The London School of Economics and Political Science

Ideological (Mis)match?

Mapping Extreme Right Ideological Discourse and Voter Preferences

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Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

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Abstract

The existing literature has long mused over the questions of who belongs and who does not belong to the extreme right party family, as well as why some extreme right parties seem to be consistently – or occasionally – more successful than others. For decades, scholars have failed to reach a consensus regarding the definition of the extreme right, used a plethora of labels to describe it, and disagreed on the defining characteristics of the party family. In order to progress from this conundrum, this thesis explores the question of whether and how the extreme right can be defined as a multi-dimensional party family based on two strategic-discursive dimensions, and the extent to which the location of each individual member of the extreme right family will affect the number and the nature of the voters whom they will attract. This question is answered – and resulting model tested – in Great Britain, Germany, and France. The thesis combines a variety of quantitative and qualitative methods including text analysis of party manifestoes, face-to-face interviews of extreme right party elites (in two countries), and analysis of survey data. Our model stipulates that extreme right parties emphasise different conceptions of an authoritarian dimension (ranging from a social/reactionary to an institutional/repressive pole) and a negative conception of identity (spanning from a civic/populist to a cultural/xenophobic scale). Based on this bi-dimensional conceptual map, four dominant sub-types of extreme right parties can be identified, all of which are represented in the three party systems, and evidenced by both party manifestoes and elites' discourse. We also show that the different positions espoused by each party have an impact on the ideological identity of the party, intra-extreme right party competition, the types of voters each party attracts and ultimately, the level of electoral success it obtains.
Chapter One

Introduction and Research Question

Chapter Outline

1.1 The puzzle of variation: discourse and electoral success
1.2 A problem of definition: an analytical minefield
1.3 The rollercoaster of electoral success
1.4 The state of current research
1.5 The puzzle of this thesis
1.6 Two birds, one stone…
1.1 The puzzle of variation: discourse and electoral success

‘There are as many differences as there are similarities within the extreme right party family’


What is an extreme right party? How do we define the extreme right party family? Who is a member and who is not? Is it a party family at all? All of these definitional and conceptual questions have plagued the existing literature for a long time and even now we are not much closer to agreeing on a definition of what constitutes an extreme right party. Over the course of the next few paragraphs, we will explore the existing literature in order to highlight some of the problems we intend to tackle within our framework of analysis. We first start by discussing the conception and definition of an extreme right party. We then move on to evaluate the various explanations provided by the existing literature as to why there is so much variation in the success of the extreme right party family across Europe.

1.2 A problem of definition: an analytical minefield

Both theoretically and empirically, authors vibrantly disagree on where the demarcation line lies between the extreme right and potentially neighbouring party families (Mudde, 2007; Betz, 1994; Kitschelt, 1997; Betz & Immerfall, 1998). Stark discursive differences raise serious questions about the uniformity of the party family. From the Italian Alleanza Nazionale (AN), that claims that Fascism was an ‘absolute evil’, to the Austrian Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ), that has defended some of the NSDAP’s economic policies, and from the ultra-liberal stance of the Swiss Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP) to
the interventionist anti-globalisation preferences of the French Front National (FN), the similarities are few and far between. Indeed, whilst many authors will agree to some extent on the core members of the party family such as the FN, MSI-AN, VB, BNP, FPÖ, difficulties persist at the peripheries of the party family. For example, the Lijst Pim Fortuyn was not considered to be extreme right by Mudde, the AN is not a member of the extreme right for Ignazi, and the Danish and Norwegian neo-nationalist parties are extreme right or not depending on the author assessing the case. As a result, scholars use a plethora of labels to describe parties of the extreme right. Cheles, Ferguson, and Vaughan (1991) talk of ‘neo-Fascist’ parties, whilst Betz (1994) prefers the term ‘radical right-wing’ parties.

To distinguish contemporary extreme right parties from their inter-war predecessors, Betz and Immerfall (1998) speak of ‘new populist’ parties, Minkenberg (1994) of ‘new right’ parties, and Kitschelt (2007) of ‘new radical right’ parties. Consequently, some authors have claimed that the extreme right is not in fact one but two completely distinct party families. This argument has often taken the form of comparing ‘old style’ Fascism to modern day right wing extremism. Some authors argue that in terms of racism, ‘modern’ positions are more subtle than in the past and anti-Semitism is rather moderate in comparison to previous positions (von Beyme, 1988). In a slightly different way, Ignazi (2003) argues that the ideological intellectual elaboration provided by the Italian neo-Fascist milieu and by some other (mainly German) groups, accounts for the ‘master’ extreme right ideology up to the 1980s, whilst later movements constitute the ‘new’ extreme right with a lighter ideological core. But here again, the relevance of the Fascist

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1 Please see appendix E for list of abbreviations.
reference as a fundamental benchmark is questioned by large segments of the literature and the criteria to differentiate 'old' and 'new' extreme right parties are difficult to operationalise (Mudde, 2007).

While some authors question the very existence of an extreme right party family, Schain & Zolberg et al. (2002) insist that there are 'as many differences as there are similarities' within it. Attempts to answer the question of who belongs to this family empirically are equally inconclusive, with persistent debate centred upon which parties should be included and which should be excluded from the party family. The importance of defining the ideological space and boundaries of the extreme right party family is, therefore not only important in terms of delineating who should be included and who should be excluded from it, but it is also crucial to do so before analysing their success.

Several scholars have given up trying to analytically define the extreme right party family to rely, instead, on the recommendations of expert studies, secondary data analysis or to simply rely on what the existing literature tells us is extreme right. In light of these conceptual and definitional hazards, some authors prefer to propose a list of criteria that should be met if a given party is to be included in the party family. These lists often detail characteristics that then can be used to delineate and ultimately define the party family. However, we are then left with a multitude of competing lists, an absence of unanimity on which criteria 'make' an extreme right party, and elements that are not exclusive to the extreme right party family. Fundamental disagreements remain as scholars fail to agree on the common features and distinctive criteria that unify the members of the extreme right family. Few authors agree on a common definition that includes all of the
supposedly 'obvious' members of the party family, but also, at the same time, respects their individual diversity and differences in radicalism. Similarly, some of these proposed party family characteristics are not exclusive to the extreme right but they are in fact relevant to other party families. Features such as ethnocentrism and hyper-nationalism, for example, are common within the ideological core of some ethno-regionalist and separatist parties in Europe (Basque nationalists etc).

This lack of unanimity within the existing literature makes it impossible to simply rely on an accepted and relevant definition of an extreme right party. Mudde (1996) found an overwhelming 26 definitions of the extreme right currently used to distinguish this particular party family and counts no less than 58 different features of extreme right ideology. Adorno et al. (1950), for example, highlight the importance of a charismatic and strong leader combined with the classical elements of dogmatism, rigidity, exclusionism, authoritarianism, nationalism, anti-permissive, xenophobia, racism, and intolerance among other features of right-wing extremism. Falter and Schumann (1988) also provide a 'shopping list' of defining characteristics that detail no less than ten features: extreme nationalism, ethnocentrism, anti-communism, anti-parliamentarism, anti-pluralism, militarism, emphasis on strong law-and-order, a demand for a strong political leader and/or executive, anti-Americanism and cultural pessimism. We encounter numerous problems, however, when we try to operationalise these characteristics in an empirical context. The question remains: how can we define the extreme right in an empirical and analytical way?
The existing approaches used to define the extreme right party family tend to be incoherent, non-exhaustive and are difficult to apply to the specificities of extreme right parties. There are numerous competing characteristics of extreme right ideology, a multitude of approaches (many of which exclude an extremely important empirical twist), and lingering doubts whether these parties are just so different that they do not constitute a real party family. Our argument throughout this thesis is that the variation across extreme right parties’ ideological stances, which seems to be so troubling when it comes to attempting to find common postures, is part of the essence of what the extreme right is, and that far from being disruptive and exceptional, it is systematic and symptomatic of constrained ideological choices that every single extreme right party has to make. In other words, we should try to first understand and perhaps typologise the different sub-types of extreme right parties based upon their discursive strategies before proceeding to compare their similarities and differences in other respects such as party competition, voter profiles, or electoral success.

In addition to this problem of definition, there is also another puzzle that deserves our attention, that is, the variation in electoral success within the extreme right party family. In the next section, we discuss the nature of the inconsistency in electoral success and review some of the explanations proffered by the existing literature as to why some parties are so significantly more successful than others.
1.3 The rollercoaster of electoral success

During the late 1980s and early 1990s, shock waves reverberated within the institutional frameworks of several major European democracies. Extreme right parties, albeit in the context of coalitions, were obtaining representation in their national political arenas. By the turn of the millennium, parties of the extreme right party family, both old and new, have (re)emerged across all four corners of Europe and are now considered to be an established part of most European party systems. Several of these parties have obtained impressive scores in several regional and European elections and have a relatively stable party history. This includes parties such as the Austrian Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ), the Vlaams Belang (VB) in Flanders, the Front National (FN) in France and the Fremskrittspartiet (FrPN) in Norway. Elsewhere, other parties of the extreme right party family such as those in Germany or Britain struggle to surpass electoral thresholds of representation and exist merely as marginal parties at the peripheries of their respective party systems and have to be content with local or regional electoral successes.

Moreover, parties that have gained the occasional electoral success have experienced difficulties in sustaining their momentum and have regularly faced competitors that have tried to capitalise upon the potential extreme right vote. Parties in Denmark and the Netherlands have enjoyed the occasional electoral success but this success has often been short-lived and their support in elections can be volatile. Norris (2005) uses the label 'flash parties' to describe parties such as the Lijst Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands. These parties seem to come from nowhere, attracting often large shares of the vote, and then disappear as quickly as they appeared. In addition, in several party systems there are more
than two parties competing for their share of the potential extreme right electorate, which adds a further dynamic to their electoral campaigns and their success as multiple parties represent the extreme right party family within one party system. The distinctive variation in electoral success is arguably one of the most interesting puzzles that have emerged from the study of extreme right politics.

Over the last decade, extreme right parties across Europe have enjoyed some relative success. In the 2001 Italian general elections, the Lega Nord and the Alleanza Nazionale were made junior coalition partners of the new Berlusconi government. In Denmark, the Dansk Folkeparti, headed by Pia Kjaersgaard, obtained a substantial 12 percent of the vote in the 2001 general election. Similarly, the Norwegian Fremskrittspartiet won 14.7 percent of the vote and consequently became the third largest party in the national parliament. In France, the leader of the FN, Jean-Marie Le Pen, obtained the second largest share of the vote in the first round of the 2002 Presidential election ushering him into the second ballot.

Table 1.1: Notable electoral successes of extreme right party family in Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>% vote &amp; year of election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>FPÖ</td>
<td>27.3 (1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>VB</td>
<td>16.8 (2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>DF</td>
<td>13.2 (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>FN</td>
<td>17.9 (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>MSI/AN</td>
<td>12.0 (2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>MIEP</td>
<td>5.5 (1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>LPR</td>
<td>8.0 (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>PRM</td>
<td>19.5 (1993)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: elections are general or presidential. Some parties have scored much higher results in specific regions.

2 List of parties classified by the existing literature as extreme right alongside their full names appears in appendix A.
Beyond the national level, the majority of European extreme right parties have been particularly successful in consecutive European Parliament elections (see figure 1.1). These elections have been used by extreme right parties as a platform for their protest against the mainstream parties and their politicians as well as a useful arena to vent their eurosceptic discourse. European Parliament elections offer an advantageous electoral setting. The combination of the ‘second-order’ election phenomena and the use of proportional representation often provide electoral benefits for small parties such as the extreme right. As a result, these elections play an essential role in the electoral strategies of extreme right parties. The European elections are often a unique opportunity for the extreme right party family to build their bid for representation. We start with a look at the results of the extreme right party family in the June 2004 European Parliament elections as this was the first time the recently established extreme right parties in the 10 new member states had competed on the European political stage.

We then move on to discuss the results of the 2009 European Parliament elections. In the 2004 European Parliament elections, most of the larger and more established extreme right parties consolidated their electoral success. For example, the Vlaams Belang in Belgium, and the majority of the Eastern European extreme right parties made gains on their previous performances. However, some of the core members of the party family were disappointed with underwhelming results. This was the case of the Austrian FPÖ and the French FN. Both parties failed to consolidate previous electoral successes and were visibly dissatisfied with their performance in these key elections. Many of the smaller parties such as the British National Party and German Republikaner and the NPD
improved their electoral scores. Extreme right parties in Central and Eastern Europe also made gains. In Latvia, the TB/LNNK obtained almost 30 percent of the vote. Similarly, in Poland, the LPR and PiS made a dramatic entrance onto the European stage. In fact, the overwhelming success of the extreme right party family across Europe prompted the formation of a new European parliamentary group, Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty. The group encompassed members from the French FN, the Greater Romania party, the Bulgarian Ataka party, the Italian Social Alternative and Tricolour Flame, and the FPÖ among a few independent candidates. These electoral successes at the European level have provided the extreme right party family with important visibility and leverage.

Figure 1.1: The electoral success of extreme right parties in France, Germany and Great Britain in European Parliament elections

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3 The group disbanded in November 2007 after members from the Greater Romania Party withdrew from the group following Alessandra Mussolini's comments about Romanian criminals.
In the 2009 European Parliament elections, the extreme right party family gained an additional eight seats compared to the 2004 European elections results. In Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Romania and the UK, extreme right parties made moderate to significant advances on their previous electoral scores. In the Netherlands, Geert Wilders’s party won four seats. In Austria, the FPÖ also performed well, winning two seats by obtaining 13.4 percent of the vote. However, splinter party BZÖ, was denied any representation in the European Parliament, despite obtaining the support of 4.6 percent of voters. In addition, successes were gained in the Eastern European member states. The Hungarian extreme right party, Jobbik, gained an impressive 15 percent of the vote and the Greater Romania Party gained two seats. The Danish People's Party gained an additional seat, giving them two representatives in the European Parliament. The True Finns party, following several domestic electoral successes, gained an additional 8.9 percent compared to its 2004 performance and was able to return its first European representative. The British National Party also secured their first two seats in the European Parliament. Similarly, UKIP consolidated their 2004 European success gaining 16.1 percent and 13 seats. The other face of the British extreme right, the English Democrats, failed to obtain a seat. Nevertheless, they secured an unprecedented 1.8 percent of the vote. Greece's Popular Orthodox Rally, or LAOS grouping, led by right-wing journalist Georgios Karatzaferis, doubled its representation (from one to two MEPs) with around seven percent of the vote. Italy's Northern League also doubled its representation from four to eight MEPs. The two other Italian extreme right parties, the AN, and the Social Alternative of Alessandra Mussolini, agreed to merge with Forza Italia to create the People of Freedom party in early 2009.
Whilst there were many reports of electoral success across Europe for the extreme right party family, there were also several parties that failed to capture the popular vote. The French Front National, for example, lost four seats in the European Parliament, down from seven, while Philippe de Villiers' party, Movement for France, which ran under the Libertas umbrella lost one seat leaving them with a solitary representative in the Parliament. Libertas, founded on 24th October 2006, was originally a lobby-group that campaigned against the Lisbon Treaty in the referendum held in Ireland on 12th June 2008. However, following the success of the campaign, the founder, Declan Ganley, established a pan-European political party of the same name, which took part in the 2009 European Parliament elections across several member states, including the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, and Poland among others.

The Flemish Vlaams Belang also lost one seat (leaving them with only two seats), while the Lijst Dedecker gained one. However, Poland saw the biggest drop in the extreme right vote. In 2004, the three extreme right parties combined returned 16 MEPs in 2004. However, neither the League of Polish Families, nor the Self-Defence party was able to gain any seats in 2009. Bulgaria's Ataka party, also lost one seat and now only has two representatives. Finally, Latvia's LNNK lost three seats. On the whole, the European Parliament elections 2009 represented a successful campaign for the extreme right party family across the four corners of Europe. As a result, a new parliamentary group under the title of Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) was created by some of the core members of the party family.
However, it is also worth noting that extreme right parties often fail to repeat or consolidate their electoral success resulting in largely inconsistent electoral records across the party family. For example, following the German Die Republikaner's success in the 1989 European Parliament elections, the party hoped to surpass the five percent threshold for the Bundestag in the 1990 parliamentary elections. Yet, on the day of the election the party received less than two percent of the vote. Similarly, the French Front National has struggled to find a successful electoral strategy to build upon its local, regional, and national successes. Le Pen's triumph in the 2002 Presidential election was followed by a disappointing result in the subsequent legislative elections. The FN received 11 percent of the vote, four points lower than their score in the 1997 election and its electoral appeal further eroded after that. Moreover, the extreme right party family has also failed to secure any real presence in party systems such as Portugal, Finland and Spain. Overall, we have learnt from the above discussion that electoral success is far from homogeneous across the extreme right party family. In some countries, parties belonging to this family regularly obtain relatively large shares of the vote, whilst in other party systems they rarely manage to make an impact at the ballot box. The next section deals with this question of electoral variance, or in other words, why some parties are more successful than others?

1.4 The state of current research

As we have seen throughout the discussion above, some extreme right parties are more successful than others. The emergence and continued success of the Austrian FPÖ in the context of relatively low levels of unemployment, immigration and an absence of any
fundamental 'crisis' within the political system is still considered to be an underlying puzzle within the existing literature. Whilst the emergence of extreme right parties in Scandinavia have long defied the strong social democratic traditions and have beguiled observers who try to find a solution to the conundrum. The question of why some parties are more successful than others has made quite an impact on the existing literature. We will now review some of the explanations provided by the literature that try to account for the disparity in extreme right party electoral success across Europe. Much of the existing literature has tried to explain why some parties are more successful than others by investigating contextual elements (such as institutional explanations, socio-political context, levels of immigration and unemployment etc) comparing for example the various parties' electoral successes across several countries (e.g. Perrineau 2002; e.g. Schain, Zolberg et al. 2002). At the same time, other scholars have focused on the micro level of analysis by studying the characteristics of voters (e.g. van der Brug and Fennema 2003; Dülmer and Klein 2005). We discuss the various approaches proffered by the existing literature and highlight the need for a more party-centric approach in explaining the variation in success of extreme right parties across Europe.

Institutional explanations

The degree of proportionality within the electoral system can provide small parties with a better chance of gaining representation as compared to majoritarian systems (Katz, 1980; Weaver & Rockman, 1993). Single-member majoritarian districts tend to foster a two-party system, while proportional representation encourages multi-partism (Duverger, 1951). The French Front National, for example, became a significant political actor on the
national party stage after proportional representation rules were adopted for the 1986 general elections. As a result of this change in the electoral rules, the Front National returned 34 representatives to the National Assembly in 1986 with 9.9 percent of the vote.

On the other hand, a more restrictive electoral framework such as the first-past-the-post system in Britain hinders the success of smaller parties such as those of the extreme right. The likelihood of obtaining national level representatives is very obscure as small parties have few opportunities to gain national representation within this electoral system. Up until the end of the 2000s, the British National Party had to satisfy itself with relatively small gains at the local level. In 2009, however, it managed to circumvent the restrictive framework of the national party system by gaining two representatives in the European Parliament. The German parties of the extreme right party family are often victims of the mixed electoral system that is used for federal elections. This system is also considered to be a relative impediment to the proliferation of parties of the extreme right. In addition, any party wishing to gain representation in the Bundestag is required to pass a five percent electoral threshold, which has often foiled the relative electoral gains of the Republikaner and the NPD. Small parties, such as those belonging to the extreme right party family, often lose out to strategic voting. Voters may not want to waste a vote for a party that has little chance of passing electoral thresholds or few opportunities to govern (Sartori, 1994). Whilst Jackman & Volpert (1996) conclude that support for the extreme right is a function of the electoral threshold and the effective number of parties, other scholars have failed to find supporting evidence and, in some cases, have provided evidence contrary to this argument (Knigge, 1998; Swank and Betz, 1996, Lewis-Beck & Mitchell, 1993). Carter (2002) concludes that the share of the vote won by right-wing
extremist parties is unrelated to the electoral system. This suggests that at the very least, while electoral systems using proportional representation can help facilitate the political representation of minor parties that would not have the same electoral opportunities in majoritarian systems; other factors undoubtedly influence the level of extreme right party success.

Some democracies have adopted restrictions against the proliferation of parties that are deemed to threaten or contravene the democratic process. These regulations often focus their attention on extremist groups including those of the extreme right. The German *Verfassungsschutz* [Office for the Protection of the Constitution] monitors political parties and organisations and those that are deemed to be anti-constitutional can be prohibited. Therefore, this constitutional court has the jurisdiction to prohibit any party within the German political system if there is evidence that a given party contravenes the fundamental values of the constitution or conveys anti-democratic values. This constitutional tool has been used by the German authorities to bring cases against several contemporary extreme right groups, including the NPD.

In addition to electoral frameworks and constitutional arrangements, scholars also suggest that the degree of fragmentation within a given party system can help facilitate the success of extreme right parties (see for example Bale, 2003; Poguntke, 2001, Ivaldi, 2002). The NSDAP’s rise to power, the 1986 legislative victories of the FN, and more recently the electoral successes of the FPÖ, illustrate how the fragmentation of party systems can provide extremist parties with a foothold to access national government. A high degree of decentralisation may foster the development of extreme right parties as
voters are, perhaps, more willing to support new and/or radical parties in ‘second order’ elections such as those for regional or local institutions (Reif and Schmitt, 1980). In countries such as Austria, Italy, and Belgium, the decentralisation of the system has allowed extreme right parties to develop a stronghold in certain influential regions (Flanders for the Vlaams Blok, recently renamed Vlaams Belang, Carinthia for the FPÖ, and Lombardia for the Northern League), while remaining less influential in others. Multiple levels of governance (local, regional, national, European) increase the electoral opportunities for small parties such as those of the extreme right, to claim an increasingly important political role. In this sense, the FN has traditionally compensated for its failure to have members elected to the National Assembly since 1993 by relatively good performances in regional and local elections. The Italian Lega Nord illustrated its political strength by achieving several electoral victories in regional and municipal elections throughout the mid 1990s and is readily expanding its appeal beyond their stronghold in the North. Although the electoral system, fragmentation and additional levels of governance may help to increase the opportunities of obtaining representation for extreme right parties, this explanation alone does not tell the whole story of why some parties are more successful than others. Whilst staying at the aggregate level of analysis, we now move on to discuss the various factors related to the social and economic context that extreme right parties reside within.

The socio-economic context

Parties belonging to the extreme right party family have historically tended to succeed in times of economic recession and/or growing inequalities. Socio-economic problems such
as widespread unemployment, large-scale deindustrialisation, inflationary pressures, a widening gap between rich and poor all seem to build up frustration and anxiety about what the future may hold, which provides a fertile ground for parties of the extreme right. This was of course the case in post-war France, Germany and Italy as well as some of the post-communist Eastern European countries. Thus, the relationship between a bad economy and the success of the extreme right has long been theorised. Relatively high unemployment rates among some groups of the population such as blue-collar workers or small business owners can help provide a fertile ground for the extreme right when they emphasise issues of economic security. Extreme right parties often try to draw attention to the failings of the incumbent government and inability of the mainstream opposition parties to deal with the hardships faced by the ‘man on the street’. Jackman & Volpert (1996) argue that electoral support for the extreme right increases directly with levels of unemployment.

However, there are some contradictory findings within the literature concerning the relationship between unemployment levels and the vote for parties of the extreme right. Rydgren (2005), for example, found that countries in which extreme right parties have not been particularly successful have also been post-industrial societies that have experienced economic downturns and high levels of unemployment during the last 20 years. Similarly, Golder (2003) and Knigge (1998) argue that high unemployment stimulates support for extreme right parties only when immigration levels are also high. However, some authors argue that the relationship between the state of the economy and the electoral success of the extreme is not as straightforward as it may appear. Immerfall (1998), for instance, argues that citizens’ perceptions of the actual socio-economic context are rendered
secondary to the predominant fear of what the future may hold. It is the fear of unemployment or social dislocation that spurs people to vote for extreme right parties in times of recession and a bad economy rather than the actual experience. Rydgren (2005) finds that during the early and mid-1980s, years that had been characterised by political protest; voters were casting their votes more from a result of feeling a threatened relative deprivation than of actual relative or absolute deprivation.

The socio-disintegration theory suggests that people who are alienated from society are more likely to vote for parties on the fringes of the political spectrum as they feel let down by society (Heitmeyer, 1994). Rydgren (2005) suggests that the reason why the extreme right party family emerged in the 1980s and 1990s is that the post-industrialisation of western European countries both undermined the salience of the economic (class) cleavage and created new ‘loser’ groups susceptible to a political message combining cultural protectionism, xenophobic welfare chauvinism, a populist critique of the ‘establishment’ and a reactionary call for the returning to the ‘good old values of yesterday’ (Betz, 1994). The majority of the contemporary extreme right parties were formed in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. This was a period of undoubtedly important and consolidated social change. The theory of economic interests focuses on the competition brought about by the introduction of foreign labour into the job markets (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2001). The increase in unemployment levels combined with the perceived deprivation of their present or future situation, often spurs voters to consider the extreme right. Thus, societies that are facing economic depression can provide electoral opportunities for parties of the extreme right.
As a considerable section of the existing literature classify extreme right parties based on their predominant anti-immigration discourse, it is logical that some studies have focused on the link between levels of immigration and the electoral success of the extreme right party family. Yet, these studies have cited contrasting findings. Anderson (1996) and Knigge (1998) suggest that high levels of immigration and the concentration of 'newcomers' in specific areas or regions favour the likelihood of electoral success for extreme right parties. Some of the parties belonging to the extreme right party family in Europe emphasise the alleged correlation between the number of immigrants within a country and the number of unemployed citizens. Thus, some groups (low-skilled and low-educated people are more likely to fall victim to market forces of the electorate will be more susceptible to the discourse of the extreme right because of their perceived insecurity and material concerns about their future employment (Falter, 1994). Extreme right leaders and their parties propose to defend the economic interests of the 'man on the street' via restricting the number of immigrants, who are perceived as direct competitors in the workplace and in accessing social welfare and housing. However, there are substantial country-specific differences. For example, Givens (2002) finds that support for extreme right parties is greater in Austrian and French regions that have high levels of immigration, but this relationship does not hold within the context of the German Länder. Taking a polar opposite stance to Anderson's and Knigge's thesis, Perrineau (1985) asserts that the greater level of contact one has with immigrants, the higher the level of tolerance towards immigration. Thus, areas with higher levels of immigrants residing are more likely to understand the cultural differences than be afraid of them. Finally, Mudde (1999) finds no convincing evidence to suggest a link between immigration levels and electoral success, concluding that there is an absence of a clear-cut relationship between
the number of immigrants and the electoral success of extreme right parties in certain territorial units

Therefore, whilst an unfavourable socio-economic context can certainly help fuel the electoral success of extreme right parties as the fears and insecurities of the public are heightened and extreme right parties tend to feed off this atmosphere, there is not enough evidence to suggest that this factor alone can explain the variation in electoral success. In the next section, we examine political opportunity structures to assess whether the perceived convergence of mainstream parties has helped boost the fortunes of extreme right parties in some countries but not in others or whether the various strategies adopted by the existing parties has indeed hampered their progress.

Political opportunity structures

Whilst we have seen that the state of the economy or rather a perceived fear of future recession and unemployment may lead voters to consider a vote for an extreme right party, there are also additional factors such as political opportunity structures that may play a part in the success or failure of an extreme right party. A political opportunity may arise at any time, for example, in October 1999, almost a third of Austrian citizens voted for the neo-populist Freedom Party (FPÖ), led by the charismatic leader, Jörg Haider. A shock result that toppled the Conservative ÖVP from its position of main party of the opposition, a place that it had held since 1945, whilst the Social Democrat SPÖ received their worst-ever result in a general election. This shock result sent tremors throughout the political systems of Europe and even led to the European Union to consider possible measures of isolation and the creation of a wiremen committee. The FPÖ’s success was a
clear sign that an extreme right party harnessing populist, anti-establishment discourse could connect with voters and send a message of discontent to the incumbent government and indeed disturb the complacency of the existing status quo.

Koopmans et al (2005) suggest that the vote for the radical right cannot be explained at all by most of the sociological variables. Their analysis is based on public claims making, that is, the political claims addressed in public as measured by accounts in the national newspapers of France, Germany, the Netherlands, Great Britain, and Switzerland. The authors draw upon arguments encompassed within the theory of social movements in which the concept of political opportunity structures plays a key role. They argue that so-called ‘discursive opportunities’ arise when these particular extreme right parties focus their discursive strategies on the topic of immigration.

In many European countries, citizens have become disenchanted by the perceived ideological convergence, reports of corruption scandals and long periods of government alternation by the main moderate parties (Rydgren, 2005). Citizens who may not usually vote for an extreme right might consider this choice if they are disillusioned with the state of politics and are, in effect, disenfranchised from the existing political system. This specific feeling of ‘Politikverdrossenheit’ is a form of political disenchantment negatively expressed by the electorate against the political system. Ignazi characterises the ‘materialist versus post-materialist’ debate that has marked the recent political climate as ‘the emergence of new priorities and issues not treated by the established parties, a disillusionment towards parties in general, a growing lack of confidence in the political system and its institutions and a general pessimism about the future’ (Ignazi 1992).

Extreme right parties across Europe soon woke up to the fact that a new ideological
discourse emphasising populist discourse that criticised incumbent governments for their many failures, for being out-of-touch with the common man, and unresponsive to the needs of the nation, may lead them to electoral success. Parties belonging to the extreme right party family were presented with electoral opportunities and were able to capitalise upon a milieu of disillusionment and cynicism with traditional parties of the Left and Right (Betz, 2002; Kitschelt, 1995). In this context, Schain, Zolberg and Hossay (2002:12) claim that ‘weaknesses in the party system, marked by a decline of confidence by voters in existing parties may be exploited by far-right parties’.

In order to express this discontentment with the existing system, voters may cast a protest vote to send a warning to the incumbent government. Indeed, Van der Brug et al (2000) conceptualise protest voting as a rational, goal oriented activity. This maintains that the prime motive behind a protest vote is to show discontent with the political elite. Since most extreme right parties are treated as pariahs by the elites within their respective party systems, votes for these parties are designed to send a message to these elites (Van der Eijk, Franklin & Marsh, 1996). Givens (2002) claims that voters, who might otherwise abstain may choose to vote for a radical right party as an alternative way of expressing their discontent with the system. However, it should be noted that a vote for an extreme right party cannot automatically and systematically be typified as a simple protest vote, far from it. There is undoubtedly a crucial difference in the decision to cast a protest vote in the favour of a mainstream opposition party in order to send the incumbent government a message of dissatisfaction on the one hand, and the decision to vote for an extreme right party which undeniably infers an ideological association. In this respect, Van der Brug and Fennema (2007) argue that support for radical right parties was just as much
motivated by ideological and pragmatic considerations as support for other parties, so it was concluded that protest voting was not an adequate explanation for the support for these parties.

Several authors have shown in multivariate analyses that the electoral fortunes of extreme right parties are affected significantly by the competition these parties face from mainstream competitors from the right (Kitschelt, 1995; Carter, 2005; Koopmans et al., 2005; Van der Brug et al., 2005). Norris (2005), however, finds that the correlation between the left/right position of the main competitor and the vote shares of 16 extreme right parties is not significant. Yet, in contrast to this finding, Van der Brug et al (2005) found that two supply-side factors and one demand-side variable explained 83 percent of the variation in electoral fortunes of the 25 parties included in their study. The supply-side variables included 1) the degree to which the party is seen to be a ‘normal’ democratic party, and 2) the ideological position of its mainstream competitor. The first variable has a positive effect: the more a party is perceived to be a ‘normal’ party, there is a higher likelihood of greater electoral success. The second variable has a negative effect: when the largest mainstream right-wing party moves to the right on the ideological spectrum, there is a reduced likelihood that the extreme right party will succeed at the ballot box.

We have seen from the above discussion that a vast majority of authors have tried to understand the extreme right phenomenon with reference to contextual factors at the aggregate level. We now move on to examine the demand-side explanations at the individual level. These explanations try to isolate the various socio-demographic groups
that are most likely to vote for the extreme right in order to shed light upon why some parties are more successful than others. The findings of the existing literature have reached inconsistent conclusions as no single social group has been highlighted as the main reservoir of support for extreme right parties.

Variation in voter profiles

The main focus of previous research on the electoral bases of extreme right parties has been to construct a 'proto-type' of an extreme right voter. However, in many cases this has proved to be an almost impossible task. Firstly, it is extremely difficult to obtain meaningful samples from the various large mass surveys (Eurobarometer and European Social Survey for example) that are conducted across EU member states. The number of self-declared extreme right voters is often very small and in some cases, the parties that are of interest to scholars of extreme right politics are often excluded from these surveys as the parties concerned are deemed to be too small or peripheral to the party system. Therefore, unlike researchers of other party families, we can not rely on an arsenal of survey data. Secondly, the few comparative studies that have been conducted have often highlighted very interesting but inconclusive findings about this elusive electorate. They have often pointed to contrasting characteristics of the extreme right voter not just across countries, but also within given party systems. In this sense, some social groups may be larger and more prominent in some countries than others therefore if this social category is susceptible to the discourse and ideology of the extreme right, parties competing within those particular party systems will be in a better position to exploit the potential extreme right vote.
If we take the case study of France by Mayer (1998) as an example of the rapid changes in extreme right electorates, we can see that the steady rise of the extreme right in France from the mid-1970s to the early 2000s was to a large extent due to the defection of blue collars from the array of left-wing parties. In the presidential election of 1988, support for Le Pen was higher than average among voters belonging to the working class. These voters were the largest bloc to move en masse to the FN. Alongside working class voters, small business owners and farmers, drawn to the stridently pro-capitalist and anti-interventionist aspects of the FN strategic-discursive platform have also regularly supported candidates of the Front National (Kitschelt, 1995: 112). In a study of the Swiss SVP and Austrian FPÖ, McGann and Kitschelt (2002) find that these two sub-groups of the population tend to be the most likely to be attracted to the discourse of the extreme right. A similar pattern is reported in an analysis of the Italian Lega Nord voters in Northern Italy. Betz (1998) maintains that it was particularly these small commercial and artisanal entrepreneurs and blue-collar workers in the Northern periphery, which accounted for much of the Lega’s resurgence in 1996. Indeed, various studies that focus their research on the profiles of extreme right voters often draw contrasting conclusions. The existing literature sometimes points to specific groups such as blue-collar workers, self-employed small business owners (Mayer, 1998) that are susceptible to the appeal of extreme right parties.

However, when research compares voter characteristics across countries, there is little evidence of any putative homogeneity of potential or actual extreme right voters. In fact, studies such as those of Svåsand, (1998) and Andersen and Bjørklund (2000) of extreme right voters illustrate that voters of extreme right parties represent a cross-section of the
electorate and in some countries such as Denmark and Sweden there are few social
groups that are exempt from the appeal of extreme right parties. Thus, it seems to be clear
that extreme right parties can draw upon a reservoir of support from a variety of stable
social groups. Blue-collar workers, small and independent business people and
professionals all seem to be susceptible to the allure of the extreme right discourse and
this interesting mix of social groups dissects boundaries that are usually associated with
the traditional Left-Right socio-political cleavages.

Demand for extreme right discourse

Extreme right parties are often able to retain a certain amount of flexibility when it comes
to their discursive appeal. They can often manipulate salient issues and change their
direction because they are not tied to exclusive bases of electoral support. In contrast to
many other mainstream parties, whose electoral bases are often supported by traditional
socio-economic cleavages, extreme right parties are sometimes able to combine a
discursive appeal (within the confines of their natural ideological habitat) that may have
the potential to appeal to a diverse cross-section of social categories. Issues such as
immigration, the enforcement of law and order, discussions of what national identity
should be, and European integration are issues that have been heatedly debated in the
public sphere and are issues that can contravene the traditional political left-right scale.
The increased salience and visibility of these issues in recent times have created
opportunities for the extreme right. These issues are ‘natural’ topics of discussion for
parties of the extreme right and as such many parties throughout Europe have latched on
to this new dynamic and have fought successful election campaigns as a result.
In this sense, Petrocik (1996) states that certain issues can become synonymous or 'owned' by one party and that this party is often regarded to be more credible or legitimate in the eyes of the electorate if they compete on this specific dimension. Therefore, parties such as those of the extreme right may by able to score an advantage with voters by emphasizing distinct issues such as immigration and the enforcement of law and order whilst other mainstream parties prefer not to openly discuss these issues. Budge & Laver (1986) argue that political parties may decide to compete by accentuating issues on which they have an undoubted advantage, rather than by putting forward contrasting policies on the same issues. Therefore, parties may try to differentiate themselves (even if it is due to their extremist nature) from other competitors by emphasising unique ideological positions as voters can then clearly identify their discourse and policies. This also relates back to the question of definition. Authors such as van der Brug and Fennema (2003) have described the dominance of the issue of immigration in the discourse of extreme right parties and as such they have preferred to refer to them as 'anti-immigrant' parties. Similarly, discourse analysts such as Scarrow (1996) and Pelinka (1998) have noted that parties of the extreme right can be typified by one particular discourse that symbolises their raison d'être, for example, Scarrow emphasises the theme of anti-party discourse amongst extreme right parties, whilst Pelinka focuses on the populist premise of the Austrian FPÖ. Once again, we are reminded that we need to reconceptualise our definition of extreme right parties. Whilst this section helps us to understand why some parties might be more successful in tapping into their potential extreme right reservoir, it opens up new questions about how can extreme right parties seduce their core electorate and appeal to their potential voters.

In summary, there tends to be no overwhelming agreement within the literature on why
some parties are more successful than others. Existing studies often exclude party-centric explanations derived from the analysis of discursive strategies, organisational factors, or leadership capacity. On the other hand, whilst explanations derived from the demand-side contribute to our understanding of the variation in electoral success, it is clear that there is inconsistency as to which social group can be classified as the main reservoir of extreme right electoral support. While certain social groups seem consistently immune to the appeal of the extreme right (students and highly educated professions); the electoral support of extreme right parties in Europe appears to stem from heterogeneous social categories across countries.

1.5 The puzzle of this thesis

Whilst these approaches have tried to capture what is happening at the aggregate level, we argue that these models exclude an extremely important piece of the puzzle: the extreme right parties themselves. Indeed, Van der Brug et al (2005) argue that a properly specified model of electoral support for radical right parties should contain demand-side and supply-side factors. There are, however, very few studies that try to explain the success of individual extreme right parties by examining the characteristics of the parties themselves. How do these parties use their discourse to differentiate themselves from their competitors? Are some types of parties more successful than others? This series of questions requires us to change the lens of analysis and move away from the traditional supply and demand approaches. We are reminded by Van der Brug & Fennema (2007) that ‘this amazing variation [in electoral scores] calls for an explanation that goes beyond the socio-structural model of voting behaviour, since the social conditions that supposedly
caused the surge of radical right parties do not vary much between the different European countries and hence cannot account for their different fortunes. We therefore need to implement a framework of analysis that tries to identify the ideological unity of the extreme right party family and that attempts to understand the variation in electoral success. We believe that by bringing ‘parties back into the picture’ we can try to understand the phenomenon of variation better by studying what renders these parties different and/or similar to one another.

Throughout the discussions above, we have tried to highlight the nature of the difficulties that we face as scholars studying the extreme right party family. Traditionally, studies have not regarded the specificities of the party itself as an important component in the electoral success equation and this is what we propose to change with our model. We believe that it is possible to construct a typology of extreme right parties based on an empirical and comparative analysis of their ideological discourse. Extreme right parties are not puppets of the party system but are ultimately, like any other political party, capable of determining their own destiny with the help of strategies and the right ‘blend’ of discourse. The existence of a niche\(^4\) or a political space may provide an extreme right party with a foot-hold on the ladder to the mainstream political stage, but how can these parties maximise this potential? It is suggested here that the parties themselves need to acknowledge the existence of a potential extreme right electorate and adapt their strategies and discourse appropriately in order to obtain the best electoral results. We draw upon the findings of Carter (2005) and Golder (2003) who suggest that some ideological discourses may be more successful in terms of securing votes for extreme

\(^4\text{A niche is defined here as the space between the voters' location in the political space and the perceived position of the parties.}\)
right parties than others. Carter (2005) finds that, with other variables held constant, parties with a xenophobic programme or image have a greater chance of winning votes than the more neo-Nazi or neo-Fascist parties. This finding confirms the results of Golder (2003). Thus, it is expected that particular combinations of discursive strategies can help the extreme right to score greater electoral success as some types of ideological discourse will be more attractive to the potential electorate than others.

Throughout the course of this thesis, we wish to highlight two intriguing and entwined puzzles that currently prevail in the study of extreme right parties: the puzzle of ideological unity and the question of differing successes and constituencies. Firstly, in relation to the question of definition, we argue throughout this thesis that in order to understand the underlying ideology of extreme right parties we must conduct empirical research that aims to dissect their ideological discourse. Existing studies have failed to propose an empirically tested definition of the extreme right party family that not only captures commonalities within the ideological discourse of all extreme right parties but at the same time understands their differences. Overall, no study so far has provided a conclusive model or widely accepted evidence to explain the cross-national inconsistencies that exist both in terms of overall success and of the type of voters each party tends to attract. In order to address these problems, this thesis uses a framework of analysis that is tailored to the specificities of this particular party family. A ‘one-size-fits-all’ definition must be avoided if we are to analyse variations in the behaviour of extreme right parties. We need to develop a new framework of analysis that tries to understand the essence of extreme right ideology and that can be empirically tested in comparative research. In summary, this thesis addresses the following research question:
To what extent does the ideological location of each individual member of the extreme right party family affect the number and the nature of the voters whom they will attract?

This research question entails two operational questions that will guide the research design and empirical framework of this thesis.

1. **Similarities and Differences in Ideological Discourse** – What are the distinguishing ideological dimensions that structure the discourse of the extreme right party family? How can we define and locate extreme right parties within their specific ideological space, and how can we conceptualise extreme right ideology in a way that will help us to understand the logic of their variations?

2. **Extreme Right Ideology and Voter Preferences** – How do potential and actual voters perceive extreme right ideology? Can we map their ideological distribution and match this with the locations of the extreme right parties that compete within the individual party systems?

This thesis therefore explores the question of whether and how the extreme right can be defined as a multi-dimensional party family based on two strategic-discursive dimensions, and the extent to which the conceptual map of extreme right ideology will help us to assess the impact of these various ideological identities on extreme right party electoral success via the types and numbers of voters they attract.
1.6 Two birds, one stone....

In the course of this thesis, we propose a conceptual map of extreme right ideology that will help us to reconceptualise our definition of extreme right parties and a research design that will allow us to confront why some parties are more successful than others based upon their ideological discourse. We aim to answer our research question within a unified framework by creating a new typology of parties specifically tailored to the extreme right family.

Before we detail how we will approach the research question, one of the most important acknowledgements comes in the form of how do we decide which term to use for the parties that we are concerned with throughout this thesis? We prefer to use the term 'extreme right' rather than the plethora of recent terms and labels assigned to this particular party family for a variety of reasons. First of all, the term extreme right predates most other labels of this party family in the literature and is widely considered to be the most 'traditional' term of reference for this political ideology. Secondly, it is one of the most easily identifiable conceptions of this particular party family in terms of its political ideology and is meaningful to the electorate when thinking of the traditional left-right ideological spectrum as opposed to the more specific labels of 'new populist right' or 'radical right wing populism'). Thirdly, as this study uses comparative analyses of extreme right parties, we acknowledged that it was important to choose a term of reference that was transportable across countries. In all three countries studied here, the term extreme right is readily and easily understood by all not just those familiar with the academic literature in this field. Finally, as we have seen in the review of the literature,
whilst many new labels and terms have been proposed, there has not been an unanimous agreement by scholars in the field that any of these should replace the existing reference of extreme right and most of them fail to stand the empirical test in a way that would validate their conceptual and analytical framework.

In terms of who we classify as an extreme right party, the following criteria are important to note. Based on the conceptual model we expose in chapter two, we propose to define an extreme right party as a political organisation running in elections (whether at the European, national or local level) and whose main ideological identity (as conceived by the conceptual model) is based on a negative expression of national identity via cultural or civic references, and a discursive support for a form of social or political authoritarianism. In the next paragraph, we will now outline how we will approach the research design and the conceptual model.

Using a party-centric approach, we use interviews with party elites and text analysis of party manifestoes to locate parties within a defined ideological space that is unique to the extreme right party family. We will contribute to comparative analyses by examining how the different sub-types of parties prioritise two structuring ideological dimensions: an authoritarianism dimension and a negative identity dimension. Each dimension has two possible ideological conceptions. With regards to the authoritarianism dimension, there is a social (reactionary) mode and an institutional (repressive) conception. The negative identity dimension consists of a cultural (xenophobic) mode and a civic (populist) conception. These two dimensions create four sub-types of parties within the extreme right party family. We locate each party based on their ideological discourse, which we
establish empirically through the analysis of party manifestoes and interviews of party elites. This conceptual map of extreme right ideology helps us to define the ideological identities of the nine extreme right parties in the UK, France and Germany.

Using the case studies of the UK, France and Germany as examples of multi extreme right party systems, we also investigate the dynamics of internal party competition within this specific party family. The analysis of party manifestoes will allow us to map the positions of each individual extreme right party within their given party system. As a result, we can focus on the three party systems under consideration in this thesis in order to try and understand the ideological identities of these parties better. We draw upon the style of analytic narrative to help us recreate the strategic discursive choices each individual extreme right party may face within their given party system. We study a ‘within party family’ model of party competition in order to describe the ideological space that is at stake when extreme right parties compete alongside each other.

The conceptual map of extreme right ideology will not only contribute to our understanding of the fundamental ideological dimensions that structure the extreme right party family, but will also allow us to address the question of why some parties are more successful in their quest to capture their potential electorate than others? In this respect, we expect that the four sub-types of parties will have varying levels of potential electoral success as their ideological message will appeal to different sub-sections of the electorate and will also impact upon their strategies for party competition. Hence, our framework of

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Footnote: 5 I carried out a pilot study of the text analysis of extreme right party programmes in the UK during the summer of 2008. The creation of the conceptual map was thus informed by the pilot study, a thorough reading of the existing literature, and the interviews of extreme right party elites.
analysis will help us to understand the subtle differences and core similarities that exist within individual party systems and across the party family.

Moreover, we also incorporate an empirical investigation of the ideological preferences of actual and potential voters of extreme right parties. By studying the location of each party and the corresponding ideological distribution of the electorate in a given system, we can assess whether some parties are relatively more successful than others at capitalising on their potential. Analysing the discourse of extreme right parties and mapping the ideological distribution of the electorate within the extreme right ideological space will enable us to evaluate the 'match' between the parties' and voters' positions within their given party systems. In other words, do extreme right parties try to maximise their chances of a 'perfect match' by trying to gauge potential voter ideological preferences by matching their discourse to the ideological distribution of the electorate within their given party system? We expect that parties that obtain higher levels of success have been able to imitate the ideological preferences of their potential electorate and have been able to transform potential votes into actual votes.

In other words, the overall objective of this dissertation is to precisely map the boundaries of the extreme right ideological universe and understand how extreme right parties and their voters vary within this conceptual model. In order to understand the intense rivalries between competing extreme right parties within the same party system, we evaluate to what extent the critical choice of location made by each party within this universe

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6 The data we analyse throughout this thesis is relevant to contemporary extreme right parties and as such only reveals a snapshot in time of the empirical reality therefore our findings and the derived conclusions must be read with this caution in mind.
corresponds to the preferences of the potential extreme right electorate within each system.

