Flagging nations? Exploring the banality of national discourse through a study of everyday talk and media texts in England

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A thesis submitted to the Department of Media and Communications of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, March 2008
Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

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Abstract

This study explores the banality of national discourse in England in an era that has been described as globalising. Drawing on the broader tenets of social constructionism, the concept of sedimentation will be employed as a means of understanding how certain discourses come to be embedded in the everyday lives of significant numbers in relation to particular historical conditions. This framework will be used to extend Michael Billig's seminal thesis of *Banal Nationalism* (1995) in an effort to address the complexities of a multi-national, post-imperial society.

The primary data set comes from a series of interviews with white, English-born people, who constitute the majority group in Britain. Various media texts have also been studied as a means of tracking any relevant debates at another level of society. The analysis suggests that national discourse continues to offer a 'common sense' heuristic within social interactions, informing manifold ways in which people articulate their lives. The resonance of this discourse is exhibited through a whole range of micro-linguistic and inter-textual features, underpinned by a framework of shared knowledge and assumptions.

This framework was particularly evident when people discussed issues such as immigration and multiculturalism, which were generally evaluated as threats to a homogeneous and bounded national space. In these cases, distinctions were made between those who un/conditionally belonged to the nation, with various minority groups often stigmatised as internal 'Others' and seen to be destabilising everyday (national) practices, utterances and symbols. The growing sense of ontological insecurity generated by these perceived threats is also thought to partly underlie the increasing visibility of national displays within England at the current time.

Finally, while increasing global mobility may sometimes pose a challenge to national frameworks, I suggest that any movement beyond the nation, whether cognitive and/or physical, is better conceptualised as a form of conditional cosmopolitanism, often underpinned by a secure sense of 'home', agency and access to cultural / economic capital.
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Acknowledgements

Over the four, long - mostly enjoyable, sometimes fractious - years I've been researching this thesis, I'd always imagined writing the acknowledgements page as being akin to crossing the finishing line and from time to time found myself idly daydreaming about what it would be like to finally sit down and do it. Now it's here, I'm wondering about two things; where all that time went and what happened to all the wonderful, witty gags I came up with (and instantly forgot) along the way. In lieu of them, a large helping of thanks goes out to:

- the Arts & Humanities Research Council who funded this research and have been flexible enough to put up with my conspicuous inability to read the fine print in pretty much everything. The LSE Finance Office also provided much needed financial assistance during my final year.

- Professor Clare Mar-Molinero at the University of Southampton who breathed life into my somewhat tentative attempts to get this thesis underway (and funded) and enabled me to find my feet during my first year back in academia.

- Professor Nick Couldry who took up the reins after my move to London and provided a great deal of time and encouragement, as well as intellectual rigour, during a sometimes painful process of adjustment. Both his writing and inter-disciplinary approach have been a constant source of inspiration.

- Professor Sonia Livingstone was good enough to step into Nick's shoes on his moving onwards and upwards and has kept the home fires burning with her classic combination of pithy asides and downright difficult questioning!

- Academic staff at both the Transnational Research Centre at University of Southampton and the Department of Media & Communications at the LSE, including the late, great Roger Silverstone, Professor Tehri Rantanen and, in particular, Professor Lilie Chouliaraki, who met with me on a number of occasions during the final writing up period. I've also received assistance and advice from various goody folks from around the LSE including; Jean Morris, Cath Bennett, Vanessa Cragoe, Kavita Abrahams, Steve Gaskell and Steve Bennett.

- Colleagues, friends and fellow PhD'ers at Media@LSE who have provided a constant source of entertainment and good old fashioned bitching when re-reading Foucault for the 27th time seemed like no fun at all. Special mentions in dispatches go to Maria "My academic idol" Kyriakidou, Indrek Ibrus, Patrick McCurdy, Niall Brennan, Ulla Rannikko, Ellen Helsper, Ana Langer, David Brake and Zoe Sujon. Cathy "P-Sheath" Baldwin at the University of Oxford also gets a large cup of something for introducing me to the wonders of doing ethnography in Swindon!

- My family, who have always unconditionally supported my endeavours, even when slightly puzzled by my strange choice in books not to mention the fact that I wanted to go back to university yet again. Much love to all.
• All the assorted reprobates I’m proud to call my friends who have kept up a constant barrage of good times and witty repartee but most importantly have reminded me that sometimes there’s more to life than re-reading Foucault for the 27th time! Large helpings of whatever it is makes you happy to Stu & Mel (and the family), Shash & Meg, Nigel Pollitt, Willease, P Patel, Si & Jo, Jimmy Mac, Spud & Fi, Captain Fabs, Dave the (Croydon) Drummer, Gayu, Dr P, Brian Murphy and everyone else who’s been there or thereabouts - you know who you are.

• Finally, thanks to all those who took part in and helped me organise the group interviews that form the primary data set for this research.

In memory of Professor Roger Silverstone and Ian Woodham
“Deze draag ik op aan diegene van wie ik hou”

Inge
Thesis Overview

In the summer of 2002 I returned home to London after a two year 'break' in Australia to the aftermath of what appeared to have been an extended party to celebrate the Queen's Golden Jubilee and the England football team’s world cup campaign in the far-east. Cars, pubs, houses and other buildings were still covered in British and, in particular, English national flags and I remember thinking that I had not seen anything like this before. At the time, I had puzzled about what this striking display might mean and, in many respects this episode provided the impetus or spark for this research project.

As a result, I first came to be interested in examining whether this and subsequent, high-profile national celebrations might tell us anything substantial about processes of national identification in England in the contemporary era. In due course, my interest moved beyond these events to also focus on the wider socio-political landscape. A number of interesting developments point towards the type of underlying issues that will be of primary interest here.

For example, in November 2005, the British media reported on the details of a 'citizenship test' that all those who wished to become British citizens were now required by law to pass so that they could prove they were familiar with the country's culture, traditions and laws (Daily Mail, The Guardian, 01/11/05). The questions ranged from those concerning historical details to the laws governing the sale of alcohol and the answers are to be found in a handbook, which the examinees are required to study prior to the test1.

Three months later, the then Chancellor Gordon Brown MP provided the keynote address at a Fabian Society conference on the subject of Britishness. In this speech, and during subsequent public discussions on the same topic, he argued for the creation of a public holiday to "develop the ties that bind us more closely together"2. At around the same time, a grassroots campaign was set up by a number of different groups, this time in England, which culminated in the former cricketer Ian Botham visiting 10 Downing Street to hand over a petition to the British Prime Minister

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1 www.lifeintheuktest.gov.uk
2 http://fabians.org.uk/events/new-year-conference-06/brown-britishness/speech
demanding that St George’s Day be recognized as an official bank holiday for the English\(^3\). The petition contained over half a million signatures.

In July 2006, the Labour MP, Ruth Kelly was appointed as the first Communities Secretary in the British cabinet with a remit “to create cohesive, thriving, sustainable communities capable of both fulfilling their own potential and of overcoming their own difficulties, including community conflict, deprivation and disadvantage”\(^4\). This was largely viewed as a response to growing popular criticisms of the ‘official’ policy on multiculturalism, which was seen by its critics to produce divided (ethnic) communities and social disharmony (Phillips, 2006). Those adopting such a position pointed toward the ‘race’ riots that occurred across a number of northern cities in England in the summer of 2001 and, in particular, the London tube bombings (carried out by British citizens) in July 2005.

Finally, the relationships between the constituent nations within Britain itself have also changed significantly since partial devolution was granted to both Scotland and Wales in 1999, causing the very idea of Britishness to come under increasing scrutiny. This has left the group most associated with the British political project, the English, to try and make sense of the new socio-political landscape (Kumar, 2003: 250-252). In this case, a wealth of popular outpourings on the subject of Englishness point to the gradual emergence of a more reflexive engagement with such questions compared to the past, where Britain and England were largely conflated (Kumar, 2000).

These macro debates, evidenced by ministerial speeches, policy debates and media reportage, tell us something significant may be happening in England/Britain at the current time. For instance, the fact that a need for a citizenship test has been identified tells us something fundamentally important about the category of Britishness today, namely that it is being subject to scrutiny. Tests, by their very nature, are a demonstration of some ability, be it practical skills or knowledge, and are generally required when there is a question mark over someone’s suitability for a task or role. In this case, the apparent need for a citizenship test seems to indicate an increasing degree of uncertainty about who can be identified as British.

\(^3\) St George is the patron saint of England.

Similarly, it is only recently and in response to particular events, generally involving certain types of people living in Britain, that political elites have deemed it necessary to have a Cabinet position that is specifically focused on ‘community cohesion’. As Zygmunt Bauman (2001) has argued the highly valued, yet rather diffuse, concept of community only becomes a subject for discussion when it is perceived to be under threat. One of the questions to be addressed in this study is what has caused this shift and how is it being responded to.

This idea can also be applied to the wider debates surrounding the perceived need for a particular day on which to celebrate the nation, be it Britain or England. Interestingly, Britain is one of the few nation-states that does not have an official holiday to celebrate its creation and/or history and, as a subject for serious political debate this topic would have been largely unthinkable until recent times. Indeed, waving a flag in the name of one’s nation was, outside of fairly rare public occasions such as the annual ‘Last Night of the Proms’ concert and various Royal Weddings and anniversaries, seen to be the province of extremist political organisations and football fans/hooligans until a decade ago (Perryman, 2005: 203).

Therefore, underpinning this research is the emergence of a set of sustained debates around questions of (national) identity and belonging in the past decade or more and the impact of wider structural transformations at a European and global level. However, while it is relatively easy to point to examples of these processes at the institutional level and there is a growing body of work charting the expressions and attitudes of different ‘ethnic’ groups across Britain, relatively little attention has been paid to the concerns and beliefs of those ‘ordinary’ people who are in terms of numbers the majority in Britain, the white English. Part of the reason for this lacuna may lie in the twin perceptions of this group as both homogeneous and the unmarked category against which other more visible minorities are defined. As a result, in both the popular and scholarly imagination the “Anglo white majority” has been assumed to have a more settled sense of self and place that makes them less worthy of scrutiny or discussion (Nayak, 2003: 139). In contrast, it is suggested here that representatives of this group might in fact be the ideal people to engage with in order to try and assess

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5 England’s population in 2002 was 84% of the total population of the UK, while whites comprised 92.1% of the English population (Office of National Statistics, 2003: 8/96).

6 Recent work on the subject of whiteness is beginning to open up this assumption to more critical scrutiny (see, for example, Frankenburg, 2000, Byrne, 2007, Garner, 2007).
whether this taken-for-granted status has any validity - both now and in the past - and how the transformations identified at the macro-level are perceived and addressed, if at all.

Therefore, the two research questions that will inform this study are as follows;

*Research Questions*

*Primary Question*

To what extent do a range of individuals from the white, English-born population in England continue to draw on (and thereby constitute) a *taken-for-granted* national discourse as a means of understanding and articulating self and other in an era characterised by increasing global flows in people, products, ideas and images?

*Secondary Questions*

What can this study of everyday talk tell us about current conceptions of national identity in Britain/England among this majority group and, in particular, what do these debates reveal about their own (perceived) status in relation to 'Others' within the national space?

In order to complement the analysis of the primary data, is it possible to identify similar concepts, references and categorisations in a wider institutional setting, indicating the extent to which such debates have become embedded across British/English society?

*Theoretical Framework*

Over the past three decades, interest in the subject of nationalism and national identity has grown enormously across a range of disciplines. Early engagements with the topic, what might be labelled the 'classic' literature, generally adopted a more macro-historical perspective and concentrated on identifying causal factors in the transformation to an international system comprised of sovereign nation-states. In contrast, a more recent wave of research, inspired by the discursive 'turn' across the social sciences, has looked to chart the competing ways of talking about the same national identity, the relations of power embedded in these processes and the extent
to which a national discourse informs the ways in which people make sense of the world and orientate themselves in relation to 'Others'.

Therefore, in the first section of Chapter 1, the underlying differences between these two approaches will be explored, notably in terms of epistemology, scope of enquiry, methodological constraints and historical focus. These discussions will be used to outline the advantages of using a discourse analytic approach for the purposes of this study, notably in offering "a more dynamic and historically-sensitive mode of critical enquiry" (Chouliaraki, forthcoming).

The next section will be used to explore, in more detail, the theoretical framework that underpins this work, first by outlining and justifying the definition of discourse being employed. I will then outline the significance to this work of theoretical insights from a number of different approaches across the field of discourse analysis, notably as they relate to issues of power and agency. This will include references to discourse theory, critical discourse analysis (particularly the discourse-historical perspective) and discursive psychology.

Then taking Michel Foucault's writing on the productivity of power as my starting point, I will look to trace some of the links between 'common sense' forms of knowledge and the establishment of relatively stable identity formations. The key concepts of order of discourse and sedimentation will be utilised as a means of theorising the dialectic between change and continuity in the (re)production of discourse. The first looks to foreground the ongoing struggle between alternative, contingent 'realities', backed by institutional structures. The second can be used to conceptualise the processes whereby particular forms of social knowledge come to be sedimented so that they are viewed as 'natural' and common sense.

In the penultimate section of Chapter 1, the focus will shift to the micro-level where it will be argued that it is the realm of the everyday which forms the bedrock for the (re)production of particular forms of social knowledge/relations, including those defined in national terms. These discussions will draw on a range of studies that have attempted to theorise 'everyday life', both in terms of its major experiential features (Schutz, Garfinkel, Berger & Luckmann, Giddens) and as a significant locus for the exercise of power (Lefebvre, Rose).
In this way, a more dynamic framework, designed to effectively theorise the processes by which discourses are established, sustained and transformed, can be built. Moreover, while this thesis follows previous studies (cf Wodak et al, 1999, 2001, Ricento, 2003, Mainhof & Galasinski, 2005, Madianou, 2005, Brubaker et al, 2006) in attending to both the macro-level, by accounting for the impact of structural changes, and, the meso/micro-level, by focusing on the (re)creation of discourse in practice, its primary concerns necessitate a different line of enquiry. In particular, there is an interest in exploring the ways in which (national) discourse(s) produces relatively stable subject positions, which are made meaningful through, temporally regulated and spatially defined, everyday practices and utterances. In underpinning an ongoing and relatively secure sense of self, 'Other' and place these subjectivities may come to be both materially and ontologically valuable, so that challenges to them are passionately resisted.

The final part of Chapter 1 will address a number of broader critiques of such an approach, including the problem of actually defining the parameters of any particular discourse. In this respect, the first part of Chapter 2 will briefly acknowledge the contribution of those who have attempted to map the dimensions that draw together and underpin the myriad expressions, practices and mobilisations that articulate (and constitute) national discourse (Wodak et al, 1999, Ozkirimli, 2005). Subsequently, I will argue that the key dimension for those focusing on contemporary expressions of national discourse in England is its routine, everyday (re)production.

Although there is an established (and growing) literature on this subject both in relation to national and other discourses, I will be using Michael Billig's seminal thesis of Banal Nationalism (1995) as a starting point for three main reasons. First, Billig's study is arguably the key reference point within the wider literature on nationalism, which marks a significant shift towards the ongoing analysis of contemporary expressions of nationhood at the quotidian level. Second, although this work is often referenced both in relation to national (cf Palmer, 1997, Reicher & Hopkins, 2001, Foster, 2002, Hester & Houseley, 2002, Edensor, 2002, 2006, Madianou, 2005, Brubaker et al, 2006, Bratsis, 2006, Byrne, 2006) and other social identities (Aksoy & Robins, 2002, Gorringe, 2006, Szersknski & Urry, 2006, Beck, 2006, Cram, 2001) there has been no systematic engagement with Billig's thesis or its implications in an era of rapid globalisation. Third, it can be used to open up a number of important debates in relation to those who have contributed to the study of everyday discourse in related
fields. These discussions will then be used to detail the main preoccupations and objectives of this particular study.

Initially, Billig's major arguments and contributions will be outlined. Then an attempt will be made to extend the original thesis, first by interrogating a number primary assumptions and second, by introducing the key element of dynamism. In the former case, ideas concerning the role of the media, national audiences and the assumed homogeneity of established nation-states will be scrutinised. In addition, the concept of ecstatic nationalism will be introduced in order to conceptualise the important and often overlooked relationship between the banal and those ecstatic. These events, in mobilising significant numbers of people, are seen to have a crucial role in "natural[ising] a common-sense perception that we live in, and belong to, nations" (Thompson, 2001: 19), notably during times of uncertainty or transformation.

In the latter case, the limitations of Billig's rather one-dimensional approach to globalisation will be foregrounded by examining the arguments of those who propose that increasing global flows in people, products, ideas and images may be challenging national forms of organisation and identification. However, rather than viewing the global and the national in terms of a zero-sum relationship, it is suggested that a more grounded approach, drawing again on the concept of de/sedimentation, is utilised as a means of empirically investigating those contexts where previously taken-for-granted forms of national life may be opened up to further scrutiny and perhaps rejected. Alternatively, Anthony Giddens' concept of "ontological security" (1990: 92) and the idea of 'home', as both a physical and symbolic haven (Morley, 2000), will be (re)deployed to illustrate why national discourse may remain a powerful feature for significant numbers.

The macro perspective

As a means of contextualising discussions in the empirical chapters, a brief overview of some of the major historical developments in Britain, relating to issues of identity, belonging and place, will be presented in Chapter 3. Beginning with the creation of the British state in 1707 and the subsequent expansion of empire, Robin Cohen's concept of "the frontiers of British identity" (1994) will be utilised in order to investigate how processes of colonisation and the categorisation of different 'Others' has been used to generate a sense of Britishness over time. The recent post-war
history of Britain will then be explored so as to observe the degree to which post-imperial decline, colonial migration, European integration and devolution have all impacted on the ways in which categories of in and out-groups have been constructed and maintained both across Britain and, in particular, England. In this respect, the rise in debates about Englishness will be referenced both at the day-to-day level and in terms of the aforementioned increase in mass, public displays. The transformation of the social and economic landscape as a result of the Thatcherite legacy will also be noted, as a number of key social theorists have linked wider structural constraints to changing perceptions of mobility, work, welfare and identity in the past three decades.

Methodological Challenges

A methodological chapter will outline a number of key issues in designing a research project aimed at effectively studying what is a complex and almost limitless terrain. In particular justifications will be given for choosing to study the 'everyday talk' of different representatives from the white, English-born majority in England and for using group interviews as the primary research method. Questions of validity, reliability and ethics will be specifically addressed before it is suggested that a range of (more limited) data sets are required in order to complement the group discussions. These are primarily designed to show the degree to which some of the issues raised within the interviews are also reflected in both media reportage and wider quantitative survey results thereby representing a significant feature across the current socio-political landscape in England. The final section of this chapter will be used to discuss how the data will be analysed, using techniques from a range of discourse analytic approaches and content analysis. The software package Alceste will also be used to provide an overview of the interview data as a means of identifying key patterns of language use across the groups. Some of the challenges of coding, analysing and selecting examples from such extensive data sets will also be addressed.

Exploring the banality of national discourse

The first of the empirical chapters investigates when (and how) national discourse is routinely utilised as “a resource in the course of interaction” (Wodak, 2006: 108). Observing these processes, across different institutional and vernacular settings,
provides an opportunity to assess the extent to which such a framework remains largely taken-for-granted (and hence sedimented) at the current time. Exploring some of the key micro-linguistic and inter-textual features involved in the (re)production of this discourse will also allow us to consider the consequences of its usage, notably in defining who is seen to belong in the national space and why.

In the first section of Chapter 5 the results of a content analysis of daily news reportage by London-based, British media outlets are presented. This is partly designed as a response to Michael Billig’s call for more systematic studies to be undertaken into the role of the media in “banally flagging” (1995: 109) the nation, by codifying the ways in which the media routinely reference a national context through processes of selection, categorisation and signification. This analysis will demonstrate the role of powerful institutional actors in (re)producing a ‘common sense’ national framework across British society, which may then be used to inform everyday understandings and expressions.

The second section provides an analysis of the group interview data, in the first part by examining talk about the nation (Fox & Miller-Idriss, forthcoming). This enables us to examine the degree to which different individuals broadly share similar ideas about what it means to be English or British. Here Ghassan Hage’s concept of “national cultural capital” (1998: 55) will be used to explore how particular ‘versions’ of the nation are privileged. The extent to which these discussions can be classified as routine, because they are not viewed as problematic, may also offer evidence as to the sedimented nature of national modes of thinking among the respondents.

The second part of this section will shift focus to analyse different forms of talk with the nation (Fox & Miller-Idriss, forthcoming). These will be used to show how national discourse is routinely used to articulate or locate particular individuals or processes using realist concepts and/or forms of language (Gergen, 2001: 18-20). Here, reference will be made to some of the earlier theoretical discussions concerning the importance of everyday linguistic features and ‘common’ forms of knowledge in generating a shared sense of understanding and hence predictability when discussing disparate topics. It will also be possible to assess whether the features identified in the media analysis are also routinely employed in ‘everyday’ talk, thus indicating the degree to which such features are firmly embedded within a range of different settings.
In the final part of the chapter, instances where individuals move between discourses, often in the same conversation, will be examined as a means of studying how particular rhetorical strategies are utilised according to context and need. In particular, it will be noted how such shifts often take place in order to manage or resolve more complex debates and how national discourse may offer a more stable footing in these situations because it is so taken-for-granted.

Managing perceived threats to the nation

Having used the previous chapter to examine the degree to which national discourse continues to offer a shared framework of reference for many, Chapter 6 explores the ways in which certain issues were discussed as threats to the nation. Subjects such as immigration and multiculturalism dominated some of the group interviews, were generally raised by the respondents and often debated in strikingly consistent ways.

For although the economic contribution of some migrants was acknowledged many argued that particular forms of migration posed a threat to a bounded, homogeneous and taken-for-granted national culture. In many of these cases, increasingly assertive, and often racialised, minority groups were seen to have crossed a threshold of tolerance, whereby they could no longer be ‘domesticated’ within the national space (Hage, 1998). These expressions point to the degree to which different groups are seen to unconditionally belong to the nation, with whiteness seen as a key element in validating those who claim to be the rightful managers of national space.

Interestingly, these threats to national culture and values were often articulated in terms of routine symbols and practices, offering some evidence that commonly accepted normative prescriptions about national values and traditions begin to unravel in the face of sustained scrutiny so that the nation becomes defined and materialised in relation to the everyday realm.

A concluding section draws on both Garfinkel’s work (2004) on the breaching of ‘common sense’ forms of knowledge and Giddens’ concept of ontological security in order to theorise these passionate debates as attempts to resediment a discursive framework that is valued for offering both social status and psychological stability.
The significance of ecstatic nationalism in post-devolution England

The role of ecstatic national events in concretising an image of the nation, notably during times of crisis or transformation, has been somewhat underplayed in the wider literature and this will be the subject of Chapter 7. With a rise in the number of events designed to celebrate the English nation and/or its sporting representatives, I was particularly interested in investigating the range of responses to such events both in terms of participation and perception.

Unsurprisingly levels of participation varied across the groups, as did the justifications for not/taking part. Interestingly, many of those questioned described these events as inappropriate or shameful, in the process putting forward a particular, dominant version of Englishness, defined as rational, civil and agnostic towards nationalism. This was in contrast to both internal and external ‘Others’ who were seen to be emotional and hubristic. However, it was suggested that while many have no interest in taking part in these activities, where significant numbers are involved the nation becomes temporarily realised through these myriad, more or less coordinated activities. Asked to account for the increasing visibility of such events over the past decade or more, my respondents argued that this phenomenon was either part of a media-led movement or the attempts of a threatened majority to re-assert their status. This latter position will be used to offer further evidence as to the opening up (or desedimenting) of a previously taken-for-granted national discourse at the current time.

A similar case will be made for the subject of St George’s Day, a putative national event in England, which while the subject of relatively little passionate debate, generated some concerns about the ability of minorities to assert themselves at the expense of the majority. In this case, however, the subject of devolution, and its implications for the majority English, was often used to frame these debates, evidenced by both my respondents and some of the wider media coverage.

Unpacking cosmopolitan discourse through an analysis of home, agency and privilege

The final empirical chapter will offer a different perspective from those preceding it, by investigating the extent to which different individuals drew on discourses that moved beyond the national in order to make sense of and orientate themselves at the
current time. This is primarily a response to those scholars who have focused on the idea(l) of the cosmopolitan, one who is open to and willing to engage with 'otherness', in an era of increasing global mobilities. In this respect, we can point to a wide range of issues discussed by my respondents, ranging from patterns of mobility and consumption, to attitudes towards travel and European integration.

In the first instance, we will examine whether the indicators of growing mobility on a more macro scale were evidenced by my discussants in relation to their own patterns of movement and consumption. The role of the media is also briefly addressed by exploring the idea that they allow people to ‘travel’ imaginatively without having to leave the comfort of their own homes. By drawing on these discussions, and a number of related empirical studies, it is possible to acknowledge the significance of, and potential for, an increased engagement with other cultures, whilst also observing how these processes depend on a sense of agency and access to economic and cultural resources.

Moving beyond the description of current practices that may bypass or obscure national frameworks, assessments will be made as to whether these forms of mobility and consumption were seen to be meaningful and, if so, in what ways. In particular, there is a primary interest in examining whether, when and how a more cosmopolitan discourse is articulated whether in general terms or in relation to specific events, such as the Asian Tsunami (Chouliaraki, 2005, Kivukuru, 2006), or topics, namely European integration. Interestingly, while the well-worn dichotomy between the tourist and traveller is reproduced extensively it tends to be underpinned by a sense of privilege linked to an ability to return ‘home’ and/or manage any engagement with ‘otherness’. In these cases, we may be witnessing growing forms of conditional cosmopolitanism that stand alongside rather than occluding more local/national allegiances.

Conclusions

A concluding section will draw together a number of the most important themes which have been developed across the chapters concerning the relationship between the everyday (re)production of national discourse through countless routine practices, utterances and symbols and the wider material and structural constraints that generate the “conditions of possibility and sedimentation” (Norval, 1996: 63). It is therefore by re-conceptualising and studying the banality of national discourse as both
an achievement and the product of an ongoing (and contested) process in an increasingly interconnected world that this thesis offers its most telling contributions.
Chapter 1  
Studying nations and nationalism:  
Theoretical approaches

*Introduction*

In engaging with the subject of nations and nationalism, one is entering into an area of scholarship that has grown exponentially in the past decade but has a relatively recent history dominated by a few pioneering works (Gellner, 1983, Smith, 1986, Anderson, 1991). In the first part of this chapter I want to offer a brief overview of some of these classic theories, first as a means of acknowledging their contribution in providing crucial insights into the origins and spread of nationalism, particularly by focusing on wider structural transformations.

A number of key weaknesses of these works will then be outlined both in general terms and in order to justify the approach to be used in this study. For instance, the search for a grand theory has often led to forms of “evolutionary historicism” (Malesevic, 2006: 128), largely obscuring the contingent, fragmented and contested nature of these transformations, while a macro-perspective is seen to be somewhat limiting for those attending to more contemporary expressions of nationhood.

These discussions will be used as an argument for expanding the scope of any enquiry, in an attempt to move beyond trying to explain *nationalism*\(^7\) in terms of a number of determining factors. Instead, I want to follow the ‘discursive turn’ that has led increasing numbers to explore the manifold ways in which human relations are understood, articulated and ordered in national terms. In reconceptualising these processes as part of a wider national discourse, it is possible to shift attention to the ongoing (re)production of national forms of identification and organisation, in both institutional and ordinary settings, through countless routine practices, utterances and symbols (cf Billig, 1995, Brubaker, 1994, 2006, Calhoun, 1997, Wodak et al, 1999, Ozkirimli, 2005).

Although this work engages with and draws upon a range of related studies, it can be differentiated in terms of a number of key concerns and theoretical insights. Therefore, in the second part of the chapter I will justify the definition of discourse

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\(^7\) Nationalism is defined for the purposes of this work as the attempt to achieve or maintain recognition of a community's uniqueness, based on any number of 'shared' characteristics, in a world that is premised on the legitimacy of an *international* order.
being employed in relation to some of the wider debates within the field. Then, using Foucault’s writing on the productivity of power as a starting point, the main theoretical framework will be outlined. In particular, the key concepts of sedimentation and order of discourse will be utilised, in combination with a number of theoretical approaches to the study of everyday life. This will focus attention on the processes by which particular discourses are realised and concretised, or alternatively challenged, through myriad daily activities and institutional demands. The final section will be devoted to engaging with a number of critiques of such an approach.

‘Classic’ theories of nationalism

Two competing schools of thought dominated the classic literature on nationalism for around three decades, in the process providing a “virtually inescapable frame of reference ... for one’s own (theoretical) stance on the matter” (van den Bossche, 2003: 493). On one side are those broadly categorised as modernists who argue that nationalism creates nations in, and only in, the modern era. This process is seen to be a result of the gradual (yet profound) shifts that took place, initially in Western Europe, in the socio-economic, political and cultural spheres from around the 15th century onwards (Hall, 1986, Breuilly 2001). On the other, stand the ethno-symbolists, who agree with the general thesis that nations are modern in terms of “their territorial consolidation, their mass-literate public cultures and their drive for self-determination” (Hutchinson, 2001:76) but alternatively posit “a casual link between ethnicity and the formation of nations” (Smith, 1986: 1). I will briefly address each in turn, first outlining some of the main arguments and contributions before noting how each has been subsequently critiqued.

Modernism

First, one should acknowledge that modernists form an extremely broad church with different authors stressing particular aspects of modernity as being salient in the emergence of nationalism. To take but three highly influential examples from the modernist canon: Gellner (1983) foregrounds the changing relationship between culture and state in the transformation from agrarian to industrial modes of production, Anderson (1991) notes the importance of print-capitalism and the fixity of vernacular languages in cementing the ‘imagined community’ of the nation in the minds of millions and Hobsbawm (1992) collates nation-building with the invention of
tradition, a process whereby political elites either adapt ancient traditions or simply invent them to meet novel situations in the modern world.

These examples are by no means exhaustive but give an indication as to some of the main pre-occupations of the modernist school. In particular, nations are viewed as "essentially territorial, political communities" (Smith, 1998: 20), emphasis is placed on the transformations wrought by the shift to industrial capitalism, attempts are made to identify casual factors within this period which might then be applied universally and, in what has been labelled a top-down approach (Smith, 2001: 57-58), there is a primary interest in the role of elite institutions, notably the state.

By focusing on origins, on the historical conditions in which national forms of organisation and mobilisation emerged and flourished, these studies began to foreground the subject as a serious academic concern (Thompson & Fevre, 2001). Placing these shifts within a broader sociological framework also challenged primordialist views that national communities are an intrinsic part of all human history and opened up to scrutiny the links between different forms of socio-political organisation and wider material and structural constraints. However, the privileging of particular causal factors and the use of an evolutionary model has also lead to some of the most powerful criticisms of modernist theories of nationalism.

**Critiques**

Perhaps the most fundamental criticism to be directed at the major modernist theories is that they are deterministic. That is, they build a case for one or more 'determining' factors being at the root of all nationalist movements with reference to either particular case studies or large-scale, macro-theorising (Sutherland, 2005). Secondly, in drawing their models from studies of particular periods, generally 18th and 19th centuries, and places, often Western Europe, and then applying them to other areas and eras, these theories reproduce the problem of what geographers call developmentalism (Taylor, 1993: 9-10). This is where different societies or areas are viewed as autonomous units and placed on a ladder according to their relative levels of development.

For instance, Gellner's "transition to modernity model" has been described as "exclusively inward looking" because it "explores an ideal type of industrial society as if that entity develops and exists in a geo-political vacuum" (Malasevic, 2006: 142).
However, individual nation-states are not isolated units but form part of a wider international system which, although idealised in terms of individual sovereignty and mutual recognition, is defined by wider relations of power (Hall, 1986: 139). This argument applies equally to the emergence of ‘older’ European nations (Llobera, 1995: 196-199) as it does to the more obvious post-colonial cases in the aftermath of the Second World War (Calhoun, 1997: 122, Bayly, 1999).

Another critique directed at modernist theories of nationalism is that they exaggerate the power of elites so that national culture is seen as being imposed from above as the masses are co-opted through invented traditions and/or standardised by a public education system and other powerful state organisations. As Roger Brubaker has argued, the ‘elite manipulation’ view (1998: 273-4) characterises elites as rational interest groups able to transmit new forms of cultural and political organisation into largely malleable populations. Such a proposal is challenged by Gellner’s observation that the potential number of nations by far exceeds the actual number in existence, implying that while some groups succeeded, others failed or perhaps didn’t even bother trying to achieve nationhood (1983: 47). Yet overlooking these types of “historical contingencies” (ibid) means missing out on asking (and answering) the fundamental questions of why, and how, particular mobilisations succeeded, and continue to succeed, and on what basis.

This last criticism of modernist theories of nationalism has been developed in some detail by a number of scholars who have argued that pre-existing “ethno-histories” (Smith, 1998: 224) inform and underpin processes of national mobilisation. This ethno-symbolist perspective will be examined next.

_Ethnosymbolism_

Ethno-symbolists do not dispute the significance of the transformation wrought by modernization for human populations (Ozkirimli, 2000: 169) or claims that nationalism emerged as a powerful political doctrine during this period (Smith, 1991: 51). However, in arguing that modernists are unable to “explain the emotional power [and longevity] of nationalism” (Ozkirimli, 2000: 141) they attempt to draw on the concept of ‘resonance’ as an explanatory device (Smith, 2003: 362).

Therefore, it is not elite manipulation that mobilized the masses but the fact that elites “select[ed] elements that possessed some meaning and significance ... for that
particular population” (Smith, 2003: 362). These mass mobilisations, then, are viewed as the response to calls for action that resonate through the use of meaningful symbols and myths based on pre-existing ethnic bonds. In this formulation, such bonds operate as “a causal force in orientating populations through the transition [to modernity]” (Hutchinson, 2001: 74) so that the primary concern of ethno-symbolists is to trace the “the often discontinuous formation of national identities back to their pre-existing cultural foundations and ethnie” (Smith, 1998: 196).

The ethno-symbolist approach is persuasive on a number of levels as it adds a new perspective to modernist macro-theories of social change by attempting to account for the “the rise of nationalism from below” (Hutchinson, 2001: 77). It also looks beyond the political sphere to analyse the significance of “persisting group perceptions and sentiments” (Smith, 1998, 181) and therefore the central role that ‘cultural formations’ have played in shaping national movements.

However, the ideas of those who place ethnic ties at the heart of their engagement with nationalism have also been subject to a sustained set of critiques.

**Critiques**

Shifting attention to what Hutchinson has labelled the “cultural dimension of nationalism” (2004: 121) offers us a potentially more nuanced and grounded approach to a subject that is as contested as it is complex. Acknowledging that historically-significant myths, symbols, values and practices may have some role to play in generating an image of the nation should not blind us to the dangers of essentialising ethnicity. For example, while Anthony Smith, has consistently argued that ethnic communities can be defined as “named human populations with shared ancestry, myths, histories and cultures, having an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity” (1986: 32 but also see Smith, 1991:21, 1998: 191-192) each of these factors has been problematised with reference to specific historical examples (cf Glick Schiller, 1977, Zubaida, 1978, 1989, Banks, 1996, Calhoun, 1997, Hylland-Eriksen, 2004).

This definition is largely unworkable in practice and also tends to reify ethnicity so that it comes to be seen as something that some groups possess and others don’t, in the process legitimising certain political claims (Madianou, 2005: 11). To this end, it is worth referencing Hutchinson’s claim that “ethnic communities are pre-political
cultural units" (2001: 74), a decidedly romantic, if not dangerous view of ethnicity as natural and enduring, something beyond the realm of politics and power (Malesevic, 2006: 134).

If the idea that "ethnicity is not a primary or autonomous source of action" (Fenton, 2003: 182) is accepted, a significant methodological challenge must then be confronted: how to accurately assess the degree to which ethnic or indeed national allegiances were used to mobilise groups in the past given the paucity of the historical record (Ozkirimli, 2000: 187, Breuilly, 2005: 15). As Anthony Smith acknowledges, before the "beginning of the twentieth century ... we can never know what the peasant masses thought or felt" (2001: 71).

A third criticism directed at the ethno-symbolist position is that by treating "nationalism [as] ... a novel form of ethnicity" (Hutchinson, 2004) it fails to assess the degree to which myths, memories, symbols and traditions are transformed over time in response to migration, empire-building, war and, in particular, the wider transition to modernity (Calhoun, 1997, 49-50). As John Breuilly writes;

To be a German in eighteenth century Germany meant to carry an identity which co-existed with other identities (social estate, confession, and so on). To raise that German identity to a special political level was both to alter the nature of that identity and also to change the relationship to other possible sources of identity (1993: 406).

In a similar vein, one should be wary of taking the idea of appealing to 'the masses' too far. For example, the concept of cultural resonance used by ethno-symbolists assumes that political elites would have been able to communicate with the masses8, even if they had been interested in doing so in periods where concepts such as democracy, universal rights and suffrage had yet to become common currency (cf Zinn, 1996: 84, Kumar, 2003:117, Connor, 2004: 43)

In a fierce polemic against modernist theories of nationalism, Smith argues that even if elites did manipulate traditions and myths in order to mobilise the masses, "they

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8 For example, "scholars have revealed that in France ... 50% of people did not speak French at all and only 12-13% spoke it correctly in 1789, the year of the Great Revolution. In the case of Italy ... only 2.5% of the population used Italian for everyday purposes at the moment of unification" (Ozkirimli, 2000: 220, see also Billig, 1995: 29-31).
had to select elements that possessed some meaning and significance ... [In other words] “it was - it is - no good trying to rouse the English with appeals to French history or Russian literature or German football” (Smith, 2003: 362). Unfortunately, while this might sound plausible for those brought up in a world of nations (Billig, 1995), it is more difficult to argue such a point when studying the past, notably where dynastic, feudal and religious power still had an important role to play in the management of human relations (Elias, 2000: 47-90). Such an observation points to the pitfalls of conceptualising the past in terms of the present.

One final point is worth noting here in relation to the ethno-symbolist perspective and that concerns the relevance of ethnicity as an explanatory concept in relation to multi-ethnic nations and/or those that emphasise citizenship, rather than kinship, as a criterion of belonging. In response to these critiques, ethno-symbolists have often returned to the analytical distinction made between two forms of nationalism; ethnic/cultural and civic/political (Smith, 1998: 177-180, Ozkirimli, 2000: 181).

This typology has a long history and has been used to distinguish different kinds of nationalism in particular regions, most obviously the East and West (Kohn, 1967: 330-331) and countries, notably Germany and France (Brubaker, 1992) as well as in identifying its liberal (good) and illiberal (bad) forms (Brown, 2000: 67). The final distinction, which draws in debates around the terms patriotism and chauvinism, is particularly problematic as it tends to evoke a value judgement, even when coming from apparently disinterested observers. As a result, their usefulness in building theoretical models has been called into question (Brown, 1999, Brubaker, 2004). As Wodak et al observe, “any attempt to apply strictly the[se] ... idealised models ... to individual nation-states under the condition of mutual exclusion will fail” (1999: 189). Where the concepts may have some purchase, as the work of Jacobsen (1997) indicates in the British context, is in “defin[ing] differences in the national self-perception within ... the same state” (Wodak et al, 1999: 189). I will reference this idea in later chapters.

Having briefly outlined the contributions and limitations of some modernist and ethno-symbolist approaches, I would like to use these discussions as a starting point for my own engagement with the subject. This looks to open up the field of enquiry in relation to the types of phenomena that are studied, the range of research tools employed and, ultimately, the kinds of questions that can be asked. As a result, it will
be suggested that a discourse analytic approach may provide a more effective means of mapping what is a complex and shifting terrain, as a range of recent studies have demonstrated (cf Kovacs & Wodak, 2003, Ricento, 2003, Mole, 2007, Wodak, 2006).

**Building a more flexible framework**

Although the classic literature has been crucial in situating the subject within a wider sociological framework, a preoccupation with the origins and spread of nationalism has ensured that most studies have generated backward-looking, rather static models while the focus on the macro-scale has produced somewhat teleological accounts backed by a realist epistemology.

In contrast more recent studies have looked to build a framework that takes into account the contested and contingent nature of such macro-processes, the importance of moving beyond elite narratives and/or the political realm and the significance of contemporary expressions of nationhood.

In the latter case, as Mark Beissinger contends, “a large number of works seek to uncover the origins of nationalism, assuming that by understanding origins, one thereby understands the universal essence of the phenomenon” (2002: 9). Unfortunately, this perspective overlooks the key questions of how national forms of imagination and organisation are sustained as part of an ongoing process and why they continue to resonate among significant numbers of people around the globe. In this respect, as Philip Schlesinger argues, “we need to distinguish between historical phases in which national cultures are being first established and those in which problems of maintenance are pre- eminent” (1991: 174).

This distinction is required for two reasons, one theoretical and one methodological. The first warns us against applying the same concepts or models established in one era or context to another where they may be inappropriate. On methodological grounds, we need to acknowledge that those who wish to conduct historical studies into the origins and spread of nationalist movements have access to a very different set of research tools than those who are interested in “the subsequent maintenance and re-enhancement of national identity in established nations” (Yoshino, 2001: 7).

For instance, we have already noted the problems involved in empirically testing the concept of ‘resonance’ during many historical periods. In contrast, much recent work
has attempted to address this very issue by observing whether, how and why individuals define themselves and others in national terms both during their everyday lives and/or in response to specific events or wider political processes (cf Kovacs & Wodak, 2003, Madianou, 2005, Brubaker et al, 2006).

Furthermore, unlike more macro-scale theories, which sometimes end up reifying the nation or treating it as a concrete entity, these more recent studies “prompt us to busy ourselves with unravelling the different histories and the different ways of speaking of the same national identity” (Thompson & Fevre, 2001: 307). Such a qualitative shift in emphasis not only challenges teleological narratives of history but also encourages us to explore both the contingent nature of these developments and the complexity of the phenomenon in all its varied guises (Zubaida, 1978: 58).

This, in turn, demands that the focus for any enquiry is dramatically expanded so that it moves beyond ‘official’ accounts and, in particular, the political realm. For instance, a preoccupation with “the political principle” of nationalism (Gellner, 1983: 1) has too often precluded any substantial form of engagement with the operation of national forms of mobilisation, categorisation and identification at other levels of society (Calhoun, 1997: 11). As Steve Reicher and Nick Hopkins observe:

.. the term ‘nationalism’ has been used to denote a range of phenomena with some usages implying quite specific political projects. One problem with adopting a definition which reserves ‘nationalist’ for those advocating the establishment of such state structures is that analysts are led to underestimate both the scope and significance of national identification (2001: 53-54).

The latter term encompasses a far wider set of orientations or points of reference (ways of speaking, acting, thinking) that are, as I will subsequently argue, of considerable importance in (re)constituting manifold individuals as nationals, whether as political actors or through what Orvar Lofgren labels as the “cultural praxis [of] ... everyday life” (1989: 23).

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9 In particular, we can refer to the influential work of Homi Bhabha (1990) who, in focusing on the nation as a form of narrative, adopted a “linguistically informed mode of analysis” (Hearn, 2006: 245). In a similar vein, Stuart Hall (cf 1992, 1997) has emphasized the constructed nature of (national) identities, arguing that they “are not things we are born with, but are formed and transformed within and in relation to representation” (1992: 292).
Another significant feature of these more recent studies is that they do not treat national identity as something that people possess (as a result of belonging to an 'objective' nation) but rather as an ongoing process of identification whereby individuals come to categorise themselves and others at certain times and for particular purposes, whether reflexively or in a taken-for-granted manner (Calhoun, 1997, Brubaker, 1998, 2004, Mole, 2007) 10.

From nations to national discourse

This constructionist approach stands in direct contrast to much of the classic literature which has been largely underpinned by an epistemological framework that has "reflect[ed] the realist, substantialist belief that 'a nation' is a real entity of some kind, though perhaps one that is elusive and difficult to define" (Brubaker, 1994: 4). This perspective has informed the work of those who have primarily concerned themselves with answering the questions of what and when is the nation (Connor, 1990, Ichijo & Uzelac, 2006). Unfortunately, as for ethnic groups, scholarly lists of attributes the ideal nation might or should possess end up excluding this or that example leading to a "conceptual impasse" (Tishkov, 2000: 629). They also tend to be used to justify particular political projects at the expense of others (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001: 7-14).

To paraphrase Steve Fenton, the nation cannot be reduced to a single, unitary definition but instead coalesces around broader ideas of culture, history and political organisation, which are largely informed by the contexts in which they occur (2003: 179-180). Therefore, rather than assuming the existence of particular 'ethnic' or national groups, and trying to identify their specific traits or features, we need to focus on processes of categorisation, mobilisation and contestation so as to, "specify how - and when - people identify themselves, perceive others, experience the world and interpret their predicaments in racial, ethnic or national rather than other terms" (Brubaker, 2002: 175)

In this way, our attention shifts from trying to theorise nations as things that exist in the world to the ways in which manifold practices, symbols, texts and utterances

10 Related studies in the field of social psychology have been important in focusing attention on how people use (national) categories “in order to accomplish forms of social action” (Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002: 118, see, for example, Billig et al, 1988, Wetherell & Potter, 1992, Reicher & Hopkins, 2001, Condor, 2000, Condor & Abell, 2006).
(re)produce particular forms of social reality defined in national terms. This enables us to re-conceptualise such disparate phenomena as "Japanese economic protectionism, Serbian ethnic cleansing, Americans singing the Star-spangled banner before baseball games and the way the World Bank collects statistics" (Calhoun, 1997: 21-2) as forms of national discourse. This means that while such processes operate across particular contexts, and with vastly different consequences, they are all predicated on a delimited understanding of national self, 'Other', culture and territory.

Such an approach has been used to inform a wealth of recent studies that have, broadly speaking, attempted to explore; how national identification and organisation are realised through talk, text and actions, the institutional arrangements that underpin these practices and the relations of power and social order that they sustain. While their influence has been considerable, it should noted that they incorporate a wide range of perspectives, some of which are of greater relevance to this study than others.

Therefore, in the next section I outline the key features of my own approach, in relation to the field of discourse analysis and other salient social theories, beginning with a justification for the definition of discourse being employed. These discussions will be used as a backdrop for the introduction of two key concepts, order of discourse, which draws attention to struggles over what counts as 'truth' and sedimentation, the idea that certain discursive forms become embedded over time and largely perceived as 'common sense'. Then, by drawing on a number of micro-theories of the social, attention will be drawn to the ways in which these processes of sedimentation occur through a myriad range of everyday practices, in both institutional and ordinary settings. Finally, it will be suggested that in establishing relatively stable subject positions, such discourses may come to underpin an ongoing, and ontologically significant, sense of (national) identity and place.

**Discourse: Meaning, power and change**

**Definitions**

In the past three decades, the term discourse has been so widely used, from such a multiplicity of perspectives, that addressing the full range of debates around the concept is beyond the scope of this work (for an overview see Howarth, 2000,
Therefore, I will concentrate here on outlining and justifying the approach to be adopted for the purposes of this thesis.

The first thing I want to emphasise is that discourses are not things but analytical concepts whose usefulness comes in trying to understand wider processes of "human meaning making ... in general" (Wetherell, 2001: 390). Put simply, the analysis of discourses attempts to answer "both 'how' and 'what' questions in relation to the construction of reality - how reality is constructed and the institutions, modes of representation and culture/material discursive regimes which emerge as a result" (ibid: 393). For the purposes of this study, I am adapting Phillips & Jorgensen's broad definition of discourse as "a particular way of talking about, ... understanding [and acting in] the world" (2002: 1) that becomes stabilised through key institutional structures during certain historical periods.

This definition stands in contrast to those who define the concept as, for example, "text in context" (Van Dijk, 1990: 164) or, "any form of spoken interaction" (Madianou, 2007: 97). In this respect, I draw on arguments put forward by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985: 107), Stuart Hall (1993: 31, 2001: 72-73) and Rogers Brubaker (2004). Firstly, I am following Laclau and Mouffe in rejecting "the distinction between discursive and non-discursive practices" (1985: 107). Adopting this standpoint moves us beyond only analysing talk and texts to explore the ways in which social objects and the material environment are also discursively constituted and the means by which all these elements come to underpin a particular framework for thinking about the world.

In this sense, Stuart Hall's definition of discourse, which directly references the work of Michel Foucault is particularly apposite; "a way of constructing meanings which influences and organises both our actions and our conception of ourselves" (Hall, 1992: 292-3). Finally, Rogers Brubaker has emphasised the importance of moving away from reifying concepts, such as the nation or ethnic group, to focus on the discursive articulation of social relations in national or ethnic terms and, in particular, "their anonymous, unnoticed permeation of our ways of thinking and talking and making sense of the social world" (2004: 44, see also Brubaker et al, 2006: 207).

In other words, this definition looks to capture the complex framework of talk, texts, practices, symbols and material environment that (re)creates the world of nations as
meaningful and consistent. In acknowledging its potential limitations, I also want to point to the fact that this definition is very much predicated on a need to effectively define those key elements that constitute a particular discourse in relation to others within the same social field. This argument will be addressed in Chapter 2, when the contours of national discourse are mapped in more detail in relation to the current literature (Hall, 1992, Wodak, 1999, Ozkirimli, 2005).

Second, for the purposes of this study I am also proposing that a clear analytical distinction be made between the concepts of discourse and ideology, with the latter defined as a “system of ideas” (Purvis & Hunt, 1992: 494) which proposes the way that (some aspect of) social relations should be organised and is therefore intimately bound up with attempts to establish or maintain power (MacDonald, 2003: 29).

For example, nationalism might be classified as an ideology that is underpinned by a range of core concepts: the world consists of nations, world order is based on a harmonious system of nations, nations have a cultural homogeneity based on common ancestry and/or history, every individual must belong to a nation and a person’s primary loyalty is to the nation (Taylor, 1993: 197, see also Smith, 1991: 74). However, as Michael Freeden suggests, these “core concepts will be found at a level of abstraction, which requires ... concretisation” (1998: 752) and this takes place through discourse. In this way, abstract ideas are materialised and embedded in social practices, symbols and talk so that they come to inform common sense understandings and institutional arrangements, which have very real consequences for people’s lives (Wetherell & Potter, 1992: 41). In this work, the emphasis will be on analysing these material forms of life and the wider contexts in which they operate, whilst also noting their “ideological effects” (Purvis & Hunt, 1992: 496). That is the role that such “discursive practices play in furthering the interest of particular social groups” (Philips & Jorgensen, 2002: 63).

It is hoped that by making this distinction, it will be possible to investigate the connections between the myriad practices that unimaginatively (re)create the world discursively as a world of nations (Finlayson, 1998a: 105) and the particular forms of social order that emerge. Of particular interest here will be the range of subject positions that are discursively produced, often generating material/psychological benefits for some, while marginalizing and oppressing others.
Having defined a number of key concepts, the next section will place them within a wider theoretical framework, first by acknowledging the different perspectives that have informed this study.

**Exploring the field of discourse analysis**

The epistemological bedrock that underlies the field of discourse analysis is that of social constructionism, which broadly argues that while “things can have a real, material existence in the world ... nothing has any meaning outside of discourse” (emphasis added, Hall, 2001: 73). As Crotty observes, “in the constructionist view ... meaning is not discovered but constructed ... by human beings as they engage with the world they are interpreting” (2003: 42-43).

While this broad perspective is common to all forms of discourse analysis, the different approaches can be distinguished by, for example, the degree to which they engage in empirical analysis, the stress they place on power versus agency (or studying macro and/or micro levels) and the range of theoretical and methodological tools they employ. Again, the full range of these discussions is beyond the scope of this work (see Burr, 1995, Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002, Wodak & Meyer, 2001). Instead, I will focus on those elements that have been particularly influential with regard to this work.

Insights from discourse theory (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, Laclau, 1990) have been productively used to try and develop a theoretical model that is able to account for both continuity, the ongoing (re)production of discursive forms, and change, the emergence of new ways of understanding and talking about the social world. In particular, by emphasising the contingency of all social forms, discourse theory also points to the ongoing struggles to “fix the meaning of the social in an organised system of differences” (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: 135). These ideas can be usefully applied to studies of nationhood both in terms of theorising the rise of nationalist doctrines in relation to specific historical transformations and observing the increasing challenges posed by the increasing intensity of global flows to established forms of national imagination and organisation in the contemporary era (see Chapter 8).

This notion of contingency is also usefully employed in relation to “the category of subject” (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: 114), where an individual is seen to occupy a range of subject positions, say, wife, mother, doctor, liberal and so on. Furthermore, “as every subject position is a discursive position it partakes of the open character of
every discourse; consequently, the various positions cannot be totally fixed in a closed system of differences" (ibid: 115), but rather operate across a range of different contexts. Where a particular discourse has become established, the subject position(s) it generates are likely to be viewed as 'common sense' and even essentialised.

This doesn't mean that social identities remain fixed, rather it suggests that ongoing processes of identification become largely taken-for-granted. As a result, they come to inform the ongoing management of social relations, largely obscuring other possible ways of identifying and responding to different people. What is important to note for the purposes of this study, is that while such processes of naturalisation may generate oppressive circumstances for some, they may also underpin a sense of ongoing continuity and security for others. This idea is partly derived from Foucault's writing on the productivity of power (1990), which will be explored in more detail below.

However, while the macro-perspective developed by Laclau and Mouffe is theoretically stimulating, it rarely discusses how such a model might be applied in practice. This stands in direct contrast to the discourse-historical approach (Wodak, 2001, Wodak & Krzyzanowski, 2008), which "always incorporates field work and ethnography to explore the object under investigation" (Wodak, 2001: 69) and seeks to integrate macro and micro-levels of analysis.

Part of the wider field of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), the discourse-historical approach seeks to explore the production of meaning within individual texts, the relationships between texts and "the broader socio-political and historical contexts, which the discursive practices are embedded and related to" (Wodak, 2001: 67). This focus on multiple levels of analysis and, in particular, locating individual utterances, texts and practices within a wider framework is relevant to this work, where there will be a primary interest in understanding how national discourse is articulated, negotiated and resisted in a world characterised by wider structural transformations.

Informed by a broader critical analytic perspective, this study is also concerned with understanding how discursive practices "are shaped by relations of power and struggles over power" (Fairclough, 1993: 135), notably in defining and naturalising the social orders and institutions that serve particular interests. Acknowledging the significance of unequal social relations, also involves reflecting on one's own position
The final discourse analytic approach that I have drawn on here is discursive psychology (DP). This perspective emphasises the importance of accounting for the ways in which "people use discourses and consequently stresses that people are producers as well as products of discourse" (Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002: 104). Primarily, DP attempts to move away from the idea that discourses are abstract, reified phenomena to focus on the manifold ways in which meaning is articulated, negotiated and challenged through routine talk and practices, as individuals move through and look to make sense of the social settings which confront them on a daily basis. This idea will be developed in more detail below, in relation to the discussion of agency.

Having briefly outlined the importance of a number of different, though complementary, discourse analytic approaches to this study, I would like to make one final point concerning the range of social theories, both macro and micro, that will be used to generate the overall theoretical framework. Here, I draw on Ruth Wodak's suggestion that a form of "conceptual pragmatism" be applied in relation to theory building. This rejects any overriding search for a grand theory and instead seeks to answer the question, "what conceptual tools are relevant for this or that problems and for this or that context?" (2001: 64). For example, I will be subsequently drawing on selected insights from Harold Garfinkel's work on ethnomethodology without seeking to engage with his broader interest in operationalising Parson's sociological theory (Sharrock & Anderson, 1986: 24). Similarly, Giddens' concept of ontological security will also be extensively employed in relation to my own data, without attending to the wider debates around structuration theory.

Having offered this important disclaimer, I would now like to develop some of these wider discussions as a means of outlining my own approach. To reiterate, I have suggested that discourse analysis is concerned with processes of human meaning-making in general. However, in focusing on the ways in which meanings are articulated and debated through individual speech acts, written texts and social practices, we also need to acknowledge that there are linked to particular historical contexts and social institutions. These place limits on thought and action as well as producing and stabilising particular forms of knowledge and the social relations they underpin. It is
the productivity of these discursive practices, and the relations of power they serve, that offers a useful starting point for my own engagement with the subject.

The productivity of power

The work of Michael Foucault has been particularly influential in drawing a link between power relations and the underlying social knowledge that sustains them (Foucault, 1980). In tracing what he labels as power/knowledge, Foucault offers a radically different approach to thinking about power that moves beyond traditional conceptions of dominant and sub-ordinate groups and the ability of the former to coerce or manipulate the latter. Instead of looking to unearth power relations through the analysis of effects (who does what to whom) Foucault focuses attention on the ways particular forms of knowledge come to be seen as ‘truth’, in the process justifying certain social relations, forms of organisation and so on.

For instance, a passport represents the ‘power’ of the state to withhold access to and restrict movement from its territory and this power is made intelligible through the creation and manning of borders, the collection and manipulation of data, the activities of state agents and so on. Yet these material constraints and institutional arrangements must be justified and sustained by ‘common sense’ forms of knowledge that are used to normalise the idea that a person belongs to one independent and sovereign nation-state and that travel between such entities should be regulated (Torpey, 2000).

The second crucial aspect of Foucault’s approach is that he rejects the notion that power is only repressive or prohibitive. Instead, he focuses on the idea that power also produces, writing:

> what makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply that is doesn’t weight on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces [subject positions] (1980: 119)

This final feature is particularly relevant to this work and can be usefully explored by examining the way individuals categorise and are categorised as members of different social groups. Each subject position (gender, age, religious, national etc) is defined in relation to a range of norms, expectations and practices, which in turn inform wider social relations. Although in principle identities are fluid and defined by individual
choice, in practice they are circumscribed by the social circumstances in which people live (Gill, 2005: 86). Just as some identities are inextricably linked to physical appearance so others demand a certain aptitude or, alternatively, access to economic capital. In this way, processes of identification are as much about recognition and wider material and structural constraints as individual agency.

Similarly, while these processes of categorisation may be used to justify discrimination or oppression, it is also important to be aware that they often assign status, generate psychological stability and offer forms of liberation for others. In this respect, many will have a vested interest in sustaining the ongoing production of such categories, whether they recognise this or otherwise (Halpern, 1995: 18-19). To return to the example of the passport, citizenship provides some groups with the opportunity to explore the world, while others are restricted in their movements because their passport, and hence status, is viewed with suspicion (Neumeyer, 2006).

Therefore, by concentrating on the production of what counts as truth at any given moment, and the institutions, technologies and subjectivities that emerge as a result, rather than any putative search for truth itself, Foucault provides a far more sophisticated approach that looks to engage with the operation of power/knowledge across the social landscape. However, this emphasis on the “micro-physics of power” that penetrate all levels of human activity (Hall, 2001: 77) has been critiqued for failing to pinpoint where (and how) power is operationalised and resisted as well as the intensity of its effects across different contexts (Layder, 2000: 108-109). This means also focusing on “the role of individuals in perpetuating or challenging already existing discourses, and in shaping those of the future” (MacDonald, 2003: 23).

The next section will argue that a perspective that can account for issues of agency may offer a more suitable framework for thinking about processes of normalisation and transformation in relation to discourse theory.

Accounting for agency

There is an inherent problem with treating discourses as, “regimes of power [that] constitute us to our very roots” (Eagleton, 1991: 47) as it leaves no space for individual decision-making. As Sinisa Malasevic observes, studies “that exclude agency from their analyses certainly cannot properly explain the role of politically motivated ideas and practices in social life” (2006: 72) or the degree to which different groups
respond to them. This is where the notion of ideological effects, which Foucault specifically rejects (MacDonald, 2003: 36, Purvis & Hunt, 1992: 488-489), may be usefully employed. This allows us to scrutinise and then evaluate the consequences of particular social practices and the wider forms of power/knowledge that are used to underpin them.

In other words, if absolute power is assigned to abstract discourses the fundamental questions of who acts, to what ends and at whose benefit and cost are often overlooked (Wetherell & Potter, 1992: 90). Therefore, rather than viewing discourses as "coherent entities which act as causal agents" (Potter, 1996: 87) we need to remind ourselves that "the objectivity of the institutional world, as massive as it may appear to the individual, is a human produced, constructed objectivity" (Berger & Luckmann, 1991: 78). Such a perspective refocuses our attention on the countless "artful practices" (Garfinkel, 1984: 32) that (re)create the social world, as individuals move through, puzzle over and discuss their everyday lives.

It is in this respect that the idea of the "discourse-user" (Burr, 1995: 90) may be introduced. This points to the ways in which people draw on (and thereby constitute) different discourses as they attempt to make sense of and articulate their own experiences. It is through these processes that individual seek to generate a meaningful and consistent sense of identity and place for themselves, both in terms of their relations with 'others' and the material environment.

As Vivien Burr writes, "this view of the person as a 'discourse-user' is ... a facilitating one" (ibid: 93). It draws our attention to the countless micro-practices that contribute to the objectification of established discourses and also the potential for change, again at the hands of social actors. However, conceptualising the individual as a discourse-user, does not presume that each person is able to (re)construct new ways of understanding and being in the world on an ad hoc basis (Schutz, 1967: 13-14). Instead, it points to the ongoing struggles to create, what counts as, 'reality' and the extent to which these processes are informed, and frequently constrained, by established social structures and relations. As Phillips & Jorgensen observe "people are ... fundamentally socially shaped, and the possibilities we have for reshaping the structures are set by earlier structures" (2002: 38).
For instance, individuals are born into a social world in which they have already been categorised, whether in terms of gender, class, religion, nationality and so on. When coming to categorise self and ‘Others’, people “do not view these categories as their own personal inventions” but instead, whether consciously or not, use them as useful frames of reference that can be utilised “in order to make sense of particular events, processes ... or characters” during everyday encounters (Thompson, 2001: 28). It is because these categories, and the subject positions they generate are seen as ‘common sense’ that individuals may struggle to ‘think’ beyond or resist them, even if they wanted to.

(Re)creating ‘social life’

The idea of ‘common sense’ knowledge leads on to a second important factor in any discussion of agency and that concerns the need to make an analytical distinction between statements or acts that reflect a perceived reality and those that propose how reality ought to be (Mavratsas, 1999: 93). For instance, Peter Berger & Thomas Luckmann differentiate between what they call, “theoretical interpretation of the world” and “common sense knowledge” (1991:27) while Pierre Bourdieu contrasts “the field of doxa, of that which is taken-for-granted ... [or] beyond question” (2006: 166) with “the field of opinion [where] ... practical questioning of ... a particular way of living is brought about” (ibid: 168).

This distinction is important because it focuses attention on the countless human activities, whether in institutional or ‘ordinary’ settings that are carried out according to habit, routine or precedent, with little or no reflection. This means acknowledging the degree to which alternative possibilities remain unexplored simply because some forms of social knowledge have become embedded over time, for whatever reasons. Such formations then come to inform “taken-for-granted mental assumptions or modes of procedure that actors normally apply without being aware that they are applying them” (Sewell, 1992: 22).

Foregrounding the important issue of ‘common sense’ knowledge, and the range of habits and customs it may inform, does not mean the active ways in which people skilfully draw on different discourses according to need and context or the potential for change are ignored. However, the skilful utilisation of different discursive forms and the advancement of novel perspectives are not the preserve of all people equally but will be largely dependent on access to economic, cultural and political resources.
As David Morley observes, these processes involve "the selection and manipulation of 'available' symbolic material, and what is available to which groups is a question of the socially structured distribution of differential cultural options and competences" (Morley, 1992: 95). In other words, the individual's ability to produce 'social life' depends on a set of resources that are socially constituted and in many cases defined, and limited, by powerful institutions (Gaskell, 2000: 39).

Furthermore, even for the most powerful groups the degree of power or freedom they possess will be conditional in that it is underpinned by particular regime(s) of knowledge that exclude other possible ways of thinking or acting (Chouliaraki, forthcoming). For instance, immigration officers may be seen as occupying a powerful position in relation to those that they monitor but their relative status is also predicated on the demands of a disciplinary system, where they themselves are also placed within subject positions e.g. as workers and nationals.

Yet in focusing on the idea of constraint, we again need to be aware that certain subject positions may become valued because they offer access to significant material resources and meet psychological needs. As Bridget Byrne asserts, "subjects [may] develop passionate attachments to their positionality, even though it inevitably involves foreclosure and the loss of other possibilities and ways of being" (2006: 17).

Agency, then, is more than who acts but must instead be re-conceptualised in terms of privilege, generally linked to wider structural conditions, and the range of conditional possibilities that each subject position generates (Rose, 1999: 68-69/87).

Perhaps the most important issue that the concept of agency raises is the potential for change and the fact that this occurs as a result of human endeavour and struggle. The significance of wider structural transformation has already been noted in relation to many of the modernist theories of nationalism. However, these macro-perspectives need to be complemented by a more agent-centred approach that takes into account the daily (re)production of different, sometimes conflicting discourses. In the next sections, two concepts, order of discourse and sedimentation, will be introduced as a means of building a theoretical framework that is more able to account for both continuity and transformation.

*Order of discourse*
In his study of 'the birth of the prison' (1977), Michael Foucault charted the complex processes whereby punishment as a social practice shifted from brutal spectacles of public torture and execution to the "deprivation of liberty" (ibid: 232). This transition from physically punishing individual bodies to disciplining, managing and surveying categories of people in new institutional settings - prisons, hospitals, schools, workhouses - occurred in relation to the growth of disciplinary society as a whole, which was, in turn, backed by new forms of knowledge relating to the economy, crime, health and politics.

One of the insights offered by Foucault is the idea that particular forms of power/knowledge are only seen as meaningful in particular historical periods (Hall, 2001: 75). Foucault was particularly interested in tracing the ways in which regimes of truth emerged and, in the process, generated novel subject positions, backed by new practices and technologies, related to illness, sexuality, citizenship and so on. However, these shifts should not be seen as smooth or evolutionary but rather involve "overlapping discontinuities" (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983:74) so that while systemic change may occur, sometimes dramatically, these transformation are rarely ordered and generally involve the persistence of some features as others fade and novel ones are taken up.

In addition, these transformations are predicated on an ongoing struggle to fix meaning and this is where the concept of order of discourse may prove fruitful. Here, order of discourse refers to discursive conflict within the same social domain, whereby different regimes attempt to legitimise their own forms of knowledge as the truth (Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002: 55-57). The success or otherwise of these endeavours will often be linked to the degree to which institutional structures can be utilised or alternatively emerge to support a particular discourse. In the latter case, the challenge to a hegemonic discourse is likely to be precipitated by wider structural shifts, where new forms of knowledge and practice come to challenge previously entrenched structures and institutions.

A recent example of this process can be seen in Europe, where the EU has emerged as a relatively powerful supra-state body at a particular historical period, marked by instantaneous communications, increasingly sophisticated transport networks, new models of global economic production and a concomitant shift to more global forms of geo-politics. The EU offers a challenge to largely established national institutions
through the articulation of a pan-European identity, backed by a new legislative framework (Krzyzanowski & Oberhuber, 2007). These movements have not yet come to form a dominant orthodoxy but are instead being contested by a variety of different groups and organisations within Europe who continue to make sense of and articulate wider social relations in terms of the nation (Alexander, 2005).

Therefore, in utilising the concept of order of discourse, we must always remain focused on the different social groups and institutions that are involved in such discursive struggles, whether in trying to overturn existing orders or objectifying others. At the micro-level this approach can be complemented by examining when and how individuals in debating social issues are required to manage, what Michael Billig and his colleagues label as, “dilemmas” (1988). Dilemmatic thinking refers to the idea that those who articulate a particular viewpoint must attend to any potential counter-arguments by justifying their own as reasonable or objective. In managing such dilemmas people do not formulate their arguments independently but draw on wider discursive resources in order “to discuss and puzzle over their everyday life” (ibid: 3). Consequently, any forms of knowledge that are broadly viewed as ‘common sense’ are likely to offer a particularly powerful form of justification.

