNSC seat, and by rebuilding new relationships with Russia and China, these initiatives lacked an overall linkage strategy which would have presented a new and coherent foreign policy identity. This rendered German foreign policy less predictable between 1998 and 2005, and helped to make established institutions and alliances less robust. As a result, the transformation of German foreign policy shows that while some successes can be ascribed to Schröder’s dismantling of the Kohlean approach to foreign policy, no alternative coherent foreign policy identity developed. Germany’s normative power decreased and foreign policy lacked a strategic vision supported by a foreign policy concept (\textit{außenpolitisches Konzept}). This is particularly important in a country where ideas matter, and pragmatism is not enough.

Notwithstanding that the critical juncture for German foreign policy was mainly domestically induced, the enlargement of the faces of German power, to reinforce the deliberate power associated with a logic of consequentialism, was accelerated by the structural changes in the Euro-Atlantic area which coincided with the international upheaval after the attacks of September 11, 2001. To handle these strategic international changes the Schröder government, no less than any other German government, lacked the institutional propensity towards thinking in terms of world order. The ‘geographical order most politicians thought about was the triad of Europe, the transatlantic area, and Russia’, as Christoph Betram suggests.\textsuperscript{331}

While Berlin felt it had achieved a new status as one of the leading powers in European politics by the turn of the century, the transatlantic crisis shortly afterwards

\textsuperscript{330} Conversation with a German diplomat.
\textsuperscript{331} Conversation with the author, Lisbon, October 2005.
revealed the limits of Germany’s new assertiveness and the absence of any real receptivity among other European countries towards German leadership – especially if this was at the expense of a cooperative multilateral transatlanticism. Berlin’s unilateral stance in 2002 was therefore also a reflection of Germany’s emotional detachment not only from the U.S. - in terms of greater autonomy - but also from its traditional institutionalist instincts in European integration. Thus what started out as a transatlantic crisis became also a European one, for Germany’s automatic commitment towards strengthening the EU institutions could no longer be taken for granted.

8.3. What kind of international player?

It was no coincidence that the unprecedented 2003 transatlantic crisis was followed so shortly afterwards by the 2005 European constitutional crisis. The latter was, in part, a reflection of the former, in which Germany had played a key part. The constitutional crisis was also a sign that Germany, together with France, was unable to convince the EU, and the French and Dutch people in particular, that Germany and France could be the natural leaders of an enlarging Europe which could become an international actor in its own right and with its own legitimacy (and without the need to achieve a false legitimacy simply from opposing the U.S.).

While in 2005 most commentators argued that the transatlantic crisis had been overcome, it was uncertain that the Euro-Atlantic community and its transatlantic Western liberal order had recovered. While this showed that the European project continued to be closely tied to the Atlantic Alliance community, it also indicated that the two might become increasingly incompatible. It is perhaps historically unfortunate for Europe that at a time when Europe is trying to initiate an assertive international actorness, and project the normative elements of its CFSP and ESDP beyond its boundaries, the U.S. is also pursuing a more pro-active policy of democratization, in order to enlarge its zone of peace. In strategic terms both the NSS of 2002 and the ESS of 2003 point in the direction of America’s and Europe’s greater international assertiveness. In this, neither Europe nor the United States are any longer status quo powers. The projection of their ideals, and the will to see them implemented, has transformed the Euro-Atlantic space into a revisionist locus of international politics. This is more likely to produce occasional disagreements than a common Euro-Atlantic approach. The lessons learnt from the transatlantic and European crises is that Germany’s emergence towards becoming a more assertive player internationally cannot be achieved at the expense of its traditional European and
transatlantic pillars - for intra Euro-Atlantic reasons, as we have seen, but also because, in the wider normative struggle which can be envisaged for a new international order, attempts to revise this order by emerging powers such as India and China, will help Germany realise that the core of its own normative power still resides firmly within the West.