In the following chapter, we introduce the theoretical framework, research design and model that lie at the very heart of this dissertation. In chapter three, we discuss the triple methodology that we use to test the conceptual model and provide justification of the case selection. In chapter four, we substantiate the model of extreme right ideology by analysing the interview extracts we obtained from extreme right party elites. Consequently, in chapter five, we analyse the strategic-discursive choices that are made by each party by analysing party manifestoes. This will allow us to ascribe an ideological identity to each party within the defined extreme right ideological space. Chapter six studies the dynamics of internal party competition within the extreme right party family in each of the countries studied here in order to understand the logic underpinning their strategic-discursive choices. Chapter seven links the previous chapters by investigating the match between the ideological locations of the parties and the ideological distribution of the electorate. Finally, chapter eight draws conclusions and discusses issues for future investigation.
Chapter Two

Theoretical Framework and Conceptual Map

Chapter Outline

2.1 Beyond the problem of definition
2.2 Models and approaches of defining the extreme right party family
2.3 How can we define the extreme right party family?
2.4 The study of party ideology
2.5 The conceptual map of extreme right ideology
2.6 The four ideological pillars
2.7 Theoretical expectations derived from the conceptual model of extreme right ideology
2.8 Defining ideological identities via interviews and text analysis of party manifestoes
2.9 Match or mismatch? Survey analysis of extreme right electorates
2.1 Beyond the problem of definition

This chapter will describe the specifics of the conceptual map of extreme right ideology that forms the theoretical framework of this thesis. We will discuss how we intend to address our research question by proposing a new approach that will enable us to understand the ideological specificities of the extreme right party family. We acknowledge that this approach must be systematic and empirical in order to identify both the similarities and differences that exist within the ideological core of this particular party family. We thus present four main theoretical arguments that structure our research design. This will help us to explain the fundamental importance of our conceptual map in defining the sub-types of parties within the extreme right party family.

As we have seen from the introductory chapter of this thesis, scholars of the extreme right are consistently confronted by the problem of definition and the theoretical misunderstandings and empirical inconsistencies surrounding it. We are regularly faced with the question of how to define the extreme right in a way that incorporates not only the subtle differences that occur between parties of the extreme right but that also recognises the fundamental similarities that exist within the party family. There seems to be no consensus as to what are the common features and distinctive criteria that unite the various members of the extreme right party family. As a result, we are often presented with complex theoretical frameworks that fail to stand empirical investigation or that make sense empirically but do not withstand theoretical scrutiny. We endeavour to recognise both of these considerations throughout the thesis in an attempt to propose a model that recognises the theoretical frameworks embedded in the existing literature,
whilst at the same time, remaining ever conscious of the empirical reality. In this chapter, we present the framework of analysis and the structure of our conceptual map.

**2.2 Models and approaches of defining the extreme right party family**

There have been several attempts to unite the plethora of competing models within the existing literature that describe the multiple characteristics of the extreme right party family. Mudde (2004) adopts an approach used by Wittgenstein (1953) whilst detailing five types of approaches used to define and characterise members of a political party family. He typifies these approaches as (1) prototype, (2) lowest common denominator, (3) highest common denominator, (4) family resemblance, and (5) ideal-type.

The prototype model that was proposed by Wittgenstein (1953) tries to identify one ‘perfect’ reference to which all other categories are compared to. This model also makes sense in the Weberian ‘ideal type’ approach. In terms of the extreme right party family, this would specify one party as a prototypical example to which all other potential members of the family would be compared to. This method emerged because political scientists wanted to test a hypothesised link between the contemporary extreme right parties in Europe and pre-war Fascist and Nazi parties (Eatwell, 1996; Harris, 1997). More recently, several authors have used the French Front National (Mayer & Sineau, 2002) or the Italian Movimento Soziale Italiano (Ignazi, 1997) as the reference to which other potential members of the family should be compared to. The problem of this particular approach is that it is highly inductive. It unilaterally ‘crowns’ one given party
as a ‘perfect’ specimen of its family, in a way that can be endlessly discussed and cannot be falsified.

The second approach, using the lowest common denominator of extreme right parties across time and systems, describes only the minimal features common to all the members of the party family. This approach would be extremely difficult to operationalise with respect to extreme right ideological discourse. Discourses vary across time and countries, according to the local legal norms, specific social and historical contexts, and the social acceptance of certain discourses and rhetoric. Therefore, while some parties occasionally adopt some openly racist stances (the NPD in Germany or the BNP in Britain for example), others prefer to refer to migrants or to asylum seekers (the French FN or the Austrian FPÖ), or to large ethnic groups that reside within the country (such as the French speaking community for the Vlaams Belang). Finding a common denominator between these discourses relies largely upon the interpretation of the social scientist and opens the way for criticism that such a common denominator is in fact of little importance (Pedahzur and Avarham, 2001).

The third approach tries to find the highest common denominator between extreme right parties. This approach implies a very arbitrary case selection as one needs to select parties that bear similar characteristics such as size, history, electoral success etc. However, if the chosen extreme right parties are of equal size, campaign in similar party systems, retain the same organisational structure, and are offered opportunities to participate in coalition governments, then, indeed, one may find greater commonalities between their discourses,
programmes, and proposals, simply because the case selection is partially biased (Anderson, 1996).

The fourth approach is based upon a theory of family resemblances that states one essential common feature may in fact be connected by a series of overlapping similarities, where no one feature is common to all (Wittgenstein, 1953). Within the context of political party families, this theory assumes there will be some common features amongst the individual members but no single feature will ever be shared by all of the family members. In this sense, we have to evaluate and compare all the fundamental features associated with each party and the party family to identify how many - and which - features need to be shared by a member for it to be deemed part of the extreme right party family. This approach is also inductive, and it is hard to establish which family features are not limited to the extreme right family but concern broader groups of parties instead. In this sense, a theory of extreme right family features is hard to falsify, and all the more so that no overarching feature is needed for a party to be considered of the extreme right.

Pedersen (1982), on the other hand, emphasises the potential worth of in typologising parties according to their life-spans. The principal implication of the 'life-span' theory is a process of evolution, that is, the surpassing of 'thresholds of legitimisation', the resolution of 'crisis' events in ideological and strategic terms, and the changing role of a party from initial beginnings through to the participation in government. However, the evolution and progression of a political party is more often than not determined by the individual politico-institutional setting and the level of electoral demand so it is difficult to find commonalities across several party systems or time frames. These life-span
developments are indeed, common to all political parties, but to date European extreme right parties present a diverse array of completed and ongoing life-spans within a relatively short period of time as many fragment, internally combust or are even, in the case of several German or Dutch extreme right parties, are prohibited.

Gallagher et al (1995:181) argue that a genetic component can be used to define members of a party family. This implies that parties of the same family should have mobilised during similar historical circumstances or set out with the same intention of representing similar interests. Whilst this theory is relevant to the parties representing the dominant cleavage-based interests (social-democratic, conservative, Christian democratic or agrarian parties), it is difficult to apply the extreme right, a party family that regularly transcends the traditional left-right dimension. However, whilst some of the older extreme right parties that have roots from the inter-war period, many of the post-war parties have tended to schism, disband, or have been prohibited. Some parties were founded and socialised in the immediate post-war period (German Sozialistische Reichspartei Deutschlands, SRP7), whereas others have made their debut in the last decade (Danish Progress party). Therefore, this particular condition that they were mobilised in similar historical contexts is clearly not relevant when defining the membership of the extreme right party family.

Some authors use membership of trans-national groups in the European Parliament to determine the eligibility of party families (Bardi, 2003). This point of reference is hard to

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7 The Sozialistische Reichspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Reich Party of Germany) was a West German political party founded in the aftermath of the Second World War, in 1949 as an openly National Socialist and Hitler-admiring split from the German Empire Party. The SRP had about ten thousand members and it won 16 seats in the Lower Saxony Landtag election, and in Bremen scored 8 seats. It was banned in 1952 by the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, the only court with the power to do so.
apply in the case of extreme right party family as even though there have been several parliamentary groups, they have been on the whole inconsistent, short-lived expedients, and susceptible to fissures. The most notable group to be established by an extreme right coalition was the 'Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty' (ITS) group, which was created in January 2007 and chaired by French MEP Bruno Gollnisch (from the Front National). However, the ITS group collapsed after 10 months, when members of the Greater Romania Party withdrew from the group. Yet, a few weeks before the European Parliament elections in June 2009, Gollnisch claimed he could resurrect the group, saying he was in regular contact with the British National Party, the Bulgarian party Ataka, and the Austrian FPÖ. At the same time, many of the parties belonging to the extreme right party family prefer to remain outside trans-European parliamentary groups and thus remain unaffiliated MEPs within the Parliament. For example, the Hungarian extreme right party, Jobbik won 14.7 percent of the vote in the 2009 elections and three seats, but has so far remained unaffiliated within the Parliament. Similarly, some parties belonging to the extreme right party family simply do not gain enough votes in the elections and are unable to return any representatives to the European Parliament. This renders it difficult to define the party family on this basis as some of the 'obvious' members will undoubtedly be excluded or some odd ones might be included such as the British Conservatives. Authors such as Müller (1989) have directed their attention to the political origins of the party leaders and officials themselves in order to trace the roots of the political ideology of the party. Yet, it is extremely questionable as to how one should select a representative sample of leaders on which you could define the ideology of a party. How can some leaders and officials be more representative of the entire party than

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8 Article in EurActiv, 17/03/09. Please see bibliography for full reference.
others? Indeed, some leaders and officials have openly declared links to inter-war or post-war Fascist groups (Schönhuber, former leader of die Republikaner), while others have not or are simply too young to have experienced the Fascist era firsthand (Nick Griffin, leader of the BNP), therefore these leaders would indeed have been socialised in completely different contexts and presumably equally different ideological mindsets.

Whilst all of the above approaches are wholly plausible in defining membership of a party family, there are many reasons to suggest that these particular avenues are unsuitable in the context of the specific ideological space of the extreme right party family. As a result, we believe that it is important that our framework of analysis is tailored to the specificities of the extreme right party family and that empirical testing is fundamental to the success of defining the individual parties within it. In the next section, we highlight some of the main approaches within the existing literature that try to define the extreme right party family and discuss their advantages and shortcomings in relation to the empirical reality.

2.3 How can we define the extreme right party family?

Alongside the debate of how to define the extreme right, we are also confronted by the uncertainty of whether we should be even speaking of a unified extreme right party family. As we have briefly seen in chapter one, there is little consensus regarding who should and should not be defined as extreme right. The same disagreements surround the debate on the existence of a party family on the extreme right. When confronted by the task of defining parties, most scholars use the concept of party families, in which political
parties are grouped across countries predominantly on the basis of their ideology (Michels, 1911; Duverger, 1951; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). More recently, Von Beyme (1984) constructs several typologies based on important ideological criteria forming different ‘familles spirituelles’ using two criteria to classify each individual party: 1) the party’s name, and 2) voters’ perceptions of parties’ programmes and ideological positions. The first criterion based on the party’s name is extremely difficult to operationalise in the context of the extreme right party family. Party leaders and officials retain the full decision to name their parties as they want and as such party names can be extremely ambiguous. For example, the Russian Liberal Democrats can be classified as members of the extreme right party family, and the National Socialist Party in Germany was certainly anything but social democratic. In addition, parties such as the German Peoples’ Union (DVU) or the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) certainly do little to acclaim their allegiance to extreme right ideology.

Usually, party families can also be distinguished by comparing the similarity of policy outputs across a number of parties. This method is highly appropriate for the analysis of parties that are, indeed, operating within government and have a direct impact on policy-making. Yet, it must be remembered that albeit with at least four exceptions (FPÖ, AN, DF, SVP) most extreme right parties have never participated in their national government, and even where they have they were only junior partners in governing coalitions. This renders it neigh impossible to distinguish which policies in particular they have had a direct influence on and which were the initiatives of other parties instead. Indeed, it is often the case that when they do reach government they are in coalition with other parties
who are on the face of it would seem hostile to extreme right values, which may well prevent their true ideological discourse being expressed through policy.

Problems also arise when trying to use voter’s perceptions of parties’ positions along the ideological spectrum as they tend to be inaccurate and often unreliable estimates of the given party’s real location. Indeed, the issue dimensions that are used to measure voter’s perceptions of parties are often one-dimensional when, in fact, in reality the interaction of political issues is dynamic and multi-dimensional. In addition, we fail to understand the essence of political parties or the basics of party competition if we assume that parties are static and can only be judged on a particular set of policies or stances at one given point in time. Parties will often change direction or adopt new stances during the course of a year or even within an election campaign. They will also react and adapt to the campaigns and policy proposals of their competitors, external influences or indeed internal pressures from the party members themselves (Laver, Benoit, Garry, 2003). Moreover, voters’ perceptions of parties’ ideologies are very difficult to measure and relies on the use of categories imposed to voters by political scientists, which might not always be ‘natural’ for them. For example, it would be unfair to assume that voters always think of extreme right parties as first and foremost ‘right wing’. Indeed, some elements of extreme right discourse overlap with neighbouring party families. In this context, it would be hard to imagine that voters who affiliate with the right wing ideology of Conservative or Christian democrat parties and would never contemplate voting for an extreme right party would perceive the ideology of an extreme right party differently to other voters.
Some authors prefer to typologise parties based upon some specified ideological characteristics or dimensions. Ignazi (1992, 2003) for example distinguishes between ‘new’ and ‘old’ extreme right parties, a typology that focuses on three dimensions: spatial, ideological, and attitudinal-systemic. As a result, parties are characterised firstly with regards to a presence or an absence of a fascist legacy and secondly, in relation to an acceptance or a refusal of the political system. Thus, he argues that extreme right parties in Europe can be divided into two main categories, ‘new’ extreme right parties building upon an anti-systemic, populist legacy such as the FN, the VB and the FPÖ, and contrasts this distinction to the ‘old’ parties that focus on the more traditional neo-Fascist ideology such as the BNP and the Italian MS/FT. However, serious questions remain about the exact basis for classification in Ignazi’s analysis. Firstly, there is little doubt that the arbitrary distinction between ‘new’ and ‘old’ extreme right parties artificially masks the underlying but obvious complexities that surround the definition of the extreme right party family. Mudde (2004: 328) states that ‘sometimes parties are classified exclusively on the basis of the party ideology, yet at other times they are judged by the attitudes of their members or even their voters’. In addition, he adds that ‘similar parties seem to be classified differently, because of the presence or absence of other parties’. To illustrate his critique, Mudde uses the example of the classification of the Lega Nord, which Ignazi describes as an anti-system but not an extremist party on the basis that the MS-FT already occupies the most extreme position on the right-hand side of political spectrum. This assumes that there is only enough space for one extreme right party in each party system. However, we question how Ignazi would apply this assumption in cases where there are undoubtedly more than one party belonging to the extreme right party family competing within the same party system. This approach exposes many empirical inconsistencies. In
many European party systems, there are multiple parties competing for their share of the potential extreme right vote (see chapter six on party competition). There are as many as three main German extreme right parties (the NPD, the DVU, and Die Republikaner), three main parties of the extreme right in France (the FN, MNR, and the MPF) and this pattern can be seen in other party systems such as Italy, Poland and even in systems where the extreme right has not been particularly successful (Britain for example).

Eatwell (1989), on the other hand, insists that in order to identify a new radical right party we must distinguish whether it is, firstly, a party that its competitors perceive it to be located ‘on the right’ and not a viable coalition partner and secondly, when the party appeared on the political scene. This categorisation seems to be too vague and moreover extremely difficult to operationalise. For example, how far right should a party be located for it to be a member of the extreme right party family? Surely, this question should not be answered on a purely theoretical basis but should also incur some empirical testing as the specificity of the party system, socio-economic context, or the political climate of each individual country is undoubtedly extremely important in determining this outcome. Furthermore, the second criteria that states that the party should not be a viable coalition partner does not work as several parties belonging to the extreme right party family have participated in coalition governments (for example, the MSI-AN and the Lega Nord joined Berlusconi’s party, Forza Italia in a coalition government after the 1994 elections). In addition, with regards to the final criterion, the time when the party appeared on the political scene criteria, it is also difficult to define extreme right parties according to this as many parties have emerged, disappeared and then re-emerged under a different name or new personnel.
Many authors base their definition on particular case studies in order to appreciate the full value of country specific detail. However, an overload of these details can add yet a further problematic facet to the puzzle. Scheuch and Klingemann (1967) base their definition of right wing extremism on what the *Verfassungsschutz* [Office for the Protection of the German Constitution] defines as political radicalism and extremism. It states that *radikalismus* [radicalism] constitutes a radical critique on the constitutional order without any anti-democratic meaning or intention; while *extremismus* [extremism] defines an anti-democratic, anti-liberal and anti-constitutional approach (Ueltzhöffer, 1992; Backes & Jesse, 1993; Minkenberg, 1998; Backes, 2001). This distinction between the two forms of right wing extremism is very interesting but its usage outside the German political system is limited as each country has its own peculiarities and benchmarks to what the terms radicalism and extremism can be compared to, which is undoubtedly particularly salient in the context of the German political system.

In summary, we have seen from the above discussions that it is extremely difficult to characterise or define the membership of the extreme right party family. The various attempts at defining the extreme right party family have so far failed to provide the social sciences with a systematic and coherent definition of what it means to be a member of the extreme right party family based not only on a robust theoretical framework but also on a confirmed empirical test. As a result, the existing literature lacks a unified theoretical framework that can explain exactly who belongs to this party family, why and on what basis. The definition of what actually constitutes an extreme right party, not only theoretically, but also empirically, is perhaps one of the most difficult hurdles that this thesis faces. We argue that in order to further our understanding of the specificity of the
extreme right party family, we need to study the discursive ideology that lies at the heart of these parties. In other words, we need to refocus our attention on the parties themselves and provide a conceptual definition of these particular parties based on their ideological discourse. In the next section, we look at how we can study party ideology in a way that will help us to identify the various sub-types of parties within this specific party family.

2.4 The study of party ideology

As yet, research on political parties and party families based on an ideological approach has been very limited in both range and quantity (Mudde, 2000:183). In the field of comparative politics, it is surprising to find that few studies actually adopt an 'ideological approach' to study party families or groups, for example in studies, which the 'substance and prevalence of a party’s ideology are of primary interest to the investigator (Lawson, 1976:15). This is particularly true in the context of extreme right parties. The few comparative studies that have adopted the ideological approach are fairly restricted to comparisons of either one party through time (Sainsbury, 1980) or focus on country-specific case studies (Hoogerwerf, 1971; Borg, 1966) or instead, they try to infer a transnational group that loosely represents the core of the party family (Gardberg, 1993; Mudde, 1995). Whilst the grouping of political parties into broader party families has been widely applied from the study of coalition governments (Budge and Keman, 1990; Laver and Schofield, 1990) to the analysis of policy outputs (Esping-Andersen, 1985; Van Kersbergen, 1995), it has often resulted in vague and tenuous linkages between parties and their supposed ‘siblings’.
Analysing party discourse and ideology can be extremely difficult. It can be very time-consuming and can often require knowledge of the multiple languages if analysing primary literature such as manifestoes and press releases. One of the most remarkable achievements in this area stems from the Comparative Manifestoes Project. This approach has been the most widely used, and forms the basis of the European Manifestoes Project that analyses the policy stances of most of the large party families in Europe (Budge et al., 1989). The Comparative Manifestoes dataset is the most extensively validated set of policy-estimates that is available within the discipline of political science. However, it is of limited use to this research as few extreme right parties are included in their case selection. In addition, the project focuses on policy, and not on structuring ideological dimensions. Therefore, it is clear to us that we need to construct our own conceptual map to test the specificities of extreme right discourse.

In a quest to define membership of the extreme right party family, some authors have suggested that parties could be defined based upon their ideological characteristics. Betz (1994:413), for example, underlines a ‘rejection of socio-cultural and socio-political systems... and of individual and social equality’ within the discourse of the extreme right parties. Similarly, Kitschelt (1995) identifies ‘new radical right parties’ on the basis of their location on three dimensions: citizenship (cosmopolitan versus particularistic), collective decision modes (libertarian versus authoritarian) and the state allocation of

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resources (re-distributive versus market-liberal). Whilst Eatwell (1989) defines the ‘new radical right’ (preferring not to use the term extreme right party) as retaining the following features 1) moral conservatism, 2) political authoritarianism, and 3) economic liberalism. Again authors disagree on the fundamental elements that constitute the core ideology of the extreme right party family. Fennema (1997), for example, has analysed the ideology of extreme right parties and movements in historical perspective, and concluded that ethnoculturalism (or ethnic nationalism) is one of four fundamental conceptions of extreme right ideology. The author claims that ethnic nationalism, anti-materialism, anti-parliamentary, and the formulation of conspiracy theories are all key features of the ideology that is common to extreme right parties.

Whilst most of these models of definition outline particular characteristics of extreme right ideology, many of them refer to specific case studies or a small selection of countries and are thus limited in their comparative explanatory power. Moreover, these definitions of sub-types of parties or character lists are often vague and ambiguous, non-exclusive to the extreme right party family, and are usually based upon expert judgments of parties or loose interpretations of extreme right ideology rather than on the actual discourse of these parties.

Whilst some authors suggest that there are too many differences between parties of the extreme right, which renders it impossible to conceive a unified party family, we argue, however, by dissecting the extreme right party family into different sub-types of parties we can truly appreciate the subtleties of this group of parties within and across party systems. We believe that we can only truly define extreme right parties by conducting in-
depth analysis of their discourse in order to reveal the most important aspects of their ideological identity.

In order to study the logic of the variations in discourse we encounter within the extreme right party family, we need to analyse the strategic-discursive choices each party must face when deciding upon their unique discourse and ideological identity. We believe that we can glean insights into the logic of these choices by analysing official discourse such as party programmes and manifestoes. Indeed, Mudde (2000) claims that, so far, studies of extreme right parties have not benefited from the interesting insights that can be gleaned from the study of party programmes. The analysis of extreme right party discourse will allow us to reveal some of the core dimensions at the heart of extreme right party family ideology. The vast majority of party specialists agree that a party manifesto is the closest thing to an official view of a party’s ideological discourse. A party manifesto remains arguably the one fundamental document where a party defines its identity. In addition, party programmes are officially endorsed by their leaders and members and are subject to conference scrutiny and debate. As a result, they are ‘considered to represent and express the policy collectively adopted by the party’ (Borg, 1966:97). Manifestoes are designed with a clear and simple objective: to set a coherent ideological standpoint, to attract potential voters, and increase visibility of the party during electoral periods and campaigns. Everything from their emphasis to their proposals via their stylistic and rhetoric choices corresponds to a certain exercise of self-definition that every party in a given party system is expected to undertake. It therefore seems logical to assume that party manifestoes will serve as a good proxy to estimate the official discourse of each individual extreme right party.
By defining each party according to their discourse, we are able to gain a valuable insight into the ideology that underpins the party family. We must, however, acknowledge that party manifestos can not just be taken at face value. Manifestoes are drafted in the aim of attracting potential voters and are aimed at the mass audience. As such, the rhetoric may be considerably more ‘moderate’ and maybe completely different to the discourse and ideology of members and activists. Indeed, Rose and Mackie (1988) distinguish between extrovert and introvert party activity, and between ‘front-stage’ discourse, belonging to the extrovert activity, and ‘back-stage’ discourse, belonging to the introvert party activity. We will nevertheless gain a valuable insight and a better understanding of the manner in which extreme right parties communicate and frame their discourse and ideology. In addition, simultaneous analyses of party manifestoes will enable us to incorporate a truly comparative and empirical framework and allow us to explore the conceptual map that we have proposed. We now move on to discuss the ideological criterion that also must be taken into account when we attempt to define and conceptualise the extreme right party family.

2.5 The conceptual map of extreme right ideology

Within the scope of this thesis, we focus specifically on the ideology of extreme right parties. There are obviously many different ways of conceptualising ideology. However, one of the most common usages is to conceive it as an inclusive concept. That is, ‘a body of normative or normative-related ideas about the nature of man and society as well as the organisation and the purpose of society’ (Sainsbury, 1980:8). This infers that ideology is a set of normative ideas on how society or man ought to be and ideas on how they are
(Mudde, 2000). This undoubtedly includes infinite configurations and would include a basic rationale of how society should be ordered and by whom. Whilst it seems impossible to simplify the ideology of a party family, let alone a single party, we should aim to provide a conceptualisation of ideology that can be ‘sufficiently abstract to travel across national boundaries’ (Rose, 1991:447) in order to make comparative analysis across the countries included in the study. In order to try and incorporate this element of transposition across borders, we propose a dual methodology that aims to capture the theoretical elements of extreme right ideology as well as the empirical reality of what is being communicated by the party’s discourse. We propose to study two facets of party discourse: an external and internal perspective. By combining analysis of external party communication (analysis of party manifestoes, programmes, pamphlets etc) with interviews of extreme right party elites and leading officials we aim to capture a valuable insight into the true discourse of the extreme right. The analysis of party communication directed towards the general electorate and potential voters should provide a fairly broad and detailed insight into the ‘institutionalised party ideology’ (Sainsbury, 1980:17, Holzer, 1981). At the same time, in-depth interviews with party elites will present another facet of the discourse of the extreme right. The following section outlines the logic and rationale underpinning the conceptual map and highlights the core ideological dimensions of extreme right ideology that we outline as the defining structure of the extreme right party family.

Whilst many of the parties belonging to the extreme right party family retain their discursive specificities and are grounded within their own unique historical context, we argue that there are two fundamental ideological dimensions that are common throughout
the entire party family. Indeed, some of the variation in discourse we witness across parties of the extreme right can be attributed to several factors such as the personality of the leader, the strategic-discursive choices each party has to make when drafting their manifestoes in the face of competition and pressure from activists, different types of legal and electoral frameworks, varying socio-political contexts etc.

We posit that extreme right ideology is structured along two ideological dimensions (authoritarianism and a negative identity) and that extreme right parties must make a series of strategic-discursive choices when deciding where to locate within the extreme right ideological universe. Every party, regardless of their ideological roots, has to make decisions on which particular aspect of their discourse they should showcase in order to provide simple and clear-cut ideological cues to their voters and potential voters. Our conceptual map of extreme right ideology is structured by these two ideological dimensions and that each party will assume a unique position on each of these dimensions. These dimensions are stable and consistent and occur within and across party systems. Each party proposes their unique blend of discourse in order to formulate their appeal to their targeted electoral market within the defined extreme right ideological space.

1) An ideological dimension of authoritarianism featuring social (reactionary) and institutional (repressive) conceptualisations and;

2) An ideological dimension of negative identity including a civic (populist) and cultural (xenophobic) mode.
We argue that extreme right parties have to make a series of ideological choices within this defined and bounded ideological space. These strategic-discursive choices define their ideological identity. This conceptual map of extreme right ideology will enable us to locate the each of the parties that we have selected to include in our analysis in relation to each other within their domestic party systems and across external party systems. One of the originalities of this thesis will be to empirically define the ideological specificity of the extreme right party family within a unified conceptual framework that will allow us to determine which parties belong to this fast growing party family. We posit that each extreme right party will choose a unique blend that combines a dominant emphasis on two conceptions of the four main ideological pillars. Each party will be defined according to which conception of the two dimensions they emphasise within their discourse and are
thus given an ideological ‘location’ on the conceptual map. The extreme right party family can, therefore, be sub-divided according to the location of each party based on the strategic-discursive choices they make within their ideological discourse. Indeed, each individual extreme right party has its own style and blend of discourse that varies along two dimensions (hence the impossibility to simply divide the extreme right into two sub-party families) and is tailored to the party’s internal pressures and constraints, its target electoral market, and the institutional and contextual specificities to the political, electoral, and party systems it operates within. We argue that the unique location of each extreme right party within the conceptual map will impact upon its ability to seduce voters, its electoral potential, and the shape of internal (within the extreme right) and external (vis-à-vis other parties) party competition.

The two dimensions of authoritarianism and negative identity create four possible ideological conceptions. Firstly, a social authoritarian conception embodied in a reactionary formation and an institutional authoritarian conception embedded in a repressive format. Secondly, the negative identity dimension can assume two different forms: a cultural conception resulting in a xenophobic discourse and a civic conception that encapsulates a populist discursive theme.

2.6 The four ideological pillars

In the next section, we will introduce the two ideological dimensions with a discussion of each conception. We will first examine the two conceptions of the authoritarian dimension: the reactionary and repressive modes. Subsequently, we will then proceed to
develop the two conceptions of the negative identity dimension: the xenophobic and populist forms.

The authoritarianism dimension - reactionary conception

In essence, the social conception of the authoritarian dimension lies within the realm of a utopian ideology and entails the devotion to a posited ideal civilization. This civilisation may take the form of a city, town, locality or in the most extreme case the entire world. In this ideal community, all perceived evils of society (poverty, crime, misery, etc) are removed and replaced by a harmonised and homogeneous society. It characterises a society that is striving towards the perfection of itself and its people. Utopian ideology is often strongly opposed to and even sometimes, rejects the existing status quo (Mannheim, 1960). The nature of utopian thinking has changed historically, depending on whether or not utopia was regarded as realisable. As such, it often constitutes a critique of social institutions (Goodwin & Taylor, 2009). With the French Revolution suggestions were made that the course of history could be diverted, and utopia (of a sort) could be implemented – in other words, that abstract ideals could be incarnated in society by deliberate human action. As the very nature of utopia depicts an ideal form of social life, which, by definition, does not currently exist we expect that parties espousing reactionary discourse would refer to a ‘glorious past’ or ‘golden age’ and encapsulate euphoric visions of the future.

The implication for current political life is that retrenchment and conservation to prevent worse decline are the necessary and only proper forms of political action. One of the major assertions of the extreme right utopian claim implies that solutions aiming to
rectify the inefficiency of political structures can not be found within the traditional democratic system. Extreme right parties propose solutions outside the liberal democratic framework of Western societies. Overall, an ultra-conservative ideological component leads parties of the extreme right party family to postulate a glorified social order. In reference to the alleged imperfections of contemporary society, they threaten to impose a utopia by force (Merkl & Weinberg, 1997). Traditional society had its balance, its natural order, something new generations fail to understand and have lost. Standards of authority and order were respected before some disruptive influences diluted them by promoting some deviant alternatives in the names of modernity and egalitarianism. The solution proposed is authoritarian but does not involve state interference in private affairs. Quite the contrary, as it requires that the state withdraw to its rightful place to allow the common sense of 'good' citizens to reign with a return to old values and solutions, which may not even be legal anymore in democracies which have 'lost their way' to political correctness.

Within the reactionary discourse of extreme right parties, there is a certain devotion to the 'community' be it the national community, regional/local networks, or simply in the first instance, the family. Parties of the extreme right point to the 'erosion of family, clan, neighbourhood, and social class' (Heitmeyer, 1993: 22) and often reinforce the need for a revival of the group mentality. This group mentality is embedded and reinforced in the extreme right ideological frame of 'man is a Gemeinschaftswesen and can only develop fully within a community'. The community's needs almost become superior to the existence of the individual. There is 'a belief in the authority of the state over the individual; an emphasis on natural community [...] limitations on personal and collective freedoms; collective identification in a great national destiny [...] and the acceptance of
the hierarchical principle for social organisation' (Ignazi, 1997: 49). We now turn our attention to the second conception of the authoritarianism dimension; the institutional repressive mode.

*The authoritarianism dimension - repressive conception*

The repressive conception of the authoritarianism dimension firmly rests upon a form of social control characterized by strict obedience to the authority of a state or organization. This often entails the maintenance and enforcement of control through the use of oppressive measures. Even though most contemporary extreme right parties couch their platforms and appeals in terms of democratic respect and institutional fair play, the underlying tone of some of their propositions have often had a subtle anti-democratic current. It is worth remembering one of Goebbels' infamous quotes about the NSDAP 'we want to make use of democratic means in order to gain power and after seizure of that power we would ruthlessly deny to our opponents all those means which they had granted to us during the time of our opposition'\(^{10}\). In order to combat impending chaos and threatened anarchy, extreme right parties often claim that they will entrust a strengthened state with the task of (re)enforcing law and order. The state must use repression to eradicate errant fragments of society. The affirmation of stability, authority and the submission of the individual to the ideological goal are paramount in many of their discourses. There are obvious differences between the levels of radicalism and the extent to which the party endorses anti-democratic behaviour. Due to the very nature of anti-systemic rhetoric, the majority of the parties proposing radical departures from the

existing status quo are relegated to the peripheries of their respective party system. Extreme right parties who want to compromise on this particular element and instead emphasise other aspects of their discourse that are perceived to be more palatable to the wider public tend to be parties that are more populist in tone and in general represent opposition against the incumbent government and the other mainstream parties than against the system per se (see populist conception of the negative identity dimension).

For the purposes of this study, we distinguish between authoritarian ideology and the authoritarian personality. In order to reinforce anti-systemic and anti-party claims, extreme right parties propose an extremely centralised and autocratic leadership of their movement, a characteristic that threatens the very existence of the party when the present leader steps down from office. The majority of extreme right parties are dominated by a strong and autocratic leader. The French National Front has its Le Pen, the Austrian FPÖ, its Haider, the Italian Alleanza Nazionale, its Fini. Extreme right parties are often 'possessed' in a very patriarchal manner (in the Weberian sense). Fortuyn gave his name to the party and Le Pen contradicted the whole internal hierarchy of the National Front to name his daughter Marine his designed successor. We use the lens of the authoritarian 'personality' to capture the effect of the leader on the party and to establish whether there is a leadership cult. Obviously, the authoritarian ideology of an extreme right party is extremely difficult to assess as they have had no chance of implementing any of their

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11 Although the concept of an authoritarian character or personality was first introduced by Abraham Maslow in 1943, it was in 1950 that Theodor Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson and R. Nevitt Sanford made the term more recognisable. Their thesis claims to predict one's potential for fascist and antidemocratic behaviour by assessing the 'structure of personality' based on characteristic experiences in early childhood and the pattern of internal, psychic processing. They developed a measure for fascist tendencies known as the F-scale (implicit antidemocratic tendencies and fascist potential), which includes elements of ethnocentrism, anti-Semitism, politico-economic ideology, anti-democratic attitudes, moralistic condemnation, distrust and punishment.
policies or influence on government. However, throughout the text analysis of party manifests, we will look for hints of authoritarian ideology, whereas the emphasis on the authoritarian personality will be more easily captured via the interviews of elites and high-ranking officials. We now turn our attention to the negative identity dimension. We first discuss the essence of the xenophobic conception, and then we examine its populist counterpart.

The negative identity dimension - xenophobic conception

In Bruter’s (2005, 2009) model, cultural political identity is broadly conceived as the perception to be part of a human community, with which one believes to share some values, history, cultural references or heritage, whatever they are deemed to encompass. It is a measure of relative perceived proximity, whereby one feels closer to those within than to those outside. Similarly, the cultural pole of the negative identity scale is a reference that excludes those seen as essentially different from the community, that is, in the broadest meaning of the word, ‘foreigners’, hence our reference to a ‘xenophobic’ pole of the negative identity dimension. By contrast, positive references will be made to the Nation, the People/Volk, historical national figures etc. The concept of Volk (the people) is often fundamental to the discourse of the extreme right party family. Klandermans and Mayer (2006: 271) claim that this is ‘the first, most important in-group’. The same authors state that the nation takes on almost biological image ‘as a natural consanguine community, with its territory, its language, its culture, that surpasses all others – family, work, religious ties’ (ibid, 271). This type of discourse also adds another dimension to the in-group structure, that is, the sense of belonging that requires a
‘total devotion to nation and cultural assimilation’ (Klein and Simon, 2006a: 168). This leads to a ‘collective identification in a great national destiny, against class, ethnic, or religious divisions’ (Ignazi, 2002: 24).

Broadly defined xenophobic, racist or anti-Semitic elements are perhaps the oldest aspect of extreme right politics to be identified by political scientists. Arendt’s (1958) study of anti-Semitism highlighted its role as a key element in the very definition of Nazism. Similarly, Adorno et al. (1950) considered racism and xenophobia to be two core elements of extreme right ideology. In fact, some authors think of these attitudes as so central to the extreme right ideology that they broadly focus on the anti-immigration stance of extreme right parties, or altogether think of ‘anti-immigrant parties’ as a more suitable label than ‘extreme right’ (van der Brug, Fennema, and Tillie, 2000, 2005). Xenophobia and racism\textsuperscript{12} are terms that often used to describe the rhetoric of the extreme right. Banton (1983) and Dickens (2000) have documented how, during the nineteenth and the early twentieth century, the concepts of race and racial inequality dominated much of the public discourse. The general belief was that one should ‘preserve racial hygiene’, races had to be ‘maintained’ and their purity ‘attained’, it was seen as legitimate to ‘fight for one’s race’ or to ‘awaken racial consciousness’. Kitschelt (1995) argues these themes are used by extreme right demagogues as a response to the increasing multiculturalisation of Western European societies. Extreme right parties almost unanimously agree that restrictions should be placed upon immigration, and as a policy theme,

\textsuperscript{12} Banton (1983) and Dickens (2000) have documented how, during the nineteenth and the early twentieth century, the concepts of race and racial inequality dominated much of the public discourse. The general belief was that one should ‘preserve racial hygiene’, races had to be ‘maintained’ and their purity ‘attained’, it was seen as legitimate to ‘fight for one’s race’ or to ‘awaken racial consciousness'.
immigration has indeed been a salient issue for the majority of extreme right parties since their inception.

Extreme right parties also draw upon a notion of identity that is intrinsically linked with the physical notion of the nation but is largely expressed and mobilised through the more politically charged term of nationalism. The nation, by contrast, is a psychological characteristic, a concept that individuals are able to identify with and claim to be a part of. Delanty (1996) argues that nationalism no longer appeals to ideology but to identity and that ideology is being increasingly refracted through identity discourse. Under the guise of a ‘need to belong’, identity often becomes a mystical phrase, a call for a return to traditional roots. The accentuation of national peculiarities creates an artificial ‘in-group’ that is simultaneously reinforced by the reference to a supposedly obvious ‘out-group’. It is assumed by many of the parties akin to the extreme right that to be fully fledged member of the national community an individual must be required to share a common identity, and to share a common language, religion, ideology, culture, and/or history. The identity of the dominant community is taken as the reference group to which all other identities should be compared to. This refers both to the distinguishing features of the group, and to the individual’s sense of belonging to it. Any group that does not fit the nationalist mould would, therefore, not be considered as a legitimate member of the national community and they would be consequently brandished an ‘out-group’.

With regard to our specific interest in the construct of the extreme right discourse, the

[13] Identity as a concept has become a powerful ideological device wielded as much by academics as political entrepreneurs, social movements or state institutions (Malesevic, 2006). Until recently, identity was almost unquestioned as a categorical apparatus of social analysis, as well as in ordinary life, which gives an insight into its omnipotent ideological status. Identity attributes a certain statement of fact and in this way someone’s identity is very rarely questioned.
dichotomy between identity frames and oppositional frames is very important. The 'us versus them' category is used as a frame to present the discrimination of relevant 'out-groups' and the inherent preference for the rights and privileges of the 'in-group'. Thus, a distinction between 'them' and 'us' is regularly made within the identity politics of the extreme right that allows parties to construct scapegoats and conspiracy theories that frequently blame foreigners, minority ethnic groups, homosexuals, Jews etc as the perpetrators of society's ills. Extreme right parties present 'outsiders' as a threat to the very fabric of their society in an era of social and moral malaise and cultural decadence. This leads us to the centrality of principles of inclusion and exclusion: right-wing extremists combine an 'external exclusiveness' (Mudde, 2000: 43) with an 'internal homogenisation' (Mudde, 2000: 68). The 'in-group' is presented as a homogeneous set of actors (who are represented by the party), which defines itself as the opposite of the 'out-group'.

Whilst Renan (1882) and more recently, Brubaker (2004) argue that membership of the national community should be viewed as voluntary (a nation is any group of people aspiring to a common political state-like organisation), most extreme right parties believe that ethno-cultural traits should determine one's admission into the national community. Indeed, there are differences across countries as to how states manage the question of how to define the nation and who can be seen as a member of its community. The French method of inclusion - essentially that anyone who accepts loyalty to the civil state is therefore a French citizen. In practice, however, this entails the enforcement of a considerable degree of uniformity. The German method, in contrast, required by political circumstances, was to define the 'nation' in ethnic terms. Ethnicity in practice came down
to speaking German and (perhaps) having a German name. The State as a political unit is seen by nationalists as the ‘protector’ of the national community charged with promulgating the traditions and heritage of the majority ethno-cultural group. In the next section, we present the populist conception of the negative identity dimension.

The negative identity dimension – populist conception

In contemporary political discourse, populism is often perceived as a rhetorical instrument based on demagogy that provides a generalised label for a number of politicians from Bossi to Le Pen via Berlusconi, each accused of using simplistic slogans to threaten traditional representative democracy and the legitimacy of political institutions. Similarly, parties of the extreme right including the French Front National, the Belgian Vlaams Blok/Vlams Belang, the Austrian FPÖ, and the Italian Northern League have often used populist dynamic to complement their authoritarian values and anti-system sentiment (Scarrow, 1996). Extreme right parties often express contempt for their fellow politicians and their parties. Parties of the extreme right party family sometimes claim not to be a ‘political party’ at all, a claim that often extends to civil society as they refuse to acknowledge the legitimacy of the mass media, trade unions or any organisation that openly express refusal of extremist and racist ideology. At the heart

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14 Populism shares a notion of opposition but at the same time a high degree of ambiguity. As a political science concept, populism is simultaneously considered to be 1) a ‘soft’ ideology, 2) a type of regime – particularly salient within the South American context, and 3) a new political stream characterised by its opposition to representative democracy throughout contemporary Europe (Betz, 1994, Kitschelt, 1995). It possesses remarkable multi-dimensionality in its ability to transform into new-populism, national-populism, or video-populism (Taguieff, 1997). Gellner and Ionescu (1969) provided a series of differentiated perspectives of populism based on several case-studies but failed to derive a unified operational concept of populism. Canovan (1981) claimed that populism encompassed such an extreme variety of recognised forms that it made any definitive analysis impossible.
of the extreme right’s electoral appeal to ‘ordinary people’ is a desire for a radical transformation of the socio-political system by attacking the social-democratic consensus (Swyngedouw, 1998). Extreme right parties often suggest that the colluded parties of the mainstream defend the same conception of politics and that they (the extreme right parties) are the only ‘real’ alternative to the existing political governance.

Populist discourse regularly consists of simply-constructed arguments based upon several common propositions. The sovereignty of the people is often championed alongside a complete denunciation of the political elites and institutions. Once the demagogues have deconstructed the establishment, they suggest that the only viable solution is to restore popular sovereignty and that they can be the only ones trusted to do it. By portraying themselves as the ‘true’ defenders of democracy, they construct a barrier to differentiate themselves from traditional elected representatives to legitimate their claims vis-à-vis their competitors. Le Pen’s campaign slogan ‘mains propres, tête haute’ [clean hands, straight head], was meant to illustrate the moral and legal ‘virginity’ of his forces as opposed to the common levels of corruption and misuse of public goods by the four main parties labelled the ‘bande des quatre’ [gang of four].

Many contemporary leaders of extreme right parties lament mainstream politicians for being out-of-touch with ordinary citizens, claiming that these public servants have alienated the people that they are supposed to represent. Leaders of extreme right parties exclaim that the will of the people should rule and that they would given a chance to govern root out the alleged corruption of the existing elites who try to usurp the power from the people. Some parties have recognised the electoral potential of populist themes
and as a result have focused on these themes in election campaigns. This phenomenon has been noted extensively by the existing literature. For example, Scarrow (1996) focuses on the unifying theme of anti-party discourse amongst a number of extreme right parties, whilst Betz (1994) and Betz and Immerfall (1998) believe that populism plays such a key role within the ideology of extreme right parties that they prefer to talk of 'right wing populist' parties or 'new populist' parties than of extreme right or far right parties.

The difficulty – both empirically and analytically – remains that there is no definitive specification of the populist discourse. However, while this type of discourse can be occasion-specific within the context of a given electoral campaign, it can also be more durable and define the very ideological identity of a party. Chirac in 1995 or Berlusconi in 2001 probably illustrate the first scenario, while a number of reactionary nationalist parties such as the Austrian FPÖ or the French FN are characterised by the second. Hassenteufeld (1991) used the case study of Austria to illustrate that the anti-system function was performed simultaneously by both the FPÖ and the BRD (Greens). Both parties have had to face the difficulties posed to their legitimacy as anti-system parties after accepting to participate in the coalition government. Consistently arguing that the mainstream parties and their politicians are corrupt and do little to represent the concerns of real people soon becomes irrelevant when the said extreme right party is then invited to share power in a coalition government.

In summary, the strategic-discursive location chosen by each party defines its ideological identity within a defined extreme right ideological territory. These two dimensions create four possible quadrants of extreme right ideology: xenophobic-reactionary, xenophobic-
repressive, populist-reactionary, and populist-repressive. We do not expect any party to use only one of the two possible types of references on either of the two dimensions. Instead, ideological references to xenophobic and populist discourse on the one hand, and reactionary and repressive discourse on the other hand is not only conceivable but also expected. Nevertheless, we believe that within both dimensions a certain tension exists between the two conceptions as they refer to different solutions to societal problems (the reactionary versus repressive conceptions) and highlight different scapegoats or culprits as the cause of these problems (xenophobic versus populist conceptions). Indeed, as we illustrate empirically in chapters four and five, these tensions are confirmed empirically as pillar scores are negatively correlated within dimensions.

If we first take a look at the authoritarian dimension, for example, the state-based solution in the form of institutional authoritarianism – is often considered the culprit when it comes to the social authoritarian argument. Indeed, rigid bureaucratic or legalistic rules, and excessive taxation are what may prevent the priest from being heard, the father from smacking his child, or the teacher from instilling respect for the morals associated with traditional values. On the other hand, when the focus is on institutional authoritarianism, the state must be stronger, tougher and harsher even if it means curbing individuals’ power of decision and the authority of competing social or moral forces, historically including religion. Insights gained from recent studies that have focused on the profiles of the electorates that vote for extreme right parties has tended to separate moral authoritarianism and traditionalism from the discourse that focuses on ethnocentrism (Billiet & De Witte, 1995; Evans, 2001; Swyngedouw and Ivaldi, 2001). When it comes to the negative identity dimension, the tension, whilst less obvious, is as deep in essence.
Philosophically, accusing foreigners of not respecting their host society, abusing social benefit/welfare systems, and causing crime is fundamentally different from blaming past and present governments for attracting immigrant workers under false pretences and creating inner city ghettos that cause misery and conditions propitious to high unemployment and crime.

In this context, we also refer to political communication theory that suggests that parties must communicate a core and non-conflicting message to their electorate (Simon & Iyengar, 1996). It is extremely important that the party decides who they are going to blame for societal chaos – is it the fault of the politicians who have engineered the multi-cultural experiment or the immigrants that have settled here and taken jobs and burden the social security structure? If the party argues that the blame should be equally shared between the foreigners and the politicians, the ideological message communicated to their electorate will be incoherent and ultimately inefficient at mobilising the electorate on a key ideological theme. Authors such as Betz (1994), Kitschelt (1995), Lubbers et al. (2000) have stated that extreme right parties have steadily moved towards emphasising social and moral issues, with a particular focus on issues of immigration, law and order and moral rectitude. However, we expect extreme right parties to emphasise a particular conception of the two dimensions in order to make their discourse succinct and clearly identifiable by potential voters. The relative positioning of every extreme right party on each dimension and its consequential location in a given quadrant will give a very unique pedigree to its fight, discourse, and strategy. This specific ideological identity will have impact upon the dynamics of party competition within the extreme right party family, the types of voters it will potentially seduce, and ultimately the electoral success it obtains.
2.7 Theoretical expectations derived from the conceptual model of extreme right ideology

In this section, we outline the theoretical expectations that have shaped our research design (see section 2.8) and discuss how our conceptual map of extreme right ideology contributes to our understanding of the ideological specificity of the members of the extreme right party family. In other words, without necessarily engaging into the test of formal hypotheses, this section discusses what the extreme right world would 'look like' if the model exposed in section 2.5 is correct. If these theoretical predictions are upheld throughout this thesis, then one could argue that there exists a network of concordant indications to support our model. Based upon our conceptual map of extreme right ideology, this section will therefore first illustrate how different combinations of discursive strategies would lead to the formation of different sub-types of parties within the extreme right party family. It will then underline the expected consequences of the model upon patterns of extreme right internal party competition where more than one extremist party addresses a national electorate. Thirdly, it will outline the predicted theoretical impact of the model on the variation in electoral success that the extreme right experiences within given party systems across countries and electorates.

