Beyond Rivalry? Sino-Japanese Relations and the Potential for a ‘Security Regime’ in Northeast Asia

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Abstract

This thesis investigates Sino-Japanese relations and the post-Cold War security order in Northeast Asia. In particular, it asks whether a ‘security regime’ now exists in the region. Security analysis of Northeast Asia has often focussed upon the likely effects of changes in material power. This has led to predictions of a ‘Back to the future’ scenario of rivalry and possible war. While acknowledging the value of this approach, I question whether it is sufficient; other approaches, notably an investigation of normative changes, are required. In considering both material and non-material factors, I follow the precepts of RSCT – which view RSCs as essentially social constructions. Thus, I employ RSCT’s eclectic posture, exploring three distinctive approaches to the possibility of structural change – Waltz and neorealism, Wendt and social constructivism, and Buzan and the English school. Thus, while not ignoring the impact of shifts in the balance of power on security practices, I also investigate ideational variables – that is the kinds of values, norms and institutions that are shared by the members of the East Asian RSC. I go on to ask why they are shared, how their identities and interests evolve over time and how these changes influence securitisation and desecuritisation practices.

By examining these variables through societal, economic and military-political sectors, and locating them at domestic, regional, interregional and global levels, I conclude that, together with Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia has formed a single ‘East Asian security regime’. This conclusion is based upon my interpretation of domestic normative constructions in Japan and in China; the growing regional identity/society in East Asia (especially after the Asian financial crisis); and the increased willingness and ability of regional actors to deal with security challenges. But challenges remain, with recurrent tensions and crises as well as continuing historical mistrust. I believe that, as yet, ideational factors, the shared norms and institutions in the East Asian RSC, are still associated with acceptance of a pluralist Westphalian international society, and these are shared largely instrumentally rather than by genuine belief. Thus, despite enthusiasm for community building, progress has been limited in collective identity formation; and balancing behaviour is still common. This means that, while East Asia has reached at least the lower or middle stages of a ‘security regime’, it is still far away from becoming a ‘security community’.
Acknowledgements

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<tr>
<td>AMF</td>
<td>Asian Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>APT</td>
<td>ASEAN Plus Three</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMD</td>
<td>ballistic missile defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>CASS</td>
<td>Chinese Academy of Social Sciences</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBM</td>
<td>confidence building measure</td>
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<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMI</td>
<td>Chiang Mai Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSCAP</td>
<td>Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific</td>
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<tr>
<td>CVID</td>
<td>complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPG</td>
<td>Defence Planning Guidance (The US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>Democratic Progressive Party (Taiwan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAEC</td>
<td>East Asian Economic Caucus</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAEG</td>
<td>East Asian Economic Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEZ</td>
<td>exclusive economic zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTA</td>
<td>free trade agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
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<td>GNP</td>
<td>gross national product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GSDF</td>
<td>Ground Self-Defence Forces (Japan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>international governmental organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>IISS</td>
<td>International Institute for Strategic Studies (London)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMS-GT</td>
<td>Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRBM</td>
<td>intermediate-range ballistic missile</td>
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<td>ISG</td>
<td>intersessional support group</td>
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<tr>
<td>KEDO</td>
<td>Korean Energy Development Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>Kuomintang (or Chinese Nationalist Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MITI</td>
<td>Ministry of International Trade and Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOF</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRBM</td>
<td>medium-range ballistic missile</td>
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<td>MTDP</td>
<td>Mid-Term Defence Programme</td>
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<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Association</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NDPO</td>
<td>national defence programme outline (Japan)</td>
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<td>NET</td>
<td>Natural Economic Territory</td>
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<td>NICs</td>
<td>newly industrialised countries</td>
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<td>NIDS</td>
<td>National Institute for Defence Studies (Japan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIEs</td>
<td>Newly Industrialised Economies</td>
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<td>NPT</td>
<td>Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>new security concept (China)</td>
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<td>NTW</td>
<td>Navy Theatre Wide project</td>
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<td>NTWD</td>
<td>Navy Theatre-Wide Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>official development assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAFTA</td>
<td>Pacific Free Trade Area</td>
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<td>PECC</td>
<td>Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>PFP</td>
<td>People First Party (Taiwan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>peacekeeping operation (UN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLAAF</td>
<td>People’s Liberation Army Air Force (China)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMC</td>
<td>Post Ministerial Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNTR</td>
<td>permanent normal trading relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROC</td>
<td>Republic of China (Taiwan)</td>
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<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea (South Korea)</td>
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<td>RSC</td>
<td>regional security complex</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSCT</td>
<td>regional security complex theory</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCO</td>
<td>Shanghai Cooperation Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDF</td>
<td>Self-Defence Forces (Japan)</td>
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<td>SEZs</td>
<td>Special Economic Zones (China)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLV</td>
<td>space launch vehicle</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAC</td>
<td>Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCOG</td>
<td>Trilateral Cooperation and Oversight Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMD</td>
<td>theatre missile defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>TNAs</td>
<td>Transnational Actors</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>weapons of mass destruction</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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1 Introduction: RSCs and Northeast Asia in Theoretical Perspective

1.1 Introduction

If anything, concerns about security and stability in Northeast Asia have increased rather than diminished in the new post-Cold War era. In particular, much attention has been devoted to the problems of the relationship between China and Japan in recent years. Whatever may have happened in Europe or elsewhere, the end of the Cold War has not freed this region from dispute, conflict or crisis. Unresolved territorial disputes – between Japan and South Korea, China and Japan, and Japan and Russia – are still far from solution. From time to time, tensions over sovereignty and status rivalries between two Koreas and between China and Taiwan have intensified and resulted in crises in which war became a distinct possibility. These crises included:

- The 1993/4 crisis over the North Korean nuclear weapons programme. This came much closer to war than was generally realised.
- The 1995/96 crisis over the Taiwanese presidential elections, coincideing with Beijing's missile tests near Taiwan and the deployment of US aircraft carriers to the area.
- The 1998 missile crisis, when the North Korean Taepodong-1 flew over Japanese airspace and landed in the western part of the Pacific Ocean – thus greatly alarming Japan, South Korea, and the United States.
- The 1999 crisis over the Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui's interview on German radio in which he referred to PRC-ROC relations as 'state-to-state' or at least 'nation-to-nation'. In response, Beijing threatened the possible use of force if Taiwan declared independence.
- The 2002 crisis when Pyongyang reportedly admitted the existence of a secret highly enriched uranium nuclear programme.
- The 2005 crisis over strong anti-Japanese demonstrations in China and South Korea.

Security concerns have been further intensified both by the rapid rise of China and by the perceived possibility of Japanese remilitarisation. Particularly in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War, in the context of a declining Russia, a stagnant Japan and a
retreating US hegemony, the rise of China appeared to constitute the most serious problem (Kristof 1993; Segal 1993; and Roy 1994). Thus, in the 1990s, and to some extent today, debates about security in Asia and in Northeast Asia have been dominated by speculations about the impact of the distribution / redistribution of material power within the international system. The likely – in some cases the only possible – outcome seemed to be a ‘back to the future’ scenario.

Writing in 1993/94, Friedberg argued that the most fundamental impact on Asian regional security resulting from the end of the Cold War had been a shift from a bipolar to a multipolar system. He predicted (1993/94) and reasserted (2000) that Asia’s future would be the same as Europe’s past; in other words, great power rivalries and major wars were highly likely. Roy (1994) also argued that the rapid rise of China as a major economic and military power would almost inevitably challenge US interests in the region and also provoke Japan. Roy (1994:162) portrayed China and Japan as ‘natural rivals’, because both saw themselves as the rightful leaders of the region. According to Segal (1993: 27), the root of the problem was that whereas ‘Japan and China used to operate primarily in different spheres (Japan in the economic and China in the military)’, now not only was China entering to the economic sphere but Japan was also moving towards the politico-military sphere. Thus, for the first time in its history, the region was entering a phase when, it would contain two great powers and this would result in competition and rivalry. This line of arguments prevailed throughout the 1990s and still have many adherents.

Christensen (1999) argued that, in this new security environment, the logic of the security dilemma was still highly relevant and hence there was a strong possibility of spiralling tension. Faced with such an uncertain future, East Asian states had responded by building up their armed forces and embarking on programmes of military modernisation. Their reaction had been all the more predictable because their behaviour had still been conditioned by historic antagonisms but had not been constrained by high levels of economic interdependence or by mature security institutions. In a similar vein, Waltz (2000: 35-6) asserted that, reluctantly or not, ‘Japan and China will follow each other on the route to becoming great powers’. It is true that, with the waning of Russian power and uncertainty as to the US role in the region, both Japan and China are likely to identify each other as their most dangerous potential adversary. Thus, Yahuda (2002)
claimed that the current, reasonably stable relations between China and Japan, were ‘only possible because of the role played by the United States’. In tune with this analysis, Taniguchi (2005) still described the security outlook of Northeast Asia as one of ‘turbulence ahead’, characterised by acute rivalry between China and Japan.

But should the security dynamics of the region be understood solely in terms of the distribution of material power? Is there any other variable likely to affect the regional security order? Is the back to the future scenario the only possible outcome? The answer put forward in this thesis – that there is the potential for a ‘security regime’ in Northeast Asia – is challenging and theoretically controversial. It questions the assumption that acute competition and perhaps war represent the inevitable and permanent feature of the international system. It does so by examining possible variables both material and ideational.

Indeed I do not deny the importance of structural conditions or of material impacts on the security practices. Northeast Asia has certainly faced serious security challenges in the post-Cold War era. Yet I contend that the realist core assumption and its over simplified application needs to be balanced by consideration of other factors; this is essential to achieve a more objective understanding of security relations. Like scholars such as Katzenstein and Okawara (2001/02); Buzan (1991; 2004a); Buzan and Little (2001); Buzan and Wæver (2003) and Alagappa (1998, 2003), I believe that the adoption of theoretical pluralism or analytical eclecticism facilitates understanding of the complexities of security relations in Northeast Asia and elsewhere. Very different realities are likely to emerge if the same region is viewed through different lenses. In short, the position in Northeast Asia is more complicated than the realists suppose.

1.2 Northeast Asia: A Multidimensional and Contradictory Case

The presence of China and Japan means that Northeast Asia is the only RSC that contains two great powers. A combination of long-standing and historically based antagonism and the experience of the Cold War meant that security relations between China and Japan and in Northeast Asia were bound to be highly complicated. But the effects of the ending of the Cold War and accelerated globalisation have actually
heightened this complexity, as evidenced in many contradictory, paradoxical and puzzling phenomena.

First, with the end of the Cold War and the growing trend of globalisation, Northeast Asia has increasingly integrated into the global economic and political system. The effects have been particularly marked in China, as exemplified in its adoption of free trade and a market economy and eventual membership of the WTO in 2001. But, in general, the effects of the end of the Cold War are less clear-cut in Northeast Asia than elsewhere. Although superpower penetration, particularly Russian/Soviet influence, has diminished, characteristics of the Cold War period survive. Ideological divisions between communism and capitalism, once so important in Europe, may have largely disappeared from the rest of the world, but they are still present in Northeast Asia. Communist party rule continues in China and in North Korea, even though Communism in China and Communism in North Korea are now so different that the value of the term has become questionable. Relations between the divided Koreas and between China and Taiwan remain difficult, while continuing US engagement exhibits many of the features of Cold War containment.

Nevertheless, the end of Cold War brought great changes to Sino-Japanese relations. In particular, the fall of the Soviet Union made the rise of China appear more threatening and hence complicated its relations with other powers, especially with Japan. Hitherto, common suspicion of the Soviet Union had provided a basis for relatively harmonious relations between China and Japan. Perhaps inevitably, once the common enemy disappeared, China and Japan became more sensitive about the other’s capabilities and intentions. Given the historical legacy of conflict between the two, these concerns became central to debates about the ‘China threat’ on the one hand and about Japan’s possible transition to a ‘normal’ country on the other. Yet, while their relationship has fluctuated, in economic terms the two great powers of East Asia have become increasingly interdependent.

Secondly, while there have been many disputes, tensions and crises in Northeast Asia since the end of the Cold War, these crises never became totally out of control or resulted in actual war – even in the two flashpoints of the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Strait. In the Korean crisis of 1993/4, tensions and the possibility of war were
contained by numerous negotiations and dialogues, mostly through bilateral dialogues and especially through talks between North Korea and the United States. Of course, the Agreed-Framework (1994) between the US and North Korea did not prevent subsequent tensions or crises. The Korean Energy Development Organisation (KEDO), established in 1995 (the so-called innovative experiment of multilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia) was set up to achieve an arms control agreement (to discontinue North Korea’s nuclear development), but little progress was made. The initiative for KEDO came from an outside power, the United States, and the organisation did not include China, the main regional actor. Thus, in a climate of recurrent tensions and in the absence of institutionalised security mechanism, the security and stability of the region appeared to depend entirely on the role of the United States as ring-holder. However, towards the new millennium, neighbouring states made increasing efforts to engage with North Korea. The historic North-South Summit was held in June 2000, and in July of the same year, Pyongyang applied for membership of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); the application was accepted. The Six-Party Talks (involving the two Koreas, China, Japan, Russia and the US), have now become the main mechanism for dealing with Korean problems. Although progress is slow and huge difficulties remain – as exemplified by the recent crises over North Korean missile and nuclear tests –, regional actors are playing increasing roles in maintaining regional security.

In the case of Taiwan, tensions are also high and questions of security and survival still remain. However, there are striking differences between the crisis of 1995/6 and subsequent ones. In 1995/6 China resorted to military intimidation. Yet there has been no Chinese military response to such things as the growth of a distinctly Taiwanese identity, to the passage of the Referendum Law and the general elections of 2000 and 2004. Rather, China has confined itself to strong verbal protests. Of course, China has not given up its claim to be entitled to use force if necessary – that is in the event of a unilateral Taiwanese declaration of independence – but stresses that its real objective is peaceful re-unification. Although China has passed an anti-secession law, it has also made it clear that it looks to the US to restrain Taipei.

Thirdly, the complexity does not end there. Many of the tensions and disputes in Northeast Asia have deep roots in the past. To take one example, the division of Korea cannot be attributed solely to the effects of the Cold War. Cummings (1998) argues that,
in part, the Korean War (1950-53) was a civil war whose roots lay in the colonial period. If he is right, it follows that a proper understanding of both the War itself and the present division requires an investigation of the years of Japanese rule.

Many of the problems of Northeast Asia are not susceptible to any single explanation. As Cha observes (1999; 2000), the realist approach cannot provide a satisfactory explanation of the apparently puzzling relations between Japan and South Korea in the Cold War era. Even after ‘normalization’ in June 1965, relations remained at a negative or enmity level, despite shared threats from the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea. One might have expected that geographical proximity and the tense Cold War environment would have led Japan and South Korea to conclude at least a bilateral defence treaty, but this did not happen. This is not an isolated example and historically generated enmity relationships are common throughout Asia. Recent anti-Japanese demonstrations (April 2005) suggest that, in China and Korea, self-identities are still largely constructed in opposition to Japan. In China and in North and South Korea alike, nationalism is by definition anti-Japanese.

Yet relations between Japan and South Korea have been improving, and even in the post war period they sometimes co-operated to achieve foreign policy objectives, often in concert with the US – in what Cha (1999) calls a ‘quasi-alliance’. Cha sees this outcome as a result of material factors, especially common fear of US abandonment. Cha is thus certainly right to point out that, while ideational influences have led Japan and South Korea to antagonism, material calculations have led them to a degree of cooperation. Yet more complex factors may be present. After its defeat in the Second World War, during the period of Occupation Authority, Japan accepted liberal concepts such as freedom, democracy and human rights. However, until the democratisation of South Korea and Taiwan began in the 1980s, Japan had no close neighbour sharing the same key values (Bessho 1999: 17). South Korea and Taiwan were also the two most successful imitators of Japan’s economic model, the so-called ‘developmental state’ model. This created some shared economic interests and values. Thus, it will be interesting to examine how these shared interests and values had begun to ameliorate historical animosities and hence to facilitate policy cooperation.
In addition, there can be no doubt that the ‘nuclear dimension’ increases the complexity of security relations in Northeast Asia. All five of the protagonists in the region have actual or potential nuclear capacity. China has long been a nuclear weapon state and many suspect that North Korea also possesses nuclear weapons. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are widely regarded as ‘nuclear threshold states’, that is, states with the capability to develop nuclear weapons quickly if they wished (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 93).

Finally, the processes of regionalisation and the emergence of multilateralism compel us to look beyond power balancing behaviour. Although, in Asia, regionalism and multilateralism are primarily phenomena of the post-Cold War era, these processes emerged gradually from post-war rivalry and antagonism. Economic interactions and the role played by Japan, through its policies of trade, aid and FDI, were especially significant. After the late 1970s, China’s economic reform and opening policy provided extra stimulus to the overall process. Yet the processes are not confined to the Northeast Asian region, but operate on broader levels – in East Asia and in the Asia-Pacific area. They also extend from the economic to the security realm.

Perhaps the most interesting outcome is that the processes have altered regional boundaries and brought Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia into what Regional security complex theory (RSCT) calls a single RSC. But how far have these processes contributed to collective identity formation in East Asia and have they changed the normative context of East Asian regional society? As I will argue in the case study chapters, the processes of regionalisation did not result in an immediate emergence of an East Asian collective identity. At least before the Asian financial crisis (1997-98), both material conditions and identity factors worked against an exclusive East Asian version of regionalism. There was a striking contrast between the failure of the East Asian attempt to create EAEG / EAEC in the early 1990s and the success of APEC. In other words, economic regionalism in Asia has developed most strongly in the Asia-Pacific region; it is open rather than closed and supports policies of non-discriminatory economic liberalism.

Regionalism and multilateralism in Asia also extended into the security sphere, most notably in the forms of the ARF and CSCAP, created in 1994 and in 1993 respectively.
Yet these developments did not follow the European model. Instead, they reflected earlier experiences in Southeast Asia (Huxley 1996a; Acharya 2003a). In particular, the so-called ‘ASEAN Way’ provided much of the practical and normative foundations. Following the ASEAN model, the ARF, the principal multilateral security organization in Asia-Pacific, did not have conventional collective defence or collective security functions. The ARF was founded upon ASEAN norms that included non-interference in the internal affairs of states, peaceful settlement of disputes, and the ‘ASEAN Way’ of consultations and consensus-based decision-making (Leifer 1996; Acharya 2003a; 2003b).

These multilateral institutions have been accused of lacking real substance. The Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s certainly revealed their limitations when faced with crises and conflict management. Yet it is striking that the crisis did not lead to the abandonment of attempts to build multilateral structures or to a return to the balance of power mechanism. On the contrary, the states of East Asia intensified their efforts to rectify the defects of existing arrangements and to find more viable ways of collaboration. Perhaps the most significant responses were ASEAN Plus Three, an exclusively East Asian initiative, and the eventual holding of an East Asia Summit in December 2005. Both Japan and China have played significant and positive roles in these developments. The institutionalisation of the APT suggests that East Asians are moving towards a new phase of regional community building.

Of course, competition between the various economies and the strength of protectionist tendencies still creates difficulties. In the political and security areas, Taiwan’s membership of regional institutions remains highly sensitive. In addition, there remains the question of whether to include the United States and other Asia-Pacific players, such as Canada, Australia, and even India. More importantly, as realists stress, Sino-Japanese rivalry for influence over East Asia constitutes a particularly intractable problem. Further progress appears to depend on reducing this rivalry and competition. Yet, as Barry Desker, Director of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore, confidently asserted at the time of the first East Asian Summit, East Asians really have made a major step towards a new era of regional cooperation (Desker 2005). Although there have been subsequent developments in the direction of further regional cooperation, this thesis examines events up to the December 2005 Summit.
### 1.3 The Application of Regional Security Complex Theory

This survey reveals that the dynamics of security relations in Northeast and East Asia are by no means straightforward. Their complexities and contradictions invite several questions:

- What are the main factors that have resulted in so many disputes, conflicts and crises?
- Why have these crises not escalated into outright armed conflict on a major scale?
- What are the key variables affecting regional patterns of interaction: changes in balance of power, historical legacies, and/or changes in patterns of economic and social relations?

Answers to these questions need a proper theoretical and conceptual framework. Theories are like lenses that allow us to see things clearer. Of course, there is a danger that while some ‘lenses’ or theories may bring clearer resolution to some areas, they can obscure others. A magnifying glass is valuable when trying to read individual words, but the naked eye will serve better when looking at the whole page. If theories are imperfect does this mean that they are useless? By no means, reality is always complicated, not least because while some events may occur randomly or by chance, others are the product of historical factors whose roots may go back far into the past. Flawed though they may be, theories are needed to make sense of anything. But if theories are required, should we use one or many? My answer is that we should use many, because the distortions of one school of thought are likely to be corrected by the distortions of another. In this thesis, therefore, I purposely adopt a posture of theoretical pluralism because I believe that this is the best way to avoid distortion in any particular direction and hence provides me with the best chance of arriving at a fairly comprehensive understanding of the security dynamics of Northeast Asia.

For the purpose of this analysis, I find Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) the most valuable and congenial. I believe that RSCT, originally developed by Buzan and later associated with the Copenhagen school’s approach to security, provides the best theoretical framework to inform my empirical investigations. RSCT insists that RSCs are social constructs and hence contends that their inter-subjective processes are highly relevant to security analysis. RSCs are defined as ‘durable patterns of amity and enmity
taking the form of subglobal, geographically coherent patterns of security interdependence’. If this is true, the particular character of a local RSC will often be affected by historical factors, either negatively by long-standing enmities or positively by common membership of a civilisational area (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 45).

Thus, the future structure of the Northeast Asian RSC – whether it changes or remains the same – depends on social processes, such as identity building (historically generated amity/enmity relations), norm setting and their internalisation, rather than upon forces outside these processes. In other words, while facilitating conditions are accepted as an important part of securitisation practice, the crucial elements in security analysis are the ways in which peoples and leaders come to identify – or not identify – matters of importance as security issues and the effects of these perceptions on security policy-making. Thus, in Buzan and Wæver’s words, ‘it is these definitions that underpin security policy and behaviour, they, and the processes by which they are made and unmade, are what must ultimately lie at the heart of security analysis’ (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 37). Thus, the application of RSCT to the Northeast Asian case is useful in at least three ways.

First, RSCT provides a conceptual framework for security analysis, which is essential in security studies in Northeast Asia and in Asia as whole. As Alagappa (1998: 10; 2003) lamented, theoretically informed inquiries in Asian security studies have been few and often fragmentary. The two volumes edited by Alagappa – *Asian Security Practice* (1998) and *Asian Security Order* (2003) – are valuable works in regional security analysis, which emphasise both material and ideational factors in security analysis. Yet, the first volume focuses on individual countries and the second deals with specific issues, such as sovereignty, balance of power and institutions. To Alagappa’s regret, despite their effort, a volume that focuses on sub-regional or regional security has not been materialised. To some extent the omission is made good by Acharya’s (2001) *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia*, an excellent attempt to develop regional security analysis by exploring the concept of ‘security community’. However, Northeast Asia is still far away from becoming a ‘security community’, and hence, though it provides a good conceptual framework, the concept of security community appears not to be ideally suited to an investigation of the current state of the region. Yet it must be stressed that RSCT assumes that RSCs are based on interactions of a
cooperative as well as of a conflictual nature. Hence, it may be applied not only to regions where relations have developed to the level of peaceful interaction and non-use of force, but also to those where they have not.

Secondly, the theory provides a framework that allows identification of different types of structural changes, both external (depending on changes in boundaries) and internal (depending on the degree of amity and enmity and/or distribution of power). The link between external and internal structural changes is particularly relevant to East Asia. As I shall argue, external transformation – that is, the emergence of Northeast and Southeast Asia as an East Asian RSC – has largely contributed to its internal transformation.

Thirdly, the application of RSCT allows us to look beyond material forces shaping security outlooks. RSCT is essentially eclectic in approach; its dialogue between the neorealist structural approach and the constructivist social understanding of international systems is especially important for my analysis. Thus, in line with RSCT’s approach to security, I explore three distinctive approaches as to the possibility of structural change – Waltz and neorealism, Wendt and social constructivism, and Buzan and the English school. Waltz’s materialistic and ‘systemic’ theory emphasises the reproductivity of the international system. Changes occur only on the surface level, that is, through the distribution of capabilities, which are regarded as the most important forces affecting states’ behaviour. By contrast, constructivism leads to an investigation of identity and interests of the actors – because these identities and interests are the ultimate sources of the outcomes. Structural change occurs by changing the identity and interests of states. Again, the English school formulation leads to an examination of how international society evolves through the creation and evolution of different norms, principles and institutions. Since these are not given but are formed through the processes of intersubjective practices – a point also emphasised by the securitisation approach – they can change through intersubjective practice, hence the structural change.

The thesis is thus an attempt to analyse patterns and complexities of security relations in Northeast Asia by consciously combining material and social approaches (in this case by combining the above three theoretical approaches in conjunction with the RSCT’s
conceptual framework, particularly with its securitisation approach). In so doing, it does not assume, a priori, that Northeast Asian RSC has already become a ‘security regime’, or claim that ideational / social variables will necessarily lead to this outcome. In other words, while my analysis goes beyond material forces, it does not overlook them. Yet neither does it go so far in the direction of eclecticism to become merely a ‘catch all’ summary of different insights with no reflection on their respective merits and significance. In essence, my purpose is to locate material factors within a social context and then to discover how securitising and desecuritising logics work inside this totality.

Thus, I undertake security analysis in relation to intersubjective processes. This includes mutual perceptions and interpretations among actors. In the course of investigation, I discover how the logic of balance of power works – in other words, how distribution and redistribution of power affect states’ perceptions and interpretations and their behaviour. I also discover changes in the normative context in which actors interrelate: that is what kind of values, norms and institutions they share, why they are shared, and how their identity and interests evolve and change over time. I further consider how these changes influence securitisation and desecuritisation practices. These practices will ultimately become the sources that determine whether Northeast Asia remains in conflict formation mode or moves to a level of security regime.

Thus, for the purpose of this analysis, I adopt a holistic approach to East Asian security. In other words, when investigating the impacts of material and social variables upon securitising and desecuritising logics, I put these variables into historical contexts. While I appreciate that the range of issues may seem too broad to be included in a single academic thesis, I am convinced that a proper understanding of securitisation logic in Northeast/East Asia is impossible without reference to the historical dimension. A narrower focus would carry a danger of distortion and would leave many features of the present situation either inadequately explained or not explained at all. It is clear that it will no be easy task to investigate these various factors and multiple dimensions in a systematic way. I believe, however, that exploration by levels and sectors of analysis provides the best way to achieve an appropriate systematic framework. My division of chapters reflects this schema.
1.4 The Framework of the Thesis

Chapter 2 provides theoretical frameworks both to inform security analysis and to assess the possibility of structural change. As the possibility of structural change is theoretically controversial, I explore both sides of the debate: that is theories emphasising the continuity of the system structure (Waltz and neorealism) and those arguing for the possibility of structural change (Wendt and social constructivism, and Buzan and the English school). In particular, I link these analyses to RSC theory’s distinctive approach to security analysis and its understanding of the nature of structural change.

The next six chapters are devoted to case studies and are divided into three separate sections – that is the societal, economic and military-political sectors. Those familiar with the RSCT approaches to levels and sectors may be surprised by this particular order, yet it has been adopted deliberately. I certainly do not intend to suggest that any one sector is more important than others. Rather, my choice of order stems from the fact that I take a broad and essentially holistic approach to East Asian security. Here, the best way to begin seems to be through the establishment of a chronological sequence. In other words, the societal sector comes first, because it sets the overall historical background and provides the basic context in which current security dynamics of the region should be understood. I then proceed to the economic sector. Many important regional developments – such as regionalism and multilateralism, which are so important in RSC building – have emerged and evolved first through economic interactions. But their implications extend into the security realm and these will be examined in the third section, dealing with the military-political sector. After careful consideration, I believe that the adoption of this order will make it easier for readers to follow the main arguments and thread of my thesis.

The societal sector (chapter 3, 4 and 5) explains the evolution of the RSC or regional society in Northeast Asia (sometimes East Asia) from historical and international society perspectives. In particular, it explains how the traditional and long-lasting Sino-centric East Asian world order operated, but eventually collapsed as the region became integrated into a Western dominated international society. Here it is important to note that, while Sino-Japanese rivalry has deep roots in history, until recently the region has
never faced a situation in which China and Japan were great powers at the same time. It also examines the norms and institutions that underpinned the traditional East Asian world order – how and why they were shared and operated and how they were changed and replaced by alternatives as international society expanded. Investigation of this historical process assists understanding of many seemingly puzzling phenomena in Northeast / East Asia. Not least, why many East Asians subscribe so strongly sovereignty non-interference norms and why have regionalism and multilateralism developed both so slowly and along lines so different to their European equivalents? Yet when these questions are examined in the context of the processes of the expansion of international society, things become rather clearer. We shall see how these norms, together with ideas of nationalism, were adopted and sometimes secured by East Asians as part of their struggle with the Western powers, especially through the processes of decolonisation and anti-imperialism. Yet it was precisely those experiences underpin their securitisation behaviour.

The economic sector (Chapters 6 and 7) considers how patterns of security practices are affected by economic factors and calculations. Here there are many contending views and contradictory phenomena. Discussion on the possibility of cooperation between states was particularly lively during the so-called ‘neo-neo’ debates of the 1980s and early 1990s. Since the new millennium East Asia has been increasingly integrated into the world economy and there has been clear shift in distribution of power caused by economic developments. As a result, the debate as to whether economic interdependence is a force for peace or for conflict acquired renewed urgency. I will consider both sides of arguments before drawing my conclusion.

Chapter 6 approaches the debate from the realist perspective. It asks why and how, at least until recently, economic interdependence and international institutions were so weakly developed in Northeast Asia. It goes on to consider the somewhat alarming fact, stressed by neorealists, that, even when economic interdependence increased and some international institutions emerged, there was little sign of reduced rivalry or competition between the regional actors, especially between the two great powers, China and Japan. Of course, neorealists are preoccupied by the rapid rise of China and its impact on economic and security relations. It appears that the rise of China presents a particularly strong challenge to the mature powers – that is to Japan and the US – and hence some
analysts argue that the security dilemma is still acute in this region (Christensen 1999; Friedberg 2005).

Chapter 7 moves on to examine the more positive side of the economics and security relations. Here the dominant theoretical perspective is that of the liberals – although I seek to take their analysis further. There can be little doubt that the emergence of economic regionalism and multilateralism in Asia and Pacific, represent some of the most significant developments in the region – particularly when contrasted to the situation in the early period of the Cold War. While the most obvious reason for the change is probably the ending of the Cold War and the sweeping globalisation, other factors have also been important. In part, the recent emergence of economic regionalism and multilateralism can be linked to the long processes of regional developments. Here, the most crucial factors were the post-war economic recovery of Japan and the example of its developmental model and, more recently, China’s reform and its adoption of a free market economy. But how have these economic interactions affected relations among the regional actors and above all their security practices?

Chapter 8 examines the politico-military sector. Much has been written on this area with studies of the balance of power, arms build ups, crisis points, territorial disputes, etc. Taking these as a starting point, I proceed to investigate the interplay between forces among global, regional, and domestic levels. Here I focus mainly on the realist side of argument, especially on the impact of distribution and redistribution of power in the system. The rapid rise of a revisionist China seems to challenge the security and stability of the region the most, above all because it invites rivalry between China and Japan, and pushes Japan further towards becoming a ‘normal’ country. Already, the Sino-Japanese rivalry is becoming more open and the rivalry is extending from Northeast Asia to East Asia as a whole. The regional arms build up and the attendant danger of nuclearisation has become so serious, that many analysts predicted and continue to believe that the security of Northeast / East Asia depends upon an external player – that is with the US as a ring holder (Friedberg 1993/4; Yahuda 2002; Klare 2006). But, even if the US is able and willing to continue with this role, there are obvious problems in leaving regional security in the hands of an external power.
But is it true that regional security and stability depend exclusively on the preponderant power of the US? Are there other variables that work to restrain acute balancing behaviour and thus mitigate the security dilemma in Northeast Asia? Finally, in the concluding chapter, chapter 9, I return to the central question posed in this thesis: that is, whether, as an RSC, Northeast Asia has moved or can move from a level of ‘conflict formation’ to one of ‘security regime’. I then evaluate the theoretical implications of this study.

First, drawing from material discussed in the case studies and from my investigation of pessimistic and optimistic analyses, I conclude that, though, Northeast Asia has not yet become a ‘security community’, together with Southeast Asia, it has managed to form what might be called a single ‘East Asian security regime’. I do not deny that East Asia still faces security challenges; serious security problems continue to exist. Nor do I claim that balance of power logic no longer applies to East Asian international relations. Indeed, balancing behaviour is still quite common in East Asia, and the fluctuating rivalry between the two great powers, China and Japan, is still at work. I freely acknowledge that it would be foolish to underestimate the importance of the role of the US in maintaining security and stability in East Asia. Yet hegemonic stability is not the only way to maintain stability in East Asia. Balancing behaviour and open competition are often mitigated by factors such as domestic constraints, economic interdependence and institutional developments. Moreover, after the Asian financial crisis, important changes have taken place, notably the growth of a regional consciousness and the development of multilateral mechanisms to achieve better levels of security. The survival of an East Asian security regime – and certainly its possible evolution into a security community – depends on two main factors: a growing awareness of regional identity / society (especially after the Asian financial crisis) and common interest and commitment to the preservation of regional security and stability.

One of the most important theoretical implications from this study is that any exclusive focus on particular factors or levels is not only intellectually unsound but can sometimes be dangerous in practice. The limitations of such an approach are obvious when considering the neorealists’ over emphasis on material power balancing. However, the findings in this thesis also suggest that, properly understood, many of the theories explored in this study are more complementary than contradictory, depending on which
levels of analysis they emphasise. I thus conclude that a posture of theoretical pluralism represents the most realistic and fruitful approach to adopt, and the essence of my thesis is based upon it.
RSCT: A Theoretical Framework

Introduction

As its subtitle – *Sino-Japanese Relations and The Potential for a ‘Security Regime’ in Northeast Asia* – suggests, this thesis seeks both to understand the security order of Northeast Asia in the post-Cold War era and to investigate the possibility of structural change in the region. The main features of its approach reflect the premises of regional security complex theory (RSCT). These regard regional security complexes (RSCs) as durable substructures and regions as socially constructed entities. On the basis of these premises, it follows that there is at least a possibility that security complexes can change and evolve. Yet, it is controversial as to whether structural/substructural transformation is possible and, if so, how it occurs.

The thesis will examine this issue from a number of perspectives by summarising and evaluating the work of three distinctive scholars – Waltz, Wendt and Buzan. Waltz’s materialistic and ‘systemic’ theory emphasises the reproductivity of the international system. Wendt adopts an ideational and social perspective to argue for the possibility of structural change. Change occurs by changing identity and interest of states. Buzan’s conclusions, based on a social structural approach, also maintain the possibility of change, although he takes a broader view. All three approaches are closely linked to RSCT.

The Northeast Asian region, with its remarkable history, rich cultural traditions, diversity of character, long standing unresolved problems, and the complexity of relations between its peoples and states, is an ideal area to apply and test these contending theories. The following chapters will attempt to investigate whether this complexity of security relations is best understood and explained by material factors or by social factors or by some combination of the two.

If one follows Waltzian materialistic approach, the main focus must be the impact of the distribution of power on the behaviour of states and their security relations. Issues to be investigated include: the role of the US, the increasing power of China, Japan’s military potential and the decline in Russian influence. All clearly have a major impact on the
security order of Northeast Asia. If we take the Waltzian approach, these will be the main elements of investigation, rather than ideology or internal factors.

However, the constructivist and English school’s social approach involves a very different emphasis. Here the central theme is an investigation of how states’ identities and interests affect their relations, and how the creation and evolution of institutions and norms not only regulates but also constitutes their behaviour. The historical context, domestic political change, regional institutional development and the impact of these on their collective identity formation become the crucial variables.

RSCT is essentially eclectic in its approach. It allows us to explore different approaches and to examine the impact of both material and social variables on security relations. Indeed the underlying assumption of this thesis is that analysis of both material and social factors is necessary to comprehend security relations in Northeast Asia. A meaningful understanding requires something of a ‘two pronged’ approach, involving appropriate theoretical support. This chapter begins with an examination of the three approaches mentioned above in respect of the question of the structural transformation. Neorealism’s emphasis on material power position may still be highly relevant to Northeast Asian case. Yet, some phenomena, which cannot be explained by materialist interpretations, may perhaps be understood by employing constructivist or English school social approaches. Then, in linking with these three theories, the main features of RSCT will be outlined. And finally, the chapter explains briefly how these approaches may be applied to the Northeast Asian case.

2.1 International Structure/Substructure: Reproductive or Transformative?

2.1.1 The Continuity of the System: Waltz’s Neorealism

Waltz’s neorealism is pessimistic about the possibility of deep structural transformation and is more concerned with continuity and sameness than with change. According to Waltz, ‘The enduring anarchic character of international politics accounts for the striking sameness in the quality of international life through the millennia’ (Waltz 1979: 66). He expects what is essentially the same system to endure indefinitely; which
‘remains highly constant, patterns recur, and events repeat themselves endlessly’ (Waltz 1979: 66). This leads him to ask why in the history of international relations ‘results achieved seldom correspond to the intentions of actors’, and ‘Why are they repeatedly thwarted?’ Waltz does not believe that the answers are to be found ‘in their individual characters and motives’ (Waltz 1979: 65); rather, it is the anarchic nature of the system that thwarted projects for reform in the past and will do so in the future (Linklater 1995: 241). This pessimistic view underlies his Theory of International Politics (1979).

Reductionism v. Systemic Theories

How does Waltz conceive this pattern of international politics as a distinct system? How do we understand the reproductive logic of his theory? As Burchill says, ‘before examining exactly what Waltz understands by ‘structure’ and the nature of the international ‘system’, it is important to consider what he is rejecting’ (Burchill 2001: 90). Waltz distinguishes two types of theories of international politics – reductionist and systemic theories. He rejects the former on the grounds that they assume a direct link between the intentions of individual actors (states) and the results of their actions.

Waltz describes reductionist theories as theories ‘about the behavior of parts’, which try to explain international outcomes – a whole – through elements and combinations of elements located at national or sub-national levels – that is the study of its parts (Waltz 1979: 60). For example, in terms of change, Waltz says that ‘Nations change in form and purpose; technological advances are made; weaponry is radically transformed; alliances are forged and disrupted’ (Waltz 1979: 67). But these are changes within systems. The argument is that the behaviour of states and statesmen is ‘indeterminate’, and hence a theory of international politics cannot be constructed by comprehending indeterminate behaviour. If such a thing were attempted, the system level would become ‘all product’ but not ‘all productive’ (Waltz 1979: 50, 68-9). In short, we cannot understand world politics simply by looking inside states because the outcomes cannot be explained reductively (Waltz 1979: 79).

To support his argument, Waltz asks why different units (states) exhibit similar foreign policy behaviour, even though they may have different political systems and contrasting ideologies. He attempts to ‘explain’ ‘why patterns of behavior recur’; ‘why events
repeat themselves’; and ‘why the range of expected outcomes falls within certain limits’ (Waltz 1979: 68, 69). Waltz answers these questions by systemic theory, that is by exploring the systemic nature, how ‘the organization of a realm’ – the structure of a system – ‘acts as a constraining and disposing force on the interacting units within it’ (Waltz 1979: 69, 72). Waltz anticipated the obvious objection to his approach: ‘with both system-level and unit-level forces in play, how can one construct a theory of international politics without simultaneously constructing a theory of foreign policy?’ His answer is that his emphasis on systems resembles market theory, which explains ‘how firms are pressed by market forces to do certain things in certain ways’ (Waltz 1979: 71).

Waltz proceeds to define a system on two levels – a structure and interacting units, and argues that in systems theory, the structure ‘is the system-wide component that makes it possible to think of the system as a whole’. In other words, the ‘structure is a generative notion; and the structure of a system is generated by the interactions of its principal parts’ (Waltz 1979: 72, 79). The advantage of systemic theories, Waltz argues, is that ‘From them, we can infer some things about the expected behaviour and fate of the units: namely, how they will have to compete with and adjust to one another if they are to survive and flourish’. Further, the ‘dynamics of a system limit the freedom of its units, hence their behaviour and the outcomes of their behaviour become predictable’ (Waltz 1979: 72). In the case of Northeast Asia, the perceived limited choice of Japan against the rise of China can be seen as this kind of systemic constraints.

For Waltz, reductionist theories fail to take proper account of the structural conditions inherent in the international system. These conditions impose themselves on all the units, and therefore ultimately determine the outcomes of the interactions between states. Waltz attempts to clarify these determining properties of the structure of the international system by distinguishing them from those of domestic political structures. He attributes three tiers of structure to the system – the ordering principle; the character of the units; and the distribution of capabilities.
Three Tiers of System Structure

Waltz suggests that, as far as political systems are concerned, there are only two ordering principles: hierarchy and anarchy. The ordering principle of domestic political systems is hierarchic, since power and authority is exerted through the compulsory jurisdiction of the political and legal processes. But the ordering principle of the international system is anarchy, since there is no overarching authority regulating the behaviour of states towards each other (Waltz 1979: 88-93).

‘Self-help’ is a necessary principle of action in an anarchic order, because the problem under international anarchy is that, unlike individuals in domestic society, states cannot look to any higher authority to provide their security. Thus in a condition of anarchy, units, ‘be they people, corporation, states, or whatever’, must rely on the means they can generate and the arrangements they can make for themselves in order to maintain their security and to achieve their objectives (Waltz 1979:111). This does not mean that states do not collaborate each other, but it does mean that collaboration is conditioned by anarchic structure, and ‘the acceptability of the means of collaboration takes priority over the desirability of its ends’ (Waltz 1979: 107-10; Ruggie 1983: 265). This is because, the international system, like a market, once formed, becomes a force that constrains states’ behaviour and intervenes between their intentions and the outcomes of their actions (Waltz 1979: 90-91; Ruggie 1983: 265).

Waltz believes that in a self-help environment, states are compelled to be functionally alike. They perform or try to perform exactly the same primary function regardless of their capacity to do so (Waltz 1979: 96). In the process, as Burchill (2001: 91) notes, they become socialised into behaviour which centres on mutual distrust, self-reliance and the pursuit of security through the accumulation of power. This is because in an anarchical order, the security dilemma is common to all states, regardless of their cultural or ideological complexions. Thus, a refusal to play the political game may endanger their own survival (Waltz 1979: 128). The implication, as Ruggie points out, is that this ‘second component of political structure is not needed at the international level, because all states are functionally alike (Ruggie 1983: 265).
While emphasising the similarities and continuities, Waltz accepts that some things do change. The constraints of the system mean that the character of the units is undifferentiated, yet states are differentiated in their capabilities. There is an unequal and constantly shifting distribution of power across the international system. Moreover, the structure of a system changes with changes in the distribution of capabilities among its units. Changes in structure change expectations about how the units of the system will behave and about the outcomes of their interactions. Thus, for Waltz, the key to understanding the behaviour of states is the distribution of power in the international system, not ideology or any other internal factor. In this sense, Waltz makes an important distinction between great and small powers; international change occurs when great powers rise and fall and the balance of power shifts accordingly (Waltz 2000).

However, the important point here, Waltz insists, is that the distribution of capabilities ‘is not a unit attribute, but rather a system-wide concept because it is the position of the units in the system relative to one another, not their capabilities as such’ (Waltz 1979: 97-8). Ruggie’s interpretation helps us to clarify this point. While ‘Ordering principles constitute the “deep structure” of a system, shaping its fundamental social quality’, ‘The distribution of capabilities comes closest to the surface level of visible phenomena, but its impact on outcomes is simply to magnify or modify the opportunities and constraints generated by the other (two) structural level(s)’ (Ruggie 1983: 265).

Thus, Waltz concludes that ‘international structures vary only through a change of organizing principle’, that is from anarchy to hierarchy. Or, ‘failing that, through variations in the capabilities of units’; changes of this nature can occur as a result of a move from a multipolar to a bipolar structure (Waltz 1979:93). Yet in the history of the modern state system, ‘a multi-polar configuration endured for three centuries, bipolarity ‘has lasted for more than three decades’. And a hierarchic system has never occurred (Ruggie 1983:271). Thus, the system has been notable for its lack of change and there is no reason to suppose that in this respect at least the future will be any different from the past. The crucial point is that whether the structure is multipolar or bipolar, it remains anarchic and anarchy reproduces itself. Waltz explains this reproductive logic or process in two ways: by examining the structure of an anarchic system and by exploring the respective roles of balancing and bandwagoning.
First, Waltz argues that states may seek reasonable and worthy ends, but they cannot figure out how to achieve them. This is because ‘structures cause actions to have consequences they were not intended to have’. The problem does not lie either in the stupidity or the ill will of states. When facing global problems, states are ‘like individual consumers trapped by the “tyranny of small decisions”’, and ‘can get out of the trap only by changing the structure of their field of activity’ (Waltz 1979: 107, 110-11).

Then, Waltz goes on to contrast the roles of bandwagoning and balancing in the domestic and international orders, showing that balancing behaviour prevails in the international arena and bandwagoning behaviour in the domestic. This is the direct result of the anarchic nature of the international order and the hierarchical nature of the domestic order. In a competition for the position of leader, bandwagoning is sensible behaviour in a hierarchical order. Such an order creates conditions where ‘gains are possible even for the losers and where losing does not place their security in jeopardy’. But balancing is sensible behaviour in an anarchical order, where ‘victory of one coalition over another leaves weaker members of the winning coalition at the mercy of the strong ones’ (Waltz 1979: 126).

In an anarchical order, security must have the highest priority. Only if survival is assured can states safely seek other goals such as power or profit with safety. Although nobody wants anyone else to win, the first concern of states is not to maximise power but to maintain their positions in the system. Power is a means and not an end and hence states prefer to join the weaker of two coalitions (Waltz 1979: 126). This ‘Balance-of-power position prevails whenever two, and only two, requirements are met: the order be anarchy and that it be populated by units wishing to survive’ (Waltz 1979: 121). Again, this is because a ‘self-help system is one in which those who do not help themselves, or who do so less effectively than others, will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open to dangers, will suffer’. Fear for such unwanted consequences stimulates states to behave in ways that tend toward the creation of balance of power (Waltz 1979: 118). Whether states in Asia tend to balancing or bandwagoning has certainly generated interesting theoretical debates.
2.1.2 The Possibility of Structural Change I: Wendt’s Social Constructivism

As we have seen, Waltz’s theoretical framework of international politics ‘is designed to explain why the international system has persisted through time’ (Buzan and Little 2000: 41), and to show how anarchy perpetuates a self-help system and power politics. But Wendt challenges this ‘deduction of power politics from anarchy’ (Ringmar 1997: 277), and claims that ‘anarchy is what states make of it’ (Wendt 1992). In other words, both implicitly and explicitly, Wendt claims that structural transformation is possible, though he is well aware of the difficulties. Wendt’s argument is based upon his reservations about the philosophical and methodological assumptions that underlie Waltz’s analysis; these are identified as materialism, individualism, and rationalism.

The Agent-Structural Question

Like Waltz, Wendt’s principal aim is to build a structural theory of international politics, but his methodological and ontological positions are fundamentally different. Waltz’s systemic theory distinguishes between the ‘structure of the system’ and the ‘structure of its constituent units’, and purposely excludes any reference to the unit level in formulation of the international system (Buzan and Little 2000: 41, 42). By contrast, Wendt is deeply interested in questions such as ‘what kind of ‘stuff’ the international system is made of’ (Wendt 1992; 1999: 35). For Wendt, Waltz’s systemic theory focuses on only one of the two sides of the agent-structure relationship. He claims that although, ontologically, agents and structures are distinct entities, conceptually they are mutually constitutive. Since each is in some sense an effect of the other, they are ‘co-determined’ (Ringmar 1997: 271-2). Thus, in the case of a social system, ‘the structure of the system and the structure of the component units are one and the same thing, because the system and the units are mutually constituted’. Consequently, it is impossible ‘to talk about the structure of the international system without simultaneously talking about the identity and interest of the component units’ (Buzan and Little 2000: 42). It is clear that Waltz’s Theory of International Politics (1979) and Wendt’s Social Theory of International Politics (1999), despite the similarity of the titles, the former represents a materialist approach, while the later is a social one.
Identities and Interests of Actors

Following these opposing methodological assumptions, while Waltz emphasises structural conditions and the continuity of the international system, Wendt argues that the concept and nature of anarchy can change by changing the identity and interests of the component states. Wendt asks ‘what it means to take identities and interests as ‘given’’, and ‘how we should think about ‘what’s going on’ when actors interact’ (Wendt 1999: 36). Here, he makes an important distinction between brute facts and social facts, i.e., whether facts ‘remain true independent of human action’, or ‘depend for their existence on socially established conventions’ (Brown 2001: 52). This distinction is crucial, because the methodological assumption raises ontological implication: that is, ‘whether they are seen themselves as processes that need to be socially sustained, or as fixed objects that are in some sense outside of social space and time’ (Wendt 1999: 36). Therefore, for Wendt, the answer affects not only the perceived nature of international politics, but also the possibilities of structural change.

Wendt claims that the structure should be conceptualised in social rather than in material terms. It follows that – contrary to the Waltzian structure, where the distribution of power matters the most – in the Wendtian structure, the identities and interests of the component units are more important. The reason for this is that ‘states act differently toward enemies than they do toward friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not’ (Wendt 1992: 396). This point resembles RSCT’s emphasis on amity/enmity relations in securitisiation practice. Wendt gives us a simple example: US military power has a different significance for Canada than it does for Cuba, despite their similar ‘structural’ positions. Hence, anarchy and distribution of power are insufficient to tell us which is which. The distribution of power may always affect states’ calculations, but how it does so depends on the inter-subjective understandings and expectations, on the ‘distribution of knowledge’, that constitute their conceptions of self and other (Wendt 1992:397). Wendt argues that identities are inherently relational, in other words, identities and interests are formed through the processes of inter-subjective practices between actors; but not prior to interaction. Therefore, ‘there is no such thing as a ‘logic of anarchy’. Instead, anarchy is ‘an empty vessel, it can vary depending on what kind of roles – enemy, rival, and friend – dominate the system’ (Wendt 1999: 247, 249). The implication for the case study is that
while no one could deny the importance of the rise of China, dynamic changes in the security outlook in Northeast Asia may be influenced more by the ways in which the various regional actors identify with each other.

Three Cultures of Anarchy and Their Internalisation

The inter-subjective view and notions of the importance of identity and norms indicate the links between Wendt and the English school. According to Wight there are three traditions of theory: realist, rationalist, and revolutionist, or Machiavellian, Grotian, and Kantian. Wendt follows Wight, and categorises international systems into three cultures – Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian. These categories depend upon what kind of roles – enemy, rival, or friend – dominate the system (Wendt 1999: 247). All three positions constitute social structures, based on representations of the Other in terms of which the posture of the Self is defined. Here, Wendt introduces two key concepts: culture, or the ‘shared ideas that make up the subset of social structure’; and role or role structure, ‘the configuration of subject positions that shared ideas make available to its holders’.

Wendt says that at the core of each kind of anarchy there is just one subject position (though this view will be further challenged by Buzan (2004a), see next section): in Hobbesian cultures it is ‘enemy’, in Lockean ‘rival’, and Kantian ‘friend’ (1999: 249, 257, 258).

Wendt proceeds to interpret these subject positions as follows. Enemies lie at one end of the spectrum of role relationships, here the Other does not recognise the right of the Self to exist as an autonomous being, and therefore will not willingly limit its violence toward the Self. Violence between enemies has no internal limits. This is the kind of violence found in a state of nature (Wendt 1999: 259-60). Friends are at the other end of the spectrum of role relationships. Here ‘disputes will be settled without war or the threat of war (the rule of non-violence); and they will fight as a team if the security of any one is threatened by a third party (the rule of mutual aid)’ (Wendt 1999: 298-9). In the middle of the spectrum, violence between rivals, is self-limiting. Unlike enemies, rivals are constrained by recognition of each other’s right to exist; therefore they do not try to conquer or dominate them. However, unlike friends, recognition among rivals does not extend to the right to be free from violence in disputes (Wendt 1999: 279).
Wendt identifies the modern, Westphalian state system as Lockean, on the grounds that inter-state war is limited, small states thrive, territorial boundaries ‘harden’, and so on. Thus he criticises realist indifference to such changes, and focuses on continuities instead: wars still happen, power still matters. But he claims that, in reality, the past few centuries have seen a qualitative structural change in international politics. ‘The kill or be killed logic of the Hobbesian state of nature has been replaced by the live and let live logic of the Lockean anarchical society’ (Wendt 1999:279). Then Wendt goes on to explore the causes of this change.

Following his identification of three cultures of international systems, Wendt asks how these cultures are internalised by actors? In other words, why do states comply with the Hobbesian system at some times and with the Lockean or Kantian cultures at others? The underlying assumption is that each culture can be internalised to three ‘Degrees’: force, price, and legitimacy. First, if a cultural norm is internalised only to the first degree, this means that an actor knows what the norm is, but complies only because he is forced to. He is neither motivated to comply of his own accord, nor does he think that doing so is in his self-interest. He does it because he must, because he is coerced or compelled. In this sense, his behaviour is driven purely by external influences rather than by internal ones (Wendt 1999: 269).

Secondly, sometimes states follow the norms of a system for reasons of individual self-interest. For example, when states comply with sovereignty norms, unlike in the First Degree case, they now have enough social space to do this by choice. In other words, their respect for the sovereignty of others involves a self-restraint which is absent in the coercion case: ‘The institution is now achieving effects on states in part from the inside out, which is what internalisation is all about’ (Wendt 1999: 287-8). Thirdly, sometimes states follow norms, not because they think this will serve some exogenously given end, but because they think the norms are legitimate and therefore want to follow them. This means that an actor fully accepts the claims of the norm on himself. Compared to the Second Degree case, when actors conform to the norm only for instrumental reasons, in the Third Degree case ‘actors identify with others’ expectations, relating to them as a part of themselves… and now ‘Other’ and ‘Me’ become identical’. Wendt emphasises that it ‘is only with this degree of internalisation that a norm itself really constructs
agents; prior to this point their identities and interests are exogenous to it’ (Wendt 1999: 272, 273).

Wendt claims that each culture can be internalised to three different degrees. While the Hobbesian culture can be held by coercion, it also can be held by belief in warrior culture. Similarly, the internalisation of Kantian culture may be due to deterrence or sanctions by status quo states against revisionists; or for reasons of individual self-interest; or due to belief. Yet the true internalised Kantian culture is the third degree, where states accept the claims made on their behaviour as legitimate. This means that states identify with each other, seeing each other’s security not merely as instrumentally related to their own, but as literally being their own. The cognitive boundaries of the Self are extended to include the Other; Self and Other form a single ‘cognitive region’. In this sense, international interests become part of the national interests, not just interests that states have to advance in order to further their separate national interests. Friendship is a preference over an outcome, not just a preference over a strategy. Thus, in the context of the Kantian culture, states must really be friends, not just act as if they are (Wendt 1999: 305, 306).

The Collective Identity Formation

It follows that collective identity formation is crucial to account for real structural change, because structural change only occurs when actors redefine who they are and what they want. For Wendt, ‘a fully internalised culture is that actors identify with it’; that means the generalised Other becomes part of their understanding of Self. Wendt says this identification or ‘sense of being part of a group or ‘we’, is a social or collective identity’, in turn this gives actors an interest in the preservation of their culture’. Thus, the structure of any internalised culture is associated with a collective identity. A change in that structure will involve a change in collective identity, involving the breakdown of an old identity and the emergence of a new (Wendt 1999: 336-8). But how far have these processes in the Northeast Asian RSC led to the formation of a collective identity?

Wendt asks how is it possible for states to create a new culture of anarchy when the structure of the existing culture disposes them to reproduce it? The focus is on how and why the dominant role in the system can be transformed from that of rival to that of
friend (Wendt 1999: 338-9). There are two factors that make change difficult. Internally, there are forces within actors that make them unwilling to change. More importantly, the internalisation of roles in identities, which generates subjective commitments to objective positions in society, is liable to produce stability rather than change. Externally, institutions and concepts, such as sovereignty and the balance of power – which reward certain practices and punish others – inhibit change even when actors want it.

Despite the presence of these stabilising influences, Wendt argues that, if identities and interests are treated as endogenous, it follows that they ‘are always in process, always contested, always an accomplishment of practice’. Even when their reproduction is relatively unproblematic and appears as given, this is really part of a process. Although agents and social structure are mutually constitutive and co-determined, Wendt still believes that actors’ actions are even more important. He says that ‘actors can do things even if they do not already have the identities which those practices will eventually create. States might initially engage in pro-social policies for egoistic reasons but if sustained over time such policies will erode egoistic identities and create collective ones (Wendt 1999:342).

Wendt suggests four master variables that cause collective identity – interdependence, common fate, homogeneity, and self-restraint. Within these, the first three, are active or efficient causes of collective identity formation and thus of structural change. As they become more powerful, actors have greater incentive to engage in pro-social behaviour, thus eroding egoistic boundaries of the Self and expanding them to include the Other. However, as Wendt acknowledges, this process can only proceed if actors can overcome their fear of being engulfed, physically or psychologically, by those with whom they would identify (Wendt 1999: 357). Thus, self-restraint plays a key role for collective identity formation to occur, it is necessary to combine one efficient cause with self-restraint. Jervis (1982) also emphasises that self-restraint must be practised if a region is to meet his criteria for the existence of a ‘security regime’. These suggest that the question of whether states in Northeast Asia have demonstrated willingness or an ability to exercise self-restraint requires close investigation.
Yet, as realists insist, the problem is formidable and is rooted in our inability to read others’ minds and thus in our consequent uncertainty as to whether they will actually restrain themselves in the absence of third party constraints. This problem is especially acute in a self-help system where the cost of a mistaken and over-optimistic inference can be fatal (Wendt 1999: 360). However, Wendt argues that, despite our limited abilities, human beings do manage to make correct inferences about each other’s intentions. Given the empirical reality that states often know that others will be self-limiting, the question becomes, ‘how do states acquire this knowledge?’ ‘How do other states know that they are self-limiting?’ His answer is:

‘[T]hrough repeated compliance states gradually internalise the institution of the pluralistic security community to the third degree. Even if states initially comply with this institution for reasons of coercion or self-interest, continuing adherence over time will tend to produce conceptions of identity and interest which presupposes its legitimacy, making compliance habitual or second nature’ (Wendt 1999: 360).

The best example can be found in China’s participation in regional security institutions and in its changing attitude towards regional affairs.

2.1.3 The Possibility of Structural Change II: Buzan and the English School

Wendt’s challenge to the Waltzian concept of the ‘logic of anarchy’ stressed the importance of changes in the identities of component units and hence pointed to the possibility of structural change. Buzan raises a similar possibility though by a different route. His scheme of social structure and his account of structural change place more emphasis on issues such as types of international society and the institutions that reflect and shape them. Buzan’s approach synthesises English school theory and Wendtian social constructivism, as revealed in his recent work, *From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation* (Buzan 2004a).

There is clearly a basis for a synthesis of this kind. As Dunne (1995) stresses, many of the ideas associated with Wendtian social constructivism can also be found in other
traditions of IR thinking, especially in the works of the English school writers, such as Bull, Wight and Watson. Dunne cites the English school’s ‘subjectivist understanding of the ‘conscious’ common interests and values on the part of states and their conformity to a wide range of constitutive practices such as sovereignty, diplomacy’, and their belief that ‘a common culture was a necessary condition for the existence of international society’. These subjectivist principles mean that both the constructivist and the English school approaches are ‘engaged in an exploration of a non-rationalist theory of an international system which does not take the rules, identities and interests of the units as a given’ (Dunne 1995: 372, 381, 383). Yet, it is important to identify which elements of Wendt’s constructivism are adopted by Buzan and to see how he modifies and applies them to English school theory. These can be examined from three perspectives: Buzan’s social structural interpretation; the debate between pluralism and solidarism; and the issues of institutions of international society.

Social Structural Interpretation

Buzan’s study of the English school theory leads him to conclude that many of its insights were valuable because they helped to develop social or ‘societal understandings of international systems’ and provided ‘powerful grounds for differentiation and comparison among types of international society, and ways of understanding both what Westphalian international society evolved from, and what it might be evolving into’ (Buzan 2004a: 1, 4). But Buzan also recognises the weaknesses of the theory and argues that further development is needed. He notes that, so far, the main sources of progress have been ‘Wendt-inspired social structural interpretations’ of the theory (2004a: 3). First, this led Buzan to question the distinction between international system and international society (or between material and social), made by English school theory. As Bull and Watson note (1984:1):

A group of states (or, more generally, a group of independent political communities) which not merely form a system, in the sense that the behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognise their common interest in maintaining these arrangements.
For Buzan, such a distinction rests on ‘a separation of the physical system from the social one’ in which the system represents ‘the physical mode of interaction’. In other words, the depiction of the physical system represents a typical ‘mechanistic, realist-style analyses of the balance of power as an automatic process rooted in the relative material capabilities of states’, whereas the social element is represented by ‘the establishment and maintenance of common rules and institutions for the conduct of interstate relations’ (Buzan 2004a: 98, 99). Although this kind of understanding is not confined to English school – as evident in the treatment of neorealism as ‘material’ and constructivism as ‘social’ –, Buzan still argues that ‘the distinction between physical and social is not nearly as interesting as it first appears’. Rather he sees a high degree of overlap between physical and social systems. For instance, even seemingly mechanistic operations, as neorealists themselves often concede, such as the balance of power, can be ‘interpreted as the behavioural characteristics of a particular type of social structure’ (Buzan 2004a: 100-101).