If ‘the power to define norms may be as important in the [XXIst] century as the power to draw the boundaries of colonies was in the [19th century]’ (Pastor 1999:18) one key question is whether emerging powers such as India and China will rise within the existing Western constitutional order, accepting its foundations, or whether they will promote the definition of a new one, either by softly substituting established norms or by contesting it in a more hostile manner (Mahbubani 2007). China and India are increasingly non status quo powers themselves. How Western relationships develop with these two Asian countries will contribute to the cohesion or the lack of it of the transatlantic relationship. This will produce two consequences for German foreign policy. First, while Germany is firmly embedded in the Western order, and interested in preserving it, it will have to define a strategy, together with the U.S. and other powers to respond to these potential challenges, which, in a legitimate form, or through open dispute, are defying the old established order of norms and institutions. Secondly, at the same time as it shares with the U.S. a commitment to the Western order, Germany, together with the rest of the EU members, can no longer accept dependence on American leadership, and will increasingly have to play a more active role in relation to extended security issues, for example in the Middle East.

The Middle East has become the new platform where transatlantic relations are being redefined. After September 11, 2001 the Middle East has substituted the Balkans as the new testing ground for NATO alliance cohesion and the future of EU-NATO relations. Alliance members do not share the same interests and strategic perceptions on how to deal with the Israel-Palestinian problem, relations with Lebanon and Syria, with Iraq and, more decisively, with Iran’s nuclear crisis. The future of the Atlantic Alliance will depend on how the U.S. and Europe deal with these problems on its borders and the wider Middle East, and on how willing NATO member states are to continue engagement in the war on terror and post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan. While their joint interest in the region may suggest a convergence of interests, it is far from certain that Europe and the U.S. will find a way to cooperate on stability in the long term and agree on the instruments needed to do so. Former foreign minister Fischer articulated the strategic dimension of Europe's responsibility when he argued that
whether the Mediterranean will evolve into a sea of cooperation or of confrontation (...) is the security question for us in the 21st century' (Fischer 2004).

But if the Middle East is the stage where different transatlantic perceptions are played out, in the long term more is at stake. America’s and Europe’s definition of the norms and rules which define an international order, and the position of power or merely player are being discerned in the politics of the Middle East. It is at the intersection between this ‘liberal world’ of a normative setting in which EU members exist and the more ‘realist world’ outside of it that the success or failure of German foreign policy and ultimately of a future common European foreign policy will be decided.

The United States will maintain its ambiguous position with regard to Europe. For the U.S., Europe needs to adopt one of two positions: either a Europe which follows Washington, or a Europe which is divided. The first case accepts the American supremacy in and outside the Atlantic Alliance. The second case entails the rejection of this supremacy by some EU members and the refocusing of other more Atlanticist members on a continued American presence on the European continent. Thus the contours of the future transatlantic relationship are still uncertain. Where does this leave Germany’s remade identity and Germany’s changed foreign policy? Germany can say it has regained self-confidence. This act of emancipation, as Schröder called it, of ensuring that foreign policy was made in Berlin and nowhere else, involved much rejection of Germany’s past, including its successful past. As the chapters of this thesis have shown, Schröder engaged in dismantling the various cornerstones of traditional post-1949 West German foreign policy. His policy of de-linkage, however, has left Germany, seven years later, in a weaker position in terms of its normative power and ‘with less diplomatic influence than it had seven years ago’ (Grant 2005).

Stating a new international assertiveness was not the same as practising it effectively. Assertiveness implies a will to responsible action and the projection of influence. Between 2000 and 2003 Germany lost influence and the strength to forge coalitions through the self-inflicted weakening of its normative power when Berlin’s position in transatlantic relations and European integration diminished considerably. There was a gap between Germany’s claim to power parity and the sense of responsibility that a great power should exert in foreign policy. Berlin seemed less preoccupied with influencing international politics than with demanding a respected status for itself. Schröder acted irresponsibly when he jeopardized the centrality of Germany’s position in the Euro-Atlantic community. If Schroder’s intention had been to
exercise German leadership he failed: in Europe’s world leadership has to be exercised in an integrative manner, through the inclusion of all involved, the big and the smaller countries. In that sense, Berlin began to change its position when in 2003 it supported the trilateral initiatives with Paris and London which at least seemed to reassure the smaller Atlanticist European members.