Discovering sub-types of parties within the extreme right party family

We argue that extreme right parties can be defined by their unique discursive positions on two fundamental ideological dimensions: a negative identity dimension and an authoritarianism dimension. The negative identity dimension ranges from a cultural
conception (xenophobic) to a civic one (populist) and the authoritarian dimension ranges from a social conception (reactionary) to a institutional one (repressive). We will try to discover whether these ideological dimensions are salient within the discourse of extreme right parties by counting discursive references (in the form of word frequencies) to these ideological pillars in the manifestoes of the nine extreme right parties that we study here. We expect that each party will have a dominant 'mode' on each of the two structuring ideological dimensions, that is, they will predominantly emphasise one of the two conceptions of each dimension. This will provide each party with a dominant discourse within the four quadrants of the conceptual extreme right ideological universe: xenophobic-reactionary, xenophobic-repressive, populist-reactionary, populist-repressive. In other words, if our model is correct, then we would expect all four types of dominant strategic-discursive combination to be represented by some extreme right parties in the three countries studied. In itself, this would be a first very important finding as, as discussed in chapter 1, many traditional theories believe that the extreme right party family is either monolithically xenophobic or, on the contrary, singularly populist in its very definition.

**Exploring the dynamics of multiple extreme right party internal competition**

We argue that multiple parties within the extreme right party family can successfully coexist in a given party system if they choose different ideological locations within the four quadrants of extreme right ideology. In a sense, this is a departure from most conceptions of a single-ideological-line spatial models that simply order parties on a left-right scale and could find it puzzling that several parties which all occupy a relatively
similar spot towards the extreme right of that scale can manage to coexist. Instead, in our model, each party is expected to try and capture a target electorate in order to coexist alongside competitors within the same party family. We argue that one of the ways this could materialise is if an extreme right party tries to distinguish itself from its rivals by emphasising different conceptions of the core ideological dimensions that are unique to their particular party family. Therefore, if a given party manages to carve out an ideological identity that is different to its competitors then this party should be able to coexist alongside other larger or pre-existing parties within the party family.

However, this also means that if a new extreme right party chooses to imitate the discourse of a pre-existing party and therefore espouse an ideological identity that is similar to another, it will fail to capture a unique electorate of its own as it will be encroaching on the ideological territory of a larger and/or pre-established rival. If this route is chosen, then the new party will find survival a challenge. This being said, if a new challenger chooses to emphasise a divergent discourse to that of the historic party then it will have better chances of survival. If the new party decides to combine different conceptions of both ideological dimensions to the one occupied by the existing historic extreme right party within its discursive strategic choices then the new party is not encroaching on the electoral territory of the former party and will instead carve out an electorate of its own.

Finally, in order to be successful within a competitive party system, a party must communicate a clear and coherent ideological message to its potential electorate. In other words, a party must choose a dominant emphasis or mode on each of the two ideological
dimensions if the electorate is to understand the ideological cues it is receiving from multiple parties within the same party family. If a party's ideological identity is unclear, for example if it straddles both conceptions of the same ideological dimension, it will be threatened by parties in neighbouring quadrants, rendering its chances of survival weaker.

**Investigating the match between extreme right party ideological identities and the ideological distribution of the electorate**

Within this thesis we try to discover the structuring ideological dimensions that lie at the heart of the extreme right party family. We use the conceptual map in order to investigate their ideological identities by examining the salience of discursive strategic references. However, more importantly, we also assess how the actual and potential electorate perceive the four pillars of extreme right ideology using the analysis of a mass survey. With these two aspects of the research design in mind, we try to ‘match’ the two components in order to evaluate whether there is a match between the discourse of parties and the ideological preferences of the actual and potential extreme right electorate. Here we expect that some combinations of discourse such as ‘populist-reactionary’ that highlight the power of the people over corrupt elites and emphasise nostalgia for the ‘good old days’ will appeal to a broader segment of electorate than that associated with the ‘xenophobic-repressive’ discourse that focuses on isolating immigrants as the root of all societal problems and empowering the state with authoritarian control. Therefore, parties espousing the ‘softer’ elements of the core extreme right ideology are expected to appeal to a greater audience than those preferring to stick to their ‘harder’ traditional reservoir of extreme right discourse. However, this expected outcome is also influenced
by the distribution of the electorate across the four quadrants of extreme right ideology. In some countries, the electorate will be more susceptible to a particular type of discourse than others. Therefore, if the actual target electorate is seduced by a 'harder' type of discourse, then this type of party could also be electorally successful (see 'investigating the match between extreme right party ideological identities and the ideological distribution of the electorate' in this section).

The underlying argument throughout this thesis is that if an extreme right party manages to secure a 'match' between their ideological location and that of their potential electorate this party will be more likely to be electorally successful than other parties in the same party family. If a party fails to capture the ideological preferences of their target electorate within their discourse, then this party will fail to attract viable or sustainable support.

In the following section, we discuss the overarching research design of the thesis and how this framework structures the methodology and the empirical and analytical approach of the dissertation.

2.8 Defining ideological identities via interviews and text analysis of party manifestoes

The conceptual framework at the heart of this thesis revolves around the necessity to empirically and analytically define and locate the positions of the parties within the extreme right ideological universe. In order to fulfil this aim, we propose a conceptual map that will allow us to define each extreme right party and locate its position within the
extreme right ideological universe in relation to their counter-parts not only within the same party system but across European party systems. By analysing the discourse of extreme right parties, we should be able to demonstrate whether (1) they belong to the extreme right family, (2) if yes, which sub-category of extreme right party can they be ascribed to. Each party will be defined by its ideological identity relative to its unique focus on the two structuring dimensions of extreme right ideological discourse. These strategic-discursive choices will impact upon internal party competition and ultimately their electoral success.

In order to substantiate our conceptual map of extreme right ideology, we use extracts and quotes gathered from the interviews of extreme right party elites and leading officials. In chapter four, we highlight the subtleties of each of the four ideological pillars that structure the conceptual map of extreme right ideology by detailing the discourse of the extreme right party leaders we interviewed in France and in the UK. We then test the conceptual map of extreme right ideology by analysing the discourse of extreme right parties through text analysis of their party manifestoes. The text analysis of nine parties in the UK, Germany and France is presented in chapter five. In chapter six, we focus upon one of the major implications that result from the mapping of extreme right party ideology, that is, the dynamics of internal party competition. We argue that the series of strategic-discursive choices that parties have to make in terms of their ideological identity and their unique location within the extreme right ideological space can have serious implications on intra-extreme right party competition when several of them compete for a share of the potential extreme right electorate. In several countries, the emergence of multiple extreme right parties competing for the same vote reservoir has aroused little
attention. The increasing number of parties wishing to fight long-established extreme right competitors to capitalise on a newly discovered electoral reservoir is not surprising.

We pose the question of what renders the emergence of a new party (within a multi-extreme right party context) within a given party system successful. We claim that the reason for the success or failure of multiple extreme right parties must not be solely dependent on their location within the universal left-right continuum let alone on external context, but, instead, on their location within a potential ideological territory that is relevant to the extreme right itself and its potential voters. The relative success of a party will depend upon the distribution of the potential electorate within the extreme right ideological territory. Each quadrant of extreme right ideology will retain different potential electoral pay-offs depending upon the ideological distribution of the electorate across the four pillars created by the two ideological dimensions. In other words, the more or less dispersed a given electorate is on one conception of an ideological dimension, the more or less scope there will be for a happy co-existence between the various extreme right parties in competition.

2.9 Match or mismatch? Survey analysis of extreme right electorates

We now turn to the third part of the study that involves an analysis of the extreme right electorate. We wish to re-examine the discrepancies of the existing literature in a bid to gain a better understanding of the profile of an extreme right voter. In order to reflect the demands of the electorate, extreme right parties will use different strategies to seduce different types of voters. Not unlike other political parties, extreme right parties try to
reach as broad as possible range of voters within their specific ideological catchment area. People who vote for extreme right parties may have varying reasons for doing so (ideological affiliation, strategic voting, protest vote etc) and thus will undoubtedly retain strikingly different characteristics. The final component of this study is to test whether the type of extreme right party has an impact on the level of success that a party can hope to achieve.

Across Europe, parties of the extreme right party family register significantly different electoral records. Some parties manage to harness the potential extreme right vote, while others fail in the task of getting their message across to the voters. In addition, in party systems where there are several parties competing for the potential extreme right vote, some parties are more successful than others. In chapter seven, we start by conducting a brief overview of the electoral success of the nine parties in the UK, Germany and France in order to highlight the relatively successful parties and the parties that are failing to effectively communicate their ideological message to their target electorate. In the second part of the chapter, we analyse the characteristics of potential extreme right voters, which will in turn enable us to evaluate the match between these potential electorates and the positions of the extreme right parties competing in each system. We use the results of the party manifesto analysis to map the locations of the parties themselves. We then compare these findings to the results of a mass survey which illustrates the ideological distribution of the actual and potential electorate.

In summary, this thesis examines the dynamic interaction between (1) the ideological preferences articulated by party leaders and representatives in order to develop the
conceptual map, (2) the ideological identity of each party as a unitary actor via the official discourse embodied by the manifesto, (3) the implications of each party’s ideological identity on patterns of party competition and finally, (4) the match between a party’s ideological position and the ideological distribution of the electorate within the individual party systems.

In the following chapter, we discuss each aspect of the methodology in greater detail, highlighting the specificity of each approach within the research design and model.
Chapter Three

Case Selection and Methodology

Chapter Outline

3.1 Introduction
3.2 Overarching empirical structure and methodology
3.3 Case selection
3.4 Capturing the ideological preferences of extreme right party leaders
3.5 Capturing the official ideological preferences of extreme right parties
3.6 Types of parties and their electoral success
3.7 Summary of methodologies
3.1 Introduction

This chapter describes how we intend to test our conceptual map and its impact on patterns of party competition and the vote by detailing the main methodologies that will be combined. Our research question aims to explore the discourse of extreme right parties in order to map their ideological identities. We wish to investigate the dynamics of the match between extreme right party discourse on the one hand, and voter ideological preferences on the other. During the process of conceptualising the map of extreme right ideology, we considered a variety of different approaches that would address the research question in order to evaluate which particular methods would be most suitable to test our model. In order to capture the specificity of extreme right ideological discourse, we decided to use a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. In this chapter, we describe how our main methodologies will be operationalised and explain the logic that underpins our case selection for the each part of the research design.

3.2 Overarching empirical structure and methodology

The first part of the research design aims to capture the ideological identity of extreme right parties in a comparative and empirical manner by empirically testing the conceptual map of extreme right ideology. We assess the ideological identity of each party by examining the series of strategic-discursive choices they make by analysing their discourse via interviews of party elites and party manifestoes. This will provide us with a typology of extreme right parties based on the two dimensions that structure the ideological discourse of the extreme right party family. In chapter four, we explore the
subtleties of the ideological discourse associated with the two dimensions and its four conceptions by presenting a series of selected quotes from the interviews of extreme right party elites in Britain and France. In chapter five, we use text analysis of party manifestoes in order to test the conceptual map by investigating the main ideological identities of each party by studying their unique locations on the two dimensions. This analysis ascribes each party with an ideological identity and illustrates how each individual party emphasises certain elements of extreme right ideological discourse. We are thus presented with a conceptual map that defines the ideological locations of each party relative to their competitors in their respective party systems. Mapping the ideological location of each party relative to its competitors has obvious implications on the dynamics and strategies of party competition. In chapter six, we thus explore the complex world of extreme right party family party competition and discuss the empirical repercussions of each party's ideological location with respect to their competitor's location and the likely chance of electoral success. In the final empirical chapter, we will examine the electoral success of each party and investigate the match between the ideological location of each party and the distribution of voter ideological preferences within each party system. This combination of approaches and methodologies will allow us to capture these three interactions in a way that is comparative and connectible. Moreover, the superimposition of this combination of quantitative and qualitative methods will enable us to triangulate our findings in order to achieve more robust, generalisable, and meaningful results. Figure 3.1 illustrates the overarching framework of analysis.
In the following section, we discuss the rationale underpinning our choice of cases that we use to test each component of the research design. We have tried to include a variety of parties that differ in terms of electoral success, organisational structure and, of course, have different ideological discourses.

3.3 Case Selection

We chose to focus our empirical analysis within this thesis on three countries: Britain, France and Germany. We chose these three countries for a variety of reasons. We wanted to focus our analysis on countries where several parties belonging to the extreme

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15 As part of a research project directed by Dr. Michael Bruter, we have extended the party manifesto analysis to 20 countries. For the purposes of this thesis, we have concentrated the in-depth analysis to three party systems and therefore nine extreme right parties.
right party family compete within the same party system. As a result, the parties we study are as follows:

- In Britain - the British National Party (BNP), the UK Independence Party (UKIP), and the English Democrats (ED),
- In France - the Front National (FN), the Mouvement pour la France (MPF), and the Mouvement National Républicain (MNR)
- In Germany - the Deutsche Volksunion (DVU), the Republikaner (REP), and the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD).

The variety of parties within three very different party systems will allow us to discover the ideological discourse of each party and how they vary within and across party systems. This diversity of cases will help us to not only understand the ideological specificity of each of the parties in the three different party systems but it will also allow us to gain a deeper insight into the dynamics of multiple extreme right party competition within the defined ideological space of the party family. We have tried to balance the need for variation within and across party systems with the desire to gain in-depth country-specific detail. In choosing parties that vary widely on the dependent variable (level of electoral success) we can minimise the effects of selection bias on causal inferences. The parties we have chosen to analyse vary significantly in terms of their size, style, history, roles within party systems, and structures. It is this broad diversity of cases included in this study that will allow us to improve our overall understanding of the extreme right party family. We have chosen to focus our analysis on parties that are representative of the entire spectrum of success within the party family in Europe:
Germany – weak overall but strong in some specific regions, UK – weak overall but strong in some specific elections, France – strong for a long time but no access to government. Each party system also varies in terms of their historical references and traditions of extreme right politics. For example, in the UK there is no strong governmental tradition, whilst in France, the Vichy experience has been largely dismissed as a ‘parenthesis’ by mainstream parties and politicians, and in Germany, there is the omnipresent legacy of the Nazi regime. Each party will no doubt have different reactions to their particular ideological heritage and this will also frame the ideological message that is interpreted by the electorate. A historical legacy may also impede the electoral advancement of an extreme right party if electoral thresholds or prohibitions are imposed by their respective democratic and constitutional frameworks. We have included cases that retain a variety of electoral and political systems, for example, in terms of electoral systems, we have plurality with a variety of electoral systems (UK), majority (France), mixed (Germany), and in terms of political systems, we have semi-presidential (France) and parliamentarian (UK, Germany); federal (Germany), devolution (UK), and unitary (France) with significant power attributed to the regions. The variation between cases will help us to expose similarities and differences between parties of the extreme right and highlight the ideological specificities of various types of parties within the party family.

Table 3.1 looks at the nine parties in more detail and highlights the variety of parties we have included in our case selection. We were conscious of including some parties that are regarded as traditional or core members of the party family and others that are located on the peripheries or that have been regularly excluded because they are too difficult to define. The French FN is often regarded as a prototypical example of an extreme right
party and the relatively ‘new’ style UKIP has been contrasted to the ‘old’ style of the NPD. By analysing the ideological identity of each party via their manifestoes we do not need to exclude any parties a priori. Our aim is to define the ideological specificity of each party in order to arrive at a definition of each party that is specific to the extreme right party family. This enables us to include a greater variety of parties and allows us to analyse parties such as UKIP, the English Democrats, and the French MPF to see how they distinguish themselves from their competitors.

Table 3.1: Comparison of parties

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>FN</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Presidential elections: two round majority, legislative elections: two round majority (round 1) then plurality (round 2) Proportional Representation for instance European Parliament elections</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2007 4.3%</td>
<td>H:14.9% L:0.2% 1997 1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MNR</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2007 0.4%</td>
<td>H: 1.1% L: 0.4% 2002 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MPF</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2007 1.2%</td>
<td>H: 2.4% L: 0.8% 1997 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>REP</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Mixed system dominated by mixed member proportional representation</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2009 0.1%</td>
<td>H: 2.1% L: 0.1% 1990 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DVU</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2009 1.0%</td>
<td>H: 1.8% L: 0.2% 2005 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NPD</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2009 1.8%</td>
<td>H: 4.3% L: 0.2% 1969 1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Plurality (several electoral systems including general elections) Alternative Voting, and Single Transferable Vote and Proportional Representation for European Parliament elections</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2005 0.7%</td>
<td>H: 3.9% L: 0.5% 2001 1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UKIP</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2005 2.2%</td>
<td>H: 2.3% L: 1.1% 2005 1997</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ED</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2005 0.1%</td>
<td>H: 0.1% L: 0.1% 2005 2005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the next few paragraphs, we provide some detailed information regarding the extreme right party family in each of the countries we have selected to be included in the analysis.

**BRITAIN**

Although the extreme right is electorally weak in Britain compared to other countries in Europe, parties belonging to the extreme right party family have recorded several electoral successes in recent years and have expanded their organisational structure. There are three parties that generally represent the extreme right party family in Britain: the British National Party, the UK Independence Party, and the English Democrats. The next few paragraphs provide a few more details about each of these parties.

The BNP is the main point of reference within the party family and is generally regarded as one of the most under-achieving ‘historic’ European extreme right parties. It regularly struggles to surpass two percent of the votes in national elections despite obtaining substantial local success. The BNP has gradually increased its local representation from 17 to 37 council seats in England. It has also received relative success in recent European Parliament elections. In the June 2004 elections, the party gained 4.9 percent of the vote. The BNP consolidated this success on the European stage in 2009 by obtaining six percent of the vote and two MEPs were returned to Brussels. In terms of organisation, the
BNP has rapidly increased its number of branches across the UK in recent years. Whilst some groups are considerably bigger than others, especially in areas where the BNP is electorally successful, the BNP has made a determined effort over the last few years to increase their local presence across the UK with the establishment of the Regional Development Group. This structure is designed to provide support and offer advice to local members who express a desire to form a regional group. The party has also invested in substantial training programmes for activists including the provision of public speaking courses, advice on managing party accounts and successful fundraising etc. In terms of membership, the BNP claims that their membership has been increasing year on year to 6281 in 2006.

One of the difficulties with parties often deemed to be of the extreme right by the literature is that some of them may also first seem to originally emerge as ‘single issue parties’. Van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie talk of ‘anti-immigration parties’, but similarly the Belgian Vlaams Belang first constructed its ideological platform around the question of Flemish independence and the Italian Lega Nord around the question of Northern separatism from the ‘corrupt’ and poor South. More recently, extreme right discourse seems to have merged with another equally important question, that of European integration. Strongly Eurosceptic parties classified on the extreme right by much of the literature have emerged in countries like Denmark or the Netherlands, but no better example of the confusion exists than UKIP. In the context of UKIP, the question of European integration (or opposition to) seems to be crucial at every level: programmatic (the core slogan of ‘leaving the EU’ has long been the party’s main trademark), symbolic (the ‘pound’ symbol of willing to fight ‘till death’ for the pound against the adoption of
the Euro in the UK) and organisational, with European Parliament elections traditionally being the main ‘rendez vous’ of UKIP and its voters. This strong Eurosceptic identity of UKIP must be born in mind when considering their electoral success in second-order elections such as European Parliament elections.

Supporters of classifying UKIP within the extreme right family suggest that UKIP’s Euroscepticism being an issue variation on its extreme right identity in the same way the Vlaams Belang and Lega Nord twisted the separatist theme to anchor a more global extreme right identity. They point out that UKIP now runs in all major elections and that it has largely diversified its manifesto despite its apparent origins as a single issue party (with proposals on the economy, social welfare, migration, crime, etc). They also point out to personal and intellectual ‘routes’ with other extreme right parties, as embodied by UKIP’s choice of partners in the European Parliament and recent claims that some UKIP members are being approached by organisers of the English Defence League (Guardian article\(^{16}\)). However, some authors also go further and look at voters’ preferences. For instance John, Margetts, and Weir (2004) use evidence from exit polls of the 2004 European and London elections, and a national survey, to examines voters’ likelihood of voting for the major and minor parties, and explore second preferences in the London elections. They argue that the electorate perceives a linkage between the British National party and the UK Independence Party through their perception of the most important policy problem concern about migration from Central Europe. This suggests that UKIP

\(^{16}\) Alan Lake, a former spokesperson for the EDL, is reported to have said that he is exploring a political future for the EDL – and argues it should consider throwing its weight behind the UK Independence party. Magnus Nielsen – a UKIP candidate in the general election – has agreed to speak at forthcoming EDL rallies. Matthew Taylor Article ‘English Defence League: new wave of extremists plotting summer of unrest’ http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/may/28/english-defence-league-protest-bnp accessed 29th May 2010
voters have embraced the ‘broader’ extremist appeal of UKIP and not only its Eurosceptic discourse.\(^{17}\)

Finally, in the context of our model, it should be noted that Euroscepticism as an issue can be alternatively phrased in ‘civic’ populist or ‘cultural’ xenophobic ways. One can resent European integration because it is perceived as a foreign threat to British identity – or even the horse of Troy of ‘globalisation’. These arguments would fully fit with our definition of the ‘xenophobic’ pillar. However, one could instead criticise European integration as a model of bureaucracy, state-like intrusiveness, and technocracy, thereby fully echoing our conception of the ‘populist’ pillar.

Thus, the argument in keeping UKIP within the territory of this investigation does not in any way suggest that UKIP was ‘always’ of the extreme right or that its extreme right identity preceded or superseded it Eurosceptic one, but simply an acknowledgement that in terms of its current ideological breadth as well as its electoral appeal, it is de facto competing within the territory of extreme right electoral politics. Moreover, UKIP, because of its very choice of Europe as its core issue faces in a particularly fascinating way the dilemma of the negative identity dimension that our model portrays.

We believe that we have a unique opportunity here to gain a better understanding of the party’s ideological discourse and therefore we have decided to include it in our analysis in an attempt to settle the debate of whether it should be in or out of the party family.

Over recent years, UKIP has attracted substantial electoral support in the European Parliament elections. As such, UKIP represents the most successful extreme right party (in electoral terms) within Britain. On the back of flamboyant and provocative rhetoric (Kilroy Silk stated ‘we will wreck the European Union18), 2.6 million people (16 percent) voted UKIP in the 2004 European elections. As a result, the party obtained 12 MEPs and gained considerable national visibility. Dismissed by many as a prototypical single-issue party, the party has tried to tackle this by authoring policy papers focusing on immigration, law and order, and crime. Over recent years, the party has managed to double its number of councillors. In the 2009 European Parliament elections, UKIP obtained 16.1 percent, 13 seats, and came second only to the Conservatives. However, as with many parties of the extreme right, there are signs of internal unrest within the party. The charismatic leader and media figure Nigel Farage has stood down from the party leadership to focus on his personal candidacy in the forthcoming general elections. As a consequence, a new leader, Lord Pearson, was appointed after a ballot of party members. He has already attracted attention and caused friction within the party due to his inflammatory comments concerning his statement that the party would disband if the Conservatives promised a referendum on the ratified Lisbon treaty. In terms of organisation, UKIP is now largely structured upon the regions stipulated as constituencies for the purposes of the European Parliament elections (East Midlands, Eastern Counties, London, North East, North West, Scotland, South East, South West, Wales, West Midlands, Yorkshire and Humberside). Despite a number of moderately sized regional branches, there is little presence within local communities except in some of their strongholds in the South West and in the East Midlands. Perhaps as a consequence of

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18 Article (reference 3803599) BBC news online. Please see bibliography for full reference.
their success at the European level, most of the party’s resources and efforts are directed towards the European election campaigns and there is little presence of the party in national and local elections where the party is a victim of the majoritarian two-party system. UKIP is reported to retain an approximate membership of 16000\(^{19}\).

The English Democrats are a small organisation and compete infrequently within elections and focus their discourse on the rights of the English people. In 1997, Robin Tilbrook reformed the defunct English National Party. The party was re-launched as the English Democrats in September 2002 after merging with several small parties (including Reform UK and the New England Party). One of the most remarkable moments in the recent history of the English Democrats was when Peter Davies was elected the Mayor of Doncaster when he obtained the support of 24,244 citizens (50.4% of the vote when first and second preferences were counted) in June 2009. During the campaign he benefitted from a widespread feeling of disillusion and strong anti-corruption sentiment as in recent years twenty-three councilors have been convicted and a further five have been jailed for corruption and fraud. Davies unexpected success also stemmed from the fact that the alternative voting system was used in this particular election. Since his election, however, a vote of no confidence and strong criticism over his proposed policies have left him sidelined as the government appointed a new chief executive and three commissioners to lead the council.

Several leading members of UKIP, including the above mentioned Peter Davies who ran

\(^{19}\) This figure was reported in 2006. Levels of membership are often kept secret within the UK and it is difficult to find reliable and up-to-date information regarding membership levels particularly for small parties and especially for those of the extreme right.
in several elections for UKIP, and a whole branch of UKIP members in West Dorset, have defected to the English Democrats. The party put forward 23 candidates in the elections held on the 6th June 2005 receiving an average 1.5 percent of the vote. It has failed to gain any seats in local elections but came second place in nine constituencies in 2007. In the 2009 European Parliament elections, the English Democrats improved their 2004 performance by 0.7 percent by obtaining 1.8 percent of the vote.

FRANCE

The tradition of extreme right parties in France has long been established. The Front National, led by Jean Marie Le Pen has to some extent dominated the political scene and has over recent years, captured the majority of the extreme right electoral potential. Whilst the FN enjoyed many years of unrivalled success in the 1980s, two other parties emerged within a few years of each to challenge the dominance of the FN. In 1994, the MPF emerged with a predominantly anti-European agenda and a split within the FN created internal fissure and in 1998, the MNR was created as a direct competitor. These three parties are considered to be the main parties of the extreme right party family in France. The following paragraphs provide a few more in-depth details regarding each individual party.

The FN is often referred to as a prototypical example of a successful contemporary European extreme right party. Created in 1972, it was soon taken over by Jean-Marie Le Pen who brought it to its first success in the European elections of 1984. In the general elections of 1986, it took advantage of a one-off proportional representation election to
enter the National Assembly with 9.7 percent and 35 seats. Since then, after a peak in the 2002 Presidential elections where its leader qualified for the second ballot, the Front National has obtained disappointing scores: 10.4 percent in the 2007 Presidential elections followed by even worse under-achievements in the legislative elections of June 2007 and local elections of March 2008. In the 2009 European Parliament elections, the FN obtained 6.3 percent of the vote, down from 9.8 percent in the 2004 elections, which meant that the party lost three MEPs. Over recent years, the French FN has built a well organised party structure that is active in local, regional, national and European elections. As a result, it has progressively won over a loyal and stable electorate. Guiraudon and Schain (2002) note that by the late 1990s, over 90 percent of those who voted for the FN had done so previously. Among those voters, there was a higher level of those who identified with the party than for any party except the Communists. In 2002, 81 percent of those who identified with the FN voted for Le Pen in the Presidential election. Indeed, although the party had some strong regional bases, it was the first or second party of the right in at least 80 percent of the electoral voting districts in France in the said 2002 election. In terms of membership, the FN remains a highly organised party with a strong and influential young members’ organisation - the Front National Jeunes. Candidates for the FN run in virtually every election and their local constituency branches are usually well-organised with fairly active members. Membership of the FN has been estimated at about 40000 – 45000\(^2\).

The Mouvement pour la France (MPF) was founded on 20\(^{th}\) November 1994 and has a marked presence in Vendée. The party is led by Phillippe de Villiers, who was the former

\(^{20}\) CERA Political extremism and the Threat to Democracy in Europe p29
communications minister under Jacques Chirac's administration. The MPF is strongly eurosceptic and campaigns for restrictions on further European integration. As such, the party was highly instrumental in mobilising the NO vote in the 2005 referendum on the proposed European constitution. It is also virulently opposed to Turkey's accession into the European Union. In alliance with Charles Pasqua's Rassemblement pour la France, it contested the 1999 European Parliament elections. As a united front, they obtained 13 seats. In the 2004 European Parliament elections, the MPF decided to break the alliance with the RPF. As a result, the MPF obtained 7.6 percent of the vote and returned three MEPs. During the 2004-2009 European Parliament term, the MPF sat alongside the UK Independence Party in the European parliamentary group named the Independence and Democracy group (IND/DEM). IND/DEM was a grouping of eurosceptic and eurorealist political parties in the 2004-2009 term of the European Parliament. It collapsed however following the 2009 European elections after losing many of its MEPs. After the 2009 European Parliament elections, 18 IND/DEM MEPs from four Member States were elected for the 2009-2014 term (the Seventh European Parliament). The great majority of these seats (thirteen) were from the British UKIP party, with others from the ChristianUnion-Reformed Political Party of the Netherlands, two from the Popular Orthodox Rally of Greece, and one from Libertas France. The group didn't meet the minimum number of members threshold stipulated in the European Parliament's Rules of Procedure. A new group was thus established in July 2009 and was named, Europe of Freedom and Democracy. There are now 32 MEPs from nine different parties including amongst others, the Danish Peoples' Party, the True Finns, the MPF, with UKIP and Lega Nord as the two largest parties within the group.
In the June 2009 European Parliament elections, the MPF scored 4.6 percent of the vote, whilst running under the list of Libertas, a coalition centered upon the MPF, but also including the smaller agrarian Hunting, Fishing, Nature, Tradition party. This result was disappointing for both parties compared to their respective combined 8.0 percent share in 2004. De Villiers was re-elected, becoming the only Libertas MEP elected to the European Parliament. It is estimated that the MPF has currently approximately 20,000 members. The party has a fully fledged charter and organisation, including county-level structures and a youth movement; the Jeunes pour la France.

The MNR was founded in 1998 after a split from the FN by a group of politicians led by Bruno Mégret. The party was intended to become a more ‘modern’ extreme right party than the FN but has failed to develop a fully developed internal organisation. In the June 1999 European parliamentary elections, the MNR, gained a mere 3.3 percent of the vote (575,940 votes), and as a result failed to break the five per cent threshold for sending representatives. It fared relatively well, though, in the March 2001 local, municipal and regional elections and, as such, cannot be easily dismissed. Yet, the growing popularity of the FN rendered the MNR helpless as it lost control of its remaining stronghold Vitrolles (Bouches-du-Rhône) in an election in October 2002. In the 2007 general elections, it only managed to run in 430 of the 577 constituencies, had no MP elected and obtained a mere 0.8 percent of the vote. In the 2009 European Parliament elections, the MNR showed no signs of recovery, scoring a meagre 0.5 percent of the vote, suggesting that the party cannot escape the dominant shadow of the larger FN.

GERMANY
The German extreme right party family has a long historic foundation. The three main parties competing for a share of the extreme right vote consist of the NPD, the DVU and Die Republikaner. The NPD is the oldest of the three parties and has existed in various forms for over forty years. The DVU is a relatively newer party, with a strong presence in the East of Germany. Die Republikaner, a splinter party formed after a few members split from the Bavarian CSU, was the first German party to receive any substantial electoral success, which came in the noted 1989 European Parliament elections. In the following few paragraphs, we turn to look at each party in a bit more detail.

The NPD was founded in 1964 and has had a somewhat persistent presence in German politics since then. Whilst the Constitutional Court has classified the party as a threat to the constitutional order, most cases have failed due to lack of evidence and infiltrations. The party has never managed to surpass the minimum five percent of votes in Federal elections that allows a party to send delegates to the Bundestag, but it managed to gain representation in several state parliaments in the 1960s. More recently, the NPD won 9.2 percent of the votes (12 representatives to the state parliament) in the 2004 state election in Saxony. This result came after an agreement of non-competition with its major rival, the DVU. The NPD had 5,300 registered party members in 2004. In the 2005 Federal elections, the NPD received 1.6 percent of the vote nationally. It garnered the highest percent of votes in the states of Saxony (4.9 percent), Thuringia (3.7 percent), Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania (3.5 percent), and Brandenburg (3.2 percent). In most other states, the party won around one percent of the total votes cast. In the recent 2009 federal elections, the NPD obtained 1.8 percent of the vote.
The DVU was established by publisher Gerhard Frey as an informal association in 1971 and established as a party in 1987. Financed by its leader, the multimillionaire publisher of extreme right documents and artefacts from Munich, the DVU has been classified by the Verfassungsschutz as an openly extremist right-wing and anti-Semitic organisation. As such, it is considered to be one of the most openly approving of Fascist ideology of all the European extreme right parties. In terms of electoral success, the party has never really achieved any major electoral breakthrough. In the 2003 municipal elections, the DVU obtained 8.4 percent of the vote in Bremerhaven (an increase of 2.1 percent), which gave it four seats in the council assembly. With the help of the aforementioned non-competition agreement with the NPD, the DVU managed to surpass the electoral threshold in Brandenburg with 6.1 percent of the vote. They also won 1.6 percent of the vote in the federal elections of 2005. More recently, in the 2009 elections, the DVU gained 1.0 percent of the vote in the national election and only managed to secure 0.4 percent in the European Parliament elections of the same year.

The Republikaner was founded in 1983 by several former CSU members. In the 1980s, the Republikaner obtained several seats in the European Parliament as well as in Baden-Württemberg (the party’s traditional strong-hold). Whilst the party enjoyed some brief success in the early 1990s, it has not managed to recapture similar electoral successes since. In the 1980s, the Republikaner obtained several seats in the European Parliament as well as in the parliament of the German state Baden-Württemberg. In October 1999 council elections, the REP won seats in one third of Berlin's boroughs. But at the national level, it has proved hard for any of the German extreme right parties to tackle the five
percent electoral threshold. In the 2002 general election, it remained under the two percent level. In the 2005 federal elections, the REP received 0.6 percent of the total vote, with strongest showings in the Rhineland-Palatinate and Baden-Württemberg, yet gaining a mere 1.1 percent of the vote. The NPD and the DVU have offered the REP a chance to join their electoral alliance, but the REP leaders refused any cooperation with these parties. However, a local leader of the REP sabotaged her own party's registration for the Saxony state elections, to the benefit of the NPD. The REP was then plagued by a period of harsh in-fighting and back-stabbing over the question of whether or not to join forces with the NPD. In the 2005 federal elections, the REP received 0.6 percent of the total votes cast nationally. Its strongest showing was in the states of Rhineland-Palatinate and Baden-Württemberg. In each of these states, the REP received a mere 1.1 percent of the vote. More recently, in the 2009 elections, whilst the Republikaner obtained a meagre 0.1 percent of the vote in the national elections, they did slightly better in the European Parliament elections with 1.3 percent of the vote. However, this result was down 0.6 percent from its 2004 electoral performance.

We have seen from the discussion above that the parties we have chosen to study here are varied in terms of their size, profiles, history and their electoral appeal. We believe that this variety of parties will allow us to capture the specificity of their ideological identities and further our understanding of the extreme right party family in general. We now turn our attention to the specific procedures of each approach and methodology that we will use to test each component of our conceptual map. In the next section, we outline the main details of each approach and method and explain how each aspect of the research design reinforces the conceptual framework that lies at the heart of this thesis.
3.4 Capturing the ideological preferences of extreme right party leaders

Understanding the specificity of extreme right ideology is one of the main objectives of this thesis. We aim to capture the essence of extreme right ideology by investigating the various strategic-discursive choices each party makes within their discourse. To do this, we need to draw a distinction between the official unitary ideological position of parties, usually expressed by their manifesto or party programme on the one hand, and the ideological preferences of party leaders, who may diverge – more or less significantly from the party’s official platform on the other. In many ways, models of ideological heterogeneity of parties’ representatives are implicitly and intuitively conceived by Miller and Stokes (1963). Both because of their own individual ideological specificities, and of their perceptions of the preferences of their electorate (conceived quite literally in Miller and Stokes’s work, possibly more broadly here), party leaders will develop their own sets of ideological and policy preferences. These preferences may include some similarities with the core ideological corpus of the party but will also probably retain some divergence or specific emphasis.

While much analysis – starting with Miller and Stokes’ 1958 data, which deals with members of the same institution in a context of low partisan discipline – focuses on the individual preferences of party leaders and representatives, there are also reasons to believe that institutional learning will lead to systematic differences of preferences according to the intra-partisan and extra-partisan structures of reference of party leaders (see for example Rohrschneider, 1996). For instance, the European Parliament
representatives of an extreme right party may well share certain ideological preferences
due to their own electoral situation, the types of debates taking place in the European
legislature, and the types of colleagues they want to argue against (Déloye and Bruter,
2008). By contrast, national level leaders with hopes of national parliamentary positions
or even cabinet portfolios may be marked by other types of influences, and the same, in
different ways, could be said of local and regional leaders both as a whole and vis-à-vis
each other. Finally, Bruter and Harrison (2009) show that young party members in
general are quite different in their preferences and positioning from older party members,
and here again, we may expect the same to be true of young extreme right leaders
responsible for the parties’ young party organisations, students’ unions, or simply
representing the 18-25 or 18-30 generations.

For all these reasons, this thesis will try to gauge as accurately as possible the ideological
preferences of European, national, regional and local level representatives in order to
substantiate our proposed conceptual map of extreme right ideology. Unlike parties (as a
unitary actor) that officially ‘speak’ through their manifestoes and other documents, there
is no unified corpus of published material representing the preferences of individual party
leaders or representatives. Of course, if one was only interested in the most prominent
national level leaders, such as the party chairs, it would be possible to rely on speeches
and addresses, but the same could not be said of less visible leaders, for instance at the
local or regional level, let alone of young party leaders. Instead, to establish leaders’
strategic-discursive true preferences in a comparable way, one has essentially a choice
between ad hoc surveys or interviews. A survey would be tempting insofar as it would
allow us to use a completely equivalent pattern to measure the preferences of all the

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leaders and representatives targeted. However, it would also raise some significant problems both methodologically and practically. Methodologically, authors such as Wodak (2008) suggest that rhetoric and discursive preferences are far better captured by interviews or text than they are by surveys, which, in comparison, are relatively ‘dry’ pieces of textual evidence.

Considering the problems associated with the use of multiple open-ended questions in surveys (Sudman and Bradburn, 1982), it would also be extremely difficult to capture the spontaneous strategic-discursive emphasis of party leaders. Instead, one would have to predominantly use ‘leading’ questions which would be very hard to compare with the totally different exercise of manifesto design, whereby, obviously, no social scientist plays the role of a ‘questioner’. Finally, in practical terms, the well known dislike of many extreme right politicians of any exercise which could be used ‘against them’ would make a survey an extremely suspicious tool of data gathering in their eyes. By contrast, interviews leave respondents the ‘space’ they need to express their preferences quite freely. In the context of semi-structured interviews, as the ones chosen here, it is also possible to combine the capture of spontaneous, unprompted preferences, with that of more targeted ones which can be ‘chased’ by the interviewer. This allows us to first let respondents express their priorities entirely in their own words, before systematically capturing their preferences with regards to the two components of each of the two strategic-discursive dimensions on which our conceptual framework is based upon.

We chose to focus our case selection for the face-to-face interviews on two countries: Britain and France. Focusing on two cases enabled us to concentrate our efforts on four
parties that represent each quadrant of our ideological map. We were therefore able to conduct a relatively large number of interviews across different regions and levels of representation. In terms of sampling, elites are by definition a limited number, so it is sometimes difficult to obtain a sufficient number of respondents. As we wanted to recruit respondents from a sample of leaders and activists of parties belonging to the extreme right party family, we were also aware that members may feel reluctant to volunteer or cooperate with our requests for interviews in fear of being ‘trapped’ or ‘tricked’ into saying something that can be used against them. In terms of case selection, we tried to include representatives in local (BNP and UKIP), regional and national (UKIP, BNP, FN and MPF) office, representatives at the European level (UKIP, FN and MPF) and across all levels of responsibility, whether it be a leader of the youth organisation or an elected Member of the European Parliament. We wanted a mix of female and male respondents, a variety of different ages (young, middle-aged, and older members) and, a variety of geographical areas (villages, towns, and cities, urban and rural). We systematically targeted leaders and representatives including national level leaders, including party heads and deputy-heads, ministers, MPs, and/or members of national party executives; members of the European Parliament; regional and local level representatives such as members of regional or local assemblies, heads of branches or national/regional organisations; and finally, leaders of young party organisations at the national, regional or local level. We tried to ensure that we obtained a well-balanced case selection interviewing respondents from small and big branches, where groups were highly active and where there was low levels of activism, respondents that lived in rural areas and those

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21 Many parties have experienced infiltrations. Several undercover journalists, for example, have infiltrated the BNP and have exposed the members and internal documentation. There is therefore a high level of security and in most cases we had to gain clearance from the parties HQ in order to interview individuals within the party.
who lived in urban settings, as well as interviewing both genders and a wide range of age
groups and socio-economic backgrounds.

Initial contact was made with a senior party leaders or officials within each of the parties
(MEPs, local, regional, national representatives, branch leaders etc) in order to
‘officialise’ the research credentials and gain clearance from party personnel to conduct
interviews with party leaders and officials. Whilst we did encounter a few problems
regarding access to some individuals, most of the respondents we did interview were
extremely helpful and very informative. Most of the respondents were a little weary
initially but after we assured them of the anonymity of the research and that the findings
were for purely academic purposes, the majority of the interviewees were happy to
expand upon their beliefs and opinions. The interview transcripts of each respondent were
rendered anonymous with numerical references assigned to each party. There are
obviously risks of biased or selective reporting when analysing the interview transcripts
but we endeavoured to minimise the effect of this upon our discussion of the interviews in
chapter four.

In total, we interviewed 92 extreme right party leaders and officials across the four parties
((UKIP = 28 interviews, BNP = 24, FN = 21, and MPF = 19). Only a few people refused
to participate in the interviews. The interviews were conducted at a place convenient to
the respondent and ranged from meeting in cafes, bars, homes or local/branch offices. The
length of the interviews varied depending on the time made available by the interviewees
and the level of elaboration of their answers, but was typically of one hour thirty minutes
to two hours. Less than 10 percent of interviews lasted under an hour, and less than 10 percent lasted over two hours thirty minutes.

We decided to use semi-structured interviews for three main reasons: 1) a mixture of closed but mainly open-ended questions gave the respondents latitude to fully articulate their responses as this type of question provides a greater opportunity for respondents to organize their answers within their own frameworks rather than that of the interviewer\textsuperscript{22}, 2) having an interview protocol with set themes of questions was important in order to maximize response validity across countries and parties, 3) respondents tend to be more open and honest if they are not put in the straightjacket of close-ended questions. They prefer to articulate their views, explaining why they think what they think. This was an important consideration for us as we suspected that most of our respondents would want to 'justify' their views and opinions to us. Moreover, we were aware that some of the respondents assumed that we were going to 'trap' them into saying things or misinterpreting them during the interviews. This semi-structured design and specifically the second part of the interview that focused on the four conceptions of the two ideological dimensions allowed us to capture the ideological preferences of extreme right party elites.

We followed an interview template that outlined the general themes in the first part and the second part was guided by the four ideological components of the conceptual map in order to ensure as much comparative analysis as possible. The two sections were not obvious to the interviewees but served as a mere transition point from the spontaneous

\textsuperscript{22} In semi-structured interviews, questions or themes are normally pre-specified before the interview according to specific hypotheses but the interviewer is freer to probe beyond the answers in a manner which would appear prejudicial to the aims of standardisation and comparability. This structure encourages the interviewer to pragmatically change the structure of the interview through developing open-ended questions. This technique is by far the most commonly applied in elite interviewing.
introduction of the interview to the more structured second part that focused on the ideological components of the conceptual map. The first part of the interview was largely spontaneous. The respondents were asked about their political involvement and their own objectives as a party leader/official. We also asked direct questions about their story of joining the party - when, how, why etc in order to find out more about the way in which they frame their decision to join the party. We inquired about the impact of friends and family - were they recruited? Did a friend or family member persuade them to join? Have they convinced others to join their party? We were also interested in finding out how others perceived their decision to join the party in question, for example, were they supportive or critical of them? This first section was aimed at easing the respondent into the interview in a bid to make them feel comfortable about talking about their political activism and 'their individual story' of membership. The first part of the interview is not presented in this thesis as we have chosen to focus the analysis on just the ideological component that was directly related to the research question\textsuperscript{23}. The interview template is reproduced in appendix C.

Following these relatively unstructured sections, we would prompt the respondents to detail their preferences or ideological stances on dimensions corresponding to the strategic-discursive elements detailed in the conceptual map of extreme right ideology. For instance, with regards to the reactionary end of the authoritarianism dimension, they would be asked if they think that society used to be a better place to live in forty years ago, etc. By contrast, they would also be asked if they thought that crime should be a higher priority and whether they believe that the state should be willing to intervene more

\textsuperscript{23} We will use the findings of the first section of the interview in a separate article that will shed light upon the 'story' of joining an extreme right party.
directly in people’s lives when they seem to act against the interest of the nation and the broader public interest. This section always remained semi-structured, so that we could use different types of formulations depending on what the respondent had already mentioned earlier and the way the discussion was going. In practical terms, we felt that it would be extremely difficult to obtain in-depth and robust answers from respondents using a recorder during the interviews, especially considering the suspicion with which our requests for interviews with extreme right party elites were met. We therefore took extensive handwritten notes throughout all of the interviews. This practice of note taking is preferred by large segments of the literature as it often provides a better quality of answers without significant loss of reliability (Bruter, 2005; Page & Wright, 2005). This creates lower levels of self-censorship and decreases the risk of deception as widely evidenced by the existing literature24. As we have stated earlier, our research design allows us to superimpose our methods and approaches in order to triangulate our findings. Therefore, we will use quote extracts from the interviews to substantiate our proposed conceptual map and corroborate our findings from the text analysis of party manifestoes in chapter five in order to map the ideological identity of each party.

3.5 Capturing the official ideological preferences of extreme right parties

Uncovering the ideological identities of extreme right parties lies at the heart of our model. We propose to do this by analysing their ideological discourse via their party

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24 We chose to only interview leaders of extreme right parties rather than to compare extreme right party leaders with non extreme right party leaders) as this was dictated by our research question which focuses solely on this group. The objective was to specifically focus on the strategic discursive preferences of extreme right party leaders and officials. Whilst we acknowledge that interviews of extreme right party elites should not be taken at face value and we should regard the findings with due caution, we believe these interviews will provide valuable insight into the hearts and minds of elites that we otherwise know little about.
manifestoes. As we have seen in chapter two and in line with the existing literature, we believe that manifestoes are a suitable proxy in determining the official ideological positioning of extreme right parties. A majority of the traditional party literature chooses to view parties as unitary actors. Whilst the assumption that political parties would accurately aggregate the multiple preferences of its members is obviously too simplistic and unrealistic, the most intuitive way of legitimising the unitary assumption is to consider that in many political systems, particularly in Europe where parliamentary government remains the norm, voters can associate to some extent a unified set of preferences with each of the parties that compete for their vote.

