From Friends to Strangers:
A Theory of Interstate Security Cooperation
Applied to German-American Relations,
1945 - 1995

Felix Sebastian Berenskötter

A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the
London School of Economics and Political Science
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

October 2008
Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without the prior written consent of the author.

I warrant that this authorization does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party.
Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to advance a theory of friendship and estrangement between states as an explanation for the emergence and decline of interstate security cooperation, defined as costly investment in a shared international institution. It seeks to illuminate dynamics in (West)German-American relations between 1945 and 1995, specifically Germany's subsequent investment in three different security institutions for the purpose of ‘European security’ which gradually excluded the United States: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1945-55), the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (1965-75) and the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (1985-95). Suggesting that the three dominant IR paradigms – realism, institutionalism and constructivism – cannot explain this dynamic, the thesis applies a phenomenological lens to explore the parameters of the national security interest and the motivation for security cooperation by interrogating what it means for the state to exist.

Combining insights from Heidegger and Aristotle, the first part argues that states (i) attempt to control anxiety through the formulation of an authentic biographical narrative inscribed in space and time, and that they (ii) attempt to stabilize their narrative by embedding it in a project of ‘world building’ negotiated with friends through shared institutions. It further argues that (iii) enduring dissonance within this relationship signifies a process of estrangement and leads to a strategy of emancipation by investing in an alternative institution with another friend. The second part applies this theoretical frame to explain the abovementioned dynamic with (dis)agreements between German and American policymakers over visions of European order embedded in respective national biographies. The thesis argues that the consensus of using NATO for building a ‘peaceful Europe’ in the Western space on the principles of ‘freedom’ and ‘unity’ weakened when (a) US administrations came to question the desirability of the latter for the American narrative and were willing to use military means to build the ‘free world’, while (b) German governments came to pursue the vision of having Germany unfold in a Greater European Peace Order marked by ‘unity’ through peaceful means.
Acknowledgements

Writing a thesis is both a lonely journey and one that would be impossible without the support and stimulating input of many.

I would like to begin by thanking my dissertation supervisor, Michael Cox, for his trust and guidance throughout. He not only pushed me to take a closer look at the Cold War but also kept my feet on the ground when I risked getting lost in abstractions by reminding me that ‘less Heidegger would be better!’. I am also very grateful to Kimberly Hutchings, Mark Hoffman and Olya Gayazova for their comments on several draft chapters.

First attempts to organise some of the thoughts engaged in this thesis date back to my time spent at Rutgers University (2000-2002), made possible by a scholarship from the German-American Fulbright Commission. For supporting my studies at the LSE, I gratefully acknowledge funding from the Economic Social and Research Council (ESRC) and from the School/the Department of International Relations. In the writing-up phase I had the privilege to spend an academic year as a Research Fellow in the quiet and picturesque setting of Dartmouth College, generously funded by the John Sloan Dickey Center for International Understanding. On the list of stimulating and sheltered research environments I benefited from over the years also belongs the German Historical Institute in London and the Otto Suhr Institute at the Free University Berlin. I am grateful for their open doors. An incredibly fruitful experience of a different kind was my time as co-editor of Millennium during my first year at the LSE, which among other things helped me to understand better how the market place of ideas works.

The ideas engaged in this thesis were shaped and tested in seminars and conference panels over the years. These forums proved crucial not only for bouncing ideas but also for giving me deadlines I could not ignore. For valuable discussions, comments and questions there, in coffee shops and in pubs I would like to thank (in addition to those noted earlier): Kirsten Ainley, Cristina Barrios, Andreas Behnke, Janice Bially Mattern, Chris Brown, Douglas Bulloch, David Chandler, Georgios Evangelopoulos, Bastian Giegerich, Stefano Guzzini, Helga Hafendorn, Chris Hill, Jef Huysmans, Dan Kelemen, Robert Kissack, Marjo Koivisto, Klaus Larres, George Lawson, Ned Lebow, Jack Levy, Simona Manea, Harald Mueller, Ed Rhodes, Graham Smith, Holger Stritzel, Benedikt Stuchtey, Louisa Sunderman, Ingo Peters, Erik Ringmar, Michael Shafer, Rose Shinko, Rob Walker, and Bill Wohlfarth.

Complementing peers and friends at LSE, my London flatmates Alejandro, Andres and Caroline not only tolerated me being locked in my room on weekends but, as friends and companions, also did much to prevent me becoming a hermit. During my time at Dartmouth I was glad to share with Kevin the experience of being ‘almost done’.

I could not have neither started nor completed this journey without the support of my parents and what I owe them cannot be expressed in words. This thesis is dedicated to my grandma, Margarete Beck, the last remaining family member who consciously lived through the historical period covered here.
# Table of Contents

## CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

- Question and Objective ............................................................................................. 9
- Contribution ................................................................................................................ 11
- Defining the Puzzle ................................................................................................... 12
- Sorting Existing Theories .......................................................................................... 14
- The Question of the 'Common Security Interest' ..................................................... 15
- The Silence of the Camps .......................................................................................... 18
- Research Design ........................................................................................................ 22
- Methodological Issues ............................................................................................... 23
- Overview of Chapters ................................................................................................. 27

## CHAPTER TWO: THE CASE FOR DEEP THEORY

- Summary ..................................................................................................................... 33
- The Interpretative Bias .............................................................................................. 33
- Taking a 'Deep' Look at Theory ............................................................................. 35
- Looking at Lakatos ..................................................................................................... 36
- The Challenge of Theory Building .......................................................................... 40
- Reading the Hard Core: Causation Begins with a 'Condition' ............................... 43
- Parameters of the 'National Security Interest' ....................................................... 47
- From Humans to 'States' ........................................................................................... 50

## CHAPTER THREE: UNRAVELLING THE FIELD

- Introduction ................................................................................................................. 53
- (I) Realism: Providing the Baseline ..................................................................... 53
- The Balancing Bias ................................................................................................... 55
- Tracing the Hard Core ............................................................................................... 59
- The State in Space: Autonomy as Territorial Integrity ........................................... 61
- Realist Attempts of Fixing the State: Learning and Nationalism ...................... 64
- The State in Time: Uncertainty and Experience ....................................................... 66
- (II) Institutionalism: Adjusting Realism ............................................................ 70
- The Path Dependency of Historical Institutionalism ........................................... 71
- Neoliberal Institutionalism: Limits and Openings ............................................... 72
- (III) Constructivism: Responding to the Postmodern Zeitgeist ....................... 76
- The Weakness of Moderate Constructivism ......................................................... 79
- The ‘Identity’ Problem ............................................................................................. 82
- Wendt and the ‘Essential State’ .............................................................................. 84
- Openings and Limits ................................................................................................. 87
- Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 90

## CHAPTER FOUR: RETHINKING THE HUMAN CONDITION

- Summary ..................................................................................................................... 92
- From ‘Identity’ to Self ............................................................................................... 93
- Reading the Human Condition with Heidegger .................................................... 94
- Being-in-the-World as ‘Unfolding’ ......................................................................... 95
- Anxiety as the Foundational Sentiment ................................................................. 99
- The Anxiety Paradox: Contingency and Continuity ........................................... 101
- The Anxiety Paradox ............................................................................................... 103
- Modern Answers: Numbers and Routines ............................................................ 104
- Back to Experience .................................................................................................. 106
- The Anxiety Dilemma: Verfallen and Authenticity ............................................. 108
### CHAPTER NINE: CSCE / TENSIONS (1965-1975)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brandt</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Envisioning Germany-in-(Greater)Europe</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Building the new European Order through Peaceful Change</em></td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locating Friends in the West: ‘Kennedy America’</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ‘Berlin Complex’</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson: The Fading of ‘Kennedy America’</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO’s ‘Harmel Report’ and the Ambiguity of détente</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pushing the Limits of NATO</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Vietnam is not Korea: Brandt’s Silence</em></td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon/Kissinger: Reorienting America-in-the-World</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Keeping ‘Europe’ Close</em></td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Discomfort with ‘Brandt Germany’</em></td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brandt: Discomfort with Nixon/Kissinger America</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO or CSCE? Tensions towards Helsinki</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ‘Year of Europe’</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CHAPTER 10: CFSP / DIVERGENCE (1985-95)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merging Adenauer and Brandt</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissonance with Reagan’s World</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Choices: Managing Dissonance</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unification and the Question of Germany-in-Europe</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonn’s Agenda of Continuity</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Bush and the Question of ‘Europe’</em></td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Bonn-Washington Nexus</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Ambiguity of the Western Project</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposing Dissonance I: Gulf War 1991</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Quo Vadis, Germany</em></td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Choices: Signs of Rivalry</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposing Dissonance II: Bosnia (1992-95)</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>America: ‘No Dog In This Fight’</em></td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Germany: ‘Europe Cannot End in Sarajevo’</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusting the German Narrative</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estrangement: Doubts About NATO/US</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emancipation: Investment in CFSP/France</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Question and Objective
The aim of this thesis is to assess, both conceptually and empirically, the motives behind interstate cooperation in security policy and why/under what conditions states cease to cooperate. The overarching question addressed is 'what explains the emergence (rise) and decline (demise) of interstate security cooperation?' Defining interstate security cooperation as the costly investment in a shared international institution, the thesis applies this question to the empirical case of German1 -American2 cooperation between 1945 and 1995. Specifically, it develops a theoretical frame to explain Germany's subsequent investments in three different security institutions for the purpose of 'European security', namely the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

Seen in the context of German-American relations, these investments are taken as indicators for the emergence and decline of security cooperation between Germany and the United States (US). Specifically, they signify a dynamic moving from shared commitment to NATO as the primary security institution in Europe ('consensus'), via differing commitments to the CSCE process marked by strong German support and American reluctance to participate ('tension'), to German investment in CFSP as a new institution in which the US was not a member and which US administrations viewed with suspicion ('divergence'). In short, the question can be posed as 'why did German governments invest in three different security institutions in Europe since the end of the Second World War which gradually excluded the United States?'

The relevance of engaging these questions is not difficult to see. Dynamics of interstate security cooperation are integral to the dynamics of war and peace and so investigating them is a well established exercise in the field of International Relations (IR), if not its core concern. Yet for the most part this does not entail scrutinizing the motivations, or shared 'security interests', on which decisions for cooperation are based. Rather than fixing them on the level of assumptions, this thesis problematizes the meaning of 'security interests' by building on literature pointing to their political and context-specific nature. It reaches down to the level of ontology to rethink the constitution of the

---

1 With 'Germany' this thesis refers to the Federal Republic (FRG) prior to unification.
2 This thesis uses the terms 'America' and 'United States' (US) interchangeably.
state and the parameters within which its ‘security interest’ is formulated and, consequently, within which ‘common’ security interests must be situated to understand when security cooperation is likely to occur, endure, and decline.

The theoretical exploration of these parameters makes up a significant part of the thesis. In a nutshell, the argument advanced is that common institutional investments signify projects of ‘world building’ among friends driven by the attempt to control ‘anxiety’ by establishing an authentic biographical narrative. The decline of such relations, marked by the decision of at least one side to invest in an alternative institution which does not include the previous partner, is said to be a reaction to a process of estrangement and the decision to pursue a strategy of emancipation. With developing this argument, this thesis is not merely offering an explanation for the aforementioned dynamics of German-American security cooperation but is also outlining a new theory of interstate security cooperation.

The German-American relationship between 1945 and 1995 provides an important and challenging case for exploring dynamics of interstate security cooperation. It is important because the two states are key actors in the Euro-American region and core member of NATO, hence the ‘health’ of their relationship affects the cohesiveness of the transatlantic link, sometimes also called ‘the West’, and the vitality of the Atlantic Alliance. Taking a fresh look at this relationship from a long term perspective is therefore not only of historical interest. It is hoped that by “expanding the data base” (Gaddis, 1987) the findings of this thesis will allow scholars and practitioners to better understand the opportunities and limits of US-German cooperation today and improve expectations about their support for security institutions in Europe in the future.

The challenge is that by most measures these two states make for rather unequal partners and, for a significant part of the period under investigation, appear in a hegemon-client relationship marked by one-sided dependency rather than eye-to-eye cooperation. In this narrative, the US emerged out of the Second World War as the leader of ‘the West’ fixated on the Soviet Union whereas Germany emerged as an occupied state thrust into the arena of superpower competition without much opportunity for agency (e.g., Haftedorn 1985; Hanrieder 1989). The thesis offers a slightly different perspective. Supporting the scholarly agenda of decentering Cold War history, it pays particular attention to the German role to assess and retrieve the agency governments in Bonn exercised during the periods in which those three institutions emerged: (i) The post-war decade (1945-55) characterized by a consensus about NATO as the primary security
institution in Europe, (ii) the period of Ostpolitik/détente (1965-75) showing differences in opinion over the need and relevance of CSCE, and (iii) the decade surrounding the end of the Cold War (1985-95) marked by German investment in CFSP as a potential alternative institution to NATO and from which the US is excluded. Applying the theoretical argument mentioned earlier, this dynamic is explained with (dis)agreements among political leaders over visions of European order embedded in respective national biographies, signifying a movement of German-American security relations from friendship to estrangement, culminating in Bonn’s emancipation by investing in CFSP.

Contribution
The theoretical contribution can be summarised as follows: in addition to offering a certain understanding of ‘theory’ in IR, this thesis contributes to the analytical toolkit by advancing a new causal narrative made up of three building blocks: (i) the notion that states are driven by an attempt to control anxiety, (ii) an ontology of the state as a national biography inscribed in space and time and (iii) a conceptualization of interstate relations as ‘friendship’ and an argument for the formation and the breakdown thereof. How these building blocks are conceptually embedded in the IR literature is discussed throughout the six theoretical chapters and summarised in the conclusion.

As for the empirical contribution, I am not aware of an analysis of German-American security cooperation that focuses on the question outlined above. By addressing this question the thesis contributes to research on three levels. First, as already noted, it stresses the creative role of German agency. Second, it strengthens the view that the security interdependence between Germany and the US was generated internally rather than by an external threat. These two points will be made by placing the three institutions – NATO, CSCE, CFSP – in one analytical story. By doing so, the thesis, third, contributes to a literature which, thus far, is characterised by imbalance and disconnect. While there is a large literature dealing with German-American relations in NATO in the post-war decade, most of it is confined to a military strategic angle. There is very little literature on the CSCE process and almost nothing on its role in German-American relations. And most of the literature on CFSP is embedded in analyses of ‘EUropean Foreign Policy’ where the US, not being a member of the EU, falls off the analytical radar. This thesis levels out this imbalance and connects the three institutions in a single study. In other words, it treats NATO, CSCE and CFSP as ‘equals’ by starting from the premise that they all deal with ‘European security’ and takes their difference in design as an invitation to explore how states come to have different understandings about what makes ‘Europe’ secure.
The remainder of this introduction proceeds as follows. The next section clarifies the phenomenon of (non)cooperation, followed by identifying the parameters along which competing explanations can be assessed. The third section outlines the inadequacy of the explanations derived from three major IR paradigms (realism, institutionalism and constructivism). The fourth section addresses issues of research design before, finally, presenting brief summaries of the individual major chapters.

Defining the Puzzle

A 'puzzle' is an intellectual challenge posed by an empirical phenomenon against the backdrop of existing theories, or ways of understanding how the world works. For this, the necessary first step is to clarify the phenomenon, namely what signifies (non)cooperation. This is by no means an easy task. As Robert Keohane warned, "the phenomenon of cooperation is elusive enough, and its sources are sufficiently multifaceted and intertwined, that it constitutes a difficult subject to study" (Keohane, 1984: 10). And indeed, two decades after Robert Jervis pointed out that the meaning of cooperation is often left unclear in studies dealing with this very topic (Jervis, 1988: 330), substantive definitions are still sparse.3

In the most basic understanding cooperation designates 'joint' action or decision-making. This is different from 'alignment' (Snyder, 1997: 6ff) in that the latter can be understood as a more passive 'taking sides' lacking interaction and, thus, politics. That said, many studies define 'joint' action negatively rather than positively, that is, they contrast cooperation against a relationship marked by conflict, confrontation, discord, or simply 'competition' (Keohane, 1984; Grieco, 1990; Stein, 1990).4 But even the meaning of these phenomena is often left sufficiently vague. For instance, defection, the juxtaposition to cooperation prominent in game theory and formal modelling, is simply described as "cheating" on an existing or expected arrangement (Stein, 1990: 42) and 'exploiting' or 'taking advantage' of the other actor within a given "payoff structure" (Jervis, 1978; 1988; Axelrod, 1984). To get a meaningful grasp on the phenomenon of (non)cooperation it is necessary to go beyond these simple juxtapositions. Cooperation is more than the absence of 'conflict' or 'competition' between two parties, and 'defection' understood as 'cheating' carries little analytical weight outside the trade-off matrix of the prisoner's dilemma (or Rousseau's stag hunt, for that matter).

3 For an overview of theories of security cooperation, see Jervis (1999); Mueller (2002).
4 Competition does not necessarily designate confrontation but unilateral action (Glaser 1994: 95) or "independent decision-making" (Stein 1982: 324, in Baldwin, 1993: 4, 41ff).
In this thesis cooperation is not understood as an instantaneous decision but as a process, that is, something occurring over time. It builds on Keohane’s definition of cooperation as the phenomenon when “the politics actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of their own objectives, as the result of a process of policy coordination”. Importantly, this process implies change where “actions of separate individuals...be brought into conformity with one another” (Keohane, 1984: 51f, emphasis added). This is echoed by Grieco (1990: 22) who adds the qualification of cooperation as “voluntary adjustment” of policies, thereby limiting cooperation to those relationships where policy coordination was not a consequence of coercion but of choice, thus implying agency. Taken together, cooperation thus requires the convergence of policies through a process of mutual coordination and voluntary adjustment. The qualification that these policies are ‘actually followed’ is important and points out that cooperation goes beyond rhetoric and distinguishes, in Morgenthau’s (1960: 186) words, an operative from an inoperative alliance. In this sense, following Grieco (1990) and Stein (1990), cooperation is defined as costly investment in a shared institutions (or regime) on the international level over a period of time.

Institutions are understood here along the lines of Stephen Krasner’s well-known definition as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge” (Krasner, 1983: 2) and refer to political agreements and treaties outlining common aims, means, and responsibilities incorporated in formal organizations (Hasenclever et al., 1996). In and of itself membership in the same institution and occasional expressions of solidarity is not a sufficient indicator for a cooperative partnership. What is required is costly investment in the shared institution, understood as the mobilization of significant political capital to influence the formulation of strategic goals and the establishment/reform of organizational elements and/or use of the same. Cooperation as substantial and reciprocated political and financial investment towards common practices, ranging from consultation and shared strategic planning to common action in crisis situations, inevitably involves the conscious sacrifice of some degree of independence (Wolfers, 1962: 27).

The simplest indicator for non-cooperation would be the resignation of institutional membership, that is, the formal termination of the contractual agreement under which the common institution was established. Yet, again, such a definition could not grasp the process of a disintegrating relationship, as everything short of un-signing a treaty would...
move outside the analytical focus. In line with the above, non-cooperation is understood here not as a sudden breakdown of relations but as a degenerative process playing out over time. While 'defection' generally does not grasp this long-term perspective, its definition as "the action of falling away from allegiance or adherence to a leader, party, or cause" (OED Online) or as the "conscious abandonment of allegiance or duty (as to a person, cause, or doctrine)" and "withdrawing support or help despite allegiance or responsibility" (Merriam Webster Online) is nevertheless instructive. Although in the context of interstate relations it may seem more appropriate to speak of the fading of 'solidarity' than 'allegiance', the notion of withdrawing support from a common cause reminds that cooperation is goal-oriented. Non-cooperation thus may be expressed in both passive non-compliance with and severe disputes over the common cause, and in the independent formulation and pursuit of policy against the expectation of shared practice.

As it is difficult to establish a threshold for when non-compliance, disputes and independent decision-making count as non-cooperation, the favouring of an 'alternative' is an important element. To be an alternative the new institution must cover the same policy realm and designed to fulfil a similar purpose, thus having, or be perceived as having, the potential to rival or compete with the old institution (Biermann 2007). Hence, inversing the definition of cooperation outlined earlier, the demise of cooperative relationship is defined here as a process in which a state ceases to give priority to the common security institution, signified by costly investment in an alternative institution over a period of time which does not include the previous partner.

Through this conceptual frame Germany's subsequent investment in three different institutions for the purpose of providing for 'European security' which gradually excluded the United States – NATO, CSCE, CFSP – reads as a dynamic moving from cooperation to non-cooperation. This phenomenon turns into a 'puzzle' in light of the inability of existing IR theories to explain it.

**Sorting Existing Theories**

While historians would explore the three decades of consensus (1945-55); tension (1965-75); and divergence (1985-1995) in great detail to offer a rich and nuanced picture of the political dynamics surrounding (and leading to) the institutional investments in

---

5 See Albert Hirschman's notion of 'exit' defined as a dissatisfied member leaving an organization to join another one (Hirschman, 1970).

6 Such a move is also different from claiming a position of neutrality or 'non-alignment'.
each case, IR scholars approach history more selectively by viewing it through a theoretical prism which deliberately highlights some aspects and neglects others. Indeed, for some IR scholars meaningful analysis is only possible “with the guidance of theory” (Waltz 1979: 5) holding that “theory is inescapable; all empirical or practical analysis rests on it” (Keohane and Nye 1989: 4). As discussed in more detail in the next chapter, behind this is the conviction that the ‘interpretative bias’ permeating all research is best compensated for by explicitly laying out the conceptual framework through which the historical material is approached. Instead of empirical richness IR scholars (should) offer a clearly stated angle focusing on a few but (allegedly) central factors explaining the phenomenon at hand. Yet when existing theories are not capable of grasping an empirical phenomenon and, thus, provide insufficient explanatory guidance, the researcher is left with a ‘puzzle’. The following suggests that the dominant IR theories on interstate (security) cooperation fail to fully explain the empirical phenomenon at hand and that, in response to that puzzle, more careful theoretical reflection is needed.

**The Question of the ‘Common Security Interest’**

To assess the adequacy of the dominant IR theories for explaining interstate security (non)cooperation – structural realism, neoliberal institutionalism, social constructivism – there is the question whether/on what basis they can be compared. After all, despite their broad commitment to illuminate the issues of conflict and cooperation, theories are constructed for different reasons and tailored towards explaining different things, thus, they may not speak to each other. In the present context, the question of comparability comes to light of two concepts generally kept apart in the IR literature, namely ‘alliances’ and ‘security communities’.

‘Alliance’ is the older term found in writings of political thinkers, historians, and military planners dating back centuries. It is used in traditional security studies dominated by realism and game theory and, correspondingly, is the focus of the first two abovementioned approaches (structural realism and neoliberal institutionalism). Broadly speaking, an alliance designates a temporary military coalition formed in the face of a (potential) common enemy. Whether for offensive or defensive/deterrence purposes, in this literature alliances are a temporary phenomena of collaboration formed against a common military threat, and thus, under the prospect of war (Morgenthau, 1960; Walt, 1979).

---

7 For a discussion on the meaning of theory and its adequacy, see the following chapter.
The notion of a ‘security community’ is of more recent origin. Often linked to the Kantian notion of a ‘foedus pacificum’, the term was coined by Karl Deutsch and colleagues in the 1950s and over the past decade has gained popularity among social constructivists. It designates the very absence of war among states or, positively speaking, collaboration for peace. More than a simple nonaggression treaty, a security community describes a long-term association among states who have agreed to solve all disagreements between them through peaceful means, making war between them “unthinkable”.

In short, it appears alliances are organised against something (an external enemy) and externally oriented, whereas security communities are organised for something (internal peace), or internally oriented. In addition, the scholarly communities favouring the concepts of ‘alliances’ and ‘security communities’ are often seen as embedding them in two distinct ways of thinking about interstate relations, emphasizing a certain ‘logic of anarchy’ in which states pursue their interests by following a logic of consequence and a ‘logic of community’ where states act according to a logic of appropriateness, respectively.

Without denying these differences in emphasis (as chapter three shows, the major theories contain both ‘logics’), one must be careful of not overstating the differences. In at least one important aspect the conceptualizations of alliances and security communities build on common ground. Leaving aside alliances formed for strictly offensive purposes, there is no intrinsic reason to treat an arrangement formed against a threat and one for peace as two different things. If anything, these are two sides of the same motivational coin as both alliances and security communities are formed by states for reasons of ‘national security’. To just mention a few examples, in their extensive literature review, Holsti et al. (1973: 4) define alliances as “a formal agreement between two or more nations to collaborate on national security issues”. Joseph Grieco (1990: 12) understands alliances as “a formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states”, a definition almost identical to the one put forward by Stephen Walt (1987: 1). Among the handful of scholars advancing the notion

---

8 Glenn Snyder defines alliances as “formal associations of states for the use (or nonuse) of military force, in specified circumstances, against states outside their own membership” whose primary purpose is thus “to pool military strength against a common enemy” (Snyder 1997: 4).
9 Deutsch et al. (1957); Adler (1997a); Adler and Barnett (1998). Snyder’s (1997: 11) definition of an entente appears to describe a similar phenomenon. See also Kann (1976).
10 See also Wolfer’s (1962) distinction between collective defense and collective security.
11 Even offensively geared alliances are, in the words of one observer, often “rationalized in the service of the alleged goal of peace” (Kann 1976: 614).
of security community, Emmanuel Adler (1998: 120) speaks about formations of "cooperative security" and Thomas Risse-Kappen (1995) frames NATO as a security community whose members cooperate because they perceive their state of security as interlinked.

Understanding (non)cooperation through the objective of maintaining 'national security' falls back on three basic assumptions in which the three paradigms converge: First, states are egoistic or self-interested actors and pursue this interest in a rational manner. This may sound surprising to those who associate constructivism with explaining 'irrational' or 'altruistic' behaviour. While this impression may have been fostered by some first-generation constructivists who presented their approach as an alternative to so-called 'rational choice' explanations, it since has become accepted that the 'rational actor' assumption is not reserved for utilitarian approaches. In its most basic form, rationality holds that actors make decisions based on cost-benefit calculations, or estimates of gains and losses, and how these are defined depends on what the actor intends to achieve, that is, depends on the definition of its goals, or basic interests. In short, rational action refers to behaviour "designed to further the actor's perceived self-interest" (Monroe, 1991: 1), which is another way of saying that states are 'egoists' or 'interest-satisficers' (Simon, 1984).

Hence, second, decisions about cooperation can be traced back to the national security interest of the respective states involved. That states cooperate (or not) because it is in their interest to do so is not a 'realist' assumption but a view readily shared across the theoretical spectrum. Few IR scholars would contest Morgenthau's point that "interest is the perennial standard by which political action must be judged" (Morgenthau, 1960: 10), if only because 'interest' is an analytically empty concept which easily becomes tautological unless specified. Saying that states seek 'security' only begets the subsequent question what exactly that means.

---

12 Monroe (1991: 4) lists four foundational assumptions of rational action, namely (1) actors pursue goals, (2) these goals reflect the actor's perceived self-interest, (3) behavior results from a process that actually involves conscious choice, and (4) the individual is the basic actor in society.

13 The debate in the social sciences in the 1990s over the merits of 'rational choice' came down to the question whether or not interests, and the preferences derived from them, should be exogenously defined (i.e. fixed) and, if so, whether they should be contextualized and, if so, how (Monroe, 1991, 2001; Green and Shapiro, 1994; Levy, 1997b). This thesis supports the contextual approach, for reasons discussed in the next chapter.

14 For a discussion, see Reese-Schaefer (1999: 11ff).
The need to specify and justify the reading of the 'national security interest' becomes all the more important in light of, third, the assumption that cooperation is based on common (security) interests. As Keohane puts it cooperation occurs because states "have interests in common which can only be realized through cooperation" (Keohane 1984: 6). Again, IR scholars will not disagree over the view that states cooperate to satisfy the(ir) ‘common interest’ and that, conversely, they will stop cooperating when the ‘common interest’ is missing. The key question is what makes interests ‘common’. In most basic terms, it can be said that ‘common’ does not imply an ‘identity’ of interests which, as Keohane (1984; 1988: 380) points out, would prompt automatic co-action. Instead, the ‘common’ must leave room for a process of ‘voluntary adjustment’ and, hence, politics. Beyond that, specifying what makes security interests ‘common’ is the basic task of any theoretical explanation.

The Silence of the Camps

By specifying this ‘common security interest’ on the basis of which two states would be willing to invest in a shared international institution it is possible to compare arguments derived from those three major IR theories dealing with international cooperation, namely (structural) realism, (neoliberal) institutionalism and (social) constructivism. The following suggests that the logical thrust of each of the three theories leaves too many blank spots when trying to make sense of the phenomenon at hand.

The most prominent argument coming out of (structural or neo-)realism holds that in an anarchical environment states will cooperate on the basis of a common threat, more precisely when facing a great power, by balancing against it. In line with balance of power logic, shifts in cooperative behavior are expected to follow shifts in the distribution of power in the international system, with institutional investments thus being epiphenomena of the balance of power dynamic. For the case at hand this argument is of little use, While the inherent conceptual vagueness (or contestedness) of

---

15 A word on the place of 'trust' in the argument: If trust is about "actors grant(ing) others discretion over their interests based on the belief that those interests will not be harmed" (Hoffman 2002: 377), this can be seen as an presupposing (a belief in) a common interest. As such, trust can be seen as a consequence of there being a common interest and is manifested in a three-part relation of the kind ‘A trusts B to do x’ (Hardin 1998: 12). It also must be noted that complete trust is not a necessary condition for cooperation to occur (Hardin 2002; Hoffman 2002). Otherwise there could be no cooperation from a realist point of view, which holds that inter-state relations are characterized by mutual distrust. While institutionalists argue that institutions allow for 'trust within limits', constructivists argue that states can learn to fully trust each other by identifying with each other. This fits with Hardin’s (2002: 58f) point that trust cannot be chosen but "just is", which moves attention to the question why states identify with each other. This thesis offers an answer to this question.

‘power’ makes measuring the distribution of power notoriously difficult, on the basis of conventional realist indicators such as economic prosperity and military capabilities the US was the strongest player coming out of the Second World War and was also recognized by West German political leaders as such. Hence, German investment into NATO must count as bandwagoning. Investment in CSCE and CFSP also does not amount to a balancing act in realist terms as these institutions were not linked to (or accompanied by) an enhancement in Germany’s military power and, thus, from a realist perspective do not count as alternatives to NATO. Even if one would frame these investments as tacit balancing attempts, this would need to be traced to a shift in the global balance of power in which Germany became wary of a growth in US power. Yet if anything from 1965 to 1975, and certainly in the second half of that period when German support for CSCE became strong, there was a sense of declining US power (due in large parts to Vietnam). And while the third period (1985-95) could be read as Germany reacting to an emerging unipolar world under US hegemony, investment into CFSP does not qualify as a ‘weak form’ of hard balancing, despite some attempts to frame it as such (Posen 2006: 164). German governments were unwilling to increase military expenditure despite US pressure to do so. Indeed, the opposite was the case: between 1985 and 1995 the defence budget was reduced.

Not all realists emphasize balancing (Wohlforth 2008). In contrast to balance of power proponents, hegemonic stability theory argues that smaller/weaker states may bandwagon because they benefit from the greatest power maintaining international ‘stability’. Correspondingly, investments in an alternative institution could be explained with smaller/weaker states’ fears of ‘abandonment’ and the rise of instability (Snyder 1997). On this basis one could argue that Germany was bandwagoning in the first period because it felt comfortable with the US as a provider for ‘stability’. For subsequent periods the argument might be that German governments worried about a possible withdrawal of the American ‘security umbrella’ expressed in a waning US commitment to NATO. As discussed in this thesis, the main empirical problem this argument faces...

---

17 See Walt (1987: 276ff); Ikenberry (2001: 168) and chapter eight.
18 Sarotte (2001: 19). Attributing CFSP to a desire for ‘soft balancing’ (Pape 2005; Paul 2005), that is, an attempt to constrain US power through diplomatic pressure and by entangling it in multilateral institutions, is even less plausible. Security institutions are not needed to provide Germany with economic leverage vis-à-vis the US. And even if Germany would be seen as using CFSP to strengthen international bodies such as the UN, it is a stretch to say that the primary reason for doing so would be to constrain the US. See also Brooks and Wohlforth (2005: 91f); Howorth (2007: 47f).
19 Snyder (1984: 486) suggests that ‘abandonment’ concerns of West Europeans during the Cold War were more part of a political game as they never really expected the US to abandon
is the fact that in cannot explain investment in CSCE and CFSP. Despite occasional demands in Congress to reduce US troop presence in Europe and the US hesitancy to intervene in Bosnia in the early 1990s, there never were serious plans in the White House to withdraw NATO’s ‘security umbrella’ from Germany. Yet the main problem this approach faces is theoretical: not only is ‘stability’ too vague conceptually to qualify as a common security interest, moreover it is logically impossible to formulate opposing arguments (balancing/bandwagoning) out of the same realist paradigm (Legro and Moravcsik 1999; see also chapter three).

Institutionalism, by definition, pays considerable attention to international institutions. They are seen as valuable providers of information which alleviate the security- and collective action dilemmas arising among states in an anarchical setting by creating an environment in which credible commitments between states become feasible. The attractiveness/value of an institution depends on its efficiency to perform this task. This approach has two central weaknesses, however, which make it unsuitable for making sense of the dynamic in the case at hand. Conceptually speaking, the force of the institutionalist argument enters only once common interests among states are assumed to exist. Hence, while it is useful to explain how institutions enable states to pursue these interests more effectively, the theory is indeterminate about what makes a ‘common security interest’. It thus offers little theoretical traction as to what leads Bonn and Washington to invest in NATO together other than labeling it (ex-post) as the ‘rational’ thing to do. Furthermore, German investment in CSCE (and then CFSP) would only be explicable if it could be shown that NATO (and then CSCE) were ‘inefficient’ in addressing German security interests. Yet without a clear definition of the latter, (in)efficiency remains an empty concept. Moreover, due to its rootedness in functionalist logic, institutionalism faces the problem that its emphasis on ‘sunk costs’ creates an argument biased towards path-dependency (Pierson, 2000; Keohane 1988). This makes it useful for explaining how institutions contribute to the persistence or increase in cooperation but ill-suited for explaining the emergence and the demise of cooperative arrangements as defined earlier.

20 Keohane (1984); Keohane and Martin (1995); Simmons and Martin (2002).
21 In the 1980s and 90s neoliberal institutionalists were absorbed in the debate with neorealists about how much cooperation was possible in anarchy assuming the existence of ‘common interests’. In an influential article on the neo-neo debate, Jervis (1999) does not even touch on the question why states would want to cooperate or why existing arrangements would weaken.
22 For a historical institutionalist analysis of cooperation in European foreign and security policy more generally displaying the path-dependency bias, see Smith (2004).
Finally, the (social) constructivist approach, in overlap with sociological institutionalism and writings on security communities, emphasizes the influence of institutions in shaping identities and, subsequently, interests of its members.\(^{23}\) It puts emphasis on the phenomenon of ‘socialization’ and, crudely speaking, explains cooperation with the existence of a shared (‘collective’) identity embedded in common institutions. While this perspective often speaks of identities and institutions co-constituting each other, its sympathy for sociological structuralism renders institutions often as “chief socializing agents” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 902). It suggests that if only states interact long enough and within the right institutions, they will increasingly ‘internalize’ collective norms around which shared identities revolve and, thus, progress towards an ever closer union. The problem with this socialization is twofold. First, it reads like a constructivist version of Haas’ functionalism (Risse 2005), that is, it suffers from the same built-in bias towards path-dependency leaving very little thought to how such communities could dissolve. Hence, as with institutionalism the social constructivist approach has great difficulties of explaining how two states deeply embedded in a common institution (NATO) and sharing a collective identity (the West) could drift apart.\(^{24}\) This is a symptom of the second and deeper problem that by anchoring common interests in a shared identity the theory must necessarily address the issue of identity formation and, by extension, dissolution. However, as discussed in chapter three, existing constructivist approaches do so unsatisfactorily.

In sum, judged on their basic logic the dominant theoretical approaches in IR are ill-equipped to make sense of (‘explain’) the phenomenon because they suffer from a balancing bias (realism), a sunk-cost bias (institutionalism) and a socialization bias (constructivism).

The researcher is hence left with a puzzle to which (s)he can respond in one of two ways. The first response would be to take one of the theories and adjust it/the evidence in a way that makes an existing theory ‘work’. This arguably is the road preferred by most scholars.\(^{25}\) It leads to studies where, hidden in more or less sophisticated methodological frameworks, comparisons of ‘competing’ explanations end up validating one. Yet if we accept Donald Spence’s (1982: 245) point that “each interpretation is

---

\(^{23}\) Katzenstein (1996); Ruggie (1998); Adler and Barnett (1998).

\(^{24}\) For a discussion of how an overemphasis on normative structure and the neglect of agency makes it difficult for moderate constructivists to come to terms with change, see Sending (2002).

\(^{25}\) King et al. (1994: 128-148) spend 20 pages on discussing the problem of selection bias and intentional selection of evidence. See also chapter two.
guided, unwittingly, by our favorite paradigm” the exercise of bending competing
theories to the case to ‘test’ their ‘accuracy’ is not necessarily persuasive.26 The second
road, taken here, asks what is wrong with existing theories and instead of ‘fixing’ them
takes the puzzle as an invitation/opportunity to rethink the causal narrative. In other
words, it aims at a new theory of security cooperation which can make sense of the
phenomenon at hand. This is arguably the more difficult road to take, also because the
IR literature provides little guidance on how to build a theory (see next chapter).

The first question arising is where to start, and an intuitive answer would be ‘with the
fundamentals’. Thus, following the point made previously, the thesis begins the theory
building enterprise at the level where the conception of ‘security interests’ comes to rest.
In effect, this requires engaging questions of ontology, starting with a conceptualization
of the state. The next chapter will justify this approach, yet a first hint at why this is a
useful point of departure is given by the phenomenon at hand. IR theories operating with
a Weberian (or Westphalian) conception of the state face the problem that the Federal
Republic was not a fully sovereign state until 3 October 1990. This is not simply a legal
issue. If one applies the Weberian definition of the state as a community possessing the
monopoly over the legitimate use of force in a designated territory, the massive presence
of foreign troops on the FRG’s territory and the fact that the Bundeswehr could not be
used for combat engagement without NATO (i.e. US) consent significantly
compromises the core feature of the FRG as a ‘state’. Certainly for the first period where
Germany was formally under occupation, one could well argue that the FRG was not a
state.27 Consequently, German-American relations did not amount to phenomena of
inter-state cooperation. Rather than brushing over this conceptual problem by noting that
sovereignty is a contested term, this thesis takes the ambiguous status of the FRG as an
invitation for thinking more carefully about the meaning of the state.

Research Design
As justified and discussed more fully in the next chapter, the thesis pursues the task of
theory building, or what is called here ‘creative theorizing’, not primarily through
empirical analysis but by engaging other theories. This, in turn, rests on a specific
understanding of what a theory is. In a nutshell, the thesis takes a ‘deep theorizing’
perspective which reaches down to the level of ontology to make the phenomenon

26 A good example is Moravcsik (1998). While a methodologically sophisticated and balanced
study, it is difficult to ignore the feeling that among his competing hypotheses for what drove the
process of European integration, the ‘winning’ one (economic interests) is also the author’s
favorite.
27 See also chapter eight.
intelligible by placing it in the context of the ‘human condition’. Theory understood in this way serves as preparation for ‘unravelling’ the three paradigms outlined earlier (realism, institutionalism, constructivism), that is, it provides a roadmap for carving out core insights as well as exposing conceptual tensions which can be carried forward for a new theory of security cooperation. The intellectual space opened up by this approach is filled with insights taken from the philosophy of, in particular, Heidegger and Aristotle. My reliance on them at different stages of the argument is an attempt to creatively use their insights and weave them into a coherent whole. It does not intend to present a fully ‘Heideggerian’ or fully ‘Aristotelian’ argument (whatever that might mean).

The case study in the second half of the thesis has a dual purpose. While its main function is to shed light on the phenomenon of German-American cooperation, it is also of exploratory nature intended to trace and refine the causal pathways of the theory developed in the first part of the thesis (Gerring 2007: 40ff.). As the case is not selected out of a pool of alternative cases but stimulates the task of theory building, the empirical analysis may seem biased to those subscribing to an agenda of theory ‘testing’ (George and Bennett 2004: 22ff.). Yet for the purpose of creative theorizing this is not a problem at all. Indeed, the ‘bias’ is inevitable, as instead of collecting empirical data for the purpose of validation or refutation, the phenomenon of German-American relations serves as both inspiration and playground for the new theoretical frame developed here. That said, to avoid the false impression that the theory is tailored towards ‘the case’, the theoretical discussion proceeds in general terms without reference to German-American relations and remains strictly separate from the case study.

Methodological Issues

The empirical study employs what may be broadly called an interpretative approach. This is due to the theory’s phenomenological focus on ontology, more specifically on its emphasis on intersubjectively created structures of meaning and their function in the constitution of the state as a biographical narrative. Of course, all empirical analysis involves some sort of interpretation in some sense of the word. Yet as opposed to a ‘rationalist’ approach which, in Keohane’s (1998) understanding of the term, assumes a reality in which the identities and interests of states (actors) are exogenously given/fixed,

28 On the problem of defining ‘case study’ and the multiple meanings that have been subsumed under this term, see Gerring (2007, Ch. 2).
29 See, for instance, Yanow and Schwartz-Shea (2006); Lebow and Lichbach (2007). Note that my approach differs from the view that an interpretative approach is ‘empiricist’ in the sense that it is all about ‘understanding’ the phenomenon from within without any theoretical predisposition.
an interpretative approach is tailored towards investigating the reality states construct for themselves and discerning the reasons (goals, motives) driving their behaviour. Such an approach is non-positivist in orientation because it denies the existence of a meaningful reality independent of conceptual frames employed by humans and, consequently, holds that theory cannot be 'tested against' such a reality. Hence, to the dismay of positivist-schooled analysts such as Moravcsik (1999), an interpretative approach cannot outline what kind of evidence would prove the theory 'wrong' and, hence, cannot provide a falsifiable hypothesis. Instead, it asks for a hermeneutical method (Kratochwil, 2000b; Tickner, 2005; Pouliot, 2007).

Rather than opening the door to 'anything goes', an interpretative approach is not relieved from the task of saying what makes the story generated thereby persuasive. For this, the analyst must address a number of challenges revolving around the overarching question of how to "interpret an already interpreted world" (Guzzini 2000: 148). Grasping how actors interpret their world is challenging because it requires analyzing the influence of ideas or 'worldviews'. The question how ideas and values can shown to be formative forces opens up the 'problem of other minds' well familiar to social scientists and philosophers. There are three ways to address this problem.

The first would be to show that 'material' factors do not sufficiently explain the observed behaviour/phenomenon, thus narrowing the focus onto ideas by excluding alternative explanations. However, apart from the fact that such negative proof only delays addressing the 'problem of other minds', an approach emphasizing that the material world is interpreted through ideas actually cannot pitch ideational and material factors against each other. Second, leaving aside that one may not be consciously aware of ones' worldviews and/or is unable to share them, they may be expressed and, in a sense, 'materialize' through some sort of symbolic medium, most commonly language. Yet sceptics will always hold that 'talk is cheap' and that there is no way to tell if someone actually means what (s)he says. Hence, third, recording the understanding actors have of themselves and what the world means to them must be approached with a broader analytical net which allows to evaluate and sort these meanings by putting them

---

30 For a view that an interpretative approach should accommodate the principle of 'falsification', see Hopf (2007), also Wendt (1999).
32 To be sure, the analysis of ideas is not reserved for 'non-positivist' approaches; yet positivists are more reluctant to engage it as the problem of knowing what is in other people's heads makes a hypothesis testing approach rather difficult.
33 For attempts in IR, see Goldstein and Keohane (1993); Yee (1996); Parsons (2002).
‘into perspective’. As Ted Hopf puts it “the meaning of an individual’s action and words are not his to control or interpret” but must be “surfaced by the observer” (Hopf 2007: 62f.). In other words, the analyst is both observer and interpreter analyzing state behaviour from ‘within’ while maintaining the broader view from ‘without’. This not only requires empathy to see the world from the perspective of the research ‘object’ (rather: subject), ideally as a participant-observer (Klotz and Lynch 2007: 37), but also reflexivity on the side of the analyst to allow awareness of its own biases when engaging this task (Guzzini 2000; Tickner 2005).

When it comes to specifying this broader analytical net which allows evaluating the evidence from a distance and placing it into ‘perspective’, constructivists like to stress the social structure and the historical trajectory actors are situated in (Pouliot 2007; Hopf 2007). It builds on the view that meaning is constructed not in isolation but in a social setting and thereby turns into a ‘social fact’ situated between and across the minds of individuals and visible in social practice. Moreover, because the construction of social reality is a temporal process, discerning and making intelligible social facts involves an evolutionary and, hence, historical perspective: “historicity…shows up as part of the contexts that make possible social reality” (Adler 2002: 102). Vincent Pouliot’s (2007: 367) suggestion that contextualization and historicity ‘objectify’ knowledge because they require the analyst to ‘stand back’ from and go beyond purely subjective and current meanings is useful for gaining perspective, but not sufficient as they do not provide the analyst with guidance on which context and which history matters (and why). As noted earlier and discussed in more detail in the next chapter, the net offering such guidance must be spun by theory.

Theoretical guidance allows engaging the historical case in a systematic and discriminatory fashion through a “structured, focused comparison” (George and Bennett 2004, Ch. 3) where the same sub-questions are “asked of each case under study to guide and standardize data collection” and with the analyst dealing “only with certain aspects of the historical cases examined” (George and Bennett 2004: 67). Even though the phenomenon at hand is a ‘single’ case in that the three periods form one overarching dynamic of (non)cooperation, it nevertheless carries a comparative element through the

---

34 Hopf also speaks of an act of ‘translation’.
35 As Guzzini puts it, using Bourdieusian terminology, “identity (agency), interests and strategies are field-specific and can be understood only after a prior analysis of the field itself” (Guzzini 2000: 166).
connection. More precisely, the empirical analysis is *structured* in that each period addresses the same set of questions, assessing the government’s conception of Germany’s national biography, how it connects with the US narrative through a vision of European order, and what implication this has for common institutional investments. And it is *focused* in that the examination of these periods is tailored towards carving out only those parameters central to the theoretical argument and brackets other issues, such as the relationship of Bonn and Washington with Moscow. Slightly out of focus but still present are the roles played by Britain and France in the process of setting up the institutional structures of NATO, CSCE, and CFSP.

On the question of what counts as evidence, two cautionary notes are in order. First, ideally a case study draws on a variety of sources and, in particular, on primary sources gained through careful archival work (historical analysis obviously does not allow a participant-observation approach). This thesis does not quite fulfil that ideal. While occasionally the empirical narrative is backed through the study of personal accounts, speeches and treaties, it relies mainly on secondary literature. This is justified by (i) the focus on theory development, (ii) the temporal scope of the analysis and by (iii) the fact that the analysis gains its explanatory power through the theoretical argument. That said, one problem remains with ‘second order’ interpretation: If all secondary literature is written from a perspective, the empirical narrative may rely on evidence taken from work whose interpretations do not coincide with the angle taken here. Said differently, it runs the risk of ‘cherry picking’ evidence from studies whose argumentative thrust is different from, perhaps even in conflict with, the argument presented here. While ideally one would point out the differences and clarify contrasting angles wherever possible, given the vast amount of studies done on German-American relations laying out all the instances where my interpretation diverges from the studies referenced in this thesis would require more space and disrupt the flow of the narrative. Hence, I merely

---

36 In Gerring’s terminology, the case study presented here is a diachronic single-case study, that is, it analyses a single case which contains internal temporal variation (Gerring 2007: 28).

37 Relying on secondary sources is common practice among social scientists working with a broad historical horizon. As Theda Skocpol notes “If a topic is too big for purely primary research – and if excellent studies by specialists are already available in some profusion – secondary sources are appropriate as the basic source of evidence for a given study. Using them is not different from survey analysts reworking the results of previous surveys rather than asking all questions anew” (in Goldthorpe 1991: 224). For a critique, see Goldthorpe (1991).

38 On this problem, see Goldthorpe (1991); Hall and Kratochwil (1993); Lustick (1996); also Elman and Fendius Elman (1997). The criticism that many social scientists taking a (macro) historical perspective tend not to follow any substantial rules but “enjoy a delightful freedom to play ‘pick-and-mix’ in history’s sweetshop” (Goldthorpe 1991: 225) is well taken but does not acknowledge the value of theoretical guidance.
signal awareness of the problem without offering a solution other than my commitment to minimize misrepresentation.

Finally, coming up with a new/original theoretical angle faces a semantic challenge, namely that one has to be careful with using established terms like the state, security, power, etc., as their meaning is always tied to a broader theoretical frame. As Waltz points out, changes of theory produce changes in the meaning of terms and so it is necessary to clarify the vocabulary used and redefine basic concepts (Waltz 1979: 12). This concerns, in particular, the meaning of security policy, which for most scholars writing during or about the Cold War concerns strategic-military issues. Rather than engaging this kind of thinking, the thesis contrasts the view that German-American security cooperation was based primarily on a military rationale, namely deterring a Soviet attack, and instead strengthens the view that throughout “Bonn’s demand for security was primarily political in nature” (Doering-Manteuffel 1983: 52).

Overview of Chapters
The thesis is divided in two major parts, a theoretical one (chapters 2 to 7) and an empirical one (chapters 8 to 10). Following this introduction, the theoretical part is subdivided into three sections: the first section prepares the meta-theoretical ground for ‘creative theorizing’ and engages the task via an engagement of the three existing IR paradigms (chapters 2 and 3). The second section draws on Heidegger for a reading of what ‘drives’ humans and subsequently offers a reconceptualization of the state as a national biography (chapters 4 and 5), and the section third presents a reading of the dynamics of interstate cooperation through the lens of ‘friendship’ and ‘estrangement/emancipation’ (chapters 6 and 7). The empirical part is also divided in three sections, each illuminating one decade of German-American cooperation, with a focus on Adenauer’s decision to invest in NATO in the decade following the end of the Second World War (chapter 8), followed by Brandt’s decision to invest in CSCE (chapter 9) and, finally, the move of the Kohl government towards CFSP (chapter 10). The conclusion reviews the major findings and offers some thoughts on the theoretical and empirical implications.

Turning to the content of individual chapters, Chapter Two outlines the basic parameters of and provides a roadmap for ‘creative theorizing’. It argues that a persuasive argument requires a strong theoretical foundation and reviews the positions of Kuhn, Popper, and Lakatos to adopt the latters’ notion of a ‘research programme’ revolving around a ‘hard core’ and the notion that a new theory is ‘better’ if it can
produce and accommodating 'novel facts'. Noting that Lakatos remains vague about the use of these terms and does not say much about the task of theory development, the discussion justifies a deductive approach and suggests that the intellectual space for theory building is opened via an exploration of the theoretical limits of existing theories ('unravelling'). The remainder of the chapter specifies the nature of a 'deep theory' and suggests that it involves tracing the causal narrative of a theory to an account of the human condition defining the spatio-temporal situatedness of the state. The chapter closes by showing how such an account operates on the level of ontology and gives meaning to the 'national security interest' via an understanding of statehood and the corresponding 'existential threat' to the same.

Chapter Three unravels the three major 'paradigms' — realism, institutionalism, and constructivism — to (i) reveal both internal tensions and explore why they do not provide a convincing causal narrative for the phenomenon at hand, and to (ii) use them as a source of inspiration for 'creative theorizing', that is, to learn from their insights and limits. The chapter first traces realism's 'balance of power' proposition to the Hobbesian account of the human condition emphasizing territorial integrity (autonomy) as what makes 'the state'. The discussion notes the conceptual void of realism on the question why states seek autonomy and highlights that realists locate the existential threat in time, addressing future uncertainty by reverting to worst-case thinking rooted in a reading of history as conflictual. The chapter then briefly discusses the institutionalist paradigm, divided into historical institutionalism and neoliberal (or utilitarian) institutionalism, to show that both versions are unsuitable for making sense of the case at hand due to their path dependency bias. While their focus on interdependence offers interesting modifications to the reading of the spatiality of interstate relations, it is noted that institutionalisms' conception of the state remains grounded in the realist hard core. The final part of the chapter engages the constructivist paradigm. Differentiating between moderate and radical constructivism, it discusses the formers' conceptualization of 'state identity' and criticizes it for (i) failing to come up with a notion of the 'state' alternative to realism and (ii) for its overemphasis on socialization, i.e. a progressive dynamic which cannot account for a breakdown of relations as it lacks a conceptualisation of threat to 'identity'. This weakness is attributed to the constructivist attempt to overcome realism without grounding constructivism in a new account of the human condition (spatio-temporal situatedness of the state).

Chapter Four relies on Heidegger to argue that humans are driven by the desire to control anxiety. It takes the postmodern emphasis on identity and contingency as a
starting point and engages Heidegger’s fundamental ontology to open up new ways of conceptualizing "the Self" and its basic interest. It picks up Heidegger’s argument that being-in-the-world is conditioned by awareness of finitude yet impossibility to know death, which generates ‘anxiety’ as the foundational sentiment. This provides an alternative to Hobbesian ontology by shifting attention to the Self’s attempt of coming to terms with anxiety by seeking orientation through meaningful ‘knowledge’ of itself and ‘the world’. It is shown how the reflexive ability of the Self generates what is termed an ‘anxiety paradox’, namely the attempt to regain a sense of continuity/stability which denies contingency of being and carries the Self beyond ‘death’. Two strategies, mathematical measuring and routine practices, are criticized with Heidegger for failing to provide the Self with ‘authenticity’, generating an ‘anxiety dilemma’. The chapter argues that the paradox does not need to end in a dilemma if past and future are conceptualized as meaningful places for the Self providing substance to a narrative of ‘authentic becoming’.

Chapter Five discusses how the Self establishes a meaningful existence – a narrative of authentic becoming – through a ‘national biography’, that is, a coherent life story of coming into being-in-the-world in space and time. Maintaining Heidegger’s phenomenological perspective, the chapter first discusses the spatial embeddedness of being-in-the-world through the notion of an experienced space. It suggests to grasp this through a taxonomy of centre/soul, valued order, and horizon to then explore the usefulness of existing frameworks in IR for conceptualizing the states’ situatedness in an ‘experienced space’. The second half of the chapter discusses the temporal features of the national biography. It highlights the importance of memory spaces generated by significant experiences rendering the past meaningful, whose ambiguity provide the creative space to devise lessons projected into the future as visions of order, or utopias and devising an ‘envisioned space’. It argues that in merging the two the Self turns ‘its’ world into a meaningful project through a coherent biography, which is the site of political agency and provides political leaders with direction.

Chapter Six argues that states attempt to create a meaningful world through friendship. After reviewing the limits of Heidegger’s ontology as one in which authenticity does not (cannot) arise out of social relations, it argues that the Self is looking to realize its project with significant Others, or ‘friends’ as a way to maintain authenticity within an intimate relationship. It shows how IR scholarship has neglected looking at intimate relations as stabilizing the Self by either focusing on the negative Other (‘the enemy’) or vague notions of group membership (‘community’). The discussion takes up Aristotle’s
notion of true friendship and focuses on the features of reciprocity and equality established through moral particularity to define friendship between states arising out of a convergence of national biographies. It argues that friends unfold through a shared experienced space and negotiate common visions (horizons of expectations) and thereby order an ‘inter-subjective’ world in which biographical narratives resonate but are also, inevitably, compromised. Establishing friendship as a creative project which empowers both sides, it is argued that this project is pursued through common institutions as sites for negotiating visions of order, serving friends as political platforms for shared world-building.

Chapter Seven argues that states invest in a new/alternative institution if their friendship undergoes a process of sustained dissonance, or estrangement. More precisely, it argues that states do so when the existing institutional arrangement ceases to function as an anxiety controlling mechanism, that is, when it ceases to be the platform through which a coherent national biography can be negotiated with the friend. This argument is made by suggesting that the existential threat to a stable sense of Self is posed by ambivalence produced by dissonance among friends over ideas of order, that is, different readings of the common project and adequate contribution to the same. Enduring dissonance, it is argued, leads to a process of ‘estrangement’ among friends. Two possible reactions are discussed: ‘adaptation’ and ‘emancipation’. Whereas the former refers to the attempt to renegotiate ideas of order with the friend through the common institution, an enduring dissonance which violates authentic ideas of order leads states to pursue a strategy of emancipation. Such a strategy involves searching for an alternative significant Other with whom a ‘world building’ project can be negotiated through a new institution which better accommodates the national biography. The chapter concludes with outlining what to expect from the empirical analysis.

Chapter Eight applies the theoretical lens established in the previous chapters to explain German and American investment in NATO in the decade following the end of the Second World War (1945-55) with overlapping narratives of being-in-the-world, creating binds of friendship. The first part lays out how Adenauer sought to give ‘Germany’ a new direction after the end of the war. He did so by formulating the narrative of Germany-in-Europe emphasizing the values of ‘liberalism’ and ‘antimilitarism’ in overlap with the American narrative and anchored in the Western space. The second part shows how this narrative resonated with the Truman and Churchill administrations in their attempt of making sense of the US presence in ‘Europe’ by building a ‘United States of Europe’ through NATO. The third part
demonstrates the German-American consensus in the debate over German rearmament as an attempt by Adenauer to secure German voice in the Western project through NATO membership. It is shown how this occurred with the help of a dystopia of a communist Europe captured in the ‘Korea model’ and the ‘Prague model’, further manifesting German-American commitment to shared ideal of European order.

Chapter Nine explores Willy Brandt’s motivation to invest in (what became) CSCE between 1965 and 1975 and the American reluctance to join this institution. It argues that Brandt envisioned ‘Germany’ unfolding into a Greater European Peace Order in a way that could not be done through NATO and that this raised suspicion in the US. It first shows how his idea to build a Germany in ‘Greater Europe’ through Ostpolitik was formulated with ‘Kennedy-America’ and that this creative relationship stalled with the Johnson and, particularly, the Nixon administration. Dissonance emerged between their narratives of Germany and America in the world over the vision of ‘peace in Europe’: whereas from Washington it meant stability in the ‘order of Yalta’, from Berlin/Bonn it meant change and overcoming this very order. The chapter shows that while the ‘Harmel report’ and the ambiguous meaning of détente allowed the Brandt government to formally pursue his vision through NATO, it considered a European Security Conference (later CSCE) the more suitable forum for building ‘Germany-in-Greater-Europe’. It discusses Nixon/Kissinger’s unease with Brandt’s course because it brought uncertainty into America’s conception of ‘Europe’ and, hence, ‘the world’, prompting a US strategy to keep Brandt close through NATO. Both sides concealed their tensions over the shared project through a strategy of silence and Nixon/Kissinger’s low-key participation in CSCE.

Chapter Ten discusses how the Kohl government came to invest in CFSP as a new forum and potential alternative to NATO and CSCE to manifest its vision of Germany-in-Europe. It addresses the divergence in German-American security cooperation in the decade between 1985 and 1995, when Bonn came to invest in WEU/CFSP as an alternative to NATO and CSCE. The first part lays out the orientation of the Kohl/Genscher government as a merger of Adenauer’s and Brandt’s narrative of ‘Germany-in-Europe’ and points out the tensions with the Reagan administration. The second part examines the ‘Bonn-Washington nexus’ during the negotiations leading to German unification to suggest that it blended out dissonance about the broader question of the Western project after the end of the Cold War. The third part discusses disagreements about the meaning of the 1991 Gulf War and the conflict in Bosnia for the ‘Western’ project, exposing German resistance to building a ‘New World Order’ with
military force and the lacking American commitment to invest in a 'European Peace Order'. The chapter suggests that over the entire decade an enduring dissonance between German and American narratives of being-in-the-world prompted the Kohl government to pursue a strategy of emancipation through WEU/CFSP and with France.

Chapter Eleven concludes by summarizing the main theoretical and empirical insights and assesses the implications for IR theory as well as German-American relations and, by extension, the institutionalization of 'European security'.
CHAPTER TWO: THE CASE FOR ‘DEEP THEORY’

Summary
This chapter lays the groundwork for creative theorizing. It has two purposes. First, it manifests the importance of theoretically-guided research and makes a case for what is called ‘deep theory’. Laying out its features, the chapter argues that causal narratives start not merely with an assumption of state interests but that the latter is anchored in an ontology of the state which, in turn, is embedded in an account of the human condition, that is, in an account of spatial and temporal situatedness. Second, the chapter suggests that a deep engagement with theory is central to creative theorizing. It allows to ‘unravel’ existing IR theories from within not only to lay out why they are unsuitable to make sense of the phenomenon at hand but also, and perhaps even more so, to use their internal tensions and shortcomings as a stimulus for building a new theoretical frame.

The discussion developing these points proceeds as follows: It begins by laying out the difference between shallow and deep theorizing. In an attempt to specify the latter, it then briefly reviews the debate between Kuhn, Popper and Lakatos, adopting Lakatos concept of the ‘hard core’ and his emphasis on the need for constructive criticism. The chapter proceeds by making the case for ‘creative theorizing’ as a deductive enterprise involving the ‘unraveling’ of existing approaches and searching for conceptual openings. It then presents a reading of the ‘hard core’ of a theory as an account of the human condition (as opposed to human nature) in which the meaning of the state and of its ‘national security interest’ is embedded. The final section justifies this ‘deep’ approach with the ‘survival’ assumption popular in IR, pointing out that knowing what it means for states to ‘survive’ requires an account of what it means for the state to ‘be’.

The Interpretative Bias
All research must come to terms with the interpretative bias, namely that conceptual frames interfere both when delineating the phenomenon and in the subsequent enterprise of making sense of it. Although the ambition to present an accurate picture of the past necessarily pervades the work of historians, since the beginning of the 20th century scholars have come to admit that the historical ‘record’ does not speak for itself. As E.H. Carr noted, ‘facts’ are not passively received but emerge out of a continuous dialogue between present and past (Carr, 1990 (1961): 21-30; Spence, 1982). In this dialogue, which for those aiming at prediction also includes the future, theory plays the crucial role of categorizing and ordering the ‘record’. Hans Morgenthau, who believed that
there was an "intrinsic nature" of international politics and in the ability of theory to capture the same "as it actually is" (Morgenthau 1960: 15), saw theory function "like a skeleton which, invisible from the naked eye, gives form and function to the body [of history]" (in Thompson, 1960: 18). Yet it is not only that theory tells us which 'facts' matter and which do not. Even more so, when 'facts' are selected, interpreted, and filled with meaning they also become the analyst's creation. In other words, the angle from which events are observed and attributed with meaning – historians would say 'represented' – also relies on an idea of how they matter. As Weber noted, "we cannot learn the meaning of the world from the result of its analysis, be it ever so perfect; [we] must rather be in a position to create this meaning itself" (in Smith, 1999: 23).

The theoretical lenses providing this meaning in turn are products/grow out of real-world concerns and experiences (Sabine, 1969 (1931); Cox, 1981; Puchala, 2003). Theories arise out of and respond to a very 'real' socio-political context, motivated by a certain Erkenntnisinteresse, a Kantian term literally translated as the interest in knowledge/insight and echoed in Robert Cox's (1981: 128) famous statement that theory is always for someone and for some purpose. As George Sabine put it, there is no such thing as a disinterested political theory. In addition to a causal narrative, theories always contain 'factual' and 'valuational' properties emerging out of the author's socio-political context and normative agenda, respectively (Sabine, 1969: 11).

If theoretical lenses and the reading of history are intertwined in this way and constitute each other, then the persuasiveness of an argument, its "narrative truth" (Spence 1982) depends on how the interaction between theory and history is managed. This interaction is central to the debate between positivism and its critics, what Gabriel Almond (1988: 839) called the "hard science - soft science' polarity endemic to the

---

39 Gaddis notes how the debate among historians in the late 1960s about the origins of the Cold War was "a dialogue thinly concealed by the fact that what many of the participants were really arguing about, and using history to support their respective positions, was the war in Vietnam" (Gaddis, 1987: 12).
40 For how personal experiences influence theorizing in feminism, see Tickner (2005).
41 Cox's (1981) famous distinction between 'problem-solving' and 'critical' theories is overly crude as it does not capture theories aimed at explaining without ascribing to a positivist 'problem-solving' approach. German theorists have classified theories in up to four types aimed at searching for the good life (normative), creating intersubjective understanding (historical-hermeneutic), prediction (empiric-analytic), and emancipation (critical-dialectic), respectively (Habermas 1986; von Beyme 1992). While useful for textbook-classification, a substantial theory cannot escape either dimension.
42 Gaddis (1987); Elman and Fendius Elman (2001); Smith (1999); Puchala (2003).
The division between positivist and non-positivist approaches fueled the Methodenstreit in German sociology and still resonates in the distinction between rational-choice and postmodern frameworks in IR. For a discussion of the latter, see Lapid (1989); Vasquez (1995); Smith et al. (1996); Mayer (2003).
purpose and character of ‘theory’ has created a situation where scholars “do not agree about what they are actually doing when they theorize about international relations” (Burchill, 2001: 8, emphasis added). In short, while much energy has been spent on discussing what makes a theory of international politics; few have focused on the question what makes a theory.

Looking at Lakatos

In approaching this question and clarifying the meaning of ‘deep theory’, it is useful to briefly review the debate between Thomas Kuhn (1996 [1962]), Karl Popper (1968), and Imre Lakatos (1970). Although focusing on the question of how to evaluate theoretical progress in the hard sciences, they are frequently invoked by IR scholars as their arguments are sufficiently metaphysical to inspire questions of theorising in the social sciences.

Kuhn argues that the history of science is best understood as a succession of overarching ‘paradigms’, socio-psychological constructs defining ‘normal science’ in theoretical and methodological terms for an entire scholarly community. According to Kuhn, paradigms cannot be objectively compared, that is, they are “incommensurable”. Indeed, scholars situated within different paradigms cannot even engage in meaningful debate about reality because the latter is always interpreted within the confines of the paradigm. As a consequence, paradigms cannot be effectively criticised from within and can only be replaced during moments of perceptual crisis, characterized by the emergence of ‘anomalies’ eventually leading to a ‘scientific revolution’ in which one paradigm is replaced by another (Kuhn, 1996 (1962): 112ff).

Popper fundamentally disagrees with Kuhn and argues that existing theories could – and should – be continuously challenged on rational grounds. Aiming at establishing objective criteria of critique which would prevent ‘ideologically blind’ research and

44 See, for instance, Booth and Smith (1995); Burchill et al. (2001); Dunne et al. (2007).
45 It is too easy to lay the blame only at the doorstep of the ‘behavioural revolution’. As Boucher points out, Martin Wight’s differentiation of ‘Hobbesian’, ‘Grotian’, and ‘Kantian’ approaches, an influential counter-discourse to the positivist approach in the US and taken up by Bull (1977), amounts only to three descriptive lenses rather than philosophical arguments (Boucher 1998: 4). Although Wight/Bull’s taxonomy is useful for pointing to different ontologies of the international and has since been further developed and incorporated into more sophisticated arguments, most notably Wendt (1999) and Buzan (2004), the English School is a prime example for an ‘approach’ considered both grand theory (Buzan, 2004) and not theory at all (Waltz, 1998). Tellingly, Dunne sees the English School as “the dominant theoretical voice” in Britain but also notes that “it needs a more rigorous account of exactly what is meant by ‘theory’” (Dunne, 2007: 128, 130).
46 As Colin Wight (2002) points out most IR scholars merely pay lip service to these authors.
allow (the monitoring of) progress, Poppers' solution to the interpretative dilemma was logical positivism, namely that theories needed to produce propositions which could be 'falsified' by stating clearly what evidence would be needed to 'disprove' the proposition. Although he knew that, ultimately, theories cannot be falsified in the strict sense as no conclusive disproof can ever be produced empirically, he saw the principle as a critical check on 'intellectual honesty' (Popper, 1968).47

The weakness of both Kuhn and Popper is that, for different reasons, their debate does not contribute much do a deeper understanding of theory. Kuhn's notion of 'paradigm' may be useful to capture meta-theoretical camps in IR whose ontological and epistemological positions are difficult to reconcile.48 Yet his definition of 'paradigm' is notoriously vague and ill suited to substantiate the meaning of 'theory'.49 Among IR scholars, at least, Popper's approach impoverished the meaning of theory by narrowing it down to a causal statement, or hypothesis, thus giving rise to shallow theorizing. To be clear, this is not to suggest that the work of Popper is philosophically shallow but, rather, that most IR research adopting a positivist approach to deal with the interpretative dilemma reduces the meaning of theory to a hypothesis of the kind 'if A then B'. It leads to a conflation of theory and methodology, that is, to a cherishing of research designs which place persuasive weight on empirical evidence and, as a consequence, talk theory but mean methodology (King et al. 1994; Shapiro et al. 2004). The focus on the falsification criterion tempted IR scholars to confuse the task of identifying and specifying meaningful relationships through a philosophically grounded narrative with the procedure of 'data collection', thereby overshadowing thinking about what a theory actually is and effectively moving the philosophical dimension, or 'deep' theorizing, out of sight.50 This left much of IR with a conception of 'theory' treated equal to formal modelling with falsification as its most important 'property', producing statements such as "a 'theory' which cannot be wrong is not a theory" (King et al., 1994: 100).

The ironic consequence of this shallow understanding of theory is that it requires dismissing one of the most important IR theories dealing with security cooperation,

47 As Klaus von Beyme (1992) reminds, Popper was no strict empiricist.
48 Although it appears that these 'paradigms' manage to exist side by side, occasionally even feeding off and modifying each other. In Kuhn's frame, debate is necessarily limited/artificial because paradigms succeed each other and, except for a brief period of overlap, do not exist side by side.
49 See Masterman's (1968) critique of Kuhn's 'paradigm' – she identifies 21 different readings – and Kuhn's (1996: 174-190) attempt to clarify the concept in response.
50 Most notably, in King, Keohane and Verba, theory does not feature among the four elements characterizing "good research" (King et al., 1994: 7f), and where theory is discussed, it is understood as not much more than an "interrelated set of causal hypotheses" (Ibid: 99).
Waltzian neorealism, which is repeatedly criticized for lacking clear statement of what counts for ‘falsifiable’ evidence (Vasquez, 1995, 1997). Notably, this critique is readily accepted by Waltz (1997) as well as Gilpin who calls realism “a philosophical position...not a scientific theory subject to the test of falsifiability” (Gilpin, 1996: 6). The same can be said about constructivism. Although some prefer to call it a “meta-theoretical position” instead of a theory (Wendt 1999: 7; Guzzini 2000), its proponents generally present a philosophically grounded argument which, despite claims to the contrary, cannot produce ‘falsifiable’ hypotheses, not the least because of the constructivist emphasis on norms which are counterfactually valid (Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986: 767).51

Lakatos provides a more fruitful roadmap. Joining Popper in criticising Kuhn’s suggestion that scholars are trapped in paradigms, he saw constant critique and the replacement of theories as both necessary and possible. More precisely, in contrast to Kuhn’s view of scientific revolutions occurring in rather unexpected and seemingly ‘irrational’ fashion coming from the outside, Lakatos emphasises that new theories can be put forward through gradual and systematic critique also from the inside. In his words, “conceptual frameworks can be developed and also replaced by new ones; it is we who create our prisons and we can also, critically, demolish them” (Lakatos, 1970: 104).52

Furthermore, in a move away from Popper,53 for Lakatos criticism needs to be constructive; there can be no falsification before the emergence of a better theory as “refutation without alternatives shows nothing but the poverty of our imagination” (Lakatos, 1970: 120, Fn). Instead of spending much valuable time on finding ‘falsifiable evidence’, theories should be evaluated as to how much they can accommodate ‘novel facts’. Lakatos suggests that one needs to deploy a ‘pluralistic’ model of theorizing by differentiating between two types of theory, an interpretative one “to provide the facts” and an explanatory one to explain them (Lakatos 1970: 129). This pluralistic model forms what he calls a ‘research programme’ consists of a succession of theories

51 Wendt (1999: 373) pays lip service to the importance of falsifiability in order to stay in the ‘scientific’ camp. Yet as far as I am aware, Wendt never produced a falsifiable hypothesis.
52 Where Kuhn saw conceptual orthodoxy punctuated only during rare perceptual crises, Popper and Lakatos saw constant theoretical competition, a “revolution in permanence” (Lakatos, 1970: 92) driving forward and making possible continuous ‘growth of knowledge’.
53 In his key essay, Lakatos tries to hide his deviation from Popper by adopting much of his language. Yet despite the semantic parallels such as naming his approach “sophisticated methodological falsificationism” aimed at “the logic of discovery”, his argument is quite different to that of Popper.
grounded in a shared ‘hard core’ of irrefutable assumptions and “a protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses” (Ibid, 133). While the latter can be adjusted to accommodate ‘new facts’, what Lakatos calls the ‘positive heuristics’ of the research programme, he emphasizes that protagonists cannot change the ‘hard core’ (negative heuristic). From this he posits that the criteria for evaluating the quality of a research programme – whether it is progressive or degenerative – lies in its ability to provide ‘auxiliary hypotheses’ which can anticipate and adjust to ‘novel facts’ (maintaining external consistency) without losing connection to the ‘hard core’ (maintaining internal consistency). When the ‘hard core’ must be altered to generate and accommodate ‘novel facts’, it “crumbles” and the programme should be considered ‘degenerative’.

In crude terms, one could say the Lakatosian approach is twofold: (1) it calls for assessing ‘theories’ for internal (logical) and external (empirical) consistency in coming to terms with ‘novel facts’ and (2) it requires constructive criticism by holding that the only valid rejection of existing theories is the presentation of a better theory able to accommodate the ‘novel fact’. Although, like Kuhn and Popper, Lakatos is primarily interested in discussing the possibility of scientific progress, for the present purpose these two elements contain useful insights.

First, his criteria of what makes a ‘good’ theory can be taken as conceptual building blocks of a ‘deep theory’. To be sure, scholars applying Lakatos’ framework have pointed out that the main concepts – the scope of a ‘research programme’, the meaning of a ‘novel fact’, and the indicators for a ‘progressive’ or ‘degenerative’ programme – remain unspecified in his writings. Yet if one takes Lakatos as an inspiration than a blueprint, this does not necessarily pose a problem but rather allows interpreting his meta-theoretical building blocks as needed. Coming up with ‘novel facts’ is thus read here not as making new predictions but, instead, as reframing past events in a way which gives rise to a phenomenon not previously addressed. The difficulty of identifying the boundaries of a research programme (DiCicco and Levy, 2003) is not much different from attempting to define a Kuhnian paradigm or a scholarly ‘tradition’ (Williams, 2005, Fn 15; Walker, 1993; Jeffery, 2005). Delineating a research programme inevitably violates the richness and complexity of individual thinkers and requires recognizing that

54 Here my reading differs from Vasquez (1997) who imports a Popperian falsifiability test into Lakatos (to criticize Waltzian realism), which is precisely what Lakatos argued against. See Elman and Elman (1997).
55 See the contributions in Elman and Elman (2003) and the debate between Vasquez and (neo)realist scholars in the American Political Science Review, December 1997.
56 For a discussion on the contestedness of ‘novelty’ claims, see Elman and Elman (2003: 34-39).
there is no correct middle path between understanding their theories from ‘within’, by focusing on their inner logic, and from ‘without’, by embedding them in the socio-cultural context in which they emerged (Fetscher and Muenkler 1985: 19). A decision for the former requires a delineation of the ‘hard core’ grounding the research programme. Similarly, whether a research programme is ‘degenerating’ or ‘progressive’ depends on the question what counts as a valid adjustment of its explanatory narrative in accommodating the ‘novel fact’, which in turn also relies on a clear understanding of the ‘hard core’.

Second, Lakatos is useful in insisting that the dismissal of existing theories is only valid if a new theory/research programme can better accommodate the ‘novel fact’. Yet his emphasis on constructive criticism also poses a great challenge, as his call for the construction of a ‘new/better’ theory/research programme is not accompanied by a substantial discussion of how to do so.

The Challenge of Theory Building
Popper’s silence of how to actually build a ‘new/better’ theory also permeates IR scholarship. Kenneth Waltz (1979) is one of the few IR theorists offering some thoughts on the process of theory development. Adopting Lakatos’ stance that theories can never be proven ‘true’ but only be overthrown by a better theory (Waltz 1979: 9), Waltz notes that “theories can only be invented, not discovered”. While he avoids discussing the process of ‘invention’, he points towards the limits of inductive and deductive attempts to generate a theory.

The question whether or to what extent ‘new knowledge’ can be generated through induction (empirical observation) or deduction (logical reflection) has occupied philosophers for a long time. As noted at the outset of this chapter, both inevitably inform our understanding of the world; theory is always inspired by the socio-political context and could not be built without abstract reasoning. We seek inspiration from ‘history’ through ‘unscientific’ impressions from personal experiences as well as by systematically acquiring information, often second hand, through careful observation.57 Yet the usefulness of the inductive approach meets its limits in the interpretative bias. As

---

57 One systematic way of doing the latter is discussed by Alexander George and Andrew Bennett (2004). Yet their manual for ‘theory development’, written largely in juxtaposition to King et al. (1994), operates with a shallow understanding of theory and focuses on “procedures... conducive to the generation of new hypothesis”. Moreover, while useful in emphasizing the value of single case studies and causal complexity, they say little about the creative process of case study research.
Waltz reminds, without theory one cannot decide "which materials to select and how to arrange them", and hence no inductive procedure can answer the question of how to make sense of the world "for the very problem is to figure out the criteria by which induction can usefully proceed" (Waltz 1979: 5). Similarly, Waltz argues that a theory cannot be created solely via deduction. He points out that this implies some "initial premises" and hence a pre-existing theoretical frame from which something can be deducted yet, according to Waltz, nothing new can emerge from deducting out of a frame already in place (Waltz 1979: 11).

If the best strategy is to somehow combine inductive and deductive approaches, the question is what this means in practice. One example of the fruitless attempt to 'discover' a theory of alliance formation and disintegration through a mix of induction and deduction, operating with a shallow understanding of theory, is the study by Kalevi Holsti and colleagues (Holsti et al. 1973). The team conducted an exhaustive literature survey from which it extracted a large number of propositions of alliance formation, performance, and termination, that is, "all statements that link alliances to their causes and effects...irrespective of discipline or definition of alliance or coalition". This provided them with 347 propositions on the formation and disintegration of alliances, laid out in an appendix of almost 30 pages. These were then clustered and tested "on all alliances formed between the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the outbreak of World War II" to determine "the relative merits of alternative candidates for a theory of alliances" (Holsti et al., 1973: v-vi). The result, however, is vague and disappointing, with the authors conceding that their objective of identifying a 'theory' of alliances had to be buried under the sheer diversity of arguments and angles their study had found, leaving them with not much more than the hope that their efforts would at least "assist others to write a more definitive conclusion".

The reason Holsti and his colleagues failed in their task of finding a theory of alliances is that their approach did not take into account what Popper knew, namely that "there is no such thing as a logical method of having new ideas" and that discovery contains a "creative intuition" (in King et al., 1994: 14). Similarly, Waltz notes that inductive and deductive procedures are "indispensable" in the construction of theory yet that "using them in combination gives rise to a theory only if a creative idea emerges" (Waltz 1979: 11). In other words, while taking historical observations/experiences and ordering/placing them in some sort of relationship to then throwing them back at 'the world' for re-evaluation plays a crucial part in generating theory, somewhere in this process there must be a creative act in which something new emerges. Waltz captures
this by saying that theories are “artistic creations”, that they require “creative ideas” and
the flashing of a “brilliant intuition” (Ibid., 9), yet he also concedes that one cannot say
much beyond the fact that theories are made ‘creatively’: “Even by those who have
authored them, the emergence of theories cannot be described in other than uncertain
and impressionistic ways” (Ibid., 10).

As sitting around and waiting for a creative idea to emerge seems hardly a productive
strategy, this thesis pursues ‘creative theorizing’ through an approach of ‘unraveling’ by
challenging Waltz’ contention that nothing new can emerge from deducting out of a
frame already in place. Encouraged by the view that it is possible to generate new
knowledge through logical reflection, the strategy here is to find a way in which
theoretical deduction becomes a creative process. Without denying that reflections are
informed by (learning more about) the empirical phenomenon, the approach of ‘creative
theorizing’ advanced here takes place in two steps.

The first step is to seek inspiration from existing theories, more precisely from their
limits and internal tensions. This is a strategy IR theorists arguably pursue all the time;
the attempt here is merely to make this process explicit and give it a name. It is termed
‘unravelling’ and holds that theory creation benefits from taking a ‘deep’ look at the
hard core of existing research programmes which have proven inadequate to
accommodate the ‘novel fact’. More precisely, the task is to isolate ‘fundamentals’,
namely insights on which the originality of the causal narrative is based, and to identify
‘openings’, namely insights identified as important yet which are not fully thought
through and often a source of ambiguity and tension in the causal narrative.

Applied to the case at hand, this requires engaging the logical thrust of theories at the
centre of the three dominant research programmes in IR – (neo)realism, (liberal)
institutionalism, and (social) constructivism – which cannot fully explain the emergence
and demise of the German-American security cooperation as defined here. Rather than
trying to adjust their ‘protection belts’ by devising new ‘auxiliary hypothesis’, the
strategy here is to trace their basic weaknesses to their respective ‘hard core’. An
unravelling approach requires ignoring the claim made by some that the hard core is
‘privileged knowledge’ not to be challenged directly (Elman and Fendius Elman, 1997),
which echoes Waltz’ repeated claim that one cannot criticize (his) assumptions. Such
disciplining claims can be ignored if the primary motivation to engage the ‘hard core’ is

58 Most famously upheld by John Stuart Mill, see Russell (2001 [1912]: 44).
not to criticize existing research programmes, but to tap into this ‘privileged knowledge’ in the hope that doing so opens up sites of inspiration through which a new theory can be created.

The second step is to take these ‘fundamentals’ and ‘openings’ as signposts for building a new argument (causal narrative), directing attention to certain points which need to be addressed. In line with the notion that ‘deep theorizing’ is a philosophical approach, those signposts are turned into creative material and a new theoretical argument grounded in a ‘hard core’ by drawing on insights from philosophers who have addressed the issues identified through unravelling existing research programmes. This thesis does so by engaging mainly, but not exclusively, insights offered by Heidegger and Aristotle. Again, the purpose for engaging philosophers is not to turn them into IR theorists but to use them as sources of inspiration for the building a new theory.

Reading the Hard Core: Causation Begins With a ‘Condition’

As an unravelling approach is about engaging the ‘hard core’ of a research programme, it is necessary to get an understanding of the ‘hard core’. This thesis goes beyond the view that it is made of irrefutable assumptions to argue that theories are anchored in an account of the human condition.

This point is arrived at by tracing arguments over what makes a theory internally persuasive. For Donald Spence (1982) the most important feature of a persuasive narrative is cohesiveness, which he discusses by drawing links to aesthetics and artistic beauty. This feature is often captured in the notion that a theory must be ‘elegant’ which for scholars like Waltz means simple or ‘parsimonious’. The maxim of parsimony is also captured in what according to Waltz are four basic ways – isolation, abstraction, aggregation, and idealization – alongside which theory building should be pursued and which boils down to creating an ‘ideal type’ model of interstate relations which focuses only on what ‘really’ matters. For him the overarching aim is “to find the central tendency among a confusion of tendencies, to single out the propelling principle even though other principles operate, to seek the essential factors where innumerable factors are present” (Waltz 1979: 10). While not all agree on the virtue of ‘parsimony’ or simplicity (George and Bennett 2004), there is little dispute that a central tenet of a

59 Although if the hard core is where the explanatory narrative is anchored and so if ultimately this ‘privileged knowledge’ makes or breaks a theory, then it must be the primary site of theory evaluation.
theory is internal consistency, or logical coherence, of the argumentative chain. Indeed, argumentative logic for many is what holds a theory together. It is a central feature of the positivism of Ayer or Popper and the backbone of some important theoretical interventions made in IR, such as Joseph Grieco’s comparison of neorealism and neoliberalism (Grieco, 1990, 1993). As Stefano Guzzini (1998: xii) puts it in his analysis of the realist research programme “by understanding theories from their inner logic it becomes possible to ascertain how they shape...explanations”.