Buzan (2004a: 99-102) notes that other scholars, including Alan James (1993), have taken a similar approach. James treats international society as the key concept in Bull’s theories, while dismissing his treatment of the international system as meaningless. Even within the English school, writers such as Watson – notably in his pendulum theory (swings from anarchy to empire) (Watson 1990, 1992) have shown how difficult it is to separate physical structures from social ones. Yet Buzan (2004a: 102) believes that it is Wendt who provides the greatest challenge to the idea of ‘distinction’. Wendt insists that ‘anarchy is what states make of it’ (Wendt 1992) and hence suggests that even Hobbesian cultures are ultimately just as ‘social’ as Lockean and Kantian ones.

If this is true, it follows that, like international societies, international systems should be also treated as social structures. This is why Buzan questions ‘whether English school theory needs to retain the distinction between international system and international society’ (Buzan 2004a: 101). In other words, of the three pillars of the English School – ‘international system’, ‘international society’ and ‘world society’ –, ‘international system’ can be removed (Buzan 2004a: 106). Yet, while adopting all international structures are social, Buzan (2004a: 101, 102) still argues that this ‘does not rule out the options of materialist theory’, nor does it ‘take the physical out of the analysis
altogether’. It is merely that ‘the physical aspect ceases to provide the principal basis for distinguishing one type of international system from another’. Thus, Buzan can still maintain that ‘Physical elements such as the distribution of power, and the nature of interaction capacity remain central to the analysis of all social systems’ (Buzan 2004a: 101-2). It follows that, if an RSC exists, it must be regarded as a social construction – even if it remains largely at the ‘conflict formation’ mode – and hence inter-subjective processes among its members are important to any security analysis. All three approaches present here – neorealism, constructivism, and the English school – rest comfortably within RSCT’s eclectic posture.

Buzan’s reinterpretation of English school theory – involving the abolition or at any rate the dilution of the distinction between physical and social systems – opens the way to further reinterpretation of the different types of international society identified by English school theory. Here in line with Wendt’s scheme of social structures – the nature of the dominant roles in the system, enemy, rival and friend and their internalisation –, Buzan separates out the type of international society from the mode / depth of its internalisation. That is, a shift from ‘what the shared norms, rules and institutions are, and who shares them, to the means by which these norms are held in place as a form of social practice’ (Buzan 2004a: 102). For Buzan, applying this scheme is crucial to understand ‘how international or world societies develop, and how stable or unstable they might be’ (Buzan 2004a: 105). The questions of what kinds of norms are shared – and indeed how and why they are shared – are highly relevant to this thesis. Hence these issues will be investigated thoroughly in the context of Northeast Asia.

However, Buzan has reservations about Wendt’s scheme and sometimes finds it is too simplistic. Since Wendt sees both his types of social structure and the three components of the how/why dimension in mutually exclusive terms but not mixture.

Wendt’s assumption that the types of social structure in the what dimension will always have a sufficiently clear pattern of enemy, rival or friend to give them clear and mutually exclusive designations is already bordering on heroic simplification (Buzan and Wæver 2003), though it might just about be sustainable for analytical purposes. But to assume the same about the three elements of the how/why dimension is not sustainable. … Almost any
social structure one can think of will be held together by some mixture of coercion, calculation and belief. The necessity of mixture, and how to deal with it, is what defines politics (Buzan 2004a: 130).

The result is a radical reinterpretation of the debates on pluralism and solidarism and on those institutions of international society. Both are central to English school theory, and are crucial to an understanding of the various types of international society. Questions about the constitution of society in terms of what values are shared, how and why they are shared, and by whom, are bound to be critical (Buzan 2004a: 161).

**Pluralism and Solidarism**

In English school literature, a pluralist interstate society is usually identified as one based on mutual recognition of sovereignty and non-intervention; hence the rule of coexistence is central to pluralism. In a solidarist international society, however, relationships between constitutive units (states and non-states actors) go far beyond considerations the self-preservation and coexistence, because these relationships are now regulated by a wide range of common values and norms, including universal human rights. Yet these propositions, so central to the English school, remain controversial. They have not fully resolved the debate about pluralism and solidarism and it is still hard to determine whether a given society should be described as a pluralist or a solidarist one. Buzan’s interpretation and development of the English school treats the debate about pluralism and solidarism as one about types of interstate society:

[I]f one accepts the argument that all of international relations is social, that ‘enemies’ is just as much a social structure as ‘rivals’ or ‘friends’, then the term ‘interstate society’ covers a wide spectrum…. In this perspective, the debate about pluralism and solidarism can be seen largely as a debate about types of interstate society (Buzan 2004a: 140).

Then, what type of values, if shared, count as solidarist and at what point, and by what criteria, does an interstate society move from being pluralist to solidarist? Two principles can be accounted for such moves. The first reflects a Kantian logic of
convergence; that is, ‘states might abandon the pursuit of difference and exclusivity as their main raison d’être, and cultivate becoming more alike as a conscious goal’ (Buzan 2004a: 146). The second relates to Mayall’s idea of an enterprise association. Here, states might cooperate in joint projects by coordinating their policies and creating appropriate norms and rules, which go beyond survival and coexistence. The joint pursuit of human rights provides the best known example and has been extensively explored in solidarist literature. Yet Buzan insists that ‘the pursuit of joint gain’ and ‘the pursuit of knowledge’ should also receive adequate attention (Buzan 2004a: 150). The pursuit of joint gain has been an especially important in the economic sector (rather neglected by the English school), where it has led states to agree on rules for trade, property rights and banking – in turn resulting in more homogenised domestic structures. Indeed, for many East Asian countries, growing consciousness of regional identity / society derives largely from the processes whereby they pursue economic joint gains.

Finally, the location of pluralism and solidarism along a spectrum of types of interstate society, does not mean that there are only two types of societies. Rather there are many, which Buzan describes as ranging from the asocial, power politics, coexistence, cooperative, convergence, to confederative interstate societies, though in reality the first and the last maybe rare conditions (see details, Buzan 2004a: 159). These functionally based types of interstate society are significantly different from those proposed by the English school and Wendtian traditions.

The Institutions of International Society

Having located international societies along the pluralist-solidarist spectrum, what are the distinctive characteristics of the various types? Here, it is important to clarify the relationship between different types of interstate society and the range of institutions within them. For the purpose, Buzan distinguishes between two kinds of analysis of institutions – one proposed by English school theory and the other by Regime theory. Accordingly, the English school deals with primary institutions, because these institutions reflect something ‘more fundamental’. They are ‘constitutive of both states and international society in that they define the basic character and purpose of any such
society’. Regime theory deals with *secondary institutions*, for the most part ‘consciously designed by states’ (Buzan 2004a: 161-63, 166-67).

The English school’s idea of institutions in international society provides an important starting point. Bull’s set of five institutions – diplomacy, international law, the balance of power, war, and the role of great power – is particularly valuable. Building on this foundation, and echoing Holsti and others, Buzan postulates a more functionally based taxonomy of primary institutions (see details Buzan 2004a: 176-90). He then links these institutions with the types of interstate societies – that is, how institutions operate with different forms of interstate societies. For the purpose of this thesis, particularly in respect of the issue of structural change, I am particularly interested in links between primary institutions and different types of interstate / international society. The main idea can be summarised as follows (Buzan 2004a: 190-95).

In a *Power Political* interstate society, the existence of primary institutions will be thin and secondary institutions are unlikely to exist at all – because such a society is based largely on enmity and the possibility of war.

But in a *Coexistence* interstate society, core primary institutions emerge – in the shape of sovereignty, territoriality, diplomacy, great power management, war, international law, and nationalism. This corresponds to the Westphalian model of interstate society based upon the balance of power system, or to Bull’s ‘pluralist international society’. Historically, the Westphalian model of interstate society first appeared in Europe in the seventeenth century and subsequently expanded to embrace almost the entire world.

A *Cooperative* interstate society occupies a level that has moved some way beyond coexistence, but still falls short of domestic convergence. In such a society, primary institutions, such as sovereignty, territoriality, nationalism, diplomacy and international law – originally arising in a Coexistence society – continue to play important role. Yet they may now be interpreted rather differently. Indeed, in a cooperative society, some primary institutions, for example the balance of power and war, may be downgraded or even eliminated. In particular, the role of war as an institution changes and the scope for its legitimate use becomes more circumscribed and narrowly defined. At the same time,
the ‘market’ becomes an increasingly important institution – a major feature in the spread of the liberal model of international society.

Finally, in a *Convergence* interstate society, there must be strong shared values among the member states and they adopt similar political, legal and economic forms. Yet, it can take many forms – liberal democracy, Islamic theocracy, communist totalitarianism, and etc. Everything depends on the model of political economy that member states of the society are converging around. In a liberal (Kantian) version of convergence interstate society, however, the market, property rights, human rights, and democratic relations between government and citizens are likely to be important primary institutions.

Thus, norms and institutions can change. Reasons for change include change in the domestic society of the member states or pressure from Transnational Actors (TNAs). The interesting point here is that although, to begin with, solidarist evolution will probably be built on pluralist foundations, further development may involve more than direct accumulation. In other words, as solidarism thickens, some key pluralist institutions may be dropped, downgraded or transformed. This provides the basis for Buzan’s argument, which resembles Hurrell’s (2002), that the overall set of institutions may contain ‘contradictions / tensions among itself’, and these contradictions and tensions themselves foster change (Buzan 2004a: 195). War, the market, and nationalism as institutions offer examples of these tensions and assist understanding of how change can result.

In a power political interstate society, war is an important institution, perhaps even the predominant one. In this type of interstate society, there is general acceptance of war and conquest as legitimate means by which to achieve political objectives. However, when interstate society moves from a pluralist to solidarist one, war as an institution becomes more problematic. Buzan contends that this ‘problematisation’ of war is not really a consequence of the development of weapons capable of inflicting tremendous destruction; such a problem could arise even within a power political interstate society. Rather, the real ‘problematisation’ of war flows from the fact that, in solidarist interstate societies, there are contradictions between war as an institution and the other institutions cultivated by such societies – for example big science or the institutionalisation of the market (Buzan 2004a: 196). As I will show, war and international law as institutions
have also become increasingly incompatible with each other; which in turn, have important implications for states behaviour within Northeast Asian RSC.

In a similar way, the rise of nationalism as a primary institution also brings considerable change in international society. After the World War I, national self-determination not only displaced dynasticism as the key to political legitimacy, it also sacralised territory (Mayall 2000b: 84). Nationalism also undermined colonialism and imposed limitations on the legitimate uses of war. This concept of the rise or fall of primary institutions and the resulting impact on international society is particularly useful when investigating how the East Asian world order was absorbed into an expanding European international society.

2.2 Regional Security Complex Theory: An Analytical Tool

Traditionally, security studies were regarded as an academic sub-discipline within the overall area of strategic studies. As a result, approaches tended to be dominated by the assumptions of realism and hence the basic premise was that issues connected with war and force formed the core of security studies. The only referent object was the state and security was to be understood in purely objective terms. In Wæver’s words, it is ‘reality prior to language, is out there… and it is measured in terms of threat or fear’ (Wæver 1995: 46). More recently the previous dominance of realism was modified by the increasing influence of neorealism. Yet even neorealist assumptions still led to a tendency to concentrate too much on the material forces and constraints generated by the global structure rather than on the role of regional dynamics. In other words, developments in a given region were likely to be explained mainly in terms of changes in global power distribution.

From the 1980s, however, there was increasing dissatisfaction with the old military and state-centred view of security. As a result, security studies have expanded to embrace a wider agenda. Some go so far as to propose that the former focus on the security of the state should be replaced by a new emphasis on the security of people, whether as individuals or as a global or international collectivity (Booth 1991). There is now also a widespread desire to relate security to human needs and thus to maximise security as
positive goals (Galtung 1985). This new outlook has major implications both for the clarity and coherence of a crucial area of IR theory.

Regional security complex theory (RSCT) was first developed by Buzan in the 1980s. As its name suggests, it treats security essentially in relational terms. Buzan claims that adoption and application of this theory would overcome some of the disadvantages of power theory, particularly its underplay of the importance of the regional level in international security affairs. In other words, RSCT advocates the regional level as the appropriate one for a large swath of practical security analysis (Buzan 1991: 186; Buzan and Wæver 2003: 43). Since then the theory has been further developed by Buzan, Wæver and others, and has become associated with the Copenhagen school’s theoretical approach to security. Although RSCT has advanced further to embrace a wider security agenda and a securitisation understanding (Buzan et al. 1998), the original focus remains unchanged. The following section will consider three main aspects of RSCT: how does it conceptualise security and the framework of security analysis; how does it define types of RSC; and how does it approach the possibility of structural / substructural change?

2.2.1 Conceptual Frameworks: An Intersubjective Approach

What is a security issue and what is not and should security be approached objectively (a real threat) or subjectively (a perceived threat)? These are the basic questions asked by RSC theorists (mainly see, Wæver 1995; Buzan et al. 1998; Buzan Wæver 2003). For them security should be regarded as ‘a self-referential practice’, because it is in this practice that an issue becomes a security issue – not necessarily because a real threat exists but because the issue is presented as such (Buzan et al. 1998: 24). Following language theory, Wæver (1995: 55) sees security as a speech act. This has two implications: first, ‘the word “security” is the act; the utterance is the primary reality’. In other words, by using the word ‘security’, a state-representative begins to move a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims the right to use all necessary means to counter the threat. Second, the meaning of security must move from positive to negative, i.e. ‘minimising’ security by narrowing the field to which the security act is applied. Wæver (1995: 55, 57) believes that the dynamics of securitisation and de-securitisation can never be understood so long as investigation
proceeds along the normal critical track that treats security as a positive value to be maximised.

This concept of the speech act, and the associated process of securitisation, facilitates the development of a new understanding of security that goes beyond issues of force. Now security is to be regarded as ‘a particular type of intersubjective politics’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 26). A simple example is provided by a situation when hostile tanks cross a border. Here, hostile is not really an attribute of the vehicle but of a socially constituted relationship, because a foreign tank could be part of a peacekeeping force (Buzan et al. 1998: 30). Thus, RSC theorists propose a definition and criteria of securitisation as something ‘constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 25).

Here RSC theorists make important conceptual distinctions between a securitising move and a successful securitisation; and between referent objects and securitising actors. First, they distinguish between a securitising move and a successful securitisation. When something presents an existential threat, that may lead to a securitising move but by itself it may not create securitisation. An issue is securitised only ‘if and when the audience accepts it as such’. To some extent, a North Korean missile test will be seen as a securitising move by all states in the region. But whether it can be successfully securitised depends on how its neighbours interpret it. The different Chinese and Japanese responses to the recent missile and nuclear crises mean that the same securitising move can result in different levels of securitisation. In other words, securitisation involves more than the breaking of rules and existential threats. The two must be combined – that is when cases of existential threats legitimise the breaking of rules (Buzan et al. 1998: 25). The other distinction is between referent objects and securitising actors. The former means ‘what is to be secured’, while the latter refers to those ‘who make claims about this security’ (Buzal et al. 1998: 35-42; Buzan and Wæver 2003: 71).

This distinction is important and highly relevant to Northeast Asian cases. This general theory allows identification of the conditions in which ‘an actor successfully ‘securitises’ some threat on behalf of a specific ‘referent object’’. In other words, the theory’s open analytical framework helps us to ‘catch’ security in its increasing varied
sectors, levels and units, while avoiding the trap of thinking that ‘everything is security’ (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 71). The referent objects of both Taiwan and North Korea have changed over the years. In both cases, the objectives have become less ambitious, though perhaps more fundamental. For North Korea earlier aspirations to victory over the South have changed to a preoccupation with regime survival. Similarly, Taiwan’s referent object of security has shifted from its re-establishment as the legitimate government of the whole China to the creation and defence of a distinct Taiwanese identity. Clearly, therefore, the referent object of security can vary as circumstances change. The referent objects for security have traditionally been the state and its survival. Now, however, ‘universal principles’ – such as free trade, human rights, non-proliferation – are becoming referent objects in the political and economic sectors.

Under this understanding of securitisation, RSC theorists deny that security is given objectively; rather it is determined by actors, and hence is essentially subjective. But they also argue that the label ‘subjective’ is inadequate, because it is not individuals alone who decide whether an issue is a security issue. In other words, a successful securitisation is not decided by the securitiser but by the audience of the security speech act. In this sense, securitisation, like politicisation, is ‘intersubjective and socially constructed’. The process of securitisation, ‘makes the case for understanding security not just as the use of force but as a particular type of intersubjective politics’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 26, 29, 30).

Thus, it is important to understand precisely ‘who securitise, on what issues (threat), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results, and not least, under what conditions (i.e., what explains when securitisation is successful)’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 31, 32). In this sense, an objective measure for security can never replace the study of securitisation, because the security quality is supplied by politics. But this does not mean that a study of the features of the threat itself is irrelevant. On the contrary, these features rank high among the ‘facilitating conditions’ – the conditions under which the speech act works – of the security speech act (Buzan et al. 1998: 32). In short, RSCT specifies ‘facilitating conditions’ that make securitisation more or less likely, yet it is ‘not causal in a traditional sense’ (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 96).
2.2.2 Types of RSC and The Possibility of Change

Based upon this conceptual framework, RSCT identifies the types and natures of RSCs. RSCs are to be regarded as substructures of the international system. They are specific and functionally defined types of security regions, although they may or may not coincide with more general understandings of what is meant by the region concerned. This is because such regions are defined by ‘the relative intensity of security interdependence among a group of units, and security interdependence between that set and surrounding units’ (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 48). For example, while some analysts may treat Russia as belonging to Northeast Asia, Russia is not included as a ‘regional actor’ in this thesis. I believe that the ties of security interdependence are not strong enough to justify the ‘incorporation’ of Russia as a Northeast Asian actor – although it will be referred to as necessary.

Within these parameters, the essential structure and character of RSCs are defined by two kinds of relations – power relations and patterns of amity and enmity. In the first place, as substructures within the international system, RSCs can be analysed in terms of polarity. At the same time, they also have important mediating effects on the actual operation of the global dynamics of great power across the international system. Here, RSCT distinguishes regional powers from global level ones (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 49). Secondly, the theory treats the distribution of power and the patterns of amity and enmity as essentially independent variables. It claims that polarity may influence, but not determine, the character of security relations. As RSCs are socially constructed, they depend on ‘what and whom they securitise, the region might reproduce or change’. Thus, the prediction of patterns of conflict needs more than an investigation of the distribution of power. Historical hatreds and friendships, as well as the specific issues that trigger conflict or cooperation, are important elements by which to define an RSC (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 50). From this argument it follows logically that there is at least a possibility that RSCs can change and redefine themselves.

RSCT treats RSCs as durable (not permanent) substructures, which have both internal structures and external boundaries that can be used to monitor continuity and change. It identifies three possible evolutions and changes in any given RSC:
• **maintenance of the status quo**, which means that there are no significant changes in its essential structure;

• **internal transformation** – changes occur within the existing outer boundary. This could mean changes to the anarchic structure (because of regional integration); to polarity; or to the dominant patterns of amity / enmity; and

• **external transformation**, which means that the outer boundary expands or contracts – that is either two RSCs merge, or one RSC splits into two (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 53).

Within these variations, I am most interested in internal transformation, particularly changes in the dominant patterns of amity and enmity. Yet, as I shall show, the possibility of external transformation is also highly relevant to the Northeast Asian case – that is a mergence with the Southeast Asian region. Some analysts have already identified such a mergence (Huxley 1996b: 216-18; Buzan and Wæver 2003: 155-64). And I shall argue that the two types of change are closely related in this case.

Thus, within these identified structure and evolutions, it is possible to monitor and analyse types as well as changes of RSCs through variations either in polarity and / or amity and enmity. On the spectrum of polarity, security regions can range from unipolar to multipolar. As social structures, RSCs may also be located along a spectrum depending on the degree of amity and enmity. That is, at the negative end comes conflict formation, where interdependence arises from fear, rivalry and mutual perceptions of threat. In the middle lies security regime, where states still treat each other as potential threats, but where they have made arrangements to reduce the security dilemma among themselves (Jervis 1982). At the positive end lies a security community, where states no longer expect, or prepare, to use force in their relations with each other (Adler and Barnett 1998; Buzan 1991: 218).

Here we can see that types along the amity and enmity line are closely related to the English school’s three categories of Hobbes, Grotius, and Kant; and to Wendt’s three cultures of Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian. It should be noted, however, that the concept of conflict formation is wider than Wendt’s Hobbesian model, and that of security regime is narrower than his Lockean model (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 53). Under this categorisation, the Northeast Asian RSC is clearly located to the bipolar type
on the polarity line. But does it belong to the conflict formation level or has it moved to a level of security regime on the amity and enmity line?

2.3 Conclusion: Intersubjective Processes – a Key to Security Analysis

In the course of this chapter, I have examined how different theoretical propositions result in specific ontological and methodological foci and hence give rise to particular questions. The Waltzian formulation of the international system clearly leads to an analytical parsimony, one that precludes investigation of the characters and intentions of individual actors (states) – because these are alleged to have little impact on ‘international’ politics. In order to understand the behaviour of states, one must understand changes in power positions within a system, since the structure of a system changes with changes in the distribution of capabilities among its units. Moreover, changes in structure change expectations about how the units within the system will behave.

By contrast, if we follow the formulation of Wendtian social constructivism, the identity and interests of the actors will be at the core of our investigation – because these identities and interests are seen as the ultimate sources of the outcomes. Again, the English school formulation leads to an examination of how international society evolves through the creation and evolution of different norms, principles and institutions. Since these are not given but are formed through the processes of intersubjective practices – a point also emphasised by the securitisation approach – they can change through intersubjective practice, hence the structural change. RSCT guides us to an analytical eclecticism and to the use of both materialist and constructivist approaches, such as the distribution of power and amity and enmity, but essentially treats them as independent variables.

This thesis accepts the argument that all types of international relations are essentially ‘social’. It posits that, even if largely remain in a conflict formation mode, the Northeast Asian RSC is a region that is socially constructed. Evolution and change will be contingent on the security practices of the actors. Thus, the analysis of securitisation must be made within the context of intersubjective processes. This includes mutual perceptions and interpretations among actors. In the course of investigation one must
discover what kind of values, norms and institutions they share, and why they are shared, and how their identity and interests evolve and change over time. It is also important to find out how these changes influence securitisation and desecuritisation practices. These practices will ultimately become the sources that will determine whether Northeast Asia remains in its present conflict formation mode or moves to a level of security regime. The next six chapters will apply theories examined in this chapter and to analyse the case of Northeast Asia.
Part I: The Societal Dimension:  
The Evolution of Regional / International Society

Introduction

‘Societal security is about collectives and their identity…. Any we identity can be constructed in many different ways, and often the main issue that decides whether security conflicts will emerge is whether one or another self-definition wins out in a society’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 120).

Is there a Northeast Asian collective identity? Have national or collective identity factors resulted in a Northeast Asian regional international society? According to Bull:

A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions (Bull 1977: 13).

For a variety of reasons, the collective identity of Northeast Asia is weaker than the same phenomenon elsewhere, even in other parts of Asia. As a regional international society it is characterised more by diversity than by convergence. This under-development is manifested in the virtual absence of effective multilateralism or any structure of security mechanism until very recently (Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002; Buzan and Segal 1994; Yahuda 2002). There is certainly a striking contrast to Europe, where multilateral cooperation is more long-standing and more institutionalised.

What are the main causes of this slow process of multilateralism and low level of consciousness as a regional society, and has this level risen? To answer these questions, this chapter explores aspects of both the English school and constructivism, and seeks to explain how these factors affect securitisation / desecuritisation practices in the Northeast Asian RSC. In so doing, it challenges some of the views on Northeast Asian regional security developed to date.
First, it challenges the Waltzian strict systemic approach that assumes that the model (the anarchical system) established in seventeenth century Europe is universal and hence describes the international system at all times and in all places. It is also assumes that structural conditions make all states ‘like-units’ and minimises the role of domestic and ideational features in security analysis. Here I challenge the Waltzian position by asking how ‘alike’ are the ‘like-units’ that allegedly constitute an international society? (Buzan 1996: 266); and suggest that a distinctive ‘Chinese world order’ existed long before the modern European international society.

Secondly, I question Hemmer and Katzenstein’s (2002) contention that the lack of multilateralism is largely due to American (external) identity factors. While acknowledging the importance of ideational factors in the development of bilateralism versus multilateralism, I seek to investigate the interplay between external and regional actors in their identity formation and its effects on interests and behaviour.

Thirdly, I investigate regionalism and regionalisation movements operating on the East Asia and Asia Pacific levels. Although relations among the states began to change in the 1970s, regionalism in Asia-Pacific has developed significantly in the post-Cold War era, coinciding with dramatic changes in domestic political economies, notably in China. These processes have resulted in a dynamic interplay between domestic, regional, inter-regional and global levels. Impacts on regional identity and interests and upon security practices are formidable.

For the purposes of this analysis, it is essential to examine patterns of security practices in Northeast Asia not only in relation to the evolution of regional international society, but also in the larger context of the expansion and development of global international society. When defining security complexes, RSC theorists emphasise ‘interactions among units’. They argue:

Since we argue that security is not an objective issue but a product of the behaviour of actors, security complexes are not objective in the traditional sense. Nor is the security complex to be seen as a discursive construction by the actors... Analysts apply the term security complex (and therefore designate a region) based upon the contingent, historically specific, and
possibly changing constellation generated by the interdependent security practices of the actors (Buzan et al. 1998: 20).

In the processes of securitisation and desecuritisation in East Asia, interplay between regional and global international society is particularly strong. As we shall see, the different responses of China and Japan to Western expansion present only one of the many examples. From this perspective, two phenomena have particular implications for regional security: the expansion of European regional international society into a global one; and the uneven development of international society at the sub-global/regional level.

Thus, my analysis focuses not only on questions such as what kind of values, norms and institutions are already shared within Northeast Asian RSC, and why? – but also on how the dynamic interplay of global and regional international society shaped and reshaped regional society, and how these affected the dynamics of securitisation and desecuritisation practices in Northeast Asia? In short, what type of international society, if any, has Northeast Asia evolved into? This approach leads me to investigate the historical processes through which the Northeast Asian regional society or the Northeast Asian RSC has evolved and changed:

- How in earlier times did the Sino-centric world order sustain a regional yet ‘universal’ international society in East Asia?
- How did this East Asian world order collapse? Here the impact of external pressures (the expansion of European international society), and internal developments (the rise of Japan and Sino-Japanese rivalry) must be considered.
- Japanese imperialism and its consequences.
- The impact of the Cold War on Northeast Asian regional society.
- The impact of the ending of the Cold War.

In so doing, I aim to provide an historical context– the evolution of international society in East Asia – in order to arrive at a better understanding of the logic of securitisation / desecuritisation in current affairs. Chapter 3 focuses on the Sino-centric world order and its demise. Chapter 4 investigates the re-emergence of a regional international society, from the first attempt made by Japan to developments in the Cold War period. Chapter
5 examines developments of international society in Northeast / East Asia in the present post-Cold War era.
The Sino-Centric East Asian World Order and its Demise

3.1 The Sino-Centric East Asian World Order

Until it encountered the European international society in the mid-nineteenth century, East Asia was a self-contained world – the so-called ‘Chinese world order’ (Fairbank 1968) or ‘the East Asian world order’ (K-H Kim 1980). Strictly speaking, this Sino-centric world was a ‘regional’ society, or in Buzan and Little’s (2001) categorisation, a ‘sub-global international system’. It developed within the area of Chinese culture (though it expanded more widely), and was heavily influenced by the civilisation of ancient China. It co-existed with the European society of states until the mid-nineteenth century. Yet it was also a unified and ‘universal’ empire, which theoretically embraced the entire world. Thus, as Fairbank (1968: 2) notes, although ‘In European parlance, it became the Far East’, ‘in Chinese terms this Far Eastern world was Sino-centric’. From time of the Middle Kingdom (Zhong Guo, China), it was dominated by the Chinese empire (Tianxia, all-under-heaven), presided over by the Son of Heaven (Tianzi, the Chinese emperor).

The patterns of this Sino-centric world – its system structure and organising principles – evolved in virtual isolation and were little affected by the dynamics of Western world (Zhang 2001a: 44; K-H Kim 1980: 1). It endured over two millennia, from at least the Han dynasty (206 BC - 24 AD) until the intrusion of the Western powers in the mid-nineteenth century. What were the distinctive features of this world order and how could it survive for so long?

3.1.1 Confucianism: the Philosophical Foundation of the System

To comprehend this system and the hierarchical relations between China and its neighbours and peripheries, we must first understand its philosophical basis – Confucianism. Zhang (2001a: 51) explains:

Confucius and Confucians represented one school of thought in the Warring States period. They were important, not only because they turned out to be
harbingers of a future age, but also because Confucian ideas, ‘amorphous, adaptable and various’ as they are (Wight 1991: 66), were used for the design of imperial institutions and systems of government and governance, particularly in the Han Dynasty, as the Confucian-legalist amalgam (the so-called Imperial Confucianism) became the prevailing ideology in the imperial bureaucracy.

Two notions require particular examination because they were crucial in shaping the Chinese view of the world: the concept of unity as peace or universal kingship; and the notion of hierarchy as a natural or Confucian moral order.

Unity as Peace and Hierarchy as a Natural Order

The notion of universal kingship derives from an idealisation of the unity of Ancient China under the Zhou Dynasty (1027-777 BC), which assumes a natural harmony between heavenly and earthly forces. Although the notion itself was pre-Confucian, as Schwartz (1968: 278) argues, over time, it became inextricably linked with ‘an absolutisation of the Confucian moral order’. Accordingly, peace and harmony were intrinsically related to political unity. When advising King Hui of Liang – who asked ‘How may the world be at peace?’ – Mencius replied ‘When there is unity, there will be peace’ (Fung Yu-lan 1948: 180). The rise of Confucianism during the Han dynasty and the associated belief in unity and peace gave rise to the Pax Sinica and remained its raison d’être thereafter.

The idea of hierarchic order is even older than Confucianism. ‘From the first, the Chinese world was hierarchic and anti-egalitarian’, or in Fei’s words, a caxu geju (concentric hierarchical order) (Fairbank 1968: 5; Fei 1945: chapter 4). As an ancient Chinese institution, li (rituals) revealed, the cosmic order was perceived as a hierarchy within which every being was assigned an appropriate place. ‘The Confucian philosophy that sanctioned this hierarchic order became an orthodoxy’ (Fairbank 1968: 6). Confucian teaching identifies five important human relations regulating familial and social life: relations between father and son, ruler and official, husband and wife, elder and younger brother, and friend and friend. Since these relationships were moral norms, though not actually legally binding, they would be enhanced by the strict observance of
proper ceremonial forms (\textit{li}). Further, in order to achieve harmony and peace, all kinds of political conduct must conform to these norms and strictly observe the five human relationships. Thus, Confucian orthodoxy provided the basis upon which China and non-Chinese states in East Asia conducted relations with one another. The five Confucian relationships usually ‘provided the vocabulary of definition for specific tributary relationships’ (Mancall 1968: 65).

3.1.2 The Tribute System: an Hierarchical Structure

Thus, the Chinese empire developed a system structure different to that of the international society that emerged in seventeenth century Europe. It is important to understand this difference, and here the concept of shared \textit{institutions}, developed by the English school, may be helpful. The ‘modern’ European interstate society was based upon the organising principle of sovereignty, that is, equality of states. Within this interstate society, territoriality was an important institution: ‘defined political space was one of exclusive legal jurisdiction’ (Holsti 2004: 83). By the late seventeenth century, this was fully accepted as an essential characteristic and became institutionalised in the eighteenth. Thus, with its preoccupation with precise division of territories and its own concepts of legitimacy, the order was largely maintained by such concepts as the balance of power and great power management. Other core institutions, such as diplomacy, war, and international law, also played important role in maintaining the system structure.

In contrast, the Chinese world order was ‘unified and centralised in theory by the universal pre-eminence of the Son of Heaven’ (Fairbank 1968: 9). The fundamental institutional arrangement within this world order was the tribute system, which was hierarchical and anti-egalitarian. Thus compared to the modern European interstate society, there were fundamental differences in shared institutions. Unlike the modern European interstate society, territoriality was not an important institution, because the Chinese order was not organised on the basis of a clear division of territories between sovereigns of equal status. The concentric hierarchical order was sustained by the subordination of all local authorities to the central and awe-inspiring power of the emperor (Fairbank 1968: 9; Fei 1945). Thus, there were no institutions such as nationalism and international law. Even if they existed in any sense of the word, they
were not of primary importance. Further, balance of power and great power management were also less important.

Diplomacy as an institution did play an important role though it operated in a different manner to its European counterpart – not least because the tributary relationship ‘was always bilateral, never multilateral’ (Mancall 1968: 65). Participants in the Chinese world order interacted with Imperial China but not with each other in any meaningful way. For instance, Annam (Vietnam) and Korea, two core members of the Chinese tribute system, had no regular or sustained contact with each other. Korea’s relationship with Japan was also different to that with China; while Korea considered relations with China ‘familial in nature and obligation’, those with Japan were regarded as ‘purely contractual in nature and origin’ (K-H Kim 1980: 20).

Instead, ceremonial forms (li, rituals), were the dominant institutions and played the most important role in maintaining the order of the Chinese empire. Li comprised ‘the rules, norms and accepted behaviours and the institutional practices’ (Zhang 2001a: 49). Although not legally binding, li was a moral norm that regulated relations between China and non-Chinese regimes. As the outward manifestation of Confucian rules of propriety, it provided a foundation for the belief that rule by virtue (de zhi) offered the best chance of peace and harmony; right conduct according to the proper norms would move others by its example.

3.1.3 The Confucian Moral Rule: Theory and Reality

It followed that the pre-ordained order of natural harmony in a cosmic unity could only be achieved through the Confucian rule of propriety, and by strict observation of the five human relationships. But to what extent did the Confucian moral and intellectual structure correspond to the actual practice of China’s relations with its periphery? Theoretically, the institution of war was only to be regarded as of secondary importance in the vital task of maintaining the divinely sanctioned order. However, in reality, war played a much greater role than the theory allowed. As K-H Kim (1980: 5, 6) notes, struggles for mastery of the Chinese continent and for hegemony in East Asia were frequent and fierce. These struggles were particularly acute in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries and often embroiled Korea, the pivot of East Asia. In 1592,
Toyotomi Hideyoshi invaded Korea with the professed aim of conquering China. The Manchus also invaded Korea in 1627 and 1636, again as a preparatory move in their planned conquest of China. Logically a substantial gap between theory and practice must raise a question as to the value of the theory – does it become worthless or does it still retain some significance?

Some scholars have questioned the Confucian notion of moral authority, and Alastair Ian Johnston (1995) has gone so far as to virtually deny it any credibility. His study of Chinese strategic culture – the relations between strategic culture and strategic choice – examines the *Seven Military Classics* and Ming policy towards the Mongols. Johnston claims that strategic offensiveness, rather than Confucian rule by virtue, dominated Chinese strategic culture. Johnston admits that there were two strategic cultures in Chinese tradition. He calls one ‘the Confucian-Mencian paradigm’, which corresponds to the ideas of the Confucian moral rule. It assumes that conflict is aberrant and avoidable. Even when force has to be used, it should be applied defensively and minimally. He calls the other culture ‘the *parabellum* paradigm’ and this comes close to Western notions of hard realpolitik. It assumes that conflict is a constant feature of human affairs and that, in a zero-sum context, the application of violence is highly efficacious when dealing with the enemy (Johnston 1995: 249).

Moreover, Johnston’s most striking claim is that, while both paradigms existed, they did not enjoy equal status. The Confucian-Mencian paradigm was an idealised strategic culture, which had little influence in actual decision-making processes. For the most part, the *parabellum* paradigm was dominant and informed imperial strategic choice. In other words, the Confucian-Mencian symbolism did inform theories of statecraft and abstract questions on the legitimacy of force. But when it came to specific strategic problems or matters of state security, the decision was rarely in favour of accommodationist or defensive strategies. Rather all means were to be used to destroy an adversary. The dominance of *parabellum* strategic culture seems to be confirmed by Ming memorials on policy towards the Mongols. Hence Johnston (1995: 253) concludes that the Confucian-Mencian strategic culture is idealised; it existed but was irrelevant. The *parabellum* strategic culture not only existed but was also relevant.
Yet, even if we accept Johnston’s claim, it is still hard to explain how Imperial China managed to maintain its rule over an area so vast and diverse and for such long period. Empires based upon force alone are usually short-lived. Further, how do we explain the survival of the Chinese empire even when China itself was militarily weak? Finally, how do we explain the gap or even contradiction between the normative claim of rule by Confucian moral example and actual practice in Chinese world order? While many scholars have answered these questions in terms of flexibility of the system (see Mancall 1968; Fairbank 1968; Zhang 2001a), I believe that other factors were at work. Here the Wendtian model of internalisation – how a cultural norm is internalised by actors and the reasons why states comply with certain systems (see chapter 2) – may be of assistance.

3.2 The Longevity of the Chinese World Order and the Question of Internalisation

Wendt identifies three degrees of internalisation: force/coercion, price/calculation, and legitimacy/belief. Depending on which degree is seen as predominant, we obtain three very different explanations of the extraordinary longevity of the Chinese world order. If ‘force/coercion’ is what really mattered, then East Asians must have accepted their tributary relations with China because they were coerced by imperial military might. Here acceptance would be reluctant and entirely external and East Asians would have looked for ways to escape it. If the ‘price/calculation’ level is dominant, however, they would accept subordinate status because they supposed that this would bring economic or other advantages. Here acceptance would be a little more voluntary, but it would still be largely ‘external’ and conditional. If the expected advantages did not materialise, then they would still want to escape. But if ‘legitimacy/belief’ is dominant, then there would be no thoughts of escape. Acceptance would be entirely voluntary and fully internalised. In other words, they would consciously subscribe to the tenets of the Confucian system. But China had many neighbours and it is possible these different levels preponderated in different relationships and that these also varied over time.

Thus, before we address the question of degrees of internalisation, it may be helpful to investigate what Fei (1945) calls the concentric image (tongxin yuan or chaxu geju) of the Chinese world order. The hierarchical Sino-centric world was graded and was not
coterminal with the Chinese cultural area. China’s relations with its periphery certainly varied in different zones. For analytical purposes, I adopt Fairbank’s (1968: 2) division:

1. **The Sinic zone**: consisting of geographically close and culturally similar tributaries – such as Korea, Vietnam, the Liuqiu (Ryukyu) Islands, and, briefly, Japan.

2. **The Inner Asian Zone**: consisting of the nomadic or semi-nomadic peoples of Inner Asia. Ethnically and culturally these peoples were non-Chinese, and were outside or on the fringe of the Chinese culture area.

3. **The Outer Zone**: consisting of the “outer barbarians” (wai-i) generally at a greater distance, including eventually Japan and other states of Southeast and South Asia and Europe that were supposed to send tribute when trading.

In theory, all non-Chinese states and peoples, wherever located, were expected to pay proper tribute to the Son of Heaven in the Central Country, and to be governed by the same Chinese Confucian propriety (li). Subscription to this theory assumed that the rule of the Chinese Emperor could be maintained by belief and legitimacy alone. While true in theory, in practice, the concept was often flouted. Indeed, patterns both of Chinese rule and the responses of non-Chinese regimes show an interesting mixture of coercion/force, calculation/interest, and belief/legitimacy. Fairbank divides these aims and means as follows:

- military (wu) or administrative (li rituals, fa legal rules) control;
- cultural and ideological (wen, de) or religious attraction; and
- material interest (li) or diplomatic manipulation (cf., Fairbank 1968:13, table 2).

Let us consider in more detail how deeply this system structure was internalised.

### 3.2.1 Coercion as the Driving Force

Despite adherence to the Confucian principle of rule by virtue (de zhi) and the myth of unity as peace and harmony, the expansion of the Chinese empire and nature of its rule over the Sino-centric world were nevertheless characterised by elements of force and belligerency. The role of coercion was particularly marked in relations with Inner and Central Asian nomadic and barbarian tribes. Unlike states in the Sinic Zone – closely tied to China by cultural bonds such as the Chinese written language and Confucianism
the peoples of the Inner Asian Zone were not only ethnically and culturally non-Chinese but were also outside or on the fringe of the Chinese culture area. For the most part, their role in the Chinese world order was as objectives of war and conquest. The position is well summarised by Mancall (1968: 70-71):

China constantly sought to dominate the Central Asian steppes and deserts by demonstrating her military strength, trying to force the barbarians to recognize it by performing the prescribed Confucian rituals. Confucian China was not only a military-political threat to the sedentary grain-growing societies of Southeast and East Asia, but it threatened the very way of life of the Turkish and Mongol nomads, who were never at ease in their relationship with the imperial power.

To some extent, wuzhi (rule by force) applied even within the Sinic zone, particularly over Vietnam (Annam) and Tibet. In any case, even if coercion was not the main driving force, China’s physical size, its military power, and the sophistication of its economy and government would leave surrounding relatively small countries no choice but to subordinate themselves to it. Indeed the degree of acceptance varied greatly. While some, like Korea, Vietnam and Liuqiu, accepted Confucianism as the tributary state’s own ideology, others, such as Central and some Southeast Asian countries, only accepted subordination for the sake of their own survival. When circumstances permitted they often ‘challenged the very legitimacy of the dynasty in Confucian terms by suggesting that the emperor had lost the mandate of heaven because of his inability to control the barbarians’ (Mancall 1968: 70). From time to time, and especially in the late sixteenth century, even Japan challenged Chinese superiority by competing to acquire their own tributaries through attempts to secure the allegiance of several adjacent kingdoms, including the Liuqiu (Ryukyu), and Korea. However, coercion was not the most important instrument in maintaining the Chinese world order.

3.2.2 Interest as the Driving Force

Wendt (1999) argues that states sometimes follow the norms of a system not because they are coerced or compelled but for reasons of individual self-interest. Wendt assigns
these reasons to his second degree of internalisation. It seems that, to a great extent, states and regimes in the Chinese world order that accepted Chinese superiority did so for their own interests – probably from economic or security calculations or both. According to Mancall (1968: 75), while the economic benefits of trade between China and the countries of Southeast Asia were useful or ‘convenient’ to both parties, economic links between China and Central Asia were ‘vital’. Imperial China required horses and other products of animal-husbandry economies not found in sufficient quantities in China itself, while Central Asia needed Chinese tea, grain, other agricultural products, and luxury goods, which played a key role in status differentiations within barbarian societies.

Japan’s position within this Chinese world order was an evolving one, and its role was largely determined by economic considerations. Japan had accepted some form of tributary status to China as early as the Han dynasty (206 BC to AD 219) and definitely acknowledged its inferior status in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Many of the Ashikaga (1392-1573) rulers, received formal investiture from the Ming court as ‘kings of Japan’. Howe (1996: 4) argues the main reasons for Japan’s acceptance of Chinese superiority were ‘the trading advantages’ this conferred. However, Tokugawa Japan (1603-1867), maintained no formal ties with China and remained outside the Chinese tribute system. This was mainly due to the influence of domestic elements such as the court nobility, the Shinto clergy and other groups opposed to the ruling shogunate. They were fiercely loyal to the Mikado – the Japanese emperor, who, though politically impotent for centuries, still remained the de jure sovereign. Yet, the Tokugawa shoguns’ position towards China was essentially the same as that of the Ashikaga rulers (K-H Kim 1980: 23-24). Above all, despite the ‘closure’ of Japan to the outside world in the middle of the seventeenth century, the Tokugawa bakufu (central government) maintained commercial relations with China through Nagasaki and through relations with Korea and the Liuqiu kingdom. As Harootunian (1980: 11) observes, in the distinctive Tokugawa speech, hakuraihin (imported goods) referred to goods produced in China; significantly, the term also came to mean ‘elegant products’. Thus, although Japan was sometimes outside the formal tribute system and often played a challenger role, economic interests kept it close to China both formally and informally.
3.2.3 Legitimacy as the Driving Force

Despite the various facts suggesting that the Chinese world order was held together by force and calculations of self-interest, belief also played a crucial role. Indeed, the importance of this factor becomes evident when one asks how the Chinese world order was able to survive even when China itself was militarily weak. The significance of belief was particularly great for countries within the Sinic Zone, that is, societies historically most influenced by the civilisation of ancient China, sharing the Chinese ideographic writing system, subscribing to classical Confucian teachings about family and social order and adopting the official examination system.

Korea provides the best example because it was the ‘probably the first major non-Chinese state to acknowledge Chinese suzerainty and certainly the last one to renounce it formally’ (K-H Kim 1980: 2-3). Of course, there were elements of force and interest in maintaining a tributary relationship with China. Korea’s major concern was security, a preoccupation derived from its geographical position, which often made it the focus of the rival ambitions of various Asian states. Hence a guarantee of Chinese protection was indispensable if Korean security was to be preserved in times of external threat. The value of Chinese protection was amply demonstrated by the massive Ming assistance that enabled the Koreans to withstand the Toyotomi Hideyoshi invasions in the 1590s. However, it must be acknowledged that belief in Confucianism was perhaps the main reason why Korea remained loyal to China.

Through its long and close cultural and political ties with China, Korea became the most Confucian of all East Asian societies. Particularly under the Yi dynasty, Korea proceeded to transform itself into a model Confucian state by creating new political, social, and cultural institutions based closely on those of Song and Ming China. By the early decades of Ming China, Sino-Korean tributary relations attained full institutional maturity. This deep internalisation made it difficult for Korea to change its tributary relations when the Ming dynasty was replaced by the Qing. Much later the same pattern was repeated when Korea came under Western pressure to renounce its tributary status to Qing China. Thus when the Manchus invaded Korea twice in the early seventeenth century, they compelled a reluctant Korea to renounce its tributary ties with the Ming and to accept vassalage to the Qing. Later, with the Manchu conquest of China itself,
Qing policy towards Korea assumed a more traditional stance – that of seeking to restore the old pattern of harmonious suzerain-vassal relations. Korea eventually accepted tributary status to Qing China. By the late eighteenth century, Korea had even come to respect the *daqing* (great Qing), not merely because Qing China was feared or because Chinese policy was more accommodating, but mainly because Qing China ‘had “become the successor of the great [Confucian] culture”’ (Chun 1968: 111). In other words, what had originally been perceived as an alien culture had itself become Sinicised.

The legitimacy argument may even apply to Japan. While it kept its place in the Chinese world order mainly for economic reasons, these were supported by elements of belief. As mentioned above, in Tokugawa speech, the term *hakuraihin* (imported goods), referred to goods produced in China – ‘elegant products’. Harootunian (1980: 11) argues that the sense of inferiority implicit in the word ‘*hakuraihin*’ ‘probably informed even other areas of Tokugawa life. Chinese doctrine and culture were esteemed over native accomplishments, often at the expense of forgetting about Japan itself’. Hence one may conclude that the Japanese relationship with China depended upon more than calculations of self-interest; it was also sustained by continued belief in and admiration for Chinese civilisation.

Thus, following Zhang (2001a: 57), we must stress the importance of legitimacy in maintaining the Chinese world order: ‘So long as the hegemonic belief in the moral purpose of the state and more broadly, of the political community incarnated in Confucianism, prevails, the tribute system as basic institutional practices in the Chinese world order is likely to stay’. Of course, it is true that the Chinese world order eventually collapsed in the second half of the nineteenth century, but it had then survived for more than two millennia. No other international system approaches it in terms of longevity. Understandably, this extraordinary longevity has impressed many modern Sinologists, but it may have led them to some rather questionable assumptions. They appear to believe that the survival of the system is only explicable in terms of a widespread acceptance of the principles of the Confucian moral order and that these same principles are likely to inform the future pattern of the relations between China and the other states of East Asia. Yet some historians and IR specialists have queried
this extreme Sino-centrism and have expressed doubts as to whether Confucian ideals were either so dominant in the past or likely to be so important in the future.

3.2.4 Implications for Chinese and East Asian International Relations: Some Controversies

It is striking that the rapid rise of China and its growing influence in the region – so obvious from the 1990s onwards – coincided with a new trend in IR thinking. Cultural and civilisational dimensions began to be viewed with renewed interest. Of course, this new orientation appears incompatible with the emphasis on the role of structural conditions in the determination of states’ behaviour, characteristic of mainstream IR theories. In practical terms, these differences of theory lay behind the debate as to whether other East Asian countries would respond to the rise of China by engaging in ‘balancing tactics’ or by ‘bandwagoning’ with it.

For those whose ideas about international relations centre on the concept of the balance-of-power, it is self evident that balancing behaviour is the natural response of states facing the phenomenon of a rising power. Balance-of-power theories assume that states are unitary actors in an essentially anarchic system. At the minimum, they seek their own preservation, while, at the maximum, they aspire to universal domination. When they face what they see as an unfavourable balance, they are prepared to use all means at their disposal to redress it (Waltz 1979: 102-28). In other words, once they are locked into such a system, all states must follow the rules of the balance-of-power ‘game’; any other response would invite danger. East Asians are no exceptions; if they want to survive and prosper they too must play the ‘game’.

But the conventional wisdom of structural constraints and balance of power logic is now challenged by other approaches, perhaps best described as ‘Asian exceptionalism’. David Kang (2003a; 2003b) argues that East Asian states are not balancing against a rising China, but are actually bandwagoning with it. Kang echoes Huntington’s (1996) assertion that the continuing influence of historical and cultural traditions associated with ‘Confucian civilisation’ means that the other states of East Asia are likely to bandwagon with a rising China. In other words, the most significant moulding factors on the pattern of international relations in East Asia are to be found in Asia’s own
history, culture, and civilisation. This is tantamount to saying that the pattern of state behaviour in Asia will not reproduce that of Europe from the seventeenth century onwards. Yet, we still need to understand why Asia will be different. In other words, how do we understand the legacy of East Asian history – particularly the Confucian civilisational tradition – and its influence?

It is important to stress that, while, like Kang, Johnston is convinced of the importance of culture, his conclusions are radically different. As we have seen, Johnston’s study of Chinese strategic culture insists that the dominant element in this culture was that of the *parabellum* paradigm, rather than the Confucian-Mencian tradition. If Johnston is right, it may be that the real traditions of Asia are not so different to those of Europe after all. Clearly, the *parabellum* paradigm is close to realpolitik traditions of Europe and hence ‘not self-evidently unique’. Johnston goes on to argue that the *parabellum* is ‘cross-cultural and learned’. Implicitly therefore, however ‘cultural’ his analysis, Johnston rejects the case for ‘Asian exceptionalism’ (Johnston 1995: 28, 31).

While both of these interpretations provide valuable insights, even taken together they encompass only some aspects of the relationship between China and its neighbours. As Michael Hunt (1996: 8) points out, the history of Chinese foreign relations consists of ‘not just one or two traditions but a multiplicity of traditions’. Perhaps emphasis on one aspect inevitably leads to the neglect of others. Even if we concede that the Confucian civilisational tradition dominated a vast area of East Asia for an extraordinarily long time, it must be stressed that there were other traditions that are also worthy of investigation.

As we have seen, Johnston has identified an alternative, *parabellum*, paradigm, operating alongside the Confucian tradition and at times perhaps more powerful. Indeed, if we extend our historical horizons further back in time – to the period before the ‘Middle Kingdom’ – we encounter still more traditions that seem to have informed the relationship between China and its neighbours. Thus, scholars have confirmed that, during the ‘Spring and Autumn’ and ‘Warring States’ periods (656-221BC), multi-state systems operated in China itself. It seems that these systems closely resembled the modern European state system. The existence of multi-state systems in Chinese history has led Gerald Chan (1999) to question the long-standing belief that the modern state
system first appeared in Europe. In other words, if Chan is right, the significance of the Treaty of Westphalia has been exaggerated. If only unconsciously, the European statesmen of seventeenth century were merely replicating systems that had operated in the Far East anything up to two thousand years earlier. Hui (2005: 1) even argues that ‘[a]lthough it is often presumed that China or Zhongguo refers to the “Middle Kingdom”, this term originally referred to “central states”.’ Eras of international anarchy, and hence of sovereign states, followed the collapse of strong Imperial dynasties – as in the Spring and Autumn periods after the collapse of the Zhou dynasty and during the Three Kingdoms period after the collapse of the Han dynasty. Thus there have been times when China was no stranger to essentially amoral interstate systems, characterised by constant manoeuvre and ruthless competition (Hunt 1996: 6; Hui 2005)

Further, it seems that, even when established, the operation of the Chinese Empire or world order went through a number of phases. Indeed, Rossabi (1983: Introduction) goes further, insisting that the so-called Chinese world order did not persist for the entire period from the second century B.C. to the Opium War. In reality, at different times, China adopted different policies towards foreigners. Hunt divides these policies into two types: the tribute system model with its unshakable Sino-centrism and a more flexible pattern characteristic of the Han (206 B.C. – 220 A.D.) and Tang (618-907 A.D.) dynasties. When the second pattern predominated, China had extensive dealings with foreign peoples, and these contacts brought new goods, aesthetic values, and ideas into China. Hunt further argues that the waxing and waning of Chinese strength along the inner-Asian frontier contributed to the ‘cosmopolitan nature’ of these periods. For example, at its peak China gained control of the Central Asian trade routes and brought non-Chinese peoples on its periphery within its borders. When China was weak, however, these same people asserted themselves, at times claiming political control over parts of China itself (Hunt 1996: 5, 6).

In a similar vein, Ledyard (1983) argues that in the course of its long history, Chinese foreign policy has tended to oscillate between Yang and Yin phases. During a Yang phase (such as the Tang dynasty), the Chinese were sufficiently powerful to impose their system of foreign relations and even secure recognition of its superiority. Yet, in a Yin phase (such as the Song dynasty), China was weak and officials were frequently compelled to accept foreign states as equals and pursue essentially accommodationist...
foreign policies (Ledyard 1983: 313-53). Thus, in the long history of Chinese empire, the combined effects of Yang and Yin phases, especially in terms of frontier interaction and of two-way long distance commerce, resulted in both a Sinicisation of Asian culture and in a ‘barbarization’ of Chinese culture. These developments were reflected in clothing, food and, above all, in religion (Hunt 1996: 6).

But there was one further historical tradition – perhaps the most important of all – that was to transform China itself and its relations with its neighbours, and indeed with other parts of the world. This came in the form of the expansion of European international society into East Asia. All previous experience of the non-Chinese world had indicated that while ‘barbarians’ could indeed conquer China and go on to establish major dynasties such as the Jin (265-42), the Yuan (1271-1368), and the Qing (1644-191), their overall impact was relatively modest. In other words, they could ‘conquer China’ but did not ‘transform it’ (Hunt 1996: 7). The Chinese may well have supposed that European ‘barbarians’ would be no different. If so, they were seriously mistaken. It was not just a matter of the European’s overwhelming military superiority. The crucial difference between the Europeans and earlier barbarian incursions was that the Europeans were able to impose fundamentally different institutional patterns, whose impact soon brought the Chinese empire to a total collapse. Of course, these new institutional patterns and the value system that informed them challenged and undermined long standing and deeply rooted beliefs in the moral purpose of the state in the Chinese world order.

3.3 The Expansion of European International Society

In the course of the nineteenth century, the Sino-centric world order, traditionally maintained by China, faced ever-grave challenges. One came from a previously unfamiliar part of the world and took the form of massive intrusion by the Western powers. As Gong (1984b: 3) points out, the challenge ‘was not merely political or economic, certainly not only military. It was fundamentally a confrontation of civilizations and their respective cultural systems’. It soon became clear that, with modern technology and power, Western states had the means to impose their system of international relations upon China, Japan, and the rest of East Asia. For their part, the East Asian countries found themselves virtually powerless and hence had little choice
but to accept what was imposed upon them, even though Western concepts were entirely alien to those that had long underpinned the traditional Chinese world order. Eventually, these developments led to the total collapse of the Chinese world order and to the emergence of a new international society on a global scale, dominated by the Western powers.

On the surface, the story seems to centre upon how Asian societies adapted to the new situation and the extent to which they fulfilled the requirements of the European ‘standard of civilisation’ to become members of the ‘family’ of that civilisation. But the truth is more complex. Behind the ostensible fulfilment and acceptance, a more fundamental struggle was taking place between the countries of East Asia and the Western powers. While the traditional Chinese world order collapsed extremely swiftly, the process of becoming members of the new family required more time and effort. But why and how, willingly or unwillingly, did countries formerly vital elements in the Sino-centric world order, seek entrance to an international society dominated by the West? What impact did the expansion of European international society have upon the countries and society of East Asia? The three major countries of Northeast Asia – China, Japan, and Korea – represent very different responses and experiences. In particular, the dynamics of the processes of the expansion of international society were to bring fundamental changes both to Sino-Japanese relations and to their relations with other East Asian countries.

### 3.3.1 The Impact on China

Faced with the intrusion of Western powers, Imperial China itself was probably the most traumatised. After all, as discussed above, although in Chinese history, there were times when China accepted non-Chinese rulers, such as the Mongols and Manchus, acceptance was essentially political rather than cultural. Even when Mongols and Manchus ruled, they did so in accordance with the Chinese traditions of proper ceremonial forms (li, rituals). Thus in the long run, it was ruling non-Chinese (Mongols and Manchus) who were largely Sinicised, though one cannot deny the opposite effect of ‘barbarisation’ of Chinese culture in its history (Hunt 1996). There remained an underlining belief, at least in China, that eventually China – and China ruled by Chinese – would return to its natural position, the centre of the world.
However, Western intrusion presented fundamental challenges that China had never faced before. It attempted to alter the essential foundations that had upheld the Chinese empire for millennia and hence challenged Chinese civilisation itself. In the past, it had been the non-Chinese who had ‘faced a constant problem of adjustment’ in their contact with China (Fairbank 1968: 12). Now, with the arrival of Western powers, China had to face the same problem – though in an even more profound way. Indeed, China did not change willingly; rather it was ‘forced to meet every term dictated by the European powers in its international relations’ (Zhang 1998: 9).

**Western Coercion**

When the Western powers attempted to establish trading and diplomatic relations in the nineteenth century, they discovered that neither China nor other East Asian countries could accept practices based on Western concepts such as equality of sovereignty, free trade, the diplomatic/consular system and international law. From the Western perspective, unsympathetic or rather uncomprehending responses to diplomatic and other approaches must have been frustrating. But the simple fact was that there was no place in the traditional Chinese world order for Western notions of equal rights or of relations with other powers based upon reciprocal interest. When diplomatic means failed to produce the desired results, the European powers did not hesitate to exercise their military might. ‘War was then a justifiable instrument of the European expansion to place the world under the blessings of the European civilisation and to cast the world in the European image’ (Zhang 1998: 9).

In the process of ‘opening’ China, Western powers demonstrated the overwhelming superiority of their military technology and organisation. Having defeated China in the Opium War (1840–42), Britain imposed the first unequal treaty, the Treaty of Nanjing (1842), which compelled China to open five coastal cities as treaty ports for Western commerce. This event was followed by a series of bloody encounters with Western powers. In less than two decades, China was forced to sign a whole series of unequal treaties, including the Treaty of Wangxia with America (1844); the Treaty of Whompoa with France (1844) and the Treaty of Tianjin with Russia (1860): These unequal treaties are known as treaty system in China. They became ‘the means by which China was
gradually if forcibly drawn into what it perceived as a European international society’ (Gong 1984a: 183). With its own corruption and weakness, China had no viable alternative but to adopt the institutions and practices required for ‘civilised’ countries, including those relating to the protection of foreign life and property, to governmental organisation, to diplomatic representation, and to international law (Gong 1984a: 183).

**Survival as the Ultimate National Interest**

The treaty system represented the most visible manifestation of the threat to Imperial China and its core Confucian values. Both were now on the point of collapse. The real significance of the threat came with two related issues – inequality and national security – that eventually and inevitably forced China to abandon its traditional ways.

In reality, what the treaty system brought to China was not the Western notion of *sovereign equality* but rather one of *inequality*. The rules and institutions embodied in the treaty system (such as capitulations) were different to those prevailing in the European society of states (free trade for example). They were ‘designed in particular to govern relations between China and Europe and more broadly, the West’ (Zhang 2001a: 59). This meant while the expansion of the European international society and the treaty system would bring the Chinese empire down, it would not mean that China would become an equal member of the new international family. Rather China was now under the Western collective domination – a ‘semi-colonial’ position.

In turn this led to the second issue – that of national security. As the treaty system placed China’s security and survival in jeopardy, China now had to fight. However, in order to contest ‘unequal treaties’ and extraterritoriality, China had to adopt decidedly ‘Western’ principles such as sovereign equality and territorial integrity. Ironically, acceptance of these Westphalian principles meant that China had to discard its hierarchic and traditional Sino-centric view of the world. The two notions – sovereign equality and hierarchy – were incompatible. Indeed, hierarchic notions, if they had any role at all, worked in favour of the West and at the expense of China. Thus, in a position of extreme weakness, Western notions such as sovereign equality and international law (rather than Confucianism) could offer a measure of protection against external intrusion. In what must have seemed an ‘upside down’ world, China’s national interest demanded the rejection of hierarchy and the adoption of equality. Alien though it was,
at least equality was preferable to inferiority. Indeed, for the sake of national survival, 
China made considerable changes to traditional practices and institutions dealing with 
foreign relations. These included the establishment of the Zongli Yamen (prototype of a 
Foreign Office) in 1861, a step seen by some scholars as ‘a turning point in China’s 
foreign relations’ (Banno 1964:1); and the adoption of resident diplomacy, international 
law, and other basic European institutions.

In this sense it may be argued that China’s adoption of Western institutions and 
practices, reflected an overlap between the two levels of internalisation – coercion and 
calculation. There was little sign of enthusiasm for the new values; in reality China 
complied with Western rules and practices ‘more as a defensive means to enforce the 
treaties which kept the West from further encroaching on Chinese sovereignty, than as a 
positive means to secure favourable treaty revisions’ (Gong 1984a: 181).

A Full and Equal Membership in International Society

Under the treaty system, Imperial China was moving swiftly towards total collapse, yet 
the process of gaining acceptance as a full and equal member of the expanding 
international society was far more protracted. While the treaty system did create 
sustained political, economic and cultural relations between China and the European 
states, the unequal treaties did not and could not ensure China’s acceptance as an equal 
member of the expanding international society. Two factors were of crucial importance 
– the issue of the standard of ‘civilisation’ and changes in primary institutions at the 
international system level.