Having tried to account for both the possibility and actuality of change over extended periods of time, I would now like to focus on the concept of sedimentation, which is of fundamental importance to this work as it offers an important means of thinking about the manifold micro-processes through which discourses become embedded and taken-for-granted.

Sedimentation

The concept of sedimentation, refers to the process whereby a particular discourse comes to be seen as objective or natural rather than one possible way of making sense of the world. The term was introduced by Husserl (Smith, 1995) and subsequently developed for the “phenomenological analysis of everyday life” (Berger & Luckman, 1991: 34/85-89). More recently, it has been utilised in relation to discourse theory in an effort to conceptualise ongoing struggles to fix meaning (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: 111, Laclau, 1990).

For the purposes of this study, I will be mainly drawing on a discourse theoretical perspective whilst incorporating insights from phenomenological sociology as a means
of understanding how sedimentation occurs in practice. For while I am keen to emphasise the contingent nature of all forms of meaning-making, this thesis is very much concerned with exploring the ways in which particular discourses come to be viewed as 'reality', in the process obscuring other possible ways of understanding the world.

To identify a particular discourse as sedimented is not to suggest that it has been placed beyond the realm of struggle or conflict or that it will not be usurped at some future point in time. Instead it draws attention to the partial fixation of meaning that may occur at particular times and places, the relations of power that are involved, notably in the production of particular subject positions, as well as the constant disruptions and inconsistencies that must be managed. In this sense processes of de/sedimentation are always ongoing, on one hand concretising particular discourses as layers of 'meaning' are laid down over extended periods of time and, on the other, opening up or chiselling away at these 'certainties' as new ways of understanding become privileged.

One of the most useful ways of thinking about this concept is in relation to the idea of society, which in many classic functionalist theories has been treated as a "self sufficient, self-adjusting entity" (Couldry, 2006: 17). As a result, as David Kertzer notes, social formations such as the, "'government', 'party', or the 'state' are not viewed as symbolic constructions. Rather, they are thought of as objects that exist independently of people and their symbolic universe" (1998: 6).

In a powerful reversal of this position Ernesto Lacau (1990) argues that instead of starting from the assumption that 'society' exists, we should instead examine the means by which the potentially limitless terrain of human activity becomes, in particular domains, categorised and sedimented. This occurs through a complex range of socially shared symbolic forms and conventions so that manifold individuals "continuously produce society", notably by defining and orienting themselves in relation to it (Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002: 39). It is because these attempts to fix meaning are the subject of constant disruption and tensions that they can never be finalised so that the (idea of) 'society' must always be conceptualised as a process of becoming rather than in terms of an 'intelligible totality' (Laclau, 1990a: 89).
Such an approach does not deny that there are powerful institutions that emerge and then act, and are treated, as if they do form the centre of a particular society (Couldry, 2003: 45). However, we need to evaluate the claims that such institutions do indeed embody the core values and beliefs of those they claim to represent (Mann, 1970, Lukes, 1973). This idea will be developed in relation to the nation in subsequent chapters by, for example, looking at the ways in which different groups and individuals put forward competing versions of what it means to be English or British and how these classifications privilege particular groups (See Chapters 5 & 6).

If the concept of sedimentation provides a more effective means of mapping the tensions between continuity and contingency in the ongoing (re)production of discourse at a slightly more abstract level, the question of how these process occur in practice also needs to be addressed. In this regard, there is a growing body of work, across a range of disciplines that can be referenced, which point to the fact that it is often at the level of the everyday that meaning is sedimented, through countless routine utterances, activities and symbols (Karner, 2007: 166). However, in the next part of this chapter, I will be focusing on insights from both phenomenological sociology as well as more critical theories of everyday life, for two main reasons. First, these works have not been extensively utilised in comparable studies and therefore may enable me to offer a slightly different perspective on the subject. Second, in focusing attention on how everyday practices (re)produce a consistent and meaningful sense of ‘reality’ for disparate individuals, these studies may help us understand why these features may come to be valued, notably in terms of generating a secure sense of identity for some.

Again, it should be noted that in drawing on a range of micro-social theories, I am adopting a pragmatic approach to inter-disciplinary research. This looks to focus on key insights whilst also acknowledging the different traditions from which these studies have emerged (Wodak, 2001: 64). Initially, I will outline some of the key findings from these studies before discussing how they may be used to inform some of the wider concerns of this project.

Theories of everyday life

The first point to make is that the everyday realm is where most activities take place and where people generally experience and make sense of the world and those they encounter (Berger & Luckmann, 1991: 33, Tomlinson, 1999: 9, Silverstone, 2006: 9).
It is primarily through the repetition of daily rhythms and routines that individual lives become structured and manageable (Garfinkel, 1984, Young, 1997). Moreover, the sense of order that is generated through the enactment of habitual and often taken-for-granted practices is not only useful in practical terms but also, in many cases, places the everyday "beyond reflection and critique" (Edensor, 2006: 529) making it an extremely powerful force in people's lives. As David Chaney observes, the everyday "can be relied upon ...does not need to be addressed as a source of problems or anxiety [and as a result] ... gives lives order and stability" (2002: 10).

Maria Bakardjieva (2005) has identified two schools of thought in the literature on everyday life and both will be briefly introduced. The first, perhaps best represented by the work of Alfred Schutz (1967) and phenomenological sociology (Berger & Luckman, 1991, Garfinkel, 1984), investigates how individuals make sense of their lives through the prism of everyday activities and routines, while the second, offering a more critical approach, moves beyond the micro-level to focus on the influence of powerful institutions on these everyday contexts.

In terms of everyday experience, three key elements have been identified as being particularly salient in the ongoing production of a relatively consistent and hence taken-for-granted realm; shared knowledge/assumptions expressed through language and social practice, spatial limits and temporal regularities, and each will be briefly discussed.

**Daily routines and experience**

Alfred Schutz characterized the everyday in terms of a range of familiar contexts, where individuals are able to draw on a shared 'stock of knowledge' that "provides [them] ... with the reference schema necessary for [the] ... organisation of the surrounding world" (quoted in Bakardjieva, 2005: 39). Harold Garfinkel has built on these observations to analyse the ways in which shared "common sense knowledge portray[s] a real society for members" (2004: 53) based around a series of assumptions about what is important and what can be left unsaid. This allows disparate individuals

11 Despite this, the concept of the everyday is a fairly recent and rather underdeveloped concept within the social sciences (Garfinkel, 1984: 49, Bennett & Watson, 2002: x), although it has become increasingly referenced in recent years (cf Brubaker et al, 2006, Bratis, 2006, Byrne, 2006, Karner, 2007, Ray, 2007).
to move through countless different, and potentially challenging, social contexts with relative ease.

At the root of these daily social interactions and material relationships lie a range of shared linguistic resources and a sophisticated set of norms and conventions that guide their use (Berger & Luckman, 1991: 51). For example, a range of studies have noted the importance of categories in allowing people to manage and make sense of the range of information and stimuli that they encounter on a daily basis. As Henry Tajfel observes, categories, “introduce simplicity and order where there is complexity and nearly random variation” (1981: 132). In a similar vein, a number of studies have looked to investigate the role of metaphors in categorising and objectifying the world for different social groups (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, Lakoff, 1987, Goatley, 1997).

It is these apparently insignificant linguistic features that “unite participants in a way that promotes order and predictability” (Gergen, 2001: 18) thus (re)creating a consistent sense of reality across time and space. This sense of continuity is not only generated through what people say but also in what they do. Often daily practices involve what Rothenbuhler calls, “interpersonal and micro-social rituals” (1998: 105), the small, habitual styles of greeting, gestures, manners and other forms of ‘phatic communication’ (Malinowski quoted in ibid: 107) that allow individuals to routinely ‘manage’ their behaviour across a range of social contexts (Goffman, 1971, Young, 1997). Moreover, for those that participate in them, “these everyday forms of practical knowledge are rarely the subject of any reflection, for they constitute part of the normal competencies required to sustain a livelihood and a social life” (Edensor, 2002: 93).

One further point concerning the idea that “solidarity is produced by people acting together, not by people thinking together” (Kertzer, 1988: 76) is worth raising here. This concerns the significant relationship between collective, mass rituals and the everyday norms and symbols that make them meaningful. As Rafael Narvaez writes, “social meaning and social cohesion are attained by way of ongoing ritual acts which ... get their strongest impulse during effervescent ritual[s]” (2006: 57). In other words, the everyday understandings that inform these events are themselves made self evident, and in the process reconfirmed, as the (imagined) community is temporarily realised through collective action (This relationship will be discussed in relation to national events in more detail in subsequent chapters).
Spatial limits and temporal regularities

These ongoing activities, both routine and eventful, are, of course, situated in particular places and one important feature of everyday living is the degrees of familiarity one has with different physical and social landscapes often clustered in a "hierarchic or concentric organisation of units" (Schegloff, 1972: 86). In this respect, Alfred Schutz proposed conceptualizing 'space' in terms of a number of "zones of operation" that, gaining in complexity, reflexivity and unfamiliarity, broadly radiate out from a central locus, which forms the realm of the known, the embodied and the habitual (see also Berger & Luckmann, 1991: 36). Here one meets one's 'fellow-men' on a daily basis and life is so banal and un-remarkable as to be perceived as largely insignificant (Schutz quoted in Bakardijeva: 41-45).

These spatial features form a solid, visible and ongoing presence and help individuals orientate themselves in relation to other people and the 'moral order(s)' that define what is seen to be appropriate at a given place. As a result individuals may come to mutually recognize each other as "member[s] of a community" (Auburn & Barnes, 2005: 45) as they co-ordinate their activities in and across particular locales.

The (re)production of the 'here' through daily social practices is also inextricably linked to the shared experience of the 'now', defined in relation to both the past and the future. As Richard Jenkins writes, "the everyday world of humans is lived in the present tense of who is who, what is what, and what is to be done" (2002: 274). He also suggests that it is this social construction of the present that provides part of the bedrock for the ways in which "most human beings experience themselves ... as relatively unitary and stable entities" (2002: 275). Through involvement in a complex array of repetitive yet barely acknowledged daily activities, as well as the enactment of 'shared' mass rituals that structure calendar time, the world of today is consistently aligned with the past (Connerton, 1989).

It is these ongoing daily rhythms, which demand the utilisation of different forms of social knowledge at appropriate times, that enable the future to be viewed as predictable and, hence, manageable. For instance, Evitar Zerubavel has explored the subject of "temporal regularity, a phenomenon that involves the structuring of social life by forcing activities in fairly rigid social patterns". He notes four key elements in this process, "sequential structures, fixed durations, standard temporal locations and
universal forms of recurrence, which contribute to establishing and maintaining the normal, temporal world” (1981: xii/xiii).

In outlining the significance of these elements in objectifying and stabilizing particular social relations and spaces, it is also worthwhile noting their potential psychological importance in providing an ongoing sense of both place and subjectivity in what might otherwise be seen as a complex and threatening world. Here, Anthony Giddens' concept of ontological security (1990: 92) is of particular relevance. Ontological security, "refers to the confidence that most human beings have in the continuity of their self-identity and in the constancy of the surrounding social and material environments of action” (Giddens, 1990: 92). Put simply, it concerns the issue of whether I, as an isolated individual, can rely on things - people, objects, places, meanings - remaining tomorrow, by and large, as they were today and the day before (Kertzer, 1988: 10, Jenkins, 2002: 275).

Moreover, it is through everyday, often ritualized behaviour that individuals gain confidence in the world around them. As Giddens observes, “ordinary day-to-day social life ... involves an ontological security founded on ... predictable routines and encounters "(Giddens, 1984:64). These daily routines, customs and habits generate a sense of familiarity, continuity and, hence, trust in the management of our relations with others. In this way, those we interact with may come to be assigned shared values on the basis of mutually recognised behaviour, coming to form what Garfinkel labels a “moral order" (1967: 35). Similarly, a 'shared' stock of public memories, linked to particular times and places and periodically (re)produced by different institutional bodies, may provide a “shelter ... from radical loneliness; [locating individuals], ontologically, [as] part of a collective, individuated but not separate” (Narvaez, 2006: 58).

These are important insights that will be used to extend current approaches to the study of national discourse in subsequent chapters but first it will be noted how more critical approaches have differed in their emphasis. These have focused on structural constrains in the production of meaning in daily life, rather than simply “describing the pragmatic activities of social agents within particular social settings” (Gardiner, 2000: 7).

*The banality of power*
The Marxist scholar Henri Lefebvre was primarily concerned with critiquing "the misery and power of everyday life" (quoted in Bakardijeva, 2005: 50) by challenging the notion of technological progress and illustrating the ways in which new forms of production and consumption generated alienation among the masses (Lefebvre, 1971, 1991). Although, Lefebvre's work was primarily focused on capitalist modes of production and the exploitation they engendered, he was instrumental in drawing attention to the wider processes by which powerful institutions regulate and manage many aspect of daily life.

As a result, everyday life must be viewed as more than the simple "process of becoming acclimatized to assumptions, behaviours and practices which come to be seen as self-evident" (Felski quoted in Bennett & Watson, 2002: 353). Instead, it is necessary to also address how particular assumptions and practices emerge as self-evident, why they are taken-for-granted by so many and to what degree they may obscure other potential alternatives in the service of power. That is, "we must also be concerned to analyse asymmetrical power relations that exist between a given bureaucratic or institutional system and its users" (Gardiner, 2000: 7).

This is an idea that has also been explored both by Foucault and his subsequent interlocutors, albeit drawing on a very different theoretical framework, who have looked to examine "the dynamics of power relations within the encounters that make up the everyday experience of individuals" (Rose, 2006: 144). Here, the concept of governmentality has been used to describe the ways in which guiding political principles are made practical and objectified through the mapping, regulation and disciplining of everyday activities and thinking.

In this way, institutions such as hospitals, schools and prisons are used to inculcate particular forms of knowledge about what it means to be, say, healthy, educated and/or civilized, in the process producing both approved and transgressive subject positions. Through ongoing and largely routinised processes of categorisation and the management of bodies across space and time, everyday life is patterned in familiar and predictable ways so that these practices, and the knowledge that underpins them, come to be seen as 'natural' rather than specific articulations in the service of power. In other words, these critical theories remind us that the 'common sense' forms of knowledge described by Schutz and others are not simply produced *in situ* but remain
the outcome of ongoing historical processes, representing what Achille Mbembe calls “the banality of power” (2006: 381).

For instance, ground-breaking studies of ‘everyday’ racism (cf Van Dijk, 1987, Essed, 1991, Back, 1996) have shown how established institutions in sectors such as the media, education, law and order and health normalise the use of racial categories through a “complex of cumulative practices ... that infiltrate everyday life and become part of what is seen as ‘normal’ by the dominant group” (Essed, 1991: 288). What these empirical analyses demonstrate is that any attempt to explore processes of sedimentation with reference to the experiential frame of the ‘everyday’ must also take into account systems of domination and, as Essed’s study powerfully shows, resistance.

Put simply, examining the ‘common sense’ knowledge that constitutes the reality of everyday life for particular (dominant) groups should not cause us to overlook the consequences of these forms, notably for those marginalized by them, nor their contingent nature. As I have suggested, this means reconceptualising these processes as part of the ongoing construction of a material and meaningful framework that, in forging particular sets of social relations, is also continually bedevilled by disruptive counter-processes.

This idea was outlined earlier in relation to the concept order of discourse, which refers to the (re)production of particular forms of ‘truth’ as an ongoing struggle designed to marginalize or de-legitimise alternative ways of thinking about, acting in and knowing the world. What can be illustrated in the next section is the degree to which these disruptions or tensions can also be usefully explored in relation to some of the wider theorising of the everyday.

Contesting ‘everyday’ norms

For instance, Alfred Schutz did not propose that the aforementioned “zones of operation” (1964: 27) should be viewed as either isolated or unchanging. Using the figure of the soldier returning home from far-flung conflicts he examined the degree to which ‘the stranger’, defined by incompatible experiences or values, may challenge embedded forms of social knowledge thus disrupting the ‘normalised’ patterns of daily life (ibid: 116-117). Elsewhere, Maria Barkadjieva (2005) has opened up some of these ideas with reference to the development of new technologies and, in particular, the
internet, which she sees as moving novel ideas and images from distant ‘unknown’ zones into the very heart of the everyday lifeworld, the home.

When discussing the concept of taken-for-granted knowledge Schutz also adds an important caveat concerning the ongoing utilisation of such assumptions, beliefs and values. He writes, “this set of experiences has stood the test so far and is, therefore, without question accepted as given although as given merely until further notice” (emphasis added, Schutz, 1964: 74). It is not then that such knowledge remains taken-for-granted and un-reflexively employed for all time but until it is opened up to challenge or scrutiny. Furthermore, it is where such challenges “interrupt the flow of habit and give rise to changed conditions of consciousness and practice” (Thomas quoted in Schutz, 1964: 96) that relatively embedded discourses become exposed to sustained scrutiny, often precipitating some form of crisis.

Harold Garfinkel’s writing on ethnomethodology might be usefully employed in relation to this argument. Garfinkel was interested in exploring the range of background expectations and assumptions that he believed inform the “stable, social structures of everyday activities” (1967: 37). He argued that the most obvious way of exposing these taken-for-granted assumptions, so entrenched were they in daily forms of life, was by openly challenging them. As a result, Garfinkel asked his students to enter a familiar social context (say a family dinner) and behave as a stranger or paying guest. These “experiments with trust” (quoted in Giddens, 1990: 98) led to confusion, suspicion and, sometimes, anger among the participants who were baffled as to why their loved ones were acting so strangely. Indeed, they are a powerful illustration of what can happen when taken-for-granted background expectations are repudiated or ignored (See also Zerubavel, 1981: 26-27).

If such arguments are applied to current processes of socio-political and economic change, evidenced by increasing mobility, the widespread availability of new technologies and the demands of global capital, it is possible to envisage how previously taken-for-granted ways of life and concepts might be rendered visible by alternative practices or symbolic systems (Bourdieu, 2006:169). The crucial questions to focus on here are the extent to which these processes of desedimentation impact on different groups and the types of response they engender. For example, are they viewed as threatening or an opportunity to move beyond existing structures? If the former, does the perceived ‘crisis’ produce new forms of orthodoxy that can be used
to explain such shifts? How, if at all, do those who benefit most from existing 'realities' attempt to re-establish “the field of doxa” (ibid)? Or is some form of accommodation reached? (These types of questions will be used to guide the analysis in many of the subsequent empirical chapters).

The preceding discussions have been designed to outline the theoretical framework that underpins this study. Informed by the tenets of social constructionism, particular emphasis was placed on accounting for both relations of power and social agency in the (re)production of discourse. Moreover, it was suggested that the complex dialectic between continuity and contingency might be usefully addressed by focusing on processes of de/sedimentation, notably in the realm of the everyday. I would now like to address a number of critiques that have been directed at the wider field of discourse analysis, as I think they will help clarify what is and isn't being claimed both in general terms and in regard to this study.

**Critiques of social constructionism**

As Kenneth Gergen notes social constructionism was originally conceived as a critique of positivism and in particular “the view that scientific claims to knowledge were effectively uncontaminated by culture, history and [power]” (2001: 7). The subsequent debates between what Gergen labels as realists and constructionists are beyond the scope of this work (cf Parker, 1998) but a number of the realist critiques are worth briefly addressing.

It is claimed that constructionists reject the idea that “practices, customs and traditions ... really exist and are [instead] just reified constructs produced by a dominant, essentialising discourse” (Bader, 2001: 259). As I have suggested above, material objects and practices are not denied a material existence by a constructionist perspective, it is the meanings that are assigned to such objects and practices that are seen to be “constructed by human beings as they engage with the world” (Crotty, 2003: 43). The fact that some meanings become sedimented over time does not make them any more real or, indeed, contingent. It is simply that they have become naturalized, for whatever reason(s), for a particular group so that “the system of possible alternatives tends to vanish and the traces of the original contingency to fade” (Laclau, 1990a: 34).
Furthermore, as Rogers Brubaker asserts, it is possible to apply this type of argument to social categories noting both their constructed nature *as well as* their very real impact on human activities. He writes, “understanding the reality of race, for example, does not require us to posit the existence of races. Racial idioms ... and racialised ways of seeing, thinking, talking and framing claims are real and consequential, especially when they are embedded in powerful organisations. But the reality of race ... does not depend on the ‘existence’ of races” (2002: 168).

The significance of embedded forms of knowledge raises a useful critique of some constructionist approaches concerning the emphasis that many place on studying change and fluidity so that “any notion of cultural continuity or reproduction is ... outlawed” (Bader, 2001: 258, see also Smith, 1998: 204-205). As a result there may be a tendency to overlook or ignore the degree to which some discourses remain powerful and sometimes limiting features of everyday life for significant numbers of people because they have become sedimented in routine practices and symbolic systems (Gunaratnam, 2003: 6-7).

In Chapter 2, this critique will be applied to those who posit a new era of cosmopolitan relations, often as part of a normative endeavour. As a result, what sometimes gets overlooked is the ways in which existing frames of reference, including those associated with the nation, continue to be utilised by social actors in their everyday lives and why they matter to so many (Calhoun, 2007).

A third accusation levelled at the constructionist approach is that everyone, constructionists included, uses ‘realist’ language in their everyday lives and sometimes talk about discursive constructs such as culture, nation, gender and so forth as if they were ‘real’ (Malesevic, 2006b). Here, it is perhaps necessary to draw a distinction between the use of realist language and concepts as an important resource in “the achievement of complex forms of human co-ordination” (Gergen, 2001: 18) and its use in the *analysis* of social relations. In the first instance, deconstructing what the doctor/bus driver/shop keeper says to you might open up some interesting insights for further academic study but it is unlikely to get you a prescription, from A to B, a pint of milk.

Alternatively, as analysts we should be wary of “uncritically adopt[ing] categories of ... practice as our categories of social analysis” (Brubaker, 2002: 166). In other words,
while categories such as nation, race and ethnic group may be viewed, and spoken about, as if they were real, such concepts, and the ways in which they are utilised, are “what we want to explain, not what we want to explain things with” (ibid: 165). This requires asking what such realist language is being used for as people try to make sense of and articulate their lives (This idea will be explored in relation to debates over national belonging in Chapters 5 & 6).

A fourth critique of the social constructionist position can be rebutted here and that concerns the proposition that because social reality is viewed as a symbolic construction, then each individual is able to create his or her own ‘reality’ independently. Eric Rothenbuhler has offered a pithy rebuttal of such a position, writing, “symbolically constructed realities are just as much a part of the environment that a given individual must adapt to as are physical realities. Our languages, cultures, traditions, social roles, and so on are given to us: we are natives in this land, not creators of it” (Rothenbuhler, 1998: 58). Adopting such a position does not, of course, deny human agency, it merely reiterates that individuals do not start from a blank slate when trying to make sense of the world (cf Schutz, 1964: 229, Berger & Luckmann, 1991).

Finally, one of the primary objections to adopting or, indeed, assessing the contribution of a discursive approach to the study of the ‘national’, and indeed the social sciences as a whole, is that many writers do not define what they are talking about in practice when they refer to this or that discourse (Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002: 143-144). Yet as Sinisa Malasevic asserts in his critique of some ‘discursive’ approaches, “one has to offer [appropriate] criteria [so] ... one [can] decide on the incommensurability of particular discourses” (2006: 67) and, thereby, assess their reach, impact and main proponents. I will use this discussion as a starting point for the next chapter by drawing on the work of those who have attempted to map the contours or dimensions of national discourse in terms of general underlying features.

Summary

While the classic literature on nationalism offers a number of important insights from a macro-historical perspective, it has been criticised for attempting to explain nationalism in terms of one or more determining factors, which are then applied across multiple contexts. The “writing of a unitary sociology of nationalism ... presents insurmountable theoretical problems” (Zubaida, 1978: 52) producing arbitrary
definitions, unhelpful dichotomies\textsuperscript{12} and teleological models that often underplay wider relations of power. Furthermore, a primary interest in the search for origins, generally informed by an epistemology that treats nations as actually existing entities, means that contemporary forms of nationhood are often ignored or taken for granted.

In contrast to these macro-historical perspectives, it has been suggested that theorising nationalism as part of a wider socio-political discourse offers a far more flexible and dynamic framework for trying to understand how complex modes of identification, categorisation and mobilisation are articulated in national terms. Here discourse is broadly defined as “a particular way of talking about, ... understanding [and acting in] the world” (Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002: 1) that becomes stabilised through key institutional structures during certain historical periods. By employing such a wide definition of discourse in relation to the nation it becomes possible to address the links between the apparently disparate phenomenon of a child supporting her national team, a politician railing against immigration and a map of the world, as well as what makes these discursive forms different from other related ways of understanding and articulating self and other.

Privileging this type of discursive approach, whilst also paying attention to ideological effects, enables us to more effectively address questions of power (notably pinpointing and evaluating its operation, distribution and impact) and agency (who acts, when, to what ends). In other words, we need to examine both “the extent to which power is ... controlled and administered by specific and identifiable agents” as well as the institutional frameworks and established forms of knowledge that support them (Layder, 2000: 108-109).

I have also utilised the concepts of order of discourse and sedimentation, first as a means of addressing the processes by which particular discourses come to repudiate alternative frameworks and then to examine how “everyday social reality [has become] ... discursively constructed around a concept of the nation which is [for significant numbers] taken for granted” (Sutherland, 2005: 193).

In the latter case, a number of theories of everyday life have been used to evidence the degree to which it is the realm of the ordinary or banal where different discursive

\textsuperscript{12} The debates over civic and ethnic nationalism perhaps being the most obvious (Brown, 1999, Kumar, 2002: 25-26).
forms become sedimented. Here, spatial and temporal consistencies and a shared conceptual and linguistic framework, backed by institutional arrangements, help objectify forms of knowledge and social relations in the process marginalising alternative ways of thinking about or acting in the world. This is not to suggest that individual agency is an irrelevance nor that change is not possible but acknowledges that, "most people most of the time remain unaware of their own role in the skilful creation and reproduction of social order" (Karner, 2007: 40).

Attending to the ways in which certain social orders may generate an ongoing sense of ontological security also provides a significant conceptual tool with which to investigate the links between the individual subject and the imagined (national) community. This again requires exploring the reasons why, and on what basis, different interest groups categorise themselves and others in national terms (Finalyson, 1998b).

In the next chapter, an analytic framework for studying national discourse will be proposed, first by mapping a number of its broad dimensions; spatial, temporal, everyday, symbolic and self/otherness (Ozkirimli, 2005, Wodak et al, 1999). Subsequently, it will be argued that in a world largely predicated on an international system composed of, more or less, sovereign nation-states, particular attention must be paid to the everyday (re)production of national forms of organisation, categorisation and imagination.

As a result, the main part of Chapter 2 will examine the growing literature on this subject, beginning with a Michael Billig's seminal thesis of Banal Nationalism (1995). Initially, Billig's key arguments and contribution to the field will be discussed before a range of recent studies, which point to the importance of challenging common sense assumptions about the power of the media, the concept of national audiences and the homogeneity of 'established nations'.

In the second section of the chapter, I will look build a more grounded theoretical framework by drawing on some of these critiques. Here I will contend that an analysis of talk, text and action may offer a better means of understanding how, and why, different groups continue to draw on national discourse, in certain contexts. The concepts of sedimentation and order of discourse will then be utilised as part of a more dynamic approach that focuses on struggles between embedded (national,
global, cosmopolitan) discourses, articulated by both elite and ordinary actors, in an era that has been described as "globalising" (Featherstone, 1990).
Chapter 2: Studying contemporary national discourse

Mapping national discourse

In the final part of the preceding chapter it was argued that one of the weaknesses of discourse analysis was that many scholars do not attempt to define the differences between particular discourses as a means of pinpointing the broader features that underpin specific expressions, practices and symbols and mark them off from other ways of making sense of the world.

In terms of outlining the contours of a national discourse, Umut Ozkirimli (2005) has identified and mapped four dimensions, “the spatial, the temporal, the symbolic and the everyday” (ibid:179), that he suggests inform more specific narratives and actions associated with particular national contexts. Interestingly, these dimensions also echo some of the earlier discussion of the processes by which discourses become sedimented through everyday forms of organisation, imagination and practice (See Chapter 1). I will briefly discuss each of these in turn before adding one further dimension, ‘Self/Otherness’, and then note the crucial link between the universal (international order) and the particular (individual nations) in (re)producing and consolidating a world defined and articulated in terms of nations.

The concept of territory is fundamental to the national imagination and the spatial dimension is perhaps the most important in marking off national from other related discourses, such as ethnicity and race (Fenton, 2003: 24). Robert Sack has argued that the nation is the most territorial of all human collectivities (1986) with the national territory being both a physical and symbolic resource for those that claim it as ‘their’ own (Penrose, 2002). The concept of a taken-for-granted national space that is seen to be the preserve of particular groups underpins many of the discussions in Chapter 6 concerning the threat that immigration is seen to pose to national culture and values.

Ozkirimli’s ‘dimensions’ may be broadly mapped onto Ruth Wodak and her colleagues “thematic contents” of national identity which include; “the narration ... of a common political past ... present and future” (Temporal), the construction of a “common culture” (Symbolic/Everyday) and the construction of a ‘national body’ (Spatial)(1999: 30-31). The contribution of Stuart Hall (1992: 293-295) is also worth noting as the “five main elements” of a national culture that he identifies: “narrative of the nation”, “origins, continuity, tradition and timelessness”, “invention of tradition”, “foundational myth” and “original people or folk” can be usefully located in the temporal and symbolic/everyday dimensions proposed by Ozkirimli. Finally, Lyn Spillman talks about the importance of spatial, temporal and particular/universal dimensions when discussing the “repertoires of national identity” in her study of nation and commemoration (1998:91-93).
Closely linked to ‘national’ conceptions of space is what Ozkirimli calls the ‘temporal dimension’ (2005: 185), whereby the past is articulated in national terms and the present embodied through daily and mass ‘national’ rituals thus enabling a (relatively) secure future to be mapped out. As Reicher & Hopkins note, “if the we of tomorrow and today is the same ‘we’ as of all our yesterdays, then what we have is a constant identity across all time” (2001: 139) and a powerful operating force in cementing a sense of nationhood for significant numbers of people.

The third dimension, the symbolic, relates, in the broadest sense, to the range of national symbols used to “define and justify ... social norms and values [and] ... create ‘maps’ for social actors” (Ozkirimli, 2005: 188). However, as each symbol is polysemic, carrying a potentially limitless range of different meanings (Barker, 2000: 71-72), there will often be struggles between different groups to impose and justify their own particular versions, in an attempt to naturalise them over time (Coles, 2002, Kolsto, 2006). This idea will be developed in relation to the English/British context in Chapter 5.

The importance of the fourth and final dimension introduced by Ozkirimli, that of the ‘everyday,’ has already been noted in broader sociological terms and in relation to the concept of sedimentation. This refers to the processes by which discourses become embedded and, as a result, naturalised through routine practices and the main part of this chapter will look to apply some of these more general discussions to the study of national discourse.

I think Ozkirimli’s dimensions provide a useful platform for thinking about the contours of national discourse. Furthermore, he does not suggest that these ‘dimensions’ are only applicable to national discursive forms but that they can equally apply to other discourses although the thematic content will often differ. Most importantly, he also argues that it is the “combination of all four dimensions” that enables us to differentiate national from other similar discourses (2005: 179).

The particular and the universal

However, I would like to propose a further dimension, which re-iterates the critical role that people, and the different traits and values they are seen to embody, have in
realizing and concretising the image of a nation in a world of nations. For in the
"discursive construction of social groups ... the fundamental process ... to create
sameness and difference .... precedes all other textual/visual devices" (Wodak, 2006:
105). In this respect, Wodak et al have proposed the idea of a *homo nationalis* (Wodak
et al, 1999: 4) for each nation, that is the range of characteristics, emotions, habits
and values that are seen to make one Austrian (ibid: 114-117) or Chinese or Peruvian.
These traits often become associated with particular, celebrated individuals who are
then seen to ‘represent’ the nation. This process of allowing individual(s) to stand in
for the country has been labelled as a form of “personification” (ibid: 44), whereby
the nation becomes transformed into a single actor (with its own needs, desires, skills
etc.) or embodied through the actions of a select few (Alabarces et al, 2001). As
George Lakoff observes, “we ... [often] comprehend categories in terms of individual
members who represent either an ideal or its opposite” (1987: 87).

Furthermore, any symbol of who ‘we’ are only makes sense if there is an ‘Other’
against which ‘we’ can identify ourselves (Norval, 1996:64 but see also Barth, 1969,
Bhabha, 1990). However, I think it needs to be noted that this sense of ‘us’ and ‘them’
means something different when it is being defined in national terms (Wodak, 1999,
2006). After all, being a member of an ethnic or religious in-group cannot be simply
equated to being a member of a national in-group (Billig, 1995: 69) although they may
have features that overlap.

Acknowledging the dimension of ‘Self/Other’ also helps highlight the importance of
the link between the particular (individual nations) and the universal (the geo-political
order of nations) to the national imagination (Billig, 1995: 83-92). As Alan Finlayson
notes, “each nationalism adds to and ‘re-writes’ the story of the universality of
nationalism” (1998a: 104). That is, individual nations “are dependent on mutual
recognition” legitimated through a wider international order, so that “the definition of
Swedishness requires the existence of Danes, Germans and Norwegians” (Lofgren,
1993: 167). Therefore the backdrop of a world of ‘Other’ nations provides us with a
sense of who ‘we’ are either through mediated representations, our own or others
travels ‘abroad’ and so on (See Chapter 8).

I will pick up on these discussions in some of the later empirical chapters so as to
illustrate how these different features form part of a inter-locking and fairly stable
cultural matrix which enables disparate individuals to view the nation as it if were an
actually existing entity. In the main part of this chapter, I want to return to the idea that in the contemporary era it is the everyday dimension that should be the primary focus for studying the degree to which national discourse becomes de/sedimented. Here, I want to use Michael Billig’s thesis of Banal Nationalism (1995) as a starting point, as it has been the most influential work on the subject, foregrounding the routine (re)production of national forms of organisation, categorisation and imagination in many parts of the world. This is not to overlook the extensive literature on everyday discourse that has been developed over the past decade or more, whether related to studies of the nation or otherwise. Rather, in providing the first systematic engagement with Billig’s work, I am looking to open up some of these wider debates as a means of developing a more dynamic and grounded theoretical framework for this study.

Banal Nationalism: A brief overview

Broadly speaking, Michael Billig’s study of Banal Nationalism (1995) seeks to draw attention to and problematise what he labels as a “double neglect” in how the contemporary era is understood and theorised (ibid: 49). First, he notes that much of the writing about nationalism is generally discussed in relation to (often violent) attempts to strive for or secure national independence so that in both popular representations and the social sciences it becomes conceptualised as “extraordinary, politically charged and emotionally driven” (ibid: 44).

Moreover, those involved in these “outbreaks of ‘hot’ nationalist passion” (ibid) are generally to be found in remote or exotic areas of the globe or, when closer to home, portrayed as members of extreme ‘political’ movements. For example, attention is drawn to the fact that it is the republican movement and not the British government that were described as nationalist during the ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland (ibid: 48). In this way, nationalism disappears as an issue for the developed nations of the ‘West’ both in the spheres of politics and academia.

14 However, Robert Foster has argued (2002: 16) that Billig himself actually reproduces the dichotomy between the West and the rest by firmly locating banal nationalism in the “established, democratic nations” (1995: 93) and largely ignoring (or perhaps ignoring the potential for) the ordinariness of national identity for significant numbers in places such as Sri Lanka (Kemper: 1993), Belize (Wilk: 2001), a number of African nations (Cusack: 2000), Trinidad & Tobago (Miller & Slater: 2000) and Papua New Guinea (Foster: 2002). This oversight may be linked to the fact that Billig’s model doesn’t adequately address the possibility of change, as we shall see below.
In critiquing this apparent dichotomy between ‘their’ hot nationalism and ‘our’ invisible brand, which also recreates the distinction between civic (good) and ethnic (bad) forms of nationalism discussed in the previous chapter, Billig makes his second important point; why is it that those in the “settled nations” (ibid: 47) who are not labelled nationalist, do not forget their national identity outside of, for example, state coronations or major sporting events, when flags are waved and national triumphs celebrated by millions? In part this question is meant to challenge those theories that posit equivalence between different forms of group identities, a position rejected by Billig who argues that national identity must be seen as more than just “an inner psychological state” (ibid: 69) defined in terms of the self (see also Calhoun, 1997: 46).

Instead, and this is the crux of his thesis, national identity needs to be conceptualised as a “form of life which is daily lived in a world of nation-states” (ibid: 68) and moreover a form of life so entrenched and taken-for-granted in many places that it is rarely commented upon. It is not then that national identity is no longer relevant in countries such as Britain and the United States merely that the symbols that ‘flag’ the nation on a daily basis no longer register as significant and, hence, are largely ignored or “mindlessly remembered” (ibid:144). As Billig writes;

The ... habits, by which our nations are reproduced as nations, are unnamed and therefore unnoticed. The national flag hanging outside a public building in the United States attracts no special attention. It belongs to no special, sociological genus. Having no name, it cannot be identified as a problem. Nor, by implication, is the daily reproduction of the United States a problem (ibid: 6).

As well as flags hanging unnoticed on public buildings, Billig also draws attention to the ways in which both political speeches and the mass media routinely reproduce a taken-for-granted world composed of sovereign, discrete nations on a routine basis. In the latter instance, individual reports are often classified as ‘home’ and ‘foreign’ news and then prioritised in terms of their relevance to the nation, while a wide range of media texts constitute and address an audience as nationals by using deictic language such as ‘we’, ‘our’, ‘us’ and ‘here’ (ibid: 105).

There is one final aspect of Billig’s study that is worth referencing at this point, albeit very briefly, and that concerns his writing on globalisation. At present, it will merely
be noted that to a great extent Billig rejects those arguments that herald the decline of the nation-state in a new era of global flows and post-modern identities but, and I will return to this issue below, largely equates globalisation with Americanisation (ibid: 149-153).

In this way, "the new world order is itself flagged as a national order, in which one nation will be primus inter pares and its culture experienced as a universal culture" (Billig, 1995: 176). This argument is backed up with reference to the dominance of American cultural industries including Hollywood films and their stars and the "multi-million dollar business of American wrestling" (ibid: 151) where global audiences are seen chanting for 'Yoo-ass-ey' and the "heroic bearers of the US flag ... a semantic sign of goodness itself" (ibid: 152).

Having provided a concise overview of some of its major arguments, the following section will first examine the significance of the Banal Nationalism thesis to those studying nations and nationalism, the social sciences in general and this particular study.

Why banality matters

I think it is fair to say that while writing on nationalism per se has increased exponentially over the past two decades (Ozkirimli, 2000: 2-3), Billig's study led the way in marking something of a shift in focus as research began to move away from macro-scale theorising to more empirical-based studies, that focused on issues of representation, contestation and localised meaning-making as well as more contextualised case studies. It has already been noted how treating nations as 'things' (and focusing on the questions of 'when and what is the nation?') tended to close down both the scope and range of enquiry so that the ongoing maintenance of national forms of organisation and mobilisation was generally overlooked.

Moving beyond general theories of nationalism, Billig's critique of the apparent orthodoxy, both in political and academic spheres, which broadly places contemporary nationalism outside the experience of civilised (that is, Western) societies has

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15 It is also worth noting the contribution of Orvar Lofgren (1989, 1993, 1996), Jonas Frykman (1993, 1996) and Anders Linde-Laursen (1993) who all produced ground-breaking studies examining how "the nation ... is often hidden in trivial forms or everyday routines, which we may overlook, blind to the familiarities and peculiarities of our own present setting" (Lofgren, 1993: 161).
contributed to the increased scrutiny of the tenets of ‘methodological nationalism’ (Beck, 2000, 2004a, Kymlicka, 2001, Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002, Chernilo, 2006a). This is the idea, which has underpinned the social sciences for well over a century, that, “nationally bounded societies are ... the naturally given entities to study” (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002: 304).

Billig has noted, for instance, that in much sociological writing the concept of society is simply (and unquestioningly) associated with the nation-state (1995: 51-55). Elsewhere, the academic disciplines of politics, international relations, history, geography and economics have tended to treat the nation as the ‘natural’ focus for their investigations (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002: 305). In these cases, the idea of a world of nations, divided into “integrated societies is so pervasive that many theorists don’t even see the need to make it explicit” (Kymlicka, 2001: 221) or to question the implications of using nations as units of analysis (Dodds, 2000).

Billig major contribution then is, paraphrasing his earlier quote, to identify a problem - a tendency to treat the nation as a given both in everyday life and social theory - and point towards its possible resolution. In noting the manifold ways in which the nation continues to be flagged in places such as Britain and the United States, our attention is drawn to the ongoing production of a hegemonic discourse whose power comes from being seen as natural, taken-for-granted, common sense (Sutherland, 2005: 196). As Jan Penrose writes, “Our acceptance of nations as natural divisions of the global territory and population is essential to the maintenance of the existing geopolitical order” (Penrose, 1994:161-181). These complex processes, what we labelled as sedimentation in Chapter 1, obscure other possible ways of understanding and being in the world so that their “contingent nature ... do[es] not prove immediately visible” (Laclau, 1990a: 34).

Moreover, by examining the everyday (re)production of national discourse through banal signifiers and practices, it is possible to observe how daily forms of life lived in and understand in relation to a world of nations often underpin the more visible (and sometimes virulent) aspects of nationalist mobilisation. As was noted earlier, “the everyday is generally the bedrock of social reality, what can be taken-for-granted” (Chaney, 2002: 4) and it is at this level that we must also try and understand when and how identities are lived and made meaningful, whether in national terms of otherwise.
A similar emphasis on the routine and ‘taken-for-granted’ informs this study where the analysis will focus on whether, when and how national discourse informs, “the ways in which people understand who they are, the nature of the world they live, how they relate to others and what counts as important to them” (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001: 3).

In the next section, I want to reference a wide range of studies that, in exploring the discursive construction of (national) identity (Wodak et al, 1999), have focused on both the significance of daily talk, texts and practices as well as the institutional arrangements that help define them as meaningful. These findings can be used to highlight the lack of complexity and dynamism in Billig’s original thesis, as a means of generating a more flexible framework for the study of processes of national identification, categorisation and mobilisation in the contemporary era.


In the latter, I will draw attention to a number of arguments concerning the place of the nation in a globalising world (Basch et al, 1994, Giddens, 2000, Beck, 2000, Appadurai, 2003, Szerszynski & Urry, 2002) and then explore the relationship between hot and banal forms of nationalism (Hutchinson, 2006). Here, the work of Daniel Chernilo (2006a/b) will prove particularly useful in moving the discussion forward.

**Studying everyday national discourse**

*Media, state and nation*

In terms of the role of the media, it is perhaps Philip Schlesinger who has most consistently highlighted, and problematised, the “functional relation between the nation and modes of social communication” (2000: 99) that has been adopted by many scholars of nationalism, including Billig (ibid: 100-106). This model basically assumes
that a national media addresses and constitutes a coherent national public and through this process disparate individuals are, to paraphrase Anderson, able to imagine themselves as belonging to the same community (1991: 33-35). The shortcomings of relying on such an assumption can be exposed by looking first at the complexity of media output and then by questioning the very notion of a bounded, homogenous national audience.

In Britain, the focus for Billig’s original Day Survey of the press (1995: 109-111), a number of empirical studies have questioned the concept of the British press (Higgins, 2004, Rosie et al, 2004, 2006) arguing that “the distribution of titles and their spatial editions and the different patterns of flags [and deixis] found in them make [it] ... of limited analytical or theoretical use” (Rosie et al, 2004: 454). Put simply, so-called British newspapers often carry distinct English and Scottish editions, while Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish audiences are all served by their own dedicated press which ‘flag’ their stories accordingly. In terms of the media, a similar argument might be applied to Belgium (van den Bulck, 2001, Dhoest, 2004), Spain (Cramer, 2000), Switzerland (van den Bulck & van Poecke, 1996) and Canada (Raboy, 1985), to name but four examples.

In these instances, particular organisations are designed to serve distinct sections of the population who are often constituted on the basis of different, sometimes conflicting, (national) identities, which may or may not be aligned with a state. It should be noted, of course, that acknowledging such criticisms does not necessarily challenge Billig’s thesis per se, given that, in many cases, we are still talking about English, Flemish or Quebecois ‘media’ in the wider context of Britain, Belgium and Canada. However, they do importantly point to the complexity of, say, the media landscape in places such as Britain, and perhaps encourage us to move beyond ‘official’ or state-run institutions to focus on the different levels - national, sub-national, supra-national or indeed non-national - that may operate in any given locale or context.

Moreover, many of these discussions relate to television and the press. In an era of new media technologies that often transcend national boundaries the relationship between the media and the nation is being made ever more complex through the widespread use of the Internet (Castells, 1996), satellite broadcasting (Aksoy & Robins, 2003, Madianou, 2005) and mobile phones (Vertovec, 2004).
The idea of complexity may be further explored in relation to the concept of a national audience and how its assumed homogeneity may be challenged with reference to media theory and the idea that national identity should also be conceptualised as a “member’s phenomenon” (Hester & Houseley, 2002: 3). This echoes the call in the previous chapter to focus on the role of individuals in articulating and/or resisting particular discourses, whether actively through a reflexive engagement or as part of a routine understanding of wider social relations.

National ‘audiences’: A bottom up approach

One empirical study that looked to “critically evaluat[e]” (Yumus & Ozkirimli, 2000: 788) the Banal Nationalism thesis by shifting the analysis beyond a ‘Western’ setting and carrying out a Day Survey of the press in Turkey, largely replicated Billig’s findings by concluding that “the discourse used by the Turkish press is crammed with the constituent elements of the nationalist ideology” (ibid: 801). Now, this is obviously quite an interesting conclusion but what limits such a study is that it fails to even acknowledge the complexity of the national audience in question beyond a brief nod to “secular-Islamist conflict” (ibid: 802). In the Turkish case, this is perhaps best illustrated by the presence of a significant Kurdish community, substantial numbers of whom have been involved in a long and often bloody conflict in the east of the country (Icduygu, et al, 1999).

Therefore, although such studies do, at least, add something to our understanding of the relationship between nation and media by focusing attention on media content16, they fail, as Mirca Madianou (2005) has observed, to take into account of media theory which has long argued that audiences cannot simply be seen as either coherent or ‘empty vessels’ that uncritically absorb the media messages that they encounter (cf Abercrombie & Longhurst, 1998 Gillespie, 2005). Instead, she argues we need to challenge this ‘transmission model’ of the media and unpack the concept of the audience by asking “what role - if any - the media play in the articulation of identities” (Madianou, 2005: 7).

16 Contrast this with Ernest Gellner’s assertion that “it matters precious little what has been fed into [the media]; it is the media themselves .... which automatically engenders the core idea of nationalism quite irrespective of ... the specific messages transmitted” (1983:127)
Investigating the role of the media (or indeed any other institution), rather than simply assuming it’s significance in reproducing national discourse, requires an active engagement with the different constituencies that are seen (or not, as the case may be) to belong to the national community. For example, Kathryn Crameri (2000) has argued that in Catalonia a degree of cultural and linguistic autonomy has enabled “a limited form of banal nationalism” (ibid: 148) to emerge in what is a stateless nation. What this study draws attention to is not only the complexity of the cultural landscape in places such as Spain, Britain and Canada but also, far more importantly, the problems of assuming a settled and largely benign socio-political environment even in, what Billig has labelled as, “established, democratic nations” (1995: 93).

As Jackie Abell and her colleagues have argued “the idea that any modern states are stable in the sense of being unchallenged over time, or lacking in internal tensions or external challenges is highly questionable” and as such should be critically evaluated in terms of its political function (Abell et al, 2006: 208). This idea will be discussed in terms of the micro-level below but will also be taken up using a wider, macro-perspective in relation to the British context in Chapter 3.

_enhabiting the nation_

In other words, we need to specifically address how different constituencies might respond to the particular media texts or political speeches used as examples of the nation being flagged in a routine or taken-for-granted manner (Rosie et al, 2004, 2006)\(^7\). In other words, adopting a top-down approach neglects the idea that “national identities depend critically on the claims which people themselves make in different contexts and at different times” (Bechhofer et al quoted in Hester & Housley, 2002: 3).

This requires an understanding of “the ways in which ordinary social actors construct themselves as nationalised subjects” (Condor & Abell, 2006: 55). As Susan Condor notes in the case of England, “a good deal has been written about English national identity, but almost all current accounts of commonsense national representations rely on analyses of cultural texts ... rather than on the discourse of ordinary citizens”\(^7\)

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\(^7\) It should be noted that Billig’s study of everyday talk about the royal family (1992) was expressly concerned with how different groups of people debated particular issues and generated a shared sense of understanding with regard to the British monarchy. It is my contention that we may use this approach to inform an engagement with his subsequent work on _Banal Nationalism_ (1995).
This is not to suggest that studies of cultural texts are not valid or insightful, merely that we need to also understand how identities are lived and therefore constantly reworked, contested and practised by people in their everyday lives. As Reicher & Hopkins argue,

To analyse the cultural battles over national identity without understanding how people come to assume and inhabit such identities, and how the identity then shapes what they do ... does not get us very far in understanding nationalism (2001: 3).

The advantages of engaging with different publics are that it allows us to empirically test the significance of often taken for granted concepts associated with, say, identity or belonging among the different social groups who are presumed to utilise (or perhaps reject) them in their everyday lives. As Hester & Housley observe, if we “fail to ascertain the [identity] categories that are relevant for members ... and instead presume the relevance of particular categories” then sociological concepts become privileged over people’s everyday realities (2002: 6).

In relation to the Banal Nationalism thesis it might be unfairly assumed, given the limits of his empirical data, that Billig believes nationalism is banal for everyone who happens to live in Britain at the current time. Now given the complexity of a population of 60 million individuals containing four ‘national’ groups, first, second and third generation migrant ‘communities’, distinct regional and class identities and so on, we might contend that making such an assumption closes down our analysis where it should begin. Instead we may be better off thinking about what Robin Cohen’s calls the “fuzzy frontiers of British identity” (1994:2) and how they shift both within and between different groups over time. In each case, we need to actually ask who takes their identity for granted, who is mobilised by a sense of national identification, who rejects such a framework and then try and understand broader general patterns in order to address the complex question of why. This more grounded approach has informed recent studies in both the constituent nations of Britain (cf Fevre & Thompson, 1999, Condor, 2000, Findlay et al, 2004, Condor & Abell, 2006, Gill, 2005) and beyond, in Australia (Phillips & Smith, 2000), Austria (Wodak et al, 1999), Hungary (Wodak & Kovacs, 2003), Greece (Madianou, 2005) and Germany/Poland (Meinhof & Galasinski, 2005). In these cases, the authors have sought to understand how different groups (stratified in terms of ethnicity, age, class, region and so on) have discussed their own and others' identities in relation to particular topics/symbols etc.
Given the extent and complexity of the terrain over which national discourse seems to operate, another possible means of addressing the question of mobilisation is to focus on particular ‘liminal’ moments or periods (Turner, 1977) when national symbols and categories become subject to wider scrutiny. In the next section, I want to argue that focusing on the status and resonance of mass, public events designed to celebrate the nation may not only act as a useful “strategic lens” (Sassen, 2000) but also enable us to re-conceptualise the relationship between banal and, what I have labelled, ecstatic forms of nationalism (Skey, 2006).

Ecstatic nationalism

Interestingly, Billig largely dismisses such events as “conventional carnivals of surplus emotion” (1995: 45) and argues that, while they may be memorable, it is doubtful whether they “are sufficient to sustain a continuously remembered national identity” (ibid:46). While this may be a fair point, I think Billig also perhaps overlooks the significance of the link between the banal and the ecstatic in sedimenting the national as a taken-for-granted discourse. In this respect, it may be worth pointing to those who have theorised the relationship between mass, communal events and notions of shared solidarity (whether informed by the nation or otherwise) before outlining my own position and the significance of the ecstatic to this study.

Perhaps the most influential contribution to this area of research has been Emile Durkheim’s *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (1915). In this seminal work, Durkheim postulated a division between the profane and sacred elements of human societies (ibid: 88), with the latter linked to a range of practices, totems and values that were designed to recreate and reify social bonds, in the process producing solidarity and a shared sense of community (ibid: 207). Subsequent studies, have adopted this Durkheimian perspective, by emphasising the integrative function of communal events (cf Shils & Young, 1956, Verba, 1965), culminating in Dayan & Katz’s classic study of *Media Events* (1992), where mass-mediated events were portrayed as “shared experiences uniting viewers with one another and with their societies” (ibid: 13). Not surprisingly, such a Durkheimian reading of communal events has also been utilised by scholars of nationalism (cf Llobera, 1996: 143, Foster, 1991). Anthony Smith, for example, has argued that Durkheim’s writing on the symbols and rituals of
tribal groups in Australia, "applies with far greater force to nationalist rites and ceremonies ... as [its] deity is the nation itself" (Smith, 1991: 78).

These approaches, while influential, have been subject to criticism for adopting the tenets of functionalism and assuming that such events are integrative (Lukes, 1975). Nick Couldry, for example, has argued that Durkheim's theory of social integration through ritual "underplays issues of power" (2000: 42) so that it fails to engage with the complex and contested processes by which particular rites and symbols come to be accepted as legitimate for some (See also Kertzer, 1988). In other words, it is again necessary to ask the fundamental question(s) of whether, why and for whom they are seen to produce feelings of solidarity and, just as importantly, who ignore or resist them (Lukes, 1975: 297).

Here, it may be worthwhile drawing on Don Handelman's argument that the "logic of design", which underpins the production and management of such events, as well as the practices they engender (1998: 15-16) be subject to scrutiny. In this way, attention is directed to both how such communal events are organised and promoted, often by institutional bodies, and then whether they are accepted as such, ignored or resisted by different groups (Fox, 2006: 232).

Having noted the importance of moving "beyond functionalism" (Couldry, 2002: 9), it is also possible to reference a range of studies which have examined the impact of particular events designed to celebrate or commemorate a national community or movement (Handelman, 1998, Spillman, 1997, Kuhlke, 2004). Most acknowledge that while such events do generally offer substantial numbers an important focus for commemorating or celebrating 'their' national community, levels of participation, dissent and indifference can vary enormously. In particular, these studies have shown that the design and reception of mass rituals shifts in relation to wider social and political transformations (Adamczyk, 2002).

I have labelled such events as examples of 'ecstatic nationalism' (Skey, 2006) and, partly drawing on Dayan & Katz's earlier work (1992), offered the following working definition: pre-planned or anticipated, designed to generate forms of social solidarity linked to a national community or movement, interrupt the routines of daily life, utilise and reify (routine) symbols of the nation, involve both a 'live' central cast and a watching, media audience.
Furthermore, it is my contention that such events may have an important role to play in concretising the image of the nation, so that the banal and the ecstatic should be conceptualised in relation to each other. In particular, it is suggested that ecstatic forms of nationalism illuminate the banal, temporarily structuring disparate lives, providing a sense of communal release and realising the nation, albeit for a limited period, as a concrete community that can be seen and heard and idealised. In other words, such events provide us with powerful evidence - huge crowds on the streets, decorations on public buildings, blanket coverage in the media - that the banal symbols of the nation that are daily taken-for-granted are still resonant, thereby allowing them to recede into the background once the "business of ordinary life" has again resumed (Billig, 1995: 156).

Finally, from a methodological perspective, and drawing on Victor Turner's concept of liminality (1977), I also want to suggest that such events - as heightened and identifiable moments or periods - might provide us with important opportunities for studying national discourses, notably in an era that has been defined by many in terms of the undermining of national sovereignty and allegiances (Ohmae, 1995, Kaldor, 2004). Again, this position will be discussed in greater detail with reference to my data sets in subsequent empirical chapters.

Therefore, as a growing body of literature suggests, we must attend to a number of important features in trying to generate a grounded framework for the study of national discourse, These would include; the complexity of particular socio-political contexts, the differing processes of identification and categorisation that might operate therein (national or otherwise) and the degree to which such forms are made meaningful through everyday and ecstatic expressions by both elites and 'ordinary' people. In the next section, I would like to focus on a second issue, which concerns the need to create a dynamic model that is able to account for the impact of wider structural transformations on established discourses (See Chapter 1). Of particular relevance here are the arguments of those who have posited a new "globalising era" (Featherstone, 1990), driven by ever increasing global flows in people, products, images and ideas, which has been seen to pose a challenge to national forms of imagination and organisation. Again, I will use Michael Billig's original study to open up a range of important debates around the subject. In particular, earlier theoretical discussions of sedimentation, order of discourse, ontological security and the
'breaching' of taken-for-granted 'background expectations' (Garfinkel, 1984) will be usefully applied.

**Theorising the global**

While Billig is prepared to acknowledge that "the internationalisation of capital" (1995: 130) may have potential ramifications for the 'national imagination' in late-modernity, he pays relatively little attention to the historical causes of contemporary globalisation and dismisses much of what has been written about the post-modern condition as largely overstated. Instead, Billig largely views globalisation as "the global transmission of American culture" (1995: 149) and cites the ubiquity of Levis, Coca Cola, American films and music across the world as evidence. Even leaving aside the complex and heated debates over theories of cultural imperialism (Schlesinger, 1991, Tomlinson 1999) this is a fairly limited thesis of globalisation.

It is, of course, not possible to present a complete overview of these complex debates but I think it is worth offering a brief account of how "the increasing pace and intensity of global flows" (Basch et al, 1994: 24) may be impacting on group, and notably national, identities. This not only emphasises the importance of such flows and their potential impact but does not presume that national discourse, as a frame of reference for understanding and orientating oneself in the world, becomes an irrelevance.

While migration has always been a feature of human societies, shifts in capitalist production and rapid state deregulation, alongside advances in communications and transport technology, have opened up new spaces of global interaction (Hannerz, 1996), be they non-places (Auge, 1995), global cities (Sassen, 2001) or diasporic networks (Basch et al, 1994, Cohen, 1997). These interactions may involve semi/permanent migrants living in relatively established trans-national communities (Glick Schiller & Fouron, 1999, Vertovec, 1999, 2001) or may be more transient in

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18 For instance, Billig critiques Joshua Meyrowitz's (1985) *No Sense of Place* writing, "Meyrowitz claims that there is no sense of place, and he specifies the place where this absence of place is taking place. This place is a nation - America. His text signals his own sense of belonging to this place" (1995: 144).

19 One of the most renowned scholars of globalisation, Ulrich Beck, has gone as far as to argue that, "the imagining of possible lives can no longer be conceived as national or ethnic" (2000: 66).

20 It is worth reiterating that these 'in-between' identities are not recent phenomenon. As Kumar notes in his study of English national identity, English settlers in Ireland as early as
nature; images flashed across continents via satellite TV stations, global brand marketing, international conferences, tourism, instantaneous financial trading and so on (Tomlinson, 1999, Held & McGrew, 2000).

The relevance of a new global economic order, and the flows it engenders, is critical in offering individuals access to new products, practices, values and forms of imagination (Frykman & Lofgren, 1996, Edensor, 2002, Moore, 2004). Furthermore, as Frykman & Lofgren observe;

in a mobile culture where people constantly meet otherness, habits are brought to the surface, becoming manifest and thereby, challenged ... Once a habit has been described, it has also become something on which one must take up a stance, whether to kick the habit or stick tenaciously to it (1996:14)

In other words, a largely taken-for-granted national discourse is likely to become subject to increased scrutiny. This is what we labelled as a challenge to the field of doxa in Chapter 1, although the emergence of these new 'potentialities' (Moore, 2004) does not necessarily mean that national forms of identification and organisation are simply abandoned. Instead, as Edensor argues;

globalisation and nation identity should not be conceived of in binary terms but as two inextricably linked processes .... As global cultural flows become more extensive, they [may] facilitate the expansion of national identities and also provide cultural resources which can be domesticated, enfolded within popular and everyday national cultures ... [Therefore] global processes may diminish a sense of national identity or reinforce it (emphasis added, 2002: 29)

Elsewhere, a number of empirical studies have indicated that significant numbers continue to respond to these processes with a great deal of ambivalence, often viewing them as a source of uncertainty and anxiety as well as opportunity (Kong, 1999, Skrbis & Woodward, 2007, Wiles, 2007). This is a significant point and acts as a counter-weight to those who, in focusing on forms of identification and organisation that move beyond the national, tend to overlook the “reasons why ‘thick’ attachments

the 12th century complained that “just as we are English to the Irish, so we are Irish to the English” (quoted in Kumar, 2003: 76).
to particular solidarities still matter - whether in the forms of nations, ethnicities, local communities or religions" (Calhoun, 2003: 532).

**Zombie nations?**

For example, the cosmopolitan - one who is generally open to other people and cultures (Szerszynski & Urry, 2002: 470) - has become an increasingly popular figure in much recent social scientific writing. Yet as Zlatko Skrbis and his colleagues have noted "the notion of openness is rather vague and diffuse" (2004: 127), and needs to be investigated empirically rather than asserted. Furthermore, because much writing on cosmopolitanism offers "no strong account of social solidarity or of the role of culture in constituting human life" (Calhoun, 2003: 535) it tends to operate in rather prescriptive terms, privileging a "progressive humanistic ideal" (Skrbis et al, 2004: 116) over more parochial allegiances (cf Nussbaum, 1996). Of course, there is nothing wrong with adopting such a position provided that an "abstract utopian value" (Skrbis et al, 2004: 115) is not used to underpin any analysis of wider social practices. Here, the problem comes when analysts begin to theorise not in accordance with what their respondents have told them (or they have observed) but on the basis of these normative prescriptions.

Ulrich Beck, for example, has argued that "normal social science categories are becoming zombie categories, ... living dead categories which blind the social sciences as to the rapidly changing realities inside the nation-state containers and outside as well" (2002: 24). If this is the case, then what are we to do when our respondents draw on these categories to make sense of their own lives, given that, for example, the "experiential frame of national societies" has already been dismissed as a "scam" (2002: 29)?

An 'everyday' example that Beck uses to make his point is instructive: "take the supermarket around the corner. Today one finds on the shelves every possible kind of food that used to be eaten on other continents and in other cultures ... The result ... is a banal cosmopolitan culinary eclecticism" (2002: 28). This seems to me to be a fairly reasonable argument in many instances. And yet at the same time, one can also

21 A study by Danny Miller & Don Slater (2002) operates as another useful challenge to such zombie categorizing. Their analysis of internet use among Trinidad's widely dispersed diasporic communities indicated the degree to which national discourse continued to inform the ways in which Trinidadians - both at home and abroad - made sense of their 'collective' experiences.
perhaps agree with Orvar Lofgren's (1993) observation that what makes a Swedish and a Norwegian supermarket different is a whole host of small, apparently insignificant features (lay-out, displays, products etc.) that might seem irrelevant to anyone besides a Swede or a Norwegian. The fact is, however, that these differences might actually be quite important to some people.

Therefore, whether one or the other (or both) of these positions are relevant for different people at particular times and places is not a question of claiming that “food and drink of all countries unite” (Beck, 2002: 28), but a matter for empirical analysis. Such a debate might also be usefully theorised in relation to the concept of order of discourse, as individuals draw on (competing) discursive resources in order to make sense of events and issues and manage particular ‘dilemmas’.

The national and the post-national

This discussion leads me on to a further significant argument made by Daniel Chernilo (2006a) who has critiqued the tendency in much recent social scientific theorising to “operate ... through [a] dichotomy” that contrasts the national (modernity) and the global (post-modernity) (ibid: 11). In this formulation, the era of modernity, defined in terms of the primacy of the nation-state, is largely viewed as stable, marked by linear progression, rational, fixed, bounded and internally homogeneous. This point can be illustrated with reference to two examples from the social science literature.

The deterritorialisation of culture refers to the way that a national or even regional culture can no longer be conceived as reflecting a coherent and distinct identity (emphasis added, Papastergiadis, 2000: 27)

There are no simple answers. The purely national has been broken, and it is not being replaced by the purely global, but by a combination of both. What is important is that there is no way of going back to the era of the pure national, that has been changed profoundly (emphasis added, Rantanen, 2002: 139)

22 See Wilk (2001) for a useful analysis of how globalisation has actually created a national culinary style in Belize or Cusack (2000) on the use of recipes as national symbols across a range of African countries.
In direct contrast, the current post-modern era is conceptualised in terms of liquidity (Bauman, 2000), flux, mobility (Szerszynski & Urry, 2006), hybridity (Papastergiadis, 2000), rhizomes (Appadurai, 2003), fractals and so on. Yet there is an inherent problem in operating with a more or less entrenched dichotomy between what Ulrich Beck labels as “national modernity ... [and] the second modernity where everyday life is banally cosmopolitan” (2004: 133). Making such a distinction obscures (however implicitly) the degree to which ‘national modernity’ incorporated non-national forms of political organisation and imagination (Tarrow, 2005: 36-40, see also Kidd, 1999) as well as the struggles involved in generating and maintaining national frameworks. As Chernilo argues, “the nation-state has been historically opaque, sociologically uncertain and normatively ambivalent” (2006a: 15) so that those who posit a new era of global or cosmopolitan realities end up simply reifying the myth of a historically stable, coherent nation-state.

This calls for a change in emphasis, ignoring “the rhetoric of the nation-state [concerning] its strength and stability [and instead acknowledging] that [it] is ... [always] an unfinished project that paradoxically presents itself as an already established form of socio-political organisation” (ibid: 16). This call to “recognise the ambivalence between solidity and instability in the nation-state’s self-presentation” (ibid: 15-16), both now and in the past, mirrors earlier discussions concerning the contingency of all social formations and the degree to which some become objectified over time so that they are viewed as concrete entities (Laclau, 1990a, Couldry, 2006). This is where the concept of sedimentation may prove fruitful as instead of using a concrete entity called the nation as a starting point, attention is drawn to the ongoing struggle over what counts as ‘truth’ by re-focusing on “those discursive forms through which a society tries to institute itself ... on the basis of closure” (Laclau, 1990a: 92).

There are, then, two things I particularly want to draw from this discussion. The first is that nationalism and globalisation “need to be reconstructed as co-original and in co-evolution” (Chernilo, 2006a: 16, see also Brown, 2000) rather than opposing forces involved in a zero-sum game. The second is to conceptualise, “nation-formation as a dynamic and potentially reversible process” (Hutchinson, 2006: 295) that in particular periods and places may become stabilised and naturalised. In these instances, as a growing body of work indicates, this national framework informs everyday ways of thinking, imagining and acting, in the process generating “essentialist conception[s] of both society and social agency” (Laclau, 1990a: 89). However, what needs emphasising
is not only the dynamic nature of these processes but also the question of what underlies these periods of relative stabilisation and sedimentation (Cohen 1994: 199-200, Fenton, 2004, Abeyratne, 2004). In line with the discourse-historical approach, outlined in Chapter 1, this means focusing on “the broader socio-political and historical contexts [within] which ... [particular] discursive practices are embedded” (Wodak, 2006: 67).

Cooling and heating nationalism

For instance, in the wider literature on nationalism, there has been relatively little attempt made to theorise how ‘hot’ nationalism may cool over time (or, indeed, vice versa) and the possible conditions that might make this possible. If we leave aside the problem of defining what Michael Billig labels, “established, democratic nations” (1995:93), it seems reasonable to suggest that they are characterised by relatively high levels of economic prosperity, wealth distribution and political stability. As a result, it might be then worth exploring whether these economic and political factors are important in allowing such cooling to take place (cf Tishkov, 2000: 644, Calhoun, 1997: 59-64)²³.