Yet logic is not sufficient. For one, it differs from beauty more in degree than in kind, that is, there is more than one ‘logic’. Moreover, it does not tell the analyst where to start or stop; as Peter Winch (1990) reminds so memorably, links between links can always be found. Most importantly, an explanatory narrative, or what Sabine calls “statements of what may roughly be called a causal nature” (Sabine, 1969 (1931): 12) may be held together by logic but cannot be entirely generated by it. It is suggested here that the persuasiveness of a causal narrative broadly understood originates in a philosophical reflection about the human condition. Causality of this kind informs David Boucher’s suggestion that a theory is an imaginative attempt to formulate principles and incorporate them into systematic order “directed not so much to the resolution of the particular problems out of which they arose, but primarily to the place of those problems generally in the human predicament” (Boucher 1998: 10. emphasis added). Boucher’s distinction between solving a problem and placing it in the context of the human predicament or, as emphasized here, the human condition, is important and must be looked at more carefully.

To begin with, an approach grounding the causal narrative in an account of the human condition is different from an approach building on certain assumptions about human nature (Arendt 1958: 9f.). While both face the issue of anthropomorphism (see below), their implications for and demands of theorizing are quite different. The former is concerned with delineating the spatio-temporal environment self-conscious humans finds themselves in and with exploring how their perception of these dimension influences behaviour (Harvey, 1989). Human nature arguments operate with fixed and quasi essentialist understandings of ‘interests’ or ‘drivers’ shared by all humans independent of time and space, most famously the ‘will to power’. Although there may be different ‘natures’ to chose from, once asserted the assumption is easily established as a universal baseline. By contrast, an account of the human condition requires a more context-sensitive approach. While the broad parameters of the condition are assumed to be a universal, that is, shared by all humans, such as in the famous ‘state of nature’
assumption underlying social contract philosophy (Kersting, 1996), this perspective does not necessarily assume that all humans respond in exactly the same way. In that sense, "the conditions of human existence...never condition us absolutely" and so one might say that the condition is "self-made to a considerable extent" (Arendt, 1958: 10, 9).

Judging from the literature, the 'human nature' assumption appears to be the more prominent road taken by IR theorists; although at closer look this is somewhat misleading. As the discussion in the next two chapters will show, the most significant interventions in IR theory have always involved, indeed focused upon, a re-reading of the spatial and temporal dimension of the 'units' of investigation. Yet for most of the IR literature one can safely echo David Harvey's note that "space and time are basic categories of human existence. Yet we rarely debate their meanings" (Harvey 1989: 201). A key question arising with both human nature and human condition accounts is, of course, how it can be applied to the level of 'the state'. This question will be bracketed for now and addressed further below.

A causal narrative anchored in an account of the human condition resonates with what has been called 'constitutive' theorizing popular in non-positivist research and thus distinguished from 'causal' theorizing attributed to positivists (Smith, 1995). As noted earlier, positivists demand not much more than a hypothesis stating a clear cause-effect relationship between 'dependent' and 'independent' variable. Statements of the kind 'x causes y' are characterized by assuming that (1) x and y exist independent of each other, (2) x precedes y temporally, and (3) without x, y would not have occurred and gain their value only through empirical evidence (that is, in competition against other pairs proposing a different relationship). By contrast, non-positivists assume that human perceptions of their world, the definitions of their interests/goals based and, ultimately, their behaviour is based on meanings which cannot be reduced to generalizing statements based on universal assumptions (Kratochwil, 1989: 24; Winch, 1990). They argue that research must focus on structures or processes attributing meaning to interests/motives/goals and suggest that these 'constitutive' forces operate in an intersubjective manner which cannot be grasped through linear/unidirectional understanding of relationships but require a hermeneutical approach.

---

60 See Freyberg-Inan (2004); Doyle (1997); See also the symposium on 'The Return of Human Nature in IR Theory' in the Journal of International Relations and Development vol. 9, no. 3 (2006).
61 King et al. (1994) frame this in terms of causal versus descriptive research.
62 Ayer (1952); Popper (1968); King et al. (1994).
63 Hollis and Smith (1990); Adler (1997b); Hopf (1998); Ruggie (1998); Guzzini (2000).
Whereas for Steve Smith these two approaches rest on different meta-theoretical positions which require "radically different types of theory" (Smith 1995: 27), scholars like Wendt argue that they should be seen as applying to different stages of the argumentative chain, addressing what others settle on the level of assumptions without abandoning the idea of doing causal or explanatory research (Wendt, 1998, 1999). The perspective advanced here falls somewhere in between. Smith is correct in pointing to the distinction between 'shallow' and 'deep' theorising, with the former prevailing among positivists, however Wendt has a point when he suggests that 'constitutive' research does not need to discard the notion of 'causality', broadly understood. Reflecting about how goals/motives are rooted in an account of the human condition takes a 'constitutive' perspective; yet investigating how the 'national interest' acquires meaning is also part of a causal narrative. As Kratochwil notes

"to have explained an action often means to have made intelligible the goals for which it was undertaken. In this sense our explanations appear 'causal'...since, by definition, motives are always prior to the action and can thus be considered its antecedent conditions" (Kratochwil, 1989: 24).

In other words, making intelligibly a states’ decision to invest in a new institution relies significantly on understanding what goal the state pursues and what meaning this institution possesses in helping it to reach this goal. Expanding the scope of the 'causal' narrative in this 'constitutive' sense is engaging in what Nicholas Onuf calls "deep causality" and is a central feature of a 'deep theory' (Onuf, 1989; also Kurki, 2006).

Although as noted earlier it is rarely specified in these terms, beginning a causal narrative with an account of what 'condition' the state is in should be familiar to IR scholars. It lies at the heart of one of the most influential conceptual frames in the study of international politics, namely the (neorealist) conception of international anarchy. This conception and its parameters will be engaged in the next chapter; for now it

---

64 Wendt is a bit confusing on this point. Constitutive theorizing not merely rejects the positivist view that x and y exist independent from each other, it investigates the meaning of x and y constituted by z.


66 Peter Winch initially argued for making a difference between 'causes' in the scientific sense and human 'motives'. However, three decades later he seemed to have changed his mind (Winch, 1990: xii).
suffices to point out that realist thinking about the ‘condition’ of interstate relations has significant impact on their understanding what international politics is all about. The fundamental distinction realists make between a theory about relations between states and a theory concerned with domestic order or, as Martin Wight puts it, “speculation about the state” (Wight, 1966: 17), rests on the view that these two settings are characterized by two different ‘conditions’. According to realists, whereas relations between states must deal with a Hobbesian ‘state of nature’ characterized by recurrence of violence/war, relations within states have escaped this setting and are about sorting the terms of the social contract. Consequently, the kinds of ‘politics’ characterizing these two settings are different. As Wight put it, whereas in the domestic realm scholars can apply “the theory of the good life” international theory must be “the theory of survival” (Ibid., 33). This distinction between ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ also underlies Waltz’ claim that there is a difference between foreign policy analysis and a theory of international politics, which spurred the view that the latter is not concerned with explaining motives (Waltz 1979 in Keohane 1986: 121f; Elman 1996; Zakaria 1998: 14).⁶⁸

These claims actually sell short the depth of realist theorizing and are misleading (see chapter three). As noted earlier, deep theorizing is fundamentally about making intelligible motives. And as suggested below, it anchors the causal narrative on the level of the ontology of the state, which is another way to say that discerning the ‘condition’ states find themselves in inevitably requires ‘speculation about the state’.

The Parameters of the ‘National (Security) Interest’
The introduction laid out that an explanation of why states cooperate and cease to do so must give meaning to the ‘common interest’ or, more precisely, a shared self-interest. It also noted that although a focus on interests is often associated with ‘economic’ or ‘utilitarian’ explanations, the assumption that states act out of ‘self-interest’ underlies all three IR theories.⁶⁹ This section does not aim at defining this interest but, rather, will provide the conceptual ground from which its formulation through an account of the human condition can proceed. More precisely, what are the parameters of the national

---

⁶⁸ As Fareed Zakaria summarizes this view, a theory of foreign policy explains why states have “different intentions”, or interests, while a theory of international politics explains “international events”, or outcomes. The former may illuminate the reasons for a particular nation’s ‘search for allies’, but a general explanation for the ‘formation of alliances’ can only be provided by a theory which fixes the meaning of intentions on the level of assumptions (Zakaria 1998: 14; also Rose 1998).

⁶⁹ For an overview of the concept of ‘interest’ and its centrality to (and creative use by) classical sociologists, see Reese-Schaefer (1999); Swedberg (2005).
(security) interest governments are expected to pursue (for the successful pursuit of which they are held responsible/accountable) on the basis of which they make decisions over investment in international (security) institutions?

From Morgenthau (1960) onwards, IR scholars across the theoretical spectrum periodically remind us of the importance of the concept of the ‘national interest’ (Nuechterlein 1985; Krasner 1987; Weldes 1999; Williams 2005). Yet they also point out that the question of ‘what is the national interest’ has no single answer if it departs from a certain level of abstraction. As Arnold Wolfers puts it, “the national interest indicates that the policy is designed to promote demands that are ascribed to the nation (...). It emphasizes that the policy subordinates other interests to those of the nation. Beyond this, it has very little meaning” (Wolfers, 1962: 147, emphasis added). In an attempt to specify the concept, one might differentiate between short and long-term interests, or to see interests distinct from preferences and desires, the former (preferences) deducted from and advancing certain interests and the latter (desires) driving or giving rise to a certain interest. From that perspective one could try and trace the ‘preference’ for a certain institution to some sort of ‘desire’, bypassing the concept of interest and render it analytically redundant. While there is something to this approach, it is easy to get lost in semantics. Even more so, if one accepts that policymakers are guided by something they consider the ‘national interest’, bypassing the concept does not seem to be analytically helpful (Williams 2005).

What can be said is that the national interest is assumed to refer to something basic, or vital, and in that sense is necessarily ‘long term’. One scholar captures this under the notion of a ‘vital national interest’: “an interest is vital when the highest policymakers in a sovereign state conclude that the issue at stake is so fundamental to the political, economic, and social well-being of their country that it should not be compromised” (Nuechterlein 1985: 26). Rather than splitting the ‘national interest’ up in various sectoral understandings of ‘well being’, IR scholars in an attempt to pin down the national security interest (which by definition is a ‘vital’ interest) tend to make use of the human analogy and resort to Hobbes’ emphasis on self-preservation, or survival. At least since John Herz declared “let us think first of all about how to survive, thereafter about everything else” (Herz 1962: 3), scholars across the theoretical spectrum from Wolfers (1962) and Wight (1966) via Waltz (1979) to Wendt (1999) readily translate the Hobbesian assumption of the individual’s ‘will’ for self-preservation into the realm of international politics. Even more sophisticated attempts to provide a ‘new framework’ for security analysis build on the assumption that “security is about survival” (Buzan et
The focus on self-preservation implies that security policy is, at bottom, about protecting ‘the state’ from serious harm by preventing things from happening which endangers ‘its’ existence. David Baldwin captures this by suggesting that the ‘national security interest’ is formulated on the basis of two components: a referent object (the ‘state’) and an existential threat as something (perceived to be) capable of doing harm to the core features of the former and endangering its existence (Baldwin 1997; also Buzan 1991; Waever et al., 1993). Hence, the conceptualization of the state is crucial because it informs the definition of the existential threat. Without knowing what governments seek to preserve it is impossible for the analyst to understand what they fear. Said differently, the ‘national security interest’ only becomes intelligible by identifying the baseline features of the state’s existence and what its vulnerabilities are. As Barry Buzan points out, threats and vulnerabilities are intrinsically linked as “only when one has a reasonable idea of both the nature of threats, and the vulnerabilities of the objects towards which they are directed, can one begin to make sense of national security” (Buzan 1991: 112).

This means that, logically speaking, a causal narrative explaining choices made in the name of ‘national security’ cannot simply stop with an emphasis on ‘survival’ as the basic interest. Questions of whether and how to differentiate between ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ accounts of national security (Wolfers 1962: 150ff), echoed in the question whether threat may be misperceived (Jervis 1976), and the debate over the widening of the meaning of security since the end of the Cold War suggest that state survival may be interpreted in different ways, a crucial point made by Wolfers some time ago (Wolfers 1962: 73). Indeterminism about what it means for a state to survive is also reflected in the disagreement about the occurrence of state ‘death’: while some scholars claim that “the world...provides a historical record replete with examples of countries that have disappeared” (Stein 1990: 87), others assert that “the death rate among states is remarkably low” (Waltz, 1979: 95; also Strang, 1991) or “almost nil” (Wendt 1999: 279). These different views do not stem from counting errors but from different conceptions of what a state is, what it needs in order to be. It reflects that there are

---

70 For a critical discussion on survival, see Howes (2003).
71 On the contested meaning of ‘security’, see Haftendorn (1991); Buzan (1991); Baldwin (1997); Huysmans (1998b); Williams (2003).
multiple ways to conceptualize statehood, each version carrying a unique understanding of what it means for a state to exist, what its vulnerabilities and threats are and, consequently, what it means to die (Beitz, 1979: 52-55). Thus, the conceptualization of the state lies at the heart of a ‘deep’ causal narrative. Rather than separating theorizing about survival and ‘speculating about the state’, as Wight suggested, the two are intrinsically linked.

From Humans to ‘States’
A handful of IR scholars exploring the meaning of the state show that this can be done in a variety of ways (e.g., Halliday, 1994; Ringmar 1996; Hobson, 2000). Yet an opening the black box and the attempt to ‘look inside’ the state can also end up without it. More precisely, it is useful to follow Erik Ringmar’s advice and avoid having the state disintegrate into various parts which do not make a whole. A fragmentation into different government branches, interests groups, public opinion, media, courts, and so on renders ‘the state’ too complex for theorising and empty of meaning (Ringmar 1996: 449). The underlying view, adopted here and discussed in more detail in chapter four, is that any conception of being, whether individuals or collectives, needs meaning. As Michael Walzer points out, the state “must be personified before it can be seen, symbolised before it can be loved, imagined before it can be conceived” (in Ruggie 1993: 157).

Yet in ‘personifying’ the state the question of anthropomorphism emerges, namely whether the state can be imagined as a person, a human being. More precisely, the question is how far the human analogy can be carried analytically, which becomes all the more relevant given the earlier mentioned suggestion that the state and its interest should be read through an account of the ‘human condition’. Roughly speaking, IR scholars have dealt with the state-human analogy in three ways.72

Most common is the ‘as if’ assumption, which holds that treating the state like an individual is a useful short cut to simplify matters, that is, a necessary abstraction to build theories. This position does not suggest that the state really is a human being/person (indeed, accepts that it is not) but argues that theories attributing assumptions about human desires to the state can provide useful models for making sense of international politics. Scholars like Waltz are thus able to treat the state as “a unit complete with will and purpose” (Waltz, 2001 (1959): 173).

The second position, put forward by Alexander Wendt, argues that the state actually is a person or, rather, can be conceptualised as possessing similar properties as a human being, including an organism, motives (cognitive and emotional) and a consciousness (Wendt 1999; 2004). Drawing on sociology, anthropology, and even biology it suggests that communities possess features similar to those of individual human beings, such as a ‘collective consciousness’, and that desires driving individuals also drive communities.

The third approach is sceptical about abstractions and of transferring insights about humans to collectives, or communities. Instead, it holds that attributing human qualities to a state only makes sense to the extent that state is represented by actual persons, such as government officials. It conceptualises the state as, for instance, a structure in and through which individuals (political leaders) act, facing all kinds of constraints and opportunities this structure brings with it (Sprout and Sprout 1965; Wight 2006).

While these three approaches appear substantially different, when combining theory with empirical analysis it is tempting to see them as overlapping, moving from the first to the third as the discussion proceeds from the theoretical to the empirical level. Yet this move needs to be justified conceptually. Even if one assumes that a society is conscious of its spatio-temporal situatedness as a collective, something must be said about how political leaders are embedded in and are able to represent this consciousness. Thus, applying philosophical accounts of the human condition to ‘the state’ level and using this for explaining inter-state phenomena must conceptualize how the individual relates to and comes to ‘represent’ the collective (Self/Society) and the relationship between these representatives (Self/Society – Self/Society).

How proponents of the three IR theories read ‘the state’ and ‘existential threats’ and how these readings are anchored in (presumably different) accounts of the human condition will be discussed in the next chapter. Yet it should be pointed out here already that engaging these different conceptions inevitably brings up issues of the relative (causal) importance of ‘material’ and ‘ideational’ factors. Indeed, there appears to be widespread consensus among IR scholars that the decision whether one chooses the ‘materialist’ or the ‘idealist’ path is a fundamental one. Anchored in the first ‘great debate’ in IR, they are portrayed as two orientations which stand not merely for a debate within IR but provide different approaches to the discipline (Crawford, 2000), with realists

---

73 For a warning against biological essentialism, see Bell (2001).
representing the 'material' and constructivists the 'ideational' camp (Wendt 1999, Ruggie 1998). While there is something to this division of labour, the question is how deep it goes, that is, whether it actually resonates with the hard core of respective research programmes. For now it suffices to say that all attempts advocating ideas as 'causes' face the familiar problem of how to interpret 'what is in peoples heads', mentioned in the introduction. The problem that one cannot 'see' ideas in the same way as one can touch material elements like rocks means that causal narratives taking into account the former must make an even greater effort to theorize carefully about why and how ideas matter in the conception of the state and its existential threats.

To close the circle, if a deep theory perspective focuses on how the national security interest emerges in the conceptualization of 'the state' and the 'existential threat', the presence (or absence) of a common security interest depends on the degree to which the two are shared. In other words, for states to cooperate in the security realm they must perceive their existence as somehow interlinked/interdependent and agree on a common (or shared) existential threat. A deep theory perspective suggests that the parameters on the basis of which such commonalities are established are logically embedded in an account of the human condition. The following chapter will discuss how the dominant research programmes in IR have dealt with this task by unravelling their causal narratives on interstate security cooperation.
CHAPTER THREE: UNRAVELLING THE FIELD

Summary
This chapter unravels the three major research programmes, realism, institutionalism, and constructivism for the purpose of theory building. As such, it offers more than a literature overview. As outlined in the introduction, the logical thrust of all three causal narratives runs into problems when trying to explain the ‘novel fact’ of German-American cooperation outlined in the first chapter, captured in the balancing bias (realism), sunk-cost bias (institutionalism) and socialization bias (constructivism). Following the strategy for creative theorizing laid out in the previous chapter, the purpose of this chapter is to unravel the logic carrying their respective arguments by carving out their conception of the ‘common interest’ and tracing it to their hard core, that is, to an account the spatio-temporal situatedness of the state. The purpose is not merely to identify weaknesses but openings, that is, conceptual insights identified by proponents of each research programme as important yet which are not fully thought through and often a source of ambiguity and tension within the causal narrative. Thus, the aim is not to turn these theories into straw men for the purpose of burning them, but to learn from them and use them as sources of inspiration for building a new/better theory. As such, whereas the criticism presented here may not be new the angle from which it is formulated is.

As realism provides the baseline argument on which the other two research programmes are built, this chapter begins with and spends most time on the task of unravelling the realist narrative. This is followed by a brief look at the instutionalist narrative, with the third part focusing on constructivism. Although the writings of a large number of authors inform the discussion, for each (alleged) research programme the conception of the hard core is illustrated through the writings of key representatives, namely Kenneth Waltz (realism), Robert Keohane (institutionalism) and Alexander Wendt (constructivism).

(I) Realism: Providing the Baseline
Realism is intrinsically connected to the origin of IR as a discipline in Western academia – Stefano Guzzini (1998) calls it the “initial paradigm” – and, although challenged time and again, it remains the dominant research programme in the study of international
politics. William Wohlforth (2008) even claims that "it is only a slight exaggeration to say that the academic study of international relations is a debate about realism". With an unbroken air of essentialism, realists claim to capture the basic forces governing our lives and to provide the best account of 'common sense' behaviour among states (Grieco, 1993: 3; Guzzini, 1998; Walt, 2002). They follow Machiavelli in propagating the necessity "to accept reality unvarnished" (Stein, 1990: 4) and "to understand international politics as it actually is" (Morgenthau, 1960: 15). The realist Erkenntnisinteresse is to identify the 'true' national interest and with it the 'laws of politics' determining interstate conflict and cooperation.

Since the foundational writings of E.H. Carr (2001) and Hans Morgenthau (1960) a number of realist 'theories' developed and generated "different worlds of realism" (Guzzini 1998), which raises the question whether there still is a realist hard core. In an influential critique, Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik (1999) argue from a Lakatosian perspective that 'realism' has become internally incoherent. They suggest that the theories formulated by a new generation of realists - sometimes labelled 'neoclassical' realists (Rose 1998) - share "little more than a generic commitment to rational state behavior in anarchy" (Legro and Moravcsik, 2000: 184). Legro and Moravcsik basically argue that the realist hard core has become too weak/elastic to serve as a meaningful reference point, with the consequence that the paradigm has become indistinguishable from institutionalism and constructivism.

This chapter echoes some of that critique, although from a different angle and with a different intention. Whereas Legro and Moravcsik read the 'hard core' as made up of assumptions and pursue the (unstated) objective to put realism back in 'its' box, here the aim is to unravel the realist account of the human condition with the objective to explore the paradigms' argumentative weakness for the case at hand and retrieve its creative potential.

---

74 For influential challenges, see Keohane (1986); Baldwin (1993); Schroeder (1994); Powell (1994); Lebow (1994); Vasquez (1997); Legro and Moravcsik (1999).
75 After Waltz' version (Waltz 1979; 2000) lost its appeal with the end of the Cold War, realism bounced back to life in fragments with scholars modifying neorealism (Buzan et al., 1993; Schwellner, 1998; Mearsheimer, 2001), providing domestic explanations for realist assumptions (Snyder, 1991; Johnston, 1995; Wolforth, 1993; Zakaria, 1998) even giving it a constructivist touch (Williams, 2005; Goddard and Nexon, 2005). Waltz's 'neo' prefix was rebranded as 'structural' (Buzan et al. 1993), 'offensive' and 'defensive' (Snyder 1991), 'contingent' (Glaser, 1994), 'neoclassical' (Rose, 1998), or 'wilful' (Williams 2005). For overviews see Frankel (1996); Guzzini (2001); Donnelly (2000); Taliaferro (2000); Wohlforth (2008).
76 For responses, see Faever (2000); Schweller (2000).
The Balancing Bias

As noted in chapter one, the logical thrust of realism’s balance of power argument cannot account for the dynamic of German-American cooperation as defined here. It is at odds with parts of Germany cooperating with the US in NATO at a time where the US was the strongest power in the system (period one), it cannot explain German investment in CSCE at a time of (perceived) decline in US power (period two), or German investment in CFSP, which occurred at a time of growing US power yet lacks characteristics of an instrument for deterrence and, hence, the key qualities of a realist balancing move (period three)\(^7\)\(^7\).

The task of tracing the conceptual weakness of the balancing argument to the realist hard core it makes sense to start with the four basic assumptions generally attributed to realism\(^7\)\(^8\): (1) states are the principal actors in international politics, (2) states behave as rational and self-interested actors who (3) compete for power in an international system without central authority (anarchy), with (4) the anarchic character of the international system being the principal force shaping (the actions of) states. As the first two assumptions are also shared by other paradigms and generic for a theory of interstate security cooperation, the uniquely realist conception of what makes a ‘self interest’ lies with the last two assumptions.

Implicit in the assumption that states compete for power is that states want power. This assumption has been central to realist attempts to make sense of international politics from the start. Carr (2001: 92) famously noted that “politics cannot be divorced from power” and Morgenthau declared that “statesmen think and act in terms of interests defined as power” and that power is “the immediate aim” of all states (Morgenthau 1960: 5, 27). Indeed, one is hard pressed to find an IR scholar who would disagree with Brian Schmidt’s observation that “realists throughout the ages have argued that power is the decisive determinant” in the relations among states, and that “all realists characterise international politics in terms of a continuous struggle for power” (Schmidt 2007: 44f). Although some attribute the will for power to human nature and, thus, suggest that power is sought as an end in itself, the prevalent understanding among realists is that states seek power as a means to the end of ‘survival’. How this link is established is discussed later; for now it suffices to say that the basic realist assumption is that states

\(^7\) On the empirical weaknesses of the neorealist balance-of-power argument more generally, see Vasquez (1995, 1997), who uses a Lakatosian framework and relies significantly on Paul Schroeder’s (1994) work. For a response, see Waltz (1997); Elman and Fendius Elman (1997).

\(^8\) Grieco (1993: 118f); Mearsheimer (2001: 17f); Frankel (1996: xivff); Elman and Elman (1997: 924).
seek power as a means for protection against the existential threat, which also is defined in terms of power. Indeed, the latter leads to the former, that is, because for realists “power...is the valid and complete measure of threat” (Doyle 1997: 168) states are assumed to want ‘power’ to ensure their security.

In seeming contradiction to the popular view (often attributed to realism) that state interests are inherently ‘conflicting’ and that cooperation is difficult to achieve, common interests and cooperation lies at the heart of the oldest segments of realist thought, namely the balance-of-power proposition. This proposition comes in various forms united in the view that some sort of ‘equilibrium’ is an integral part of the order of things. The most popular version, focused on here, emphasises the tendency of states to cooperate in an effort to counter the most powerful state, or coalition of states. In other words, the common interest bringing states together is the determination to prevent any (group of) state(s) to achieve or maintain a dominant position through ‘internal’ and/or ‘external’ balancing (Waltz 1979). The latter leads to cooperation as “first and foremost a means for adding interchangeable, culmulative power” (Liska, 1968: 24) for the purpose of deterrence. Alliances are thus a “necessary function” (Morgenthau 1960: 181) and an “integral part” (Levy, 2002) of the balance of power dynamic and security cooperation a permanent feature of the realist understanding of international politics. States may institutionalise their alliance for coordination purposes, yet because they don’t like to be constrained and aim at reducing interdependence (see below) they will keep investments in common institutions at a minimum.

According to the balancing logic, states will end the cooperative relationship when there is a shift in the distribution of power, that is, either when a state within the alliance increases its relative power or when the hegemon experiences a decrease in its relative power. More precisely, states will cease to cooperate if they expect a shift in how gains

---

79 Realists may bridge the tension between saying that cooperation is difficult to achieve and implying that it occurs all the time by suggesting that it is a practical dilemma (Snyder 1997: 18). However, the tension is also due to the fact, rarely acknowledged, that there are two different kinds of cooperation, namely between ‘rivals’ and between ‘allies’ (Mearsheimer 1994: 338 in Brown).

80 For discussions, see Bull, (2002 [1977]); Levy (2002); Little (2007); Kaufman et al. (2007). For offensive realists (e.g., Mearsheimer 2001) and hegemonic stability theorists (e.g., Gilpin 1981) balancing is neither something that occurs automatically nor is it the preferable/most stable configuration.

81 Glenn Snyder (1997) provides a comprehensive conceptual discussion of alliance dynamics, including the stage of bargaining omitted here. Yet while much of it rests on a (neo)realist frame, his discussion does not add up to a coherent theoretical argument (Snyder, 1997: 22ff).

82 Indeed, because realists focus on the distribution of ‘hard power’ capabilities they don’t pay much analytical attention to institutions (Mearsheimer, 1994; Jervis, 1999).
are or will be distributed between allies, that is, if the partner is expected to grow too strong in comparison to others. Just as power shifts rather than disappears, it is more correct to speak of shifting alliances than simply disintegration, which moves attention to the existence of an alternative, prominent in the debate among realists whether bipolarity or multipolarity makes the more stable system (that is, produces more fragile alliances).  

As the main problem of the balancing argument for explaining the case at hand is that it cannot explain (German) bandwagoning (with the US), it is useful to briefly review attempts to conceptually integrate this phenomenon into the realist narrative. The simplest way out is to find refuge in the 'historical record' and maintain that 'overall' states were more likely to choose balancing over bandwagoning. Instances in which a weaker state aligns with the stronger state are seen as misguided outliers, the result of irrational decisions. However, even then realists have difficulties integrating acts of 'irrationality' in their balancing narrative. In part this is because realists pay little attention to the calculations of weak/small states. Guided by the famous Thucydides quote that 'the weak suffer what they must', the paradigm itself came to suffer from a great power bias captured by Waltz in noting that "the units of greatest capability set the scene of action for others" (Waltz 1979: 72). With balancing assumed to be a quasi natural process in which those who did not follow 'common sense' would learn to do so and otherwise 'punished', realists were mostly content with arguing that balancing occurs without specifying how (Levy 2002: 140).

One notable attempt to come to terms with 'bandwagoning' is presented by Stephen Walt, who tries to turn it into a rational decision within a balancing framework by arguing that states do not balance power but threats. More precisely, he holds that

---

83 Echoing George Liska (1962: 193) that "increases in alternatives available contribute to realignment and alliance dissolution", Waltz argues that bipolarity is more stable because smaller states have no viable alternative, whereas in a multipolar world an alliance "unskillfully managed" may fall apart more easily (Waltz 1979: 170). What makes '(un)skillful management' remains unclear.

84 Waltz (1979: 126f); Walt (1985); Snyder (1997); Jervis (1999); Levy (2002).

85 Against the argument that small states are manipulated by the hegemon to go against their 'common sense', Walt (1985, 1987) shows that 'bribery' is effective only when a shared threat already exist.

86 For an exception, see Liska (1962, 1968).

87 As Holsti et al (1973: 6) write, the balance of power proposition "requires that statesmen adhere to certain rules, one of the most important of which is that they must form alliances to prevent any nation...from achieving a position of hegemony. Failure to do so when the situation demands it is not merely irrational, it is also a serious dereliction of duty".

88 Walt also suggests that regions have their own dynamic (Walt 1985: 35ff; see also Buzan and Waever 2004). Yet decoupling regional power estimates from the international system or
states feel threatened not simply by relative military capabilities but by a combination of (i) aggregate power, (ii) geographic proximity, (iii) offensive military capabilities, and (iv) aggressive intentions. The problem is that whereas the first three factors can be accommodated by the realist research programme, the fourth, which emphasizes the evaluation of others’ intentions, cannot. It is not merely that Walt remains unclear on what basis states evaluate the intentions of others; his empirical discussion leads him to emphasize ideology yet this factor is not translated into a coherent causal argument integrated into the realist narrative. The reason he fails to do so is because an argument emphasizing states weighing (future) intentions is in conflict with the realist account of the human condition and its consequence, discussed below, that states are (should be) inherently pessimistic about the (future) intentions of others and (should) mistrust each other (Waltz, 2000).

Randall Schweller (1998; 2006) takes up Walt’s (1985: 8, 18) suggestion that states bandwagon because they hope to benefit from the ‘spoils of victory’ (also Snyder 1997: 18) and suggests that states surrender to great powers because they pursue ‘revisionist’ aims and prefer being on the ‘winning side’ in the belief that it represents the “wave of the future” (Schweller 1998: 79). The problem with this avenue is, again, that states following such a ‘wave of the future’ act ignore that down the road the strong state might turn against them. In response Schweller (2006) presents what he calls a theory of ‘underbalancing’, or a “theory of mistakes”. He presents a systematic analysis of the domestic configurations of states who bandwagon to explain misperception of intentions of a rising power and/or the failure to adopt protective policies with a lack of social and elite ‘cohesion’ (Schweller 2006: 10f.; 128). While this explanation may have empirical merits, Schweller’s suggestion that a domestically fractioned state fails to perceive a ‘great power’ as an existential threat and, by implication, is less pessimistic about the future intentions of others is not grounded in something that could be called a deep theory (see also Legro and Moravcsik 1999).

suggested that the global distribution of power is viewed through a ‘regional lens’ is a serious compromise of the systemic scope of structural realism. Moreover, transferring the puzzle to a more confined geographical setting does not eliminate it.

Walt’s note that ideology only affects the choice of allies when states feel secure already, that is, “face no significant external threat” (1987: 217) is inconsistent with his argument that ideology may be part of the threat (Ibid).

This is the problem of hegemonic stability theory, which can account for bandwagoning but contradicts the assumption that power is threatening. On how hegemonic stability does not fit the realist research programme, see DiCicco and Levy (2003).

When Schweller (2006: 6f.) situates his argument in the realist paradigm he makes no mentioning of core realist assumptions but only re-states the case for opening up the ‘black box’ of the state and analyze the configuration of domestic political structures.
An issue not directly addressed by either Walt or Schweller, yet which is at the heart of the realist conundrum why some states do not ‘answer’ great power threats in the way balancing logic dictates, is the question of how to actually measure power. The ubiquitous nature of ‘power’ makes it difficult to trace patterns of alliance formation and disintegration to shifts in the distribution of power. Morgenthau (1960: Ch. 10) already discussed the problem of recognising shifts in the balance of power, quoting Lord Bolingbroke that “the precise point at which the scales of power turn...is imperceptible to common observation” (in Morgenthau 1960: 206). Yet the issue is not merely the (mis)perception among practitioners about the ‘real’ distribution of power (Wohlforth 1993) but the conceptual vagueness of the meaning of ‘power’ as such. The recognition among sociologists that power is an essentially contested concept also bedevils realism.2 As a number of scholars have pointed out, there is no unified understanding among realists as to how ‘power’ should be defined,3 reflected in disagreements about the distribution of power in ‘the system’ at a given point (Schweller 1998; Grieco 2007). One can find a complex and multifaceted understanding of power (Carr 2001, Morgenthau 1960), a vague and general one lumping together all kinds of factors (Waltz 1979) and a more specific and more narrow one (Mearsheimer 2001).

The problem this poses for the realist narrative is obvious: it makes it difficult to conceptualize what counts for a threat and, hence, what makes for a ‘common interest’ and the absence thereof. The difficulty of realists providing a straightforward reading of power is not intrinsic to the concept, however. Contested as it might be, realists could well choose one particular reading, as attempted by Mearsheimer (2001). I suggest the reason can be found elsewhere: the realist argument that states want power to ensure their survival ties the reading of power to its conceptualization of the state. Thus, as suggested by a deep theory perspective, the realist assumption that states seek power needs to be traced to its account of the spatio-temporal situatedness of the state.

**Tracing the Hard Core**

As outlined in the previous chapter, tracing a causal narrative to an account of the human condition is different from anchoring an assumption in ‘human nature’. Hence, it requires going beyond the view that humans have a natural desire for power often attributed to realists and traced to Machiavelli (Boucher 1998: 93f.; Doyle 1997; 1996; 1997a; 1997b; 1997c).

---

2 On multiple meanings of power in IR, see Barnett and Duvall (2005); Berenskoetter (2007).

3 See David Baldwin’s critique of Waltz (Baldwin 1993, 2002). For different realist conceptions of power, see Guzzini (1993); Schmidt (2005).
Freyberg-Inan 2004). Morgenthau is generally referred to as someone who anchors aggressive behaviour in human nature “in which the laws of politics have their roots” (Morgenthau 1960: 4). However, even Morgenthau’s understanding of human nature is complex and he does not link the drive for power to a single human nature attribute. He speaks of bio-psychological drives “to live, to propagate, and to dominate” (Morgenthau 1960: 33) and mentions sociological motivations like pride and prestige, as well as “the moral principle of national survival” (Morgenthau 1960: 10). In short, when Morgenthau claims that “whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim” (Morgenthau 1946: 13), he leaves open what this ‘ultimate aim’ is.

Since Waltz, structural realists reject the view that humans/states have a natural drive for power and, instead, resort to Hobbes in emphasizing the will for self-preservation or ‘survival’. Waltz holds that “the survival motive is the ground for action” of all states (Waltz 1979: 92).95 Gilpin argues that it constitutes the “objective component” in the definition of the national interest (Gilpin 1996: 8), and Grieco considers it to be the “core interest” of states (Grieco, 1993: 127). Even for offensive realists like Mearsheimer survival is the “number one goal” (Mearsheimer 2001: 46); and “the fundamental assumption dealing with motives” in realist theory (Mearsheimer, 1994 in Brown et al: 335).96 While acknowledging that states pursue other, “more noble” (Gilpin) goals as well, they are considered subordinate simply because “only if survival is assured can states safely seek other goals” (Waltz 1979: 126). On the question how states turn from a ‘survival-seeker’ into a ‘power-seeker’, realists point to international anarchy (see assumption (4) above) which, as is well known, realists adopt from the ‘state of nature’ image provided by Hobbes (Waltz 2001; 1979; 2000; Mearsheimer 2001). This image basically pictures individuals coexisting without a third party arbiter that can solve disputes and enforce rule above them. In Hobbes words, the state of nature is a situation of “men living together without a common power to keep them in awe” (in Doyle 1997: 113). Adapted to the inter-state level, anarchy is “the ordering principle which says that the system comprises independent political units (states) that have no authority above them” (Mearsheimer, 1994: 334).97

94 Some have labeled this the ‘evil’ school of realism (Wolfers 1962: 83; Spirtas, 1996).
95 Waltz solves the tension (if not contradiction) between his embrace of the survival motive and his dismissal of human nature (or what he calls ‘first image’) arguments by treating the latter fairly narrow as either ‘good’ (peaceful) or ‘bad’ (aggressive).
96 Also Powell (1994: 320f); Zakaria (1998); Schweller (1998).
97 For Hobbes the ‘state of nature’ was fictitious, a backdrop imagination against which an ordering sovereign, known as the ‘Leviathan’, could be conceptualized. Realists build on Hobbes’ suggestion that by overcoming the ‘state of nature’ domestically this would come to characterize relations between states. For a discussion, see Doyle (1997: 116f); Beitz (1999: 60)
While for most IR scholars the ‘condition’ of anarchy is expressed in the distinction between a vertical (hierarchical) organization of the legitimate use of force within states and a horizontal (‘anarchical’) organization among states, the reading here emphasizes a different angle. It suggests that on a deeper level the ‘condition of anarchy’ rests on a certain (realist) reading of the spatial and temporal situatedness of states, namely the reading that they are autonomous units organised on the principle of territorial exclusivity (spatial dimension) emerging out of a history of conflict and facing an uncertain future best engaged with a pessimistic outlook (temporal dimension).

The State in Space: Autonomy as Territorial Integrity

In a prominent realist image states situated in the ‘anarchical environment’ are pictured like billiard balls (Morgenthau 1960: 174ff). While this metaphor may appear simplistic, critics have repeatedly pointed out that beyond such a picture realists lack a theory of the state. For Wendt (1987), realism is ontologically primitive. As realism is interrogated here as a ‘deep theory’, it is worth pursuing John Hobson’s suggestion that realism does provide a substantial conceptualisation of the state (Hobson, 2000).

In general terms, realists understand the state to be a ‘sovereign’ entity. Sovereignty of course is a contested term with a history of different meanings, and realists generally use it synonymously with “autonomy” and “independence” (Waltz 1979: 90, 204; Grieco 1993: 127; Mearsheimer 2001: 31). Thus, when they note that states are driven primarily by their desire for survival understood as maintaining autonomy/independence, underlying this claim about what states want is an ideal of what a state is, namely a non-social or ‘atomistic’ unit. This ontology can be traced to Hobbes’ conception of the individual as an autonomous/independent being and thus to the notion of individualism central to modern Western philosophy since Hobbes (Lukes 2006 [1973]; Doyle 1997: 114). Realists project this ontology onto the ‘Westphalian’ state captured in Max Weber’s famous definition of the state as “that human community which (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a certain space [Gebiet]” (Weber, 1999 (1919): 6, my translation; see also Smith, M. 1986: 24). Weber’s conception is echoed by Morgenthau, one of the few realists

---

32f.); Boucher (1998). The application of Hobbes’ ‘state of nature’ image to interstate relations has been widely criticized by Ashley (1988); Wendt (1992); Beitz (1999); Hutchings 1999: 19ff.).
98 See Cox (1981); Ashley (1986); Ruggie (1986); Wendt (1987); Walker (1993); Buzan et al. (1993: 47ff).
99 Jackson (1999); James (1999); Biersteker and Weber (1990); Krasner (1999).
100 See also Paul (1999); Howes (2003).
discussing the meaning of sovereignty, who defines it as ‘supreme authority’ in the realm of law-enforcement (Morgenthau, 1960: 312ff).\footnote{Morgenthau’s note that the sovereign has “the responsibility for making the final binding decision” (Morgenthau 1960: 326) overlaps with Carl Schmitt’s view that the state is the political entity which decides the “extreme case” (Schmitt, 1996 [1932]: 43).} Similarly, for Waltz, sovereignty is about “being able to decide for itself how to cope with internal and external problems” (Waltz, 1979: 95).

The main challenge this ontology faces is interdependence, that is, the fact that no decision-making process is completely autonomous or free from external constrains. Long before the phenomenon of interdependence became prominent in the literature in the 1970s, Morgenthau (1960: 328) grappled with the fact that sovereignty was “not actual independence”. He acknowledged that dependence of some states on others in military, economic, or technological matters makes it difficult, or even impossible, for them to pursue independent domestic and foreign policies. More recently, Krasner (1999) in a comprehensive discussion of the concept of sovereignty shows how states are regularly coerced into making decisions or even invite their dependence through voluntary agreements. Waltz concedes that sovereignty does not mean that the state can do whatever it wants. While he claims that “to be sovereign and to be dependent are not contradictory conditions”, Waltz still notes that sovereignty understood as decision-making autonomy is a “bothersome concept” (Waltz 1979: 95). After all, if the concept is a defining feature of the state, then one cannot move too far away from the fact that “sovereignty is indivisible” (Morgenthau 1960: 320). Differently said, if sovereign statehood is characterized by degrees of interdependence, it becomes difficult to conceptualize at what point it becomes existentially threatening.

There are two further ontological implications, downplayed by realists. The first is that if sovereignty cannot be fully claimed from within it needs to be recognised by others, which introduces a social component. Notwithstanding repeated violations of the norm, in acknowledging that ‘sovereignty’ is a relational attribute realism must compromise its atomistic ontology of the state as a non-social (or asocial) entity (see also below). The second implication is that decision-making autonomy understood as an ideal which states strive towards compromises the reading of the state as a static entity. Said differently, conceiving of the state as ‘sovereign-in-the-making’ implies a tacit evolutionary ontology. While the realist literature does grapple with these issues, visible
in Waltz' account discussed below,\textsuperscript{102} this has not led realists to rethink the ontology of the state.

Instead, realists emphasize territorially and make control over/possession of an exclusive territory the central feature of the spatial configuration of the state (Hobson 2000: 56ff; Ruggie, 1993). Carr, while acknowledging that the “most comprehensive power units” in international politics must not necessarily be territorially organized, notes that the modern state clearly is based on “territorial sovereignty” (Carr 2001: 210). Morgenthau also defines sovereignty as “supreme power over a certain territory” (Morgenthau 1960: 312), echoed by Krasner who, while distinguishing between four different types of sovereignty, focuses primarily on ‘Westphalian sovereignty’ based on “the exclusion of external actors from authority structures within a given territory” (Krasner, 1999: 4, 20). John Herz perhaps most forcefully argued that territoriality forms the “existential basis” for the sovereign state (Herz 1959: 50), echoed in Gilpin’s assertion that “the essence of the state is its territoriality” (Gilpin 1981: 17).

Conceptualizing the state as a certain territorial space and, correspondingly, of survival as maintaining “territorial integrity” (Mearsheimer 2001: 31) moves analytical attention towards the importance of borders. Although realists don’t spend much time talking about borders, they are obviously central to the notion of the state as an autonomous/independent entity. While it is unimportant to realists how communities are organised within a certain territory, what matters is that their authority to define and enforce order extends at a physical border. Borders are both markers for separating realms of authority and protectors of the same; they divide and compartmentalise the territorial surface of the planet and mark the existence of ‘states’ as exclusive territorial units. While few might use George Liska’s (1968: 47) words that the state is a territorial unit with natural boundaries – although Carr at one point speaks of how states are built on “rigidly demarcated frontiers” (Carr 2001: 211) – the very fact that borders are not part of realist theorising is proof that they are assumed to be fixed.

While this focus on territorially makes for a static ontology (Ruggie 1998), it allows realists to pin down the existential threat. The elasticity of the meaning of ‘sovereignty’

\textsuperscript{102} Waltz’ note that “states seek to control what they depend on or to lessen the extent of their dependency” (Waltz, 1979: 106; Waltz, 1986: 324) echoes the classification of states as either ‘satisfied’ or ‘dissatisfied’ (Carr 2001; Morgenthau 1960; Wolfers, 1962) and also permeates the debate between ‘defensive’ and ‘offensive’ realism and its emphasis on ‘status quo’ and ‘revisionist’ states, respectively. See Snyder (1991); Jervis (1999); Taliaferro (2000); Mearsheimer (2001); Schweller (1994, 1998).
makes it difficult to conceptualise when exactly ‘the state’ is existentially threatened, yet
the conception of the state as a territorial entity with fixed borders provides a clear
target. It suggests that survival is at risk when borders are permeated and the territorial
integrity of the state is violated, which happens in war. To be precise, war as such is
not threatening but the possibility of losing is, and so the notion of the existential threat
will need to be qualified in what defines this possibility. This crucial point is engaged
later.

Realist Attempts of Fixing the State: Learning and Nationalism

How does realism account for the compartmentalization of territory into units whose
autonomy/integrity governments are expected to safeguard? Asked differently, how is
the spatial fixation of states as exclusive territorial entities embedded in an account of a
‘condition’ states are situated in? This section reviews the two arguments realists have
used to justify their ontology, learning and nationalism, and points out their weaknesses.

As expressed in assumption (4) above, structural realists argue that the sovereign state is
a product of the dynamic of interstate relations in the ‘anarchical environment’. They
portray the state as what Hobson calls a “passive-adaptive” actor (Hobson 2000) and,
thus, rely on a tacit learning argument. Waltz most famously (and murkily) blends
sociological and microeconomic logic carried forward through two mechanisms,
socialization and competitive selection, to argue that states have to adjust to ‘the rules of
the game’ if they want to survive. He invokes Durkheim’s insight that groups establish
norms of behaviour which members conform to (Waltz 1979: 75), remaining quiet about
where these norms come from other than vaguely suggesting that “the persistent
characteristics of group behaviour result in part from the qualities of its members”
(Waltz 1979: 76). Supplementing this rudimentary socialization dynamic with
microeconomic logic, Waltz translates the market analogy that “competitive systems are
regulated...by the rationality of the more successful competitors” (Waltz 1979: 76) to IR
and suggests that states will conform to successful practices of the most powerful state
and that “those who not...will fail to prosper, will lay themselves to dangers, will suffer”

103 This point is made by Morgenthau. In a section entitled ‘How Sovereignty is Lost’ he argues
that such loss occurs when a nation is placed under the authority of another “so that is it the latter
that exercises supreme authority to give and enforce the laws within the formers’ territory”
(Morgenthau 1960: 318). This can take place in two possible ways, namely (i) by giving the other
nation veto-power from the outside or (ii) through the physical violation of territorial integrity
which “places the agents of B above A in terms of lawgiving and –enforcing”, in other words by
taking physical control of the authority structure through occupation (Morgenthau 1960: 322).
Ultimately, ‘civilian’ means do not fundamentally damage territorial integrity, only war does, as
“it is the very essence of war to penetrate the territory of the enemy” (Morgenthau 1960: 314).
Waltz 1979: 118). His notion that international structure "molds agents" and thereby "causes" states to be alike by encouraging "similarities of attributes and of behaviour" (Waltz 1979: 74, 76) blends socialization and competition to some kind of casual force, but it also involves reflective activity on the side of states. Other than in Darwinian evolutionary processes where selection takes place randomly, Waltz suggests that states can come to understand the ‘rules of the game’ and learn to adapt.105

When Waltz asserts that "those who survive share certain characteristics" (Waltz 1979: 77) the question is whether this refers only to behaviour or to the very understanding of what a state is/should be. For scholars like Barry Buzan structural realisms' "demonstration effect" of reward and punishment explains how life in anarchy "will push the range of governmental functions towards sovereignty" (Buzan et al., 1993: 39). This may be giving too much credit to the 'logic of anarchy'. While one may argue that the co-existence of autonomous units creates a situation of anarchy (Buzan et al. 1993: Ch. 4), and while the condition of anarchy encourages the practice of balancing (see below), there is no compelling logic in the realist narrative which suggests that anarchy conditions states to be autonomous, or desire autonomy/territorial integrity. Waltz does not distinguish between structure encouraging balancing and shaping states themselves, which masks that the constitutive argument is not there. As Wendt has pointed out, the static ontology of the state leaves structural realism without room for processes of socialisation or evolution operating on the level of ontology (Wendt 1987; 1992; 1999; also Ruggie 1986).106

The second prominent attempt of fixing the spatial configuration of the state as an autonomous entity seeking territorial integrity is to point towards the constitutive force of nationalism (thus focusing on the community in Weber’s definition). Classical realists like Carr and Morgenthau favoured ‘the nation’ as the political entity whose relations they studied. In his study on the evolution of nationalism, Carr notes that the state merely was “a colourless legal word” (Carr, 1945: 1). Morgenthau identifies nationalism as the reason why the mass of individuals in a society identify themselves with the foreign policy wielded by small number of people. He defines the nation as “an

104 For critical discussions of Waltz' market analogy, see Buzan et al. (1993); Walker (1993); Guzzini (1998); Inayatullah and Blaney (2004: Ch. 4). One observer notes that the relationship between 'self-help' and competition is underdeveloped, if not "fundamentally flawed" (Glaser, 1994).

105 For an attempt to buttress Waltz' argument with Darwinian logic, see Thayer (2000). See also the critical response by Bell and Macdonald (2001).

abstraction from a number of individuals who have certain characteristics in common” (Morgenthau 1960: 101) and suggests that there is an inverse relationship between “the emotional intensity of the identification of the individual with his nation” and the stability and sense of security within a society (Ibid., 106). He also argues that the existence of a “national character” and “national morale” are core elements of every state with decisive influence on its vitality (Ibid., 269f). The importance of nationalism as a cohesive force is also noted by structural realists. Waltz in Man, the State and War takes up Rousseau’s point that the unity of the state is achieved through a “public spirit or patriotism”, which Waltz sees mirrored in the idea of nationality. He even comes to suggest that “the centripetal force of nationalism may itself explain why states can be thought of as units” (Ibid., 174ff; also Grieco 1990.). Gilpin (1981: 14f) notes the close link between realist state-centrism and nationalism and Mearsheimer (1990: 18ff in Brown), mentions nationalism as beliefs of uniqueness and pride “which hold that a nation should have its own state” and calls it a “second order force in international politics” (Ibid., 19; see also Posen 1993). Buzan’s conceptualization of the state primarily as a “binding idea” or “organizing ideology” provides the most elaborate discussion among realists of the meaning of ‘national’ security (Buzan 1991: 64, 72-82).

There is an empirical and a conceptual problem with this argument. First, history is replete with examples of nationalism as a force undermining rather than strengthening ‘the state’. The fact that nationalistic sentiments may lead to the disintegration of a state does not fit with a static ontology and renders nationalism unsuitable for supporting the conception of the state as a geographical unit with fixed borders. As Lapid and Kratochwil observe, Buzan (1991: 72) is aware of this conceptual problem and, hence, does not incorporate nationalism in his subsequent reformulation of structural realism (Buzan et al. 1993). Similarly, the rudimentary attempts by Mearsheimer and Posen to integrate nationalism into structural realism are highly selective (Lapid and Kratochwil, 1996). Even if one ignores these inconsistencies, second, from a deep theory perspective the ‘binding idea’ would need to embedded in an account of the human condition. Yet realists do not elaborate why a state is formed around a ‘national morale’ or a ‘binding idea’, why this idea would be connected a certain territory, or when/how such an idea may be threatened.

The State in Time: Uncertainty and Experience

While the realist account of anarchy provides no convincing logic for why states should be conceptualized as autonomous/territorially exclusive and fixed units, it fares better in explaining their desire for a certain kind of ‘power’ that protects this existence once this
ontology is accepted. Notwithstanding the weakness this disconnect brings to realisms’ causal narrative, it is important to look at this account more closely because it shifts attention to the temporal dimension by emphasizing (future) uncertainty and (past) experience and highlights distrust/pessimism as a central feature of the realist narrative.107

Realists stress that because under ‘anarchy’ no third party will protect individual states from arbitrary violence, states live in uncertainty. More precisely, they invoke the Hobbesian state of nature where individuals (states) can never be sure that others will not take advantage of them and therefore live in “continual fear and danger of violent death” (Hobbes in Doyle 1997: 114). The key point here is not the states’ situatedness in space as exclusive territorial units co-existing without an overarching authority. The absence of a third party arbiter as such does not explain why states fear each other. This, states owe to their situatedness as reflexive beings in time. More precisely, the deeper reason is that there is no guarantee that agreements made today will be respected in the future, that is, there is no enforcement mechanism which constrains the future behaviour of others and makes the future (somewhat) predictable. States cannot rule out war as the existential threat to territorial integrity.

Importantly, the threat does not stem from war per se but from a particular war which holds the possibility of military defeat, that is, of being “conquered” (Mearsheimer 2001: 31).108 This possibility emerges from another state possessing more military capabilities, specifically from the possibility that these capabilities are used offensively to invade and occupy the territory of others. The notion of war as a possibility is important here because it clarifies that to say “among states, the state of nature is a state of war” (Waltz 1979: 103) does not mean that war is ongoing but, rather, that it may break out at any point in time. In that sense, the condition foreign policy operates under is marked not by war itself but by the possibility of war, making war as an “ever present” threat (Morgenthau 1960: 9). As Carr phrases it, war forever “lurks in the background” (Carr 2001: 102). Strictly speaking, the language of the threat as ‘ever present’ and in the ‘background’ does not fully capture the logic within which it emerges and that it relies on a particular understanding of past and future. This must be looked at more carefully.

107 From a deep theorizing perspective, pessimism is not grounded in human nature, as Annette Freyberg Inan (2004) suggests, but in an account of the human condition.
108 Morgenthau points out the difficulty of viewing war a ‘common threat’ when noting “humanity is united in its opposition to war as such, war in the abstract...[but] splits into its national components when the issue is...a particular war” (Morgenthau 1960: 267). States may worry about the violation of the territorial integrity of other states if this leads to a shift in the balance of power (Snyder 1997: 24)
When realists emphasise that "uncertainty is given by the human condition" (Copeland, 2000: 210) it is important to be clear that there are, strictly speaking, two ways in which uncertainty comes to play out: the impossibility of knowing what others think (the famous ‘problem of other minds’) and the impossibility of knowing (what others think in) the future. The two are often conflated in the literature. It is useful to keep them apart analytically because the inability to know the future is the more crucial one. Regardless of what the interests of state Y are today, even in a state of full transparency and perfect information state X cannot know what Y’s interests will be like tomorrow and, consequently, what state Y might do with the military capabilities at its disposal (indeed, Y in all likelihood does not know for certain, either). Therefore even states with peaceful relations today evaluate each other from the position of the future. And because the future is unknown, indeed contingent, the other state’s intention must also be considered unknown/contingent. More precisely, for realists states (should) respond to the unknowability/contingency of the future with pessimism, that is, with a worst-case scenario based on the possibility that the intentions of others might be hostile. They argue that states are better off mistrusting each other and frame the relationship as one of potential adversaries. Pessimist states are states which fear others in the future.

The concern that today’s friend might be tomorrow’s enemy informs Joseph Grieco’s well-known argument that states worry about ‘relative gains’, which he identifies as a central feature of realist logic. In Grieco’s words, because states are unable to predict or readily to control the future interest of partners, and hence are “uncertain about another’s future intentions...they pay close attention to how cooperation might affect relative capabilities in the future (Grieco, 1990: 45, emphasis in original). This distrust about future intentions makes them “acutely sensitive” to any (anticipated) erosion of their relative capabilities (Grieco 1993: 127). The tragic consequence of this logic was famously laid out by John Herz, the first IR theorist systematically thinking about the implications of the condition of uncertainty states find themselves in and who, thereby, formulated a central element of the hard core of the realist paradigm (Herz 1951; see also Booth and Wheeler 2008). Herz noted that states situated in an anarchical environment respond to “uncertainty and anxiety as to [its] neighbours’ intentions” by mistrusting each other and acquiring military means for protection (Herz, 1951: 3). As Waltz summarised the logic “because any state may at any time use force, all states must

---

109 Herein lies the logical problem realists have with conceptualizing ‘common interests’: because assuming the ‘worst case’ minimizes unpleasant surprises, for realists states are (or should be) pessimists and should always consider interests to be conflicting.
constantly be ready either to counter force with force" (Waltz 2001: 160). Herz famously captured the tragic consequence of this distrust in the notion of the security dilemma where uncertainty turns relations among states striving for self-preservation into a competition for military power (Herz 1951; Jervis, 1978, 1988; Booth and Wheeler 2008).

It is worth pointing out that differences exist among realists with regard to reading the future, observable in the split between ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ realism. The former suggest that states (must) always base their expectations on worst-case scenarios and follow the logic of “the best defense is a good offense” by “relentlessly seeking power” (Mearsheimer, 2001: 21, 36). By contrast, defensive realists argue that states are aware of the potential danger of the spiral triggered by the security dilemma and hesitant to ever increase their capabilities (Jervis 1999: 4; Waltz 1979: 126). Indeed, they hold that the security dilemma can be eased by arguing that states can make the future more predictable by taking into account what Taliaferro (2000) has called “structural modifiers”, such as geography, signalled intentions and/or reciprocal behaviour. Hence, in an important way the disagreement is about the value of present knowledge for predicting the future; more specifically about what kind of knowledge should be used to deal with uncertainty.

The important question remaining is: what is this knowledge and where does it come from? Hobbes wrote in the Leviathan that the ‘state of nature’ is a ‘state of war’ because the former is a condition “wherein the will to battle is sufficiently known” (in Doyle 1997: 114). This makes anarchy a state of war not simply because of the absence of an overarching sovereign but because of a presence of ‘sufficient knowledge’ which, for realists, comes from history. Worst case scenarios projected into an uncertain future are not invented out of thin air but, rather, view the future through the past. Paradigmatic statements by realists, likely invoking Thucydides or Machiavelli, cannot go without pointing to the historical ‘record’ of conflict as a recurrent phenomenon, a habit that stretches from Morgenthau’s note that the struggle for power is the law of politics “universal in time and space and space and an undeniable fact of experience” (Morgenthau 1960: 33, emphasis added) to Mearsheimer’s famous ‘back to the future’ argument which predicted that, with the end of the Cold War, European states were likely to return to competition and conflict (Mearsheimer, 1990). Colin Gray puts it succinctly when noting that for realists “the future is the past” (Gray, 1999).
Because realists emphasize a particular history as a guide for reading of the future, namely the history of violent conflict, or war, the future also is one of violent conflict, or war. With emphasis put on ‘recurrent patterns’ the temporal plane takes on the appearance of a cyclical view of history where past and future merge as the latter is made intelligible by being filled with historical reference points to which the lessons of history can be applied. As Mearsheimer notes, realism not only aims to explain histories of conflict but also has a prescriptive element in that “states should behave according to the dictates of…realism, because it outlines the best way to survive in a dangerous world” (Mearsheimer 2001: 11, emphasis in original). The result is the image of a world – ‘reality’ – marked by the possibility of violent conflict, or war. It follows that, paradoxically, from a realist perspective not-knowing the past and applying its lessons generates the greatest threat to state survival: ignorance about the recurrence of conflict and/or the belief that the troubled past (read: conflict) could be ‘overcome’ is dangerous because it tempts governments to pursue policies blind to “the rational elements of political reality” which the past teaches (Morgenthau 1960: 8; Carr, 2001 (1946); Morgenthau, 1946; Herz, 1951).

In sum, in the realist narrative the national security interest forming in ‘anarchy’ is constituted to a significant degree in time, relying of a particular knowledge of the past (as one where conflict arose out of an imbalance of ‘power’) projected into an uncertain future (entertaining corresponding worst-case scenarios which depict great powers as threatening). Consequently, the common interest leading to cooperation converges around such shared knowledge of the past, ideally from shared experience, and corresponding agreement that the correct use of this knowledge is pessimism about others’ intentions.

(II) Institutionalism: Adjusting Realism

The institutionalist argument was originally developed to explain phenomena in political economy and attempts to explain cooperation in the security realm are relatively new. The label of ‘Institutionalism’ also encompasses a variety of approaches which often have not much more in common than emphasizing that ‘institutions matter’ in the study

---

110 Carr (2001: 4f) was quite explicit about the emancipatory purposes of theorizing. Morgenthau (1960: 8) pointed out that rational foreign policy as defined by realism would be “good” foreign policy.

111 Keohane and Hoffman (1991); Haftendorn et al. (1999); Lake (2001); Wallander (2000); Smith (2004).
of international politics.\textsuperscript{112} Here it is sufficient to distinguish between two strands, historical institutionalism and neoliberal institutionalism. As the former overlaps with social constructivism, discussed in the final section of this chapter, the main focus will be on neoliberal institutionalism.

One might expect ‘institutionalism’ to provide the most suitable explanation. However, as noted in the first chapter this is not the case, for two reasons. First, the force of the institutionalist argument enters only once common interests among states are assumed to exist and offers no argument why interests would drift apart. Related, second, the logical thrust of the argument is characterized by a path dependency bias ill-suited for explaining the decline in cooperation (marked by investment in alternative institutions). Thus, the institutionalist causal narrative does not offer a specific ‘common interest’ shared by Germany and the US cooperate through NATO and cannot account for why German governments subsequently invested in CSCE and CFSP. As this section will show, these shortcomings are explained by the fact that while institutionalism offers spatio-temporal modifications to the realist reading of the ‘human condition’, it remains rooted in the same and, from a deep theory perspective, does not amount to an original research programme.

\textbf{The Path Dependency Bias of Historical Institutionalism}

An influential precursor of and inspiration for historical institutionalism, still prominent in European integration studies, is (neo)functionalism. Developed originally by Ernst Haas (1958, 1964), it suggests that shared institutions established in core sectors will gradually take on a life on their own and push forward an integrative dynamic through unintended ‘spill-over’ processes.\textsuperscript{113} Historical institutionalism adopts this emphasis on the evolutionary, indeed progressive character of institutions,\textsuperscript{114} and some even stress socialising effects of institutions on their members (‘sociological institutionalism’).\textsuperscript{115} The shared baseline of historical institutionalism is a causal narrative which contains a strong bias towards path dependency by emphasizing that institutions or, rather, the trajectory of their development, are ‘locked in’ at a certain point in time and then unfold from thereon in a certain direction. Such an emphasis may be useful for explaining how institutions contribute to the persistence in cooperation yet is ill suited for explaining

\textsuperscript{112} For overviews, see Hasenclever et al. (1996); Hall and Taylor (1996); Simmons and Martin (2002).
\textsuperscript{113} Haas (1958, 1964); for an overview see Rosamond (2000, Ch. 3).
\textsuperscript{114} The term comes from Theda Skocpol, see Thelen and Steinmo (1992) for an overview.
\textsuperscript{115} See Finnemore (1996); Finnemore and Sikkink, (1998). For an attempt to bring the sociology into Haas’ approach, see Risse (2005).
why states choose to create new institutions, even more so if this is framed in terms of a degenerating cooperative dynamic. This weakness is reflected in the observation made by two prominent scholars who identified the emphasis on structural constraints and continuity as “a general problem in contemporary institutional analysis” (Streeck and Thelen 2005: 6).

To be sure, state agency does have a place in the institutionalist narrative. Historical institutionalism emphasises what Stephen Krasner (1984) calls a ‘punctuated equilibrium’, namely an interruption of the institutional trajectory as the moment when significant change occurs. These turning points, also called ‘historical junctures’ or ‘critical moments’, open up space for agency, indeed are defined by the very fact that agents are able to influence the direction of institutional development (e.g., Katznelson 2003). The basic idea is that there is a moment in time when institutional structures are weakened or break down, and which thereby provides a window of opportunity for agents to recreate or change the institutional path. This perspective is buttressed by claims of policymakers being “present at the creation” (Acheson 1969) and part of an “architectural moment” (Holbrooke 1995: 38) after the end of a major conflict (Ikenberry 2001). Apart from running the tautological risk of reading ‘critical moments’ back into events, the problem for the case at hand is how this approach portrays both the scale of the change (radical) and when it happens (instantaneous). Picturing change as major and only during a specific point in time implies that between those rare moments, nothing really happens. When the window is closed the path is locked-in and there is no place for agency and, hence, no politics capable of bringing about change. This does not fit with the process-perspective taken here which emphasizes gradual change over a long period of time.116

Neoliberal Institutionalism: Limits and Openings

As the name suggests, neoliberal institutionalism is a mix of regime theory and neoliberal reasoning developed most coherently by Robert Keohane.117 In contrast to historical institutionalism it gives continuous prominence to state agency. Emerging out of the work he did with Joseph Nye on the impact of economic interdependence (Keohane and Nye 1989), Keohane challenges the realist view of the irrelevance of

116 For a discussion and critique of the analytical value of ‘historical junctures’, see Capoccia and Kelemen (2007). Some scholars have called for shifting the analytical focus towards processes of continuous/incremental change, see Thelen and Steinmo (1992); Streeck and Thelen (2005). This seems similar to Haas’ emphasis on adaptation and learning (Haas 1990). Still, these approaches focus on change within institutions, not the creation of new ones and thus does not quite discard the path dependency bias.

institutions and that cooperation would occur only on a shallow and 'ad hoc' basis, arguing instead that extensive and persistent cooperation is possible under anarchy even without the presence of a hegemon enforcing commitments (Keohane 1984: 85f). In managing interdependence institutions are neither irrelevant nor simply constraining but are enabling by allowing states to cooperate for mutual benefit. His basic argument is that states use institutions to 'tame' anarchy.

Like realists, institutionalists like Keohane situate their theory in the liberal tradition "that is rationalistic and individualistic without being optimistic about human nature" and accept the realist reading of the state as an 'egoistic' entity situated in anarchy (Keohane and Martin, 2003: 92f). They emphasize the neoclassical view that states are utility maximizers with "consistent, ordered preferences" weighing alternatives on a cost-benefit basis to choose the one that is more efficient in meeting these preferences (Keohane, 1984: 27). The notion of efficiency then becomes the "driving force" behind the institutionalist argument (Moe, 1984: 743). The argument is that, once common interest are known to exist which can be 'more efficiently' pursued by working together, states strive towards reaching a pareto-optimal level of cooperation, that is, a level when no (known) alternative arrangement exists that could make one state better off without making the other worse off (Keohane, 1984: 51). To achieve this level, they will set up an institution whose primary function it is to reduce the transaction costs arising in an anarchy, mainly costs of coordination, by providing 'reliable information' about each other. Thus, institutions are said to be able to alleviate distrust by providing an environment in which credible commitments become feasible. The attractiveness of an institution depends on its ability to fulfil this function, that is on its efficiency in "improving the informational environment" by providing mechanisms which reduce uncertainty (Keohane and Martin, 2003: 80).

The institutionalist narrative has two major weaknesses. First, its 'sunk cost' logic also contains a path dependency bias (Keohane, 1984: Ch. 4; 1988). This logic rests on the utilitarian view that institutions are costly to set up, so states will not create a new

---

118 As Jervis points out, this question of how much cooperation is possible and to what extent institutions can enhance the same was at the centre of the neo-neo debate (Jervis 1999, 2003).

119 As Milgrom and Robert (1992: 22) state it, pareto-optimality is achieved "if there is no available alternative that is universally preferred in terms of the goals and preferences of the actors involved".

120 Specifically, institutions address the risk of free-riding and cheating (collective action dilemma), as well as mistrust and information asymmetries (security dilemma), obstacles to cooperation identified in games such as the prisoners' dilemma (Jervis 1978). See also Moe (1984); Keohane (1984).
institution if an existing one performs efficiently. In addition, the 'sunk cost' argument holds that the choice between abandoning an old institution and establishing a new one is biased. Because institutions are providing increasing returns, meaning that high start-up costs pay off over time, even in the case of temporary inefficiency states are likely to stick with the old institution because the costs of reform are considered lower than those of establishing a new institution. As a consequence, states are likely to be biased towards keeping and reforming existing institutions (Keohane, 1984: ch. 4; Keohane, 1988; Pierson, 2000). The 'sunk cost' factor holds that the decision to invest in a new institution would need to be preceded by a clear case of institutional inefficiency (in this case of NATO and CSCE, respectively) and the 'cheap' availability of a more efficient alternative.

Here the second and major weakness of the argument arises: indeterminacy of the meaning of '(in)efficiency'. Milgrom and Roberts (1992) point out that in applying the efficiency concept "it is necessary to be clear about whose interests are counted and what alternatives are considered to be feasible" (Milgrom and Roberts 1992: 22). An evaluation of an institutions' efficiency comes down to the question whether it provides sufficient 'information' and satisfies the states' security interests. The theory does not specify the kind of 'information' the institution must provide beyond the track record of past compliance and projecting expected gains and losses and a pareto-optimal situation. Yet institutionalist logic says nothing about what the interests are on the basis of which future calculations are made. Like rational choice approaches more generally, interests (or 'preferences') are plugged into the argument from the outside, they are exogenous to the theory. While some may see indeterminacy in defining security interests as an advantage because it allows institutionalism to be more flexible in defining 'security interests' depending on the case at hand (Haftendoren et al. 1999), from a theoretical perspective this luxury is symptom of the larger problem that the causal narrative does not go deep enough.

The reason institutionalism does not provide a unique reading of (security) 'interests' is because it does not possess a distinctive hard core but relies on realist ontology of the state as an actor striving for autonomy in an anarchical environment. While at one point claiming that it represents a distinct research programme (Keohane and Martin 2003), by their own admission this claim is difficult to uphold. From the earlier claim that the aim was "to broaden neorealism" (Keohane and Nye: 1989: 251) to the later concession that "institutionalism adopt[s] almost all of the hard core of realism" (Keohane and Martin 2003: 73), Keohane's institutionalism is not merely a "half sibling of realism" but part of
the realist family (Keohane and Martin 2003: 81; Jervis 2003: 280).\footnote{Looking back, Keohane justified his adoption of Waltz' world as a step “taken more for analytical convenience and rhetorical effect than out of deep conviction” (Keohane and Martin 2003: 81).} That said, the institutionalist argument offers two slight modification of the realist account of the ‘human condition’ (its reading of the spatio-temporal situatedness of states) worth pointing out.

First, institutionalism provides an opening in the spatial dimension by treating interdependence not merely as an ontological inconvenience but as something that is fundamental to the existence of states. Highlighting issue-specific linkages across state boundaries and, thus, spaces across borders reaching into domestic structures, the theory presents a picture in which states do not appear like a billiard balls anymore but are closely connected. These transnational linkages present the international as a space that is not confined to the ‘in-between’ state borders and, thus, changes the perspective on how states relate to each other spatially. Picturing states not as closed ‘units’ and borders not as rigidly separating but as permeable shifts the focus of the spatial dimension towards the transnational and towards how states manage this condition. By moving the spotlight on ‘complex interdependence’ institutionalism also reveals new vulnerabilities and avenues of influence, consequently painting a picture of more complex power relations than does realism.

Second, the theory suggests that institutions can alter how states conceive of their situatedness in time. Loosely defined as rules, norms, and decision-making procedures, institutions are not merely regulating interdependence but are providing information which reduces uncertainty and, consequently, tames anarchy (see also Krasner 1982). In an overlap with ‘defensive realists’, institutions are thus said to function as ‘structural modifiers’ able to increase interstate trust by providing reliable information about each other’s commitments, thereby changing the ‘informational environment’ and making the future (somewhat) more predictable (Jervis, 1999; Keohane and Martin, 2003). By stressing that function, the institutionalist narrative recognizes the importance of the temporal dimension in the realist argument, yet it does not quite grasp the latter’s depth. It does little in substantiating the ‘informational environment’ on the temporal dimension and, more specifically, does not address the root of the realist (pessimist) state of mind, namely that the reading of the future is based on a certain reading of the past as one of recurring conflict.
(III) Constructivism: Responding to the Postmodern Zeitgeist

As noted in chapter one the (social) constructivist approach also has great difficulties with explaining how two states deeply embedded in a common institution could drift apart. While this perspective likes to speak of ‘states’ and institutions co-constituting each other, it tends to emphasize processes of socialization of the former by the latter, that is, it emphasizes the influence of institutions in shaping identities and, subsequently, interests of its members. By suggesting that if only states interact long enough and within an institutionalized cooperative setting they will internalize collective norms and progress towards an ever closer union, it contains a path-dependency bias very similar to that of historical institutionalism. As this section will show, underlying is the same neglect of providing an alternative account of the human condition, yet also a promising opening by directing attention to ‘identity’.

Like realism, constructivism is a broad church housing a number of priests and congregations. Its emergence in IR is often portrayed as a response to the ‘failure’ of realist approaches to come to terms with the end of the Cold War. While this may help to explain why constructivism became popular among IR scholars when it did, it was not meant to be merely an explanatory corrective to realism, filling the gaps so to say. Rather, as part of the critical turn making its way through the social sciences in the 1980s, constructivism, alongside feminist and postcolonial approaches, emerged out of a fundamental dissatisfaction with the ontology and epistemology of the realist-rationalist mainstream.122 This critical move was stimulated by the philosophical Zeitgeist of postmodernism and the contours of the constructivist research programme developed through the intellectual openings this Zeitgeist provided. The meaning of postmodernism is difficult to grasp and disputed even among (alleged) proponents, not the least because it depends on both the underlying understanding of ‘modernity’ and the subsequent question of how to relate to it (i.e. what the ‘post’ stands for).123 In broad terms, postmodernism designates “a reaction to the monotomy of universal modernism’s vision of the world” as “positivistic, technocentric, and rationalistic” and marked by “the belief in linear progress, absolute truths, the rational planning of ideal social orders, and the standardization of knowledge” (Harvey 1989: 9). The postmodern reaction combines deconstruction of accepted categories and rejection of deterministic thinking with the

---

122 See, for instance, Hoffmann (1987); Onuf (1989); Kratochwil (1989); Wendt (1992); Der Derian and Shapiro (1989); Walker (1993). For discussions of how ‘constructivism’ is situated in IR, see Adler (1997, 2002); Ruggie (1998); Hopf (1998); Guzzini (2000); Zehfuss (2002).

123 For seminal discussions, see Harvey (1990) and Luhmann (1992). For a problematization of modernity in IR, see Ruggie (1993), for ‘postmodernism’ in IR, see Devetak (2001) and the epilogue in Campbell (1998a).
aim of liberating human existence through the embrace of contingency and diversity. Simply put, it advocates an agenda of emancipation by bringing about the “death of meta-narratives” (ibid.).

IR scholars stimulated by the postmodern *Zeitgeist* reject positivist methodology, the ontology of the atomistic conception of ‘the state’ and a world where ideas, norms, and identities did not matter. Yet “fracturing and destabilizing the rationalist/positivist hegemony” was only “a necessary first step in establishing a new perspective on world politics” (Price and Reus-Smit 1998: 263). While this new perspective, broadly speaking, is marked by a shared commitment to ‘reflexivity’ (Adler 2002: 95), the question remains what exactly ‘reflexivity’ entails and how far it should go. In the words of Stefano Guzzini, following the postmodern invitation to “think the unthinkable”, constructivists face the difficult task of engaging (and thinking in) categories mainly borrowed from the Enlightenment while having to invent new ones “to show us a way ‘beyond’” (Guzzini 2000: 152). According to Guzzini, the way looks like and whom to draw on for sign posts. Following the ‘critical turn’ there have been ‘linguistic’ and ‘sociological’ ones, with inspiration from Foucault, Derrida, Durkheim, Parsons, Mead, Giddens, Bourdieu, Habermas, Honneth, Luhmann, and so on. While this makes the ‘constructivist’ research programme rather incoherent, three issues are at the heart of the constructivist narrative.

First, as the name suggests, constructivists agree on problematising the subject-object distinction, that is, they don’t take the world as ‘given’ but inquire how “we construct worlds we know in a world we do not” (Onuf, 1989: 38). While ideas, norms and discourses are generally seen as playing an important role in this process, there is disagreement among scholars on how far the construction goes and, consequently, whether there is a ‘world’ left outside mental/discursive frames. Some say there is and use a scientific realism frame to argue that there are ‘natural’ and ‘unobservable’ structures which affect our lives independent from our thoughts (Wendt 1999; Wight 2006). For others the crucial question is not what is ‘out there’ but how we relate to ‘the world’ and endow it with meaning, as it is meaning that makes human behaviour intelligible (Kratochwil 1989). This division also reaches into the reading of ‘the world’, specifically concerning the degree to which it constructed, symbolised in the question

124 To be sure, Kant’s idea of enlightenment is an invitation to critical thinking and his insight that knowledge of reality occurs through a priori mental filters makes him “the great pioneer of constructivism” (Hacking, 1999: 41); Adler (2002: 97f).
whether one should speak only of the construction of social reality (Searle 1995) or of the social construction of reality (Berger and Luckmann 1966). Whereas the former perspective assumes that there is a reality that can be understood by everyone and, thus, universally ‘known’, the latter perspective stresses that meaning is created intersubjectively and can only be comprehended from within the social setting, thus taking the route of epistemic relativism.

Second, with the commitment to reflexivity a central feature of constructivist ontology is a focus on ‘identity’. It emphasizes that “identities provide a frame of reference from which political leaders can initiate, maintain, and structure their relationships with other states” (Cronin 1999: 18). This is in particular the case for scholars engaging with security issues where, in line with the notion that “the issue of identity...is inseparable from security” (Booth, 1997: 88), constructivists have come to focus on state ‘identity’ as that (referent object/subject) which needs to be secured. However, as discussed below in more detail, it rarely is clear what exactly identity is, what it does and how to study it. With becoming the analytical shooting star in the 1990s identity was often poorly conceptualised and (over)used to explain all kinds of things, prompting a much noted critique by Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper that ‘identity’ was used so loosely that it had become an analytically empty concept (Brubaker and Cooper 2000). In IR this weakness is particularly visible when it comes to the link between identity and interests. In the 1990s, the key intervention of constructivists against ‘rationalists’ was to assert that the definition of ‘interests’ is dependent on the conception of identity, i.e. that identities ‘constitute’ interests (Wendt 1999; Chafetz et al 1999). The rationale behind this assertion is that in order to recognize its interests, a state needs to be aware of itself as a subject, simply put “an actor cannot know what it wants unless it knows what it is” (Wendt, 1999: 231). Yet perhaps because this sounds intuitively convincing, constructivists rarely discuss in any detail why and how exactly identity ‘constitutes’ interests, with the result that identities and interests tend to be conflated (Reese-Schaefer, 1999).

---

126 Lapid and Kratochwil (1996); Wendt (1994, 1999); Chafetz et al. (1999); Zehfuss (2001).
127 Katzenstein (1996); Krause and Williams (1998); Adler and Barnett (1998); McSweeney (1999); Zehfuss (2002); Farrell (2002). Note that as part of the ‘cultural turn’, these works tend to argue that national identity is constituted by some sort of ‘culture’ (strategic, political, military). I find the analytical value of the culture concept questionable and it is omitted here and throughout the thesis, for a simple reason: any application of ‘culture’ in a meaningful way – other than a vague catch-all concept – requires specification of the determinants or parameters making up a ‘culture’, which constructivists suggest are norms and ideas. It makes more sense to jump directly to the latter and skip the ‘culture’ concept as a step in between that offers little value added.. For a critique of ‘culture’, see Desch (1998) and Campbell (1998a: 217).
128 For two attempts to come to terms with the concept through “rigorous analysis”, see Fearon (1999); Abdelat et al. (2006). See also Hopf (1998: 184ff).
Related, third, constructivists like to stress the ‘mutual constitution’ of things. Yet in their attempt to come to terms with what Wendt (1987) called the ‘structure-agency dilemma’, constructivist reasoning tends to emphasize structure over agency. While early sound bites like ‘world of our making’ (Onuf) and ‘anarchy is what states make of it’ (Wendt) point to agency, the focus on norms and discourses tempted constructivists to focus on the constitutive effect of structural forces at the cost of accounting for agency and structural change (Sending, 2002).

In dealing with these issues, two constructivist strands can be identified. The first is that of ‘moderate’ (or thin) constructivism. Its proponents attempt to conceive of constructivism as a ‘bridge’ (Adler, Checkel) or ‘via media’ (Wendt) between ‘reflexive’ and ‘rationalist’ positions, a motivation which responds to an influential article by Keohane (1988) and spurred what some have called the ‘Third Debate’. The second cluster is that of ‘radical’ (or thick) constructivism, or post-structuralism. This approach remains committed to the critical agenda of piercing through the ‘mainstream’ and exposing the ‘power/knowledge nexus’ (Foucault), hence regards attempts to speak with realists/rationalists as ‘selling out’ (Behnke; Zehfuss; Campbell). While more ‘genuine’ from a postmodern perspective, the radical agenda to reveal, resist and emancipate makes it ill suited for devising a theory of interstate cooperation. Any attempt to establish a causal narrative in the deep theory sense inevitably risks stepping into the ‘enlightenment trap’, that is, it risks claiming a higher access to truth and thereby becomes part of the very power/knowledge nexus the radical strand seeks to undermine. Hence, the following focuses on the ‘moderate’ strand and primarily on the work of Wendt (1999; also 1992; 1994; 2003), which comes closest to presenting a deep theory, as well as Adler and Barnett (1998) and Cronin (1999).