The Standard of Civilisation

Chinese and other non-European civilisations were insulted by the idea that they should 
be judged by a standard of ‘civilisation’ as defined by Europeans (see details, Gong 
1984b). When China and other East Asian countries were brought within the compass 
of the expanding European-centred international system, European states had to define 
the conditions under which non-European societies would be admitted to membership 
of the international society that the European powers had formed among themselves. By 
definition, as Gong (1984b: 3) notes, ‘those who fulfil the requirements of a particular
Western pressure to ‘civilise’ was echoed in increasingly vociferous domestic demands for reform. The example of nearby Japan (which had methodically ‘civilised’ itself with dramatic results) stimulated China to increase its objections to the unequal treaties. As such, the beginning of the twentieth century, the final decade of Imperial China, has been identified as a period of reform and revolution. The main reforms carried by Imperial China included the abolition of the civil examination system in 1905, the creation of a ‘New Army’ modelled on the Japanese and the German armies and the adoption Western-style of judicial codes and procedures (for the Imperial reforms see, Zhang 1991: 8-11; Wright 1968).

Imperial China implemented these reforms in an attempt to resist foreign encroachment and to save China from total collapse. Such imperatives, as Zhang (1991: 10) points out, were precipitated by a sense of national crisis, particularly after the Allied pillage of Beijing in the wake of the Boxer Rebellion in the early 1900s. This was accompanied by the rise of Chinese nationalism culminating in the Republican Revolution of 1911. The establishment of the Republic of China on 1 January 1912 may be seen as the formal conclusion of Imperial China. However, despite the significant efforts made by imperial China to lessen the gap between China and European states, and despite the fact that China had proclaimed itself as a new state, they did not bring China a full membership of the family of nations. We must now move from domestic change to the system level.

**The Change in the International System**

From the system level perspective, Zhang (1991; 1998) has made an important point – that is, changes in international system after World War I created an international milieu favourable to China’s search for its rightful place in international society. But Zhang has not given sufficient attention to changes in primary institutions in international society. The point is simple. Until World War II, colonialism remained an important institution in the international states system. Hence sovereign equality could not become
a universal norm. Here Holsti’s (2004) accounts of change in institutions in the international system facilitates a further understanding of the difficulty China faced in becoming an equal member of the international society before the Second World War.

According to Holsti (2004: 248), ‘colonial expansion was largely a game of international politics, prestige, and military security’ in the late nineteenth century, and the idea of colonialism was applied beyond formal colonies. Holsti (2004: 243-44) defines colonialism as ‘an ostensibly legal arrangement formalised through treaties and constitutional law’. Thus, although China did not become a formal colony in the face of the Western intrusion, in reality the extraterritoriality of the treaty system, was actually a facet of imperialism and colonialism. Thus we may agree with Holsti that the partial democratisation of the international system after the World War I represented a significant development in the expansion of interstate society, perhaps ‘the first major step towards de-colonization and the end of colonialism as an international institution’ (Holsti 2004: 262). The idea of colonial authority was explicitly challenged at the Paris peace Conference of 1919. The Mandate system was designed to deal with the colonies of the defeated powers.

In reality the system was not all that effective and, even at the time, it was seen as a mere rhetorical means to cover the traditional division of the spoils of war. Yet the mandates had significant implications in the overall process of undermining the legitimacy of colonialism. Holsti argues that ‘the language of the Covenant relating to the Mandates is significant because it was the first explicit statement that political independence – full sovereignty – should be the ultimate goal of colonial policy’ (Holsti 2004: 269). Thus, the establishment of the League of Nations, the declared principle of national self-determination and the idea of collective security, all challenged the pre-war international order and created a positive environment in which all states and political communities, whether African or Asian, could be incorporated into a framework of international peace and order.

Indeed, indigenous political activities and resistance also played an important part in the overall decolonisation processes. China certainly played an assertive role in the reconstruction of international order in the post-war years. Its participation in the Paris Conference and its successful attempt to secure membership of the League of Nations
provide good examples. More specifically, China’s demand for the recovery of its territory – notably of Shandong, which had been under German control – was entirely consistent with the principles of national self-determination and territorial integrity now universally recognised by the emerging international society. These developments demonstrate that although decolonisation proper was only achieved after 1945 with the founding of the United Nations, some of the groundwork had been undertaken in the inter-war period. There can be no doubt that China’s protests against the unjust treatment it had received in the past should be seen as part of a wider process through which it gained full membership of international society and as one aspect of the entire process of decolonisation.

Yet China had to wait until 1943 for the total abolition of the treaty system. As Fishel (1952: 209) observes, during World War II, the Japanese attack on the United States and the Philippines in 1941, brought Great Britain and the United States together and made China a major ally in the war against Japan. This brought a significant change in the allies’ policy towards China. One major consequence was that, on the initiative of the British and American governments, extraterritorial rights in China were abolished in 1943. Of course, Zhang (1998:15) is right to point out that there was a strong element of political expediency behind the Anglo-American abrogation of extraterritorial rights. In the long run, however, abrogation could be regarded as the culmination of changes in the normative foundation of the international system in the interwar period and thereafter. Holsti (2004: 271) notes:

The obsolescence of colonialism was not a ‘big Bang’ event, but a lengthy process founded on the residues of world war and changing capabilities, and most of all, on intellectual change involving reconstruction and deconstruction of ideas and beliefs, the unveiling of inherent ideational contradictions, and the undermining of the myths and stories upon which colonial authority had been founded and legitimized (italic added).

Decolonisation and the obsolescence of colonialism may be seen as post-World War II phenomena, yet by the time of World War II, the foundations were in place. Thus, the idea of maintaining the extraterritorial rights was no longer tenable. Fishel (1952:1) is right to see abrogation as removing ‘one of the obstructions to complete political
equality among the United Nations’. To put it another way, to a great extent, the difficulty China experienced in achieving an equal place in international society had arisen from factors at the international system level. Until World War II, with colonialism continuing as an institution, sovereign equality was not and could not be universal, but belonged exclusively to the privileged class in the international society.

Finally, the processes by which China had been transformed from a world in itself to become a state among other states, has had a major impact on the emergence of China’s present curious dual identity – at once a great power but also a weak and victimised developing nation. An understanding of this duality is important when seeking to comprehend China’s behaviour thereafter.

### 3.3.2 The Impact on Japan

Japan also faced Western intrusion but its experience and response was very different to that of China. As Gong (1984b: 164) observes, ‘Japan exemplified par excellence the East Asian countries which conformed its governmental institutions, legal system, and general international practices to the interests, rules, and values of the “civilized” international society’. Above all, in contrast to the protracted process in China, the collapse of the traditional Japanese order and the emergence of a centralised modern state were astonishingly rapid. While this contrast needs some explanation, the major questions to be asked here are how and why Japan conformed – and with exceptional speed and thoroughness – to the Western standard of ‘civilisation’? And, more importantly, how this transformation affected Japan’s own identity, particularly its conceptions of the West and of Asia?

**Japan’s Entry into International Society: the Question of How and Why**

*Conformity by Force*

Within five years of the arrival of Commodore Perry in 1853, treaties were concluded between Japan and the Western Powers. Perhaps the most significant was the Ansei Treaty with the United States (1857). This treaty opened Japan to Western trade and specifically gave the Americans access to Nagasaki and the right to permanent residence
at Shimoda. Thus, in a limited way, Japan began to practice some of the basic rules and practices of international society. Unlike the Chinese case, no overt military force was used to achieve this opening or the signature of the initial treaties. However, an element of coercion was present, especially during the Bakumatsu (End of the Bukufu) period. The then Japanese government, the Bukufu, did not or could not resist Perry by force, and simply accepted Western terms in discussions about the treaties. The significance of China’s humiliation in the Opium Wars and the overwhelming superiority of Western technology and power suggested ‘to the more perceptive Japanese leadership that peaceful accommodation was preferable to a war which Japan would inevitably lose’ (Gong 1984b: 171).

The coercive nature of the relationship was reflected in the initial low level of internalisation of Western values, particularly before the Meiji Restoration. The Western powers did not regard Japan and other East Asian states as equal members of family of nations, indeed Japan ‘did not appreciate the value of preserving these institutions, or indeed of becoming a member of an international society with such institutions... it is doubtful whether Japan can be said to have become a member of international society in any proper sense during the Bukumatsu Period’ (Suganami 1984: 190). Yet, despite of this low level of internalisation, the impact of the West through the treaty system was profound. To a great extent, it hastened the fall of the Tokugawa regime and facilitated the emergence of a new centralised Meiji state (For different views on the downfall of the Tokugawa regime see Storry 1960: 94-95).

**Conformity by Interest and Belief**

The Meiji restorers overturned the Tokugawa Bakufu under the slogan son-no jo-i ‘Revere the Emperor; Expel the Barbarian’. Yet, while they understood ‘by 1864 the futility of attempting to repel the Western powers’, they still ‘clung to the later half of the slogan because it effectively disclosed the Bakufu’s weaknesses’ (Suganami 1984: 191). Of course, the reformers had neither the power nor the intention to revert to the policy of seclusion, and so, in 1868, the new Meiji government formally declared that it would abandon the policy and comply with Western rules and practices. Thus, we still see a degree of ‘coercion’ in Japan’s abandonment of isolation, an essential part of the
process of Westernisation and the first step to becoming a member of international society.

However, the coercive dimension soon gave way to a high level of acceptance of Western values, based on a mixture of genuine belief and careful calculation. As Suganami (1984: 191-92) suggests, after a short period as an ‘unwilling pupil’, Japan soon became ‘a keen student of Western diplomacy’. The Iwakura Mission to the West (1871-73) can be seen as turning point in Japan’s internalisation of the standards of ‘civilisation’. It was Meiji government’s first official diplomatic mission specifically ‘designed to evidence its new understanding of Western diplomacy’ (Gong 1984b: 179), and to secure from the Western nations revision of the unequal treaties. Storry may be right to argue that the mission was premature, because it failed to achieve its objective of securing the revision of the treaties, but he still acknowledges that the mission had a profound impact on Japan’s modernisation and Westernisation.

The venture was premature; but the failure spurred the Japanese government to make greater efforts to hasten the modernization of the country. This proceeded at an ambitious pace throughout the seventies and eighties (Storry 1960: 107).

It is noteworthy that the leading members of the Mission, who had now acquired extensive experience of direct dealings with foreign powers, became major figures in Meiji Japan. Furthermore, bummei kaika (civilisation and enlightenment) was now adopted as one of Japan’s slogans for progress. It was appreciated that the best way to achieve the aim of fukoku kyohei (a rich country and a strong army) was by learning from the Western powers – acquiring their technology as well as replicating their political structures and institutions. Thus, what had previously been regarded as alien methods and institutions, especially international law, and accepted unwillingly in the face exterior coercion, were now embraced with enthusiasm. In other words, Japan had to adopt the ‘civilised’ ways of the foreigners in order to achieve its goal of catching up with the West.

It was this change in perceptions and belief – that is, recognition of its own backwardness and acceptance of European civilisation as a standard – that led to the
astonishing speed of Japan’s modernisation and Westernisation. Within a short space of time, Japan fundamentally changed both its political organisation and its diplomatic and legal sectors. They were all ‘part of a much larger movement to emulate the general civilization of the West’ (Gong 1984b: 187), under the catch phrase *oitsuke oikose* (catch up and over take). Thus, by the end of nineteenth century Japan ‘had transformed her uncertain relationship with the West into a full ‘societal’ one, while her traditional ethnocentric system lost its practical relevance’ (Suganami 1984: 190).

Despite the high level of belief, calculations of self-interest were also important in the adoption of Western norms into Japanese foreign policy. For Japan, international law and the norms of sovereign equality and non-interference provided both means of defence against Western interference – especially as devices to secure the abolition of the unequal treaties – and useful tools to break the traditional Chinese suzerainty in the region, particularly over Korea. In relations with the West, Japan succeeded in securing an agreement to terminate the unequal treaties in 1894 and followed this by removing restrictions on its tariff autonomy in 1899. In relations with its neighbours, by successfully employing international law, Japan first imposed a Western style ‘unequal treaty’, the Treaty of Kanghwa, on Korea in 1876 and then gained most-favoured-nation status in relation to China after the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95. Thus, by the turn of the century, use of Western concepts and methods, coupled with its newly gained strength, had enabled Japan to begin to behave ‘like a Great Power, and to be accepted by the Western Powers as a member of the ruling directorate of international society’ (Suganami 1984: 192-93). Yet, the impact of this development upon the Japanese identity was more ambivalent and complicated; this was affected both by Japan’s relations with the Western and with its Asian neighbours.

**The Impact on Japan’s Identity and Conceptions**

The encounter with the expanding Western-dominated international society certainly brought profound changes to the Japanese identity. Today we often talk about Japan’s ambivalent identity between Asia and the West. This ambivalence, as Bessho (1999:13) argues ‘stems not from any ‘cultural’ or ‘civilisational’ characteristics, but from the history of the country’s dealings with Asians and Westerners’. The processes by which
Japan was transforming its traditional feudal structure into a centralised modern state system also involved a search for a new identity and place in the world.

**Modernisation and Westernisation**

As we have seen, unlike China, the opening of Japan was not accompanied by overt military force. Yet, as with China, the imposition of ‘unequal’ treaties meant that the initial encounter with the Western powers exposed Japan’s inferiority and backwardness to the mighty western powers. Against this backdrop, again in comparison with China, revolutionary change in Japan came much quicker. The events of 1868-9, which abolished Japan’s traditional feudal structure, though officially a ‘Restoration’, should really be described as a ‘Revolution’ that was to ‘transform the face of Japan’ (Storry 1960: 105). Despite the initial slogan *son-no jo-i* (Revere the Emperor; Expel the Barbarian), the Meiji leaders were quick to recognise the futility of this aspiration and hence abandoned the old policy of isolation. Now they sought to learn from the West and indeed, ever since, modernisation, often treated as synonymous with Westernisation, has been the predominant theme in Japan’s state building.

The quest for Westernisation was given powerful impetus by observation of the fate of China. ‘That massive country, too proud and disdainful to copy the methods of the West, was humiliated again and again by the ‘barbarians’’ (Storry 1960:106). If China was powerless against Western civilisation, what could Japan do? Although written some time after the Meiji Restoration, realisation of the futility of attempts to resist the advance of Western civilisation was well expressed in Fukuzawa’s (1885) article “Datsu-A-ron” (Dissociation from Asia). Fukuzawa was no admirer of the West, going so far as to compare the spread of Western civilisation to the spread of measles. But as with measles, there was not much that could be done to stop it: ‘Even if we were to abhor the damage done by this epidemic... we could do nothing’. For Fukuzawa, therefore, there was little to be gained by a doomed attempt to arrest the advance of the West. There was only one sensible course: ‘as men of wisdom we should endeavour to promote its spread so that the people may enjoy its beneficial effects’ (Fukuzawa’s “Datsu-A-ron” quoted in Hashikawa 1980: 328-55).
The sense of the irresistibility of the West was soon accompanied by a genuine admiration for Western civilisation, especially its scientific achievements and high industrialisation. These attitudes became especially marked after the Iwakura Mission. Storry (1960: 107) describes the changed outlook:

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\text{Indeed the first two decades of the Emperor Meiji’s reign saw a Japan to all appearances intoxicated with the strong wine of Western thought, techniques, and customs. Some prominent Japanese, such as Inoue Kaoru, even went so far as to advocate the universal and permanent adoption of European dress by both sexes, the substitution of bread for rice, and the large-scale importation of sheep to graze on those rice fields, transformed into meadows, that had not been turned over to the production of wheat, oats, and barley.}
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Such suggestions raise more fundamental questions; to what extent did Westernisation change Japan’s identity? Had Japan accepted the values of the West not just superficially but in a much deeper sense; had it become a truly ‘Western’ power?

It is true that the Westernisation of Japan brought about a remarkable and rapid transformation of a traditional feudal society into a powerful modern state. In terms of technology, political organization and even lifestyle, Japan seemed to adopt virtually every aspect of the general civilisation of the West. But there was always a hint of reservation; there was more enthusiasm for the technology of the West than for other facets of Western culture. In the words of a contemporary slogan, the catchwords were to be \textit{wakon yosai} (Japanese spirit, Western technology). This implies that the changes ‘were essentially pragmatic, far-reaching in form rather than in spirit: the aim was to build ‘a rich nation and a strong army’ (\textit{fukoku kyohei}) to gain the West’s respect’ (Bessho 1999: 14).

Thus, there was probably no desire to affect a fundamental change in the Japanese identity or spirit. Rather, the externals – but not the internals of the West – were taken on in an attempt to secure ‘a place among the ranking great powers of “civilized” international society’ (Gong 1984b: 181). It remained to be seen how far Japan could achieve this goal by fulfilling the standards of ‘civilisation’?
Becoming a ‘Western’ Power?

Japan may have looked for rewards earlier than they actually materialised. The signs were that it would need more than fulfilment of the standards of ‘civilisation’ to achieve the equal status so much desired. Even though the Meiji government gave a high priority to the abolition of the ‘unequal treaties’, sparing ‘no efforts toward internal readjustment and reform’ (Ishii 1933: 223), four decades elapsed between the first treaty with Perry in 1854 and the abolition of the unequal treaties in 1894 (the Aoki-Kimberley Treaty). Even then, Japan still found that its status was not truly ‘equal’ with the ‘civilised’ powers. These interactions and experiences resulted in considerable changes in Japanese ideas on international relations.

In the years immediately after the Meiji Restoration, the overall mood was optimistic. It was believed, as Jansen (1968b: 157-58) observes, that huge benefits would follow from the adoption of ‘the “universal principle” whereby Japan should be friendly with foreigners’. In part, this somewhat naïve belief stemmed from the way in which Western text books on international law were translated, which using a terminology derived from Neo Confucian morality. But reality began to dawn when the Iwakura Mission failed to secure the desired abolition of the treaty system. As Bismarck cynically told the Mission, ‘although people say that so-called international law safeguards the rights of all countries, the fact is that when large countries pursue their advantage they talk about international law when it suits them, and they use force when it does not...’ (Quoted in Jansen 1968b: 158). What Japan learned was that ‘international life was much more predatory and the powers far less rational and disinterested’ than pure theory suggested (Jansen 1968b: 158).

It is true that Japan finally secured an agreement for abolition of the ‘unequal treaties’ in the Aoki-Kimberley Treaty in 1894. As Aoki noted at the time, it seemed that Japan could now ‘disregard the insults we have suffered over the last thirty years and at one go enter the “Fellowship of Nations”’ (Gong 1984b: 195). However, at that time, Japan could not have anticipated the blow to its aspirations that would fall a year later – in the shape of the Triple Intervention. The Intervention occurred after Japan had been victorious in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95 and, under the terms of the subsequent Treaty of Shimonoseki, obtained the Liaodong peninsula from China, with the provision that a Japanese naval base could be established in the area. Although Japan had obtained
promises from the Great Powers that they would not intervene in the conflict, Russia, Germany and France now threatened Japan with military action unless the Liaodong peninsula was restored to China. The shock was immense. As Gong (1984b: 196) notes, ‘After conforming wholeheartedly to the spirit and letter of international law and diplomacy, Japan seemed forced to conclude that, in the end, only force mattered in international relations’.

Yet, while the Triple Intervention may have represented a humiliation for Japan, still ‘Japan’s status after the war with China was vastly improved’. Although it may have achieved less than it hoped for, it had secured the ‘independence’ of Korea, acquired Taiwan, and gained a huge indemnity. While Western diplomacy coupled with threats of force may have deprived Japan of some of the fruits of victory, it had retained many. In the last resort, the lesson of the war was that ‘the use of force paid good dividends’ (Storry 1960: 128). Thus, by force Japan had entered the club of Western imperialists. And although Japan’s view of the West was now more cynical than in the early days of the Meiji Restoration, it was still profoundly different to the Japanese view of the other countries of Asia.

3.3.3 The Impact on Sino-Japanese Relations and Regional Security

The entry of China and Japan into the Western-dominated international society in the middle decades of the nineteenth century indicated that the traditional Chinese world order could not last much longer. But it is still important to investigate precisely how the old order ended and to identify the consequences of its collapse for Northeast Asian regional security and for amity/enmity relations between the countries involved. It is tempting to assume that an external threat would have bound regional actors more strongly together against a common enemy. If so, Western expansion might have generated a regional collective identity, a ‘we-ness’ against the ‘other’. It is certainly true that Western expansion did have a major impact upon regional identity and its securitising and de-securitising logics. Yet the processes by which the Chinese world order was finally brought to an end had different meanings for the various regional actors. There was no ‘common response’ and, indeed, if anything, regional collective identity was weakened rather than strengthened. In particular, the rise of Sino-Japanese
rivalry was the major theme in this un-precedentedly tumultuous era, and Korea became the focal point in this drama.

**A Dualistic Policy**

By the 1860s, extensions to the treaty system had brought most of the East Asian countries into the expanding international society dominated by the Western powers. But this did not result in an immediate and total collapse of the traditional Chinese world order. Korea, the hermit kingdom of the East, still remained outside this newly introduced system. Neither the French expedition in 1866, nor the American one in 1871 succeeded in breaking Korea’s policy of strict isolation. Korea still refused to have official trading or diplomatic contacts with Western countries, even with Japan, and continued to live in ‘a Confucian dream world’ (Wright 1958: 367) while remaining as a vassal state of Qing China.

Furthermore, even after the Tianjin treaties of 1860, and the establishment of the Zongli Yamen in 1861 – which symbolised commitment to the treaty system – it was still doubtful whether China itself fully accepted the system. As we have seen, in the ancient Chinese world, the natural order had been perceived as resting on unity (rather than division) and on Chinese rule (rather than barbarian rule). These long-established values were slow to change. The treaty system may have been powerfully enforced, but that probably did not stop many Chinese officials from regarding it as no more than ‘a temporary expedient to be discarded as soon as China regained sufficient strength to reassert its imperial authority’ (K-H Kim 1980: 69). Thus change in Chinese policy was only partial. While still ‘highly selective’ (Fairbank, Raischauer and Craig 1965: 9) in its adoption of Western ideas and institutions, China did conduct its relations with Western powers in conformity with the treaty system. Yet there was no corresponding change in China’s relations with its Eastern tributaries; there was thus no hint of acceptance of the Western principle of ‘sovereign equality’ in its dealings with Korea and Vietnam.

Within this dualistic system, the position of Korea was seen as crucial, not least because of its geographical importance. Of course, in itself, Korea did not pose a direct threat either to China or Japan – and had never done so (K-H Kim 1980: 13, 14). However,
because of its pivotal position in East Asia, both China and Japan had always been fearful that Korea might fall into the other’s hands. Now, with the emergence of a centralised Meiji state, Japan was eager to break Korea’s dependency on China, while China was determined to keep Korea within its sphere of influence whatever the cost. Yet, for China, this objective became increasingly difficult to maintain: not only because of the expansion of Western influence, but also – and more crucially – because of the rise of modern Japan. The unrealistic rigidity of Korean foreign policy made China’s task even more difficult.

The Treaty of Kanghwa and the Opening of Korea

Despite their geographical proximity, relations between Korea and Japan were very different to those between Korea and China. While Korea’s relationship with China ‘was known as sadae (serving the great)’, that with Japan ‘was succinctly described as kyorin (befriending the neighbouring country)’ (Oh 1980: 38), and was largely confined to contacts through the Tsushima han (fief) of Japan. As early as 1868, the new Meiji government had sought to reform the old pattern of practices in relations with Korea. When sending a mission to announce the reorganisation of the Japanese government, the new authorities requested the opening of direct relations. But Korea was then under the rule of the Taewon’gun, who pursued a firm closed-door policy. Taewon’gun was scornful of Japan’s acceptance of Western ideas and refused the request. Subsequent missions from Japan in 1869 and 1871 received the same response.

The ‘Sei-Kan Ron’ and the ‘Unyo’ Incident

Korean intransigence antagonised the Saigo Takamori faction in the Japanese government, and they now demanded an invasion of Korea. This led to a political crisis within the Japanese government in 1873, known as sei-Kan ron (conquer-Korean-argument). While supporters of sei-Kan ron insisted that Korea was important for the future security of Japan, moderates, led by Okubo and others, argued that Japan was not yet in a position to undertake overseas military expeditions. For the time being, the

\[1\] Taewon’gun (Grand Prince), the de facto ruler and the father of the king, who was known as foe of Japan and the West.
moderates were able to prevent the immediate dispatch of a punitive expedition to Korea. Yet, as Nelson (1946: 127) observes, it was only ‘the imperial will and fear of the Western nations’ that ‘enabled the policy of the peace group to prevail’.

While Japan was in the grip of political crisis over the sei-Kan ron, an important political change took place in Korea. Taewon’gun, the de facto ruler and implacable foe of Japan and the West, was forced from power in internal power struggle. But even then the Korean government was slow to change its traditional policy. By 1875, the Japanese government had become convinced that the ‘opening’ of Korea would require strong measures. Following accepted Western practice, the Japanese waited for specific pretext to provide a justification for securing satisfaction from Korea (Nelson 1946: 127). The opportunity came in September 1875, when, in utmost secrecy, Japan dispatched three warships to make a survey of the Korean coast. One of the warships, Unyo, was fired upon when it appeared on the western coast, off Seoul. There followed the ‘celebrated’ Unyo incident (Oh 1980: 42).

**The Treaty of Kanghwa**

The Japanese government used this incident effectively as a means of forcing Korea into a treaty relationship. Success came on 27 February 1876 with the signing of the historic treaty of amity, known as the Treaty of Kanghwa. The treaty has considerable historical significance. It was the first treaty embodying Western concepts of international law to be signed by Korea. It is striking that it was Japan that had forced Korea to change its ways; earlier attempts by Western powers had failed. The treaty also marked a turning point in an even more fundamental way.

It showed that it was no longer possible to maintain a kind of ‘half way house’ consisting of ‘Western-style’ relations with Western powers and ‘traditional relations’ between the Asian countries themselves. ‘Western’ notions would apply to all relations between states, including those between Asian countries. Of course, although, the treaty was signed between Japan and Korea, the underlying contest was between resurgent Japan and China. It also represented the first major conflict between the Eastern and Western systems of international relations within the regional powers.
To the Japanese, it appeared that ‘the Western idea of sovereign statehood was a convenient tool’ for starting the process of breaking the bonds previously uniting Korea and China and replacing them with a close relationship between Korea and Japan (Nelson 1946: 126). Yet, as an East Asian country, a neighbour of China and Korea, Japan appreciated the strength and importance of the ancient relationship between the Middle Kingdom and the peninsula. This awareness was fully revealed in Mori’s mission to China immediately after the Unyo incident.

In the aftermath of the attack on the Unyo, Japan despatched ‘a military expedition to Korea in emulation of Perry’s expedition to their own country’ (Nelson 1946: 128). Simultaneously, it also sent a separate mission, headed by Mori Arinori, to China. Mori had been instructed to persuade the Chinese authorities to issue a definite and formal acknowledgement of Korea’s independence. In negotiations with Zongli Yamen, Mori encountered a readiness to acknowledge Korean independence, but this was hedged about with references to Korea’s continued tributary status to China.

The Japanese concluded that, although China now claimed to subscribe to Western notions of international law, as long as China still maintained that Korea was a dependent nation, any nominal acknowledgement of Korean independence would mean little. Thus, Mori’s arguments were consistently based on Western principles of sovereign non-intervention and hence he sought to force China to abandon the Confucian connection with Korea. When his negotiations with the Zongli Yamen reached deadlock, Mori approached Li Hongzhang – the imperial commissioner of the northern ports – and secured a promise that Li would use his influence to obtain a courteous reception for the Japanese. But the Li agreement, as Nelson (1946: 130) noted, was not to ‘renounce China’s claims to Korea’, as generally supposed; rather it ‘gave concrete illustration of the strength of the time-honoured connection’.

Yet, even if China had been able to exercise its ‘time-honoured’ authority over Korea until the mid nineteenth century, thereafter the task had become increasingly difficult. While pressures from external powers had played a part, internal weaknesses in China itself had probably been more important. In short, China faced an acute dilemma in its relations with Korea. Wright (1958: 369) explains:
On the one hand, it was physically impossible for China to defend Korea’s extreme stand against all the world at a time when China’s own energies were bent on the domestic reconstruction, which dictated the avoidance of any international entanglement. On the other hand, it was morally impossible for China either to renounce its suzerainty over Korea or to force Korea to abandon the Confucian tradition which China itself had not yet abandoned.

Thus, Li Hongzhang’s agreement with Mori revealed that considerations of ‘power’ were central in the conflict between two systems and conceptions. Security concerns were the main reasons behind Li’s readiness to come to an agreement with Mori. As Oh observes, even before Mori’s visit, Li told Yamen of his concern over the tensions between Korea and Japan and of his fears that these could lead to war. If hostilities occurred, Korea would be ‘no match for Japan and probably would ask for assistance from China – as in the sixteenth century when Japan invaded Korea’ (Oh 1980: 43). However, the position of Qing China in the mid-nineteenth century was different to that of Ming China more than two hundred years earlier. The problem now was that, if China sent troops to strengthen Korea, Japan would express outrage and respond by attacking Korea. Further, if as seemed likely, Japan succeeded in conquering Korea, Manchuria would probably become its next target. Following Li’s analysis, Oh (1980: 44) argues that:

Li’s recommendation, adopting a more positive policy toward Korea, was impelled primarily by concern for China’s own security. But Li had not realize the far-reaching implications of his proposal: by urging a change in the old “hands-off” policy in order to keep Korea in its traditional relationship with China, he was, in fact, undermining the traditional relationship.

In February 1876, the Japanese mission to Korea arranged a treaty of peace and friendship, the Treaty of Kanghwa, with little trouble. The treaty, consisting of 12 articles, met Japanese objectives by opening three Korean ports for trade, establishing diplomatic relations and granting Japan the right to conduct a coastal survey. In
particular, Article 1 declared that ‘Chosen [Korea], being an independent State (zizhu, or tzu chu), enjoys the same sovereign rights as does Japan’. Thus, the treaty marked the end of Korea’s policy of isolation and its entry into ‘relations with a nation in the Western manner’ (Nelson 1946: 131). In practice, there was no immediate change in Japan’s actual policy towards Korea. Official stances and international law notwithstanding, Japan could not completely ignore the historical fact of Chinese suzerainty over Korea (K-H Kim 1980: 341). China, too, did not at first realise how seriously the Treaty would affect its relations with Korea. China ‘was convinced of Korea’s loyalty and presumably read the “independence” clause of Article 1 in a light more favourable than that of the English translation’ (Nelson 1980: 135).

However, despite Chinese sensitivities and Japanese caution, the treaty with Korea meant that Japan had achieved its major goals – diplomatic and commercial parity with Western powers in dealing with other East Asian countries. It also gave Japan further confidence in its ability to handle Korea, particularly in light of its growing ability to control Ryukyu/Liuqiu and its success in the Taiwan expedition. Thus, K-H Kim (1980: 338) argues that, ‘Japan’s Korean policy shifted from the conciliatory approach adopted after the sei-Kan crisis of 1873 to intimidatory gunboat diplomacy culminating in the Unyo incident in September 1875’. It did not take long for China to realise the growing threat to Korea from both Japan and Russia, a recognition that forced China to make a radical change in its Korean policy.

**China’s Interventionist Posture**

Chinese policy towards Korea finally began to change in 1879 – the year of the Sino-Russian dispute over Ili and of the Japanese formal annexation of the Liuqiu/Ruykyu islands. The first sign of the change was that management of Korean affairs was transferred from the Board of Rites to Li Hongzhang, who we have already encountered as imperial commissioner for the northern ports.

China’s major problem – in the face of the increasing threat to Korea from Russia and Japan – was lack of adequate resources, especially the military capability to defend Korea. Indeed, if Korea fell under foreign dominance, China’s own security would be threatened. Such considerations gave Li and his associates little choice but to rely
chiefly on diplomacy. He therefore advised the Korean government to negotiate treaties with the Western powers. Li’s policy of ‘opening Korea’ can be seen as a resort to the ancient Chinese strategy of *yi-yi zhi-yi* (using barbarians against other barbarians), or even as a realisation of the merits of the modern European concept of balance of power. In other words, Li was suggesting that Korea should use the Western treaty powers to check the Japanese and Russian threat to the peninsula. As far as China was concerned, Japan and Russia were more dangerous than the Western powers. While the Western powers wanted an expansion of trade and missionary activities, Japan and Russia wanted territory.

But China’s policy toward Korea involved more than advice; in practice it became increasingly interventionist. Li’s advice to Korea to improve relations with the Western powers arose from his fears that Japan would offer its services as a mediator in disputes between Korea and the West – and then exploit the situation to its own advantage. To Li’s dismay, however, it was soon obvious that the Korean government was ignorant of modern international diplomacy and lacked the ability to act decisively. Li was forced to step in himself and act as the self-appointed representative of Korea. Thus he ‘negotiated with the American representatives on his own, with little consultation with the Korean government’ (K-H Kim 1980: 346). A treaty, agreed in Tianjin between Li and Commodore Shufeldt of the United States, was presented to Korea and signed by the Korean government on 22 May 1882. In the same year, Korea also signed treaties with Britain and Germany, thus fulfilling a major goal of China’s new Korean policy.

However, the new policy did not produce the expected benefits for either Korea or China. Chinese statesmen might be capable of impressive pragmatism and show increasing understanding of modern international diplomacy, but, without sufficient power at their disposal, their Korean policy could not fully exploit either the old principle of *yi-yi zhi-yi* or the new one of the balance of power. Li failed to include a clause in the treaty with Shufeldt recognising Korea’s tributary relationship with China, while this and the other treaties with the Western powers did not signal any immediate change to the signatories’ lack of interest in Korean affairs. More seriously, while China’s ultimate objective was to preserve Korea’s status as a vassal state to itself, ironically, it was China itself that altered the very nature of Chinese suzerainty over Korea by its unprecedented interventionism.
Virtually taking over the conduct of Korean foreign policy, China made an unprecedented departure from the traditional practice of non-interference in Korea’s affairs. By its own actions and by Korea’s ready acquiescence, China transformed what had been its moral and ceremonial authority into a political authority (K-H Kim 1980: 347-48, italics added).

By the early 1880s, therefore, the old Chinese world order had come to an end both in theory and in practice – not least because of the actions of the Chinese themselves. Chinese interference was taken further by its military intervention in Korean domestic politics. In 1882, there were signs of strong conservative opposition against the policy of rapid opening. Sections of the Korean army mutinied in Seoul in July and this produced tension between Korea and Japan. The Chinese authorities then sent troops to Korea without prior consultation with the Korean government. Perhaps without fully appreciating the significance of its actions, China had gone beyond seeking to influence Korean foreign policy to direct interference in domestic politics.

In December 1884, the situation was made more complicated when a small band of Japanese-supported radical reformers attempted an anti-Chinese coup. Although the coup was crushed by Chinese troops, the problems it raised were settled in separate treaties – the Seoul Protocol between Korea and Japan, and the Tianjin Convention or Li-Ito Convention between China and Japan. By these treaties Japan gained virtually the same rights as China to intervene in the peninsula. By the mid-1880s, along with the French seizure of Tongking, ‘the metamorphosis of Sino-Korean relations brought the final demise of the old world order’ (K-H Kim 1980: 349). Now all Northeast Asian countries, including Korea, had been brought into the new family of nations. In the processes of the transformation, pressure from the West (the ‘other’), had not resulted in a Northeast Asian collective identity formation, which would have bound the states of the region together against the outside powers. Rather, as Oh (1980: 57) points out:

During the decades of modernisation in China and Japan and their own struggles against Western encroachment, to maintain or secure control of Korea became a measure of the success of Chinese and Japanese efforts to survive and to achieve power status.
In their rivalry, fear of Japanese threat to Korea, forced China to adopt and impose a policy of ‘opening Korea’. The policy may have been intended to head off the danger from Japan but, however well intentioned, it actually increased the threat to Korea and ultimately to China itself. The subsequent interventions into Korea by both China and Japan only heightened the sense of mutual distrust, suspicion, and even antagonism between them. Moreover, Sino-Japanese rivalry over Korea represented more than a struggle for power and influence; it was also a conflict between two opposed concepts and systems. The Confucian propriety, *li*, as the basic institution that sustained the Chinese world order, was undermined, not only by the treaty system, but also by China’s interventionist policy. Now, in place of *li*, war, the balance of power, territoriality, diplomacy, along with sovereignty and international law, became the major institutions governing international relations in the expanding international society. Thus, in the succeeding international order, intra-regional relations had to take on the new spirit of international power rivalry, in which Japan would strive to create a new East Asian order/society.
4 The Re-Emergence of an East Asian International Society?

In chapter 3, I examined the operation and demise of the Chinese world order. This chapter continues that theme and investigates what kind of new order / society then emerged and how. Here, I focus on two issues. The first concerns the shift in power positions within regional and global systems: in other words, how changes in power structure influenced and even defined the new regional society. The second concerns changes in normative structure: that is, what kind of norms and institutions have emerged and how some concepts and principles must now be reinterpreted. In the course of my analysis, I examine the impacts of Japanese imperialism, and of the onset of the Cold War in Northeast Asia.

4.1 The Emergence of Japanese Imperialism: Towards a New Regional Order?

The expansion of European international society into East Asia brought the old Chinese world order to an end. Of course, this meant that the basic normative structure had to be changed completely. With the collapse of the tribute system, hierarchical and concentric notions were replaced with ones of sovereign ‘equality’ and the concept of nationalism arrived in East Asia. As explained in Chapter 3, within the old Sino-centric world order, territoriality as an institution did not play a significant role. Hence, loyalties were directed to family, lords, kings, emperors, or religious leaders, rather than to nations (Mackerras 1998: 36). In addition, the concept of power also received a new interpretation. As Lucian Pye (1985: ix) observes, historically power was associated with beliefs about ‘the role of authority in upholding the cosmic order’, but now it became more identified with ‘social status’.

Thus, increasingly ‘international relations’ in East Asia became power-struggle for survival, influence and status. In this struggle, while the weakness and backwardness of Imperial China reduced it to a status of less than a state among states, Japan transformed itself from an old feudal kingdom into a centralised nation state. Through rapid industrialisation and modernisation, Japan subsequently developed into an imperial power. This involved the acquisition of Taiwan in 1895, the annexation of Korea in 1910, the creation of the puppet state of Manchukuo, occupation of additional parts of
China and the colonisation of many parts of Southeast Asia. Thus, within less than fifty years, Japan ‘successfully’ reshaped the East Asian order under its own leadership until its sudden collapse in 1945 following defeat in the Pacific war. Many questions arise: why and how did Japan turn to imperialism, how was this new East Asian order held in place, why did it collapse and what were the main consequences on the region’s identity/society and security?

4.1.1 The Rise and Fall of Japanese Imperialism

Clearly, the biggest difference between China and Japan was that, whereas China was brought to the brink of destruction as a result of the impact of the West, Japan escaped colonisation by engaging in a successful process of nation-building on more or less Western lines. Japan’s experience from the middle of the nineteenth century was to be crucial in shaping its modern national identity and, at the same time, drastically altered its relations with neighbouring countries. Japan chose to leave behind the familiar ‘balanced and relatively stable world order that revolved around China’; and to compete in ‘the Western international system, where the strong eat the weak’ (Goto 2003: 3). In this power struggle, Japan devoted its energy first to securing national independence against the threat post by Western imperialism.

There were two different approaches as how to achieve its new objective. One option was to promote the cause of Pan-Asianism, emphasising the need for Asian unity in the face of Western encroachment. The other was to ‘cast off Asia’ and to seek the club of Great Powers. As discussed in the previous chapter, during the Meiji period (1868-1912), the latter option – striving for equality and joining the West – was regarded as the only ‘realistic’ response and hence dominated Japanese foreign policy (Saaler 2996: 2, 3). However, with the passage of time, Pan-Asianism regained its appeal and provided a rationale for the creation of a ‘new East Asian order’ led by Japan. But why did Japan ‘return’ to Asia and what kind of new order did it create?

Pan-Asianism and the Creation of the Japanese Empire

Japan made effective use of pan-Asian rhetoric to support its attempt to create a new East Asian order under it leadership, even attempted to create a pan-Asian imperial
The notion of Japanese superiority over China was not new and was sometimes advanced even when – whether formally or informally – Japan was part of the Sino-centric hierarchic system. Japanese assertiveness had been revealed in various invasions of Korea, designed to wrest the peninsula from its attachment to China and to subject it to Japanese influence. On occasion, the Japanese went so far as to claim that they, rather than the Chinese, represented the true ‘Middle Kingdom’. Whereas Chinese dynasties had come and gone, the unbroken Japanese imperial line made it the senior dynasty of East Asia and perhaps of the world (Saaler 2006: 3).

However, despite these occasional challenges, by and large, Japan remained fairly comfortably with its inherently subordinate position in the old Chinese world order, treating China as its ultimate civilisational centre and teacher. Even when Western intrusion effectively destroyed the Chinese world order, Japan could not immediately aspire to a new order under its own leadership. Yet, as Goto observes, Japan soon concluded that China was no longer to be regarded as its teacher and or as the centre of civilization; in reality it was actually only ‘half-civilized’ (Goto 2003: 3, 4). But, at least initially, Japan did not see itself as China’s successor. Rather, it regarded the West in much the same way that it had once viewed China. In other words, the sense of inferiority and awe, once directed to China, was now focussed away from Asia and towards Europe and North America. Such attitudes were surely behind Japan’s decision to cast itself off from Asia (datsuan'yūō). Interestingly, Goto (2003: 4) sees the ideology of the ‘Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere’ as a deformed amalgam of Japanese inferiority and superiority.

**Return to Asia**

Before World War I, ‘Asianism’ amounted to little more than a somewhat vague and romantic yearning for Asian solidarity. Subsequently, however, it developed into something more formidable and came to be perceived as a ‘realistic option’ for Japanese foreign policy (Saaler 2006: 6). In the 1930s, the Japanese government embraced pan-Asian rhetoric with increasing enthusiasm. Now more strident than in the past, it emphasised hostility to the West, especially opposed to Western imperial domination.

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2 For changing national identities in East Asia in the period of Japanese expansion, see Narangoa and Cribb (eds) 2003.
At the same time, the rhetoric was used to legitimise Japan’s claims to leadership in Asia. ‘Return to Asia’, so different to the earlier policy of ‘European orientation’, clearly requires explanation; considerations of status and security probably weighed most heavily.

Although there had been minor disappointments, until the end of World War I, Japan’s policy of abandoning Asia and ‘tilting’ to the West had produced impressive results. Starting with the Treaties of Kanghwa (1876) and Shimonoseki (1895), which extended its influence over Korea and Taiwan; Japan had gone from strength to strength. In 1902, it concluded an alliance with Britain, in many ways still the greatest power in the world. In 1905, Japan inflicted a decisive yet unexpected defeat on Russia ‘the White’. Following participation on the Allied side in World War I, it was accorded a place alongside the major victors at the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919. Japan was now one of the five great powers and seemed to have realised its ambition, pursued with such single-minded determination, to be accepted as an equal by the West.

However, this story of apparent success only served to expose the underlying tensions between Japan and the European powers. It soon became clear that the fact that Japan had secured an ‘advanced’ status in relation to its neighbours – largely by the use of Western methods – had not guaranteed complete equality with the Western powers. The Triple intervention and failure to secure the proposed racial equality clause in the Covenant of the League of Nations were significant set-backs for Japan – the first major ones since the Meiji restoration. The sense of disappointment, even of betrayal, led Japanese such as Ishii to reassess the situation, especially in the light of anxieties and tensions over Korea and Manchuria. Ishii (1933: 220; 223) claimed that, ever since it had entered the ‘family of nations’, Japan’s prime objectives had been ‘equality and security’. Yet it was now abundantly clear that neither could be achieved by fulfilment of Western ‘standards of civilisation’. Thus, security and status concern was in the heart of its foreign policy, and much influenced its identity building. The point was well made by Hayes (2001: 22):

From the time of the restoration to the 1930s, Japan’s political development was influenced in decisive ways by the enduring sense of insecurity, both physical and cultural. This insecurity led to an exaggerated ambition for
national power, respect, and equality. These motives, intertwined and often inseparable, made up the chemistry of a distinctive nationalism, a force which impelled Japan along its particular historical path.

There were now increasingly influential elements in Japanese political and military society who opposed the status quo. Inevitably their seemingly aggressive posture produced anxiety and hostility in the West. The Manchurian Incident of September 1931 was the first military action taken by the Japanese without prior consultation with the other powers. The West was particularly alarmed because Japan’s reliance on force seemed to echo the policies and style of dictators such as Hitler who were coming to power in Europe. Reaction to the Manchurian Incident led Japan to withdraw from the League of Nations in March 1933. This withdrawal was to have a deep effect on subsequent Japanese foreign policy and Goto (2003: 18) identifies it as the first step toward de-Westernisation and the eventual adoption of a return to Asia policy.

**Pan-Asianism: Non-hegemonic Course**

But Japan’s ‘return to Asia’ cannot be explained solely in terms of disillusion with Europe and all that it stood for. Japan was also driven towards China and Southeast Asia for economic reasons, above all by the perceived need for assured markets and sources of raw materials. Goto (2003: 5, 7) suggests that, while the Japanese regarded themselves as culturally superior to the peoples of Southeast Asia, they believed even more strongly that the region as a whole possessed ‘great economic value’. Southeast Asia was thirteen times larger than Japan and its population three times bigger; it also contained important raw materials and constituted a potentially significant market for the products of Japanese industry. Similar calculations informed Japanese attitudes to Taiwan, Manchuria and other parts of China. At least until the mid-1930s, however, Japan’s southward-advance policy (*nanshin seisaku*) continued to emphasise an essentially peaceful approach to the realisation of its objectives. But when Japan turned towards colonial expansion, pan-Asian rhetoric assumed a central role of Japan in its bid to create an economically integrated Empire. This development should not be explained solely in terms of the evolution of official policy; other elements also played parts in the drive to create pan-Asian solidarity and regional identity.
While official policy showed few signs of turning away from Europe before the 1920s, pan-Asian activists within Japan had long sought contacts with their counterparts in other Asian countries. Especially after 1905, these activists sought to give encouragement and support to revolutionary movements that aimed to overthrow traditional regimes in countries like Korea and China. As early as 1898, the Chinese reformers Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao, who had been forced to flee Beijing, were warmly received by Japanese pan-Asianists. The Chinese revolutionary leader, Sun Yatsen (1866-1925), and the Korean dissident, Kim Ok-kyun (1851-94), were frequently guests at pan-Asian gatherings in Japan (Saaler 2006: 6). The same pattern was also visible in Southeast Asia before 1945. Some Japanese visitors identified strongly with the peoples of the region, forming connections with nationalists in territories under colonial rule. A few even stayed after the War to assist and participate in nascent anti-colonial movements (Goto 2003: 10).

The Problems of Pan-Asianism

The creation of an East Asian order inspired by the ideas of pan-Asianism – whether in the form of the ‘New Order’ of the 1930s or the ‘Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere’ of the 1940s – encountered many problems. Observers elsewhere in Asia could hardly fail to notice that Pan-Asian ideas had largely originated in Japan and that their growing influence had at least coincided with the rise of Japan to near equality with major Western powers. There were bound to be suspicion that these ideas were actually the product of Japan’s increasing success. In other words, however, benign in theory, was pan-Asianism merely a cover to advance Japan’s interests, not to the advantage of the other peoples of the region but to their detriment? It was surely worrying that many of the most fervent advocates of Pan-Asianism insisted that its objectives could only be realised under Japanese leadership, perhaps only under Japanese colonial rule. Far from bringing liberation to the oppressed peoples of Asia, would the end result be no more than the replacement of one sort of colonial regime with another? Japan’s track record in Korea and Taiwan did not fit easily with the ‘benign face’ of pan-Asianism.

These fears were to be justified after Japan entered the ‘Greater East Asia War’. As Japanese forces swept through the former European colonies and their peoples were subjected to Japanese military rule, the earlier version of pan-Asianism experienced significant modification. The notion of Japan as the leader ‘meishu’ and ‘liberator’ of
East Asia was asserted with greater stridency, yet other tenets subscribed to by the Pan-Asianists earlier in the century – such as Asian solidarity and equality – appeared to become forgotten. The stress on Japan’s ‘mission’ to liberate Asia replaced earlier emphasis on Asia’s ‘common destiny’ (Saaler 2006: 8, 11, 12). It seems that many Japanese were unaware of the contradictory elements in the Pan-Asian programme, although these must have been brutally obvious to many in China, Malaya, Indo-China, Burma, Indonesia and elsewhere.³

Ironically, in some respects, the ideas behind the operation of the ‘New Order’ under Japanese leadership were similar to those that had informed the traditional Chinese tributary system. In both, the principle of hierarchy was central. Previous chapter identified concentric hierarchic zones – the Sinic, Inner, and Outer zones – within the Chinese world order. The Japanese ‘New Order’ produced its own version of hierarchy: ‘independent’ or ‘puppet’ states, semi-independent protectorates, directly administered by Japan, and colonies that would remain under the rule of European powers (Saaler 2006: 12-13). Of course, in this New Order the Japanese would be the ‘leading race’ in the region for all time (Benson and Matsumura 2001: 80, 81). Yet the ultimate object was even more ambitious. If the Chinese world order had once claimed to embrace ‘all under heaven’ (Tianxia), Japan now advanced a concept of hakkō ichiu (eight corners of the world under one roof). In other words, Japan would assume ‘the whole world’s unification under the emperor of Japan’ (Hook et al. 2001: 29).

Thus, in some respect, the new order in East Asia represented little more than a change of masters for East Asia; the old hierarchical Chinese and the subsequent European imperial order was to give way to a new hierarchy under Japan. Of course, there was a difference. Japan could find some justification for its actions by stressing its contribution to the defeat of the Western powers – the common oppressor of East Asia. In this sense it may be argued that ‘pan-Asian’ ideology did more than use a traditional characteristic of East Asian international society to provide a degree of some legitimacy for Japanese leadership. It may also have served as the essential foundation for any subsequent, more ‘genuine’ regional union. In the 1930s and 40s, Japan attempted to

³ For the contradictions of Pan-Asianism, see Narangoa and Cribb (eds.) (2003); Szpilman, Christopher W. A. (2006).
create a pan-Asian imperial identity, with itself as the model for others to follow. At

times, this was accompanied, by policies of assimilation or Japanisation, particularly in
Korea and Taiwan. Of course, as Narangoa and Cribb (2003: 2) point out, Japan’s
attempt to remodel the national identities of East Asia fell ‘far short of its intentions’ –
an understatement to put it mildly. But they also argue that the implications of this
apparently unsuccessful attempt were ‘much more far-reaching’. But was this because
Japanese rule and dominance was so short-lived or were other factors at work? In order
to discover the answer we must examine the nature and operation of the Japanese order
in more detail.

4.1.2 The Operation of the Japanese Order

The relatively brief period of Japanese imperial expansion and the attempt to create a
Japanese-led ‘new order’ in Asia remains highly controversial. Rival interpretations
constitute a major obstacle both to improved relations between Japan and its neighbours
and, more generally, to the further development of regional integration. In particular,
neighbouring countries have been angered by the way Japan’s role is treated in Japanese
school text-books and by the visits of prominent Japanese politicians to the Yasukuni
Shrine. For these countries, the story of the years between 1931 and 1945 is above all
one of Japanese aggression. In Japan, however, there has been an increasing tendency –
closely linked with growing inward-looking nationalism, associated with the
conservative Right – to portray the Pacific War as a sacred struggle in which Japan
made enormous sacrifices to try to free the peoples of East Asia from Western
colonialism. Thus, if the rest of East Asia complains of Japanese aggression and
brutality, at least some elements in Japan complain of East Asian ingratitude. Here I
examine more closely the respective roles of ideology, interests and coercion in the
operation of Japanese empire.

The Role of Ideology

As discussed earlier, when seeking to create a new East Asian order, Japan employed a
pan-Asian and anti-imperialist rhetoric that was primarily directed against the Western

\[\text{\footnote{For the impact on regionalism, see Saaler and Koschmann (eds.) (2006).}}\]

\[\text{\footnote{For changes in nationalism in Japan, China and Taiwan, see Deans (forthcoming).}}\]
imperial presence in Asia. On the face of it, this rhetoric had much in common with the nationalist agenda elsewhere in Asia became a strong force in the course of the 1920s and 30s. Since Japan had been ‘the first to successfully challenge the Western conception of international society as a closed club’ (Mayall 2000a: 188), and had succeeded in securing the complete abolition of the unequal treaty system by 1911, it appeared well-placed to present itself as the potential or actual liberator of other Asian nations. Japan’s earlier success, particularly its defeat of Russia in 1905, had made many Asians eager to imitate Japan’s ‘political, social and technological model’ (Narangoa and Cribb 2003: 6). From the end of the nineteenth century, many young radical Chinese and Koreans attended military schools in Japan. When they returned home, they took the lead in reforms and revolutions; the Chinese revolution of 1911-12 is a case in point. As exemplified by Sun Yat-sen’s 1924 Kobe speech, pan-Asianism was gaining a significant following in several Asian countries.

Japan’s relationship with the countries of Southeast Asia was particularly complex. When Japan sought to expand into this area, much of it was under Western colonial rule. Thus, as Goto (2003:22, 79) points out, for a while at least, opposition to Western colonialism served the interests both of Japan and of local nationalists. For Japan, even though the prime objective of its ‘southern expansion’ was the swift acquisition of important natural resources such as petroleum, tin, and rubber; this frank avowal was rapped up in lofty expressions of the sacred cause of the liberation of Asia and the destruction of Western colonial rule. In other words, some of the language was virtually identical to that employed by local nationalists. But how should these react? If their countries had already been independent, they would have had little option but to regard collaboration with the Japanese as treason. But it was not so simple for those in colonial territories. Some collaborated willingly with the Japanese, claiming that collaboration was their patriotic duty, a strategy that would soon bring full independence.

However, it is questionable whether the seemingly attractive ideologies of ‘Asia for the Asians’ and Pan-Asian solidarity, had become deeply internalised among the Japanese or their ‘colonial’ subjects. No doubt, there were some in Japan who really believed that their destiny was to create a new order in Asia that would expel Western influences and establish a new structure based on Asian concepts of justice and humanity (Pyle 1978: 147). But there are bound to be doubts. There was an element of cynicism in the way
the Japanese authorities used of the high-flown phraseology of pan-Asianism to serve their own purposes. As Goto (2003: 22) argues, it was a useful device to gain the support of local nationalists and to mobilise enthusiasm for the war among the Japanese themselves, especially the younger generation. Local nationalists were also somewhat calculating. In part, they gave the appearance of subscribing to the ideas of pan-Asianism and of collaborating with the Japanese, either to further their real goal of eventual independence or because Japanese coercion gave them no choice. So long as Japanese military might seemed unassailable, collaboration was the only way to achieve eventual independence.

The Role of Interest and Force

Especially for Japan, the drive to establish a New Order in East Asia was as much the product of economic calculations as of security considerations. Indeed, Japan’s need for natural resources was central to the entire process. Thus Japan extended its influence and control, already established in Korea and Taiwan, to China and to most of Southeast Asia. The slogan, ‘the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere’, emphasised ‘mutual’ economic interests and held out a prospect of prosperity for all. Even in the 1930s, ‘Japanese of nearly all political persuasions looked at their country’s involvement in China as sanctioned by economic need’ (Hayes 2001: 24).

Many Asians, too, genuinely admired Japan’s rapid modernisation and technological advancement; even before 1905, Japanese progress had inspired many Koreans. A minority welcomed modernisation, and some of this group were to serve the subsequent Japanese colonial regime. In Southeast Asia, too, Japanese expansion seemed both in tune with demands for greater secularism and likely to further the regional quest for economic and political liberation from Western colonial powers. Thus, as Japan developed important economic networks throughout the region, it also offered financial assistance and military training to anti-colonial Filipinos and Indonesians as well as to the subjects of the French and British Empires.

However, serious problems arose as Japan expanded into China and then into Southeast Asia in 1930s and 1940s. Acute labour shortages meant that Japan resorted to increasingly draconian methods to recruit workers to sustain its economy and war
The beginning of all-out war with China in 1937 had already created serious labour shortages in Japan, but was further exacerbated by the effects of the Pacific War and Japan’s massive territorial expansion. Now the Japanese tried to obtain workers, not just from Korea and China but also from virtually everywhere in the occupied territories. Some of these workers were needed for local Japanese-owned enterprises, especially in mines, but others were sent to distant parts of the Empire.

It must be stressed that, coming as they did in the aftermath of the economic collapse of the 1930s – which had created high levels of unemployment in much of the region – Japan’s initial attempts at recruitment met with a quite favourable response. Many were glad to take any work on offer. Furthermore, Japan made some effective use of intermediary organisations, such as the North China Labour Association, to recruit workers (Ju 2005). However, towards the end of the war, especially in 1944 and 1945, Japan increasingly adopted methods of forcible recruitment. Workers were sent to distant locations and many did not return. Koreans were a major element in this foreign workforce. They were employed in Japan in coal-mines, construction, and in dock transport. Some modest wages were paid, but life in the Japanese coal mines was extremely harsh. Explosions caused by gas, rock falls, and accidents with coal trucks resulted in a heavy mortality among Koreans and Japanese alike (Naitou 2005: 91, 95).

In fact workers were recruited throughout the entire area controlled by Japan and used for a variety of purposes, but especially on military construction projects. Even in Indonesia, as Raben shows, tens of thousands of Indonesian workers, known as rōmusha, died of malnutrition, disease, and maltreatment. Most were buried in unmarked graves far from home, and no records were kept of their deaths. Raben argues that, understandably, at least outside nationalist and upper class circles, the years of Japanese rule in Indonesia are remembered as ‘a time of massive enslavement and hardship’ (Raben 2005: 197, 211). In Nish’s (2000: 85) words, while many Asians had looked for Japanese leadership, ‘they did not like it when it came’. If Japanese rule was indeed synonymous with enslavement and hardship, then it must be concluded that, in

For labour in the wartime Japanese Empire, see Kratoska (ed.) (2005).
reality, all the talk of pan-Asian solidarity turned out to be a deception, a horribly cruel joke. We must examine the implications of this for regional identity and security.

4.1.3 The Impact on Regional Security: Nationalism in East Asia

The speedy rise and even more sudden collapse of the Japanese-led East Asian Empire or society, had major consequences. It certainly fostered strong revolutionary and anti-colonial nationalism. Understandably, people in East Asia welcomed the end of the war, yet, even in Southeast Asia, they were reluctant to accept a return to the pre-war status quo of colonial rule by foreign nations. Nationalism helped to inspire decolonisation movements based on anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist sentiments, which also gave rise to a loose feeling of regional solidarity. Yet, at the same time, much anti-colonial nationalism in East Asia also had a specifically anti-Japanese flavour. Hence, although this concept of nationalism is ultimately derived from the expansion of European international society into East Asia, it has taken a form that is radically different from the Western version. The distinctive features of East Asian nationalism continue to affect regional relations.

In the nineteenth century, the expansion of European international society into a global one introduced the concept of nationalism, together with other ideas such as sovereignty and international law, into East Asia. Thus, ‘nationalism’ emerged as a constitutive institution (Mayall 1990, 2000b) or, in Buzan’s terminology, as a ‘primary institution’ (Buzan 2004) in the extended global international society. In the West, although nationalism emerged in opposition to imperialism and colonialism, it sought to replace dynastic with popular sovereignty (Mayall 1990: 2). Since 1919 the political principle of national self-determination has been a close adjunct of nationalism in the struggle against colonialism. However, the spread of nationalism took a distinctive course in East Asia. Here, nationalism is more associated with the idea of preservation of states against outside pressure – namely the challenge of the West. It is often expressed in patriotic terms, rather than linked to that of modernity or notions of popular sovereignty (Yahuda 2000: 25).

Initially Japanese nationalism ‘had its impact on nationalistic movements around Asia’ (Nish 2000: 85). Faced with the Western challenge, by and large, Asians attempted ‘to
join the society of states on equal terms, not to challenge it’ (Mayall 2000a: 188). These efforts were primarily directed towards the preservation of their states against outside pressure. From the 1890s onwards, however, these states were threatened not only by the Western powers but, increasingly, by Japan. Ironically, by its successful challenge to Western imperialism, Japan itself became the major imperialist power in East Asia and faced resistance from its own colonial subjects. For instance, defeat in the Sino-Japanese war of 1895 sparked off modern Chinese nationalism. The Japanese authorities confronted major nationalist opposition in Korea, China, and Taiwan in March and May 1919, and in January 1921 respectively. Thus, under the principle of ‘national self-determination’, nationalist movements in East Asia increasingly took on not only an anti-imperialist but also a specifically anti-Japanese character.

Moreover, from the early 1930, with growing military influence in its government, Japan turned to ultra-nationalism and militarism. In part, this reflected a world-wide trend; in many countries liberalism collapsed and was replaced by nationalism, racism and imperialism (Nish 2000: 85). Thus, although Japan presented itself in pan-Asian terms as the only force capable of defeating European colonialism and of bringing peace and prosperity to East Asia, ‘the reality was quite different: it was an occupation of extreme barbarism’ (Mackerras 1998: 39). Benson and Matsumura (2001: 83) insist that the Japanese ‘proved even more harsh and insensitive than their predecessors’, especially through the imposition of broad programs of ‘Japanisation’. After acquiring Taiwan in 1895 and annexed Korea in 1910, in both territories, Japan adopted a policy of ‘assimilation’ in an attempt to turn Koreans and Taiwanese into Japanese by forcing them to learn the Japanese language and to adopt Japanese culture. It is hardly surprising that the horrors of Japanese expansionism and militarism gave rise to anti-Japanese nationalism. The sudden collapse of Japan in the 1940s brought a further strong nationalist upsurge throughout East Asia.

