

THE POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND

ECONOMIC IDEAS OF

JOHN MACMURRAY

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THESIS FOR Ph.D.

as EXTERNAL STUDENT

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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

The title and the table of contents of this thesis, in one respect, fully convey its contents, substance, and plan. Here is expounded, surveyed, and critically appraised certain branches of Macmurray's thought.

Very little, if any, of either Macmurray or his work has been written about in this way, if at all. So this thesis is, as it should be, a unique and original contribution to knowledge and scholarship.

The programme and procedure has been to expound his ideas under suitable headings according to subject matter, and to follow this - from time to time - with a relevant appraisal, rather than intersperse criticism with exposition.

But Macmurray's thought is so broad, so encompassing, so diverse and intricate that it must never be imagined that adequate justice has been, or could be, done to the subjects contained in the title in such a short compass. Thus whilst not exhaustively covering the subject in exposition, which would require at least ten thesis of this length, it has also not been possible to raise, discuss, and positively answer numerous questions which frequently come to mind as we read both the original texts and this exposition of them.

Many, of course, have been raised, researched, met, and answered. But many more must wait for further researches, and for more space to consider and probe them.

The above has had to be made clear for I would not want it to be thought that this is, and was meant to be, a definitive work in the selected field of Macmurray's ideas.

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A NECESSARY INTRODUCTION

For years John Macmurray has been overlooked or almost deliberately ignored. Yet about 1930 he enjoyed widespread public and popular allegiance and acclaim for his broadcast talks on realistic, practical, down-to-earth, philosophy in relation to contemporary and fundamental problems; problems of such an intransigent and intractable nature that they are still essentially the same, still with us, today; and still unsolved. In the early 1940s he was still around and known, especially in association with a new political party, Commonwealth, which had proclivities towards moral and social regeneration, and had quite a following. Since that time, apart from some modest and minority academic attention, Macmurray has sunk into obscurity and oblivion.

Yet he gave so much, and has so much to give. This thesis is written in the belief that much of what he had to say, made explicit, and taught, is as relevant, meaningful, and indeed downright essential today as it was when first enunciated. And if originally enthusiastically heard but coolly unimplemented then, is nevertheless worth bringing to the fore to be given a second chance of consideration and, it is hoped, put into practice.

For although a man of thought, Macmurray's whole emphasis was on action and practice. No ivory tower of pure thinking for him. No withdrawing from the world. Thought is for living, or it is not worth bothering about.

What then are some of the ideas Macmurray introduced and propounded? As with the ideas of every thinker not all are of such originality and profundity that they need special attention and consideration. But those of vital and essential interest are the following. However, first a word of warning. In the readability, fluency and ease of writing; in the core of the idea; and in the telling, Macmurray can be, or may seem to be, simple and even commonplace. You read him, or hear of one of his ideas, and think - What's all the fuss about; we know of, or are doing, this already. But this is not so. If you pause, reflect, and look deeply enough, you will realize that none of his ideas, as given in the following summary, are yet, nor within an age of becoming, a part of our general, social, psychological, moral, or educational ethos. None have been incorporated into our thought, behaviour, or actions - public or personal. In ourselves, and in our society, we are still thinking, feeling, believing, and doing all the things Macmurray would wish us not to think and do. So; be cautious of Macmurray's easy style and presentation - especially in his popular and best-known books. Their seeming simplicity belies their originality, depth, and profundity.

So what are some of the things which, so original yet so out of step with the general feeling and ideas of those times and these, Macmurray told, or still has to tell us?

But first -

A Biographical Note.

John Macmurray was born at Maxwellton, Kirkcudbrightshire, on the 16th February 1891. His father, James, was a civil servant; and the family were deeply religious, a fact for which he says, "he was

fortunate". (SRR 5). The home was one of Christian piety in the traditional Calvinism of the Scottish Church. This had a strong intellectual strain. The Bible was the book both of inspiration and of reference in case of dispute. There was a distrust and suppression of emotion, and doctrine was paramount. Macmurray speaks of the shock he received when he first heard by chance that, in contrast to science, religion expressed the emotional aspects of human consciousness. (SRR 5). Hitherto for him religion had been purely intellectual and the fount of control and discipline.

Macmurray was educated at a local grammar school, but later his father asked to be transferred to Aberdeen solely for the sake of the children's education. (SRR 7). At Aberdeen Macmurray went to Robert Gordon's College.

In the 1890s there was a tremendous upsurge of evangelistic fervour, much of it springing from America, and Macmurray's parents were not unaffected by it. They experimented with several Baptist sects, eventually becoming Plymouth Bretheren, but still retaining their Calvinist rigidity (SRR 6). When young, Macmurray's father had wanted to be a missionary, but the Boxer Movement and parental commitments had prevented this. Perhaps influenced by this knowledge Macmurray went, eventually, to Glasgow University specifically to become a missionary in China. But his enthusiasm for this soon waned.

But from an early time Macmurray had been a Bible-class teacher, and continued as an open-air and tent evangelist whilst still at Glasgow studying. Gradually however, about this time of his life, although not once in all his years was he ever not totally committed

to religion, Macmurray began to doubt his own religious sincerity, and the sincerity of all formal religion. He says (SRR 9), "It is possible to have a real religious experience coupled with religious beliefs and practices which are fallacious and undesirable; or to hold sincerely and convincedly to religious beliefs and practices with no reality to sustain them". Here we have the beginning, although as he says he did not formulate it till much later, of the whole import and essence of Macmurray's religious teaching and outlook. This insight is the root of all that Macmurray has to say about religion.

But parallel with his long-experienced and deep religious knowledge and way of life is another interest - science (SRR 10). This interest began before he had reached his teens. Science came to him, he says, like a revelation (SRR 10). He wanted to become a scientist, and although fighting strongly against his schoolmasters who had insisted on him pursuing the classics, he was eventually forced to compromise, but became the only student at school, and later at university, permitted to study science as an extra subject. Biology, chemistry, and geology were his main science subjects. And science, either predictably or perversely, was the only university subject in which he gained a medal!

At university he was very much taken up with the then widespread and influential Student Christian Movement. Apart from anything else "It taught him that religious fellowship could be fun". (SRR 13). In other words, his religious severity and strictness began to melt and warm up under the influence of more liberal Christians around him. He also perceived at this time that "there was no branch of creative human effort which could not be integrated with Christianity". (SRR

13).

Further religious and scientific studies taught him four more things. 1) Firstly; that the theology and scriptural texts, on which he had been brought up, would not stand up to serious scrutiny or criticism. Their dogmatism was becoming repugnant to him. 2) Secondly; religion is not to be identified with theology, nor with any system of belief or beliefs. (SRR 15. SRR 16/7). 3) Thirdly; that religion ought to be non-sectarian and interdenominational in character, and be also missionary and ecumenical in essence, outlook, and practice. 4) Fourthly; Macmurray reasoned that when a scientific theory has been proved to be invalid or outmoded you do not overthrow and renounce science. On the contrary; you pursue it more avidly. Why then, when a particular religious conception is shown to be puerile or untenable, renounce religion, as countless people were doing and are still doing when certain religious beliefs and dogmas no longer stand-up? "Could we not hope that through testing and modification we should arrive at a religion which science need not be ashamed to serve?". This last insight of Macmurray's had an important and profound effect upon the development of his religious ideas and outlook. It explains how, and why, he is able to cling fast to his religion despite all his scientific interests, a position which was very unusual at that time, the first decade of this century. It reveals, too, why Macmurray insists, against all the conventional conceptions of it, that religion - to retain its credibility - must become, and be, empirical.

In 1913 John Macmurray took his first degree, at Glasgow University, and in the same year won a Snell Exhibition to Oxford,

and entered Balliol College in October 1913. But his course was far from finished when, with the coming of the First World War, he joined the R.A.M.C. in October 1914. He chose this branch of the Services because, although not a full pacifist, he had qualms and reservations about war and killing not yet fully worked out. But by 1916 he had realized, so he says, (SRR 16) that he was as much a part of the fighting organisation as if he were in the front line; so he took a commission as lieutenant in the 40th. Cameron Highlanders. On leave in that same year, 1916, he married Elizabeth Hyde. They had no children. Also in 1916 he was awarded the M.C. Wounded near Arras early in 1918, he was invalided home, but not discharged for a considerable time. Indeed, he was allowed to return to Oxford and took his degree in the summer of 1919, before he was finally and officially allowed to leave the Army. (SRR 16).

Out of his experience in the War Macmurray learned, inter alia, two things very important to his subsequent thinking. Firstly, the removal for ever of the fear of death. This was, and is, "a tremendous gain in reality; for until we reach it - however we do reach it - we cannot see our life as it really is, and so we cannot live it as we should." (SRR 18). Secondly, Macmurray learned or decided to remove himself, and never join again, any Christian Church or denomination; yet, of course, remaining a full and committed Christian. It is interesting how this second determination came about. On leave from France he preached in a North London church about being on guard against the "war mentality", and of the need for reconciliation. (SRR 21). On saying this he met with cold hostility and was shunned by the congregation as he left the church. This left an indelible impression upon him of the mistakenly, to him,

nationalistic and limited character of the conventional and orthodox churches. This vow of non-attachment he broke only in the early 1960s, when he joined fully, after years of admiration going back at least to the First World War, the Society of Friends.

On the whole Macmurray was, as were so many of his contemporaries, disillusioned by the War. According to him the only major result of it, and this was wholly unintended, was the setting up of communism in Russia. (SRR 19). But not until later did Macmurray concern himself with Marxism; and this occurred by chance. He attended a religious conference on "What Is Christianity?" at which one of the study groups were asked to prepare a contributory paper on the then rather novel and topical subject of communism (SRR 25). Macmurray, not at that time knowing very much about it, actually wrote the paper. Instantly, he, in various ways unique to him, discovered certain unusual - not the commonplace ones - associations between Christianity and communism. From then on communism played a big part in his thinking. However, whether he is to be regarded, or regarded himself, as a communist, is an open question and is discussed in the relevant chapter later.

No known thinker has especially influenced Macmurray, nor does he acknowledge any or speak of any indebtedness. He does say (SRR 24) that, like Kierkegaard, he was aroused and stimulated by the problem of "What is Christianity?" or "How to become a Christian". And he speaks of Martin Buber as one of the "very greatest of modern thinkers". (SRR 24). If not an existentialist Macmurray is often on the fringes of it. In "Ten Modern Prophets," (Frederick Muller 1944). J.B. Coates says that "Intellectually, Macmurray has been

greatly influenced by Bergson", but in all Macmurray's works Bergson is mentioned only once, and then rather casually.

Discharged from the Army, Macmurray resolved to join with anybody or any organisation to prevent war occurring again. He hoped to become a member of staff of the newly formed League of Nations (SRR 22) but this was not to be. Instead, philosophy became his task and profession for life.

After taking his degree at Oxford he was, in 1919, appointed John Locke Scholar, and in the same year became a lecturer at Manchester University. From 1921/2 he was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Witwatersrand, South Africa. Returning from there he was made a fellow and tutor of Balliol College, 1922-1928. During the early 1930s he gave his very popular B.B.C. talks on philosophy and the contemporary world; and this whilst at the University of London as Grote Professor, 1928-1944. To finish his academic career he then moved to Edinburgh University as Professor of Moral Philosophy, 1944-58.

During the years 1953/4 he gave the renowned Gifford Lectures at Glasgow University. These were published as "The Form of the Personal" (2 volumes), and refer to one of Macmurray's foremost, exploratory, and pioneering themes, the fruits and development of which have hardly begun. They foreshadow an area to be defined and formulated, yet too far ahead for contemporary man, with his principal interest and obsession in knowing, manipulating, and exploiting the exterior world, to the neglect of emotional development and the promotion of true human relationships, understanding, and mutuality.

Altogether Macmurray wrote 24 books. Stemming from his scientific interests his main recreation was gardening. He died on 21st June 1976.

There ends a brief biographical note.

What then were -

Macmurray's Major Contributions

1) Emotional Reason

Everybody in our society, and indeed throughout Western civilisation, is conditioned to the idea that thinking can be, or should be at its best, imbued with reason. Not all thinking is; far from it. Some of the biggest efforts, and hours of valuable time, both in private and public life, are taken up with pointing out the flaws and lack of reasonableness in others, rarely if ever in one's own, thinking and arguments.

Embedded in this idea of satisfactory thinking are the notions of logic and rationality. They are not the same. But here is not the place to discuss them. Sufficient if we know and agree that thinking includes some reason, or ought to, and the more of it the better. Most, too, would agree that although rational thinking can be found in nearly all branches of human knowledge, its most advanced exemplification, so far, is in the scientific area of enquiry.

Along with this idea it is universally accepted that the enemy of good and reasoned thinking, the enemy within which prevents it from ever becoming good thinking, is emotion; this apart, of course, from mere structural failings. It is our emotions, we believe, which keep us from thinking satisfactorily. Just as we are on the verge of

thinking successfully feeling intervenes and ruffles reason. We suspect, too, that feeling interferes with thinking even if we are unaware of it. It certainly does in other people, when we are only too pleased to tell them that they are "rationalizing", which despite the name, means just the opposite of what it might be thought to mean.

Emotion, according to this widespread view of it, at the best interpretation we can put upon it, a-rational or a-reasonable. But beyond this, most would say that our emotions are the seat and fount of unreason and of irrationality; and that they are incurably so. The very nature of emotion is to be thus. This is how it is. Thought alone has the monopoly, or the possible monopoly, of the highly commendable and laudable characteristic of reason and rationality. So says the conventional wisdom.

This is not so, says Macmurray. Nothing is farther from the truth. Feeling can be as rational, and imbued with reason, as thought. Like thought it often isn't. But it can and should be. Reason, as we so mistakenly believe, is not the prerogative of thinking. Our emotions must be seen to be as equally subject to, and as much in need of reason, as our thought.

Moreover, Macmurray goes further. "Reason," he says (RE 26) is primarily an affair of the emotions whilst the rationality of thought is the derivative and secondary one". He could not make his point clearer. Emotion is the essence of our being. Thought is secondary. We are essentially "feelers" not thinkers. Therefore until we make our feelings as rational as our thought can, at its best, sometimes be, we can never live satisfactorily. Macmurray suggests, even if he does not state it outright, that all our

problems, personal and public, private and social, psychological and relational, are due to our almost total obliviousness to this fact of human existence. Western man has got into the cul-de-sac of obsession with thinking which blinkers him to the need for emotional growth and emotional objectivity; to the need for emotional reason.

At first hearing, this notion may not sound radical and revolutionary. Modern psychology, you may say, has been around for some time and this has said quite a lot about the emotions. But reflect upon Macmurray's contention; allow it to penetrate and permeate your awareness, and you will soon come to realize its startling originality and perceptiveness. It calls for nothing short of a complete shift of emphasis, and a redirecting of our way of life, of our values, and of our way of seeing things. Only thus will we find the path that may lead us out of the immense difficulties and problems of this present age of man.

As with all these introductory sections, only the barest minimum has been given concerning Macmurray's thought. A much fuller exposition and justification, in this case, is given in the chapter on Macmurray's psychological thought. But there can be no doubt that the concept of Emotional Reasons has been Macmurray's greatest, penetrating, and most profound contribution and insight into this fundamental and important aspect of our living. Some may have hinted at the notion; others intuitively or vaguely discerned it. But only Macmurray has made it explicit.

2) The Personal

This is Macmurray's most major contribution after Emotional Reason. In fact, emotional reason, although important in its own right can be seen, when both are known and fully comprehended, as a vital element of the Personal. Here again, when you first come to understand what the personal is, nothing is more tempting than to say - "Bosh! We've known that all our lives. What is it but another name for the spiritual. We certainly don't need to be told about it as if it were some important discovery like Copernicunism or electricity".

But look around you. How many people do you know who are living Personally? Are you living thus, except for very brief, unintended, and discontinuous periods each day?

What is the Personal? The Personal is the third order. We are all familiar with orders. The basic, because most ubiquitous and extensive, is the material order. This includes all the physical aspects of existence - the Earth, atoms, things, the basic substances of our bodies, to name but some. The essence of this order is fixity, rigidity, regularity, uniformity, usually a certain persistency and permanency, behaving always according to fixed laws; passivity, unfreedom, non-self-directing or self-reproducing, egoless; all the qualities we associate with thingdom.

The second order is the organic. Here are included all plants, trees, fish, bacteria, insects, animals, and certain aspects of man. The essence of this order is sentience, drives, desires, will to survive, adaptability, procreation, conditioned response, life cycle, and inevitable individual extinction.

And then coming through, existing upon and as it were, creatively emerging from the first two is the third order, the Personal. I say "emerging from" as this is the best way to depict it at this stage of our exposition and understanding. But Macmurray believes the Personal to be the most basic and fundamental of the three. But more elaboration and discussion of this in the text later on.

What is the essence of the Personal? Freedom, openness, creativity, intention, self-consciousness, objectivity, rationality, reason; and just as important - as we are all, or can be, or should be, all Personal together - interdependence, mutuality, relatingness, and the most advanced and satisfactory of these and of the Personal, fellowship, friendship, and love. The Personal can never be imposed. It cannot be implemented by law, social order, politics, force, or administration. The attainment of it, of its very nature, must be from choice, and of self-volition.

As you will now recognise, the Personal has been around a long time. Macmurray argues with considerable justification, that Jesus discovered the Personal. If nothing else it has been implicit in religious teaching - especially those of Christianity - for centuries. But. as with Emotional Reason, what Macmurray has done is to give it a form and definition, a sort of philosophical and logical acceptability; he has brought it down to earth. We were conscious of it before; he has made us self-conscious of it. And by doing this never again can it be something vague, something you by accident, choice, education, or cultural environment heed and attend to or not. He has identified it, articulated it, and named it. From now on nobody who understands what Macmurray has made explicit about the

Personal, however sceptical of regarding man as anything but a highly complex, involved, and computerised animal, can not intend to live in the Personal. If you do not you are, as it were, degrading your own existence.

Before you came to the last paragraph, and the reference there made to it, it is highly improbable that you could have read these introductory remarks on the Personal without the word and concept of religion arising in your mind. For the Personal, as so empirically defined by Macmurray, for the first time in the history of human thought and awareness is, for him and I believe for us all from now on, because of Macmurray's insights and articulations, is to be associated, if not absolutely coincidentally and co-existently, with religion.

So, to Macmurray we owe the explication of the Personal.

3) Religion

Without being "religious", at least not in any visible, conventional, or recognizable sense, religion is the all-important, all-including, thing for Macmurray. There are few branches of human learning and culture about which Macmurray does not have plenty to say and throw enlightenment upon. Science, art, psychology, thought, economics, politics, communism, philosophy, ethics, and society all receive considerable attention, some even commanding whole books of exposition and discussion. But mingling and intermingling through all is Macmurray's penchant, his thing, that which he perceives as the essential factor of humanness, the ground of all living - religion. With such permeation and penetration we cannot help but

get the feeling that religion is natural, not that Macmurray ever mentions the word in this context. But that is what he consciously or unconsciously, intentionally or unintentionally, is conveying. And whether this is his open intention or not, from this perception of naturalness and religious normality, an extremely important and far-reaching effect occurs; at least for those who are prepared to understand and heed what Macmurray is saying.

One problem troubles countless people today, try as they may to brush it aside. It is - How to be religious. Millions of sceptics, agnostics, atheists, secularists, and humanists are, at heart even if not overtly, yearning to be religious. And countless people who are ostensibly religious, believing, and orthodox, and within the fold are, whether openly seen to be or not, confronted by the same problem. Either they have their doubts, witness the mental and intellectual struggles of so many bishops; or they are vaguely aware of shortcomings in their behaviour, practices, relationships, approaches, and attitudes. And yet another group, and a very large one indeed, especially amongst the young, are those trying every cult, from fringe religious organisations, the occult, astrology, spiritualism, evangelism, the maharishi, and scientology to drugs, addictions, pot, and pops - to name but a few! Everywhere, people knowingly and unknowingly are trying desperately, almost frantically, and in however a substitute fashion, to be religious, yet to no satisfactory, real, and happy effect. All is phoney, false, ephemeral, and unsatisfying in the long run, if not in the short.

Why is there this intense seeking? There are three reasons. Firstly; the important, even if not the sole, roots of our Western society are in Christianity. Therefore if for any cause, perhaps for

example because of the effects of science and technology, the link with our roots is broken or partially severed, there must inevitably be a widespread feeling of voidness and loss; not so much a feeling of longing for what was as a disorientation, especially as those things which are most intrinsic, vital, and sustaining in our lives, namely values, become unstable as a result.

Secondly; the same applies to individual lives, not merely to society in general. Countless numbers of people alive today were reared directly, or in the lengthening shadow of Christianity, even if it was only a conventionalised Christianity exemplified by church-going or by school assembly. To many it was more, of course. The loss of this, shrugged-off with indifference by many, cannot but be felt, even if unadmitted. Something, however vague and unidentifiable, has gone from their lives.

Thirdly; and here we come to what no doubt Macmurray would call the essential reason; the reason which exists apart from both general history and individual experience. And to understand this fully we must recall the last section of this introduction; the Personal. We are, you remember, made to be Personal. To be Personal is what we are, or what we must become. Only thus can we be ourselves. We are things, and often have to exist as such; we are creatures and must act organically. But superimposed on all this, and indeed making it very difficult for us, is the Personal. And it is in this order that we must intend to live and be.

Now the area especially relevant to the Personal is that of religion. Religion exists, however inadequately, gropingly, or unconsciously, to promote the Personal. Because, therefore, however

seriously or however reluctantly and superficially we are and must pursue the Personal, we are self-evidently, all and every one of us, religious and involved with religion. It is of our very essence. The immature expressions of religion manifested so far have, quite naturally, "turned off" millions of people in today's world. But this does not in any way detract from our need for religion.

We can see now why countless are wondering how to be religious. And why the important contribution Macmurray has made to religion is that, whether totally acceptable or not, he has given us the clue as to how we can recognize that, despite all our own ideas, and the ideas of the contemporary world, we are and must live in a religious context. We are religious whether we recognize it or not, for it is the most natural and normal thing for all men to be. We are Personal, and religion is the area, the ambience, of the Personal. Macmurray makes it possible for us to be religious again, and possibly at a more advanced, maturer, stage than before. Macmurray has metamorphosed religion. By discovering this, by showing religion to be as normal and as natural a part of human existence as thinking, breathing, and relating, he has gone a long way to making unbelievers religious again; and believers less eager to portray religion as something special, spiritual, sacred, and supernatural; something only for the "elect" and chosen and thus putting everybody else off. Religion for Macmurray is simply living Personally.

4) Freedom

Apart from religion Macmurray, throughout his works, has more to say about freedom than anything else. It is a major and important conception of his, and he brings much original thought to it. And

where he is not original he, as perhaps we have come to expect by now of him, puts an emphasis on some aspect almost ignored in contemporary thought and action.

The important contribution Macmurray makes regarding freedom is that he deepens and broadens our awareness and apprehension of it. Ask most people, not merely the man in the street but those in the more educated and higher controlling and influencing strata of society, what they understand by freedom, and they will give some sort of political answer possibly extended to include rather vague references to such social matters as freedom of the press and freedom of assembly. One thing is certain. You can be sure nothing will be said about psychological freedom, that is freedom of the emotions and of the self.

Yet this is Macmurray's greatest concern when the question of freedom arises. Moreover, he links the two. Structural and institutional freedom, that is political and social freedom, may be there for all to benefit from, but none can satisfactorily benefit unless they are personally free; that is, free in themselves and in their emotions. In a sense, political freedom, except formally and without any real meaning and substance, cannot exist without personal freedom. This is because the most unfree, yet energetic and vigorous members of society - the power lovers - will take over, and do take over, even in a democracy. They then subtly and insidiously manipulate the feeling of the numerous and the majority but less power-driven of the people. Thus in a "free" society most people are unfree.

How has this situation arisen? Because, says Macmurray, we have freed thought but not emotion. Freedom of thought started about five hundred years ago, and from tentative and opposed beginnings progressed to its greatest expression in science. The essence of scientific thought is freedom and reality. Without preconceptions or dogmatism and authority, it operates in freedom, seeking solely for what is, not for what it would wish to be. Science is the prime example of what all freedom, contrary to popular conceptions of it, must contain; and that is discipline. The discipline of relating itself, whatever the cost - in human pride, vanity, or dignity - to reality.

But although we have freed thought, and thus related it to reality and shifted its centre of balance from "in here" to "out there", from subjectivity to objectivity, to our immense advantage thought-wise, we have not freed our emotions. And remember, as Macmurray so pertinently reminds us - indeed, he might be said to instruct us, so oblivious is contemporary society to the fact - that the essence of our living is our emotional life. Our emotions are the vital, essential, part of ourselves. Not only does all experience come by and through our emotions, feelings, and senses, but all our evaluations, and hence our choices are determined by our emotions and not by our thinking.

Earlier we considered the importance of emotional reason and growth. No less an aspect of this, for Macmurray, is the freeing of emotion. Yet in this area we are enchained, biased, and as unfree and unreal as thought was in its pre-scientific era. Only as we bring the same freedom to our emotional life can we grow and develop into satisfactory, personal, human beings. The irony is that the

common ethos tells us that we are free, mainly because we enjoy constitutional freedoms. Moreover, many people, probably the majority, think that more money and more material possessions would make them more free. Considering Macmurray's ideas on personal, emotional, and psychological development and freedom, additional possessions have very little to do with freedom essentially.

Macmurray gives interesting and cogent reasons and historical analysis as to why we are in this state of emotional unfreedom.

This introductory section can only hint at Macmurray's penetrating and valuable contribution to our understanding of freedom. Much more will be elaborated upon in the relevant chapter. But enough has been given to indicate the insight Macmurray has brought to this vital topic, and of the importance of what he has to say about it.

5) Monism

Of all the five major tendencies or advocacies considered in this introduction, Macmurray's monism is the least heightened, focused, reinforced, and re-expounded by him. The other ideas have each been encapsulated in one or more books, devoted more or less exclusively to their subject matter. Not so his monism. Yet it pervades all his writings and thought. If one thing is the essence, if not the substance, of Macmurray, it is this.

Macmurray is the foremost monist of our time. He may not be the foremost in advocacy and intention, arguing, expounding, and defending his case in the most detailed, logically reasoned, and extended way. That, as we have come to know, is not Macmurray's

method. For him the proof of the pudding is in the eating (or should we say, in the experiencing) not in an inspection, analysis, and admiration of the list of ingredients, however brilliant and convincing these may be.

Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that Macmurray unquestionably considers the world as one, and merely by reading him we totally and automatically feel this to be so. Very subtly, or though not consciously or deliberately, and certainly with no ulterior motive, Macmurray through his writing and the consequent shifting and redirecting of feeling which we experience, is able to bring about a change in us imperceptibly; and without the doubtful necessity of logical argument we become monists. Through him, and the way he writes, we see and experience the point, and the need of so being.

Why is monism, and to be monist, so important? Because, both in ourselves and throughout Western civilisation, if not in all extant civilisations and cultures, we are divided. Now sometimes, and at different times in history, division or centrifugal interests and forces are necessary for growth, or at least as an essential catalyst and precursor to growth. At other times unifying, centripetal, monistic, interests and directions are essential to promote and create cohesion, both within ourselves and in society at large. Indeed, such monism may be essential to survival. Of such an era is the one in which we are now living.

It was Plato who first divided our consciousness, reinforced by Descartes the father of the modern world, philosophy-wise. Since then we have been bedevilled by dualism, and even by pluralism. Existence, the world, man, thought, politics, and religion must have

or perhaps in the light of Macmurray we ought to say, "are seen by us to have" - two or more sides or aspects. Obvious examples of dualism are inexhaustible, but here are some to remind us; mind and matter, body and soul, left and right, heaven and hell, science and religion, will and passion, reason and emotion, spiritual and temporal, either or. And examples of pluralism are; mind, body, and spirit; the trinity; and social classes - upper, middle, and lower. Nobody can say that dualism is not an inbuilt feature of our way of perceiving the world, life and ourselves.

But, inconceivable as it may seem to us, conditioned as we are by the structure of Western thinking and perceiving process, we do not have to see things in this way. They are merely categories we have created in the human mind, mainly for our seeming convenience. And its effects have reached a dangerous stage as we well know. According to Macmurray, since primitive times, only one people have been totally and naturally monist; the Jews of the Old Testament. His admiration for them, in this respect, is immense. This example of monism forms for Macmurray one very important aspect (about half, if one can roughly apportion it) of his "clue" to history. For monism to appear so important speaks for itself in Macmurray's thought.

If monism, if to be a monist, is so important for us, how are we to achieve it? Descartes said, "I think, therefore I am." Here lies the root of all our troubles and divisions. Thought, thinking, is not the essence, the core, of our being. Thought is only instrumental, a means to an end. It can never be anything of itself. It can never be ultimate. It can never cause us to experience

reality.

And this is where Macmurray turns the tables, and consequently revolutionizes our way of seeing things. Macmurray instead of saying, "I think, therefore I am", would say, "I act, therefore I am". But even this is not complete enough for him. Reality is Personal - remember? - and the Personal includes us all. Therefore the ultimate phrase, the ultimate expression of being for Macmurray is, "We act, therefore we are". In this conception of action lies the clue to Macmurray's monism. For, although thinking can be divided an action, at any one particular moment, can never be divided. It can only be one thing. For some reason, to be discussed later, Macmurray calls this paramountcy of action "agency"; we are "agents". But perhaps this whole aspect of his thinking could best be called Actionism. Macmurray's monism exists through and by the fact that he is an Actionist. We are here to do, not to dream or wish.

What "to act" means is elaborated upon at length. It includes the very important conception of "intention", which plays a very big part in Macmurray's psychology and philosophy.

Enough has been said to illustrate how important monism is for Macmurray; and of how essential it is, both in ourselves and in our world, to be undivided and seamless. He has shown how, by redressing the balance between thought and action, we can achieve this. Macmurray's monism, and of how to be monistic, is certainly one of his foremost conceptions - and a means of saving the world. For, although unsaid, this no doubt is one of Macmurray's major objects.

A Final Note

The foregoing brief introductory sections have been written with two things in mind.

Firstly; to introduce, in an easy way, a few of the major ideas of John Macmurray.

Secondly; to awaken, arouse, and stimulate interest in an important writer and thinker who has much to say of great relevance for us today, yet who has been almost totally neglected.

No attempt has been made at this stage to appraise or criticise the ideas presented. In your mind, as you have read, some doubts, questions, and even antipathies, will inevitably have arisen. Each chapter following contains several sections of criticism and appraisal; and a final chapter will attempt to summarise and evaluate overall Macmurray's place, contribution, relevance, influence, and shortcomings.

FREEDOM

Relevant Books

Freedom in the Modern World. (FMW)

Conditions of Freedom. (CF)

Philosophy of Communism. (PC)

Introduction

Macmurray has many diverse and varied ideas on freedom. It is not easy to bring total coherence to them, or to incorporate them exhaustively into one system. Although a man of reason and rationality Macmurray was not predominantly a man of logic or proof, not a man to totally and exhaustively justify what he was saying. Nor was Plato - far from it. Yet he was not criticised on these grounds.

This does not mean that Macmurray's views on freedom - or, indeed, on anything else - are inconsistent or incongruent; at least, not beyond the inevitable and acceptable limits of any thinker. But as in all Macmurray's work and intentions, proof of anything said or believed is in the living of it, not in verbal substantiation and argument. Truth is to be found in living, not in and through thinking. Thinking plays a valid and valuable part to this end, but it is feeling which gives us our values and it is values which determine our life and living - not intellectual thinking. "Thought is only verifiable in action." (PC 26).

Such an outlook is quite against Western tradition, especially

since the end of the Middle Ages and the coming of the Modern era; and since Descartes. Of this period, science is its prime, although by no means sole, manifestation. In philosophy, probably only existentialism challenges this. Even Pragmatism is thought-orientated.

Thus, what Macmurray is really trying to do is to shift the whole emphasis of Western thinking and ideas. This is like trying to lift a twenty ton rock with, and on, one human shoulder. And if followers or acknowledgers are any indication of one's success and influence, Macmurray has - at least to date - failed miserably. At best, one can say he has gone unheard. Maybe the coming of the Permissive Society in the 1960s was in some way, however indirect, the result of Macmurray's work. But a lot of study and research would be necessary to trace it to him (even as but one factor in a complex situation). And nobody has even attempted or suggested it yet.

But there can be no doubt that this major shift of life-emphasis, away from thought to feeling and consequent improved action, was a very prominent and important theme and intention of Macmurray's. It is perhaps unfortunate that Macmurray's style - except in the three more academic books - is so "easy" and fluent, so readable, that people understand it, or think they do, as they read without bothering to find reflection and questioning as to meaning necessary. If he were more obscure, and had to be worked at, he would be more revered. I remember a student in one of my classes saying of another lecturer (with slight intended amusement, but nevertheless meant), "He must be a good lecturer, I don't understand

a word he says!"

If Macmurray had the obscurity of Hegel he might well have superseded him by now. For he is certainly attempting as major a task as Hegel (or Marx).

But now for freedom. And first of all - what, according to Macmurray, is:-

The Origin of Freedom

Why do we seem to want freedom? Why has it been a major theme and intention of modern man? From whence does this idea in us come from?

It might be noted in passing that although the books listed at the head of this chapter are obviously, by their titles, the ones most devoted by Macmurray to this subject, freedom is often referred to throughout his works. It is a major theme.

Macmurray attributes freedom to two sources.

1) Firstly; to Christianity. "Christianity implanted in us the desire for freedom of life". (FMW 48). And again. "The driving force below the development of Europe has always been the struggle for freedom and the clue to that struggle lies in Christianity." (FMW 48). (And more generally Macmurray speaks of this influence in CF 35).

One further special exemplification of this contention is given. Science, claims Macmurray, is our most notable area of freedom attained so far. It results from freedom of thought. And the required underlying freedom necessary for its production came not, as is usually contended, from the Greeks, but from Christianity with its insistence on truth and light. To illustrate this Macmurray quotes

from the New Testament, (FMW 38). "This is the condemnation that light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than light because their deeds were evil". For full discussion of this see FMW 37/41.

So Christianity is a major source of the idea of, and need for, freedom.

2) Secondly: freedom is of man's essence. man would not be man had he not this urge and need for freedom. To quote CF 16. "There is a sense in which freedom is absolute. It is the sense in which freedom is the defining character of Man; the property which sets us apart from the rest of creation and fixes a gulf between us and the highest of the animals."

Macmurray then, in acceptable but nevertheless his own meaning and interpretation of words and terms, puts forward - or at least implies - three ways of being. These are:-

To act.

To behave.'

(see CF 16/17).

To react.

Material things behave. Living things react. But only man acts. (There is much more about this, and of the freedom and types of morality these three ways of being respectively evoke, in the chapters and pages of FMW 175/210, but I do not think it especially relevant to develop them at this point. See later in this chapter.)

To act means to form an intention and seek to realise it (CF 16). To act is to be free. As Agents - one of Macmurray's most major concepts - we are concerned not with what exists or is, but with what will be i.e. with the future and our intentions for it. The past is fixed and unalterable. The present is merely the point

of action. Only in our intention for what is to be are we free.

"The future is the field of freedom" (CF 17). The only way to deny that freedom is of our essence is to assert that we never, nor can, act (but only behave or react).

Beside acting and agency another unique feature of man, as equally important and of the essence of freedom, is the Personal, also discussed later at length in this thesis.

So there are Macmurray's two main ideas - Christianity and essence - as to why man has, wants, needs, seems to be involved with, freedom.

(Rather than wait to the end of each chapter, I shall from time to time interrupt the exposition to make an appraisal and evaluation. The first occasion for this is now).

Appraisal (1)

1) Without being able to substantiate it in detail, I do myself feel that Christianity has been a major source of freedom. But surely Macmurray could give a better quote from the New Testament than the one he has given. Moreover, there must be many quotes he could give from the same source. To those unfamiliar with Macmurray's works one might reasonably say that Christianity, as it has come down to us, is a restricting, inhibiting, influence - not one of freedom. But Macmurray recognises this, especially in the realms of feeling and emotion (but not in the area of thought) and has given for this a rather interesting reason. This will have to be fully discussed later in an appropriate context. Sufficient to say here that Macmurray contends that the Christianity we have and know

is not the original and real Christianity introduced by Jesus. It has all the hall-marks of the culture and attitudes of Ancient Rome.

So; to go back to this point in the appraisalment. It would have been better if Macmurray had substantiated his assertion with more and relevant evidence.

2) Regarding his second reason for man's need for freedom i.e. that it is of our essence, the fact that you cannot prove it, or bring overwhelming evidence to support it may, of itself, be sufficient indication of it probably being true. But we must not confuse the "unknown" (which the future is) with the "free". The future is definitely unknown, but is it open and free? Much of it e.g. movement of the planets, to give but one obvious example, must already be part of a deterministic and unfree chain. Is our own individual future any the less determined?

However, if we take Macmurray's ideas, and incorporate them in our own lives, thoughts, emotions, actions, and relationships we do find ourselves becoming "freer". No doubt other "systems" (of the right kind) will produce this effect too. So, in experience and practice, it would seem that freedom can be enlarged by each one of us; and, as it is enlarged, we feel more adequate, satisfactory, and effective persons. Thus, through living, Macmurray's contentions that to be free is of our human essence, would seem to be "proved" as far as it can be. And proved by the method of proof Macmurray all along advocates, namely action and living, not thinking. Speaking of the rejection of idealism, and the acceptance of the principle of the unity of theory and practice, Macmurray says, "they involve the belief that all theory must seek verification in action and adapt

itself to the possibility of experiment. They make a clean sweep of all speculative thought on the ground that the validity of no belief whatever is capable of demonstration by argument. They involve a refusal at any point to make knowledge an end in itself, and equally, the rejection of the desire for certainty which is the motive governing speculative thought. The demand for personal certainty is only the ideal reflection of the demand for personal security and that demand is the psychological basis of the struggle for power between individuals, classes, nations and empires." (PC 63).

End of Appraisalment (1)

The Paradoxical Position of Man Concerning Human Freedom

Freedom may be of man's essence; it may be absolute (as Macmurray expresses it CF 16). But equally, Macmurray says, it is relative - which means that, although made for freedom, although freedom is of our nature, we are not always free, able to be free, nor even, in many cases, to want to be free.

As we would expect Macmurray (CF 17) quoted Rousseau's famous dictum "Man is born free, yet everywhere he is in chains". But, to misquote, what I think Macmurray should have said (to be more in line with his thinking) is "Man is born to be free, but everywhere he is still emotionally in chains".

We experience this relativity of freedom in many ways. When, for example, we fall short of what we would be, or know ourselves to be capable of. And again; in the conflict of conscience versus impulse (see CF 17). All other creatures are always themselves, but

man's nature is not fixed and predictable. To illustrate this Macmurray quotes St. Paul, " - it doth not yet appear what we shall be". We are always becoming. We are ourselves yet always we are reaching out to be what is, as yet, not ourselves. So this is the paradox of human freedom. Our freedom is at once both absolute and relative.

But then there is a second paradox concerning human freedom. Or if not a paradox then at least a very marked proviso concerning the first. (see CF 18/20). We profess to desire freedom but fear to be free.

On hearing this phrase one is reminded of a book with the same theme written after Macmurray's ideas had been published, namely, "The Fear of Freedom" by Erich Fromm. This is very relevant to the point. What is this fear of freedom? Perpetually - it is not a once-for-all choice and done with it - we are each confronted by a choice, freedom or security. And most of the time, "inhumanly" and "sub-personally", we choose security. This then is the second paradox of freedom. We are born to be free yet out of fear we shun it. Yet, and here is the essence of the paradox, we can only be ourselves when going for freedom, therefore only in freedom can we be secure.

Going for security in preference to freedom can lead only to frustration, and to the destroying of ourselves. "If we aim at security we aim at the impossible, and succeed only in multiplying the occasions of fear, and magnifying our need for security. There is no security for us except in choosing freedom. For our insecurity is our fear, and to choose freedom is to triumph over fear". (CF 20).

As we shall come to understand as we go along, fear is another important theme throughout Macmurray's writings. The desire for security is based on fear. Fear is a negative emotion. It either shrivels us up and leads into a withdrawal from life and people; or; it puts into us a mighty urge to power, to conquer all and sundry, to master all imagined enemies and sources of fear.

But it never succeeds. In jungle and instinctive conditions fear is necessary, proper, and propitious. At the human, personal, level it is disastrous. Most of all - and very much to the point here - it is a major source of our unfreedom.

It is interesting to ask in passing - why is fear such a big "thing" with Macmurray? Is its discernment a rational, objective, analysis on his part? Or is he somewhere, somehow, a 'fearful, fear-filled' person? We cannot tell. But a slight hint might be gleaned from the following - perhaps. "The free man is the man who takes responsibility for his own life before God and his fellows. Is it any wonder that when we are faced with the challenge of freedom, our fear is usually more than a match for its attractiveness; and that we seek, for the most part, to escape the demand that it makes upon us? This, at least, is my experience; and that our capacity to deceive ourselves in this matter is of extreme subtlety." (CF 19). Does this give us a clue or not?

So this is the paradox, concerning freedom, in us. Freedom is of our essence as men, as human beings, as persons. However, we are not yet free (or only partially so, and each of us has acquired different degrees of freedom, of which we may lose or gain more) because 1) of our inbetween and transitory state as man. 2) of fear(s) in us, evoked by, probably, this very transitory condition in

which we find ourselves, and of our consequent need for security.
Very awkward isn't it! - but very cleverly analysed by Macmurray.

What is Freedom?

As we would expect, all of Macmurray's ideas of freedom are not concerned with their ontological, philosophical, or theoretical aspects, but with their manifestations in life and action. So; in practical, psychological, and down-to-earth terms what, for Macmurray, is freedom?

After years of study I believe I know - and am able to summarise - what Macmurray meant by freedom. But a serious first half-a-dozen readings of his ideas on the matter (one reading will not bother you!) will lead you into a miasma of seeming anomalies, even contradictions; one moment he seems to regard freedom as "doing as you please" absolutely; the next he says that he does not mean this at all - so "don't misunderstand him"!