The Weakness of Moderate Constructivism

In line with the postmodern Zeitgeist, starting point is a critique of realism’s static/reproductive conception of interstate relations and its alleged material and individualistic ontology. Drawing on ideas of Haas (1958) and Deutsch et al. (1957), the moderate constructivist narrative maintains that interstate relations are social and structured to a

---

129 This is close to the distinction made by Hopf (1998) and Wendt (1999). For slightly different categorisations, see Price and Reus-Smit (1998); Adler (2002).
130 On the Third Debate see Lapid (1989); Albert (1994); Price and Reus-Smit (1998).
significant degree by ideas and that ideas change (through) the dynamic of social relations.\footnote{See also Ruggie (1993); Reus-Smit (1998); Hall (1999).}

Strictly speaking, Wendt’s theory is not about cooperation but about three different kinds of interstate systems and about the (unidirectional) process of moving from one to another. Specifically, Wendt argues that different ‘political cultures’ or ‘logics of anarchy’ may develop between states which, borrowing English-school typology, he describes as (i) a Hobbesian culture ruled by fear of war, where states see each other as enemies, (ii) a Lockian culture regulated by mutual respect for the right of sovereignty, where states considered each other rivals, and (iii) a Kantian culture in which states have ruled out war as a conflict-solving tool and identify each other as friends. Although cooperation can occur in all of these settings, the move from one system into another not only describes a shift towards different kinds of cooperation but also a process establishing conditions for ever closer cooperation (more peaceful relations). Drawing on theories of symbolic interactionism and Haas’ neofunctionalism, Wendt argues that relations progress from Hobbesian to Kantian through a process of learning in the course of which mutual trust is being built through the gradual internalisation of shared knowledge (norms) (Wendt 1999: Ch. 6 and 7).\footnote{For a different adaptation of the English School typology, see Buzan (2004).}

This argument resonates with the one by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett’s (1998) that interstate relations undergo an evolutionary dynamic bringing them from ‘nascent’ to ‘mature’ security communities (Adler and Barnett 1998: 48ff). Building on the work by Karl Deutsch, Adler and Barnett also emphasise the creation of shared knowledge through ‘social learning’ brought about by increased transactions and communication, which over time establishes “we feeling’, trust, and mutual consideration” through “partial identification in terms of self-images and interests” (Deutsch et al. 1957: 36). Adapting the institutionalist perspective outlined earlier, Adler and Barnett see institutions as providing trust-enhancing mechanisms, as sites of interaction where learning occurs and as creative forces through which states develop “dependable expectations of peaceful change”. They also suggest that ‘power’ plays a crucial role in the formation of security communities with a ‘core state’ serving as a ‘magnet’,\footnote{This stands in contrast to Wendt’s narrative, where ‘power’ is understood in realist terms as military capabilities and becomes increasingly mediated by ideas and thus irrelevant for structuring relations.} yet apart from noting that such power is exercised via “positive images” and expectations about “benefits” associated with the community they don’t elaborate on the nature of
this magnet and how it works (Adler and Barnett 1998, 33-45). Finally, Bruce Cronin’s (1999) narrative, which falls between the above two, offers a slightly more complex typology of six different security arrangements ranging from one where cooperation is based on a balance of power logic, expressing interstate relations characterised by hostility, to a highly institutionalised system of collective security, characterised by symbiosis (Cronin 1999, Ch. 1). His argument explaining their formation relies less on social learning and more on symbolic interactionism and Social Identity Theory (also Mercer 1995), which describes collective identity formation through an ‘ingroup’ vs. ‘outgroup’ dynamic, a point downplayed by Wendt and only hinted at by Adler and Barnett (Cronin 1999: 21ff).

Taken together, the moderate constructivist ‘signature argument’ emerging out of these narratives is that ongoing interaction within a common institution leads states (via some process of ‘learning’) to share knowledge and a social/collective identity which, in turn, moves them to closer/improved cooperation. From a deep theory perspective, this argument has two key weaknesses reminiscent of those faced by institutionalism noted earlier.

The first weakness is that the ‘common interest’ setting off this dynamic is neither specified nor theoretically accounted for. Adler and Barnett (1998: 38) mention a range of factors leading to the crucial first cooperative agreement from which security communities evolve. They overlap with what Wendt (1999: 343ff.) calls ‘efficient causes’, namely (economic) interdependence, a shared threat (what he labels ‘common fate’) and homogeneity (in language, domestic institutions, etc.), and with Cronin’s (1999: 32f.) suggestion that a common identity forms on the basis of shared characteristics “salient to a society’s self-understanding”, exclusivity and a high level of ‘positive interdependence’. These factors either repeat realist/institutionalist reasoning or come close to a tautology; in any case they don’t hang together and remain outside the causal narrative offered by constructivists. The lack of a theoretically grounded account for what sets off the cooperative dynamic is the price paid for holding that (shared) identity constitutes (shared) interests, which consequently means that the ‘factors’ generating a shared identity cannot be ‘interests’ as this would spark the question where these come from if not from ‘identity’. The above authors do not address this question,  

134 I take this term from Wohlforth (2008) who uses it for realism.
135 Wendt also mentions self restraint as a ‘permissive cause’, which is said to enhance trust. For a critique, see also Kratochwil (2000).
thereby exposing the murky conceptualization of the link between identities and interests in the constructivist narrative.

Cronin’s reminder that the above ‘factors’ only provide favourable conditions as a shared identity is created through common experience “of high intensity and long duration” (Cronin 1999: 33) does not solve the problem. While an interesting avenue, this argument is not theoretically grounded in anything other than a reference to the integrative dynamic of ‘continued interaction’ also emphasized by Wendt and Adler/Barnett. Moreover, if this interaction is occurring within common institutions, this puts the latter on the wrong end of the causal narrative. Rather than using an ‘identity’ lens to highlight a specific interest leading to investment in a certain institution, the moderate constructivist narrative points the causal arrow from institutions to identities and, by extension, interests.

This feeds into the second weakness: the narrative lacks an account of what undermines a shared identity and, hence, what weakens the common interest keeping cooperation alive. Tailored towards explaining phenomena of increasing (or improving) cooperation, the causal narrative is not only one of process but also of progress. Although strictly speaking ‘interaction’ is not necessarily cooperation (see chapter one), without making a clear distinction between the two the argument that ongoing interaction has a socializing effect suggests, crudely put, that cooperation leads to more cooperation in some sort of self-reinforcing mechanism. This undisturbed causal link between cooperation and socialization inserts a ‘socialization bias’ into the constructivist narrative and forestalls a substantial argument for reversal/breakdown of cooperative relations. And it exposes the flipside of constructivism’s departure from the realist definition of the common interest as constituted by a shared threat, namely a lacking conceptualisation of a threat to ‘identity’ altogether.136 As a result of merging Durkheim’s emphasis on structure with the integrationist logic of Deutsch and Haas, both Wendt (1999: 321) and Adler/Barnett (1998: 49) explicitly acknowledge the path dependency and unidirectional thrust of their argument (see also Wendt 2003).137 And while Cronin takes a slightly different approach by suggesting that cooperative arrangements are made/changed during “periods of social upheaval” (Cronin 1999: 37), his ‘punctuated equilibrium’ contains the same weakness

---

136 This is discussed in more detail in chapter seven.
137 Adler and Barnett only pay lip service to the possible ‘reversal’ of the dynamic, not going beyond the suggestion that “the same forces that ‘build up’ security communities can ‘tear them down’” leaving the reader in the dark as to how exactly this is supposed to work (Adler and Barnett 1998: 58).
as institutionalism’s ‘historical juncture’ approach noted earlier and, in any case, he does not discuss what undermines transnational identities.

**The ‘Identity’ Problem**

From a deep theory perspective, behind the two above weaknesses lies the failure of moderate constructivists to formulate an original account of the human condition which explains why states seek an ‘identity’ and lays out the parameters making up the latter. This becomes apparent when taking a closer look at how constructivists like Wendt conceptualize ‘identity’.

Constructivists argue that ‘identity’ has an ‘internal’ (or individual/personal/reflective) and an ‘external’ (collective/social) dimension. This insight is taken from social psychology and traceable to the famous distinction between ‘I’ and ‘Me’ made by George Herbert Mead (1934). Mead argues that Self-fulfilment takes place through an evolutionary process in which the acting Self, the ‘I’ driven by intuition and instinct, comes to internalize the “attitude of the whole community”, devising the sense of ‘Me’ gained by adapting to a social group (Mead 1934). The difficulty is, however, to conceptualize the ‘internal’ and the ‘external’ dimension and their relationship beyond asserting that they are ‘co-constituted’. This is difficult because, as Heidegger points out, the very notion of ‘identity’ contains an insolvable tension in meaning both ‘similarity’ and ‘distinctiveness’ (Heidegger 1957/1969).

This tension bedevils all ‘identity’ based arguments and invites the incoherent and often contradictory use of ‘identity’ pointed out by Brubaker and Coopers. Constructivists struggle with how to balance this dual nature. It is one thing to say that “the self-identification of individuals...is in part defined in terms of their participation in a collective identity” and that “individual identity acquires social significance only with reference to the identities of others” (Hall 1999: 34f.), but what exactly does this mean? Scholars who, implicitly or explicitly, treat the state like a person read the ‘internal’ somehow into the state and attribute the ‘external’ or social/collective source of identity to some notion of international ‘community’ or ‘group’, that is, they remain vague on how to conceptualize the ‘internal’ source of a states’ identity and specifying (how it relates to) the ‘external’.

---

Yet the question if and how the ‘I’ has any influence on the kind of ‘community’ or ‘group’ from which the social/collective identity is obtained is a crucial one for the constructivist narrative, as choosing to cooperate (or not) and, thus, to conceptualize change within cooperative relationships requires some sort of standard against which the value of this relationship is assessed. For a causal argument explaining change in external relations, it thus makes sense to move analytical attention to the ‘internal’ source of ‘identity’. Otherwise one is left with a purely social ontology in which ‘states’ are defined exclusively through a relation setting and turn into cultural dupes who merely take on a designated ‘role’ following a given script. While identities and interests must to some degree be internally generated to provide the state with agency, addressing this ‘internal’ dimension/source is not easy. Indeed, shunned by the anti-foundationalism of the postmodern Zeitgeist and neglected by the structural reasoning of a neo-Durkheimean ontology which assumes that all construction must be social, it tends to be ignored.139

To his credit, Wendt tries to balance the ‘internal’ (or personal) and the ‘external’ (or social) dimension of ‘identity’ and keep a place for agency. When defining identity as “an actor’s self understanding” (Wendt 1999: 224) he does not assume that the Self is necessarily defined in relation to, and consequently involves the conception of, an ‘Other’, which allows him to maintain an ‘individualistic’ element in his ontology. Unfortunately, despite inserting a multifaceted reading of ‘identity’ into the conceptualisation of the state, at closer look Wendt’s solution to the structure-agency dilemma is complicated on the surface but unoriginal underneath.140

**Wendt and the ‘Essential State’**

Wendt defines identity vaguely as “a property of [states] that generates motivational and behavioural dispositions” (Wendt 1999: 224). This suggests that identity is something a state can possess, which logically gives the latter an ontological status independent from ‘identity’, a move which will become clear once the discussion proceeds. Yet how or why this ‘property’ generates motivational dispositions remains unclear. This gets brushed over by the suggestion that interests are constituted by ideas (Wendt 1999: 113ff.), which in turn are seen as embedded in ‘culture’ defined as ‘shared knowledge’ (Wendt 1999: 141, 157ff). It is hence not ‘identity’ but this ‘shared knowledge’ which does the heavy lifting in Wendt’s causal narrative. It deceptively replaces the notion of a

---

139 As Cedermann and Daase (2003, fn. 5) note, ‘Meadian identity theory’ also tends to focus on the ‘Me’ while leaving the ‘I’ undertheorized.

140 For a good summary of Wendt’s complex argument, see Guzzini and Leander (2006).
'common interest' and leaves 'identity' as a conceptual funnel through which 'shared knowledge' is channelled into behaviour.

This emphasis on 'knowledge' also guides Wendt's conception of the essence of 'the state'. In an attempt to offer an ontology which integrates the 'internal' (individualistic) and the 'external' (holistic), Wendt conceptualises the state as an entity possessing four kinds of identities (collective, role, type, corporate). These can be seen as situated on a spectrum ranging from as exclusively social (collective) to entirely pre-social (corporate). For Wendt these 'identities' are hierarchically organised, with the corporate one designating the 'essential state', a platform on which everything else is built (Wendt 1999: 224-231). It is described as the states' 'body', endowed with five 'essential properties' which taken together echo the realist conception of the state (Wendt 1999, Ch. 5, 197).

Two properties stand out, namely territory and society (Wendt 1999: 225). In line with his critique of Waltz' ontology as static Wendt tries to portray these properties as not-fixed. Hence, he notes that the territorial base can have "fuzzy" boundaries and whose meaning can vary and that states may include others "cognitively", thereby making territorial borders less 'rigid' or exclusive (Ibid., 212, see also Cronin 1999: 21). Yet the core of his ontology is society, loosely defined as "people with shared knowledge", and with the crucial qualification that this knowledge is "self organizing" (Wendt 1999: 209). It is this notion of a self-organizing structure of 'private knowledge' as something unique holding society together which makes the state essential. He distinguishes this 'stock of knowledge' from knowledge gradually shared beyond territorial borders, which he calls 'common knowledge' making up the 'micro-structure' of specific relationships and 'collective knowledge' constituting the 'macro structure' of the system (Wendt 1999: 147ff., 159ff.).

Apart from the crucial question why and how knowledge is shared amongst states and how it relates to the domestic 'stock of knowledge' – according to Wendt the two are not necessarily connected (Wendt 1999: 249, 257) – Wendt does not specify what this 'knowledge', in particular this private knowledge making up that self-organizing structure of the state, is about and where it comes from. He only vaguely suggests that

---

141 In his earlier writings he relied on Giddens' structuration theory which puts forward the notion of mutual constitution in a 'moment of structuration' (Giddens 1984).
142 Wendt (1999: 201-214) discusses the following properties: (i) an institutional-legal order (ii) an organization claiming a monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence, (iii) an organization with sovereignty, (iv) a society and (v) territory.
the shared knowledge is an effect of state policy or "well[ed] up from the 'bottom' of the human experience" and elsewhere speaks of the importance of an 'idea of the state' rooted in collective memory, myths and traditions which allows society to "acquire continuity through time" (Wendt 1999: 209; 218, 163; see also Wendt 2004). These thoughts, which hint at the temporal situatedness of the state, are neither elaborated nor substantially integrated into the theory (also Cronin 1999).

This makes Wendt’s conceptualization of the states’ 'Self' as a 'self-organizing structure' ontologically incomplete. Against the view that understanding oneself as unique and distinct requires a social setting providing a standard of comparison (Cronin 1999: 24), Wendt argues that the 'self organizing structure' is like a body (of knowledge, presumably) and that "having a body means you are different than someone else's body, but that does not mean that his body constitutes yours in any interesting way" (Wendt 1999: 225). This defense is weak not only because its appeal relies on the metaphor of a human ‘body’ as a self-organizing biological organism, which cannot be applied to the state, as Wendt himself recognizes. He concedes that what really matters is not the body but “a consciousness and memory of Self” (Ibid.). But, again, this claim is not followed up. Substantiating it would require discussing what constitutes a states’ self-consciousness, how it is organized and why society – which always slips in when Wendt talks about the state as having a consciousness – develops a (collective) mind-set isolated from others/the world. Yet Went does not offer such an argument.143 There is no discussion of how to study a states’ consciousness, that is, how the ‘structure of knowledge’ is generated, what its parameters are and how its boundaries are drawn.

Thus, despite all the claims to the contrary, in Wendt’s picture ‘the essential state’ appears like a stable and isolated something.144 Instead of providing a theoretical narrative with a novel ontology and a corresponding conception of (security) interest, in the end Wendt’s discussion of the state as a ‘person’ only serves to justify defining the ‘national interest’ with reference to familiar basic needs: survival, autonomy, economic well-being, and self-esteem (in that order). With the possible exception of the last one, there is no sign that these interests are generated by identity or ideas or in any way

143 Wendt (2006) recognised this as being the central problem of his theory and is working on a new one that focuses on consciousness through Quantum theory.
144 His insistence that his theory is not concerned with “state identity formation” (Wendt 1999: 11) nor with offering a “theory of the state” (Wendt 2006: 208) looks odd alongside an entire chapter on the state, including an extensive conceptualisation of state identities (Ch. 5), and a lengthy discussion of identity formation (317ff.).
integrated into an original account of the human condition; Wendt simply attributes them to ‘human nature’ (Wendt 1999: 131f., 233-38).

Openings and Limits
The constructivist narrative of interstate relations as a dynamic space under construction opens up a view on interstate relations through an evolutionary ontology and contains some useful conceptual openings in terms of both space and time.

Whether Wendt’s ‘political culture’, Adler and Barnett’s collective identity, or Cronin’s shared social identity, all these terms capture a transnational conception of space. They go beyond the institutionalist insight that territorial boundaries are more porous than realists would like to have them by noting that the meaning/significance of territorial borders depends on the social setting and that they can be cognitively transcended. This reading of borders is captured in Wendt’s notion of ‘fuzzy’ boundaries and most explicitly in Adler’s notion of ‘cognitive regions’, which is echoed in the view of “communities develop[ing] around networks, interactions, and face-to-face encounters that are not dependent on inhabiting the same geographic space” (Adler and Barnett 1998: 33; Adler 1997; also Cronin 1999). The formation of ‘collective identities’ through ‘common knowledge’ thus also can be seen as bringing states closer together, as thickening the shared space and replacing, or reducing, the ‘inter’ as a separating realm. The ‘inter’ may not cease to exist but, rather, becomes a shared space that means something to the states evolving under this ‘collective identity’. The interdependence which challenged realist ontology is thus fully incorporated into the narrative as a positive ontological force.

But then, as we have seen the ontology is not transnational ‘all the way down’. In correspondence with his notion of the ‘essential state’ Wendt does not challenge the assumption of the state as autonomy-seeking. Although his ‘Kantian culture’ has the potential to break with this conception, this potential is not realized as Wendt ends the discussion by advocating a rethinking of the state and interstate relations (Wendt 1999: 307f). Adler and Barnett assert that “domestic characteristics and practices” must be “consistent with the community” (36), yet at the same time they shy away from adopting a thorough transnational perspective by focusing on ‘pluralistic security communities’ where states maintain their ‘sovereignty’ (Adler and Barnett 1998: 5). While Cronin goes furthest in empirically substantiating the formation of ‘transnational identities’ in an analysis of the formation of the German and Italian statehood as a merging of formerly separate ‘entities’, he does not underpin this theoretically with an ontology of
the state' which would allow for such a merger to occur. Hence, implicitly or explicitly, the narratives of transnationalism are carried out on the back of the conception of the state as a sovereign entity (also Risse-Kappen 1995; Bially Mattern 2005).

This fall-back on realist ontology has been criticized by radical constructivists, who targeted in particular Wendt’s essentialist reading of identity and, hence, of the state. As David Campbell (1998) and Maja Zehfuss (2001) highlight, the assumption of the state as possessing a fixed/corporate identity - a fixed understanding of Selfhood based on stable ‘properties’ – fails to pay sufficient attention to the phenomenon of identity politics. They persuasively show that identity claims are contested and manipulated within society and that, therefore, an analysis seeking to understand how ‘identity’ influences state interests/policy must take into account the domestic political struggle over claims/representation of a certain ‘identity’, specifically the construction of the ‘Other. Hence, for both Campbell and Zehfuss the state is not a unitary/stable entity whose Selfhood is defined in isolation from the world, but something that exists only by constantly (re)instating ‘its’ borders, always “in the process of becoming” through practices of representation of Otherness and the construction of boundaries (Campbell 1998: 12). Wendt’s response to this critique that IR scholars only need to know which understanding ‘wins’ the domestic debate is unsatisfactory, not the least because it blocks out the role of transnational links in bringing this ‘victory’ about.

The dynamic perspective brings the temporal dimension into the moderate constructivist narrative. Although insufficiently spelled out, the notion that collective identities and the ‘shared knowledge’ they are based on are ‘sticky’ suggests that they reach into the future and reduce uncertainty. More precisely, the socialisation process marked by an increase in ‘shared knowledge’ of what Cronin calls “constitutive rules” is assumed to affect the expectations states hold towards each other. According to the progressive narrative, these expectations are changed positively, creating relations marked by increased mutual trust, with trust defined as “believing despite uncertainty” (Adler and Barnett 1998: 46). In the constructivist narrative the content of this belief depends on the ‘stage’ the relationship is in. Wendt’s ‘Kantian culture’, Adler/Barnett’s ‘mature’ security community and Cronin’s collective security systems all have in common that its members come to believe that the other will not attack them at any time and, hence, have

145 The role of the ‘Other’ in the formulation of the Self will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
146 Here Wendt’s thinking also appears stifled by the attempt to maintain Waltz’ “foreign policy versus IR theory” distinction.
a shared reading of the future as something other than war, also contained in Cronin’s suggestion that states rally around a notion of “common good” (Cronin, 1999: 131).

Yet the notion that shared knowledge plays a key role in managing the temporal situatedness of the state already reads more into the constructivist narrative than most authors care to do. Indeed, when looked at closely, the constructivist engagement with the temporal dimension is rather limited. Notably, Wendt’s discussion of the Hobbesian culture does not even address the problem of uncertainty/contingency and the cyclical view of history emphasised by realists (Wendt, 1999: 250ff). The relevance of symbolic interaction for creating shared expectations reads like an extension of game theory, where future uncertainty is reduced through expected reciprocity based on “some degree of long-term interest derive[d] from knowledge of those with whom one is interacting” (Adler and Barnett 1998: 31). Yet because the causal narrative does not go deep enough in specifying what kind of knowledge states come to share and how it matters. The ‘shared knowledge’ binding states together is not specified beyond ‘norms’, and even if one accepts that the internalisation of the same norm(s) increases states abilities to ‘know’ each other, the argument that this affects how states conceive of (each other in) the future is reduced to the assertion that norms are ‘sticky’ without specifying what that means, or why such is the case. More precisely, preoccupied with how norms are ‘internalized’ through processes of interaction, the moderate constructivist narrative does not sufficiently engage the role of the past or specify why and how norms matter for the future. An over-reliance on the guiding function of norms, a function they seem to possess simply by being ‘norms’, brushes over the issue of contingency emphasized not only by realists but also by the postmodern Zeitgeist and leaves it insufficiently integrated in the constructivist narrative.

At bottom, these limits are symptoms of the fundamental weakness of the moderate constructivist ‘research programme’ or, rather, its attempt to represent one. Despite their seemingly radical shift towards focusing on ‘identity’, moderate constructivists (at least those discussed in this chapter) don’t provide an alternative to the ontology of the state employed by realism and the corresponding understanding what states want. They don’t succeed in substantiating the concept of (collective) ‘identity’ with an alternative reading of how states are situated in space and time. This weakness is meta-theoretical and rooted in how moderate constructivists approach the task of ‘showing a way beyond’ realism: Because the causal narrative in which the concept is integrated focuses

---

147 For an attempt of a more substantial treatment of ‘communities of practice’, see Adler (2005).
148 For Wendt, see the contributions in Guzzini and Leander (2006); Paul (1999); Howes (2003).
on how states (may) escape the condition manifested by realists, those ‘Kantian cultures’ and ‘thick communities’ are only endpoints of a progressive dynamic whose main achievement is to overcome Hobbesian anarchy without replacing the ontology it is linked to. In short, moderate constructivism is not grounded in an original account of the human condition.

Conclusion
This chapter interrogated three research programmes – realism, institutionalism, constructivism – by tracing their causal narratives to their respective hard core, that is, to an ontology of the state and its ‘security interest’ deducted from an account of the human condition, understood as a reading of the spatio-temporal situatedness of ‘the state’. The main purpose was to carve out the main elements of the three causal narratives and trace their weakness in explaining the ‘novel fact’ of German-American security cooperation, hoping to find some analytical openings which can be carried forward for the task of creative theorizing.

The discussion showed that from a deep theory perspective only realism presents an original research programme and, as such, an original causal narrative of interstate security cooperation. Its definition of the national security interest as a desire for survival (or self-preservation) understood as maintaining territorial integrity is anchored in a (Hobbesian) account of the human condition of states as autonomous individuals distrusting each other because they read an uncertain future through a certain past, namely a past of conflict/violence. While institutionalism and constructivism were shown to offer useful adjustments to this spatio-temporal situatedness of the state by stressing institutions and shared identities, the causal narrative these concepts are integrated in are caught in the attempt to ‘tame’ and ‘overcome’ anarchy (e.g., realism) and, thus, are not anchored in an original account of the human condition. They do not offer an alternative conception of the state and its national security interest and, consequently, lack a substantial argument for what is means for states to have such interests in common (or not).

That said, for the purpose of creative theorizing the analysis encourages taking seriously the three basic elements characterising these three causal narratives: uncertainty as a key feature of the human condition (realism), institutions as a modifying structure which can alter the ‘informational environment’ (institutionalism), and Self-Other interdependence as an integrative force leading to the spatial extension of ‘the state’. In addition, the analysis identifies the following conceptual openings: (1) an evolutionary ontology of
the state with an ability to learn, (2) the relevance of nationalism or a ‘binding idea’ more generally, (3) the notion of the state having a consciousness and an ‘identity’, (4) the social situatedness of the state marked by interdependence/transnational linkages, (5) the role of certain ‘knowledge’ to deal with uncertainty and the possibility to share this knowledge with others. These leads and openings are taken up over the following chapters and woven into a new causal narrative to build a deep theory which presents a substantial alternative to realism and is suitable to explain the case at hand. The next chapter begins by using opening (3) to explore how a causal narrative stressing ‘identity’ can be anchored philosophically in an account of the human condition by drawing on Heidegger’s fundamental ontology.
CHAPTER FOUR: RETHINKING THE HUMAN CONDITION

Summary
The previous chapter unravelled three IR research programmes offering a causal narrative on international security cooperation, realism, institutionalism, and constructivism to reveal their logical weaknesses in explaining dynamics as in the case at hand and search for conceptual openings. One of the key findings was that only realism offers an original reading of the human condition adopted from Hobbes’ state of nature image, which was modified yet not replaced by institutionalism and constructivism. In an attempt to build a ‘better’ – more suitable – deep theory, this chapter leaves the plane of IR to provide the philosophical ground from which the state and its motive for investing in international security institutions can be rethought (in subsequent chapters). Its objective is to offer a reading of the human condition different from the Hobbesian one and to thereby arrive at a new ontology of the state and its security interest, i.e. an understanding of what it means to be secure.

For this purpose, the chapter engages Heidegger’s fundamental ontology to open up new ways of conceptualizing the Self (‘identity’) in the face of uncertainty. It explores Heidegger’s argument that ‘being’ or, more precisely, coming into being-in-the-world is conditioned by awareness of finitude yet impossibility to know death and that this generates ‘anxiety’ as the foundational sentiment. The chapter suggests that shifting attention to the Self’s attempt of coming to terms with anxiety requires understanding how the Self seeks orientation through meaningful knowledge of itself and ‘the world’. It is shown how the reflexive ability of the Self generates what is termed an ‘anxiety paradox’, namely the attempt to regain a sense of continuity/stability which denies contingency of being and carries the Self beyond ‘death’. Two strategies for gaining such ‘ontological security’ are discussed, namely mathematical measuring and routine practices (Giddens), both of which are criticized by drawing on Heidegger’s notion of Verfallen for failing to provide the Self with ‘authenticity’. This dilemma – gaining ontological security at the cost of authenticity – is termed the ‘anxiety dilemma’. The chapter ends by arguing that the paradox does not need to end in a dilemma if past and future are conceptualized as meaningful ‘places’ for the Self providing substance to a narrative of ‘authentic becoming’.
From ‘Identity’ to ‘Self’
The starting point here is given by the postmodern Zeitgeist, specifically its intervention that our understanding of ourselves and the world cannot be taken for granted. That said, rather than following the radical constructivist call and embrace contingency, the aim here is to revisit the question how humans react to contingency. In other words, this chapter does not aim at conceptualizing a ‘postmodern Self’ but to take the postmodern intervention as an invitation to think about the human condition and the desires/behaviour it gives rise to. As such, this chapter takes up Jef Huysmans’ point that “the postmodern project is a return to Hobbes; not to his answers…but to his question…[of] how to deal with the collapse of certainties”. Equally important, it is “not a celebration of the undetermined…[but] a (plea for the) search for new life strategies” (Huysmans 1998a: 247f.).

I approach this task through the constructivist opening that ‘identity’ matters and that endogenizing state identity is the “next step in Constructivist IR Theory” (Cedermann and Daase 2003). Given the ambiguity of the term and the apparent failure of moderate constructivists to build a new theory on it, as discussed in the previous chapter, this step requires some adjustment. Indeed, in what may at first seem counterintuitive I follow Brubaker and Cooper’s (2000: 2) suggestion to move ‘beyond identity’. To be sure, eliminating a term from the analytical toolkit does not change the fact that it touches on something fundamental. In other words, while ‘identity’ has been overused analytically in IR, it cannot be ignored that scholars have provided convincing accounts of how concerns about ‘identity’ affect foreign and security policy.149 Indeed, as Hans Joas (2000: 151f) points out, ever since ‘identity’ was introduced as a sociological concept in the early 20th century the view has prevailed that it is good to have an ‘identity’. If one takes the position that states cannot or don’t want to ‘live’ without an identity,150 rather than asserting that identities constitute interests, as moderate constructivists do, it seems more fruitful to explore this very desire of establishing an ‘identity’. Thus, from a deep theory perspective the task is to discern the condition which gives rise to the “will-to-manifest-identity” (Hall 1999).

For understanding this process, I accept the point made by Brubaker and Cooper that it is useful to discard the concept of ‘identity’ and focus on the much older term which it

---

149 See contributions in Katzenstein (1996); also Prizel (1998); Campbell (1998a); Hopf (2002).
150 According to Ted Hopf a world without identities would be a “world of chaos, a world of pervasive and irremediable uncertainty, a world much more dangerous than anarchy” (Hopf 1998: 175).
entails, namely the ‘Self’. At least since Freud identity is understood as having a Self-consciousness, as having a ‘sense of Self’. And while the concept of the Self emerged towards the end of the 19th century (Joas, 2000: 149) the notion can be traced back to Plato (Strong 1991). Conceptualizing the state as a Self is not as far-fetched as it may seem. It follows the logic, noted in chapter one, that to define a states’ security interest and, hence, to know what the state seeks protection from (the existential threat) requires an understanding of what it means for the state to be (to exist). Whereas realists took their clues from Hobbes, my reading relies on an account of the human condition offered by Martin Heidegger.

**Reading the Human Condition with Heidegger**

Largely ignored by IR scholars, Heidegger can be considered one of the most influential philosophers of the 20th century. His standing as a thinker and relevance for the purpose at hand stems primarily from his attempt of devising an ontology of ‘being’ in his 1927 magnum opus *Sein und Zeit* (‘Being and Time’). In this work, Heidegger explored the basic ontological question “what we actually mean with the expression ‘being’” (Heidegger 1953: 11) and developed what is known as ‘existential phenomenology’. Phenomenology is a philosophical strand founded by his mentor Edmund Husserl which, broadly speaking, is concerned with the study of phenomena through structures of experience. Criticizing any kind of scientific ‘naturalism’, phenomenologists start from the premise that one cannot come to understand ‘things’ other than through experience. In Husserl’s words, “the world is an experience which we live before it becomes an object which we know” (cited in Odysseos 2002a: 376).

---

151 Again, I am neither trying to turn Heidegger into an IR theorist nor to reconstruct his argument in detail (an impossible task anyhow). Instead, the aim is to discern some of his the broader insights and use them for creative theorizing, which is also how Heidegger encouraged others to engage his work.

152 Exceptions are Coker (1998); Odysseos (2002a, 2002b; 2007). This lack of interest in Heidegger among IR scholars stems likely from a combined dislike of his biography (a supporter of National Socialism in the 1930s), of what he said (not much about international politics) and of the way he wrote (complex arguments expressed in often opaque language), which has left him rarely engaged in fields outside philosophy (see also Elden 2004). The neglect of Heidegger is echoed by the observation that, despite the ‘interpretative turn’, theorists have been slow to engage the study of meaning (A. Williams 2003).

153 For different perspectives on Heidegger’s thought, see Guignon (1993, 2006); Dreyfus and Hall (1992); Holland and Huntington (2001); Kisiel and Sheehan (2006); and more generally Safranski (1998).

154 I am relying on the original German text, so all translations are my own. In addition to page numbers I refer to sections (§) where necessary. I use the version from 1953, republished in 2001, and thus will use the former as the year of reference. For popular English commentaries, see Dreyfus (1991); Mulhall (2005).

Importantly, such ‘knowledge’ gained through experience is not knowledge in the sense of accumulated information but as having generated structures of meaning which lend significance to the world (meaning understood as Bedeutung). In short, phenomenology involves the study of how ‘things’, including Selfhood, obtain meaning through experience.156

Convinced that one cannot devise an abstract theory of consciousness, as Husserl tried to do, Heidegger’s existential phenomenology puts forward a method for ‘fundamental ontology’ allowing for an “examination into what life might reveal itself to be” (Odysseos 2002: 381).157 It is important not to confuse this ‘existentialist’ perspective with a commitment to ‘essentialism’ in the sense of locating the intrinsic substance of something (in this case the Self). Although existentialists, apart from Heidegger most famously Sartre, share the ambition of searching for the ‘authentic’ Self, existential phenomenology does not assume objectification or categorization to be possible or feasible.158 As Dorothea Frede reminds, Heidegger’s engagement with the ‘meaning of being’ and his embrace of phenomenology arose out of a dissatisfaction with Aristotelian ontology, specifically the latter’s suggestion that things have a substance independent from our perception of them, that there is “a primary category of substance, designating natural ‘things’ that exist in their own right” (Frede 2006: 44, Aristotle NE). To Heidegger, such a view is mistaken in assuming that things were read off ‘nature’ rather than into it and misleading in that it did not address, indeed obscured, the underlying question of the meaning of being in a unified, holistic sense, thereby ending up using an empty concept. In Heidegger’s view, the meaning of being can only be grasped through an account of our specific understanding of being, which requires grasping our experience of and with ‘the world’ and the meaning structure this gives rise to (Frede 2006; also Odysseos 2007: 31ff.). As discussed further below, in offering such an account Heidegger also rejects the Cartesian duality of mind and matter (body) by arguing that ‘being’ is both more than a state of mind and not reducible to a physical body.

156 Heidegger’s exploration of meaning comes at a time in Germany after the First World War where there was an atmosphere of disenchantment, of having lost the belief in enlightenment’s promise for progress. This feeling of a spiritual void is visible in the writings of a number of thinkers at the time such as Weber, Freud, or Mannheim. See Williams, A. (2003: 16f ).
157 Here Heidegger departed from Husserl’s view of phenomenology as a scientific method, that is, with the possibility of finding the essence of consciousness (or perception), what Husserl called ‘transcendental subjectivity’, see Safranski (1998); Odysseos (2002); Dostal (1993).
158 For an introduction to existentialism (although weak on Heidegger), see Flynn (2006).
As Louiza Odysseos points out, Heidegger’s fundamental ontology can be seen as a philosophical precursor for the postmodern agenda of deconstructing assumptions about subjectivity – his writings significantly influenced the icons of postmodern thought such as Foucault, Levinas and Derrida – yet it also opens up ways for reconstructing the same through understanding how Selfhood is constituted (Odysseos 2007). For some, this makes Heidegger’s fundamental ontology the continuation of the ‘Copernican revolution’ in philosophy brought about by Kant (Blattner 2006). While Heidegger did not present (did not aim at presenting) a theory of the Self ‘as such’, his analysis of “existential understanding” (Heidegger 1953: 12) certainly makes him a foundational figure in hermeneutics, an interpretative approach similar to Weber’s notion of Verstehen and further developed by Hans-Georg Gadamer (2004 [1975]; Hoy 1993). For the present purpose, his hermeneutical exploration in Sein und Zeit engages the fundamental spatio-temporal parameters within which (the consciousness of) human existence unfolds.

**Being-in-the-World as ‘Unfolding’**

Heidegger develops his understanding of being or, in his terminology, Dasein as one of ‘being-in-the-world’. The hyphens are used deliberately by Heidegger to symbolise that an account of ‘being’ cannot be ontologically separated from an understanding of ‘the world’ (Heidegger 1953: §12). One does not exist previously of or independent from the other; their meanings are interwoven. For Heidegger the inherent ‘worldliness’ of human existence – a term which he uses to describe “the structure of a constitutive moment of ‘being-in-the-world’” (Heidegger 1953: 64) – must be thought of as the aspect of the human condition (Mulhall 2005: 61). Time and space are the two dimensions in and through which the Self develops its ‘worldliness’.

As the title of his study conveys, Heidegger’s attempt to conceptualise the ‘structural whole’ of being-in-the-world focuses primarily on the temporal dimension. He opens the study with declaring as his aim “the interpretation of time as the possible horizon of any understanding of being” (Heidegger, 1953: 1). As we shall see further below, this makes his philosophy particularly suitable to rethink how uncertainty conditions the Self. That

---

159 Heidegger (1953, §11) makes a terminological distinction between Sein and Dasein, the former acknowledging that there are different ‘beings’ or ‘things that are’ (Seinendes) and the latter designating human being, which he sees as distinct because of its ability to reflect about its existence (Dasein as an expression of understanding Sein). Dasein is what his study is primarily concerned with because, not disregarding other ‘beings’, for Heidegger Dasein is logically the only kind humans can reason about (and the question he and most philosophy is grappling with is how). For an extensive discussion on the difficulty of translating Dasein into English, see Malpas (2006: 47-50).
said, more recently theorists have rediscovered Heidegger also as a philosopher of being in space. As Peter Sloterdijk points out, Sein und Zeit “contains the seed of a revolutionary treatise on being and space” (Sloterdijk 1998: 336, my translation) and Jeff Malpas even suggests that Heidegger’s overall work provides “perhaps the most important and sustained inquiry into place found in the history of Western thought” (Malpas 2006: 3; also Elden, 2001).

The spatial dimension becomes central to his ontology when Heidegger’s conceptualization of ‘being-towards-death’, discussed below, becomes an exploration of how being is constituted via its ‘orientation’ and ‘situatedness’ in the world (Heidegger 1953, §23 and §24). In conceptualizing this ‘situatedness’ of the Self, contained in the term Da-Sein which literally means ‘being-there’, Heidegger rejects the Cartesian notion of geometric space, a res extensa that can be measured objectively (see also below). For Heidegger a sense of being-there is generated by disclosing ‘the world’, by gaining a sense of ‘being in’. His conceptualisation of being-in-the-world fits neither with environmental determinism nor with the notion of a Self dreaming up a world. Heidegger notes that ‘being-in-the-world’ can not be understood analogue to our understanding of the ‘water in the glass’ or the ‘dress in the closet’. If this was so ‘the world’ would logically be independent from and thus prior to ‘being’, a possibility ruled out by the ontologically foundational nature of ‘being’ (Heidegger 1953: 54). So being is not established by ‘discovering’ or ‘recognizing’ its place in a pre-existing world.

Yet neither is it the case that Selves are creators of their worlds, as this would imply that the Self comes into ‘being’ independently of and prior to this process of creation. For Heidegger, a phenomenological perspective holds that ‘being’ is not thinkable prior to ‘the world’, that is, we cannot assume the Self to be some independent spirit which subsequently is placed, or finds its place, in space. ‘Being-in-the-world’ implies that this being has already discovered ‘the world’ or, more precisely, a world without which it could not exist (Heidegger 1953: 110). In contemporary terminology, one might say the ‘Self’ and ‘the world’ are mutually constituted. In Heidegger’s words,

“space is ‘in’ the world to the extent that ‘being-in-the-world’...has disclosed space. The space is not situated in the subject, neither does it [the subject] regard the world ‘as if’ it was in a space, but the ontologically properly understood ‘subject’, the Dasein, is in an original sense [in einem ursprünglichen Sinn] spatial” (Heidegger 1953: 111).
Leaving the conceptualization of the spatial parameters of being-in-the-world to the next chapter, the point to be made here is that spatial situatedness is not fixed but inscribed in time and, as a consequence, evolving.

The evolving character of being-in-the-world is given by the overriding significance of the temporal dimension in Heidegger’s ontology, which starts with the recognition that being ‘takes place’ in a time-span between birth and death. As Heidegger puts it, the basic feature of the human condition is that the Self is ‘thrown’ into ‘the world’ and towards death. And because until it is dead there is always something the Self is not-yet, ‘being’ is always incomplete, making “permanent incompleteness” a central feature in the configuration of being (Heidegger 1953: 233, 236, 242f.). This incompleteness gives ‘being’ a dynamic or evolutionary character in which neither the Self nor ‘its’ world can ever be solidified. Being-in-the-world is constituted in a continuous process in which the Self discloses [erschliessen] ‘the world’ and by doing so discloses and comes to understand the possibilities of being. As he puts it, “das Dasein ist seine Erschlossenheit” (Heidegger 1953: 133). The process of disclosure (or understanding) of the Self and the world can be conceptualised as a mutually constitutive process of ‘coming into being’ together. Said differently, the Self and its world are understood to be in a permanent process of becoming or unfolding, what Heidegger at one point calls Aufgehen (Heidegger 1953: 54, 110).

Heidegger is clear that ‘unfolding’ is not reducible to a mental process. It is not mere spiritual fulfilment arrived at through internal reflection but occurs through involvement/engagement and, thus, activity (or practice, to use the term popular among pragmatists). He notes repeatedly that things only obtain meaning through their usage and are organised or ‘placed’ accordingly. As Henri Bergson, a French philosopher whose ideas found their way into Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit (although not always favourably) notes, conscious beings “do not find themselves in a world but make themselves...and make the world...through their activity, their engagement” (Grosz, 2005: 121). At the same time, for Heidegger engagement with the world is not ‘a-theoretical’, that is, it is not the act as such that captures the ontological structure of being but the perspective from which it is done. Consequently, acts need to be understood in context of this perspective. Even more so, as ‘the world’ is made in

---

160 The evolutionary perspective was of course prominent at the time, see Guerlac (2006: 26f). On Kierkegaard’s analysis of becoming as an influence on Heidegger, see Westphal (1996).

mutual constitution with the Self, the process of disclosing is not simply about gathering information from a pre-existing world located outside the Self. Unfolding encompasses all kinds of seeing 'the world', including forgetting (Heidegger 1953: 62) and is a creative process.

This creative process of coming into being-in-the-world ('unfolding') will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. For now, it suffices to say that the unfolding perspective offers an alternative to 'Hobbesian' ontology adopted by realists most obviously by rendering the assumption of the Self striving for self-preservation unsuitable. Instead of assuming an intrinsic property already 'there' to be preserved, 'coming into being' is more appropriately grasped as the Self pursuing an agenda of self-determination without necessarily assuming this to mean striving for autonomy. To understand what drives this process from a deep-theory perspective and how it differs from the Hobbesian view, it necessary to take a closer look at Heidegger's account of the human condition.

Anxiety as the Foundational Sentiment

Heidegger's fundamental engagement with the temporal dimension of 'being' leads him to identify, like Hobbes, uncertainty as a central factor in structuring the human condition. Yet Heidegger's discussion about the impact of uncertainty on being and, by extension on its relations with others, takes a different route than Hobbes.

Heidegger starts with the seemingly trivial fact that the one thing affecting the Self in a unique way is its own death. Death is unique quite simply because it signifies the moment after which 'being' becomes impossible (Heidegger 1953: 250). Said the other way around, death is the utmost and unsurpassable possibility of being. Because it is only then that the life-span is 'complete', and because the finitude of ones' existence cannot be shared, that is, because death happens only to the dying individual, Heidegger argues that it is here, in experiencing death, where 'being' is constituted in its wholeness. However, as noted earlier, being is always incomplete because until it happens, the Self is merely (inevitably) moving towards death. Heidegger solves the conceptual dilemma by arguing that it is not death as such but fear of death which constitutes true being (Ibid, 184ff). This appears to be on par with Hobbes' assumption that the fear of a future in which only death is certain is a shared by all individuals. Yet as Odysseos (2002b) points out, in contrast to Hobbes, Heideggerian logic does not conclude that this fear results in the fear of others, that is, it does not

162 On this point (and others) Heidegger was influenced by Kierkegaard, one of the very few names Heidegger respectfully mentions in Sein und Zeit.
translate in suspicion about other’s intentions and in considering its capabilities a potential threat. The reason is, again, that it is logically impossible to have an experience of what it means to die. As Heidegger discusses at length, even the death of a close family member is an experience that, ultimately, cannot be shared (Heidegger 1953, § 47).

The implications of this seemingly trivial point are profound: without being able to experience death it is impossible to know what to fear. While knowledge of inescapable finitude fundamentally affects ‘being’ and makes ‘death’ an integral part of our world, indeed “a phenomenon of life”, we are unable to comprehend ‘it’ in the sense of grasping it as a meaningful thing (Heidegger 1953: 246). And so we also cannot really fear that which brings death about, that is, we cannot ‘know’ the existential threat. The inability to locate the existential threat makes it seem to be potentially everywhere and appear out of nowhere (Ibid, 186). This leads Heidegger to the fundamental insight that it is not fear through which we have to comprehend the ontological structure of being but anxiety [Sorge] (Heidegger 1953: 191ff). It is this anxiety, coming out of the unknowability of the future, which is the foundational sentiment or mood [Befindlichkeit] of the human condition. In Heidegger’s words, the sentiment/mood of anxiety is prior to any wills, desires, needs, or drives and provides the ontology of being with an “original structural whole” [ursprüngliche Strukturanze] Although he is reluctant to reduce fear or anxiety to a strictly emotional experience, he thus places a feeling at the centre of the human condition (from which wills or desires can spring) (Heidegger 1953: §41, 192f.).

An ontology which takes anxiety as the basic sentiment/mood provides an alternative to the Hobbesian ‘condition’ – indeed, one could argue surpasses Hobbes – by taking the same starting point, fear of death, but embarking on a logically more compelling direction by problematizing the nature of this fear. The combination of knowing that death may occur at any moment and the inability of comprehending it brings the Heideggerian account close to the postmodern emphasis on the radical contingency of the human condition. However, other than the postmodern agenda to expose contingency, a deep theory trying to understand how this reading of the human condition

---

163 Strictly speaking, for Heidegger that which brings about death is not a threat to ‘existence’ because it is only through the awareness of such a threat that authentic existence is fully grasped. 164 Sometimes misleadingly translated as ‘care’. The term Sorge has a double meaning in German and can be used for both ‘care’ and ‘anxiety’. Heidegger uses it in the latter sense.
influences behaviour requires exploring how the Self reacts to (deals with) anxiety, how it structures its sense of being-in-the-world.

As the following discussion shows, there is ample evidence that the Self does not embrace anxiety but seeks ways to tame the same by reducing or ‘controlling’ contingency. In simple terms, it is suggested that the Self seeks stability through gaining a sense of continuity of being-in-the-world. To use the terminology offered by Anthony Giddens, the question then becomes what “anxiety controlling mechanisms” are employed by the unfolding Self to obtain this sense of stability, or what Giddens calls ‘ontological security’ (Giddens 1984: 50; also Giddens 1991). The below discussion reviews two prominent strategies of how humans attempt to ‘tame’ anxiety and create a sense of continuity – through mathematical symbols and routine practices – and draws on Heidegger to suggest that these ‘mechanisms’ fall short because they do not allow for authentic being.

The Anxiety Paradox: Contingency and Continuity

Awareness of contingency is not a ‘postmodern’ phenomenon but emerges at the very moment of enlightenment. Indeed, it is the very motivation for assuming universal reason. This insight has been noted by numerous analysts of (post)modernity, such as Zygmunt Baumann or David Harvey, and is expressed perhaps most famously in Horkheimer and Adorno’s *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, which points out that the ‘knowledge’ generated by the enlightenment was not so different from the myth it sought to replace (Horkheimer and Adorno 1988).

The example used by Horkheimer and Adorno is the transition in ancient Greece to a ‘post-mythical’ condition, that is, a condition when the conviction that time and space were cosmic creations ordered by the Gods was replaced by more ‘self conscious’ or reflexive thinking. Originally, ‘mythical’ or ‘cosmic’ time followed a natural rhythm and was not seen as passing, humans did not see themselves as masters of their own fate and hence did not (need to) reflect over their own finitude or contemplate about the past. Their world was one without uncertainty and anxiety (Horkheimer and Adorno 1988: 33, 50ff; also Gunnell, 1987: 25ff). For Horkheimer and Adorno the emergence of temporal self-consciousness, the transition from the myth to an understanding of human existence as a historical one and corresponding speculation about the human place in the world, had an “enlightenment character”. In John Gunnell’s (1987) reading, the transition occurred in two steps.
The first was the separation of the past from the present, and the mortal from the immortal, as articulated in Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. In these epic poems, connections between the gods and humans still exist, but the gods become gradually disassociated from nature and are not portrayed as the creators of the cosmos. Individual action is given a sense of uniqueness with humans being influenced by their experience, by emotions, aware of their mortality and partially claiming responsibility for their actions. The emergence of the human as a self-conscious individual is visible in particular in the journey of Ulysses where “historical time is strenuously...detached from space” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1988: 55; Gunnell 1987: 79f). Yet the poetic challenge did not go all the way. The unity of Ulysses’ adventures remains external to the individual, it is a sequence of events in places dominated by local gods in which “the inner form of organizing individuality, time, remains weak” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1988: 55). While introducing awareness of human finitude, the possibility of achieving a status of immortality of the soul was maintained and linked to the performance of god-like heroic deeds (Gunnell 1987: 87). Furthermore, Homeric epics, as well as the histories of Thucydides and Heredot, described a present whose order remained oriented towards a past characterized by crisis, suffering, and tragedy, that is, towards a disorderly ‘origin’ from which there is no escape, captured in Thucydides’ famous statement that his account of the Peloponnesian War was to be ‘a possession for all time’ (Ibid, 10ff).

The mythic language of Homeric poetry and the notion of eternal tragedy claimed by the historians was challenged by Plato. Convinced that knowledge was not cosmic but generated by humans, Plato criticized the Athenian society as ordered by values “embedded in a mesmeric folk memory” (Gunnell 1987: 127). By emphasizing the human ability for shaping the future, his view was that the creative mind should extricate itself from the Hellenic myth, that is, break with the gods and engage in re-envisioning order. Plato expressed this most famously in the *Republic*, where five types of city are discussed as housing five arrangements of the soul.165 Having Socrates propose “let us create a city from the beginning, in our theory”, Plato broke with the repetitive conception of (dis)order tied to the memory of tragedy and suggested that the poet and the philosopher (himself) were “expressing different modes of existence” placing them in “a competition for the soul of Athens” (cited in Gunnell 1987: 152, 128f). Yet while emphasizing human creativity and, with it, agency and an open future, Plato kept the idea of immortality of the soul. Instead of linking the soul’s immortality to rituals or god-like heroic deeds, eternity now could be reached through the (philosophers’) ability

---

to envision/create a just/good order in which the soul could be embedded. The Self was to remain eternally linked to the polis, which was to serve as its permanent ‘home’, “an imperishable space” which would transcend human time (Gunnell 1987: 115).

**The Anxiety Paradox**

This account reveals the fundamental paradox characterizing the condition the ‘enlightened’ individual, which I call the ‘anxiety-paradox’: awareness of its ability to organize the temporal world is accompanied by reluctance of fully accepting the consequences and an attempt to re-introduce an eternal perspective. More precisely, awareness of being positioned in finite time and recognizing that past and future are dimensions affected by, and affecting, human activity, ‘post-mythical’ conceptions of time did *not* embrace contingency but convey a desire to hold on to some sort of ‘continuity’. Tellingly, Henri Bergson, whose work on the temporal constitution of the evolutionary Self has recently been reclaimed as an avantgarde of postmodern thinking, notes at one point that the “natural inclination” of the mind is to proceed “by solid perceptions...and stable conceptions” (cited in Grosz 2005: 135). This inclination to ‘solidify’ and/or ‘stabilise’ the world and the Self within it, and the strategies pursued to satisfy this desire reveals that humans, upon recognizing that they are masters of their own future, attempt to extend themselves beyond ‘their’ time by becoming re-inscribed into a permanent space outside human intervention.

Examples how the freedom to intervene and imagine is used to re-order time in a way that allows for an eternal perspective surpassing death can be found everywhere. Since antiquity humans have placed a lot of effort in creating what Aleida Assmann calls ‘spaces of remembrance’ which allow being carried over into the ‘afterworld’ (Nachwelt), whether through poetry, scriptures, architecture, or images (Assmann 1999). Attempts to insert a structural element into the conceptualization of time are strongly visible in the teleology of Judeo-Christian narratives, not only in religious doctrines where eternity is sought most clearly through inscribing the Self into a moral universe, but also in the secular philosophies of Kant, Hegel, and Marx. Although these narratives differ regarding the relative openness of the future, ‘the world’ is

---

166 Consider the example of Alexander the Great shedding tears at the grave of Achilles not out of grievance but because he realized that Achilles was given immortality through Homer’s poetry, whereas he, Alexander, did not have a Homer (Assmann, 1999: 39-43).

167 On immortality ideologies in Western philosophy, see Sheets-Johnstone (2003); also Hutchings (2008). As Hutchings shows this reaches all the way into IR theory. It is not difficult to see that, for instance, realism’s emphasis of standing in a tradition beginning with Thucydides and stressing the same cyclical view of history also fulfils a stabilising function.
portrayed as following a law-like path unfolding over time, and the individual must become aware of this path and optimize its standing in it.

**Modern Answers: Numbers and Routines**

There are two strategies of mastering time and space dominating modern societies, namely mathematical measures (scientific time/space) and routine practices. They are important to look at because they significantly influence how analysts conceive of states and their actions.

The first is the quantification of time and space. Mathematical measurement allows humans to increasingly live “within a world of symbols of their own making” (Elias, 1992: 42). It allows imagining time and space as part of an eternal order of things without contradicting human agency in timing and mapping by assuming that a sequence of events and the discovery of new ‘lands’ can be mentally ordered (‘calculated’) by everyone in the same way. Hence, along Kantian lines this ‘Cartesian’ approach assumes that the scientific conception of time and space is universally accessible through reason (Elias 1992: 123). In this imagination, the temporal dimension is reduced to a succession of numbers and intervals with a universal logic, providing a scale into which all events and fluctuations can be neatly embedded. Designed and supported with mechanical/computerized measures, time becomes cognitively controllable and universally accessible through mathematical logic, manifest in the Western calendar, the 24-hour clock, and ‘timetables’ which map out past and future and allow synchronised planning. Time thus is imagined as if part of the eternal order ‘running’ (flowing/passing) external to human thought. The same applies to space. Once the medieval image of a flat earth sandwiched between heaven and hell was discredited, science became the new authority for ‘accurately representing’ or mapping space, carefully recording of ‘the world’, including the existence of states. Their spatial imagination became neutral, seemingly detached from a particular place. As John Agnew points out, mathematical measures enhance the sense that modern mapping is devoid of bias and convince the reader of “a fairly close approximation between the maps and what [lies] ‘out there’ in the world beyond immediate experience”. Its maps thus purport to convey an image of the world “without the actively mediating hand of

---

168 Bergson sees it as a psychological defense against the disorderly influx of experiences (Guerlac, 2006: 76), and Elias as a reaction to the fear of death, that is, the “longing for something permanent behind the impermanence of all observable data...for something imperishable...as the solid fundament of transient lives” (Elias 1992: 128).
the cartographer” (Agnew 2003: 19), providing a sense of knowing the world as it is today and will be tomorrow.

The second anxiety controlling mechanisms are everyday practices, or routines, which may be seen as complementary to scientific measures or as reducing contingency in their own right. Routines play a central role in Giddens’ structuration theory, a popular reference for moderate constructivists, some of whom have recently also emphasized their function of providing ontological security to states (Giddens 1984, 1991).169 Echoing the human condition as marked by awareness of being positioned in ‘irreversible time’ (Giddens 1984: 35), a term taken from Bergson, Giddens draws on Heidegger to argue that the Self seeks ‘anxiety controlling mechanisms’. He argues that the Self attempts to establish a sense of temporal continuity through everyday practices, or routines which, for Giddens are carried over from the past and established in a social setting.170 Yet contingency is reduced not simply because practices are being shared but by because it being a routine, that is, by carrying a familiarity that comes from being ‘established’ in the past and carried over through formal or informal institutional rules. The appeal of routine practices is thus that they hold the promise to exist indefinitely. Said differently, although taking place in a moment, a routine act is not a contingent experience but implies continuity by making the individual part of a structure capable of outliving its ‘irreversible time’. By plucking the individual into what Giddens calls the ‘longue durée’ of institutional time, routines provide a structural frame which the individual can hold onto to experience the illusion of immortality.

Mathematical measures and routine practices seem well suited to control anxiety by providing individuals with a structural promise for continuity. Because their promise reaches above and beyond individuals, the accounts suggest that these mechanisms also satisfy a demand for ‘simultaneity’, highlighting the attraction of a socially shared order for coping with anxiety. That said, these accounts show four interrelated weaknesses, most visibly in the case of scientific time but applying to routines as well. First, they contain a thin conceptualisation of past and future; second, they are rather static and do not accommodate an evolutionary understanding of being as unfolding; third, their universal character of does not account for particular narratives of unfolding and,

---

169 For an application of Giddens’ structuration theory to IR, see Wendt (1992), for a critique see Jaeger (1996). For an adaptations of his notion of ontological security sustained through routine practice to IR, see Huysmans (1998a); Mitzen (2006).
170 In highlighting the importance of the social dimension for stabilising meaning, Giddens echoes what Benedikt Anderson (2006) calls the desire for ‘simultaneity’. The social dimension is addressed in chapter six.
finally, these accounts disconnect the Self from a world of meaningful experiences. In particular the last to points show that these ‘mechanisms’ stand in conflict with the search for authenticity as a response to anxiety. As the temporal dimension is the one in which the anxiety paradox emerges, the below will focus on the shortcomings with reference to that dimension. The next chapter will engage the spatial dimension as well.

**Back to Experience**

Most obviously, establishing a universal conception of time as successive and unalterable units makes for a thin, indeed empty conception of past and future. They are seamlessly connected on a numbered scale, distinguished cognitively merely by a number (1958 versus 2058) and trapped in a progressive logic where all ‘future’ numbers eventually become ‘past’ ones. While in a sense the Self evolves (‘ages’) by moving along the numeric time scale, this kind of ‘becoming’ is primarily conceived of as a steady and gradual movement where experiences are recorded through marking the successive occurrence of events. Yet numbers do not convey the meaning associated with experiences and how they contributed to unique disclosures of being-in-the-world.

Criticizing the universal conception of, in particular, scientific time, scholars from different fields (philosophy, sociology, anthropology) have shown how unique temporal orders have evolved in spatially bounded social settings, giving rise to the phenomenon of ‘social time’. For instance, Norbert Elias discusses in detail how timing is a ‘socio-centric activity’ where context-specific experiences are organised along a “social time-grid” (Elias 1992: 91, 95). He argues that the sterile sequencing of events in scientific time brushes over the fact that “the meaning of past, present and future constantly changes, because the human beings...whose experiences they represent also constantly change and the connection with them” (Elias 1992: 76). The basic insight is that the way humans order/conceive of time differs because their ‘time’ is filled with different experiences, rendering scientific time empty and homogenous.

Before Heidegger, the “strange timelessness of the Newtonian world” as one which is stripped of experiences and meaning has also been criticised perhaps most forcefully by Bergson (cited in Guerlac, 2006: 28). Whereas in Elias’ account the role of meaningful experiences in ordering time is gradually blended out over the course of the civilising/modernisation process, they are at the centre of Bergson’s critique of the

171 Elias ends up arguing that different temporal orders are the result of being situated at different stages in the ‘civilizing process’, going hand in hand with an increased need to synchronize and coordinate activities in modern societies (Elias 1992: 122). This reading is similar to that of
‘emptiness’ of scientific time. Against the view of a Self plugged into a neutralizing ‘outer time’, where conceiving of time through a succession of numbers is akin to counting units in space, he argues that if we want to understand how conceptions of Self evolve in the temporal dimension we need to focus on how meaningful experiences constitute what he calls ‘inner time’. According to Bergson the individual’s thinking in time primarily occurs not on a cognitive but on an emotional level, and its ‘inner time’ is grounded in the “quality” of lived experience, in the “intensity” of the sensations triggered internally in response to ‘external’ events (Guerlac, 2006: 61f). Hence these experiences cannot be conceptualized through static symbols but need to be understood through what he calls ‘duration’ of a unique experience. When drawing on these experiences, the individual is “closer to dreaming than to knowing”, acting on the basis of what is often called intuition (Guerlac 2006: 43). In line with his notion of creative evolution, for Bergson sensations derived from experiences are not merely ‘conserved’ but evolve by mixing with other meaningful experiences, the synthesizing dynamic of which makes ‘inner time’ a creative process in which the fusion of experiences is a source of energy (Grosz, 2005).\textsuperscript{172}

An important implication of Bergson’s notion of ‘inner time’ ordered around significant experiences which cannot be quantified is that they cannot be fully communicated and are therefore difficult to share. Experiences differ in intensity/quality among individuals and so do their conceptions of inner time. And just as a fusion of experiences cannot be comprehended through scientific mapping along a numbered time-scale, Bergson argues that attempts to translate inner time into (communicate it through) a common language will succeed “only at the level of the superficial self” inevitably leading to a loss of the “passionate self” (Guerlac, 2006: 77). Because language neutralizes the emotions associated with ‘quality’ experience, representations of inner times through shared symbols has the consequence that “little by little one loses sight of the fundamental self” (ibid., 71). While some elements of Bergson’s approach, most significantly his disassociation of time from space,\textsuperscript{173} stand in tension with a phenomenological perspective pursued here, the notion of the Self organising its being-in-time through emotionally significant experiences and the creative potential of the same are important and will be further explored in the next chapter.

\textsuperscript{172} Anderson (2006) and Tilly (1994) who describe the evolution of temporal orders as a function of modernisation and focus on how the desire for continuity/simultaneity in modern societies is exploited by, that is, how the anxiety controlling mechanisms are controlled by, some larger structural force, such as capitalism.

\textsuperscript{173} Heidegger discusses something similar to synthesis in his notion of ‘ecstasy’.

\textsuperscript{174} Because for him space only exists in the Newtonian conception, which he rejects.
The Anxiety Dilemma: *Verfallen* and Authenticity

Much of the critique directed against scientific time can be extended to everyday practices through Heidegger's discussion of the phenomenon of *Verfallen*. The view of the everyday as manifesting 'being-in-the-world' by providing a structure which tames temporal anxiety is discussed at length by Heidegger.\(^{174}\) Indeed, Heidegger sees the disclosure of everydayness as the dominant kind of unfolding. Others play a prominent role in this process, yet not so much in the sense of differentiation against which the Self sets itself apart but more as populating a world of which the Self is a part just like 'anyone' else, rendering 'being in' a neutralising 'being-with' (Heidegger 1953: 118).

This structure of the 'being with' the world is the *Man*, a term similar to 'one' or 'they' signifying a general something, structuring everyday life through averageness and levelling. According to Heidegger, the *Man* dominates the state of being — the *Man* "schreibt die Seinsart der Alltaeglichkeit vor" (Ibid., 127) — because it allows the Self to diffuse the issue of its own death by giving in to idle talk [*Rede*], curiosity [*Neugier*] and ambiguity/ambivalence [*Zweideutigkeit*]. 'Curiosity' makes the Self eager to disclose ever more of the world, which is made accessible through 'idle talk' and 'ambiguity' enabling loose communication (Ibid., 167-175). These activities, which can be read as encompassing those everyday routines, allow the Self to order its world with reference to the *Man* and seemingly allow obtaining knowledge of 'everything' and suggesting that everything is 'in order' (Ibid., 177). Hence, because it provides comforting knowledge, the everyday structure of the *Man* is a fundamental trait of human existence.

However, for Heidegger, the downside of this kind of unfolding is that, rather than manifesting the authentic Self, it places 'being' in a mode of "groundless floatation", a state of being-in "everywhere and nowhere" (Heidegger, 1953: §37, 177). Hence Heidegger calls this process *Verfallen* ['falling away'] which designates a process of crumbling, decomposing, or loosing quality. Heidegger describes it as a process of the Self "getting lost in the public [*Offentlichkeit*] of *Man*" (Ibid., 175). Although Heidegger notes that, analytically speaking, *Verfallen* should not be seen as a negative process of 'falling down' from a higher or more 'pure' state of being (Ibid., 43, 175f), also because it is impossible to know the latter, it is clear that he does not consider *Verfallen* a desirable process. While by giving in to those temptations the Self responds to its desire of overcoming anxiety and thereby unconsciously confirms its own being, Heidegger is

\(^{174}\) For the following, see Heidegger (1953, §37).
clear that being “swirled into the un-authenticity [Uneigentlichkeit] of the Man” means moving away from the experience of authentic being (Ibid., 179).\(^{175}\)

A major reason why being in the Man is inauthentic is that it is based on a thin conception of past and future. As Heidegger argues, the temporal structure of Verfallen – the temporal experience of being in the Man – is the presence (Heidegger, 1953: 346). A Self lost in the everyday is characterised mainly by forgetfulness of what was and a by a lack of genuine engagement with what could be. Everyday practices are momentarily acts which make the presence stand out more sharply and which allow temporal orientation without paying attention to past and future. Even when routines are linked to a ‘tradition’ and seen as an extension of ‘quality’ experiences passed on through formal or informal rules, by themselves routines do not provide a source for meaningful orientation. Similarly, even when routines are seen as having a potential to endure by being institutionalised and thus reaching into the future, they do not consider the future as a significant place in and of itself. Instead, routines are fundamentally conservative and rest on the hope that the future will be like the present. While the future is not absent in the ontological structure of being in the Man – after all Verfallen as a response to uncertainty/contingency – as Heidegger argues a Self giving in to the “constant temptation to Verfallen” (Heidegger, 1953: 177) is alienated from its future and dispersed in the presence (Ibid., §68c). Existing in the “modus of the presence” in which being is everywhere and nowhere, the Self is in a state of Aufenthaltslosigkeit (Ibid., 347).

*The Anxiety Dilemma*

While these critiques of scientific time and the everyday echo the Zeitgeist of the 1920s lamenting a dehumanization of the individual in the industrial age, from an analytical perspective the temptation of getting lost in these ‘calming’ temporal orders turns the

\(^{175}\) Similarly, Elias notes the calming effect of organizing temporal space in universal terms as “people’s attempts to run away from themselves” (Elias 1992: 84). Note that Vefallen differs from Marx’ notion of ‘alienation’ in important ways: For Marxists, alienation is seen as a result of economic structures built on capitalist logic (and, in the Gramscian variant, with ideology on top) controlled by the state and, thus, expression of a power structure which, if recognized by the oppressed, could be overcome. By contrast, for Heidegger Verfallen is a process not imposed by some political-economic superstructure but something chosen by the individual, an inevitable consequence of the human condition in search for ontological security. Although by speaking about temptations Heidegger opens up to the possibility to resist, this is more an internal struggle not one against an external structure such as the state. The two perspectives are combined in Foucault’s notion of ‘governmentality’ popular among poststructuralists. The problem is that their portrayal of the linear/universal conception of time as a disciplining power structure of ‘the state’ (e.g., Edkins, 2003) leads to a pre-occupation with the theme of resistance which blends out the anxiety paradox and the subsequent dilemma which Heidegger’s critique of the Man raises.
anxiety paradox into a dilemma: scientific time and everyday routines may function as anxiety controlling mechanisms, but they prevent the Self from becoming authentic. They provide ontological security by embedding the Self into structures promising 'continuity' and 'simultaneity' at the cost of authenticity, more precisely by reducing the possibility of having an authentic experience (what Bergson called the 'fundamental' or 'passionate' Self). The two seem mutually exclusive. Elias alludes to this anxiety dilemma as the 'jaws of a trap' which studies of time inevitably come up against (Elias 1992: 85).

There are two possible strategies to deal with the anxiety dilemma (apart from ignoring it). One is to accept it and, like Heidegger, examine this paradoxical state of being from all angles in the most detailed manner. The other strategy, pursued here, is to come up with a view of how the Self unfolds into the world without getting lost to the everyday, the Man, by rethinking the possibility of 'authentic (coming into) being'.

Rethinking Authenticity

The way out of the anxiety dilemma offered here is, first, to suggest that humans develop a desire for 'authenticity' to control (perhaps even take away) anxiety and, second, to rethink how a state of authentic being is obtained.

Despite his normative undertones, Heidegger's discussion in Sein und Zeit does not suggest that the unfolding Self is driven by a desire for authenticity. Indeed, his suggestion that Verfallen is the desired path of unfolding is what gives the anxiety dilemma in the first place. One explanation might be that the Self does not want to face death because it does not want to be reminded of its finitude. Another, more significant explanation lies in Heidegger's ambition to pursue a 'fundamental ontology' which rules out any preconceived wills, needs, or desires. However, there is no need to attribute the desire for authenticity to 'human nature'. It can also be seen as emerging out of the human condition. All one needs to do is take the insight that humans respond to awareness of contingency with a desire for continuity and add to this a desire for authenticity.

Although generally remaining on the normative level, scholars have identified authenticity as a key force guiding people's lives, coming from two directions. The first

---

176 How to conceive of 'time' constructed on the basis of experience occupied phenomenology from Husserl onwards, who struggled with the question whether time is a priori or a construct of human consciousness, that is, whether we are in time or whether time is in us, see Dostal (1993).
suggests that becoming authentic is (would be) an improvement in people’s life and is desirable. Charles Taylor, whose writings on the Selfhood are influenced by Heidegger, notes that crucial for grounding a sense of Self is a feeling of ‘doing it my way’. Authenticity, according to Taylor, is an ideal which holds that “being true to myself means being true to my own originality, which is something only I can articulate...In articulating it, I am also defining myself. I am realizing a potential that is properly my own” (Taylor 1994: 31). In correspondence with an unfolding perspective authenticity is understood as something that is to be realized, and this realisation is something which provides the Self with a sense of originality (see also Guignon 2006). The suggestion that humans have a desire for authenticity not only shines through in the normative undertones in Heidegger’s writings but also in his support of the Nazi regime in the early 1930s. The regime’s claims of what it meant to be authentically ‘German’ were greeted by Heidegger, who considered the National Socialist movement a ‘moment of awakening’ for the German people.177

Coming from another direction, Adorno criticizes authenticity as a dangerous ‘jargon’ (Adorno 2003 [1964]). More specifically, he criticizes the language of authenticity as an ideology with “theological resonance” permeating public discourse enveloped in “judicial garb”, whose pretence of “closeness, noble and homey at once” is intertwined with unquestioned assertions of “primalness” (Ibid., xix, 3-7). The importance of Adorno’s warning of the negative consequences of authenticity claims, namely the temptation to exclude, discriminate, and even eradicate the ‘inauthentic’, is indisputable and is echoed in the radical constructivist critique of reifying conceptions of culture and essentialist claims of identity (Campbell 1998a; Zehfuss 2001; see also chapter six). This critique is not a case against the influence of the discourse of ‘authenticity’, quite the contrary. By noting its psychological effect of strengthening self-esteem and its capability to generate an “overflow of deep human emotion” readily (ab)used as a “means of power”, Adorno implies that there is a demand to feel ‘authentic’ and that the ability to satisfy this demand is a source of power (Adorno 2003 [1964]: xix, 3-7).

Including a desire for authenticity in the causal narrative is only the first step. The second and more laborious task is to conceptualise how this desire is satisfied, that is, to understand the basic parameters in which authenticity claims are successfully made. For doing so it is useful to look once more at Heidegger, who, despite recognising the logical

---

177 Although the totalising character of this narrative which eradicated any notion of individualism posed a paradox for Heidegger, visible in his tacit critique of Nazi bureaucracy.
dead end he meets in the anxiety dilemma,¹⁷⁸ spends considerable time (indeed the entire second part of the book) discussing what authenticity might entail, that is, how it might be possible.¹⁷⁹ To recall, for Heidegger (the fear of) death is the only authentic experience, and so the only point at which authentic being is logically possible is the moment at which the Self faces its own death (Heidegger 1953: §53). As he puts it “death is the ownmost (eigenste) possibility of being” (Ibid., 263). That moment of facing death does not refer to the actual experience, but to the understanding/recognition of being as ‘being-towards-death’ and of death as the end-state after which being is impossible. In this moment of understanding, the basic sentiment of anxiety is replaced by fear, and it is this fear which pulls the Self out of its “complacent absorption in everydayness” (Guignon 2006: 282) and signifies authentic disclosure allowing being to “finds itself” (Heidegger 1953: 250f, 268, 308).

It can be said that in Heidegger’s discussion of authenticity four features stand out. First, authentic disclosure/being, conditioned by fear of one’s own death, is an exception, occurring in rare moments of vision [Augenblick] (Heidegger 1953: 190f., 338). Such moments emerge suddenly and unexpectedly.¹⁸⁰ Second, authentic being is an isolating or individualising experience. It does not place the Self in an empty world but it designates a process of Singularization [Vereinzelung] (Heidegger 1953: 187ff., 336ff.). Third, authentic being is characterised by a distinctive temporal structure in which past and future are meaningful places, in contrast to the inauthentic existence in a state of Verfallen where the Self is dispersed in the presence and, fourth, authentic being endows the Self with resoluteness/resolve [Entschlossenheit]. Recognising the possibilities of being provides a ‘clear view’ of what is ahead and enables moving into the future with a sense of direction (Heidegger 1953, §31, §68a). In particular the latter two points inform Charles Guignon’s suggestion that

“Authenticity is characterised by a distinctive temporal structure (...) an authentic life is lived as a unified flow characterized by cumulativeness and direction. It involves taking over the possibilities made accessible by the past and acting in the present to accomplish something for the future. Or to rephrase this in the narrativist mode, such a life is lived as a coherent story” (Guignon 2006: 282f.)

¹⁷⁸ See Heidegger’s notes how the attempt to grasp being in its entirety “seems” to scheitern on the structure of anxiety (Heidegger 1953: 233, 317).
¹⁸⁰ Heidegger’s discussion of how authentic disclosure ‘happens’, that is, how the Self comes to fear death and escape the neutralising experience of the Man, is difficult to follow (it revolves around a “call of conscience” and the acceptance of guilt, see Heidegger 1953, §§5- §60). As I will offer a different reading of authentic being and, consequently, how authenticity is obtained, engaging Heidegger on this point is not necessary.
My reformulation of authentic being presented in the following chapters rejects the first two of Heidegger’s features and adopts features three and four, which are compatible with Guignon’s characterisation. Rejecting the first – the notion that authenticity occurs in a sudden and rare moment – is a consequence of the assumption made earlier that that the Self actively seeks authenticity. Here arises the question how to combine a notion of authenticity with an unfolding perspective. In conjuncture with Taylor’s notions of ‘articulation’ and ‘realization’ of authenticity, the task is to think about a process of authentic becoming, that is, about the generation of authenticity in a creative process of living life as a coherent story, to use Guignon’s words. In suggesting what this may entail, my narrative departs from Heidegger’s focus on fear of death as the only significant experience through which the Self can ‘find itself’, as well as from his notion that authentic becoming is a process of singularization. Instead, the next chapter will sketch out the spatial and temporal parameters making up the ‘authentic’ life story of the Self, what will be called a national biography. The subsequent chapter (six) will argue that the originality of this story is not articulated in isolation but with significant others, or friends.
CHAPTER FIVE: THE STATE AS A NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY

Summary
The previous chapter drew on Heidegger to lay out an account of the human condition and its consequences for conceiving of (what drives) the Self. It highlighted an evolutionary ontology of the Self in a process of unfolding and suggested that being confronted with an uncertain future generates anxiety rather than fear. It was argued that the Self responds to this condition with a desire for continuity, that is, for a stable sense of ‘being-in-the-world’ through the generation of meaningful knowledge from experience. The chapter concluded with arguing that the attempt to control anxiety is expressed in a desire for ‘authentic becoming’. The present chapter has the dual purpose of substantiating these points and making them applicable to IR by conceptualizing what it means for the state to ‘exist’ in space and time. Using the opening of statehood resting on a ‘binding idea’, the below discussion develops a reading of the state as a national biography defined as a coherent life story through which societies gain orientation in ‘the world’ by inscribing space and time with meaning. Against this backdrop, the national security interest can be understood as generating and safeguarding an authentic national biography.

After introducing the idea of a national biography, the chapter substantiates its parameters in two parts. The first half of the chapter is devoted to discuss the spatial dimension. More precisely, it discusses the spatial embeddedness of ‘being’ through the notion of an ‘experienced space’, specified analytically with a taxonomy of centre/soul, valued order and horizon. It then explores the usefulness of existing frameworks in IR, such as empire, milieu, and region for conceptualizing the state as situated in an ‘experienced space’. The second half of the chapter then addresses the temporal dimension of a national biography. Using the openings of the constitutive effect of ideas, learning, and the past as a guide for the future, it discusses the importance of (i) memory spaces generated by ‘significant experiences’ whose emotional impact provides the (national) ‘Self’ with a significant place in the past and whose ambiguity provides (ii) space for creative learning of moral lessons projected into the future as visions of order, or utopias. Emphasizing the particular importance of the latter, the chapter concludes by arguing that in merging the two the Self (the state) turns its world into a meaningful project providing it with direction and a sense of authentic becoming.
The State as a National Biography

To conceptualize the state as a reflexive Self it is instructive to take as a starting point Weber's definition of the state as a community holding the monopoly over the legitimate use of force in a certain space and to ask what holds this community together. Answering this question touches on the phenomenon of nationalism. As the term international relations suggests, (the idea of) the nation is or, rather, should be constitutive of IR scholarship. While this task is taken up by IR scholars roughly once a decade, \(^{181}\) generally speaking it has become a habit in IR to collapse the 'nation' into the 'state' and make the former disappear, resurfacing only when nationalist aspirations were identified as a source of conflict and disorder undermining rather than carrying 'the system'. Yet some understanding of (the idea of) the nation' certainly matters for a theory trying to come to terms with the concept of a 'national interest', at least if one accepts Wolfers' point that "the national interest indicates that the policy is designed to promote demands that are ascribed to the nation" (Wolfers 1962: 147). In light of the discussion in the previous chapter, this demand can be understood as 'controlling anxiety' by generating a stable sense of 'authentic becoming'.

Shifting the focus back to 'the nation' is not a straightforward task. Most importantly, it is useful to heed the advice of scholars of nationalism and distinguish between an analysis trying to discern the features of a nation and a study of the phenomenon of nationalism. The former assumes the existence of a certain group or community with or without a direct link to a state understood as a territorially exclusive entity, if anything considered more basic and preceding, indeed, claiming 'their own' state (nation → state). By contrast, an analysis of dynamics of nationalism focuses on how the state understood as a structure of governmental authority is able to create and manipulate the 'idea of the nation' which otherwise would not exist (state → nation). Another way of framing the debate is that it is about what holds communities together, with views oscillating between (i) the realist/primordialist position emphasizing intrinsic or fixed properties such as ethnicity and (ii) the constructivist/modernist position emphasizing that nations are 'imagined' and formed by things that can be learned. In both frames the debate is about who comes first, the chicken (state) or the egg (nation).\(^{182}\)

---

\(^{181}\) As noted in chapter three, both Carr (1945) and Morgenthau (1960) wrote on nations/nationalism. So have Deutsch (1966), Bloom (1990); Buzan (1991); Hall (1999); Laitin (2007). The study of nationalism is intrinsically linked to the study of 'national identity' (Bloom 1990; Smith 1991), yet constructivist discussions of the latter often do not make this link (Katzenstein 1996).

The perspective taken in this chapter is of the constructivist kind, emphasizing nationalism as a phenomenon created, substantiated and sustained by political practice. It focuses on the state as a governmental authority which administers, manipulates and represents a certain ‘binding idea’ of a nation and is held accountable for the protection of the same by its constituency. Understood as an unfolding and politically contestable idea, the conception also overlaps with Herder’s view of the nation as mobile community whose sense of order is “continuously renovated in terms of the needs of each generation” (in Hutchinson 1987: 13). This ‘accountability’ qualifier is important insofar as it tames the constructivist position in assuming that governments can manipulate the idea only within certain limits acceptable to society. Hence, it does not entirely discard of the idea of a nation as a living thing and accepts the existence of what John Hutchinson (1987) calls “cultural nationalism”. I will return to this point when speaking about political agency at the end of this chapter.

The constructivist account presented in this chapter engages the concept, mentioned by Benedikt Anderson, of a ‘biography of nations’ through which communities imagine their continuity in time (Anderson 2006: 205).183 Kenneth Boulding (1959: 122) captures something similar when he speaks of a “national image” which “extends through time backwards into a supposedly recorded or perhaps mythological past and forward into an imagined future” (also Coker, 1989). By reading the state through the concept of a national biography, this chapter also makes use of Erik Ringmar’s suggestion, drawing on Paul Ricoeur, who in turn was influenced by Heidegger, to conceptualize the state as a narrative.184 Taking up the view that “when we wonder who we are...we tell a story which locates us in the context of a past, a present and a future” Ringmar argues that while ‘the state’ may not be empirically verifiable, “the spirit of the nation does leaves its trace in time” (Ringmar 1996: 451, 454). This chapter substantiates these claims by exploring the idea of ‘Germany-in-the-world’ or ‘America-in-the-world’ and, by doing so, adds that a nations’ ‘trace in time’ cannot be meaningfully separated from its ‘trace in space’.

Carving out the parameters of a national biography builds on the insight that ideas impact how states, or rather, those who represent them conceive of their (respective state’s) place in ‘the world’. At least since Robert Jervis’ (1976) work on the effect of belief systems on foreign policy making, scholars have shown that ideas introduce a

183 The concept is also mentioned in passing by Steele (2005).
184 On the ‘narrative’ approach see also White (1987), applied to IR by Campbell (1998b, Ch. 3).
'cognitive bias' among decision makers in their perception of 'the world'.¹⁸⁵ Yet most studies in IR are concerned with demonstrating that ideas matter, they rarely engage the question which ideas matter, why they matter and where they come from, let alone embed the answers in an ontology of the state.¹⁸⁶ This chapter addresses these questions by presenting ideas as an integrative element of a national biography, specifically as providing anxiety-controlling mechanisms through authentic meaning structures which enable the state to situate itself in space and time.

Parameters of Authenticity I: Unfolding in Space

This section discusses the spatial dimension of a national biography. Although some promising avenues are discussed further below, IR's reliance on the Hobbesian ontology provided little incentive for scholars to rethink the spatial features of the state. Content with it as a clearly delineated and exclusive territory easily to locate on any (political) map, the problematization of this space and spatial theorizing more generally has been left to critical geographers who, in turn, draw on social theory and philosophy to rethink space outside/beyond the state.¹⁸⁷ Although, despite the recognition that "spatial orientation lies very deep in the human psyche" (Taylor 1989: 28) among philosophers the role of space in the formation of Selfhood also has been somewhat neglected. As one scholar puts it, "the exclusive focus on the who-question ("who am I?") has often made philosophy forget the correlate where-question. All the answers given to the first question describe a [Self] which is essentially nowhere" (Manoussakis, 2007: 674). In seeking an answer to the whereabouts of the Self, it is useful to return to Heidegger and his notion of being as unfolding in space.

As noted in the previous chapter, for Heidegger "the ontologically properly understood 'subject', the Dasein, is in an original sense spatial" (Heidegger 1953: 111). And the Self's unfolding into 'the world' and disclosing it by rendering it meaningful is not merely a spiritual or imagined process (Heidegger 1953: 106, 110). That is, just as the Self is not simply formed by stuff (events, people, etc) populating its spatial

¹⁸⁵ Goldstein and Keohane (1993); Yee (1996); Wendt (1999); Parsons (2002); Tannenwald (2005).
¹⁸⁶ As noted in the last chapter, even constructivists such as Wendt who strongly emphasize the "constitutive effect" of ideas on the self-conception of states don't see them working 'all the way down' (Wendt 1999: Ch. 3). Systematic attempts such as by Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane (1993) fail to anchor the notion that ideas help to order the world by providing "road maps" or "focal points" in a deep theory of international politics and end up treating them as 'intervening variables'.
¹⁸⁷ For classic treatments, see Simmel (1922); Bollnow (1963); Lefebvre (1991). For recent engagements, see Agnew (2003); Sparke (2005). On the (missing) conversation between political scientists and geographers, see the contributions in Political Geography 18(8), 1999 and, more recently, Mamadouh and Dijkink (2006).
surroundings, the world is not a vacuum into which the individual projects its ideas, i.e. something 'empty' that is gradually 'filled'. Instead, the space is a dynamic 'living' mass, something that provides stimulus and opportunities for the creation of meaning structures and, thus, for 'self-realization'.