What were the main consequences of the emergence of nationalism as a key institution in East Asian regional society? Mayall argues that the rise of nationalism challenged many of the existing institutions of international society, especially imperialism and colonialism, and eventually de-legitimised them (Mayall 1990: 35). This was true of East Asia, where anti-Western and anti-Japanese revolutionary movements should be seen as part of the international anti-imperialist / colonialist movement. The process
began when East Asia entered the expanding international society. There, both nationalism and sovereign norms developed with strong link to anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. Moreover, here these objectives were achieved through long and painful efforts. So, in Acharya’s words (2003/4:159), these norms have been ‘hard-earned’, rather than just provided by others.

However, unlike its Western counterpart, in East Asia, nationalism did not have a close association with ideas of democracy and human rights. In other words, in the West, national self-determination was more than an end in itself, but was seen as a means of achieving a more democratic society. Ultimately, it was democracy that would legitimate the new arrangements. In the East Asia, however, the struggle against colonialism and for national self-determination was all-important. Thus, while they exploited the symbols of nationalism in their efforts to dislodge foreign rule, political elites in East Asia paid scant attention to the ethnic or cultural dimensions of self-determination. Therefore, ‘decolonisation’ and ‘self-determination’ became unproblematic synonyms (Mayall 2000a: 190). Thus, successful resistance to Japanese rule, rather than respect for popular sovereignty – that is democracy – became the hallmark of legitimacy. These differences had both immediate and long-term implications for regional international society.

From the start, nationalism was equated with patriotism. Many Asians, particularly in China, ‘nationalism’ means aiguo zhuyi (patriotism), a concept strongly linked with political legitimacy, rather than minzu zhuyi (nationalism). This was clearly revealed when Japan was defeated and withdrew from China. Both the Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took on the mantle of patriotism and hence claimed legitimacy on same grounds. Both had fought against the Japanese though neither could claim to be democratic in the ‘Western’ sense of the word. The competing claims of ‘patriotic legitimacy’ resulted in civil war in China between 1946 and 1949. In Korea, too, various nationalist groups and political parties were formed from the 1920s onwards. Among these, the movement led by Kim Il Sung was popular because it linked nationalism and communism together with anti-imperialism (Cumings 1998: 154).

Thus, although nationalism became a primary institution on the global scale, Eastern and Western understandings of it remained far apart. In some ways, this divergence has
become even more important since the end of the Cold War. In particular, it has affected attitudes to democracy and human rights. East Asian nationalism puts so much emphasis on sovereignty and non-intervention norms that it tends to regard anything potentially incompatible with these norms with suspicion – and this includes such things as insistence on democracy and human rights. Today, many disputes and tensions over sovereignty and territory in the region can only be understood in the context of specifically East Asian ‘patriotic’ notions of nationalism. Only when this point is grasped, it is possible to answer otherwise puzzling questions: why have visits to the Yasukuni shrine and the contents of school text books provoked such fury in Japan’s neighbours; why has the relationship between Japan and China been one of ‘hot economics and cold politics’; why have regionalism and multilateralism have been so slow to develop in Northeast/East Asia; and why, when these have appeared, are their characteristic features so different to superficially similar institutions elsewhere, particularly in Europe?

4.2 The Cold War in Northeast Asia

The end of World War II brought significant changes to international society. The rise of nationalism and decolonisation finally gave international society a truly global character. Yet, the development of superpower rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union divided the expanded international society into two opposed camps. Above all, the binary division between the Western and Communist Blocs meant that several norms and principles operated differently in the rival camps. While the Western side extolled democracy and the free market, the Communist camp sought to achieve socialism through self-reliance and centrally planned economies.

Developments also varied at the regional level. Though it expanded to become all-inclusive, the society of states still exhibited different degrees of development. Types of states varied widely – as they still do. To take one example, multilateralism as an institution has become increasingly prominent after World War II, and has come to be seen as a criterion to determine whether a particular society is well integrated or well developed. Northeast Asia is widely regarded as ‘impoverished in its development’ as a regional international society, and the virtual absence of effective multilateralism has often been seen as worrying (Buzan and Segal 1994). This was particularly true in the
Cold War era; in the 1950s and 1960s, Northeast Asia almost ceased to function as a regional society in any sense of the term. Why?

No doubt, the legacy of Japanese expansion, followed by the divisions of the Cold War, partly explains this low level of development. But there have been other variables, less well appreciated but at least as important. From ideational and comparative perspectives, Hemmer and Katzenstein (2002), stress the role of America’s collective identity in its preference for bilateral rather than multilateral approaches in its dealings with Asian countries. While this is a valuable aid to an understanding of the situation in Northeast Asia, it could be taken further. There was also a significant lack of collective identity among the regional actors and not all of this can be attributed to American policy. Yet, even within these low level of interaction some unmistakable changes have been occurring. These can be analysed through following three aspects.

- The Arrival of the Cold War in Northeast Asia: Domestic and Global Factors.
- Multilateralism versus Bilateralism.
- Re-emergence of Northeast Asian International Society.

4.2.1 The Arrival of the Cold War in Northeast Asia: Regional Divisions

In the immediate aftermath of World War II, domestic developments in Japan, China and Korea exercised a major influence on the future course of the region. The sudden collapse of the Japanese empire divided the East Asian RSC into separate Northeast and Southeast Asian RSCs (Buzan and Wæver 2003). It also resulted in an upsurge of radical nationalist movements, as examined earlier. Communists and anti-communists alike derived their legitimacy from their successful resistance to Japanese imperialism; in several instances these rival claims resulted in civil war. But the political space created by the collapse of Japan was not only filled by new nationalist regimes; essentially ‘outside’ superpowers were either drawn or intruded into the region.

The Domestic Impact

After Japan’s defeat in the Pacific War, it underwent a period of Allied Occupation (1945-52). Efforts to reform Japan and to prevent remilitarisation were exemplified in the so-called peace constitution, particularly in Article 9, which prohibited the use of
armed force. Further, under the San Francisco peace treaty and the simultaneous US-Japan security treaty of September 1951, Japan was firmly incorporated into the US camp both politically and militarily. In addition, traumatised by war and defeat, ordinary Japanese and many influential elites came to reject the pre-war approach to national security and its associated nationalist ideology (Berger 2004). Thus, Japan distanced itself from East Asia, a tendency strengthened by Yoshida’s policy of accepting political, economic and security dependence on the US. The overall result was that Japan ceased to function as a major independent power, while remaining as a US ally and dependent. Ideologically, Japan came to identify itself with the Western bloc, both in terms of politics and values.

Meanwhile, Japan’s defeat enabled the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Nationalist Party (KMT) to resume their civil war in 1946. After three years devastation, the war ended in victory for the Communists under Mao and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established in October 1949. The KMT and the government of the Republic of China (ROC) retreated to Taiwan, hence creating the de facto division of China that has lasted ever since. While the Chinese civil war and national division sowed the seeds of tension and insecurity in both Chinese regimes and in the region generally, the victory of the CCP and the emergence of communist China also had a significant impact on international society. As Dockrill (1988: 48) notes, particularly in the US, the Chinese communist victory was linked with the explosion of a Soviet atom bomb. The rapid succession of these events had a profound and unsettling effect. It seemed that ‘communism was on the march everywhere’. As a result, American ‘isolationism’ in the traditional sense all but disappeared. The US could no longer insulate itself militarily from the rest of the world. A year after the Chinese communist victory another war broke out, this time in the Korean peninsula.

When Eberstadt and Ellings (2001: 5) argued that in world affairs, a country’s location could have ‘profound, far-reaching, and enduring consequences’, they cited Korea as a prime example. The Korean peninsula occupies precisely the space where the territories, or at any rate the spheres of influence, of the great powers of the Pacific – China, Russia, Japan and the United States – happen to adjoin. Each of these powers has tended to regard the Korean peninsula as falling naturally within its own sphere, while fearing that it might fall into other hands.
An old Korean saying describes the country as ‘a shrimp among whales’. In other words, Korea’s location meant that it could not escape from the struggles between the great powers for hegemony in East Asia. This had happened many times in the past (see chapter 3). Once Korea was freed from Japanese occupation, it once more became a ‘shrimp’, this time between the whales of the United States and the Soviet Union. Almost immediately after the Japanese surrender, Korea became the place in Asia where Soviet-American Cold War rivalry revealed itself earliest and most forcefully (Mackerras 1998: 41). It was divided involuntarily into Soviet and American zones of occupation along the 38th parallel, a division which continues to date. Moreover, between June 1950 to July 1953, Korea was the scene of the ‘hottest’ of all Cold War conflicts; British, American and Chinese forces were directly involved. But the results of this extremely bitter conflict were inconclusive. At the end of the war, Korea remained divided along the original 38th Parallel, and the peninsula has continued to be a potential point of conflict ever since – between the two Koreas or between the United States and China (Bell 2001: 112).

The Global Impact

Prior to 1949, the Cold War had barely touched the Asian Mainland. Yet the victory of the Communists in China and the outbreak of the Korean War changed both regional and global landscapes. These developments gave a global dimension to the Cold War and, thereafter, Northeast Asia as an RSC was to be heavily penetrated by the two superpowers. After the Korean War, the US incorporated Taiwan into its defence perimeter and commenced large-scale aid to regimes it favoured. The war also had significant effects on the ex-enemy state, Japan. It hardened American determination that Japan should not become dependent on trade with mainland China, and that it should have closer links with Chiang Kai-shek and Taiwan than with Mao Zedong and the mainland (Dunbabin 1994: 116). Equally, the War strengthened the Sino-Soviet alliance – though it would split later – and both supported North Korea.

Thus, the Cold War bipolarity effectively divided Northeast Asia into communist and anti-communist camps. The result was that the capitalist countries of the region now communicated with each other through the United States, a process institutionalised in
bilateral defence treaties with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Thus, direct or ‘horizontal’ contact between South and North Korea or between China and Taiwan was non-existent and extremely limited between Japan and the Communist states (Cumings 1998: 458; Pempel 2005: 8-9).

4.2.2 Multilateralism versus Bilateralism

The division between Communists and anti-Communists made it difficult for Northeast Asia to develop into a meaningful regional international society, much less to acquire any sense of community. The problem was exacerbated by the contrast between US bilateralism in Asia and its multilateralism in Europe. A new phenomenon, multilateralism expanded after World War II, largely in accordance with ‘the American vision as to what constitutes a desirable world order’ (Ruggie 1994: 560). But multilateralism progressed furthest in Europe and in the North Atlantic Community. To a more limited extent, multilateral and regional approaches also emerged in Southeast Asia from the late 1960s, although in ways and forms different to those in Europe. However, Northeast Asia has not yet experienced a movement to multilateralism of any sort until recently. Why?

The Impact of US Identity

US foreign policy towards Europe and Asia in 1940s and 1950s resulted in very different outcomes. In Europe the US alliance structure led to the establishment of multilateral organisations, such as NATO, but there was no similar organisation in Asia. Rather, the United States preferred a ‘hub-and-spoke’ alliance system, based on arrangements with individual allies, such as Japan and South Korea and Taiwan. When comparing these differences, Hemmer and Kantzenstein (2002) ask important questions: why did the US government favour multilateral security arrangements in Europe and bilateral ones in Asia; and if NATO was so successful in Europe, why was it not copied in East Asia? Hemmer and Katzenstein do not deny the realist argument that the great disparity of power between the US and its Asian allies made the multilateral approach unattractive to the US. They contend, however, that considerations of identity may have been more important in determining America’s behaviour.
The main arguments are that:

Different forms of cooperation make greater or lesser demands on shared identities. Multilateralism is a particularly demanding form of international cooperation. It requires a strong sense of collective identity in addition to shared interests.

However,

Shaped by racial, historical, political, and cultural factors, U.S. policymakers saw their potential European allies as relatively equal members of a shared community. America’s potential Asian allies, in contrast, were seen as part of an alien and, in important way, inferior community. At the beginning of the Cold War, this difference in mutual identification, in combination with material factors and considerations of efficiency, was of critical importance in defining the interests and shaping the choices of U.S. decision makers in Europe and Asia (Hemmer and Kantzenstein 2002: 575).

According to this analysis, lack of US identification with Northeast Asia was crucial to the absence of multilateralism in the region. US relations with its European allies were underpinned by many common values, such as democracy, the free market and religion. These provided a firm basis for US identification with Europe. Moreover, the common threat posed by Soviet Union in the immediate aftermath of World War II served to strengthen mutual identification. As Wæver (1998: 81) argues, the Soviet threat was the issue ‘securitised most dramatically, constantly’ and ‘legitimised a wide array of activities and contributed to defining the identity of what was first of all a Western or North Atlantic community’.

It is true that US relations with the Northeast Asian counterparts of its European allies were very different. There were few shared values between them – whether religious, economic or political. At that time, none of America’s allies in the region (Japan, South Korea, or Taiwan) was a true democracy: only Japan was to introduce the Constitutional Law at the behest of the Allied occupation authorities, in a hope for transforming it into a liberal democratic country (Bessho 1999: 15). South Korea and Taiwan were
‘essentially developmental authoritarian regimes’ (Hook et al. 2001: 160). In addition, Japan, formerly the US’s enemy, had been totally defeated in World War II, Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists were defeated in the Chinese civil war and retreated to Taiwan, and Korea, just freed from Japanese occupation, was in a state of internal chaos. Not surprisingly, the US could not see its potential Asian allies in equal terms.

Moreover, the US policy towards Northeast Asia was essentially instrumental. It was driven by an ideological purpose – the containment of communism, especially communism in China. Here, the Chinese Communist victory in 1949 and its subsequent military intervention in the Korean War were highly significant. The Chinese civil war revealed that Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists could not defeat the People’s Liberation Army led by Mao Zedong – despite US support, involving aid amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars and the delivery of massive military supplies. In the Korean war, too, Chinese intervention prevented the US-led UN troops from crossing the 38th parallel. The result, as argued earlier, was increased American involvement.

Thus, the US intensified its commitment, yet only through bilateral means with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Hence we may agree with Hemmer and Katzenstein that US identification constituted a major obstacle to the development of multilateralism in Northeast Asia. However, some puzzles remain. Although Northeast Asia was divided into two camps – communist and anti-communist – there was no integration between states allied to the US. It was rather like the position in the time of the old Chinese world order when all tributary states had bilateral relations with Imperial China but not between each other (Dan 2005; Mancall 1968); now the various allies were connected bilaterally to Washington (Ikenberry 2001). Yet equally, on the Communist side, there was no arrangement corresponding to the Warsaw Pact standing in opposition to the US alliance system. The absence of multilateralism on the Communist side raises doubts as to whether American identity factors – that is those of an external actor – can provide a complete explanation. It seems likely that the identities of regional actors were even more important.
Collective Identity of Regional Actors

Two historical factors had particularly critical effects on collective identity formation in Northeast Asia – the legacy of the Chinese world order and the legacy of Japanese Imperialism.

The Legacy of Chinese World Order

As explained in the previous chapter, the Chinese world order developed into a system structure very different to the kind of international society that emerged in seventeenth century Europe. First, the tribute system was anti-egalitarian. Zhong Guo (the Middle Kingdom) was not simply Asia’s largest state, but was also a self-contained world, theoretically embracing the whole Earth, and ruled by Tianzi (the Chinese emperor) (Fairbank 1968; Bessho 1999: 31). Secondly, the tributary relationship was ‘always bilateral, never multilateral’ (Mancall 1968: 65). In other words, participants in the Chinese world order interacted with Imperial China but not with each other in any meaningful manner (see chapter 3).

The fact that the legacy of the old order did not provide a good cultural basis for the development of a regional identity/society still has negative implications. Under the ‘concentric’ hierarchic order, East Asia had little experience of multilateralism or even inter-state relations, at least in modern sense (see Fairbank 1968; Fei 1945; Kang 2003b, 2003c). China saw itself as superior to other Asian states, which, in theory, were expected to be properly tributary. Though they related to Imperial China according to their levels of allegiance to the Emperor, these surrounding states did not develop a common identity. In other words, there was no strong regional collective identity. Thus, because of their long experience of ‘suzerain and vassal’ relations, regional actors tend to view ideas of multilateralism and regional integration with suspicion. Such concepts may be perceived as threats to their hardly-won sovereignty. In other words, the surrounding states’ attitudes reflect concerns about the possible revival of the old Chinese claims to suzerainty. No doubt their fears are sharpened by the sheer size of China.
The Legacy of Japanese Imperial Past

While nationalism in East Asia was arising in opposition to imperial and colonial rule, it must be acknowledged that there were at least some faint signs of a nascent regional identity, transcending ethnic and religious divisions. But this ‘proto’ regional identity was focussed on Japan. Japan’s earlier success, its defeat of Russia in 1905, and its anti-Western and pan-Asian rhetoric did go some way to inspire a nascent regional identity. Later, the promotion of the idea of a ‘New East Asian order’ under the banner of ‘Co-Prosperity Sphere’ seemed to provide a beacon for those who sought to create an East Asian order characterised by genuine equality and co-prosperity. Yet, the new Order when it came was marked by extreme inequality and a notable lack of prosperity. In other words any sense of emerging regional identity was destroyed and both the ‘New East Asian Order’ and the circumstances of its collapse actually placed major obstacles in the way of the development of any new regional identity (see earlier argument).

In most of East Asia, Nationalism came to be understood in essentially anti-Japanese terms and this was especially true of Japan’s near neighbours in Northeast Asia. Post-war governments even based their claims to legitimacy on their successful resistance to Japanese aggression. Hence the situation (now that the main imperialist enemy was within) seemed to preclude the development of any sense of regionalism or even of any alliances that might include Japan as a member (Duffield 2001). In part, this explains the puzzling persistence of earlier patterns. There was no horizontal integration among US Asian allies. A sense of distrust for and securitising of Japan was not only a characteristic of the opposite communist camp; it was also a powerful sentiment in South Korea. Even though South Korea was on the same side as Japan in the US-led anti-communist camp, and both faced threats from China and North Korea, relations between Japan and South Korea remained negative or hostile (Cha 1999; 2000).

These historical legacies – a suspicion of Chinese suzerainty and securitisation of Japanese imperialism – impeded multilateralism and hindered the emergence of regional consciousness and collective identity. This lack of regional identity / society was worsened by the Cold War ideological division. Thus, until 1960s, Northeast Asia almost ceased to function as a regional international society and no multilateral mechanisms developed. While US lack of identification with its Asian allies (more than power asymmetry) may have been partly responsible, regional factors – such as
historically generated lack of regional collective identity (both by China and Japan) – played even more important part. But things did not remain this way for ever; some unmistakable changes have been occurring from the post-war division.

4.2.3 The Re-emergence of Northeast Asian Regional Society

After a protracted period of post-war rivalry and antagonism, Northeast Asia has gradually re-emerged as a regional international society. Relationship between China and Japan has improved much in this improving context. Two factors are particularly important: the Sino-US rapprochement (which partly broke Cold War logic) and Japan’s adoption of anti-militarist norms (which helped to reduce regional suspicion and high securitisation).

The Sino-American Rapprochement

The Sino-US rapprochement is an important factor in rebuilding Northeast Asian international society, in that it provided political conditions that allowed former enemies to have some contact with each other. It can even be argued that the Cold War ended rather earlier in East Asia than in Europe. Whereas, in Europe, the Cold War only ended in 1989, the watershed changes in East Asian politics occurred in the early and mid-1970s. The beginning of the Sino-Soviet conflict and the start of the new Sino-American relationship, ‘emptied Cold War logic of its previous meaning’ (Cumings 1998: 459). From an international society perspective, while the Sino-American rapprochement and Sino-Japanese normalisation in the 1970s were certainly developments of enormous political and strategic significance in themselves, they had even wider implications. Above all, they appeared to create the right conditions for the rebuilding Sino-Japanese relations and of a regional international society.

There were probably many divergent calculations behind the opening of diplomatic relations between the United States and China in 1971. Faced with a deteriorating relationship with Moscow, Beijing had good reason to seek better relations with the US, while Washington may have wished to take advantage of its improving relationship with Moscow to gain more leverage in its Asian policy. Yet, despite initial divergent motivations, the opening of diplomatic relations between the US and Communist China
was to transform their ‘deep enmity to not-so-tacit partnership’ (Dunbabin 1994: 108). This political change has profound implications throughout the region. It led Japan to normalise relations with China, though the Taiwan question became more complicated. It also fostered increasing regional economic interactions. Most important of all, it prepared the ground for dramatic internal changes within China itself and for the integration of China into international society.

Since the 1970s, China has turned away from its previous internal strife and external isolation. Gradually it has re-entered international society, taking the UN seat previously occupied by Taiwan in 1971. 1978 is now seen as the crucial turning point. The removal of the Cultural Revolution leadership allowed Deng Xiaoping to introduce reforms and to open China to the rest of the world. Meanwhile Japan not only normalised relations with China, but also extended its regional relations through economic means. Improved relations between Japan and China and/or relatively stable relations between the big three (the US, Japan and China) had important implications for Northeast Asian regional security. As the political environment began to change, powerful economic forces emerged pushing Northeast Asia towards closer integration.

Further changes came in the 1980s, both reflecting and causing economic growth. Notable developments included democratisation processes in Taiwan and South Korea. It appeared, therefore that several of the regional actors were moving towards more convergent values. Furthermore, growing interaction between them and their efforts to find common ground – particularly in the economic sphere – finally supplied some of the underlying conditions that would enable regionalism to emerge in East Asia and Asia-Pacific region once the Cold War proper came to an end.

**Japan’s Domestic Normative Developments**

Although less dramatic than the Sino-US rapprochement, domestic change in Japan – the adoption and developments of pacifist and anti-militarist norms – is another important factor in region-building in Northeast and/or East Asia. Berger (1993: 120) argues that since World War II Japanese society has developed a strong anti-militarist

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7 About Japan’s relations with Taiwan after the Sino-Japanese normalisation, see, Deans (2001).
norm, ultimately derived from the experience and collective memory of aggression and war in the 1930s and 40s and, even more, from subsequent total defeat, for ever associated with the horrors of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombs. Thus, Japan has learned an essential lesson from history, namely that ‘the military is a dangerous institution that must be constantly restrained and monitored lest it threaten Japan’s post-war democratic order and undermine the peace and prosperity that the nation has enjoyed since 1945.’

Although this social norm or culture of anti-militarism originally developed ‘under the aegis of a benevolent U.S. hegemon during the 1950s and 1960s’, over time it has become institutionalised in the Japanese political system (Berger 1993: 120). Despite some challenges from traditional nationalists in the early years of the Cold War, and again in the changing environment of the post-Cold War era, pacifist norms have endured and still constitute constraining forces on Japanese security thinking and hence continue to shape foreign policy. In the 1950s when the conservatives, particularly Prime Minister Kishi, held power, there were attempts to revise the Constitution in line with a gradual change in government policy. In other words, the Kishi government tried to ‘contest the pacifist social norms’ embodied in the Constitution – yet it failed (Katzenstein and Okawara 1993: 100, 102-103, 107-08). Thus, Maull argues that, like Germany, Japan is already in a prototype ‘civilian power’. By this he means: ‘a) the acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of international objectives; b) the concentration on non-military, primarily economic, means to secure national goals, with military power left as a residual instrument serving essentially to safeguard other means of international interaction; and c) a willingness to develop supranational structures to address critical issues of international management’ (Maull 1990/91: 92-93).

Indeed, in the post-Cold War era Japan faced new challenges and there have been considerable changes in Japan’s approach to international affairs. This trend has been accelerated by the war on terrorism after 9/11, which led some analysts to question whether Japan is becoming a ‘normal’ country (see, chapter 8). However, there is no doubt that Japan’s domestic development of anti-militarist norms played an important role in regional security practices. It was particularly important in the early years of post-war era, when Japan’s relations with its neighbours remained largely at the enemy
end. When explaining subject positions in terms of social structures, Wendt (1999: 260) defines ‘enemy’ as follows:

Enemies are constituted by representations of the Other as an actor who (1) does not recognize the right of the Self to exist as an autonomous being, and therefore (2) will not willingly limit its violence toward the Self.

In the eyes of its neighbours, Japan was the ‘enemy’ in a series of conflicts – including the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-5, the colonisation of Taiwan and Korea, the Russo-Japanese war and the Pacific War – and perpetrated violence against them on a massive scale. In the aftermath of the Pacific war, when memories of the war were still fresh, Japan’s relations with its neighbours were still largely at the enmity end of the spectrum. The level of regional securitisation was high and chiefly directed against Japan’s imperialism. In such circumstances, the highest priority for Japan’s security perception was not how to resist physical invasion from the Other. It was more important to strive to reduce the Other’s high securitisation against the Self, while at the same time maintaining domestic stability. In such circumstances, a balance-of-power approach became ‘officially taboo’ in post-war Japan – because ‘such an approach would imply that Japan’s involvement in power politics had gone beyond provision for its self-defense’ (Soeya 1998: 211).

Thus, in this inter-subjective process, the domestic development of anti-militarist norms, together with the US security engagement, played an important role in reducing the Other’s suspicion of Japan’s remilitarisation. The resulting reduced level of regional securitisation allowed Japan to re-engage with regional actors – largely through economic interactions – and gradually to become a major player in emerging regionalism in East Asia and Asia-Pacific.

Conclusion

After the collapse of old Chinese world order, the first attempt to rebuild international society in East Asia – one under the dominance of Japanese imperialism – failed badly. In the days of the Cold War, no further attempt at rebuilding was possible. Under the Cold War division, Northeast Asia was separated from Southeast Asia and almost ceased to function as an international society. The Northeast Asian RSC remained
deeply fragmented with high levels of mutual suspicion. It was also strongly penetrated by the two superpowers. Things only began to change when China and Japan normalised their relations in 1972, a development closely linked to the emerging Sino-US rapprochement. Other major changes have included the apparent consolidation of anti-militarist norms in Japan and huge domestic changes in China since the late 1970s. Together, these developments provided the essential background for the first signs of the re-emergence of a regional international society. We must now turn to developments in the post-Cold War era.
The present situation in Northeast Asia differs fundamentally from that found in the days of the Cold War. The full extent of the transformation is difficult to determine in that elements of continuity interweave with those of change. Both elements affect the nature of the evolution of regional international society and have interesting implications for the logic of securitisation / desecuritisation. It seems that the best way to approach these issues is through analysis of the impacts of the following factors: the ending of the Cold War; domestic changes in China; the region’s two flash points; and the growing regionalism and multilateralism in East Asia and Asia-Pacific.

5.1.1 The Ending of the Cold War

Initially, the end of the Cold War was marked by the abandonment of ideological and military confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union. But the effects on international society in Northeast Asia, particularly on the relationship between China and Japan, have been mixed. In several ways, the end of the Cold War brought the US into greater prominence and pre-eminence. Indeed, the collapse of the Soviet empire and then of the Soviet Union, effectively ended the bipolar system and provided the US with a much-improved strategic environment. This transformation of the global system both heightened American exceptionalism – the belief that American values and their associated rules have universal validity – and strengthened its tendency to unilateralism. Of course, the end of the Cold War meant more than the disappearance of the bipolar system. It appeared to signal the victory of the West and its values and the US is the prime supporter and promoter of those values. It followed that, once the ideological Cold War division had broken down, many hoped that international society could move from a pluralist to a solidarist basis – as revealed in the growing desire ‘to promote convergence towards certain core values, and a focus on the sovereignty of individuals rather than of states’ (Foot 2001: 30). In other words, the post-Cold War era might come to be characterised as an ‘era of accelerated globalisation’ (Rozman: 2004b: 226). Of course, this trend to globalisation or convergence raises questions as to how the US – now the lone superpower – defines international society or globalisation and what kind
of values, norms and rules does it promotes, and how? China and Japan, the two great powers in the region, certainly face dilemmas in this new security environment.

Dilemmas in Sino-Japanese Relations

Although the removal of ideological competition between the two superpowers meant that it would now be easier for China and Japan to cooperate, especially in the economic sphere, their relationship also became more complicated as new difficulties and dilemmas were thrown up. As a result of the fall of the Soviet Union and the reduced influence of Russia, China increased its power both relatively and absolutely, which allowed it to project its identity as a great power. It makes no secret of its desire to promote an essentially multipolar world order. Yet the fall of the Soviet Union also made the rise of China appear more threatening and hence complicates its relations with other powers, particularly with Japan (see, chapter 8).

Moreover, the demise of the Soviet Union and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe also produced a difficulty that was unique to China. In other words, although the end of the Cold War was welcome in the sense that it gave China greater opportunities to strive for a great power status, it was highly unwelcome in that it appeared to leave China ideologically isolated and even raised a question mark over the legitimacy of the Communist regime. The obvious question was whether Communist China could remain immune to the tide that was sweeping away most of the other Communists regimes in the world? The issue was brought into even sharper focus by what appeared to be the new direction of US foreign policy after the Cold War. As Rozman observes, from 1989 to 1995, the United States viewed globalisation largely through the lens of human rights and democracy. Though willing to accept economic integration as a necessary element of globalisation, China ‘refused to embrace the twist that Americans, triumphant in the Cold War and angered by Tiananmen, gave to it’ (Rozman 2004b: 226).

Ironically, without the common threat posed by the Soviet Union/Russia, Beijing’s bargaining power vis-à-vis the US became weaker and it had no option but to make concessions on issues such as NPT, trade and human rights (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 166). At the same time, in an improved strategic environment, the US is well placed to lead on many international issues. Above all, it can exert formidable pressure on other
countries to move more speedily towards an American vision of political and economic reform. Thus, in the new environment, China’s efforts to achieve integration into international society encountered serious difficulties. The Tiananmen incident epitomised this dilemma. The American reaction, including immediate imposition of sanctions on China, ‘demonstrated anew America’s power in the global system’ (Foot 1995b: 20).

The event created high tension between Beijing and Washington and complicated Japan’s position. Like Taiwan and South Korea, Japan had relatively few problems with the values and norms promoted by the US. The real problem for Japan is increased entrapment and abandonment dilemmas, which result from the difficulty of balancing between the US and China. According to Drifte (2000: 454, 455), during the Cold War period, Japan’s main fear was entrapment – as revealed in conflicts such as the Korean and Vietnam wars. But Japan must now face dangers, both from entrapment and from abandonment. Since the mid-1990s, Japan has deepened its alliance system with the US, including the revision of Guidelines and joining TMD development – essentially to reduce the risk of abandonment. Yet such steps create the danger of entrapment, since Beijing views them as directed against China. The strong American reactions both in the Tiananmen crackdown 1989 and Taiwan crisis 1995-96 made Japan realise the difficulty of managing relations both its main ally (the US) and its most important neighbour (China).

Yet Japan is also motivated by fears of abandonment. There were serious concerns about the implications of US-Japanese trade disputes in the late 1980s and early 1990s and of the 1996 Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute (see detailed account, Deans 2000), when the US showed some ambiguity over whether the Security Treaty covered the islands (Funabashi 1999: 401-07). Fears of abandonment were increased by the Clinton administration’s perceived over-emphasis on ‘the importance of China in relation to a number of countries but in particular to Japan’ (McDevitt 1998). However, the most serious challenge for Japan, particularly in times of crisis, is how to balance between the US pressure and China’s opposition to it and how to manage the consequent regional securitisation. Indeed, if war should break out, many Japanese leaders admit that their country would face a nightmare situation (interviews, April 2005). The most dangerous scenario would be a new crisis over Taiwan. If Japan failed to support the US, that
would endanger the US-Japan alliance, but if it gave total support to the US it would be sure to encounter the wrath of China. Japan’s new multilateral approach to security in the post-Cold War era is unlikely to solve this fundamental dilemma, but should certainly be seen as part of an attempt to reduce it.

**Greater Cooperation?**

At the same time, the US approach to security in Northeast / East Asia has undergone some changes. As Huxley (1998: 114-15) observes, Washington’s East Asia strategy no longer rests solely on calculations of relative power. While retaining a strong military presence, the US has simultaneously attempted to engage China and has supported regional confidence-building dialogues. To some extent, the new US posture has facilitated the extension of the scope of regional cooperation.

First, with the end of the Cold War and the diminishing importance of ideological factors, the US began to shift its exclusive ‘hub and spoke’ system and to view multilateral, or at any rate ‘minilateral’, security arrangements with more favour. After APEC, the US has supported the ARF, the most important multilateral security arrangement in the Asia-Pacific region. In Northeast Asia, the US initiated the creation of KEDO, involving cooperation between the US, Japan, and South Korea, in an attempt to deal with the North Korean nuclear issue. Although KEDO has been criticised for its lack of progress (Segal 1997: 245), it represented the first attempt in Northeast Asia to solve a specific and very difficult security issue through a multilateral agreement. More recently, the US has also committed itself to the Six-Party Talks. Adam Ereli, deputy State Department spokesman, insists that ‘we have a multilateral approach to dealing with North Korea’, that is, the Six-Party Talks (*Xinhua* 21 June 2006). Of course this does not mean that the US has abandoned bilateralism. In fact, the ties between the US and its East Asian allies have been strengthened, particularly with Japan (see, chapters 7, 8).

Secondly, the nature of Sino-American relations and their competition in the post-Cold War era also deserves more careful examination. Of course, as sole superpower, the US makes it clear that it will not allow a peer competitor to arise and challenge its own position – and China is no exception. However, contemporary Sino-US relations should
not be seen as displaying essentially the characteristic features of the Cold War rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union. During the Cold War era, the US succeeded in securitising the Soviet threat on the global scale, in Buzan’s words a successful ‘macro securitisation’ (2006). For more than forty years, the Soviet threat was the over-riding priority of American policy – sometimes to the apparent exclusion of everything else. Although Beijing clearly fears that the US will take the same line with China, US attempts to contain China look decidedly half-hearted in comparison with the resolute determination so long displayed towards the Soviet Union. We must ask why.

Of course, the power gap between the US and China is still very wide; there is nothing like the near equality of power that once existed between the US and the Soviet Union. Although Chinese power has risen, American power has not waned. It may be that American superiority is so great that Washington sees little need to subject China to the kind of pressures it once used against the Soviet Union. Yet, given its track record with the Soviet Union, the American stance towards the rise of China – in some ways encouraging its development and certainly more engaging than containing – seems hard to explain. As Christenson argues, since late 1978 – when the US normalised relations with the PRC and Deng Xiaoping launched his historic reform program – ‘no foreign country has done more to make China stronger economically and diplomatically than the United States’ (Christenson: 2006: 108). Robert Zoellick, then Deputy Secretary of State, even stated publicly that the US engagement strategy has worked well: ‘the dragon emerged and joined the world’. He has insisted that it is very much in the interests of the US to persuade China to become a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in the international system (Zoellick 2005). These developments suggest that, while changes in the balance of power is important when state determining its securitisation practices, it may be more important how actors identify each other – in the last resort should they be regarded as enemies or friends? From Zoellick’s perspective, it would appear that, if China is not yet regarded as a friend, it is certainly no longer perceived as an enemy in the Cold War sense.

There have been corresponding developments on the Chinese side. One of China’s most influential scholars in American studies, Wang Jisi (2001; 2005d), is convinced that there is room for accommodation between China and the US. He thinks that, despite the rise of China, the two countries can ‘avoid’ (bimian) a new Cold War; and other
Chinese scholars agree (Zheng Bijian 2005; and interviews, June 2005). Their optimism is derived from the belief that there are fundamental differences between recent Chinese foreign policy and the objectives pursued by Soviet Union in the Cold War period. The Soviet Union’s ultimate goal was the end of capitalism throughout the world. Even when it made agreements with the West, the Soviet Union regarded them as no more than temporary expedients; they did not mean that it had abandoned its mission to secure the eventual overthrow of the Western world order.

But the recent position of China is very different. Rather than wishing to destroy the Western world order, since the late 1970s China has become increasingly appreciative of the benefits that this order may produce for itself and is hence correspondingly eager to be integrated (rongru) into it (Wang Yizhou 2003). It follows that Chinese policy is driven more by pragmatism rather than by rigid ideology, and accommodation with international society is a vital strand in China’s ‘peaceful rise’ strategy (see below China’s domestic changes). Thus, relations between China and the US are no longer seen in terms of a strictly zero-sum game. Since the September 11, the scope of their cooperation and the elements of strategic partnership have expanded further. It remains true that China and the US are not firm friends, but their relationship is someway removed from the ‘enemy’ end of the spectrum. There are still many contentious issues that divide them – notably the Taiwan question – which could easily draw them into heightened competition, serious conflicts and even war. That is why the US simultaneously enhances its bilateral alliance system while engages in multilateral approaches. Nevertheless, as Christenson (2006: 110) argues, the broader US strategy towards China is now ‘not one of Cold War–style containment’ and their present relations reveal more positive sum elements than seemed possible in the early 1990s. These changes have enormous implications – mostly welcome – for the other regional actors, since virtually none want to have to choose between the US and China (Huxley 1998; Shambaugh 2004/05).

8 An excellent account on US security strategy in East Asia both from zero-sum and positive-sum approaches, see Christenson 2006.
5.1.2 China’s Domestic Changes

In the post-Cold War era, the rise of China received much attention both regionally and internationally, and, particularly in the early and mid 1990s, it became fashionable to talk about the ‘China threat’ (for details see Roy 1996). Yet we cannot ignore China’s domestic change and the changing nature of its relations with regional and international society, which may have even greater significance for regional security and stability. As argued earlier, in the early years of the regime, Communist China adopted a strong revolutionary and anti-imperialist rhetoric. However, more recently China has shown a different face to the world – not only in terms of the way it projects its material power but also in terms of its presentation of its own images and its relations with regional and global societies. Many see developments over the last half-century – that is from China’s internally costly and externally dangerous isolation to more recent moves to ‘rejoin the world’ – as making a remarkably positive contribution to regional and international peace (Oksenberg and Economy 1999). Here it is important to examine how China ‘rejoined the world’ and to what extent its identity and interests changed in the processes.

China ‘Rejoined the World’

Of course, the true extent and significance of China’s integration into the global community and the adoption of cooperative behaviour within it remains controversial and difficult to assess. In terms of quantity, the number of China’s membership and participation in regional and international institutions and organisations has increased dramatically. In terms of quality and commitment, however, the position is less clear. In particular, it is hard to judge how much this kind of participation has changed China’s identity and interests, and hence changed its foreign policy orientation. China’s record in various international and regional institutions provides evidence that can be used to support a range of different conclusions.

In quantitative terms, a brief explanation will illustrate how China’s participation in international organisations increased so impressively in the 1980s and 1990s. As Samuel Kim (2004b: 42) concludes, China’s membership of international governmental organisations increased ‘from only two in the 1960s to 52 in the 1990s, about 83 per
cent of the average of major Western democracies and about 160 per cent of the world average’. It is often said that China has a better record in the economic sphere, yet according to Swaine and Johnston (1999: 100-101, 107) and Johnston (2003:12), China’s perspective has changed dramatically even in the area of arms control and non-proliferation. In the past, it saw arms control agreements as largely irrelevant to its own concerns but now recognises their benefits. Thus, while in 1970 China had signed up to only 10-20 percent of the arms control arrangements for which it was eligible, the proportion had reached 85-90 percent by 1996.

Of course, China did not move in this direction without hesitation; in particular it had serious reservations about signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) or committing itself to any other regime that might restrict its nuclear programs. This attitude arose from fears that the viability of China’s nuclear deterrent might be undermined by the deployment of ballistic missile defence systems in the US or Russia. However, after intense negotiations, primarily with the US, a compromise was reached on the intrusiveness of the CTBT verification regime. China eventually signed the CTBT treaty in 1996 even though this represented a considerable sacrifice and a constraint on its power. Hence, Swaine and Johnston (1999: 100-101) argue that China has shown considerable flexibility when participating in international institutions, and has made significant efforts to be seen as a responsible power. Similarly, many positive effects followed from China’s participation in regional security institutions. (I will look at these aspects in more detail in chapter 7). These changes have had profound impact on the emerging international society in Northeast / East Asia, as well as on the regional securitisation practices.

The Implications for China’s Identity and for Regional Society

Contrary to the position taken by neorealists, constructivists tend to emphasise the possibility of change in state identity and interests. China’s participation in the ARF provides a good case to examine how much state identity and interests can be changed. As Foot (1998) observes, less than five years after the first ARF meeting, China had abandoned its initial scepticism and had become an active, even enthusiastic participant. During the Asian financial crisis, China made further efforts to change its image to that of a benign power, and was eager to increase its influence in East Asia. Now under its
‘peaceful rise’ strategy, China wishes to be seen as a constructive economic player in
the region and to gain more trust from ASEAN countries and from the world. At the
2004 National People’s Congress, Premier Wen Jiabao went so far as to describe China
as ‘a friendly elephant’ that posed no threat to others (Cheow 2004).

Thus, if has not yet changed its identity, at least China has become both more flexible
and skilful in its handling of issues, including sensitise ones. For instance, at the time
when China was considering membership of various institutions the case of Taiwan’s
membership appeared a major stumbling block, because the China/Taiwan question had
been central to China’s extreme sensitivity over matters of sovereignty. Under the
principle of one-China policy, the exclusion of Taiwan appeared a precondition for
China’s membership. Indeed, China often insisted that this was non-negotiable. But as
time passed, China became less inflexible. By 1986, both P. R. China and Taiwan were
full members of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) – made possible by the simple
expedient of referring to Taiwan as ‘Taipei China’. The implicit compromise provided
the crucial precedent for dual membership of other international institutions, and made
subsequent agreements easier (Deng 1997: 59). Taiwan joined PECC in 1986 and Hong
Kong in 1990; in 1991 China, Taiwan and Hong Kong all joined APEC. In terms of
military transparency, too, China has made gradual improvement, as demonstrated by
its recent publication of several defense white papers (Shambaugh 2004/05: 88)

Over democracy and human rights, Beijing has also shown some modest flexibility.
Early in April 2004, it rejected a demand that, in 2007 there should be direct elections to
choose the chief executive in Hong Kong. Of course this encountered strong protests
from Hong Kong, UK, US and others. Yet, on the eve of his European tour (28 April
2004), Chinese Premier Wan Jiabao, signalled a softer approach. He said ‘The objective
stipulated in the Basic Law has not changed’, and direct elections of the chief executive
and entire legislature were still the ultimate aim (Financial Times 29 April 2004). In
March 2004 the National People’s Congress amended the constitution to include formal
guarantees of human rights and private property (FEER 25 March 2004). These changes
may be only minor or symbolic, yet they still reflect a change in direction and in degree.
We may not be seeing dramatic changes – as when norms and institutions wither,
emerge or collapse – but more subtle changes in understandings and interpretations of
existing norms must also be counted as changes.

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5.1.3 The Two Flashpoints in Northeast Asia

The very existence and certainly the development of the Northeast Asian RSC is challenged most seriously by two related questions; both involve divided countries – between China and Taiwan, and between two Koreas. Both problems have deep historical roots and have been much affected by the divisions of the Cold War. In the post-Cold War era, they raise serious new challenges, yet also provide opportunities for the regional actors. I will examine these issues in detail in chapter 8, but here I will discuss them with particular reference to ideational factors.

The Taiwan Question

In the post-Cold War era, tensions over Taiwan have become more acute – that ‘relations between China and Taiwan suffered their worst crisis for 40 years in 1995-96’ (Lee 1999: 9). What are the main causes of such crisis? The Taiwan question began in 1949, when the Chinese Nationalist Party or Kuomintang (KMT) lost the civil war with the Chinese Communist party (CCP). The KMT fled to the island of Taiwan and continued its struggle with the CCP throughout the Cold War. Both the KMT and the CCP insisted that there was only one China and each claimed to be the legitimate government of the whole of the country. Thus, the referent object of security for both was the nation state – China as a whole. In this zero-sum game, the central question was who was the legitimate government of China. Tension was high in the 1950s, yet Beijing’s attempts to regain Taiwan were deterred by ‘an explicit US military protection of Taiwan backed with veiled threats of nuclear weapons’ (Kang 2003: 362). The Taiwan problem has had major implications on the triangular relationship between China, America and Japan, perhaps even more so on direct Sino-American relations. Initially, both Washington and Tokyo recognised the Taipei government, headed by Chiang Kai-shek, as the legitimate government of China and signed peace treaties with the ROC. The newly established Beijing government allied with the Soviet Union and identified itself with the communist bloc.

Changes in the Referent Object of Security

In the course of the 1990s, the security issue, the referent object (that is what is to be secured) shifted from the legitimacy of the government of the whole China to focus on
the status of Taiwan. The change may be traced back to 1970s, when the international community, particularly the US and Japan, transferred their recognition from the ROC to the PRC. The new situation, especially American de-recognition, was a major blow to Taiwan’s global and geopolitical status, completely destroying its claim to represent China as a whole. In other words, Taiwan, could no longer compete with the PRC because the international community had rejected its claim to represent the whole of China. Indeed, in 1991, it officially abandoned the idea of retaking the mainland. This shift has been accelerated by democratisation in Taiwan. The process began in the 1980s and increasingly brought the idea of a distinct Taiwanese identity to forefront of domestic political debate. Since then the political space has widened dramatically. Taiwan has moved from an authoritarian regime to one based on elections, a transformation culminating in a free presidential election in 1996. Further major steps towards democracy followed. In 2000, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), formerly in opposition, became the ruling party, and the Referendum Law was passed in November 2003 (Kang 2003: 364; Wu 2004).

Paradoxically, however, as Buzan and Wæver (2003: 149-52) suggest, the ROC’s abandonment of its claim to represent the whole of China has not reduced tension with the PRC – because it actually challenges the PRC’s own ‘one China’ dogma. From Beijing’s point of view, this is totally unacceptable. While Taipei may have abandoned the one China dogma, the PRC has not and views it as a cornerstone of China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, upon which no compromise is possible. Thus, Chinese leaders have repeatedly threatened to use force to prevent Taiwanese independence. It was within this context that two crises occurred in 1990s.

At the turn of the millennium the problem of Taiwan’s status and tension across the Strait remained acute. In 2000, when Chen Shui-bian was elected president, the DPP replaced the long dominant KMT as the ruling party. The DPP not only campaigned for greater democracy but was also more strongly committed to independence than its rival. The two causes were seen as inextricably linked. A growing sense of ethnic identity has been the driving force in the rise of the DPP, which enjoys substantial support among the bensheng-ren (Taiwanese natives). DPP policy has moved beyond the claim to unconditional sovereignty for an independent Taiwanese state; it now pursues a ‘one China, one Taiwan’ agenda.
Challenges and Limitations of the Taiwan Issue

The Taiwan question poses particular difficulties for Sino-Japanese relations. For China, the possibility of Taiwan’s independence is clearly a highly sensitive and perplexing issue, or, in Mahbubani’s (2005) words, one of its most ‘tender spots’. This is not surprising, because ‘the issue ultimately impacts on the legitimacy of the communist regime’ (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 151). It is also the last remaining symbol of a century of Chinese humiliation, much of it at the hands of Japan. Japan defeated China in the war of 1894-5 and ruled Taiwan for fifty years until its defeat in the Pacific War (see chapter 3). Thus, the Taiwan issue became sensitive to both sides, and their already difficult relationship became increasingly complicated in the post-Cold War era.

After the switch of diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC in 1972, Japan officially supported the ‘one China’ policy and hence confined relations with Taiwan to the unofficial level (for a detailed account, see Deans 2001). Until the early 1990s, however, the problem did not appear insuperable. Although Japan could no longer recognise the ROC or maintain formal diplomatic relations with it, Tokyo adopted the principle of seikei bunri – the separation of politics and economics – thus allowing it to maintain informal contact with Taipei. Deans describes Japan’s practice as one of ‘informal politics and virtual diplomacy’ (Deans 2001: 152) in which Japan enjoyed reasonably harmonious relations with both China and Taiwan. Thus, while official policy was to support ‘one China’, in practice, Japan operated something close to a ‘two Chinas’ policy.

Recently, however, the Japanese position has become more complex. Many Japanese, especially the younger generation of politicians, admire the successful democratisation of Taiwan and a perceived convergence of values has been seen as the basis for closer bilateral ties between Japan and Taiwan (Q. K. Wang 2000: 360). There is thus an inclination in some quarters to ‘tilt’ towards Taiwan – and by implication away from the still far from democratic PRC. This tendency has been reinforced by the so-called Lee Teng-hui factor. The former President of Taiwan (KMT) was educated in Japan, speaks fluent Japanese and has strong personal ties with many Japanese politicians. In the 1990s tensions occurred between China and Japan over the issue of invitation of Taiwanese politicians, including Lee Teng-hui, as Beijing viewed those invitations as
serious challenge to the ‘one China’ principle. Beijing’s concerns were heightened by the development of closer ties between the US and Japan, because it particularly worries their implication for Taiwan (see chapter 8).

Yet the future may not be so bleak. Recent developments in China, Japan, and in Taiwan itself also point to the emergence of constraining forces that could reduce the threat of war over Taiwan. Most importantly, China faces an acute dilemma over the Taiwan question. In particular, its desire to uphold its political principles and maintain its legitimacy is to some extent offset by an understandable reluctance to engage in all out war. Indeed, in 2002, the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party adopted avoidance of conflict with the US over Taiwan as an official objective of Chinese policy. Thus, while Beijing continues to improve its military capabilities for a possible conflict in the Taiwan Strait, it clearly hopes that it will not have used them. Significantly Beijing sees the US as the key to the solution of the Taiwan problem and looks to Washington to provide the necessary ‘heavy lifting’ to restrain Taipei’s pro-independence moves (Glaser 2004). But China is also interested in direct contacts with Taiwan, strikingly demonstrated in the historic meeting between leaders of the CCP and KMT in Beijing in April 2005. Thus, there are signs that, over the years, Beijing’s position has moved from a belligerent emphasis on its readiness to use force towards a tacit readiness to settle for the status quo.

Similarly, the pressures pushing Japan closer to Taiwan are balanced by other calculations pointing in the opposite direction. As I argued earlier, in essence, the dilemma facing Japan is whether to seek to preserve its alliance with the US at all costs or to give priority to maintaining stable relations with China. The dilemma is particularly acute because, under the revised US-Japan security guidelines, Japan is committed to providing logistical support for US military interventions in ‘areas surrounding Japan’. As a Japanese official admitted, if the cross-strait conflict intensified to a point where it prompted US intervention, Japan would face a ‘nightmare in which it has to choose’ between the US and China (Japan Times 19 March 2000; interviews, April 2005). Thus, Tokyo desires a peaceful settlement of the cross-strait conflict to avoid direct military confrontation with China. In other words, with increased tension cross the Strait, Japan’s first concern was to avoid entanglement in a crisis in which it has no desire to be involved.
Moreover, developments within Taiwan in the 1990s and in the new century suggest that there is appreciation of the risks of a formal declaration of independence and an underlying preference for a continuation of the status quo. Of course, the ‘Taiwan identity’ movement has become a major force in Taiwanese politics since the mid-1990s. Chen was elected in the 2000 and 2004 elections, largely due to the support of those who emphasised Taiwanese identity (Schubert 2004). However, when Chen went so far as to provoke Beijing and to risk war, the Taiwanese electorate was notably less enthusiastic. In the run-up to the December 2004 legislative elections, Chen and his supporters repeatedly indicated that they might seek to adopt a new constitution. Beijing responded by escalating its threats to use force and even President George W. Bush publicly criticised Chen. Significantly the DPP lost ground in the legislative elections of December 2004.

Other developments in Taiwan also suggest a more conciliatory mood. Subsequent developments cross the Strait suggest a further conciliatory trend rather than toward actual war. Opposition parties, such as the KMT and the People First Party (PFP), took heart from the DPP’s setback in the December 2004 legislative elections. Thus, despite the fact the China passed the Anti-Secession Law in March 2005 – which inflamed public opinion in Taiwan against the mainland – the KMT Chairman Lien Chan visited the mainland in April 2005 and the PFP Chairman James Soong followed in May. Both confirmed their support for the ‘1992 consensus’ and their opposition to Taiwan’s independence (IHT 29 April 2005; People’s Daily 10 May 2005). Polls taken shortly after Lien’s trip showed that 56 percent of Taiwan’s electorate supported his visit and that 46 percent identified the KMT as the party most capable of handling cross-strait relations, whereas only 9.4 percent believed that the DPP was most capable (Ross 2006).

These developments suggest that while many of its inhabitants now think that Taiwan has an identity separate from China’s and hence merits a degree of international recognition, this does not mean that they favour a formal declaration of independence to risk of war (Ross 2006). In short, the Taiwanese are concerned about any developments that would change their day-to-day lives. That is, while conscious of their separate identity, Taiwanese voters seem to prefer the status quo in cross-strait relations. Thus,
although Taiwanese identity or formal independence has become a referent object of security, it is somehow muted by the risk of day-to-day stable life.

**The Korean Question: From Victory to Regime Survival**

Of all the problems facing the Northeast Asian RSC, Korea has proved the most difficult and intractable. Despite the end of the Cold War, the Korean peninsula still remains a serious source of mistrust and conflict; the problem has become even more acute because of decisive changes in power balance (see chapter 8). These have been caused not only by the relative decline in North Korea’s capability against the South, but also by changes in great power support behind the two states. An asymmetry appeared in which the South was recognised by China and Russia, but the North was not recognised by either the United States or Japan. Thus, these developments ‘not only undermined the credibility of the commitment of the North’s great power backers, but they also eroded the credibility of the North’s case against the South’ (Yahuda 1996: 265). According to Kang (2003a: 356) these highly negative developments forced North Korea to change its strategy. The North could no longer win a power game against the South. Its over-riding objective moved from *victory* over the South towards an increasing preoccupation with the *survival* of the regime itself. This change provides the essential context for an understanding of the many crises that have occurred in Korea since the mid 1990s.

**Threats, Dilemmas, and Opportunities**

North Korea has demonstrated that it can complicate Sino-Japanese relations and seriously undermine regional and international security; it even has the capacity to cause major destruction. Yet, while the problems of Korea have presented the states of Northeast Asia with a series of threats and dilemmas, they have also provided them with opportunities.

Certainly Japan experiences the same twin dilemma in relation to the Korean issue, although in the case, it is arguable that historical factors are even more important. Japanese leaders acknowledge that it is difficult to take any clear stance on the Korean reunification. If Japan supports reunification, it may be accused to seeking to weaken
the Korean economy. Yet if it shows no enthusiasm for reunification, it could face the allegation that it wishes to prevent Korea from achieving political and military strength. Thus, Armacost and Pyle (2001: 131, 132) see Japan’s low profile in inter-Korean affairs as the result of the long and troubled history of Japanese-Korean relations. They argue that despite new conditions, the burden of the past will continue to weigh heavily on the course of Japan’s present and future relationship with Korea. In a same vein, Samuel Kim (2002: 28) identifies Japan’s colonial past as the ultimate reason why it has made less progress than the other members of the ‘Big Four’ in normalising its relations with North Korea.

Developments in Korea also present China with a dilemma. The peninsula has a tremendous significance for Chinese security, ‘a source of threat’ unless it is ‘controlled or neutralised’. Above all, Korea is ‘a potential entry point for rival powers’ (Scalapino 2001: 107). Thus, after the partition of Korea, China pursued a policy of assisting the survival of the North Korean regime, both for ideological considerations and for reasons of its own national security interests. Although, following the example of Russia, Beijing normalised relations with Seoul in 1992, China certainly fears any sudden collapse of the North Korean regime. Ideologically, North Korea is one of the few surviving fellow communist regimes and hence the Chinese are more committed to its survival than they were to that of other Communist states, such as Russia. Chinese national interests may be even more important. Yet North Korea’s nuclearisation increasingly complicates China’s relations with other states particularly with Japan (see, chapter 8).

Yet the Korean problem has also given China and Japan and regional actors opportunity to improve their relations with each other. First, Japan’s relations with South Korea improved considerably over the years, though with some fluctuations. As Cha (1999; 2000) observes, relations between Japan and South Korea have been marred by intense antagonisms rooted in feelings of historical injustice. However, in the post Cold War era, policy co-ordination between Japan and ROK has developed to quite a high level, including joint management of KEDO following the Agreed Framework (despite many problems in its implementation). Japan and South Korea joined the US in creating the Trilateral Cooperation and Oversight Group (TCOG) in the wake of the Taepodong-1 incident. Auslin (2005:467) argues that the crises over North Korea were mainly
responsible for this cooperation. The rapprochement between Japan and South Korea has been extended to address history. As Berger (2004: 152) notes, despite numerous setbacks, the two sides have tried hard to overcome historically generated feelings of antagonism. At the 1998 summit, the Japanese Prime Minister, Obuchi Keizo, made a formal apology for Japanese misdeeds during the colonial period, while the Korean President Kim Dae Jung also sought to move beyond the acrimony of the past. His government eased bans imposed a half century earlier on Japanese investment and on the importation of Japanese movies, music, magazines and other forms of popular culture (Armacost and Pyle 2001: 143).

The Six-Party Talks: a Positive Move?

The effort to end North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs brought six nations – the two Koreas, Japan, China, Russia, and the United States – together in Beijing in August 2003. By November 2005, five rounds had been held. There have been many complaints of lack of progress and the six parties themselves often assembled in Beijing ‘with very low expectations’ (BBC 28 February 2004). Yet, despite the low expectations and criticisms, at least the Talks continue to provide a framework for addressing the North Korean problem. The continuation of the Talks suggests a tacit recognition by all the parties that there is no alternative to negotiation, although none have much room for manoeuvre. This ‘stalemate’ has important implications for regional security.

Some of the complaints made about the talks may be unfounded. While no breakthrough has been achieved and some of the obstacles appear almost insurmountable, analysis of the successive rounds does suggest some modest progress. In the first two rounds, there was no agreement at all – except to meet again. North Korea would not go any further than its offer ‘to freeze but not scrap its nuclear facilities in return for energy aid and security assurances’, while the US appeared equally intransigent, demanding that North Korea agree to the ‘complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of all its nuclear capabilities (BBC 28 Feb 2004).

Yet, in the third round (June 2004), the parties were more flexible and reached some tentative agreement. As Cossa (2004) noted, the US stopped taking about CVID, recognising that the term carried too much political baggage – even though it continued
to regard this as the only acceptable long-term outcome. On the other side, under strong pressure from the US, Pyongyang accepted that the proposed ‘freeze for rewards’ would be a first step towards dismantlement of all its nuclear weapons programs. For its part, the US agreed that the ‘rewards’ could come early in the process. Other countries seemed amenable to ‘front-loading’ energy and economic assistance if a verifiable freeze progress could be initiated. On 19 September 2005 during the fourth round, for the first time, the six parties agreed a joint statement of principles. This created a real momentum after two years of meetings and Japan’s Foreign Minister paid tribute to the efforts of all the countries involved, particularly China (MOFA, Foreign Minister Machimura’s statement 20 Sep 2005).

Of course, these achievements are relatively modest and the denuclearisation of Korea remains a long way off as evident of recurring crises. Nevertheless, as Adam Ereli, deputy State Department spokesman, points out, the Six-Party Talks still provides ‘a framework for achieving jointly held goals, jointly held objectives’, and can be regarded as ‘an effective one’ (Xinhua 21 June 2006). More importantly, the talks could have positive long-term effects on Northeast Asian regional security. Some scholars believe that if the Talks become systematic and regular, they can develop into a general system to ensure security in Northeast Asia (Shen Dingli, interview in June 2005). Pang (2004) argues that the Six Party Talks have ‘kindled of gleam of hope for the establishment of a multilateral security system in the region’. As a Chinese scholar at the University of Nankai, he even sees the possibility that the process could culminate in China bringing the Taiwan issue to a multilateral table – unthinkable previously.

5.1.4 Growing Regionalism and Multilateralism

The emergence of regionalism and multilateralism in East Asia and in the Asia-Pacific region, suggesting a trend to a new pattern of relationships, has attracted growing attention since the end of the Cold War. The increasing sense of regionalism is an important and positive development, especially when compared to the situation of Cold War fragmentation. Particularly it is significant as historically East Asians have not experienced multilateralism. The main question here is to what extent these processes facilitated the emergence of regional identity / society (for other aspects of regionalism and multilateralism will be examined in subsequent economic and military-political
sectors). To answer this question, while examine the Sino-Japanese factors and the role of ASEAN, I look at more closely the role of the US.

**The Sino-Japanese Factor and ASEAN Experiments**

The leadership issue has always been at the centre of Sino-Japanese relations in the context of regionalism and multilateralism in Asia. So far, neither of the two great powers has taken a full leadership role. Rather, they have been willing to see ASEAN take on a role of collective leadership. Identity factors and their respective positions in regional and global international society help to explain these somewhat surprising attitudes. As I discussed in the previous chapter, both China and Japan have problems in their regional identity and neither finds it easy to accept the other as a leader.

China, historically an Empire itself, found it difficult to see itself as ‘part of Asia’; rather Asia was once merely ‘China’s periphery’ (Bessho 1999: 31). Thus, while regional actors may fear a revival of China’s old claims to suzerainty, China also has difficulty in accommodating itself into multilateral arrangements. This was particularly true in the early 1990s – the initial period of emerging regionalism and multilateralism in East Asia and Asia Pacific – when a desire to socialise China to make it a more responsible power was clearly a driving force (Foot 1998). For different reasons, Japan also finds it hard to identify itself solely with Asia. Since the Meiji period Japan never fully resolved its dilemma between the West and Asia. Even today it is often said that Japan is *in* Asia but not *of* Asia (Bessho 1999). This ambivalence hindered Japan’s leadership role, which was not helped by regional distrust and Japan’s own doubts about its own imperial past.

Thus, historically constructed identity factors worked negatively for both China and Japan and hampered any aspiration to claim legitimate leadership of the emerging regionalism. Since neither China nor Japan could take a role of legitimate leadership in a regional grouping, an alternative approach was necessary. There was probably a desire to ‘socialise’ China and this objective seemed more likely to be achieved in a larger rather than a smaller grouping. In other words it made better sense to include Southeast Asia in a multilateral approach rather than to attempt an exclusively Northeast Asian grouping – in which Sino-Japanese rivalry was likely to be the dominant feature.
Fortunately, a model was already available in the shape of the long-established ASEAN, which already had considerable achievements to its credit\(^9\).