Moreover, when you do understand him (or think you do), one of the terms essential to his conception of freedom, namely "reality", is extremely difficult to comprehend in this context of freedom.

However, as I say, I believe I know what he means; but others may have a different interpretation, or at least a different emphasis.

Let us start by quoting some of Macmurray's definitions or delineations of freedom:-

To do as we please without restraint or hindrance. (FMW 172).

To express one's own nature in action. (FMW 170).

To act freely is to act without restraint. (FMW 167).

In the absence of personal reality freedom is just impossible.

(FMW 168).

Free action is spontaneous action. (FMW 170).

Free action flows from our own nature. (FMW 170).

Freedom is spontaneity. (FMW 170).

Communism is therefore the necessary basis of real freedom. (PC 80).

The free man is the man who takes responsibility for his own life.

(CF 19).

Only a real person can be free. (FMW 171).

To be free means not to be under restraint. (FMW 169).

Freedom depends upon our inner condition. (FMW 172).

It is obviously untrue to say that we are free to do as we please, if we don't know what we want to do. (FMW 172/3).

Even a real person cannot be free in the face of unreal persons. (FMW 173).

And to paraphrase other relevant quotations:-

Unfreedom is to be still in the bondage of tradition and authority.
(FMW 53).

Undisciplined thought is never free. (FMW 53).

It is only in friendship that we ever find ourselves completely, and so be completely free. (FMW 174).

To act freely is to take a decision and accept the consequences.
(CF 19).

Let me try to collate the above, and bring some cohesion and coherence to what may seem a disparate and sometimes incongruent set

of assertions. And others could be added, equally as amorphous!

From the above quotations it will be seen that the key words, apart from freedom itself, are:-

Spontaneity.

Reality. Real.

Personal reality.

Friendship.

Own nature.

Inner condition.

Discipline.

Responsibility.

Using, where necessary, these words and concepts, what might be said to be Macmurray's ideas on freedom - in a summary?

To be free means to be spontaneous, untrammelled, unrestrained - even unreflecting. (In "Persons in Relation" Macmurray strongly contrasts these two - action and reflection - alternating and essential phases of life.) To be free means immediacy and instantaneousness. It means living and acting creatively at a point of time.

But whilst spontaneity is essential to freedom, not all spontaneous action is free. Far from it; indeed very little of it is. Externally, and more important internally, we are constrained, unfree, and inhibited - and this without necessarily having the psycho-analytic connotation.

What, then, must accompany spontaneity in order for our actions and our selves to be free? Four things:-

Reality.

Discipline.

Intention.

Friendship.

As we saw earlier Macmurray says that only real persons can be free. And so important is this idea of "real" and "reality" that the second part of "Freedom in the Modern World" is called Reality and Freedom, and five chapters (pp. 116/166), plus many other references, are devoted to it.

Reality might be said to be anything, and our ideas about it.

"Anything" can be everything external to ourselves, all other people, even our own bodies with both their attributes and efficiencies, their defects and deficiencies. Included in the term "ideas" are thought i.e. ideation, and feeling, and evaluation.

Now we can only live freely, and be free, if our ideas, in relation to what is not ourselves, are true i.e. if they coincide. If they do not coincide, then we cannot be free. To give an outlandish example. If my ideas and feelings are such that I persist in the "unreality" of believing that carbon-monoxide will serve just the same purpose as oxygen in my breathing I shall not be here long, let alone be free! But extreme and ridiculous as this example may seem countless people, and all of us sometime in our lives and thinking (however much we may think otherwise) have ideas which do not coincide with reality. And to that degree we are unreal and - more to the point of our present consideration - unfree. We cannot act in terms of what is.

All this seems to me a secular and rational description of a situation which used to be religiously stated as (speaking of God) "His service is perfect freedom". In other words; one important

aspect of freedom, if not all of it, is to discover what is out there, how it works, and then fit yourself in with it. If you don't you will always be tangled and twisted-up; in other words, unfree.

The area in man where this conception of Macmurray's has been best illustrated is in scientific thinking. All the time we thought we knew about the world; all the time we wove imaginative fantasies about it, we really got nowhere. But once, from the 15th. century onwards, we worked on our ideas about the external world in terms of reality we not only got on much better in finding solutions to problems, but to the degree that our knowledge was based on reality, so equally did we become free. And regarding thought - not emotion and evaluation for the moment - the more we really know, the freer we shall increasingly become.

It is important to note a very pertinent point made by Macmurray (FMW 53) - and, incidentally, to see where another of our "words" fits in - concerning the above. Thought was increasingly freed from the 15th century onwards, freed from the fixed, rigid, traditional ideas of the Middle Ages. But although this thought was freed it was highly disciplined thought. Freedom, in this context, did not mean wild, uncontrolled, bizarre, thinking. On the contrary; only by relating it totally, through discipline, to what was, did it become successful, and enlarge freedom.

The need to relate it to reality, imposed a necessary discipline of its own. "The free thought that has unravelled the mysteries of the natural world is not and cannot be undisciplined thought, which is never free." (FMW 53) .." It is disciplined by the world with which it deals, by testing its conclusions against fact." (FMW 53).

The importance of Macmurray's pressing of this point will appear later when we come to consider freedom, not of thought, but of feelings, and the discovery of values.

Earlier I spoke, paraphrasing Macmurray, of the absolute and the relative aspects of freedom. Another way in which freedom is relative for Macmurray concerns intention and the ability to fulfil that intention. (See CF 21). Freedom entails responsibility for yourself i.e. knowing what you want to do. If a man's wants are negligible he does not need much power to fulfil them; and to that degree he is soon free. But if a man has immense desires and ambitions he has got to be very important, and command a great amount of power to even begin to fulfil them. "But our freedom also depends upon what we want to do. For it is no limitation upon a man's freedom that he has not the power to do something that he has no desire to do". (CF 21).

"We can increase our freedom, therefore, by limiting our desires. The free man is the man whose means are adequate to his ends." (FMW 21). This reminds me of a very pertinent remark of Henry James. "I call people rich when they're able to meet the requirements of their imagination." (The Portrait of a Lady p. 196). Thus we can increase our freedom in two ways:-

- 1) By reducing our desires.
- 2) By increasing our power to achieve them.

But our chances at the present time of achieving more freedom are remote. Our power over the environment has increased out of all proportion and expectation; but as this has happened our perception of what we want, or could have, have increased even greater. Thus we are less free! On the other hand; to reduce desire (as did the

saints) in order to enlarge personal freedom has gone out of fashion. But presumably for our own happiness, and personal and emotional growth, it might be worth trying again. "The increase of power is an increase of freedom only if our demands remain relatively stable. But this is what they will never do if left to themselves. Plato saw this more than two millennia ago. In the Republic he pointed to the fact that though animal desires can be easily satisfied, desire in man is insatiable. For when the natural needs of men are supplied, new desires appear for more elegant and more complicated satisfactions, until the resources available are too few for the demands upon them: and in this he found the origin of war.

The very spectacle of increased resources breeds a corresponding proliferation of desires; and if this process is uncontrolled, desires always grow faster than the power to satisfy them; for their increase is rooted in the creativeness of the imagination. If, then, we double our resources while we treble our demands upon them we do not increase our freedom. We diminish it. There is no need for astonishment that the vast increase of our resources in the last generation has gone hand in hand with a loss of human freedom. The two variables - the moral and the technological - must both be considered. Self-control is as imperative as the control of nature if freedom is to be increased or even maintained." (CF 22/3). (See also CF 21/2 for very relevant remarks concerning these points).

The Three Modes of Freedom

Even as - we saw this earlier - there are three ways of being, so there are three corresponding freedoms. These are:-

1) The freedom of material things, we recognise this when we say that things make a "free" fall to the ground if left to their own desires and "volition". (For a full exposition and discussion of the points merely stated here see FMW chapters 8 and 9).

This first type Macmurray calls mechanical freedom.

2) The freedom of living organisms. The essence of their freedom is to grow, respond, and adapt themselves to their environment. (FMW chapters 8 and 10).

3) The freedom of persons. "Personal reality expresses itself in spontaneous objectivity. (FMW 182). This means we are free - or freest - when we relate to, and live in communion with, that which is not ourselves. (FMW chapters 8 and 11). The most advanced and satisfactory state of this condition is in our relationships with other human beings. Thus only in friendship can we find true, or perhaps we should say real, freedom.

"To realize ourselves we have to be ourselves to make ourselves real. That means thinking and feeling really, for ourselves, and expressing our own reality in word and action. And this freedom, and the secret of it, lies in our capacity for friendship." (FMW 219).

Thus, being essentially personal by nature, we achieve the maximum freedom we are capable of, and can know, in friendship - and better and wider still, in the extension of this which is community. The whole of chapter 3 of "Conditions of Freedom" is taken up with the analysis and development of this contention of Macmurray's. "The prime condition of freedom lies in the character and quality of human relations". (CF 31).

Whilst not a perfect exposition of Macmurray's ideas on "What is

Freedom?", I hope I have given enough, and got it together enough, to show that at least I have some understanding of what he is, or at least intends to be, saying.

Appraisement (2)

1) Regarding the paradox of freedom in which man finds himself, probably Macmurray's analysis, in principle, is right. Man's position for long, at least in or according to religious circles, has been recognised as one of in-betweenness. "We are a little lower than the angels." "We are fallen creatures." Philosophy, however, seems not to over-favour this view - not at least to my knowledge. All arguments in this area seem rather either/or; some philosophers contending that we are free; others that we are not. In this matter perhaps Macmurray introduces a realistic note into the discussion. Even Rousseau's dictum, perhaps for rhetorical effect, seems of the black and white, absolute, type.

2) As regards the fear aspect. I am sure much of this is true. But whilst Macmurray seems to suggest that the choice has continuously to be made between security and freedom, I am not so sure about this. There seems to me to be permanently negative people in whose lives fear, in a multiplicity of forms, pervades. Whilst others are not fear-enveloped. But, of course, even the most positive and free-loving person may sometimes be accosted by doubts and fears.

3) Macmurray (CF 19) makes the interesting point that history reveals not a struggle of man for freedom, but a struggle to avoid it! This is a clever volte-face; not a usual interpretation of

history. But it is not wholly true. We are intending always to be free; over the last few hundred years anyway. Whether we are or not is another matter.

On the other hand, it does seem that innumerable people do depend upon, or are looking for, some form of external authority, leader, oracle, god-figure, saviour, prophet, religion, or ideology; and to the degree that they are dependent psychologically upon any of these, and other similar props, they are unfree, and desire unfreedom. And must remain so. Perhaps at first there is a struggle not to be free - as witnessed in the opposition to the ideas of Copernicus, Darwin, and Freud - but freedom eventually seems to triumph; at least, so far.

4) We continue now with an appraisal of Macmurray's ideas of what Freedom is, or of how it manifests itself.

As already hinted, it is a pity Macmurray does not "get it together" more. To have to try and understand bits and pieces in a piecemeal fashion, and make some total coherence of it is quite a task. Be this as it may, I feel that Macmurray is on the right track. What other writer or thinker has given such valuable attention to freedom in the way Macmurray has? Nobody that I know of. Some religious writers, with an axe to grind, are perhaps saying the same sort of thing but Macmurray, religious as he might be basically, discusses freedom in contemporary and secular terms. We all talk of freedom, from the heads of state to the humblest office-boy, but apart from political freedom - which is only a very small part of it, important as that may be - nobody discusses freedom, tries to understand, nor attempt to enlarge it. On the contrary. Everybody thinks, wrongly, that they have got it! All except

Macmurray.

Macmurray's idea of freedom and its relation to reality is important. Science, as he suggests, proves it. Only as we rightly know what we have to contend with, external to ourselves, can we act propitiously, and thus be free. If we do not know reality there must be a great deal of hit and miss about our responses and behaviour.

The external and the internal grow together i.e. at the same time and out of the same experiences. As we come to know reality so we become more real inside, and thus more free. To this whole set-up I have always given the name - although Macmurray never mentions or suggests it - maturity. But maturity, as we shall try to understand it in this context, has not a great deal to do with maturity, and the mature person, as we commonly understand it in our society today.

Today's mature person is one who has swallowed and embodied all of the contemporary main-stream values. He is self-sufficient, materialistic, has a family intending to go to university or some other prestiged and advantaged training, professes to care for others but really doesn't care a damm, holds responsible positions irrespective of any moral considerations these positions ought to raise and be concerned with; is an IQist, and actively promotes the interests of himself and the various limited groups with which he is associated, totally oblivious to the interests of other persons and groups, or of the interests of the community as a whole. In other words; absolutely different from Macmurray's idea of a real and free person!

Maturity, as I would have it understood, means and entails a great deal of objectivity in thought and consequent actions; much

less subjectivity, whether of self or groups; belief in, and the practice of, emotional and relational growth - not the static, self-complacent, negative, self-indulgent belief that we are what we are, and that we feel what we do, and nothing will or could change it. Maturity, too, requires social interest, one-mandom, caring - a sense of - and a strong belief and intention that men, all men are personal beings, and that we can live satisfactorily only if we promote this end.

If, as I believe, Macmurray meant all these and other similar things by his concept of reality, and its importance for freedom, then I think he would be better understood if at least the inner, the subjective, the felt, side of reality was called maturity, instead of calling it "being real". But then, if he called it maturity it would inevitably be misunderstood! Incidentally, after all his writing and chapters on reality and being real, his description of a "real" person (FMW 256/7, and to some extent subsequently - to page 166) seems nothing short of ludicrous! Surely our knowledge of whether a person is real or not comes from an acquaintance with his personality, mind, attitudes, and values. In other words, we must have some knowledge of him from his speech and actions. But Macmurray, for some reason I have never been able to fathom, seems to think that you can go into a room of people and, by just looking, pick out the real ones!

This is surely nonsense - the nonsense of mysticism and intuition, which from evidence elsewhere you would have thought Macmurray utterly despised and rejected. Even if some people do have a noticeable aura of calmness and appeal, which sets them apart in a crowd, from experience we know that usually their minds are trivial,

their attitudes trite, their character thoroughly selfish and self-promoting, their morals non-existent, and eager only to exploit their own attractiveness.

Perhaps you might assume that Macmurray was unconsciously projecting his own type of personality and ability to stand out in a crowd by some essence or emanation. Far from it. When I met him in 1971, I was surprised - after reading his works and the person that comes through - to find him relatively insignificant and generally lacking in any special attraction or charisma. So perhaps if it was not projection which made him have this unreal idea of the perceiving of real persons, it was an unconscious wish or compensation factor. Whatever it was, it certainly produced a strange, inconsistent, and unfortunate anomaly.

Regarding other points as to what freedom is; there is much truth in the idea of freedom depending upon our needs and desires. Aldous Huxley's ideal - at least in one period of his life, circa 1946 - was the "non-attached" man. This followed and exemplified, of course, in a modern context the religious ideas of many before him, as Huxley himself acknowledged - both in title and content - in his work "The Perennial Philosophy". Much of Eastern philosophy especially Buddhism, so advocated by Schopenhauer in recent times (advocated but not practised!), believes that a satisfactory human state can be reached only by a reduction, or even an obliteration, of desires and wants.

Thus we have, presumably, the paradox of a man in prison - with, needless to say, the right attitude - being the freest man on earth; or as free as a man outside who is enslaved by his desires. But if

carried to extremes this approach to freedom entails a complete withdrawal from life. Where then would come the real freedom, as advocated by Macmurray, found only in the "personal", and in friendship and community? So whilst recognising that we can enlarge our freedom by reducing wants, Macmurray - it would seem - cannot believe in going the whole way, for this would banish freedom, and the possibility of it, altogether; or at least the freedom Macmurray so earnestly advocates.

5) Is friendship, which includes fellowship and is extended to community, the area and condition of human life where we do, or can, achieve freedom? Freedom, by the way, is for Macmurray more important, satisfactory, and worthy of humanity, than happiness. "We recognise this when we honour those who have been ready to sacrifice happiness, and even life itself, for freedom's sake." (CF 16).

Being quite gregarious myself - if not fanatical about it - I am inclined, from my own life and experience, to regard this as true. All permanent, or even tendencies to, withdrawal I regard as rather pathological. The saints i.e. those that did, I find strangely odd and not to be admired. Melancholics and isolates in mental hospitals cannot be regarded as enviable nor the sanest amongst us. People who choose to live alone seem to be missing out to me however happy and contented they may profess to be. The classical example is George Gissing in his semi-autobiographical "The Private Papers of Henry Ryecroft". It is not possible for me to believe that his solitary early retirement to an isolated cottage in Devon was as blissful and idyllic as he depicted.

Contrary to many people's views and feelings, during and after marriage, real, developed, mature, relationships do provide the

condition where we are, or can be, ourselves; the condition where we are most self-realised, and therefore where we are most free. (FMW 211/219).

And so in the wider world. The more people develop mutuality and fellowship, and reduce fear between themselves, so will freedom be enlarged. We are unfree in ourselves to the degree that mistrust, doubt, fear, jealousy, and suspicion pervade our relationships with others. Thus it would seem that friendship, fellowship, and community do provide the essential condition for freedom; and if, as countless people would say today, that this is pie-in-the-sky and idealistic nonsense, then recall what Macmurray says. "Any theory is ideal, and provides a standard which can never be realized in its application. One does not say that because perfect justice cannot be realized on earth, we should not aim at justice. We do not scorn the theory of the steam-engine because a perfect steam-engine cannot be built." (CF 92/3). Why then decry community, in all its aspects, because we so obviously cannot have perfect community?

To accept this is vital. Countless people, following the values and attitudes of our society, with its very rigid, built-in, idea that human nature is immutable, are only too keen to defend their own selfishness and lack of desire for moral effort, on these grounds, and pour scorn on everybody who suggests otherwise. It seems to me that Macmurray has provided a useful illustrative clue to the combating of this attitude which is met time and time again.

End of Appraisalment (2)

Have We Freedom Now - Or; To How Far Have We It?

This is one matter concerning freedom to which Macmurray gives a straightforward and easily discernible answer. We have freed the intellect and kept the emotions in chains. (FMW 48). Our thinking is free but our feelings are unfree.

To free thinking meant, and means, that we allow our minds to find reality by seeking and finding What Is, and not submitting to ideas imposed upon them from outside by authority or tradition. The prime exemplification of the freedom of thought is to be found in scientific knowledge; knowledge which we have obtained by thought being free. And individually, to some extent, each person thinks for himself today and, in a democratic society, is allowed to think for himself. It is not enough to say that throughout human existence men have always been able to think for themselves because thought is private and hidden. This natural fact does not mean that most private thinking in the past, nor even most today, has been and is free.

How different with our feelings, contends Macmurray. And, not merely our feelings but our values, for "value is emotionally apprehended" (FMW 50). Even when we get our values secondhand e.g. from our parents, teachers, or Christ, and thus would seem to be acquired by thought, they originated, in the first discerners of them, in feeling and emotion, not in intelligence.

To become free, our emotions must be able to find and fulfil the same conditions as have our thoughts, namely, relate to what is outside of ourselves and not to be determined by authority or tradition. Writing as I am about Macmurray as he interpreted life in

the 1930s, I will not at this point question how far emotions and values have been since freed, as witnessed in the "Swinging Sixties" and the coming of the Permissive Society. Sufficient to remind ourselves of an earlier point in this exposition that the first requirement of real freedom, and its discovery and effecting, is self-discipline, as evidenced by the severe discipline necessary to produce science, far more discipline than is required to follow and effect traditional ideas.

Only as our feelings come to relate to real situations, and we cease to respond conventionally and rigidly in our relationships and evaluations, will we begin to get anywhere, either collectively or individually. Incidentally; our unfreedom of feelings and our freedom of thought have produced what Macmurray calls the Modern Dilemma. Through freedom of thought we have acquired immense knowledge and power. But in our unfreedom of feeling, and consequent ignorance of real values - or the absence of our discovery of them - we do not know how to use the power we have. "We do not even know what we want to do with it." (FMW 48).

So the answer to the question - Have we freedom now? - seems to have been answered quite directly by Macmurray. In fact, it is an important part of his total contention. We do have freedom of thought, but have yet to free our emotional life, to achieve which, he says, we need a third revolt. We have already had two - one at the Renaissance and the other the Romantic Movement (FMW 83/92). "Our civilisation is heavily balanced in favour of the intellect against the emotions." Try as we may, the effort to do which has not been very conscious, we do not seem able to throw-off I.Qism.

Why Are We Not Emotionally Free?

Once again, Macmurray never gets this totally together. In one chapter, or section of a book, he never systematically, and more or less exhaustively, applies himself exclusively to this question. But, if we search, as I have done, through his writings with this question in mind, I think we may say that Macmurray gives, or would give, four main reasons why we have not yet got, or achieved, emotional freedom. They are:-

- 1) The undue influence of Rome - ancient Rome - upon us, with its philosophy of Stoicism.
- 2) Our insatiable demands in relation to our immense power to fulfil them.
- 3) Fear.
- 4) Other people's unreality.

1) The first of these Macmurray is explicit about, and does develop at some length. (FMW 74/83).

In common with the usual analysis of our cultural origins, Macmurray recognises the three strands of Hebrew, Greek, and Roman influences. But, he says, these streams have never really fused together. Rome predominates. And this means prior concern for efficient organisation, governmental predominance together with law and management, and the maintenance of property rights.

Like the Romans, we do occasionally turn to the Greeks (art) and to Christianity (religion). But these are only of secondary consideration, and treated with a certain condescension - especially when they might come in useful! We regard the artist as rather odd, and the saint as a bit of a nuisance or a "mollycoddle" (FMW 76).

Our ideal is social efficiency.

But the most important aspect of this Roman predominance is to be found in our moral tradition and outlook. Following Rome we have a morality of organisation, order, obedience, social reference, and an emphasis on Will. To live by will means behaving in a fixed way, according to a pre-conceived plan; of being something determined, whatever we feel. It is wrapped-up in policy. It may entail willing unpleasant, or even brutal, acts to achieve the fixed end. It means controlling and restricting the emotions. Duty is a strong element in the Roman type of morality and philosophy. Roman morality stands by principles. Under this system desires, emotions, and impulses are a nuisance.

Now to fulfil this morality of Rome, it is necessary to have a public, universally recognised, plan - and this was soon provided by the Catholic Church. It prescribed how one should behave, and all "willed" to behave thus - short-falling often, of course, to be then plagued by a sense of sin and guilt.

Accepting this analysis by Macmurray, it is simple to see why the Christianity we all profess to believe in and follow is not the Christianity and morality of Christ, Not the religion of freedom and love, but one of unfreedom, enslavement (if only emotionally), and of the subordination of the feelings, and the subjection to authority and obedience; in other words, a religion of duty and will.

Looking at the extreme forms of Puritanism and Victorianism one can realise how true this analysis is. Over Christian morality we have all been deceived!

On pp 79/81 of FMW, Macmurray shows how, through St. Paul, Stoicism became the official philosophy and morality of the Romans,

and subsequently our own morality and pervading social philosophy. Thus did the rational tradition, as Macmurray calls it, prevail over our emotional life, thus ensuring the unfreedom of our feeling life. "The Roman i.e. Stoic insists on the distinction between reason and emotions. Its ideal makes reason dominant and emotion subservient, or even itself the source of all evil For this ideal of life emotion is the real enemy." (FMW 82).

But the disaster of this is shown later on the same page. "... emotion is the creative force in human experience, the only source of living growth, progress, and development. Reason can organise what is given ... but it is only emotion which can provide the impetus." (FMW 82).

At this point Macmurray, although giving a complete clue, does not seem to develop sufficiently what he would wish to say, and which obviously (from reading elsewhere in the same book) is the essence of his thought. Namely; emotion is not only the supplier of energy; it is the supplier - which reason can never be - of quality. i.e. values. As R.R. Marett said, and with which I am sure Macmurray would agree, "All true progress is progress in charity" i.e. fellowship and love.

So; the Roman ideal and Stoicism so germinal, if only unconsciously so, to our tradition and the culture we have developed, is the main source of our present emotional unfreedom.

2) The second source of our unfreedom is our insatiable appetite, which has out-paced our immense power to provide. This "gap" of unfreedom was discussed earlier here together with the relevant Macmurray quotes and references. As far back as Plato's

"Republic" - Macmurray observes - it was pointed out that "although animal desires can be easily satisfied, desire in man is insatiable" (CF 22). And again, "The very spectacle of increased resources (as in the modern age - VE) breeds a corresponding proliferation of desires ... and this demanded increase is rooted in the creativeness of the imagination" (CF 22). If our power trebles yet our desires quadruple we are, according to Macmurray, that much less free.

3) Our third source of unfreedom is fear. This, too, was discussed earlier, and Macmurray's references given. Fear inhibits both ourselves and our relationships with others. To meet these, mostly by unjustified or "unreal" fears, we either withdraw into ourselves - erecting actual or psychological walls for defence - or, we aggressively acquire various forms of power from bullying to money, position, and status, in order, never successfully - success, at least in the long term, is impossible - to pretend we are conquering, beating down, or mastering our fears; or those who we, mistakenly mostly, think are the source of those fears. Anybody, any society, can never be free whilst living under, often of its own making, imagining, or evocation, the shadow of fear.

4) Real and free as we may become in ourselves, we cannot be free whilst other people remain unfree or unreal. We are all in this together. To give a simple example. How often are we forced to be unfree with certain persons we meet because we know that we dare not bring-up a particular subject or tell a particular joke? Wider still, in the area of politics, how many people, by their attitudes, use of money and position, and lack of empathy - all classifiable as "unreal" or immature - are causing others to be and remain unfree? "For even a real person cannot be free in the face of an unreal

person." (FMW 173).

So these are the main reasons why people are unfree.

How Then Shall We Become Free?

"The primary condition of freedom lies in the character and quality of human relations." (CF 31).

Two factors are involved in this - the means; and the intention.
(See FMW 49).

One main thing provides the means - the political aspect of society. Cooperatively we together provide the physical means i.e. economic and the non-physical means i.e. institutional and political, embodied in the concept of, and the implementation of, justice.

The intentional aspect springs from religion. The function of religion is to intend and create fellowship and community. Politics may create order but it can never create fellowship - and only, as has been demonstrated, in the fellowship of all men, world-wide, can, ultimately, freedom be found, practised, lived, and sustained.

Briefly, Macmurray (CF 91) analyses the three major religions, and the role they may seem to be able to play in this prime task of religion. But both Buddhism and Islam are motivated by fear, and consequently manifest the features we would expect where fear is present. (See earlier section of this chapter). Buddhism is a religion of withdrawal. Islam is a religion of assertion, power, aggression, and compulsion. Only Christianity is positively motivated. It seeks a universal fellowship realised in the actual condition of human life, a brotherhood of mankind, a kingdom of heaven on earth (CF 91).

Christianity, it would seem, is and has been the fount of freedom, and the means by which this freedom can be achieved. And presumably, at least for Macmurray, is the only way.

Much more exposition could be developed in relation to the role politics and religion respectively are playing, or should be playing, in relation to freedom. But I will leave that for the present as I shall deal with the role of each, in relation to economic, social, and political matters, later in this thesis - or a subsequent one!

Appraisement (3)

1) In general I think this analysis is true. People are unreal and unfree in their feelings and evaluations. And, compared with the distance there is to go, I do not think we have come all that far since Macmurray was telling us about this - in the 1930s. Countless people you meet and talk with are unfree. And this is where an area of human psychology and perception needs more elaboration or, better still, deep study and penetration. Perhaps for the purposes of presentation - although he never makes this qualification or proviso so maybe he is not aware of it - Macmurray seems to have rather a black and white idea of thought and emotion. (For a deeper analysis of this, see my book "Practical Philosophy" 1982 - which may be useful). But to my way of thinking, an idea or conception always has three facets and all are co-existing in one thought, howbeit in very different proportions in different thoughts.

Even a bold, seeming "thought-filled" thought, such as $2 \times 2 = 4$, has some emotional content and evaluative aspect - and even these may vary according to the circumstances in which the

conception is used by different people at different times. On the other hand a political thought is far from being a pure thought as Macmurray would seem to see it to be. It is full of emotion and valuation, and has a quite low "thought", or ideation, intellection, objective, or factual - call it what you will - content.

2) To turn to another point. Macmurray several times suggests that it is within the emotional aspect of mind that values lie or are generated, and not in the thought i.e. intellection, aspect. I believe this to be a wholly, descriptive fact i.e. true! But nowhere does Macmurray demonstrate this, nor even make the attempt. As values, and not merely emotions, are highly involved with attitudes and actions of every kind - especially to that of freedom, in our present concern and context - he might have performed a useful and propitious service by showing how values emerge from emotions. Incidentally; this is a general and public comment. I do not need to be told. To know this is my profession and competence. But not everybody knows how values arise in emotion. They need to be shown.

3) I hope and believe, although I cannot always and exactly see how it works out in practice, that Macmurray's idea of freeing the emotions produces results parallel to that of freeing thought. We know how science "gropes" in freedom for truth, which is ultimately found, because the things it is seeking are "in fact" out there.

But is there, as seems to be implied if never stated in Macmurray's exposition of this idea, something "out there" of a parallel kind to which our emotions and values can discover and relate? There perhaps would be if values are absolute and eternal. And perhaps Macmurray believes this, although he never says so. But

his idea of "groping" in freedom for emotional and axiological truth seems to suggest vaguely that he does not. On the contrary, it would appear that values and right emotion - objects are, as it were, created as life, in man, moves forward into reality and freedom.

As I say; I am not sure about this contention of Macmurray's. I think that my life - following Macmurray's influence - has proved it; but how can I know that, in fact, I am not really living in terms of values, rationalised and objectified maybe, instilled into me as a boy? And not by values I have personally discovered through the freeing of my emotions?

However there is no doubt that our civilisation is highly biased in favour of intellectualism. And presumably it must be; for all the time we are primarily concerned with promoting the world "out there" - science, technology, thingdom, economics, materialism, I.Q.ism - and always at the expense of "humanity", we must, per se, be putting the intellect before the emotions. All our supposed questioning of values, "caring" services, and welfare provision are but a shallow pretence and sham.

But in responding to this situation Macmurray seems, in the same book, to advocate opposing solutions! On page 44 of FMW he says "If we leave the decision of what is worth while as a use for science to chance (i.e. go on as we are. VE) then inevitably chance will decide against us. There are laws of the world of values". This, on the face of it - although we get the point - is all very unsatisfactory. If there is such a thing as chance, which is doubtful in this context, how could it decide against us?

But to turn to his second contention, which contradicts the above. On page 61 of FMW he says "So I say let us be quiet and wait.

To those who want to reply 'But if we don't hurry and get things settled; if we do nothing, we shall be lost', I say, 'Be quiet, be still - the world is not resting on our shoulders. If it were, heaven help us'".

It seems that Macmurray is unaware of this contradiction; that is, if we have traced his thinking correctly and interpreted it rightly on this particular point.

4) Why are we not emotionally free? You will remember Macmurray suggests four reasons for this.

Probably he is right about the influence of Rome and Stoicism. Our strongest influences have been from Gaul, the Normans, the Roman Church - and presumably all these were anchored in Stoic thought and action.

From my knowledge, at least concerning the distortion of Christianity as a result of Stoicism, and of our lack of emotional freedom, it does seem quite an original conception. And, as with so much of Macmurray's thinking, it puzzles me why he has passed so unnoticed, let alone unheeded.

On the point of influence for our freedom; besides Christianity he might have mentioned Anglo-Saxon influences e.g. the witan and the like. But my detailed knowledge of ancient history does not extend to awareness of how far institutions, like the witan, were at one time influenced by early Christian thinking. Or did they have another source? If so, this would have to be another important source to add to Macmurray's suggestions concerning the origin of the idea of freedom.

5) Regarding his contention that the area of freedom is reduced if our increased demands are matched only by a smaller increase of provision and production - I am not sure about this. Logically it would seem to be irrefutable. But beyond a certain point i.e. provided a good amount of basic needs, and above, are fulfilled and satisfied, I do not feel that my freedom is lessened when extravagant wants are not fulfilled. A factor which comes in, yet is unmentioned by Macmurray, is the strength of that imagined desire. If it swamps us with its supposed urgency, then it will truncate our freedom. But a number of vague, unsatisfied, wants - not, I stress again, of a basic-to-life type - does not seem to really reduce our freedom. In full rational moments we can often observe that if a desire were fulfilled it would not bring the satisfaction we, in a different and unreflecting moment, imagined.

6) Fear, as another limiter of freedom, is very real. People, in a variety of ways, are much more fear-ridden than we would normally observe and believe. There is, I would assess, much more fear in the world than unfear. And to the degree we have fear, in any of its multiple manifestations - and these are indeed numerous - which is unjustified by rational assessment, then to that degree we are unfree. Fear is a major source of our unfreedom.

7) And Macmurray's diagnosis that the unreality of other people is a source of our unfreedom, is indeed true. To my way of thinking it hardly needs confirming. That it is not recognised, talked about, understood, and responded to by people in high and influential places, let alone by those in more pedestrian walks of life, has always totally bewildered me; at least, ever since I found Macmurray. I was brought up under entirely normal conditions. Parents,

teachers, church people, child and youth organisations, working colleagues, and friends all had average and contemporary responses and ideas. None of them were offensive, ill-willed, anti-social, or anything else outside of the variations one would normally expect, and which are generally agreed to be acceptable.

Yet; if only I had been brought up and surrounded by Macmurray's "free" people! How different, and better, life would have been! The tragedy is that - as everywhere manifested - although some of us now know the importance of educating the emotions, and the value of the relational side of life, nothing is done about it. Nobody even really talks and writes about it, let alone publicly implement it on an adequate scale, or even begin to. Certainly, as Macmurray said, our civilisation is much too weighted in favour of the intellect, at the expense of emotions and values.

Other people's unreality is a source of my and your unfreedom. And we are a source of theirs! - although, as followers of Macmurray, not too great a source I hope and believe!

8) We now appraise Macmurray's idea on: How we can become free. This is achieved, he seems ultimately to be saying, through Christianity. In principle, I think this contention is true. But with thousands of ideas of Christianity around, to understand and implement this contention is an impossible task - at least within the contemporary condition of human thinking, and ability to deal with thought and emotion - which is still exceptionally elementary, to say the least!

Basically - getting rid of, or forgetting for a moment, all the theology, spirituality, type of world-orientation which existed at

its inception, religiosity, and all the other clutter - Christianity introduced a new order of human relationships. This does not mean to say that there were no signs of this before. And it certainly does not mean that the new order has predominated since. Far from it!

But it does mean that man knows of a new orientation, the only orientation which will "save" him i.e. 1) permit the species to survive; and 2) enable man to continue as the agent of this new order of living, or of "going on" to yet further developments and orders. The essence of this new order, introduced by Christianity, is friendship, fellowship, fraternity, and community. Only as we achieve these, shall we be what we are able to become, and only thus be, free.

So here is the paradox. Only as we change from excessive "intellectualism" to more emotionally-based values and attitudes, can we be free; but we cannot change, or find it excessively difficult to do so - both collectively and individually - because only the now unnourished and unrecognised emotional side of life can motivate us to do it, and to show us how.

End of Appraisalment (3)

Conclusion

Freedom is for Macmurray a big thing; and so it ought to be for us all. The idea is familiar to every mind, to the degree that it has become commonplace, pedestrian, hackneyed, and very much taken for granted.

But; whilst external, public, political freedom - call it what you will - needs to be defended and enlarged, inner, personal, psychological, emotional, internal freedom - call this what you will - hardly exists. Everybody is "tied-up", and is tying everybody else up. Few people know what this type of internal and personal freedom is like. Macmurray, almost alone, has investigated, opened-up, tried to stimulate and arouse interest in, and enlarge, this area of freedom.

In the face of the general, prevailing, philosophy, few if any have heeded him. But political, organisational, social, economic freedom can never bring each of us to full freedom. Only a far greater concern for the personal, relational, religious, aspects of freedom can achieve this.

So, I believe, says Macmurray.

RELIGION

Relevant Books

The Structure of Religious Experience. (SRE)

The Clue to History. (CH)

Creative Society. (CS)

Reason and Emotion. (RE)

Religion, Art, and Science. (RAS)

Search for Reality in Religion. (SRR)

A Challenge to the Churches. (CC)

Relevant Quotations

Religion is what a man makes of his personal relationships. (RE 211. 225).

The primary religious assertion is that all men are equal, and that fellowship is the only relation between persons which is fully rational, or fully appropriate to their nature as persons. In this assertion the whole nature of religion is bound up. (RE 205/6).

The religion of any society is properly the expression of the forms of personal relationship which constitute it, of the interpersonal values which determine its structure. (RE 211).

The field of personal relationships is the centre of every human life. (RE 225/6).

The civilising of the emotions is the business of religion. (RE 190).

Religion (is) the expression of rationality in the field of personal relationships. (RE 211).

The salvation of the world is the task of religion. (SRE 14).

The focus of religious valuation concerns the mutual relationship of human beings and the sharing of a common experience between them. (SRE 13).

Religion is simply the universalization in reflection of the central factor in human experience. (i.e. the common facts of everyday relationships). (SRE 54).

Religion is merely the description of facts which are so common and universal in our daily experience that we hardly notice them. (SRE 53/4).

Religion is that mode of reflection which relates to the problematic of personal experience. (RAS 62).

Religion is always something that we do. (i.e. act). (SRE 73).

The reality of life lies in community and any religious statement about human life is a statement about human community. (CH 63).

The religious claim - that reality is personal. (RE 213).

The goal of religion is the creation of a human society, universal in its extent, based upon the communion of persons. (RE 229).

Conquest of fear - the eternal task of religion. (CS 102).

Since there is nothing in the whole range of our experience which cannot or which may not be seen and valued in its bearings upon our relations with one another, there is nothing at all which does not, directly or indirectly, belong to the field of religion. (SRE 45).

Religion is firmly rooted in our common experience. It arises from our ordinary experience of living in the world in relation with other people and to that experience it refers. (SRE 108/9).

The only way to reject religion, is to reject, deny, or ignore, our relations to one another. (SRE 109).

Whilst wide-ranging these quotations clearly indicate the trend of Macmurray's thought on religion. As stated in the Introduction, religion pervades the whole of Macmurray's thinking. It is important therefore that we understand what religion is for him.

What Religion Is

Put in one short phrase religion for Macmurray is human relating. At its minimal level this means that we find ourselves here together, and have to get on together to some extent for our own survival. But, of course, human relating, and consequently religion, can and does entail very much more than this. It includes community, friendship, fellowship, and communion between ourselves at family and personal level right up to, at the moment, the ideal of total world harmony, integration, and community, plus all the possible stages and levels inbetween. Religion exists to unite mankind into one family.

To avoid misunderstanding this at the start it must be said that Macmurray distinguishes two ways of recognizing the attainment of this end. It can, ostensibly, be reached politically. In fact, this is the only way men today visualise it being attained. Voluntary world fellowship is not seen as a practical possibility. Already, and for some considerable time, there have been economic networks, links, and ties, extending far beyond any political or religious units or boundaries. This is but a forerunner and indicator of the possibility of world union by formal means, not by religious ones. And several ways are envisaged as to how world unity can be achieved politically. One power, by conquest, infiltration, or both could dominate and rule the Earth; there could be a total federation, voluntarily reached, of states, with one acceptable and recognized controlling agency. The United Nations was this in embryo. Or states, voluntarily surrendering or amalgamating their sovereignty, could gradually form into one world unitary state. Such a political unification might come, or be prompted by, some huge catastrophic

threat from within or without.

But, and here is Macmurray's point, this would not be the final and finest achievement of human community, relationships, and the apotheosis of religion. For such a unity would be merely structural, mechanical, and impersonal. There are two forms of unity; cooperation and community. (CC 33/4). Mainly we cooperate because, and only because, we have to in order to survive. We commune, or create and enjoy community, voluntarily and because this is the very essence of being human. It is only the second which Macmurray affirms as being religious. This is not to say that they cannot be related. The family is a prime example of this. Relationships in a family are enjoyed supremely for their own sake. But family cooperation exists for less joyful but equally necessary ends. Another example is a people in wartime. Political cooperation and communications may break down but a sense of community keeps the people together. One has only to think of France 1940-1945 to get this point.

Macmurray fully recognizes the paradoxical situation we, as human beings, are in. As human beings we are from inception born into a nexus of relationships, into the Personal if you like, the best and ultimate form of which manifests itself in fellowship. This fact of being so born is the area of religion. Yet, and here is the other side of the paradox, at any particular time, whether in our individual lives or in society at large, or more widely, in history, we have not achieved the full end and religious possibility of this fellowship. We can only, perhaps, and then only if we so intend, be moving towards it. To be however in this situation is the essence,

and the inevitable accompaniment, of two important features of being human; our possession of freedom; and our possession of reason. But more of these as we go along.

Macmurray's idea of religion may, on first acquaintance, seem a very limited, even unusual, view. Where are some of the common features we have come invariably and importantly to associate with religion? Such conceptions as God, worship, prayer, belief, creeds, salvation, redemption, the Church, sectarianism, and a theory of the ultimate? Why is he not more open and honest, and realistic, and call his views mere human or interpersonal relations, social psychology, a form of natural sociology, or human ecology? Or why not see them as a branch of, or kind of, morality? Why call this area of life, important as it is, religion? Or perhaps its importance is a reason for so-calling it! We shall later see that within the basic framework of religion as human relating Macmurray does have a place for at least some of the normal concepts and activities associated with religion, but they are all subservient and subsidiary to this main idea. How then does he justify his conception?

He hardly does justify it. And certainly not in any extended arguments of substantiation. But he does strongly hint at an answer, in the following manner. What are some of the most basic tenets and acts of religion, especially of the Christian religion? Fellowship, sin, guilt, remorse, reconciliation, and forgiveness. Are these not the very same essential features of good human relationships? When we quarrel, or experience or even create antagonism, strife, and discord, is not harmony restored only by a change of heart, a recognition by one or both parties, of error and hurt, a certain

resultant humility, and subsequent forgiveness? And is not this exactly what conventional religion bids us do? So it is by this overlapping and coincidence of these ideas that Macmurray comes to see religion as the area of human relating, the area of the Personal. No other explanation or hint is given as to why there is this identity. But perhaps this identification is more important than at first appears. For, as mentioned in the Introduction, does not this create, in however and tenuous a fashion, a bridge by which the anti-religionists may find an acceptable way back to religion, and the warmth of human fellowship and belongingness? Does it not prove that we are, and must be, by nature religious? If he has not made us religious again, Macmurray has shown us the way to so be.