This has tempted Hubert Dreyfus to analytically split Heidegger's ontology into an 'objective' space the Self in inhabiting and an 'existential' space in which the Self is getting involved (Dreyfus, 1991). Yet as Malpas (2006: 77-83) points out, this distinction risks losing much of the value of Heidegger's topology. While Heidegger at one point makes a distinction between 'inner' and 'outer' worlds, this is a methodological step in his argument to show that the two meet in the experience rather than a distinction carrying his fundamental ontology. Heidegger endorses the notion of a 'subjective' world where a concept like 'nature' must be seen as part of the Self's conceptualization of 'the world'. Assuming 'nature' as something ontologically independent skips the basic question of how the phenomenon of worldliness in which something like 'nature' matters, emerges in the first place (Heidegger 1953: 64). More broadly speaking, for 'things' to be considered part of 'the world', they have to become part of the spatial conception of the Self. As Malpas puts it, the 'objective/existential' distinction only leads to the question of how the two spaces relate to each other conceptually, the answer to which would need to be that, from the perspective of the Self, they are the same (Malpas, 2006: 81). For instance, while it could be argued that the 'objective'/ 'existential' distinction is analytically useful to explain how the 'same' event is experienced differently by different individuals, this actually does not require the notion of an 'objective' world. If the world only becomes intelligible through disclosure by the Self, then the difference is not merely a matter of 'perspective' or 'angle' on the 'same' event. Because the meaning of the event is only constituted in the relation between the event and the experiencing subject, it is unique. From that perspective, there is nothing like the 'same' event, it is actually a different one.

Thus, conceptualising the spatial character of 'being-in-the-world' from a phenomenological perspective needs to focus on how experience and the meaning structures derived from it are manifested in space. Said differently, the Heideggerian perspective emphasizes that the space that matters is the space that means something to

---

18 One important implication arising here is that because the Self cannot be established 'without' a world, as knowing the Self is interwoven with knowing the world, it cannot choose to make a connection or relate to the world (or not) and, thus, it also cannot choose to 'reach out' or 'withdraw from' its world.
the Self. Heidegger uses terms such as the ‘surrounding’ space (Umraum), ‘surrounding field’ (Umfeld) or the ‘surrounding world’/environment (Umwelt) (Heidegger, 1953: 63, 66, 102f.) to capture that space the Self has disclosed and filled with meaning. This is the space the Self has come to know and which is, therefore, ‘around’ or ‘close to’ the Self. As this closeness is constituted by experience, one could also refer to that particular environment which the Self has come to ‘know’ as the ‘experienced space’. This is the terminus used here.

The ‘Experienced Space’

The notion of the experienced space is taken from Otto Friedrich Bollnow (1963) and Reinhard Koselleck (1985: 271f.), both of whom were students of Heidegger. Whereas Koselleck remains in the temporal dimension and uses the term akin to that of a memory space, discussed below, Bollnow focuses on the spatiality of the concept. He shares Heidegger’s view that the human conception of and relation to ‘space’ must be understood differently from the mathematical/geometrical Cartesian one, and that such space is neither external to the human nor something purely ‘spiritual’ or ‘imagined’. Instead, it is a space in which ‘life happens’. With the terminus ‘living space’ [Lebensraum] contaminated by the politics of Nazi Germany, Bollnow replaces it with that of the ‘lived space’ [erlebter Raum] (Bollnow 1963: 18f.), which can also be translated as ‘experienced space’ [erfahrener Raum or Erfahrungsraum].

To be sure, the term is not ideal, for two reasons. First, as discussed further down in more detail, it does not quite capture that Erlebnis – a term which as Gadamer (2004 [1975]: 53f.) points out arises out of the biographical literature – designates not just any experience [Erfahrung] but one which leaves a deep and lasting ‘impression’. Yet the space in which authentic being unfolds is not based on an everyday experience but only on those experiences which are in some sense ‘significant’. Second, by linking the definition of the space to (significant) experiences, it gives the impression that the space is defined primarily through the past. Yet as the discussion of the temporal dimension below will argue, the way the space is envisioned is just as if not more significant, hence

189 This reading of space is different from Henri Lefebvre’s Marxist-inspired attempt to combine physical, mental, and social dimensions into a universal theory of “produced space” (Lefebvre 1991; Elden 2001). Although some of Lefebvre’s insights are useful, in particular if read with Elden (2004), as a critical engagement with Heidegger and existentialism more generally, his thrust towards revealing universal structures (economic or otherwise) does not suit the subjective perspective taken here.

190 Note that Erlebnis can be read as the significant experience of an event, or happening [Ereignis], which is semantically closely linked to the German term authentic [eigentlich] used by Heidegger and which links authenticity, understood as ‘being one’s own [eigen]’ to an event one owns (see also Malpas 2006: 58).
it also must accommodate the notion of an envisioned or expected space. With those limitations in mind, the discussion will employ the notion of the ‘experienced space’. Loosely following Bollnow, the features of this space are a centre (or soul) through which the Self evaluates and orders ‘its’ world along value horizons.

**Centre: Feeling ‘at Home’**

To begin with, if the experiences space contains the notion of a ‘surrounding’ space this suggests that there must be something like a centre. As understood here, this centre is not simply a physical but an emotional location, a place which has something ‘familiar’ to it which lends it “a character of trustworthiness” (Bollnow, 1963: 55ff.). It is also captured by understanding being as inhabiting something, as residing or dwelling in a specific place.\(^{191}\) Heidegger is known for having emphasised the notion of ‘dwelling’, which is generally associated with living in the specific place that is ‘home’ or a ‘house’.\(^{192}\) When Bollnow notes “only by dwelling in a house can the human be at home in the world, can he also dwell in the world” (Ibid., 148) he echoes Heidegger’s statement that “to be human means: to be on earth as a mortal, means: to dwell” (cited in Bollnow, 1963: 126). A German term capturing the significance of a place is Heimat, where familiarity is attributed in a more abstract way than ‘home’ and can be applied to the local, the region, and the nation (Confino, 1997: 9). A place considered Heimat is primarily associated with an emotional state, designating a place rising out of a feeling, a Heimatgefuehl, which in the broadest sense could be translated as feeling at ‘home’ (see also Applegate 1990). For Gaston Bachelard, on whom Bollnow also draws, the notion of the home contains “one of the greatest powers of integration” without which a human would be a “dispersed being”. Bachelard links the home to the ‘soul’ as the place of emotional being, which he explicitly differentiates from the cognitive function of the mind. While he sees mind and soul inseparable for the overall experience of ‘being’, it is the soul where the world ‘reverberates’ (Bachelard, 1994: 7).

Whether the notion of the place is grasped in terms of home, Heimat, or soul, the centre designates the place through which the Self organises its unfolding. Consequently, this centre is not permanent/static but a creative/evolving place. For Bachelard the soul is the site of an “inner light” which does not reflect ‘the world’ but, rather, where ‘intimate meanings’ are created and recognized, where worlds are inaugurated, which makes

---

\(^{191}\) For comprehensive discussions of the philosophy of place and its link to experience, with particular focus on Heidegger, see Malpas (1999, 2006), also Casey (1997).  
\(^{192}\) On Heidegger’s notion of dwelling, see Malpas (2006: 74ff). It is no coincidence that ‘dwelling’ (or the German wohnen) is often used synonymous to (or translated as) ‘living’
‘home’ an intimate place (Bachelard, 1994: 10). It is a place where the Self ‘knows’ itself best, the centre of familiarity, where it can feel comfortable and emotionally ‘at peace’. Yet it is not merely a place of shelter and withdrawal, but of creativity and engagement, with the potential for happiness and the good life (Bollnow, 1963: 132).

In the words of Iris Marion Young, the ‘home’ is “the site of the construction and reconstruction of the Self” (Young, 2001: 286). This reading of ‘home’ as a place from which world building occurs ties in with Heidegger’s conceptualisation of building not only as constructing but also as cultivating something, which means that the idea of ‘preserving’ is not entirely discarded; although clearly the notion of building it is not a conservative enterprise (Young, 2001: 225).

Finally, reading the center as a ‘soul’ links the reading of Selfhood inscribed into space back to ancient Greek thought where having a soul was understood to be the very indicator of being alive (and where, correspondingly, the departure thereof was taken as the evidence of death). The soul was not only considered a harbour of emotions, feelings, and perceptions; a ‘strong’ soul was also an indicator for acts of courage and determination and for morally significant behaviour (Lorenz, 2003), characteristics echoed in Heidegger’s notion of the ‘resolve’ of authentic being. And Plato’s claim that the soul can be made immortal by inscribing it into the good order of the polis, mentioned in the previous chapter, leads over to the second feature of the experienced space, namely that the process of gaining orientation in space is a process of creating order (Bollnow, 1963: 36).

**Order: The Valued Space**

The argument that the Self is formed through identification with an ‘order’ is well-established in social theory, indeed has been central to Western thought since Plato (Strong 1992: 8, see also Baumann 1991). Perhaps just as long-standing is the debate

---

193 It is important not to read causal narratives attributing importance to such places (home, Heimat, soul) as a regression into romanticism or even reactionary thinking. Young’s defence of the idea of ‘home’ against feminist criticism of the same nicely shows that it is a mistake to automatically associate attempts linking understandings of Selfhood to a place like ‘home’ as supporting an exclusionary and essentializing understanding of Selfhood. Echoing the point made about authenticity in the previous chapter, Malpas reminds that “the real question...is just how place should be understood”, which he rightly suggests is “a pressing question because of the way in which place, and notions associated with place [such as authenticity] are indeed given powerful political employment across the political spectrum” (Malpas 2006: 26f.). In other words, it is to take serious the political implications of what Gaston Bachelard has called ‘topophilia’, or love of place, as an anxiety controlling mechanism.

194 It only has the potential because the centre’s familiarity is generated by significant experiences which are not necessarily positive (see below).
whether order rests (or should rest) on norms or values. The interplay between the 'good' and the 'right' and how they (should) relate is subject to much debate among social theorists (Joas 2000: 161f), yet frequently brushed over by IR scholars. The distinction is important when it comes to understand what makes space meaningful.

The emphasis on norms is heavily influenced by social contract thinking and the related advocacy of specific but potentially universally valid rules of behaviour to organize social life. Norms are seen as necessary for regulating interaction through understandings of what is the 'right' thing to do, such as stopping at red lights, guiding the Self's activities along a 'logic of appropriateness'. Leaving aside the notion of a coercive order (as in Hobbes), the importance of norms for constituting Selfhood is said to be found in their cognitive-regulative function. As such, respect for norms may well be 'neutral' or 'soulless' in the sense that little emotional significance is attached to them. By themselves, norms understood as rules are not sufficient to inscribe a space with significant structures of meaning. This is done by values. As Kratochwil (1989: 64) notes, values are more general than norms, or rules, and inform attitudes and generate emotional attachment. Having values allows for moral judgments guided by an understanding of the 'good' (Joas 2000: 21). As such, values rank the importance or quality of something, including a norm, and are attributed to things which satisfy desires and create a 'good' feeling, stirring emotions. Values may find expression in, or lend support to, certain norms. Yet while one can imagine an abundance of possible norms, or rules, tied to and varying with specific contexts, values go deeper and are about evaluating which norms serve as the Self's primary orientation devices and create the 'good' feeling. Hence, it is not that norms don't matter but, rather, that they are tailored towards (attached to) a certain value. The Self unfolds into the experienced space with an idea of what is a 'good' order, thereby making the space meaningful.

For Heidegger a meaningful space is one in which 'things have their place' and where distance to the Self is not measured in physical proximity but according to the value attributed to things (wertbehaf tet) (Heidegger, 1953: 63, 66, 102f.). Similarly, Simmel suggests that space obtains significance through the classification of its 'parts' carried out by the soul (Simmel, 1922: 461). The view that being-in-space gains significance through attachment to a conception of 'the good' is also captured by Charles Taylor

---

195 On how the interplay between values and norms, between the 'good' and the 'right', and how they (should) relate is subject to much debate among social theorists (Joas 2000: 161f).
196 Most notably, Bull (2002) mixes norms and values as elements of order.
197 For a detailed discussion, see Joas (2000).

122
For Taylor, having a sense of Self means knowing an answer to the question ‘what kind of life is worth living’ and to make what he calls ‘strong evaluations’. Consequently, human beings aspire to be connected to what they consider good or of fundamental value (Taylor, 1989: 42). Taylor suggests that we should see the process of ‘value-orientation’ as one of Self-positioning in a “moral space”, which he defines as “a space in which questions arise about what is good or bad, what is worth doing and what not, what has meaning and importance for you and what is trivial and secondary” (Taylor, 1989: 28). In this sense, gaining orientation in space, “‘value-ceiving’ (Wertnehmen) always precedes ‘perceiving’ (Wahrnehmen)” (Scheler cited in Joas 2000: 88) and is always also an emotional orientation (Bollnow 1963; Unger 1990).

Horizons: Delineating the Possible

The third feature engages the understanding that spatial orientation requires some sort of boundary, or border (Simmel 1922: 465f). As discussed in the previous chapter, for realism and, indeed, for any theorist trying to conceptualize ‘the state’, the delineating function of a border is central to conceive of an ‘entity’ at all. It differentiates one territorial claim from another. Similarly, constructivists consider the concept of border as indispensable because it captures the attempt of the Self to differentiate between appropriate and inappropriate behavior, making the concept of the ‘border’ form an analytical triad together with ‘identity’ and ‘order’ (Lapid, 2001). Whether this process of ‘bordering’ must be problematized as a phenomenon of exclusion, as most constructivist literature suggests, depends very much on how the Self-Other relationship is conceptualized, which will be discussed in the next chapter. For now, the question is how to conceive of the boundary of an unfolding Self situated in an ‘experienced’ space without dependency on an ‘Other’.

Bollnow suggests that space always features both sharp borders and gradual transitions, that a world is ordered through clearly delineated features and at the same time is infinite and open for exploration and discovery. The sharp borders could be seen as those cognitive-regulative railings which help the Self to stay on a certain path in the everyday, yet the path is coming from somewhere and is leading to somewhere, from and to places not clearly defined. It is here where, from an unfolding perspective, those ‘transitionary markers’ play a crucial role. Indeed, if understood as delineating the moral space, they are of primary importance for the Self’s orientation in space and are best understood as horizons (Bollnow, 1963: 74-80, Koselleck 1985: 273; Gadamer 2004).

198 See also Campbell (1998a); Reus-Smit (1998). Note that for Taylor the moral space is devised in-relation to others. The relational dimension will be taken up in the next chapter.
The horizon has the peculiar character as both limiting the possibility of perception/experience and something that can never be reached, or surpassed. In this sense, the ‘horizon’ is an existential border, delineating realm of ones unfolding existence and, thus, delineating the world that is known to be possible.

Precisely because of its indeterminacy in the human experience, because of its unfolding character, the horizon is not a boundary that constrains but one that invites or, at least, holds the possibility to explore and change/open new perspectives, without ever disappearing. In correspondence with the discussion so far, the horizon is understood here in terms of value-creating experience, making it a ‘value horizon’, which may expand and contract, characterizing the Self through a ‘wide’ or ‘narrow’ horizon (Bollnow, 1963: 75). From this perspective, the horizon is not delineating space against something but is simply marking the realm of the familiar, the possible, as creating a ‘comfort zone’ in which the Self can tame anxiety.\textsuperscript{199} It both fixes and fosters spatial imagination and in that sense is an invitation for devising a project that has no ‘end’.

**Thinking Space ‘beyond’ Westphalia**

How to translate this conceptualisation of the Self unfolding in an experienced space to IR? Are there any frameworks going ‘beyond’ Westphalia one can build on? At first sight, the conceptual landscape appears not very promising. The general observation made by Harold and Margaret Sprout that the ‘environmental’ terminology used by scholars of international politics is vague still holds true (Sprout and Sprout 1965: 5ff.). In most IR scholarship the ‘environment’ is generally understood as the ‘external’ dimension, that what is outside the state, and reduced to the presence of other ‘actors’, mainly other states. And, if anything, the understanding of Selfhood attached to a certain space/place has evaporated in the wake of postmodernity. Selfhood in what Baumann tellingly calls ‘liquid modernity’ is seen as fluid and disconnected from a specific sense of place and, correspondingly, the state is conceptualised by emphasising its spatial diffusion. While scholars have scrutinized the political construction of borders to reveal the contingency of the spatial categories modern IR continues to operate in, they have done so without rethinking the situatedness of the state in ‘the world’.\textsuperscript{200} Indeed, most contemporary attempts to expand IR’s reading of political spaces are trying to understand the extension of what calls “systems of rule” (Ruggie 1993) beyond the state,

\textsuperscript{199} An important question here is whether ‘borders’ are defining desirable behaviour (making everything else inappropriate) or inappropriateness (making everything else ‘normal’).

\textsuperscript{200} Walker (1993); Campbell (1998a); Agnew (1999, 2003); O Tuathail, (1999); O Tuathail et al. (2006); Rosenau (2004).
thereby often loosing sight of the state altogether. That said, there are three areas where scholars of international politics have devised perspectives which provide useful entry points for conceptualising the state as an experienced space, namely those dealing with phenomena or ‘empire’, ‘milieu’ and ‘regionalism’.

From Empire to Milieu

The notion of ‘empire’ most obviously invites a rethinking of spatial boundaries beyond the state, perhaps even denoting a special kind of ‘state’. That said, the conceptualisation of ‘empire’ is much debated and preoccupied with the nature of control outside the ‘core’ state rather than the ontological configuration of the same. The distinction between territorial or non-territorial manifestation, as in the traditional distinctions of land (e.g., Russia) and maritime empires (e.g., Britain), has grown more complex in the question over the nature of American hegemony, with scholars emphasizing US global military reach/presence, control of international markets, and the spread of consumer/popular culture. While Gramscian and Foucauldian frameworks offer new ways of ‘tracing’ empire, the spatial configuration of empire, more precisely the spatial situatedness of states within it is overshadowed by questions of (how to measure) power.

Political geographers in Britain and Germany in the late 19th century spoke to the imperial ambitions of their governments and developed concepts used for mapping spatial spheres of influence and areas of strategic (‘vital’) importance. In Britain, Halford Mackinder’s notion of the Heartland stressed the idea of space as “the stake of the struggle between human collectivities” and thus of space as a contested terrain (Aron 1966: 198). In Germany, Friedrich Ratzel developed conceptual ideas for the study of the state as a spatial phenomenon influenced by social Darwinism and suggested to conceive of the state as a living organism and identified ‘space’ and ‘position’ as “the two principle determinants of the fortunes of states” (Parker 1995: 170). This was married to notion of Lebensraum, or living space, the ‘adequate acquisition’ of which was, according to Ratzel, of fundamental importance to provide society with the

---

201 Studies exploring the ‘globalisation’ of space, in particular, emphasize the ‘deterriorialisation’ of political space through (mainly economic) structures or networks emerging above and beyond ‘states’ without rethinking the spatial configuration of ‘states’ themselves (Ferguson and Jones, 2002). An exception is Michael Mann, whose reading of ‘globalisation’ suggests that states are intertwined with those ‘new’ political spaces (Mann 1997; Weiss 2005). Mann’s view is close to (in his case not coincidentally) the spatial thinking one finds in the literature on ‘empire’.

resources necessary to develop its potential (O Tuathail, 1998: 4, 20f). Intertwined with the racial ideology of National Socialism and providing a justification for Hitler’s expansionist-destructive agenda, Ratzel’s notion of Lebensraum and the related Grossraum concept used by Karl Haushofer and Carl Schmitt became highly problematic concepts after 1945.\(^{203}\)

Disconnected concept from Nazi ideology the Grossraum concept is notable, however, as an attempt to think about spatial situatedness of the state beyond Westphalia. As Aron points out, when Schmitt spoke about Raumsinn or ‘sense of space’ he captured something important, namely “the image which man [sic] have made for themselves of their habitat” (Aron, 1966: 207). Whatever the character of this habitat, it highlights that communities perceive/sense their existence as bound up with a broader environment that means something to them, whether the experiences generating this meaning are positive or negative (see below). Said differently, the Grossraum concept captures how states identify with an environment beyond their designated territorial borders, whether it is the US claiming the Western Hemisphere as its ‘backyard’ under the Monroe doctrine or, more recently, Russia declaring the former Soviet states as forming a space which is neither foreign nor domestic but ‘Near Abroad’ (Trenin, 2002). A broader sense of space is also identifiable amongst former subjects of empire. As J.G.A. Pocock notes, New Zealand’s ‘national existence’ was long situated less in the Pacific Ocean than in imperial area devised by the British and this area possessed “a consciously preserved history” of British culture of which New Zealanders “saw themselves as part” (Pocock, 1997: 299). This notion of being situated in a cultural Grossraum also echoes in the suggestion that states may be part of a ‘civilization’ (Huntington 1993). However, as in Huntington’s version, the ‘civilization’ concept serves primarily to cluster ‘states’ according to vague ‘cultural’ characteristics and offers little in terms of rethinking the spatial conception of the state (see, however, Jackson 2004, 2006).

A more useful concept which re-imagines the spatial situatedness of the state untainted by the politics of imperial domination is the ‘milieu’, put forward by Harold and Margaret Sprout (1965) in their attempt to bring clarity into how states relate to their ‘environment’. The ‘milieu’ is broadly defined as a space encompassing human and nonhuman, intangible and tangible factors (Sprout and Sprout, 1965: 27). On whether one can (or should) think of this milieu as something independent from the state, the Sprouts make the distinction between subjective and objective worlds and suggest that

\(^{203}\) In Germany these terms remain banned from the conceptual vocabulary (Parker 1995: 172).
the milieu can be understood either as a “psychological image”, which they call the ‘psycho milieu’, or as something that exists independently from perception, the ‘milieu as is’ (Sprout and Sprout, 1965: 28f). While from a phenomenological perspective this distinction breaks down, the subjective character of the ‘psycho milieu’ – which the Sprouts acknowledge is the one that matters if one wants to explain ‘decisions’ (Sprout and Sprout, 1965: 30f) – comes close to the notion of the ‘experienced space’, except that it is a purely cognitive construct lacking the emotional dimension and the emphasis on values.

The Sprouts extensive discussion of the “man-milieu relationship” (Sprout and Sprout, 1965: 47ff) deals with how the environment affects the state and vice versa and ranges from environmental determinism, a watered down version of the same where the environment ‘conditions’ human existence, via what they call “environmental possibilism”, where the milieu is “simply there” and like clay “sometimes malleable, sometimes refractory...at the disposal of...the builder” (Ibid., 83), before settling with a complex model. While the Sprouts’ complex model is unsuitable for integrating it into the concept of a national biography, it draws attention to the interplay of how the state forms and is formed by the space it is situated in (see also Aron, 1966: 187ff). It is echoed in Arnold Wolfers’ suggestion that states hold “milieu goals” aimed at shaping conditions “beyond national boundaries”. With the notion of milieu goals Wolfers seeks to capture that states “have reason to concern themselves with things other than their own possessions”, namely creating “peace and order” and making a difference in “happiness, in future opportunities, and perhaps in moral satisfaction” (Wolfers, 1962: 73ff). Said differently, shaping the ‘milieu’ is about influencing the development of a space beyond its Westphalian borders, a space which ‘the state’ neither owns nor controls but whose constellation it nevertheless considers of vital importance for its well being.

Although none of these authors are concerned with rethinking the ontology of the state – indeed they do not question its composition as a territorial unit – their attempt to think about a symbiotic relationship with the environment goes some way towards the idea of an ‘experienced space’. From recognizing complex interactions between the state and its ‘milieu’ it is only a short step to conceptualise this relationship as a process of mutual

---

204 After a lengthy discussion about the problems involved with ‘personifying the state’ the Sprouts accept that one may redefine states “in a manner compatible with psychological modes of speaking” (Sprout and Sprout 1965: 37).

205 For an application to the German case, see Bulmer et al. (2000).
constitution. What still needs to be emphasized is that ‘the state’ is not ontologically separate from ‘its’ surrounding space, that the two unfold together and that in this process meaning is inscribed into both.

**Thinking of Regions: The European Space**

The third concept for thinking differently about the state’s situatedness in space is regionalism. In IR a focus on ‘regions’ and on processes of ‘regionalisation’ is generally understood as analyzing interaction on the level somewhere between ‘the state’ and ‘the global’. For Karl Deutsch, a region is “a set of countries that are more markedly interdependent over a wide range of different dimensions – and usually transactions – than they are with other countries. In many ways, therefore, regions are made by culture, history, politics, and economics rather than by geography alone” (cited in Adler 1997a: 253). For many scholars the analysis of regions primarily is about a shift in the level of analysis within an anarchic world. For instance, Barry Buzan and Ole Waever’s ‘Regional Security Complexes’ are objectively identifiable ‘subsystems’ in a neorealist world of anarchy, rooted in territoriality and defined by (perceived) security interdependence amongst its entities (states) (Buzan and Waever 2003: 11, 41-49, 80-87). As Buzan and Waever note, this framework does not deal with the political practice of “labelling regions”, that is, how regional spaces are constructed from the perspective of ‘the state’ and the meaning given to them, let alone how the state sees itself situated within a ‘region’ (Buzan and Waever 2003: 48).

More fruitful for the present purpose is David Lake and Patrick Morgan’s (1997) conception of regions, which picks up Andrew Hurrell’s point that notions of ‘regional awareness’, ‘regional identity’ and ‘regional consciousness’ are central to the analysis of regionalism. Hurrell even makes an explicit connection between nationalism and regionalism when noting that “as with nationalism, there is a good deal of historical rediscovery, myth-making, and invented traditions” within regions (Hurrell 1995: 41). In the same vein, and with a focus on the security realm, Emanuel Adler suggests that understanding of how people create security requires examining the link between their images of reality and “the places and regions that people feel comfortable calling ‘home’” (Adler 1997a: 249). For Adler such places which are “perceived as ‘home’ and ‘insideness’” are regions, defined not primarily on the basis of territory but values. In what echoes the Sprouts’ psycho-milieu, Adler describes processes of identification with

---

206 For overviews of the conceptualisation of ‘regions’ in IR, see Hurrell (1995); Lake and Morgan (1997, ch. 1); Buzan and Waever (2003: 77-82); Katzenstein (2005, ch. 1).

207 Less ‘objective’ yet also focused on state-state interaction is Katzenstein (2005).
what he calls “regional systems of meanings” or “cognitive regions” (Ibid., 252-254). Although Adler downplays the significance of emotional attachment, contradicting his own emphasis on ‘feeling comfortable’, his discussion makes three important points. First, and most strongly, Adler sees these regions as an extension of what Ruggie called “social epistemes”, namely webs of meaning and signification emerging out of “the process by which a society first comes to imagine itself” (Ruggie 1993: 157). As such, second, he not only emphasises the importance of institutions and interactions within them as playing a major role in constituting such regions, but the region is also understood to be part of ‘the state’. This is linked to, third, Adler’s notes how regions, understood as cognitive spaces, serve to provide a sense of being at ‘home’. Although the last two points are made more tentatively, they provide important conceptual openings when now moving to the specific phenomenon of the ‘European’ region.

The final clues are taken from studies of the ‘European’ region. This is not merely because the empirical puzzle deals with institutions addressing ‘European security’ but, in confirmation of Hurrell’s (1995: 45) claim that the study of European integration has done most to advance the theoretical analysis of ‘regionalism’, because the phenomenon of ‘Europeanisation’ comes closest to capturing the image of a state unfolding in an experienced space. Most obviously, the process of European integration invites conceiving of ‘Europe’ as a dynamic space under construction. Attempts to come to terms with Ruggie’s (1993: 140) assessment that the spatial complexes associated with the EU “may constitute nothing less than the emergence of the truly postmodern international political form” provide fertile ground for rethinking ‘the state’ in space.

If one looks beyond the debate between ‘supranationalist’ and ‘intergovernmentalist’ designs, and if one leaves aside complex attempts to conceptualise Europe as forming some sort of neo-medieval system, valuable ontological insights on how ‘Europe’ features in the spatial configuration of the state emerge in the debate around a ‘European identity’ (Smith 1997; Strath 2002). When research on whether ‘Europe’ had replaced the ‘nation’ as the primary point of identification among the population of EU member states produced inconclusive results, scholars came to realise that there is no trade-off in the interplay between national and European identities. Instead of replacing the state, ‘Europe’ was inscribed into the conception of ‘the state’, suggesting that “the states/nations themselves have been transformed and the European level integrated into the meaning of the state/nation” (Weaver 1998: 94; also Wallace 1997). This process has

---

208 Adler’s conception of cognitive regions jumps immediately to the relational level by emphasising their intersubjective nature. See the following chapter.
been captured in the literature under the notion of ‘Europeanisation’, encompassing both ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ movements of how either ‘state’ representatives have transformed the ‘European’ landscape of governance (most visible in terms of law) through EU institutions or how the latter have shaped the Member States’ understanding of themselves as ‘European’ (captured on the individual level in the notion of ‘going native in Brussels’). In contrast to Adler’s notion of cognitive regions as purely intersubjective constructs, studies of ‘Europeanisation’ have demonstrated that the European space takes on a genuine national outlook and, thus, that states have different (subjective) conceptions of ‘Europe’ (Marcussen et al. 1999; Herzfeld 2002; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003). This ‘Europeanisation’ phenomenon comes closest to offering a conception of the state unfolding in a broader experienced space whose meaning is incorporated in the national narrative (see also Delanty and Rumford 2005).

That said, the ‘Europeanisation’ perspective has one weakness which it shares with the moderate constructivist narrative discussed earlier: by implying a progressive development, the Westphalian state remains the starting point and the ‘European’ dimension is conceived of as something new, a recent phenomenon which is product of a socialisation process through participation in European integration. Yet from a deep theory perspective this spatial conception is nothing ‘new’. While it arguably is the case that the EC (now EU) process has advanced a certain idea of Europe, as Pocock (1997: 302) reminds ‘Europe’ has always meant different things to different people. States which are geographically located on the European continent have always contained a some conception of ‘Europe’ in their national narrative, a point made recently by Ute Frevert’s (2005) in her call for a ‘Europeanisation’ of German history.

Parameters of Authenticity II: Unfolding in Time

This section substantiates the temporal dimension of the national biography and, hence, to conceptualize how “the good [is] woven into my understanding of my life as an unfolding story” (Taylor 1989: 47). Simply put, it is about exploring how meaning is generated and manifested in time. In discussing how an unfolding Self gains a sense of stability/continuity by turning ‘past’ and ‘future’ into meaningful places, the below also considers how the spatial features discussed earlier – centre/soul, valued order and value-horizons – feature in time. By doing so, the discussion also weaves in two of

209 See also Green Cowles et al. (2003); Radaelli (2004); Major (2005).
210 Paul Schroeder (1994) suggests that a shift towards thinking ‘European’ occurred around the time of the Vienna Congress in 1815. On the history of the idea of Europe, see Pagden (2002).
Bergson’s points, downplayed by Heidegger, namely how meaningful experience grounds the Self emotionally and how experiences have creative potential.211

Past: Memory Spaces
The ‘experienced’ space is one which, by definition, brings out the past as a category for orientation. Said the other way around, as an accumulation of experiences, the past is a reservoir for inscribing space with meaning. This reservoir is accessed through memory or, more precisely, by “memory space” (Assmann, 1999). Memories have long been recognized as a force of orientation central Self-consciousness. Indeed, scholars of memory hold that a sense of Self is defined primarily, if not exclusively, by engaging with the past: “an understanding of the past...tells us who we are” (Lebow, 2006: 3).212 While this claim is a bit too strong as it misses taking into account the future, for now the important point is that through memories or “frames of remembrance” (Irwin-Zarecka 1994) the Self is linked to its past. Indeed one might even say the memory space is the past the Self lives in.213 The significance of memories for the national biography is that they are rooted in and thereby give access to experience (Koselleck, 1985). As Iwona Irwin-Zarecka emphasizes,

"we have by now become so familiar with accounts of how history can be rewritten, manipulated for political ends, forgotten, or embellished, that we may be at risk of losing from view the experiential bases on which...memory, rests. In the most direct terms, as people first articulate and share the sense they make of their past, it is their experience, in all its emotional complexity, that serves as the key reference point" (Irwin-Zarecka, 1994: 17).

Unfolding through a memory space requires a reflective Self as the process of remembering involves an evaluation – learning and interpretation – of experience. This process is intertwined with forgetting, indeed as Heidegger and others have pointed out that the latter is a necessary element of the former (Heidegger 1953: 339; Assmann 1999: 30; Bleiker, 1997). Thus the notion of memory space does not simply add another layer to the experienced space but substantiates the conceptualisation of the latter. It

211 Bergson’s account is otherwise less suitable for three major reasons. First, rather than rethinking the spatiality of being, his critique of the mathematical conception of space leads Bergson to reject the link between experience and space (Guerlac 2006: 63-65). Second, Bergson’s reading of ‘inner time’ as a unique mental/emotional state places too much emphasis on the inward-looking individual rather than one constituted via ‘worldliness’. Third, by focusing on the fusion of experiences and the moment of creation, past and future cease to be meaningful analytical categories. Heidegger was highly critical of Bergson’s ontology of Self and time which he considered “completely unbestimmt and insufficient” (Heidegger 1953: 333). On Heidegger’s engagement with Bergson, see Collins-Cavanaugh (2005)
212 See also Assmann (1999); Irwin-Zarecka (1994); Fentress and Wickham (1992).
213 Historians have long ignored memory as a credible source because of its subjective bias.
asks how meaning is extracted from (or, rather, attributed to) experience and how it becomes part of the ontological structure of being. More precisely, it asks how memory and experience relate.

Irwin-Zarecka (1994) speaks of a “household” or “infrastructure” of memory, where memory is ‘held alive’ through various media and practices. Yet to say that ‘memory’ is held alive, scholars are divided over whether memories should be regarded as ‘knowledge containers’ which store and recall ‘facts’ on demand, or whether they should be seen as an unsystematic source of sensations (Fentress and Wickham 1992; Assmann 1999). One way out is to adopt the suggestion made by Fentress and Wickham (1992) that the question is not about two ‘kinds’ of memory but about representation. Those memories which appear like replica of the past do so because they are translated into and made accessible through language, whereas those experiences which cannot be articulated remain ‘personal’. In other words, the matter is one of communicability: “what emerges at the point of articulation is not the objective part of memory but its social aspect” (Fentress and Wickham 1992: 7).

The notion of a ‘personal’ memory echoes Bergson’s notion of ‘inner time’ constituted by the idiosyncratic fusion of significant experiences mentioned in the previous chapter. While its exclusivity makes it a source of authenticity, when applied to the level of a national biography, that is, when assuming that memory is held collectively in a ‘society’ or ‘nation’, this exclusivity is compromised of course. Distancing himself from Bergson, Maurice Halbwachs famously spoke of the existence of such a “collective memory”, or the “social frameworks of memory” (cadres sociaux de la memoire), as he originally termed it (Halbwachs, 1992 [1952]). A national biography is such a social frameworks which binds a society through shared meaning structures generated from experiences. More precisely, political agents compete for the most ‘adequate’ representation and seek acceptance for the same amongst those sharing the experience and identifying with the national biography. To understand how memory space can give rise to competing representations, it is necessary to take a closer look at the ‘nature’ of the experience.

214 The role of agency will be taken up towards the end of this chapter. The next chapter (seven) will argue that this representation occurs in a transnational setting, that is, involves not only the domestic constituency but also external partners.
The Ambiguity of Significant Experience

A memory space is created by a significant experience, vaguely defined as an experience which disturbs and reconfigures the world the Self had disclosed. It is foundational by way of unsettling the Self's understanding of the world and, hence, its position in it. It leaves a deep emotional impression. An extreme version of a significant experience is the 'shock', which could be seen as similar to that Heideggerian moment in which the Self is pulled back from the everyday and able to grasp the authenticity of its existence. The difference is that while Heidegger fixes that moment as one in which the Self 'faces' its own death, the shock as a significant experience constitutes a source for authentic becoming by turning the past into a source for meaning through which the Self understands its being-in-the-world.

While a significant experience is not necessarily negative, they often are. Amongst them, war can be seen as forming a crucial if not the most important memory space in a national biography. The experience of violence, suffering and loss it entails leaves a deep impression amongst all involved. As one scholar notes, “no single act of politics interferes so radically and so profoundly in the lives of people...as war” (Krippendorf quoted in Rast 2006: 16). Although the degree of interference varies in a society, war affects and leaves deep traces in society and shapes those cadres sociaux de la memoire (Rast 2006). Psychoanalysts have discussed the impact of war in shaping the biography of those experiencing it and historians have discussed its effect on nationalism and the 'making' of states. Indeed, the central place of war in the memory of 'states' as reflexive beings is central to IR since its inception. As discussed in chapter three, realist theorizing fundamentally builds on the argument that the experience of war conditions how states (should) orientate themselves in space and time.

A significant experience such as war cannot be reproduced but only represented, and even this is difficult as pointed out by scholars investigating the phenomenon of 'trauma'. Introduced by Freud used to replace the term 'shock', the 'trauma' was to describe the psychological effects witnessed among soldiers in the First World War unable to explain what happened 'out there', witnessed also among survivors of other 'unimaginable' experiences such as concentration camps in Nazi Germany, the detonation of atomic bombs in Japan, or the American defeat in Vietnam (Edkins 2003). Phenomenologically, what makes (war understood as) trauma significant is that it cannot be 'unmade' or forgotten. The Self has to live with it, quite literally, in what Saul

---

215 Caruth (1996); Edkins (2003); Fierke (2003); Bell (2003); Alexander et al. (2004).
Friedlander has termed “deep memory” (see Young 2003), inscribed in the very definition of a trauma as an “event that leaves indelible marks upon...consciousness, will mark...memories forever, and will change (the) future in fundamental and irrevocable ways” (Alexander 2004: 1).

In contrast to the notion of a ‘critical juncture’ employed by institutionalists, a significant experience (shock/trauma) does not lay out a clear path on which the Self moves forward. Hence, against the view put forward by realists, the experience of war does not necessarily generate distrust and pessimism. By intervening in the Self’s understanding/knowledge of the world, it not only magnifies the feeling of anxiety but also opens up the view for possibilities of being which the Self had not been aware of previously (see below). In the taxonomy used here, the significant experience necessarily alters the configuration of the centre/soul and the drawing of value-horizons. In that sense, it does marks a ‘turning point’ in the biography of the Self by both ‘breaking’ ground and providing necessary opportunities for ‘(re)making’ ground. Yet because the meaning of a shock/trauma cannot be exhausted, it is not historically deterministic but a source of creativity, as noted by scholars like Bergson, Walter Benjamin, or Hannah Arendt. As noted in the last chapter, Bergson particularly emphasised the creative process coming out of the fusion of experiences, which transforms the memory space and poses a permanent necessity and opportunity to, as Arendt put it, “think experience” and use this thinking as a guide for activity (Althaus, 2001).

Significant experiences thus become a source of energy through which moral lessons are derived. They leave places in the past marked through not much more than names – Verdun, Auschwitz, Hiroshima, Vietnam – which ‘stand for’ something. And when this something (linguists would say the ‘signifier’) is filled with meaning they become a space for creativity. Thus, ‘making sense’ of significant experiences associated with these places implies that the lessons derived from them are made. Because lessons are a creation of the Self and not intrinsic to the experience, it comes to no surprise that scholars examining the use of ‘history’ among foreign policy makers find that analogies

216 A war experience does not need to be exclusively traumatic and may be offset by the experience of victory. The emotional experience of ‘winning’ has a significant effect on how the Self sees its place in the world, as the phenomenon of ‘triumphalism’ visible in post-1990 American foreign policy testifies.
217 Assmann (1999: 372ff) discusses various examples of how memory takes the form of a ‘treasure of suffering’ [Leidschatz] and becomes a creative driving force for ‘traumatized’ individuals.
are contested and that ‘learning’ is an ambiguous process which does not lend itself to prediction.\textsuperscript{218}

\textbf{Future: Envisioned Spaces}

For ‘thinking experience’ the past is not enough. Memory spaces cannot sufficiently center the Self, that is, control its anxiety and satisfy the desire for stability/continuity, for two reasons: first, as noted above, significant experiences will always remain a source of ambiguity, and the lessons ‘learned’ from them are never definite. Second, while the ‘grounding’ in memory provides a centre of gravity in the past, even a strong ‘sense of history’ cannot tame anxiety simply because it does not address the uncertainty of the future. Hence, what is missing from the biography of the Self is how the ‘historicity’ of being is linked to the future. More precisely, it is necessary to connect the ‘historical being’ with the ‘future being’ by thinking about how the future becomes a meaningful place which can be, if not ever ‘known’, at least imagined.

The importance of the category of the future is apparent in the fact that unfolding is a forward-movement. Indeed, in Heidegger’s understanding of the ‘structural whole’ of being-in-the-world, being as \textit{becoming} is fundamentally future oriented. The unknown future is the source of anxiety and is responsible for the fact that ‘being’ is always incomplete, something not-yet. And because the mood of anxiety is directed into or, rather, comes out of the future, the orientation towards and its desire to ‘understand’ (give meaning to) the future is the most significant element of ‘being’ (Heidegger 1953: §65, 327ff.).

As noted in the last chapter, for Heidegger authenticity emerges out of understanding ones “ownmost [or: innermost] possibilities” (Heidegger 1953: §31, §68a). As a future-oriented being, the Self is constituted through its understanding of that it can-be. Being, Heidegger writes is not a present thing \textit{[ein Vorhandenes]} but is “primarily possible-being \textit{[Möglichsein]}. Being is always that which it can be and how it is its possibility \textit{[wie es seine Möglichkeit ist]}’. This possibility is not an “empty, logical possibility” as contained in contingency, where one is randomly expecting that this or that may happen (Ibid., 143). Rather than being a free-floating possibility, the possible-being Heidegger speaks about is that being which has understood that it could become one way or another. The understanding of this possibility of being takes the form of what he calls \textit{Entwurf}, which might be translated as design, which delineates “the room of manoeuvre

\textsuperscript{218} May (1973); May and Neustadt (1986); Jervis (1976); Khong (1992); Levy (1994).
"Spielraum" of what the Self actually can become. Yet as Heidegger points out the Entwurf is not a carefully thought-through plan which the Self follows but, rather, is an understanding the possibilities of being, of what it can become, as possibilities (Ibid., 145). The designing Entwerfende Self is envisioning the places it can unfold towards, projects them into the future and draws its horizon of expectations around them. And by understanding its possibilities, by seeing these places, the Self always already is these possibilities and, to that extent, already is in these places. As Heidegger writes, “Only because [the Self] is constituted through understanding and its design-character, because it is what it becomes [bzw] does not become, can it...say to itself: ‘become what you are!’” (Ibid., 145). In Malpas’ words, being is “always ‘on the way’...but that which it is on the way toward is the place in which it already begins” (Malpas 2006: 17).

Understanding ones ‘ownmost’ possibilities, then, is a key feature of authentic becoming. Heidegger calls this vorlaufen, which literally means ‘running forward/ahead’ but may be better translated as advancing into or anticipating, basically capturing the formulation of an authentic future (Heidegger 1953: 336). He juxtaposes the vorlaufende Self with the Self on the path of Verfallen, where the Self’s understanding of its possibilities is blurred because by getting lost in the everyday the Self looses sight of what it could be. It does not recognise that only death limits the possibilities available to being and thus also does not recognise the future as its place. Such a future is inauthentic. Hence, in the process of Verfallen the Self does not really grasp the potential of ‘being towards’, of projecting meaning into the world of the ‘not yet’, it lacks full awareness of the ‘not yet’ as a source of hope, promise, and possibilities. Even if the theoretical narrative developed here does not adopt Heidegger’s point that only in facing ones own death the ‘moment of vision’ emerges in which grasping authentic being is possible, it does adopt the view that the ability to delineate a distinctive meaningful future, which one is able to ‘claim’ and move towards, is necessary for authentic becoming.

Recognizing the possibilities of the future implies not only that the future is understood to be ‘open’ (although not open-ended), it also makes the future a space which provides its own source of energy. Whereas the memory space and the significant experiences it contains is an inexhaustible source of meaning, as noted earlier, the energy of the future is found in its ‘pull factor’, that is, of providing the Self with an opportunity to ‘rethink’ experience the past and move on, or ahead, on a certain ‘course’. It lends unfolding what Heidegger calls Entschlossenheit, namely the resolve to realize a vision which, by doing so, it is becoming. Conceptualising authentic becoming – the formulation of an authentic
biographical narrative – as the ability of understanding ones future possibilities is not to argue that visions of future places are designed out of thin air, or that they are sterile and fixed. Rather, in correspondence with the above discussion, they are created through the memory space formed by significant experiences in a process of creative projection. This conceptualisation of the connection between past and future will be arrived at via a discussion of utopias/visions.\textsuperscript{219}

\section*{Utopia as the Place to Be\textsuperscript{220}}

Enabling the Self to unfold into a meaningful future, utopias are a central element of a coherent biographical narrative. In a way, utopias or visions of the ‘good’ order projected into the future provide the complementary anxiety controlling mechanism to the memory space created by significant experiences. A utopia transforms the ‘surrounding’ space the Self has disclosed into one in which the Self situates itself in the future and turns the same into a meaningful place. It delineates an envisioned space and corresponding “horizons of expectations” (Koselleck 1985) which the Self sees itself unfolding into/moving towards and in the possibility of which it believes. By delineating this place to be, utopias provide the direction for unfolding and, as such, are confirmed through practices. As such, the vision toward which political leaders direct the narrative of ‘the state’ also directs their policies and, in that sense, means and ends merge.

Unfortunately, while IR scholars accept that decision makers may be guided by ‘worldviews’, utopias carry an analytical stigma in the discipline and do not receive much analytical attention. Paradoxically, this stigmatisation was advocated and continues to be upheld by those scholars who first recognised its importance, namely realists. The insight that utopias matter has been central to IR scholarship since Carr noted that “utopianism penetrates the citadel of realism” (Carr 2001: 85). Realism emerged as a normative-analytical corrective intended to warn policymakers ‘blinded’ by the wrong ideas of how the world works, and so giving analytical importance to utopias other than those advocated by realist worst-case scenarios was discouraged.\textsuperscript{221}

Although scholars have rehabilitated ideas and acknowledge that they may serve as “road maps” and “focal points” defining “the universe of possibilities” in the future (Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 8), with Wendt at one point suggesting that state

\textsuperscript{219} I am using ‘visions’ when referring to ideas of order projected into the future because ‘utopias’ and ‘ideologies’ are too laden with meaning in the general understanding.

\textsuperscript{220} In that sense, the place attributed to utopias here contradicts the original meaning of the term, a fusion of the Greek words ‘ou’ (not) and ‘topos’ (place), hence literally ‘no-place’.

\textsuperscript{221} The stigma also has lead some politicians to deny that they are guided by visions, as former German chancellor Helmut Schmidt once remarked “the one who has visions should go see a doctor” (cited in Der Spiegel, 44/2002, p. 26).
behaviour is guided by “self-fulfilling prophecies” (Wendt 1999: 184ff.), the realist critique has left its mark and makes a closer look at them necessary.

Utopias have always played a central role in social life. While the term is said to have entered the world with the publication of Thomas More’s book of the same title in 1516, this publication can be placed in the line with political writings envisioning order initiated by Plato (Logan and Adams, 1989). Formulations of utopias can be found in all philosophies promising progress in human affairs, whether Kant’s idea of a perpetual peace, Hobbes’ formulation of the Leviathan, or Marx’ promise of a classless society (Ruesen et al. 2005; Hutchings 2008). Karl Mannheim describes utopias as “methods of thought by means of which we arrive at our most crucial decisions, and through which we seek to diagnose and guide our political and social destiny” (Mannheim 1936: 1f) and Tower Sargent claims that “utopian thinking it essential for our social, political, and psychological health”, quoting Oscar Wilde saying that “a map of the world that does not include utopia is not worth even glancing at” (Tower Sargent 2005: 4).

While for some utopia is “the best of all possible worlds” (Nozick, 1974: 298), the present conception is more modest. It does not understand utopia as a promise of paradise but merely as a vision of a better world. This follows Lyman Tower Sargent’s (2005) point that envisioning the ‘good life’ does not necessarily mean envisioning a perfect world. Indeed, one can go all the way back to More’s character, who sees a society which he considers preferable to the one he lives but not one without flaws (Moore 1989 [1516]: 109-111). At the same time, visions of the future may also encompass a dystopia, that is, they may include pictures not only of ‘better worlds’ (characterized by the good/desirable order) but also of undesirable ones (characterized by the bad/undesirable order). Dystopian visions are also projected into the familiar space and paint the picture of an unpleasant future. To be envisioned, they must be considered just as ‘possible’ as a utopia, and their purpose is to call for certain activities for averting the dystopia. As such, dystopias are used to envision and order the Self could become if it does not sufficiently invest into the path given by the utopia. In manifesting an image of a ‘worse world’, dystopias further strengthen the future as a meaningful place by reinforcing the contours of the ‘better world’ through an image of the alternative unfolding. However, while a utopia is likely to be strengthened through the parallel formulation of a credible dystopia – a prominent pairing being that of heaven and hell – it is not assumed here that a utopia is necessarily accompanied by a dystopia.
An important question is when visions of the future, whether utopias or dystopias, are considered possible (credible/believable). This brings in the realist critique of utopias. Perhaps most famous is Marx’ critique of ideology and his complaint that religion was creating happiness through an illusion. Yet Marx’ critique of ideologies is not only evidence that he was well aware of their influence in shaping human consciousness (which for him was ‘false’ until it recognized the material conditions as he saw them), the fact that he still devised his own utopia of a class-less society is testimony to the ambivalence the role of visions have in ‘materialist’ (or realist) writings.

One prominent example is Karl Mannheim’s work. For Mannheim, who was influenced by Marx, ‘ideologies’ and ‘utopias’ are psychological phenomena transcending the historically formed order or, in his words, ‘reality’ (Mannheim 1936: 193). The central feature distinguishing ‘ideologies’ and ‘utopias’ is the static (or conservative) character of the former and the progressive (or revolutionary) character of the latter (Mannheim 1936: 40). More precisely, for Mannheim ‘ideology’ is not only a self-deceptive understanding of the world but a state of mind whose strong value-orientation makes people unaware of the dynamic of ‘reality’, an artificial stabilizer rendering its bearer prone to misperceptions and, therefore, functions as a source of error. By contrast, utopias are states of mind “oriented towards objects which do not exist in the actual situation” (Ibid, 192) and aimed at transformation. They are ‘wish-images’ giving rise to practice challenging and breaking with “the order of things prevailing at the time”, which makes them revolutionary in character and different from ‘ideologies’ which Mannheim sees as more conservative. Yet while Mannheim gives a negative connotation to both, he tries to reconcile the tension in Marx’ by mentioning forward-looking ideas that are ‘appropriate’ in the sense that they neither ignore nor challenge the existing order but remain “organically’ and harmoniously integrated into the world-view characteristic of the period” (Ibid, 193). In other words, here the vision is ‘transcending’ by going beyond but not breaking with what ‘is’ or, rather, if reality is understood as a historically condition order, what ‘was’.

Carr, the most prominent IR scholar discussing utopias, was influenced by both Marx and Mannheim (Cox, 2001: xix) and also struggles with both criticizing utopias and acknowledging their importance. He approvingly quotes Reinhold Niebuhr saying that

---

222 In his Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right Marx called religion “the opium of the people”. Marx/Engels’ critique of ‘The German Ideology’ was influential in casting ideology as deceptive.

223 “Not until certain social groups embodied these wish-images into their actual conduct, and tried to realize them, did these ideologies become utopian“ (Mannheim, 1936: 193)
“the truest visions of religions are illusions, which may be partly realized by being resolutely believed” (in Carr, 2001 [1946]: 85). He balances his attack on the specific belief of a ‘harmony of interest’ with noting that political thinking always contains an element of utopia because aspirations are an inevitable, even necessary part of (political) life. Indeed, for Carr ‘utopia’ and ‘reality’ – the conditions given by history – are related in a dialectic movement in which ideals (utopias) become embedded in institutions and over time turn into ‘reality’. In this process of ‘materialization’ the ideal looses its utopian character and is eventually challenged by a new ideal (utopia). Carr’s critique of ‘idealism’ thus is compromised by recognizing that ‘pure realism’ can offer nothing in satisfying human aspirations; once a utopia is demolished, he concedes, “we still need to build a new utopia (...) The human will continue to seek an escape...in the vision of an international order” (Carr 2001 (1946): 87). It is not difficult to see why Carr’s analytical frame has been labelled “utopian realism” (Booth 1991) and “peculiar realism” (Wilson 2001).

Even realist scholars accept the human need for utopias as an anxiety controlling mechanism, indeed by producing their worst-case scenarios they are in the business of producing their own. More generally, realists share Marx’ basic point that utopias are dangerous if divorced from certain historically grown structures. Thus, Mannheim calls for an ‘appropriate’ utopia and others stress ‘relative’, ‘limited’ or ‘robust’ utopias, that is, visions which build their transformative agenda into/onto the existing order of things rather than against it (Alexander 2001; Tower Sargent 2005). In addition to the from an ethical standpoint crucial warning against totalizing utopias, what societies consider an ‘appropriate’ utopia in the sense of it fitting in the national biography points to the fact that visions of order are not invented in a vacuum. As noted earlier, for it to work as a meaningful reference, a vision must be considered possible and must have a reference somewhere, which means that place in the future cannot be radically ‘new’.

In other words, the purpose of utopias is not to confirm the contingency of the future but

---

224 For a recent argument along similar lines, see Lawson (2008). Although Mannheim also acknowledges that judgment is relative by noting that the label ‘utopia’ tends to be used by those who believe someone else’s plans to be unrealizable, whereas for those following it a ‘utopia’ may well mean the reality of tomorrow (Mannheim 1936: 196, 203).

225 The problem being, of course, that what may appears as a ‘better world’ containing a ‘good order’ utopia for some may be an undesirable order for others. Utopias which are clashing or irreconcilable with, or even ignore the lives of, others may produce trajectories the pursuit of which lead to oppression and violence. Unfortunately, there are many examples of national biographies adopting such totalizing utopias, the one propagated by Nazi Germany being just the most tragic example. For a critique of flawless and ‘pure’ ideas of order, see Baumann (1991: 10; 1997: Ch. 1).

226 The emphasis on the creative ability of the human to imagine the future disconnected from what ‘exists’ is prominent among feminist scholars, see Grosz (2005).
to turn it into a domain of envisioned possibilities which, in one way or another, must be known to be imagined (Koselleck 1985). Hence, envisioning the future must go 'through' the past, through the experienced space in a narrative. Just as in More's novel – his character discovers an island similar to the size of England – utopias are not completely invented but inscribed into a familiar space. They build upon and transform the 'experienced space'.

To be sure, this construction of expectations/visions/utopias out of experience does mean envisioning the future as a return of past as the realist cyclical view of history would have it. As noted earlier, significant experiences do not issue clear guidelines, they are ambiguous and indeterminate. The meaning given to an experience and the inscription of value into an experience occurs through the formulation of the lesson taken from it. And because these lessons are used as future guidelines, their generation occurs with an eye to the future. In other words, exactly what is remembered and exactly which lessons are extracted from the memory space emerges only in the process of sorting future possibilities of being. They only emerge by being linked to a design for the future, by being embedded in a vision of what being-in-the-world can (should) look like. It is only through that vision that the experienced space becomes a project in which the Self is constituted as a temporal whole.

Agency in the Biographical Narrative

This project is the formulation of an authentic national biography. Pursuing a meaningful vision through the memory space connects past and future to a coherent narrative and controls anxiety. More precisely, where horizons of experience and expectation are fused, where the experiences space merges with a meaningful vision of its future composition, where the ‘lessons’ can be used to give life to a ‘project’ – this is where the biographical narrative feels authentic and the Self feels at ‘home’. In such a narrative, the design of the envisioned space resonates with the soul, as captured by Gaston Bachelard when he speaks of space gaining significance through a poetic image (Bachelard, 1969/1994). Just like a poem, a meaningful utopia makes a connection which Bachelard describes as “a veritable awakening”, the possibility of the onset of an image which takes emotional root in the soul. Just like a poem, the project and the

---

227 As Koselleck points out, this connection between past and future used to be understood among historians when Geschichte was more a narrative which “did not primarily mean the past, as it did later; rather it indicated that covert connection of the bygone with the future whose relationship can only be perceived when one has learned to construct history from modalities of memory and hope” (Koselleck 1985: 270). On narrative, see also Carr (1986); Ringmar (1996); Campbell (1998).

228 On the notion of the state as a project, see also Jackson and Nexon (1999: 307ff.).
design of the future being-in-the-world it contains is simple, “the property of a naïve consciousness...in its expression it is youthful language” (Bachelard, 1994: xix). It is necessarily naïve because otherwise it could not be creative; and it is necessarily simple because it needs to evolve. This project constructed in the interstices of past and future is both intimate and sufficiently vague to accommodate changing interpretations and allowing the project’s endurance.

Generating and sustaining a biographical narrative thus is more than an act of transmitting signals, of putting together some lose ends. It is, rather, an existential of being which requires not administrative but creative capacity, that is, agency. Agency here appears similar to what Emirbayer and Mische (1998: 970) have described as a temporally embedded process where decisions are informed (1) by the past, stimulating an element of iteration based on past patterns of thought and action (here: ‘learning’), (2) by the future, stimulating an element of projection based on the capacity to imagine alternative possibilities, and (3) by the present, stimulating an element of practical evaluation. In its reflexive capacity to synthesize spatio-temporal orientations this way, the Self becomes an agent in the form of what might be called a “relational pragmatic” (Emirbayer and Mische 1998). As this interpretative act is open to debate and contestation, it is political. Scholars have captured this under the notion of ‘identity politics’, which mostly focuses on the ‘politics of history’, with the ‘politics of the future’ receiving far less attention.

The formulation of a national biography is a contested terrain in which political actors compete for voice and authority. While every society contains a variety of agents engaged to greater or lesser degree in the formulation and maintenance of a meaningful biographical narrative – ranging from teachers, via artists and intellectuals to editors, curators and bureaucrats – in this thesis authority is assumed to lie primarily with political leaders. More precisely, it focuses on personalities which obtain the authority to formulate and represent the narrative by virtue of their position as formally accepted (elected) heads of state. How this position of authority is reached varies with each society. Weber’s (1976: 28) famous discussion on authority, derived from the belief in the legitimacy of a certain person, or body, to formulate and uphold order, distinguishes between authority based on cost-benefit calculation, custom, or personal affection amongst those accepting the order. Said differently, Weber suggests legitimacy is granted through either a legal arrangement, a belief in tradition, or the leader’s charisma.

229 For a comprehensive analysis of the politics of time which, unfortunately, I could not adequately incorporate in this thesis, see Hutchings (2008).
(Weber 1992: 151-166). In most cases it is a combination of the three, to which
democratic political systems put in place mechanisms which ensure that the leader
(knows he/she) is held accountable for the formulation and maintenance of the
narrative.  

230 The securitization literature is beginning to address questions of authority, see Stritzel (2007).
CHAPTER SIX: INTERSTATE RELATIONS AS FRIENDSHIP

Summary

The previous chapter conceptualized the state as a national biography and outlined its spatio-temporal parameters. It was argued that the state, maintained by a community sharing a sense of 'Self', controls anxiety and stabilizes its being-in-the-world world through a coherent narrative where meaning is inscribed in an experienced space ordered and bound by value horizons and projected into an envisioned space. The formulation of an authentic national biography through the merger of memories and visions, thereby connecting horizons of experience and of expectations, was said to be a creative project pursued by political leaders. This chapter discusses the social or intersubjective dimension of this narrative and suggests that it is formulated with significant Others, that is, in the context of a particular or ‘intimate’ relationship defined as friendship.

The insertion of the friend into the causal narrative occurs in five steps: first, it will be shown that Heidegger's logic is unsuitable for reading authenticity into a social dimension (and criticises attempts doing so). Second, the chapter argues that friendship has been underconceptualized in IR and that existing accounts focusing on 'group membership' are unsuitable for accommodating desires of authenticity. Third, the ontology of unfolding through friendship will be substantiated by drawing on Aristotle, discussing equality and a unique logic of reciprocity as key aspects of friendship. Fourth, the friendship ontology will be adapted into a reading of ‘interstate’ relations bonded by overlapping national biographies to argue that creating such bonds in a particular space enables ‘states’ to gain social stability (satisfying desires for belonging/recognition) as well as maintaining a sense of authenticity. Finally, discussing the empowerment effect of friendship through investment in a shared project, the chapter concludes with arguing that international institutions serve as platforms through which this project is negotiated.

The Limits of Heidegger’s Social Ontology

So far, the conception of ‘states’ as striving for an authentic national biography might be seen as creating what Charles Taylor calls a “culture of narcissism” (Taylor 1994: 55), as supporting an individualistic, anti-social and potentially conflictual reading of interstate relations due to clashing narratives of meanings and values. Such a reading is premature, however, because it is based on an incomplete ontology and an incomplete causal narrative. While the previous chapter described the process of authentic becoming, of unfolding in space and time, as a creative process merging past and future,
little was said about the place of ‘Others’ in this process. Yet if cooperation is to be explained on the basis of a common interest emerging out of and supporting individual (national) interests, defined as the creation and maintenance of a coherent biographical narrative, then the role of the ‘Other’ in this process needs to be looked at more carefully.

A Hobbesian account of the human condition rests on the basic acknowledgment that the Self is not alone in the world. And as hinted at already in the previous chapter, Heidegger also is well aware that disclosure of being-in-the-world inevitably involves relating to other beings and these others play a central role in the individual's attempt to tame anxiety. As Charles Guignon reminds us, contrary to the view of existentialist philosophy as emphasising being as self-centred and inward-looking, Heidegger’s fundamental ontology is not one of ‘rugged individualism’ (Guignon 1993, 2006). This view is advanced, in particular, by feminist interpreters of Heidegger, who pick up his point that ‘being in’ is always also ‘being with’. They have come to devise a social ontology of the Self by reading Heidegger's statement that “being with” [Mitsein] is an “existential characteristic of Dasein” (Heidegger, 1953: 120) as an invitation to conceptualise the authentic Self as one which recognises its being as one of ‘coexistence’ (Chanter 2001: 88ff; Odysseos 2002b, 2007).

Most recently, this is the approach taken by Louiza Odysseos, one of the few IR scholars engaging Heidegger. She focuses on Heidegger’s discussion of the Self disclosing the world as a process in which it becomes embedded “in a world always already constructed by otherness, and one that is not of Dasein’s sole making” (Odysseos 2002b: 397). This leads her to suggest that not only does Heidegger provide an account in which the Self inevitably coexists with the Other, even more so for Odysseos it reads as if “Dasein seeks the safety of companionship with the other” because “the other delivers (the Self) from anxiety” (2002b: 390). While Odysseos recognises Heidegger’s argument that being lost in the Man is a state of inauthenticity, she argues that it is primarily so because being ‘lost’ means the Self has ‘forgotten’ its ‘radical embeddedness’. Said differently, for her an inauthentic Self is one which does not recognise that it is ‘permeated through and through by otherness’ (Odysseos 2007: 58). For her, authentic being is thus the process of “traversing toward a proper intelligibility of itself as a heteronomously constituted and fundamentally coexistential being...a recovery of its dispersed being as a ‘self’” (Ibid., 96f.).
In my view this postmodern reading of Heidegger’s notion of ‘being with’, specifically Odysseos’ conceptualisation of the “other-determined constitution of the Self” (Odysseos 2002b: 397) is problematic. To begin with, at the centre of Heidegger’s ontology is not ‘the Other’ but ‘the world’ which, as discussed in the previous two chapters, must be seen first and foremost as a spatial-temporal experience. Most importantly, an interpretation building on Heideggerian insights must offer an answer to what has been called the anxiety dilemma (see chapter four), namely to reconcile the desire for ‘stability’ (continuity/simultaneity) with the desire for authenticity, while conceptualising the latter as a distinctive conception of unfolding in space and time. The problem with Odysseos’ reading of authenticity as a ‘dispersed being’ is not only that it stands in tension with Charles Taylor’s notion of authenticity as something original, as being ‘true to myself’ (see chapter four), but that it stands in tension with both accounts of ‘social’ relations found in Heidegger.

The first account, which for Heidegger captures the dominant state of being-in-the-world, is being as getting lost in the Man. As outlined in chapter four, in this state the Self is thoroughly enmeshed in the ‘social’ world, yet this world is one without deeper meaning; in this world being with and through ‘Others’ in the role of the Man puts the Self in a groundless floatation and renders ‘becoming’ a process of Verfallen. It is an evasion/flight of the possibility of authentic being, which appears only when the Self ‘pulls back’ from the Man and faces its own death. In short, Heidegger’s discussion of the social dimension in terms of the Man is primarily to clarify what authentic being is not.

The second account is the possibility of ‘Being with’ [Mitsein] arising in the (rare) event that the Self faces (comes to fear) its own death. In this moment, the Self is able to recognize Others as distinct Others (rather than a Man) which it can relate to, because consciously facing death provides a basis for authentic Self-understanding and, thus, a basis for recognizing its being with or, rather, alongside Others. As Robert Dostal puts it “the prospect of death dissolves the anonymous (Man) into myself and the other” (Dostal 1992: 405). However, while Heidegger in this context speaks about solicitous being with Others, being-with does not rest on a social ontology but on the precondition that the Self recognizes itself as a unique and ultimately lonely individual. Because relations with Others can only arise on the basis of gaining authenticity as an isolating

---

231 In ‘the world’ the experiences made by the Self arise from encounters with other things, which can be of various kinds. Heidegger’s illustrations of the process of disclosing the world and lending meaning to it often involves engagement with tools rather than other humans.
experience, that is, by cutting social bonds rather than building them, Heidegger's conception of *Mitsein* in one of a relation without bonds. As a consequence, his treatment of human 'togetherness' in the state of authentic solicitude remains "sketchy" at best (Dostal 1992: 406).\(^2\)

In sum, while Heidegger recognizes that disclosing the world in both authentic and inauthentic states of being is tied up with encountering Others, the logic he presents cannot accommodate a truly social ontology of authentic being. Consequently, rather than attempting to think about the social dimension of authentic becoming through Heidegger, it is necessary to make a clear departure from him, specifically from his notion of authenticity as logically tied to the lonely experience of facing death. Said differently, it is necessary to seek inspiration elsewhere for conceptualising authentic becoming in space and time as an *intersubjective* experience. This task is pursued in this chapter by (a) picking up Taylor's (1994) suggestion that an authentic narrative is created not through a monologue but through dialogue with a significant Other and (b) combine this with Robert Dostal's point that the weakness of Heidegger's conception of authentic solicitude becomes apparent when compared with Aristotle's discussion of *friendship* as a fulfilling relationship.\(^3\) It thus follows the line of reasoning that "cooperation is ultimately based on understandings actors develop about themselves, in particular, recognition of the importance of relationships to fulfilment of their deepest needs" (Lebow 2003: 311). Leaving Heidegger behind and moving to Aristotle as a source for inspiration, the argument put forward in this chapter, and my suggestion as to how Selves respond to the anxiety dilemma, is that friendship defined as an intimate relationship allows for authentic unfolding within a social setting.

**Friendship Matters (but is Missing from IR)**

Friendship is complex and difficult to define, but scholars exploring the phenomenon agree that one of its core characteristics is intimacy. A review of scholarly definitions and survey responses suggests that friendship is commonly understood as a relationship satisfying cognitive and emotional needs and characterized by reciprocity, trust, openness, honesty, acceptance, and loyalty. Trust and openness is seen as both engaging

\(^2\) Indeed, on the basis of a review of all of Heidegger's publications (available by the time he wrote his article) Dostal concludes that in Heidegger's philosophy there is "no development of the understanding of 'Being-with' (*Mitsein*)" (Dostal 1992: 408).

\(^3\) For Dostal the lack of attention paid to the phenomenon of friendship is one of Heidegger's great 'failings', not because he was not aware of it but because his ontology provides no logical space for it. Thus, Mulhall's (2005: 143f) attempt to insert friendship into Heidegger seems rather fruitless.
in intimate self-disclosure and keeping confidential information, while honesty and loyalty is linked to authenticity and genuine commitments (Fehr 1996: 3-16). These features coalesce in the view that friendship is a special relationship and that 'true' friends are few in number (Ibid; Allan, 1989; Pahl, 2000), a view which sociologists share with moral philosophers who see it as a particular and morally significant relationship affecting the Self (Blum 1993; Jollimore, 2001). Hence, they agree that a meaningful understanding of friendship does not treat it as bond of solidarity among all humankind but as a partial or intimate relationship and, thereby, necessarily exclusive (Thomas, 1993; Friedman, 1993). Through this exclusivity, friends are seen as reinforcing and moulding each other's sense of Self by creating moral certainty and social capital for pursuing common projects, capable of both carrying and transforming order through a space marked by intimacy and reciprocal assistance.²³⁴

These insights, which appear in writings on friendship all the way back to Aristotle, have not been picked up by scholars of international politics. To be sure, claims of 'friendship' and 'special relationships' are found regularly in statements of government officials and political commentators, and from Morgenthau onwards the 'friend' is a word commonly used in the IR literature. However, little in-depth thinking about the meaning of friendship between states has occurred in IR. On the rare occasions when it is discussed, it is done thinly. Arnold Wolfers discusses the phenomenon of amity yet does not go beyond describing it as "a relationship of 'going it with others'" based on "inward-oriented" incentives such as promoting welfare and peace (Wolfers 1962: 27f). And Wendt, who notably suggests that IR needs a theory of friendship, does not go beyond portraying it as a 'Kantian culture' where relations are characterized by non-violence and mutual aid, mainly differing from alliances by being expected "to continue indefinitely", which does not much more than echoing Adler's reformulation of Deutsch's security community (Wendt 1999: 298f). More promising is Lebow's drawing on classical Greek writers to suggest that friendship is vital for sustaining communities through 'honest' dialogue, or Janice Bially Mattern account of the sociolinguistic construction of 'special relationships' and their importance for building order. Yet while offering valuable pointers, they also do not engage with theories of friendship in philosophy and social theory (Lebow, 2005; Bially Mattern, 2005a).²³⁵

²³⁴ On friendship's impact on 'identity', see See Allan (1989: 59ff); Pahl (2000: 68f), Giddens (1991: 87-98). In contrast to philosophers (Hutter 1976) and early sociologists like Simmel (1950: 126), sociologists long assumed that the intimate character of friendship had no broader consequence for society. However, they changed their mind, see Allan (1989, 1998).
²³⁵ For a discourse analysis tracing the meaning 'friendship' or 'amity' has taken on in international politics, who uses it, why, and to what effect, see Roshchin (2006).
The main reason for the thin conceptualization of friendship in IR is the dominance of the Hobbesian ontology of the state as an autonomy-seeking entity, discussed in chapter three. It is not only the realist narrative which is unable to imagine friendship as a special relationship but also moderate constructivists who have to rely on the social contract, entered through reason and/or socialization, as a theoretical solution. Yet Kantian contracting partners, keeping open the promise of universal membership, do not qualify as friends.

The Issue of ‘the Other’

Even those constructivist attempts to depart from Hobbes and rethink interstate relations through a social ontology have neglected friendship as an intimate relationship. While there is consensus among constructivists that stabilization of the Self occurs through ordering practices in a relationship involving ‘Others’, there is considerable disagreement (if not confusion) when it comes to specify the ‘nature’ of the Self-Other relationship, that is, when it comes to the question how to conceptualize ‘Otherness’.

As noted earlier, diverse and potentially contradictory readings are rooted in the fact that the very notion of ‘identity’ contains an insolvable tension between meaning ‘similarity’ (relationality) and ‘distinctiveness’ (individuality) between which all kinds of Self-Other conceptualizations can flourish. Broadly speaking, two approaches can be identified in the IR literature, those emphasizing the Other as the ‘enemy’ and those emphasizing the comfort of ‘the community’.

The Conservative Limit of ‘the Enemy’

On one side are those who scrutinize and thereby emphasize that the Self turns the ‘Other’ into a negative, an opposite, an enemy. Scholars like David Campbell (1998a) argue that foreign policy is mainly about the identification of a threatening Other for the purpose of manifesting national Selfhood. This argument rests on the assumption that the Self gains knowledge of what it is through an understanding what it is not. More precisely, it takes a specific reading of the consequence of this differentiation, which is

---

236 On the challenge modernity’s concern with individualism poses for conceiving of friendship, see King and Devere (2000).
237 Wendt’s ‘Kantian’ reading of friendship as a (potentially global) non-war community must be differentiated from Kant’s own discussion of friendship, which Blum describes as being “sensitive and sensible” (Blum, 1993: 203). Kant recognized that “to be the friend of everybody is impossible, for friendship is a particular relationship” (cited in Jollimore, 2001: 43).
238 See Kearney (2003); Neumann (1999); Hopf (2002); Rumelili (2004); Diez (2005).
239 See Heidegger (1957/1969); Brubaker and Cooper (2000), and chapter three.
240 Campbell (1998a); Weldes (1996); Neumann, (1999); Behnke (2004); Williams, M. (2003).
inspired by William Connolly’s argument that identity “requires difference” which is then turned into (negative) otherness (Connolly 1991: 64). To put it briefly, Connolly argues that the dualism of good and evil is not only central to religious doctrines but underlies all constructions of identity. Only through distinctiveness is the particular identity of the Self assured, and this difference is turned into (negative) otherness, that is, degenerates into a hierarchical relationship to reassure the identity, or sense of Self, as “intrinsically good, coherent, complete” (Ibid. 65). Eager to guard the (illusion of) ‘true’ identity, those questioning this truth are declared evil, or irrational/mad in the secular version (Ibid. 8). While according to Connolly this “problem of evil” resides within “structures of personal identity and social order” (Ibid, 3), he notes that turning difference into (negative) otherness is a “temptation” rather than a disposition. Adopted to the terminology used here, one would say that negative Othering is used as an anxiety controlling mechanism.

The focus on the ‘negative Other’ is also dominant among scholars who see international politics through a Schmittian lens, that is, who accept Carl Schmitt’s (1932) definition of the political as a decision identifying enemies and friends. As Schmitt’s primary point was to locate the meaning of politics in the act of making the distinction, not speculating about the specific meaning this distinction may take, the ‘friends’ category only appears as fundamental to politics because it is the opposite of enemy, not because it possesses an intrinsic value. Friendship is substantiated neither by Schmitt nor by any of his adaptations in IR, if anything, Schmitt is read as “the thinker of the enemy” (Derrida 1997: 161).241

Scholars emphasizing that Selves focus on the ‘negative Other’, or the enemy, as the stabilizing relationship could argue that this allows for the generation and maintenance of an authentic sense of Self. Indeed, this argument would even allow maintaining a Heideggerian notion of authenticity because the enemy raises the spectre of ones death by holding with Derrida that “the true enemy is a better friend than the friend. For the enemy can hate and wage war on me (...) if he desires my death, at least he desires it...singularly” (Derrida 1997: 72). Yet even if one would find a way to ground ‘hate’ in an account of the human condition, there are a number of problems with this argument. First, a process of ‘negative Othering’ says very little about the Self except that there is something it is not. Second, if a positive sense of Self is gained by being hated, a relationship of mutual hatred and, hence, confrontation favours a conservative ontology

241 See Williams (2003); Behnke (2004); Prozorov (2006).
of the parties involves. Hate necessarily is fixated on a certain image of Self and, therefore, is ill suited for conceptualizing the relationship as a source for the creative unfolding, more suitable for a realist ontology of states as fixed entities.242 Third, as visible in Connolly and Campbell, it risks losing the social dimension. The formation of national Selfhood is a domestic enterprise where the Other is merely a passive enemy-image, without agency, constructed for the purpose of demarcating national boundaries.243 Finally, while an account emphasizing mutual hatred could accommodate the desire for recognition stressed by social theorists, it cannot account for the complementary desire to belong. This latter point will need to be looked at more carefully.

The Elusiveness of 'the Community'

The view that desires of belonging and recognition drive behaviour is found among scholars exploring 'positive' identification and the formation of social or 'collective' identity (see chapter three).244 After Mead, the social dimension of Selfhood was captured in Erik Erikson's notion of 'collective identity' and has been further explored by social psychologists, most notably through the development of social identity theory around Henri Tajfel, who argued that collective identity is seen as "that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group" (Tajfel 1978: 63).245 The key argument coming out of this research is that groups make individuals 'feel good' by satisfying desires of belonging.246 In what echoes Anderson's (1999) notion of 'simultaneity', the desire for 'belonging' is seen as expressing the Self's desire to have access to stable structures of meaning and thereby provide cognitive-emotional assurance. Brubaker and Cooper mention the "emotionally laden sense of belonging to a distinctive, bounded group" as an important avenue for researchers of the formation of Selfhood (Brubaker and Cooper 2000: 19). Logically desires for belonging are only satisfied when met with recognition, the need of which is a prominent element in Hegelian philosophy and revived by Axel Honneth, who locates the desire for recognition in Mead's 'I' to suggest that the claim to recognition "is anchored in every subject as an enduring motive" (in Haacke 2005: 88; Honneth 2003; see also Gutmann 1994).

---

242 See also the argument by Mitzen (2006) of how states become locked-into a relationship of rivalry.
243 This risk also arises in the conceptualization of friendship, see below.
246 Smith (1991); Greenfeld (1992); Kratochwil (1996); Calhoun (2003); Migdal (2004).
A number of IR scholars have used these insights to argue that desires for belonging and recognition are incentives for interstate cooperation. For instance, Larson and Shevchenko (2003) argue that Gorbachev’s new thinking was a consequence of seeking recognition by ‘the West’ as a great power, Merje Kuus (2001) shows that Estonian security discourse in the 1990s and the question of NATO membership primarily evolved around the aim of becoming a member of ‘the West’. Wendt (2003) even suggests that the desire for recognition will lead states to form a world state. These are useful pointers, yet for the current purpose these arguments have one weakness. While desires for belonging and recognition can be read as expressions of the Self’s desire to tame anxiety by being with Others, the suggestion that these desires are satisfied through ‘group membership’ or being part of a ‘community’ does not quite work as well when it comes to satisfying a desire of authenticity. Conceptually, the terms of ‘collective’ and ‘community’ are just one step away from Heidegger’s *Man* and too broad/generic for hosting a Self seeking authenticity. For this, a focus on friendship emphasizing the particular/special relationship is necessary.

To be sure, some studies recognize the importance of special relationships. One group of scholars speaks of “distinct communities” expressed in metaphorical structures of ‘family of nations’ (Brysk et al., 2002: 268), yet this remains vague conceptually just like Huntington’s notion of “kin-countries” (Huntington, 1993: 35). More indicative are Thomas Risse-Kappen’s analysis of bilateral relations among NATO allies during the Cold War and Bially Mattern’s account of the British-US relationship during the Suez crisis (Risse-Kappen 1995; Bially Mattern, 2005a). Both focus on the interdependence of two specific state ‘identities’, embedded in broader conception of ‘the West’. An understanding of ‘the West’ as a shared project must not necessarily lead to a falling back into the ‘group membership’ narrative. However, rather than theoretically anchoring this ‘West’ as something devised from within the special relationship, in their discussion the special relationship ends up as a function of the East-West conflict. From here it is not far to Jonathan Mercer’s (1995) adaptation of social identity theory, where the value of group membership is reduced to winning a competition against another group and, thus, where the negative Other returns in form of an ‘out-group’ as the decisive factor which keeps the ‘in-group’ together.

---

Where to go for a conceptualization of Selfhood formed within a special relationship? Interestingly, one place is Mead’s discussion of the formation of the ‘Me’, the same source that generated the quasi-consensus among scholars that the social element of Selfhood is provided by ‘community’ or ‘group membership’. This consensus brushes over Mead’s account of the socialization process as one emphasising two stages: in the early stage of development the Self gains particular experiences in interaction with “significant others”, such as family members or friends, and only in the second stage the individual’s identity forms through adaptation to the larger community, which he terms the “generalized other” (Mead 1934: 154), which blends with Heidegger’s Man. The reason why the crucial role of the ‘significant other’ in the self-fulfilment process has been ignored by scholars can be explained with Mead reducing its relevance to a mere ‘first phase’ or ‘stage’ and his subsequent argument that “the essential basis and prerequisite of the fullest development” occurs through the adaptation to the ‘general Other’ (Ibid.). In that sense, Mead’s ontology deems the ‘generalized other’ as more relevant than the ‘significant other’.

This thesis suggests the reverse. It picks up on Mead’s insight that self fulfillment emerges out of a conversation between ‘I’ and ‘Me’ yet without allowing for the Self to get lost in a conversation with the ‘general Other’. Said differently, the task here is to retrieve the ‘significant Other’ as the one “whose opinion matters most” as the partner who can satisfy both desires of belonging/recognition and authenticity. In Taylor’s words, “the key loci of self-discovery and self-affirmation” is found on the “intimate level” (Taylor, 1994; 36), which is to say that in their attempt to combine the desire for authenticity with the desire for belonging/recognition, ‘individuals’ seek intimate relations. The next step is to conceptually ground such relations in friendship by going back to Aristotle.

Aristotle: Others as Selves

Friendship is a central theme in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (NE), which is still considered the most substantial work on the subject. For Aristotle, as for most philosophers in ancient Greece, friends are an essential part of life, “for no one would

---

248 The definition of the ‘significant other’ is from Hoelter (1984: 255).
249 Taylor does not pursue the friendship perspective, given his stance that “it would be utterly wrong...to draw the boundaries any narrower than around the whole human race” (Taylor 1989: 6). See also Giddens’ discussion of ‘pure’ relationships, friendship being one, which he sees as of “elementary importance for the reflexive project of the Self” (Giddens, 1991: 87-98).
choose to live without friends, even if he possessed all the other goods" (NE, Book VIII, 1). Beyond the common assumption of his days about the sociability of human nature, Aristotle sees friends as central to the individual’s attempt to achieve virtue and happiness, which he considers the highest goal in life. (NE, Book I). Happiness is associated with stability, and thus as something which opens the experience of time by giving faith and certainty (Derrida 1997: 15). More than cognitive certainty, happiness is “a certain sort of activity of the soul in accord with virtue” and, thus, an emotional state. It also is not a property one is born with, or which can be obtained in isolation, but something that comes into being through activity with friends (NE, Book IX, 9). In line with some commentators, this fundamental human sociability and the emotional desire to be with others is read here as a response to anxiety.²⁵¹ In other words, the emphasis that friends are vital for emotional well-being (happiness) is understood to mean a feeling of having satisfied desires for belonging and recognition without loosing authenticity. In that sense, Aristotle provides an account of how self sufficiency is relational “dependent upon and interwoven with others” (Sherman 1993: 94).