For instance, Orvar Lofgren’s study of America and Sweden indicates that banal symbols emerged after a period of sustained ‘nationalization’ by the state and as levels of affluence began to rise for an increasing majority of the population (Lofgren, 1993:183-186). Elsewhere, Andreas Wimmer (2006) has argued that the provision of social welfare in European countries helped nationalise the working classes who then fought strongly against those, such as migrants, who were perceived to threaten or dilute their new economic and political rights. Therefore, it may be necessary to incorporate wider socio-economic factors, notably levels of wealth creation and relative distribution, into any framework used to analyse the emergence and maintenance of banal forms of national identification. This is particularly relevant for those countries that could be labelled as multi-national, including Britain, Spain, Switzerland, Canada, Belgium etc.

Conversely, as John Hutchinson has argued (2005, 2006), it cannot be presumed that national forms of organisation and imagination, once established and largely

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²³ Answering these type of questions has tended to be the preserve of economists dealing with developmental issues although the empirical studies I wrestled with seemed to offer rather conflicting results (cf Collier, 2001, Abeyratne, 2004, Alesina & La Ferrera, 2005).
routinised, continue to exist, un-remarked upon, in perpetuity. Instead, he writes, "the nation is a process, and a non-linear one, that is reversible" (2006: 300) and identifies a number of factors, war, 'natural' disasters, migration and ideological threat, that may cause hot outbursts of nationalist fervour - riots, civil conflict or war - or, to stretch our analogy a little further, the gradual heating of largely taken-for-granted forms of national life. Although the metaphor is different, the idea of heating/cooling can also be usefully mapped onto earlier discussions of de/sedimentation.

In both of these cases a brief example may be useful for illustrative purposes. In the first instance, Jared Diamond has examined the impact of environmental devastation caused by overpopulation and the growing disparities in land ownership in Rwanda as possible factors in the 1994 genocide. He acknowledges the important and self serving role of political elites whipping up 'ethnic hatred' and the post-colonial history of Hutu and Tutsi relations, but suggests that these commonly accepted explanations for the slaughter need to be contextualised in relation to wider and underlying economic and environmental considerations (2005: 311-328, see also Malesevic, 2006).

In the latter, Pal Kolsto (2006), in his study of how national symbols are utilised in varying contexts, focuses on the case of Norway in the 1920's and links political struggles over the meaning of national symbols, including the flag and Constitution Day, with wider social unrest between political classes (ibid: 690). Furthermore, he suggests that the meaning of such symbols only became routinised again in the 1930's, once the Labour Party, which broadly represented working-class interests, had come to power. Here, he argues that attention must be paid to the underlying causes of such episodes as well as the ways in which they produce critical conflicts over the meaning of popular national symbols. In other words, "the closing of ranks on the level of symbols came about only after the social split had been healed. It was not so much a cause as an effect of greater political harmony" (ibid: 692).

Therefore, the processes by which particular habits or ways of life become both naturalised and then opened up to scrutiny needs to, at least, take into account wider structural conditions (local, regional, global) operating in any period as they broadly define the possibilities of political and economic life within any particular national setting (I will return to this discussion in the next chapter in relation to the English/British context).
The foregoing discussion has been an attempt to produce a more grounded framework for understanding the significance (or otherwise) of national forms of organisation, mobilisation and identification in the contemporary era. Taking Billig's seminal thesis of *Banal Nationalism* as a starting point, I have looked to extend his arguments by drawing on a growing body of literature on the subject of nationhood and (national) identity and wider social theory. In particular, it has been argued that we need a more grounded model that is able to address the complexity of many 'national' contexts and the relations of power therein. The incorporation of a dynamic element is also crucial as it allows us to take into account (the potential for) change, generally in relation to structural shifts. In the final section of this chapter, I will draw together a number of these ideas, together with some of the earlier theoretical discussions in Chapter 1, in order to illustrate how they might be usefully employed in practice.

*The national in everyday life*

As I have already noted, one of the key achievements of discursive approaches to the study of nations is that they have focused attention on the ways in which the nation is mindlessly flagged on a daily basis so that it becomes "embedded in routines of social life" (Billig, 1995: 175) and "absorbed into a common sense view about the way the world is" (Edensor, 2002: 11). Over the past decade or more, a range of studies have looked to trace the contours of this vast and complex terrain, focusing on, for example, landscapes (Palmer, 1998, Cusack, 2001), borders (Lofgren, 1999), everyday practices (Fox, 2004), national 'time' (Postill, 2002, Edensor, 2006), architecture (McNeill & Tewdwr-Jones, 2003), diet (Cusack, 2000, Wilk, 2001), motoring habits (Edensor, 2004), tourism (Kaysen Nielsen, 2003, Palmer, 2005), money (Pointon, 1998, Gilbert & Helleiner, 1999), postage stamps (Brunn: 2001, Cusack: 2005), street signs (Pinchevski & Torgovnik: 2002, Azaryahu & Kook, 2002), the mass media (Rosie et al, 2006, Nossek, 2004, Dhoest, 2004) and 'everyday talk' about the nation (Condor, 2000, Phillips & Smith, 2000, Abell et al, 2006).

Unfortunately, there is no space here to examine these varied studies in detail. Instead, a more general overview can be provided by returning to our earlier theorisation of everyday life and the three key elements (language/shared knowledge, spatial and temporal limits) that were identified as being salient in underpinning a relatively consistent and hence taken-for-granted realm. These again point to the degree to which national forms of identification, categorisation and mobilisation are
often “grounded ... in the mundane details of social interaction, habits, routines and practical knowledge” (Edensor, 2002: 17).

In terms of language, a number of works have explored the ways in which the media routinely used location markers and deictic phrases to address a national audience (cf Yumus & Ozkirimli, 2002, Higgins, 2004, Madianou, 2005). Similarly, a growing range of empirical studies have shown the degree to which people draw on national discourse in a routine fashion whether talking about their own or others nation(s) (Wodak et al, 1999, Condor, 2000, Philips & Smith, 2000) or discussing more general topics (Brubaker et al, 2006, Fenton & Mann, 2006). Equally one might apply similar arguments to social practices, ways of doing ‘things’ that are largely seen as ‘normal’ or appropriate in a given context; how to drive (Edensor, 2004), dig a trench (Mauss, 1979), play football (Lechner, 2007), order a takeaway (Parker, 2000), queue (Fox, 2004) or wash up (Linde Larsen, 1993)\(^4\). Again, I do not want to suggest that class, gender, local or regional differences are not relevant but in many cases particular ways of speaking or acting can come to be defined in terms of the nation (Kayser Nielsen, 1999, Bratsis, 2006: 95, Fox, 2004, Brubaker et al, 2006).

In the case of spatial limits, maps (Anderson, 1991: 170-178) and street signs (Pinchevski & Torgovnik: 2002, Azaryahu & Kook, 2002) are just two of the most banal symbolic representation of an objectified world of nations that are routinely used. Elsewhere, Schutz’s zones of operation may be applied to the national, both internally in the categorisation of regional differences and allegiances (accents, local specialties, geographical knowledge, sporting rivalries etc.) and externally in terms of borders, mass media coverage, architectural styles, languages and social institutions. Edensor, in his discussion of the importance of “familiar, quotidian landscapes” to a sense of identity, refers to “the plethora of everyday, mundane signifiers which are noticeably not present when we go abroad. These institutions, vernacular features and everyday fixtures are embedded in local contexts but recur throughout the nation as serial features” (2002: 51).

Here, it is also possible to reference the relative difficulties people encounter both officially and practically when they move across these different zones. At each level

\[^4\] There are an increasing number of studies that illustrate how ‘techniques of the body’ (Mauss, 1979) are linked to forms of collective memory (Connerton, 1989, Halbwachs, 1992) and social identity (Kayser Nielsen, 2003, Molz, 2006). Therefore, we need to acknowledge that bodily enaction has “very much to do with what one is and with how and why one is” (Narvaez, 2006: 61).
there will be spaces, products, people and practices that are more or less familiar, taken-for-granted and unproblematic, which, as a result, demand more or less thought, effort and/or resolve. Yet these levels are not all equally significant as moving across a county border in England is a very different process from travelling to, say, France, where official documentation must be carried, a ‘foreign’ language and new driving conditions dealt with and so on (Lofgren, 1999).

Temporal regularities are also routinely predicated on a national framework, in terms of broadly settled times for work and rest, eating, entertainment, worship, holidaying and so on. For instance, van den Broek et al.’s longitudinal study into temporal regimes of daily life in the Netherlands argued that “collective rhythms and individual routines have stood their ground” considering the period in question, 1975-1995, was one of large-scale restructuring across Dutch society (2002: 214). These collective routines included the timing of household chores and other daily activities such as getting up, eating, watching TV and doing the shopping.

Yet while the broader changes that these and other authors point towards are significant, notably in the spheres of the economy and entertainment, the role of powerful state and other institutions in setting limits - spatial, temporal and practical - should not be overlooked. In many situations, as Ann Swidler writes, “individuals ... come to act in culturally inform ways, not because their [values] ... are shared, but because they must negotiate the same institutional hurdles” (1995: 36).

Institutionalising the nation

This idea can be illustrated in relation to the national by focusing on the regulation and management of both the temporal and spatial spheres of everyday life, predominately by the state. As Edensor notes, “through its laws, broadcasting policies, policing and economic management, the state provides a regulatory apparatus which informs many standard actions and ostensibly champions good habits” (2006: 530). These ‘official’ regulations, concerning the opening times of public institutions and private businesses, public holidays, who may drink, work, go to war, drive and have sex and when, in turn inform the (often) highly formalised patterns of behaviour that are considered suitable at a given time and place.
In terms of the spatial dimension, we have already noted that the nation is the most territorial of all human collectivities but as well as the management and policing of borders (Shome, 2003), state planning and organisation also helps generate a familiar network of locales, institutions and banal features - traffic and other public signs, street furniture, building designs etc. - that form a largely “unquestioned backdrop to daily tasks, pleasures and routine habits” (Edensor, 2006: 537). These are the routine features of daily life that everyone must contend with, whether or not they have any particular allegiance to the ‘imagined’ national community that the state purports to act on behalf of (Brubaker et al, 2006: 216/365).

Cesar Mavratsas illustrates this point rather well in his study of Cyprus, writing, “Greek Cypriots, even those who reject the very idea of an independent Cypriot state, find themselves in ... an independent polity and have no choice but to confront it: they must abide by its constitution and laws, use its currency, serve in its army, utilize its services, pay taxes to it, carry its passports and identification cards” (1999: 99).

Having outlined how theoretical approaches to the concept of the everyday might be usefully applied to studies of the national, I would now like to return to the idea that it is the unproblematic nature of daily life that makes it so powerful “as a site of identity formation” (Barkardjieva, 2005: 70). Here, we can apply Anthony Giddens’ concept of ontological security (1990: 92) using it to explore in more detail how the idea of ‘home’ often coalesces around both local settings and the particular features of one’s own nation in a world of nations. These discussions are particularly significant as they mark out some of the main concerns of this study, notably in relation to other similar work in the field.

**Ontological security and the idea of ‘home’**

As we noted earlier, ontological security, “refers to the confidence that most human beings have in the continuity of their self-identity and in the constancy of the surrounding social and material environments of action” (Giddens, 1990: 92). Furthermore, it is daily routines, customs and habits that are seen to play a crucial role in generating a sense of predictability, continuity and hence trust, in the management of our relations with others. What the contemporary studies, outlined above, illustrate is that in many cases what we are talking about are practices defined
as national, governed and institutionalised in accordance with national temporalities and taking place within the spaces of the nation.

As a result, the tacit understandings generated by a life lived in a world of nations may be viewed as a key element in generating a sense of ongoing stability and order in what is a complex and often threatening world. As Caterina Kinvall writes, “by supplying a consistent structure, [the nation] ... provides order from the chaos and uncertainty in the world ... [as well as] answers to questions concerning existence itself, the external world and human life ..., the ‘Other’ and what self-identity really is” (2004: 759). This important point picks up on the earlier argument concerning the productivity of power/knowledge and the idea that particular subject positions assign status and generate psychological stability (see also Chapter 6).

One significant aspect of this discussion can be explored in relation to the idea of home (Schutz, 1964: 108). Here, in particular, David Morley (2000) has traced in some detail the double meaning of ‘home’ in relation to both the macro (national) scale and its “ground[ing] in an understanding of the (often, literally domestic) micro-processes through which the smaller units ... make up that larger community” (ibid: 3). Morley notes, for instance, that the idea of home as a distinct ordered location only emerged in the 17th century as space, both domestic and public, become subject to increasing surveillance, standardisation and disciplinary practices. In effect, the regulation of one’s own individual private space was matched by the demarcation and control of public space, including territorial borders, by the state (Sahlins, 1989) and it is through this complex relationship that the idea of home as a place of security and stability, for both the individual and ‘society’ as a whole, emerges (see also Billig, 1995: 108-109). Here, Morley draws on the work of Agnes Heller, who writes:

integral to the average everyday life is awareness of a fixed point in space, a firm position from which we proceed ... and to which we return in due course. This firm position is what we call ‘home’. Going home should mean returning to that firm position which we know, to which we are accustomed, where we feel safe (quoted in Morley, 2000: 24).

This quote ties in rather neatly with our earlier discussion of Schutz’s work, where home is described “as a familiar zone of operation where recurrent unproblematic situations occur” (Barkardjieva, 2005: 70). As a result, “life at home follows an
organized pattern of routine; it has well determined goals and well-proved means to bring them about, consisting of a set of traditions, habits, institutions, timetables for activities of all kinds" (Schutz, 1964: 108). At the micro level, this means home is the place where (in ideal terms) people can relax, be themselves and, by and large, pander to their own wants and desires. At the macro scale, it refers to the idea that the everyday contexts that one moves through will be, on the whole, recognizable and consistent, where a general knowledge of how things are and should be, rules and regulations, common practices, popular pastimes, who matters and why, contributes to the imagination of national "homely space" (Billig, 1995: 109).

This is what Descombes calls "rhetorical country ... the place where a person feels at home - in the sense that there they are able to, by virtue of a shared rhetoric to make themselves (relatively) easily understood and to understand others" (quoted in Auge, 1995: 108). This can be contrasted with the idea of the 'foreign' which - in the words of the film-maker Fellini - represents a place where, "I no longer know what anything means" (quoted in Morley, 2000: 18). Here, the world outside 'our' borders often places additional demands on us as 'we' struggle to comprehend alternative systems and social practices, even where linguistic or other important cultural features may appear superficially consistent (Geertz, 2000: 13, Edensor, 2002: 21-22).

Having briefly outlined how 'common sense' forms of life associated with the nation may become materially and psychologically valuable (Finlyason, 1998b), I would like to acknowledge an important (possible) objection as a means of foregrounding the important link between identity and context.

The difference that 'difference' makes

In outlining the degree to which national discourse may inform routine aspects of daily life for significant numbers, I am not suggesting that everyone, everywhere frames their every word and action in terms of the nation. This is patently a ludicrous idea and, as I have tried to acknowledge, one needs to be aware that there are and always have been many other significant discourses that people draw on in their daily lives.

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25 In a similar vein, John Urry has argued that "tourism results from a basic binary division between the ordinary/everyday and the extraordinary" (2001: 12) again linking the idea of 'home' with daily routines that are largely taken-for-granted. Therefore, "people [seek] ... particularly distinct pleasures which ... are on a different scale from those typically encountered in everyday life" (ibid).
(linked to, say, class, gender, age, race, cosmopolitan, religion, consumerism and so on) that may offer direct challenges to a national perspective.

Therefore, in acknowledging the national as one (albeit powerful) discourse among many that people can potentially draw on, it is then necessary to address the questions of where and when it is utilised and for what purposes (Gill, 2005, Brubaker et al, 2006), notably as people are required to manage “dilemmas” in their everyday lives (Billig et al, 1988). As a result, particular attention must be paid to the significance of the context(s) in which different discursive forms are utilised, observing that they will “influence action much more powerfully at some moments than at others” (Swidler, 1995: 34). For instance, Gerd Baumann’s ethnographic study in a multi-ethnic suburb of West London examined the ways in which people exhibited a “dual discursive competence” when discussing culture and identity “depending upon their judgements of context and purpose” (1996: 189). The first discourse reified culture in relation to a particular bounded community, while the second offered a far more open or fluid version of these two concepts. Similarly, Les Back’s (1996) study of everyday discourses of race and identity in South-East London, demonstrated how young people in the area moved between racist and a more open ‘community discourse’, based on a local sense of belonging, in relation to particular circumstances.

Elsewhere, the anthropologist Nigel Rapport (2006) has offered a number of useful observations about “national identity [as] ... an everyday way of being” after completing an ethnographic study in a Scottish hospital (ibid: 1). Having argued that the national should be viewed as one of a number of forms of identity, ranging from the local to the global, that one might articulate depending on need and contingency, Rapport observes that among his colleagues, “Scottishness was less significant as an everyday marker of identity at work [except] ... when one was engaged in certain practices or events; watching football on television; having an argument with a fellow-worker who one supposed was born somewhere else” (ibid: 3). This is an important point because it again warns us against over-estimating the importance of national identity in every aspect of people’s daily lives. Crucially, however, it also illustrates the degree to which individuals, when confronted with difference (in the form of an accent, dress, objects, practices etc.) may draw on a ‘common sense’ national discourse to make sense of or interpret their experiences.
The work of Peter Bratsis (2000), this time focusing on Greek-Americans living in New York, offers a broadly similar insight noting the degree to which a more Greek or American identity was privileged depending on contextual relations, with internal and external ‘Others’. Bratsis writes,

in the case of Greek Americans ... the Greeks in Greece constitutes one ‘Other’ ... and the WASP American tends to function as another privileged ‘Other’. [Therefore], when in Greece, all the interviewees noted that they felt much more American there than when they are in the United States (ibid: 104-105).

Interestingly, both of these out-groups are again constituted in opposition to ‘us’ in relation to a whole range of banal practices and traits. In the first case, Greek Americans differentiate themselves from Greeks in terms of diet, work ethic and (liberal) attitudes (ibid: 105-106), while in the latter, WASP Americans, “do not care about their children, are money hungry ... play golf and eat mayonnaise and sliced white bread that comes in plastic bags” (ibid: 105).

While these seem to be fairly banal examples of a national discourse being utilised in response to otherness, arguments over football matches or cheese pies (ibid: 101) should not, of course, let us overlook the degree to which these processes of categorisation and stigmatisation have very real and sometimes horrifying impacts on people’s lives. However, as I have already argued in relation to the idea of heating and cooling nationalism, the question of whether and when (national) ‘difference’ moves from joking about sports to outright hostility must be understood in relation to both the immediate context and the wider structural conditions within which those involved operate. For instance, Steve Fenton has identified three crises that may convert ‘difference’ into conflict; one is where a dominant majority perceives a loss of internal power and reacts to secure their status, the second concerns the erosion of state sovereignty as a result of increasing regional or global movements and the third involves the collapse of state authority/institutions (ibid: 189).

These ideas can be linked back to the earlier discussion concerning the growing intensity of global flows, where it was noted that the current era is one where people are increasingly having to engage with ‘difference’, whether in the form of people, products, ideas or images, during a period of wider structural transformations. Again,
the question we need to ask is what sort of response these shifts produce and how they may impact on the daily contexts through which people move.

*Engaging with the ‘Other’*

As some analysts argue, these engagements may inculcate a spirit of increasing openness towards other people and practices so that national and local allegiances are rendered obsolete by new forms of imagination and identification (Beck, 2004). Alternatively, it is possible to envisage that national forms of discourse, because they are embedded in countless routine settings and practices, may come to be increasingly significant as a means of explanation or interpretation when individuals are confronted with or, at least, perceive difference in their everyday lives. Indeed, for some, “the initial unfamiliarity engendered by confronting ‘Others’ spaces can ... result in disorientation and a desire to reinstate the familiar” (Edensor, 2002: 187). In those cases where the ‘Other’ is perceived or confronted within the most settled of the daily zones of operation it seems more likely that it will become an increasing source of anxiety or what Giddens labels as “ontological insecurity” (1984: 63). As we saw in Chapter 1, Harold Garfinkel’s studies of activities or utterances that ‘breach’ everyday expectations and therefore generate feelings of uncertainty and confusion can also be productively utilised in relation to these debates.

However, in discussing the potential threat that increasing global mobility may represent to previously taken-for-granted social formations, it is important to note that it is “not the presence of otherness per se which is problematic but only that of undomesticated otherness” (Morley, 2000: 223). This is an argument developed by Ghassan Hage in relation to debates over multiculturalism in Australia (1998). In his work, *White Nation*, Hage observes that particular groups position themselves as the ultimate and rightful arbiters of what counts as authentically Australian and therefore, who can settle in the country.

It is only when these groups perceive a challenge to their own position as “occupiers of the centre of national space” and culture (ibid: 19) that the ‘Other’ becomes a source of anxiety. In this sense, it is necessary to understand whether, and why, (perceived) ‘differences’ have shifted from being understood as manageable, perhaps something against which the in-group can be defined, to being viewed as a direct and uncomfortable challenge to the routines and (supposed) rationalities of a particular, dominant group’s way of life.
These are obviously only two possible responses to the increasing ‘potentialities’ offered by globalisation on a continuum that is likely to include much that is between the ‘extremes’ of absolute openness (whatever that means) and outright hostility. However, as I have suggested, such processes cannot remain the object of theorisation alone and, therefore, must be investigated empirically in terms of both individual perceptions and practices and the wider structural conditions that constrain them.

Summary

This chapter has assessed how some of the broader concepts outlined in the theoretical framework might be applied to a study of contemporary expressions of nationhood, beginning with a detailed analysis of Michael Billig’s seminal study of Banal Nationalism. After outlining the major contributions of Billig’s work, a number of weaknesses were addressed, in relation to a wide range of recent studies, in an attempt to provide a more dynamic framework for this thesis. In particular, it has been argued that, “the banality of national referents must be seen as a “social accomplishment” (Condor, 2000: 199), so that the nation is conceptualised as a process of becoming, rather than an actually existing entity (Laclau, 1990a). Adopting such an approach provides a better understanding of the contingent nature of national forms of identification, categorisation and mobilisation, even as they come to inform everyday ways of thinking and acting for many.

Similarly while the banality of national discourse can be evidenced at some times and places by a wide range of empirical studies, the current era is marked by new patterns of mobility and technological development that place an increasing pressure on the logics of national life. As Kevin Robins observes in an article, which is I think, worth quoting at length;

The nation can never exist in the form of its ideal image of itself. It is always bound to be compromised by disorderly realities. Thus, the imagined unity of the nation has always been under threat - or has always been imagined as under threat - from a real world characterised by its multiplicity and complexity. The imagined unity of the nation has always struggled to cope with actual diversity and difference. In recent years, however, through the accelerating logic of globalization, national communities have felt themselves to be more and more under siege, and they have found it increasingly difficult to defend their integrity and coherence (2001: 85-86)
Acknowledging the dynamic and contested nature of nation-building and maintenance both now and in the past enables us to refocus on processes of de/sedimentation over time linked to wider material constraints and socio-political transformation. This more macro-perspective can be complemented by an examination of the processes by which sedimentation occurs in practice both through words and activities of elite institutions and actors and the myriad daily dispositions of ‘ordinary’ people, which are fundamental in realising and constituting a world defined in national terms.

Or to put it another way, the nation is not a “daily plebiscite”, to use Renan’s oft-quoted phrase, providing a basis of consent for those who have “clearly expressed [a] desire to continue a common life” (2000: 19). Individuals in Peru do not get up each morning and decide that, all things considered, they again feel Peruvian enough to want to continue partaking in all that Peruvian (national) life has to offer. Instead, where nationalist doctrines are backed by powerful state institutions and where particular practices, products, people, places and ideas have become first ‘nationalised’ and then naturalised for a majority, then they are, in turn, likely to become part of the framework of most people’s lives, whether particular individuals adhere to them or not.

In advancing this position, I have also argued that those researching the resonance of national discourse to different individuals must also take-into-account the contexts in which they are utilised, whether un-problematically or in a more reflexive display, rather than simply assuming their salience. Furthermore, in order to try and better understand why national forms of identification and organisation are meaningful, it has been suggested that they can generate valued subject positions, which, in the process, provide many individuals with an important sense of “ontological security” in the modern world (Giddens, 1990: 92).

In contrast, the ‘potentialities’ offered by the increasing intensity of global flows may represent a challenge to (relatively) well established forms of organisation and understanding thereby becoming a source of anxiety or threat for some. In these cases, it has been suggested that it is not ‘difference’ per se that it seen as problematic but the presence of an undomesticated ‘Other’. These ‘others’ come to represent a threat to a previously taken-for-granted, and often valued, social order.
because they are seen to be out of place, thereby challenging those who view themselves as the symbolic owners of the nation.

In the next chapter, I want to provide a context for the subsequent empirical chapters by examining a number of key historical processes in relation to the British/English case. This will involve sketching a brief outline of the emergence and growth of the British state, the relations between the four nations that constitute Britain, the importance of empire, religion and war to the British/English imagination, and finally bringing us up to the post-war era, current debates over Europe, immigration and devolution. This macro-perspective will, it is hoped, then enable us to foreground some of the more in-depth micro perspectives concerning the relevance and resonance of national forms of identification among different people in contemporary England.
Chapter 3: The macro perspective

Introduction

This chapter is designed to provide a concise overview of some of the wider socio-political developments relating to questions of identity and belonging in Britain/England from a macro perspective. In particular, I will be focusing on, what Robin Cohen calls, the “frontiers of identity” and how they have been defined, maintained, negotiated and challenged over time, in relation to shifting concepts of self and other among Britain’s diverse and changing populations (Cohen, 1994: 2).

It should be noted at the outset that this is not an attempt to provide an in-depth history of the British Isles and its peoples. Instead, in the first section, I will focus on particular significant events and periods from the Act of Union (which legislated the British state into existence) in 1707 until the end of the Second World War in 1945, before offering, in the second, an analysis of some of the major issues and developments in contemporary British history.

There are perhaps two other points to make at this juncture. The first concerns the earlier discussions in Chapter 1 of the dangers of defining and interpreting the past in terms of the past (Hobsbawn, 2005). In this section, word limits and expediency mean that terms such as Britishness, English national identity and the Welsh will be used, albeit advisedly. We do however need to remember that what these terms mean now and in the past may have been markedly different and that in many cases what we are often talking about is increasingly coherent elite groups that dominated political and economic spheres of influence as well as territorial domains. Secondly, it should be noted at the outset that much of this chapter will draw on secondary sources as a means of providing as extensive and coherent an analysis as is possible given the large time-span and range of issues that need to be addressed.

The formation of the British nation-state

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26 It is also hoped that this chapter will illustrate some of our discussion in the preceding chapters, notably those concerning the contingent (and contested) nature of processes of national mobilisation and organisation.
The complex history of the British Isles up until 1707 is beyond the scope of this work (cf Kearney, 1989, Davies, 1999), but it is perhaps worth noting that although processes of colonisation, co-option and socio-economic integration were important across the British Isles up until the Act of Union, any sense of coherence should not be overstated (Kidd, 1999). As Linda Colley writes:

Great Britain in 1707 was much less a trinity of three self-contained and self-conscious nations than a patchwork in which uncertain areas of Welshness, Scottishness and Englishness were cut across by strong regional attachments and scored over again by loyalties to village, town, family and landscape (Colley, 1996: 17)

The 1707 Act of Union between England (and Wales) and Scotland, was signed against a backdrop of European-wide religious ferment and primarily designed to safeguard Britain's future as a Protestant entity against the growing threat of Catholic France and her allies (Colley, 1996: 11). Indeed, the twin forces of Protestantism and economic expansion, increasingly bolstered by colonial settlements, are seen to have underpinned Britain's growth and rise to global hegemony (Colley, 1996, McCrone, 1997).

For instance, Linda Colley has argued that the growing sense of a common British identity “did not come into being ... because of an integration and homogenisation of disparate cultures. Instead. Britishness was superimposed of an array of internal differences in response to contact ... and conflict with the Other” (ibid: 6, see also Kumar, 2003, Wellings, 2002).

Allied to this powerful threat from an external 'Other' was the fact that Britain as a whole was changing in remarkable ways that marked her off from other parts of continental Europe. Trade was bolstered by the removal of barriers within Britain and this combined with population movements to the major urban centres generated new economic networks across the country. Elsewhere, the growth of the press enabled the literature classes to imagine themselves as part of a wider context defined in national terms (Thompson, 1995: 66-68).

Again, it is important to note that we are not talking here about battles between 'nations' (in the modern sense) but rather struggles for power between dynastic and religious elites (see examples in Kearney, 1989: 109, Paxman, 1999: 97, Winder, 2004: 94).
If religious fervour and economic development helped generate a degree of integration across Britain, then overseas expansion accelerated this process. This took place, first, to the west of Europe across the Atlantic and then east in the Indian subcontinent, China and south-east Asia and presented the British with new forms of 'Otherness' against which they could identify and celebrate themselves (Cohen, 1994: 21-25).

Immanuel Wallerstein has argued that Britain's "industrial advance" was underpinned by an ability to focus on developing naval superiority so that by the end of the Seven Years War (1756-63) the British navy had a new dominance of the seas (1974: 233). However, in boasting 'possessions' including former French and Spanish colonies in Canada, West Indies, Africa and Asia, it was no longer so easy to justify the myth of a British trading empire, "small ... and homogeneous enough to be perceived as... the beneficent creation of a commercial and liberty-loving people" (Colley, 1996: 109)28.

However, if the gains of the Seven Years war transformed Britain's position and possessions, it was the American War of Independence that finally shifted British (elite) attitudes towards empire. In the aftermath of this shattering defeat, political elites began a new period of re-structuring at home, so that

in the half-century after the American war, there would emerge in Great Britain a far more consciously and officially structured patriotism which stressed the attachment to the monarchy, the importance of empire, the value of military and naval achievement and the desirability of strong, stable government by a virtuous, able and authentically British elite (ibid: 154).

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28 Christopher Bayly concurs with Colley's thesis writing, "until large-scale territorial empire came into existence from 1750 ..., British influence outside the West Indies and the thirteen colonies ... was limited to [a] ... network of forts and markets scattered across the globe" (1999: 21) and largely relied on local intermediaries. The West Indies were, up until that point, seen as a special case because of their economic significance, contributing "15% of Britain's total overseas trade" (mainly in the form of sugar and slaves) and relative vulnerability to French/Spanish attack (ibid: 22).
As a result both English and Celtic elites were drawn together far more effectively through the network of public schools, universities, the diplomatic and civil services, parliament (Kumar, 2003: 183) and, above all, the armed forces (Colley, 1996: 111). Elsewhere, appropriate pastimes, such as hunting, sports and tourism, began to be promoted and institutionalised alongside a cult of heroism, which was materialised through ceremony, art, literature and ritual (Kestner, 1996). This re-shaping of the ruling class, also extended to the monarchy itself, which underwent a radical transformation through the introduction of countless public ceremonies and rituals across the length and breadth of the country, coming in due course to represent stability, domesticity and, above all, imperial might (ibid: 208-250, Kumar, 2003: 181-182, Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983).

Outside of the ruling elites the undoubted growth in the economy, and the benefits it accrued to an increasing section of the population is likely to have produced some degree of attachment to the idea of Britishness. However, as Said has powerfully argued, “the enterprise of empire depends upon the idea of having an empire” (1994: 10) which has to be prepared for, justified and realized within a culture. This idea is “supported and perhaps even impelled by impressive ideological formations that include notions that certain territories and people require and beseech domination, as well as forms of knowledge associated with domination” (ibid: 8).

It is these formations, then, that were to have a fundamental influence on the ways in which increasing numbers of the British both viewed themselves (superior, civilised, dominant, enlightened) and the disparate ‘Others’ (subject races, subordinate peoples or dependent colonies in nineteenth century parlance) over whom they held sway. Moreover, these forms of imperial discourse not only fed into Anglo-British nationalism, but have also infused many aspects of contemporary British culture (Johnson, 2003: 204-206, Johnson, 2002: 168-170, Gilroy, 2004).

This second aspect will be examined in more detail below but for now, I want draw some attention to the ways in which the changing frontiers of Anglo-British identity

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29 A cult of masculinity was a key feature of British imperial discourse linked as it was to the idea, that “there was nothing but God above and duty below” (Chamberlain quoted in Johnson, 2003: 101-102, see also Dawson, 1994, Foley, 1995)

30 While the idea of empire as a ‘continuous enterprise’ seems fairly commonplace to the contemporary imagination, this was, “whatever one may think of the morality, a momentous innovation” (Said, 1994: 9) marking a radical change from earlier forms of empire, which in turn required its own forms of continuing justification and rationalisation.
were defined, developed and transformed in relation to the manifold processes of
colonisation and imperial expansion first in Britain, itself, and then abroad. In
particular, the fascinating role (or position) of the Celtic fringe, and notably the Irish
will be highlighted, in order to focus on the dynamic nature of this process. As Robin
Cohen observes,

ambiguity often characterises the boundaries between an English and a British
identity (the internal frontier) and between a British and a supranational identity
(the external frontiers) ... Some frontiers (for example, the line that divides Britons
from aliens) are less fuzzy than others ...[but]... the degree of focus along different
frontiers of identity can be varied situationally and temporally (1994: 7).

The empire and ‘otherness’

During the colonisation of Britain’s Celtic fringes (and in particular, Ireland) the Anglo-
Norman elites used the idea of a civilising mission in order to justify their, often
brutal, offensives. For instance, in 1155 the pope encouraged Henry II to take
possession of Ireland “so that he could reform its ‘rough and ignorant people’ and
extirpate their ‘filthy abominations’ and ‘enormous vices’” (Kumar, 2003: 82). These
justifications were then used to create a two-tier colonial system of governance with
the best land reserved for the Anglo-Norman elites (ibid: 83).

Significantly, these attempts to, "transform the Irish into a people fit for ... savage
colonisation ... did not concentrate on the body ... but on culture as the matrix of
difference" (Garner, 2004: 75). In other words, rather than focusing on physical
differences (which were minimal) the colonisers pointed to, and often exaggerated,
Irish forms of agriculture, governance, dress, diet and behaviour in order to “maintain
the distinction between civilised and uncivilised peoples” (ibid). This factor becomes
even more important when it is considered how subsequent categories of belonging
and exclusion were very much predicated on physical differences.

However, it should be noted that even as British colonial expansion moved further
afield the Irish continued to remain a problematic ‘Other’ within the popular
imagination. Uprising and revolts in Ireland itself (Curtis, 1971: 49-51) were matched
by the denigration of Irish immigrants to Britain. These are just some of a selection of
descriptions of the Irish that Robert Winder has culled from newspapers and historians
writing in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries:
‘[The Irish] are more like tribes of squalid apes than human beings’
‘[The average Irish person] is a ready made nucleus of degradation and disorder’
‘Ireland is pouring into the cities and even into the villages, a fetid mass of famine, nakedness, dirt and fever’ (Winder, 2004: 201, see also Curtis, 1971, for a useful overview of Irish caricatures in Victorian literature)

These tales of Irish treachery, drunkenness, deprivation and violence continued into the latter part of the twentieth century (Hickman, 1998, 2005, Hickman & Walter, 2002, Garner, 2004), although softening somewhat with the progress of the recent peace process. What is perhaps more relevant for this part of the discussion is how the Irish, Scottish and Welsh were transformed from colonised to colonisers (Kestner, 1996: 115) as a result of the expansion of the British empire to areas where new categories of ‘otherness’ become resonant. These ‘Others’ could not only be defined in terms of cultural and religious differences, but also in terms of physical attributes, namely the colour of their skin (Garner, 2004: 82, Rich, 1990: 12).

As well as the traditional “expressions of British superiority ... based on morality, law, religion and political institutions” (Johnson, 2003: 107), this later period of high imperialism, also saw an increasing reliance on technology and pseudo-science as a means of classifying, ranking and stigmatising colonial peoples (Bayly, 1999: 20, Garner, 2004: 93, Rich, 1990: 102-106, Lorimer, 1996).

Race, culture and imperialism

Through these new forms of “scientific racism/naturalism” (Lorimer, 1996:25) attempts were made to categorise the colonial other through the use of new forms of disciplinary knowledge, including maps, census and other population statistics. These representations were not, however, limited to government documents and/or ‘scientific’ journals but instead became the common currency of the popular press, novels, children’s literature (Kearney, 1986), art and travel books (Barringer, 1996), so that they permeated almost all aspects of social life often becoming routinised in the process (Rich, 1990: 205).

One of the most detailed examination of the links between culture and imperialism is that undertaken by Edward Said (1994), in his book of the same name. In this work, Said offers a compelling and in-depth analysis of the ways in which popular literature,
art, poetry and opera contributed to and, indeed, naturalised the very idea of empire and relations between the dominant and dominated that underpinned it. He writes,

the main battle in imperialism is over land, of course: but when it came to who owned the land, who had the right to settle and work on it, who kept it going, who won it back, and, who now plans its future - these issues were reflected, contested, and even for a time, decided in narratives (ibid: xiii)

Moreover, it is arguable that the fact that these narratives included everyday works of literature and art makes them all the more powerful in sedimenting the idea of empire. Here it might also be worth drawing on Mosse's work on the “process of trivialization”, in which he argues that war came to be seen as a commonplace in the minds of increasing numbers through the manifold ways in which it was represented on everyday items (cushions, postcards, plates) and bric-a-brac, notably in people’s homes (1990: 126-127). In the same way, the empire was also sanitised and routinised through countless banal symbols and narratives (Pletcher, 1992, McClintock, 1995: 34), a classic example of which, in Britain, was the gollywog (Kushner, 1999: 75-77), discussions of which also featured in a number of the group interviews (See Chapter 6).

Linking back to the earlier discussion of sedimentation and its links to everyday practices and symbols, we can see that the idea of empire, and all that it represented, came to inform an enormous number of daily routine and taken-for-granted aspects of British life. This, of course, was to have a fundamental influence on both the ways in which an increasing number of the British viewed themselves and, as we shall see, the degree to which these concepts have remained entrenched into the contemporary era (Hall, 2001: 335-336). In this way, the frontiers of British identity shifted once again, drawing on similar tropes and underlying assumptions, but now expanding to include both proximal and distant ‘Others’, the latter of which came to be defined and articulated in terms of physical attributes.

31 As Johnson observes, “young people in Britain were exposed to a great deal of imperial literature and organisation” (2003: 216) through, for example, the school curriculum, Empire Day, popular fiction and films and youth organisations, such as the Boys Brigade, the Boy Scouts and the Girl Guides.

32 It should, of course, be noted at this juncture that typologies of race closely inter-linked with those of class (Cannadine, 2001) and gender (McClintock, 1995, Midglely, 1998) in defining those who ‘belonged’ in British imperial discourse.
From high imperialism to steady decline

It is during this period of high imperialism, with Britain as the pre-eminent world power, that bombastic characters such as Cecil Rhodes, the governor-general of what is now South Africa, could announce, "we are the finest race in the world and the more of the world we inhabit the better it is for the human race" (quoted in Johnson, 2003: 110).

It was the Boer War that marked the first serious setback for Britain, "destroy[ing] for ever the confidence that ... all classes and persuasions had had in their Empire" (Kumar, 2003: 198, see also McCrone, 1997: 588). Growing unrest in other parts of the empire, notably India and Ireland (again) and then global competition, in the shape of the US and Germany, also acted as a brake on Britain's imperial ambitions.

As the sun began to set on the empire that had once "covered one-fifth of the globe and governed 400 million subjects" (Johnson, 2003: 1), two further events, the two 'great' wars of the twentieth century, were to have a further irrevocable impact on British concepts of identity and belonging that still resonate today. The First World War, the first truly industrial conflict, not only impacted on the millions who fought overseas, but transformed British society as a whole. As Stevenson writes,

> the demands of total war in terms of the mobilisation of resources and their efficient utilisation led inexorably towards greater regulation and control by central government. From being one of the least centralised and regulated societies in Europe, Edwardian Britain was forced into the acceptance of a hitherto unprecedented degree of government control (quoted in McCrone, 1997: 590).

The state's increasing role as a result of the conflict continued largely unabated in peace time with further regulations concerning the economy, welfare provision and planning and, perhaps most significantly of all, the incorporation of the working class into the democratic process, men receiving the franchise in 1918 and women a decade later (ibid: 590). This contrasted with Britain's position overseas where moves towards greater independence in certain parts of the empire - notably Ireland, India and the Middle East - were already being put in motion before the Second World War and its aftermath hastened the process. I will turn to this issue in the final section shortly,
but will note for now that World War Two provided one of the last significant locus for a truly British identity to be mobilised and celebrated across the Isles.

In one sense, this was simply because the entire population was involved either as soldiers or in support of the war economy, austerity measures, by and large, affected everyone, Nazi raids targeted civilian populations as well as military installations and, during the early part of the war, there was a very real threat of an invasion (Morgan & Evans, 1993: 87). Moreover, during the war a powerful set of narratives concerning the sanctity, valour and unity of the nation were developed, notably through the mass media\(^\text{33}\), generating and popularising ideas, which, as a result of frequent and ongoing re-presentation remain resonant for significant numbers, even today.

As Mark Connolly argues (2004) the war is remembered through a multitude of popular representations but often using an extremely narrow prism. This has tended to focus on the early part of the war when, to use the cliché, Britain stood alone against the might of the Nazi's. Here, narratives of doggedness, courage under fire and social unity are explored in relation to, for example, Dunkirk, the Blitz (Noakes, 1997) and the Battle of Britain\(^\text{34}\).

Asides from the powerful role that military memory has had in informing popular culture and ideas about Britishness, the aftermath of the war impacted on Britain in a number of other significant ways. These would include; post-war reconstruction efforts, particularly the establishment of the welfare state, the subsequent transformation of the economy and changing relations with former colonies, the new hegemonic power, America, and Europe. In the second part of this chapter, I want to examine these factors in greater detail bringing us up to the contemporary era.

**Post-war Britain**

\(^{33}\) As Scannell and Cardiff write, “The BBC fulfilled its mandate of service in the national interest by synthesizing a national culture from components that had begun to converge since the late nineteenth century ... Radio and, later, television were potent means of manufacturing ... the ‘we-feeling’ of the [national] community. They made the nation real and tangible through a whole range of images and symbols, events and ceremonies, relayed to audiences direct and live” (1991: 277).

\(^{34}\) These quotes from contemporary British textbooks are instructive: “by June [1940] Britain stood completely alone” and the Blitz “brought out the best in people”, “during the war, everyone was equal and there was a community spirit” (Lancaster & Lancaster quoted in Malesevic, 2006: 105-106) and the Dunkirk spirit produced “the feeling that even though Britain was alone, it would fight on until victory was done (Gray & Little quoted in ibid: 106)
In 1942, the Japanese airforce bombed the town of Darwin causing the Australian government to ask for further assistance from Britain. The response from Clement Atlee, Dominions Minister, was telling, “Your greatest support in this hour of peril must be drawn from the United States” (quoted in Johnson, 2003: 182). This one sentence encapsulates the British position in the post-war era both in relation to the US, the emerging global super-power, and its former colonies. If one charts the process of decolonisation, and ignores the self-serving rhetoric about ‘transfers of power’ between benevolent imperial leaders and grateful subjects (Owen, 1996: 158, Schwarz, 2005: 483), then one of the main features is an increasing American influence at almost every level; political, economic, military (Schwarz, 2005: 484).

Although Churchill declared throughout the war that the empire would not be given up, in peacetime the clamour for independence could not be denied. American pressure contributed to the granting of independence for India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka in 1947/8 (Robbins, 1994: 193) and the former British ‘protectorates’ in the Middle East soon came under the US sphere of influence in a new Cold War era (Kinzer, 2003). Perhaps the final nail in Britain’s imperial coffin was placed in 1956 with the debacle of Suez where, again under American pressure, the British (this time supported by France and Israel) were forced to halt attempts to stop Egypt nationalising the strategically important Suez Canal (ibid: 195, Johnson, 2003: 200). As Robbins writes, “the Suez affair disclosed that the British government did not now have the power, militarily or economically, to mount an overseas expedition if the United States disproved” (1994: 196)35.

Allied to US military supremacy, was the fact that Britain, largely bankrupted by the war, relied on American financial assistance in the form of loans and technology (Robbins, 1994: 178-79). Subsequently, Britain’s nuclear deterrent, designed in large part to “reaffirm ... Britain’s position as a world power” (ibid: 189) has also relied on American expertise (Ball, 2005: 544-545). All of these processes meant that in the two decades after the war, “Britain shrank from the status of a global leader with far-flung imperial interest to a less certain position on the fringes of Europe” (Owen, 1996: 157).

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35 A more recent example is also instructive. In 1982, when Britain went to war in order to reclaim a rather insignificant group of islands of the coast of Argentina, it was only American diplomatic and military support that ensured victory (Reynolds, 2000: 245).
The question of Europe, and the extent of Britain's role as a member of the European community vis a vis its 'special relationship' with the US has also impacted on the ways in which those in Britain now imagine themselves (Hopkins & Young, 2005: 29). The uneasy nature of this relationship can probably be attributed to a number of factors, the most important of which seem to be; Britain's physical estrangement from the rest of Europe, the role of the French and Germans as (former) powerful and tyrannical 'Others' and the added complication of American influence and commonalities (notably language).

Joining the European Economic Community (now European Union) as a latecomer in 1973, Britain has consistently remained out of step with its European 'partners' by, for example, refusing to give up sterling, signing out of numerous social and economic policies, promoting an American-led defence policy (in the form of NATO) at the expense of Franco-German attempts to build a European force and resolutely arguing that immigration control should remain a British, rather than European, prerogative (Cohen, 1994: 28-33).

This question of immigration, however, not only relates to debates over whether European (as opposed to national) legislation should be used to manage border controls. It has, far more critically, also informed wider discourses of identity and belonging in Britain in the post-war period to an unprecedented degree, and it is to this important issue that I want to devote some attention now.

**Immigration, 'race' and the question of who belongs in Britain**

As we have seen, one of the ways in which British elites 'justified' the expansion of empire across the globe was in terms of their civilising mission. The corollary of this position was that those in the colonies were recognised (however tacitly) as subjects of the British empire which meant officially, at least, that they also had the right to come to Britain. This comment from Henry Hopkins, a former Minister of State for Colonial Affairs is typical, "we still take pride in the fact that man (sic) can say civis Britannicus sum whatever his colour may be, and we can take pride in the fact that he wants and can come to the Mother country" (quoted in Webster, 2005: 97).

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36 Here, I use the word 'officially' advisedly, as it wasn't until the twentieth century that any attempt was made to define in legislation who 'belonged' to the empire through the 1914 British Nationality and Aliens Act" (McCrone, 1997: 592).
Furthermore, this 'official' version has come to inform the commonplace view - parroted by government and the media in particular - that Britain is a tolerant nation with a proud history of “taking in outcasts and helping the helpless”, to quote the Daily Mail columnist Paul Johnson (quoted in ibid: 96). These forms of myth-making, however, often obscure a history of sometimes virulent anti-immigration rhetoric that has continued up to the present day with both written (Kushner, 2003, Kundnani, 2001, Buchanan et al, 2004, Greenslade, 2005) and physical attacks (Schuster & Solomos, 2004: 277/283) on asylum seekers.

What is perhaps most interesting, in terms of this study, is the processes by which British citizens were transformed into Commonwealth migrants on the basis of their apparent incompatibility with the culture of the ‘Mother country’. Here, the ‘frontiers of identity’ that had (so it was claimed) previously extended across the globe were brought into sharp focus and in this case were drawn on the basis of one fundamental feature, skin colour (Paul, 1998: 229).

Indeed, government legislation in 1962, 1971 and 1981 was largely designed to show that “some British subjects were ... more British than others” (Paul, 1998: 223, see also Schuster & Solomos, 2004). In this way, “the policy-making elite ... categorised each migrant groups according to how that group was perceived to ‘fit’ within or against the constructed British national identity” based on the following factors; religion, conservatism, anti-communism, patriarchy, race (ibid: 228). In the case of Commonwealth migration, the most significant of these was race so that “colonials were presumed not to belong ... because they were black” (Paul, 1998: 229).

Official government investigations into migration focused only on “coloured workers from other Commonwealth countries” (ibid: 232) so the issue of immigration became both racialised and problematised. In contrast, white migrants from Eastern Europe and Ireland were seen by political elites as solutions to Britain’s post-war labour shortage and future contributors to British society (ibid: 224-229).

Myths of homogeneity and consensus

37 Many of these discussions can also be evidenced in relation to other ‘western’ countries as well as the EU as a whole. For instance, Miciukiewicz and Paszkiewicz (2005) have looked at how cross-border legislation has forced the new accession states to tighten their border controls at the behest of the major European powers (see also Fekete, 2005).
Therefore, contrary to previous representations of the Irish as a “different race” (Hickman, 1998: 298), they were now portrayed, at least officially, as British people and used to maintain the “myth of homogeneity” in Britain\(^{38}\) (ibid: 299). This myth “assumed that all people who were white smoothly assimilated into the ‘British way of life’ and that [any] problems resided with those who migrated and possessed a different skin colour. Different skin colour was taken to represent different culture” (ibid: 299). Unfortunately, this type of official ‘recognition’ also conveniently overlooked the ongoing problem of anti-Irish racism in Britain (Hickman, 1998: 298, Webster, 2005: 102).

Once again it can be seen that the ‘frontiers of identity’ were moving in two directions at the same time. Inwards, so as to exclude those non-white British citizens seeking to come to the ‘Mother country’ and outwards to include white Irish citizens who because of their “genetic similarity” were seen to possess the requisite cultural traits to make them British (Paul, 1998: 241). This legislation has, been backed by a welter of elite and public discourse concerning the threat posed by non-white immigrants to British culture, whether it be the Tory MP Enoch Powell’s infamous ‘Rivers of blood’ speech in which he painted a gruesome picture of kindly old (white) ladies being menaced by “grinning piccannies” (quoted in Gilroy, 1996: 356) or Margaret Thatcher’s claim that Britain was being “swamped by people of a different culture” (quoted in Cohen, 1994: 58)\(^{39}\) (This idea of ‘too many’ will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6).

More recently, immigration has risen again to the top of the public agenda evidenced by a series of national surveys, undertaken by the polling group MORI, which looked to explore what ordinary people thought was “the most important issue facing Britain today”. Throughout most of the 1980’s and 1990’s immigration was seen to be the primary concern for only around 5% of those questioned. However, its profile

\(^{38}\) This comes from a 1955 government working party report; “it cannot be held that the same difficulties [assimilation of migrants] arise in the case of the Irish as in the case of coloured people ... The outstanding difference is that the Irish are not - whether they like it or not - a different race from the ordinary inhabitants of Great Britain” (quoted in Winder, 2004: 342).

\(^{39}\) Continuing attempts to link concepts of nation and race in order to place whiteness at the heart of a British identity by some elites and their supporters should not blind us to the fact that “Britain has perhaps the strongest anti-racist, anti-discrimination legislation in the world” (Kushner, 2003: 257).
increased dramatically in the middle part of 2000 becoming (and staying), for over a third of the respondents, the most important issue facing Britain. 

Allied to this popular perception is the fact that while net immigration into Britain topped a million in the past decade (McCrone, 2006: 66), almost all of those questioned overestimate the numbers of those coming to the country by a factor of between five and ten. Interestingly, MORI argue in their summary of these findings, “it is clear that in many cases the public do not base their views on any direct local experience, but rather a general anxiety, and presumably media coverage” (www.mori.com/mrr/2002/cr020261).

Un/marked categories

Debates about (coloured) migration have also extended to those non-whites born and raised in Britain. Here we might usefully draw on Rogers Brubaker’s discussion of marked and unmarked categories in relation to (national) identities (2006: 211-215). He argues that across different contexts, particular categories are defined by “asymmetries of power, position and perspective” (ibid: 211) so that the dominant (usually majority) becomes “unmarked ... [that is] the normal, default, taken-for-granted category” (ibid) while ‘otherness’ is made visible with reference to particular physical traits, social practices and so on. Although obviously a complex and changing situation, it is probably fair to argue that non-whites (no matter their birthplace) remain the marked category within the minds of a significant majority in Britain today. As Grosvenor writes, “racialised identities are a product of histories. Over time, there has been a process of sedimentation whereby they have become a constitutive part of the exclusionary ideology, which underpins the idea of the ‘British way of life’ (Grosvenor quoted in Alibhai-Brown, 2001: 104).

This does not mean that all white people in Britain are inherently racist or that all non-whites are treated with disrespect. It is simply to note that being non-white means occupying a far more visible, both literally and symbolically, and sometimes precarious position, notably in relation to ideas about who belongs to the nation (Hall, 1997: 178). This ‘visibility’ seems to be referenced in any number of ways including  

41 The role of the media in these debates has been noted by a wide range of scholars (cf Cohen & Gardner, 1982, Seale, 1987, Van Dijk, 1991, Gibson, 2003, Lynn & Lea, 2003, Buchanan et al, 2004, Greenslade, 2005) but, beyond illustrating a wider context, is largely beyond the scope of this work.
apparently innocuous questions about 'where you really come from?' (Younge, 2005), public debates about religious dress and practices\textsuperscript{42} (Tarlo, 2007) as well as more extreme acts of intimidation and abuse (The Independent, 30/10/07: 4).

The sporting arena, in particular, has presented some of the most famous examples of this phenomenon. In 1990, for example, the Conservative politician Norman Tebbit questioned the loyalty of British-born second and third generation black and Asian people with his infamous 'cricket test'. Here non-white people were asked to prove their commitment to 'English society' by showing their support for the England cricket team (Polley, 2004). However, it is not just fans but also non-white players that have been subject to such scrutiny. Both pundits and supporters alike called into question the commitment of the Jamaican-born footballer John Barnes when he played for England and was seen to be unable (or unwilling?) to transfer his undoubted skills at club level to the international stage (Hill, 2001: 15).

Also of relevance here, is the fact that these debates relate to different forms of 'otherness' over time, which, in turn, can be traced to wider local, national and global shifts. For example, during the 1970's and 80's the question of race was often discussed in relation to Afro-Caribbean minorities, and in particular, young men, who were seen to be associated with crime, civil unrest and poverty (cf Hall et al, 1979, Gilroy, 1987). Subsequently, from around the 1990's\textsuperscript{43} it has been Muslim minorities that have been problematised as a threat at both the national and global level (Phillips, 2006, Huntingdon, 1996). This can be illustrated with reference to the ongoing debates in Britain over 'community cohesion' (Parekh, 2000, Cantle, 2001, Singh, 2007) and the (apparent) threat of Islam to British values and culture. For example, as was noted earlier, Britain first Communities Secretary was appointed in 2006 in response to the perceived need to generate cohesion among an increasingly divided population.

These long-standing debates that link skin colour and 'otherness' also inform current obsessions with former imperial/military glories or what Paul Gilroy labels as

\textsuperscript{42} Emma Tarlo (2006, 2007) has studied the ways in which the hijab (Islamic veil) has come to make "difference visible" both for those who wear it and a range of critics. In the process this piece of clothing has become a powerful symbolic marker in a series of high profile media debates pertaining to school uniforms, ID cards, classroom teachers and, almost inevitably, terrorism.

\textsuperscript{43} The OED records that the term 'Islamophobia' was first used in print in 1991 (Parekh, 2000: 319).
"melancholia" (2004). This is a nostalgic view of the national past in which a powerful Britain is represented as united by a common ‘white’ culture, values and traditions prior to the onset of Commonwealth migration. In opening up this popular viewpoint (see Goodhart, 2004 for a recent example) to critical scrutiny, the varying class, political, regional, religious, national and gender differences that stratified (and continue to mark) populations within the British Isles should again be taken into account. Perhaps the most important idea here is that the past, and in particular a heavily mythologized post-war period, can be presented as embodying consensus in relation to the fractured party politics of the 1970’s/80’s (Jones, 1996: xiv) and/or debates over ‘cultural conflicts’ that dominate contemporary political and media discourse.

Nowhere was this fixation with the past more evident than in Margaret Thatcher’s promises to make “Britain great again” (Reynolds, 2000: 243) when she came to power in the late 1970’s and in the next section I want to examine the Thatcherite legacy in Britain.

Thatcher and neo-liberalism

David Marquand has argued that Margaret Thatcher filled the vacuum left by the demise of both “democratic collectivism and whig imperialism” with her brand of “authoritarian individualism” (quoted in McCrone, 1997: 592) that promised security, stability and prestige for Britain. As we have seen, Thatcher broadly equated the non-white presence in Britain as a threat to national culture although her attacks extended to the ‘enemy within’, a motley group of trade unionists, pro-Europeans, the unemployed and even single mothers that could also be blamed for Britain’s continuing socio-economic problems (Barnett, 1982).

Yet her political views were entirely Janus-faced, combining a nostalgia for the past with a rhetoric of ‘modernization’ that focused on market-led economic reforms (Hall, 1997: 178-9). Under successive Thatcher administrations the goal was “to roll back the state” (Fink, 2005: 274) by cutting welfare provision and taxes, privatising major nationalised industries, deregulating other sectors, particularly the money markets, and reforming the trade unions, who were vehemently opposed to such polices (Hall, 1983: 27). For instance, under Thatcher we saw the sight of a British leader aiming to restore ‘great’ Britain whilst at the same time either attacking or privatising the public and private institutions that had once represented British power.
and identity. As well as undermining public institutions such as the NHS and the BBC, successive Conservative governments criticised and withdrew funding from the arts and museums and sold off numerous public utilities including British Telecom, British Airways, British Gas, British Rail, British Coal etc (Kumar, 2003: 264).

As part of this neo-liberal consensus, full employment was abandoned as "a primary economic objective" (Pemberton, 2005: 192) and the structure of the economy shifted as the manufacturing base of the country was decimated and service industries, many employing part-time and casualised labour, filled the void (ibid: 189). The combination of these factors meant that despite Thatcherite rhetoric concerning the need to cut back on welfare provision, payments actually increased under the Conservatives as unemployment reached three million and an ageing population stretched public services (Fink, 2005: 274). Under a New Labour government (since 1997), the attacks on welfare provision have increased in terms of rhetoric and the targeting of the ‘undeserving’ poor, while spending on the NHS and education has rocketed, albeit with mixed results (Bunting, 2004: 119-143).

A further important aspect of economic liberalisation has been the rise in job insecurity as labour markets are ‘encouraged’ to be flexible under the pressure of global competition (Bauman, 2001: 118, Sennett, 1998, Harris-White, 2002), while trade unions remain largely peripheral even under a Labour administration (Pemberton, 2005: 193).

This idea of uncertainty is significant in the wider context of this work and therefore I would like to spend a little time outlining a number of studies that have offered a general analysis (although ones that can be usefully applied to contemporary England/Britain) of what Richard Sennett has labelled The Culture of New Capitalism (2006). That is, a broader examination of the social consequences of the shift to a new mode of economic production, in the post-1970’s era, defined by the demands for constant growth and flexibility.

Sennett first contrasts this new model with the previous corporatist approach where, by and large, stability was prized and the gradual improvement of yields could be largely guaranteed by large powerful bureaucratic structures, both private and public (ibid: 22-29). In this era of mass organisations and mass publics, the individual was locked within the ‘iron cage’ of “rigid bureaucracy” (ibid: 2) but in return was
provided with an existence that was predictable, managed and planned and for many offered a relatively secure "psychological home" (ibid: 52).44

In a post-Bretton Woods world, however, where many Western governments, and in particular the US and Britain, have largely adopted a policy of deregulation in the economic sphere there has been a shift "from managerial to share-holder power" (ibid: 37). This model is marked by the ascendancy of global, "impatient capital" (ibid: 40), at the expense of "national and international regulative institutions" (Hariss-White, 2002: 8) so that the demands of flexibility, constant innovation and high yields became privileged at the behest of 'market forces'. The consequences of this transformation have been, broadly speaking, “ever greater economic inequality as well as social instability” (Sennett, 2006: 3).

**Globalising insecurity**

In the case of inequality, the privatization of many national industries combined with the deregulation of financial markets has led to the creation of 'footloose capital', which has, in many instances, become concentrated in the hands of an increasingly global elite (Leys, 2002: 86).45 The loss of secure, relatively well paid manufacturing job has impacted disproportionately on the lower classes in Britain but these structural shifts are now also beginning to be felt in the professional and managerial sectors as well (Bunting, 2004: 53).

Zygmunt Bauman has similarly argued that this increasing inequality has allowed employers to threaten workforces with the spectre of unemployment, in the process creating a sense of "perpetual uncertainty" (2001: 16). Indeed, there seems to be a direct correlation between this growing uncertainty in the labour market and increased working hours with the number in Britain (which has one of the least regulated labour forces in western Europe) working more than 48 hours a week more than doubling from 10 to 26 per cent since 1998 (Bunting, 2004: 9)

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44 This argument is broadly dealing with the major Western democracies and, in particular, the rapidly growing middle-classes in a post-war era.
45 In Britain, for example, the wealthiest 10 per cent owned approximately 51% of the UK's marketable wealth in 1976. This had risen to 71% by 2003. In contrast, half the population shared only seven per cent of total wealth in 2003 (http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=2).
It is not just growing inequalities between those in work and the unemployed, however, but the fact that the meaning of work for many has dramatically altered in the past two decades. As Zadi Laidi writes,

work was the factor that encompassed almost the whole process of social integration. It conferred identity, security and hope on people; identity through hope, security thanks to full employment and, finally, hope through the interplay of mobility and redistribution (1998: 173)

This loss of meaning at the site of production has been matched by a concomitant shift in the significance of consumption. As a result, what one buys and covets is seen to be increasingly important to notions of identity and belonging, albeit predicated on similar maxims of innovation, volatility and flexibility (cf Miles, 1998). Moreover, these new forms of consumption have extended to almost all aspects of social life so that public services and politics are now defined in terms of a consumer-driven agenda (Urry, 2001: 15).

In Britain, at least, this has produced a paradoxical situation where general levels of affluence and consumer spending power have grown for many (as labour and material costs are driven down) at the same time as levels of (perceived) security and well-being have fallen (Layard, 2006). Overall inequality has also increased along axes of gender, ethnicity and region in the past two decades (Zweiniger-Bargielowska, 2005: 240-241).

One further impact of these wider structural shifts worth referencing here, has been the dramatic increase in personal mobility as technology has improved, the transport industries privatised and costs slashed. For instance, in Britain there is perhaps no greater sign of this process than the fact that in 1999 “the inability to afford ‘a holiday away from home once a year not staying with relatives’ was perceived as a sign of poverty or social exclusion” (Zweiniger-Bargielowska, 2005: 240)

The number of holidays being taken is only one indications of this rise in mobility as increasing numbers are now able to choose to live and work abroad. A report by the

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46 On average, women are poorer than men, whites are richer than ‘ethnic minorities’ and the south-east is the wealthiest part of the country (Zweiniger-Bargielowska, 2005: 240-241, Daniels, 2005: 204-205/218).
Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) in 2006 estimated that around 5.5 million Britons were now living overseas (Sriskandarajah & Drew, 2006: 1), while for those who do not want to move permanently the attraction and availability of second homes abroad continues to rocket (Telegraph Online, 11/01/03). In terms of work, the Future Foundation has estimated that by 2020, “the number of people leaving Britain to work abroad each year will rise to one and a half million, a six fold increase on today” (Centre for Future Studies, 2003: 7). Moving in the opposite direction, it has been estimated that “a million foreigners have settled in Britain” since 1997 (The Times, 23/08/06: 4).

We will return to the impact of this increasing mobility in later chapters, but in the final section, I would like to focus on the transformation of the political landscape that has occurred in Britain since devolution and how this has impacted on the ongoing relations between the populations of the four constituent nations, and notably the majority English, during this period.

Devolution and the question of the ‘English’

Margaret Thatcher, like many of her contemporaries, largely equated Britain with England (Kumar, 2003: 227-228). Therefore she tended to treat Scotland and Wales as a Labour-supporting irrelevance (Harvie, 2005: 435), while her policies towards Northern Ireland vacillated between increased security measures and some limited political initiatives (Hennessy, 2005). This might have been one reason why the “centrifugal forces [of devolution] that operated at low power until the 1960’s” (Harvie, 2005: 427) increased in significance during her time in office, culminating in the granting of (partial) devolved government in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland under the Blair administration. As a result, Britain remains the “nightwatchman state” dealing with “defence, foreign policy and maintaining a stable currency” (McCrone, 1997:585) while internal affairs (education, health, transport, the environment) rest with the ‘national’ government.

This process brings us full circle from the emergence of the British state in 1707 and highlights some of our earlier arguments that British forms of identity were primarily forged in relation to the imperial project and then mass warfare and welfare (Colley, 1996, McCrone, 1997, Wellings, 2002). In other words, once empire, warfare and subsequently welfare provision came to be empty signifiers for sufficient numbers, then the British identity around which they coalesced became subject to increasing
In the case of the ‘Celtic’ fringe, Europe has offered an alternative ‘centre’ with which to identify, trade and secure financial assistance, while the English remain a useful ‘Other’ in the popular imagination (Edensor, 2002: 139).

This process is further complicated by the fact that at the policy level Britishness is still the resonant category, as Labour, in particular, grapples with the (potential) impact of both full devolution and the (perceived) need to unite increasingly fragmented populations under a new umbrella form of national identity (Brown, 2006, Blair, 2006).

In the latter instance, Britishness itself is now seemingly being redefined and (sometimes) embraced by non-white ‘minorities’ (Modood et al, 1997: 218, Jacobsen, 1997, Ethnos, 2005) although attempts to open up the category of Britishness to reflect the diversity of the population have often been criticised for being politically correct. This is a pejorative term that is broadly used to attack any proposed change to (apparently) ‘common sense’ social practices, language or symbols at the behest of minority interests. In these debates, majority culture is “commonly presented as the everyday common sense of ordinary people” in opposition to “anti-racism and multiculturalism [as]... the public sensibilities of a liberal intellectual elite that is ‘out of touch’” (Mann, 2006: 14) (Chapter 6 examines how this subject was discussed by many of my interviewees).

Elsewhere, and this is particularly significant to this study, these complex processes have produced a renewed focus on distinctly English forms of identification as a recent glut of popular literature, media coverage, government speeches and policy documents on the subject indicate (Kumar, 2003: 251-252). In the past, as Krishan Kumar observes; “all of the ... things that provided the English with an identity ... not so much suppressed as made it unnecessary to ask searching questions about ... themselves” (ibid: 250). However, shorn of imperial power, hemmed in by resurgent forms of nationalism on its borders, resolutely antipathetic towards further European integration, unsure of relations with America and stratified by regional, class, economic and cultural differences, these questions are coming to the fore.

47 It is arguable that the Labour government, with its strongholds in Wales, Scotland and the industrial towns of northern England, would be threatened as a political force in England - the seat of political and economic power - should Britain fragment.
This idea can also be seen in public displays associated with English sporting achievements or celebrations, which have grown in both number and intensity since the later 1990's. In 1998, a year after the very public response to the death of Diana, Princess of Wales (McGuigan, 2000) the England football team’s world cup campaign in France produced further evidence of this new nationalist fervour culminating in a quarter-final defeat to Argentina, which was watched by over 26 million people across Britain (Alabarces et al., 2001: 554). Although, the popularity of football had been building since the early 1990’s and the Euro 96 championships held in England were popularly supported, the tournament in 1998 provided something of a blueprint for subsequent sporting endeavours involving English national teams, namely media saturation, targeted marketing campaigns and increasingly ebullient public displays of allegiance. Indeed, as I noted earlier, such events, involving substantial numbers in attendance and watching at home, have become a noticeable feature of the social landscape in England in the past decade.

The summer of 2002 perhaps represented the high-point of this process so far, when a combination of the Queen’s Golden Jubilee and another England football world cup campaign brought a million onto the streets of the capital as well as a plethora of public events and informal parties across the country to mark the occasion, blanket media coverage, phenomenal television audiences and endless commentary on what it all meant!