If religion is the ambience within which we do and must inevitably live why is this so? Why does religion exist, or have to exist, at all? How does the need for religion arise? Why is it the very essence, the essential fact, the sine qua non, of human existence? Macmurray gives four reasons.

1) Firstly; because of our interdependence (SRE 107/8). Nobody in the world, try as they may, can live unto themselves. "It is a simple commonplace that the lives of human beings are interdependent. Other people bring us into the world and other people bury us when we die, and all our life through we are dependent in a thousand ways upon other people. That is the simple fact; and it means that the structure of human experience, dependent as it is for its very existence upon the mutual relations of persons, is religious in its texture. It is this primary fact about us that gives rise to religion, and since this is a universal fact about human life,

belonging to its very nature, it follows that religion is an inseparable component of human life and always must be." (SRE 45/6). The only way for religion, as understood by Macmurray, not to exist would be if we were "all hatched out by the sun on desert islands and lived and died without knowing that there was anybody else in the world but our solitary selves." (SRE 46). We are all, whether we recognize it or not, whether we like it or not, members one of another. And only as we live thus can we be truly human. And the reverse obtains. "A person who has no religion, or a society which has repudiated religion, has merely forgotten that humanity exists only in the relation of human beings to one another." (SRE 46). Our interdependence compels us to be religious.

2) Secondly; we are religious because we have reason. (CS 36/48). Reason for Macmurray is not merely the power and process of cogitation laced with logic; nor is it a certain type, or way of acquiring, knowledge. It is all these things, but principally it is what we would call awareness or self-consciousness." In man, the continuity of nature is broken through the emergence of a new capacity in consciousness. In animal life there is consciousness; but it is a consciousness in the world, not consciousness of the world. The new capacity in human beings sets them over against the world, knowing it, and knowing it with foresight." (CS 36/7). Because of his reason man knows he is alive, and because of this awareness he knows he must die. Thus this knowledge brings fear of death, and all that this means and includes. Isolation, separation, the end of life and not merely of physical life but "the whole delicate nexus of possessions and interests and values with which the

individual has identified himself." (CS 40/1). Unless this consciousness of death were met and overcome, human life would be paralysed and we would sink back into the sub-rational world of animal existence. In this situation of awareness our greatest fear, according to Macmurray, is of our fellows. They can harm us, kill us, shun us, exclude us, and not cooperate to sustain us. Thus religion, as understood and propounded by Macmurray, is the means by which we seek to live harmoniously with our fellows so that we can survive as long as possible. And is not this fear and its attempted alleviation part of conventional religion? Religions are concerned at one end of the scale with ancestor worship i.e. with prolonging the "life" and influence of those gone before; and at the other with eternal life and with some form of resurrection or after-life. Reason indeed, on this broad definition of it, is certainly one of the roots of religion, and to discern this has been a genuine insight of Macmurray's as to why we have to have religion, and are religious at all.

3) Thirdly; this is closely related yet not identical to the last. Man is a spiritual being. Now here again, as with religion, Macmurray astutely suggests a meaning of spiritual which is very worldly and natural, and therefore acceptable to the most extreme cynic or sceptic. Very explicitly he says, "The spiritual world to which, by our transcendence of the natural order, we belong is not another world, but the natural world known and intended. We live in the natural world in good truth; but we know it and know that we are living in it. Because of this knowledge our actions, so far as they are human, are intentional; and our intentions, directed upon the natural world that our knowledge reveals, transforms it and all that

it contains. It is no longer a world of fact, but a world of possibility; no longer an existing present, but a world with a future. So we have our being in a spiritual world which is the natural world of existence raised to a higher power by our capacity for reflection and the intentionality which reflection confers upon our activities. It is this world which is the real world; not the world of fact but the world of significance; the world of fact become possibility; become existence with a meaning, a future, and a destiny. For a fact known is no longer a fact. It is a possibility of transformation." (SRE 107).

Always we should be intending to enlarge and "increase the scope and the complexity of human cooperation by creating, sustaining, and expressing men's union in a spiritual family or a spiritual brotherhood. It should be noticed that the term spiritual here means merely not related by blood. It does not mean not material." (SRE 62/3). So here again, yet with a completely new interpretation and angle, Macmurray links up, in a contemporary and acceptable way, the spiritual and the religious which in the minds of the conventionally religious are virtually facets of the same thing. But it is not a vague, ethereal, impalpable, ineffable, spiritism, but one which is tightly and inextricably bound to the tangible, the material, the real. "To assert that the world is spiritual is not to deny that it is material." (RE 223). Moreover, and very importantly, if we accept at least some of Macmurray's ideas, and as referred to in the Introduction, his idea of the spiritual as outlined above totally reinforces his insistence on monism. He will have no dualism between matter and spirit. Yet both are.

4) Fourthly; reason, as we have seen, and as understood by Macmurray, is the principal distinguishing feature of human life. Now this attribute of reason applies itself, or should we say has to apply itself, to three areas, or to three ways of looking at things. Firstly, there is the way which ultimately results in the reflective activity we call science. Emotionless thought is applied vigorously and relentlessly to an external feature until it yields information, information which we can use and is therefore solely instrumental. Always when reflecting scientifically we are searching for factors which apply as generally and widely as possible. We have no use for individual examples, except as they reveal and illustrate the universal.

The second way in which reason is expressed and asserted is through Art. Art is just the opposite of science in so far as it exalts the individual thing. It does not look for the common features but portrays the unique. Its object is to give significance to anything the artist chooses for his subject. The bringing of reason, through emotion, to each individual thing in creation is what Art does, or intends to do when successful.

Now you will observe that, except for the need of elementary and natural contact to pursue the matter at all, both science and art, the scientist and the artist, have no relationship with their subjects at all. They both look and explore their subjects as if they did not exist as entities in their own right. And this, at least for science, is perfectly legitimate and true. We can assume that a lump of iron, or even an atom, has no awareness at all, let alone any interest in it's observer. And an artist may perhaps have to relate to his subject perfunctorily, but this is only for his own

ends and purposes.

But how different when we reach the third order and possibility, one human being in association with another. Here there is, or ought to be, no absolute one-sidedness, no one human being using, analysing, depicting, or enjoying another without the least care and consideration for his responses, or as if he did not exist in his own right. Just the opposite. Mutuality, interdependence, response and counter-response are the minimal exchanges taking place between two human beings, right up to union, communion, and fellowship. And indeed, this mutuality can only be maximised for both if there is accord, goodwill, harmony, consideration, and unselfishness, all - to brings us back to the main point - traits and conditions advocated and promoted by religion as we have come conventionally to understand it. Thus this aspect of reason, as depicted and analysed by Macmurray, suggests why religion exists, and why it is vitally important and central to our living.

Appraisement (1)

Religion is, essentially, what Macmurray understands it to be. If we for a moment look beneath all the ritual, ceremony, dogmas, creeds, professions, symbolism, and formal religious actions and activities of conventional religion we come to the basic and fundamental nub of the matter, namely, How are we getting on together, how are we treating each other, how can we better promote and further the ends of human community, brotherhood, and fellowship? And, if we would, we can accept how religion arises from the four situations of human development; and from the given, evolved or

developed, faculties special to us as human beings.

But to agree with all this, profound or very ordinary as it may be (whichever way we look at it) does not mean that no doubts can be raised or questions asked. For example -

1) Has Macmurray a too limited, a too parochial, view of religion? Although we have not dealt with this yet, Macmurray does stretch out a bit to include God here and there. But beyond this he has no universal conception or total explanation of experience, life, being, and the existence of the universe. About these things he never hints, let alone speculates. Except for the Logical Positivists Macmurray is probably the least speculative of all philosophers. Christianity, for example a religion, does have a total explanation. God created the universe, put man into the world as a free agent to do His will, and so on. Even if some people take this only symbolically and figuratively it is an explanation. But religion for Macmurray, broad as he may suggest he makes it i.e. that the Ultimate is Personal, is so small in conception; and without really being anthropomorphic (although he does say elsewhere that man can only be this, his is rather a man-focused religion. Can we really believe that, in relation to the billions of light years, black holes, and countless galaxies, which we no know exist, the essence of everything, the heart of the matter, is for us to become friends amongst ourselves? Is this the limit of our religious perceptive powers? If so, it does seem rather inadequate. To say this is not to discredit in any way Macmurray's earnest desire for human personal unity. It is a great and worthy object, and perhaps the sooner achieved the better for all mankind. But can this, ought

this, to be identified with, and seemingly exhaust, the concept which we call religion? This may be religion. Time will tell. But it is a much more limited religion than most of us have ever regarded religion as being.

2) Macmurray's ideas of religion, which include emotional reason, development, and maturity; the harmonising of all mankind; and the recognition, promotion, and supremacy of the Personal, rightly and valuably redresses our excessive concern for all the intellectual aspects of life. Science and technology, and their effects, are everywhere rampant. Physical discoveries, inventions and their application, are our permanent concern. We are rushing into this like the Gadarene swine. Our evaluation and classification of people is almost solely related to their I.Q, never of their intrinsic worth, at least, not publically. Hearing of, or speaking to, a newly-met person our first question and interest is not, "What sort of person is he?", but, "What does he do?". And by the answer that person is immediately slotted and categorized. And mainly, if television and the tabloids are anything to go by, the admired person is the crook, the self-publicist, the get-rich-quick, the pervert, the playboy, the womaniser, the slick twister, the person who outwits his fellows, the dodger, the uncooperative, the way-outer, and those who cunningly evade the law.

Our educational system has, naturally, the same aims and intentions, and produces the desired end product; living to promote and pass-on the same instrumental and non-personal values to the next generation. Very little, if anything, is done in education to promote good relations, or emotional management and maturity. Hence all the stress, tension, unhappiness, addictions, marital breakdown,

suicides, oppression, depression, and dissatisfaction.

But having said all this, does Macmurray go a bit too far? This may be questioned on four grounds.

Firstly; important and good as human harmony might be, does not some good result from human conflict, discord, disharmony, and strife? It is easy to give scientific and material examples but these are hardly fair to the argument. Space exploration, medical progress and alleviation of suffering, a positive agricultural policy, and radar, to give but a few examples, all developed out of, and as a result of, the conflict and holocaust of the Second World War. But so did the United Nations Organisation; the growth and freedom of the colonial countries into independence; a more harmonious, if not entirely so, Western Europe and the E.E.C., the welfare state, and rapid steps made towards the levelling out of social classes.

I have not had occasion to mention this so far, but quite a lot will be said about it in a later chapter. For Macmurray a favourite and essential element in the structure of thought, and indeed of movement and progress in actual reality, is the dialectic. The dialectic proceeds by two opposing forces and situations compromisingly merging to form a new unforeseen position. This new position then becomes a new thesis, as it is called, which in turn will develop its own opposite, the antithesis, and so on. Could it not be argued therefore that a temporary conflict, even in human relationships can be necessary and good? For from it might not a higher and better good emerge? If, therefore, in human relationships we are to have no discord, but only fellowship, will progress stop

and growth cease?

Secondly; can there ever be harmonisation except in a limited way, and between limited numbers of people? Is there not something innately intransigent in human nature? Psycho-analysts have shown that, even if not severely and disruptingly so, most of us have some leanings towards either masochism or sadism. We are either prepared to be hurt, 'sat on', or be used; or, to do the hurting and oppressing. Some of this, on either side, arises from fear, and of different ways of meeting and dealing with it. But not all. Banish fear and we would still have these leanings. Now, whether these tendencies are merely part of a long age of Man, the age, say, of industrialism or nationalism i.e. culture patterns, or whether they are permanently in-built and have contributed to our emergence, survival, and authority, we cannot know. Other similar questions arise concerning such traits as aggression, assertion, and combativeness. And even more extreme, the annihilation of whole classes and peoples who thwart progress, presumably towards freedom, equality, and unification of man, as exemplified in the French and Russian Revolutions. Was this good, bad, or only necessary? Can we afford to forgo these entirely? The only hope in the creation of Macmurray's desired religious end is to sublimate them. Even in an everyday way how many people do we know who enjoy, and indeed psychologically and emotionally need, a little row and quarrel. For them it keeps things alive, relieves the boredom of so much of contemporary life, and affords an outlet for feelings which are beginning to build up. What better example of this than the widely acclaimed Albee play, "Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf?" And, to add

another point; ought all broken marriages be ultimately reconcilable? It would have to be a very optimistic, or naive, person who answered 'Yes' to that one!

Thirdly; one thing must be mentioned here, as it will have occurred to many people as they read Macmurray on religion. And this same idea is frequently thrown impatiently at other notions, whether Macmurray's or anybody else's, which dare to stray from the contemporary path of intellectualism, materialism, secularism, and non-personalism. And that epithet of contempt is 'idealism'; 'idealistic nonsense'; 'Nobody, or very few indeed yet have taken the right-relationships aspect of religion seriously. Why then does this John Macmurray suddenly appear and purport to show us the way?'

Macmurray anticipates this inevitable comment and has an answer which, once and for all, should silence the critics and cynics concerning idealism, whether it makes specific reference to religion or to anything else. "There is a tendency in many quarters to think that it is idealistic and impractical, because it would involve a universal perfection of character which is far beyond the reach of the mass of human beings. Such a view rests upon an elementary misunderstanding One does not say that because ideal justice cannot be realized on earth, we should not aim at justice in the political field. We do not scorn the theory of the steam-engine because a perfect steam-engine cannot be built. Nor do we imagine that because an ideal friendship is beyond our capacity, it is stupid to make friends. The question of a universal community is of the same sort." (CF 92/3). As already stated this seems a splendid answer by anybody whose ideas, intentions, and moral and relational

concepts are scornfully accused of being "idealistic".

Fourthly; this follows from appraisement (1) and need not detain us long. But it is a legitimate question to ask. What happens next i.e. When we have achieved total human harmony and community? Why are we, why have we had to be, in the process of doing this? And to what ultimate end? Fortunately for him Macmurray is never bothered by such questions. Being profoundly realistic, down to earth, content to live for the moment (in the finest interpretation of that phrase) and unspeculative, the question seems never to have occurred to him. But, when possible, is it not always better to see an act or intention in a wider context even if such visualising might have to include a little speculation? Does not to do so lend proportion and perspective, and a more eager anticipation of fulfilment of the present sector and task? For my part, I see human community as a worthy, indeed a necessary, object and condition; but considering the known immensity of Ultimacy I cannot see this as anything more than a stage in the process of something striving to attain a much more comprehensive and far-reaching end which must include meaning and conceptualising as well as emotion and fellowship.

End of Appraisement (1)

So far we have considered Macmurray's general view of religion. We must now turn to his ideas concerning Christianity.

Christianity (Part I)

You would think that being of the West, and religious at the same time, Macmurray would inevitably and automatically espouse Christianity; and that anything written about it by him, as with so many other apologists, could be seen as a rationalization, or a mere unconscious justification of a conditioned situation. This proves to be not so. Muddled and higgledy-piggledy as much of his exposition and analysis of Christianity are, a prolonged and serious study of these reveals several deep, penetrating, and major ideas, some of which indicate not only a genuine adherence to Christianity, but produce a number of novel and innovative thoughts. Through these understanding is considerably enlarged, and approval and acceptance of Christianity is, for some, made more possible; where for others it is strengthened because grounded in fact and reason.

To understand all this we must first discuss the Jews, and then Jesus.

The Jews

The Jews, especially the Jews of the Old testament, are for Macmurray historically, socially, and religiously the race par excellence. "The achievement of the Hebrews lies in the fact that they retain, through the process of their development, the capacity to think this world religiously (CH 30). They of all people conformed, and presumably still do, to Macmurray's essentials of real religion. What are these essentials?

1) Realism. To quote again, "The characteristic of Hebrew religion which makes it unique in history is its intense and continuous realism. This realism shows itself peculiarly in the

absence of a doctrine of immortality and in the absence of other-worldliness. For the Hebrews religion remained the great organizing principle of social life, capable of unifying every aspect of individual and social activity, It never became a particular aspect of human life, relating men to a human existence transcending the earthly life. Hebrew religion was, in fact, intensely materialistic, and it is precisely this that gave it its persistent and effective reality". (CS 59/60) And again, "... there is obvious empirical truth in the assertion that the ancient Hebrews present us with the only example in history of a specifically religious civilization, and there is no unambiguous trace in the whole of their classical literature of a belief in another world or in a life after death." (CH 20). These quotations are so clearly expressed, that the point about the realism of the ancient Jewish religion would seem to be self-explanatory.

2) Non-dualism. A vital feature of the real, as opposed to pseudo and unreal religious consciousness, is, according to Macmurray, non-dualism. Without this no society can be religious. Dualism arises when there is a dissociation of the inner life from the outer. (See CS 131). Where this happens religion can take one of two forms. It can become idealist, mystical, other-worldly, withdrawn; or it can become an instrument of power "seeking to create and control society by its control of secular power". (CS 131). Neither of these, says Macmurray, is real religion. Primitive societies were and are, non-dualistic, but only the Jews, of all societies, retained it as they progressed. Indeed; they progressed religiously because they did retain it. They did not split their

lives and consciousness into spiritual and material, secular and religious, the ideal and the real world, the present and the after-life. Theirs was one, undivided, world and experience. And this monism of the Jews was wholly extended into every area of life without exception. For example; social classes are an evident exemplification of dualism. The Jews would have nothing of this, The priesthood, it might be thought, were a group apart. But according to Macmurray they were not. "The main danger of dualism in Hebrew society arose in fact from the position of the priesthood, and it is in the resistance of the Hebrew consciousness to this tendency of a priesthood to become a ruling class that the historical significance of the prophetic tradition is to be found. The prophets are the mouthpieces of the resistance to the privileged position of the priests. They may happen to be priests, but it is not as priests and not in virtue of any privileged position in the social order, that they say, 'Thus saith the Lord'. In Jewish civilization it is the prophet, a person without social authority, who is the inspired source of religious revelation. There is no priestly hierarchy which is the guardian and exponent of religion". (CH 31/2). Nor would the Jews tolerate classes founded on rich and poor; or, at least, not from extremes of wealth and its consequent power as we know it. To prevent such situations developing the Jewish law required debts to be cancelled, if unpaid, after a certain period. "The elaborate precautions of the Jewish Law to prevent the enslavement of debtors or even the perpetuation of the debtor-creditor relation beyond the year of Jubilee, are in fact, provisions against the rise of an aristocracy of wealth." (CH 31). Usurers were thus strictly controlled in the interests of the maintenance of a non-dualist,

religious, society.

Not that the Jews were never confronted by the possibility of dualism, nor tempted by it. "The establishment of the kingship under Saul is an excellent example both of the tendency to split the world into the ecclesiastical and a secular aspect, and also of the resistance that this tendency met with from the Jewish consciousness. Indeed, the whole history of the Jews as described in the Old Testament, is the story of the continuous struggle to overcome the continuous tendency towards dualism." (CH 31). Why they were able to resist this almost ubiquitous trend, Macmurray never really makes any pertinent suggestions, except perhaps that the Jews had a real, integrated, religious consciousness. But this either begs the question, or is a circular argument.

This opposition to dualism by the Jews is tellingly summed-up in a phrase which, with our divided consciousness, seems on first hearing not possible to believe. Yet we come to see it as true. Macmurray says, "If a society (or an individual) has a religion it is not religious. If it is religious it cannot have a religion. The reason is that to "have" a religion, religion must be conceived and experienced as a particular aspect of life which is contrasted with others which are not religious. The religious mode of consciousness is precisely a habit of mind which prevents such an atomizing of life. For any other form of consciousness religion is a particular and distinguishable set of beliefs. But for the religious form of consciousness, religion is a way of living the whole of life, and consequently, as part of this, a way of thinking and understanding the world." (CH 29). A similar confirmation of this point is to be

found in SRR 36. To finalise this point, "The Hebrew consciousness demands a theocracy, that is to say, an integral religious community." (CH 31).

3) Empiricism. Hebrew religion was empirical. "... Hebrew thought is at once religious and empirical. It is religious in that it thinks history as the act of God. It is empirical in that it reflects upon history in order to discover the nature of God and the laws of divine agency ... this reflection is an effort to discover the true principles of social life." (CH 38/9). Hebrewism ... "unlike other tribal religions never became fixed upon the past and divorced from the actual fortunes of the people. It adapted itself continuously to the material and social changes in the development of Hebrew history, and so maintained the conditions of religious evolution." (CS 60). Empiricism in religion is a great thing with Macmurray, and we shall have occasion to mention it again. Dogmas, creeds, authority, may be good and necessary from time to time to sum-up and embody the stage reached so far, but inevitably they become fixed and prevent further necessary progress religiously. The Jews were the one people to avoid getting into a creedal cul-de-sac. Their whole view of their history, experience, and of the contemporary situation, at any one time, was empirical. "Throughout Jewish history, the development of culture is the result of a continuous reflection upon contemporary history in the light of past historical experience, It is not, as the non-religious mind is apt to think, a reflection upon specifically 'religious' experiences." (CH 39). No other people or religion could be said to have this attribute. It is this empiricism which enabled them to be progressive, and thus be the 'chosen' vehicle for the development of

religion. "... the Jews are God's chosen people. For the religious consciousness this is not a boastful claim to superiority. It is a mere statement of historical fact" (CH 54).

4) Social Righteousness; it was this empiricism, and the empirical approach, which also enabled them to work out, recognize, and give to the world an important awareness. Only gradually did this emerge and dawn on them. And this is the consciousness of social righteousness. "It was this intimate connection between their religion and the whole of their material life as a nation that forced upon them, as their great contribution to culture, the development of an understanding of the moral basis of social life..... Every national failure was traced to a failure to maintain that social righteousness which was the basis of God's favour; so that the process of Hebrew development became the process of discovering the spiritual basis of human community. We can trace in the succession of the Hebrew prophets the gradual deepening of the conception of social righteousness, not as an abstract ideal but as the structure of inner relationship between men which creates and maintains the community of social life, and which is the basis of all social fulfilment." (CS 60/1). Notice; morality for the Jews was not an ideal, something we ought to be thinking of doing and becoming, if only we could. It was an essential and integral factor in social living. That is quite a different conception of morality from that which is held in Western society today; where, that is, it is considered and reflected upon at all. Morality is very marginal to us. It is not an integral part of our lives and society. One illustration of this, if any is necessary, is that a person is at

once criticised, censured, discouraged, or ostracised, if he starts 'moralising'. We fear, of course, that there might be some truth in what he says, and we ought consequently to change, or even think of changing, our ways. Thus we find it difficult to understand how involved the Jews were with it, and of how central morality was to their living. "Social disaster or social failure is, therefore, always interpreted by Jewish thought as evidence of national sin, that is to say, of a national departure from the purpose of God for his people, and this failure is also interpreted as the act of God in history to bring his people back to the acceptance of his purpose." (CH 39).

5) God; we have just had occasion to mention God. That sounds rather casual, but as Macmurray says, "Let us forget about God for the moment. He won't mind. He is much too reasonable! What would you think of a father who wanted his children always to be thinking about him? Surely, that he was the complete egoist! So true is it that our emotional subjectivity insists on fashioning God in our likeness". (RE 62).

But to return to the point. God, from the beginning of known Jewish history or myth . i.e. from genesis, was the one, central, figure of Jewish culture and living. There must, of course, have been a time previously when, as with all other races and tribes, polytheism was the order of the day. Even in the early times of the Old Testament there had only be a little trouble or disunity, and God would find himself vying with the old gods. But the Jews are unique in their perception and establishment of one god. At first, this was mere monolatry, one god for them. But this eventually developed into monotheism, one God only for everybody and for all peoples. Modern

religious people everywhere conceive of God i.e. one entity and being, but because no total agreement exists as to his character and being, it is disputable whether there is one God in practice and reflection. However, this does not lessen the importance of the conception; nor of the Jewish recognition of it.

This Jewish idea of one god probably arose out of their monism, i.e. non-dualistic view of life and experience as previously briefly discussed, and of their perception of social righteousness. The first is, at least for us, easy to conceive and understand, although we as members of Western culture are, according to Macmurray, ourselves dualists. But of the second, social righteousness; once recognized, this must, to be effective and to ensure communal, relational, progress and social unity, be exacted and expected from all, and applied to all. This was the idea contained within the ambience, expectation, and jurisdiction, of one god. Today, we should probably call this a projection, but the point is made, call it what you will.

God, as one, having been perceived and identified, is insufficient for the Jews. Out of this, and because of, their aforementioned empiricism, so marked a feature of their religious approach and attitude, the apprehension and understanding of God and his nature grew and developed. At first, as Jehovah, he was thunderously like Thor, arbitrarily lashing about in general in his wrath. Then he was modified, or modified himself, into a Kitchener-like figure, stern but a little less violent, temperamental, and ill-tempered. Later he became Lord, an authoritative entity, rather more approachable and to be held in awe rather than in fear, although the

'fear of the Lord' was still held in reserve. Later still, and after these Jewish ages, he developed further, as will be shown. But, and here is the relevance of Macmurray's argument; only because of earlier Jewish insights, was this later progress possible.

So the great innovation of the Jews was the recognising of one God, and that he was very much concerned with righteousness. The third factor which Macmurray finds applicable to God as unearthed by the Jews, is that he was and is a worker. "In the dualist forms of consciousness God always appears as an aristocrat. What is characteristic of the Hebrew conception of God is that he is primarily a worker." (CH 33). Macmurray makes no bones about this, nor tempers what seems to be, for him and indeed for us, a rather bald and blunt fact and statement. It is common to understand that God is creator, and that, in the theistic view, he is still moving and acting in his creation. But to call him a worker, with all the connotations of that word, comes rather as a shock; and this possibly no matter how many times we have read it. Yet worker he is for Macmurray; or rather as Macmurray sees it for the ancient Jews. How does he justify this statement? Basically, it arises out of Macmurray's own philosophy which is, at least partially and seminally, derivative from and identifiable with the Jewish outlook and its ensuing post-Jewish phase. Besides being a monist Macmurray is an actionist. The universe was created to be, to move, and become, not to be pondered over and reflected upon except as this serves and contributes towards effective action. Therefore, once God is established he must, to be real and perfect, be a doer too. Macmurray is no lover of leisure! He would not agree with Sir Ernest Barker that "Leisure is greater than work". "But the religious

consciousness of the Hebrews conceives of God as a worker and, therefore, in terms of action. The religious idea of perfection is, therefore, not timeless. It does not believe in leisure as the goal of human life". (CH 37). And we are given a hint as to why this is so. "Now the motive which sustains this mode of consciousness is the desire for the contemplative life of leisure. But the material necessities of life forbid this and peremptorily drag men out of contemplation into action for their satisfaction. The problem... of the leisure class.... is therefore to escape from the necessities of the practical life or to find some way of doing without work. This involves a tension and conflict between the 'spiritual' and 'material' aspects of life." (CH 132). So leisure is to be deprecated because it brings inevitably the bedevilment of dualism. We must remember Macmurray was writing this before the days of automation, intensive computerisation, and the enforced leisure for many these things inevitably bring. How he would evaluate the situation today would be most interesting to know. Dualism, at least in its original and Greek form, brings as its accomplishment and ideal the contemplative life; and this can only be achieved and sustained by spells of non-work. As Macmurray sees the world as a place of activity, even by God, he will not countenance leisure at any price. Perhaps this is a rationalisation of a rather stringent upbringing, as we saw in the Introduction. Equally, however, it depends on what is really meant by leisure, both by him and by us. But, to return to the point. An important aspect of God for the Jews was that he was a worker.

An attempt has been made in the last five sub-sections to outline what Macmurray sees as the main contribution of the Jews towards the eventual creation or emergence of Christianity. Here are a few quotations to sum-up.

"What is the unique contribution of the ancient Hebrews to human experience, and why is Western civilization so shy of it? The answer to both these questions is, I believe, that the Jews were and are religious, while we are not." (CH 19).

"What is characteristic of the Hebrew people is that it achieved a development to a high level of civilization without this breaking up of the aspects of social life into autonomous, contrasted, and competing fields of interest and effort." (CH 28).

"..... because in the Hebrew unity the integration of practice and reflection is maintained, the development of Hebrew culture is not a development of ideas, in which the implications of the primitive forms of Hebrew life are speculatively worked out. Instead, the history of the Jewish community itself becomes the working out of the implications of its social consciousness. The reflection of the prophets is itself a call to the Jewish people to return to the divine purpose which is embedded in their history, at a higher level of understanding. Consequently, it is not the ideas of reflection (as in the case of the Greeks) nor the practical institutions of social organization (as in the case of the Romans) that are universalized and scattered abroad throughout the world, but the Jewish people themselves." (CH 40/41).

We now turn to review and discuss Macmurray's second, and obvious, major source and contribution to Christianity, namely -

Jesus

Jesus is the supreme expression of the religious mode of consciousness (see CH 49). Most of us, by our upbringing, have an idea, however vague, of what Jesus was and did; and of his real or supposed significance. These vague impressions are made more definite and articulate by Macmurray in a way perhaps not done before, certainly on some points. What are these?

1) Jesus universalized Judaism. The Jewish religion was the only true religion in so far as all life and all people of the Jewish race were totally included in it. But, according to Macmurray, this situation, so splendid and admirable as it was, had one major failing. It was limited in its area of includingness. Many were excluded from its recognition and belongingness. These were every other race and people, generally known as the gentiles. Jesus corrected this, or rather recognized that if we are to create a human community, which is the prime object and purpose of religion - "The creation of the universal family is the meaning of the religious impulse". (CS 67) - none on earth must be excluded. Moreover, only thus can man, any man, by so acting and recognizing, really become human. "The conception of a universal community of mankind is in itself an enormous revolution in human thought. But for Jesus this is more than a bare possibility. It is the expression of the true nature of man himself and, therefore, it is grounded in the nature of reality." (CS 67). "It was in Jesus that Judaism became a universal religion through the discovery of its own implications, and this discovery was the culmination of a long process of historical development." (CS 59).

In this context of the universalisation of religion two points

must be made. 1) It remained concrete. It did not take off into the realms of other-worldliness and idealism. It stayed firmly rooted in reality and in the material and social. 2) Macmurray makes the distinction between conservative and creative religion. Conservative religion is one which "... maintains exclusiveness by fostering and emphasising community where it already exists." (CC 35). Creative religion, on the other hand, "is... concerned to create community where it does not exist." (CC 35). The fact that today we are fighting the inequalities of race, sex and class proves that our religion, at least up till now, has been far from creative. "Creative religion must keep, as it were, the emotional unity which characterises the natural family group and yet lose its natural basis in blood-relationship. By achieving this, it escapes from the exclusive community and becomes a 'universal' religion." (CC 39). There can be no doubt that Jesus introduced and promoted this transition, which was probably conceived of by him because of the 'universal' extent of the Roman Empire around. "In the Roman Empire (Jesus) sees the act of God creating a universal community and inserting the Jewish people like a leaven into it." (CH 117). But he had no illusions about this. The universalisation of the Roman Empire as such could not form the basis of his human family. The Roman Empire was a political unity. Jesus thought only religiously. "The Roman Empire was already a political unification of a large part of the world. One might have expected that Jesus would have sought to use this approximation to a universal integration as a basis for the creation of the kingdom of heaven on earth. Yet this was precisely what he had already decided against in the temptation in

the wilderness." (CS 70).

To illustrate Jesus' move from conservative to creative religion, Macmurray gives many already well-known examples to substantiate this contention; the Good Samaritan, enlarging community beyond his own people (CS 65/6); The 'who is my mother and brother' question (CS 66/7. CH 63); the recognition of obligations beyond one's own kin and blood; the rich young man told by Jesus that he had obligations beyond his class i.e. to the poor (CS 80/1). Moreover, because of his riches he excluded himself from the human family. The obvious example of this is the Prodigal Son, who until he had become impoverished could not become a member of the family again. (CS 79). "The religious transition from Judaism to Christianity which is recorded and reflected in the New Testament is a perfect instance of the transition from a conservative to a creative religion". (CS 39).

2) Jesus advanced still further the idea the Jews had developed of God. You remember how it had progressed to one God, and then to Lord, still a relatively remote entity in feeling if not in personal propinquity. But arising out of Jesus' idea of one human family, God emerged as, or became, the Father. "Therefore (the universal family) becomes at once the conscious end of all real human effort and at the same time the purpose of God for human life. It is this that brings God and man so closely together in the thought of Jesus, so that God becomes the universal father; and human life, in its true expression, the revelation of the Divine nature." (CS 67/8). Such a recognition develops yet even further a major aspect of religion. Religion, inter alia, exists to overcome fear. "The overcoming of fear and isolation is possible through the complete integration of mankind, through a conception which makes God their

common father and the world their father's house." (CS 68). Thus Jesus' recognition of God the Father makes possible, according to Macmurray, the banishment of fear from our lives.

3) Jesus discovered the Personal. "Jesus made the discovery that human life is personal". (CH 55). What is the Personal? It is; the defining characteristic of human life, of being human. It is that element or elements which we all have in common. It is that which distinguishes human life from all other forms of life. "... properly speaking, personality is a term which denotes the general character which distinguishes human life from all other forms of life. To say that human life is personal is primarily to deny that human life is organic, or that it can be treated as differing from animal life only in degree and not in kind. It is to assert that the essence of human life is radically different from the essence of organic life, and that the relations which constitute the totality of human life are radically different from those which make a unity of the organic world. It is this essential character of human life, the thing that constitutes its humanness, that Jesus discovered." (CH 56). Macmurray would like to call this personality, but the term in modern times has been degraded or misused. It is now seen as that which highly differentiates and individualises human beings. "We are accustomed to use the term to denote that which is peculiar to a human individual in distinction from other human individuals, and which, therefore, constitutes his unique individuality". (CH 56/7). But personality, or the personal, is for Macmurray, as we have seen, that something which we all have in common, and which makes us essentially human. And there is a built-in corollary to this. It

means that human life, to be and remain human life, can only be lived personally. (CH 56). If you are not living personally, then you are not living humanly. You are living either mechanically i.e. as matter or as a thing; or, organically i.e. merely as other forms of life. These are deep and important distinctions for Macmurray which we cannot, in this general review, go into here. It might be said, however, that living personally can have two major aspects, negative and positive. It is negative when we are living merely non-organically, that is just above and beyond the organic level. It is positive when we are reaching out to include and create human community. The essence of this positive approach and way of living personally is love. (CH 62/9), (CS 114/121).

Jesus discovered the personal, but it was already implicit in the Old Testament Jewish religion, experience, and development, where it had been coming nearer and nearer to the threshold of consciousness. (See CH 56). Macmurray regards the discovery of the personal not merely as an added piece of human knowledge, but as the very self-discovery of man, by man. And this self-discovery necessitates a transformation.

At this point (CH 56/7) Macmurray, very perceptively and convincingly, elaborates upon the cost of not accepting this revealed truth about ourselves. What does this discovery entail? A knowledge of the significance of all human life, and of the intention which is embodied in the existence of human nature i.e. what human nature is for and what it can become. "... it defines the end to which present history is in fact moving." (CH 58). "Thus, by discovering, at the point where the development of Hebrew reflection completes itself, his own essence as a human being, Jesus discovered the

intention of God for man." (CH 58).

4) Jesus discovered the common people. This, according to Macmurray, is Jesus' great contribution to social history. (CS 70). Macmurray firmly believes in the dialectic. Time and again he refers to it throughout his writings. And he believes that Jesus, knowingly or unknowingly, used this method for discerning and promoting truth and progress. (CS 69/76), (CS 80). The common people, and Jesus' use of them for the fulfilment of his intentions and mission, is an example of this. To achieve the greatest and highest condition of man, that is, complete human community, or the Kingdom of Heaven to use traditional religious language, Jesus harnessed the support, not of the rich and influential, but of the common people, the working class, as we would call them today. (CS 76/81). These alone were capable of achieving the ultimate human success." Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth". (CH 72).

And from this recognition and choice of the common people by Jesus sprang democracy (CS 70). Allied to this are other commendable progressive and essential features of a real human community; freedom and equality - although Macmurray does not argue in detail the link here. Communism itself also has its basis (CS 143) in Jesus' promotion and advocacy of the common people.

To conclude in general concerning Jesus. "What makes (the life of Jesus) unique is the scope of the vision which it embodies, and his profound insight into the conditions demanded for its accomplishment. The teaching of Jesus is not something separable from his life; it is the expression of the understanding which grew out of his life. Theory and practice are there completely unified.

The one interprets and expounds the other. It is this fusion of insight and action that makes the life of Jesus the religious life par excellence, though it is far from being the kind of life that nowadays would be so described. And it is in terms of this life, and its expression in his teaching, that we have to rediscover the nature of Christianity." (CS 88/9). Rediscover the nature of Christianity? Did we ever fully know it before Macmurray?

With this reminder of the main theme of this section, and having discussed the Jews and Jesus, and their respective and seminal contributions to the formation and formulation of Christianity, let us return to Christianity itself. But before doing so let us pause to give an appraisalment of the last sections.

Appraisalment (2)

Whilst saying almost nothing about God i.e. as to what he is, his character, his intentions, and to what might be meant by the concept at all, Macmurray frequently refers to him when writing about the Old Testament Jews and of their naturally theocratic outlook. And, of course, as we would expect, he refers to God often when speaking of Jesus. For example, from countless which could be given, "Now it is a fundamental postulate of religious rationality that the purpose of God must inevitably be achieved." (CH 58). And again, "Social disaster or social failure is, therefore, always interpreted by Jewish thought as evidence of national sin, that is to say, of a national departure from the purpose of God for his people, and this failure is also interpreted as the act of God in history to bring his people back to the acceptance of his purpose." (CH 39). Obviously

Macmurray believes in God, literally, unquestionably, and as an automatic assumption. Moreover, at least as it comes through his style of writing and expression, he assumes everybody else does too!

Now, here is the issue. Nobody advocates empiricism, and the empirical approach and application to all matters of life and experience with such concern and fervour, as Macmurray. Furthermore, because religion is his prime area of interest, it is more that he is one of the few advocates, and certainly its most passionate, of empiricism. How then does this tie-up with his frequent, unsubstantiated, assertions concerning God's existence and being, even if he never, fortunately, purports to know or tells us what he, God, is doing?

Macmurray has quite clearly defined what his conception of empiricism is, "The hall-mark of empiricism is its emphasis upon facts. It insists upon starting from facts and ending in facts ..." (SRE 12). To put it cogently and succinctly; by Macmurray's own declared standards what factual evidence is there of God, which he so authoritatively proclaims the existence of? Surely about this Macmurray could be a little more reserved and circumspect; or, a little more explicit for, if not doubting himself, he never demonstrates how God is, or can be, recognized as a fact. To say that God is or exists - and the automatic assumption of this is even worse - is to be dogmatic, an attitude Macmurray professes, presumably in all other contexts than this, to deplore.

Macmurray seems unaware of this anomaly, let alone to raise or discuss it. But to me, and inevitably to any other observant person who is critical of yet sympathetic to Macmurray's general themes and position, this must seem very anomalous and incongruent. The very

slightest suggestion as to what he might reply if he were ever challenged on the point is given in the following, "It is highly dangerous to include in a statement of religious belief, anything that is liable to empirical disproof." (SRR 58). Maybe, he would say, God cannot be proved. But equally he cannot be disproved. For Macmurray to argue thus would still allow a matter to be regarded as empirically acceptable, pro tem. But, even if not to be disproved, can it be said, according to Macmurray's necessary requirement of the empirical, that God is a fact? Has Macmurray strayed from, or even broken his own ideal and standard? And on a very major and fundamental point too?

2) Were the Jews like this? i.e. as outlined on pages 14/21. And, if so, were they thus for the reasons Macmurray gives? It has long been understood in Western thinking, and not contradicted by modern scholarship and interpretation, that the Jews were an unusually religious people, and that their experiences did cause them to recognize, proclaim, and live by the idea of one God. Probably they were, too, the main human instigators and agents of living rightly with each other, or of realizing that they could and ought to be so living; this developing from the earlier prescribed moral and social code, the ten commandments, through the exhortations of the prophets, up to the more advanced, universal, and all-including standards of Jesus, loosely incorporated in the idea of love, and in whom religion finally became mature. In this sense, the Jews have rightly been called the 'chosen' people.

But were they able to be so perceptive because of their undivided, non-dualistic, consciousness and perception of life, the

world, and experience? Or was it so by the merest chance, an ethnic fortuitous mutation, or even for some other reason? Are the two, on the one hand God and righteousness and the discovery thereof, and on the other non-dualism, necessarily related? Macmurray never speculates on this, nor puts forward any argument. He merely states and asserts it. Yet the point is both interesting and important.

Interesting, because no other thinker has proposed or even hinted at such an idea and linkage. Most are content to ascribe it to God's will and purpose. They give no hint of a natural or empirical reason. And important, because does it indicate the way, indeed the only way in Macmurray's estimation, to lead a satisfactory human life, both individually and together? Modern man, as we have earlier seen, and know any way, is immensely "Broken-up", "Broken-down", and diversified. We have a sort of unspoken method for meeting every situation, namely divide and rule. In many things we are dualistic, but pluralistic would be a better description of the situation, both within each man, and in society at large. But, has not this division and diversification helped us materially at least, and Macmurray is no despiser of the material! Examples of this are division of labour; where would we have been, or be, without it? We analyse, classify, specialise, categorize, and label all for some good. Would a less pluralistic, a more whole society and man, be less well provided for? At least we are in with a chance of moving towards a more satisfactory condition. We are each in our own cul-de-sac; but to be thus has been an avenue of human advancement.

Perhaps the basic question, the one which Macmurray would ask but never did, is, Can we have diversity without dualism and pluralism resulting? Do we want to get back, or go forward

(whichever way you look at it) to a whole and unified consciousness such as the Jews had?