Aristotle differentiates between three different types of friendship, namely friendship of utility, of pleasure, and of excellence (NE, Book VIII, 3).²⁵² Only the latter amounts to excellent or ‘true’ friendship, because in the first two cases friendship is ‘instrumental’ in the sense that it cannot contribute to true happiness.²⁵³ A state of happiness, for Aristotle, is a state of moral fulfillment and true friendship “is the friendship of good people similar in virtue” (NE, Book VIII: 3). Virtue is difficult to define in the abstract yet can be broadly defined as knowing what is ‘the right thing to do’. In accordance with his view that happiness is achieved through activity (or experience) Aristotle also emphasizes that virtue is expressed not only in knowing what is ‘right’ but also acting accordingly.²⁵⁴ Moreover, in what nicely fits into the perspective of authentic becoming, for Aristotle virtue is neither a fixed property nor acquired naturally but obtainable primarily through activity with friends. As Sherman points out, this means that friends not only choose each other on the basis of a shared ‘sense of...commitment and ends,

²⁵² Aristotle notes that complete friendship may well accommodate the previous two. For an influential discussion of the different forms of friendship, see Cooper (1980).
²⁵⁴ For Aristotle virtue is about finding an intermediate between excess and deficiency, about expressing feelings such as pity, pleasure, anger, or pain in an appropriate and measured way. Having these feelings “at the right time, about the right things, toward the right people, for the right end, and in the right way...is proper to virtue” (NE, Book II: 6). For an attempt to pin down Aristotle’s notion of virtue, see Smith-Pangle (2003: 143–5). To “walk together in the path of virtue” also underlies the Confucian conception of friendship, see Kutcher (2000: 1618).
and a sense of what we take to be ultimately good', they also develop their moral capacities together over time (Sherman 1993: 97). In what points to a creative relationship of mutual learning, from an Aristotelian perspective "the virtuous agent continues to grow, and ... friendship itself is the most congenial context for such moral growth" (Ibid., 99). Hence, friends are functioning both as "moral witnesses" (Friedman) to each other and as active generators of the moral space in and through which their Selves unfold.\(^{255}\) For Aristotle the true friend thus takes on the role of another-Self. The "shared life" (Sherman) of friends is marked by two important features worth looking at more closely.

**Reciprocity**

First, friendship operates on a unique logic of reciprocity. In his discussion of the ‘Object of Friendship’ Aristotle emphasises that friendship is based on reciprocated goodwill (NE, Book VIII, 2 and 8; Smith-Pangle, 2003: 142ff). In the case of ‘true’ friendship, such reciprocity does not follow a ‘tit-for-tat’ logic and cannot be seen in terms of an instrumental or utilitarian notion of exchange.\(^{256}\) Although he notes that "we should, generally speaking, return what we owe" (NE, Book IX, 2), and that friendships between those in formally unequal positions (see below) have to give proportionally, Aristotle argues that “friendship seeks what is possible, not what accords with worth”, as returning what is ‘worth’ is impossible in some cases (NE, Book VIII, 14, emphasis added). In the case where there is a friendship between unequals, Aristotle suggests the returns are (should be) different: “the superior should get more honour, and the needy person more profit” (Ibid.).

However, it appears there really can be no expectations among true friends about what exactly is being returned. As Aristotle puts it, “friends who give services because of the friend himself are not open to accusation [of inappropriate return] since this is the character of friendship that accords with virtue”. Any return that is made “is not measured by money and no equivalent honour can be paid; but it is enough ... to do what we can” (NE, Book XI, 1). Hence, there can be no ‘accusations’ for inadequate returns in true friendship, simply because both aim for what is good, and because the good is shared both benefit from activities contributing to it (NE, Book VIII, 13). Hence, the notion of ‘debt’ as commonly understood has no place among friends, and the value of services exchanged is unique to their relationship and cannot be objectively fixed.

\(^{255}\) The notion of the friend as a ‘moral witness’ comes from Friedman (1993).

\(^{256}\) Hutter (1978: 3); Pahl (2000: 55). On the utilitarian notion of reciprocity as used in game theory, see Axelrod (1984: 4ff).
Friends trust each other that they contribute what they can/deem necessary, and so “if friends ‘owe’ [each other] anything, it is only thanks” (Smith Pangle 2003: 128). Furthermore, Aristotle notes that friends would neither provide ‘bad’ action for each other, nor request such action from the friend. Instead, Aristotle appears to endorse well-meant criticism among friends when he suggests that “it is proper to good people to avoid error themselves and not to permit it in their friends” (NE, Book VIII, 8).

Although the precise logic of this reciprocity remains unclear, there is no doubt true that for Aristotle friendship involves a unique kind of ‘reciprocity’ which serves both sides as a mean to further and display virtue and reach ‘inner harmony’ (i.e. tame anxiety) and is characterised by the fact that friends ‘wish good to each other for each other’s own sake” (NE, Book VIII, 3). Hence, something done ‘for’ the friend cannot be seen as an exchange occurring between distinct individuals, just like wishing each other well cannot be grasped in terms of ‘selfless’ behaviour but is better seen as a merging of self-interest and other-interest.

Equality

The unique logic of reciprocity is intrinsically linked, second, to friendship as a relationship among ‘equals’. By definition, the Aristotelian notion of true friendship formed among those similar in virtue is one characterised by equality, as the friend who perceives the Other as ‘another Self’ cannot conceive of this Other as inferior or superior. Equality in friendship, then, does not refer to a right but to a recognition of mutual benefit, contributing to each other’s happiness (NE, Book VIII, 2, 3 and Book IX, 8). Yet while true friends necessarily recognise each other as equal in this sense, the question is whether this is affected by and can be upheld in a situation in which the individuals stand in a formal institutional or otherwise functional relationship of hierarchy. Here, Aristotle is ambiguous.

On the one hand, he suggests that inequality in standing can be compensated through similarity in virtue and mutual love, a view echoed by most theorists of friendship who consider it the one thing which can transcend otherwise divisive hierarchies (Aristotle suggests that superiority in power and position rarely goes along with superiority of

---

257 Reciprocity was also important for Socrates, who equally struggled with grasping its nature (Smith Pangle 2003: 211). For a comprehensive discussion of how a logic of consequentialism has no place in friendship, see Jollimore (2001).

258 On altruism in Aristotelian friendship, see Blum (1993).
virtue). It is clear that the gap influences the logic of reciprocity; however it is less clear to what extent it suffices to recognize each other as virtuous and adapt the ‘returns’ as noted above, and to what extent the gap puts more burden on the formally ‘inferior’ side to ‘give more’. Certainly Aristotle emphasizes that there are different kinds of inequality and suggests that each “must make the return that is proportionate to the types of superiority” (NE, Book VIII, 13). On the other hand, Aristotle argues that true friendship between ruler and ruled is difficult, if not impossible, as is being friends with kings or gods. The emergence of significant and gaps in, for instance, wealth is likely to corrupt the logic of reciprocity among friends by generating unequal expectations, thereby becoming a cause for the dissolution of friendships (NE, Book VIII, 7 and 14). This theme will be taken up again in the next chapter. For now, it suffices to say that while Aristotle’s ambiguity regarding the prospects of friendship across formal hierarchies does not invite conclusive or one-sided arguments, at least not in the abstract, it can be said that considering and treating each other as ‘equal’ despite differences in ‘standing’ is a fundamental aspect of friendship.

In sum, Aristotle confirms the need for ‘being with’ and grounds it in friendship as an intimate social space marked by equality and a unique logic of reciprocity. Yet how can these insights be translated to relations among states? More precisely, how can they be inserted into the causal narrative seeking to explain government decisions for investing in international security institutions? The remainder of this chapter is devoted to answering this question.

The ‘In-Between’ of Friendship

For the purpose of conceptualizing interstate relations as friendship, it is useful to start by confirming that ‘friendship’ is actually a relationship and, thus, can be political. This is necessary because Aristotle’s notion of true friendship as an extension of self-love can be seen as collapsing the Self with the Other. As Derrida suggests, when Aristotle emphasises “friendship seems to consist more in loving than being loved” (NE, Book VIII, 8 and Book IX) he seems to place more importance on ‘knowing rather than being known’, making the friend a narcissist construct rather than something arising between individuals. Hence, Derrida criticises Aristotle’s understanding of true friendship for being ‘total’ and ignoring difference, that is, for not recognizing the separateness of

29 NE, Book VIII, 7 and 11. Aristotle even notes that friendship is possible between master and slave insofar as they recognize each other as human beings (NE, Book VIII, 11). See also Hutter (1978); Kutcher (2000). For a view that Aristotle does not provide a convincing account for ‘true friendship’ across hierarchies, see Smith Pangle (2003: 101f.).
Selves (Derrida 1997: 11). The reading of true friends linked by an organic bond merging Self and Other is similar to what Hannah Arendt calls ‘fraternity’, a label she uses for relations grounded in unconditional love and characterised by closure and homogeneity. Such relations for Arendt are apolitical, even antipolitical because they are akin to natural relations: “love...destroys the in-between which relates us to and separates us from others” (Arendt, 1958: 242; Chiba 1995).260

One does not need to read totality into Aristotle’s notion of true friendship, certainly not if reciprocity is considered the ‘object’ of friendship and if there is room for disputes and the dissolution of friendship.261 Yet those voices are important to remind us that in order to conceptualize friendship as a political relationship it must be conceived “through a philosophy of difference so as to be rendered politically relevant” (Chiba, 1995: 522). This does not compromise the understanding of friendship as an intimate relationship262 but points to the ‘in-between’ of friendship as the space where the bonding occurs.

In IR terminology, it requires conceptualizing friendship between states through the ‘inter’ (of the international). As Fred Halliday notes, the ‘inter’ is basically understood to denote “links between states” (Halliday 1994: 6).263 For approaches grounded in a Hobbesian ontology, the ‘inter’ is not filled with much substance but understood to be the space outside Westphalian borders with their dual nature as a simultaneous divider and the arena where states come to meet. This ‘meeting’ space is a realm defined by strategic interaction, also called a ‘theatre’ (Aron, 1966: 183), where states are reduced to ‘actors’ calculating how to achieve their objectives by taking into account the presence, understood as the activities and resources, of other ‘actors’ (Ibid, 191; Ruggie 1993). To reframe the discussion in the third chapter, for realists, the space is reduced it to a map about the relative distribution of military capabilities (Aron 1966: 95ff); for institutionalists the ‘inter’ is filled with institutions managing economic interdependence, even reading it as a ‘trans’ (Keohane and Nye 1989), and for constructivists and English School the ‘inter’ is a realm of order filled with mutually recognised norms (varying in thickness), such as sovereignty (Bull 2002; Wendt 1999).

260 Arendt’s discussion of ‘fraternity’ is set against her reading of friendship as involving heterogeneity and potentially global (Chiba, 1995: 520). Like Derrida, Arendt views politics as based on the plurality of being, as “about togetherness and being-with of the diverse [der Verschiedenen]”. Politics for her is about managing relations and thus “develops in the in-between and manifests itself as the relation” (Arendt 2003: 9f. emphasis added).

261 For how friends retain their separateness in Aristotle’s true friendship, see Sherman (1993: 102-107).

262 Hutter (1978); Friedman (1993); Jollimore (2001).

263 For a discussion going in a similar direction, see Kratochwil (2007)
Even though the latter two perspectives gradually compromise the Waltzian' reading of the ‘inter’ as a realm ontologically separate from ‘the state’, the ‘inter’ still remains a space of strategic interaction and, thus, reduced to “points of convening” (Latham 2002: 133). The idea of interstate friendship as a relationship revolving around a shared sense of ‘being-in-the-world’ offers a different reading, as discussed next.

**Defining International Friendship**

To begin with, friendships do not form because of geographic proximity, economic ties, or some kind of increased ‘interaction’. And while similar religions or similar political systems designate broad ideas of order embedded in histories and visions for the good life, they do not provide sufficient ground for friendship bonds. They are too broad to satisfy the desire for authenticity and meaningfully capture the particularity of friendship. These factors may, individually or in combination, facilitate the emergence and maintenance of friendship, yet by themselves they do not make for intimate relations. For friendships to form and sustain, there must be some sort of ‘attraction’. The concept is useful because it provides an alternative to the socialization argument and recognizes that friendship is a voluntary relationship, based on choice. If we combine this with the definition of the significant Other as that one “whose opinion matters most” (Hoelter 1984: 255), we arrive at Peter Blau’s note that, generally speaking, attraction rests on approving of each others opinions (Blau 1964: 69). On the question opinions about what, the answer offered here picks up the threads developed in the discussion so far.

In basic terms, states form a friendship through a shared project of ‘world building’ in which their national biographies are embedded. More specifically, friendship designates an intimate relationship revolving around a shared sense of ‘being-in-the-world’, that is, a shared sense of situatedness in space and time within which structures of meaning are established. Bonds of friendship develop through a shared experienced space and the agreement of transforming it into a shared envisioned space by coming to agree on an idea of the good order, that is, by agreeing on lessons from significant experiences and how to translate them into a common project lending significance to a shared future. One could say their ‘inner time’ becomes ‘social time’ through a convergence of horizons of experience and expectations, through the formulation of a shared utopia inscribed into a

---

264 On how increased interaction does not necessarily create communal bonds, see Brown (1996).

265 Like Aristotle, for contemporary scholars there is no blueprint or ‘typical’ form of friendship (Allan, 1989; Porter and Tomaselli, 1989; Fehr, 1996).
certain space to which the parties become emotionally attached and commit to. In that sense, one could adapt C. S. Lewis’ suggestion that friends at any point in time give an affirmative answer to the question Do you see the same truth? (Lewis 1993: 42) by changing the question to Do you see the same world? Seeking and sustaining that Other which sincerely answers ‘yes’ is the ‘common interest’ in friendship.

Yet ‘sharing’ in the sense of agreeing to ‘see the same world’ does not mean a total merger, which would take away the space of the in-between. To reiterate the point made with regard to Aristotle’s notion of true friendship, there never is a total merger of national biographies and so friends can never completely ‘know’ each other (although, as discussed in the next chapter, they may be mislead to think they do). In a fundamental sense this is because, as discussed earlier, the temporal dimension of the Self makes it impossible to ever ‘know’ itself in its entirety simply because the Self is always also not-yet. Yet also the worlds they disclose and inscribe with meaning over the course of their unfolding and the visions they contain cannot be identical. An agreement of seeing the ‘same world’ really is an agreement, and is perhaps better understood as a commitment, confirmed through practice, for an intimately shared world which both consider possible and desirable. To use the terminology of the Sprouts, the milieu’s two states are situated in may overlap to greater or lesser degree (and in the case of friends the overlap is obviously great) but “no two [states] are environed by exactly the same milieu” (Sprout and Sprout 1965: 204). The shared world and its horizons delineating the shared moral space must always allow for some “personal maneuvering space” (Herzfeld 2002).

The primary reason why the conception of the ‘in-between’ cannot be identical is, of course, because the variety (or uniqueness) of experiences makes a truly common history impossible (Wagner 2002). While significant experiences are ambiguous, as discussed in the previous chapter, this lack of determinism not only makes the generation of a shared world possible but also means that even those who share the experience never completely agree on what to do with it, that is, on its representation. Within a society, the lessons learned from significant experiences are often contested and so the shared place in the past is a compromise, an act of negotiation over representations and lessons with the view towards the creation of commonalities. It emerges in “the interaction between those who propose to the see the past as something shared, and those who let themselves be convinced to accept such representation for their own orientation in the...world” (Wagner 2002: 51).
Thus, friendship is a project of shared world building. In this process of devising a common storyline both sides feel comfortable with shared utopia/visions play a key role. As discussed earlier, the future is not only a source of anxiety but also a source of energy. Because of its openness, the future has more room for shared world building than memory: it is through agreeing to a common place in the future that memory spaces, and the lessons learned from them, can be adjusted. And it is also in the shared vision of the ‘good order’ where trust is established. Trust, which in general terms is about “plac[ing] the fate of ones interest under the control of others” (Hoffman 2006: 17), is fundamentally about the future, about expectations that my becoming is taken into account “in some relevant way”. As Giddens points out, trust is based not so much on past experiences, let alone subject to a rational decision-making process, but presumes “a leap to commitment, a quality of ‘faith’ which is irreducible” (Giddens 1991: 19). While in friendship this faith may not be ‘reducible’ it is anchored in the understanding that there is a mutual commitment to build a shared world. Friends trust each other because the shared vision which aligns horizons of expectations is not controlled by one or the other but produced together.

Friendship as Empowerment

For specifying the process of world building we must return to the question of the political in friendship. Here it is important to note that the exclusiveness of friendship does not require falling into a Schmittian reading of politics as making the distinction between friends and enemies, a reading which inevitably produces a black-and-white reading of the international (Behnke 2004). While friends may come to agree on a common enemy, no serious philosophy/sociology of friendship, and certainly not one inspired by Aristotle, considers enmity vis-à-vis third parties to be a necessary condition for creating bonds of friendship. After all, the very reason why sociologists have long ignored friendship is because it is in many respects an inward-oriented relationship. While friendship does have external effects (see below), it excludes but does not automatically oppose others. Consequently, the argument made here goes against the view that a stable sense of Self requires both an Other the Self identifies with (the ‘friend’) and one it identifies against (the ‘enemy’), as in Zygmunt Baumann’s assertion that “building and keeping order means making friends and fighting enemies” (Baumann 1991: 24). Rather, it suggests that intimate relations are outnumbered by relations where

266 See also Russel Hardin’s account of trust in relationships: “I trust you with respect to some action if your reason for doing it is to take me into account in some relevant way. Typically your reason will be that it is in your interest to maintain our relationship. Hence, my trust in you is typically encapsulated in your interest in fulfilling my trust” (in Hoffman 2006: 21). See also footnote 15.
there is no commitment to shared world building and where no emotional stakes are involved, an image where friends are surrounded by what has been called “familiar strangers” (Milgram 1972).

For the Aristotelian conception of politics as finding the (common) good it is redundant to ask for the ‘political’ in friendship relations. But if political relations are understood with Karl Deutsch (1967) as relations of ‘power’ this needs to be specified. Within friendship relations one can identify two interrelated types of power phenomena, one of empowerment and one of ‘soft power over’. The latter will be picked up in the next chapter; here the argument is that by taming anxiety and providing self-confidence, friendship is a source of empowerment for authentic becoming.

As noted by all scholars since Aristotle, learning from each other is intrinsic to unfolding within friendship and an important source for ‘moral growth’ and provision of happiness, that is, of taming anxiety. In stabilizing the horizons of each others’ biographical narratives, friendship processes are mutually strengthening Self-confidence and, in this sense, also enhance a sense of Self-sufficiency. Yet the creative force emerging out of friendship relations, the energy drawn from imagining a common future and the resolve to engage in a shared project is not merely stabilizing, it is empowering. This process of ‘world building’ (Chiba 1995: 523) expresses Arendt’s reading of power as the ability “to act in concert” and to achieve/produce something together (Arendt 1970: 44). In other words, the power at work here is productive (power-to) rather than coercive (power-over). It not captured in the “opportunity [Chance] to have one’s will prevail [durchsetzen] within a social relationship”, as in Max Weber’s famous definition (Weber 1976: 28, author’s translation) but in the creative potential of the ‘in-between’, that is, power is expressed in an ‘emerging property’ generated through social exchange (Blau 1964), rather than by having something pre-existing prevail.

Importantly, in this process of world building, friendship does not merely ‘strengthen’ the Self but inevitably transforms it as well (Friedman 1993: 195-202; Allan 1989). As noted earlier, national biographies cannot ever become identical and, indeed, the creative potential of friendship is drawn from unique understandings of ‘being-in-the-world’. It builds on a conception of inner time in which experiences and expectations are formed, enables to exchange views and provide each other with slightly different perspectives, thereby stimulating the learning process. As Marilyn Friedman notes,
“the experiences, projects, and dreams of our friends can frame for us new standpoints from which we can experience the significance and worth of moral values and standards. In friendship, our commitment to our friends, as such, afford us access to whole ranges of experience beyond our own” (Friedman 1993: 197).

This learning process requires, obviously, that friends are willing to share concerns and to listen, that they are open for learning and moral growth. It is also here, in the provision of satisfying desires for belonging/recognition and in mutually providing stimuli and energy for common projects where friends relate as equals and contribute on a unique logic of reciprocity. In this sense, commitment to ‘world building’ is also a commitment to ‘burden sharing’, although not one that rests on a quantifiable division of labor. Empowerment understood as a transformative process implies that friends must not only “respect and take an interest in one another’s perspectives” (Friedman 1993: 189) but are also willing to adapt (and recognize the benefits from doing so). For states conceived as national biographies this implies the willingness to adapt domestic orders and the narratives which uphold them, which echoes James Rosenau’s notion of states as “adaptive entities” constantly changing in response to stimuli from “salient environments” (Rosenau 1981). To be sure, this does not rule out the possibility that disagreements arise over how to read ‘the world’, what matters is that compromises are made not in response to coercion but voluntarily, arrived at through deliberations characterized by respect for occasional divergence of views and the willingness for mutual understanding, solidarity and, again, learning (Risse-Kappen 1995). Friendship, then, does not fall into place but is an investment, a political project.

The empowerment process, expressed in the pursuit of a common project, affects international order at large. Overlapping experienced spaces are likely to be shared with/inhabited by others and so the world built by friends is not that intimate, which is to say that the ‘in-between’ in friendship relations is not an exclusive space. By providing each other with ‘voice’, the agenda pursued by friends also weighs in interaction with third parties and is likely to affect them. The application of a double standard may not merely exclude ‘third parties’ from decisions and leave them in the dark about the ‘real’ reasons for doing X or Y,\(^\text{267}\) the decisions taken may be very well directed against third parties. Hence, the finding by philosophers and sociologists that friendship affects

\(^{267}\) As Goffman puts it “the self that is revealed in our dealings with our friends is closer to our self definition than the ‘self’ we portray in other contexts...friends are permitted ‘backstage’ more than most” (in Allan 1989: 59).
society (Hutter 1978; Allan 1989) can be applied to the international level and supports Bially Mattern's suggestion that special relationships are sources of international order (Bially Mattern 2005a).

Institutions as Platforms for Negotiating World-Building

As noted earlier, friendship among 'states' as an evolving relationship is about negotiating a shared project across formal state boundaries, about entwining national biographies in a shared space. This negotiation is done by governments ('heads of state') who have been given the mandate from, and are held accountable by, their domestic constituency to 'represent', administer and protect/enhance the national biography and negotiate it with government representatives of the friend-state. Thus, the negotiation process takes place in a 'two level game' where institutions play a crucial role. In the domestic setting institutions vary with the political system, and in most societies they encompass a complex setting in which political parties, parliament, courts, the media, and other public and private sector groups debate the national biography on the basis of a formal constitution. While these 'domestic' institutions may also organize themselves across formal borders, thus thickening the transnational space on the level 'below' the government, focus here is on how government representatives negotiate the shared project through formal international institutions.

More precisely, the argument is that states do so primarily through international security institutions. To be sure, what is ontologically secure, that is, what provides the national biography with a sense of coherence and authenticity, may well include ideas about economic order. Thus, the logic of the causal narrative presented here does not necessarily limit institutions to those formally in charge of 'security'. However, such institutions are explicitly devised to protect 'the state' and, in the reading presented here, a national biography. Moreover, it could be argued that security institutions are concerned with the use of force, and the definition of what accounts for a legitimate use of force, central to Weber's definition of the state, is a key element of ideas of the 'good' order inscribed in national biographies. Even in that case, security institutions, including those often described as military alliances such as NATO, are understood here as political platforms through which the very meaning of 'security' for the Self and its

---

26 Or what Harald Mueller (2004) has called a "two-level discourse", although I shy away from using the term 'discourse' to avoid the impression that shared world building is a purely rhetorical exercise.
world is established, that is, agreed upon with friends. As such, the function of institutions is different from the realist reading of stabilizing a certain distribution of economic/military ‘power’, and from the institutionalist reading of mediating anarchy by providing reliable information for members with pre-existing common interests. Instead, institutions are seen here as platforms for creating a common understanding of ‘being-in-the-world’, used by friends to negotiate, administer, and manifest the common project. They are, in short, vehicles for shared ‘world building’.269

To a degree, the purpose of international institutions to facilitate the convergence of horizons of experience and expectations encompasses Krasner’s (1983: 2) definition of institutions as “principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor’s expectations converge in a given area”. What is missing from this definition is that institutions, as understood here, are forums for creating a valued order. While they also come to embody this order, it is more in form of holding an architectural promise for creating a certain moral space. Institutions come to symbolize the common project and are thus placeholders for the envisioned space that friends are unfolding towards; they are sites creating the ‘illusion’ of an eternal temporal structure providing the comfort that the future can be planned. This makes institutions projecting rather than preserving bodies, platforms for devising and pursuing shared visions and for administering the potential through which friends can carry out activities towards this end. In that sense, institutions are uncertainty-reducing structures, as friends investing in them confirm their commitment to a shared path, although without institutions themselves manifesting that path.

As inter-subjective constructs which are used by friends as platforms for building a shared world institutions only possess what John Ruggie (1998: 62) calls “transordinate authority”. Consequently, the relevance of an institution is dependent on the vitality of interstate friendship, which makes for a more limited reading of the influence of institutions along the lines suggested by Lebow (2003: 326f.) in contrast to those scholars emphasizing their socializing power (see previous chapter). And because intersubjectivity among friends is never total and their common project always subject to negotiation (and confirmation), institutions are not static but dynamic. Just as the entities investing in them, they unfold over time and are never complete (Wallander 2000).

269 For a discussion of institutions as structures of empowerment, see Ringmar (2007).
In sum, the purpose of institutions is both symbolic and practical, serving as forums for negotiations and as a frame for common (expected) practices, providing friends with a space for devising a shared utopia and enabling them to confirm their commitment through co-operation. An institution through which this is achieved, that is, through which friends can weave together their national biographies in a shared project, through which a valued space can be imagined and moved towards, satisfies their respective ‘national security interest’. To complete the causal narrative, the question then is why a state would invest in a new institution. This question will be addressed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER SEVEN: PROCESSES OF ESTRANGEMENT AND EMANCIPATION

Summary
The previous chapter argued that states invest in common security institutions for the purpose of controlling anxiety through common ‘world building’ project with friends. More precisely, it was argued that friendship understood as an intimate relationship allows for authentic becoming in a social setting and that institutions enable them to negotiate a shared narrative of order in space and time in which respective national biographies – their sense of authentic ‘being-in-the-world’ – can be embedded. This chapter continues the argumentative path to explain why states would invest in new/alternative institutions. It suggests that they do so when the existing institutional arrangement and the friendship sustained through it ceases to function as an anxiety controlling mechanism. More precisely, it puts forward the argument that the decision to invest in a new institution is an expression of a weakening/deteriorating friendship undergoing a process of estrangement and the decision to strengthen bonds with an alternative significant Other in a process of emancipation.

The argument is made in four steps: First, it explores what threatens friendship through the broader question of what poses a threat to ‘identity’ manifested in a social relationship, attention is directed to ambivalence. Second, it is argued that ambivalence arises in the figure of the stranger which enters friendship relations from within through a process of friend-turning-stranger, or ‘estrangement’. Third, the chapter outlines what characterizes an estrangement process and points to some causes which may put friendship onto this path before, fourth, discussing two possible strategies for affected states of dealing with such a process, namely ‘adaptation’ and ‘emancipation’. The chapter concludes with some guiding thoughts on what can be expected when applying the causal narrative developed thus far to the empirical study of the German-American relationship.

Conceptualising the ‘Existential Threat’
The intuitive answer to the question why a state would invest in a new institution is that it considers the old arrangement inadequate (or, as utilitarians would say, inefficient) in fulfilling the function it was set up for. In the theoretical frame developed here, it means the institution has become inadequate in providing ‘ontological security’ in the sense of enabling the Self to construct and ‘live’ (formulate and practice) a coherent biographical
narrative inscribing meaning into time and space through a project devised with friends. Given the close link made in the causal narrative between costly investment in an institution and the maintenance of friendship, an exploration of what renders an institution ‘inadequate’ consequently requires taking a closer look at what undermines/weakens friendship. Said differently, to understand what makes an existing institutional arrangement inadequate requires a better understanding of what generates a feeling of ontological insecurity, that is, what poses an ‘existential threat’ to a stable sense of Self generated within friendship. The task is thus to think more carefully about what possesses the potential to destabilize the narrative of ‘authentic becoming’ generated with a significant Other and to give some clues where ‘it’ comes from.

Although there are some useful hints, IR scholarship fares poorly when it comes to conceptualizing the threat to socially constructed ‘identities’ and specifying how it emerges among states. The initial group of moderate constructivists dealt with the ‘existential threat’ in two ways, both of which end up with an argument where such a threat has disappeared. The first does so deliberately and is most apparent in Wendt’s work. In his progressive narrative of states moving towards a Kantian world the ‘threat’ (along with ‘power’, tellingly) gradually disappears. When states move away from that Hobbesian ‘state of nature’ in which relations are characterized by a fear of war towards a world in which relations are peaceful and trusting, threats are socialized away accordingly.270

The second reason for why the existential threat drops out of the causal narrative among moderate constructivists is a logical mistake found in the discussion by Adler/Barnett and Cronin. Like Wendt’s Kantian cultures, security communities are marked by expectations of peaceful co-existence amongst its members; yet in contrast to Wendt these works also rely an ‘ingroup’ versus ‘outgroup’ dynamic to explain how states come to share a collective identity. In this context, they cannot avoid noting that understandings of peaceful coexistence shared within the community may not be shared with those situated outside and, thus, may involve conceiving of non-members as enemies. While this is safely rooted in Social Identity Theory, the logical mistake arises in conceptualising these outsiders/others as a threat to identity (Adler and Barnett 1998: 56, also Cronin 1999: 141). As noted in the previous chapter and further below, the labelling of the excluded ‘Other’ as a ‘threat’ or ‘enemy’ is a political act to stabilise the

270 Again, this shows that Wendt has not gone beyond realist ontology when it comes to conceptualising what constitutes an existential threat. He only mentions in passing the “psychic threat of not having standing” (Wendt 1999: 237).

Two recent works exploring the socio-linguistic ties of the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ by Steele (2005) and Bially Mattern (2005b) offer some promising hints for conceptualising ontological insecurity. Steele looks at the British decision not to intervene in the American Civil War, which he attributes to Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation framing the war as one being fought over the issue of slavery. This would have made an intervention in support of the South inconsistent with the view that slavery was immoral and thus, according to Steele, would have undermined Britain’s biographical narrative. In short, the decision not to intervene was thus made to avert a threat to British ontological security (Steele 2005: 523, 538). Whereas Steele provides little conceptual guidance on the phenomenon of ontologically insecurity and does not embed it in a social ontology, Bially Mattern’s discussion of the temporary breakdown of the special relationship between London and Washington in the 1956 ‘Suez crisis’ goes one step further. To explain why the Anglo-American friendship was eventually repaired, she suggests that ‘national identity’ was threatened by normative inconsistency produced by the breakdown of the special relationship. According to Mattern, mutual accusations of violating shared values/norms fundamental to the Western order in which American and British narratives of national Selfhood were embedded generated “epistemological disorder” and, thus, threatened ontological security on both sides. And so “to prevent their very existence from cascading away” political leaders in London and Washington decided to re-produce ‘Anglo-American we-ness’ (Bially Mattern 2005b: 57, 79, 121 and Ch. 7; see also Risse-Kappen 1995).

Although both analyses fall short of providing a substantial theoretical argument for this process, what emerges is the suggestion that national biographies are threatened by normative inconstancy/incoherence and that its emergence is somehow linked to ‘discord’ in a special relationship. Part of the task of adapting this insight to the present theoretical argument is to conceptually substantiate what kind of ‘discord’ is posing an existential threat, and why. Then there is the question when it occurs. Steele speaks of ‘critical situations’ when “states must make a decision about who they are” (Steele 2005: 537) and Bially Mattern of ‘crises’ as “moments during which statesmen…come to view [an] event as so divisive that it demands a complete reassessment of the status quo relationship” (Bially Mattern 2005b: 57). While they have little to say about what makes certain situations ‘critical’ or why some moments turn into a ‘crisis’, both authors suggest that ontological insecurity emerges in the context of wars/violent conflicts, more
precisely in the act of interpreting such conflicts and integrating them into the meaning structure and of being-in-the-world.

The following takes up these hints to conceptualize the threat to/weakening of friendship and, correspondingly, the investment in a new institution, in accordance with the causal narrative presented so far. The guiding thought is that, having argued that ‘authentic becoming’ is established on the social level, the threat to the same must emerge from a loss of these social bonds into which the biographical narrative is embedded.271

**Difference?**

It is useful to start by addressing the prominent misconception that authentic becoming is threatened by ‘the enemy’, touched upon earlier, and the more fundamental but equally problematic notion of ‘difference’. One prominent source of this mistake is Connolly’s discussion of ‘the Other’ touched upon in the previous chapter. For Connolly, the identification of evil and its synonyms, such as the enemy, is a political act to ‘fix’ difference, and this act of fixation is done because difference is seen as a threat to the attempt to establish a ‘true’ identity (Connolly, 1991: 71). According to Connolly ‘difference’ is perceived as threatening for those seeking a ‘true’ identity because it suggests that the ‘ultimate’ answer to what is, or can be, is not possible. Hence, “the threat is posed not merely by actions the other might take to injure or defeat the true identity but by the very visibility of its mode of being as other” (Ibid., 66, emphasis added). This view is echoed by Campbell who notes that the existence of “an alternative mode of being” denaturalizes the claim of a particular identity to be the “true” identity (Campbell, 1998: 3). Hence, to “secure identity in its truth” and keep difference at bay, everything that appears ‘different’ is fixed as the enemy ‘Other’ and degraded to an inferior status. Through this act of fixation the (perceived) threat to the Self disappears, which means the portrayal of the Other as ‘enemy’ (or evil) functions as a stabilizer of conceptions of Self (see also chapter six).

That said, Connolly sows confusion through his suggestion that the threat to the Self comes from ‘difference’. This sits uneasily with his portrayal of the fixed and non-threatening Self-Other relationship for two reasons. First, his suggestion that the Self is capable of recognising difference, that the visibility of ‘being other’ can be grasped as a

---

271 Here my argument further inverses Heidegger’s logic. While Heidegger does not explicitly address the issue of the existential threat, as discussed in chapter four he does offer a conception of what threatens ‘authentic being’, namely the process (the temptation) of Verfallen (although the irony is, of course, that the Self does not ‘know’ this threat). This theme is visible especially in his later writings on the impact of technology (Dreyfus, 2006: 361).
possibility implies that this ‘other mode of being’ already is part of the meaning structure the Self ‘knows’ and, hence, moves within the horizons it understands. Such an understanding of the possibility of a different ‘mode of existence’ is not a destabilizing experience. The reasoning applied here is similar to the one behind the argument that an apocalyptic scenario of the future, a dystopia, does not pose an existential threat to the Self. As discussed in chapter five, any substantial vision of the future is a projection providing the Self with a meaningful reference and serving as an anxiety controlling mechanism. Rather than facing ‘nothing’ the Self sees ‘something’ unpleasant coming, which provides a sense of direction and purpose in the determination to avert the scenario from becoming ‘reality’. And this something must be ‘known’, must be considered possible. Just like dystopias can only be imagined by drawing on past experience, so difference can only be recognized if it is already part of the world the Self has disclosed.

Second, locating the threat to the Self prior to the act of ‘fixation’ is difficult to reconcile logically with the view that a stable sense of Self is socially generated, that is, in a relationship. For there to be a conceivable ‘threat’, the Self must be in a state of ontological security and, hence, must already have identified its ‘Other’, which in Connolly’s version is the ‘enemy’. The threat must come after the act of ‘fixation’ and, if we follow Connolly’s logic, from disappearance of ‘the enemy’. Ronnie Lipschutz (1995: 217) captures this in a well-known anecdote about a Soviet diplomat noting to an American colleague in the final days of the Cold War: “We are about to do a terrible thing to you. We are going to deprive you of an enemy”. Adapted to the present argument, which takes friendship rather than enmity as the social relationship in which a stable sense of ‘being’ is obtained, the threat emerges in the ‘disappearance’ of the friend. Before engaging this, it is necessary to clarify what happens in this process by taking a closer look at the condition which the Self, striving for authentic becoming, fears.

Ambivalence!
The argument pursued here follows Jef Huysmans (1998a: 241), who relies on Zygmunt Baumann to argue that the nature of the destabilising experience which generates ontological insecurity is best captured in the notion of ‘ambivalence’ (Baumann 1991). Broadly speaking, ambivalence describes the simultaneous coexistence of opposed/conflicting feelings, thoughts and desires and, thus, a ‘torn’ or confused’ being unable to make a choice. A Self which finds itself in a state of ambivalence is uncertain about how to evaluate its world and which direction it should take. As Baumann put it,
in a state of ambivalence the Self is “unable to read the situation properly” which creates a feeling of “acute discomfort” (Baumann, 1991: 1). Although it is not quite a state of meaninglessness but of a conflict of meanings, it is a state of disorientation and thus a state heightening the mood of anxiety. This becomes clear in Baumann’s discussion of ambivalence as juxtaposed to order.\footnote{It is not difficult to see the Heideggerian lines in Baumann’s reasoning, with the neutralizing force of the everyday as a totality (modernity/order) which nevertheless contains the possibility of the ‘dreadful’ (ambivalence).} Whereas order enables the Self to comfortably place things into familiar categories, ambivalence is characterized by “the possibility of assigning an object or an event to more than one category” and therefore “disorder” (Baumann 1991: 1). For order-seeking individuals, a state of ambivalence signifies ‘the other’ of order, “the indeterminate and unpredictable” and, thus, generates a feeling of uncertainty “that source and archetype of all fear” (Ibid., 7). The significance of ambivalence hence is the ‘emptiness’ of the future, the difficulty to ‘read’ it as a meaningful place, and the negative emotional impact this has on the Self. In a section entitled ‘The horror of indetermination’, Baumann argues that this uncertainty about where to go is not only confusing and discomfiting but “it carries a sense of danger” (Ibid., 56).

The threat posed to the Self by ambivalence is that it is \textit{destabilizing} and thereby creates an ‘identity crisis’, a concept introduced in the 1950s by Erik Erikson to capture individuals suffering from acute problems of orientation. While Erikson developed the notion of an identity crisis to describe crises of adolescence, it has since been used more generally to describe a Self suffering from “massive dislocations” (Straub, 2002: 62), “an acute form of disorientation” (Taylor, 1989: 27). For a Self gaining orientation primarily by being placed in a valued space, a “radical uncertainty” about where to stand signifies a moral uncertainty. As Taylor phrases it, Selves suffering from an identity crisis “lack a frame or horizon within which things can take on a stable significance, within which some life possibilities can be seen as good or meaningful, others as bad or trivial. The meaning of all these possibilities is unfixed, labile, or undetermined. This is a painful and frightening experience” (Taylor 1989: 27f).

In other words, ambivalence means a blurring, if not loss, of the meaning structures through which the Self discloses the world. Having the world stripped of its familiarity is an experience of instable foundations, if not loss of ground, and thus uncertainty about where to stand. The lack of orientation is threatening to the Self because it faces a world
it does not ‘know’ or understand, generating what Huysmans calls ‘epistemological fear’ (Huysmans, 1998a: 235). In this sense, the Self’s ontological insecurity is brought about by epistemological insecurity. Applied to the terminology used here, ambivalence is a ‘frightening experience’ because it brings about incoherence into the biographical narrative, a loss of centre or feeling to be at ‘home’. More precisely, as the centre is a duality consisting of meaningful places in the past and the future, it moves these places out of focus, captured in Baumann’s note that ambivalence turns the world into a ‘grey area’. In such a world, the value attributed to the order the Self has disclosed is called into question and horizons of experience and expectations are disconnected. As the vision pursued cannot be satisfactorily placed inside the memory space anymore, lessons learned don’t appear to translate into a meaningful project, making it difficult if not impossible to simultaneously unfold out of and into a known ‘world’. Instead of being able to formulate a coherent national biography the Self faces “temporal and spatial diffusion” (Straub 2002: 61).

In one way, the destabilizing experience brought about by ambivalence is similar to the ‘shock’ discussed in chapter five in that both shake the meaning structure of ‘the world’ the Self has disclosed for itself and trigger a heightened feeling of anxiety. Apart from that the two are very different. The shock is an extreme version of a significant experience which creates a memory space and is given meaning together with the friend, thus coming to serve as a source of order integrated into the national biography. After rupturing ‘the world’ it takes on a stabilizing function by manifesting a past and certain ‘lessons’ which friends can agree on and use for their project. By contrast, the ambivalence leading to an identity crisis, while it may become visible and crystallize in one moment, gradually undermines the coherence of the biographical narrative and weakens the Self’s ability to generate stable meaning structures with the friend. The difference will become clearer when taking a closer look at how/where ‘ambivalence’ enters ‘being-in-the-world’.

**Introducing ‘The Stranger’**

For Baumann, ambivalence is an inevitably side product of modernity (Baumann 1991: 15; also Huysmans 1998a). Adopting Horkheimer and Adorno’s diagnosis of a dialectic of enlightenment, he suggests that ambivalence may appear as a disturbance to order but actually falls within the logic of creating order. In the process of (trying to) categorize things into a coherent whole, or what Baumann calls a ‘dream of purity’, there is always something which does not fit and remains ‘outside’. Ambivalence thus is the very consequence of boundary drawing, more precisely a result of the fact that boundary
drawing is “never foolproof” (Ibid.: 57). Hence, Baumann argues, ambivalence cannot be eradicated, its appearance is unavoidable and thus a “normal condition”, creating an “ambient fear” (Baumann, 1997: 22). This dialectic is a bit too static because it assumes a fixed and rigid sense of order and the desire for a totalizing closure, whereas the argument presented here emphasizes a dynamic of ‘world building’, a creative and open process through a malleable memory space and a ‘limited utopia’. That said, Baumann makes gives a crucial hint in locating the emergence of ambivalence in the appearance of a ‘stranger’.

Except for a mentioning by Huysmans, the category of ‘the stranger’ is by and large absent from the IR literature and remains under-conceptualized even among social theorists. Those who discuss the phenomenon describe the stranger as, broadly speaking, presenting a “limit-experience for humans trying to identify themselves” (Kearney, 2003: 3). Beyond that, there is no clear definition of what makes a ‘stranger’ other than that it represents the ‘unknown’ (the German term _fremd_ means both ‘strange’ and ‘foreign’). For Richard Kearny the figure of the stranger is pretty much everything that is ‘uncanny’ and ranges from the ancient notion of ‘foreigner’ to the contemporary category of ‘alien’, in a chapter entitled ‘Strangers and Scapegoats’ he tellingly does not really discuss the concept of the stranger (Kearny 2003: ch. 1).

The earliest discussion in sociology, which remains quite influential, is presented by Georg Simmel. For Simmel the stranger emerges in the image of “the potential wanderer” who “has not quite overcome the freedom of coming and going” (Simmel, 1950 [1908]: 402). It is a person who simultaneously is and is not part of a ‘familiar setting’, whose position within a group is “determined...by the fact that he has not belonged to it from the beginning, that he imports qualities into it which do not and cannot stem from the group itself” (Ibid.). The unique feature of the stranger is that “it embodies that synthesis of nearness and distance” and is thus someone who is in close contact but not “organically connected” (Ibid, 404). In spatial terms, while present in the sense that it cannot be ignored the stranger cannot be placed by the Self within its frames of experience and expectations; it appears quite literally ‘out of place’. One can develop two slightly different conceptualizations of the stranger out of Simmel’s discussion, namely the ‘newcomer’ and the ‘marginal’ (Mclemore, 1970). It is easy to see how the two may be conflated in that the newcomer is marginalized by society because it does not ‘fit’, yet for the present purpose they must be kept apart. The reading of the stranger as ‘the marginal’ moves the analytical focus towards a study of discrimination as a
reaction to the appearance of the strange; the present task, instead, is to discern the threatening potential of the ‘wanderer’.

Whereas Simmel sees the stranger as a peculiar but not necessarily problematic feature of society, Baumann points out that the stranger is perceived as a threat to the Self striving for order by introducing ambivalence and interrupting familiarity. He describes the destabilizing atmosphere surrounding the appearance of the stranger is stark colours: “the arrival of a Stranger has the impact of an earthquake...the Stranger shatters the rock on which the security of daily life rests” (Baumann 1991 or 1997: 10). Baumann nicely captures the difference between the enemy and the stranger and makes clear that it is the latter which poses the ‘existential threat’ to the Self:

“The threat he [the stranger] carries is more horrifying than that which one can fear from the enemy. The stranger threatens the sociation itself — the very possibility of sociation (...). And this because the stranger is neither friend nor enemy; and because he may be both (...). The stranger is one (perhaps the main one, the archetypal one) member of the family of ‘undecidables’” (Baumann 1997: 55, emphasis added).

In other words, the stranger is feared because it defies sociability. It does not allow the Self to connect/establish bonds and appears to ‘empty’ the in-between space of meaning, thus standing for the fallibility of ‘the world’. It introduces the grey areas, a world of ambivalence, and thus the ‘horror of indetermination’ discussed above. This overlaps with Kearny’s description of strangers as triggering an ‘uncanny’ experience and with Julia Kristeva’s notion of the ‘horrific sublime’ experience when encountering the ‘abject’ (Kearney 2003: 73ff., 89ff). And it is echoed by Baumann who suggests that for a Self seeking stability “it is best not to meet strangers at all” (Baumann 1997: 62).

If the threat to a stable sense of Self is associated with the figure of the stranger, where does the stranger come from? Given that it is difficult to conceive of ‘states’ as wandering around, where/how does it emerge? For Simmel and Baumann the stranger is an ‘Other’ being which cannot be understood but is present in ‘the world’. Taking up this hint and thinking about where, most likely, in ‘the world’ comes from, this thesis shifts the conception of the stranger away from the notion that it enters from the ‘outside’. Furthermore, it is useful to differentiate the conception of the stranger

273 Baumann echoes Connolly to some extent when arguing that “the national state is designed primarily to deal with the problem of strangers, not enemies” by “keeping the stranger at a mental distance through ‘locking him up’ in a shell of exoticism” to assert an actual identity (Baumann 1991: 63-67).
introduced here from what might be called the 'familiar stranger', which is not entirely 'unknown' to the extent that it has a recognizable place in the experienced space but it remains at a distance to the centre, that is, it is disconnected from the soul. Whereas the familiar stranger is a being the Self does not feel emotionally close to, the argument is that in order to pose a threat to ontological security, 'the stranger' lacks this distance.

Emotional proximity is what the stranger has in common with the friend. Hence, picking up Simmel's note that the phenomenon of "strangeness" enters "even the most intimate relationships" (Simmel 1950: 406) the argument put forward here is that 'the stranger' – the figure turning being in the world 'ambivalent' – emerges from within friendship. Indeed, it can be argued that the notion of the stranger (or 'strangeness') as something that poses an existential threat must appear from within friendship because of the vulnerability of intimacy. To see this we must recall that the identification of what can pose an 'existential threat' is logically linked to an understanding of the vulnerabilities of that which sustains the Self. If friendship is crucial in sustaining a stable sense of Self, in what sense is it vulnerable and who is in the position to exploit this vulnerability? Again, the answers are easy to see. Strengthening of friendship bonds inversely creates a relationship of interdependence: by empowering each other in pursuing a project which lends coherence to and entwines their national biographies, friends also come to depend on each other for sustaining the same.

The social capital contained in friendship, namely the ability to provide stability by mutually satisfying desires of belonging/recognition and authenticity, turns into a soft-power relationship in which interdependence exposes its flip side, namely vulnerability. In the process of developing ideas of order / a shared a moral space together by collaborating on making sense of the past and planning for the future, friends tame their anxiety by coming to share intimate knowledge, and this intimacy implies great vulnerability. The trust that friends will continue to invest in the common project and, thereby, will continue making the world meaningful for each other, makes the friend powerful. Indeed, because no-one is as vital to the biographical narrative of the

---

274 This duality inherent in relationships of interdependence is discussed for the economic realm by Keohane and Nye (1989). Keohane and Nye conceptualize interdependence in terms of 'sensitivity' and 'vulnerability', the first referring to the degree to which A is affected if B shifts its policy in a specific issue area (such as oil production), and the second referring to A's (in)ability to switch to an alternative source (such as nuclear energy). They suggested that international regimes function as intervening factors through which interdependence among states is channeled and shows its effects.
Self as the friend, no-one is as powerful to undermine it. As Horst Hutter in his comprehensive discussion of *The Politics of Friendship* puts it: “there is no one who is as vulnerable to the actions of Self as a friend (...) no power is as total as the power one has over friends” (Hutter, 1978: 12).

The dialectic relationship of empowerment producing vulnerability underscores the conceptualization of the unfolding Self as one which never completely ‘owns’ its world. The possibility of the friend-turning-stranger and, hence, the inherent ability of the friend to significantly destabilize the national biography is always ‘present’, so that the feeling of a loss of identity is “a threat against which no one can be completely secure” (Straub 2002: 62).²⁷⁵ And if the friend plays a key role in enabling authentic becoming, then its ‘disappearance’, the process of the friend turning into a stranger, poses the greatest threat to the same. This process of estrangement, its character and causes, and the strategies available to the Self for dealing with it must be looked at in more detail.

**Estrangement as Enduring Dissonance**

The core features of an estrangement process are an inversion of the central characteristics of true friendship discussed in the previous chapter. It was argued that friends agree in the possibilities projected into the future and trust each other to commit to ‘realizing’ a shared vision. Friends invest in this process of shared world building according to a unique logic of reciprocity and regard each other as equals. Conversely, estrangement is characterised by disagreements over what the project entails and by mistrust over the other’s commitment and investment, expressed in perceptions/complaints of lacking reciprocity, that is, complaints about unequal ‘burden sharing’, ‘free-riding’ and unpaid debt, as well as accusations of lacking solidarity and of not being treated as an equal.

The stranger brings ambivalence into the world, and so the threat of estrangement does not lie in an absence of ordering narratives among friends but, rather, in their incompatibility and, consequently, in the absence of a shared narrative. Estrangement creates an ambivalent atmosphere because friends don’t ‘understand’ each other, which turns the world they were building into something unexpectedly fragile. The use of the

²⁷⁵ This view is also prominent in the writings of Butler and Kristeva, modifying the Freudian theme of the (oppressed) otherness within and (unconsciously) projected into images like monsters and aliens located ‘outside’ (Kearney, 2003: 35, 72ff).
term ‘unexpectedly’ here is deliberate to suggest that, given the fundamental importance of friendship in stabilising the sense of Self, friends have a common interest in maintaining their bonds, which means that processes of estrangement occur unintentionally.

How, then, can friends become strangers? For useful pointers to what might cause estrangement we shall return to Aristotle.276 His discussion of problems arising in friendship mainly concerns friendships of utility and pleasure, which are expected to dissolve “whenever they are no longer pleasant or useful” (Aristotle, NE Book IX, 3). According to Aristotle, true friendship is characterized by stability because the virtue on which it is based is stable: “friendship of virtue is enduring and immune to slander” (NE Book VIII, 7, 8). However, Aristotle discusses those three types of friendship as ideal types which do not exist in isolation in ‘real life’. In other words, true friendship encompasses the other two and/or may at times be difficult to tell apart.277 Hence, true friendship is not devoid of ‘utilitarianism’. Aristotle writes that “if friends come to be separated by some wide gap in virtue, vice, wealth, or something else...then they are friends no more, and do not even expect to be” (NE, Book VIII, 7). There is a difference between the effect of an emerging gap in ‘virtue’ (NE, Book IX, 3) and a shift in wealth/material assets (NE, Book VIII, 14). While Aristotle is not clear as to how the two are related, the first is the more fundamental one, as gaps in formal inequality can be compensated by agreement on the desirable good, not the other way around.

As noted in the previous chapter, friendship is never unconditional in the sense that something is always expected in return (Smith Pangle, 2003: 138f). And just as the unique logic of reciprocity cannot be made intelligible from the ‘outside’, friends do not follow a formal objective code of conduct and so by trusting that each side contributes ‘what is possible’ friends do not understand the logic of reciprocity themselves. And so it is well worth taking seriously Aristotle’s warning that significant shifts in formal status and resources/assets available changes conceptions of what/how much can be contributed, which in turn may lead to a corruption of reciprocity (NE, Book VIII,

---

276 For a comprehensive discussion of sociological studies on the dissolution of friendship which is rather indeterminate because it discusses all kinds of factors, see Fehr (1996: 178ff).

277 “Friendship for pleasure bears some resemblance to this complete sort, since good people are also pleasant to each other. And friendship of utility also resembles it, since good people are also useful to each other” (NE, Book VIII, 4).
Yet in the end, serious disputes over adequate contributions to the shared project must be taken a symptom for disagreement over the good life, that is, a *dissonance over ideas of order*. The notion of dissonance over ideas of order is similar to what Kratochwil has termed a “norm collision” (Kratochwil, 2000; see also Cardenas, 2004; Wiener 2004), although from an evolutionary perspective ‘collision’ is a misleading term because it suggests a one-off ‘cut’ or ‘clash’ of views rather than gradual divergence.

Dissonance may occur if there is a misunderstanding between A and B regarding the terms of their friendship; as Aristotle puts it “friends are most at odds when they are not friends in the way they think they are” (NE, Book IX, 3). As noted in the previous chapter, despite their entwined national biographies friends never completely ‘know’ each other. In a sense, because friends meet in the project, they necessarily identify with an image of the Other. Simmel argued that even if one can never know the other absolutely, “one forms some personal unity out of those fragments in which alone [the other] is accessible to us” (Simmel 1950: 308, 326). This overlaps with Arendt’s note that prejudice [*Vorurteil*] is a necessary element of social life to compensate for the impossibility of sharing every experience (Arendt 2003: 13-27). Yet it is important that “the picture of each in the other” built in the relationship “interacts with the actual relation” (Simmel, 1950: 309). In other words, as noted by Aristotle, the image must be affirmed through common activity in pursuit of, and through costly investment into, the common project, showing consistency between stated values and action (also Mattern 2005).279

A relationship which is entirely built on images, designed so the Other fits into a shared ‘world’, is poised to encounter problems if these are not frequently adapted. In that case, friends’ understanding of each other may turn into a hollow prejudice where both sides believe they are still investing in the same project, share the same horizon of

---

278 Telling is Aristotle’s vagueness regarding the possibility of friendship among formally unequal actors and the question of what makes an appropriate return, to which his answer ranges from ‘honour’ to ‘affection’ to ‘what is possible’.

279 Commitment to shared world building does not form overnight. Peter Blau differentiated between intrinsic and lasting attraction, the first conceived of as “spontaneous reactions to [the Other’s] qualities” which lose their significance for the Self if it becomes apparent that they are “calculated to have a certain effect” (Blau 1964: 69). On the damaging nature of deceit, see Lebow (2005).
expectations, when in fact they do not. Because the future holds a prominent place in the process of coming into being-in-the-world, dissonance emerges primarily in diverging utopias — visions of the desirable future — and, hence, in divergence of horizons of expectations. If A changes, for whatever reason, its vision of a desirable future it alters the direction of its unfolding and consequently its ‘personal maneuvering space’ within which the common project is pursued. This inevitably leads to a change in what A considers an appropriate contribution to the project, which will be perceived by B as a reduced commitment to the shared project as B knows it. Said differently, A’s activities, meant to be investments in the shared project, move beyond B’s horizon of expectations. As a consequence, on both sides expectations and corresponding activities will not appear familiar to the friend and trigger disputes over adequate contributions to the shared project.

Diverging expectations about what each can/should contributes to the shared project and inconsistency between the image A holds of B and B’s activities will insert a feeling of ambivalence into the process of ‘world building’. To be sure, a low level of dissonance is nothing unusual and does not necessarily lead to estrangement. What matters is the depth and endurance of dissonance. If dissonance is strong and long divergence reaches a critical level and common activities are difficult to pursue. Ambivalence may linger in the background, glossed over through vague rhetoric, yet it will ‘hit home’ if there is an event which A considers an integrative part of the world building task while B does not. More precisely, if A and B differ about whether/how the event fits into the shared project, their reactions and views about the appropriate response will differ as well, exposing the dissonance and turning ‘the world’ into an ambivalent place.

Friends perceive the significant other’s attempt to shift the shared project in a new direction as an alienating experience, and so the Self’s reaction to the estrangement process can be understood as a struggle against alienation, a diversion from what it considers the path of authentic becoming. This understanding of alienation as an

---

280 See also Peter Blau’s distinction between intrinsic and lasting attraction, the first conceived of as “spontaneous reactions to [the Other’s] qualities” which lose their significance for the Self if it becomes apparent that they are “calculated to have a certain effect” (Blau 1964: 69). On the damaging nature of deceit, see Lebow (2005).

281 One reason for expectations to diverge, not engaged here, is when there are conflicting loyalties, that is, when different friends make claims which cannot all be satisfied (Smith Pangle, 2003: 135f.). This opens up the issue of multiple friendships.
unwanted separation\textsuperscript{282} expresses, more precisely, the disconnect of horizons of expectation and experience which had previously lend coherence to the biographical narrative developed together with the significant Other. Fear of alienation is the fear of ‘loosing’ this narrative and requires finding a way to reduce the tension between the desires of recognition/belonging and the desire for authenticity.\textsuperscript{283}

**Preventing Alienation: Adaptation and Emancipation**

Estrangement does not happen overnight but is a gradual process in which the parties have the opportunity to counter an increase in ambivalence and alienation by renegotiating the shared project. Crudely speaking, the affected state can choose between two (not mutually exclusive) strategies: adaptation and emancipation.

**Adaptation**

Taking up the suggestion that identities are ‘sticky’ or ‘resilient’, social conceptions of Self are not changed overnight as, after all, such a loss stability is precisely what the Self wants to avoid. And as the biography written through friendships contains sunk costs which the Self does not want to give up easily, it is assumed that adaptation is the preferred strategy. Adaptation basically refers to the attempt of state representatives to renegotiate order with the friend, which can take various forms. As research in sociology shows, one of the most important measures to ‘rescue’ friendships is ‘communication’ (Fehr 1996; see also Bially Mattern 2005b). However, even a Habermasian discourse ethics requires a common ‘lifeworld’, which is to say that communication reaches its limits when friends grow dissimilar in virtue, that is, when they start to diverge in their views over what is the desirable ‘good’ order. This comes close to Bergson’s point that different ‘inner times’ can be a hindrance for communication, echoed by Elias, who gives a number of illustrations for how interaction between members situated in different ‘social time-grids’ may lead to communication difficulties and even ‘blockages’ (Elias 1992: 39, 137).

\textsuperscript{282} For a discussion, see Der Derian (1987). This usage is found in the writings of religious and secular enlightenment thinkers accusing each other of advocating the individual’s distancing from god and from reason, respectively. It is different from the second meaning of ‘alienation’ prevalent among social contract scholars who put forward the idea of a limited transfer of rights to the sovereign in exchange of security (Der Derian, 1987: 15-19; Olsen 1969: 291f). See also Dean (1961).

\textsuperscript{283} By focusing on the fear of alienation, the phenomenon is approached from a different angle than the one found in Marxism, which places its focus on a situation in which the (subconscious) separation from authentic being has already occurred and is upheld by material power relations (Der Derian 1987: 24f).
One strategy of dealing with such dissonance is to ignore it by glossing over the differences. This may involve consciously talking 'past' each other, that is, relying on old/familiar but sufficiently vague formulas which hide the different meanings given to them. Another and related strategy is to take a passive stance and remain silent. The underlying concern in both cases is that open confrontation may put the shared project at risk, and so using familiar formulas and/or silence is a strategy to 'sit things out' in the hope that they will 'return' to where resonance is restored. Although friendships lack formal "societal mechanisms" (Fehr, 1996: 183) which estranged parties could revert to, deteriorating friendships will likely continue to rely on formalized low-level procedures within the shared institution, which allows to keep the appearance of continuing the common project while knowing that these at they are not sufficient for maintaining/recreating the bond.

A more forceful strategy is that the parties will openly voice discontent and engage in making a "gesture of resistance" (Laclau 1996) against expectations placed by the significant Other to signal that these are considered unreasonable. Rather than hoping to 'sit out' the dissonance, in this gesture of resistance the state invokes the theme of the 'true identity' through what Ernesto Laclau calls "strategic essentialism" (Laclau, 1996: 51). State representatives will claim the 'essential' parameters negotiated under the familiar (now endangered) relationship and use this 'true identity' position strategically to demonstrate the limits of their manoeuvring space and engage the significant Other in negotiations with the aim of re-adjustment. The gesture of resistance, in other words, is aimed at reducing the depth of the expected changes and stake the position from which to renegotiate the common project without radically altering the biographical narrative.

In the attempt to balance desires of belonging/recognition with the desire for authenticity, governments may apply a combination of these strategies. Their success depends on the both the willingness of the friend to compromise and on the depth of required changes of the national biography. The problem is, however, that the two may become caught in a downward-spiral: dissonance emerging due to a lack of 'understanding' marks a relationship in which friends appear less familiar to each other and, consequently, in which the willingness to make voluntary compromises is significantly reduced. In this situation of instability, where the familiar world is fading away and where its restoration requires one or both sides to adapt, that states will
attempt to exert pressure on the significant Other to adapt. In other words, in a process of estrangement, the social capital built up in friendship is transformed from a creative source of world building into a coercive force, turning the ‘power-with’ into a ‘power-over’ relationship. 'Soft power' moves back into focus, yet this time not as empowerment but in attempts to impose a worldview on the significant Other. The relationship between significant Others turns into a confrontation over the meaning of order in which both sides attempt to model the ‘common’ project closer to ‘their’ respective places in past and future and request that the significant Other adjusts its national biography accordingly. This can range from subtle forms of persuasion\textsuperscript{284} to the exercise of what Bially Mattern terms “representational force”, that is, a state where adjustments are not expected to be made voluntarily but under the threat of being thrown into a meaningless world, giving it a coercive character (Bially-Mattern, 2005a: 602).

\textit{Emancipation}

If the state finds itself in a position where the significant Other is unwilling to reduce its expectations and where it thinks its voice is not sufficiently taken into account in the process of world building,\textsuperscript{285} and if adaptation is perceived to require an alteration of the national biography by pushing it beyond what James Rosenau (1981) calls “acceptable limits” that would lead to a loss of authenticity, the state will pursue a strategy of emancipation.

Generally speaking, ‘emancipation’ describes a process of liberation, that is, of setting oneself free from restraints “imposed by superior physical force or legal obligation” as well as “from intellectual, moral, or spiritual fetters” (OED). Emancipation thus has a progressive connotation implying the escaping/overcoming of a power-relationship. As Laclau (1996) points out, this classic account of emancipation contains a tension: emancipation is said to be marked by an “absolute chasm”, that is, by radical discontinuity which, once achieved, eliminates power-relations. Yet understood as freeing/liberating the Self from something/one it implies prior oppression of something that must be liberated and which, consequently, pre-exists the act of emancipation. Hence, for emancipation to be meaningful it cannot simply be ground-breaking but also

\textsuperscript{284} On persuasion Mueller (2004); Lebow (2007).
\textsuperscript{285} Note: The emergence of a power-over dynamic in which A can ‘threaten’ B with a loss of the shared world implies that the relationship has turned into one of asymmetric interdependence. The question how asymmetry emerges, essentially about how one side can have more soft power than the other, is important yet difficult to answer in the abstract.
requires a ‘dimension of ground’ to stand on. As Laclau points out, this ‘classic’ account of emancipation is logically incoherent. The main tension arises between seeing emancipation (i) as a complete break with what has been before, as a founding act which constitutes a radically new identity and (ii) as a process that liberates a pre-existing Self which had been oppressed, without which the very desire for emancipation would not arise (Laclau 1996: 3f.). Despite their logical incompatibility, he suggests the two dimensions are necessary elements of emancipation (Ibid, 6).

Laclau’s discussion is valuable in drawing attention to this tension between reading emancipation as ‘liberation’ and as ‘creation’, yet whether the two are logically incompatible depends on how radical the break is. The tension Laclau identifies, also captured in the paradox that, given the anxiety controlling function of friendship, friends should never allow their relationship to dissolve in the first place, rests on the understanding that the sense of Self is constituted in relation with the Other and that breaking with this relationship means it desires to become something else, the possibility of which it presumably has learned outside this relationship. Yet is this the case? Must this possibility have been disclosed in complete independence or can some of the previously established ‘ground’ not be carried over within that vision which drives the emancipatory move? The question is, once again, how to think about this ‘ground’ on which Selfhood stands, how the internal/personal (domestic) and the external/social (international) dimensions of Selfhood relate. For Bially Mattern ‘demagnetized’ friends are able to maintain their sense of Self and restore their special relationship by drawing on sources outside the friendship, by following Wendt and assuming that states have what she calls a ‘primordial nugget’ (Bially Mattern 2005: 60).

By contrast, for an ontology which understands authentic being as both social and evolutionary, the break can never be truly ‘radical’, for two reasons: First, there cannot be a complete break in the national biography, that is, it cannot become completely disconnected from its experienced space as even new utopias cannot leave the past ‘behind’ in the sense of ignoring/denying it. Second, and quite importantly, it is not the relationship per se that is being abandoned but the relationship in which friends have become strangers. Said differently, the biographical narrative has the bygone ‘friendship’ integrated into it because that relationship still fits, that is, it has become
part of the experienced space and still resonates with the world building project. So rather than conceiving of emancipation as an ‘absolute chasm’, it is understood here as a *conservative-creative* process which allows change within some sort of continuity.

The question whether the Self will pursue a strategy of emancipation depends not only on the how much change would be necessary for A to accommodate B’s expectations but also how much does A depend on B. In other words, there is the question of the availability of an alternative as, after all, from a friendship perspective a state cannot maintain what it considers its authentic biographical narrative on its own. Hence, the process of emancipation as understood here is a search for alternative ways of satisfying desires of belonging and recognition, more specifically a search for an alternative significant Other with whom a common project can be more successfully negotiated. While in this process the biographical narrative also will also undergo change, the adaptation required will be more attractive if the Self has more influence in determining the direction these changes take.

Hence, adaptation and emancipation are not mutually exclusive strategies and affected states likely pursue a combination of both. As noted above, the emancipation process does not imply a radical discontinuity of relations in which everything is left behind (Laclau 1996: 2). However, strategies of adaptation and emancipation can be pursued simultaneously only up to a point. While states may possess close relations with more than one significant Other, the phenomenon of ‘multiple identities’ has its limits in the fact that an authentic national biography can only accommodate so many compromises: “although we may have a diversity of relatively discrete selves, there needs to be...a continuing theme” (Hogg and Vaughan 2002: 125). To avoid becoming entangled in conflicting projects, intimate relations are layered, with the preference being placed on the one which supports the project in which the unfolding Self feels more ‘at home’.

---

286 This is not too different from Aristotle who argues that after friendships dissolve “surely [the Self] must keep some memory of the familiarity they had” (NE, Book IX, 3).
Applying the Lens: Looking Ahead

With the causal narrative completed in the abstract, the task ahead is to apply the theoretical frame developed thus far to the dynamic of German-American cooperation as captured at the outset: (i) the consensus that NATO was the institution most desirable for dealing with ‘European security’ in the post-WW II decade (1945-55), (ii) the tensions between Bonn and Washington over the usefulness of CSCE in the ‘detente’ decade (1965-75), and (iii) the divergence over institutional preferences for the purpose of ‘European security’ in the decade surrounding the end of the Cold War (1985-95) signified by German investment in CFSP as an institution which excluded the US. The task is to make sense of this dynamic by framing it as a phenomenon of friendship and estrangement/emancipation and provide evidence for why it occurred.

The empirical analysis first needs to identify the parameters of the ‘national security interest’ on each side to then determine the presence or absence of a ‘common’ security interest. Rather than engaging military-strategic thinking about force structures among the military establishment, the theoretical lens applied here understands security policy as being about creating and maintaining order within a national biography and to assess the overlap between German and American conceptions of the same. This provides the basis on which the usefulness (or value) of a security institution is evaluated and, consequently, the investment or lack thereof in a common institution can be explained.

In more specific terms, the task is to identify how political leaders in Bonn and in Washington formulated national biographies in their spatial and temporal dimension – a meaningful narrative of what Germany-in-the-world and America-in-the-world could/should become – and to show how the (lacking) overlap of those narratives explains the commitment (or lack thereof) to invest in NATO, CSCE, and CFSP, respectively.

As the formation and weakening of friendship bonds – the emergence of resonance and dissonance in national biographies and the success or failure in negotiating a shared project – and the corresponding investment in international institutions takes time, the empirical analysis spans three ten-year periods. Each period will address the same set of questions, namely (i) how political leaders formulated the national biography of ‘Germany-in-the-world’ and ‘America-in-the-world’, respectively, (ii) whether and how these narratives connect and (iii) how this (dis)connection motivates common institutional investments. Although the US side will be given ample consideration, for reasons outlined in the introduction the empirical analysis is biased towards the German
side. Broken down for each period, the investigation is going to present the following account:

In the first period (1945-55) the analysis will be looking for the reformulation of the narratives situating 'Germany' and 'America' in the world after the end of the Second World War were closely interwoven and resonated with each other. It presents evidence for how both sides agreed on a vision of how to order a shared experienced space in which national biographies could be embedded, and that NATO was the desirable institution through which the common project of 'world building' should be pursued. In that context, it suggests that American and German policymakers saw each other as equals and were content with each other's contribution to the shared project.

The analysis of the second period (1965-75) will show first signs estrangement. It will discuss how German enthusiasm and US hesitancy to invest in CSCE was accompanied by disagreement over the usefulness of NATO as the institution through which to build a meaningful 'being-in-the-world' and trace this to dissonance between Bonn and Washington over ideas/visions of order. While the analysis will present evidence of misunderstandings and signs of distrust, accusations of lacking reciprocity (expressed in complaints to insufficient 'burden sharing') and unequal treatment (expressed, for instance, in complaints about arrogance), it suggests that sufficient adaptation took place to conceal/reconcile the dissonance, allowing sufficient 'room of manoeuvre' for both along the limits of the shared project.

The third period (1985-95) is will show further dissonance between German and American policymakers, only that now adaptation attempts are expected to remain insufficient in reconciling the dissonance and holding off the estrangement process, prompting Bonn to pursue a strategy of emancipation. The discussion provides evidence for deep and enduring disagreements over ideas of order, expressed in diverging expectations about appropriate contributions to the shared project and in feelings of ambivalence in Bonn about the direction for Germany's unfolding. Furthermore, it suggests that German leaders concluded that expectations held in Washington could not be met without substantially compromising (violating) the authenticity of Germany's national biography and that this motivated them to invest in CFSP with an alternative significant Other.

As noted in the introduction, the phenomenological lens on the development of 'national biographies' requires a hermeneutical approach. This means adopting the perspective of
the 'state' in question by standing in the shoes, so to say, of those political leaders in a position of formulating and representing the national biography. It requires analytical empathy and seeks to offer a deliberately uncritical reconstruction of how these leaders represented Germany's or America's 'being-in-the-world'.

In this context, it must be noted upfront that three central aspects of the theoretical narrative are difficult to carve out empirically. The first concerns identifying feelings of anxiety and, in an attempt to control the same, desires for belonging/recognition and for authenticity expressed by political leaders and the broader community they represent. While the empirical analysis must provide some indication that these feelings are present and drive decisions/behaviour, this requires some interpretative sensitivity/freedom as these feelings are rarely shown in public or voiced in these terms.

The second difficulty concerns the argument that national biographies are constructed together/in interaction with significant others (the intimate bonds of friendship). This process, in which both sides come to agree (or not) on how to order an overlapping experienced space by formulating a meaningful vision of it that resonates with their understanding of 'being-in-the-world' is difficult to trace systematically. It does not proceed in a neat sequential interaction which can be traced in a linear fashion, or in a feedback loop of action and reaction. Rather, this process of 'mutual constitution' is a messy one in which biographical narratives become interwoven with each other and draw on each other simultaneously and indirectly through the shared project.

The third aspect concerns the process of 'emancipation', namely that states which loosen their friendship bonds and, correspondingly, show reduced interest in the institution through which their shared project has been pursued, need an alternative friend with whom a common project can be more successfully negotiated. This effectively brings another 'special' relationship into the analysis. Specifically, the analysis of enduring dissonance between the German and the US narrative and the emancipation of the former from the latter would ideally be accompanied by an analysis of the growing resonance of German ideas of order with those of another state, namely France. Such a parallel analysis is omitted here, as it would either blow the third part out of proportion or come at a cost of a more detailed understanding of the dynamics in German-American relations.287

287 The omission is compensated for by the fact that the development of intimate bonds between Bonn and Paris is well documented in the literature and can be referenced where appropriate.

Introduction
This chapter offers an explanation for what motivated German and American investment in NATO in the decade following the end of the Second World War (1945-55). Echoing the view that German-American security cooperation was not based on a military rationale but about „wrapping political problems of an entirely different kind“ (Krieger in Schwabe 1994: 47), the chapter assesses the explanatory power of the ‘friendship’ argument developed over the previous chapters. It outlines the need for regaining orientation after the end of the war and how the narratives situating ‘Germany’ and ‘America’ in ‘the world’ after 1945 came to resonate with each other. Specifically, the chapter explores how political leaders came to agree (a) on a particular vision giving rise to a project in which respective national biographies could be embedded and (b) on NATO as the most suitable institution for pursuing this project. With a focus on the German side, the chapter pays particular attention to Konrad Adenauer as an agent who successfully formulated a Germany-in-Europe narrative in mutual empowerment with American counterparts thereby establishing the German-American friendship through NATO.

The chapter proceeds as follows. The first part lays out the experiences and lessons on the basis of which a new narrative of ‘Germany’ was built and shows how these were linked to the vision of Germany unfolding into a ‘united Europe’ free and at peace. Capturing his anxiety of not being able to control Germany’s future in the ‘Potsdam complex’, it is shown how Adenauer projected Germany into the Western space and located the US as a friend. The second part shows how his vision of Germany in a ‘United States of Europe’ resonated with the American agenda of finding a place for ‘Europe’ and a new Germany in its national biography. The third part demonstrates how this formed the basis for a German-American consensus about German rearmament as an attempt to ‘contribute’ to the Western project and thereby increase Germany’s voice in the Western space through NATO.

Reinventing ‘Germany’
The end of the war required the reinvention of ‘Germany’. After Hitler’s death, the breakdown of the Nazi regime and the unconditional surrender in May 1945, relief that the war was over was mixed with a feeling of loss and disorientation. Indeed, it is

288 For the military debates, see Meier-Dörnberg (1990); Tuschhoff (1994); Wiggershaus (1994).
important to be reminded with Axel Schildt that for the majority of Germans the end of
the war appeared as "a catastrophic collapse rather than liberation" (Schildt 2007: 32).
Germany had been defeated in yet another war which left the country in ruins,
diminished its population by about 10 per cent, its territory by about 20 per cent, while
displacing millions. The shadow government was dissolved by the Allies in late May
and a week later, on 5 June 1945, the Allied Control Council proclaimed supreme
authority. Alfred Grosser puts it succinctly: "the total war...ended with total
disempowerment" (Grosser 1985: 14). Wilhelm Grewe, a German law professor and
close advisor to Adenauer, noted that Germany had "lost...its character [Eigenschaft] of
a state" (Grewe 1960/52: 3).

The loss was not merely a legal one (of 'sovereignty') or a material one (of people and
territory). In addition, what was lost to most Germans with the collapse of National
Socialism was an understanding of what 'Germany' was meant to be(come). The
biographical narrative constructed by Hitler's regime culminating in a Thousand Year
Reich utopia had defined the meaning of 'Germany' and its place in the world as the
rightful ruler of 'Europe' for more than a decade. It had propagated a glorious German
history, cultural/racial superiority and megalomaniac visions of a 'Thousand Year
Reich' given aesthetic texture in all kinds of exhibitions, Riefenstahl images and Speer's
architectural plans. As outlined by Hitler in Mein Kampf, in this narrative German
authentic existence was intertwined with the claim to rule 'Europe'. Picturing a world of
great "spatial formations", among which he counted the British Empire, the US, Russia,
and China, Hitler's aim was to have 'Germany' recognized as a great power and to
expand the Lebensraum of the German people over and bring order to "our European
homeland" (reprinted in O Tuathail et al. 1998: 36-39). While this narrative may not
have been embraced by all, it was accepted by the majority of the population until close
to the end of the war and now needed to be replaced.289 As Schildt notes "national hubris
was followed by a mood of moral depression" and abstract fear (Schildt 2007: 33).

Thus, in the summer of 1945, political leaders had to find a new answer to the 'German
question' by recreating a narrative of Germany-in-the-world.290 In addition to physical
reconstruction, the renewal of Germany as a country, a society, a participant in the world
required an narrative which dealt with the memories and redefined the vision towards
which a post-war 'Germany' could unfold. In an interview with a British journalist that
summer, Adenauer described Germany as a spiritual desert and noted that just as

289 On how German society adopted the Third Reich narrative, see Fritzsche (2008).
290 For a comprehensive overview of the 'German question', see Verheyen (1991).
important as material reconstruction was stilling hunger for new “spiritual values” [geistige Werte], stressing the need to “give the people new ideas!” (cited in Schwarz 1986: 442). In the terminology introduced earlier, the task was to redefine a coherent national biography of Germany in space and time which satisfied desires for belonging/recognition and authenticity. It required an answer to what Verheyen (1991) calls the two faces of the ‘German question’, an internal and an external one: how to reconstruct a Germany its citizens would want to live in and one which others would agree to live with. As two émigrés to the United States noted Germany was “a country in search of friends, just as she is a country in search of herself” (Deutsch and Edinger 1959: 20).

Who was in the position of remaking the biography of Germany-in-the-world? The Allied Council devised in Potsdam formally enjoyed supreme authority, yet this authority was soon decentralized and moved to the military (and later civilian) commanders of the respective (three, then four) zones. What was initially envisioned as a central administrative ‘European’ organ for occupied Germany was turned into a fractioned authority without much coordination; that is, fragmented not only in terms of location, but also in the directives it was to install (Mai 1994). Beyond a general agreement to set up measures preventing future German aggression and extracting reparation payments as outlined in the Potsdam Agreement, captured under the objectives of demilitarization, denazification, and decartellisation (which basically meant destroying German war industry), the Allies’ ideas about what to do with Germany after Hitler were “neither specific nor compatible” (Pulzer 1995: 24). Different answers were rooted in different views about the causes of the Third Reich: was Nazism a disease from which the German society could be cured? Was there a logical continuation of ‘Prussian’ aggression from Bismarck to Hitler? Or was the rise of Nazism caused by structural economic inequality and the work of capitalist elites? Policymakers in London, Washington, Paris, and Moscow diverged in their views not only about the balance between punishment and re-education but also disagreed over what each would entail (Grosser 1985: 15f.; Mai, 1994). In short, there was no coherent plan in place in the summer of 1945 and one could say “there was a vacuum...in Allied policy” (Pulzer, 1995: 23; Judt 2005).

Into this ‘vacuum’, German political life developed rather quickly. The first two post-war years saw a fast development of political institutions and, within them, an intense domestic debate about the direction the ‘new’ Germany should take (Pulzer 1995: 32). Although this happened with oversight from the occupying powers, the political figures
emerging were no administrative puppets. Leadership was (allowed to be) claimed by experienced politicians who had either avoided or resisted the Nazi regime, gone into either mental or physical exile, or endured in captivity. These personalities had strong views over what had gone wrong and were eager to ‘correct’ the German path and were able to reactivate structures of party organization deeply rooted in Germany’s political tradition. While success in creating the new narrative depended on a fruitful connection to narratives of the occupiers, their determination to redefine ‘Germany’ was not a response to external pressure and their ideas were not a result of re-education programmes (Grosser, 1985: 42ff).

Adenauer

There was no consensus among German politicians on how to deal with the memory space left by the Third Reich. Beyond the condemnation and rejection of Hitler’s narrative, domestic leaders disagreed, like the occupiers, over the adequate (re)placement of ‘Germany’ in time and space.Crudely speaking, there were three camps on the issue of what was a ‘good’ order: Those envisioning a communist order, those emphasizing a socialist-democratic one, and those advocating a liberal-Christian-conservative society. Although the communist party existed in the Western zone until it was banned in 1956, most of its supporters moved to the Soviet zone. The second group, represented by the SPD under the leadership of Kurt Schumacher, appeared to be predestined to politically dominate the ‘new’ Germany due to its strong democratic tradition, its institutional base and the fact that it was the only one of the major parties which had opposed Hitler’s rise and paid the costs. However, Schumacher and his SPD lost the leadership position to the third group around Konrad Adenauer and the newly created Christian Democratic Union (CDU), who won the 1949 election by one vote in coalition with the Bavarian sister party (CSU) and the Liberal Party (FDP) and was re-elected in 1953 by a wide margin.

Adenauer’s rise and his success in claiming the political leadership in the Western occupied zones has been comprehensively discussed by historians like Hans-Peter Schwarz (1986). A seasoned politician who had experienced the occupation after the First World War as mayor of Cologne, Adenauer reemerged as the chairman of the CDU in the British zone and, after holding multiple offices, including of the assembly writing

291 For a detailed discussion of the FRG’s domestic debate on security issues involving all parties and interest groups, see Volkmann (1990). For an overview of the main figures and fault lines on the question of German unity, see Zitelmann (1991).

292 See also Baring (1969); Koch (1985).
the Basic Law, became Chancellor of the newly founded FRG in 1949. Viewed through
the friendship lens, Adenauer's successful claim of (West) German leadership was owed
to his ability of redefining Germany's course together with Western powers, in particular
the United States, in a way that found approval of his domestic constituency and which
famously lead Schumacher to call him 'the chancellor of the allies'. Said differently,
what united Adenauer's domestic opponents, namely the discomfort with his course of
Westintegration, was precisely what made him attractive to Americans. In outlining
this (mutual) empowerment, this chapter agrees with the contention that "to an
exceptional extent...the study of West German foreign policy [during this period] must
be based on an appraisal of Adenauer" (Richardson, 1966: 11), while steering a course
between the view that "in the beginning was Adenauer" (Baring 1969: 2) and the
counter-argument that "in the beginning were the allies" (Haftendorn, 2006: 9).

There is ample evidence that Adenauer, who also occupied the post of Foreign Minister
until 1955, embedded his decisions within a broader understanding of a German national
biography. Often described as a pragmatic and cunning tactitioner, he was also known
to be stubborn and authoritarian in his aim of nudging the evolution of things in one
direction rather than another. According to his biographers, including his long-term
assistant, Adenauer was convinced that political practice must be guided by basic
principles (Grundsätze) and long trajectories or tendencies (Entwicklungstendenzen).
In his memoirs Adenauer wrote that fate was determined by "big ideas" and "ethical
foundations" and defined politics as the art to realize over the long term what was
recognized as morally right (in Poppinga 1975: 13). His 'big ideas' for Germany, more
specifically for the direction it was going, were significantly influenced by the place
from where he saw the world. As Arnulf Baring (1969: 48-62) notes, whereas Bismarck
had thought about Germany's place in Europe from Prussia, Adenauer did the same
from the Rhine region, more specifically from Cologne. Before delineating the broad
contours of the 'Germany' narrative Adenauer pursued, creating what some have called

---

293 On the debate between Adenauer and Schumacher, see Weber and Kowert (2007: Ch. 3). The
friendship lens suggests that Schumacher was unable to create a vision of a new 'Germany'
which resonated with both the German public and the Western Allies, in particular the US. This
disconnect is not the purpose of this chapter, yet it is indicated by Schumacher's skepticism about
Westintegration and NATO membership and the labeling of him as a 'nationalist', points which
Adenauer highlighted and skillfully exploited in his own meeting with US officials.
294 In addition to Schumacher, Adenauer fought party-internal political battles with Andreas
Hermes and Karl Kaiser over party leadership and with Gustav Heinemann over rearmament.
295 Lord Pakenham, minister for Germany in the British cabinet, described Adenauer as acting
"like a grandfather" on behalf of a German people he did not trust (cited in Baring 1969: 58).
297 Also Poppinga (1975); Weidenfeld (1976); Schwarz (1986).
a ‘Rhenish Republic’, it is necessary to outline his source of anxiety, the Potsdam complex.

