Social democracy in Latin America: 
Policymakers and education reform in Brazil and Chile

Guy Jonathan Sands Burton

A thesis submitted to the Department of Government of the 
London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy

London, January 2009
Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without the prior written consent of the author.

I warrant that this authorization does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party.
Abstract

What is social democracy in the Latin American and what has been its impact on public policy? I argue that it is a government's origins and its use of the state and related institutions that shape the nature and content of social democracy. To illustrate this, three cases using governments and their approach to educational policy to 2007 are presented: the Concertación (since 1990) in Chile and the Cardoso (1995-2002) and Lula (since 2003) governments in Brazil.

The first part situates social democracy within the Latin American context. First, social democracy is defined ideologically and sociologically in relation to the wider Left-Right divide. Second, social democracy is distinguished between two models: the Third Way (which is more tolerant of inequality resulting from difference, the market and less associated with class concerns) and the Participatory Left (which has deeper roots in socialist ideology, state intervention and social movements). The section establishes that despite differences between each, Third Way and Participatory Left social democrats adopt elite-based policymaking in government.

The second part analyses the impact of Third Way and Participatory Left social democracy on public (education) policy. The findings reveal broadly similar policy approaches, including a broader role for the state, curricular reform within the prevailing economic/education paradigm; increased (targeted) public spending; extensive use of evaluation/assessment mechanisms; and adoption of more representative means of participation with (organised) stakeholders. At the same time, policy content and relations with particular stakeholders (i.e. private interests, teachers and students) was also shaped by the institutional constraints and historical contexts faced by each government.
Acknowledgements

Along with those I interviewed, there are many others whose names do not appear within the following pages, but who must also be thanked, for taking the time to provide me with their time, assistance, guidance, advice and/or moral support during the course of this project. They are (in no particular order of importance): Patrick Dunleavy, Fiona Macaulay, Sarah McLaughlin, Matt Bolton, Sofia Sebastian, Mike Seiferling, Susana Carvalho, Heather Murchison, José Olivas Osuna, Vassilis Paipais, Markus Wagner, Nick Vivyan, Jacqui Baker, Nathalie Wlodarczyk, Frank and Marta Lawson, Polly Diniz, Rafael Piñeiro, Sergió Toro, Tristan McCowan, Bill Kissane, Emanuela Hedayat, Ed Page, Andi Salazar, Lamprini Kaftantzi, Sara Motta, António Marques, Rafael Minoro, Renato Bastos, Farimah Daftary, Omar El-Mougy, George Philip, Aninka Bolton, Analia Inés Meo, Avril Fielding, Robert Funk, Florentino Rojas, Ana María Muñoz, Eugenio Guzmán, Rodrigo Castro, Fernando Atria, Hernán Ampuero, Beatriz Etchegaray, Lilian Ravest, Conan Ryan, Matthew Whiting, Marcelo Enríques, Rodrigo Mardones, Alfredo Jognant, Pablo Halpern, Alfonso Morais, Nelson Silva, Joao Felipe Rammelt Sauerbronn, Fatima Lobato, Marisa Rigo, Camila Souza, Patricia Scarlat, Carolina Cucumides, Tanya Harmer, Victor Figueroa-Clark, Pablo Mejias, Franklin Roach, Thaice de Oliveira, Natalia de Moraes, Luciana Ribeiro da Costa, Ana Alzamova, Ximena Osses, Sonia Kuzmanic, Wendy Hunter, Leany Lemos, Maxine Molyneux, Ricardo Candia, Laura Thiele, Michael Hardy, Luis Armando Gandin, Paulino Motter, Sandra Sales, Rodrigo Prando, Maria do Céu de Lima, Jean Tible, Danielle Ardaillon, Julie Coimbra, Angela Dias, Cinara Custodio, Laurie Henderson, Mike Macdonnell, Kieran Brett, Jairo Nicolau, Carlos Costa Ribeiro, Tomas Chuaqui, Alfredo Rehren, Angélica Atalla, Ryan Carlin, Ursula Zurita, Graciela Riquelme and Colin Rogers.

I am especially grateful to Francisco Panizza, Ken Shadlin, Alan Angell, Anthony Hall, Malte Gerhold, Christopher Burton and Alejandra Falabella, who managed to work their way through all or part of the final draft. Their contributions improved it immeasurably.

Last, but by no means least, I would not have achieved half of what I have without the constant love and support of my parents, Christopher and Maureen Burton. It is to them that I dedicate this work.
# Table of Contents

GLOSSARY ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 6
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES ....................................................................................................................................................................... 10

1. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 11

2. LATIN AMERICAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY: THIRD WAY AND PARTICIPATORY LEFTS IN BRAZIL AND CHILE .................................................................................................................. 31

3. ENGINEERING ELITES: ACCOUNTING FOR THE NATURE OF GOVERNMENTAL POLICYMAKING IN EDUCATION IN BRAZIL AND CHILE ......................................................................... 55

4. FINDING THE RIGHT BALANCE: THE ROLE OF THE STATE AND SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS .......................................................................................................................... 77

5. THE PURPOSE OF EDUCATION: SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC OBJECTIVES AND CURRICULAR REFORM ................................................................................................................................. 96

6. SPENDING MORE?: PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION AND SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS ........................................................................................................................... 116

7. MAKING US ALL MANAGERS?: THE USE OF ASSESSMENT AND EVALUATION BY SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS .................................................................................................. 143

8. NO PARTICIPATION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION: SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS AND PARTICIPATION IN THE EDUCATION SECTOR ............................................................ 160

9. A COMPROMISED POSITION: PRIVATE INTERESTS AND SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS ................................................................................................................................................. 182

10. LOBBYING FROM THE LEFT: TEACHERS AND SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS ............................................................................................................................................................... 202

11. AN UNEQUAL RELATIONSHIP: STUDENTS AND SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS ........................................................................................................................................................................... 226

12. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 244

APPENDIX 1: POLITICAL EVENTS IN CHILE, 1964-2006 ................................................................................................................................................... 257
APPENDIX 2: POLITICAL EVENTS IN BRAZIL, 1964-2006 ................................................................................................................................................. 259
APPENDIX 3: TIMELINE OF EDUCATION IN CHILE ................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 261
APPENDIX 4: TIMELINE OF EDUCATION IN BRAZIL ................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 263
APPENDIX 5: COMPARATIVE EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION IN SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1990-2005 ........................................................................................................................................... 265
APPENDIX 6: INTERVIEW METHODOLOGY AND SCHEDULE ................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 267

BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 274
Glossary

abertura  
Attempt at controlled political liberalisation by military regime in Brazil from mid-1970s

ABMES  
Associação Brasileira de Mantenadores de Ensino Superior (Brazilian Association of Higher Education Managers)

AGECH  
Asociación Gremial de Educadores de Chile (Association of Chilean Educators)

Alianza por Chile  
Right-wing coalition consisting of the UDI and RN in Chile, in place since the return to democracy in 1990 – although the current name dates to 2000

ANDES-SN  
Sindicato Nacional dos Docentes das Instituições de Ensino Superior (National Union of Teachers in Higher Education Institutions)

ANDIFES  
Associação Nacional dos Dirigentes das Instituições Federais de Ensino Superior (National Association of Federal Higher Education Institution Leaders)

Articulação  
Largest internal faction within the PT; it is social democratic-oriented and is associated with the party leadership around Lula

Basic education  
Pre-higher education

Bloque Social por la Educación  
Left-wing network of groups and organisations associated with the Fuerza Social that participated in the 2006 presidential advisory commission on education

Bolsa escola  
School grant; cash-conditional transfer introduced in Brazil during the 1990s and paid to household heads for sending their primary school-age children to school

Bolsa familia  
Family grant; an amalgamation of new and existing grants and benefits provided to poorer households, introduced during Lula’s first term

careira/carrera  
career path (Portuguese/Spanish)

CAED  
Comissão de Assuntos Educacionais (Education Issues Commission)

Calmon amendment  
1983 constitutional amendment named after Senator Pedro Calmon that hypothecated 13% of federal and 25% of state and municipal tax revenues to education

Carta ao Povo Brasileiro  
Letter to the Brazilian People; PT 2002 election manifesto

CDES  
Conselho de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (Council for Social and Economic Development)

CFE  
Conselho Federal de Educação (Federal Education Council); replaced by CNE in 1995

CNE  
Conselho Nacional de Educação (National Education Council)

CIAC  
Centro Integral de Apoio à Criança e ao Adolescente (Integrated Support Centre for Children and Adolescents)

CIDE  
Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo de la Educación (Centre of Education Research and Development)

CIEP  
Centro Integrado de Educação Pública (Integrated Public Education Centre)

CNBB  
Conferência Nacional dos Bispos do Brasil (National Conference of Brazilian Bishops)

CNI  
Confederação Nacional da Indústria (National Industry Confederation)

CNTE  
Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores em Educação (National Confederation of Education Workers)

Colegio de Profesores  
Chilean teachers’ union

CONACEP  
Colegio Particulares de Chile (Private Colleges of Chile)

Concertación  
Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia (Coalition of Parties for Democracy); centre-left coalition of parties that campaigned against extending Pinochet’s mandate in the 1988 constitution and then from 1989 as a coalition of political parties. The main parties include the Christian Democrats (PDC), Socialists and the Party for Democracy (PPD).
concertacionista
Member of the Concertación coalition

CONFECHE
Confederación de Estudiantes de Chile (Confederation of Chilean Students); association of student unions from the 14 traditional universities

CONFEMUCH
Confederación Nacional de Asociaciones de Funcionarios de Educación Municipalizada de Chile (National Confederation of Chilean Associations of Municipal Education Workers)

CONSED
Conselho Nacional de Secretários de Educação (National Council of Education Secretaries)

CPB
Confederação dos Professores do Brasil (Confederation of Brazilian Teachers); succeeded by CNTE

CPPB
Confederação dos Professores Primários do Brasil (Confederation of Brazilian Primary School Teachers); succeeded by CPB

CUT
Central Única dos Trabalhadores (Central Trade Union)

ENEM
Exame Nacional do Ensino Médio (National Secondary School Exam)

ENU
Escola Nacional Unificada (National Unified School)

FECECH
Federación de Centros de Estudiantes de la Universidad de Chile (Federation of University of Chile Student Centres); replaced in 1994 by FECH

FECH
Federación de Estudiantes de la Universidad de Chile (Federation of University of Chile Students)

FEUC
Federación de Estudiantes de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile (Federation of Catholic University of Chile Students)

FIDE
Federación de Instituciones de Educación Particular (Federation of Private Education Institutions)

FLACSO
Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences)

Fuerza Social y Democrática
Network of Chilean social movements, including Colegio de Profesores and FECH

FUNDEB
Fundo de Manutenção e Desenvolvimento da Educação Básica e de Valorização dos Profissionais da Educação (Fund for the Maintenance and Development of Basic Education and Valuation of Education Professionals)

FUNDEF
Fundo de Manutenção e Desenvolvimento do Ensino Fundamental e de Valorização do Magistério (Fund for the Maintenance and Development of Basic Education and Valuation of Teachers)

gremio
association of individuals organised by sector in Chile during the military period; the military alternative to trade unionism

HEI
Higher education institution

IALS
International Adult Literacy Survey

IDEB
Índice de Desenvolvimento da Educação Básica (Basic Education Development Index)

IFI
International financial institution

ILO
International Labour Organisation

IMF
International Monetary Fund

INEP
Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas Educacionais Anísio Teixeira (National Institute of Educational Studies and Research)

ISI
import substitution industrialisation

JEC
Jornada Escolar Completa (Whole School Day)

La Moneda
Chilean presidential palace; bombed during the 1973 coup

LDB
Lei de Diretrizes e Bases da Educação Nacional (National Education Law Guidelines and Directives)

LOCE
Ley Orgánica Constitucional de Enseñanza (Constitutional Statutory Law of Education)
MEC  Ministerio da Educação (Ministry of Education)
MECE Programa de Mejoramiento de la Calidad y Equidad de la Educación (Improvement of Educational Quality and Equality Programme)
Mineduc Ministerio de Educación de Chile (Chilean Ministry of Education)
MST Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (Landless Workers' Movement)
New Republic Political regime in Brazil after 1985
ODEPLAN Oficina de Planificación (Planning Office)
Participatory Budget (PB) form of democratic and deliberative decision-making, in which residents can influence (mainly municipal) spending decisions
PC Partido Comunista de Chile (Chilean Communist Party)
PCB Partido Comunista Brasileiro (Brazilian Communist Party)
PCdoB Partido Comunista do Brasil (Communist Party of Brazil)
PDT Partido Democrático Trabalhista (Democratic Workers’ Party)
PER Chilean evaluation system for schools in 1982 and 1984
petista Member of the PT
PFL Partido da Frente Liberal (Liberal Front Party)
PIIE Programa Interdisciplinario de Investigaciones (Interdisciplinary Research Programme)
PISA Programme for International Student Assessment
PPA Plano Plurianual (Multiyear Plan)
PPD Partido por la Democracia (Party for Democracy)
Provão Literally 'big test', although official name was Exame Nacional de Cursos (National Examination of Courses), 1996-2003
ProUni Programa Universidade para Todos (University for All Programme)
PRSD Partido Radical Socialdemócrata (Radical Social Democratic Party)
PMDB Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party)
PSDB Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (Brazilian Social Democratic Party)
PSU Prueba de Selección Universitaria (University Selection Test)
PT Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party)
P900 Programme of funding for poorest performing 900 schools in Chile
Real Plan Anti-inflation and economic stabilisation programme introduced in Brazil in 1993-94
RN Renovación Nacional (National Renovation party)
REUNI Programa de Apoio a Planos de Reestruturação e Expansão das Universidades Federais (Support Programme to the Plans for Restructuring and Expanding of Federal Universities)
SAEB Sistema de Avaliação da Educação Básica (Basic Education Evaluation System)
salário-educação Payroll tax on businesses introduced by Brazilian military regime to provide funds for education
SIMCE Sistema de Medición de la Calidad de la Educación (Quality of Education Measurement System)
Sinaes Sistema Nacional de Avaliação da Educação Superior (National System of Higher Education Evaluation)
SUTE Sindicato Único de Trabajadores de la Educación (Education Workers' Union)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>tendência</td>
<td>term for internal political faction within the PT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIMMS</td>
<td>Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UBES</td>
<td>União Brasileira dos Estudantes Secundaristas (Brazilian Union of Secondary School Students)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDI</td>
<td>Union Democrata Independiente (Independent Democratic Union party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDIME</td>
<td>União Nacional dos Dirigentes Municipais de Educação (National Union of Municipal Education Leaders)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNE</td>
<td>União Nacional dos Estudantes (National Union of Students)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTÉ</td>
<td>União Nacional dos Trabalhadores em Educação (National Union of Education Workers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td>Unidad Popular (Popular Unity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zero Hunger</td>
<td>Programme introduced by Lula government to eradicate extreme hunger and poverty ('Fome Zero')</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Figures and Tables

Figures

**Figure 1:** Differences between the Left, Right and Social Democrats on the Welfare State and Education .............................................. 24
**Figure 2:** Public expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP in middle-income countries, 1990-2005 ..................................................... 117
**Figure 3:** Chilean Government Spending, 1970-2007 .......................................................... 121
**Figure 4:** Chilean Public Spending per Student, 1990-2004 (’000 Pesos) ........................................ 122
**Figure 5:** Chilean State Spending on Education, 1970-2007 ...................................................... 123
**Figure 6:** Brazilian Federal Government Spending, 1980-2007 .................................................. 126
**Figure 7:** Spending in Education in Brazil by Level of Government, 1995-2006 ........................................ 138
**Figure 8:** Proportion of Spending by Modality and Level of Government, 1995-2006 .......................................................... 139
**Figure 9:** Public expenditure per student in middle income countries (US$ PPP), 2006 .............................................................. 141
**Figure 10:** Matriculation by School Type in Chile, 1981-2005 ................................................. 185
**Figure 11:** Primary and Secondary School Students in Brazil, 1988-2000 ........................................ 192

Tables

**Table 1:** Key educational positions within the Garcia-Huidobro Commission, 2006 ........................................... 169
**Table 2:** Significant Social Class Segregation by School Type in Chile (2003) ................................. 188
**Table 3:** Primary and Secondary School Teachers in Chile, 1985-2005 ........................................... 206
**Table 4:** Teachers in Brazil, 1985-2000 (’000s) ........................................................................ 217
**Table 5:** School and College Attendance in Urban Areas by Household Income Level and Age Groups in Chile, 1994-2005 (%) ......................................................... 234
**Table 6:** School and College Attendance in Urban Areas by Household Income Level and Age Groups in Brazil, 1994-2005 (%) ...................................................................... 238
**Table 7:** Social Democratic Governments and Education Policy in Latin America ............................ 245
**Table 8:** Expenditure on Education Institutions as a Percentage of GDP, 1995-2005 .......................... 265
**Table 9:** Public Expenditure on Education as a Percentage of GDP, 1990-2005 ........................................ 266
1. Introduction

‘Si no hay educación para los pobres, no hay paz para los ricos’
‘If there’s no education for the poor, there’s no peace for the rich’
– Graffiti scrawled on Santiago wall, Chile

In January 2006 Chileans elected Michelle Bachelet to the presidency. She was the country’s first woman president to be elected and the fourth since democracy had returned to the country 16 years previously. A few months later, the capital city, Santiago, was rocked by widespread demonstrations, estimated at up to a million-strong and led by secondary school students. It had started as protests against rising prices for university entrance exams and transport costs, and developed into a critique of the Chilean education system and its associated social stratification. For several weeks, students occupied schools and clashed with police, conjuring in the minds of the older generation images of social and political polarisation under the Socialist presidency of Salvador Allende, which culminated in the bloody military coup on 11 September 1973.

It was during the autumn of 2006 that the above quote was sprayed on a wall near the offices of the national teachers’ union, the Colegio de Profesores. It neatly captured the essence of social democracy, which emphasised both the demand for social development and redistribution (through its reference to education for the poor) and the need for class compromise (for the mutual benefit of both rich and poor). Soon after, President Bachelet announced the formation of a presidential advisory commission on education, including representatives from across the educational community. The commission published its final report in December 2006, the same month that General Augusto Pinochet, the man who presided over the military regime after 1973, died.

Two months earlier, in October 2006, President Lula of the Workers’ Party (PT), had been re-elected in Brazil, beating the Social Democrat (PSDB) candidate. It was the fourth time that these two parties had faced off for the country’s top executive post. The PT government’s family grant (bolsa familia) programme was deemed especially important in Lula’s victory, the core component of which was the school grant (bolsa escola), a cash conditional transfer that poorer families received in exchange for sending their children to school. The role of social policy, education and redistribution was recognised by the government as making the difference: as he began his second term in January 2007, Lula stated that the government’s aim would be to prioritise education.
The 2006 Brazilian presidential election was also among the last of the 2005-06 election cycle that had swept across Latin America; a cycle which many observers anticipated being dominated by left-wing candidates. Indeed, since the beginning of the century, from Argentina to Brazil, Bolivia to Chile, Uruguay to Venezuela, presidential candidates from the Left have been elected to government. Yet the emphasis of much scholarly analysis has been in distinguishing between two main versions: what Castaneda (2006) suggested in a polemical article prior to the region's elections, between a 'close-minded', nationalistic and populist version on the one hand, and a more modern, 'open-minded' and cosmopolitan alternative on the other. This approach is problematic in that it is impressionistic and has largely obscured differences that can exist within each. Furthermore, while there have been recent attempts to introduce a more empirical dimension into this comparison (see Tussie and Heidrich 2008; Merino 2008), the reformist branch has tended to attract lower levels of public attention than that of its more populist relation, especially with regard to Venezuela and Bolivia in recent years.

A comparison of Castaneda's analysis of the reformist Left between the end of the Cold War and the present illustrates this uncertainty. Recently, Castaneda and Morales (2008) suggested that the most notable examples of this Left have not only included the Frente Amplio in Uruguay, APRA in Peru and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, but also Lula's Workers' Party (PT) government in Brazil and the Lagos and Bachelet Socialist Party-led administrations in Chile since 2000. Omitted from this list of reformist governments were Lula's and Bachelet's predecessors but one; that is, Fernando Henrique Cardoso in Brazil and Patricio Aylwin and Eduardo Frei in Chile respectively.

That the Cardoso and earlier Concertación governments should be overlooked sits oddly with Castaneda's previous survey of the Latin American Left, *Utopia Unarmed*. It was published shortly after the end of the Cold War and the apparent collapse of socialism. In that seminal publication Castaneda (1994: 136, 143-4, 166) had suggested that Cardoso's party, the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB) and the Chilean Socialist Party's participation in the pre-2000 Concertación coalition governments, placed them both in this more reformist, social democratic camp. The omission – or oversight – of these earlier governments in Brazil and Chile is reflected by both scholars and voters remaining uncertain about the exact nature of the differences that exist between them and their contemporaries (Castaneda 2008: 238).
At the same time, the reservation against including these cases from the 1990s within the contemporary Latin American Left may well be attributed to their apparent failure to achieve economic and social improvement for their peoples. This is reinforced by many (formerly Marxist) observers who see the impossibility of this occurring within the context of electoral politics or the capitalist system (Petras 2005b, Ellner 2004, Harnecker 2005). Yet the three governments in Brazil and Chile arguably present useful – if different – examples of the Left generally and social democracy in particular, within the region. While Cammack (1993) claims that Latin America is distinct from the more commonly associated experience of social democracy (in terms of greater social exclusion and less established political party development), a broader perspective of social democracy would encompass both countries. Although the Chilean social democratic Left encompasses criteria such as class compromise and alliance with market interests, both the Cardoso and Lula governments represent examples of 'social democratic politics', by pursuing redistributive policies (Sandbrook et al 2007). Furthermore, the value of studying social democracy in Latin America is especially relevant given the finding that such governments appeared to outperform more populist, nationalist ones in social policy terms during the 1990s and 2000s (Merino 2008).

That social democratic governments might be more effective than other versions of the Left is given added importance given leftists' prioritisation of social policy. Social policy, in the guise of the welfare state, is an area that Left parties and labour organisations have been especially influential, being involved in the development of policies to achieve greater equality and redistribution (Pierson 1996; Bobbio 1996; Merino 2008). That concern has persisted, despite the 1980s retrenchment across the developed and developing world (Huber et al 1993; Allan and Scruggs 2004). Indeed, it could be argued that the importance of social over economic policy as a way of distinguishing partisanship has become even greater as the scope for alternate macroeconomic paths has declined (Hibbs 1977; Boix 2000). Tavares (2004), for example, has observed that the Left tends to remain credible in times of fiscal adjustment when it goes against its expansionary instincts by cutting public spending.

Of the welfare state's various dimensions, while health, pensions and social benefits may all serve to equalise differences between individuals, the role of education is of a different order. States can use it as a means of transmitting and controlling a society's values, knowledge and beliefs (Carnoy
and Samoff 1990; Kivinen and Rinne 2000; Lawton and Gordon 2002; Hall 2003). The state’s use of power, including its relations with other social, political and economic groups, is therefore at the heart of the debate about education and how it should be shaped (Apple 2003; Popkewitz 1999; Torres 1999). An empirical analysis of comparative education policies in social democratic governments, both before and after 2000, can consequently reveal much about the nature of such administration in Latin America. Indeed, by using the cases of Brazil and Chile in particular, it is possible to draw a more contextualised understanding of the supposed merits of the reforming, non-populist, social democratic Left. This includes the relative differences in values, motivations and practices adopted by the different governments.

The study of education policy under different governments therefore addresses two key questions posed throughout this dissertation. First, what is social democracy in Latin America? Second, what is the impact of social democracy on public policy? The empirical evidence presented shows that like the wider Left, social democracy in Latin America after 1989 can also be distinguished between two kinds: a market-oriented, more middle class Third Way and a Participatory Left, which is more closely associated with socialist ideology, social movements and the poor. In power however, the differences between each are diminished by the formation of policymaking elites that, owing to institutional constraints, result in broadly similar policy outcomes. Of the two social democratic types, the Participatory Left has the furthest route to travel in this regard, opting for electoral success over social representation. In terms of public policy – and education specifically – this includes a broader state, more public spending and critically-inclined curricular and evaluation policies. While the policy preferences and practical considerations also influence elites’ relations to seek collaboration with the private sector, other social actors’ (i.e. teachers and students) relations with government depends on past association – being more conciliatory under Participatory Left governments more confrontational with Third Way administrations.

These findings are shaped around several hypotheses related to the two research questions. The rest of this introduction therefore accounts for the nature of education systems in Latin America, upon which the hypotheses regarding social democracy and social democratic policy are constructed. Consequently, I first examine the Latin American welfare state and the education system from the 1930s to the 1980s. I consider the main challenges to the region’s educational approach, from the Left
via the Cuban Revolution and, following the various political, economic and social pressures of the 1970s and 1980s, the New Right. This section finishes by outlining the main features of the New Right education system in the 1980s and 1990s and which social democratic governments in the region inherited. The following section then examines the state of social democracy in Latin America in the 1990s, including its ideological and social roots and its relative internal and external weaknesses. In this section I account for the main typological distinction that may be drawn in Latin American social democracy: between the Participatory Left and the Third Way. Using this typology I set out a series of hypotheses relating to social democratic governments and their expected impact on education policy. The final section provides an outline of the dissertation and its subsequent chapters, the empirical evidence in each which will test the proposed hypotheses.

1.1. The features of Latin American education systems, 1930s-1970s

The Latin American education model reflected the wider welfare system over this period. That is, it was expensive, poorly administered, inefficient and with few links between contributions and beneficiaries (Angell and Graham 1995: 197-8). In many respects the model of education maintained high levels of social exclusion. Education had traditionally been seen – and largely remained – as a means of preparing the elite rather than a general democratic or universal right (Albornoz 1993; Brint 2006). But the expansion of education in this period also coincided with a more general ‘modernisation’ process, consisting of a state-led import substitution industrialisation (ISI) economic policy which sought the development of technically proficient labour (López 1999; Ramos 1999). This contributed to the introduction of a basic education model to bring up levels of literacy, greater levels of vocational training and an expansion in educational coverage (Graham 1972; Havighurst and Moreira 1965; Edholm 1982; Souza 2001; Anderson and Randall 1999).

The increase in educational access was achieved through the use of both the public and private sectors (Puryear and Olivios 1995; Birdsall et al 1996; Cunha 2004; Brint 2006). Despite their involvement, the results were few. Both the quality and quantity (especially in rural areas) of public education was relatively poor, with considerable ‘wastage’ of educational cohorts within the system. While there were substantial increases in the amount invested and enrolments in the decades following 1945, expansion was focused on primary education with insufficient attention paid to
secondary school. Despite the attendance rate of secondary school age students, rising from 30% to 60% between 1970 and 1997, this compared poorly with an increase from 80% to 100% in industrialised countries (López and Tedesco 2002). Teachers were under-qualified, class sizes were large, students frequently repeated grades and the amount of time available for schooling was limited. Politically, the system was authoritarian, with students adopting a subordinate position to teachers in the classroom and teachers tied into a clientelistic relationship with the state (Havighurst and Moreira 1965).

2. Challenges to the Latin American Educational Model

Despite the limitations of the system, this Latin American educational model remained viable so long as sufficient numbers of qualified and trained people were able to emerge from it and meet the needs of the economy. However, this system was soon to be challenged. This came from two quarters: first, from the Cuban alternative which suggested that both a new political course and 'progressive' education were possible; and second, a series of economic and political pressures throughout the region during the 1970s.

2.1. Challenging the Consensus (1): The Cuban Revolution and 'progressive' education

The initial challenge to this dominant Latin American political and educational model was the Cuban Revolution which sought a more 'progressive', or socialist, education system at state level. This was in contrast to previous small-scale, local attempts by the Left across the region.

Although the Cuban Revolution had primarily been a nationalist victory and its cadres concerned with breaking political and economic dependence on the United States, the Cold War context of a bipolar world meant that the new government had only limited capacity to steer an independent course. The only alternative was alliance with the Soviet Union and entry into the socialist economic bloc (Leogrande and Thomas 2002). Domestically, the new regime focused on the establishment of a comprehensive welfare state, increasing spending on education and health.

While other Latin American states had pursued education models that involved expansion of the public system with space for private initiative, in Cuba basic education was made a universal right and both basic and post-secondary education state-provided. Private schools were nationalised, which reflected dependency theory advocates' views that the previous educational model had failed to
benefit the poor and disadvantaged while serving only the interests of the landowning and commercial classes (Brint 2006).

Among the first educational actions taken by the government was the 1961 literacy campaign which reached nearly one million people. This was achieved by placing greater emphasis on education in rural areas (an issue much overlooked in other Latin American states) and sending both teachers and literate students into the countryside to participate in the programme. Alongside this, curricular changes were made to encourage collective working between students and co-ordination between educational institutions and the local economy (Sack et al 1978; Carnoy and Wertheim 1979; Rojas et al 1983). Investment, enrolment and both teacher and student performance in Cuban education remained noticeably high in comparison to the rest of the region. This owed much to the regime’s willingness to invest in education: in 1965 Cuba was spending 7% of GNP on education; by 1975 it was spending 12%. As a comparison, although Colombia’s education spending had doubled between 1960 and 1969, this meant a rise from 1.7% to 3.4% of GNP (Sack et al 1978).

By the 1990s Cuba’s education system was seen as an anomaly, outperforming other Latin American models in attainment levels (Nikandrov 1997; López 1999; Ramos 1999; Ratliff 2003; Lutjens 1998). Despite the regime’s loss of its international sponsorship after the end of the Cold War, the Cuban Revolution’s educational achievements ensured its continued support by the masses and its position as a model for the wider Latin American Left. Yet Cuban education also faced several challenges. Neither the regime nor the educational system was sufficiently democratic; like the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, a single-party state had directed these changes from above. There was little wider involvement in its development. Second, the tension between ideological, pedagogical and economic objectives was seen as compromising the educational system. For example, the best schools tend to select students from the elite while the system remained ‘closed’ to Western educational theories and values (Gasperini 2000). Indeed, since 2001 the regime has adopted a series of educational measures that appear designed to bolster its legitimacy, by co-opting mobilised youth movements and introducing distance learning and outreach higher education to wider sections of the population (Kapcia 2005). However, many of these practices reinforce how economic concerns have triumphed over social ones, since they emerged in response to the country’s economic crisis during the 1990s (Vasquez 2002; Mesa-Lago 2005).
2.2. Challenging the consensus (2): New Right education

While the Cuban Revolution and its education system represented a distinct alternative to the Latin American mainstream, governments in the North and South continued to concentrate efforts on 'modernising' their educational systems to produce labour forces that were capable of meeting the demands of industrialisation, especially in the manufacturing sector (Cowan 1997). This 'modernisation' was seen as expanding access to formal schooling and increasing state investment in education. In the Latin American context (with the exception of Cuba), the result had been a larger system, but of questionable merit (Brock 1985).

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, developed and developing states were subject to various economic, social and political challenges which put pressure on welfare states and their education systems globally. In the North, countries faced declining productivity as a result of a decade-long rise in input prices, rising wage demands and external competition. In the South – and Latin America specifically – the period of ISI had been financed by recourse to private loans and their repayment via favourable terms of trade. With the rise of inputs such as oil exceeding these states' revenue they began to find repayment of these loans increasingly difficult, eventually defaulting in 1982. At the same time Latin American societies were becoming more diverse and complex. Social class was becoming just one identifier amongst others, as non-material concerns came to the fore (Kitschelt 1993, 1994; Inglehart and Carballo 1997). These included religious views, ethnicity, environmental and gender issues. There was growing support for human rights as societies tired of the torture and disappearances that military-led governments had pursued since the 1960s, instilling support for democracy and human rights (Portantiero 1992; Ellner 1993; Hurtado 1994; Castañeda 1994; Shifter 1997; Oxhorn 2003; Cardoso, interview, 2008\textsuperscript{1}).

In education it was the (New) Right that benefited from these changes during the 1980s. It introduced various policies which reflected two distinct and apparently contradictory tendencies: neoliberalism and neo-conservatism (Giddens 1994; Apple 1997; Trowler 1998; Whitty 1997). The neo-liberal strand emphasised the use of competition, consumerism and diversity in the educational sector, to enable greater individual choice. The neo-conservative element was more communitarian, drawing

\textsuperscript{1} Details of all interviews cited in this dissertation are located in Appendix 6: Interview methodology and schedule.
on a traditional vision of education which included a concern with government intervention, a commitment to public morality, tradition and order in society (Trowler 1998; Manzer 2003).

Despite the contradictions, the New Right coalition was more durable than it otherwise appeared. Both neo-liberals and neo-conservatives could agree on the importance of preparing individuals for the world of work. Arguing that ‘progressive’ education was inefficient, the New Right sought to revise the role of education so that it could meet the changing demands of the labour market. Given the economic crisis, this meant a greater emphasis being placed on vocational forms of education (Moore 1987; Fernan 1997). In addition, the New Right also presented its objectives in non-partisan language, thereby glossing over potential tensions. Apple (1997) notes the use of terms such as ‘choice’ (via vouchers and tax credits for schools), ‘raising standards’ (through tests and assessments of both students and teachers) and concentrating its fire on the old curriculum as anti-family, anti-business and secular.

Although the bulk of Latin American educational systems could not be identified as ‘progressive’, the New Right’s analysis and policy prescriptions nevertheless carried great weight amongst the region’s elite during the 1980s and 1990s. The economic crisis meant a tightening of government spending, including on the welfare state and hence education. Furthermore, the collapse of the economic model meant that curricular changes were necessary. The acceptance of the New Right critique did not mean a complete reversal of the prevailing Latin American educational model. By the 1980s the public sector was substantial, owing to the expansion of the system over previous decades. Rather the New Right ‘revolution’ across the region heralded a shift towards the role of the market in providing solutions, owing to falling public expenditure following recession and domestic and external pressure for structural readjustment (Aasen 2003; Lindbom 2001; Mitler 1997; Cowan 1997; Carnoy 2002; Gray and Wilcox 1995; McLeish and Phillips 1998).

The New Right ‘revolution’ included privatisation, administrative decentralisation and performance standardisation. First, privatisation was seen as a means of paying for a public service that was undergoing retrenchment, by attracting alternative sources of revenue beyond the state. Privatisation would also provide a way to achieve greater diversity in provision while also empowering parents by offering them choice (López 1999; Carnoy 2002; Belfield and Levin 2002). Second, decentralisation would reduce bureaucracy while giving consumers and local administrators greater
influence over the running of schools (Ratliff 2003). Accountability was tied up in this process, by ensuring that it was schools that would become directly responsible to consumers (parents) for their performance, rather than to a faceless bureaucracy. However, as critics have since observed, in the absence of any increase in funding, Latin American schools or regions suffered from having increased responsibility without the means to act (López 1999; Anderson and Randall 1999; di Gropello 1999).

Third, the state would maintain overall standards in two key ways: through a national curriculum and nationwide testing of students, teachers and schools. Nation-wide testing could also serve as a form of achieving accountability which would benefit the economic interests at the centre of power, by identifying ‘better’ or ‘worse’ schools for consumers and providing a clear indicator of prospective workers’ technical competences (Carlson 2000; Gray and Wilcox 1995). But contrary to its emphasis on educational quality, the measures largely resulted in managerialism rather than any substantive differences in results and pedagogical change (Casassus 2007).

Following the New Right changes, the public education systems of the 1980s and 1990s presented a mixed picture. Politically, decentralisation was intended to open up the education system. Yet without the transfer of adequate funds to the local or school level, it was not entirely apparent how schools were supposed to respond to consumer demands. Furthermore, the neo-liberal model was accused of maintaining an authoritarian façade; teachers continued to be largely excluded from decision-making. Economically, public spending declined which put pressure on a system that was continuing to expand during the period. Socially, the quality of much Latin American education continued to be poor, with teachers remaining under-trained and underpaid and social stratification setting in between areas and schools (di Gropello 1999; Anderson and Randall 1999; López 1999; Ramos 1999; Fischman 2000; Marin 2001; Carnoy 2002). The poorest social sectors, which had the most to complain about regarding this system, were also the least organised; thereby weakening the importance or urgency associated with social sector reform (Angell and Graham 1995).

3. Social democratic governments and education policies in Latin America

If the New Right measures taken in the 1980s did not dramatically improve the state of Latin American education, the Left did not appear to be in a position to take advantage. Despite the symbolic value of the Cuban revolution, the end of the Cold War not only seemed to represent socialism’s last gasp; it
had also deprived Cuba of its sponsor. The only other left-wing option, the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, was meanwhile proving problematic, as the country suffered an ongoing civil war against the US-backed Contras. The anti-Sandinista strategy soon proved itself, following their loss in the 1990 elections.

But if the end of the Cold War and the Sandinistas' defeat was the Left's low point, after 1990 the situation paradoxically improved for the Left. The Cold War's end meant there was no longer a direct threat from the Soviet Union, thereby removing the grounds for direct US intervention in Latin American states' internal politics. In addition, the re-establishment of representative democracy and persisting inequality and poverty provided the space for left-wing governments to be elected (Castañeda 2008: 233). This began in the 1990s with what Castañeda called 'reformers', who were distinct from other sections of the Left, including traditional communists, armed groups and intellectuals. These reformers were broadly social democratic and, given the nature of the period, were distinguishable from the New Right in particular ideological and sociological terms. Ideologically, while social democrats saw themselves as located on the left of the political spectrum, this was complicated both by the apparent decline of socialism and its greater acceptance of the market. However, Bobbio (1996) argued for the continuing relevance of the left-right dichotomy by examining the values at the root of each. Although the socialist-capitalist distinction seemed redundant, Bobbio observed that the distinction between each was related to that between egalitarianism and difference. While the Left tended to favour measures that increased equality among people, the Right was more accepting of difference – and the resulting inequality. Sociologically, the Left tended to distinguish between different social constituencies: one that was dominant and another that was subordinate (or for the more socialist-inclined, the working class) (Miliband 1982). The dominant class was more closely identified with the Right, since it was made up of those who control the means of production and coercion, while the subordinate classes – or the Left – consist of those without access to either. The existence of these 'haves' and 'have-nots' meant two groups structurally determined to struggle against each other (Miliband 1989). Furthermore, despite its smaller size the dominant class remained politically powerful, owing to its ability to build coalitions across society, including the bourgeoisie, sections of the new working class and the politically uncommitted. By contrast, the larger subordinate class remained politically weak because it was internally divided and heterogeneous, making it more

The distinction between Left and Right can be applied to the Latin American welfare state and education system outlined above between the 1930s and 1980s. Although the welfare state is commonly perceived as being an emancipative entity, designed to reduce social and economic inequality (Pierson 1998; Giddens 1994), its development has tended to reflect class concerns and capacity to form coalitions (Esping-Andersen 1990; Daniels and Trebilcock 2005; Bloch et al 2003). Where the middle (or dominant) classes failed to find common cause with the working class, the outcome were more conservative welfare states which maintained social difference and hierarchy. This was certainly the case in Latin America, where efforts since the 1930s had been directed at dividing the working classes by appealing to, and patronising, their more industrialised sectors. The welfare states (and the education systems) were tailored primarily to the middle classes and limited numbers of the working class elite, ensuring corporatist control of these sections of society and failing to reduce overall social inequality (Archetti 1987; Huber 1996; Conliff 1999). This was all in a marked contrast to the more Scandinavian-style social democratic welfare state, which reflected a more cross-class consensus in favour of improving the lot of the subordinate class, through universal rights. Instead, the Right had largely dictated the parameters of the welfare state and education policy since the 1930s. Despite the various economic, political and social challenges between the 1960s and 1980s across the region, the Right had remained dominant. Along the way it had taken up a new neo-liberal discourse alongside conservatism, which was reflected in the New Right’s construction of class alliances to support its approach to public policy (and education) during the 1980s.

More specifically, in education the difference between Left and Right is apparent in the contrasts that may be drawn between different educational approaches and objectives, all of which may be superimposed over Bobbio’s equality-difference spectrum. Loveless (2001) distinguishes between educational models that emphasise traditional subject matter, methods of teaching and agreed standards and objectives against another that is more student-centered in its content, teaching and goals. Caston (2006) likens the difference to be between educational forms that are ‘linear and sequenced (‘traditional’) and flexible and open-ended (‘progressive’). The latter is perhaps most visible in the critical pedagogy of Paulo Freire (1978, 1985), who distinguishes between education as a
banking process’ and as a dialogue. The former portrays education as a process by which teachers ‘deposit’ information into students and maintain the established structure of power relations within society. This is in contrast to Freire’s approach where the difference between students and teachers becomes indistinguishable as both engage in critical thinking and problem solving. The effect of this more challenging approach is to undermine both the prevailing system and the authority that oversees it (Sarup 1982). Applied to the left-right dichotomy, it is those educational models that most challenge the status quo and that are closest to the Left, since they pursue greater equity. By contrast, the Right, given its more comfortable relationship with difference – and hence resulting inequality – tends to be more identifiable with more traditional versions of education (figure 1).

Tied into the ideological and educational variation between the Left and Right were also those that existed within the Left – and social democracy in particular. Once again, the features and values associated with left-right dichotomy aided comprehension by providing a way of understanding the relative differences between them. By the early 1990s, the prospect for social democrats in Latin America did not look promising. What existed was complicated by the apparent division within this reformist, social democratic Left, between a politically centrist form and a more radically inclined type (Castañeda 1994). Kirby (2003:148) subsequently delineated the two, distinguishing between a ‘Third Way’ – which included those groups that largely accepted the neo-liberal reforms and believed it could be managed more effectively through regulation, tax reform and the use of targeted social programmes – and ‘popular radicals’, who aimed to introduce more popular forms of participation and innovative social programmes.

The contrast between these two groups of reformers pointed to a qualitative difference between them. The radicals’ emphasis on socialism prior to 1989 placed them at the more egalitarian end of the Bobbio left-right dichotomy in the post-socialist 1990s. Meanwhile the centrist or Third Way’s accommodation of some of the features associated with the New Right – including the role of the market – meant that it was less troubled by the differences that resulted from such policies (Giddens 2000, 2003). But both still maintained a role for the state that was more substantial than that proposed by the New Right, although this was more comprehensive in the Participatory Left than the Third Way. The Third Way’s stance was arguably helped by its relatively narrow base of support, which was drawn mainly from the middle classes and thereby ensured a greater weight within the party to the
leadership. By contrast, the more popular, radical version – what I choose to term the ‘Participatory Left’ – emerged from a wider constellation of groups and social movements. They included workers' groups, trade unions, progressive sections of the Catholic Church, indigenous peoples and social activists, all of which provided internal and external support to such parties.

Figure 1: Differences between the Left, Right and social democrats on the welfare state and education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participatory Left</th>
<th>Third Way</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Left</strong></td>
<td><strong>Right</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality/Reject difference</td>
<td>Accept difference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subordinate class concerns</td>
<td>Dominant class concerns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universal rights</td>
<td>Selective rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenge status quo ('progressive' education)</td>
<td>Accept status quo (education as 'banking process')</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexible, open-ended curriculum</td>
<td>Linear, structured curriculum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative student-teacher dialogue</td>
<td>Traditional student-teacher relationship</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite its difference to the Third Way version, the Participatory Left can arguably be associated with social democracy, mainly owing to the contrast between it and the nationalistic, populist version that has emerged in the first decade of this century and its use of power (Castañeda and Morales 2008; Castañeda 2008). These various factors suggest the following hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 1:** The Left and Right in Latin America may be distinguished between a more equality-inclined Left that is supported by the subordinate class and uses the state to challenge the status quo and a Right that accepts social differences (and hence inequality), less state intervention and favours dominant class concerns and the status quo.

**Hypothesis 2:** Social democracy in Latin America may be distinguished between a more egalitarian Participatory Left and a more elite-driven Third Way, which should have an impact on public policy outcomes.
The two hypotheses above delineate the relative position of Latin American social democrats, both from the Right as well as within the Left. But what should be the implications of these distinctions when it comes to public policy? More specifically, how should social democrats – whether they are Third Way or Participatory Left – compare to each other (and the Right) when they enact policy? Presumably the relative differences between each should be played out in the way they make policy.

To assess this in relation to education therefore requires an account of social democrats in relation to four main actors: the state, civil society, the private sector and international development agencies (Hall and Midgeley 2004). As state actors, given the relatively discredited status of the Left after 1989, social democrats were unlikely to pursue a model similar to that presented by the Cuban Revolution, in which the state acted as a monopoly provider of education. At the same time, social democrats do not subscribe to the deregulated, privatised version espoused by the New Right. Rather the state plays an active role in education, as a provider of resources, licensor, regulator and guarantor of performance (Giddens 1998, 2003; Jary 2002). Yet there should be some distinction between the two types of social democracy: given the Third Way’s greater acceptance of the market and differences in terms of providers means that it should adopt a less state-oriented approach relative to that of the Participatory Left. This can be summarised as follows:

Hypothesis 3: Social democratic governments are inclined towards greater state involvement and intervention in policymaking, although the Third Way version is less state-oriented than that of the Participatory Left.

The differences in the role of the state for Third Way and Participatory Left social democrats should be reflected in the types of specific education policies they pursue. The framework for this will arguably be found in the function or purpose of education, which is perhaps best expressed in curricular content and its reform. The Right, as observed above, tends to accept the prevailing educational structure and modes of teaching, especially those that promote rote-learning and order within the classroom. By contrast, the various currents of the Latin American Left have tended to draw on more ‘progressive’ Freire-related critical pedagogy, where educators and learners seek to challenge and transform the
existing model jointly. Within the social democratic Left, however, there was much greater commitment to such ideas by those groups that made up the Participatory Left, while policymakers in general (including those in the Third Way) became increasingly concerned with the development of human capital to promote economic growth during the 1980s.

Given the primacy of New Right thinking in the 1980s and 1990s, it was perhaps unsurprising that policymakers increasingly took account of such theories. This was especially evident at the global level where international organisations such as the World Bank, International Labour Organisation (ILO) and others have stressed the need for education reforms to facilitate 'knowledge' that would assist economic development (Dale and Robertson 2007: 205). Among Third Way social democrats, such ideas were increasingly accepted and were expressed in the following: a broader interpretation of education, emphasising greater flexibility, more lifelong learning and the use of different approaches other than formal schooling (Giddens 1998; Anderson 2001; Bottery 2000; Fitzsimmons 2006; Delorenzi 2007). Consequently:

**Hypothesis 4:** Social democratic governments have increasingly adopted human capital development theories associated with the New Right (i.e. markets, entrepreneurship and social order); but Participatory Left governments are more inclined to pursue policies that maintain aspects of 'progressive' critical pedagogy than Third Way ones.

Unlike New Right governments, social democrats differ in that they are more inclined to increase investment in education (Nuttal 2004). This may be attributed to their different sense of the size and role of the state. However, this may come at a price, with other government services being squeezed elsewhere (Glyn and Wood 2001). Arguably Third Way governments are more susceptible to this than Participatory Left ones, since they are more accommodating of other, non-state providers to make up the shortfall. Meanwhile, Participatory Left governments would presumably be more inclined to substantially greater investment in education by comparison, especially given their broader vision of the state. This suggests that:
Hypothesis 5: Social democratic governments support increased social spending in education; but Participatory Left governments will spend proportionately more than Third Way ones.

Just as social democrats encountered changed perceptions of the role of the state, public spending and the purpose of curricular reforms, a similar situation may be found regarding the role and nature of evaluation. New Right reforms, including the deregulation and privatisation of education, not only prompted thinking about students and parents as customers, but also required a mechanism to ensure that educational quality was achieved. Social democrats could either accept or reject them. Given the Third Way’s broad acceptance of some of the themes associated with the New Right, including the need for wider provision and different providers, some degree of assessment would remain necessary. However, they were disinclined to adopt them wholesale, instead preferring to adapt them. This appears most apparent when considering the use of New Right test scores as a means of providing a market indicator for students and parents and the Third Way’s greater concern with establishing ‘standards’ (Bottery 2000). The other approach is to reject the use of evaluation and assessment, which would be more likely by Participatory Left governments, whose base of support includes teachers and their unions who would be on the receiving end of such assessments. This suggests then, that:

Hypothesis 6: Social democratic governments can either accept or reject evaluation and assessment regimes; Third Way governments accept them, Participatory Left governments reject them.

†The role of the state, curricular reform, public spending and evaluation constitute the substance of governments’ education policies. However, to develop and implement them, they require the support of other actors in the education policy process. These include those beyond the government itself, to include interest groups such as teachers, students, parents (Harman 1984; Andrain 1985). How governments engage with such groups is therefore of particular importance. Indeed those that are better organised would be more likely to capture the attention of government. At the same time
though, given the social bases of Third Way and Participatory Left governments, one would expect substantial differences in the way that each would interact with interest groups. Given the Participatory Left’s greater sense of egalitarianism and roots in social movements and groups, one might expect them to adopt a more participatory approach compared to the Third Way’s more limited base of support.

Furthermore, the distinction between Participatory Left and Third Way relations with interest groups overlooks the preferences that each may have regarding specific groups. Given their ideological position on the Left, one would expect social democratic governments to identify more closely with groups that share their position. In the case of education, this means that Participatory Left governments, with their historic association with teachers’ unions and student movements, would have a ‘better’ relationship with such leaderships compared to Third Way governments. The latter, meanwhile, given its rejection of a less dichotomous world view, may be more inclined to accommodate actors not traditionally associated with the Left, such as private interests and business (Jary 2002; Driver and Martell 2002). This would indicate then that:

Hypothesis 7: Social democratic governments tend to recognise and pay attention to interest groups that are more organised and cohesive; but Participatory Left governments tend to have closer relations with teachers and students; Third Way governments tend to have closer relations with private interests.

4. Outline of the Dissertation

This purpose of this dissertation is to establish what social democracy is and its impact on public policy in the Latin American context. So far this introduction has outlined a loose, working definition for the Left, especially in the post-Cold War environment. Drawing on the impact of previous challenges from both the Left (the Cuban Revolution) and the (New) Right (during the 1980s) to Latin American welfare states and education systems, the chapter presented the emergence of two main social democratic tendencies in the region in the 1990s: the Third Way and the Participatory Left. This included a comparison of the values and features associated with each within the wider left-right spectrum.
Drawing on previous scholarly analysis, it also promoted several hypotheses related both to the nature of social democracy (and the wider Left-Right debate) and its impact on public policy, with particular reference to education.

To test the hypotheses and hence answer the research questions, the dissertation is divided into two parts. The first comprises two chapters (chapters 2 and 3), which examine what kind of governments emerged and why. The first chapter provides a general overview that considers the particular historical contexts surrounding the rise to power of the Concertación, PSDB and PT governments in Chile and Brazil. The second chapter then draws out the implications of these governments being in power, through the emergence of the educational policymaking core that came about in each. The second part of the thesis (chapters 4-11) addresses the impact of the three governments and their policymaking cores on educational policy. These include: the role of the state, the purpose of education for each government (and expressed through curricular development), public expenditure, forms of assessment or evaluation, approaches to participation generally, followed by specific accounts of the governments' relations with key educational actors (the private sector, teachers and students).

The concluding chapter not only brings together the various findings but also assesses the extent to which the hypotheses finally hold. While they are largely found to conform to expectation, certain qualifications have to be made, mainly as a result of various political, social and economic constraints that the three governments have found themselves in. Through contextualisation it becomes apparent that social democrats do not operate in a vacuum. Instead they have to take into account pre-existing educational structures and arrangements, obliging them to operate in a pragmatic fashion. That this occurs, whereby social democratic theory is translated into social democratic practice, is most evident in the development of policymaking elites when in government. These have a causational effect on the nature of policy formation.

The dissertation therefore concludes that despite the presence of two social democratic tendencies in Latin America, when in government they tend to conform towards a similar elite-driven form of policymaking that privileges certain groups (i.e. private interests) over others (i.e. students and teachers) and adopts a broadly comparable set of policy prescriptions in relation to the state, curricular reform, public spending and evaluation. Notwithstanding recent efforts by the Left – in particular the
anti-globalisation movement – to pursue a different form of policymaking, the dissertation concludes that taking power results in an internal imbalance regarding the relationship between leaders and supporters in social democratic parties. This is manifested in the formation of policy elites with policy preferences that are framed by the institutional constraints and historical contexts in which they find themselves, rather than reflecting the division between Third Way and Participatory Left social democracy.
The Left that emerged in Latin America after the 1970s and 1980s reflected the various social, economic and political changes that had occurred. Since the 1990s there has been much scholarly effort in characterising these changes. This arguably began with Castaneda’s *Utopia Unarmed* (1994), in which four historic groups were identified: traditional communists, national populists (such as Vargas in Brazil and Cardenas in Mexico), political-military coalitions and reformers. By the late 1990s this had shifted into three main groups: intransigent communists, populist radicals and the Third Way reformers (Kirby 2003: 148, 200). However, despite the persistence of the Cuban regime, during the 1990s Marxism was becoming less credible as a viable ideology for the Left, especially following first the tearing down of the Berlin Wall followed by the rejection of communism in Eastern Europe and finally the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. In the absence of a programmatic political and economic model that Marxism offered, the emergence of the two remaining alternatives, the populist radicals and the Third Way reformers constituted the most visible options for the Latin American Left. Consequently, their respective approaches formed the basis of contemporary social democratic practice in Latin American today – although owing to the ambiguous nature of the term ‘populism’, I prefer to use an alternative term, the ‘Participatory Left’, rather than populist radicals.

The emergence of the Participatory Left and Third Way owed more to the reformist branch suggested by Castañeda (1994) than the intransigent or traditionally-minded communists. This was evident in the change between reformers and communists, whereby the reformers adjusted their thinking on social and economic positions while the communists generally failed to shift. The Participatory Left adopted a socially and politically pluralist stance. Unlike the hegemony espoused by the communists, it sought to distinguish itself from the elitist stance of the Cuban Revolution by introducing a more collegial form of leadership. In part this was due to the Participatory Left’s structure of support that went beyond class, to include a wide range of social movements and actors, including human rights activists, independent trade unionists, neighbourhood associations, feminists, indigenous peoples and sympathetic members of the Church. Furthermore, these activists played a more direct role in policy development and management within these parties; the party generally tended to be an...
umbrella organisation under which various forms of action and causes were pursued (Petras 1999). Economically, it initially aimed to revive the state-led approach to development that had been prevalent in the region prior to the 1980s. However, in the 1990s as they shifted from opposition to government they came to accept the prevailing free-market orthodoxy (Roberts 1998; Soares et al 2004; Coggiola 2004; Katz 2005; Couto and Baia 2006). Increasingly, the Participatory Left within the state sought alternative solutions to the limitations of the public sector, including space for private interests.

If the Participatory Left gradually came around to the free market, the Third Way Left in Latin America had largely adopted this approach from the outset. Although its adherents identified with the redefined social democratic values and principles outlined by Giddens (1998) and others during the 1990s, it felt relatively more comfortable with the market. This was reflected in part both by such parties' membership and leadership styles. Third Way politicians constituted a small cadre that was not generally drawn from social movements. Lacking such support, this arguably gave them more freedom of movement, both in terms of electoral strategy and policymaking. Strategically, with socialism discredited after 1989, they sought the political centre. This delivered them electoral success at the cost of compromise with advocates of neo-liberal reform, failure to respond to growing inequality or represent effectively the most disadvantaged sectors of society (Roberts 1998; Goertzel 1999; de Souza 1999; Ellner 2004). The absence of a grassroots check on the positions led to a more elitist position by Third Way leaders, which was reflected in a tendency towards technocratic policymaking.

By the mid-2000s the distinction between the Participatory and Third Way Lefts was less than it appeared. Castañeda (2006) reported the existence of two Lefts in the region, in which the Third Way and the Participatory Left shared similar traits and were distinct from a more reactionary project espoused by Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and Evo Morales in Bolivia. This was reaffirmed by Sandbrook et al (2007) who asserted that since the 1990s Brazil had experienced social democratic politics under both Cardoso and Lula.

Given the apparent divergences in approach between the Participatory and Third Way Lefts in the 1980s, what had happened over the subsequent two decades to bring them closer together? Furthermore, to what extent did the Lefts that emerged in Brazil and Chile in this period fit these models and represent a form of social democracy?
To answer these questions, this chapter examines the nature of the military regime in each country and its transition to democracy. Particular attention is paid to the relationship between political parties and social movements associated with the Left in this period. This is followed by the form that the Left took in each country after democracy’s return along with the political Right. In doing so, it will become apparent that in Chile the Left was based largely on political parties and social movements that formed a Third Way coalition known as the Concertación that took power after 1990. In Brazil it was split between a grassroots-based, social movement-oriented PT and a narrower, less class-based PSDB. Whereas the Concertación faced a strongly organised and identifiable Right after 1990, in Brazil the Right was more fluid and reliant on support from across the political spectrum.

The reasons for these contrasting developments in the Chilean and Brazilian cases may be summarised briefly. First, the effect of democratisation in each country varied, which had implications for the nature of the governments that emerged. In Chile the transition from military rule was accompanied by an immediate change in government and ideological slant, from the New Right under Pinochet to the social democratic Concertación. In Brazil by contrast, the democratisation process was staggered. Democracy’s return in 1985 did not mean an immediate transfer of power from Right to Left, since supporters of the military regime continued to remain in government. This was not to happen until 1995 (or 2003 for those observers who consider the Cardoso government to have not been sufficiently social democratic). The effect of this meant that initially social democracy was achieved through a Third Way PSDB under Cardoso – who relied on a governing coalition with former supporters of the military regime – and which was then followed by a more Participatory Left PT after 2003.

Second, the social composition of the three governments illustrate the tendency of each towards either the more elite-based Third Way or the Participatory Left. In Chile although the movement for democracy had included both social movements and political parties, after 1990 parties became the more dominant actors. Within the Concertación this gave the party leaders greater leverage and contributed towards a more elite-based form of social democracy. In Brazil the PSDB was similarly elitist as a result of a relatively strong party leadership over its members. This was exacerbated by a relatively narrow membership base that was largely drawn from the middle classes. By contrast, the PT not only had a strong grassroots membership that was drawn from a wide range of
social movements, it also had a range of internal institutional mechanisms to ensure that these members were able to participate actively in the direction of the party. This had the effect of constraining the party leadership.

Third, electoral pressures contributed towards more elite-driven forms of policymaking. In the cases of the Concertación and the PSDB already powerful party leaderships in each were further strengthened, initially by the search for votes and then subsequently by being in government. A similar process was faced by the PT, although the distance travelled was greater than that faced by the Concertación and the PSDB. Its internally participatory nature and critical stance against government was increasingly challenged as it achieved electoral success. Many of the recipients were party leaders who took up executive posts at the subnational level as mayors and governors, affording them greater weight within the PT.

1. Chile

This section examines the various aspects that led to the rise and shape of the predominant contemporary social democratic form in Chile today, the Concertación. To comprehend its nature, particular attention is paid to the preceding military regime and its base of support, which contributed to the formal rules related to political parties under which the Concertación and its rivals on the Right emerged. In addition, particular emphasis is placed on the relative weakness of civil society vis-à-vis political society after 1990, despite its emergence as a vehicle for protest against the Pinochet regime during the 1980s. Instead social movements for change were subsumed under the political leadership of the Concertación parties, creating the party-oriented form of Chilean social democracy that has persisted to this day.

Chile’s status as a social democracy is controversial given the heavily market-oriented approach to development in that country. Against this though, the Concertación appears relatively socially democratic, emphasising some increase in the role of the state to tackle inequality, expand social services and promote development. The result is a form of social democracy that is more closely associated with the Third Way version (Sandbrook et al 2007: 147-8), which places considerable emphasis on elite control, led primarily by the president, cabinet and key advisors. That this occurred illustrates the depth of the changes that occurred in that country between the early 1970s
and 1990s, since the Chilean Left had been one of the most class-oriented and Marxist-inspired prior to the coup.

1.1. Chilean politics until 1990

The shape of the social democratic approach has its roots in the military regime and the immediate period before, from the 1960s until 1973. Angell (1972: 3) noted that representative government in Chile had strong constitutional and popular roots. The Pinochet years reversed the apparent progress and liberalisation within Chilean politics and society that had persisted until then. Another view maintains that the progressive governments of the 1960s and early 1970s are the exception rather than the rule: until the Frei (1964-70) and Allende (1970-73) governments, Chilean politics had been largely authoritarian and military intervention was common. Loveman (1979) observes that this was the case under the Alessandri and Ibáñez governments in the 1920s and 1930s, which was repeated when General Augusto Pinochet took power in the 1970s.