The facts and figures associated with this summer are all the more extraordinary given the build up to, in particular, the Jubilee. Here, Clare Wardle and Emily West’s study of the press coverage is instructive. They argue that in the six months prior to the event, there was widespread concern that the proposed celebrations would not be well attended. However, “when it became clear that the Jubilee had been an overwhelming success, the press heralded the occasion as evidence of Britain’s continued strength and national unity” (2004: 195).

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48 Broadly speaking, English football’s tarnished image began to alter after Sky Television won the right to broadcast live matches in 1992. This lead to better facilities and players and greater exposure as Murdoch’s corporation aggressively marketed the sport (Andrews, 2003). In a matter of a decade, football was almost gentrified, attracting a new wave of ‘fans’, to the extent that a game that had largely been associated with spectator violence and government opprobrium in the 1980’s was suddenly transformed into “the People’s favourite pastime” (Marin quoted in Alabarces et al., 2001: 558).
The England football team’s campaigns in either European or world championships are now almost inevitably marked by a frenzy of flag waving⁴⁹, both public and private, while this appetite for communal displays of national pride have also extended to what might be considered minority sports in England, rugby and cricket. In 2003, the victorious England rugby world cup side was met by a million strong crowd of people on the streets of London on a cold, wet November day while the England cricket team’s thrilling Ashes series victory against Australia in the summer of 2005 provoked similar scenes of euphoria and another open-topped bus ride through the streets of a thronging capital.

In addition to the sheer visibility of these displays across the country, the English national flag has also been gradually being transformed from an “instrument of racism and intimidation” largely associated with neo-fascist far right groups into “a symbol of unity” (The Voice, No.1119: 1), worn and waved by an increasing number of non-whites (Pines, 2001). The liberal journalist Sarfraz Manzoor, for example, described the process by which he came to buy a t-shirt emblazoned with the English flag during the summer of 2004, having as a boy singularly failed to support any English team (sporting or otherwise) as he felt “in this country, but not of it” (10/06/04: 2-3)⁵⁰. Similarly, while some of the more emotional displays of national fervour have been described as distasteful or articulated in relation to class, as we shall see in later chapters, support for the England team was by no means limited to a particular social group⁵¹.

Finally, across many of these debates the countryside has remained a powerful symbol within the popular imagination, and continues to represent an idealised vision of the white (middle class) English nation (Wiener, 1981, Neal, 2002, 2006, Chakraborti & Garland, 2004, Wallwork & Dixon, 2004). This can be seen in the current media obsession with the (presumed) sanctity of rural living and the very real phenomenon of ‘white flight’ from the urban centres. As Paxman wryly comments, “the red-white-

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⁴⁹ In 2004, the Daily Mirror newspaper gleefully recorded that some three million national flags had been sold in the run up to England’s campaign in the European football championships (09/06/04: 1).
⁵⁰ These examples offer a useful illustration of the degree to which non-whites continue to be (and feel) a marked category in Britain/England.
⁵¹ The Guardian, for instance, published a flag for its readers, which summed up this dilemma (albeit with a healthy dose of irony) perfectly. The flag was intended to “show ... support for the England team” while rejecting “connotations of xenophobic nationalism” and “reaffirm[ing a] ... commitment to the European Social Chapter” (10/06/04).
and-blue is no longer relevant and [some] ... are returning to the green of England” (Paxman, 1999: 265).

Here, once again it is striking to note the degree to which the frontiers of identity continue to shift, often in conflicting directions, as signifiers from the past offer some solace in relation to wider socio-economic and political shifts, while new forms of allegiance and solidarity emerge within and between different groups.

**Summary**

In this chapter, I have traced some of the most pertinent macro-level historical processes that have impacted on concepts of identity and belonging in Britain (and the four constituent nations) since the Act of Union in 1707. In particular, it has been noted how processes of boundary-making and maintenance in relation to migration, religious and economic rivalries and colonisation have come to the fore in defining in/out groups over time. In the words of Robin Cohen, “who constitutes the self (the acceptable, the insider, the familial) and who the other (the stranger, the outsider, the alien) is the warp and woof of all British history and the basic ingredient of a British identity” (Cohen, 1994: 35).

Initially, this sense of Britishness, largely driven by the dominant English, was forged in relation to threatening religious, economic and then national ‘Others’ (Colley, 1996). However, while British social and political elites were broadly centralized through education and government service and processes of industrialisation, urbanisation, mass communication and military expansion did undoubtedly draw together substantial sections of the wider population, no ongoing attempt was made “to integrate political, cultural and economic structures [as] in the classical nation-state” (McCrone, 1997: 585). Therefore, allegiance to Britain was largely secured in relation to the monarchy and other powerful institutions rather than any putative national community (Wellings, 2002).

Subsequently, mass warfare, some welfare provisions and then, more recently, the categorising (and castigating) of non-white Commonwealth migrants as ‘Other’ have all played a part in defining an exclusive British/English identity. In the latter instance, changing immigration patterns have demonstrated the degree to which categories of British identity have shifted over time as different cultural and physical characteristics have been used to identify and then stigmatise ‘difference’. In more
recent times, this has focused on Muslims, notably in the aftermath of the 2005 London bombings, and the search for 'community cohesion' has become one of the key policy objectives for government at the current time (Rogers & Muir, 2007).

At the economic level, the emergence of a neo-liberal consensus has led to the deregulation of financial markets, the privatisation of 'national' institutions and the growth of a service-based economy as the manufacturing sector lost out to overseas competition. Although this has increased relative affluence for many on the back of falling labour and production costs, an increasingly casualised labour market has also heightened job insecurity.

Politically, devolution in the 'Celtic fringe' has opened up to scrutiny the previously overlooked relationship between British and English identity in England itself. These debates have been complicated by Britain's changing relationship with Europe and America and while both have been offered as a partial panacea to post-imperial decline, a strong sense of nostalgia for the past still pervades many of these contemporary debates.

Alternatively, the growing mobility of all but the poorest has enabled many to travel abroad on a regular basis and increasing numbers are also beginning to settle overseas. In Britain itself, tastes are changing in response to the growing diversity of the population and it is perhaps in the major urban centres, and notably London, where more inclusive, hybridised forms of solidarity are emerging (Gilroy, 2004).

Referring back to Chapter 2, what these discussions illustrate is the complex dialectic between continuity and contingency from a macro-historical perspective. On one hand, it has been observed how concepts of (national) identity and belonging have been transformed over time, often in relation to wider socio-economic and political shifts. On the other, some signifiers have become entrenched in everyday texts and routines so that they have contributed to a dominant, taken-for-granted definition of national belonging, which privilege some groups, generally defined in terms of race and class, at the expense of others (See Chapters 5 and 6). However, before, exploring some of these issues in more detail in relation to my own data sets, in the next chapter I want to outline my justifications for the methodological approach I have employed as well as the research methods that have been utilised in order to gather the data.
Chapter 4 - Research Design and Methods

In the following chapter the "framework for the collection and analysis of data" (Bryman, 2001: 29) will be discussed, first by providing a set of guiding research questions and outlining the population to be studied in relation to them. The possible means of researching the wider topic is then examined in some detail, including underlying strengths and weaknesses, before a series of justifications for the methods to be employed in this study will be offered. Subsequently, the framework for the analysis of the data sets is presented which, referring back to the earlier discussion in Chapter 1, will draw on the tenets of discourse analysis (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, Wodak et al, 1999, Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002) and some aspects of grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, Strauss & Corbin, 1990). In conclusion, the expected contributions of this study both in terms of its links to extant literature and its claims to originality will be outlined.

Research Questions

Primary Question

To what extent do a range of individuals from the white, English-born population in England continue to draw on (and thereby constitute) a taken-for-granted national discourse as a means of understanding and articulating self and other in an era characterised by increasing global flows in people, products, ideas and images?

Secondary Questions

What can this study of everyday talk tell us about current conceptions of national identity in Britain/England among this majority group and, in particular, what do these debates reveal about their own (perceived) status in relation to 'Others' within the national space?

In order to complement the analysis of the primary data, is it possible to identify similar concepts, references and categorisations in a wider institutional setting, indicating the extent to which such debates have become embedded across British/English society?
Defining the population

As I have a primary interest in assessing the degree to which a national discourse continues to be utilised in a taken-for-granted manner, I decided to focus on white people born and living in England for the purposes of this study. My reasons for this are three-fold. First, it is arguable that as members of the largest and most powerful group in Britain (economically, politically, culturally) such people are likely to have a more secure sense of who they are in relation to their own national identity. As Yasmin Alibhai-Brown observes, “for centuries the English had never had to think of themselves in any self-conscious way” (2002: 47). Referring back to the earlier discussion of un/marked categories in relation to questions of nation, empire and race, I think it is fair to argue that English is (or at least has been) the unmarked category in Britain overall, and that in England, in particular, whiteness is the category that “need not be expressed at all in most contexts” (Brubaker et al, 2006: 212).

Second, perhaps because they have been treated as the default category “ethnic majorities” have sometimes been left out of the debates over belonging and identity in the contemporary era (Fenton, 2005). In this way, whiteness in England has been treated as an unproblematic category overlooking the enormous diversity along the lines of class, nationality, region, age and wealth that undoubtedly exist (cf Hickman, 1998). Therefore we must try and understand whether and when such individuals draw boundaries between in and out-groups, and on what basis, rather than simply

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52 Even those whites that constitute some of the poorest and most disenfranchised constituencies in England form part of the broader unmarked category against which ‘Others’, namely non-whites, are judged (See Chapters 5 & 6 for more detailed discussions of this idea).

53 Ruth Frankenburg (2000) has argued that there are three key features of ‘whiteness’. The first is that it is a location of structural advantage, of ... privilege” (ibid: 451). The second is that it provides a place from which to view ‘otherness’, where whiteness is accepted as the norm by which non-whites can be judged and, in many cases, stigmatized. Thirdly, whiteness is taken-for-granted and remains “unmarked and un-named” (ibid) so that the issue of ‘colour’ and the social problems that are associated with it become located in the actions and attitudes of the ‘Other’, that is non-whites. Therefore, prejudice on the basis of skin colour is “conceived as something external to [whites’] ... rather than as a system that shapes ... daily experience and sense of self”(ibid). However, as whiteness as both a social construction and daily practice has become subject to challenge it is argued that whites are beginning to see themselves as a distinct group and, in many instances, construct an image of themselves as victims of exploitation (cf McKinney, 2003, Hewitt, 2005).

54 The recent wave of EU migrants, notably from Eastern Europe, has also complicated the ‘unmarked’ category of whiteness in England.
viewing them as part of a homogeneous, coherent ‘community’. In this respect, I have looked to engage with as wide a variety of different groups as possible in order to empirically investigate the degree to which different people across the country, articulate their own sense of self and place in national terms and, furthermore, how such a nation is defined.

Third, as a member of this group I thought it would be easier for me to access participants and increase the chance of them speaking frankly in relation to a number of potentially controversial subjects, that are sometimes discussed using racial categories (I will discuss this final issue in more detail when addressing the issue of reflexivity and ethics below). Therefore, although I acknowledge that engaging with a range of ‘ethnic’ groups might have produced fascinating data in its own right, I wanted to explore in great detail how (national) in and out-group categories were articulated and debated and believed that this process might be curtailed if the study groups were not homogeneous. As Fallon & Brown argue, “homogeneity of background and experience is desirable amongst group members, since this facilitates focus and enables shared experiences to be explored” (2002: 198 but also see Morrison, 1998: 203, Kitzinger, 1995: 301, Gaskell, 2000: 48).55

There is one final debate that I wish to address here before turning to the issue of research design and methods and that concerns the potential advantages and pitfalls of carrying out empirical work ‘at home’. It is in the field of anthropology that these types of discussions first emerged where, in the classic literature, the researcher became immersed in the lives of an exotic ‘Other’ and through a detailed and sustained ethnographic study began to understand their “structures of signification” (Geertz, 2000: 9). In this formulation, it is only when the researcher is able “to sort winks from twitches and real winks from mimicked ones” (ibid: 16) that s/he can provide a “thick description” of the group or society being studied (ibid: 6). The more recent counter-argument to this is that a researcher “thoroughly at home in linguistic

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55 One might argue that by presuming that racial categories are salient, the researcher is also responsible for reifying them. This what is what Radhakrishnan has labelled the “treacherous bind” (quoted in Gunaratnam, 2003: 23), the idea that, “our very concern with naming and examining ‘race’ and ethnicity .... always runs the risk of reproducing ‘race’ and ethnicity as essentialized and deterministic categories” (ibid: 32). However, I think it is possible to answer such a critique by linking the use of such categories prior to carrying out data collection with evidence garnered from the relevant literature (cf Gilroy, 1987, Hewitt, 2005) and acknowledging that the focus of the analysis will be on how such categories are constructed and maintained (if at all), rather than on any presumption of their essential nature (Brubaker, 2004).
denotations and familiar with behavioural form, is more able to appreciate the connotative: to pick up on those niceties of interaction and ambivalences ... where the most intricate (and interesting) aspects of socio-cultural worlds are constructed, negotiated, contested and disseminated (Rapport, 2002: 7). In other words, because the researcher breathes, by and large, in the same cultural atmosphere of his respondents s/he will be able to pick up on the fine details that an outsider may miss or not comprehend.

Both sides of this argument have a degree of validity but I think it is possible to attend to those who object to studying the familiar for fear of taking too much for granted by calibrating one’s own findings against similar studies (Condor et al, 2006) and by trying to ensure that the researcher’s position in relation to both those s/he interacts with and the wider culture as a whole are addressed (Madianou, 2002: 104). In this way, any underlying assumptions that the respondents and the researcher share can be more effectively exposed and opened up to scrutiny. This is particularly salient given the earlier discussion concerning the degree to which scholars have been implicated in adopting the tenets of methodological nationalism in their studies (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002). Now, having offered a number of justifications for the population to be studied, I would now like to turn to the question of how to generate the data in order to answer the research questions.

Moving into the field

As was suggested in Chapter 2 the potential terrain of study in a place such as England is almost limitless because national discourse seems to be so widely and routinely produced across so many aspects of daily life (Billig, 1995, Wodak et al, 1999, Edensor, 2002, Brubaker et al, 2006). However, given the wide range of studies which indicate that everyday forms of talk, text and practice are particularly important in cementing national discourse, it is also my contention that any engagement with this phenomenon must address its routine representations. In the following section, I want to draw upon a number of recent studies that have also engaged with the subject at the level of the everyday, noting the advantages and limitations of each, before outlining my own framework.

Given his relevance to this study it is worth noting Billig’s justifications for looking, albeit briefly, at political speeches and media texts in his analysis of Banal Nationalism. In drawing attention to the ways in which Western politicians waved the
patriotic card on a routine basis, Billig was pointing to the fact that “nationalism provides the framework and language for almost all political discussion” (Harris quoted in Billig, 1995: 99, but see also Reicher & Hopkins, 2001) and not just those associated with violent struggles or civil unrest. In carrying out a day survey of the British press, it was also Billig’s intention to show “that rhetorical forms of flagging and deixis” (ibid: 109) are not simply confined to the stylised language of professional politicians but permeate many aspects of mass culture.

The media has provided something of a fertile ground for studying everyday national discourse, as scholars look to test empirically “the extent of the mass media’s role in the formation of national identities” (Brooks, 1999: 247). Much of this work, both at the level of content (Brooks, 1999, Higgins, 2004, Dhoest, 2004, Aslama & Pantti, 2007) and production (Nossek, 2004, Clausen, 2004, Sonwalkar, 2005) has tended to challenge those who proclaim that the nation is becoming an increasing irrelevance in a world of global media institutions, satellite TV and the internet. However, as I have argued in Chapter 2, while many of these studies are interesting in themselves, they don’t tend to offer any insights into how people make sense of their everyday lives with reference to national discourse.

Studying ‘everyday’ talk

In this respect, a second wave of research into everyday forms of nationhood has moved away from analysis of elite institutions and representations (Condor & Abell, 2006) to focus on the ways in which ‘ordinary’ people “think about their nation” (Phillips & Smith, 2000: 203) employing a range of methods and approaches. Surveys continue to be a popular way of asking a representative sample of a population to mark the degree of allegiance they feel to particular nations or national symbols (Schatz et al, 1999). However, surveys are particularly limited by their reliance on pre-determined categories, which as a rule do not allow respondents to speak on their own terms (Seale, 1999: 134). This, in turn, may restrict their suitability for a study designed to “search for the common-sense assumptions and ways of talking about nationhood” (Billig: 1995: 61), As Condor et al note, “there are problems in assuming that reports of self-labelling practices collected in survey

56 This has become a particularly popular approach in the post-devolution era in Britain, where pollsters (and the politicians and research units that fund them) have been keen to assess the degree to which different individuals identify with either Britain or the constituent nations; England, Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland (Stone & Muir, 2007).
contexts necessarily reflect the ways in which people actually use language in everyday life" (2006: 199). Although surveys provide a more representative sample of the population in question, they do not permit a sustained analysis of processes of categorisation in relation to a particular topic or across different contexts.

In order to try and offer a more in-depth analysis of the range of symbols, images and assumptions different individuals and groups reference and debate when asked to discuss their own or other nation(s) semi-structured interviews have also been increasingly employed (Phillips & Smith, 2000, Fenton, 2007). These type of interview tend to focus on what Fox and Miller Idriss label as ‘talk about the nation’ (forthcoming), that is what the nation means to different people, perhaps articulated in terms of archetypal places, people, values, activities and events. While such approaches have generated interesting data in their own right, they again tend “to treat ‘national identity’ as an analysts’ construct rather than a participants’ resource” (Condor & Abell, 2006: 457, see also Brubaker et al, 2006: 168).

In particular, the rather artificial nature of many of the questions and discussions neglects “the variable meaningfulness and salience of ethnic and national self understandings” in people’s lives (Brubaker et al, 2006: 168). As Jon Fox and Cynthia Miller-Idriss write about their own work; “rather than continually equipping interview subjects with our own national categories, we ... adopt a ‘wait-and-listen’ approach to see how and when nationhood comes up in the discursive and interactional contexts of everyday life” (forthcoming).

Adopting such a perspective means not only asking what the nation means to particular people but also “when is the nation in everyday life?” (ibid). This latter question does not direct respondents to talk about the nation but instead assesses the extent to which national discourse is employed to make sense of or articulate a response to a particular topic or discussion. In other words, there is a primary interest in examining the extent to which national discourse, as one possible “way of understanding and interpreting experience” (Brubaker et al, 2006: 207), is utilised in relation to particular debates across different contexts.

This type of approach seemed to offer a particularly fruitful means of addressing my own research questions but as previous studies have shown may involve the utilisation of a range of different methods including interviews, ethnography and participant

A number of contemporary researchers have undertaken ethnographic studies in order to observe how people utilise national discourse in their daily lives through talk and action (Abu Lughod, 2005, Madianou, 2005, Brubaker et al, 2006). This enables researchers to pay particular attention to the contexts in which different discourses are alternatively employed, ignored and/or rejected “provid[ing] a window for viewing the nation in everyday life” (Fox & Miller-Idriss, forthcoming). However, ethnographic studies are incredibly time consuming and as a result only allow the individual (unless blessed with copious assistance and/or money) to spend time in one or two locations over a sustained period of time. Alternatively, I wanted to examine the extent to which national discourse continues to operate as a taken-for-granted framework for understanding the world across as wide a range of the white English population as possible, in order to compare and contrast the beliefs, attitudes and assumptions of different groups, stratified on the basis of region, education, age and gender.

Therefore, in assessing the range of possible ways for gathering evidence in order to answer the research questions (de Vaus; 2001: 9), I identified three primary considerations in relation to the proposed research design; the need to gather data from as wide a range of sub-groups within the population under study (the majority ‘white’ English community in England), an interest in whether, when and how my respondents utilised national discursive forms in the course of our discussions and ensuring the entire project remained manageable for one individual. As a result of these requirements, I chose to use group interviews as a means of generating the primary data.

Group interviews

I choose to use group interviews rather than single, depth interviews for this project, as the former provide a useful location for examining whether and how taken for granted ideas or concepts regarding the nation and national identity are used and exchanged by different members of the groups. As Gamson notes, “to talk about issues with others, people search for a common basis of discourse” (1992: 91-92) and it is these commonalities or shared process of meaning making that I wanted to attend to.
Obviously, it is debatable whether such discussions can be labelled as “natural” (Morrison, 1998: 166) but even given the limitations of a one-off interview it is likely that those present will use ideas, concepts, values and beliefs that inform their everyday lives in order to express themselves even if some of these views may be curtailed. As Denzin notes, “what the subject tells us is itself something that has been shaped by prior cultural understandings” (quoted in Miller & Glassner, 1997: 101) and given the right setting and appropriate moderation of the group, it is possible that such an interview may represent “a ... genuine social interaction” (Gaskell, 2000: 46). This broad perspective is largely influenced by Michael Billig’s work on rhetorical psychology and his observations are worth noting;

In the cut-and-thrust of discussion, one can hear the processes of thinking directly, witnessing the actual business of people formulating and using thoughts. When people argue they justify and criticise, frequently appealing to common-sense, or to the values of accepted common-places (Billig, 1992: 16-17).

Having offered these justifications for using group interviews I would now like to discuss a number of the major issues concerning validity, reliability and the sampling rationale, which are particularly apposite given the enormous target population and the relatively miniscule sample to be used. In particular, I want to address the arguments of David Morrison who advocates that group interviews only be used as either exploratory guides or in relation to other quantitative data sets (1998: 172-176). He contends that because data gathered from select individuals is only interesting in as much as it tells us something about people in general then “group interview research ... demands that the findings be quantified” (ibid: 164) 77.

Validity

Validity in social research refers to two broad issues, the first concerning the degree to which inferences can be drawn from a sample and then applied to the population as a whole (internal validity) (Neuman et al, 1992: 26-27) and the second dealing with the degree to which the data generated reflects everyday reality, known as external

77 There is a wealth of relevant survey data available that can be used to offer a more “general picture” (Seale, 1999: 124) in relation to my own qualitative data sets. For example, the polling group MORI (amongst others) collects information from representative national samples on attitudes towards immigration on a regular basis and has in the past carried out surveys dealing with questions of race, identity, national signifiers and so on.
or "ecological validity" (Bryman, 200: 31). In the following section I will address both issues in turn.

The idea that data generated from a sample should be representative of the wider population is predominately associated with quantitative research methods, such as surveying. Alternatively, in qualitative studies researchers have tended to respond to the issue of validity with reference to the concept of theoretical rather than representative sampling (Silverman, 2001: 105-107), an idea outlined in detail by Glaser and Strauss in their work on grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).

In effect, the use of group interviews in this manner represents an attempt to shift the unit of analysis from the individual as a representative of a wider social group to "thematic content" (Lunt & Livingstone, 1996: 92) and the possible range of views associated with a particular subject. As George Gaskell notes, "the real purpose of qualitative research is not counting opinions or people but rather exploring the range of opinions, the different representations of the issue" (2000: 41). In terms of this study, the levels of coherence across the groups may provide some indication as to whether different people continue to use the nation as a frame of reference for interpreting and understanding certain topics and, therefore, the degree to which this framework remains sedimented in the current era.

This type of approach is predicated on the notion that the data generated through the initial group interview discussions will in turn inform who is approached to take part in subsequent interviews. For example, initial assumptions that age or class differences may produce somewhat different views, are then calibrated in terms of the data that is actually produced. As Glaser and Strauss write, "as he sees similar instances over and over again, the researcher becomes empirically confident that a category is saturated. He goes out of his way to look for groups that stretch diversity of data as far as possible, just to make sure that saturation is based on the widest possible range of data on the category" (Glaser & Strauss, 1967: 61).

Once the ideas and opinions from the most recent groups can be broadly identified in the data generated in preceding discussions, and the researcher has balanced the costs of carrying out further interviews with the benefits of accruing new data, then it may be broadly agreed that "theoretical saturation" has occurred and the data collection process ceases (Strauss & Corbin, 1990: 188).
My own strategy involved relying on snowball sampling in the first phases of the recruitment process drawing on contacts from friends, colleagues and acquaintances situated across the country and then, in the second phase, focusing on those areas and groups that I hadn’t been able to recruit up until that point (Seale, 1999: 116-117). This involved writing to hundreds of targeted organisations (including working men’s clubs, colleges and companies) and finally paying a professional recruiter in the case of the hardest to reach group, working class people under the age of twenty-five (See Appendix 1 for more details).

The second issue in relation to group interviews, ecological validity, is often couched in terms of ‘naturalness’ and the degree to which the interview setting and context replicates an everyday discussion. Thus far I have been placing the term ‘everyday talk’ in scare quotes when discussing group interviews as it seems fairly obvious that bringing together a group of individuals who may or may not have met before to talk about a particular subject is not an everyday occurrence (Hansen et al, 1998: 262). As Morrison notes, “the technique ... [is] a deliberately constructed exchange between the moderator and the members of the group interview” (1998: 166).

However, while acknowledging this position it is also important to note that even this type of group context can offer an important forum for observing how meaning is generated and negotiated with reference to concepts, ideas and values that are utilised by people in their everyday lives as well. This is particularly true when the group consists of individuals who know each other already (Bloor et al, 2001: 23-24). In addition to trying to recruit “naturally occurring groups” (Kitzinger, 1995: 302) wherever possible, I also tried to ensure that the setting was as relaxed and comfortable as possible by allowing the respondents to choose when and where the interview was held. In many cases, the discussions took place in an individual’s house and food and drink was served during the course of the interview58. In four other cases, I conducted the interviews in pubs/social clubs, which led to a more natural conversation, although transcribing the discussions proved something of a challenge in some cases! The success of many of the groups was represented by a comment from one respondent who claimed that it was just like a discussion they might have had.

down their ‘local club’ which indicates that a well directed group interview can get
close to resembling an ‘everyday’ discussion (Neuman et al, 1992: 26).

A final point needs to be raised here and this refers to the particular subjects that my
group interviews were asked to discuss, because, as Robin Mann observes, asking
direct question about categories of identity tends to invite particular replies (2006: 7-
8). Therefore, it was necessary to generate discussions that enabled me to assess
when national discourse was being utilised and to what ends (Fox & Miller-Idriss,
forthcoming) and, in this respect, I adopted a number of strategies.

First, I tried to present my research in as general terms as possible, usually claiming
that I was interested in ‘what different people thought about the state of the
country’, in an attempt to prevent people coming to the interviews with too many
preconceptions. In terms of generating discussions my first question, which was
designed as an ice-breaker, asked the interviewees to name two or three things that
they associated with ‘this country’. Initially, I was interested in seeing whether this
question made any sense and then to what degree my respondents engaged with it,
notably in the way that they defined ‘this country’. Second, this ‘talk about the
nation’ was used to assess the range of symbols, people and places that individuals
discussed and how particular categories of nationhood were constructed and
negotiated across the groups.

However, the main part of the discussion focused on asking far more general question,
what people dis/liked about living ‘here’, how had things changed etc in order to try
and allow my respondents to direct the conversation to topics that they saw as
important. In almost all cases this led to the groups discussing wider issues of identity
and belonging (for example, immigration, citizenship, European integration etc.) and
therefore allowed me to analyse how different groups articulated and negotiated
these issues (or not) with reference to a national framework of understanding.

_Replicability_

The issue of replicability is again taken from quantitative research and refers to the
idea that if a particular method is used in two different situations or in the same
situation by a different researcher it will produce broadly similar data. One of the
primary arguments against using group interviews is that the same group of people
when brought together and asked the same set of question on different days will not
give exactly the same answers. Acknowledging this argument at the level of specific statements should not take away from the fact that the broader patterns of meaning and negotiation, and the concepts and values that are used to underpin them, are unlikely to change significantly given a discussion of similar subject matter.

The question of replicability also draws in the degree to which the group interview should actually be focused. In other words, whether the moderator should stick tenaciously to the interview protocol in order to ensure some degree of replicability or alternatively allow the participants to "control the tone and emphasis of the discussion" (Neuman et al, 1992: 26) in an attempt to ensure the validity of the method. My own approach was to ensure that all the questions on the interview protocol were asked (or at least broached) whilst allowing for a fairly wide-ranging discussion that enabled those involved to articulate their own concerns, individual experiences or values in their own terms. This meant, of course, directing the conversation back on track when necessary but also acknowledging that some of the most revealing ideas emerge in some of the most unlikely places, or in this case discussions, notably when trying to uncover 'common sense' frameworks of meaning linked to the nation.

**Reflexivity / Ethics**

There is one final issue that I would like to address in relation to the use of group interviews as a research method and that concerns my own role - as both the moderator and as a white, London-based, middle-class researcher - in both recruiting for and participating in the interviews. I have already addressed the fact that my own position as a member of the relevant category group (namely white, English) may have meant that I was treated in greater confidence by my respondents, given that 'race' continues to operate as a marker of identity/belonging in contemporary England (Mason, 2000, Alexander & Alleyne, 2002).

However, this argument needs to be tempered with the fact that I am middle-class and, more importantly, identified with a university. Therefore, what Morrison labels as "moderator demand" (1998: 184) may come into play with participants either reluctant to express their true feelings or opinions, notably with regard to controversial subjects, or trying to gauge what it is they 'think' the moderator wants to hear. This problem may partly be offset by the use of "naturally occurring" groups (Kitzinger, 1995: 302) where the moderator in effect becomes the 'outsider' so that
more contentious opinions may be expressed due to a feeling of “safety in numbers”\(^{59}\) (ibid: 303).

In terms of responding to the participants' discussions, I would contend that it is the role of the moderator to listen, ask respondents to elucidate where necessary and challenge statements where it is both prudent and likely to produce a useful outcome. Finally, while Miller & Glassner argue that the moderator should empathise with subjects in order to relate to their experiences, notably when they oppose dominant narratives (1997: 104), one might ask whether this is the case when marginalised groups are expressing, say, racist, homophobic or misogynistic views? In terms of my own study, I think it depended on the context whether such views were interrogated. Certainly, I tried to ask whether other respondents agreed with what was being said and, in some appropriate cases, whether the individual respondent could explain their position further by highlighting inconsistencies in the argument. However, I don’t believe it is the role of the researcher to impose their own views on the discussion, notably if one is arguing that group interviews provide an opportunity for ‘ordinary’ people to express their views. In any case, such efforts are likely to be self-defeating in practice unless the researcher is directly seeking a confrontation with his respondents.

In this respect one must bear in mind that although the moderator is responsible for convening and then facilitating the group interview discussion participants are not entirely powerless themselves. As Wolf notes, “subjects can resist and subvert the researcher’s efforts, making some interviews difficult or even impossible” (Wolf quoted in Henry, 2003: 238). Indeed, given that both moderator and participants “are bound together as stakeholders in the project, albeit with different underlying objectives” (Lindlof & Grodin, 1990: 8), it is not difficult to agree with Holstein & Gubrium (1997) that the interview is an active process of meaning-making as both sides attempt to assert their own authority on the process. This means that the

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\(^{59}\) Asides from making the discussion as informal as possible, and re-stating at the outset that all opinions are welcomed and anonymity will be maintained at all times, it is difficult to see what else can be achieved with regard to this issue outside of using a more ‘suitable’ moderator though this is in itself fraught with problems (not to mention costs) (Fallon & Brown, 2002). It may be that we have to accept that if people wish to moderate their views in accordance with the (interview) context then that is their prerogative (as is normal practice in everyday settings) and that it is often possible to ascertain underlying beliefs and values in what is implicated or not said as well as more obvious statements of intent (Billig, 1992: 19).
moderator cannot be conceived as all-powerful (though, of course, they are central to the interview process) but as one of many motivated participants.

I would like to make one last observation at this point and that concerns the issue of participant's motivations for taking part. Obviously, we cannot know exactly why each individual agrees to be interviewed outside of those who were paid. However, in terms of my own study, I would like to acknowledge that the issue of self-selection by people associated with either a political or other interest group, which might have potentially biased the data (Seale, 1999: 117), was noted at an early stage with further recruitment efforts adjusted accordingly (see Appendix 1).

Having chosen to use 'everyday talk' among representatives from a particular constituency in England as my primary data set, and noted the advantages and limitations therein, I now want to discuss my reasons for choosing to gather and analyse a range of texts generated at a different 'level' of society in an attempt to provide a richer, more grounded study of national discourse in England.

From Talk to (Con)text

Before discussing the other types of data that have been analysed for this study, I first want to outline my justifications for moving beyond 'everyday talk' and how the relationship between the two data sets has been conceptualised. Here my own approach differs in emphasis from those recent studies, which, in focusing on both informal and institutional settings have addressed, however cautiously, questions of causality.

For instance, Ruth Wodak and her colleagues (1999) justified using a range of different data sets in relation to "the principle of triangulation ... [so as] to identify and contrast competing configurations of national identity as well as divergent narratives of identity" (1999: 9). Through their analysis of group interview data, media texts and political speeches, Wodak et al were specifically concerned with "unmask[ing] ideologically permeated and often obscured structures of power, political control and dominance" (ibid: 8) by looking at the ways in which features of elite narratives are also employed by 'ordinary' people in everyday contexts. Indeed, in their conclusion

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The one area where the researcher does have absolute power - unless participants are allowed to comment on the research - is in the process of analysis which I will discuss in more detail below (Lunt & Livingstone, 1996).
the authors note that "the groups discussions perfectly mirrored the public political debate, and recontextualisation and intertextuality could be clearly traced" (ibid: 202).

A related approach was employed by Mirca Madianou whose work *Mediating the Nation* (2005) examined how different ethnic groups in Greece responded to and debated particular media texts relating to controversial 'political' issues as well as wider questions of identity and belonging. Utilising various analytical techniques (including semiotics and content analysis) she examined how meaning was generated within the texts and then - through a series of individual and groups interviews - assessed how the different groups made sense of them by drawing on particular (often divergent) social and cultural resources. In providing an empirically grounded and highly sensitive study of how different publics experience and articulate their own sense of identity both in general and in response to specific mediated events, Madianou was, however, answering a very different research question from my own, namely, "what role - if any - the media play in the articulation of identities" (2005: 7).

As discussions in Chapter 1 demonstrated my own approach also acknowledges that processes of meaning making are marked by relations of power (backed by particular regimes of knowledge) and that "power and dominance are usually organized and institutionalised" (van Dijk, 2001: 303). However, rather than focusing on any specific "inter-relationships between elite and 'ordinary' discursive identity constructs" (Wodak et al, 1999: 202), this study, by examining a range of different data sources, broadly seeks to track convergences in the articulation of national discourse at different levels of society.

In other words, having decided to study 'everyday' talk as my primary data set, I also wanted to examine the degree to which similar linguistic features, ideas or debates could be seen (or otherwise) in a wider institutional setting, as a means of extending, however guardedly, the range of conclusions that could be drawn by only carrying out group interviews with a relatively limited number of people across England. Institutions, such as the media, the government and so on, are significant not only because their 'messages' reach millions but because they form part of the wider context within which people make sense of their lives, whether or not they accept, ignore or challenge a particular narrative.
By including an examination of wider institutional texts alongside references to extant studies and survey data it is suggested that the richness and depth of the qualitative analysis can be complemented by the breadth of coverage offered by more quantitative data sets (Campbell & Holland, 2005: 5). This approach draws on the concept of complementarity, which involves a more holistic approach to the study of complex phenomena by trying to utilise a more diverse range of data sets so as to capture a wider collection of ‘snapshots’ of the social terrain under investigation (Lobe et al, 2007: 15).

To sum up, if a relatively taken-for-granted national discourse is being used (or challenged) at both the everyday and institutional level in relatively similar ways at the current time, then it might be possible to argue with greater certainty that these processes are significant for wider numbers. The next sections will discuss which complementary data sets were examined and why.

**Which institution?**

In terms of analysing data from an institutional source there are a whole host of possibilities that might have been considered given the argument that national discourse - as a means of articulating and understanding wider social relations - is widely embedded in British society. One could, for example, acknowledge the numerous writers who have noted the importance of education systems for inculcating a sense of national identity (cf Gellner, 1983: 25-28, Berghalm & Schissler, 1987, Green, 1997, Clark & Munn, 1997, Levy, 2002) and decide to conduct an analysis of school curricula or textbooks and/or carry out interviews with policy makers or teachers in order to assess the degree to which national discourse continues to underpin the education system.

Alternatively, foreign policy might be seen as an apposite field in which to conduct research into the ongoing utilisation of national discourse and therefore a study of, say, official government documents on a particular event or issue might be considered perhaps backed up by interviews with civil servants. As we have seen, political speeches and interviews with politicians have been used by a number of different scholars in order to analyse how competing discourses of nationhood are constructed in order to mobilise often widespread and diverse populations (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001).
However, the institutional data that I have studied for the purposes of this thesis is a product of the mass media and, in this case, the mainstream, established ‘old’ media of the press, radio and television. It should also be noted at this juncture that although I consider the study of national discourse at the level of media production an entirely valid endeavour (cf Nossek 2004) I have focused my analysis on media texts for reasons of time and practicality.

My reasons for choosing to analyse media content in order to examine the utilisation of national discourse at the institutional level are fourfold. First, I am following Michael Billig’s call for further systematic studies of how the nation is flagged on a daily basis through the media (1995: 104) by identifying the range of micro-linguistic and intertextual features that routinely (re)produce national discourse. Second, I am drawing on the considerable weight of research, which argues that the media are central to lived experience (Silverstone, 1999, Gitlin, 2002, Couldry, 2003, Bird, 2003), even if the question of influence remains open to debate (Livingstone, 1999, 2005) and subject to methodological constraints (Lewis, 1991). Third, media texts are often easy (and cheap) to access and collate. Finally, I am focusing on the media as an institution because of the degree to which I am using ‘tools’ from the discipline as a whole to carry out my research. Therefore, it seems to make sense to apply those tools to the field of study in which they were first developed.

Media Content

Having argued that the analysis of media content is designed to complement the primary data sets, it should also be noted that the range of data analysed varied according to the specific discussion and also the range of available literature on the topic. For instance, Chapter 5 present the results from a systematic content analysis of the British media in order to assess the degree to which national discourse features across routine news output (Billig, 1995: 93). In Chapters 6, 7 and 8, I have noted the amount of press coverage that particular topics, such as political correctness, have received in three representative newspapers, The Guardian, Daily Mail and The Sun, using Lexis Nexis software. This is designed to illustrate the degree to which such issues have grown (or otherwise) in terms of actual press coverage over a period of

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61 I think it is important to note that I do not consider the media to be a coherent, homogeneous, unified institution as such (Gitlin, 2001: 7), merely that the mass media I am interested in are established, generate audiences of millions and therefore provide important cultural resources which are used by people in their everyday lives.
five years. I have also analysed in more detail a limited number of texts (in most cases from the press) in order to illustrate the degree to which my respondents’ views coincide with or challenge those disseminated by particular media organisations. This is not an in-depth survey of the media, and is not intended to be. However, where some of the group discussions reflected or drew on wider institutional narratives, I was keen to note this. Again, this study has not been designed to investigate any causal link between the two but instead explores how the articulation of particular arguments, beliefs and assumptions at different levels of society may contribute to the sedimentation of particular discursive features.

Where in-depth studies have already been carried out in related research areas, I have drawn on these to complement my own studies. For example, a great deal of work has already been completed in relation to media representations of immigration and race, which can be usefully referenced in relation to my own group discussions.

*British Media Day Surveys*

Following Billig’s call for a more ‘systematic’ survey of the media to be carried in order to demonstrate that “banal flaggings are neither unusual nor confined to politics” (Billig, 1995: 109), I carried out a content analysis of British news reporting. Bryman has provided a fairly useful definition of content analysis writing that it is an “approach to the analysis of documents and texts that seeks to quantify content in terms of predetermined categories and in a systematic and replicable manner” (Bryman, 2001: 180). In his analysis Bryman notes that particular attention must be paid to issue surrounding both the sampling of stories and categories within the story and also the process of coding, where categories should be both mutually exclusive and exhaustive (ibid: 182-189). The coding process must also be subject to the test of inter-coder reliability to ensure that results do not diverge when applied by two different coders (Hansen et al, 1998: 120-121).

It should be noted at this point that content analysis has been subject to sustained critiques “for its quantitative nature, for its fragmentation of textual wholes, for its positivist notion of objectivity [and] for its lack of a theory of meaning” (Hansen et al, 1998: 91). However, when used sensitively, for particular, well-defined purposes and in combination with other complementary qualitative methods, content analysis offers a degree of systematicity and methodological rigour, and provides the possibility of identifying broader trends or patterns across large bodies of data.
For my analysis, the following media outlets were used:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Radio Station</th>
<th>Commercial/Public</th>
<th>Content</th>
<th>Target Audience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TalkSport</td>
<td>Commercial (National)</td>
<td>Sport, Phone-in, News</td>
<td>Males, 30+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC Radio Five Live</td>
<td>Public (National)</td>
<td>News, Sport</td>
<td>M/F, 30+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC Radio One</td>
<td>Public (National)</td>
<td>Contemporary Music Specialist Music</td>
<td>M/F, 25 years and under</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital Radio</td>
<td>Commercial (Local)</td>
<td>Contemporary Music</td>
<td>F/M, 20-35 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Political Bias</th>
<th>Circulation</th>
<th>Market Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daily Mail</td>
<td>Right</td>
<td>2,400,000</td>
<td>Mid-range</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Sun</td>
<td>Right</td>
<td>3,300,000</td>
<td>Popular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>Left</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>Quality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Initially for the analysis I was intending to record a daily news broadcast from Channel 4, BBC1 and Sky. Unfortunately, the recording process was interrupted on a number of occasions and this meant that I was only left with recordings for the BBC. Although this has limited the scope slightly, I still felt that there was sufficient data to carry out a useful, albeit tightly focused, analysis.

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62 A news report was chosen for each station according to my own schedule on the relevant day, taped and then analysed.
63 The British press is commonly divided under three sub-groups; red tops (sensational tabloids aimed a working class/popular market), quality tabloids (aimed at a lower middle class market and, often, women) and broadsheets (aimed at middle class market, notably the AB higher income bracket) and I have selected a paper from each. In terms of readership, The Sun is the most widely read newspaper in England, with Daily Mail the third most popular. The Guardian, lags behind the Telegraph and The Times as the third most popular broadsheet, but provides a greater contrast editorially with the two tabloids I wish analysed. In terms of political leanings, the Guardian is avowedly liberal, while the Daily Mail is conservative, anti-Europe and has been at the forefront of the campaign to tighten immigration laws. The Sun, nominally supports the Labour government, but is vehemently anti-Europe and immigration, pro-American and self-styled champion of the “British” working class (cf Curran & Seaton, 2003: 71-108). Only the front page story, back page story and main story on the business pages were analysed. The latter has been chosen as the economic arena is often considered to be the most global in outlook and therefore perhaps indicative of wider trends regarding the continuing use of the nation as a frame of reference.
64 Figures from September 2005 (Media section, The Independent, 14/11/05: 8).
Using two distinct periods (October/November 2005 and April/May 2006), I built a composite (five-day) 'week' collating news reports on the Monday of the first week, on the Tuesday of the second week and so on. Each news report was be analysed in terms of the following criteria; use of deixis in the story, location markers that place the story in England/Britain or otherwise (Higgins, 2004), reference to any transnational actors and whether the story can be described as being particular to England/Britain or not (See Appendix 2). This study of news reports in the London-based British media should give an indication as to the degree to which Billig’s hypothesis still holds or whether other discourses, which exclude or challenge a national framework, can be identified.

Having outlined my justifications for using group interview data complemented by a range of media texts in order to answer the research questions, I would now like to turn my attention to the question of how the data was coded and analysed so that any underlying patterns or features could be identified. In the following section, I will offer a rationale for the framework that was employed drawing on some of the earlier discussions concerning the utility of adopting a discourse analytic approach for this study.

**Coding and Classifying the Data**

In carrying out the analysis, I used the Nvivo computer package to assist in the coding process and drew on the broader tenets of grounded theory so as to inform my engagement with what is a huge body of empirical data (Strauss & Corbin, 1990: 62). It should be noted that qualitative software packages, such as Nvivo, allow the researcher to codify large data sets in a systematic and coherent manner and draw links between different statements, extracts, respondents and groups. Therefore, the software is not used to draw conclusions or advance concepts - this remains the province of the analyst - but rather as a facilitating device. For my own research, I initially coded the interviews using the ‘traditional’ tools of paper, pen and post-it note before placing all the data within NVivo and then working through all the transcripts again. This enabled me to re-evaluate the first set of codes I had marked out on the paper transcripts as a means of drawing up more effective categories of analysis.

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65 I decided not to analyse weekend reports for reasons of time and effort.
These initial engagements with the primary data were broadly informed by "the constant comparison method" (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), which involves two 'levels' of coding, open and axial. Initially, the researcher places the data into broad categories or themes so as to make it more manageable and enable the identification of potentially useful relationships or patterns. For instance, I used categories such as immigration, Europe and devolution when initially coding the data before exploring in more detail "the full range of types or continuia of the category, its dimensions, the conditions under which it is pronounced or minimised, its major consequences, its relation to other categories, and its other properties" (Ibid: 106).

For example, the category of immigration involved statements that reflected both positive and negative views about migrants in Britain. In terms of the latter, respondents tended to talk about threats to culture / way of life and/or to material benefits and so each statement was coded accordingly. By focusing on these features it was then possible to turn attention to the ways in which such statements were specifically articulated and by whom. It also enabled me to trace patterns both within and across the groups by focusing on the types of topics or questions that prompted specific utterances and, crucially, how they were responded to, justified and debated. In this way, it was possible to move back and forth, beginning with individual statements or extracts, then assessing the relevance of the categories within which they had been placed and finally exploring the extant literature in the field to see which particular concepts or insights might offer theoretical purchase.

I also conducted an analysis of the data using Alceste, a software package that generates "an empirically based classification of text units according to patterns of co-currence of word tokens within these units" (Abraham et al, 2006: 1). By investigating "statistical similarities and dissimilarities of words in order to identify repetitive language patterns" (ibid: 3-4) across the entire corpus, Alceste offers a more overarching 'view' of the data which may be used to complement the more focused qualitative analyses (See Appendix 3). Indeed, the broader classes generated by the Alceste software offered a further useful means of calibrating the micro-level coding and categorisation processes, providing a useful source of "comparative evidence" (Mautner, 2008: 44). In using Alceste, or similar corpus linguistic techniques, one needs to balance out the necessary loss of detail, notably in terms of context, that occurs when counting such features as keyness ("the statistically significant higher frequency of particular worlds of clusters in the corpus under analysis") or collocation ("the above-chance frequent co-occurences of two words
within a pre-determined span") with the insights offered by analysing broader linguistic patterns across the corpus as a whole (Baker et al, 2008: 277-278).

Data Analysis

Having coded and categorised the data over a period of months, key extracts were then carefully selected in terms of either their representativeness of a particular category / debate or as a means of drawing attention to a negative case. In conducting a more detailed qualitative analysis, I approached this complex task by focusing on three levels, the micro, meso and macro when approaching the data66. At the micro level, I drew on many of the features of linguistic and conversation analysis, in order to assess how a particular phrase, sentence or exchange was constructed / negotiated in order to generate meaning. On engaging with the data, a number of linguistic features were identified as being particularly significant including (but not limited to): the use of specific vocabulary in order to generate emphasis or vagueness (Wodak et al, 1999: 40-41); deixis (the construction of in and out-group categories often through the use of pronouns such as ‘we’, ‘our’, ‘here’); transitivity (who does what to whom) and modality (degrees of certainty or hedging) (Mautner, 2008: 41); metonyms (which “enable ... speakers to dissolve individuals, and hence volitions and responsibilities, or to keep them in the semantic background” - De Cilla et al, 1999: 165); and metaphors, which are often culturally specific. However, as Meinhof and Galasinski (2005: 116-117) observe, the analysis of, what they label, ‘the language of belonging’ does not involve a check-list of lexical or grammatical features that can be ticked off because they apply in all cases. Rather, it demands “an interpretive, context-sensitive, qualitative reading of texts” that focuses on the specific range of linguistic repertoires being employed at any given moment, according to circumstance and need.

Moreover, as we noted in Chapter 1, these types of linguistic features are of fundamental importance in generating a shared framework of understanding, enabling individuals to move through countless everyday encounters with a degree of certainty and comfort. They are also crucial in underpinning and normalising particular social relations so that it is difficult to point towards their contingent nature.

66 This approach draws on Wodak’s discussion of “four levels of context” but places the second and third of her levels into the category of ‘meso’, as follows; “the immediate language or text” (micro), “the intertextual ... relationship between ... texts” / “the extra-linguistic social ... variables ... of a specific context” (meso) and “the broader socio-political and historical contexts” (macro) (Wodak, 2006: 107).
Therefore, there was a particular emphasis on identifying those forms of expression that passed without comment and could therefore be seen as being largely taken-for-granted or uncontroversial among the group members. This also applied to interactions between the respondents and myself given that I was very much implicated in the overall process of meaning-making within each of the groups (Mann, 2006).

Conversely, when this was a dispute over a particular topic, attention was paid to the ways in which problematic issues were broached and managed (often indicated by pauses, hedges, a change in style or repetition), the rhetorical forms employed within a debate and also the manner in which consensus was achieved, if at all. As Phillips & Jorgensen note, “these signs can reflect conflicts between [individuals drawing on] different discourses” (2002: 125).

Of particular interest for this study was the ways in which categories of belonging were defined, maintained, negotiated or challenged in relation to the nation or other possible 'identity' groups. Here, I drew on the broader tenets of Membership Categorisation Analysis (MCA) (Sacks, 1992, Baker, 1997, Egbert, 2004) which not only focuses on processes of categorisation but also the range of practices and norms that are associated with boundary-making. As McCabe and Stokoe write, “categories ... are linked to particular actions ... or characteristics ... such that there are conventional expectations about what constitutes ... normative behaviour” (2003: 603-4). Moreover, in almost all forms of categorisation, there will be what is broadly considered normal and transgressive behaviour, which, in many cases, will involve some form of “moral order” (ibid: 607). Observing how, and in relation to which topics, different groups constructed particular categories formed an important part of this study in assessing the degree to which national discourse, and those practices, values and norms associated with it, underpinned or informed these processes.

At the meso level, the concept of inter-textuality was of particular relevance as it enabled me to chart the manifold ways in which different texts and utterances draw on the same ideas, language, background knowledge and symbols. Intertextuality “refers to the influence of history on a text and to a texts influence on history, in that the text draws on earlier texts and thereby contributes to historical development and change” (Kristeva quoted in Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002: 74). This might be as simple as a newspaper directly quoting a government report or speech (manifest intertextuality) (Fairclough, 1992: 117) or the repetition of a particular idea or narrative (say friends discussing a news item) through an “intertextual chain” (Fairclough, 1995b: 77). In
some cases, such chains may stretch over a period of years or longer, as indicated by
the ways in which events of the Second World War, popularised in film and print, are
still used to inform contemporary political speeches or media reportage in Britain
(Connolly, 2004).

Therefore, examples of inter-textuality that were introduced and largely passed
without comment or generated widespread agreement might indicate the degree to
which certain forms of knowledge are taken-for-granted and therefore have become
sedimented. Finally, this level of analysis points to our earlier discussion of
(re)contextualisation (notably with regard to the media) as individuals often draw on
and discuss wider institutional narratives in order to make sense of the world around
them and/or articulate or refute a particular point of view.

In the case of the macro-level, we can draw together the more micro-scale analyses so
as to identify the primary discourses being utilised in at any given moment. Returning
to the earlier discussion (in Chapter 1) of the main features of national discourse, it
should be possible to both assess whether the main dimensions (temporal, spatial,
symbolic, everyday) identified by Ozkirimli (2005) and Wodak et al (1999) are salient,
and hence viable, and the degree to which national discourse is utilised in an
unproblematic manner both within and across the different groups.

Attending to the manner in which discursive forms are employed at particular
moments also encourages us to assess how particular ways of thinking about and
understanding the world are sometimes ranged against each other and to what ends.
This means moving beyond the immediate context of the encounter itself and trying to
place it within a wider historical context (Wodak, 2001). For instance, where
individuals rejected national frameworks by articulating a more cosmopolitan
discourse then it was important to also assess such statements in relation to the status
of the individual in question, the structural constraints within which they may operate
and, wherever possible, wider theoretical interventions. In this formulation, it is
assumed that there is a “dialectical relationship between particular discursive events
and the situations, institutions and social structures in which they are embedded”
(Wodak, 2006: 112).

Contribution of the thesis

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This final section details the main contributions that this study hopes to make to the social sciences and in particular the study of national forms of identification and mobilisation, which are seen to be in the following key areas;

- develops Michael Billig's theory of *Banal Nationalism* (1995) at the theoretical level by drawing in arguments from other areas (media theory, studies of globalisation and transnationalism and theories of everyday life) and empirically by analysing its relevance to ordinary people's 'everyday' talk.
- argues that banality must be seen as a social achievement by reconceptualising the reproduction of national discourse as a contingent and contested process. Therefore, rather than viewing nations as actually existing entities this requires observing when and how national discourse operates as a meaningful frame of reference for significant numbers in the contemporary era.
- utilises Laclau's writing on sedimentation in order to theorise the processes by which discursive forms, including those associated with the nation, become embedded and taken-for-granted and, alternatively, subject to challenge and resisted across time and space.
- emphasises the importance of micro-processes and practices of everyday life to cementing social identities, thus providing individuals with an ongoing sense of place, self and other as they move through countless daily contexts.
- draws on the concept of ontological security and arguments from phenomenological sociology to enable a better understanding of why national frameworks continue to matter to different people. In particular, I suggest that the generation of an embedded and stable subject position may prove psychologically valuable as well as assigning a key sense of status in what has been characterised as a complex and threatening world.
- locates more localised processes of meaning-making in relation to wider structural constraints/transformations and their impact on notions of work, risk, community and mobility (Bauman, 2000, 2001, Sennett, 1998). This provides a more effective means of theorising the links between everyday experience in an increasingly inter-connected world and the perception that national culture and space are under threat from proximal and external 'Others'.
- puts forward the concept of ecstatic nationalism as a means of conceptualising the ontological connections between mass rituals and everyday forms of life.
As a result, it has been argued that events designed to celebrate the nation offer important 'liminal' moments for concretising the image of an actually existing national community whilst also providing a 'strategic lens' for studying national discourse.

- scrutinises through empirical analysis the notion of the cosmopolitan by suggesting that any movements beyond local or national frameworks must also take into account questions of conditionality, privilege and agency linked to wider economic, political and cultural capital.
Chapter 5: "Football, tea and racism" - Exploring 'everyday' national discourse

Introduction

In this first empirical chapter I want to examine, from a number of different perspectives, whether (and how) national discourse is routinely utilised as "a resource in the course of interaction" (Wodak, 2006: 108). If it is possible to identify across everyday talk and media texts the routine and largely unreflexive use of a national frame of reference to make sense of and articulate self, other and everyday processes, then it might be more persuasively argued that this framework remains largely sedimented.

The chapter is organised in two parts. The first presents the results of a content analysis of the British media conducted over two composite weeks in 2005 and 2006. In a complex and stratified society such as Britain, the mass media are one of the key institutions that, in generating and disseminating texts with significant reach, are able to present "widely shared constructions of reality" (Mautner, 2008: 32). In this case, a focus on daily news output allows us to investigate the extent to which a taken-for-granted national framework continues to inform routine reportage and the range of micro-linguistic and inter-textual features that constitute this framework.

The second part involves analyses of the group interviews from a number of different perspectives and is divided into three sections. The first examines how the different groups responded to my opening question, 'Can you name two or three things that you associate with this country?' This is what Fox and Miller-Idriss (forthcoming) label as "talk about the nation", which is useful for examining the ways "ordinary people give discursive shape and content to their otherwise taken-for-granted understandings of the nation".

These responses will then be briefly compared to recent survey results in order to assess the degree to which they adhere or conflict. In effect, we will be examining whether particular symbolic markers constitute a form of shared knowledge about what it means to be a member of 'this country' and how these processes of categorisation draw boundaries between different groups who are seen to be more or less English. As part of a more reflexive engagement with the overall research process,
it will be also observed how these assumptions are used to inform interactions between the discussants and myself (the interviewer).

In the second section, I will then explore the extent to which my respondent’s “talk[ed] with the nation” (Fox & Miller-Idriss, forthcoming) by routinely discussing particular issues and events in national terms. In these analyses there will be an emphasis on discovering whether the dimensions of national discourse identified in Chapter 1 have theoretical purchase and the degree to which the articulation of national discourse through everyday talk is linked to the same micro-linguistic and inter-textual features identified in the analysis of media texts. In the final section of the chapter, we will look at instances where individuals move between discourses in order to manage or resolve more complex debates and how taken-for-granted national discourse may offer a more stable footing in these situations.

Again, it should be noted at this juncture that the analysis of different data sets is not intended to probe any notion of causality. Rather, the primary interest is in examining how similar (or otherwise) features, patterns or themes occur at different levels of society, as a partial attempt to provide multiple views of what is a complex and contested terrain.

**Reporting the nation**

In Chapter 1, it was argued that while processes of meaning-making can be traced through individual speech acts, written texts and social practices, it is also important to acknowledge the impact and influence of powerful social institutions in stabilising particular forms of knowledge and the social relations they underpin. In the contemporary era, institutions, such as the mass media, the government and so on, are significant not only because their ‘messages’ reach millions but because they form part of the wider context within which people make sense of their lives, whether or not they accept, ignore or challenge a particular narrative.

Therefore while the specific influence of the media is beyond the scope of this work, it is possible to point to the ways in which its daily output continues to identify, prioritise and evaluate people, issues and events in national terms thus recreating a taken-for-granted national discourse. Furthermore, in analysing the specific features
that inform these processes and comparing them with those used by ‘ordinary’ people during the group interviews, we examine the extent to which these features operate as part of a vast and inter-locking framework of reference across a range of institutional and vernacular settings.

In order to systematically investigate the role of the media in “banally flagging” the nation (Billig, 1995: 109) the results of a content analysis of news reports from two composite weeks (October-November 2005 and July-August 2006) will be presented (See Appendix 2). Although this is not intended to be a comprehensive study, it offers a number of useful and interesting insights into the ways in which the media select, locate, categorise and signify their news coverage by drawing on a national discourse. In order to unpack some of these findings in a little more detail, I will address each variable (see below) in turn, using some illustrative examples to justify the arguments being put forward. A number of these insights will then be taken up when examining the group interview discussions in this and subsequent chapters.

Table 1: Results of a Content Analysis of British news reporting focusing on the ‘banal flagging(s) of nationhood’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Results</th>
<th>Inter-coder reliability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Use of homeland deixis</td>
<td>45.7%</td>
<td>54.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Country named in the story</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Mention of location in Britain with no mention of country</td>
<td>30.8%</td>
<td>69.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Mention of location in ‘foreign’ country but with no mention of the country</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Mention of trans-national actor or organisation</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Story particular to Britain/England</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stories that feature one or more variables that indicate a national context (1,2,3,6)</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

First, the use of deictic terms allows individuals to locate themselves and their audiences in particular locales and contexts and, just as importantly, may point

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67 As a percentage of the total number of news reports analysed (N=80).
68 15% of the data was second coded by an independent coder producing an overall figure of 85% for inter-coder reliability (Hansen et al, 1998: 120).
Towards the “shared universe” (Billig, 1995: 108) that they inhabit. The context that words such as ‘we’, ‘this’, ‘here’ and ‘the’ signify is not necessarily national but in much media reporting this shared universe is routinely defined in relation to the nation, as the following example indicates:

We’ll be assessing the impact of the proposals, which have already been criticised on the back-benches and within the cabinet itself (BBC News, 24/10/05).

Here, deictic terms are being used in two different ways. The ‘we’ll’ in the first sentence refers to the BBC, whose journalists will be evaluating the value or otherwise of a particular government policy. In the second line, ‘the back benchers’ and ‘the cabinet’ point emphatically to a national context. Indeed, the term ‘the back benches’ may only make sense in a British context as it is a colloquial term used to indicate those group of members of parliament (MPs) who do not hold government posts, referring to where they sit in the Houses of Parliament debating chamber. Similarly, ‘the cabinet’ is a short-hand, and commonly used, reference to the most senior politicians who head government departments and advise the prime minister. However, the BBC report does not explain these terms, assuming that the audience will know what is meant and their significance to the story.

It could be argued that because instances of homeland deixis feature in less than 50% of cases, that this particular feature is not particularly significant in the everyday reporting of news. However, homeland deixis is just one of the ways in which a national context can be inferred and it is the combination of such variables that helps objectify the nation in the majority of these reports.

**Location markers**

One of the most obvious ways of locating a story within a national setting is by referring to a specific country and, as Table 1 shows, this feature was identified in 77% of the reports. Interestingly, these location markers are often used to anthropomorphise a nation into a single actor with its own objectives, needs and abilities. The following quote from the sports pages of The Sun offers a good example of this.
It was 83 minutes before England cracked the resistance of the Caribbean minnows (16/06/06: 75)

In this report, the term ‘England’ refers to the actions of a sports team who, as representatives of the nation, compete against other nations on an international stage. Through this process of ‘overgeneralization’ (Schegloff, 1972: 87) particular people, events or places come to stand in for the wider whole, so that nations are represented (and imagined) as concrete, unified entities acting in concert to pursue a desired end. As Eric Hobsbawm has argued, “the imagined community of millions seems more real as a team of eleven named people” (1992: 143).

The next two variables, focusing on the naming of locations, complement each other and again indicate the degree to which media producers expect audiences to recognise places at ‘home’ in contrast to foreign locales. When places in Britain feature in news reports, they are far less likely to be qualified with a national marker than locations abroad. This is akin to what Schegloff has labelled as ‘common sense geography’ (1972: 85-86), the idea that participants position themselves in relation to each other through the use of meaningful location markers and, in the process, assess and validate the other’s credentials. In the case of the news, reporters in Britain assume that their audiences will know when they mention the place-name, ‘Birmingham’, that it refers to the town in the middle of England and not the one in Alabama, USA, unless stated otherwise (see also Hester, 2002).

Michael Higgins makes a broadly similar argument for the Scottish press, writing, “newspapers engage in the process of ‘homeland making’ by joining an inclusive and explicit rhetoric of nationhood with an assumption of local political competence” (2004: 645). For instance, he describes how the place-name Holyrood, the site of the Scottish parliament, has come to stand in for the legislature itself so that it becomes a powerful metonym for Scottish politics as a whole in a post-devolution era (ibid: 640-643. Returning to this study, it is interesting to note that the only consistent use of a foreign place name without any national marker was Baghdad, indicating the degree to which by British audiences are presumed to share in ‘common’ knowledge about Iraq due to British military involvement in the area.
The relatively small minority of stories that mentioned trans-national actors (TNA's) indicates that much routine news reportage does not focus on their activities. Moreover, unlike most of the results, which were fairly standardised across all media, in this case the contribution of one media outlet, The Guardian newspaper, far outweighed all the others. It should also be noted that most of the references to TNA's concentrated on one news story, which concerned the Israeli bombing of Lebanon during the summer of 2006.

’Our’ business

The final variable in Table 1 might be considered the most subjective but produced an inter-coder reliability score in the 80’s, which again suggests broad agreement between coders. In applying this variable, I drew on Christopher Hill’s argument that, “there are ... some things - the fire-fighters’ strike for instance - which are mainly ‘our’ business and others, like the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which are mostly considered other people’s business” (Hill, 2003: 237). Two examples are probably worth examining to illustrate the point I want to make:

A body found in a river in Ecuador has been confirmed as that of missing British teenager Aaron Goss. The 17 year-old from Northamptonshire disappeared in the Taner region of the country last Wednesday whilst swimming on a school trip (Talksport, 01/08/06, midnight news)

Also tonight, more allegations about business dealings but David Blunkett says he’s not resigning (BBC News, 01/11/05, 2200 news)

The question that needs to be asked about these stories is why journalists and producers think they matter. The first, as tragic as it may be, is featured because it is a British boy that has died in fairly exceptional circumstances. The idea that particular nationalities have certain news values was clearly, and cynically, expressed 30 years ago by a TV producer in Philip Schlesinger’s study, Putting Reality Together; “One thousand wogs, fifty frogs, one Briton ... One European is worth twenty-eight Chinese or perhaps two Welsh miners worth a thousand Pakistanis” (1978: 116).

The second extract, involves a well-known British public figure that had been accused of breaking the British government’s parliamentary rules. Here, the headline assumes background knowledge of both who Blunkett is and why he matters, and the
significance of the story in the wider context of British politics. Therefore, both these items are featured because they involve fellow nationals and/or concerns that are seen to be relevant to a British audience. Overall, my analysis shows that there are relatively few stories reported by the major news organisations that could be categorised as being non-specific to Britain, the most obvious exception being the conflict in Lebanon, which featured widely at the top of most news agendas.

At a broader level, the results from this analysis reflect both Galtung and Ruge's (1995) classic study of news values and more recent work on global news reporting (Cohen et al, 1995, Liebes, 1997, Nossek 2004). Galtung & Ruge argue that 'cultural proximity' is one of the key factors for understanding why producers and reporters choose particular news stories. Later empirical studies lend weight to this thesis by observing that foreign news stories are generally reported far more objectively than those considered to involve the national interest (Nossek, 2004). As Cohen and his colleagues conclude, “domestication of television news should thus be seen as an important process that allows for the reiteration of a given country’s specific orientations, as well as its connections to more inclusive categories such as Europe or the West” (1995: 142).

Overall, a number of useful conclusions can be drawn from these results. First, they point towards the fact that the London-based, British media routinely locate their reports within a national context, whether that nation is Britain, England, Scotland etc. Second, we can see that this process involves the utilisation of a range of institutionalised norms, including everything from micro-linguistic features (location markers, overgeneralization, deictic language and metonymy) to the wider level of context, where the concept of “givenness” (Brown & Yule, 1983: 180-181) might be usefully employed. This refers to “knowledge which the speaker assumes to be in the consciousness of the addressee at the time of the utterance” (ibid) and in this case draws on the notion that individuals living in a particular nation, in a world of nations, will have broadly similar reference points, background knowledge and interests.

Here, I would argue that it is not any one factor that makes the difference but their combination across different stories, time periods and contexts, so that they produce an interlocking, and often quite dense, framework for orientating oneself in and
making sense of the world⁶⁹. In other words, it is the combination of the primary dimensions of national discourse identified in Chapter 1 - spatial, symbolic, temporal and everyday - that underpin the ongoing (re)presentation of the nation as a concrete, unified and bounded entity in much news reporting.

Although, Institutions, such as the media, are significant in generating narratives that are engaged with by countless millions on a daily basis, the precise nature of this relationship, including causality, is beyond the scope of this work. What is of interest here is observing whether there are similar features in the primary data sets, the ‘everyday’ conversations of different people in England, which will studied in the rest of this chapter. In the next section, it will be observed how the groups routinely drew on a national discourse in order to talk about the nation.

Defining ‘this country’

In asking my respondents to come up with two or three ‘things’ they associated with ‘this country’ I was first interested in whether the request, in and of itself, made any sense⁷⁰. In other words, was the existence of something called ‘this country’ (however, my respondents defined it) taken as read or did it provoke consternation or incomprehension. Second, I wanted to examine the degree to which the symbols, objects, places and traits named by both my group discussants and in the wider surveys “give credence to the notion that there exists a core set of stable identity markers underpinning the nation’s identity” (Palmer, 2003: 428). This was not in order to make any value judgements about their choices but to see what this “Sunday best” version of national culture” (Lofgren, 1989: 16) told us about current thinking “on what constitutes the typical or essential” elements of the nation in question (ibid).

In fact, none of my discussants considered my request to be nonsensical or unintelligible. One individual questioned its utility and although some struggled to come up with many suggestions (one respondent labelled it, “a strangely hard
question”), others cheerfully rattled them off. Interestingly, there was very little
disagreement over the suggestions with most individuals recognising, or at least not
querying, those put forward by other members of the group (but see below for one or
two notable exceptions).