There are obviously many ways of conceptualising this unified set of preferences, and from the point of view of the voters, many rational and subjective perceptions alike may come into play when it comes to assessing a party’s positions. However, the vast majority of party specialists agree that the closest thing to an official account of a given party’s set of ideological preferences is represented by their manifesto. Party programmes are officially endorsed by the leaders and members of the party through party conference and they represent the external image of the party to its potential electorate. Manifestoes, thus, have a predominantly external orientation (Flohr, 1968). Nevertheless, they ‘represent and express the policy collectively adopted by the party’ (Borg, 1966). Whilst manifestoes have an undoubtedly moderate façade as they are designed to attract potential voters, these official documents can offer important insights into the strategic-discursive choices made by extreme right parties. Fleck and Müller (1998) suggest that a more

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25 In other aspects of our research, we analyse a variety of textual data that includes party-directed press releases, campaign material and posters, and information on party websites

26 Borg, 1966:97
radical backstage exists behind the seemingly ‘moderate’ external showcase of the party programmes. However, we argue that these documents will allow us to uncover the ideological identity of each party via the emphasis they place on certain conceptions of the extreme right discourse to their style and rhetoric. This corresponds to a certain exercise of self-definition that every party is expected to embrace when deciding upon their strategic-discursive choices. Therefore, we consider party manifestoes as the best possible proxy for the official unitary positioning of an extreme right party. Moreover, as we have stated earlier in this chapter, we will triangulate our findings throughout the thesis in order to validate our analysis and combination of methods. In this sense, we can use the interviews of party elites to reaffirm the ideological identity of each party as this will provide a ‘backstage’ insight into the preferences of the internal organisation.

In terms of data collection, we gathered the most recent party manifestoes across the three countries: for the FN, MNR, and MPF we used the manifestoes produced in 2007 and for the BNP and UKIP the 2005 General Election Manifestoes and a revised 2006 manifesto for the English Democrats. For the German parties, we used the 2006 DVU, 2005 NPD and the 2002 Republikaner manifestoes. Each manifesto varied in terms of length, style and date according to how often the parties rewrite or change them. Table 3.2 illustrates the details of each of the documents we used for the text analysis.
Table 3.2: Details of party documentation used for text analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Length (in words)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FN</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>29820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPF</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>19175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNR</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>23856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DVU</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPD</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>21646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REP</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>8456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>24723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKIP</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>8918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English Democrats</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>11079</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All documents were manifestoes published for general election campaigns.

As we can see from the table, some of the manifestoes were extremely short (for example in the case of the DVU), whilst others were considerably longer (the FN programme was over 100 pages long). The German Republikaner’s programme has not been updated since 2002, whilst the French Parties revised their manifestoes in preparation for the 2007 Presidential election campaigns. In addition, many of the parties author publications that emphasise certain policy proposals or specific campaigns. All of the manifestoes were accessible on-line and were available for public download. The websites of these parties are an important point of contact with the general public, activists and potential voters.

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27 For example, UKIP has a special pamphlet on Europe and have several ‘policy papers’ that range from issues such as immigration to crime and ID cards. Most of the parties also author material especially for the European parliament elections but we chose to focus on the national election material to avoid skewing the results with a ‘European’ bias.

28 Contemporary parties of the extreme right party family often rely upon the internet as the natural medium for their communication. As a consequence, their websites are often very interactive and professional. The BNP has recently revamped its website and now includes an interactive forum where members and the general public alike can join discussion groups, watch BNP TV, buy merchandise from T-shirts to mugs, listen to music by extremist bands, or, indeed, read the press releases and commentary on news or BNP forthcoming events.
In order to study the specific variations in discursive patterns across parties and party systems, we realised that the design must be tailored to the specificities of the extreme right party family. There was little existing data that we could utilise for the purpose of studying the discursive strategies of extreme right parties across countries. In terms of existing data, the Comparative Manifesto Project was not suitable for our research design because it only included some of the parties classified as extreme right. In addition, the framework used in the Comparative Manifestoes Project is structured along traditional left-right scales and focuses on policy not ideological dimensions, which we felt was inappropriate for our study as our foci of interest would almost universally be placed at the most extreme position on the scale. Therefore, we decided to construct our own database on the ideological preferences of extreme right parties.

We chose to use text analysis to digest the content of the party manifestoes. This method is regarded to be ‘a systematic, replicable technique for compressing many words of text into fewer content categories based on explicit rules of coding’ (Stemler, 2001) and coincides with the specifications of our research design. Computer-assisted content analysis offers a way to surmount the difficulties of traditional content analysis, while at the same time producing results that are entirely consistent with it (Allum, 1998). Using software such as Nvivo enables the researcher to analyse vast amounts of text quickly and cheaply (Laver, Benoit et al., 2002). This method has recently captured the attention and imagination of political scientists such as Gabel and Huber (2000); Laver and Garry (2000); Garson, (2002); Laver and Benoit (2002) and has received well-deserved praise. This type of text analysis involves applying a coding framework to the text or discourse that is to be analysed and words/word families are highlighted and counted.
For this aspect, we have chosen a quantitative analysis of word counts rather than a qualitative discourse analysis as we wanted to capture the salience of each word category within the four pillars of extreme right ideology. This allows us to evaluate the individual word scores of each conception of the two ideological dimensions. In terms of procedure, we are primarily interested in the substance of the text. We wanted to gauge the salience of the four strategic discursive pillars that we have outlined in our conceptual map of extreme right ideology. The use of content analysis of discourse will enable us to examine how particular arguments are constructed, highlight issue salience, or indeed, remark upon the absence of certain themes. It will also provide us with an opportunity to scrutinise emerging patterns and trends within the discourse, whilst recording the rhetoric in a comparative, systematic and comparable way.

The conceptual map of extreme right ideology is crucial to the explanatory strategy of this thesis as we wish to explain some of the variation in electoral success by defining the sub-types of parties that exist within this specific party family. Insights into extreme right party ideology and discourse derived from the existing literature combined with the findings of the interviews with extreme right party leaders enabled us to construct a tailor-designed coding frame in order to scrutinise the official partisan discourse of each party. In the pilot study, we extended the analysis of party manifestoes to include all of the mainstream parties in each system\(^29\). This expansion of the analysis allowed us to highlight the specificities of the extreme right discourse in each party system, thus,

\(^29\) We tested the specificity of the word categories we had assigned to the coding framework of the extreme right parties by running text analysis on the main right-wing and main left-wing parties within each of the three party systems. The results are reported in chapter five.
eliminating any risk of misinterpreting the results; avoid reporting artefacts of the party system, political culture, etc.

Using the four conceptions of the two ideological dimensions as core themes, we allocated words, word families and word categories to the four types of extreme right discourse (civic conception of negative identity — populism, cultural conception of negative identity — xenophobia, social conception of authoritarianism — reactionary, and finally the institutional conception of authoritarianism — repressive).

Our framework of analysis is designed to capture the substance of the text, that is, the salience given to the four strategic-discursive pillars and how these discourses interact and compare to one another. The manifestoes were blindly triple-coded. The coders read all twelve manifestoes and suggested word lists that were considered to be representative of the two dimensions (negative identity - in the forms of populism and xenophobia, and authoritarianism - in the forms of reactionary and repressive) that lie at the heart of extreme right ideology. The three multilingual lists were then compared. Both the lists of words were attached to a relevant pillar, and their coding (i.e. which pillar they fit in) had reliability of over 95 percent. The other five percent were discussed, and final coding decisions agreed on which remaining few words should be retained and how, and which excluded because of their ambiguity.

In total, we obtained a list of 827 words that were then collapsed into 509 word categories representing the two dimensions and four pillars of extreme right ideology. References to
these words and word categories\textsuperscript{30} were coded manually and critically. For example, if a word appeared that was on the list of word categories but was used in a completely different context, we ruled that it should be excluded from the total count. As an example of how the coding was conducted, we have selected a section of text from the BNP's 2005 General Election manifesto. The extract below highlights how we coded the words and assigned them to one of the four ideological pillars.

\begin{quote}
It is the "average" man and woman who suffers from the failings of our politicians to grasp the issue and restore genuine democracy.
\end{quote}

In the above passage, we coded the italicised words and assigned them to the populist pillar as they refer to discourse embodied by the civic conception of the negative identity dimension. With regards to the extract below, we coded the emboldened text as discourse related to the xenophobic pillar of the negative identity dimension. Again, the italicised words refer to the coding of the populist pillar.

\begin{quote}
The British peoples are embroiled in a long term cultural war being waged by a ruling regime which has abandoned the concept of "Britain" in pursuit of globalisation. We are determined to win that cultural war, and to that end, we must take control of our national borders.
\end{quote}

The word occurrences were systematically registered. We then counted the total word occurrences for each pillar and each party and expressed them as comparable proportions of word occurrences. Our first measure expressed the coded words as proportions of the total words in each programme. This, however, is a linguistically unrealistic tool of comparison to the extent that English, German, and French are languages with very

\textsuperscript{30} Words and word categories across parties and countries were conceived to be equivalent rather than a mere translation. For example, 'Saxons' in the British case was treated as equivalent to 'Gaulois' in the French context, while 'Wales' was balanced out by 'Corsica'.

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different proportions of wasted purely 'grammatical' words. French and German use a far
greater proportion of prepositions, articles, etc. than the English language. We thus
created a second count which expressed each word occurrence as a proportion of the total
valid words in each programme, that is, the total words excluding neutral grammatical
items. We used this count when we required comparisons of gross word occurrences in
the parties' discourse. Finally, we created a third count, which expressed word
occurrences as a proportion of the total coded words. That is, the proportion of the
'ideological' words used by a given party that fit the xenophobic component of the
negative identity dimension and its populist component, the reactionary component of the
authoritarianism dimension and its repressive counterpart. This third, relative count is the
one we use in the analysis when comparing the different types of parties within the
extreme right party family. In the next section, we introduce the third component of the
research design, which involves the analysis of the ideological positioning of each party
and the relative match between this and the ideological distribution of the actual and
potential extreme right electorate in each of the three party systems.

3.6 Types of Parties and their Electoral Success

As we have seen from the previous chapters, the extreme right party family offers a full
spectrum of examples of electoral successes and failures. In the third empirical
component of the research design, we investigate the match between the ideological
identities of the parties and the ideological distribution of the electorate within each of the
three party systems. The series of strategic-discursive choices that each party has to make
in order to determine its ideological identity can impact upon their chance of survival against competitors (as we shall see in chapter six) and can also determine their electoral fortune. We expect that some types of parties will attract larger shares of the electorate as their ideological identity will ‘match’ a larger proportion of the potential extreme right vote. For example, the ideological distribution of the electorate in a given party system may be more or less susceptible to one of the four conceptions of the extreme right ideology. Therefore, it would be logical to assume that the party that has chosen an ideological identity that mimics the ideological distribution of the electorate will be the best placed to obtain higher levels of electoral success. Apart from the first section on electoral results, chapter seven, which deals with voters’ ideological preferences across the four pillars of extreme right ideology, is based on the results of a mass survey conducted in June 2009 during the week that followed the European Parliament elections.

The survey was conducted as part of a project on European identity and citizenship directed by Dr. Michael Bruter. The survey was conducted by the survey company Opinium and their partners using a total sample of 31,269 cases across the 27 member states of the European Union, and mixed methodologies (internet, face to face, and telephone/CATI). Quota samples were used for the internet-based samples, and randomisation for the face-to-face and telephone samples. The questions on extreme right voting were asked in eight countries: Austria, Belgium (French and Dutch speaking sub-samples), Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Romania, and United Kingdom (Great Britain and Northern Ireland sub-samples). The samples used for each of these countries

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31 This project entitled ‘Feeling European? Citizens’ European Identity and Parties’ Vision on the Future of EU Citizenship’ was financed by the Economic and Social Research Council. Grant reference number RES-062-23-1838.
were as follows: Austria: 1006, Belgium (French speaking): 813, Belgium (Dutch speaking): 1201, Denmark: 1001, France: 2000, Germany: 2010, Italy: 2000, Romania: 1013, UK (Britain): 2054, and UK (Northern Ireland): 100.

We selected a few specific questions that are related to the ideological distribution of the extreme right electorate (see appendix D). The results are analysed in chapter seven. The survey questions we focus our analysis on are as follows:

Two formulations of the dependent variable:

(1) Vote choice: two questions asked respondents which party they voted for in the recent European Parliament elections, and which party they would vote for if a general election (or equivalent depending on the country) took place next week. Respondents were first asked if they had voted (would vote) (alternatives included not being able to vote and abstaining), and then for which party. The results of the two questions were indexed in order to create a single extreme right variable coded 0-2, where 0 means that the respondent did not/would not vote for any of the extreme right parties competing in his/her party systems in either European or general elections, 1 means that the respondent either voted for an extreme right party in the recent European elections but would not in forthcoming general elections or the other way round, and 2 means that the respondent both voted for an extreme right party in the recent European elections, and would do so again in forthcoming general elections.
(2) Propensity to vote: the survey used the propensity to vote questions used by Cees van der Eijk, Mark Franklin, and their colleagues in recent European Elections Studies. These questions ask respondents how likely it is that they would ever vote for party X in the future and repeats the question for each of the main parties in competition in the respondent’s party system. In this specific case, the question also asked respondents about their propensity to vote for each of the extreme right parties included in the analysis. The question used a 0-10 scale.

In addition, a series of questions was used to capture respondents’ placement on each of the four pillars of extreme right ideology. The measures used agreement scales asking respondents to what extent they agreed with eight different statements, two statements per each conception of the four pillars of extreme right ideology: the reactionary, repressive, xenophobic, and populist conceptions.

The two ‘reactionary’ questions measured agreement with one statement suggesting that their country was a better place to live in 20 years ago than today, and another claiming that their national values and cultural heritage are not sufficiently respected by the young generations.

The two repressive statements asserted that criminals are not punished with sufficient severity in our society, and that the state should be stronger to guarantee order.
The two xenophobic statements claimed that there are too many foreigners and immigrants living in our society, and that some ethnic minorities do not respect the national traditions sufficiently.

Finally, the two populist statements declared that politicians do not care much about the interests of ordinary citizens in their country, and that there is still quite a lot of corruption and dishonesty amongst the national elites.

In the analysis, we used both actual average placement on each scale and how these scores fit relative to the mean of the eight countries. We used the means and standard deviations to compare how citizens are ideologically distributed on each of the four pillars of extreme right ideology, on average, across and within each country, how these pillar placements vary according to the propensity to vote for extreme right parties as well as the actual decision to vote for them in European and/or national elections.

3.7 Summary of methodologies

The study of political programmes is a central component of our research design but alone it is not sufficient in determining the ‘true’ ideological core of extreme right parties or to answer the question of which parties differ in their discourse. In the analysis of party programmes, we should at least expect to find some evidence of the underlying themes of extreme right ideology but the terminology and discourse may be sufficiently cautious or ambiguous so as to attract a wider audience than if it was overtly racist or decidedly xenophobic in style. In order to gain a deeper insight into the ideology of the extreme
right, we feel it is necessary to speak to the representatives of the parties. Through face-to-face interviews, we will be able to pick up on themes that are usually left out of party manifestoes such as authoritarian-style leadership, attacks upon parliamentary democracy, etc. Gathering information from the varied official party documentation in addition to that of the material gained from the interviews, we should be in a better position to make inferences about the ideology and discourse of the extreme right parties we are including in our study. Moreover, the third empirical component investigates the match between the ideological identity of each party and the ideological distribution of the electorate within each particular party system. This final aspect of the analysis will allow us to triangulate the findings gathered from the previous chapters and assess whether the current ideological locations of extreme right parties in Britain, France and Germany are indeed in tune with the ideological preferences of their potential and actual electorate.
Chapter Four

The Conceptual Map and Extreme Right Elites

Chapter Outline

4.1 Introduction

4.2 Interviewing extreme right party elites

4.3 The authoritarianism dimension

4.4 The negative identity dimension

4.5 Summary
4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, we will refine the conceptual map that lies at the heart of this thesis by confronting it to and enriching it with the ideological discourse of extreme right party leaders. As explained in chapter three, we conducted a significant number of interviews of party leaders from UKIP and the BNP in the United Kingdom, and the FN and the MPF in France (the full interview protocol is also detailed in chapter three). Consequently, this chapter is based on the corpus of data thus gathered, which will be analysed both in terms of its general trends and using specific excerpts and quotations.

This qualitative exercise serves several important goals. First, it provides a way of verifying on the basis of semi-structured discussions whether the pillars detailed in our conceptual map make sense, flesh them out, and tie them to the reality of an everyday political discourse held by those who, in many ways, represent the voice of their parties. This discursive illustration of the ideology at the heart of extreme right parties will thus help us to substantiate the four main quadrants embodied in our conceptual map. Whilst this chapter looks into the details of the two ideological dimensions and draws upon examples extracted from the interviews, it is also an extremely important pre-requisite to understanding the full meaning of the findings of the following chapter in which we test the conceptual map of extreme right ideology by analysing the 'official' discourse encapsulated within the party manifestoes of extreme right parties in the UK, France and Germany.\footnote{The importance of studying the discourse contained within the party manifestoes and conducting the interviews with leaders and members of the parties in question is underlined when it is apparent that there are significant differences in what the voters are voting for and what the members think and believe in. In Klandermans’ and Mayer’s study of extreme right activists (2006) their findings confirm this disparity.}
In this chapter, we use the two case studies of France and Britain to illustrate some of the main ideological references that represent the conceptual map of extreme right ideology. We conducted a series of elite interviews with four parties: the British National Party, the United Kingdom Independence Party, the French Front National, and the Mouvement Pour la France. These parties represent some of the most interesting cases of intra-country rivalry within the extreme right party family with all parties competing in major elections. In addition, as we shall confirm in the next chapter, these parties represent different aspects of the extreme right ideological spectrum and each party has a very different story to tell in terms of electoral success. In total, we conducted 92 interviews across the four parties (UKIP = 28 interviews, BNP = 24, FN = 21, and MPF = 19).

In the next section, we describe who we selected to interview from the parties. Whilst we provide a few details here regarding the interview protocol, the full briefing of the methodology is contained within chapter three.

4.2 Interviewing extreme right party elites

As detailed in chapter three, we decided to interview a selection of party leaders from each of the four parties because we wanted to add a qualitative dimension to the testing of our conceptual map. We felt that if we were to rely purely on the quantitative analysis of the official party discourse contained within their manifestoes we would be overlooking and missing out on a crucially important facet of extreme right discourse and ideology.

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33 The fieldwork involved in conducting the interviews was funded by a small grant from the ESRC.
By conducting face-to-face interviews with extreme right leaders (from ‘small’ local party executives to national party leaders, via elected representatives in regional assemblies or the European Parliament), we are able to add a fundamentally important aspect to the study of extreme right discourse, which will help us to locate and identify the different tenets of the conceptual map.

Who do we mean when we speak of party leaders and activists? In terms of the core party leaders, this group is fairly easy to identify as the party elite who direct and steer the party organisation. This group is limited in number and will have a certain level of adroitness in handling questions from researchers, interviewers and the like. For this reason, we were also conscious of including some party executives and officials at a lower level within the selection so we were not just receiving the ‘official’ party line that might be recalled by those who staff the national headquarters. We therefore focused our selection upon a group of leaders and party officials from each party. Interviews were conducted across different regions within the UK and France.

As we mentioned earlier, the full briefing of the methodology is contained within chapter three but we just want to recap on a few details in order to set the scene for the following empirical analysis. The semi-structured interviews were designed to capture the essence of extreme right ideology within the individual discursive formulations of extreme right party leaders. Whilst the interviews were semi-structured and allowed some flexibility within the questions, we ensured that interviews were kept as comparable as possible by retaining, after a more open section, specific themes related to the four pillars of extreme right ideology. The majority of the interviews lasted between one hour and half hour and
two hours. However, some interviews took up to three hours when the respondent was particularly excited and talkative about their involvement. The interviews were conducted within the locality of the respondent.

In chapter two, we described the conceptual map that posits that the extreme right ideological space is structured by two dimensions; authoritarianism and negative identity. We expect that each party will have a unique position (ideological identity) according to the discourse it espouses not only in the official party manifestoes but also in the rhetoric of its party elites. In this chapter, we look at the ideological discourse of extreme right party elites through the medium of face-to-face interviews. We anticipate that party leaders and officials will refer to components of extreme right ideology that the conceptual map describes. As a recap, the negative identity dimension comprises of a cultural conception which forms the xenophobic pillar, and a civic conception, assumes the guise of a populist discourse. Similarly, the authoritarian dimension is made up of a ‘social’ conception, which is named the reactionary pillar, and an ‘institutional’ form known as a repressive discourse. Therefore, the interviews were designed to tap into these specific ideological dimensions in order to gauge the relevance of these pillars in the discourse of extreme right party elites. In the following section, we present the analysis of the elite interviews. We use excerpts from the interviews in order to understand the ideological discourse within the hearts and minds of extreme right leaders but also to substantiate and expand the conceptual map of extreme right ideology.
4.3 The authoritarianism dimension

As explained in chapter two, the contention of our conceptual framework is that extreme right parties must choose a location on an ideological space comprising of two fundamental dimensions: authoritarianism and a negative identity scale. We will first look at the authoritarian dimension. Numerous authors have insisted on the willingness of extreme right parties to present themselves as the champions of order, or even as the only ones capable to restore it in societies, which, they claim, have become chaotic or anarchic. Many commentators have argued that in the 2002 French presidential election campaign the Front National had benefited from a focus on the theme of ‘insecurity’. At the same time, Polish parties such as the League of Polish Families (LPR) or Self-Defence (SD) largely build their electoral campaigns on the idea that contemporary Poland had lost the yardsticks on which its order and cohesion relied. We argue that the authoritarian stance of extreme right parties can take two very distinct forms depending on the solution that they advocate to restore order. Fundamentally, these two conceptions are either a return to a previously existing utopian order, whereby traditional society and values are deemed to be the answer to today’s anarchy (reactionary pillar), or a stronger state, expected to be capable of atomising those elements who make society hell for good citizens (repressive pillar).

The reactionary conception

We saw in chapter two that the first possible expression of the authoritarian dimension is a social conception which we identified as ‘reactionary’. We explained that it would take
the form of references to a utopic past, a lost Eldorado that had been betrayed by modern times and modern leaders. What can we expect these reactionary references to be in the context of the discourse of corresponding extreme right party leaders? Certainly open references to past times, use of the rhetorical field of deterioration, worsening of social, economic, and political conditions, but also, as defined in chapter two, suggestion that the state and public authorities have interfered with a ‘natural order’ in which the authority of institutions such as the church, parents, or teachers have in fact been either subsided or relegated to the same level as unreliable alternatives in the name of political correctness (typically, a complaint that the dominant church would be put on par with a loony sect or that legitimate parental discipline be brandished as violence). Let us now see how this is effectively reflected in the discourse of the extreme right party elites that we interviewed. We expect to find numerous references to an idealised civilization or community during the interviews of extreme right party elites. In order to illustrate their utopian vision of a structured society, leaders may refer to the perceived chaos of modern day society and all its woes including increasing levels of poverty, crime, social and cultural malaise etc. We also expect that leaders will advocate a return to traditional morals and values and uphold the precious link between religious and family loyalties. We anticipate that references to a ‘glorious past’ or ‘golden age’ alongside a vehement criticism of contemporary institutions that are perceived to reinforce the imperfections of society. At the same time, extreme right party leaders may try to reinforce their connection with the key nucleus of the community by claiming to represent the interests of the traditional family network. They will advocate that standards of authority and order should be upheld and thoroughly respected in the face of modernity and egalitarianism. The reactionary solution to these problems is authoritarian but does not involve state interference in private affairs. In
contrast to the repressive conception of authoritarianism, the reactionary discourse requires that the state withdraw to its rightful place to allow the common sense of ‘good’ citizens to reign with a return to old values and solutions, which may not even be legal anymore in democracies which have ‘lost their way’ to political correctness.

Of course, when it comes to traditionalism, no institution is more emblematic of a utopic past than the reverence of a decaying nuclear conception of the family as the ultimate cell of society. The traditional family is seen as a microcosm of what society as a whole should be, a scene where the individual learns the bases of respect and authority while benefiting from love and protection, in short, the first ‘school of life’ where all the values that should later make a ‘good citizen’ will be instilled and experienced. The following British interviewees express the significance of traditional values and morals within the ideology of the extreme right. Both of the respondents stress the importance of family as the nucleus of the community and believe that society should be a coherent and cohesive unit that protects the interest of the community.

Instead, I think we need to protect the values of our country. Protect families first because family is the basic cell of the nation. For example, why not offer mothers – if they want it – some money not to work? That way, they could take care of their children and they would be less likely to wander the streets and sometimes be up to no good (UKIP011).

There are an increasing number of broken homes in this country. The family should be at the heart of the community. I believe core values are about a stable education system, family values, the family as a unit, and restoration of discipline. In recent years, there has been a break-down of the family as a core unit. Many homes now don’t even have a dinner table. People eat dinner off their knees and at separate times. (UKBN007).

In both examples above, the ruin of the very notion of family as an untouchable yardstick, a system of values, and a cell of reference is seen as the ‘cancer’ within a society in the
sense that it is likely to spread to neighbouring cells and institutions to the point that the whole cement of society would consequently be endangered.

Similarly, within the context of this particular ideological component, almost all of the respondents wanted to reemphasise the importance of preserving local traditions, history and culture in a bid to protect and preserve the homogeneity of the national community. This again is a method of strengthening the in-group's culture and homogeneity by referring to historical references and yardsticks, a 'fatherly' conception of patriotism and of a national heritage deposited in the hands of the new generations. The following examples typify the importance ascribed to the traditional values of family, the national community and its heritage.

To me, the founding values we want to defend are the defence of the country, of its traditional values, of family, of nation, of traditions (FRMF005).

As I am becoming more mature, I have come to realise how proud I am to be French. This is an amazing country and it has one of the richest heritages in the world. I don't think that a country which doesn't respect its ancestors or pretends that other people's ancestors matter as much as ours is a country which respects itself. You need to respect our past too. Like all our great (wo)men, for example Jeanne d'Arc, of course. But even, also, all the unknown soldiers, all the family mothers and so on (FRMF010).

We should be investing in local traditions, history and culture. Leicester council invested thousands of pounds into the celebrations for Diwali so why couldn't they do anything for St. George's day (UKBN021).

The idiots here banned a true representation of a Christian scene. There was no Christmas tree or nativity scene. There was no sense of excitement or celebration. We decided to take it upon ourselves to broadcast over a PA system some Christmas carols to instil some festive spirit. We plan to also make our own special arrangements for the other festivities such as Easter, St. David's Day, and St. George's day. We need to preserve our traditions for the sake of future generations (UKBN013)

The EU smacks in the face of British history. We shouldn't replace the British flag with the European one. It is wrong (UKIP012).

To me, to be French is to accept French history as a whole. 1500 years of history with its good and bad moments. As Le Pen says, we are not the owners but the tenants of our country, and as a result we do not have the right to let France disappear (FRFN014)
In the above examples, note the multiple references to national historical figures — 'Jeanne d'Arc' or '1500 years of history' for the French extreme right elites, old Christian celebrations of St George's day and St David's day for the British ones. It is interesting to see here, in the context of the reactionary pillar, that the emphasis is predominantly on symbols and heritage rather than practical risks or dangers. It appears that reactionary extreme right party leaders try to portray themselves as the depositaries of a conception of a nation that no one else is defending.

Often, public education is seen as an integral part of the national infrastructure. In France 'l'école républicaine' is often described as the mould which helps shaping the national coherence of values and citizens. Extreme right parties thus often emphasise their impression that education systems have deteriorated and lost their way. They claim to regret the old ways and want to reform schools, so that once again, to instil discipline into unruly children who have no respect or manners. They want to reinstate education as the backbone of society and re-educate people so that they understand the traditions, values and heritage of the country they live in. The following excerpts are from both French and British interviewees and highlight the importance that is attached to education within the ideology of the extreme right.

Education needs to be reformed to. The education of the 'éducation nationale' is a scandal, it is really politicised education and it is bankrupt, now young people don't even know how to speak or right properly. I don't even understand it, now it's phone text language, now people say 'lol' if they want to tell you they find something funny, it's taken me days and days to understand it!! Knowledge has been degraded (FRMF003).

Everything revolves around education. I was taught everything but British history or Christianity or for that matter anything about paganism. They should be taught about the important customs that were and still are important in Britain. We have a responsibility to future generations and our children (UKBN004).
Schools are rubbish. Yobs dominate. We need to instil discipline and create a stable situation for children. They have to be the role models of mother and father. The world is going crazy. For example, what is the thing with super-nannies? No incentive for good behaviour. If you are bad you are sent to the naughty step. What good does that do? If I was bad, I was smacked. I think spanking is ok as long as it teaches the child right from wrong. It should be positive and negative reinforcement (UKIP010).

Within the extreme right party discourse, one is also frequently exposed to numerous references to an apparent ‘Americanisation of culture’ (or standardisation thereof). This discourse was also present within many of the interviews we conducted with the leaders and high-ranking officials of the extreme right parties. The following examples are taken from both of the two British parties and the French MPF.

The values and moral codes of our parents and grandparents are polluted by SKY TV and American TV channels (UKIP002).

We are less British than we used to be. We have become more Americanised. Everything is changing and not for the better (UKBN001).

The word ‘chav’ has Americanised gang culture here in Britain (UKIP004).

We would never let TF1 [largest French TV channel] show more American films than French one! This is a betrayal of our whole culture! (FRMF008)

Don’t expect me to take the grandkids to ‘McDo’ as grandparents do in their TV ads! We didn’t have that when I grew up and they love the ‘fetes de villages’ as much as I did when I was growing up. (FRMF010)

Interestingly enough, while the US is often used as a model of reference by many right wing parties, notably in Britain, but even sometimes in France, it is rarely the case in the discourse of extreme right parties which equate it with standardisation, generalisation of a lowest common denominator, and ‘reign of mediocrity’. Once again, we should emphasise how elite’s discourse is concerned with symbols and not just with substance, which reinforces the very utopic nature of the reactionary pillar. Relying on symbols allows politicians to avoid engaging with a level of specification which could make the past sound less glamorous or vivid, or the present less scary and dramatic.
Indeed, to a certain extent, one of the most common aspects of the reactionary conception of extreme right ideology is nostalgia for the golden age, a harkening back to the ‘good old days’. Extreme right parties tend to compare the contemporary disastrous state of affairs to that of a time when all things were harmonious and joyful, where everything and everybody knew its place and role within society. Here again, we see that references to the traditional values and morals of a bygone age are heralded as superior to those of today’s society. The following quotes illustrate this perception of the past and today’s society quite succinctly.

Values such as fair play, common sense, patriotism, loyalty, duty, and self-reliance to name a few are passed on from one generation to the next. There would be no morals without this kind of fabric of society to hold it together. Take these things away and you debase society (UKIP024).

When I was growing up, I grew up on a council estate. Everyone had a job and the gardens were tidy, houses were clean. Now if I were to go back today the people would be on welfare, there would be drugs everywhere and the gardens would be overrun and dirty (UKBN008).

We used to have a stiff upper lip. We need to toughen up a bit I think. We need to bring back the values I knew as a kid (UKIP022).

People always make fun of elderly people saying ‘in my time we used to...’ Well, my time was better! (FRMF002).

Yep, that was the ‘good old time’! (FRFN019)

Most of the interviewees, across all age groups and across all of the parties, referred to an idealised glorious past with nostalgia. This finding was also confirmed by the Klandermans and Mayer (2006) study of extreme right activists in five European democracies. In the next section, we discuss the second conception of the authoritarian dimension. The repressive conception of authoritarianism proposes an institutional solution to the problems that society faces, preferring to summon the strength of the state to deal with delinquents and a repressive order of society.
The repressive conception

The repressive conception of the authoritarianism dimension is built upon a form of social control characterized by strict obedience to the authority of a state or organization. Thus, we expect that extreme right leaders may espouse the enforcement and maintenance of political control through the use of oppressive measures. Despite the fact that most contemporary extreme right party elites vouch to uphold and compete within the regulations and rules of their respective constitutional democratic frameworks, there is often a subtle anti-democratic tone to their discourse. As a result, we expect that the affirmation of stability, authority and the submission of the individual to the ideological goals of the party will be paramount in the discourse of many extreme right party leaders.

In line with the repressive ideology, party leaders may advocate fighting chaos and threatening anarchy by entrusting a strengthened state to eradicate errant fragments of society. Therefore, we expect to find numerous references to a strong state and the enforcement of law and order within the discourse of leaders and officials. We also anticipate that there will be numerous references to the strong, charismatic leader of the party (be it the current leader or previous figureheads). The majority of contemporary parties are personified by an autocratic leader and retain an extremely centralised and hierarchical organisation. As a result, we expect that leaders and officials will refer to the extraordinary capabilities of their leader in comparison to other politicians and we look upon as a saviour of their respective nations.
In the following examples from interviews of extreme right party leaders, we can see an obvious emphasis on the restoration of law and order. This is indeed witnessed across the two countries of France and the UK. Most interviewees reinstated the importance of law and order within a coherent society and the majority were convinced that their party had the means to sort out the problems of today’s society.

I think that discipline and order need to be reinforced in our country. Le Pen is the only one who proposes to change that (FRFN011)

People want more order, more police, more authority – they tell us that all the time (FRFN021)

I feel strongly about the absence of law and order in this country. Something has to be done (UKIP015).

We need to strengthen law and order. We have to confront several problems associated with gangs; lack of job opportunities, working class estates, no money to go to cinema, etc. they haven’t got anything else better to do than cause trouble (UKBN020).

Beyond the general glorification of order enforcement and authority, extreme right leaders venture into specific proposals for a stronger and more authoritarian and punitive State. Of course, no area is as ‘natural’ a field for the expression of repressive preferences as the fight against crime. Thus, many of the interviewed extreme right party leaders also spoke about tougher penalties for criminals and agreed that prison sentences should be tougher in order to deter people from committing crimes in the first place. The majority of the respondents derided the influence of political correctness and the hypocrisy surrounding crime and punishment. The following quotes from several interviewees shed light upon these beliefs and detail some possible solutions to society’s problems.

How can things work well without criminals realising that crime is punished? We need to have tougher policies on crime. (FRMF006).

The police arrest them, then one hour later they release them – that’s what our justice system has become, and it’s the good citizens who live in fear (FRFN005)
We have always been clear – zero tolerance policy and we will make crime go down. Judges are not here to be social workers they are here to punish criminals (FRFN012)

I joined UKIP because they take a firm line on crime and they propose proper punishment of criminals (UKIP015).

There is an insidious influx of human rights and political correctness entering this country so that punishment is not fairly distributed (UKBN009)

We need an extreme political party to get this country back onto an even keel. Society has become far too liberal, whether it is with drugs, litter etc. They need to be punished (UKBN022)

In contrast to the reactionary pillar of the authoritarianism dimension which as we have seen emphasises education, values and morals, the repressive conception of the same dimension is much more coercive and direct. Some of the interviewees focused on the reintroduction of the death penalty as a means of instilling law and order into society. The following examples highlight this trend within the extreme right parties in Britain and France.

He proposed big popular referenda on the important decisions: A good one to start with would be death penalty; it should be the people’s choice (FRFN001).

I don’t see how anyone can be against death penalty for monsters that have raped and killed some innocent children (FRFN021)

The public have the right to know whether repeat sex offenders live in their local area. We should introduce the death penalty with the advance of DNA evidence and proof of evidence. Don’t need anything else. The majority is what’s important. The Conservatives introduced a bill to bring back the death penalty in 1954 but it was scrapped by Labour (UKBN023).

There is a minority of UKIP members that want us to do more on the social authoritarian dimension like the reintroduction of the death penalty (UKIP019).

We should shoot drug dealers and this would control the horrible drug problem this country is facing (UKBN012).

We should have the death penalty for some crimes. It is crazy that with the ethics of human rights the perpetrator of the crime is often more protected than the actual victim of the crime (UKBN008).

While the repressive pillar of authoritarianism naturally emphasises the popular theme of ‘toughness on crime’ (and on criminals), it would be wrong, however, to believe that it is
limited to the topic of police and justice. Political authoritarianism is not just a policy principle but a whole conception of governance. Thus, in addition to tougher stances on crime and punishment, the respondents we interviewed also centred upon the role of the leader within the party. The emphasis was on a strong leader who had a certain charisma, excellent communication skills, could relate to the ‘common man’ and could be relied upon to make the ‘right’ decisions for the party and society at large. We encountered a certain sense of awe when respondents spoke about their leader. All of interviewees were committed to their leader’s cause and believed that he was the right man for the job as briefly illustrated below.

Le Pen is simply someone exceptional. The first time I met him, I was shivering for hours afterwards (FRFN013)

In meetings, it’s extraordinary, he steps on the scene and everybody understands that they are going to witness something exceptional (FRFN004)

De Villiers is a true leader, without him, France wouldn’t be the same country at all (FRMF013)

Nick Griffin is a true leader. He is strong willed and knows what he is talking about not like the rest of the politicians (BNP001)

In summary, we found several common traits among the fundamental tenets of extreme right ideology within the hearts and minds of the leaders we interviewed. Party membership was often described as being a member of a close-knit family, a circle of trust and acceptance, where individuals can voice their opinions without prejudice. This sense of belonging to a group or community was prevalent amongst the leaders of the British BNP and the French FN. The group-oriented identity of extreme right militants has been explained as a reaction to the erosion of family, clan, neighbourhood, and social class (Heitmeyer, 1993). This group mentality is embedded and reinforced in the extreme right ideological frame of ‘man is a Gemeinschaftswesen and can only develop fully within a community’. The community becomes almost superior to the individual. There is also ‘a
belief in the authority of the state over the individual; an emphasis on natural community; distrust for individual representation and parliamentary arrangements; limitations on personal and collective freedoms; collective identification in a great national destiny [...] and the acceptance of the hierarchical principle for social organisation’ (Ignazi, 1997: 49).

To a certain extent, there was a cult of leadership. The leader of each party was highly regarded and many expressed admiration, awe, or even love for the party executive. The leader was considered as the only person who could restore faith, common sense and put the country back on an even keel after the many years of abandonment. Whilst there was a strong emphasis on local issues within all of the four parties, some respondents spoke of links with other European and international groups who they occasionally met and organized joint rallies and events with strong neo-nationalist themes. For example, the young BNP organisation met regularly with the FNJ the youth organisation and they reportedly held meetings with the Swedish Democrats. Most of the interviewees, and in particular, the most high-ranking leaders of the group wanted to portray an image of unity and consensus within the party organisation. Several suggestions were, however, made by some respondents that this was not indeed the true picture. It emerged in some of the interviews that there was little internal coherence and it was often hard for leaders to coordinate the varied interests of members that were far from ideologically coherent.

4.4 The negative identity dimension

We discussed the conceptual nature of the negative dimension in chapter two. The negative identity dimension relies on the identification of negative referents against which
the identity of the national community can be conveniently defined. Large segments of
the literature have underlined the propensity of extreme right parties to ‘exclude’ or
‘oppose’, but the various targets of this exclusion or opposition (foreigners, immigrants,
asylum-seekers, minorities, other parties, systems, corrupt politicians, bureaucrats, etc)
have usually been considered as independent or discrete. Instead, our conceptual map
suggests that these possible targets of opposition and exclusion fit together on a negative
identity dimension, which runs from a civic negative identity to a cultural one, mirroring
the two main pillars of political identities identified by Bruter (2005). The identification
of an ‘out-group’ is fundamental to this dimension of negative identity as it features in
both the populist and xenophobic conceptualisations, albeit in different ways.

The stigmatism of ‘out-groups’ is used to simplify references to a presumed unified and
Here, we identify two different out-groups – the politicians are the main point of
reference for the populist discourse, whilst ‘the foreigners’ (however broadly conceived)
are the out-group victims of the xenophobic discourse. This particular theme of discourse
is discussed in detail below throughout the description of the two conceptions of the
negative identity dimension. On the whole, the cultural conception of negative identity
broadly corresponds to xenophobia, whilst its civic conception is referred to as populism.
These two conceptions of negative identity serve the same purpose and the relative
balance between them in the discourse of extreme right parties varies from one emphasis
to the other. In our conceptual map, the first strategic-discursive pillar of the negative
identity dimension is xenophobia, which relies on cultural identity exclusiveness, which
contrasts the ‘true’ national community with its ‘parasitic’ foreign elements, be they
influences, norms, values, institutions, or indeed people. This foreign out-group may refer to a foreigner within (minorities, etc) or outside (other countries, etc).

The xenophobic conception

The xenophobic conception of the negative identity dimension relies upon an exclusive cultural identity that privileges the national community over all else. Within the interviews of extreme right party leaders and officials, we expect to respondents to distinguish between the interests of the ‘true’ national community and an assumed ‘out-group’. This out-group may refer to a foreigner within the national community (ethnic minorities, religious groups etc) or outside (for example other countries, etc). We anticipate that leaders will express this cultural negative identity in many forms and guises but they may focus on the ‘foreign’ elements of modern day society in contrast to the assumed homogeneity of the nation. Leaders may also highlight a xenophobic discourse that contrasts an ‘us’ versus ‘them discourse and that foreign elements are a threat to the cherished national identity and interest. We also expect that the elites will embellish their xenophobic discourse by attributing the problems of today’s society to the presence of the increased number of immigrants, migrants and asylum seekers.

In the following interview excerpts, we can see that immigration policy is on the top of the agenda for many of the extreme right party leaders. There is often a recurrent theme within the immigration discourse of extreme right parties that contrasts the needs of the national community to that of the immigrant population. As a result, many parties use slogans such as ‘British jobs for British workers’ or ‘Les Français d’abord’ and similar
slogans can be found within the discourse of a variety of other European extreme right parties from the German NPD to the Danish DF.

The only problem we have is over-population. If we grasp it and articulate it in the right way, we will be on a winning straight. We are not in the same class as the BNP. Enoch and Howard have both made mistakes when it came to articulating immigration policies. There is no other political quest that it is harder than to try and articulate immigration policy without sounding racist (UKIP002)

I am against uncontrolled mass immigration. We have to impose a defined limit to the numbers of people coming into the country. It is a well-known fact that the UK is over-populated. There is huge pressure on markets, housing, jobs etc. The high population density however you look at it is a massive strain on the country. Our main concern is the large population growth, which is directly linked to immigration. Death and birth rates cannot be controlled but immigration can be. It is the only variable of population growth that can be controlled. An aim of zero population growth is the only sensible policy to pursue (UKIP020)

To me, it is all summarised in the motto ‘Les Français d’abord!’ It is the beginning and the end of it all. To me, it is really down to the old saying ‘charité bien ordonnée commence par soi-même’. I’m not at all against helping others, but I think that one needs to start by helping his own (FRFN008)

We don’t hate foreigners, but the French must come first, it’s just normal (FRMF012)

If you have only one steak, won’t you give it to the people from your family before donating it to others? The nation is our family (FRMF010)

The motto is France, France, France (FRMF006)

The connection between xenophobia, race and identity is extremely intertwined within the discourse of the extreme right. Although many contemporary parties disavow their allegiance to racist rhetoric and questions of how they actually define the national community they propose to defend, we can see from the following examples that it is not that straightforward. We can see in the cases that some leaders of extreme right parties still view racial ancestry, differences between cultures and races, and even social Darwinism as obvious references on how to define the national community or identity.

British identity is of course intertwined with racial ancestry. If you go down this route, you are not doing anything wrong. It is not racist it’s a fact. Negroes born in this country could never be British in the way I am. It is a question of human nature. British values are a function of British racial ancestry too and its people. The British are a product of a white European race. We built the churches and the roads. They are not like us. They are different because they evolved differently.

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They are not the same. Look at the figures of Richard Lynn (shows me the book again) the making and meaning of Britishness. He shows that they have different IQ scores etc. Prof. Sykes at Oxford has shown that every British woman is one of the 7 daughters of Eve. You are the descendant of one of 7 women. British white Europeans evolved differently. We had to cope with an ice age, scarce food, draughts, the survival was key. We are from the same genetic stock of Northern Europe (UKBN022).

Different cultures and races do not naturally mix. We have seen this in the conglomerate of Eastern Europe, Africa, India, Indonesia, and the UK. It’s a cultural clash. The increasing numbers of Muslims and blacks create a divide from the whites. Take Bradford, for example, the Hindus are being driven out by the Muslims there. It’s not racist; it’s just a simple fact (UKBN004).

People cluster around common identities and work together through cooperation. The idea of destroying this process, this ‘organic’ growth is ridiculous. It screws up the natural progression of the survival of the fittest. It’s the basics of social Darwinism. These are my people. I have homogenised with these people. Now we are threatened by this outside force. We at the BNP aim so preserve our identity and protect our culture at all expense (UKBN007).

France is not a country that was born yesterday, and the French were not a people who were born yesterday. You can’t just bring anyone in out of the blue and claim ‘ok, let’s redefine France so that it adapts to you’. (FRMF017)

Yes, of course it was a bit easier to integrate people like the Poles or Italians who were white and Catholic in the 1930s than people who are Muslim and come from a completely different background today (FRMF003)

The American notion of a ‘melting pot’ is a myth! (FRFN003)

Other interviewees preferred to voice their xenophobic discourse by targeting mass immigration as a threat to national identity, the coherence and homogeneity of the national community and even in some cases, the root of society’s decline and cultural malaise. The following examples illustrate the connection that extreme right party leaders establish between the impact of immigration and the fight to preserve their national identity.

I want to protect my own country like the Aboriginals in Australia and the Native American Indians in North America were fighting for the same thing. They wanted the whites out but look where that got them (UKIP009).

If we don’t preserve our British identity, then it will be lost forever and we might never be able to regain it. We are also fighting to live freely on our own land (UKBN004).

If you don’t understand your past, then you can never fully understand your present or future. Who are British people and where did we come from? Opponents of our say that Britain is a country of immigration but most of the people who came to live here hundreds of years ago assimilated to the British culture and identity (UKIP013).
We don't want concentration camps or to deport everyone. We are what we are. We want to maintain and preserve our identity and democracy (UKBN005).

We created this country. Our people fought in wars, laid the roads, railways and waterways. It's our bloody country. Everyone has to have their own patch that they can call their own. We must reclaim our identity. What would we do without a name? It is getting to that point now in this country. People don't know who they are any more (UKIP014).

Yes, I do think that French identity is under threat (FRMF011)

It is not just us saying it, with the current policy, there is a real risk that in 20 years, there might be more minarets than church towers (FRMF012)

We need to protect our borders – that's rule number 1 (FRFN021)

What we always say is that we don't 'own' France – it has really been entrusted to us, and this is why it is our duty to protect her, watch for her, and ensure that what makes her identity is not betrayed and sacrificed in the name of the political ambitions of a few politically correct politicians (FRFN016)

The tchador [Islamic veil] is simply not part of the French identity. These are not the women described by Victor Hugo and Lamartine! (FRMF009)

Similarly, there is often an accusation that mass immigration and the subsequent growth of multi-culturalism poses a threat to national traditions and cultures. The following examples are drawn from our French sample of interviews. It is interesting to note the underlying change in tone of the French extreme right parties from a virulent anti-immigrant stance to one of criticising the government for letting the immigrants into the country in the first place34.

De Gaulle said himself that France is 'a white country of Judeo-Christian tradition'. Politicians have let it become a 'cafe au lait' country of Islamo-Judeo-Christian tradition instead. They have let scores of recent non-European immigrants come and settle in, millions of them, whilst earlier, the French habit was to let a few dozens of thousands of European immigrants who could assimilate far more easily (FRFN011).

Contemporary immigration is completely different. You take a North African immigrant, tell him to come with his customs, and plant him with his family in a district full of other immigrants. The customs are very different; the Poitiers battle still represents a major fracture in the history of Islamic people. So it simply cannot work like that, it is really the politicians' fault (FRMF002).