In other words, if we consider that Germany moves within what Robert Cooper has termed the ‘post-modern world’, the normative framework of the constitutional order assures the effectiveness of Germany’s normative power. In this post-modern world, where sovereignty and the balance of power have been superseded by a new security system and new norms of international diplomacy, traditional states remain the fundamental units, even though ‘they might have ceased to behave in traditional ways’.

Yet in dealing with the modern world, where the classical state system remains intact, or with the pre-modern world, characterised by pre-state, post-imperial chaos, the exclusive use of normative power is of little practical effect, and can, in situations of crises, initially be more of a hindrance than a sign of strength.

While during the Cold War Germany’s normative power was effectively employed within what was mostly a Euro-Atlantic area of norm projection, in the present world, the real test for German foreign policy will be for policy-makers to define to what extent they are willing to make use of other forms of power, including military means, for more than merely humanitarian and reconstruction purposes, in interventions to create regional stability. It is then a thin line between power politics and upholding the validity and legitimacy of the norms and institutions to which the Federal Republic has contributed.

Yet, in this undefined new system, falling between global unipolarity with American preponderance and multipolarity among regional great powers, Germany will only succeed as long as it stays firmly embedded in the European Union, where it is a main player, together, increasingly, with a role as a Euro-Atlantic power in close cooperation with Washington. Merkel’s international approach seems to be heading in the latter direction. Merkel managed to transform the German-American post-crisis reconciliation into a strengthening of the wider trans-Atlantic community. The attempt to forge a new trans-Atlantic economic partnership was essentially Merkel’s initiative

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332 Robert Cooper (2003). *The Breaking of Nations. Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century*, London: Atlantic Books, p. 32. The pre-modern world belongs, according to Cooper, in a different time zone: ‘as in the ancient world, the choice is again between empire and chaos.’ (p. 17) The modern world is characterised by nation states in a system of balance of power or hegemonic states which are willing to resort to the use of force to maintain the status quo (p. 22)
followed during the German presidency of the European Union. Indirectly this had a beneficial outcome through ending the EU’s own constitutional impasse.

This suggests that Merkel’s pragmatic style has led to the enlargement of the realm of Germany’s foreign policy projection. It has revealed a more strategic global vision, in fact one, where former foreign minister Fischer would have better pursued its own strategic framework for security around the EU, especially around the Mediterranean basin and Middle East. In forging a rebuilt transatlantic partnership, Germany aims to position itself as Washington’s new indispensable partner. This represents a change from previous policies and attests to Germany’s affirmation not only as a European but increasingly also as a transatlantic power, and the aspiration to be a global player. However, the means towards exerting a more global foreign policy will depend, first, on its capacity in maintaining its normative power, especially within its own area of policy-making. Secondly, its new role will depend on Germany’s ability to support the EU’s will to act internationally.

With the present grand coalition government Germany has entered a more pragmatic phase of its emergence as a European power. The Merkel government relinquished the attempt to reconcile deeper integration with enlargement, as it has moved away from the automatism of ever increasing Europeanisation seen in the Kohl years. At the same time Merkel rejected Schröder’s emancipation politics which risked eroding the traditional pillars of a successful foreign policy. With regard to the first, Merkel stated her preference for institutional reform and resolving the European constitutional crisis; with regard to the second, she reaffirmed Germany’s policy of Euro-Atlantic linkage. Parallel to this readjustment a more assertive German foreign policy is taking shape through a strengthening of the instruments of multilateralism, but through a lessening of its Europeanised policy-making style; while Berlin maintains a highly multilateral policy approach with other countries and powers, the context for multilateralism has been gradually enlarged. In policy terms, Berlin maintains its integrationist stance but has increased its diplomatic manoeuvrability by participating in selective multilateral initiatives like the EU3+1 approach towards Iran, together with Britain and France.