ASEAN was formed in 1967 and, as Acharya (1998: 204) argues, was certainly inspired by the progress of the European Community, although its members were ‘not interested in emulating the EC model’. Unlike the European model – which aspires to a high level of regional integration requiring at least partial surrender of member states’ sovereignties – ‘ASEAN was conceived as a framework which will allow its members to preserve their independence and advance their national interests, rather than promote supranationalism’. In the processes, something now known as the ‘ASEAN Way’ has developed. Acharya (2003b: 253) explains:

> The “ASEAN Way” consists of a code of conduct for inter-state behaviour as well as a decision-making process based on consultations and consensus. The code of conduct incorporates a set of well-known principles, e.g. non-interference in the domestic affairs of each other, non-use of force, pacific settlement of disputes, respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states.…

ASEAN’s experiences and its approaches provided a model for post-Cold War security multilateralism in Asia. The ARF was founded upon the norms of ASEAN, including non-interference in the internal affairs of states, non-use of force, pacific settlement of disputes – in short upon the ‘ASEAN Way’. In the processes of regionalism and multilateralism, ASEAN countries, particularly Malaysia and Singapore, endorsed ideas such as ‘Asian values’ and ‘East Asian community’ as important symbols. However both in economic and security realms, regionalism and multilateralism did not result in an immediate and exclusively East Asia identity / society. Rather in the processes, the so-called ‘super-regional projects’ (Buzan 2004b: 103-6), such as APEC and ARF, have been institutionalised; and ideas such as ‘Asia-Pacific’ or ‘Pacific-Rim’ now became widely accepted that some even refers to as ‘rimspeak’ (Cumings 1993: 29-47). To find the main reasons, one has to turn to the role of the US.

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\(^9\) About the role of ASEAN in the Emerging East Asian Security Architecture, see Huxley 1996a.
The US Role

In large measure, the reason why regionalism and multilateralism has not developed on an exclusively Northeast or East Asian basis, but rather on a wider Asia-Pacific one, is that this accords with the preferences of the United States. From identity considerations, Katzenstein stresses lack of any meaningful Asian-American identity on the US side. In the 1990s, the US was becoming part of an emerging Asia-Pacific region in the 1990s, yet it still perceived itself as more closely linked with ‘Eurocentric Anglo-American culture’ than with any ‘Asian-American identity’. Thus, the US eschewed ‘references to Asian values and an East Asian community’ (Katzenstein 2000: 358, 359). This means that the US identification towards East Asia has remained the same as in the 1940s and 50s, when it preferred a system of bilateral alliances to a multilateral one. Now for the same reason the US still cannot subscribe to the idea of an East Asian community.

Yet the question remains as to why the US supports a specifically Asia-Pacific grouping and identity? Here Buzan’s (2004b) arguments on the US ‘swing power’ strategy are relevant. According to Buzan, American preference of Asia-Pacific or Pacific-rim is more than instinctive; it is a conscious choice, closely linked with the way it manages its superpower position throughout the world:

The US has adopted a *swing-power* strategy in which it positions itself as a member of three macro-regions (Asian-Pacific, North Atlantic, Western hemisphere) as a way of legitimizing its actual presence as an outside power in Europe, East Asia and Latin America (Buzan 2004b: 7).

It suited American interests to construct Asia-Pacific as a ‘super-regional’ project, because this would permit the US to institutionalise its position inside this ‘super-region’ – precisely as it had done in other ‘super-regions’ such as in Europe and Latin America. The ‘Asia-Pacific’ strategy had the advantage of effectively preventing the possibility of any consolidation of East Asia that ‘might either shut the US out’ or, ‘even develop as global power rivals to it’ (Buzan 2004b: 104). Moreover, by constructing such super-regional projects, the US did not lock itself completely into them and hence retained its ability to act as a ‘swing power’. In other words, while engaging in several regions, it was not permanently wedded to any. In principle, it could
‘vary the degree and character of its engagement according to its own choice’ – that is the way how it manages its ‘superpowerdom’ (Buzan 2004b: 105).

Thus, if lack of ‘Asian-American identity’ led the US to eschew specific East Asian regionalism, its interests as the sole superpower actively drew it to Asia-Pacific regionalism. Of course, the US could be a legitimate member of an ‘Asian-Pacific’ grouping whereas it could never be a member of an exclusively East Asian one. At the same time, involvement in ‘Asia-Pacific’ did not threaten to ‘pull’ the US from legitimate membership of other regional groupings and placed some limits on its commitments to this – or indeed to any other – region. In this way, the US has institutionalised the idea of Asia-Pacific and its ‘swing-power strategy’. Moreover, the US has the ability to construct its ‘swing’ identity and enforce its strategy. In East Asian case, the regional dependency on the US further increased America’s power of leverage, and enhanced the prospects of the ‘Asia-Pacific’ way it preferred.

Thus, a mixture of material and ideational factors affected the development of regionalism in Asia and the Pacific. Whatever may have happened elsewhere, particularly in Western Europe, regionalism in Asia did not lead to the formation of a strong collective identity. Yet this may change; the Asian financial crisis (1997-98) triggered renewed interest in something more exclusive, the so-called new East Asian regionalism. The creation of ASEAN Plus Three represents a major development in the relationship between ASEAN and Northeast Asian powers. APT, which brings together the ten member states of ASEAN with China, Korea and Japan, had its first meeting in 1997 to discuss a regional response to the financial crisis. The APT summit meeting in 1999 produced a Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation. This was followed by other developments aimed at greater regional collaboration in East Asia, and included the ‘Chiang Mai Initiative’ of May 2000, the ASEAN-China Free Trade agreement of 2001, and the first East Asian Summit of December 2005. The processes have been moving further towards an East Asian community building.
Conclusion to Part I

Part I of this thesis has sketched a brief history of the evolution of international society of Northeast and East Asia from the Chinese world order, through its collapse and integration into the global international society and then the brief experience of Japanese imperial order, on to the intense military and ideological competition of the Cold War, and finally arriving at the post-Cold War period. Of course my main purpose is to examine Sino-Japanese relations and the Northeast Asian security order in the post-Cold War era. I believe, however, that current events and trends cannot be properly understood unless they are viewed in the light of history. If approached with no historical context, many contemporary phenomena appear anomalous and puzzling. In other words, the historical experience of East Asia, going back for millennia, has important implications both for IR theories and for empirical interpretations.

The mainstream IR thinking assumes that the model established in seventeenth century Europe is universal and hence describes the international system at all times and in all places. However, the story of Northeast Asia and East Asia exhibits a very different reality, one in which the Chinese world order, with all its distinctive features, existed or co-existed with the European society of states until the mid-nineteenth century. Moreover, the process whereby the Chinese world order collapsed and the territories formerly belonging to it became integrated into the expanding European international society suggests that Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis is not just a present or future scenario. Rather it was part of the process whereby the present international society was constructed. The European international society successfully expanded itself to East Asia and to the rest of the world. Yet, whether through colonisation and decolonisation or through ‘socialisation and competition’ (Waltz 1979), the process of forming a ‘standard of civilization’ (Gong 1984a) is still continuing. After the collapse of the old order, Northeast / East Asians constantly strove to build and rebuild regional international society, which would coexist with, to be integrated into, or even compete with the expanding and evolving global international society.
It is certainly true that examination of the contemporary situation in Northeast / East Asia reveals the inadequacies of general or single IR theories. Many phenomena simply cannot be explained in these terms. For instance, historically, the international order in East Asia has been characterised by the application of the principle of hierarchy; notions of sovereign equality have only gained currency since the mid-nineteenth century. It is curious, however, that while the Western powers, the original inventors and imposers of the sovereign norm, are moving beyond the Westphalian model, many Asians still subscribe enthusiastically to the Westphalian norm of sovereign equality. How should we interpret this apparent reversal of positions and what implications does it have for security relations in the region?

While it may be possible to find a partial explanation for this phenomenon in terms of systemic constraints, it makes better sense to investigate it in the historical context – that is to explain how East Asians entered into present international society and how they gained their sovereign rights through the processes of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism. Similarly, the historical experiences of the ‘standard of civilisation’ should be used to assist understanding of the emergence of distinctive versions of regionalism and multilateralism. These versions have developed more slowly than their European equivalents and exhibit major differences from them. These matters will be more fully investigated in the next two sections, dealing with the economic and military-political spheres respectively.

Moreover, on the global scale, the rise of China has been seen as presenting a major challenge to the post-Cold War security order both regionally and internationally. Yet many Northeast and East Asian countries have viewed the rise of China with relative equanimity. They have taken a softer posture than the Western powers and displayed greater engagement towards the rise of China. Does this mean, as Huntington (1996: 237-38) and Kang (2003a; 2003b) argue, that East Asia will revert to the historical norm of a hierarchical order, a revived but modified version of the old Chinese world order. I will argue that the possibility of this happening is remote. I shall contend that, despite its long history of hierarchy, the experience of East Asia since the mid-nineteenth century has also been highly formative. East Asian countries have concluded that their national interests are best served by application and acceptance of the principle of sovereign equality. Here, as argued in Chapter 4, the process of the emergence of
nationalism is of crucial importance, as indeed is the chain of events that led to independence of these states.

Finally, Sino-Japanese rivalry has become a central concern in the Northeast Asian or Asian security order. In part, this concern reflects a response to a shift in the balance of power – the stock in trade of traditional IR theories – but the historical dimensions are important too. The present situation in East Asia is unique in its history in that there have never been two regional great powers in the region at the same time. But it is not entirely unprecedented; historically, Japan and China have often been rivals. Even in the days of the Chinese world order, Japan frequently challenged Chinese superiority and attempted to expand its sphere of influence. Japan’s domination eventually came into reality when it acquired Taiwan from China and displaced Chinese influence from Korea – and going on to conquer most of East Asia and much of China itself. Thus, the high levels of securitisation logic associated with tensions over Taiwan and the Korean peninsula have deep roots in history and cannot be explained without it. Hence, this societal sector provides the essential background for the understanding and interpretation of security dynamics in the post-Cold War period both in economic and military-political dimensions, too.
Part II: The Economic Dimension: The Possibility of Cooperation and Beyond

Introduction

The relationship between economics and security or, more precisely, how economic interactions affect security dynamics, is highly controversial. Perhaps the most controversial question of all is whether close economic interdependence and mutual involvement in international institutions makes states more cooperative and hence lowers the possibility of war. This issue was at the centre of the dialogue between neorealists and neoliberals in the 1980s and early 1990s – the so called ‘neo-neo’ debates (see Baldwin ed. 1993).

In this Part, I explore aspects of neorealism and neoliberalism to determine whether new calculations resulting from closer economic interaction induced regional actors to become more cooperative or more competitive in their behaviour. Yet I go beyond the ‘neo-neo’ debate to consider the effects of increasing economic interaction on normative conditions and on security dynamics – focussing in particular on the emergence of economic regionalism. Chapter 6 investigates the neorealist approach, especially the impact of economic development on states’ capability and the resulting effects on security practice. Chapter 7 examines the neoliberal perspective, especially the impact of economic interdependence and international institutions on states’ behaviour. This investigation is taken further to include the English school approach to the role of norms and institutions in international society. These various approaches will all be linked to the central question of whether developments in the economic sphere reduced or increased the logic of securitisation.
6 Economic Capabilities and the Distribution of Power

Introduction

In debates about economics and security relations, two relatively optimistic liberal views seem to have prevailed. One holds that increasing economic interdependence raises the costs of conflict and lowers the incentives for war. The other contends that international institutions provide information that engenders trust and reduces uncertainty, and hence makes states more willing to cooperate (Keohane and Nye 1977; 1987). But neorealists reject these optimistic analyses. As discussed in Chapter 2, the basis of the neorealist position is the belief that the international system is, by nature, an anarchy and that this has important consequences. Hence, neorealists hold that states take a ‘positional’ stance in the international system and that the logic of security competition compels them to aim to maximise their power positions relative to other states (Grieco 1993: 117-18; Mearsheimer 1994/95: 11-12). Neorealists accept that economics and security are closely related, but the true significance of this relationship is that, since economic resources and development contribute directly to a state’s capability, it follows that they help to determine its power position within the system. As the economies of states rise or decline, a redistribution of power occurs within the system and causes major changes in security relations among the actors.

Even viewed from an economic angle, if the neorealists are right, there is little reason to take an optimistic view of the security relations of Northeast Asia. Of course, it is true that the webs of economic interdependence and multilateral institutions, which neoliberals think should have pacifying effects, have not developed very far until very recently. But neorealists insist that, even if these webs and institutions became more highly developed than at present, there would be no guarantee that a benign security regime would follow. In other words, economic interdependence can cause conflicts and war as readily as it can promote peace. Thus, the most critical aspect of economics-security relations in Northeast Asia is the distribution of power. This distribution is already being affected by China’s rapid economic expansion, representing an obvious challenge to the US’s interests and position in the region and also liable to provoke the remilitarisation of Japan. This chapter focuses on two main issues: the weak effects of
economic interdependence and institutions; and the security challenges posed by the rapid rise of China.

6.1 Interdependence and Institutions: Weak Effects

Neorealists believe that, even at best, increasing economic interdependence and the emergence of multilateral institutions will have only marginally positive effects on security in Northeast Asia; indeed the effects could well be negative. The situation may be contrasted to that found in Western Europe. There, the density of economic interconnections and institutional developments has facilitated the emergence of a security community. Thus, even if conflicts occur, they will be resolved in peaceful ways. In Northeast Asia, however, even with rapid economic growth, ties of economic interdependence remain weak. Further, multilateral institutions are also underdeveloped, even compared to Southeast Asia or to the European Community in its early days. These factors meant that, until the mid 1990s, there was ‘no mechanism’ in Northeast Asia to discuss broader strategic issues or to minimise disputes (Buzan and Segal, 1994: 12; Yahuda 1996a; 2002). We must ask, therefore, why the region was so underdeveloped, both in terms of economic interdependence and international institutions, at least until the mid 1990s. There are probably many reasons, but these can be divided into two categories – the global level impact and the regional factors.

6.1.1 The Global Level Impact

From the global level perspective, two interrelated factors obstructed the development of regional interdependence and integration: the extension of the Cold War into Northeast Asia and US policy of communist containment. Their combined effect both divided Northeast Asia into two competing camps and created a situation in which many regional actors became dependent on the US market – instead of developing greater regional interdependence between themselves.

In the first place, the binary logic of the Cold War hindered regional coherence and interaction. Of course, as argued in Chapter 4, in the aftermath of World War II, many historical developments – including antagonisms generated by Japanese aggression and
by the civil wars in China and in Korea – had already produced deep divisions that seemed to preclude moves towards integration. Yet any prospect of integration, however remote, was certainly worsened by the bipolar competition of the Cold War, a competition that became particularly acute in the 1950s and 1960s Beijing and Pyongyang identified with Moscow, while anti-communist regimes communicated with each other through their bilateral alliance systems with Washington. Economically, too, there were competing approaches – the free market (though the genuineness may be questioned) versus centrally planned economies following policies of autarky.

Secondly, the US policy of containment, adopted after the communist victory in the Chinese civil war, added another dimension to the division. In Northeast Asia, the US made no attempt to bring its diverse allies into effective multilateral institutions – either military or economic – by reasons of its identity and ideology (see chapter 4). This has significant implications for regional economy. Fear of ‘Communist blackmail and ideological contamination’ led the US to seek to persuade its allies in Northeast Asia (Japan, South Korea and Taiwan) not to develop significant economic relationships with China (Shaller 1985: 291). As an inducement, the US was prepared to open its own markets asymmetrically to its Northeast Asian allies, particularly to Japan. While there can be no doubt that access to the US market was crucial to several Asian economic success stories, the availability of this market certainly diminished the attraction of any moves towards greater regional interdependence.

Thus, from the beginning of the Cold War, there was no direct or ‘horizontal’ contact between the two hostile blocs (Cummings 1998: 458; Ikenberry and Mastanduno 2003), while even US allies in Northeast Asia had ‘far stronger ties across the Pacific than they had among themselves’ (Pempel 2005: 9). Again the difference with Western Europe is striking; there, institutions designed to promote economic cooperation date back to the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, yet APEC – with a similar function – was only launched in November 1989. In other words, in the economic sphere as in the political-military one, Northeast Asia lags far behind Europe in constructing explicit cooperative arrangements.
6.1.2 The Regional Factors: The Asian Model Development

The weakness of regional economic interdependence and institutionalisation also reflect important regional factors. After World War II, communist regimes pursued self-reliance policies that were designed to minimise economic dependence. Elsewhere, regional economic developments in Northeast and Southeast Asia were dominated by Japan. Japan’s remarkable economic recovery in the 1950s and 1960s, soon allowed it to re-emerge as a major economic power. Countries such as South Korea and Taiwan sought to emulate the ‘Japanese developmental model’, to such effect that it came to be known as the ‘East Asian Developmental Model’.

After the Plaza Agreement (1985) – which resulted in the rapid rise of the yen against the US dollar – the Japanese economic presence in East Asia expanded rapidly. By the 1990s, the Japanese economy had become the second largest in the world, while other parts of East Asia had come to achieve high levels of economic growth and modernisation. However, despite industrialisation and high economic growth, regional economic interdependence and institutionalisation have yet to progress far. Trade disputes, starting in the 1980s, between the US and East Asian economies, particularly Japan, have certainly not helped. The problem may be more fundamental and could lie in the very nature of the Japanese/Asian model of development itself. Here, the most relevant implications are: the competitiveness of regional economies, and the possibility of conflicts between Asian and the Western, particularly US, economies.

The Asian Developmental Model

Since the early 1980s there have been intense debate about East Asian economic development and the model behind it. The debates centre both on the apparent difficulty in explaining the economic success of East Asia from the perspective of traditional neoclassical economic theory; and more immediately from heightened concerns in the US over its trade deficits with East Asian partners, particularly with Japan. Neoclassical economists assume that an economy will be most successful if it is allowed to function according to the universal laws of the self-regulating market. This universalist approach means that structural differences between national economies are largely ignored. Yet revisionist scholars, such as Chalmers Johnson, have challenged the neoclassical
position, arguing that the state played a central role in promoting Asian economic development. Hence Johnson identifies a distinctive Asian ‘developmental model’ to describe a process of industrialisation radically ‘different’ to the model followed in quite different from that followed in other capitalist economies (Johnson 1982). If Johnson is right, the question arises as to whether the earlier clash between the rival ideologies of communism and capitalism has been replaced by a different kind of conflict between rival models of development within capitalism. Clearly, the trade disputes between the US and East Asian countries, particularly with Japan, could reflect these more fundamental differences.

The concept of the ‘developmental strong state’ was first proposed by Johnson in the context of Japan. Johnson (1982) defines Japan as a *plan-rational* state, which not only differs from *plan-ideological* states such as China and former Soviet bloc, but is also distinct from *market-rational* states like the US and most Western countries. Japan was late to industrialise and had a strong sense of economic and political vulnerability. Hence the state itself led the industrialisation process, taking on developmental functions. This involved setting substantive social and economic goals that gave industrial development the highest priority. Thus, unlike Western market-oriented capitalism, the Japan/Asian ‘developmental’ model is best described as neo-mercantilist.

In this mercantilist developmental model, two related features are especially striking: the role of government and a distinctive trade pattern. In order to enhance Japan’s international competitiveness, the government was more interventionist than any of its Western counterparts. In many instances, this intervention took the form of the adoption of protectionist measures. Johnson even believed that it was really the economic bureaucracy – the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) – that planned and executed most important decisions; in large measure big business simply fell in line with these decisions. In other words, it the economic bureaucrats were the ultimate architects of Japan’s economic success (Johnson 1982).

The Neo-mercantilist economic strategy was also expressed in a distinctive pattern of foreign trade. A substantial proportion of the foreign trade of the US and of European
countries is intra-industrial, whereas Japanese trade has been largely inter-industrial. In
other words, a good deal of Western trade consists involves imports and exports of
manufactured goods. While exporting large amounts of manufactured goods – such as
electronic and other high-tech products – Japan imports only small quantities of these
things. Its imports are mainly in the shape of commodities, such as food and raw
materials. In large measure, the Japanese pattern of trade reflects features of government
intervention, notably the setting of industrial targets, the provision of subsidies and the
imposition of quality regulations (Lincoln 1990).

The characteristic features of the plan rational model, successfully adopted by Japan,
were soon copied by South Korea, Taiwan and several other East Asian economies. The
Japanese model was followed particularly closely in South Korea, where government
intervention also involved planning, target setting, protection and price control – even a
distorted price structure as a result of subsidies (Amsden 1989). But in other East Asian
capitalist countries state intervention also relied on organisational and institutional links
between politically insulated state development agencies and major private-sector firms
(Johson 1987). Yet the results have been mixed.

The strategy has been successful in that most East Asian capitalist economies have
experienced impressive economic growth. But neo-mercantilist policies inevitably mean
that East Asian economies are highly competitive with each other. Exports – especially
exports to the United States – rather than the domestic market, have been the chief
drivers of economic growth. In other words, it was the US that bore the main burden of
adjustment when there was a rapid expansion of exports of manufactured goods from
the East Asian NICs in the 1980s (Ravenhill 1993: 118). Of course, the crucial question
is whether the US is willing to accept a situation in which its markets are open to East
Asian products but East Asian markets are largely closed to American products. Such
an imbalance is bound to mean that the US faces a large trade deficit. American concern
about this deficit – was certainly at the root of the trade disputes of the 1980s and early
1990s.
Possible Economic Conflict between the US and East Asia

The US-Japan trade conflict arose from concerns about Japan’s immense trade surplus and America’s enormous deficit. At least for a time, there were fears that economic conflict might have dangerous knock-on effects in the security area. Once the Cold War ceased – and with it the old competition between capitalism and communism – Samuel Huntington (1991) could announce that Japan now presented a serious security threat to the United States. As explained above, revisionists ascribed the conflict to the distinctive East Asian economic strategy. Of course, this analysis was based on the postulate that the Asian strategy was the direct cause of the huge trade imbalance, especially of the American deficit. Neoclassical economists questioned this and argued that the trade imbalance was the result of macroeconomic factors rather than of the rational plan development policies followed by the East Asian countries. Instead, the Neoclassical economists insisted that trade surpluses or deficits were essentially the products of high or low savings rates, high in the case of Japan and low in the case of the US. After examining both the revisionist and Neoclassical explanations of trade imbalances, Gilpin (2003) concludes that the two views are really more complementary than contradictory; the seemingly divergent explanations reflect different levels of analysis.

Gilpin agrees with the neoclassical economists by accepting their argument that Japan’s trade surplus is not responsible for the America’s trade deficit and that both are attributable to high and low savings rates. Yet why should Japan have such a high savings rate? Here, Gilpin comes closer to the revisionist position when he contends that the high savings rate in Japan is itself a product, and a deliberate one at that, the neomercantilist economic policies followed by the Japanese government. It may be true that Japan does not import much in the way of manufactured products – that it has a low level of intra-industrial trade – because it is so good making manufactured goods itself. Its comparative advantage certainly lies in this area rather than in the production of other goods. Yet, according to Gilpin, this comparative or competitive advantage in manufactured goods has been substantially increased or exaggerated by ‘the quite visible hand of the Japanese state rather than by the invisible hand of the market alone’ (Gilpin 2003: 318, 319).
Yet the tensions that had been so acute in the 1980s seemed to fade in the mid-1990s. The improvement was aided both by economic recovery in the United States and by some changes to the pattern of Japanese foreign trade following the Plaza Agreement. The dramatic rise of the yen led to increased imports of manufactured goods from other APEC countries, particularly from the East Asian NICs. Hence Japan’s index of intra-industry trade rose beyond the previous peak in the early 1970s. Ravenhill (1993: 120) claims the Plaza Agreement produced a ‘rupture with Japan’s previous pattern of trade’. Yet he admits that Japan still lags considerably behind the United States in its imports of manufactured goods from other East Asian countries. Indeed the same is true of imports of finished goods from a rather wider area, including China and Southeast Asia. In other words, the United States now faces the same problem it once faced with Japan – but on a much larger scale. In turn, a new version of the old question reappears: will the US be willing to bear a disproportionate share of the costs of adjustment to East Asian industrialisation and hence allow the adverse trade imbalance between itself and East Asia to continue to rise?

The security implications appear negative. Indeed, since the mid 1990s, the US trade deficit with Japan has reduced, though it still continues. America’s own economic recovery and fears of likely adverse consequences on US-Japanese security ties, meant that the US eased pressure on Japan to open its markets to more imports from America. However, it must be acknowledged that the trade imbalance and its associated consequences for US wages and employment could still provoke a significant protectionist ‘back-lash’ (Gilpin 2003: 319). The effects of the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 have increased this danger. Possible negative reactions in the United States are now likely to be directed not merely against Japan but also against China and other Asian countries. The financial crisis resulted in a sharp fall in Asian currencies against the dollar, making East Asian manufactured goods more attractive to American consumers and thus increasing the volume of imports. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, East Asian economies are very competitive and have long targeted the American market. This, coupled to high East Asian savings rates, must lead to ever-larger trade imbalances. So long as the US remains reasonably prosperous there may be no serious trouble. But, if there should be a prolonged American recession, Gilpin believes that ‘calls for protectionism against “unfair” Asian producers could become irresistible’.
Thus, both global and regional factors did not favour the emergence of regional economic interdependence and institutions. Of course, the obstacles were greatest in the Cold War period. Yet the central neorealist contention is that, even though Northeast Asia is now becoming more interdependent in economic terms, there is no strong reason for thinking that this must lead to more cooperation or greater harmony. Waltz argues that ‘interdependence promotes war as well as peace’ and hence ‘among the forces that shape international politics, interdependence is a weak one’ (Waltz, 2000: 14). There were close economic relations between Japan and the United States in the 1920s and 1930s, yet they came to war in 1941. In 1914, Britain and Germany were each other’s most important trading partners. Recent history suggests that this pattern could repeat itself.

Rather than emphasising the pacifying effects of economic interdependence, neorealists fear that rapid national economic growth may cause conflict or even war. The main concerns in the economic area in Northeast Asia are rapid economic growth (except North Korea) and increased military spending. Above all, they see the chief challenge to security and stability in China’s emergence as an economic great power. This issue is closely linked to the questions of how long is Japan, with its enormous economic capability, likely to refrain from becoming a military great power and how any major changes in power position would affect US interests in the region. The economics-security relationship in the region is clearly highly constrained by the structure of international system. The impact and implications of economic growth and interactions must be examined in the context of the overall distribution of power within this system.

6.2 The Rise of China: Challenges to Regional Security

Since the start of its programme of economic reform in 1978, China has achieved impressive and continuous economic growth. In November 1992, the Economist reported:
China’s economic performance in the 14 years since then has brought about one of the biggest improvements in human welfare anywhere at any time. Real GNP has grown by an average of almost 9% a year. By 1994, China’s economy is almost sure to be four times bigger than it was in 1978.

The extent of Chinese economic growth can be overstated and there are legitimate doubts about the accuracy of official statistics, yet China is generally believed to have achieved sustained growth rates of between 7 and 9 per cent in the 1990s, even during the Asian Financial Crises of 1997-1998. This rapid growth has continued and even accelerated in the new millennium. Hu Jintao, China’s President, said on 16 April 2006 that the economy had grown at annual rate of 10.2 per cent in the first quarter, the biggest increase in three years (The New York Times 18 April 2006).

Is such a strong China compatible with regional security and stability? While opinions remain divided as to whether China’s rise can be peaceful, understandable concerns about the likely effects on regional security emerged immediately after the end of the Cold War (see Segal 1993; Kristof 1993; Roy 1994). Neorealists see an inherent connection between rapid national economic growth and expansionism. After all, historically, the external expansions of Britain and France, Germany and Japan, the Soviet Union and the United States all coincided with phases of intense industrialisation and economic development. Waltz argues that countries with great power economies become great powers – whether they want to or not (Waltz 2000: 34). In this analysis, states function in a self-help environment and their behaviour is best understood in terms of responses to threats and opportunities. The very nature of the international system and of states themselves will ensure that they will always seize any chance to put themselves in a dominant position in relation to other states. Neorealists see no reason why China should be different and identify additional factors that seem to strengthen their conclusion. China’s rising power is certainly accompanied by increasingly nationalism. It could well be that the reaction against ‘the century of shame and humiliation’ could make this nationalism more xenophobic and Chinese foreign policy more irrational and inflexible. The neorealist analysis appeared especially plausible in the early and mid 1990s. It had obvious and alarming implications for Sino-Japanese relations and for Northeast Asian security and formed the intellectual basis of the fashionable ‘China threat’ thesis.
Yet, against the ‘China threat’ thesis, China itself contends that the implications of its rise are benign. Since the mid 1990s China has gone out of its way to reassure its neighbours about the likely results of its ‘peaceful rise’ – or rather of what it now prefers to call its ‘peaceful development’. A distinctive ‘peaceful rise’ thesis has been developed in Chinese government and academic circles – not least to refute the arguments of the rival ‘China Threat’ thesis. The essence of the thesis is that the rise of China poses no threat to its neighbours and actually offers them extremely favourable opportunities. This point was highlighted in a speech delivered by Premier Wen Jiabao to the first East Asian Summit leaders dialogue on 12 December 2005. Wen’s speech, entitled ‘China’s Peaceful Development: An Opportunity for East Asia’ insisted that while certainly benefiting its own 1.3 billion people, China’s rise ‘also provides more opportunities for other East Asian countries’ (Wen 2005).

The ‘peaceful rise’ thesis obviously appeals to those who support regional attempts to socialise China into becoming a good citizen. Indeed, over the years, particularly since the Asian Financial crisis of 1997/98, the Chinese case has gained quite widespread acceptance – apparently with good reason. However, in reality there are also many negative factors behind these interactions.

6.2.1 Competition between China and ASEAN Economies

As explained earlier, the present structure of the East Asian economy is essentially competitive rather than complementary. This is true of the relationship between the economies of China and its Southeast Asian neighbours and the competitive element has proved a major obstacle to closer economic integration. Competition is strong both in terms of trade and of investment. In terms of trade, China and ASEAN countries are not each other’s chief export markets. Both China and the ASEAN countries send more of their exports to the industrialised economies of the West and Japan and look to them to supply advanced technology and investment capital. Thus, as Wong and Chan observe, despite the steady increase in bilateral trade, Sino-ASEAN trade does not account for a significant proportion of each other’s total trade. For instance, in 2000, 56
per cent of China’s total exports and an average of 57.4 per cent of ASEAN-4’s\textsuperscript{10} were destined for the industrialised countries of the US, Japan, and the EU (Wong and Chan 2003: 516-17).

The main problem is the economies of most of ASEAN countries have factor profiles and technology levels similar to that of China. That is, China and the ASEAN countries export similar products and similar markets, although China has a competitive edge due to its lower labour costs. The only exception is Singapore, the one country whose industrial structure actually complements China’s. It accounts for approximately forty per cent of foreign trade with China (Tan, interview March 2005). This explains why the Singapore was the main proponent of the FTA Agreement, while closer, yet more economically backward ASEAN states, such as Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam, were more reluctant to enter into the agreement. Similarly, in terms of investment, China and ASEAN countries are not significant investors in each other’s economies, rather they are direct competitors for FDI. In 2001, Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea accounted for an overwhelming 54 per cent share of FDI inflow into China. In the same year, however, the ASEAN-5\textsuperscript{11} countries accounted for only 6 per cent of China’s FDI inflow. This very modest investment inflow – with similarly small amounts between the ASEAN nations themselves – certainly hinders higher levels of economic interdependence among them.

Consequently, it is no surprise that even as ASEAN signs a free trade agreement with China, its secretary-general, Severino, still calls for closer integration between the member states of ASEAN. He believes that ASEAN countries are confronted with more intense competitive environment, largely because of the economic transformation of China. FDI into China soared from just over $11 billion in 1992 to $44 billion in 1997, only dropping slightly to $40.8 billion in 2000 (Severino 2003). Hence, Wong and Chan (2003: 523) even argue that at present, ASEAN countries still fear an FTA, tightening the economic ‘embrace’ of China, will result in more intense ‘competition’ rather than in more ‘cooperation’.

\textsuperscript{10} ASEAN-4 refers to Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, but not includes Singapore.

\textsuperscript{11} ASEAN-5 refers to ASEAN-4 plus Singapore.
Motives behind China’s ASEAN strategy

How should China’s recent enthusiasm for closer economic interaction and for ‘improved’ relations with Southeast Asian countries be regarded? As I argued above, most neorealists believe that China is unlikely to refrain from acting like any other great power; if possible, it will expand its spheres of influence, utilising force when necessary, and generally strive to maximise its relative power over others. Since China’s power is rising so rapidly, it is likely to be presented with many opportunities and it will do everything it can to exploit these to greatest advantage. Thus, China’s Southeast Asian strategy should not be viewed in isolation; it must be approached from a broader power position perspective. Although less negative than some other commentators, Moore (2004: 122) points out that China’s seemingly benign economic initiatives could be no more than a cover for more selfish political purposes:

Although Beijing’s pursuit of an FTA with ASEAN is ostensibly about economics (trade liberalisation) and Chinese relations with Southeast Asia more generally, a closer look reveals that it is actually driven more by politics (regional influence) and China’s relations with Japan, South Korea, and the United States.

Similarly, Khoo and Smith do not go so far as to argue that the dramatic rise of China requires acceptance of Mearsheimer’s variant of realist theory – that is China will be a destabilising force in twenty-first century Asia. Yet they note that it is quite obvious that China has been steadily increasing its relative power over the Southeast Asian states by weaning them away from China’s competitors: Japan, Taiwan, and the United States. Even the planned formation of a Sino-ASEAN FTA by 2010 should be seen in this light (Khoo and Smith 2005: 203). If this is right, we must proceed to examine how the rise of China is likely to affect the two mature powers in relating to the region – the United States and Japan.

6.2.2 The Impact on Sino-US Relations

How will the ‘peaceful’ rise of China affect its relations with the US and American Asian strategy? Will it foster an increased regional cooperation and stability or lead to
open competition, conflict and even war? On the economic front, two important
questions arise: how might China challenge US interests both regionally and globally,
and how might the US respond to such a challenge? The answers to these questions
must have profound implications for regional security and stability. Of course, China
has displayed considerable diplomatic skill in presenting a favourable image of itself
and achieved some success in gaining acceptance of its ‘peaceful rise’ thesis. Beijing
has given repeated assurances that China will never seek hegemony, and has insisted
that its rise is conducive to world peace, stability and prosperity. However, as
explained earlier, realists doubt whether a state can rise peacefully in an anarchical
international system. They are equally sceptical as to whether any dominant and mature
power will tolerate challenges posed by rising powers (Mearsheimer 2001; Huntington
1991; Friedberg 1993/4).

China’s Expanding Economic Interactions: at the Expense of the US Interests?

Despite its ‘peaceful rise’ strategy and attempts to portray its influence as essentially
benign, China’s rapid rise and steady expansion, particularly at the beginning of the new
century, appear to present ever greater challenges to US interests globally and
particularly in East Asia. China’s economic success has enabled it to expand its
interactions almost worldwide – into the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and even Latin
America (home of US influence). For instance, the BBC (3 April 2006) reported,
‘Chinese influence in Brazil worries US’. While the US concentrated on its ‘war on
terror’, China was promoting its slogan of ‘peaceful rise’ to a receptive audience in
Latin America. This led Washington to dispatch Thomas Shannon, the assistant
secretary of state responsible for Latin America, to Beijing to find out what is going on.

In recent years, Chinese influence has increased in many parts of the world, but the
increase has been particularly marked in Southeast Asia. China’s success may be largely
attributed to a ‘charm offensive’ in which it has assiduously cultivated its Southeast
Asian neighbours. The Chinese efforts appear in marked contrast to the posture of
relative neglect adopted by the US. Whatever the reasons, there can be little doubt that

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Chinese influence has increased at the expense of that of America – the region’s traditional hegemon (Economy 2005). Of course China’s East Asian campaign has been greatly assisted by major economic developments – including growing trade relations, the signing of numerous cooperative agreements, and even Chinese development assistance to Laos, Burma, and Cambodia. Yet from time to time, China has shown a less benign face. On occasion it has behaved aggressively and even used force, particularly in its attempt to control the South China Sea. Following the promulgation in 1992 of a Territorial Waters Law – which reiterated its claim to the Spratly Islands – China engaged in many disputes with Southeast Asian countries, including one with Vietnam over the Spratly Islands 1994. In 1995, it occupied Mischief Reef, also claimed by the Philippines. Significantly, the occupation of Mischief Reef occurred soon after the US withdrew from Subic Bay and Clark air force base.

To a great extent, China’s attempts to control the South China Sea stem from the potential oil and gas reserves in that sea (see Salameh 1995/6). Daojiong Zha, Director at the Centre for International Energy Security, Renmin University, also admits that growth in energy consumption has become a security issue that could pose a real threat to China (Zha 2006). With phenomenal economic growth and its huge population, China has moved from energy self-sufficiency to energy dependence. Thus, while China exported 30 million tonnes of oil in 1985, by 1993 it had become a net importer of oil products and, by 1996 a net importer of crude oil. Since then, the trend has continued, so that, in 2000, oil imports almost doubled from 36.6 million to 70.2 million tonnes. Zha is clearly right to claim that ‘the era of Chinese energy independence is gone’ (Zha 2006: 180).

Fears about the implications of energy dependence, already acute in the United States, Western Europe and Japan, are now being shared by China, not least because many of its industries are heavy users of energy and levels of energy efficiency are poor by Western standards. If present trends continue, by 2020, almost 60 percent of China’s energy requirements will come from abroad. It follows that the energy resources of the South China Sea, Malaysia, Brunei, and especially Indonesia, will become increasingly attractive as China’s oil dependence grows. Thus analysts believe that China may be tempted to use military pressure to ensure that these nations give Beijing preferred
access to their energy resources (Copeland 2003: 336). If these happened, how would the US respond?

**US Responses**

On the surface at least, relations between Washington and Beijing appear quite positive since the events of 11 September 2001. They have co-operated over many issues, including the handling of North Korea and Iran. Yet some commentators doubt whether relations are really so positive (Friedberg 2002; 2005; Roy 2003; Klare 2006). The US side increasingly fears that the balance of power in East Asia is shifting towards China and that growing Chinese influence works to the disadvantage of America. These concerns are clearly reflected in the US Defense Department’s 2005 and 2006 Annual Reports on China’s military strength. In particular, the 2006 Report declares starkly, ‘China’s military expansion is already such as to alter regional military balances’.13

If the balance of power is shifting towards China, will the US simply acquiesce or will it take counter-measures? Copeland (2003: 336) believes that since it is highly likely that Washington would indeed take counter-measures, ‘the risk of escalation would be significant’. Friedberg (2005: 21-22) expresses similar concerns:

> If this is true, and assuming that the United States continues to adhere to its century-old policy of opposing the dominance of either half of Eurasia by a hostile power or coalition, the stage will be set for an intense and possibly protracted strategic competition between the two Pacific giants (Friedberg 2005: 21-22).

Indeed, some analysts, such as Klare (2006), contend that there has been no fundamental change to America’s long-standing policy of opposing any power that seeks dominance in East Asia. In other words, it would be wrong to think that the

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present preoccupation with the ‘global war on terror’ marks more than a temporary shift in US priorities; in the last resort, the US will continue to pursue its traditional and long-term objective. In the early 1990s, US strategic goals for the post-Soviet era were encapsulated in the so-called the permanent-dominancy doctrine, which was formalised by the Defence Planning Guidance (DPG) 1994-99. The chief objective is ‘to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival... that poses a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union’ (quote in Klare 2006). In other words, the doctrine was designed to deter potential rivals – implicitly including Russia, Germany, India, Japan, and China – from seeking to develop, although the doctrine did not actually identify those potential rivals. Towards the new century, however, the dramatic rise of China seemed to narrow the list of potential rivals to just one – China itself. This was clearly articulated by Condoleezza Rice (2000), who believed that, as an ambitious and rising power, China would inevitably challenge vital US interests. When Bush took office in 2001, he appeared totally committed to the tenets of the permanent-dominance doctrine and there was every sign that he intended its fulfilment to be a central objective of his Presidency.

Indeed, despite the continuation of the global war on terror and America’s preoccupation with Iraq and Iran, Washington has begun to turn once more to the problem of China. American determination to contain China has been particularly marked since 2005. Of course concerns about the implications of the rise of China go back much earlier, as do the measures designed to contain it. Thus the US has been taking steps to strengthen its alliance with Japan since the mid 1990s. Attempts to upgrade relations with America’s traditional Southeast Asian allies and the designation of the Philippines and Thailand as major non-NATO allies in 2003, are clearly part of the overall US long-term strategy. Of course, Beijing sees these moves as threatening and often criticises the ties developed by the US as ‘lengzhan shiwei’ (relics of ‘Cold War mentalities).

Yet since 2005, however, Washington has not only expressed concerns about China more openly but has also taken firmer direct measures to protect its interests. At first sight it may be surprising that, given its many other preoccupations, the US should have focused upon China at this particular moment. Klare (2006) is convinced that the explanation lies in a revised perception of China; ‘China had finally emerged as a major regional power in its own right and was beginning to contest America’s long-term
dominance of the Asia-Pacific region’. It was not really Chinese military strength or occasional belligerence that was at the heart of Washington’s concerns. Rather, the US was alarmed by Beijing’s success in exploiting its enormous purchasing power and hunger for resources to establish friendly ties with such long-standing US allies as Thailand, Indonesia. In other words, the US was finally waking up to the fact that the Bush administration’s preoccupation with the Iraq war meant that it has done little to counter the huge increase in Chinese influence in Southeast Asia. Now the realisation dawned that something had to be done (Klare 2006).

From this perspective, the US-Japan (2+2) talks of February 2005 may be seen as marking a decisive shift from mere anti-Chinese rhetoric and towards more concrete action. In the talks the US and Japan agreed to expand their military collaboration in an area stretching from Northeast Asia to the South China Sea. They also adopted the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan problem as their ‘common strategic objective’. Of course, Beijing is bound to regard the agreement as indicative of the Bush administration’s determination to create an anti-Chinese alliance system. On this basis, many analysts believe that the security dilemma logic is still highly applicable to the state of international relations in Asia (Christensen 1999; Friedberg 2005). Indeed, recent American moves and China’s response to them pose further questions as to the relationship between economic interdependence and security.

**The Impact of Possible US Retaliation on China**

If the US perception of the ‘China threat’ remains unchanged and its policy of containment is taken further, the impact on China would be enormous. Clearly, economic interdependence between China and the US has become very deep. The US is now China’s biggest trading partner and the maintenance of close relations with America is vital to China’s continued development. According to Chinese statistics, China-US trade amounted to $80.5 billion in 2001, thirty times more than in 1979. Beijing admits that US investment has led the way in the recent wave of overseas investment fever (*People’s Daily* 5 February 2002). On 11 April 2001, the BBC reported that China had now replaced Japan as the country with the largest trade surplus with the US. The implications of the close economic ties between China and the US have major, though uncertain, implications for the security of East Asia. They could
point to an increasing cooperation between Chinese and the US, but other factors may lead to the disruption or even cessation of the trading links between the two countries. There can be no doubt that, if the US was ever to cut-off its trading links with China, the effects on the Chinese economy would be devastating.

Copeland introduces the idea of ‘a state’s expectations for future trade’ as an important factor into the debate as to whether economic interdependence will drive actors to peace or conflict. He argues that positive trade expectations promote peace. However, interdependence can also lead a state towards aggression, particularly when it has negative expectations for future trade – fearing a cut-off of vital goods or markets or even the continuation of current restrictions (Copeland 2003: 323-4). From these variables he sees quite high possibility of future conflict between China and the US. Historically, conflict and war between Japan and America occurred in precisely such a situation. In the 1920s, like China today, Japan was eager to trade extensively with America and with the outside world. Yet, as the world became increasingly protectionist in the 1930s, Japan changed its policy and sought to create an East Asian ‘Co-prosperity Sphere’ to minimise the impact of protectionism on its economy. Washington eventually retaliated by imposing harsh sanctions. As Japan’s trade expectations fell even further, it resorted to war (Copeland 2003: 329-34). While Copeland acknowledges that the present international environment is different to that of the 1920-40s, he still sees some parallels with today’s Sino-US relation. We must now consider the impact of the rise of China on Sino-Japanese relations.

6.2.3 The Impact on Sino-Japanese Relations

The rise of China presents an even bigger challenge to Japan – its great power neighbour and rival – than it does to the US. The challenge may be more acute because of recent changes in the nature of nationalism both in China and in Japan. This challenge has significant implications for regional security; in particular it affects the sensitive issue of whether Japan will become a ‘normal’ country commensurate with its economic strength. Indeed, some analysts have argued that the development of Japanese domestic political culture meant that Japan would remain a ‘civilian power’. The reason is that Japan, like Germany, has followed ‘remarkably consistent national security
policies that deemphasise military instruments as a means of achieving national objectives’ (Berger 1996: 317).

Neorealists admit that Japanese domestic caution has been a major constraint precluding a more assertive military role. The terms of its Constitution and public distaste have prevented Japan from assuming the mantle of a great power. However, neorealists insist that the behaviour of states in the international system, responds more to external conditions than to internal habit if external change is profound. Moreover, in a system of self-help, ‘the possession of most but not all of the capabilities of a great power leaves a state vulnerable to others’. Economically, Japan already possesses the technological capabilities to transform itself rapidly into a great power. This means that, given the constant competition for wealth and security and the necessity of taking care of one’s interests in an anarchic environment, positive refusal to become a great power can only be described as ‘a structural anomaly’ (Waltz 2000: 33, 34). So far, Japan has remained unassertive because it has been protected by the US security umbrella and a relatively weak China has posed little serious challenge. But, since external conditions shape the behaviour of states, when these conditions become seriously threatening, neorealists argue that Japan will be compelled to exchange its present lack of assertiveness for a more assertive policy (Roy 1994: 164; Calder 2006).

Of course, it remains to be seen whether the neorealists’ gloomy predictions will come true, yet there can be no doubt that relations between Japan and China in the post-Cold War are undergoing a serious test. It was clear that China’s growing assertiveness became evident as early as the 1990s, as revealed in Beijing’s nuclear and missile tests and military exercises in 1995 and 1996. Japan also took increasingly assertive posture towards China. For example, in 1994, Prime Minister Hosokawa and Prime Minister Hata ‘both took a harder line with Beijing on military transparency and nuclear tests than their predecessors ever had’ (Green and Self 1996: 36). Yet, while changes in the distribution of material power are obviously important, their significance may be outweighed by other developments. In particular changes in the nature of nationalism in both China and Japan threaten to drive their peoples further apart.
Nationalisms in China

For most of the twentieth century nationalism played an important part in Sino-Japanese relations, and today it increasingly complicates the relationship between the two countries. As discussed in chapter 4, the ultimate basis of the CCP’s claim to be the legitimate government of the whole of China is that its leaders served the cause of Chinese nationalism by gaining victory over Japan. Thus nationalism provides the Communist government with a valuable propaganda tool to maintain its authority. Indeed, the emphasis on nationalism increased in the 1990s. In earlier days of P. R. China, CCP could base its claims to legitimacy on two grounds – on nationalism and on Marxist-Leninism. But the effective abandonment of any ideological commitment to Communism meant that nationalism became the sole justification.

Claims to legitimacy have subsequently encountered major challenges – represented by the implications of the end of the Cold War and those of the Tiananmen massacre of 1989. Both raised issues that threatened to make the CCP government more vulnerable. On the international level, the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and in Russia was an enormous blow to Beijing. Domestically, the results of economic reform were mixed. While they succeeded in creating impressively rapid economic growth – and hence helped China’s bid for great power status, they also brought new problems for the government. In the first place, the fact that economic growth was highly uneven and was accompanied by high inflation, corruption and unemployment, was bound to weaken support for CCP rule, not least among its traditional supporters. Perhaps even more important, there were many who thought that the transformation of Chinese society begun with economic reform could not be complete unless there was also political reform, including the introduction of Western-style democracy. A capitalist economic system seemed to require a capitalist political system too. Dissatisfaction about lack of political reform was largely behind the Tiananmen demonstration in 1989. International condemnation of its brutal repression and the introduction of sanctions only served to make Beijing feel more vulnerable and insecure.

In response to international condemnation and signs of internal discontent, in the early 1990s, the Chinese authorities launched the Patriotic Education campaign, whose purpose was to ensure loyalty by direct evocation of Chinese nationalism. The
campaign offered a version of *guoqing jiaoyu* (education on national conditions), which insisted that political stability and continuing economic development were dependent on the continuation of one party rule. Yet there was also an appeal to history. The communist government reasserted its claim to legitimacy by stressing the suffering and humiliation that China had experienced at the hands of foreign powers – exemplified in the Nanjing massacre of 1937 – and by highlighting the CCP’s achievement of victory over Japan.

However, Chinese nationalism is a complex phenomenon that has developed on variety of levels. As Deans observes, there are clear differences between the kind of nationalism subscribed to by the ruling elite and that of the Chinese masses. The elite discourse on nationalism, or more precisely ‘patriotism’ (*aiguozhuyi*), centres on the qualities of loyalty and national unity. It is harder to identify the chief characteristics of mass nationalism or *minzuzhuyi*, but Deans thinks this ‘may go beyond the state’s approved and preferred boundaries of discourse’ (Deans forthcoming, m/s). There is certainly a powerful strand of hostility to Japan in this popular nationalism – as exemplified in scenes at the Asia Cup Final in Beijing in 2004 and in the anti-Japanese demonstrations of spring 2005. The Chinese government is clearly worried that popular anger against Japan could actually be turned against itself. There can be little doubt that, in 2005, popular and emotionally-driven anti-Japanese sentiments – fanned by internet sites and use of mobile phones – came as something of an embarrassment to the more pragmatically inclined leadership, who saw it as threatening their projects for further reform. The supporters of popular nationalism called upon the Chinese government to take a harder line against what they perceived as American and Japanese provocations. In reality some of the more pragmatic elements in the Chinese leadership were highly unsympathetic to these demands, not least because they appreciated that China’s economic success is heavily dependent upon integration with the outside world and, above all requires reasonably cordial relations with advanced countries, including Japan (Shuisheng Zhao 2007).

The formulation of ‘peaceful rise strategy’ and the associated principles of peaceful co-existence and harmonious relations with the rest of the world must be seen in this context. On occasion, some Chinese intellectuals even sought to overcome historical barriers and move to give Sino-Japanese relations a new basis – the so-called ‘new
thinking’ (xin siwei) (Ma Licheng 2002) or ‘revolution in diplomacy’ (waijiao geming) (Shi Yinhong 2003). It appeared that the chief requirement should be that China should cease to dwell so much on past injuries and should concentrate more on future partnership with Japan. In particular, Ma called for ‘new thinking’ in China’s policy and was critical of what he saw as the excessive nationalism that characterised attitudes towards Japan. It is not entirely clear whether the new Chinese leaders, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, directly endorsed Ma’s position but it is striking that his article appeared in December 2002 – that is directly after the 16th CCP Congress which had effectively approved the new leadership arrangements. There is good reason to think that the successors of Jiang Zemin, the ‘fourth generation leadership’, genuinely attempted to create a constructive environment for Sino-Japanese relations.  

Sadly the attempt was short lived. Ma’s article produced fury in popular nationalist circles. Furthermore, it may be that, as Shu Yinhong – author of ‘revolution in diplomacy – claimed, the Japanese government failed to respond sufficiently positively (jiji huying) to these more conciliatory signals coming from China. Indeed, rising nationalism in Japan, and particularly Koizumi’s repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, looked very much like a rebuff. The Chinese leaders were obviously upset and, when in Japan in May 2005, Wu Yi, the Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister, cancelled a planned meeting with Koizumi in protest at his regular visits to the Shrine. Thus, developments within Japan, particularly the rise of what Deans (forthcoming) calls, ‘revisionist nationalism’ also affects greatly the relationship between the two great powers of East Asia.

Nationalisms in Japan

After Koizumi became Prime Minister of Japan, he continued to make annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, where Class-A war criminals are buried and commemorated. These visits provide the most obvious explanation for the steady deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations that occurred during Koizumi’s Premiership. They certainly provoked outrage among Japan’s neighbours, particularly China, and led to a

14 Interviews in Japan and China between April and June 2005, some of them believed that Hu and Wen were behind the ‘new thinking’.
15 Personal interview with the author in May 2005; also see, Shi 2006.
suspension of top-level meetings between the leaders of the two countries. Yet the
Yasukuni visits were probably merely a symptom of the wider phenomenon of the rise
of ‘revisionist nationalism’ in Japan. As discussed in chapter 4, Japan’s motives and
role in the attempt to create an East Asian order between the early 1930s and 1945 were
already extremely controversial. Elsewhere in Asia and also in the West, Japan was seen
as having used the ideology of Pan-Asianism as a cynical cover for its true ambition. In
reality, Japan had only sought to eject the European powers from Asia in order to set up
a colonial Empire of its own, if anything more oppressive and exploitative than the
European versions. Japan’s position was rather like that of Germany in 1919; in effect,
it too was ‘convicted’ of ‘war-guilt’. As in Germany, there were some in Japan who
never accepted this verdict. As Deans (forthcoming) argues, while there are many
different strands in Japanese revisionist nationalism, its real focus is a demand that
Japan should rebut the charges made against it and produce a version of history that
rehabilitates its record. Clearly this agenda ‘directly challenges, confronts and rejects
the dominant narrative in most other Asian countries and in western historiography’.

In the 1990s, revisionist nationalism – in Goto’s words, ‘a deepening inward-looking
nationalism’ – grew in strength. School textbooks and the popular media seemed to be
returning to the rhetoric of the war years, interpreting the Pacific War as a sacred
struggle for Asian liberation (Goto 2003: 290). The new mood also found expression in
the increasing demand for the revision of the so-called ‘peace constitution’ of 1947. At
the same time, Japan strengthened its defence forces and adopted a more assertive
stance in its policy towards China. For many, it appeared self-evident that Japan was
moving to become a ‘normal country’. According to many Chinese scholars, this
development could only have one purpose: it was designed to thwart the resurgence in
Chinese power (Liu 1997). Of course, these developments must also be viewed in
international and regional contexts.

Internationally, the Gulf War of 1991 marked the beginning of a new era. For the first
time since 1945, there was a possibility that Japanese forces would serve overseas and
perhaps find themselves in a combat role. This seemed the only logical result if Japan
agreed to American requests that it should make a ‘human contribution’ in support of
the US-led war effort. Pressure intensified after 9/11 2001, with increasing demands
that Japan should be ready to deploy its SDF overseas in support of the US-led war on
terror. Regionally, there were crises in Korean peninsula and over Taiwan Strait in the early and mid 1990s and again from 2000 onwards. In all of these crises, the growing power of China became increasingly evident.

But Japan’s higher profile was not merely the result of changes in the international and regional security environment. It was also affected by internal changes, notably the apparent weakening of progressive forces within Japan. External and internal factors seemed to be working together to promote the transition to a ‘normal country’. Significantly, there was more public support for constitutional revision and for the overseas use of the SDF. At the same time, previous signs of quite friendly attitudes towards China appeared to be evaporating. Here we can see the full significance of Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni shrine and his powerful advocacy of constitutional revision. Koizumi appeared to be giving a degree of official recognition to tenets of revisionist nationalism in a way that none of his predecessor would have done. There can be little doubt that Koizumi encouraged and emboldened elements supporting revisionist nationalism. Of course, the consequence was a marked deterioration of relations, not only with China, but also with other countries, such as South Korea, that had had similar and painful experience of the reality of Japanese ‘liberation’. As Deans argues, Koizumi’s visit carried a clear message, both at home and overseas. At home, he was really saying that ‘Japan was changing, that it could now look at its past without fear’. Toward its neighbours especially to China and South Korea, he was signalling that ‘Japan would no longer automatically defer to criticism about the past’ (Deans forthcoming). It was in these contexts of both growing Japan’s assertiveness and rising popular nationalism in China that Sino-Japanese relations have suffered from the so-called ‘economically warm but politically cold’ syndrome in recent years.

The ‘Hot Economy Cold Politics’ Syndrome

In recent years, economic interaction in Northeast Asia has increased dramatically. In particular, the rapid expansion of China’s economy and foreign trade have certainly been major factors in the creation of much higher levels of regional economic interdependence. However, growing regional economic interdependence in the post-Cold War era has not produced closer friendship between China and Japan. The gap between them has actually widened since the start of the new millennium (Yahuda
The result has been a ‘hot economy but cold politics’ syndrome (see Jin 2004; 2005; Xaopu Wang 2005; Taniguchi 2005). While China (including Hong Kong) finally overtook the US to become Japan’s most important trading partner by 2004 (see below figure 1), relations are very cool in the political and security spheres. Jin Xide, a specialist in Sino-Japanese relations, argues that there is no sign, at least in the short or medium terms, that ‘hot economy, cold politics’ will become ‘hot economy, hot politics’; rather it could become a matter of ‘cold politics, cold economy’ (Jin 2004; 2005).

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>3,830,868,452</td>
<td>175,796,257</td>
<td>4,006,664,709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>7,994,233,171</td>
<td>10,198,963,424</td>
<td>18,193,196,595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HK + China</td>
<td>11,825,101,623</td>
<td>10,374,759,681</td>
<td>22,199,861,304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The US</td>
<td>13,730,742,370</td>
<td>6,763,358,820</td>
<td>20,494,101,190</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: ASIA Calendar Year Data (a thousand yen), Source: Ministry of Finance, Japan Statistics.

Indeed, in Japan’s NDPO (2004), China was formally identified as a major security concern – along with North Korea. Previously only Russia had been described in such terms. In the light of these concerns, Japan has devoted far more attention to its defences. It has further strengthened its ties with the US and steadily expanded the activities of its SDF. Perhaps the most significant move has been proposals to remove the post-war constraints on Japan’s military forces. Recently the attempt to revise the so-called peace constitution has gone so far that many analysts believe that major changes are likely or even inevitable in the near future (Nishi, Osamu 2005; Klare 2006). If these trends continue to their logical conclusion, Roy (2005:196) argues that Japan might eventually qualify as ‘a full-fledged great power’ as opposed to an ‘incomplete’ or ‘economic’ power’.

Of course these Japanese moves have raised serious concern in Beijing. The tension approached crisis point in the spring of 2005, when there were large-scale anti-Japanese demonstrations in China. Beijing was particularly alarmed by the February 2005 US-
Japan joint statement concerning Taiwan. From China’s point of view, the joint statement represented an unprecedented step for Japan. Not only did it mark a departure from Japan’s previous practice of avoiding all reference to the Taiwan issue, but also contained a hint that Japan would be prepared to assist the United States in the event of a military clash with China. In recent years, the two great powers of East Asia have engaged in several acrimonious disagreements, but the dispute over energy probably has the most serious implications for economics-security relations. As noted earlier, since the 1990s, China has moved from energy self-sufficiency to energy dependence. Yet Japan has long been energy dependent and now imports about 99 per cent of its oil and natural gas. Thus the dispute over the gas fields under the East China Sea (see chapter 8) affects both economic and security relations. As the Chinese old saying suggests, it may be difficult to keep two tigers in one mountain.
Introduction

Chapter 6 examined the effects of economic growth and interactions on states’ capabilities, especially in terms of alterations to the distribution of power and of implications for regional security dynamics. These effects were identified, by neorealists, as largely negative, but this chapter goes further and investigates other, perhaps more positive, consequences of economic interactions. Can economic interdependence and the creation of international institutions facilitate cooperation between states and produce more benign security practices and outcomes in Northeast Asia? In other words, the central question is whether economic developments increase or decrease securitisation logic among regional actors?

Liberals are generally more optimistic than realists about prospects for international cooperation. They believe that economic interdependence encourages cooperation and hence make states less likely to seek to resolve conflicts by force (see Keohane and Nye 1977; 1987). Moreover, liberals claim that international regimes and institutions have active as well as passive roles. Instead of merely reflecting power relations, they can provide ‘constructed focal points’ that make cooperative outcomes more likely (Keohane and Martin 1995: 44-45).

It must be acknowledged that it is not easy to apply the liberal model to Northeast Asia. For instance, the present troubled Sino-Japanese relationship suggests that economic interdependence has not done much to improve matters in the political and security spheres. Further, economic interdependence was often the result rather than the cause of political change. This point is exemplified in the fact that increasing economic interactions followed the normalisation of relations between the US and China and between China and Japan. Moreover, there is a sharp contrast between Asia and the West. The Western institutional model is highly developed and is based upon universal principles and legalistic and contractual paradigms. So far, institution building in Northeast Asia is at a very early stage. Although it has proceeded somewhat further in
East Asia and the Asia-Pacific area, even there it has not followed the Western patterns. Institutions are relatively informal and processes more ‘bottom up’ than ‘top-down’ (Pempel 2005).

However, despite these limitations and the significant divergence from Western patterns, the fact remains that economic interactions and the emergence of some regional institutions have had important and positive consequences. Particularly when compared to the high level of fragmentation after World War II, growing economic interactions and consumerism have led Northeast and East Asian countries towards greater integration – a trend especially marked since the end of the Cold War. The trend has been reflected in the steps taken to resolve or ease conflicts, to expand cooperative endeavours and to build closer ties among previously hostile governments. These processes, which led to the emergence of an East Asian international society, developed further after the Asian financial crisis. Thus, Morgan (1999: 5) argues that ‘the East Asian regional system has made remarkable gains’.

The impact of growing regional integration and cohesiveness on security relations can be examined on various levels. First, on the global level, we must examine the impact of the end of the Cold War and the role of the US global market as a spur to regional economic development. Secondly, on the domestic level, the key elements are developments in Japan and China. Thirdly, on the regional level, the growing acceptance of free trade and market economy in the region narrowed the regional gap between the capitalist and communist camps. The result was the emergence of natural economic territories (NETs) in the region. Finally, on the inter-regional level, one of the most important developments in the post-Cold War era has been the emergence of economic regionalism in East Asia and Asia-Pacific. This chapter examines economic and security relations on these four levels.