Broadly speaking, the responses can be divided into a number of categories, which are
presented in Table 2 (below) with examples. Those highlighted in bold featured in
more than half of the groups. The final column indicates the degree to which the
dimensions of a national discourse, identified in Chapter 1, can be linked to these
examples.

**Table 2 - Responses to the question, ‘what do you associate with this
country?’ (Group interviews)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Examples</th>
<th>Dimension of national discourse (see Ch.1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>NHS, monarchy, parliament, armed forces, BBC</td>
<td>Everyday/symbolic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traits/characteristics</td>
<td>Tolerant, reserved, inventive, sense of humour, polite, pessimism/cynicism, resilient</td>
<td>Self/Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material objects</td>
<td>Food (fish and chips, tea, curry, beer), red buses, ancient buildings, oak tree, pubs</td>
<td>Everyday/symbolic Temporal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td>Queen, Winston Churchill, Tony Blair, football hooligans/yobs, diversity of population</td>
<td>Temporal Everyday/symbolic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values</td>
<td>Democracy, respect for traditions, freedom of expression, sense of fair play</td>
<td>Self/Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Places</td>
<td>Countryside, Stonehenge, seaside, villages</td>
<td>Spatial Temporal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practices</td>
<td>Queuing, sport (football/cricket), binge drinking</td>
<td>Everyday/symbolic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>Weather/rain, history</td>
<td>Spatial Temporal Everyday/symbolic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As one of my respondents rightly pointed out this is a list of “standard replies” that
might well be dismissed as mere clichés or stereotypes. Yet because something has
become a cliché does not mean that we should ignore its resonance (especially if it is
employed unthinkingly) or the power it has to shape people’s definitions of themselves
and others. As Steve Reicher & Nick Hopkins write, “The very fact that some cultural products are familiar to all and constitute a part of what ‘everybody’ knows about the nation means that they are particularly powerful argumentative resources with which to ground one’s construction” (2001: 117).

The widespread acceptance, or apparent internalisation, of some of these stereotypes across broad swaths of the population can be examined with reference to a number of wider public surveys dealing with the subject of Britishness / Englisness that have been conducted recently. Indeed, the plethora of such surveys points to the transformation of a subject once largely beyond reflection, into a mainstream, public debate.

For instance, Tim Edensor has listed the responses people gave to the question, “What one thing best represents something good about Britain to you?” (2002: 175) which was used to generate a national ‘self-portrait’ in one of the zones of the now defunct Millennium Dome. Although this list represented a far wider “cacophony of voices, images and sensations” (ibid) it was still underpinned by some common patterns and themes, relating to the monarchy, warfare, the everyday (and in particular diet) and the countryside.

Many of my respondent’s suggestions also echo a YouGov Poll for the Daily Telegraph in 2005, which asked people ‘What defines Britain?’ and produced the following results (as the percentage of people who thought the phrases were important in defining Britain)

| British people’s right to say what they think | 61 |
| Britain’s defiance of Nazi Germany in 1940 | 59 |
| British people’s sense of fairness and fair play | 54 |
| The landscape of Britain | 53 |

Finally, for the purposes of this study, I want to refer to a research project undertaken by Ethnos (2005), on behalf of the Commission for Racial Equality, which was specifically designed to address the question of ‘What is Britishness?’ across as wide a range of ethnic groups as possible. Here again “a widely shared and nearly consensual representation of Britishness” (ibid: 19), featuring the monarchy, countryside,
queuing, sport, fairness, tolerance etc. (ibid: 34), was produced even as the different groups questioned their own degree of identification with Britain71.

There are a number of points arising from these examples that I want to consider, first, by noting how they lend weight to earlier theoretical approaches concerning the primary dimensions of national discourse. Subsequently, I will address the wider role that these sorts of representations might play in asserting and contesting a particular version of the nation and, as a result, categories of belonging and exclusion.

**Dimensions of national discourse**

Although every dimension of national discourse (Ozkirimli, 2005, Wodak et al, 1999) is well represented in Table 2, I would suggest that it is the way in which each inter-relates with the others that may provide a better understanding of how national discourse operates as a fairly integrated framework for making sense of processes, issues and interactions. In other words, because each particular feature generally operates across a number of the dimensions it is more likely to be viewed as self-evident and, hence, part of the routine fabric of what people know.

Here the concept of intertextuality might usefully be employed as it points to the ways in which different texts, symbols, utterances and practices refer to others and as a result become “constructed by that reference to other texts” (Mills, 1997: 154). Through their countless repetition across different (con)texts certain features become concretised in “inter-textual chains” (Phillips & Smith, 2002: 81) in the process being transformed into common sense knowledge. This “circulation of ideas and images ... provides a vast storehouse of inter-linked cultural forms, places, objects, people and practices” (Edensor, 2002: 187) that forms a relatively stable backdrop to everyday life.

For instance, the ‘weather’, on reflection, may seem a rather ludicrous symbol of a country given that everywhere ‘has’ weather (Billig, 1995: 116-117). Yet it is often routinely perceived and articulated in national terms across a range of different

71 A British identity was most likely to be rejected by all Scots and Welsh participants followed by the white English. It was seen as most relevant by ethnic minorities in England who viewed Britishness as “potentially inclusive and open to diversity” (Ethnos, 2005: 45) in contrast to Englishness, which was broadly connected with being ‘white’.  

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contexts as the following comment from one of my respondents illustrates, “you don’t get weather like this anywhere else in the world” (Newcastle College Group).

In fact, the weather in Britain, perhaps because it is so changeable, operates on an everyday level as a useful social facilitator (Fox, 2004: 26-29) allowing disparate individuals to engage with each other using a safe and mutually acknowledged form of “phatic communication” (Rothenbuhler, 1998: 107). Temporally, the weather is tracked by the Meteorological Office (in the UK) who produce daily, weekly and other periodic inter/national forecasts, which are represented spatially on weather maps. Similarly, periods of extreme weather affecting relatively specific places may be ‘overgeneralised’ (Schegloff, 1972: 87) into a national crisis and are then invariably examined in relation to other comparable historical episodes.

A similar discussion could be applied to the Queen who also operates as a national signifier across a range of dimensions; everyday/symbolic (on money/stamps), spatially (through official residences and ‘royal’ visits) and temporally (as the reigning monarch). Finally, the Queen, is also seen to ‘represent’ the nation either by standing in for the population as a whole on official visits and/or by embodying those characteristics or traits that are presumed to identify the British population (Self/Other).

However, while particular national signifiers, whether places, people or symbols, and those values and traits that they are perceived to embody, may become viewed by a substantial majority as largely axiomatic, the questions of who/what belongs to the nation and why are always part of an ongoing process of contestation. After all, these choices by definition exclude other possible selections and therefore the debate about what it means to be an authentic member of the nation both reflects and constitutes wider relations of power. As Philip Schlesinger writes, “national cultures are not repositories of shared symbols to which the entire population stands in identical relation. Rather they are to be approached as sites of contestation in which competition over definition takes place” (Schlesinger, 1991: 174). These processes of categorisation and exclusion, and the types of power structures that they underpin, are the subject of the next section.

*Which nation?*
The most obvious tension that such categorisations illustrate is the complicated relationship between British and English identity, which was discussed in Chapter 3 from a more macro perspective. Indeed, my intention in asking respondents to talk about things they associated with 'this country' was to allow them to express what this term meant to them (Condor, 2000). This approach drew on the work of those who had pointed out that for many in England, the terms British and English are conflated (cf Palmer, 2003: 428, Kumar, 2003: 1) and, as a result, used interchangeably.

Perhaps of most interest here is the fact that the majority of my interviewees took the question of 'this country' to be unproblematic listing a range of both popular English and British icons72. If we examine the broad categories identified in Table 2, it can be seen that at the institutional level, 'this country' is generally referring to Britain in the shape of the monarchy, armed forces, government, National Health Service (NHS) etc. However, many of the other categories, particularly places, practices and material objects, identify a distinctly English version of the nation73. For instance, cricket is a sport predominately played in England and very often linked to notions of fair play and politeness in the popular imagination (cf Fox, 2004: 244). It is very much a middle-class pastime (though also popular among some ethnic minorities), generally played by men and often associated with a rural setting. Therefore, cricket refers to a very particular category of English national identity, which is defined along specific racial, class, gender and spatial lines.

Similarly, the idea of the countryside, what the former British primer minister Stanley Baldwin referred to as 'this green and pleasant land, has, and continues to be, a powerful symbol of a particular middle-class English identity that underpins a nostalgic vision of a nation defined by village life, class hierarchies, stability (Wiener, 1981) and, particularly in an era of post-colonial migration, whiteness (Neal, 2006). Indeed, except for a few references to London, and some of the city’s iconic symbols e.g. red buses and black cabs, urban life is noticeable by its absence.

72 For those that did question the concept of 'this country', I generally attempted to ask what it meant to them (as I subsequently did at a later stage for all the groups). These discussions are explored in more detail in Chapter 7 in relation to the question of devolution.
73 A recent attempt (2006) by the (British) government's Department of Media, Culture & Sport to map the ICONS of English culture featured the following: cup of tea, fish and chips, red bus, stiff upper lip, the pub, the weather, cricket and a pint of beer (www.icons.org.uk).
The following extract from the group interviews provides a useful example of the ways in which both cricket and the countryside continue to operate as powerful signifiers in the articulation a particular version of the (white) English nation. It involved people, now living in a rural part of Somerset, who had previously bemoaned the transformations that were taking place in the cities, such as London, where they were born and brought up. This particular exchange was part of a wider narrative in which Lisa was talking about a visit made by a family of Indians to the National Trust facility she works at.

Lisa: It was delightful, I mean it was almost surreal because there they all were in their finery and they'd come to the country because the government told them they had to, so they thought, 'we ought to play cricket'.

Richard: And did they join the National Trust?

Adrian: That must have been the maximum they let in to Somerset that day! Twenty.

The intertextual reference to 'the government' in this extract almost certainly relates to a widely-reported study, which examined ways of encouraging ethnic minority groups to make greater use of leisure and recreation facilities in the countryside (Countryside Agency, 2000: 138). The impact of the reference in this context comes from the fact that Lisa is able (perhaps with the help of a news report) to transform "the language of official written documents into a version of popular speech" (Fairclough quoted in Mills, 1997: 157) in a way that shifts the meaning and effect of the report to reflect her own concerns. In this case, a powerful government seems to be telling ethnic minorities to go to the country thereby upsetting the 'natural' order of things.

In this case, the countryside again "represents a place of security away from the commonly perceived urban malaise of English cities which have, in the post-war period, become increasingly diverse (unEnglish) and synonymous with an undesirable black/Other presence" (Neal, 2002: 445). The Indians in Lisa story's are marked to the degree that their very presence is seen as 'surreal' while they are seen attempting to ape the true (white) countryside dweller by playing cricket. The irony of this is, of course, that cricket also remains a particularly powerful symbol of national identity in many of the former British colonies, including India.
The two comments in response to Lisa’s story also consolidate the idea that non-whites don’t belong, the first being a sardonic quip about whether ‘they’ joined the National Trust, the archetypal English white, middle-class, heritage organisation (Urry, 2002: 87, Askins, 2006). The second is slightly more obvious but achieves the same effect, (half) jokingly referring to the idea that limits are (or perhaps should be) set on the number of such ‘marked’ groups allowed into white bastions, such as Somerset. This final example shows the degree to which different places become associated with particular categories of people so that the presence of the ‘marked’ group in inappropriate areas becomes a form of “visual defilement” (Auburn & Barnes, 2006: 45) in what is seen “as a timeless white landscape” (Neal, 2002: 444).

*National cultural capital*

Another aspect of this process can be examined in relation to class distinctions, although in this case we are dealing with hierarchies of practice rather than questions of belonging per se. This comment from a member of the Bexley Group was quite typical;

*I think that these people .. um .. that go around, that, that have, that give that bad image of England, the football hooligans and the yobs, they are sort of tapping into something which they can associate with but I’m not, actually, actually, involved with myself*

It is the actions of a particular in-group (football hooligans and, to a lesser extent, chavs74) that makes some people ‘ashamed of being English’ and establishes a boundary between those who embody the desired values and traits of the idealised nation and those who remain suspect or derided, even as they are grudgingly accepted within the category of the in-group. Nobody, after all, is denying that these hooligans or yobs are English rather they are bemoaning the fact!

Here, we see how the apparently contrasting characteristics of politeness and yobbish behaviour can co-exist within the same category of belonging because they refer to specific groups occupying vastly different positions within the wider socio-political

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74 ‘Chav’ is a recent term used to pejoratively describe working-class people who are associated with excessive drinking and drug-taking, random violence, unemployment and a (perceived) lack of cultural mores (Hayward & Yar, 2006). As a respondent in the Swindon Group declared, with a heavy dose of irony “If you want to learn about England, chavscum.com”, a reference to a website dedicated to haranguing and lambasting working-class people in tracksuits.
hierarchy. Ghassan Hage has explored this idea by suggesting that within a national space different groups are perceived to be (and made to feel) "more or less national than others" (1998: 52). Hage argues that those groups who possess greater "national cultural capital" in relation to a whole host of "sanctified and valued social and physical cultural styles and dispositions" (ibid: 53) are better able to position themselves as the ultimate arbiters and managers of national values, traditions and, crucially, space. These discussions also illustrate the critical idea, raised in Chapter 1, that power/knowledge is productive. In this case, even the sub-ordinate, lower classes, by virtue of their acknowledged in-group status, can draw on this sedimented discourse as a means of differentiating themselves from other marked groups, who occupy far more precarious positions within England. This issue will be addressed in more detail in subsequent chapters, as these types of boundary-making processes are significant in positioning particular groups within the nation.

Observing these processes should not cause us to overlook the manifold ways in which such powerful formulations are resisted or rejected by different groups even as they define wider institutional narratives and arrangements. As Fox and Miller-Idriss observe, talk about the nation is important in showing how different groups may challenge "those variants traded in elite discourse" (forthcoming). For example, research undertaken by the polling group Mori indicates that many young British people reject what they call "the stiff upper lip code of old Britain" (2007: 7), viewing it as outdated and largely irrelevant to their own lives. This is also reflected in the call by the recent Commission on Community Cohesion to generate a more inclusive sense of national identity that "reflect[s] positively on the diversity of experience in Britain" (Singh et al, 2007: 48).

Having observed the manner in which many symbols and attributes associated with 'this country' privilege particular groups who look to secure or maintain their own position within society, I would like to shift attention slightly. In the next section, I will focus on two interactions that point to the ways in which the researcher also brings to the interview situation assumptions and background knowledge about these processes of categorisation. This provides further evidence of the routine manner in which national discourse informs common sense ways of understanding and talking about the world even for those looking to open up the subject to academic scrutiny!

**Drawing on 'shared' knowledge in the interview**
The first example comes from one of the smaller group interviews, involving just a husband and wife. The following exchange took place in response to my query about things they associated with ‘this country’.


Interviewer: McDonalds? OK. Steve? (South London Group)

The use of McDonalds, a global, American-based multinational, as a marker of Britain or England might usefully open up a whole host of discussions concerning, say, globalisation or cultural imperialism (Ritzer, 1993, 2002). However, for the purposes of this discussion I am more interested in focusing on my own response to this statement given that it takes the form of a query, followed by the qualifier, ‘OK’. Quite obviously, this indicates that the inclusion of McDonalds is somewhat problematic or, at least, surprising, notably in contrast to the other two signifiers, royal family and pubs, which are seen to be “non-controversial information” (Brown & Yule, 1983: 29).

Indeed, the following extract, which took place moments after the initial exchange, shows the degree to which Steve and myself draw on shared “implicit understandings” (Mann, 2006) to probe Janet’s statement.

Interviewer: McDonalds is an interesting one.

Steve: Yeah, I don’t understand, I don’t know where you get McDonalds from.

Janet’s response, which acts as a defence against ‘our’ (Steve and my) questioning, employs a number of strategies of justification that culminates in the following statement.

Janet: The, the great British pub or a cup of tea or .. um ... scones and tea and that sort of thing. That is a big British institution. And yes, McDonalds isn’t a British institution but if you think what effect it has had on the British economy and children in this country ...

Although the fact that Janet adopts a more conciliatory approach, drawing a more careful distinction between authentic British symbols and McDonalds is interesting in itself, what, I think, this issue highlights is the fact that I (as the interviewer) do not come to this discussion as a disinterested observer. Instead, “knowledge of the world and ... past experience” (Brown & Yule, 1983: 61) informs my ideas about what might
be appropriate to put in the category of English or British. It is when these expectations are not met, as in the case of McDonalds, that further explication is sought. In other words, a truly objective analyst (if there is such a thing!) would also want to question why the royal family and pubs, as well as, McDonalds represent ‘this country’. Therefore, it is not just my respondents who are illustrating the degree to which these features are taken for granted as indicative of nationhood but also myself.

In a similar vein, a member of the Swindon group offered the following in response to the same question;

Lee: For mine, it’s football, tea and racism.

Interviewer: Why?

Lee: Why? I haven’t lived here all my life so I came back to this country and that was one of the things that hit me.

Again, what I want to look at here is the interaction that takes place and the types of shared knowledge on which it is predicated. Although what Lee initially says is queried, there is no real indication as to whether I, again as the interviewer, am referring to any particular signifier, all three or any combination thereof. Instead, Lee assumes (quite rightly as it happens) that racism is the issue that I want him to elucidate rather than football or tea, which are taken as given by us both. As in the mention of McDonalds, in the example above, there is no reason why I shouldn’t ask for further clarification here. The choice of racism after all is very interesting both in itself and in contrast to other symbols of Britain/England, notably those it contradicts such as tolerance, fair play etc. However, this extract shows once again that both my respondents and I often drew on a similar set of background knowledge and assumptions pertaining to the nation, even if, as in this case, they were challenged. As Michael Billig writes,

one cannot step outside the world of nations, and ... rid oneself of the assumptions and common sense habits which come from living within the world. Analysts must expect to be affected by what should be the object of their study (1995: 37).

As I suggested earlier, this means acknowledging one’s own position within a wider national environment and the possible impact this might have on any analyses. It also
requires accepting that, in some cases, the ability to recognise particular nuances may 
be counter-balanced by the tendency to take other elements for granted.

A final point is worth noting in relation to this example, which is the fact that Lee 
considers racism to be a feature of 'this country' as a direct result of his experience of 
living overseas where he claims “there was none” and “you didn’t think about it”. 
Therefore, the definition of who ‘we’ are comes into focus when contrasted with the 
attitudes or practices of an ‘Other’.

In the next section, I will develop this idea albeit from a slightly different perspective 
by noting how individuals may adopt a more constructionist perspective when 
challenging what they perceive to be clichés about the nation and then, just as 
importantly, how the idea of the ‘Other’ is used to provide a more stable footing by 
re-defining ‘our’ identity.

Contesting clichés

In the following extract members of the Newcastle group open up to scrutiny one of 
the national signifiers that had been suggested, arguing that it does not capture the 
complexity of everyday life and those that move through it.

*Interviewer: Any places that are symbolic of this country?*

*Geoff: A village green in the Cotswolds or something. Cricket on the ... uh ...*

*Interviewer: Do you think that’s a fair representation?*

*Geoff: No, no. It’s a clichéd representation.*

*Alison: Yes.*

*Geoff: What would be a fair representation? I don’t know ...*

*Alison: There’s no one place is there ...*

The first thing to note here is the degree of intertextuality in the initial statement 
about village greens and cricket, an image and ideal that, as we have already seen, 
has been repeatedly utilised across the decades in relation to a heavily stereotyped 
vision of England. Another illustrative and widely publicised example comes from a 
speech in 1993 made by the then British Prime Minister, John Major, in which he, like
so many politicians of his era, was outlining his intention to protect Britain from the (perceived) ravages of European integration.

Fifty years from now, Britain will still be the country of long shadows on county [cricket] grounds, warm beer, invisible green suburbs, dog lovers and pool fillers - and as George Orwell said - 'old maids cycling to Holy Communion through morning mist' (quoted in Kumar, 2003: 227)

Major, unlike my discussants, was not treating these symbols in an ironic fashion and also discussed Britain in terms of primarily English exemplars (Billig, 1995: 102). The fact that members of the Newcastle Group (like so many of my other respondents) recognised this ‘ideal’ is significant in itself. However, of more interest here is the manner in which they reject this representation as fair and then go on to contrast the mythical with the reality they have observed.

Initially, Geoff offers, what he subsequently labels, a clichéd representation in answer to my query about national places. He draws on an image that is, to use Billig’s term, “unimaginatively familiar” (ibid: 103), but qualifies his own commitment to it with the phrase, ‘or something’. Here again, we can see that in the process of this interaction some degree of shared background knowledge informs what is being said. Geoff’s non-committal reply provokes a second query from myself - also fully aware of the clichéd nature of the statement both in this context and in general - in an attempt to get him to elucidate further.

Alison reinforces the overall sense of agreement between interviewer and interviewee by ‘begging the question’ (Sandford, 1972), a rhetorical flourish aimed at generating further consensus. The latter part of this exchange is far more reflexive and, in challenging the stereotype, provides a space for thinking about often taken-for-granted concepts in new ways (Gergen, 2001: 18). Indeed, Alison goes on to reject categories that “pigeonhole” and “caricature” groups as they prevent people from seeing “what it’s really like”. They then attempt to resolve this issue by celebrating this diversity as a feature of the country (see also Table 2) as the following extract demonstrates:

Alison: ... and actually it’s really like lots of different things isn’t it, in the end, isn’t it?
Geoff: But I think that's the reality, y'know, one of the reasons why it's probably a very good place to live is, is just the diversity and, y'know ...

Alison: Mmm.

Geoff: ... ... um ... the, the, y'know, there are a lot of cultures and there are a lot of environments ....

Alison: Yeah.

In this way the conversation moves full circle from one clichéd representation to another. Indeed, the lack of conviction in both Geoff and Alison's comments, which are punctuated by repetition, hesitations and stutters, seems to indicate a rather forced resolution to the problem that has been raised. Yet as the work of Henri Tajfel indicates, any problem in drawing a meaningful boundary around the in-group can often be resolved with reference to an 'Other' be it distant or proximal. Tajfel writes, categories “can help us to cope [but] only if fuzzy differences between groups are transmuted into clear ones” (1981: 132). In this case, the discussants shift towards a more stable footing by focusing on the apparent uniformity of life in other places, Saudi Arabia and the US are specifically mentioned, in order to demonstrate 'our' diversity.

We will return to the idea that realist forms of language or concepts are employed when seeking more secure ground shortly but, for now, I would like to draw together some of the most important points from these discussions 'about the nation'.

**Talk about the nation**

Perhaps the most obvious conclusion to be drawn from these debates is that most people do not find it particularly difficult to engage in such talk thereby illustrating the degree to which they take-for-granted that idea that the world consists of identifiable nations, each having 'things' that can be associated with them. This provides further evidence as to the degree to which national discourse remains sedimented for many in contemporary England. Subsequently it has been shown that significant numbers of both my group respondents and those questioned in wider public surveys offered similar or related signifiers when asked to categorise the British/English nation. Moreover, it was not simply that similar patterns emerged across diverse groups and contexts but that many, including the author, engaged with such questions by drawing on 'shared' background knowledge and assumptions. In this
way, “familiar particularities are employed to represent a commonly understood sense of ‘us’; and, because they are familiar, the representation is a repetition, which involves an imaginative act of unimagination” (Billig, 1995: 102).

The banality of these referents and the manner in which they are discussed should not disguise the fact that these processes of categorisation are rarely equitable, involving the articulation of particular subject positions that generally reflect wider power relations. As McCabe and Stokoe note, forms of categorisation are generally predicated on the boundary between normative and transgressive behaviour, which in turn informs a powerful and often highly regulated “moral order” (2004: 607). Therefore, the use of particular exemplars to define the in-group, invariably involves a concomitant process of exclusion, whereby those who do not, will not or cannot match the ideal become marginalized. In this respect, Hage’s concept of national cultural capital was introduced which posits a continuum along which different groups, possessing particular physical and cultural characteristics, are positioned in relation to their ability to “claim certain forms of dominant national belonging” (1998: 56). This process was usefully evidenced in relation to the position of certain minority groups whose skin colour was used to mark them as ‘Other’ (This idea will be explored in more detail in Chapter 6).

Such categories while often firmly established can never be closed down and the ongoing process of contestation that this involves again points to the idea that meanings are always more or less stable rather than permanently fixed. For instance, a number of individuals were able, and willing, to critique standard or official representations as stereotypes or clichés that failed to match their own experiences. However, whether such resistance is meaningful in and of itself will be linked to wider structural constraints and the relative status of those involved.

Finally, it is important to acknowledge the fact that even the fiercest debates over what it means to be, say, British or English rarely challenge the legitimacy of national discourse per se. This is a crucial point in relation to the wider thrust of this work and we can perhaps think about these discussions in terms of two broader levels, the second being deeper and as a result more stable.

The first level refers to “the arguments which arise within a particular common sense, as people debate about the common sense they share” (Billig et al, 1988: 17), in this
case who and what can be designated as belonging to the nation. This is a process that may invoke intense and apparently irresolvable disagreements (Coles, 2002), yet the existence of such opposing views while important in and of themselves in defining boundary markers, rarely challenge “the essence of the nation” (Kolsto, 2006: 678). In fact, such debates are likely to obscure other possible ways of conceptualising socio-political relations meaning that any challenges to a taken-for-granted world of nations remains largely unthinkable. Quite simply, debates over national categories presume the existence of nations (both ‘ours’ and ‘theirs’) and thereby help concretise both in the imaginations of many. As William Sewell observes, the “instability or unpredictability of [the] surface structures [may] actually reinforce ... the deeper structure” (1992: 26).

Notwithstanding these important points, some scholars have argued that talk about the nation represents a somewhat artificial way of garnering evidence about the routine (or otherwise) use of a national discourse. Therefore, such an approach may be of limited value in assessing the degree to which the nation is routinely utilised given that such discussions rarely feature outside of an ‘official’ interview context (Ethnos, 2005: 18). Therefore, I will now examine a different form of data, what Fox & Miller-Idriss label as ‘talk with the nation’ (forthcoming). These represent the moments or contexts when the nation is routinely utilised by individuals in the general flow of conversation in order to articulate or make sense of a particular issue or process. Interestingly, a number of these features have already been discussed in relation to the analysis of the media texts, indicating the extent to which they operate in a taken-for-granted manner across a range of everyday settings.

**Talking with the nation**

The first example I want to examine comes from the Liverpool Group. One of the group had been talking about his father’s positive relations in the 1950’s with his Irish neighbours. Another then related an ‘ironic’ story about Ireland concerning her husband’s family who had been “happy to get out .. because it was so backward and so poor”. In contrast, she and her husband had thought about moving to Ireland to live, as the following extract describes:

*Louise : We went back the following summer and, at the same time, Ireland had adopted the euro, they’d extended the DART from Dublin and improved the motorway network .... Ireland, I think, is, is, is a magical place in terms of what it’s
got to offer as a country for having beautiful countryside with a real sense of community and a very strong economy and I, I think if you look, sort of, the Irish approach compared to the English approach, we've got an awful lot to learn from our Irish cousins.

This is a prime example of the routine use of realist language in relation to the nation and a number of the micro features are worth exploring. First, the nation is anthropomorphised, through the use of metonymy (Wodak et al, 1999: 43-44), so that it is seen to act as a unified, independent agent; “Ireland had adopted the euro”.

The second feature is the use of deixis, “they’d extended the DART”, which also places the speaker in another identity category, later identified in national terms as English. Subsequently, Ireland is not only defined in spatial terms through an overgeneralization (“a magical place” etc) but also by contrasting different national approaches, the dimension of ‘Self/Other. Having drawn a boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’, Louise uses a family metaphor (“our Irish cousins”) to objectify the relationship between the two categories. In this way, “persons and nations become conceptually interchangeable [so that] personality and nationality are united in a single dialectical blur” (Ree, 1998: 85) making the latter seem both more concrete and autonomous. Many of these micro-features can also be seen in the following extracts, taken from across the group interviews:

Norman: When I first went to America, I saw all the policemen with a, a thing, y’know, across their body and a gun ....

Betty: They have that a lot in Italy.

Elizabeth: They have a lot of crime there, don’t they? (Manchester Group)

Steve: It’s because they had a bloody Swede in charge (Taunton Group)

Martin: The Welsh are quite unfriendly (Cirencester Group)

Don: In Spain, y’know, they, they’re all on the national health service and everything, the ex-pat community (South Shields Group)

Chris: That’s what the French ... call us, the whingers (South Shields Group)

Stuart: I think they all like to be quite separate, especially Scotland (Swindon Group)

Fran: It’s come out of our NHS budget to pay the French (Devon Group)
Fiona: I'd love to go to Spain or Australia or basically all the big places that I've never been too. Not like, like, yeah, Spain and Australia and all those type of places that are just amazing, I'd love to go there (Carlisle Group)

John: The English have been tolerant and they also drunk excessively, Tacitus records that, it comes right the way through history, excessive drinking (Hastings Group)

The fact that many of these extracts were accepted as common sense, so banal as be unworthy of comment illustrates, what Schutz terms, “the reciprocity of perspective” (quoted in Brown & Yule, 1983: 11). This is the idea that people commonly assume that those they interact with will share many of the same experiences and background knowledge as them. In this respect, each speaker is making the “pragmatic presupposition” (ibid: 29) that everyone present will understand the idea that there is a category group known as the Welsh who can be classified as ‘unfriendly’ or a place called Italy that can be identified by its crime rates.

Reproducing national contexts

As Brubaker et al (2006: 237) have pointed out, the human propensity to categorise is ubiquitous the use of national categories is not. Therefore we must continually pay attention to the discursive work that such markers undertake, reaffirming the resonance of a globe divided into concrete, pre-defined national entities for those that reference them. For instance, the commonsense use of national markers indicates the degree to which space (as in those ‘big places’) is understood in national terms. These examples do not however use nations as simple location markers but, through the use of metonymy, allow “a complex of ideas [to be] concealed in a simple description” (Higgins, 2004: 642). When somebody mentions France or Spain or Italy they are not simply identifying a particular place on the world map, they are also invoking the range of symbolic features that make the place and the people that live there meaningful in relation to ‘us’. As Michael Billig asserts;

This place has to be unimaginatively imagined and the assumptions of nationhood accepted, for the routine phrase to do its routine rhetorical business. Through this routine business, the nation continues to be made habitual, to be enhabited (1995: 107).
These routine processes help disparate people to orientate themselves through the articulation of a common framework of understanding. For instance, the comment about the "bloody Swede" only makes sense if the idea that the England football team lost because of the national identity of its manager is meaningful at all. Whether Steve was joking or not is beside the point, the fact that his comment generated widespread laughter indicates that all those present, myself included, drew on and, in the process, (re)produced a common sense national discourse.

Elsewhere, in constituting named countries as actors ("they all like to be separate, especially Scotland"), people are able to delimit, quantify and, as a result, make sense of a world of potentially limitless stimuli in a relatively consistent manner. Similarly, the use of a range of deictic terms, ("the National Health Service") allows the world of nations to be "presented as the objective world: the is so concrete, so objective, so uncontroversial" (Billig, 1995: 109). It is partly through these seemingly insignificant micro features of everyday language that individuals construct a sense of themselves and others. This position ties in with our earlier discussion of everyday life and the ways in which shared linguistic forms and the concepts that underpin them are important elements in sedimenting a taken-for-granted and ongoing sense of reality (Garfinkel, 2004: 53).

Finally, the comment from John (Hastings Group) is of particular interest in that he references current debates about heavy drinking in England and projects them back into the past in order to make sense of historical processes and peoples. Therefore, current practices defined in terms of national characteristics are used to claim an unbroken link to people living in Roman times who also (apparently) drank a lot. This is a clever rhetorical move as in defining the past in terms of the present it also objectifies those current understandings - English people are, and always have been, heavy drinkers -in a self-reinforcing loop75.

These examples again indicate the extent to which national discourse is routinely used to inform 'everyday' talk about both contemporary and historical processes. I would suggest that what is important here is not the fact that individuals always use these

75 What we need to ask here is not whether people in what is now England drank heavily but can we draw any links between the two periods given that the 'idea' of the English (as we now understand it) would have been unthinkable in Tacitus' time.
forms of language in relation to the nation, but that they draw on them with sufficient regularity, across a range of settings, that they come to inform a fairly stable framework that makes sense to disparate individuals, including those they have never met before. As we noted earlier, the role of institutions such as the media, education system, government and so on is also crucial in continuing to articulate (and constitute) forms of knowledge that are then used to justify and enforce particular social relations and orders.

In the next section, I want to shift focus by examining a number of cases that draw on conflicting discourses. Previous studies (cf Baumann, 1996, Madianou, 2007) have shown how people draw on particular discursive frameworks according to context and need, utilising particular rhetorical strategies to manage counter-arguments. My analysis will provide further evidence for this important idea but also suggests that because some frameworks are seen to be part of what ‘everybody knows’, they may operate as particularly powerful sense-making devices, notably when dealing with complex or challenging issues.

The first extract concerns an instance where a national framework is initially rejected as a means of making sense of an issue, while the second explores the attempts of a group to respond to and ultimately resolve a question that directly challenges any taken-for-granted notion of (national) identity and belonging.

Moving between discourses

The following extract comes from the Newcastle Group and is preceded by one of the men (John) talking about his experience at university living on the same street as a number of Asian families. John comments that initially it was “quite difficult” but that over a period of time he and his friends got to know their neighbours and eventually got “on talking terms with them”. As a result of this, he was able to observe the ‘commonalities’ they shared, which included “certain moral standards” and a respect for the “family thing”. Lesley, drawing on this notion of commonalities, makes the following comment:

Lesley: I think John’s sort of touched on, what, what ... um ... my opinion is, ‘cos I, I kind of think, y’know, culture and race and all that sort of thing are a bit of a red herring, y’know ... And ... um ... I think for every people the world over, I think people are, that people are people and I don’t know think they’re that different ... um ... wherever they are.
By drawing on the "traditions of universalism" (Billig et al, 1988: 36) Lesley is able to gain the moral high ground by portraying herself as disinterested and largely removed from more narrow forms of parochialism. The use of the well-worn terms 'red herring' (commonly understood as an attempt to divert attention away from an issue) and "people are people" (an intertextually rich cliché) are particularly significant in categorizing Lesley (note the repetition of "I think") as someone who can move beyond sectional interests.

Shortly afterwards, the following exchange took place between Lesley, her husband Geoff and Alison (John’s husband):

Geoff: But ... what I’m saying is, if you had 10 people in the same room and five of them were American and five of them were British then the Americans may go one way and the British go the other, that’s where it’s quite interesting ...

Lesley: But one’s not any better than the other is it, so, why would, why would ... um ... your ... where you come from makes no difference.

Geoff: (Laughs) Where you come from makes no difference but it does help you ...

Alison ... influence ...

Geoff: .. understand why you’re here and why you do what you do, doesn’t it? We’re getting very ethereal, oh dear ... we’ve changed the direction of the conversation.

This is a good example of two people drawing on competing discourses in order to account for individual motivations and actions. Geoff argues that national traits are important because they can help you understand why people behave as they do, while Lesley draws on a more cosmopolitan discourse, which emphasizes commonalities over difference.

At the risk of over analysing this episode (Brown & Yule, 1983: 12), and ignoring the possible dynamics of a married couple debating in a semi-public forum, the cosmopolitan discourse that Lesley articulates is the more socially acceptable position to hold, notably for middle-class liberals in Britain (cf Billig et al, 1988: 101-106). Therefore, this is also a useful example of an inter-action in which an individual is required to manage a "dilemma" when debating an issue (Billig et al, 1988). This is the idea that people must attend to potential counter-arguments when putting forward a particular viewpoint (See Chapter 1).
Consequently, as his wife has adopted the more ‘enlightened’ perspective, Geoff is required to manage his own arguments as a means of inoculating himself against any potential accusations of prejudice. First, he suggests that national differences may be “quite interesting” before (laughingly) agreeing with his wife by repeating her statement. He then posits a question as a means of seeking agreement for his own position and finally defuses the situation by claiming that they have moved away from a rational discussion by “getting very ethereal”. As a result, what we see is the “general concern to avoid the imputation of a stake - that is, of a potentially prejudicial interested perspective” (Condor, 2000: 187).

Lesley’s rejection of a national framework in this context is interesting as a form of “impression management” (ibid: 175), as by presenting herself as above any narrow-minded beliefs she forces those she is interacting with to carefully formulate their own claims. However, individuals are more than able to shift between discourses and this may involve them adopting contradictory positions as they struggle to make sense of particular issues. For instance, contrast Lesley’s articulation of a cosmopolitan discourse above with the following extract, uttered in the context of a wider debate about Europe:

Lesley: I think it goes back to the, sort of ... of like attracting like doesn’t it? There’s more, there’s more in common with America, I mean, we never liked the French did we?

(GENERAL LAUGHTER)

John: Well, some people do.

Lesley: Well (unclear) I do like them, I do like the French but I think they’re jolly odd. Y’know, when you, when you consider how, I mean, they’re on the doorstep but really, y’know, very little in common considering, y’know, America is what, five hours away, y’know, you can go to America and, y’know, sort of, y’know, absorb all, y’know, their lifestyle no problem. But you go to France and it’s a different world altogether.

This extract shows the same individual drawing on a national discourse, once more utilising some of the features such as deixis and metonymy that transform nations into concrete, unified entities, articulated in terms of traits (‘they’re jolly odd’) and practices (‘their lifestyle’). Furthermore, what Lesley is trying to make sense of here is the contrast, she perceives, between the physical distance and the ‘cultural’ distance that separates Britain from America and France respectively. Drawing on a
national discourse enables her to resolve this particular conundrum in the process employing a whole raft of realist language in order to make her point.

The extent to which Lesley struggles to articulate her position, evidenced by the number of false starts and hesitations, is also of interest here. This type of repair work, no doubt in response to John's comment and the general laughter, is probably aimed at deflecting any possible accusations of prejudice (however unlikely), thereby tempering the effect of her initial comment about 'the French'. Again we can see the "ambivalence ... between the universalism of Enlightenment themes and the particularism of national ones, with the latter needing to avoid the taint of 'prejudice' as defined by the former" (Billig et al, 1988: 105). Incidentally, these types of comments about the French are widespread within British/English popular culture and are another prime example of intertextuality across decades if not centuries (see Garland, 2004: 84, Rogers, 2004).

These two examples point to the fact that people undoubtedly do draw on non-national discourses as part of their everyday lives according to context and need. In the first instance, it might be argued that the more 'enlightened perspective' that Lesley adopts is not only socially desirable but also doesn't cost anything in terms of managing her stake. When she is dealing with an issue that matters to her own sense of self, her category group's relations with distant 'Others', it is a embedded and accessible national framework that is used "as a means of knowing and evaluating others" (Hearn, 2007: 666).

In other words, it is the banality of national discourse that makes it a particularly powerful and often appealing resource that can be used, almost without a second thought, to render salient issues that are meaningful to one's own life (This idea will picked up in Chapter 8 when examining how people talk about global travel and their engagements with 'other' cultures).

What should ultimately concern us is when such competing discourses are employed and how individuals strive to manage or resolve any dilemmas that emerge. The next section provides a further example of the ways in which people move between competing discourse but also attempt to secure a more stable footing by drawing on established frameworks of meaning.
The following extensive exchange featured members of the Surrey Group, a retired couple and their son and daughter-in-law. Doreen and Roger, who are both in their sixties, had been describing a recent holiday they had taken in the north of England and the sorts of people they had encountered. This story was used to prompt a discussion about what different people living in England have in common, which, in turn, produced a reflexive and dynamic account of the multiple sources of identity that individuals respond to, and rely on, as they move through their lives. In the final part of the extract, there was a dramatic shift in emphasis as one member of the group suddenly focused on the problems posed by external ‘Others’, almost certainly as a means of drawing more concrete, and therefore secure, boundaries between them and us.

Doreen: I mean when I speak to a Yorkshire-person and realise they’re English, and when I speak to someone who comes from Tyneside and I realise they’re English ... LAUGHS .. and then I think, well, you know, it, it gives you a funny sort of feeling.

Roger: It does because the thing is you cannot .. I mean with a lot of these different dialects, dialects and accents and things like that ... um .. although they’re speaking English or British ....

LAUGHS

Roger: ... or whatever you like to call it, you can’t understand ‘em.

Interviewer: Yeah.

Roger: Y’know? I find it very, very confusing.

Me: Yeah.

Roger: Very confusing. But, but the thing is, the trouble was when Scotland wanted to go independent, Wales wanted to go independent and everything like that, I mean, the thing is, that they were trying to disintegrate their .. y’know, like their British culture and, the thing is, I think this made people say, well, the Scots wanna be on their own, the Welsh wanna be on their own, so we’re English and that’s it.

Interviewer: So what makes the Yorkshire-person and the person from Lincoln and the person from Cornwall and the person from London, what, what’s that Englishness, what, what, what binds them together?

Doreen: Well, that’s what I’m wondering because I think we’re, we’re sort of regionalised now .. um .. the Yorkshire people, y’know, sort of really do pounce on what they call the Southern accent because they really think well you’ve got it good down here. You’re from the South, you’re alright. And therefore you’ve
got a division because of that. They don’t realise that .. um ... we, we may have more but we’re having to work harder to keep up with it all. So, it’s. it’s all becoming very confusing.

Angela: I mean, I think every country to a certain extent is very regionalised as well ...

Doreen: Yes. Even France, yes.

Angela: ... or even say Australia and America, I think that’s quite natural, that that will happen anyway.

Interviewer: Yeah.

Brian: But I, I think that’s why people feel that it’s so important to have their identity because I still feel that even though, as you say, Yorkshire, Cornwall, London, they’re all English, but I still consider that they’re very insular from each other and they’re not integrated. Although they’re all English, they’re not integrated which I think, which is why I think it’s still important for people to have, hang on to some kind of ... um ..

Angela: ... like you said, you’re a Londoner or whatever ....

Brian: That’s right.

Angela: I was just going to say, one thought that strikes me is part of identity or people need to identify with something because they need to have a purpose and they need to feel they belong because that, I think that’s part of being human, like they like to identify with a religion, it, it helps them to have a purpose and to justify why they’re alive and I think that’s maybe part of life, why you do need to identify with something, whether it’s with a football team, a country, a religion or, or something. I think that is very important to people and maybe that’s why they do re, regionalise themselves and things because it just makes them feel that they do belong and feel part of something.

Brian: I think it’s also almost like a comfort zone, like when you were born, your comfort zone is your mum and dad ...

Angela: Mmm.

Brian: .. and when you get older, your comfort zone has to move, I think to other things, like ... er .. your girlfriend or your boyfriend or your wife or your husband ...

Angela: Mmm.

Brian: .. or whatever. Y, to .. um .. be with someone and ... um .. sort of identify yourself with things as you move on. And as you move on in life I would say that you identify with different things, as you move on.

Doreen: And I think that is the problem with ... um .. it, it, it’s not their colour that identifies them but it is their loyalty to this country, that identifies them. .. um .. and I remember working with a girl who was working part-time as a dental nurse but she was in agricultural college. This girl, V, who was ... um ....
they, they, they were West Indian and ... um ... she suddenly became a totally
different person ... um ... there was no loyalty to this country coming from her.
As far as she was concerned this country got where it got through treading on
the backs of the, their empire, which she blamed us for. And she said now, we
are taking back what you took from us. And I've never been so shocked in all my
life. This person was a friend and she turned on me because of all these political
issues. And it made me realise that it goes very, very deep. The feeling of what
our empire, how our empire grew and how we got our power ... um ... a lot of, a
lot of ... um ... a lot of foreign people, y'know, they feel that, they feel that we
shouldn't have what we have and whatever we've got they want some of it. And
I feel we're being taken over. I feel very much in this past ten years, we are
being taken over.

Initially, the question of what unites all the different people in England, with their
varying accents and different outlooks, is quite disconcerting and is managed, at least
initially, by the others with a statement, met with broad general agreement, that
regionalisation is not only common in England but also America, Australia and “even
France”. Angela then continues this more reflexive engagement by arguing that people
need to identify with something, “whether ... a football team, a country, a religion or,
or something”, in order to give their life purpose. Here national identity is not seen as
being particularly important or the overriding focus for loyalty but as one of many that
people can draw on as they move through their lives.

Interestingly, Brian then develops this argument in relation to the idea of a “comfort
zone” that is initially provided by familial relations and then wider processes of
identification with “different things”. Whilst continuing to offer a nuanced account of
the multiple sources of identification that individuals may draw on, Brian also crucially
points to their importance in generating, what we might call, psychological stability.

This need to identify with ‘different things’ as a means of generating ‘comfort’ or
security also finds an echo in Zizek's discussion of the national ‘Thing’ (1993). Drawing
on insights from Lacanian psychoanalysis, Zizek suggests that the unique set of
properties that make up the specificity of ‘our’ nation are seen to be generated by an
indefinable Thing. This Thing “is a fantasy of consistency and order, a fantasy that
behind the numerous rituals and cultural patterns of life there is some structuring
agent, in this case the essential nation” (Finlayson, 1993: 155). Furthermore, this
‘Thing’ must be protected from the threat of the ‘Other’. This is an idea that is
powerfully illustrated by Doreen, in the final part of the extract, when she
dramatically shifts the terms of the debate to focus on this threat in relation to internal ‘others’.

On my first reading of this interview, I had briefly noted Doreen’s comment and placed it under the broader issue of ‘immigration and multiculturalism’. Yet the power of this statement comes from looking more closely at the overall context of the discussion. The group had been trying to deal with what is an unusual and problematic question and had attempted to provide a response with recourse to a strategy that defined identity as flexible and multi-dimensional.

Doreen’s contribution is to transform what had been a fairly reflexive and open discussion into an attack on non-white people for their perceived lack of “loyalty to this country”. Moreover, this argument was quickly picked up by the other discussants in a welter of anti-immigration rhetoric as well as (regrettably) an interviewer eager to pursue this new line of enquiry.

However, the discursive shift which takes place here is crucial as it points to both the problem of actually addressing what constitutes the ‘we’ category and the means by which a more stable footing is sought by defining ‘us’ in relation to a racialised ‘Other’. This allows the group to bring the ‘fuzzy frontiers’ of ‘our’ identity (Cohen, 1994) back into sharp focus.

National discourse as ‘terra firma’

The above extracts draw together a number of the ideas that have been identified as particularly relevant to the discussions in the second part of this chapter. Firstly, it has been noted that while people are able and willing to draw on non-national discourse by, for example, probing the taken-for-granted notions of who ‘we’ are and what ‘we’ represent, there seems to be a concomitant tendency to eventually seek more solid ground as a strategy to either manage dissent or seek clarity. This can be usefully tied in with the earlier discussion about constructionist and realist forms of language being used as ‘cultural resources’, utilised according to context and need. To quote Kenneth Gergen,
Constructionist discourse often functions ... a[as a] liberating agent, challenging the taken-for-granted and opening new realms of comprehension and action. Yet, in doing so it also undermines the legitimacy of precious traditions, along with practices of complex co-ordination and dispositions of mutual trust (emphasis added, 2001: 18)

It may be then that a more reflexive and questioning outlook eventually necessitates a search for more solid ground simply because it opens up to scrutiny forms of knowledge and imagination that are ontologically valuable. That is, to wonder or question about what 'binds' English people together generates a feeling of discomfort as it begins to undermine one's own sense of self and place.

Based on my empirical data the search for terra firma is often grounded in talk about both internal and external 'Others', where forms of realist language can be usefully employed, drawing on deixis, location formulations and personification. The fact that national discourse is so routinely utilised and articulated across so many fields of institutional and daily life means that it offers a point of anchorage or security, notably with regard to particularly problematic issues or dilemmas. In many cases people draw on this discourse in a routine and un-reflexive manner. Surrounded by banal national signifiers, they are by and large not required to think about what such statements really mean or how they obscure the lived experience of different peoples. However, when confronted by difference or a challenge to this taken-for-granted framework (including a researcher asking questions) then a more reflexive engagement may follow.

For instance, it might be argued that Doreen and her husband, in going on holiday 'up north' (see above), and moving beyond the immediate realm of the known and habitual, were confronted with difference (in the form of accents and attitudes) that challenged their idea of a common English identity. It is difficult to assess the degree to which such encounters unsettle habitual ways of thought or action beyond the immediate context and perhaps a re-telling here and there with family and friends. It is likely that such moments fade as daily routines take over, only to be recalled when faced with a similar problematic or, as in this case, when asked directly. However, when such discrepancies cannot be explained away or come to inform daily experience
that they may present an ongoing issue. This was discussed in Chapter 1 as a more sustained challenge to an established field of doxa.

At some times and in some places, thinking about these issues in a more critical manner may, of course, provide a sense of liberation, allowing individuals to challenge what previously had been considered an onerous or limiting framework (See Chapter 8 for a useful example from my own data). Yet, in others this level of scrutiny may be somewhat troubling causing individuals to seek out new ways of reasserting formerly taken-for-granted concepts or relations. In outlining these two opposing positions it is likely that most people will shift between them in relation to context, need and wider structural constraints. These conditions and the responses they provoke will be the subject of subsequent chapters.

**Summary**

This chapter has been primarily concerned with evaluating the degree to which national discourse continues to inform everyday conversation and news reportage in England in an era that has been characterised by an increasing intensity of global flows and the concomitant threat to established forms of (national) organisation and imagination. In examining contrasting data sets, I have shown how at different levels of society national discourse is routinely used in order to articulate and make sense of issues and processes. At the micro-level, the consistent use of a range of linguistic feature, such as deixis, metonymy and location markers, has been identified across a range of (con)texts.

These routine phrases contribute to the unimaginative (re)presentation of nations as concrete, unified entities and define place, self and other in national terms. Through this process, “we are unmindfully reminded who ‘we’ are and where ‘we’ are. ‘We’ are identified without even being mentioned” (Billig, 1995: 109). Such realist forms of language, and the concepts that underpin them, emphasise unity, coherence and consistency across space and time. They form a complex, inter-locking framework, “forged out of a huge catalogue of intertextual reference points” (Edensor, 2002: 33) that (re)produce the nation as if it is an actually existing entity.

Crucially, as the work of Schutz, Garfinkel and others suggests, it is these micro-features that are vitally important in creating meaningful and relatively stable forms
of social reality. Of particular significance here is the extent to which individuals successfully orientate themselves in and move through the world based on the assumption that others 'like them' will possess similar forms of common knowledge. For instance, this can be seen at the institutional level where media producers routinely let a national context stand in for the context thus privileging particular stories about those 'like us', identifying people and places in national terms and even assigning motivation on the basis of national traits and predilections.

The two different kinds of talk, about and with the nation, have also been used to provide further insights into the functioning of national discourse, notably as it generates particular subjectivities linked to relations of power. My respondent's talk about the nation pointed to the ways in which particular versions of x or y nation - generally associated with dominant groups who are seen to possess greater national cultural capital - become privileged over time and concretised through inter-textual chains. However, even where such processes of categorisation are critiqued they rarely challenge the primacy of national discourse per se. In other words, these debates are about content not underlying structure.

When discussing more general issues, a national framework was seen to offer a particularly powerful heuristic because it continues to be so securely embedded in the realist language and routine aspects of daily life. This does not presume that people are unable to draw on other discourses according to need and context, merely that particular discursive forms may offer a more stable footing and hence psychological relief because they are woven into the fabric of daily life, making them both accessible and part of what 'everyone knows' (Finlayson, 1998b: 152-153). Therefore, rather than conceptualising national discourse as simply banal in places such as England, attention should be paid to how such discursive forms are continually and often unthinkingly utilised in routine ways, for what purposes and at whose benefit and cost.

In Chapter 6, we will examine how this national discourse, sedimented through an interlocking network of banal language forms, social practices and symbols, provides a taken-for-granted framework for making sense of broader structural changes at the socio-economic and political level. In particular, the subjects of immigration and multiculturalism are often articulated in relation to a common sense understanding of a world defined in terms of national spaces and cultures. As a result such processes
come to be viewed by many as threats to the sanctity, fixity and homogeneity of the nation. Here, as established and often prized identity formations and social practices come to be scrutinised by and subject to challenge from (perceived) ‘Others’ and liberal elites, there is a concomitant attempt made to restructure and sharpen the boundaries between in and out-groups as a means of managing these transformations.
Chapter 6: ‘Aggressively defensive’ - Managing perceived threats to the nation

In Chapter 3, it was noted that the frontiers of British identity (Cohen, 1994) had shifted over time in relation to processes of colonisation and the presence of particular groups within Britain and that in a post-war era race was primarily used to define and maintain boundaries between in and out-groups (Gilroy, 1987, Paul, 1998). The drawing of boundaries between groups on the basis of racial and, increasingly, religious differences, was also identified across many of the group interviews and particular examples will form the starting point for this analysis.

However, as Ghassan Hage suggests these categorisations need to be understood in terms of their function. In other words, "they are categories of everyday practice [designed] ... to make ... sense of, and to interact with, the world" (1998: 31) and this idea can only be fully explicated in relation to the functioning of national discourse at the current time. Such an approach will specifically draw on a number of the concepts introduced in the theoretical chapters, including de/sedimentation, the domesticated ‘Other’ and ontological security.

In particular, the concept of de/sedimentation will be utilised as a means of contextualising these debates in relation to wider structural transformations. This is the idea that all discourses, no matter how objectified, are always being challenged by other possible ways of making sense of social identities and relations. However, at particular times and places “the field of doxa ... that which is taken-for-granted” (Bourdieu, 2006: 166) becomes subject to sustained scrutiny, precipitating a crisis. By using this approach, it is possible to see how many of these debates can be viewed as attempts to re-sediment a national framework even as individuals are required, in practice, to attend to counter-arguments, what was earlier labelled as “dilemmatic thinking” (Billig et al, 1988). Both the nation’s social resources, jobs, welfare, housing etc, and culture/values were perceived to be under threat at this time and the manner in which arguments relating to each were justified will be of particular interest.

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77 This term, used by one of my interviewees in relation to immigration, echoes Edward Said’s conceptualisation of those migrant communities who have limited access to economic or social capital: “With very little to possess, you hold on to what you have with aggressive defensiveness” (quoted in Hannerz, 1996: 105). Ironically enough, in this case, many of the individuals making such claims would be seen as fairly privileged within the context of wider British society.
Interestingly, while some individuals expressed concerns about these threats by referencing normative values, it was generally in relation to everyday contexts and practices that most people experienced and debated them. This will be used to lend weight to the earlier discussion concerning the importance of daily micro-practices to the underpinning of an ongoing and stable sense of self and place.

Finally, it should be noted that although a number of media texts will be featured in order to illustrate how similar arguments can be found in different locales a systematic analysis is beyond the scope of this work.

*The same old story?*

The first point to make in relation to these discussions is that the subjects of immigration, multiculturalism and political correctness were generally raised in response to questions such as, “what has changed in this country in the past decade?” and/or “what do you dis/like about this country?” In some cases, it would be fair to say that these subjects dominated the interview to the extent that it was difficult to get the participants to talk about anything else.

In terms of broader content, it is possible to apply the findings of earlier studies that have examined the processes by which non-white settlement has been defined as a threat to an indigenous, white culture (cf Barker, 1981, Gilroy, 1996, Kushner, 2003, Kundnani, 2002, 2003, Schuster & Solomos, 2004, Hewitt, 2005). Many of the group discussions followed a well-established pattern with the majority’s self interest first being denied with reference to both historical examples of welcoming ‘genuine’ migrants and the perceived ‘national’ values of tolerance, fair play, civility and so on (discussed in Chapter 5 but see Kushner, 2003 for a useful overview). This, in turn, allowed distinctions to be drawn between genuine and bogus migrants, with the latter being demonised and posited as a threat to the country (Kundnani, 2001, 2003). Often during these discussions there was a degree of slippage from non-white migrants per se to ‘ethnic’ minorities in general so that “Blackness and Englishness are constructed as incompatible, mutually exclusive identities” (Gilroy, 1996: 357).

The fact that a considerable amount of the group interview data replicated these studies is significant in that it shows how resilient these narratives have become. However, in examining these processes of ‘othering’, I also want to explore the idea
that it is only with reference to a *taken-for-granted* national framework that the marking of certain groups as unwelcome or threatening can be justified (Hage, 1998).

In the following section I want to examine a number of examples from the group interviews not only to illustrate how racial categories continue to be used in marking out who 'really' belongs in England but to also explore what these processes are designed to achieve.

**Un/conditional belonging**

In the previous chapter, it was argued that certain groups within England are perceived to be, and made to feel, "more or less national than others" because they embody, or otherwise, the "sanctified and valued social and physical cultural styles and dispositions [that constitute]... national cultural capital" (Hage, 1998: 52-3). The following examples show that while different 'marked' groups are seen to possess greater or less cultural capital, race continues to be used to identify 'otherness' per se in relation to the default category of whiteness.

The South Shields group focused on Bangladeshis as the marked category who were seen to possess the least cultural capital because they could not or would not integrate. My respondents also pointed out that Hindu families that they knew who had "fully integrated into British society" were worried that "there will be racial tension probably in the future and they [white people] won't say, 'are you a Muslim?' they're just going to say, you're black and that's [their] ... great concern". In this case, it can be seen that even becoming 'fully integrated' is not enough to enable these Hindu families to really belong during times of increasing tension because of their physical appearance. This is also where the notion of civic and ethnic nationalism may have some theoretical purchase as it points to the ways in which groups within the same state are differentially defined through everyday popular conceptions of the nation, even where they have been officially recognised as citizens (Wodak et al, 1999: 189). Put simply, the granting of a passport and other rights of citizenship (civic) does not automatically mean that the individual is recognised by those groups who, in possessing greater national cultural capital, are able to define themselves as unconditionally belonging to the nation (ethnic).
This dichotomy is also evidenced by members of the Hastings Group when talking about their neighbours who are just about allowed into the category of English when asked directly.

Paul: I, I, I mean, their children, for example, will go in. They are not going to look at the Urdu part of it ‘cos their ... they've grown up ... they are more or less ....

Heather: English.

Paul: ... English. If you want to put ...

Interviewer: More or less?

Paul: More or le .... w, w, well, yeah, more or less.

Interviewer: What brings someone from being more or less to being ... English?

Paul: It's good, I know, you picked out a very .... I, I, I've used ... uh ... you picked up on a point, I .... You've got to accept them as being English.

In this case, Paul and Heather are able to consider their neighbours as English because they possess sufficient cultural capital, with language skills, accent and participation in Christmas celebrations also mentioned. However, this possibility presents Paul with a dilemma, evidenced by the range of false starts, hedges and pauses as he tries to provide an ‘appropriate’ answer to my final question. He is aware that, in this context, any reference to skin colour would not only contradict previous statements but also mark him out as unreasonably prejudiced. Having struggled to articulate his position, the deictic term ‘them’ in the final phrase is particularly telling as even when offering a grudging acceptance of his neighbours’ status, Paul still recreates a marked boundary between those who really belong and those who “you’ve got to accept”.

This type of comment offers further evidence that race is a crucial element in assigning, and recognising, national cultural capital78. However, the significance of these arguments can only be explicated if we focus not only on the types of people that are seen to un/conditionally belong, and on what basis, but also what they are seen to belong to and why this matters.

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78 This does not mean that these categories are always associated with skin colour. For example, Allan Findlay and his colleagues (2004) have noted that English people living in Scotland are often positioned as the ‘marked’ category as a result of their accent. Indeed, a number of those interviewed actually identified themselves with Scotland, having living their for the majority of their lives, and found it incredibly frustrating to be labelled as ‘Other’ on this basis (ibid: 75).
The right to manage national space

This idea can be opened up in relation to the following extract, which offers a powerful echo of the ‘cricket test’ first posed by the Conservative MP Norman Tebbit 25 years ago (See Chapter 3).

The biggest thing which we find as a bugbear in this country, well I find it, is that when you get an international cricket match against England and Pakistan, then the true loyalties of your country are reflected ... and we’ve got far more Pakistani people who are quite proud to put T-shirts on their back of their own country, their own flag, but yet they’re living in this England (Manchester Group)

Here again international sport is used to test national loyalties because it crystallises more complex issues into a relatively straightforward choice. Yet only certain groups in England continue to be subject to such questioning. For example, there have been no calls for Irish or Australian migrants now living in Britain to support the domestic nations or for British migrants to follow their ‘host’ country’s sporting teams. One feature, in combination with the vivid range of deictic language, is particularly significant. The term “we’ve got ...” again constructs powerful boundaries between self and other but it is the fact that those excluded are defined as a possession or, as we shall see, something that must be managed that I want to focus on here as it raises two crucial points.

The first is that an undesirable ‘Other’ can only be defined and monitored within an identifiable, bounded space. In other words, it is only with reference to “this England” that the presence of “Pakistani people” can be defined as a problem. This argument also applies to the wider question of migrant numbers, long a feature of political and media debates and also raised in a large number of the group interviews, which has frequently been studied in terms of racial categories.

Yet as Ghassan Hage suggests the motivation for wanting to delimit migration cannot only be understood as a form of racist practice (1998: 32-33). Hage writes, “concepts such as ‘too many’ are meaningless unless they assume the existence of a specific territorial space ...[Therefore, while] the evaluation of too many ... [may] embody some form of racist belief, [it is] primarily [about] spatial management” (ibid: 37-38), which in the contemporary era is underpinned by national “modes of thinking” (ibid: 32). Drawing attention to the manner in which such formulations are underpinned by
national discourse is not meant to deny the significance of racist categories, rather it offers a means of investigating when and how the “interconnection of race and nation ... defines the terms of ... belonging” (Back, 2007: 43).

The second point to make is that the argument that there are ‘too many’ depends on the presence of two distinct groups, those who feel entitled to make such judgements as well as the ‘Others’ who are subject to this managerial gaze (Hage, 1998: 44-46). Put simply, it is those who unquestioningly believe, and are treated as if, they ‘really’ belong that are able to position themselves as the rightful arbiters and managers of national culture and space.

Likewise, the consequences of this need to be explored as an expression of power relations, notably in terms of the subjectivities they produce. The earlier quote from the South Shield group pointed to the uncertainty that certain groups feel as a result of their marked position, particularly during crisis periods. Alternatively, those who are recognised as having a legitimate entitlement to judge who and what is appropriate within the bounded territory of the nation may gain an important sense of identity and place, which can be used to anchor them ontologically.

In the rest of this chapter, I want to draw on the work of Ghassan Hage by focusing on the extent to which topics such as immigration and multiculturalism are made meaningful and articulated in national terms, whilst also observing how specific membership categories are generated (1998: 32). In the first place, the question of ‘how many’ will be unpacked in relation to the idea of the domesticated ‘Other’ before examining in more detail how perceived threats to the nation are debated and justified.

*The undomesticated ‘Other’*

The assumption that some people within the nation can evaluate ‘how many’ also implies that there is an acceptable level of ‘just right’ as well as the possibility of ‘not enough’ (Hage, 1998: 37). As a result some degree of diversity or sharing can be welcomed, although there is a limit beyond which these differences cannot be tolerated. In these cases, as Anne Phillips writes “toleration is perceived as non-egalitarian, resting in some way on a distinction between majority norms and minority deviance, and incorporating some implied preference for a particular way of life” (1994: 79).
A sense of control or agency is at the heart of these debates and this is where the concept of the domesticated 'Other' may have particular theoretical purchase. This concept, briefly flagged in Chapter 2, challenges the common perception that it is "the presence of otherness per se which is problematic" (Morley, 2000: 223) within a delimited space. Instead, we need to emphasise "the necessity of the Other to the functioning of dominant forms of life, and of how that otherness is kept in its place, rather than necessarily being entirely excluded" (ibid).

As the previous chapter illustrated, the 'Other' plays a significant role in allowing people to make sense of their own identity and place, notably when reflecting on the features that bind together those disparate individuals who are presumed to constitute the in-group. However, these 'Others' must be carefully positioned or domesticated if they are not to threaten the homely space of the nation. This is particularly true for those proximal 'Others' that possess some forms of national cultural capital but whose loyalty or status is often the subject of ongoing scrutiny (Gilroy, 1987, 1996). These individuals "are not unfamiliar people but they cross or break the dividing line of dualism, they are neither us nor them. [They] poison the comfort of order with the suspicion of chaos" (Clarke & Garner, 2006: 9).

The following extracts from the group interviews illustrate the idea, both in general terms and in relation to more specific practices, that diversity is to be welcomed provided it can be managed on the terms of those who unquestioningly belong:

Betty: In one way it's rather nice because .. um .. they've brought a bit of culture over from their own country which is quite pleasant and it is nice to share cultures ...but the important thing is that they take on our culture (Manchester Group)

Steve: These countries [Austria is mentioned] seem to be able to keep their individuality, y'know, their uniqueness, their culture, keep, ours is basically getting, we're ... we're a mismatch of cultures and ... yes it's acceptable from a dietary point of view, 'cos I can go out and eat 15 different, 20 different varieties of food, fantastic ... (South London Group)

Betty's comment is typical of many within the group discussions in that she presents cultures as fixed entities linked to particular groups. She also inoculates herself against possible accusations of prejudice by acknowledging that it's 'nice to share' (though the banality of the words 'nice' and 'pleasant' are telling). This process does
not involve a relationship between equals, however, as ‘they’ are required to adapt to the majority’s norms and values.

In the second extract, the underlying assumption that each nation possesses an exclusive and individual culture is used to contrast the ability of some countries to maintain their “uniqueness” with the problematic situation ‘here’. Interestingly, this “mismatch of cultures” is to be welcomed, when it allows the individual to select from, for example, a wide selection of exotic foods. When that sense of agency is removed and transfers to the one who can, for example, ‘choose’ to live in ghettos or speak another language or refuse to integrate, all examples from across the groups, then it becomes an issue and lines have to be drawn.

For many of my respondents, the line between an unthreatening ‘Other’ and one that causes anxiety because it can no longer be managed appears to be being breached at the present time. In these instances, it may be possible to argue that previously taken-for-granted ways of making sense of and articulating social relations are becoming desedimented, so that there is a concomitant need for many to try and reassert their own position within a familiar and, hence, ontologically secure, national space.

I will explore further examples of this process shortly but first I want to reference the idea that, in attempting to resediment these commonsense frameworks by posing the presence of the undomesticated ‘Other’ as a threat, individuals are also required to manage alternative viewpoints so as to justify their own position as reasonable. In the next section, I want to explore the ways in which the question of ‘how many’ was discussed, and how different arguments were formulated and then debated by drawing on particular, and sometimes conflicting, discursive resources.

“It’s too many. We’ve been swamped”

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79 In one of the more ludicrous political statements of recent times, the Conservative leader, David Cameron, argued that Muslim ghettos should be broken up in order to generate further integration. This idea implies that Muslims might have a choice as to whether or not they wanted to live in some of the poorest neighbourhoods in the country as well as conveniently ignoring the fact that predominately white neighbourhoods don’t tend to be labelled as a problem for social cohesion (Evening Standard, 14/10/06).

80 This comment echoes (as part of a deeply embedded inter-textual chain) Margaret Thatcher’s comment some 20 years before regarding the fear that British people had of their culture being swamped (See Chapter 3).
The first point to make in relation to these discussions is that an analysis using the Alceste software, which shows patterns of language use across the groups as a whole, identified two broad categories that can be used to inform the textual analysis. The first links words associated with a general ‘Other’ (they, them, they’re, they’ve) and a specific ‘Other’ (Muslim, Bangladeshi, Sikh) with terms pertaining to work and state benefits (taxes, money, job, school, health, council). The second category is notable for featuring the terms political correctness and multiculturalism alongside words such as losing, identity, government and ‘our’ (See Appendix 3). Both these features are worth bearing in mind as specific examples are analysed below.