34 For more detail on this subject please see the forthcoming Bruter and Harrison's paper on the discourse of the extreme right in France over time.
Many of the extreme right parties that have flourished throughout Europe over the last few decades have in common this rejection of all ‘others’, immigrants, foreigners, refugees (Ivaldi, 2001). However, whilst xenophobic rhetoric was expressed during the interviews, there was a predominant tendency to highlight the rights and privileges of the nation over all else. This national preference was often used in conjunction with framing the xenophobic discourse, for example, by stressing the homogeneity of the nation and what it means to be British/French also ultimately says a lot about what and who they do not consider to be a part of this ‘in-group’ or national community (however vaguely defined by the parties or the individuals). In other cases, respondents took the opportunity to emphasise the ‘out-group’ distinction with regards to the language issue. The following interview quotes exemplify this discourse. They discuss the problems that arise from multiple languages and the effect that it has on local communities. One of the French extreme right party leaders also questions whether anyone could indeed feel French if they did not speak the language.

In some schools in Bradford and Leeds, English is not the first language. In some it’s French because of the high numbers of black Africans. No wonder standards are slipping if children can’t even communicate with each other (UKIP023).

The number of Eastern Europeans, especially Poles, here in Grantham has dramatically increased over the last few years. There are whole sections of town that are dominated by the Poles and if you walk down the street all you can here is Polish and not one word of English. They have no car tax but they live and work here. If we did that, we would be in a lot of trouble. These little things grate on me and I get hacked off. That’s why I listen to what the BNP says as most of it makes sense to me (UKBN010).

How can you feel French if you don’t speak the language? (FRFN009)

Of course, the French language has always been a big part of French identity, so yes, when I see some groups of youngsters who speak together in Arabic, it shocks me to an extent (FRMF018)

Extreme right parties that compete in regular elections and try to increase their share of the vote have in recent years tried to ‘tone down’ the more radical xenophobic discourse
focused on immigrants and foreigners. Instead, some extreme right leaders prefer to speak of the damage that has been inflicted on the national community by the treacherous politicians that have instigated mass immigration into the country. The following interview extracts of extreme right party leaders highlight this change of strategy that is increasingly evident in their discourse.

They have engineered mass immigration. The interbreeding with Negroes and half-castes is very convenient for the globalisation plan (UKBN014).

I can't blame the immigrants themselves for their take, take, take attitude and I don't hate the asylum seekers either. They are being offered everything on a plate and who would say no. The people I do hate are those white politicians that have sold this country down the line (UKBN002).

The government is sweeping the problems under the carpet, which ultimately results in problems and violence as there was in Bradford during the riots. The UK is the most overcrowded place in Europe, with over twice the population of France and four times that of the US. The unchecked immigration has had a huge strain on the welfare bill and created terrorism (UKIP007).

I don't agree with their multi-cultural experiment. The government has purposely concentrated different ethnic groups and races into small areas so they fight against each other and not against the government. It is a case of 'divide and rule' as the saying goes (UKBN011).

We say attack the government that is letting all these people in not the individuals. The immigrants before were of a different type. They didn't want to change the country. My parents didn't want to come here and impose their views on other people living here. Now, they want halal, ban the use of alcohol hand wash in hospitals so they are not clean. The labour party is letting them do this (UKBN016).

It is a question of space not race. It is not a race issue but we don't want to give criminals open access (UKBN013).

People are not naturally racists but as I see it they are merely reacting to the swamps of immigrants coming into the country putting increased pressure on the economy, jobs, housing, NHS etc (UKIP012).

It's not even the fault of immigrants either, they are also the consequence, it is the fault of those who let them in without counting (FRMF002).

Yes, I always say that the politicians who opened all the doors are more to blame than the poor people who chose to pass them (FRFN007)

They invited them all in when they had no business to do so (FRFN017)

In addition, there has also been a shift towards criticising Islam within the rhetoric of the extreme right. There have been an increasing number of references to the impact and
influence Islam has on the national community and its way of life. The following examples echo some of the references we encountered in the text analysis of the party manifestoes.

I don’t want to see minarets in every French city, but I don’t think this is the right focus. It’s always the same here, in France, we always tend to tackle what you can see instead of the root of the problem, it’s the same with the veil, and the rest (FRMF009).

The threat of Islam is not recognised by the other parties. They don’t want to talk about it. They are importing a huge problem. It is a time-bomb. It is the fastest growing religion not just here but in the world. To underestimate the threat is the biggest act of treason this government has made (UKBN003).

It is a fact that Islam is a polar opposite to everything that represents the values of the western world (UKIP008).

I do not want to live in 6th Century Saudi Arabia. If they do, then they can go home (UKBN012).

The extreme right often presents their exclusive identity concept as an opposed ‘other’ in direct contrast with the in-group of the nation. In the following cases, we encounter the EU as the perceived ‘other’ with its alleged foreignness contaminating national systems, corrupt bureaucracy running amok, and suspected undemocratic institutions and representatives making a mockery of national political and legal systems.

The EU is an alien system run by countries (mainly Germany) that have an alien tradition of politics and very different legal systems. It is just outrageous to subordinate our system to theirs (UKIP006).

We were the only ones who voted against the 10 new members of the EU. All of the UKIP MEPs voted against Romania and Bulagria. We didn’t want them in (UKIP021).

It’s bureaucrats trying to replace democracy by their technocratic system (FRMF001)

The EU is becoming more powerful by the day and laughs when citizens express their disagreement. This is scandalous. (FRMF008)

It was ridiculous to open the door to countries like Romania, and now, of course, Baroso, Sarkozy and Merkel are intent on bringing in Turkey. They know 99 percent of the people are opposed to this but they don’t give a toss (FRMF015)

Turkey is intent on joining, and they are happy to try the back door against European public opinions (FRMF007)
As we have seen above, most of the xenophobic discourse of the extreme right focuses on the identification of an ‘other’ be it immigrants, minority groups, or even a foreign country or a political system or institution. In some of the interviews, we experienced some virulent anti-American rhetoric usually in the form of an attack on globalisation and the effect it has on British or French culture. However, the following examples show that a country, the USA and Germany in this context, can also be singled out as the enemy of extreme right ideology.

I used to like America but now I hate them. Invading countries is not good or clever. What right does he have? They wanted the oil but it is not that important anymore. I don’t believe the story of the September 11th attacks now. I think America did it to themselves to justify the war (UKBN004).

There is something about the US that is aggressively imperialist, and as they always side with the same, like Israel, England, or some dodgy South American regimes, it is clear that in a way they are trying to rule the world (FRFN002)

American culture is trying to annihilate national cultures on its way (FRMF009)

We have to be very suspicious of Germany, especially as they seem so intent on taking over the EU. If history has taught us anything, we should be very careful. They are still our number one enemy (UKIP027).

Well, Germany was France’s public enemy number 1 for 150 years, so it is a bit odd to suddenly ask the French people to pretend they are our biggest friends (FRMF019)

One of the main keystones of extreme right discourse is the opposition imposed upon the conflict arising from the national interest and the foreign outside world or the defined ‘out-groups’ within the community. The glorification of the national patrimony alongside a desire to preserve national traditions and culture serves to diminish and minimise the impact of globalisation, multiculturalism, and the influence of American culture on the national heritage and culture. We now move on to discuss the second aspect of the negative identity dimension that is encapsulated by the populist civic conception.
The populist conception

At the other extreme of the negative identity scale lays the contrast between 'the people' and the 'parasitic' and devious influence of the elites, who are accused of betraying the national interest and its heritage and traditions. In Bruter's model of identity (2005, 2009), the civic pillar of political identities represents the way in which citizens define themselves as part of the political system, focusing on their civic rights, their political duties, and their relationship and experience of the relevant institutions. A negative civic identity can therefore be expressed by voicing criticism against the existing system and accusing political institutions and their representatives of betraying the interests of the national community.

Similar to that of the xenophobic conception, the civic populist reference may target a variety of victims: political parties (the parties of the extreme right are often implicitly excluded from this criticism as they assumed to be outside the corrupt circle of the mainstream parties and are often presented as non-parties or movements), the media (considered to be unified, hostile, and often under the control of other powers), economic and bureaucratic elites are alongside pressure groups – from trade unions to human rights groups to civil society organisations. Extreme right leaders may claim that one of their prime objectives is to try and retrieve the power of the people from the corrupted elites of the mainstream parties. We expect that they will also draw upon the contrast between the 'man on the street' and the 'parasitic' and devious politicians, who are accused of betraying the national interest and the people’s will. We anticipate that party leaders will
emphasise their allegiance with ‘the people’, their party listens to their concerns and that their party is the true representative of their interests.

During all of the interviews we conducted, respondents were keen on mentioning populist themes with jibes at politicians, incumbent governments, the media and even their ‘enemies at large’. One of the most common themes within the populist discourse of the extreme right is the accusation that the existing parties and their politicians are out-of-touch with the mass public. The party of choice is often portrayed as ‘outside’ the existing system and status quo and is untainted by the corruption and scandals that allegedly haunt the other parties. Extreme right leaders explained that their party would solve societal problems by listening to what the ‘man on the street’ wanted and applying a common sense approach to politics. The interview extracts below highlight the sentiment of a BNP leader, who outlines how the BNP is different to the other mainstream parties and a young French FN leader who believes that politicians are out of touch with real people.

The ruling liberals are out of touch with public opinion. They just don’t understand what normal people think especially the middle and lower classes. We are different because we listen. We are different from all the rest of the other parties. We don’t believe people should be told what to do or think. We don’t believe that politicians are the masters of people. That’s not democracy. The politicians think that people must be told about this and that, but they are out of touch (UKBN003).

All the elites come from the same mould. All the leaders come from the ENA, it is a very elitist clique with very few people who are represented. The elites, as a result, are completely disconnected from the people (FRFN011).

Similarly, a UKIP representative for the European Parliament voices his thoughts about the mainstream parties and the way that the existing parties are seemingly unequipped to deal with the problems of the general public.
In terms of British politics, there is nothing left to vote for. The mainstream parties all propose more of the same. I hate the sight of the puffy face of Cameron. It tells you all you need to know about him - he has never had a tough day in his life. He has had everything given to him on a silver spoon (UKIP013).

The following respondent laments that the way that the existing parties and their politicians seem to have very little regard for the average man-on-the street and feels that the BNP, on the other hand, appears to have the concerns of real people at the heart of its campaign.

The existing parties in the British party system are completely and utterly useless. They don't have anything in common with real people. They have never lived like an average person so why they should pretend to understand our concerns and views. They have no idea about us or how the man on the street lives. They are not average people, they are professional politicians and we all know how they lie. The BNP is different. It is made up of average people like me and you. They seem to understand the man on the street and our concerns. They want to bring the country back. They want to look after the country, not give it away. They would restore morale (UKBN005).

A common theme within the extreme right populist diatribe is a search for truth within a world of politics considered to be corrupt and misrepresentative. The extreme right party, in contrast, is portrayed as the champion of truth. In the following examples, respondents echo these populist sentiments. In the case of a young BNP party leader, he believes that truth should be paramount in politics. A young party activist of the FNJ (the FN's youth organisation) and a member of the MPF repeat similar themes within their interviews.

If you are not telling the people the truth then there is no point. What is the point of voting otherwise or doing anything really if you are not telling the truth to the people who have elected you? They are the real people who matter (UKBN010).

One of the reasons why I am a true FN supporter and activist is that we are the only ones trying to put an end to conditions of unfairness in this country. (FRFN002)

Honestly, I think that current politicians should be tried for High Treason in front of the High Court of Justice because this is really what they are doing: betraying the country: Mitterrand, Chirac, Sarkozy et al. (FRMF008)
Political parties are not the only victim of the extreme right’s slurs. The media is also criticised, with complaints referring to a pact between the media and the established parties. There is often an element of alleged collusion between the media and the mainstream parties against the extreme right party in question. A local leader of the UK independence party expresses his suspicion of the media. Similarly, two leaders of the MPF and the FN explain their mistrust of the media and their cooperation with the elites.

To me, this misportrayal, this manipulation is predominantly the fault of the media; they are really quite close to the main parties (UKIP012)

There is really no difference between the parties. They are all the same, and the media support them. In fact, ‘democracy’ is only a name in this country (FRMF011)

So many French female journalists are married to politicians that it is pretty obvious how intertwined the big parties and the media have become! (FRFN006)

Many respondents affiliated to the BNP referred to an over-load of political correctness in the UK, for example, the following respondents tell us about their paranoia and conspiracy theory-like stories surrounding the infiltration of the BNP and suggests that the current trend of political correctness is orchestrated by the ‘liberal internationalist elites’ in a bid to ‘control the people’. A UKIP member also shares her frustration with the incumbent government and the detrimental influence of political correctness on society. In addition, a BNP activist suggests that the feminist movement is responsible for the increased number of women in the workforce and that this has forced them to abandon their procreative role in favour of employment.

The media are like prostitutes: they have enormous power but no associated responsibility. The fight will be won or lost in the media. Why do they want to dismiss the BNP? I understand now that it is all associated with political correctness. There is a blatant agenda by the liberal internationalist elites to control the people (UKBN018)

There is an institutionalised political correctness scheme against the BNP (UKBN013)
The Government is so politically correct now. You can’t say anything but they let people off for beating up the elderly. It has got to the stage where it is over the top (UKIP001).

The feminist movement has convinced women in their 30s not to have children. They have beguiled them from their natural role of reproducing (UKBN016).

Nowadays, political correctness is everywhere (FRFN001)

I really think that political correctness is used to vilify ['diaboliser'] those who have things to say that disturb the governing majority. It is nothing less than a dictatorship of the unique, prescribed thought that most politicians and media believe in and that the people don’t (FRFN021)

As we expected, the populist discourse of the leaders and officials of UKIP was predominately directed towards a harsh criticism of the European Union. In line with the theory of issue ownership, we can see in the next section that UKIP has made the question of Europe its own. Petrocik (1996) emphasised that certain issues can become synonymous or ‘owned’ by one party. Party supporters develop a certain degree of brand loyalty either based on past party performance (Fiorina, 1981) or previously staked-out party positions (Shepsle, 1991). The majority of respondents from UKIP criticised the overwhelming bureaucracy and the alleged undemocratic character of the European Union.

The duly elected politicians have illegally sold us to Europe. We now find ourselves in a dictatorship. The EU system of government is totally undemocratic (UKIP001).

The EU is an absolute tyranny. The losses of freedoms have exposed oppression by tyranny. The EU is the risk. The growing embryo of the EU is dangerous to the peace of the world (UKIP010).

We have lost things such as a true system of parliamentary democracy, control of crime and punishment and we will eventually lose the unwritten constitution as we will have to convert to the ‘European’ way. When you lose it, you will know what we have lost and that will be the British identity. People just don’t realise the danger yet though. The British people didn’t fully realise the threat Hitler posed then and they still don’t realise the threat the EU is now (UKIP008).

The EU is the polite way to impose undemocratic decisions on the people without them being able to rebel (FRMF019)

No system so undemocratic has been used in France for hundreds of years (FRFN027)
In addition, both of the following interviewees highlight their criticisms against the EU and refer to the ‘behind-closed-doors’ decision-making in the bureaucracy of the EU.

People are now beginning to see and realise for themselves the real consequences of the EU on our country. The Parliament is not the supreme authority it is meant to be. It has been superseeded by the European Commission, who are a bunch of unelected bureaucrats and their staff are above the law now. We are not allowed to find out what they are up to, what they do or what they are even supposed to do. The European Parliament is a front to their activities. It is not a parliament at all. It forms no policies, laws, government or taxation. It is all part of a big fraud scheme. We should withdraw immediately and UKIP is the only viable to commit to that mission (UKIP025)

The EU’s main aim is to proceed by stealth. Have you heard of the term useful idiots? Well, the EU is full of them. They are useful to the cause but they delude themselves over the real nature of the EU. Look at the SEA and all the rest of the treaties. Why do we need them? (UKIP023)

When asked to describe how to locate the ideological position of his/her party, one young French FN party member explains that the FN is a true populist party and emphasises the importance of common sense values. In addition, an older member of UKIP states that it is nothing to do with the political ideological spectrum that forces people to view parties as left or right but for him, it was more to do with the morals of right and wrong. This again highlights a populist discourse that accuses the elites of corruption and stresses the ‘virginity’ of the extreme right as a party of opposition to all that is bad within the system.

If anything, I would say we are a true populist party. We are a popular party and we have the common sense values. We are a nationalist populist party I suppose. (FRFN006)

I don’t see UKIP as left or right politically, but more simply right or wrong morally (UKIP002).

Throughout the interviews, respondents across all parties described the deficiencies of the current political system and contrasted the ‘virginal’ forces of the extreme right against the corrupt political elites and other institutional representatives. Leaders believed that their party would be the saviour of true democracy and the guardian of the national
interest. In addition, they claim to be the real voice of the people who are misrepresented and alienated by the professional politicians.

In addition to the more obvious distinction between the ‘in-group’ and ‘out-group’ in terms of the national community versus foreign elements, we noticed throughout the interviews that many respondents recalled a tangible feeling of exclusion from society as a result of their membership. The stigmatism attached to being a member of an extreme right party can lead to a consequent perception of injustice and frustration. This sentiment appeared to be self-reinforcing within the party and seemed to strengthen the bond of the inner circle of party activists. Some activists recalled accounts of blackmail and persecution because of their partisan affiliation. Others reported that they were frightened of losing their jobs and/or friends if their activism became public knowledge. This observation was indeed reported by Klandermans and Mayer (2006) in their study of extreme right party activists in the Netherlands and points towards an element of stigmatism in connection with extreme right partisan affiliation and how this reinforces a second dimension of in-group/out-group tension but this time the distinction is between members of extreme right parties and non-members.

If we look back at our proposed conceptual model of extreme right ideology, an important element of our model is to suggest that to a certain extent, parties and politicians have a 'choice' of where to locate themselves on the negative identity and authoritarianism dimensions. This means that we expect a certain ‘tension’ between xenophobic and populist references on the one hand, and between reactionary and repressive preferences on the other hand. In the context of manifestos analysis (see chapter 5), we could do that
systematically by looking at comparison between pillar occurrences. In the context of the interviews, it is a little bit more difficult to portray things as straightforwardly. Indeed, first of all, the interviews were qualitative and not based on random samples of party politicians, which would make any generalisation problematic. Secondly, after an initial ‘spontaneous’ phase, the interviews also included an element of systematic ‘probing’ of politicians’ views on all four pillars, which partly ‘evens out’ references across politicians and parties. However, based on the first ‘spontaneous’ part of the interviews, the differences between leaders of various parties were quite striking. For instance, in the French context, reactionary references were very frequent when talking to MPF politicians, and almost completely absent from the discourse of FN ones. Similarly, populist references were far more frequent when speaking to UKIP politicians, while references to the xenophobic pillar were far more sustained in the speech of BNP politicians. Even though this can only be proposed as an ‘impressionistic’ and approximative estimation, in both cases the insistence on the two competing pillars was clearly imbalanced and almost symmetric between MPF/FN on the one hand, UKIP/BNP on the other hand.

4.5 Summary

In this chapter, we have used the interviews that we conducted with leaders of extreme right parties in the UK and France to qualitatively illustrate the essence of the four pillars within our conceptual map. We have found that there were elements of each of the four pillars in the discourse of extreme right party leaders and officials in both France and the UK. In the context of the authoritarian dimension, we heard references to a reactionary
component based on the return to a traditional way of life with the instillation of established values and morals. We also experienced a repressive element within the authoritarian dimension that emphasised the rule of law and order within a structured society led by a strong state and an authoritative leader. Similarly, in respect to the negative identity dimension, extreme right leaders and officials highlighted the xenophobic conception by contrasting the interest of the national community with that of the foreign ‘other’. Scapegoats for modern day society’s problems were found in references to immigrants, migrants, asylum seekers or more generally in ‘foreign’ elements. In addition, there were also numerous references to a populist discourse that identified politicians and institutional elites as the common enemy and that the way forward was to place the power in the hands of a party that could restore the people’s will and follow policies inspired by ‘common sense’.

Based on the interviews, we can already see that some of the parties have a discursive predominance on some of the strategic-discursive components. In this respect, in the UK, the BNP tends to have a discourse leaning towards a xenophobic-repressive ideological identity, and UKIP is more aligned to the populist-reactionary discourse. In contrast, leaders and officials of the FN in France, largely emphasise the populist-repressive dynamic of extreme right ideological discourse, whilst the elites of the MPF identify mostly with the xenophobic-reactionary pillars of the conceptual map. These preliminary findings will be empirically tested in chapter five when we analyse the manifestoes of the French, German and British extreme right parties.
Chapter Five

Capturing the Ideological Identities of Extreme Right Parties

Chapter Outline

5.1 Introduction

5.2 The negative identity dimension: the xenophobic and populist pillars

5.3 The authoritarian dimension: the social and institutional authoritarianism pillars

5.4 Confirming the conceptual map of extreme right ideology

5.5 Summary
5.1 Introduction

The extreme right party family in Europe consists of many parties that seem to have an ideology in common but one that is marked by substantial discursive variations. In fact, we argue that each individual party has to make a series of strategic-discursive choices that will determine an ideological identity that defines each party within the family group. In this chapter, we test our conceptual map of extreme right ideology by mapping the discourse of the nine extreme right parties in France, Britain and Germany. We use comparative text analysis of party manifestoes to show how these parties retain different ideological identities. Whilst the quantitative analysis of ideological references is extremely interesting as it provides an overview of the global ideological discourse, it is also important that we do not overlook the value of a brief but crucial qualitative analysis of the manifestoes. Therefore, we also present some excerpts of discourse from the manifestoes of the three British extreme right parties (BNP, UKIP, and the English Democrats) in order to illustrate the various types of strategic-discursive rhetoric. We discuss the ideological 'location' of each party within the defined and bounded territory of the extreme right party family and ascribe each party to a sub-type that identifies their ideological and discursive emphasis. The three party systems we study in this chapter include at least three main parties of the extreme right party family. These parties vary greatly in terms of their discursive strategies and retain very different electoral records. This provides us with a unique testing ground to try and understand the core ideological discourse of multiple extreme right parties within a given country and across several party systems.
In chapters one and two, we discussed some of the conceptual and definitional problems faced by scholars studying the extreme right party family. Whilst the existing literature is plagued by competing models and lingering doubts whether these parties are just too different that they do not constitute a real party family, we propose to test an empirically defined map of extreme right ideology that is tailored to the discursive specificities of this particular party family. In order to capture the subtle differences between these parties, we require a robust empirical framework that can be transposed to various party systems, whilst at the same time it must retain conceptual validity. A central tenet of our argument throughout this thesis is that the variation within the discourse of extreme right parties, which seems to be so troubling when it comes to finding common postures, is symptomatic of constrained ideological choices that every single party has to make. Far from being disruptive and exceptional, these subtle differences should be discussed and taken into account when defining the ideological heart of the extreme right party family.

Indeed, as we have described in chapter two, each party retains a unique blend of discourse that varies along two fundamental ideological dimensions (authoritarianism and negative identity). Furthermore, we argue that there is also a natural tension between the two competing conceptions of each dimension. The emphasis placed on the different conceptions of each dimension will allow us to define each party based on its location on the conceptual map. Each party’s ideological identity will vary according to internal ideological pressures and constraints, its target electoral market, and the institutional and contextual specificities of the political, electoral, and party system. In addition, as we shall see in chapter six, the specific ideological locations of extreme right parties within each system will shape internal - within the extreme right, and external - vis-à-vis
mainstream parties - party competition. Moreover, as we test in chapter seven, each
specific sub-type of party is expected to have different levels of likely electoral success
according to the ideological distribution of the electorate across the four quadrants of
extreme right ideology.

While we believe the four pillars of extreme right discourse make some intuitive sense, it
seems important to underline what they correspond to in actual terms, and what sort of
references they effectively encompass. Throughout the next section we present examples
of the discourse we coded as part of the textual analysis of the British party manifestoes.
This will help us to provide the reader with a better understanding of the subtleties
concerned with the discourse of the extreme right and conceptualise the ‘locations’ of the
parties on the ideological map.

5.2 The negative identity dimension: the xenophobic and populist pillars

As we have seen in chapters two and four, the first defining feature of the negative
identity dimension relies on contrasting the identity of the national community to the
defined ‘out-group’. The ideological discourse associated with this dimension tends to
emphasise the exclusion of specific groups or minorities whether they be foreigners,
immigrants, asylum-seekers, countries, minorities, other parties, systems, politicians,
bureaucrats, etc. Our conceptual map of extreme right ideology suggests that references to
the negative identity dimension can embody a civic negative identity or a cultural
negative identity. This distinction of civic and cultural identities draws upon the
inspiration of Bruter’s model of political identities (2005, 2009). The cultural conception
of negative identity broadly corresponds to xenophobia, whilst its civic conception is embodies its populist counterpart. To recapitulate, the cultural conception opposes the assumed homogeneity of the national community (as it is defined by the extreme right party in question) to an assumed out-group. Similarly, the civic conception of the negative identity dimension contrasts the will of the people to that of the self-interested corrupt ruling elites. Each party will have a dominant mode on one of the two conceptions according to their relative emphasis within the discourse of their party manifesto (see chapters two and four on the tension between the two conceptions)

*The cultural conception of the negative identity dimension: the xenophobic pillar*

As we have stated already, the cultural conception constitutes the xenophobic conception of the negative identity scale. We expect to find anti-foreigner references within the discourse of extreme right parties. These references will typically contrast the assumed homogeneous characteristics of the 'in-group' (usually the national community however ethnically defined) to the targeted 'out-group' (various types of foreigners). We expect that the dichotomy between identity frames and oppositional frames to be important within the discourse of the extreme right party family. The 'us versus them' distinction is used as a frame to present the discrimination of relevant 'out-groups' and the inherent preference for the rights and privileges of the 'in-group'. This negative conception of identity relies on cultural identity exclusiveness, which contrasts the 'true' national community with its 'parasitic' foreign elements, be they influences, norms, values, institutions, or indeed people. This foreign out-group may refer to a foreigner within (minorities, etc) or outside (other countries, etc). Broadly defined xenophobic, racist, or
anti-Semitic elements are perhaps the oldest aspect of extreme right politics to be identified by political scientists.

The BNP, for example, emphasises the 'in-group' and 'out-group' distinction of opposing the national community (however defined) and the targeted 'other'. The party also refers to the national community as the 'indigenous peoples of these islands'. In addition, the BNP appoints itself and as the spokesperson for the people of the national community as we can see in the following excerpt 'we, as the sole political representatives of the Silent Majority of the English, Scots, Irish and Welsh who formed and were formed by our island home, have one overriding demand: We want our country back!'. In order to stress the distinction between the rights of the national community and that of others, the BNP states that 'when we talk of British democracy we do so in an ethnic as well as a civic sense'. This suggests that the BNP conceives democracy as a reserve for the national community and that it can be defined not only in a civic manner but also in an ethnic sense.

Furthermore, the BNP asserts that the country has been taken hostage of the 'social experiment of multi-culturalism'. They also suggest that multicultural Britain is a product of a plan that the elites have engineered 'our Masters have spent decades giving our money away in pursuit of an unworkable imperial fantasy' and is part of the 'long-term cultural war being waged by a ruling regime'. The BNP believes that this will lead to the 'eventual liquidation of Britain as a nation and a people' and that 'Britain's very existence today is threatened by immigration'. There is also a certain level of scaremongering with an anti-Islamic slant such as 'the accession of Turkey would at a stroke increase the EU's
Muslim population by more than 75 million'. The BNP also indulges in some anti-American rhetoric such as 'US-led 'Clash of Civilisations' and 'the worldwide reach of US consumerist culture through film and television'.

With respect to the discourse contained within UKIP's manifesto, there are fewer references to the xenophobic conception of the negative identity dimension. UKIP demands that ‘the first duty of the British government is to defend our country’. In addition, the party asserts that ‘the first responsibility of a British government is to its own population, not to those who would like to settle here’. Here, there is little provision for immigrants and refugees but the party does not advocate forced repatriation of non-nationals but does state that they want to achieve zero immigration.

In terms of cultural negative identity, the English Democrats are pure and simple a party for the English. They claim to represent the English people and offer a definition of what it is to be English, ‘to be English is to be part of a community. We English share a communal history, language and culture. We have a communal identity and memory. We share a “we” sentiment; a sense of belonging. These things cannot be presented as items on a checklist. Our community, like others, has no easily defined boundaries but we exist and we have the will to continue to exist’. In addition, the party states that ‘the public culture of England should be that of the indigenous English’. Another example of these cultural conceptions of the negative identity dimension is embodied by the following extract ‘the wishes, security and interests of the people of England should be the dominant factors in determining asylum and immigration policies for England’. There is no elaboration of what these interests might be or who the people of England include. In
addition, they oppose mass immigration and wish to preserve and protect English national identity in order to foster social cohesion, for example, ‘our principal concern is to preserve and build on what is left of English cultural unity and social cohesion. The preservation of our identity and culture are at least as important as economic considerations. We do not accept the fallacious but widely publicised economic arguments for mass immigration’. There are also some references to anti-French rhetoric within the English Democrats’ manifesto, for example, ‘France obtained privileged access to the European market for its colonial produce, and took the lead in building European institutions on the French model - centralised and bureaucratic’. In addition, the party also targets globalisation as corrosive influence on society and national identity, ‘the globalism being inflicted on us is neither desirable nor inescapable. It is not the product of an inevitable historical process. We need not stand by and allow our identity and way of life to be sacrificed to its needs’. Similarly, the party does not elaborate on what they mean by ‘whatever measures are necessary’ in their attempt to stop mass immigration, ‘the people of England have never voted for nor supported mass immigration. The English Democrats support whatever measures are necessary to bring mass immigration to a complete end’.

As we can see from the above examples taken from the three British extreme right parties, the xenophobic conception of the negative identity dimension has different interpretations and is of varying importance within the discourse of these three extreme right parties. It is evident that the BNP and the English Democrats retain a different line of xenophobic discourse compared to UKIP. We now turn our attention to the populist conception of the negative identity dimension.
The civic conception of the negative identity dimension: the populist pillar

At the other end of the negative identity dimension lays the contrast between the ‘real people’ and an equally ‘parasitic’ and devious influence: the elites, who are deemed to betray the nation’s identity and interest. We expect that the populist discourse of extreme right parties to target a variety of actors and institutions: political parties (with the extreme right parties implicitly presenting themselves as a non-party whilst often preferring the term of a popular movement), the media (seen as unified, hostile, and often controlled by other powers), and economic and bureaucratic elites. All are likely targets within this populist pillar, alongside pressure groups – from trade unions to human rights organisations. In fact, all elites are accused of combining their forces and resources to share power and deprive the ‘people’ of what is rightly theirs. The enemy is ‘within’ and (broadly) institutional, and the extreme right party bestows upon itself the challenge to reclaim the people’s power from these elites who have usurped it, only pretend to compete (a proper cartel), and are only interested in their personal professional and financial gains. We now take a look at examples of the populist discourse within the manifestoes of the BNP, UKIP and the English Democrats.

When speaking about the national parliament the BNP refers to the ‘rubber-stamping closed shops for rule by diktat from Brussels and Strasbourg’. Verbs such as ‘blackmail’ and ‘cajole’ are used to emphasise in order to stress the allegation of corruption amongst the elites. In contrast, the BNP promises to restore ‘honesty’, ‘integrity’ and ‘transparency’ to the civic and public institutions. The BNP also pledges to ‘put an end to the blackmail and underhanded tactics’ that the elites engage in. The ‘out-of-touch liberal
elite’, the ‘left-liberal elite’ or ‘the tired remnants of the old ruling class’ do not understand the worries and insecurities of the common man on the street and the ‘handcuffs of bureaucracy’ prevent them from listening to the people.

There is often an element of paranoia and exposition of conspiracy theories within the discourse of the extreme right. This is indeed true of the BNP, which claims that the ‘political elite are nearing the end of a process which will outlaw any expression of opinions deemed to be politically incorrect’. The party suggests that the political elites are engaging in a process that will ultimately subvert the freedom of speech. There are several references to the damaging influence of political correctness and that the elites use this to silence opposition from the BNP. The BNP promises to ‘end the practice of politically correct indoctrination in all its guises’.

We now turn to look at the populist discourse in the manifesto of UKIP. There is an overwhelming dominance of the populist conception of the negative identity dimension within their manifesto. UKIP places emphasis on their criticisms of the existing political system and the mainstream political parties and their representatives. The party often links allegations of corruption directed towards the establishment to the EU, for example, ‘the UK Independence Party exists because none of the old political parties are prepared to accept that the real government of Britain is now in Brussels’ and ‘the EU is undemocratic, corrupt and unreformable’. UKIP believes that ‘the only way for Britain is UKIP’s way: we must leave. Until this is done, individuals and our businesses will continue to be strangled by all the ill-conceived intrusive regulation’. This statement suggests that UKIP perceives itself to be different from all the rest and is the only party
that can remedy the situation. The following extract exemplifies the simplistic rhetoric that is frequently iterated in the manifesto ‘SAY NO to European Union. But we also say NO to the culture of paperwork, performance targets and spin, NO to uncontrolled immigration, NO to a society in which everything is regulated and dissent is suppressed by fear and political correctness. Only outside the EU will it be possible to begin rebuilding a Britain which is run for British people, not for career politicians and bureaucrats’. In addition, UKIP stresses their claim to represent honesty (in contrast to the allegedly corrupt and dishonest politicians and elites) and to voice the concerns of hardworking and law-abiding citizens. In the following excerpts, we can see these elements within the discourse of the manifesto ‘we are the party that speaks out and is prepared to confront our country’s problems squarely and honestly’ and ‘decent, law-abiding British citizens feel increasingly vulnerable and personal safety is now a major concern, particularly for women and the elderly’.

We now move on to discuss the details of the discourse of the English Democrats. In terms of populist discourse, the English Democrats highlight the sovereignty of the people and claim to be their true representatives. In the following quotes, we can see this notion is exemplified in the manifest; ‘We are committed to government of the people, by the people, for the people’ and they assert that ‘sovereignty belongs to the people’.

In summary, we can see that here again there are substantial differences within the populist discourse of the three British parties. UKIP leads the way in terms of populist references by identifying the elites as the main culprits of the ‘mess’, whilst the BNP and
the ED are more interested in emphasising the xenophobic conception of the negative identity dimension. We now turn our attention to the authoritarianism dimension.

5.3 The authoritarian dimension: the social and institutional authoritarianism pillars

The conceptual map also posits that extreme right parties must choose a location on a second core ideological dimension: authoritarianism. In this respect, we expect extreme right parties to present themselves as the champions of order, if not the only ones capable of restoring it in countries vibrantly described as chaotic and anarchic. Many have argued that in the 2002 French presidential election campaign, the Front National had benefited from a campaign focused on ‘insecurity’. Similarly, the Polish League of Polish Families (LPR) and Self-Defence (Samoobrona Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej) largely build their campaigns on the idea that contemporary Poland has lost the yardsticks on which its order and cohesion relied. As a recap, we argue that the authoritarian stance of extreme right parties can take two very distinct forms depending on the solution that they advocate to restore order. Fundamentally, these two conceptions represent either 1) a return to a previously existing utopian order, whereby traditional society and values are deemed to be the answer to today’s anarchy (reactionary pillar), or 2) call for an empowered and strengthened state, that is expected to be capable of atomising those elements who make society hell for good citizens (repressive pillar).

The social conception of the authoritarianism dimension: the reactionary pillar

With regards to the authoritarianism dimension, we expect extreme right parties to distinguish between a ‘social’ conception of authoritarianism that emphasises the traditional way of life and the sacralisation of an old and dominant culture, and an
'institutional' conception based on a stronger state. We refer to these conceptions as reactionary and repressive forms of discourse respectively. We expect that reactionary discourse will accentuate the traditional values and morals of an age long past in order to create a new revolutionary order. As a result, this national rebirth will require a collective and unitary effort. This reinstates the presumption that these goals can only be achieved if the national community works together as a whole. This type of group-oriented discourse has often been explained as a reaction to the erosion of traditional linkages such as the breakdown of family nuclei, loss of neighbourhood communities, or the collapse of social class solidarity. Reactionary discourse therefore emphasises a utopian vision of a higher social order that will overcome the alleged imperfections of contemporary civilization in a bid to restore some kind of cohesion that is currently lacking from today's society. Within the discourse of reactionary types of extreme right parties, we would expect references to idealism, patriotism, belief in and respect for traditional values, and the subordination of virtues such as efficiency and diligence to the national community and the rejection of 'hedonism' and the 'leisure society'.

In the discourse of the BNP, the reactionary conception is expressed as a desire to return to an idealised past with utopian elements. The party wishes for a 'national and cultural regeneration'. The BNP stresses the importance of traditions and civic duties in order to create cohesive communities, for example, they want a 'return to traditional standards of civility and politeness in British life' and the 'creation and maintenance of an undercurrent of national solidarity is one of the cornerstones of a true national democracy'. The BNP also states that they have an 'obligation to pass on to generations yet unborn, the collected knowledge, wisdom and lore, which we ourselves have
inherited'. Here, the emphasis is not an exertion of power and control but that of preservation of traditions and ancestral heritage. The BNP demands 'a return of pride and purpose', a 'national revival' and measures to 'strengthen the traditional family'. They argue that 'tradition, heritage, and civility must be understood as goods in themselves, to be defended for their own sake'. The party also stresses the importance of heritage, patriotism, and pride in national identity. 'We demand the right to be proud of Britain again, and for the English, Scots, Welsh, Irish and Ulster peoples to be allowed to celebrate their identity and heritage with as much right as is accorded to other native peoples'. Similarly, they state 'we demand the right to preserve our culture, heritage, and identity. Our national character and native institutions are a precious inheritance, for which our ancestors have paid a high price over the centuries'. Within the discourse of the BNP, the role of children and youth is crucial to the survival and preservation of national identity and cultural traditions. The following statements exemplify this notion. 'We believe that all children suffer when deprived of their right to an ancestral identity and contact with their cultural roots' and 'we will also seek to instill in our young people knowledge of and pride in the history, cultures, and heritage of the native peoples of Britain'. The next extract from the BNP manifesto highlights the appeal to the common sense approach of the BNP and that they will be the only ones able to implement the changes that are required to bring society back from the brink of chaos 'the British National Party with its comprehensive, articulated and common sense approach seeks to be the vehicle for that change. Our time is approaching'.

We find a relatively significant number of references to the reactionary conception of the authoritarianism within the discourse of UKIP. For example, the following extract from
the manifesto highlights the centrality of the family within society; 'when proper
democracy is also restored, individuals, and particularly young people, will regain a
stronger sense of belonging to a society with the family as the basic stable unit and a
better set of values'. In addition, the following example highlights the reactionary
conception rather well. 'But too often, rights favour the criminal rather than the victim
and the unruly pupil rather than the teacher. They create tension rather than relieve it,
emphasise differences, set society against itself and diminish the much more precious
right to free speech. The reality is that all these rules and rights are killing off the virtues
of trust, initiative, responsibility and respect that make society work. A change of mindset
is necessary in order to move away from the regulatory culture, the dependency culture
and the compensation culture'.

The English democrats also emphasise the key role of the family nucleus and the
transmission of cultural and moral values. The following statement exemplifies this
belief. 'It is often overlooked that our society is founded on the institutions of marriage
and family life. The family is the place where cultural and moral values are most
successfully passed from one generation to the next. We favour the promotion of marital
families, consisting of mother, father and children, as the preferred building block of our
society'. In addition, there is nascent nostalgia for a past time that rejoiced in social
cohesion, for example, 'our society, which now lacks the social cohesion and shared
values that once gave us a mostly peaceful and well-ordered way of life'.

The reactionary conception has its place in all three parties of the extreme right party
family in Britain but it seems to be most prominent and pronounced in the discourse of
UKIP. In the final part of this section, we examine the repressive conception of the authoritarianism dimension within the manifestoes of the three parties.

The institutional conception of the authoritarianism spectrum: the repressive pillar

The repressive mode of the authoritarianism dimension relies on the exercise of state power to fight chaos and threatening anarchy. We expect that extreme right parties will refer to the role of the strong state, the importance of restoring law and order within society, and the requirement of strong leadership. The references are not to lost values but to crime, the solution is not discipline but prison, the actors are not parents, priests, and teachers, but policemen, judges, and sometimes, the military. Fear of punishment and the restored authority of the state will ultimately re-establish order. As such, limitations are often imposed on personal and collective freedoms and the only authorised collective identification is channelled towards achieving the great national destiny. We also expect references to a preferred hierarchical organisation of the community within the discourse of the extreme right. This hierarchy is determined by the party and often assumes the subordination of the individual to the state. Within extreme right discourse, the state, is thus, depicted as a strong and powerful institution that will employ its power to eliminate the disruptive elements in society.

Before we move on to discuss the examples of repressive discourse within the discourse of the British extreme right parties, it is worth noting that it is predictably difficult to find references to and examples of repressive ideology in party manifestoes. Extreme right parties may wish to minimise references in an official document such as party
manifestoes to an omnipotent state or an autocratic leader as this may inevitably restrict their potential electorate. This particular problem highlights the importance of combining the quantitative text analysis with the face-to-face interviews of extreme right party leaders and officials as we can hope to triangulate the findings in an attempt to gain a better understanding of the true ideological identities of extreme right parties.

Notwithstanding this note of caution, there were indeed a few clear examples of the repressive conception within the manifestoes of the British extreme right parties. The BNP, for example, declares that the armed forces ‘must take control of our national borders’ and to ‘defend our homeland and our independence’. They also aim to ‘reintroduce the death penalty for terrorists’.

In terms of repressive discourse, UKIP does not wish to exert oppressive rule by force or strengthen the state ‘we need to relieve our forces from too much central direction, including performance targets, the mass of paperwork and politically-correct rules that ignore the realities of the job’. UKIP wants to see ‘bobbies back on the beat’ and the ‘handcuffs on the criminals, not the police’. Again, we see the criticism of bureaucracy but this time it is preventing the police from doing their job.

References to the repressive conception of authoritarianism within the manifesto of the ED are rather predictable. The party recognises the central role of the armed forces in the following example ‘our armed forces should enjoy the highest standards of training and equipment. Their primary role should be as a fighting force’.
Overall, these examples of discourse have helped us gain a better understanding of the various ideological references that are common throughout the manifestoes of the three British extreme right parties. We can clearly see that the BNP and the English Democrats seem to lead the way in their references to the xenophobic conception of the negative identity dimension, whilst UKIP’s discourse is predominantly populist and reactionary with few references to both the xenophobic and repressive pillars. This finding reinforces the tension between the two different conceptions of the ideological dimensions that we have proposed in our conceptual map.

5.4 Exploring the conceptual map of extreme right ideology

In chapter three, we outlined the overarching arguments that have guided the research design and the empirical testing of the conceptual map of extreme right ideology. In chapter four, we used interviews with extreme right elites to gain a better understanding of whether our conceptual map made sense in the context of their discourse. Here, we now test whether the two founding strategic-discursive dimensions can be found within the ‘official’ discourse of extreme right parties. The two dimensions create four possible sub-types of party within the extreme right party family: xenophobic-reactionary, xenophobic-repressive, populist-reactionary, populist-repressive. References to the four conceptions will be coded. The parties will be assigned a dominant ideological identity according to which conceptions they refer to most often within the manifestoes. With reference to communication theory, we anticipate that extreme right parties will assume a dominant ‘mode’ on each dimension, that is, that they will emphasise one of the two conceptions of each dimension as they will want to stake out their specificity and avoid
ideological incoherence. This will thus provide each party with an ideological identity within this specified and constrained ideological space.

We outlined the general structure of our methodology for the text analysis of party manifestoes in chapter three. Our framework of analysis aims at capturing the salience given to the four strategic-discursive pillars in each manifesto to compare the ideological discourse of the nine extreme right parties. As a recap, each manifesto was blindly triple-coded by hand. Informed by the interviews with extreme right leaders and the discursive illustrations of the four pillars from within the manifestoes themselves, the coders read all twelve manifestoes and provided a series of word lists that represented the ideological discourse characterised by the conceptual map. The multilingual lists were then compared and discussed. The word lists that contained the ideological discourse and their coding, which pillar each word had been ascribed to, had reliability of over 95 percent. The remaining words were discussed at length until we had all agreed on which words should be retained and which ideological pillar they should be assigned to, and which words should be excluded from the analysis because of their ambiguity. All references were coded manually so that a word used in a completely irrelevant context was not counted. The word occurrences were then systematically registered. In total, we came up with a list of 827 words, which were collapsed into 509 word categories that represented the two ideological dimensions of extreme right ideology. Full word lists appear in appendix B. Words and word categories across parties and countries were conceived to be equivalent rather than a mere translation. Total word occurrences for each pillar and each party were then expressed as two comparable proportions. Expressing occurrences as proportions of

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35 As well as manifestoes of extreme right parties from twelve other European countries.
the total words in each manifesto would seem intuitive but would be linguistically unrealistic as shown by discourse analysts (Wodak, 1999), as various languages use different proportions of ‘wasted’ grammatical words (prepositions, articles, etc.)

We thus created a variable expressing each word occurrence as a proportion of the total valid words in the manifesto, that is, the total words excluding neutral grammatical items. This Proportion of total Valid Words (PVW) is used when comparing gross word occurrences in the parties’ discourse (e.g. showing they appear more often in extreme right than non-extreme right parties). We created a second variable expressing word occurrences as proportions of the total coded words. That is, all the words that fit the xenophobic, populist, reactionary and repressive pillars. This Proportion of total Coded Words (PCW) is used to compare the emphases of discourse and party types. The resulting patterns produce some provocative findings.

The results of the text analysis, presented in figure 5.1, confirm the importance of the two ideological dimensions in extreme right discourse. Altogether, total gross references represent an average of 39.5 percent of total valid words (PVW) for the nine extreme right parties analysed, which is 6.5 times higher than the 6.1 percent average PVW for the six main non-extreme right parties, which manifestoes we also analysed. In fact, the highest PVW amongst these other parties is below 10 percent. By contrast, scores range from 24.3 percent for the ED to a massive 59.7 percent for the Republikaner. These direct references to the two dimensions seem to confirm their role at the heart of the extreme right ideology as suggested by our conceptual map.
Figure 5.1: The distribution of discourse across the four ideological pillars

Average total score (39.5 percent)

Hill!!

Average total score (all 4 pillars) non-extreme right parties (6.1%)

Highest total score (all 4 pillars) non extreme right parties (9.8%)

Note: Figures are proportions of total valid words in percent (PVW)
Table 5.1 gives another insight into the way these references are distributed across the two ideological dimensions. Overall, 58.2 percent of total coded word counts (PCW) refer to the negative identity dimension and 41.8 percent to the authoritarianism dimension. Indeed, for eight of the nine parties considered, the negative identity dimension takes precedence over ideological discourse referring to the authoritarianism dimension. The exception to this is the German Republikaner, with 52 percent of PCW dedicated to authoritarianism discourse, whilst only 48 percent of PCW are related to the negative identity dimension. At the same time, however, 68 percent of PCW in the English Democrats’ manifesto were references of negative identity and only 32 percent of PCW to the authoritarianism dimension. The negative identity dimension thus seems more salient for the British parties than it does for their French and German counterparts.