The Alessandri and Ibáñez experiences highlight the extent to which authoritarianism in Chile transcends political ideology. Whereas Pinochet was closely identified with the political Right, the authoritarians of the earlier period were associated with the political Left, especially through the Popular Front government that was eventually established in the 1930s. Indeed, this authoritarianism never completely vanished: despite its democratic and participatory rhetoric, the Allende government was underpinned by an increasingly polarised and militant set of forces and supporters. Indeed, Chilean politics was affected by a tension between political parties and anti-party movements that challenged the system (Angell 1993: 153). Where the Pinochet regime broke with previous authoritarian projects was in the emphasis it assigned to the market. On one side the regime drew support from the traditional elite in Chilean society who were socially conservative and favoured a return to social order and stability; on the other, it broke new ground by appealing to an emerging class of entrepreneurs and their academic allies, the Chicago Boys, who supported economic liberalisation and the use of the market in the social sphere.

This coalition between social conservatives and economic liberals coalesced throughout the mid- and late-1970s. Opposition was minimised by an extreme level of repression against groups associated with the pre-1973 period. Indeed, the level of persecution that followed the coup took many
in Chile by surprise, including the Christian Democrats who had opposed Allende and initially supported the military takeover. The exile and disappearances of many associated with the past meant that by 1980 the Pinochet regime reached its apogee with the formalisation of a new order through a new constitution. In particular, the constitution envisaged a protected form of democracy that would result at some point in the future, buttressed by the various neo-liberal changes introduced in the latter half of the 1970s (Boeninger 1998).

After 1980 the military regime increasingly began to experience opposition. At first this was economic in character, following the 1982 debt crisis. Later it became political, with the 1988 plebiscite on the continuation of Pinochet’s presidency acting as a focus for dissent. Initially this opposition originated in social movements and groups, since political party activity was banned. The rise of such social mobilisation had implications on the regime, contributing towards its de-legitimisation, especially as it began resorting to the use of repression and coercion, while failing to improve living conditions (Varas 1989).

However, unlike Brazil where the social movements achieved a strong, independent position, in Chile they were eventually subsumed by the political parties (Garcia-Huidobro, interview, 2007). Initially forced to operate clandestinely, the parties increasingly took a leading role in organising the protests. This may have been due to the relatively deep roots that political parties had in Chile: prior to 1973 the two main parties, the Socialists and Christian Democrats (PDC), retained strong class-based support. While the former drew support from poorer sections of society, the latter was more prominent amongst the middle class.

The 1980 constitution allowed for the eventual return of political parties to electoral competition — although in a new format. It provided for an electoral system which would encourage the creation of coalitions (Herrera 2005); this, it was envisaged, would also prevent extremism in favour of compromise and moderation. Yet there was also continuity in the party system that had preceded 1973. This was apparent in the three cleavages that persisted in the party system from 1987 on: clerical and anticlerical parties, parties identified as either Left or Right and those that supported or rejected key political leaders and their legacies (Valenzuela 1995). Indeed, the main political distinction remained the Left-Right axis, which owed much to the polarities and history each side
represented: in favour of equality, democracy, freedom and Allende on the Left and for development, order, security and Pinochet on the Right (Fontaine 1995).

Amongst the opposition parties, during 1985 the Christian Democrats secured control of the mainstream by sponsoring a National Accord for Democracy; the signatories included most opposition parties and excluded the more militant ones. Two years later the repeal of the law against political parties was finally overturned (Herrera 2005). Electoral competition was close to returning. However, before that could happen, a transition was needed from military to civilian rule, which occurred as a result of the 1988 plebiscite on Pinochet’s continued rule.

Despite Pinochet’s defeat, the transfer of power to civilian authority was not controlled by the parties and especially the opposition ones; the regime remained strong, resulting in a transition based on accords and consensus between the various political actors (Santa Cruz 1996). The result was an incomplete transition in which authoritarian enclaves remained (e.g. the presence of life senators appointed by the military, Pinochet’s continued role as chief of the armed forces), meaning that the new government had not only to complete the transition, but begin the process of democratic consolidation at the same time (Garreton 1990). This approach was reflected in the new government’s method of policymaking, by seeking accords with the opposition and relevant actors (Santa Cruz 1991, 1995).

If the political opposition was obliged to accommodate these dimensions of the ‘pacted’ transition, this illustrated the extent to which ‘political society’ had trumped ‘civil society’ in Chile’s re-democratisation. Following the 1988 plebiscite, a cross-societal organisation of different social movements and groups examined the differences that existed between themselves and the political parties: while the parties would focus on trying to change the constitution, the former would focus on finding solutions to urgent social problems (Acuerdo Social por el ‘No’ 1988). However, given the overlap that existed in party and social movement memberships (e.g. the leadership of the Colegio de Profesores and the student unions tended to be members of Concertación parties), the priorities of the political class invariably trumped those of the movements.

Within that political class, the mainstream opposition on the Left (or more accurately, the Centre-Left) comprised the parties that had joined together in the Concertación coalition that had campaigned against the Pinochet regime in the 1988 constitution. It included both clerical parties such
as the Christian Democrats and anticlerical parties like the Socialists, the Party for Democracy (PPD) and the smaller Social Democratic Radical Party (PRSD). Its experience of the repressive nature of the military regime as well as the 'pacted' nature of the transition meant that it was disinclined to tamper with the outcomes of the various policies that had been undertaken during the 1980s. But this was not the result of any overt pressure or coercion by the regime; indeed, some of the leading concertaciónistas came to profoundly believe in the objectives of those policies (Sandbrook et al 2007: 165).

1.2. Main Chilean political actors after 1990: the political parties

The two leading parties within the Concertación, the Christian Democrats (PDC) and Socialists, held contrasting positions at the time of the 1973 coup. The PDC had supported the military takeover while leading Socialists were largely persecuted. During the 1980s, however, the two parties' leaderships came to share the view that democracy should return, along with individual liberty and greater scope for public participation. While the Socialists experienced a shift from a previously radical stance to a more moderate ideological position, the PDC underwent no substantial transformation, other than a general distancing from the Church's teachings and becoming closer to business (Hofmeister 1995; Roberts 1997; Herrera 2005). Nevertheless, though it maintained support from the more religious sectors of society, its base began to shift in the 1990s: not only were PDC voters likely to have lower education levels than other Concertación parties, they were also more likely to split their vote between presidential and parliamentary candidates (Morales and Poveda 2007). Indeed, the looser attachment of PDC voters to the party has worked against it since 1997, when it saw votes shift from it to the ideologically conservative Independent Democratic Union (UDI) (Huneeus 2007).

Although the PDC and Socialists comprised the main forces within the Left in the 1980s, this was a notable contrast to the period before 1973. Until the military coup the Left was dominated by the Socialists and the Communists. Since the 1980s the two began to move apart: the Socialists became more moderate while the Communists were radicalised (Herrera 2005; Valenzuela 1995; Benavente 1988; Roberts 1997). The result was that while the two parties operated clandestinely during the movement for democracy in the 1980s, by the 1989 elections the Socialists were part of the Concertación bloc while the Communists remained outside. Despite this trend, some on the political
Right remained unconvinced of the change in the Left, claiming that its spokespeople rejected individualism, criticised the market and remained wedded to a stronger role for the state (Cáceres and Santa Cruz 1996; Camhi et al. 1999). In part this may reflect the presence of a wide range of personal and ideological factions that exist within the party (Salcedo and Fuente 2007). Indeed, by the late 1990s the Socialists’ accommodation of such interests was reflected in its acceptance of diversity within educational provision, despite demands for greater state control of privately run (i.e. state-subsidised private) schools and more scrutiny of private bodies using public funds (Comision Nacional de Educacion 1997).

Alongside the Socialists was a new party that shared their increasingly centrist stance in the late 1980s: the PPD. The PPD is called an ‘instrumental’ party owing to its origins. Following the 1973 coup, the military regime had banned political party activity. This had an adverse effect on the two strongest parties on the Left, the Communists and Socialists, especially as many of their members either disappeared or were forced into exile. Despite repealing the ban in 1987, the order remained on both the Socialist and Communist parties until 1989. To circumvent the measure, left-wing activists formed the PPD as a way of getting involved in political party activity during these years. Indeed, until 1992 Socialist Party members were also able to be active within the PPD (Valenzuela 1995).

In contrast to the Socialists with its long history in Chilean politics, the PPD is seen to represent a new form of politics and culture. As a result it has been portrayed as a pragmatic, modern party of the Left (Salcedo and Fuente 2007; Klugmann 1991). This perspective yielded substantial electoral dividends, ensuring that during the first part of the 1990s it received a greater share of votes cast than those won by the Socialists (Herrera 2005). However, since its founding the party has struggled and continues to be bedevilled by a lack of strong organisation. This has made it easier for particular leaders to impose themselves and their positions on the party over that of the wider membership. Such a situation may be due less to a sense of ideological pragmatism than a lack of programmatic coherence resulting in a paralysis between its activists who support a centre-left or a centre-right stance (Salcedo and Fuente 2007).

Against the heterogeneous Left that the Concertación represented, Chile retained a relatively strong political Right. As noted above, the Pinochet regime was distinct from previous military interventions in that it had brought together both social conservatives and economic liberals. These
perspectives were given institutional form through the creation of new political parties in the late 1980s. They included the formation of the Independent Democratic Union (UDI) and National Renovation (RN). Of the two, the UDI is arguably the more successful, having increased its vote share at the expense of the Christian Democrats (Huneeus 2007). However, whether this constitutes wider growth for the Right at the ballot box during the 1990s is debatable, although Lehmann and Hinzpeter (2001) do claim that it has done so despite the regime's defeat in 1989. This, they argue, may be attributed to a shift in the parties' focussing less on social concerns such as liberty and equality (the main issues during the 1988 plebiscite) in favour of those regarding social delinquency and crime.

The origins of the UDI and the RN can be traced to the 1983 protests against the government. The UDI has tended to be seen as the main supporter of the military regime, although Pinochet's detention in London in 1998 enabled the party to put greater distance between it and the former dictator (Berrios 2007). Ideologically, the UDI fuses together conservative social Catholicism and neoliberalism (Valenzuela 1995), although the former was arguably stronger in its formation than the latter. Its leaders were drawn from those who had worked within the military regime while its base included substantial sections of the poor and working class. This support was achieved through the strategy of its regime's chief ideologue and UDI leader, Jaime Guzman, both by promoting the organisation of the party in poorer neighbourhoods and participating in assistance programmes in needy communities during the 1980s (Pinto 2006). This strategy, coupled with close contacts in the business community, provided the party with substantial resources. Meanwhile, after 1989 party cohesion and discipline was further aided by the social homogeneity of its parliamentarians, which contributed towards the party's growth during the 1990s. The result was an increase in its vote share, from 9.8% in 1989 to 25.2% in 2001. Indeed, by the 2005 elections it was picking up middle class support alongside its more established support base amongst the working class, making it the largest party on the Right (Joignant and Navia 2003; Berrios 2007).

The RN comprised the remnants of the old Partido Nacional, the Frente Nacional de Trabajo led by a former Pinochet interior minister, Sergio Onofre Jarpa and — until 1988 — the UDI (Valenzuela 1995; Gamboa 2007). The split with the UDI occurred over its decision not to support Pinochet in the 1988 plebiscite. Yet even with the UDI's departure, the RN has never been cohesive, owing to its division between those who supported a more 'progressive', less authoritarian and centrist approach
led by Andres Allamand and the more corporatist, conservative tendency initially headed by Jarpa. Despite Allamand’s leadership, during the first half of the 1990s he could not count on the support of his deputies in Congress; Pinochet’s arrest in 1997 similarly divided the party (Gamboa 2007). The result has been a decline in the RN’s electoral fortunes in favour of the UDI since 1989.

2. Brazil

In Brazil the factors that led to the rise of social democratic governments was, on the surface, similar to that in Chile: a military regime gave way to democracy that eventually enabled social democratic governments to take power: first under Cardoso and the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB) and since 2003 under Lula and the Workers’ Party (PT). However, this process was less linear than it seems. This section therefore examines not only the difference between the two types of social democracy that the Cardoso and Lula governments represent, but also the pathway travelled to that point. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the Brazilian road to democracy was a more drawn out process than in Chile. The relatively lower levels of repression under the military regime, the continuing presence of congressional and political party activity all contributed to a much more ambiguous state of affairs in Brazil. This made defining the Left and Right in Brazil much more complicated, since there has been considerable overlap between actors associated with each since Brazil’s return to democracy in 1985.

2.1. Brazilian politics until 1994

As in Chile, the military regime provided formal rules which helped shape the nature of political activity prior to re-democratisation in 1985. However, unlike Chile, the situation faced by both civil and political society was noticeably different. First, in the decade before 1985 the regime had begun a process of ‘abertura’ (political liberalisation or ‘opening’) which was designed to control the transition. This had been instituted after the peak of military repression, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and when the regime appeared confident that it had rooted out what it considered to be subversive activity. Second, the process soon took on its own dynamic, making it difficult for the regime to control or contain it. The results were growing social and political demands which were exacerbated by the debt crisis after 1980s.
The military regime which resulted in the 1964 coup occurred with the support and organisation of prominent sections among the economic, political and social elites (Green 2003; Alimonda 1984; Levine 1979). Although it initially closed Congress and banned political party activity, the regime subsequently changed tack and reinstituted political party activity shortly after the 1964 coup. However, this was directed from above and limited to only two new political parties: the National Renovation Alliance (ARENA) which represented government supporters and the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) (Skidmore 1988). Until the mid-1970s this two-party system was secured by relatively easy victories for the regime’s candidates in indirect presidential elections.

The military regime sought to keep a firm grip on both the political system and society, even as its control from the late 1970s began to unravel. In part the coercive nature of the state and its suppression of debate opened up a cleavage within its ruling group, between the upper bourgeoisie and the military. The divide also provided growing space for other social and political actors to emerge (O’Donnell 1999; Stepan 1988). At the same time the military-led governments were becoming less hardline following the defeat of subversive activity undertaken by left-wing guerrillas by the mid-1970s. These less militant elements in the regime began to press for political liberalisation which they sought to manage (Cammack 1991).

In the latter half of the 1970s the MDB provided a political forum for opposition to the military regime to coalesce. But at the same time social movements were either organising or reconstituting themselves from the late 1970s – and doing so in ways that were independent of the political parties. In São Paulo and the developed South, a ‘new unionism’ was emerging in the manufacturing and industrial sectors. Unlike the older trade unions, which had been officially recognised and co-opted under the pre- and post-1964 governments, the new unions were relatively autonomous (Branford and Kucinski 2003). Alongside were the rise of other, diverse sets of actors, such as social Christian activists and identity-based movements. Like the new unions, these groups were independent, but willing to co-operate with the MDB, most notably in the cross-societal demand for rights and direct elections for the presidency during the early 1980s.

Brazil returned to democracy in 1985 when the last military president handed power back to civilians. However, the transition was pacted and did not herald a complete break with the past. There was considerable overlap between the two regimes, most notably in members of the political class that
straddled both. The first democratic vice-president, José Sarney, took over the presidency in March 1985, following the death of Tancredo Neves, who had been the first civilian to be indirectly elected by Congress to the post. Unlike Neves, Sarney had been a former supporter of the military government, highlighting the degree of continuity with the previous regime. Sarney’s governing coalition included both former political supporters of the military from the Liberal Front Party (PFL) and its opponents from the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) (Power 1991; Menguello 1998). Following electoral changes at the end of the military regime the MDB had renamed itself the PMDB and remained the largest political party in Brazil. As a result it became increasingly a catch-all party, with messages that accommodated a wide variety of social groups.

Although the post-1985 political environment was more democratic, this created problems for the new government. The association of some of its leading members with the previous regime delegitimised it in the eyes of many in the opposition, especially those social movements associated with the Workers’ Party (PT). Furthermore, democracy had opened space both for the more clientelist and populist political actors at the subnational level and civil society demands. The government proved largely unable to address them, resulting in the abandonment of strategic long-term planning in favour of short-term political fixes (Sola 1991; NEPP 1988; Power 1991). The situation was exacerbated by the economic deterioration of the country, as hyperinflation took hold of Brazil and various stabilisation packages repeatedly failed.

Despite democracy’s return in 1985, the government and its supporters had remained largely committed to state-led forms of economic development. In 1990 this consensus was challenged by the prospect of a more market-oriented approach offered by the new, directly elected president, Fernando Collor de Mello. The role of the state was to be reduced through deregulation and the use of the market (Brasil 1991). The shift appeared different in political terms as well: the new government constituted a break with previous governments and their supporters by eschewing compromise or the construction of a coalition in Congress (Menguello 1998). For contemporary observers, Collor represented the ‘New Right’ (Bresser Pereira 1991). He was different from other politicians on the Brazilian Right, which largely consisted of social and economic conservatives at the time (Cardoso, interview, 2008). During the 1990s though, while these politicians increasingly came to embrace the market, they remained largely conservative on social issues. They were significant enough in
Congress that it has provided a substantial and important base to government stability throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Both Cardoso and Lula have relied on electoral and congressional coalitions with such actors: Cardoso’s alliance with the Liberal Front Party (PFL) and Lula, initially with the Liberal Party (PL) and more recently with the PMDB.

However, in the early 1990s Collor’s neo-liberal drive was too aggressive, fundamentally challenging the tenants of the established political spectrum. While the Left rejected his privatisation proposals, the conservatives feared society’s marketisation (Costa 1996). When a corruption scandal involving the president’s family and associates broke in 1992, he was without support to avoid impeachment and eventual resignation. His departure was hastened by the growing tide of opposition beyond the political class and directed by the media and other social groups such as secondary school students. The succeeding president, former vice-president Itamar Franco (1992-94), did continue to press ahead with some key reforms, including economic stabilisation through the Real Plan (under Cardoso’s management) and some initial privatisations. However, unlike Collor he ensured the passage of these reforms – and his presidency – through the construction of a stable government coalition (Menguello 1998). This latter point was not lost on his successors, both of whom would do the same.

2.2. Third Way social democracy in Brazil: Cardoso and the PSDB

Upon his succession to the presidency, Itamar Franco had appointed Fernando Henrique Cardoso to the foreign ministry. Soon afterwards he was invited to become finance minister and tackle the persisting economic crisis which included hyperinflation. It was a challenging task: since 1985 no government had achieved more than temporary success. Despite the risk, the new minister soon produced and implemented an economic stabilisation plan that achieved the desired effect in 1993-94. Six months after the Real Plan had taken effect Cardoso was elected president. Today Brazil’s economic and financial situation remains largely stable (minus a slight blip in 1999-2002) and the policies associated with the Real Plan have been maintained.

The Real Plan’s achievements won the presidency for Cardoso in 1994 and 1998. In so doing it also made his party, the PSDB, among the most important in Brazilian politics, alongside the PT, PMDB and PFL. Despite its national role, the party’s origins remained primarily regional, in São Paulo.
The PSDB was an offshoot from the PMDB, forming officially in 1988. However, its origins may be found earlier, at the end of the 1970s, as wider political opposition to the military regime was growing.

In 1978 the PMDB nominated Cardoso to run for the Senate. Among those involved with the campaign were members of the academic community, including Francisco Weffort, Sergio Motta and Alino Afonso; Gilda Gouvêa was the campaign secretary. Alongside the intellectuals in Cardoso's campaign were also included some of the new union movement, including Lula and those around him (Gouvêa, interview, 2008). After 1980 the rules on political parties were changed, prompting sections of those involved with the Cardoso campaign to separate and form the PT. This division was cemented by the 1982 direct election for São Paulo governor when Cardoso's PMDB ally, Franco Montoro, beat Lula (Gouvêa, interview, 2008).

During the 1980s the PMDB shifted from the party of opposition to the party of government. Its identity had become increasingly blurred; indeed by the 2000s its supporters tended to identify themselves as centre-right on the political spectrum, whereas those who voted for the PSDB positioned themselves in the centre (Samuels 2006). By 1988 this oppositional wing within the party opted for separation, forming the PSDB. The new party had four main groups: the social democrats that formed the main bulk, a more conservative wing, democratic socialists (who favoured dialogue with the PT) and Christian Democrats (Furtado 1996). Gouvêa concurs that the social democrats were the largest group within the party and that Cardoso's ideas, including those associated with dependency theory, were prominent from its foundation (interview, 2008). By contrast, Jaguaribe (1998) has claimed that as well as being internally split, the social democratic wing of the party was a minority; its eventual dominance may be attributable to its supporters occupying the presidency after 1994 and access to the state.

Indeed, the tensions within the PSDB are evident from its early years. Following the first round of the 1989 presidential election, the party leadership was faced with choosing between Collor and Lula. It ultimately offered 'critical support' to the PT, while remaining concerned at (the then radical) petista demands for workers' power over public and representative institutions. This uneasy balance was made less problematic after 1990 when the democratic socialists – those most closely associated with the PT – won fewer congressional seats, thereby losing influence (Furtado 1996).
The emphasis on institutional and representational concerns highlights the nature of the PSDB's support base. Being dominated by intellectuals, university leaders and the middle class, it had fewer links with grassroots social movements (although this was common with most Brazilian political parties other than the PT; Samuels 2006). Cardoso (interview, 2008) sees this as a virtue: since it is not tied to traditional Brazilian politics and practices, it is more 'puritan' and less tolerant of clientelism. However, this may possibly weaken the party's social democratic identity and make it more susceptible to other interests. For example, although dominated by its São Paulo membership, the PSDB also has a Northeast wing, the base of which is a 'modernising' business elite (Tendler 1997; Burton, forthcoming). These was a group of young industrialists and entrepreneurs within the PMDB associated with the new governor of Ceará state, Tasso Jereisatti. Joining the PSDB at the time of its formation, they had a more market-oriented approach to government, including laying off state employees and privatisation of state assets. This did not constitute any notable differences within the party; indeed, only since the mid-2000s have splits emerged within the Ceará PSDB and between it and the São Paulo-based party, mainly as a result of regional and personal differences (Cardoso, interview, 2008).

The PSDB's susceptibility to the market and business support has elicited criticism that it is not socially democratic, but rather neo-liberal. However, it differs from the neo-liberal model in that it is 'integrative' or 'modernising' (Arroyo, interview, 2008). Whereas neo-liberals see withdrawal of the state to set individuals free, those associated with the PSDB see a legacy of inherited social problems as the reasons for individuals being constrained. The solution is therefore not for less state, but rather an 'enabling' state to address those imbalances (Giddens 1998). This 'new' Left may be what Sandbrook et al (2007: 238) are getting at when they portray the Cardoso (and Lula) governments as examples of social democratic governments in a country lacking the criteria for social democracy, such as class compromises and an alliance with market interests.

Underpinning the PSDB's approach was a commitment to institutional means and addressing problems through formal channels. This was reflected in Cardoso's construction of his government. Although he sought to keep the social policy areas (education, health, agrarian reform) in the hands of his associates (Cardoso, interview, 2008), the construction of Cardoso's governing coalition suggested that he understood the need for political compromise. Former presidents, Collor and (before the 1964
military coup) Jânio Quadros, had forsaken coalition politics and sought to impose their policies using charisma alone; both had failed. Cardoso saw an alliance with the centre-right PFL as necessary to avoid congressional defeat. Although he acknowledged the party as socially and culturally conservative, its attitude to power had changed. Like the PSDB it was less inclined towards patronage and more willing to embrace the new roles required for the market and state (Pompeu de Toledo 1998). Yet the size of the coalition meant that it could not be permanently united or disciplined (de Souza 1999). The result was what Shifter (1997) called a choice between democracy and efficiency: the government’s search for macroeconomic stability meant that both efficiency and prompt solutions to social problems were sacrificed in favour of consensus-building and the institutionalisation of representative democracy.

2.3. The Participatory Left in Brazil: Lula and the PT

Cardoso’s senatorial campaign in 1978 was a multi-class activity. It included his own support from the ‘new middle class’ and the new and independent union movement emerging in the industrial and manufacturing sector of São Paulo. But rather than heralding the beginning of a new class alliance, Cardoso’s electoral campaign marked its highpoint. Following the change of electoral law that allowed new political parties to be created, the opportunity for a workers’ party became possible. The effect was to divide the most influential actors on the Left in Brazil formally across different party lines. This was most apparent a decade later when the PSDB offered ‘critical support’ to Lula and the PT in the 1989 presidential election run-off. The separation was then reinforced by the PT’s opposition to the Cardoso government after 1994. The national rivalry that exists between the two parties owes much to their joint origins in São Paulo state during the 1970s (Costa, interview, 2008).

Of course the PT had its own supporters in the middle class and intellectual community after its formation in February 1980. But in contrast to those who had stayed with the PMDB, the new party’s radical demands and rhetoric challenged the new regime instituted after the 1985 transition. Whereas the Concertación assumed the leadership of both civil and political society opposition to the military regime in Chile, during the 1980s when the PT was at its most militant – and when its positions were arguably closest to opposition-based social movements – it failed to take power. Instead a new faction within the elite, Collor’s New Right, took power. During this time the PSDB had pursued a less directly
confrontational stance: it had accepted the rules of the game after 1985 and remained an opposition force within the system. By contrast, during the 1980s the PT was viewed as a more radical party than it is now. There was considerable fear about the direction the PT would take if it won the 1989 presidential election; this fear contributed to the substantial support that Collor received as a relatively unknown candidate in the second round against Lula.

If the MDB and its supporters (including the future leaders of the PSDB) constituted the reform wing of the opposition at the end of the military period, the PT encompassed a broad spectrum of more radical reformists who sought to transform the foundations of Brazilian politics, society and economy (Arelaro, interview, 2008). Unlike the PSDB it drew its support from across society rather than just the economic and intellectual elites. Its origins were to be found in many grassroots movements in the late 1970s and early 1980s. These included the new unionism in the manufacturing and industrial sectors of São Paulo, social activists in the Church and former guerrillas.

The PT's foundation presented a new kind of political representation in Brazilian politics (at least in its early years). First, the PT adopted a clear oppositional stance and avoided co-optation by the state. Co-optation of labour-related organisations had been common during the populist period in the 1940s and 1950s, when trade unions appeared to act less as independent organisations than as a branch of government. Second, although the PT was a 'workers' party', it had a more socially diverse constituency than its name suggested, including a wide range of social movements and activists other than those associated with labour. Furthermore, just as the party sought political autonomy from the state, so did the PT also seek to provide it to the various groups that made it up. Membership between the party and social movements tended to overlap, although there were institutional mechanisms to ensure that one did not dominate the other. This was most evident in the institutionalisation of various factions within the party called tendências and of various forums and party bodies formed to enable internal dialogue and participation to occur. Such behaviour was in marked contrast to other Brazilian parties, where the bulk of activism was concentrated in the leadership rather than throughout the party as a whole (Baiocchi and Checa 2008). Third, the PT increasingly came to have a stronger sense of affiliation by both its members and supporters (Samuels 2006). Activists' sense of being a part of a political process rather than just a foot soldier is arguably shown in the anecdote that whereas most Brazilian parties employ people to distribute their materials during election campaigns, the PT can rely
on its volunteers to do so. Such support owes much to the relatively open and participatory nature of the party.

If the PT presented a challenge to conventional party politics in the 1980s, it has also faced an internal dilemma since its foundation. As Przeworski (1985) observed, electoral competition generally undermines socialist parties and their association with the working class. Elections encourage compromise, which weakens radical goals (such as the overthrow of the capitalist system) and prompts more reformist and pragmatic goals (such as material benefits for workers). The PT was no different in this respect, other than in the nature of its support base being broader than simply class interest. Since engaging in elections, the PT had to ask itself if its primary aim is to represent its constituent base or to maximise votes. (Keck 1992: 18; Leal 2004) Between 1980 and 2003 the party was closely associated with opposition groups and individuals, many of whom identified with socialism. This was complicated by the election of PT activists to executive positions, first as mayors and then governors; since 2003 this has come to include the national level, through control of the presidency.

Critics claim that PT mayors and governors fail to respond to the social demands and needs of the previously excluded. As Sposati (1999) observed, ‘socialists’ should champion an alternative vision for society that involves not just universal entitlements, but goes beyond the constraints of the state and social policies as they are presently understood. This wide, expansive vision of what the PT should strive for created difficulties for those in elected positions: not only were they constrained by the structure of the state (and the wider capitalist system underpinning it), they stressed the need to govern for everyone, including those groups and interests not associated with the party.

Even when the party has sought to accommodate this more radical vision, it has been uncertain what the party’s relationship was to representative versus participatory institutions (Nylen 1995). As the experience of the first PT administration in São Paulo showed (1989-92), while the party could create new institutions to run alongside the existing ones in health, it was uncertain whether they were to be merely consultative or deliberative (Keck 1992: 232-4).

Given the openness of the party, the uncertainty caused considerable tension within the PT. It also prompted debate about a ‘modo petista de governar’ (petista way of governing) that laid out general aims and themes which elected officials could follow (Bittar 1992). Perhaps the most notable of these efforts was the introduction of the participatory budget (PB) in PT-run Porto Alegre city after
1989. Its operation has been outlined extensively elsewhere (see Baiocchi 2003a; Koonings 2004; Bruce 2004). For the purpose of this dissertation, it is sufficient to observe that the mechanism sought to balance the demands of both the representative and participatory branches of the party. Set up by the municipality, it provided formal rules by which greater participation – principally those otherwise overlooked groups – could take part in public investment decisions by local authorities. The PB consequently provided a new space away from representative institutions themselves where differences between petistas and their supporters could be played out (Macaulay and Burton 2003; Goldfrank and Schneider 2006). In addition, the PT-run executives similarly benefited, since the PB never adversely affected their ability to influence the bulk of public expenditure. At no point has the PB ever constituted more than 10% of a municipal or state budget in any Brazilian municipality or state since its introduction (Schneider 2008).

Although differences would persist between the party and its activists in executive positions, during the 1990s these were relatively modest compared to the previous decade. This reflected several changes that were occurring simultaneously within the PT. First, the choice between electoral maximisation and social representation had not gone away. However, during this period they were held in check as a result of the groups associated with each being relatively evenly matched. This remained the case so long as the prospect of a PT national election victory remained reasonably remote (Leal 2004).

Second, after 1994 there was a shift in the base of the party between its representative and participatory wings at the local level. Activism and dialogue were drying up (Arelaro, interview, 2008). This was to have a greater impact on those associated with greater participation within the party, who were also the most Marxist-oriented in ideological terms (Petras 2005a), thereby reducing their relative influence.

Third, changes were occurring further up the party structures which had an impact on the representative and participatory sections of the party. On the one hand, the leadership around Lula was adopting stances in the economic sphere that it had previously rejected. From being critical of the Real Plan in 1994, by 2002 it not only accepted, but embraced, the macroeconomic policy implemented under Cardoso. The then PT governor of Brasilia, Cristovam Buarque, recalls in 1998 voicing support for Cardoso’s finance minister, Pedro Malan, when he devalued the Brazilian real. He
expected to be disciplined by the party for doing so, only to receive an acknowledgement from Lula in 2001 that he concurred with his view (interview, 2008). On the other hand, the social composition across the party was changing. The party’s membership was becoming more middle class and white-collar as well as increasingly professionalized and bureaucratic (Samuels 2004). This was due in part to changes in the union and social movements that made up the party’s membership: according to Samuels (2004), industrial unions have declined just as those in the public sector have grown. Meanwhile, social movements are more inclined to work with the state than confront them. Such a perspective is in contrast to those such as Petras (2005a), who claim that the PT has seen its support shift away from the old social movements to those with less class-based associations.

Fourth, the ideological sharpness of the party was being blunted, just as the leadership was strengthening its grip on the party. This was no doubt aided by the more professional and bureaucratic party that existed in the 1990s. But it also owed much to the coalitions that the PT formed, especially after 1998. Until 2002 the leadership played down the use of Marxist terminology in its rhetoric (Petras 2005a). Electoral campaigns generally involve coalitions between parties in Brazil, especially for the executive posts of mayor, governor and president. Similar ones had been undertaken by the PT before 1994, but after Lula’s defeat of that year he demanded that he and his team have greater control over the party’s strategic direction. This was formalised in 2001 when the prospect of a Lula victory looked possible. The PT’s National Meeting effectively passed the power to make electoral alliances to the National Directorate, which was dominated by Lula’s faction. Their choice was to align with the market-friendly Liberal Party (Leal 2004). This shift was also influenced by the growing preference of rank-and-file members for moderation in the party after 1995 as the party increasingly won executive positions at the subnational level where the PT was obliged to administer cities and states rather than merely criticising the government (Samuels 2004).

By 2003 then, the PT seemed a noticeably different party from the one that had been founded in 1980. Although the party could still draw on the support of social movements and organisations in a way that other political parties could not, the nature of its membership, internal structures and the relationship between the leadership and grassroots had changed. Furthermore, ideological differences had been lessened, even if the rhetoric of change still remained during the election campaign. Yet it was still identifiable as a leftist party: both its members and supporters placed themselves to the left of
the political spectrum. In addition, like Cardoso's 'puritan' middle class base, the PT's support also showed a rejection of traditional and clientelist ways of conducting politics and a commitment towards representative institutions (Samuels 2006).

The PT's internal changes continued into government. Like the Cardoso government before it, the party pursued the creation of a stable and effective governing coalition by attracting the support of other political parties. Initially the government showed itself inclined towards partisan support: it sought partners from within its electoral and congressional alliances, although showing a reticence to share power in the cabinet (Samuels 2007, Baiocchi and Checa 2008). This changed following the mensalão scandal in mid-2005, when the party's use of state funds to buy political support was exposed. The impact was substantial as a number of party leaders were implicated, meaning that Lula lost several key allies, including his chief of staff, José Dirceu, and party president José Genoino. Several months later, in an unrelated scandal, his finance minister, Antônio Palocci, was also forced to resign. Increasingly, the PT came to be associated with the figure of Lula himself (Bourne 2008; Baiocchi and Checa 2008). Lula's response to the scandals was to build an oversized coalition with the participation of the PMDB to provide greater government stability. The result was the PT pursuing an 'aggressive centralism' (Power 2007), which pulled the leadership increasingly away from its already weakened participatory-minded and ideologically socialist grassroots. More recently, this search for stability provided by coalition has meant the rise of more clientelist forces within the government, thereby weakening the extent to which the PT has achieved a break with traditional political activity (Cardoso, interview, 2008).

At the same time the leadership was taking active steps to impose order on the party. During the government's first year dissident voices were either disciplined or expelled from the party (Petras 2005a). Several, including the Alagoas senator, Heloisa Helena, set up a new socialist party, PSOL. However, their capacity to influence both the PT and the wider Left remained limited, owing in considerable part to the relative size and hegemony of the PT. This was reinforced by the party's weak showing in the 2006 elections. The situation means that while the PT's old support base of social movements and organisations may express frustration at the party's changes and offer sympathy to such efforts, the PT remains the only sizeable and effective party available to form a
government. As Costa (interview, 2008), observes, there currently is no other space for those on the Left to go.

3. Conclusion

This chapter began by noting the two main types of reformist Left that exist in Latin America – the Third Way and Participatory Left versions – and asked how they appeared to have collapsed into one another after 2000. In addition, we asked what this meant in terms of the nature of social democracy in each country.

In both countries there was a military regime and a transition to democracy. In Chile the regime was arguably more repressive than in Brazil and the transition from military rule to democratic rule coincided with an immediate change in the political elite. By contrast the pace of change in Brazil was protracted, with liberalisation occurring under the military from the late 1970s and the regime’s allies remaining in power after democracy’s return in 1985. Similarly, the nature of the Right faced by the governments in each country varied: in Chile it remained strong, both ideologically and organisationally even after the transition; in Brazil the Right was less clearly definable as a particular party or organisation and primarily concerned with maintaining power. This was apparent in the compromises made after 1985 to remain in government, first by accepting democracy and then through coalition with the PSDB.

The difference in the transitions and the type of Right in each country, combined with the relative autonomy and organisation of social movements in Brazil, meant that the demands of government ensured a more immediate top-down approach in Chile. Given the strength of political parties in Chilean society, they soon assumed leadership of the opposition to the military regime, weakening social movements’ influence. In Brazil the PSDB had a relatively weak association with social movements, contributing towards a more elitist approach. Meanwhile the PT has reflected the various changes in the transition as an opposition party prior to the 1990s and the pressures wrought through growing electoral success, and the resulting responsibility to run municipal and state governments. This has influenced its internal composition and its relationship with power. The most participatory model of the three governing cases studied, various factors ensured that the PT’s leadership gained greater control of the internal party mechanisms prior to taking national power.
The contrasting experiences of Brazil and Chile point towards different types of social democracy within each. Despite the intensity of the military regime and its New Right project, Sandbrook et al (2007:178) suggest that Chile had the basis for social democracy, through well-organised working class interests and programmatic parties. Indeed, it could be argued that the Chilean Left remained more closely tied to Marxist ideals than the Brazilian Left before the 1980s, thereby making its shift towards social democracy the more impressive. The re-emergence of parties in the 1980s and their class basis reinforces the tensions at work within that country's Left. Meanwhile in Brazil the veneer of social democracy was weaker. Class-based politics was less the rule and substantial inequality has – and still – remains the norm. This contributes towards a social democratic ‘politics’ by the Cardoso and Lula governments as opposed to a social democratic ‘regime’ (Sandbrook et al: 238).

This distinction means that the Third Way approaches pursued by the Concertación and Cardoso governments were distinct: the PSDB’s attachment to social democracy was arguably slighter than the Concertación’s more ‘rooted’ version. Meanwhile, the road travelled by the PT since the 1980s has meant that in government its commitment to the Participatory Left was notably less ‘participatory’ than it might otherwise appear. These variations are presented in the following chapter regarding the educational policymaking cores within each government.
3. Engineering elites: Accounting for the nature of governmental policymaking in education in Brazil and Chile

Social democracy in Latin America appears to fall between two main types: the Third Way and Participatory Left. The former lacks ties with wider social movements and class-based interests, the latter retains them. This distinction should similarly hold for the way that each approaches decision-making: while the latter would adopt a more 'participatory' style, including various individuals and groups from within and outside the party, the Third Way approach will tend to be 'technocratic', in which an elite dominates policymaking.

However, the difference between these two models is not so clear and is less apparent in practice than it seems, especially as a political party moves from opposition into government. The cases of Brazil and Chile show that while the PSDB presented the clearest example of the Third Way, the nature of the Concertación prior to taking office suggested it shared some of the characteristics of the Participatory Left. Similarly, the PT in government has proved to be less 'participatory' than its Participatory Left ideal.

Much of this can be attributed to the inevitability of elites. 'Democracy is inconceivable without organization... [and] Organization implies the tendency to oligarchy', leading to a small minority of leaders became dominant (Michels 2001: 19, 26). For the Left such elites were negatively perceived, since oligarchy tended towards conservatism and bureaucracy, whilst downgrading the role of party non-elites (Barker 2001: 32). The nature of the reformist, or more social democratic, approach is further complicated by the distinction between politicians who are economically independent and thus able to work towards change and those whose motives are constrained by their material dependence on the system (Beetham 1985: 229). Today, arguably, most politicians – especially elected ones – find themselves in the latter position, being part of a professional political class. Yet even if they rely on the political system for financial support, political leaders may not be as limited by structural constraints as they appear; Jones (1989) observes that leaders have a certain degree of agency, being able to act both where certain rules and conditions are in place or by reacting creatively in more ambiguous settings.
The degree of agency is arguably greater among left-wing Latin American politicians (whether they be socialist or social democratic) than elsewhere, even as the pro-liberalisation and deregulation influence of international organisations in the education sector have grown since the 1990s (Leuze et al 2007). Compared to other regions, Latin American bureaucracy tends to be less institutionalised, providing politicians with greater space to shape the direction of the administrative apparatus. Furthermore, given that left-wing politicians tend to be more distrustful of bureaucrats, they are therefore more inclined to adopt counterstaffs to break bureaucratic control of policy (Guy Peters 2001: 247-8, 250). This may be reflected in the policymaking core of political appointees and advisors that a minister builds around him or herself in the ministry, which may be perceived as a coherent, united and self-conscious group of individuals (Parry 1969). In Latin America, this elite role is especially important, given the largely top-down engineering of social sector reforms during the 1990s (Hall 2003: 275).

Despite the presence of policy elites, it would be incorrect to assume that their emergence is exclusive. Barker at al (2001) note that more inclusive, democratic leadership does exist, where elites seek understanding and acceptance from their supporters. In such circumstances the elite engages in defining the parameters of action that it and its supporters can agree with. However, this is a not a view that one would expect to find in the Participatory Left, which, owing to its ideological origins and roots in social movements, would be more likely to conform to socialists’ distrust of bureaucracy. In addition, given the diverse interests that a broader base of social support would demand, one would assume the Participatory Left to be less cohesive in its approach to policy. Meanwhile, a Third Way government, with its narrower base of external support would arguably be more susceptible to being absorbed into the administrative system, while at the same time being far more cohesive.

The Brazilian and Chilean cases that follow illustrate that the Third Way Concertación and PSDB governments largely conform to type. The education policy cores in both governments demonstrate few links with other actors within their parties or social movements more generally. Furthermore, given their reformist nature they tended to be less sceptical of bureaucracy than more radical sections of the Left and had a clearer policy agenda from the outset. But contrary to assumptions related to Participatory Left governments, the first Lula term suggests that it too conformed to a similar, elite-oriented form of policymaking as well. The journey the PT had to travel to
reach this point was far less direct than that faced by the Third Way cases. Initially the relative strength of the social base underpinning the party had to be overcome. This occurred in tandem with the PT's growing electoral success during the 1990s and the breaking down of party suspicion towards the state as increasing numbers of activists worked within it at municipal and state level. Once in national government, through the policy core failed to be sufficiently cohesive, reflecting internal divisions within the leadership between President Lula and his first education minister. This failure of cohesion was evident in the lack of focus in education policy, which was only resolved when changes were made to the education team thus ensuring it presidential support.

1. Chile

Educational policymaking in Chilean governments has always been dominated by a small core concentrated within the Ministry of Education (Mineduc). The Concertación that took power after 1990 was characterised as elitist and technocratic. This was similarly the case in education, where the same handful of individuals dominated policymaking until the mid-2000s. Policymaking in this period may be divided into two parts: before 1994 when policymakers focused on 'saving' the system, following years of neglect by the military regime; and after 1994 when the focus was on improving the management of the system. During this period the cohesiveness of the policymaking core remained strong, ensuring a clear focus in educational priorities and policies.

Since 2000 there have been changes in personnel that appeared to be opening up the policymaking process, to include new individuals and groups within the executive branch. In 2006 protests and demonstrations that initially began with secondary school students and subsequently escalated to include parents, university students and wider society in general, seemed to indicate a more expansive approach to policymaking was on the cards. However, this was shut down a year later by the Concertación's traditional way of working.

1.1 Education policy within the Concertación prior to 1990

The present Concertación's approach to policymaking in education has links in its predecessor parties prior to the military period. Both the PDC and UP governments that managed the education system between 1964 and 1973 were strongly associated with reform (Bitar, interview, 2007). Both governments sought to increase coverage throughout the educational system and invested in
infrastructure to achieve this. However, the PDC was seen as technocratic and clientelist in its approach while the UP was seen as more inclusive and committed to decentralised policymaking, engaging and involving various educational actors at the local, regional and national levels (Fischer 1979; Farrell 1986; Yocelevzky 1987; Corvalan 2003; Zemelman and Jara 2004).

During the military period policy makers throughout the government, including Mineduc, were primarily motivated by economic concerns. The most prominent actors included the finance, economic and planning ministries which influenced policymaking. In the first part of the military period Mineduc's ministers were drawn from admirals and after 1978 from civilians (Dittborn, interview, 2007). It was during the early 1980s the key policies that would shape the Chilean educational system were implemented, including the deregulation and decentralisation of the school system.

The most visible members of the Concertación that would form its educational policy core after 1990 were individuals such as Cristián Cox, José Joaquin Brunner, Ivan Núñez, Carlos Eugenio Baker and Juan Eduardo García-Huidobro. All shared a common historical experience, having been militants in the late 1960s and having supported the Allende government in the early 1970s. The secretary general of the opposition movement to Pinochet's 1988 plebiscite poll, the No Campaign, Genaro Arriegada, commenting on the wider Concertación generation of which these educationalists were a part, claimed that they were the last to have been involved in full political participation prior to 1973. Not only did the military regime prevent them from entering politics, the universities, the media and public administration, its actions also prompted them to re-evaluate their thoughts regarding political action, including tolerance and respect for the views of others. The result was a shift towards political moderation (Seminario de Campaña del No 1988). Furthermore, many of these individuals that would be associated with the Concertación, went into exile in the period after 1973: Cox and Brunner ended up pursuing graduate studies in Britain while Garcia-Huibodro completed his doctorate in France. As well as excluding them from Chile, exile arguably opened doors to these future policymakers, exposing them to wider international trends in both politics and education and providing them with experiences and perspectives that went beyond those promoted by the IFIs in Chile during the 1970s and 1980s.

The exiles' return to Chile occurred while the Pinochet regime remained in place. Still denied from participating within the existing political and educational system, these education-oriented concertacionistas either established new independent academic research centres or clustered around
existing ones, including the Latin American Social Sciences Faculty (FLACSO), the Interdisciplinary Programme of Educational Research (PIIE) and the Centre of Investigation and Development of Education (CIDE). In these institutions they collaborated on analysing the military educational reforms. At the time the scope for independent research within Chilean universities was limited. This environment ensured that they gained close personal and professional knowledge of each other that arguably transcended any ideological differences that existed between them (Cox, Brunner, Elacqua, Muñoz, Weinstein, interviews, 2007).

In the 1980s the group lacked consensus over the education changes in Chile. A 1984 series of academic discussions between Concertación-associated scholars showed little agreement on a wide range of issues, from the role of primary and post-secondary education, municipalisation and teacher training (Cox 1985; Cox, interview, 2007). Nonetheless, there was a determination to find some agreement, which was evident by the time of the democratic transition. These concertaciónista academics stressed the need for continuity in educational policy (PIIE 1989). This was evident in the Concertación’s 1989 educational commission proposals which proposed to improve educational quality through targeted measures. They included greater financial assistance to poorer students, schools and teachers, building infrastructure, curricular changes to primary and secondary education, extensions in the school day and revision of various forms of teaching and evaluation (Concertación 1989; Diaz, interview, 2007).

1.2. Education policy makers within the Concertación after 1990

The first Concertación education minister was Ricardo Lagos, who many had expected would be a senator until he lost the election in 1989. Lagos’s prominence in the Concertación meant that despite the assumption that education reform remains largely overlooked by Latin American governments owing to the relatively weak position of education ministries (Angell and Graham 1995), in Chile by contrast the prospects seemed promising. Cox (interview, 2007) suggested that the presence of Lagos, José Pablo Arellano, Sergio Bitar and Mariana Aylwin as education ministers ensured a degree of continuity during the period. In addition ministers remained committed to the governing coalition and consequently sought to effect changes within agreed parameters. This was most evident following
the 1994 Brunner commission which provided the strategy and terms of reference for the coalition's approach to educational policy until 2006 (Cox, interview, 2007)

Policy continuity was buttressed by the various academics and scholars that were appointed by Concertación ministers to lead Mineduc after 1990. They came mainly from the two centre-left parties, the Socialists and the PPD, and remained in post for more than a decade. Given the role that social movements had played alongside the political parties in the struggle for democracy during the 1980s, it was perhaps surprising that after 1990 the Concertación approach to policy became increasingly party-centric. Yet this could be understood in two main ways: first, owing to the overlapping role of these policymakers as both political party and social group activists; second, the acceptance of the wider memberships of social organisations and political parties to defer to this elite. This deference could be attributed both to the recognition that a more democratic government was in place and because both organisations and political parties had struggled against the military regime. In other words, support for the Concertación could be perceived as support for democracy (Angell 2007: 174) – hence the lack of overt civil society opposition or challenges to the governments during the first half of the 1990s.

Within the new Concertación’s education team there was a feeling that the government’s approach needed to change. While the early 1990s had involved debate about the role of the state and the use of the market and municipalities in educational provision, from the mid-1990s government thinking emphasised greater spending and incentives. At the turn of the century ministers and officials began to pay greater attention to the ‘second generation’ of reforms, namely the more problematic issues of curricular, pedagogic and evaluative changes (Cox 2006).

Initially, the Concertación did not subject much of its educational policies to the legislative route, the exceptions being the 1992 and 1996 curricular reforms. Between 1990 and 1995 education ministers generally sought to reform education by executive discretion (Scope 1997). Politically, this was due in part to the relative strength of the Right in Congress, the lack of a Concertación majority and the high threshold required to pass a constitutional law. Attempts to pass bills faced stiff opposition, as shown by the failure to reform the Constitutional Organic Teaching Law (LOCE) in 1992 and the compromise to accept co-financing of subsidised schools in the 1993 tax reform (Núñez, interview 1, 2007; Elacqua, Brunner, interviews, 2007; Cortes 1996).
While the Concertación had introduced changes in the education sector during the first Aylwin government, it was only in 1994 that it more thoroughly analysed the system and the direction for future policy reform. A commission, chaired by a political appointee at Mineduc, José Joaquin Brunner, was set up. First, the Brunner commission highlighted the emphasis that the Concertación had placed on the need for consensus in educational policy; this was expounded on in Frei’s presidential message in May 1996 which laid out education reform as the main task of his government (Weinstein, interview, 2007). Frei’s first education minister, Schiefelbein (1994) stressed the need to find policies and solutions that met the demands of different social sectors, although Rivero (1999) observed that it did not offer an alternative approach to education. Increasingly attention was being paid to what was occurring within schools, with more research directed to this end (Bosch, interview, 2007). These perceptions were soon reinforced by the cross-party agreement signed by the Concertación and right-wing parties in early 1995. In particular this emphasised an acceptance in favour of the existing school system over that of a centralised one. Both Brunner himself and Carlos Peña stressed that the main points of discussion in his commission had been over how to manage and finance decentralisation (interviews, 2007). The agreement also ensured that a consensus was achieved over other aspects of the educational system, including municipal autonomy over schools, flexibility in the labour regime and a commitment to increase educational spending from 5% to 7% of GDP, with contributions from families, tax incentives and business (Acuerdo Marco 1995). Second, the 1994 commission marked the end of the governing coalition’s early phase when it had primarily been concerned with passing emergency measures. In its place came a less urgent period in which the Concertación broadly accepted the model as they had inherited it, and sought its reform rather than replacement (Diaz, Soto, Garcia-Huidobro, interviews, 2007).

The second phase of Concertación policymaking, from the mid-1990s on, ended any discussion that the pre-1990 decentralisation, choice and market reforms would be reversed. Instead, from 1994 until the 2000s the emphasis was on accommodating these trends while increasing spending (Cox 2006). This coincided with the arrival of a new president, Eduardo Frei, who sought to prioritise education through new improvement programmes. These included the continued use of the targeted funding programmes to poorer schools (P900 and MECE), curricular reform, the professional
development of teachers and the introduction of the Whole School Day Programme (JEC), which sought to extend the school day and provide school meals (Mineduc 1998).

The approach adopted by the Concertación during the 1990s was maintained into the 2000s. Notwithstanding the rhetoric about participation and citizenship during Bachelet’s 2005 presidential campaign, her manifesto did not challenge the coalition’s prevailing educational orthodoxy (Cox, interview, 2007). Despite some references to the importance of improving pre-primary schooling, the educational section of the Concertación programme offered no fundamental change other than to propose a differentiated subsidy scheme and more money for social programmes and improvements in general (Cox 2007). This was greeted with opposition from the Right and the private sector, who argued that this would limit resources and should be replaced with a more general increase in funding (Cáceres 2007; Bosch, interview, 2007).

Since the early 2000s the policy-making group has undergone both internal and external pressures in relation to government. Internally, there has been a shift away from policymaking being restricted solely to Mineduc to other branches of government. The change began under the Lagos presidency and has continued under Bachelet. In part this is a generational effect, with younger scholars and researchers taking up posts within Mineduc, and a broader range of actors, from both the technocratic and political sides in government. This has made for a less cohesive policymaking core than previously. Unlike the previous generation, which could cite a shared historical experience, the lines of attachment are more ‘blurry’. Whereas the initial concertaciónistas could place themselves clearly on the side of democracy and in opposition to the Pinochet regime, current political appointees both in the government and Mineduc distinguish themselves from the Right by being less comfortable with the present political and educational situation (Elacqua, interview, 2007). These changes exist alongside a social cleavage that persists in Chilean society between those that supported or opposed the Pinochet regime (Angell 2007). Alongside this there would appear to be less fear of the Right as existed in the period immediately after 1990, although it continues to be consulted on any legislation being drafted (Elacqua, interview, 2007). In addition, there are a wider range of political and technical individuals involved in the Concertación’s educational policy-making. Under Lagos this was reflected in the involvement of senior politicians such as Sergio Bitar as minister. More recently, under Bachelet educational policy-making is influenced by actors beyond Mineduc, to include the Finance and
Regional Development ministries as well as the presidency, through her advisors and the involvement of the educational advisory commission (Muñoz, interview, 2007). Yet the view is that policy-making in education remains a largely technocratic model (Peña, interview, 2007).

Externally, the Concertación’s educational policymaking was challenged most notably during the 2006 demonstrations. Initiated by secondary students unhappy at rising costs for exams and transport, the protests gained the support of university students, school teachers and parents as well as the media. Pressure on the government prompted Bachelet to set up an advisory presidential commission to examine the problems within the system and make recommendations. Unlike the previous 1994 commission the membership was broader (Aguilera 2007). The prospect of a wider policymaking process did not ultimately emerge: in November 2007 the Concertación eventually reached an agreement with the Right in Congress on the way forward. Among the proposals was a suggestion for a National Education Council to be established that would set the policy agenda and be insulated from politics and the presidential electoral cycle (Puryear 2007a). Rather than offering a new approach, this appeared to reinforce the present, technocratic form of policymaking within the Concertación – although in a more formal setting than through the current team of ministerial advisors within Mineduc.

2. Brazil

The policymaking teams that emerged in the Cardoso and Lula governments were more similar than the distinction between the Third Way and Participatory Lefts would otherwise suggest – although the paths each party took was substantially different. In both administrations policymaking was concentrated in the education minister and his team within the Ministry of Education (MEC). Like the Concertación in Chile, those associated with education in the Cardoso and Lula governments (at least for the first year in the PT’s case) came from an educational background, especially from those involved in higher education. In the Cardoso government this policy elite arrived at the ministry already formed, following collaboration by the leading figures prior to Cardoso’s election in 1994. In the case of the PT government the policy core was from a more politically-oriented background, with their own electoral support bases, including the first two ministers (Cristovam Buarque and Tarso Genro) and their senior appointees (e.g. the former teachers’ union leader, Francisco Chagas).
recently, figures which are more politically dependent on Lula have come to dominate MEC, such as the current education minister, Fernando Haddad and the president of the National Institute of Educational Studies and Research (INEP), Reynaldo Fernandes.

One main difference between the two governments was that where Souza and his team had a clear policy agenda and presidential support during the Cardoso government, the same could not ironically be said of the PT. The relatively clear focus for the PSDB meant it had no trouble adapting to a more elitist, top-down approach. The PT by contrast had to cope with a shift away from a participatory form of policymaking, an absence of any clear educational project and a relatively weak position for MEC in relation to other government departments.

2.1. The education policymaking team in the Cardoso government

The team that took over MEC in 1995 marked a break both in the educational debate and policy making. By the mid-1990s the situation seemed open for change: following a decade of economic stagnation and emphasis on constitutional matters, there was growing concern about the state of education (Hall 2003: 274). There was increasing recognition within political circles about the need for change: in 1990 a UN-sponsored global education conference had prompted the creation of a Ten Year Education for All Plan in 1993 by the Franco government. This plan aimed to stimulate and mobilise government, the education sector and NGOs to become more engaged. The Plan noted that government at all levels allocated 5% of GDP to education, which put it in a similar position to other developed countries. The Brazilian experience suggested that it was not effectively distributed and was subject to either misplacement or embezzlement (Castro 2000). Part of these problems stemmed from the nature of policy making within MEC prior to 1995. Education was subject to clientelist pressures, whereby resources were allocated on the basis of political support rather than educational need (Goldemberg, interview, 2008). Constitutionally, financially and administratively, Brazil’s education system needed a response.

Reflecting these trends, Cardoso decided to make education one of his campaign priorities in the 1994 election. Paulo Renato Souza, a former chancellor of Unicamp university and education secretary for Montoro’s state administration of São Paulo during the 1980s, was appointed as the coordinator for the manifesto. Five months before the elections discussions were held among 1000
PSDB activists and technical advisors at state level across the country to formulate a plan for education. In contrast to past efforts at developing educational policy at a party level, the process included strong involvement by both Cardoso and his election communication team (Souza 2005). The result was the close association of Cardoso, the candidate, and education. Despite the efforts to broaden the process nationally, including different study groups and the involvement of school teachers and union leaders, the bulk came from the higher education community, and from São Paulo in particular (Souza, interview, 2007; Cardoso 2006).

The resulting manifesto, *Mãos à Obra*, sought to balance the market and the state in poverty alleviation (Cardoso, interview, 2008). More specifically, in education it stated the need for more resources and institutional reform by MEC to ensure guaranteed places for all 7-14 year olds at the primary level. The central state – or federal government – would take on less direct responsibility and focus on the coordination of the education system (Cardoso 1994).

Following Cardoso’s 1994 election victory Souza subsequently took on the task of coordinating the transition from one president to the next. Cardoso was determined to keep the areas he had prioritised within the control of his associates rather than of his electoral and government coalition partners in the centre-right PFL (Souza, interview, 2007; Gouvêa, interview, 2008) – a decision which Cardoso claimed met little resistance from the Right (interview, 2008). Initially Souza appeared to be headed for the Ministry of Planning, where he would have maintained the strategic approach he had brought to the manifesto and the transition. This was altered when a close Cardoso ally, José Serra, was placed there; Souza was then invited to take up the post at MEC.

Souza would eventually put together a core of advisors in the various departmental secretariats that consisted of the group involved in the PSDB’s election manifesto – and that related to education in particular. Drawn mainly from the party’s support in São Paulo and amongst the academic community, this new education team included Gilda Portugal Gouvêa, Eunice Durham, Iara Prado and Maria Helena Guimarães de Castro. Gouvêa and Prado had both previously worked with Souza at Unicamp; Durham had already spent several years in MEC’s secretariats while Maria Helena was then the municipal education secretary in the São Paulo city of Campinas. Like Cardoso, Serra and Souza, all had backgrounds in higher education and constituted the strongest voices within the PSDB on educational matters (Gouvêa, interview, 2008). Furthermore, like the Concertación’s education team
in Chile, the core of this education team lasted through both Cardoso terms, thereby providing policy continuity and consistency at the centre (Costa, interview, 2008). This marked a shift from previous education ministers, who had not built such close teams around themselves (Goldemberg, interview, 2008) and appears to have outlasted the Cardoso presidency, being partially reformed at the state level in São Paulo since 2007, following Serra’s election as governor.

The direction of the new team soon focused on institutional matters, buttressed by publicity and marketing (Souza 2005; Motter, unpublished). The government identified the main problems with the education system as being its poor quality owing to the low level of primary school completions, limited or absent materials and teachers’ precarious financial positions (Brasil 1995). This assessment was completed during the first part of 1995 and involved a decision to restructure and coordinate more effectively the education system.

The restructuring required the introduction of new institutional parameters, which included constitutional amendments to the administrative responsibility for education provision (LDB) and its finance (FUNDEF). In addition, new mechanisms were introduced (e.g. an external university evaluation system, the Provão) or adapted (e.g. the primary school testing regime known as SAEB) to assess the performance of the system as a whole (Souza 2005). These developments, the bulk of which occurred during the first Cardoso term, were largely generated within MEC by the educational core. FUNDEF, for example, was the result of a working group involving Gouvêa, Prado, Durham and an advisor and economist, Barjas Negri (Durham, interview, 2008). For the new LDB the government removed the existing legislation that had been before Congress for several years, working on a replacement with the sponsorship of Senator Darcy Ribeiro (himself a former education minister and noted academic). The evaluation mechanisms, meanwhile, were designed and implemented by the National Institute of Educational Studies and Research (INEP), an agency of MEC that had previously been influential in the 1950s and 1960s (Souza 2005).