So the question of Jewish one-mindedness is important. If Macmurray is right, and we could come to learn of the origin, roots, promotion, development, and the sustaining of a single consciousness, perhaps some of our problems would automatically be soluble, or indeed resolve themselves. Ought we to somehow create, or recreate, a truly religious society, in the Macmurray sense? At least the question is worth asking.

3) Macmurray's idea of conservative and creative religion is an original and useful one. All people and organizations professing to be religious could profitably ask themselves into which category they fall. Apart from the missionary zeal of the 19th century, most Christians in recent times have been conservative and excluding. Some other religions, especially the Eastern ones and Islam, seem more expansive and creative at the present time. Most churches and Christian groups, except for American evangelists and their European counterparts, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Catholics in South America, seemed concerned only with conserving what little of their essential religious belief and fellowship they have left. They have no time or energy to encompass the world, or even their own neighbourhood, in a mood and spirit of religious creativity.

But if Jesus discerned the difference between conservative and creative religion he was not a complete exemplar of it. Good, perceptive, innovative, and enlarging as he may have been, he was less than perfect in this area when it came to practice and example. Nothing is easier in life than to love and be friendly towards those

who honour and support us. The crunch and test comes for all of us, including Jesus, as to how we act and respond creatively and constructively towards those with different ideas, positions, psychologies, characters, and life-styles. Jesus had nothing but scorn for certain classes of people, especially the scribes and pharisees. It is no use contending that they were traditionalists, or opponents of Jesus' intentions, or hypocrites. That they may have been all these, and anything else seemingly adverse, only demonstrates and reinforces the point. If Jesus had felt so creatively about religion would he not have been more constructive, more creative, and shown us by his own example how to bring disparate elements into the one human fold of fellowship? Surely, this is what, as human beings, we are still trying to find out how to achieve.

Creative religion is a vital and useful concept. But a discernment of it is not enough. We must know how to effect it. Macmurray as a realist and actionist should appreciate this.

4) Regarding Jesus' conception of God. I am sure that he did enlarge and deepen this. The idea of God the father, leading, caring, nurturing and loving his universal family, enlarges our humanity and togetherness. By it our relational and emotional edges are softened. We become, and have become, more inter-relatable as a result. In saying this, of course, Macmurray would be the first to admit that this idea is nothing new, but has for long been part of the lore of Jesus.

5) Did Jesus discover the personal? This depends on whether you can recognize something even if you do not name it. Jesus discerned what Macmurray calls the personal, or at least aspects of

it, but it would not appear that he so named it. Apart from the reservation made in Section 3 of this appraisal, Jesus was generally, and certainly in intention, creative in relationships. This in itself would be evidence of at least an awareness of the personal. But the personal includes a wide, creative, attitude to life at large in all its branches and aspects (see RE 156/163). No mention is made in the New Testament of, for example, Jesus' joy in art, although obviously, by his figurative use of language, he was alive to, and immersed in, all around him, and not least in nature. It is difficult to distinguish fact from fiction; and, because of intensive and excessive conditioning, few of us brought up in a Christian social environment can ever see Jesus objectively. But it does seem that he was a very alive person and, as such, an embodiment of the personal.

6) Jesus did discover the common people. What is important, from our point of view, is that Macmurray was the first to draw our attention to this, with all its tremendous consequences; consequences which surprisingly only fully began to manifest themselves in the last century, probably as a result of the French Revolution. Eighteen hundred years of dormancy and gestation! It vividly illustrates how long some ideas, especially social and moral ones in contrast to material ones, take to become anything like operational and effective.

Both, in his thought and action, Jesus, of all ancient and mediaeval leaders and thinkers, almost alone espoused the cause of the common man. Admittedly, he found it useful to use them for his purposes, but there was probably more to it than that, especially if

he did have some awareness, as Macmurray contends, of the dialectic, and of its contradictory and paradoxical workings. Because of his espousal of the common man there can be no doubt that communism (small c) sprang from Christianity and Jesus; ignoring, that is, aggressive Marxism, mistakenly called Communism today.

End of Appraisement (2)

Christianity (Part II)

To return to Christianity. We now have a fair idea of what Macmurray thinks of Christianity; or rather, what he thinks Christianity is. Some of his thinking is traditional and established, but much of it is novel. Having written, for an introduction, so much already on this I shall not attempt to summarise what Christianity is for Macmurray, as I think this has come through clearly enough. Macmurray is primarily a Christian, and one could rightly say this, along with religion in general, forms the matrix out of which most of his ideas, in other fields of human activity and thought, spring. Christianity is, for him, a seminal idea.

But this far from says it all. About many aspects, developments, omissions of Christianity Macmurray is somewhat critical and disturbed. Here again, many of these are unusual, and consequently deserve special attention and consideration even if ultimately some of them may not be acceptable, or at least subject to doubt. In continuing therefore I propose to give an outline of some of these.

1) Our idea of Christianity is not Christian. "Unfortunately, most of what is now called Christianity has little enough to do with the teaching of Jesus." (FMW 214). And this applies not merely to the idea. It permeates, mostly unconsciously, the very way we live, or intend to live, as Christians - that is, when we intend this at all these days. And this distortion, this misguidedness, goes back a long way; indeed, to the ancient world itself. For, according to Macmurray, our idea of behaving, our conduct, is Roman; and much of our religious thinking is Greek based. And this, of course, instead of being founded upon, and grounded in, the Hebrew ethos and tradition, as we think it to be.

To take conduct and morality first. "What is called Christian morality to-day is based upon a Stoic tradition; upon intellect and will, upon the suppression of the emotional basis of conduct in the interest of 'principles'. The result of that is inevitable. Though Europe has developed itself intellectually with a steady growth upwards, has progressed in its grasp of principle, in scholarship and understanding, in the organization and control of life and of the world, it has remained all but completely barbaric on the emotional side. Our civilization, for all its scientific and administrative capacity, has remained emotionally vulgar and primitive, unchaste in the extreme. We do not recognize this, of course, because it is simply the reflection of our own inner insensibility. That insensibility is the inevitable result of a morality based upon will and reason, imposing itself upon the emotions and so destroying their integrity. Until we insist upon emotional sincerity, until we cease playing ducks and drakes with our feelings in the mistaken desire to drag them into conformity with what we conceive to be our

'duties', until we begin to trust our emotional life, this state of affairs will necessarily go on". (RE 132). And again; "Now if this capacity to act rationally, according to plan, is made an ideal of conduct, as it was by the Romans, then we get a morality which consists in obeying a moral law. Moral conduct, on this basis, will be conduct which adheres consistently to the moral plan and successfully resists all our inclinations to do otherwise. The good man will be the man who always does what he ought to do, not what he wants to do. He will be the man who acts rationally, not emotionally. Desire and emotion and impulse will be the great enemies of such a morality, since it is their interference that makes it difficult for us to act according to plan." (FMW 78). A full statement of this whole contention can be read in FMW 74/82. And all this Stoic morality which has permeated Christianity, no doubt as a result of the powerfully influential Roman Empire adopting Christianity as its official religion, is contrary to the religion of Jesus. "But the spirituality of the Hebrews expressed itself in their long line of individual prophets, who stand out against the background of legal organization and in opposition to it. The prophetic tradition was one of inner vision and emotional response, not of the fixed plan of law and formal obedience. That prophetic tradition culminated and completed itself in Jesus, who insisted ... that life should be based upon an emotional principle, not on an intellectual one. Thus the morality of policy and plan, of will and obedience is the antithesis of the morality preached by Jesus". (FMW 80/81). Jesus' idea of life, living, relating, and action was based on freedom, emotion, and love, not on duty, will, and obedience,

either to another person, or to an abstract, supposed, moral law.

Regarding religious thinking. The Romans were an overt, materialistic, pragmatic, law-conscious, ruling people. Hence their zest for the will and obedience. They had nothing but contempt for the emotions and reflection. The Greeks, on the other hand, were an artistic and contemplative people basically, but also without much deep concern for religion, such as the Hebrews had. "Greece developed a reflective consciousness at the expense of social development in the practical field, and when her social structure was overthrown by superior practical organization, her reflective development became a universal heritage for the reflective life of mankind in the future." (CH 40). Arising out of this reflective and contemplative mood and tradition, there came to be introduced into Christianity, in the early centuries, the idea of the mystical and other-worldliness, causing various degrees of retreat from this world, and dissatisfaction, even abhorrence and renunciation of it. Apart from pure mysticism the most extreme exemplification of this was monasticism and celibacy. Plato contributed to and endorsed this strain with his doctrine of Forms. Perfection, the ideal, is laid up elsewhere. Here we see and know only the shadow of things. Even more effective in distancing real religion, as Macmurray and the Hebrews understand it, was Neo-platonism, which flourished from about 200 A.D. to 500 A.D., and was expounded by Plotinus. Unification of the individual soul with the divine was to be achieved only through asceticism and purification.

The unfortunate and unwelcome upshot of all this contemplative and unrealistic development is that it inevitably leads to Macmurray's bete noire, dualism; the bane of religion and life. "On the practical side Christianity became dualist by accepting the Roman structure of law, organization and administration as the guarantee of the unity of the Church. On the theoretical side it fell into dualism by the acceptance of the thought-forms of Greek philosophy." (CH 131). (See also CC 51/2).

So; we are mistaken. The Christianity we know is not Christianity. "In this way Christianity came to be identified with a conception of the world and of life which is largely pagan in origin and wholly pagan in its intellectual structure, and in consequence became the bulwark of a traditional paganism which it had set out to supersede." (CC 51/2). Perhaps pagan is too strong a term. But, indeed, the effect was not in the true Hebrew-Jesus tradition.

Another source of dualism within the Christian religion has arisen historically. When the Roman Empire officially adopted Christianity a difference soon became apparent between the very robust, earthy, and secular, Roman way of life and of state authority, and the way of life prescribed by the Church. To meet this incompatibility, yet for both to work in harness and harmony, a tacit compromise and modus vivendi was eventually reached. Rome, and by now the mediaeval political world, would exercise their power in and over this world. The Church, with ostensibly equal power, authority, and force would ignore the evils and injustices of this world, and proclaim, and be content with, a 'heaven' in the next. Macmurray calls this agreement a pious fraud. It is, and has been, the prime source of unreality in the Christian religion, of pseudo-

religion, of dualism, and of a false spirituality. "The Christian Church could now sanctify and defend the traditional system of morality, of law, of property, of warfare as well as of myth and philosophy, by referring its revolutionary conception of community to another world. This pious fraud - for it is nothing less - might be very effective for a time. But it must inevitably recoil upon the Church itself in the long run. We see the final result in our own day. The Church has created a demand for the classless society of a universal brotherhood in the hearts of men, but has bidden man look to the secular power for the ordering of life on earth. The Church itself has decided that the effort to establish the Kingdom of Heaven on earth shall be a purely secular effort, and that so far as it distracts men's minds from the pursuit of spiritual aims it is an effort which she must condemn and oppose. Why then should we be surprised that the revolutionary movements of our time are anti-religious, anti-Christian, and materialistic? The Church has willed it so." (CC 50/1). This obviously, for Macmurray, was nothing but a sell-out of religion to the state; a way of buying by subterfuge the continuance of its own existence, however ineffective, moribund, pointless, that might turn out to be.

2) The progressive temper of our age is empirical. Everybody recognizes that all the benefits and the 'progress' of man and society spring from empiricism, the prime examples of which are science and technology. Throughout the world all peoples want the science which originated and is still at its most advanced in the West. On the other hand, they are not so keenly seeking our religious and artistic culture, except in so far as a plastic veneer

of it must inevitably accompany technological society wherever it goes. (see RE 172/3).

Christianity, because of its archaic, dogmatic, authoritarian, mood and tone, its mediaeval orientation, its total inability to modernise itself, has, and still is, losing ground. All its progressive pushes of the last forty years, promoted by such innovators and thinkers as Bonhoeffer, Bultmann, John Robinson - the renounced Bishop of Woolwich - and Tillich, have, or seem to have, all come to nothing. Only de Chardin, of the reorientators has any credence left and he alone, of them all, bears some resemblance to Macmurray. It is, although this is a much too vigorous and picturesque conception of it, fighting a rearguard action. but it is a losing battle. "... the tide of social evolution cannot for ever be dammed by the dykes of vested interest. The progressive forces are bound to win; and it looks as though the bursting of the dykes would be quick and catastrophic. If in that hour religion is found still on the side of reaction, as it was in Russia, it must suffer almost total eclipse. Its existing form will be doomed to destruction." (SRE 9). And the irony is that, as we have seen, it is not Christianity at all! Marx, one of the major trumpeters of this rout and inevitable death-knell, did not, according to Macmurray, know what real Christianity is. His denunciation was of the religion of other-worldliness and unreality which he mistakenly took, as so many millions of other people do and have done, to be Christianity.

Although Macmurray never says so, and although he regrets this dying of Christianity, now even more marked in the Western World than when Macmurray was producing the bulk of his work, perhaps its

passing would be a good and saving event; its final demise the end, to say no more, of a mistaken, costly, and unfortunate deviation from the path of true religion. But Macmurray is eager to resuscitate it in its true and essential form. And there is only one way to do this. Like science, like the mood of our era, religion and Christianity must become empirical. All dogmas, assertions, and rigidities; all antiquated and obsolete ceremonies, rites, beliefs, and structures; and its whole reactionary and conservative temper, must go. Science did it - to become real science. Science came to maturity when it ceased to search for the philosopher's stone, the arcane formula for changing base metals into gold, when it stopped looking for the elixir of life, when it superseded alchemy. Growth and maturity come when all is orientated to reality i.e. the facts, conditions, and situations of this world and existence. So too, must religion, to become real, a vehicle of life and the creator of an acceptable human future, shed not only its past but also its unacceptable extant methods, thought-forms and techniques, and reorientate itself to this world, and to the facts of existence here.

"One of the main reasons for the fatal alignment of religion with reaction is that the progressive attitude of mind is frankly empirical, while the religious temper remains traditional and dogmatic. The empiricism which is at war with our religious traditionalism is bound-up with science, and upon science the progress of civilization increasingly depends. So our house of life is divided against itself and cannot stand. Our religious habits of mind, defending a tradition, pulls us backwards to the past, and fastens us to forms of life which the march of development is surely

destroying. Our scientific empiricism draws us into the future, toward the construction of new habits and forms of life. Between the two tensions we are paralysed and can only stand helplessly watching the approach of catastrophe." (SRE 9/10). "But there is another way out of the dilemma. If religion could abandon its traditional dogmatism and become itself empirically minded, it could lead the progressive movement with science as its technical adviser. If this is impossible, then religion can no longer perform any positive function in a society which depends, even for its daily bread, upon the empirical temper of scientific research and technical inventiveness. Religion must either transform itself or fade away." (SRE 10/11). Only the empirical approach can save religion and Christianity. What Macmurray regards as the essence of empiricism was quoted here, a little way back.

3) In this I include a number of short criticisms made by Macmurray, all very important, but which space and time are inadequate for their development, or, to the fuller treatment they deserve. They may be followed-up more adequately from the references given in, or after, each. To need to mention them, however, indicates their significance.

Western Christianity places much too much emphasis on requiring adherence to certain beliefs and doctrines in order to be, or at least to feel oneself to be, a member of a particular church. Eastern Christian churches, being Greek in origin, are much less rigid on this point, the whole atmosphere being, as one would expect, orientated towards the aesthetic and emotional side of worship, not the doctrinal. This is not necessarily good, but neither is insistence upon intellectual conformity. "Eastern Christianity, when

it succumbed to dualism, did so in the pure contemplative mode, not in the ethical mode which compromises with the necessity of practical activity. The result is an official religion which is non-intellectual and does not codify belief as a law of faith and action, but instead develops an aesthetic and mystical character and seeks a dramatic expression. In relation to action, such a religion performs a negative function. It provides a contemplative expression for the suppressed Christianity which it introduced into pagan society and so provides an escape-mechanism for emotional energies which might otherwise have sought expression in social change." (CH 152/3).

".... the identification of religion with intellectual assent to organized doctrine could hardly have arisen within the sphere of Eastern Christianity, which has always been relatively innocent of theological systems and even of moral codes. Instead Eastern Christianity has elaborated the aesthetic moment in religious reflection. (see RAS 72). Then, having said (RAS 77) that adherence to belief or doctrine is the aspect of religion farthest removed from the essential core of religious practice and meaning, Macmurray goes on to add two further reasons for this contention. "Firstly, it is in the nature of intellectual formulations that they are hypothetical. Certainties are either formal, or they belong to the field of action, where knowledge is integrated with movement. When, in reflection, we substitute symbols for the things we meet directly in action, truth lies in a reference beyond thought, and all our statements require verification. In the second place, it is of the utmost importance, and particularly in the revolutionary transformation in which we are now involved, that we should not

profess to believe anything that we cannot believe effectively. If this means that religious beliefs are reduced to a minimum, then we must put up with it. Also it is wrong to ask anyone to profess to believe something that he does not even understand, and that has no meaning for him. In religion particularly complete intellectual sincerity is required of us. From this it follows that it is necessary, if the task of religion in our time is to be undertaken, that there should be an end of dogma, and that the statements of theology should be accepted, like those of science, as hypothetical only. For Christianity must become, not in fact only, but in intention, a developing religion. It must be able to integrate itself, both in respect of fact and of value, with the development of scientific and artistic knowledge." (RAS 77).

Christianity has sentimentalized love, to turn to the next point. This contention is discussed in CS 113/121. Human action has two fundamental positive motives; hunger and love. Together these lead to the integration of human life. Hunger motivates us to collectively cooperate to provide our material and physical needs; Love, even in its sexual form, is self-transcending. Its essence is what we spontaneously give, or "spend", upon the world. Unlike hunger, its expression is unconditional. To live satisfactorily the two, hunger and love, must work together. One without the other is useless. Communism i.e. Marxism, concerns itself with, and concentrates upon, the hunger factor; probably because of Marx's aforementioned misunderstanding of Christianity, and his subsequent denunciation of it. Christianity, on the other hand, has come to dwell almost exclusively upon the love motive, and consequently sentimentalizes it. By this Macmurray means that it has ceased to be

a motive for action, a motive bent on realizing community in this world. Instead, it becomes an escapism, a love of the mystical or of other-worldliness. It is a love displaced from its real purpose. In other words, it has become unreal. "The dissociation of love from hunger is one of the forms in which pseudo-religion expresses itself most readily. This dissociation turns love into a mere idea or a sentiment which exists as the idea or the sentiment of communion. But in this form it has already ceased to be a motive for action and has become, therefore, unreal and imaginary." (CS 120). Love, to be real, must be love as motive, expressing itself in practical intent and action. Very relevant here, but too long to quote, are pages 120/121 CS).

Thirdly; fear is a very marked feature of human life, and one of the tasks of religion is to rid us of all but the most essential fears. "... conquest of fear (is) the eternal task of religion." (CS 102). Yet, contrary to Jesus' teaching and outlook, Christianity has used and exploited fear. One reason for this is that there is nothing like fear to make people amenable to the control of others. Fear has, mistakenly, become one of the main agents of so-called salvation. The principle way this has been introduced is through the instilling of a sense of guilt. Spontaneous living, happiness, and creativity, are the essence of Jesus' teaching. When wrongs are committed nothing is more important between people than genuine contrition, forgiveness, and reconciliation. But to be continually belaboured by a sense of sin, guilt, and fear of divine retribution, often for the most absurd, irrational, and trivial so-called offences, ruins all joy and spontaneity in living; it produces just

the opposite of what Christian living is, or should be. "This doctrine of the forgiveness of sin has been almost more completely parodied by pseudo-Christianity than any others. A great deal of Christianity has actually perverted the plain teaching of Jesus as to conceive that its first duty was to arouse and deepen in men, by all the means in its power, the sense of guilt. This is, of course, one of the subtlest means of destroying the spontaneity of any individual and making him amenable to the control of others. The whole problem for religion, as Jesus clearly saw, was to reverse this process; and so to create the kind of man who could not be imposed upon by authority through their own sense of guilt, but would spontaneously create from a sense of equality and freedom. His method was to assert the falsity of the sense of guilt, without denying the reality of the occasions which give rise to it...." (CS 111/112).

Yet a fourth failing is that Christianity has become an ideal instead of an intention. Christianity is for living and for action. It is a way of life, something to be worked out, lived, and literally realized. But formal and official Christianity has, more and more, allowed it to become something hoped for, something in the future, something to vaguely set your sights on, but obviously hopeless of ever being realized. Only as Christianity is seen and acted upon, says Macmurray, as an intention, can it be anything but an unrealistic, pie in the sky, other-worldly, and useless idea. (See CH 6/10). ".... we must define Christianity in terms of intention. This means that we must not define it in terms of an ideal. An ideal of life is precisely a conception which is not thought in terms of a practical intention. It is inherently reflective and contemplative in character. It appears, therefore, as an idea of how life might be

lived or ought to be lived; as a standard by which actual life can be measured and either approved or condemned. In this way it is concerned with judgement, not with action. Or it is an imaginary picture of a better world which can be believed in or hoped for. In this case it is associated with a belief that there are forces working in the world which will, or may, produce it by transforming the world. But all this is independent of any purpose or intention informing and determining practical activity." (CH 8).

As mentioned earlier, many other interesting questions, raised by Macmurray, concerning Christianity could be made. But enough has been said to indicate some of his original thinking on this subject. For a good summary of his keen desire to see changes in Christianity, and its consequent re-establishment as a necessary, major, force and influence in modern society, read RAS 74/79; OC 59/63; and SRR 78/81.

In closing this section two other interesting points regarding Christianity must be made.

Firstly; that, according to Macmurray, and ironically, and quite contrary to what is very generally understood, science is the child of Christianity; in fact, the only child it has yet produced of any lasting value and substance. "The one creative achievement of the Reformation was science and the scientific spirit. Science is thus the legitimate child of a great religious movement, and its genealogy goes back to Jesus. In its true sense, science is the one proper, positive, expression of Christianity that the world has yet seen. The rest of modern culture - its art, morality, and religion - is simply the disrupted remnants of the pseudo-Christianity of the mediaeval world." (RE 172/3). "..... it was Christianity which gave

us science by its insistence on the spirit of truth" (FMW 37). See also FMW 38/9. Could this be, one cannot help observing, a brilliant example of how one of Macmurray's favourite themes and mechanisms, the dialectic, is operating in the world and history?

Secondly, to be effective, we have observed Macmurray argue, religion must be universal. It must intend to include the whole of mankind. Jewish Old testament religion, excellent as it was, fell short on this point, and was only metamorphosed into universalism by Jesus. But, it may be rightly said, There are at least two other universal religions, Buddhism and Islam. Are not these, therefore, to be considered as of equal worth and value with Christianity? No, says Macmurray, Christianity stands supreme and alone. Why? Because Buddhism is other-worldly, much more even than debased Christianity. Not to act at all; to remove oneself from the pains and pleasures of feeling and existence, is the essence of its teaching. And, in contrast to Christianity, Islam is too much of this world. It aims to live by power, mastery, and conquest. It has no time for real community, human communion, and fellowship. Christianity alone, properly understood, performed, and realized, perfects in action the full possibilities of our existence with one another here. A full development of this point is to be found in CS 63/4.

This concludes what is able to be said here in outlining Macmurray's main ideas and directions concerning Christianity. We now turn to our last subject under religion -

God

Nowhere does Macmurray bring together his scattered views and hints of God. Probably God is mentioned a hundred times throughout Macmurray's writings, yet only one chapter, that of the second in "Creative society", has God in its title; and, although called "Belief in God", is mainly about Communism. According to Macmurray the Marxists, unconsciously of course, have a faith in God far exceeding that of any decadent Christian; which is rather a telling point, except that elsewhere Macmurray remarks that Marxism can never be religious because it operates only through the hunger and not the love motive. (CS 27/9). CS 116/121).

However, although scattered and never made comprehensively explicit or coherent, we can piece together some of Macmurray's thoughts on God, and of what he understands by the concept. And I think the following is a fair summary of his major views on this. Whilst adding a few extra relevant remarks at the end I shall treat the matter in three short sections. (1) Macmurray's idea of what God is; (2) Knowledge of God; (3) Belief in God.

Macmurray sees God as the infinite ground of the personal. To explain. We are all familiar with the idea of matter in the common, exhaustive, concept of 'matter, life, and mind'. When we speak of matter in this context, or within any similar universe of discourse, we are not referring to any particular piece of matter but to the sum total of, and every instance of, all the stuff in the universe manifesting the substance and behaviour of matter. The same, quid pro quo, with life in such a context. Now God, for Macmurray, is the sum total of all the personal, and its manifestations, in the

universe. God is, "The infinite person in which our finite human relationships have their ground and their being." (SRE 81). Further quotes, relevant to the above, are, ".... the only way to discover what matter is is to investigate particular material facts, to deal with actual instances. None of these, of course is matter, because matter is the infinite ground of all instances. (RE 209). "God is the infinite ground of all finite phenomena in the personal field - and therefore, ultimately, of all phenomena whatsoever." (RE 210). Regarding the last phrase. Macmurray believes the personal is the ultimate thing in creation, God being its ultimate expression and manifestation, and includes the "lower" orders of life and the material (see RE 223).

Why is this so? Why is the personal the supreme, fundamental, and seminal element? Because, so the argument, if you can call it that, seems to run - we are interdependent upon each other. It is this basic fact, as we saw earlier which makes us and the ambience of our living, whether we recognize or like it or not, religious. But we are also dependent upon the material i.e. the earth, air, soil, water - remember the quite valid, if seen in its proper place and perspective, hunger motive? Thus God, the ground and sum total of the personal, must be and to continue at all must be, or at least include, the material and organic as well. Easy to write, it is less easy to understand how this can be. Macmurray would definitely call himself a theist, yet if he has here been understood aright, his thinking on this matter would seem to border very much on pantheism. But as previously mentioned, as more of an intuitionist than a logician, Macmurray leaves some questions rather vague and open; perhaps intentionally. For as we have seen, his whole emphasis is

upon relating, living, and action, not upon the perfecting of theory and doctrine.

Macmurray also conceives this idea of God as the infinite ground of the personal from quite a different but allied approach. We can only be because we are aware of something which is not ourselves. We are always aware of this "other". If we were not we would be living in an interior, mental, world of unreality. "To say that personal consciousness is objective is to say that we are persons because we live in and through a knowledge of what is not ourselves The difficulty of grasping it arises simply from the fact that it is almost impossible to be explicitly aware of it. There is nothing to contrast it with. But if we consider the familiar statement that 'we live in the world' we shall discover that it is paradoxical. It asserts that we have our conscious being not in ourselves but in what is not ourselves. We live in the other, in that which we recognize to be other. It is only when we withdraw into ourselves and find ourselves in a dream-life of phantasy and imagination that we discover the possibility of a consciousness which has no objectivity, and we discover it precisely because we are now living not in the world but in ourselves, in a world where we are not dependent on reality but masters of the unreal. Our dependence on what is not ourselves - or rather, since we always are dependent, whether we recognize it or not, our recognition of dependence and our living in terms of this recognition - is the core of our reality." (RE 219). Now this other includes the usual three orders of material, organic, and personal. We naturally experience them all. To be brief, but I think the point is easily understood, the ultimate Other, now

properly favoured with a capital letter; the other which, although essentially of the personal but which nevertheless as we have seen must include the material and organic, is according to Macmurray, God. This for him is God. "Who then is the Other in relation to Whom all find themselves in a complete self-transcendence? The Other can only be an infinite person, who is at once the Father of men and the creator of the world. For the Other must be personal - since he is one term in a personal relationship. He must be infinite and eternal - the same yesterday, today and for ever; and since the ordinary experience of a personal relation is necessarily a unity in cooperation, directed towards nature and upon nature, he must unify the natural with the personal." (RAS 59). But Macmurray goes even further than to suggest that this "factual", essential, experiencing of the universal other is God. He asserts that God as so perceived cannot be rationally denied. "The idea of God as the universal Other is, therefore, inherent in the act of religious reflection itself. It is given in the act of reflection itself, which starts from the actual fact of personal relationship. The universal cannot be denied, since to deny it would be to forbid the act of reflection, while it is only through the act of reflection that the denial is possible. The existence of God cannot, therefore, be rationally denied, since it cannot be denied without self-contradiction. And since, as we have seen, religious reflection is the primary form of reflection from which scientific and artistic reflection are derived and in which they are contained, God is the primary correlate of human rationality." (SRE 80/81). See also "Persons in Relation" 164/5. For a comment on this see the appraisal of this section later.

In the brief explanation of these two conceptions, of the infinite ground of the personal and of the incontrovertible other, enough has been given to indicate what God is for Macmurray; not forgetting to add, of course, what was earlier mentioned in the section on Old Testament Jewish religion, that God is a worker, a living acter-out of his own intention, in and through that which he has created, and is still creating. Moreover, according to Macmurray, whatever we do his intention cannot, ultimately, be frustrated - or he would not, presumably by definition, be God. (CH 54. SRR 45).

We now turn to the second part of this section; knowledge of God.

For Macmurray intellectual, formal, knowledge is not real knowledge. It is only knowledge about not knowledge of. It is merely instrumental. Macmurray calls this type of knowledge information. "Intellectual knowledge tells us about the world. It gives us knowledge about things, not knowledge of them. It does not reveal the world as it is. Only emotional knowledge can do that.... The wider use of the senses for the joy of living in them, is knowing the world itself in and through emotion, not by means of the intellect. This is not to disparage intellectual knowledge but only to insist that it is meaningless and without significance, apart from the direct sensual knowledge which gives it reality. One cannot really know about anything unless one first knows it. Intellectual awareness is egocentric. It uses the senses as its instrument. But the direct sensual awareness has its centre in the world outside, in the thing that is sensed and loved for its own sake." (RE 43). All

scientific knowledge, for example, is and can only be of this kind. It merely gives us information. "When he (the scientist) escapes from the real world of home and friendship and the traffic of life, and shuts himself into his laboratory, he escapes from himself and loses himself in a world of information. Of information, however, not of knowledge. Knowledge is always personal, always somebody's; but information is just anybody's. Science wants facts, atoms of information, which must all be indifferent to their being known; all equally valid for anybody at all. Science is not the personal knowledge of this scientist or that; it is information, the raw material out of which you and I can pick and choose what we want for our purposes, to build up our own knowledge which is real knowledge just because it is ours and nobody else's." (RE 150/1). Real knowledge comes only through the emotions. Art provides, whether as experienced by the actual artist or merely by the recipient and appreciator, a much more real knowledge of things than does science. It puts us, or should do if it is good art, emotionally and essentially in touch with the basic essence of whatever it purports to be depicting or creating. "The receptivity of art, the artistic consciousness of the object, is knowledge proper as distinct from the understanding of or information about the object, which is all that science can give us. The artistic attitude alone enables us to come into contact with the reality of things, to realize the individuality, the value of actual objects, actual people. For science things exist only in terms of something else. Reality is that which exists in and for itself, the individual. Knowledge is the grasp of reality, the contemplation of the individual in its own

proper being. This is precisely what art gives us and science does not; therefore the receptivity of art is knowledge; the receptivity of science is not." (RE 155).

But even this is one-sided and incomplete as the art-object cannot know us. We can only know it. Only in human relations can the knower be known, and, in turn, know. This is meaning of St. Paul's deeply religious perception, and echoed in the well-known hymn, "I shall know as I am known". Religion transcends and completes the limited relationship of art " by the simultaneous recognition that I am one of them, and that I am recognized and appreciated by them, as they are by me. For the artistic rationality "I know" is the full expression of its contemplation; for the religious consciousness this is not enough. It must say "I know and I am known". The promise of the full maturity of religion in human life is put perfectly in Paul's words: "Then shall I know even as also I am known"; and it is the close of his paean in praise of love. It expresses the perfect and complete mutuality of communion, of mutual emotional awareness." (RE 63). The essence of essential knowing is mutuality leading to communion. Such a state can only be realized in a condition of equality and freedom. (See RE 104/5. RE 111).

Thus God, to turn to the upshot of the last paragraphs, whom we have seen is the total ground of the personal, of relating, and the entire and essential Other, can only be known through the emotions. We can only, if we would wish to experience God, do this in a very down-to-earth, practical, way. There is no element of mysticism required to know the God of Macmurray. Nor, on the other hand, can we know him by ideation. Of course, it may be necessary to do this

for the sake of formal communication between ourselves. But this is not knowing him as such. God is only to be discovered and known empirically i.e. in our relationships with each other. "God is the primary correlate of human rationality. And moreover, because religious reflection is not primarily expressed in thought but in action, God is not primarily apprehended as an idea, but in life which is centred in the intention of mutuality, as that infinite person in which our finite human relations have their ground and their being." (SRE 81).

The more real these relationships are, the more shall we know God. Obviously, for Macmurray, there is no other road to God. This is, and must be, and can only be, the way. We cannot know him by reason, or by seeking to establish proofs of his existence. "It might seem proper to make reference to the traditional proofs of the existence of God. But this would serve little purpose. For they belong to a mode of philosophy which we have been compelled to reject, and even in that mode they failed to stand If we refer to these proofs at all, it is only to underline their failure and to add a further reason for it, which has arisen in our own study." (PR 206). Once you have discovered that God is the ground of emotion and relationships the only way to experience and know him is through emotion and relationships. "Thus, like the true scientist, the truly religious man will talk little about God - he will leave that to the speculative philosopher and theologian - and much about the empirical life of personal relationships. He will realize what Blake meant when he wrote: "God only exists and is in existing beings or men." So a scientist might truly say that matter only exists and is in

existing material phenomena or object. In particular the really religious man will define the nature of God, not in terms of the analysis of ideas or of transcendental beliefs, but in terms of his empirical knowledge of human relationships. So Jesus is reported to have said; 'He that hath seen me hath seen the Father, and how sayest thou, then, show us the Father.'" (RE 210). And again. "The idea of communion with God is the universal correlate of the empirical experience of finite personal relationships and its meaning is discovered and realized only in the empirical field." (RE 210).

Our last section concerns belief in God. For Macmurray, to profess belief in God counts for little or nothing. As we saw, some way back, Western Christianity, mistakenly, gives priority to, and puts far too much emphasis upon, doctrine and dogma - especially concerning God - as a sine qua non of being supposedly religious at all. Basically it is theology and its ramifications which divides Christendom into its countless sects and denominations. Differences concerning what life we should be living hardly ever divide or diversify. Occasionally ritual and ceremony i.e. the art side and aspect of religion, may do this, but rarely the personal, relating, and moral side. Macmurray says, critically, "To believe in an idea of God would seem to be the very symbol of self-righteousness and self-assertion. If I can insist that my idea of God must be maintained, how can I have the humility to recognize the existence of a Being in the light of whose infinite understanding all my knowledge must be the ignorant phantasy of a child? I have a growing impression that many religious people now speak and behave as if the existence of God depended upon their belief in him." (CS 16/17). How then can we assert our belief in God? We do it in our living,

behaving, and relating. "Belief in God is properly an attitude to life which expresses itself in our ways of behaving." (CS 19). "If we wish to know what it means to believe in God, we must ask ourselves what this practical attitude is and how it expresses itself." (CS 20, and much more follows on the same page). "We are concerned with actions, not with professions, and we have repeated warnings from the teaching of Jesus that the Divine judgment pays little attention to professions and is likely to have surprising results." (CS 20). And equally, whatever our professions, we deny belief in God if we do not live thus. "For all our relational investigation and rational planning of the economic and political and social spheres is without meaning unless it is the means to one end - the living of the personal life of community in joy and freedom. To sacrifice life to its own conditions is the ultimate insincerity and the real denial of God." (RE 254).

And underlying, and fundamental to all this, is one factor which is indicative of itself of our belief in God. This is our attitude of faith and trust. Faith and trust not specifically in God, as is conventionally and traditionally proclaimed, but in life and being. Are we trust motivated and pervaded? Or is it fear which motivates and pervades us? These, according to Macmurray, are the crucial and fundamentally relevant questions, revealing our belief, or the absence of belief, in God. "Perhaps the fundamental component of a belief in God is the expression in action of an attitude of faith and trust. Its opposite is an attitude of fear. A man who is on the defensive in his attitude to life does not believe in God, whatever his professions may be. Belief in God necessarily delivers a man

from fear and from self-centredness, because it is his consciousness that he is not responsible for himself nor for the world in which he lives. It involves the recognition that his own life is a small, yet an essential part of the history of mankind, and that the life of mankind is a small but essential part of the universe to which it belongs. It involves the recognition that the control and the determination of all that happens in the world lies in the hands of a power that is irresistible and yet friendly." (CS 20/21). To be other than this is to disbelieve in God. "If we believe in God we live as if the fortunes of the world did not depend on us; we live as if the world did not depend on us; we live as if the world could be trusted to work out its own destiny and to use us, even through our mistakes and our failures, for its own good purposes. (CS 22).

The concept of faith we have come principally to use is in the context of "what I believe". Faith, as Macmurray would have us use and understand it, as an indication of our belief in God or not, means "do I trust in life and reality?" This trust and faith includes our relating, and of our including all men in our fellowship. "These two things - the inner integrity of the individual and his integration in communion with all individuals - are strictly correlative, since human nature is objective and can only be integral in the integrity of its relationships to what is not itself. Similarly, there could be no distinction between religion as communion with God, and the social community of man. There can be no whole without its parts; and a communion with God which is not a communion with man is no communion at all, but its refusal. If any man say he loves God and loveth not his brother, he is a liar, and the truth is not in him. For religion in its maturity, whatever is a

condition of real and complete communion between men, is a condition of religion itself." (RE 250). "... a relation to God which is not a relation to my neighbour is unreal." (RAS 69). If we have not a true conception of God, or at least of the area of experience in which he is to be found, (presumably, that which is suggested by Macmurray) then it might well be that those who reject and repudiate our God, and profess to be atheists, are (so far as it goes) more religious, honest, and more in touch with reality than those still professing belief in an erroneous and outdated image of God. Macmurray puts Marx and the Marxists in this category. (See CS 22/7). "When, therefore, a society has crystallized a conception of God which is false, the professed atheist may be more truly religious than the theist." (RE 207).

To end; a few rather stark, and here undiscussed, remarks of Macmurray concerning God.

"If there is no God, the effort to maintain and propagate religion is a crime against humanity" (CS 17).

"I do not believe that there can be a religion without God, or even that the existence of God can be rationally questioned." (RE 208).

"There is an inherent connection between a people's conception of God and their conception of man. In particular, the way they conceive the relation between God and man determines the way they conceive the relations between men in society." (CH 33).

"There is, then, only one way in which we can think our relation to the world, and that is to think it as a personal relation, through the form of the personal. We must think that the world is one

action, and that its impersonal aspect is the negative aspect of this unity of action, contained in it, subordinated within it, and necessary to its constitution. To conceive the world thus is to conceive it as the act of God, the Creator of the world, and ourselves as created agents, with a limited and dependent freedom to determine the future, which can be realized only on the condition that our intentions are in harmony with His intentions, and which frustrate itself if they are not." (PR 222).

So, within the limits possible here, a brief summary has been given of Macmurray's ideas of God. It is hoped that enough has been said to do justice to Macmurray on an aspect of religion which, as remarked earlier, he has never collated, nor made fully coherent and cohesive. I wonder why?

Appraisement 3

1) Christianity

How far is our Christian morality Roman and not truly Christian? Perhaps we can, to be honest, appraise and judge this contention only in relation to the time Macmurray was writing i.e. the 1920s - 1950s; as since then there has been a revolution in conduct, if not in religious belief. Moreover, there were times in the past when society was freer and less duty conscious and concerned. Whether our permissive society is a temporary, releasing, lid-off-the-kettle, phase - as were, for example, the times of the Roman orgies, the Restoration decades, the age of Louis XIV, and the Gay Nineties - or whether it heralds the start of a more permanent trend, allowing us to grow emotionally in freedom, as it seems Macmurray desires, has

yet to be seen. Only the future will tell.

There must be raised the slight doubt as to whether the mistake was wholly attributable to Rome and Stoicism. No doubt it played some part, but I would put part of the blame at the door of St. Paul, who Macmurray often quotes and who is obviously a favourite of his. The cumulative influence of St. Paul, with his restrictive and restricting ideas of life and morality, upon Calvin, the Puritans, Baptist, and Methodists, to name but some, to be followed later by an age of moral restriction, severity, and at least in part by hypocrisy i.e. the Victorians and Victorianism, seems a considerable and influential contributory cause to our mistaken view of Christian morality. However, whatever the cause, I think we can agree with Macmurray that we have not got real Christian behaviour and intentions today; in principle and understanding that is, let alone in practice.

Regarding the sell-out of the Christian Church to the Roman state, and the consequent development of dualism and other-worldliness in Christianity as an effect of this, this would seem to be as good an explanation as any. The early centuries of the Church were vigorously earthy, related to the situations and demands of this world, outgoing, obviously empirical, and except for the odd, ominous, Council, not over-concerned with doctrine or the conditions of another, hypothetical, life. Yet a change does seem to have come over the Church in the mid-centuries; so the engineered compromise of this "pious fraud" could, as Macmurray contends, be the major reason.

Who else, to turn to another point, is advocating empiricism in religion, whether strongly and persuasively, with an interested

following, or simply hinting at it and suggesting that it might be a good thing? Nobody to my knowledge. And if by any chance somebody is, but is doing it couched in traditional religious symbolism and language, then it is no wonder they are not being heard or heeded. Only Macmurray, forthrightly and unashamedly, puts, expounds, and urgently pleads such a case and a breaking with the past.

In this he is extraordinarily novel and, religiously, far ahead of his time. Only two points of critical questioning need be made of his advocacy, and these are made in no carping, petty, or trivial spirit, at least not by me, because I agree utterly and unreservedly with Macmurray's contention. I am no lover of Barth and allied schools of theology. To me they are purely reactionary.