7.1 Global Level Influences on Regional Economic Developments

In the previous chapter, I examined global level factors hindering the emergence of regional economic interdependence – the extension of the Cold War into Northeast Asia and the US policy of communist containment. But here I examine the more positive side
of global influence on regional economic development – notably structural changes resulting from the end of the bipolar system and the rise of a global market, particularly in the US.

7.1.1 The End of the Cold War: Implications for Regional Integration

As discussed in the chapter 6, the Cold War era, especially the 1950s and 60s, was characterised by an emphasis on radically different approaches to economics and correspondingly divergent attitudes to political and strategic issues; and there was relatively little intra-regional trade. Indeed, given the divisive impact of the Cold War, the end of bipolar structure was a key factor in the move towards a more benign environment in the region. The end of the Cold War and the abandonment of ideological and military confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, led to a growing belief that economic issues would now dominate global policy agendas. This expectation was enhanced by the apparent triumph of the US-led capitalist system. Free trade and the market economy, with their associated liberal and democratic principles, appeared to be carrying all before them. China has long accepted free trade and the market, and even North Korea has begun to adopt some features of a market-oriented economy. Thus, although the full logic of the Cold War had been weakened in Northeast Asia in the early 1970s as a result of the emergence of Sino-Soviet conflicts, links between the ‘capitalist’ and ‘communist’ blocs now expanded much further.

The early 1990s witnessed many new interactions between former ‘enemies’. South Korea and China normalised their relations in 1992. Given its special and difficult relations with the North, this step had enormous strategic importance for South Korea; for China, however, economic considerations were probably paramount. Yet, even between the two Koreas, interactions began in the early 1990s, including prime ministerial talks in autumn 1990 and signing the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Cooperation on 13 December 1991 (Kihl 1997). China also began to expand its economic relations with Taiwan, despite long standing and often acute political antagonism. In such a new environment, Asian regionalism has begun to emerge. Multilateral networks of various sorts have been created, including trade, finance, and government collaboration.
7.1.2 The Role of the US Market

The development of the Northeast Asian economy, even that of East Asia as a whole, depended heavily on access to the global market, especially on exports to the US. Initially, the US opened its market asymmetrically to its Northeast Asia allies, particularly to Japan, in order to further its policy of containing communism. It is true, as argued earlier; the availability of US markets diminished the attraction of any moves towards greater regional interdependence. However, while US motives may not have been altruistic, there can be no doubt that access to its markets was crucial to several Asian economic success stories. Since the countries of Northeast Asia sought to promote economic growth by increasing their exports, they were notably reluctant to take imported manufactured goods from their neighbours. Japan’s low levels of imported manufactured goods only increased dependence on the US.

After the Plaza accord of 1985, Japan’s trade with and investment in the region increased significantly, yet regional dependency on the US still continues. It followed that, when regionalism emerged in Asia, it could not be exclusively East Asian but had to follow the US ‘swing-power’ strategy of the Asia-Pacific model (see chapter 5; Buzan 2004b). Significantly, dependence on the US market has also been a major element in China’s economic success story. As elsewhere in East Asia, the expansion of exports to America has been crucial to China’s economic growth since mid-1970s. The US has become China’s biggest trading partner, and the PRC enjoys what is called ‘permanent normal trading relations’ (PNTR) with the US. In other words, Chinese goods are admitted to the US on the same terms as exports from other countries (BBC 11 April 2001).

7.2 The Domestic Level: Economic Policy Changes in Japan and China

While global level influences played a significant role in fostering Northeast Asian economic development and integration, their significance can be exaggerated. Changes at the domestic level, especially Japan’s post-war economic recovery and the changes in China since the 1970s, have been equally important.
First, ‘Japan has been the most important motive force in the emerging Asian regionalism’ (Pempel 1996/7: 14). Its remarkable economic recovery in the 1950s and 1960s created one of the important conditions for the later emergence of economic interconnectedness – both as a developmental model for other countries and as a practical catalyst. By 1991, Tokyo had become the world’s largest donor of official development assistance (ODA). With nearly half of this aid bound for Asia – Indonesia and China have traditionally been the largest recipients of Japanese bilateral ODA – the programme represents an important source of capital for Asia (Kohara 2003: 196-98; Johnstone 1999). (I will discuss Japan’s role on the inter-regional level in more detail later in this chapter).

Secondly, changes in China’s economic policy since the mid-1970s have also boosted regional integration. The victory of the Chinese Communists in 1949 was followed by decades of internal strife and external isolation, especially during the period of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76). It was not until the late 1970s that China began to emerge from this situation. Since the 1960s, advocates of a ‘Pacific community’ have been striving to create regionally based networks and regimes to further economic cooperation. A notable example was the attempt to establish a PAFTA. Yet for much of this time, China remained aloof. The government in Beijing was one of the most isolated states in the world, with a high level of securitisation of global threats. Internally, China followed a policy of self-reliance and, on the international level, identified more with the Third World and revolutionary movements than with rapidly developing capitalist societies (see chapter 4). It made little attempt to define its place in Asia.

The Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist party in 1978 is generally regarded as the turning point of China’s relationship with the outside world. But what is the significance of the ‘opening policies’ and what are their implications for regional integration? It must be admitted that the initial stages of reform focused more on the agricultural sector and mostly affected the peasants. While some of the policies involved foreign trade, investment, and borrowing arrangements, China’s opening to the global economy was limited to specially selected coastal cities, namely the Special Economic Zones (SEZs), and hence did not signal an immediate reversal in Beijing’s attitude to regional economic cooperation. Beijing still feared that
regional cooperation would work mainly to the advantage of Japan (Deng 1997: 57), on the ground that it would provide the Japanese with secure access to raw materials, energy supplies and markets and would thus increase Japan’s regional and global political influence. Nor did the international community do much to encourage Chinese participation, because a rising China might pose a challenge to regional and global international societies. In other words, there was concern about China’s rising economic and political status and about how Chinese leaders might use this.

However, since the mid-1980s, China has pushed forward economic reform and opening up policies and made strenuous efforts to create an environment attractive to foreign investors. Incentives have included tax rebates for exporters, the creation of a legal basis for wholly foreign owned enterprises and low labour costs and rents (Breslin 2004: 112). As these policies were implemented, they narrowed the structural gap between China and the outside world, and hence reduced obstacles that had previously prevented a reluctant China from participating in free market oriented regional and international cooperation programmes. Gradually, the international community also moderated its view of China. Increasingly its rapidly growing presence in international markets and its modernisation campaign were viewed ‘less as a threat to the global economic system than as an opportunity to bring China into the global economy on favourable terms’ (Pearson 1999: 214). In addition, there was growing recognition of the diversity of the region and thus greater appreciation of the need for greater flexibility. Hence it was hoped that the tremendous uncertainties about China’s development could be resolved through multilateral joint efforts (Deng 1997: 57, 58).

Thus, the relationship between China and the international community has changed dramatically since the mid 1980s. Foreign-investment enterprises now play a crucial role in the Chinese economy; in 1986, these enterprises accounted for only 2 per cent of exports and 6 per cent of imports but by 2000, the figures had increased to 48 percent and 52 per cent respectively (Braunstein and Epstein 2002: 23). Yet changes in China’s attitudes to international and regional institutions may be even more significant. Here, the Chinese position has moved from one of rejection (ju jue), through recognition (cheng ren), to active membership (can yu) (Yizhou Wang 2003: 252). In other words, as argued in chapter 5, China began to be increasingly integrated into regional and international societies. Since the Asian financial crisis, the process has been taken
further and acceptance of China as member of the WTO in 2001 marked an especially important step.

But what reasons and motives lay behind the new Chinese posture? The most obvious answer is that it served the interests of both China and many of the regional actors as well. It is obvious that participation in multilateral dialogues and institutions – and acceptance of their associated norms – serves China’s interests better than would be the case if it rejected them and pursued unilateral policies and actions (interviews, Chanrong Jin; Xiaoming Zhang, May 2005). Such an analysis is at the core of the thinking behind China’s ‘peaceful rise’ strategy. At the same time, China’s opening also served the interests of many economies in the region. As Breslin (2004: 112-13) argues:

Increasing production costs in Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea coincided with appreciating regional currencies, which increased the cost of exports on the US market. As such, both those Japanese producers that had originally invested in regional NICs to produce exports, and indigenous producers from the NICs themselves, were searching for new lower-cost production sites.

It is in this context that growing economic interactions occurred in the region, including the emergence of natural economic territories.

### 7.3 Regional Level: The Emerging Natural Economic Territories

In contrast to the post-war division and fragmentation, from the mid-1970s, economic interactions and consumerism began to pull Northeast Asians together. Particularly after the Plaza Accord of 1985, trade, investment, and production network increasingly tied the region in more complex webs. Earlier trans-border trade and investment had mostly linked South Korea and Taiwan to Japan and to the US, but now, as argued earlier, the quest for cheaper labour and other resources turned Japan, South Korea and Taiwan towards China and to the countries of Southeast Asia. Investment also flowed from both manufacturing and financial institutions based in Hong Kong and Taiwan and much of this investment went to China.
The development of regional economic cooperation facilitated more flexible business interactions through cross-border trade and investment. One important phenomenon is what Scalapino (1997:139) calls ‘Natural Economic Territories’ (NETs), defined as ‘economic entities that cut across political boundaries, taking advantage of geographic proximity and various complementarities to combine manpower, resources, capital, technology and managerial skills’.

NETs have emerged in Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia. In Southeast Asia, growth triangles, such as the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle (IMS-GT), have become increasingly important. In Northeast Asia, NETs include: the Southern China NET, which links China’s two southern provinces – Guangdong and Fujian – with Taiwan and Hong Kong; the Yellow Sea rim, which links among China, Japan and South Korea; and the Tumen River project, which involves no less than six states – North and South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and Mongolia.

Perhaps, as Cossa and Khanna (1997: 228) observe, this approach is particularly suited to the Asian context; informal agreements, rather than legalistic and binding treaties, and incremental rather than bold systemic change are preferred. Above all, given Northeast Asia’s varying levels of economic development, different socio-political systems and complex security and political relationships, this flexible approach provides greater opportunities for states and entities to engage each other – despite their divergent interests. On balance, these experiments in cooperation have positive implications for both political and security relations (Scalapino 1997).

One relatively early development and a very successful one was the Southern China NET, which emerged from early 1980s. With China’s economic reform, SEZs along China’s south-eastern coast attracted capital and other inputs from Taiwan and Hong Kong. The result was an economic boom that ‘thoroughly swept across political borders’ (Jordan and Khanna, 1995:436). The success of this experiment seems to raise an interesting possibility: ‘if cross-border trade and investment can pervade even the political hostility of the Taiwan Strait, what would be the effect if governments were actively to cooperate for mutual economic benefit?’ (Cossa and Khanna 1997: 228).
This emerging NET probably had some desecuritising effects, although it is hard to measure their extent, especially in terms of cross-Strait tensions. Beijing did not renounce the possible use of force if Taiwan claimed outright independence and there were crises over the Taiwan Strait in 1995/6 and in 1999. Yet, the NET did lead to the first direct interaction between the two governments after four decades of hostilities. At least the crises did not lead to actual war and economic links were not interrupted. Although there were many other reasons for China’s relative self-restraint over the Taiwan issue (see chapter 4), there can be little doubt that economic calculations figured prominently. When the 1999 crisis was at its height, the *Hong Kong Economic Journal* (Editorial 19 July 1999) was quick to point out that, if war broke out, ‘the bulk of China’s economic achievements that have been built up painstakingly over the last 20 years will become history and China’s national fate will henceforth be reversed’. Significantly, the trend towards closer economic ties was not even broken when the DDP – far more inclined to independence than the KMT had been – came to power in Taiwan. Indeed, by 2001, the mainland had become Taiwan’s most important export market and, since 2002, more than half of Taiwan’s foreign investment has gone to the PRC (Ross 20006: 141-48). Thus, the success of the Southern China NET had implications that went beyond the economic sphere; at least implicitly, it had made a significant impact on political and security matters.

Since the early 1990s, partly inspired by the development of the Southern China NET, other NETs – particularly the Yellow Sea rim and the Tumen River project – have emerged in Northeast Asia. Yet behind these plans and developments, initially inspired by economic motives, there are important political and security calculations. In the post-bipolar structure, regional players tend to balance their previous focus on the global stage with a greater recognition of the value of regional ties. In other words, they seek to create multiple policy options in international relations. Members of the ‘pro-Western group’ no longer place sole reliance on the United States, while Anti-Americanism is no longer the first principle of the nominally Communist group. Nowhere is the tension between the global and regional approaches more evident than over the critical question of North Korea. The continuing uncertainty over Korea has made regional actors of all persuasions appreciate the necessity of working together, but the legacy of the past still restrains them from proposing really bold solutions.
A sharp comparison may be made between the Southern China and the Yellow Sea rim NETs on the one hand and the Tumen River project on the other. Despite official UN endorsement, the Tumen River project has made extremely slow progress. Its future is uncertain because of tensions involving Pyongyang. In addition there are many other difficulties. The political rift between Japan and Russia over the disputed Northern Islands reduced Japan’s enthusiasm. Russia has been preoccupied with internal economic turmoil and has no resources to contribute to its Far East. South Korea, which once hoped the plan would nudge North Korea out of isolation, has decided that bilateral trade between the two must now take priority over multilateral schemes (Jordan and Khanna 1995: 448, 49). Nevertheless, the project still has great significance for the region, as Foot notes:

[I]ts contemplation reflects many of the features of the post-Cold War era: an attention to economic development and reform, a greater willingness by the divided states to be flexible concerning representation, and a closer association between nominally communist states and their capitalist neighbours (Foot 1995: 244).

In comparison, the Yellow Sea rim economic cooperation has achieved more progress. This NET links China’s northern coastal region from Liaoning down to Shanghai, Korea’s west coast centred on Chungchong and Cholla Provinces, and Japan’s Kyushu. The Yellow Sea rim Net also enjoys government support especially from South Korea and China. For China, Japanese and South Korean capital and technology are attractive because they can foster China’s further economic advance. South Korea’s support is consistent with its ‘west coast development’ strategy. It is also consistent with South Korea’s ‘Northern policy’, adopted in July 1988 to negotiate diplomatic relations with China and the former Soviet Union, given their important relationship with North Korea. Thus, NET economic cooperation demonstrates that, despite continuing political and security complexities, the nations of Northeast Asia have shown a willingness, even a practical ability, to put historic enmities and suspicions aside. They appreciate that this is essential if they are to participate in and sustain the region’s growing economic

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16 Under this ‘Northern policy’, South Korea re-established diplomatic relations with Moscow in September 1990, and with Beijing in August 1992.
prosperity. But regional cooperation and integration processes have gone even further in the overall East Asian context and hence we must now move on to investigate developments at the inter-regional level.

7.4 Inter-Regional Level: Growing Economic Regionalism and Multilateralism

At the inter-regional level, the most important development has been the emergence of regionalism and multilateralism in East Asia and Asia-Pacific. Of course, this owes much to economic interactions and, whether by conscious design or not, the states of the region have developed closer ties and connections. In turn, these developments raised the question of the possibility of what RSCT calls ‘external transformation’ – the change in regional boundaries. Indeed, some analysts, such as Huxley (1996b: 216-18), have already questioned the sustainability of distinct Southeast and Northeast Asian RSCs. In other words, we have to consider the extent to which these processes have driven Northeast and Southeast Asians into single East Asian identity/society; and what are major implications for regional security. Chapter 5 examined this issue in terms of identity; here I turn to the economic dimension, and to examine their implications for security.

7.4.1 Towards an Asia-Pacific Region: before the Asian Financial Crisis

In Western Europe and in the North Atlantic area, multilateral institutions, even a multilateral spirit, appeared in the decade following World War II. This development was encouraged by the United States and seemed to reflect the American vision of the world order (Ruggie 1994). But Asian regionalism and multilateralism is a much later phenomenon, one that did not become really significant until after the end of the Cold War. Since then, it has developed on an Asia-Pacific regional basis rather than on an exclusively Northeast Asian or even East Asian one. Of course, this distinctive pattern of regionalism – in many ways so different from the European model has been strongly influenced by economic factors. Two elements have been particularly important: the role of Japan and regional dependency on the US.
Japan and the Emergence of Regionalism in Asia-Pacific

While the emergence of regionalism and multilateralism in Asia is largely a post-Cold War phenomenon, its origins can be traced back to the post-war period. Here, Japan’s role was especially significant. The first signs were visible as early as 1965, when Kojima, attempting to implement the flying geese theory, proposed a Pacific Free Trade Area (PAFTA) to encompass all five industrialised countries in the Asia Pacific region – Japan, the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Externally, the proposal was intended to counter the consolidation of the EEC and the increasing possibility of an Atlantic-based NAFTA (Deng 1997: 31). Internally, Kojima sought to create a regional system in the Pacific area that ‘would support the process of economic change through which Japan and its Asian neighbours would be indelibly linked’. Under this scheme, Japan would have been linked both to ‘the advanced US economy on whose markets its exports depended vitally, as well as backward Southeast Asia that was destined to absorb Japan’s sunset industries’ (Katzenstein 2000: 357).

Thus, from the beginning, it was clear that Japan’s economic interests would be better served by the creation of a wider Asia-Pacific base than by an exclusively East Asian region. Thus the idea of an Asia-Pacific region became the ‘basic context’ of Japanese foreign relations. In 1967, the foreign minister Takeo Miki, for the first time officially and explicitly articulated an Asia-Pacific policy that included an awareness of common principles, regional cooperation in Asia and cooperation among the advanced nations around the Pacific Ocean. Moreover, the track-II meetings starting in 1969 became a powerful lobby for a market-led integration of the broad Pacific area. Subsequently, in September 1980, the Japanese Prime Minister Ohira, the foreign minister Okita and the Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser convened a meeting at the Australian National University, which led to the establishment of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC). As Deng argues (1997: 36), PECC, ‘composed of representatives from academic, business and government circles, has proved most effective in fostering a regionally based trans-national ‘epistemic community’ that has helped enhance communication and identified common concerns and interests’.

Consequently, the first multilateral Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum was established in Canberra in November 1989. It encompassed a broad membership
and at the Seoul meeting in November 1991 three new members – China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan (under the name of Chinese Taipei) – were admitted. The enlarged group held its first summit in Seattle in November 1993. By 1994, Cabinet-level representatives from eighteen states (or quasi-states) in the Asia-Pacific region were involved. APEC supports policies of economic liberalism but its main objectives are: to sustain the growth and development of the region; to develop and strengthen the open, multilateral trading system; and to reduce barriers to trade in goods and services and in investment (Foot, 1995: 246-47). Thus, the creation of APEC symbolised the emergence of Asia’s market-based and ‘open’ regionalism.

This emerging new regionalism was also influenced by developments in the international environment towards the end of the 1980s and early 1990s. Regional cooperation was now seen as a crucial bridge to global multilateralism. For example, difficulties encountered in the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations and accelerating regionalization in Europe and North America led both the United States and Japan to view regional economic cooperation in a new light. For Japan, APEC appeared a convenient and relatively safe mechanism through which it could help to support and extend the GATT-based trade regime (Deng 1997: 39). For the US, both conflicts between it and the EU, leading to a possible failure of the GATT Uruguay Round, and growing trade frictions with Japan made APEC an attractive counterweight to a rising tide of protectionism (Katzenstein 2000: 358).

However, the aspect of APEC was not entirely to the taste of many Asian governments, who wanted to adhere to specifically Asian values and to foster a distinct East Asian regionalism. In 1990, the Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir, proposed the creation of East Asian Economic Group, with the explicit purpose of developing a purely East Asian voice and identity. But the proposal was rejected due to the opposition from other East Asian governments, often acting under US pressure. Even when the proposal was formally endorsed by ASEAN in July 1993, the idea of an Economic Group was downgraded to a mere ‘caucus’ that would meet within APEC (Ravenhill 2002: 168). The entire project was overshadowed and largely nullified by the rapid success of APEC and opposition from the US.
This slow and often difficult evolution towards a more inward-looking East Asian regionalism demonstrates that an idea is one thing but its realisation is another. Indeed, as argued in chapter 5, it was the US interests to promote the idea of Asia-Pacific rather than East Asia. This fitted neatly with its ‘swing-power’ strategy (Buzan 2004b). Yet the success of Asia-Pacific and the relative failure of East Asia also points to the region’s essential weakness – its dependency on the US in both the economic and security spheres. Economic dependency on the US derives partly from the region’s own economic model. East Asia as a whole has largely followed the Japanese economic ‘developmental state’ model (Johnson 1982). In this model, free trade and the market operate within a context of considerable state management and control (see chapter 6, the East Asian developmental model). Although by adopting this strategy, many East Asian economies have experienced impressive economic growth, its inherently neo-mercantilist nature means that their economies are rather competitive with each other. Inevitably, export-led growth has depended largely on external markets. In other words, exports – especially exports to the United States – rather than expanding domestic markets – have been the chief drivers of economic growth. In turn, dependency on external markets means that there has been only limited interdependence between these countries. Thus Asia-Pacific regionalism retained considerable appeal – even for many East Asians.

Thus, economic factors also did not lead the processes of regionalisation to the immediate emergence of an East Asian collective identity/society. This is evident from a comparison between the fates of various initiatives. Thus the East Asian attempt to create EAEG/EAEC failed in the early 1990s. By contrast, as symbolised by success of APEC, regionalism in Asia has developed most strongly in the Asia-Pacific region. Asian-Pacific regionalism is open rather than closed, and supports a policy of non-discriminatory economic liberalism. However, the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 was to bring a rather different direction to regional developments.

7.4.2 New East Asian Regionalism

Towards the end of the millennium, things began to change. In responding to the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, ‘East Asian states have moved towards institutionalising an exclusive Asian grouping in the ASEAN Plus Three meetings, a body that has adopted
an increasingly ambitious agenda for regional economic cooperation’ (Ravenhill 2001:210). Proposals for regional collaboration in East Asia proliferated at multiple levels, including bilateral free trade arrangements, regional trade liberalisation, and various forms of cooperation in the monetary field. The most important developments have been the ‘Chiang Mai Initiative’ of May 2000 and the ASEAN-China FTA of 2001. While the CMI was seen as another version of the Asian Monetary Fund, the Chinese initiative leading to the ASEAN-China FTA was regarded as a strategic coup by Beijing (Robertson 2002). It allowed China to take the lead in future proposals for the inclusion of Japan and South Korea in any ASEAN Plus Three free trade agreement.

However, the APT is not an entirely new idea; it can be seen as a revival of the failed EAEG / EAEC attempt of the early 1990s. Its creation suggests that, while regional initiatives and the ideas that inform them may fail if launched prematurely, this does not preclude later revival and success in a more favourable climate. In these new initiatives, both China and Japan play more positive roles. In particular, Japan’s support for the APT is in marked contrast to the hesitation it displayed towards the EAEC project. The changed approach may reflect the fact that the United States no longer objected so strongly to such schemes and hence Japan felt less constrained about involving itself in the APT (Terada 2003: 268). But Japan did not have an entirely free hand. Whereas, in the past, it had been held back by American pressure, now it was driven forward by its continuing rivalry and competition – however ‘soft’ – with China. As Stubbs (2002: 443) argues, ‘the Chinese government’s agreement to take up ASEAN’s invitation essentially forced Tokyo’s hand’. In other words, faced with increased ASEAN-China cooperation, Japan could not afford to let its rival gain ‘an uncontested leadership position in the region’.

Yet, whatever its reasons, Japan’s approach toward East Asia became even more positive at the start of the new century. Its new position was clearly expressed in Koizumi’s speech in Singapore (January 2002), where he suggested that East Asian should seek to create a ‘community’. To achieve this end, it was essential to make ‘the best use of the framework of ASEAN+3’ (Koizumi 2002). Koizumi’s comments also shed light on Japan’s role in the CMI. This successful revival of the earlier – and failed – AMF project allows signatory states to borrow US dollars from other members’ reserves to buy their own currency. In other words, it provides a mechanism intended to
assist currency stability by creating a bulwark against the potentially destabilising effects of global financial flows and speculative attacks (Wang Seok-Dong and Andersen 2003).

While the Japanese position has altered, China’s changing attitudes and its more active role in East Asian initiatives may be even more significant. As mentioned earlier, APT is an extremely important East Asian initiative. Beginning with discussions on a regional response to the crisis in 1997, the APT meeting produced a Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation in 1999. Initially, China was relatively ‘cool’, emphasising that the implementation of the 1999 Joint statement must be incremental and consistent with the principles of consensus. Yet China became increasingly enthusiastic and now argued that the process should be developed into the ‘main channel’ of East Asian regional cooperation (Haacke 2002). Beijing must have calculated that such cooperation would work to its advantage – as indeed it does. It is in China’s interest to work with neighbouring states to prevent or contain potential crises – if only because its continued growth would be jeopardised without closer cooperation and enhanced regional stability.

Thus, China’s ‘peaceful rise’ strategy, especially its newfound enthusiasm for the expansion of economic ties with its neighbours, has transformed its regional posture. Here, the engagement between China and ASEAN – culminating in the establishment of the China-ASEAN FTA – appears particularly significant (see Ba 2003). Given China’s previous hostility to regional trade agreements, it is hardly surprising that the initial proposal – made by the then Premier, Zhu Rongji, during meetings with ASEAN officials at the APT Singapore summit in November 2000 – was received with some scepticism. But negotiations began and, despite occasional difficulties, progress was made; Expert Group studies proved especially useful in overcoming problems. Finally, the two parties signed a Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation at the Phnom Penh APT summit in November 2002.17 This stipulated that an initial common tariff reduction would be completed by 2006 and that a full free-trade would be in place by 2013. Of course, we must ask how far have these processes have

contributed to the wider task of East Asian region-building and explore their implications for Sino-Japanese relations and for regional security.

7.4.3 The Significance of Regional Initiatives

We must now assess whether the developments discussed above will lead to new levels of collaboration in the trade and financial fields and hence facilitate true regional integration. Breslin (2004: 122) believes that the ASEAN-China FTA is likely to foster such processes, notably because it is intended to spur intra-regional investment and to allow ASEAN producers increased access to the Chinese market. Bergsten (2000: 23) goes even further and speculates that the FTA and CMI could ultimately lead to a replication of much of the European experience; East Asia could have its own version of the EU:

Virtually unnoticed by the rest of the world, East Asian countries are getting together to make their own economic arrangements. As a result, for the first time in history, the world is becoming a three-block configuration.

These predictions could be realised. For instance, the 2002 ASEAN-China Agreement has done much to allay fears – once widespread among ASEAN countries – that closer ties with China would damage their own economies, especially if the Chinese were to take over their export markets. In particular, China has displayed an apparent willingness to open its own markets and has already reduced tariffs on some (mainly agricultural) imports from ASEAN countries (Wong and Chan 2003; Moore 2004: 122). The result has been a rapid growth in ASEAN-China trade. Premier Wen was quick to emphasise the benefits for China’s Asian trading partners:

With import growing by an average annual rate of over 15% in recent years, China is ranked [the] world’s third largest and Asia’s largest importer. In 2004, China’s import from other Asian countries and areas grew by 35% over 2003 to about US$370 billion, accounting for 65% of its total import. With domestic demand growing, China will import more than US$2 trillion of goods in the next five years (Wen 2005).
However, despite enthusiasm and widespread expectations of future benefits, in some respects, the actual results to date have been quite modest. As I argued in the previous chapter, the East Asian economies are still more competitive than complementary. Major benefits are likely to be some way in the future. Thus, Tan, a specialist on Asian Economic Development and Cooperation (personal conversation, September 2005), stressed that the FTA must be seen as a long-term process. Today, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia all compete to sell rubber on world markets. This is why states such as Singapore have made so many bilateral agreements (with Japan, New Zealand and Australia) rather than multilateral ones. Singapore knows that the FTA will take a long time to mature. In a similar vein, Ravenhill (2002: 187) argues that the exact shape of the CMI ‘remains to be determined but from its implementation to date it is possible to deduce what the scheme will not do. The product will not be a regional institution but a series of bilateral swap arrangements’. It is true that, so far, post-crisis initiatives have been largely bilateral and directed towards forging closer links with Western partners. There is an obvious tension between this pattern and the aspiration to create an exclusively East Asian bloc.

7.4.4 Implications for Regional Security

While economic interactions and calculations about economic interests may largely explain the origins of regionalisation and regionalism in East Asia and Asia-Pacific, these processes have now expanded some way into the security realm – especially through the ARF and APT. It is clear, therefore, that the emergence of regionalism and multilateralism in the region has important implications for regional security. But what has been the impact on securitisation practices? It certainly seems that all three of the major powers involved in the region – the US, Japan and China – have changed their positions more or less significantly. Yet elements of ambiguity remain, especially in the relationship between the two actually located in the region – China and Japan.

Changes in China’s approach need little further explanation, as these have been discussed at some length in chapter 5 and at the domestic level in this chapter. Clearly, China’s foreign policy now appears far more pragmatic than the ideology-dominated policy of the past. Above all, China seeks to project the image of a good neighbour and
a good partner under its ‘peaceful rise’ strategy. According to the recent survey taken by Yomiuri Shimbun (5 September 2006), more than 80 percent of people in Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia had a ‘good impression’ of China. The change has been most dramatic in Indonesia. When the same question was asked in 1995, only 31 per cent indicated a favourable impression whereas, by 2006, the figure had risen to 81 per cent. These responses suggest that many people in South East Asia view the rise of China more with enthusiasm than with alarm. Also ‘there is a recognition within the rest of East Asia that any viable organization has to include China’ (Breslin 2004: 120).

Similarly, Japan’s more positive attitude towards East Asian initiatives, particularly its support for APT, has been regarded as ‘a milestone for East Asian regionalism’ (Terada 2003: 267). As a result, many East Asians, particularly Southeast Asians, express exceptionally favourable views regarding Japan. The same survey by the Yomiuri Shimbun shows that in many Southeast Asian countries, about 90 per cent of those interviewed had a ‘good impression’ of Japan and hoped it would play a greater economic and political role in regional affairs (Daily Yomiuri 5 September 2006; Huanqiu Shibao 12 September 2006). Such positive assessments of Japan should indeed encourage it to play a bigger part in regional affairs. Of course, as mentioned earlier, Japan’s more positive stance may reflect reduced US opposition to such possibilities. In fact the US approach towards East Asia as a whole has changed considerably, especially towards the turn of the century. If it has not abandoned its bilateral approach and its alliance system, the US became more willing to participate in and to support regional multilateral and minilateral arrangements. In part, the success of the APT rests on tacit, if not active, US support. In turn, the new American position may have been facilitated by the fact that most of the regional actors – including China – also appreciate the importance of US support in regional affairs.

**Sino-Japanese Relations**

But while the US, China and Japan all seem to be adopting quite positive positions, Sino-Japanese relations in this context appear more problematic. Their rivalry for influence over East Asia constitutes a particularly intractable problem for regionalisation processes. Thus, even when China made what it hoped would be regarded as ‘positive’ moves, these were often interpreted as attempts to dilute Japanese
and American influence. In some instances, they triggered a new round of competition between China and Japan. For instance, a ‘Strategic Partnership’ was agreed between China and ASEAN in October 2003. Although words of the agreement were benign – ‘non-aligned, non-military, and nonexclusive’ – they were modified on the advice of Washington (FEER 20 November 2003). Japan also responded by holding a similar summit with ASEAN, in which the parties agreed to create a new ‘special relationship’ and Japan also joined TAC (Glosserman 2004). These developments suggest both China and Japan are still anxious about the other’s influence in the region.

However, it should be noted that, while rivalry continues, other forces seem to be working in the region at least to prevent major escalation of that rivalry. It is also true that both China and Japan have found it easier to work together in this emerging multilateral context. In the light of past history, it would have been difficult for Japan to express a unilateral concern about the lack of China’s military transparency, because this might alarm Japan’s neighbours. Concern could be expressed more effectively if they were raised in concert with ASEAN and South Korea. Indeed, these joint statements seemed effective in that China responded positively by increasing its levels of military transparency (Shambaugh 2004/05: 88). The same lesson can be drawn from the emergence of the APT after the Asian financial crisis. Here, both China and Japan responded favourably to essentially East Asian initiatives. At the same time, cooperation between China and Japan and among the Northeast Asian Three expanded significantly.

Following Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi’s proposal, leaders of three Northeast Asian countries – Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji, Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi and South Korean President Kim Dae-jung – held an informal breakfast meeting on the sidelines of the third APT summit meeting in November 1999. This was the first meeting between the leaders of the three states in modern times (Terada 2003: 267; Yoshimatsu 2004). Thereafter, things were taken further. In October 2003, the leaders of the three states – Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro and ROK President Roh Moo Hyun – met in Bali and signed the Joint Declaration on the Promotion of Tripartite Cooperation to promote trade, culture, personnel exchanges, political and security cooperation between the three parties. They also discussed the idea of a trilateral foreign ministers’ meeting – the first was held in
Beijing in June 2004. It is significant that, when there were strong anti-Japanese demonstrations in major Chinese cities and in South Korea early 2005, senior officials from the three countries met swiftly and agreed on steps to alleviate the tensions (Zhitao Ding 2005). Thus, it is in this increasingly complex regional context that Sino-Japanese rivalry has been managed to certain degree. Sometimes they compete and sometimes they cooperate with each other.
Conclusion to Part II: Economics and Security

In this part, through two chapters, I examined the relations between economics and security. Chapter 6 focused on neorealist perspectives, which generally portray the post-Cold War relationship between economics and security in Northeast Asia as highly competitive and unstable. It is true that economic interdependence and multilateral institutions were weakly developed in Northeast Asia, particularly during the Cold War period. Global and regional factors led Northeast Asian or East Asian economies to become more competitive than complementary – a feature that seriously hindered further regional integration. Indeed, even when much higher levels of economic interdependence were attained – as between China and Japan after 2000 – this did little to produce more harmonious relations. Their relationship could be described as one of ‘hot economy but cold politics’. Sino-Japanese rivalry is certainly an obstacle to the development of any idea of an East Asian community.

Thus realists such as Waltz (1979; 2000) and Mearsheimer (1994/95) insist that the crucial factor in determining the relationship between economics and security must be relative gains and losses and how these affect the distribution of power within the international system. Here, the most critical change in Northeast Asia is surely the rise of China as a major economic and political power as against the relative decline in Japan’s economic might. Despite China’s contention that its ‘peaceful rise’ threatens no-one, there can be no doubt that its increased influence, particularly in Southeast Asia, does constitute a threat to the interests of the US and Japan. The result has been increasingly open competition between the great powers involved in the region and this competition has been especially marked over energy resources.

Chapter 7 examined economic and security relations from the liberal perspective and its later developments. Although the case of Northeast / East Asia does not fit the liberal analysis exactly or exclusively, the dynamics of economic interactions have had significant effects on regional security. Here, the emergence of an essentially East Asian international society is perhaps the most important outcome. In Northeast Asia, cross border joint projects, especially in the form of NETs, involve government agencies and private companies. They bind previously hostile actors together in pursuit of their joint
interests. Over time, a common set of interests and some sense of regional society have emerged.

There have been especially important developments in East Asia. The emergence of regionalism and regionalisation has linked Northeast Asia to the broader East Asia and Asia Pacific regions. More significantly, after the Asian financial crisis, the processes have led East Asians toward greater integration and community building. Economic interest, above all the desire to sustain economic development, has certainly been a driving force, while the links between Northeast and Southeast Asia – bringing both greater economic opportunities and access to ASEAN’s experiences – have had significant desecuritising effects.
Part III   The Politico-Military Dimension: Sino-Japanese Rivalry

Introduction

In the aftermath of the Cold War, debates about security in Asia and in Northeast Asia were dominated by speculations about the impact of the distribution / redistribution of material power within the international system. The likely – in some cases the only possible – outcome was identified as a ‘back to the future’ scenario, in which the Asian and Northeast Asian regional security order would be prone to crisis and conflict (Friedberg, 1993/93; Roy, 1994). Of course, predictions of this kind appeared most convincing when crises were actually occurring. According to the traditional approach, the end of the Cold War brought fundamental changes to the Northeast Asian regional security environment, and hence transformed the strategic context of Sino-Japanese relations. The most serious problem arising from the redistribution of power was perceived to stem from the rise of China. This part examines Sino-Japanese rivalry and regional security dynamics in the military-political dimension mainly through neorealist perspective.
8 Rivalry for Pre-Eminence

Introduction

Relations between China and Japan and between these two powers and the US are central to any analysis based on the power position perspective. Three interrelated concerns can be identified. The first, and most serious, is the challenge posed by the rise of China as a major economic and military power. As a rising power, China may become increasingly assertive. This would alarm China’s neighbours and also inevitably challenge Japanese and American interests in the region. This leads to the second and third concerns: the possibility of Japan’s remilitarisation and uncertainty as to whether the US, ultimately an external power, will remain committed to its present role as a guarantor of regional security. Given the tensions and crises in Korea, problems over the Taiwan Strait and other territorial and energy disputes, Northeast Asia could be heading towards a ‘back to the future’ scenario. This chapter focuses on the distribution and redistribution of power and their impact on regional security dynamics. It considers how Sino-Japanese rivalry and regional instability may be generated by factors operating on four different levels – domestic, regional, interregional, and global.

8.1 The Domestic Level

Domestic developments in China and Japan seem likely to have important consequences for their relations and for regional security and stability as a whole. Neorealists are by no means indifferent to domestic developments. Their main concerns, however, are not with characters or ideologies, but with domestically generated capabilities, especially economic and military power. Above all, they believe that changes in the relative strengths of states and their positions within the international system have the biggest impact upon security relations. Hence, what matters about domestic developments is that how they affect relations between China and Japan and how they change the relative position of these states in the region and in the global system.
8.1.1 The Rise of China

Since the rise of China has been identified as the most serious security challenge in Northeast Asia – and even in the world – it is not surprising that there is talk of a ‘China threat’. As noted in chapter 7, the introduction of its economic reform and ‘opening’ policy, allowed China to achieve continuous and impressive economic growth of between 7 and 9 per cent per annum. China has also undertaken a huge programme of military modernisation. But what are the implications and consequences of China’s growing relative and absolute power? Is a stronger China compatible with regional security and stability? Although analytical emphases vary, protagonists of the ‘China threat’ are united in appealing to a series of related theoretical, historical and empirical arguments.

Concerns about the rise of China and resulting implications for regional security are often associated with power transition theories, which postulate a direct link between internal growth and external expansionism. Gilpin (1981: 187) argues that ‘As its relative power increases, a rising state attempts to change the rules governing the international system, the division of the spheres of influence, and most important of all, the international distribution of territory.’ Hence, rapidly rising powers are identified as revisionist or dissatisfied powers because they seek to change the existing international order. Although power transition theory deals with the international system, Roy (1994: 165) believes that the same logic can be applied to ‘a regional rivalry for control of East Asia between a dominant but mature Japan and a rising China’.

Historically, the ‘external expansion of the UK and France, Germany and Japan, the Soviet Union and the United States coincided with phases of intense industrialisation and economic development’ (Huntington 1991:12). Although the character of these great powers varied – from relatively benign to malign – all were subject to the same pressures and temptations to expand their influence and domination. Will a more powerful China experience the same pressures and temptations or is there any reason why China should depart from this pattern? Not surprisingly, realists think it will not. Many analysts predict that ‘China will undoubtedly be moving into such a phase in the coming decades’ (Huntington 1991:12). Furthermore, Kristof (1993: 71) notes, as the rise of new powers creates widespread alarm, ‘there is a growing suspicion in Asia and
abroad about China’s intentions and aspirations’. In other words, history may repeat itself.

Empirical evidence suggests that a rapidly growing China will be more assertive. Its revisionist or dissatisfied stance appears to be reflected in the priority it has given to enhancing its military capability. As Kristof (1993: 59) asserts, ‘China is the fastest growing economy in the world, with what may be the fastest growing military budget’. Since the late 1980s, China has increased expenditure on armaments and made intensive efforts to acquire advanced air and naval systems. China’s defence budget doubled between 1990 and 1994 – an increase unmatched by any other state in the region (Pagano 1997). Indeed, after the Cold War, the other major powers in the world reduced their military expenditures by at least 30 per cent. The Gulf War (1990-91) led China to reassess its defence strategy. It began to abandon its traditional emphasis on large low-technology ground forces and to embark on a major programme of military modernisation. The purchase of modern arms equipment and a new air-defence system from Russia began in the early 1990s. Segal (1993: 29, 30) argued that these purchases indicated that ‘China was prepared to enter into long-term military procurement agreements with Russia’s defense industry’. Towards the late 1990s and in the new millennium, these purchases expanded to include systems such as Su-27UBK and SU-30MK2 (Military Balance 2004-5, IISS).

Many believe that ‘China is not simply a status-quo power, but is pursuing nationalist aims’, and thus seeks to recover territory and prestige lost to the West during the century of humiliation (Segal 1993:29; Roy 1994: 61; Drifte 2002: 131-32). Kristof (1993: 72) argues that, despite obvious differences, there are striking similarities between contemporary China and Wilhelmine Germany. Both societies exhibit ‘the sense of wounded pride, the annoyance of a giant that has been battered and cheated by the rest of the world’ (cf., similar view, Taniguchi 2005). Thus, as it modernises, China seeks a regional and global role commensurate with what it considers its rightful historical place (Drifte 2002: 131-32). China’s irredentist claims have resulted in disputes and conflicts, such as those over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands with Japan (see, Deans 2000), and over the South China Sea islands with many Southeast Asian countries. Recently there have been further disputes with Japan over the gas fields in the
East China Sea. China has also often indicated its willingness to use force over the Taiwan issue if necessary.

During the Cold War, Chinese leaders often perceived the international environment as primarily hostile and their own place within it as insecure. But the end of the Cold War has not removed this sense of insecurity; all that has changed is that the chief threat has taken a different form. As Yahuda (1996: 211) argues, in the past, the main threat to China was perceived as primarily ‘military’, but now it has become ‘political’. The collapse of communist states in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union raises obvious doubts about the long-term survival of Communist Party rule in China. Thus, Kristof (1993: 72) speculates that ‘Chinese leaders may be tempted to promote Chinese nationalism as a unifying force and ideology, to replace the carcass of communism.’ It is true that in the early 1990s, the Chinese government, led by Jiang Zemin, did launch the Patriotic Education campaign (see, chapter 6)

What does the rise of China, with its attendant revisionist tendencies, imply for Northeast Asian regional security? How do actors (status quo powers) respond to such a challenge? Gilpin (1981:187) argues that ‘the dominant power counters this challenge through changes in its policies that attempt to restore equilibrium in the system. The historical record reveals that if it fails in this attempt, the disequilibrium will be resolved by war.’ This suggests that a stronger China is likely to undermine the regional peace. In the first place, a stronger China challenges US interests in the region. In turn, this raises the question of US responses and of American engagement (I will discuss this question in detail on the Global level). It also challenges Japan’s existing interests and causes a redistribution of power. Thus, domestic developments in China raise the question of Japan’s response. If this response is remilitarisation, it will represent a serious challenge to regional security.

8.1.2 The Japanese Question

With the end of the Cold War, uncertainties about domestic developments in Japan and its future role in international affairs have given rise to serious concern in Northeast Asia, and in Asia as a whole. The main uncertainty was whether Japan would retain its low and dependent politico-military posture. If, as seemed increasingly likely, it would
not, then two further questions presented themselves: would Japan emerge as an independent military power in its own right, or would its more assertive posture take the form of a more active security role in support of the US? In the early 1990s, the first possibility aroused greatest concern, but, in the last decade, the second has seemed more likely.

**The Cold War Period**

Despite remarkable economic growth since the end of World War II, Japan has been either unable or unwilling to pursue a truly independent foreign policy or to display decisive international political leadership. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution – the so-called ‘Peace Constitution’ – prohibits the use of armed force. Wartime memories in neighbouring countries and elsewhere, coupled with Japanese reaction to the use of nuclear weapons against Hiroshima and Nagasaki, made it difficult for Japan to apply military pressure as a legitimate instrument of state policy. Moreover, in the Cold War circumstances the so-called Yoshida Doctrine – choose to focus on economic matters while depending on the US for its strategic political and security matters – served Japan well. These factors ‘effectively deprived’ Japan of credibility as a major security actor in the Cold War period (Hook et al. 2001: 12). In short, Japan’s defence policy relied almost exclusively on the US ‘security umbrella’.

**The End of The Cold War**

However, developments in the late 1980s and early 1990s seemed to pose fundamental challenges to ‘the entire foundation of Japan’s post-war international stance’ (Brown 1994: 430). In the first place, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union raised questions as to the future credibility of the US-Japan alliance system. They also changed the strategic context of Sino-Japanese relations (Yahuda 1996: 247; 2002). The ‘anti-hegemony’ clause in the Sino-Japanese Communiqué, implying common opposition to a perceived Soviet threat, lost much of its former meaning. In addition, growing trade frictions between the US and Japan since the 1980s and signs, in the early 1990s, that the US was retreating from East Asia suggested that Japan would have to seek a more independent solution.
These developments must be considered alongside China’s rapid rise in the region and perhaps in the world. Yahuda (1996a: 262) argues that Japan may be ‘the only country capable of balancing Chinese power in the event of a major American military withdrawal’. Hence, attention has focussed on Japan’s likely domestic development and, in particular, on its response to a rising China. Indeed, there are increasing voices that urging the country to protect itself more vigorously. As such, Japan’s constitutional status as a pacifist country – one of its post-war foundations – was also being questioned. Increasingly both policy elites and public opinion are more supportive to the idea of constitutional amendment, including Article 9. In September 2003, Koizumi called for a national debate on the issue of amending Article 9; and Nishi Osamu (2005: 32) claimed:

It is now inevitable that a move will be made to revise the Constitution, and it goes without saying that when this time comes the biggest point of contention will be Article 9.

In other words, the revision of the ‘peace Constitution’ including Article 9 is increasingly possible. These trends have caused concern whether Japan’s pacifism, anti-nuclearism, and dependency of the US that evolved since the postwar era are eroding (Matthews 2003).

In this sense, the 1991 Gulf War was an important turning point for Japan’s security posture. The war shattered the ‘taboo’ on the overseas use of the Japanese SDF, allowing Maritime SDF minesweepers to participate in operations at the end of the conflict. In June 1992, the Japanese Diet passed the Peacekeeping Operations Bill, which allowed the SDF to participate in various UN PKOs, such as Cambodia (1992-3), Rwanda (1994), and East Timor (1999 to present). Of course, these activities were confined exclusively to non-combat roles, yet still many Asians reacted with suspicion and hostility, particularly the Chinese and Koreans. Ezrati (2002: 20) sees these activities as providing Japanese troops with an opportunity to gain training, experience, and even a reputation for effectiveness, while incurring few negative diplomatic side effects.

Secondly, Japan’s changed international posture is also evident in its increasing firmness towards China. From the time of the Sino-Japanese ‘normalisation’ in 1972
until the early 1990s, Japan adopted a low posture towards China. Conscious of Chinese sensitivities stemming from World War II, Japan was reluctant to make public criticisms of human rights abuses in China and preferred to raise any concerns in private (Segal 1993: 30; Shambaugh 1996: 93). Even after the Tiananmen crackdown of June 1989, Japan adopted a ‘soft’ response, in sharp contrast to that of its G7 partners. Japan did sign the joint statement agreed at the 1989 Paris Summit imposing sanctions upon China, but applied these sanctions very selectively (Shambaugh 1996: 84) and was the first country to lift them.

During the 1990s, however, Japanese perceptions of China’s security policies and its stance towards China changed profoundly. Of course, the realist logic of power struggle would interpret these changes as natural responses to the rise of China and its growing assertiveness. As argued earlier, with the rapid rise of its economy, China enhanced its military capabilities and displayed renewed firmness over territorial issues – as revealed in the purchase of modern military equipment from Russia and in the promulgation of the Territorial Waters Law of 1992. Thus it appeared that China was bidding for regional hegemony and might well seek to resolve territorial disputes ‘by force or by the threat of force’ (Brown 1994). Japan’s more assertive approach to China has also been influenced by generational changes in its political and bureaucratic leadership. Younger leaders are showing increasing impatience with Chinese criticisms of Japan’s failure to come to terms with its past (Drifte 2002: 132; Yahuda 2002). Thus, under growing pressure from other G-7 states, coupled with its own rising confidence, Japan is now more critical of China’s human rights policies (Segal 1993: 30) and of its general assertiveness. In 1995, Japan took the unprecedented step of suspending some of its grant aid to China, after China’s nuclear test. Although this affected only a tiny portion of Japan’s aid to China, it was a drastic departure from Japan’s earlier policy (Drifte 2002). That is, Japan has turned from its policy of disconnecting development assistance with politics, to making them as part of political disputes (Wakisaka 1998: 121). Since the mid 1990s, Japan has strengthened its ties with the US – a move widely seen as linked to ‘harder’ attitudes to China.
Japan’s Links with The US

In the early 1990s, there were signs that Japan was embarking on a more ‘independent’ foreign policy. More recently, however, its growing assertiveness has taken the form of closer defence cooperation with the US. In part, the renewal of ties with the US reflected a changed view of the international system. In the earlier 1990s, the end of the Cold War and the relative decline of US power, led many Japanese to conclude that the system was about to enter a multi-polar phase (Matsuda; Shaopu Wang, interviews in April and June 2005). Thus it seemed sensible to devise policies that would safeguard Japanese interests in the uncertain circumstances likely to follow any US withdrawal from East Asia. For example, the International Peace Cooperation Law of 1992 enabled Tokyo to dispatch units of the SDF to participate in UN PKOs. Japan also undertook a new initiative to pursue security multilateralism in the region (I will examine this issue in more detail at the interregional level). All seemed to point toward a more independent foreign policy. However, by the mid 1990s, the possibility of US withdrawal had receded. Since the US seemed firmly established as the sole superpower and the pre-eminent country in the world, Japan’s analysis of the international system, and hence its policy orientation, changed accordingly.

The Japanese analysis was also influenced by China’s increasing assertiveness, which seemed to be leading to greater regional uncertainties. Tensions over the Korean peninsula, over the Taiwan Strait and, above all, the Taiwan crisis of 1995-6, induced Japan to strive to strengthen its ties with the US. In November 1995, increased enthusiasm for cooperation with the US led Japan to make significant changes to its 1976 National Defence Program Outline. The modifications extended the scope of possible Japanese military activity from defence against ‘limited small-scale attack’ to something more controversial and ambiguous. Now military activity would be a possible response to situations that might arise ‘in the areas surrounding Japan’ (Green 1999: 155). There was no indication of how extensive these areas might be.

This was followed by the renewal of the US-Japan Joint Security Declaration in 1996, followed in 1997 by the revision of the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-US Defence Cooperation. The 1997 revised Guidelines certainly worried China, since they further and more explicitly expanded the scope of bilateral defence cooperation (Liu 1997). In
the past, this had been limited to the defence of Japan’s home islands but now extended to cooperation to deal with regional crises\textsuperscript{18}. The 1997 Guidelines, also appeared to mark a significant step towards the establishment of a formal alliance structure, by moving away from the previous situation in which Japan merely provided facilities and the US provided the military personnel. In other words, Japan effectively signified its readiness to assume greater military responsibility for the stability of Asian-Pacific region. China was apprehensive about the intentional ambiguity in the 1997 Guidelines, particularly about their applicability to Taiwan. Shi Yinhong, an expert on China’s relations with Japan and America, even described the revised Guidelines as an Asian version of NATO, largely designed to prevent (\textit{fang fan}) China’s rise and to preclude the possibility of its using force to resolve the Taiwan issue (Shi 2000: 57).

China’s concerns about Japan’s renewed ties with the US and its growing assertiveness were heightened by Japan’s decision to embark on a joint study of Theatre Missile Defence Programme (TMD) with the US in 1994. Such fear appears quite well founded; Drifte (2000: 455) argues:

\begin{quote}
Since the proposed TMD system is navy-based, involving Japan’s AEGIS ships (which are now also being considered for sale to Taiwan!), China fears that TMD would not only undermine its nuclear deterrent but also encourage Taipei’s resistance to reunification on Beijing’s terms. There are even some in the USA and in Taiwan who would like to involve Taiwan directly in TMD in order to protect it against Chinese missiles.
\end{quote}

Chinese fears were increased when Japan decided to deploy a TMD system in December 2003.

\textbf{11 September 2001}

The ties between the US and Japan became even closer after 11 September 2001. Shortly afterwards, the Japanese government, under Prime Minister Koizumi, passed an anti-terrorism law and a package of national security laws enabling Japan to send troops

\textsuperscript{18} See the revised Guidelines, particularly Article V, ‘Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan’, on MOFA Japan Web: \url{http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/guideline2.html}. 212
to Afghanistan and to deploy naval vessels in the Indian Ocean. By 2004, things had moved further, so that, on 26 January, Koizumi could give final approval to a plan to send a significant SDF contingent to Iraq, involving more than 1,000 ground, air and maritime personnel. The first group of ninety core Ground SDF troops left on 4 February. The next day The Japan Times described this as ‘the first time since World War II that Japan has dispatched troops to a country where fighting is taking place’. The newspaper noted that ‘The government is sending the troops to what have been deemed non-combat areas in Iraq’, yet went on to observe that the confused situation in Iraq meant that a ‘non-combat area’ could easily become a ‘combat area’.

Furthermore, as stated earlier, Japan has committed itself to the development of a joint programme of regional missile defence with the US. In December 2003 it went so far as to decide to deploy a TMD system. Thus, under Bush and Koizumi, the US-Japan alliance system has been strengthened and its scope expanded. Beijing clearly regards these moves as directed against China. It was particularly alarmed by the US-Japan (2+2) talks of February 2005 when, for the first time, the US and Japan publicly emphasised the need for dialogue and the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan problem. In a decisive break with the previous practice of avoiding all reference to the Taiwan issue, Japan now appeared to be prepared to protect the Taiwan Strait in cooperation with the US (interviews with Chinese scholars, April and May 2005). Even some Japanese scholars, such as Amako (interview, April 2005) admitted that behind the April 2005 anti-Japanese demonstrations lay the Taiwan issue. On the basis of these developments, Taniguchi (2005: 455) argues that Japan is ‘seeking to jointly manage U.S. hegemony in the region’.

**Conclusion**

These analyses make domestic developments in both China and Japan look increasingly alarming, with the two great powers locked into what amounts to a security dilemma. The rapid rise of China and its assertiveness in territorial issues has provoked Japan into moving away from its previous low political posture and ‘soft’ approach to China. If not specifically designed to contain China, Japan’s enhanced defence capabilities, particularly its stronger ties with the US, at least seemed to have China in mind. In turn, China responded by purchasing more modern military equipment from Russia. Does
this escalation mean that peace in Northeast Asia is impossible if there are two great powers in the region at the same time? Many commentators regard China and Japan as ‘natural’ or ‘incipient’ rivals (Roy 1994:162; Yahuda 1996: 249), because both see themselves as the rightful leaders of the region. As Waltz (2000: 35-6) points out, the fact that Japan and China are both becoming great powers means that, for the first time, Northeast Asia will soon contain two great powers. The logic of power transition suggests that security competition between China and Japan has already begun and could well become sharper.

8.2 The Regional Level

The end of the Cold War and of superpower competition has not removed regional tensions or insecurity from Northeast Asia, rather Sino-Japanese relations and Northeast Asian regional security face new challenges. These include territorial disputes, crises in the Korean peninsula, and growing tension over the Taiwan Strait. In this new security environment, regional actors are bound to re-evaluate their security. Faced with an uncertain future, they have responded by building up their armed forces and embarking on programmes of military modernisation. Thus some analysts claim that the security dilemma is still highly relevant and that there is a real danger of spiralling tension (Christensen 1999).

8.2.1 Territorial Disputes

In Northeast Asia, there are many unresolved territorial disputes: between China and Japan, between Japan and South Korea, and between Japan and Russia. Disputes over the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands came to the forefront at the end of the Cold War. Although Japan, P. R. China and Taiwan all claim territorial sovereign rights, Japan retained de facto control for more than a century and no serious disputes arose. But the issue came into prominence in the 1990s following the collapse of the Soviet Union and China’s re-emergence as a power with a stature commensurate with its size and geographical location. From the early 1990s, China became more assertive in advancing its territorial claims in the South China and the East China Sea. Two disputes involving the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands can be highlighted – one in 1992 and the other in 1996.
In February 1992, the Territorial Waters Law stressed China’s long-standing claims to sovereignty over many islands in the South China and East China Seas, including the Dongsha (Pratas Bank), Xisha (Paracel), Nansha (Spratly), and Daioyu (Senkaku) Islands. In October of the same year, President Jiang Zemin unveiled the PLA’s new military mission, which included its role in the protection of maritime rights and interests in order to guarantee China’s continuing economic progress. Since 1992 the Chinese Navy has conducted regular exercises in the waters around the disputed islands and there have been many reports of Chinese interference with Japanese fishing boats (Shambaugh 1996: 96).

Against this backdrop, in the summer of 1993, Tokyo made official protests to Beijing. Japan was deeply concerned by the Chinese Territorial Waters Law; although China’s claims to the islands were longstanding, the Law gave them greater significance. The law explicitly defined the Senkaku/Diaoyu as lying within China’s territorial waters and gave China a specific right repel invaders by military force if its ‘sacred sovereignty’ were challenged (Shambaugh 1996: 96; Brown 1994). In 1996, as Japanese anxieties over China rises, it responded by publicly claiming the Senkaku Islands for Japan. The Chinese authorities then warned the Japanese government of the dangers of raising its ‘rhetoric’. Soon afterwards, China dispatched an oil exploration vessel to the adjacent waters. Chinese (PLAAF) fighters also began regular infringement of Japanese airspace near the islands. In response, a right-wing group in Japan built a second lighthouse on one of the islands (the Japan Youth Association had set up a lighthouse on the main island in 1988). Chinese protestors, including some from Hong Kong and Taiwan, then visited the Senkaku Islands, leaving the flags of ROC and PRC on the main island. The disputes and their mutual interactions demonstrate the ‘complexities of growing nationalism’ in region (Deans 2000: 119).

While these disputes have not escalated into major wars, they have placed additional strain on Sino-Japanese relations. There would, perhaps, be less reason for concern if the disagreement over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands were simply an isolated case. Since there are other more serious territorial disputes and competing sovereign claims in Northeast Asia and the 1990s saw major crises involving the Korean Peninsula and the
Taiwan Strait. Garrett and Glaser (1997: 399-400) go so far as to describe these crises as ‘a harbinger of more conflicts to come’.

8.2.2 Crises in the Korean Peninsula

The first post-Cold War crisis in Northeast Asia occurred in the Korean peninsula, when North Korea announced its impending withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on 12 March 1993. Tensions over North Korea’s ‘suspected’ nuclear weapons program rose further in the course of 1994. On 19 March 1994, during the Panmunjom meeting, the North Korean negotiator (Pak Yong-Su) made ‘threatening’ remarks to his southern counterpart. He declared, ‘Seoul is not far away from here. If a war breaks out, Seoul will turn into a fireball….’, though this remark was subsequently retracted by North Korean leader Kim Il Sung (Kihl 1997: 184-85).

The Seoul government responded with strong defensive measures. The Clinton administration also reacted by announcing, on 21 March, that Patriot missiles would be sent to South Korea, and that work would start on a UN resolution seeking to apply economic sanctions against North Korea. Cumings believed that, in this case, the alarms were warranted; the United States and North Korea actually came much closer to war than was realised by the media (Cumings, 1998: 484). The possibility of war was averted through the intervention of the former US President, Jimmy Carter, and the subsequent acceptance of an ‘Agreed Framework’ between North Korea and the United States, signed on 21 October 1994. However, the turn of events clearly signified the emergence of the North Korean crisis as a key factor in the region’s security (Lee and Cho 2000: 142).

Since 1994, North Korea has continued with the development of medium-range and potentially inter-continental-range missile systems. On 31 August 1998, a North Korean Taepodong-I multi-stage space launch vehicle (SLV) / intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) was launched, flew over Japanese airspace, and landed in the western part of the Pacific Ocean. This newly demonstrated capability greatly alarmed Japan, South Korea, and the United States. Moreover, the underlying crisis reached a new level of intensity after October 2002, when North Korea admitted it had a secret uranium-enrichment programme. US intelligence estimated that North Korea had already enough
material for two devices and warned that it could soon produce enough for dozens more. Today, despite US and regional efforts, tensions in Korean peninsula continue – as demonstrated in the July and October missile and nuclear tests. What are the main problems beneath these crises?

**Victory to Regime Survival**

The Korean problem centres on conflicting claims to legitimacy. The end of Japanese occupation in 1945 did not result in an independent Korea. Rather the peninsula was divided by the US and Soviet Union along the 38th Parallel, with the two occupying powers supporting client regimes. An authoritarian communist government was established in the north under Kim Il Sung (supported by Soviet Union), and an authoritarian, anti-communist government was established in the south under Syngman Rhee (supported by the US). Both Kim and Rhee were intense Korean nationalists, anxious to unite the country, and willing to use force to achieve their objectives; their rival ambitions resulted in war between 1950 and 1953. The war involved more than the forces of North and South Korea; there was also direct military conflict between the US and China. Yet war did not bring unification and Korea remained a potential point of conflict, between the two Koreas and even between the United States and China (Bell 2001: 112).

The situation has been worsened because of decisive changes in power distribution, generally favouring the South rather than the North. Waltz (1979: 126) argues that ‘in anarchy, security is the highest end’; only if survival is assured can states safely seek other goals such as power or profit with safety. In the early 1990s, the very survival of North Korea began to be called into question. For most of the Cold War period, the two Korean regimes were of approximately equal strength and both were supported by their superpower patrons. From the early 1960s to the late 1970s, as Victor Cha (2001: 179) notes, North Korean GNP per capita and conventional military capabilities rivalled, if not surpassed, those of its southern counterpart. However, the 1980s saw a relative decline in North Korea’s military capability, a decline that owed much to economic boom in the South. The balance in favour of the South became more pronounced after South Korea normalised relations with Russia and China in the early 1990s. An
asymmetry appeared in which the South was recognised by China and Russia, but the North was not recognised by either the US or Japan.