Alongside these institutional changes the government ran marketing campaigns to encourage families to ensure their children were in primary school, including the Wake Up Brazil! (Acorda Brasil!), Now is the Time for School (Esta na Hora da Escola) and Every Child in School (Toda Criança na Escola) publicity programmes (Motter, unpublished). The president took an active part in the early
stage of this process, travelling to the Northeast to teach a primary school class to make the point (Cardoso, interview, 2008).

2.2. The education policymaking teams in the first Lula government

The education team that emerged in the Lula presidency differed from previous PT administrations at the local and state levels. Historically, PT policymaking has tended to be participatory, drawing in a wide range of social movements associated with producer and grassroots interests. In education this would mean teachers and students as well as trade unions, progressive Catholics and various minority groups. However, since 2003 this has changed, with policymaking increasingly restricted to PT individuals and associated groups within the state apparatus. Furthermore, the PT has become substantially less ‘political’ in the individuals steering policy and more ‘technocratic’ – or at least sees the education sector in less political terms.

In the past the PT’s approach to education had been drawn through participation within the party itself and the social movements to which it was aligned. During this period these actors’ ideological orientation was strongly socialist, which meant they were considerably wary of the state structures they found. In response petistas pushed for the creation of more participatory mechanisms to include wider social groups in policymaking when they gained executive power, including in Porto Alegre, São Paulo, Belo Horizonte and Rio Grande do Sul. Examples of socialists’ efforts to weaken conservatism and bureaucracy in the education sector were demonstrated in Rio Grande do Sul where the PT’s education secretary was a former president of the state teachers’ union, CPERS, while in São Paulo the PT had brought the educator and critical pedagogue, Paulo Freire, into the municipal secretariat (Burton, forthcoming; Arelaro, interview, 2008).

There was also considerable overlap between social movements and the party throughout the 1980s. This began in July 1980 when a PT-associated group of teachers participated at the National Congress of Education Workers. Echoing the strength of the party in São Paulo, the bulk of the teachers came from that state’s teachers’ union, the APEOSP. During the 1980s this influential group played an increasing role in various educational seminars across the country while pressuring for more space within the PT. When the party established a National Secretariat of Popular Movements...
Alongside the growing presence of social movements within PT educational policy in the 1980s, there was further institutional space for discussion. The Education Issues Commission (CAED) enabled party activists to debate policy in the sector on a more regular basis than at the level of a national conference. The goal of the CAED was to search for and identify types of educational policies that best reflected the party’s concerns (in particular a ‘modo petista de governar’ or ‘PT way of governing’) while providing a platform on which party activists, social movement activists and PT officials in state and municipal administrations could share their views (Arelaro, interview, 2008).

However, by the late 1990s this strong institutional space and intra-party dialogue in educational policy was weakening. Buarque (interview, 2008) noted that by the time the PT took office in 2003 the CAED had effectively ‘died’ as a forum for discussion. Furthermore, what remained cast a broadly critical view over both his policies and that of the government more generally.

Why had this happened and how? Internal and external pressures brought about its demise, resulting in a different type of educational policy making that owed more to formally constituted institutions than informal participation between diverse social movements and party activists. Internally, the party had undergone a broad change in the period prior to the 2002 presidential election victory. During the 1990s the party’s composition had changed; activists and members were increasingly drawn from the middle and professional classes while the party was becoming more bureaucratically structured. This was attributable to various reasons: first, public sector trade unions were growing while those in the manufacturing or industrial sectors were declining; activists in social movements were becoming more professional in order to engage the government more effectively; second, electoral success was both catapulting PT leaders into executive posts while influencing party members to adopt a more moderate strategy that coincided with the leadership’s outlook (Samuels 2004). The party’s growing involvement in the management of cities and states (and their education systems) meant that PT mayors and governors were appointing party members and supporters to official positions. Not only did this have the effect of weakening the party’s radical anti-system stance, it also blurred the lines between acting to change the system and those who were dependent on it.
In the 1990s these various changes meant the party was faced with a dilemma: whether to maintain its social representation that it had done since the early 1980s, or focus on a more electoral-oriented platform (Leal 2004). As the party won more votes and gained more executive positions in the decade, the party leadership which favoured the latter strategy, became increasingly influential. These changes had the knock-on effect of making the internal institutional mechanisms less important: with a growing number of rank-and-file members in broad agreement with the leadership, the capacity of more socialist-inclined dissenters to influence the direction of the party became weaker. Contrary to the image of a party leadership that was cut off from its membership and supporters, this suggested a relationship that was more inclusive and democratic between the elite and non-elite.

For the dissenters, the tendency towards elitism was further exacerbated once the PT won the presidency, since the leadership now had considerable access to state resources and patronage and therefore demanded loyalty from its members. To a large extent this was achieved. The few that refused were either disciplined or forced to leave the party during the government's first year (Petras 2005a). This was most evident in the run-up to the new government's legislative proposals on social security in 2003, prompting the departure of several PT senators and congressmen, including Heloise Helena, to establish a new party, PSOL.

External explanations for the weakening of the PT’s internally participatory policymaking approach centre on the nature of the commitments faced by the party prior to and in office. In particular this involved pre-existing commitments and agreements with various international agencies and state governments (Brooke, interview, 2008). Indeed, the most visible manifestation was Lula’s commitment to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan that was worked out by his predecessor during the 2002 election campaign. There was consequently less room for manoeuvre on the economic policy front than might otherwise have been the case. In addition there was a growing separation between the demands and expectations of the new government and its allies in the social movements. Education researchers expected a general change of direction by the new government while social movements associated with teachers and students were focused on resolving their material concerns (Costa, interview, 2008). There was a growing disconnection between institutions such as the CAED and the government (Chagas, interview, 2008). With the PT leadership now entrenched in the federal state apparatus, the party faced a resource imbalance as the leaders could
rely on access to the state to develop and implement policy. By contrast the party’s dissenting rank-
and-file had only the internal institutional mechanisms (which as noted above was in a parlous state) 
and moral suasion to influence the leadership.

The PT’s educational core after 2003 consequently drew less upon its origins in the social 
movements in favour of its insertion into the state. The shift towards a more elite-driven approach to 
policymaking had already emerged prior to winning power, and was seemingly endorsed by the bulk of 
the party. At MEC this meant the use of its internal secretariats and formally configured forms of 
policymaking, such as national consultations, which necessarily included all educational actors rather 
than just those associated with the party. This approach has been dominant since 2003, despite 
ministerial changes under Cristovam Buarque (2003-04) and subsequently under Tarso Genro and 
Fernando Haddad (after 2004). The difference between the pre-2004 and post-2004 periods has been 
one more of emphasis than policymaking and may be divided into two periods.

Buarque, the first PT education minister, was a former chancellor of Brasília University, and 
senator and governor of the Federal District (1999-2002). Buarque was strongly associated with 
education, much of it stemming from the ideas generated within Brasilia University which he promoted 
and publicised in various publications. During his time as governor he had put his ideas about 
education into practice with the introduction of the 'bolsa escola', a cash conditional transfer paid to the 
head of a household (usually the mother) to send her school-age children to school rather than having 
them work. The programme's success and popularity was such that not only was it subsequently 
implemented at the federal level towards the end of the Cardoso government, but received 
international support; including from the World Bank after Buarque ended his governorship (Haddad 
2003; Buarque, interview, 2008; Hall 2006).

Although Buarque was highly identified with education within the PT, policymaking appeared 
constrained during his time in office. Compared to the previous government, there appeared to be less 
focus about what he sought to achieve as minister. While there was a concern with basic (i.e. pre-
school, primary and secondary) rather than primary education (as had been the case under Souza), 
this largely involved discussion than any tangible outcomes (Fernandes, Chagas, Soares, interviews, 
2008). During his year as minister, Buarque concerned himself with pronouncements on adult literacy 
campaigns and vocational training (Costa, interview, 2008; Schwartzmann, interview, 2007), much of
which elicited few immediate results. Gouvea (interview, 2008) suggests that this undermined effective management of MEC and its policies. The one exception to this was the decision to press ahead with FUNDEB, the funding mechanism for basic education that would replace FUNDEF, the Cardoso government's financial system for primary education, when it expired at the end of 2006. Part of the reason for this was the PT's clear position on FUNDEB, a policy that had been worked on in opposition with its partners in the social movements and which formed part of the 2002 election manifesto.

Accompanying Buarque's lack of policy focus during the first year is a more critical view that suggests the minister was more concerned with marketing and publicising himself rather than that of the party as a whole. In particular this assumed that Buarque's agenda was not administrative but a personal, political one (Costa, Arelaro, interviews, 2008). The evidence for this lies in his subsequent departure from the PT and presidential candidacy in 2006 for the Democratic Workers' Party (PDT). Furthermore, those who criticise Buarque's educational policy tend to lie amongst those associated with the 'historic' section of the PT (i.e. those who had been supportive and actively involved in the CAED). Their criticism may be attributed to two main reasons: first, despite the changes made in the leading positions within MEC, the bulk of secretariats were assigned to Buarque's supporters; if the 'historic' section was offered appointments it was to secondary positions. Second, although a political figure, Buarque was not seen as a team player or actively involved in the institutional life of the party (Arelaro, interview, 2008). He was therefore viewed as apathetic to the fate and role of forums such as CAED.

Against the notion of a lack of clear policy, Buarque's own explanation of his time in office highlights difficulties in the relationship between minister and president. In particular he claimed that although he had a wide range of policies he wanted to pursue, he failed to receive sufficient support from Lula. Not only was Lula disinclined to support a national teaching salary, he was unwilling to expand the role of the federal government to take direct responsibility in educational provision at all levels. Buarque was subsequently dismissed by Lula in February 2004, although the reasons for this remain unclear; Buarque claims to have had no warning and assumed that it was due to open up space in the cabinet for a coalition partner (interview, 2008).
For the remainder of the first Lula term there has been a closer relationship between MEC and the presidency, which may be due to its diminishing politicisation and more technocratic approach. This began first under the stewardship of Tarso Genro, an academic and former mayor of Porto Alegre and his successor, Fernando Haddad. While Genro had a strong base of support within the party, his successor did not. Furthermore, compared to Buarque, Genro was less of a political threat to Lula, while Haddad barely registered. According to the critical view of the ‘historic’ PT, this suited Lula, since he was personally unenthused about education and more inclined to support an individual who was less problematic (Arelaro, interview, 2008).

Genro’s status as a team player was reflected in his appeal to the teaching community during his time at MEC. As well as introducing a higher education reform bill, he downgraded Buarque’s proposals to certify school teachers. Although not involved in the mid-2005 mensalão scandal, which highlighted the extent to which the PT had grown reliant on the use of state resources to buy political support in Congress – the resulting cabinet resignations obliged Lula to shore up his support, moving Genro to the Ministry of Justice and leaving a vacancy at MEC. Genro’s replacement was his politically appointed executive secretary, Fernando Haddad.

Whereas both Buarque and Genro were political figures in their own right, Haddad was not (Schwartzmann, interview, 2007). Although a member of the São Paulo PT, he did not have a support base of his own (Costa, Arelaro, interviews, 2008). He was a former São Paulo University (USP) professor who had been appointed to an official position in the finance secretariat during Marta Suplicy’s mayoralty of São Paulo (2001-04) and owed his position under Genro at MEC to a similar process. As education minister he consolidated and implemented the various legislative proposals initiated under Buarque and Genro, including the FUNDEB constitutional amendment and higher education bill (Chagas, interview, 2008). Despite the differences between Genro and Haddad in terms of their political base, their positions reflected a closer – or at least lukewarm – relationship between minister and president. This was evident in the president’s eventual involvement in setting the federal contribution for FUNDEB and Lula’s decision to maintain Haddad in post, following lobbying from the private sector-led All for Education (Todos pela Educação) pressure group following the 2006 election (Chagas, Soares, interviews, 2008).
The presence of Haddad has also meant that MEC may be seen less as a ‘political’ and more as a ‘technical’ ministry in the Lula government. While Genro replaced a number of key individuals heading MEC’s internal secretariats, Haddad retained most of them. The notable exception was the INEP president. He appointed an associate, Reynaldo Fernandes, to that position. Fernandes claims to be a technocrat rather than a party activist (interview, 2008), and was influential in overseeing and coordinating the work carried out by MEC to launch the Education Development Plan (PDE) at the start of the second Lula term, in April 2007. Although the PDE included a range of measures that could gain the support of the PT’s supporters among social movements (including a national salary and training opportunities for teachers and increased credit and finance for students), it was generated within government; input from PT-supporting allies came afterwards in the consultation process (Vieira, interview, 2007).

The reaction to this shift in the development of educational policy within and outside the PT has varied. On the one hand there is acceptance of the policies and approach presented. Until 2004 the role of CAED had declined as there was a separation between the forum’s participants and the government over the government’s educational agenda. Since 2004 this has begun to change, as the CAED increasingly engages with the proposals being presented by the government, rather than presenting their own demands (Chagas, interview, 2008). Chagas’s view represents that of the policy elite, whereas among the more socialist-oriented dissenters within and outside the party, CAED’s role suggests its capture by what is increasingly a conservative and bureaucratic leadership.

The dissenters’ view is arguably a minority one: the wider PT rank-and-file does not appear to oppose the educational agenda presented by the government. Where criticism does exist it tends to be concentrated in the educational sector and especially the academic community (Brooke, interview, 2008). Indeed, the association between the PT and social movements may be weaker than previously, but it has still managed to transcend the party’s move from opposition to government. Despite the departure of disaffected left-wing petistas since the 1990s and the creation of alternative political parties, the PT remains largely hegemonic on the Left. Furthermore, the leadership continues to see itself as more participatory than its predecessor, notwithstanding its approach to policymaking.
3. Conclusion

This chapter examined the formation and development of the policymaking cores in each government’s education sector. Despite the distinction between the Third Way and Participatory Lefts, in the three cases studied the presence of an elite concentrated in the state apparatus that largely determines the overall shape of the governments’ educational policies seems apparent. However, of the three cases, while the Third Way’s development of a policy elite was relatively straightforward, that presented by the Participatory Left was far more circuitous.

Until the mid- to late-1990s the Participatory Left PT had been subject to a wider range of different interests and practices, which owed much to its own administration of municipal educational systems. This experience of subnational government arguably helped erode some of the suspicion felt by party members relating to the administrative apparatus – increasingly PT activists found they were economically dependent on politics, which blunted their radicalism. At the same time, management of municipal education prompted the development of internal party institutions to enable discussion about policy and their dissemination. However, as the party came closer to winning national power the same pressures that had affected the party as a whole began to have an impact on its educational sector. The matter was exacerbated after 2003 by the party leadership’s insertion into the state apparatus, ensuring a structural imbalance between the governmental education team and what remained of an activist base amongst the party’s educational sector. But the effect was not immediate; unlike the more Third Way case of the Cardoso government, the PT’s new education minister did not have the full support of the president, ensuring not only a weak degree of cohesion and unity, but also eroding the position of MEC against other ministries.

More recently, the shift from MEC as a ‘political’ to a ‘technical’ ministry (where the minister does not have an independent political position) suggests no pressure within the executive to return to a more participatory approach. Such a situation for the PT is ironic, given the assumption that left-wing politicians and parties tend to be distrustful of bureaucracy. For the leadership though, this may represent a trade-off between access to the state and its resources against the relative lack of policy control within the party.

While both the Third Way Concertación and Cardoso policymaking teams show cases of educational professionals (or rather academics) in key positions, the extent to which they were linked
to wider society has varied. Other than Cardoso’s minister, Souza, the educational team had no independent political status and was therefore heavily reliant on his patronage. In contrast, the Concertación’s educational team was prominent in the opposition movement during the 1970s and 1980s. Yet in both cases the policymaking core was narrow and socially homogenous: the majority being based in academic institutions and research organisations and being personally associated with each other. Indeed, the extent of personal relations is of profound importance and apparently overlooked by the emphasis on participatory or technocratic forms of policymaking. This is especially apparent in the way an educational team gains presidential support for its policies (such as contrast between the Cardoso and Lula governments) or ensures policy continuity despite ministerial changes (the Concertación).

The chapter has therefore stressed the importance of three key issues. First, the relationship between political elites and non-elites is relevant. The understanding between the Concertación’s social base after 1990 and the support of the PT’s rank-and-file and supporters in social movements helped both governments develop more technocratic policy elites. Second, while politicians and their advisors do find themselves constrained by structural considerations, they do have some degree of capacity to act. On the one hand, this may involve developing policies that operate within the parameters laid out by the overarching structure; on the other hand, where those lines are less clearly defined they may be creative in advancing new proposals. Examples of this include the Concertación’s decision to maintain the educational system while employing commissions to influence future policy directions and the PSDB’s introduction of new educational mechanisms, such as the LDB and FUNDEF.

Third, the type of policy choices will vary even within the same policymaking approach as a result of the relative position of key individuals and groups within the elite. In practical terms this meant that the Concertación (until 2006) and the Cardoso education teams were relatively well insulated and able to carry out a clear policy agenda. Meanwhile, the PT’s educational agenda demonstrated initial uncertainty and subsequent policy continuity with its predecessor, as ministerial changes and executive level support took their toll. In part this may be the relationship between governments and their wider support. In sum then, while in all three cases this has tended towards a largely elitist approach regardless of a government’s origins, the extent to which this was achieved
varied. The Concertación and the PSDB had perhaps the weakest link – and hence accountability with their base – thereby enabling them to pursue their policy directions more forcefully than the PT, which claims to be more participatory, was able to do. These differences are explored in the second part of this dissertation, with reference to the nature of the policies pursued in relation to the role of the state, curricular reform, public spending and participation with other, organised stakeholders (i.e. the private sector, teachers and students).
4. Finding the right balance: the role of the state and social democratic governments

The emphasis on the state as a single political unit overlooks the extent to which it is internally organised. This ranges from the most centralised or unitary states to the more decentralised, where power is dispersed to a wider range of subnational actors. These differences are presented in Chile and Brazil respectively, the Chilean state being among the most centralised in the region and Brazil a visible example of federalism. Yet despite these fundamental institutional differences, both types of state find themselves subject to a range of similar social, economic and political pressures at both the local and global levels. Despite these local and global developments, this has not meant a convergence in state structure: both unitary and federal states retain a certain resilience and ability to adapt. Nevertheless, the pressures have prompted governing elites to consider how the state and the features associated with it (including the education system) might best respond to these demands.

For social democrats, the role of the state has involved the development and improvement of institutions to achieve their ends (Hutton 1996). The social democratic state – at least as it is currently understood – is neither a minimal nor a maximising one. Rather it is an ‘active’ or ‘enabling’ one, with licensing, regulating and monitoring capacities along with the provision of state resources (Giddens 1998, 2003; Jary 2002).

However, understanding the social democratic state and its implications for education is complicated by several factors. First, there is the problem of normative comparisons in which a previous ‘Golden Age’ for education is idealised. Certain educational actors (especially those who defend comprehensive state education) claim that in this period, the highpoint of which was between the 1940s and 1970s, the state dominated educational provision. This overlooks the involvement of private interests within the system, attributing a negative connotation to the recent past.

Second, the relationship between social democrats and the state has tended to be ambiguous. Unlike neo-liberals who see the state’s reduction as a virtue, or the socialists’ expansion of the state, social democrats have a vaguer notion of the right size for the state; this is apparent in Bresser Pereira’s (2001) use of the term ‘complementary state’ to distinguish the ‘new’ Left from the ‘central state’ of the ‘old’ Left. The result has been that social democrats have been subject to criticism from
both sides of the political spectrum, who view such governments as not having gone far enough in
their own chosen direction.

Third, attitudes have shifted over the past 20 years regarding the role of the state. This is best
shown through the development or ‘expansion’ of the Washington Consensus in this period. Generally
associated with the New Right internationally, the Washington Consensus may be distinguished
between its ‘first generation’ reforms in the 1980s and early 1990s. In the earlier period its supporters
within international financial institutions (IFIs) endorsed structural readjustment to reduce the size,
spending and intervention played by states. During the later, ‘second generation’, supporters
proposed reforms that would strengthen state capacity and institutions (Zurbriggen 2007; Panizza
2005).

Given these issues, suggesting the social democratic state is ‘active’ and ‘enabling’ is
insufficient. This chapter therefore presents an approach that seeks to distinguish between Third Way
and Participatory Left versions of the state. The Third Way state is conceived as a much more limited
form compared to that presented by the Participatory Left. This may be due to the Third Way elites in
the Concertación and PSDB governments having a more comfortable association with the market and
non-state providers than the Participatory Left administration by the PT. It may also be attributable to
the Third Way governments in the 1990s coinciding with the state-reducing ‘first generation’ reforms
promoted by the Washington Consensus and, since the early 2000s, a shift in favour of state-building
‘second generation’ reforms associated with the Participatory Left (Bourne 2008: 220).

However, although the chapter provides a contrast between Third Way and Participatory Left
understanding of the state, the distinction is complicated by the context surrounding ideological
preference. Although the Concertación pursued a more Third Way vision of the state in the 1990s, it
has adopted a more interventionist strategy in the past half decade, reflecting the growing support for
the ‘second generation’ reforms. Meanwhile in Brazil the PT’s association with the more state-oriented
Participatory Left model was not necessarily determined; indeed, during its first decade in the 1980s its
position was more ambiguous. Although it was opposed to private education, its stance on public
education was also buttressed with a strong commitment to non-state education. This was largely
attributable to the social composition of the party, which drew heavily on social movements, which the
PT saw as having a role to play alongside that of the state. Only as the party began to pursue a more
electoral strategy and gained executive posts such as mayoralities, governorships and ultimately the presidency, was there a shift towards a more state-oriented perspective.

1. Chile

Chile’s education system underwent a dramatic rationalisation and reduction in the role of the state under the military regime. The measures undertaken by the military showed a clear preference in favour of both neo-liberal and conservative interests, by enabling private interests to enter the system while reducing the role of the state in some cases (e.g. the administration of schools) and maintaining it in others (e.g. the funding system for state-subsidised private schools).

The New Right measures were ‘flat’ in the sense that they were applied comprehensively across the system. The Concertación government that took office in 1990 was deeply affected by the historical experience of the military period and the measures that had been undertaken during the 1970s and 1980s. Owing to its wariness regarding the military and the relative strength of the political Right in the immediate post-1990 period, the Concertación opted to maintain the inherited education system. But even if the model was kept, the Concertación did present a slightly more activist approach to the state, to pursue a more ‘staggered’ approach that involved democratising the system through local elections and more targeted anti-poverty policies.

While the Concertación approach largely conformed to the limited, Third Way model of the state in the 1990s, in its second decade it has pursued a rather more interventionist approach. In part this reflects growing social demands for educational reform, resulting in a package of measures in late 2007 that include a number of new institutions to oversee the system as well as additional targeted funds.

1.1. The Chilean state in education before 1990

Chile’s educational system in the 1960s-70s was known as the Estado Docente – the so-called ‘Golden Age’ (Diaz, interview, 2007). It is assumed the state dominated the provision and funding of education in this period, although this overlooked the role of private actors, especially the Church. In the early 1970s this mixed system was reviewed by the Allende government. It was in this period that discussion about a national education system emerged. Though national, it would not be state-
dominated. Instead the state would coordinate the system at the regional level while decentralising administration to schools themselves (Superintendencia de Educación Pública 1971).

The 1973 coup brought in a regime that viewed its predecessor as overly statist and centralised. Later, the regime claimed that this had not only contributed to funding distortions, but also meant insufficient space for other, private and community-based groups to participate in the system (Republica de Chile 1976; ODEPLAN 1988; Dittborn, interview, 2007). By the late 1970s the influence of the free market, neoliberal Chicago Boys was making waves throughout Chile’s economic and social policy spheres. In 1979 Pinochet made a speech that set the stage for the economic and social reforms of the 1980s. In the minds of Pinochet and his closest advisors, the state was seen as a burden which constrained individuals’ ability to act. What was needed was a change in the nature of the state. The ideal form was one that was decentralised as far as possible (Pinochet 1979). That these objectives were implemented in the 1980s was not due to the repressive nature of the regime, but rather the legacy of pre-1973 factors such as a tradition of relatively honest administration, a strongly independent auditing system and a legalistic culture (Angell and Graham 1995:205). Indeed, these features persisted in Chilean politics and bureaucracy after 1990, which the Concertación would similarly draw on in their own reforms.

For education Pinochet’s 1979 proposals meant the introduction of reforms between 1981 and 1986 that resulted in both the administrative decentralisation of schools and the opening of the system to other, private interests (Araújo 2006a). This process was instigated through a series of decrees which were effectively ‘locked’ in constitutionally through the Constitutional Statutory Law of Education (LOCE) in March 1990, days before the Concertación government took office. A similar set of actions occurred in the higher education sector during this period, whereby the regime made it easier for private interests to establish their own relatively autonomous universities.

Although perceived as ‘flat’ the decentralisation and deregulation processes opened up by the military in the 1980s were both unequal in effect and biased against the public sector. Public schools’ administration was transferred to municipalities, with the aim to bring them closer to the local community they served (Dittborn, interview, 2007). But instead of being subject to parents’ control, the schools tended to be subject to the regime-appointed municipal authorities. Schools therefore had little decision-making power. Furthermore, both schools themselves and the municipalities had little
influence over their finances. The result was less one of decentralised power than deconcentration of responsibility from the centre, without the means to act (Mardones 2006).

Meanwhile, private schools thrived, as a result of not only being left to their own devices (including the right to selection denied to public schools) but also by being able to access the new voucher system, which provided them with state funds based on the number of enrolled students they enrolled (ODEPLAN 1988). Despite these advantages, there were still limits to what was possible within the military-structured education system. Private school managers claimed that the system still remained too restrictive and centralised, owing to a standard public funding system that had little regard for local need (Bosch, interview, 2007).

1.2. The Chilean state in education since 1990

The new Concertación government faced a choice between continuing or changing the education system it inherited in March 1990. The system was formally enshrined in both the 1980 constitution, which guaranteed the 'freedom of education' (libertad de enseñanza) and with it the right of selection, and the new LOCE. Given the LOCE's constitutional nature it became quickly apparent that its revocation would prove difficult, not least because a constitutional amendment required a high threshold, or four-sevenths of Congress – a figure that the Concertación did not have. This was shown by education minister Ricardo Lagos's failed attempt to reform LOCE in 1992 (Núñez, interview 1, 2007).

The effort was also half-hearted, mainly because those in the Concertación education team had undergone a change of opinion during the 16 years of military rule. Whereas the UP government had proposed a national education system, the long years of opposition had left their mark. On one hand although the military had left office they remained latently powerful. The new government therefore thought it prudent to act cautiously. One the other hand within the Concertación coalition there were now mixed views over the effects of the military-era reforms. While some held fast to the idea of turning the clock back to a nationally controlled and run school system, others suggested the military-era reforms could be used to improve the situation faced by schools and municipalities. The attitude was not simply a domestic reaction to the reforms; they also reflected a wider, international
trend in favour of decentralisation that was part of the 'first generation' reforms associated with the Washington Consensus (Cox, Velasco, interviews, 2007).

Concertaciónistas, however, distinguished between their approach to decentralisation and that of the military regime. Whereas the latter had seen it primarily in terms of economic rationalism and reducing the burden on the state, the new government saw it as a means of extending democracy to the local level (Núñez, interview 1, 2007). In 1990 the government introduced legislation that would subject municipalities to elections from 1992. This would add a more democratic and representative veneer to local administration. However, at the same time the government did not propose any change in municipalities’ attributes or organisation (Pozo 1990). This suited the government: the assumption (which proved correct) was that the Concertación would be the chief beneficiary of the democratic dividend in 1992, thereby ensuring that control of municipalities (and the education system) would remain in their hands.

The adoption of this decentralised education model – albeit with a democratic coating – showed that the Concertación had opted for a marginal approach to state reform. It meant that it would not directly challenge the legal basis of the system (Díaz, interview, 2007) but also ensure the persistence of certain inequalities and distortions within the system. Discrepancies between different municipalities existed, which affected their capacity to administer the local education systems effectively and financially (García-Huidobro, interview, 2007). Indeed, it has been estimated that by 2006 less than 65 of Chile’s 345 municipalities had sufficient expertise to tackle the challenges presented by educational matters (Bloque Social 2006; Bitar, interview, 2007).

Similarly, decentralisation meant differences between the individual providers, most notably the municipal and state-subsidised private schools. Indeed, the model maintains the market in education between these different types of schools, with implications for social stratification and inequality as a result (Bloque Social 2006). Generally, municipal schools faced greater financial pressures than the private schools; this was exacerbated by the unintended consequence of a change in the tax code in 1993 during its passage through Congress which enabled state-subsidised private schools both to charge parents and guardians a levy and receive tax-free donations.

However, this did not mean the Concertación had bought completely into the military regime’s vision of the state. The Pinochet government had pursued two largely contradictory paths, which
reflected the tension at work within the New Right – and which was in stark contrast to the social democratic orientation of the Concertación. The neo-liberals within the Pinochet government had sought to reduce the burden of state management and administration, by either contracting it out to the private sector or deconcentrating it to the municipalities. At the same time the conservative instinct in the military regime was still strong: it could not give up full control of funding, resulting in the state allocating funds to public and publicly-funded private schools rather than giving them directly to parents (Dittborn, interview, 2007). Beyond this, the military regime adopted a largely ‘hands-off’ approach.

By contrast, the Concertación differed from its military predecessor in the scope of state engagement. Accepting the decentralised model, it pursued a more ‘hands on’, or Third Way ‘activist’, approach including the introduction of new measures from the centre. Unlike the military, the government not only acknowledged the administrative and financial inequalities between different municipalities, but acted on them. The government introduced targeted funds to alleviate inequalities in the system, through the use of additional payments to poorer schools in its P900 and MECE programmes (Raczynski 1999). Another approach taken by the government was to introduce the Teachers Statute in 1991, to provide a national form of oversight, through labour stability and pay equality for teachers in both municipal and state-subsidised private schools (Núñez, interview 1, 2007; Cox, interview, 2007). Meanwhile, in higher education, the government initially introduced a national accreditation body, to bring some order to the expanding number of (mainly private) institutions (Consejo Superior de Educación: Republica de Chile 1998).

The model of the state adopted by the Concertación therefore sought neither to assume full responsibility for educational provision nor accept the distortions that resulted. This demonstrated the ambiguous position adopted by the government and the criticisms made by its rivals on the Left and Right. For the Right, the Concertación projects an overbearing state that disregards families and the private sector (Santa Cruz 1996; Camhi et al 1999; Cáceres and Santa Cruz 1996; Santa Cruz 1991). The Teachers Statute, the demand for obligatory accreditation of higher education courses and the efforts of some concertaciónistas against selection in private schools (including state-subsidised ones) all point to a burdensome and bureaucratic state (Weinstein, García-Huidobro, interviews, 2007). By contrast, for the Left the Concertación is not seen as state-oriented enough. The government is
accused of conducting a 'blurry' role for the state while being largely disconnected from the system as other, private interests have taken its place (Colegio de Profesores 2003). The Bloque Social, meanwhile, criticises the Concertación as being unwilling to take responsibility for the population's educational needs, by limiting itself to the system's financing (Bloque Social 2006).

These criticisms reinforce the Concertación's own position that it has opted for a midway stance between the two, which seeks a balance between private participation and management whilst retaining state scrutiny and supervision (Díaz, Brunner, Elacqua, interviews, 2007). However, the signs are that since 2006 the government has shown a greater willingness to intervene (Peña, interview, 2007). This suggests a shift in the Concertación approach away from the limited Third Way approach towards the so-called 'second generation' reforms in education. Admittedly, this overlooks the extent to which the education system was already subject to official and public scrutiny and the various proposals laid out during the previous Lagos government (2000-06), including differentiated funding for schools according to the socio-economic condition of their enrolments. Part of the reason for the change may be attributed to the mass protests staged against the educational system in 2006 and the resulting presidential advisory commission. At the same time as facing social demands, the Concertación has undergone a generational shift within government: many of the ministerial appointees and advisors in the policymaking team who lived through the years of opposition to the military regime are being replaced by a younger, less cohesive group of individuals who came of political age during the Concertación government in the 1990s.

By 2007 various education-related recommendations were apparent. The resulting agreement negotiated between the Concertación and its right-wing opponents in Congress included the following: one, a preferential subsidy bill that would create an additional fund for the most vulnerable students; two, constitutional reform to provide ‘quality’ education; three, a General Law of Education that would impose standards, require private schools to be run as not-for-profit entities and limit their ability to select, and establish a National Education Council that would define the rights and responsibilities of various actors in the system; four, a school inspectorate (Superintendencia) that would contribute to scrutiny and standards in schools, providing support if necessary and applying sanctions (such as the closure of municipal schools or withholding vouchers from public-funded private schools); and five, a
change in the voucher system that would increase in value for schools where the most vulnerable students were enrolled (Cox 2007; Puryear 2007a).

2. Brazil

The Brazilian education system is formally federal in structure. However, the model masks centralising and decentralising pressures that have characterised it since the 1960s. Under the military regime the system was relatively centralised, although arguably not as much as in other policy areas. From the later 1970s the influence of political liberalisation and grassroots pressures meant there was a decentralisation in educational policies, with both formal state bodies (state and municipalities) and non-state actors engaged in the process.

The swing back towards a more centralised approach occurred after 1995 with the new Cardoso government. This pointed towards a more ‘activist’ state in the mould of the Third Way. However, the process was more ambiguous than it initially appeared: the centralisation that developed was relative compared to the previous decade and a half. Furthermore, this centralisation happened only in the administrative and financial areas of the public school system – where it involved both greater coordination and organisation – and not in school administration, which was municipalised. Meanwhile at the higher education level a parallel process of deregulation and greater state scrutiny developed, reflecting the extent to which the PSDB government was comfortable with the market.

In contrast, since 2003 the impression given is that the state has played a greater role; centralisation has therefore continued. However, this remains subject to interpretation, owing to the different perspectives brought to the government both by its rivals and supporters. Furthermore, it overlooks the extent that the PT has shifted on its views regarding the state since its foundation in the 1980s, when its position on the state was counterbalanced by support for alternative, non-private forms of education.

2.1. The federal government in education before 1995

During the military period the regime began a process of political centralisation which had an impact on education, although this was relatively less than in other social policy areas. The regime issued various national plans for education throughout the 1960s and 1970s while educational administration was largely decentralised to the states (Arretche and Rodriguez 1999: 89). Nevertheless, funds
always proved insufficient and dependent on additional discretionary resources from the centre. This was exacerbated by the constitutional separation of responsibilities, whereby states and municipalities were mainly concerned with basic education and the federal government with higher education. This resulted in a chronic shortage of funds which affected educational infrastructure (including buildings and teachers) by the later period of the regime.

The military regime's later phase was also notable for a growing decentralisation in education activity. Much of this was not directed by the governments, but rather reflected the growing political liberalisation from the late 1970s on. Across the educational system there were developments, both within the formal structure of the state at federal, state and municipal levels as well as by social movements and NGOs. Among the most visible examples within the state were measures including the creation of integrated school and community centres under Lionel Brizola's state government in Rio de Janeiro (CIEPs), to the deliberative and participatory school experiments led by Paulo Freire in São Paulo city, and the schools run by the landless movement in the countryside (Goldemberg 1993; Valente 2007; Branford and Rocha 2002). A further legacy of the military and post-1985 years was a substantial private sector, which had contributed towards educational expansion, although mainly at university level (Araújo 2006a). This was due in large part to the growing demand for higher education during the 1960s and 1970s and the inability of the state to provide a sufficient supply. However, this had occurred with little overall direction or scrutiny.

The presence of a prominent private sector had pre-dated the military period. Its strength was evident in the balance laid out between public and private education in the 1961 national education guidelines (LDB). The return to democracy did not adversely affect this situation, with the new 1988 constitution outlining a similar balance between the two positions. However, the constitution failed to resolve the problems within Brazil's education system, not least because the reaffirmation of educational responsibilities between the three levels of government involved, an absence over where to allocate financial responsibility. Also, the lack of consensus over the public-private debate limited the prospect for reform (Plank 1990: 550, 557-8).

By the early 1990s the lack of reform resulted in an education system at both school and university levels without any outward sign of control or coordination. The 1988 constitution had encouraged an increase in enrolment numbers, but both the federal and state governments proved
unable to financially support them. This was especially the case in the Northeast where municipalities dominated public education provision, whereas state governments did so in the more prosperous Southeast. The result was uncoordinated growth (Arretche and Rodriguez 1999: 107) and increased financial aggravation as a result of limited discretionary funds made available by the federal government (Goldemberg, interview, 2008; 1993).

Meanwhile the federal government showed few signs of rectifying the problem, or introducing a rationalisation similar to that undertaken by the Chilean military. Despite the election of a neo-liberal president, Fernando Collor, in 1989, this educational variation was never subjected to the logic of state reduction, as happened in science and technology (Goldemberg, interview, 2008). Instead, the federal government’s approach was to outline general goals for the education sector while pursuing projects that promoted the president at local levels. Indeed, during the Collor presidency the main educational innovation was the construction of integrated schools and community centres (CIACs), which like the CIEPs in Rio de Janeiro, were designed to be integrated schools and community centres. The frustration and dissatisfaction of the educational community regarding the sizeable proportion of the budget expended on such projects prompted a rethink by Collor’s successor, Itamar Franco (Brasil: Presidente da Republica 1994). By the end of the New Republic’s first decade, there was growing acceptance that Brazil’s education system was inadequate (Motter, unpublished2; Castro 2000; Durham, interview, 2008). It appeared that perhaps the long-awaited consensus was on the horizon.

2.2. The Cardoso government and the role of the state in education

The emergence of a consensus for reform – across the political class if not in the educational community – appeared to have arrived. Until 1995 different actions at different levels of government were taking place throughout the education system, but there was recognition that on their own it was insufficient. Something more had to be done. The result involved addressing the structure of power and resources within the system, which from the perspective of the early 1990s had not been addressed by the Constituent Assembly in 1986-88 (Plank 1990: 550).

The new government’s approach was largely managerial in scope. It saw the problems facing the educational system as primarily that of a lack of efficiency, competition and choice. It was not a lack of resources that was seen as prompting financial difficulties, but rather its allocation and
distribution: the existing funding mechanisms paid little attention to the number of students in schools (Motter, unpublished; Durham, interview, 2008).

The government’s response was therefore to adopt two different approaches to the education system. On one hand in pre-university education it rationalised the public sector through a process of decentralisation while creating new mechanisms and institutions at the federal level to oversee the process. On the other hand, at the higher education level it maintained — and indeed enhanced — the deregulated system, opening up space for non-state actors other than business to participate. Underpinning these contrary approaches though was a common policy in both sectors: the introduction of evaluative mechanisms and procedures to provide oversight, backed up with more general scrutiny by the public.

First, the Cardoso government inherited an uncoordinated and uncontrolled pre-university public education system. Like the Concertación government in Chile, the educational policymaking team in MEC appeared divided between those who favoured a more state-oriented approach (e.g. more state-provided schools), such as Eunice Durham and Iara Prado, and others who preferred a more state-directed approach (i.e. less direct state involvement and more non-state solutions), including Simon Schwartzmann (Gouvêa, interview, 2008). This difference of opinion meant that a balance had to be found between the two sides. The way through was eventually found, with both sides agreeing that the one position on which they could agree was the need for a constitutional separation of responsibility for the education system (Souza, interview, 2007).

The effect of this consensus was to pursue a policy that meant the federal government would opt for indirect rather than direct control of the school system, by adopting a coordinating role for itself. The implementation of this objective meant that the federal government effectively recentralised education policy (Durham, interview, 2008; Brasil: Presidente da Republica 1999). The way this was done was through the creation of a new set of educational guidelines (LDB) in 1995 and the creation of a funding mechanism, FUNDEF, which hypothecated tax revenues to primary education. While the LDB delineated responsibility for education, placing primary schools in the hands of municipalities, secondary schools to states and higher education and general overall coordination to the federal level, FUNDEF set out an amount of funding per student alongside a federal supplement. The effect of FUNDEF was also to contribute towards greater primary school municipalisation, given that the federal
supplement would be paid directly (Pinto 2007). Both of these measures were achieved through the passage of constitutional amendments. This not only demonstrated the policy elite’s commitment to legal measures to achieve political ends, but also legitimised them as a consequence of the high levels of congressional support required to pass them.

Publicly, Cardoso’s education team stressed that the measures put in place demonstrated their commitment to the constitutional separation of powers and subnational autonomy, which accounted for the government’s decision to leave the setting of teachers’ salaries to states and to decentralise resources (Souza 2005). However, unlike neoliberal advocates, the policy core believed that their approach to the municipalisation of primary schools was substantially different from that presented by the neoliberal model. Unlike neoliberals, Cardoso and his associates did not have faith that the market knew best in all circumstances; rather they believed that while the market had a role to play, it could not cover all eventualities (Cardoso, interview, 2008). Consequently, the state needed to be involved and therefore played a prominent role in the reforms that happened after 1995.

To achieve this, the education minister, Paulo Renato Souza, and his team reconstituted the national evaluation agency, INEP, which would provide comprehensive data and analysis of the system as a whole (Motter, unpublished). The agency and its work would complement the centralising policies offered by the LDB and FUNDEF. In contrast, the neoliberal version could be characterised by a willingness to decentralise, but without effective control of resources or resort to the market. Indeed, the government’s emphasis on publicity and campaigns to get wider society involved in sending their children to school, highlighted the extent to which the Cardoso government did not see either the state or the market as the only actors involved in education (Motter, unpublished).

Even if the Cardoso government’s stance was not as stark as the neoliberal position on the role of the state, the lack of agreement regarding the correct size of the state within the policymaking team meant that its ‘activist’ approach was constrained. This was evident in the non-state sector, in particular the private school system. Rather than seek to impose itself and regulate private school tuition fees, as previous governments had done, the team at MEC opted towards their deregulation, leaving it to the market to decide. Gouvea (interview, 2008) explained that this was due to the Cardoso government being subject to criticism for its apparent willingness to intervene in education
during its time in office; this was felt keenly by the team associated with educational reform, prompting them to back away from the sector.

Second, at the university level the government sought a similar clarification and codification of policies. This was a particular challenge since this was a part of the education system that had been more directly affected by previous unorganised growth by the private sector; by 1995 around two-thirds of students were in private higher education institutions (HEIs) (IBGE 1996). However, the government did not propose to change the existing model: demand was growing for places and the public system had insufficient space to provide an alternative. Furthermore, the education core at MEC was sceptical about the public system: it neither had a wide enough range of courses, nor were they sufficiently vocational or regionally based in scope (Gouvea, interview, 2008). In contrast to the school system where the policymaking core was divided between those who favoured state or market solutions, in higher education the only option appeared to be the latter. Consequently, the government pursued a pragmatic approach, by opening up the sector to the market while tackling the obstacles in its way.

Unlike previous market-led growth in the higher education sector, the government sought to introduce a new role for the state to go alongside deregulation. This included an accreditation process and a state evaluation system, the Provão – which received opposition from supporters of both public and private HEIs alike. The accreditation process required that a minimum of two-thirds of an institution’s teachers have a masters or doctoral degree and gave power to MEC to decertify courses or intervene where an HEI was deemed to be failing (Niskier 2007: 28). Meanwhile the Provão would provide a form of regulation, by publishing the results of poorly performing courses and institutions. This would encourage improvement since it would provide parents and students with sufficient information about HEIs to make better choices over where to apply and study (Durham, Soares, interviews, 2008; Folha de São Paulo 2005a).

2.3. The Lula government and the role of the state in education

In contrast to the Cardoso government, where state reorganisation of educational responsibility and additional state involvement (e.g. FUNDEF and the various measures of oversight) were introduced alongside more space for non-state actors (i.e. the market and parents and students), the first Lula
term was more state-oriented. This was evident in the government's first educational announcements, in particular its decision to universalise basic education from pre- to secondary school level (Brasil: Presidente da Republica 2003).

Universalised education for the new PT government meant federal intervention in areas which the previous administration had shied away from on constitutional grounds. This meant that the government would play an active role in the development of both primary and secondary education, implying a weakening of the role of the municipalities and the 27 states in this respect. The creation of a new funding mechanism, FUNDEB, which allocated resources per student from pre-school to secondary level, replaced the previous FUNDEF version, which was limited to primary schools. The 2007 Education Development Plan (PDE), outlined various methods that the federal government would use, including standards and evaluative mechanisms, to improve the quality of Brazil’s primary and secondary schools (Souza, interview, 2007; Costa, interview, 2008).

Alongside these changes the government's willingness to intervene more directly was highlighted by developments in both further and higher education. In further education the administration was engaged in both the construction and integration of new technical and agricultural schools into the federal network. In higher education, it was committed to building ten new public universities and expanding 49 other campuses (Brasil: Presidente da Republica 2007). In addition the government also introduced federally-imposed quotas for public school students and minority groups (Brasil: Presidente da Republica 2005). Finally, the government endorsed a greater role for the state in the regulation of the higher education system, since it believed that the public interest could only be met if private universities were subject to greater scrutiny (Folha de São Paulo 2005a).

The greater role of the (federal) state in education emphasised the tendency of PT administrations in this direction prior to 2003. While it illustrated the more state-oriented nature of the Participatory Left in the 2000s, historically the party had a more ambiguous relationship with the state in education. During its first decade in the 1980s, although the PT supported the principle of free public education, it also believed that education had to be popular too. In particular this meant that social movements had an equally important role to play, including in the education of the masses (Gadotti and Pereira 1989). This perspective was arguably reinforced by the first experiences of the PT in elected positions of power, where it found administering cities and states insufficiently
representative or responsive. One way this was resolved was by distributing public funds to social organisations and movements (Costa, interview, 2008). Another was to construct new state-sanctioned institutions; perhaps the most well-known being the participatory budget (PB). Its educational dimension was to be found in the way that it engaged participants to learn about and subsequently influence the budget-making process. More specific education-related measures had also been tried, including the creation of local popular councils throughout São Paulo city during the early 1990s (Arelaro, interview, 2008). This was followed later in the decade by the school grant programme (bolsa escola), whereby the state provided financial assistance to households whose school-age children were in regular attendance.

Despite petistas' views of the state’s many limitations, the transition from a party of opposition to that of national government presented new opportunities regarding the state and its education system. In executive positions at the subnational level, the PT had previously only had a marginal impact on the educational system; at the federal level it could now directly mould and shape education in the way it wanted. This more ‘hands-on’ approach was reflected in a less wary attitude towards the state and the abandonment of previous policies that it had rejected; among the most notable was its acceptance of FUNDEF, which it had voted against in Congress, and its replacement by the FUNDEB programme when it finally expired.

More recently, the policies laid out in its Education Development Plan (PDE) in April 2007 mean that compared to its predecessor the Lula government can be seen as more state-oriented and less inclined to rely on the market (Brooke, interview, 2008); indeed, the government argued that whereas education had previously been fragmented between different jurisdictions and levels, the measures laid out in its plan would contribute towards a much more integrated system (MEC 2007b: 7). However, such pronouncements overlooked the fact that the government’s plans for higher education initially rested on support by the private sector. In particular this involved the creation of public subsidies for the sector, through the ProUni programme. Since 2004 this measure has meant the government pays private HEIs varying amounts of poorer students’ tuition fees, ranging from half to the full amount.

In addition, the extent to which the PT government has brought education under direct federal control remains subject to interpretation. Souza claims that since 2003 there has indeed been an
increase in the role of the (federal) state. According to him, this is apparent in the government's failure to respect the constitutional lines of educational responsibility (interview, 2007). In FUNDEB for example, the federal government proposes to expand spending in areas that are not directly under its jurisdiction. Furthermore, while FUNDEF never defined a set contribution by the federal level, the FUNDEB constitutional amendment includes them. Against this view though, is that of Lula's first education minister, Cristovam Buarque, who suggests that the government has not substantially increased the role of the state. Rather than 'federalise' – or nationalise – education as Buarque proposed, Lula has preferred to maintain the existing municipal system of schools. The reasons for this appear to have been both economic and pragmatic, the president seeking to avoid the growth in demands that would result from scaling up control of educational policy (Buarque, interview, 2008).

3. Conclusion

The chapter began by noting the difficulty in defining the state's role today and has sought both to define the contemporary social democratic (educational) state and to distinguish between the (more limited) Third Way and (more expansive) Participatory Left variants within it. But defining the social democratic state is made especially challenging by the vagueness of the terms used to explain its role. While words such as 'complementary', 'enabling' and 'active' emphasise a form of state distinct from the minimal neo-liberal ideal, it does not always make clear what this means in practice.

The situation is made more complicated in that the different types of social democratic state have coincided with changes of opinion regarding the role of the state, as well as regional differences between the cases studied. First, over the past 20 years there has been a shift from a 'first' to a 'second' generation of reforms associated with the Washington Consensus. This must be factored into an understanding of a state at a given time: the former period until the late 1990s emphasising the reduction of the size of a state, the latter since the early 2000s with enhancing its capacity. Second, the Chilean and Brazilian cases show (and regardless of whether the state has been unitary or federal) that governments have pursued centralising and decentralising policies at the same time. However, these contrary paths become clearer when one observes that this involves forms of state support, oversight and scrutiny policies at the centre while the decentralisation has concentrated on the management or administration of the system.
The Concertación has done this both in the creation of new institutions and forms of support at the centre to oversee the system as a whole, while maintaining – and democratising – the municipalities. In Brazil the Cardoso government sought to rationalise the system by encouraging the municipalisation of primary schools through a centrally introduced funding mechanism (FUNDEF), while also deregulating its university sector. Indeed, this arguably went further than intended, following obstruction of its accreditation system and reliance on the market to shape demand. Of the three, the Lula administration appears the most state-oriented, with expanded federal involvement and spending across all pre-university education (FUNDEB). Yet even here the results have been more ambiguous than they suggest: state funding of the private sector and maintenance of the municipal school system point away from centralisation.

What do these governments’ experiences say about their respective vision of the role of a state and what does it say about the nature of the political elites at the heart of these decisions? Of the three cases, the Third Way example of the Concertación shows the closest attachment to a neo-liberal version of the state, because it largely accepted the military regime’s model in which the state’s role was dramatically reduced. However, against this were the preferences of its policymaking core, who had not only to recognise the relative strength of the political Right, but also the extent to which the military-era reforms had become ‘fixed’ by 1990. Consequently, the Concertación inherited a limited educational state and subsequently sought to modify it at the margins through targeted programmes, funding and oversight mechanisms.

In Brazil, the Third Way government of Cardoso oversaw the rationalisation of school administration to the municipal level, following a decade in which neo-liberalism barely penetrated educational discourse, even if the private sector in higher education had grown prior to this point and was allowed to persist – and even encouraged – after 1995. In contrast to the Concertación, the PSDB did not find a readily established school system in place and was therefore obliged to pursue its own rationalisation programme alongside support for a deregulated higher education sector. However, the lack of consensus within the policymaking elite over whether the state or market should take precedence, contributed to the emergence of apparently contrary positions in the school and university sectors. Yet, like the Concertación, the Cardoso government operated in a period when the
Washington Consensus was in ‘first generation’ mode and domestic and international elite opinion was predisposed towards the market.

By contrast, the PT has operated in a period when the ‘second generation’ had emerged. Like the Concertación it also inherited a rationalised system which it has largely maintained, despite claims that it had made in opposition prior to 2003 that the Cardoso government had been ‘neo-liberal’ in its educational policies; FUNDEB, for instance, is largely an expansion of the previous FUNDEF model. Furthermore, despite Buarque’s claim that Lula did not want to ‘federalise’ (i.e. nationalise or bring the central government into closer co-operation with the state and municipal levels) public education (interview, 2008), this seems to be part of the aim of FUNDEB. Such measures point to a more expansive role of the state, one which is associated with the Participatory Left. Yet despite the PT’s association with this model, during its first decade in the 1980s it favoured a more balanced relationship between the state and civil society.

Even if there are differences between the Third Way and Participatory Left visions of the state and its role, what seems apparent is that where the state dominates a particular sector it may well be easier for it to introduce policies that enhance its role than in a sector where it is weaker. This will therefore affect the extent to which a social democratic government can shape the state. For example, the opportunities for greater (federal level) state development in Brazil’s school system was possible under Cardoso, since the public sector was dominant. In contrast, in higher education, where the private sector was especially strong, this meant the scope of state involvement was more constrained. Similarly, the growth of state-funded private schools in Chile during the 1980s meant that the Concertación was limited in the approaches it could take. Finally, Lula’s decision to keep the public school system at arm’s length by ensuring that it remains primarily a municipal- and state-level responsibility means that the government is arguably less susceptible to potential pressures and demands from teachers, students and parents.
5. The purpose of education: social democratic objectives and curricular reform

What is the purpose of education and how is it best expressed by governments? This is usually done through the establishment of an official national curriculum. Furthermore, its content tends to be ideological in tone, enabling the observer to determine the political stance of a given government. For the post-Cold War era, Bobbio (1996) refashioned the left-right spectrum to account for the decline of socialism, distinguishing between a greater commitment to equality on the Left and difference on the Right. This spectrum may be similarly applied in educational ideology: At one end the more radical or 'progressive' educational ideologies (e.g. Marxism) offer a challenge to the status quo by promoting critical pedagogy that seeks to empower the marginalised. At the other end of the spectrum, occupied by the New Right, neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism tend to reinforce 'difference'(Sarup 1982; Trowler 1998; Loveless 2001). Differences may be seen between the neo-liberals' preferences for vocational curricula that stresses the primacy of human capital development and the neo-conservative aim to maintain established social norms and values (and hence existing hierarchies). More recently, since the 1990s the Right's values have been softened via international organisations' advocacy of educational reforms to produce relevant 'knowledge' that will assist economic development (Dale and Robertson 2007: 225). Hall and Midgley (2004: 153) meanwhile argue that during the 1990s the education for human capital development paradigm declined and was replaced by education for social development (i.e. poverty alleviation, human rights and empowerment). Within this perspective lies social democratic education, which seeks to balance the demands of the Left and Right. In terms of curricular content this has meant greater personal development through the use of critical learning methods as opposed to learning by rote.

However, social democratic education cannot neatly be associated with one form of educational ideology. The political variation that exists within social democracy between the Third Way and Participatory Left may be similarly observed in the educational context. Given the Third Way's greater level of market orientation and technocratic approach to policymaking, one would expect it to occupy space that is closer to the New Right perspective. By contrast, the Participatory Left, with its origins in the social movements that advocated critical pedagogy and its ideological challenge to the
status quo, should occupy a more radical position. This should mean that the Participatory Left PT government's educational ideology and curricular content should be more closely associated with the egalitarian end of the spectrum than the Third Way Concertación and Cardoso governments.

Contrary to these assumptions though, the cases reveal a much more complex state of affairs. Despite the association of the PT with critical pedagogy, it was the Third Way governments in Brazil and Chile that presented a deeper set of curricular responses. Not only was the curriculum more comprehensive than that set out by the PT, but both Third Way governments showed a greater concern for critical thinking than might have been expected from a form of social democracy closer ideologically to the Right than the Participatory Left. In the case of Chile this may be explained by the extent to which New Right ideology had permeated the curriculum by 1990, prompting the Concertación to seek its reform. By contrast, in Brazil curricular policies had drifted even after the return of democracy. The Cardoso government therefore had an opportunity to make changes, the bulk of which were accepted by its successor.

In addition to comparing the difference between the Third Way and Participatory Left in terms of curricular content, several factors must be taken into account. First, variation between critical pedagogy and more traditional approaches tend to be based at the level of instruction, usually within a school or another, less formal educational setting. This therefore presents a challenge to assessing the three social democratic governments' curricular policies since their objectives belong at the macro-level and therefore do not take account of either their implementation within the classroom or their attainment by students (Benavot 1992; Montero-Sieburth 1992). In addition, this overlooks the institutional difference between Chile as a unitary state and Brazil's federal structure. Whereas Chile was able to develop a national curriculum that was implemented in all schools, Brazil's federal government was only able to set national guidelines and parameters for state and municipal authorities to develop their own more detailed curricula.

Second, the comparison of the Chilean and Brazilian cases also highlights an institutional distinction which must be considered. Higher education tends to have greater autonomy in the development of curricula compared to earlier levels of education. As a result one does not find too much direct government intervention into the content of university teaching (the military periods with
their totalising effect on society being the exceptions to the rule). Consequently, governments have tended to concentrate their curricular changes at the primary and secondary school level.

1. Chile

The debates that have occurred within Chilean curricular policies have tended to be over the balance between vocational and general education at the secondary school level. In particular this discussion since the 1960s has centred over the extent to which one should be given greater emphasis than the other, regardless of governments’ political complexion. Indeed much of this discussion was tied up in the economic goals of the country’s various governments and their vision of how best to develop the country.

Until the 1973 coup the differences between the two were largely held in check, reflecting the wider domestic and international consensus on education and development. This changed during the military period: first as the regime sought to reduce what it saw as a high level of politicisation within the system; second, as part of a wider restructuring of the state and transformation of society. These two trends contributed to educational goals that were more conservative and neo-liberal; in the vocation-general skills debate the balance was tipped towards the former. However, these changes during the 1970s and 1980s did not achieve the desired effect. The Concertación government after 1990 therefore began a series of curricular reforms that reflected what it saw as the inadequacy of the military changes as well as its response to the challenges and pressures faced by globalisation. Like its predecessor though, the Concertación’s curricular reforms were not completely successful.

1.1. Curricular policies prior to 1990

Debate over curricular content has had a long history within Chile. Prior to the military coup the country experienced substantial growth in school coverage. However, the emphasis on expansion appeared to take priority over what was being taught in Chilean schools: the government-appointed educational commissions in both 1961 and 1963 failed to make a decision on the relative merits of technical (or vocational) education over the more academic, generalist route (Gill 1966).

This emphasis on vocational-generalist education reflected the general consensus on development at the time: both the Christian Democrat and UP governments were preoccupied with economic development and saw education as the means by which this might be achieved. Whereas
the Christian Democrats saw education as a means for preparing individuals for work, the UP government believed that the education system had to be integrated into national planning; moreover, workers' control of the means of production would also mean that of the school system (Fischer 1979; Superintendencia de Educacion 1969; Oficina de Planificación Nacional 1971). Internationally, this was also the heyday of the state-led development process consensus, which was highlighted by the US-sponsored Alliance for Progress.

Under the military this balance was ended as the regime opted for a more vocationally-oriented approach. Like its predecessors it saw a close link between education and participation in the labour market. It felt that previous reforms had been insufficient and that vocational education was neither adequate nor viewed as sufficiently prestigious (Oficina de Planificación Nacional 1977). Pinochet himself stressed the need for practical skills such as reading and writing (Pinochet 1993), while his government expressed concern at the apparent disconnection that existed between the educational system and the labour market. The response was for a more professionally-oriented approach to education (Government/Republic of Chile 1981; CPFUCH 1975).

These two perspectives – an emphasis on basic skills and professional education – highlighted the conservative and neo-liberal currents at the heart of the military's thinking about education. The regime's initial preoccupation had been the political polarisation and destabilisation in Chile prior to 1973. In an effort to overcome this it stressed the need for national unity and a closer connection to family. However, as the 1970s progressed and the regime came under the influence of monetarist thinking, the same was applied to social policies. Education soon gained a neo-liberal dimension, in which individual choice was encouraged (Pozo 1982; Prieto 1980; Pinochet 1993; Castro 1977; Chile, Junta Militar de Gobierno 1977).

This New Right ideology could work in different directions. The conservative strain was clearly apparent in the military's attitude to universities. It discouraged free thinking and treated subjects such as political science, sociology, journalism, psychology and Russian studies with suspicion (Martinez and Valladares 1988; Newsome 1993; CPFUCH 1975; Chile, Junta Militar de Gobierno 1977?). This occurred despite the relative absence of Marxist influences; notwithstanding an invitation to the Brazilian educationalist and advocate of critical pedagogy, Paulo Freire, to introduce his methods in Chile under the Christian Democrat government during the 1960s, the results were not lasting (Núñez,
interview 2, 2007). Nonetheless, the regime reacted as it did since it saw the universities as having been part of the pre-1973 crisis.

Meanwhile the neo-liberal dimension became increasingly evident in the vocational direction pursued by the government, especially after 1980. Education became subordinated to overriding economic concerns, which entailed a restructuring of the state (Cariola et al 2003). In the late 1970s the regime had identified bureaucracy as being both too centralised and prone to distorting opportunity (Oficina de Planificación Nacional 1977). As part of the solution, reforms were instigated after 1980 that deregulated education, making it easier for private interests to enter the system and operate their own schools and universities. The deregulation after 1980 provided the impetus for a surge in new providers and opportunities for many students from poorer families to go to university. This was paradoxically seen as a 'democratisation' of education, including among those later associated with the more market-oriented sections of the Concertación (Brunner, Peña, interviews, 2007). At the same time the regime encouraged schools to create their own study plans. This heralded a change from the approach adopted during the 1970s, when autonomy had been contained in an effort to overcome ideology.