Firstly then; right and proper as empiricism may be for approaching and discerning religion and its truths, how is it to be done? What are its skills and techniques? Of this vitally important matter Macmurray makes not the slightest suggestion. He does identify and define the relevant field, namely that of human relating; but as to how and what we might discover, or seek to discover, and learn here about religion, and of any acceptable hypotheses about it, he gives no hint. Intangible and imperceptible, piecemeal and exploratory, as growth and discovery must be in this difficult field, surely it must be possible to describe and articulate a little of it, however tentatively, from the beginning. And presumably Macmurray himself has, in his own life, and in his feelings and relating, made a start privately, even if not openly admitted anywhere in his writings. But perhaps time is necessary here. After all, science was ages getting off the ground. Although its mature consciousness was envisaged and promulgated by Francis

Bacon, not until John Stuart Mill, in the middle of the last century, nearly four hundred years later, did science fully realize and state its own techniques and methodology.

Jesus apart, despite seeming evidence to the contrary with its profusion of saints and mystics, who incidentally are mostly, but not quite all of them, withdrawers from life and reality, religion has perhaps yet to produce men of real religious genius, both in practice and in the description and analysis of that practice. From them, and perhaps only from them, as in all other areas of life and disciplines, we shall learn in detail the elements of empiricism in religion. There must be more to it than merely living satisfactorily with, say, one's family. Admittedly, from such a situation there will emerge happiness and joy of a profound kind. But although one might legitimately, if one would so wish, call this religious, or the expression of religion, can one really think that this has been an empirical discovery, experience and exploration of religion? Good as this is, surely there must be more to it than that.

The second challenge concerning empiricism in religion, and of its paramount importance, is that Macmurray does not, in his writings on religion, observe it himself. His writings are full of dogmatic, challengeable, statements. Whilst for much of the time it could be said he has the empirical approach, which is admirable, he constantly slips back into assertions of the most rigid and unproven kind. And he, astonishingly, seems quite unaware that he is doing this. For example; to speak of God the way he often does, fails to measure up to the standards he would wish us to be adopting in our empirical approach to religious thinking and feeling. Written science may,

admittedly, be full of old dogmatic assertions when in the process of describing a new discovery or hypothesis. But we know that these seemingly necessary dogmatic assertions have already been empirically "proven" in earlier experiments and works, and have become acceptable and a part of the established orthodoxy. Not so with Macmurray's religious assertions, especially as we are only on the threshold of the religious approach, with as yet no empirical, or very little, past to work and build on. Religion is at the stage empirically which science was five hundred years ago, if that. Indeed, to approach religion empirically is hardly understood yet; and to the perceptive eye, Macmurray's dogmatism and unempiricism in this area, however inadvertent, detracts from its promotion.

In closing this part of the appraisal section on Macmurray's views and criticisms of Christianity, only the briefest comment on other matters can be made.

Already we have had occasion to refer to doctrine and intellectual beliefs. We must agree with Macmurray that these hold much too important a place in Western Christianity.

Love is sentimentalized in much of Christian thought and ritual. Jesus did make the supreme sacrifice as indeed countless others have done, Christian and otherwise, for their beliefs. But the sentimentality concerning, inter alia, the cross, rightful, proper, and useful a symbol as this may be, is often too sickly, sentimental, and maudlin, to be believed. If, as Macmurray would have us envisage real Christianity to require and entail, a quarter of that emotional outpouring was spent on helping people in need or, better still, in genuinely and realistically promoting improved relationships with those with whom we are daily in contact, the world would begin to

know what real love is.

Can religion cast out fear? To some extent perhaps, but not always in the way and to the degree we would wish it to. Certainly if human relations are right, or, it would be better to say, were right, one great area of fear would be banished. But would all fear, except of course the most biologically necessary, be removed as a consequent? It would seem not, at least not on this account alone. To give but one example. We should still certainly fear severe, chronic, progressive, illnesses which are inevitably accompanied by pain, incapacity, permanent discomfort, hopelessness, and the inevitable extinction. These only in the most indirect sense can be attributed to our fellows, and then often only in the most innocent and inadvertent manner.

But Macmurray even meets this point. He says, "All religion, as we have seen, is concerned to overcome fear. We can distinguish real religion from unreal by contrasting their formulae for dealing with negative motivation. The maxim of illusory religion runs: 'Fear not; trust in God and He will see that none of the things you fear will happen to you.'; that of real religion, on the contrary, is 'Fear not; the things that you are afraid of are quite likely to happen to you, but they are nothing to be afraid of,'" (PR 171). This would seem to be going a bit too far. One would have to be more than extremely religious, or possessed of an unconscious death wish, to genuinely and really live in this state of suggested trust and faith. And, moreover, when it comes, if it comes, one suffers whether you are fearful or not. So what's the odds!

To turn to the last part. In view of all the criticisms made

earlier, including both their style and kind, it would seem fair to say, as Macmurray does, that Christianity has come to be regarded as an ideal rather than as an intention; which it must be to become effective i.e. achieved in reality and action. I never have argued with the old adage, "Hell is paved with good intentions". Intention, genuine intention, is everything. If you do not intend, but are content to exist in the shining light of an ideal, you may get a glow of self-glory and approval, but you will get nowhere and soon become even more unreal and ineffective in this world which is enveloped in and demands action and activity.

There seems truth in Macmurray's contention that of all the universal religions only Christianity is real and capable of totally fulfilling life. This, however, must always be taken with the proviso, never stated by Macmurray but which by implication he would entirely agree and endorse, namely, that the Christianity concerned must be real Christianity, not the pseudo, other-worldly, unreal, facade it has become.

2) Of God

Once again we must recognize that Macmurray has a novel, even if not quite a unique, view of things common only in this case of God. Its novelty lies not so much in any originality as in the fact that it updates the imagery and conception of what has been loosely and vaguely understood before in other, and now less acceptable terms and images. To do this revisualizing is an excellent and essential thing to do as it brings, especially to the exceptionally sensitive and vulnerable area of religion, once again into the fold a conception which has wrongly been rejected because it is clothed in the wrong,

and outdated, language and imagery.

But on his own sort of acceptable argument, does Macmurray go too far? Exemplified only in finite manifestations we still call matter matter when speaking of its infinite aspects in the same way we call life life. Why then call the infinite ground of personality, manifested in countless examples, God? Why not call it personality? Is not personality a substantial and worthwhile thing in its own right without having to give it, as it were, an extra status symbol, an extra bit of kudos? Is not personality justification enough? Nowhere does Macmurray attempt to explain or suggest why he has made this sudden leap.

Moreover is personality the fundamental thing of the Ultimate? Conventionally religious people automatically and unthinkingly affirm this, but at least it is questionable. Although personality is the essential thing for us - we are nothing if we are not living, and do not live, as persons. And even if we recognize that personality is the most advanced known manifestation in the universe, does this justify us thinking that it is the fundamental, seminal, stuff of creation, prior to all other substances and essences, except perhaps for that of a higher, and as yet unperceived by us, form of itself? Of course, Macmurray would argue that anything, any whole, cannot be less than its most advanced part, however small, tentatively holding, and insecurely placed, that part may be. But I would not be so sure. There might be genuine emergence in creation.

Rationally and objectively can we, on the evidence available, believe that personality is the basic and all-pervading stuff of creation? Is there not a large element of anthropomorphism about this? Or a psychological projection to succour what we would wish?

We now know something of the vast extent of matter, space, and time. It would seem to be a gross over-statement to say that in and on this vast, celestial, and infinite structure, mind (let alone personality) occupies a billionth billionth part. So Macmurray's firm belief in the paramount nature of personality, ultimately perceived as the essence of God himself, needs more justification than Macmurray ever gives for it to be even tentatively acceptable.

Macmurray's conception of God as the infinite Other is interesting. Obviously we experience consciousness only because we are aware of something external to ourselves even if that external is only a part of our own body. Why not then an infinite all-inclusive Other ultimately common to all finite others? Whether true or not, whether possible or not, it is certainly a very interesting idea. But, as with our comment on the infinite ground of personality, why call this Other God? Only presumably because, by our own human definition, the concept of God requires to be the infinite, the ultimately all, the all-included and all-including entity. Whether such an entity actually is is another matter.

To know God through the emotions and in our relationships with each other, requires some comprehending. I feel that a blind man might understand and be able to move some way towards appreciating and experiencing it, more than a sighted person, for whom knowing almost invariably includes a visual element. Far, far, from this being all that is necessary, but some element of it has to be present. Even listening to music for the majority of people I would suggest, and here I am talking about all music not merely programme music, includes a visual, visualizing, or pictorial element, even if

this visual element is only secondary i.e. "seeing" the orchestra in the mind's eye, let alone all the hundreds of wider mental images that might arise.

Good deep relationships, as mentioned before, are of infinite value and worth. The fact that they exist could be interpreted as the sign of a benign creation and creator, despite all the evidence and experience to the contrary. But to say that this is the way to know and experience God, together with a few other types of emotional experience, such as from art, seems to me a limited conception of God, and certainly a very difficult one to accomplish. After all; knowing must include the full articulation and verbalization, or enumeration where relevant, of what is purported to be known. However articulate, could one "know" God from and through relationships and emotions? Would it not be merely a case of describing feelings?

Obviously, behind this question lies the whole concept of what is, or should be, meant by knowing; too large a question to be discussed here!

The next section, that on believing in God, embodies, I think, the truth. Not by their professions but "by their fruits ye shall know them". Naturally, being an Actionist, Macmurray would endorse this approach, and I see nothing wrong with it either. Similarly with faith and trust. There is only one doubt here. Macmurray seems to take no account of pathological disorders such as the numerous phobias and anxieties brought on by chemical, congenital, social, or environmental factors. Desire, intent, and will alone, and even "religion", on the part of the afflicted, seem powerless to induce a

state of faith and trust in living. From whence then springs the power to be trusting?

Macmurray's suggestion that people become atheists because the current conception of God is outdated or unreal sounds good, and may be true for some people. But most people are atheists, the same as others are extreme left or right in politics, because of emotional factors, experiences, and influences, most of which they are totally oblivious. Their reasons and justifications are quite unrelated to the real cause. However, taking it at its face value, is Macmurray's assertion true? To answer this we must ask another question. Have you ever known a religious person who has become an atheist ever being able to build-up, over perhaps a number of years, a new and acceptable concept of God? I have not. The old, now discarded image, instilled and experienced in childhood, is too ingrained to be emotionally modified. It may have been rejected, but it cannot be replaced.

Moreover, there are very few professing and outright atheists. When the current idea of God becomes effete or moribund most people, as we are witnessing today, are quite content to live in a sort of religious, no-man's-land, vacuum. Few, if challenged, would profess to total disbelief and atheism; but, equally, few act positively Christian.

With one contention of Macmurray's I find it very difficult or even impossible to agree with. "If there is no God, the effort to maintain and propagate religion is a crime against humanity". (CS 17). This seems to me to be a totally immature and irresponsible standpoint. And it brings to light a contradiction in Macmurray's thinking. Speaking of science and the state of the world, admittedly

in the 1930s, but the situation has not altered much since fundamentally, he says, "If we continue in this state, if we leave the decision of what is worth while as a use for science to chance, then inevitably chance will decide against us. There are laws of the world of value. The civilisation which leaves the decision of its values to chance has failed; and history, like Nature, sweeps its failures on to the dust-heap and starts over again. If we do not deliberately decide what we shall do with our science, science, like Samson, will bring down our house upon us and destroy itself, with us, in general ruin." (FMW 44). However we interpret this we must basically agree in regarding it as meaning that we i.e. man, us, individually and collectively, must recognize that we are responsible and have the future, both of man and the world, in our hands. I would say that such a position is even more marked and obvious today. But in the same book, a few pages later, he says, "So I say, let us stop trying and be quiet, and wait. To those who want to reply 'But if we don't hurry and get things settled, if we do nothing, we shall be lost,' I shall say 'Be quiet, be still - the world is not resting on our shoulders; if it were, heaven help it'" (FMW 69). Also see 20/22 CS. This can only mean that we of ourselves can, and need, do little in face of the purpose of God and creation of which we are the indispensable but, in the last resort, a non-self willing part.

Now I prefer to take the first stance, and I do not believe we can have it both ways. We cannot leave it to chance and must save the day by our own efforts. This is our God-given task. Moreover, to return to the opening comment and criticism of this sub-section, God or no God, we are obligated, if only by the fact of life itself,

to work for a richer, more harmonious, existence for ourselves and for all our fellows together. God, or no God, makes little or no difference to our vital need for fellowship and communion. In other words, or rather Macmurray's, whether we will or not, and whether God exists or not, we still have hope, endeavour, and vision. To say, virtually, that nothing matters a damn if God is not, is to me a very narrow, self-centred, unobjective, and childish view. It is virtually saying, if the game is not as I want it I will not play. No - religion is vital, God or no God.

One final point. If God is to be found in the fellowship and communion of life with our fellows, the essence of which is mutuality, freedom, and equality, we must be equal with God. The essence of personality is, and can only be, fully realized in this condition, Macmurray tells us. Therefore God must be part of this equality. If he is superior to us we cannot totally mutualise. This condition can only be attained in circumstances of equality. Perhaps to make this comment is to be either too arch or too logical, or both. But it is a consideration worth noting concerning Macmurray's idea of God, and of how and where he can be found and known.

End of Appraisement (3)

And so we end what must inevitably be, with so limited a space available, this cursory introduction and examination of Macmurray's principal religious ideas. I hope later, in a more extended form, to devote at least one book to this important and germinal aspect of Macmurray's thinking. But being such an extensive and permeating part of his thought it is doubtful if one book could do it justice.

SCIENCE

Relevant Books

The Boundaries of Science. (BS)

Interpreting The Universe. (IU)

Reason and Emotion. (RE)

Freedom in the Modern World. (FMW)

Religion, Art, and Science. (RAS)

The Self As Agent. (SA)

Persons in Relation. (PR)

Introduction

Religion, Science, and Art are for Macmurray the principal modes of reflection and human rationality. "Now religion is one of the three major modes of reflective activity. The others are science and art". (RAS 7). "Religion, in the sense in which it deserves consideration, is one of the three general expressions of rationality. The other two are art and science" (RE 195). "... religion is the pressure towards rationality in our relations with our fellows". (RE 201). "It is through science that we come to relate our lives rationally to the material world, it is through art that we can come to relate our lives rationally to the world of organic life." (RE 203).

Of these, as we have seen, religion is for Macmurray the major, prior, and all-encompassing mode. Religion is of the essence of

human living and is both the end and the ambience of our real existence as human beings. Its hallmark is the personal. But of the other two, by far the most prominent for Macmurray is science. Let it be pointed out at once that for him science is predominant in interest and concern only, although it takes up more time and space in his thought and writing than does art. A whole book, "The Boundaries of Science", has been devoted to but one aspect of science, or rather of one basic problem philosophically viewed; but none has been given over to art. Yet art, for Macmurray, no doubt takes precedent over science on the scale of worth and human values. Art is of a higher order than science. Science is the Cinderella of the three, and rightly so if we accept Macmurray's contentions, to be revealed as we go along.

But the reason why science, despite its lower status, occupies so large a part of Macmurray's thought is attributable to at least two reasons.

Firstly; science, rightly or wrongly, is the paramount mode of thought of our time in Western society, and probably throughout the world. And this is more so today than when Macmurray was doing most of his writing. For in a later book of 1961 he says, "In our present social condition it is almost essential to begin by considering science. For science occupies the centre of the stage." (RAS 9). And again. "We forget how very recent the faith in science is. One might almost say that it is one of the consequences of the Second World War." (RAS 9).

Secondly; because as we saw in the earlier biographical note, science was a major interest of Macmurray's when very young. His

first acquaintance with science at about the age of ten, after a severe and exclusively religious upbringing, was "a revelation." (SRR 10). And throughout his youth his aim, although thwarted and determined otherwise by his elders, was to be a scientist. "If I had had my way I should have been a scientist". (SRR 10). Under these circumstances art, which in less strictly religious families and sects might get at least a look-in via sacred ritual, ceremony, and music, had very little if any place in Macmurray's early environment and conditioning. This is not unusual in non-conformist households, but accounts for Macmurray's seemingly modest interest in actual art, although not neglected by him in its philosophical aspect, compared with religion and science.

Having then, as it were, given the rough geography of science so far as Macmurray is concerned; that is, its place and status in his mind and outlook, and consequently of his view of it in life and the world, let us turn to a more detailed exposition and examination.

But first must be mentioned his unstinted and unreserved praise and admiration of science; properly understood and in its right place, of course.

"Science needs no justification and by its very existence and development it refutes any condemnation. This view of science requires to be enforced in the opening chapters of the present book. We start from the conviction that modern science represents one of the finest achievements of human activity and constitutes a final and unassailable value in human history. To condemn science is as absurd as to condemn architecture. To justify science is to gild the lily. Let this be said once and for all, so that it need not be repeated, I yield to no one in my admiration of modern science." (BS 19/20).

Other similar laudatory passages are to be found in BS 21, BS 136, RAS 10, RAS 28. And this despite the inadequate and sometimes unsatisfactory use so far made of science, and of its misuse or even destructive effects. ".... my belief in science is not a reaction to the practical effects that have so far followed from the use to which science has been put.... On the whole, it seems to me that modern society has been characteristically inept in the use that it has made of the science it has created. But even if modern society uses its science to destroy itself, I should still refuse to retract by one iota my assertion that science is in itself wholly admirable.... I insist on this, because a good deal of what I have to say about psychology might seem at first sight to involve not merely a disparagement of psychology but of science as a whole. I shall indeed have occasion to reject some of the claims which are made for science by its uncritical devotees. But that is a totally different matter." (BS 20). So, whatever is said later, questioning and criticising science, must not be regarded as detracting from Macmurray's whole-hearted support and advocacy of science. Indeed, only science has made possible that which he would have us achieve in the religious sphere of human life, namely a "truly human society" (BS 20).

In what follows much that is known and accepted about science will obviously of contextual necessity have to be mentioned or referred to. But an effort will be made to bring out, and dwell in more detail upon, ideas which are unique or peculiar to Macmurray's conception of science, or which are at least favoured or emphasised by him, so that we can clearly comprehend and assess his view of

science.

What is Science?

Science is knowledge, but of a very limited kind; so limited, in fact, that Macmurray prefers to call it information to contrast it with real knowledge. "When (a scientist) escapes from the real world of home and friendship and the traffic of life, and shuts himself into his laboratory, he escapes from himself and loses himself in a world of information. Of information, however, not of knowledge. Knowledge is always personal, always somebody's; but information is just anybody's. Science wants fact, atoms of information, which must all be indifferent to their being known; all equally valid for anybody at all. Science is not the personal knowledge of this scientist or that; it is information, the raw material out of which you and I can pick and choose what we want for our purposes, to build up our own knowledge, which is real knowledge just because it is ours and nobody else's." (RE 150/1). And again. "Information is always information about something, not knowledge of it." (RE 151). "Scientific knowledge is, of course, the result of systematic activity of a reflective kind. In our concentration upon this we erect science into the type of all knowledge. We forget, in our preoccupation, that the kind of knowledge science achieves is the result of investigating a world that we already know. The conclusions of some centuries of scientific research into the characteristics of matter constitute only a minute portion of our knowledge of the physical world." (IU 16). If this, in an age given over more or less exclusively to science and technology, is difficult

to accept we have only to do two things.

Firstly; simply ask, 'Did man know anything before science appeared five hundred years ago?'. Asked thus, the question at once appears ridiculous, as indeed it is. Of course they did, and a vast amount too, or they, and men from the start of the world, would not have survived. "Men knew the world they lived in long before science was thought of. And in some ways, perhaps, they knew it better and more intimately than most of us know it today, since we took to living in towns and travelling in motor cars. That immediate knowledge of the world which is the effortless result of living in it and working with it and struggling against it has a much higher claim to be taken as the type of human knowledge than anything that science has or can make possible." (IU 16).

Secondly; to remind ourselves of other kinds of knowledge. All of these are much more real and immediate than science is or ever can be. Of these the most important and ubiquitous is sensual knowledge i.e. that which comes to us through our senses. This is not to be confused with mere perception or elementary or primitive experience, as Macmurray takes the trouble especially to point out on page 19 of IU. You know your wife, husband, house, and job. And however brilliantly, articulately, detailed, and feelingfully you were able to describe these to anybody, they could never be known as you know them, immediately and wholly. "The understanding of the world which we gain through science can never be a substitute for the experience of it that we have in the normal unreflective process of living. Apart from this experience, indeed, all scientific conclusions would be completely meaningless, with no significance of any kind. They signify something only because they interpret our immediate knowledge

of the world. If we did not know what water is by drinking it and washing in it and boiling it in our kettles, the scientific statement that water is H₂O would be merely a meaningless noise. Yet time after time, in discussions of science and its discoveries, we find people talking as if the discoveries of science wiped out our unscientific knowledge of the world and put something quite different in its place." (IU 17).

"Knowledge, then is first and foremost that immediate experience of things which is prior to all expression and understanding. Upon this primary knowledge all reflection and all thought are based. This perhaps is specially obvious in our knowledge of people. When I say that I know my father, the knowledge I am speaking of has nothing to do with the results of my thinking about him, nor has anyone any doubt of what I mean. But if I tried to describe my father to someone who did not know him I should find it a very difficult task. I should have to reflect and think and express the results of my reflection in words. Probably the result would seem adequate neither to the listener nor to myself. And if later the person to whom I tried to express my knowledge made the acquaintance of my father he might well tell me that I had given him a quite false description. He might even say that it was obvious that I did not understand my father. But he would never dream of denying that I knew him." (IU 17/18). "If I ask a Londoner whether he knows St. Paul's Cathedral, he will almost certainly answer 'Yes'. But that would not imply that he could put his knowledge into words, that he could describe the Cathedral in any adequate way to someone who had never seen it" (IU 18).

Another vast area of knowledge of a different kind is self-knowledge. Apart from knowing how we "see" things, this field of knowledge includes self-depiction, evaluation, fears, doubts, feelings, responses, habits, obsessions, techniques, values, our self-discerned awareness of our "position" and "status" in relation to those close to us; those whom we have to be in contact, for example work colleagues; and indeed to the whole vast concourse of all humanity. We know what other people think of us, or of what we think they think. No matter which, and no matter whether right or wrong, true or false, it is part of our self-knowledge whether we are fully aware of it or not, and whether we could articulate it or not.

Then there is the field of knowledge concerning the intangibles; invisible and impalpable perhaps, but nevertheless very real and essential knowledge. Such knowledge permeates, penetrates, and affects our every action and choice. Primarily, here is our knowledge of God, values, beauty, truth, and ultimacy; your concept of man, and of other men in general; of society, and of our purposes and intentions. You may be inclined to say that this is not knowledge but surmise or assumptions. It may be on reflection, but in practice and in its effects we treat it as if it were knowledge, and live by it as much as the tangible knowledge of fire keeps us from being burnt or of wanting to be burnt. Value knowledge is far more ubiquitous and practical i.e. important to each of us and useful, than is scientific knowledge. We live by this knowledge. In more abstract, technical, and general terms than outlined above, Macmurray speaks of these other forms of knowledge in BS 100/4 and BS 106/8.

So blind or unaware as we usually are of them, a reminder of these major forms of knowledge enables us to see scientific knowledge in perspective and proportion, and to realize that, if it is knowledge at all, it is not the main avenue of our knowing by a very long way. It is very important indeed that Macmurray, almost alone these days, has drawn our attention to these very important facts about knowledge, especially in relation to science. It is unfortunate that his ideas on this vital topic are scattered, and that he never made an overall comprehensive effort to educate and inform us of this most necessary perception and enlightenment.

Macmurray is a great admirer of Kant. In "The Self as Agent" a whole chapter is devoted to him, and there are frequent references throughout the book. "The adequacy of a philosophy depends upon its range; upon the extent to which it succeeds in holding together the various aspects of human experience, and exhibiting their unity. Kant is unique in the comprehensive unity of his thought." (SA 39). "... in discussing Kant we discuss, in principle, all modern philosophy". (SA 39), although Macmurray does admit that "... every significant movement in philosophy since Kant can be derived from the Critical philosophy by rejecting parts of it". (SA 39).

It is this admiration, or perhaps more likely what Macmurray learned from Kant, to turn to another point, which causes him to regard science as rather insubstantial, invented, knowledge. "Kant was convinced that knowledge is created by the spontaneity of the mind, by that productive imagination which he described as a blind art hid in the depths of the soul. To use the language of modern psychology, Kant realized that all our knowledge, including

especially our scientific knowledge, is the product of fantasy. His greatness consisted in the fact that he realized the problem which this recognition involves. If we invent our knowledge, what right have we to call it knowledge? For knowledge is by definition the receptivity and not the spontaneity of the mind. The pure spontaneity of the mind is art, not science. If science is the creation of the human imagination, how can it be more than a modern mythology?" (75/76).

This invention or imaginative product manifests itself in at least two major ways. Firstly; after all their observations of the real world scientists aim to embody their findings and conclusions in a law, hypothesis, or formula, and are never more satisfied than when they can do this in mathematical form. But where and what are these formulae? "They are not to be discovered in the external world. Mathematics, from beginning to end, is an invention of the human mind..... In so far as physics consists in a set of mathematical formulae, it is something invented by human minds". (BS 76).

Moreover, when they produce something slightly less abstract and a little more imaginatively visual, as with electrons and neutrons moving in a microcosmic atom, or proclaim that a table is mainly space with a relatively few atoms whirling within that space, they are not depicting anything we could ultimately see and know, even if we were to become minuscule ourselves, or improved our present mode of perception. It is nothing but an imaginative analogy. "This other world that science has created for us, is in fact, much more unlike the familiar world which we observe than any of the other worlds that the fantasy of the religious mythologists of earlier ages ever produced. This is one thing that Kant realized about science.

The scientist sets out with the conviction that there is something in the world that we do not know. He tries to discover it, and so to bring it within the charmed circle of our experience. Yet instead of doing this, he succeeds only in inventing a new mathematical formula. This formula is an invention. Kant's question is, 'If we invent our scientific knowledge, what right have we to call it knowledge? How is it distinguished from imaginative fiction?'" (BS 77).

Secondly; this end product, this summary of supposed facts is not the only element of invention and imagination in the scientific exercise. Most of the observation is imagined as well! Macmurray illustrates this by the well-known example of the vase. Accidentally we knock a vase off the table and find it smashed on the floor. The subsequent and instant train of thought is too familiar to repeat. But, our actual experience of the event has been negligible, especially compared with our account and supposed "knowledge" of it. All we experienced sense-wise was a slight touch on our elbow, a noise, and the sight of the shards on the floor. Our minds and imagination built-up the rest. (See BS 78/81). Scientific practice is a little more careful in its observing and inferring than we would be in everyday life, but even then much of it arises from speculative imagination. Most of what we regard or say is happening is invention.

These criticisms can be partly offset in action and practice. By testing, and satisfactorily using the "invented" formula in practice, and in the natural world of events, we "prove" it. This may sound a bit like pragmatism, but Macmurray denies this. "The pragmatist is no doubt wrong in claiming that what works is true, but

he may be right if he limits his claim to the statement that what does not work is false." (BS 82). Hinted at in this quotation, and as a very timely reminder to ourselves, we must remember that, contrary to a very popular and widespread conception, the usefulness of a scientific formula or hypothesis has nothing to do with its truth or falsity. "We must guard against the tendency to use the term 'scientific' as a substitute for 'true'. A belief may be true even if it is not scientific. It may be scientific and yet untrue. This tendency is part of the 'religion' of science. It comes from the very unscientific hankering after an authority which will certify the truth of our beliefs. But science depends upon the repudiation of such authority and upon our ability to overcome our natural tendency to seek for such an illusory certitude." (BS 22). Science is no more than an imaginative idea which happens to work in practice. Nothing more; and it would be most unscientific to proclaim it as anything else. "And you will notice that scientific knowledge is always about how things behave, rather than about the things themselves. It is not really important to know whether electrons exist or not, so long as things that do exist behave as if they were composed of electrons." (RE 190). "The term 'objective' does not mean 'true'. Objective statements are often false. Nor is the term 'scientific' synonymous with correct." (PR 31).

So far we have seen that, according to Macmurray, some main features of science are (1) that what it provides is information, not knowledge. (2) that, contrary to what we commonly suppose, science is not a statement of fact or of reality but is, at best, an invented, imaginative, symbolism, whose only justification is that it enables us better to manipulate and manage the world external to ourselves.

Three other features of science can be considered together. These are generality, abstraction, and impersonalism. Probably, more people would be agreed upon these than upon the previous two.

"Science is concerned with generalities, with more or less universal characteristics of things in general, not with anything in particular. And anything real is always something in particular." (RE 152). "... to what I call the 'generality' of science. The scientist is not interested in particular things, or particular happenings. He must, of course, deal with particulars, since any object or any happening is particular. Yet when he observes anything he thinks it as an instance of a kind. He abstracts from its particularity, and attends only to what it has in common with all other members of its class." (RAS 13). "But it is peculiar to science that it never does anything else. It is only concerned with the general, never with the particular in its particularity; as, for instance, the historian is. Perhaps the best way to express the aim of science is to say that it is the search for constants; that is to say, for patterns which repeat without change indefinitely." RAS 13).

"Science must be abstract. It cannot, in its very nature, deal with anything in its individual wholeness. Now, when we talk of the concrete we mean that wholeness which constitutes the individuality of things. The moment you analyse and classify you are committed to the dissolution of individuality - to breaking things up into their elements. The moment you generalize you are committed to dealing with your subject matter in a special aspect, in terms of what individuals have in common, in contrast to the specific differences which mark their individuality, which make them themselves. This is

not an accusation against science; it is a justification. It is the business of science to analyse and classify in general terms; if it fails to be abstract, if it tries to be concrete, it falsifies itself." (RE 185/6). Here, in this extract, is mentioned indirectly another marked feature of science, its fragmentariness. It fragments to know; and as it knows more it fragments even further into more and more sciences and sub-sciences. The fragmentation of science is dealt with in RE 185.

Regarding impersonalism; "This is the pith of the whole matter. Whose knowledge is science? Everybody's? Nobody's? Science is impersonal; that is to say, it is available information, and the place of information is in books, where one can find it when one wants it." (RE 191). ".... a scientific enquiry is merely objective; and an objective account is necessarily impersonal". (PR 27). Concerning generality, abstraction, and impersonalism Macmurray gives a very good analogy, or is it more than that, related to the three speech situations. (RE 145/50. PR 178/181). When two people meet to converse and enjoy each others' company they talk about anything. The subject does not matter. It's their harmony, mutuality, and fellowship which is everything. This is comparable with, or perhaps indeed is, a religious situation.

Two other people meet and one begins to speak about his holiday in Switzerland. He becomes so enthralled with his recollections of the scenery, climate, food, and atmosphere that he totally monopolises the conversation, and the other person can only listen and either share the other's enjoyment, or at least try to be interested in what is being described. This is the art situation.

Two egg-heads meet; they show no interest whatsoever in each other personally, or of what each has experienced or felt, but they talk and discuss unemotionally, abstractly, objectively, and endlessly the one topic that has brought them into contact and conversation at all. Science is the analogue here.

This I think clearly, indeed brilliantly, illustrates the type of thing science is essentially; and of what, incidentally, the essence of religion and art are too.

When science gets to the stage, as it first tentatively did about a hundred years ago, where it begins to investigate human beings and their behaviour i.e. it has reached psychological science, a problem always implicit in any science, becomes explicit. How can an observer observe, totally objectively and impartially, that which is of his own kind and stuff, whilst he himself is obviously of that kind and stuff? This is discussed in BS 87/91. Here is not the place to go into this question, but one result, relevant for us at this moment in our general review of what science is, or rather what Macmurray thinks it is, emerges. This is the fact that science is instrumental. By this Macmurray means that science, investigating anything - and Macmurray insists that science can investigate anything; no field is closed to it (BS 92) - cannot, and never can, give us complete knowledge of that thing. "The answer that I shall suggest to this problem is that science is instrumental knowledge." (BS 81/2). "Science can cover the whole range of phenomena but not the whole of the possible knowledge about any of it. It is not limited to a part of the field but to a particular aspect of any part of the field. In other words, there is nothing that science cannot

give us some knowledge about, and there is nothing that science can give us complete knowledge about." (BS 92). "The world is material for our use, and science seeks to develop that knowledge of the world through which we can use it as the instrument of our intentions." (PR 217). Such knowledge, as the name suggests, is a means to an end.

"But if societies are to progress beyond a limited and impoverished existence it can only be by the deliberate invention of more elaborate techniques, of more complicated machines and methods, in a word, by the invention of instruments of control. Science is the kind of knowledge of the world that is needed for this purpose, and it is for this reason that we can define it as instrumental knowledge." (BS 99). "Science is throughout concerned with the control of the world in so far as it is material and in relation to the development of human life. It is the theoretical instrument for subordinating the material environment to man." (IU 150).

"Scientific knowledge is instrumental knowledge; it is the kind of knowledge which provides the basis of technological advance". (RAS 16). Science, instrumental knowledge, can never be a knowledge of things in themselves. This can only come from art; or from religion in the case of persons. Nor can it be, or ever give, a knowledge of how or what to choose and intend i.e. of values. It is merely a knowledge better able to achieve ends discerned by other means of knowing. To realize this is of special relevance today when countless people see science both as an end in itself and as the provider, mistakenly, of a philosophy of life which perhaps most appropriately could be called scientific materialism - mistakenly, not merely because it is wrong, but because it is not even philosophy! But more of this later.

In his exposition of science Macmurray finds it necessary to distinguish between events and actions. This is a major distinction based upon what we find in the actual world. And it is a permanent distinction. "The distinction of 'act' and 'event' is a principle of ultimate or metaphysical classification, and is an absolute distinction." (SA 149). Nothing could make us see that they could ever coalesce or become compatible. Especially, the fundamental difference is that an event has a cause. It is an happening. On the other hand an action is intended; there is, that is, a reason for it. "For every event there is a cause; for every act there is a reason." (SA 149). "To speak quite strictly, nothing can be done without an intention. Action is inherently intentional. Where there is no intention there are only events which happen." (BS 206). "We have therefore to draw a distinction between actions and events; a distinction which we can mark clearly by saying that events happen, while actions are performed. Events are not performed and actions do not happen. Whenever we conceive anything as an event, we imply that it is not an action. In other words, all events are matters of fact; while no actions are matters of fact, but matters of intention. The world of fact consists of things and events. Things are, as it were, the static components of the world of fact, and events the dynamic components. What characterizes this world of fact is the absence of intention and, hence, of action. The distinction between fact and intention is the basis of all practical consciousness." (BS 206/7). Macmurray goes much deeper into this and its ramifications in SA chapter 7; and in BS 206/218. The relevance for us here, at this point of our first and cursory examination of Macmurray's view of

science, is that events only, it would seem, can be properly and satisfactorily subject to scientific examination and, consequently, as a ground for the effective practical use in the world of those scientific findings. Intentions, at least from the external and the scientific observer's point of view, are not recognizable in his observings. He can only see events. Yet, of course, intentions are a major part of human make-up, personal psychology, and consequently of reality which the scientist purports to be examining and dealing with. Is there a way, as yet undiscovered, by which intentions can be discerned with complete objectivity? That is, not 'known' only because we are told about them by a subject, or merely assume them in others because of our own private experience of them? Or must they for ever be hidden, secret, indiscernable, and thus never available for scientific, objective, examination? Have we here reached the 'limits' of science? This will be touched upon later.

A seeming anomaly or paradox is found in Macmurray's writings on science. Frequently, in the foregoing we have had occasion to use the word 'objective'. Macmurray uses it often too, either directly or by implication and we understand and agree, without exception, that this is an appropriate word and idea to use in connection with scientific activity and research. If one thing describes science it is objectivity. And where better illustrated and proved than in the earlier given analogy of the speech situation? Emotion had been banished and only objectivity prevailed. "By objectivity, I mean the capacity to stand in conscious relation to that which is recognized as not ourselves. Everything, of course stands in relation to what is not itself, and everything that is capable of consciousness stands in conscious relation to what is not itself. This however, is not

sufficient to constitute rationality. We must add that that to which we stand in conscious relation is recognized, is consciously apprehended, as not ourselves." (IU 128). "... all objective knowledge is knowledge of matter of fact only and necessarily excludes any knowledge of what is matter of intention." (PR 39).

"For science is only interested in the object, and therefore writes, speaks, and thinks, even of itself, in the third person. (RE 150). Then suddenly, out of the blue, Macmurray speaks of science as subjective. "... science remains subjective, while art achieves objectivity." (RE 155). And there can be no denying that this idea of subjectivity, in this context of science, has been used by Macmurray a number of times, as subsequent extracts will demonstrate.

By a long and roundabout examination of Macmurray's subtle meanings it is partially possible to resolve this anomaly, but it is a pity confusion was caused in the first place.

Apparently, science in its drive for objectivity is subjective because it cares nothing for the thing in itself nor for relating with it, even if it were a person. Thought is considered only as a means to the scientist's end. "Science cannot rest in any object, just because it is not interested in any; its interest is subjective, in the operations of the mind upon the object, in doing something to it, describing it, referring it never in the object itself, in and for itself, in its individual reality." (RE 156). "Any real object is for science only an example, a fact, something to be referred to a class, something to be analysed into elements, something which is the effect of something else. Thus science is endlessly referred from one thing to another and chases objectivity over the infinite cosmos,

finding, like Noah's dove, no place on which the sole of its foot may rest. For science really is always round the next corner." (RE 155/6). Whether these very opposite and irreconcilable concepts ought to have been used to describe the same activity, much as we eventually begin to understand their respective meanings in this context, is certainly questionable.

This finishes, so far as is possible here, a summary of what science is for Macmurray. Many extracts from his books could be used to sum up his ideas of science, but the following is as good as any.

"The term 'science' refers primarily to a personal activity of intellectual reflection. It is something that people do. It means secondarily and negatively the set of beliefs which form the datum for this activity, at a particular time, in any branch of scientific enquiry. All scientific knowledge rests on a postulate of determinism. If it did not, it would not be 'objective'. but if scientific knowledge were made normal for all possible knowledge; if this were interpreted to mean that there are in fact no human activities, or no aspect of human activity which are not objectively determined; if it involved a total denial of freedom, then the possibility of the personal activity which we call science would itself be denied. For the production of science is one of the manifestations of the 'I do'. It is a matter of intention, and not merely matter of fact. (PR 42).

It is natural that only an incomplete and tenuous review can, and only could, be given; but an attempt has been made for it to be a fair account. After a brief appraisal, we will turn to some further ideas and comments of Macmurray, either extending or arising out of his basic conception of science.

Appraisement (1)

Macmurray gives us a timely reminder that there are other ways of knowing besides science. We are inclined to believe, unthinkingly, that scientific knowledge, and its older, long-standing, ubiquitous brother, knowledge of things and facts and of their workings, constitutes all knowing. This attitude has been blindly and unquestionably reinforced by, and since, the 1902 Education Act which by its nature, inevitably if not intentionally, made I.Qism and instrumentalism the permanent basis of our outlook, knowledge, knowing and apprehending, to the exclusion of almost all other ways of knowing. Personally, being like everybody else the product of the current educational system and conditioned by this ethos and theory of knowledge and learning, increasingly and never so intense as it is today, I find it difficult to accept in my feeling life, although of course I recognize it intellectually and theoretically, that other forms of knowing exist. And it is even more difficult to accept their primacy, and to appreciate that scientific knowledge is only information. I believe this obtains from everybody else too, which leads to the question as to whether Macmurray could really have been living "out of his time". Did he live in the full awareness that experiencing and relating, and other direct forms of knowledge, were more real to him than the sort of knowledge we generally get, admittedly indirectly, from books, science, and other secondhand sources and which we comprehend and take to ourselves mainly through the intellect? Would he not be an exceptional or rare person if he did? This does not mean of course that he was not right in his analysis of the knowledge situation.

Perhaps we should go further than Macmurray, and not only remind ourselves that other more immediate and vivid ways of knowing exist, but recognize that we have lost a whole vast area of knowing; or if we have not lost it in fact, we have nevertheless lost it in consciousness. How often does our knowledge of theatre, drama, literature, poetry, sculpture, and music consist not so much of direct experience, appreciation, and joy, as of a vast bulk of analysis and criticism; our own sometimes but, more often than not, other peoples? This, surely, can only be called secondary and "scientific" knowledge, and not direct, immediate, experienced, personal, knowledge. Often the same goes for our knowledge of people too. Probably the only thing we knowingly feel directly is a spring morning! Often we are too busy thinking of the next task to enjoy and know the immediate and live in it. Under pressure we eat our meals quickly and fail to know and enjoy the immediate taste of our food; and very few people have time for the real enjoyment of each other's company, wife's, husband's or children's. We deliberately set out, through the social ethos and its chief agent in this matter, formal education, to constantly enhance a person's knowledge of facts. We do very little to enlarge and improve his ability to know himself, improve his emotional and relational life, nor to improve his knowledge of the whole fundamentally important world of values, whether artistic or social.

As mentioned earlier in the exposition it is unfortunate that having perceived and diagnosed this vital failure in our knowing, and of our consciousness of it, that Macmurray does not make more of it as a major theme. "Reason and Emotion" does have much to say about

it, but even here it is not contrasted strongly enough with our distorted and ultimately disastrous insistence that there is only one way of knowing, or at least that there is only one worthwhile way. And in this way everything else is considered to be either non-existent, secondary, or of no account.

Next, as we have seen, Macmurray intentionally or unintentionally goes a step further. What we take to be information, as scientifically provided, is on the one hand invented by us and embodied in abstract formulae whose source can only be described as the imagination. It is about as much like reality as that of a drawing by a man's blind from birth would be. And on the other hand, the observation out of which we create the formulae are, to say the least, extremely tenuous. Moreover, they are made up for the most part from our assumptions and inferences not from whole and continuous observations at all. The only positive thing to be said about such formulae or hypotheses is that, in practice, they work and often enable us to move on to yet another step or another formula. Is this true? It obviously is, and must be, assuming that the world you and I habitually experience is the real world, the known world. Admittedly it is, and must be, the world for us. but if we take this too seriously could we not rightly be accused of excessive subjectivism or anthropomorphism? Whether the source of knowledge is of a questionable kind or not, surely we must believe that the universe we experience is the external manifestation of underlying basic stuffs, whether we choose to call these stuffs atoms, elements, or anything else. As a philosopher Macmurray cannot possibly be unaware of this very elementary conception. A person who had never heard of philosophy or science would concede it. Now; who is to say

that "our" world is the real world? Why have our senses been endowed with the prime ways of knowing, and to be regarded as such? From the practical point of view it is proper for us so to regard knowledge, but to stamp it, as Macmurray seems to do, with the authority of ultimacy, if only by implication, as if this is, and must be, the final situation seems to be going beyond the evidence. Sense and direct knowing obviously evolved for our survival as the entities we are. It need not be the essence of real or ultimate knowing.