In the global competition for power, and in the political struggle for multipolarity, Germany has experienced the limits of its ability to contest American primacy. In the aftermath of the German-American row over the Iraq war, Berlin’s unilateralism did not pay off, and furthermore contributed to Europe’s own

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constitutional crisis in 2005. The Merkel government has therefore repositioned Berlin’s diplomacy in European and transatlantic institutional structures and embarked on the enlargement of the transatlantic normative area.

To the extent that the member countries of the European Union want to develop a joint European foreign policy and a credible European defence structure, Germany, as one of its main supporters, will have to make continuous adjustments. First, it will have to ensure the necessary resources and means to make this policy viable. Secondly, it will have to contribute to a multilateral European strategic ambition in defining the purpose of such a foreign and defence policy. While the ESS gives an indication of what Europe’s strategy should be, the means of its implementation still leaves room for manoeuvre for the member states, which can make a common strategic approach difficult.

The acceptance of a more utilitarian, deliberate power and the use of a logic of consequentialism have led Germany to be active in building coalitions and forging initiatives with other big powers. It is precisely regarding the Middle East that these great power initiatives have materialised. To deal with Iran’s ambition to become a nuclear power, Germany has been accepted as the sixth element at the negotiating table of the Security Council’s permanent members (P5+1). In EU politics, Germany has also applied this selective initiative together with Britain and France, and the CFSP’s foreign policy chief, Javier Solana (EU3+1) in the continuous attempt to stop Iran from acquiring offensive nuclear power. These initiatives have been a much more effective way for Germany to translate its increased power into effective action than the previous unilateral initiatives earlier this decade, or the failed attempts to forge a German-French-Russian triangular relationship with a specific anti-American tone as was attempted in 2003. These more recent initiatives, which began during the Schröder government have been diplomatically more productive and have increased Germany’s deliberate power. In its selective multilateralist approach Germany can return to a mediating role within these initiatives. Thus, given divergences between the five members of the UNSC as to how to deal with Iran, Berlin can play a mediating role between the U.S., Britain and France, which support a harder approach towards Teheran, and Russia and China, which are more inclined towards a less coercive line, refusing to threaten Iran with the use of force. Thus while to the outside world these initiatives reflect big power exclusiveness, within these groupings members can mediate between them and seek to contain less acceptable outcomes. Germany’s position within this grouping, where it can argue just as much for an anti-war stance, thus plays a more
constructive role and stands in direct opposition to Berlin’s unilateral anti-war stance in 2002. And even if the outcome of a change in Iran’s position has not yet been able to materialise, the cohesiveness of a European position can be more productively attempted through this core group or leadership group position rather than through unilateral positions.

Between 1997 and 2007 Germany has adopted a new international identity as a more assertive power. To achieve this new position its leaders have attempted four different power routes. Chancellor Kohl wanted to avoid change by maintaining the institutional continuities in the hope of a gradual increase of power. Chancellor Schröder pursued unilateral stances against Washington and new relationships with Russia and France. Seeing the failure of both attempts the Schröder government followed a different, more selective and utilitarian multilateralism through concerted action within given institutional structures (Germany, Britain and France on defence initiatives or Iran). The Merkel government has maintained the utilitarian multilateralist approach through concerted action and coalition building with different EU partners, while returning to the more traditional role of mediating between big and smaller member states. The first two routes no longer serve Germany’s interests, while the second two are now Berlin’s preferred diplomatic instrument.

Despite Germany’s strong embeddedness in European institutional structures, changes in foreign policy were a direct consequence of domestic change which was induced by policy-makers and the political and cultural elite (e.g. Martin Walser) ready to challenge normative core values, such as the meaning of history for Germany’s foreign actions. Norms and ideas remain important, but policy-makers loosened ideational structures and Germany has lost the inhibition to articulate its interests more forcefully and in different institutional arenas. Because of Germany’s receptiveness towards the realm of ideas, its foreign policy continues to be shaped by its identity, by what sort of country it wants to be recognised as internationally, and by what sort of power it projects when it exteriorizes its identity. Thus the use of normative power has become more selective, since policy-makers no longer feel as constrained as before to invoke new justifications.