The liberalisation of school teaching plans meant that both the outlines of national objectives as well as the content supplied by Mineduc became increasingly limited (Dittborn, interview, 2007). The situation was exacerbated by the fact that not all schools had sufficient capacity (in terms of teachers' ability or resources) to be able to respond effectively; Cariola et al (2003) note that generally private schools were better prepared for this development than municipal schools, thereby reinforcing social segregation and differences in learning opportunities between schools.

1.2. Curricular policies under the Concertación

In 1990 the Concertación's view was that the educational system and the national curriculum were both inadequate. Not only were there differences in the ability of different types of schools to provide a minimum level of education for their students, but the efforts at introducing a more vocational form at the secondary school level did not seem particularly effective. Despite the military regime's preoccupation with preparing the labour force for work, it was not seen as sufficiently linked to the productive sectors. Meanwhile the more general schooling offered was seen as too academic and
focused on preparing for higher education. Consequently, the measures taken since the 1960s appeared to have yielded few benefits by 1990.

By adopting a Third Way approach to curricular reform the Concertación's approach reinforced the link that governments make between economic development and education, effectively subordinating social concerns to economic ones (Petras et al 1994). According to a former education minister, Sergio Bitar (2005), this was evident in the need for economic growth (alongside democratic stability and social programmes) as a means of achieving educational coherency and success. A similar point was made by Cox (2006), who suggested that since the 1990s Chile's political and economic elites found a common agreement on education as a strategy for economic growth and social justice.

The link between education and economic growth by the Concertación contributed to a two-stage process of educational reform. The first, between 1990 and 1993, concentrated on increasing resources rather than pressing ahead with curricular reform at the secondary level or tackling the issue of vocational-general education. Although the new government wished to do so eventually, it was felt that the time was not yet right (Núñez, interview 2, 2007). The exception to this was the changes made at to the primary school curriculum, which although begun in 1992, did not reach final agreement until 1996.

The second, which occurred from the late 1990s, emphasised the development of new curricula, changes to the school day and improvements in the teaching profession (Cariola et al 2003). The new secondary school curriculum that was developed in this period demonstrated the Concertación's preoccupation with wider economic challenges presented by globalisation.

However, contrary to the initial period when the government's concern had been with maintaining market objectives and increasing resources, in this second phase the Concertación appeared to adopt a more critical pedagogical perspective. In particular, its designers advocated an educational model that should be less linear, less focused on set subjects and on memorising topics. Instead it should be more flexibly organised and tailored to the needs and demands of modern society. This meant placing a premium on general knowledge and information and the means to communicate and innovate (Programa MECE 1997; Cox 1994; Bitar 2005; Núñez, interview 2, 2007). In effect then, the change heralded a shift away from the military's support for vocational education in favour of one
that was more balanced. In the 1990s general skills rather than specialisation was now seen as the way to reduce inequality (Carnoy and Castro 1997: 64). This echoed the persistently low value which is attached to vocational qualifications more generally (Wolff 2002: 93).

Curricular reform occurred at both the primary and secondary levels. At the primary level this was completed by 1996. The aims included the inculcation of individual values and rights along with interaction in the design of their teaching between both the state and educational establishments (Mineduc 2002). Although the emphasis on the individual and decentralised study plans was arguably similar to the military approach in the 1980s, there were notable differences. These included the development of children’s capacity to resolve problems, self-learn, select relevant information and to work as part of a team. As part of this general and comprehensive education, issues of personal development and moral values were central (Mineduc 1996). At the secondary level the process was finished in 1998 (Doyle 2004). Like the primary model, it included particular moral values that had not been included before, such as the teaching of ethics (Mineduc 2005a). Other key changes included the decentralisation of study plans to the school level, the reorientation of its objectives and content and changes in the structure to include two years of general education followed by specialisation in the last two years (Riveros 2004).

Despite the curricular reforms, they still remained relatively limited in scope – and hence were not as radical as critical pedagogy would suggest. First, there was difficulty in satisfying the various social demands that were generated through the consultation; not all interests could be represented, resulting in frustration and dissatisfaction by certain groups (Núñez, interview 2, 2007). Against this was the fact that debate had been generally slight anyway. The details within the curricular reforms had generated less discussion than the main objections presented by the Right, including the constraints that a national curriculum would have on school autonomy and ‘freedom to teach’ (Peña, interview, 2007).

Second, despite having new curricular criteria, teachers were ill-prepared to carry through the pedagogic changes (Doyle 2004; Cortés 1992). While teacher focus groups expressed interest in the opportunity for more flexible study plans, they were concerned at the increase in the amount of material they were required to teach while having the same amount of time to prepare and teach (Colegio de Profesores 1997a; Soto, interview, 2007).
Third, there was also an apparent lack of connection between the new curricular criteria and what was being taught to prospective teachers (Doyle 2004). This was a source of frustration for the government, which had limited means to influence this. The situation was further exacerbated by the government's dependence on university-trained teachers, since there were few other avenues into teaching. Only those with a pedagogy degree were entitled to teach, which excluded other groups of people who were deterred from a course lasting several years. Bitar (interview, 2007), for example, would have liked to have liberalised the requirements for teaching qualifications, to open the pool up to a wider base, including those not initially trained as teachers.

Fourth, the growth of the curriculum exacerbated problems differences between public and private schools, namely that of schools' capacity to deliver these study plans. As was the case during the military period, private schools remained in a stronger position to do so than many municipal ones (Doyle 2004; Consulta Pablo Moreno 1997). The hope is that following the educational package agreed between the Concertación and the Right in Congress in November 2007, more schools might be able to cover the requirements laid out in the national curriculum; they would be required to teach the national curriculum for only 70% of teaching time, although this would mean they still had to reach standards set by the government (Puryear 2007a).

Fifth, the curricular changes were pushed through with relatively limited participation by the teaching profession. This was mainly the case at the primary rather than the secondary level (Cox, interview, 2007; Núñez, interview 2, 2007), but might arguably be due to the relative lack of consensus within the teaching profession on the proposals too (Colegio de Profesores 1997b).

2. Brazil
Curricular design in Brazil has followed a similar path to that in Chile, albeit in a manner that has accommodated the federal structure of the educational system. Under the military a conservative approach was largely adopted that stressed discipline and preparation for the labour market. Like the Chilean military, it promoted vocational over general education, but as happened in Chile, by 1985 the departing government had shown itself unable to effectively integrate education into its economic development planning. The situation continued to drift during the first decade of the New Republic, partly as a result of the immobilism caused by re-democratisation.
Curricular reform, and the government's ideological positions underpinning it, effectively occurred after 1995 – although it was a Third Way government that undertook it. Global pressures and demands encouraged the development of new curricular guidelines and parameters, which were drafted in such a way to accommodate the institutional nature of the Brazilian education system. Notwithstanding the more radical stance that the Participatory Left PT would adopt a curricular reform, its entry into government in 2003 did not herald substantial change. Indeed, many of the various curricular changes and priorities selected suggested a form of education similar to that introduced during the previous Cardoso presidency.

2.1. Curricular policies prior to 1995

Before 1995 two broad trends could be seen in thinking about the role of education. The first, which occurred prior to the military coup and was sustained until the 1980s, emphasised the importance of planned educational policy within the wider context of state-planned economic development. This planning introduced a degree of authoritarian control into the education system, along with other measures designed to impose the regime's goals. The second phase began in the later stages of the military regime. Authoritarianism was acknowledged as generally inefficient and coincided with a democratisation of Brazilian politics and society, which was reflected in its educational approach. Ironically though, the political opening up of the system contributed to curricular paralysis, as the New Republic governments largely failed to produce any substantial details about the role of education and its content.

The military governments after 1964 was preoccupied with linking the education system to wider economic needs. This was the period of state-led forms of development, when national planning was a common theme globally. In Brazil the regime viewed the education system's role as meeting national needs rather than import models from abroad (Banas 1972).

In 1971 a restructuring of primary and secondary education resulted in compulsory professional or vocational training. The aim was both to ensure the development of qualified labour and relieve pressure caused by growing demand for university places (Fernandes e Silva n.d.; Soares, n.d.; Moura Castro 1989). These changes occurred at the height of the regime's anti-subversive activity. This period had educational implications too, in particular the introduction of 'moral and civic' education.
from school to post-graduate level (Skidmore 1988; Cury 1996). The areas covered by the course reflected many of the regime's preoccupations, including national security doctrine, religious education, and the importance of science and technology for national development (Leme Lopes et al 1971).

The political liberalisation in the late 1970s and early 1980s provided space for a discussion about the regime's educational objectives. It was becoming increasingly evident that compulsory vocational education had proved inadequate for several reasons. Economic pressures, regional variations in development and unemployment all undermined the military's efforts to achieve effective planning and management. Despite its compulsory status, not all schools were in a position to provide adequate vocational training, resulting in its repeal in 1981 (Moura Castro 1989; Brooke 1985). This was followed soon after by the termination of moral and civic education when democracy returned in 1985.

The post-1985 period resulted in an effective stalemate for educational development in Brazil. On one hand democracy had opened up the system and weakened the previous regime's authoritarian measures. At the same time re-democratisation arguably made it more difficult to achieve a coherent approach to educational – and curricular – reform. In contrast to the previous period, including in the populist era before 1964 when the public-private schools debate had been central, there was a surge of new interests clamouring for attention. Both the 1988 constitution and the more detailed educational guidelines (LDB) that was still being debated in Congress by 1994, included references to minority groups, social rights and decentralisation (Cury 1996).

By 1995 the New Republic had experienced almost a decade of inertia in the area of curricular development. Increasingly subnational actors, whether they were individual states and municipalities or civil society organisations, were carrying out their own educational programmes and practices. As Plank (1990: 599) has observed, this gave rise to more personalistic and clientelist forms of policy, but with little overall structure or co-ordination.

The situation was complicated by the competing economic visions at the elite level. The state-led model of education had not yet been defeated by the early 1990s. Although its support had been weakened by the economic pressures and hyperinflation of the 1980s and was challenged by President Collor's (1990-92) neo-liberal vision, it was by no means certain which economic model would eventually prevail. This had repercussions for the education sector: given the close association
between economic development and education made by all governing elites, the lack of consensus on
the economic model meant that it was uncertain what the education system’s role should be too.

2.2. Curricular policies under the Cardoso government

The Cardoso government appeared to have a clear agenda for education. In contrast to the half­
hearted attitude of previous governments to economic liberalisation, the new administration appeared
to embrace the trend. Indeed, the Real Plan that contributed to the PSDB election victory in 1994
relied on opening up the economy to foreign markets (Ferrari­Filho and Fernando de Paula 2003;
Vasconcellos 2005). The new government saw a similar role for education. While the new education
minister, Paulo Renato Souza, did not offer anything substantially different to government thinking
when he said the role of education was to ensure preparation for the labour force, he did acknowledge
the context. Not only were markets globalised, but technological advances had occurred, prompting
the need for education systems that accommodated this looser, more flexible situation (Souza 1999).
Like the Concertación in Chile, this did not require a specialised form of education like that under the
military, but rather a more general set of skills and knowledge. This position has persisted within the
PSDB, most recently in its 2007 education policy document. This commits the PSDB to flexible,
lifelong learning with access available to all and at any level, including distance learning and vocational
training to complement general education (PSDB 2007: 16).

While the Cardoso government endorsed a wide range of educational opportunities, it saw their
implementation in formal terms, using schools and other educational institutions rather than through
non­school spaces (Arroyo, interview, 2008). However, the government faced a difficulty in delivering
these aims in the form of curricula at school level. The federal structure of Brazilian education meant
that the federal government did not have direct responsibility in the running and management of
schools. Moreover, the government was seeking to refine responsibilities for the federal, state and
municipal levels, and create greater coordination within the system (Souza, interview, 2007).

The government’s response was to attempt influence in an indirect manner, through the
introduction of a new set of educational guidelines (LDB) (Durham, interview, 2008). These would be
expanded upon by the states and municipalities. Until 1994 a previous version had been subject to a
wide range of amendments in Congress and did not appear close to passing. The new government
viewed the existing version as compromised by 'corporatist' and ideological demands (Souza 2005). The former education minister and then senator, Darcy Ribeiro, was approached to sponsor a new LDB, eventually being passed in 1996 (Hall 2003).

The LDB included details for all levels of education, from primary through to higher. It proposed the development of national curricular parameters rather than a detailed national curriculum, whereby states would set their own curricula and which municipalities could develop. This would enable the subnational level to reflect more the various regional diversities (Souza 2005; Gomes 2000).

Like the content in the 1988 constitution, the outline of the government’s curricular proposals reflected wider social changes as well as more established concerns. In a sense it was a follower of fashion rather than an instigator. At the primary and secondary level it stressed the need for Portuguese, mathematics and the natural sciences — all seen as essential for the economic development of a country. Art was to be made compulsory, religious teaching was to be accessible (although not at public expense), while history was to include reference to all aspects of Brazilian development, including indigenous and African involvement. In addition, the guidelines acknowledged regional differences, by including rural areas where schooling had to be organised around the agricultural cycle (Brasil 1996; Niskier 2007: 28). The content of this at the primary level was achieved relatively quickly, in 1995 following discussion between MEC and the state education secretaries (Brasil: Presidente da Republica 1996).

At the university level, where the federal government had greater direct responsibility, course and curricular details were left to the individual institutions to produce (article 53, LDB 1996). This overlooked the reality that many professional associations (e.g. doctors, lawyers) remained especially influential in determining the content of courses related to their area of interest, thereby controlling the market (Schwartzmann, interview, 2007). The government’s concession to these private interests in the higher education sector arguably reflected its attitude to economic policy by favouring deregulation. This latter point meant the elimination of the vestibular exam as the only means of entering university, to include school notes and the exams taken at secondary school level (Niskier 2007: 28).

The LDB did not meet with complete support. Among its most visible critics were those 'corporatist' sections of the educational community, including the teachers who would have to implement the guidelines. In particular they felt there had been insufficient consultation and
participation with wider social actors and that it undermined public education. They placed particular emphasis on those aspects of the LDB that opened up the education system (especially the tertiary sector) to private interests and the pressures that would result from increased teaching hours and insufficient support to teachers (CNTE Noticias 1995a; Abicalil 1998; CNTE 1997; Neubauer and Silva and Cruz 1996). At the university level the government was criticised for its emphasis on technical efficiency and economic productivity over the development of the individual. This was apparent in the absence of any change to internal university structures from the military regime’s 1968 reform. That reform had prompted a departmentalisation of universities that had effectively restricted students’ ability to pursue different courses and interests across the university (Arelaro, interview, 2008).

Meanwhile at the secondary school level more detailed curricular guidelines (PCN) were introduced in 1998. Although the Cardoso government’s main priority had been primary education, by the late 1990s pressures were growing for reform of secondary education. These included the growing demand for places as more completed primary school, the new economic context which required the training of new skills and the challenge of making the curriculum more relevant to contemporary youth (Zibas 2005). The aim of this curricular reform was to reduce rigidity in the curriculum. It set aside a quarter of teaching time at the upper end of secondary schools to be defined by states and schools themselves. It weakened the link between vocational and general education, while also providing differentiated forms of vocational training, from the basic to the more specific (Brasil: Presidente da Republica 1999).

The process undertaken by the government to develop this reform reflected the administration’s emphasis on the use of state institutions and representative participation. Rather than a wide, national debate it opted for a more limited approach. According to Souza (2005) the parameters were drawn up within MEC using support primarily from São Paulo-based teachers in both public and private schools. Using both the case study of Spain, where curricular development had been implemented in a decentralised system, and the main curricular proposals that had been presented in Brazil over the past ten years, the group’s recommendations were passed onto the state-level forum, the National Council of Education (CNE). Participation in the development of these parameters were therefore decided between formally constituted, organised actors, such as state and municipal education secretaries and teaching groups and unions (rather than the favoured deliberative and broader
participatory approach favoured by the government’s opponents in the educational community). The government considered the changes a success, given the finding later that year that suggested half of 12,000 teachers surveyed were using the guidelines.

Despite these changes and their supposed success, like the Concertación in Chile, the government faced similar problems in the actual implementation of these curricular guidelines. The government faced difficulties with the teachers’ movement, which had placed itself against the government politically and ideologically. This meant that efforts by the government to reform the technical colleges and encourage them to award their own qualifications as an alternative to entering higher education was obstructed by teachers (Schwartzmann, interview, 2007). Meanwhile, many schools admitted that they lacked sufficient conditions to implement fully the guidelines’ criteria (Zibas 2005). Once again, the goals of officials were constrained by facts on the ground.

2.3. Curricular policies under the first Lula government

The introduction of the Participatory Left form of social democracy through the PT government after 2003 did not herald any substantial change in direction regarding the purpose of education. In contrast to the Cardoso years, no new LDB was introduced. Instead changes were made at the margins. It was not until the start of the second term that the government displayed its role for education, in its Education Development Plan (PDE), in April 2007. The plan maintained the link between educational reform and economic development, which demonstrated the emphasis that governments continue to play in this regard. Indeed, even former policymakers associated with Souza’s team at MEC found little difference in the general educational goals undertaken after 2003 (Gouvêa, interview, 2008).

That the PT government was pursuing an economic-oriented educational project highlighted the transition undertaken by the party since the 1980s. In its earlier years it had a substantially different, more socially-oriented project for education. This was shown not only in the party’s wider political project and development, but also in the shifting influence of particular groups and individuals in educational policymaking. In education it meant a shift from ‘socialist’ aims of transformation in the 1980s which required the state to play a key role (Arelaro, interview, 2008). This was reflected in the themes associated with PT educational policy in the period, which drew strongly on Freire’s ideas of education as a means of liberation and as a right. This was reflected in its divergence from PSDB
thinking, which stressed the role of formal education, such as schools, as opposed to a more open-ended process (Arroyo, interview, 2008).

The 1989 election campaign defined this 'socialist' approach. It stressed the importance of conducting the project at all levels, from pre-school to higher. Furthermore, the PT placed itself against the dominant class, which sought to maintain the masses in ignorance — and thereby perpetrate the status quo. Instead, the PT believed that its purpose was to assist the masses in making them aware of their situation. The party should therefore be the educator of the masses. At the same time it recognised its role was as much responsive as educative; preparation of the masses would mean a more questioning and demanding society (Gadotti and Pereira 1989). This view was generally held throughout the PT; the future education minister, Cristovam Buarque, wrote in 1991 that in the past education had generally been seen as a privilege and luxury. Education therefore needed to be 'educated', which meant that the elite had to accept inclusion of Brazilian society at all levels. This meant the prioritisation of educational over economic concerns, the redirection of resources, the elimination of illiteracy and completion of secondary school (1991:53-66). This last point was made a few years before the more modest proposals of the Cardoso education team to prioritise primary education.

The aims of the 1989 campaign were never implemented nationally. Lula was defeated in the presidential election by Collor. However, the party did have a base both in municipal government and the social sector. Municipally, the most prominent manifestation of the PT's educational practices in this period was in the Erundina administration in São Paulo, where Paulo Freire had been appointed the city's education secretary (1989-92). Emphasising a collaborative approach between educators and educated, Freire promoted a city-wide dialogue on the purpose of education and the creation of tailored curricula for the city's schools that reflected the demands of local needs. This took the form of 'popular councils' consisting of the municipal bureaucracy, educators and social groups locally. (Valente, Zanetic 2007, Arelaro, 2007). According to Macaulay (1996) the impact of the Erundina administration on education resulted in municipal school enrolments rising by 20% while truancy and failure rates dropped. Teachers benefited from a more structured system, including only teaching in one school (rather than several), having clearer job descriptions, improved salaries and materials. However, following a wide range of problems, including internal divisions within the São Paulo PT,
Despite the limited opportunity afforded the PT, some of the educational practices associated with the São Paulo experience soon spread to other PT-run municipalities. In Belo Horizonte Miguel Arroyo instigated the Plural School, which involved the integration of informal educational processes occurring in the city into the established school network. The content of school materials was reviewed to include subjects not previously covered, either in the city or elsewhere in the country at the time, including Afro-Brazilian history. In addition, learning cycles were introduced, which involved students’ automatic promotion from one grade to the next, rather than holding them back and distorting the relationship between a student’s age and a teacher’s level of teaching (Arroyo, interview, 2008). This approach ensured that time periods were reflected and avoided adolescents being taught in primary school classes. Indeed, the popularity of this last approach was such that it was taken by other cities during the 1990s, including in Porto Alegre, Blumenau and Brasília. However, against this, automatic grade promotion has been criticised for providing superficial improvements in education indicators (Hall 2003: 282).

The PT’s more participatory approach was echoed by its supporters in civil society during its early period. The most notable of these was the landless movement (MST), which pursued educational objectives in line with Freire’s ‘pedagogy of the oppressed’ within its camps (Branford and Rocha 2002). But while the PT lost its radical edge in educational policy during the second decades of its existence, that of the MST has persisted. McCowan (2003) notes that the MST has continued to challenge the system, by encouraging the landless to demand both their rights as well as changes to improve their situation. Since the 1980s, this approach has become increasingly institutionalised within the movement; Diniz-Pereira (2005) observes that the MST has introduced pre- and in-service teacher training that reinforces the movement’s commitment to socialist and collective ideas within its own schools and educational establishments.

The persistence of the MST’s educational ideology therefore provides a contrast to the extent that the PT has shifted with regard to critical pedagogy. To account for the PT’s growing moderation in the curricular sphere, several factors occurred during the late 1990s that may account for the party’s transition. These included issues related to the policymaking machine within the party as well as
broader developments occurring in relation to party membership and organisation. But of perhaps
greatest impact was the growing strength of the party leadership to its grassroots and social base as
the party came closer to realising a possible Lula election victory in 2002 (Leal 2004).

Despite the changes within the PT before 2003, there was no clear separation between the
party’s approach to curricular practices before and after this date. The policymaking core under the
new education minister, Buarque, initially reflected some of the ‘progressive’ goals associated with the
party during the early part of the 1990s. Buarque initially appeared to prioritise more informal
educational practices, such as youth and adult literacy campaigns at the expense of the formal basic
educational system (Souza, Schwartzmann, interviews, 2007; Soares, interview, 2008). This was in
keeping with more community-based popular education practices that were occurring globally during
the 1990s (Hall and Midgley 2004: 157). However, in the case of the PT, the attempt to pursue this at
the national level failed and reflected the broader tension that was at work in the government’s
approach to social policy during its first year. For Buarque, the failure of his education policies were
largely due to a perceived lack of presidential support (interview, 2008).

The emphasis on the informal or social was not one that occurred at MEC in isolation. Other
social policy areas were also subject to this pressure. In particular, this included the debate over the
form that the government’s Zero Hunger (Fome Zero) programme should take. Goertzel (unpublished)
summarises this as a choice between adopting an organic, social movement-based approach or the
use of formal institutional mechanisms. In this instance the latter was eventually opted for, resulting in
the cash conditional family grant programme (bolsa familia). Similarly, PT educational practice
eventually shifted in this direction, especially after Buarque left office. This was evident in the
emphasis given to formal education, including reforms of educational finance (FUNDEB) and higher
education (Schwartzmann, interview, 2007; Brooke, interview, 2008).

With the emphasis on the formal, the PT’s educational goals demonstrated no substantial
difference from its predecessor. By pursuing more institutional goals, the party commitment to
‘progressive’ education arguably diminished. The emphasis was less on transforming the system than
on managing what it had inherited. This meant expansion of formal education, most especially in the
pre-university levels (Brooke, interview, 2008). The introduction of FUNDEB meant that guaranteed
school finance was broadened from the primary level to include pre-school and secondary levels.
Higher education reform included both a commitment to increase the public university network as well as providing state support for poorer students to enter the (private) system, through the ProUniri programme. Evaluation was widened in both scope and content; at school levels samples were ditched in favour of countrywide tests and their publication (Motter, unpublished 1, unpublished 2, unpublished 3; Soares, interview, 2008).

This expansionary approach was reinforced in the government's curricular practices. Unlike its predecessor, it did not issue any new educational guidelines or parameters, but instead made adjustments to the existing ones. Primary school education was expanded from eight to nine years and the teaching of Afro-Brazilian history and culture became compulsory in both primary and secondary schools (Brasil 1996; Niskier 2007).

One difference in the formal education system between the Cardoso and Lula years though was the emphasis given to vocational training. Whereas the previous government had weakened the link between vocational and general education, the PT government claimed to have substantially increased the number of vocational teachers during its first term and proposed to expand the size of the sector in its second (MEC 2007b: 32-3). Schwartzmann (interview, 2007) meanwhile noted that the PT government sought to make the link between vocational education and other forms closer by making it easier for those attending technical colleges to be able to enter university. At the same time the period saw a growth in numbers both in terms of students and schools in the sector (Azevedo 2006). The reasons for this growth may have been due not only to the recovering economy after 2002, but also the expansion in government-backed employment opportunities; Cardoso (interview, 2008) claimed that his successor had fallen back onto past political practices, such as clientelism and the construction of public works.

The decision to adopt a more institutionalised approach to education meant that the Lula government adopted the logic of the system as left by its predecessor. Government supporters did argue that there was a substantial difference separating it from the Cardoso era, not least in the notion of the PT having 'rescued' education through expanded financial coverage and in linking it to wider child and youth concerns through the bolsa familia (Pinto 2007; Arroyo, interview, 2008). However, this was a far cry from the revolutionary rhetoric of the late 1980s and the commitment to achieve a comprehensive transformation and suggested a more modest set of objectives.
3. Conclusion

This chapter has compared and contrasted the educational aims of the three governments and the extent to which these have been followed through in curricular changes. Attention was initially given to how educational objectives may be perceived, distinguishing between the forms of education associated with the Left and Right and social democracy. More specifically it sought to distinguish between the variations that exist within social democrat thinking about the curriculum, between the Third Way and the Participatory Left. Of the two, the Third Way shares some of the traits of the Right, most notably in its inclination to reform rather than transform the prevailing educational model, only making adjustments where necessary to accommodate economic demands. That economic reality reflects a change in fashion from the state-led development approach of the 1970s towards one that is both more liberalised and deregulated. This has placed pressure on governments to develop their education systems to accommodate the demands of economic globalisation. Against the Third Way approach is the Participatory Left version, which is more closely associated with ‘progressive’ educational aims of challenging the status quo.

Given these differences, it is ironic that the two governments which appear to have produced the most extensive curricular reforms have been the Third Way administrations in Brazil and Chile. By contrast the PT, which began life closer to the ‘progressive’ end of the educational spectrum, has ended up conforming to the model bequeathed it. Rather than seeking an overhaul of the system, the government since 2003 has largely echoed the educational goals and curricular content of the Cardoso years. The reason for this can be laid at the shift away from a more society-oriented form of education towards the use of existing institutions. This was due in large part to the difficulties of achieving educational change through social means.

Although it modified them, by emphasising greater coverage, this had the unintended consequence of tying the government to the goals and content of the Cardoso-era curricular reforms. The act of adopting its policy approach arguably determined this result. Furthermore, given various changes within the party and the leadership’s acceptance of the same broad vision, this did not appear to create any substantial problems in terms of education content.

The two Third Way governments were therefore the most comprehensive reforming their curricular policies. This reflected the fact that both came to power just as state-led development had
been discredited and economic globalisation required a response (in which case the Lula government may be seen as the beneficiary of those decisions taken a decade ago). As a result, the reforms while comprehensive, they were paradoxically limited as well. They did not challenge the wider economic context, opting for models that reflected what other governments and international agencies were recommending at the time: general education and knowledge of skills to support more flexible labour forces. These curricular policies also highlighted the governments' conformity regarding the link between education and economic development. Perhaps the unwillingness to challenge this – and adopt a more 'progressive' approach – was due to their predecessors' difficulties: the first decade of the New Republic in Brazil displayed a persistence in trying to resurrect the state model of development to little effect; in Chile the military's New Right policies failed to achieve their aims.

However, at the same time regardless of the governments' responses, their capacity to influence the outcome of their decisions has remained marginal at best. The Brazilian federal system provided much space for other, subnational actors to influence the curricular debate. In both countries government aims depended on educators to put them into practice, whether it be within the classroom or a community centre. No government could have that kind of direct control over the process and so were therefore dependent on wider forces if their objectives to be realised.
6. Spending more?: Public expenditure on education and social democratic governments

If the role of the state for social democrats has been rather vague, its involvement in public expenditure has been more apparent. In contrast to the New Right, which seeks to reduce public spending, social democracy – in both its past and current incarnations – has tended to favour its increase (Bresser Pereira 2001). However, in contrast to the past these increases do not mean the contemporary social democrats support across-the-board rises in public spending; it may well be the case that it is held steady or reduced in certain areas while it is expanded in others (Glyn and Wood 2001). This reflects the changes that have occurred since the 1970s, due both to the need to ensure stable public finances generally, and evidence of weak correlations between welfare spending and outcome. Indeed, more sophisticated analyses of the relationship between these last two suggest that issues such as market failure, spending composition, corruption and effective service delivery may be more relevant (Funk 1999; Goldstein 2008).

Although social democracy is relatively clear about its preference towards greater public spending, it is complicated by the more recent global ideological convergence in its favour. During the 1980s the institutions associated with the Washington Consensus stressed the need for structural readjustment, including a reduction of the state and its spending and its replacement by privately funded provision. Since the 1990s however, this rhetoric has changed towards stressing greater state capacity and institutional strength (Zurbriggen 2007). This seems apparent both in the World Bank’s recommendation to use targeted spending for particular groups to encourage school enrolment and attendance (World Bank 2007) rather than increasing general spending for education overall (figure 2). Such data, selected from a set of Latin American and non-Latin American middle income countries, suggests that since the early 1990s public spending on education as a proportion of GDP has remained within the same band, between around 3% and just over 6% of GDP (the exception being the Cuban government, which saw the amount it allocated to education fall dramatically owing to the economic difficulties it faced in the period) – although in both the countries studied, Brazil and Chile, the proportion of GDP spent on education by the public sector has tended to be lower than other comparable cases.
The shift towards a global consensus that first emphasised state reform (whether it be its reduction or more recently capacity-building) over that of greater public spending (in education) has arguably complicated the conventional distinctions between social democratic theory and practice regarding public spending. With the exceptions of Cuba, Estonia and Poland, most other countries (including within Latin America) increased their proportion of public expenditure on education during the 1990s and 2000s (figure 2). Meanwhile, in both Brazil and Chile there were overall falls in public spending in the first decade before a stabilisation in the former at 4% of GDP and an increase of 1% to 3.4% between 2000 and 2005 in the latter. The relatively lower Chilean amount in public expenditure has been compensated by a greater reliance on private funding than in Brazil, enabling it to spend nearly the same amount as the OECD average of 5.8% of GDP (from both public and private sources) in 2005 (and 1% more than the OECD mean in 2000) (OECD 2008).

That this occurred arguably reflects the origins and ideological direction of the Third Way which dominated in both countries during the period, when a more modest expansionary approach to education spending might occur against a Participatory Left that would be more inclined to a
substantial increase in expenditure. Yet the reasons for the policymaking elites adopting these lower levels of spending compared to other countries may be attributed primarily to domestic concerns. For the Third Way this consists of its much closer association and comfort with the free-market and structural reform, making it more favourably disposed to spending less than the Participatory Left. As for the Participatory Left, because it draws its support from those social movements and organisations largely opposed to the structural readjustments of the 1980s, it would be expected that they would demand substantial spending increases to overcome public sector weakness.

Yet despite the supposed differences between the Third Way and the Participatory Left and the shifts in the total amount allocated by the public sector to education during the 1990s and 2000s (figure 2), in practice all three cases show that certain education sectors within each country experienced a real increase. However, the extent to which the governments were directly responsible varied. Of the three, the Cardoso government contributed the smallest direct increase. This was paradoxical since one of its main achievements was the introduction of a funding mechanism – that drew mainly on subnational expenditures – to increase spending substantially. Furthermore, in terms of targeting, the Third Way Concertación and the Participatory Left PT appeared to adopt the use of targeted funds most actively.

The reasons for the difference were due to Concertación and PT leaders' belief that the educational sector required substantial direct investment. Each came to this from different starting points: the Concertación had broadly accepted the educational model that it inherited in 1990, meaning that its scope for action was more constrained; the PT could draw both on social support and previous experience of successful targeted programmes (such as the school grant or bolsa escola) as influences. In contrast, the Cardoso government's decision was guided by the educational policymaking core's belief that the main spending concern was to achieve a more rational and efficient use of resources – hence the development of a new funding system rather than a substantial overall increase.
1. Chile

1.1. Macro-economic policy prior to 1990

The Concertación’s spending on education has been shaped by the broader economic policies pursued under the previous military regime. In particular, this involved a wholesale structural reform of the state, including spending cuts and greater use of the market. The focus was consequently more on the state’s economic capacity rather than resolving social questions. What resources remained became increasingly targeted. This approach contributed to a perspective that not only recognised the limited funds available, but also emphasised efficiency in spending rather than its expansion (Puryear and Olivios 1995).

In addition to the dictatorship’s economic transformation, it intended to change Chilean society and notions of citizenship as well (Taylor 2006; Sandbrook et al 2007; Taylor 1998). The process occurred in two stages. The first, between 1973 and the early 1980s, saw the regime stabilise the economy and reduce the role of the state. The rise of the monetarist-inclined Chicago Boys in economic policy-making from 1975 meant the introduction of policies that reduced the number of state-owned companies from over 400 to 45 (Boeninger 1988). The second, which occurred after the economic crisis of 1982-83, saw the regime adopt a less dogmatic and more pragmatic approach to the economy (Sandbrook et al 2007). By the end of the 1980s the country had largely recovered from the economic crisis. Chile was experiencing rising economic growth, based largely on primary commodity exports. But alongside this, spending in education – as in other social policy areas – had fallen (figure 3): in 1990 spending per student had fallen to 23% compared to 1982 (Marcel and Tokman 2005: 10-11). Education, like other social policy areas, was subject to the influence of the economic ministries, such as finance and planning (Dittborn, interview, 2007).

It was during the 1980s that the government began to make use of targeted resources. The most notable of these was the introduction of the ‘voucher’ system for schools. Within Mineduc discussions were held on whether the voucher should be paid directly to schools based on the number of students they had or handed over to parents to redeem at the school of their choice. The first option was eventually chosen (Dittborn, interview, 2007). This model of funding meant that the ‘voucher’
system as practiced in Chile after 1980, while maintaining elements of the market, was never complete since it maintained a role for the state.

Another approach was to promote the greater use of private funds, reflecting earlier encouragement by the regime’s education ministers during the 1970s; one of the last military ministers, Rear-Admiral Luis Niemann, suggested that those who could afford it should spend what they could (Zalaquett 1977). In higher education, this included encouragement towards self-financing, greater use of the market in meeting demand and discussions about a graduate tax (CPFUCH 1975). By 1980 a new three-part funding model was introduced into higher education: smaller direct state contributions to the eight pre-1980 institutions; new indirect contributions which were available to new, private institutions set up after 1980 and which were dependent on student performance; and direct student credits (Pinochet 1993; Larrain 1997). The aim of these measures was to expand the role of the market in the sector. Indeed, after 1980 the bulk of university funding certainly did come increasingly from private sources. By the 1990s higher education was the education sector that was most exposed to the market (Marcel and Tokman 2005).

The Concertación’s 1989 programme maintained the general thrust of economic policy of the previous two decades. Yet it did not offer a complete acceptance of the military approach. The Concertación saw itself as different from the military in being concerned with assigning greater spending to social issues. This was reflected not just in the Concertación’s commitment to a more progressive tax system (as opposed to the Pinochet regime’s acceptance of a constant level of spending, albeit it redirected to the poorer sectors), but also to identify the root causes of social problems and assign a greater role to social groups. This included increasing the minimum wage and improving the bargaining position of the unions (Petras et al 1994; Raczynski 1999; Angell 2007).

Despite the greater social focus, the Concertación approach meant that economic concerns would invariably override those of education. This was reflected in the relative importance of the Finance Ministry in educational policy, including its acceptance of the voucher system and its prioritisation of issues such as unemployment, which constrained spending (Garcia-Huidobro, interview, 2007; Aylwin 2002). The effect of this was to limit the possibility of substantial structural change, according to Garcia-Huibodro (interview, 2007). This was echoed by more leftist actors such as the Colegio de Profesores, who believed that the educational reform of 1996 was financially
motivated and maintained the process of deregulation and privatisation begun in the 1980s (Moreno 1998).

1.2. Public expenditure on education under Concertación governments

It was a market-oriented educational model that the Concertación confronted when it took office in 1990. As a first measure, the decline in education spending as a proportion of the budget, was reversed, along with that of health (figure 3). In real terms, education spending, which had seen an 8.4% fall in the 1980s, more than doubled between the 1980s and late 1990s. By the mid-2000s it had increased three-fold (Araújo 2006a; Raczynski 1999; Cox 2006). As a proportion of GNP, this meant an increase in public spending from 2.7% in 1990 to a high of 4.4% by 2002 (CEPAL 2007: 65). Notwithstanding the increases in education spending during the 1990s under the Concertación, by 2006 the proportion allocated in the budget had begun to decline, from 4.4% to 4.1% of GNP (CEPAL 2007: 65). However, this decline masked the fact that the amount allocated was still higher than that spent under the military during the 1970s, and compared to social security, its decline had not been as steep.

Figure 3


Source: Ministerio de Hacienda (various years)
Alongside the general increase in education spending, the Concertación’s commitment to the earlier phases of teaching was reflected in the doubling of spending per student at both primary and secondary levels during its first 15 years in office (figure 4). Against this though was variation in the amount the public sector spent per student type: 73%, 62% and 51% of pre-school, primary and secondary schooling respectively (Marcel and Tokman 2005). By contrast, the proportion allocated to higher education continued to decline under both military and Concertación governments (figure 5).

For left-wing critics though, the Concertación’s increases in educational spending remained insufficient. During the national debate on education in 2006 the Bloque Social advocated further reductions in the military budget and the allocation of 10% of copper revenues to expand the resources available for education and other social policies (Bloque Social 2006). However, the government arguably had relatively less direct control over the use of these resources as a result of the 1980s changes when they were transferred directly to primary and secondary schools: by the time the Concertación took office in 1990 more than half of Mineduc’s resources were being allocated directly to schools (figure 5).

Figure 4

Chilean Public Spending per Student, 1990-2004 ('000 pesos)

Source: Table 21 in Mineduc 2004
If the Concertación’s priority was primary and secondary education during its first years of office, by the late 1990s and 2000s it was refocusing attention towards pre-school (Marcel and Tokman 2005). This reflected a growing global concern that children better educated at pre-school level did proportionately better later on than those who were not (Eyaguirre and Le Foulon 2001). During Lagos’s first year as president, the budget for pre-school programmes doubled from Ch$632.m to Ch$1.2bn in 2002, before nearly doubling again to Ch$2.1bn in 2007 (Ministerio de Hacienda, various years). This increase in spending not only offered mothers the opportunity to seek employment, but also presented the possibility of a break with the cycle of poverty (Marcel and Tokman 2005).

1.3. Targeted public spending programmes under the Concertación

The Concertación was especially concerned by inequalities in educational opportunities and made use of existing mechanisms to address this. The new government had broadly accepted the tripartite school system and made similar use of the previous regime’s use of targeted resources. But whereas the military had used it to promote economic rationalisation, the Concertación used it as a form of
positive discrimination. Targeting was the way that the Concertación could focus on resolving inequalities between schools, rather than on attempting to reform the system as a whole – an issue made all the more problematic owing to the government’s lack of a majority in Congress. Targeting was therefore a way of pursuing priorities that did not require legislation (Muñoz, Elacqua, interviews, 2007; Núñez, interview 1, 2007).

Of the Concertación’s targeting measures, there were several which addressed education from pre-school to higher levels, including the use of specific credits and grants (Aylwin 1994b; Mineduc 1993; Cox 1994; Garcia-Huidobro interview; Concertación 1994). Their use meant increased spending on school improvements and the marginalised sectors of Chilean society. Among the most important was the Educational Quality and Equity Improvement Programme (MECE) at pre-school, primary and secondary levels. Launched in 1992, it initially allocated US$243 million over five years to its various component parts, of which US$170 million came from the World Bank (Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación 1996: 118). Within the fund was the P900 programme. Allocated to those schools deemed in greatest need, between 1994 and 2002 the P900 programme saw its budget rise from Ch$812m to Ch$3.74bn, while those related to educational improvements grew from Ch$1.1bn to Ch$3.2bn in the five years to 1997 (Ministerio de Hacienda, various years). Against this were criticisms from parts of the left-wing educational community that these measures were devised and implemented with the limited involvement and participation by them (Cáceres, Rodríguez, interviews, 2007). This was explained by the government’s apparent sense of distrust and lack of confidence in schools to manage themselves effectively (Bosch, interview, 2007).

The Concertación also sought alternative sources of funding for its social policies. In education this was explicitly stated by the 1994 Brunner Commission which recommended greater spending, from both private as well as public sources. This was to be achieved through resources from families and business, the use of tax exemptions and the development of funds for innovative projects. The result was a three-fold increase in education spending since 1990 (Comité Tecnico Asesor del Diálogo Nacional sobre la Modernización de la Educación Chilena 1994; Concertación 1994; Cox 2006). The World Bank was approached for loans to fund the MECE programme (Rivero 1999; Cortes 1994). This initially proved controversial for parts of the Concertación, who were concerned that the Bank
would impose conditions on the government’s education policy. This was averted by the Ministry’s use of negotiations and demand for independence from the Bank (Núñez, interview 1, 2007).

2. Brazil

2.1. Macroeconomic policy and public spending on education before 1995

In contrast to the Chilean case, the neo-liberal impetus was never as strong in Brazil. The military regime pursued a broadly state-led development model, a direction that was largely maintained for most of the first decade of the New Republic. The one exception to this trend was that of the Collor presidency (1990-92), which was stridently neo-liberal in tone and included some of the first privatising and deregulating measures, but resulted only in temporary economic stabilisation and left the education sector largely unaffected (Goldemberg, interview, 2008; Coes 1995; Longo 1993).

The reasons for the persistence of the state-led model into the 1990s was due to the general success of the model from a long-term perspective that included the ‘economic miracle’ of the early 1970s, and an inability to resolve the economic crisis after 1982, in particular hyperinflation and rising public debt (Font 2004; Spanakos 2004; Moura 1993). Indeed, during the military period education reforms failed to improve the system or provide sufficient resources, owing to spending distortions (especially at the federal level) in favour of higher education (Hall 2003: 270).

At the same time the New Republic was increasingly susceptible to wider political demands, especially at the subnational level where elected politicians agitated for greater public funds. Public spending on education rose from 0.7% of GDP in 1980 to 3.7% by 1990, eventually settling at 4.5% in 1993-95 (CEPAL 2001: 49). Much of this spending came at the subnational level, which during the 1980s became more decentralised and less coordinated. In 1983 the Calmon amendment was introduced, a constitutional mechanism that required 13% of federal and 25% of state and municipal tax revenues to be allocated to education (Gadotti 1992). However, it was made largely irrelevant by the growing independence of states, municipalities and social movements after 1985 and the increasing politicisation of education spending (Medici and Maciel 1996; Neubauer da Silva and Cruz 1996; NEPP 1988; Castro 1996; Hall 2003). At the local level there was variation though: differences in states’ GDP allowed states in the Southeast to draw on more resources than those in the Northeast, which affected the level of enrolment (Plank 1990: 543; Arretche and Rodriguez 1999).
The rise in public spending on education was not sustained at the federal level (as opposed to the states and municipalities) (Plank 1990). As a proportion of the budget education spending declined along with most other social services after 1985 (figure 6), as the government began to shoulder the growing burden of public debt (included in administration and planning prior to 1994).

**Figure 6**


Source: Tesouro Nacional (various years)

Given the decentralised nature of education, the federal government had two main ways of influencing expenditure: through distribution of the federal quota of the salário-educação and resources from international institutions (Arretche and Rodriguez 1999: 90). The salário-educação was a levy established under the military, targeting employers’ payrolls to fund schooling at federal, state and municipal level, and was divided on a quota basis between each authority. However, as a form of funding, it was undermined by the lack of adequately controlled municipal finance for education to go alongside its growing management responsibilities (Neves 1992). More generally, the discretionary nature of much education spending became problematic, with politicians at the subnational level redirecting funds elsewhere (Goldemberg, interview, 2008). Especially notable in this period were the highly visible construction of integrated schools and community centres, such as the CIEPs during
Leonel Brizola’s governorship of Rio de Janeiro state and Collor’s CIACs, whose funding remained uncertain and insecure (Goldemberg, Cardoso, interviews, 2008). Indeed, in the absence of any effective central control, these factors, coupled with various short-term government responses to tackle growing inflation, only served to create a less financially secure environment for the wider public sector and education itself.

2.2. Public expenditure on education under the Cardoso government

Brazil’s macroeconomic situation – and that for education – changed after 1994 with the Real Plan. Introduced by Cardoso while at the Finance Ministry, the Real Plan was different to previous stabilisation attempts, helping deliver and retain the presidency for Cardoso in 1994 and 1998 (Cardoso, interview, 2008). The Plan resulted in a sharp and lasting fall in inflation, rising incomes throughout the 1990s (especially amongst the poorest sectors) and attracted greater foreign investment. Its downside though was that it made the economy more susceptible to external financial pressures (Ferrari-Filho and Fernando de Paula 2003; Vasconcellos 2005). This risk became a reality when the East Asian and Russian financial crises affected Latin American markets and the Cardoso government was obliged to devalue the real in early 1999, contributing to an economic slump (Rocha 2002).

With a stable financial environment the new Cardoso government set about determining its spending priorities for education. In 1994 the view held by the educational policymaking team was that the system had relatively little coordination, control, equality or efficiency in the use of resources. Unlike the Concertación in Chile, the Cardoso team did not see the problem facing educational finance as a lack of resources, but rather their efficient use. Having chosen to prioritise primary education, the government therefore set about making changes to the educational system’s financial mechanism and the use of targeted resources to ensure both sufficient funds and keep children in school. This involved the development of three main policies: the creation of a new financial compact in the form of FUNDEF, targeted incentive programmes to households through the bolsa escola to keep children in school, and direct payments to schools to assist material improvements.
2.2.1. FUNDEF

The search for a means to secure educational funding had been introduced through the Calmon constitutional amendment in 1983. A similar effort was made in the 1988 constitution, which required that 18% of federal and 25% of state and municipal tax revenues be spent on education (Levacic and Downes 2004). However, as with the Calmon amendment, this measure was poorly implemented. State and municipal governments did not earmark the necessary funds, contributing to wide variations in spending allocations across the country. To address this, Paulo Renato Souza, Cardoso's education minister, set up a working group within MEC made up of his senior ministerial advisors in early 1995. Drawing on comparative consultancy work she had done for the São Paulo state education secretariat where she had observed differences in the finances and performance of municipal and non-municipal schools, Eunice Durham proposed a mechanism that would equalise those differences (interview, 2008). The result was a new funding system, FUNDEF, which would require that over a period of ten years 15% of state and municipal tax revenues – or 60% of the revenues hypothecated for education – would be allocated to primary education (Levacic and Downes 2004).

In addition, FUNDEF was to provide greater equality in primary education funding by allocating a set amount to municipalities on the basis of the number of students enrolled as well as a minimum amount of R$300 per student each month (Souza 2005). Where spending by states and municipalities failed to reach the minimum amount, the federal government would step in to provide a supplement. For the government, the process was deemed to be more efficient than before, since it would work alongside the constitutional jurisdictions laid out in the 1996 national education guidelines (LDB). The new LDB determined that while municipalities would bear the main responsibility for primary education, the federal government would provide overall coordination and assistance where necessary. FUNDEF was credited with adding two million new students into the primary school system, although only 600,000 of those were assumed to be new entrants, the bulk being those who had dropped out of school previously. Consequently, a substantial number of the students who benefited from the FUNDEF programme were older than the primary school age range (7-14 years) (Araújo e Oliveira 2004).
The educational team was helped by Cardoso's immediate support for FUNDEF, which helped overcome reservations by the Finance Ministry and enabled the government to build sufficient congressional support to achieve the necessary constitutional amendment to make FUNDEF law (Souza 2005; Cardoso, interview, 2008). After coming into force in 1998, the result was a near tripling of the amount allocated to primary education by the end of the first Lula term (2006). This meant that primary education spending had increased from R$13.2bn to R$35.9bn – even as the federal contribution declined from R$435m to R$250m (Ministerio da Fazenda 1998-2006). As intended, the fund provided resources for greater primary school attendance, redirected money to the relatively poorer North and Northeast and ensured rises in both teachers' salaries and spending per student (Draibe 2004). At the same time, however, while the fund did centralise control of educational funds and protect the federal level from subnational pressures, it did not deliver the same level of oversight and scrutiny of spending at the municipal level, where mayors had considerable discretionary power in its allocation (Sands 2008).

Despite FUNDEF's achievements, the initial response to the proposal from the wider (left-wing) educational community was muted. The teachers' union response to the FUNDEF proposal noted the absence of any reference to a key demand, that of a national teaching salary. In its place the government specified that at least 60% of the funds raised by FUNDEF should be spent on teachers' salaries (Souza 2005). In addition, criticisms included: the extent to which all municipalities were capable of managing FUNDEF resources and whether there were sufficient incentives to encourage this; whether it really meant an expansion of resources or was just a reallocation of existing funds; its emphasis on primary education at the expense of pre-schooling and secondary education; whether it provided sufficient funding per student; and the reduction in the federal contribution over time (Arelaro, interview, 2008; Nascimento, interview, 2006; Neves 1999; Hall 2003; Araújo e Oliveira 2004; Pinto 2007). The teachers received support for their views from the PT, to which they were closely aligned. Given its status as an opposition party in 1996, the PT voted against the constitutional amendment (Buarque, Soares, interviews, 2008).
2.2.2. Targeted programmes under the Cardoso government

If the federal government did not directly contribute to the expansion of public spending in education under Cardoso, where there was a more noticeable change was in the area of targeted funds. This included the introduction of the *bolsa escola*, money paid directly to schools, and targeted international assistance. In part this reflected the tendency of political leaders prior to the Cardoso government to fund projects (e.g. CIEPs and CIACs) that were readily identifiable with their administrations. However, where the process was arguably different was in these programmes' shift away from being associated with a specific politician in favour of a more technical set of criteria to determine allocation.

First, unlike FUNDEF, the *bolsa escola* did not have a single intellectual origin, but stemmed from several different forums and practices from the late 1980s on. The *bolsa escola* is a cash conditional transfer (CCT) that is paid to the head of a household to encourage them to send their children to school rather than work. Cristovam Buarque, the first education minister in the PT government, claims intellectual credit for the idea, arguing that it originated in the Brazilian Studies Centre at the University of Brasília in 1987, where he was chancellor at the time. Buarque also noted the PT's initial opposition to the idea (interview, 2008). Eunice Durham, an advisor to Souza, similarly distinguishes between Buarque and the PT (interview, 2008), while it is notable that the *bolsa escola* was one of the notable features of Buarque's administration of the Federal District between 1995 and 1998 (Macaulay and Burton 2003).

Souza (2005) suggests that debates surrounding the use of CCTs had been around since the early 1990s and were put into practice at the local level in Campinas by the PSDB mayor in 1994 – which, according to Buarque, involved his participation (interview, 2008). The *bolsa escola* was subsequently taken up in discussions between Souza and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) president, Enrique Iglesias, over the possibility of a bank-funded CCT project in the Northeast the following year. However, it was not deemed sufficiently mature enough by the Bank to be rolled out at that time (Souza 2005: 102). Nevertheless, the notion of CCTs was gaining broader social and political appeal in the latter half of the 1990s, including endorsement from the PT through senator Eduardo Suplicy and his commitment to a basic income (Souza 2005).

Following a federal evaluation in 1997-98 of existing programmes and the introduction of central funds from 1999, the *bolsa escola* remained a largely subnational policy. In 2000 the
government took the decision to reduce mayoral association with the programme and introduced a federal level *bolsa escola*. The decision also included the use of magnetic cards by beneficiaries to reduce the level of bureaucracy and potential corruption by municipalities (Souza 2005). The resulting package from 2001 initially reached 5.8m families and cost around R$2bn a year (Aguiar and Araújo 2003; Caixeta 2002; Cardoso 2006). Despite the national *bolsa escola*’s introduction, there remain questions regarding the causality between income and schooling levels. Vasconcellos (2005) has suggested that compulsory school attendance would have a greater impact on income than any contribution. This position was subsequently accepted by Souza, who noted that while its value was real, it was also limited; economic growth, sufficient education and a well-paid job are also necessary preconditions (Souza 2002).

Second, the other main targeted programme involved funds paid directly to schools for infrastructure improvements and materials. Drawing on the *salário-educação*, this discretionary fund was proposed within MEC by Iara Prado, one of the ministerial advisors, and sought to bypass the municipalities through direct-school payments. Although the sums paid to the schools were small, they did not require any form of ‘earned autonomy’, whereby the school was required to reach certain standards or deliver particular results. The policy’s success is measured by the claim that it has been maintained under the subsequent Lula government (Durham, interview, 2008).

Third, the administration followed previous governments in seeking out international funding where necessary. Although the *bolsa escola* was not deemed sufficiently mature to receive support from the IADB, the government did accept funds worth US$1.3 billion from the World Bank to assist states and municipalities in training teachers and delivering school materials in the Northeast (Brasil: Presidente da Republica 1996, 1998). In contrast to previous international assistance – most notably that by USAID in the late 1960s (Poerner 2004) – the programme was subject to little visible opposition. This suggested a decline in nationalist discourse between the two periods and highlighted international financial credibility in the government. Indeed, the lack of opposition may have been due to the government’s decision to focus international financial assistance in the Northeast (Hall 2003: 278), which has historically been the poorest and most disadvantaged region of Brazil.
2.3. Public expenditure on education under the first Lula government

The PT in government and its behaviour in power surprised many observers, who had anticipated a change of economic direction, since the new administration maintained its predecessor's focus on low inflation and openness to foreign investment. The flipside was a continuing dependency on the international markets and limits to public expenditure. The path was not a complete shock: the PT had laid out its intentions in its Letter to the Brazilian People (Carta ao Povo Brasileiro) during the 2002 election campaign, which had been put together by a small group around Lula and the leadership (Palocci 2007). The group was determined to gain both domestic and international credibility, which meant avoiding policies such as capital controls or rejection of the 2002 IMF loan which might aggravate the financial situation. Nonetheless, the PT leadership's adoption of this approach came at a fortunate moment: following the economic downturn during Cardoso's second term, Brazil soon began to recover, ensuring growing revenues for social policies (Cardim de Carvalho and Ferrari Filho 2006; Mollo and Saad-Filho 2006; Cardoso, interview, 2008).

In public spending on education, the new PT government maintained the funding system it had inherited. This included the use of FUNDEF for primary education funding and the steady increase in both the minimum amount per student and the total sums allocated, even as the federal government's share continued to decline. By 2006 the amount allocated per student had risen from R$300 in 1998 to between R$683 and $R730 depending on a student's grade and geographic location (MEC: Secretaria de Educação Básica 1997-2006).

Where the Lula government differed from its predecessor was in the 'deepening' and politicisation of the Cardoso-era reforms. Rather than start again, the first Lula term saw expansion of the constitutional funding mechanism and targeted programmes as the way forward. In the first instance this involved the expansion of the financial system that underpinned primary education funding through FUNDEF to include all basic (i.e. pre-school, primary and secondary) education through a new fund, FUNDEB. Alongside this the government introduced changes to the salário-educação in 2003, which directed two-thirds of its funds to public education as opposed to the state governments which invariably spent it on subsidising private schools (Cunha 2007). Meanwhile targeted policies included changing the bolsa escola into a more general form of financial assistance via the bolsa família, as well as a new grant for poorer students to attend university known as ProUni.
The government’s pursuit of these goals emphasised the extent to which concerns about quantity seemed to trump those relating to quality within education (Schwartzmann 2006).

2.3.1. FUNDEB

By the late 1990s the previous opposition by the PT and its allies in the educational community to FUNDEF had largely evaporated. The (predominantly subnational) fund had not only increased the amount allocated to primary education, but had arguably contributed towards greater enrolments and retention of children in school. The main criticism levelled against it was derived from its success: having achieved so much in primary education, pre-school and secondary education were seen to have lost out. This was especially the case with the latter, which now faced greater demand following the increase of primary school completions (Cardoso, interview, 2008). In association with social movements, the PT had originally presented a constitutional amendment bill in Congress in 1999. Later, during the 2002 election, the proposal formed part of its education manifesto (Davies 2006; Nascimento, interview, 2006; Chagas, interview, 2008). The matter became more pressing once the PT took office, as FUNDEF had been passed with a ten year limit (Aparecida da Silva, interview, 2006); any government after 2003 consequently had to act, whether it was to maintain the FUNDEF model or pursue the PT’s alternative.

With a mandate to act, the new education minister, Cristovam Buarque, set up a working group within MEC to outline the details of a new financial model to begin when FUNDEF ran out, in 2007. This was followed by consultations including state and municipal educational secretariats and representatives as well as wider social movements (Chagas, interview, 2008). The proposals elicited little opposition, with the exception of the former education minister, Paulo Renato Souza. He rejected the idea of one funding mechanism covering all basic education, as this would blur the formal responsibilities laid out for states and municipalities. While not rejecting the need to cover all three modalities in basic education, he favoured a separate package for each – a recommendation that found limited support amongst the states and municipalities (Souza, interview, 2007; Chagas, interview, 2008).

Like FUNDEF, the new FUNDEB mechanism would hypothecate tax revenues at state and municipal level, raising them from 15% to 20% in a constitutional amendment in 2006. In terms of
federal spending though, this would not mean any substantial new funds, since the vast majority would come from the states and municipalities. In FUNDEB’s first year the federal contribution was anticipated to be at less than 5% (or R$2bn). Furthermore, the government proposed to use some of the federal component of the salário-educação to fund its contribution – which, given that the salário-educação is already a hypothecated education resource, did not suggest the use of new money (Davies 2006: 765).

These claims were disputed by the fund’s supporters, who argued that it was different to the previous model through expanding both the amount of resources to be allocated and the modalities to be covered. The number of students covered by the fund would rise from around 35 million of primary school-aged children (7-14 years) to 60 million of children aged from 3 to 17 years. Not only would each student receive a greater average amount than before, but it would also involve a constitutionally fixed federal commitment. Under FUNDEF the federal government’s contribution had not been specified, other than it would be a supplement to state and municipal spending; under FUNDEB it would rise to 10% of the value of state and municipal contributions from 2010 and remain in place until its expiry in 2020 (MEC 2006). Furthermore, all teachers would benefit from the salary payments stemming from the new system, rather than just primary school teachers under FUNDEF (Chagas, interview, 2008; Mercadante 2006; Brasil: Presidente da Republica 2007; Pinto 2007).

Despite such arguments, the passage of FUNDEB was not as simple as that which created FUNDEF. While FUNDEF received almost immediate support from the president and received relatively quick attention in Congress, FUNDEB’s passage was slower. First, despite the general agreement that Buarque’s working group achieved, it was only passed in 2005, towards the end of the government’s first term. Indeed, Davies (2006: 760) suggests that FUNDEB was not seen by the government as a priority. Had it done so, FUNDEB might have been introduced earlier, in 2003, when public support was high, rather then during the middle of the mensalão scandal which threatened to engulf the party. Consequently, FUNDEB could be seen as a means of improving the government’s public image. Second, although there was consensus between MEC and the Finance Ministry over the fund’s structure, there were differences over their respective views of the federal government’s financial contribution: while MEC wanted to introduce it into the constitutional amendment, the Finance Ministry wished to address the issue of financial amounts later. The issue was eventually resolved.
when Lula stepped into the debate, to specify a set amount during the fund's first four years (Folha de São Paulo 2005b; Fernandes, Chagas, interviews, 2008). Lula's late entry reflected the frustration felt by the first PT education minister, Buarque, that education was not seen as high a priority by the government compared to the economy (interview, 2008).

Just as FUNDEF had elicited opposition from the PT a decade earlier, FUNDEB was criticised by the PSDB education policy elite. Their complaints were twofold: first, the increase in the population would prove too great for the amount of resources presently set aside for it; second, the inclusion of pre-school, primary and secondary education in the same funding mechanism would weaken the constitutional separation of educational responsibility between municipalities and states (Souza, interview, 2007; Durham, interview, 2008).