These negative developments forced a change in North Korea’s strategy. Since it could no longer win a power game against the South, the over-riding objective of the Communist regime moved from ‘victory’ over the South to an increasing preoccupation with its own ‘survival’ (Kang 2003: 356). As Waltz argues, in an anarchic self-help system, states ‘at a minimum, seek their own preservation’ and, ‘at a maximum, drive for universal domination’ (Waltz 1979: 122). Yet for North Korea, even this minimum goal of regime survival now seemed doubtful. Thus, the decisive change in distribution of power and the regime survival provide the essential context for an understanding of the many Korean crises since the mid 1990s.

It is true that, as economic conditions deteriorated from the 1980s, North Korea sold missiles to raise foreign exchange, yet this analysis suggests the nuclear weapons programme was largely driven by fears for survival and security. In other words, the growing political, economic, and military imbalance between the North and South may have virtually forced North Korea to produce nuclear weapons. The possession of such weapons may appear the only way to ensure the survival of North Korea’s own style of socialism and the continuation of Kim Il Sung’s dynasty (Dae-Sook Suh 1998). Thus, for neorealists, the ultimate root of the Korean problem lies in the self-help response necessarily required in conditions of anarchy. Waltz argues that, in these conditions, the only way that states can achieve their objectives is through reliance on ‘the means they can generate and the arrangements they can make for themselves’. That is, internally increase their economic and military capabilities; and externally strengthen their alliance or to weaken opposing one (Waltz 1979: 111, 118).

Having lost much of the support formerly provided by its allies and patrons, North Korea’s conventional forces deteriorated sharply and its economy was close to collapse. Thus, when faced with extreme power asymmetry, North Korea turned to the ‘only means’ available, that is, to the pursuit of a nuclear weapons programme. These weapons and their missile delivery systems are now perceived as an alternative to conventional forces. In North Korean eyes, their justification is that they go some way to redress the otherwise adverse shift in the military balance on the Korean Peninsula.
Yet others see things differently. For the region and international community as a whole, it is believed that, by developing missiles and nuclear weapons, North Korea is delivering a fundamental challenge to regional and international peace and stability. Taken alongside the other major flashpoint – the Taiwan Strait – developments in Korea suggest that Northeast Asia may experience arms races and even nuclearisation (I will come to this point later).

### 8.2.3 Crises over the Taiwan Strait

In 1995/96 another major crisis occurred over the Taiwanese presidential election. The crisis began when Lee Teng-hui, President of Taiwan, referred to ‘The Republic of China on Taiwan’ while on a private visit to the US. Beijing took the visit and the phrase as signs that Taiwan was raising its international political profile and challenging the ‘one China’ principle. In response to Lee Tenghui’s visit and Taiwan’s first general election in March 1996, the Chinese held military exercises and missile tests close to Taiwan. As Yahuda argues, these were designed to demonstrate China’s military strength and thus intimidate those who favoured Taiwanese independence. But by their actions, ‘the Chinese have unwittingly provoked a security dilemma with Japan’ (Yahuda 2002: 10).

Tensions continued and heightened further when Lee Teng-hui referred to PRC-ROC relations as ‘state-to-state or at least nation-to-nation’ in an interview on German radio in 1999. In response, Beijing threatened the possible use of force if Taiwan declared independence. Subsequent political developments within Taiwan appear to have brought a formal declaration of independence even closer. The long dominant KMT was defeated in the election of 2000 and Chen Shui-bian, leader of the pro-independence DPP, became President. The DPP not only campaigned for greater democracy but was also more strongly committed to independence than its rival. Since 2000, DPP policy has become clearer. Earlier advocacy of an independent and sovereign Taiwanese state has hardened into an explicit adoption of a ‘one China, one Taiwan’ agenda.

In November 2003, shortly before the 2004 election, Chen secured the passing of a referendum law. The DPP then conducted an extremely provocative presidential campaign, which included proposals for referenda on sensitive cross-Strait issues. These
proposals seemed deliberately designed to provoke Beijing (Sutter 2004). Chen was re-elected to serve a second term as President and announced that a referendum would be held on a new constitution in 2006. If the electorate endorsed the constitution, it would come into force in May 2008. There is no doubt that China views Chen’s agenda as so threatening that military action may be necessary. For Beijing, a new Taiwanese constitution symbolises a possible break with the long-standing ‘one-China’ policy of the ROC and represents a move towards juridical independence or even a new Taiwanese State. This is something Beijing is determined to prevent – by force if necessary. Thus, when China passed an anti-secession law early in 2005, the measure caused alarm, not only in Taiwan, but in the international community as a whole – because the law appeared to provide Beijing with a legal basis for an attack on Taiwan if it declared independence.

In the run-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, international concern about the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait is increasing. The fact that Beijing sees the Olympic Games as an opportunity to remove any remaining traces of its former ‘pariah’ status and to demonstrate its power and success to the world, may tempt Taipei into a dangerous gamble. It may calculate that the PRC’s desire to present a favourable image to the rest of the world will provide the Taiwanese government with an opportunity to take a dramatic move towards independence with greater impunity than would be possible in other circumstances. Possible steps include the abolition of the National Unification Guidelines or something even more dramatic (Taniguchi 2005; C. R. Hughes Public Lecture, LSE, 1 Feb 2006). But it is dangerous to assume that Beijing’s preoccupation with its international image at the time of the Olympic Games would mean that the PRC would stay its hand. Indeed, given the deep US involvement in Taiwan’s security and Japan’s interests in Taiwan, the possibility of ‘a Sino-American war – potentially even nuclear war’ (Romberg 2004) – or a war involving the US, China, and even Japan, could not be excluded.

8.2.4 Impacts on Regional Security

Thus, the Korean peninsula and Taiwan Strait remain as flashpoints, which could have significantly destabilising effects on the region as a whole. Some analysts (Christensen 1999; Yahuda 2002) suggest that, combined with many other problems, the tensions
associated with Korea and Taiwan could generate an acute security dilemma in Northeast Asia. The area is experiencing dramatic and unpredictable changes in the distribution of capabilities and is characterised by long-standing territorial disputes, competition for energy supplies. There is also a long tradition of historically based mistrust and animosity among regional actors. Taken together, these factors are only too likely to result in a situation in which ‘even defensive weapons’ appear threatening (Christensen 1999: 50) and all military activity is liable to be interpreted as potentially offensive (Roy 1994: 162). China and Japan are increasingly suspicious of each other’s military activities and the region is experiencing a significant build up of armaments – suggesting a troubled future.

China and Japan: Growing Mutual Suspicion

In the aftermath of the Cold War, there were already concerns about the rise of China and its assertiveness, and about Japan’s anticipated remilitarisation. These concerns and the mutual suspicion between the two great powers in the region were intensified by the events in the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Strait.

Japan certainly regarded Pyongyang’s nuclear programme and its development of the Rodong missile – North Korea’s most advanced intermediate-range missile, capable of striking the Japanese home islands – with enormous concern (Umemoto 2003, 2005; Shambaugh 1996: 95). The rapid rise of China’s military spending in the early 1990s and the acceleration of its nuclear testing programme since 1993 made Japan feel even more vulnerable. This feeling was further heightened by the crisis over Taiwan, when China responded with missile tests and military exercises close to the Taiwan Strait. To address these concerns, Japan not only gave stronger support to a powerful US presence in the Pacific – including American bases in Japan – but also made further efforts to modernise its own forces. Its commitment to the US led TMD project was hardened by the shock of North Korea’s missile test, Taepodong-1 in 1998.

Thus, it seems clear that fears about China and North Korea played a significant role in pushing Japan to become more heavily militarised. Umemoto claimed explicitly that the main ‘WMD threat’ faced by Japan comes from ‘North Korea and China’. Above all, the Taepodong-1 test played ‘a catalytic role in bolstering domestic support for a limited
missile defense system in Japan’ (Umemoto 2005; also see Umemoto 2003). Others point out that China’s military exercises and missiles and nuclear tests in 1995-96 certainly contributed to growing anxieties and fears about China among the Japanese public (Drifte 2002: 134; Green 1999: 153-56). There can also be little doubt that these signs of regional instability also resulted in a strengthened US commitment to the region – not least because American military facilities in Japan now appeared vulnerable to attack by North Korean missiles. Even more, the Taepodong-1 test was the first occasion that a ‘rogue state’ demonstrated its potential capacity to reach the American continent with weapons of mass destruction (Lee and Cho 2000: 152). The incident had its uses for Japan and Washington, because it provided a justification for their joint development of a TMD system in the region – without appearing to threaten China directly.

**Security Dilemmas?**

Although the strengthening ties between Japan and the US were presented as a response to North Korean weapons programmes, they also caused apprehension in China. Despite its rapid economic growth and increased absolute capabilities, Beijing’s assessments of its relative power and the security of its position in the international system remain pessimistic (Yan 2000). In the rest of the world there may be increasing talk of a ‘China threat’, but the Chinese themselves tend to regard their military capability as relatively weak and backward. They contend that Western analysts have used the questionable concept of ‘purchasing parity’ to exaggerate the true extent of Chinese spending and to provide a spurious basis for the idea of a supposed ‘China threat’ (Zhou 1999: 8). Above all, Chinese commentators stress the relative weakness of China compared to the unmatchable power of the US and the strength of the Japanese economy, still the second largest economy in the world.

Although the US reduced its military spending and the number of overseas bases after the end of the Cold War, this did not mean that its military capacity was reduced. On the contrary, the development of even more sophisticated military technology actually increased its ability to intervene speedily and decisively in almost any part of the world (Jisi Wang 2005c). The demonstration of overwhelming US military power both in the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis and in the Kosovo war of 1996-99 undoubtedly made a deep
impression on China. As far as Beijing was concerned, the end of Cold War appeared a mixed blessing. While competition between the two superpowers may have ceased, the character of international politics as struggle for power and dominance have not changed. But, whereas in the Cold War, neither of the super powers had been truly dominant, the fact that there was now only one super power – the United States – that other great powers could not match (Yan 1999: 2). This post-Cold War US hegemony is generally known in China as the ‘yichao duoqiang’ (one super power plus many great powers) system, which corresponds to what Buzan and Wæver (2003) call the ‘1+4 system’.

In the context of ‘yichao duoqiang’ or 1+4 system, Beijing is increasingly concerned about the enhanced US-Japan alliance, which it believes is ultimately targeted against China. As perceptive Chinese commentators have noted, if the decision taken in 1995 to embark on an eastwards expansion of NATO was really directed against Russia, then the 1996 US-Japan Joint Security Declaration ‘implicitly’ moved the ‘target’ of US strategy away from the former Soviet Union and towards China (Yan 1999: 3). These concerns were heightened by the US-Japan joint TMD programme. Given the sensitivity of the Taiwan issue, developments in the mid-1990s – notably US ‘intervention’ in the Taiwan crisis of 1995-6, the 1997 revised Guidelines, and especially the US-Japanese joint development of TMD – have touched security nerves in Beijing (Liu 1997; Wu 2005).

These fears were closely linked to possible impacts on Beijing’s hopes for national reunification. An Aegis-based Japanese NTWD system could easily be used for the defence of Taiwan. Even scholars within Japan admit that although Japan’s antimissile systems could make only a limited contribution to the defence of Taiwan in the event of a Chinese ‘pre-emptive strike’, they can still make the following impacts:

Japanese BMD could play a major role in countering Beijing’s attempt to coerce Tokyo to refrain from assisting U.S. forces operating in the Taiwan area by the threat of an MRBM [medium-range ballistic missile] (and IRBM [intermediate-range ballistic missile]) strike. Assuming a nuclear balance heavily favoring the United States, it might be presumed that the U.S.
“nuclear umbrella” would effectively deter such a strike (Umemoto 2003: 193).

Thus, many Chinese do not accept the argument that the development of North Korean missiles justifies enhanced US-Japan defence cooperation. Beijing fears that the cooperation between Japan and the US would mean that the US might use bases in Japan to intervene militarily in some future Taiwan crisis or that the Taiwan itself might come to possess the TMD system. In other words, TMD could be a stepping-stone to further developments in which Japan might acquire ‘a more offensive missile capability, or even ultimately to go nuclear’ (Drifte 2003: 100).

These negative interactions have led some analysts (Christensen 1999; Yahuda 2002) to argue that security dilemma theory is still highly relevant to Northeast Asia. Of course theoretically defensive systems, such as TMD, should not provoke arms races, and hence lead to security dilemma and spirals of tension. However, as Christensen (1999) claims, this comforting belief may not apply in contemporary Northeast Asia. After all, in this region, fear and insecurity stem not only from the possibility that Japan may progress from its new found defensive roles into more threatening military build-ups, but it is also much affected by the Taiwan factor.

Beijing’s focus on preventing Taiwan’s permanent separation from China means that even defensive weapons in the hands of Taiwan or its potential supporters are provocative to China. Given the bitter history of Japanese imperialism in China and Taiwan’s status as a Japanese colony from 1895 to 1945, this certainly holds true for Japan (Christensen 1999: 51).

In response, Beijing is building its ties with Moscow and purchasing sophisticated weapons and defence equipment from Russia. In 1996 China also made an agreement of a ‘Strategic Partnership’ with Russia. Although China insisted that this partnership was not aimed against any third party (Yan 2000), it was bound to arouse suspicions that the real purpose was to counter US-Japanese influence in the region. Since 1997 China has begun to promote a so-called ‘new security concept (NSC)’ in the region. Officially this emphasises the importance of ‘enhancing trust through dialogue and promoting security
through cooperation’. Yet, China makes no secret of its dislike of what it calls the outdated ‘Cold war mentality’ (lengzhan siwei) of competing and antagonistic blocks. Hu Xiaodi, Chinese Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs, declared in Geneva in February 2001: ‘The 21st century needs a new security concept and the old security concept, based on military alliance at the expense of other countries’ interests, should be discarded’ (People’s Daily 16 February 2001).

The NSC has been increasingly influential in Chinese foreign policy since the mid 1990s. For instance, Beijing has turned from its previously critical attitude of multilateral institutions to become an active and positive participant, it became eager for better relations with ASEAN countries, playing a significant role in formation of SCO, and becoming a major player in the six-Party Talks. Yet, there are fears that the NSC and related foreign policy initiatives are really targeted against the US-Japan alliance. In other words, China may be seeking to undermine US leadership as part of its overall campaign to establish its own sphere of influence in the region. As early as the 1997 Defence White Paper, Tokyo identified China as a potential external threat (Defence of Japan 1997).

8.2.5 New Millennium: Trouble Ahead?

Many critical security concerns remain in Northeast Asia and some have even become more acute in the last five years. In October 2002, North Korea admitted that it actually had a secret uranium enrichment programme, which led to a second nuclear crisis in the peninsula. The Six Party Talks finally managed to agree to a joint statement of principles after the fourth round of the talks on 19 September 2005. There were some experts on Korea who praised the joint statement, believing that it would provide guidelines for ‘a more specific road map for resolving the second North Korean crisis’ (Snyder, Cossa and Glosserman 2005). In reality, however, the Talks soon became stalemated and have not yet been able to make further progress towards the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. The continuing crises suggest the real

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difficulty of the issue. As argued above, tensions over the Taiwan Strait also continued and became particularly acute during the Taiwanese general elections of 2000 and 2004. In Taiwan itself, movements working towards formal independence are still powerful and are actively canvassing the possibility of the abolition of the National Unification Guidelines, while Beijing has reaffirmed its determination to prevent Taiwanese independence by passing its anti-secession law early in 2005.

In the new millennium, many of the old problems of Northeast Asia have taken on new and worrying forms. In particular relations between Japan and China have deteriorated sharply since 2005. Early in 2005, the Japanese government approved the adoption of a new history text-book – that appeared to minimise or excuse Japanese atrocities in the late 1930s and in World War II – for use in schools. In the same year, the Japanese Prime Minister, Koizumi insisted again on revisiting the Yasukuni Shrine despite furious protests from neighbouring states. Thus tension rose sharply between Tokyo, Seoul and Beijing. Anti-Japanese demonstrations soon spread over China and South Korea. The demonstrations attracted large crowds, especially in China, and Japanese owned buildings were attacked. Neither Beijing nor Seoul would support Tokyo’s bid for a permanent seat for UN Security Council. In turn, the Japanese media expressed strong disapproval of the demonstrations and alleged that, in China, they had received the tacit support or even the active encouragement of the authorities. There can be no doubt that the Japanese were dismayed by the demonstrations and gave credence to the allegations of official involvement. Of course Beijing denied any such involvement, but both Beijing and Seoul had been angered by the text-book and shrine issues, which had aroused old memories and appeared to have alarming implications for such sensitive matters as sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Beijing had an additional cause for concern because, at a 2+2 meeting in February 2005, for the first time, a joint US-Japanese statement called for ‘the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue’. While the joint statement did no more than hint at Japan’s interest in preventing Chinese military action against Taiwan, it still represented a significant departure from the very low profile previously taken by

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20 I happened to be in Tokyo in April 2005 for the fieldwork of this thesis when the anti Japanese demonstrations reached their highest point.
Japan on anything connected with Taiwan. Developments in Japan also caused alarm in South Korea. Here the issue was the dispute over the Takeshima / Tokto Island. On 9 March 2005, Japan’s Shimane Prefectural Assembly passed a bill designating 22 February as ‘Takeshima Day’, thus effectively reasserting Japan’s claim to sovereignty over the disputed island. The next day, (10 March 2005) the Korea Times commented that the designation of such a special day in Japan was bound to result in the escalation of the diplomatic dispute between Seoul and Tokyo over ‘Tokto (Dokto), South Korea’s easternmost islets’.

In the face of anti-Japanese sentiment, Japanese public opinion hardened against neighbouring states. Extreme right wing views, centring on the supposed ‘China threat’ gained a significant following that had been absent previously. The Mayor of Tokyo, Ishihara Shintaro, went so far as to argue that the proper response to the demonstrations in China would be to send the SDF to occupy the Senkaku Island (Shukan Bunshyun 5 May 2005: 24-26). Recently, the already strained relations between the two great powers of Northeast Asia have been further inflamed by rising tensions over energy resources in a disputed area of the East China Sea.

The gas dispute stems from a long-standing disagreement over Japanese and Chinese the claims to gas-rich areas under the East China Sea. According to a UN convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, both countries can claim an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) extending 200 nautical miles (370 km) from their shores. But China claims a larger EEZ on the basis of the 1958 Geneva Convention on Continental Shelves, which would extend the Chinese EEZ into areas of the East China Sea claimed by Japan (see, map below). The gas fields where China has been test drilling – known as the Chunxiao field – actually lie in waters which both sides agree belong to China. But the fields are very close to the area claimed by Japan’s, leading to fears that China is preparing to siphon off gas buried under the seabed on the Japanese side.

In diplomatic gatherings both countries give theoretical support to the idea that the region’s resources should be shared. By May 2006, no less than four rounds of negotiations had been held – but no resolution has yet been reached. Japan has made formal and informal complaints but China is clearly in no hurry to stop drilling. Every step by China is extensively reported in the Japanese media and the public is becoming
increasing impatient at what it sees as the Tokyo government’s inability to take effective counter measures. In response to this feeling, in the middle of 2005, the authorities offered exploration rights in the disputed area to the Japanese company, Teikoku Oil (BBC 30 Sep 2005). Of course this dispute is only one part of wider tensions – thus hindering its resolution.

In addition, since Prime Minister Koizumi took office in April 2001, Japan has taken significant steps towards strengthening its alliance with the US. In addition to sending troops to Iraq, Japan has also established a quasi-permanent maritime military presence in the Indian Ocean and in the Arabian Sea. Taniguchi (2005: 453) notes that such things would have been unimaginable in the past – even for the Japanese Imperial Navy in World War II. Japan also enhanced its participation in a US-led sea-based missile defence build-up, and in December 2003 decided to deploy the TMD system. It was within these contexts that the February 2005 US-Japan joint statement calling for ‘the peaceful resolution’ of Taiwan issue appears alarming. Wenran Jiang (2005) argues that the statement marked ‘a new turn on Asia’s security chessboard’.

Of course, Beijing’s real concern is Taiwan’s growing independence movement and possible conflict in Taiwan Strait. Some Chinese analysts argue that, in real terms, China’s security position in the first decade of the 21st century and thereafter is less assured than it was in the 1990s. It is true that the international environment as a whole now suggests that a major war is unlikely for the foreseeable future, yet the Taiwan factor could mean that China faces a higher possibility of a series of small-scale conflicts and wars (Yan 2000: 51). The eyes of the international community increasingly turning towards 2008 – a year that will see elections in both Taiwan and in the United States as well as the Beijing Olympic Games. It may well be that the political
atmosphere in Taiwan and the United States will give a further boost to the cause of Taiwanese independence. Given China’s determination to prevent any such thing, it is hard to be optimistic about the future peace and stability of the region.

**Regional Arms Build-Up?**

Given the generally tense security environment, a significant regional arms build-up must be a source of serious concern. Patterns have been very different from much of the rest of the world. After the Cold War, the major world powers reduced their military expenditures by at least 30%, yet in Northeast and East Asia, states increased their military spending and were especially eager to buy and stockpile modern weapons systems. This trend, first visible in the early 1990s, is still continuing.

As in the 1990s, China continues to give priority to military modernisation and transformation. The Gulf Wars of 1990-91 and 2003 appear to have had effects on Chinese defence thinking. In particular, China has begun to abandon its traditional emphasis on large low-technology ground forces and has embarked on a major programme of military modernisation. In the aftermath of the second Gulf War China is putting even more effort into the development of ‘networked C4SIR systems’ and psychological operations (IISS, The Military Balance 2004-05: 161). With the launch of the Shenzhou-V in October 2003 and Shenzhou-VI two years later, China became the third country to achieve a manned space mission.

Meanwhile Taiwan continues to buy sophisticated weapons systems from the US and, under the terms of the 15 procurement bill sent to the Legislative Yuan on 2 June 2004, it will add PAC-3 – Patriot Advanced Capability – currently under development for the US Army to destroy in-coming short-range missiles to its defence system (IISS, The Military Balance 2004-05: 163). North Korea, too, is developing advanced weapons systems. Having tested the Taepo-dong 1 missile in 1998, it was reported in early June 2004 that Pyongyang had conducted an engine test for the Taepo-dong 2, a missile with an estimated maximum range of 6,000km (IISS, The Military Balance 2004-05: 163).

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21 C4SIR refers capabilities for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.
South Korea has also been active. It is possible that, in 2011, war-time operational control of Korean forces will pass from the US to the South Korean authorities (Chosun Ilbo 5 June 2006), a development likely to encourage South Korea to seek to bolster its military capability. In 2002 Seoul, purchased forty multi-role aircraft – the F-15K advanced derivative of the F-15E Strike Eagle – for its Next Generation Fighter program under a $3.6bn contract with Boeing. Recently it was reported (Huaqiu Shibao 31 May 2006) that, under a $2bn plan, Seoul would buy a further twenty F-15Ks, with deliveries beginning in 2009. The plan was approved at a Defence Ministry meeting in May 2006 as part of a medium term arms acquisition project running from 2007 to 2011. Analysts believe that the acquisition of these highly sophisticated aircraft, marks a crucial step towards the realisation of South Korea’s ambition to achieve ‘national self defence’, and could significantly alter the balance of air power in Northeast Asia (People’s Daily 2 June 2006).

Since the mid 1990s, Japan has embarked on a programme of the development of sea-based missile defence systems in cooperation with the US. The programme began in 1994 with the joint US-Japanese study of Theatre Missile Defence (TMD), which gave rise to the short-range ballistic missile defence systems (BMD). Towards the end of 1998, Tokyo decided to participate in a technical Navy Theatre Wide project (NTW) (Umemoto 2003: 187) – involving upper-tier long-range BMD systems to be deployed on Aegis-Equipped cruisers or destroyers. Taniguchi notes that, apart from the US, Japan is the only country to possess ‘the Aegis-equipped destroyers needed as platforms for sea-based, “mid-course” missile defence weapon systems’ (Taniguchi 2005: 453-4). In December 2003, Tokyo decided to continue to proceed with upper-tier and lower-tier BMD elements – which will be installed on four Aegis-equipped Kongou-class destroyers, and to approve the upgrade of 16 Patriot fire units, delivering a PAC-3 interception capability (IISS, The Military Balance 2004-05: 163).

Together with the various disputes, conflicts and crises, the military build up in Northeast Asia seems to confirm the prediction made by Friedberg in the early 1990s. The nuclearisation of North Korea could lead to a similar development in South Korea and Japan. In turn this might prompt China to accelerate and expand its own nuclear programmes – which would then influence the defence policies of Taiwan. Hence, a
'rapid and multifaceted expansion of nuclear capabilities could increase the dangers of misperception, miscalculation, and war' (Friedberg1993/94: 25). So far war has been avoided but competition among the regional actors and balancing behaviour are certainly growing.

8.3 The Interregional Level

Almost by definition, Great Powers have interests that extend over large areas; it follows, therefore, that rivalries between China and Japan will be similarly wide-ranging. Indeed, Sino-Japanese rivalry extends beyond Northeast Asia to include Southeast Asia as well. Both China and Japan have important interests and possess considerable influence in this part of the world. While China’s links have a strong historical base, Japan’s presence is a more recent development and stems largely from its economic ties. In many ways, the effects of both the reduced influence of the Soviet Union/Russia and the expectation of a declining of US presence and commitment in East Asia clearly pointed to an increase in the relative importance of China and Japan. In this post-Cold War environment, Sino-Japanese relations face new challenges and tests. Strategic options between bilateral and multilateral approaches are often exploited with considerable skill to serve the national interests of the major protagonists.

8.3.1 Japan’s New Initiatives

With the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Russian threat, Japan began to focus on China’s strategic ambitions (Yahuda 1996: 248). China is now ‘less constrained by outside powers than at any time during the twentieth century’ (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 156). Given the perceived ineffectiveness of attempts to bring pressure on China through bilateral means alone, Tokyo has developed a new tactic; it seeks to achieve its objectives through a combination of bilateral and multilateral pressures.

Japan’s bilateral relations with Southeast Asian nations remain important policy tools in furthering its search for a favourable political and military balance through the establishment of effective deterrence in East Asia. As Drifte (2002: 140-42) observes,
since the 1990s, Tokyo has made increasing use of bilateral security dialogues with its Southeast Asian partners. In particular, relations with Burma and Vietnam have become an important part of Tokyo’s strategic balancing against China. For example, Japan’s relatively sympathetic attitude towards the oppressive Rangoon regime stems from a desire to prevent Burma falling into the Chinese orbit. Similarly, the rapid improvement in Japan’s relations with Vietnam – including high level politico-military talks – also seems to be aimed at containing China. The Vietnamese have many grievances against China, so much so that the two countries appear natural enemies. Under these circumstances, the Japanese approach to Vietnam offers a classic example of the ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’ scenario, which lies at the core of much realist analysis. In turn this indicates that realist assumptions, with their accompanying balance of power logic, remain influential in the minds of policy makers in East Asia.

Japan’s approach to security in the post-Cold War era involves another dimension; it seeks to act as a facilitator of multilateralism, as evidenced in its role at the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Meeting, held in Kuala Lumpur in July 1991. Taro Nakayama, then Japanese Foreign Minister, proposed the institutionalisation of an annual forum on regional security matters. This initiative – particularly in the light of US opposition and negative reactions from ASEAN countries – represented ‘a bold departure’ from the essentially ‘reactive policy’ followed by Japan on issues of regional security during the Cold-War era (Midford 2000: 368). The 1991 initiative, taken further in Japan’s subsequent diplomacy, played an important part in the foundation of an inter-governmental multilateral security forum – the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) – in 1994 (see Yuzawa 2005: 71-97).

Tokyo certainly viewed multilateral mechanisms as a means of promoting its strategic purposes in the new environment. But Japan’s calculations were probably complex, resting on a belief that a multilateral mechanism could serve its interests in a variety of scenarios. One crucial variable was the likely future relationship with the United States. If the US were to remain a major power in the region, the multilateral mechanism could provide a suitable framework for Japanese-American cooperation in terms of broader regional security, but yet the same mechanism could also be used to protect Japanese interests in the event of US withdrawal (Green 1999: 164).
Secondly, Tokyo saw multilateral mechanisms as useful means to reassure neighbouring Asian countries about its own intentions; Midford (2002) calls this Japan’s ‘grand strategy’. The end of the Cold War – especially the decline of Soviet power and doubts about continued US commitment in the region – had inevitably focussed more attention on the actual and potential power of Japan. Given the extreme suspicion with which its neighbours view Japan, Tokyo developed its ‘grand strategy’ whereby it would use multilateral mechanisms both to ensure continuing US engagement and to dissuade its Asian neighbours from balancing against it (for a detailed account, see Midford 2000; 2002).

Last but by no means least, Japan probably saw multilateral mechanisms as means both to engage and constrain China, a power that was not only becoming stronger and more assertive but also often fostered historically based hostility to Japan – both in its own population and in other neighbouring states. The China factor is certainly one of the reasons why the US and ASEAN countries are changing their attitude towards the creation of ARF. Thus, the declared purpose of the Forum was to help ASEAN and its dialogue partners to work with other regional states to evolve a predictable and constructive pattern of relationships in Asia-Pacific. It is also widely believed that ‘the key object was to draw China into a pattern of constructive engagement’ (Yahuda 1996: 248).

Two obvious questions arise. First, will multilateral fora really work as vehicles for engaging and constraining China and hence make China a ‘good citizen’? Secondly, will these fora bring closer relations between China and Japan? Many neorealists doubt whether institutions can ‘tie down’ strong countries like China. Friedberg (2000: 154) argues, that unlike small countries, a great power has more opportunity to ‘impose its will on the others’, and hence such powers are ‘more likely to defect and to act unilaterally when their interests are truly challenged.’ China has shown signs of doing precisely that in Southeast Asia, particularly in disputes over the South China Sea.

8.3.2 China’s Responses

China’s response to the creation of multilateral fora has been mixed. Although cautious, China did not challenge Japan’s role in launching the ARF, an essentially consultative
China’s leaders were pleased to be invited to join, or did not want to be left out, believing that membership would bring benefits (Yahuda 2002). Japan, too, was not too disappointed with the outcome, not least because, by the mid-1990s, the ARF seemed to be providing Japan with a favourable environment for conducting relations with China. As Green (1999: 164) observes, Tokyo found the multilateral forum made it easier to express concerns over China and to put pressure on Beijing to behave well in future. Significantly, Japan also found that, while its bilateral suspension of grant aid to China in 1995, by itself, did little to force Beijing to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, implicit criticism made by the multilateral ARF had considerably more impact on Chinese thinking.

In August 1995, at the ARF Ministerial Meeting in Brunei, Qian Qichen, China’s Foreign Minister, declared that China would seek to resolve the South China Sea dispute peacefully based on principles embodied in the Law of the Sea Convention – though claiming that China’s claim did not contradict the freedom of navigation through international waterways in the South China Sea. In some sense, it can be seen that the incident forced China’s acquiescence in allowing the South China Sea dispute onto the formal agenda of the ARF (Scott 1996). Yet, the relatively accommodating behaviour also indicated that China wanted to avoid ‘a coalition being built against it’ (Segal 1996: 129).

However, there are limits to what China is prepared to concede. Apparent readiness to resolve disputes through multilateral agreement does not extend to all areas. In some, the Chinese position is inflexible and confrontational. Beijing refuses to discuss any issues related to its military modernisation programme, to its wide-ranging maritime claims, or to the Taiwan problem. China considers these matters its own ‘internal affairs’ and hence not subject to multilateral discussions or resolutions (Shambaugh 1996: 96).

Suspicions as well as calculations lay behind China’s confrontational attitude. Particularly up to the Asian financial crisis, Beijing often viewed regionalism and

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22 Winston Lord’s Statement at Department of State, USINFO, Released 11 June 1996; also see, Scott 1996.
multilateralism as covers for the advancement of Japanese interests and hence refused to take cooperation beyond a certain point (Deng 1997). As a strong and rising power, it may be in China’s interest to deal with its neighbours bilaterally, rather than ‘internationalise’ issues (Segal 1996: 114). Things are further complicated by the rise of Chinese nationalism. With the rapid advance of its economic and military power, China seems determined to correct perceived historical injustices, resulting from earlier interventions by the major powers. It believes that its increased military capacity will allow it to impose settlements on its own terms.

8.3.3 The South China Sea

In the 1990s, attention focused on the Spratly Islands of the South China Sea. For strategic, economic, and nationalistic reasons, the Islands are claimed either in whole or in part by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines. As China’s power increased, regional fears about its intentions intensified. Concern deepened when, in February 1992, China promulgated a Territorial Waters Law that reiterated its claim to the Spratly Islands and allowed the naval wing of the PLA to use force to protect its sovereignty.

In 1994 a dispute between China and Vietnam arose over Spratly Islands. There were a number of incidents, including one in which Vietnamese forces chased off Chinese boats operating in Vietnamese-controlled waters around the islands. More alarmingly, in 1995, China occupied Mischief Reef, also claimed by the Philippines. In January 1995, the Philippines discovered that China had built installations on Mischief Reef and left troops behind to guard them. Southeast Asia as a whole was shocked, as this was the first time that China had seized territory claimed by an ASEAN state (Segal 1996: 121). The occupation raised suspicion that China was in the process of building a naval outpost. It also shattered the belief that China would act only against Vietnam in the South China Sea (Dobson and Fravel 1997: 259).

At the 1995 ARF meeting, the Chinese did say that they were willing to discuss the South China Sea dispute with all ASEAN countries, but in general they have resisted regional solutions preferring instead to deal on a bilateral basis. On occasion, they have suggested that conflicting sovereign claims could be put aside for the time being –
though not abandoned – to allow economic resources to be developed jointly. In the absence of a resolution of the dispute, however, Beijing continues its policy of incremental occupation, while ASEAN has failed to take a strong stand.

Although Japan was not directly involved in these disputes, the events in the South China Sea increased Japanese determination to keep the sea lanes open, and raised fears that China might use force in bilateral disputes (Drifte 2002: 134; Segal 1996: 125). Thus, Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea reinforced growing doubts about long-term Chinese intentions. These concerns brought major changes to Japan’s strategic thinking in the mid-1990s – including renewed emphasis on ties with the United States and to more explicit and public expressions of reservations about China’s aggressive policies. The Spratlys case also reinforced Japan’s recalculation of its nascent Asia strategy (Johnstone 1999). In short, Japan’s enthusiasm for regional security multilateralism has been waning; in stead it put greater emphasis on the US-Japan alliance (Yuzawa 2005).

8.3.4 Asian Financial Crisis

The inability of ASEAN and ARF to provide an effective response to the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 revealed serious flaws in these regional institutions. In the face of crisis, regional actors were disunited and displayed clear signs of rivalry. The viability of the ARF was undermined by the decreased capacity and disunity of ASEAN. This was because the ARF itself was largely based upon the experience and principles of ASEAN – in short on the so-called ASEAN way. ASEAN also provided leadership, which was often described as a ‘driver’ for regional institutions. However, ASEAN’s response to the crisis was widely perceived as inadequate, despite the various initiatives and measures it undertook (for a detailed account see: Soesastro 1998; Funston 1998). Moreover, the domestic turbulence caused by the crisis, and disunity about how it should be handled, seriously weakened ASEAN’s leadership role and its commitment to the ARF. In turn this undermined the processes, such as the promotion of confidence building and preventive diplomatic measures, which the ARF had been seeking to foster (Simon 1998).
Thus, with the diminished effectiveness of ASEAN in regional institutional building, the role of great powers, such as Japan and China, acquired greater prominence. Yet the crisis also reinforced the concerns of the great powers – Japan, China and the US – and made them more suspicious of others’ intentions. The complexity of the situation was revealed in Japan’s failure to carry its proposal for the creation of an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), intended to help regional economies in future currency crises. The proposal was rejected by Beijing, ‘a clear indication that China was prepared to blunt Japanese efforts to exert regional leadership’ (Johnstone 1999: 377). More decisively, the proposal was opposed by Washington. The US – the indispensable co-architect of a financial rescue package put together by the IMF, the World Bank and others – feared that an AMF would offer loans under less stringent conditions than the IMF, thus undercutting the Fund’s authority (Johnstone 1999: 377). Washington also saw the AMF as a threat to its influence in Asia. Tokyo was disappointed by and suspicious of these negative responses – which even suggested Sino-American cooperation directed against Japan. Yet, in reality, relations between Washington and Beijing were not improving. China remains highly suspicious of the renewed and more wide-ranging ties between Japan and the US. Strikingly, the revision of the Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation was immediately followed by the financial crisis.

While the immediate effects of the financial crisis may have been unfortunate, however, its longer-term consequences may have been more salutary. The crisis shocked the region into realising that unity among the widely disparate nations was vital. It opened the door to the establishment of fora, such as ASEAN plus Three and the East Asia summit. Thus in the new millennium there has been much talk about East Asian community building. However, regional disagreements remain as to the terms and conditions on which a regional community should be built. In February 2006, a symposium attended by politicians, researchers and journalists from Japan and ASEAN countries even concluded that regional integration was at the ‘midnight’ hour, far from ‘dawn’ (Asahi Shimbun 8 March 2006).
8.4 The Global Level

8.4.1 The United States: a Guarantor of Regional Security

The interplay between regional and global levels is particularly significant in Northeast Asia. Taking the power position perspective, since there is no strong alternative security mechanism in place, the role of the US is crucial to the maintenance of security and stability in Northeast Asia and for preservation of reasonably stable relations between China and Japan (Friedberg 1993/94: 31, 32; 2000: 156; Yahuda 1996: 259; 2002; Deng 1998: 105). Strategically, despite the end of the Cold War, the United States is still by far the most dominant power in the region.

The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the former Soviet Union effectively removed Russia as a major player in the region, while US engagement continues essentially unchanged. But will this continue? The decision in June 2004 to withdraw some of the US forces from South Korea pointed to a change of policy and it is now clear that by 2011, South Korea will assume wartime control of its forces (Chosun Ilbo 5 June 2006). But this does not mean that the US is losing interest in Korea. As General Leon Laporte remarked on 31 March 2004, shortly before the June decision, changes in US force structure would enhance, rather than reduce, South Korean defence capability. In reality the changes would reflect improvements in the combined military capabilities of US and South Korean units – through force modernisation and interoperability. He emphasised America’s commitment as ‘an enduring United States military presence in Korea and a stronger alliance’. American commitment to Japan has actually increased and its bases in Japan and South Korea with associated naval and air power are unrivalled in the region.

The significance of US commitment was evident in periods of difficulty involving both Korea and Taiwan. Since the early 1990s, tensions arising from the suspected North Korean nuclear weapons programme have given the US new reasons for maintaining its

23 Remark delivered on 31 March 2004 to the House Armed Services Committee of the US. Can be accessed through USINFO, Department of States, at http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive/2004/Jun/29-535351.html.
commitment to the region. These were made more pressing by the divergence of responses and interests among the regional powers when dealing with the Korean crisis of 1993-94: the unwillingness of the Chinese to support sanctions against the North (Kihl 1997: x); the inability of Japan to take an initiative or to give a proper support to the US (Armacost and Pyle 2001); and the unlikelihood of regional actors addressing problems in any meaningful multilateral way (Yahuda 1996: 275). At the high point of the Korean crisis, it was the US, virtually alone, that managed to secure the ‘Agreed Framework’ with North Korea in October 1994.

The 1995-96 Taiwan crisis also demonstrated that the continued US engagement was crucial for regional stability. In the event, it was the military superiority of the US and its strong response to China’s military threats that seemed to restrain Beijing (Matsuda 2004: 11). Deng (1998: 107) argues that the US decision to send two aircraft carriers to the waters adjacent to the Taiwan Strait in defiance of Beijing ‘was tacitly welcomed by many in the region, such as ASEAN and Japan, as it signalled the United States’ continued security commitment to this region’. There can be no doubt that there is common concern in the region about the instability and arms races that would probably follow any significant American withdrawal.

The United States also plays a crucial role in maintaining stable relations between China and Japan. Because its security commitment ensures that China’s increasing strength can be offset. Conversely, ‘American power is the linchpin that holds Japan in place’ (Friedberg 1993/4: 32). Without US protection, Japan would feel compelled to re-arm itself rapidly, especially in light of the threat from the Korean Peninsula and China. Thus Deng (1998: 105) argues, ‘Anchoring Japan in the U.S. dominated security framework is the only way to put a brake on Japanese ambition to acquire military and political power commensurate with its economic clout’. Despite all problems in the relationship between the US and China, in the last resort Beijing gives tacit acquiescence to America’s military role in the Western Pacific – because it restrains militaristic tendencies in Japan. Indeed, despite recent arms build ups, it is likely that the arms race would have been on an even larger scale had it not been for the stabilising role of the United States. Such considerations led Yahuda (2002:10) to conclude that currently, stable relations between China and Japan are ‘only possible because of the role played by the United States’. In other words, the American alliance with Japan
assures the Chinese that ‘the cork remains on the bottle of Japanese “militarism”’. Yet there are still areas of uncertainty – will the US remained committed indefinitely and, if so, how will it respond to the growing power of China?

### 8.4.2 Problems of US Commitment

One of the common concerns about Northeast Asian regional security is the credibility of US security commitment. Factors that could bring a sudden and dramatic change to the present US posture include domestic constraints, trade disputes with key allies, and divergences of strategy and interest between America and one or more of those allies. Concerns about possible US withdrawal were particularly acute in the aftermath of the Cold War, a time of growing US-Japanese trade frictions. Yet the crises over Korea and the Taiwan Strait in the mid 1990s gave the US a new interest in the region and seemed to raise the level of its commitment. But it is not clear whether this reassertion of American involvement will prove short-lived or long lasting; in other words doubts about the strength of American commitment remain. Friedberg (2000:156) points out, ‘As the history of the past decade should suggest, political arrangements that appear fixed and unshakeable today can disappear almost overnight’. He is clearly sceptical about American assurances of long-term commitment, insisting that continued US strategic engagement just cannot be ‘assumed into the indefinite future’ (Friedberg 2000: 156).

As discussed above, the major fears about a change to American policy centre upon Japan’s likely response and upon the possibility of a much-accelerated regional arms build up. As the logic of security dilemma suggests, the danger of any sudden American withdrawal is that, faced with an increasingly hostile environment, ‘Japan would be forced to seek diplomatic reassurance and military self-reliance. These steps, in turn, could finalize its estrangement from the United States and further fuel the anxieties of its neighbours’ (Friedberg 1993/4:31). But American withdrawal is not the only concern; continued American presence could also cause problems. While the US commitment to Northeast Asia may help to preserve a measure of long-term regional balance, many analysts fear that it could also lead to conflicts and perhaps a series of confrontations – particularly in the light of China’s rapid growth (Friedberg 2000; Roy 2003; Shambaugh 2000).
In the post-Cold War era, with the decline of the Soviet threat, the US role in Northeast Asia and its relations with Japan and China have become more complex and difficult. In the 1970s and 1980s, the US, Japan and China went through a period of relatively ‘comfortable trilateral security dynamics’ (Green 1999: 156), in which all three enjoyed ‘positive relations with one another’. But this happy state of affairs did not last (Vogel 2002: 1). From the mid 1990s, it became clear that they had fewer shared interests and hence elements of suspicion and competition have increased. Two developments are especially relevant: the enhancement of the US-Japanese alliance alarms China, while the dramatic rise of China challenges the leadership of the US.

**The Enhanced US-Japan Alliance**

In the mid 1990s, in order to respond to the changing environment and increasing uncertainties, the US and Japan began to redefine and strengthen their alliance structure. Steps included revision of the 1976 National Defense Program Outline in 1995; the US-Japanese Joint Declaration on Security in 1996; and the revision of the 1978 Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation in 1997. These developments have induced Beijing to take a different view of Washington-Tokyo security arrangements. In the past, the US-Japanese alliance appeared to serve China’s interests well. Above all the alliance seemed to offer a guarantee against the return of militarism in Japan. Some Chinese likened the American role to a ‘bottle cap’ – keeping the Japanese military genie in the bottle (Liu 1998). In the 1970s and 1980s, the alliance also aided China’s strategic objectives by containing the Soviet Union. However, with the removal of the Soviet/Russian threat, Beijing fears that the enhanced US-Japanese alliance is increasingly aimed at containing China.

But the biggest question for China is whether the US-Japanese alliance will continue to ‘be a force containing Japan as it has been in the past’ (Garret and Glaser 1997: 384, 390, 401). Beijing would become totally hostile if the real purpose of the concluded alliance was now to counter China, that it was no longer performing its ‘bottle stop’ role and actually becoming a device for letting the genie of Japanese militarism out of the bottle. Beijing does not believe that Japan will emerge as an independent military power in its own right in the near future; its concern is that it will play a more active security
role in the region in support of the United States (Liu 1998; Xaopu Wang 2005; Yahuda 2002). It is precisely such concerns that colour China’s suspicions about the revision of US-Japanese security arrangements and opposition to Japan’s commitment to TMD research.

Thus, a major problem arising from the enhancement of US-Japanese security cooperation in the post-Cold War era is the increasing difficulty of persuading China that it has nothing to worry about; thus making it harder to maintain the so-called triangular relations among the big three. This difficulty further exacerbated by China’s rapid growth and its revisionist tendencies. With the ending of bipolarity, particularly after George W. Bush became President, Sino-American relations have become increasingly characterised by so-called ‘strategic competition’.

**The Rise of China: A Strategic Competitor?**

If there were shared interests and limited cooperation between the US and China until the early 1990s, thereafter those interests seemed to diverge and hence the previous limited co-operation was replaced by increasing competition. At least for the time being, there is a paradox about the relationship, one reflecting aspects of power transition theory. On the one hand, China is already a rapidly growing, yet dissatisfied power that inevitably challenges US leadership. On the other hand, China still lacks ‘the desire, political influence, and military power to contest the United States globally’ (Shambaugh 2000: 99). Thus, while ‘the two nations are vying for strategic pre-eminence and leadership in East Asia’ (Shambaugh 2000: 99), China is not yet a ‘potential hegemon’ (Mearsheimer 2001) seeking either to challenge US dominance or to take over the international system in the immediate future.

Thus, in so far as China challenges the US, it does so in a limited way. The present ‘strategic competition’ relationship between China and the US is different fundamentally from the one between ‘strategic adversaries’, characteristic of Soviet-American relations during the Cold war period. The difference cannot be ascribed solely to China’s continuing material inferiority to the US, but also stems from the fact that, to some extent, China still benefits from the current international system. It is in China’s interest to cooperate with the US in certain areas, such as the prevention of
nuclear proliferation in the Korean peninsula. However, even if China accepts some aspects of the current international system, denying any intention to dominate or extend its hegemony over the Asia-Pacific region, it is decidedly uncomfortable with the current American-dominated regional-security architecture. Neither will Beijing be satisfied until the other major powers and neighbouring countries have sufficient regard for its wishes to refrain from implementing any major foreign policy that displeases China (Shambaugh 2000: 99; Roy 2003: 74).

Thus, it is often argued that, as China grows stronger, it will become more assertive and will expect to be accorded even greater leadership rights. Roy has already claimed that ‘Beijing is quietly preparing the ground for a future era in which, essentially, Chinese international leadership has waxed and American leadership has waned’ (Roy 2003: 70). Indeed, since the end of the Cold War, Beijing has been expressing its opposition to US hegemony and asserting its strong preference for a multi-polar world, where American supremacy would be constrained while China’s power and influence would roughly equal to that of the other great powers.

As noted earlier, faced with the uncertainties of the post-Cold War environment, Washington has been strengthening its alliances and security partnerships in Northeast Asia. To counter these developments, Beijing has been building its ties with Moscow. Since 1997 Beijing has also been promoting a New Security Concept or NSC (see, the regional level section in this chapter) in East Asia. Since the NSC is based on opposition to the Cold War mentality of military alliances, it is often seen as having been designed ‘to circumvent Washington’s well-established alliance networks’ (Deng and Moore 2004: 125). Many events since 2005 suggest that the climate of mutual suspicion and rivalry between the US and China has intensified, and there are much talks about the ‘emerging US-China conflict’ (Klare 2006).

In the first place, there are signs that Washington is increasingly alarmed by China’s speedy military build-up across the Taiwan Strait. On 16 February 2006, the CIA Director, Porter Goss, warned a hearing of the Senate Select Committee that ‘Beijing’s military modernization and military build-up [are] tilting the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait’, and hence threatened US forces in the region. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld agreed, adding that China’s increasing military muscle was an issue the
Department of Defense ‘thinks about and is concerned about and is attentive to’ (USINFO, 18 February 2005). There can be little doubt that this concern lay behind the identification of Taiwan as a ‘common strategic object’ in the joint statement issued by the US and Japan to the 2+2 talks in February 2005. Wenran Jiang states explicitly:

Washington has not yet labeled China an “outpost of tyranny,” as North Korea, but warnings of a China threat and a recent joint US-Japanese statement designating Taiwan as a “common strategic objective” have marked a new turn on Asia’s security chessboard. It remains to be seen whether the emerging divide will force other countries to choose sides. Beijing, however, will likely confront a potential containment with new counter-measures (Wenran Jiang 2005).

Of course, Beijing was greatly alarmed by the reference to Taiwan in the joint statement. Li Jiaquan, China’s leading expert on Taiwan, argued that while the statement ostensibly sought a ‘peaceful resolution of the Taiwan problem’, this was merely a device to give the US and Japan an excuse to support Taiwan’s ‘peaceful independence’. He went on to define China’s stance in stark terms: US and Japan’s objectives risked the stability and security of the Taiwan Strait because ‘Taiwan’s independence’ would mean war to China (Huanqiu Shibao 21 February 2005). In wider terms, Beijing regarded the statement as an excuse for the military expansion of the US-Japan alliance, whose real purpose was to contain China (Tatsumi 2005).

Against this backdrop, China not only continues to purchase modern military equipment from Russia, but also increases its efforts to expand the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) – one of Beijing’s major policy achievements under its NSC. Formally established in 2001, and consisting of China, Russia and four Central Asian countries – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan – SCO is supposed to be dedicated to combating the ‘threats posed by terrorism, separatism and extremism and illegal drug trafficking’. Yet, the growing power of China has prompted a rethink in Washington, where conservative analysts have concluded that the SCO could have a far more ambitious role. They believe that China intends to use it as nothing less than an embryonic rival to NATO (Guardian 15 June 2006). These fears have been strengthened since 2004 as Mongolia, Iran, Pakistan and India have been accepted as
observers and Afghanistan as a guest nation, while the US’s application for observer status has been rejected.

The fifth annual summit meeting of the SCO was held in Shanghai on 15 June 2006. The presence of the representatives of states strongly opposed to the US – notably Iran – must increase concerns about the organisation’s potential role as a counterweight to the US (Asia Times 16 June 2006; Guardian 15 June 2006). Although the summit has not given Iran full membership of the SCO – as the Iranians wished – the Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, received a warm welcome in Shanghai despite his country's problems with international nuclear inspectors over Tehran’s uranium enrichment program. It is true that the 2006 summit has not expanded the SCO’s membership and its communiqué – with its emphasis on combating terrorism – does not strike a different note to communiqués produced after previous summits. Nevertheless, some commentators, such as Klare, still see the SCO as a possible ‘mini NATO’ or ‘anti NATO’, which could become a counter-bloc to the United States in Central Asia. He further argues that ‘the Russians and the Chinese hope that it will help them turn back US influence in the energy-rich Islamic territories of the former Soviet Union’ (Klare 2006).

Thus, regional and global level interplay suggests that lack of an institutionalised security structure and the absence of a proper strategic understanding between Japan and China, means that Northeast Asian regional security depends heavily on the United States as a security guarantor. The US security role has been and will continue to be the most important factor in Northeast Asia. However in the post Cold War environment, US involvement as an external player appears to be problematic; either its sudden withdrawal or its enhanced commitment seem likely to bring destabilising effects.
Conclusion to Part III

This part has examined the politico-military dimension of Northeast Asian regional security through the neorealist lens. From this perspective, the most decisive change in Northeast Asia in the 1990s was the distribution and redistribution of power generated by the rise of China and the fall of the Soviet Union. Such a shift in the power balance inevitably and decisively changed the strategic context of the region. In particular, the historical rivalry between China and Japan has led to increased competition over Northeast and Southeast Asia. Many disputes, tensions and crises have heightened Sino-Japanese competition. Events also revealed that neither China nor Japan could use multilateral fora to address regional security problems in a meaningful way.

Thus, the US, an external player, has become the ring holder of Northeast Asian regional security. However the problem remains because there are still doubts about the certainty of US commitment and fears of possible conflicts between China and the US. This is why many realists are so sceptical of the future security outlook in Northeast and East Asia. Thus Friedberg (2000: 148) concludes that it is as ‘difficult to achieve a stable, lasting peace in a multipolar Asia as it was in Europe in the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth centuries’.
9 Conclusion: Towards an East Asian ‘Security Regime’?

This thesis has analysed Sino-Japanese relations and the Northeast Asian security order in the post-Cold War era. It has sought to do this by examining a variety of sectors and levels and by investigating material and social variables. The story of Northeast Asia is by no means straightforward; it is extremely multi-faceted and answers are rarely clear-cut. Yet, despite all the complexities of relations between peoples and states – perhaps because of them – the region provides an ideal ‘testing ground’ for the application of security analysis and for evaluation of contending theoretical approaches. In this concluding chapter, I first ask whether a level of ‘security regime’ is in place in the Northeast Asian RSC. I conclude that such a regime does exist – while also assessing how firmly and deeply it is now established. I then consider the implications of this case study for the various theories explored earlier – that is, whether they provide useful lenses to assist understanding of Northeast Asian security dynamics or whether entirely new theories, more relevant to Asian reality, are needed.

9.1 An East Asian ‘Security Regime’?

Has the Northeast Asian RSC moved or can it move from a level of ‘conflict formation’ to one of ‘security regime’, or even ‘security community’? As stated in chapter 2, RSCT views RSCs as essentially social constructions. From this perspective, it follows that social processes – such as identity building, changes in amity/enmity relations, norm settings and their internalisation – are to be seen as more important than forces external to these processes in determining whether the structure of the Northeast Asian RSC remains in ‘conflict formation’ mode or is transformed into a higher level of interaction.

Drawing on materials from case studies and investigation of both pessimistic and optimistic analyses, I believe that Northeast Asia has not yet reached a level of ‘security community’. Nevertheless, together with Southeast Asian countries, it has probably managed to form what might be called a single ‘East Asian security regime’. This does not mean that East Asia no longer faces security challenges or that balance of power logic has become irrelevant. Serious security problems could well continue to arise – as exemplified by present troubled state of the Korean peninsula. Yet considerable changes
have taken place across East Asia in the post-Cold War era, particularly after the Asian financial crisis. While changes in the balance of power continue to influence the behaviour of states, international society in the East Asian region is now more securely established than in the Cold War era, or even in comparison to the early 1990s. Regional actors, including the great powers, increasingly appear to be moving towards a higher level of what Alagappa (2003) calls ‘rule-governed interaction’, while the role of force is becoming more limited. In short, these changes seem to mean that the enlarged East Asian RSC now conforms to Jervis’s definition of a security regime.

A ‘Security Regime’: Jervis’ Definition

There is a fundamental difference between a ‘security regime’ and a ‘security community’. A ‘security community’ assumes a long-term habit of peaceful interaction and rules out the use of force in settling disputes with other members of the group (see Adler and Barnett 1998). Obviously, the use of force remains a possibility in the Northeast Asian RSC. However, a ‘security regime’ only involves acceptance of those principles, rules, and norms that ‘permit nations to be restrained in their behaviour in the belief that others will reciprocate’ (Jervis 1982: 357). Under a security regime, relations between members are not always harmonious. They may be harmonious but disputes and conflicts are possible. However, when disputes or conflicts do occur, Jervis’s definition suggests that members will cooperate to deal with them. There is also a belief that ‘war and individualistic pursuit of security’ is costly, and hence an expectation of ‘self-constraints on states’ behaviour’ arises when disputes occur (Jervis 1982: 360-62). But how well does the enlarged East Asian RSC fit Jervis’s definition of a security regime? Have its members exhibited any willingness or ability to cooperate in dealing with security problems and is there any regional expectation of mutual or general self-constraint? To use RSCT terminology, has the degree of amity / enmity risen to a more friendly level or descended to one of greater animosity?

In the post-Cold War period, particularly in the early and mid 1990s, it was precisely these kinds of security concerns that dominated the East Asian security environment. As discussed in chapters 6 and 8, the region faced serious security challenges. Tensions, crises, even possible wars, resulted from longstanding territorial disputes, and over sovereignty and status rivalries. In addition to these concerns, there were decisive
changes in the distribution of power. The rapid rise of China – especially against a background of declining Russian influence, an apparently stagnant Japan and the seeming uncertainty surrounding continued US commitment – indicated that a multipolar system was emerging. These developments pointed to the likelihood of great power rivalry and major wars (Friedberg 1993/94). Moreover, the international society in Northeast / East Asia was poorly developed; the signs of economic interdependence were still weak and there were no meaningful regional multilateral security mechanisms. In such circumstances, any temporary peace and stability was attributed to the preponderance of US power in the region. This perception appeared vindicated at the time of the Korean and Taiwan Strait crises of the mid-1990s – when the US certainly demonstrated its power and its capacity to play the role of a ‘ring holder’ in Northeast Asian security.

The role of the United States is certainly a key issue when deciding whether there is really a security regime in East Asia. It may be inappropriate to speak of such a regime if regional security and stability was maintained exclusively by an external power and by material factors such as the balance of power. But are these external and material factors the only variables that maintain security and stability? I believe that other factors are at work and hence I am led to the conclusion that it is appropriate to describe the East Asian RSC as a ‘security regime’. Recent developments indicate that a regional society has been emerging and developing in East Asia and these provide the main rationale for my assertion.

Despite the continuing presence of many critical challenges to regional security – such as recurrent crises, continuing shifts in the balance of power, and regional rivalries and competitions – it is important to stress that these problems have been contained to a certain degree. Regional security mechanisms are finally emerging and regional actors appear to be more willing to seek their own solutions to security challenges. In other words, although the US remains important, it is no longer the sole factor in maintaining regional security and stability. There is now increased regional cooperation and a greater degree of self-restraint. Of course, questions remain as to the extent of these changes – in other words, whether or not they have become deeply internalised. Here we must ask if the changes have really changed actors’ identities and their interests, and facilitated the formation of collective identity in the region. If something like this has
occurred, what has been the effect on their securitisation practices? These questions have emerged strongly from my case studies and the best way to answer them is through more detailed investigation of the domestic, regional and global levels.

9.1.1 Domestic Changes

If a security regime already exists in East Asia – however precariously – will it dissolve and the region descend into conflict and war or will it become more firmly established and perhaps even advance to become a security community? Here, domestic developments in both China and Japan are crucial. As two great powers in the same region, their relationship has often been considered primarily in terms of power projections and rivalries. Up to a point this is legitimate, but evolutions and changes in their respective domestic characters also need close attention – a point emphasised by social constructivists. They argue that, if the structure is conceptualised in social rather than material terms, the identities and interests of the component units acquire greater importance than the distribution of power (see chapter 2). Following the constructivists’ lines, when I examined the rise of China and its implications for a possible remilitarisation of Japan, I also addressed domestic normative developments in both countries: that is, changes in perceptions and attitudes towards international society in China, and growing social norms of pacifism and antimilitarism in Japan.

The Rise or ‘Peaceful Rise’ of China?

Since the introduction of the economic reform policy in 1979, China has experienced sustained economic growth. Its industrialisation and modernisation has been so successful that it seems probable that China will continue to rise through the ranks of the great powers, perhaps even to the point of bidding for superpower status (Buzan 2004b: 113-6). Yet opinions are sharply divided on the likely effects on the regional and international order. On the one hand, the ‘China threat’ thesis was particularly popular in the early and mid 1990s and still has adherents today; on the other, since the late 1990s, a growing body of opinion has argued that China can become a responsible great power.
A Malign Power?

From the neorealist power position perspective (see chapter 8), the security implications of the growth of China’s relative and absolute power in the region and in the world are almost entirely negative. Power transition theory postulates that rapidly rising powers are generally revisionist or dissatisfied powers, seeking to change the existing international order and to assert their influence. It is true that history provides many examples of coincidence between rapid internal development and external expansion; Imperial Germany and 1930s Japan come to mind. Neorealists see no reason why China should depart from this pattern (Huntington 1991:12; Waltz 2000). China has certainly displayed strong revisionist tendencies, and in many ways, practices traditional realpolitik. This is evident in rapidly increasing arms expenditure; arms sales and export of nuclear technology to Pakistan, Iran and elsewhere; assertiveness in territorial claims; and stated readiness to use force if necessary over the Taiwan issue. Thus, the dramatic rise of China has often led to a ‘China threat’ conclusion (see detailed account, Roy 1996).

In many respects, the end of the Cold War made the rise of China appear even more alarming, As Yahuda (2004: 209) points out, the immediate effects of the end of the bipolar system were ‘essentially power related’ in Northeast Asia – in sharp contrast to Europe, where ideological change was more obvious. Chinese power increased rapidly both absolutely and relatively. Its importance seemed all the greater when set against the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the problems of post-Communist Russia, the retreat of US hegemony (though soon reasserted) and the economic stagnation of Japan. To some extent these factors are still present and commentators believe that this shift in power positions will almost inevitably challenge US interests in the region and also provoke Japan. Hence, it must follow that Northeast Asia is heading towards power competition and instability (Friedberg 1993/93; Roy 1994; Taniguchi 2005), a situation in which Sino-Japanese rivalry becomes the most acute factor. Yet, does a rising China necessarily pose a threat to the existing international order? Could changes in its identity and interests in regional and international society make a difference?
**China Rejoins the World**

Until the early 1970s, the Communist state of The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was extremely isolated. The establishment of the PRC in October 1949 was a hugely significant event, which Zhang and Austin see as unique in the history of great powers. From its inception, the PRC developed ‘a set of uneasy and unusual social relations with global international society’ (Zhang and Austin 2001: 4). Ideologically, identification with the Soviet Union and its socialist allies, adherence to Marxism-Leninism, and the adoption of a centrally planned economic system, all meant that ‘China was a state that appeared to challenge many of the world-order policy goals that the United States and its allies had tried to build post-war’ (Foot 1995b: 15). Hence, the creation of the PRC represented a major step towards the division of the world into two power blocs characterised by mutually opposed ideologies.