The identification and mapping of these two strands is significant as it reflects wider quantitative studies within Britain (McLaren & Johnson, 2007) but I would like to try and adopt a slightly different approach. This draws on the idea, introduced in Chapter 1, that discussions about social issues such as immigration present individuals with ‘dilemmas’ (Billig et al, 1988). This means that in expressing a particular viewpoint people must attend to any potential counter-arguments by justifying their own as reasonable.

What I want to look at in the following examples is the manner in which different respondents address and manage such dilemmas in relation to each topic, material benefits and culture/values. The success or otherwise of the strategies they employ will be observed, notably as they relate to the utilisation, or otherwise, of national discourse.

_Gerald: Or health migrants. And coming here for the benefits they can reap. These are the benefits that a) our fathers fought for b) we’ve paid for ... And, which we should have handed over to our children intact, but it’s not, it’s been undermined_

_Tony: Because it is very definite that ... in, say, eight years time ... there will be fewer .. y’know .. genuine Londoners than there are immigrants (Middlesex Group)._
The word ‘reap’ is significant as it is generally employed in relation to ideas about careful management (of a crop) and efforts that will be rewarded over time, that is, ‘you reap what you sow’. In this case, the ‘sowing’ has not been done by the migrants but by the second group, who are identified through the use of a number of deictic terms, including “our father’s” and “we”. Here, it is not just the family of the speaker, or the immediate group, that is being referenced but the national family as a whole.

This is evidenced by the implicit reference to Britain’s role in the Second World War and the welfare state, so that individual families are identified as part of a wider collective. In other words, health migrants are not simply taking away from certain individuals but are also undermining the nation’s inheritance. The use of the nuclear family as a metaphor for the nation is a particularly powerful rhetorical device transforming complex socio-political processes into matters of immediate relevance (Jackson & Ress, 2007: 922). As a result, Gerard is able to construct very distinct and well-managed boundaries between those who belong and those who do not, which were accepted as reasonable by other members of the group as Tony’s comment about “genuine Londoners” indicates.

“They’re making this bloody economy work”

The second extract I want to examine is representative of a style of apocryphal storytelling, which seems to reference actual experience, but is likely to be culled from either media reportage and/or popular mythologizing.

Tina: ..do you know how frustrating it is to know that somebody has come over from Somalia with their five kids, gone into the council ... and just bought a family hatchback BMW, for their family.

Katie: I don’t believe that happened though.

Tina: I swear down on my daughter’s life that happened ... They was only in the country, like, two months and they got a house and everything. How frustrating is that? They didn’t have to work for what they got (Enfield Group)

Katie is aware of the story but chooses to question its validity, which seems to indicate that it is an inter-textual feature, something that has been discussed or read about in another context. However, the truth or otherwise of the story is not necessarily what makes it interesting but the fact that it illustrates the type of
dilemmas that people may be required to manage when discussing this type of controversial issue.

In the first place, Tina contrasts the family that has only been in the country "two months" with herself, "I can't afford to buy a place and I pay all my taxes", setting up powerful boundaries between the in and out-group. This time though the argument is rejected by other members of the group, who challenge the categories Tina employs by arguing, "we do it, we, we got people, we got our own people [who claim benefits]" and, "they're [immigrants] paying taxes and paying pensions".

These opposing positions, which feature across a number of the interviews, point to the problem of stigmatising immigrants on the basis of material benefits alone, in the context of wider diatribes against 'benefit culture' as a whole (Gans, 1995). This is particularly true when it comes to the recent wave of migrants from the EU accession states that are often perceived as hardworking even if they are defined as 'Other'81.

Indeed, this discussion offers an illuminating example of the way in which people emphasis worth on the basis of merit not nationality. A similar viewpoint is offered in the following example;

They're coming in the country doing the jobs we don't want to do and they're making this bloody economy work (Newcastle College Group)

This extract is interesting as even where individuals are judged on the basis of the economic contribution they make, a national discourse is still routinely articulated. Most obviously, it features a number of deictic terms (they, we, this bloody economy) that firmly locates the subject within a national context. This points to the complexity of the transformations that people are having to manage in their daily lives as "overlapping but incompatible frames of reference and meanings" (Beck, 2002: 33) open up to scrutiny previously entrenched ways of understanding and being in the world, an idea that was earlier discussed with reference to the concepts of order of discourse and desedimentation.

81 Another variation on this theme is complaints about migrants accepting the poorly paid work that the British unemployed refuse to do. This comes from the Liverpool Group: "They've got people working on, on, on the small-holdings there, like, y'know, foreigners, like, Polish or Czechs or whatever. And I see, and I see teenagers, teenagers hanging around town or hanging around here, so, why can't they, why can't they go and do the job?".
If discussions about migration in relation to material benefits are illustrative of one potential dilemma then the claims about threats to ‘our’ culture and values from immigration, and subsequently multiculturalism, generate another. Again, those who put forward such arguments must ensure that their prejudices against ‘Others’ are seen to be ‘reasonable’ (Billig et al, 1988: 114). As Billig and his colleagues note, “if views are to be presented as being rational and unprejudiced, then they must be seen to be justified or at least to be justifiable” (ibid: 113). It is here in particular, that national discourse may be used as a form of trump card against those who argue from a more liberal or cosmopolitan position.

**Facts that happen in the world**

Concerns regarding the perceived threat of migration to current norms, values and practices were often articulated in a strikingly consistent manner across many of the groups and, once again, religion and race were commonly used to categorise the ‘Other’. However, underpinning many of the arguments was a rhetorical scaffolding that indicated the degree to which almost all of my respondents were aware of the taboos associated with prejudice and racism (Lynn & Lea, 2003: 426). It is within this wider context that individuals attempt “to present themselves and their beliefs as rational ... [that is] determined by the facts that happen in the world rather than by irrational feelings” (emphasis added, Billig et al, 1988: 112-113).

This is where we can refer to an argument made by Martin Barker in his seminal study, *The New Racism* (1981). In it Barker argued that rather than focusing on difference “in terms of superiority/inferiority” (ibid: 4) these new forms of racism are underpinned by a theory of human nature which suggests “that it is natural to form a bounded community, a nation, aware of its differences from other nations” (ibid: 21). In this way, prejudice is denied and any antipathetic response to foreigners can be seen as part of “our biology, our instincts, to defend our way of life, traditions and customs against outsiders - not because there are inferior, but because they are part of different cultures” (ibid: 23).

Barker’s is a rich and well documented study, with widespread evidence culled from both political speeches and the media, and many of his arguments have been supported by subsequent studies looking at both elite and everyday talk and texts (cf Van Dijk, 1993, Gilroy, 1987, 1996, Kundnani, 2001, Kushner, 2003). However, what these works do not generally address in any depth are the reasons why national
categories are employed to define who belongs and, crucially, what makes these arguments seem reasonable to so many. In other words, if biological racism is no longer acceptable because counter-arguments have rendered it suspect, what is it that makes these 'new' forms of cultural racism justifiable?  

The answer may lie in the fact that justifications for limiting the presence of 'otherness' are rooted in a 'common sense' understanding of a world defined in national terms, which is re-produced through the daily repetition of countless, routine activities and speech acts and evidenced in the presence of numerous banal symbols (See Chapter 5). Through these processes the nation comes to be seen, or perhaps it is possible to see it, as something that is fixed, bounded and homogeneous, one of the 'facts that happen in the world'. It is in this sense that the uncontrolled movement of 'Other' people into the nation can be defined as a challenge to the natural order of things.

In this formulation nations are seen to have a "natural territoriality", a protective instinct over their own space and the way of life shared by their own kith and kin. When outsiders enter this space, there is a threshold of tolerance (a breaking point), after which there is a natural reaction against further incursions" (Kundnani, 2001: 50). This idea of a threshold is particularly salient given the earlier discussions concerning processes of de/sedimentation. Using this framework, it can be argued that a previously sedimented national discourse is being used to make sense of and articulate some of the wider transformations that people are having to deal with in their everyday lives. Furthermore, it is because this framework matters to so many people, providing access to material resources and an ongoing sense of ontological security, that challenges to it are often resisted. Therefore, many of these discussions can be viewed as attempts to resediment national discourse as a means of reasserting a dominant position within the national space, thereby making it more familiar and secure.

What is particularly interesting to observe in the next section is the degree to which these challenges are perceived and experienced in the realm of the everyday. Therefore, while terrorist activity and media reports about social cohesion have been obvious reference points for discussions about undomesticated 'otherness' (Poole,
2002), the symbolic threshold that the ‘Other’ was seen to have crossed was generally articulated by my respondents in relation to the most banal practices and symbols.

Drawing the line

The following extracts list a range of routine occurrences involving the presence of a threatening ‘Other’ that, on the surface, might seem rather unremarkable, yet for my respondents they made a lasting impression.

Steve: I draw the line at things like that, y’know, you go into, you go into hospitals and you go into schools and the signage, for example, is split down, Hindi, Urdu, whatever else. don’t get me wrong ... I’m not just ... er ... cracking on at the Asians ... I go into my local paper shop, when I used to have my paper delivered, pay my bill and the guy behind the country said, basically he wouldn’t take the money from me because he didn’t have enough English (South London Group)

Terry: Well, if you got to Hyde, we’re talking Muslims ... the first sign you saw was in Arabic ... uh ... don’t get me wrong, I don’t mind helping ‘em if they come over here but the emphasis all seems to be ... to, to find the English leaflet was harder and that annoyed me, really annoyed me (Manchester Group)

Geoff: All the signs don’t have to just be in English but they have to be in Urdu and y’know, has to be in different languages (Newcastle Group)

Charlie: ... there’s tea bars, coffee bars ...  

Barry: ... they’ve let ‘em in and they’ve taken over.

Charlie: ... just for them to sit in, do you know what I mean, and they’re sat in there, sat in the corner, twenty of them sitting around and the lasses that work there, they’re grabbing their fucking arses (Middlesbrough Group)

Rita: My, my grand-daughter was on holiday a couple of weeks ago. She came back into Manchester Airport and she was so annoyed... She [girl wearing a “yashmak”] was on the passport desk and she [grand-daughter] said ‘I’m coming back off my holiday into my own country’ and there’s this lady standing there, telling us what to do (Liverpool Group)

Most of these examples again point to the question of agency and the fact that it is the dominant group’s status that is perceived to be under threat. Talja Blokland made similar observations after concluding an ethnographic study in a working class housing estate in Rotterdam, the Netherlands (2003). She noted that the everyday practices of migrants, cooking ‘strange’ foods, playing loud ‘foreign’ music, wearing Islamic dress, upset local white residents “because their norms of public practice had been violated and their symbolic ownership of the space challenged” (ibid: 11-12). Positioning themselves as “the people that belonged here” these individuals argued “that they
were entitled to have the [migrants] adapt to them, the powerful and symbolic owners of the space" (ibid).

A similar sentiment is expressed by Rita when describing how her grand-daughter became annoyed when she, as someone who belonged without question, was told what to do by another, whose dress - the "yashmak" - marked her out as suspect. In this instance, even the passport officer's 'official' status, being charged with protecting the country's borders, fails to generate recognition of her 'national' status, as one who belongs without question. Indeed, this example demonstrates how an ethnic definition of belonging overrides institutional (political) recognition pointing again to the significance of "differences in national self-perception within ... the same state" (Wodak et al, 1999: 189).

Elsewhere, the question of public signage does not seem to be about utility, given the signs are also in English, but the fact that individuals are being presented with difference either on a par with or even privileged over what is accepted as the norm. Notice also that both Steve and Terry use an identical phrase, 'don't get me wrong' as a stake inoculation against any possible accusation of prejudice.

Finally, it is doubtful that the sexist behaviour in cafes itself is a problem, given some of the other statements that this group made concerning the status of women. It is simply a question of who is doing the pinching (them). "Twenty of them, sitting around" represents a violation of the symbolic ownership of a place that as part of the backdrop to daily life the speakers had previously, and unthinkingly, considered 'theirs'.

This final point is significant as it seems to be the very ordinariness of the locales in which these 'challenges' are perceived that makes them so disconcerting and, hence, memorable. In the earlier discussion in Chapter 2 of Alfred Schutz's work, it was suggested that the most familiar and taken-for-granted 'zones of operation' generally form the backdrop to daily life because they can be managed through routine habits and as a result do not require much reflection (see also Berger & Luckmann, 1991: 169-74). Therefore, anything that interrupts or threatens this realm is likely to be perceived as particularly disturbing, as the following extracts demonstrate:

Shelley: ... I respect that they, that they speak two languages, I really do and its fine, but they shouldn't do it like that when I'm there, when you're already ....
Melanie: ... and, and you do feel just kind of like ....

Shelley: ... you feel isolated ... in what you feel should be your own country .... (Cirencester Group)

Frank: My son was in hospital right ... he was bad there in hospital and a fucking big group of fucking them women right walked in, like fucking them ghosts of ... uh .. of what do you call it? Harry Potter ... Just black, right, all you can see that (unclear) ... I was like ‘what the fuck?’ They could be doing anything in here (Middlesbrough Group)

In the first extract Shelley is talking about her experience working in a care home where some of the staff speak languages other than English. This sense of isolation that she refers to may be partly the product of feeling left out. However, because this incident is specifically discussed in relation to the question of belonging and who is permitted to decide what is appropriate behaviour, it is also very much about the entitlement that Shelley feels she has as the symbolic ‘owner’ of this particular space. The fact that, “even when people are speaking about specific localities, they often end up articulating these to the space of the nation” (Hage, 1998: 38) provides further evidence that a ‘common sense’ national discourse continues to be used to make sense of these issues.

Similarly, in the second example a contrast is made between the ordinariness of the hospital setting and the ‘Otherness’ of the women in Islamic dress, who again represent a “visual defilement” (Auburn & Barnes, 2005: 45). Here, the sense of threat caused by ‘their’ very presence in familiar surroundings may merge with popular representations of Muslims as terrorists (Poole, 2002: 6-8) so that their reasons for actually being in the hospital are questioned. As Harold Garfinkel argued in relation to his famous breaching experiments, the greater a form of knowledge or practice is taken as read “the more severe should be [the] ... disturbance when [these] ‘natural facts of life’ are impugned” (Garfinkel, 2004: 54).

For instance, the presence of people talking in a foreign language at a tourist destination would probably not be considered problematic because it is likely to meet some basic expectations. However, as individuals carry out routine activities in familiar zones of operation (work, the newsagent, even the local hospital) they are likely to carry with them a different set of assumptions about what is expected and acceptable, based on previous experience or what van Dijk labels the “assumed normality of the world” (quoted in Brown & Yule, 1983: 62). As a result, it is the
context that is of paramount importance in understanding these interactions and this is where many of the insights from phenomenological sociology can be usefully employed.

The presence of the marked ‘Other’ in a familiar, everyday location, a local street, is also problematic for Jean, a member of the South Shields Group.

Jean: I think the women [in Islamic dress], I mean, I find, I mean, I walk up B Street and I always, sort of, make a point of saying, ‘good morning’ and you very seldom get a response, you actually stop and say it again and then they'll turn round and say ‘good morning’, but it's very, very hard to get, to get through to them. And I think we should really do it

Emma Tarlo has noted that while the hijab “in popular perceptions is linked to the idea of hiding ... and the effacement of women's presence in the public sphere ... [it is] also about increasing a women's visibility ... making her visible as Muslim” (Tarlo, 2007:138). It is this visibility (what this style of dress represents) that seems to make Jean uncomfortable and drives her to confront the ‘Other’ women by making a specific effort to speak to them on her terms. This form of interaction is very far removed from the idea of ‘phatic communication’ discussed earlier, as it is intended to reassert the status of one group at the expense of another. It is an act of domestication, a deliberate attempt to reassert her sense of symbolic ownership over the area, which has been threatened by those marked groups that are seen to reject her own standards and mores. As Ghassan Hage observes, “the hijab represents a woman who is wilfully subjecting herself to a law other than the law of the nation ... It is this that those who are trying to find a sense of security in their national space cannot tolerate” (2006: 10).

The final extract that I want to flag up in relation to this issue sums up these broader debates concerning the place of the marked ‘Other’ and the perceived difficulties of managing the boundary between toleration and threat.

Melanie: In my old school like it was really weird, there was not a single black or mixed race person. It, it's so sheltered and it's so uncultural, it was English, proper English and I think that's a shame that in a way, without, y'know, the line between having too many and having none, but like, it was a shame we didn't get, whereas in London you get a chance to meet people from all walks of life, and like, learn about other stuff whereas around here it is really quite sheltered, I guess (emphasis added, Cirencester Group)
There are a whole host of features that one might examine in relation to this statement but I want to pick out four. The first concerns the idea that ‘Other’ people (in this case non-whites) are seen to possess culture. This draws a powerful distinction between whites, the default category whose habits are so familiar and unproblematic as to be “uncultural”, and the externalised other whose “stuff” can be learnt about and evaluated.

Second, the phrase “proper English”, defined in terms of whiteness, reaffirms the idea of unmarked categories within a national space and the degree to which each is defined according to the amount of national cultural capital they possess (Hage, 1998: 54). In this instance it is skin colour that ultimately decides who is allowed into the inner sanctum of “proper English” again demonstrating that the deployment of racist categories needs to be understood in relation to a national frame of reference.

The use of the term “sheltered” is also significant as it refers to those places where the white English are so secure that the absence of the ‘Other’ is actually lamented. In these cases, where majority norms can be taken-for-granted, engaging with difference is presented as an attraction but given earlier discussions concerning the breaching of acceptable limits, the notion of a “sheltered” culture takes on a whole new meaning, as a place where one can retreat to during times of crisis.

Finally, the idea that the “proper English” can make a distinction concerning the right number of them to ‘have’ is absolutely crucial, where “to have is the state of the possessor, the one for whom something is” (Hage, 1998: 139). This raises the spectre of a colonial past where ‘they’ were to be domesticated and managed by a superior ‘race’ and in the process treats the non-white ‘Other’ as a possession, a form of exotica to be welcome or tolerated providing that their numbers and actions can be controlled. As Ludmilla Jordanova writes,

“the other [is to be treated as] an object, something to be managed and possessed, and as [potentially] dangerous and threatening. At the same time, the other becomes an entity whose very separateness inspires curiosity” (quoted in Barringer, 1996: 34).
The fact that this group was composed of middle-class students who denied with absolute conviction that they were racist\textsuperscript{83}, illustrates the degree to which such ideas, consolidated over a period of centuries, have become entrenched in wider society.

Having examined the idea of a threshold in relation to categories of un/conditional belonging within the national space, I now want to focus on the manner in which these debates also fed into narratives of victimhood and injustice, whereby some minorities were seen as being privileged at the expense of the (white) majority. In the following section, attention will be paid to the controversial topic of political correctness (briefly discussed in Chapter 3), which provoked great antipathy among many of the groups that I spoke to, most of whom raised it of their own volition.

"Somehow or other the minority seems to rule this country"

The level of prominence of this issue in Britain as a whole can perhaps be illustrated with reference to the number of stories which featured the terms, political correctness, politically correct or 'PC gone mad', across three newspapers (The Sun, Daily Mail, The Guardian) in recent years. In 2000 there were 847 stories, in 2003 the figure had dropped to 700, while in the first 10 months of 2007 there were 835 stories containing one of these terms, an average of two a day.

The classic statement relating to political correctness is that 'we' are not allowed to say or do anything for fear of offending 'minorities'\textsuperscript{84}. The question of who 'we' and 'they' shifts according to context but often will involve religious or racial categories:

\begin{quote}
Interviewer: You mentioned the words .. um .. politically correct ... is that a new thing do you think?

Tina: No, but it's more so now than it ever has been

Interviewer: Why's that?

Tina: With all the different cultures that are in our community. It's like ...
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{83} Shelley: ... we’re English and we should, it shouldn’t be a black country, it is a white country, there wouldn’t be any, whether we’re, like, however, because we’re not racist at all, any of us (emphasis added)

\textsuperscript{84} A Guardian investigation into these stories showed that many of the claims relating to PC were either untrue or based on the flimsiest of evidence (Burkeman, 08/12/06). The important point seems to be that the truth or otherwise of these reports is largely irrelevant, for it seems that they capture the mood of uncertainty and anxiety for many in relation to the figure of a threatening 'Other', which is what I want to focus on here.
Dave: ... You can’t do anything (Enfield Group)

Sean: It [political correctness] seems to be in vogue, where people seem, we don’t have the freedom to speak our minds that we maybe used to have on certain issues that have become sensitive, such as asylum, racism etc (Birmingham Group)

The first example introduces an important element of dynamism into the discussion as the majority is portrayed as subject to increasing restrictions (“it’s more so now”) as a result of the “different cultures that are in our community”. Here again it can be seen how cultures are defined as bounded entities so that interlopers can be identified as distinct elements within the nation, while the deictic term ‘our’ reinforces this boundary. Moreover, political power is possessed by representatives of these ‘different cultures’ to the extent that they are able to circumscribe what ‘we’ can and cannot do.

The extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986), “we can’t do anything” is then backed with reference to a story in the British media (in 2006) concerning a woman employed by British Airways who challenged the company’s decision to prevent her from displaying a Christian symbol on her necklace. Through this process, ‘our community’ now becomes largely associated with Christianity in crude opposition to an Islamic faith that is commonly represented as a threatening ‘Other’ (Poynting & Mason, 2007). Indeed, this type of categorisation was noticeable across a number of the groups as people talked (rather un-ironically) about a “so-called Christian country” (Surrey Group) - and the powerful threat to its traditions, celebrations and beliefs - where church attendance has been falling for years!85

In the second extract, the speaker places both asylum and racism in the same category of issues that have “become sensitive”. As a result, the ‘we’, as a deictic term, is doing an extremely important job in drawing boundaries between those who cannot speak (that is white British people) and the subjects that cannot be spoken about. Moreover, the fact that this problem “seems to be in vogue” indicates that it should...

85 The Observer journalist Nick Cohen has focused on this apparent anomaly writing, “committed Christians with a sincere faith were ... [a] minority - somewhere between 5 and 10 per cent of the population. The 2001 census ... [found] that 71 per cent of the population of England and Wales - 42 million people - considered themselves Christians”. Cohen suggests that “there must have been a temptation to tick ‘Christian’ simply as a way of saying ‘we’re white and not Muslim’ and points to the writing of the “Italian journalist Antonio Polito [who] defined what can happen when people with no religion worthy of the name feel their values are under threat”. Polito uses the term “theo-con” to describe those atheist Italians who “support the Pope as a defender of Western civilisation” (The Observer, 03/12/06: 14)
not be considered as a universal principle that defines who ‘we’ are but as something that is novel. In other words, the increasing sensitivity of particular groups is causing the majority to lose their rights.

This notion of dynamism, indeed of a ‘breaking point’, is also referenced in the following quote from the parliamentary spokesman for the Campaign Against Political Correctness (www.capc.co.uk), an internet-based pressure group. The MP claims, “people used to laugh about it, but that’s changed ... they’re angry with white, middle-class, liberal do-gooders with some kind of guilt complex and too much time on their hands” (The Guardian, 08/12/06). The idea that certain privileged groups protected or colluded with minorities was also expressed in the group interviews with complaints about the government, human-rights lawyers and even “fucking Cherie Blair” (Middlesbrough Group), being used to bolster accusations that non-whites were, for example, able to “play the race card” (South London Group) at the expense of the majority.

The identification of internal ‘Others’ (liberals and minorities) is often combined with critiques of external meddling from ‘Europe’. The image of “other people ... who’re actually dictating to me, in my own home” (Manchester Group) illustrates the links between the “nationalisation of the domestic and domestication of the nation” (Morley, 2000:107) whereby ‘home’ not only refers to a physical abode but also the national home, bounded and (supposedly) safe. A further common refrain in the group interviews was the inability or unwillingness of British political elites to ‘manage’ the impact of EU legislation in contrast to other European nations (See Chapter 8 for more discussions of ‘Europe’)

Having briefly outlined some of the broader features of these debates around minorities and political correctness, I would now like focus in more detail on two aspects that are of particular significance to this study. First, the extent to which they involve “a breach of the background expectancies of everyday life” and then how subsequent attempts to “normalise the resultant incongruities” (Garfinkel, 2004: 54) may provide further insights into the functioning of national discourse during periods of sustained crisis.

“It’s utterly ridiculous and it did cause a lot of resentment”
The following set of extracts again illustrate the degree to which these controversies are used to draw boundaries between the in-group (those who cannot say or do what they want) and the ‘Other’, defined in relation to both race and religion (namely Islam).

Tina: They had to change that because if they turn it up, if they turn the ice cream cone upside down on a Burger King ice cream, it was the shape of Allah, so they had to change the whole thing and it’s like, why would you turn a cone upside down anyway. Y’know, what would it, what’s the point of doing that? (Enfield Group)

Barry: You can’t have black jelly babies, you can’t have black jelly babies ‘cos it’s fucking racist. If you kiddies eat it, you’re a fucking cunt taking the piss, know what I mean?!

Derek: You’re not allowed to say ‘blackboard’. You’re not allowed to have blackboard. It’s a drawing board.

Alan: It’s a chalkboard.

Garry: It’s baa, baa white sheep now innit? (Middlesborough Group)

Doreen: The silly nonsense about blackboards ...everything that was black had to have the name changed, it’s utterly ridiculous and it did cause of lot of resentment.

Brian: ... like the gollywog on the jam jar .... and, if I remember correctly that was taken off because of .. like .. the black issue ...

Doreen: The slave trade, yeah (Middlesex Group)

What also links all these statements is the striking level of incredulity and frustration that is being expressed. In these cases, the opening up to scrutiny of routine linguistic forms, social practices and material objects, previously considered so banal as to be unimportant, is met with incomprehension and anger. Concomitantly there is a tendency to trivialize such issues as “silly nonsense” or deny minority claims of prejudice as unfounded (Ayim, 1998, McKinney, 2003). For instance, the comment about black jelly babies is almost certainly a response to an article that appeared in the press just three days before I conducted the group interview in Middlesborough (The Sun, 03/11/06). The story concerned the acquittal of two men working for London Underground who were alleged to have made racist comments towards a co-worker, using the sweets as props. In this case, a particular instance of alleged racism has been transformed into the widespread practice of eating these sweets per se,

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86 See also “Baa, baa rainbow sheep” (Daily Mail, 08/03/06) and Mortimer & Mortimer (2007).
while there is a singular failure to acknowledge the possibility that such routine acts might be used to racially denigrate people.

However, even having invalidated any individual claims as nonsensical or, in tabloid parlance, ‘PC gone mad’, it is arguable that such incidents are likely to provoke some sense of disorientation, as taken-for-granted background expectations are (at least, temporarily) opened up to scrutiny. A further example of this process comes from a radio programme in which the DJ had been hosting a discussion on political correctness. In the following extract he is talking about wearing a pair of St George Cross cufflinks to a public dinner engagement:

Host: .. and I had them on and I was in the back of a cab and for the first, isn’t this funny though, you know what happened, I was sitting there and I thought, ‘Hang on, am I meant to be wearing these’, I started to question myself ...(emphasis added)

This would seem to be a useful example of the psychological stress that might be otherwise labelled as ontological insecurity, brought about by the questioning of what Schutz labelled as ‘tested recipes’ (1967: 95). In this case, wider debates have prompted the individual to think actively about what a previously taken-for-granted item of jewellery might mean to ‘Other’ people, and hence doubt its suitability for public display. Elsewhere, discussions about blackboards, point to the fact that for some, “even words themselves can’t ... be counted upon to mean what you’ve been taught they mean” (Charrington, 2001), thus rendering problematic a key element of routine social interaction.

In making these points, I am not attempting to justify what is being said by my respondents, merely suggesting that these expressions of bewilderment and anxiety also need to be understood in relation to their own sense of self and place. Any such points of anchorage are, as I have argued earlier, underpinned by a range of conventions and (assumed) norms, which are crucial in “unit[ing] participants in a way that promotes order and predictability” (Gergen, 2001: 18) in their daily lives.

What is also interesting to observe is the manner in which individuals attempt to manage such threats by drawing on already existing frameworks, in particular those associated with the nation. As Orvar Lofgren writes: “many of the ways in which [the nation] ... is evoked or inscribed into the routine and rituals of everyday life is taken-
for-granted. They do not come to symbolize a [national] way of life until ... confronted with other cultures” (1993: 190).

_Wendy: ... I mean, we are, we offend ‘em now with the British stamp. All the stamps that we made up for, for Christmas ...(Manchester Group) _

In this case the stamp becomes transformed into a symbol of the nation because it is seen to be under threat. In the process, boundaries are drawn between a hypersensitive ‘Other (the ‘now’ referencing a long litany of previous complaints) and the national in-group, which is identified as being collectively responsible for producing the stamps through the use of the deictic term ‘we’.

_Defining the nation through everyday practices_

These ideas concerning the breaching of taken-for-granted background expectations and their subsequent transformation into ‘meaningful’ symbols can also be usefully developed by drawing on Sinisa Malesevic’s idea of a “normative” and “operative realm” (2002: 92-93) in relation to the functioning of national discourse. The normative relates to “fundamental goals and values” (ibid: 92), generally defined by elite institutions, while the operative is concerned with the daily routines and symbols that constitute and concretise the nation.

The critical point to make is that these normative values, which are broadly disseminated through official state documents, political speeches, the education system and so on, “involve a reification of culture as standing above or outside practical everyday argument” (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001: 117). Consequently while they may be useful in mobilising particular constituencies behind a political project or contributing to a general sense of what it means to be x or y, they are too diffuse to offer much purchase when subject to more intense scrutiny as the perceived boundaries between groups are brought into sharper focus (We have already noted, for instance, the problems that a number of my respondents had when asked ‘what unites different people across England?’).

Zygmunt Bauman makes a similar point in relation to the idea of ‘community’. He writes, “since community means shared understanding of the ‘natural’ and ‘tacit’ kind, it won’t survive the moment in which understanding turns self-conscious ... and becomes an object for contemplation and scrutiny” (2001: 11). It is then, I would
suggest, that the operative realm - composed of tangible symbols, organisations, people and practices - comes to the fore, so that the boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’ become seemingly defined by apparently incongruous debates over whether a piece of office equipment is called a blackboard or a chalkboard.

As Orvar Lofgren writes, “These seemingly trivial ways of giving a national flavour to many everyday activities and routines mean that the strongest influence of ‘the national’ are found on the level of everyday practice rather than in rhetoric or ideological statements” (1993: 190). This provides us with one possible means of understanding why these issues create such a powerful response and resonate across years if not decades.

“This does alter what you stand for”

For example, attempts to remove the gollywog (a racial caricature dating back to the days of Empire) from a particular brand of jam in the 1980’s produced the following response from the company’s marketing manager in 1984; “the golly is part of our national tradition and an attack on it is an attack on a part of British culture” (quoted in Kushner, 1999: 76). Two decades later, three of my groups raised the issue of the gollywog in relation to wider debates about multiculturalism and the privileging of non-white minorities.

A similar sort of shift occurs in the following extract from one of the group interviews, where ‘our culture’ is suddenly transformed into the singing of hymns, when subject to critical scrutiny.

Claire: Do you think our own culture underneath has been watered down because we have to be so tolerant of other cultures?

Lee: What culture?

Claire: Well, we can’t sing hymns in school anymore.

Susan: No and somebody I work with, a guide leader and I think they wanted to sing Jerusalem or something, they’re not allowed to do that anymore (Swindon Group)

Here again, a threshold of tolerance is perceived to have been breached with the idea that something has recently changed referenced through the repetition of the term, “anymore”. The fact that this transformation is articulated in terms of religious practices indicates that the general term “other cultures” is being used to reference
non-Christians, namely Muslims. In this way, individuals are able to avoid the taint of prejudice towards ‘Others’ by discussing routine actions or symbols, what Lilie Chouliaraki has called “the situated enactment of values in the discursive practices of culture” (forthcoming).

A further example of this process can be seen in the outcry in the tabloid press during October 2005 over the decision taken by a bank to ban piggy banks from a high street branch so as not to offend its Muslim customers (Daily Star, 24/10/05). In response to this story, the radio station, TalkSport, conducted a phone-in where the DJ and his listeners swapped childhood stories about their own piggy banks and railed against those who (apparently) wished to ban them. This extract is indicative of the kind of comments that were made:

Caller: .... the pathetic mind-set of these people over a piggy, they’ve already stopped us having nativity scenes on Christmas cards for goodness sake. Now we can’t have a piggy bank in a bank.

Host: I mean you’re absolutely right .... we’re told, well, any other group of people coming into this country to start a new life are not here to alter the fabric of the country, well, clearly, somebody else is here to alter the fabric of the country. This does alter what you stand for. If you have to change your Christmas cards then, a certain element within society has won a battle to change the way we live, if you have to not put decorations up or have pigs in banks then someone has won the battle to alter the way we live (emphasis added)

This is quite an incredible statement and, even if the host is engaging in a little hyperbole for dramatic effect, amply demonstrates the crux of the argument I am making. The caller’s indignation stems once again from a sense of incredulity (“for goodness sake”) that anyone could want to ban such apparently unimportant items, although it is, course, Muslims per se (“these people”) rather than any particular individual or group that are blamed.

The issue is emphatically defined in terms of the nation through a host of deictic terms and the shared assumption there is an underlying culture and set of values that
inform “the way we live”\textsuperscript{87}. As for the case of the British stamps, discussed above, it is not grand values or idealised traits that define the nation but Christmas cards and piggy banks. As I have already suggested, these banal symbols enable individuals to reconstruct boundaries between in and out-groups when normative ‘values’ begin to unravel as a result of sustained scrutiny or powerful counter-arguments.

To try and make sense of this process in more detail, let us examine the practice of putting up Christmas decorations. One can assume that a sizeable majority of the population do actually share in this practice and have done for many years. Therefore, it forms a link, no matter how tenuous, to other people across the country. In Chapter 1 it was suggested, drawing on the work of Garfinkel and Giddens, that common habits helped generate a sense of familiarity and confidence in the management of relations with disparate others, so that these ‘shared’ activities led to mutual recognition and the establishment of a moral order, an idea that can be usefully applied here. In this way, such practices come to form of common cultural currency, worth little when used year in, year out without a second thought but growing exponentially in value when offered as a sacrifice to the perceived demands of an increasingly threatening ‘Other’.

Likewise, singing hymns at school, eating jelly babies, writing on a ‘blackboard’, ordering a black coffee, saving pennies in a piggy bank, are all utterly banal and common practices, which help form what might be called the bedrock of day-to-day existence, even if they only become resonant when perceived as under attack. As Roger Silverstone contends, “our everyday lives are the expression, in their taken-for-grantedness ... of our capacity to hold the line against the generalised anxiety and the threat of chaos that is a \textit{sine qua non} of social life” (1994: 165).

Looking at these apparently innocuous examples, one might conceivably question whether such conclusions can be drawn on the basis of individuals bemoaning the fact that a particular set of stamps has been withdrawn. My point is that if the everyday provides individuals with a sense of both who they are and where they belong, then any (perceived) challenge to this will be both strongly felt and, almost certainly, resisted.

\textsuperscript{87} A recent debate in the House of Lords produced the following “values for which this country stands ... justice, freedom, democracy and fair play” (Daily Telegraph, 07/12/07: 12). However, normative statements about such ‘values’ are not restricted to Britain but are routinely used by politicians in other countries as a broader feature of liberal democratic discourse.

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The fact that these banal features then become articulated in terms of the nation again indicates the extent to which national discourse has become sedimented. Put simply, the power of this common sense framework “lies in [its] ability to [generate a sense of] unity, security, and inclusiveness in times of crisis. In conveying these beliefs they provide the idea of a ‘home’, a place where subjectivity can be anchored and securitized, giving both protection and safety from the stranger” (Kinvall, 2005: 762).

**Summary**

The subjects of immigration, multiculturalism and political correctness have risen to the top of both the political and media agenda in recent times and also produced some of the most passionate debates across the group interviews. In many cases these group discussions reflected previous studies of similar issues, as significant numbers of my respondents drew on established ideas about British tolerance and civility before identifying particular forms of (non-white) settlement as a problem.

Yet while these arguments often drew on racial categories, it was suggested that they also need to be examined in relation to the functioning of an underlying, and broadly taken-for-granted, national discourse, which informs popular conceptions of identity, culture and place (See Chapter 5). For instance, in the case of migration, justifications for limiting migrant numbers were informed by an understanding of a national space that needed to be managed in order to preserve its homely character. Here, particular forms of national cultural capital, including skin colour, were used to define those who un/conditionally belonged to the nation, with whites forming the unmarked or default category who claimed responsibility for ensuring the national territory and culture remained familiar and secure. In these cases, it was not ‘otherness’ per se that was a concern but the presence of an undomesticated ‘Other’ that could no longer be effectively managed within the nation’s territory.

However, individuals were also required to manage particular dilemmas when talking about these controversial issues and, in some cases, a national framework was specifically rejected. For example, where some people argued that social resources, such as jobs and welfare, were under threat from migrants, others responded by drawing on a more universalist discourse that privileged work ethic over nationality and by highlighting the benefit culture at home. Where such debates focused on threats to a homogeneous and bounded national culture, an embedded national
discourse enabled people to more easily justify their position by referring to the 'assumed normality' of a world defined in terms of national borders and peoples.

The threat of undomesticated 'Others' within the national space also found expression in narratives of victimhood and injustice, whereby minorities were seen to be privileged at the expense of the (white) majority (Cole, 2007). The subject of political correctness was frequently used to articulate the restrictions that individuals felt were being placed on 'their' way of life by powerful elites. Here it was suggested that where individuals perceive that their (assumed) dominant position or symbolic ownership of a place is being threatened, they will often look to re-assert their authority or re-define boundaries between themselves and the 'Other'. As Talja Blokland observes, "hostility, prejudice and scapegoating [may] offer ... a pseudo-orientation in an estranged world where [individuals might] otherwise experience degrouping. The degrouped [person], by directing his hostility upon a specific target ..., attempts to find a solid point of repair in a world that otherwise makes no sense to [them]" (2003: 16).

The fact that these challenges were generally discussed in relation to the most banal linguistic forms, practices and symbols and, at the same time, expressed so vehemently indicates the extent to which these (apparently insignificant) features of everyday life contribute to the stabilising of social structures and identities that people rely on to orientate themselves on a daily basis. These "mundane details of social interaction" (Edensor, 2002: 17) can therefore be viewed as a crucial element in securing individuals ontologically, notably when normative values, used as a matter of course to define 'us' and 'them', begin to unravel during times of transformation or crisis.

In sum this chapter has examined the ways in which previously taken-for-granted ideas pertaining to national place, self and other have become increasingly exposed to scrutiny at a particular point in time, an idea that was earlier explored in relation to the concept of de-sedimentation. I want to extend this discussion in the conclusion by reconnecting these debates to some of the wider social theories that were briefly discussed in Chapter 3. For now, however, I will note that both increasing global mobility and the demands of neo-liberal capitalism have been seen as contributing to a growing sense of general anxiety or uncertainty (Bauman, 2000, 2001, Sennett, 2006).
that may, in turn, be precipitating some of these wider debates both in Britain and beyond.

In the next chapter, these ideas can be examined from a slightly different perspective by moving away from the everyday realm and focusing on mass, public rituals that are designed to commemorate or celebrate the nation. Here, I have argued that these events might be usefully employed as a "strategic lens" with which to examine wider debates about national identity and belonging, with the banal and the ecstatic being conceptualised in a dialectical relationship. In this case, my interviewees' responses to the rise in visibility of expressions of national pride among the English since the late 1990's will be of particular interest.
Chapter 7: “We wanna show ‘em who we are” - The significance of ecstatic nationalism in post-devolution England

Introduction

In an article written in 2004, Mary Kaldor quoted a friend from Nagorno Karabakh who had been in Britain during the summer of 2002 when celebrations marking the Queen’s 50th anniversary on the throne were in full swing. Asked what he thought of British nationalism, the friend had replied, “That’s not nationalism ... nationalism is about passion” (2004: 168). In comparing the “new nationalisms to be found in places like Nagorno Karabakh or Bosnia-Herzegovina” with the “spectacle nationalism ...[of the west, involving] consciously, mediated construction” (ibid), Kaldor not only reaffirms the hot/banal division critiqued by Billig (1995: 43, see Chapter 2) but also fails to acknowledge what these (apparently) moribund, inauthentic, flag waving processions might mean for both those that take part in them and the wider population as a whole.

In Chapter 2, I outlined the concept of ecstatic nationalism, events designed to generate forms of social solidarity linked to a national community or movement, arguing that it was significant for two primary reasons. First, it was suggested that the banal and the ecstatic should be conceptualised in relation to each other, with the latter concretising the image and idea of the nation, often through the use of everyday symbols, so that it comes to be seen, albeit temporarily, as a coherent, unified and bounded entity. That is, how social ties linked to the nation “are not only reflected upon but also constituted and reconstituted” during such periods (Couldry, 2002: 33).

Then, drawing on Turner’s concept of ‘liminality’ (1977), I argued that such events might be usefully studied in order to investigate empirically how different (and perhaps competing) versions of the nation are articulated and negotiated during heightened, and identifiable, periods of time. It was also noted that these processes, and the wider responses to them, might be particularly significant in an era where national allegiances are seen to be increasingly undermined by global flows.
Two approaches to the study of such events were discussed, the first, largely inspired by Durkheim, assumes they have a socially integrative function, while the second, privileges the far more interesting questions, of "whether, to what extent and in what ways" they are meaningful and to whom (Lukes, 1975: 297). This demands that these events are not only examined from a macro perspective - institutional involvement and representations, levels of participation and opposition - but also how they are perceived by both those who participate and critics alike.

Therefore, in the main part of this chapter I want to examine whether this conceptual framework has any purchase by exploring my respondent's views, initially, to see whether they had participated in any national events and then, what such events were perceived to mean and/or offer, if anything. This will include discussions about major national celebrations, such as the Jubilee and the world cup, as well as a more putative 'national' event, which is slowly growing in visibility, St George's Day. Here, I will argue that the latter event may be used to study contemporary debates around English national identity in a post-devolution era. The final section will then look to draw together some of these discussions with reflections from some of the previous empirical chapters in an attempt to provide a framework for understanding the significance of ecstatic nationalism, notably in re-sedimenting an 'image' of the nation during particular critical periods.

Before, turning to a more detailed analysis of the empirical data, however, I want to briefly examine one interesting element of the Alceste data, which shows broad patterns of language use across the groups. In this case, there was a striking consistency in the degree to which conversations directly referencing the 'home' nations, Britain / British, England / English, Scotland / Scottish etc. were all linked to one particular category, which could be broadly defined by language associated with sport, competition and events (See Appendix 3). Here, I want to suggest that these topics might offer an important 'space' for talking about the nation in England, where overt expression of nationhood have often been subject to criticism (Condor, 2000). This is because nationalism, in the popular imagination, has generally been linked to the parochial or emotional 'Other', in the process enabling the English to define themselves as enlightened and rational (Kumar, 2003: 250). The fact that there is a need for this 'space' now may again point to the idea that previously taken-for-granted ways of thinking about and articulating the world, in national terms, are being desedimented.
In terms of the wider context, it has already been observed in previous chapters that public displays have become a far more visible and consistent feature since the late 1990's and have been generally associated with national sporting endeavours. However, relatively little attention has been paid to the ways in which ‘ordinary’ people perceive and participate in such events and therefore, I would now like to turn to the group interview data.

**Embodying the nation**

When I asked my interviewees whether they participated in the Queen’s Jubilee celebrations of 2002 or any other similar events, there was a whole range of responses, including everything from enthusiastic affirmation to complete disinterest or disdain. The following extracts are indicative of the former:

Anne: “We had a disco on the Saturday” *(Birmingham Group)*

Derek: “We had a bar-b-q and a garden party. It was great” *(Doncaster Group)*

Interviewer: What about things like the Jubilee, did you take part in that? What did you do for that?

Trevor: Street parties

Helen: Yes, oh, yes, all the neighbours more or less get together. I think everybody in England did it, didn’t they? Had some sort of a party. *(Manchester Group)*

Geoff: We had a Queen’s Jubilee party at our place ... So we had union jacks and red, white and blue bunting on the table and, and so forth *(Newcastle Group)*

Given that England was blessed with not only reasonable weather but also an extended bank holiday to mark the Jubilee, it is not surprising that many people decided to hold parties with friends or neighbours. What I want to suggest here is that even this level of participation, involving a good meal and drinks with friends is significant because it temporarily unites people across the country in a shared endeavour. This can be evidenced by the degree to which these ‘celebrations’ often involve an adherence to particular social practices and symbolic codes co-ordinated across private and public spaces.

In a related discussion, a number of my respondents talked about how much they enjoyed watching sporting events involving the national team as part of a large
communal group as it helped generated a more intense atmosphere. There has been a gradual shift towards these type of shared viewing practices across the country, either in traditional venues such as pubs or, increasingly, in public spaces - town centres or public parks - which are commonly set up to cater for many thousands of spectators.

In addition, the idea that one could show commitment to the nation materially and symbolically was also discussed. For instance, different groups talked about painting bodies with the Cross of St George (Cirencester, Devon Groups) and/or waving flags and wearing clothes with national symbols on them (Swindon, Carlisle, Manchester Groups). During the game itself people co-ordinated their activities through bodily enaction by, for example, singing songs, cheering the team and celebrating or lamenting the final result.

As a result, the emotional impact of these events becomes heightened, whether inspiring feelings of pleasure, grief or even disgust, because they involve so many others whose own display acts as a form of mirror or catalyst, intensifying the overall experience of the event. The following extract is indicative:

Tom: Yeah, or if I know there's a match coming up or even when there isn't a match on, like in the world cup and that because it's coming up towards it, it's build up and build up. You just get into it anyway, you start singing the songs, even when the flags are up, you just get into the mood of it (Carlisle Group)

Much of the history of crowd psychology (from Le Bon, 1896, onwards) has pointed to the degree to which mass publics are seen to act as one, as individual mores become (or at least appear to be) submerged under the weight of numbers moving or acting in unison. Often the sheer scale of such events is impressive so that those who attend or witness it are not simply 'sharing' in the immediate experience but will carry away with them memories of the event that can be 're-lived' in combination with others and subsequent generations (Connerton, 1989). In this way, such annual or periodic events can offer an important means of anchoring disparate individuals to a wider (imagined) community across time.

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88 It should also be noted that if such events do come to dominant wider institutional and popular narratives even those who would rather ignore the proceedings will often be forced to take up a position, whether critical or otherwise. In some cases, the disinterested or dissenters will be provided with their own special events (republican parties during the Jubilee or cinemas showing particular films during the world cup) or narratives (press stories about football refugees), which again contribute to the overall sense of liminality.
"You can grab onto something and say that it is England"

The emphasis on temporal and spatial co-ordination through embodied action means that these events provide focused moments where collective identities are displayed and, in the process, materialised. This is idea is put forward by one of the Swindon Group in relation to support for the English football team:

Lee: The thing is, with that situation [the world cup] ... you’ve actually got something tangible to grab on to as being an identity of being English ‘cos you’ve got an England football team, you’ve got the tactics that they use, you’ve got the, y’know, the bravado that they show on the pitch and so forth ...So, like, yeah, it’s, you can grab onto something and say that it is England (Swindon Group)

We have seen in the previous chapter how international sporting competitions have been used to ‘test’ the loyalty of different members of society because support for a national team can be unambiguously demonstrated materially and bodily. Likewise where significant numbers do participate the nation becomes temporarily realised through these myriad, more or less coordinated activities. As a result, such mass events may, “serve to naturalize a common-sense perception that we live in, and belong to, nations” (Thompson, 2001: 19). As Barbro Blehr, writing about Norwegian Constitution Day celebrations, observes, “when people engage, once a year, in the [day’s] activities ... they confirm ... that the Norwegian community exists, and that they are themselves part of it” (1999: 37).

It is in this sense that I think we need to make a careful distinction between assigning significance to an event because so many took part and attributing underlying motivations to those that participated (as onlookers, media audiences or through related, informal activities). In the first instance, the question of numbers is absolutely fundamental. For, if no-one had ‘celebrated’ the Jubilee it would have been a major public embarrassment to the organizers, not to mention challenging the credibility of the monarchy. A similar point is made by Lyn Spillman in her study of national events in the US and Australia, where she notes, “for bicentennial organizers, sheer participation, not any particular representation of the nation, was the goal” (1997: 100).

An analogy might be that the wider voting population holds a multitude of different views and express them (however imperfectly) through the ballot box. The range of these views is not really an issue, however, provided that voting levels are maintained
and the democratic process as a whole is validated (Eder, 2000). This means that while understanding the manifold reasons why different people took part is important, it should not detract from the fact that many, many people did hold parties etc., for whatever reason, and that this is significant in and of itself.

Therefore, part of the power of the shared ritual comes from the act of participation as people orientate their actions for specific periods not the fact that all who take part share the same set of intrinsic values or beliefs. As Bauman writes, “sharing physical space with other actors engaged in a similar activity adds importance to the action, stamps it with the ‘approval of numbers’ and so ... justifies it without the need to argue” (2000: 97). For the Jubilee and world cup celebrations, each of the participants contributed to the realisation of the nation as a (temporarily) coherent and concrete entity, through their collective endeavours, even if their reasons for taking part were completely opposed.

However, engaging with what Handelman labels “the logic of practice” (1998: 15), what motivates people to take part and how they evaluate these activities, is also crucial to understanding the significance of such events for different groups. Therefore, in the next section, I want to explore some of the ways in which these types of national celebrations were perceived by my own discussants, notably the ways in which they articulated their own and others participation or lack thereof.

“A good excuse for a party”

A fair number of my respondents replied in the negative when asked if they took part in the Jubilee celebrations, declaring it an irrelevance (Doncaster Group), farcical (Brighton Group), boring (Cirencester / Carlisle Groups) or anathema to their own political beliefs (South Shields Group). This quote from a member of the Brighton Group is perhaps the most forceful rejection I heard.

Mary: Oh, god, Jesus, not the Golden one, absolutely not. Just not interested, not interested in any way. Silver Jubilee definitely because I was a child then (Brighton Group)

Again these types of viewpoints, and the vehement ways in which they are expressed, draw our attention to the importance of not making presumptions about the function of such events. Rather the focus needs to be on range of responses to them and,
perhaps, whether any links can be identified between particular views and certain social groups. For instance, many of the younger people I spoke to claimed that events involving royal celebrations were an irrelevance to their own lives but were often enthusiastic about following and overtly displaying their support for English sports team competing in international tournaments.

However, in the following sections, I will be particularly interested in examining those statements that either offered a more qualified support for such events or rejected them on the basis not of disinterest but distaste. In both cases, these comments present a particular, dominant version of what it means to be British and, in particular, English and can be usefully linked back to earlier analyses of ‘talk about the nation’ (See Chapter 5).

In the first place, we can return to the comment made by a member of the Newcastle Group, which shows that many of those who did participate were often keen to portray themselves as mere partygoers, rather than as, say, dedicated royalists or fervent patriots.

*Geoff: We had a Queen’s Jubilee party at our place ... So we had union jacks and red, white and blue bunting on the table and, and so forth which was, it was a good excuse for a party (Newcastle Group)*

The desire to present his own involvement in a more detached or ironic way seems to indicate that Geoff is aware that he may be opening himself up to ridicule for showing support for such an event. To understand this position more fully, I think we again have to locate it within the wider context of English society, notably in relation to the popular idea that “nationalism ... is an alien phenomenon, invented elsewhere and thankfully kept at bay from English shores” (Kumar, 2000: 577). This idea is used to inform a particular version of what it means to be English/British, which is seen to privilege hard work, diligence and reserve over pride and self-satisfaction. This idealised image has become sedimented over a period of centuries in the popular imagination and can be traced back, in part, to a self-serving representation of empire as a civilising mission (Hall, 1997: 174, see also Chapter 3).

It is therefore in reference to these dominant narratives that we can make sense of Geoff's statement. Having described in some detail what he did for the party, Geoff seems to become aware (note the change in emphasis after “which was”) that these
actions may be used to classify him as an enthusiastic supporter of the event. He, therefore, subsequently attempts to manage this (possible) interpretation by downplaying his stake and (re)presenting himself as someone who was only really interested in a party.

This is a fairly subtle example of “impression management” (Condor, 2000: 175) in relation to the idea that displays of national pride are inappropriate or shameful. In the next section, we can see how this idea was also expressed far more vehemently by some of the other respondents. Interestingly, not only do these comments evidence the degree to which this notion has become ‘common currency’ but they may also offer a starting point for understanding how contemporary transformations are opening up this previously sedimented framework to scrutiny and, in the process, generating a notable response.

**Excessive nationalism**

The following comments were made in response to the question asking whether any members of the group had ever taken part in an event celebrating the nation. Here the response was far more unambiguous, bluntly pointing to the inappropriateness of, what the speakers considered to be, displays of “excessive nationalism” (Condor & Abell, 2006: 453)

_Interviewer: ... I’ve got .. um ... one last question for you which is about celebrating Britain or England. Have you ever taken part in events that celebrate this country?_

_Melanie: I have to say that after, what we have been saying about appreciating Britain and stuff and I do and everything, but I’m really not into that whole, really patriotic ..._

_Lauren: Yeah._

_Melanie: ... let’s go wave a flag._

_Shelly: Oh yeah, I appreciate it but I wouldn’t ..._

_Melanie: I don’t find that very ....it’s not like ‘Look at me, I’m British’ ....I’m proud to be British, yes, but I’m not ...

_Lauren: ... but I’m not going to stand up, saying ..._

_Melanie: ... not going to preach about Britain (Cirencester Group)_
The idea that it is possible to identify and embody an acceptable level of national pride is particularly noticeable here as the speakers discuss “national self-identification as a matter of being ... of rational self-knowledge as opposed to sentiment” (Condor & Abell, 2006: 30). In other words, being able to appreciate Britain involves a sense of control or calm appraisal that needs to be actively distinguished from the physicality of either waving a flag, standing up or preaching about it.

Furthermore, although Britain is specifically mentioned, I think it is possible to open up these discussions with reference to Tom Nairn’s (1988) argument concerning the dominant status of the English. He suggests that as the most powerful group in Britain, the English are (or at least were) more secure in their own identity and, as a result, privileged normative ideas about tolerance and restraint as a means of downplaying their dominant relations with proximal and distant colonial ‘Others’. For instance, it has already been noted how the term British is often used to stand in for English, so that the two become conflated in the popular English imagination (It is difficult to imagine individuals from the other British nations making the same mistake!). In the process, this enabled the English to define passion, emotion and a loss of self-control as the preserve of the ‘Other’. Furthermore, this was applied to both internal and external groups, as we can see in the following examples.

John: I was just thinking, thinking about what a, a big national celebration of national identity. Well, it’s funerals now isn’t it? It started with Princess Di, when, y’know, when she passed away ...all that ridiculous flower throwing and, and so on ...

Peter: And all that emotion.

John: ... very un-English showing of emotion, I’m sorry, but I don’t do it. Not in public anyway (Cheltenham Group)

In this extract, the speakers present themselves as the arbiters of national mores and values by drawing a concrete link between the national group, which is defined in terms of the popular signifier of the English as “un-emotional” (See Fox, 2004: 160-161), and their own actions (“I don’t do it”). Furthermore, in making this distinction between dispassion and emotion (Fischer, 2000) a gendered version of the nation is

89 It has already been noted that Britain is one of the few nation-states that does not ‘celebrate’ or commemorate it’s own history or society through an official national holiday.
presented, which implicitly references women as the threat to "national patriarchy" (Shome, 2001: 324). It is the death of Princess Di and the "ridiculous" response to it that is seen to have breached the existing boundaries between public and private in a "disruption of the logic of nationalised domesticity" (ibid: 332).

While in this case emotional displays are used to identify a feminised 'Other' in relation to the 'core values' of the nation, as we saw in Chapter 5, this dominant version of Englishness is also based on class distinction. The following extracts reaffirm this idea in relation to the increasingly visible flag-waving events taking place in England:

Sally: I think those flags look so shit and chavy.

Clare: Yeah.

Lee: I think, yeah, they're just tacky (Swindon Group)

Nina: I think it's a controversial thing to say, but I think it's a class thing to a certain extent because you'll get, you'll go to ... you'll go to certain areas of Birmingham, they'll be people, y'know, flying ...

Sean: Like my area?!

Nina: ... the flag. Yeah, like your area! (Birmingham Group)

In the first extract, it can be seen how questions of taste are linked to class, whereby the flags are associated with the lower classes (chavs) and castigated as such, producing an unusual degree of consensus across what was a fairly reflective group. In contrast to these more direct outbursts, Nina, at least attempts to manage any potential accusations of prejudice by admitting that the point of view she is about to introduce is "controversial". Indeed, the number of false starts and hesitations indicates the delicate nature of the subject area. The dilemma that Nina presents the group is ultimately defused with humour as Sean acknowledges that he lives in one of the suspect areas, creating some degree of mutual recognition and hence consensus among those present.

"You keep your head down"

As we have seen, the critiques employed against internal 'Others', stigmatised on the basis that they fail to live up to the mores and values of a dominant group, are also often applied to out-groups.
Richard: I think generally we're not very nationalistic. When you compare us to other places, I think if you go to Canada or the States ... I'm not sure whether we are or whether it's naturally a lower key approach to nationalism in this country.

Lisa: It's too embarrassing.

Ian: You keep your head down (Taunton Group)

In the above extract, Richard's suggestion that 'our' reticence may be innate can be linked to a range of popular inter-textual representations, the classic being the 'stiff upper lip' (see Fox, 2004: 135 for a recent example). Yet in re-asserting their own "agnosticism towards nationalism" (Kumar, 2000: 577), these individuals are again putting forward a definition of who they are by contrasting their own lack of patriotic fervour with 'Others' more crude displays of nationalism. This is what Condor and Abell label as a "strategic attempt to differentiate a rationally-national ... self from the passionately-driven ... other who ... [is] imagined to be susceptible to the influence of 'ugly forces'" (2006: 30-31).

For instance, America was mentioned by a number of the respondents when discussing the reluctance of English people to display their nationality, some of whom spoke approvingly of 'their' more overt patriotism (Middlesex / South London Groups), while others privileged 'our' healthy scepticism towards such outbursts (Newcastle Group). The latter position is reflected in an article written by The Times journalist, Martin Samuel, which is of particular relevance to this discussion. Samuel was writing in response to the then Chancellor Gordon Brown's suggestion that Britain should have a national holiday to celebrate Britishness. In drawing distinctions between rational and emotional forms of national pride, Samuel contrasts British decorum (using mainly English signifiers!) with the "frenzy of flag-flying, sticker affixing and apple pie baking" that marks out American patriotism.

This is another example of the way in which the particular group can only be imagined in relation to the universal world of 'Others'. However, there is a second aspect, arguably more important given the main thrust of this study, that is worth highlighting and that concerns the fact that both Richard (Taunton Group) and Samuel propose, in almost identical terms, a link between British/English understatement and a settled sense of identity

Lisa: It's too embarrassing.
Ian: You keep your head down.

Richard: Not so much, more, more a sort of, there is no need to be, you're perfectly content with your sense of identity within your country, you don't need to push your country (emphasis added, Taunton Group)

Brown wants us to work hard at being British, which is not British at all. Leave us alone and we'll show you British. Christmas trees and lights and little nativity plays ... the right to laugh at everybody and not watch what we say ... What truly makes a country great is ... the fabric of its daily life: the humour, the tolerance, the kindness displayed by British people ... who feel no need to wave a Union Jack (emphasis added, The Times, 24/03/06)

The quote from the Times sums up a number of the arguments that have been made thus far, notably the way in which routine activities and traits are used to define the nation and how threats to 'the fabric of ... daily life' are perceived to be under threat at the current time. In particular, it's fascinating to see how the range of features that are listed as threatened (Christmas lights, nativity plays, freedom of speech) echo with almost unerring accuracy those examined in our earlier analysis of political correctness and multiculturalism. Samuel's article also incorporates a range of micro-features (metonymy - “America loves a flag”, deixis - “we are so happy in our own skin”) as well as assumed knowledge (that 'we' no longer have the right to laugh at people) that were previously identified as important features in concretising an 'image' of 'our' nation in a world of nations.

However, in relation to the wider discussion on the possible significance of ecstatic nationalism in England at the current time, the idea that there is "no need" to "push your country" or "wave a Union Jack" is crucial. For while, this is obviously the case for those who reject such displays as inappropriate or un-English/British, I would also suggest that for many people, one of the reasons for participating in more public displays is because they are, indeed, beginning to feel this need, as previous certainties (language, ways of being, symbolic repertoires) become subject to scrutiny.

Here, once more, we can point to the previously dominant and stable nature of English identity within Britain and then relate it to some of the current debates about,
say, immigration and wider political changes in Britain and Europe. In other words, to conceptualise the increasing visibility of such displays alongside the growing number of public debates about how to best categorise and celebrate Britishness/Englishness as part of an attempt to re-sediment a previously taken-for-granted orthodoxy that has become subject to sustained crisis.

However, in positing such a link, I am distinctly aware that some of the earlier critiques directed at functional approaches to the study of ecstatic events might also be applied to this analysis and therefore, in the next section, I want to turn to my own respondent's views to see if they can lend any weight to this thesis.

“People get hooked on everything”

One of the subjects I was most interested in hearing the groups discuss was the reason why they thought that there had been an increase in flag flying and other more visible displays of national pride in England in the past two decades. Interestingly, the reasons given for this upsurge, and it is worth noting that nobody denied that it was happening, could be divided into two fairly distinct strands that were employed across the groups. The first attributed the rise to the power of the media and other commercial interests, which are seen to have an undue influence on a significant proportion of the population. The second, of most relevance here, argues that English people are feeling increasingly insecure at the current time and therefore have a concomitant need to re-assert their presence through such displays. I will discuss each in turn with reference to a range of fairly extensive extracts.

Lesley: That's what I'm saying is that's the media, that's the media-led thing, I don't think it's, I don't think it's the reality

Geoff: But that is media driven, red top tabloid driven, isn't it? Kind of ...

John: It is. (Newcastle Group)

Fran: I just think it's a bit bad when they go a bit over the top and you've got flags dripping off everything. Y'know, flag in your ears, flag on your scarf and it's just like, y'know ...

Susan: It's another way of making money like Father's Day, y'know, it's like 'oh yes, I see a', and they're all made in China the flags anyway!

Fran: They do get carried away by it all (Devon Group)
Interviewer: Why is it, do you think, now that the flags are suddenly being flown whereas perhaps 10 or 20 years ago, you wouldn’t see that?

Trevor: Because it’s cheap, because commercially this is ...

I: You think?

Trevor: Yes, it’s been pushed by all the newspapers.

George: It’s commercialism.

I: You reckon people are that gullible?

Trevor: Yeah.

George: Ohhh, aren’t they ....(Doncaster Group)

Tony: I think you’re right with this marketing because the flag waving for the world cup and stuff has only become popular since Sky Sports and that started getting 24 hour football and .. um .. mass football advertising all the time (Swindon Group)

Dave: ... it’s a different culture, it’s like, advertising’s much better now innit?

Garry Yeah, marketing, the marketing ...

Dave: ... and things, people get, people get hooked on everything (Enfield Group)

These statements again reinforce the idea that these patriotic displays are often defined in terms of class distinction. The most obvious example of this is the nod to the red-top tabloids, which are more widely read by lower social classes. The first three extracts all draw boundaries between the people who are seen to be affected by this hype, and as a result go ‘over the top’, and those who can see through it and adopt a more considered, rational position. The comment about the flag being ‘Made in China’, as if to suggest that the product is less authentic and those flying it even more gullible, is particularly striking90.

In these instances, a transmission model is privileged (Carey, 1989) whereby the media is ascribed incredible power in relation to its influence on other vulnerable people whilst the speakers are able to see through the marketing hype. This is born out by the comment from George concerning the gullibility of others (“ohhh, aren’t they?”) in relation to newspapers and is also reflected in the Enfield Group’s discussion of people getting “hooked on everything”.

90 Martin Samuel, in the article from The Times quoted above, also makes this point: “America loves a flag ... Made in China, every one” (24/03/06).
Asides from noting that these discussions again re-articulate a particular class-based version of what it means to be English, I think it is probably worth making one or two further comments. Firstly, as Tony observes, the impact of Sky Television on the promotion of sport, and in particular football, has been absolutely crucial in raising its profile (Andrews, 2003). Similarly, marketing and advertising, notably with the expansion of the media into almost aspects of public life (cf Gitlin, 2002) have in the past two or more decades contributed significantly to the privileging of more consumerist lifestyles (Miles, 1998).

Although, the extent and range of these impacts are beyond the scale of this study, Douglas Kellner’s argument concerning the degree to which media output in countries such as Britain is increasingly based on “the concept of the spectacle” (2003: 3) might be usefully employed. He writes, “the spectacular society spreads its wares mainly through the cultural mechanisms of leisure and consumption ... To succeed in the ultra-competitive global marketplace, corporations need to circulate their image and brand name, so business and advertising combine in the promotion of ... media spectacles” (ibid: 3-4) and sport is seen to be a key element in this process.

Comments about the cost of flags are less persuasive, given that 20 years ago very few people - no matter their class, age or colour - would have dreamt of attaching one to their car or house. This is not because they were extraordinarily expensive, but because the English flag (in particular) was generally seen as a symbol of the far right, and overt displays of flag waving remained beyond the pale of acceptable behaviour, even unthinkable, for the vast majority (Perryman, 2005). To echo the earlier comments, there was ‘no need’ to wave flags.

Therefore, while the media obviously have an important role to play in marketing these events or encouraging wider participation, it cannot be assumed that audiences treat media messages as simple injunctions detailing what they should or should not do. If that was the case, to offer but one example, then one million people would not have gone to London to take part in the 2002 Jubilee celebrations given the mixed response in the media in the run up to the event (Wardle & West, 2004).

This is where the second set of arguments put forward by my respondents might be usefully explored. These lend weight to the idea that such displays are a response to an increasing sense of insecurity and unease being felt among many English people at
the current time. These discussions are particularly relevant as they allow us to incorporate an element of dynamism into the analysis.

"We wanna show 'em who we are"

The following set of responses were again in answer to the question asking why an increasing number of flags are being displayed in England on a more frequent basis, compared to, say, 20 years ago. I have included as many of these statements as possible as I think they are crucial in illustrating the wider points that I have been trying to make about the significance of ecstatic nationalism in an era of increasing mobility and change.

Charlie: See years ago they didn’t, years ago they didn’t fly it because they didn’t fucking have to. We knew who we were (Middlesborough Group)

Anthony: In recent history we ran the world and we didn’t need to celebrate Britishness because we were everywhere.

Mary: Yeah, yeah

Anthony: ... when, when you’re in that situation you don’t need a national day ....

Mary: But you do now.

Interviewer: And now?

Anthony: Now is different (Brighton Group)

Garry: .. maybe we’re just trying to show we’re an .. um .. an indication, that there is still an English identity ...

Katie: Yeah, I think people are starting to get a bit paranoid, that English is ...

Tina: ... fading out.

Dave: .. so like bringing out proof to show you’re still here...

Tina: .. it’s like it’s fading, isn’t it, really. They’ve gotta try and hold on ...

Garry: It’s like, it’s like you’re trying to prove something ...trying to prove something but 40 years ago you wouldn’t have to prove anything. This is England (Enfield Group)

Simon: I think it’s just trying to show a bit of national pride isn’t it? To say that we are British and we English or whatever, we are here (Devon Group)

Graham: Yeah, the need to celebrate it comes from this feeling of that it’s being actually suppressed ... Had, had it not, and the English haven’t been very vocal, but
because we feel now that, that our Englishness and our identity is being suppressed
we now feel the reason to celebrate it (Hastings Group)

Janet: It was ... wasn’t in your face But it’s now in your face and you think ‘Hang on
a sec, this is my country, so therefore I celebrate what my country is’ (South
London Group)

Terry: I think, more and more people are, English people are starting to do it as a
retaliation if you like, that people ...