2.3.2. Bolsa família

The PT government's change in public spending on education was not restricted to expanding the financial mechanism from FUNDEF to FUNDEB. A similar approach was also at work with its targeted programmes. We have noted the introduction of CCTs in education through the bolsa escola, first at the subnational and subsequently at the federal level during the 1990s. This was achieved across political lines, by different actors including PSDB mayors and the PT in the Federal District. Under the Lula government the process became increasingly politicised and associated with the figure of the president.

The identification of Lula with targeted programmes initially began with a Zero Hunger (Fome Zero) campaign in 2003, before it succumbed to administrative difficulties (Goertzel, unpublished). This was due to the lack of coordination and coherence in the different parts of the programme (Hall 2006). It was subsequently replaced by an amalgamation of existing and new social cash transfers for food, energy and health as well as the bolsa escola, into the bolsa família (family grant) in October 2003. Of the government's social policies, this was the most visible and widely publicised, and was credited with contributing to Lula's re-election in 2006, owing to his support among bolsa família claimants from the North and Northeast (Hunter and Power 2007).

Despite its amalgamation of various programmes, as a targeted programme its cost remains relatively small, taking up only 0.72% of GDP, but has grown in coverage from 3.6 million to 11.2
million families during the first Lula term. Amongst those receiving the bolsa familia, the proportion of families who received the bolsa escola and who sent their children to school rose from 19% to 77.5% between 2003 and mid-2005 (Patu 2006; Mercadante 2006).

Notwithstanding (poorer) voters' enthusiasm for the bolsa familia, it has been subject to criticism, including by the advocate of the bolsa escola within the PT, Cristovam Buarque. In particular, Buarque (interview 2008) saw the immersion of a school grant into a more general, family one as reducing the emphasis on education, and increasingly, of it being seen as an assistance programme rather than as a CCT. Rather than being a payment conditional on mothers sending children to school, it could be seen as a payment made because the mother (and family) is poor. In addition, Schwartzmann (interview, 2007) claims that the bolsa escola component of the bolsa familia remains insufficient as a means of keeping children in school, especially if a school continues to be poor and there is no subsequent work for graduates. Indeed, Hall (2006) questions its value given that it covers children aged 7-13 years since they are likely to attend school anyway. The problem is that it does not cover 14-17 year old students, where a CCT would have most impact – and is the age at which children start dropping out of school.

2.3.3. ProUni

While FUNDEB and the bolsa familia were extensions of existing programmes begun under the previous government, in 2004 the PT administration introduced a new funding system that had no previous equivalent (Brooke, interview, 2008). Whereas FUNDEB and the school component of the bolsa familia dealt with basic education, the introduction of ProUni not only brought targeted public spending into the higher education, it also blurred the lines between the public and private sectors.

Just as FUNDEB sought to address the rising demand for basic (as opposed to only primary) education, ProUni was seen as a way of dealing with the pressure for more higher education. An inter-departmental working group had carried out a study in 2003 that recommended: increases in places and teaching staff, greater university autonomy to access additional resources, and including non-state resources at under-resourced federal universities. The government responded with ProUni (Otranto 2006). The programme targeted ethnic minorities, poorer students and students from public schools, with either partial or full grant assistance (Mercadante 2006). The difference was that rather than
placing these students in public universities, they would attend private higher education institutions (HEIs), which already accounted for a majority of the student population.

The programme anticipated 120,000 new places being achieved each year from 2005 (Mercadante 2006; Aparecida da Silva, interview, 2006). By 2006, 203,000 grants had been offered, with 400,000 applying in 2005 (Araújo 2006b; Saad Lucchesi 2007). Despite these numbers, critics questioned why the money had not been spent on increasing public university places rather than subsidising private places, especially as the government’s own evaluation suggested that the quality of public university courses was better (Leher 2005; Arelaro, interview, 2008; Mendes Catani et al 2007; Saad Lucchesi 2007). Indeed, ProUni has been characterised as little more than ‘inclusion at the fringes’: it meets the demand of poorer people for a university education while directing state resources to lower cost private education rather than spending it on the more expensive public universities (Motter, unpublished2). The corollary of the government’s financial assistance to private HEIs, however, has been its commitment at the beginning of the second Lula term (2007-10) to expand the public university system, by increasing both resources and the number of physical campuses (REUNI) (MEC 2007b).

2.4. Structure of public spending on education in Brazil, 1995-2006

If the targeted programmes, such as the bolsa escola, bolsa familia and ProUni were relatively small, the impact of FUNDEF and the financial changes brought by the Cardoso and first Lula governments did substantially affect the structure of public spending on education in Brazil by the mid-2000s. Overall government spending on education – at all levels – did grow and budget cuts were avoided, although the emphasis was more on redirection of expenditure coupled with a drive for greater efficiency (Cardoso 2006; Castro 2005, 2007).
Between 1999 and 2006 the real amount spent on education (in Brazilian reais) by the federal government did increase, although given the limited availability of figures, it is unclear whether this occurred under the Cardoso or the Lula government. Certainly, the tendency during the Cardoso years was to reduce the proportion spent by the federal government: during its first term (1995-98) when the educational team was at its most active in terms of the policies developed and implemented, both the amount and the proportion spent by the federal government fell. Nowhere was this more evident than in higher education, which following the 1996 LDB had been designated for direct federal jurisdiction. In primary and secondary education, which were assigned to municipal and state governments respectively, the proportion of federal assistance similarly declined (figures 7 and 8).

The bulk of the spending increase in education came from the state and municipal levels, which following the 1996 constitutional amendment obliged them to allocate directly a proportion of their tax revenues. The most substantial rise was found in municipalities, which under FUNDEB was directed towards primary education. The shift towards hypothecated spending for basic (i.e. primary and secondary) education in FUNDEB in 2006 should mean that state and municipal spending will continue to grow, although it remains uncertain whether this will be the case for the federal government (Souza,
However, the figures suggest that at the end of the Lula government’s first term the federal government was expanding its share of revenues in education, although this was most apparent for higher education (figure 8). This may be attributed to the government’s decision to expand the sector, including expansion of the existing system and construction of new institutions (MEC 2007b). The problem with higher education spending in Brazil though, is the extent to which it undermines redistribution. Hall (2003: 281) notes that higher education funding primarily benefits the middle classes: only 2.6% of Brazil’s poorest 40% of the population have access to university compared to 21% of the country’s richest 10%.

Figure 8

Proportion of Spending by Modality and Level of Government, 1995-2006

Sources: IBGE 1997: Table 2.117, IPEA n.d., 2003

3. Conclusion

The general trend across all three governments has been for greater public expenditure in education, regardless of the assumed differences between the Third Way and the Participatory Left. Similarly, all three cases have shown not only a reliance on the wider economic context to help shape their education spending, but also demonstrate a marked willingness to make use of targeted resources –
whether it was through the MECE and P900 programmes in Chile or the *bolsa escola* (later *bolsa familia*) and ProUni policies in Brazil.

There were differences though. Whereas the Cardoso government had emphasised the need to restructure public spending in favour of primary education with funds coming from sources other than the federal level, the Lula government stressed the need to increase spending across the board. This included the expansion of the FUNDEF mechanism to FUNDEB; this meant a shift from addressing only primary school funds to include all pre-university education, and a guaranteed federal contribution that had not existed before. This across-the-board increase was similarly pursued in Chile, where more resources were allocated both to schools and per student generally, and in targeted assistance. The effect of the Concertación and Lula cases showed that public spending increases happened regardless of the structure of the educational system (i.e. whether it was federal or unitary) or of the nature of the government (i.e. whether it was a Third Way or Participatory Left type).

After a decade and a half of these various spending policies and reforms meant that the amount being spent per capita by the public sector on primary and secondary students was around the same as other middle-income countries within the region and slightly less than those outside (with the exception of Turkey) (figure 9). The fact that the experience of social democracy in Brazil and Chile remained low in comparison to these non-Latin American states demonstrated the extent to which the Third Way model dominated during the period. The acceptance of the growing global consensus on state reform – and the development of effective state capacity in particular – illustrated the spending priorities within the Cardoso and Concertación governments. As has been noted previously, the Cardoso government sought to redistribute existing finances for education through FUNDEF while the Concertación accommodated this comparatively low amount of expenditure by making use of private funds alongside targeting of public expenditure.
The implications of these findings suggest that Third Way and Participatory Left approaches to public spending may be due less to their ideological or social origins than their immediate political and economic concerns. Politically, both the Concertación and the Cardoso governments were tied to institutional approaches to education spending (the former through its acceptance of the military regime’s model and the later through its aim to set a constitutional minimum for primary education spending). Meanwhile, the PT supported the development of FUNDEB through pressure from its supporters in the educational community (i.e. teachers), but arguably preferred the use of targeted programmes such as the bolsa familia, which enabled it to distinguish itself from its predecessors.

Economically, the differences between the three cases – the focus on redistribution by the Cardoso government and the decline in federal funds during his first term (1995-98), against the increased spending under Lula and the Concertación – could be attributed to the broader economic context. Both the Concertación and Lula governments were the beneficiaries of economic changes that had occurred prior to them entering office. Following the economic crisis of the early 1980s, by 1990 the Chilean economy had undergone restructuring and was growing. In Brazil the Lula
government adopted the macro-economic policies of its predecessor which had begun to improve after a slight economic downturn in the late 1990s. Meanwhile, although Cardoso owed his presidential victories to the anti-inflationary Real Plan, a concern with economic factors arguably shaped his government's approach to social policy and education in particular. This was most apparent in the emphasis on restructuring public spending across the three levels (federal, state and municipal).
7. Making us all managers?: The use of assessment and evaluation by social democratic governments

Echoing the changes wrought by the New Right, social democrats have largely accepted the need for assessment and evaluation of public services. In particular they see such measures as a means of not only setting standards, but also as a means of testing the quality (as opposed to quantity) of public services (Bottery 2000). However, in education the use of evaluation has been more multidimensional than it is sometime portrayed in the literature. Although the purpose of evaluation is to improve the system, how that is to be achieved is open to contestation, given the different and changing views of what constitutes improvement, both between and within affected groups (Behn 2003; Broadbent and Laughlin 2004). At the extreme end is its extensive use in Britain, which despite initially driving up results appears to have presently stalled (Bevan and Hood 2006).

The difficulty of using evaluation to achieve improvement is highlighted by the uncertainty of what affects public service delivery. At a global level there is growing concern for greater accountability and deeper understanding of how poverty and inequality manifests itself. This has prompted pressure for more effective targeting in public services, which requires more refined impact evaluations and policy-relevant research (Goldstein 2008). Yet this 'accountability' has increasingly been displaced by a greater emphasis on making institutions 'auditable', whereby the objective is less about accounting for various practices than measuring performance (Espeland and Sauder 2007: 2).

Making evaluation effective is further complicated by the individuals and groups involved within the process and their diverse interests and demands. Indeed, the more inclusive a process is, arguably the less rigorous and useful it will probably be (Pollit 1999). This is compounded by the fact that no one assessment process will work for all the different purposes pursued by evaluation; consequently designers must decide what their main concern is. For example, policy makers may seek to use data generated from evaluations to make administrative decisions and monitor progress, while researchers may be concerned with identifying the determinants of 'quality' (Amin and Chaudhury 2008).

In education, the issue of relevant evaluation is especially pertinent. The expansion of school coverage globally raises questions about the effectiveness of that service provision, especially in
developing countries, where until recently, the focus was on quantity as opposed to 'quality'. It therefore encourages more attention to be placed on standard forms of evaluation, to be able to ascertain the extent to which a system is performing. In the context of education, this has meant a shift away from focusing on educational access towards what schools teach and hence the use of standardised tests to assess this (Amin and Chaudhury 2008; PREAL 2008; Dale and Robertson 2007; Vegas and Petrow, 2008).

At both ideological and sectoral levels the purposes of evaluation may diverge. Ideologically, the choice between a progressive or an economically-oriented education model may affect both the types of skills and learning assessed, as well as the purpose of that evaluation (Apple 1997; Adamson and Morris 2007). Neo-liberal advocates stress the need to create markets in education; the use of assessment can provide a market indicator to assist in them. Conservative education, meanwhile, would make use of assessments to ensure that students are absorbing the desired social values and order. By contrast, a more 'progressive' educational approach, which emphasises the central role of the child, would favour evaluation that stresses the development of students' critical faculties.

Sectorally, different groups will also have different ideas about the purpose of evaluation. Just as education bureaucrats (or managers) are primarily concerned with effectively managing a reasonably centralised and uniform test system, teachers see themselves as more professional and experienced in this regard, emphasising issues of 'quality' and impressionistic evaluations (Ball 1990). Indeed, these viewpoints may well come into conflict, as bureaucrats see teachers failing to impose consistency across the system, while teachers may feel threatened by the bureaucrats' attempts to manage them.

Even when both sides (along with other education stakeholders such as parents) agree on the need for student assessment, differences will persist over what should be assessed. While this may be partially attributable to the ideological stances of each actor, it may also be due to the level at which assessment is to take place. Are tests designed to evaluate a student, or test aptitude, or assess the education system as a whole? (Carnoy and Castro 1997: 37) Whichever approach is used, the issue is further complicated by external factors outside the classroom for which there appear to be no means of control, such as household income or community background (Amin and Chaudhury 2008). Furthermore, even if such matters could be controlled, there is a further problem: to what extent does a
test — especially as it becomes more uniform — assess anything more than what is being assessed? In other words, contrary to the expectations of its designers, a test and its results may not adequately reflect students' general abilities and skills, but rather their capacity to pass that particular test (Dohn 2007; Herman 1997). This is especially complicated in international testing, where the areas of evaluation and comparison are pared down to the minimum, thereby lacking sufficient context of a country's educational model or socio-economic development. Yet at the other extreme, the more expansive the test model, arguably the less rigorous and comparable it presumably becomes.

Notwithstanding the various views presented by particular stakeholders, this chapter is primarily concerned with how the social democratic governments in Brazil and Chile have used educational assessment. The differentiation between the Third Way and Participatory Left approaches suggests that one might expect to see differences between the three cases and challenges the more stark contrast assumed between each at the start of this dissertation: namely that the Third Way would support evaluation and the Participatory Left reject it. Evaluation and assessment, judging by the various stances that can be adopted, suggests that its status is much more nuanced. Consequently, given the closer association with the New Right, the Third Way offers an educational vision in which economic concerns take precedence; consequently, one would expect to see assessment used to accommodate this, both as the development of a market indicator and as a means of ensuring that students are assimilating key societal values. The Participatory Left approach, by contrast, offers more scope for other stakeholders to become engaged in the evaluative process. One might therefore expect less externally-imposed and collaborative forms of assessment in favour of a more 'progressive' approach that would be associated with imbuing students with a more critical perspective.

However, as the cases show, the distinction between Third Way and Participatory Left approaches to evaluation is less apparent than would be expected. In both countries the growth of assessment has been accompanied with an expansion in stakeholder concerns and involvement, thereby diminishing any clear ideological undercurrent in favour of one form of social democracy or the other. Indeed, despite governments' attempts to manage and control the system, evaluation and assessment gains a momentum of its own, which increasingly absorbs stakeholders' views and perspectives into the process.
1. Evaluation in Chile prior to the Concertación

The Chilean education model is amongst the most market-oriented globally. After 1980 the school system was formalised into a tripartite model in which public and private schools were joined by the state-subsidised private schools, which is the fastest growing section. For many, the underlying ideology inherent in this system suggested a neo-liberal direction: a reduced role for the state in favour of the private sector. To such observers though, the market logic remains relatively weak in the absence of an effective means of providing information and therefore choice regarding the different types of schools and their consumers (i.e. parents and students). The need for market indicators that can identify the 'best' and 'worst' performing schools is therefore necessary. Such an interpretation has been placed on the use of both student and teacher evaluation. Amongst school students, the national SIMCE tests for fourth and eight grades and second year secondary school students were implemented by the military regime in the late 1980s.

However, despite this neo-liberal critique of assessment, the use of SIMCE and teacher evaluation has been rather more multi-faceted and complex than ideology would suggest. Indeed, while sections of the Chilean Right do endorse the notion of SIMCE as a market indicator, a closer study of the aims and uses to which SIMCE have been put by both the military regime and the Concertación suggest a more ambiguous role.

The current method of student assessment in school is done through the national SIMCE tests. Between 1968 and 1971 only eighth grade tests existed, after which there were no nation-wide exams until the 1980s. In 1982 and 1984 some attempt at national evaluation was made through the PER assessment mechanism, but this was limited. Indeed, the regime’s critics claimed that Mineduc failed to make use of the assessments to influence policies that would deliver improvements in the system (Cox 1985).

In 1987 SIMCE was developed, using the methodology adopted by educators at the Catholic University. Designed to test students’ aptitude in mathematics, Spanish, social and natural sciences, it was carried out in 1988 amongst fourth graders before including eighth graders a year later (Carnoy and Castro 1997: 40). However, contrary to neo-liberal interpretations of its use, Mineduc accompanied the publication of the results with an explanation of the test's purpose. While it noted that it was not a 'global evaluation' (i.e. it did not seek to assess all aspects of a child's education), it
aimed to contribute to educational ‘quality’ and to analyse, with a view to developing further governmental action in schools and curricula. Furthermore, in this first test it also included the results of student, parental and teacher perceptions of the education system and its performance; it was therefore as much concerned with eliciting information for internal usage within Mineduc as it was in providing it to the system’s users (Mineduc 1989).

Consequently, if the purpose of SIMCE was merely to provide consumers with sufficient information to help choose where to send their children to school, then the mechanism had failed. The outgoing military regime was not only using the results to determine where (limited) state resources should be allocated, it also provided insufficient information for parents to choose between ‘good’- and ‘bad’-performing schools. Furthermore, compared to the methods of evaluation that would come into use later in the 1990s, the Chilean system was relatively modest in scope: during the 1980s there was no international testing regime that distinguished between the performance of different countries’ students at the same age (Dittborn, interview, 2007). This restricted the extent to which any meaningful comparisons and analysis could be carried out.

2. Evaluation under the Concertación: SIMCE, international comparisons and teacher assessment

The entry of the Concertación into government, and its management of the education system, did not undermine the notion of evaluation as a means of enacting neo-liberal educational policy. If anything, the critique intensified, especially as test scores demonstrated differences between public and private schools. Furthermore, Chile’s involvement in international tests and efforts to introduce teacher evaluation were also cited as examples of the government’s increasing interest in the economic use of assessment. Yet the Concertación presented more complex and ambiguous responses about the use of evaluation than the neo-liberal claim afforded.

First, since the 1990s the SIMCE results have been broken down to the micro-level, to include both school and municipal level. However, this does not extend to individual students (Matear 2007). Generally, the findings are that students in municipal schools have the lowest average scores compared to state-subsidised and independent private schools (Aedo 1998). Indeed, between 1998 and 2003 a widening split was observed between public and private school results, even though the
change was not as great in state-subsidised private schools. Given the greater amount of state resources for such schools, the results suggest that state-subsidised private schools failed to address the influence of children's socio-economic backgrounds and the impact on their education (Matear 2007). This has not stopped the private sector arguing in favour of a private education over that provided by the state (Bosch, interview, 2007).

The government claims to make use of the results to determine the use and level of targeted state assistance and resources. During the 1990s this was done with the P900 and MECE programmes, which were based in part on the weakest performing schools (Aedo 1998). To achieve this, the government considered other factors alongside SIMCE results, including the socio-economic context of schools. Since 2000 the government has made this data more widely available by providing it by school. This indicates a further use of the results as not just a means of providing information to parents, teachers and students, but also to policy-makers and researchers as well (PREAL 2006:13-4). Against this is the fact that the circulation of useful or meaningful information remains largely circumscribed. Not only are the tests conducted independently from schools' own student assessments, but parents are not supplied with their children's individual scores. This last point is especially pertinent, since it limits parents' ability to choose schools effectively – even though evidence suggests that Chilean parents tend to use other factors than test scores to choose schools, such as social demographics and location (Matear 2007).

Second, since the late 1990s Chile has made increasing use of international testing and comparisons, including the IALS, PISA and TIMSS assessments. Such tests are perceived from the educational progressives to reflect the Concertación's adherence to the New Right. In particular this includes pressure for the neo-liberal acquisition of skills – primarily communication, language and scientific knowledge – necessary for the labour market and neo-conservative concern with centralised order and discipline. Indeed, globalisation arguably demands labour forces with a more flexible skills base; poor performance in international education evaluations could therefore be used to undermine a country's relative position and affect prospects for foreign investment and economic opportunities. Yet given these concerns, the results of international tests and comparisons have not been favourable to Chile: the PISA findings showed that nearly half of Chilean 15 year olds were in the lowest level of reading proficiency in 2000 compared to the OECD average of 18% of the same age group (PREAL
When coupled to national test results, around 40% of children in fourth, eighth and tenth grades were found to be functionally illiterate (Eyzaguirre and Le Foulan 2001). This was despite Chile’s performance in international tests placing it above other Latin American countries (Matear 2007).

Although these findings did initially shake confidence in Chile’s educational system, the outcome was not as negative as portrayed above. There was acknowledgement on both the Left and the Right that the education system was failing to deliver (Dittborn, Bitar, interviews, 2007). At the same time it opened up a national debate on the state of education in Chile, which was reflected in the 2006 protests (Weinstein, Brunner, interviews, 2007). The subsequent presidential advisory commission offered an opportunity for those concerns to be aired and solutions to be proposed. This led to a subsequent agreement in November 2007 between the Concertación and the Right, which included the establishment of minimum, measurable national standards and a Quality Assurance Agency to assess students’ progress and classify and publicise school performance (Puryear 2007a). Cox (interview, 2007), meanwhile, suggested that the international test score findings had helped erode old ideological certainties concerning the education system. The use of international comparisons was encouraging a more open approach to policy-making: rather than restricting itself to regional comparisons, Mineduc was increasingly interested in learning how education policy was conducted elsewhere, including North America, Scandinavia and East Asia (Bitar, Brunner, interviews, 2007).

Third, the Concertación has pushed through teacher evaluations in municipal schools. This may be presented as evidence of the government subjecting the teaching profession to the same managerialist impulse as that faced by the education system as a whole through the international testing regime. The pressure for such evaluation may be deduced from private school supporters’ claims that their teachers are more ‘efficient’ than public school ones, owing to the higher SIMCE results they deliver and the cost they deliver it at (Bosch, interview, 2007). Yet such claims are made without reference to students’ socio-economic contexts and private schools’ ability to select. Furthermore, the recent election of the Communist Party member Jaime Gajardo as president of the Colegio de Profesores in October 2007 prompted calls by its leadership for teacher evaluation to be ended (Núñez, interview 2, 2007).
The current distinction between the private sector and the teachers' union on the issue of teacher evaluation would suggest a clear ideological separation and places the Concertación in the former camp. Yet this distinction is not as clear as it would seem. The evaluation of municipal teachers became law towards the end of the Lagos presidency (2000-06) and included the involvement of the previous leadership of the Colegio de Profesores under Jorge Pavez (Assael, interview, 2007). An accord was signed between the two, which according to Núñez (interview 2, 2007) reflected the shift in the teachers' union from a corporatist, materialist body to an increasingly professional community (Chagas, interview, 2008). Furthermore, the Concertación's measure was limited only to public school teachers and did not include private school teachers, a measure that the former education minister, Sergio Bitar, wanted to see corrected in the future (interview, 2007).

3. Evaluation in Brazil prior to 1995

In the 20-30 years prior to 1995 the use of centrally administered exams had been largely abandoned, with only the vestibular as an exam to enter higher education remaining (Carnoy and Castro 1997:39). However, this did not mean an absence of discussion or concern surrounding the need for evaluation. In the early 1990s there had been various state-level and regional forms of testing, while at the national level the SAEB tests had already been carried out once, in 1993 (Souza, interview, 2007). The main distinction between the period before and after 1995 was in the nature of the Brazilian debate on evaluation: prior to 1995 it had been a largely national discussion involving a wide range of educational actors such as academics and researchers; after 1995 discussions included a more international dimension, while the development and implementation of assessment mechanisms was increasingly centralised and concentrated in MEC's National Institute of Studies and Research (INEP) (Teixeira de Freitas 2004).

4. The development of assessment and evaluation during the Cardoso presidency

The purpose of evaluation under the Cardoso government was tied to its vision of the state. The 1996 LDB had defined the roles and responsibilities of federal, state and municipal levels on educational matters: the federal government's was predominantly in the higher education sector and providing complementary assistance and coordination to the system as a whole. Given the federal government's lack of direct involvement in primary education— an issue that it had made among its
priorities – it needed to find a way for improvement to be achieved. Evaluation became the means by which the federal government exerted indirect control (Durham, interview, 2008).

The first stage involved an internal reorganisation within MEC. Before 1995 both INEP’s status and role had been in decline, while little national-level evaluation had taken place (Souza, interview, 2007). This was reversed with the appointment of Maria Helena Guimarães de Castro as its president with a brief to take responsibility for the government’s assessment and evaluation of the education system (Souza, interview, 2007; Soares, interview, 2008; Souza 2005: 83-84). Between 1995 and 2002 the effect of this change was to take Brazil from one of the least assessed to the most centrally evaluated of federal educational systems. Two new national evaluation mechanisms were created at secondary and tertiary levels, while at primary level the existing model was given a new lease of life, alongside school censuses to provide more accurate data on the system and assessments of teaching materials (Brasil: Presidente da Republica 1998). Towards the end of the Cardoso government the first international tests and comparisons also took place, in the PISA assessments.

The new government inherited SAEB, which had been held once previously for fourth and eighth grade primary school children in Portuguese and mathematics (Soares 2004). It was remodelled, extended to include eleventh graders and conducted every other year. The government contracted out to private institutions and foundations, including the Carlos Chagas Foundation, to design the methodology eventually used (Souza, interview, 2007). SAEB provided information at a given place and time, which enabled comparison between places and at the national level over time (INEP 2001). Furthermore, while the test would include both public and private schools, it would not be nationwide. Rather it would be done by sample, with the results being publicised by state rather than municipality or school. This limited the test as a means by which parents might be able to exercise choice – and challenged the notion of it as a neo-liberal measure.

Instead, the purpose of SAEB appeared directed towards assisting the funding and control of various government programmes, including curricular guidelines and teaching materials (Brasil: Presidente da Republica 1997). Despite these aims, the findings throughout the 1990s did not suggest any notable improvement in learning outcomes amongst those taking the test. MEC explained this as reflecting other policies which contributed towards growing numbers of individuals entering the education system, including those from backgrounds not previously associated with high educational
attainment. This underpinned the notion that any expansion of an educational system will have an adverse impact on its performance, as quality is substituted for quantity (Motter, unpublished).

In 1998 the government introduced a secondary school exam, ENEM, which similarly sought to monitor performance. Conducted annually, its arrival did not face any public opposition, which the educational team had anticipated following their experience with the university evaluation system (Souza, interview, 2007). Societal acceptance of ENEM was evident in the growing number of participants taking the test each year, from 120,000 in the first year to 1.3 million by 2002 (INEP, various years). Similarly, ENEM's growth may have been attributable to the government ensuring that ENEM was kept free for students from public schools (Souza, interview, 2007). Nonetheless, like SAEB, there was no discernable improvement in students' scores, a situation which could have been explained in a similar manner to that related to the primary school test.

From 2000 Brazil began to participate in international evaluations. Like Chile, the results were not good; indeed, in PISA's findings Brazil came out in last place. In 2000 56% of Brazilian 15 year olds tested were found to be at the lowest level of reading proficiency; in the mathematic assessment in 2003, the figure was worse, with 75% failing to meet the first level. In both tests OECD countries found that a fifth of their 15 year olds were in the same position (PREAL 2006: 31-2). On average, Brazilian 15 year olds were categorised as amongst the weakest in terms of maths and problem solving, although in language comprehension the results were slightly better (OECD 2004a, 2004b). Indeed, when analysed more closely, the top 10% of Brazilian 15 year olds had a higher average score in language comprehension than the OECD average, although this had more to do with the smaller pool of 15 year olds in secondary education and the greater propensity of such students to be in elite, private institutions (Carnoy 2004: 62). However, this did not worry the government in the same way that it concerned Chile's policymaking core. When challenged on Brazilian students' low performance, Paulo Renato Souza, Cardoso's education minister, claimed that the comparisons were by country and excluded the wide range of differences that exist within the Brazilian education system, including whether students are the correct grade age or have repeated a year (Souza 2005).

If SAEB and ENEM were generally approved of, the same could not be said for the government's evaluation for higher education, the Provão. Although Souza (interview, 2007) claimed that wider society was in favour of it, the majority of the organised university community, including
chancellors, teachers and students, were wary of any external assessment. Furthermore, the minister had to cope with considerable pockets of resistance within MEC as well, including among his own allies (Souza 2005). The Provão was criticised as neo-liberal, and of the various evaluation systems introduced by the Cardoso government in education, it was perhaps the closest to achieving that status. Although it constituted part of the same package of reforms designed to introduce coordination and indirect control of the education system, the Provão was notably different in one key regard: its assessment of university courses, teaching and final year student exams would be used to accredit existing higher education institutions (HEIs), thereby providing a form of market regulation to the sector. Unsurprisingly, each of the various actors in the university community feared the impact of a bad result (Cunha 2004). Students were especially worried that a poor final result would affect their future career prospects, although the government argued that it was not aiming to stigmatise them but rather that higher education in general would benefit from such scrutiny (Souza 2005).

5. Assessment and evaluation measures during the first Lula term

If evaluation during the Cardoso period was designed to bring about greater indirect control, ensure coordination from the centre, and thereby increasing the role of the state, the changes made by the PT in MEC after 2003 ironically shifted the direction towards the market. With the exception of higher education evaluation, the main changes to the primary and secondary evaluation systems were much closer to the notion of assessment as a form of market indication. Indeed, the PT began to reconsider its position on the need and nature of evaluation in the transition from opposition to government (Soares, interview, 2008; Abicalil 2002). This contrasts with the position in the late 1990s when it rejected many of the evaluation systems used by the Cardoso government; among the most visible of these protests was Rio Grande do Sul state, where the PT administration elected not to publish the SAEB results (Burton, forthcoming). This was due in part to the composition of the party’s membership, which was dominated by former trade unionists (Buarque, interview, 2008). The relationship between the national teachers’ union and its sympathisers in MEC similarly challenged Buarque’s proposals for teacher evaluations during his time as minister.

Since 2003 the PT government’s stance on evaluation has become more ambiguous. Arguably the PT’s path is no different to that faced by other parties in government: the need for more and
detailed information has become a necessity, especially as 'quality' in education becomes increasingly synonymous with what individuals learn (Brooke, interview, 2008). Within the government this is emphasised, especially by self-identified technocrats, such as the INEP president since 2005, Reynaldo Fernandes. In particular he sees the role of evaluation as providing 'accountability' to the system; but, rather than engaging in an ideological definition of what accountability stands for, he stresses the practical. This requires a national assessment system to ensure that the educational structure is working effectively since the federal government cannot directly intervene in the running of schools (Fernandes, interview, 2008). The government's commitment to this approach was echoed in its support for state-level evaluations to go alongside the national one they administer (Brasil: Presidente da Republica 2004).

Notwithstanding the technical nature of its justification for evaluation, the first reforms conducted by the new PT government were very political. It scrapped the Provão and replaced it with a new system, Sinaes. This gained the new administration considerable support from within the public and private university community, who had actively opposed the Provão when it was first introduced in 1996. Where Sinaes differed from the Provão was that, despite retaining external assessment, internal self-assessment was also introduced, alongside student exams in the first and last years (Brasil: Presidente da Republica 2005, 2007). Nevertheless, doubts were expressed by this more participatory process, most notably regarding the extent to which any effective or indeed negative assessment could be made (Barreyro and Barreyro 2006; Durham, interview, 2008).

In contrast to the more participatory Sinaes evaluation in higher education, the PT government's approach to assessing primary and secondary education not only maintained the models introduced before 2003, but deepened them. In primary education the government shifted emphasis from the sample-based SAEB assessment to a more universal model via the Prova Brasil from 2005. This evaluation of every public school in the country had widespread support both within and outside the government (Fernandes, interview, 2008). In part, the reason for the relative absence of opposition could be found in the detail: the government claimed that the additional information would be passed back to school teachers and administrators at the local level, to help them in the development of policies and solutions (Brasil: Presidente da Republica 2007). However, the aim of influencing teaching behaviour is constrained by the fact that since the results are only made available
at the end of each academic year, it would not provide any immediate benefit (Brooke, interview, 2008).

In secondary education, the ENEM continued to be the main form of assessment and its popularity grew as greater numbers of students took it each year. Its credibility as an instrument was enhanced through the government’s decision to publish the average results by schools each year. Its use both as means of gaining a ProUni grant and as either an alternative or complementary qualification was generally welcomed (Brasil: Presidente da Republica 2007; Motter, unpublished). Against this, there were concerns that the publication of the average results – while increasing transparency – also opened the door to school rankings (Motter, unpublished).

Alongside these developments, two further proposals highlight the ambiguity regarding of the PT’s objectives concerning evaluation. In 2003 Cristovam Buarque introduced proposals for teacher evaluations at the primary and secondary levels. This prompted considerable opposition from the teaching profession, who campaigned against them. The teachers feared that evaluation would create differences amongst teachers, rewarding those deemed ‘good’ against the ‘bad’ ones, and would also fail to take into account the contrasting situations faced by teachers in different parts of the country (Vieira, interview, 2007; Chagas, interview, 2008). The lobbying was sufficient in that the proposals were quietly dropped following Buarque’s departure in 2004.

By 2007 the PT’s concern with context was manifest in the proposals creating the Basic Education Development Index, or IDEB. Developed within MEC – as opposed to being contracted out as SAEB’s methodology had been under Souza – the IDEB would deepen school assessment by bringing it down to the local level and including wider socio-economic data concerning a school’s situation. In addition, the aim of IDEB was to help influence teaching behaviour in a way that SAEB had not, by providing data for teachers and managers to use (Fernandes, Brooke, interviews, 2008). However, there was uncertainty about how it would actually be applied. First, how might the government make such data and intentions intelligible to individual teachers and school administrators (Brooke, interview, 2008)? Second, there was an issue of equity absent in the index: if a school’s position on the development scale was dependent on the use of ‘average’ results, then simply improving the performance of the most able at the expense of any involvement with the least able would improve a school’s overall position (Soares, interview, 2008).
The various approaches taken by the PT government to evaluation since 2003 reflect its increasingly ambiguous relationship with it, compared to that before 2002. Buarque (interview, 2008) observed that this change was partly attributable to the organisational structure of the educational community. Responsibility for higher education was held mainly at the federal level, which placed it in the direct line of campaigner who sought the Provão’s replacement. By contrast, primary and secondary education was managed at subnational level, thereby insulated pressure from the federal government. The exception to this was when the government proposed to evaluate teachers during its first year, prompting a lobbying campaign both by the CNTE and its supporters within government (Vieira, interview, 2007; Chagas, interview, 2008). Yet the pressure against teacher evaluation showed that the federal government could be challenged on its policy. By contrast, the PT government pressed on with introducing or expanding evaluation mechanisms because they were either supported by other educational actors (such as teachers or students) or not directly rejected. This might account for the IDEB in the 2007 Education Development Plan (PDE), where context would be considered alongside results. The proposal of such measures arguably offset other aspects of assessment, such as the growing use of test scores as a means of ‘ranking’ schools and students by journalists – an issue over which the government claimed to have no control (Chagas, interview, 2008).

6. Conclusion

The experience of the three governments and their relationship to evaluation suggest that distinguishing between a supportive Third Way and an anti-evaluation Participatory Left is not so simple. Each case presents a combination of the different objectives and goals associated with assessment, as well as considerable stakeholder involvement which has contributed to this blurred situation. The aims and direction to which evaluation has been put by the three governments reflects a more ambiguous position than ideology might otherwise suggest.

Although evaluation is used to achieve improvements, what that means can vary ideologically and across different groups. For neo-liberals, evaluation is generally seen as providing a market indicator to enable choice and competition. Amongst neo-conservatives the goal is discipline and order. For more ‘progressive’ educationalists on the Left – where teachers’ organisations usually place
themselves – the objective is to create a form of evaluation that assesses a student’s critical capacities and self-empowerment.

Yet the use of assessment is never as singular as this. While governments may have their own objectives, they have to also accommodate the aims and demands of others within the educational community. This is especially apparent on Mineduc’s SIMCE website, which includes details of how the test and its results may be used by different groups, including teachers, parents, students and researchers (Mineduc n.d.). Consequently, the aims and objectives to which assessment is put by government are more multidimensional and hence more complex than simple ideology will allow.

Despite the difficulty of making this distinction, some similar and diverging trends between the three case studies appear evident. The use of limited (and decontextualised) international comparisons on specific learning outcomes (e.g. language and maths) appears in line with the Third Way’s narrower focus on economic development. However, against this perspective, both the Cardoso and Concertación governments appear to demonstrate a more progressive concern by encouraging the use of test results by school teachers and managers. From the late 1980s this was one of the stated objectives of SIMCE (thereby undermining the supposed New Right goals of the military regime which had begun the process of testing); policymakers at Mineduc also used the results after the return to democracy to target resources through the P900 and MECE programmes. Furthermore, from 2000 the Concertación added more context to the published results, including background details on a school’s level of socio-economic development. Meanwhile the SAEB model used by the Cardoso government was always limited as a market indicator since it operated on a sample basis, and details of ENEM results remained confined to MEC, schools and students and were not publicly available.

In addition, the institutional differences between the two countries had an impact on the motivations for assessment. The centralised nature of the Chilean education and political system contributed to an early system of evaluation prior to democracy’s return. The Concertación which inherited the model did not therefore have to make any substantial changes, being able to adapt its use according to the various demands made on it by different constituencies.

By contrast, the decentralised nature of Brazil’s education system, and the relative chaos that the new Cardoso government encountered after 1995, made the creation of a new evaluation system
necessary, especially if the government sought how best to coordinate and provide complementary assistance to subnational actors. In other words, the introduction of a national testing regime had more to do with establishing a more effective state, prompting the creation of new testing methods, including at secondary and higher education levels in ENEM and the Provão. This last one was certainly the most controversial, arguably because it was closest to the market model questioned by parts of the education community. The intention behind Provão was not only to assess the 'quality' of the courses and the students' results, but to inject some competition and regulation into the higher education system through the publication of results. Contrary to the ideological logic, this did not find favour with the most market-oriented sectors of the education community, private HEI managers. Rather, there was a common consensus against the Provão by both private and public education advocates, which meant the government's assessment of the sector was met with obstruction.

Provão's replacement by Sinaes in the first year of the Lula government included self-assessment by HEIs. This made for a less market-oriented evaluation model and highlighted a more participatory approach. Elsewhere though, the form and content of the reforms to the evaluation processes undertaken since 2003 reflect the growing ambiguity regarding assessment and its role in education in the Lula government. On the one hand, the PT government's deepening of the reforms, through the publication of ENEM and the universalisation of SAEB into the Prova Brasil, offered space for a more neo-liberal interpretation, including making school rankings possible. On the other, these changes were accompanied with a progressive concern for greater details about background context, which made the introduction of IDEB an important tool in this regard.

Finally, alongside the introduction and expansion of these domestic evaluation systems, both countries have played a visible role in the international testing regime that has been emerging since the mid- to late-1990s. Along with other Latin American participant countries, Brazil and Chile have been regularly ranked in the bottom third of the PISA evaluations and have done worse than similar middle-income countries such as Poland and Estonia (Puryear 2007b). Notwithstanding the extent to which these tests offer truly comparable data (Dohn 2007), the findings have enabled attention to be focused on Latin American education, most especially in the differences between the (relatively) successful Cuban model and poorer-performing regional cases. This has prompted a realisation that issues of quality (as opposed to quantity) need addressing: the lack of a sufficiently challenging
curriculum, inadequate preparation by teachers, poor training, low expectations and insufficient mastery of the material by both teachers and students (Carnoy 2004: 68-70).
8. No participation without representation: social democratic governments and participation in the education sector

Today's social democracy is notable in its accommodation of non-corporatist, non-class based interests. This suggests a looser understanding of the types of social groups that governments might engage with to develop their public services and the education sector in particular. Analysing governments' attitudes to participation offers a broader perspective of their involvement with the educational sector, as opposed to the material concerns that dominate government interaction with specific groups (e.g. teachers and students). Attention to the key groups that have effectively 'captured' the public education debate (Puryear 2008) therefore means that other less organised or visible groups are overlooked in the process – in the case of education this would include parents compared to the organising capacity of teachers (Angell and Graham 1995: 198).

A government's approach to 'participation' is complicated by the widespread ideological consensus in its favour. However, demand for greater forms of participation in public services has grown over the past twenty years; it has not always been clear what is meant by the term. This is due to the fact that 'participation' can appeal to different audiences, each with a distinct vision of what it represents. Anderson (1999) has observed that participation can be distinguished between three main types. Representative democracy emphasises the role of organised constituencies in school decision-making. Deliberative democracy is a more open-ended process between groups that search for dialogue and seek consensus. Finally, rational choice or self-interest sees participation as mainly being market-based; in the educational context this stresses the role of vouchers and parental choices. With regard to the first two forms, representative and deliberative participation, while groups may well be organised in the former, in the latter the need for such coherence is arguably less rigid.

Bobbio (1996) suggested that despite socialism's decline after 1989 the Left-Right distinction persists. This is due to the underlying values associated with each ideological pole, namely more egalitarianism related to the former and acceptance of difference for the latter. Such values arguably underpin the relative differences between the three approaches associated with participation as well. The deliberative or participatory approach occupies the end closest to the egalitarian pole, with few distinctions drawn between groups and their capacity to organise, making it arguably the most open-
ended process of the three. At the opposite end, the market model of participation is most closely associated with the notion of difference. By stressing individual (or parental) choice, it breaks down any idea of a shared or public form of engagement. This means that the representative approach lies somewhere in between the two poles, since it provides space for a wider range of actors than under the market version, but not to the same degree as the deliberative approach. This model will find it easier to accommodate those interests that are relatively well-organised.

Given the distinction between the Third Way and Participatory Left, one would expect the participatory version to conform closer to the deliberative end of the spectrum and the Third Way to adopt a more differentiated approach, hovering around the representative market-oriented approaches. This would suggest that of the three cases, one would expect the PT government to be the most deliberative and inclusive in its approach to participation, while the Concertación and Cardoso governments would be more exclusive, restricting involvement to more organised groups. However, as the evidence shows, this is not the case. The presence of policymaking elites at the heart of each government has arguably contributed to all three adopting a more representative approach, in particular through the use of institutional, state-related channels. For both the Concertación and the Cardoso government, this arguably reflected a way of 'controlling' participation. Meanwhile, the PT government has opted for the same approach, partly because it has to accommodate demands wider than that of its own social base, but also because the Brazilian state's division of educational responsibility disaggregates participation along federal, state and municipal lines.

1. Chile

Participation in Chile's education system has swung like a pendulum across the different perspectives on what participation means. In part this reflects the ideological difference between Left and Right: whereas the Left has tended towards a more egalitarian outlook, the Right is generally more hierarchical in its approach – and therefore tolerant of differentiated outcomes (Bobbio 1996). In Chile this meant that prior to 1973 government attitudes to involvement in the educational community not only reflected the high degree of mobilisation within society, but also the extent to which they identified with the Left, by being more inclusive. Following Anderson's (1999) typology, this was closest to the
deliberative form of democracy or participation. This was reversed by the military regime. The Right, which dominated in this period, was more selective in its choice of interlocutors and restricted participation of the bulk of educational actors in favour of more narrow, economically-oriented ones. This was the heyday of the rational choice or self-interest approach, when private interests were given institutional space, in particular through the formalised status of publicly funded private schools and selection. Since 1990 the shift back to the Left has been evident in the Concertación's modification of this approach. Participation is more inclusive than before, involving groups otherwise overlooked during the 1970s and 1980s such as teachers and students. But rather than returning to the more deliberative model period associated with the Popular Unity (UP) government before 1973, the Concertación has opted for a more representative approach. This was challenged briefly in 2006 following widespread protests regarding the education system, and a subsequent presidential advisory commission, before soon reverting to type.

1.1. Participation prior to 1990

In the decade prior to 1973 Chile can be characterised as a hyper-mobilised society (Sandbrook et al 2007: 198). Different social groups were both highly visible and assertive in their demands. At the same time Chilean society and politics was becoming increasingly polarised. Both the Frei (1964-70) and Allende (1970-73) governments were seen as determined to respond to rising social demands, especially those for the poorer and less privileged sectors. This was apparent in the expansion of rights and benefits to the working classes during the 1960s and early 1970s, which appeared to conform to European notions of development. Notwithstanding this trend, the Christian Democrat government was seen as technocratic and clientelist by its rivals, including those on the Left, such as the teachers' unions. By contrast, the UP government was seen as more inclusive and decentralised in policy-making, with the involvement of various educational actors in policy making at national, regional and local levels (Fischer 1979; Farrell 1986; Yocelevzky 1987; Corvalan 2003; Zemelman and Jara 2004). At the same time though, the UP also managed to antagonise its rivals. In the education sector this meant divisions between the government's supporters and its political opponents over its proposed National Unified School (ENU) proposal between its discussion in 1971 and eventual proposal in 1973. The ENU was seen as a means of democratising and restructuring the education
system, along with eventual curricular reform that would conform to the government’s ‘Chilean road to socialism’ (Núñez 2003: 35).

Seen as a response to the historic demand circulating in ‘progressive’ sections of the Chilean education community, ENU presented an opportunity to integrate and unite the socially and institutionally segmented educational system. A highly political project, it would bring together the different types of education, such as general and technical, manual and intellectual (Núñez, interview 1, 2007). However, the proposal suffered from both a lack of consensus within the UP, and the highly polarised environment and social divisions of the early 1970s (Farrell 1986; García-Huidobro, interview, 2007). Allende’s education minister, Aníbal Palma, subsequently felt that the ENU proposal was ill-timed and presented in too controversial a light (Hite 2000). Yet even with the defeat of the UP, ENU continued to occupy a prominent position. The military the coup prevented its introduction while for sections of the Left it was seen as a future education policy goal (Núñez, interview 1, 2007).

Alongside the ENU, the UP government introduced a broad participatory mechanism, the National Conference on Education. This brought together a wide range of actors within the education community and involved both national and local level engagement in December 1971 (Fischer 1979). The aim was to encourage a nationwide debate and dialogue about education, including what role it should have, and the structure it should take to develop and transform Chile. Both the ENU proposal and the need for greater inclusion contributed towards proposed legislation, aimed to create a common school structure and its administrative decentralisation in subsequent years (Fischer 1979; Núñez, interview 1, 2007).

The military regime that took power in 1973 rejected the previous forms of participation. For Chile’s new rulers, participation was conceived in more narrow terms. During the 1970s this meant an emphasis on national unity and the role of the family; after 1980 it involved a greater role for economic interests, in particular the role of private actors in school and university provision. Alongside this, the wider educational community was to be largely ignored.

In the immediate period after 1973, the military regime sought to do away with political pluralism. It had taken power fearing that political polarisation had made the country susceptible to communist subversion. Repressive measures were carried out, initially during the 1970s and maintained intermittently until 1989. In education, the government’s exclusionary attitude was
reflected in its Declaration of Principles made a year after the coup (Briones et al 1984). In practice this meant military intervention in educational institutions, including the replacement and appointment of university chancellors, and the expulsion of teachers associated with the UP (Castro 1977). Unlike the previous model, participation was restricted to those it could trust, thus excluding wider society. During the curricular development and reforms of the 1970s for example, only education professionals and policy-making within the ministry and higher education sector were consulted (Prieto 1980).

After 1980 the tone of the military regime’s approach to participation in education changed. The late 1970s had seen the rise in ascendancy of economic liberals (Boeninger 1998). Monetarism was increasingly seen as the means to transform not just the Chilean economy but society as well. Although Chile’s education system had always included a large number of private schools, the decrees in the early 1980s formalised the situation – especially state subsidisation of particular private schools. Similar developments were happening within higher education that also contributed to the creation of new private higher education institutions (Newsome 1993).

1.2. Participation according to the Concertación

By the time the Concertación took power, the military education reforms were well established, making them difficult to replace. Indeed, in many respects the military’s approach had been successful in its own terms, although with unintended consequences. It had sought to transform Chile’s economy and society by encouraging private interests. For a number of observers and scholars, this contributed towards greater individualism and consumerism in Chilean society by the 1990s (Colegio de Profesores 2003; Tironi and Ariztía 2003). Against this, the more conservative elements of the regime would have been disappointed at the other, unintended effects: these included the Church’s declining role, a rise in unmarried cohabitation and children being born outside of marriage. These changes were subsequently confirmed through legislation, such as the divorce bill (Garretón 1998; Funk 2006; Salcedo 2005).

With the proliferation of groups and demands, the Concertación opted for a ‘middle way’ between the extremes of the pre-1973 and military regimes with respect to participation in the educational sector. In particular, this meant maintaining those groups who had benefited before 1990, while also providing space to those who had been overlooked. The result was a more representative
than deliberative form of participation, which also meant that the government would have to play a more adjudicative role than previously. Furthermore, it meant that participation would not be open-ended, but ordered and structured, making use of existing or new institutions. This would provide the framework of participation under the Concertación until the 2006 protests, when sections of the educational community associated with the Left declared that the Concertación was behaving in an elitist manner which privileged private interests over social ones (Bloque Social 2006). Yet notwithstanding the government’s more deliberative response in the presidential advisory commission that followed, this now appears to have been an exception to the rule of representation.

Before examining the Concertación’s approach to participation, it is worth noting that despite new forms of social activism and organisation, Chilean democracy is characterised as one where technocratic decision-making is especially prominent (Moulian 2002; Salcedo 2005; Águila 2005). Both of the two main Chilean political party coalitions, the Concertación and the Alianza, have been dominated by the same elites since the early 1990s (Hidalgo 2005; Salcedo 2005). This is suggested by evidence which suggests that despite the general liberalisation within Chilean society, individuals remain politically conservative (Palacios and Martinez 2006). This is reflected by the growing vote share of the Right since the 1990s, as society has become more concerned with issues such as delinquency and crime rates over those of political freedom or equality (Lehmann and Hinzpeter 2001). Indeed, Cleuren (2007) notes that Chilean civil society appears broadly supportive of the government’s approach, showing little interest either in more participatory politics or those on the Left who advocate it. Consequently, there would appear to be a lack of pressure or incentive for political parties to change. Such a situation has its own advantages for Concertación politicians and the Right. Recalling the turbulence and polarisation of the pre-1973 period, they favour a more technocratic form of government. The civil service assists this attitude by operating in a manner is both centralised and suspicious of wider involvement, either by NGOs or the wider public (Cleuren 2007).

Despite this sclerotic image of Chilean politics and its criticisms by the Left, the Concertación has arguably been more accommodating of participation than is supposed – even if its willingness to include previously excluded groups means that it does so through state institutional channels rather than more deliberative, grassroots-based methods. Nationally, the Concertación was characterised as pursuing a top-down form of policymaking from the centre, through the minister and advisors at
Mineduc. This was shown by its educational reforms concerning curricular content and objectives, and the various recommended methodologies for teaching and learning (Thomas and Hernandez 2001). In the early 1990s this involved a National Conversation on Secondary Education between 1992 and 1993, which the government claimed involved 30,000 students, teachers and business people in 2000 groups (Programa MECE 1997). For a number of left-wing associated NGOs and teachers’ organisations though, this did not represent any meaningful consultation, since it was shaped from the centre rather than emerging from wider civil society. Meanwhile, the Right opposed the process and sought to slow its progress towards implementation (Doyle 2004).

Despite the government’s commitment to the National Conversation, it began to redirect its energies towards the Brunner Commission during 1994, which established the parameters for educational activity under the Concertación (Scope 1997). Furthermore, seen from the perspective of the 2006 presidential advisory commission, the Brunner Commission appeared substantially narrower in social representation, with a strong emphasis on technical experts. Indeed, notwithstanding the shift from Christian Democrat (PDC) to Socialist control of the Concertación by the end of the 1990s, this approach to policy-making remained strong, with substantial use of technocrats and NGOs to design and plan educational policy (Rivero 1999; Weinstein, interview, 2007). This was due to the policymaking core continuing to be dominated by educationalists, who sought consensus as a matter of course rather than by independently influential political figures from the parties that constituted the Concertación (Bitar, Garcia-Huidobro, interviews, 2007).

Locally, the Concertación sought to channel participation through particular institutions, by decentralising the basis for participation to the level of the school. There, participation would occur through the teacher in the classroom or on school councils, where students, teachers and parents would have the space to engage in educational issues (Mineduc 1993; Concertación 1994; Rivero 1999; Racynzski 1999). The government was aided by municipalities, whose response to Mineduc’s policies was more collaborative and less confrontational than that presented by other actors, such as the Colegio de Profesores (Weinstein, interview, 2007).

Aylwin’s government had sought to decentralise pedagogy, with teaching responsibilities shifted away from Mineduc to the schools (Cox 1994). This process was maintained under his successor, Eduardo Frei, whose approach to participation in the educational sector was seen as
offering a more flexible, decentralised model that offered greater responsibilities and opportunities at the school level (Concertación 1994). For example, the outcome of the National Consultation on Secondary School Curriculum provided a basis for understanding how this would occur: while the changes were deemed to be obligatory, with uniform study programmes across all schools, it would be up to schools and teachers themselves to determine and interpret how they would be taught (Mineduc 2005a; Cox, interview, 2007). Meanwhile, legislation existed to provide for consultative school councils on which students and families would be able to participate in school management (Castiglioni 2006).

The emphasis of the Concertación on representative participation meant that it was susceptible to overlooking particular groups, especially where interest groups had either not existed or were organisationally weak. Among the most visible were non-teaching staff and parents, both of whom were obliged to organise in order to engage with the government and its policies. In the first instance, this was apparent in 1996 when the government passed legislation relating to the roles, responsibilities and remuneration of non-teaching staff in educational establishments (Law 19.464). The absence of any representative body for these workers prompted the formation of CONFEMUCH the following year with 16,000 members in 92 municipalities, as of 2007 (Rodriguez, Cáceres, interviews, 2007). In the second instance, despite the Concertación’s rhetoric about the role of parents within the education system, the latter have tended to be weakly organised and consequently neglected by the government. In both cases this has been due mainly to the relative lack of information available to parents concerning the finance, management and performance of their schools (Velasco, Catalan, interviews, 2007). More recently this sense of weakness prompted the creation of a Metropolitan Association of Parents and Guardians in Santiago in 2000, which not only sought to organise these actors at the school level, but has also taken a stance alongside the Bloque Social in the 2006 education debate (Catalan, interview, 2007).

1.3. The 2006 ‘penguin revolution’: representative to deliberative participation and back again

By 2006 the Concertación’s approach to participation had apparently run its course. The early years after democracy’s return and the relative absence of social pressure and demands had accommodated
the Concertación's style of policymaking. In 2006 this no longer seemed sustainable. Mass protests, demonstrations and school occupations occurred, initially led by secondary school students (who were known as penguins for their uniforms), and soon included university students, teachers, parents and other social groups and organisations. Their complaint was about the quality of the Chilean education system, which was perceived as failing.

In addition, for the protestors, representative democracy was increasingly seen as constrained and insufficient to accommodate wider social demands, with observers claiming that democracy increased in relation to growing social mobilisation (Observatorio 2007). This perspective was not lost on concertacionistas. Cox (interview, 2007), cited Toqueville's *Democracy in America* as a comparison for what was happening in Chile in 2006: that is, expanded education coverage and mass knowledge prompted more social and political demands. At the same time, there was a shift in Concertación discourse: the newly-elected president, Michelle Bachelet, represented a distinctly different discourse to previous Concertación leaders, with a greater emphasis on societal engagement (Garcia-Huidobro, interview, 2007).

The main difference in terms of educational demands before and after 2006 was to do with the structure of the educational system. Until 2006 most interest groups had been primarily concerned with material issues (e.g. teachers' pay, student finance, sufficient resources for the voucher system). In 2006 the educational model and the right of private schools both to select and gain profit was being questioned. The demonstrations also surprised the Concertación by their intensity (Brunner, Elacqua, interviews, 2007). Finally, the main difference in the pre- and post-2006 period was the origin of demands: before it had been technical experts; but now it was coming from social groups and movements.

The Concertación's response was the creation of a presidential advisory commission to examine the state of Chilean education and make recommendations. According to its chairman, Juan Eduardo García-Huidobro, this represented a break with previous presidents and working groups, since it sought to listen to societal concerns. In other words, the process marked a change from the Concertación's usual form of participation through representative and institutional channels in favour of one that was more deliberative. The result was a greater number of representatives from social
groups and organisations than there had been in the previous educational commission, under José Joaquin Brunner, in 1994 (García-Huidobro, Weinstein, interviews, 2007).

The work of the commission coalesced around four main positions with the key differences being on the role of profit and the level at which schools should be controlled (table 1): the right-wing opposition maintained its support of for-profit schools and the existing model of municipalisation, while the left-wing opposition – the Bloque Social – opposed for-profit schools and sought greater control of the school system from the centre. The Concertación, meanwhile, consisted of elements that ranged between these two particular poles, although the more politically powerful sectors tended to be less concerned with profit and municipalisation (or Bloque Social) (García-Huidobro, Cox, interviews, 2007). The Right was obliged to shift its position owing to the groundswell of public criticism of the educational model (Cox, interview, 2007).

| Table 1: Key educational positions within the García-Huidobro commission, 2006 |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| **Bloque Social** (extra-parliamentary Left) | **Concertación** (centre and centre-left) | **Alianza** (Right) |
| Oppose for-profit schools, school fees and co-financing | Differing internal positions on for-profit schools | Defend for-profit schools |
| Reform LOCE | Differing internal positions on LOCE reform | Reform LOCE |
| Stronger state role/less municipalized system | Stronger state role/maintain municipalized system | Weaker state role/municipalized system and greater school autonomy |
| Internally divided on selection | Regulate selection (in municipal and subsidised private schools) | Defend selection |

Source: Author’s own analysis; García-Huidobro 2007

The Bloque Social arguably represents the most visible – albeit politically limited – coalition of social organisations challenging the Concertación from the Left in Chile today. As well as criticising the technical approach to policymaking since the 1990s, it sees municipalisation as disconnecting the state from its obligation to provide adequate education, and encouraging segregation within the system. Furthermore, parental choice is seen as unviable, owing to the ability of schools to select and the variability of families’ economic situations (Bloque Social 2006). Organisationally, the Bloque
Social comprises key educational actors, such as the Colegio de Profesores and the main student unions, along with teaching assistants, non-teaching staff and parents’ groups (Bloque Social 2006).

The Bloque Social today presents several further challenges to the Concertación. First, it represents a previously silent body of public opinion, by being larger than its constituent parts (Cox, interview, 2007). This is despite the fact that differences of opinion exist as to whether it is strong or weak (Brunner, Elacqua, interviews, 2007). Second, it presents political obstacles to the Concertación through its association with an alternative vision of the Left, and its association with social movements, a relationship that the Concertación increasingly lacks (Grau, interview, 2007). Forming the educational component of the Fuerza Social, the network includes former Communist Party members among its leadership. Consequently, it is perceived as more leftist than the Concertación, thereby weakening the Concertación’s hegemony in that political space, and pressuring the government to respond in two ways: on the one hand, by making concessions such as the reform of LOCE (Velasco, Elacqua, interviews, 2007), and on the other by seeking an accommodation with the Right through a national agreement in November 2007.

Despite the visibility of this non-Concertación Left during 2006, its political impact has been marginal due to institutional, ideological and organisational factors. Institutionally, unlike the Concertación and the Alianza, the Fuerza Social lacks parliamentary representation. This makes it difficult for its views to be articulated through the Concertación’s preferred way of participation, primarily through Congress (Cox, interview, 2007). Furthermore, the absence of parliamentary representation means that its ability to challenge the consensus is made that much harder, both rhetorically and practically; this presumably contributed to its marginalisation in the negotiations that took place in the commission and its separation from the consensus sought by the government (Kubal 2007). Ideologically, the agreement between the Concertación and the Alianza not only demonstrates the persistent strength of the mainstream Left and Right, but also the fact that these two groups’ political positions are not as stark as they were before 1973. This suggests that the main differences between the Left and Right are over the details of policy rather than the nature of the policies themselves (Angell 2007: 179) – thereby leaving the Fuerza Social, with its strident anti-systemic rhetoric on the outside. Organisationally, the Fuerza Social and the social sectors it represents remain relatively weak. In the 2005 elections, the presidential candidate behind which most of the non-
Concertacion Left could converge, Tomas Hirsch, achieved only 5.4% of the vote (Gobierno de Chile: Ministerio del Interior 2006). More recently, despite its visibility during the 2006 protests and subsequent involvement in the Garcia-Huibodro commission, its strength has been diminished through internal divisions and splits, the most notable of which occurred in one of its strongest constituent member groups, the teachers’ union, in late 2008 (Coordinador Nacional: Fuerza Social y Democrática del Magisterio 2008).