We must concede that Macmurray does admit that scientific knowledge does not give us truth, except if it does so by chance; and of course, we do not know that. But, by the truth here he means the minute truth of that particular formula. He does not mean all truth, reality, or knowledge which is questioned above and which, let it be repeated, he is strangely unaware of.

As foreshadowed in the exposition I think most people would agree with Macmurray's contention that science is general, abstract, and impersonal. And his speech situation illustration and support for this seems both very enlightening and vivid. We can visualize the three situations clearly. The question again arises as to why the first should be called religious, but this is not the place to re-open that criticism.

Whatever we think of science, and agree partially, wholly, or not at all with Macmurray's previously discussed criticism of it, it is useful to be reminded that science, even if it gives knowledge, does not give the whole of it, but only the instrumental kind. Never does, or can it, give us a knowledge of values. This is regardless of whether one is an Absolutist or a Relativist. Values may or not

be eternal, intrinsic, and vital elements in the universe, laid up in heaven as it were, and there for us to discover and live by. They may only, as the Relativists would claim, be humanly created, practical, discernments and rules arising out of our constant necessity to act and choose. But whatever they are science cannot provide a working hypothesis concerning them, let alone a full-fledged prescription. They are of a different order and category. However we regard science it is, as Macmurray says, instrumental.

Events and actions, to turn to another point, are fundamentally distinguishable, and to make such a distinction is very pertinent. And within the meaning of the terminology and explanation used here, they are importantly different. Moreover; the distinction makes it easier to scientifically explain, or not explain as the case may be, certain things we observe in the world. Without going into detail one might ask, Do actions, once they have become established, irrespective of their reason for being, become events? To ask this will not perhaps help us to satisfactorily describe their origin, motive, and reason for being as they are; but in a "chain", and not merely one hypothetical, isolated, act, it may become more explicable, and become the subject of scientific observation and surmise. But this is only a preliminary suggestion. Certainly there are events, and there are actions.

As stated in the exposition objectivity and subectivity, although seemingly incongruous, can be (as shown by Macmurray) explained and used within the same universe of discourse. But it seems regrettable that, at least so far as "subjective" seems to be understandable, another descriptive term might have been chosen to better effect. "Objective" seems an appropriate term in the context,

and as commonly used to describe what indeed it does here.

Apart from someone who is a specialist philosopher of science, Macmurray's understanding, ideas, and criticisms of science seem very comprehensive and cogent, and in one sense, that is in the wider conspectus of life, thought and practicability, of equal or even greater value than those of somebody who is a narrow specialist in this branch of human thought. Such a person might be too much of a "scientist" of science, and not a philosopher of it!

End of Appraisalment (1)

Origins of Science

How does science come to be? "The scientific impulse is as old as man. It is the impulse to control nature through understanding." (RE 245). I have emphasised "impulse" because even Macmurray would find it hard to give evidence for science before the Renaissance; or to stretch a point - before the end of the Middle ages. There may always have been the impulse but not the science. However, he does go slightly further in his analysis and nomenclature than would seem to be necessary by declaring that science came to maturity at this time. Maturity, one would ordinarily think, is the condition achieved by something which has existed for a considerable time and is at last becoming, after a period of gestation, infancy, and adolescence, of trial and error, an established entity or being in its own right. It has at last found itself. Indeed Macmurray says, "Science found its real nature at the Renaissance." (RE 245). It is doubtful if this is true. For a couple of centuries or more after

this it was groping to find its own reality, meaning, and techniques.

However, in one respect science did evidence maturity at the Renaissance. "If we try to discover in what the difference between mature science and its immature forms consists, we find the essence of it in a new attitude of mind which defines a new method and secures unity and continuity of development through a full consciousness of the task. There is first a repudiation of dogmatism, and a conviction of ignorance. Immature science, like immature religion, is cocksure and convinced of its knowledge. Mature science is humble and tentative, convinced of the immensity of its ignorance, and sure only that patient research can gradually extend the field of knowledge. It has given up the hope of certainty; it has lost its life in order to save it. It has become objective, governed by the facts, submitting to the discipline of the world it seeks to know". (RE 245/6). Pages RE 245/7 are also relevant to this point.

Another obvious factor of long-standing in man which is conducive to the production of science is the need to explain, to find reasons for things. "It is grounded in the impulse to reason that creates science." (RE 55). But it took many ages for man to reach the scientific temper. Yet explanation and reason were usual, common, indeed rife before science. They certainly were never lacking. To give one example from Macmurray, "The ancient Indians thought that the world rested on an elephant, and the elephant on a tortoise. That belief was the expression of the reason in them seeking an explanation of the world. Yet it is a childish explanation of a crude kind." (RE 55).

But on the point of origin, a very common trap, as Macmurray warns us, we must not fall into. Many authorities write and speak under the impression that the Greeks originated and established science. This they certainly did not. Coincidentally they may have had imaginative ideas about the elements, atoms, and even evolution. But this was brilliant guesswork. It was more allied to art and poetry than to science, the essence of which is a total commitment to ascertained facts and experimentation thereon. "It is only through the ambiguity of words that we consider modern science to be continuous with Greek philosophy. Modern science rests upon the adoption of the experimental method in preference to all forms of reflective speculation. Greek theories, even when they coincide with some of the conclusions of modern science, rest upon aesthetic insight and are not the products of observation tested by experiment. In the modern sense, science is not science because its results are true, but because they are arrived at through the use of a certain technique." (CH 24). And again. "A great artist has often the power to arrive through intuition at a truth about the structure of the world, which science only discovers in its own slower but surer fashion later on. But this does not make it possible for the scientist to look to the artist for his conclusions nor even to accept them as scientific hypotheses." (CH 25). "The poet may anticipate the scientist; but even if his insights prove true, it is not thereby scientific. It is at best the suggestion of a hypothesis which science may, in its own systematic development, find verifiable." (SA 61).

But if Macmurray, quite rightly, dismisses claims made on behalf of the Greeks as the originators of science, it is with greater surprise that we find him attributing, if not its origin then its inspiration and motivation, to Christianity. He does this mainly on the grounds of integrity. Macmurray mentions this several times - at least seven. He sometimes uses the term truth. But as in another context he contends that science is not about truth this is slightly misleading. But we understand and accept what he means.

Christianity introduced a burning desire and urge for the discovery and recognition of reality. Only science, so far, of the three main modes of reflection, has taken this seriously. Hence, according to Macmurray, its foundation in Christianity. "There is one limited field of knowledge in which we can find a clue to the integrity we are seeking and that is in modern science. This is no accident. Science, in its own field, is the product of Christianity, and its most adequate expression so far." (CH 86). "Science, then, is rooted in Christianity and stands or falls with it. So that if we throw Christianity overboard in order to choose science, we shall destroy the basis of science in doing so. It is therefore impossible to choose between science and religion." (FMW 40). "There is ample evidence, though it is generally overlooked, to justify the judgment that the empiricism of modern science is itself the product of Christianity. One has only to read the Christian gospels to realize that it was for the realistic, empirical, naturalism of his attitude that Jesus was hounded to death by the religious traditionalists of his day." (SRE 11). Other references are to be found in CH 192, RE 184; RE 193; RE 172.

Moreover, science is our only form of reflection, so far, grounded in empiricism, as opposed to speculative phantasy or ingrained traditionalism, an attitude or way of seeing things we must, and will have to eventually and inevitably, adopt in all areas of experience and living.

However, we must remember, as was said earlier, truth or falsity does not come into it, either with yesterday's or today's explanations. "But we must not suppose that the expressions we have found, or that men have found in the past are true and adequate expressions. That would be very unlikely. It would be just as absurd to suppose that the ideas men have had about the nature of the world, or the ideas they have now, were true and adequate ideas." (RE 54/5).

So; if man has always had the scientific impulse, and if he has always sought to explain things through reasoning, why did science appear when it first did, about five hundred years ago? And why has it continued to grow and flourish, until now it is probably our major form of thought and action, at least so far as its two allied, or should we say rival, forms of human modes of reflection are concerned i.e. art and religion?

One thing about the origin of science, as we know it in our era, is certain; or so we must believe if we are to be scientific at all. And that is, that science did not appear arbitrarily, a sort of spontaneous, social, mutation. It must have had a cause.

And Macmurray attributes its emergence to two causes or conditions. He calls these:-

- 1) The outer objective, material condition.
- 2) The inner, subjective, psychological condition.

The first is grounded in the economic conditions of existence. Obviously, this is based on the economic interpretation of history. Environmental changes necessitate human adaptation and response and, as we know, if we accept the theory, this causes repercussions beyond the mere basically economic. Science was such a response to a unique situation at an appropriate time in history. "The material conditions are no doubt mainly economic. They are pressure of social necessity which society finds itself under of adapting its forms of social behaviour to changing material conditions of life, and certain new possibilities of doing so." (BS 40/1). "It is part of the effort of society to adapt itself to changes in the conditions of its existence. It is always the pressure of necessity which sets a problem for society. Science was the answer of modern society to the problems set for society by environmental conditions at that point in history." (BS 41).

The second, the psychological conditioning, implies Macmurray is less well recognised than the first, whether in this context or in any other. And it must also be noted that the first cause alone, as outlined above, is insufficient in itself to produce science. "The necessity of changing the social habits of life, if society is to survive or maintain its standard of living, is not in itself sufficient, since it might be met by a conservative resistance to change which did actually result in the failure to survive or to maintain the standard of life. If a society meets the threat by an effort of conscious adaptation instead of by an increased effort to maintain the customary forms of adaptation, then it will need a new

sort of knowledge on which to base its deliberate effort." (BS 45c). Nevertheless, it is not permissible "to explain the development of science without reference to the field of practical effort". (BS 46) i.e. the economic.

So what is the second condition? It is not, as some have suggested, the sudden upsurge of a desire for knowledge. Stimulation for this did not come from a rediscovery of Greek thought with its reawakening of interest. "No doubt natural curiosity at all times makes us ask questions and seek to answer them merely for the sake of doing so. But such a natural curiosity will never give rise to science." (BS 42). "It is no sociological account of science which relates it to the general human desire for knowledge. That desire is universal in human nature and operates at all times in all societies. But it does produce science at all times and in all societies. And since the actual people who produce science are limited in number to a relatively small minority, the social motive which underlies the production of science is not their motive necessarily." (BS 44/5).

The essential condition is dissatisfaction in a society with a strong desire to improve and progress. The Middle Ages could not have produced science. "The attitude of mind which was characteristic of the Middle Ages could not have produced science. It had no interest in doing so. Mediaeval society did not want scientific questions asked and answered because it had no intention of modifying the traditional forms of life." (BS 42). "The mediaeval world was a traditional society. It lived by custom and habit. It assumed, therefore, that the right way to do anything was the traditional way, the way it had always been done. Its intentional

life was conservative." (BS 43).

Macmurray emphasises that the motivation must be that of a society, or at least of a considerable number of people within it. Not once does he refer to the stimuli provided by great and pioneer thinkers. Except perhaps, by implication, to Kant - who is not relevant at this point. Nowhere in his writings does Macmurray ever mention or support the "great men" theory. It can only result from a deliberate effort and the deliberate effort must be a social one because science, unlike art, is only possible through a continuity of cooperation. In other words, the inner condition of science is the intention to produce it, and the intention to produce science is a particular aspect of the intention to achieve progress.

Sociologically, therefore, the inner condition of the appearance of science as a feature of the life of a particular society is that the society should have formed the intention to progress." (BS 43).

"Before society can produce science there must be a socially effective group of people who have abandoned the outlook that finds its canons of rightness in the wisdom of the past, and replaced it by an attitude which is determined to make the future better than the past. Until people feel that the right way to do things is to do them better than they have ever been done, the idea of progress and the intention to progress are unthinkable." (BS 43/4). There is much more elaboration of this kind in neighbouring pages. But enough has been said and quoted to make the point.

But is the explanation sufficient? Macmurray seems not to think so for he goes yet a step deeper into the social and psychological mood. The clue he gives is that many people wanted, for the first time, to live their own lives and break free from the bonds of habit

and custom. "The social condition for the origin of science is that a particular society wants to strike out upon a new path in its social behaviour instead of to maintain its traditional form of behaving. Towards the end of the Middle Ages in western Europe this was the situation which arose, and it marks a very significant change in the inner conditions of social life. Large numbers of people found themselves wanting to live their own lives in their own way instead of in the traditional and customary way. They began to break loose from the social custom and to attempt to live by their own judgement." (BS 46/7).

This naturally caused chaos at first, rather similar one could say to the stage we are now going through with the coming of the Permissive Society, which has thrown off the moral, social, and relational restraints and shackles of Puritanism, Victorianism, and the rigours of Non-conformity. Once freed, and released from the past, people in this situation have no idea of what to do or of how to do it. They have to learn. And to learn means knowledge, new knowledge. And in the case we are considering i.e. the overthrow of Mediaevalism, the new learning, the new knowledge, was science. "The social result was the threat of chaos. The first discovery, in fact, was that people could not live their own lives in their own way without first discovering how to do it. This discovery no doubt tended to throw numbers of people back into the conservative camp as conscious opponents of the effort to invent new ways of living. But it also gave rise, in other quarters, to an effort of a reflective kind directed towards the achievement of the kind of knowledge that would enable the effort to succeed. Thus the desire to devise a new

form of social life led to the desire to create a new kind of knowledge as the condition of success. The progressive intention which had arisen in society was thus canalised into the field of reflection. The first stage in the transition from a customary to a progressive social life had to be a deliberate effort to achieve progress in knowledge. Science is the first stage of the effort to achieve social progress, and it is the first stage, because until science has been developed, it is in fact impossible to change practical modes of social life without disastrous consequences". (BS 47/8).

Macmurray makes several relevant points concerning this. Science is a reflective activity, therefore it is some time before its effects could be felt practically. Meanwhile society had to get along as best it could within the old framework and social structure. (See BS 48).

Furthermore, the change at the end of mediaevalism to science "constitutes perhaps the most far-reaching of all revolutions in human society. It involved the production and spread of a radically new attitude to life, and for this reason it is fundamentally a change in moral outlook. Its novelty does not consist in the fact that numbers of people rebelled against customary authority. That has always happened to a greater or lesser extent. It consists rather in the association of the sense of rightness with the revolt. Instead of feeling that the right way to live was the way that was hallowed by tradition and custom and guarded by social authority, they began to feel that the right way was to live better than anybody had lived before." (BS 48/9).

Macmurray admits (BS 49) that the foregoing account of the origin of science is incomplete and leaves many questions unanswered. But it does initiate a train of historical thought and analysis worth following up. No reason or cause can ever be fully satisfactory as an explanation. There is always the need and feeling to seek for, and to push it back, to the stage before i.e. to the preceding cause, ad infinitum.

And there are a number of subsidiary but important and relevant questions that need to be answered. Macmurray makes a tentative attempt at one. Why did science take the mathematical form in its enquiry into matter when, presumably, it could have taken other forms? After all, as we have seen, science is only invented knowledge. We could therefore, perchance, have invented other forms to describe matter.

Mathematics became the form because it is related to the techniques of the counting-house, which at this time was emerging as a foremost economic factor, as trade both local and on a wider scale began to grow and prosper. (See BS 50). This was incipient mercantilism if not capitalism. And for this, quantity - the duplication of identical items and units - became as important as quality. "All commodities must be represented as complexes of identical units of value, and equations established between different complexes. Thus the way in which the merchant succeeds in dealing with his world of materials is identical in principle with the way in which the physicist deals with the material world. There is thus an instructive set of correlations to be worked out between the methods of developing science and the method of developing capitalism; between the enterprising spirit of modern society, in the practical

and in the reflective fields." (BS 51/2).

We are often presented with the view that science first attacked the material and physical world because this was the most remote from human feeling; and thus more acceptable, although Copernicus had a rough time. (See BS 56). Only recently have we been able to bear scientific research into religion and psychology, the most personal and sensitive part of ourselves. "The field which is most highly charged with emotion and which the inhibitions which express our fear are most powerful, is the field of the personal life." (BS 58).

But whilst not disputing this (see BS 56 & 58) Macmurray suggests another reason why matter came first to be studied by science. "We should observe that the underlying social intention of progress makes it inevitable that the new reflective effort should be directed primarily upon the material world in an effort to secure a conscious and deliberate control of material conditions. The control of material is the primary necessity of life, and an improvement in our control of matter is the primary necessity if we are to improve our ways of social life. The first effective expression of the intention to progress must be an effort to achieve the basic means to progress; and this is clearly an increasing mastery of the material world." (BS 51)

The Development of Science

Macmurray's ideas of the development of science are the common and usual ones, and short of a major upheaval in historical thought by an original thinker, these will continue to be the views.

Therefore it need not detain us. The view, of course, is that the

development of science parallels the main ethos of society. (See BS 55/60). From the Renaissance to the middle of the eighteenth century physical science matched a reason-orientated society. From this time until 1914 Romanticism paralleled scientific biological and allied interests. Since 1914 psychological science has matched a chaotic, 'mental' and irrational age, which has yet to be dubbed and receive its final categorizing by historians. Needless to say, all the suggested dates and ages above are merely approximate.

The Acceptance of Science

But in all this development and growth of science Macmurray makes a point - indeed he makes it several times - which is often overlooked by historians, and which leads to the important question of how it still operates, or has ceased to operate, today. We have already referred to the fear of science and of how, as a consequence, it was allowed to grow only gradually, from material to personal investigation. But this fear brought another consequence. Science was allowed to grow only under a pretence - the pretence that it was about theory only, and had no practical effects. This pretence has, from time to time, been expressed in different ways, but they all amount to the same thing. "Under the stress of the tension between the desire for progress and the fear of abandoning custom and tradition modern society achieved a compromise by which the effort to achieve progress in scientific knowledge was socially accepted while any effort to apply it to the transformation of social practice was declined. This is the sociological meaning of the notion that knowledge should be sought for its own sake". (BS 54).

"We decided, if I may use the personification, to face the task of deliberately developing our knowledge of how to control the world but not to proceed to the length of deliberately controlling it. We decided, in other words, that the new knowledge must be pursued as an end in itself, but it must not look beyond knowledge to the control of practical life." (BS 59). "The structure of modern science is socially conditioned by the inhibition which expresses itself in the idea of knowledge for its own sake." (BS 62). "But, as we saw, it is this same inhibition which resulted in the divorce between the progressive development of knowledge and its application in the practical field. This divorce is responsible for the form of pure science, since it limits progress to the field of theory and makes knowledge an end itself". (BS 68/9). (See also BS 67).

Have we at last, in our time, freed ourselves from both fear and pretence? The immense technological advances of the last forty years, permeating the whole of society and affecting every aspect of our lives, would suggest that we have. But let us not overlook the reservations. But for trade union thwarting and restrictive practices in face of the introduction of new techniques, founded on scientific research and progress, we could all enjoy a standard of living 10% higher than at present.

That we now allow psychological aspects of life to be scientifically investigated suggests to Macmurray that we have overcome our final fears and banished the pretence of theory only. "The acceptance by society of the effort to establish a scientific psychology is evidence that this inhibition is being broken down". (BS 61). "Our society is now beginning to be able to look directly

at the facts about ourselves, our actual behaviour and its motivation. This is the inner social condition which is necessary for the development of psychological science. As a result, it is no longer impossible to apply the methods of scientific investigation to the study of human behaviour. (BS 58). But how far have we allowed this to affect us practically?

Despite the whole of our lives from work, culture, literature and art, the press, to all entertainment being riddled with, and probed by, psychology, how far have we allowed it and its findings to genuinely affect our lives, both as individuals and as a society? Very little indeed, one would think, if the childishness, immaturity, irrational behaviour, crime, addictions, and mental disorders are any guide. We still prefer to interpret events and our lives, and even our health, especially our emotional and mental health, in terms of non-scientific conceptions.

Perhaps, even yet, science is only physically and materially acceptable. And we are certainly and rightly suspicious and unsure of the damage it may yet, in its variety of ways, do for and to the human race. In fact, we may be more familiar with science, as indeed we must be compared with past generations, but we are no less wary of it.

The Limits of Science

Has science any limits? We live and think in the belief that it has none. The general feeling is that eventually science, despite present fears, will 'know' everything and open up for us the whole field of opulence, ease, bliss, and health. Science, we believe is

the key to the universe and eternity. Reservations there may be about mishandling or misusing it - as stated in the previous section. But none about its ultimate efficacy and ubiquity.

Yet Macmurray, with deeper perception, reminds us that this is not so on at least five counts. But, contrary to what some people are inclined to think, he does affirm that there are no areas of existence into which science, in principle, may not probe. Nothing is outside of the scope of science. Everything can be grist to its mill. "Science takes the whole world of experience and leaves nothing over for religion. But equally, religion claims the whole world of experience for itself. The artist does likewise. We are driven, therefore to suppose that the difference between them must lie not in their fields but in the attitudes of mind in which they deal with the same field." (SRE 21).

But despite this ubiquity, we already have a hint as to one limitation of science. It may have the whole field, but the attention and concern with this is limited by its own perception and intention. And this occurs in two ways. Firstly; it limits itself to what might be termed the material and measurable aspects of things or events. Secondly; such knowledge as it does obtain of the object is always, as we saw earlier, instrumental. It is never the whole of knowledge, but only one aspect of it. And this is all it is interested in. This is a vital and fundamental limitation of science, and we should all recognise it, both for our personal benefit, and for society and its future. We are so apt to think that science is the only kind of knowledge. Nothing is further from the truth. If we persist in this we are likely to go into a biological and evolutionary cul-de-sac from which we shall be unable to retreat,

thus becoming a 'fixed' species as all others have become through the blind specialisation of one faculty.

Referring to science, art, and religion Macmurray says, "It is as if the same field of general experience became organized in three different ways round three different centres of interest." (SRE 23). "... the whole field of experience can be scientifically investigated, but that the knowledge that results from a scientific investigation of the whole field, or of any part of a field, is not the whole of the knowledge that can be gained about it. Science can cover the whole range of phenomena but not the whole of the possible knowledge about any of it. It is not limited to a part of the field but to a particular aspect of any part of the field. In other words, there is nothing that science cannot give us some knowledge about, and there is nothing that science can give us complete knowledge about." (BS 92). "Everything in the world is material. It may be that nothing in the world is merely material, though certainly much that is in the world is more nearly pure matter than the rest. Even in the field of what we usually call material objects, there seem to be features which escape from the meshes of the mathematical net. But organisms and persons, whatever they may be, are certainly material objects. It follows that there is nothing in the world as we know it in immediate experience to which mathematical thought is inapplicable. The proper way to state the limitation of this type of symbolic interpretation is to say that it is valid for reality in so far as it is material." (IU 101/2). And although we cannot here elaborate upon it the following is relevant. "The limits of mathematical thought are, in fact, the limits of science. Science

cannot offer us and should not be expected to offer us an interpretation of the universe. It is limited by the abstraction which creates it, and to apply its results beyond these limits is merely to be unscientific and illogical." (IU 102).

Arising from the foregoing is another marked but important limitation. That of value. Macmurray, following the usual classification, divides values into two categories, utility or instrumental values and intrinsic values. The names are sufficient to recognise their respective roles, if they are not familiar enough already. Whilst having to exist by the first, that is, compelled to make choices as the best means of surviving and of 'doing' things, it is the second, intrinsic values, which make us essentially human. These are really what we are living for and by, or ought to be, although unfortunately we often are not. And as we shall see later, we are ironically not so living because of science itself, or of its effects. To give relevant quotations for this paragraph. "We can value things in two different ways, for themselves or for their use, and both of these ways of valuing can be generalized. We can look upon the world from either of these points of view. If we envisage it from the point of view of intrinsic value we look upon it as good in itself and therefore to be enjoyed. If our valuation-attitude is instrumental the world appears as material which can be used." (BS 107/8). Three times Macmurray gives very extended examples of these different values. SRE 25/6; BS 100/4; SRE 27/9).

Thus we see that science, value-wise, is limited to only one half of life. The rest has no place in the world of science. Indeed, Macmurray in one place goes the whole hog and calls science 'valueless'. He qualifies this at once but nevertheless it has been

said. "The corollary of this is that science in itself is strictly valueless." (RE 189).

Thirdly; we will not linger over this point for it has been discussed elsewhere in this thesis; but it needs to be mentioned in this context. Life, as we experience it, is whole and infinite. The moment, this moment, is undivided and indivisible. The instant we begin to break it up we are not living, not acting, but reflecting. Science is always discrete. Of its very nature it is so. Philosophy, religion, and art are whole. Their intention is to be whole. They cannot but be whole. Science, to rule, must divide. This is its only way and method.

And this is its limitation. Wholeness is the essence of knowing and of living. Science is extremely useful. But it must always be the part, never the whole. By its very method it can produce only indicative and contributory bits of the truth, never the truth." But science is abstract and partial in a way that philosophy is not. For science always thinks about a part of what there is to reflect upon, never the whole. It limits itself to a particular subject-matter. Indeed, there is no such thing as science, but only a number of different sciences each dealing with a part of what is given in immediate experience." (IU 26).

Fourthly. Science is limited to the exploration and knowing of things which can be verified. If a thing, or rather an assertion concerning that thing, cannot be verified, it does not fall within the province of science." This explains why it is a fundamental principle of scientific method to exclude from consideration whatever cannot be verified by observation and experiment. So soon as our

minds pass beyond the limits of what can be verified in this way, we have no longer any means of distinguishing between reality and fiction." (BS 83). "The necessity for the verification of all conclusions is now completely recognized in the scientific field". (IU 74). (See also the whole of IU 74/83).

This note on verification as a limitation of science, important as it is, is mentioned only briefly because it has been dealt with more fully in another part of this thesis. But one thing needs to be especially noted in respect of verification. Science accepts only that which can be verified. But not all things which can be verified are necessarily scientific. Macmurray, you will recall, endeavours to find ways of verifying philosophy. And as a totally committed empiricist, he would wish to discover ways of verifying everything, in any field, before accepting it. Whether this is possible is another matter.

Lastly, we come to a problem of limitation which is much less direct, and much more subtle, problematic, and obscure than those hitherto mentioned. Although many matters relevant to science, as we can see by the quotations in this chapter on science, are raised and discussed in Macmurray's book, "The Boundaries of Science", essentially its *raison d'être* is this problem; as follows.

Scientific psychology enquires into human behaviour. About its capability of doing this there can be no doubt, for as Macmurray says, "Already in certain fields scientific psychology has provided for itself the same kind of justification as the other sciences. The field in which it has done so is limited; and the extent to which it has done so is still small in comparison with sciences such as physics and chemistry. But in principle it is the same kind of

justification. Already psychological sciences have thrown a great deal of light upon problems of human behaviour which have until now remained wrapped in mystery, and already the results of psychological investigation have proved themselves capable of successful application." (BS 90/1).

But how far can it go? And how correct is it so far as it has gone? This problem arises because of the following doubts. Firstly; can like investigate like? The essence of science is the independence of the investigator and the investigated. The scientist must always, and can only, explore the 'external'. "It follows from this that scientific knowledge is only possible so far as we can stand apart from things and observe without interfering." (BS 86 - and there is much more relevant to this on the same page). "Now, there is a field of experience where it is impossible to maintain this distinction between knowing something and acting upon it. What is the situation if I want to understand what I myself am doing? Is it possible for me to observe, in the way that science demands, my own actions? If I stop performing an action in order to observe it, there is no longer any thing to observe. My actions depend upon me and they only exist because I do them. It is quite clear in this case I cannot stand aside and observe what is happening as if it were external to me and independent of me". (BS 87). There is much more relevant to this point on adjacent pages of BS.

Secondly; science is concerned with events and causes. Here again, the full meaning of these terms and an understanding of them, is discussed elsewhere. But human beings are not of this form. The essence of being human is to intend, and subsequently to act; not to

be an automatic part of the chain of cause and effect. But this is the whole of science. Its purpose is to discover the workings of this chain of sequence. Intentions are created moments. Whilst they can be known they can never be 'discovered' in any scientific science.

It would seem therefore, if Macmurray is right, that whilst some aspects of human and social behaviour may, in so far as it is purely external and natural, be observed, classified, and brought within the bounds of the theories and hypotheses of science, the essential part of man can never be. "..... it must set limits to the possibility of science by isolating a part of social behaviour which is in principle independent of our intentions as its object of study. The difficulty which would then arise would be the mystery of the relation between the part of our behaviour that is independent of our intention and the part that is dependent upon it." (BS 67/8).

Obviously, if this is so then this is a real limitation of science. And, moreover, as science is a human activity and endeavour, how could science explain and prove science? Man is more than cause and effect and must therefore be, in the last resort, outside and beyond science." The philosophical question which arises can then be stated in the form, 'Can science give a satisfactory scientific account of science as a part of a general scientific account of human behaviour?' If it cannot, then the limits of science have been reached in the development of science itself." (BS 35).

The question of limitation is a very important aspect of the subject and we have been barely able to touch upon it. It deserves a thesis of its own.

Appraisement (2)

Nobody but Macmurray has before suggested that science originated in Christianity. This is not merely novel but shrewd - whether intended or not. In a way one of the greatest divisions in the world and in the mind of men, if not the greatest, is still between religion and science. Despite what Macmurray says, and he says it a number of times in his works, that the 'scientific view' of the universe and existence is not philosophy, nor 'religion', it is not easy to accept this, especially as the revelations of science get both more encompassing and mind-boggling.

Macmurray's strong argument, or supposedly strong, argument against this is that such a view is not scientific. Nobody pretends that it is. Everybody recognises it for what it is, and it is no less cogent for that. Looked at objectively there is much more evidence for it than for the religious view.

But assuming that this, the religious view, is in some way right - and of course Macmurray believes this to be so, especially that of Christianity - then to contend that it is the source of science, and he does so with some conviction and persuasion, is certainly a major and good step in the much needed direction of reconciliation and unity, both of society and of mind.

Earlier numerous attempted reconciliations, since the 1860s, have failed. They relegate either one of the contenders to a ringside role. Or they fudge the issue, and leave it unresolved. But Macmurray, if only heeded, as with many other things, could have done the trick. He has attempted to heal the breach at its very roots and not tried merely to manipulate the branches.

On this problem of conflict between religion and science Macmurray says, "And a perplexing question arises for us. How can the spirit of science, which is a passionate faith in truth, be in conflict with the spirit of Christianity? How is it possible to accept Christianity and reject the spirit of truth which is the basis of science?" (FMW 39).

2) Regarding the origin of science. We can accept the environmental, economic, view provided it is not to be the sole source but is to be taken with the psychological. But what causes the psychological is problematic. Why did more people want to think their own thoughts and live their own lives? We know from the experience of our own time and living how few people have original ideas and act upon them.

The question is - Who has the ideas? One person, or a small number of people? Macmurray, although he does not state it outright, seems inclined to the latter. But why were these so motivated? Is there no room for the 'great man' theory? Is social pressure so pervasive and uniquely timed that had Erasmus, Copernicus, Galilei, Newton, Freud, and Einstein not appeared, others of equal stature, awareness, and brilliance would have been thrown-up to do the job? Does not, to believe this, undermine Macmurray's whole conception of the uniqueness, spontaneity, and creativity of personality and human intention?

Obviously there can be at the moment no precise answer to the question of the origin of science, but supposedly an answer would add to our understanding of what it is. There is a chance, one would moot, that both the origin of science and what it is essentially and

in relation to man and this role, turns out to be something quite different from what we think now. A clearer and more realistic perspective of it must come with time.

3) Macmurray's explanation of how science came to be associated with mathematics is interesting. But how far is mathematics necessary to science? Of course, as it has developed, mathematics is a function of science. They are concomitants. They are essential to each other. But could science have developed without mathematics? And, if so, how? Macmurray vaguely suggests that it could. But does not offer, imaginatively, possible ways of this happening.

4) Perhaps because for so many years I have known and been influenced and conditioned by Macmurray's thinking, I find it easy to accept the limitations of science he has given. They seem obvious. But I can imagine countless people, unless open to reason, not finding them easy to accept.

We are so conditioned to think of science as knowledge, indeed the only form of valid knowledge, that it is not easy to re-orientate our minds and feelings. And this concerns the general outlook and field. How much more difficult it must be to accept the more abstract discussion of the limitations concerning the area within the human psyche.

There can be no doubt however that Macmurray's point is an extremely valid and practical one. It is obviously important not only for science, but for every field of human interest, especially for religion. What, if any, a conclusive answer could be is not apparent at this stage, but it is certainly a field of enquiry which must be sustained.

End of Appraisalment (2)

ART

Relevant Books

Reason and Emotion. (RE)

Religion, Art, and Science. (RAS)

The Structure of Religious Experience. (SRE)

Introduction

Unlike religion and science, art is not a major interest or consideration of Macmurray's. You feel that he knows, experiences, and lives religion and science, but not art. As we have seen he has a number of books named and each devoted to religion and science respectively, but none to art; and only one with art in the title - along of course with religion and science! Only the odd chapter in any book is concerned with art.

Given Macmurray's background, as related in the Introductory chapter and Biographical Note earlier, this is understandable. His home background, or perhaps we should say foreground, was intensely religious; and very early in life he developed a deep interest in science. Art either had no place, or Macmurray never refers to it, which is equally as telling and indicative. In his early religious life the usual artistic elements of religion - architecture, ritual, ceremonial, dress, and music - have little place.

Protestantism, and especially non-conformity from which Macmurray springs, is almost devoid of art; or it is only very

modestly allowed to show its face in devotional and sacred music, a little elementary carving, and a few flowers as decoration. Art is associated with the sensuous, an aspect of life never to be openly recognised, and certainly not to be enjoyed or encouraged.

However, despite this, Macmurray has a very definite and important place for art in his theorising, if not in his life. And much of this stems from his concern to show the respective places and function of religion and science - and art. For Macmurray the role and contribution of each is very significant, clear, and precise; and, together, exhaustive both of human experiencing and possibility.

Relevant Quotations

With this in mind we give a few quotations indicative of Macmurray's thinking and assessment of art.

The three generalised expressions of the personal - science, art, and religion - can only be properly understood in relation to one another. Of the three, religion is the fully concrete expression; the other two are partial and abstract. (RE 145).

Religion, in the sense in which it deserves consideration, is one of the three general expressions of rationality. The other two are art and science. Of the three religion is the basic expression and the most comprehensive. The others are more abstract and in a special sense included with religion. (RE 195).

Art, then, like science, is an abstraction from the full unity and wholeness of the personal. Yet it remains personal in a sense that science is not; and its value is higher than the value of science, because its abstractedness is lower. (RE 154).

Starting from the same facts, religion and art and science move in different directions because they deal with the facts differently. The religious man comes to worship, the artist to admire, the scientist to observe. (SRE 21).

Now religion is one of the three major modes of reflective activity. The others are science and art. (RAS 7).

Science is the creation of intellectual freedom; art of emotional freedom. (CH 182).

Apart from the above all saying something very important about art, they very obviously, in their wording and sentence structure, illustrate a point made earlier. In the mind of Macmurray thoughts of art come after religion and science! But some others do say a bit more about art.

The artistic attitude alone enables us to come into contact with the reality of things, to realize the individuality, the value of actual objects, actual people. For science things exist only in terms of something else. Reality is that which exists in and for itself, the individual. Knowledge is the grasp of reality, the contemplation of the individual in its own proper being. This is precisely what art gives us. (RE 155).

The field in which emotional reason expresses itself most directly is the field of art. (RE 30).

The artistic attitude, therefore, organizes the data of experience in terms of their beauty. The more beautiful anything is the more near it lies to the centre of interest. (SRE 29).

Innumerable other pithy and telling quotations are to be found in the following.

RE. 53. 58/9. 160. 164. 165. 187. 167/8.

RAS. 30. 31. 33.

SRE. 29. 31.

PR. 133/4.

Although not in their context these quotations are sufficient to illustrate Macmurray's ways of thinking on art, and of its sometimes rather bewildering, amorphous, wide-ranging, and unusual nature. We

have such terms as empiricism, abstract, rationality, moral, generalised expression, the personal, reflective - to name but some. Not an easy lot of ideas with which to work.

After much examination and thought I have tried to consolidate these ideas, and bring some coherence and order to them, although I am not sure how contradictory some of them might be. Sometimes, as mentioned before, Macmurray throws up ideas, often of value and with considerable insight, without relating them for us - they may be related in his mind - to the immediate context.

And rarely do sub-headings appear in his work, always a feature helpful to the reader; to do which also tends to bring more order and self-discipline to the writer.

Why Art?

Perhaps the first thing we have to ask ourselves is, Why art? Why do we have, create, recognise, experience, appreciate, enjoy this thing called art? Why, and how, does it come to be? Why do no other creatures have it? Why is man its only exponent? Why has art, in man's existence and history, increasingly become a recognised good, even a necessity?

Macmurray's answer to the question, Why art?, as you will have concluded from the quotations, may be summed-up in three basic ideas and concepts, all of which are related and to some extent interdependent. These are - the personal, rationality, and reflection.

To take the personal first you remember the quotation, earlier given, "The three generalized expressions of the personal - science,

art, and religion - can only be properly understood in relation to one another." The personal is such a major and important theme for Macmurray that I shall be expanding, examining, and evaluating it later in a section to itself in the philosophy chapter. Therefore, this is not the place to go into it deeply. Sufficient to say that the personal is the total and wholeness of those elements and manifestations, which are peculiar to man, and which makes man man and not any other entity or creature. But one example of this is language. Other creatures may communicate, but none have language.

Now we turn to our other two characteristics mentioned earlier, which are also unique to man; rationality and reflection. Rationality is "objective consciousness, and is possible only in beings who stand in conscious relationship to objects which they know and which are not themselves." (RE 195). This means, to be brief, two things. Firstly; that all creatures are conscious, but man is conscious that he is conscious. Secondly; and this is most important; that man can appreciate, live his life, and indeed best live his life, in terms of what is not himself i.e. in terms of reality; and not live subjectively i.e. in terms only of himself and of his immediate feelings and demands. To live subjectively is to be apersonal or even non-personal. It is to be less than man.

And one of the general expressions of rationality is art. (See RE 195). To say this may seem quite incongruous because we have been conditioned to associate rationality only with reasoning, and therefore with thought. But Macmurray, as you have realised from his definition, has a much more comprehensive view of it. Rationality is an aspect of the personal, and therefore can manifest itself in and through all man does and experiences, including feeling - and art.

Indeed art is an exemplification of this rationality; a contributory proof of it, as it were. That art exists at all demonstrates our rationality; that we are rational; that rationality is one of our constituents. "Now art and religion are two aspects of this search for the life of rational personality. They are the efforts of our sensitiveness to live in the knowledge of the reality of which we are a part. They are efforts to express the life of reason in us. They are alike in this, that they seek the awareness of reality through our emotional sensitiveness. They are the expressions of reason working in the emotional life in search of reality. Because we are persons it is not enough to have a feeling. We are driven to ask: 'What is it in the world that this feeling is about?' It is not enough to feel fear like an animal and then turn tail and run. We have to ask; 'What am I afraid of, and is it really to be feared?' The reason working in our emotional life forces us to take our feelings as an awareness of things outside us, as a consciousness of the meaning and value of things other than ourselves. So, on the basis of our emotional consciousness of the world we become artists and we become worshippers of God. Art and religion arise as ways of behaving as rational beings, as ways of expressing in our modes of living our awareness of the significance of the world we live in, an awareness that we possess through the reason in our emotional life. They are ways of expressing our emotional rationality." (RE 54).

What of the other basic term, reflection? Reflection is another big theme of Macmurray's. In his most erudite work, "The Form of the Personal." (two volumes), two long chapters are devoted to it; and there is a chapter on it in SRE. And many other references are made

on reflection throughout his writings.

Yet it is not always clear what he means by it. Sometimes he uses it as one would in everyday life, contrasting a mode of withdrawal into private mental activity with acting and relating in the tangible, physical, world. "... and indicate the relations which hold between the reflective activities and the primary unreflective activities." (RAS 8).

At other times he seems to regard reflection, especially as it shows itself in art, as a form of activity - beyond of course the obvious fact that even thinking is an activity i.e. the brain moving about. "When, therefore, we now turn to consider the arts, we shall think of them as activities - as human doings; to be understood as forms of reflective activity which have their place in the Browning called 'the general deed of Man', and their justification in the contribution which they make to it." (RAS 29). Perhaps the answer is that although you must "do" religion, art, and science, the fact that they exist as we know them, and are conscious of them, is enough to make them be seen as reflective, or perhaps reflected, entities.

This is all we can say at this point without the space available to analyse exhaustively and dissect; and if necessary reconstruct Macmurray's very lengthy exposition of reflection. We must be content to accept that, for him, art is one of our foremost forms of reflection.

From the foregoing enough has been said to indicate Macmurray's answer to the question, Why art? Art is, and exists, because it is one expression of man's nature and essence. It is a concomitant of the personal. Admittedly this is only an answer which merely pushes the question further back. It might even be circular. But all

questions of this kind cannot be answered in a total, absolute, and ultimate sense. We, with our limited minds, understanding, and comprehension, have to be content with forays, explanations, and suggestions which illuminate and orientate, and take us a step on the way. And I think Macmurray's conception of art does this.

What is Art Doing?

Or, what does it have to do? What is its role? How does art go about its business?

Man is personal and therefore needs to be doing personal things and be living personally. If he does not, either collectively or as an individual (each one of us, you and I), he is shortfalling. He is virtually not man. Now, as man, we have to contend with three orders - things, organisms, and people; matter, life, and the personal.

Science deals with things. Even when it studies organisms, or even people (psychology and sociology) it deals with them in a "thing" way. Its very essence is to be "feelingless".