Table 5.1: References to the two ideological dimensions in the nine extreme eight party manifestos

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Negative Identity Dimension</th>
<th>Authoritarianism Dimension</th>
<th>Total PVW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Xenophobic</td>
<td>Populist</td>
<td>Reactionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ED</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPF</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>29.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKIP</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPD</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FN</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNR</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DVU</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REP</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: All figures are percentages. Figures in the first four columns represent proportions of total coded words (PCW) associated with each dimension for each party. The sum of these four figures in each row thus equals 100 (+/- rounding). The figure in the last column represents the total occurrence of words associated with the four dimensions (PVW) for each party. The average PVW for the nine parties is 39.5 percent and for the six non-extremist parties, 6.1 percent.
Beyond the relative weight of each of the dimensions, we expected that a tension would exist between the two conceptions of each dimension. We test this by looking at the correlation between pairs of pillars for 29 extreme right parties in 15 European countries. We find negative correlations both between the parties' scores on the xenophobic and populist expressions of negative identity (-0.10) and between the reactionary and repressive conceptions of authoritarianism (-0.13). This result seems to confirm our expectation stated in section 2.7 in chapter 2 that each party will have a defining dominant mode of discourse that emphasises one of the two conceptions on each of the two ideological dimensions.

Our conceptual map acknowledges that extreme right parties can choose different strategies when it comes to choosing their dominant ideological identity. Therefore we witness a diversity of ideological identities that combine different conceptions of the negative identity and authoritarianism dimensions. In order to differentiate themselves from their competitors in the same party system, we expect extreme right parties to emphasise different conceptions of the two structuring ideological dimensions. Indeed, table 5.2 shows how parties that are usually considered to belong to the same party family differ in their dominant discursive emphasis and are thus located in the four different quadrants created by the two structuring ideological dimensions. The results of this analysis confirm that the nine extreme right parties competing in the three countries studied here occupy all four ideological quadrants. Three parties can be characterised by a predominantly xenophobic-repressive ideological discourse (BNP, DVU, and ED), three

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36 This analysis was conducted on the findings of a project that extends the party manifesto analysis seen here in this thesis to 29 parties across 15 countries. The project is directed by Dr. Bruter.
37 Both results are statistically significant at 0.10 level, which is used because of the small n of 29 parties.
parties are defined by their emphasis on populist-repressive references (FN, NPD, and marginally MNR), whilst two parties are located within the populist-reactionary quadrant (UKIP and die Republikaner), and finally the MPF, can be defined by its xenophobic-reactionary position. This finding echoes the core expectations of our conceptual model detailed in section 2.7. All four types of strategic-discursive combinations are represented in the three cases. This is an important finding as, as discussed in chapter 1, many traditional theories believe that the extreme right party family is either monolithically xenophobic or, on the contrary, singularly populist in its very definition.

Table 5.2: Ideological identities of the nine extreme right parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUADRANT</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Negative Identity Orientation</th>
<th>Authoritarianism Orientation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>XENOPHOBIC-REPRESSIVE</td>
<td>ED</td>
<td>-40.752</td>
<td>+62.696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>-9.538</td>
<td>+10.710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DVU</td>
<td>-2.169</td>
<td>+34.707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POPULIST-REPRESSIVE</td>
<td>MNR</td>
<td>+0.467</td>
<td>+43.194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FN</td>
<td>+27.065</td>
<td>+35.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NPD</td>
<td>+90.937</td>
<td>+106.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POPULIST-REACTIONARY</td>
<td>UKIP</td>
<td>+134.329</td>
<td>-86.957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>REP</td>
<td>+20.914</td>
<td>-9.728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XENOPHOBIC-REACTIONARY</td>
<td>MPF</td>
<td>-111.39</td>
<td>-125.824</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Entries represent the net difference between populist and xenophobic references (negative identity orientation column), and between repressive and reactionary references (authoritarianism orientation column). This means that in the first column, a negative result suggests a xenophobic orientation of the negative identity discourse of the party (cultural negative identity), and a positive result a populist one (civic negative identity). Similarly, in the second column, a negative score implies a reactionary orientation of the authoritarianism discourse (social authoritarianism) and a positive score a repressive one (institutional authoritarianism). The first column indicates in which of four possible quadrants each party is thus located.
The majority of parties have a distinct location, with the exception of the MNR and the Republikaner, both of which have rather vague positions on the negative identity and authoritarianism dimensions respectively. Figure 5.2 illustrates the ideological location of all nine parties within the conceptual extreme right 'universe', based on their emphases, and location in one of the four quadrants of extreme right ideological discourse.
Figure 5.2: The ideological identities of the nine extreme right parties

Notes: Each shape (illustrated by the full, dashed, broken lines) exemplifies the salience of references to each of the four ideological pillars based on proportions of total coded words (PTW). The corresponding stars, crosses and circles represent the net location of the party within the extreme right ideological territory.
5.5 Summary

The analysis of the manifestoes of the nine main French, German and British parties competing for the same potential electorate reveals some extremely interesting patterns. The first concerns the conceptual ‘geography’ of the extreme right. We show that two fundamental dimensions of extreme right discourse – negative identity and authoritarianism – not only distinguish the extreme right from mainstream parties in strategic-discursive terms (references to them are an extremely important 6.5 times more frequent in extreme right manifestoes than in those of other parties) but also structure the extreme right ideological territory into four quadrants: xenophobic-reactionary, xenophobic-repressive, populist-reactionary, and populist-repressive. Each extreme right party chooses specific strategies and emphases different conceptions of their ideological discourse, which gives them a location on each dimension and provides each party with its own ideological identity.

The implications of these findings are significant for our understanding of extreme right party politics. First of all, they explain why it is apparently so difficult to find common ideological traits across members of the extreme right party family. Indeed, our map of extreme right ideology shows that variations between xenophobic and populist attitudes on the negative identity scale and between reactionary and repressive positions on the authoritarianism scale are an intrinsic part of the very concept of extreme right ideology. Thus, the apparent difficulty to define the extreme right party seems to stem from the fact that the definition must be tailored to suit the specificities of the extreme right party family ideological discourse and that a one-size fits all definition does not work when trying to understand the subtle complexities of this particular party family. Indeed,
references to all four conceptions of the two ideological dimensions are present in the discourses of most extreme right parties, but we show that they are negatively correlated by pair, and that at the extreme, a pillar can be almost absent from a party's discourse as long as the alternative mode of expression of the same dimension is sufficiently emphasised (for example, the reactionary pillar is relatively insignificant within the ideological discourse of the ED).

Whilst this particular conceptual map of ideological discourse is tailored specifically to the extreme right party family, it could also be conceivably replicated for other party families albeit along with their respective ideological dimensions. Although, of course, a defining ideological feature in the discourse of the extreme right such as the xenophobic conception of the negative identity will not have any place at all amongst the defining ideological dimensions of moderate parties. Therefore, each party family will have its own structuring ideological dimension that can be used to define the sub-types of parties within it. Thus, our findings suggest that there is a difference between ideological dimensions that define the membership of a party family and policy dimensions that are important to a party's programme but are not essentially ideological. Political parties from all party families often change their policies as they have far more freedom to move and change their location on these compared to the ideological dimensions. Parties can decide to change their ideological identity (see chapter six on the dynamics of party competition) and move their strategic-discursive position on the two dimensions but the structuring ideological dimensions within the party family remain stable. Members of a given party family will therefore have to make fundamental choices between various conceptions or strategic-discursive expressions of their core ideological foundations.
As we have seen in the course of this chapter, the axes of internal competition seem to vary across countries. In France, the main axis of opposition is between populist-repressive and xenophobic-reactionary parties, whilst in the UK; two xenophobic-repressive parties vie with a populist-reactionary one. In Germany, there is no predominant combination. This lack of correlation between the two dimensions of extreme right ideology emphasises their independence. It also shows how both dimensions – and both pillars within each of them, equally participate in the definition of extreme right politics. Indeed, if one were to argue, say, that a xenophobic emphasis is a necessary pre-condition for membership of the extreme right party family, one would exclude the French FN from it. This would obviously be a difficult position to maintain as the FN is one of the most widely used referent in prototypical definitions of extreme right parties. Similarly, supposing the need for a repressive orientation would lead to the exclusion of Die Republikaner. If, on both dimension, each possible pillar is thus a credible choice, one of the consequences of a party’s chosen location is its likeliness to survive where several extreme right parties compete.

As a result, these strategic-discursive choices may have implications, not only on the dynamics of internal party competition (see chapter six) but also their relative electoral success – depending on the ‘match’ between the party’s location within its own ideological territory and that of its potential voters (see chapter seven). As we shall see in the next chapter, the dominant ideological emphasis and the corresponding specific location of a given party can have repercussions and implications on the survival and existence of other parties from the extreme right party family. Therefore, a party’s ideological location will be influenced by the strategic-discursive choices of other
competitors within and outside the extreme right party family. In addition, in chapter seven we highlight the impact of these strategic-discursive choices upon each party’s relative electoral success. Their level of success may be determined, among other social, economic and political factors, by the relative ‘match’ between the party’s location within its own ideological territory and the ideological distribution of its potential voters.
Chapter Six

Exploring the Extreme Right Universe – Patterns of Internal Party Competition

Chapter Outline

6.1 The phenomenon of multiple extreme right parties
6.2 A ‘within party family’ model of party competition
6.3 The French extreme right party family – patterns of internal competition
6.4 The British extreme right party family – patterns of internal competition
6.5 The German extreme right party family- patterns of internal competition
6.6 Broader implications - General party competition
6.7 Summary
6.1 The phenomenon of multiple extreme right parties

In the previous chapter, we saw that the nine extreme right parties in the three party systems that we have included in our analysis can be defined according to their strategic-discursive choices and that the conceptual map of extreme right ideology adds to our understanding of the variation in ideological discourse within the party family. We discovered that each party retained a unique positioning relative to its emphasis of the four ideological pillars and that some parties were located within the same ideological quadrant. This was true of the FN and the MNR in France and the BNP and the English Democrats in Britain. Germany was alone in the fact that all three parties assumed different ideological identities. The ideological positioning of each party within its respective party system will undoubtedly cast interesting questions as to the impact upon the internal dynamics of party competition and the relative openness to newcomers and challengers within the extreme right universe. This chapter will focus on the question of internal party competition within the extreme right party family and discuss the implications for success, coexistence and indeed, survival amongst competitors both within the internal and external context.

In several countries including the party systems of Germany, Italy, Britain, Poland and France among others, there are several parties competing for the potential extreme right vote in the hope that they conquer this increasingly lucrative electoral reservoir. On the basis of some successful electoral breakthroughs, the desire of an increasing number of parties wishing to capitalise on the potential extreme right electoral reservoir is certainly not surprising. Yet, the coexistence and survival of multiple extreme right parties within
the same party system has received little attention within the existing literature. This chapter builds upon the conceptual map of extreme right ideology exposed in chapter two and the empirical party manifesto analysis of chapter five that locates the respective ideological identities of the nine parties. We argue that the key to understanding the survival and coexistence of multiple extreme right parties can be understood if we analyse their respective ideological locations within the extreme right ideological universe and try to decipher the dynamics of internal party competition within the party family. We aim to understand how each party's individual strategic-discursive choices can impact upon the dynamics of internal party competition in a way that will help us to understand the logic underpinning the discursive variations within each party system.

In chapter five, we illustrated the ideological discourses of the nine extreme right parties in Britain, France, and Germany. We saw how these series of strategic-discursive choices results in each party being ascribed a unique ideological identity, that is, a location in the xenophobic-repressive, xenophobic-reactionary, populist-repressive or the populist-reactionary quadrants. The empirical analysis shows how each party emphasises distinctive conceptions of the two fundamental ideological dimensions and that across all three of the party systems we witness parties that occupy each one of the four quadrants. Whilst the ideological identity of each party is extremely interesting in terms of finding a suitable empirical definition of the extreme right party family, it also raises significant questions as to what other factors might have influenced the strategic-discursive choices that each party has had to make. Here, we will focus on how dynamics of party competition may have influenced these specific ideological locations and how it has altered the extreme right ideological space within each party system.
6.2 Towards a ‘within party family’ model of party competition

Traditional spatial models of party competition that are based on the traditional left-right political spectrum do not predict the coexistence of two ‘equally right-wing’ parties (Downs, 1957, Sartori, 1976). However, as we have seen, several party systems have witnessed the emergence of multiple extreme right parties that are undoubtedly competing for the same potential electorate and belong to the same party family. How can this be explained? We suggest that instead of looking at the global picture of party competition along the traditional left-right political spectrum, if we focus our attention on the bounded world of extreme right party competition, we will be able to further our understanding of these internal dynamics of party competition. In this chapter, we concentrate our focus on the extreme right party family and ‘zoom in’ on the ideological space that these parties operate within in order to examine the underlying dynamics of party competition. In other words, we claim that the important distance between parties is not measured on a universal ideology scale but on dimensions specifically meaningful to the parties themselves and their potential electorate. In the specific case of the extreme right party family, these are the two fundamental ideological dimensions of negative identity and authoritarianism. We argue that the determinants of coexistence and survival of multiple extreme right parties within the same system are, instead, to be found in this ‘within party family’ model where we analyse the ideological locations of each party and try to seek explanations that may help us to better understand their choice of location. In the following paragraphs, we outline some of the main arguments that we will put forward concerning the strategic-discursive choices of extreme right parties and the subsequent impact these locations have on the dynamics of party competition.
A clear and coherent ideological identity

In order to survive, particularly within a party system that is home to several extreme right parties, each party must communicate a clear, coherent, and understandable ideological identity to their electorate. That is, they must adhere to a distinct location on each of the two dimensions and have a predominant emphasis on two of the four conceptions. Petrocik (1996) emphasized that certain issues can become synonymous or ‘owned’ by one party and that this party is often regarded to be more credible or legitimate in the eyes of the electorate if they compete on this specific dimension. In multidimensional issue competition, parties may compete in party systems not by converging to similar positions but, rather, by emphasizing the salience of the distinct issues that give them the advantage with the voters (Feld & Grofman, 2001). Similarly, Budge & Laver (1986) argue that political parties may decide to compete by accentuating issues on which they have an undoubted advantage, rather than by putting forward contrasting policies on the same issues. Therefore, one logical conclusion of the salience theory is that parties will try to differentiate themselves from other competitors by emphasising unique ideological identities. Since there is no reason to expect that any two parties will want to campaign on the same ideological location and thus attract the same sub-group of voters (i.e. either a clear winner, loser or split vote), we expect that in order to maximise electoral success, parties will try to choose different ideological locations. Hence, each party will attempt to cultivate its own section of the ideological space or quadrant and usually one distinct from those of other existing extreme right parties.
We argue that several parties can only coexist within one party system if they distinguish a clear ideological identity that enables them to appeal to sufficiently diverse electorates and differentiate themselves from their competitors. This means that if a party is to be successful, then, it needs to emphasise different conceptions of the two ideological dimensions and have a unique location on the conceptual map. We also claim that two extreme right parties, regardless of relative radicalism, will not happily coexist within a party system if they are located ‘too close’ to each other within the same quadrant of extreme right ideological territory. This would imply that their ideological identities are not sufficiently different and that the potential electorate for this specific type of extreme right party would be in fact split between the two parties competing. In other words, a lack of ideological differentiation would mean that they would be fighting for the same segment of their already very small and restricted potential electorate. By contrast, we suggest that the key to successful cohabitation lies in the ability of extreme right parties to locate in different quadrants from pre-existing competitors as illustrated by figure 6.1.

**Figure 6.1: A strategic dilemma? The dynamics of internal party family competition**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authoritarianism dimension</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Optimal location</td>
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<td>for new party</td>
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<tr>
<td>Risky option for</td>
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<td>new party</td>
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<td>Risky option for</td>
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<td>new party</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party X (historic party)</td>
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<td>Worst option for</td>
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<td>new party</td>
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The figure depicts a hypothetical scenario in which party X is the historic extreme right party within a given party system. This party has a predominantly populist-reactionary ideological identity. We assume that a new party wishes to emerge within the same party system and wants to challenge the electoral dominance of the historic party. The new party has several different choices as to where to locate within the extreme right ideological space and each of these locations has different risks and benefits. As the figure suggests, the optimal location would be the quadrant that is ideologically opposed to the historic party (that is, different conceptions of both dimensions) and the riskiest position would be to imitate the ideological identity of the historic party by emphasising the same conceptions on both ideological dimensions. In other words, the new party would have the highest chance of survival against the historic party if it chose a different strategic-discursive identity to that of the historic party, which would thus mean that it would have to emphasise different conceptions of both ideological dimensions. In this particular case illustrated above, this optimal ideological location would be the xenophobic-repressive quadrant.

However, this ideologically optimal location does not automatically ensure electoral success for the new party. For example, if this quadrant does not seem to be electorally significant with the potential extreme right electorate (i.e. the distribution of the potential extreme right electorate is not favourable to this particular quadrant), then the loyalty afforded to the historic party may reign and the challenger would ultimately fail to gain a stronghold on the extreme right electorate. Moreover, a party that fails to choose a distinctive position on either dimension (for example, a location that would take no distinctive position on say the authoritarian dimension – no clear emphasis on the
repressive or reactionary conceptions) would be threatened by parties located in neighbouring quadrants as these parties would have a stronger ideological identity.

_No space at the inn..._

New challengers wishing to capitalise on the potential extreme right vote must avoid choosing an ideological location that has been pre-selected by an existing party of the extreme right. If an existing party has communicated a clear ideological message and is the first party to settle within one of the four ideological quadrants (not straddling either conception of the two dimensions), then this party will be the ‘historic’ party and will have to some extent a connection with the potential extreme right electorate. This existing party will have a fairly strong and stable electoral allegiance within their particular ideological quadrant. As a consequence, a new party may find it difficult to challenge this party on its own turf. Fiorina (1981) states that party supporters and voters develop a certain degree of brand loyalty based on past party performance. This is also consistent with Shepsle’s (1991) findings as he insists that parties will benefit when they campaign on previously staked-out party positions.

At any time, an existing extreme right party, whether alone in the party system or competing with ideologically close challengers may wish to relocate to a different quadrant and change its ideological discourse as a result. This move may be a good strategy if the party decides to locate in an ideological quadrant that is currently vacant (without an extreme right party espousing that particular combination of discourse) and if the electoral potential of this location is high (i.e. there is a concentration of the electorate
within this particular quadrant). In some cases, this may lead to a new or existing party surpassing the electoral success of the historic party within that particular party system. However, this strategy also runs the risk of alienating otherwise loyal existing supporters, therefore, it must be noted that a party should try to avoid making too many shifts across the ideological territory in order to assume multiple ideological identities (i.e. changing the party’s official ideological and discursive line). If a party is perceived to frequently change its location on the core ideological dimensions then it will cease to have a clear ideological identity and will not be trusted by its potential electorate. Moreover, a move from one quadrant to another will free up the ideological space previously occupied by the party and open it to potential competitors, so the party must be reasonably confident that the new position will have a greater reservoir of voters.

Keeping up with the times

A historic party could also lose out on a potential share of the extreme right electorate if it fails to keep abreast of new developments in voter preferences or if it simply occupies an ideological quadrant that is not attractive to potential extreme right voters in a given party system. For instance, if a new issue (such as opposition to European integration) suddenly becomes salient within the context of a particular election or campaign and the historic party fails to address it, then an entrepreneurial party/party leader may decide to incorporate it within their ideological discourse and benefit from higher levels of electoral success. In Britain, UKIP emerged as a new and major challenge to the historic force of the BNP based on a virulent populist-reactionary location focused on anti-EU discourse. As there was a higher concentration of the potential electorate within this quadrant
compared to the xenophobic-repressive quadrant of the BNP, UKIP has surpassed the electoral success of the BNP, especially in the European Parliament elections.

**Distribution of the potential electorate**

The relative electoral success of each party is thus not only dependent upon the appeal of the specific ideological identity that a party chooses to communicate to its electorate but also on the ideological distribution of the potential extreme right electorate across the four extreme right quadrants. In other words, it is logical to assume that some combinations of extreme right discourse are more attractive to a potential electorate than others (see Carter, 2005; Golder, 2003; and the discussion of this in chapter two). Thus the distribution of the electorate across the two dimensions and the four conceptions will not be uniform but will in fact vary according to the preferences of the extreme right electorate. We expand upon this puzzle and analyse the consequences in chapter seven.

In chapter two, we stated a series of arguments derived from the conceptual map that relate to each empirical chapter. As a recap, with regards to this specific chapter, we state that multiple extreme right parties can only coexist and survive alongside each other in a given party system if they choose different ideological locations within the four possible quadrants of extreme right ideology. If a new competitor chooses to locate in a quadrant already occupied by an existing party it will struggle to survive as the new challenger will be at a comparative disadvantage to that of the existing occupant. A new competitor entering the field should try to locate in a distinctly different quadrant (ideologically opposed, that is, different conceptions of both dimensions) to the one occupied by the existing historic extreme right party. Moreover, each party must communicate a strong
and coherent ideological message to its potential electorate. If a party’s ideological identity is unclear it will be threatened by parties in neighbouring quadrants, rendering its chances of survival weaker. We will now present a brief overview of each party and its recent history within their respective party systems. We will then discuss the impact of each party’s ideological location on the dynamics of party competition within each party system. We will outline how each party has had to find its own niche within the extreme right ideological territory and discuss whether the strategies that each individual party have made have been successful or not.

6.3 The French extreme right party family – patterns of internal competition

The tradition of extreme right parties in France has long been established, with historical examples such as the personalised movements led by Boulanger in the 19th century and Poujade in 1950s, and the more global experience of the Vichy regime in the Second World War. Within the contemporary system, however, the historical continuity of extreme right representation in the party system has rested on the relentless presence of the Front National. The party, founded in the 1970s, obtained its first major success in the European Elections of 1984 where it secured its first national-level representation. It readily asserted its position as a serious contender on the French political scene in 1986, when a temporary introduction of proportional representation allowed the FN to acquire a seat in the national parliament. The Front National has grown stronger over recent years culminating in the massive political earthquake that saw Le Pen access the second-round of the 2002 presidential election. As a result, Le Pen has personified the party and doubts are expressed as to what will be the future of the FN when he steps down from power.
The FN is therefore the largest of the extreme right parties and has secured the most electoral success. Potential competitors from within the same party family need to challenge this historic party in order to have any chance of success in the French political system. Indeed, in recent years, the FN has been challenged over its overwhelming share of the potential extreme right electorate. The first contender was the MNR, which was created when a group of former FN militants seceded from the mother party under the leadership of Bruno Mégret in 1998. Mégret’s argument for secession was one of political and electoral efficiency. He and his supporters argued that the provocative rhetoric of Le Pen had become a liability and that his occasional xenophobic jokes had prevented the party for having any foreseeable chance of accessing government, whether in its own right or within a coalition. The MNR hoped that without the overzealous and autocratic leader at its head, it could tap into a more moderate and larger electoral reservoir within the extreme right electorate. In other words, they wanted to emphasise a different conception of the two dimensions and take the party in a different direction to that of the FN. The ‘coup’ was severely resented within the ranks of the Front National and there was a lot of agitation between the two parties following the split. However, in 2006 Le Pen and Mégret entered negotiations regarding non-competing candidacies in the 2007 presidential elections.

In the mid 1990s another competitor emerged to challenge the FN for the potential extreme right electorate. The MPF primarily emerged from a scission of the moderate right on European issues. Segments of the moderate right violently opposed the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 (finally adopted by 51 percent of voters by referendum) and came to the conclusion that the European issue was too important for
them to remain members of a party endorsed by a majority of Europhiles. Whilst founded in 1994, the MPF hesitated for many years between staying within the moderate right camp or to instead move into new territory and attack the extreme right potential based on the euro-sceptic theme. However, the 2002 French presidential elections was a turning point and with the decisive takeover by de Villiers and sidelining – if not dismissal – of old Gaullist Pasqua, the party was ready to embrace a new direction towards the extreme right electoral territory. The party’s new ideological identity became public when discussions were held between the National Front and the MPF on whether an alliance – favoured by many in both parties – would be feasible. However, a long series of disagreements and a fierce struggle for absolute power within the extreme right party family prevented any kind of alliance for the 2007 presidential elections. Nevertheless, in the general elections that followed, the support expressed by prominent MPF member Couteaux for FN’s Marine Le Pen in her second ballot battle against a socialist confirmed the party’s ideological line. With this multi-faceted picture of the French extreme right party family in mind, this appears to be a perfect case study to explore the impact of ideological identities on intra-extreme right party competition. Both the MNR and the MPF have had to challenge the historic party of the FN for a share of the potential extreme right electorate. Our main arguments derived from the conceptual map, stated in chapter two but also recapitulated at the beginning of this chapter, suggest that in order to successfully challenge a pre-existing party, each party must choose a distinct and different ideological identity. Indeed, as we shall see in the following section, both parties employ different strategies and tactics in order to try and coexist alongside the FN.
The ideological locations of the FN, the MNR, and the MPF on the conceptual map of extreme right ideology are illustrated in figure 6.2. The diagram illustrates that the ideological location of the MPF is quite distinct from the two other parties therefore it is not in direct ideological competition with that of the FN and the MNR. By contrast, the ideological identity of the MNR mimics the discourse of the FN. Unfortunately for the MNR, the FN as the historic party has a significant advantage over the smaller party and thus is able to retain its position within the extreme right territory and obtain the lion’s share of the vote. Indeed, the MNR is also hindered by the fact that it fails to give a clear ideological message to its potential voters by straddling the two conceptions of the negative identity dimension.

As we have seen from the above discussion of the French extreme right party family, both the MNR and the MPF had to challenge the historical stronghold of the FN. We suggest that in order to be successful each of the parties must choose a distinct ideological identity and to locate in a quadrant that is different from the main historic party. Despite accusations of extreme xenophobia by the MNR, we see that the current dominant discourse of the FN is populist-repressive. This of course may be the result of recent ideological moderation, which has made the FN’s core ideological positions less extreme than they were during the 1980s. We also argue that newcomers that challenge the historic party can only survive if they occupy a different quadrant than that of the pre-existing party. This would be ideally the ideologically opposed quadrant of the FN. Therefore, as we stated in section 2.7, we would expect that if the challenger should theoretically choose to locate in the xenophobic-reactionary quadrant and as a result emphasise rather different conceptions of the two fundamental dimensions of extreme
right ideology. This strategy ensures that the challenger to the historic party would be in the optimal position to exploit a yet untouched potential of the extreme right electorate.

As the MPF retained a heritage of ideological influence stemming from the moderate right, we would have expected the leadership to choose a 'soft' populist discourse focusing on the Eurosceptic rhetoric when venturing into the newly sought-after extreme right territory. This would have been the least effective strategy to pursue as their discourse would have been very similar to that of the FN and with a comparative advantage of being the historic force, the FN would have won the battle. Yet, according to the analysis of the party's discourse, this was not the strategy that was implemented by the MPF. Acknowledging that their Eurosceptic credentials would be worthless given the FN's dominant position on the populist dimension, the MPF after some initial hesitation finally decided to locate in the xenophobic-reactionary quadrant. This was perhaps the most effective strategy that could have possibly been pursued by the MPF as it was most radically opposed to the FN's ideological position. By contrast, the MNR, which emerged as a dissident from the FN camp, clearly failed to pursue an effective strategy. Whilst the MNR accused the FN of being too xenophobic, fierce internal tensions erupted within the MNR. There were factions of members who wanted to push the MNR into adopting a more 'modern' populist ideology who clashed with the traditional ideologues within the party who wanted the party to adopt a stronger xenophobic line. The result was that the MNR became more extreme on the xenophobic conception of the negative identity dimension. In terms of its electoral prospects and chances of survival, this was a disastrous decision by the party leadership as the MNR had chosen to replicate the same discourse (and located in the same quadrant) as the FN but with an accentuated
ideological line, which has proved to be too extreme for the majority of the extreme right electorate. However, as we outlined in our section on theoretical expectations derived from the model (section 2.7) if a party fails to choose a clear ideological identity and communicates an incoherent message to the electorate (i.e. blurring the emphasis on the populist versus xenophobic conceptions of the negative identity dimension), which the MNR, seems to have done, it places itself in a highly vulnerable position and has little chance of survival.
Altogether, the MNR failed to distinguish itself from its old rival by replicating a similar discourse to that of the FN and sending mixed messages to its electorate. There is little chance of electoral success whilst the MNR is located in the same ideological quadrant as the historic force of the FN. The electoral implications of these strategic-discursive

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choices for intra-family party competition are highlighted by the circles representing the parties' electoral appeal in figure 6.2. The FN occupies the populist-repressive quadrant and has secured a stronghold within the extreme right territory and has the dominant share of the potential extreme right vote. The MPF has successfully adopted the optimal strategy and has located in the opposite quadrant to that of the FN. The MPF has therefore been able to tap into an unexploited extreme right electorate and has derived some electoral success from this new location in the xenophobic-reactionary quadrant. As a result, and as we will investigate more fully in chapter seven, the MPF has obtained a few seats in the 2007 general elections and consistently scores above 3 percent of the vote in other elections. By contrast, the MNR failed to present itself as a serious challenger for a share of the extreme right vote as it chose to locate in the same quadrant as the FN where it was suffocated by the dominance of the historic force. Moreover, the MNR’s fuzziness on the negative dimension undoubtedly handicapped their electoral progression. This failure to capture the extreme right electorate was confirmed in the general elections of 2007 when the MNR scored less than 1 percent of the vote. On the whole, the theoretical expectations outlined in section 2.7 seem to have stood the empirical test in the case of the three extreme right parties in France.

6.4 The British extreme right party family – patterns of internal competition

The British extreme right party family, whilst historically dissimilar to the French case we have just outlined, is also of interest with respect to the internal dynamics of party competition. In Britain, there are few historical references of the extreme right ideological tradition like those of Boulangisme, Vichy, and Poujadisme in France. In addition, there
were few parties espousing extreme right discourse until the 1970s. The main party that has dominated the extreme right political scene in Britain was the National Front, until it became the victim of a dissident coup in the 1980s, which slowly precipitated its death. However, in the face of the National Front’s demise a phoenix from the flames was born; the BNP arose as the new champions of the British extreme right. Whilst the BNP has been largely relegated to the peripheries of the party system, it has obtained several local successes and more recently, it managed to send two MEPs to the European Parliament in the 2009 elections. Although many believe that the extreme right potential in the UK is limited, a challenger emerged in the 1990s that focused on a vehement anti-European discourse. The Anti-Federalist League formed in 1993, quickly transformed into the United Kingdom Independence Party and was readily competing in elections on a predominantly EU withdrawal agenda. Whilst still a predominantly Eurosceptic force, UKIP has recently expanded its electoral appeal and campaigns in local elections on issues such as crime, law and order, restrictions on immigration etc. These campaign issues are a direct threat and challenge to the traditional territory of the BNP. In addition, there have been several recent attempts initiated by the BNP to form electoral allegiances in the local and European Parliament elections. However, UKIP has so far resisted these attempts and has remained a challenger to the BNP for the potential extreme right vote. More recently, the English Democrats established in 1998 emerged campaigning for the formation of a devolved English Parliament. The party specifically claims to only represent the interests of the people of England. In addition, they also have a fierce anti-European tone to their ideological discourse. Thus, they have also tried to stake their claim on the potential extreme right electorate, which has proved to be progressively more promising than was once thought in Britain.
In Britain, the BNP is the historic force that new competitors have to face. In contrast to the French extreme right party family, which is structured by strong positions both on the negative identity and authoritarianism dimensions, the British extreme right party family on the whole seems to rely more on the negative identity dimension than the authoritarianism dimension. As figure 6.3 illustrates, this generates a more ‘horizontal’ polygon compared to that of the French model. The BNP’s ideological location on the conceptual map of extreme right ideology features a dominant tendency to emphasise xenophobic-repressive discourse with a very weak reactionary pillar. Thus, this was the position that UKIP and the ED had to challenge if they wanted to attack the extreme right potential vote. UKIP was in enviable position where it could choose to locate in any of the three other ideological quadrants that were left vacant by the BNP. Obviously, the most logical strategy would be to locate in the quadrant most ideologically opposed to the BNP’s location. The party did in fact decide that this was the most efficient strategy and located in the populist-reactionary quadrant. A few years later, the ED was confronted by a similar decision but its choices were less enticing as UKIP now occupied one of the vacant quadrants. The logical strategy would have been to occupy one of the two remaining quadrants – xenophobic-reactionary or populist-repressive, but instead, it chose to replicate some of the BNP positions, therefore has faced the same fate as the MNR in France.
Here, in the British case, we can see that similar to the French party system, one particular party has a clear distinct ideological identity whilst the other two parties share the same conceptions of the two ideological dimensions. In the French case, the MPF took a distinctive location within the xenophobic-repressive quadrant, UKIP, on the other
hand, takes a distinctive location within the populist-reactionary quadrant. Therefore, UKIP is not in direct ideological competition with that of the other two extreme right parties within the British party system. Whilst UKIP is not the historic party within the extreme right party family, it has reached a stronger electoral position than the historic BNP suggesting the distribution of the potential extreme right electorate is more favourable to UKIP’s location within the populist-reactionary quadrant than that of the xenophobic-repressive discourse of the BNP or ED. The ED put itself in an untenable position and was immediately suffocated by the dominant BNP whose territory it unsuccessfully tried to encroach. By contrast, the situation of UKIP (similar to that of the MPF) looks far more promising with almost no overlap between its electorate and that of the historic force. Moreover, it seems that the distribution of the extreme right electorate is more concentrated within the populist-reactionary quadrant that UKIP has decided to exploit than that of the BNP’s xenophobic-repressive centred discourse. The bulk of the British extreme right electoral potential seems to be located in the populist-reactionary quadrant than that of the historic force. Whilst the BNP was in the most favourable position of having the choice of all four quadrants, it failed to choose the most lucrative location in terms of electoral potential as the majority of the potential electorate was in fact located in the ideologically opposed quadrant to the one it chose. Thus, whilst we confirmed that fighting a pre-existing party in its own quadrant is a strategy that is doomed to fail, we find that the advantage of the historic force never guarantees that an extreme right party will remain dominant when other parties start exploiting the quadrants left vacant. The historic party may be surpassed by a new competitor who exploits the electoral potential of another quadrant. In this case, as we shall see in chapter seven, the BNP can hardly expect more than two to three percent of the vote nationally in general.
elections. UKIP, on the other hand, excels in European Parliament elections (16.1 percent in 2004) and has had several successes at local elections. By contrast, the failed strategy of the ED has meant that it has almost collapsed soon and now rarely competes in elections. These findings from the British case study again confirm our expectations that a copy-cat party will lose out to the historic party if it fails to differentiate itself from its competitors already trying to capture the potential electorate.

6.5 The German extreme right party family- patterns of internal competition

In Germany, the NPD has been the stalwart of extreme right ideology. Established in 1964 as a successor of the German Reich Party, it has undergone several transformations including adopting several different names and competing under different guises. With links to several neo-Fascist groups, ideological consistency and the inheritance of key personnel from the German Reich Party, the NPD has faced a number of legal proceedings that have been brought to them by the German constitutional court. The NPD has been the dominant historic force of the German extreme right party family in terms of its history and ideological connections with the Fascist legacy. However, it was Die Republikaner, a challenger from the south of Germany that took the first significant electoral success. Founded in 1983 by former CSU members, the Republikaner secured an impressive six members of the European Parliament in the 1989 elections. Whilst struggling to gain federal representation, the Republikaner have obtained several successes at the regional level in Bavaria but find the electoral threshold sometimes too high to surpass. They have been several attempts made by members of the NPD and the DVU to form electoral alliances with the Republikaner but so far these efforts have been
rebuffed. For the purpose of this analysis, we will consider the Republikaner not the NPD as the historic force of the extreme right party family in Germany because they have had a much more prominent electoral record and have been largely coherent in their organisation and structure as compared to the NPD. The Deutsche Volksunion (DVU) was founded by publisher Gerhard Frey as an informal association in 1971 and established as a party in 1987. As of 2009, the party has never surpassed the five percent threshold that is imposed as a minimum in federal elections, but has, however, gained seats in several state parliaments. In 2004, the DVU entered a non-competition agreement with the NPD for the state elections in Brandenburg and Saxony. As a result, both parties passed the five percent threshold in their respective states. After this relatively successful election, the parties formed an electoral alliance for the 2005 federal elections and consequently obtained 1.6 percent of the total votes nationally. As we have stated already, a fuller examination of the parties' electoral results is provided in chapter seven.

Historically, the NPD has been the major player on the extreme right scene but as we have stated earlier it was the Republikaner that achieved the first real breakthrough in terms of reinventing the German extreme right party family. As we can see from figure 6.4, Die Republikaner relies on a vaguely defined populist-reactionary stance. This hesitant location is almost ‘symmetric’ to that of the French MNR. Consistent with our expectations, this position makes the Republikaner vulnerable to attacks not only from other potential parties within its quadrant, but also from parties in neighbouring quadrants.

38 The DVU reached 6.1 percent in the Brandenburg state elections, and the NPD won 9.2 percent in the Saxony state elections.
Figure 6.4: Patterns of competition within the German extreme right party family

Notes: ideological dimensions are the same as figure 5.2. The thick circle corresponds to the historic party, the thin ones to its challengers. The diameter of the circles is relative to their electoral strengths.

In the German case illustrated above, the NPD has assumed a distinctive ideological identity to that of its two competitors. The weakest of the three parties, the DVU, is struggling to find its niche, although it is not entirely suffocated by its two competitors.
(unlike the cases of the English Democrats and the MNR in Britain and France respectively). Despite being the only extreme right party within the German system to have a predominantly reactionary discourse on the authoritarian dimension, the Republikaner find it difficult to define a clear ideological identity within the extreme right ideological spectrum and struggle to compete within the more ideologically defined NPD and DVU.

The NPD was resuscitated after German unification in 1990 with a new image and a strong presence in the former East Germany. The NPD chose a clear populist-repressive location within the extreme right ideological territory (similar to the French FN), while the DVU which made several inroads in several of the Eastern Länder chose a moderate xenophobic-repressive locate. The DVU's quadrant is opposite to that of the Republikaner, but the location of the NPD is in a quadrant neighbouring both the Republikaner and the DVU that made it a natural threat to both parties. Unlike parties of the extreme right party family in France and Britain, the three faces of the German extreme right have settled in three different ideological quadrants as they have chosen to emphasise different conceptions of the two dimensions. This may explain how they have managed to coexist and survive within the same party system. The pattern of competition illustrated by figure 6.4 is clearly favourable to the NPD, which, in the 2000s, managed to encroach some of the electoral potential of the Republikaner in its traditional stronghold in the southwest of Germany. The DVU, with its own distinct ideological identity has also had space to develop its own niche and record several electoral successes. This confirms the central tenet of our model that if parties of the extreme right party family emphasise different conceptions of the two ideological dimensions then it is possible for them to
successfully coexist within the same party system as the potential electorates associated with the four different conceptions are discrete and may only overlap at the boundaries of the four quadrants.

6.6 Broader implications - General party competition

In party systems where weak moderate right parties have led unsuccessful election campaigns or have failed to anchor their electorate, extreme right parties can quickly move in and capture an increased share of the vote (Swank & Betz, 2003). Mainstream parties are, thus, often faced with a dilemma: the choice of implementing accommodative or adversarial strategies (Koopmans & Kriesi, 1997). If we take the emergence of the French Front National as an example, we can highlight the different strategies that are implemented and assess the dynamics of competition when an extreme right party emerges onto the political scene. It was clear that with a strong anti-immigrant undertone the FN would prove to be a direct competitor for the right-wing RPR. In response to this threat, they adopted an accommodative strategy, launching an intense campaign to convince voters of their ardent anti-immigrant position and passed bills restricting the rights of immigrants in France (Pasqua Law of 1986, Debre Law of 1996) and halting further immigration (Pasqua law of 1993). In the 1980s and early 1990s, several RPR and FN candidates made electoral alliances in some local-level elections. The left-wing PS, which was not immune to the threat of the radical right, responded with an adversarial strategy emphasising its opposition to the anti-immigrant policy. Using the ‘strategic-voting’ logic (votes for the FN would split the right-wing vote as to prevent a RPR-UDF victory) the PS hoped that Le Pen would gain votes at the expense of the RPR if they
implemented proportional representation. Indeed, the FN won 34 seats in the 1986 elections and as a result demolished the vote of the RPR.

Similarly, on April 19th 2002, Jean-Marie Le Pen, the leader of the French Front National (FN), obtained a staggering 16.9 percent of the vote in the first round of the Presidential election. As a result, he was ushered into the second ballot alongside Jacques Chirac. This result caused massive mobilisation of the Left and young people and demonstrations were organised across France in protest of the electoral result. As a result, Le Pen failed to garner enough support and lost the election to Chirac in the second ballot. Guiraudon and Schain (2002) note some of the consequences that followed on from the shock electoral success of the FN in 2002. The electoral breakthrough had a considerable impact upon the party system and the dynamic interaction among the mainstream political parties competing for votes. The electoral impact was manifested in a realignment of parties within the system in many voting districts. Le Pen’s success also affected the distribution of issue-priorities of voters across the political spectrum. The party was also able to gain increasing influence over the policy agenda, as parties of both the Right and the Left tried to combat the influence of the FN and realign themselves on the issues of immigration and the enforcement of law and order. The efforts of the mainstream parties to counterbalance the popularity of the FN by attempting to co-opt some of their policy stances turned out to be futile. Their efforts to offset the electoral success of the FN by directly addressing the issues of immigration and the enforcement of law and order were perceived by many as legitimising the concerns and demands of Le Pen and his party.
In the Netherlands, Pim Fortuyn's campaign centred upon the issue of immigration and in particular xenophobic discourse was directed against Moslem migrants. Despite the fact that this type of rhetoric was a sharp contrast to the traditional neo-liberal backdrop of the Dutch party system, this campaign was by no means something new. In 1989, the leader of the conservative Liberal VVD party, Frits Bolkestein, broke the Dutch elite consensus regarding immigration by calling Islam a 'deviant' culture preventing the integration of Moroccan and Turkish immigrants, using terms similar to Fortuyn's pamphlet on 'the Islamization of Dutch culture' that deemed Moslems 'backwards'. Throughout the 1990s, immigration and the integration of Moroccan and Turkish immigrants remained a key campaign issue that often capitalised on the anti-establishment backlash that was directed against incumbent governments. In the 1994 parliamentary elections, the Dutch Parliamentary Election Study panel survey revealed that almost 50 percent of voters believed that foreign minorities were an important problem, a score higher than for any other issue. Consequently, Hans Janmaat and two other Centrum Party members were elected. In the 1998 elections, with 24.7 percent of the vote, the VVD became the second largest parliamentary group and joined the 'purple coalition'. Thus, Fortuyn's party was merely tapping into the existing extreme right vote potential and co-opting the policy agenda of the VVD but this time with an extremely charismatic and flamboyant leader at its figurehead. The incumbent government made efforts to reassure and comfort voters by introducing tough measures on illegal immigrants and restrictions on the number of applications for asylum. However, rather than restoring confidence in the government's ability to keep the problem under control, their policies highlighted the issue further and gave yet more legitimacy to the claims of the LPF.

39 The study is available at http://www.bsk.utwente.nl/skon/
The strategy of co-opting issues of extreme right discourse has not always been dismissed as ineffective. The British and German cases seem to demonstrate that this strategy can work to hamper the progress of extreme right parties in given political systems. Kitschelt (1995) argues that the sharp shift to the xenophobic right by the Thatcher leadership was a key determinant in the demise of the British National Front in the later 1970s. Minkenberg (1998) also comments that when the German mainstream parties co-opted the issue of immigration, extreme right parties lost out in terms of their electoral success. Despite the success of the strategy, he argues that 'at the sub-national level, these parties (extreme right parties) have demonstrated greater staying power than analysts were willing to concede after their decline in the wake of the major parties' asylum compromise of 1993. Yet, whilst periodic thrusts at the sub-national level have allowed the Republikaner, the NPD and the DVU to have some influence on immigration policy during the 1990s, the impact of these parties has been rather limited due to their fragmentation and by their inconsistent electoral success. On the other hand, in the context of the highly centralised French political system, decentralised structures are reinforced by strong local party units that enable parties such as the FN, the MNR and the MPF to gain important policy-making roles. These local structures can sometimes magnify the influence of the extreme right onto the national political stage. Over recent years, there have been several occasions when mainstream parties have entered into electoral alliances with the FN in some local and regional elections.

Extreme right parties often find that they possess blackmailing prowess over the parties of the mainstream right by threatening to encroach upon their electoral territory or challenging them to take a stand on certain issues, which they would not have necessarily
done if they had not been pushed to it. This was the case of UKIP, the BNP and the Conservative party in the UK during the 2005 general elections. The Conservatives were pushed into a tight corner by increasing pressure from UKIP about the question of quotas on immigration in the UK. Michael Howard, the leader of the Conservative party, was pushed into a tight corner until he eventually declared that they would indeed consider imposing immigration quotas. This move proved to be highly unpopular with the general public. It was interpreted as a legitimisation of the extreme right demands and delivered precious media attention and publicity into the arms of the extreme right parties. If mainstream parties react to the challenge of the encroaching extreme right party by incorporating elements of their discourse, they run the risk of ‘normalising’ the extreme right’s discourse and even its ideology. The Austrian, Swiss, and Italian Governments have all been victims of such accusations after incorporating parties of the extreme right in national coalition governments. Yet, if the moderate right parties are perceived not to respond to the challenges posed by the extreme right then they face the prospect that their campaigns may be overshadowed by the more provocative and attention-grabbing discourse of their competitors on the extreme right.

In any explicitly or implicitly spatial model whereby parties and voters can ‘move’ along ideological lines, a question has to be raised as to whether parties are simply trying to ‘catch up’ with voters or, instead, creating demand by aggregating some specific ideological preferences around a strategically chosen point in an almost entrepreneurial way (Schattschneider, 1957). This question is implicitly present in our strategic-discursive model: is it that parties will try to move along the negative identity and authoritarianism dimensions to try and discover a statically optimal reservoir of votes, or
is it that by choosing a location, parties create an 'ideological magnet' which will create – or at least – structure ideological demand from a potential electorate? As always in such cases, the answer will invariably entail a bit of both movements.

It is undoubtedly a limitation of our research design, that on the basis of the specific research design used in this dissertation, we cannot fully evaluate the dynamics of reciprocal ideological influence between extreme right parties and their potential voters. This can be explored in other parts of our research that include a dynamic time component.

Within the framework of this dissertation, however, there are two reasons to focus primarily on the 'race' of extreme right parties for their voters. Firstly, in a context of multiple parties – not in general, but even within the extreme right family – there is a analytical need to first view the political world through the eyes of the parties which aim at maximising their appeal. Only this way can we establish their real leeway in terms of movement on the two strategic-discursive dimensions developed earlier in chapter 3.

Secondly, as pointed out earlier, one of the puzzles of extreme right success in some European countries, such as the UK, is that at times the overall success of the extreme right as a family seemed bound to remain low until suddenly increasing in a sharp and rapid way, as has been the case with UKIP. Regardless of whether a party such as UKIP then shaped the political preferences of British extreme right voters, it thus seems conceivable to assert that the party 'discovered' a ground which had a real electoral potential and had not been exploited by other extreme right parties until then. Once again, however, the fact that an extreme right party will try and target the 'greenest' possible electoral pasture should not make us forget that once the party settles down there – or
indeed once any party moves from an ideological location to another – this will most likely also have an impact on voters’ preferences in that it can lead or shape ideological demand over time. Finally, it should also be noted that over time, ideological demand should not be assumed to be static. Instead, a strategic-discursive location that proved most fruitful at a given point in time might well become obsolete, or one which was irrelevant, progressively become effective as citizens’ preferences, worries, and problems evolve or as other parties’ offer changes. We now provide a summary of this chapter and draw upon some of the main conclusions derived from this chapter.