The Concertación’s eventual agreement with the Right in Congress in November 2007 suggests that the present round of deliberative participation has come to an end. Not only was the Bloque Social largely been frozen out of the Concertación-Alianza negotiations that followed the commission, but of the three advisory commissions enacted by Bachelet in 2006 the one on education was the most participatory. The others (social security and health) functioned largely as expert-led organisations (Aguilera 2007). Nevertheless, sections of the Concertación felt that the approach undermined representative political institutions such as Congress, by introducing a new space in which policies would be debated and negotiated (Elacqua, interview, 2007).

2. Brazil

Participation as understood for Brazilian governments has not followed a stark back-and-forth approach as that in Chile. From the military period to the present, all governments have broadly adopted the representative form of participation, which has surprisingly included the supposedly more participatory PT since 2003. In part this may be due to a less ideological polarisation between Left and Right, although variations between governments before 1995 and after are evident. Indeed, in the first decade of the New Republic, the Right was largely in government and this was reflected in the greater role played by private interests — although in contrast to Chile, this had less to do with economic interests than with self-interest, or ‘corporatist’, material concerns.

2.1. Educational participation, pre-1994

Whereas the military government in Chile was closely associated with the market model of participation, in Brazil this was less so. Yet to suggest it was representative is also erroneous. The regime was inclined to a state-led form of development and this was reflected in the types of groups it favoured. These included those of a similar inclination in the private sector and within the state
apparatus, in particular technocrats. Furthermore, throughout the regime, there was an emphasis on state planning (MEC 1965, 1967, 1973, 1976). The centralisation of the system made it easier to disseminate control and direct demands down the chain, especially as the regime ensured that administration was decentralised (McGinn and Pereira 1992). Towards the end this approach came increasingly under threat as the liberalisation process of the late 1970s (the 'abertura') spilled over into the education sector, prompting grassroots social movements to campaign for both educational and wider political reform.

Compared to the military regime that preceded it, the New Republic showed itself more open to participation by other social and political actors. This included those that the governments did not politically identify with, such as teachers' unions. In some respects it was a continuation of the period prior to 1985, when the military had begun a process of political liberalisation where social actors were increasingly gaining space. At the same time, the relative openness of the first New Republic governments in education was attributable to other factors, including awareness of the persistent 'social debt' or inequality in Brazil (Plank 1990). Meanwhile, even if the governments had wanted to control social demands they would have faced difficulties in doing so since these were increasingly autonomous. This was evident in two main arenas in this period: during the Sarney government's dialogue with the educational community in its D-Day initiative, and subsequently in the debates surrounding educational responsibilities in the 1988 constituent assembly. In both areas the government faced criticism from the teachers' unions and their allies that the dialogue was not deliberative enough and too limited by its representative format (Neubauer da Silva and Cruz 1996; CPB Notícias 1987b). The role of representative participation was not restricted solely to those groups that failed to identify politically with these governments. Other groups were forming throughout the 1980s, including the state and municipal education secretaries, into CONSED and UNDIME respectively, as well as the owners of private HEIs (Plank 1990: 556).

This criticism highlighted the extent to which the first New Republic governments were further away from the more participatory vision that the Left espoused. Given their greater inclination towards representative over deliberative participation, they more closely identified with the political Right. Furthermore, the sentiments of policy elites in this period highlighted their affinity to that end of the spectrum: Collor's second education minister, José Goldemberg, observed that while he did not
identify with neo-liberalism, he did share a more general, conservative commitment to elitism. This was most evident in his opposition to directly elected university chancellors, over which he clashed with the more left-leaning teachers’ unions (interview, 2008).

Meanwhile private interests of a sort did predominate. Such interests were less economically-oriented and instead more particular, and were personalist. Increasingly, governments were subject to the pressures and demands of subnational administrations and their policies, thereby limiting the capacity of the federal level to coordinate the education system as a whole. This included a wide range of policies and actions, from the popular participatory educational policies enacted under Paulo Freire in São Paulo city to the creation of prefabricated new schools and community centres by Lionel Brizola in Rio de Janeiro state, and – eventually at the federal level – by President Collor himself (Mignot 2001; Velloso 2004). Indeed, the latter faced considerable criticism from teachers, who claimed that he was failing to involve civil society and Congress in his policies and was offering too few incentives for public schools (CNTE Notícias 1991, 1992). Yet this self-interest was not one-way. It was also reflected in the way that government perceived the educational community. Although ideologically aligned with the Left, the general view was that teachers and students remained largely ‘corporatist’ actors, concerned mainly with material maximisation, including salaries, grants and credit (Goldemberg, interview, 2008).

2.2. Participation under the Cardoso government

The Cardoso government adopted a broadly representative approach to participation that was characterised by the use of institutions – and in particular those associated with the state. As a result social movements that did not have sufficient organisation or involvement in the state apparatus received less attention, at least according to those movements themselves (e.g. the teachers and student movements).

The Cardoso government’s main focus after 1994 was the creation or reform of institutions through the laying out of new directives and state bodies. This included the creation of a new LDB defined the structure and responsibilities of the educational system, and the changes to the state structures for proposing and developing policy. It also brought an end to what had become an
increasing phenomenon under the Franco government (1992-94), of bilateral pacts signed between government and social actors (Arelaro, interview, 2008).

Despite the government’s approach, in early 1995 it appeared that the new administration was going to pursue a direction that was more deliberative (Arelaro, interview, 2008). Cardoso’s election manifesto had emphasised the role of the ‘community’ in educational policy and made reference to participation through various campaigns involving various groups (Cardoso 1994). For the Left in the educational community, this soon proved not to be the case, as the drafting of the FUNDEF proposals and the constitutional amendment setting out the parameters of federal, state and municipal responsibility for educational provision soon demonstrated (Arelaro, interview, 2008). The government had a distinct view of what participation, or ‘community’, entailed: rather than all education actors, it mainly meant parents and wider civil society (Cunha 1995; Naspolini 2001). Furthermore, ‘civil society’ in this context included private interests, which would potentially reduce the degree of influence that such left-leaning organisations such as teachers’ and students’ unions would have in educational policy. The new government adopted this stance partly because it saw the existence of ‘corporatist’ or particular interests as detrimental to achieving change. Cardoso (2006) acknowledged as much in his political memoirs, noting that the MEC bureaucracy was highly susceptible to corporate and political influences, making reform in the higher education sector, and in the decentralisation process, substantially difficult to achieve.

Indeed, concern with corporatist interests prompted the administration to introduce changes to the state structures to minimise these influences (Souza 2005: 148). At the national level official rules and bodies were recognised. The Federal Education Council (CFE) was replaced by the National Education Council (CNE), which involved new membership procedures and competences. They appeared to give greater weight to MEC, by not only giving it the right to choose with whom it consulted, but also in drawing up the final recommended membership list (MEC 2007). Cury (1996) observed that the new system was consequently too skewed towards the executive and its agenda and did not adequately capture the concerns of the wider educational actors, such as students and academics, who complained of being overlooked (Neves 1999). This latter criticism was politically motivated, given these groups’ opposition towards the Cardoso government after 1995. Executive power was also reflected in the changes made to the election of university chancellors: while teachers
would constitute 70% of voters, they would be required to put forward three candidates, one of whom would then be selected by the education minister (Brasil: Presidente da Republica 1996). In contrast students and teachers had favoured direct elections. Locally, the government sought to transfer powers and resources directly to schools (Cardoso 2006). This occurred in several ways, including the use of small federal sums and efforts to devolve the management of primary schools to the municipalities in the 1996 LDB.

The use of official rules reflected the government's priority of participating with state actors as opposed to civil society. The passage of the LDB was one such example. Another was the involvement of the state education secretaries in the development of national curricular guidelines (Brasil: Presidente da Republica 1996). Despite the government's rhetoric on the need for more community participation in schools, research during the period suggested relatively little had changed at the local level. This was especially the case regarding parental involvement (Maia et al 2001; World Bank 2003). Indeed, school councils were the forum by which parents were best placed to influence educational issues. These were set up at by the state governments from the 1980s on. However, even in Ceará state, where Cardoso's PSDB allies oversaw the establishment of such councils, parents' awareness of their function on such bodies was poor and dependent on the teaching staff and head teacher (Maia et al 2001). Furthermore, even among the most aware parents, the federal delineation of educational responsibility, and the bulk of primary and secondary education fell to state and municipal governments, which meant there was presumably less pressure on them to organise nationally as opposed to subnationally.

To combat what it saw as 'corporatism', the government was also inclined to use the media as a means of going around those it considered to be obstructive, thereby and appealing to wider society. This occurred on several occasions, including a defence of the new Provão higher education assessment exercise after teachers and students threatened to boycott it, and inviting the press to sit in during pay negotiations between the university teachers and the government (Souza 2005). Similarly, the use of media promotion was prominent in the administration's publicising its prioritisation of primary education, through the use of the Wake Up Brazil! (Acorda Brasil!) and All Children in School (Todos na Escola) campaigns during the Cardoso presidency (Cardoso, interview, 2008). The use of the media by the government was not new: it had been a key part of the 1994 election
campaign in which the manifesto and the communications teams were designed to work closely together (Souza 2005). However, using the media constitutes a relatively limited form of participation. By its nature it was a one-way process, designed to promote and defend the government’s agenda rather than engage in a wider dialogue on educational policy.

The extent to which the Cardoso government had sought to reduce the threat of corporatist influences and make use of representative participation culminated in its National Education Plan in 2001. Produced within MEC rather than through a deliberative process (such as that which occurred in Chile in 2006), the wider educational community criticised it for failing to promote sufficient funding. The teachers’ union, the CNTE, noted that it was never fully consulted on the plan and that neither did the government appear willing to accept amendments from civil society organisations (Vieira, interview, 2007). Concerns were raised at the lack of credit for poorer university students, pensions for retired teachers and salary plans for non-teaching staff. These were developed into a series of amendments that supporters in the wider educational community, including the PT, sponsored when the plan came before Congress. In 2001 Cardoso vetoed nine of these demands, citing constitutional, financial and planning grounds for doing so (Presidência da República: Casa Civil 2001; CNTE 2002; Peixoto 2001).

2.3. Participation during the first Lula term

The representative approach to participation was largely maintained under Cardoso’s successor, Lula. But whereas the Cardoso period was seen as constraining participation (certainly by those social movements that felt excluded from the process), under Lula it was perceived as more accommodating. This did not mean that the process was made more deliberative; the new government maintained the institutions introduced by Cardoso while being more attuned to the demands of previously excluded groups, such as teachers and students.

The use of the state to recognise who was included in the policy process heralded a shift in thinking by the PT. Until the mid-1990s there had always been a tension at the heart of participation within the party. While all broadly agreed on the need to have as wide participation as possible, this had different interpretations. At one extreme were those activists and social movements who believed the party should act in the interests of those it represented: essentially the otherwise excluded and overlooked. At the other end were those activists (usually in elected state positions as mayors or
governors) who argued that they had to act in the interests of the wider community, including social
groups that the PT did not usually align with. This was a tension that has been at the heart of PT
administrations since the early 1980s (see Keck 1992, Baiocchi 2003b; Macaulay and Burton 2003).

The PT has recognised these difficulties and argues that the solution is for more democracy
rather than bureaucracy (Pontual and Almeida Silva 1999). Yet how this is to be achieved seems
vague and open to interpretation. Furthermore, the very ambiguity of the rhetoric made its practical
application not only difficult to achieve but may well have contributed towards reinforcing the very
criticisms made by the ‘inclusive’ group within the PT. Pontual and Ameida’s ‘radicalised democracy’
and increased citizen activity was associated with the participatory budget, arguably the most notable
and readily identifiable policy associated with the PT in the 1990s. However, since then this
participatory approach has been undermined as a tool for achieving radical change. This is evident
through the increasing involvement of organisations as opposed to direct democracy, and the degree
to which the system has been used to co-opt groups (Cabannes 2004).

In education, the PT’s arrival at MEC similarly showed up the difficulty of pursuing policies that
focused on the party faithful. Regardless of the PT’s sympathies, the government faced demands and
expectations from other actors such as the private sector (Nascimento interview, 2006). The new
administration therefore had to accommodate wider, more diverse interests that could potentially come
into conflict with its own constituent base. In this context, the resort to use of the existing state
apparatus was therefore advantageous since it shifted debate from within the party to the level of the
state. As a result the PT’s approach to participation and dialogue did not differ dramatically from that
undertaken during the Cardoso years (Costa, interview, 2008).

The reliance on the state as the arbiter for participation was reflected in the main policies
undertaken during the first Lula term and into the second. At the broadest level, the government failed
to engage social movements and organisations in anything like the same format that it did during the
1990s, and the participatory budget. Both the Council for Social and Economic Development (CDES)
and the Multiyear Plan (PPA) ended up more consultative and dominated by the executive than being
collaborative (Baiocchi and Checa 2008). In education the same state-dominated perspective was
similarly evident: the development of FUNDEB, the higher education review and reform bill along with
the drafting of the Education Development Plan (PDE) were all undertaken within MEC. Much of this
arguably had to do with the PT leadership's greater access to resources and information within the ministry compared to outside.

The rules of the game suited a wider educational community that has been broadly established since the 1980s: organisations represent a cross-section of categories, from managers of private HEIs to teachers' unions in both the public and private sector, and from students to state actors (i.e. state and municipal level education secretaries). However, the PT's entry into national level government presented particular obstacles, especially for those movements that have historically associated themselves with it. Indeed, they were a relatively weak voice during an MEC-sponsored basic education conference in the early part of the first Lula term (Chagas, interview, 2008). One reason for this may be due to these organisations' willingness to allow the government to take the lead in policymaking, on the assumption that the new leadership reflected their own objectives.

Another reason for the social movements' relative weakness may be due to the nature of lobbying in a federal system. Buarque (interview, 2008) noted that given the decentralised management of basic education, the national level organisations were consequently relatively weak. Since states and municipalities are directly responsible for basic (primary and secondary) education, which consisted of the bulk of Brazil's education system, movements lobbying for change at this level had to direct their pressure to the subnational education secretariats. By contrast federal government had direct constitutional responsibility for higher education only – which meant that only those movements associated with the sector had much influence with the federal government.

This greater pressure at the higher education level was perhaps best reflected in the policies pursued by the PT government during 2003-06. But even here there was arguably some shift in emphasis between the Cardoso and Lula governments. Whereas Paulo Renato Souza and his team had sought to challenge 'corporatism', the Lula government sought a compromise between the different interests. For its supporters in the academic and student communities, MEC replaced the Provão with Sinaes and ProUni. The ProUni benefited both poorer students as well as the private HEI managers, who had been seeking state support (Barreyro 2007). Similarly quotas in federal universities were made available to minorities and those who had attended public schools (Arroyo, interview, 2008; Brasil: Presidente da Republica 2005).
3. Conclusion

Contrary to expectations, the distinction between the Third Way and Participatory Left is not easily perceivable in the manner in which these governments approach participation in the education sector generally. While both the Concertación and Cardoso governments demonstrate a relatively close affinity between the Third Way, and more representative approaches to participation, this also appeared to be the case for the PT government during the first Lula term. Indeed, just as the more deliberative form of policymaking declined prior to the PT entering government, so too did its own approach to participation. Whereas the Cardoso government’s approach sought deliberately to weaken the power of ‘corporatist’ interests, such as the well-organised teacher and student movements, the Lula government found its commitment to representative forms of participation owed much to context. By 2003, the party faced the combination of its formerly more deliberative approach to policymaking being substantially weakened, and the petistas who now occupied positions within the state (MEC) having relatively greater influence and access to resources. This encouraged them to make use of the formal state bodies and institutions already in existence, prompting education stakeholders to engage the PT within the state.

Consequently, in all three cases the main form of participation was conducted through institutional channels, either already established or set up at the state level by each government. In Chile, the Concertación opted for the representative path since it ensured that its own position – including the politicians leading the coalition and the bureaucrats employed to implement policy – remained paramount, especially after the relative decline of civil society as a mobilising force. This was evident in the government’s use of school boards as the means of encouraging local participation. While nationally it sought to constrain participation through convening educational commissions in 1994 and 2006. In both cases not only was membership based on organisational size and presence, but the parameters for debate were largely defined by the government. Indeed, the later commission was the result of the government seeking to institutionalise the growing social demands and dissatisfaction around the educational system. Social groups seemed attuned to this perspective: new legislation and institutions introduced during the 1990s prompted previously unorganised groups to mobilise, for example as parents and non-teaching staff, in order to gain both official recognition and to be able to participate.
In Brazil the Cardoso government created new state institutions, such as the CNE, through which the influence of social movements was minimised by the presence of official groups at the state and municipal levels. Similarly, the development of policies was kept within MEC, limiting participation to a form of consultation, in which teachers and students would be but one voice. While the Cardoso government’s approach therefore helped constrain those actors that it considered ‘corporatist’, its association with civil society organisations was weak. Unlike the PT, the PSDB did not have any strong links with educational organisations, other than the academics that constituted its policymaking core. Meanwhile, under Lula, the institutional approach has persisted, reflecting the extent to which the insertion of the party into the state apparatus contributes towards a more representative approach.

Various factors, including the separation of educational responsibility between the federal, state and municipal levels, arguably weakened the influence that many of the social movements associated with the government might have – especially in the largest education sector: that related to basic education.

In addition, the PT government also experienced a ‘honeymoon’ period during its first term, during which social movements either waited for the administration to propose policy or were uncertain what stance to adopt.

Perhaps the options for social democratic governments – whether Third Way or Participatory Left – are more limited than the participation models suggest. Certainly, all three cases tended toward the representative rather than the deliberative approach. Efforts to create a more participatory form of engagement cannot be conducted without the establishment of certain parameters; both the ENU and National Conference on Education under the UP government in Chile in the early 1970s involved some degree of organisation and representation. In the 1990s the PT also introduced participatory mechanisms at the municipal level; like the Chilean case, this also required frameworks to be developed from the centre. In both instances the measures suffered from political polarisation surrounding and within them. Even in less polarised or politically charged settings, such as the most participatory effort by any of the three governments to date – the Garcia-Huidobro commission in 2006 – the prospects for deliberation seems constrained. Participation required education stakeholders to be organised as interest groups, and also set out a timetable by which to report back its findings and recommendations. This possibly suggests that deliberation, especially in its most organic and least rule-driven version, is no more than an ideal rather than being achievable in practical terms.
The lesson regarding social democrats and participation, then, is that to engage the government a social group must take on forms of organisation that will provide it with official recognition. Yet this does not mean that all groups will consequently be treated equally. As the following chapters and the focus on government relations with key educational actors will show – teachers, students and private interests – much of that engagement is influenced by political ideology and the affinity, or not, between government and social movements.
9. A compromised position: Private interests and social democratic governments

For the Left, the presence of private interests challenges the notion of education as a public good, prompting it to be treated with suspicion. Crouch (2003), for example, suggests that the introduction of private interests into public services affects the nature of the public system and distorts citizenship, by weakening the link that individuals have with the state. If public services are provided by private organisations, then citizens are unable to influence the system through the vote. The private sector, for its part sees its role in a different light. Since the 1980s its discourse has stressed its relatively cheaper cost and greater productivity compared to the centralised inefficiency of public systems, (Puryear and Olivios 1995; World Bank 2007; Albornoz 1993). The rhetoric appears to have captured some degree of support, as the World Bank (2007) reports a rising proportion of families accessing private primary and secondary schools, including in developing countries.

The question for social democratic governments then is how best to manage the relationship with a prominent actor in education. The private education sector has shown a considerable capacity to organise itself, especially in comparison to other social actors. This is the case even though the private education sector is not homogenous: it includes entrepreneurs who own and manage for-profit institutions and other non-profit, religious and community-based schools and universities. Notwithstanding the variation, the private sector has managed to organise itself effectively, thereby enabling it to influence public policy. Given social democrats' disposition towards representative participation through state institutions, this has meant that such governments in Brazil and Chile have largely opted to either accommodate existing institutions or to change the rules of the game around private interests. Where governments have sought to impose conditions on private interests – or where the sector itself feared an adverse impact – the government has faced obstruction and, on occasion, has had to abandon its objectives. This has been the case regardless of whether the government has been from the Third Way or Participatory Left.

Yet even though the direction of the social democratic government-private education sector relationship has been largely one-way, the composition and ideological differences between Third Way and Participatory Left social democracy should mean that nuances do exist. For example, the Third
Way's greater accommodation, both of the market and the use of representative participation (i.e. through organised groups), should mean that it is more willing to cede space to the private sector in terms of policy direction and outcomes, more so than the social movement-oriented Participatory Left.

That this difference between the two forms of social democracy did not occur may be attributed to the willingness of all three governments to treat the private sector as a partner rather than as one interest group among many. In Chile this was due not only to the Concertación’s determination to strike a balance between different educational actors, but also its inheritance. Unlike the federal Brazilian model, where the government was only responsible for higher education, Chile’s unitary nature meant it was responsible at all levels. This made government policy more complicated, since it inherited a school system in 1990 where nearly half of all students were in private schools. Furthermore, the system had been formalised to include state subsidies for a rising number of private schools after 1980.

Meanwhile, in Brazil both the Cardoso and the first-term Lula governments faced a relatively uncoordinated and unplanned private university sector. With limited resources available for higher education expansion, the two governments treated the private sector as a partner which could provide the growing demand for university places.

1. Chile

Among Latin America's education systems, Chile has a more market-oriented model than most. This trend was encouraged after 1980, following the various military decrees that opened up the education sector to private interests. The Concertación therefore faced a substantial and relatively well organised private sector when it took office in 1990. This was especially the case in the school system, where a tripartite system operated, with municipal (public) schools, state-subsidised private and private schools. This led to a policy approach that has not substantially altered the system, partly because of the growing dependence that successive governments have had on the sector to ensure sufficient educational provision.

1.1. The Private Sector in Education prior to 1990

At the school level Chile had a notable private sector even before the military coup (Bosch, interview, 2007). Allende’s Popular Unity (UP) government had sought to integrate private schools into a
national and publicly controlled education system through the National Unified School (ENU) proposal (Superintendencia de Educación Pública 1971; Núñez, interview 1, 2007). ENU raised fears among the middle class of socialist indoctrination in schools and threaten the role of the Church and family in education. This contributed towards the general climate of fear and suspicion that precipitated the military coup in 1973 (Farrell 1986). The military response was to emphasise the role of the family and the principle of subsidiarity, or decision-making, at the lowest possible level, in government. This would be achieved by reducing the role of the state, providing space and private competition in the education sector (Riesco 1981).

Following evaluations undertaken by the ODEPLAN and Mineduc between 1977 and 1981 and Pinochet’s March 1979 presidential directive, several decrees followed in 1980 and 1981. School administration was municipalised (Schiefelbein 1982; Bosch, interview, 2007) and management deregulated, leading to a substantial increase in the number of private schools. These schools were entitled to select their students, and were funded by the state through a ‘voucher’ system. The voucher system not only introduced a degree of choice into the system, it also rationalised resources by only paying schools for their number of students. However, the system never provided full competition and choice, as some in the government favoured (Dittborn, interview, 2007): rather than being directly paid to parents to spend at their preferred school, it was allocated by Mineduc on the parents’ behalf.

Despite the incompleteness of the voucher system, the impact of the changes was swift. Between 1981 and 1990 the number of students in municipal schools fell by over a fifth, while the number matriculated in subsidised private schools more than doubled. The trend persisted after the return to democracy in 1990: during the first 15 years of Concertación government the number of municipal school students remained broadly steady, but the drive towards subsidised private schools continued, with the number enrolled rising by more than half again (figure 10).
While the military's efforts to deregulate the education system had proved successful, sections of the private sector felt underrepresented. The private sector had begun to organise itself during the 1980s, the two main bodies being the Chilean Private Colleges (CONACEP) and the Federation of Private Education Institutions (FIDE). As of 2007, they represented around 1400 schools between them, with CONACEP members responsible for over half a million students. Despite the relatively privileged status of the private sector, it felt that it was not able to participate fully; this was due in large part to the non-democratic nature of the regime. In addition, the organisations felt that the state still retained too much control and supplied too little funding both in education generally and in the voucher system (Bosch, interview, 2007).

At the university level, a similar deregulation and competition took place after 1980. Prior to the military coup there were eight universities and around 71,000 students. These universities included both state and state-funded private institutions, which accounted for 70% of government higher education spending. The sector began to suffer as student numbers more than doubled between 1966 and 1975, while coordination between universities and the use of resources remained poor and inefficient (Oficina de Planificación Nacional 1971, 1977).
The higher education reforms of the early 1980s occurred alongside the changes to the school system. The measures at tertiary level were similarly designed to develop a market in the sector, by curtailing public universities’ autonomy and established funding streams, while also making it easier for new, privately-run institutions to be established. The impact of the reforms initially encouraged selection and reduced the proportion of the budget spent on higher education (Newsome 1993). By the early 2000s, the objectives of the military regime – to reduce the burden of higher education on the state – appeared to have been realised. The proportion of public to private spending in higher education was reversed, from 70% public to around 70% private (Marcel and Tokman 2005). The ease of entry into higher education was combined with relative freedom of private HEIs to organise their courses and collaborate with external actors, such as business. Regulation was effectively left to the market while there was a general absence of accountability mechanisms (Brunner and Uribe 2007: 195-7).

As well as introducing new types of institutions and courses, and stimulating greater research, the changes paradoxically led to a less elitist culture in higher education (Brunner 1989). Expanded coverage meant that higher education was no longer limited to richer sections of society, but was now accessible to all social classes. The flipside to this, of course, was an ability to pay for that education since the shortfall in resources resulting from the military reforms meant that students and their families had to contribute towards their own tuition.

1.2. The Private Sector and the Concertación

Since 1990 the Concertación government has sought to balance the needs and demands of the various social groups such as teachers, students and private interests within the education system. This is largely due to its inheritance of the strongly market-oriented philosophy bequeathed it by the outgoing military. As a result its main way of dealing with the private sector was to accommodate the school structure while aiming to improve it at the margins. This has included the use of targeted resources to schools and more recently proposals for a differentiated voucher system that would help poorer-performing schools in lower socio-economic areas (Cox 2007).

Another reason why the Concertación chose to work with the private sector was the residually strong Right in Congress which provided allies to private interests in education. In addition, within the
Concertación there was no consensus about the private sector, ranging from support to opposition. This meant there was no agreement over the extent of private sector involvement in education. By contrast, the Right had a clear and simple argument: that private schools provide a ‘better’ education, since although state-funded private schools have the same level of resources as municipal ones, they tend to outperform them in exam scores (Larrain 1997; Cáceres 2007). This is despite the fact that public and private schools do not compete equally (García-Huidobro, interview, 2007; Marcel and Tokman 2005). Private schools (both those funded by the state and those which are not) are able to select their students, whereas municipal schools cannot.

Part of the reason for the Concertación’s failure in taking a clear stand on the private sector is that much of its support is also drawn from these same private interests. On the one hand the rise in the number of school students attending state-subsidised private schools means a growing number of their parents – potential Concertación voters – are part of the system. On the other hand, according to the CONACEP president, many of the organisation’s members are middle class supporters of the main political parties in both the Concertación and opposition sides (Bosch, interview, 2007). The breadth of political opinion ensures that they coalesce around common interests, including schools’ autonomy, the right to profit and pupil selection (Velasco, Bosch, interviews, 2007). Such circumstances make it difficult for the Concertación to repudiate the private sector completely.

The role of the private sector has also benefited the Concertación in other ways, in particular by supplying resources that would otherwise be lacking. Indeed, by 2003 the private sector accounted for 46% of spending in primary education, 49% in secondary and 72% in higher education (Marcel and Tokman 2005). At the school level the 1993 tax code which included co-financing, also contributed towards greater private resources.

The impact of co-financing helped increase the number of students in subsidised private schools after 1990. This was in keeping with the government’s drive to increase family and private sector involvement and contribution in education during its first years in office (Concertación 1994). At the same time, the Chilean school system is extremely socially segregated (table 2), so subsidised schools were at an advantage by having children from the middle and upper middle sections whose parents could afford such contributions. Meanwhile, enrolment figures in state funded private schools remained largely static. The change in the tax code enabled exemptions to be made on school
donations, as well as any co-finance made by parents (Raczynski 1999; Aedo 1998; Carnoy and McEwan 2001). The introduction of co-finance caused tensions within the Concertación during the tax reform bill’s passage through Congress. However, any concerns had to be put to one side, as the political arithmetic in Congress meant that the bill required the support of the Right – which demanded the exemption remain – in order to be passed (Garcia-Huidobro, Elacqua, interviews, 2007). The exemption is therefore seen as an unintended policy by the government, even if it did plug the gap in public expenditure.

Table 2: Significant social class segregation by school type in Chile (2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quintile</th>
<th>% Municipal school enrolment</th>
<th>% Subsidised school enrolment</th>
<th>% Private school enrolment</th>
<th>% as a total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A (Low)</td>
<td>79.4</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B (Lower Middle)</td>
<td>81.9</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C (Middle)</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D (Upper Middle)</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>81.6</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E (Upper)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>93.9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mineduc 2006

Furthermore, co-finance is a measure that still prompts division to this day. Bitar (interview, 2007) accepted the need for it in the 1990s when schools needed more resources, but today feels that it does not take into account parents’ different income levels and ability to pay. Elacqua (interview, 2007), meanwhile, feels that eliminating it without also providing sufficient regulation, greater accountability and an end to selection, will make little difference. The private sector meanwhile claims that not all state-subsidised schools have benefited; CONACEP claims that while co-payment has contributed more funds in wealthier areas, this has not been the case for those schools with students from poorer families and areas. Furthermore, the average amount contributed remains relatively low, at Ch$40,000 per student each month (Bosch, interview, 2007).

Given concerns regarding the level of funding in Chilean schools (both state and state-funded private), by the mid-2000s both the Concertación and the wider political spectrum was united in seeing the need for the use of more targeted resources, and the introduction of a preferential subsidy to schools taking in more vulnerable students. During the 2005 presidential campaign, the right-wing candidate, Joaquín Lavín expressed no great opposition to a differentiated voucher scheme when it was proposed by Lagos (Elacqua, Velasco, interviews, 2007). The Left, in the guise of the Bloque
Social, meanwhile maintains that state-funded private schools should not be able to select or for-profit (Bloque Social 2006). Indeed, following the Concertación-Right agreement on education in November 2007, it was proposed that private schools would not be allowed to select before the seventh grade and should no longer be allowed to select on the basis of family income. Instead, it could only be done on academic achievement and association with the school’s objectives (e.g. religious identification) (Puryear 2007a).

The division between these two positions is based on the way that each side views the ‘voucher’ paid to state-funded private schools, regardless of empirical evidence that provides no conclusive proof either way whether such schools are better than municipal ones (Sapelli 2002). To the Left, these are public funds, whereas the Right views them as originating from the individual, even if they are collected as a tax (Velasco, interview, 2007). Furthermore, the Right places emphasis on the right of the individual (in this case the parent and student) to be able to choose, and of providers to offer the widest range of options possible. Diversity, then, is a virtue. Given the various positions held within the Concertación, the difference between the two political positions has been largely sidestepped by the Concertación centre which has tried to shift the focus away from a debate over public and private in favour of one that concentrates on standards, accountability and performance (Elacqua, interview, 2007).

At the university level the role of the private sector is similarly prominent. More than 90% of Chilean higher education institutions are private, with nearly 70% of students enrolled within them (Informe del Consejo Asesor Presidencial 2008: 7); 72% of funding in the sector is concentrated in private hands (Marcel and Tokman 2005). Indeed, compared to OECD countries, Chile’s higher education sector is among the most privately oriented globally; only South Korea, Japan, Kazakhstan, Indonesia and Colombia come relatively close (Brunner and Uribe 2007: 185). Despite its presence though, Chile’s private higher education sector has arguably received less scholarly attention compared to its school system. Nevertheless, the same arguments tend to be advanced in this sector as in the school system, in particular the right to autonomy and selection.

The incoming Concertación government had the same concerns about HEIs as the previous regime. In particular this included the relative lack of coordination between the state, institutions and productive sectors such as business or industry (Aylwin 1994a). In addition the new government felt
that the proliferation of new HEIs had not been sufficiently overseen. An early response was the creation of a Higher Education Council (Consejo Superior de Educación), with a duty to supervise the system and ensure the accreditation of private institutions (Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación 2006; Consejo Superior de Educación 1998). However, this accreditation process remained largely voluntary among all universities, with reliance on exam results and the market as the means by which the higher education system was regulated (Brunner and Uribe 2007: 195-7). Indeed, by 2005 a government review concluded that the system remained largely deregulated and uncoordinated (Informe del Consejo Asesor Presidencial 2008: 9).

Meanwhile, the government cut back on direct state funding to private HEIs. Whereas this remained available to public universities, state resources entered private higher education in a more indirect fashion after 1990. Such institutions were allowed to participate peripherally in some government finance programmes and their students were able to access credit for their studies (Brunner and Uribe 2007: 197). This was reinforced by Lagos's decision to allow students to gain additional funds if an institution was accredited (Castiglioni 2006). This reflected the aim of the Concertación to introduce more state-related regulation – as opposed to direct intervention – through accreditation, into the system (Concertación 1994) and highlighted the extent to which the government accommodated private interests as opposed to challenging them.

2. Brazil

Compared to Chile, Brazil is less dependent on private interests at the school level. However, in higher education much of the growing demand of the 1960s and 1970s was met through private provision. To achieve this, the military regime deregulated the system without providing sufficient means of quality control. Given the Cardoso government's concern with organising and more effectively monitoring the (higher) educational sector, various measures in the 1990s were introduced. Those that were perceived to be in the interests of the private sector flourished (e.g. enabling new institutions to be set up), while those that were seen as detrimental were opposed (e.g. regulatory mechanisms such as the Provão and the accreditation system). The same occurred in the first Lula term, with the ProUni programme (where the state provided financial support to private institutions) being accepted and the university reform bill being opposed.
2.1. The Private Sector in Brazil in Education prior to 1995

Like Chile, the private sector has always been present in the education system. Prior to the military coup the debate surrounding the 1961 national guidelines (LDB) was dominated by the opposing positions of supporters for public and private education, resulting in a balance between the two positions (Plank 1996; Morales-Gómez and Torres 1992). This changed after 1964, as the new regime provided greater space for the private sector to participate.

As in Chile, the military governments saw the private sector as a partner and the means for greater education provision, especially as a means of satisfying demand that it was either unable or unwilling to meet through the public sector. However, unlike Chile, the size of the private school system was never as substantial. Indeed, between the end of the military regime and 2000 the numbers attending private schools remained largely constant and formed a diminishing part of the total, as the public system nearly doubled between 1982 and 2000 (figure 11). By contrast, the situation was different at the university level, where the private sector consistently accounted for around two-thirds of students during the same period (IBGE 1983: 284; 1990: 198; 1996: 2-183; 2000: 2-201).

Even if private interests in Brazil's school system have tended to be more modest than in Chile, they are still influential. It was generally the higher income groups that made use of them where there was no good public school to be found. For lower income groups that lacked public schools – let alone good ones – this proved more costly effect as they were obliged to pay disproportionately more for (private) education compared to richer income groups (Birdsall et al 1996).
In Brazil the growth of private education has faced a number of problems. These have ranged from being insufficiently coordinated and managed, while also being vulnerable to economic shocks. During the late 1970s, national industry observed persisting distortions and income inequalities owing to a failure in planning between the education system and the labour market (CNI 1979). The expansion of institutions (especially HEIs) was seen as directionless and had occurred with little supervision and evaluation or use of quality controls (Banas 1974; Souza 2005; Schwartzmann, interview, 2007). Meanwhile, the debt crisis of the early 1980s highlighted the risk of relying on the private sector to deliver a public good as the number of basic and higher education institutions fell.

The New Republic oversaw this deterioration in both the public and private sectors during its first decade. There was little prospect of change, not least because the size of the private sector across the school and university system was strong enough to ensure that it was not directly challenged by government. Indeed, the reliance on private education at the expense of the public system meant that government from national to municipal levels was transferring large sums to the sector (Plank 1990: 551). By the early 1990s the number of private HEIs was already beginning to
increase (Durham, interview, 2008), pre-dating the expansion that is generally attributed to the laissez-faire attitude of the Cardoso years.

When comparing the Cardoso and Lula governments and their relationship to the private sector, two factors must be considered: first, changes related to administrative responsibility of education which made higher education the main arena for government-private sector relations after 1995; second, the main policies associated with higher education were the same under both presidents. This included efforts to introduce regulation and autonomy into the system.

2.2. The Private Sector and the Cardoso government

Given the federal government’s responsibility for higher education, the new Cardoso government’s main involvement with the private sector was at this level. The government saw the private sector as a partner in its educational policies and, unlike its critics in the PT and social movements, it was more inclined to accommodate private interests, be they business, national and international NGOs or international sources. The government felt confident in its position, since it believed it could maintain overall public control (Souza 2005). Indeed, the Cardoso government showed its willingness to work with private interests at the school level by creating a partnership with industrialists soon after coming to office. The result was the Wake Up Brazil! (Acorda Brasil!) campaign which was designed to promote greater uptake of primary education (Cardoso, interview, 2008).

However, the private sector was not as unified as it seemed. Two main groups constituted it: industrialists and big business on the one hand, and managers of private HEIs on the other (Rodrigues 2007). Although both groups advocated freedom of choice and diversity in educational provision, industry saw its main concern as national development, while private HEI managers were primarily concerned with raising public and private funds. They questioned the right of the government to interfere in what they saw as their private interests, especially when an external assessment system was introduced. Indeed, they query whether the state is capable of being objective in this respect, owing to its dual role as both provider of public education (at the university level) and evaluator of quality. Meanwhile, the industrialists, including the National Confederation of Industry (CNI) and the finance community-associated Herbert Levy Institute, stressed the importance of national solutions,
such as a minimum amount of government spending per primary school student and the adoption of national and permanent systems of quality assessment (de Oliveira 2003).

During the Cardoso years HEI managers were the most visible of private actors. The government’s approach to addressing private interest concerns in higher education was therefore to lay out the rules of the game. We have observed that the growth of private educational institutions throughout the system prior to 1995 had been largely un-orchestrated. The new administration therefore sought to create some institutional parameters, which it delivered through the new LDB. These guidelines delineated responsibility for education, including in the university sector, and thus differentiating between the various kinds of private institutions, such as confessional, community-based and philanthropic endeavours. The guidelines were designed to make it easier for the creation of new HEIs by other actors while limiting the state’s role to that of supervision and scrutiny (Souza 2005). Indeed, Souza claimed that he had wanted to make the higher education system more flexible and break what he considered to be an effective cartel between the established public and existing private HEIs (interview, 2007).

Deregulation led to a surge in private HEIs. Between 1994 and 2003 the proportion of universities that were public fell from a quarter to 11% (França 2005). By the late 1990s, 75% of university students were in private HEIs (Trindade 2000). Given the now-recognised heterogeneity of the private sector, it was perhaps unsurprising that a wide range of associations emerged to represent the various private HEI owners and managers. The largest was the Brazilian Association of Higher Education Managers (ABMES), founded in 1983, which has a growing membership totalling several hundred (França 2005).

Alongside the relaxation in rules, the government introduced several other institutional changes. A decision-making body, the National Education Council (CNE), replaced a previous body that the education team at MEC felt was too beholden to corporate interests. Generally the criticism of ‘corporatism’ was levelled by the government at its critics in the teaching and student professions. But corporatism could also include private interests as well, including those associated with ABMES, some of whose members also sat on the CNE. Furthermore, whereas certain groups, such as teachers and students, set themselves against all government policies, ABMES adopted a more differentiated approach, only campaigning on issues that it considered vital to its members (Sampaio 2000).
As part of the government’s hands-off approach to supervision, its proposals included additional institutional mechanisms through evaluation and accreditation systems. The evaluation system, the Provão, elicited considerable opposition from all quarters, including the public universities. Teachers and students were concerned at the consequences of poor results and the impact this would have on their future employment prospects. University managers – both public and private – worried what impact poor results would have on applications (Cunha 2004). By contrast Souza (interview, 2007) viewed the Provão as a means of injecting regulation by the market into the system, since it would encourage improvements, with the better-performing institutions attracting more students. Moreover, Souza claimed that the measure was a success, since its coverage grew each year until it was replaced by the new government after 2003 (Souza 2005).

Meanwhile, the accreditation system did not achieve the same degree of implementation as the Provão. This had been laid out in the LDB and proposed that all HEIs either seek accreditation or re-accreditation. This reflected the relative absence of scrutiny that had occurred during the expansion of the private sector since the 1970s. However, the government could not overcome opposition by the private sector, with ABMES and others resorting to legal means to obstruct the passage of legislation. The argument made – and accepted – was that the government had interfered unduly in private initiative (Cunha 2007).

The legal challenges to accreditation and the private sector’s ability to opt out of the Provão meant that private HEI managers had a relatively influential position during the Cardoso years. The situation was further compounded by the government’s apparent unwillingness or inability to adequately resource public higher education as an alternative. Not only did this mean a reliance on the private sector to accommodate the demand, but also the relatively lower quality of education that is generally perceived among private HEIs (Kempner and Jurema 2002). This is due in part to the traditionally higher status associated with public universities, which attract the best teachers and students. The effect of this was worst for poorer students, since they tended to be the ones accessing private HEIs, while better-off students dominated the more exclusive public institutions (Castro 2004; Caixeta 2002). The extent to which public institutions provided better ‘quality’ to private ones is alluded to by the fact that such universities accounted for 90% of scientific and technological research (Trindade 2000).
Finally, private sector obstruction was also arguably detrimental to itself. As well as avoiding regulation, the sector's actions made it difficult for the government to achieve its stated aim of coordination within the system. By the 2000s more than a third of places in private HEIs were not being filled, causing widespread pressures on institutions' finances and course availability (Saad Lucchesi 2007).

### 2.3. The Private Sector and the Lula government

In many respects, the experience of the Cardoso government with the private sector was repeated during the first Lula government (2003-06): the emphasis was on the creation of rules and parameters which would indirectly influence the nature of the private sector. Furthermore, given the differentiated responsibilities for basic and higher education that had occurred under the previous government's reorganisation, the bulk of MEC's dealings were therefore with private HEIs and their associations, as opposed to private school providers. Indeed, the government's attempt at higher education reform during the first term was perhaps the main policy where it engaged with the sector; the latter's opposition to its proposals largely prevented any substantial reform in the period.

While the failure of the government to pass its reform legislation suggests that private interests remained strong, it also showed the extent to which the Lula government had shifted in its attitude to the sector. Indeed, while the government's traditional supporters within the teaching and student communities remained suspicious of the private sector, the Lula government saw it as a partner. The government's accommodation of private interests was consequently seen as a source of frustration by its historic support base, who questioned why a sector with few links to the PT should receive such attention (Nascimento, interview, 2006). This was despite the government's announcement of REUNI at the start of Lula's second term, which would increase resources for the development of new and existing public universities (MEC 2007b; Lima et al 2008).

Part of the reason for the government's decision to accommodate the private sector during the first term may be attributed to the shift that had occurred prior to the 2002 election victory, when the party had begun to reach beyond its regular base. Another reason was the realisation that in government the PT was required to balance a wider range of demands, including those not commonly associated with the party. In effect it was a repeat of the internal tension faced between those who
emphasised the party’s social origins over those in responsibility once elected (Keck 1992). However, there was another factor in play too: since the 1990s there appeared to be a growing convergence in social policy by governments, regardless of ideological complexion (Panizza 2005). This, though, was skin-deep and overlooked different motivations that could vary between different actors.

Certainly Rodrigues (2007) has recognised this by noting the different tensions within the private sector and its contrasting relationship with government over higher education reform. While the industrial class and MEC were broadly united on the need to subject public universities to greater competition (and hence efficiency), the industrial class seemed wary of the quality of the product offered by private HEIs (Rodrigues 2007: 132). Despite such intra-private sector differences, they were glossed over when they shared common interests, most notably in the key higher education policy that was implemented by the government before 2006: the introduction of state-subsidised places for students in private universities through ProUni.

ProUni was created as a result of the government’s review of higher education. In the first year, an inter-departmental working group was set up to examine the state of higher education. Among its recommendations were: an increase in the number of places and teaching staff, distance learning and the need for university autonomy to enable institutions to access additional resources. For under-resourced federal universities it recommended seeking out non-state resources (Otranto 2006), which resulted in legislation for public-private partnerships and generated considerable opposition from the Left of the education community (ANPEd 2005).

ProUni was set up in 2004 and designed to cover poor students wanting to access higher education by paying either part or all of their tuition at a private HEI. It prioritised ethnic minorities and students who had attended public schools (Saad Lucchesi 2007; Arroyo, interview, 2008). It was anticipated there would be 120,000 new places each year to a total of 400,000 by its fourth year (Mercadante 2006; Araújo 2006b; Aparecida da Silva, interview, 2006). According to MEC’s figures, 112,000 grants were offered in 2005, followed by 139,000 in 2006 and 164,000 in 2007 (MEC 2007a).

At one level ProUni challenged the private HEI system: private institutions saw their right to selection being challenged by the conditions imposed through ProUni. However, at the same time the programme offered a public subsidy to the system amounting to around R$2.7 billion a year while filling places that would otherwise have remained vacant (Mendes Catani et al 2007; Leher 2005).
Even the PT’s rivals, the PSDB, viewed ProUni in a positive light: both Souza and Cardoso felt that the principle was correct and constituted a logical next step (interviews, 2007, 2008). What concerns existed were related to the details of the programme (Souza, Schwartzmann, interviews, 2007).

Amongst the PT’s traditional supporters opinion was divided and those committed to public education were critical. Students and (primary and secondary school) teachers both supported the programme, claiming that it would provide access for many students who would otherwise not have had the chance to go to university (Aparecida da Silva, Stumpf, interview, 2006; UNE 2005; Minoro 2006). Against this, public university defenders asked why the government had not used the funds to create more spaces in the public system rather than subsidising the private sector. Moreover, they had reservations over the value of such spending, which appeared to ‘accelerate’ the approach adopted by the previous government (Schuch, interview, 2006) and which was especially prejudicial. Indeed, findings suggest that the relative quality of private HEIs was poorer than those in the public system (Saad Lucchesi 2007; Arelaro, interview, 2008). The emphasis appeared to rest more on quantity – or increasing higher education coverage – than on providing quality for those involved with the programme (Schwartzmann, interview, 2006; Mendes Catani 2007). By mid-2006 nearly half the courses covered by ProUni were in the worst-performing universities (Folha de São Paulo 2006). To these concerns the government stressed that ProUni was just one aspect of its higher education programme; with REUNI it proposed to increase federal spending on higher education as well as expand the public university network, including the building of new campuses across the country.

The success of ProUni and its implementation showed that where government and private interests converged, policy was possible. By contrast, the other key policy area during the first Lula term, that of higher education reform, largely collapsed as a result of differences – and both direct and indirect pressure by private HEI managers – in Congress. Although the private sector was divided between different interests, including for-profit, community, confessional and philanthropic HEIs, they shared a common concern that the state should not interfere in what they saw as their internal activity (França 2005). They were also astute enough to build common cause on this issue with public institutions as well, thereby creating a broad front to defeat the government’s proposals.

The higher education reform bill had been drafted within MEC in 2004 and was submitted to various organisations associated with the sector for consultation. This included not just the private
interest groups, but also those associated with defending public education, such as the teachers and student organisations, the National Association of Federal Higher Education Institution Leaders (Andifes) and the National Students’ Union (UNE). There was dissatisfaction from both sides regarding the bill: public sector defenders wanted to see a greater increase in government spending for public universities as well as direct elections for chancellors. In addition these groups felt that the bill did not adequately address the diversification taking place in the higher education sector and failed to provide a ‘single quality standard’ by which HEIs could be judged (GTPE 2006).

Meanwhile private sector organisations were opposed to the prospect of additional bureaucracy that would regulate the system and impose constraints on the opening of new courses or institutions. ABMES put together the National Forum for Free Initiative (Forum Nacional de Libre-Iniciativa), which emphasised the diverse nature of the HEI sector and rejected any singular attempt to regulate it (Rodrigues 2007). Before the 2006 election the organisation stressed the importance of respecting university autonomy and the need for equality in regulation. By contrast, owing to the state’s role as both the owner and manager of the public system as well as the assessor of private HEIs, it questioned whether the government was able to carry out both tasks without being biased against the private sector (ABMES 2006).

Defenders of both public and private HEIs criticised the government for failing to meet their demands and favouring the position of the other side. Increasingly the government seemed less inclined to find a way through. By mid-2007 the bill appeared to have lost momentum and observers were suggesting that the government’s education priorities had shifted elsewhere (Souza, interview, 2007). However, the decline of government action in this area does not mean that the issue is dead or that a balance between the two sides exists. As the previous experience of the Cardoso government showed, the deregulation of higher education has created space for private interests, whose influence has grown substantial enough to block efforts at supervision and scrutiny. This can only benefit the private over the public sector, but as a result of government inaction rather than action.

3. Conclusion
The cases of the Concertación, Cardoso and Lula governments all highlight different levels at which the relationship between social democrats and private interests may be analysed. In the Chilean case...
the focus of that relationship has been mainly in basic education whereas in Brazil this has been in higher education.

The cases presented above show that the differences between the Third Way and Participatory Left do not count for much in governments' relations with private interests. While Third Way governments are more inclined to accommodate the market and diversity in educational provision, one would expect the Participatory Left government to pursue a less friendly approach to non-state interests. That this has not happened reflects the extent to which these governments are dependent on the private sector to meet demand in the educational sector. Where governments are either unwilling or unable to provide education, they have resorted to private actors to do so. This has ensured greater coverage across education systems and made certain kinds of education (such as university and the ProUni programme) accessible to those who might otherwise not have had the opportunity.

While a case might be made for the Concertación being constrained by the system it inherited, it also provided space for the private sector, by seeking to balance the competing demands of different educational actors. In Brazil meanwhile, both the Cardoso and Lula governments were arguably less constrained, but still perceived the private sector as a partner. During the Cardoso presidency this occurred even as efforts to regulate the private university sector took place. In Lula's first term, higher education expansion was directed through the use of private institutions. That the government proposed to direct greater public funds towards the sector through REUNI following Lula's re-election, this may also suggest that it was constrained by its predecessor's own stance.

For social democrats, the accommodation of private interests has come at a price. Liberalisation and deregulation of the education market generated its own expansionary impetus. While economic factors may constrain its advance (as happened in both countries during the debt crisis of the 1980s), governments' efforts to oversee the process themselves has been less successful. As the actions taken by the private sector against the accreditation scheme during the 1990s or the higher education reform bill in 2004-06 in Brazil show, the size, organisation and influence of the sector can prevent this from happening. This can compromise public services generally, since the dependence on the private sector limits the scope for government action. Furthermore, an acceptance of diversity in educational provision means that differences will inevitably result; this can have an
impact on the extent to which the system is able to provide redistribution — a key social democrat concern.

That the private sector has managed to achieve such influence owes much to its organizational capacity. As the higher education reform case in Brazil shows, despite the heterogeneity of the private education sector, it is able to act cohesively and in partnership with political allies in Congress to achieve its ends. This has arguably placed it in a relatively stronger position in the educational sector compared to other actors, such as teachers and students. Governments, regardless of political complexion, are therefore obliged to take into account private sector concerns and demands to a degree that undermines any attempt for a balanced form of representative participation. Consequently, social democratic governments which seek this approach as a means of providing a level playing field for engagement with the educational community will invariably fail to achieve it.
10. Lobbying from the Left: Teachers and social democratic governments

The relationship between government and teachers in the education system is usually either conciliatory or confrontational, due to the different demands and expectations of each – although one would expect social democratic governments to be more favourably inclined to teachers’ needs than the Right. This reflects the extent to which the Left generally is supportive of labour interests. However, the relationship between government and teachers is complicated by the ambiguous position which the teaching profession occupies. Should teachers be best understood as a traditional trade union or a distinct group of professionals? Do they constitute a class of civil servants or are they social reformers? (Cooper 1992) What is their position regarding social change? Do they seek to transform or maintain the status quo? (Cook 1996)

Part of the answer lies in the different ideological and motivational perspectives placed on teachers, both by themselves and others. For social democrats, teachers may be perceived as partners in the educational arena, while more Marxist observers may view them as either a hinderer or facilitator of social change. On the Right, neo-liberals consider them to be anti-business (and favour replacing them with industry and commerce as more attractive partners) and neo-conservatives perceive them as permissive (Trowler 1998). These contrasting approaches were neatly summarised by Le Grand (2003), whose general view of producers in the state sector distinguished between public-spirited and altruistic knights of the past, as opposed to selfish budget-maximising knaves during the neo-liberal period.

Despite this distinction between the Left and Right regarding teachers’ motivations, this remains insufficient for understanding their relations with government. It is made more complex by the ambiguity that exists within social democracy in relation to teachers. While the past social democratic notion of teachers’ purposes as presented above seemed clear cut, the changes within social democracy and the entry of a more managerial and ‘outcomes’-based perspective suggests a very different kind of teacher. Whereas the past vision of the teacher presumes a 'knight' model similar to that outlined by Le Grand, the contemporary ‘outcomes’ vision presumes a more professional
managerial role, with an emphasis on standards and evaluation, with strategies derived through external directives (Bottery 2000).

The situation is further exacerbated by the context in which teachers find themselves in. Since the 1980s teachers have generally felt attacked by what they have perceived to be a New Right assault involving centralisation and privatisation. The restructuring of education systems has at one level sought to seek greater productivity, efficiency and results while at another it has challenged their own notion of professionalism, empowerment and organisational capacity (O'Donoghue and Dimmock 1998; Cooper 1992). As a result, teachers' organisations find their scope for engaging governments concentrated in the following areas: to seek official recognition as a bargaining agent; to engage in collective bargaining; to withdraw services (through strikes); to seek third party mediation or intervention; or to gain access to management decision-making (Cooper 2000). These various positions and strategies adopted by teachers' organisations mask two types of demands which may be summarised between the material and non-material. Whereas material concerns are related to their declining economic situation, non-material issues relate to their role and status in society.

Given the political, social and economic contexts facing teachers, of the two social democratic forms one would expect the Participatory Left to be more responsive to their concerns than the Third Way. The Participatory Left has roots in the social movements of which teachers are a part. It should therefore be in tune ideologically with the organisations that represent teachers, namely the unions, and in their desire to reverse their declining economic and social status. This will mean more collaboration and conciliation. The Third Way, meanwhile, having fewer links with social movements – and hence teachers' organisations – would therefore be less susceptible to their demands. Although this does not mean they oppose improving their social status, they are arguably less persuaded by teaching organisations' arguments, and therefore more inclined to develop policy related to teachers independently. This antagonises teachers' leaders and consequently would lead to a more confrontational relationship.

In the cases of Chile and Brazil this holds closest for the two Brazilian governments. Both the Third Way Cardoso and Participatory Left Lula governments offer contrasting relationships with teachers. The Lula government has been more closely engaged with the concerns of teachers (most notably reversing its position on teacher evaluations when they were opposed). Meanwhile, during the
Cardoso presidency the government was inclined towards an antagonistic relationship in which it imposed education policies regardless of teachers’ opinions. By contrast, in Chile the Third Way Concertación government seemed in tune with the teaching profession initially, especially by introducing a Teachers Statute. More recently, however, the relationship has shifted towards one more commonly associated with the Third Way. While this may be attributed to changes in the leadership of the teachers’ organisations after 1995, it also suggests that Chilean democracy has finally consolidated itself.

1. Chile

In Chile the teachers’ unions have historically been associated with the Left. The highpoint was the close collaboration between it and the Allende government prior to 1973. During the military period teachers faced several challenges, including the disbandment of their organisation and subsequent re-organisation from above by the regime. During the 1980s the movement democratised itself and formed part of the broad opposition movement with the Concertación parties. In this period its leadership was drawn from the Concertación which meant that relations between it and the government after 1990 were cordial. Since 1995 the union leadership has been dominated by communists who adopted a more confrontational approach with the Concertación.

1.1. Teachers and government, pre-1990

Teachers and educational workers prior to the military coup were represented through the Education Workers’ Union (SUTE). The union was highly politicised and divided, with conflicts between the different parties trying to control it. Allende’s arrival in the presidential palace, La Moneda, initially weakened it, with a number of its leaders moving from the union into government (Farrell 1986). However, this pre-1973 period is recalled for not only producing a relatively collaborative relationship between government and union, but also in the degree to which the profession was mobilised and involved in the educational debate. The status and prestige of teachers was high and reflected in improved work conditions, considerable freedom in teaching content and methods, and involvement in the development of policy (Superintendencia de Educación Pública 1971; Colegio de Profesores 2003). In 1971 the National Congress on Education was held which enabled teachers and other education-related workers to participate and engage in a broad discussion about the aims and role of
education. Looking back, teachers recalled the relative freedom they had to conduct their work without any external or repressive influence. At the same time, the teaching profession experienced the same wider social polarisation occurring in the country, most evidently in the proposed National Unified School (ENU) programme. The teaching profession – like wider society – was split between those who defended it and those who feared it would lead to Marxist indoctrination of children and society (Colegio de Profesores 2003).

Teachers neither expected the military coup nor the level of cruelty it introduced. From the perspective of 30 years teachers’ impressions of the dictatorship was of lost freedoms. Certain teachers were removed from teaching while the regime imposed restrictions on what could be taught. As with wider society, teachers grew more distrustful of each other and self-censoring, for fear of being accused by colleagues or students (Colegio de Profesores 2003).

The regime’s economic rationalisation from the late 1970s had a pronounced effect on teachers, reducing the teaching body in total by 25% through various side effects. These included a decline in salaries, which by 1990 were only a quarter of that at the start of the 1970s (CENDA 2000; Rojas 1998), and changes to teachers’ career structure in 1978, which meant those without a professional qualification would be laid off from 1986. Meanwhile, all of them experienced longer teaching hours and less tenure (Soto, interview, 2007; La Opinion 1987; Escobar 1987; Lomnitz and Melnick 1991). Faced with these pressures, many teachers chose to leave their post (Colegio de Profesores 2003). By 1990, teachers had few safeguards on job security, opportunities for leadership or training (Arrellano 1998; Becca et al 2006).

The impact of these changes on teachers was felt disproportionately though. In the early 1980s, reforms had formalised state subsidies for privately managed schools, creating an incentive for resulting growth for that sector. However, unlike the publicly run municipal schools, teachers’ financial and social status was dependent on the private managers of such schools, rather than the minimal safeguards provided by the state. This meant that they were in a more precarious and insecure position, even as their numbers grew (table 3). That this situation developed was in marked contrast to the military regime’s claims that the reforms would contribute to improved teachers’ salaries; instead it meant the persistence of an authoritarian managerial model, which was perhaps most visible at the
university level, where generals and colonels were imposed as chancellors (CPFUCH 1975; Riesco 1981).

Table 3: Primary and Secondary School Teachers in Chile, 1985-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Municipal</th>
<th>Subsidised Private</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Delegated Municipal</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>84,762</td>
<td>10,507</td>
<td>24,053</td>
<td>4,819</td>
<td>125,397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>78,916</td>
<td>36,462</td>
<td>15,768</td>
<td>3,196</td>
<td>134,342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>80,597</td>
<td>41,053</td>
<td>20,348</td>
<td>2,379</td>
<td>144,377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>84,085</td>
<td>63,283</td>
<td>20,435</td>
<td>2,458</td>
<td>170,261</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Table 3.15 in Mineduc 2005b; Table 31.02 in Mineduc 1990; Table 3-2 in Mineduc 1985
(NB. Municipal includes fiscal schools as well)

Although the military regime abolished the SUTE, it found it necessary to introduce some form of representation. In the first phase of the dictatorship (1973-80) the approach adopted constituted a conservative reaction against the growing influence of the Left by 1973. This involved the creation of 'gremios', or associations, which sought to depoliticise social groups by breaking their link with political parties and limiting the scope of their demands (Dittborn 1993). The regime introduced the Colegio de Profesores in 1974 with membership being obligatory for all teachers, and leaders being appointed (CTERA et al 2005; Núñez, interview 2, 2007; Lomnitz and Melnick 1991). The result was an uncertain position between teachers and their representation with the regime during the 1970s (Castro 1977). However, during this first phase of the dictatorship, some pockets of limited and locally-based autonomy were sustained within the teaching profession. This was done through informal education and using non-school spaces provided by social groups such as the Catholic Church (Soto, interview, 2007).