**The ‘Potsdam Complex’**

The ‘Potsdam complex’ is recognised among Adenauer scholars as a fundamental element guiding his policy and captures the concern that Germany’s future would be shaped by others (Poppinga 1975: 105, 124f). There is no doubt Adenauer resented being treated like a second rate head of state, yet at the core of the Potsdam complex was not hurt personal pride. Instead, it was his anxiety of not being able to influence what Germany would become and, thus, of not being able to ‘see’ Germany’s future because of the ever-present possibility of a revival of the Allied control council and its claim to supreme authority, that is, ‘another Potsdam’ (Grewe 1960: 57). Said differently, he was anxious about *Fremdbestimmung*, the possibility that the direction of the ‘new’ Germany would be determined by others he could not meaningfully communicate with and/or which would not listen to him.

Adenauer’s main concern was that incompatible worldviews would prevent the occupying powers from coming to an agreement about what to do with ‘Germany’, thereby keeping it in a state of uncertainty and without direction. This fear was fuelled through the experience of the immediate post-war years, where there appeared to be no coherent plan for Germany’s future among the Western allies. While the Russians seemed determined in creating their idea of order in the Eastern zone, Adenauer repeatedly complained about discriminatory practices and about chaos in planning and administration in the Western sectors, calling it a “verhaegnisvolles Durcheinander” (in Schwarz 1986: 443-447; Foschepoth 1997). For Adenauer this reduced Germany’s ability to re-invent herself and pursue a meaningful project. Indeed, across party lines the view prevailed that the occupiers were to assist reconstruction and open up a new path Germans could invest in. The second facet of Adenauer’s Potsdam complex was the concern that Germans could become attached to the wrong ideas (wrong, of course, in his estimate). He feared that should there be a four-power agreement resulting in

---

298 Symbolic is this well-known episode: when summoned onto the Petersberg to present his cabinet and receive the occupying statute in late 1949, the newly elected chancellor refused to follow the protocol and stay off the carpet on which the three High Commissioners were standing (Baring 1969: 66).

299 In 1953 Adenauer famously described his “nightmare” (“it’s called Potsdam”) in an interview, see Schwabe (1994: 81).

300 A *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* article complained about “that floating uncertainty which currently makes German planning for the future more or less illusionary. Germany needs to know its path. It should be shown [this path] now” (von Brück, 1946).
German ‘neutrality’, this would keep Germany unstable and increase the risk to again move down the ‘wrong path’ (Poppinga, 1975: 105f). This concern was behind his note to the steering committee of his party that the great danger to Germany was to be “sacrificed on the altar of reconciliation between East and West” (in Niedhart and Altmann 1988: 103).

Thus, for Adenauer the importance of creating stable bonds was not just a pragmatic strategy born out of the inevitability of accommodating the occupiers. His conviction that ‘Germany’ needed to be developed with someone was a core theme reflected in his gloomy predictions of what would happen if Germany became ‘neutral’. According to Adenauer, the wars and occupations in German history were the result of a policy of shifting alignments or ‘seesaw policy’ [Schaukelpolitik] between East and West, of mishandling the country’s middle position in ‘Europe’, or its Mittellage. As he saw it, the failure of political leaders to create lasting bonds had made it difficult for Germans to manifest a stable sense of Self and eventually allowed the ‘wrong ideas’ to take hold. While his warning to party colleagues that “it was Germany’s great misfortune that it has always been without real friends” (in Poppinga 1975: 48) was clearly exaggerated, the scenario of a country (at risk of) drifting into loneliness was effectively (and repeatedly) used by Adenauer to denounce the directions chosen by his rivals.

Adenauer dealt with the ‘Potsdam complex’ by trying to gain a voice in the negotiations amongst the Western allies about Germany’s future and to thereby influence the parameters of the space the ‘new’ Germany would unfold into. As discussed below, he expressed this goal in repeated demands to gain the status of an ‘equal’ or ‘full partner’ a demand which also applied to NATO membership after the formation of the Atlantic Alliance in 1949. The reason this request was largely granted in Washington was that the narrative of ‘Germany-in-Europe’ Adenauer presented resonated with American policymakers.

**Sorting the Memory Space**

The formulation of a ‘new’ German narrative required connecting past (memory) and future (visions). The notion of 1945 as an ‘hour zero’ for Germany was not to imply that

---

301 That is, neutrality would provide no guard against the temptation to follow the communist vision, in case of which ‘Potsdam’ would lead to ‘Prague’. See the discussion below.

302 Adenauer’s complaint that the ‘discontinuity’ in the German narrative makes it difficult for its people to find a stable place (Poppinga 1975: 99) built on Helmut Plessner’s notion of the ‘delayed nation’ (coined in 1935). Scholars have since called this the German ‘dilemma’ (Bracher, 1971) or ‘problem’ (Calleo, 1978). See also Schwarz (1994); Verheyen (1999).
reconstruction was occurring from a historically blank slate; obviously it did not. The past could not be discarded and there remained plenty of continuity in everyday life (Doering-Manteuffel 1983: 9-24; Schildt 2007). Adenauer's task “to form a new state out of the Konkursmasse of the Reich” (Foschepoth 1988: 40) was to use the memory space the war had created in a way that signalled a break with the Third Reich and satisfied domestic and international audiences. This task was marked by the fact that the German question was really a European question. It was not only that ‘Europe’ was Germany’s experienced space and the situatedness of the latter in the former had to be rethought. Given the violent way the ‘Third Reich’ had attempted to order this space, ‘Germany-in-Europe’ had become a central and negative place in the experience of other (European) nations, weaving German military aggression and genocide into their biographical narratives.

In order to make the past meaningful Adenauer drew on ‘usable pasts’ and frequently invoked historical analogies and their lessons (Poppinga 1975: 44-56). This was a balancing effort which also dealt with silences. Adenauer was aware that there were things many Germans preferred to ‘forget’ (Poppinga 1975: 99). This meant, in particular, establishing a “cordon sanitaire around Nazi crimes” (Kansteiner 2006: 111). Despite efforts by the occupying powers to confront Germans with the horrors of the concentration camps, the Holocaust was eradicated from public debate by way of ‘forgetting’ and deflecting responsibility to superiors, a strategy aided by the Nuremberg trials and the formal ‘denazification’ process. Adenauer knew that this silence and the maintenance of memories of ‘better times’ and own suffering from bombardment and expulsion, was unsuitable for the reformulation of a national biography, especially with outside partners. Adenauer knew that any project capable of creating new friendships needed to start from a rejection of the Third Reich, also reflected in his support for compensation – ‘Wiedergutmachung’ – for Jewish victims of the Third Reich, which he considered essential for Germany’s moral regeneration (Schwarz 1986: 898f.)

Broadly speaking, Adenauer’s narrative highlighted two negative legacies, ‘illiberalism’ and ‘militarism’. These two were core elements which the Allies had identified in the Potsdam Agreement and vowed to root out in their design for any post-war German order. It was not difficult for Adenauer to confirm them with a narrative that these had

---

been elements of a "misguided nationalism" embedded in the "wrong conception of the state" (in Poppinga 1975: 101f.).

The 'legacy of illiberalism' portrayed the Third Reich as the climax of a Germany which in comparison to other European societies had failed to translate the values of the enlightenment into a stable political, i.e. democratic order (Verheyen 1999: 20ff). For Adenauer, Germans had accepted an order without respect of the dignity and value of the individual and ignored the spiritual foundation of Christian-humanist thinking. He blamed this on a mix of modernity and Marxism, more precisely, on industrialisation having created a society focused on material values and seduced by the socialist idea, culminating in collectivist mass movement and the centralisation of power which disrespected individual rights (Poppinga 1975; Schwarz 1986). In the German case, the 'legacy of militarism' stood not only for aggressive foreign policy but for a way of organizing society, that is, as a principle of domestic order. It pictured a Germany dominated by the 'Prussian tradition' where the military was considered the 'school of the nation' and feeding an authoritarian mindset. With the military having enjoyed considerable political influence, it also was seen to have played a key role in the demise of the Weimar Republic, lifting Hitler to power and leading Germany into the war.

In Adenauer’s narrative that ‘wrong’ conception of the German state constituted by these two ideas was ‘Prussian’ (later replaced by the GDR). Symbolic for this was his first major speech as party leader of the British zone at Cologne University in 1946 where he described orders of illiberalism and militarism as the character traits of a ‘Prussian spirit’ which had prepared the seedbed for the rise of National Socialism. He used this image to both denounce political rivals, in particular Schumacher whom he frequently accused of carrying “the old Prussian spirit”, and to connect with the anti-Prussian sentiment prominent among the occupying powers (Schwarz 1986: 514; Baring 1969: 53).

---

304 Despite declaring nationalism ‘the cancer of Europe’, Adenauer was convinced that people could not live without what he called a “national sentiment” (Poppinga 1975: 69f). The problem was not a national consciousness as such but, rather, the sort of ‘hypernationalism’ or ‘aggressive’ nationalism Germans had displayed, see Jarausch (2004: 64-96).

305 This was later captured under the notion of Sonderweg, see Kocka (1982).

306 Baring (1969: 51ff); Schwarz (1986: 449ff); Poppinga (1975: 101f). This, again, is Adenauer’s reading of the Prussian legacy. It is worth noting that Hitler’s movement took off in Catholic Bavaria and that Hitler himself never was a fan of Prussia.
Envisioning Germany-in-Europe

There was consensus among political leaders in Germany that a meaningful vision needed to picture German ‘unity’. On one level this vision was about uniting people and territory, concerned with overcoming ‘inner’ borders, that is, the division into zones by the occupying powers, and with the status of ‘outer’ borders in the West (Ruhr/Saarland) and the East (Oder-Neisse). Yet because as argued in chapter four space only gains meaning/value through an understanding of what is a ‘good’ order, the more fundamental question was what kind of order a unified Germany should encompass. And because Germany’s experienced space was ‘Europe’ and the German question very much a European question, the idea of ‘German’ unity was inevitably entwined with the idea of ‘European’ unity.307

On the question what Germany and what Europe was to be ‘united’, Adenauer promoted the idea of a space which ensured individual rights and safeguarded against militarism. Again, these were the cornerstones for post-war ‘Germany’ stated in the Allies’ Potsdam agreement, yet they were also considered desirable principles domestically. In Adenauer’s version, they resonated with Christian values, which he considered fundamental for orienting the new Germany-in-Europe convinced that “only respect/pursuit of Christian principles is able to save humanity from falling back into the worst barbarism and, indeed, safe it from self-destruction” (in Poppinga 1975: 210).

The commitment to ‘freedom’ was a guiding theme in the (West)German political discourse throughout the first decade and featured in all of Adenauer’s statements. His interpretation of the ‘freedom’ principle as holding that all humans were equal and possessed fundamental and inalienable rights resonated with the emphasis in catholic social theory placed on the respect for human dignity and the intrinsic value of human life (Poppinga 1975: 193ff; Weidenfeld 1976; Schwarz 1986). The draft of the party program for the newly founded Christian Democrats in the Rhine region, written by Adenauer in October 1945, emphasized that “the principles of Christian ethics and culture, of true democracy must carry and pervade the life of the state”, noting the right to political and religious freedom, equal rights for all, protection of minorities, etc. (in Schwarz 1986: 496). Seven of the first twelve Articles of the German Basic, written by a cross-partisan committee chaired by Adenauer, manifested the guarantee of personal freedoms as inalienable rights and emphasised the FRG’s “free and democratic basic order”.

307 For a passionate call to Germans for focusing on the ‘spiritual reconstruction of Europe’ [als die wesentliche Voraussetzung jedes politischen Anfangs], see Die Welt, 1946
There also was a profound commitment to anti-militarism in post-45 German society, which at core really was an anti-war or pacifist sentiment. As Konrad Jarausch points out, in contrast to the heroisation of soldiers and battles following the First World War, this time the war experience was portrayed as profoundly negative. It was not only that total defeat left a feeling of meaninglessness about the war; across the ranks it was remembered as “bad times” and “a horrible thing” and there was consensus that the war, and everything that came with it, was an experience which “must never happen again” (Jarausch 2004: 47). This ‘lesson’ was formally manifested in the Occupation Statute from September 1949 where the Adenauer government stated its “firm determination” to maintain the demilitarization of the new German space and prevent the creation of armed forces (Schröder, 1988: 124).

Values of individual rights (liberalism) and pacifism (anti-militarism) were combined in the commitment towards “freedom’ and peace” which Adenauer constantly alluded to and which together with a commitment to ‘unity’ was formally anchored in the Basic Law and, in turn, inscribed into the European space. The future of ‘Germany’ was embedded in a vision of European order in which peace would be guaranteed through freedom and unity. This was in simple yet fundamental terms the authentic narrative of the ‘new Germany’. Specifically, for Adenauer, European order was captured in the notion of a ‘United States of Europe’, an idea of a federal union among European nations with an element of supra-nationalism which carried the promise of ‘peace through unity’. The vision that a united Europe would be a formula for prosperity and peace was central to all conceptions of European order entertained at the time, no matter if formulated in religious (Catholic/Protestant) or secular terms (socialist/liberal). Developed in the 19th century and popular in the ‘Pan European’ movement in the 1920s this vision had lived on during the war in the resistance and among exiles. After the end of the war, Adenauer participated in meetings reviving the federal idea of a ‘United States of Europe’ and adopted it as a promising design, endorsing it in his Cologne speech in 1946 a few months before Churchill famously did so in Zurich.

---

308 This overlapped with the Allied objective, as Eisenhower put it, to educate Germans to the “self-evident truth” that war was “immoral” (in Jarausch 2004: 41).
309 For a topography laying out the history of the idea of Europe, including the United States of Europe first mentioned by Victor Hugo in the 19th century, see von Plessel (2003), also Pagden (2002). For a discussion of the various ‘Pan-Europe’ groups, see Loth (1991).
310 On the development of the European design in Adenauer’s thinking, see Weidenfeld (1976: 47f); Schwarz (1986: 556-563).
Not surprisingly, for Adenauer the 'United States of Europe' was to be a Christian space. Even before the Vatican in 1948 officially declared its support for the federalist movement, Adenauer at a CDU party congress in August 1947 noted that it was "the Christian occident we want to try to rescue" (in Schwarz 1986: 564). Although Adenauer's appeal to Christianity resonated with both conservatives and liberal-progressive parts of German society (Jarausch 2004: 149), it generated complaints from Social Democrats that he was aiming at establishing a 'Vatican Europe'. To tone down this image in the German public and (once he recognised this) to prevent possible tensions with the American suspicion of the catholic faith as a ruling doctrine, Adenauer formulated the vision of Europe as an Occidental or Western space. This was not a compromise as, of course, historically the Christian/Occidental/Western notions blended into each other and were spatially confined to – and arose out of – the narrative of Europe. For Adenauer they all met in Cologne, which he once called "the true centre of the Occident" (in Baring 1969: 50). He constantly referred to the idea of a 'Western Civilisation' and 'Occident' interchangeably as the place within which rebuilding Germany was to occur and committed to anchor the vision of a united Germany in the 'Western' space through a path of Westintegration (Jackson 2006). Viewed from Cologne, the vision of a Germany-in-Europe and of a Germany-in-the West were inseparable, as reflected in his inauguration speech as chancellor in September 1949 when he claimed that Germany belonged to the "Western European world" (von Brentano 1964: 42).

**Locating Friends in the West**

The above reformulation of the authentic German narrative occurred not in isolation but with a significant Other. Adenauer from 1946 onwards tried to connect with Western occupiers and motivate them to invest in a 'new' Germany-in-Europe (Schwarz 1986: 556). Having them shift the focus from punishment to rehabilitation/reconstruction in effect asked for a turn from occupier to friend.

Initially Adenauer hoped that the idea of Germany in a 'United States of Europe' could be engaged with France under British leadership (Foschepoth 1988: 33). In his view

---

311 While Schumacher was not very good in formulating the European dimension of his conception of 'Germany', other Social Democrats like Carlo Schmid did. Indeed, as Risse and Engelmann-Martin (2002: 298) point out, the Heidelberger Programm from 1925 embraced the notion of a 'United States of Europe' making the SPD the first major German party to do so.  

312 Said (1976); Coker (1998); Neumann (1999); Pagden (2002).  

313 Critics (then and now) accuse Adenauer of being content with a divided Germany, while sympathisers hold that his strategy of Westintegration was designed to attract and 'pull over' the Eastern part. My reading supports the latter. On the debate, see Foschepoth (1988); Loth (1994)
Britain still was an empire and had proven a reasonable occupier to work with after the First World War. Adenauer was also sensitive to the fact that reinventing Germany-in-Europe required redefining the relationship with France. Indeed, when noting that building a ‘United States of Europe’ promised “the best, safest, and most enduring protection of Germany’s Western neighbours” (Schwarz 1986: 515), the neighbour Adenauer had particularly in mind was France. Having spent his life close to French border and aware of the marks which conflicts over designs of being-in-Europe had left in both biographies, French-German reconciliation in a new ‘Europe’ became a key theme in his speeches, noting in October 1948 that “The whole future of Europe relies on a real and lasting accommodation/understanding [Verständigung] between Germany and France” (in Poppinga, 1975: 68).

However, neither Paris nor London were ready to invest in a project which, in Adenauer’s view, provided a desirable ‘home’. In the French and British experience, Germany remained a notorious aggressor, an image they had no reasons to dispose of anytime soon. Busy with their own recovery, they were not inclined to give Germany hope for quick rehabilitation. In France, the German narrative was not open for negotiation. Humiliated in the war and struggling with re-establishing its own political life after the split between resistance and collaboration, for France a rehabilitation of Germany would have meant giving up demands on the Saar and Ruhr regions, significant not only economically but also for the French status as the victorious nation. As such, French politicians were more interested in strengthening ties with Britain and the US. While the British did not dismiss the idea of ‘civilising’ Germany, this would be a slow process which it could be embark upon only after paying appropriately. Although the Churchill government, in particular Anthony Eden, had a more positive view of Adenauer than the Labour government under Atlee – the Foreign Office in 1948 named Adenauer a “dangerous man” (Schwarz 1986: 592) – there was little enthusiasm in London about investing in the vision of a united Europe. Apart from despising the idea of ‘Vatican Europe’ (Lundestad 1998: 30), Britain did not see herself as living in a shared European space, or only as a detached balancer, and was primarily oriented towards Washington and its (fading) empire.314

That neither Paris nor London were willing to conceive of Germany as a creative partner for the spatial reorganization of their post-war world became apparent in the creation of

---

314 The difference between these spaces was famously captured in the three circles which Churchill sketched for Adenauer in 1951, positioning Britain at the intersection of an Atlantic space with the US, the Commonwealth and Europe (Trachtenberg, 1999: 116).
the ‘Brussels Pact’ in March 1948 (which the North Atlantic Treaty later built on and which, ironically, was to play a crucial role for eventually allowing German membership in NATO). It built on the Anglo-French Dunkirk Treaty from March 1947, formalizing the war-time alliance (Baylis, 1984). While the Dunkirk Treaty was accompanied by the idea of a European ‘third force’ (Loth 1991: 34-40), its primary aim was resisting any possible future German aggression (Baylis 1984: 618). When the Benelux countries joined a year later, making it the ‘Brussels Pact’, the anti-German focus was toned down but the explicit commitment of resisting a ‘renewal of German policy of aggression’ was maintained.\textsuperscript{215} While not excluding the possibility that Germany would eventually join, it was not considered to partake in actively shaping the ‘Western Union’, at least not until, as Ernest Bevin noted in January 1948, “circumstances permitted” (in Baylis 1984: 620). The Brussels agreement thus lacked a decisive promise that the space negotiated through them was to include Germany in positive terms, it certainly did not cater to Adenauer’s vision of recreating a Germany at the ‘heart’ of Europe. Aware of how deeply Germany’s ‘Prussian’ image was entrenched in France and Britain, Adenauer realised that overcoming their reservations and envisioning a new Germany as an ‘equal’ would take a long time (Poppinga 1975: 108).

The US position appeared different. While until late 1948 Adenauer had little knowledge about the workings of US politics and had difficulties grasping its direction, he recognised the US potential for the renewal of ‘Germany-in-Europe’ early on (Schröder 1988: 123).\textsuperscript{216} In March 1946 Adenauer wrote a colleague in the US to help convince the government “that the rescue of Europe can only succeed with help from the USA” and that such a rescue would also be “elementary” [wesentlich] for the US (Schwarz 1986: 564). Even prior to the Marshall Plan, when it was not yet clear how the US would use its resources, across party lines the US attitude towards Germany appeared more benevolent than Britain’s, that is, it appeared more willing to support a reconstruction of Germany-in-Europe (Foschepoth 1997: 83ff).\textsuperscript{217}

\textsuperscript{215} French-British insistence to keep the anti-German clause may in part have been a strategy to ensure Moscow that the Pact was not directed against the Soviet Union (Baylis 1984; Loth 1991: 65f.). In any case, the Pact was envisioned by Bevin as “a sort of spiritual federation of the West” aimed not at integrating Germany but at strengthening US engagement in Europe (cited in Baylis 1984: 620). More precisely, the aim was to win the US as a member of the Western Union and to satisfy US demands for better cooperation in Western Europe. It did not endorse the vision of a ‘new’ Germany (Ibid; Kaplan 1984: 59f; Loth 1991: 63f; Winand 1994: 18).

\textsuperscript{216} On Adenauer’s relationship with the US, see the contributions in Schwabe (1994). As Schwarz (1986: 656) points out, Adenauer’s understanding of the US and its politics sharpened only in 1948 with the choice of Herbert Blankenhorn, an experienced diplomat, as his advisor.

\textsuperscript{217} The positive perception of the US was also visible amongst the general population. It was aided by the fact that the America-image was underdeveloped and romanticized in Germany, and
An important sign was the speech given by James Byrnes in Stuttgart in September 1946, the first public speech by a Secretary of State in the destroyed Germany. In this speech, Byrnes basically used the principles of the Potsdam Agreement to shift the agenda from punishment to rehabilitation. From the German perspective, the speech offered a vision of a better future in three ways. First, it identified the interrelationship between ‘Germany’ and ‘Europe’ and, noting that German resources must be used “to rebuild a free, peaceful Germany and a free, peaceful Europe” explicitly connects the future well-being of Germany with that of ‘Europe’. Second, it confirmed the commitment of the Potsdam Agreement that Germany should be administered as an economic unit which, while falling short of formulating the aim of German political unity, holds the promise that zonal barriers would not be entrenched. Third, and most significantly, Byrnes called for a “successful rehabilitation of Germany”, not restricted to the economic realm but connected to “setting up a democratic German government” and drafting a constitution for a “new Germany”. While reminding Germans that they were bearing the responsibility for their current situation, he closed his speech by saying

“the United States has no desire to increase those hardships or to deny the German people an opportunity to work their way out of those hardships (...) The American people want to help the German people to win their way back to an honorable place among the free and peace-loving nations of the world”.

The speech was received very positively, with German newspapers commenting that Byrnes had opened a “door of hope” through which “a friend and helper showed Germans the way to a new life” (cited in Jarausch 2004: 150). The next few years confirmed the American support for the creation of a ‘new’ Germany and gave Adenauer the sense not only of US strength but also of direction. In his inaugural speech as chancellor in September 1949 he noted: “I don’t think ever in history a victorious country tried to assist the defeated country in such a way, and [tried] to contribute to its reconstruction and its recovery like the United States did and [still] does towards Germany” (cited in Schröder 1988: 118). In a Bundestag speech in October that year he emphasised Germany’s “great luck that the American people are freedom-loving, progressive, and determined” (cited in Schröder, 1988: 123). Adenauer celebrated American determinism because it invested in a vision of Germany-in-Europe he shared. As Rainer Barzel puts it in basic terms, his positive view of the US was based on a

so the disclosure of ‘America’ in a post-war world through interaction with friendly US soldiers and an influx of US popular culture had tremendous impact, see Jarausch (2004: 148ff).

318 All quotations are from Byrnes (1946).
feeling that "these are people who want the order which I strive towards as well" (Barzel in Schwabe 1994: 61), as expressed in Adenauer’s comment at a CDU party congress in August 1947 that “the occident, the Christian occident, is not a geographic term, it is a spiritual-historical term which also encompasses America” (in Schwarz 1986: 564). How this space looked from Washington and why Germany was treated favourably in there is discussed next.

**America-in-the-World: Shaping the West**

Adenauer’s framing of the European project as crucial for re-instating the values of ‘Western civilization’ resonated in Washington. ‘The West’ was the value space within which the American narrative unfolded. It was forged through detachment from the European continent and the Westward-movement of ‘manifest destiny’, creating a space that was not ‘Europe’ but still linked to it through common roots in enlightenment values. The overarching ordering principle defining this space, and to which the existence of America-in-the-West was tied, was ‘liberty’ or ‘freedom’ (Foner 2003). Expressed in the notion of American exceptionalism, this space and the order it contains was considered a space for human progress and the promise of a better future, quite literally a ‘New World’. The identification of America as an exceptional nation unfolding in the Western space generated the self-understanding of ‘America’ as the defender of ‘the West’, a reading becoming visible in the Monroe doctrine and manifested with the First World War as a foreign policy principle (Coker, 1998; Gress 1998; Jackson 2006).319 Freedom was the principle grounding Henry Luce’s 1941 famous formulation of the authentic American narrative, and as Dean Acheson noted, the line of American foreign policy was to be “the constructive task of building, in cooperation with others, the kind of world in which freedom...can flourish. The success of our efforts rests on our faith in ourselves and in the values for which this Republic stands” (Acheson 1950: 10).

In spite of George Washington’s famous call not to become entangled with ‘Europe’, the two World Wars (re)integrated ‘Europe’ into America’s experienced space, ‘the West’. The signing of the Atlantic Charter by Roosevelt and Churchill in August 1941 is often referred to as a symbolic revival of the West as an Anglo-American sphere (Coker 1998, Ch. 2; Gress 1998).320 The Charter was not merely a declaration of military solidarity but

---

319 Leffler calls the emphasis of the US military establishment to predominate throughout the Western Hemisphere “a natural evolution of the Monroe Doctrine”, see Leffler (1984: 354f.). On American exceptionalism and missionary ideology, see Blanke and Krakau (1992).

320 Christopher Coker calls the Charter the product of “a heightened consciousness of the values of Western civilization” and suggests that the idea of an “Atlantic world” came from Churchill.
captured a political project whose purpose it was but to lay out the vision of a peaceful (potentially global) post-war order around the principles of sovereignty, political and economic liberalism and denouncing military aggression. It makes no reference to a geopolitical space, however, because the American vision differed from the British when it came to specifying 'the world' it should apply to. Most importantly, there was disagreement as to what extent the idea of a united Europe was, or should be, part of 'the West'. As symbolised in Churchill's three circles, the British imagined the West more narrowly as an Anglo-American 'Atlantic world', a space separate not only from the British Empire but also from 'Europe'. Investment in the 'West' and 'Europe' were considered two different and potentially conflicting projects (Coker 1998).

From Washington things looked different. The initial tension between the Truman doctrine's global outlook and a regional focus on Europe gave way to the latter. While universalism remained visible in the Truman and Eisenhower administrations (Gaddis 2005: 55), 'Europe' took a privileged place in the American conception of the world. When Kennan convinced Washington in 1946 that views held in the Kremlin were irreconcilable with the idea of 'one world' and that 'two spheres of influence' were emerging in Europe (Trachtenberg 1999), US planners saw Europe and, within it, Germany, as the place whose horizon of expectations needed to be kept in line with the American one. By the time Marshall noted in June 1947 that the US was "one of the bulwarks of Western civilization" and would not "stand by and watch the disintegration of the international community to which we belong" (in Jackson, 2003: 244), the future of 'Europe' had become central to the future of the Western space.

**Envisioning the 'United States of Europe'**

It is useful to being with the reminder that American designs for post-war Europe were not primarily responding to a perceived Soviet threat but aimed at addressing the causes of the war, namely preventing a resurgence of rivalry and turmoil (Ikenberry 2001: 170ff; Layne 2006: 43f). Yet from a phenomenological perspective the American motivation for becoming engaged in Europe was not merely to create a 'zone of peace' (McArdle Kelleher, 1983), but a particular peace, one which provided the US with authentic ontological security. The point made here is that, in contrast to explanations stressing pure economic motives (securing a new market) or a traditional security rationale (deterrence against Soviet aggression), from a national biography perspective

---

(Coker 1998: 32). The idea certainly resonated with Roosevelt who in his 'four freedoms' speech from January 1941 had outlined the values the US sought to defend (Kissinger, 1994: 385-391). The principles were echoed in the Potsdam agreement and the UN Charter.
the US investment in ‘Europe’ was aimed at positively integrating this space into the American narrative. And as suggested by the friendship lens, US policymakers were looking for pursuing this task through a special relationship.

Trachtenberg’s observation of an American desire “to pull out (of Europe) as soon as she reasonably could” (cited in McAllister 2002: 19) may be true where the stationing of troops was concerned. Yet on a more fundamental level the US needed (and wanted) to remain engaged simply because ‘Europe’ could not be pulled out of the American biography. ‘Europe’ had become spatially integrated in into the American understanding of ‘being-in-the-world’. Once this space had been disclosed and made part of the world through the experience of the war, America could not disengage from the memory but had to make it meaningful. From that perspective, the geopolitical argument why Europe mattered popular among strategic analysts at the time, building on the conviction that “who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world” (see Leffler, 1984: fn 30), was informed less by a realist (balance of power) mindset than by the view that a strong Europe within the West would vitalize America’s vision for and unfolding in ‘the world’. The aim was to integrate Europe for a creative project which accommodated American ideas of order and was supported by European nations thereby satisfying desires of both belonging/recognition and authenticity. As Kennan put it in the summer of 1949, without ‘Europe’ the US would be “a lonely nation...in the sense of philosophy and outlook on the world” (cited in Winand 1994: 15).

It is suggested here that the vision of ‘Europe’ in which the Truman and Eisenhower administration invested resonated with the one Adenauer pursued, namely that of a regional federal order, a ‘United States of Europe’. Yet whereas the Chancellor’s support for this design is well known, the American position requires some elaboration.

As Pascaline Winand (1993) and Geir Lundestad (1998) have shown, the US was a strong supporter of the idea of European integration from the start. One scholar has even spoken of an American “obsession with Western European unity” (McAllister 2002: 17). In addition to the paramount theme of creating ‘peace through freedom’ present in all

---

322 For a comprehensive revisionist discussion of the American ‘national security interest’ at the time, including the view prevailing among strategists that “any power(s) attempting to dominate Eurasia must be regarded as potentially hostile to the United States”, see Leffler (1984: 456ff.).
323 In a speech emphasizing the importance of defending ‘freedom’, Acheson noted how millions of people in Europe were looking for a way out of misery and that “if we want them to move in the direction of freedom, we must help them” because “those who think like us should have the power to make safe the area in which we carry that faith [in freedom] into action” (Acheson 1950: 4f.).
key speeches of US officials, the administration invested heavily in the vision of ‘peace through unity’. In Washington the idea of a ‘united’ Europe was discussed already during the war, with reports on how to best organize economic aid highlighting a region-specific design with Germany at the centre (Winand 1993: 7-14). Like Adenauer, US planners and policymakers were exposed to the idea by advocates of a European federation, including Monnet. The idea of a ‘United States of Europe’ was prominent also in the State Department and favourably debated in the press and on Capitol Hill through groups such the ‘American Committee for a Free and United Europe’ (Winand 1994: 19ff.). After initial concerns that such an approach would compromise the idea of free trade, the Truman administration since late 1945 set course for the economic reconstruction of ‘Europe’ and developed institutions were not just to distribute aid most efficiently, but to install the kind of European order of ‘freedom’ and ‘unity’ the US deemed worth investing in.

Rather than dismissing the popularity of the ‘United States of Europe’ vision as mere rhetoric, as Kaplan (1984; 1994) seems to suggest, the argument here is that it was fundamental for how Washington rationalized and justified its engagement in/with the European space. Turning Europe into a ‘free and unified’ space in a design familiar to Americans provided US policymakers with an opportunity to productively integrate ‘Europe’ into America’s world. In other words, the reason the vision of a ‘United States of Europe’ was adopted was that it resonated with the American biography. Just as the Founding Fathers had introduced the federal constitution as a solution to make unity out of diversity, and just as the American Civil War had been turned into a creative force to ‘unify’ Americans, so the ‘European civil war’ could be turned into unity under the federal design. It was a foundational moment; the federal union had brought peace and prosperity to America and the ‘United States of Europe’ would do the same for Europe. This was the theme of Carl Van Doren’s widely read ‘Great Rehearsal’ and was echoed by Congressmen and administration officials in frequent lectures to Europeans on the importance of these American lessons. As one British Foreign Office official remarked (in frustration) “the Americans want an integrated Europe looking like the United States of America – ‘God’s own country’” (in Kaplan 1984: 131, 60f.; 1994: 18f.; Lundestad 1998: 15).

324 According to Winand, Monnet had strong bonds with key American officials such as Dulles and Kennan and inspired their pro-European stance (Winand 1994: 2ff.), as was Coudenhove-Kalergi for Fulbright. For a more sceptical perspective of the influence of these figures, see Kaplan (1984: 52-58).
325 Most famously to ‘oversee’ the European Recovery Program (‘Marshall Plan’) through the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) and administered through the Organisation for European Economic Co-Operation (OEEC).
Investing in this vision, then, had significant payoffs: It accommodated a vision of ‘Europe’ within the Western space and it reduced the possibility of renewed conflict based on the dual belief that (i) a liberal and federal order had an intrinsic pacifying effect and that (ii) a society striving for an order built along the lines of the American model would be a ‘natural’ partner. In the belief that ‘all good things go together’ the vision of a ‘united Europe’ reduced uncertainty by holding the promise of a recovered and peaceful Germany-in-Europe siding with the US. This trust that a ‘United States of Europe’ would be a peaceful and reliable partner explains why influential voices in both Truman and Eisenhower administrations were not worried about and, indeed, supported the idea of a ‘third force’ under the assumption that “as that third force, Europe would most often side with the United States” (Winand 1994: 15; Trachtenberg 1999). The vision of a ‘third force’ benevolent to the US provided the perfect balance between ensuring a strong link between the US and ‘Europe’ without becoming formally ‘entangled’, thus not departing from George Washington’s dictum entirely.

Rebuilding Germany

One could ask whether ‘Germany’ mattered to the US because of its concern for ‘Europe’, or vice versa. From a phenomenological perspective this distinction makes little sense. As noted earlier, Hitler’s policies connected the two in the experience of the participants and victims in that war and rendered it impossible to conceive of one (‘Europe’) without the other (‘Germany’). Thus, the task of ordering Europe inevitably included the task of ordering Germany. As Tony Judt points out, 85 percent of American war effort had gone on the war against Germany (Judt 2005: 105) and so it was not the ‘Soviet question’ but the ‘German question’ which stood at the centre of US post-war planning and informed the broader question how to order ‘Europe’: “the central question of the postwar world was and would remain the future of Germany” (McAllister 2002: 4). Even when it was not always stated Germany was the “major issue in every meeting of the Allies and in most of the planning sessions within the United States” (Kaplan 1984: 3; Lundestad, 1998; Görtemaker, 1994: 76; Trachtenberg, 1999; Layne, 2006).

---

326 Republican Presidential candidates Thomas Dewey in April 1948 asserted that “what is needed to restore stability in the world is a unified Europe – a strong third power devoted to the cause of peace. What is needed is a United States of Europe” (in Kaplan 1984: 71, emphasis added). For a view that the US wanted to prevent a ‘third force’, see Leffler (1993).

327 For remarks in this direction, see Acheson (1950: 114).
The analytical lens used here does not follow the common portrayal of the US engaging in a "struggle over" or even "for" Germany (McAllister 2002), which reduces 'it' to a prize fought over by the victorious powers. Instead, it was about an investment in Germany-in-Europe with Adenauer. This perspective is supported by the fact that in discussions of what to do with Germany after the war the ‘punishment’ agenda was abandoned relatively quickly. Proposals such as those advanced by Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau which recommended stripping Germany of its industrial capacity and turning it de facto into an agricultural society were discarded. Although Roosevelt initially leaned towards German punishment, in September 1944 he distanced himself from the Morgenthau Plan in the face of opposition from Congress, the press and from within the administration, who argued that such measures were counterproductive for achieving ‘lasting peace’ in Europe. Directive 1067 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, presented to Truman in April 1945 calling for treating occupied Germany as “a defeated enemy nation” faced similar criticism and faded in the implementation phase (Winand, 1993: 7; Judt 2005: 105). Neither was Washington’s approach towards Germany simply about containment, as suggested most prominently by Gaddis (2005; also Hanrieder 1989). While the aim clearly was to prevent a similar Germany from re-emerging, if ‘containment’ is understood as ‘keeping the Germans down’ the term is misleading. From Byrnes’ speech to the Marshall Plan to Acheson’s note that the US was “giving the Germans a goal to work as partners with other Western countries” (in Kaplan 1984: 6), US policy towards Germany is better captured in terms of ‘recreation’.

Recognising the importance of Walter Lippmann’s insight in 1944 that a peaceable Germany “must have a place somewhere” (in Harper 1994: 186), the aim was to place the ‘new’ Germany firmly in, and have it contribute to America’s conception of ‘the West’. Conceiving of and representing Germany as such a positive force was not difficult. Whereas the two wars had made it part of America’s experienced space, other than France and Britain the US lacked the trauma from German aggression. Thus, the US biography did not need to accommodate a ‘Germany’ which had brought destruction, suffering and/or occupation to the American ‘homeland’. The number of American lives lost in the war was below that suffered by most European nations and the war itself had strengthened, rather than weakened, the US economy. When Acheson spoke about the difference between the American, French and British policies on post-war Germany, he noted “I suppose that it is a result of the depth of the historical background, the emotions and the passions that have been aroused by Germany’ aggressive wars and the inevitable importance attached to the course of German development” (Acheson 1950: 118). As
Lawrence Kaplan (1984: 25) notes, whereas French memories made it impossible to accept Germans as “colleagues in a common effort”, the US had no problems rehabilitating Germany and channelling reparation payments into a common project. Building on the theme of redemption in the American narrative and the right to have ‘a second chance’, the view, as expressed in aforementioned Byrnes’ speech, was that Germans were capable and could be assisted to do better. In short, they were considered capable of living the American Dream.\textsuperscript{328}

The State Department was explicit in that Germany’s new place had to be defined together with Germans (Maier 1990: 33; Acheson 1950). Kennan, in particular, came to recognise that German public opinion would never give up on the idea of unification and that a divided Germany de-facto meant a divided Europe and so, after initial scepticism, adopted the ideal of German unity. However, the administration shared with Adenauer the assessment that there was “a gap between the desirable and the practicable” (Gaddis 2005: 72f.). So Kennan’s proposal from November 1948 to aim towards a unified Germany was dropped by Acheson due to anticipated French and British opposition to seeing Germany ‘restored’, Russian unwillingness to withdraw its troops, and the concern that a united Germany could slip into the Soviet zone of influence (the ‘Rapallo complex’, see below). Instead, the idea was formed, found in more general terms in NSC 68, to build up a West German state which would serve as a magnet and ‘attract’ the Eastern part, thus pursuing the idea of German unity through a ‘politics of strength’, the path Adenauer embraced.

\textbf{NATO as a Forum for Building ‘Europe’}

The signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949 and the commitment of solidarity it contained is considered a milestone in the history of a United States traditionally wary of becoming entangled in European affairs. Yet in contrast to the portrayal of NATO as an institutionalization of deterrence/containment, the lens used here suggests that the primary purpose of NATO was not the military defense of Western Europe’s territorial integrity. Neither was it, as Ikenberry (2001) suggests, for making American preponderance “acceptable” to Europeans by setting up power sharing institutions. Instead, the argument here is that that the US sought an institutional frame through

\textsuperscript{328} On the theme of redemptionism in US foreign policy, see Coker (1989: 11-20). Indicative for American faith in German ‘learning abilities’ were the various re-education programmes targeted towards instilling a ‘democratic consciousness’ and war as a morally bad thing. This was supported by the view that Germans were not inherently evil but, for the most part, had been ‘misguided’ by Hitler and his regime. On ‘re-education’ programmes, see Jarausch (2004). The fact that about 30\% of Americans claimed German heritage, making it the largest immigrant group, in all likelihood also contributed to the hope in a ‘better’ Germany.
which it could build a ‘United States of Europe’ within the Western space. For this, the economic institutions set up around the Marshall Plan were not sufficient. Given the highly militarized environment after the war and the vivid memories of German aggression a new European order required an institution dealing with the question of the legitimate use of force. It is argued here that NATO came to be that institution which allowed creatively integrating, together with Germany, the European space into America’s national biography. Thus, in addition to “breaking down the barriers of national sovereignty...that were held responsible for much of the disasters of the twentieth century” (Kaplan 1984: 5), NATO was to create the conditions for setting up a ‘United States of Europe’ containing a strong and friendly Germany.

To be sure, Washington was wary of British and French attempts to have to commit to an extended ‘Western Union’. As symbolized in the debate over the terms of mutual solidarity and what was to become Article five of the North Atlantic Treaty, the US administration was unsure about the institution’s purpose or, more precisely, about how the US would benefit from it (Kaplan 1984: 113ff.). Pentagon and State Department were concerned for different reasons. The former was wary of over-commitment, that is, of promising military assistance to weak European forces without a clear military rationale and ambiguous statements of purpose, and of investing in what might be perceived as a military provocation by the Soviet Union (Ibid., 69f.). This last concern was shared by diplomats, who in addition were worried that a formal US commitment of military solidarity was undermining the idea of a European ‘third force’. Both branches had a feeling that by joining an extended Western Union the US would be asked to commit over proportion in military and political terms.

Yet given the weakness of Europeans, the feeling of a lacking reciprocity was less a matter of correcting the balance in terms of means supplied, it was a question of ends. For Kennan and John Hickerton, director of the Office for Western European Affairs, the Brussels Pact was ‘too negative’, that is, at root still a military alliance which treated Germany as a potential enemy and was not politically advancing the project of European unity. This was also Truman’s view. In his congratulating remarks on the signing of the Brussels Pact, Truman attempted to shift the focus by emphasizing the potential of a united Europe and embedding his support in the view that the treaty was “a notable step in the direction of unity in Europe for protection and preservation of its civilization” (in Kaplan 1984: 66).
The administration eventually engaged negotiations because it saw this as an investment in the project of a free and united Europe and hoped to thereby move closer to its vision of a Western space promising a meaningful future in peace. When Acheson in March 1949 explained the meaning of the North Atlantic Pact in a radio address, he stressed its purpose to be the defence of Western civilisation, “the product of at least 350 years of history” connecting the US with Western Europe fundamentally through “common institutions and moral and ethical beliefs...acceptance of the same values in life”. Yet he portrayed it not merely as a conservative institution. Behind the characterisation of the Pact as a “self-defense arrangement” Acheson emphasised its creative function of ‘waging peace’ understood as creating “an environment of freedom, from which flows the greatest amount of ingenuity, enterprise, and accomplishment” (Acheson 1950: 82ff.).

Because the federal idea and German rehabilitation in it were cornerstones of this vision, the US tied its signing of North Atlantic Treaty to concessions from Britain and France. The former had to accept the dilution of the Atlantic space by recognising the US plan to merge the Western and the European space and France had to accept that the US was disinclined to create the West as a space in which Germany would be discriminated against. Still, debates over membership, spatial terminology (‘Western’, ‘Europe’ ‘Atlantic’) and the precise meaning and formulation of Article Five highlighted that disagreements remained about the common project (Kaplan 1984).

Adenauer’s Germany turned out to be the ideal partner. The American plan to recreate Germany by integrating it into a ‘united Europe’ within the Western space resonated with Adenauer’s path of Westintegration and vice versa. The resonance of Adenauer’s thinking with both Truman and Eisenhower administrations concerning the future of ‘Germany-in-Europe’ was so strong that already prior to his election as chancellor Adenauer was described by a high ranking American civil administrator in Bonn as “our man” (in Schwarz 1986: 591). During his first visit to the US in 1953, great efforts were made by the Americans to provide Adenauer with backing for the upcoming elections, with Dulles even noting at a press conference that it would be “disastrous” if he was not re-elected. From an American perspective Adenauer was considered so important for the direction of Germany that after his re-election in 1953, the US High Commission in an assessment of his first term was not worried about the fact that his autocratic governing style but that there was ‘stagnation’ in public support for his

329 On Adenauer’s relationship with the US, see Schröder (1988); Schwabe (1994).
politics (Schröder 1988: 134-38). Ironically, the reason for this ‘stagnation’ was that Adenauer had decided that the FRG needed to adapt a core principle of its (young) narrative to be able to negotiate its future in the West with the US.

Rearmament as Voice

Adenauer was convinced that German participation in the US effort of shaping the Western space would require NATO membership. This would bring recognition as an ‘equal partner’ entitled and expected to help developing Germany-in-Europe. Hence, even before the North Atlantic Treaty was signed and his election as Chancellor, Adenauer noted in March 1949 that membership in NATO was “one of the first tasks of a West German government” (Baring 1969: 73). Aware of the American expectation for reciprocity, that is, strong voices coming out of the US Congress binding US engagement in Europe on corresponding European contributions, Adenauer needed to find a way for Germany to contribute to the vision of Europe as a ‘Third Force’.

That way was rearmament. In December 1949, a few months after he was elected chancellor, Adenauer publicly called for a European Army and a possible German contribution to it through, tellingly, interviews in American newspapers. Soon rearmament became the central political issue of his first term in office (Hanrieder, 1989: 38; Baring, 1969: 70f.). Given that the idea of rearmament appeared incompatible with the anti-militarism/pacifism principle of the ‘new Germany’ narrative, this was a significant adaptation and highly contested. Domestically it triggered “one of the sharpest controversies about a political issue ever carried out in the Federal Republic” (Volkmann, 1990: 237) and was met with opposition from France and viewed with some suspicion in the UK.

As concerns over a ‘remilitarization’ of Germany were understood and shared by Adenauer, it is not uncommon for scholars to apply the ‘great power bias’ and argue that German rearmament was result of pressure from Washington in the wake of the Korean War. Specifically, the argument is that this was a price the Pentagon requested for agreeing to station additional troops in Western Europe (Gaddis, 2005 (1982): 112). This argument stands on weak ground, however. As Hans Peter Schwarz points out,

---

330 The call for Europeans to engage in ‘self help and mutual aid’ was stressed in the influential Senate Resolution from June 1948 sponsored by Arthur Vandenberg, the powerful chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, who kept warning that a lack of progress in European integration would lead Congress to reduce the financial flow (Kaplan 1984: 70-77; Winand 1994: 20; Maier, 1990: 139).

331 The interviews were given to the New York Times and the Cleveland Plain Dealer. Adenauer made frequent use of US newspapers to disseminate his ideas.
Adenauer was thinking about the possibility of rebuilding some sort of German army before being 'encouraged' by the US. While for Schwarz Adenauer's interest in rearmament is "one of the puzzles of his personality which can never be fully explained" (Schwarz 1986: 734), Wolfram Hanrieder reminds that Adenauer viewed rearmament primarily in political terms and that it became "the anchor of Adenauer's diplomacy" (Hanrieder 1989: 38). Building upon this argument, I take up the two reasons given by Adenauer for rearmament, namely (i) the acquisition of sovereignty and (ii) the protection from a communist threat and suggest that both were used in support of recreating Germany's place in 'the West' through NATO.

Adenauer repeatedly noted that the possession of a military was a fundamental aspect of 'sovereignty'; however, sovereignty is a vague and contested term. For Adenauer, 'sovereignty' did not mean 'autonomy' but having 'equal rights' [Gleichberechtigung]. He frequently used it synonymously with 'equality' and reminded his Cabinet that rearmament would speed up the path towards recognition as an 'equal partner' (Volkmann 1990: 240). Adenauer rejected the idea of a national army, wanting German soldiers integrated into a supranational 'European Army' instead. Neither he nor Schumacher, who was an even stronger advocate of 'sovereignty', wanted a reduction of military presence of allied forces on German territory, quite the opposite.332 And while Adenauer was determined to end the Occupation Statute put in place after the founding of the FRG in 1949 (see below), this was because it kept open the possibility of 'another Potsdam'; Adenauer worked hard on tying the vision of a unified Germany to the course of Westintegration and European unity.333 As Hanrieder observes, the sovereignty for which Adenauer aimed was "of a rather special kind: once obtained, it would be immediately 'dissipated' within treaties that bound Germany to the West. (...). Integration and equality rather than the quest for sovereign independence became the central precepts" (Hanrieder 1989: 233).

In short, the sovereignty Adenauer wanted did not refer to autonomy but to having a voice in the development of Germany-in-(Western)Europe. The German military was the asset Adenauer could offer to the US as a contribution to the Western project. It allowed him to link the possibility of German participation in a 'European army' with

332 In his security memorandum to the High Commissioners from August 1950, Adenauer called for a reinforcement of occupying troops (Baring 1969: 86), as did Schumacher in his Bundestag speech from November 1950 (Schumacher 1950).
333 Adenauer tried to insert an article (Bindungsklausel) into the 'Bonn Conventions' which would tie future German governments and the Western Allies to the commitment that a united Germany would remain embedded in the Western project. The Article (7.2) was ultimately toned down on the insistence of the Allies, see Grewe (1952/1960: 58).
the demand that Germany had to be considered an ‘equal partner’ in a supranational structure, ideally NATO. By arguing that it would be impossible to ask Germans to fight for an order in which they were discriminated against, Adenauer tied rearmament to the revision of the Occupation Statute and to the establishment of ‘Germany’ as a formative actor in the Western space through NATO. In this strategy, the ‘communist threat’ was a means to an end.

**Negative Visions of Germany-in-Europe**

Adenauer justified rearmament by through the use of a dystopia (see chapter five), namely the negative vision that Germany-in-Europe could become a communist space. This allowed him to entrench the determination for the project, that is, to mobilize domestic support for rearmament and thus manifest the path of *Westintegration* against domestic critics and to strengthen the bonds with the American narrative. Adopting the terminology offered by his advisor Wilhelm Grewe, Adenauer formulated two scenarios of the communist threat, the ‘Korea model’ and the ‘Prague model’, scenarios of Soviet military invasion and political subversion, respectively (Grewe 1960: 13). Both models lend the authentic texture for Adenauer’s narrative of undesirable futures and resonated with the US.

**Dystopia I: The ‘Korea’ Model**

The Korea model contained the fear of Soviet invasion through military attack in the style of North Korea’s invasion of the South in May 1950 with presumed support from China. The outbreak of the Korean War, which took American forces stationed there by surprise and almost drove them off the peninsula, triggered an atmosphere of panic in Bonn. The press service of the CDU described the events in Korea as an ‘educational film’ for future conflicts in Europe (Koch, 1985: 260) and Adenauer firmly expressed his conviction that Stalin was planning “the same procedure for Western Europe as had been used in Korea” (in Kaplan 1994: 42).

The task here is not to assess the ‘accuracy’ of Adenauer’s vision, which had been laid out long before the Korean War in scenarios prepared by his military advisors, the former *Wehrmacht* Generals von Speidel and von Schwerin (Schwarz 1986: 740). It suffices to say that there were no signs of Soviet aggression against Western Europe and that from a balance of power perspective the Soviet Union was not a threat to a Germany occupied by the US and its allies. While measuring the distribution of ‘hard power’ in Europe in the first post-war years is notoriously difficult, on the basis of conventional indicators the US clearly outweighed the Soviet Union. During the war it had only
suffered a fraction of the over 20 Million Russians lives that were lost, and while Stalin had to deal with heavily damaged cities, industry and infrastructure, the US economy had been boosted by the war. Most importantly, the US military was not only technologically more advanced but also holding the monopoly over nuclear weapons. Ikenberry’s note that the pre-eminent position of the US was recognized at the time is true for the German government, with Adenauer in October 1950 describing the US in the Bundestag as the most powerful actor since the Roman Empire (in Schröder 1988: 123). If, as Kissinger (1994: 443) writes “the much-advertised Soviet invasion of Western Europe was a fantasy”, the point made here is that Adenauer made effective use of this scenario to generate momentum for German rearmament. It was effective because it struck a familiar chord in the German and the American narrative and thus was accepted as a possibility.

The Korea model drew on several aspects of the German biography. There was the racist element, with Adenauer describing Russia as an ‘Asian’ space, tapping into the familiar theme of Europe facing a barbaric civilisation in the East (Neumann, 1999). Although as Baring (1969: 53) reminds us Adenauer used the term ‘Asia’ rather loosely when looking Eastward, his view of the Soviet Union being fundamentally different, backwards and aggressive echoed the anti-slavic sentiment fostered by the Nazis (Niedhart and Altmann, 1988: 102). The racist element was embedded in the larger enemy-image of the ‘red scare’ built up under Hitler and amplified by a fear of a revenge-driven Red Army, fed by reports of rape and oppression told by German refugees from the East. Most obviously Adenauer benefited from the Nazi’s anti-communist propaganda and adapted it to remind of communism’s disregard for traditional Christian values, warning that “a victory of communist atheism” would destroy “everything Christianity has given to humanity over the 2000 years of its existence” (in Weidenfeld, 1976: 86). Finally, and most importantly, to make the Third

---

334 The figure is from Gaddis (1996: 13). Judt (2005: 18) puts the total Soviet losses at around 24 million lives. Depending on sources, the US lost up to 400,000 lives.

335 Between 1938 and 1953 the US share of the world manufacturing output rose from 31.4 to 44.7 percent, compared to Russia’s 9.0 and 10.7, see Ikenberry (2001: 168); Leffler (1984: 380).

336 In 1945 Washington’s share of military expenditures among the six great powers stood at a staggering 74.5 per cent against Moscow’s 7.1 (Ikenberry, 2001: 168). For an argument of American ‘weakness’ in the immediate post-war period due to demobilization, see Coker (1989; 36ff.). This argument is not very convincing, however, because it downplays the nuclear advantage and does not provide a comparative perspective, without which ‘power’ cannot be measured.

337 On Adenauer’s enemy image of the Soviet Union, see also Niedhart and Altmann (1988). It is not unreasonable to assume that Adenauer never expected a Soviet attack. Certainly the Korea model had a brief life-span as the primary threat in Adenauer’s rhetoric, as less than a year after the outbreak of fighting he shifted his emphasis to the ‘Prague model’ (Schwarz 1986: 848).

338 See also Grossmann (1997); Gaddis (1996: 286f).
reich’s anti-Russian/Slavic/communist narrative fit with the notion of a ‘new Germany’, Adenauer effectively merged it with the negative experience of the Third Reich itself and painted the Soviet Union in the colours of Nazi Germany by equating communism with totalitarianism. This was made ‘official’ in the commentary to the Basic Law and with Adenauer attributing an inherent aggressiveness to Stalin by comparing him with Hitler (Schwarz 1986: 523, 553). Thus, Adenauer tapped into a rich repertoire of ‘usable pasts’ and although not all were convinced of an immediate Soviet attack – Schumacher, despite being fervently anti-communist, accused Adenauer of abusing the ‘fear from East’ for political purposes (Schumacher 1950) – the familiarity was sufficiently strong that a majority of Germans accepted the scenario (Volkmann).

The Korea model also resonated in the US. To be sure, it was taken with a grain of salt. While the Pentagon also had produced scenarios of a Soviet invasion, an actual attack on Western Europe was considered unlikely (Leffler 1984: 359ff.). The consensus in Washington was that Adenauer painted an overly stark image of the Soviet military threat and that his Korea-analogy was exaggerated. Pointing to their nuclear arsenal and superior naval power, US officials informed the German chancellor that they believed the likelihood of a Soviet invasion to be slim (Volkmann, 238f.; Sommer 1988).

That said, Adenauer’s framing of a Soviet invasion as an attack not merely on ‘Germany’ but on ‘Western civilisation’ (Volkmann 1990: 294f) fell on fertile ground. It resonated with the US view of the communist order as undesirable and the widespread belief that ‘the world’ was facing a ‘red tide’, revived with Kennan’s analysis of the ‘character’ of communist Russia and accentuated with NSC 68 (Gaddis 2005). The image of falling dominos fitted well into the scenario laid out in NSC 68 and was “frequently raised” by US policymakers in the wake the Korean War, convincing Truman that “a worldwide Communist conspiracy had operated in Korea and would manifest itself elsewhere” (Kaplan 1984: 145ff.; Jervis 1980). Aware that Europe was a special ‘elsewhere’ for the US, Adenauer’s reaction thus merged the two places by sending a strong statement of solidarity with the American experience in Korea. The Korea model confirmed that the worlds of Germany and the US significantly overlapped and that Adenauer understood US engagement in Korea as part of the project to strengthen the Western world – “a test of the West’s steadfastness” (Kaplan 1984: 8; Milliken 1999). Indeed it is telling that Kaplan, who otherwise pays very little attention

\[39\] According to Jervis the assessment was “mixed, if not incoherent” (Jervis 1980: 579).
to German voices, notes that Adenauer “spoke for the allies” when he claimed that Stalin was ‘testing’ the West in Korea (Kaplan 1994: 42).

The Korea experience strengthened US commitment to NATO as the primary institution through which Western order was to be created (‘defended’). As Kaplan puts it, Korea placed the ‘O’ into NATO: within six months of the invasion the Alliance was restructured into an organisation with a strong headquarter, command structures, finance committees, etc. And for the Pentagon Germany emerged on the strategic map because of the military rationale: if Western Europe needed more troops, who would be better than the Germans in fighting the Russians? For the Joint Chiefs of Staff “a German component to NATO was no longer a matter of speculation” but was considered “mandatory” (Kaplan 1994: 44). The White House saw things slightly differently. Viewing NATO primarily as a vehicle for ordering Europe, it was concerned about the political threat to Germany-in-Europe. The overarching dystopia it shared with Adenauer was the possibility of a communist Germany, what Germany-in-Europe could become if not for Westintegration.

**Dystopia II: The ‘Prague’ Model**

The vision that Germans could adopt the ‘wrong’ value horizon was captured in the ‘Prague model’. Referring to the communist coup in Prague in February 1948, this scenario envisioned the communist takeover of ‘Germany’ through domestic political subversion supported from Moscow (a ‘fifth column’). The viability of this image was fed not only by the Soviet determination to install Moscow-friendly regimes in Eastern Europe and its attempt to get a hold of Berlin but rested on Adenauer’s ‘distrust’ of Germans doing the right thing, namely that a disoriented society would fall for the communist promise (Baring 1969: 57f; Foschepoth 1994). It did not matter that the German communist party in the FRG was relatively weak and that the Social Democrats had a strong leader in Schumacher unwilling to cooperate with the communists; Adenauer linked the Prague scenario to everyone who questioned the path of Westintegration and envisioned German unity as a demilitarized and neutral state. By framing the rearmament decision as one between “Asian Pagandom” and “European Christendom”, he implied that those supporting a neutral Germany would be responsible for the downfall of Western civilization.340

---

340 At a CDU party convention in October 1951 Adenauer warned: “Neutrality and demilitarization of Germany means that we will become a satellite state in a short period of time. This means, furthermore, that we will see the triumph of communism in France and Italy, which means that the Christian Occident will be finished, and that the United States will lose interest in Europe. Therefore, my friends: Those of you who want neutrality and demilitarization of
At the same time, the government argued that rearmament was consistent with the trajectory of a new Germany unfolding into a peaceful Europe. Heinrich von Brentano, Adenauer’s party colleague, argued that the term ‘rearmament’ was misleading because it “suggests that we intend to restore, or at least copy, the past”. Instead, he sought to reassure domestic critics, the intention was “to create something new”, assuring that “We do not want re-militarization; we do not want a national German army as an instrument of power-politics. What we want is to make a contribution to a European army as part of the integration of Europe” (von Brentano 1950: 45). Rearmament thus would not mean a fall-back into a ‘militarization’ but was a necessary contribution to the Western project of ‘peace through freedom and unity’. Reminding that US support for this project was vital, rearmament was to be an act of reciprocity. Adenauer repeatedly noted that Washington expected Germany to contribute to the ‘protection’ of the Western space and that reluctance to do so would risk that the US loses interest in ‘Europe’ and, consequently, would lead to the demise of the Occident.

The ‘Prague’ scenario resonated strongly in the US, where the possibility of European nations falling for communism had become a familiar vision. As Acheson noted, the scenario was that the communist virus would infect others “like apples in a barrel infected by a rotten one” (in Kaplan 1984: 33). The objective of preventing political ‘subversion’ of European states by communist parties had of course been central to getting the ‘Marshall Plan’ through Congress and by 1950 the image of a ‘fifth column’ had even befallen American domestic life, captured in ‘McCarthyism’. US receptiveness for this dystopia was exploited by Adenauer to gain voice and improve his standing in the West. Pointing to his thin mandate – Adenauer in 1949 had won election in the Bundestag by only one vote – and the strong domestic opposition to his rearmament plans, in 1950 he repeatedly warned Washington that the forces favouring German neutrality were gaining strength and that support for his course of Westintegration was waning. Leaving aside whether Adenauer was really as weak domestically as he presented it to his American colleagues, he was most effective in transmitting the image

Germany are either extremely dumb or traitors” (cited in Baring 1969: 107, my translation, emphasis added).

341 An example of how German rearmament was portrayed as ‘European’ rearmament and justified with a combination of the ‘Korea model’ and the ‘Prague model’ is found in Die Welt from February 1951.

342 On Adenauer’s continuous worry about US isolationism, see Poppinga (1975: 80ff). In 1952 Adenauer called on his Cabinet that it was important to demonstrate willingness for progress in the project of European unity to support Eisenhower in the upcoming US elections. Adenauer feared that the challenger, Tafts, would prioritize ‘Asia’ over ‘Europe’ (Maier, 1990: 115; Jackson 2006: 224).
of a German society still unsure whether the most desirable future was found ‘in’ the West.

The warning that the US might ‘lose’ Germany tapped into the ‘Rapallo complex’. Referring to the 1922 treaty between the Germany and communist Russia, ‘Rapallo’ stood for the scenario of Germany turning towards Russia as a reaction to feeling humiliated/frustrated with the West. It was an analogy regularly used by US diplomats to refer to the possibility of a neutral Germany bonding with Moscow (Schröder 1988: 140). In March 1950, three months before the outbreak of the Korean War, a report from the State Department invoked the possibility of another ‘Rapallo’. Acheson went on to note that a new initiative was needed to ensure anchoring Germany in the West. Later that year, after a meeting with Adenauer and Schumächer, McCloy reported back to Washington that the course of Westintegration was loosing attraction in the FRG and suggested “to take a drastic step toward political unity such as the establishing of articles of confederation for Europe” and to consider bringing Germany into NATO so that “Germans will begin to see promise in a future by the side of Western democracies” (in Lundestad 1998: 35f.).

In sum, the analogies of ‘Korea’ and ‘Prague’ were used successfully by Adenauer to manifest a vision of what Germany/Europe could become if not for Westintegration. Those negative visions strengthened US commitment to invest into Germany-in-Europe and allowed Adenauer to reciprocate by offering German rearmament as a valuable contribution to the Western project, opening a window through which NATO membership could be claimed.

The Rocky Path from EDC to NATO

Even with the Bonn-Washington consensus on rearmament the path to German NATO membership was a difficult one. The six years which lay between Adenauer’s first mentioning this aim in March 1949 and its formal admission in May 1955 saw an intense period of negotiations between the Western Allies and Germany, which is worth sketching out because it exemplifies the bond between Bonn and Washington. The negotiations took the following steps: the revision of Occupation Statute in March 1951, followed by negotiations over its termination leading to ‘Bonn Conventions’ and parallel negotiations over the European Defense Community (EDC) culminating in the EDC Treaty. The two were signed in May 1952, with the clause that the former would not enter into force until the latter was ratified as well by all parties. When the French assembly failed to do so in 1954, bringing about the failure of EDC, the ‘Paris Treaties’
in October 1954 finally allowed Germany to enter NATO and terminated the Occupation Statute, coming into force in May 1955.3

The main hurdle was French and British reservations about Adenauer's strategy to increase Germany's position in the West, echoed in their less than enthusiastic reception of his 'communist threat' scenarios. In Paris and London the question which direction Germany should not take had an answer already: it was the pre-45 Germany they knew. As noted earlier, the primary concern of the French was not the development of a 'new' Germany but oppressing the 'old' and familiar one. Yet also the British view that Germans could be gradually brought back into the circle of civilized nations did not quite resonate with the German-American stance that 'Germany' urgently had to be saved from becoming communist. The New York conference of Allied foreign ministers in September 1950 exposed the differences among the Western Allies on the issue of German rearmament and Adenauer's demand for 'equality' (Baring, 1969: 95). Whereas the British were hesitant to have the FRG rearmed and put forward a proposal for establishing a West German police force, Paris rejected the idea of German membership in NATO and expressed its sincere discomfort about rearmament plans.3

When the US pressured France to provide an alternative to German membership in NATO, Monnet came up with a design for a European Army in what came to be known as the 'Pleven Plan' (named after the Prime Minister Renee Pleven). This plan was rejected, in turn, not only by Adenauer but also by the US and Britain. It was strongly criticized not only by military experts for being unsound but was also politically unacceptable as it was highly discriminatory towards Germany and appeared to be designed mainly to drag out the issue of German rearmament – precisely the reasons why the French National Assembly had accepted it (Maier 1990: 231; Kaplan 1984: 24).3 Sensitive to French resistance, the US and Germany built on the idea of a European army under NATO's oversight. Also for domestic reasons, Adenauer publicly rejected the idea of setting up a 'national' army. And while the Pentagon continued to emphasize NATO membership on pragmatic operational grounds (Maier 1990: 138), State Department and White House endorsed a 'European solution' because it fit with

---

3 As McAllister (2002: 24, Fn 54) points out, there is surprisingly little research on EDC in the English-speaking literature. He provides a good discussion on this and German rearmament from the US perspective (McAllister 2002, Ch. 5).

3 The French National Assembly in October 1950 explicitly rejected entrance of a state into NATO which might have territorial claims, a diplomatic shortcut for Germany (Maier 1990; Ruane 2000: 17).

3 Adenauer, true to his game, blamed the French objection to German NATO membership to French communists undermining Schumann (Maier 1990: 93, 211).
the integrative steps of the Schumann Plan and the conception of Europe as a ‘third force’.346

After a number of revisions which reduced German discriminatory measures in the French proposal and established a link to NATO, in September 1951 the Allies agreed to integrate a German defense contribution in a European Defense Community (EDC).347 The EDC proposal maintained Monnet’s idea to have the European Army established as an element of political integration running parallel to and eventually merging with economic integration. While the Pentagon never warmed up to the EDC idea, Truman/Acheson and Eisenhower/Dulles came to see it as a central step towards securing the FRGs commitment to West and establishment of a United States of Europe within NATO’s sight. In other words, EDC was seen as the best option for creating a third force in the West. Assured that the US was underwriting the EDC proposal and that it was embedded in a larger Western project and linked to NATO, Adenauer agreed.348 The chancellor even told the Bundestag in early February 1952 that joining the EDC would eventually lead to NATO membership (Baring 1969: 119). To accommodate French reservations, he publicly withdrew demands for direct NATO membership, though adding that EDC membership should not rule out the possibility of NATO membership in the future. In turn, the French National Assembly agreed to the idea of a European army in which Germany could participate without discriminatory conditions (Maier 1990: 88-90).

The signing of EDC and Bonn Conventions – Adenauer’s wish of calling it ‘Germany Treaty’ was blocked by the French – in May 1952 were celebrated as a success in Bonn and Washington. Article 4 of the ‘Bonn Conventions’ crucially stated that Allied forces stationed on German territory would have the stated purpose “to defend the free world, to which the Federal Republic and Berlin belongs” (also Grewe 1960: 51). This transformation from ‘occupying’ to ‘defending’ forces was crucial because would mean de facto Germany’s transformation as a place in the West.349 The hurdle, though, was ratification. Britain remained highly sceptical about the federal design and did not like

346 Disagreements between the military and the political viewpoints led to mixed signals coming out of Washington which only ceded somewhat when Eisenhower was persuaded of the political purpose of a European Army, a change of mind which as analysts suggests came after a meeting with Monnet in May 1951 (Winand 1993; Dwan 2000).
347 On how military integration was to be organised in EDC, see Ruane (2000: 16). The link between NATO and EDC was outlined in two protocols, see Maier (1990: 104f, 122f.).
348 On the importance of the link with the US for Adenauer during the EDC negotiations, see Gersdorff (1999).
349 For a discussion on why the term ‘sovereignty’ was omitted from the Bonn treaty, see Grewe (1960: 54f.)
the idea of tying Western defense to European integration. Only after Washington had accepted London’s unwillingness to play a significant role in the project, the British supported the EDC to keep the US happy and committed to Europe (Ruane 2000: 27ff; Maier 1990: 91). The problem was France, where military defeats in Indochina and British reluctance to get involved reduced confidence in EDC. When it became clear that ratification was in danger, the US exercised pressure on Paris through both sticks and carrots, though without much success (Ruane 2000: 46f.; Maier 1990: 138). Adenauer in 1953 wrote to a party colleague “the Americans are currently our only friends” (in Schwarz, 1991: 47).

When the French parliament in August 1954 rejected the EDC, the German-American project appeared to have hit a wall. Eisenhower was frustrated and Adenauer was devastated, fearing that the US now would abandon the European project and with it the path carved out for the new Germany. The British government came to the rescue (Ruane, 2000). Privately welcoming the ‘death’ of the federal utopia, Churchill and Eden saw a chance to revitalise NATO and, with French approval, worked out a compromise which paved the way for Germany into NATO via the ‘Western European Union’ (WEU) (Grewe 1960: 63f). Washington and Bonn welcomed the proposal, and the treaties were revised and in May 1955 the FRG acquired NATO membership, ensuring German participation in the debate about its future in the ‘free world’.

Conclusion
Against the backdrop of a reading of security institutions serving the purpose of negotiating a common project among friends, this chapter provided evidence for the argument that German and American decision makers invested in NATO because they considered it the most suitable institution through which they could transform their shared experienced space, Europe, into a shared envisioned space. The chapter showed Adenauer, on the one side, and Truman, Acheson and Eisenhower, on the other side, coming to see each other as attractive partners – more so than with either France or the UK – for redefining their respective place in the world, that is, for rendering their ‘being-in-Europe’ meaningful through the idea of a peaceful Europe ordered around the value of ‘freedom’ and ‘unity’. In other words, they shared the common interest of turning ‘Europe’ into a meaningful space through the vision (utopia) of a ‘United States of Europe’ which resonated with respective national biographies and manifested German-American friendship in a shared Western project.
It has also been argued that this investment provided Adenauer with a partner supportive of German rehabilitation in a Christian/Occidental space willing to treat him as an ‘equal’. At the same time it provided the Truman and Eisenhower administrations with a friend who understood their world and with whom they could build up a European ‘Third Force’ supportive of the US narrative. Both sides came to agree that NATO was the suitable forum for doing so and the discussion suggested that Adenauer’s push for rearmament was a strategy aimed at establishing Germany’s status as a formally ‘equal’ member in NATO. He mobilized negative visions, or dystopias, of what Germany ‘could become if not for Westintegration’ – the Korea model and the Prague model – to strengthen the bond with the US narrative and to justify the adjustment of the pacifist element of the FRG’s narrative domestically. The next chapter discusses why, two decades later, the German government deemed it necessary to invest in a new institution.

Introduction

The previous chapter showed how, in the decade following World War Two, German and American policymakers bonded over the idea of how to order Europe through NATO in a way that resonated with their respective national biographies. This chapter focuses on Willy Brandt as the main figure representing the German narrative to offer an explanation for his motivation to invest in a new institution for ordering 'Europe', namely the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in which the US was reluctant to participate. Applying the estrangement lens developed earlier, I seek to explain this in terms of a divergence between German and American narratives of authentic becoming, specifically with an emerging dissonance about a desirable vision (utopia) for European order. To substantiate this argument, the chapter traces the narratives of 'Germany' and 'America' in-the-world as formulated by Brandt/Bahr (on the German side) and Johnson and Nixon/Kissinger (on the US side) between 1965 and 1975, with particular attention given to their visions of 'peace in Europe' and how these informed evaluations of NATO and CSCE.

The discussion proceeds as follows: first, it outlines Brandt’s vision of ‘Germany-in-Europe’, how it differs from Adenauer’s version, and how it motivates a policy of peaceful change. Second, it notes Kennedy’s influence in formulating this narrative and also shows how, at the same time, the Berlin Wall experience exposed the dissonance between German and American narratives. Third, it outlines attempts to tone down the dissonance through NATO’s Harmel Report and Brandt’s silence on the US engagement in Vietnam. Fourth, it discusses the Nixon administration’s reorientation of America-in-the-world and the ambiguous role of Europe in this narrative and carves out the disagreements between Kissinger and Brandt over visions of European order. The final part of the chapter links this to German-American differences concerning the evaluations of CSCE and closes with a review of Kissinger's failed ‘Year of Europe’ attempt to reinvigorate the partnership.

350 There is very little literature on German motives and corresponding position in the CSCE process. See Becker (1992); Spohr Readman (2006), also Peters (1999). A recent and valuable publication which goes in the direction of the account presented in this chapter is Bange and Niedhart (2008). For the US position, see Maresca (1984). On the CSCE process and its effects, mostly with how it contributed to the end of the Cold War, see Bender (1996); Schlotter (1999); Thomas (2001); Adler (1996).
Brandt

The (re)formulation of Germany’s national biography in and the investment in CSCE in the period under investigation here was pursued most forcefully by Willy Brandt, first as Foreign Minister (1966-69) and then as Chancellor (1969-72). Brandt was the first Social Democrat holding a leading position in the federal government since the founding of the FRG. As a young social democrat, he had escaped Nazi persecution by going into exile in Scandinavia (mainly Norway) and returned to Germany after the end of the war to resume both his citizenship and his political activities in the Social Democratic Party (SPD). With Schumacher’s help Brandt became a member of parliament in 1949, then serving as an assistant to Ernst Reuter, the mayor of West Berlin, before taking this post himself in October 1957. In 1961 and 1964 Brandt was the (unsuccessful) SPD candidate for Chancellor, became the party’s leader in 1964 and in 1966 Foreign Minister in the Grand Coalition, with Kurt-Georg Kiesinger (CDU) as Chancellor. He succeeded Kiesinger as Chancellor in 1969, was confirmed in this position in a sweeping re-election in 1972 before forced to resign in 1974, handing the position over to his party-colleague Helmut Schmidt.

As will become clear in this chapter, the SPD’s understanding of Germany-in-Europe differed significantly from that propagated by Adenauer’s Christian Democrats. This inevitably made the Kiesinger/Brandt government’s formulation of the German narrative a compromise and less sharp. Kiesinger was willing, however, to shift away from Adenauer’s course and pursue some significant Ostpolitik initiatives. This created CDU-internal tensions, however, with Adenauer loyalists accusing Kiesinger of compromising core principles of Westintegration by giving in to Brandt’s course. Eventually the differences between Kiesinger and Brandt and their respective parties concerning the path Germany-in-Europe should take became unbridgeable and led to the break-up of the coalition in 1969, with Brandt taking over as chancellor in a coalition with the Liberal Party (FDP).

---

351 Born under the name of Herbert Frahm, he took on the pseudonym ‘Willy Brandt’ after Hitler came to power. For a biography, see Prittie (1974); Merseburger (2002).
352 Kiesinger gradually moved away from the Hallstein doctrine (or ‘around it’, as Kiesinger preferred to put it) by taking up diplomatic relations with Rumania in January 1967 and with Yugoslavia in early 1968, and establishing low-level contacts with the GDR (Hacke 2003: 134f). These initiatives stripped Westintegration of Adenauer’s maxim of non-engagement with ‘the East’. On Kiesinger’s Ostpolitik and the relations with the US, see Niedhart (1999); Hacke (2003).
Like Adenauer, Brandt was a combination of a visionary and a practitioner of realpolitik. As Golo Mann (1971) reminds us in his foreword to a collection of Brandt’s speeches, Brandt was well aware of the importance of moral forces, or values, in the Weltgetriebe and structured his conception of Germany’s national biography. Brandt emphasised the importance of history as a guideline. In a book written during his time as foreign minister, he notes how he was guided by the “knowledge that you cannot escape your people’s history but carry it as a heritage and experience” and that the task was to use the various forces contained in this history in a fruitful way, emphasizing the responsibility to build on “the tradition of a movement for liberty and its will to form/create [Gestaltungswille]” (Brandt 1968: 21f.). While less cunning than Adenauer in day-to-day practice, he shared the old Chancellor’s thinking in long term processes and his evolutionary understanding of politics, the fixing a greater vision gradually approached through ‘politics of small steps’ (Mann 1971: 15-20). Supported by Egon Bahr, a close aide whose conceptual thinking played an important role in Brandt’s formulation of the German narrative, the belief in social democratic principles and personal experiences Brandt to pursue a utopia of Germany-in-Europe different from Adenauer’s in important aspects.

Envisioning Germany-in-(Greater-)Europe

For Brandt, the highest value for Germany’s future was ‘peace’ and, like his predecessors, Brandt conceived of a peaceful Germany as embedded in a united Europe. When in his two speeches at Harvard in 1962 Brandt emphasized the interdependence between the German question and the European order, this was a long-held conviction. Already in 1949 he spoke of a “European solution” for the new Germany and that task was to think “about Germany’s place in the European order” (in Brandt 1971: 48-49). Brandt envisioned to have Germany unfold in a ‘European Peace Order’ [Europäische Friedensordnung] based on the familiar principles of freedom/democracy and unity. In a speech to Social Democrats in Berlin in May 1949 he referred to the Heidelberger Programme and its call for the creation of a ‘United States of Europe’ to note that commitment to European unity was central to social democratic thinking (in Brandt 1971: 52). Almost two decades later, in a speech to the Council of Europe in January 1967 Brandt claimed that all the different paths pursued in Bonn were “striving towards

---

353 The latest biography on Brandt is subtitled ‘visionary and realist’ (Merseburger, 2002).
354 Before Thomas Mann put out his famous dictum, Brandt noted in 1946 that “the Nazis attempted to Germanise Europe in their own way. Now the task is to Europeanise Germany” (in Brandt 1971: 41).
355 See the collection of his speeches in Brandt (1971). In Stockholm in February 1945 he noted that the post-war order would be marked by claiming rights of freedom and democracy (in Brandt 1971: 23).
the same goal: European unity” (in Brandt 1970: 21). While the commitment to
democracy was ingrained in the party’s identity, according to Kocka (2004: 41) the
explicit adoption of ‘freedom’ as a core value first occurred noted explicitly with the
1959 Godesberger Programm, which also marked the SPD’s acceptance of
‘Westintegration’ and, hence, the role of the United States as a partner in creating
Germany in the Western space.

That said, Brandt’s utopia was distinct from the one pursued by Adenauer in two
fundamental ways. First, Brandt pursued the idea of a Europe built on a social
democratic order. His commitment to social democracy as an ordering principle,
exemplified by his party affiliation, for the European space was fostered by his exile
experience in Scandinavian social democratic countries during the war, in particular
Norway. Oliver Bange even suggests that “Brandt’s idea of a ‘social democratisation
of Europe’ was born in Scandinavia” (Bange, 2006: 715). Like Schumacher, for Brandt
social democracy was the only alternative to communist totalitarianism, even noting that
“the United States of Europe will be filled with social democratic thinking or they will
not be.” (Brandt, 1970: 53). Even though as Chancellor he sought to downplay the
impression that he was pursuing a different conception of European order than his
predecessors.356 ‘social(ist)’ values remained central to the Europe he envisioned, also
exemplified in his attempt to bring Britain and Scandinavian countries into the EEC.357
In March 1963 he noted that Europe was not limited to the six EEC members: “the signs
of our times point towards greater integration (Zusammenschlüsse). Nobody will stop
this development” (Brandt, 1971: 77)

Here the second major departure from Adenauer’s course emerges. Whereas the latter
planned to have Germany to unfold into a Europe anchored geographically in the South-
West, Brandt undertook an adjustment of Germany’s path into a wider European space.
Most importantly, when he discarded the project of a ‘small’ or ‘Vatican Europe’ and
formulated the idea of Germany situated in a ‘Greater Europe’ [Gesamteuropa],358 this
also encompassed ‘the East’. This crucial and most controversial spatial extension of
Germany-in-Europe, which informed his Ostpolitik, was formed significantly through
Brandt’s experience of living in Berlin.

356 In a speech to the Bundestag in November 1970 Brandt noted that the project of European
unity should not be hampered by tensions over ‘Christian Democratic’ or ‘socialist’ notions of
‘Europe’, as both would share the deeper commitment to liberal, law-based and social
democracy.
357 In July 1972 he noted to Pompidou that economic growth could not remain the only indicator
of success in European integration and proposed a ‘Social Union’ (Brandt, 1976: 345).
358 The literal translation would be ‘entire Europe’.

228
Whereas Adenauer was never fond of Berlin, Brandt conceived of the European space largely from Berlin. Until the wall was built in 1961, the city had been an example of the permeability of the borders between Eastern and Western zones. As discussed below, witnessing the division first hand, convinced Brandt of the human tragedy of the division of Germany-in-Europe. It made him ‘see’ that the European space was not, and could not be, limited to ‘the West’ but needed to encompass ‘the East’ as well. In that sense, the Berlin years widened his horizon of experience: despite his rejection of the communist order, Brandt did not see ‘the East’ as a foreign, backward and fundamentally ‘different’ land as Adenauer had done. Just as the GDR was part of ‘Germany’, most Warsaw Pact countries were part of ‘Europe’. Thus, in a speech to the Bundestag in November 1970 he stressed the importance of including the ‘East’ into the future of Europe, warning of an internal contradiction when “if we conjure the future (only) to the West and the past (only) to the East” (Brandt, 1976: 331).359

That said, Brandt’s vision of Greater Europe remained situated within the Western space. While his domestic critics complained that Brandt was pursuing the “chimera of a Grossraum Europa” at the cost of West European integration (in Ash, 1993: 25), this was not the case. While Brandt did speak against a “one-sided West orientation” and favoured a policy of ‘Ausgleich’ (Ash, 1993: 37f.), in line with the SPD’s programmatic ‘turn’ at Bad Godesberg in 1959 in which the party formally gave up opposition to Westintegration, Brandt saw the project of building a Greater Europe as occurring from within the Western space. He noted that Social Democratic internationalism in tune with the Atlantic Charter (Ibid., 26) and did not see a contradiction between West-European integration and the building of a Greater Europe, quite the contrary (Brand, 1976: 318-373). When taking office as Chancellor in 1969, he took steps to reinvigorate the EC process and repeatedly expressed how Western European integration was part of the vision of a greater European order. Indeed, he wanted the EC to become an “exemplary order” which would serve as building block for his Greater European Peace Order [Gesamteuropäische Friedensordnung] (Brandt, 1976: 320, 331). As Bange puts it, Brandt saw the two processes as “two equally valued pillars of an overarching concept for the ‘social democratisation’ of a Greater Europe” (Bange, 2006: 713). Brandt’s vision of Germany-in-Europe thus did not intend to replace ‘Western’ with ‘Eastern’

359 Already in 1945 he vowed that “the problem of Germany and Europe can only be solved on the basis of freedom and democracy. It can only be solved by bringing together West and East – and what lies in the middle” (Brandt 1971: 41).
orientation but, rather, to shift of the vision of Europe within the Western project. By
doing so, he inevitably attempted to alter the character of the latter as visible in Brandt’s
‘New Ostpolitik’.

Building the new European Order through Peaceful Change

Traditionally, discussions of Ostpolitik read it as Deutschlandpolitik and focus on the
bilateral ‘Eastern’ treaties, treating the CSCE process as an add-on without greater
political significance (for instance, Haftendorn, 1985: 159-252). The Germany-in-
Europe perspective does not consider ‘Germany’ isolated from the broader European
space, and so in this chapter I follow the more recent interpretation of Bange (2006) and
read Ostpolitik as Europapolitik of which the CSCE process became an intrinsic part
(Bange, 2006).