John: Says, ‘if they can do it, I can, we can’ (Manchester Group)

Derek: I think it’s, I think it’s the white community making a statement ...

Neil: Yeah, yeah, that’s got a lot to do with it.

Derek: ... there’s a lot of people, I mean, round this area, there was hordes of them
on cars, buildings, the lot, and there’s flag still flying ... but I think that was the
white community making a statement about immigration and about
multiculturalism (South Shields Group)

If we look briefly at some of the micro features of the language, nations are
constituted as concrete entities through the use of deictic terms (we/our) and the
actions of individuals (“I celebrate what my country is / you’re trying to prove
something”) who personify the wider group.

Interestingly, English, British and white are all used to reference the in-group who
must respond to these challenges with the comment from Simon particularly pertinent
to this discussion. Having used the terms British and English in relation to ‘we’, the
phrase “or whatever” illustrates the extent to which he finds this distinction an
irrelevance and the point is driven home with the qualifier, “we are here”. This
phrase, alongside other possessive statements such as “this is my country” and “this is
England” also reference the fact that the speakers locate themselves - and people like
them - as the de facto, and rightful, symbolic owners of the nation in contrast to those
who have arrived in the past ’40 years’.

“We knew who we were”

As we saw in the previous chapter, this “mode of national belonging” is predicated on
the belief that one’s own group is entitled to comment on the management of national
space and culture so that it remains familiar and secure and is a response to the
(perceived) threat posed by an increasingly undomesticated ‘Other’ (Hage, 1998: 46).
In this instance, 'Other' groups are seen to be able to wave their flags, to the extent that they are now “in your face” and therefore ‘our’ response is to be classed as “retaliation”. In contrast to the past, it is necessary for the neglected majority group to assert their continuing presence and symbolic ownership of the national space, given the fact that they haven’t been “very vocal” up until this point. The idea of a threshold, discussed in the previous chapter, might also be reapplied to some of these statements where the continuing agency of perceived minority ‘Others’ can no longer be tolerated.

These discussions also re-iterate the sense of dynamism concerning processes of de/sedimentation in relation to national discourse that I have tried to conceptualise and substantiate in this thesis. In this case, the certainties that had been taken for granted are seen to be unravelling, so that the tacit knowledge and assumptions about who belongs and what matters becomes opened up to scrutiny or desedimented. Furthermore, these processes generate a tangible sense of ontological insecurity (the term “paranoid” used by the Enfield Group is particularly striking) so that there is a concomitant desire to seek a more secure footing, which, in this case, may be achieved through more overt expressions of nationality in an attempt to re-establish the visibility, and hence symbolic power, of the group. As Kong & Yeoh write:

> given that identities are conjunctural and socially constructed ... it follows that at particular times and under particular conditions, the sense of national identity is particularly threatened. In other words, the need to foster and assert the sense of identity may be stronger at some times than others (1999: 214)

This is an argument that is echoed in the following exchange between members of the Liverpool Group:

*Frank:* It [England’s world cup campaign] actually provided an outlet for people to say ‘we’re in danger of losing something’ that we value. And it’s being eroded over time.

*Interviewer:* And what’s been lost, do you think?

*Diana:* I think, I think what’s been lost is a sense of pride, a sense of where you belong in the world in terms of history, context (emphasis added)

The palpable feelings of loss and disorientation articulated in this extract offers further evidence as to the manner in which national discourse has underpinned a
relatively stable sense of identity and place for these individuals and, moreover, that this ontological framework continues to matter because it offers “still points in a turning world” (Hall, 1997: 175). The phrase “eroded over time” echoes the earlier discussion concerning the dynamic process of de/sedimentation as well as the perception that a threshold has now been reached. Finally, the statement also lends weight to the idea that such ecstatic events represent a ‘space’ where individuals can manage wider feelings of uncertainty or loss, by actively embodying and, thereby, re-sedimenting the ‘imagined community’ of the nation.

Having pointed to the fact that more established ecstatic events seem to play an important role in concretising the image of the nation in a time of uncertainty and ontological insecurity, I would like to offer a brief disclaimer. Without a doubt, this is far too complex an issue to be reduced to an apparently clear-cut relationship between, say, migration levels and mass flag-waving. Therefore, while my empirical data points towards such a link in contemporary England, we cannot assume that all such instances of ecstatic nationalism function in such a way. Therefore, at the risk of labouring the point, any investigation into what these events might mean for disparate individuals and group must be investigated empirically.

Bearing this in mind, I want to draw attention to one particularly illuminating example, which may be used as a “strategic lens” (Sassen, 2000) to highlight some of the ambiguities that exist when different people discuss such events. The (putative) national event I will be examining is that of St George’s Day, which has become the focus of increasing public attention over the past few years. However, as a subject for debate within my own groups it produced some noticeably mixed responses, although pointing in a number of cases towards the wider issue of devolution within Britain.

*St George’s Day*

Before examining some of the ways in which my own group’s discussed this subject, it is probably worth providing some context for these debates. St George is the English patron saint and while some of the other nations within Britain celebrate their saint’s days with an official bank holiday, this is not the case in England. Indeed, up until the

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91 Barbara Ehrenreich (2007) has recently argued that ecstatic rituals (religious, national or otherwise) have always been fundamental in generating a sense of place and identity for disparate collectivities and furthermore, may be an important way to counter individual depression and wider social anomie (ibid: 129-153).
past few years, St George’s Day passed with almost no comment and a poll conducted this year indicated that over a third of people did not know when St George’s Day was. Ironically, enough the same poll suggested that 83% of those questioned believed that it should be made into a national holiday (The Metro, 23/04/08: 20).

A survey on Lexis Nexis Professional indicated that press coverage of stories containing the words St George or St George’s Day, in the week preceding April 23rd, has grown over the past decade, rising from 71 in 2000 to a peak of 180 in 2005, but still over 150 in the last two years. This rather simple quantitative survey perhaps belies a number of features of the coverage, particularly in the tabloid press. In 2005, for instance, many of the tabloids publicised a campaign, led by an unholy alliance of English nationalists and breweries, to make St George’s Day a national holiday. The petition handed in to the Prime Minister totalled some 600,000 signatures with the former England cricketer Ian Botham, who fronted the campaign, telling The Sun newspaper, “Why shouldn’t it be a national holiday? Our heritage is being eroded” (23/04/05).

Elsewhere, a number of tabloid newspapers have reported on the apparent attempts of various ‘killjoys’ (generally either representatives of local or central government) to ban individual attempts to mark the day, including a publican whose application for an extended licence was turned down because the day was not seen to be a “special occasion” (Daily Mail, 29/11/05; 5). This was a significant case, as it allowed the publican’s supporters, to highlight the fact that other licencees had been allowed to extend their opening hours in order to celebrate St Patrick’s Day (Ireland), Chinese New Year, US Independence Day and Diwali (Hindus) (Daily Star, 20/04/05). Here, the sense of injustice discussed in relation to minority agency identified (in Chapter 6) was again very much in evidence as “defiant patriots” complained of having their “English identity thwart[ed]” (ibid).

Outside of these well-documented stories, much of the tabloid press coverage has tended towards rather predictable shots of pretty girls wearing not many clothes wrapping themselves in the flag, ‘ordinary people’ celebrating the occasion or somewhat tangential features, such as a ‘How English are you?’ quiz (The Sun, 23/04/07: 10). The broadsheets rarely indulge in such tomfoolery although the right-wing dailies are not beyond publishing the odd opinion piece on the suppression of the English (see, for example, Daily Telegraph, 23/04/07: 20). Many of the newspapers also list special events where St George’s Day can be celebrated. Such events are
increasingly in evidence across the country, as zoos and other family attractions put on themed days out, pubs produce special menus, breweries look to cash in on beer promotions and concerts are held to mark the occasion (cf The Times Knowledge supplement, 23/04/05).

Examples of this trend include two (by now) annual events held in London, one organized by the Royal Society of St George which takes places in Covent Garden and the other which is supported by the Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, and held in nearby Trafalgar Square. In 2006, I attended both and was somewhat underwhelmed by the numbers in attendance (more of which below). No doubt the mayor was too, because in 2007, he organized a fair more structured event with the theme of ‘English humour’ and ensured a raft of Monty Python tie-ins to increase its appeal. This seemed to work with around 2000 people taking part.

Having outlined a range of features that indicate a growing, albeit intermittent, preoccupation with St George’s Day at the institutional level, I would like to examine the degree of significance my respondents accorded the day itself and then some of the wider debates they discussed in relation to it.

_English and proud?

_Beyond a minority who were quite prominently involved in promoting English national identity through official organisations (Hastings Group), the subject of St George’s Day elicited a fairly mixed and generally non-committal range of responses. The majority had never done anything special for the day, while for those who acknowledged doing anything at all, this wasn’t always intentional and, as a rule, involved a trip to the pub!

_Tina: I’ve gone to the pub for St George’s Day (Enfield Group)

_Tony: I’ve been to, I’ve been, like Nick said, I’ve been to pubs on St George’s Day which were decked out in ‘Come and celebrate St George’s Day’ but ...

_James: I, I wasn’t really there for St George’s Day ...

_Tony: ... the pub was open and it was cheaper because it was St George’s Day (Swindon Group)

Furthermore, while many individuals were keen for it to be made a bank holiday, this doesn’t really tell us that much given that most people are likely to reply in the
affirmative when offered the prospect of another day off work! Having said this, three of the groups (Liverpool, Taunton, Hastings) referenced the case of the publican who was refused an extended licence for St George’s Day (see above) while others talked about the subject in far more emphatic terms:

Interviewer: OK, I’ve got one last question ... which is with regard to celebrating ...Englishness or Britishness.

Steve: Bloody disgrace, it’s not a national holiday, St George’s Day (South London Group)

Sean: I think there’s a resurgence of Englishness, there seems to be a lot more happening with things like St George’s Day ...

Anne: That’s right.

Sean: ... and the quest to make it a bank holiday.

Anne: Once again, it’s because we perceive that certain sections of the community are allowed to ... um .. worship or celebrate their (unclear) and we’re not (Birmingham Group)

In the first extract Steve quickly crystallises what had been a rather vague opening statement about celebrating the nation into a fairly passionate outburst against the status of St George’s Day, which seems to indicate that this is a subject he has considered or discussed in the past. A sense of injustice comes to the fore in the second extract as minorities are again seen to possess forms of agency denied the in-group. Here, the reference to worship indicates that Anne is drawing a boundary between the two groups on the basis of religion.

This is, of course, relevant in the wider context of this thesis but what I particularly want to focus on in this discussion is the fact that much of the talk about St George’s Day also focuses on a different set of proximal ‘Others’. These are the other national groups within Britain, the Scots (in particular), Welsh and Irish, who are being increasingly portrayed and perceived as being privileged by the government at the expense of the majority English. An example of this in the press come from a front page story in the Daily Mail entitled “Divided Kingdom”, which outlined the range of social benefits received by Scots but unavailable to the English. Inside, the paper wondered whether this “new apartheid” would “shatter 300 years of union” (16/06/07: 1/14-15).
Similarly, within the group discussions, comparisons between the paucity of events designed to celebrate Englishness vis-à-vis ‘Other’ groups in Britain often become inter-twined with wider diatribes against devolution, a subject that generated a fair amount of antipathy among my own respondents.

“Perhaps we should be doing it more”

In the first place, let us examine how well established (and obviously well known) events designed to celebrate the ‘Celtic’ nations in Britain are discussed in relation to the situation of the English.

Susan: We could do with some more bank holidays, we don’t have enough bank holidays, personal opinion, compared to other Europeans, we can’t we have theirs, y’know, and have it on St George’s, yes.

Simon: Yeah, that would be good, have it on St George’s Day, we celebrate St Patrick’s Day.

Susan: And, and St David’s Day and .... St Andrew’s Day. Burns Night, for people in Scotland. We don’t have anything (Devon Group)

Sarah: Because I feel ...again, that they, they see the Welsh and the Scottish celebrating their national days and think, ‘well, why the hell aren’t we?’ (Cheltenham Group)

Paula: I think gradually we are because, I think the Scots celebrate ...

Carole: Yes.

Paula: ... St Andrews Day. And the Irish certainly do St Patrick’s ... um ... I think, gradually we’re thinking, well, perhaps we should be doing it more ...

Carole: We should do.

Norman: But we haven’t been encouraged to (Middlesex Group)

These extracts are almost defined by a degree of ambivalence towards celebrating George’s Day, indicating that the subject is not something that these people have given much thought to or discussed before. However, when asked directly it is interesting to see the extent to which the statements follow a pattern, first noting the fact that ‘Others’ within Britain celebrate their identity and then, albeit guardedly, proposing that the English should do likewise.
In these cases it might be argued, and this is somewhat speculative, that there is a growing tension as antipathy towards overt displays of English nationalism becomes compromised by the desire to re-establish the group's dominant status in the face of a range of perceived internal and external challenges. This ties in with the idea that the dominant English classes had been largely able to submerge their own sense of identity within a wider British framework, in the process portraying themselves as above any parochial interests. As this state of affairs has come under increasing pressure both from within and externally, these challenges have produced the need for an 'outlet' whereby the dominant group's symbolic ownership can be re-established. To put it bluntly, what I am posting here is the idea that the gradual recognition of St George's Day (and I certainly do not want to overstate the significance of the event at present) represents the opening up of a formerly secure sense of identity among the English in relation to Britain as a whole.

"I woke up English"

For example, a number of those involved in organizing 'official' St George's Day celebrations in the centre of London all pointed to the fact that they had been largely inspired by the promotion of other British national groups celebrations and/or devolution, itself.

Greg: Yeah ... um ... three years ago we started the ... erm ... started the St George's Day events ... which I suppose was in response to the fact that Ken Livingstone had decided to, you know the story, put £100,000 into a St Patrick's Day parade .

Dave: People are getting fed up with people flogging St Patrick's Day and St Andrew's Day and not allowing St George's Day. You put a St George's Day flag up and they call it racialist (Interview 1, Covent Garden)

Frank: But that [devolution] changed the whole deal in these islands ... erm ....[unclear] ... I went to bed on the night of the referendum British and woke up English (Interview 2, Covent Garden)

The question of devolution was also raised within the group interviews, in many cases following directly on from those that bemoaned the suppression of Englishness vis-à-vis the other British nations.

Edna: No, on all the, the presenters and people [on the BBC], the Scottish.

Frank: Oh, the Scots.

Edna .. have you noticed this?
Diana: How many Scottish MP's are their standing in ....

Edna: Yeah, yeah.

Diana: .. representing the population of how many? ... The actual legal, or the way this country is governed is fundamentally biased. The fact that the prime minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer ...and they're all Scottish (Liverpool Group)

The inter-textual nature of some of these debates is illustrated by the first exchange, where Frank responds to Edna's initial assertion with a comment, "Oh, the Scots" which seems to indicate that this is something that he has been aware of or discussed before. The way in which the group then colludes in building the argument against Scottish over-representation in the media and politics is striking, as if this is something that they have all perceived independently and are now enthusiastically confirming through a joint discussion. In this way, the process of devolution becomes a focus for English disquiet about the perceived imbalance in relations between the constituent nations of Britain. This idea is most consistently applied to the role of Scottish MP's in the British government and cabinet.

Norman: The government’s setting out to, to knock down all ....

Gerard: Undermine Englishness.

Jack: Yeah.

Interviewer: But why would they do that?

Norman: Because they're Scotsmen! (Middlesex Group)

The Middlesex Group trade in a broad conspiracy about the infiltration of the government by Scottish elites, which has become a popular refrain among English nationalists (an admittedly small group). However, it is worth noting that this argument again draws on a sense of injustice whereby a privileged minority is apparently able to exploit the majority, defined once more in national terms.

John: I used to be British but since they seem to have, made such a great play of wanting their independence and sod them, I'm English.

Interviewer: Who's they?

John: Well, the Welsh ....

Peter: Welsh, Scots .... (Cheltenham Group)
Derek: Well, that was a silly, silly, that’s driven a wedge between, between neighbours isn’t it? It’s like building a, planting a conifer hedge ....

Kathy: Yes, it is, honestly. I was laughing at the analogy.

Derek: Yeah. And, and nobody’s got the guts to cut the hedge down. The fact that we’ve got more bloody Scottish men in the, in the ... cabinet ...

Tom: .. that’s right ...

Derek: ... than we’ve ever had. And now they’ve got a right to vote on things for us (Doncaster Group)

A number of these extracts make implicit reference to the ‘West Lothian question’, which has drawn attention to the fact that Scottish MP’s sitting in the British parliament are able to vote on purely English affairs -for example, the imposition of university fees in England - while English MP’s are not able to do likewise for Scottish matters, where those studying at Scottish universities do not pay fees. This has produced a degree of dissent in England, evidenced by reports in the press, where the Scottish electorate is seen to benefit from more generous social welfare policies at the expense of the English.

Another quantitative survey of three newspapers (The Sun, Daily Mail, The Guardian) using Lexis Nexis software indicated that mentions of the ‘West Lothian question’ had risen from seven in 2000, to 24 in 2003 and then 62 for the first ten months of 2007. Therefore while it is still obviously not a major issue, at least for the press, it is growing in prominence. Indeed, some scholars have suggested that the higher profile of this issue is the reason why the English are increasingly unwilling to describe themselves as British (Johnson reported in the Daily Mail, 24/01/07: 7).

The last two extracts are particularly interesting as they illustrate a somewhat ambivalent attitude towards devolution. Peter’s recent retreat into a more parochial English category, in response to ‘their’ independence, again assigns agency to the ‘Other’ but it is the term, “such a great play” that is of particular interest here. Rather than taking Scottish claims for independence seriously, they are instead portrayed as akin to a child making continuous and unreasonable demands. Peter then draws a powerful distinction between his own rational position, in rising above

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92 See, for example, “Being ruled by the Scots is no joke for the English majority” (Daily Telegraph, 17/05/06: 14) or “Ungrateful Scots have finally awakened the dormant nationalism of the English” (The Independent, 03/07/06: 27).
parochial interests, and the truculent 'Other' who must be taught a lesson for upsetting a previously settled state of affairs.

A similar shift occurs in the final extract, where again we see a complex political process reduced to something as insignificant and 'silly' as a squabble between neighbours (note again how nations become anthropomorphised into actual people). This analogy not only belittles Scottish aspirations to nationhood but also places the two groups on equal terms. Furthermore, Scottish autonomy is contrasted with the unwillingness of English elites to restore the previously existing (and presumably more rational) state of affairs. In some ways, this idea of gutlessness reflects earlier debates concerning political correctness and the need for the majority to re-establish a more 'common sense' system rather than bowing down to minority demands or EU diktats.

This fairly benign opening is then supplanted by a far more passionately articulated sense of injustice, in which the 'foreign' nationality of the cabinet is listed as the underlying problem and its repercussions for 'us' (that is, the English) outlined, again with reference to the West Lothian question. In this way, we see a shift from the portrayal of an equal partnership of nations in Britain to a fairly well documented 'them' and 'us' framework where the 'Other' is seen to be privileged at 'our' expense.

"We're all the same country"

The final example that I want to reference perhaps illustrates the crux of the argument that I am trying to make here, a sense of genuine puzzlement (and unease) that devolution, and in particular 'Celtic' antipathy towards the English (beyond, say, sporting encounters) seems to have produced for some:

Ray: "I was in Scotland (unclear) this little girl, was eight-years old, from England, beautiful little kid, she was on the stage, eight fucking Jocks, eight Jocks, said "Get off"...they all went "Boo, boo" and I'm like, I stood on my seat and went, 'All of us, we're all the same country, we're all the same country, what are you booing an eight-year old child for?'" (Middlesbrough Group)

Exhibiting a similar sense of bafflement as regards to the changing nature of the British socio-political landscape as the Doncaster and Cheltenham Groups, but articulated in far starker terms, Ray's plea echoes a number of the challenges facing the English within Britain at the current time. Having, as the dominant group,
previously been able to conflate Britain and England as an unproblematic and fairly secure identity, many English people seem to find it difficult to understand why the other national groups within Britain would want to consider changing what appears to them to be a perfectly acceptable arrangement. This argument overlooks the relations of power between the different groups within Britain and thereby undermines any possible objections the non-English nations might have. As a result, we get the passionate claim, “we’re all the same country”, whilst at the same time castigating those responsible for the booing as “Jocks”.

What then do these relatively complex debates about devolution and the shifting boundaries of ‘us’ and ‘them’ within Britain tell us about a small, largely neglected saint’s day and the gradually emerging narratives around it? First, it should be reiterated that both my own qualitative data and wider public surveys indicate that St George’s Day is not a particularly significant issue for most people within England. When asked many do not even know when the day is and the majority does not go out of their way to celebrate it. Yet the gradual emergence of the event within the calendar, even as an excuse to go and drink cheap beer, and, in particular, the way it is being used to reference and even make sense of wider structural transformation in Britain, makes it, I think, worthy of further scrutiny.

For instance, Ian Botham’s assertion, “Why shouldn’t it be a national holiday? Our heritage is being eroded” in relation to the campaign to make St George’s Day a bank holiday, might seem a little puzzling given that the 23rd April has never been officially recognized or celebrated and was largely an irrelevance for most until very recently. Therefore, the term ‘heritage’ (which is taken as given by both Botham and the newspaper which quoted him) may actually be referring to the wider changes occurring in Britain at the present time, including devolution. A routine text message published in the Daily Star also partly illustrates this point:

Jedi Order don’t run UK, if they did crime and immigration would b low, sentences 2 fit crime, UK pulled out of EU, NHS sorted out & St Georges day public hol (Daily Star, 07/09/07: 51)

Ignoring the significance of the ‘Jedi Order’, I find it fascinating to see how St George’s Day features alongside far more recognizable and high profile laments about ‘this country’, many of which we have already discussed in some detail in Chapter 6.
One text, of course, does not make an argument but it seems to me that St George’s Day may be (slowly and only for some) an increasingly accessible framing device through which English discontent in relation to issues such as multiculturalism, political correctness and devolution may be expressed. This may be particularly significant given that the ‘spaces’ for talking about nationality have been limited in the past as a largely dominant and settled sense of identity meant that the English generally had ‘no need’ for such forums.

Summary

Although I have suggested in this study that the everyday realm must be studied more systematically in order to better understand how discourses become sedimented through a range of micro-practices, this chapter has been designed to illustrate the “ontological connections” (Blehr, 1999: 39) that exist between the banal and the ecstatic. In this respect it has been argued that ecstatic national events may help to concretise the image of the nation as disparate individuals engage in a range of temporally structured activities that draw on everyday symbols of the nation. As a result, the image of collectivity generated by these events may echo into the wider routines of daily life so that the passionately waved flag becomes once more, “mindlessly remembered” (Billig, 1995: 46). In this way such national symbols become part of the comfortable furniture of everyday existence precisely because their meaning and salience has been re-articulated and (presumably) approved during a heightened ritual performance. However, while participation per se is therefore crucial in materialising the nation, we cannot assume that such events have a similar meaning for those that take part, which must be investigated as an empirical question.

In the case of contemporary England I have examined the meaning which different individuals attributed to these celebrations and, in particular, their growing visibility from the end of the 1990’s. Initially, it was noted how displays of national pride were characterised by many as inappropriate and the preserve of emotional or hubristic ‘Others’, both internal and external, an argument that defined the in-group as rational, disciplined and enlightened (See also Chapter 5).

In response to the question of why such events might be increasing in visibility in England, two broad strands were identified. The first focused on the perceived role that the media have had in promoting these events, while the second described a
growing need for the (white) English/British majority to display ‘their’ identity as previously taken-for-granted certainties concerning forms of national identity and solidarity were opened up to scrutiny. While the first is of some importance (although beyond the scope of this study), the latter position ties in rather well with the earlier discussions concerning the perceived threat from undomesticated ‘others’ and the need to re-establish the symbolic position of the dominant (white) majority within the national space.

Similarly, conversations about St George’s Day reflected some of the wider public and media debates concerning the (perceived) marginalisation of the English in a post-devolution era. Here, a number of my own respondents raised the issue of devolution and the extent to which internal and proximal ‘Others’ (Scottish, Welsh and Irish) were seen to be challenging a settled state of affairs, which is unmindfully predicated on English hegemony. Consequently, it has been argued that such events increasingly provide a ‘space’ where anxieties concerning the transformation of the socio-political landscape in Britain can be articulated, notably as a previously settled sense of place and self largely precluded the need for such debates in the past. As Krishan Kumar writes, “the English [are] feeling increasingly dislocated, increasingly isolated on an island that they had previously regarded as theirs” (2003:268). Compounding this unease is a relatively strong sense of identity among the other British nations who are in many cases able to define themselves in opposition to the majority English.

Overall, the previous two chapters have been designed to examine the ways in which national modes of belonging and understanding are for different people in England becoming subject to sustained pressure in an era of increasing global flows (Hall, 1997). In theoretical terms, these processes can be understood in relation to the concept of de-sedimentation and the attempts of those groups who regard themselves as rightful managers of the national space and culture to re-establish previously taken-for-granted forms of doxa. It is also suggested that these frameworks of reference provide a significant point of anchorage in terms of locating and assigning status to different groups on the basis that they un/conditionally belong. As a result, those who (are seen to) form part of the dominant group are more likely to resist any perceived challenges to their position.

However, while “a globalised world is for many ... devoid of certainty, ... a world where many people feel intensified levels of insecurity as the life they once led is
being contested" (Kinvall, 2005: 742), for others it may represent an opportunity to actively engage with different people, novel tastes, images and sounds and new ways of being and doing (Basch et al, 1996, Giddens, 2002, Beck, 2000, 2004). As Ulf Hannerz writes, “interspersed among those most committed nationals, in patterns not always equally transparent are a growing number of people of more varying experiences and connections” (1996: 89).

We have already discussed in Chapter 2 the arguments of those who suggest that increasing global flows and connections create a “sense of boundarylessness” (Beck, 2006: 3), which in turn may open up new spaces of interaction and imagination that move beyond the nation. In the next chapter, I want to raise a number of these debates in relation to my own interview data as one of the primary criticisms of the cosmopolitan agenda has been that its adherents fail to provide empirical evidence for the claims being made (Calhoun, 2003, Skbris et al, 2004). In this respect, I want to examine whether the idea of the cosmopolitan has any theoretical purchase by exploring the degree to which debates surrounding the increasing potentialities offered by globalisation are taken up by my respondents, this time in a more positive manner.
Chapter 8: "Broadening our horizons" - Unpacking cosmopolitan discourse through an analysis of home, agency and privilege

Introduction

In this chapter, we will explore the manner in which my respondents discussed a wide range of issues, including patterns of mobility and consumption, attitudes towards travel and European integration, which are seen to offer potential challenges to a national frame of reference. Although these topics rarely dominated the interviews they still point to some interesting ideas and the fact that they did not generate much heated debate is perhaps significant in itself.

In the first section, there will be a primary interest in focusing on whether macro-indicators of increasing global mobility, discussed in Chapter 3, were evidenced by my discussants in relation to their own patterns of movement and consumption and the degree to which more distant places are being transformed into familiar ‘zones of operation’ (Schutz, 1964). Here, we will also address the role of the media, this time in relation to the idea that they allow people to ‘travel’ imaginatively without having to leave the comfort of their own homes or local environs.

The second section we will move beyond what people do to see whether these practices are seen to be meaningful and, if so, in what ways. In particular, there will be a primary interest in examining whether, when and why national discourse is rejected. First, it will be observed how discussions of overseas travel among my respondents often drew on the well-defined division between the tourist and the traveller (Buzard, 1983). However, these more normative dispositions can be unpacked by examining how notions such as agency, home and otherness were also articulated, whether in general terms or in relation to specific events, such as the Asian Tsunami (Chouliaraki, 2005, Kivukuru, 2006).

A final section will draw together these practical and cognitive elements in relation to the question of Europe, which has been viewed as a primary example of political, economic and cultural integration at a supra-national level (Beck & Grande, 2007). Although, it has been noted in a previous chapter, that Europe as a political entity was often perceived as a threat to national homogeneity and values in England, these discussions point to the increasing availability of an alternative framework for making
sense of place and self at the current time, albeit one linked to both mobility and cultural/economic capital. A concluding section will then assess the theoretical validity of the concept of cosmopolitanism in light of some of the earlier discussions.

"The world's got smaller hasn't it?"

It is probably no surprise to learn that all my respondents, from the oldest to the youngest, either travelled more now or, if limited by age or funds, perceived that overall mobility had increased dramatically for people in England.

Interviewer: And do you think it's changing for your generation? Do you think you are moving more?

Susanna: Yeah.

Aaron: It's getting more accessible.

Interviewer: And do you all, so your friends etc, do they travel further afield, I mean are they going abroad on holidays and stuff like that?

Susanna: Yeah, I think, some of them, like, one of my friends, until a few years ago she'd never been out of the county but I think she's probably more gone abroad than gone to like places in this country (Appledore Group)

Interviewer: Have you all travelled? Do you think you travel more now than you did in the past?

Nicola: Mmm.

Claire: Than our parents particularly yeah ... my mam and my grandma didn't go abroad until they were like in their mid-30's or something and like I went when I was like 11 (Carlisle Group)

Peter: It's no closer than it ever was but it's just so much easier than it ever was and cheaper, relative ...That's definite, I mean, my, my kids have travelled all over the world. They've been to Japan and Australia and New Zealand, whatever. Well, my, that's was beyond my parents comprehension (Cheltenham Group)

Simon: Yeah. It's so much easier. We've gone from being an island to an international hub basically. You can fly and work anywhere now and do anything (Devon Group)

Nora: I was offered time in France when I was at school but my mother wouldn't let me go because it wasn't done in those days and ...um .. I mean, I've been abroad a lot since ....

Albert: .. same as me ...(Margate Group)
Terry: ... y’know everyone used to pile out of Oldham, Rochdale, Bury, Blackpool. Blackpool, Morecombe, North Wales, that was your, now the, the first thing they think about now is, ‘Are we going back to Majorca or Ibiza or ...

Betty: Some go to India, don’t they, for a holiday, people?

Terry: Yeah, yeah, I mean, there’s nowhere now where we think of, ‘Oh, we’d never get there’ (Manchester Group)

These are useful examples of the way in which the more macro-scale indicators of increasing mobility are reflected in ‘everyday’ conversations about travel as a largely routine feature in so many people’s lives. One of the most significant aspects of this talk is the emphasis almost all place on change and the fact that in the past overseas travel was beyond the means and, hence, experience, of most people. Nora, for example, a pensioner from Margate, refers to the fact that in the past overseas travel was seen as socially unacceptable for, in this case, women, while many of the comments can be usefully examined by returning to Schutz’s writing on ‘zones of operation’. This conceptualises ‘space’ in hierarchic or concentric units that, gaining in complexity, reflexivity and unfamiliarity, broadly radiate out from a central locus, which forms the realm of the known, the embodied and the habitual.

For instance, Terry compares the past holiday destinations of people from the urban centres of the north-west, which are seaside resorts in Britain no more than 70 miles away from ‘home’, with the contemporary alternatives which all involve a movement beyond national borders. In this way, places such as Ibiza and Majorca become familiar to increasing numbers of people and perhaps part of their routine knowledge about the world. This process of getting to know other places and people is likely to come both through the actual holiday itself and the ways in which such trips are planned, evaluated, mediated and imagined.

Similarly, Betty’s barely disguised incredulity concerning the status of India as a holiday destination reflects the idea that certain areas have been transformed within the space of a generation from distant spaces on a map to places ‘ordinary’ people might conceivably visit. This generation gap is also referenced by Peter who contrasts his parents’ inability to even imagine that their grand-children might be able to travel so easily to far-flung corners of the globe. Finally, Simon’s glowing assessment of the ‘potentialities’ offered by increased mobility reflects some of the most optimistic writing on the subject, claiming that anything is now possible.
Changing expectations with regard to global mobility and the increasing affordability of international travel is crucial in moving manifold individuals into ‘foreign’ zones allowing them to (at least potentially) engage with ‘otherness’ on a far more regular basis. If mobility is one aspect of this process, then patterns of consumption both abroad and at home represent another interesting feature.

Global café culture?

Further evidence of the ways in which the ‘potentialities’ offered by globalisation are being routinely embraced and incorporated into everyday lives can also be seen in the more reflexive discussions about the products and tastes ‘we’ share with those living outside our immediate national environment.

Jason: No, it’s general aspirations. Ten years ago, you’d go into a shop and get a, a ham and cheese sandwich, now you get a fetta, baloney ....

Claire: Ciabatta.

Jason: Ciabatta.

Stuart: But what’s wrong with that?

Jason: It’s just our aspirations about what we want ....

Stuart: That’s getting some of the nice ...

Lee: But that’s quite European isn’t it, I suppose (Swindon Group)

Martin: We get so many foreign students here, it’s just a small example of what happens all over Europe, all over the world, people are going over borders all the time because they want the same things out of life.

Nina: Things like eating and café culture.

Martin: Y’know, if you go to any British pub now, (unclear) but I suppose 15 or 20 years ago you wouldn’t have been able to get a cappuccino in a lot of bars but now they’re everywhere so the sort of things that we enjoy are the same things that people all over Europe and the world enjoy.

Nina: Yeah, absolutely, I’d, I’d feel very stifled if everything, if I didn’t have all these, if I didn’t go out for my cappuccino (LAUGHS) and all this and if it was typically, typically British, if it was conforming to all the stereotypes that we talked about earlier (Birmingham Group)

We’ll return to the idea of Europe later but for now it’s worth observing that these extracts again point towards the idea of change and how forms of what might once have been labelled as exotica are now routinely incorporated into people’s lives. This
is evidenced by the rather bland nature of the first exchange where the use of hedges, ("It's just", "I suppose") and the adjective "nice" define this subject as a non-issue for those present. Elsewhere, although Justin may be drawing a distinction between the familiar (a cheese sandwich) and the novel (ciabatta) in national terms, the deictic term 'our', in "our aspirations", is an "overgeneralization" (Schegloff, 1972: 87) which allows those who aspire to such 'foreign' tastes to stand in for the in-group as a whole. Observing this process reminds us that these 'tastes' often remain the preserve of particular privileged groups, as we shall see.

In the second extract, Nina offers a more stark evaluation of these changes by actively contrasting the broad range of opportunities available to her now with the staid conformity she associates with British norms and values. The term "stifled" is particularly evocative as it connotes the idea of either something being suppressed or someone who is struggling to breathe, in this case in the cloying atmosphere of a familiar national culture. The fact that she chooses to illustrate her argument with a cappuccino offers further evidence that it is through daily rituals, including patterns of consumption, that particular discursive forms become routinised.

I have already made a brief reference to the status of those who articulated this more open outlook towards different practices and lifestyles or recognised in themselves commonalities with 'Others' living abroad and this idea is worth pursuing further. In most cases, these individuals were college educated, aged between 30 and 40 years, in a number of cases spoke another language and could broadly be described as part of an upwardly mobile, liberal, middle-class group. Here, we can tentatively point to a link between greater access to economic and cultural capital and the degree of agency that underpins such encounters whereby individuals are able to first evaluate novel styles and attractions as potential opportunities and then take advantage of them. This idea will be explored in greater detail below.

*Mediated interaction*

Another subject that I tried to address during the group interviews was the role of the media in these processes. This is because a range of studies have argued that the media are crucial in allowing people to access and engage with 'otherness' across different contexts in the process providing 'spaces' for new forms of non-national imagination and perhaps solidarity to emerge (cf Tomlinson, 1999, Rantanen, 2005).
Interviewer: What about the internet, do you think that’s changed the way people live their lives?

Dan: Yeah. You can ...people can find out anything about anybody really (Newcastle College Group)

Doreen: I think we’re very, very lucky with the television services that we get and you know the way we can go all round the world just sitting in our armchairs, y’know (Surrey Group)

Shirley: It’s ... um .. we had an e-mail from people we met in New Zealand, didn’t we? ... And that was, it, it was so quick. We sent them a card and .. uh .. we had an email back and we were sent a photograph of their garden, with their cherry tree in it which was delightful and that was very instant somehow.

Richard: I find it useful, yeah .... (Taunton Group)

Debbie: People that take part in online games, online communities, my housemate does some, plays some fantasy game with people all over the world, y’know, in his bedroom which I used to think was really a bit geeky and a bit sad but it’s quite amazing that his has these relationships with people, y’know, that are so distant, so .. uh .. it sort of, the technology brings people closer together, y’know (Brighton Group)

As for much of the talk about ‘foreign’ purchasing practices, the most interesting aspect of these debates about the media’s role in broadening horizons is that the language used is so matter of fact, focusing in the main on utility and convenience. Mike Savage and his colleagues also make reference to this feature in their study of Globalisation and Belonging (2005), noting that while the “media allows significantly more spatial and social diversity for our audiences” the consequences of this tend to be underplayed resulting in “narratives of ordinariness” (ibid: 154)\(^93\).

Whether or not this is the case for others is obviously an empirical question but this data seems to indicate the degree to which many have ‘domesticated’ new technologies such as the internet, incorporating them into the rhythms and routines of daily life (Bakardijeva 2005)\(^94\). This fact is significant for it means that the media’s ability to take us “all round the world” has become part of what people take-for-granted so that witnessing and, in some cases, engaging with difference is part of what they do on a routine basis.

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\(^93\) It doesn’t seem then that my respondents are faced by the same issues as Mark Poster who when using the internet (apparently) puzzles, “Where am I then? Who am I?” (quoted in Beck, 2000: 102).

\(^94\) In the process, such evidence provides a further challenge to the first wave of new media theorists who tended to view the internet, in particular, as a deterministic medium that would irrevocably alter social relations on a global scale (Meikle, 2002: 33-38).
However, the argument that "a banal globalism is ready to hand and increasingly acts as a backdrop for an enormous amount of media information" (Szerszynski & Urry, 2002: 477) cannot be used to make broader claims about audiences and their orientations. A "strong awareness of global flows" of people, products etc. is not the necessary condition for the emergence of a "mundane cosmopolitanism" (ibid: 472) as for many the local or the quotidian will "still set the agenda of relevance" (Tomlinson, 1999: 176).

A good example of this process can be illustrated with reference to an actual event, the Asian Tsunami, which, while global in terms of media coverage, was also often explicated in relation to the identity of those involved. As the next section will illustrate, it was the suffering of people more or less like 'us', defined in both local and national terms, in distant locales that made the events particularly resonant.

"It doesn't make any difference though"

When discussing with one group the role of the media in "broadening our horizons", the subject of the Asian Tsunami was raised. Interestingly, while both members of the group suggested that the media were important in making people aware of such global issues they argued that it made little difference to the ways in which people thought or acted. Furthermore, they suggested that the Tsunami was such a high profile issue in Britain because Thailand was now such a popular destination for British people:

Janet: Did you not think that's also because people now know that for example we could have been there ...whereas twenty, thirty years ago, the likelihood that you would have travelled to those countries ...

Steve: Forty, fifty years ago, you'd never go there.

Janet: .... you wouldn't have gone there. So therefore, it's, it's almost a fact, that it's, it's affecting people, we had people at school who were affected by it (South London Group)

According to my respondents, then, what made the disaster truly meaningful was not only the scale of the event and the sheer weight of media coverage that followed it (Chouliaraki, 2006: 1), but also the fact that it involved recognizable people, doing things 'we' could relate to. In this case, Thailand is no longer a place beyond our imagination but a country where our friends and neighbours go on holiday, it becomes a zone where increasing numbers have the possibility to operate (to re-appropriate Schutz’s terms). The point I am trying to make is that any focus on the new (the fact
that increasing global mobility and awareness quite obviously matter) should not allow us to overlook those factors or processes which remain more or less significant at the local or national level. Furthermore, these comments may offer an important insight for those that look to analyse the processes by which the media, in an age of globalisation, stages, “our relationship with the far away other” (Chouliaraki, 2006: 113) and in particular those who are seen to be suffering. Here I want to focus on one recent study, Lilie Chouliaraki’s *The Spectacle of Suffering* (2006) as it is not only a carefully argued and balanced work but is also largely predicated on a post-national framework. She writes, “if the nation has been, in the past, a major resource for cultural resonance, the question today is whether or not we being confronted with alternative resources that construe ‘beyond the nation’ modes of resonance and homogenize new configurations of people” (2006: 12).

Taking, as a starting point, the UN’s Secretary General’s argument that the Asian Tsunami disaster of 2003 represented a watershed as a “display of global unity” (2006: 1), Chouliaraki goes on to identity three types of disaster news, adventure, emergency and ecstatic, and the ways in which each sets up divisions between self, largely construed as the West, and other. Using the example of the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in 2001, she argues that the latter news-type (re)presents both “suffering and identification” (ibid: 157). In this way, there is a shift from “thinking about terrorism as a story about ‘Others’ to thinking about it as a real possibility for somebody like the Western spectators themselves” (2006: 188). In this case, and I am not dismissing Chouliaraki’s work by making this claim, we again seem to be presented with an argument (also made in Chapter 5) that some news is seen as ‘ours’ while others stories are mainly to do with them. Obviously, whether or not the in and out group is shifting in a new era of global inter-connectedness is important but acknowledging new or emerging pan-national solidarities should not blind us to the ways in which a national context continues to inform such reporting.

“A selfishness of orientation”

Although Chouliaraki offers a detailed and insightful analysis of media content, there is no attempt made to map how different audiences responded to these spectacles. In this respect, I would like to examine a further empirical study, this time of “Tsunami communication in Finland” (Kivikuru, 2006) as it provides a useful counter-point to the wider debates about new forms of global imagination.
The Finnish study is interesting because it notes how in the first place coverage of the disaster largely focused on the scale of the phenomenon. However, once Finnish news reporters began to arrive in the affected areas, “the Finnish media switched focus almost entirely to what had happened to Finns in the area. In fact, all the Scandinavian media seemed to have behaved in a similar manner” (Kivukuru, 2006: 501). In this case, it seems that the claim then that the Tsunami disaster united the globe needs to be tempered with a closer analysis of how the story was reported and the degree to which, what Kivukuru calls, “a selfishness of orientation” (ibid) emerged.

That is, whether the age-old adage of ‘our’ deaths and ‘our’ stories of grief being more important and more relevant than ‘theirs’ came to the fore (Schlesinger, 1978: 117). The following comment from a foreign news editor quoted by Phillip Schlesinger over 20 years ago seems still relevant today: “the general public do feel themselves involved. They can identify with these ... the public see themselves in it - it’s a talking point” (ibid: 118). This takes us back to Tomlinson’s point that for many it is the relevance of the different news stories, whether globally situated or otherwise, to individual’s daily lives that makes them resonant and hence worthy of considered attention (1999: 176-177).

What these examples show is that we need to be investigate the potentialities of a globalising world empirically paying particular attention to both local contexts and the wider structures that limit the possibilities for action or engagement. After all, to observe that people travel more and use new media technologies to instigate or maintain relations across national borders is one thing. To argue that these phenomena, by definition, transform the same individuals into cosmopolitans, at ease with ‘otherness’, be it proximal or distant, and largely divested of national mores, is another. As Pheng Cheah writes, “The world is undoubtedly interconnected and trans-national mobility is clearly on the rise. But this does not inevitably generate meaningful cosmopolitanisms in the robust sense of a pluralised world political community” (2006: 292). Here again, I would also echo Veit Bader’s critique that too much emphasis tends to be placed on change and fluidity in much current work on place and belonging, so that what remains relatively unchanged or, at least, continues to be relevant/resonant is overlooked (Bader, 2001).
Therefore, in acknowledging new patterns of mobility, consumption and mediated interaction, and the fact that for many they seem to be such a routine feature of daily life, their impact should not be taken for granted. In other words, we need to try and ‘unpack’ this subject by moving beyond the simple observation of frequencies (who does what, when) by addressing the fundamental issues of power, agency and context. This will be the focus of the next section.

"You pick the bits that you want"

One of the primary debates within the literature on globalisation and its potential impact on concepts of identity and belonging is the degree to which increasing mobility and changing lifestyles are the preserve of particular elites who enjoy a range of “material privileges”, be they a ‘good’ passport, wealth or a range of international contacts (Calhoun, 2003: 543). Although cheaper transport and other production costs mean that the number of global travellers is increasing as a whole, the ability of particular groups (notably those associated with the more established, democracies of the “West”) to effectively manage their world-wide movements is worth noting. For instance, Ulrich Beck has argued that Western travellers may feel more “at home in all countries in the world” because they can stay in the same hotels, drink the same drinks, eat the same food and talk in the same language (English) (2006: 4-5). In other words, “the institutions of transnational culture tend to be organized so as to make people from Western Europe and North America, feel ... at home” (Hannerz, 1996: 107).

The idea of agency, linked to different forms of privilege, has been explored in the previous chapter, in relation to the idea of the proximal ‘Other’ that requires domesticating, and a similar argument can be made in relation to overseas travel, as the following extract suggests.

*Derek: It’s nice and bonny, they can’t have prosperity, we, we can have prosperity, we can have growth and we can buy cheap holiday homes in Bulgaria or whatever, but they can’t have prosperity ... we’re cherry picking, you pick the bits that you want but not the rest, y’know ...*

95 Adopting such a position should not blind us to the fact that less privileged diasporic communities and travellers “provide for other circuits of international connectivity” but often their more marginal status leads to “significantly different contextual pressures” (Calhoun, 2003: 543), that are perhaps not as relevant to this study.
Bill: .. the biggest group of ex, non-Spaniards in Spain are English and that's happening all throughout Europe, we're the only, it's like, y'know, they can't come here and take low paid jobs, but we can go there and buy a cheap house and do what the hell we like.

Neil: And take their jobs, as well (South Shields Group)

Here, the hypocrisy of 'our' (again note the wide use of deictic language) position is exposed as difference and mobility is to be celebrated and championed when it allows us to indulge in novel tastes and practices but is felt as a threat when it concerns the 'Other' imposing themselves in our local environs. This idea of 'cherry picking', whether it be the ability to go on cheap holidays, enjoy a cappuccino or buy a holiday home in Bulgaria, is I think a useful one as it points once again to the ability of some to broadly enjoy greater mobility on their own terms through both access to greater economic and socio-political resources.

"Do you speak English?"

A second example of this process, referenced by a number of my respondents, concerns language, and the degree to which native English speakers can take advantage of the fact that so many 'Other' people are able, and willing, to speak their mother tongue. The following extracts indicate the sense of comfort that people get from being able to speak their own language in 'foreign' places. This is particularly true for those born in England given that relatively few people speak a language other than English.

Gary: So, and we just sit there and go, like, 'do you speak English', and you just, that's why we never, my mum and dad, like, they're, like, 'oh, we're going to Spain, we're going to Cyprus'. I'm, like, 'why don't you go, like, Dubai or .. uh ... because no-one English, they think that no-one's going to speak English (North London Group)

As we noted in Chapter 1, language is a key element in generating a sense of common understanding and mutual recognition and Gary's comment points to the added comfort of being able to converse in one's own language when abroad. In this case, the ability to make oneself understood is likely to be an important factor in attending to or managing the more novel elements of the 'foreign' situations people might be confronted with as well as placing them at an advantage vis a vis those who speak English as a second language. In these cases, what we might be seeing is a "new
vehicle of postcolonial privilege" (Thompson & Tambyah, 2004: 219) whereby inequalities are refracted through the prism of a service ethos.

Interestingly, Gary chastises his parents' choice of holiday destination as part of a wider diatribe against those who hypocritically attack difference at home and yet stick to what they know when travelling. This more reflexive position echoes the critiques of the South Shields Group members but one wonders whether this ability to probe such inconsistencies at a distance, which is significant in its own right, is matched by a willingness to apply these principles in practice. For in the following example, we see how the ideal of "getting involved in what they actually do" (Cirencester Group) is rather undermined by the practice of what is done:

**Interviewer:** Do you all, do you find it comfortable being abroad?

**Melanie:** Yeah.

**Lauren:** Yeah.

**Shelley:** I think it's because ...

**Andrew:** They make you comfortable.

**Shelley:** ... they speak English.

**Lauren:** Yeah.

**Shelley:** Like when I went to Iceland, I never spoke a word of Icelandic, you didn't have to at all (Cirencester Group)

I think we can safely presume that Shelley would not have been able to speak much Icelandic had she needed to. It is more likely that a basic expectation, that someone will be able to speak English, was met and therefore the potential problematic of not being able to make yourself understood was rarely even an issue96. And yet, ironically enough, this is the same girl that so passionately criticised those who did not speak English to each other in the care home that she worked in (See Chapter 6). As Thompson and Tambyah write, what we are seeing here is a "delimited but inconsequential adaptability that is fundamentally tied to transnational commonalities produced by the institutional structures of the global economy" (1999: 228).

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96 A bilingual member of the Bexley Group also raised this issue by noting how, whilst on holiday in Spain, he had it "in the back of my mind" that people would still be able to speak English even if his rudimentary Spanish failed him.
In relation to this idea of flexibility, and in particular its links to particular forms of mobility and consumption, a study by Jennie Germann Molz (2006) offers further insights. Molz examined the ways in which global travellers, namely backpackers, bought and prized particular items as a way of showing their ability to adapt to different places and hence ‘fit in’ (ibid: 9). Yet at the same time “for the... travellers, flexibility and global readiness are always bound up in discourses of risk” (ibid), which often can be anticipated and managed by drawing on shared cultural resources, such as guidebooks, websites and personal contacts.

Therefore, whether these engagements with otherness are designed as a means of enjoying relative affluence in a tourist resort or accessing an ‘authentic’ cultural experience, they are often predicated on an ability to manage risk. The privileges of a Western passport, access to greater economic resources and global cultural capital are all crucial elements in this process, enabling those blessed with such advantages to engage with difference on their own terms. Furthermore, as I argued in Chapter 2, particular attention must be paid to the wider context when analysing these processes for that will ultimately inform the extent of any engagement.

Globalising privilege?

In relation to the idea of context, the situation of one of my respondents in the Swindon Group, who works in the oil industry in China but lives in England, might be usefully explored. Here, Jason is talking about the relations he has with different work colleagues and how they are centred on particular places and practices.

*Interviewer:* So you wouldn’t just necessarily just hang out with British people, you’d hang out with Europeans or Americans or?

*Jason:* Europeans, Americans, in China it’s anybody who’s not Chinese.

*Interviewer:* Right, and, and, you hang out as in you ...like, go out together restaurants and, and ...

*Jason:* Yeah, go round the houses, same bars, same clubs, same restaurants

Skilled workers, in these contexts, share an identity based on their trade, material privilege and (perhaps) whiteness and broadly represent a form of *homo economicus* whose mobility is linked to economic opportunity (Antonsich, 2007). This might then be labelled as a temporary or utilitarian form of pan-national solidarity, where
categories of self and other expand and contract in relation to changing contexts and, in particular, the shared experience of being away from ‘home’. I am wary of using the concept of cosmopolitanism in relation to this example given that the Chinese still operate as a very powerful ‘Other’ within this new trans-national context. Indeed, as we have already noted, this is one of the problems of simply defining cosmopolitanism as ‘openness to others’, which tends to be so vague as to be meaningless and does not take into account the conditional aspects of so many of these engagements.

Problematic definitions aside, what is notable here is that American and European workers are able to assert a temporary sense of ‘self’ and ‘place’ through a range of shared practices within locales that are designed and orientated towards their needs. A similar finding was produced by researchers involved in the ‘Cultural Globalalization Study’ where “globalizers” who spent over a third of their time abroad moved through the same “socio-cultural bubble” of offices, health clubs, airports etc in the major global cities (quoted in Bauman, 2001: 55). As a result, they were described as “cosmopolitans ... but in ways that are very limited and insular (ibid: 56).

This is not to suggest that such trans-national networks may not become ‘thickened’ over time (Kennedy, 2004) or that such movements abroad are not important in opening up to scrutiny previously held values and beliefs. However, these practices must always be evaluated in relation to context and, in particular, the degree to which any pan-national identities that emerge continue to draw on notions of ‘them’ and ‘us’, which, in this case, have long standing colonial histories.

As a result, particular attention needs to be paid to the ways in which some groups are more able “to sustain a favourable position within the socio-economic circuits of the global economy” (Thompson & Tambyah, 1999: 228) and the extent to which such privilege allows them to manage their relations with ‘Others’ in a range of shared practices. In other words, it is a conditional flexibility often located in broadly comparable (urban) settings, which generates solidarities that are “always situated, always imbued with partiality and vulnerability” (Ley, 2004: 161).

In the next section, I want to move away from debates centred on broader patterns of mobility and consumption to look at some of the ways in which my respondents perceived and articulated the significance of these shifts. In the first place, we will see how increased levels of mobility are explained in normative terms using the
dichotomy, between the cosmopolitan traveller and the parochial tourist (Buzard, 1993), with the former being privileged. However, this rather simplistic formulation again needs to be unpacked both for those who travel frequently, but on a temporary basis, and others who spend longer periods of time overseas, generally for work purposes. In both cases, it will be argued that a stable sense of place, underpinned by relative privilege, may allow for the emergence of more conditional forms of cosmopolitanism.

“We want to go over there to the sunshine and still have bangers and mash”

In his classic work The Tourist Gaze (2001), John Urry argued that for many travel “was a quest for authenticity ... and a modern version of the universal human concern with the sacred” (ibid: 9). Removed from the dull banalities of everyday, modern life, engagement with other cultures (and in particular the ‘exotic’97) is popularly viewed as a public good, providing an opportunity to “see things from a different perspective [and] ... learn new things” (quote from German ex-pat living in Singapore in Thompson & Tambyah, 1999: 226). The following comments offer further examples of this perspective:

Clare: I think you just mix with more countries, have a broader experience of how other people work and hopefully it makes you a better person (Swindon Group)

Steve: It broadens our horizons. It makes us more aware and understanding of how other nations ... operate (South London Group)

In contrast, being a tourist or visiting “boring touristy places [like] ... Benidorm” (Newcastle College Group) is discussed in pejorative terms. Tourists are seen to be unadventurous, narrow-minded and generally in search of what Theroux has labelled as ‘home-plus’ (quoted in Hannerz, 1996:104), that is, the comforts of home plus, say, good weather or access to a beach. The following examples from the group interviews not only demonstrate this idea but are also striking in the degree to which they pick on the same reference points to illustrate their arguments:

97 Some commentators have argued that in many ways the tourist gaze is an extension of “colonial and neo-colonial representations of the non-Western other ... [through] the voyeuristic consumption of the exoticized native .. culture” (Thompson & Tambyah, 1999: 218).
Karen: There’s just like a whole strip of English pubs with English names ... and just, y’know, selling purely English beer ... and, y’”know, they are full to the brim and, and the English people sort of flock to that. It’s ... um ... I, I find it really difficult ... because ... I don’t want to be part of that (Bexley Group)

Simon: Brits in Spain having an English breakfast as ugly as that sounds ...(Birmingham Group)

Alison: I think a lot of people think, well, y’know ...you’re going on holiday abroad to get better weather. But actually when we get there we still want fish and chips and we still want Watney's Red Barrel.

John: Speak for yourself.

Alison: That’s not me you understand! A lot of people do! ... then you get the, y’know, you get the other, other people go on holiday ...to go and find out about other people ... and they’d be very upset if they came across another English person (Newcastle Group)

Dave: You do find an awful lot of the Brits will, kind of, go over there and because they’ve got live football on, so what they do, they just swap locality and they go over there, they’ve got their all day English breakfasts, and I’m not knocking it, I’m saying it’s the way they live (Taunton Group)

In these extracts the divide between tourists and travellers is very much predicated on the idea of (class) distinction, linked to what Bourdieu has labelled as “cultural capital” (1984). We have already come across this idea in relation to national categories in Chapter 5, where dominant social groups attempt to secure their position within the national space through the privileging of their own values and practices.

In these instances, however, individuals do not draw on a national framework but instead juxtapose culture (as in being cultured) with nature. As Bourdieu writes, “The nature against which culture is ... constructed is nothing other than what is ‘popular’, ‘low’, ‘vulgar’, ‘common’ ... [and involves] a process of civilization” (quoted in Urry, 2001: 85). Those labelled as cultured are portrayed as being able to move through different locales with relative ease and are far more open to new experiences (Savage et al, 2005: 9). This is a useful idea in its own right but what I want to particularly draw attention to here is the way in which the cultured or cosmopolitan ‘us’ is distinguished from the ‘Other’ in these debates.

The uncultured ‘Other’
For example, in the above extracts ‘their’ vulgarity is illustrated with reference to one of the most powerful symbols of the nation, diet (See also Chapter 5). Here, eating and drinking, be it an English breakfast, fish and chips or beer comes to signify the ‘uncultured’ other, which in many cases produces feelings of real abhorrence. We saw in the earlier discussion of immigration how national discourse was used to refute a more universal-liberal position by appealing to a taken-for-granted world of nations. Alternatively, in these instances, these two competing positions can be mapped onto the concept of the traveller (enlightened, civilised, urbane, rational) and the tourist (vulgar, coarse, parochial, profane) with the former now being articulated as the acceptable position.

For instance, while some of the individuals quoted are careful not to be seen as too judgemental (“I’m not mocking it!”) all are keen to position themselves in the cosmopolitan category, which operates, in this case, as the trump card. As Thompson and Tambyah note, “middle class tourists generally prefer to be regarded as cosmopolitan travellers, and, reciprocally, the stereotype of the parochial tourist serves as a proscriptive image of how not to experience different cultures when travelling” (1999: 216). In this way, particular forms of travel have come to be (re)presented and valued as “the key to self-enhancement and the attainment of a sophisticated worldly outlook” (ibid: 217).

This is obviously an important finding given that a national framework is being rejected in favour of a more cosmopolitan perspective. However, there is a further idea that I would like to explore here and that concerns the extent to which adopting such a position when talking about overseas travel doesn’t actually cost anything and, in the process, allows one to present a rational and enlightened self-image (Billig et al, 1988: 34-6). We saw in previous chapters how individuals were able and willing to draw on a more cosmopolitan perspective in relation to some topics but when confronted by a more puzzling or potentially challenging situation or issue often shifted to a national footing as it provided a more accessible and common sense framework. It is my contention that we may need to pay attention to similar processes in relation to people’s talk about their own travels and/or engagement with ‘Others’.

A useful example of this comes from a recent empirical study of the “whole German population” (Mau et al, 2007: 2), which was designed to evaluate cosmopolitan attitudes on the basis of age, education and mobility. Initially, the researchers found
that "people with border-crossing experience and trans-national social relations are more likely to adopt cosmopolitan attitudes with respect to foreigners" (ibid: 1). Interestingly, they then discovered that in relation to foreigners at 'home' there was no correlation between mobility and a positive response to the question of "whether all foreigners living in Germany should have the same rights as Germans on all levels" (ibid: 16). This seems to indicate that "a willingness to engage with the other" (Hannerz, 1996: 103) through travelling does not necessarily translate into a more cosmopolitan attitude towards those who may represent a challenge to one's own sense of (national) self and place.

Therefore, what I want to argue is that more normative claims may obscure a degree of fuzziness and ambivalence in practice. In other words, it is unlikely that 'local' identities and solidarities are simply ditched in favour of a more cosmopolitan outlook but instead will be utilised according to circumstance and need. In the next section, I want to unpack the idea(l) of a global or cosmopolitan traveller by drawing on my own data, which will, in turn, be backed by a number of other recent empirical studies. In both cases, concepts relating to home, agency and the 'Other' will be used to illustrate the degree to which national discursive forms continue to permeate these debates.

Comfort zones and going home

Although, in my group discussions the traveller/tourist dichotomy was often used to assert a more cosmopolitan outlook, there were instances where a more ambivalent attitude towards travelling was displayed:

Charlotte: It's just comfort because they've been there before and they don't have to worry about getting lost or, y'know, I think it's just one of them comfort zone things. I mean I love going to Benidorm just to laze around and have a proper holiday where you don't have to do anything or be traipsing from art gallery to one crypt. It's just sometimes it's nice just to kick back for a week and do nothing, read a few books and chill (Newcastle College)

In the passage above we see an interesting shift as Charlotte first places other people in the category of tourist. That is, those who are not interested in seeking out new experiences as they would rather opt for the familiar and hence a feeling of security when going abroad. However, she then includes herself in this group, albeit as someone who can recognise the attraction of both positions, on the one hand being able to enjoy a "proper holiday" and on the other exploring new historical and cultural
sites. The language used in drawing a distinction between the two ‘roles’ is also worth examining, as becoming a traveller requires having to make an effort as the verb “traipsing” indicates. It is therefore not simply about being open to new experiences but actively seeking them out, in contrast to the tourist who doesn’t “have to do anything”. In other words, the traveller may be seen as the normative position but fitting into this category in practice exacts a cost, whether physical or psychological, and it is one that many people find relatively easy to refuse!

Therefore, it is the conditional nature of these engagements, and the sense of agency that underpins them that comes to the fore. Rather than focusing on the idea of the pure cosmopolitan it is suggested that we examine the moments when such a discourse is articulated, paying attention to both the wider context and the degree to which shifts occur between discourses (See also Chapter 5). For instance, while many of my respondents categorised themselves as regular and enthusiastic travellers, open to new experiences and people, these engagements were rarely portrayed or envisaged as anything more than temporary.

Albert: Well, I haven’t heard from him [a friend who moved abroad] ... and I often wonder meself, if he has done the right thing. Because it’s all, when we, like when I was young, not so long back, you go away on a holiday. Two or three weeks is quite enough. But to go and live out in Spain, I don’t think I could do it (Margate)

For Albert the lure of the exotic began to fade after two or three weeks away so that he welcomed a return to the comfort of what he knew. In this case, it is likely that dealing with the uncertainties caused by differences in, say, language, customs and institutional arrangements, which can be managed or enjoyed on a temporary basis, would generate too much of a cost over an extended period of time.

You just come right back

Others made explicit reference to the fact that returning ‘home’ was a critical, and enjoyable, part of the whole experience of travelling:

Simon: I mean, I’ve travelled around ... but I miss home so I always end up coming back and ...(LAUGHS) because you know it, you know the area, you know your friends are here and your family is here and whatever, y’know, you just come right back (Devon Group)
In the above extract, Simon is referring to ‘home’ as a local place centred on a fairly close network of friends and family that enable you to ‘come right back’ as if nothing has changed. In this instance home is more than a simple location, it is the place where one feels at ease, the ‘zone of operation’ where things and people can be taken-for-granted. This idea of predictability and comfort is also expressed in relation to the idea of ‘home’ in the following passage but in these cases it is the national ‘home’ that is being referenced:

Melanie: Yeah. I mean it is nice to go away but when, but when you come back it’s like ‘Oh, thank god I’m back’.

Andrew: Yeah.

Melanie: It’s the safety of hearing what you know.

Lauren: Yeah, the safety, and it is that I feel very stable and y’know.

Melanie: The novelty would wear of, there’s the excitement because you’re going away ...

Lauren: Yeah, yeah.

Melanie: .... because it’s different from the norm but if you lived there it would be like ...

Lauren: No, I wouldn’t, I wouldn’t ...

Shelley: It’s like when I went to Iceland, I went there for a month, in sort of mountains, you can, there’s no place in Iceland where you cannot see a mountain ... But then you just come back flying over England, it’s just green, it’s like ‘Oh, fields!’ (Cirencester Group)

I quoted the Cirencester Group at length because I think the extract rather nicely sums up some of the points I am trying to make here. In the first place, ‘here’ and ‘there’ are again described in national terms, while the comfort of being home is initially perceived through the classic English symbol of the countryside (see Chapter 5). Secondly, the novelty of being abroad is welcomed in as much as it provides individuals with a well-managed engagement with difference, generating a temporary sense of wonder or excitement. However, once the novelty has worn off then the prospect of returning ‘home’ to what is known can then be anticipated and enjoyed. Indeed, it might be argued that these travels far from undermining any sense of national identity actually concretise it as individuals first define themselves in opposition to ‘otherness’ and then find it wanting. Finally, the stability of ‘home’ is
founded on largely routine features of everyday (sensory) experience, in this case, what one sees and hears.

This process of imagining the national home does not only apply to those who take relatively short trips abroad but also for those whose overseas stays extend over months, turning them into semi-permanent migrants for the purposes of work:

Jason: It's very predictable here. That's why ... having the choice of living anywhere in the world, especially for my job, I keep coming back here because it's still gonna be here, my house is still gonna be here. People moan about the same things. I can put Eastenders on and pick up the story in one episode (Swindon Group)

This quote is particularly instructive if we compare it with the one above where Jason describes the trans-national networks he becomes involved in through access to the same social amenities whilst working in China. Here, we might usefully map Robert Sack's thick and thin conceptions of place (1997) onto Jason's own contrasting discussions of home and workplace. 'Home' is a 'thick' (national) space that is predictable and hence stable, where a sense of continuity and hence familiarity comes from routine features of daily life. This includes everything from the way people talk about everyday issues to the fact that the form and content of popular television programmes are well-known and hence effortlessly engaged with. In contrast, the locales in which groups of generally 'Western' trans-national workers gather are specifically designed to answer their needs and provide a useful if 'thin' sense of self/place.

"A general familiarity with everything"

I would now like to extend this discussion with reference to other recent empirical studies, which broadly echo a number of the points I have made so far. The first study, which involved interviews with a number of ex-pats from the US and Europe living in Singapore and working for trans-national organisations (Thompson and Tambyah, 1999) also noted the degree to which respondents first articulated the benefits of adopting a more cosmopolitan outlook. However, these more normative views were then tempered with reference to “a litany of problems complications and stress points” (ibid: 227) that, in the main, related to both feelings of loss for home and the discomfort caused by living in an unfamiliar environment.
First, we can highlight two examples, which again illustrate the importance of the idea of 'home' in generating a sense of security and identity in the modern world. The first speaker is comparing the experience of having to deal with his own sense of otherness abroad, with the feelings of security that the daily routines and familiar surroundings of home engender. The second points to the importance of “creating a sense of home in a new cultural locale” (ibid):

[What] you take for granted is just a general familiarity with everything, right down to what you would expect people to respond to in any given situation and also down to your general knowledge of the area. In your country, you grow up with advertising, you are used to the TV ... and you just gain this huge cushion of comfort in local knowledge that you don’t even notice at the time (quoted in ibid: 229)

'I’m from Cambodia and we try to form up a kind of Cambodian society in France or a Cambodian society in ... Germany (quoted in ibid: 233)

The first example echoes Jason’s earlier comments by focusing on the taken-for-granted aspects of daily life that enable one to move effortlessly through any given situation. The nod to shared knowledge and expectations also ties in rather well with our more theoretical discussion in Chapter 1 concerning the ways in which a more or less objective social reality was produced through micro-linguistic features and the common assumptions that underpinned them. The fact that these previously ‘tried and tested recipes’ no longer work may produce a sense of anxiety and disorientation in relation to the new environment and a longing to return to more familiar surroundings.