Javier Solana’s statement at the beginning of the chapter remains valid. Identity has an impact on foreign policy. For what European powers – and the EU - do on the international stage is also a function of their identity and of how they define themselves and the values they seek to promote abroad. Germany’s identity as a reflexive multilateralist was constructed through its European policy and through the location of
its foreign policy mostly in the normative anti-hegemonic foundation of the European Union where realism was ‘too normatively unacceptable’ (Hill 2002:88) to have an impact on decisions taken. But the EU’s normative motivation to become an international actor and Germany’s increased engagement outside the realm of the Euro-Atlantic area, suggest that realism may be more necessary than German politicians are willing to accept to uphold the normative order. German diplomacy is confronted with this reality the more it engages in an assertive foreign policy, as the EU 3+1 initiative and the ESDP and other operations have revealed. There is an increasing willingness on the part of Germany to maintain the normative power approach, but to combine it with more effective capabilities. Thus the decision to make use of military power remains contingent on the framing of the issues according to the normative power perspective.

The challenge for German foreign policy-makers is not to reject the normative or the realist approach, but to combine the strengths of Germany’s new foreign policy identity and not to feel inhibited to act according to a combined logic of appropriateness and consequentiality. But the German political class has to reveal more boldness in preparing the German electorate for the inevitable costs and risks involved in regained prestige and power. The ongoing debate on Germany’s military involvement in Afghanistan, for example, and the growing public scepticism surrounding such operations, suggests that Germany’s remaking of foreign policy identity is far from over and the hard tests of a more assertive international commitment have not yet won over the hearts and minds of Germany’s citizens.
Appendices

Charter of the United Nations

Article 53

CHAPTER VIII: REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.

2. The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.

Article 77

CHAPTER XII: INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM

1. The trusteeship system shall apply to such territories in the following categories as may be placed thereunder by means of trusteeship agreements:

   a. territories now held under mandate;
   b. territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War; and
   c. territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration.

   It will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which territories in the foregoing categories will be brought under the trusteeship system and upon what terms.

Article 107

CHAPTER XVII: TRANSITIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the Governments having responsibility for such action.

http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/
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Gernot Erler, SPD, 28 September 2000
Member of the Bundestag. Minister of State at the Foreign Office since November 2005.

Helmut Haussmann, FDP, 28 September 2000
Member of the Bundestag.

Werner Hoyer, FDP, Berlin, 25 September 2000
Member of the Bundestag.

Ulrich Irmer, FDP, 25 September 2000
Member of the Bundestag.

Helmut Lippelt, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 28 September 2000
Member of the Bundestag.

Gero Pfennig, CDU/CSU, Berlin, 27 September 2000
Member of the Bundestag.

Friedbert Pflüger, CDU/CSU, Berlin, 26 September 2000
Member of the Bundestag and chairman of the Committee on EU affairs.

Holger Ruthe, London, 8 July 1999
European Union Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Wolfgang Schäuble, CDU/CSU, Berlin, 25 September 2000
Member of the Bundestag. Interior Minister of the FRG since November 2005.

Christian Schmidt, CDU/CSU, Berlin, 28 September 2000
Member of the Bundestag and the Defence Committee. Parliamentary State Secretary to the Federal Minister of Defence since November 2005.

Andreas Schockenhoff, CDU/CSU, Berlin, 26 September 2000
Member of the Bundestag, Coordinator for German-Russian Intersocietal cooperation in the Foreign Ministry since 2006.

Member of the Bundestag.

Friedrich von Ploetz, London, 5 October 2000
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Christoph Bertram, Lisbon, October 2005.


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