Ostpolitik was driven by Brandt’s conviction that the division of Germany-in-Europe did
not constitute a state of peace and that building Germany-in-Europe required a
transformation of the status quo (the order of Yalta). Most importantly, it rested on his
conviction that such a transformation was possible. In his Harvard speech in October
1962 Brandt noted that recognition of ‘coexistence’ of East and West was giving rise to
a ‘chance’, with which he meant a perspective of change through small steps. Brandt
was convinced of the artificiality and permeability of the borders in Europe and noted
that establishing points of contact between East and West would at core be about
pursuing a “politics of transformation” (Brandt 1971: 89). A revitalised Europe “a self-
confident, dynamic West” would provide an opportunity for “a peaceful offensive of
freedom” which would contribute to the deconstruction of walls (in Brandt 1971: 111).
These thoughts were reiterated in 1963 in Tutzing, where Brandt called for a “new
dynamic” in orienting Germany and a policy of peaceful change which would break up
the static division of Europe. This approach was captured famously by Egon Bahr who
in his Tutzing speech coined the catchy slogan ‘change through rapprochement’ [Wandel
durch Annäherung].

It is important to note the intrinsic link Brandt made between ‘peace’ and ‘change’ when
emphasising peaceful change. The conviction that “peace...is nothing static but a
dynamic process” (in Brandt 1971: 110) reveals that for Brandt the process of
transforming the space into a Greater and Social Democratic Europe was not simply
means to an end. In an evolutionary national biography, ‘endpoints’ are never reached.
Brandt’s vision established a new horizon in which the unfolding of Germany-in-Europe
was to occur and there was no difference between this envisioned space and how to ‘get
there'. By investing in the transformative potential of this vision, the process of peaceful change was as an end in itself. Brandt was convinced that change was possible. For him, the building of the Berlin wall and the violent oppression of the reform movement in Czechoslovakia in 1968 were signs of weakness of the communist order. And so rather than risking an infection of the Western space with the communist 'virus', as envisioned in Adenauer's 'Prague' scenario (see previous chapter), Brandt was convinced that increased points of contact would have the opposite effect.360

A major target of this change was the conception of 'Germany-in-Europe' in the national biographies of Eastern Europe. This was one of the key points made by Egon Bahr. Upon becoming head of policy planning in the Foreign Office in 1967, Bahr organised a brainstorming session about how unification could be achieved. The result was the recognition that neighbours needed to feel so secure from 'Germany' that they would not be afraid of its unification, which lead to the subsequent question of how 'Europe' would have to be organised to provide security not only for and but also from Germany (Bahr 1996: 226). In other words, building a Germany in a Greater Europe meant creating a narrative of the FRG whose 'past' and 'future' positively resonated not only with 'the West' but also with 'the East'. This meant Brandt needed to adjust the FRG's biography, that is, he had to devise a narrative which broke with the continuities Adenauer had maintained to the Third Reich, most notably the scathing anti-communism and the 'forgetting' of Nazi crimes.

Brandt did not make use of the dystopia of a communist Germany. In his eyes, the Western branding of communism as a threat had manifested the division of Germany-in-Europe. While Brandt/the Social Democrats rejected the communism as a desirable order,361 formally expressed in the 1959 Godesberger Program, they did not consider it an alien ideology, as Adenauer had done. Instead, the SPD's (and Brandt's) disagreement with communism was anchored on a different level, namely in the translation of socialist principles into political practice. This meant there was a shared

360 Brandt noted to NATO colleagues in April 1969 that the Prague Spring was evidence for the weakening of the dream of a communist Europe and, thus, for the possibility for changing views of the people in the Warsaw Pact towards something close to social democracy (Brandt 1976: 282-288). Already in 1958 he claimed “we have much more chance of poisoning them, so to speak” (in Hofmann 2006: 436)

361 In a speech to his SPD colleagues in January 1949, at the height of the Berlin blockade, he noted that “today one cannot be a democrat without being anti-communist. But anti-communism is not the only criteria of the democrat” (Brandt 1971: 44).
baseline which allowed offering nations in ‘Eastern Europe’ a democratic alternative from within the socialist narrative.\(^{362}\)

A major hurdle was to address the ‘image problem’ the FRG had in the East. Just as Adenauer had projected memories of the Third Reich into the East through the ‘Korea model’, the same was done in reverse by Moscow and the GDR leadership, in whose narrative the FRG was the continuation of German fascist order in the colours of a capitalist, imperialist, and aggressive state aimed at dominating ‘Europe’. This strategy of using each other for locating and disposing of the ‘bad’ memories of the Third Reich worked well as long as there were two ‘Germany’s’. However, Brandt was well aware that a unified Germany would not have this luxury. Any attempt by the FRG to claim sole representation of the German national biography in Greater Europe could only succeed by taking on responsibility for what had happened in Germany’s name, that is, by taking ownership of and dealing with Third Reich memories. Already in a speech in Stockholm in February 1945 Brandt noted that „Unreserved recognition of the crimes committed by Germans and in the name of Germany on other peoples is the first precondition of a healing \([\text{Gesundung}]\) of the German people“ (in Brandt 1970: 36). This conviction lead Brandt to apologise to the Czechoslovak nation that the GDR had participated in the 1968 occupation, as well as his more well-known (and more symbolically profound) gesture of kneeling in front of the Warsaw-Ghetto memorial in December 1970.\(^{363}\)

Redefining Germany-in-Europe thus required re-engaging the memory space created by the Third Reich and disseminating the new vision of (Germany in) a Greater European Peace Order. The Brandt government first pursued this through direct (bilateral) engagement with key nations in Eastern Europe, mainly through talks on the ‘renunciation of the use of force’, which Brandt had pursued as foreign minister together with Kiesinger. As soon as he became Chancellor, the talks were intensified and, in a remarkable speed the Brandt government negotiated and signed treaties with Moscow (1970), Warsaw (1970), and the GDR (1972).\(^{364}\) Two crucial elements were required, however, to turn this into an enduring project within the Western space. First, it needed

---

\(^{362}\) That Brandt’s vision was appreciated in Eastern Europe is suggested by Jiri Dienstbier, one of the most prominent dissidents in Czechoslovakia in the 1970s and 80s, who prefaced his book entitled “Dreaming of Europe” with the note that in thinking about the goal how to overcome the order of Yalta, Brandt’s Ostpolitik was the only larger conception developed in the West “which reckoned with a Europe other than the one to which we had all accustomed ourselves” (in Ash 1993: 15).

\(^{363}\) On the symbolic power of that gesture, see Ash (1993: x); Markovits and Reich (1997:x).

\(^{364}\) For a discussion, see Haftendorn (1985, Ch. X)
to resonate with the partner most intimately linked with the FRG’s unfolding in the Western space, America. Second, the question was which institution was suitable to enable the successful negotiation of this project, specifically whether and how NATO could be made that institution. It is these questions the discussion now turns to.

Locating Friends in the West: ‘Kennedy America’

As the friendship lens suggests, Brandt’s vision and transformative agenda of having Germany unfold into a Greater European Peace Order was not created in isolation but with support from Western friends.

Within limits, Britain and France played important roles in Brandt’s project insofar as both could accommodate his vision of a Greater Europe and also provided creative impulses. The attempt of the Labour government under Harold Wilson to bring Britain ‘closer to Europe’ was supported by Brandt, who in December 1961 noted that Social Democrats “always were of the opinion that one cannot imagine the free Europe without England” (in Brandt 1971: 72) and in the following years repeatedly advocated Britain joining the EC (Ibid., 73, 129; Brandt 1970: 21). For Brandt, British membership in the EC was a central element in building a Greater Europe. The connection to London remained strong even when Wilson was replaced by a conservative government led by Edward Heath, whom Brandt describes as someone with whom he confidently shared ‘European’ topics and a relationship “close to friendship” (Brandt 1976: 326). However, despite British willingness to consider a future ‘in Europe’, London was not in a position from where it could significantly engage with Bonn in building a Greater Europe because it lacked membership in the EC and was significantly outranked in NATO by the US.

While France remained a core partner in the process of building Germany-in-Greater-Europe, for Brandt cooperation with Charles de Gaulle and since 1969 with Pompidou who, in Brandt’s view, was continuing Gaullist policies was not easy. It required navigating between the French desire to build a Europe independent from the US and one in which ‘Germany’ was not getting too strong (Hoffmann 1964, Bozo 2001). De Gaulle’s determination to create a European ‘third force’ under French leadership and his boycott of institutions he considered not supportive of this aim affected both the

---

365 In a speech to the British parliament in March 1970, Brandt linked British participation in the project of “organising the peace” in Europe to the British democratic tradition and the memory of the second World War when Britain had “the power [Kraft] not to let the flame of freedom be extinguished when it was very dark on the continent”, as well as to British willingness for understanding for Germany’s “special problems and anxiety over Berlin” (in Brandt 1971: 186).
Western and Eastern dimensions of Brandt’s project of building a ‘Greater Europe’. On one side, de Gaulle’s ‘empty chair’ in the EEC (Juli 1965 to February 1966), withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military structure in 1966 and the veto of British EEC membership in May 1967 were seen as unhelpful to strengthening Western Europe. On the other side, de Gaulle was one of the early protagonists of ‘détente’ and had loosely advocated the creation of a European security system ‘from the Atlantic to the Ural’ in the early 1960s. His increasing contact with Moscow and the three-step model from ‘détente’ via ‘entente’ to ‘cooperation’ (Vahl 1979: 231) was an important factor in opening space for Kiesinger and Brandt to turn away from Adenauer’s path (Bange 2006).

The key partner remained the US, however. Already in May 1949 Brandt noted that the reconstruction of Europe was largely depended on American support, speaking favourably of the Truman administration and noticing its commitment to democracy, freedom, and internationalism (Brandt 1971: 45). While in these early years one finds the occasional calls from Brandt for European ‘independence’, by the time he held the position of mayor of Berlin, Brandt was convinced of the importance of close partnership with the US. In March 1963, in a debate over the Franco-German Elysee Treaty, he warned Adenauer not to strengthen the bonds with Paris at the expense of the relationship with Washington. According to Brandt, “this friendship is vital [lebenswichtig]….not only…because America is the leading power of the West, but it is a friendship founded in the dark days of the Berlin blockade…no document can make changes to this friendship, this foundational structure of the free West” (in Brandt 1971: 75). He repeated this stance in a television address on President Kennedy’s death in November 1963 where Brandt criticises Adenauer’s conception of European order, specifically his focus on a ‘small Europe’.

John F. Kennedy played a crucial role in Brandt’s conception of the US as a partner which endured long after the US President’s death. Although there were also signs of dissonance, discussed below, it is suggested here that it was ‘Kennedy America’ which Brandt was looking for as a partner and hoped to build Germany’s future with. In addition to formally supporting German unity, this ‘Kennedy America’ was composed of two elements which profoundly influenced Brandt’s vision of Germany-in-Europe.366

366 In his memoirs Brandt devotes an entire chapter to Kennedy, the only person for whom he does so (Brandt, 1976: 71-100). On this relationship and its impact on respective thinking about détente, see Hofmann (2006).
The first element was Kennedy’s conception of the relationship between the US and Europe as a “creative partnership of equals” (Winand 1996: 139). Invoking the image of ‘two pillars’ carrying the Western project Brandt repeatedly referred to Kennedy’s speech from 4 July 1962 which renewed the view that a united Europe embodying the spirit “which gave birth to the American Constitution” was “a partner with whom we can deal on a basis of full equality in all the great and burdensome tasks of building and defending a community of free nations”.\textsuperscript{367} Although Kennedy never imagined US giving up its leadership position, his ‘two pillars’ metaphor represented the relationship between the US and Europe as one of equals pursuing a common project or, more precisely, carrying a shared roof of ‘freedom’, ‘unity’ and ‘peace’. After Kennedy’s death Brandt declared it a core task to make this ‘active partnership’ a reality “not merely as a partnership of defense but going far beyond that...as a partnership of two world powers and crystallisation point of free people” (in Brandt 1971: 110; Brandt in his 1962 Harvard speech, here p. 87). In an interview in February 1967 Brandt noted that “the politically organised Europe we aim at understands itself as a partner of the United States and...as a factor in the stabilisation of peace”, adding that this was the vision of Kennedy and the “declared aim” of Johnson (in Brandt 1970: 31).\textsuperscript{368}

The second element was Kennedy’s forward-looking optimism and courage to induce change (Brandt 1976: 100). Brandt saw not only a president who had vowed in his inauguration speech that “we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty”. He also saw someone his own age, a representative of a new generation with whom he shared the ability to think beyond tradition and who inspired to open up ‘new horizons’ (Brandt 1976: 71). In an almost romantic flourish, Brandt notes Kennedy’s youth, energy, compassion, and courage to tackle difficult projects and heal divisions (Ibid., 99f). Brandt’s perception of Kennedy as a representative of a courageous America promising a better future was echoed in Kennedy’s simultaneous toning down of the anti-communist position and advocacy an ‘activist’ or ‘transformative’ approach towards ‘the East’.\textsuperscript{369} After the Cuban missile crisis Kennedy chose a course of peaceful engagement in which efforts to reduce tensions with Moscow through negotiations on arms control were coupled with establishing trade relations with East European states intended to

\textsuperscript{367} See Kennedy (1962). For the context, see Winand (1993: Ch. 7).
\textsuperscript{368} Yet he also knew that to be considered equal, the US expected Europeans to work closer together. In a speech in Brussels in 1964, Brandt reminds his European socialist colleagues that “we are valued in Washington only as much as we in Europe and out of Europe can achieve together and contribute” to the common project (in Brandt 1971: 130).
\textsuperscript{369} On the military dimension of ‘flexible response’, see Gaddis (2005: 212f).
progressively detach them from the Soviet Union by creating new aspirations (Winand 1996: 364). This pursuit of an active strategy of gradual transformation stimulated Brandt’s thinking, as evident in his speeches at Harvard (1962) and Tutzing (1963) and influenced his conception of Ostpolitik (also Ash 1993: 258).

While Arne Hofmann (2006: 437) finds that the “general conceptual agreement between Brandt and Kennedy was extraordinary”, he also shows that within this dynamic there were important differences. This concerned, in particular, Kennedy’s view on the necessity of recognising the ‘status quo’, which stood in tension with his transformative outlook and required some adjustment on Brandt’s side (Hofmann 2006: 440). Because this tension is indicative of the dissonance Brandt experienced with later administrations, the episode at which it came to the forefront, namely the building of the Berlin Wall in August 1961, must be looked at in more detail.

The ‘Berlin Complex’

Even after the termination of the occupation statute, the Western powers continued to hold some formal and informal authority in the FRG, in particular when it came to the use of the Bundeswehr. Yet it was the unresolved status of Berlin where the anxiety-producing ‘Potsdam complex’ was most strongly felt. The city remained formally divided into four zones with the Occupation Statute still in force and, hence, was the place where the four powers continued to hold ‘supreme authority’. For Brandt, who as noted earlier lived in the city for two decades after the war, including as mayor, the Potsdam complex became the ‘Berlin complex’, the concern that negotiations between Washington and Moscow affecting European order were bypassing Bonn and that the two sides would come to an agreement detrimental to the vision of having Germany unified in a Greater Europe. Brandt experienced the utter powerlessness of the FRG vis-à-vis the occupying powers and, in particular, the potential dissonance between his vision and the one held in Washington in August 1961 when he witnessed the building of the Berlin Wall.370 Brandt begins his memoirs with an account of these days and was deeply affected by the event. Berlin was a highly symbolic place of historical significance and, in Brandt’s view, was the likely capital of a unified Germany. Most importantly it was the place where hope of overcoming the division was still alive. The unexpected building of the wall and its death-strip reversed that vision and turned Berlin into the starkest symbol of the divide. Bahr remarked the ‘loss’ of the Eastern zone felt like the amputation of a leg (Bahr 1996: 133ff.). Brandt recalled the feeling was that

370 Bahr recalls this dissonance became visible already in the reactions of the Western Allies to the June 1957 uprising (Bahr 1996: 81).
“someone had lifted the curtain to show us an empty stage...we have been stripped of our illusions...which clung to something that had ceased to exist” (Brandt 1976: 17).

Central to Brandt’s disillusionment was the hesitant American reaction to the event. Brandt had placed high expectations in earlier statements from US officials insisting on the Allied ‘rights’ in Berlin, which to him meant that the city was part of the Western project (Brandt 1976: 18). Moreover, as noted above Brandt thought highly of Kennedy who had linked the idea of German unity with Berlin and had declared it a valuable place in the West. Yet for three days after the wall had gone up there was no substantial reaction coming out of Washington, and then only after a strongly worded letter from Brandt voicing his frustration and in which he noted that there was the “danger of a crisis of trust [Vertrauenskrise]” (Brandt 1976: 29). Although Kennedy in his response expressed sympathy, also sending Vice President Johnson for a visit and deploying some additional American troops in the city, he made clear that the wall only manifested what was ‘reality’. Changing the status quo would require a war which, Kennedy noted, was in no-ones’ interest (Bahr 1996: 136). From Kennedy’s perspective (as well as Adenauer) the building of the wall was an unfortunate part of the logic of the division of Europe.

Brandt did not accept this assessment of the inevitability of the division. For him the building of the wall was a “human tragedy” deserving a reaction of anger (Brandt, 1976: 16f), and he began to have doubts over the American commitment to the project of German/European unity: “If Berlin as the capital in waiting is put into question, what would then be the perspectives for Germany as a whole?” (Ibid., 25). Recognising that even an energetic visionary like Kennedy was willing to accept the status quo, Brandt adjusted his horizon of expectations vis-à-vis the Western project (see also Merseburger, 2002: 396ff; Ash 1993: 58ff). In a Bundestag speech from December 1961 entitled ‘sober assessment on the state of the nation’, Brandt emphasizes that the FRG must bring its own contribution towards ‘peace’, even noting that the FRG must put forward a vision of peace which “will relieve our friends and win new friends” (1971: 68f). While for Brandt the US remained the most important partner with whom Germany’s future could be built, the Berlin wall episode had made it clear that new initiatives were necessary for re-shaping the path through which Germany-in-Europe was to unfold. Looking back, he noted this episode forced him to recognise “that traditional formulas of Western politics had proven ineffective and even estranged from reality [wirklichkeitsfremd]” (Brandt, 1976: 17).
As Hofmann (2006: 440ff.) shows, Brandt adapted to Kennedy’s emphasis on recognizing the ‘status quo’ and combined it with his transformative outlook. The resulting dialectic was reflected in his speeches at Harvard (1962) and in Tützing (1963) and became the credo of Ostpolitik: ‘recognising the status quo in order to change it’. By attributing this dialectic to Kennedy, Brandt not only skilfully reconciled the tension between (i) accepting the status quo, including the GDR, which meant the death of the Hallstein doctrine and was widely seen as undermining the idea that there was only one authentic vision for Germany-in-Europe, and (ii) maintaining the latter. It kept the impression that the US and Germany were still investing in the same project, thereby sustaining the friendship. This is testified in Brandt’s insistence later on that Kennedy had not undermined but continued to support his vision, which an in large parts be attributed to Kennedy’s willingness to reassure Germans of commitment to a ‘free Berlin’ through his famous speech in June 1963, at the 15th anniversary of the air lift, declaring that he also was a ‘Berliner’.

Johnson: The Fading of ‘Kennedy America’

Johnson’s link to Kennedy was sufficient to at least maintain the impression that Kennedy-America was still ‘there’ and Kennedy’s approach of gradual engagement carried over into Johnson’s suggestion to build bridges in Europe (Froman, 1991: 26; Bange, 2008: 107). In a speech from October 1966 ‘Making Europe Whole: An Unfinished Task’, Johnson not only reiterated Kennedy’s image of the two pillars but also noted that the US expected Europe “to move more confidently in peaceful initiatives toward the East” and to “provide a framework within which a unified Germany could be a full partner without arising ancient fears” (in Winand 1996: 364). Johnson remained supportive of integration processes taking place in the EC and continued to see ‘Europe’ as the key political partner for building the Western world. When leaving office, he reportedly was disappointed that Western Europe had not come closer to unity as he considered it “essential to have an effective partner if the US role in the world is to be stabilized in the long term” (in Lundestad, 1993: 82).

371 On the Hallstein doctrine (the politics of non-recognition of the GDR), see Gray, 2003.
372 Kennedy skilfully reconciled the American commitment to the shared narrative when he declared “All free man, wherever they may live, are citizens of Berlin and, therefore, as a free man, I take pride in the words, Ich bin ein Berliner”. Brandt notes the enthusiastic reception of Kennedy’s visit and describes the speech as a highly emotional moment in which the US president provided the perspective of a “just peace” (72f). Looking back, Brandt defended the late Kennedy against the claim that he had tried to seek agreement with the SU ‘at the cost of Germany’ (in Brandt 1971: 109). On the importance of ‘Berlin’ in the US narrative, see Risse-Kappen (1995).
However, the notion of the EC as a ‘third force’ had become less attractive in Washington since de Gaulle gave this term a new meaning. Observing EC institutional reform and the establishment of the Commission and the Council of Ministers, a memorandum from the State Department’s European bureau to Dean Rusk from February 1965 recommended continued support further integration along a ‘federalist’ design, but also noted that EC members must not create a “small Europe” or ignore “the crucial collateral policy of Atlantic partnership” (in Lundestad, 1998: 78). In response to de Gaulle’s attempt to weaken the Atlantic framework and reduce US influence on building European order good relations with Bonn only gained in importance (also Winand 1996, Ch. 9.). To ensure that the EC was not ‘closing off’ Western Europe from the US, the Johnson administration began to invest in the ‘Atlantic’ approach by confirming its commitment to NATO and emphasizing it as the primary forum for consultation. Johnson’s strategy was to “bind the Atlantic nations closer together [and] support, as best as we can, the long term movement towards unity in Western Europe” (in Lundestad, 1998: 80f).

Johnson’s support for ‘European unity’ mainly focused on Western Europe rather than Greater Europe. Enlargement in Washington meant British EC membership and not expanding European order towards the East. If the division of Europe/Germany was a result of ‘tensions’ between the superpowers, these tensions needed to be reduced before divisions could be overcome. Maintaining a peaceful Europe thus meant keeping Western Europe close to the US and improving relations with Moscow, rather than actively pursuing a transformation of European order. While the Johnson administration maintained that overcoming the division of Europe was desirable and that it was committed to the idea of German unification, “particularly as a means of strengthening ties” to the FRG, “its immediacy disappeared” (Froman, 1991: 33). Oliver Bange’s (2006) finding that there is little to no evidence for any substantial ‘bridge building’ projects under Johnson is exemplified by George Ball’s testimony to the Senate in June 1966 to explain what was meant by ‘bridge building’. Ball basically repeated Adenauer’s mantra by noting that the primary focus was on strengthening Western Europe which would then function “as a very powerful magnet” to Eastern Europe and that, specifically, German unification would be achieved by integrating the FRG in a system of Western unity whose magnetic forces would be the greater the closer it is connected to the US (Winand, 1996: 364). For the medium term, a policy of strength meant strengthening the status quo (Thomas 1997).
NATO’s ‘Harmel report’ and the Ambiguity of Detente

The differences emerging between German and American ideas of ordering Europe (transformation versus status quo) were managed until 1969 by Kiesinger moderating Brandt’s views and Johnson embodying the image of Kennedy-America. They also were tamed by an important adjustment to the Atlantic Alliance as the institutional frame through which to order the ‘shared’ Western space with the help of a new strategic document.

Bonn was eager to legitimize its move towards Ostpolitik through NATO, and in a speech to the WEU assembly in January 1967, Brandt described NATO as “a living organism which adapts to changing demands (Anforderungen)” (in Brandt, 1970: 16). Support came from NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio who in 1966 noted that the Alliance was losing its shared sense of a mission and its function as a center for consultation. In addition to the French exit from military integration and Washington’s focus on Vietnam, Brosio criticized that the ‘detente’ policies pursued in Western capitals were conducted without coordination, let alone consultation (Bagnato, 2006: 174-177). Upon the initiative of Belgian foreign minister Pierre Harmel a working group was put in place with the task to come up with a document which would ensure NATO’s viability as a forum for pursuing a common project. The resulting document from December 1967 was entitled “The Future Tasks of the Alliance” and informally called the Harmel Report.373

From Bonn’s perspective the Report was important in manifesting that “the ultimate political purpose of the Alliance is to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe” and that to this end “the possibility of a crisis cannot be excluded as long as the central political issues in Europe, first and foremost the German question, remain unsolved.” It then combines two views on how this “uncertainty” should be dealt with, namely (i) through the maintenance of “a suitable military capability to assure the balance of forces” to create “a climate of stability” in which (ii) the Alliance can “pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved”. As such, the report states that “military security and a policy of détente are not contradictory but complementary”. Furthermore, the report recognizes that the German question is an open one and declares

“no final and stable settlement in Europe is possible without a solution of the German question which lies at the heart of present tensions in

Europe. Any such settlement must end the unnatural barriers between Eastern and Western Europe, which are most clearly and cruelly manifested in the division of Germany”

It goes on stating that, consequently, the Allies would examine “suitable policies designed to achieve a just and stable order in Europe, to overcome the division of Germany and to foster European security”. While stating that “the participation of the USSR and the USA will be necessary to achieve a settlement of the political problems in Europe” the report reiterates that NATO was the primary forum for dealing with European order, noting “the way to peace and stability in Europe rests in particular on the use of the Alliance constructively in the interest of détente”. Here the report also describes NATO as “an effective forum and clearing house for the exchange of information and views” and recognises that “to this end the practice of frank and timely consultations needs to be deepened and improved”, in particular when discussing “the problem of German reunification and its relationship to a European settlement”.

The achievement of the Harmel Report was the prominent place it attributed to this ambiguous term: détente. To be sure, this did not ease the frustration of Brosio, for whom détente remained a “political mirage”, no more than “a word, a smoke” (in Bagnato, 2006: 180). Yet ambiguity was intrinsic to the term since it had entered the political discourse of the West in the early 1960s, some described it as a “mood of spirit” (Seabury, 1973: 62). On the most general level, détente meant a relaxation of tensions and captured the spirit of cooperation for ‘peace’. It stood for all kinds of policies intended to reduce tensions between ‘East’ and ‘West’, that is, any motion “from the pole of war to the pole of peace” (Köhler, 1981: 41) and as leading “to a more normal situation” meaning ‘more peaceful’ (Maresca 1984: 3). By inserting a commitment to ‘détente’ into NATO’s task catalogue the Harmel Report provided the framework into which various national détente policies could be integrated (Haferndorn 1985: 119; Thomas 1997: 88-101). It allowed policymakers in Bonn and in Washington to understand détente as leading to a ‘more peaceful Europe’ and to agree that it was a vision worth investing in.

Yet there was the question what a ‘peaceful Europe’ looked like. For Bonn the value of the Harmel Report was its commitment to overcoming German division/the ‘unnatural’

374 One scholar tracing the development of the idea of ‘détente’ in US administrations from the 1950s onwards notes it was “among the most contentious terms in diplomatic discourse” (Froman, 1991: 1). Indeed, it was not always clear whether détente was replacing or refining containment. On the difficulty of defining détente, see also Frei (1981); Hanhimäki (2000).
barriers in Europe, thus allowing Brandt to interpret the 'European settlement' as a Greater European Order and 'détente' as accommodating a transformative Ostpolitik. Among German policymakers, this made the Harmel Report the central reference point for NATO's purpose for decades to come, indeed as Ash points out it was considered "the bible of East-West relations" (Ash 1993: 41). However, in Washington a peaceful European order meant primarily reducing the possibility of conflict and reaching a mutually agreeable level of 'coexistence' with the Soviet Union rather than transforming the European space. In the words of one US official the report was "to fill in a mental picture of the Atlantic system we wish to build", which basically meant to solidify the cohesion of the Western space and to complement a 'peace through strength' with talks with Moscow about arms control (Thomas 1997: 89f., emphasis added), displayed in the Harmel Reports' emphasis on stability/stable relationships rather than change.

**Pushing the Limits of NATO**

While the vague meaning of 'détente' provided sufficient manoeuvring space for German and American policymakers to continue speaking of a shared commitment to a common 'Western' project pursued through NATO, both sides saw limits of the institution concerning its ability to embed respective narratives of 'world building'.

In Bonn, Egon Bahr most clearly identified the limits of the Harmel Report for the German narrative. He noted that despite its endorsement of détente the emphasis on stability/stable relationships cemented the division of Europe into two blocs and displayed the limits of NATO as that institution for building Germany in a Greater Europe (Bahr 1996: 228). As a consequence, Bahr advocated an alternative institution to NATO. In June 1968 his policy planning staff produced an important paper entitled "Conception of European Security" which laid out three visions of a European peace order achieved through (i) significant reduction of tensions between the two pacts through arms reductions, (ii) connecting the two pacts through gradual institutionalisation of a common security conference, and (iii) replacing the two pacts through a European security system supported by both superpowers without having them as members. The paper noted that the first option was the most likely and would at least keep the German question open and the second would be desirable for Germany's neighbours but would offer little perspective for overcoming the division. The third option would open up the possibility to fundamentally reorder Europe and "create a

---

376 Tellingly, the three security systems were discussed in purely political terms, with the report noting that it had "abstained from the presentation of military aspects" (in Hacke, 2003: 155).
political basis for the reunification of Germany and a European peace order” and be the
best scenario from a German perspective (Bahr 1996: 227f.). Although he conceded it
was also the least likely to happen, this third version was the one Bahr recommended.
While he knew that the idea of building Greater Europe through an institution from
which the US was excluded was not acceptable for either Brandt or Kiesinger, the paper
was effective in making clear the need to go beyond the Atlantic Alliance, a view shared
by Brandt (Hacke 2003: 154).

Bahr’s paper not only coincided with a 1967 French study laying out de Gaulle’s
tripartite ‘détente-entente-cooperation’ idea (Bahr, 1996: 228; Vahl, 1979: 230f.), and
his third version resonated with the idea of a European Security Conference proposed by
the Warsaw Pact. A 1954 proposal from Moscow attempting to reduce US control over
the FRG and prevent the latter’s entry into NATO had been taken up by the Polish
foreign minister Adam Rapacki in October 1957 and modified into a proposal to create a
nuclear-free zone in Central Europe. Repeated by diplomats and scholars calling for
some sort of pan-European security system, by 1966 the idea of a European conference
had become “a recurring theme” in statements coming from the Warsaw Pact (Maresca
1984: 5). As of yet, neither Washington nor Bonn had responded to these proposals
because they implied participation of the GDR and only observer status for the US, and
because they made the inviolability of existing borders a precondition for talks. NATO
members only confirmed their general commitment to détente in the ‘signal’ of
Rejikjavik from June 1968 in which they agreed to discuss mutual and balanced force
reductions (MBFR).

In Washington, the Harmel Report was interpreted not only as a document of détente
which confirmed US leadership in ordering (stabilizing) Western Europe, but also as
approving the spatial extension of the Western project beyond Europe. By noting that
“the North Atlantic Treaty Area cannot be treated isolated from the rest of the world”,
that “crises and conflicts arising outside the area may impair its security” the report
indirectly sanctioned US military engagement in Vietnam. This tacit widening of the
scope to the ‘global’ hinted at later attempts of using the institution for ‘out of area’
missions, discussed in the next chapter. Moreover, in the view of Secretary of State
Dean Rusk it encouraged members to cooperate over security issues outside the treaty
area without requiring them “to go at the speed of the slowest ship” (in Sherwood 1990:
133f.). While the Vietnam engagement gradually expanded the American experienced
space, for the present purpose the German reception must be noted because the
difference to Adenauer’s reaction to the Korean War is telling.
Vietnam is not Korea: Brandt's Silence

Expanding the Western project through NATO beyond Europe did not meet enthusiasm in Bonn. Initially, the narrative coming out of Washington was reminiscent of ‘Korea’, justifying the engagement with the familiar formula of Vietnam being a test for Western steadfastness in support of freedom loving people. The engagement was to secure South Vietnamese independence and to demonstrate US determination to oppose the expansion of communist order, there or ‘elsewhere’ (Gaddis, 2005 (1982): 264). This narrative was adopted by Kiesinger at first; however, when the US stepped up its military involvement the German support did not go beyond offering a medical vessel in February 1967 (Schoellgen 1999: 76). In stark contrast to Adenauer’s leading voice two decades earlier in merging US engagement in Korea with ordering Europe, this time the German government joined other NATO allies resisting US attempts to make Vietnam “a genuine NATO issue” (Nuenlist and Locher: 13). As Elizabeth Sherwood notes on the subject of the war in Vietnam “NATO remained mute” (Sherwood, 1990: 133).

Brandt’s silence was an attempt of not fostering the dissonance in German-American world-building narratives. While the Chancellor privately noted that he did not see Berlin being defended in Vietnam, in public he only came up with vague formulations on the government’s position which were often dropped under the pressure of his foreign and defence ministers (Merseburger 2002: 562, 626). When in his 1973 governmental declaration he refused to criticize US bombing campaigns Brandt was heavily criticized within his party and in public. The SPD-internal newspaper asked “Why is Brandt silent?” and a list of 150 German academics and public intellectuals called on the chancellor not to become guilty in sharing the American failure in Vietnam (Merseburger 2002: 670). The Chancellor’s silence did not just stem from not wanting to openly criticize a friend in trouble; it expressed a fundamental ambiguity Vietnam brought into the German-American relationship: On the one hand, he saw Johnson as an extension of ‘Kennedy-America’ pursuing the ‘transformative’ agenda which also had inspired him and he acknowledged the Nixon administration’s difficulty of withdrawing from the conflict. He also did not want to be associated with the increasingly harsh anti-American undertone found in the critique voiced in Germany, going as far as associating US activities with those of the Third Reich (Mueller and Risse-Kappen 1987: 76-78). On the other hand, Brandt was unable to positively insert ‘America-in-Vietnam’ into the shared project of building the West. The forceful extension if the Western space into South-East Asia did not fit with the ‘peaceful change’ agenda of Ostpolitik; most obviously as American military activity was irreconcilable with the pacifist principle of
the German narrative. Indeed, the escalation appeared as a failure in US judgment, generating doubt about Washington's virtue and its contribution to the Western project.

Nixon/Kissinger: Reorienting America-in-the-World

When Richard Nixon took over the White House in 1969, the Vietnam experience had begun to bring uncertainty into the American narrative. This uncertainty arose over the question what the US was doing in Vietnam, which had gradually evolved into a costly military campaign which did not succeed and had become questionable on moral grounds at home and abroad. In addition, with Western Europeans getting stronger economically and the Soviet Union apparently reaching 'strategic parity', there was a general feeling of American power in decline. To Nixon the direction of US foreign policy was in dire need for reorientation, or what Kissinger in 1968 called "philosophical deepening" (in Gaddis, 2005: 275). This deepening, that is, the Nixon administration's conception of America-in-the-world and the place of Germany/Europe took in it, was significantly shaped by National Security Advisor, and after September 1973 Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger.377

In particular when it came to grand strategy and the US approach to 'détente' in Europe, Kissinger was the leading thinker and practitioner. His academic background made him well equipped to come up with a "conceptually coherent" (Gaddis) narrative of America's place in the world, which he did by resorting to 'realist' principles to conceive of the world as one of 'great powers' (Gaddis 2005: 272ff.). Specifically, he saw the US unfolding in a 'pentagonal' world populated by the United States, the Soviet Union, Western Europe, Japan and China. According to the model, relations among these entities were facilitated by a common interest for 'security' and pledge to non-intervention. Ideology was to play a reduced role in judging others, there was no 'communist block', and no need to change the internal order of others; that is, there was to be no transformative agenda. Vietnam was to be reduced to "a small peninsula on a major continent" (in Gaddis, 2005: 275) without greater value for America. What Nixon liked to called a 'structure of peace' was achievable in this world through balancing coalitions and deals struck among the great powers. According to Gaddis, Nixon took his conception of the condition of peace from Kissinger's book 'A world restored' when noting in a *Time* interview in 1972, "the only time in history of the world that we have

---

377 On Kissinger’s influence, see Kohl (1995); Hanimaki (2004); Dallek (2007). Oddly, the latter two contain very little on Kissinger’s view of Europe and the tensions with Germany, in particular.
had any extended period of peace...is when there has been a balance of power" (in Gaddis 2005: 278).

Although there was a need to bring more certainty into America's unfolding, the theoretical lens applied here suggests that Kissinger's ability to 'rethink' America-in-the-world, that is, his ability to change the American narrative, was limited. As noted earlier, the phenomenological perspective holds that one cannot withdraw from a world once disclosed and cannot strip it of values/meaning. Thus, while Kissinger's frame (as presented by Gaddis) was useful for providing the Nixon administration with a strategy to withdraw militarily from Vietnam, it did not change the fact that 'Vietnam' became a significant experience in the memory space of the American biography.

Most important, while Kissinger's 'realist' model suggests a world without friendship, the lens applied here points attention to the fact that this was not the case. For the Nixon administration the building of a meaningful Western space containing 'Europe' and the seeking of intimate bonds with certain European counterparts remained central to the agenda of manifesting 'America-in-the-world'. As Gaddis notes, while according to Kissinger relations were to be "purged of (their) sentimental and emotional components" and instead build upon "those common interests" of survival and security" he also added "a congenial international environment" to the list (Gaddis, 2005: 277). The meaning of 'congenial' is open to interpretation, yet that Nixon was very much looking for friends is noted by Kissinger himself when he recalls that the President was eager to revitalise the special relationship with Britain (under Heath): "[Nixon] wanted nothing so much as an intimate collaboration of a kind he would grant to no other foreign leader" and especially wanted Britain to be this "kindred spirit" whom he would "not need constantly to buttress, and from whom we might learn a great deal" (Kissinger, 1979: 932f.). This unsuccessful attempt to strengthen bonds with Britain can be explained with the administration's discomfort with Brandt's course. Before outlining the dissonance, it must be shown that 'Europe' remained a valued space in Kissinger/Nixon's vision of the world.

**Keeping 'Europe' Close**

For Kissinger the US relationship with 'Europe' was that of an 'uneasy alliance'. He recalls that Washington looked back in nostalgia to US-'European' cooperation during the time of Marshall Plan, which was seen as a time of harmonious relations where

---

378 When London turned down the offer for a special relationship Nixon was greatly disappointed according to Kissinger (1979: 933).
American moral leadership had evoked "spontaneous and authentic consensus" from Europeans (Kissinger: 1979: 380). This nostalgia was an indicator that Washington was not quite happy with the 'Europe' it was dealing with now. Kissinger captured this basic discontent when noting "Europe was proceeding toward political unity – if not always along the route we favored" (Ibid., 381). The kind of route he favoured, of course, was one in which 'Europe' was supportive of the multipolar 'structure of peace' he envisioned. Yet as 'Europe' was a valued space the ordering of which was part of the Western project, Kissinger's attempt to reduce it to a 'pole' was beset by ambiguity.

To begin with, the Nixon administration decided to take a "low profile" on the project of European unity and wanted to stay out of "intra-European quarrels", pretending to pursue an approach based on concern for "what the Europeans want for themselves" (Kissinger, 1979: 390). While this gave the impression that Washington had lost interest in the European project, this was not the case. Rather than being indifferent about the direction 'Europe' was taking, Kissinger preferred that to maintain a European order it could understand. The tension arising out of not wanting to engage questions of European integration but at the same time wanting 'Western Europe' to remain a familiar space was visible in two ways.

First, while in Kissinger's pentagonal world Western Europe was a 'unit', he did not really want it to be one. Indeed, as Lundestad (1998, Ch. 8) points out, the Nixon administration shut the door to the 'Europeanists' and was the first administration which did not fully support the vision of European unity. When testifying to the Senate in 1966, Kissinger noted that he would prefer a confederal Europe (i.e. the way it currently was) over a federal one because the former would permit the US to maintain its influence "at many centers" while a more united Europe might become more 'Gaullist', that is, take an anti-American stance. With his suggestion that Anti-Americanism might become the "one cohesive bond" among Europeans, Kissinger departed from the view that a more united Europe would remain a natural partner of the US (Kissinger 1979: 390).

Second, while Kissinger did not want to create an 'organic' bond to 'Europe', he wanted it to stay close to the US. In 1966 Kissinger expressed his discomfort with the idea of forming some sort of Atlantic community and noted that his "instinct" was that Europe and the US would work together for "common interests" without being "organically tied together" (in Winand 1996: 363). In a meeting with the British prime minister, Nixon noted that he would like to see Britain in a "strong" Europe which was independent but
"going parallel with the United States" (in Kissinger 1979: 418). That the US conception of an ‘independent’ Europe was ambivalent is also exemplified by a report to Congress from February 1970 in which the Nixon administration advocated its ‘strategy for peace’ and noted that the US could not detach itself from Europe just like it could not detach itself from Alaska. In other words, ‘Western Europe’ was expected to remain an intimate part of the Western space.

To keep it there, the Nixon administration further endorsed the building of ‘Europe’ through NATO. It reacted positively to a proposal by Britain’s Minister of Defense, Denis Healy, from March 1969 for creating a ‘European’ group within NATO. Whereas some were concerned that such a European caucus might divide the Atlantic Alliance, Kissinger was “generally favourable” of European attempts “to create a more coherent voice within NATO” because, in his view, “there was no conceivable contingency in which Europe would be better off without American support” (Kissinger 1979: 385, emphasis added). The conception that NATO allies were engaged in a common project also was visible in the ‘burden sharing’ debates. These were not merely about the US trying to get Europeans to invest more in military capabilities in the current of the new NATO strategy of ‘flexible response’ and pressure by Congress to cut defense expenditures. Like his predecessors, Nixon used this as a lever to get Western Europeans to help the US with its balance of payments and other economic problems (Lundestad 1998: 102f; Duke, 1993). At bottom the White House never intended to withdraw US troops from Europe because their presence provided an effective lever to exert influence over any order-building enterprise (Kissinger 1979: 393ff.).

Hence, Kissinger in a memo to Nixon from March 1970 argued that policy towards Europe should adhere to three principles: (i) to remain ‘sober’ when dealing with the Soviet Union so Europeans would not “grow to fearful of a US-Soviet deal”, (ii) to be ‘meticulous’ in consultation with NATO allies so they could “be sure that their vital interests would be protected”, and (iii) to avoid unilateral decisions of withdrawing forces from Europe to avoid any “tendencies of submission to the Soviet Union” (Kissinger 1979: 382). These points show that Kissinger was not only well aware of the Bonn’s ‘Potsdam complex’, that is, of being ‘left out’ in vital decisions about Europe’s

---

379 In the US this strategic shift was neither new, nor was it clear what exactly ‘flexible response’ meant militarily (Kissinger 1979: 393, 398).
380 This was highlighted in the debate around the Mansfield amendment from May 1971, which (once again) demanded to cut US forces in Europe by half. The White House defeated the proposal by gathering the support of old pro-European luminaries such as Acheson, McCloy, and Ball. Nixon also asked Brandt to issue a statement warning that US withdrawal would leave the impression that “the United States is on its way out of Europe” (Kissinger 1979: 938ff.).
future (Kissinger 1979: 400ff.). They also hint at the vitality of the ‘Rapallo complex’ emerging in the dissonance with the Brandt government.

**Discomfort with ‘Brandt Germany’**

The Nixon administration continued to see Germany as playing a central role in the making of European order. Kissinger noted (and presumably not only with the hindsight of 25 years): “There were only three powers capable of disrupting the postwar status quo in Europe – the two superpowers and Germany” (Kissinger, 1994: 735f.). He was also aware of Bonn’s “unfulfilled national aims”, specifically that unification would always be an overarching aim that would be difficult to achieve in a divided Europe (Kissinger 1979: 96ff.). Yet while German unification may have been desirable in principle, in Kissinger’s world Germany-in-Europe was to remain a stable space. As he put it diplomatically, the Western powers were “willing to wait; they were not prepared to run significant risks on behalf of reunification” (Kissinger 1979: 411).

Yet, as noted earlier, ‘waiting’ was not the vision energizing Ostpolitik and the dissonance generated anxiety in Washington. On his first visit to Western Europe after becoming President in 1969, Nixon expressed scepticism about the popularity of détente he encountered, concerned that the European commitment for peace was “played on” cleverly by Moscow. To keep Europeans from slipping away, he concluded that “we could best hold the Alliance together by accepting the principle of détente but establishing clear criteria to determine its course” (Kissinger 1979: 403). Behind this assessment lurked the spectre of Rapallo and the discomfort with Brandt’s Ostpolitik.

Kissinger’s assessment was that Ostpolitik was “not without dangers”. The State Department in October 1969 suggested that under the new Brandt government “an active all-German and Eastern policy will have the first priority” but also that Bonn “could not pursue simultaneously active policies towards East Germany and integration of the Federal Republic into Western Europe” (Kissinger 1979: 408). The implication was that Bonn’s Ostpolitik was conducted at the expense of ‘Western European’ integration. Although Kissinger did not assume that Brandt wanted to ‘defect’ from the West, he saw this as a possible unintended consequence of Ostpolitik. In a memo to Nixon he noted “there can be no doubt about their [the Brandt government’s] basic Western orientation. But their problem is to control a process which...may shake Germany’s domestic

---

381 How Kissinger felt about the country of his birth and how his personal experiences of the Third Reich impacted his thinking about Germany-in-Europe is an important question. Unfortunately, I am not aware of a study addressing it in a substantial way.
stability and unhinge its international position" (Ibid., 408f.). Kissinger’s scepticism echoed Adenauer’s reasoning in suggesting that Brandt’s course could turn into “a new form of classic German nationalism” and that “from Bismarck to Rapallo it was the essence of Germany’s nationalist foreign policy to manoeuvre freely between East and West”. Only through NATO and the European Community the FRG had become grounded firmly in the West (Kissinger 1979: 409).

Uncertainty over whether the unfolding ‘Germany’ would remain in ‘the West’ concerned the Nixon administration,382 and its discomfort with Brandt-Germany was reflected in how the personalities, Brandt and Bahr, were evaluated. From Kissinger’s memoirs it is clear that among Western European leaders, Brandt was liked the least by Nixon. While the president admired de Gaulle and hoped to establish a special relationship with Heath, neither he nor Kissinger spoke favourably of the Chancellor. In private, Nixon expressed outright dislike of the ‘socialist’ and worse (see Merseburger 2002: 626). Kissinger also had little sympathy for Bahr, his ‘back channel’ contact. After the latter’s first visit in Washington in 1968, Kissinger concluded that Bahr was not committed to the German-American friendship: “a man of the left...above all a German nationalist who wanted to exploit Germany’s central position to bargain with both sides”, who “believed that Germany could only realize its national destiny only by friendship with the East” and who “was obviously not as unquestionably dedicated to Western unity as the people we had known in the previous government; he was also free of any sentimental attachment to the United States” (Kissinger 1979: 410f).

These meetings were hence not characterized by an intimate connection and were not a creative source for world building. After their first meeting, Kissinger complained about “single-mindedness” of Brandt and Bahr “asking not for our advice but for our cooperation in a course to which its principal figures had long since been committed” (Kissinger 1979: 411f.). Instead of voicing this concern openly, Kissinger decided “to mute the latent incompatibility between Germany’s national aims and its Atlantic and European ties” and to channel Brandt’s policy “in a constructive direction” (Kissinger 1979: 410). A ‘constructive direction’ meant supporting Ostpolitik where it fit the US agenda of

382 Considering German public opinion’s desire for ‘equidistance’, the US had reasons for questioning the FRG’s ‘Western’ commitment. In a poll from May 1973 the majority (54%) thought Bonn should pursue a strategy of equal cooperation with Washington and Moscow, whereas 36% preferred closer cooperation with the former and 3% with the latter. See Clemens (1992: 43, 51). Kissinger’s concerns were not limited to Germany. He also feared a communist takeover in Italy: “These trends seemed obvious to me” (Kissinger 1979: 920f.).
stabilising Europe and where it offered a lever in negotiations with Moscow, and remaining passive, at best, where Bonn’s course risked undermining Kissinger’s world. The overall aim was not to allow Brandt to redefine the Western project, while at the same time not letting him become frustrated with the US and loosen ties. To keep Brandt close, Nixon took up his request for regular ‘consultations’ – Brandt recalls an “unprecedented” close contact between the Chancellery and the White House – and sought to make sure all major Ostpolitik initiatives went through NATO, without energizing them. Hence, when in a meeting with Nixon in December 1971 Brandt expressed his gratification for NATO’s support for Ostpolitik “Nixon frostily corrected him, saying the Alliance did not object to the policy” (Kissinger 1979: 966, emphasis in original).

Brandt: Discomfort with Nixon/Kissinger America

The Brandt government was aware that its ambitions to introduce fundamental changes into the design of Europe were not shared in Washington. Although the White House never openly expressed doubts about Ostpolitik or European unity towards him, Brandt noted the “ambivalence” and scepticism he encountered in meetings and registered unwillingness to engage in a constructive discussion about European order. Moreover, open critique to his course from the old US foreign policy establishment, in particular its ‘Europeanists’. Encouraged by an active CDU/CSU lobby trying to mobilise Washington against Ostpolitik, figures like Clay, Ball, McCloy and Acheson variably accusing Brandt of weakening the FRG’s commitment to NATO and to the EC (Brandt 1976: 386).

The Chancellor worked hard to counter this impression and dispel American doubts about his government’s commitment to the Western project, repeatedly assuring that his Ostpolitik was a German contribution to détente. On every possible occasion he emphasized to American audiences the importance of the FRG’s partnership with the US

---

383 Symbolic was the meeting in December 1971 where Nixon assured Brandt that despite the US focus on the Soviet Union and China “Europe is the most important, and the key to Europe is Germany (...) The future of Germany and its position in the Alliance always stands in the foreground of American considerations. Maintaining the strength of the Alliance...[is] the precondition for the efforts to détente” (in Brandt 1976: 397f).

384 In his memoirs, Brandt recalls a confusing conversation with Nixon over US support for his negotiations on the ‘Eastern Treaties’. He even prints an transcript extract to demonstrate his difficulties in understanding Nixon’s position when he said things like “the USA will respect [Bonn’s] decision with benign neutrality” (in Brandt 1976: 401).

385 To the American Council on Germany in New York he presented his policies as “the logical complement and extension” of what NATO allies were doing (Brandt 1976: 394f).
and assured that his government was not going ‘off course’. He buttressed this by arguing that in his understanding the German and American biographies remained intimately linked. In a dinner speech at the White House he stressed the German commitment to the values of liberty/freedom, democracy and self determination which “corresponds not only our experience but also determine our spiritual position in world politics” (Brandt 1976: 381). At the National Press Club in Washington in April 1970, Brandt praised the American support in rebuilding Germany after the war as a high moral accomplishment and the ‘rescue of Berlin’ in 1948/49 as unforgettable (ibid., 384f). Yet he also noted that overcoming the frozen European fronts and working towards peaceful coexistence in Europe would require leaving behind outdated theories and making an effort towards “a new synthesis of reality and ideals” (ibid., 385). In the same vein, in a speech in Yale in 1971 he called for the “willingness and ability for permanent reform” (ibid., 387).

In this aspect Brandt had great difficulties to see in the Nixon administration the desired partner for building a shared European order. To him “the role of the United States in the world...had undergone substantial [wesentlich] change since the time of Kennedy” (Brandt 1976: 379), with ‘wesentlich’ describing a change that cannot be captured in measurable quantities but points to a change in a state of authentic being. That Brandt was thinking in these terms becomes clear when noting that he took ‘Kennedy America’ as a point of comparison against which ‘Nixon America’ appeared as a power in decline with a conservative president who seemed insecure and never really seemed at ease (Ibid., 375). In particular when it came to discuss ‘Europe’ he encountered a US administration whose position ranged from being vague and indifferent to the confused and defensive.

Brandt recognized the importance of Kissinger in shaping the American conception of the world and regarded the basic principles of this outlook as problematic. For the Chancellor, the world at the end of the 20th century could “never match the ‘concert of the powers’, which had determined politics and diplomacy of the 19th century” (Brandt 1976: 376f). He sensed that with this frame in place Kissinger’s willingness to engage the European project did not go far. According to Hanrieder, the Chancellor was “fully aware” that Washington pursued an “essentially conservative” European policy (Hanrieder, 1989: 98). Herbert Blankenhorn, the FRG’s ambassador in London, assessed

---

386 This also motivated Brandt’s strategy to remain silent over the issue of Vietnam noted earlier.
Thus, when it came to the issue of European order, Brandt complained that Kissinger did not show sufficient understanding and was unwilling, even unable to be a creative partner. In his memoirs he recalls that “the word Europe...also hints at the shadows which occasionally touched my relations with Kissinger. I could not fight the impression that he did not want to fully acknowledge the reality of the slowly and laboriously growing European Community – as if it was particularly difficult for him to understand the changing Heimat of his parents and forefathers” (Brandt 1976: 377). He goes on describing his American colleague in rather unflattering terms when noting how Kissinger often reacted impatiently and that “perhaps...he [Kissinger] was overburdened not only physically but psychologically” (Ibid., 377). Brandt’s disappointment with the lack of fruitful interaction is also noted in his observation that Kissinger seemingly wanted to take East-West questions in his own hand and considered himself in a position from which he could see better: “He sometimes seemed to look (down) at the old continent with the contempt of the new Roman for the Hellenic small states” (Brandt 1976: 377ff).

**NATO or CSCE? Tensions Towards Helsinki**

Recognising that NATO was not the institutional frame through which ‘Germany’ could unfold into a Greater European Peace Order, the proposal for a European Security Conference (ESC) gained momentum in Bonn. The ‘Budapest Appeal’ from March 1969 renewed the proposal for a ESC and dropped the demand that NATO would have to be dissolved. The same month, Brandt made a positive remark about such a conference in the Bundestag, and in April he suggested to Nixon and Kissinger to engage the proposal to make further progress on the way to ‘peace’ by linking it to talks on force reductions (Brandt 1976: 248f.). NATO foreign ministers offered to look into how a useful process of negotiation could be initiated, insisting that US and Canadian participation would be necessary in a conference of this kind, which was accepted by the Warsaw Pact in June 1970. After some back and forth establishing the conditions under which the conference would take place, concerning in particular the demand by Brandt that the status of Berlin and the relationship between FRG and GDR had to be clarified prior to the conference, talks on what now was called a Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) were opened in Helsinki in July 1973. This was followed by working level negotiations in Geneva from September 1973 to July 1975 and concluded with a meeting of heads of states in Helsinki on 1 August 1975.

As John Maresca recalls, it was clear to participants that at core of the CSCE negotiations was the question of Germany in Europe: “although it was never mentioned publicly...all of the delegates at the Conference realised that the CSCE was, in fact, about Germany, and that it would bear importantly on the status of that divided nation in the future” (Maresca 1984: 81). In light of the dissonance of how to envision Germany-in-Europe, American and German approaches to the negotiations differed significantly.

For Brandt the idea of a pan-European security conference was not a ‘Soviet’ idea. Even though the first concrete proposal had come from Moscow, the idea of such a conference and the notion of ‘collective security’ it promised had circulated among Social Democrats since the 1950s. This allowed Brandt to adopt and substantiate the proposal with his own ideas of order, appropriating it for his project of a ‘Greater Europe’. Given Moscow’s eagerness to engage the conference, it also enabled the Brandt government to practice ‘linkage’ politics similar to those Adenauer had used towards NATO membership. As noted earlier, Brandt had accepted that negotiations about change required the quasi-recognition of the GDR, but the aim was to tie the latter to the former. The conference offered a lever for bilateral negotiations concerning the status of Berlin and of the FRG-GDR relationship, as otherwise participation of both FRG and GDR would de facto legitimise the latter as a state equal to the FRG (Brandt, 1976: 248; Tessmer 2004: 58). Yet the conference was far more than a lever. The ‘Eastern treaties’ and the Helsinki Final Act were interwoven, part of a two-step strategy. When Brandt noted in March 1973 that the time had come where the bilateral elements of Ostpolitik were to be replaced by multilateral ones (in Roloff 1995: 83), he saw CSCE as the necessary forum through which the development of a Greater European order could be

---

387 In May 1970 a NATO communique laid out (Bonn’s) precondition that the bilateral negotiations between the FRG and the Soviet Union, Poland and the GDR would have to be completed beforehand. After the Germany-Soviet treaty was signed in August 1970 and the Germany-Poland treaty in December that year, Bonn insisted on a four power agreement on Berlin before starting preparatory talks for a ‘European’ conference. Moscow, in turn, asked for the bilateral treaties to be ratified in the Bundestag before singing the Berlin agreement. When the FRG and the GDR agreed on a ‘basic treaty’ establishing mutual recognition in December 1972, the way to CSCE was opened.

388 While many saw the Helsinki document as a de facto peace treaty thirty years after the end of the Second World War, Germany sought to prevent this, which is why it was called ‘Final Act’.

389 On the Brandt government’s linkage policy and the use of back channels, see Geyer (2004).

390 For the link between CSCE and Deutschlandpolitik, see Spohr-Readman (2006).
pursued and in which a change of the narrative of Germany-in-Europe could be embedded. Domestically, this move produced a heated debate over its impact on the Western project. Brandt and Scheel were accused by the CDU/CSU of abandoning the Hallstein Doctrine/recognising the GDR and of weakening the FRG’s ties with the West, indeed of pursuing a course of ‘changing camps’. The government countered that Ostpolitik was the German contribution to the Western détente effort operating firmly within the frame formulated in the Harmel Report and intended to strengthening the West (Knapp 1974: 169f.).

The Nixon administration was not at all enthusiastic about the prospect of a conference which could only introduce uncertainty into European order. Rather than seeing it as an opportunity to recreate the Western project, Nixon considered the conference “a Soviet project” (Maresca, 1984: 42). In his eyes Moscow was seducing Western Europeans with a false promise for peace by being extraordinarily persevering in proposing such a conference over and over again which “like drops of water on a stone...sooner or later erode the resistance of restless democracies” (Kissinger 1979: 413). Hence, once the talks got underway the Nixon administration exercised a ‘low profile’ approach. When in early 1971 Brandt again brought up the topic in Washington he found his discussion partners “surprisingly indifferent” (Brandt 1976: 386), an attitude which according to Brandt did not change (Ibid., 391). This attitude of ‘indifference’ is confirmed by John Maresca, the senior American diplomat participating in the negotiations process, who recalls that the administration showed a “desire to deliberately downgrade (its) significance” (Maersca 1984: 64). The US delegation was not provided with specific or, indeed, any written instructions and throughout the conference used three different chief negotiators with little experience (Ibid., 44ff.). At the same time, Washington pressed for an early conclusion of the negotiations, with Kissinger at one point calling for an end of the “theological debate” in Geneva (Ibid., 65f). Kissinger also publicly ridiculed the number of Western proposals tabled and fostered the view in the American public that the CSCE was “a somewhat silly haggle among diplomats” (Ibid., 68).

The American ‘low profile’ approach is sometimes explained with Washington’s desire not to disturb its negotiations with Moscow over MBFR and the preoccupation with

---

391 The CDU/CSU rejected the Helsinki Final Act. On the CDU/CSU position to Brandt’s Ostpolitik more generally, see Clemens (1989).
392 The ESC receives very sparse attention in Kissinger’s accounts of his time in the White House: three out of almost 1500 pages, which mainly note its ‘irrelevance’. Similarly, Lundestad’s (1998) appraised account of the US policy towards European integration does not mention the CSCE.
finding an 'honourable' way out of Vietnam (Kissinger 1979: 1249f; Maresca 1984: 45). Yet the theoretical lens used here suggests that Washington toned down its involvement not because it considered the CSCE process irrelevant but because it unsettled the American understanding of European order and, hence, the Western project. With the fears of a 'selective' détente and Rapallo lurking, the position of the Nixon administration was indifferent only at the surface. Given its potential to change the status quo in Europe, the display of indifference masked a feeling of uneasiness. Thus, when Brandt complained that the Nixon administration did not "clearly enough [recognize] the great opportunity which could arise out of this novel...connection to Europe" (Brandt 1976: 386f.), he failed to notice that it did care. As Kissinger writes in his memoirs, directly referring to Brandt's assessment: "He was wrong. We got the point. We simply were not persuaded by the argument and we thought it to be more tactful not to pursue it" (Kissinger 1979: 424). What to Brandt looked like an opportunity to create something new, for Kissinger it brought an uncertainty into the Western space he did not like.

The 'Year of Europe'

Kissinger tried to counter the growing popularity of the ESC idea with initiatives to revitalize the Western project through NATO. Yet given the lack of a shared vision of a future European space, these attempts only exposed the dissonance over ideas of order. Two initiatives exemplify this. As soon as entering the White House in 1969, Kissinger had tried to revitalize NATO as the primary institution for shared world building in Europe. In April he emphasized in a memo to Nixon the need for "consultations within NATO designed to develop coherent western positions" (Kissinger 1979: 415) and proposed a 'Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society' within NATO, as well as suggestions for a more frequent mid-level meetings. Nixon put these ideas forward in his speech on the twentieth anniversary of the Alliance in April 1969 (Ibid., 386). Kissinger complained that this proposal only received a "lukewarm reception" from Bonn, which he took as proof that German/European calls for rethinking the purpose of the Alliance were not serious and that demands for more consultations were only meant "to limit America's freedom of action" (Ibid., 387). Yet Kissinger had failed to accommodate that Brandt was not asking for working-level meetings and talks about environmental protection and improving transportation but was looking for top-level exchanges working towards the peaceful transforming of Greater Europe.

Similarly ill conceived, yet more revealing, was Kissinger's proposal for a 'New Atlantic Charter' from April 1973 (Kissinger 1973), which can be seen as a response to
the EC's communique from October 1972 calling for a 'constructive dialogue' with the US. In this proposal, Kissinger called for making 1973 the 'Year of Europe'. Noting that "the problems in the Atlantic relationship are real" Kissinger rightly identified the challenge as whether its unity can be restored by drawing "new purpose from shared positive aspirations" (Kissinger 1973: 188f.). Indeed, he went as far as saying that "the Atlantic nations must join in a fresh act of creation, equal to that undertaken by the post-war generation of leaders in Europe and America". For this purpose Nixon would "embark on a personal and direct approach to the leaders of Western Europe (...) to lay the basis for a new era of creativity in the West" and to reinvigorate "shared ideals and common purpose with our friends" (Ibid., 189).

Apart from complaining about rising economic competition and lacking reciprocity in defence spending, Kissinger identified two key problems. First, his note that the US had global interests and responsibilities whereas Europeans had regional ones and his suggestion to include Japan in the common project, point to the difference between American and European spatial horizons in their world building ambitions. Second, Kissinger’s remark that “some of our friends in Europe seemed “unwilling to accord the United States the same trust in our motives as they received from us” (Kissinger 1973: 191) pointed to a divergence of horizons of expectations. However, while Kissinger recognised these fundamental problems and called for “a shared view of the world we seek to build”, the initiative was, in the eyes of one close observer, “a failure” because it “created more discord than it alleviated” (Kohl 1975: 18). It was perceived not as an invitation for building a shared world but for contributing to Kissinger’s world.

It was not only that the speech was crafted and delivered without any prior notification, let alone consultation of NATO allies, leaving them surprised and suspicious of American intent (Ibid.). The key problem was that Kissinger, while paying lip service to the continuous US support for “the unification of Europe” (Kissinger 1973: 190), depicted a united Europe primarily as an economic rival. From the German perspective, in particular, Kissinger’s ‘New Atlantic Charter’ lacked a sense of the European project as one of transformation. Brandt, in a response to Kissinger’s speech in the New York Times, stressed that the European project was growing beyond economic integration and that “the major task of all Europeans [is] reuniting our divided continent”. Indeed, whereas Kissinger did not specify the shared project Brandt noted that Ostpolitik has released “energies for the construction of a common Europe” (Brandt 1973: 193). Notable in this response is that it maintains that this development is anchored in Jefferson’s ‘pursuit of happiness’ principle, while at the same time calling it an
‘emancipated partnership’ built on a “new self-awareness of Europe” and a “consensus of opinion within the European Community...formed around the nucleus of Franco-German solidarity” (Brandt 1973: 194f.).

With this last point Brandt also refers to the support the CSCE conference received from other Western European governments. When the US took a low profile stand Brandt successfully moved to the EC as the primary forum for coordination and consultation among Western Europeans. The Luxembourg Report from October 1970 was an important stepping stone in establishing the EC’s new ‘European Political Cooperation’ (EPC) mechanism and for forming the EC subcommittee in the CSCE process which, as analysts have pointed out, was quite successful in devising joint positions and influencing the negotiations (Smith 2004: 69-89; Maresca 1984: 19; Spohr Readman 2006: 1101). While Western Europeans, in particular France, may have opted for close consultations in the EC in part because they wanted to keep a close watch on Germany, the EC caucus was an effective forum in the negotiations because its members could agree on the purpose of the conference as instilling opportunities for changing Europe’s order (Maresca 1984: 43).

Conclusion
This chapter sought to explain the tensions entering German-American relations in the decade leading up to the Helsinki Final Act. Framed as a process of estrangement, the objective was to assess why and in what way political leaders in Germany and the US came to disagree about the relative value of NATO and CSCE as the most suitable institution through which their respective understanding of ‘Germany’ and ‘America’ in the world could unfold. The discussion traced this disagreement to dissonance over visions of an order of Europe at peace.

The discussion laid out Brandt’s vision of ‘Germany’ becoming unified in a Greater European Peace Order, which motivated his policy of overcoming the order of Yalta and rendered Ostpolitik a kind of Europapolitik. While it was argued that Brandt’s transformative vision of Germany-in-Greater-Europe was developed in interaction with ‘Kennedy America’, his relationship with the Nixon/Kissinger administration, in particular, was not marked by creativity but by dissonance over the meaning of ‘peace in Europe’. It was shown that in contrast to Brandt’s transformative vision, from Washington ‘peace in Europe’ meant stability of the order of Yalta and that Kissinger’s conception of ‘Europe’ was not only static but also ambiguous about the value of
European 'unity' for the Western project, rendering him unable to solve the tension between envisioning an independent yet 'close' Europe.

The chapter showed that German-American dissonance found expression in mutual suspicion about commitment to the Western project. In an attempt to maintain the friendship, it was mediated by silence on contentious issues, such Vietnam, and by hiding diverging paths under a shared commitment for 'détente' as formulated in NATO's *Harmel Report*. The chapter suggested that despite Nixon/Kissinger's efforts to curtail *Ostpolitik* through NATO and revitalize the Atlantic frame, Brandt considered NATO insufficient for Germany's authentic becoming in a 'Greater Europe' and sought investment in CSCE. It interpreted the Nixon administration's reluctant support of the conference and attempt to decrease its importance through a show of 'indifference' was as a strategy to keep Brandt committed to the Western project yet reduce his ability to bring uncertainty into European order.

Introduction
The previous chapter explained German-American tensions over investment in CSCE, specifically Bonn’s pro-active stance and Washington’s reluctance, with dissonance over the meaning of ‘peace in Europe’ signifying a process of estrangement. This chapter addresses the divergence in German-American security cooperation in the decade surrounding the end of the Cold War, specifically Bonn’s investment in CFSP as an alternative to NATO and CSCE. The theoretical lens applied here suggests that during this period one can witness an enduring dissonance between German and American narratives of being-in-the-world prompting the Kohl government to pursue a strategy of emancipation. Corroborating this argument is not an easy task as it runs counter three conventional wisbons. First, Kohl is known for his pro-American attitude and the Germany/Europe-friendly reputation of the three US administrations, lead by Ronald Reagan, George Bush and Bill Clinton, increased from the first to the last. Second, German unification is generally considered an example of close and harmonious German-American cooperation rather than part of an estrangement/emancipation process. Finally, NATO’s engagement in Bosnia in 1995 is generally seen as affirming its relevance and symbolising the failure of CFSP. This chapter does not repudiate these points, but it suggests that if looked at carefully they did not halt the process of estrangement but were either hiding or even fuelling it.

The discussion proceeds in three parts. The first part lays out the orientation of the Kohl/Genscher government as a merger of Adenauer’s and Brandt’s narrative of ‘Germany-in-Europe’ and points out the tensions in place with the Reagan administration. The second part outlines the close cooperation between Bonn and Washington during the negotiations leading to German unification to suggest that it left untouched the dissonance over the vision of European order. The third part shows how dissonance resurfaced in the evaluation of the meaning of the 1991 Gulf War and the conflict in Bosnia for the ‘Western’ project, discussing German resistance to building a ‘New World Order’ with military force and lacking American commitment to invest in a ‘European Peace Order’. The discussion concludes with arguing that to compensate the estrangement process with Washington, Bonn throughout pursued a strategy of emancipation by cooperating with France to invest in CFSP.
Merging Adenauer and Brandt

Brandt’s successor Helmut Schmidt (SPD), Chancellor from 1974 to 1982, did not formulate a new/original vision of Germany-in-Europe to the extent Adenauer and Brandt did but self-confidently steered the FRG on a path balancing Ostpolitik and Westintegration. Schmidt is often described as a manager who, after having completed the CSCE talks in Helsinki, pursued a strategy of “consolidation” of Ostpolitik (Hanrieder 1989: 209f.) while focusing on making the FRG “the second world power in the West” (in Niedhart 2004: 51). As such, he placed less emphasis on the vision of a ‘Greater Europe’ and more on strengthening the FRG’s position in the Western space. While developing strong bonds with France and considering the EC a valuable institution for deepening the Western European integration, Schmidt regarded friendship with the US a “clear priority” (in Banchoff 1999: 111). Thus, although Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher worked hard to keep the CSCE process alive (see below), Schmidt moved the government’s emphasis back to NATO. But his relationship with the Carter administration was tense and produced few impulses for common creative endeavours, and his famous ‘double-track decision’ was controversial domestically and played a key role in his political downfall in 1982.393

Since 1982 the government was formed by a coalition between Christian Democrats and Liberal Democrats, headed by Chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU) and, until 1992, Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher (FDP). Despite the fact that the FDP was only a minor coalition partner, Genscher exerted considerable influence on the government’s path. Even more so than Schmidt the narrative of Germany-in-Europe it pursued was a merger of the orientations of Adenauer and Brandt, that is, a bifurcation of Westintegration and Ostpolitik.

As part of the Flakhelfer generation which had experienced the war as teenagers, Kohl and Genscher shared the anti-war sentiment characterizing the narrative of post-45 Germany. They also shared the sense that the FRG’s prosperity was owed largely to having adhered to Western ideals. Thus, they were both committed to continue building Germany in a peaceful European space valuing ‘freedom’ and ‘unity’. Beyond that,
Kohl and Genscher favoured two slightly different visions of Germany-in-Europe, with the former emphasizing the ‘Western Europe’ space of Adenauer and the latter favouring the notion of a ‘Greater Europe’ reminiscent of Brandt.

Kohl grew up in Ludwigshafen in the Rhine region, the Palatine, and after the war joined the newly founded CDU in 1946. He gradually climbed up the ranks of the party, becoming minister president of Rhineland-Palatinate in 1969, federal chairman of the CDU in 1973 and three years later leader of the parliamentary opposition in the Bundestag. In 1982, after Schmidt’s resignation, Kohl was elected Chancellor and held this position until 1998. Regarding himself as the political heir of Adenauer, Kohl upheld the maxim that German unity would be desirable only within the ‘free world’ (Kohl 1996: 21ff.). His ‘Report on the State of the Nation in a divided Germany’ from March 1984 was entitled ‘Freedom is the core of the German question’ and declared that “the protection of freedom takes priority over all other goals”. It claimed “we know where we belong; we know where we stand: on the side of freedom” and that, therefore, Germany’s place would always be in the West (Kohl 1984; also von Weizsaecker 1986). Kohl’s commitment to ‘freedom’ was combined with a strong commitment to European unity. In the abovementioned report he noted that “we must unify Europe to also complete the unification of Germany” and that the lessons from the mishandling of Germany’s position at “the heart of Europe” was that “we have to and want to shape our future within a European framework and resolve our national question as a work of peace” (Kohl 1984: 3). For Kohl, the creation of a united Europe was in Germany’s “existential interest” (Bering 1999: 159; Banchoff 1999; Duffield 1998).

Kohl’s agenda of revitalizing the vision of German unity was thus built on a strong commitment to the space of Western Europe. Like Adenauer, Kohl was a Catholic from the Rhine-region and liked to stress his Heimat roots in the Palatine from where he conceived of Europe as a Christian space. In his memoirs Kohl describes in grandiose terms how the Palatine is intertwined with the history of Heimat Europa and manifests “to be from the Rhine means to be from the Occident”. Kohl held a very positive image of the US. He “grew up in a CDU that was wedded to German-American

---

394 Kohl even liked to refer to himself as Adenauer’s grandson (Bering 1999: 43)
395 During a visit of Thatcher, Kohl reportedly asked one of her advisors to “convince her that I am not German but European”, to which Thatcher is said to have responded “My god, Helmut is so German!” (in Papcke 1993: 11).
396 Kohl invokes the cathedrals in Speyer and Worms as places from which the German Kaiser “carried the consciousness of the occident world, this...Christian shaped cultural space”. He calls Palatine the center of the Holy Roman Empire and “a European coreland (Kernland)” and traces all values guiding his vision of ‘Europe’ into this region (Bering 1999: 29; Kohl 2004: 26-29).
partnership” (Clemens 2001: 180; Zimmer 2001: 144f.) and according to one biographer believed that the Americans were needed “as an important stabilizing factor for the German psyche” (Bering 1999: 14). The friend Kohl wanted as a stabilizing partner, however, was ‘Truman America’. As Clay Clemens notes, Kohl’s positive image of America was anchored in memories of US support for the ‘new Germany’ during the post-War decade. The Chancellor was an admirer of Truman who in his view had placed America “at the heart of a historic shift in [Germany’s] orientation...to a respected democracy”. For Kohl the value of the German-American relationship was thus maintained by a feeling of gratitude which proved “remarkably durable...despite what remained his own fairly modest level of specific knowledge (of) the US itself” (Clemens 2001: 179ff., Bering 1999: 45).

Genscher saw things differently. He grew up near Halle and initially chose to stay in the Soviet occupied zone after the end of the war, where he studied law and joined the newly founded German Liberal Democratic Party. Yet this attempt to build up his life in the Eastern Zone eventually conflicted with the political project pursued by the leaders of the GDR and, by extension, Moscow. By 1952 he felt ‘out of place’ in the GDR and concluded it was “not my state” (Genscher 1965: 65), deciding to settle over to Bremen in the FRG where he joined the Free Democratic Party (FDP). After fighting tuberculosis, in 1965 Genscher became a member of the Bundestag, serving in several party offices, including chairman of the FDP (Genscher 1995: 55-68). He was Minister of the Interior in Brandt’s cabinet and in 1974 became Foreign Minister under Schmidt and in this position in the Kohl government until his retirement in 1992. During his 18 years as Foreign Minister, Genscher became one of the FRG’s most popular politicians and profoundly shaped the office, so much that in the remaining three years of the period under investigation here his successor and protégé Klaus Kinkel can be seen as operating within Genscher’s orientation.

Not surprisingly given his party affiliation, Genscher championed a liberal order, once noting that “freedom is the breath of progress” (Genscher 1995: 523). Yet despite the obvious resonance concerning the desirability of liberal order, the connection to the American narrative was not a deep, emotional one. In contrast to Kohl, Genscher’s appreciation of the US was less sentimental. While he agreed that US assistance was instrumental for allowing a new ‘Germany’ to emerge, his personal experiences of the post-war decade were not filled by friendly GI’s and CARE packages but, as noted earlier, by trying to build up his life in Halle and finding his place in the West. While
committed to having ‘Germany-in-Europe’ unfold in the Western space, Genscher’s vision
of a desirable European order was less ‘Adenauer’ and more ‘Brandt’.

Genscher was not simply a ‘liberal internationalist’ but committed to the idea of a united
Europe. In 1981 Genscher attempted to revitalize the vision of a European Union,
claiming that “(from) the great goal of political unification of Europe...we shall derive
the strength to act in a spirit of solidarity and to take decisions...which are genuinely
forward-looking solutions”. Yet other than Kohl, he was oriented towards a ‘Greater
Europe’. Raised as a Protestant and skeptical about using Christian beliefs as the maxim
for guiding politics, the notion of a ‘Vatican Europe’ did not resonate with him
(Genscher 1995: 55). Moreover, his roots in East Germany bestowed him with a
horizon of experience reaching deeper into the East than Kohl and, thus, an emotional
attachment to the space beyond the wall. A critique of Adenauer’s course, already in
1966 he advocated a “clear concept for the future development in Europe” which “has
nothing to do with a policy of strength” (Genscher 1995: 93). With entering the SPD-led
government in 1969, the Liberal Democrats signed on to Brandt’s Ostpolitik, adopting a
similar vision of a Greater European Peace Order and stating in its electoral platform the
aim to prevent any “one-sided dependency” of Germany. So when shifting to the CDU-led
government in 1982, Genscher saw himself as “the guardian of the Ostpolitik
tradition” (Zimmer 2001: 149).

Despite these differences there was sufficient overlap between the two leaders and their
respective parties to allow for a workable coalition government steering the path of both
Westintegration and Ostpolitik. Kohl did not consider the East a completely Alien
land and, other than his party-internal rival Franz-Josef Strauss, was open to the
FDP’s insistence to continue some form of Ostpolitik, though preferring the term
Entspannungspolitik (Hanrieder 1989; Banchoff 1999: 120ff.). Theo Sommer noted in
1988 that “there is no break in the continuity of Bonn’s Ostpolitik. As Brandt laid it
down, and Schmidt played it in, so it is advanced by Kohl” (in Ash 1993: 33), leading
Ash to even suggest that “there was one ‘Ostpolitik’ of the Federal Republic of

397 However, Genscher agreed with Pope John Paul II over the desirability of overcoming the
division of Europe peacefully and speaks of “extraordinary cooperation” between Bonn and the
Vatican on issues concerning the CSCE process (Genscher 1995: 288f).
398 On Genscher’s Heimat feelings for, in particular, Halle, see Genscher (1995:66f., 1024ff.)
399 When opening the German Historical Museum in Berlin in October 1987, Kohl emphasized
that the opposition between East and West could only be overcome through a “lasting
overarching European Peace Order”. He also noted that Berlin was intimately interwoven with
the German narrative and that there was “hardly any other place so suitable” for hosting the
museum (Kohl 1987).
Germany" (Ash 1993: 33). This was possible because Genscher was not calling for a social(ist) but for a liberal democratic Europe and accepted the central place of the US in the German narrative. In short, they converged around the authentic narrative of Germany-in-Europe stressing familiar core values of freedom, anti-militarism and unity. Recognition as a ‘normal’ Western state thus meant recognition as a liberal democracy committed to European integration through a politics of ‘checkbook diplomacy’, a sense of Self which has also been called a “Civilian power” (Maull 1990; Duffield 1998).

Dissonance with Reagan’s World
The problem was that the intersubjective integration of this narrative in the Western project and its stabilization with the United States as the significant Other was difficult to pursue with the Reagan administration. Ronald Reagan entered the White House in 1982 at a time of perceived ‘decline’ of America in its world. A significant part of this world was the Western space and Reagan declared it his aim to reclaim US leadership in the shaping of the Western agenda. In the imagery of one analyst, buoyed by a domestic constituency which called for “strength and toughness in foreign affairs” (Schneider 1983: 43), Reagan aimed at moving the US from an ‘entangled’ to a ‘defiant’ eagle (Oye 1983; Posen and Evera 1983). This meant not an isolationist strategy of withdrawing from the world but one of engaging it more forcefully on ‘American terms’. Like Adenauer in the 1950s, Reagan sought to strengthen America’s voice in the West by mobilizing the enemy-image of communism and buttressed his rhetoric of ideological confrontation with a significant military buildup. Such a strategy had little sympathy for an approach seeking gradual change through dialogue and so the Reagan administration was “sharply hostile and skeptical of negotiations and remnants of détente” (Kahler 1983: 281f.). Secretary of Defense Weinberger informed his European counterparts that “if détente is progress, then let me say that we cannot afford much more progress” (in Lundestad 1990: 49).

Yet as scholars have pointed out, despite the moral righteousness with which Reagan instilled the aim of restoring US primacy, his policies were far less clear in direction than his stark rhetoric suggested (Kyvig 1990). It was difficult to see the strategic rationale behind Reagan’s policy of strength, that is, his denouncement of ‘détente’ and the focus on military buildup, including the controversial Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), in dealing with the Soviet Union (Posen and van Evera 1983: 75ff.). Reagan’s vision of America-in-the-world remained blurry in particular when it came to the
question of European order. Certainly 'Europe' was still important, but it was less clear what place it had in the American narrative. More precisely, it was not clear what place the idea of a united Europe had in America's West. The rise of the EC as a serious economic player ('rival') was seen as a central factor in the (felt) decline of US power (Oye 1983: 7ff.). And the dispute over the pipeline project into the Soviet Union in the early 1980s and tacit European attempts to address security issues in an institutional setting outside NATO (see below) cast doubt that a stronger Europe was a 'natural partner' and fed concerns that Europeans might 'gang up' against the US (Lundestad 1998: 111). Thus, 'Europe' was a place where the US needed to reassert its authority.

On a more fundamental level the Reagan administration was confronted with Kissinger's ambivalence, mentioned in the previous chapter, about the value of European integration for America's unfolding: if a project committed to the idea of a unified Europe was actually closing the space to American influence was it still worth supporting? The answer given by the Reagan White House was negative. As Klaus Larres points, out Reagan was "not the least interested in a supranational Europe" (Larres 2001: 106). Thus, Reagan's policy of strength and what Larres calls his "arrogant inattention" towards Europe go together. Rather than seeing Reagan's 'defiant eagle' approach as directed primarily against Moscow, the friendship lens interprets it a strategy to regain voice in the Western project and shift it away from a European order of 'unity'. Reminiscent of Adenauer's strategy of rearmament in the 1950s, discussed in chapter eight, Reagan sought to reassert America's leadership position in strategic debates within NATO.

The problem with Reagan's approach, and the reason why one might see it as one of 'inattention', was that the administration was not merely unsupportive of European integration but was indecisive as to what would make a desirable European order. More precisely, in particular from the German perspective the 'defiant eagle' narrative was devoid of a vision of a 'peaceful Europe'. Whereas for Nixon/Kissinger 'peace' had meant stability of the status quo, the Reagan administration neither appeared to pursue a policy of stability, nor did its policy of strength seem embedded in a vision of peace in Europe. Even after Reagan toned down the confrontative rhetoric and shifted to portray itself a "party of peace" (Kahler 1983: 301; Lundestad 1990: 52), the lacking willingness to engage a discussion on European peace order, combined with a continued emphasis on US military capabilities, did little to counter the view, prevalent in the peace

---

400 Some of the literature on Reagan's foreign policy makes no mention of a 'European policy'.
movement, that Reagan accepted the possibility of ‘Europe’ as a nuclear wasteland (Mueller and Risse-Kappen 1987: 81ff.).

Given Reagan’s discomfort with the vision of European unity it is not surprising that he bonded with Britain’s Margaret Thatcher, with whom he shared the project of countering a feeling of decline with bold ‘conservative’ policies (Krieger 1987). However, Germany continued to matter and the Reagan administration welcomed Kohl’s Western commitment and his seemingly humble and decisively pro-American attitude. It was irritated, however, by Genscher and his insistence on Entspannungspolitik. As one not-so-neutral observer put it, Reagan officials considered the German Foreign Minister as a “royal pain in the neck” because he seemed “incapable of uttering a sentence without words like ‘cooperation’, ‘peace’, ‘dialogue’, ‘conciliation’, ‘European security conference’, or ‘detente’ tumbling uncontrollably form his tongue” (Bering 1999: 21).