The trend to isolation was intensified by the failure of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. China became internally chaotic and people lived in fear and poverty. Externally, Communist leaders vilified the international system and the organisations associated with it. They denounced arms control agreements and the international economic system, largely isolating themselves from world affairs. The rare contacts that did take place were with socialist and communist states or movements, mainly in the form of verbal, material, or military support for revolutions in Asia and liberation movements in the Third World. These initiatives challenged the dominant interests in the international system, particularly those of America. The result was to bring tension to the whole of East Asia.

However, since the early 1970s, particularly in the post-Maoist period and throughout the post-Cold War era, China has increasingly ‘integrated into’ and been ‘cooperative within’ regional and global political and economic systems (Johnston 2003: 5). Hence Oksenberg and Economy (1999) claim that China has ‘rejoined the world’, while Samuel Kim argues that China has abandoned its former role of ‘system challenger’ to become a ‘system maintainer’ or even a ‘system exploiter’ (Kim 2004b). In any event, Foot (2001: 35) concludes that China has at least stepped ‘inside the tent of international society’.
But what is the real significance of China’s integration into the global community and the adoption of cooperative behaviour within it? Before the mid-1990s, the answer was not clear, although China joined an increasing number of regional and international institutions. Since the late 1990s, however, the picture has become clearer. There can no longer be doubt that China has integrated into the international society. Two questions arise. Why has China decided to join so many regional and international multilateral organisations and regimes and to comply with their related norms and has its participation and practices within them changed its attitudes or even its identity?

**Internalisation and Socialisation**

Of the three degrees of internalisation identified by Wendt, the second – that of calculation – offers the most obvious explanation of China’s motives for joining multilateral institutions and for its subsequent compliance to the various norms associated with them. No doubt, positive and negative calculations were at work. Beijing did not want to be excluded from regional discussions because exclusion would be contrary to its interests. More positively, participation provided a potential opportunity to allay the concerns of other states, alarmed by China’s growing strength – especially by its defence modernisation programme. Adoption of the multilateral approach might also serve to undermine the political and moral bases of US efforts to strengthen its bilateral security ties in the region (Wu 1998). Even today, the element of calculation remains strong, as evidenced in the ‘peaceful rise’ strategy. Xiaoguangkai, chairman of Chinese Institute for International Strategic Studies, states explicitly that ‘China is trying to create a peaceful international environment for the benefit of its own growth and is trying to make its due contribution to world peace’.24 In other words, China’s engagement policy may be attributed to its desire to continue with its extraordinarily successful economic development.

Thus, the lack of genuine belief suggests that there are limitations and shallowness in its internalisation. This limitation is often reflected in China’s attitude towards those multilateral institutions – that is, China could not and did not want to share its perceived

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sensitive issues in multilateral settings. Yet, it is striking that, regardless of the initial reasons for participation, once China joined, the pattern of its involvement soon moved from caution to enthusiasm, a change especially striking in attitudes to regional security mechanisms. It took China less than five years to overcome its initial scepticism of multilateral fora and to become an active participant in the ARF and in many track-two processes (Foot 1998; Johnston and Evans 1999).

A more fundamental change in China’s attitude towards regional multilateralism took place after the Asian financial crisis and continues in the new millennium. Economic development and improved international status may have made China more confident. China gradually learned how regional and international institutions worked and, as a result, became more comfortable in multilateral gatherings. A prominent Chinese scholar and think-tank leader, Jin Chanrong (Interview, May 2005) explained that when China first joined multilateral institutions, its delegates felt that they were in a dark room, surrounded by enemies. However, once the light was on, they began to realise the other delegates might not be enemies after all – because they looked more like ‘us’. It seems therefore that China is acclimatising itself to the multilateral way and even enjoying it. International appreciation of China’s decision not to devalue the Yuan in the crisis increased the feeling of acceptance and confidence. In other words, the new psychological mood encouraged China to believe that it would be accepted and welcomed if it took positive steps.

Then, how far have the socialisation processes gone? Wendt insists that states’ identities and interests can change through inter-subjective processes: ‘States might initially engage in pro-social policies for egoistic reasons but if sustained over time such policies will erode egoistic identities and create collective ones (Wendt, 1999:342). Does the case of China demonstrate such a trend? And what has been the impact of these processes of socialisation on regional securitisation practices? Here it is important to look more closely at Chinese responses to pressing security issues. Of course, the most critical of these is Taiwan – the real ‘litmus test’ of whether China has ‘changed’ or not. But the responses of other regional actors to China are also important. These issues will be examined later in relation to regional aspects.
The Normative Constructions of Japan’s Security Thinking

One of the most critical questions affecting the security of post-Cold War North East Asia is whether Japan will retain its low and dependent politico-military posture or become a ‘normal’ country, playing a more active and independent role in regional and international affairs. As with the rise of China, two contending views have emerged. Neorealists believe that systemic forces, especially the redistribution of power caused by the decline of Russia and the rise of China, will compel Japan to become a ‘normal’ country. If this does not happen, the situation could only be described as ‘a structural anomaly’ (Waltz 2000: 33). By contrast, constructivists, such as Katzenstein and Okawara (1993) and Berger (1993; 2004), believe that Japan will remain as a civilian power. This would not constitute a structural anomaly, because it would be Japan’s deliberate choice not to become a great power in its own right in regional or international politics.

Domestic Normative Developments

Like Germany, Japan is already regarded as a prototype ‘civilian power’ (Maull 1990/91). Many constructivists (Katzenstein and Okawara 1993; Berger 1993; 2004) see this is the result of domestic developments in Japan since 1945. In other words, since the end of World War II, Japanese society has developed a strong anti-militarist norm, derived from the experience and collective memory of aggression and war in the 1930s and 40s – and, even more, from subsequent total defeat, for ever associated with the horrors of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombs. Although this social norm or culture of anti-militarism originally developed under the aegis of a benevolent US hegemon in the 1950s and 1960s, over time it has become institutionalised in the Japanese political system. Despite some challenges from traditional nationalists in the early years of the Cold War, and again in the changing environment of the post-Cold War era, pacifist norms have endured and still constitute constraining forces on Japanese security thinking and hence continue to shape foreign policy. This was the case even in the early 1990s, after the end of the Cold War.

This constructivist approach to security thinking and behaviour reveals much about post-war Japanese domestic normative development and its impact on foreign policy. It thus challenges the dominant neorealist approach, which may place too much emphasis
on structural forces while paying insufficient attention to domestic and normative constraints on states’ behaviour. By looking at factors beyond the purely material – that is, by analysing the historical bases of Japan’s perceptions of security and by seeing how these perceptions have changed or endured over time – constructivists challenge the neorealists’ pessimistic view that Japan has almost no choice but to become an independent great power in the traditional sense.

However, while the constructivist case has great merits, its supporters may have gone too far. There is some truth in Soeya’s (1998: 199) comment that their analysis ‘does not fully capture the realpolitik considerations that also inform Japanese security thinking’. Above all, the constructivists underestimate the importance of the US security guarantee – arguably the factor that allows Japan the luxury of pacifism. It is striking that, since the first Gulf War, Japan’s approach to security has changed considerably, particularly after 9/11 – including passing the Peacekeeping Operations Bill of 1992, the anti-terrorism law of 2001. Now there is also growing pressure to revise the ‘peace Constitution’, including Article 9. Thus, some analysts believe these developments have ‘potentially radical implications for its [Japan’s] overall security policy trajectory’ (C. W. Hughes 2005: 131); and think that Japan has already abandoned its ‘norms-based’ defence policy in favour of a ‘realpolitik’ one (Kliman 2006). Others go so far as to insist that Japan has now reached the point of no return in the process of becoming and acting as a ‘normal’ military power (Miller 2002).

Is a ‘Normal’ Country Necessarily Threatening?

How should we view neorealist and constructivist interpretations of these phenomena and changes? There is a surprising symmetry in the two positions. Both advance what are actually two distinct propositions, although they do not seem aware of this. At best they run their two propositions together, strongly suggesting that acceptance of the first implies acceptance of the second. The neorealist argument is that Japan is moving to become a ‘normal’ country and hence will necessarily return to power politics and create instability. The constructivist argument is that Japan will remain a ‘civilian power’ and hence will not engage in power politics or become the source of instability. We cannot tell whether Japan will become a normal power or remain a civilian power.
But the crucial thing is whether there is any logical progression from the first to the second propositions advanced by either school.

Is it necessarily the case that a ‘normal country’ will always be militaristic and threatening? Can we envisage a scenario in which Northeast Asia could live as well – if not better – with a ‘normal’ than with a ‘civilian’ Japan? It would be unwise to assume that, even if Japan were to become a ‘normal country’, it would necessarily become a source of instability or that decision-making would revert to the military, as in the 1930s. Following the frameworks of RSCT, proper investigation of the un/changing nature of Japanese security approaches requires examination of social and material factors; exclusive concentration on either will produce a distorted picture. It is probably no longer useful to focus discussion on whether Japan is becoming a ‘normal country’. Rather it may be better to ask why and how does Japan comply with norms of pacifism and antimilitarism? How have Japan’s perceptions of and approaches to security developed and changed over time? What are the implications of these developments for securitisation and desecuritisation practices in the Northeast Asian RSC?

**The Internalisation of Norms**

It is crucial to determine why Japan complies with pacifist norms and why – at least so far – chooses not to become an independent great power? While it is tempting to pin point a deep internalisation or belief as the key factor in shaping the culture of anti-militarism, other factors may also have been important.

**By Belief**

There can be no doubt that the Japanese culture of anti-militarism is based on belief. This belief is largely derived from the experience and collective memory of the Pacific War. The lesson is that ‘the military is a dangerous institution that must be constantly restrained and monitored lest it threaten Japan’s post-war democratic order and undermine the peace and prosperity that the nation has enjoyed since 1945’ (Berger 1993: 120). This negative view of the military has become institutionalised in the Japanese political system, and is widely held by a high proportion of the public, and by large segments of the political and economic elite (Huang 2006). This common outlook gave rise to Japan’s deliberate policy of caution and restraint. In other words there has
been a considerable degree of internalisation by belief. Even today, progressive Japanese academics and groups seek to resist neo-conservative and revisionist trends (Rose 2006); and advocates of Constitutional revision are encountering formidable opposition (Takahashi 2001; Nakano et al. 2005).

By Calculation

Of course, instrumental elements also influenced Japanese attitudes and policies after 1945. Kenneth Pyle (1996: 4) points out that Japan’s stance was also ‘the result of the conservative leaders’ opportunistic adaptation to the circumstances of the international order’. Pyle supports his argument by a study of the Yoshida Doctrine (named after the Prime Minister who formulated Japan’s post-war strategy). Yoshida and his successors did more than formulate an ‘economics-first’ policy, coupling this with dependence on the US security guarantee. They also chose to interpret the constitution so narrowly as to frustrate all attempts to engage Japan in collective security commitments. Thus, since World War II, Japan has shunned international political-military commitments while concentrating on economic growth. This policy worked brilliantly in the unique circumstances of the Cold War. Hence, Pyle argues that we miss the essence of post-war Japanese political history if we ignore evidence indicating that the fundamental orientation toward economic growth and political passivity was ultimately the ‘product of a carefully constructed and brilliantly implemented foreign policy’ (Pyle 1996: 20).

By Coercion

The first degree of internalisation is by coercion or force. It is true that no gunboat forced Japan to adopt a pacifist norm or to take a low political stance. Yet in the aftermath of World War II, Japan had few choices in terms of policy options. Two constraining factors can be identified: a troubled history and domestic instability.

The troubled history of relations with its neighbours constitutes a major constraint on Japanese policy. The problem was particularly acute in the early post-war years, when memories of Japanese invasion and occupation were fresh. Even the faintest signs of assertiveness were liable to be misinterpreted or even highly securitised by Japan’s neighbours. Even today, despite new conditions, the burden of the past and the residual suspicion continues to weigh heavily on Japan’s relationship with others. This is why, when faced with 2006 July North Korean missile crises, its neighbours’ (South Korea
and China) main worry was that Japan would use the crisis as a pretext for its own rearmament (Yonhap 11 July 2006; People’s Daily 14 July 2006).

Another major problem for Japan’s security policies – also especially acute after 1945 – has been its domestic instability. The trauma of total defeat and destruction, coupled with economic devastation, led to popular discontent in the shape of anti-government political movements. A good deal of violent protest was instigated by the extreme Left and pacifists sought to obstruct and reverse the government’s conservative pro-US policies. American troops were used to ‘put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan’ under the terms of the Security Treaty (Soeya 1998: 210). In short, a combination of the legacy of the past with internal unrest gave Japan virtually no option but to make security arrangements with the US and to keep a low stance in foreign policy.

Of course, the low stance of Japanese foreign policy cannot be understood without reference to the US security commitment. When examining Japan’s security orientation on both the domestic and international levels, Robert Uriu stresses the importance of international factors. For Uriu (1998: 83), the ‘abundant security’ guaranteed by the US commitment is ‘a prerequisite for pacifist states or civilian powers to exist’. Without such protection, ‘it [Japan] long ago would have become what politician Ozawa Ichiro has called a “normal country” – an autonomous, militarily self-sufficient nation’. Many analysts would agree that, even if it has not been the cause of Japanese constraint, the American security guarantee has at least allowed it to continue for so long (Huang 2006).

Soeya makes the same point but slightly differently. He explores Japan’s dual identity – ‘a major actor coping with traditional security issues’; yet also ‘a pacifist nation committed to a non-threatening security posture’ (Soeya 1998: 213). Soeya argues that the US-Japan security relationship remains central to Japan’s ability to maintain this dual identity. That is, the US-Japan security arrangement allowed Japan to cope with the tension between its ‘security needs and the normative constraints’, thus enabling it to become ‘a major actor in international politics’ while still choosing ‘not to act independently in the security arena’ (Soeya 1998: 119, 200). In this respect at least, things have not changed since the post-war period.
The Securitising Level over Japan

But have normative developments in Japan brought improved relations with China, or indeed significantly reduced historically based regional suspicion of Japanese intentions? If they have, the result should have been a marked desecuritising effect on the entire RSC. The ways in which Japan and its neighbours deal with the still ‘unresolved’ history issue are likely to be crucial. It has to be admitted that, to date, the processes of desecuritisation have not gone very far and have often experienced setbacks.

It is true that, for a long time, the domestic development of anti-militarist norms in Japan, together with the US security engagement, did play an important role in reducing the Other’s fears of Japan’s remilitarisation. This factor was particularly significant in the early post-war years – when the level of securitisation was extremely high and Japan’s relations with its neighbours remained largely at the enmity end of the spectrum. Liu Jiangyong (2005: 217), a leading Chinese scholar in Japanese studies, even argues that, while the American umbrella appeared to contribute most to Japanese security, in reality, Japanese pacifism was even more significant – though his purpose is to criticise the closer ties between Japan and the US that have developed since the mid-1990s.

But the security environment was different after the end of the Cold War. Japan’s approach to security faced new tests and challenges. The first came with the end of the first Gulf war, when Japan sent minesweepers to Iraq and deployed its SDF to serve with the UN PKO in Cambodia. While the Western response was to urge Japan to do more, its Asian neighbours viewed even these relatively modest efforts with suspicion and foreboding, fearing that they presaged a return to more full-fledged militarism. But the initial suspicion has showed signs of abating. Although Japan has taken further steps to increase its role in international affairs – including the deployment of the SDF in logistical support and humanitarian missions – the regional response has been calmer and more relaxed. Significantly, China’s leaders did not challenge Japan’s key role in launching regional multilateral consultative organisations, notably APEC and the ARF.
Thus, from the late 1990s, Japan’s relationship with China, and even more so with South Korea, seemed to be improving.

The 1998 summit between Japan and South Korea – which did much to improve their relationship – was a bold attempt to address the vexed history issue (Armacost and Pyle 2001: 143; Berger 2004: 152). Thereafter, South Korea removed its ban on Japanese movies and other forms of popular culture. Similarly, South Korean popular culture has now become quite fashionable in Japan (FEER 16 September 2004). The Chinese President, Jiang Zemin’s visit to Japan in 1998 also produced a joint declaration on building a Partnership. Jiang’s visit may have produced a major break-through; it seemed to mark the end of the period of serious friction characteristic of the mid 1990s and the beginning of a new era of relatively stable relations that promised to set the pattern for the future (Jin 2002: 103-13).

Yet there were soon to be setbacks. In March/April 2005, large anti-Japanese demonstrations took place, mainly in China but also in South Korea. These disturbances created great concerns in both Japan and China. Some even claimed that Sino-Japanese relations had fallen to their lowest point since the normalisation of 1972 (Shao-pu Wang, interview in June 2005; Okamoto and Tanaka 2005: 10-13). Of course, issues relating to history were central to the crisis – notably the new Japanese history textbook and Koizumi’s repeated visits to the Yasukuni shrine. But the crisis was precipitated by the US-Japan 2+2 statements over Taiwan in February 2005, and by the establishment of Takeshima-day by Shimane-Ken (Amako, interviews in May 2005).

Recently, regional suspicion and concerns over Japan’s assertiveness have risen once more. This has been a marked feature of the North Korean missile and nuclear crises of July and October 2006. In responding to North Korea’s missile tests, Japanese leaders insisted that it was entirely natural for Japan to be able to launch a ‘pre-emptive strike’ and to have ‘the capacity for attacking enemy bases’ (Asahi Shimbun 9, 10 July 2006). These responses have given rise to concerns in Beijing that Japan is simply using the supposed threat from North Korea as an excuse to justify its real objective – the acceleration of its own externally oriented military build-up (People’s Daily 14 July 2006). Seoul also sharply criticised Japan, claiming that the statements amounted to an ‘exposure of the nature of its aggression’ (Yonhap 11 July 2006). These events not only
reveal that the issues relating sovereignty and territoriality are still high on security agenda in Northeast Asian RSC, but also demonstrate that the burden of history is still heavy. They also show that once a ‘role structure’ – enemy, rival or friend – is established in the minds of the various actors, it is very difficult to change these perceptions.

Yet, it would be wrong to conclude that no serious efforts have been made to improve matters or that no progress has been made. Despite the many difficulties, there have been some attempts and achievements. These have involved both top-down and bottom-up approaches (see, detailed account, Rose 2005). The debate about ‘a new thinking on Sino-Japanese relations’ in Chinese academic circles in 2002 and 2003 certainly suggested that the relationship was now being taken more seriously (see, Ma 2002; Shi 2003; Jin 2003). Although the ‘new thinking’ was short lived, it was a bold attempt to overcome the burden of history and to bring Sino-Japanese relations into a new era.

Some scholars claim that Sino-Japanese relations are now in a ‘transitional’ (tenkanki) period – implying a cooler relationship than that of the ‘friendly’ era followed normalisation. But the ‘friendly’ period of the 1970s and 80s was not without its problems. Then the improvement was essentially superficial, involving little serious reflection or strategic thought (sikou teishi), and hence, fundamental problems were simply not faced (Mouri 2004: 228). In comparison, since the late 1990s, despite the recurrent problems and crises, China, Japan, and South Korea have at least shown some willingness to face these problems. They have articulated the issues more clearly and openly and have taken the first steps towards resolution. One seemingly small, but significant step occurred in June 2005, when a joint (Korea-Japan-China) history book was published in the three respective languages. Of course, the future evolution of Sino-Japanese relations remains uncertain; much will depend on the sincerity and boldness of both sides. In this sense, how Abe’s Asian diplomacy unfold, will have important implications for their future relations.

9.1.2 Changes in Regional Dynamics

Possible and actual linkages between Northeast and Southeast Asia have led RSC theorists to posit the emergence of an East Asian RSC (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 155-
The case study in this thesis demonstrates that this began after the Cold War and was reinforced by developments after the Asian financial crisis. With the establishment of this wider East Asian context, the relationship between China and Japan and their relations with other regional actors changed dramatically. The most important developments are growing economic interdependence and the emergence of multilateral arrangements, notably the ARF and APT, which have exerted a powerful influence on states’ conceptions and behaviour.

**Growing Economic Interdependence**

In recent years, particularly since 2000, economic interactions in Northeast / East Asia have increased dramatically. In particular, the rapid expansion of China’s economy and foreign trade has been a major factor in the creation of much higher levels of regional economic interdependence. This phenomenon is sharp contrast to the situation during the Cold War and even to the position in the early 1990s. But how has growing economic interdependence facilitated better relations between China and Japan and influenced securitisation logic among regional actors? The findings of this case study suggest that, by itself, economic interdependence did little to create a more friendly relationship between China and Japan. The best that could be said was that it was characterised by a ‘hot economy but cold politics’ syndrome. In fact, closer economic ties had both positive and negative implications.

**Some Negative Implications**

As explained in chapter 6, until the early 1990s, economic interdependence and multilateral institutions in Northeast / East Asia were weakly developed. Both global and regional factors meant that regional economies were more competitive than complementary. The various economies were heavily dependent on US markets and there was relatively little trade among East Asians. Even the attainment of much higher levels of economic interdependence, particularly after the Asian financial crisis, also gave rise to additional security concerns. The most serious concern was related to the rapid rise of China. Despite China’s insistence that its rise poses no threat but provides opportunities to other East Asian countries (Wen Jiabao 2005), acceptance of the
Chinese position is by no means universal and there are signs that some powers are decidedly alarmed.

First, despite moves towards the creation of an ASEAN-China FTA, the present structure of the East Asian economy, particularly as between China and most of the ASEAN countries, remains competitive rather than complementary. Thus, Southeast Asian countries fear that the economic transformation of China will mean that they face stronger competition in vital markets. Secondly, economic relations between China and Japan have become so highly developed that, in 2004, China (including Hong Kong) finally overtook the US to become Japan’s most important trading partner (Ministry of Finance, Japan 2004). Yet, economic ties did not automatically bring greater closeness in other areas. On the contrary, it led to worrying tensions and disputes, particularly over the gas field under the East China Sea.

But the most serious fear is of a future conflict between China and the US. The rapid expansion of China’s influence in many areas in the world, particularly in Southeast Asia, may undermine US interests. One major concern is that China has moved from energy self-sufficiency to energy dependence (Zha 2006). Thus Beijing may attempt to control the South China Sea because of its potential oil and gas reserves. If China goes too far it might face US retaliation. Given the depth of Chinese economic dependency on the US, any such retaliation would have devastating effects on China. Pessimistic analysts such as Copeland (2003) fear that the story of US-Japanese relations in the 1920s and 40s – burgeoning Japanese exports, followed by US countermeasures, a deteriorating relationship and ultimately by war – could repeat itself, with China responding to the US much as Japan once did.

Thus, many realists believe that relative gains and losses are more important than absolute gains to relationship between economics and security – because they affect the distribution of power in the system. Of course, economic interdependence can cause cooperation as well as conflict. In East Asia, however, the effects of economic changes – above all the rise of China – may have been more to increase security concerns than to reduce them.
The Emergence of International Society in East Asia

Despite the negative implications, many of these have not been materialised; it remains to be seen whether they will. At least to date, economic interdependence and the emergence of regional institutions have brought tangible benefits to the East Asian RSC. Above all the emergence of regional society in East Asia certainly owes much to economic interactions and the actual and expected benefits from them. Even today economic factors are probably the strongest driving force behind East Asian community building.

Although regionalism and multilateralism in East Asia and Asia Pacific are largely phenomena of the post-Cold War era, their ultimate origins go back to the time of post-war rivalry and antagonism. Then, the economic role played by Japan – particularly its policies of trade, aid, and FDI – was especially important. Before the normalisation of Sino-Japanese relations and in a climate where Japan was regarded with so much suspicion and antagonism by its immediate neighbours, its relations with Southeast Asia were especially important. Japan found it easier to rebuild its regional relations in this broader East Asian setting. It was through this process that Northeast Asia gradually re-linked with Southeast Asia. With US and Japanese support, the links and contacts led to the creation of APEC in 1989. In the security realm, the ARF and CSCAP were established in 1994 and in 1993 respectively. As mentioned earlier, one of the purposes of the ARF was to cope with the rise of China. Three main questions arise: to what extent has China been socialised in this emerging multilateral setting; how far did the processes facilitate collective identity formation in East Asia; and to what extent has the new context contributed to the amelioration of Sino-Japanese relations?

Before the Asian Financial Crisis

Until the Asian financial crisis, the results were rather mixed. The increasing sense of regionalism was an important and positive development, especially when compared to the situation after World War II. Then regional identity was largely absent and Northeast Asia exhibited a high level of fragmentation and mutual hostility between states. Yet the evolution of regionalism in Asia differed from the process elsewhere, especially in Europe. It did not result in the immediate emergence of an East Asian collective identity. As symbolised by APEC and ARF, the focus of regionalism has
been the Asia-Pacific region rather than Northeast Asia or even East Asia. This regionalism is open rather than closed, inclusive rather than exclusive. Both material conditions and identity factors worked against an exclusive East Asian version of regionalism, particularly until the Asian financial crisis.

First, as the two great powers in the region, both China and Japan have problems in their regional identity (see chapter 4) and neither finds it easy to accept the other as a leader. Here the ASEAN Way and its leadership role have been important. Yet, despite their endorsement of ideas, such as ‘Asian values’ and ‘East Asian community’, these did not materialise immediately. Instead of EAEG / EAEC, it was APEC and ARF that became symbols of regionalism and multilateralism in Asia-pacific. Behind this lies East Asia’s dependency on external players, particularly the US, in both the economic and security areas. Since Asian economic success stories relied heavily on exports to the markets of North America, particularly the United States; even Japan has its structural vulnerabilities – extraordinary military and economic dependence on the United States, coupled with economic and political links to both rich and poor countries (Katzenstein 2000: 365).

Thus it seems clear, that the reason why regionalism and multilateralism have not developed on an exclusively Northeast or East Asian basis, but rather on a wider Asia-Pacific one, is that this accords with the preferences of the United States. But why does the US prefer Asia-pacific to East Asia? Of course, there is an identity factor at work. As in the 1940s and 50s, so in the 1990s, the US still perceived itself as more closely linked with ‘Eurocentric Anglo-American culture’ than with any ‘Asian-American identity’ (Katzenstein, 2000:358, 359).

Yet the question remains as to why the US supports a specifically Asia-Pacific grouping and identity? As the US ‘swing-power’ strategy (see Buzan 2004b: 103-6) suggests it was an American conscious choice. It suited American interests to construct Asia-Pacific as a ‘super-regional’ project, because this would permit the US to institutionalise its position inside this ‘super-region’. At the same time, however, the US would not be completely locked into these institutions and hence would retain its ability to act as a ‘swing power’. The creation of Asia-Pacific institutions would also effectively prevent any consolidation of East Asia that ‘might either shut the US out’ or, ‘even develop as
global power rivals to it’ (Buzan 2004b: 104). Thus, it is argued that if the lack of an ‘Asian-American identity’ led the US to eschew specific East Asian regionalism, its interests as the sole superpower actively drew it to Asia-Pacific regionalism.

In terms of socialisation of China, before the Asian financial crisis, the outcome was also limited. Despite initial caution and scepticism, China did become more positive in its attitude to the ARF. Among other things the ‘ASEAN way’ approach helped to ‘ease’ China into deeper participation (Foot 1998). However, there were limitations and problems both in the ASEAN way of conducting business (see, Huxley 1996a: 29-39) and in the nature of China’s participation. Yet, despite China’s apparent readiness to resolve some disputes through multilateral agreement, this did not extend to all areas – and still does not today. There are matters, notably the Taiwan issue, where the Chinese position remains inflexible and confrontational. In addition, disputes over the Spratly Islands in the mid 1990s also not only alarmed ASEAN countries, but also raised fears in Japan that China might use force in a variety of their bilateral disputes (Drifte 2002: 134).

The Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 exposed many of the weakness and shortcomings of regional fora, such as ASEAN and ARF. ARF itself was largely based upon the experience and principles of ASEAN. Although ASEAN undertook various initiatives and measures, these were widely perceived as inadequate (Soesastro 1998; Funston 1998; Wesley 1999). Thus, with the diminished effectiveness of ASEAN in regional institutional building, the role of great powers, such as Japan and China, acquired greater prominence. Yet the crisis also reinforced the concerns of the individual great powers – Japan, China and the US – and made them more suspicious of the others’ intentions. The failure to create an AMF demonstrated the limits of regional cooperation. Inevitably, the ineffectiveness of regional multilateral mechanism was much criticised in the course of the crisis.

**Asian Financial Crisis: The Turning Point**

However, the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 marks a turning point in East Asian regional developments. It is true that the crisis revealed many of the limitations of regional multilateral institutions in dealing with crises and with conflict management.
But while these shortcomings provoked much criticism, the response of the states of East Asia was not to abandon attempts to build a multilateral mechanism or to return to the balance of power mechanism. On the contrary, they made great efforts to rectify defects in the existing arrangements and to find more viable ways of collaboration. The new approach is significant in three ways – economic factors become a strong driving force for East Asian regionalism; it is more attuned to the East Asian regional identity; and both Japan and China play more positive roles. But how far have these led to an East Asian regional identity / society? And how effectively have they affected regional securitisation practices?

**Identity Factors**

Following the crises of 1997-98, proposals for regional collaboration in East Asia proliferated at multiple levels. The most important developments have been the ASEAN Plus Tree, the ASEAN-China FTA of 2001, the ‘Chiang Mai Initiative’ of May 2000, and the East Asian Summit of December 2005. To a great extent, the new regional initiatives were direct responses to the crisis – which had ‘exposed the risks of self-survival’ and hence strengthened the feeling that greater cooperation was needed to prevent future crises’ (Han 2001). In other words, a broad understanding emerged that an exclusively East Asian association was required to address immediate problems and to improve the region’s collective bargaining position in the global economy (Ravenhill 2000: 211, 212). But there was more to that, and Evans (2005: 200) is right to argue that although these post-crisis initiatives are a ‘call for economic cooperation, it is also in some minds a search for a new identity or, more precisely, elements of a new identity’.

The increasing role of China is another important factor in the emergence of a new East Asian regionalism. Of course, this development also raised question as to the likely direction of the new regionalism in East Asia and its compatibility with Asian-Pacific. In the earlier days when Japan was the chief source of regional initiatives – though careful not to make this too obvious – the interests of the two leading powers (Japan and the US) appeared to coincide. Both preferred an Asia-Pacific region to an exclusively East Asian one. But has the rhetoric really changed?
Some commentators see the post-crisis new regionalism as pointing to a revolutionary change, which ‘could reproduce much of the European experience’ (Bergsten 2000), thus enhancing its ‘autonomy’ by keeping the US ‘out’ (Bowles 2002). However, the cases in this study reveal that the emerging new identity is more overlapping than exclusive; East Asia and Asia-pacific are more complementary and less competitive than some suppose. Even in the future, material constraints, particularly on how far monetary and trade cooperation can proceed, are likely to be crucial. Thus many post-crisis initiatives, including FTAs are bilateral rather than multilateral and with many extra-regional partners (Ravenhill 2002). Even China’s increasing influence operates within the existing framework and it does not seem to be adopting a radically new approach to regionalism. As Evans (2005: 213) points out, ‘China has neither the capacity nor vision at this point to create an independent multilateral framework that operates against the interests of the United States, at least in the short term’. Indeed, there is general consensus in China that the US must be included in East Asian regionalism (interviews, May and June 2005). Thus, even after the post-crisis, the US presence and influence in the region continues – and has even grown after 9/11 – and the rhetoric of regionalism has changed little.

Of course, the development of ASEAN Plus Three (APT) in the post-crisis has been significant. As an East Asian framework, the APT is more attuned to its members’ sense of regional identity than previous institutions, such as APEC or the ARF could have been. Indeed, APT can be seen as a revival of the failed attempt of the EAEG/EAEC in the early 1990s. The important roles of the two great powers – China and Japan – have been a major factor behind the success of the APT. In particular, Japan’s support for APT is in marked contrast to the hesitation it displayed towards the EAEC project, a development which some regard as ‘a milestone for East Asian regionalism’ (Terada 2003: 267). This change also has political consequences because it provides the three main Northeast Asian states with increased opportunities to cooperate despite their historical differences. Here it is important to mention that the Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi’s proposal at the 1999 APT meeting for a trilateral leaders’ level dialogue has now been upgraded to a regular annual summit.
China Factors

A more fundamental change in China’s attitude towards regional multilateralism took place after the Asian financial crisis and continues under the ‘peaceful rise’ strategy. But how significant is this change, and what are its implications for regional securitisation practices? In other words, has China’s integration into regional and international society reduced the regional securitisation level towards it, and has China also shown some self-constraint?

China Alters The East Asian Regional Order?

There is increasing tendency in East Asia to see the rise of China more in terms of opportunities than of threats. It has become fashionable to regard China’s recent ‘charm offensive’ in Southeast Asia as a major success. Some analysts argue that, together with other factors, China’s engagement policy with the wider region has begun to shape ‘a new order in Asia’, in which most nations in the region see China as a good neighbour (Shambaugh 2004/05: 64, 65). Some, such as Kang (2003b; 2003c), go so far as to contend that the rise of China invites ‘bandwagoning’ rather than balancing behaviour from its Asian neighbours. As the record of much earlier history indicates, it could be that, once more, a powerful, even dominant China will be the key element in ushering in a new period of stability based on a modern version of the ancient principle of hierarchy. These claims merit more careful examination because there would be profound implications for the East Asian RSC and its future direction – if they are true.

The case studies in this thesis, investigating both pessimistic and optimistic interpretations, however, do not show much sign of bandwagoning or of moves towards hierarchy. Rather they provide numerous examples of balancing behaviour. On rare occasions these have been quite extreme but, for the most part, East Asian states have certainly not adopted extreme balancing policies or subscribed to the associated ‘containment of China’ approach. This has been evident in their willingness to maintain and enhance their engagement with China, especially through their relatively low-key response to the Tiananmen crackdown and to other human rights issues. There are both economic and security reasons for many East Asians to engage with China, but that does not mean they have totally abandoned balancing or hedging responses to the rise of China. Supporting evidence can be found in regional arms modernisation and alliance strengthening. China might not be the sole reason, but, after 11 September, many
ASEAN countries, such as the Philippines and Thailand, revitalised their ties with the US. Japan is also strengthening its ties with the US, as evident in 1997 revision of Guidelines and the 2+2 talks of February 2005.

Moreover, multilateral institutions, such as ARF, CSCAP, and more recently APT, have something of a dual role. They work simultaneously both to engage and to constrain China; they certainly do not facilitate its domination or unilateralism. Indeed, Beijing has also shown that it is willing and comfortable to work within regional frameworks. In fact, the ‘peaceful rise’ strategy appears to be more concerned with accepting and working within the existing regional and international framework, rather than seeking to achieve a radically different new order. Thus, while one of the central tenets of the strategy is that China will never seek hegemony, the main theme is more about assuring its neighbours and the world that China’s rise presents opportunities – in the shape of mutual benefits – rather than threats.

China demonstrated its more cooperative stance by forging a strategic partnership with ASEAN and by issuing the Declaration on the code of conduct in the South China Sea. Particularly over North Korea, China helped to broker the September 2005 Statement of Principles. In international affairs, too, China backed UN Resolution 1637 on Iraq, which extended the mandate of the coalition military presence. In short, on matters of importance China works within the multilateral frame, alongside Washington and other regional parties. In response, while balancing behaviour continues, these steps may have made regional actors more relaxed and thus more willing to cooperate with China. As a result, some commentators have changed their views. In 1999, Christensen expressed deep concern about the security dilemma in East Asia, but ten years later, he had become convinced that there were new elements in East Asia that were working to ‘lower mutual security concerns, prevent spirals of tension, and reduce strategic misperceptions’. What had made the difference was the development of deeper economic interdependence and multilateral diplomacy, where the key feature had been China’s central role in the process of regional integration (Christensen 2006: 82).

China’s moderation seems to have made an impression on the US. Early in 2005, the US was still expressing strong concern about the rise of China, yet by the end of the year it was articulating a new approach, encouraging China to become a ‘responsible
stakeholder’ in international community. Of course, as yet, the US does not regard China as an entirely responsible stakeholder, but it does see this as a possibility, perhaps a highly desirable one. Some scholars (Jinbo 2006: 26-8; Takahara 2006: 12-5) believe that the US is adopting this new stance as the real basis of its policy towards China and that this is already reflected in rising levels of communication between the two powers at all levels. During the 2006 North Korean missile crisis, while Japan lobbied the US in favour of harsh UN sanctions, Washington preferred to give Beijing time to persuade Pyongyang to adopt a more moderate posture. Significantly, the end result was strong words against North Korea rather than actual sanctions.

In East Asia, too, while Shambaugh’s observation – that ‘most nations in the region now see China as a good neighbour, a constructive partner, a careful listener, and a non-threatening regional power’ – may have gone too far, it is still reasonable to accept his view that regional actors are now ‘accommodating themselves’ to China’s rise (see Shambaugh 2004/05: 64, 67). In part, the trend of growing accommodation between China and its neighbours may be attributed to the success of China’s ‘peaceful rise’ strategy. Yet the trend also points to the success of regional multilateralism, and seems to vindicate those who thought – against considerable scepticism – that the socialisation of China was an achievable goal. But regional multilateralism is one thing; there remains the question as to whether China has the ability to demonstrate its self-restraints.

**Self-Restraint**

When identifying master variables that affect the promotion of collective identity, Wendt (1999: 357-66) emphasises ‘self-restraint’ as the most important one. Similarly, Jervis (1982: 360-62) also identifies ‘self-restraint’ as one of the key indicators of a ‘security regime’. This means that if socialisation increases China’s self-constraint, then the regional securitisation level will be reduced and the possibility of a security regime enhanced. Inevitably many analysts see Taiwan as providing the litmus test for Chinese self-restraint and hence the key indicator of its future role in global affairs (Medeiros 2004; Economy 2005). But how far has China really changed?

Although its record is mixed, there are signs that, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, China is showing greater self-restraint than in the past – even over its most
sensitive issue of Taiwan. In the mid-1990s, when Taiwan challenged the so-called ‘one China’ policy and sought to be treated as a separate state, Beijing reacted aggressively by conducting military exercises and missile tests close to Taiwan. The international community as a whole was greatly alarmed – all the more so because many believed that the only reason why China did not go even further and launch an outright invasion was because of purely military calculations, notably about US power (Tucker 1998/99; Matsuda 2004). If China was only held back by military calculations that could hardly be considered as an example of self-constraint.

Of course, subsequent developments caused worries for regional / international society. These centred on the likely effects of the growing democratisation in Taiwan and a corresponding growth in a distinctly Taiwanese identity. After the turn of the century, trends in Taiwan appeared to be gathering pace – the pro-independence DPP became the ruling party in 2000 and passed the Referendum Law in November 2003; its leader, Chen Shui-bian was re-elected in 2004. Against these developments, China seems to be engaged in a struggle to uphold its political principles and maintain its legitimacy, while avoiding all out war. Thus, while it maintains its old position when it insists that it reserves the right to resort to force, China also maintains that it wants a peaceful re-unification. Again while passing its anti-secession law, China also looks to the US to restrain Taipei. Thus, cautious optimists can at least claim that ‘the Taiwan problem does not get more serious than what it has been’, particularly in comparison to the situation in the mid-1990s (Zha 2001: 219).

It is important to ask why China has avoided actual war over Taiwan and shown some signs of restraint in recent years. Indeed, military calculations remain significant; the cost of any armed conflict would be very high, not least because it would almost inevitably mean war with the United States (Matsuda 2004). But China has other good reasons to be cautious in the new century. Its Fourth Generation leaders are preoccupied with consolidating their power and pushing through key reforms (FEER 4 March 2004). Beijing is clearly reluctant to do anything that would jeopardise its otherwise excellent opportunity to boost its economy further. As emphasised by Wen Jiabao (2005) China needs ‘a durable and peaceful international environment’, that is, it needs a window of opportunity, free from major conflict, to derive maximum economic advantage. Thus,
elements of coercion and calculation are obviously powerful factors in encouraging China to show self-restraint.

Besides these material factors, important normative elements are also at work. These include at least the partial internalisation of the principles of international law and the consequent realisation that the whole question of the legitimacy of war in international society is influenced by those principles. Onuma (2003) emphasises the indirect binding functions of international law, and the mixture of ideational and material considerations upon decision makers. International society now seems to accept that international law should play a greater role. There are doubts as to whether war – other than for the purposes of self-defence – retains any legitimacy. In this new international environment, the freedom of action of states seeking to justify their use of force has become seriously restricted.

Perhaps more important, home populations seem less willing to approve of the use of force by their governments. This mood has affected China; according to an Horizon Research poll taken in Beijing in January 2004, 58 per cent of the 4,000 people surveyed believed military action over Taiwan was unnecessary and both sides should work toward economic integration. Only 15 per cent supported immediate military action (FEER 4 March 2004). It is hard to imagine that the Chinese government would ignore such a clear indication of public opinion. In short, it seems that normative changes to the structure of the international system, coupled with domestic changes – which have facilitated the internalisation of the values of the new system – have been quite as important as material factors in the narrow sense. We must now turn to relations between the two great powers in this regional context.

**Sino-Japanese Rivalry**

As two great powers in the same region, the relationship between China and Japan is one of the most important factors for the future evolution of this RSC. Yet their relationship has been the least improved and has experienced the greatest fluctuations. Even the most recent events – over North Korean missile and nuclear tests – suggest that suspicion and possible tensions remain. Since Japan already claims that it is entirely reasonable for it to have the capacity to launch ‘preemptive strike’, and the means to
attack enemy bases (*Asahi Shimbun* 9, 10 July 2006), increased tension in Korean peninsula may well drive Japan further in that direction. This would certainly increase worries in both Beijing and Seoul about Japan’s real intentions. Given that the three powers still face unresolved historical problems, including territorial ones, possible rivalry and tension cannot be ruled out. Indeed, as realists stress, Sino-Japanese rivalry for influence over East Asia constitutes a particularly intractable problem.

Nevertheless, it is also true that there are increasing forces in the East Asian RSC that are working to prevent the escalation of rivalry. Growing economic interdependence is one such force. As Mouri (2004: 223) points out, the depth of mutual dependence between China and Japan has gone beyond the relatively modest level of ‘interdependence’ (*sougo izon*) and has now reached a point of ‘inter-reliance’ (*motareai*) – so that in many areas the two Asian great powers have little choice but to cooperate. Even Roy, who predicted in 1994 that the rise of China would almost inevitably lead to Sino-Japanese cold war, has changed his views. Eleven years later, (2005: 205), he came to argue that ‘Sino-Japan relations will not collapse. Neither China nor Japan could afford losing the benefits of economic cooperation’. On both sides there is belief that things cannot remain in the ‘hot economy, cold politics’ situation for long. This was why as soon as Koizumi left his office; both sides seized the opportunity to resume their top level meetings.

Moreover, the historical experiences suggest that it is unlikely that most East Asians would tolerate either extreme great power competition or single power domination of the region. This attitude not only reflects surviving memories of the experience of the excesses of the Japanese ‘Co-Prosperity Sphere’ but also the very experiences whereby East Asians entered into present global international society. For instance, like nationalism, the emergence of sovereign norm was strongly linked to anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. Here East Asians achieved their objectives through their own efforts, not just provided by others (see chapter 3 and 4). These historical experiences help to explain the ways in which East Asians securitise certain things. South Korea would certainly not like to make a stark choice between dependence on Japan or China or even the US. As I argued in chapter 3 and 4, because of its pivotal geographic position, in the course of the past two centuries and more, Korea has been the main victim of great power rivalry. Even today, Koreans remain highly sensitive about the
likely effects of great power competition on themselves. As the Korean scholar Moon (Moon, Geongyin and Jisi Wang 2006) stresses, real confrontation between the Big Three would place South Korea in a most difficult situation. This approach is very similar to that of ASEAN, which would certainly not like to choose among the Big Three, and would much prefer to remain in the ‘driver’s seat’ in East Asian affairs.

These arguments suggest that while East Asians are enthusiastic for community building, their strong preference of sovereignty non-interference norms makes it unlikely that the East Asian RSC will develop along the lines of the highly integrated EU model. Processes of community building are bound to be slow and incremental. However this does not mean that there is no constraining force or that the East Asian way is totally ineffective in maintaining regional security and stability. On the contrary, the willingness and ability of East Asians to co-manage regional affairs, together with their aversion to extreme great power competition or to the dominance of any single power, makes the East Asian RSC more viable and stable than in the past. Here, Katzenstein (2006: 1-33) is right to assert that regionalism in East Asia is moving ‘beyond any national model’, and forging a ‘hybrid form of regionalism’. In this changing environment, the role of the US in East Asian RSC is also undergoing considerable changes.

9.1.3 The Changing US Role in East Asian RSC

As the greatest external power, apparently ready to take responsibility for the regional security order, the US is often seen as the ring-holder in Northeast Asia, or even as a de facto regional actor. Yet the US role as a security provider has changed in the post-Cold War era. During the Cold War, US security policy was driven by anti-communist ideology. In Northeast Asia it also pursued an exclusively bilateral alliance strategy – the ‘hub and spoke’ system. However, after the Cold War, when the ideological dimension diminished to some extent, the US also became involved in some multilateral security arrangements in Northeast Asia and Asia-Pacific.
Identity Factors in Cold War Power Competition

For many years, global influences on the Northeast Asian security landscape were deeply coloured by ideological factors. Particularly, after the end of the Korean War, the US strengthened its involvement in the region by creating an alliance system. The War also strengthened the Sino-Soviet alliance (though this split later). Northeast Asia was divided into the Cold War containment and counter-containment camps. Within this containment and counter-containment power struggle, the US strategy towards Northeast Asia centred on the ‘hub-and-spoke’ system of bilateral alliances. That is, the US developed alliances and basing arrangements with each of its anticommunist allies – Japan, South Korea and Taiwan – on a one to one basis. This system became the ‘centrepiece’ of US grand strategy toward Northeast Asian security (Ikenberry and Mastanduno 2003: 435). As argued in chapter 4, this bilateralism was in sharp contrast to the system operating in Europe, where a multilateral security institution – NATO – played a central role (Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002; Ikenberry 2001). Thus, without any institutionalised security institutions, the US military presence was the central feature of the pattern of regional security.

‘Bilateral Arrangements Plus’

Even after the end of the Cold War, continued US commitment to Northeast Asia proved indispensable. This was clearly demonstrated in the 1993-94 Korean crisis, the 1995-96 Taiwan crisis and in relations with the two Asian great powers – balancing China and keeping Japan in check. However, US policy towards Northeast Asia and Asia-Pacific has changed. While it continues to strengthen its bilateral alliance system, the US has begun to commit itself to multilateral or ‘minilateral’ security arrangements, most notably the ARF. More recently, the US also committed itself to the Six-Party Talks seeking resolution of the North Korean nuclear problems. Washington refuses to deal with the problem bilaterally through one-to-one negotiations with North Korea. As such in both the Taiwan and Korean cases, the US has been more ready to cooperate with regional actors than was the case in the mid-1990s (see chapter 8). In the economic dimension, too, behind Japan’s changing approach to East Asian regionalism was lessened pressure of the US on Japan (Terada 2003: 268).
The War on Terrorism

In the broader war on terrorism, particularly in the case of Iraq, the US has displayed an increasing unilateralism – by criticising and ignoring the UN and asserting its right to use pre-emptive force. Yet Washington’s approach to Northeast Asia reveals a mixture of the unilateral and multilateral. The war on terrorism has brought Japan, a major US ally, into closer cooperation with the US. However, Washington’s relations with Taipei and Seoul seem less satisfactory. Chen’s increasingly unpredictable and provocative actions have seriously complicated US interests in preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. There is great concern about relations between Washington and Seoul, especially following the partial withdrawal of American troops from ROK for service in Iraq in 2004 (Strategic Comments 2004), which raise question about the utility, relevance, and survivability of the alliance (Snyder and Glosserman 2006). To meet these concerns the two initiated US-ROK FTA negotiations and a strategic dialogue process in early 2006, yet, there is no doubt that Seoul has certainly taken a more independent posture.

Thus, in the post-Cold War era, there have been shifts in the US security approach to Northeast Asia – from strong ideological orientation and exclusively bilateral arrangement with individual allies to a readiness to embrace some multilateral or minilateral approaches to security. Yet, this does not mean that the US has adopted security multilateralism in Northeast Asia as alternative to its bilateralism or is preparing to abandon its alliance system. Rather its strategy is now what Ikenberry and Mastanduno call ‘bilateral arrangements plus’. That is, ‘the maintenance of bilateral alliances and special relationships, reinforced by attempts at multilateral or minilateral cooperation where practical’ (Ikenberry and Mastanduno 2003: 436). Nevertheless, the shift still reflects flexibility in US policy towards Northeast Asia, as well as the increased role of regional actors in managing the regional security agenda. Thus, some analysts argue that the US hegemonic pathway, though important, is limited in practice to providing order in Asia (Alagappa 2003; Mastanduno 2003).
9.1.4 An East Asian Security Regime

Having briefly considered the case for a Northeast / East Asian RSC, we now can return to Jervis’s conditions for a ‘security regime’. Do regional actors accept those norms and rules that restrain their behaviour so that others will reciprocate? In other words, have regional expectations for mutual or general self-constraint increased, and hence, the level of securitisation decreased? The crucial question is not the continuation of serious security challenges; there is no sign that they have or are about to disappear. What really matters is, when such challenges arise, whether regional actors show appropriate willingness and ability to deal with them.

Developments in the Northeast / East Asian RSC in the post-Cold War era, particularly after the Asian financial crisis and in the new millennium have been significant. It is true that the region is still not free from disputes, conflicts, crises, and even the possibility of wars – as demonstrated in recent crises over North Korean missile and nuclear tests – and that many territorial and other disputes remain unresolved. Yet, the security outlook today is very different to that of Cold War period, even to the situation in the early 1990s. Despite continuing security challenges, it is precisely the growing willingness and ability of regional actors to cooperate and deal with those challenges that makes the RSC today so different from the early 1990s.

Until the mid 1990s the security outlook remained negative. Without strong economic interdependence, no meaningful multilateral security mechanisms, and much historical distrust, it was difficult for regional actors to have any general expectation of each other’s self-constraint. Rather, it was much easier for them to indulge in mutual suspicions, hence leading to the securitisation of the intentions of others. Naturally, strategies of balancing mechanisms and self-help characterised security practices. Thus, when crises occurred in the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Strait in early and mid 1990s, it was mainly the US intervention that defused the crises. The vital US role pointed to the inability of regional actors to handle security problems. It may have been this lack of trust and the ensuing climate of suspicion that made the rise of China seem so threatening. Even China hesitated to join multilateral arrangements in the region because it feared that other members would use those bodies against its own interests.
But what makes today’s East Asian RSC different to the Northeast Asian RSC of the early 1990s? Most important is the emergence and development of regional international society in this wider region. Within this RSC, there are growing mechanisms that restrain state behaviour and there are increased expectations of others’ self-constraint. These expectations and mechanisms derive from domestic normative constructions, growing regional economic interdependence, as well as from increasing regional multilateral arrangements. For instance, Japan’s adoption of pacifist and anti-militarist norms and China’s ‘charm offensive’ to ‘sell’ its ‘peaceful rise’ strategy have the same objective; both are designed to assure other states in the region that they are safe and that they can expect self restraint from the Asian great powers. A combination of the two has indeed brought desecuritising effects.

Similarly, such expectations have also been increased by multilateral fora and dialogues. For instance, by bringing China into regional frameworks, these bodies could restrain it at a time of its rising power. In addition, through their multilateral arrangements, regional actors have demonstrated their willingness and ability to deal with security issues – as exemplified by China’s signing the code of conduct in the South China Sea with ASEAN, and the fact that the Six-Party Talks has become the major body to deal with North Korean nuclear issue. Thus, although the US, with its preponderant power, continues to play an important role – and although the balance of power and great power management are still important institutions in maintaining order – there is no doubt that East Asians are now increasingly taking responsibility to manage their security issues. The increased ability of East Asians to forward the processes of constructing an East Asian community into an institutionalised direction must be seen as a positive gain.

9.2 Theoretical Implications

What are the theoretical implications of the empirical findings in this study? Have the theories really informed my study and, if so, to what extent? Although the case studies investigated in earlier chapters certainly revealed many complexities, they have provided an interesting, even ideal, ‘testing ground’ for answering these questions.
9.2.1  The Levels and Sectors of Analysis

In the first place, RSCT’s approach of linking security studies with levels and sectors of analysis was particularly useful in this study, especially since my overriding purpose has been to develop a systematic approach that facilitates a balanced understanding of the region’s security dynamics. Hence, I took a holistic approach that attempted to examine the security dynamics of the region from the historical perspective and through investigations of material and social variables, which might seem beyond the scope of a single thesis. However, I believed that an exclusively materialist approach carried a danger of oversimplification and could not lead to a balanced picture of Northeast Asian security outlook. In this sense, the exploration of levels and sectors of analysis proved particularly valuable, because it enabled me to treat apparently highly complicated cases in a more systematic way than would otherwise have been impossible. Levels and sectors of analysis reflect the overall structure of the thesis and of the chapters within it.

9.2.2  Conceptual Framework: Structural Change

Secondly, a central question addressed in this thesis is whether there is a possibility of a ‘security regime’ in Northeast Asian, that is, of structural transformation. The answer required a proper theoretical and conceptual framework. RSCT’s conceptualisation of RSCs as social constructs – and hence the importance of their inter-subjective processes – was certainly useful. I believe that social processes will determine whether the structure of the Northeast Asian RSC continues unchanged or is transformed. Here, RSCT, together with neorealism, constructivism and the English school, led me to identify changes not only in the material power balance, but also to examine social processes, such as identity building (historically generated amity/enmity relations), norm setting and their internalisation.

In addition, the RSCT’s identification of different types of structural changes, both external and internal, has been particularly relevant to my case studies. As I show, historically Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia have been either conflated into one region or separated into different ones. Without the concept of external changes in RSCs, this would have caused much confusion. Thus although my main purpose has been to examine internal transformation, I have explored external structural change as
well. In the process, I have discovered important links between internal and external structural change in East Asia. In essence my argument is that the two have been mutually reinforcing.

First, ASEAN experiences the ‘ASEAN Way’, and its leadership provided valuable examples and principles for other multilateral institutions in East Asia and Asia-Pacific. Secondly, for historical reasons, without links with Southeast Asia it would be much more difficult to develop exclusively Northeast Asian multilateral arrangement, though it has now the Six-Party Talks. For instance, as mentioned in chapter 7, although regionalism and multilateralism are largely post-Cold War phenomena, they emerged gradually from post-war rivalry. Japan played an important role both in the early period and in the post-Cold War era. The inclusion of Southeast Asia made it easier for Japan to rebuild its regional relations and to play a more positive role.

Thirdly, the changes in China are also essential to the case of the existence of a security regime. Above all, without the socialisation of China within regional multilateral institutions, its rise would appear more threatening. In large measure, China’s initial scepticism towards multilateral institutions was overcome through the less binding and more flexible ‘ASEAN way’. Its characteristic features did much to smooth the path to more enthusiastic participation. This can be seen clearly in the success of the ‘charm offensive’ that emphasises the positive side of the ‘peaceful rise strategy’ to China’s neighbours. In this sense, it can be said that internal transformation – moving into a ‘security regime’ – has been greatly assisted by the corresponding external transformation, that is, the emergence of a new East Asian RSC.

9.2.3 Theoretical Pluralism

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this thesis benefited greatly from RSCT’s fundamental postulate – theoretical pluralism. Above all, RSCT conceptualises security and its analysis in both material and social terms. Following this eclectic approach, I have been able to investigate the strengths and weakness of other theories, such as neorealism, constructivism, and the ideas of the English school in conjunction with RSCT. These investigations have enabled me to challenge the prevailing security analysis in Northeast Asia – one that favours the realist position and focuses mainly on
material factors. It also provided me an opportunity to shed some light on aspects of theoretical debates in IR.

First, this study clearly found that an exclusive focus on material factors and on the military-political dimension is not appropriate to the security analysis of Northeast Asia. It is theoretically unsound and could even be dangerous in practice. This is especially true when considering the likely impacts on regional security of such sensitive issues as the rise of China and the possible remilitarisation of Japan. After the end of the Cold War, most of the pessimistic (back to the future, or ripe for rivalry) scenarios and predictions were derived from examinations of the distribution and redistribution of material power and their likely impact on states’ behaviour. The findings in this study suggest that, while the security dynamics of the region are indeed affected by purely material factors, social constructions may be more important. Thus, I emphasise the significance of shared norms and institutions, and how deeply they are internalised.

After the Pacific War, together with the US factor, Japan’s development of pacifist and anti-militarist norms did much to assure its neighbours and hence reduced their securitisation level. It is the prospect that Japan might abandon these norms – and here the crucial development would be the revision of the Peace Constitution – that concerns its neighbours. Similarly, the rise of China caused concern in the early 1990s and this is still the case today. But despite concerns about China, it must be stressed that relations between China and its East Asian neighbours, particularly with ASEAN countries, are now very different to what they were in the early 1990s. There is greater cooperation and postures are more relaxed. It is hard to imagine that this desecuritisation effect would have occurred had it not been for the socialisation processes achieved through regional multilateral arrangements. Since the mid 1990s, China has been increasingly willing to be integrated into regional multilateral institutions, and to share associated norms. But how far have these processes gone? Have they really changed identities and perceptions of interests and hence reduced the overall securitisation level? These elements, together with distribution of material power, are the crucial variables that allow us to identify the character of the East Asian RSC. That is why RSCT treats the distribution of power and the patterns of amity and enmity as essentially independent variables. It claimed that polarity may ‘dispose’, but ‘not determine’, the character of security relations (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 66-9).
By following RSCT precepts, I have sought to explain the reasons for the improved relations within the East Asian RSC and to identify the factors that impede the development of a closer collective identity. To a considerable extent, both the progress that has been achieved and its limitations are closely linked to the degree of China’s socialisation. ‘Impeding factors’ include China’s preference for strictly Westphalian norms, such as sovereignty and non-interference and its reservations about the norms of democracy and human rights. So far, China’s membership of most regional and international institutions and its compliance with their associated norms, appears to derive more from calculation than from belief. In other words, the internalisation level remains instrumental. It follows that there remain limitations on what China can do or wants to do in order to assuage the concerns of other members of the RSC. The apparently intractable problem of Taiwan points to the relative shallowness of China’s internalisation and means that the possibility of future Chinese aggression cannot be ruled out. It is perhaps for this reason that, while ASEAN countries welcome China into their institutional framework and applaud the signs that it is becoming a more constructive player, they have by no means abandoned their balancing behaviour. From time to time, they turn to the US and Japan – China’s rival – to improve their bargaining position with China, even to constrain and hedge this increasingly powerful element in their RSC.

Thus, application of constructivist and the English school formula – such as identity building, shared norms and how deeply they are internalised – has proved particularly useful in explaining these complexities and even apparent paradoxes. They helped me to understand structural change and to demonstrate how far and how deeply or genuinely it has progressed. Without the help of these theoretical lenses I would have certainly missed many important points that affect security practices.

At this point, it is tempting to suggest that neorealism is outdated and inapplicable to security analysis in Northeast / East Asia or elsewhere; and hence that it should be replaced with alternative theories, ones better equipped international relations in general. The great debates of the past have revealed that, as an academic discipline, IR
has had a tendency to treat theoretical approaches in mutually exclusive terms – in other words there is an assumption of paradigmatic incommensurability. However, the findings of this study rather suggest that the major IR theories explored in this thesis are more complementary rather than contradictory, perhaps they focus on different levels of analysis. For instance, when considering the likelihood of Japan’s becoming a ‘normal’ country, I accounted that neorealists tended to over-emphasise systemic constraints. Yet, this over-emphasis could be corrected by drawing on the constructivists’ ideas on domestic and normative developments. Yet this does not mean that I think that the constructivists are entirely right. They may over-emphasise domestic constraints and identity factors and underestimate the importance of international factors – notably the US security guarantee – in shaping Japan’s security thinking. Constructivism is also less convincing in explaining what appear to be Japan’s recent moves towards a more realpolitik position.

In addition to the point about paradigmatic incommensurability, some analysts, such as Kang (2003b; 2003c), suggest that present rather Euro-centric IR theories do little to assist understanding of international relations in Asia. It may be that cultural and historical preferences tend to make Asians more likely to join the bandwagon of a major power, such as China, rather than to counterbalance it. Hence, contrary to the neorealist notion of a ‘ripe for rivalry’ scenario, (Friedberg 1993/94), the rise of China could lead Asia into more stable times. If this is true, then we may have to conclude that a new theory is needed to understand the international relations of Asia. Yet my findings indicate that balancing behaviour in Northeast Asia and East Asia is actually quite widespread, especially in response to the rise of China. While there are signs of some modification of acute balancing and growing cooperation between China and its neighbours as a result of socialisation processes and economic interdependence, most East Asian states keep their balancing options in place.

Thus, on the basis of my case studies of Northeast Asia, I conclude that there would be little point in trying to formulate a completely new theory or to dismiss existing theories – neorealist, constructivist or any other – in their entireties. All have value and

25 Of course there are scholars who try to pursue theoretical pluralism, most notably, Wendt (1999); Buzan and Little (2000); Katzenstein and Okawara (2001/02).
limitations but their limitations are best overcome by balancing them with other approaches. In other words, we arrive at theoretical pluralism as the posture that is most appropriate, because it corresponds most closely to the actual situation in East Asia and hence provides the surest foundation for further research. The theories explored in this thesis are genuinely complementary and I have benefited from them all.
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