Religion deals with the personal, which includes relating, love, freedom, and equality. The essence of religion is total, mutual, benign feeling, exchanging, giving, and sharing.

Art deals with the organic. It takes up and captures life with all its vibrant and enveloping zest, vitality, and sensuousness. As with religion, feeling is rich and positive, but its expression is all one way - outgoing, but not reciprocal or receiving.

As art is our present concern, let us have a quotation to illustrate this. "This joy in the life of the senses would seem to be a particular expression of something wider - the feeling that it

is good to be alive. There is a pleasure in the healthy functioning of our bodies, with which there is joined that sense of overplus of energy ready to be used. We feel fit for anything; and the natural outlet for this energy is to shout or sing or dance. One sees this particularly in children. The sense of organic well-being tends to express itself in rhythmic movement. It is natural to suppose that the origin of this externalizing of rhythm, this natural expression of harmonious sounds, lies in the rhythms of the bodily life itself, and in the smooth and harmonious interplay of all the organic functions. It is certainly the case that there is a close and constant relation between art and the organic aspect of our own experience. In philosophy, too, we can observe that where the attitude of mind is aesthetic - as it is with the ancient Greeks or with the modern Idealists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries - the world is conceived invariably in organic terms." (RAS 31).

"Life as life, in its characteristic nature as growth, development, self-reproduction, sensitiveness and instinct, needs another approach. We must find how to relate ourselves organically to organic nature; and the pressure towards an objective, rational, relationship with this world of life gives rise to art in all its forms. If it is through science that we come to relate our lives rationally to the material world, it is through art that we can come to relate our lives rationally to the world of organic life. The drive to rationality in this field is a pressure towards balance and rhythm and harmony, towards functional relationship; and the rationality it seeks is a rationality of the instinctive and emotional life." (RE 203/4).

From this we can see a little clearer what the special area and competence of art is. Not, let it be at once noted, that special aspects of life are reserved for art - or for science or religion, for that matter. Although some things tend to be the focus of their respective interest and attention, there is no ultimate restriction on any of them. How many things and happenings in our own lifetime have become the subject of art which were ignored, or deliberately excluded, in our earlier days? Art excludes nothing (see RAS 40/1). This whole matter of the respective fields and interests of religion, art, and science are discussed at length by Macmurray in SRE 20/4.

Having cleared the ground, we are now in a better position to consider our question, What is art doing? What are its intentions and purposes?

But, firstly, following Macmurray, we must say what art is not about. To appreciate this is very important. On this we may find ourselves not agreeing with what Macmurray says. It may surprise, shock or even annoy us, being so contrary as it is to a very common viewpoint. But as we are here to study Macmurray and his ideas, however unusual these may be, we are not here necessarily to endorse our own feelings, predilections, prescriptions, or prejudices; nor to continue our comfort and security if these are unreal. This is an example of how Macmurray, taken seriously, promotes our own growth towards, and into, the personal.

Rationality, as we touched upon earlier, is grounded in our objectivity, or in our genuine intention to be so. Now the need for rationality and objectivity applies just as much to our feelings as to our thought and perceiving. In the case of our feelings Macmurray calls this worthwhile state or intention, emotional reason. "The

real problem of the development of emotional reason is to shift the centre of feeling from the self to the world outside. We can only begin to grow up into rationality when we begin to see our own emotional life not as the centre of things but as part of the development of humanity. The field in which emotional reason expresses itself most directly is the field of art. The artist is directly concerned to express his emotional experience of the world. His success depends upon the rationality of his emotions." (RE 30).

Because art arises from, and is developed in, feeling it is obvious that emotional reason is very relevant to it. But, says Macmurray, "Unfortunately the very first thing that confronts us in this is the fact that our way of regarding art bears witness to the absence of emotional reason." (RE 52). Using the terms technically, we are subjective and egocentric. We regard the world as existing for our private satisfaction, as a means to our individual ends. With reference to art, "We think that art is concerned with our pleasure or our consolation; so long as we look upon it as an activity of our own or of other people which gives us something that we want; which makes us happy or comforts us, we are in a subjective and irrational frame of mind. Now this is the way most of us do regard art (and religion and science too, for that matter). We look upon art as a decoration and a beautifying of our lives. Beautiful things are made for our delight. This is how we look at the matter. Our treatises on Beauty start off, almost without exception, by assuming that the real question about art is why it gives us pleasure; and proceed to try to distinguish good art from bad by the kind of pleasurable effect it has on the spectator or the listener."

(RE 52).

So art is not mere adornment; not just a pretty appendage and distraction from the rigours and cruelties of reality; not an escapism and compensation; not the superficial icing on the cake on the solid, monotonous, cake of life. Nor is it the luxuriant and sybaritic pleasure of wallowing in feeling - often combined with a self-righteous sense of cultural snobbery - evoked by a so-called work of art.

If none of this, what is it then? It is, or performs, a number of functions.

1) Education of the Emotions

Firstly, it is the educator of the emotions and senses. Our emotions in their natural state are primitive, stark, and unrefined. Just observe a baby or young child to confirm this. We experience unreal feelings; we have feelings which are mistaken; or we do not feel at all when we ought to be feeling something. Our emotions are often misdirected too.

For many people emotions remain undeveloped all their lives, especially in a society like ours where the emphasis is on science and technology, and where consequently the purpose of education is to develop the intellect, not the feelings. Art, subtly, is the instrument of remedying this crudity and self-centredness. At our mother's knee we are, or were (few mothers have time to do this today - a very symptom of the above) told stories which at once began to enlarge our empathy, and even our sympathy and compassion. Our emotions were beginning to develop. They started, however tentatively, to become objective.

And so throughout our lives, so far as we heed it - one of Macmurray's greatest complaints is that art is of so little interest to our society. "The supreme condemnation of a civilization is that it is inartistic, that is to say, impersonal, inhuman, unreal. The absence of art is the absence of spontaneity, of proper humanity; the penalty for it is an inner stultification, a loss of spiritual integrity, a slowing down of the pulses of the inner life." (RE 158). Art is developing and enlarging our sensitivity, our capacity to feel. It is educating our senses too, the only channels - sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smell - by which we apprehend the world outside of ourselves. If these senses are poor, inadequate, obtuse, and insensitive, so too will be our whole life and living. Art quickens, stimulates, arouses, and renews these important avenues. "The practical function of art is, therefore, the refinement of sensibility." (RAS 42). "It (art) is an education of emotion and a training of judgement." (RAS 42).

How art performs this task will be referred to later.

2) Value Discernment and Training

A good second role of art, is the discernment of good values. Values - except monetary! - are, along with emotional development, to which they are extremely closely allied, never mentioned or discussed today; except, of course, in closed academic circles and coteries where they are still-born and have no practical relevance or effect.

Yet values are the very essence, the tissue and substance, of ourselves. Each moment of the day we are either choosing or living-out choices already made. And choices, all choices, are, and must be, the expression of values.

Macmurray, following tradition, recognises two kinds of values, utility or instrumental, and, intrinsic. For a full discussion of these see SRE 25/32. Utility values are manifested in things we choose as means to our ends. Intrinsic values are those which are ends in themselves. The practice of science, to give one possible example of many, is grounded in utility values. Art, on the other hand, is concerned with intrinsic values.

And one of the purposes of art is to promote such values; to make us aware that things are, and can be, worth something in themselves, and not merely for our own self-utilisation and physical satisfaction. Not that proportion is not necessary here. Without utility values we would not survive to enjoy intrinsic values - or more precisely, things of intrinsic and not mere instrumental worth.

But what has intrinsic worth? The Greek trio of Beauty, Goodness, and Truth, held by so many for so long - as recently as the 1940s, C.E.M. Joad was their greatest popular exponent - have little meaning today. The whole idea is too vague, and thus virtually meaningless. They sound good but are vapid and empty.

Intrinsic worth can only be discerned as we grow emotionally, as we develop emotional reason and objectivity. At least, this is Macmurray's view. We have, as it were, to grow in our own emotional self-trust. "The appraisement is a search for an appropriate emotional attitude to the object". (RAS 37). Thinking "cannot decide whether the thing it reveals is good or bad, beautiful or ugly, to be shunned or to be sought. For the determination of values we are dependent on our emotions - or on those of someone else." (RE 36). "There can be no hope of educating our emotions unless we are prepared to stop relying on other people's for our judgment of value.

We must learn to feel for ourselves even if we make mistakes." (RE 37). Too often our values are 'external' and phoney. "How many people would maintain stoutly that Milton's Paradise Lost is a very beautiful poem, who have never read it, or have been bored by it when they did!" (RE 37).

All our evaluating must be empirical, a favourite approach of Macmurray's you will recall. "This involves a reference to a third form of empiricism which finds its appropriate expression in aesthetic activity." (SRE 13 and see this and adjacent pages for more on empiricism). And one of the things empiricism means in this context is that we are not afraid to revise our evaluations in the light of experience. "It is my feeling that is the basis of the judgement, so that the judgement, as in science, remains hypothetical only, and always liable to revision." (RAS 38).

But although you start to develop your ability to evaluate once you stop taking your values secondhand and begin to trust your own feelings (from which all valuation springs anyway) a great step will be made when your attitude and style of evaluation, paradoxically, changes from "I like this" to "This is good" - honestly made of course. When you are doing this you will have made an immense shift of feeling and perception from the subjective to the objective, from the self to the object. "The condition of this process from 'I like it' to 'It is good' is that I should be interested throughout in the object, and not in myself being affected by it. My feeling must really be for the object itself and not to enjoy myself by means of the object. This is the essence of emotional self-transcendence; or, if you will, emotional 'objectivity'. We are, in fact, quite

familiar with the distinction; it is the difference between the way we enjoy a good 'thriller' and the way we enjoy a great novel. In the first case what one enjoys is the thrill the story gives us; in the second it is the book itself, in virtue of its own inherent quality." (RAS 38).

3) Significance

Art discerns, creates, and specialises in, significance. This is one of its main *raison d'être*. The great aim and purpose of science is to discover the common factor of a million things. Each of these million things has, for science, no individual value or significance. Each is as good as, or a substitute for, any other. It glories in generalisation and uniformity.

Art takes just the opposite view. It searches out, discovers, heightens, and depicts those gestures and elements of a thing different from anything of its kind, or indeed of all other things in the universe. "The artistic attitude, in reflection, moves in the opposite direction toward individuality and uniqueness. Bringing to experience the desire to contemplate and admire, it sees the world as a collection of unique and interesting objects." (SRE 31). "The scientist seeks to minimise the personal factor. He wants to see as everybody sees. The artist maximizes the personal element." (RAS 41).

If art is not doing this, then no matter how much a production would seem to resemble art, it is not art. It is counterfeit. "Art, it seems to me, is always a search for the value in the individual things with which the world is stored." (RE 58/9). And this means something quite extra as well. It is; that art sees a thing as

existing in its own right. It is not something to be 'found-out about', however uniquely regarded. It is to be cherished just because it is. "And this suggests at once what the development of art signifies in human life. It represents the effort to become aware of the significance of individuals in themselves through an emotional apprehension of them. Art expresses to us our capacity as rational beings to apprehend the values of things in themselves; not their value to us but their meaning and significance in their own right as individuals in the world. It expresses that rational impulse in us to delight in the things that are real individuals in the world just because they are there and reveal themselves to us. A mature art, if we achieve it, as we have now achieved a mature science, would be our way of reaching nearer and nearer, through the cooperative effort of many individuals, to a real emotional knowledge of the significance of real things. (RE 59/60).

So what does art do? It not only trains us in value discernment, but leads us to recognise the uniqueness of everything in creation. And thus produces a sense of awe and wonder. But for Macmurray's firm admonition that we are not to confuse art with religion (a matter we will refer to later) we might feel that here, when we speak of awe and wonder, we are approaching the domain of the latter.

4) Conservation

This point is a sort of negative, but necessary, accompaniment of the last. To discern, even create, significance is a splendid, outgoing, thing to do. One feels the care, concern, energy, vitality, and the optimism of youth in it. The whole of creation

must be depicted, illuminated, and immortalised through the artist's brush, the poet's pen, and the composer's rhythm.

But, says Macmurray, besides this urge to creativity, art exists to capture and conserve beauty before it inevitably dies and fades for ever. Whilst creativity is a sign of youth, this conservation and nostalgic feeling must be the sign and prerogative of age. But art is required to do this because we live in a constantly changing universe. "What distresses it most is the changeableness of the things of experience. Individuality is everywhere subject to fading and dissolution. Nothing keeps its beauty long. So the artist seeks, as we say, to immortalize what is in experience evanescent. He seeks to make what is passing a possession for ever; to confer on the data of common observation a individuality which can defy time; to prevent what is unique from being wholly reabsorbed into the common dust from which it arose." (SRE 31). And even this encapsulation cannot, of course, be for ever; canvases rot, the hardest stone erodes and crumbles, porcelain shatters.

But a work of art endures longer than that which prompted its creation; and longer, too, than its creator. And so long as new treasures, new embodiments of artistic awareness and vitality, are being created, so will this purpose of art be, at least partially, fulfilled. "The effect of art upon us is the opposite. It leads to the effort to maintain and preserve against the ravages of time things which have for us an intrinsic value. Not merely ancient works of art but ancient ceremonial, ancient buildings are carefully guarded and preserved; and even corners of the world which have struck man by their natural beauty, like the Yosemite Valley, are carefully and expensively preserved against the scientific attitude

which would dissolve their beauty in an effort to exploit them for practical purposes." (SRE 32).

5) Wholeness

Art creates wholeness. Good art is whole and entire. It is strange that Macmurray, in all his varied and scattered conceptions and notions about art, refers to this function but once, and then only briefly in one paragraph. "The image, if it is to present the object in its individuality, must itself be self-contained. This is what is meant by saying that a work of art is an organic whole. The elements of which it is composed are not merely arranged; they are organized. They are functionally or purposely related to one another, so that they give the impression of necessity. What this secures is that the composition of the image is such that the elements refer us to one another, and so are seen as constituting a completed whole, which needs nothing beyond itself for its apprehension. Its formal characters, therefore, are rhythm, proportion, balance and harmony." (RAS 39/40). But wholeness has always seemed to me to be one of art's foremost purposes and a very cogent test of its satisfactoriness, or even whether it is art at all.

Life is disparate, broken and piecemeal as we experience it. Each moment may be whole, especially an unreflecting moment - but if we are reflecting we do not recognise that we are experiencing that moment unreflectingly at the time. However organised a life is, and very few are in a total and emotional sense, experiences come and go haphazardly, and fortuitiously, and in-comprehensively. And if we have a certain amount of personal coherence and cohesion, public

events - even limited ones, say, within our work situation, let alone wider happenings - present a broken, discontinuous, even bewildering and unordered succession. This feeling and impression exists whether we are directly concerned with them or not.

Now, it is the function of art to depict wholeness for us; to emotionally, if only for a short time, bathe us in the joy and delight of unity and unbrokenness. This should be seen not as an escapism but as an experience of the reality that can be. Such wholeness may be demonstrated and conveyed in the painting of a simple flower, a symphony, a novel, a Gothic cathedral. Size and matter are immaterial. Through some work of art we have for a moment or longer experienced the wholeness we do not, and cannot, because of the nature of things, know in everyday living.

Perhaps a recluse alone, if he is at peace with himself and not bedeviled mentally by earthly things, experiences this of, as it were, his own volition. But then he is not living; certainly not in a Macmurray sense. He has withdrawn from life!

As I have said, Macmurray does speak of this wholeness (see here the end of the later section on 'Constructive Imagination', but he, it seems to me, fails to give it the emphasis and importance it justifies, as one of the main things art does.

6) The Architect of The Future

Art is the architect of the future. This very vital role will be discussed where it is most relevant i.e. under the section on the Artist.

Artistic Reflection

"Art is a reflective experience." (RAS 33). It is one of the three main reflective activities of man. The other two are science and religion. And each has a particular mode or manner. For science it is intellectual analysis. For religion, community. The enveloping and distinguishing mode of art is contemplation. This Macmurray has unravelled and discussed on pages 33/42 of RAS.

He distinguishes three elements in contemplation so far as art is concerned:-

- 1) Looking.
- 2) Reflective Activity.
- 3) Constructive Imagination.

By the way; for ease of exposition Macmurray has chosen to analyse and illustrate artistic contemplation through the visual arts. But, as he says, "I have confined myself in this commentary upon art to the visual arts." (RAS 40). Then after much more in the same vein, which should be read, he adds. "..... what I have selected for comment in the case of the visual arts has its proper counterpart in all the others, and that the account I have given will apply, mutatis mutandis, to any." (RAS 40). Despite this we must say that, as he is prone to do - a little too often perhaps - Macmurray seems to have hedged his bets, for on an earlier page he says, "We shall have in mind, to begin with, the visual arts, reminding ourselves, however, that there is a danger in assuming that all that is true of the arts which derive from an appeal to visual experience will be true of the others - of music, for instance, of

dancing, or, of poetry." (RAS 33).

Let us then look at these three aspects of contemplation.

Firstly, Looking. (See RAS 33/4).

This, for Macmurray, is something very much more than just looking and seeing. It is to be undertaken systematically, purposefully, and critically. It is a prolonged activity. Unlike scientific observation, with which we are most familiar today, and considered to be the norm and apogee of knowing, we are not looking at an object for what it has in common with other similar things. Nor are we looking with utilitarian and functional eyes to see what it can give us, or of what we can get out of it.

We are looking as a lover looks at his sweetheart; looking with intensity of concentration so as to absorb her splendour and uniqueness. "Compared with the artistic description of nature, in poetry, for example, or in painting, the scientific is description only in a very Pickwickian sense. The empiricism of art, it would seem, is much more thorough-going than that of science. At any rate, the physicist's picture of the natural world - cold, dark and shaking like a jelly - is much further removed from the world as we know it in perception than the wildest fantasy that the imaginative painter can put on canvas." (RAS 30).

We all know how dramatists, novelists, and biographers, will spend a whole year in libraries reading up background material, most of which will never be used in their ultimate production. And Macmurray has another illustration. "It is said that Japanese landscape artists think it necessary to live for a time in the landscape they intend to paint. They walk about it, watching it at different times of the day, under different conditions of light and

in different weathers. This prolonged visual study may last for months, until the painter has thoroughly learned the landscape with his eyes. Then he will shut himself up in his study and paint from memory." (RAS 34). Can anyone challenge that this is not the real way to know something? It is, says Macmurray, the only way to know anything in its actual, individual, existence, as distinct from knowing about it. "We recognise this most clearly in the case of other human beings, where the distinction between knowing a person and knowing about him is familiar and unambiguous. But the same holds over the whole range of experience." (RAS 34).

Looking, then, systematically and purposefully is the first major element in contemplation, and is the only way of getting to know things, places, and people individually, which is the essence of artistic reflection.

Secondly; in the contemplative process is, Reflective Activity (see RAS 34/9).

Perceiving the object, however intimately, special, and caringly is not enough. It produces nothing of itself, essential as it is to be performed. Reflective activity may be likened to the stage in scientific reflection when observation is succeeded by analysis and assessment, and perhaps the formulating of an hypothesis. But in no way are they to be confused. Scientific analysis is purely intellectual. It would not be scientific if it were not. But the reflective stage of art is emotional, leading to the evaluative. "Now the reflective activity in contemplation is not at all like this. It is not an intellectual activity. Scientific reflection

results in general theories; and these become the basis of constructive activity through the application of a technical rule which is grounded upon them. But any reflection that results in a theory is not contemplation, and any painting which proceeds by the application of rules is ipso facto bad art." (RAS 35).

Much of what happens and is required at this stage was discussed and worked-out a few pages earlier under both Education of the Emotions and Value Discernment and training. It is all a tentative, evaluative, exploration, a discerning of worthwhileness or otherwise. Of its very nature no rules or prescriptions, or even real methods, can be laid down for it. "To describe the process of contemplation is extremely difficult - perhaps, in the end, impossible. This is because it is not an intellectual process; it has its own mode of expression which is by means of imagery, by the construction of images. We might say that it is largely 'unconscious'; that it is not discursive but intuitive; that in the end if our reflection is successful we just know that we are right, but we cannot tell how we know and certainly not prove that we are right." (RAS 38/9). It is a matter of trust, especially of self-trust and emotional growth. "Given this concentration of interest in the object the process of contemplation proceeds by perceptual examination, by discovering more and more of what is there to be perceived, both as to the elements which make it up and as to the relation of them to one another in the whole." (RAS 38). "And as the "seeing" of it - the knowing of it by critical looking - becomes more adequate, so the "feeling" of it - the valuation of it by feeling - becomes correspondingly more adequate. In this process the feeling which is our first reaction to the object always changes; and it may be completely reversed." (RAS

38). "The capacity to appraise an object in this way has to be learned and it grows with exercise." (RAS 38).

But however good one's own appraisal of a particular object is; however good one's own appraisal apparatus and ability becomes in general, this can never be wholly satisfactory. Or even if it is can never be known to be so without the critical appraisal of others. (See RAS 29). Thus, out of this need, we reach the third state of contemplation which is:-

Constructive Imagination (See RAS 39)

Only with the physical creation - construction to be taken quite literally - is the process of contemplation completed. If the image remains private (i.e. mental) it "remains an unfixed, impermanent and almost certainly unfinished image." (RAS 39).

This image, the result you will recall of emotional reflection, is not a reproduction, not a copy, and certainly not a 'photograph', but an appraisal in itself. And as the purpose of art is to individualise, the more individualistic the image the more valuable it is; provided, of course, that it is sincere.

What is the essence of an adequate and satisfactory image if it is to manifest individuality? On this point, but without elaborating (see RAS 39/40) Macmurray refers in a paragraph to some of these questions. These include rhythm, proportion, balance, and harmony. The work of art, to be a work of art, must be self-contained, or, in other words, an organic whole. Each part of which it is composed must be "functionally or purposively related to one another, so that they give the impression of necessity." (RAS 40).

The composition of the image must be such "that the elements refer us to one another, and so are seen as constituting a completed whole, which needs nothing beyond itself for its apprehension." (RAS 40). These are achieved by selection, modification, and organisation.

We have just discussed contemplation, the basic attitude and approach of art. We now turn to consider what Macmurray has to say about the contemplator, namely:-

The Artist

Art is an expression of the personal; and the essence of the personal is emotional freedom. The core, or essential manifestation, of emotional freedom is spontaneity. "The spontaneity of the personal, which is art, is the capacity we possess to create reality". (RE 167). "The spontaneity of art is personal creativeness, or self-expression." (RE 156. See also RE 69).

From all this we can conclude with Macmurray that "creative spontaneity (is) the quality which the real artist shows us in abstraction from what normally conceals it." (RE 157). This creative spontaneity is the essence of personal individuality.

Now, because of this because we all, each one of us, must have personal individuality, so must we be, or have it in us to be, creatively spontaneous. And so we come to Macmurray's first point about the artist. We are all artists; or, at least, have it in us to be so. This reminds one of Gray's 'mute inglorious Miltons'. Or of the old adage that 'we are all poets but we do not all write poetry'. "All of us, without exception, because we are persons, are

essentially artists. The capacity for creative self-expression is our birthright; it is what makes us human." (RE 157).

Macmurray then goes slightly astray. He says, "Genius is no mysterious gift that some magical power confers on one man in a million. It is not something unique and supernatural. It is simply human spontaneity, the expression of personal freedom." (RE 157). Whoever said or thought that all artists were geniuses, or that art must be, and can only be, the expression of genius? Surely this assumption, and use of language, is going too far. One would hardly regard it as a usual or acceptable definition of genius. We all, it could be agreed, have creativity which is dormant, unrecognised, and uncultivated - a regrettable waste of humanity both for man and for the universe and creation. But to call this creativity, in every case, genius seems an exaggeration!

But Macmurray goes on, more acceptably and wisely, to say that the fact that we do not recognise this i.e. the innate artistic ability of all, is "a measure of the derangement of our inner life, of our failure to be our human selves. The artist is not abnormal, but simply the normal human individual. Not of course the average human being, after education and the constraints of social and physical necessity have succeeded in suppressing and stunting his natural capacity." (RE 157). And later, in the same context, he goes on to say, "Remove the restrictions, both inner and outer, which suppress the spontaneity of any human being, and his natural spontaneity will show itself as artistic creativeness." (RE 158 - and much of what follows should be read).

So, in a sense, we are all artists. We all know the most seemingly uncreative person becomes alive and creative when he finds an interest and expression suitable for his gifts and capacities. And this applies to all persons, irrespective of intelligence, education, social background, or handicaps.

But, accepting all this, what sort of person is the recognised artist; or everybody else, for that matter, when they are exercising their spontaneous creativity? How and what is the artist living and experiencing, as an artist?

The artist, it is obvious, must feel and act in all the ways earlier stated and discussed under contemplation. He must be a looker. "The artist is first and foremost the observer." (RAS 29). He must be able to utilise, organise, and develop his feelings so that he comes to a satisfactory evaluation of that which he has chosen to dwell upon. And he must have the skill, technique, and competence to exhibit, in one of the many innumerable forms, what he has 'seen', so that his individual, personal, and unique vision may be given to others. To summarise these essentials of the artist we cannot do better than quote Macmurray himself. "He is emotionally contemplative. He fills his senses with an object or set of objects, and seeks to feel it; to become emotionally aware of its being, and to realize it fully as that individual thing, that is his attitude to the world, when he is being an artist. He wants to go out to it, to soak himself in it and so to become emotionally conscious of its meaning and significance in itself. He is not trying to discover things about it but to know it as something that exists in its own right, something that is part of the furniture of earth, and therefore has value in itself - not for him or for anyone else." (RE

59). And again. "So far as he can do this he finds that it has the result of producing in him a spontaneous creative activity which expresses the awareness of the thing which he has achieved. If he paints a picture, what the picture says is not 'This is what the object looks like; so, if you have seen this you needn't look at the object' it says rather: 'I have known something - really known it - and this is what it means in itself. Look at this and you will realize the significance of the thing as it revealed itself to me'." (RE 59).

The artist, to turn to another point, lives in and for the senses. His task is "to apprehend the world finely through his own sensibility, and to express it in spontaneous activity purely for the joy of doing so." (RE 74/5). But "he does not exclude the intellectual processes." (RAS 42), and certainly not in the way, nor to the extent, that the scientist excludes emotional activities. But the artist does subordinate the intellectual processes of analysis, inference, and generalisation, to those of feeling and contemplation.

The senses are important to everybody. But we do not always realise that they can take two forms. We can use them as a means to an end. This we mostly do in the daily business of life and survival. The scientist uses his senses in this way all the time.

Or; we can use our senses for the benefit they can bring in themselves. The artist chooses the latter way. "The relation of each to sense-perception is quite different, and the difference is one which belongs to our everyday experience. When we are engaged in some practical activity, we rely upon our senses for guidance. They provide us, so to speak, with information which enables us to act

successfully. Our attention is concentrated upon what we are trying to achieve; what we see, hear, and feel is what is necessary or useful to our purpose. What is not we ignore. In a word, we are using our senses as means to an end which lies beyond them. But there are times when this 'use' of our senses is interrupted; times when we do not merely see, but look; when we do not merely hear, but listen. There are occasions when we live in our senses instead of using them; when the sensuous activity is its own end, and has its meaning in itself. The artist's perception is of this latter kind; the scientist's is the former. Consequently, the artist's seeing or hearing is associated directly with satisfaction, and the delight is in the hearing and the seeing". (RAS 30).

To be an artist one must live in the senses. In them, too, the artist must experience joy, even if sometimes mingled with anguish at his own inadequacies and artistic imperfections.

We now have to mention an aspect of the artist, pointed out by Macmurray, which is contrary to what anybody has thought before. Whereas until now it has been proclaimed and unquestioningly understood that the scientist is objective, indeed the prime example of it, and the artist the most subjective and highly self-centred of all human beings, Macmurray reverses this. It is, he says, the scientist who is highly subjective; the artist objective. In fact he can be a good artist only if he is this. How does Macmurray justify this very surprising volte face?

Simply on the ground that, as we have seen, an artist must know the object he has chosen to depict, and this knowing requires him to get right out of himself into the object and, as it were, identify

himself with it. What could be more objective?

On the other hand, the scientist is not a bit interested essentially in that which he is studying. He could not care twopence about it intrinsically. He wants only to make use of it for his own ends, or of those he is working on behalf of. Thus, in relation to it he is living highly self-centredly and highly subjectively. Contrary to what we have believed there is no objectivity about it. And indeed there is none - at least, not in the artistic sense.

If we accept this slightly arcane interpretation, although it seems down-to-earth enough when explained and understood, then Macmurray would seem to have a point, even if we still have slight reservations and doubts - probably due to our conditioning, or to our lack of real interest in, and attention to, art; scientifically, or at least intellectually, orientated as most of us, knowingly or unknowingly, are. Some quotations to illustrate and confirm this aspect of Macmurray's view of art must now be given. "For the same reason the value of science is utility-value, while the value of art is intrinsic. Why is this? It is because science remains subjective, while art achieves objectivity. Any real object for science is only an example, a fact, something to be referred to a class, something to analyse into elements the more unsubstantial the better; something which is the effect of something else. Thus science is endlessly referred from one thing to another and chases objectivity over the infinite cosmos, finding, like Noah's dove, no place on which the sole of its foot may rest." (RE 155/6). "But art never has to seek objectivity, because it is objective from the beginning. It rests in the object of its choice, stirring only to

penetrate deeper into the heart of its reality. Its enjoys its object, and without such an interest in the object for its own sake, it is impossible to grasp any reality at all. Science cannot rest in any object, just because it is not interested in any; its interest is subjective, in the operation of the mind upon the object, in doing something to it, describing it, referring to it, never in the object itself, in and for itself, in its individual reality." (RE 156 - and see RAS 41; RE 59: 151: 187; for many more relevant quotations.)

Artists, to turn to what must be the last point in this section, are architects of the future. You will remember we referred to this earlier, under What Art is Doing; but now we enlarge upon it.

Macmurray follows Plato on the point about to be made. In fact Macmurray is a great admirer of Plato in general and refers to him admiringly a number of times in his writings. Why, it is not easy to understand; for, if anybody, with his 'forms', dualism, and elements of other-worldliness - to say nothing of his elitism and aversion to democracy - was less like Macmurray and of all he stands for and advocates, it would be difficult to discover a better example. Moreover, Plato's thinking is so seminal to all European thought, both philosophical and religious, that his ideas are the source for a whole succession of thinkers, instilling ideas to which Macmurray is strongly opposed. Personally, being a convert of Macmurray's, I deplore Plato and his influence, and cannot understand why Macmurray does not feel and recognise this too. It seems to me that Plato, apart from being the first to formulate philosophical problems and questions, and then in only a mere literary form and in a very non-philosophical, non-rational, way, was the biggest mistake in European

history, thought-wise.

However, to return to the question. The artist's creation takes on an aura very similar to Plato's forms, and like those forms, gives a glimpse of reality. "A work of art is always in this sense an idea, the form of something, nothing actual. This is, I think, our experience of works of art. They express to us some actual phase or aspect or fragment of the real, and they reveal an intimacy of knowledge of the real that all our science and philosophy can never show." (RE 166). But that is not all. This vision, this momentary insight into reality, evokes in us a desire that that thing might be. The artist thus "creates the possibility of a reality that is not yet, the idea of a future reality more perfect than the actual world we know". (RE 166). The artist is therefore the architect of the future. This is emphasised in the following. "And it is the modern artists that we must look to in our need; the old masters are useless. They have no knowledge of the actual world in which we live, out of which a new world might be created. The craze for what is old and what has stood the appraisal of the centuries is a symptom of the fear of art rather than of the love of it. The cult of the antique may develop taste, but it tends to destroy artistic receptivity. For the old has done its work of social transformation. It remains as a monument of beauty. But a living work of art strikes always at the roots of our complacency and its beauty is hidden by its attack upon our security and our tradition." (RE 167/8).

Macmurray particularly stresses that the artist is the architect, not the creator. He may provide the vision, and suggest a plan, but he is not the builder. This task is for others to perform (see RE 166/7) once aroused and fired by the artist's glimpse of what

might and could be. If none listen then the artist will be "a voice crying in the wilderness, a despairing voice that cries: 'Ye will not come unto me, that ye might have life'". (RE 167).

What better way to sum-up than with Macmurray's own words on this. "But art is no adornment of life, no amusement or relaxation for energies that are weary of the serious work of civilization, no 'purgation of pity and fear', no safety-valve for an excess of emotion, no laboratory for the sublimation of dangerous passions. It is the spontaneity of the personal, the expression of self, the creation of the vision of what might be real, and therefore the architect of the future. We have to build the future. But it is mere insanity to build without an architect - even with a completed science to fetch and carry for us." (RE 169).

Problems of the Artist

- both to himself and to others.

All the problems of the artist stem from, and are related to, one fact. The artist cannot be, or even hope to be, a whole human person. "The artist is not a full human being, because of the abstraction which isolates him." (RE 164). In this self-limitation the artist is not alone. The scientist, too, is equally incomplete. "Darwin lamented in his old age that his mind had become a mere machine for grinding out general laws, and wished that he had read a poem a day." (RE 164).

What effects has this inevitable situation upon the artist?

1) Because he is interested only in giving, be that giving a vital part of himself, he cannot receive. He therefore cannot know

and enjoy mutuality - which, as we know, is for Macmurray, along with communion, the highest and most satisfactory and satisfying human condition.

The artist is rather like the tireless - and very tiresome - person, we have met or know, who must give of their time, energy, and life itself helping others. They have no life of their own and no time to, or awareness of the need to, receive the love and care of others. In this sense they shut others out, much as they think they are helping them and relating to them. Some people are rarely able to truly relate or mutualise. The artist is in the same position.

"The artist wants to give, not to receive; so that mutuality is lost, and his experience, though it remains intensely personal, is one-sided, has lost part of the fullness of personal experience. Knowledge there is, and the pouring out of knowledge, which is self-expression, but not mutuality." (RE 154). "The artist can write his description for anyone to read, to paint his picture for anyone to see. He gives himself, not to anyone in particular, but to the world at large. That is not a fuller but a narrower experience; because personally, to give yourself to everyone, is to give yourself to no one." (RE 154). A major part of the essence of the personal is mutuality. (See RE 154).

2) A second effect of the artist's predicament is that he cannot cooperate - not even with his fellow artists. The essence of art is the artist's individual vision, and the essential individuality of this. If it has no individuality it is of no account. It is not even art. "Consequently, the extreme individualism of the artist and the extreme individualism of the

object provide no basis for personal togetherness." (RAS 43).

An artist, as artist, cannot possibly cooperate. As Macmurray says, the foremost illustration of this is Plato's Republic. A brilliant piece of work by a supreme artist - and to get it to work he had to exclude artists! "For Plato's ideal republic is an artist's vision of the perfect society; and even to imagine it he had to exclude the artist, attack art and devise a system of education to eradicate the individualism of the artistic element in human nature. There was no room in Plato's Republic for any artist but Plato." (RAS 43). If the artist seeks to use human beings as his medium, he is so constituted that they must be merely passive in his hands. There can be no equality, and thus no mutuality and cooperation. "Each artist is confined within the limits of his own acquaintance with the world, within the individual objectivity. No artist can speak for art, only for himself as an isolated artist." (RE 162/3).

3) Macmurray says that the artist is always at the mercy of society. This follows from the foregoing. An artist, as it were, 'sticks his neck out.' He is not interested in you or anybody else. He baldly lays his cards on the table, with a take it or leave it attitude. If he wins, he wins well. If he loses he must, with equal nonchalance, take the consequences, and suffer accordingly. If the essence of his approach is non-mutuality, then when he receives no response it is hardly more than he can expect or ask for. "The full life of the personal is a continual give and take. For that very reason he is completely dependent upon the takers, and must await their pleasure. That is why the artist, in peculiarly desperate fashion, is always at the mercy of society." (RE 165).

4) The artist is amoral. Proverbially he is in his life but, more important here, he is in his art. This arises from his limited, intense, interest. He chooses an object and medium and concentrates on these to the exclusion of all other things. He becomes almost fanatical in his one-purposeness. He has a kind of mono-mania. Nothing else is of value. His one aim is to express, fulfil, and corporealise his vision. Is it any wonder he has no time for, or interest in, morality? For the essence of morality is mutuality, the way we would wish to be and act together as persons. Such a consideration is not within the artist's capability. "The mere artist would be necessarily amoral for lack of mutuality and would therefore fail of the fullness of the personal." (RE 164). "The artist notoriously tends to treat other persons as objects, and so to fail in the fullness of moral relationships." (RE 164).

The Shortcomings and Limitations of Art

What are the shortcomings and limitations of art? - apart from those already referred to, by implication, under The Problems of the artist.

1) Its Immaturity

This is indicated by our dogmatism. We all rigidly know what is good and bad art. Our values are set. Once again we are back to empiricism, and the need for it. Only when we become open is there any hope of art becoming more mature. And an aspect of this dogmatism and non-empiricism is our subjectivity.

We are nearly all at the stage of "I like this" rather than "That is good (or bad) in itself". "I believe that in art mankind is

still in the stage of immaturity. There has been no true art established yet in the world. And one of the strongest reasons that I have for saying so is precisely that we are so sure that we are right in this field. We are so confident that we know what is right and what is wrong; and yet we all contradict one another over it." (RE 56). "It is worthwhile to remember that one of the signs of a subjective consciousness is its habit of swinging from the heights of confidence to the depths of despair." (RE 56). "When art reaches its maturity, the sign by which we shall know this is our discovery of our ignorance, the falling away of our dogmatism." (RE 57 - and much more of relevance follows on this page, and must be read).

Of our three principle modes of reflection only science has achieved maturity. "A mature art, if we achieve it, as we have now achieved a mature, science, would be our way of reaching nearer and nearer, through the cooperative effort of many individuals, to a real emotional knowledge of the significance of real things". (RE 60).

2) Failure to be Artistic

Not only is art immature but we fail to use the art we have got. We are failing to be artistic. Perhaps this is not actually a shortcoming of art itself but it is a very important and relevant point to be considering.

Perhaps this failing is due to our overwhelming concern for science and technology. All our effort, energy, mental power, and emotion is consumed by these, with the result that, as art cannot be totally excluded from life, we are still living in and with the puerile forms of the past - important as they were when first conceived. Consequently today we have no real interest in, nor

emotional and sensuous knowledge of, the real significance of things; and that means of everything, people included. Our values, such as they are, are utilitarian not intrinsic.

How many millionaires, and thousands of less wealthy people, owning pictures and other so-called art treasures, love and appreciate for their own sake? Very few, if any. They possess them merely as an investment. This ignorance and non-appreciation of art is regrettable; for only art, never science, is the sign of a people's humanity, a people's sensitivity, and their ability to be really living. We are too intellectual by far. This is evidenced in our educational system and ethos. "We should be seeking to make children exquisitely aware of the world in which they live, purely for its own sake, because this constitutes an increase in the quality of life in them. We are seeking to develop a fineness of expressive activity because it is good in itself, not in any sense because of what may be achieved through it." (RE 74).

So our educational system reflects our society's poverty of art. "Education in art is turned into an intellectual or scientific activity, and becomes not a training in artistry but a training of the mind in the analysis and understanding of the artistry of others. The proper training of the aesthetic capacities is, as I have described it, a training in perception and expression, which in its full results would develop to the fullest measure of which the child is capable, his ability to be an artist; that is to say, to apprehend the world finely through his own sensibility, and to express it in spontaneous activity purely for the joy of doing so." (RE 74/5).

Art, as we have seen, has much wider implications and effects than mere beauty, adornment, and pleasure. It is both the essence and the indication of the quality of our lives, measured as it only can be in terms of feeling and sensuousness. So the sooner art becomes a vital part of our lives the sooner will we truly start living. Now we are less than man, less than the persons we have it in us to be. We are instrumentalising ourselves. "In sober language, if this country is to have a future, if we are to create a society even a little better than the ramshackle patchwork which we live in at the moment, we shall have to attend to the artists, and learn how to attend." (RE 167).

Art, Religion and Science

We now, having given a chapter to each - Art, Religion, and Science - have some idea of Macmurray's views on these subjects. They are all an aspect of man's reflective activities. They are, and exist, only in virtue of man's reason and rationality; his ability alone of all creatures to live, if he will, not subjectively but objectively i.e. in terms of what is not himself. Only thus can he live satisfactorily.

We also saw earlier, in the opening of this chapter, on Art, that Macmurray had by predisposition and conditioning a much greater natural concern for religion and science than for art. Art was brought into Macmurray's consideration to complete, quite legitimately and properly, the reflective picture of man.

Having covered the ground then, what has Macmurray to say about the relationship of these three? Being, as we have seen, each so

clearly defined and located by him in its respective human role, his main concern is with the confusion between them he finds in men's minds and actions. This especially applies to confusion between religion and science, and between religion and art. I do not think he has seriously recognised or diagnosed much fudging between art and science, although he does mention it.

That there is confusion at all causes immense difficulties. If men have not clear ideas on these matters how can they live rightly? They are misleading themselves. Why does any confusion arise in general between any of them? It arises because of our whole thought tradition, starting with the Greeks, and especially with Plato and Aristotle, of putting reflection before living, thinking before action. "The second main object which governed our way of treating science and art was the fact that both are apt to be confused with religion. It may be profitable to preface our direct consideration of religion itself by asking for the underlying reason of these strange confusions. The reason lies in the theoretical character of our philosophical tradition. By this I mean that philosophy has always tended to take the reflective activities as primary and to define reality from the reflective point of view. Plato and Aristotle expressed this typically Greek view when they argued that the good life is the life of contemplation. From this it follows that the practical life should be a means to the life of the mind; while knowledge, whether of the good, or secondarily of the world of actuality, is an intrinsic good, an end in itself." (RAS 45/6). There is much more of this over the next page and a half, some of it slightly repetitive, but which nevertheless should be read.

Another reason for the confusion, and a consequence of the last point, is that we fail to see science, art, and religion as activities which can be evaluated only in relation to their role in action in life.