Behind these and similarly harsh descriptions of Genscher as an “ambiguous figure” portraying “weakness” (Weinberger) and “a guy who was very slippery, who could change any time” (Richard Burt), the Reagan administration showed anxiety about Germany moving in a direction which did not seem to strengthen the American narrative. In other words, its frustration with ‘Genscherism’ echoes Kissinger’s problem with Ostpolitik (personified by Bahr) discussed in the previous chapter, namely the concern of an unpredictable German maneuvering between East and West captured in the ‘Rapallo complex’.

Kohl attempted to keep the bond intact by denouncing domestic criticism of the US and by trying to be supporting of US initiatives. Yet while a ‘policy of strength’ approach resonated with Kohl in principle, he also felt uneasy with Reagan’s course. It was not only the concern that a renewed confrontation between Washington and Moscow would ‘freeze’ the status quo, which threatened to deprived Europe of a “supportive political

---

401 Critique was most vocal in the left wing of the Social Democrats, whose leader, Oskar Lafontaine, wrote a book entitled “Fearing the friends”. On the debates within the SPD in the 1980s, see Ash (1993: Ch. VI). A poll from May 1984 among Germans showed 53 per cent feared that Reagan’s re-election was bad for world peace (Mueller and Risse-Kappen 1987: 60). For a discussion of the phenomenon of ‘anti-Americanism’ in Germany, see Diner (1996); Gassert (2004); Morris (2004).

402 Quotes are taken from Bering (1999: 21ff).

403 Eventually Kohl even responded positively to a US invitation to participate in SDI research, against the protest of Genscher, who threw his weight behind the French EUREKA initiative (Sandholtz 1992: 263f). Although Kohl was “extremely cautious” in his official remarks on SDI and did not endorse the military rationale, his government only came to support EUREKA “once it became clear that it was not an alternative to SDI but rather parallel to it” (Sandholtz 1992: 272). For a detailed discussion, see Sandholtz (1992, Ch. 9), also Smyser (1990: 51ff.); Genscher (1995: 376ff).
atmosphere” in which the unity of Germany-in-Europe could be pursued (Hanrieder 1989: 213). Even when Reagan shifted away from his confrontational stance in his second term, he continued to discomfort the Kohl government with unexpected moves on strategic policies affecting European order. Symbolic was his meeting with Gorbachev in Reykjavik in October 1986, which involved significant discussions about US nuclear strategy without any prior notification, let alone consultation, of NATO allies. Tellingly, not only were US officials surprised when Bonn reacted with serious discontent about being sidetracked, even more “this mutual misunderstanding was never adequately clarified” (Smyser 1990: 59). Thus, ‘Reagan America’ kept the ‘Potsdam complex’ alive in Germany, visible in complaints about his policies as being contradictory and, hence, unpredictable voiced by moderate and centrist voices (Genscher 1995: 528; Mueller and Risse-Kappen 1987).

To reduce the uncertainty, Kohl’s approach of not criticizing Reagan was complemented by a campaign of stabilizing Germany’s narrative as a ‘normal’ Western European state, to confirm, as Kohl put it “the solid mooring and position of the Federal Republic of Germany in the West” (in Verheyen 1999: 158). In this campaign the notion of ‘normalization’ became a “tirelessly repeated formula” (Ash 1993: 15). Domestically, the ‘normalization’ agenda sparked the Historikerstreit, a major controversy among German historians about the place of the Third Reich in the German biography and the weight of its lessons.404 Externally, Kohl’s normalization agenda was pursued with France and the US and received symbolic approval through joint appearances with Mitterand at the military cemetery in Verdun in 1984 and with Reagan to a German military cemetery in Bitburg in 1985. It not only allowed Kohl to continue an intra-German “selective détente” (Hanrieder) but also to regain US commitment for a shared vision of ‘unity’, as displayed in Reagan’s Berlin speech from June 1987 in which he called on Gorbachev to “tear down this wall!” (Reagan 1987).

Institutional Choices: Dealing with Dissonance
The basis on which Bonn evaluated security institutions was captured by Genscher in 1986 when he noted that Germany was looking for an institution providing the frame of action [Handlungsrahmen] which allowed it to pursue its “legitimate wish for a condition of peace in Europe within which in can regain its unity in free self

---

404 At the core was an attempt by some historians to rehabilitate the Kaiserreich as a positive memory space, while at the same time toning down the uniqueness of the Holocaust, not only its importance within the German biography (as the sole focus) but also as an event in general by comparing it with Stalin’s Gulag (Kattago 2001; Verheyen 1999).
determination" through "trustworthy and peaceful cooperation with all its neighbours" (Genscher 1995: 318). This was a diplomatic formulation of the Kohl government’s narrative: the vision of a unified Germany in a free and peaceful Greater Europe. The security institutions available were NATO and CSCE. While Kohl’s ‘normalization’ agenda largely concealed the estrangement with Reagan America over the Western/European project, it was visible in Bonn’s exploration of the EC as an alternative security institution.

In Bonn, NATO remained the primary institution for negotiating the Western project. Kohl’s Western orientation and commitment to German-US relations made him a strong supporter of NATO, with one biographer describing him as “fundamentally a deep believer in the NATO alliance” (Bering 1999: 14). The sense fostered under Schmidt that the FRG was the most important European member and an “indispensable part” of the Atlantic Alliance was maintained even by Genscher: “NATO relied in the first place on German participation and American engagement in Europe” (Genscher 1995: 349). However, in contrast to the Reagan administration, the Kohl government read NATO through the Harmel Report, that is, as an institution committed to ‘detente’. The aim of bringing about peaceful unification of Germany-in-Europe was still considered “the heartpiece” of the report, which Genscher called “the Magna Charta of the transatlantic policy of responsibility” (Genscher 1995: 466). Given Reagan’s rejection of détente, what was left from Bonn’s perspective was to continue Schmidt’s strategy and influence in the ‘strategic’ debate on arms control,405 while de-emphasizing military instruments as a means of achieving national objectives and resisting US pressure to increase defense spending (Allan and Diehl 1988). The ‘Civilian power’ narrative was reconciled with the Bundeswehr as the largest conventional army in Western Europe by it being integrated into NATO and with Articles 26 and 87a of the Basic Law restricting its use for defensive purposes only, explicitly denouncing the right to attack, making the very scenario of Bundeswehr engagement outside the Western European space a “foreign world” (Hilz 2005: 44).

German support for CSCE was steady, but here Kohl and Genscher differed in their assessments. The Christian Democrats had of course rejected the Helsinki Final Act and although Kohl appreciated the CSCE as a forum for Entspannungspolitik he did not consider it the primary forum through which to build Germany-in-Europe. By contrast,

405 Specifically when it came to US missiles stationed in the FRG, with Genscher in 1988/89 blocking US modernization plans. See Banchoff (1999: Ch. 4); Broer (2001); Genscher (1995: Ch. 15).
Genscher was enthusiastic about CSCE's potential to pursue a Greater European Peace Order (1995: 100, 212-216, 299-323). He had participated in the final stages of the Helsinki negotiations and considered CSCE the most suitable negotiating frame for, as he put it diplomatically, the aims formulated in NATO’s Harmel Report (Genscher 1995: 315). In 1985 he initiated a 10-year anniversary meeting in Helsinki as well as a cultural forum in Budapest and was an active force in the third follow-up meeting in Vienna from 1986 to '89. Yet these attempts of keeping the Helsinki process alive were hampered by continued disagreement with Washington over its purpose (Genscher 1995: 229f., 303-320). Instead of seeing CSCE as a forum for negotiating a transformative path into a Greater Europe, US administrations interpreted the Final Act as a formal acknowledgment of the ‘status quo’ order of Yalta and used it as a tool in its confrontation with the Soviet Union, specifically as a vehicle to criticize Moscow for its record of human rights violations.406 For Genscher, the US approach did not correspond with “the European CSCE philosophy” (Genscher 1995: 312; Lucas 2001: 71f; Ash 1993: 263f).

Notable developments were occurring in the EC and the WEU. While the 1980s are generally known for reviving economic integration, culminating in the 1987 Single European Act (SEA),407 attempts were made to also move the EC into the security realm. Here the German government found common ground with member states. Genscher’s initiative from November 1981 to extend the EC’s competence in ‘external’ relations, strengthening EPC and incorporating ‘security’ issues into the EC’s domain found its way into a ‘Solemn Declaration’ in Stuttgart in 1983 (Genscher 1995: 362-366). It was picked up again by France in 1984 with a proposal to revive the WEU, leading to the Rome declaration from October 1984 in which EC foreign and defense ministers promised “to increase cooperation between member states in the field of security policy” (WEU 1984). In October 1987, the WEU Ministerial Council adopted a Platform on European Security Interests which declared that “we are convinced that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence” (WEU 1987). In pursuing these investments Bonn relied on the availability of European partners, particularly France. As Smyser observed, “after Reykjavik, Kohl and Mitterand turned to each other”, intensifying consultations and high-level visits

406 The US participated only reluctantly in meetings in Belgrade (1978) and Madrid (1981-83), which were characterized by clashes with Moscow. In the latter meeting the US agreed on signing a final declaration only after Kohl persuaded Reagan to do so (Lucas 2001: 70).
407 On the negotiations leading to the SEA, see Moravcsik (1991).
which produced also bilateral initiatives like the joint Franco-German Brigade (Smyser 1990: 59).

While playing the ‘European card’ (Krieger 2001: 195), Kohl did not want to loosen ties with the US. He remained sensitive to a warning from the State Department in March 1985 to WEU members not to seek common positions on security/defense matters outside NATO (Lundestad 1998: 111) and endorsed the emphasis in the 1987 ‘Platform’ that the revival of WEU was to occur within NATO and for the sole purpose “to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance” (WEU 1987; see also SEA, Title III 6(a) and (c)). Still, Smyser notes, Washington realized that “the German moves towards Paris represented a kind of insurance policy that reflected some German doubts about the United States” (Smyser 1990: 61).

Unification and the Question of Germany-in-Europe

The ‘end of the Cold War’ did not bring about a radical change in the German-American relationship. The period surrounding the years 1989/90 – the fall of the Berlin Wall and the formal unification of ‘Germany’ – followed by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsav Pact, is generally considered a transformative ‘moment’ in European order. Yet from a phenomenological perspective for there to be change within ‘the world’ friends disclose and build together it must be incorporated into their meaning structures as ‘change’. In other words, this period did not designate a historical ‘break’ unless it was construed as such. Hence, without denying Timothy Garton Ash’s observation that between November 1989 and October 1990 “more happened in ten months than usually does in ten years. The whole map of Europe was – or began to be – redrawn” (Ash 1993: 343), the point is that the ‘redrawing’ of the European map did not happen on a tabula rasa but occurred within existing narratives of authentic becoming. And these narratives, by definition, are coherent (‘stable’). German and American policymakers were giving meaning to ‘what is happening’ and channelled it in a direction that strengthened the project they invested in. Even though both sides saw ‘the end of the Cold War’ as an opportunity for reinvigorating the relationship and the Western project, as discussed below their different views about the place of ‘Europe’ in the same were carried over.

Bonn’s Agenda of ‘Continuity’

In 1989 the overarching concern for the Kohl government was that the dynamic witnessed in the GDR and Central and Eastern Europe would be channeled into the ‘right direction’. This direction was given by the vision of Germany-in-Europe
formulated and fostered in Bonn over the years. And so, while formal unification of FRG and GDR changed the physical appearance of ‘Germany’, adding population, territory and, in March 1991, full legal sovereignty, from national biography perspective also “unification amounted to little more than a takeover of the GDR by the Bundesrepublik” (Markovits and Reich 1997: 24).

The Kohl government’s desire to keep the ‘Germany’ narrative stable found expression in a policy of ‘continuity’. As Kohl promised his NATO colleagues on 4 December 1989, there would be no German ‘special path’ (Kohl 1996: 188). Indeed, as Mark Duffield notes, Bonn’s commitment to ‘continuity’ appeared to become an end in itself (Duffield 1998: 66). Under a policy of continuity, the usable pasts and desirable futures lending coherent meaning to the narrative of Germany-in-Europe were merely adjusted. As President Richard von Weizsäcker put it “Germany has become a completely Western country and will fully remain so following unification” (in Duffield 1998: 63). The government remained dedicated to the idea of European unity, manifested in the revised preamble of the Basic Law committing the German people to European integration. At the first congress of the reunited CDU in 1991 Kohl claimed that “German unity and European unity are two sides of the same coin” and that “Europe is our future” (cited in Markovitz and Reich 1997: 45). In short, unified Germany was to continue to exist as a ‘Civilian Power’, as a ‘normal’ liberal democratic and peaceful state in the Western world committed to building a united Europe.

By emphasizing ‘continuity’ the government attempted to prevent a reopening of the infamous ‘German question’ More precisely, the ‘continuity’ strategy was so important because Kohl knew that the question of which was the ‘normal’ Germany was back on the table. Neighbours in both East and West continued to harbour concerns about ‘Germany’ falling back into its ‘old’ Third Reich being and reviving its hegemonic aspirations. Not surprisingly, these concerns were strongest among those who had the most intense experiences of the belligerent ‘Germany’, namely France and Britain in the West, where German unification had a “seriously unsettling effect” (Markovits and Reich 1997: 134), and Russia and Poland in the East. In these countries, the ‘pessimist’s view’ prevailed as the ‘Germany’ narrative had not or only partly shifted away from the

---

408 Hence I disagree with Ash’s characterization that unification was “closer to Adenauer hopes...than it was to Brandt’s” and that it was “fundamentally different from anything that West Germany had done, dealt with, envisaged, or planned in its Ostpolitik” (Ash 1993: 343, emphasis added). While the precise timing and circumstances were envisaged in neither of the two narratives, the unification process unfolded within the familiar horizons of experience and expectations characterizing both Westintegration and Ostpolitik.

negative image anchored in the memory space created by the *Third Reich* (Markovits and Reich 1997: 50-55, also chapters 4, 8 and 9; Ash 1993). And given the important role these countries played in enabling German unity to take place, Bonn’s effort to maintain the ‘Germany-in-Europe’ narrative made perfect sense.

Facing a process in which the four victorious WWII powers were negotiating about how to situate a united ‘Germany-in-Europe’, Bonn was dealing, once again, with its ‘Potsdam complex’. Kohl’s strategy to tame the anxiety and influence the terms of how Germany was unfolding in 1989/90 was to rely heavily on Bonn’s intimate relationship with Washington. For instance, in the run-up to a summit between Bush and Gorbachev in Malta in late November 1989, he sought repeated reassurance from Bush that ‘Malta’ would not become another ‘Yalta’, which, just like Potsdam, stood for great powers deciding over the future order of Germany-in-Europe. Indeed, there is general agreement among analysts and involved officials that the process leading to German unification was marked by an extraordinary degree of close cooperation between the FRG and the US, captured in what Robert Hutchings calls a “Bonn-Washington nexus” (Hutchings 1997: 109).

**Bush and the Question of ‘Europe’**

In January 1989 Reagan was succeeded by his former Vice President, George H. W. Bush. While more moderate/cautious than Reagan and often described as a ‘pragmatic realist’ sceptical about the ‘vision thing’, Bush reportedly encouraged his staff to “dream big dreams” (Zelikow and Rice 1995: 24). And these were needed as his administration needed to integrate the events in Europe into the narrative of America-in-the world. While a “lonely superpower” in military terms (Krauthammer 1991), from a friendship perspective the US did not seek to build the post-Cold War world on its own. Instead, it was first and foremost looking for someone in ‘Europe’ to rebuild the Western space with rather than against someone.

On the one hand, the understanding was that the US had won the Cold War and that ‘freedom’ had prevailed lead to what Snyder (1992) calls “end-of-history optimism” about the superiority of (American) values of economic and political liberalism (Fukuyama 1992). At the same time, the changes in Europe and the disappearance of the

---

410 Poland due to the unsolved legal status of ‘Germany’s Eastern border, which Kohl initially tried to keep open, see Hutchings (1997: 115f.).
412 Kohl (1996); Genscher (1995); Zelikow and Rice (1995); Risse (1997); Kuesters (1998); Cox and Hurst (2002).
'order of Yalta' affected the configuration of the Western space and, hence, required adjustment of the Western project. As one astute observer pointed out, "the existence and meaning of Europe dominated international politics in 1989" and 'defining Europe' once again became "a practical problem" (Hoagland 1989: 34). Yet the Bush administration had its difficulties with formulating a vision of a desirable 'Europe'. While willing to take a more positive stance towards European integration than his predecessor, the lacking vision of a desirable European order had been carried over from Reagan. Bush once described himself as "less of a Europeanist" (in Zelikow and Rice 1995: 28) and the first months of his administration were marked by a careful attempt to formulate American Europapolitik. Even when the political dynamics in 'Europe' made this a more pressing matter, there was no clear sense of a desirable European order beyond a general commitment to a Europe that was "whole and free" and 'stable'. As Robert Hutchings, Director for European Affairs with the NSC at the time, recalls:

"We wanted a strong, more cohesive Europe as our main partner in world affairs, and we were prepared to lend our support and encouragement to that end...But these abstract judgments still begged the question of what kind of Europe" (Hutchings 1997: 29).

Again, the question was whether a united Europe would be a 'natural partner' or a competitor. Alongside the hope that European unity would "reduce the burden on ourselves, yielding a new transatlantic balance of roles and responsibilities" (Hutchings 1997: 158f.) was the concern of an emerging 'Fortress Europe'. Whereas Bush reluctantly accepted the development of the EC into a potential economic competitor, he did not want this to spill over into the security realm. Such a Europe, he feared, might become "more exclusionary and potentially in competition with the Atlantic Alliance" (Hutchings 1997: 29), which is another way of saying that it would reduce Washington's ability to shape European order. The overarching aim was to ensure that a 'united Europe' remained in the Western space – "to forge a unity based on Western values", as Bush put it (in Zelikow and Rice 1995: 31) – by maintaining a permanent American 'presence' in Europe and promoting a "new Atlanticism". As Hutchings recalls, the

---

413 In light of my analysis, the claim that Bush was "outlining a future for a new Europe which was more ambitious than anything his postwar predecessors or, for that matter, his contemporaries...had been prepared to contemplate" (Cox and Hurst 2002: 133) cannot be upheld.


415 The EC's emergence as an economic 'block' yet its diffuse Gestalt as a negotiating partner during the 1991 Uruguay Round frustrated the Bush administration (Hutchings 1997: 159f.).

aim of keeping the US ‘in’ Europe was “our central vision and key organizing principle” and the driving force behind a new European strategy group (Hutchings 1997: 157).

While the question remained what exactly the US would do with its European ‘presence’, it was clear to the Bush administration that the ‘European question’ was intertwined with the ‘German question’. An NSC memorandum from March 1989 held that “the top priority for American foreign policy in Europe should be the fate of the Federal Republic of Germany...we cannot have a vision for Europe’s future that does not include an approach to the ‘German question’” (in Zelikow and Rice 1995: 26-28). The US commitment to build ‘Europe’ with Germany was reflected in Bush’s Mainz speech from May 1989, in which he famously declared the two countries to become “partners in leadership”. Indeed, given the amount of attention Germany received at the time, Hutchings feels compelled to remind that among US policymakers “in 1990 the question was not so much about Germany but about the European order into which it needed to fit” (Hutchings 1997: 141).

The ‘Bonn-Washington Nexus’

Although there were voices who continued to see the division of Germany-in-Europe as a stable source of peace, the possibility of overcoming of the status quo was cautiously accepted in the White House, with the NSC memorandum recommending “we should offer some promise for change” to Germany (in Zelikow and Rice 1995: 26-28). In an attempt to give meaning to events and move them in a fruitful direction, the Bush administration resorted to the view that the American narrative had always envisioned German unity as a good thing. Thus, once the possibility was raised by Kohl, the Bush administration was supportive and gave ‘Germany’ a strong voice in the process to “take the lead in deciding (its) future” (Hutchings 1997: 97, 113). With that, the US position differed significantly from the sceptical views held by Germany’s European neighbours. In September 1989 he denounced the view prevalent “in some quarters” that a unified Germany would be detrimental to the peace of Europe (in Nye and Keohane 1993: 117). Reminiscent of the supportive attitude during the post-45 decade, Bush trusted that Kohl was moving Germany in the right direction: “I felt that Germany had learned its lesson” (cited in Bering 1999: 135).

To be sure, even though the Bush administration saw in ‘Kohl Germany’ a loyal and reliable partner, the ‘Rapallo’ complex – the concern that a Germany striving for unification might accept the status of ‘neutrality’ to accommodate Soviet demands – did not disappear (Hutchings 1997: 107). While full of praise of Kohl’s pro-Western
orientation and his commitment to NATO, US officials continued to be wary of Genscher and the direction he seemed to represent. Many in the Bush administration saw Genscher as “undercutting Western positions” (Bering 1999: 138). Hutchings puts it diplomatically: “it was simply that Kohl was seen as more reliable than Genscher when it came to the integrity of the Western alliance” (Hutchings 1997: 19). To prevent ‘Genscherism’ from becoming too influential, keeping Bonn close and strengthening Kohl’s position thus only gained in importance.

The American offer for renewing the partnership was welcomed by Kohl, who described Bush as “the most important ally on the path to unification…capable of real friendship” (Kohl 1996: 185; also Zelikow and Rice 1995: 187). The seemed to be confirmed with Kohl’s famous ‘Ten Point Plan’ from 27 November, a road map for unification which combined elements of Ostpolitik with elements of ‘change through strength’. It was a clear signal of Kohl claiming agency in defining the path of ‘Germany-in-Europe’, as the plan was devised by Kohl without consulting the Western allies, or Genscher. Yet whereas London and Paris criticized Kohl without consulting the Western allies, or Genscher. Yet whereas London and Paris criticized Kohl’s handling and the content of the plan – Mitterand expressed his concern that ‘Europe could fall back into the imagined world (Vorstellungswelt) of 1913’ (Kohl 1996: 183f.) – Washington accepted both and worked on rallying Britain and France behind the plan. And when Kohl asked Bush to support the points in his meeting with Gorbachev, the President assured him that “we are on the same wavelength” and told reporters afterwards “I feel comfortable…I think we’re on track” (Kohl 1996: 157-167; Zelikow and Rice 1995: 120ff; Hutchings 1997: 99). From a US perspective, the track was a reorganization of the Western space and given Germany’s potential there was “much to gain from the prospect of a strong, democratic, and united Germany” (Hutchings 1997: 97).

This last claim hints at why the close and productive relationship over German unification did not halt the process the estrangement. Mutual support for ‘world building’ was not supposed to end with German unification. Whereas in Bonn, the expectation was that the US would also be there to ‘complete’ the unification of ‘Europe’, in Washington Kohl’s commitment to the West was seen as a guarantee that a unified Germany would be a creative partner in reordering the Western space on a global scale and with military means, if necessary. As the remainder of this chapter shows,

---

417 As Risse (1997: 161, 172f.) rightly points out, US suspicion of Genscher and the downplaying of his role in the unification process also pervades the account of Zelikow and Rice (1995).
418 According to Kohl, he informed Bush about the plan a few hours before everyone else (Kohl 1996: 167-176).
both expectations remained unfulfilled. The consensus on German unification as a ‘good thing’ did not encompass the question what space this ‘new’ Germany would be embedded in and what ‘world building’ project it would contribute to.

**The Ambiguity of the Western Project**

Two formative events, the 1991 Gulf War and the conflict in Bosnia, exposed the fragility of the Bonn-Washington nexus. The meaning attributed to them and, hence, the place these events took in the project of building a post-Cold War world exposed the dissonance between German and American ideas of order. The 1991 Gulf War made clear that German commitment to ‘continuity’ had failed to take into account the American understanding of the Western project, in particular its ‘global’ scope and its acceptance of war as a means for creating an order where peace was achieved through freedom. The conflict in Bosnia exposed the second fault line in the German-American project or, more precisely, another aspect of the divergence: it revealed the American indecisiveness about how to order ‘Europe’ and its hesitancy to stress ‘unity’ as a reading of peace and, correspondingly, its ability to accommodate the German vision of a European Peace Order. Together, they motivated the Kohl government to invest, with France as the main partner, in CFSP as an alternative to CSCE and NATO.

**Exposing Dissonance I: Gulf War 1991**

In August 1990, one week following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces, President Bush announced large-scale military assistance for Saudi Arabia and asked for allied support. In an attempt to place this event and the US response in a meaningful frame which purported to “keep the dangers of disorder at bay”, on September 11 Bush announced to a joint session of Congress a ‘New World Order’ (NWO) under the auspices of American leadership (in Kennan 1991: 26; Hutchings 1997: 146f.). In formulating this vision Bush could not quite resist “the Wilsonian temptation” (Hutchings 1997: 149) of making the world safe for democracy and echoed familiar traits of American liberal internationalism, supplemented with the promise for reviving the United Nations as a forum for debating and enforcing order.419 A month later in Prague, he wove together the task of fulfilling “the promise of a Europe...that is truly whole and free” and a ‘Europe’ that would accept new responsibilities and “work with us in common cause toward a new commonwealth of freedom..., a moral community united in its dedication to free ideals...(t)hat is why our response to the challenge in the Persian Gulf is critical” (in Hutchings 1997: 147f.).

---

While the Bush administration expected Germany, the creative partner in the Western space, to be part of this response, the Kohl government decided to lay low. Although it condemned Iraq’s actions as a breach of international law and supported the set-up of sanctions, it did not want to share political responsibilities for military engagement. While there were intense domestic debates and calls for a diplomatic solution, the Kohl government’s external response to the outbreak of hostilities was perceived as “largely one of awkward silence” (Duffield 1998: 180). Bonn only dispatched at the last possible moment and after a long, and for external observers incomprehensible, debate over Germany’s alliance obligations a small number of fighter jets to Turkey, which were not allowed to participate in any offensive action.

The decision not to participate militarily in the campaign against Iraq was explained with the value of anti-militarism marking the German narrative. The government argued that articles 87a and 26 of the Basic Law restricted the German security space to ‘NATO territory’ and that Bundeswehr engagement in ‘out-of-area’ operations were hence illegitimate, a position which was echoed across party lines. Of course, the constitutional constrains were not as decisive as the government put it; Kohl simply was guided by the understanding that offensive military action was not part of normality, more precisely, where war was not seen as an acceptable continuation of politics but the breakdown thereof. Foreign policy of unified Germany was to remain ‘peace policy’ (Friedenspolitik), aimed at making war a thing of the past (Berger 1996; Duffield 1998). As such, Bonn’s response was a logical consequence of the ‘continuity’ strategy with which the government sought to maintain the familiar narrative of ‘Germany’ and assure both domestic and external audiences that unified Germany would remain a ‘civilian power’.

To its surprise, the German government earned harsh criticism from the US officials and the American media, accusing Germany of being a ‘reluctant ally’ and a ‘free rider’. At the heart of this critique was a sense of lacking reciprocity, specifically the government’s unwillingness to publicly share the political responsibility and to carry the

---

421 Bundestag (1990a: 11/221, 17468-17469); Bundestag 1991a; Genscher (1995: 901f)
422 See Lamers (1991); Zehfuss (2001); Becher (2004: 399-400).
423 The governments decision was accompanied by massive anti-war demonstrations all over Germany, with about 200,000 people protesting in Bonn in late January (see Duffield 1998: 180).
424 Kinkel (1992); Genscher (1995: 907); Duffield (1998); Meiers (2006: 249f). In that sense, I disagree with Hellmann’s (1997) view that the government was not fulfilling US expectations because it was ‘distracted’ by unification.
political burdens for an operation which Washington perceived to be in the “common interest of the West” (Bluth 2000: 57). Bonn’s refusal to openly lend political support to Desert Storm was perceived as a sign of lacking solidarity and unappreciative of American support in the unification process and left the Bush administration “very disenchanted” (Hutchings). Bush warned that “to conclude that these challenges are not everyone’s concern” would put “at risk everything we have achieved” (Riddell 1990). Similarly, the US media commented that “German wobbling puts the Trans-Atlantic partnership at risk” (Hutchings 1997; Hoagland, 1991; Fehr 1991). While Bonn ended up contributing DM 18 billion to Operation Desert Storm, a sum amounting to more than one-third of its annual defense-budget and over half of which went directly to Washington (Otte 2000: 93), in Washington the German contribution was considered “too little, too late” (McArdle Kelleher 1993: 275).

**Quo vadis, Germany?**

As the friendship lens would expect, the American criticism caused anxiety in Bonn. The US perception of unified Germany as a ‘free rider’ which was not contributing to the Western project was destabilizing because it exposed a disconnection between German and American horizons of expectations. Paradoxically, Kohl’s attempt to maintain ‘continuity’ had produced the opposite effect: it raised questions of whether ‘Germany’ really was a reliable and trustworthy partner in the West. To counter this unpleasant dynamic, the government saw a need to re-evaluate the understanding of Germany in the world. According to Karl Lamers, influential foreign policy spokesperson for the CDU, the impact of the Gulf War on German politics was “cathartic” (Lamers 1991b). As Defense Minister Volker Ruehe (CDU) phrased it, the Gulf War had cast “a bright light on the need to redefine united Germany’s international role” (in Duffield 1998: 181). The Kohl government came to realize that just when ‘Germany’ had become a coherent and stable narrative as ‘normal’ state in the Western space, the contours of this space were changing.

It was not so much that the US had extended the spatial horizons of the Western project – after all it had done so many times before with engagements in Korea and Vietnam, and with trying to include Japan in the Western world. The key problem was that becoming a creative agent in the New World Order required adapting the German ‘Civilian power’ narrative embedded in the vision of unfolding into a Greater European Peace Order. Such an adaptation was extremely difficult. When Ruehe conceded that Germany had to face a new reality in which “war…has returned as an instrument of politics” (Ruehe 1992), this ‘reality’ stood in stark contrast to the world in which
Germany had unfolded since 1945 and where it gained its sense of authentic being through the conviction that, in the words of Brandt, war was “the ultima irratio of politics” (in Baumann and Hellmann 2001: 70).

Yet the Kohl government had to come to terms that for Washington a unified Germany was a ‘new’ Germany in the sense of it being a more ‘powerful’ partner expected to act ‘accordingly’. Karl Lamers reminded in an internal paper that “responsibility is contingent upon power” and warned that German denial about its power could lead its Western partners to think the country was back on a Sonderweg: “If Germany acts as if it has no power, it will awaken only mistrust among its neighbors. Germany must therefore acknowledge its power” (cited in Anderson and Goodman 1993: 48). It is worth reminding here that, as discussed in chapter six, ‘power’ here is understood as creative potential. Unification had not suddenly brought more economic and/or military capabilities; if anything, the costs of incorporating the former GDR were draining German resources. Rather, the question was how to use the creative potential of unified Germany-in-Europe, how to adjust the German narrative without losing its authenticity.

Thus, the question was how to re-engage its memory space and draw new lessons from it without discarding the vision of a peaceful Germany-in-Europe. This dilemma was well captured in Lamers’ remark that “without forgetting its history, Germany must become as normal as possible” (in Anderson and Goodman 1993: 48). The government addressed this dilemma with contradicting and vague assurances to its Western partners that German foreign policy would remain “marked by continuity” while at the same time stressing its “reliability and calculability” (Kinkel 1992). Such promises were problematic, of course, as they implied that Germany would remain on its ‘familiar’ path, the definition of which had become less clear. Thus they were followed by promises that Germany was open for “new developments” (Ibid.). Yet such ‘developments’ de facto required a reinterpretation of the desirable order ‘Germany’ was unfolding into, that is, the project unified Germany was responsible for (Baumann and Hellmann 2001). The question, then, became with whom, in advance of what project and through which institution this potential could be used and where the coherence of Germany’s biography could be restored without too much adjustment.

**Signs of Institutional Rivalry**

Scholars like to argue that Bonn and Washington agreed to embed a unified Germany-in-Europe in NATO, CSCE, and EC/WEU, satisfying the various parties involved, and that these were ‘interlocking’ institutions complementing each other (Anderson and
The theoretical lens applied here suggests, instead, that Bonn invested in those three institutional frames to assess through which it could offset the dissonance with the US exposed by the Gulf War, that is, which was most suitable for negotiating its national biography without losing its sense of authenticity.

For reasons noted earlier, the Bush administration made it clear to Kohl that it expected unified Germany to remain in NATO, a requirement shared by France and Britain in their reluctant agreement to unification (Zelikow and Rice 1995: 131f, 141, 154). The US National Security Strategy from March 1990 stressed that NATO was to remain the primary security institution in Europe which “sustains the overall structure of stability” (in Theiler 2003: 185). And while Kohl did not mention NATO in his ‘Ten Points’, he repeatedly assured Bush of the German commitment to NATO (Hutchings 1997: 100; Kohl 1996: 166). Yet as noted earlier, the German commitment to NATO was reading it through the Harmel Report as an institution through which a unified Germany in a Greater European Peace Order could be built. In December 1989 Kohl noted to his NATO colleagues that the goal was “a European peace order in which all Europeans...come together in freedom” (Kohl 1996: 189). Bush appeared to confirm this reading at the same meeting by stating that the Alliance was to provide “the architecture for continued peaceful change” (in Zelikov and Rice 1997: 132). With that assurance, Kohl signed up to NATO’s London declaration from July 1990 which proclaimed NATO as the primary security institution in Europe and agreed to its function as “the principle venue for consultations” in May 1991 (Hutchings 1997: 279).

However, Bonn’s hope that NATO would transform into a forum for negotiating a Greater European Peace Order was compromised by US plans to build a New World Order beyond Europe. Although NATO was not formally involved in the 1991 Gulf War, in the eyes of the US the operation served to redefine NATO’s scope as a more globally oriented institution an attempt which, as we have seen, can be traced back to the late 1960s. The strategic concept agreed upon in Rome in November 1991 suggested that the scope of NATO missions was not limited to Europe by noting that “Alliance security must take account of the global context” (NATO 1991, § 12) and that members “could...be called upon to contribute to global stability” (Ibid, § 41). It also emphasized

425 The notion of ‘interlocking institutions’ was stated in NATO’s 1991 Rome communiqué.
426 Although outside the scope of this analysis, Germany’s attempt to participate in formulating Bush’s ‘New World Order’ included investment in the United Nations (UN). The Kohl government advocated the importance of international law, supported UN ‘peacekeeping’ missions and bid for a permanent seat in the Security Council (Ruehe, 1992a; Thraenert, 1993; Kuehne 1996; Daalgard Nielsen 2006).
the continued primacy of conventional and nuclear capabilities and cleared the ground for the 1992 Oslo agreement which expanded NATO’s strategic scope by adopting the possibility of ‘out of area’ missions authorized by the UN Security Council. The doctrinal shift towards ‘power projection’, pushed forward by the US military, largely sidetracked the political debate (Schake 1998; Sandler and Hartley 1997: 60).

In light of the Iraq experience, these adjustments did not resonate well in Bonn. Yet the Gulf War ‘defection’ had politically weakened the Kohl government and left it with little influence in the negotiations over NATO’s military strategy, exemplified by complaints coming out of the Ministry of Defense about ‘unilateral’ decision-making among NATO allies, a ‘nationalization’ of NATO, and of being downgraded to a ‘second-class member’ (Honig, 1992; Thraenert, 1993).

The Kohl government was more successful in persuading the US to strengthen the non-military dimension of NATO and reach out in cooperation with Central and Eastern Europe. Genscher played a key role in inserting commitments to preventive diplomacy into the Rome document which emphasized the importance of CSCE (Genscher 1995: 787ff.; Otte 2000: 170ff). Yet for Washington this link was a concession to Bonn in an attempt to keep it from investing in alternative institutions rather than a genuine determination to transform NATO in this direction. While the Bush administration accepted the ‘Helsinki Principles’ as part of the negotiations about Germany’s future in an ‘All-European process’ and saw CSCE as a potentially useful instrument for promoting political and economic liberalism in Eastern Europe (Hutchings 1997: 191f.), at bottom it still considered CSCE a ‘Soviet design’ resurfacing in Gorbachev’s vision of a ‘Common European Home’ and, hence, “the most unwieldy European forum imaginable” (Hoagland 1989; Zelikow and Rice 1995: 127, 133).

Whereas the US gave only low key and last-minute support for CSCE meetings, Bonn held high expectations for this institution (Genscher 1995: 320). In his Ten Point Plan Kohl had described the CSCE process as the heart piece of the ‘Greater European’ architecture and the government put great efforts in revitalizing it (Kohl 1996: 165f., Peters 1999). As one astute observer notes, in the reform process of CSCE and the EC the Germans were “the movers and shapers” (Pond 1991: 125). The assessment that CSCE could be used for building a Greater European Peace Order was widespread around the time of its rejuvenation in November 1990 with the ‘Charter of Paris’, and, indeed, the view that CSCE might be a potential alternative to NATO was not
uncommon across the political spectrum.  

The most significant move, however, occurred in the reform of the EC. As noted earlier, the main partner in the EC was France, which had made Kohl’s commitment to European integration a precondition for supporting German unification. Building on the dynamic from the 1980s, the idea of European unity was taken head on during the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in 1990/91, where Bonn and Paris shifted the emphasis of the EC from economic to political unity. An initiative by Kohl and Mitterand from December 1990 called for a strengthening of the Community’s political and security realm, followed by a number of further Franco-German initiatives pushing for the integration of the WEU into the EU and suggesting to expand the German-Franco brigade into a multinational corps answerable to the EU (‘the Eurocorps’) (Meiers 2006: 125-138). This set the agenda for negotiations among EC members leading to the integration of the EPC into the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) and to the creation of a pillar of ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’ (CFSP) within the EU’s new institutional framework. By pushing for the prospect of having defence issues discussed in the EU, the Treaty broke with the understanding that ‘defence’ was a term exclusively reserved for NATO (Hill and Smith 2000: 152).

That these developments in the EC did not quite fit Bush’s ‘Atlantic frame’ and laid the groundwork for a potential alternative to NATO was recognized in Washington. The Bush administration worried that Kohl was responding to French overtures of creating an institution which was “taking Germany farther away” from NATO and responded sharply. In the ‘Bartholomew-telegram’ from February 1991 the US warned EC members rather undiplomatically not to undertake “efforts to construct a European pillar by redefining and limiting NATO’s role” (Meiers 2006: 219). Later that year at NATO’s Rome summit Bush claimed that the US was “an unhesitating proponent of the aim and process of European integration” yet warned that this should not lead to a “European alternative to the Alliance”. Behind close doors, he bluntly asked “if Western Europe intends to create a security organization outside the Alliance, tell me now!” (Hutchings 1997: 277-281).

The American warnings effectively put German commitment to NATO on the spot. In an attempt to alleviate tensions Bonn reassured Washington that NATO was to remain

---

428 "The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy" (Article J.4, 1, TEU).
the primary security institution. The purpose of CFSP was not to establish a rival to NATO but, resorting to Kennedy's metaphor, to strengthen the 'European pillar' of the Atlantic Alliance and, as such, to bring France closer to NATO. To this end, the German government successfully lobbied for the ominous *European Security and Defense Identity* (ESDI) within NATO and came to echo the British view that WEU served as a 'bridge' within NATO (Tams 1999; Kirchner 2000; Theiler 2003: 184ff; Hilz 2005). In turn, Bush renewed his offer for building the New World Order as partners in leadership, and he expressed his hope that "a more united Europe offers the United States a more effective partner, prepared for larger responsibilities" (in Lundestad 1998: 116). However, the estrangement dynamic could not be reversed. As the next section shows, the German-American dissonance over the meaning of the Western project was further exposed over the question how to respond to the conflict in Bosnia.

**Exposing Dissonance II: Bosnia (1992-95)**

Tensions among groups in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) had been rising since 1991 and in Bosnia war broke out in April 1992. The 'Europe' this conflict portrayed was neither 'whole' nor 'free', let alone 'at peace'. Yet between Washington and Bonn there was no consensus as to what this conflict meant, that is, how it was integrated into the Western project and how to engage it.

**America: 'No Dog in This Fight'**

In contrast to the Gulf War, the US government decided to play a low-key role and not to intervene. Counter to previous assurances that the US "shares Europe's neighbourhood", the Bush administration now applied a very narrow interpretation of the Western space and considered the Balkans as peripheral to its agenda of building a post-Cold War world. As such, NATO was not to become involved. In the words of NATO's Supreme Allied Command Europe, the Balkans were "not within NATO's defense zone" (in Hutchings 1997: 308). Robert Hutchings' recollection that "We never decided whether important US interests were at stake. We never decided whether Yugoslavia mattered enough" (Hutchings 1997: 312) is revealing in itself, yet US

---

429 Bush noted to Weizsaecker in 1992: "Just as Germany has transcended...its past, so has the German-American relationship shed the burdens that were history's legacy. A united Germany, champion of a more united Europe, now stands as our partner in leadership. Together, we have achieved our common goal of a Germany united in peace and freedom. But our partnership did not end with that. To the contrary: now that we are free of the dangers and divisions of Europe's Cold War confrontation, the German-American partnership has really just begun." (cited in Hutchings 1997: 162).

430 Hutchings (1997); VanHoonacker (2001)

passivity indicates — and others, like Senator John McCain, noted more openly — that neither was the case. Hutchings’ acknowledgment that the watchword for American policy became “We got no dog in this fight” is another way of saying that the conflict did not touch on US ‘vital interests’ and an engagement did not seem to contribute to the Western project. As Lene Hansen notes in her analysis of the US discourse on Bosnian conflict, the Balkans were conceived as spatially outside ‘Western civilisation’ (Hansen 2006: 105ff., 136).

To be sure, as Hansen (2006: 135) points out, there were voices in Congress calling for US engagement, but these remained ineffective until Clinton shifted course in 1995. Behind the American reluctance to get involved was the administration’s lack of a robust utopia for a peaceful ‘Europe’, that is, the missing of a clear vision of a desirable European order it wanted to invest in. That Bush was not really committed to a Europe ‘whole and free’ became visible in the assessment that ‘unity’ and ‘freedom’ seemed to contradict each other as a meaningful principle for ‘peace’; and in the American narrative the latter trumped the former, with Baker stressing on a visit to Belgrade that the US would “always choose democracy over unity” (cited in Hutchings 1997: 310). Supporting the principle of self-determination yet not the unity of ‘Europe’ was made easier in that Yugoslavia’s disintegration was seen as part of the process of self-determination in Europe.

Ambiguity concerning the desirability of a unified Europe was complemented by the view that ‘unity’ among people in the Balkans was difficult, if not impossible to accomplish. The dominant interpretation in the Bush administration was that the fighting was the inevitable result of historical tensions, ‘ancient hatreds’, which had been ‘deep frozen’ under the East-West conflict (Hutchings 1997: 318; Hansen 2006: 107ff., 134). Thus, although some sceptics saw this as a prelude for what could happen in all of Europe with the order of Yalta gone, in the administration the view prevailed that the fighting was a ‘local’ conflict, not representative of something ‘bigger’. This reading further justified US non-engagement by integrating the image of the Balkans as a quagmire into the American narrative through the memory of ‘Vietnam’. With the swift victory in the Gulf War just having added an experience widely seen as ‘overcoming’

433 Hansen (2006: 148-156) attributes the popularity of this image to Clinton reading Robert Kaplan’s ‘Balkan Ghosts’. Given that the narrative was already present during the Bush administration, Hansen’s argument, in my view, exaggerates the importance of Kaplan’s text.
434 The scenario of the resurfacing of “long oppressed ethnic antagonism and national rivalries” was formulated most famously by Mearsheimer (1990), who famously argued that the breakup of the Soviet Union would lead to new instabilities in Europe.
the trauma of Vietnam, the possibility of becoming entangled in a civil war with complex ethnic roots in a 'far away place' trumped the humanitarian discourse (Hansen 2006: 134, 138; Hutchings 1997: 314). While Clinton had vowed to change course, his administration maintained its predecessor's interpretation of the conflict as one of ancient hatreds and, thus, continued the passive stance until 1995 (see below).

During the electoral campaign in 1992 Clinton had criticized Bush for "failing to provide a broad vision of America's world role" (Hyland 1999: 16). Once in the White House, he formulated such a broad (and familiar) role, namely of America as a global force for the good life, promoting the pacifying power of liberal values and the humanitarian purpose of UN peacekeeping missions. National Security Advisor Anthony Lake described the strategic outlook of the Clinton administration as one of 'pragmatic neo-Wilsonianism' and 'helping the helpless', criticized by others as an attempt to "turn American foreign policy into a branch of social work" (Mandelbaum 1996: 18; Hyland 1999: 58). In this narrative European unity was not a prominent concern, symbolised by Secretary of State Warren Christopher's note that American policy had been too 'Eurocentric' (Smith and Woolcock 1994; Hyland 1999: 94). The Bosnian conflict was considered a 'European problem' which could be safely left outside the 'global' responsibility of the US.

'Europe' entered Clinton's world when half-hearted interventions in Somalia and Haiti in 1993 exposed a lack of determination in his approach and drew heavy domestic criticism. He sought to counter this slump by revitalizing the Western project with European friends, taking up an invitation made by Kohl already back in November 1992 (Lundestad 1998: 124). Visiting Europe for the first time in January 1994, almost a year after his inauguration, Clinton worked hard to reassure his counterparts of US support for European integration (Clinton 1994; Eizenstat 1994). Yet while his positive assessment of the EU as an economic partner carrying a liberal world order and his call for a new transatlantic security partnership "improved the atmosphere", his visit did not address deeper issues (Smith and Woolcock 1994: 473f.; Clinton 1994; Lundestad 1998). Specifically, it was not accompanied by a shared reading of the conflict in Bosnia and did not lead to a significant US investment in the vision of a European Peace Order.

---

435 In his inaugural address Clinton promised that "our hopes, our hearts and our hands are with those on every continent who are building democracy and freedom. Their cause is America's cause".
As noted earlier, the Kohl government had intimately linked the notion of unified Germany unfolding in a united Europe, claiming that Germany's "European path" would be "without any alternative" (Kinkel 1992a). The debate on German responsibility in the wake of Iraq was considered "fundamental for the future of our country and the part we want to play in Europe" (Lamers 1991). Such claims, voiced parallel to the negotiations leading to the Maastricht Treaty, were possible because there was a strong sense of shared commitment among governments of EC member states to invest in a 'united Europe'. Yet it was still necessary to concretize this vision and, by doing so, the 'European path'.

One of the dominant images coming out of the Maastricht negotiations was that of 'Europe' as a pacifying project, which closely resonated with the narrative of Germany in a European Peace Order. The Kohl government, together with governments of other EC member states, took the conflict in Bosnia as an opportunity for manifesting the commitment to build a European Peace Order by framing it as that what 'Europe' could be allowed to not become. Rather than placing the Balkans outside the Western space, the conflict was pictured as "the return of war into the heart of Europe" (Ruehe 1994). And rather than viewing it as tragic yet local conflict which was inevitable due to unbridgeable ethnic divides and ancient hatred (the US version) it was pictured as a challenge to the European Peace Order. In other words, the fighting was integrated in the narrative of Germany-in-Europe as a dystopia, a negative vision of 'Europe' as a fragmented space. This image also was formed out of the memory space of Europe's conflictual past, yet where the White House saw a conflict limited to the Balkans, German policymakers together with European colleagues magnified the conflict into a vision of European fragmentation as a possibility to be prevented. Mobilizing memories of the First World War having been 'triggered' in Sarajevo, the view was nurtured that, once again, the Balkans could be burying the prospect of peace in Europe raising the possibility of 'Balkanization' of the European space. The dystopia was captured by Claus Leggewie in the question "Does Europe end in Sarajevo?" (Leggewie 1993).

In Bonn the answer was a resounding 'no'. Policymakers agreed that decisive action was

---

436 As Christopher Hill (1998: 34) has shown, following Maastricht the EU was perceived as potentially (1) a replacement for the USSR in the world balance of power, (2) a regional pacifier, (3) a global intervener, (4) a mediator of conflicts, (5) a bridge between the rich and the poor and (6) a joint supervisor of the world economy.

437 The 1994 Whitebook of the Ministry of Defense warned that "the development towards peaceful coexistence in the whole of Europe is not irreversible" (Weissbuch 1994: 23, 27, 30).
needed to "clarify that Europe won't allow its values to be ridiculed in this manner" (Lowack 1994). In a speech to the Bundestag in January 1994, Kohl argued that the conflict demonstrated that the development of a European Peace Order and the political unity of Europe were "more important than ever". He famously claimed that "the question of European unity has always been a question of war and peace (...) The fact that we can look back on 48 years of peace...is partly the result of the ability of Europe to come together" (Kohl 1994). This was echoed in an influential position paper published by the CDU caucus in September 1994, during the German EU presidency, which argued that the unity of Europe was at risk. And "if Europe were to drift apart" the paper warned it would be "difficult for Germany to give a clear orientation to its internal order" (Lamers 1994: 105).

In short, by framing it as a warning what 'Germany-in-Europe' could become if it was not for integration, the Bosnian conflict served to strengthen the commitment to a vision of a European Peace Order with EC member states. Just as Adenauer had used 'Korea' to mobilize the dystopia of a communist Europe for manifesting German commitment to the Western space of 'freedom', now the commitment to idea of 'peace-through-unity' was confirmed through the dystopia of Europe's disintegration (Waever 1996; 1998).

**Adjusting the German Narrative**

As discussed in Chapter Six, an ontology of authentic becoming holds that the vision toward which leaders direct the narrative of 'the state' guides their policies. Consequently, Bonn's framing of the Bosnian conflict as a commitment to the vision of a Greater European Peace Order also mandated a 'peaceful' solution to the conflict, that is, it confirmed the superiority of civilian means. The Kohl government put significant effort into mobilizing EC/EU diplomacy and devising "a new form of crisis management" through a strengthened CSCE (Genscher 1995: 320ff.; 759f.). Yet diplomatic efforts, monitoring missions and sanctions through CSCE and EC/WEU did not prevent the tensions from escalating, neither did UN conferences, the 'Vance-Owen' diplomacy and arms embargos against Belgrade. The CFSP initiative by Kinkel and his French counterpart Juppé in November 1993 also showed no significant effect, and Bonn's hope for a diplomatic solution was laid to rest as UN 'peacekeepers' were unable to protect declared 'safe havens' and prevent mass killings in Srebrenica in July 1995 (Hilz 2005: 255-256; Genscher 1995; Meiers 2006).

In light of these developments, the Kohl government had to push for a change of the German narrative. The Gulf War had already made clear that military means had not
been banned from the Western project, and the apparent failure of civilian means in bringing the conflict in Bosnia to an end raised the possibility of military intervention there. Given its investment in a European Peace Order and its commitment to avoid European ‘fragmentation’ the Kohl government could not ‘defect’ from such a possibility. After all, under the German presidency the WEU had in June 1992 committed itself to engage in “humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking”, the so-called Petersberg tasks (Western European Union 1992). The problem was that the latter remained outside the horizons of the German narrative. Despite declaring the Balkans to be at the heart of Europe, they were outside the territory of NATO member states and, thus, outside the space of possibility of military engagement in Germany’s world. To be able to support any kind of military engagement ‘out of area’ an adjustment of this space was required.

In March 1993 the government introduced a bill to clarify the ‘casus foederis’, arguing that military missions ‘abroad’ were to be allowed under a UN mandate without change of the constitution (Gutjahr 1994: 217). In a landmark decision, the Federal Supreme Court in July 1994 confirmed this position. The Court argued that a lack of German support in UN missions would lead to a loss of confidence in its Buendnisfaehigkeit among Western allies. Referring to Article 24 of the Basic Law which states that “With a view to maintaining peace, the Federation may enter into a system of mutual collective security”, the Court argued that participation in ‘out of area’ missions was in harmony with the Basic Law as long as these missions took place within the framework of ‘systems of collective security’ “strictly bound to the preservation of peace” and approved by a simple majority of the Bundestag. Importantly, in the Court’s view the UN, CSCE, WEU and NATO all qualified as systems of collective security.438

While the ruling opened the door to significant changes, doorstops were put in place to ensure it would not be opened too widely. In addition to the Court’s insistence on the need for parliamentary approval, the government echoed the peace ‘preserving’ aim of any Bundeswehr activity and emphasized that military force remained the very last resort and also limited the spatial horizon of possible out-of-area engagements. Kinkel

438 BVerfG: Urteil 12. Juli 1994, Pkt. 5b, reprinted in Stichworte zur Sicherheitspolitik, 7/1993, p. 17. While the Court was criticized for defining alliances such as NATO and WEU as systems of collective security, which for critics was reserved for UN and CSCE, the Court’s view corresponds to the treatment of these organisations in this thesis. However the debate can be seen as reflecting domestic differences about which institution was most appropriate for embedding Germany’s ontological security. See also Meiers (2006: 274-277). For a detailed legal-political analysis of ‘systems of collective security’, see Jaberg (1996).
assured that “normalcy in foreign and security policy does not mean to act as the worlds policeman, it does not mean to send German soldiers to all the burning spots worldwide” (Kinkel 1994b). The 1994 Whitebook of the Ministry of Defense stated the primary goal of security policy to be “the political formation [Gestaltung] of peace in the near and expanded periphery of Germany” (Weissbuch 1994: 43; Ruehe, 1995), and Kohl declared that the Bundeswehr would not get involved in territories which had once been occupied by the Wehrmacht. In other words, there were limits to support for ‘out of area’ missions if the ‘Civilian Power’ narrative of Germany-in-Europe was to maintain its authenticity.

The adaptation of Germany’s national biography was practically manifested in the support of NATO’s air-campaign in Bosnia in June 1995 with non-combat forces and occurred on the back of a tense and well-documented domestic debate. The coherence of the narrative was maintained by arguing that the German memory space generated two lessons, namely the moral maxim ‘never again genocide’ and ‘never again war’, and that if the two were in conflict the former trumped the latter. This reinterpretation was made possible, first, because it was inscribed into the utopia of a European Peace Order emphasising ‘unity’ and supported by the dystopia of the disintegration of the value space of ‘Europe’, with Joschka Fischer of the Green Party famously arguing that pacifists could not accept “the new form of fascism” he saw in Bosnia (Fischer 1995). Thus, as with Adenauer, a dystopia was used to generate significant changes to the antimilitarism of the German narrative. Second, as suggested by the friendship lens, the government argued that the change was necessary because core partners committed to the same vision expected Germany to adopt this new stance. As Kinkel argued, the ‘culture of restraint’ was not acceptable to Western friends who had liberated ‘Germany’ in 1945 and who now expected Germans to “actively contribute towards the protection of the international order...especially in Europe” (Kinkel 1994a). Yet, again, the government made clear there were limits to maintain the coherence of the biographical narrative. The use of force was to be a ‘last resort’ if all else had failed. As Kinkel stressed, “especially we Germans want to hold on to the culture of non-violence, dialogue, and the readiness to compromise” (Kinkel 1994a).

The crucial point for the present argument is that this adjustment of the German narrative did not occur primarily with the US and within NATO. Instead, the Kohl

---

439 The Bundestag approved with 386 to 285 votes, 11 abstentions, see Otte (2000: 104).
government embedded the redefinition of German ‘responsibility’ in foreign and security policy in the project of European integration (Kreile 1996). This must be looked at more closely.

**Estrangement: Doubts about NATO/US**

The US did not appear as the most attractive partner and NATO not the most suitable institution in which this adjustment of the German narrative could be safely negotiated. Washington’s hesitancy to get involved in Bosnia had already cast doubt over its commitment to a Greater European Peace Order and this doubt was confirmed when the US became involved more actively.

In 1995 the Clinton administration shifted course and declared the conflict in Bosnia a Western matter that could only be solved with US leadership through NATO. Suddenly the Balkans became a symbol for “Europe’s freedom and Europe’s stability” and “vital to our own national security” (Clinton 1995 in Hansen 1995g). As Hansen points out, this shift in the American narrative was made possible by replacing the image of a localised conflict at the margins of Europe beset by ‘ancient hatred’ with an image of ‘genocide’ occurring at the heart of Europe and within a multi-ethnic Western space (Hansen 2006: 140-144). Although in this aspect Clinton’s narrative connected with the German reading, the shift did not reflect a commitment for the same project. The American incorporation of the Balkans into the Western space and through NATO was not the same as investing in the vision of a European Peace Order. While before his administration had effectively vetoed European diplomatic initiatives, Clinton now claimed that the US needed to take on the responsibility of leadership because “Europe alone could not end the conflict” and it was necessary to bring in America as “freedom’s greatest champion”. In a Newsweek article entitled *Why Bosnia Matters To America*, Clinton justified US engagement as necessary not only to end human suffering and build a peaceful Europe, but also to maintain NATO’s status as the dominant institution for ordering Europe: “If the US does not do its part in a NATO mission...we would also weaken NATO – the anchor of America’s and Europe’s security – and jeopardize US leadership in Europe” (Clinton 1995b).

The problem was that in doing ‘its part’ in the NATO mission the US was not engaging in shared world building. The memory of Vietnam, revived by the debacle in Somalia in

---

441 Bonn was frustrated by US rejection of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, the lack of US support for the EU Action Plan and that in May 1993 it excluded Germany from the talks producing an alternative Joint Action Programme (Owen 1995: 179).
October 1993, remained too powerful and made it impossible for the Clinton administration to commit to ground troops. Instead, it continued to press for a strategy of ‘lift (the sanctions) and strike (from the air)’, a practice opposed by European NATO allies who wanted to uphold sanctions and strengthen the UN troops stationed on the ground (Owen 1995; Hansen 2006). When Washington got its way, NATO allies were sidelined in the planning and conduct of combat operations, as well as in the peace negotiations leading to the Dayton agreement. Resentment about US dominance – of not being treated as an equal – transpired also into German criticism of how the US approached the peace-building task, such as its rejection of UN oversight of civilian relief efforts in coordination with peacekeepers and its plans to rearm the Bosnian army (Whitney, 1995).442

In short, the Bosnia experience confirmed what had been become apparent in the Gulf War, namely that despite Clinton’s charm offensive in 1994 the American narrative had moved the Western project away from the vision of a Greater European Peace Order. This turned the American claim for leadership through NATO into a problem. US passivity had prevented the institution from taking a more active role early on and the sideling of Allies during the operation, stretching into the post-conflict stage, had exposed the limits of US willingness to work together. Given the Court’s ‘door opener’ mentioned earlier, this raised the concern in Bonn that the US path of action might not come to support the vision of a European Peace Order through which the ‘out of area’ adjustment had been justified. In other words, the government might sign off on a NATO mission whose conduct and consequences come to violate domestic values. In crude terms, the relationship with the US within NATO had become a generator rather than a controlling mechanism of German anxiety.443

**Emancipation: Investment in CFSP/France**

As for the alternatives, the high hopes for CSCE as a forum for building a Greater European Peace Order had not been fulfilled. Formally Bonn continued to support CSCE, most notably by turning it into an actual organisation (OSCE), yet US disinterest in the institution and its apparent ineffectiveness in ‘managing’ the Bosnian conflict diminished its value considerably for negotiating German authentic becoming.

---

442 The US oversaw NATO’s Implementation Force to which Bonn contributed 4,000 troops (Schake 1998).
443 Scholars have identified this in more traditional ‘alliance’ terminology as a German/European fear of entrapment (Press-Barnathan 2006; Hilz 2005).
While Bosnia had also exposed what Christopher Hill (1993) famously called the “capability-expectations gap” of CFSP, building an alternative through the EU with France as the creative partner appeared the most promising option. Already during Germany’s 1994 EU presidency a consensus formed in the government that it was necessary to give ‘face and voice’ to CFSP. The 1994 coalition treaty and the subsequent Bundestag address of the re-elected Kohl government voiced support for the development of an independent European security and defence identity (Bundestag 1994c). Four of the five central security objectives listed in the Whitebook explicitly linked German security to European integration, with only one stressing the importance of the transatlantic alliance “because the global power of the United States is indispensable for international stability” before in a separate point calling for the creation of a “new security order encompassing all European states” (Whitebook 1994: 42).

The aforementioned CDU position paper called for closer cooperation with France and the deepening of European integration by “raising the Franco-German relationship to a new level”. It suggested creating a French-German “hard core” and in improving CFSP’s capacity for “effective action”, explicitly noting that this would constitute an “indispensable factor in endowing the EU [read: Germany] with an identity of its own” (Lamers 1994: 113). The paper even went so far as suggesting that “the USA can no longer play its traditional role” and that Germany’s relations with France were now “the yardstick by which to measure its sense of belonging to the West’s community of shared political and cultural values” (Ibid., 112). This was accompanied by a number of high level affirmations of the French-German ‘special relationship’ in the Summer of 1994, symbolized in the participation of German Eurocorps units in the 14 July parade in Paris. The sincerity of this shift towards France was also indicated by the concern among Atlanticists that the Kohl government was undermining the Germany’s Western identity and even ‘the West’ as such.444

To be sure, this move did not involve a denouncement of the German-American relationship or of German commitment to NATO. Emancipation is a painful and slow process and among conservatives, in particular, the Atlantic Alliance continued to enjoy high support (Leggewie 1993: 20; Schaeuble 1994). Kohl did not stop calling NATO the “security anchor” and “bedrock” of Europe’s security architecture (Duffield 1998: 118)

444 See Weissmann (1994); Gillessen (1994); Diner (1994); Baring (1994). Similar voices are found among conservatives in the US (Gompert 1997). For debates between ‘Europeanists’ and ‘Atlanticists’ over what role the US could/should (not) play in Europe, see Weidenfeld (1996).
and liked to claim that ‘Germany’ was equally committed to relationships with the US and with France, always courting both as ‘core allies’. Along the same times, German officials always assured that their institutional commitments in the EU and in NATO were complementary. Again, Kennedy’s metaphor of the two pillars proved particularly helpful here. Policymakers in Bonn and Washington could agree about the idea of the WEU as the ‘European pillar’ of NATO and put in place various rhetorical and institutional links between the two. These bridges always seemed to uphold the primacy of NATO, such as in the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), which would make “collective assets” available for WEU operations “on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council” (NATO 1994, Sect. 6) and the earlier mentioned idea of a European Security and Defence Identity within NATO, supported by Clinton during his 1994 visit and confirmed at the 1996 Berlin summit.

The key problem (or appeal) with the ‘pillar’ metaphor was that the question what ‘roof’ the European pillar was carrying was ultimately left open: was it NATO, or was NATO the second pillar? And if WEU/CFSP and NATO were two pillars standing next to each other, what roof were they carrying? This was the question of the common project. And from that angle, the issue was not one of complementarity between institutions but one of resonance among significant others about visions of European order. And so it was in an attempt to improve the latter that Bonn continued to cooperate with France to enhance WEU capabilities and integrate them into the EU, as in a French-German ‘Common Security and Defense Concept’ from December 1996 and during the following Intergovernmental Conference in Amsterdam (Jopp and Schmuck 1996; Hilz 2005: 163-179; Meiers 2006: 1138-156).

Conclusion
This chapter assessed the argument that German investment in CFSP was a reaction to a process of estrangement in German-American relations. It provided evidence for enduring dissonance between German and American narratives of being-in-the-world which rendered NATO unsuitable as a forum through which to negotiate a shared project in which an authentic German narrative could be embedded and provided a rationale for creating an alternative.

---

445 See Duffield (1998); Hilz (2005); Meiers (2006). Kohl’s comment to US Ambassador Robert Kimmitt that while France was Germany’s ‘closest’ ally he considered America to be its ‘most important’ ally is exemplary (Bering 1999: 45).
Continuing a trend started by Kissinger (see chapter nine), this chapter showed lacking support for the vision of a united Europe as envisioned by Germany among all three US administrations (Reagan, Bush, Clinton). The view that such a ‘Europe’ did not contribute to America’s narrative as the leader of the Western world was strongest under Reagan and ambiguous under Bush. The chapter showed that German unease with Reagan was alleviated by Kohl’s commitment to the friendship and by his strategy of ‘normalization’ and that the ‘Bonn-Washington’ nexus over the issue of German unification disrupted the estrangement process only on the surface. The close cooperation between Bush and Kohl was merely hiding the dissonance by blending out the question of how to order ‘Europe’ and how a united Germany would be integrated in the Western project. While both sides thus considered the relationship as a creative source for building a post-Cold War world, by blending out the parameters which had nurtured the estrangement process the Bonn-Washington’ nexus gave the misleading impression that their horizons of expectations were aligned when in fact they were not. As such, the collaboration over German unification raised false expectations.

It was demonstrated that the dissonance resurfaced in interpretations of the 1990 Iraq invasion of Kuwait and the conflict in Bosnia. Different view of what these events meant for the Western project and, correspondingly, how to respond to them revealed that horizons of expectations were not aligned. The Gulf War challenged the German narrative in positing that the global projection of military force was considered an acceptable part of the Western project, exerting pressure on the Kohl government to adjust. The German reading of the conflict in Bosnia as a confirmation of its commitment to a Greater European Peace Order and, by contrast, the American view that Bosnia was situated outside the Western space and its hesitancy to get involved further confirmed the dissonance. American leadership in building Western order through NATO thus generated anxiety in Bonn and rendered the Atlantic Alliance unsuitable for adjusting the German narrative and ‘opening the door’ to ‘out of area’ missions. Hence, the chapter suggested that the Kohl government pursued a strategy of emancipation by turning to France as that friend with whom it could invest in (W)EU/CFSP as an alternative forum for negotiating a project which required less compromise to the authenticity of the German narrative.
CHAPTER ELEVEN: CONCLUSION

This thesis has attempted to assess, conceptually and empirically, the motives behind the emergence and the decline of interstate security cooperation, defined as the costly investment in a common international institution and applied to German-American relations between 1945 and 1995. It took as its starting point Germany’s subsequent investment in three different security institutions for the purpose of ‘European security’ which over time came to exclude the United States, namely (what became) NATO, CSCE and CFSP. This investment was framed as a phenomenon of German-American security cooperation moving from ‘consensus’ (1945-55) via ‘tension’ (1965-75) to ‘divergence’ (1985-95). When the logical thrust of the three main IR theories – realism, institutionalism and constructivism – were shown to be unable to provide a coherent explanation for this dynamic, the phenomenon turned into a puzzle (chapter one). Against this backdrop, the thesis attempted to build a new theoretical argument for explaining interstate security cooperation and apply it to the historical case of German-American cooperation. Below I briefly summarize the argument and highlight some of the contributions to IR theory and to our understanding of German-American security cooperation.

Argument

The basic argument advanced in this thesis was that states invest in common international institutions to pursue a shared project of ‘world building’. More precisely, it was suggested that (1) states are driven by the aim to control anxiety through the formulation of a meaningful narrative of (coming into) ‘being-in-the-world’ and that (2) the formulation and practical maintenance of such an authentic biographical narrative is pursued with states regarded as friends. It was further argued that (3) enduring dissonance between friends about visions of order signifies a process of estrangement which brings ambiguity in the biographical narrative and undermines the friendship’s ability to control anxiety. And if states cannot reduce this dissonance (4) they will pursue a strategy of emancipation by seeking new friends with whom they can invest in an alternative/new institution to pursue a world building project which better accommodates their understanding of meaningful becoming. Using this theoretical lens, the dynamic of German-American cooperation was captured as moving from friendship (consensus) to estrangement (tensions) and, eventually, emancipation (divergence) and explained with (dis)agreements among political leaders over visions of a peaceful European order and its place in respective national biographies.
I explored this argument empirically beginning with chapter eight, which examined the shared commitment to NATO in the post-war decade (1945-55). It was argued that the German-American consensus of NATO as the security institution for ordering ‘Europe’ rested on the agreement of a shared project of ‘world building’ in which respective national biographies – narratives of authentic becoming – were embedded. More precisely, the chapter showed that policymakers in Bonn and in Washington, in their attempt to meaningfully inscribe ‘being-in-Europe’ in respective national biographies, came to share the vision of a ‘United States of Europe’ marked by ‘freedom’ and ‘unity’. This shared vision generated commitment to building such a ‘Europe’ in the Western space through NATO, a project in which the US was willing to regard ‘Germany’ as an equal partner and Adenauer could reciprocate by pushing for rearmament. It was shown that against French opposition and buttressed by the dystopia of a communist Germany-in-Europe, Adenauer and US administrations under Truman and Eisenhower worked closely together to bring the FRG into NATO.

While both sides remained committed to the value of ‘freedom’, chapters nine and ten suggested that a gradual withdrawal of US commitment to the vision of a ‘united’ Europe came into conflict with a growing German vision of a Greater European Peace Order, leading to (dis)agreements about the suitability of NATO for negotiating their respective national biographies of ‘Germany’ and ‘America’ in the world. Specifically, the analysis of the second period (1965-1975) developed in chapter nine highlighted the dissonance between Brandt’s and Kissinger/Nixon’s conception of a peaceful ‘Europe’, with the former pursuing a transformative and the latter a static/conservative vision. In an effort to maintain the friendship and, thus, the commitment to build the West through NATO, this dissonance and the sense of lacking reciprocity was muted by silence on contentious issues, such as Vietnam, by channelling diverging paths through NATO’s emphasis on détente, and by an American approach of ‘indifference’ to Brandt’s attempt to pursue the vision of Germany-in-(Greater)Europe through CSCE.

Finally, chapter ten examined German-American dissonance about the meaning and desirability of a ‘united Europe’ in the Western project period surrounding the end of the Cold War (1985-95). It was argued that tensions were visible during the Reagan administration and that close cooperation between Kohl and the Bush administration over German unification misled both sides in assuming that horizons of expectations were now aligned. The chapter showed that dissonance was exposed in disagreements over how to integrate the 1990 Iraq invasion of Kuwait and the conflict in Bosnia into
the Western project. Whereas US administrations expected unified Germany to support the widening of the Western space in a post-Cold War world, the Kohl government feared a direction which did not contribute to the building of a Greater European Peace Order and could not accommodate the anti-militarism principle, thus alienating ‘Germany’ from its authentic post-45 narrative. This led the Kohl government to invest, via the WEU, in CFSP.

Contributions
The first contribution the thesis makes is that it offers a strategy for how to build a theory (of interstate security cooperation). It puts forward the notion of a ‘deep theory’ as a causal narrative starting on the level of ontology which anchors the meaning of the state and its ‘national security interest’ in an account of the human condition (chapter two). It suggests that this offers a new way to understand the meaning of a ‘common security interest’ as one of sustaining a shared project which enables authentic becoming. In this context, the thesis suggests an approach of ‘creative theorizing’ taking place in two steps: (i) the unravelling of existing paradigms in IR for discerning conceptual openings, in this case realism, institutionalism and constructivism, which then are engaged by (ii) drawing on philosophical insights, in this case making particular use of Heidegger and Aristotle.446 Even if the result is still more a conceptual skeleton than a fully fledged theory, I suggest the discussion redirects thinking about interstate (German-American) relations in a number of ways.

First, reading the human condition with Heidegger points to anxiety as the foundational sentiment of ‘being-in-the-world’ (chapter four), which offers an alternative to the Hobbesian reading that humans react to uncertainty with fear. It builds on the phenomenological insight that one cannot have an experience of death and, hence, cannot have knowledge about what to fear to suggest that the unknowability of the future makes the Self anxious, not fearful. While the empirical discussion outlined the anxiety-raising conditions among policymakers, the ‘Potsdam complex’ in the German case and the ‘Rapallo complex’ in the American case (see, in particular, chapter eight), anxiety is a feeling and difficult to record. One can trace its effects, however, by paying attention to the strategies employed by the Self to control anxiety and, thus, understand the ‘national interest’ as the formulation of a coherent and authentic national biography (e.g., Williams 2005).

446 Again, the fact that these two thinkers inspired the argument at crucial stages does not mean that it intends or pretends to be a Heideggerian or an Aristotelian theory of IR.
Second, by advancing a dynamic ontology of 'the state' as something that unfolds in time and space, the thesis offers an alternative to the static and exclusive ontology of states associated with Hobbesian ontology. It contributes to the "next step in Constructivist IR Theory" by 'endogenizing' the analysis of state identity (Cedermann and Daase 2003), although this step remains one in the direction Onuf (1989) originally laid out, namely to study the 'world of our making'. More precisely, my conceptualization of the state as a narrative of 'authentic becoming' defining its existence through a coherent national biography (chapter five) suggests a re-reading of the spatio-temporal configuration of 'the state'. It stresses the notion of an experienced space, a meaningful environment reaching beyond Westphalian boundaries and encompassing that 'world' which has gained meaning and become 'known' (disclosed) through significant experience. The philosophical grounding of the need for historical analogies and visions as anxiety controlling mechanisms directs attention to the temporal ordering of this space by pointing to the creative act of transforming memories into meaningful visions lending direction to unfolding. It highlights the importance of memory and visions as politically contested existentials in the sense of manifesting the existence of 'the state' in a national biography.

The existential reading of the state as a national biography directs attention to a certain reading of what drives the security policy of governments. Rather than focusing on survival understood as the maintenance of territorial integrity, the thesis supports the argument that states strive for 'ontological security' (e.g., Mitzen 2006). That said, it goes beyond the Giddensian focus on 'routine practices' by emphasizing the desire for authenticity which, it was argued, cannot be satisfied by routines (chapter four). In this current, the argument that governments are primarily concerned with formulating a coherent narrative of, for instance, 'Germany' situated in space and time offers an alternative to the argument advanced by Haftendorn (1984) that 'unity' and 'security' were conflicting goals for German policymakers during the Cold War. The theoretical lens used here suggests these two goals did not stand in conflict because policymakers were concerned primarily with safeguarding a vision of a particular 'Germany' and, as such, a particular 'unity'.

By emphasizing the ontological importance of the experienced/envisioned space, the thesis also provides a new angle for assessing the importance of spatial metaphors, such as 'Europe' and 'the West', within narratives of the state. It supports the task of
'Europeanizing' and 'Westernizing' the history of both Germany and America and, correspondingly, suggests that analysts should take seriously how policymakers envision the future of 'European' and/or 'Western' order and how these are embedded in national biographies (e.g., Banchoff 1999; Jackson 2006). In this context, the thesis also suggests that the vision of a desirable order (utopia) may be complemented by a negative vision (dystopias), as in Adenauer's 'Korea' and 'Prague' scenarios (chapter eight) and Kohl's 'fragmentation' or 'Balkanization' scenarios (chapter ten). Here the empirical narrative suggested something not anticipated by the theoretical discussion, namely that dystopias are mobilised not merely to highlight which paths not to pursue, but for justifying significant adjustments of the biographical narrative, in this case to allow for German rearmament and participation in 'out of area' missions, respectively.

Third, the thesis offers a substantial reading of interstate relations as 'friendship', conceptualized as an overlap of national biographies embedded in a shared project of 'world building' (chapter six). It does so by directing attention to the inter-subjective dimension of authentic becoming to argue that a coherent biographical narrative is achieved with a significant Other. The focus on friendship as a particular relationship reconciles the social dimension of conceptions of Selfhood with the need for 'substance' (or authenticity) and, more broadly speaking, thereby offers an answer to the 'structure-agency' dilemma and to the 'constructivist-essentialist' debate. Furthermore, by suggesting that states seek friends to control their anxiety, the thesis shifts the focus away not only from the 'collective' but also from the 'enemy' as that through which a sense of Self is stabilized. By offering a reading of security interdependence between Germany and the US as internally conditioned and sustained through friendship, this thesis substantiates the notion that German-American security cooperation is internally organised around shared values (e.g., Risse-Kappen 1995) and highlights the importance of a common spatial orientation, in this case the overlapping commitment to a particular order of 'Europe' in 'the West'.

Fourth, the friendship lens also offers a certain reading of institutions (chapter six). In contrast to the reading of institutions as either neutral 'information providers' (utilitarian institutionalism), or active 'socializing agents' (moderate constructivism), it conceives of international institutions as sites for friends to negotiate their common world building

---

447 As historians recently pointed out the 'Europeanization' of Germany occurred long before the framework of European integration was established (Fervert 2005: 11; Blackburn 2005). The spatial conception of 'America' requires even more rethinking, as despite the debate about American 'empire' the US is still read as a representative of the classic notion of sovereignty (Keohane 2002).
project in both deliberation (discourse) and activities (practice). This is not to suggest that all members in international institutions are friends but, rather, that they are used by friends to order the experienced space and invest in a shared vision of what this space should be. Other members of the institution may or may not support this project, and they also may want to use the institution for a different project.

Fifth, by discussing causes for the dissolution of friendships, the causal narrative fills a gap in the constructivist literature whose socialization bias has, so far, prevented scholars from discussing why and how social relations deteriorate (chapter seven). In this context, the discussion of the estrangement process also tackled the neglected question of how ‘identities’ are threatened in their existence. It was suggested that ‘ambivalence’ threatens the stable sense of Self and that, from a friendship perspective, the existential threat to the same emerged from within the significant relationship rather than from without. This, it was argued, is the logical consequence of the process of mutual empowerment among friends which generates existential interdependence and, thus, mutual vulnerability. By bringing in ‘the stranger’, the thesis contributes to the increasing recognition among constructivists that it is necessary to go beyond the ‘Self-Other’ binary (with the Other mainly understood as the enemy) and, thus, expand the range of ‘Otherness’ in IR’s analytical toolkit (e.g., Huysmans 1998a; Rumelili 2004; Diez 2005).

Sixth, the friendship lens enhances the understanding of ‘power’ in international relations (Barnett and Duvall 2005; Berenskoetter and Williams 2007). It does so by highlighting two power phenomena in the process of shared world building which significantly differ from the conventional (neo)realist reading: It was argued that central to friendship is (i) a process of mutual empowerment lending direction and resolve and to each others’ unfolding and that within this process friends not only enable authentic becoming but, inevitably, also (ii) exert reciprocal ‘soft’ power over each other by requiring adaptation of respective national biographies (chapter six and seven).

This angle shines a light on the German-American relationship which is different from that of ‘great power competition’ and supports the scholarly agenda of viewing Germany as a player rather than a playground (Banchoff 1999; Weber and Kowert 2007). It suggests that figures like Adenauer, Brandt and Kohl possessed a ‘soft power’ resource and, thus, agency in shaping the Western project. Specifically, by offering a reading of the Adenauer government as a creative force in the making of the ‘Germany-in-Europe’ narrative (chapter eight), the thesis offers a correction to the understanding that “the
founding of the Federal Republic... was a decision of the Western allies and a consequence of the cold war" (Haftendorn, 1985: 2) and, by extension, to the reading of German politics as passively reacting to the East-West conflict. Similarly, the discussion suggests that Brandt's vision for embedding 'Germany' in a Greater European Peace Order (chapter nine) nudged the Western project into a new direction and into a new forum (CSCE). Finally, the Kohl/Genscher government demonstrated agency not only in negotiating German unification but also in pursuing a vision of Germany-in-Europe which, when US support was lacking, successfully tapped into long-standing French plans to establish an alternative to NATO.

Taking a look at the overall dynamic, the empirical discussion generated two further notable findings: First, in both the first and the third period the WEU provided a bridging function for channelling German ambitions to invest in NATO and CFSP, respectively. Moreover, as noted earlier, dystopias were used by both Adenauer and Kohl to justify significant adjustments of the anti-militarism principle and confirm German commitment to, and manifest its voice in, these institutions. Second, while the Bosnian conflict exposed the inadequacy of CSCE as a forum for negotiating a Germany in a Greater European Peace Order, its replacement by CFSP for pursuing this aim was neither radical nor entirely surprising. As noted in chapter nine, the institutional embryo of CFSP, EPC, was founded in the context of and proved successful in the negotiations leading to the Helsinki Final Act. As such, in design and purpose CFSP must be seen less a late fulfilment of EDC (see chapter eight) but, rather, as an institution which comes closer to Bahr's 1968 'third version' of a European System of Collective Security (see chapter nine).

Looking Ahead

The expansion of the 'data base' provides important insights for understanding the opportunities and limits of contemporary US-German security cooperation, aided by that the analysis resisted the temptation of rigidly separating the 'Cold War' and the 'post-Cold War' period (see chapter ten). Instead, by interpreting tensions between (now) Berlin and Washington as growing out of a conflict between German plans for unfolding in 'Europe' and American vision of the Western project, this thesis points to roots which lie much deeper than the question of whether there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq or the personalities of office holders (Szabo 2004). If these tensions and the parallel support of German governments for a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), established in 1999, are any indicator, then German emancipation has not been halted (Forsberg 2005). To be sure, this process is not path dependent. However, if support for
the vision of a European Peace Order upheld through unity is central to German policymakers, an America whose national biography does not accommodate this vision and is unwilling to build ‘the West’ in a mutually empowering manner will not be that friend Germany is looking for.

If that is so, and if German-American friendship is important to the vitality of NATO, then doubts of whether NATO can re-invent itself as a creative forum for building ‘the West’ should be taken seriously. Hence, my analysis suggests that Atlanticist scholars were not entirely wrong to diagnose the “twilight of the West” (Coker 1998) and to note that preventing its “collapse” (Harries 1993) required a new, unique long-term vision carrying the West and, hence, NATO (Huntington 1996). In other words, whereas constructivists celebrated the ‘survival’ of NATO throughout the 1990s as an intellectual triumph over realism, neoconservatives may have been more on target when they warned that the Atlantic Alliance lives on “borrowed time” and that “Europeans and Americans have yet to discover the idea that will energize their cooperation” (Gompert 1997: 4). This warning holds if one takes into account that, from a phenomenological perspective, such a ‘discovery’ must be anchored in significant experiences. If, as suggested in chapter five, experiences of violent conflict leave a particular mark, then American interventions such as in Vietnam and the Gulf in 1991 and 2003 and the terrorist attacks from September 11, 2001, have reduced the shared experienced space. Common interventions in Kosovo (1999) and Afghanistan (2001), which required the Schroeder government to further adjust Germany’s national biography, did not appear to recreate common ground for resonance but, if anything, increased German commitment to ESDP (Berenskoetter and Giegerich, 2008).

That said, just as NATO cannot be reduced to a vehicle of the German-American relationship, emancipation only occurs if dissonance is enduring and if there is an alternative significant Other with whom an authentic biographical narrative can be more satisfactorily negotiated. The thesis suggested that France emerged as this new friend for Germany, yet to assess its depth and complete the picture further research would need to flesh this out. Similarly, it would be necessary to more carefully assess the dynamic and depth of the British-American friendship through NATO as an alternative to the German-American relationship. Here also arises a broader conceptual question not engaged in this thesis, namely that multiple friendships. Even though this thesis discussed friendship primarily as a dyadic phenomenon and made a case for the limit of multiple friendships due to the need of maintaining authenticity (see chapter seven), it did not exclude the possibility of there being more than one significant Other. Aristotle’s
note that it is “impossible to be an extremely close friend to many people” (NE Book IX, 10) reminds that true friendship are rare yet does not put a specific limit onto the number of close friends one may have. This opens up the question of degrees of friendship, that is, of whether some friends can be closer than others and whether multiple friendships may work in complementing ways. In that sense, more than anything, this thesis is an invitation to further explore the promises and limitations of friendship in international politics.

448 Consider the analogy of the Self as house with many rooms where different friends have access “to different rooms at different times or venture into them in a different order” (Allan, 1989: 14f.). See also Simmel’s discussion of differentiated friendships (Simmel 1950: 324-326).


Berenskoetter, F. and Giegerich, B. (2008) 'From NATO to ESDP? German Strategic Adjustment since the End of the Cold War from a Social Constructivist Perspective' manuscript under review with *Security Studies*.


341