The second extract seems to reiterates the idea, discussed in Chapter 6, that it is ‘natural’ to both seek out and feel more comfortable with one’s own kind (again often defined in national terms). It is also points to the importance of trying to achieve a more stable sense of place (albeit temporarily) where previously taken-for-granted norms and habits can operate in conjunction with those who possess a similar range of experiences and shared knowledge (see also O’Reilly, 2000). This is akin to what Kronsell calls the practice of “homesteading ... making and shaping a .... space for oneself in order to surpass the life of contradictions and anxieties” of an unfamiliar place (quoted in Kinvall, 2005: 747).
Another good example of this tension between home as the place where one resides and 'home' as the place where one belongs comes from Lucas & Purkayastha’s (2007) study of Canadian migrants living in the US. This is a particularly relevant piece of work because one might think that on paper Canadians and Americans share a wide range of commonalities (language, relative wealth, cultural norms), particularly as the question of visibility (or of being a marked category in the States) would not be so significant for Canadians (ibid: 249). Yet in talking about their experiences as migrants the interviewees not only referred to home as the place where they happened to live or where they had close family or other emotional ties, but as a national space. Furthermore, “home was also experienced and described as a space defined very much by movement; specifically cross border movement. [Furthermore] references to landmarks and the unique elements of Canada’s cultural landscape characterized these descriptions” (ibid: 250), as the following extracts demonstrate:

First time I see a highway sign and instructions in English and French .. then I know I am home

In the airport in Vancouver. When I see native sculptures and old ladies my mother’s age wearing beige and also Asian and Indian faces .... they make me feel at home

A similar idea is expressed by a respondent in Orvar Lofgren’s study of the significance of borders to national forms of imagination:

My husband and I like to go to Norway on vacation, but all the same, there is a special feeling coming back. Every time we cross the borders we look at each other and 'sigh': Great to be back home again! We long even for the prohibitory signs (1999: 13)

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98 Niels Kayser Nielsen has examined the degree to which this process of 'coming home' involves a bodily as well as emotional dimension. He uses the example of his wife, who has lived abroad for 35 years, coming home to Finland every winter and immediately immersing herself in particular homely activities: “My wife borrowed a pair of ski’s and set out for a lengthy trip through the Finnish winter landscape. She returned from the fields and the forest an hour or two later, totally exhausted, sweaty and evidently happy - she had come home. Not only in her mind, but also in her body” (2003: 84).
This extract again focuses on people travelling from two countries (Norway and Sweden) that might be for many relatively similar on a number of levels. Yet for the couple in question, coming home is tied to emotional feelings of safety and belonging, in this case represented by the most banal of national symbols, road signs. What all of these disparate examples demonstrate is that (the idea of) ‘home’, which is spatially, temporally and symbolically defined, often acts “as the material anchor for agency” (Wilkes, 2008: 123). This, in turn, may be a critical element in allowing individuals to maintain a more secure sense of security and control when moving to unfamiliar places or engaging with novel cultural practices. In the next section, I want to explore the possible link between this sense of security/place and a more cosmopolitan outlook in a little more detail.

Global citizens?

We have already noted the degree to which global mobility, and the type of experience one can access, is often predicated on greater access to material resources. However, it is not just economic capital and the privileges that it bestows that I am referring to here. What I want to suggest is that because many of these individuals have a more-or-less secure sense of their place and identity in the world, linked to both embedded local and national frameworks, they may be more willing to engage with difference on a global scale. In other words, “these are people who can afford to experiment, who do not stand to lose a treasured but uprooted sense of self” (Hannerz quoted in Thompson & Tambyah, 1999: 216).

One of the most illuminating examples of this phenomenon I have seen comes from the writing of the sociologist Ulrich Beck in his book *Cosmopolitan Vision* (2006). Beck details a conversation he had with a Danish businessman on a plane travelling to Helsinki. He asks the man whether he felt more European or Danish and the man replied “with barely disguised amazement ... that he saw himself as ... a global citizen” (ibid: 4).

Having defined himself in these terms the businessman then proceeded to outline his own involvement with a Danish “civic movement supporting a restrictive immigration policy” (ibid). Beck uses this example to illustrate his argument that the current era is defined by a “both/and logic of inclusive differentiation” (ibid: 4-5), which has already been critiqued in Chapter 2. Of far more significance here is the idea that in particular contexts cosmopolitan discourse produces subject positions that can be
delighted in and embraced, assigning status to oneself as an enlightened and rational being able to engage productively with other people and cultures. Attending to the significance of these encounters should not, however, cause us to overlook those other times when the presence of the ‘Other’ is perceived as a threat to the individual or group’s own sense of self and place, so that the boundaries between groups are redrawn.

In other words, the ability to engage with otherness “implies personal autonomy ... The cosmopolitan may embrace the alien culture but he does not become committed to it. All the time he knows where the exit is” (Hannerz, 1996: 103). A similar idea is echoed in Molz’s study of backpackers and the ways in which global travellers perceive ‘Other’ places. For these putative cosmopolitans risks are often “laid out on a ‘country by country basis’” so that, “home is imagined as safe, while abroad, and especially the developing world, is imagined as perilous by comparison” (2006: 11).

To conclude this section, I would like to return to a comment made by one of my respondents, who argued that the broader range of experience that travelling offers, “hopefully makes you a better person”. Ironically enough, that statement produced the following response:

_Sally: I've become, I don't know whether it want to say this out loud, a bit more bigoted after travelling because of going to Muslim countries and the way they treat women. And then they lecture us about the Muslim religion (Swindon Group)_

Engagement with the ‘Other’ is not then only about challenging perspectives and broadening horizons, it may also produce entirely the opposite effect, making individuals aware of who they are and what they hold dear. Therefore, it is imperative that any analyses of these complex processes are empirically grounded and predicated on a far more sophisticated theoretical framework, which takes account of questions of agency, context and wider structural limitations. This echoes the arguments of Skrbis and Woodward (2007) who write; “we see cosmopolitanism as a cultural outlook that is deployed and retracted ... These dispositions are flexible, and sometimes contradictory. They are discursive, practical resources available to social actors to deal with emergent, everyday global agendas and issues ... Yet we do not see cosmopolitan values expressed fully, or at all times and on all issues” (2007: 735).
In the next section, I would like to try and illustrate some of these ideas by looking at the different ways in which my interviewees discussed the question of 'Europe', alongside some of the wider surveys, trends and media coverage of the subject. The issue of European integration has been of interest to a growing number of theorists many of whom have seen the emergence of European political institutions and closer trade and security links as prime indicators that the nation is being superseded in this part of the globe (cf Sweeney, 2005, Beck & Grande, 2007). Discourse analysts have also contributed to our understanding of the ways in which European identities are articulated and negotiated across a range of different dimensions (Wodak, 2007: 75, see also Mole, 2007, Krzyzanowski & Oberhuber, 2007).

My own approach will be limited in purview, primarily because the subject of Europe was rarely raised by my respondents and, when introduced, generated relatively little passionate debate. However, I think it is worth briefly examining how some of these issues were debated, notably as they point to three identifiable threads, which again point to the conditional and, sometimes, contradictory nature of these post-national articulations.

**The question of Europe**

It was briefly noted in Chapter 6 that the EU was sometimes portrayed as a threat to British culture and values. The idea that Europe dictates policy to the British government over and above the wishes of the British people has been a common theme within the right-wing press in Britain. In fact, as I write this, newspapers are full of stories demanding that Britain withdraw from the Human Rights Act because it is (commonly) perceived as a European imposition that gives succour to an unholy alliance of criminals and liberals. This editorial from the Daily Telegraph, under the banner headline, 'We must stop giving away Britain's powers', is indicative:

This EU directive, like so many affecting virtually every aspect of life in this country, may be meat and drink to a handful of lawyers but has simply not registered with the wider public ... The EU is now responsible for more than three-quarters of legislation in member states (23/08/07: 25)

The comment about the wider public is backed up by a number of polls that suggest that a significant proportion of the British public are either indifferent to or
antagonistic towards European integration. For example, polls conducted by the MORI consistently show that up to half of the British population are strongly opposed to further European integration, Britain adopting the euro and/or signing up to the European Constitution/Treaty with many others yet to be convinced of the benefits of the European project.\textsuperscript{99}

These attitudes towards Europe were also reflected in the comments of some of my respondents:

\textbf{Interviewer:} What about Europe, do you consider yourself European at all?

\textbf{Katie:} No. When I think of Europe, I think of other countries.

\textbf{Fiona:} Funnily enough, when I was staying with relatives in America they, like, whereas we when we travel we go to America and places like that, they all go to Europe and they class me in, in Europe and that was weird at the time because I hadn’t really thought of myself as ....

\textbf{Dave:} I’ve never been classified, like, as a European, I’ve never been anywhere outside, like, Europe really (Enfield Group)

\textbf{Paul:} It is divide and conquer, yeah.

\textbf{James:} .. and it’s, because, it’s only the, the English who are massively anti-European, I don’t think the Scots, I mean if they’re going to get their independence, they’ll have to be a member of Europe and the same as the Welsh .... (Hastings Group)

The first example is interesting because it seems to highlight the link between mobility and an awareness of Europe as an alternative source of solidarity or commonality. In this case, the idea of Europe does not directly impact on the lives of my respondents and so they consider it as something apart from themselves. The second instance combines a common argument that European elites are threatening our way of life and values with a reference to devolution in Britain. Here, Scottish and Welsh independence is seen to have EU support as part of a wider attempt to create a Europe of regions, hence the comment about “divide and rule”.

\textit{“Nationality plays a very small part”}

This more antagonistic view was tempered by other groups who either talked about Europe in more pragmatic terms. This was often because they had travelled extensively and saw the benefit of having, for example, a common currency, passport and reduced border controls, or as a positive development, uniting people with shared tastes and values:

Dennis: ... I think we should take up the euro.

Kay: Yeah ... because it's a lot cheaper when you going on holiday and you're having to pay stuff in Europe and there's a conversion rate and personally and financially you lose out (Doncaster Group)

Some of these debates can also be seen in Michael Bruter’s (2004a, 2000b) qualitative studies of attitudes towards Europe. He suggests that increased interactions between peoples across Europe and, in particular, the removal of borders is slowly generating a shared - and felt - European experience, albeit haphazardly. Indeed, the increasingly taken-for-granted nature of some of these factors (money, flags, passports, impact of EU legislation) has led one scholar to suggest that, “some degree of banal Europeanism has already begun to emerge within the EU” (Cram: 2001: 355).

Cram’s argument is particularly relevant as she points to the fact that it seems to be everyday, banal symbols and practices, in combination with institutional demands, that are concretising the ‘image’ of Europe into a felt reality. Obviously, the structures put in place by the major European political institutions are important but as Cram notes, it is when the impacts and influences of these factors “become the norm ... [when] individuals ‘forget to remember’ that the current situation is not how things always were” (ibid: 353), that ‘Europe’ becomes a routine (and hence resonant) category within people’s lives (cf Krzyzanowski & Oberhuber, 2007, Mole, 2007, Uricchio, 2007).

This idea is also evidenced in the following extract from a member of the Bexley Group:

Andrew: We’re looking at, y’know, the countries of Europe divided vertically. You’ve got, sort of, y’know, English people, Dutch people, French people, Belgium

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100 A number of studies have looked, for example, at the role of the euro, as a banal symbol, in concretising a vision of European identity (Fornas, 2007, Raento et al, 2004).
101 Sport is one popular arena where the impact of EU legislation has been felt and largely incorporated into everyday talk. The ‘Bosman ruling’ is a good example of this (Parrish & McArdle, 2004).
people, and I almost believe it’s not like that, it’s, it’s almost a horizontal division. When you go abroad you meet people who have similar values and interests and um.. hobbies as yourself and you get on with those people, regardless of national identity, so it’s in a way, y’know, you find people of a similar nature who happen to be Dutch or French or German and you’d get on fine with them, than you would with people who happen just to be English. I think when you go into it, you really get to know people, the nation, the nationality plays a very small part

This comment indicates the degree to which pan-national solidarities are becoming increasingly resonant (and taken-for-granted) among particular groups in England at the current time. Andrew enunciates perhaps the most outward looking perspective of all those I interviewed by focusing on horizontal commitments, that link people by virtue of value, taste and lifestyle, in the process eschewing the more narrow, vertical allegiances most closely associated with the nation. Indeed, this group represented, at least in part, Beck’s ideal of the cosmopolitan able and willing to engage with others (in this case Europeans) and their views and experiences offer an important challenge to distinctly national ways of being in and thinking about the world.

Two further points are worth making here and they both refer back to our earlier discussions concerning agency and context. Firstly, members of the Bexley Group were marked out by being able to speak at least one foreign language having undertaken university-level studies in Europe and by having family members living abroad. In other words, they seem to prove the link between a more ‘open’ outlook that moves beyond local or national solidarities and higher levels of mobility, economic capital and education (Urry, 2001: 78-83, Mau et al, 2007). Furthermore, it should also be noted that members of this group effortlessly moved between a more cosmopolitan discourse and a national one. Therefore, even those who may reject national allegiances at particular moments rarely deny the existence of nations or, indeed, their significance to their own lives at other times. As a consequence, while forms of “banal cosmopolitanism” (Beck, 2004: 133) may well be emerging and ready to hand for some, their practical applications and significance must always be an empirical question.

Summary

This chapter has been designed to examine whether the arguments of those who have proposed a new era of social relations and allegiances that move beyond the nation are borne out by my own empirical data.
First, we saw that my respondents either classified themselves or those they knew as more mobile or, where limited by financial or other constraints, perceived that increasing mobility was a feature of the contemporary era. Many of these ideas were routinely expressed, notably by the young, and they point to the degree to which increasing numbers expect to be able to travel further and more frequently. Similarly, patterns of consumption were seen to be changing in response to wider global flows and there was a growing sense of reflexivity as to the degree to which ‘we’ share common interests, values and tastes with others in different areas of the globe. This was particularly the case for those who had regular experience of travelling and/or friends and relatives living abroad.

When discussing the meaning or impact of such transformations a majority of my respondents portrayed them as a common good, by drawing on a more cosmopolitan discourse. Here, parochial allegiances, defined in national terms, were broadly castigated and a well-worn dichotomy between the enlightened traveller and uncultured tourist was utilised. However, these more normative prescriptions tended to overly a more complex set of dispositions, which go some way towards challenging the idea that global flows render previous local and national solidarities obsolete.

The idea of agency, and privilege, in the form of cultural, economic and political capital, was explored and it was argued that engagements with the ‘Other’ may often be underpinned by an ability to withdraw to more familiar territory (namely the national ‘home’) when required. In such cases, individuals are more able to “exert some degree of control over the kinds of cultural differences they encounter and, importantly, the pace at which these differences are (selectively) incorporated into their lives” (Thompson & Tambyah, 1999: 228). Therefore, rather than observing the growing range and intensity of such ‘movements’ and concluding that the national is becoming irrelevant, more emphasis should be placed on examining how, when and in what context such shifts occur and the backgrounds of those involved, including the type of resources they are able to bring to bear in their engagements with other people, places and cultures.

In this sense, it may be necessary to eschew the idea of the pure cosmopolitan, offered in contrast to the pure national, and focus attention on the emergence of more conditional forms of cosmopolitanism that although increasingly available as part of everyday lives, food, music, diet, dress, the workplace, are often fragile and
ultimately linked to wider perceptions of risk and safety. Moreover, where such forms can be usefully or playfully incorporated into daily routines they are likely to become sedimented and part of a taken-for-granted landscape of shops, restaurants, products and people.

Acknowledging the significance of these processes, and their potential for dialogue between different groups, should not allow us to overlook the ongoing question of domestication (See Chapter 2) and the extent to which a still largely embedded national discourse may offer a more stable footing particularly during periods of turbulence or tension.

In the concluding section of this study, I would like to draw together some of the main arguments that have been put forward in the empirical chapters, first by returning to the original research questions and then assessing the utility of the theoretical framework that has been used to structure this thesis. A number of broader strands that have been identified through an analysis of the data will then be examined before the limitations and contribution of the study will be discussed.
Conclusions

This study has investigated the resonance of national discourse in the lives of 'ordinary' English people through an analysis of everyday talk and media texts. In particular, I have looked to extend Michael Billig’s study of *Banal Nationalism* (1995) by using the concept of de/sedimentation to focus on the processes by which particular discursive forms become embedded in everyday lives or alternatively challenged by competing frameworks for making sense of the world.

Having noted in the introduction the significance of a number of socio-political transformations within England and the wider debates about identity and belonging they had generated, it was suggested that more work was required in order to try and understand how 'ordinary' people made sense of and responded to these complex processes. This was particularly the case for white, English-born people who have sometimes been overlooked in the literature because, as the dominant majority in Britain, their identity was often assumed to be stable.

In the final part of this work, I would like to draw together some of the major themes and insights by grouping my concluding remarks under five broad sub-headings. These discussions will look to assess the significance of the proposed theoretical framework in light of the empirical evidence that has been presented. Following these analyses I will discuss a number of limitations of the study, before outlining how some of the most important findings might be used to inform possible future research.

*A discursive approach to studying nations*

First, this work has outlined the advantages of adopting a discourse analytic approach to studying nations and nationalism as a means of generating a more flexible, dynamic framework that is able to integrate both macro and micro-levels of investigation. Moving away from the classic literature's pre-occupation with origins extends the scope of enquiry beyond a historical macro-perspective (as important as that may be) and, at the same time, refocuses attention on the practical means by which national forms of organisation, mobilisation and imagination are realised. The fact that these 'practical means' vary so dramatically across time and space requires that unitary theories and classifications are eschewed as they tend to be unworkable in practice (Tishkov, 2000). Instead, it is necessary to refocus on myriad discursive processes, which are informed by 'common' understandings of territoriality, the past and social
relations, as well as the ‘shared’ symbolic forms they generate, the historical
conditions in which they emerge and their ideological effects. In the latter case, these
means attending to structures of power and, in particular, the subjectivities they
produce.

Although such an approach is underpinned by a radically different epistemology, I
would argue that it should not reject modernist and ethno-symbolist theories out of
hand but rather negotiate a path between their broader concerns. In the former case,
the modernist emphasis on investigating the impact of structural constraints and wider
historical transformations on the ways in which individuals, often through institutional
frameworks, order, classify and experience their lives across different period is
absolutely fundamental. At the same time, replacing a teleological model with one
that accounts for struggle and resistance enables attention to be paid to the processes
by which “remarkable and known diversities and fierce micro-attachments ... [are]

Alternatively, ethno-symbolist concerns with a more ‘bottom up’ perspective can be
attended to whilst absolutely rejecting any essentialised notion of ethnicity. Rather,
the focus here should be on acknowledging that “macro-level phenomenon cannot be
explicated outside the multiplicity of relationships at the micro-level [as] ... individuals
are ultimately the sustaining force of [such] phenomena” (Gorringe & Rafanell, 2007:
102). In this way, we can more effectively analyse the processes by which national
forms of life become normalised through countless practices, institutions structures
and symbols even as they remain contingent, one way of making sense of and
articulating social relations, and subject to ongoing disruptions.

Accordingly, this approach rejects any purported dichotomy between the imagined
and the real instead arguing that all forms of social life are “symbolically constructed”
(Rothenbuhler, 1998: 58) with some having become sedimented and hence naturalized
so that their contingent nature is no longer (as) evident. It is in respect to the concept
of sedimentation that we can begin to develop a more dynamic model and also address
the question of why nations continue to matter to so many people (Calhoun, 2007).

**De/sedimentation**

This study might also be defined as an attempt to map the dialectic between
contingency and continuity in the (re)production (and repudiation) of national
discourse and this is a thread that I have consistently tried to weave throughout the empirical analysis. Focusing on processes of de/sedimentation allows us to unpack Billig’s key concept of the banal both in relation to national and other discourses (Cram, 2001, Beck, 2004, Gorringe, 2006). In this way, banality is no longer viewed as an endpoint for a particular form of life or social reality but instead is re-conceptualised as an achievement that must be sustained in the face of constant challenges and transformations. Or to borrow Reicher & Hopkins pithy phrase, the nation “is always a project the success of which depends on being seen as an essence” (2001: 222).

In terms of continuity a number of theoretical interventions focusing on the everyday have been utilised in order to try and understand how a range of micro-practices underpin and reproduce particular social relations and institutions. In particular I outlined the significance of linguistic forms, spatial and temporal regularities and institutional norms to the (re)production of taken-for-granted background expectations and shared forms of knowledge by drawing on the work of both phenomenological sociology and more critical theories of everyday life. These arguments were then applied to the work of Billig and his interlocutors as a means of addressing the ways in which national discourse informs (and is constituted through) daily life so that other ways of understanding and being in the world are marginalised or made ‘unthinkable’.

In what Billig labelled as “established, democratic nations” (1995: 93) the ‘essence’ of the national community for many is continually recreated through the use and recognition of everyday symbols, talk and practices. This sense of continuity, underpinned by ‘common sense’ forms of knowledge, is never entirely secure though, only more or less so, and the arguments of those who have posited the emergence of a new post-national order in relation to both global economic and political transformations have been referenced. These wider structural shifts are seen to be unsettling the ‘logic’ of national life in places such as England, opening them up to scrutiny and providing the potential for de-sedimentation.

As we observed in Chapter 8, these potentialities are being realised through increasing trans-national mobility and patterns of consumption that are recognised as shared across national boundaries. The media is also perceived as allowing people to travel imaginatively and the activities and concerns of distant ‘Other’s are routinely
(re)presented. Despite these physical and imaginative movements the appropriation of a meaningful more pan-national, European or even cosmopolitan discourse seems to be fragile, partial and often the preserve of particular privileged groups. Furthermore, while engaging with difference, whether at ‘home’ or abroad, is for some an enjoyable or liberating experience it seems to generate in others a sense of discomfort or anxiety,

*Resedimentation*

Based on the evidence of two empirical chapters (6 & 7), it was first shown how an increasing perception of undomesticated ‘otherness’ within a national space has produced narratives of fear and anxiety, where previously taken-for-granted practices and ways of life are seen to be under threat from increasingly empowered internal/external ‘Others’. In Chapter 7, it was argued that debates over the need to ‘celebrate’ the nation (both British and English) as well as the actual growth in and intensity of ecstatic national events in England may be a further indication that a previously settled sense of identity is being opened up to scrutiny. Here, it was suggested that through these events the nation is materialised though co-ordinated, embodied practices and, as a result, re-sedimented. In both cases, established, ‘common sense’ forms of knowledge or organisation associated with the nation may offer a powerful heuristic.

In this respect, what many post-national theorists fail to adequately assess is the extent to which this vast, inter-locking, often institutionalised national-cultural matrix is embedded through the routines of daily life as well as what it may offer to countless individuals in terms of psychological relief, namely a significant sense of self, place and ontological security. This is “the confidence that most human beings have in the continuity of their self-identity and in the constancy of the surrounding social and material environments of action” (Giddens, 1990: 92). As a result national discourse is seen to provide a critical point of anchorage in an era of rapid globalisation defined by growing instability and complexity.

*The nation as a heuristic*

In the empirical chapters, the ways in which national discourse was articulated in a routine manner across both the group interviews and a range of media content was mapped in some detail. At the micro level, deixis, location formulations and metaphor
were used to define the nation as if it was an actually existing entity. Elsewhere, a range of inter-textual features demonstrated the degree to which manifold individuals shared the same sort of reference points concerning the assumed normality of a world where people belong to a nation and as a result (are presumed to) act, talk and think in certain ways.

Whether discussing the range of foods they associated with England, the importance of supporting national sporting endeavours, the threat migration was seen to pose to a settled, homogeneous and coherent national culture or the pleasure they felt in returning 'home' after going on holiday, these disparate debates articulate and reference (constitute and are constituted by to use Giddens' famous phrase, 1984: 51) a more or less routine understanding of a world defined in terms of nations. This understanding is, of course, replicated in countless institutional settings as both the media content analysis and other empirical studies have shown.

At the same time, individuals were also seen to be more than able to challenge clichés associated with a national type, adopt a more reflexive position in relation to the idea of their own nation and reject a national discourse altogether in the course of a particular conversation. Yet even in these latter instances, "there was [little] evidence ... that the speakers ... were seriously considering that they might not have a nationality, or that their country might ever cease to exist as an entity" (Condor, 2000: 195).

These somewhat contradictory discoveries point once more to the importance of context when trying to make sense of the ways in which people draw on different discourses. However, the ability of different people to shift between discourses should not blind us to the fact that some are articulated on a far more routine basis and as a result may represent a kind of default position individuals can return to, notably when trying to manage potential misunderstandings or crises. For there is also some evidence from this study that people often strive for a more stable footing as a means of locating themselves and others in relatively fixed and stable positions when confronted by alternative and/or potentially challenging ways of making sense of the world.

It is in this sense that 'national' may be seen as a heuristic, a tested recipe to borrow Schutz's term (1967: 95), that has been used in the past and continues to offer.
purchase as people move through their daily lives. This idea may be particularly applicable to those who unthinkingly define themselves, and are accepted as, members of the national community because they possess the requisite amount of national cultural capital. Interestingly, what tended to link all of my respondents, despite their wide range of backgrounds and beliefs, was the idea that they unconditionally belonged in England and, as a result, had a right to comment on the way in which the country was being run. It is in this respect that skin colour, alongside other key characteristics, continues to be employed as a means of drawing, often implicit, distinctions between those who live in England and the “proper English” people who are seen to be the rightful arbiters of national culture and space.

Finding points of anchorage

In terms of application two points are worth making, which relate not only to discussions of the nation but all forms of “psychological essentialism” (Hirschfeld, 1996: 55). The first concerns the idea that such a heuristic will only continue to be used if it is seen to be epistemologically sound and this process occurs primarily in relation to everyday interactions. The second is that where such a heuristic can be effectively employed it is likely to become an important resource in both allowing people to get on with the complex and challenging business of daily life and anchoring them ontologically in a world of (potentially) overwhelming complexity.

For instance, if in moving through their everyday lives people apply largely taken-for-granted national categories and they prove to be more or less workable then it is likely that they will be continually used as a means of saving time and effort in dealing with both new and existing situations (Allport, 1954: 173). At ‘home’ this might mean assuming, and observing, that most people will speak the same language in a range of recognisable accents, broadly share some of the same reference points (whether it be the weather, having to surmount the same institutional hurdles, being exposed to the same media and so on), support the same ‘national’ team in the world cup and moan about the same politicians. Similarly, when engaging with ‘foreigners’ it will be assumed that some of these expectations will not be met (See Beck, 2006: 25 for a useful example).

Indeed, any uncertainty derived from dealing with ‘strangers’ can be partly negated by the ability to ‘place’ people in particular groups on the basis of language, skin colour, dress, accent etc (Egbert, 2004: 1495). The fact that, “it [is often] easier to
find supporting evidence for the assumed class characteristics of an individual than to find contradictory evidence” (Tajfel, 1981: 133) means that such categories are more likely to remain sedimented over time unless subject to sustained challenge.

This is again where the concept of national cultural capital offers particular purchase, as it enables us to observe on what basis categories are defined and contested and also how these processes replicate existing relations of power. In other words, it is only some groups that are permitted to offer definitive categorisations as to who belongs or is considered ‘foreign’. As a result they tend to involve gross, and often unjust, oversimplifications although that surely is the point. Such essentialist heuristics, whether national, racial, gender or class-based, are designed to simplify and this is where they may come to be valued102.

To make this point is not to validate those who utilise such categories, notably to subjugate ‘Others’, it is to simply acknowledge that such processes “introduce simplicity and order where there is complexity and nearly random variation” (Tajfel, 1981: 132, see also Lakoff, 1987). As Les Back argues in relation to race, “rather than pointing out racism is bad or wrong, we [should] start from the point of view of trying to understand why racism appeals to people and what they need it for” (Back, 2007: 157). Therefore these categories also need to be understood in terms of the psychological stability, not to mention social status, they may provide for some. The anthropologist David Kertzer offers a related argument.

The world out there confronts each individual with an infinite number of stimuli, yet no one can deal with all of them. We must be selective in our perceptions, and those aspects of the world, that are selected must be further reduced and re-ordered in terms of some system of simplification (or categorisation) that allows us to make sense of them. This order is largely provided by the symbol system we learn as members of our culture .... Such ... systems provide us with ‘a shield against terror’ (1988: 4)

*Mapping the social*

102 An interesting study by Van Ausdale & Feagin (2001) points to the way in which preschool children use “racial-ethnic distinctions” to define self and other by drawing on wider socio-cultural resources e.g. media, parents, their peers.
The communications scholar, James Carey (1989) has likened this broader process to symbolic map-making whereby particular features of the social environment are privileged and others ignored as a means of orientating disparate individuals in a relatively unproblematic and coherent manner. This is not a benign process but in many situations these symbolic maps become vitally important in cementing a sense of trust, notably in the complex, abstract systems that are a feature of modernity (Giddens, 1991: 83-88). As Jonathan Hearn writes, “human beings have a fundamental need to control uncertainty and unpredictability in their social environment ... [and] this is [partly] achieved ... [through] a stable and well-adjusted sense of ... identity [and place]” (2007: 667).

This study has illustrated that when a loss of control is experienced (when the newsagent cannot speak ‘our’ language, when public signs are not entirely meaningful, when people living among ‘us’ support other teams) it may produce, in turn, feelings of disorientation and anxiety as these ‘tested recipes’ can no longer be relied upon. For those who have, up until this point, unthinkingly defined themselves as the rightful symbolic owners of national space, these processes may be particularly disturbing.

Obviously, this argument cannot be only linked to the nation, people draw on these heuristics in all aspects of their lives, but it is suggested that a key set of “background expectations” (Garfinkel, 1967: 37) are provided by the taken-for-granted idea that one belongs to a nation, which is spatially, temporally and culturally designated by powerful institutional actors, in a world of nations. For example, we saw in Chapter 6 how discussions about immigration were often defined in terms of race. However, it was also argued that in order to understand what these categorisations were designed to achieve, it was necessary to examine how such claims were informed by a taken-for-granted national framework. In other words, it is only in relation to a bounded space that a particular group is able to define the presence of an undesirable ‘other’ as a problem.

Acknowledging this idea provides an important conceptual tool with which to try and understand why, and how, some people may evaluate change or perceived otherness within previously taken-for-granted settings as problematic or unsettling (Ray, 2007: 40). For others, these developments may offer a new opportunities for engaging with ‘Other’ people and forms of living so that they are able to move beyond the “stifling”
atmosphere of local/national mores and solidarities either temporarily or for more extended periods. I will turn to this debate in the following section by suggesting that such while movements are of absolute significance, they cannot be theorised in terms of simple dichotomies between the national and global.

**Peripatetic nationals and conditional cosmopolitans**

In his discussion of social movements that move beyond national boundaries and encompass a more global outlook in dealing with environmental, social justice and political issues, Stanely Tarrow uses the term “rooted cosmopolitans” to describe those who form part of these new pan-national networks (2005: 41). He defines them as people who move “physically and cognitively outside their origins” even as they continue to maintain links with these more familiar places and the social networks, resources and opportunities they provide (ibid: 42).

In light of earlier discussions, where it was proposed that increasing global flows and the resulting engagements with ‘otherness’ be theorised in terms of a tentative, sometimes fragile and often limited form of cosmopolitan, I want to suggest turning Tarrow’s argument on its head. Rather than starting with the idea(l) of the cosmopolitan who maintains existing links with ‘home’, we instead re-focus on the degree to which individuals, with a more or less secure sense of their own place and (national) identity, are presented with increasing opportunities to engage in temporary or conditional forms of life that move beyond the local/national. These peripatetic nationals travel more, whether physically, imaginatively or through consumption patterns, often delight in their ability to seek out and experience novel people and places and sometimes shift locale for an extended period of time. Rarely, however, does this sense of connection with ‘home’ become permanently shattered and nor do these individuals, as a rule, stop thinking of themselves and others in national terms.

Indeed, these engagements with the ‘Other’ may actually be predicated on an ability to experience difference on their own terms, retreating to the comfort of the familiar when necessary. This idea was also explored in relation to the ‘internal (domesticated) other’ where a certain level of difference at ‘home’ could be welcomed provided a threshold of tolerance was not breached. Similarly, many of my respondents expressed a desire to manage their engagements with ‘Otherness’ when travelling as they spoke about being made to “feel comfortable” or retreating to
particular, known “comfort zones”, where their own mores and preferences could be indulged.

In putting forward such an argument I am not intending either to deny the experience of those who consider themselves to be ‘at home in the world’ (Iyer, 2004) or the significance of these increased interactions (whether at home or abroad, temporary or semi/permanent) in opening up previously held values, beliefs and practices to scrutiny. Instead, I want to highlight again the need for many to carefully balance levels of risk and safety when moving out from a fairly stable locale and also the manifold ways in which such mobility is experienced, whether precipitating the desire to kick previous habits, modify them or cling on to them more determinedly (Giulianotti & Robertson, 2007: 148).

In some cases such movements may provide the opportunity “to stand outside of having one’s own life written and scripted by any one community” (Hall quoted in Tarrow, 2005: 42). Yet even those who construct wider pan-national networks as a means of confronting ‘global challenges’ rely “on a combination of domestic resources and opportunities to launch their trans-national activities and return home afterwards” (ibid: 42), It is this idea of ‘home’, a powerful physical and symbolic marker and “in an ontological sense ... the place from which the world can be founded” (Berger quoted in Back, 2007: 69), which I want to (re)place at the centre of these wider debates on cosmopolitanism and mobility.

Finally, as I have suggested before, the tendency to focus on what is (apparently) novel has meant that those forms of life that remain relatively unchanged or, at least change more slowly, are sometimes overlooked. As Doreen Massey wryly observes,

amid the Ridley Scott images of world cities, ... the Baudrillard vision of hyperspace, much of life, for many people, still consists of waiting ... with your shopping for a bus that never comes. Hardly, a graphic illustration of time-space compression (quoted in Morley, 2000: 196)

The final discussion that I want to open up here is a little more speculative in nature and looks to draw out a number of threads from earlier chapters and re-connect them to the work of one or two social theorists (briefly noted in Chapter 3) who have
attempted to assess the impact of some of the wider socio-political and economic shifts currently being experienced in places such as England.

**Banality and the bigger picture**

In Chapter 2, I argued that the link between banal forms of national identification and wider social structures hadn’t been sufficiently explored in the literature. As a result, it was suggested that more attention needed to be paid to the “historical conditions of possibility and sedimentation” (Norval, 1996: 63). Put simply, this requires examining the wider structural conditions that both provide for the possibility of change, whether gradual or eventful, or alternatively, the partial fixing of particular forms of social knowledge and the wider relations they underpin. That is, when, how and why, particular discourses become established as hegemonic and, in the process, largely perceived as natural.

A number of empirical studies pointed to the possible link between levels of socio-economic development, the distribution of resources and the (partial) concretisation of national symbols and solidarities. For instance, Orvar Lofgren’s (1993) study of the US and Sweden provided some evidence that national symbols became embedded features of the wider socio-political landscape after a sustained period of economic growth in the post-war period.

I am not suggesting here that there is a simple correlation between these two factors but the idea that a relatively well developed political and economic system, that guarantees some rights and allocates benefits, might allow for more banalised forms of national identity to emerge has not, to my knowledge, been explored in any detail (Although see Alesina & La Ferrara, 2005 & Collier, 2001: 158 for an economist perspective). For example, one might focus attention on the wider structural conditions that have allowed different, self-proclaimed national/ethnic groups in places such as Switzerland, Belgium, Canada and, indeed, Britain to co-exist, with relative degrees of stability, across time.

However, such processes of sedimentation are always subject to ongoing challenge and therefore it is necessary to understand “under what conditions do some boundaries of difference become boundaries of serious conflict” (Fenton, 2004: 179). For example, in the case of Sri Lanka, Sirimal Abeyratne has persuasively argued that the civil war, which is commonly understood as an ethnic conflict, has economic roots, namely
“widespread social exclusion in a stagnant economy” (2004: 1313). Elsewhere, in many Western European countries wider structural transformations have led to the unravelling of previously entrenched institutional structures and forms of knowledge, although these have impacted on different countries in particular ways depending on a wide variety of socio-historical factors (Hall, 1997: 175-178).

In effect, what I am trying to argue here is that the narratives of insecurity and anxiety that many of my respondents have been articulating need to be placed within a wider, in some cases, global context and this is where more macro-scale sociological theorising might be usefully referenced. For instance, as we saw in Chapter 3, Richard Sennett’s work addresses the transformation to a new era of global capitalism that is underpinned and sustained by the tenets of flexibility, innovation and shareholder power.

In Britain the shift to a service economy, demanding both adaptability and new knowledge-based skills, and the rapid influx of migrants to fill many of these new positions, has meant that previously taken-for-granted structures have been rapidly undermined, notably for men. These transformations, and the responses they often generate, provide first-hand evidence of the some of “the contradictions of late capitalist modernity” (Fenton, 2003: 185), between, say, the lauding of individuality, linked to narratives of choice, flexibility and mobility, and the desire for community, as bounded, homogeneous and stable (ibid).

An example of these contradictions from this study has been the ways in which the same individuals talked about migration, sometimes acknowledging the status and efforts of those who came ‘here’ and worked hard, in contrast to home-grown welfare scroungers, and then castigating migrants as a ‘threat’ to the nation’s values and traditions. In a similar vein, mobility was prized in that it allows ‘us’ to travel to new places and experience new ideas and ways of being but alternatively represents a threat when ‘our’ borders were seen as being regularly breached.

It is in trying to manage these contradictions and their manifold impacts at the level of the everyday; the presence of ‘Other’s on the high street, an ability to access

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103 Numerous studies have shown that the media do have an important role to play in representing this issue but it is also arguable that anti-immigrant rhetoric is resonant because it appeals to wider individual anxieties concerning both social resources and culture (McLaren & Johnson, 2007).
cheap flights and other services, growing job insecurity as multi-national companies seek cheaper labour markets abroad, debates over the number of foreign football players in the English leagues, the closure of ‘uncompetitive’ local services, that previously taken-for-granted discourses, such as the national, may come to the fore in providing a reliable framework for making sense of complex changes (Kinvall, 2005). As Jonathan Hearn notes, “national identities, like all identities, are rendered salient for persons when they seem to address personal issues of power over one’s own life” (2007: 657), whether ‘power’ involves access to welfare and jobs or the ‘right’ to manage national space.

Policy implications

I would like to make one final point in relation to this subject and that concerns the recent debates in Britain over the subject of community cohesion and the increasing desire of various politicians and public bodies to try and define what it means to be British or English as a means of uniting disparate populations. As I have already argued these normative values become almost meaningless when subject to any form of sustained scrutiny because they “represent a shopping list of desirable attributes ... [that are] embraced by virtually every modern nation” (Furedi, 2006: 76). As a result, government initiatives that focus on defining abstract values fail to address a number of core issues.

The first concerns the idea that solidarities are generated through everyday lived experiences not citizenship tests. In other words, “people’s loyalties evolve through engaging with an inspiring public culture, one that offers them a genuine role” (ibid: 77). Two is that any discussion of community and belonging has to draw in questions of equality, whether in relation to political rights, income distribution and/or access to social welfare. For instance, Alesina and La Ferrera’s recent study points to the importance of “a relative balance of power and economic equality among different groups” (2005: 795) in improving economic performance in multi-ethnic states.

Third, acknowledging disparities in access to opportunity and resources across different groups in England means also taking seriously (though not condoning) the concerns and anxieties of those who are, to use Queen Elizabeth II’s rather delicate phrasing in her 2004 address to the nation, “unhappy about unfamiliar cultures” (Telegraph Online, 26/12/0). As Richard Sennett observes, for some “the spectre of uselessness ... intersects with the fear of foreigners, which, beneath its crust of simple
ethnic or race prejudice, is inflected with the anxiety that foreigners may be better armed for the tasks of survival” (2006: 90) in an increasingly insecure global marketplace. In this way, it may be possible to foreground the very real impacts that new forms of economic and political organisation are having on local settings, often producing, in turn, a concomitant response that draws on ‘common sense’ explanations concerning who belongs and why.

Therefore, it is imperative that these discussions, which have risen to the top of the political and media agenda, are also framed in terms of economic and political realities rather than relying on simplistic ‘ethnic’ categories and/or an endless stream of meaningless statements about values and traditions. Theoretically, this also provides a far more sophisticated model with which to be able to assess not only the conditions for sedimentation but also the unravelling or opening up of doxa, at the behest of different institutions and organisations, in an increasingly interconnected world.

Finally, relations both within Britain and between Britain and other states, notably in Europe, have to be redefined so as to first acknowledge the significance of the racialised ‘Other’ to the modern English imagination (Byrne, forthcoming) and then move beyond the tiresome obsession with reviving past imperial and military ‘glories’. This means addressing not only the different trajectories of those currently living in Britain but also what they share in common as part of a more “convivial culture” (Gilroy, 2004). In particular the link between multiculturalism and race needs to be shattered in order to emphasise the fact that human societies are and always have been a mess of cultures and interest groups. Too often the fact “people live with the muddle and mess of multicultural life most of the time” (Back, 2007: 141) is overlooked in the rush to foreground conflict and the, presumed, incompatibilities of different groups. Conversely, the importance of multiple and sometimes shifting allegiances and solidarities should not be overlooked in the rush to promote a well-meaning, if rather naïve, vision of global cosmopolitan culture (Calhoun, 2007: 165-167).

104 This popular perception is challenged by a recent study by Manning & Roy who argue that “among those who are born in Britain, over 90% of all groups of whatever religion or ethnicity think of themselves as British”. They note that it is Irish Catholics rather than British-born Muslims who reject Britishness to any great degree and conclude; “there may not be much of a problem with immigrants and minorities in Britain thinking of themselves as British, but there may be a bigger problem in the refusal of the indigenous white population to see these groups as British” (2007: 8-10).
In the final parts of this work, I want to outline one or two notable limitations of this study and the possible ways in which its claims can be built on to inform future research.

**Limitations and reflections**

One of the main questions to ask as part of a reflexive research project is am I overstating the influence of national discourse in the lives of different individuals? Perhaps. As a scholar intent on mapping the extent and common sense usage of such discursive forms one tends to be attuned to those everyday occurrences that justify one's thesis. Turning on the radio, a debate about obesity or celebrity culture is not engaged with on its own terms but instead becomes a potential example of the use of deictic language or other banal linguistic terms. As a result this may mean missing out on some of the nuances of a particular text or conversation so that other ways of thinking about or understanding it are overlooked.

This is also true for some of the media analysis where generally texts were selected to contextualise an argument from the group discussions. Although, I did state at the outset that the media analysis was intended to complement the group interviews, it could be maintained that because I was more attuned to certain topics, I may have overlooked texts that offered alternative viewpoints. Given the vast range of potential content available this is probably true although many of the individual media texts selected were also designed to reflect or engage with extant studies, for example, in relation to immigration or the thesis of cosmopolitan suffering.

In this respect, I am also adopting Eviatar Zerubavel's perspective that “to deliberately concentrate ... on selected aspects of social reality” is necessary in order to offer a sufficiently in-depth analysis, provided that one is able to, at least, acknowledge where their biases lie (1981: xvi). In this case, I have tried to draw attention to a number of counter-arguments within the social sciences that challenge the idea that nations do still matter in an era of increasing global flows.

A second issue that might be raised, this time in relation to the theoretical framework that has been developed, concerns the analytical distinction that I have drawn between discourse and ideology. The range of debates concerning these concepts both in terms of definition and utilisation are vast and as Meinhof and Richardson observe,
“it is not always clear what theoretical and methodological issues hang on the choice of the term ‘discourse’ as against the term ‘ideology’ [in] referring[ring] to a more or less systematic framework of understanding that permits the expression or ‘realisation’ of particular meanings in textual forms” (1994: 16).

Therefore I would like to note the limits of my own approach given that there are many alternative strategies available. I choose to use a deliberately wide definition of discourse as a means of drawing attention to the myriad texts, talk, symbols and practices that constitute national “way[s] of talking about, ... understanding [and acting in] the world” (Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002: 1). This allowed me to identify and explore the links between micro (apparently insignificant texts, utterances and daily practices) and macro levels (dominant institutional arrangements that define and regulate everyday lives) so as to more effectively map the vast, inter-locking socio-cultural framework that underpins national forms of imagination, mobilisation and organisation. The concept of sedimentation was then been applied to focus on the processes by which such disparate features become normalised and taken-for-granted.

Conversely, the concept of ideology I have utilised in this study, which has been primarily used to draw attention to the ‘effects’ or consequences of such discursive processes, might be seen as relatively ‘thin’ in relation to other approaches that treat ideology as more than an abstract system of ideas. One of the problems of using such a broad definition of discourse is that it may be difficult to assess which elements are most important within this matrix and/or draw distinctions between more inclusive and oppressive practices or utterances, although it is hoped that by paying attention to “relations of power and struggles over power” (Fairclough, 1995b: 132) this may be partly overcome. I have also argued that even those statements or activities that may appear to be inconsequential contribute to the sedimentation of a discourse, which may then be used, at other times, to inform and justify more oppressive actions because it is viewed, and accepted, as ‘common sense’.

The third major critique that I would like to flag up here concerns the argument that I have put forward concerning the lack of dynamism in Billig’s thesis of banal nationalism, which tends to talk about either hot or banal nationalism without adequately addressing processes of heating or cooling. However, while I have referenced a range of empirical evidence that taken-for-granted ideas and concepts
surrounding the nation are being opened up or desedimented, it might be argued that there are no group discussions or surveys against which to compare the current data.

Here Billig’s arguments that when a concept is not generally seen as problematic its contours or dimensions will rarely be analysed or, indeed, acknowledged is particularly salient, which is one of the reasons his work is so important to our understanding of the nation in the modern era. This is also a point put forward by the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman who suggests that debates about ‘community’ only become prominent when the concept itself is no longer taken-for-granted by a dominant majority (2001: 11).

Bauman’s writing, as well as being salient in the wider English/British context, also raises this issue of dynamism in relation to scholarly analyses, as where a subject (in this case ‘community’) is not seen to be a problem it is unlikely to become the focus of intense academic attention. Therefore, the comparison is not necessarily between group discussions about identity and belonging in 2007 and 1967\(^{105}\), but instead between the absence or perceived need for such research in 1967 and the overwhelming number of studies aiming to investigate just this in 2007. As Orvar Lofgren observes, “the very fact that these [are] years of intense national rhetoric tells us that old allegiances [are] being questioned” (1993: 177).

I would like to end this section by reflecting on my own place within these wider debates. In *Banal Nationalism*, Michael Billig argued that analysts “should confess” to their own role in the daily (re)reproduction of national discourse, which might include, for example, taking greater interest in news stories about ‘home’, enthusiastically supporting a national sports team or drawing on national stereotypes when talking about ‘Others’ (1995: 125-127). In this sense, I am guilty as charged. For instance, I sometimes get stupidly excited when watching English teams play sport, notably football, and have very fond memories of jumping around like an idiot in a field in Glastonbury with 60,000 other people when Frank Lampard scored a late equaliser for England in a quarter final of the 2004 European football championships. Of course, I should have either been taking careful field notes or photographs of this archetypal ecstatic national event!!

\(^{105}\) This is not, of course, to suggest that there were no related debates thirty years ago (cf Banton, 1972), merely that the sheer number and intensity of the discussions now mark them out.
At the same time, my sense of national belonging is cross-cut by other arguably deeper allegiances. I live in the most diverse borough, Newham, of perhaps the most cosmopolitan city in the world, London, with my Dutch partner who I met whilst travelling in New Zealand! I am one of three ‘home’ PhD students in a cohort of around 30 at a university that is renowned for its international student body. My class, education and interests connect me far more closely to disparate national ‘Others’ than many of those I happen to share the same passport with. In other words, I am subject to the same shifting currents as those I am studying and while I may respond to them differently in many cases, I am not beyond thinking in terms of tired clichés and simplistic categories (national, racial, gendered, class-based) from time to time.

This is not simply a confession of ‘impure’ thoughts. I have argued (in Chapter 6) that in order to try and explain the power and endurance of, say, national or racist discourse, it is necessary to understand what they are used for and what they offer different people. This demands, as Les Back points out in his book the *Art of Listening* (2007), first acknowledging the (potential) appeal of these frameworks and the feelings they engender in oneself, as a means of identifying and interpreting their uses. In this way, it may be possible to more effectively destabilise and, perhaps, transcend the social relations and iniquities that such modes of thinking produce (ibid: 156-157).

Put simply, my own experiences, whether as a cosmopolitan Londoner shopping at my local market, a son/brother listening to loved one’s discussing immigration round the dinner table or a white, middle-class liberal who is sometimes unsettled by the presence of women wearing the hijab on the bus, “can provide a tool or a resource for interpretation and critical reckoning” (ibid: 156). I have drawn from these experiences when trying to make sense of the complex discussions that have marked out this study and it is something that I will look to fruitfully explore in future research.

**Future directions?**

I would suggest that the conclusions drawn in relation to this study might be usefully employed in the following subject areas:

- The link between economic and political inequality and the relative cooling/heating of national discourse has been under-theorised and is one possible area for future research.
Empirical studies of migrant communities have been ongoing for a substantial period of time but I would be particularly interested in focusing on the position of those born overseas (but of English parentage) and the degree to which they orientate themselves in terms of place and identity. This would be a means of investigating how different groups, with access to greater economic and cultural capital, manage competing allegiances and points of reference across time and space.

It would be useful to assess the relevance of the concept of national cultural capital in relation to other groups within Britain by, for example, studying how ethnic minorities, born and brought up in England, Scotland and Wales, discuss ideas about recognition, status and agency. In particular, I would be interested in exploring how non-white minorities position themselves in relation to those who have entered Britain in the past five years from the EU Accession States and how concepts around birthplace/culture may be overriding ‘race’ when defining who belongs in the national space.

Exploring the promise of ethnography in analysing both how national and cosmopolitan discourses are employed, negotiated and resisted by different groups at the level of the everyday, particularly for those who work overseas and/or travel extensively.

Extending the arguments made here with regard to the significance of ecstatic nationalism in England at the current time by conducting a comparative analysis across different countries in order to see whether similar processes can also be observed in other parts of the globe.

The interview schedule used in this study provided relatively limited scope for exploring the significance of local or regional forms of identification. A future project might be designed to investigate the meaningfulness of these identities in relation to the nation, notably as other scholars have pointed towards both the increasing resonance of cities in a global environment and the significance of regionalisation in Europe, often as a result of EU support.

The ongoing debates in the media and beyond concerning the presence of increasing numbers of foreign-born sportspeople in England and the impact on various national teams and leagues may be particularly useful in demonstrating the complex ways in which different individuals and institutions are drawing on opposing discourses to make sense of these transformations.
Re-employing the concept of de/sedimentation in relation to everyday practices and symbols in order to focus on the operation of other taken-for-granted or embedded discursive frameworks.

A final thought

I would like to end on a more personal note. Some scholars of nationalism have argued vehemently that their interest in the subject comes from a desire to replace the current international order (Ozkirimli, 2003, 2005, 2006), while others have pointed out that - despite the bloodshed associated with national conflict - national forms of identification are valuable in that they offer people an important sense of community and reassurance in the contemporary world (Brubaker, 1994, Smith, 1996, Calhoun, 2007).

Although both arguments have some validity, the real issue for me is focusing on how (and why) national discourse continues to operate as a means of constituting different groups and individuals in particular (sometimes contradictory, often oppressive) ways because for so many it is taken-for-granted as the way the world is and should be. Indeed, my own interest in the subject was largely piqued by an undergraduate course that opened my eyes to an issue that I had previously not even considered, never mind considered worthy of study. Similarly, when I talk to people about what I am studying the response is often bemusement, one of those pointless academic excursions in (to use the tabloid parlance) 'stating the bleeding obvious'. But as I have tried to suggest throughout this work what seems to be 'the bleeding obvious' is part of a wider, historically sedimented, ongoing, discursive process, involving very real and often damaging consequences for some. Therefore, its very banality makes it more worthy of study. As Les Back writes, it should be the role of sociology "to remark upon the unremarkable, evidence the self-evident and relate the troubles contained in the smallest story to a larger, more worldly scale" (2007: 22).

In attempting to map the routine (or otherwise) use of national discourse among different people in England at the current time, I have also tried to understand the ways in which national forms of identification and mobilisation are important to people as a means of making sense of often complex and confusing social-political and economic transformations (Hage, 1998: 21). This is also why efforts were made to move the study beyond everyday experiences to focus on structural constraints and
the wider questions of inequality and resource distribution, that individuals both reflect and respond to.

Writing in 1959, C. Wright Mills argued, “the very shaping of history now outpaces the ability of men (sic) to orientate themselves in accordance with cherished values”. He then suggested that the “the sociological imagination” might offer a better understanding of “what is going on in the world ... in terms of its meaning for the inner life and the external careers of a variety of individuals” (1970: 16-17). It is hoped that this study can contribute in some small way to the expansion of this sociological imagination and a wider understanding of how “ordinary men (sic) ... cope with the larger worlds with which they are so suddenly confronted” (ibid: 16).

Yet understanding does not necessarily involve approval, notably when ‘commonsense’ discursive frameworks are used to justify and promote the exclusion or oppression of particular groups or individuals on the basis that they don’t belong. Therefore, I would also like to think that this research might be seen as part of a wider “project to disclose limits, to map the horizons of our thought and to enable us perhaps to think beyond them” (Rose, 1999: 59).

This applies as much, if not more so, to those that wield power in the name of the nation. Many years ago, I remember reading an article about French nuclear testing in the South Pacific where Jacques Chiraq defended the policy in relation to the French ‘national interest’ (whatever that may be). It’s a term that is trotted out on far, far too many occasions to defend the ‘great and the good’ by governments across the world, including my own. Too often it brokers no argument. To quote Nikolas Rose again;

what [we must] think beyond [is] ... all those claims made by others to govern us in the name of our own well being, to speak for us, to identify our needs .... To the extent that others seek to govern us in our own interests, we have the right ... to interrogate and even protest those strategies (ibid).

For, no matter how much those in power base their policies on some putative national good or lay claim to national values or traditions, no matter how passionately people are willing to respond to these calls, we must always try and remember that living as a national in a world of nations remains but one of the ways of understanding the world,
one way of organising 'our' relations with others, one way of making sense of what 'we' and 'they' do and say. At the risk of ending on a cliché, we must as social scientists (perhaps if not always as individuals) constantly remind ourselves and others that another world is possible, even if those possibilities are rejected.
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Conclusion

Appendix 1: Interview Schedule, key characteristics of groups, recruitment strategy

Interview Schedule

((Brief note here about the approach you are using - wait and listen approach - important to try and ascertain where and when people draw on a national discourse to make sense of issues etc - reference Morley's comment about 'methodology' in pre-viva report))

Introduce yourself and the research project. Thanks everyone for taking part. Re­affirm that all contributions will be anonymised.

*Can you tell me three things you most associate with this country?*

(Do you agree with each others choices?)
(If there is a query about 'this country' then you may wish to go on to ask respondents what they consider to be 'this country' and what it means to them - note that a discussion on Britain/England may provide some fruitful insights and should be pursued e.g. what does it mean to be British/English - values, attitudes, beliefs, behaviour? What is the difference between being British/English? Do you see yourself as more British/English and why?)

What makes the English different from the French or the Germans or Americans?

*STATE OF THE NATION*

*Can you tell me three things you dis/like about living in this country?*

(If no answer forthcoming ask respondents where they would prefer to live and why? How are these attitudes towards 'this country' influences - talking to others, personal experience, media etc?)

We have talked about some of the positive and negative aspects of living here. If we take the last ten years or so, do you think much has changed and, if so, can you describe these changes?

*What in your opinion might have led to these changes?*

(If topics such as immigration / asylum / Europe are mentioned then try and encourage the respondents to talk more fully about these subjects. I think it is also important to ask respondents where they get their information about, say, immigration/Europe from)

((If there is no response suggest drawing on a number of prompts, for example, stories taken from the press etc detailing concerns over e.g. Europe, off-shoring, economy, health service, immigration, unemployment etc))

Link to sources of information - MEDIA (Is the role of the media important?)

*GLOBALISATION*
Do you or people you know travel abroad more now than in the past? What sort of places are you/they visiting? Do you have increasing contacts with people living in other places?

Global identity - involvement in wider global civil society (NGO's)? Working with other abroad? Or just simply travelling abroad on holiday?

British/English industry - Rover, ASDA, Chelsea FC/Manchester United

EVENTS

How is it possible for ordinary people to 'show' who they are in terms of a national identity? Do you think it is important for them to do this?

Can you remember an example of a national celebration in this country?

Do you take part in this event or have you taken part in any such events in the past? (If so, which ones? When you went along do you enjoy the event? How did you feel?)

IDENTITY

We have talked about some of the changes that have taken place in the last decade or more and your opinions about them. Have do you think these changes might have affected the way in which people feel about their sense of identity? What do you think it means to be British/English today?

(Are you proud to be British/English? What does it mean to be British/English today perhaps compared with 10 years ago?)

Are you aware of some of the discussions taking place in Britain at the current time about national identity, citizenship, community cohesion and so on? If so, what do you think of these discussion and how might a British national identity be promoted?

WRAP UP

Any other comments that you would like to make. THANKS!!!
Table 3: Overview of group interview participants in terms of key characteristics

Interviews carried out between September - October 2005

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**Doncaster**

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Interview carried out between June - August 2006
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**Interviews carried out between September - December 2006**

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Recruitment strategy:

The following groups were recruited through snowball sampling:

Surrey, Middlesex, Margate, South London, Newcastle, Taunton, Devon, Appledore, Liverpool, Cheltenham, Cirencester, Doncaster and Swindon.

Members of the Manchester, South Shields and Carlisle groups responded to letters that were sent out to organisations, including schools, colleges, sporting and social clubs and businesses, across the country.

The Bexley, Hastings and Birmingham groups were recruited via an article posted on the BBC website.

Interviews with the Middlesborough and Newcastle College groups were carried out ‘on the spot’ in a working men’s club and a student union bar.

A professional recruiter was paid to organise the interview with the Enfield group.
Appendix 2 Content Analysis Coding Frames, Coding Book and Crosstabs/Frequency tables

Table 4: Content Analysis Coding Frames

Press Coding Frame

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<td>Partic. Br/Eng</td>
<td>Yes (1)</td>
<td>No (2)</td>
<td>NPTS (3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## TV Coding Frame

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TV station</th>
<th>BBC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date &amp; Time</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deixis</td>
<td>Yes (1) No (2) NPTS (0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation mention</th>
<th>1 BR</th>
<th>2 E</th>
<th>3 SC</th>
<th>4 W</th>
<th>5 NI</th>
<th>6 EU</th>
<th>7 US</th>
<th>8 OTHER</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Place mention</td>
<td>1 (in BR/no)</td>
<td>2 (in BR/yes)</td>
<td>3 (not BR/yes)</td>
<td>4 (not BR/no)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non/trans-nat</th>
<th>Yes (1)</th>
<th>No (2)</th>
<th>NPTS (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partic to Br/E</th>
<th>Yes (1)</th>
<th>No (2)</th>
<th>NPTS (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Key:**

- **Br** - Britain
- **E** - England
- **S** - Scotland
- **W** - Wales
- **NI** - Northern Ireland
- **EU** - European Union
- **US** - United States of America

**NPTS** - Not possible to say
Coding Book

Press

Note which paper the story comes from
The Sun/Daily Mail/The Guardian

Mark the type of story
Front page/Back page/Main business story

Radio

Note the radio station and the time of the broadcast

TV

Note the time of the broadcast

All stories

Note the date of the story

Does the story include any instance(s) of deixis that sets in within a national context?
E.g. the use of words such as ‘we’ or ‘our’ (referring to Britain or British people),
‘here’ or ‘there’ (indicating Britain or another country), ‘the’ government or prime
minister (referring to the British government etc)

Are any countries specifically mentioned and, if so, which ones?

Are any places that you know to be in Britain mentioned without any mention of
Britain?

Are any places that you know to be outside of Britain mentioned without the name of
the country also being stated?

Are any trans-national organisations mentioned in any of the stories?
E.g. United Nations (UN), FIFA, World Trade Organisation (WTO), European Union (EU)
etc.

Do you consider the story to be particular to Britain/England? In other words, if the
story were to be shown in a foreign newspaper is it, in your opinion, significant enough
to be placed outside of the ‘foreign news’ section.
Content Analysis: Crosstabs and Frequency Tables

Table 5: Crosstabulation of story and mention of country

Crosstabs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Processing Summary</th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Valid</td>
<td>Missing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>which medium *</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mention of Britain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>221</td>
<td>97.4%</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| which medium *          |       |         |   |          |   |          |
| Mention of UK           |       |         |   |          |   |          |
|                         | N     | Percent | N | Percent |
| 221                     | 97.4% | 6       | 2.6% | 227     | 100.0% |

| which medium *          |       |         |   |          |   |          |
| Mention of England      |       |         |   |          |   |          |
|                         | N     | Percent | N | Percent |
| 221                     | 97.4% | 6       | 2.6% | 227     | 100.0% |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>which medium * Mention of Britain Crosstabulation</th>
<th>Mention of Britain</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>which medium</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>which medium * Mention of UK Crosstabulation</th>
<th>Mention of UK</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>which medium</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>which medium * Mention of England Crosstabulation</th>
<th>Mention of England</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Press</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>63</td>
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<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
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<td>105</td>
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<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

365
Table 6: Crosstabs of story and named place/country

Crosstabs

Case Processing Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Valid</th>
<th>Missing</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>which medium * Mention of a place in Britain without any mention of Britain/British/England/English</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>97.4%</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>which medium * Mention of a place not in Britain without any mention of the corresponding country</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>97.4%</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

which medium * Mention of a place in Britain without any mention of Britain/British/England/English Crosstabulation

Count

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mention of a place in Britain without any mention of Britain/British/England/English</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>which medium Press</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>153</td>
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</table>

which medium * Mention of a place not in Britain without any mention of the corresponding country Crosstabulation

Count

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mention of a place not in Britain without any mention of the corresponding country</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>which medium Press</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>221</td>
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</table>
Table 7: Crosstabulation of use of homeland deixis and story/medium

**Crosstabs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>use of homeland deixis</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>221</td>
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<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>54.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>which medium * use of homeland deixis</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Crosstabs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>use of homeland deixis</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
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<td>N</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>54.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>which medium * use of homeland deixis</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Press</td>
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<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8: Crosstabulation of story particular to Br/Eng and medium

### Crosstabs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Processing Summary</th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Valid</td>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>which medium * use of homeland deixis</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>97.4%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>which medium * Story particular to Br/Eng context</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>97.4%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

which medium * use of homeland deixis Crosstabulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>use of homeland deixis</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>which medium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

which medium * Story particular to Br/Eng context Crosstabulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Story particular to Br/Eng context</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>Not possible to say</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>which medium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 9: Crosstabulation of mention of trans-national organisation and medium

Crosstabs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Processing Summary</th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>which medium *</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mention of non-national or trans-national actor/organisation</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>97.4%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

which medium * Mention of non-national or trans-national actor/organisation Crosstabulation

Count

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mention of non-national or trans-national actor/organisation</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>which medium</td>
<td>Press</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Television</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 10: Frequency tables for each variable

**Frequencies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>which medium</th>
<th>use of homeland deixis</th>
<th>Mention of Britain</th>
<th>Mention of UK</th>
<th>Mention of England</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N Valid</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Statistics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mention of a place in Britain without any mention of Britain/ British/ England/ English</th>
<th>Story particular to Br/Eng context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N Valid</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Frequency Table**

**which medium**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid Press</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>39.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>86.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**use of homeland deixis**

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid YES</td>
<td>101</td>
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<td>45.7</td>
<td>45.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>97.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Missing System</td>
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<td>2.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Mention of Britain**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>21.7</td>
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<td>78.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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<td></td>
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### Mention of UK

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<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
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<td>95.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>97.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>System</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Mention of England

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>11.9</td>
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<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
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<td>85.5</td>
<td>87.8</td>
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<tr>
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<td>221</td>
<td>97.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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</table>

### Mention of a place in Britain without any mention of Britain/British/England/English

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Percent</th>
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<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>100.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>97.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>System</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>227</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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### Story particular to BriEng context

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>81.1</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>83.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>14.5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not possible to say</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>97.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 3: Alceste Data

Alceste is used to investigate patterns of language use across a large body of data by classifying the co-occurrence of particular words within text units (Abraham et al, 2006). Put simply, Alceste classifies words into broad categories according to the patterns and frequencies of usage in relation to other words, in the process identifying commonalities in word use across a range of texts. For my data I was interested in examining whether there were any particular patterns across the groups interviews as a whole and then to what extent individual groups could be positioned in relation to any categories that emerged. Therefore the first data set relates to the analysis of the groups taken as one unit and the second where each group was tagged individually (see below).

The first analysis identified six broad classes each containing a list of words that predominately feature in relation to each other across the group interviews as a whole. Each word is given a significance rating which indicates its relevance to the overall class, the higher the Chi2 figure the more it features. I have listed the ten words with the highest Chi2 figure for each class (plus one or two others that are particularly relevant to the study as a whole) and given them broad headings on the basis of these word clusters.

The three classes that are of most significance to this study are Class 1, Class 3 and Class 6. In the first class we can see how terms associated with both a general (they, them) and named ‘Others’ (Muslims, Sikhs) are linked to words that reference wider social resources (work, money, job, school). Similarly, Class 3 points to the way in which talk about multiculturalism and political correctness is strongly linked to a number of words (our, identity, losing, change, society) that indicate both the degree to which these topics are defined as a challenge to the in-group’s status and the (perceived) role of the government in these processes (See Chapter 6). Finally, Class 6 indicates that people predominately mention the specific countries within Britain when discussing national celebrations and/or sporting events (This relationship is analysed in more detail in Chapter 7).

106 In some cases I have ignored words such as ‘doesn’t’ or ‘sort’ as they don’t seem to add anything to the overall analysis.
It is more difficult to draw concrete conclusions from the other three classes although Class 4 may indicate a more general sense of concern about social ties, notably those linked to the family. Similarly, while Class 2 features words that reference a more international or global frame of reference it is difficult to assess whether these terms indicate a positive engagement or otherwise.
Table 11: Keywords from the main classes generated by the Alceste software analysis

Class 1 - Material benefits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Chi2 rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fucking</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Them/they</td>
<td>145+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wear</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Get</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikh</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Class 2 - Global/International

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Chi2 rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kind</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speak</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feel</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries / European</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Class 3 - Cultural threat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Chi2 rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political correctness+</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi (culturalism)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Losing</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Class 4 - Past/Family

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Chi2 rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Had</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Came</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ago</td>
<td>78</td>
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<tr>
<td>Made</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Son</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guy</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Back</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Wife, 56 /Grandfather, 47 / Daughter, 46 / Mother, 43)
### Class 5 - Travel/Home

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Chi2 rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Holiday</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mile</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hour</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Go</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City/Street</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Away/Road</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summer</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Class 6 - Nation/Celebration/Sport

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Chi2 rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>St/Georges</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wales/Welsh</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland/Scottish</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Football</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cup</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celebrate</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England/English</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Won</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Jubilee, 149 / Ireland, 121 / Flag, 105)
The second analysis, where each group was tagged and analysed as an individual unit was used to assess where the groups were positioned in relation to each of the classes (see below).

Table 12: The position of the interview groups in relation to the main Alceste classes

This graph points to a number of interesting features as although many of the groups are positioned in close proximity to the classes that the micro-analyses would have predicated in some instances this is definitely not the case. For example, I would not have expected the Middlesex Group to have been located next to Class 2, given that they talked passionately about the threat that immigration/multiculturalism posed to ‘their’ country. Likewise, I found it somewhat surprising that the Newcastle College group was positioned so closely to Class 1 (material benefits) given that some of the group welcomed immigrants in terms of their economic contribution. These findings partly illustrate the fact that many of the group discussions were not marked by
consensus as different individuals drew on their own particular experiences and knowledge as well as wider discursive resources. This cautions us against making generalised claims when talking about common sociological categories such as class, age and region, which may often be cross-cut by other more significant biographical factors. As a result, such processes need to be understood contextually through detailed empirical analysis.

However, although consistent patterns in relation to region and age were not discernible there seemed to be a more positive correlation between higher levels of education and a more cosmopolitan perspective (Bexley, Brighton, Newcastle), which tallies with other recent research on similar topics. Overall, I think the Alceste analysis offers some limited insights into the patterns of language use across the groups, notably in regard to the identification of particular classes that broadly reflect much of the closer textual analysis and, then, by challenging the idea that particular viewpoints can be firmly linked to different sociological groups. In other words, the fact that a consistent relationship between the groups and the classes were not always identifiable might actually be significant in showing the degree to which apparently differentiated individuals draw on the same discourses to make sense of these complex issues.