6.7 Summary

Our findings in this chapter show that when it comes to understanding the coexistence and survival of multiple extreme right parties in a given party system, it is crucial to analyse the specific strategic-discursive choices that each party has had to face when deciding where to locate. It is not just a simple question of whether there is enough room for several of them or indeed whether there are enough extreme right voters. Instead, the puzzle is multifaceted. Firstly, we have to consider the location of the historic extreme right force and contemplate what would be the best strategy for a competitor to secure an optimal position in order to challenge the dominant party for the potential extreme right vote. We must also consider the dynamics of competition outside the extreme right territory, for example, in the global universe of left-right party competition. The strategies of mainstream right-wing parties may also affect the location of an extreme right party due to accommodative or adversarial tactics. We have shown that across three very different party systems similar patterns exist within the strategies of internal party
competition in the extreme right party family. Firstly, if two parties decide to locate in the same ideological quadrant, a comparative advantage will be given to the historic force. Thus a new party may fail to survive as they run the risk of being suffocated by the dominant extreme right party that has a pre-existing tradition of that particular ideological identity and an anchor within that specific extreme right electorate. Parties that do not communicate a strong ideological identity - i.e. that do not sufficiently emphasise one conception of the two dimensions – will find it hard to mobilise their potential extreme right electorate, thus these parties will probably be overshadowed by their competitors.

We have also shown that new parties that choose an ideologically opposed quadrant to that of the historic force and who communicate a clear and distinct ideological identity can coexist alongside the dominant party and may in some circumstances even surpass their electoral success. In this respect, our findings present new perspectives on some of the paradoxes that can found within the existing literature concerning the heterogeneous electoral support of the European extreme right. Most studies that investigate the profile of an extreme right voter have tended to assume that political competition is fixed by voters’ attitudes that are rooted in socio-economic experiences. The underlying model is one of demand for discourse and/or ideology that create opportunities or dilemmas for political parties. This perspective has caught the attention of those studying the social composition of the populist vote towards asking what the voters’ common grievances are and attempting to define new alignments. The ‘demand model’ of political competition compensates for the void in Down’s spatial model (1967) that fails to define how the dimension(s) of political space are defined, or how they can be changed. As we have seen in this chapter, extreme right parties can and sometimes do change their strategic-
discursive choices. They can often manipulate salient issues and change their direction because they are not tied to exclusive bases of electoral support. In contrast to many other mainstream parties, whose electoral bases are often supported by traditional socio-economic cleavages, extreme right parties are able to combine a discursive appeal that seduces many different social categories.

It is the variety of strategic-discursive choices that extreme right parties can make and the interdependence between internal and external party competition within limited dimensions, which transform a constrained ideological territory into a chessboard of partisan politics. In this way, we also need to consider the ideological distribution of the potential extreme right electorate over the four quadrants of ideology as different ideological locations may prove to offer variable electoral payoffs. This is indeed the question we set ourselves for the final empirical chapter.

The findings of this chapter, thus, refocus some of the questions that try to pinpoint the heart of the electoral support of extreme right parties in Europe. The preferences and orientations of electoral supporters of contemporary extreme right voters are largely unknown but is one of the avenues that we pursue in the following chapter. In chapter seven, the final empirical chapter, we discuss the 'profile' and various characteristics of an extreme right voter and investigate the 'match' between the strategic-discursive locations of each party and the ideological preferences of potential and actual extreme right voters using mass survey data. In the final section, we evaluate the electoral results of extreme right parties in the three party systems in general and European parliament elections.
Chapter Seven

Match or Mismatch?

Exploring the match between extreme right parties' ideological positions and the ideological preferences of voters

Chapter Outline

7.1 Introduction

7.2 A marked variation in the profiles of extreme right voters

7.3 Match, set and game?

7.4 Extreme right voting in Britain, France, and Germany

7.5 The relationship between potential and actual extreme right vote

7.6 Extreme right voting and ideological positioning on the four pillars of extreme right ideology

7.7 From seducing individual voters to achieving global success: aggregate level fortunes of French, German, and British extreme right parties over time

7.8 Summary
7.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the final empirical component of the thesis. In the first section of this chapter, we discuss the various characteristics that have been attributed to the social groups that are susceptible to vote for an extreme right party. The existing literature has often highlighted a few social groups that are consistently more likely to vote for parties of the extreme right than others. On the other hand, there also seems to be a remarkable heterogeneity within the social bases of extreme right parties when these groups are looked at in comparative analysis. In the second part of this chapter, we conduct a quantitative analysis of some selected questions that were presented to respondents in a mass survey conducted in June 2009. A detailed description of the survey questions we selected and the methodology we used is presented in chapter three and are outlined in appendix D. Throughout this chapter, we are looking at the match between the parties’ ideological locations as indicated by the elite interviews and the analysis of party manifestoes, and the ideological distribution of these parties’ actual and potential voters. Finally, the third section presents an analysis of the electoral success of the parties that we have studied in order to evaluate their relative success or failure in making a connection with their respective electorates.

7.2 A marked variation in the profiles of extreme right voters

The puzzle surrounding the variation in electoral scores of the extreme right across Europe is complicated by the fact that we know very little about the voters of parties belonging to the extreme right party family. Extreme right voters are extremely hard to
identify and represent a small minority of the electorate therefore the characteristics of
this sub-group are elusive to many scholars working within this field. As a result, existing
studies have had to cope with a low $n$ even in the largest of national surveys and election
studies. In addition, these parties are sometimes extremely small organisations and have
little chance of accessing positions of responsibility; therefore many comparative
electoral studies have often failed to include extreme right parties in their survey
questions. Electoral studies such as the European Social Survey and several National
Election studies do include some parties of the extreme right party family but they tend to
focus on the relatively prominent and successful parties, excluding most of the other
parties that fail to secure substantial electoral success but nevertheless belong to the
extreme right party family.\footnote{As we have highlighted before, in terms of studying the discourse of extreme right parties, the Comparative Manifestoes Project (Budge et al, 2002) focus on the relatively prominent and successful parties and exclude most of the other parties that belong to the extreme right party family.}

Despite these hurdles, several studies have undertaken analyses of the extreme right
electorate. Mayer (1998) for example has focused on the case of the French Front
National and compiled an in-depth study of the characteristics voters of the FN. In an
analysis of six elections from 1986 to 1997, Mayer (1998) found that the party’s ‘most
solid support has come from two occupational groups - small shopkeepers and blue-collar
workers’ (1998: 18). Similarly, scholars studying the Norwegian Progress Party and the
Danish People’s Party, found that although these parties received a large proportion of
tax-protest votes from owners of small businesses or the ‘petty bourgeois’ in the 1970s,
they have received an increasing number of votes from blue collar workers since then
(Svåsand 1998; Andersen and Bjørklund 2000). Whilst the marriage of these two
radically different social groups seems to be contradictory at first sight, several parties of the extreme right have been increasingly able to tailor their strategic-discursive strategies in order to cater to the demands of these two social groups. In a study of the Swiss SVP and Austrian FPÖ, McGann and Kitschelt (2002) find that these two sub-groups of the population tend to be the most likely to be attracted to the discourse of the extreme right. A similar pattern is reported in an analysis of the Italian Lega Nord voters in Northern Italy. Betz (1998) maintains that it was particularly these small commercial and artisanal entrepreneurs and blue-collar workers in the Northern periphery, which accounted for much of the Lega's resurgence in 1996. Lubbers, Gijsberts and Scheepers (2000) found that unemployed people were more likely than most other groups to vote for an extreme right party. Similarly, Guiraudon and Schain (2002) found that in 2002, Le Pen, in his Presidential campaign, made gains with unemployed voters, obtaining 38 percent of their vote in the ballot.

If we take the case study of France by Mayer (1998) as an example of the rapid changes in extreme right electorates, we can see that the steady rise of the extreme right in France from the mid-1970s to the early 2000s was to a large extent due to the defection of blue collars from the array of left-wing parties. In the presidential election of 1988, support for Le Pen was higher than average among voters belonging to the working class. These voters were the largest bloc to move en masse to the FN. Alongside working class voters, small business owners and farmers, drawn to the stridently pro-capitalist and anti-interventionist aspects of the FN strategic-discursive platform have also regularly supported candidates of the Front National (Kitschelt, 1995). Thus, it seems to be clear that extreme right parties can draw upon a reservoir of support from a variety of stable
social groups. Blue-collar workers, small and independent business people and professionals all seem to be susceptible to the allure of the extreme right discourse and this interesting mix of social groups dissects boundaries that are usually associated with the traditional Left-Right socio-political cleavages.

The Vlaams Belang (formerly known as Vlaams Block) has a slightly different profile amongst its key supporters (Ignazi, 1992). Whilst there is no longer an overrepresentation of independent businesspeople, blue collar workers or what is described as ‘lower classes’ are overrepresented within their electorate (Billiet and De Witte 1995; Swyngedouw, 1998). With the exception of the Flemish case, then, the evidence suggesting that the support for the contemporary populist right rests on a coalition that disproportionately includes owners of small businesses and blue collar workers is overwhelming. As a result, Ivarsflaten (2005) argues that a simultaneous appeal to both blue collar workers and owners of small businesses is difficult to achieve in Western Europe. She argues that these two sections of the electorate are ‘deeply divided on the socio-economic dimension of politics, and they are, therefore, not a readily available coalition. The Flemish case is an example of how populist parties may easily fail to appeal to both these groups, while the French and Danish cases are examples where this difficult balancing act has been successfully pursued by the populist right. Table 7.1 illustrates the variation in the occupational profile of extreme right voters across countries. It highlights the main social bases of extreme right parties in Germany, Belgium, France, Austria, Britain, and Italy.

Whilst bearing in mind sample sizes vary, table 7.1 shows that in Britain and in Germany, the main reservoir of support for the extreme right is represented by middle management,
while it is self-employed business owners and independent farmers who primarily affiliate with the extreme right ideology in France. In Belgium, the main supporters are top-level managers, and in Austria, the leftist populist origin of the extreme right electorate is highlighted by the primary support of blue collars. Employees are the largest groups to sympathise with extreme right parties in Italy but most other categories, including students also feature highly. In Germany, there is broad support amongst the self-employed, middle management, and manual workers. This diversity could be explained by the individuality of each of the three main extreme right parties in Germany. We have already seen in chapters four and five that each party retains a distinct ideological line and discursive identity. In addition, there have been very few attempts to form a union across the three parties despite the fact that the extreme right vote is split amongst the three parties. Moreover, in the general European context, it is interesting that no socio-professional category truly escapes the tentacles of the extreme right party family.

Table 7.1: A comparison of extreme right support in six European democracies.

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Notes: Data is from Eurobarometer 53 (April-May 2000). Figures in bold italic represent the primary category of support for the extreme right in the country.
Education

In terms of education, DiGusto and Jolly (2008) find that higher skilled or educated respondents are consistently less xenophobic in their attitudes. This is consistent with expectations from economic models, such as the Heckscher-Ohlin theory, which suggests that higher skilled citizens have less to fear from more open trade and immigration regimes (Brinegar and Jolly, 2005). The likeliness to vote for an extreme right party will decrease as education levels increase. The argument maintains that through education, people are intensively exposed to liberal values and thus more likely to embrace them. Similarly, Mayer (2005) asserts voters of the FN tend to be less educated than other voters. A study carried out by Andersen and Evans (2004) reaffirms the importance of socialisation in determining authoritarian attitudes. They also found that blue-collar workers tend to be more authoritarian on all dimensions than people from other social classes - the traditionally right-wing authoritarian self-employed aside - which supports Lipset’s working class authoritarianism hypothesis. Moreover, Kitschelt (1995) argues that people employed in non-manual jobs that enjoy a small degree of autonomy in their work, are likely to develop authoritarian preferences, similar to those ascribed to working-class voters.

Gender

Existing studies often highlight that gender is one of the more defining characteristics of an extreme right voter, with male voters more likely to vote for an extreme right party than women. Simply put, Kitschelt (1995) argues that male voters tend to be more
attracted than their female counterparts to the discourse and ideology of extreme right parties. Mayer (2005) finds strong feminist opposition to the ideology of the extreme right in her study of France. However, the Front National’s electoral appeal although predominantly male (around 60 percent) cuts-across class boundaries and extends itself across most social categories. Women, once unlikely to vote for the FN, have seen their leverage within the party’s electorate increase (Schain, 2002). Table 7.2 provides some interesting findings within the context of gender differences in West and East Germany. Whilst men clearly lead the way in their affiliation with extreme right ideology in both West and East Germany, women tend to have slightly higher levels of intolerance to minorities than men in West Germany.

**Table 7.2: Gender differences in extreme right sympathy and intolerance to minorities in West and East Germany**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Extreme Right Sympathy</th>
<th>Intolerance to Minorities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Table extracted from Harrison, S. (2004) Phoenix from the Flames? Undergraduate dissertation. Based on data on Eurobarometer 53 (April-May 2000). Entries are percentage of extreme right sympathisers across the age groups. Extreme right sympathy is measured in Eurobarometer as an answer of 8-10 when respondents are asked to self-place their ideological preferences on a scale where 1 means most to the left and 10 most to the right. Intolerance to minority groups us measured in the World Value Survey and is the mean of rejecting the idea of having foreign, Muslim or Jewish neighbours.

**Age**

Existing studies have often shown that an age-effect exists within the electoral base of extreme right parties, with both younger and older voters being more likely to support the extreme right than other age groups. This maybe because the effects of a changing social structure have not affected all generations equally: young voters and pensioners are more
likely to lack solid social ties. Greater social integration is likely to be reflected not only in higher levels of electoral participation but also in a tendency to refrain from voting for a party of the extreme right. Guiraudon and Schain (2002) conducted some extremely interesting individual level analysis of voters for Le Pen. Surprisingly, Le Pen received the highest level of support among 18-24 year olds with a massive 20 percent of these young people casting their vote in his favour. This was almost double that of any other candidate (Jospin received 12 percent of the vote amongst this age group). Second only to Chirac, Le Pen also scored well amongst the 45-64 year old category with 19 percent of their vote. Interestingly, at the local level, Le Pen received some of his best results where the extreme left is strong and the abstention levels are high, suggesting that in these particular localities there is a widespread dissatisfaction with the established parties and mainstream politicians. Table 7.3 shows some interesting differences across age groups in the context of West and East Germany. In West Germany, it is the older generation - the 65 years and over category - that primarily sympathises with the ideology of the extreme right. In contrast, it is the youngest generation – the under 29 category – that place themselves on the far right of the Left-Right political spectrum in the Eastern Länder.

Table 7.3: Sympathisers of extreme right parties across age groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Under 29</th>
<th>30-44</th>
<th>45-64</th>
<th>65 and over</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Table extracted from Harrison, S. (2004) Phoenix from the Flames? Undergraduate dissertation. Based on data on Eurobarometer 53 (April-May 2000). Entries are percentage of extreme right sympathisers across the age groups. Extreme right sympathy is measured in Eurobarometer as an answer of 8-10 when respondents are asked to self-place their ideological preferences on a scale where 1 means most to the left and 10 most to the right.
**Proximity theory**

In line with Allport's contact theory (1994), DiGusto and Jolly (2008) find that respondents in *departments* with large immigration populations are less likely to think that there are too many immigrants. Perrineau (1985) argues that this is because voters tend to respond to the physical and socio-economic insecurity they perceive foreign-born populations to entail. Mayer (1995) argues this heightened xenophobia is not a result of greater contact with immigrant groups but that it is instead a product of the prospect of greater immigration and an ignorance of its effects (Mayer, 1995: 102).

**Ideology**

As we have stated earlier, there is a large amount of variation among the ideological stances of parties that are traditionally classified as belonging to the extreme right party family. The Scandinavian Progress Parties, for instance, have been characterised as Right-libertarian (Harmel and Gibson, 2007) and even the attitudinal positions of voters for 'hard' Right parties such as the Vlaams Belang do not correspond entirely to a homogeneous authoritarian set (Evans, 2001) but there has been a convergence of such parties across time towards more similar authoritarian stances (Andersen & Evans, 2004). Voters who share authoritarian, ethno-nationalist, and xenophobic attitudes were more likely to support the Front National. Whilst, Van der Brug et al (2000) and Van der Brug and Fennema (2003) argue that the principal motivation for voting for extreme right parties is the presence of an authoritarian ideology, Mayer (1995) insists that extreme right voters tend to express a lower degree of trust in France's cultural and political
institutions, except the trust invested in the police and the military. Mayer (1995) also finds that FN voters are far more xenophobic than supporters of other right-wing parties. However, Kitschelt (1995) states in contrast that FN voters are only marginally more racist than other right-wing party supporters. More specifically, Rydgren finds that xenophobia, law and order, personal security (for example death penalty), anti-European Union sentiments, and a belief that politicians do not care about the opinion of ordinary people were of particular importance (Rydgren, 2005).

In summary, we have seen from the above discussion that creating a ‘profile’ of an extreme right is not straightforward. There does seem to be some consensus that blue collar, small business owners and the unemployed are amongst the occupation groups that are most susceptible to vote for a party belonging to the extreme right party family. It seems that education matters, with the lower-educated voters more likely to sympathise with extreme right ideology than others. Young, male voters are also more prone to vote for an extreme right party. In addition, there are some attitudinal dispositions that make some people more likely to confirm their ideological sympathy with an extreme right party, for example, citizens who retain authoritarian, xenophobic, populist or reactionary values are expected to be amongst voters of the extreme right. However, there are many comparative differences across not only across countries but also within party systems. In an attempt to shed more light upon the preferences of extreme right voters, we move on to investigate the match between the strategic-discursive positions of the nine extreme right parties included in the analysis and the ideological preferences of potential and actual voters.
7.3 Match, set and game?

It is now time to critically establish whether the ideological positioning of extreme right political parties across the three countries that we have focused on matters when it comes to the attitudes of their potential voters. This is what we will investigate using the results of a mass survey that was run in the aftermath of the June 2009 European Parliament elections. In this context, there are a number of questions regarding public attitudes towards the extreme right that we want to tackle. Firstly, what is the relationship between actual and potential vote for extreme right parties in the three countries that we are studying? Secondly, how are the public opinions of these three countries ideologically distributed when it comes to the four pillars of extreme right ideology that we define in the conceptual map? Thirdly, how does the likeliness to vote for an extreme right party increase as citizens become more radical on these four ideological pillars? Let us now consider these three questions in turn.

7.4 Extreme right voting in Britain, France, and Germany

One of the great breakthroughs of electoral behaviour research over the past fifteen years has concerned a new questioning of the best conceptualisation of the dependent variable that scholars should focus on to understand the vote of citizens. The most traditional conceptualisation of the vote has consisted of asking voters either, retrospectively, which party or candidate they voted for in a given election, or, prospectively, which political

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41 The survey was directed by Michael Bruter from the LSE as part of an ESRC-sponsored project entitled 'Feeling European? Mass European identity in 27 European countries'. The survey was conducted by the opinion company Opinium. See chapter three for the details of the methodology.
party or candidate they would vote for if a general/presidential etc. election ‘took place tomorrow’. This understanding of the vote claims to be the most ‘realistic’ on the whole as, in most countries, citizens are of course asked to choose only one candidate or party to vote for and there is little reward for a party that would come ‘second best’ in a voter’s preference rankings. There are, however, some exceptions, and in countries which use alternative voting or the single transferable vote (Australia, Ireland, etc), the question effectively asked to voters changes quite a bit as they are asked to determine who are their two favourite candidates, or even to provide a full ranking of all the parties that compete for their vote.

Beyond this ‘electoral technicality’ (albeit, by no means, a minor technicality), however, scholars such as van der Eijk, Franklin, et al. (1996) go further and demonstrate that even in countries where voters are ultimately only asked to decide on their favourite party or candidate, simply focusing on this binary conception of the vote (the chosen party/candidate vs. all the others) prevents scholars from understanding much of what the electoral decision and electoral choice really entail. For instance, if one only asks a respondent which party they voted for, it is difficult to realise how ‘close’ competitors were, the ‘subset’ of parties the voter might have considered choosing, and the underlying trade-offs that presided over the voter’s final choice. They therefore propose to focus on an alternative dependent variable, the propensity to vote for each and every party in competition in a given party system. Propensity to vote questions establish how likely a voter would say that they would vote for a given political party in the future and, regardless of actual voting choice, allows to ‘map’ the underlying electoral preferences of voters in a much more comprehensive way than voting choice questions. For instance,
propensity to vote questions allow us to understand which political parties are completely and comprehensively removed from a voter's subset of potential choices. It also allows us to map which parties are 'real rivals' for the vote cast by a given citizen, and therefore what could be the real consequences of 'short term factors' (as per the Michigan model of Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 1960) in terms of a vote being lost by a party and won by another. For instance, we may find that while voter A feels most likely to vote for the Socialist party of country X, only the Greens and the Communists are real contenders for this respondent's vote if he is disappointed by the Socialists. By contrast, voter B who also feels most likely to vote for the Socialist party of the same country may vote for the Christian Democrats or the Liberals if he proves disappointed by his 'favourites'. These two voters might have answered the exact same thing to the question 'which party would you vote for if a general election took place tomorrow?' but their actual electoral 'potential', and the role they may play in electoral change could be completely different.

The survey we are using here used three electoral preference questions as explained in chapter three: (1) respondents' propensity to vote for each of the main parties (including all major extreme right parties) in each party system, (2) respondents' actual vote choice in the European Parliament elections that took place a few days before the survey was conducted (again, every main extreme right party was included in the list of choices offered), and (3) respondents' most likely choice if a general election took place a week after the survey was conducted (same remark as above). These questions allow us to compare the actual vote for the country's extreme right parties (in the actual European elections that took place and in a hypothetical forthcoming general election) and the
potential vote for the same extreme right parties, that is the propensity of individual voters to vote for any of the extreme right parties in competition in his/her party system.

In the context of our research question, this distinction is absolutely essential. Indeed, a significant part of our investigation is to try and understand how the actual ideological and strategic discourse of extreme right parties tap into the four potential ideological pillars and how this impacts the ability of these parties to ‘catch’ a small or large portion of their potential electorates. In this sense, it is important to first isolate this said potential electorate (if a given voter would never ever vote for an extreme right party, then presumably, nothing this party will do will make them change their mind, but if the voter would consider voting for this party in principle, then the party’s strategy as well as that of its competitors comes into play), and then realise which proportion of them end up being ‘transformed’ into actual voters.

*Potential extreme right voters in Britain, France, and Germany*

The first question is therefore to understand how large the proportions of potential extreme right voters are in the three countries included in the analysis. The propensity to vote questions asked, for every major party and every meaningful extreme right party in each party system how likely it is, on a scale from 0 to 10 that the respondent would ever vote for this party in the future. The first important figure is therefore the proportion of respondents who chose ‘0’ to all three of the extreme right parties included in the analysis in each country (three in each of the countries considered). These results are compiled in
Table 7.4 alongside the average propensity to vote for the three extreme right parties in the countries rounded to the nearest full point.

Table 7.4: Average propensity to vote for extreme right parties in Britain, France, and Germany

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average Extreme right PTV</th>
<th>Britain (%)</th>
<th>France (%)</th>
<th>Germany (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>75.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first conclusion of this table is indeed that not all nations are likely to consider the possibility to case a vote in favour of an extreme right party. Indeed, in Britain, only 35.7 percent of the voters would never consider voting for any of the three extreme right parties competing for their vote, but this proportion increases to 49.2 percent of the electorate in France, and even to 75.6 percent of voters in Germany. Of course, some will comment that the British score might be due to the specificity of UKIP, which does very well in European Parliament elections by having managed to ‘steal’ euroscepticism as a policy issue. However, as mentioned in chapter two, it is important to remember that while some voters may indeed choose to entrust UKIP with their vote as a eurosceptic gesture, the ideological discourse of the party is in fact quite close to that of other parties included in this analysis and strong on the same two pillars. Moreover, there have been historical links with other radical groups and some associates that were, at different times, members of UKIP and the BNP, and additionally, in the European Parliament, UKIP tied
their fortunes with other extreme right parties notably from Eastern Europe. Finally, a significant part of the literature, such as the work of John, Margetts, and Weir's (2005) agrees that UKIP is indeed an extreme right party, quite close, in fact, to the BNP and other 'ideal typical’ members of the extreme right party family.

The rest of the table, whilst constrained by the proportion of 'absolute' non-extreme right voters is relatively more homogeneous, with always very few respondents in each country who would highly consider voting for all three extreme right parties. In fact, the total proportion of respondents having an average propensity to vote for extreme right parties between five and ten is 22.8 percent in Britain, 11.2 percent in France, and 7.3 percent in Germany. Finally, the group of 'unlikely' extreme right voters (with average propensity to vote situated between one and four) constitutes approximately 41.5 percent of the electorate in Britain, 39.5 percent in France, and 17.1 percent in Germany.

*The actual vote for extreme right parties*

Let us contrast these figures to respondents answers’ to the questions they were asked about their actual vote in the recent European Parliament elections and their likely vote if a general election took place within a few days. Respondents who said that they would probably vote were offered a choice of all the main parties competing in the party system (and all the lists actually competing in the elections for the European Parliament). In the following analysis, we simply give a score of 0 to respondents who did not choose one of the country’s extreme right party in either election, a score of 1 to respondents who chose any of the country’s extreme right party in one election but not for the other, and a score
of 2 for the respondents who chose one extreme right party for both elections. Respondents who answered that they had not voted in the European Parliament elections and would probably not vote in forthcoming general elections were excluded from the analysis, voters who answered that they had/would vote for only one were scored on the basis of their only answer.

The results of this coding are summarised in table 7.5. We can see that there is a clear difference between ‘considering’ a vote for an extreme right party and actually voting for it. This time, the proportion of respondents claiming to not have voted for an extreme right party in the last European Parliament elections and not intend to vote for one in forthcoming general elections is even larger: 79.1 percent in Britain, 93.6 percent in France, and 95.2 percent in Germany. However, it should also be noted that social acceptability was likely to prove even more of a problem for these two questions than for the other. Indeed, when it comes to propensity to vote questions, one could consider a likely extreme right voter just ‘lowering’ his or her score. When it comes to actual vote, however, the only way to bow to the pressure of social acceptability would be to fully disguise an extreme right choice into a non-extreme right one (e.g. ‘unsure’, ‘other’ or some more respectable party). Of course, the consequence of this limited variance, which confirms that surveys do under-estimate actual extreme right vote when we compare them to actual electoral results in the three countries, means that this question will be ‘harder’ for us to use in our analysis than is the case with the propensity to vote question which is less skewed in its distribution.
Table 7.5: Actual vote for extreme right parties in Britain, France, and Germany

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chose an extreme right party</th>
<th>Britain (%)</th>
<th>France (%)</th>
<th>Germany (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neither election</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>93.6</td>
<td>95.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Either European or general</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both elections</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Beyond these claimed non-voters, the proportion of respondents claiming to have/intend to vote for an extreme right party respectively reaches 11.7 percent in Britain, 4.0 percent in France, and 2.7 percent in Germany, while the proportions claiming to vote for extreme right parties in both elections is of 9.1 percent, 2.4 percent, and 2.1 percent respectively in the three countries. However, if we intend to use propensity to vote as a more realistic proxy for extreme right voting, we need to understand the relationship between the two variables a little bit better.

7.5 The relationship between potential and actual extreme right vote

The next task at hand is therefore to look at the relationship between propensity to vote for extreme right parties and declared actual vote in just-past European Parliament and hypothetical future general elections. Table 7.6 summarises the way the average actual vote for each of the nine extreme right parties considered in the analysis increases for each extra point of average propensity to vote for extreme right parties within the party system in general.
Table 7.6 provides for a range of broadly interesting findings. The first is that in all of the nine cases at hand, a propensity to vote for extreme right parties of 0 results in an actual average vote of 0. In other words, there is a 'perfect match' between the two – potential and actual – questions when it comes to absolute extreme right non-voters, a finding worth stressing if only to emphasise the prima facie robustness of the propensity to vote question in the context of extreme right electoral behaviour. Secondly, in general terms, consistently with what one would expect, actual extreme right vote tends to increase when propensity to vote for extreme right parties increases as well. There are of course some marginal exceptions. The scores of voting for the MNR are so low that such a pattern is almost unnoticeable, and in the case of the German Republikaner highest actual vote is in fact to be found amongst those with a propensity to vote for extreme right parties of 4, perhaps because the correlation between the propensity to vote for the Republikaner and other German extreme right parties is not very high. By contrast, the progression of actual vote by propensity to vote is almost linear in the case of parties such as the BNP or the NPD and very strong for the FN. For other parties, the tendency suggests that there are

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average Extreme Right PTV</th>
<th>Britain (%)</th>
<th>France (%)</th>
<th>Germany (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>UKIP</td>
<td>ED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
some 'cut off' points around an average propensity to vote of 3, 4, or 5 depending on the party, with actual vote being high for UKIP, the DVU, the MPF or the ED when this threshold is exceeded. Again, it should be born in mind that in this section, we are looking at the relationship between an average extreme right propensity to vote and individual extreme right parties' choices, which certainly explains some of the marginal apparent inconsistencies of the table. Indeed, a very strong BNP voter may perfectly well want to stress that he or she will only vote for his/her party, and would not really consider voting for competitors or enemies 'from the inside' such as UKIP. This would in turn result in a lower average extreme right propensity to vote, particularly in those systems where the tensions between competing extreme right parties are fierce (in fact, this is really the case, at least to an extent, in all three systems!)

7.6 Extreme right voting and ideological positioning on the four pillars of extreme right ideology

Let us now consider the relationship between extreme right voting – both in terms of actual vote and of extreme right propensity to vote, and respondents' positions on the four strategic discursive pillars of extreme right ideology defined in chapter two: xenophobic, populist, reactionary, and repressive.

The first question is to know whether all countries are equal in the face of extreme right ideology. Indeed, when it comes to explaining the overall success of extreme right parties in various European party systems, the argument that some countries are more 'predisposed' to being open to extreme right arguments than others is far from rare, and
the survey data that we analyse gives us an opportunity to verify whether this is indeed true. As explained in chapter three, all respondents were asked to situate themselves on eight attitudinal scales, two for each of the four pillars of extreme right ideology that we wanted to target. The scales used asked respondents to what extent they agreed with given statements using, each time, an agreement scale that varied from 0 to 10. Each time, one of the statements was phrased 'positively' and one 'negatively' to avoid problems of acquiescence.

_Ideological predisposition to vote for extreme right parties in Britain, France, and Germany_

Based on the model developed in chapter two, we defined extreme right ideology on the basis of the relative combination of four ideological (or, in the case of parties, 'strategic-discursive') pillars: xenophobia and populism as expressions of negative identity, and reactionary attitudes and repression as forms of authoritarianism. Conversely, when it comes to voters, we therefore expect those citizens who score highly on some of these four pillars to be more predisposed to vote for extreme right parties.

The first part of our quest has to do with the aggregate level of adhesion to these four pillars in the four countries and how they compare to the average adhesion to these pillars measured in the eight countries in which the questions on extreme right ideology were asked: Britain, France and Germany of course but also Austria, Denmark, Italy, Romania, Northern Ireland, Belgium (with a French and a Dutch speaking samples). The result of the relative adhesion to the four extreme right pillars is summarised by table 7.7
Table 7.7: Relative support for the extreme right ideological pillars (compared to the average of eight European democracies)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Reactionary</th>
<th>Repressive</th>
<th>Xenophobic</th>
<th>Populist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>6.96</td>
<td>7.69</td>
<td>7.21</td>
<td>8.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.53)</td>
<td>(2.49)</td>
<td>(2.88)</td>
<td>(2.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>7.15</td>
<td>6.91</td>
<td>6.27</td>
<td>8.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.36)</td>
<td>(2.86)</td>
<td>(3.02)</td>
<td>(2.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>6.26</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>5.97</td>
<td>8.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.57)</td>
<td>(2.70)</td>
<td>(3.06)</td>
<td>(2.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>6.59</td>
<td>7.40</td>
<td>6.53</td>
<td>8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>countries</td>
<td>(2.52)</td>
<td>(2.64)</td>
<td>(3.00)</td>
<td>(2.30)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Figures are on a 0-10 scale. Figures in brackets are standard deviations of the means.

The results produced in table 7.7 show some interesting variations across the three countries included in the analysis. Of course, the gross results need to be taken with caution since the eight items were not distributed in the same way, and some distributions were therefore more skewed than others across countries. However, we can see that British citizens score higher on average than the eight countries included in the analysis on all four pillars, and particularly in terms of xenophobic, repressive, and reactionary attitudes. By contrast, Germany, which, out of the three countries studied here, has the lowest combined extreme right vote, scores lower than average, particularly in terms of xenophobic and reactionary (and to some extent repressive) attitudes. Finally, France is far more reactionary than average, but the least repressive of the three countries at hand.

In short, the first finding could be rephrased by saying that overall levels of 'ideological predisposition' to extreme right voting seems to be high in Britain, average in France, and low in Germany. The second finding suggests that the three electorates have different specificities, with the British being mostly xenophobic and repressive, the French
reactionary, and the Germans rather populist and repressive. It should also be noted that
the populist pillar is the one that seems to vary least across the countries studied, certainly
in part because of the rather skewed distribution of the two populist items.

Both findings are obviously quite important at face value. The different levels of
predisposition are interesting because for many years, Britain was considered a country
with a relatively low propensity to vote for the extreme right. However, our results show
that the ideological 'potential' is high, which may explain why the emergence of new
parties that were more in tune with the aspiration of potential extreme right voters ended
up 'revealing' the real extreme right reservoir of Britain. By contrast, while the extreme
right does not poll very highly in Germany, our results suggest that its potential based on
the ideological predisposition of its citizens is in fact not much superior to its actual
results at the moment. Of course, as this is the first time these questions were asked in a
survey, we do not know how robust or volatile this ideological predisposition remains
over time. Finally, in France as well, while there is potential for extreme right voting, it is
not as high as in Britain, and mostly, it seems to currently favour the ideological positions
of the MPF more than those of the FN and the MNR.

An important qualification of these results has to do with the way it concerns various
demographic groups. A first interesting distinction regards differences between men and
women. Indeed, while much of the traditional literature suggested that men were
perceived as more likely to vote for the extreme right, and expected to feel closer to its
ideology because of its perceived 'violent' nature, more recent analyses have been far
more cautious on the gender front. Indeed, the dominant finding of contemporary studies
is that gender is not a good predictor of extreme right voting, which suggests that the perceived natural affinity of men to extreme right 'values' may no longer be true. Table 7.8 does indeed go a long way into refuting such an affinity, and indeed, shows that in all of the countries analysed, women tend to score higher than men on most or all of the pillars of extreme right ideology.

Table 7.8: Gender differences in the relative support for the extreme right ideological pillars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Reactionary</th>
<th>Repressive</th>
<th>Xenophobic</th>
<th>Populist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>6.83</td>
<td>(2.60)</td>
<td>7.11</td>
<td>(2.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>7.13</td>
<td>(2.43)</td>
<td>7.17</td>
<td>(2.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>6.20</td>
<td>(2.63)</td>
<td>6.33</td>
<td>(2.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average 8 countries</td>
<td>6.51</td>
<td>(2.60)</td>
<td>6.66</td>
<td>(2.45)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Figures are on a 0-10 scale. Figures in brackets are standard deviations of the means.

The only pillar on which there is no obvious difference between genders is the xenophobic pillar, but on all other dimensions, women on average seem more reactionary (not a real surprise considering the existing literature on conservatism see for example Shapiro & Mahajan, 1986), but also more repressive and more populist across all three countries analysed.

We also ran similar tests with regards to the different pillar scores across age groups. There again, there have been some inconsistencies in the literature with regards to the relationship between age and extreme right voting. In this case, the inconsistencies have been even more extreme with contradicting tales of younger or elderly extreme right
voting, and some of the literature has stressed how different the story could be across different countries.

Of course, as shown by the existing literature, age can play a role in behaviour in the form of a life cycle or a generational effect. In the first instance, people obviously ‘change’ over the course of their lifetime, whilst generations brought up in particular circumstances develop different behavioural profiles which they will keep throughout their lives. According to Inglehart (1971), post materialist values are acquired through a generational effect, and if support for extreme right ideology can be conceived as a reaction to such post materialist values, then the effect should logically be generational as well. Conversely, if extreme right preferences are conceived as a certain form of protest towards some mainstream value, then life cycle effects could instead be at play. Intellectually, we would suggest that both elements could in part explain age-related differences in the propensity to vote for extreme right parties, however, it should be noted that within the framework of this investigation, we cannot fully arbitrate between the two alternative theories for lack of time series data. This therefore seems to call for a substantial analysis of the way adhesion to the four pillars of extreme right ideology evolves over life cycle of individuals. Firstly, table 7.9 summarises the overall correlation between each of these pillars and age (measured as a continuous variable) across the eight countries.

Table 7.9: Correlation between age and pillars of extreme right ideology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillar</th>
<th>Correlation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reactionary</td>
<td>0.12**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repressive</td>
<td>0.05**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xenophobic</td>
<td>0.10**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Populist</td>
<td>0.06**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
On the whole, there is a statistically significant positive correlation between each of the four pillars of extreme right ideology and age. However, in some cases, this correlation is rather small (0.05 for the repressive pillar, 0.06 for the populist one) revealing more complicated stories. We will now try to capture these complexities by looking at the average level of adhesion to each of the four pillars of extreme right ideology across four age groups: 18-24, 25-44, 45-64, and over 65. These four age categories typically correspond to a citizen’s years of early adult socialisation, the first part of their active life, the second part of their active life, and the typical period of retirement from active life.

Table 7.10 summarises these differences in each of the three countries studied in this work and the average of the eight countries studied in the survey.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Reactionary</th>
<th>Repressive</th>
<th>Xenophobic</th>
<th>Populist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Britain</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>5.69 (2.40)</td>
<td>6.87 (2.61)</td>
<td>5.91 (3.01)</td>
<td>7.07 (2.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-44</td>
<td>6.39 (2.62)</td>
<td>7.38 (2.53)</td>
<td>6.85 (2.87)</td>
<td>7.75 (2.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-64</td>
<td>7.47 (2.34)</td>
<td>7.98 (2.39)</td>
<td>7.59 (2.81)</td>
<td>8.50 (1.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>7.81 (2.28)</td>
<td>8.20 (2.34)</td>
<td>7.94 (2.54)</td>
<td>8.55 (2.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>6.51 (2.59)</td>
<td>6.09 (2.95)</td>
<td>5.63 (3.26)</td>
<td>7.63 (2.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-44</td>
<td>7.02 (2.26)</td>
<td>6.99 (2.75)</td>
<td>5.90 (3.04)</td>
<td>8.06 (2.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-64</td>
<td>7.31 (2.39)</td>
<td>6.98 (2.91)</td>
<td>6.55 (2.99)</td>
<td>8.13 (2.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>7.24 (2.24)</td>
<td>6.96 (2.84)</td>
<td>6.61 (2.74)</td>
<td>7.61 (2.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Germany</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>5.28 (2.55)</td>
<td>6.25 (2.65)</td>
<td>6.18 (2.89)</td>
<td>7.07 (2.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-44</td>
<td>6.34 (2.33)</td>
<td>7.04 (2.48)</td>
<td>6.20 (2.95)</td>
<td>7.93 (2.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-64</td>
<td>6.50 (2.65)</td>
<td>7.13 (2.80)</td>
<td>6.01 (3.12)</td>
<td>8.31 (2.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>5.76 (2.55)</td>
<td>6.82 (2.74)</td>
<td>5.26 (3.05)</td>
<td>7.80 (2.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average 8 countries</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>5.84 (2.48)</td>
<td>6.95 (2.67)</td>
<td>5.94 (3.00)</td>
<td>7.54 (2.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-44</td>
<td>6.47 (2.42)</td>
<td>7.47 (2.50)</td>
<td>6.39 (2.95)</td>
<td>7.96 (2.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-64</td>
<td>6.76 (2.57)</td>
<td>7.41 (2.71)</td>
<td>6.68 (3.02)</td>
<td>8.11 (2.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>6.84 (2.56)</td>
<td>7.53 (2.71)</td>
<td>6.86 (2.96)</td>
<td>8.02 (2.40)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Figures are on a 0-10 scale. Figures in brackets are standard deviations of the means.
As can be seen from table 7.10, not all pillars evolve equally across age in the different countries explored. While the general story is one of overall radicalisation over time, the story is thus more straightforward for some pillars than for others. Indeed, while levels of adhesion to the reactionary pillar predictably progress as one moves on from one age group to the next (and, perhaps less predictably so, levels of adhesion to the xenophobic pillar) the story is a little bit different for the repressive and populist pillars. When it comes to the repressive pillar, it seems that while younger voters are less repressive than the rest, variations are limited – when looking at the eight countries average – across the other three age groups with respondents aged 25-44 almost as repressive as those aged 65 and over. Similarly, with regards to populism, while levels seem to increase up to the 45-64 year old group, they then go down amongst 65+ year old respondents.

When one looks at differences across countries, variations are even more striking. Amongst our British sample, it seems that levels of adhesion to most pillars keep increasing over age groups. By contrast, when it comes to the German sample, one could note that respondents aged 65 and over tend to dissociate themselves from extreme right ideology pillars more than those aged 45-64 and those aged 25-44 alike. Moreover, when it comes to the xenophobic pillar specifically, it is almost a case of respondents being less and less xenophobic as they age. As for the French sample, the populism curve seems to imitate a reversed U with the youngest and oldest respondents feeling less populist than middle-aged ones, whilst in terms of repressive attitudes, levels are almost flat from 25 years old onwards even though younger voters (aged 18-24) are significantly less prone to repressive attitudes than the rest.
Altogether, it is therefore particularly interesting to note that the evolution of adhesion to extreme right ideological pillars across age groups varies differently in the different countries and depending on the specific pillars, with some clear differences between xenophobic and reactionary pillars in Germany, and between populist pillar and the rest in France. It is now time to look at the specific implications of these differences in respondents’ attitudes towards the various pillars and actual propensity to vote (and actual decision to vote) for extreme right parties across Britain, France, and Germany.

*Ideological adhesion to the four pillars of extreme right ideology and extreme right voting*

Let us now look at how this plays at the individual level. After looking at the ‘mood’ of the three nations that we want to analyse, it is crucial as a test of the worth of our model, to understand if indeed, voters who are more reactionary, repressive, xenophobic, or populist end up being more likely to vote for extreme right parties. For this particular part of the analysis, we will look at the link between pillar scores and both propensity to vote for extreme right parties, and actual vote for these parties.

Tables 7.11 and 7.12 investigate the evolution of the average extreme right ideological pillar scores for each level of average propensity to vote for extreme right parties in the three countries in our analysis. The picture that emerges from these three tables is extremely straightforward. The higher the propensity of a voter to vote for the extreme right parties running for election in his or her party system, the higher their score on the four ideological pillars that characterise extreme right ideology. This is globally true.
across all three countries and all four pillars, although there are variations in terms of the
details of what matters most. In all three countries, the xenophobic pillar remains one of
the most sensitive to extreme right propensity to vote. In Britain, however, the reactionary
and populist pillars also matter a lot.

Tables 7.11: Evolution of extreme right ideological pillars scores as the propensity to
vote for extreme right parties increases

7.11.1: Britain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average PTV</th>
<th>Reactionary</th>
<th>Repressive</th>
<th>Xenophobic</th>
<th>Populist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
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<td>8.8</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
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</table>

7.11.2: France

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average PTV</th>
<th>Reactionary</th>
<th>Repressive</th>
<th>Xenophobic</th>
<th>Populist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>0</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.0</td>
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<td>8.8</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>9.9</td>
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</table>

7.11.3: Germany

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average PTV</th>
<th>Reactionary</th>
<th>Repressive</th>
<th>Xenophobic</th>
<th>Populist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>5.6</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>7.8</td>
<td>6.7</td>
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</tr>
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<td>6.2</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>8.1</td>
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260
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Reactionary</th>
<th>Repressive</th>
<th>Xenophobic</th>
<th>Populist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
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<td>6.5</td>
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<td>7.1</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.6</td>
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<td>8.6</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>9.6</td>
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<td>9.1</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>9.2</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Notes: Figures are on a 0-10 scale.*

### Tables 7.12: Evolution of extreme right ideological pillar scores by actual extreme right voting in the 2009 European Parliament elections and hypothetical forthcoming general elections

#### 7.12.1: Britain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actual Vote</th>
<th>Reactionary</th>
<th>Repressive</th>
<th>Xenophobic</th>
<th>Populist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>7.4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe or National</td>
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<td>8.6</td>
<td>8.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 7.12.2: France

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actual Vote</th>
<th>Reactionary</th>
<th>Repressive</th>
<th>Xenophobic</th>
<th>Populist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe or National</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>8.9</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

#### 7.12.3: Germany

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actual Vote</th>
<th>Reactionary</th>
<th>Repressive</th>
<th>Xenophobic</th>
<th>Populist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe or National</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Notes: Figures are on a 0-10 scale. Figures in brackets are standard deviations of the means.*

#### 7.7 From seducing individual voters to achieving global success: aggregate level fortunes of French, German, and British extreme right parties over time

In this last section of the chapter, we now turn to look at the evolution of the aggregate level of success of the nine extreme right parties that have consistently competed in
national and other elections in the UK, Germany, and France in contemporary years. In traditional Downsian theory (Downs, 1957), the very definition of a political party is that it aims to achieve political power, and thus, by extension, to win elections. Since then, theories have been refined, and particularly in the case of multi-party systems, it has been theorised that parties may try to achieve very different types of success, not only by being office seeking, vote seeking, or policy seeking (Axelrod, 1970; Lijphart, 1984; Luebbert, 1986) but also by sometimes exerting a 'power of nuisance' or indirect influence that may be tailored to individual institutional contexts. One thing remains clear, however, by and large, it is accepted that political parties will want to achieve the best possible results in elections in order to maximise their power and influence.

When it comes to extreme right parties, which, as seen in chapter one, are, mostly, 'secondary' political parties in most party systems, and certainly so in the three countries analysed in this thesis, it is important not only to look at national elections, where 'dominant' parties may hope to obtain the key to government, but also at European Parliament elections, where smaller parties may hope to use the second order elections phenomenon (Reif and Schmitt, 1980) to benefit from the willingness of electorates to punish government parties and often large parties in general. Let us now discuss the evolution of the nine parties included in the analysis over time in both national and European Parliament elections. We will also try to see how these evolutions seem to match the patterns that we theoretically proposed in the earlier parts of this thesis by looking in particular at national intra-extreme right party competition. Let us now look at the evolution of these parties’ electoral scores in each of the countries in the analysis.
Evolution of extreme right parties' success in France

As explained in chapter three, the Front National emerged as the historical extreme right party in France, first being born in the 1970s before emerging as a true political force in the mid-1980s. It was later joined by the MPF which split from the moderate right in the mid-1990s, and the MNR which split from the FN itself in 1998. We also saw in chapter five that while the MPF progressively occupied a strategic-discursive position radically different from the FN, the MNR failed to differentiate itself in any significant way from its former big brother and simply assumed a slightly more blurred ideological identity than that historic comparator. According to our theory, it should therefore have been difficult for the MNR to successfully coexist alongside the FN, while it should be a little bit easier for the MPF which carved out its own ideological breathing space.