The end of the regime’s initial phase saw an ideological shift towards neo-liberalism from 1980 on. In social relations this included the changes to the gremio system by allowing free association and from the mid-1980s internal leadership elections (CTERA et al 2005; Núñez, interview 2, 2007; Lomnitz and Melnick 1991). The changes had several effects on teachers’ representation. First, an independent Association of Chilean Educators (AGECH) was founded, which both demanded an end to the privatisation occurring within the education system and the creation of a Teachers’ Statute (CTERA et al 2005). While its membership was both smaller and more subject to persecution than the Colegio, it remained highly visible and prominent during the 1980s (Assael, interview, 2007). This
included not only remunerative demands, such as increased salaries and pensions and greater job security for teachers, but also critique of the education model being set up by the regime. It challenged the lack of democracy and presence of privatisation within the system, the lack of attention paid to the linkages between education planning and national development needs and the rigid administration structure that existed. It sought the reversal of municipalisation, increased spending on schools and more opportunity for public debate on the role of education (AGECH 1984, 1985).

Second, the Colegio underwent internal changes through its first leadership elections. Its first elected president, Oswaldo Verdugo, adopted a similar position of opposition to the regime as the AGECH's president, Jorge Pavez. During the 1980s, both organisations and their leaders were involved in popular protests against the deaths of students and teachers and demands for the return of democracy, resulting in their detention (Colegio de Profesores 1986). The shift towards greater opposition to the regime was reflected in the rise of the Left in leadership elections for teachers' representative bodies. In 1972 left-wing candidates won 29% of the internal vote for the SUTE executive; in 1985 the Left received 19%, while in 1987 it gained 25% in the Colegio. Against this, the centrist groups remained constant in their vote share, gaining almost 50% in all three elections.

Third, the shared consensus amongst both teachers' organisations and their common political direction, coupled with the Colegio's larger size, prompted the AGECH to recommend its merger with the Colegio (AGECH n.d.). This resulted in a unified organisation for the teaching profession which was allied to the growing social and political opposition movement to the regime and constituted the largest union in the country (CTERA et al 2005; Palamidessi 2003; Gode la Maza 1999). However, against this is the fact that the Colegio primarily represents teachers in the municipal school sector, which make up only half of the profession (table 3). This meant that despite the Colegio's links with the Concertación during the 1980s, the extent to which the union represented the teaching profession was questioned by concertacionistas, especially after 1990 within Mineduc (Cox, Brunner, interviews, 2007).

1.2. Teachers and the Concertación

The context of the changes in teachers' organisation, its size and political demands, had implications for its relations with government when the Concertación replaced the military regime. In particular
relations may be studied from several different perspectives: one, from within the Colegio or the government; two, from the change in the political composition within the Colegio before and after 1995, and those implications on the nature of its demands.

First, both the Colegio and the Concertación government had different views about the role that the teachers' union should play. For several officials associated with the government, the Colegio was seen as primarily concerned with 'corporatist' interests, emphasising traditional material concerns such as better salaries and working conditions (Brunner, Elacqua, interviews, 2007). Such a position is arguably more prominent in the centrist sections of the coalition. By contrast the more leftist sections of the Concertación would presumably concur with those in the Colegio leadership who see its role as far broader. This wider involvement in educational policy appears to be the result of a changing view within the Colegio about its purpose, a result of internal and external political changes since 1990.

Second, the Colegio's changing approach to educational policy and its relations with the government may be divided into three since 1990: 1990-95, 1995-2000 and 2000-07. Internally, changes within the Colegio occurred between 1990 and 1995, when the Colegio directorate was dominated by the Concertación's allies, and after 1995, when political control shifted to Communist Party (PC). This tension was apparent by the Colegio's more confrontational approach, including over the rejection of the voucher system. By contrast, after 2000 the relationship became more collaborative (Palamidessi 2003). The change since 2000 may be partly attributed to shifts in the political leadership, following the relative distancing of the Colegio leadership from the PC, but also in the nature of the demands adopted by the Colegio. In the first phase these focused on restoring the membership's material concerns, while the second saw greater demands for participation in the policy-making process, with the Colegio investing in research, technical work groups and advisors (Assael, interview, 2007; Núñez, interview 2, 2007). Externally, the Colegio's political composition and shift in demands coincided, from the mid-1990s, with Chilean democracy becoming increasingly consolidated, and social movements and organisations more assertive in its demands. In the early years following democracy's return, not only was the economic situation relatively precarious, contributing to weakened union organisations, but also the Concertación was driven by the need for political stability and governability (Espinosa 2005). This approach was aided by the relative decline of broader social mobilisation that had dominated the 1980s.
1.2.1. Teachers and the Concertación, 1990-95

The first phase of relations between the Colegio and the Concertación government was notable for several reasons: one, the political configurations within the union and government, which contributed to collaboration; two, the relatively limited level of union mobilisation; and three, the limited scope of policy-making and outcomes by the government that involved the Colegio – despite the close association between government and union leaderships.

First, both the union leadership and the new government were dominated by members of the Concertación. The Colegio's president, from the mid-1980s until 1995, when he was defeated by the former AGECH president, was Oswaldo Verdugo. By being associated with the Christian Democrats, this ensured relatively low levels of conflict between the government and Colegio (Palamidessi 2003).

Second, the teachers' organisation was relatively weak in 1990. The structural changes to the education system in the 1980s, including municipalisation and privatisation, meant that there was substantial variation in teachers' work conditions and salaries. This affected the degree to which the teachers' movement could maintain solidarity (Cariola et al 2003). Furthermore, the capacity of the teachers to mobilise was constrained by the Concertación's efforts to pursue consensus and stability, appealing over the head of the union to wider society if necessary. The Colegio's 1991 strikes for increased pay drew criticism from the education minister, Ricardo Lagos, while prompting President Aylwin to ask for understanding. A subsequent education minister, Jorge Arrate, noted that the choice open to teachers was either dialogue or confrontation – but the latter would not lead anywhere (Arrate 1993b). Indeed, during this period the Colegio appeared to recognise its own weakness, noting that, despite its demands for changes to the Teachers Statute, including an increase in salaries and resolution of municipal debt accrued from rising education costs, there had been only limited achievement (Colegio de Profesores 1994).

The Colegio's mixed feelings seemed especially evident with regard to teachers' salaries. Although Mizala and Romaguera (2004) noted that between 1990 and 2002 the average value of salaries for teachers working 44 hours a week rose from Ch$258,242 to Ch$660,161 (in 2001 pesos), the change was more beneficial for those in the state-funded private sector as opposed to municipal schools. While teachers in both sectors had a starting salary of Ch$389,442 in 2002, in 1990
municipal teachers had received Ch$142,591 compared to teachers in state-funded private schools who earned Ch$73,337.

Third, despite the close association between the Concertación and the Colegio, this did not extend to policymaking. Once in government, the Concertación became cut off from the wider social mobilisation that had campaigned during the 1988 referendum against Pinochet's continued rule and propelled it into power. This was partially due to the teachers' precarious financial and labour situation, but also the demobilising effect that re-democratisation had on social movements. Angell (2007: 174) has noted the extent to which support for the Concertación could be interpreted as support for democracy. At the same time, despite the military regime's departure, it remained latently influential (most notably through Pinochet's continuing presence as head of the armed forces until 1997), prompting both government and social actors to seek a cautious line.

Within such constraints and opportunities, the new government saw the establishment of a Teachers' Statute as its primary concern in relation to teachers (Aylwin 1994a). This was aided in part by the limited resources that the government claimed to have available in 1990, contributing to their being focused on teaching salaries (Aylwin 1994a). Notwithstanding its introduction, the Teachers Statute was primarily a creation of the Concertación rather than a collaborative result between it and the Colegio (Núñez, interview 2, 2007). The debate on the nature of the legislation occurred primarily within the government over the issue of municipalisation (Weinstein, interview, 2007). The finance and labour ministries initially opposed the Statute's introduction and subsequently sought a more decentralised version. It would have ensured that teachers' negotiation occurred at a local level, but was rejected by Lagos and his associates who favoured a national model. This version, which was eventually achieved, would ensure both an agreed national minimum salary and avoid conflicts between teachers' organisations and municipal administrations at the local level (Núñez, interview 2, 2007).

While the Colegio was consulted on the proposed Statute, it was not directly involved in its drafting (Núñez, interview 2, 2007; Soto, interview, 2007). This meant that the Statute neither covered state-funded private and private school teachers nor did it provide a teaching career path ('carrera'). Furthermore, the minimum salary was seen as insufficient by teachers themselves (Aedo 1998; CTERA et al 2005; Ministério Secretaria General del Gobierno 1993; Cortes 1994; Colegio de
Indeed, the association of the Colegio with the public sector and the growth in the private school sector meant that the Colegio arguably represented a smaller proportion of the teaching profession (Bosch, interview, 2007). Yet against this, it was arguably a gain for the union movement: the Right had been critical of the Statute's measures, which it saw as introducing specific and unequal legislation for different groups, while providing both higher financial costs and few incentives for teachers to improve their teaching (Larrain 1997). Furthermore, teachers in subsidised schools could not only count on aspects of the Statute, but also the Labour Code, which all private enterprises were subject to (Bosch, interview, 2007).

The relative absence of the Colegio in policy-making circles was also apparent in the Concertación’s approach in two other areas: primary school curricular reform and the impact of the 1994 educational commission. On primary school curricular reform, the Colegio showed no substantial disagreement with the government’s proposed changes, which were begun in 1992 and completed by 1996 (Colegio de Profesores 1992). Although there was broader consultation with the Colegio over secondary school curricular reform in 1998, the involvement of the Colegio was perceived by concertaciónistas to be relatively limited (Cox, interview, 2007; Núñez, interview 2, 2007). During the 1994 educational commission, the chair, José Joaquin Brunner, recalled that despite not having the complete support of the Colegio, it was considered a marginal player at the time (interview, 2007). This was echoed in the Colegio’s apparently modest contribution to the commission through its response: while it did not think privatisation of schools was necessary, it did not reject the existence of different types of schools (Colegio de Profesores, Directorio Nacional 1994).

1.2.2. Teachers and the Concertación, 1995-2000

The second phase in relations between the Colegio and the Concertación government occurred after 1995. In contrast to the prior period, the relationship was marked in three main ways: one, a growing political difference between them; two, greater levels of teacher mobilisation and demands to participate in policy-making; and three, the persistence of the Colegio’s exclusion from those circles. At the same time, the period also saw a shift in the way that the Colegio engaged the government, from confrontation to dialogue, which suggests consolidation of Chilean democracy.
First, the 1995 Colegio leadership elections marked a break in the Concertación’s control over the union. The split had already been developing, presenting a challenge within and outside the Colegio. Internally, the Colegio’s leadership was divided between those who supported the government and others, around Jorge Pavez, who opposed it. This had been evident prior to Pavez’s successful election as Colegio president in 1995, most notably in the criticism directed at the leadership’s agreement of a pay deal with the ministry during the early 1990s (Colegio de Profesores, Directorio Nacional 1993). The split persisted after 1995, with confrontation between both sides over whether to pursue stoppages in demand for higher pay (Colegio de Profesores, 1998a, 1998b). According to Angell (2007: 92), this change was due less to the appeal of Marxism than a protest against a non-participatory party system and centralised parties. Externally, both Cox and Brunner queried whether the preponderance of PC members in the Colegio executive after this date reflected the rank-and-file membership (interviews, 2007).

Second, the change in leadership after 1995 heralded a shift in the Colegio’s demands. Politically, this had much to do with the difference of opinion that existed between the Colegio and PC leadership. The PC leadership saw itself in the leading role within an anti-neoliberal movement that would include various opposition social and political groups. This meant that the Colegio should take a subordinate role to the party. However, the PC-supporting Colegio president and his followers believed that those civil society organisations should remain autonomous (Soto, interview, 2007). The split between these activists inside and outside the PC led to the creation of the Fuerza Social, a loose association of social movements that sought to coordinate their activities while avoiding any attempts at hegemonic political control by a third party. In education, this split led to wider social discussion about the way forward, most notably through the National Education Congress convened by the Colegio in 1997 (CTERA et al 2005).

Third, despite the Colegio’s new direction in relation to education policy, it did not appear to yield any immediate or substantive results. The National Education Congress resolutions were largely overlooked by concertacionista policymakers, who perceived the role of the Colegio in more instrumental concerns, such as pay and work conditions (Cox, Brunner, interviews, 2007). Indeed, the focus of Concertación governments for much of the 1990s had been on finding ways to develop and improve teachers’ performance, through the use of more courses, incentives and performance-related
pay (Concertación 1994; Arrate 1993a; Bitar, interview, 2007). This last objective proved difficult to implement, as many refused to participate. Meanwhile, education minister Mariana Aylwin (2000-03), acknowledged that the government needed to change, from imposing policies from above to concentrating on the development of teachers’ capacities (Angell 2007: 132). Furthermore, the Colegio leadership’s approach was arguably undermined by its own members as well. In the late 1990s a poll showed that nearly half (48%) of those surveyed had a ‘very good’ or ‘good’ view of the government’s educational reforms, while almost the same number (45%) had a ‘regular’ view and only 7% felt that they were ‘bad’. Nearly a third of polled teachers thought Mineduc was most worried when it came to improving educational quality against a quarter who felt that the Colegio was similarly concerned. Among the reforms that had taken place, more than half (55%) claimed to have participated in pedagogic decision and 85% had received training in the previous five years, with 53% claiming it had been very beneficial (MORI 1998).

1.2.3 Teachers and the Concertación, 2000-07

After 1995 there seemed a clearer understanding of the different roles played by government and union respectively. Initially, this had been confrontational, as the new Colegio leadership engaged the Concertación on both material and pedagogical issues. By 2000 a new dynamic appeared to be emerging. Despite the differences that existed between them, the relationship appeared to be one that more clearly delineated government from union. In contrast to the 1990-95 period, the government now engaged in dialogue and negotiation with the Colegio (Aylwin 2002). The Colegio, for its part, qualified its criticisms of the system inherited from the military regime by acknowledging the reforms that had occurred under the Concertación (Colegio de Profesores 2006a). At times these differences could become confrontational, with the government claiming the Colegio had an idealised image of the pre-1973 regime. This was sustained by teachers’ memories of a greater degree of mobilisation and participation among the profession during the Allende period, when compared to the present with a less politicised environment and policy being driven by the Ministry (Mineduc 2003; Colegio de Profesores 2003). Sometimes government and union could find themselves arguing at cross purposes. On the Whole School Day (JEC) programme, for example, the government claimed that the teachers had not changed their teaching methods sufficiently while teachers argued that the new
measures required them to spend more time in class and gave them too little time to prepare (Bitar, interview, 2007; Bloque Social 2006). Even the 2006 presidential commission that was appointed in the wake of the student protests raised suspicion, since it not only included notable figures who had established the educational model under Pinochet, but it was claimed, did not provide sufficient weight to social actors (Colegio de Profesores 2006b).

If the Colegio and Concertación had defined their respective roles by the turn of the century, the electoral results in the Colegio leadership in October 2007 potentially heralded a new period in government-union relations. For the first time since 1995 the results changed the complexion of the executive. The new Colegio president was PC activist Jaime Gajardo, who defeated Pavez’s Fuerza Social block. The result was attributed to a low turnout and misinformation during the campaign (Assael, interview, 2007). However, the change was by no means certain, since despite his electoral victory, Gajardo did not have a majority on the executive (Assael, interview 2007; Núñez, interview 2, 2007). The demands posed by the new leadership included a revision of the current salary agreement, rejection of teacher evaluations and the inclusion of a teaching career path within the Teachers’ Statute (Assael, Muñoz, interviews, 2007; Núñez, interview 2, 2007).

In sum then, the nature of the relationship between the Concertación and the Colegio has passed through three main phases between 1990 and 2007. The first, between 1990 and 1995, provided the government with the least level of resistance. In this period, the teachers’ leadership was mainly dominated by government supporters, who had participated in the wider movement for democracy during the 1980s. This shared experience meant that the new government was perceived in a more favourable light than its predecessor. At the same time, it also meant that concertacionistas’ fears of the relative strength of the Right after 1990 were similarly echoed among the teachers’ leadership; the implications of this was such that the Colegio did not overtly challenge the government. Yet even if it wished to, it was questionable whether it had the capacity to do so: the teachers’ relatively weak position in both economic and organisational terms meant that the government was able to dominate the agenda. It acted strategically, rectifying teachers’ situations by introducing a Teachers’ Statute – but with little direct involvement from the Colegio in its drafting.

During the second phase, between 1995 and the early 2000s, the teachers’ leadership became more independent. On the one hand, in contrast to the early 1990s, the Colegio’s executive was
dominated by leaders who did not identify as closely with the government. On the other hand, the leadership began to make non-material demands that did not conform to the Concertación's perceived role of the Colegio, as being primarily being concerned about its members' material interests. This certainly caused confrontation in the latter 1990s, most notably in the form of protests and strikes. Since the early 2000s, however, relations have become less combative, even as the positions of each are further apart than they were a decade earlier. This third phase arguably reflected a 'normalisation' of Chilean politics, whereby the role of government and interest groups became both more clearly defined and stable compared to 1990.

2. Brazil

In Brazil the relationship between the military regime and teachers was not as arbitrary as it was in Chile. Until the mid-1970s the movement was largely co-opted by the regime. During the political liberalisation later in that decade the teaching profession adopted an increasingly autonomous position vis-à-vis government, while a substantial part provided part of the social base that subsequently formed the PT in 1980. The close association between the teaching unions (mainly organised at state level) and the PT contributed towards a more confrontational approach with government during the Cardoso years and a more conciliatory one once Lula was elected.

2.1. Teachers and government, pre-1995

The relationship between the military regime and the teaching profession in Brazil was initially more ambiguous than that in Chile. The government's relations with the teaching community were largely shaped by their economic situation. Initially teachers presented no substantial challenge to the regime following the 1964 coup. This was largely due to the relative co-option of their representative organisations by the regime. However, at primary, secondary and tertiary levels the introduction of various reforms had an impact on the community, which ultimately challenged the nature of the relationship.

At primary and secondary level, school teachers had begun to organise themselves in the 1950s, mainly under the Confederation of Brazilian Primary School Teachers (CPPB). Owing to its co-opted state with the regime after 1964, the CPPB (later the Confederation of Brazilian Teachers or CPB) offered little threat. However, the 1971 primary and secondary education reforms effectively
broke the compact between teachers and government. The legislation brought about greater regulation and evaluation of teachers, including an obligation to undertake short-term courses. Furthermore, as the economic miracle came to an end, working conditions and salaries declined, placing the previously middle class teacher within the ranks of the proletariat (Tavares 1995).

At the university level, the academic community similarly presented no substantial challenge to the regime until the late 1970s. However, following a series of incomplete higher education reforms in the late 1960s (Durham 2004), academics found both their organisational and economic situation weakened. Organisationally, the reform sought to introduce a US-style departmental system (as opposed to the interdisciplinary approach then present) (McGinn and Pereira 1992). Economically, like the primary and secondary school teachers, the university level staff began to develop a more proletarian outlook that enabled them to identify with the working class (Schuch, interview, 2006).

From the mid-1970s on, teachers at all levels increasingly aligned themselves with other social groups in a similar position, including Christian grassroots activists. The association with the working class and other excluded groups lent the movement a left-wing hue, which identified with Paulo Freire’s ideas on critical pedagogy, on the need to transform both the state and school (Aparecida da Silva, Schuch, interviews, 2006). This resulted in national teachers’ conferences during the late 1970s, culminating in the formation of the primary and secondary school teachers' National Union of Education Workers (UNTE) and the academics’ National Union of Teachers in Higher Education Institutions (ANDES) in 1981. The regime-compliant CPB was challenged, prompting it to reverse its line and undergo a process of internal democratisation (Ferreira Junior 1998). Meanwhile ANDES found itself challenged by an internal tension between its more conservative elements and those who saw the need for the organisation to adopt a vanguard role in the demand for rights and democracy (Schuch, interview, 2006).

By the early 1980s teachers had become more specific and vocal in their demands. Identified with the Left, many had been involved in the formation of the PT as well as the communist parties. The relationship between the military regime and teachers shifted from co-option to confrontation. Alongside the wider demand for democracy, teachers wanted the right to independent unions, the presence of their representatives in federal and state education councils, salary readjustments and an end to the regime’s use of economic pressure to undermine their position (Jornal da Educação 1981).
In the first decade after the return to civilian rule in 1985, the most evident example of teachers' growing organisational capacity and influence was in the explicit statement of teachers' pension rights in the 1988 constitution. This had not existed in the previous 1967 version under the military (Brasil 1967, 1988) and followed a broad, cross-societal dialogue in the constituent assembly between teachers' organisations and the political class.

However, the teachers' advances in the 1988 constitution were the highpoint of their demands and organisational unity. The first two governments after 1985 were identified both by their supporters and their opponents in the union movement as right-wing politically. As such, neither of these two governments was seen as particularly sympathetic to workers' interests or those of teachers. Consequently, aside from their constitutional rights, there was little else that the teaching unions could point to as an advance in their working conditions. Teachers continued to see their salaries eroded, prompting calls from the CPB for a national minimum salary and strikes (CPB Notícias 1986, 1987a). Indeed, the decline in teachers' salaries was considered so large by the early 1990s that teachers had a lower level of income relative to other workers in the service sectors despite being more highly educated (Tavares 1995). Second, the failure of the teaching unions to achieve any substantial change in this regard had an impact on their organisation. By the early 1990s the CPB's successor, the National Confederation of Education Workers (CNTE), observed that it was struggling from a lack of regional unity, common dialogue and strategy among its affiliates' associations (CNTE 1990). This occurred against a growth in the size of the teaching body at all levels (table 4).

| Table 4: Teachers in Brazil, 1985-2000 ('000s) |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|                | Pre-School      | Primary         | Secondary       | Higher          |
| 1985           | N/A             | 1,041           | 206             | 122             |
| 1991           | 163             | 1,285           | 250             | 133             |
| 1994           | 275             | 1,335           | 296             | 156             |
| 2000           | 228             | 1,538           | 430             | 174*            |

* refers to 1999

The removal of Collor from office in 1992 did not offer the teaching community any immediate source for optimism. According to the CNTE, President Franco was not seen as likely to improve their situation (CNTE 1993). Consequently, the teaching unions continued with their demand for a national minimum salary and took to the streets in support of their cause.
minimum salary. This eventually resulted in a National Accord that committed the government to its implementation in September 1994. However, it proved no more than a dead letter since four months later, under the new education minister, Paulo Renato Souza, the agreement was overturned.

2.2. Teachers and the Cardoso government

During the Cardoso years the concerns of the teaching movement remained broadly the same as those after 1985. In particular teachers' unions expressed concern at their economic situation and their organisational capacity. However, this was also a period where there were substantial protests and strikes against the government, which the unions accused of being 'neo-liberal' and contributing to a tense government-union relationship (Palamidessi 2003). In part this was due to the strong left-wing identity of the teachers' movement, which was politically associated with the opposition PT and other parties of the Left. The result was that the educational arena became a battleground. The reaction of the administration was to adopt a similar position to that of previous governments, accusing the teaching community of being 'corporatist' and politically motivated in their actions (Goldemberg, Souza, Durham, interviews, 2008).

The Cardoso government's relationship with the teaching community may be understood at two levels: first, among primary and secondary teachers; second, with the higher education community. While both were chiefly concerned with material concerns, the extent to which they were able to challenge the government varied, as a result of their organisational capacity and the institutional nature of educational responsibility within Brazil.

At the primary and secondary level, the CNTE remained the largest national teaching union. Although it had expressed concern at its capacity to organise across the country, during the Cardoso period it had an estimated 700,000 members, with its leadership being dominated by those either associated with, or members of, the PT (Palamidessi 2003). Nonetheless, it suffered from the institutional nature of educational responsibility in Brazil which granted substantial influence to states in education. As a result, the state-level teaching unions were arguably stronger than that of the national CNTE (Vieira, interview, 2007; Buarque, interview, 2008).

From the beginning of the Cardoso presidency the CNTE maintained its support for a national minimum teaching salary. It pointed to the agreement signed with Franco at the end of 1994 as the
basis for discussion. While the bulk of public school teachers received their salaries from states and municipalities, the CNTE saw a national minimum as a means of securing a fair and decent salary (CNTE 2005a; Palamidessi 2003). However, the incoming education minister, Souza, rejected the idea. He claimed that its introduction would challenge subnational autonomy and educational responsibility by interfering with states' and municipalities' rights to set their own salary levels (Souza 2005, interview 2007; Durham, interview 2008). As Souza's position was being formulated, teachers carried out a 20,000-strong protest in favour of public schooling, social security and a national minimum salary in early 1995. They were the largest teacher demonstrations seen since the end of the Collor government (CNTE Noticias 1995b).

The government's eventual response to the teachers' economic concerns was FUNDEF. The study group at MEC proposed that 60% of the fund be allocated as teachers' salaries. The fund effectively vetoed the prospect of a national teachers' salary (CNTE Noticias 1995b, 1995c, 1995d, 1995e; CNTE 1997), which seemed borne out by subsequent findings. Although Souza claimed that the fund eventually increased primary school teachers' salaries by 30% (Souza n.d.), variations in both teachers' own education and regional location contributed towards substantial differences. While the average salary for primary school teachers rose from R$717 to R$929 per month between December 1997 and June 2000, a teacher in the poorer Northeast with only a primary school education saw her income rise from R$168 to R$326 while one who had a teaching degree in the richest region, the Southeast, experienced an increase of R$1165 to R$1545 in the same period (Souza 2005:96). Furthermore, compared to several other Latin American countries, Brazil's teachers were paid less per hour than other professions (Castro and Loschpe 2008).

Distrust continued to persist between government and teachers, even as protests dwindled after FUNDEF took effect. Initially, the FUNDEF proposal had elicited little support from both the teachers and their PT allies. In particular they argued that the fund failed to cover basic education sufficiently, being limited only to primary education. Furthermore, there was concern that the proposal and its elaboration had received insufficient consultation with educational actors outside of MEC, and appeared to lack adequate oversight mechanisms (Chagas, interview, 2008).

At the higher education level, the degree of antipathy between government and teachers remained similarly acute. However, unlike primary and secondary school teachers, visible protest
persisted until the end of the Cardoso presidency. This owed much to the direct responsibility of the federal government for much of public higher education (as opposed to those institutions run by the states or the private sector) and the relatively stronger level of organisation by university teachers, compared to their school colleagues at the federal level (Costa, interview, 2008). Among such (federal university) teachers the key concerns including the lack of a career plan, insufficient rises in their salaries and a restricted form of democracy within universities. The government's main concern during this time was with the extent of academics' qualifications, time spent teaching and efforts to create incentives to encourage greater productivity.

However, the academic community that confronted the government was split. By the mid-1990s it was no longer a single, identifiable community. The growth of the private sector since the military period had weakened academics' ability both to organise and to have a collective sense of identity. The expansion of higher education had contributed towards academics' individualisation and isolation, as they competed for better salaries, funding and research opportunities from a diminishing pot (Bosi 2006; Vianna 2000; Schuch, interview, 2006). The difference was also generational. While younger academics with more advanced research degrees felt relatively more comfortable in this new environment, it was the older academics that were more organised and challenged the government's measures (Schwartzmann, interview, 2007). It was this latter group that Souza criticised as corporatist and self-interested (Souza 2002).

Despite an increase of academics in federal universities from 44,500 to 45,900 (3.1%) between 1994 and 2002 (Paulo Renato Souza Consultores n.d.), the view of the higher education teaching organisations was that the Cardoso presidency had neither improved their career plan nor their salaries (Schuch, interview, 2006; Schwartzmann, interview, 2007). This was aggravated both by Cardoso's 1994 manifesto commitment that he would introduce teacher career plans (Cardoso 1994) and the subsequent claim that exchange rate instability and fiscal pressures limited the scope for salary adjustments (Cardoso 2006). The results were two major higher education strikes in 1998 and 2001. In both cases the protests were led by the academic teaching union, ANDES, whose leadership identified with the political opposition to the government. In each case negotiations were achieved, in the first instance by internal elections in ANDES and second by the government's invitation to the media to attend (Souza 2005). Nevertheless, a comprehensive reform of higher education was never
fully achieved during the Cardoso administration, owing to the active and ideological opposition brought to bear by the teaching profession, in partnership with the student movement (Cardoso 2006; Brooke, interview, 2008).

Finally, the government and higher education teaching profession divided over the degree of internal democracy within federal institutions. The academic unions wanted a substantially proportional say by the student and administrative bodies in the vote for university chancellors (Durham, interview, 2008). This was vetoed by Souza, who challenged the academics when he appointed a new chancellor for the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) from outside those proposed to him (Schwartzmann, interview, 2007).

2.3. Teachers and the Lula government

Compared to the Cardoso government, the Lula presidency was seen as more receptive to the demands of teaching unions (Schwartzmann, interview, 2007). The unions noted that while personal relations were seen as good, the aim was to institutionalise the relationship between government and teachers (Vieira, interview, 2007). Much of the initial good personal relationship between government and teaching unions may be attributed to the close political association formed in the past; a number of individuals from the teaching organisations took up positions within MEC after 2003 (Aparecida da Silva, interview, 2006).

Notwithstanding the relatively close relationship between government and union, the teachers' movement faced ongoing challenges regarding their capacity both to organise and maintain a collective identity. Indeed, the situation has arguably been exacerbated by the acquiescence of key government supporters among the social movements (Schuch, interview, 2006). Indeed, during Lula's first term, the level of collective action had weakened and corporatist organisations were becoming ever less representative of educators. CNTE findings in 2004 showed that 61% of teachers had no involvement with social movements, against 9% that were sympathetic towards them, and 11% who counted themselves as active members. Similarly, more than half (56%) of teachers reported not being a member of any political party, with 23% being inclined to one and 25% either an activist or an armchair member (Vieira 2004). While the decline of collective and political identity among teachers neither began with the Lula presidency nor its predecessor, this development contextualises these
Despite the close political identification between government and unions, differences did exist between the two during the first Lula term. Between 2003 and 2006 the main education issues faced by the government and teaching unions were over differences over its approach to participation, teacher evaluation and salaries.

First, teachers have been concerned at the limited scope of participation under the PT government. Despite the widespread support for FUNDEB from across social movements and prior to the PT’s entry into government, many educators neither felt that the proposed amendment met their demands nor did they feel it had been debated widely enough. This was partially placated by the PT’s decision to include a long-standing CNTE demand, that of a national teaching salary, in the new funding system (Brasil: Presidente da Republica 2004). The CNTE proposed that the value of the salary be set at R$1000 per month, but felt overlooked because rather than consulting its partners in the social movements, the government had concentrated its deliberations with representatives of the state and municipal educational secretaries (CNTE 2005b; Nascimento, Aparecida da Silva, interviews, 2006). Against this, the government saw FUNDEB as far more equitable than FUNDEF in terms of teachers’ salaries: the use of a constitutionally guaranteed minimum of resources to be spent on salaries meant that all teachers would benefit under FUNDEB, whereas only primary school teachers had done so through FUNDEF (Chagas, interview, 2008). In July 2008 the legislation mandating a national teaching salary was passed, setting the amount at R$950 per month from 2010. During the interim the education minister, Fernando Haddad, announced that any teachers earning less than this would receive a supplement worth two-thirds of the difference between his or her current salary and the legal minimum (Ministério da Educação 2009).

Second, the CNTE was opposed to the efforts of the first PT education minister, Cristovam Buarque, to certify teachers through an evaluation (Buarque, interview, 2008; Vieira, interview, 2007). The Teachers’ National Certification Exam would establish a national evaluation system along existing state-level assessments. Teachers would not be obliged to take the exam or attend the courses; but Buarque offered incentives to do so, including the use of federal grants for further training and salary increases, up to 30% in parts of the country (Brasil: Presidente da Republica 2004; Buarque, interview,
Francisco Chagas, a former CNTE leader and government-appointed MEC official, recalled that this was the source of greatest tension between the new government and the union, prompting him to seek an early meeting with Buarque to discourage the idea. In Chagas’s mind, the introduction of a certification process would be discriminatory, by separating ‘good’ teachers who had gone through the process and received increases in income as a result, against ‘bad’ teachers who had not done so (interview, 2008). Following Buarque’s departure in February 2004 the new minister, Tarso Genro, downgraded the proposal (Genro 2004). Buarque noted that his ideas received support from his predecessor, Paulo Renato Souza, who tried to improve on the inclusion of a national teaching salary in the FUNDEB proposal by recommending only those who participated in the evaluation process should receive the national salary. The measure was rejected on what Buarque called ‘corporatist’ grounds (interview, 2008). Despite the measure’s defeat with Buarque’s departure, it has since been revived in the National Education Plan since April 2007 (Motter, unpublished).

Third, teaching unions have expressed their dissatisfaction with the level or form of salary increases under the PT government. The CNTE, for example, claimed that the expanded coverage offered by FUNDEB did not yield either the necessary level of payment to teachers nor set a value for a minimum teaching salary. While the CNTE had campaigned for 80% of FUNDEB resources to be paid towards teachers, the government fixed on 70%. Furthermore, while the government accepted the need for a minimum teaching salary, it refused to set a value (Aparecida da Silva, Nascimento, interviews 2006; CNTE n.d.). Meanwhile, in higher education ANDES claimed that the Lula government had failed to readjust salaries (Schuch, interview, 2006). This was in contrast to observers and the government, which claimed that it had indeed increased university and technical school teachers’ salaries over inflation, in some cases up to 20% (Azevedo 2006; Schwartzmann, interview, 2007).

3. Conclusion
This chapter started with the challenge faced by the ambiguity of teachers’ motivations and the ideological impositions that may be placed on the movement by governments of particular political hues. What is evident is the relative decline of past social democratic notions of the teaching profession: the notion that the teacher is an altruistic ‘knight’ is disregarded by all three governments.
This is apparent in the rejection of the teacher as the sole professional actor in the education system. Under the Concertación, the teaching body complained at the level of scrutiny which had not previously existed under Allende; the Cardoso government’s rejected school teachers’ demand for a national salary and university teachers’ demands for a more comprehensive voting system for chancellors; and halted the use of teacher evaluations under the Lula administration.

Such tensions blur the distinctions that were initially drawn between Third Way and Participatory Left governments and the relations with teachers’ organisations at the start of the chapter. Owing to the closer links between Participatory Left and social movements, it was assumed that a more collaborative and conciliatory relationship might be expected, against the Third Way’s weaker social links and hence more independent policymaking — which would contribute to confrontation. Of the three governments, the Cardoso and PT governments appeared to conform most to type. The education team in the Cardoso government appeared weary of teachers and their inclination to strike. This influenced their opinion of them, prompting them to ask with scepticism whether these organisations accurately represented the movement. The PT’s Participatory Left government arguably had a closer and less fractious relationship with teaching unions. Whereas teachers were inclined to use their capacity to strike under both the Concertación and Cardoso governments, its use was distinctive in its relative absence in Brazil after 2003. Instead, teachers’ organisations engaged in greater levels of debate and discussion, no doubt aided by the relative overlap in membership that existed between government and unions. The closer relationship was evident in the introduction of a national teaching salary and an expanded constitutional fund for education, FUNDEB, which both the CNTE and PT had defended. However, despite this relative closeness, the government did not give full reign to the union. The CNTE’s involvement in the design of FUNDEB highlighted the limits of government-union engagement over decision-making. Meanwhile, the Third Way Concertación government’s relationship with teachers could be divided into periods: one until 1995 when it appeared to share their concerns, most notably through the creation of a Teachers Statute and after 1995 when the teachers’ leadership changed. In this later period the notion of teachers as selfish, budget-maximising ‘knaves’, became more apparent in Concertación thinking (as it was during the Cardoso presidency).
The separation of the Concertación’s relationship with the teaching profession into two periods demonstrates the limits of analysis offered by the distinction between Third Way and Participatory Left approaches. With regard to the Third Way, both the Teachers Statute in Chile and the Cardoso government’s FUNDEF fund placed teachers on a more secure and legal footing. Furthermore, the Participatory Left model fails to account for the tension between the PT government and the CNTE over teacher evaluation. This may be due to the change in the nature of policymaking by the PT before and after 2003: whereas before it was more participatory and therefore in tune with union concerns, once in power it ceased to have the same degree of engagement with social movements.

Despite these developments, it remained the case that the Cardoso administration was beset by opposition from the teaching unions from the start. By contrast, the Concertación’s first half decade in power was notable for the relative absence of conflict emanating from the teaching unions, due in large part to pro-Concertación sympathies of the union leaderships during these years. The variations between the governments and their relationships with teachers may therefore owe much to previous associations between governments and the movement. Of the three cases, the PT has had the longest such relationship: teachers were among the founders of the party in 1980 and remained close political allies during the years of national opposition during the 1980s and 1990s. Indeed, despite the changes that had occurred within the party in terms of policymaking, the bulk of the teaching profession’s leadership remained closely identified with the PT until its election and provided individuals for government positions. The PSDB has had the weakest links with teachers’ unions – indeed, compared to the PT, they have arguably been non-existent. Meanwhile in Chile, the Concertación has occupied space between these two extremes. The Concertación dominated the mainstream opposition movement before 1990, in both political parties and social movements (including the teachers’ union). Despite the decline in social mobilisation, concertacionistas remained in leading positions in the teachers’ union after 1990, thereby providing a collaborative relationship until their defeat by a more radical group in 1995.
11. An unequal relationship: Students and social democratic governments

Like teachers, students are an interest group in the education policy process (Harman 1984). Furthermore, like teachers, the student movement can be distinguished between those in the school system (at secondary level) and in higher education. The extent to which they present both a collective entity, students’ capacity to organise and the nature of their demands are contingent on a range of factors.

First, students’ relationship to the education system is especially ambiguous. From an ideological perspective, the Left views students as either an agent of change (by Marxist, feminist and conflict theorists) or as a beneficiary or ‘entitlee’ (past social democracy) while on the Right they are perceived to be either raw material for the market (neo-liberal) or as empty vessels to be filled with social values and norms (neo-conservative) (Trowler 1998). This distinction sits at odds other images of students (or consumers more generally): of ‘pawns’ (passive and lacking agency) by the Left and social democrats and ‘queens’ (demanding and active) under the neo-liberal Right respectively (Le Grand 2003). Meanwhile, student leaderships tend to make similar demands as teachers’ organisations, illustrating their shared ideological commitment. This seems contradictory, since teachers’ positions means they can be perceived as a producer group, while the positions ascribed to students by both Left and Right suggest anything but this. Notwithstanding this paradox, the role of students remains relevant for analysis since of the two so-called ‘consumer’ groups (the other being parents) they tend to be the most well-organised nationally.

Second, student concerns range from the narrow to the broad. At its most limited, student interests address the educational system and its impact upon themselves. At its broadest, they have formed part of society-wide movement in favour of social or political change. In part this may be explained by the wider political context in which they find themselves: Liebman et al (1972) suggest that under stable, liberal and democratic government students will focus their attention on university reform, while under authoritarian or non-responsive regimes, students will concern themselves with...
political issues. The extent to which they are successful in their demands depends on their ability to manipulate and provoke the prevailing social and economic forces (Boren 2001).

Third, in Latin America students have been an especially important interest group – arguably more so than in the global North. This owes much to the relatively elitist nature of education in the region, where historically a minority passed through higher education, let alone completed secondary school. Furthermore, the stratified nature of Latin American society meant that those who reached the later stages of education in the past came from families that were in the higher income groups, ensuring a relatively cohesive and socially homogenous movement. However, the expansion of education coverage across the region since the 1960s, while ensuring that greater numbers now complete secondary school and go onto higher education, has also weakened the student movement's self-identification and political activism. This is due in part to the growth in private provision of education and the repressive and depoliticising actions of military regimes in this period (Levy 1981). Yet it must also be due to the increasingly diverse nature of the student population, politically, economically and socially.

As with teachers, governments tend to find that their previous associations with the student movement influences the extent to which the relationship is confrontational or conciliatory. This is due in large part to the self-conscious association of the bulk of student leaderships with the Left, and suggests distinctions between the different social democratic approaches: whereas relations should be relatively collaborative between students and Participatory Left, they will be more confrontational with Third Way governments that have fewer connections with them. Such an assumption goes against the more consumerist vision of students, who would welcome not only more choice but also the procedures and information to facilitate it.

As the cases show though, it is the Participatory Left perspective of students that appears to hold in both Brazil and Chile. Student leaderships appear motivated more by shared political affiliation than by consumerist concerns. However, even though the Participatory Left enjoys a relatively closer – and less confrontational – relationship with students, they do not appear to be especially influential with governments generally, thereby challenging past notions of the relevance of students as an interest group in Latin American education policymaking. Indeed, contrary to the notion of students as

227
consumers, among both Participatory Left and Third Way governments student organisations have not been treated as full and active partners in education, but rather as entitles.

1. Chile

In Chile, student organisations were shut down following the military coup in 1973. This followed several years in which the student movement had played a visible role, especially on the Left. In the 1980s the regime introduced student organisations once again, seeking to control them from above. However, they soon lost control, with student leaderships being largely made up of concertacionistas. Unlike Brazil, there was no national student organisation, so student activity remained concentrated in a few key institutions. Following the Concertación’s entry into government in 1990, the relationship between it and the student movement was largely cordial until changes in organisational leadership in the mid- to late-1990s prompted a more confrontational approach. Throughout the Concertación period the government has largely introduced measures directed at students and has not included them as an active partner in policymaking. The 2006 demonstrations forced the government to respond, although this did not result in any lasting change in students’ status vis-à-vis the government.

1.1. Students and government, pre-1990

The expansion of Chile’s education system occurred in the middle part of the 20th century, with key reforms occurring during the Christian Democrat presidency under Frei (1964-70). Although there were only 346,000 secondary school students in 1966, between 1957 and 1966 the number of primary school students had increased by around 50%, from 997,000 to 1.57m (DESAL 1969). Politically, student leaders reflected broader society. They were primarily Christian Democrat activists or at the least, left-leaning (Burnett 1970). It was in this period that Christian Democrats took control of the largest university student union in Chile, the Federation of University of Chile Students (FECH), demanding more autonomy within higher education institutions. This it achieved in 1967, following student protests and occupations and despite the presence of Christian Democrats in the presidential palace, La Moneda (Hofmeister 1995). Furthermore, in contrast to other Latin American student movements, the Chilean student body was noted for being more moderate in its strategy and tactics (Burnett 1970).
During the Allende presidency the level of mobilisation among students was enhanced, including in the pre-university sector. Space existed for secondary school students to participate not only in school councils, but also in deliberations within the teachers' union, SUTE, itself (Colegio de Profesores 2003). But the presence of the Popular Unity (UP) government coincided with growing polarisation in Chilean society; in the educational arena this was most visibly demonstrated by divisions over the National Unified School (ENU) proposal. Chilean students were not immune from this debate, separating themselves along political lines. Arguably the most conservative student group in the country, the leadership of the Catholic University's student union, FEUC, denounced ENU as a means of trying to impose political control and a uniform educational model on society (FEUC 1973).

The military regime, following the 1973 coup, sought a transformation of Chilean society. This included efforts to change the nature of the student movement as well. The military leadership saw the universities as problematic, on account of the level of politicisation and agitation within them. This could not be allowed to continue, prompting the regime to control them directly, by appointing chancellors drawn from military ranks (Chile, Junta Militar de Gobierno 197?). During this first phase of the regime, enrolments fell by 30% between 1974 and 1980 (Newsome 1993). Meanwhile the student movement remained in disarray, being unable to organise or co-ordinate itself in the first years after the coup.

By the early 1980s there was some demand from within the student movement to organise although the political context did not allow the prospect of any kind of activity other than cultural ones, and only at the level of the department rather than university-wide (Martinez and Valladares 1988; Toro et al 2005; Gode de Maza 1999). At the same time as the regime began to allow the creation of professional labour associations, or gremios, these student organisations were co-opted and controlled from above. Notwithstanding the military's intentions, they became increasingly autonomous from 1982 on. This was due in part to the absence of any links with political parties, the economic crisis in 1982 which brought students alongside other protestors, and the construction of a university-wide student association at the University of Chile (FECECH) (Martinez and Valladares 1988; Toro et al 2005).

If higher education was bearing the brunt of military repression in the 1970s, at the secondary school level the number of students surged forward. Although this would create more demand for
university places in the 1980s, it also meant that the student body became less politically and socially homogenous. Increasingly, poorer classes were able to access the Chilean university system (Cariola et al 2003). These changes, coupled with the educational reforms promoting greater liberalisation and use of the market, contributed to a model that was perceived as individualist and consumer-driven (Schiefelbein 1982).

In the final phase of the dictatorship, the military faced more vocal opposition from the student movement. The 1982 economic crisis gave way to broader protests across the country. Within higher education, this was evident in demands for an end to military intervention in universities via the appointed chancellors, in favour of greater autonomy for institutions and student bodies. These demands transcended political lines, being supported by both opposition and government supporters alike in the 1984 Federation of University of Chile Student Centres (FECECH) elections and beyond the student movement, to include the teaching profession (Toro et al 2005; AGECH 1986). Organisationally, the student movement became increasingly tied to political party activity. This was dominated by the left and centre-left parties, the more visible and moderate tied to the Christian Democrats and the more clandestine elements centred on the Communist Party (Gode de Maza 1999; Toro et al 2005). Despite these links, the repressive nature of the regime ensured that the student movement remained fearful and received only limited support from their parents and the media, when compared to the secondary student protests on 2006 (Pancani, interview, 2007).

1.2. Students and the Concertación governments

Notwithstanding the differences between secondary school and university students, relations between the Concertación and the broader student movement may be distinguished by two main concerns: material issues since 1990, followed by educational quality and the nature of Chilean democracy in the decade after 1995. This latter shift was associated with the change in student leadership in 1995 and arguably reached its highpoint in 2006 when student protests gave rise to mass demonstrations and social demands for education reform.

Interest group concerns and actions were primarily material in nature, including grants, student financing and access to higher education (Núñez, interview 1, 2007). These have dominated Concertación-student relations since 1990, although they were arguably more prominent during the
first half of the 1990s. In 1992, students took to the streets to protest against a credit system that was deemed insufficient (Roco Fossa 2005). In response, the first Concertación president, Patricio Aylwin, while stressing the wide range of priorities his government faced and his prioritisation of primary and secondary education, did commit the government to more student credit, from 5000 to 20,000 grants between 1991 and 1994 (Aylwin 1994b). The demand for a national fund of credit and support formed the basis of the Left’s campaign platform in the FECH elections in 1995 (Roco Fossa 2005). In the years following, the level of student mobilisation increased, most notably between 1997 and 2002, along with protests in 2002 by secondary school students concerning limited resources (Grau, interview, 2007; Garretón 1998). Yet the most prominent of these protests regarding university credit occurred in 1999 when police shot protestors in Arica (Roco Fossa 2005). Given the agitation within the student movement and the crisis in the university credit system, an accord was eventually signed between the Confederation of Chilean Students (CONFECH), the organisation which represented students at the traditional universities (Grau, interview, 2007) and Mineduc in September 2005. This guaranteed free study in the first year for the poorest students while recalculating poverty levels to assess the extent of financial assistance to such students (Roco Fossa 2005). A similar agreement in November 2005 was also achieved, between the government and secondary school students. This occurred despite the relatively weaker level of organisation by secondary school students compared to university students (Núñez, interview 1, 2007).

Concerns about educational quality and the nature of democracy reflected the second dimension of Concertación-student relations. Prior to 1995 these concerns were muted, mainly as a result of the strength and legitimacy of the Concertación and the representative political institutions including Congress, when compared to other social actors (Thezá and Muñoz 2005). Meanwhile the representative student bodies, most notably FECH, suffered from a corresponding lack of legitimacy (Roco Fossa 2005). This was due to the close link that existed between government and the student leadership in FECH. At the same time, a debate was taking place within FECH over whether to accept the present educational system or demand an alternative. Finally, the FECH leadership was accused of financial impropriety and a lack of participation and transparency. The result was the disbandment of FECH between 1993 and 1994 (Gode de Maza 1999). Following its reformation, the Concertación’s allies were defeated in the 1995 elections by a coalition of left-wing non-party and social-movement
based groups which – with the exception of 1997 when it was led by the Right – have dominated the organisation ever since (Grau, interview, 2007).

The change in student leadership is characterised as a break from past, internally-focused, 'gremialist' concerns such as student finances, towards one that is more outward-looking and structural in its demands, seeking changes to the educational system as a whole (Grau, interview, 2007). In particular this represents a demand for less use of the market in education, the need for stronger student organisation (especially in private universities) and a greater state commitment to public funding (Grau 2005). During the 1997 student demonstrations, the role and purpose of the university in contemporary society was questioned and new issues emerged, including greater regulation, the derogation of the Constitutional Statutory Law of Education (LOCE) and an end to for-profit institutions (Garretón 1998; Perez de Arce 1998). These visions were shared by other social actors, including the Colegio de Profesores, whose change in leadership after 1995 echoed a similar shift in thinking, and the creation of a left-wing cross-social movement grouping known as the Fuerza Social in 2001. Like many of those involved in the Fuerza Social, many student leaders either have been or are Communist Party (PC) activists. These activists see Chilean society as insufficiently politicised and Chile's representative institutions as inadequate, since they do not allow social organisations to participate (Grau 2005).

Chile's student movement remains organisationally weak, despite its substantial increase in numbers (Weinstein, interview, 2007). Student organisation is at its strongest within the traditional public and state-funded private universities, the largest of which – the University of Chile and the Catholic University – constitute up to 27,000 and 24,000 students respectively (Grau, interview, 2007). Despite attempts to create a more co-ordinated approach through CONFECH, these efforts broke down in 1998, leaving it with a limited organisational structure (Roco Fossa 2005). This was apparent to the government, which viewed the main representative student bodies as being those associated with the University of Chile, the Catholic University, the University of Santiago and some of the regional universities (Weinstein, interview, 2007). Furthermore, in the larger sector of private higher education – which makes up around 70% of the student population (Informe del Consejo Asesor Presidencial 2008: 7) – few student organisations exist. In many cases they are not allowed by the university authorities. Those that do exist, such as at Diego Portales and Universidad Central, remain
relatively weak (Grau 2005; Grau, Weinstein, interviews, 2007; Perez de Arce 1998). This would also appear to reflect the changes in higher education more generally, with the greater diversity in the student population and provision limiting the degree of solidarity (Roco Fossa 2005).

The 2006 secondary-school led demonstrations have also been portrayed representing the shift from students’ concerns with material benefits to demands with more structural concerns about the education system. This interpretation overlooks three factors, however: the extent to which student mobilisation was evident prior to the 2006 protests; the immediate, material catalysts that prompted it; and the extent to which education was a mass concern.

First, there is debate over whether the demonstrations were a unique event or the culmination of growing frustration of the education system by students and wider society. Gutiérrez and Caviedes (2006) trace the origins of the estimated 600,000 to one million-sized demonstrations back to student activism in the early 2000s and general frustration at an apparently unresponsive government. By contrast, Silva (2007) presents the protests as unexpected, given the relatively limited degree of social mobilisation in recent Chilean history, and the memory that it brought back of the 1971-72 period, obliging the government to respond. This became more urgent after hundreds of students were injured by police action (Fuerza Social y Democracia 2006). This perspective also maintains that such activism tends to be organic, sporadic and limited in its long term organisation (Weinstein, interview, 2007).

In between these two positions is the notion that the demonstrations marked a generational shift in Chilean politics. The ‘penguin revolution’ (named for the secondary school students which are known as ‘penguins’ for their uniforms) was distinct from the Concertación generation by being comprised mainly of individuals who had not directly experienced the dictatorship. As a result there was a difference in the expectations between the two generations in terms of educational quality, with the younger cohort both more dissatisfied and inclined to protest (Bitar, Cox, Peña, interviews, 2007; Huibodro-Garcia 2007). This was possibly aided by the level of support experienced by the cohort. Unlike their 1980s forebears, the 2006 protestors could not only count on support from their parents and the media, but operated in a less politically risky and repressive environment (Pancani, interview, 2007). Indeed, police action against demonstrators prompted Bachelet to fire the chief of the riot police as a result (BBC News 2006).
Second, the demonstrations were seen as presenting a shift from material to structural demands concerning education. This includes the limitations of the Whole School Day (JEC) programme, and concern at the rising costs of the university examination test (PSU) and public transport (Garcia-Huibodro, interview, 2007; Núñez, interview, 2007). Against this should be noted students' frustration at the relatively weak financial position of municipal schools compared to subsidised ones, insufficient infrastructure, the limited capacity for student participation owing to 'authoritarian' head teachers on school councils and a non-responsive ministry (Estudiantes Secundaristas de la Región Metropolitana 2005). Demands were made to reform the LOCE, change the financial arrangements for education funding and alter the municipal nature of the school system (Colegio de Profesores 2006a).

Third, the demonstrations reflected the extent to which education had shifted from being an elite to a mass concern. Since the 1980s the proportion of the population in education had expanded across all social and economic groups. During the 1990s not only had primary education been effectively universalised in Chile, but an increasing number of poorer students were accessing both secondary and higher education; by 2005 at least four-fifths of the relevant age group across all social groups were in secondary school (table 5). The effect of this broad education system meant that more people were able to access knowledge and develop themselves, and thereby becoming more inclined to make political demands (Cox, interview, 2007; Cox 2007).

| Table 5: School and College Attendance in Urban Areas by Household Income Level and Age Groups in Chile, 1994-2005 (%) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Poorest quintile | Middle quintile | Richest quintile |
|  | 7 to 12 years | 13 to 19 years | 20 to 24 years | 7 to 12 years | 13 to 19 years | 20 to 24 years |
| 1994 | 98.7 | 76.4 | 14 | 99.8 | 82 | 24.5 |
| 1997 | 98.7 | 76.4 | 14 | 99.8 | 82 | 24.5 |
| 2005 | 99.2 | 81.4 | 18.9 | 99.8 | 84.1 | 31.4 |


The scale of the demonstrations contributed to the creation of a presidential advisory committee presided over by Juan Eduardo Garcia-Huibodro that was broad in the range of social actors represented. This was seen by both the Concertación government and students to have a wide-ranging discussion about the nature of the education system and propose changes (Grau, Diaz,
Garcia-Huibordro, interviews, 2007). The Right, though, questioned the extent to which the ‘structure’ of the educational system was discussed. They saw the demands as primarily political or ideological in scope and claimed to be uncertain what was sought beyond more investment in infrastructure (Dittborn, Velasco, interviews, 2007). However, despite students’ engagement with the committee, there was a split between the government and the Right on one side and the Bloque Social consisting of social movements, including student organisations on the other. This was evident in the Bloque Social’s rejection of both the final report at the end of 2006 and the government’s eventual agreement with the parliamentary (Right) opposition in November 2007 on the proposed education legislation.

2. Brazil

Student activity in Brazil has arguably concentrated more on broader political issues than educational policy and material matters. During the military period the student movement formed part of the growing opposition movement, with significant numbers contributing to the rebuilding of the political Left, including the formation of the PT. During the New Republic’s first decade secondary school students were a visible part of the movement demanding Collor’s impeachment while after 1995 the student movement opted for an opposition stance against the Cardoso government. Following Lula’s victory the student movement has adopted a more conciliatory approach with the government, although in both cases students have been the recipients of policies rather than participants in their formation.

2.1. Students and government, pre-1995

Students were arguably among the most prominent critics of the military regime, both educationally and politically. They challenged the regime’s higher education reforms and questioned its political legitimacy, which was largely attributable to the movement’s self-conscious association with the Left (Mische 1997; Skidmore 1988). It was also in marked contrast to its relationship with government prior to 1964, when it had acted as an arm of the corporatist state (Durham 2004).

The regime’s response to the student movement was noticeable in the different approaches it adopted. This was largely attributable to the tendency which dominated within the regime at any given time: the moderate or the hardline. Following the coup it pursued a moderate course, during which student protests were tolerated. This was followed by a more repressive period, during the regime’s
hardline phase, followed by a resurgence of student activism under the liberalisation process of the late 1970s and early 1980s.

The process of liberalisation which began in the later 1970s contributed to a less repressive environment in which the student movement was able to emerge. Yet as with the previous moderate phase in the mid-1960s, the regime was only prepared to tolerate limited dissent. Initially student activism was confined to internal university matters, regarding the dismissal of staff and meetings on technical issues and areas related to study. As long as this remained the extent of student action, the regime restrained itself (MEC 1975a, 1975b). After 1977 though, the student movement became more visible and critical. MEC interpreted this dissatisfaction to reflect student frustration at an insufficient supply of university places (MEC 1977b). The regime responded by reminding all university chancellors that order and discipline be maintained on campus and the 'prohibition of any university assemblies of a political nature' ensured. If necessary, the government was prepared to call upon the security services and, as a last resort, suspend all academic activity if the disturbances became too great (MEC 1977a).

However, the regime increasingly found itself unable to control the student movement. This was partly due to the sheer size of the student population that had increased throughout the military period. Secondary school student numbers had increased from 510,000 in 1965 to 2.82 million in 1980 and 3.02 million in 1985. In 1965 160,000 had entered higher education; by 1980 this had reached 1.38 million (IBGE 1977, 1982, 1987/88). The students, emboldened, reconstituted their own autonomous organisations within both public and private universities (the latter being a notable difference in student organisation compared to Chile); in May 1979 the university students reformed the previously banned the National Students' Union (UNE), whose leadership was strongly leftist (Poerner 2004). By the early 1980s UNE had joined a wide coalition of social and political forces which were not only demanding changes to the education system, but also for a return to democracy. The movement was increasingly active and organised, achieving a national three-day strike by around one million university students and teachers in 32 higher education institutions to support its political and educational demands (Poerner 2004).

Following the return to civilian rule the student movement lost its previous impetus and momentum. With democracy now established, there was no focal political issue around which
students could gather. This absence was coupled with a less politically or ideologically inclined student body, whose primary concerns were individual and work-based, owing in large part to the economic difficulties faced by Brazilian society in this period (Costa 1996; Mische 1997; Maia 2004). Indeed, it is significant that during this period there were few prominent or widespread demonstrations or protests against government higher education policies. This changed in 1992 when the student movement once again became visible. However, it had less to do with the education system, being a moral-based protest against corruption within the Collor presidency (Boren 2001). The first protest involved 10,000 students and occurred after months of media campaign. While the protests eventually gained a broad base in society, students were among the earliest and most visible participants (Gusmão 2005).

Following Collor’s replacement with Itamar Franco, government-student relations shifted towards more material concerns. Secondary school students expressed concern at the relative difficulty faced in organising and arbitrary increases in tuition fees in private schools (Brito da Silva 2005). University students celebrated the return of UNE’s headquarters which had been confiscated under the military regime while making demands for the freezing of tuition fees and greater resource in public universities (Gusmão 2005).

2.2. Students and the Cardoso government

Despite the organisational challenges faced by the student movement following 1985, the leaderships of both the UNE and UBES (the national secondary school student organisation) quickly adopted an oppositional stance to the Cardoso presidency. This was due in large part to the political identification of the organisations’ leaderships: since 1989 the UNE leadership had been dominated by the PT and the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) (Araujo 2007; Gusmão 2005). In sheer numbers, the two organisations represented substantial constituencies: the number of secondary school students doubled from 4.5 to 9 million between 1995 and 2005 while the number of university students increased from 1.76 million to 2.13 million during Cardoso’s first term; with more than three-fifths being based in private institutions (Paulo Renato Souza Consultores, n.d.; IBGE, various years; MEC/INEP 2000). As in Chile, the population accessing education in these years was expanding across all social groups and most especially among the poorer sections; by the mid-2000s primary education was
effectively universalised while around three-quarters and one-fifth of the relevant age groups were in secondary and higher education respectively (table 6). It was in this period that the existence of state-level student organisations, especially in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, aided the movement in its capacity to mobilise and target its protests (Maia 2004).