Table 7.13 looks at the historical results of all three parties in French general elections. First, we can see that after a timid start, the FN emerged as a strong political party in 1986, when France used proportional elections as a one-off departure from the fifth Republic tradition of two ballot majority-plurality elections in single member districts (first ballot requires an absolute majority of the vote, if not all candidates obtaining over 12.5 percent of registered voters are allowed to run again in a second ballot where the candidate with the highest proportion of the vote is elected). However, the limit of the institutional analysis is that a return to majority/plurality elections did not in any way impede the progress of the FN in vote terms, despite condemning it to having between zero and one elected Member of Parliament in all subsequent elections. The FN remained strong in general elections, apart from a disastrous result in the 2007 legislative ballot.
Table 7.13: Election results of French extreme right parties in general elections since 1978

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<td>MPF</td>
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<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNR</td>
<td>% vote</td>
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<td>0.4</td>
<td></td>
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Figure 7.1: Extreme right electoral success in France

Of course, from the point of view of internal competition, the arrival of two trouble makers made electoral races far more interesting from the point of view of extreme right rivalry. While the MPF still ran as part of the presidential majority in 1997, its first truly independent showdown in 2002 made for a very timid electoral score. By contrast, the party picked up more support in 2007, in a generally difficult election for smaller parties.
The MNR followed a completely different curve. When it split from the FN in 1998, it was promised a bright future by many analysts, and indeed, many French political commentators expected the new party to outshine the FN by embracing a similar discourse without the embarrassing blunders of FN leader Jean-Marie Le Pen. However, while the 1.1 percent of the vote obtained in 2002 was probably disappointing for leader Bruno Mégret and his troops, who had secured some major electoral successes in the municipal elections of 1999, the party’s results continued to steadily collapse to reach a negligible 0.4 percent of the vote in 2007. Thus, between the late 1990s, and the late 2000s, the new extreme right party expected to do well collapsed, while the one expected to do poorly managed to build a strong enough reservoir of independent support to survive. According to our model, this is largely due to the fact that the MPF managed to find a distinctive strategic-discursive position to defend that made them a unique offer within the French extreme right scene, while the MNR never managed to emerge from the shadow of the FN, whose ideological discourse it merely echoed. In terms of European Parliament elections, the picture is partly similar and partly different. The similar component is that as was the case on the national political scene, the MNR started with a promising result of 3.3 percent in 1999 before collapsing and remaining under 0.5 percent in subsequent elections. The aspect which was different, however, is that the MPF started its existence as a front runner in European Parliament elections, trumping the Front National, before a change of fortune in 2004, when the party declined in support and fell second to the FN. However, from this point of view, it is worth remembering that the MPF first emerged as a splinter group of the Gaullist (moderate) right in the mid-1990s. At that time, it predominantly campaigned with a strong Eurosceptic focus, and even managed to get the support of some prime traditional right-wing politicians such as
Charles Pasqua. However, it was in the early 2000s that the party completely changed its ideological placing to primarily focus on a xenophobic rhetoric, which emphasised its ideological independence from the FN, but also came at a cost when it was trying to attract the disappointed moderate right-wing voters. Moreover, the new tone of the party revealed its extreme right identity and as a result many of the non-extremist politicians, including Pasqua decided to withdraw their support.

Table 7.14: Evolution of French extreme right parties’ electoral success in European Parliament elections

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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>3.3</td>
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</table>

Notes: * PFN was a predecessor of the FN. ** The French party MNR ran under the title of Parti de la France.

In the following section, we turn our attention to the electoral success of the extreme right party family in Germany.

Evolution of extreme right parties’ success in Germany

As explained in chapter three, the historical genesis of the German extreme right scene is somewhat less straightforward than in the French case. Under different names and in different forms, the NPD is probably the oldest component of the modern German extreme right. However, with several judicial condemnations and even dissolutions, there
were several lengthy periods of times when the party did not have a presence, including the one when, in the 1980s, the Republikaner emerged as a strong new extreme right party. As for the DVU, it mostly first emerged as a one-man populist party in 1987 (despite the pre-existence of a looser form of association since 1971), before rooting itself in its extreme right positioning throughout the 1990s.

It is also worth noting that the conclusions of chapter five suggested that all three parties occupy distinct strategic-discursive positions, whereby the NPD is predominantly populist-repressive, the DVU xenophobic-repressive, and the Republikaner populist-reactionary. Despite some overlaps between each of these parties, they all have a form of ideological specificity that would normally give them a ‘protected’ core electorate. In federal elections, it is interesting to note that the NPD, the ‘true’ historical party’ tended to lose ground in the early years until 1994, before slowly rebuilding its electoral strength. In fact, the party almost completely disappeared from its original Western heartlands to re-emerge primarily as a strong player in East Germany as soon as the unification honeymoon was over in the mid-1990s. By contrast, the Republikaner which had a relatively strong showing in the 1990 elections progressively lost ground to almost collapse towards the late 2000s. Finally, the DVU which did not do well at all in 2002, started to pick up support again in subsequent elections, partly through some implicit partnership agreements with the popularising NPD. Altogether, by the late 2000s, the federal extreme right scene therefore looked poly-partisan, albeit with a consistent fading of the Republikaner whose support in wealthy Southern Germany (Bayern, Baden-Württemberg, Sachsen-Anhalt, etc) seemed to erode for good.
Table 7.15: Election results of German extreme right parties in federal elections since 1949

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</table>

Notes: REP: Die Republikaner; NPD: National Democratic Party of Germany (1949: German Right Party, DRP; 1953-1961: German Reich Party, DRP. * In the 2005 Federal Election, the NPD and the DVU ran under the same list. DVU candidates appeared on the NPD list.

When it comes to European Parliament elections, which were the first to witness a strong Republikaner party in 1989, the state of affairs is slightly different and the three parties’ fortunes rather harder to compare. The main reason for this is that the NPD and DVU never ended up competing against each other. In some cases, the two parties gave some more or less explicit electoral support advice to their voters, in other cases, they did not. As a result, neither party could be seen shining in European Parliament elections where they also tended to invest truly minimal effort and resources. The Republikaner saw its score consistently erode as it did for federal elections. The party obtained a modest 1.3 percent in the 2009 vote.
Table 7. 16: Evolution of German extreme right parties’ electoral success in European Parliament elections

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<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
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Notes: * The NPD and DVU had some electoral alliances and only the DVU ran in the 2009 European Parliament Elections.

Figure 7.2: German extreme right electoral success

However, the most interesting conclusion that we can derive from these European Parliament elections results, consistently with our model, is that even when a dominant extreme right party does not compete in an election, its support is not, in any way,
automatically transferred to other extreme right competitors. In the case of the 2009 elections, the most fashionable extreme right party of the moment, the NPD, did not compete, and yet, this absence did not really benefit either the Republikaner, nor the DVU, both of which only achieved rather poor showings overall. In other words, the ideological differences between the three parties seem to clearly impede the transfer of electoral support from one to the other, regardless of whether an absent party tries to influence its voters or not.

Evolution of extreme right parties' success in Great Britain

Finally, the third country included in our comparison is the United Kingdom (or rather, in practical terms, Great Britain, since Northern Ireland is structured by different core cleavages and is not aligned on the left/right spectrum in the usual sense). In this last case, the historic extreme right party was the National Front, which slowly lost some ground to be replaced by the British National Party – a splinter group from the said National Front, which became a fully-fledged party in 1982. In the 1990s, two internal extreme right rivals also emerged: the English Democrats on the one hand, and the UK Independence Party on the other hand, which first emerged as a Eurosceptic party before progressively mutating into a more broadly-encompassing extreme right political party. In chapter three, we highlighted some of the elements of proximity and tension between these three parties, including their history of prime politicians moving from one party to the other, and mostly failed attempts of electoral agreements, etc. In chapter five, we found that the BNP and the English Democrats tend to mostly occupy the same quadrant in our strategic-discursive conceptual map (the xenophobic-repressive quadrant), while the UK
Independence Party has located in the completely opposite quadrant (populist reactionary), which, according to our model, would make it easier for UKIP to survive alongside its rivals than for the English Democrats, which tried to compete with a well-rooted historical party on its own ground.

Table 7.17 shows how the fortunes of the three parties in general elections have evolved over time. Firstly, while the modern BNP never managed to equate the strong results of the National Front in the 1960s, since it re-emerged as an independent political party in 1982, its electoral strength has overall consistently progressed apart from a very weak showing in 2005. Conversely, while UKIP was always portrayed in the media as a ‘Eurosceptic’ party despite its increasingly generalist rhetoric, we can see that since it first ran for general elections in 1997, its electoral support has consistently progressed, and it overtook the BNP as the top extreme right party in the general elections of 2005. Finally, the English Democrats only ran in the 2005 elections, which prevents us from evaluating its progress in national elections at this stage. However, it is important to note that its introduction in the electoral race might have contributed to deprive the BNP of a small part of its electoral support in these 2005 elections, while the entry into the competition of (the stronger) UKIP in 1997 and 2001 had not in any way prevented the BNP from increasing its electoral scores at the time. This seems to confirm our understanding that extreme right political parties mostly encroach on each other’s electorate when they are situated in close strategic-discursive proximity while, by contrast, extreme right parties situated in different quadrants on our conceptual map may attract new types of potential extreme right voters.
**Table 7.17: Election Results of British Extreme Right Parties in General Elections since 1964**

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Notes: * 1964 and 1966 results are those of the National Front, the BNP only emerging as a party in 1982.

**Figure 7.3: Extreme right electoral success in Britain**

![British Extreme Right Electoral Success](image)

Table 7.18, which looks at the evolution of the results of the three parties in European Parliament elections over time, seems to confirm this broad tendency, but the way the parties have approached the election make it more difficult to compare. Indeed, before 2004, neither the BNP nor the English Democrats had invested any effort into European
Parliament elections, preferring to focus all their resources and energy into the local elections that always took place at the same time. Conversely, they would also leave the field entirely open to UKIP which already emerged as an important player in these elections in 1994 and 1999. However, when the other two parties joined the race in 2004 and 2009, they clearly confirmed that this did not, in any way, affect the electoral support basis of UKIP. On the contrary, all three parties managed to thrive at the same time, and while the English Democrats remained small by any standard, the fortunes of UKIP and the BNP progressed synchronically, confirming that the types of potential voters they were seducing were probably parallel rather than overlapping.

Table 7.18: Evolution of British extreme right parties’ electoral success in European Parliament elections

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Overall, throughout the 1990s and 2000s, British extreme right parties – and particularly the BNP and UKIP – managed to strongly progress in electoral terms in parallel, without the success of one affecting the electoral potential of the other, either in general or in European Parliament elections.
7.8. Summary

In the first section of this chapter, we examined the profile and characteristics of an extreme right voter. As we know from other areas of our study, it is extremely hard to conduct empirical analyses of extreme right voters due to the relatively small number of voters in each country and the fact that most electoral studies exclude smaller parties such as those belonging to the extreme right party family. The existing literature highlights certain social groups that are believed to be more susceptible to vote for an extreme right party. For example, the typical profile of an extreme right voter tends to be blue-collar worker or unemployed, with a low level of education, between the age of 18-25, and predominately male. Yet, whilst these social groups are more likely to vote for an extreme right party, there is a relative amount of variance across countries. These variations show that few social categories are left untouched by the allure of the extreme right discourse and that the electoral base of extreme right parties often dissects boundaries that are usually tied to the traditional Left-Right socio-political cleavages. With this in mind, the next section endeavoured to uncover some crucial understanding of the ideological preferences of the voters in each of the three countries included in our analysis. Here, we were looking for the match between the ideological position of the party (ascertained by the empirical testing of the conceptual map via elite interviews and analysis of party manifestoes) and the preferences of these parties' targeted electorate. In order to do this, we analysed the ideological preferences of potential and actual voters on the four main pillars. First of all, we looked at the average propensity to vote across the three countries. In Britain, only 35.7 percent of the voters would never consider voting for any of the three extreme right parties competing for their vote, but this proportion increases to 49.2
percent of the electorate in France, and even to 75.6 percent of voters in Germany. Secondly, the proportion of respondents claiming to have/intend to vote for an extreme right party respectively reaches 11.7 percent in Britain, 4 percent in France, and 2.7 percent in Germany, while the proportions claiming to vote for extreme right parties in both elections is of 9.1 percent, 2.4 percent, and 2.1 percent respectively in the three countries. When comparing the results of the two questions there is a 'perfect match' potential and actual voters when it comes to absolute extreme right non-voters and that obviously, with some minor exceptions, the actual vote tends to increase when propensity to vote for extreme right parties increases as well. In terms of the analysis of extreme right voter preferences, we saw that overall levels of 'ideological predisposition' to extreme right voting was highest in Britain, average in France, and low in Germany. The results also suggested that the three national electorates have different attitudinal attributes, with the British being mostly xenophobic and repressive, the French reactionary, and the Germans rather populist and repressive. This variation in the distribution of the national electorates across the four ideological pillars will undoubtedly affect the chances of electoral success for each individual party and confirms that some of their electoral success will be party dependent upon their strategic-discursive choices and their consequent location on the conceptual map.

Throughout the three countries, our analysis of the evolution of the electoral success of multiple extreme right parties within a system produced some interesting results and findings. The first is that regardless of national contexts (in some countries, the extreme right was globally on the 'up', in others, on the 'down'); the emergence of new internal extreme right competitors has very different consequences depending on whether they
invest a pre-occupied strategic-discursive ground or a previously abandoned one. As predicted by our model, in the former case, as with the emergence of the MNR on the grounds already occupied by the FN in France, the new entrant will find it hard to prosper unless it can actually fight the historic party to death. In the latter case, however, as with the emergence of UKIP in a quadrant completely opposed to that of the BNP within the extreme right conceptual map, the two parties will be able to prosper alongside each other, and perhaps, even to benefit from a new dynamic of extreme right voting that they may jointly generate. A second important point is that despite the differentiation often made about ‘true’ extreme right parties and ‘single issue’ – and notably eurosceptic – parties, ultimately, the fortunes of extreme right parties tend to be parallel in national and European elections. A given party may do much better in one type of election than in the other, but on the whole, they will not tend to improve in one type of election if they collapse in the other.
Chapter Eight

Summary of Findings, Conclusions and Discussion

Chapter Outline

8.1 Introduction

8.2 Key findings: ideological match and mismatch amongst the French, German and British extreme right

8.3 Broader implications: towards a new generalisable model of partisan competition and ideologically coherent dealigned electoral behaviour
8.1 Introduction

Parties, manifestoes, leaders, voters – throughout the previous seven chapters we have confirmed the founding statement of this thesis, that is, far from being a monolithic and unified concept, the extreme right – at least in France, Germany, and Great Britain – constitutes indeed a complex multidimensional universe. Here, however, the notion of multidimensionality is fundamental. While much of the literature has already highlighted differences and inconsistencies amongst extreme right parties, leaders, and voters, we have aimed to empirically demonstrate that far from being oddities or anomalies, these variations follow some very specific patterns along two strategic-discursive dimensions: negative identity, which can be expressed in a xenophobic and/or populist way, and an authoritarian dimension, which itself can assume a reactionary and/or a repressive mode.

In this conclusion chapter, we will first recapitulate some of the most significant implications that we highlighted throughout the various components of our empirical analysis. We will then proceed to evaluate some of the broader consequences of our findings for our general understanding of the evolution of parties’ ideologies and party families in a largely dealigned context as well as the way we envision the evolution of party competition and voters’ choices within and across party families.

Before we turn to look at the empirical findings, it is important to note that this thesis is a study of contemporary extreme right parties. The analysis of the findings is relevant to the specific time of the data sources. In the case of the party manifestoes data, the time frame spans 2006 to 2008. Whilst this data anchors this thesis to this specific snapshot in time, in other areas of our research (Harrison and Bruter, forthcoming) we use a time series
component to assess the evolution of extreme right discourse over time by integrating analysis of press releases into the party manifesto analysis. The interviews were conducted over a period of a year and the survey data was collected in 2009. For these reasons, my findings refer to these specific time points and any conclusions drawn from these results should be viewed within this time frame.

8.2 Key findings: ideological match and mismatch amongst the French, German and British extreme right

Throughout this thesis, we have theoretically developed and empirically tested a conceptual map of the extreme right ideological 'world', based on two dimensions: (1) a negative identity dimension that can take two predominant forms of expression, which we respectively defined as xenophobic and populist, and (2) an authoritarian dimension, of which the two founding modes are respectively reactionary and repressive. We showed that the first dimension comprises of the way an extreme right party, leader, or voter tends to identify the simplified source of the problems faced by the nation and that the second concerns the equally simplified universal and utopian solution that they propose to fix it.

In order to test our model, our research design embraced a multiplicity of empirical tests: we interviewed some extreme right party leaders and high ranking politicians from France and Britain, we systematically analysed the party manifestoes of nine extreme right parties, and we looked at various attributes of extreme right supporters and potential voters as well as the success of the nine extreme right parties competing in French, German, and British national and European elections over time.
Let us now summarise some of the most intriguing findings derived from this battery of co-ordinated empirical tests. In chapter four, we first wanted to really understand the types and forms of discourses corresponding to the four ideological pillars identified in our conceptual model. In order to do so, we interviewed 92 leading politicians from four French and British parties (the FN and MPF in France) and (UKIP and the BNP in Britain). These politicians included top party leaders and executives, locally elected representatives, MEPs, and young party organisation leaders. We used these interviews to confirm how the references these politicians made vary along the two highlighted dimensions of negative identity and authoritarianism. The interviews also enabled us to qualitatively understand what specific types of xenophobic, populist, reactionary and repressive references are made by extreme right party leaders in their every day discourse.

We found that different politicians do tend to emphasise different pillars in their discourse. For instance, BNP and MPF interviewees had a greater tendency to use a xenophobic discourse, while FN and UKIP leaders placed a stronger emphasis on a populist alternative. Similarly, MPF and UKIP showed a clear tendency to stress reactionary references, while the FN and the BNP politicians were clearly more enthusiastic when suggesting repressive solutions to the ills of their respective societies. Some of the examples of discourse that we highlighted included populist discourse that referred to a 'glorious past' or 'golden age'. Leaders advocated a return to traditional morals and values and demanded respect of the family, the sacred nucleus of society. Within the domain of the repressive discourse, we heard leaders speak of enforcing law and order, calls for the reintroduction of the death penalty, a strengthened state that could
eradicate delinquency and deliver ‘proper’ sentences to criminals. Similarly, on the negative identity dimension, we heard leaders refer to measures to stop mass immigration, the importance of preserving the nation, the imminent danger posed by ‘foreigners’ to national identity and the nation’s very existence. Finally, in reference to the populist conception, leaders cited the corruption and betrayal of the politicians and institutional elites, claims to represent the ‘man on the street’, and that their party was the only true voice of the people and therefore different from all the rest of the parties and politicians that were only in it for what they could get out of it.

While chapter four used the qualitatively and more spontaneous approach to capture the four types of discourses that structure the two dimensions of our extreme right conceptual universe, chapter five embraced a quantitative and more systematic methodology to evaluate the party manifestoes of the nine main extreme right parties that compete in French, German, and British elections: the FN, MNR, and MPF in France, the NPD, the DVU, and the Republikaner in Germany, and finally, the BNP, UKIP and the English Democrats in Great Britain. We simply counted the total references to words embodying the four pillars of interest in our conceptual map of extreme right ideology, measured them as proportions of the total word count in each manifesto, and finally compared them across parties.

One of the first key findings of this chapter was that the total global references to words belonging to the four pillars are significantly higher amongst the nine extreme right parties included in the analysis than among the leading centre-left and centre-right competitors. We found that the ideological references associated with the four pillars of
strategic-discursive did not just make intuitive sense but that they were meaningful in so much as that they were 6.5 times more likely to appear in the party manifestoes of parties belonging to the extreme right party family when compared to the documentation of the mainstream parties. Altogether, total gross references represent an average of 39.5 percent of total valid words for the nine extreme right parties analysed, compared to the mere 6.1 percent average score for the six main non-extreme right parties, whose manifestoes we also analysed. In fact, the highest PVW amongst these other parties was below 10 percent. By contrast, scores range from 24.3 percent for the ED to a massive 59.7 percent for the Republikaner. These direct references to the two dimensions seem to confirm their role at the heart of the extreme right ideology. This finding supports our core theoretical expectation that the negative identity and authoritarianism dimensions of discourse are indeed the structuring backbone of the extreme right ideology and distinguish the extreme right from neighbouring party families. That is, even though of course non-extreme right parties can make references to a xenophobic, populist, reactionary, or repressive ideology as well, these references added together will simply not compare to the total negative identity and authoritarianism emphasis of an extreme right party.

However, the next equally important finding from the purpose of our conceptual map is that even within these three countries, extreme right parties vary a lot in their predominant reliance on some of these four pillars. Indeed, while summarising the dominant position of each of the nine parties included in the analysis within the extreme right conceptual universe, we found that all types of extreme right parties are represented. That is, we found some parties occupying all four possible quadrants of extreme right ideology: xenophobic-reactionary (the MPF), xenophobic-repressive (English Democrats,
the BNP, and the DVU), populist-reactionary (UKIP and Die Republikaner) and finally populist-repressive (MNR, FN and NPD). This finding is extremely significant because much of the literature tended to claim that one given pillar (for instance, xenophobia for the proponents of the ‘anti-immigration party’ model or populism for the supporters of the ‘right-wing populist’ definition) is a prerequisite to be admitted in the extreme right ‘club’. By contrast, our results suggest that you can be a fully fledged member of the extreme right party family even with relatively marginal xenophobic references if you make up for them in terms of populist discourse and authoritarianism or vice versa. To add to the more quantitative analysis of the word frequencies, we also highlighted numerous extracts from the party programmes that typified the ideological discourse of the three British extreme right parties; the BNP, UKIP and the English Democrats. This allowed us to further understand the discursive context in which the ideological word references were found and helped us to validate the quantitative analysis.

From this confirmation of the organised multi-faceted nature of the extreme right, it intuitively followed that one should examine the effects of this model on party competition, be it internal (between multiple extreme right parties within the same party system) or external (between an extreme right party and its non-extreme right competitors). This was the object of chapter six with a few important findings. First and foremost, we confirmed the theoretical expectations that we outlined in section 2.7 that when several extreme right parties coexist within the same party system – as in the case of the three case studies covered by our analysis – it seems inefficient to only focus on their relative placement on broad left-right scales and instead it is more relevant to look at their respective locations within the confines of the extreme right conceptual map.
key to the parallel survival of multiple extreme right parties within a specified system becomes their location in different quadrants of the conceptual map so that each party retains an independent reservoir of potential voters who will ensure its continued electoral existence. We saw that in the case of France, this resulted in the predictably 'doomed' MPF surviving alongside the FN. By contrast, even when a party is promised some electoral fortune, if it locates itself in the same quadrant as a pre-established party, only one of them will probably survive. Still in France, this was the case of the MNR, which had first been expected to do well by many commentators but ended up suffocating electorally after failing to find an ideological niche, any distance at all from the FN. These contradictory tales emphasise the need for extreme right challengers to occupy different and vacant quadrants from their internal competitors. In fact, in the case of the UK, we showed that it may even happen that the quadrant first invested in by an extreme right party may not be the most electorally rich and thus, we saw that UKIP, while settling itself in the opposite quadrant to the BNP, found itself uncovering an apparently much stronger electoral mine. Finally, the same chapter also looked at patterns of external competition, where we showed that the type of quadrant occupied by extreme right parties unveiled different possible strategies for their mainstream right and left wing opponents. These include a broad choice between 'pre-empting' areas of focus of extreme right parties or, instead, trying to marginalise them. Of course, the strategic-discursive choices of extreme right parties themselves will impact the best possible response of mainstream competitors as well as their credibility in terms of issue ownership. Thus, for example, in the case of the populist-repressive FN, the repressive response of right-wing Sarkozy was clearly more threatening to the historic French extreme right party than the reactionary
discourse of a similarly right-wing Chirac, even though it also gave more response angle
to the xenophobic-reactionary MPF.

Finally, in chapter seven, after extreme right parties and their leaders, we focus on the
position of their potential voters. We demonstrated that it is very hard to find common
social demographic traits of extreme right voters that work across countries and historical
contexts. We contrasted these limits of the political sociology approach to the very clear
specificity of potential extreme right voters in terms of how they score on xenophobic,
populist, reactionary, and repressive scales. Indeed, we demonstrated that as the
propensity to vote for extreme right parties increases so do the scores of voters on all four
scales, and the relationship between propensity to vote and these scales is in fact not only
statistically significant but in fact, substantively strong. The relationship is equally strong
when it comes to looking at respondents' actual/planned vote for extreme right parties in
terms of both European and national elections (general or presidential). The only limit to
this finding is that with skewed samples where the number of people who show a strong
propensity to vote for a given extreme right party (and to a lesser extent, some degree of
overlap between them), we could not find statistically significant differences between the
dominant extreme right ideological pillars of the voters of each individual party within a
party system. Only a few significant differences could be confirmed in some of the
countries.

The last section of chapter seven was dedicated to the examination of the long term
evolution of the electoral success of all nine parties in general and European parliament
elections alike, where we could confirm quantitatively the results of chapter six that
concern the need for a new extreme right party to (1) choose a clear position in one given strategic-discursive quadrant, and (2) ensure that this quadrant be distinct from those already occupied by pre-existing historic extreme right parties. In fact, we even showed that when this is indeed done and two parties spread over two significantly differentiated sub-parts of the extreme right conceptual universe, as is the case for the BNP and UKIP in Great Britain, then, far from threatening each other’s survival, these ideologically complimentary parties may create an extreme right momentum that could lead to their parallel electoral growth. This result clearly challenges a simplistic interpretation of Sartori’s (1987) analysis of the spatial model of the vote and party dynamics in the context of multi-party systems.

We obviously acknowledge the fact that the political science literature on party support has made tremendous progress over the past 60 years and we draw upon their findings and conclusions here in this thesis. Traditional explanations of extreme right support successfully include sociological determinants (Lipset and Rokkan’s 1967 four cleavages, etc), socialisation (Greenstein, 1960, Butler and Stokes, 1974, etc), utility maximisation (the entire rational choice literature starting with Downs, 1957), economic perceptions (Erikson, McKuen, and Stimson, 2002, van der Brug, van der Eijk, and Franklin, 2007, Wlezien and Anderson, 1997, etc), short term factors such as policy, personality, or incumbents evaluations and records. In this particular context, it was not possible to propose a fully integrated model since the data is not based on a voting behaviour dataset and therefore did not include all these variables. When looking at the impact of citizens’ positioning on all four pillars as a possible source of support for extreme right parties in general or individual parties in particular, one should therefore take our results with a
certain caution if there is a suspicion that positions on these four pillars could likely be highly correlated with any of these 'traditional' explanations of voting behaviour. It is because of this limit of our model that we restrict our interpretation of the findings as 'correlations' and 'patterns' between support for xenophobic, populist, repressive, and reactionary statements and propensity to vote for extreme right parties, without claiming that the model necessarily explains such behaviour.

With this note of caution in mind about the limitations of our analysis, we have, however, proposed a conceptual model that seems largely confirmed by the discourses and behaviour of extreme right parties, leaders, and potential voters. Yet, it also becomes important to consider the broader implications of our findings on the more global fields of partisan politics, party competition, and electoral behaviour in a European context of significantly dealigned politics.

8.3 Broader implications: towards a new generalisable model of partisan competition and ideologically coherent dealigned electoral behaviour

Some of the findings of this thesis prompt the question of the extent to which our model and its implications might be generalisable to other countries, other party families, and other aspects of the electoral choice and electoral change. The geographical generalisation of the model is probably self-explanatory and the object of a current co-operative project with Michael Bruter that will encompass the entire European continent and all of its extreme right parties. It is indeed essential to confirm the relationship between the two dimensions and four strategic-discursive pillars of extreme right ideology in a broader and
more diversified universe that will also, for instance, include Central European party systems and their respective extreme right parties. Such a broader analysis will also help us to test more refined hypotheses on why certain extreme right parties choose specific quadrants, on patterns of internal and external party competition and ultimately provide the larger potential extreme right voters samples that may result in more statistically significant findings about different types of potential extreme right voters.

The question of the generalisability of our model to other party families when it comes to the party family ideological theory, however, is a significantly more complex one. Our model posits that ultimately, while any political party will make a number of policy proposals on a multitude of issues (an extreme right party may of course make numerous proposals on tax policy, foreign policy, pensions or the environment), a limited number of discursive themes may create structuring ideological dimensions relevant to a specific party family but not to others. Thus, while a socialist party will most certainly make policy proposals about crime, law and order, or immigration, the fact that these do not constitute their own structuring ideological axis will give them a completely different 'value' than when extreme right parties develop their own proposals in these areas.

Conversely, it begs the question of whether all other party families may be structured by comparable ideological axes that are both far more prominent and far more essential – or even 'existential' for them than they are for competitors from other party families. For instance, the environment could play the same role for Green parties as the negative identity does for the extreme right, while the other extreme right structuring axis,
authoritarianism, could be mirrored by the question of social redistribution for Social-Democratic parties or perhaps public ownership for their Communist counterparts.

The other essential element of our model, however, is that these elements do not simply consist of monolithic values but rather of dimensions on which the various members of a given party family have a certain element of choice, or indeed, even a duty to situate themselves vis-à-vis alternative (but not mutually exclusive) dominant conceptions. Thus, to reflect further on the examples proposed above, Social-Democratic parties may not just be identifiable by an emphasis on social justice per se but, possibly by the choices they will have to make as to how to achieve it, for instance by being more or less focused on regulation or taxation. In a similar way, attitudes towards the market economy could create an essential dimension on which different Social-Democratic or Socialists parties may take diverging views to achieve similar goals.

If our model is generalisable beyond the confines of the extreme right, the question thus becomes double-barrelled (1) what ideological dimensions structure the ideology of other party families, and (2) which alternative conceptions could become their dominant mode of expression as xenophobia, populism, reaction, and repression are in the extreme right context. Finally, we would need to understand if a structuring dimension is always unique to a party family or if some could be shared between neighbouring party families.

The third aspect of the possible generalisability of our model concerns the question of party competition. While the traditional Downs model (1957) predicts the convergence of parties towards the median voter, much recent research has found that in fact, such
convergence fails to occur empirically, both in the contexts of two party systems and multi party systems (see for example Bruter, Erikson and Strauss, 2010). Could it be that part of the reason for this is that the usual simplification that asserts that patterns of competition can be summarised by a unified ideological scale is, indeed, over-simplistic? Could it be that even the solution that would consist of highlighting two or three dimensions that would apply to all competing parties hides the fact that instead, members of given party families may have specific ideological dimensions that are proper to their party family and on which potential voters will specifically judge their stance regardless of their other, more general policy proposals?

In other words, beyond the ‘global’ world of party competition whereby all existing political parties compete with each other in an election, a multitude of smaller races – or internal rivalries – make an election. The balance of power between the SPD and Die Linke in Germany, the rivalry between the Christian Democrats and the Liberals in Flanders, or the fight between the FPÖ and the BZÖ in Austria represent as many bitter battles that cannot be equated to the overall electoral battle between all parties, simply because we know in each case that a relatively predictable number of votes is at stake and will be attributed to one of each of the pairs of parties, and one of these parties only. In a certain manner, our model adds a story to this second layer of party competition, these intense duels which run in parallel to the main open race.

Obviously, the corollary to these duels resides in the real scope of potential individual level electoral change. The propensity to vote model (van der Eijk and Franklin, 1999) which we use in chapter seven, allows scholars to establish which parties a given voter
realistically expects to possibly vote for in the future. It is clear that radical changes beyond those conceived at a given point in time by a specific voter are always possible, but in many cases, instead, it can be conceived that a number of voters realistically hesitate between two or three political parties competing for their vote and whose ideologies will not be radically opposed. There again, our model suggests that when such is the case voters may not just look at the place of these neighbouring rivals on an abstract global left-right scale but, instead, on their positioning on some idiosyncratic ideological dimensions which maybe uniquely relevant to voters situated in a specific sub-part of the ideological spectrum. Thus, someone hesitating between two competing Green parties may be more sensitive to their respective attitudes towards nuclear energy or to their willingness to enter coalitions with other parties in the name of ‘realism’, than to the question of whether one is marginally more left-wing or more right-wing than the other.

If this is indeed the case, then this creates a sub-division between multiple types of ‘key voters’ who may react to different types of stimuli when making their final decision in a given election. As such, this makes for an additional reason why we need to understand the specific ideological dimensions that may make any of these switch voters arbitrate between competing neighbouring parties.

Indeed, this perspective would imply a slightly different understanding of the very notion of dealignment whereby dealignment has not resulted in ‘chaos’ or some randomly floating voters but, rather, in a series of individually organised floatations. Indeed every ‘dealigned voter’ would still be defined by a relatively precise ideological identity card which would also determine a limited set of possible options for every such voter which
would be related to his/her individual ideological profile. This sub-set of possible votes
would also immediately be echoed by a set of specific ideological dimensions that would
ultimately constitute the basis for the voter's final choice in a given election. It is a little
bit as though the ideological universe became multi-dimensional, and made of a broad
number of possible subsets of ideological choice, that is, individual combinations of
'possible' ideological territories with their own individual criteria of electoral choice, in
this context, voter A may well evolve in an ideological subset which boundaries would
encompass social-democracy, green politics, and communism, voter B another subset
made of socialism, communism and the extreme right, and voter C a third yet completely
different subset made of conservatism and the extreme right. This could explain why
some extreme right parties seem to equally attract some former moderate right wing
voters and some moderate left wing (or even, at times, extreme left wing) voters. Indeed,
while the reactionary pillar could easily be considered as 'shared' with conservative
parties, the populist pillar can also be shared with the extreme left or indeed anarchist
movements.

Where does this model leave us? To an extent, it seems that assuming the multi-
dimensionality (as opposed to the single location) of any political party's ideology
transforms an apparently simple situation into a significantly more complex one.
Nevertheless, this very complexity does not seem all that anomalous when we look at
current models of party competition and electoral behaviour. At the end of the day, the
two main current reservoirs of vote for the British Liberal Democrats are elderly people
from small Southern countryside locations, and a young cosmopolitan and liberal
population including students and young active people from large British cities including
London and large Northern urban centres. This type of situation simply cannot be ‘easily’ explained by traditional political sociology models or any possible variation on the Lipset and Rokkan model. If all major parties attract similarly sociologically-multi-coloured voters, then the two choices that we have are either to 1) believe in a form of complete randomness of the vote, which does not seem to be matched by what we know of the reality of our democracies and of individual citizens, or 2) to find a more sophisticated basis for the coherence of voters than some simple sociological trait.

In this context, ideological mismatch between parties and voters, be it in the context of extreme right parties or of their competitors from all other major party families ceases to be the exception or the sign of an individual party failure to become a baseline, a rule of the game. There would always be a founding mismatch between a voter and any number of possible parties ‘truly’ competing for his or her vote, and this mismatch would serve as a basis to understand what voter this citizen is and which ideological or strategic-discursive dimensions will serve as fundamental bases for his or her future electoral decisions. It does not matter if parties do not understand why Miss X seems to switch from the Liberals to the Greens or the Social-Democrats to the Conservatives, or why Mr Y who supports the Communists never ever ends up voting for the Socialists because in their individual cases, the universe of ideological dimensions that matter is more rigid than a single left-right continuum lets us see.

Of course, the next question raised by this notion of a mismatch as a founding reality for many citizens’ electoral behaviour is its behavioural limit. What are the potential consequences of mismatch? When do citizens start to get lost on the way for specific
parties and for electoral politics in general? Where do abstention, protest, or cynicism and disaffection sit vis-à-vis given ideological dimensions? Are some party families 'closer' to expressing – or attracting a form of protest than others, or is there a more general risk that the disequilibrium created by the mismatch between a voter and the parties realistically competing for his or her vote could lead to ever broader widespread abstention and deeper rooted political protest? Or on the contrary, is the possibility for parties to move along specific ideological dimensions to refresh their discourse and re-seduce the electorates that they may have lost at one time in their history the best possible provision for the said parties to continuously fight back and avoid losing vast numbers of voters in the long term. What is more, if our model of party competition allows for the survival of multiple parties within a party family as long as they occupy multiple ideological positions within a given universe, then in party systems that institutionally allow for such diversity, such as the Netherlands or Israel, then there is a chance that most voters will find some competing forces that will be close enough to their true ideological preference at any given point in time even if this party changes over the years.

A final point has to be made regarding the implications of our model regarding the reciprocal effects between the dynamics of electoral change and party competition. In the perpetual fight for parties to adapt their ideological discourse, within a bounded territory, to maximise their electoral appeal, and the perpetual risk that citizens will 'escape' to another ideological dimension that also fundamentally matters to them, what is the scope for partisan responsiveness in modern partisan politics? If parties fight parallel fights against internal and external enemies, and look for the best possible ideological location to maximise their reservoir of potential electoral voters, protect them, and gain those of
their rivals within the context of a multidimensional model rather than a unidimensional one, then the situation likely to arise is most likely to fail to provide any equilibrium in the party competition.

Indeed, unlike what happens in a traditional Downsian model, the more dimensions emerge in the ideological universe that we depict; the least likely it is that a party truly has a ‘best location’ to fight on. In the context of the extreme right, we saw how the subset of potential extreme right voters is rather strictly limited – that is, when looking at propensity to vote scores to evaluate which citizens give a ‘non-zero’ probability that they will vote for one or other of the extreme right parties, such a proportion of ‘non-zero’s’ is relatively small. Within this context, we saw how different parties can end up taking paradoxical positions (again, we may remember the MPF in France which moved from being a former moderate right wing movement to becoming the most ‘xenophobic’ of all the French major extreme right parties in its orientation). However, once again, this context seems to mean that for extreme right parties, more of the competition is ‘internal’ rather than ‘external’. In the alternative context of parties which would have a much broader subset of potential voters (parties that have a large number of ‘non zero’s’) things could be very different and the stretch between the need to fight internal competition with ideological neighbours, and external competition with more general rivals in the race for institutional power may become almost impossible to manage. If that is indeed the case, some of the larger parties may, ultimately, be the most firmly rooted of all in a situation of crisis and mismatch between the party, its leaders, its members, and its ideological voters, that is, ultimately, they may be the most cursed by ideological mismatch as an existential condition.
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## Appendix A

### List of Extreme Right Parties in Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>FULL NAME</th>
<th>PARL.</th>
<th>GVT</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FN(B)</td>
<td>Front National/Front voor die Natie</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>9.7</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agir</td>
<td>Agir</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>PFN(B)</td>
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<td>LPF</td>
<td>Lijst Pim Fortuyn</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>SWEDEN</td>
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<td>Ny Demokrati</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>FPS</td>
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<td>UKIP</td>
<td>UK Independence Party</td>
<td>-</td>
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</table>

Note: Parties have scored over 0.1 percent of votes in a general election since 1979. Source: Marcel Lubbers (2000) Expert Judgement Survey of Western European Political Parties (Nijmegen, Netherlands).
Appendix B

Word Lists for the Four Pillars (British Sample)

Negative identity dimension – pillar I: Xenophobic


Negative identity dimension – pillar II: Populist

Nonsense, Shamblies, Chaos, Contempt, Favouritism, Blind, Apparatchik, Bastards, Devil, Against, Nanny State, Dogma(tic), Thug (elites), Rowdy, Influence, Corrupt, Establishment, Demand, Totalitarian, University, Terror(ism) (meaning 2), Interest, Transnational, Policy, People(s), Siphon, Fact, Mass, Modern, Better, Worse(n), Short Term, Elected, Electoral (system), Unavoidable, Cynic, Regime, Tax, Victim, Tories, Lords, Squallor, Existing, (Il)legitimate, Anti-, Central(ise), Clean, Referendum, Oppose (-ition), Consensus, Pseudo, Complacency, Block, Restriction, Prevent, Laundering, Work(er), Dictatorial (-ship), Tyranny, Diktat, Fracture, Racket, Arbitrary, Plot, Conspiracy, Media, Journalist, Newspaper, Press, TV, Gang (politicians), Blair, Gordon Brown, Giscard, Thatcher, Other left/right wing politician, ruling regime, Larvae, Lie, Paperwork, Responsible, Waste, Elite (-ist), Oligarchy, Cartel, Monopoly, Power(s), Powerless(less), Parties, Partisan, Government, Minister, Crisis, Politician, Politicised, Isolate, Bureaucracy, genuine democracy, Administration, Civil Servants, Betray, Traitor, Concession, Concede, Blackmail, Injustice, Unfair, Inequitable, Inequality, Egalitarianism, Refuse, Reject, Unacceptable, Handcuffs, Imperial, Boycott, Harassment, Expert, Crones, Cronyism, (Politically) correct, Specific media, Decree, Fall, Collapse, True, Incompetence, System, Independence, Slave, Labour, Marxist, Socialism, Liberal (-ism), Capitalism, Conservative, Rigid, Deregulation, Lobby, Pressure group, Nationalisation, Black market, Confidence, Truth, Genuine, Real, Salvation, Claim, Always, Neve, Present, Now, Current, Future, restore, Advantage, New World Order, Strangulate, Suffocate, Pathology, Sick, Disease, Discriminate, Abuse, Dirty, Survive, Unemployed, Mafia, Dissolution, Inventive, Creative, Solution, Resolve (-ution), Indifferent, Save, Abandon, Free, Above the law, Prejudice, Shame, suffer, Scandal, Unacceptable, Partricty, Indoctrination, Untrue, Lies, Con, Cajoled, Rob, Cheat, Renewal, Innovation, Blood, Union, Right, Left, Treasure, Mistake, Fault, failings, Catastrophe, Subversion, Fabricate, New, Myths, Tragic, Contagion, Chimera, Illusion, Regret, average man/woman

Authoritarianism dimension – pillar I: Reactionary

Tradition, History, Ancient, Ancestor, Generation, Old, Forefathers, Christendom, Christian, Church, Anglican, Catholic, Baptism, Catechism, Sunday School, Bishop, Priest, Feminist, Land, Language, Ownership, Homeland, Freedom Rights, Social Service, Market, Believe, Country (as land or countryside), Reference to historical characters (Churchill, William, etc), Popular (cultural meaning), Rome, Roman.

Authoritarianism dimension – pillar II: Repressive

To protect, Paedophile, Rape (-ist), Murder (-er), Agitator, Activist, Firm (-ness), Order, Natural Order, Disorder, Strength, Struggle, Combat, Fight (meaning 1), Strong, Must, Legal Duty, Problem(s), Revolution, State (Stat-al), Citizenship, Subordinate, Crime(inal), Misdemeanour, Delinquent, Delinquency, Justice, Injustice, Life (meaning 1), Death, Combat, Army, Armed, Military, Defence, Soldier, Troops, Police, Severe, Rigour, Rigorous, Punish (-ment), Security, Insecurity, Restoration, Drugs, Specific drugs, Drug addict, Penalise, Consequence, Prison, Penalty, Sentence, Death Penalty, Move(ment), Direct, Right (Legal meaning), Law, Legal, Forbid, Control, Porn, Indecency, Illegal, Outlaw, Authority Authoritarian, Authorise, Court, Tribunal, Rules, Surveillance, Safe, Violence, Violent, Risk, Impose, Enforce, Essential, Maintain, Reverse, Eliminate, Eradicate, Radical, Remove, Danger, Dangerous, Destruction, Destructive, Exploitation, Prostitution, Master(s), Repression, Repressive, Attack, Attacker, Uniform, Action, Leadership (meaning 2), Agitate, Agitation, Magistrate, Judge, Barrister, Solicitor, Demolition, Solidarity (meaning 2), Dismantle, Secure, Gang (criminal context), traffic (criminal context), lenience, depenalisation, unprotected, anarchic (criminal context), Thug (criminal context), Organised Crime, Petty Crime.
Appendix C

Interviews of Extreme Right Party Elites - Interview Template

The interviews are semi-structured and consist of two components:

1. Firstly, an unguided part, whereby respondents will be asked about such things as their main political and policy objectives, what they believe their party stands for and can bring to their country, why they think a number of citizens (a) join them, (b) voter for them, etc;
2. Secondly, a guided section, whereby items corresponding to the specific four discursive strategic pillars of the model will be introduced to the respondents, who will be asked how important/relevant they believe they are in the case of their party.

Part I: Spontaneous section.

- Brief introduction of interviewer and interviewee;
- Personal story of involvement and aims;
- Any difference between respondents (R) main priorities, and those of the party as a whole;
- How would (R) describe the party main priorities / objectives / ambitions over the next 10 years;
- What can the party bring to the country? What gap does it fill?
- Is there a difference between preferences of party leaders and members? What does (R) think makes someone join the party?
- How about voters? What explains the electoral success of the party?

Part II: Semi-guided.

- Main policy issues. How important? Immigration, Europe, crime/law/order, etc.
- Role of the party leader;
- Relationship to other parties; does the party invalidate other parties; Perceptions of the political/institutional system: is it sustainable, does it imperatively need reform, what kind?
- Perceptions of other social actors: bureaucracy, media, education, pressure groups, etc.
- Need to restore order? How? Role of the state? Is the state sufficiently respected by all citizens? If not, how can this be remedied?
- Can country problems be sorted out? How? How long would it take? How radical would changes need to be?
Appendix D

SELECTED QUESTIONS FROM MASS SURVEY (SEE CHAPTER 3) - VERSION UNITED KINGDOM-GREAT BRITAIN

Q7: We have a number of parties in Great Britain, each of which would like to get your vote. How likely is it that you will ever vote for the following parties? Please, answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means that it is extremely unlikely that you will ever vote for the party mentioned, and 10 means that it is extremely likely that you will vote for that party at some point in the future. [grid 0... 10]

1. Conservative
2. Labour
3. British National Party
4. UK Independence Party
5. English Democrats
6. Liberal-Democrats
7. Greens

Q8: Please, look carefully at the following statements. Can you please tell us to what extent you agree or disagree with each of them? Please answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means that you completely disagree with the statement, and 10 means that you completely agree with the statement: [grid 0...10]

REACTIONARY ITMES
1: Overall, Britain was a better place to live in 20 years ago than it is now
2: The British values and cultural heritage are not sufficiently respected by the new generations

REPRESSIVE ITEMS
3: On the whole, in Britain, criminals are not punished severely enough for their crimes
4: The state should be stronger to guarantee order in our society

XENOPHOBIC ITEMS
5: On the whole, there are too many foreigners and immigrants who live in Britain
6: The British culture and traditions are not sufficiently respected by some minorities

POPULIST
7: On the whole, politicians in the UK do not tend to care much about the interests of ordinary people
8: There is still quite a bit of corruption and dishonesty among the British elites
Q9: A few days ago, British citizens were invited to elect the Members of the European Parliament. Did you cast your vote and, if so, for which party did you vote?

Chose not to vote;
Ineligible to vote;
Voted for the Conservative Party
Voted for the Labour Party
Voted for the British National Party
Voted for the UK Independence Party
Voted for the English Democrats
Voted for the Liberal-Democrats
Voted for the Greens
Voted for the Scottish National Party
Voted for Plaid Cymru
Voted for another party (specify):

Q10: And if there was a general election tomorrow, would you cast your vote, and if so, for which party would you vote?

Would choose not to vote;
Would be ineligible to vote;
Would vote for the Conservative Party
Would vote for the Labour Party
Would vote for the British National Party
Would vote for the UK Independence Party
Would vote for the English Democrats
Would vote for the Liberal-Democrats
Would vote for the Greens
Would vote for the Scottish National Party
Would vote for Plaid Cymru
Would vote for another party (specify):

Q11: When it comes to politics, people often talk of ‘left’ and ‘right’. Please, consider the following scale where 0 means that somebody’s ideas are on the far left and 10 means that they are on the far right. Can you please tell us where you would place yourself on this scale?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Appendix E

List of abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
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<td>FPÖ</td>
<td>Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs</td>
</tr>
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<td>BZÖ</td>
<td>Bündnis Zukunft Österreich</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BELGIUM</td>
<td>VB</td>
<td>Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang</td>
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<td>FRPd</td>
<td>Fremskridtspartiet (Denmark)</td>
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<td>DF</td>
<td>Dansk Folkeparti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRANCE</td>
<td>FN</td>
<td>Front National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>MNR</td>
<td>Mouvement National Republicain</td>
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<td>MPF</td>
<td>Mouvement pour la France</td>
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<td>REP</td>
<td>Die Republikaner</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DVU</td>
<td>Deutsche Volksunion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>NPD</td>
<td>Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands</td>
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<td>Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei</td>
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