Table 6: School and College Attendance in Urban Areas by Household Income Level and Age Groups in Brazil, 1994-2005 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Poorest quintile</th>
<th>Middle quintile</th>
<th>Richest quintile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 to 12 years</td>
<td>13 to 19 years</td>
<td>20 to 24 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>90.5</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>97.4</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The university and secondary school students' emphasis on the political was evident in the key features of the government-student relationship between 1995 and 2002. First, both types of students focused their criticism of the government on its 'neo-liberal' course (Poerner 2004; Stumpf, interview, 2006; Maia 2004; Brito da Silva 2005). Secondary school students opposed the government's decision to separate vocational training from general education and were determined to maintain concessionary transport fares and spaces in public universities for public school students (Brito da Silva 2005). University students (and teachers) challenged the government's efforts to allow increases in tuition fees and the Provão, a university-level evaluation and exam system to be taken by all students in federal universities, on the basis that it would introduce individual assessment of students (Cunha 2004). This prompted students to boycott the Provão (Maia 2004), despite Cardoso's education minister, Paulo Renato Souza, claim that the assessments were designed to provide students, parents and the educational community an opportunity to identify whether a given course and institution was adequate (Souza, interview, 2007).

More generally, the students' opposition to the 'neo-liberal' approach was evident in their clashes with the federal police over the government's proposed social security reform in March 1995. This was followed in 1999 by general protests against the government's economic model, in which UNE formed part of a broad civil movement with other groups of the Left, including the Landless
Workers' Movement (MST), the Central Trade Union (CUT) and the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops (CNBB) (Maia 2004).

Second, the movement saw the government as determined to curtail their civil and organisational rights (Stumpf, interview, 2006). This was evident in two key ways: one, when 8000 university and secondary school students demanded that the senate president's political rights be stripped in 2001, resulting in action by the police and 18 injuries and arrests; two, MEC's decision to end UNE's monopoly on the sale of student cards in August 2001, which had been worth R$1.9m the previous year and constituted around 80% of UNE's income (Poerner 2004; Stumpf, interview, 2006; Maia 2004). Indeed, this latter issue became one of the key rallying points for students against the government, given the impact that this financial measure had in financially hamstringing the movement. In response, Souza's own justification was that the UNE was using the money it raised through this monopoly to provide election finance to the Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB). He considered this 'un-transparent' since the student movement was a politically plural rather than a party political movement (Souza, interview, 2007).

The government criticised the student movement in much the same fashion as it did teachers' organisations. Cardoso claimed that both were 'corporatist' and had prevented university reform (Cardoso 2006). This view overlooked the extent to which universities themselves – including those in the private sector – challenged the measures as well. Nevertheless, the government's frustrations were reflected in the students' approach to its policies. The former UNE president, Felipe Maia, conceded that for much of the period its response to Cardoso and Souza was limited to the negative; the movement did not work up alternative proposals. This prompted the UNE leadership to draw up proposals that included an emergency spending programme for federal universities and teaching salaries (which UNE perceived as having fallen throughout the Cardoso period) and a replacement of tuition fee increases with legislation regarding paid teaching (Maia 2004).

2.3. Students and the Lula government

With the election of Lula, the relationship between students and government became substantially less confrontational. Indeed, from the government's perspective, there were virtually no notable sources of tension between the two (Chagas, interview, 2008). This owed much to the political identification of
the student organisations' leaderships, which are dominated by the PT and other parties of the Left (Araujo 2007; Brito da Silva 2005). This remained the case despite the declining presence of students associated with the PT Articulação faction (to which Lula and his close allies belonged) on the UNE executive after its 2001 congress (Maia 2004).

The strength of the Left was evident in the movement's approach to the 2002 elections. Students generally saw continuity in the presidential candidacy of the PSDB’s José Serra. Lula appeared to represent change (Brito da Silva 2005). The UNE published its own manifesto during the 2002 elections and included all the presidential candidates in its distribution. At the time only Lula appeared to meet all the demands set out in the manifesto. However, it was not until the second round run-off between Lula and an ex-UNE president from the 1960s, José Serra, that both university and secondary students held a plebiscite among 400,000 student to decide which candidate to support. The result indicated a clear preference for Lula and explicit support was given to his campaign (Araujo 2007; Poerner 2004). In 2006, the UNE, along with other social movements, took a similar approach in relation to Lula’s re-election, delaying support until the second round (Baiocchi and Checa 2008: 125).

The student leadership’s stance in relation to the PT government has been seen as advantageous and disadvantageous. On the positive side, the government is seen as more accessible and sympathetic to their concerns than its predecessors. The UNE leadership was determined to maintain its autonomy but recognised the government as more inclined to engage with them. This included discussion between the two in the transition period between the presidential election and Lula taking office. The environment also enabled UNE to present its own proposals (Maia 2004, Petta 2004). This represented a shift from the Cardoso years, when the leadership had maintained a confrontational stance throughout. Soon afterwards, both UNE and the Brazilian Union of Secondary School Students (UBES) were invited to discuss their concerns with the new education minister, Cristovam Buarque, in January 2003, followed by Lula himself later that year.

Among the demands laid out by UNE during the first Lula term included a commitment to a more state-led form of economic development, the re-constitution of the Rondon Project (an assistance programme using student labour that was originally initiated under the military regime), the elimination of the Provão and the reinstatement of UNE’s monopoly on the sale of student cards.
Soon after taking office Cristovam Buarque announced the end of the Provão and invited UNE to participate in the development of a new evaluation mechanism in higher education (Maia 2004). The Rondon Project was subsequently restarted in 2005 (UNE 2006) while the UNE leadership also celebrated the government's expansionary higher education programme of new public universities, quotas and the ProUni assistance programme. This latter scheme involves a grant assistance scheme for poorer students to attend private institutions, although it was apparently devised with little direct input from the movement.

On the negative side, the government had failed to reinstate the student card monopoly by the end of the first Lula term (Monteiro, interview, 2006). This was arguably the central UNE concern, as it limited its financial capacity and autonomy. Furthermore, the relationship between government and movement remained ambiguous: while the students' leadership claims organisational autonomy, its closeness and ability to influence the government was criticised. This included its unwillingness to mobilise or carry out large-scale campaigns during the first Lula term (especially in relation to its higher education reform which some leftist students accuse of being 'neo-liberal' and 'privatising') and its decision not to submit its 2006 election manifesto to the PSDB presidential candidate (Monteiro, Stumpf, Schuch, interviews, 2006; Araujo 2007). This has prompted the UNE to reconsider its way of working, including how it mobilises support in favour of proposals rather than against them. Indeed, at the 2003 UNE congress, the first after Lula took office, the main issue concerned whether the organisation should actively support or oppose the government or remain independent (Maia 2004, Petta 2004).

Notwithstanding the movement's closer relationship with MEC since 2003, the extent to which it is a full participant in policy-making remains ambiguous. Although the presence and engagement of government ministers was noted at the 2003 UNE congress (Petta 2004), the organisation's decision to remain autonomous has meant that its concerns are not fully adopted by the government. This was most apparent in the government's higher education reform which began to emerge in 2004. The UNE leadership supported measures for more resources for public education and greater democracy in university chancellor elections, but criticised the government's apparent unwillingness to regulate and control the private sector (Stumpf, interview, 2006; Petta 2004). The result of the PT government's policies in relation to students has therefore been less of a student movement directly involved in the
construction of policies than of being a cheerleader on the side. This presents a dramatic shift from the traditional image of Latin American students, in which they have a key political role as an important pressure group that governments must take account of.

3. Conclusion

At the outset of the chapter, it was suggested that given their ideological association with the radical Left and their social attachments, student organisations would be more in tune with Participatory Left than Third Way governments. One would expect to see greater collaboration with the former and more confrontation with the latter. Certainly the student protests in Chile in 2006 against the education system overseen by the Third Way Concertación were but the most notable and recent example of this. At the same time there were also regular protests and opposition by students against the Cardoso government in Brazil. By contrast during the first term of the Participatory Left PT government, student mobilisation declined substantially.

Despite the difference between the three governments, the extent to which the student organisations were seen as active partners was questionable. Despite the PT government’s early meeting with the UNE and UBES leaderships, this arguably proved the highpoint for the Brazilian student movement. Regardless of whether a Third Way or Participatory Left government was in office, students were generally not seen as full partners by policymakers. The reason for this may have been the decline in students’ historic moral and political role since the 1970s, but it also was not helped by both the educational and political stances taken by the movements (which itself undermined the other assumption that student leaderships would focus primarily on education matters in democratic periods).

In Brazil, for example, the student organisation arguably took a conscious early decision to oppose the new Cardoso government and accuse it of being ‘neo-liberal’. The relative absence of dialogue appeared to suit the administration, which accused it of being ‘corporatist’ and politically biased. Following the 2003 meeting with the government, PT policymakers’ involvement with students began to flag. On key initiatives that affected students – FUNDEB, ProUni and higher education reform – the student movement was not present either in their design, other than as one stakeholder among many. Even in the most notable case of where student action yielded a government response,
the involvement of students in the presidential advisory commission in Chile, it was constrained by the Concertación’s eventual negotiations with the political opposition on the proposed education legislation. It seemed that while the Concertación was prepared to listen to the grievances of students, acting on them was another matter.

Similarly students’ weak involvement in the policymaking process may also be attributable to their relative organisational decline – although this varied between the two countries. While the expansion of higher education after the 1970s undoubtedly expanded the student population, the impact of economic pressures and the impact of military repression affected their capacity to mobilise. The repression by the military in Brazil and Chile contributed to a politically active and cohesive student movement which formed part of a broader civil society united in its demand for a return to democracy. When this occurred, in Brazil in 1985 and in Chile in 1989, the activism of the student movements ebbed. While in Brazil the student movement returned to visible prominence momentarily during the anti-Collar corruption scandal in 1992, in Chile the student leadership remained relatively acquiescent until its change in 1995. However, unlike the Chilean case, Brazilian students have generally remained more strongly organised: both at a national level and within the private sector.

The effect of these various economic and organisational pressures and ideological stance meant that in all three cases, social democratic governments adopted positions that treated students more as beneficiaries or ‘entitlees’ than as full partners, as shown by the Lula government’s ProUni programme to enable poorer students to enter university and the Concertación’s increase in student grants and assistance. This approach also indicated that even if Third Way social democrats were more inclined towards the market and the notion of choice than the Participatory Left, their treatment of students did not appear to conform to the idea of them as ‘consumers’. The closest version of this model was the Cardoso government’s Provão, which did little to assist current students in making an informed choice for their education, since its methodology meant that assessment would only be made at the end of a student’s course rather than during it.
12. Conclusion

This dissertation set out to answer two main questions: what is social democracy in Latin America and what impact does it have on public policy? To examine this, three case studies of education policy were used, including the Concertación in Chile and the Cardoso and Lula governments in Brazil. The case studies were chosen due to their association with social democracy, whether by themselves or by others (Castañeda 1994, 2008; Kirby 2003; Navia 2008; Sandbrook et al 2007).

As social democratic governments, the three cases are distinct from other, arguably more publicised, forms of the Left in Latin America today. They are clearly different from the nationalist, populist version more commonly associated with Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia, and possibly Rafael Correa in Ecuador and Nestor Kirchner in Argentina, in two main ways. First, while social democrats arguably remain more committed to the use of institutions to drive through their agenda, populists are more inclined towards charismatic and personal leadership allied to mass mobilisation. Second, social democrats appear more cosmopolitan and comfortable with globalisation, while populists tend towards more nationalistic and state-led rhetoric.

The distinction between ‘two Lefts' in the region overlooks the extent to which differences also exist within the social democratic Left, and the impact this may have in policy terms, specifically in the field of education. I have distinguished this between what I term a Participatory Left and the Third Way. Castañeda (1994) was perhaps the first to develop this contrast, suggesting both a more reformist and radical strain in the post-Cold War period, including the Concertación and Cardoso's PSDB in the former and the PT in the latter. That division was stark, not least because of the social origins of each, with the Third Way owing more to a narrowly selected political class and the Participatory Left drawing its support from a range of social movements.

Yet despite the scholarly separation of Latin American social democracy into the Participatory Left and the Third Way, the evidence presented in preceding chapters suggests that these contrasts are not as stark as they might otherwise seem (table 7). For example, certainly the PT and PSDB disagreed on policy prescriptions during the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s and were composed of particularly distinct bases of support, but once in government they have developed surprisingly similar approaches to policy, with the PT building on PSDB measures in the areas of evaluation, public
spending, the curriculum and participation. In other words, when not in power they appeared to represent substantially different objectives and constituencies, while conforming to a broadly similar path once in government.

Table 7: Social democratic governments and education policy in Latin America

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part One: Government emergence and nature</th>
<th>Concertación (Third Way)</th>
<th>Cardoso (PSDB) government (Third Way)</th>
<th>Lula (PT) government (Participatory Left)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Origins</td>
<td>Political party-social movement opposition to military regime, pre-1990</td>
<td>Political party opposition to military regime, pre-1985</td>
<td>Political party-social movement opposition to military regime, pre-1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education policymaking core</td>
<td>Opposition: political party-social movement links</td>
<td>Opposition: concentrated in political party</td>
<td>Opposition: political party-social movement links (pre-2000s)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Part Two: Impact on education

| Role of state                           | Limited, supervisory (1990s) Expansive (2000s) | Limited, coordinative | Expansive |
| Purpose of education (curriculum)       | Economic competitiveness; curricular reform; primary and secondary education (formal) | Economic competitiveness; curricular reform; primary education (formal) | Uncertain, changing goals (formal and informal); subsequently primary and secondary education (formal) |
| Public expenditure on education         | More public spending, targeted programmes        | Redistributed public spending (FUNDEF), targeted programmes      | More public spending, redistributed spending, targeted programmes |
| Assessment/Evaluation                   | Method: universal (SIMCE), external (international testing) | Method: samples (SAEB), external (Provão), international testing | Method: universal (Prova Brasil), participative (Sindaes) |
| Attitude to participation               | Representative (1990-2006)                        | Representative | Deliberative (pre-2000s) |
|                                          | Representative (post-2006)                       |                                           |                                           |
| Relations with private sector           | Consensual                                      | Consensual | Consensual |
| Relations with teachers                 | Consensual (1990-95)                            | Conflict | Consensual |
|                                          | Conflict (post-1995)                            |                                           |                                           |
| Relations with students                 | Consensual (1990-95)                            | Conflict | Consensual |
|                                          | Conflict (post-1995)                            |                                           |                                           |

Source: Author's own analysis

What accounted for this? I maintain that, rather than the ideological and sociological nature of social democratic parties that influence the course of education policy, it was the construction of policymaking elites within the parties that largely determined their approach to education. The emergence of elites emphasises the observation made by Michels (2001) that in all organisations there
is a tendency towards oligarchy, or elite formation. That this finding should prove central to the study of Latin American social democracy should not have proved so surprising, since the emergence of elites is presumably inevitable, that sections of the Left – including within the PT (see Keck 1992; Baiocchi 2003b) – have not only shown themselves to be elite-aware, but also sought to counter them. Perhaps the most notable of such efforts has been the participatory budget (PB). Yet there is arguably something within the nature of national (as opposed to subnational) government which exacerbates the dynamic between elites and non-elites and directs social democracy in practice along broadly the same policy lines. Consequently, I suggest we take a closer look not only at the formation of social democratic parties themselves, but of the policy elites within social democratic parties once they take power as well. This is addressed in the following section, which considers the evidence of the preceding chapters in relation to the hypotheses presented at the start of this dissertation.

1. Evaluating the Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: The Left and Right in Latin America may be distinguished between a more equality-inclined Left that is supported by the subordinate class and uses the state to challenge the status quo and a Right that accepts social differences (and hence inequality), less state intervention and favours dominant class concerns and the status quo.

Hypothesis 2: Social democracy in Latin America may be distinguished between a more egalitarian Participatory Left and a more elite-driven Third Way, which should have an impact on public policy outcomes.

Qualification of hypotheses 1 and 2: Hypothesis 1 distinguished between the Left and Right in both ideological and sociological terms. As a basis this is a useful delineation, although the acceptance of the left-right dichotomy as proposed by Bobbio (1996) is relative rather than absolute. Such an approach has both strengths and weaknesses. On the one hand it offers a timeless point of comparison between the two poles and their associated values. This proves especially useful in the context of a post-Cold War environment where differences are less binary (e.g. socialist-capitalist).
all three cases the social democratic governments demonstrated their determination to pursue objectives that were different from their predecessors. In Chile, the Concertación governments did appear motivated by subordinate class concerns and enhancing opportunities for more marginal groups through the use of targeted programmes such as MECE and P900. In Brazil the Cardoso government was preoccupied with universalising primary school coverage and creating a more equitable funding system through FUNDEF, while Lula's first term involved broadening out that financial mechanism to include pre- and secondary school education.

On the other hand, differences between the two can only be expressed in relation to each other – and the values and objectives associated with each in theory may not be apparent in practice. For example, although the Left tends to challenge the status quo, the nature of social democracy is to pursue a more modest objective: that of reform. That this occurs reflects its more politically 'centrist' approach (relative to the more radical Left), which is further complicated by the different 'reform' projects happening in that space. This may mean a less robust adherence to the state than is otherwise assumed. Certainly in the context of the 1990s this may well have been the case given the New Right's own claim to reject the status quo also and seek structural readjustment, albeit through neo-liberalism. The situation is exacerbated for the Third Way (over the Participatory Left) by the fact that it shares some of the features associated with the New Right, including tolerance of the market and less attachment to class concerns. In other words, rather than pursuit of subordinate class concerns, social democrats sought policies that were cross-class, which meant appealing to dominant class concerns. This was especially the case in terms of the Concertación and Cardoso governments, which did not directly challenge the influence of private interests, including in the tripartite school system in Chile and the expansion of private higher education in Brazil.

Certainly, in comparison to the Participatory Left, the Third Way looks less 'leftist', being less egalitarian and more elite-driven – like the New Right (hypothesis 2). Yet although they are different, the division between the two is not always so apparent. The nature of government encourages elite formation, which tends to share broadly similar traits between the Third Way and Participatory Left. In particular they include the separation of social democrat leaderships from their supporters in policymaking, and a growing imbalance in the relative power and influence in favour of the former at
the expense of the latter. This unequal relationship suggests a shift away from the supposedly more egalitarian Participatory Left in favour of the more 'differentiated', elitist Third Way.

The emergence of policymaking elites highlights the difference between social democracy as theory and practice, or between 'ends' and 'means' respectively. The distinction between Third Way and Participatory Left is typological, drawing on ideological and sociological differences. However, typologies are only models, therefore providing incomplete representations. They help encapsulate the contrasts between the two, but remain incomplete because they are not contextualised. By providing such material it becomes readily apparent that in terms of means, or practice, the two types share more than is otherwise assumed. In Chile, this included social democrats’ re-evaluation of the political polarisation prior to 1973, wariness of the Right’s continuing political strength after democracy’s return in 1990 and the lack of consensus among education policymakers regarding the structure of the education system. In Brazil, although PSDB leaders saw themselves as relatively more committed to equality and social justice compared to other actors within the political system, government was a balancing act, as they required coalition support from the centre-right. And in the PT, the party leadership faced a choice between pursuing electoral success or representation of its constituent base. The party’s growing success at the ballot box and pursuit of executive posts at the subnational level not only shifted its leaders to adopt stances it would previously have rejected, but it was also supported by sections of its rank-and-file that encouraged it to do so.

This last point, that the rank-and-file had a role to play in the development of policy elites, is a key element. It highlights the fact that power is relational and that the interaction between elite and non-elite can affect the type of leadership that emerges. Rather than being imposed, the nature of that elite may be more inclusive and democratic than is otherwise perceived (Barker 2001). While the PT’s policymaking became less participatory in terms of utilising the party’s internal institutional mechanisms, the replacement of Buarque with Genro and later Haddad not only reflected greater policy coherence, but more consensus within the party – since the latter two enjoyed the president’s ear, who himself was broadly supported within the party.

The effect of similar policymaking elites in both types of social democratic governments has implications for policy outcomes. Through the greater access they enjoy to state resources, both Third Way and Participatory policy elites become detached from their bases of support within and outside
their parties. In the case of the Participatory Left, this situation is more extreme, owing to its closer links with its members and supporters, compared to the less member-bound Third Way. The fact that both social democratic forms share an elite form of policymaking means that they tend to pursue broadly similar policies.

Hypothesis 3: Social democratic governments are inclined towards greater state involvement and intervention in policymaking, although the Third Way version is less state-oriented than that of the Participatory Left.

Qualification of hypothesis 3: As with hypothesis 1 and 2, the empirical evidence both supports and challenges hypothesis 3. On the one hand it remains valid owing to the different values and principles associated with each version of social democracy in government and the policies associated with them. On the other hand, the extent to which a social democratic government intervenes or not in the state appears to depend on context, rather than a rigid commitment to the state – as proposed in hypothesis 1.

The Third Way's greater acceptance of the market means that it is inclined to adopt a more limited role than that proposed by the Participatory Left. This is evident in the fact that the Concertación opted for a more supervisory role and the Cardoso government for a more coordinative role in the 1990s. Meanwhile, the PT adopted a (relatively) more expansive role for the state, part of which may be explained by the party’s early rhetoric associated with public education, and its support by public sector workers generally and teachers in particular.

However, the difference between a more limited and a more expansive role for the state may also owe as much to context. In Chile for example, the Concertación’s decision to maintain the market-influenced reforms highlighted the extent to which they could benefit the poor: Brunner (interview, 2007) observed that the market reforms in Chile had paradoxically contributed to greater access at all levels of education. In higher education especially, the growth in supply and means-tested tuition meant that students from previously overlooked social classes found it easier to attend university. In Brazil, meanwhile, the PT’s more expansive state role could be attributed to other, global factors. It came to power at a time when there had been a shift by organisations associated with the
Washington Consensus. During the 1980s and 1990s, the Washington Consensus espoused a ‘first generation’ of reforms, stressing a reduction in the size of the state and its interventions. Since the turn of the century ‘second generation’ reforms have gained currency, including the building up of states’ capacities (Zurbriggen 2007; Panizza 2005). This ideational change can similarly be seen within the Concertación government thinking on the state between the 1990s and 2000s. During its early years in power it adopted a more hands-off approach to education policy, most notably by maintaining the military era school structure, and overseeing an increase in the number of state subsidised private schooling. More recently it has adopted a more interventionist role since 2006, following growing social protests and demands. Among the measures that it now favours are differentiated state funding for schools and greater supervision of the system.

Hypothesis 4: Social democratic governments have increasingly adopted human capital development theories associated with the New Right (i.e. markets, entrepreneurship and social order); but Participatory Left governments are more inclined to pursue policies that maintain aspects of ‘progressive’ critical pedagogy than Third Way ones.

Qualification of hypothesis 4: While the left-right dichotomy has proved useful in comparing and contrasting educational perspectives, in practice the differences have proved less apparent. To some extent this was reflected in a shift from education for human capital development towards social development over the past 20 years (Hall and Midgley 2004: 153). Despite the distinction drawn in hypothesis 4 – that the Participatory Left is more committed to critical pedagogy than the Third Way – the evidence suggests both types of social democracy have viewed the role of education and the content of curricular reform in broadly similar ways. Where an alternative educational approach was initially attempted, during the PT government’s first year, the importance of formal structures (e.g. the state and the existing school system) and context proved more decisive. The new education minister, Cristovam Buarque, sought an approach to educational policy that would make greater use of social movements than the institutional apparatus of the state. However, this reliance on other actors, coupled with an uncertain set of policy priorities (between a literacy campaign reliant on social movement involvement and reforms of the state institutions regarding basic education funding and
higher education) and an absence of strong presidential support, meant the education agenda arguably suffered during the PT government's first year. Subsequent education ministers were more inclined to maintain the inherited system, with the result that the PT government became tied to the prevailing education agenda, limiting its scope for reform. The reformist stance essentially meant conformity to the Third Way model, which was reflected by maintaining the bulk of the Cardoso government's curricular guidelines (the exceptions being proposals to extend the number of years children spend in primary school and the compulsory inclusion of Afro-Brazilian history and culture in schools).

Yet even if Third Way governments have appeared most comfortable from the outset with policies that emphasised the development of human capital in a structured, formal environment (school) to aid economic growth and competitiveness, it would be a mistake to assume they were accepting the New Right agenda unquestioningly. Those associated with the Third Way emphasised the impact that such policies would achieve for social justice and opportunity (Giddens 2000) and recognised the need to reform existing curricula to achieve them. This was distinct from the arguably more limited, economic focus of the New Right's curricular goals.

_Hypothesis 5: Social democratic governments support increased social spending in education; but Participatory Left governments will spend proportionately more than Third Way ones._

Qualification of hypothesis 5: Although social democratic governments do tend to favour greater levels of public spending generally (and in education specifically), the distinction drawn between Third Way and Participatory Left versions is too simplistic. It fails to take into account the way each achieves it. In particular, the main distinction is between the uses of general or targeted spending. Indeed, both the Concertación and the PT governments pursued increased general and targeted funds, while the Cardoso government opted largely for the general approach. These differences illustrate the relative unimportance of the Participatory Left or Third Way labels in this regard.

The reason for targeted spending over general increases owes much to context. In Chile, the Concertación pursued targeting because its maintenance of the military-era school system meant that targeting was the most effective way to direct financial assistance from government; the alternative
would have been to place it in the hands of private providers, who constituted a growing proportion of the school system. For the PT government the use of targeted funds helped provide it with a distinctive image, which contributed towards popular support and Lula’s re-election in 2006. Meanwhile, although the Cardoso government made use of some targeted programmes, its primary concern was on creating a more effective financial regime. Consequently, it focused attention on restructuring the system, which resulted in greater resources for education at the subnational level, relative to the direct amount provided by the federal government.

_Hypothesis 6: Social democratic governments can either accept or reject evaluation and assessment regimes; Third Way governments accept them, Participatory Left governments reject them._

_**Qualification of hypothesis 6:** The trend towards education systems that produce ‘knowledge’ for economic growth and the development of human capital in education has coincided with a rise in evaluation and assessment. This reflects a wider concern with the need for greater public sector accountability and performance, led domestically and internationally by the New Right since the 1980s. Social democratic governments in power have therefore had to accommodate these considerations. The distinction between Third Way governments accepting them as they are, and the Participatory Left rejecting them outright, is too simplistic. Furthermore, a more nuanced, modified version of the hypothesis, in which the Third Way pursues mechanisms that have a greater economic focus, and the Participatory Left which accommodates those stakeholders associated with it (i.e. teachers and students), was similarly found to be insufficient.

The evidence presented by the three cases suggests that the distinctions between Third Way and Participatory Left regarding evaluation and assessment are less apparent than it otherwise appears. Social democrats, regardless of type, appear inclined towards mechanisms that may be used by a wider range of stakeholders, including administrators, teachers, students and parents. In so doing they demonstrate a different set of objectives to the New Right, being less inclined to use assessment as a form of market indicator. In addition, the use of evaluation and assessment can gain its own momentum owing to the involvement of stakeholders (e.g. the use of test score for ‘rankings’,
despite governments' objections). This means that the process can become subject to political pressure, which can affect social democrat elites and policymaking. In Brazil, for example, the PT and its supporters in the teacher and student movements challenged the Cardoso government's evaluation and assessment mechanisms and promoted their reform.

Hypothesis 7: Social democratic governments tend to recognise and pay attention to interest groups that are more organised and cohesive; but Participatory Left governments tend to have closer relations with teachers and students; Third Way governments tend to have closer relations with private interests.

Qualification of hypothesis 7: Social democratic governments do appear to engage more with organised interest groups over non-organised ones, and pursue more representative forms of participation, regardless of type. In addition, the evidence certainly points to teachers and students being more closely related to Participatory Left governments than Third Way ones. However, the notion that Third Way governments cannot have conciliatory relations with teachers and students is erroneous. The evidence also suggests that private interests will tend to trump those of other stakeholders, such as teachers and students.

First, the three cases presented in Brazil and Chile suggest that interest groups such as business associations, private school managers, teachers and students tend to be both more recognisable and likely to participate in the policymaking process than those that are not. Indeed, the cases of non-teaching staff in Chile and parents in both countries would seem to demonstrate the extent to which the hypothesis holds. The absence of a non-teaching staff organisation at a time when the Concertación was passing legislation on such workers meant that they lacked a voice. There was no one able to engage the government regarding their concerns. Following the creation of CONFEMUCH, non-teaching staff now have the capacity to lobby and influence government actions. Meanwhile parents in both countries continue to lack a strong national organisation. This has meant that all three governments have largely overlooked them as an interest group in the policymaking process.
Second, social democratic governments approach policymaking with other actors in a more representative way (i.e. formally structured decision making with clearly defined organisations) as opposed to a deliberative (i.e. open-ended process with organised and unorganised groups) path. This occurs regardless of the social and political origins of such governments. Much of this may be attributed to the fact that such governments have a more elite-based form of policymaking. The education policy elites in all three governments were committed to working through state institutions; in such circumstances, those groups that were organised fared a better chance of gaining government attention. Of course, the reasons for pursuing this common approach to policymaking varied between governments: the Concertación adopted it after 1990 as a means of balancing the contrasting needs of different groups, such as teachers and the private sector. In Brazil the Cardoso government identified institutional channels as the way to defuse ‘corporatist’ groups that it felt compromised its objectives. Meanwhile, the PT shifted towards using state institutions following failed efforts to pursue socially mobilised education projects during Buarque’s administration (2003-04).

Even when social democratic governments have pursued a more deliberative approach to policymaking, the process has never been especially open-ended and inclusive. The PT, before it assumed power at the national level, pursued the most participatory of policy approaches, including through the party itself. However, the pressure for timely decisions by PT-elected executives at the subnational level would always trump more deliberative policymaking. Meanwhile, the Concertación, in response to the 2006 protests against the education system, established a time-limited advisory commission to examine the problems and propose solutions. This meant that a structure had to be imposed on the process and the government had to determine which groups were to participate – thereby leading back to the point that those most organised and cohesive had a better chance of being engaged. Consequently, social democratic governments’ ability to offer a more deliberative policymaking arena remains constrained, enabling this to only occur in a time-limited and partial fashion.

Third, despite social democratic governments’ use of representation and attention to organised groups, private interests gained greater attention and engagement with government than other stakeholders such as teachers and students. This happens regardless of whether governments are Third Way or Participatory Left, and the historic connections that each has with certain interest groups.
The reason for the private sector's relative influence is due to social democratic governments' reliance on them regarding the structure and finance of social policy generally, and education in particular. In such circumstances teachers and students find themselves constrained by their relative weakness, notwithstanding their past association with particular social democratic parties. In addition, teachers and students can have conciliatory relations with Third Way governments as much as Participatory Left ones: in contrast to the clearer distinction between the relationships that teachers and students had with the Cardoso and Lula governments, in Chile the Concertación shared much with these groups during the first half of the 1990s. This was due to the government being perceived as far more preferable than its military predecessor, and included an overlap between the Concertación leadership and teacher and student movements.

2. Final remarks

In sum, then, social democracy in Latin America appears to comprise two main tendencies: a more ideologically egalitarian Participatory Left version and a more elite-driven Third Way model. Although social democratic parties will tend to conform to one type over the other, the business of government ensures the emergence of elites irrespective of the politics of those in power. These elites' inclination towards the use of institutions – and the opportunities afforded by the state – ensures that not only do their policy agendas are broadly similar regardless of type, but also distance them from their supporters, within and outside the party. By acknowledging such factors, it becomes easier to account for the supposed variation between current and recent governing experiences by the centre-left since the 1990s.

By focusing on the nature of social democracy and its impact on policymaking, this dissertation has not directly addressed itself to the important and interesting question of whether the quality of education in either country has improved as a result. In part this has been addressed indirectly, through reference to other, pre-existing research, much of which does not necessarily distinguish between policymakers' political principles and ideologies. Certainly it is the case that more research and work could be done on the matter of educational 'quality' (a subject whose definition is contested at the best of times), including with reference to spending and curricular reforms.
The focus on elite formation and its impact on policy also emphasises that the influence of social democracy is to be found less as a social or political movement or party, than its actual application in power. Social democratic parties have been perceived as facing a dilemma: do they focus on representing their core constituencies – the poor, the dispossessed and the disadvantaged – or do they strive for greater electoral success by adopting ideological moderation and greater affinity with other social groups? The evidence suggests that, in government, the choice appears largely pre-determined, in favour of the latter.

Should the choice be as stark as this? There are sections on the Left that maintain this need not be the case, that it is possible to represent the poor and excluded and still win votes. Since the turn of the century, there have been efforts to create a more egalitarian and participatory version of the Left, most notably through the anti-globalisation movement and initiatives like the World Social Forum. Certainly the space presented through such mechanisms challenges the more elite-oriented approach taken by social democrats in government. Yet the glaring weakness of the anti-globalisation movement is its emphasis on opposition to existing forms of power and the role of the state and its institutions. This means that despite the idealistic rhetoric of the egalitarian and participatory Left (as opposed to political parties of the Participatory Left), anti-globalisation groups have tended to offer no more than social mobilisation, foregoing efforts to control the state directly. Where the Left seeks – and takes – power, the inevitability of elite formation and policymaking, with the relative advantages that the state offers, will invariably occur. According to Michels (2001: 6), nearly a century ago:

'Democracy has encountered obstacles, not merely imposed from without, but spontaneously surgent from within. Only to a certain degree, perhaps, can these obstacles be surpassed and removed.'

So, it can be said, is the case of social democracy in Latin America.
## Appendix 1: Political events in Chile, 1964-2006

### Pre-1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Eduardo Frei Montalva (Christian Democrat) wins presidential election with 56.1% of the vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Salvador Allende (Socialist) wins presidential election with 36.6% of the vote</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Military period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Military coup (General Augusto Pinochet eventually achieves dominance of ruling junta); congress is shut down and political parties banned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>New constitution promulgated; Pinochet wins plebiscite with 68.52% to remain in power for eight more years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-83</td>
<td>Debt crisis and growing social protests against regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>National Accord for Democracy (signatories include Christian Democrats and other opposition political parties)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Repeal of law banning political party organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Pinochet loses plebiscite to remain in power; the opposition coalition including the Christian Democrats and Socialists (Concertación para el No), receives 55.99% of the vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Presidential election, first round: Patricio Aylwin (Christian Democrat and candidate for the Concertación) wins with 55.17% of vote Legislative elections: Concertacion wins 51.49% of vote for lower house compared to 34.18% for the right-wing coalition (including RN and UDI)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Concertacion governments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Aylwin becomes president; Pinochet remains commander-in-chief of the armed forces (until 1997)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Presidential election, first round: Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (Christian Democrat) wins presidential election with 57.98% of vote Legislative elections: Concertacion wins 55.4% of vote for lower house compared to 36.68% for the right-wing coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Pinochet steps down as commander-in-chief of armed forces and becomes senator-for-life Legislative elections: Concertacion wins 50.51% of vote for lower house compared to the right-wing coalition's 36.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Pinochet arrested in London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Presidential election, first round: Ricardo Lagos (Socialist) receives 47.96% of vote to Joaquin Lavin's (UDI) 47.51%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2000  Presidential election, second round: Lagos wins with 51.31% of vote (January)  
      Pinochet returns to Chile (March)

2001  Legislative elections: Concertacion wins 47.9% of vote for lower house compared to the right-wing coalition's 44.27%

2005  Presidential election, first round: Michelle Bachelet (Socialist) receives 45.96% of vote to Sebastián Piñera’s (RN) 25.41%  
      Legislative elections: Concertacion wins 51.76% of vote for lower house compared to the right-wing coalition's 38.72%

2006  Presidential election, second round: Bachelet wins with 53.5% of vote (January)  
      Pinochet dies (December)
Appendix 2: Political events in Brazil, 1964-2006

Military period

1964 Military coup deposes President João Goulart (who had succeeded Jânio Quadros following his resignation in 1961); General Humberto Castelo Branco becomes president

1965 Existing political parties banned and new rules for political parties introduced
Two new parties established: ARENA (government) and MDB (opposition)

1982 Direct elections for governor replaced by indirect elections through state legislatures; mayors replaced by presidential appointees

1967 New constitution promulgated
General Artur Costa da Silva elected president by Congress
Military regime passes acts granting itself greater powers, including over national security and suspending habeus corpus

1969 Costa da Silva leaves presidency following illness and replaced by military junta
General Emilio Garrastazu Médici elected president by Congress

1974 General Ernesto Geisel elected president by Congress

1980 General João Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo elected president by Congress
Change of electoral legislation, abolishing ARENA and MDB and allowing registration of new political parties
Former MDB politicians register PMDB as new party

1980 Workers' Party (PT) founded

1982 Direct elections for state governors re-introduced
Legislative elections: PMDB receives 43% of vote for lower house, PDS/PPR (right-wing coalition) 43.2% and the PT 3.6%

1984 Political protests against the regime; social demands for direct presidential elections

New Republic (Sarney, Collor and Franco governments)

1985 Tancredo Neves (PMDB) elected president by Congress but dies before taking office; vice-president José Sarney succeeds to the presidency

1986 Legislative elections: PMDB receives 47.8% of vote for lower house, PFL 17.7% and the PT 6.9%

1988 New constitution promulgated
PSDB formed by break away faction of the PMDB

1989 Presidential elections: Fernando Collor de Mello elected in direct presidential elections, beating Luis Inácio 'Lula' da Silva (PT) in the second round

1990 Legislative elections: PMDB receives 19.3% of vote for the lower house, the PFL 12.4%, the PT 10.2% and the PSDB 8.7%
1992  Collor resigns and impeached; vice-president Itamar Franco succeeds to the presidency

1994  Fernando Henrique Cardoso (PSDB) appointed minister of finance; introduction of the anti-inflationary Real Plan

1994  Presidential election: Cardoso and his PSDB-PFL electoral coalition wins with 54.3% of vote in first round
Legislative elections: PSDB wins 14% of vote for the lower house; PMDB receives 20.3%, the PFL 12.8% and the PT 13.1%

Cardoso government

1998  Presidential election: Cardoso re-elected with 53.1% of vote in first round
Legislative elections: PSDB wins 17.5% of vote for the lower house; PMDB receives 15.2%, the PFL 17.3% and the PT 13.2%

2002  Presidential election: Lula wins, beating José Serra (PSDB) in second round
Legislative elections: PT wins 18.4% of vote for the lower house; PMDB receives 13.4%, the PSDB 14.3% and the PFL 13.4%

Lula government

2006  Presidential election, Lula re-elected, beating Geraldo Alckmin (PSDB) in second round
Legislative elections: PT wins 15% of vote for the lower house; PMDB receives 14.6%, the PSDB 13.6% and the PFL 10.9%
Appendix 3: Timeline of education in Chile

Pre-1973

1971 National Congress on Education
1973 ENU proposed

Military period

1973 Military coup; SUTE (teachers' union) shut down
1974 Colegio de Profesores formed
1979 Pinochet speech on state and market reform and presidential directive
1980 New constitution promulgated
   Decrees on decentralisation and deregulation of school system introduced
1981 Changes to freedom of association
   AGECH (independent teachers' union) formed
1982 First PER evaluation of school children carried out
1984 Second PER evaluation of school children carried out
   Opposition take control of FECECH following elections
1985 Opposition take control of Colegio de Profesores following internal elections
1987 SIMCE methodology established
1988 SIMCE evaluation carried out for first time
1990 Constitutional Organic Education Law (LOCE)

Concertacion governments

1990 Introduction of targeted policies (P900 and MECE)
1991 Teachers' Statute
1992 Failed effort to reform LOCE
   Reform of primary school curriculum started
   Local elections introduce democratic control of schools
1993 Tax reform (changes include allowing state-subsidised private schools to introduce co-financing
1994 Brunner Commission
1995 Jorge Pavez elected to presidency of Colegio de Profesores
   Non-Concertacion Left take control of FECH following internal elections
1996  Reform of primary school curriculum completed
       Reform of secondary school curriculum started
       Legislation on non-teaching staff passed

1998  Introduction of Whole School Day programme
       Reform of secondary school curriculum completed

2006  Secondary school students protests against school system
       Presidential Advisory Commission on Quality of Education (Garcia-Huibodro
       Commission)

2007  Concertacion-Alianza agreement on education reform
       Jaime Gajardo elected to presidency of Colegio de Profesores
Appendix 4: Timeline of education in Brazil

Pre-Military period

1961 National education guidelines (LDB) passed

Military period

1967 New constitution promulgated
1968 University reform
1971 Reform of primary and secondary school systems
1979 UNE reformed by university students
1981 Formation of independent ANDES (high education) and UNTE (primary and secondary school) teachers’ unions
1983 Calmon amendment detailing set amount of federal, state and municipal revenues to education

New Republic (Sarney, Collor and Franco governments)

1988 New constitution promulgated
1992 Society-wide protests, including visible secondary school mobilisation, against President Collor
1993 Ten Year Education Plan introduced
SAEB (primary school) tests carried out for first time
1994 National Accord agreed between President Franco and CNTE (teachers’ union)

Cardoso government

1995 Paulo Renato de Souza becomes minister of education
Student protests
1996 New national educational guidelines (LDB) passed
Constitutional amendment establishing FUNDEF passed
Provão (higher education) evaluation introduced
1998 FUNDEF takes effect
Secondary school curricular guidelines introduced
ENEM (secondary school) tests introduced
University strikes
1999 Social protests versus government’s economic model (including teachers and students)
2001 Education Plan introduced
Bolsa escola introduced at federal level
University strikes
UNE monopoly on student cards ended

Lula government

2003 Cristovam Buarque becomes minister of education
Bolsa família introduced
Review of higher education
Provão evaluation scrapped

2004 Buarque sacked as minister; replaced by Tarso Genro
Sinaes evaluation introduced
University reform bill drafted (and not yet passed)
ProUni introduced

2005 Fernando Haddad replaces Genro as minister of education
ProUni introduced
Prova Brasil (primary school) tests introduced

2006 Constitutional amendment establishing FUNDEB passed, to start from 2008

2007 Education Development Plan introduced
FUNDEF expires
Appendix 5: Comparative Expenditure on Education in Selected Countries, 1990-2005

Much comparative data exists on education spending at a global level. Distinctions must be drawn, however, between both total amounts (table 8) as well as those that disaggregate spending by public (table 9) and private forms. In the cases of Brazil and Chile, private sector funding in Chile constitutes a greater amount of the total amount allocated to education than in Brazil, thereby enabling it to spend closer to the OECD average or mean during the 1990s and 2000s (indeed, even exceeding it in 2000).

While the OECD data enables a comparison to be made between Brazil and Chile and the richer countries, it lacks data that enables a regional comparison to be made. Figures from UNESCO fill this gap. Effort has been made to provide data both from other countries in the region as well as other middle-income countries against which the Chilean and Brazilian cases may be compared. The countries are defined as middle-income by the World Bank (World Bank 2009) and includes all the examples cited below, with the exception of Cuba, which is presented as the prime example of socialism within the region.

Table 8: Expenditure on education institutions as a percentage of GDP, 1995-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU19 average</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD average</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD mean for countries with 1995, 2000 and 2005 data (24 countries)</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Table B2.1, OECD 2008
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Non-Latin America</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public current expenditure on primary education as a % of GDP</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public current expenditure on primary education as a % of GDP</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As % of total government expenditure</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As % of total government expenditure</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Table 9: Public expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP, 1990-2005
Appendix 6: Interview methodology and schedule

1. Interview methodology
The thesis tackles the nature of social democracy, including its nature and impact on public policy, especially education. The main approach was through the use of three case studies in Brazil and Chile. While there is a considerable amount of secondary literature on the content of these policies, material related to social democrat policymakers and their perceptions of what they were trying to achieve in education was substantially less. With few exceptions (e.g. Souza 2005), the bulk deal with political issues more generally (e.g. Cardoso 2006, Palocci 2007). Without such material, I opted for the use of qualitative interviewing by which the secondary literature could be ‘tested’.

The interviews were therefore drawn from two main groups: those within and others outside of the social democratic governments studied. The use of both types of interviewees not only aided comprehension of the different values and interpretations of these actors, but were especially important given the working assumption that social democracy was distinguishable between Third Way and Participatory Left versions. For observers outside government and the policymaking process, detecting the difference between each could be difficult; interviews with participants within government provided an insight into what they understood those differences to be.

In addition, it provided an opportunity to engage in ‘snowball sampling’ (Esterberg 2002: 93), whereby interviewees could suggest additional respondents that I should contact. This was especially useful, since in trying to make the study of education policymaking in the three cases as comprehensive as possible, it helped to identify other social democrat and non-social democrat participants within the policymaking process that might have been otherwise overlooked.

The format of the interviews was therefore semi-structured and generally lasted for an hour on average. This provided sufficient space for the respondents to express themselves and get across the points they considered most relevant (Bell 1999; Mason 2002; Esterberg 2002). All the interviews were scribbled down in note form, with some also being subject to tape or digital recording at the same time. The use or non-use of the latter depended on several factors, including battery lifetime, interview location (e.g. a coffee house and senatorial tea room where the volume was too loud). The use of recordings was only done as a means to refer back if necessary.
Following the interviews, the notes would be typed up in report form and including additional information such as when a respondent was prompted on a given subject or moved onto a topic of his or her own volition. Since the interviews were largely concerned with arguments and explanations of participants’ own and others’ actions, the need for verbatim transcription – and hence recording of all interviews – was removed.

One key limitation of the interview approach is the post facto rationalisation that respondents can engage in. In particular this involves a re-evaluation and re-interpretation of issues and events that may have occurred several years ago, allowing interviewees not only to respond to questions with the benefit of hindsight, but also to portray themselves in a positive light and paint others more negatively. Consequently, just as data generated from interviews helped ‘test’ secondary literature assumptions, so could contemporary material similarly ‘test’ respondents’ claims. While this was largely lacking within the policy process (e.g. minutes, emails, letters), those of social actors who the governments engaged with provided an alternative. These included materials from the most comprehensive of education archives during the periods studied: the teachers’ union archives in both countries.

2. Interview questionnaire

Given the semi-structured nature, no interview was exactly the same. However, I approached each respondent with a general set of topics and questions along with some that were more specifically tailored, depending on the nature of the interviewee and the context being studied (e.g. whether the interview was in Brazil or Chile). Generally, I had around 10-12 questions/topics in each interview. The following includes the type of general ones raised, regardless of interviewee:

1. Please provide some details of your background in the party/movement/government; what your history is in relation to the organisation and how you came to be appointed/selected.

2. Please define your own ideological position and stance and that of the organisation which you are connected to.
3. Is there a difference, in your view, between the previous regime/government and [the Concertación in Chile] / [PSDB and/or PT in Brazil]? Can you explain what you mean by your answer to this question?

4. Is there a difference, in your view, between [the Socialist Party and the Christian Democratic Party in Chile] / [PSDB and the PT in Brazil]? Can you explain what you mean by your answer to this question?

5. Where, in your view, is education policy made?

6. Which social groups are important in the education in your country?

7. What are [Concertacion/PSDB/PT] government relations like with each of those groups (private interests, teachers, students, parents, others)? Do some have more influence than others? If so, why?

8. What other points/topics would you like to raise that have not been covered in this interview? Who else do you recommend that I speak to in relation to these issues?

Other, more specific questions were also asked to each interviewee, depending on their role. The range of topics covered varied, including the following – but which are by no means exhaustive:

1. Why did the Concertación [in Chile] not return to the National Unified School (ENU) proposal first suggested during the Allende government after 1990?

2. Why did it take until 1980 for the Pinochet regime to instigate neo-liberal reforms? Why not before?
3. Were the student-led protests in Chile during 2006 accidental? Why did they happen and what sustained them?

4. Were there differences between your organisation [civil society] and the different ministerial and adviser teams in the government? How would you distinguish these periods?

5. What employment legislation for teachers [in Chile] is used in private schools?

6. Why was – and is – there no national students' union [in Chile]?

7. Why was civil society depoliticised in Chile after 1990?

8. What accounts for the change/shift from FUNDEF to FUNDEB in Brazil?

9. What do you understand neo-liberal education to be?

10. What is 'participation' in education?

11. What is 'progressive' education?

12. Why was the national students' union (UNE) monopoly on student cards ended [in Brazil]?

13. Why did FUNDEF not include pre- or post-primary education funds?

14. Which political groups dominated your (i.e. student, teacher) organisation's executive in the past and today?
3. Interview schedule

The interviews were conducted in Brazil, Chile and the United States over the following time periods: August-September 2006, March-April 2007 and January-April 2008 in Brazil; August and November-December 2007 in Chile; and September 2007 in the US.

3.1. Brazilian interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Conducted interview?</th>
<th>Location and date of interview</th>
<th>Type of interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aparecida da Silva, Fátima</td>
<td>International relations Secretary, CNTE (national education workers' union)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Brasília, 13 September 2006</td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arelaro, Lisete</td>
<td>University of São Paulo (USP) professor in education policy and member of Paulo Freire's education team in São Paulo city (1989-92)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>São Paulo, 5 March 2008</td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arroyo, Miguel</td>
<td>Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG) education professor and former Belo Horizonte education secretary (1993-97)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Rio de Janeiro, 18 March 2008</td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beauchamp, Jeanete</td>
<td>Pre-School and Primary School Education Secretary, Ministry of Education (MEC), since 2004</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brooke, Nigel</td>
<td>Education Evaluation and Measures Group (GAME) Director, Education Faculty, UFMG</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Belo Horizonte, 27 February 2008</td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buarque, Cristovam</td>
<td>Brazilian education minister, 2003-04</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Brasília, 7 April 2008</td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cardoso, Fernando Henrique</td>
<td>President of Brazil, 1995-2002</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>São Paulo, 22 April 2008</td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castro, Maria Helena Guimarães</td>
<td>National Institute of Educational Research (INEP) President, MEC (1995-2002)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chagas, Francisco</td>
<td>Basic Education Secretary (current) and MEC political appointee since 2003</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Brasília, 8 April 2008</td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa, Marcio da</td>
<td>Education Professor, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) and ex-'historic' PT member</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Rio de Janeiro, 24 January 2008</td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cury, Carlos</td>
<td>Education professor, UFMG</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durham, Eunice</td>
<td>USP Professor and MEC official (HE and Educational Policy Secretariats, 1990-1997)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>São Paulo, 6 March 2008</td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fernandes, Reynaldo</td>
<td>National Institute of Educational Research (INEP) President, MEC (since 2005)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Brasília, 8 April 2008</td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franco, Thiago</td>
<td>National secondary school students' union (UBES) president, 2006</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goldemberg, José</td>
<td>Brazilian education minister, 1991-92</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Rio de Janeiro, 22 January 2008</td>
<td>Phone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gouvêa, Gilda Portugal</td>
<td>Advisor to Paulo Renato Souza, MEC</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>São Paulo, 5 March 2008</td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henriques, Ricardo</td>
<td>Economist, UFRJ and Literacy, Diversity and Continuing Education Secretary (SECAD), MEC</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monteiro, Leandro</td>
<td>PSDB Executive Member on UNE (national union of university students)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>São Paulo, 30 August 2006</td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nacimento, Iracema</td>
<td>Communication Coordinator for National Campaign for the Right of Education (Ação Educativa)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>São Paulo, 30 August 2006</td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petta, Gustavo</td>
<td>UNE President, 2003-07</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pochmann, Marcio</td>
<td>Economics professor, Unicamp, and President of Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPER)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocha, Selma</td>
<td>Director of PT think tank, Fundação Perseu Abramo, education historian and advisor to São Paulo (1989-96) and Santo Andre municipal education secretariats</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Conducted interview?</td>
<td>Location and date of interview</td>
<td>Type of interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arellano, José Pablo</td>
<td>Chilean education minister, 1997-2000</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assael, Jenny</td>
<td>Advisor to President of the Colegio de Profesores (national teachers' union), 1996-2007</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Santiago, 21 November 2007</td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aylwin, Mariana</td>
<td>Chilean education minister, 2000-03</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bellei, Cristián</td>
<td>Education sociologist, University of Chile</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bitar, Sergio</td>
<td>Chilean education minister, 2003-05</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Santiago, 21 August 2007</td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boccado, Giorgio</td>
<td>FECH (University of Chile students’ union) President, 2007</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosch, Rodrigo</td>
<td>President of CONACEP (private school gremio)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Santiago, 27 November 2007</td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunner, José Joaquin</td>
<td>Ex-Mineduc (Ministry of Education) official and Diego Portales University professor</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Santiago, 28 August 2007</td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalan, Eduardo</td>
<td>Former President, Asociación Metropolitana de Padres y Apoderados</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Santiago, 15 November 2007</td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contreras, Dante</td>
<td>Economics professor, University of Chile</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cox, Cristian</td>
<td>Ex-Mineduc official and Catholic University professor</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Santiago, 28 August 2007</td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diaz, Francisco</td>
<td>Head of Presidential Policy Unit, Chile (since 2006)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Santiago, 16 August 2007</td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dittborn, Paulina</td>
<td>Mineduc chief of staff, 1981-88 and Education Sub-Secretary, 1988-89</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Santiago, 19 November 2007</td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elacqua, Gregory</td>
<td>Technical Advisor to Sergio Bitar, Mineduc, 2003-05</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Princeton, 12 September 2007</td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gajardo, Jaime</td>
<td>President of the Colegio de Profesores (since 2007)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garcia-Huidobro, Juan Eduardo</td>
<td>Head of Presidential Advisory Commission on Education 2006 and former advisor, Mineduc</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Santiago, 20 August 2007</td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grau, Nicholas</td>
<td>FECH President, 2005-06</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Santiago, 22 November 2007</td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardy, Clarisa</td>
<td>Minister of Planning and Cooperation, 2006-08</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagos, Ricardo</td>
<td>Chilean education minister (1990-92) and President of Chile (2000-06)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medrano, Patricia</td>
<td>Economics professor associated with education, University of Chile</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muñoz, Mauricio</td>
<td>Public Policies Advisor to President Michelle Bachelet</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Santiago, 9 November 2007</td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navia, Patricio</td>
<td>Political science professor, New York University and Diego Portales University</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Núñez, Ivan</td>
<td>Ministerial Advisor, Mineduc (since 1990)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Santiago, 15 November 2007</td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position and Affiliation</td>
<td>Interviewed?</td>
<td>Interview Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pancani, Dino</td>
<td>Secondary School Student Leader, 1980s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Santiago, 20 November 2007</td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peña, Carlos</td>
<td>Chancellor, Diego Portales University</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Santiago, 18 December 2007</td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rodriguez, Carlos</td>
<td>Non-teaching staff union leadership (CONFEMUCH – Confederación de Funcionarios de la Educación Municipalizada de Chile)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Santiago, 20 November 2007</td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rodríguez, Carlos</td>
<td>Sub-Secretary of Education, 2006</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soto, Clodile</td>
<td>Metropolitan Santiago leader, Colegio de Profesores</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Santiago, 24 August 2007</td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toha, Carolina</td>
<td>PPD congresswoman and member of Presidential Advisory Commission on Education 2006</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valenzuela, César</td>
<td>2006 secondary school student leader</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vela, César</td>
<td>Social policy researcher, Libertad y Desarrollo (right-wing think tank)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verdugo, Oswaldo</td>
<td>President of the Colegio de Profesores (1986-95)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weinsten, José</td>
<td>Advisor to education minister, Ricardo Lagos (1990-92) and Sub-Secretary of Education (2000-03)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Santiago, 10 December 2007</td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zavala, Fernando</td>
<td>FEUC (Catholic University of Chile students' union) President, 2007</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bibliography


275


Brooke, N. (1985) 'The Diversification of Secondary Education in Latin America: The Case of Brazil'. In Education in Latin America, C. Brock & H. Lawlor, eds. London: Croom Helm


Cabannes, Y. (2004) 'PB as a significant contribution to participatory democracy', *Environment and Urbanisation*, 16 (1), pp. 27-46


281


Chile, Junta Militar de Gobierno (197?) 1974: primer año de la reconstrucción nacional. Santiago: Editora Nacional Gabriela Mistral


Confederação dos Professores do Brasil (CPB) *Noticias* (1987b) 'Governo impõe arrocho aos trabalhadores', July

Confederação Nacional da Indústria (CNI) (1979) 'O pensamento da Indústria'. Documento from CNI to President Figueiredo, January.


Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores em Educação (CNTE) *Noticias* (1992) 'Mudanças educacionais e a formação dos educados', August-September


Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores em Educação (CNTE) *Noticias* (1995c) 'Proposta do MEC ameaça Piso Salarial', August-September

Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores em Educação (CNTE) *Noticias* (1995d) 'Proposta do MEC de criação de Fundos Estaduais rompe Acordo', August-September


Council of Presidents of Chilean University Students' Federation (CPFUCH) (1975) *The Chilean Student Movement Accuses Fascism: Every University a Centre of Solidarity with Chile.* Chile: CPFUCH


285


DESAL: Centro para el Desarrollo Economico y Social de America Latina (1969) Diagnostico Economico y Social de Chile. Unknown: DESAL


286


287


Federación de Estudiantes de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile (FEUC) (1973) ENU: el control de las conciencias. Santiago: FEUC


288


Goertzel, T.G. (unpublished) *Brazil under Lula: Populism-lite for a Personalist Society*. Unpublished manuscript


Marín, J. (2001) 'Education Reform in Chile', *CEPAL Review*, 73, pp. 81-91


Mineduc (n.d.) ¿Para qué sirve el SIMCE? [accessed 29 May 2008]


Mineduc (1989) 'Resultados del SIMCE', *Revista de Educación*, 172 (November)


Mineduc (2005a) *Objetivos Fundamentales y Contenidos Mínimos Obligatorios de la Educación Media.* Santiago: Mineduc

Mineduc (2005b) *Estadisticas de la Educacion.* Santiago: Mineduc


Ministerio da Educação (MEC) (1975a) Education Minister dispatch to President Ernesto Geisel. 27 May. E. Geisel Archives, Roll 11. Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil – CPDOC (Research and Documentation Centre of Contemporary Brazilian History), Fundação Getulio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro

Ministerio da Educação (MEC) (1975b) Education Minister dispatch to President Ernesto Geisel. August. E. Geisel Archives, Roll 11. Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil – CPDOC (Research and Documentation Centre of Contemporary Brazilian History), Fundação Getulio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro

Ministerio da Educação (MEC) (1977a) Education Minister dispatch to President Ernesto Geisel. 2 August. E. Geisel Archives, Roll 11. Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil – CPDOC (Research and Documentation Centre of Contemporary Brazilian History), Fundação Getulio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro

Ministerio da Educação (MEC) (1977b) Education Minister dispatch to President Ernesto Geisel. 27 September. E. Geisel Archives, Roll 11. Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil – CPDOC (Research and Documentation Centre of Contemporary Brazilian History), Fundação Getulio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro


Ministério da Educação (MEC) (2007c) *Processo de Escolha de Conselheiros para o CNE.*


Ministerio da Fazenda (1998-2006) *Boletim Fundef*
http://www.stn.fazenda.gov.br/estados_municipios/transferencias_constitucionais.asp,

Ministerio de Hacienda. (various years) *Ley de Presupuestos del Sector Publico.* Santiago: Ministerio de Hacienda


http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.eom/media/3d325d0vukdvpjc5yj2q/contributions/x3/1/t/x31tgu3701u26414.pdf [accessed 10 November 2006]


Observatorio Chileno de Políticas Educativas (2006) '¿Por que hay que cambiar la LOCE y revisar la municipalización?' 1 July. Centro de Documentación 'Olga Poblete' de Colegio de Profesores (Colegio de Profesores Documentation Centre). Archive File: M: Movimiento Estudiantil 2006


Oficina de Planificación Nacional (1977) *A Social Development Experiment in Chile*. Santiago de Chile: Oficina de Planificación Nacional


http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1/60/34002216.pdf [accessed 16 October 2008]


Paulo Renato Souza Consultores (n.d) ...sendo que o número de professores vem aumentando vertiginosamente. Presentation.


Programa de Promocion de la Reforma Educativa en America Latina y el Caribe (PREAL) (2008)
Las evaluaciones educativas que America Latina necesita. Working Document 40. Washington DC: PREAL

Programa MECE (199?) Podemos Soñar con Confianza. Santiago: Mineduc


Roco Fossa, R. (2005) 'La FECH de Fines de los 90: Relatos de una Historia Presente', Las Anales de la Universidad de Chile, 6 (17), pp. 51-83


303


304


Superintendencia de Educación (1969) *La superintendencia de educación y la reforma educacional chilena*. Santiago de Chile: Ministerio de educación publica