Let us now consider very briefly the confusion between religion and sciences. Macmurray has a whole chapter on this giving the detailed differences. (RE 171/194). This must be read. But it is with the main overall difference with which we are concerned. Religion is about relating, community, and mutuality. It is about persons. For a very good summary of this read SRE 43. Science, on the other hand, is merely the discovery of information about the universe. Why then being, apparently, such separate things are they confused?

Because, instead of both being content to fulfil their respective role, they take it upon themselves to expound a philosophy - howbeit religion conceals this endeavour under the cloak of theology. "People refer quite often to what is called 'the scientific view of the world', and the phrase is often used in contrast with the 'religious view of the world', with the assumption that one has to choose between them. This is a clear case of science out of bounds. Nothing can properly be called a 'scientific view' except a belief or theory which has been reached by using scientific method, and tested by experiment or by some other method in use, in one or other of the sciences, for this purpose. One would be justified, therefore, in asking anyone who spoke of a scientific view of the world, which of the sciences is responsible for its discovery. And one could properly ask for references to the papers embodying the

researches by which it was reached and the experiments or other recognized methods by which it was verified. Merely to ask such a question shows that 'science' here has got beyond its limits. A view of the world can only be philosophical. 'A scientific view of the world' might mean - and often seems to mean - the kind of philosophy that results from ignoring the limits of science, overlooking all other aspects of experience, and conceiving the world as the ideal object of scientific enquiry". (RAS 20). The reason for this confusion was suggested above. "The confusion of mind that makes it possible to think of religion and science as rivals arises from the traditional adoption of a purely theoretical point of view. We assume that man is primarily a thinker, and so look upon religion and science as systems of knowledge. From this point of view the roots of their difference, and the functions they serve, remain below the surface. The only question that arises is whether these two systems of knowledge are compatible with one another and, where they are not, which of the two is right. Instead of proceeding in the way I have invited you to think of science - and I shall invite you to think of the arts and religion - as activities, as things that people do." (RAS 28/9).

One effect of confusing science with religion, in whatever form this takes, is that power instead of love becomes a dominating factor in human relationships. "This led to our second main conclusion, that the attempt to push science beyond these limits could only lead to the irrationality of making power an end-in-itself, and involve us in treating everything, including human beings, as merely means to the increase of power." (RAS 28). It also mistakenly leads us to think that scientific reflection is the only form of reflection.

(See RAS 134). "The attempt to make scientific rationality the whole of rationality and to look to science to humanize life throughout its whole scope is at once readily comprehensible and radically mischievous." (RE 204).

What about the confusion of art and religion? This is easy to recognise and diagnose. According to Macmurray, as we have had occasion to repeat many times, the essence of art is contemplation; of religion, communion. Yet how often are these two confused religiously.

So much of religion, especially that aspect of it regarded as religion at its highest and most profound, is really contemplation i.e. a manifestation of art. The supreme example of this is mysticism, where the mystic entirely cuts himself off from all possible association with his fellows, thus utterly withdrawing from any possibility of communion, which is the very essence, or should be, of his religiousness.

In mysticism, the mystic is displaying, almost to perfection, the prime role of the artist - a brooding absorption with an object, real or supposed - and not doing what he professes to be doing. If he says he is loving God he is mistaken, according to Macmurray, because the first step to loving God is to be vitally and actively loving your fellows. And love for Macmurray remember is not a sentiment but an action, or intention, made manifest in the real world of people and relationships.

It is only a tiny step from this position to Macmurray's bete noir of religion, namely otherworldliness; his strong aversion to which, for very real, genuine, and down-to-earth reasons, we

discussed in the chapter on religion. "Indeed, the confusion is both insidious and very widespread. It was to point the radical difference between them that I chose as the title of this lecture, 'Contemplation and Communion.' For 'communion' is the key word of religion in the same sense that 'contemplation' is the key word of art; and the two experiences are very different. Indeed, there is a fundamental sense in which contemplation excludes communion. Contemplation is inherently a solitary activity. It is the attitude of the spectator. One must stand aside to contemplate; one must not be personally involved. But personal involvement is the core of communion." (RAS 43).

Much, too, of religious ritual, music, ceremony, and dress falls into the realm of art. Art, of course, as elsewhere does have a place here. But all too often it assumes such priority and dominance that the real meaning, significance, and purpose of religion, namely communion and love between people, becomes quite secondary, even if considered or heeded at all, especially in practice. As we know so well it is, as we say, given only lip service. "The substitution of art reveals itself in the 'spiritualizing' of religion, and this in turn rests upon the dualism of matter and spirit which identifies reality with the spiritual. The purely spiritual, unrelated to the material, and unrealized in the material, is the purely imaginary. And it is art that creates in imagination. Religion creates in reality. The belief that religion is grounded in mysticism, that it grows out of a commerce, real or imagined, with the supernatural, is a form of the confusion which is very common at the present time. Mysticism is, in itself, an expression of contemplative reflection.

It is an aesthetic rather than a religious experience; or rather, it expresses the point at which the aesthetic attitude seeks to take the whole real as its object, ignoring the limitations of art, and finds it ineffable." (RAS 44c).

But despite the foregoing confusions, art and religion are closer to each other than they are to science. "For art is in certain important respects the natural ally of religion, and is much more definitely anti-scientific." (RE 176).

Let us close with two very relevant quotations for this whole matter. "Art and religion are ways of living the personal life - and I mean by that the life of rational consciousness, the real life of human beings. The question is not 'What use is art or religion to us?' but 'What is it in us that demands and produces art and religion? What is it in our nature that insists that we should seek after beauty and after God?' My first answer to these questions is that it is simply the natural impulse to fulfil our own being, to be rational creatures, to achieve personality. Primarily it is a blind urge towards reason; and it is the force in us that makes us human beings at all. It is that drive in us that makes us seek reality and be dissatisfied with illusions and unrealities in ourselves and in the world. We are made to be reasonable creatures - to live a life of objective consciousness. Because of this there is in us a need to be aware of the world - and to live in that awareness and by it." (RE 53/4). "Art and religion arise as ways of behaving as rational beings, as ways of expressing in our modes of living our awareness of the significance of the world we live in, an awareness that we possess through the reason in our emotional life. They are ways of expressing our emotional rationality. (RE 54).

So we end our brief review of Macmurray's ideas concerning art. And of the relation of these to religion and science.

Appraisement

This appraisement is apart, of course, from what has already been given or raised, directly or indirectly, or by implication, in the foregoing exposition.

The first thing to ask is; are we more enlightened by reading Macmurray's views on art? I think we are. Unless the theory of art is one's specialism, it is not usual - as is indeed true also of all other studies and fields of life - to consider, let alone study, the philosophical background. I am sure artists never do. They are too busy producing art. And if one is a philosopher, aesthetics and the philosophy of art are usually, short of being one's specialism within philosophy, very marginal interests. All other branches and aspects of philosophy are more well-known and popular. And not many works of philosophy bring into their general train and trail of interest the subject of art as Macmurray does.

Art forms an integral part of his philosophy. In fact, philosophers at large are a little fearful of the subject, and if they feel that they have to discuss it, for conscience or completeness sake, relegate it to the sidewalks or even the basements of their works. So to work it into the mainstream of several of his writings and theories is a commendable feature of Macmurray's.

Moreover, one feels that it has a genuine place in his thought, if not a major spot in his life. He has done a great service by lining it up alongside of other predominant human reflective

activities, and giving it a comparable place.

Not that he, as in so many other things, has been particularly heeded. Art is no more recognised than it was when Macmurray was writing about it fifty years ago. It has not enlarged its hold on our lives, individually or collectively. We and society are not more art permeated than then.

So much for general comment. What of specific points?

1) Does art educate the emotions? It does in some ways but not in others. Macmurray, despite all his psychological insight, seems not to make any distinction. Art does refine our taste and visual (or whatever) sensibility. But on his own admission, and obviously so anyway, our emotions play a vital role in our relationships. Art does nothing for this very important area of human action, which for Macmurray must surely take priority over emotions connected with art objects.

For this is the field of religion. Indeed, as we have seen, art has the opposite effect. It isolates the artist relationally and morally. The more efficient and effective as an artist the less has he - energy, interest, direction-wise - any time for people and the growth of emotions relevant to this endeavour and concern. Is not the artist, not only proverbially so, but often in fact, notoriously bad in his relationships - petty, self-centred, selfish, uncooperative, and peevish, to name but a few of the multitude of relational and emotional defects to which he is emotionally subject?

So, although the emotional growth and education which Macmurray attributes to art are not to be despised, it certainly has its limitations, and is not so totally good as Macmurray seems to imply

it is. Some rather barbaric ages were highly artistic. One has to think only of the Renaissance. And why does art tend to revive temporarily during modern wars, surely times of relational barbarism?

2) Are we convinced by Macmurray's neat categorising? Science he allies with matter; religion with people and the personal. Making allowances, especially for science, we can accept these linkages. But is art to be allied with the organic? We concede that it is to do with vitality and energy - both obviously organic manifestations. But is this enough to really place it? Must we relate these three aspects of reflective thinking so exactly to matter, the organic, and the personal? In other areas, not discussed yet, for example morality (see FMW) Macmurray seems bent on categorising everything into three distinguishing groups. It is ironical that, in another context, Macmurray warns us against being over-logical and systematic in theorising and classifying, when in fact reality may not be so tidy and precise. "Since in the unity of theory and practice it is practice that is the determining factor, it is much better that the theory should be an ugly theory than that it should be a beautiful deception." (PC 41).

Could it be that this is an unconscious hangover in Macmurray's mind from when he religiously and unthinkingly was conditioned to believe in the Trinity? That this idea of three has become so much a part of his mind and discernment, that everything subsequently has had to be structured according to it? Or is three a genuinely, recognisable, feature of reality? Is threedom an intrinsic, in-built, element of, and in, the universe? Certainly I feel a little uncomfortable about the way Macmurray, so neatly and exhaustively, categorises religion, art, and science in their respective

relationships to persons, life, and matter. It seems a little too glib. And interesting as it is, has it all that much value, even theoretically? I would not like to state positively that it has not; but at least it is questionable.

3) Are we all artists? I discussed this briefly in the relevant context, but it is worth mentioning again here, although I will not repeat in detail what was said there.

We are, or can be, all creators; but to say we are all artists is going too far. One might suggest that we are all scientists and all philosophers. We are in a way, but only moderately so. We may even all have the embryonic mental and sensory equipment, but limitations of time and necessary specialisation for the benefit and survival of society, of which we are a part, prevent us developing such capacity, gifts, talents, or potential - call it what you will.

Why then pick on art only as a potential in us all? Or not even a potential. Macmurray says we are all artists. Surely it would be more beneficial to emphasise our religious possibilities. That at least would sow the idea in everybody's mind that they have it in them to get on better with all other human beings, and that life is not, or need not be, a struggle with and against each other for power and authority.

4) Is religion reflective? This must be mentioned here, although seemingly slightly irrelevant, as the question of reflection has arisen, as we have discussed art, much more than when discussing religion and science earlier.

Religion, art, and science, you remember, are the main reflective fields of man. Why Macmurray has not included philosophy

it is difficult to understand, except that a fourth field would upset his beloved, sacrosanct, and presumably aesthetically satisfying tripartitism.

However, to return to the point, is religion reflective? We can understand that the essence of both art and science is reflection. Actual practical doing forms the lesser part of the performance of each. The major part is that of thinking and contemplating. They both require a certain amount of withdrawal to be performed satisfactorily.

But, by Macmurray's own definitions, of which we have given many on the early pages of the religious chapter, religion is essentially an active and creative relationship with other people, with each other. The last thing it is is a mental reflection or dwelling upon God or upon anything else. If it were this, or if religion were seen to be this, it would be immediately condemned by Macmurray as being otherworldly and unreal. Its whole task and endeavour is to get on with the business of loving, relating, and living satisfactorily together.

Religion is better performed the more rational and objective, and the less subjective and self-centred, one is. But to be this does not necessarily entail deep and lengthy reflection; although, of course, it improves by having some moments of withdrawal to review one's condition and relationships. But this is not to be a permanent state.

So raising this point rather questions, if not undermines, the validity of Macmurray's edifice of reflection. Instead of religion completing the trio perhaps it would after all have been better to have slipped in philosophy instead.

But, as earlier said, despite these criticisms Macmurray has done well to remind us of the place of art in the human emotional and reflective economy; and of how more concern with, and understanding of it would enrich both our own lives, and that of society at large.

(End of Appraisement)

MARXISM

Relevant Books

The Philosophy of Communism. (PC)

Creative Society. (CS)

Marxism. (With other authors). (M)

Justification of Chapter Title

In view of Macmurray's great interest in the subject, and of his frequent reference to it, it might be thought that Communism would be the most apt and relevant title for this chapter. I at first held this view. But a more detailed study of Macmurray's approach and attitude reveals that Marxism is far more appropriate; and this for the following reasons.

Firstly; as countless other people have done, and are still doing, Macmurray mistakenly identifies Marxism with communism (small c). One would think that a thinker of Macmurray's sensitivity, ability, and perception, especially with his strong Christian background and convictions, would not have made this obvious and, indeed, disastrous error.

More than anything he said upon the subject, and he has said much, and of which we shall be expounding and discussing here shortly, what a great service he would have done if he had only drawn attention, influential as he was at his peak in the thirties, to the fundamental and irreconcilable difference between Marxism and

communism. Only thrice, and then only passingly and very briefly, in all his exposition, does he hint that Marxism may not be the whole of communism, and that other deeper and more human and personal influences were at work and contributed to its foundation and development. "Communism is not ultimately a matter of economics, even though it carries as a consequence some approach to economic equality. It is a matter of the inherently social nature of human personality. It must rest upon the need that men and women feel for living their lives in community." (PC 95). "There is only one way in which we can escape from some form of state-communism maintained by a dictatorship of force, which would destroy freedom and with it individuality, and that is by creating a form of community life which is compatible with the individuality of all its members." (PC 96). "Throughout the history of Christianity the conception of the Communist society in which property is held in common for the needs of all, and in which brotherhood, equality and freedom are the governing principles of social organisation, has emerged time and again." (CS 142). You may say that nothing could be plainer than that; Macmurray obviously acknowledges the Christian origins of communism. But read deeper, especially chapters 5 and 6 of "Creative Society". Here Macmurray (page 91) goes so far as to attribute the four basic tenets of Marxism to Jesus! And he goes on to say, "My own interest in Communist theory - and I suspect also that this is the case with other Christians - arose through the discovery of these principles in the Gospel in the first instance, and the subsequent discovery that they reappeared in different but recognizable forms in the philosophy of Karl Marx." (CS 91).

This I cannot believe. It may be remotely true for Macmurray, although I think that this is a bit fanciful, but not for others. Obviously many people's interest in communism originates from the practical attempts to implement politically and sincerely their Christian beliefs. Mine does. But the whole emphasis and orientation is on communism not Marxism, with its encouragement of bitter antagonism and human group hostility, as opposed to peace and genuine reconciliation amongst all men. Where is the mutuality, community, and voluntary sharing in Marxism? Strangely enough, as we have seen earlier in our discussion of religion, this is exactly what Macmurray, in his less prejudiced moments, advocates. And the two approaches are irreconcilable, an anomaly Macmurray seems not to notice, fudge as you might communism with Marxism.

Secondly; and this appears, at first sight, to be quite incongruous with, and even to contradict, the first reason just given. Communism, seen politically and socially, we have just agreed, is bigger and wider than Marxism, and deeper and more human, less theory ridden, than Macmurray seems to understand it. Now, I say, and have to say - interpreting and expounding Macmurray's ideas on the matter of course - that Marxism is broader than communism. How does this seeming inconsistency arise?

Because I am now speaking from the philosophical aspect. And remember Macmurray is primarily a philosopher. Whereas most commentators and thinkers interpret and understand Marx in the light of politics and economics, and a little social history, using him merely as a theoretical prop and justification for ends already determined by other, often unconscious, motives, Macmurray appreciates him more deeply. Sometimes we might even feel that he is

too generous and enthusiastic, attributing to Marx things which he perhaps was only implying. But only a Marxist scholar, exhaustively knowing his subject, could confirm or deny this. To talk therefore of communism in this context would hardly be broad and comprehensive enough. So Marxism is the more adequate and satisfactory title.

Why Was Macmurray So Keen On Communism?

Why was Macmurray so keen on communism and Marxism, so that we can say that it was the third or fourth area of interest within his thinking - at least, at the time of his greatest and most productive period of life? There are four reasons.

1) At this time for Macmurray, the thirties, The Russian Revolution, or rather interest in and discussion of its effects and possible developments, was at its peak. Apart from fascism, with its obvious evil intent, evoking instant aversion in anybody of a liberal and democratic bent, communism was the focus of interest, and indeed of partisanship and action.

Poetry reflected it. Popular writing espoused and expounded it e.g. the Left Book Club; and young people of many Western nations died for it in the cities and plains of Spain. The fact that, at this time, Stalin was at his most brutal, cruel, and vicious - murdering and oppressing thousands of his own people who dared to challenge his tyranny - had no effect on the ardent and blindly biased young. Russia was proclaimed, as showing the decadent, capitalist, world the way to a new rebirth.

Macmurray, as is very obvious from his writings and advocacy, was carried, if not swept, along by this popular wave of enthusiasm.

"The development of communism in the modern world is a phenomenon of obvious importance and one which demands careful consideration and understanding." (PC 9). "... because the subject itself is one that has an immediate bearing upon the social questions which press so heavily upon us all at the present time". (PC 9). Perhaps he got wiser as he got older, for only once in his later books, apart from very casual references to Marx, does he make a positive statement about the subject, when he says, obviously disparagingly, "In communist practice the personal is subordinated to the functional to a point at which the defence of the personal becomes itself a criminal activity". (SA 30).

2) Marxism, according to Macmurray, is the only example of explicit philosophy being put into effect. "Unlike most political movements (Marxism) has an explicit philosophy of its own". (PC 9).

Obviously the emphasis is on explicit, meaning in this context not only an articulated philosophy, but one which is relatively, if not totally, whole and comprehensive. For it could be argued that no action, except the most instinctive, occurs in this world, including political action, without an underlying philosophy. Could we say that socialism, or even liberalism and conservatism, have not an implicit philosophy? Many books have been written expounding the philosophy of all three.

What Macmurray really means, and here again it applies to Marxism and not to communism as earlier distinguished, is that the whole of the philosophy was created and articulated separately first, and only afterwards effected, or attempted to be effected. Most other political movements tend to proceed and progress with the

philosophy and practice developing piecemeal and alternatively, sometimes one making the running, sometimes the other. Incidentally, one of Macmurray's favourite themes in general is this continuous and necessary swing from reflection to action and from action to reflection. For examples see SRE 88. And SA chapters 8 and 9, especially page 181.

But whether Marxism is unique in this respect is at least questionable. Perhaps Fabianism, although less total in its philosophy and more empirical in its effect, could be given as another example of an explicit philosophy preceding action. Although less rigid and looser in concept it was first expounded and then intentionally effected, or attempted so to be.

Why does this aspect of Marxism so appeal to Macmurray, assuming that there is some truth and validity in it? It is because it suggests to Macmurray a parallel with science, experimentation, and empiricism; the latter being especially favoured by Macmurray, as we saw when discussing his religious ideas. Of course, it could be argued that deciding first on an explicit philosophy and implementing it afterwards is just the opposite of empiricism. It is theorising first and acting afterwards. But Macmurray would emphasise, as valuable, its experimental aspect. "Instead of trying to construct in idea a conception of what a satisfactory society might be, we can set to work at a harder task, to understand what our actual society is and how it really works. That will show us what is possible and enable us, as ideals do not, to cooperate with the processes which are actually at work; and it will make our action experimental, for out of an accurate knowledge of the social facts a theory will emerge upon which social action can be based and which the action based upon

it will either refute or modify or confirm". (PC 44). This is how Macmurray regards Marxism. Never before has a total philosophy been effected and tested experimentally.

Obviously if this is the correct interpretation of what is happening in the Russian experiment (as it was then called; we probably have, or ought to have, different ideas about it now if only because so much more time has passed) we can understand that for Macmurray, as a philosopher, especially with his emphasis on action, it would be of exciting interest to him, a unique event never before known to man. A milestone in human history and adaptation.

3) We were on the threshold of this third point, and the beginning of an overlap, towards the end of the last reason for Macmurray's enthusiastic concern for Marxism. Quite contrary to the European philosophical tradition, at least since Descartes, but really stemming from Plato, is Macmurray's advocacy, indeed it almost amounts to preaching so earnest and intense is it, his advocacy of the primacy of action. And this as a fact i.e. not what ought to be but is. We just do not recognise it.

Thought is merely functional, contributory, and instrumental. Unlike action it can never be meaningful, or an end in its own right. It certainly can never be paramount, as European tradition has mistakenly made it, or tried, with ever increasing frustration and impotency, to make it. We think we can grasp reality, in and by thought, whereas in fact, according to Macmurray, we can only know it in action. We are born to act, not to think.

This is why philosophy in the European tradition, and especially the British, tends to concentrate upon epistemology, the theory of

knowledge and of truth, instead of on freedom which is the essence of right action. CH 70 must be read on this. Also; "To hold that reality is idea is to hold that thought is primary and action secondary. It is to mean that action is for the sake of thought, not thought for the sake of action. It is, in practice, to make thought an end in itself and knowledge the goal of life. It is to set up thought as the judge of life and deny that life can judge thought. Idealism, when it asserts the primacy of ideas over things, is ridiculous; when it asserts the primacy of the activity of thinking over the activity of real life, it is perverse. It is, in fact, the rationalization of the desire to escape from action and so from responsibility. It represents the tendency to substitute ideas for things, to take refuge from reality in imagination, to live in make-believe." (PC 25). See also PC 34/5 - which must be read. But, although secondary, thought is essential to satisfactory action.. "Ideas are the eyes of action." (PC 41). Thought provides, to give but one example, foresight; and therefore the ideal and proper condition is the unity of thought and action. Marx's famous aphorism epitomises this. "Philosophers hitherto have explained the world in different ways; the task is to change it". (PC 26).

Marxism alone of all philosophies proclaims the unity of thought and action, theory and practice. Marx alone, according to Macmurray, has shifted the whole emphasis of philosophy, life and thought. "Thus there comes directly out of the rejection of idealism the first fundamental principle of Marxian philosophy - that theory and practice are one." (PC 36). "Thus the principle of the unity of theory and practice dictates a completely new approach to social and political practice. If we grasp this, then we shall be able to

understand how all the rest of communist theory hangs together. If we do not, if we persist in thinking that communist theory, like other theories, works in terms of ideals and how to achieve them, it will seem just a jungle of organized nonsense." (PC 44/5).

So important is this aspect of Marx for Macmurray that we must refrain from enlarging upon it here, and devote a section to it later. Sufficient to note at this point that its recognition of the unity of thought and action, is a major reason for Macmurray's interest in Marxism.

4) Macmurray's last main reason for espousing Marxism (and let it be clear that I have determined and unearthed these reasons from Macmurray's writings; he never stated them so explicitly, nor with any cohesion or coherence) is that Marxism is more religious and Christian than is any religion or Christianity as we know them today. And do not forget that Macmurray is totally committed to religion and Christianity. Also remember that religion is Macmurray's paramount thing. So such a construction or contention, true or false but believed, would make him inevitably interested in Marxism.

The Marxist's professed atheism, paradoxically, reveals a truer, finer, more sincere belief in God than does the life, behaviour, and professions of most Christians today, and of a society at least nominally professing allegiance to Christianity. These reveal far less concern for human well-being than does Marxism, far less will and intention to work towards a better life for all. "If a man has discovered that what God means for himself and for the society to which he belongs is untrue, and if he can see no possibility of any other conception of God than the one with which he is familiar, then

honesty demands that he should profess himself an atheist. An honest and courageous atheist is surely more pleasing to God than a dishonest and cowardly theist. We should do well to consider whether the profession of atheism in contemporary society, and in particular by the Communists, is not in fact a repudiation of a conception of God which is at once traditional and false". (CS 19). "I cannot help feeling that this simply means that Communism, whatever its exponents may say, has recovered that essential core of a real belief in God, which organized Christianity has in our day largely lost." (CS 24. Much more of this should be read on this page and the next). Maybe there is some truth in this.

These four reasons, some mere passing and almost ephemeral, others of a deeper and more long-standing nature, enable us to understand why Macmurray had a considerable interest in Marxism.

Macmurray and Marxism

We now turn to consider what must be the essence or *raison d'être* of this chapter, namely, Macmurray's exposition, understanding, interpretation, and analysis of Marxism. This is mainly to be found in "The Philosophy of Communism" (1933).

For ease of consideration, economy, and managability, we will divide our review into two sections. Firstly; attention to those Marxian ideas mentioned, discussed, and commented upon by Macmurray, which are widely known and accepted as being fundamental to Marxism. Because of their familiarity it will not be necessary to elaborate extensively on these except where Macmurray may have an original comment to make upon them.

Secondly, Marxist ideas and aspects which are either originally interpreted by Macmurray, given greater emphasis than usual, neglected by the general commentators, not found in the standard package of Marxian ideas, or even novelly treated by Macmurray.

These two together will display both Macmurray's knowledge and appreciation of Marxism, and reveal any new light or original thinking he may have on this subject. So firstly:-

Marxist Ideas, Known and Generally Accepted, Discussed by Macmurray

In starting we might mention that Macmurray had the highest regard for Marx's ability and performance, irrespective of his manifest thought and contribution - although, it must be noted, Macmurray never suggests why Marx did not do all that Macmurray thinks him capable of. He says, for example, "It is worth noting in this connexion that Marx was a man of highly critical philosophical ability, while Engels, though a very able man, was not outstandingly philosophical." (PC 18). "It is not, for all that, necessitated by Marx's views, nor did he himself provide a philosophical system, though he was eminently capable of doing so, if he had chosen." (PC 19).

So what are these generally accepted ideas of Marx mentioned and discussed by Macmurray? There are five principal ones.

1) Firstly the dialectic, a form of logic which Marx got from Hegel. Formal, traditional, Aristotelian, logic was adequate to deal with matter but what of the great, new, emerging, interest of the 18th. and 19th. centuries the biological, or to give it its wider and more comprehensive title, the organic? For this, and with great

originality, Hegel adapted the ancient Greek form of conversation or argument and raised and extended it to describe the whole process not only of the organic but of reality itself. This idea of the dialectic Marx took over from Hegel and applied it at least to society, social history, and human development, if not to the whole of reality.

It is not relevant, for reasons already given, to discuss all this here, nor to illustrate the working of the dialectic. Either it is all too well-known or can be read-up, at least from Macmurray's point of view, in chapter 1 of PC pages 15/19 and 31/33. So sufficient to say that Macmurray accepts this logical principle of Marx's.

2) Secondly; reality, the world, is a thing not an idea. Hegel, having worked-out and created the dialectic as descriptive of the ultimate process, said that this process is Idea. Hence the description of his philosophy as Idealism. Only one other philosopher went further than this, namely Berkeley with his solipsism. Not only is reality idea, but it is solely my idea. The only things in existence that can be known, so far as I can ever know, are my ideas.

Now as everybody with the minimum of interest in the subject knows, Marx up-ended this, or to use the popular phrase, Marx "found the philosophy of Hegel standing on its head and merely turned it right side up." (M 30).

Dialectic there is, but this is working itself out in society and social history; not in the abstract world of thought and ideas. Ideas only reflect and mentally represent what is happening in

reality. Macmurray firmly endorses all this. (inter alia M 30/4).

Throughout his writings, and not just here and on this point, Macmurray abhors idealism, and that is hardly a strong enough word. He loathes it and regards it as totally mistaken, with disastrous effects.

This second aspect of Marx, adhered to by Macmurray, is discussed quite fully in PC 19/36, and in M. as already quoted.

3) Thirdly; as a result of the foregoing we come to the third major feature of Marxism, if not of Marx, namely dialectical materialism. This is fully discussed by Macmurray in M. chapter 2.

I say "if not by Marx" because Macmurray is doubtful as to whether Marx held this view (see PC 15/19) although everybody attributes it to him. "... is generally described as the philosophy of dialectical materialism. It is doubtful, however, whether it was accepted by Marx himself". (PC 15). And again. "Now I have said that though this position is accepted by orthodox communist philosophy at the present time, it is not indubitably accepted by Marx. It is, I think, undoubtedly present in the writings of Friedrich Engels, and the close cooperation of Marx and Engels makes it rather difficult to distinguish between the two men. All that we can say is that it is curious that though Marx did not definitely reject this principle as it appears in writings with which he himself was so closely associated, he never committed himself to it unequivocally, and there is evidence to show that this non-committal attitude was a deliberate one." (PC 18).

Dialectical materialism means that the whole of reality, which is regarded as ultimately physical, is working itself out by the

dialectic. As we have seen Marx agrees that the dialectic is at work, but will not affirm that Ultimacy is merely material, which the doctrine obviously implies. Of course, Macmurray will not accept this either, realist and anti-idealist as he may be, Instead he makes a clever transformation of it as we shall see much later.

Although we ought to leave the point now to be made to the next part - that where Macmurray shows some novelty over Marx's ideas - it will not be out of place here to observe an astute observation, if only a logical one, of Macmurray's on dialectical materialism; an observation which nobody seems to have made before, and which Macmurray himself does not express with total clarity. If we take precisely the respective and accepted meanings of dialectical and materialism, they are incompatible. Dialectical means the growth and emergence of new things out of a synthesis or compromise of the old. As with the organic, of which as we have seen it purports to describe logically, it is always 'becoming'. "An organic process is a process of development; a process not of 'being' but of 'becoming'. At one stage it is A, and at the next it is B and not A. That description itself is a falsification because a process of development never is at any stage. It is essentially a 'becoming' throughout. Any stage A is really A-becoming-not-A-but-B. Hence any description of the process involves the recognition of the emergence of the contradictory at every point, and the synthesis of contradictories in the further development." (PC 15/6).

Materialism, although a loose term, correctly defined, means the existence of entities which never grow, or even change; or if they do, they change only according to fixed rigid laws. Moreover, they

hardly ever change of themselves, but require some external entity or agent to effect this, even if it is another piece or form or condition of matter. In other words, their essence is of the mechanical, not the organic. On this Macmurray says "This is a matter of some importance, because the use of the term materialism to describe communist philosophy is misleading. When we use the term 'materialism' we normally take it to imply a mechanistic determinism, while 'dialectical materialism', like modern idealism, rest on the repudiation of mechanistic determinism" (PC 19).

Thus has Macmurray shown that dialectical materialism is unreal, a combination of incompatible terms. Where the term dialectical qualifies anything "It implies that reality is either organic or superorganic. It negates any mechanistic metaphysic." (PC 19).

But now in response, as it were, to his own criticism, Macmurray makes an even astuter move. He redefines materialism. And he does this so that it becomes not merely acceptable within the description of dialectical materialism but elevates it to a level where it has become the focal point, or at least a major effect of, a whole new way of philosophising; a way which we must all come to see, according to Macmurray, as being the only way, or the only relevant and progressive way, to philosophise.

Such a transformed view of materialism, which takes a whole chapter to expound (M. chapter 3), will be dealt with in the later section on Marxian ideas instituted or metamorphised by Macmurray.

4) Fourthly the economic interpretation of history. To state an obvious fact, but one far from being always satisfactorily, and certainly not fully, recognised (as we shall see later), society is

persons in relation." (PC 46, 53). Now, if not the sole, but certainly the most fundamental, reason for people relating and cooperating i.e. being social at all, is to provide their basic material needs - food, clothing, warmth, and shelter; the means to survive at all. Thus the basic roots of society are economic. (See PC 53).

A second major feature involved in this situation is change. (See PC 48. 53. 58). Changes in the economic process inevitably occur, brought about by climatic conditions, natural disasters, diseases, human conflict, population changes, and improved production techniques, however elementary and basic these in the past might have been, and however sophisticated today.

These two factors, the providing of the basic needs of a society and of inevitable change in the circumstances of that provision, are together enough to explain the 'cause' and 'course' of history i.e. of human social movement, development, progress, and conflict. All else is but a facile superstructure, almost an excrescence, upon this. Ideas, theories, culture, cultures, religion, customs, and art are mere superficial manifestations and reflections of this basic thing, and determined by it. They do not exist, as it were, in their own right. Their form and essence is determined by the underlying economic pattern and structure, and changes with it. This determines everything.

The comments of Macmurray upon this will be made after we have mentioned the next major Marxian idea which inevitably follows from the economic interpretation of history, namely the class struggle. It might be said, however, in passing that if the economic interpretation of history were true, it could never be known to be so

for it would have to be regarded as an inevitable and economically determined throw-up of the economic situation at the time of its conception.

5) Fifthly; the class struggle; because of this basic and inevitable human economic situation and entrapment, at any particular time in history one class will be holding economic power and dominating the scene, bringing automatically, and virtually unconsciously, its own philosophy and cultural superstructure, and imposing these on other classes.

Past top classes will be too effete and moribund to oust or oppose this new dominant class; but 'lower' classes, yet to have their day, and waiting in the wings, will opportunely challenge the present top class until they supersede it and assume power. This is the classic class struggle, or at least the theory of it. "The communist holds that the historic process is essentially a struggle between social classes for the control of the means of production." (PC 72. See also PC 55).

Now the fact that this is called the class struggle, or even class war, suggests in standard Marxist theory that a class not in power hates (see the famous Communist Manifesto 1848) the class that is in power, and fights to eliminate it, ultimately succeeding.

It is interesting to note, however, that Macmurray has a slightly different interpretation. A top class at any particular time has not won, stolen, or usurped power deliberately and consciously. And certainly it has not done this for its own ends and benefits. On the contrary. Unknown to itself it has been merely the vehicle, the best vehicle at the time or it would not have succeeded,

of the total economic situation. And when, because of the factors of inevitable economic change earlier mentioned, it ceases to be a propitious vehicle or instrument, it is superseded by a class more in keeping with the current, overall, situation, possibilities, and potentialities. See M 65/9.

But, Macmurray asks (M 69), why cannot class and social changes necessitated by the pressures of the supposed inevitable economic factor, be recognised, met, and peacefully effected? One reason he gives is human conservatism. In all ages of life men cling to outdated modes of life and thought. Superstitions are but one of many examples Macmurray gives of this (see M 69). None more so than in the economic sphere. Once comfortably ensconced, as the class at the top of the economic tree must be, any move for a change can only be seen by it as a threat to security.

This comment of Macmurray's, however, is not absolute. One could argue that change can and does occur without open conflict. To give but one example of many which could be given. In our own day in Britain, 1986/7, we are witnessing, and indeed ourselves becoming a part of, a social and economic class transition of quite a major kind. Since the defeat of the open and classical Marxist challenge of the Lefties e.g. Scargill's miners strike, and the infiltration of communist subversives into schools, there has developed over the last two years a very deliberate and conscious policy of enlarging share-owning however modest the holding, to include eventually, it is hoped and forecast, at least 80% of the people.

Another allied factor, first mooted, discussed, and very perfunctorily realised in a very few cases, but now very much

occurring, is the granting of shares to workers in their own company i.e. the company by whom they are employed. These, and similar moves, might well obviate the abrupt and temporarily destructive change of power from the present top class, that of the financial-cum-managerial-cum-bureaucratic-cum-I.Q.elitist, to the well-off section of the so-called working class. In the past this would have been called the artisan part of the working class, but this is hardly a relevant term today, in this context at least.

In all the class struggle theory and analysis by Marx, Macmurray, and innumerable other commentators and pundits, a factor of some importance, unnoticed by them, has come to my attention very recently, and may itself become the cause of a new, if barely economic, discontent, despite the above modifier and ameliorator. It is slightly festering and smouldering already, even if it has not really surfaced. And surprisingly, or perhaps not surprisingly, it is due to class improvement for, as in all areas of life, the more we become basically secure in essentials the wider our vision, imagination and demands grow.

I have heard it articulated only once - by Michael Arditti, who spoke on the radio recently (12th January 1987), about his recent play "The Chatelaine" (which was later broadcast). This play was written to illustrate Arditti's thinking on this matter. This is; that a class may, indeed does, lose power, and is superseded in the Marxian sense, but still - and this is the point - retains its privileges, prestige, culture, and influence and, to a very great extent, its wealth.

How true this is! Especially of the British monarchy and artistocracy. To give a minor example of Arditti's; the deposed

classes, as in the past, still live in high style in their country houses and estates but, unlike in the past we pay for them to do so through "Stately Homes" open days, and through government and private grants.

And abroad, there are still countless counts in Italy and Germany living it up, and innumerable rich Russian emigres living in Paris. The meaning and implications of this, in general and especially for Marxism, must be something well worth researching and theorising about. It is certainly something Marx failed to take account of, and all contemporary Marxists seem blind to it. And surely it is something more than a mere updating of Veblen's "The Theory of the Leisure Classes."

What, forgetting the last two paragraphs, has Macmurray to say about the Economic Interpretation of History, and of the class struggle? His thoughts on these are scattered widely in PC chapter 3, but a reasonable summary would be to say that man is far from being solely economic. He is economic, and where this is so, and so far as he is economic, the economic interpretation of history may apply.

But he is more than economic, more than a mere organic entity. "For a very long time and, indeed, in principle, since man became man, the personal life of human beings has never been purely organic. So far as purposes are deliberately formed and action is deliberately chosen, human life is superorganic. Within any human society there has always been a field of individual and social freedom. Friendships between individuals, for example, have never been completely determined by economic relations or even by common

purposes. The range of this freedom has of course always been limited by economic considerations, and in the process of human social development every step in progress has meant an enlargement of the field of free relationship. It is, for instance, very much easier today for people belonging to different social classes to enter into friendly relations, or even to marry, than it was a hundred years ago. The superorganic element in society has, therefore, been increasing in importance during the process of social development. But it does not follow that this makes any difference to the interpretation of social development as a whole". (PC 74/5).

But two qualifications apply. Marx foretells the end of the class struggle i.e. when the last and 'bottom' class has assumed power. Then, too, the economic dialectic must automatically end and with it the economic interpretation of history. Marx of course recognises this and astutely makes provision for it by saying that what has really been pre-history will cease and real history begin. "It led to the statement (by Marx) that with the achievement of communism prehistory would come to an end and history would begin. That is an admission that the economic interpretation of history, with which the Marxists have made us familiar, is only applicable to the immaturity of social life. A truly human society would follow a process of development which could not be interpreted dialectically, that is to say, as a process of adaptation to the environment." (PR 75).

This is an admission that essentially man is more than economics and organic. We are, to use Macmurray's often mentioned term in this book (PC 19, 65, 67, 72, 75, 76 and 84), superorganic. Thus it would seem that Marx, in a devious, backhanded, and afterthought way, is in

agreement with Macmurray.

The second qualification is this. What Marx really intends to do, and it comes through in much of his work, is, by the heightening of the consciousness of society and its functioning, to view and know society scientifically, "The main new principle, the principle of the necessary unity of theory and practice, demands a theory of society which is scientific, in the sense that it can be used as a basis for deliberate social action which will bring the development of society under the control of human understanding." (PC 57). Other relevant references are PC 45 and 77/8. Man has adopted science in the physical world, to his great advantage. Now he must do the same in the social world. And, as with the physical world, by doing this we can free ourselves from our total submission to it; in the present context this means freeing ourselves from the inevitable, inexorable, grip of economic dominance, and from the economic chain of history. Such a transition would mean a change from the economically determined society to a planned society - a society a very long way off, as Macmurray understands that term.

We now turn to the other half of our survey as proposed on pages 7/8 earlier. Namely:-

Some Aspects of Marxism Unnoticed, Or Not Usually To The Fore,
Discussed Or Initiated By Macmurray

1) Stirner

Marx's debt to Hegel is proverbial. Even here we have had occasion to discuss it. And Macmurray certainly writes at length on

this. Another important source is Ludwig Feuerbach, who wrote "The Essence of Christianity", and from which Marx got some useful ideas. "It is a plain matter of historical fact that the social content of communist theory is derived from Christianity, through the philosopher Feuerbach's treatise. Yet there is a strong resistance in communism against recognizing this". (CH 19/20). Less laudatory, and even more briefly, Macmurray says, "The philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach merely represents stages in the rejection of idealism." (PC 27). Both seem to be very important matters in relation to Marx's philosophy and deserve more explanation and development. Although Macmurray refers to Feuerbach four times in his writings CS 91, 117; CH 20; PC 27) he passes him over lightly.

But Macmurray does stay considerably longer with Max Stirner (PC 26/31), usually considered to be a lesser influence upon Marx than the other two. Why does Macmurray regard him to be so important in relation to Marx and the development of his ideas? "For the remainder of this discussion of the origins of communist philosophy I wish to indicate another source of Marxian thought which has a special importance in that it is generally overlooked, although it supplies a clue to the values which underlie Marxian sociology. I refer to the philosophical anarchism of Max Stirner." (PC 26/7).

The relevant position is stated in Stirner's book "The Self and Selfdom". He is the advocate and lover of freedom, almost to the point of anarchy. But what limits our freedom? What prevents us being free? We can see at once why Macmurray is interested in him and brings him forward. So; what inhibits our freedom? Simply, ideas.

Marx agreed with Stirner on two points. Firstly, that freedom is good. Secondly, that ideas prevent it being realised. But from here onward Marx and Stirner part company. And it is his anger with Stirner, and his subsequent attack upon him, that caused Marx to clarify and make explicit his own ideas on the matter. What is the gravamen of their difference?

Stirner said it is our own ideas which prevent us being free. We are our own enslavers. To find freedom therefore we have only to cast aside, to banish, ideas and reach down into the reality of the self - hence the title of his book. Macmurray reminds us (PC 28) that Stirner's position is similar to that of D.H. Lawrence in our own day, of whom he, Macmurray, is a great admirer. Speaking of different types of people he says, "The former are not merely dead souls; they stand for death against life. They obstruct and fight against life wherever they find it. They are the people of whom D.H. Lawrence - who understood these things better than any other man of our time - said that they are sunless." (FMW 58).

Marx will have none of Stirner's individualism and subjectivism. He rejects its efficacy on three counts.

1) To cast aside, or try to cast aside, your ideas still leaves you in the realm of ideas. You are really trying to escape the tyranny of thought by thinking about it, an impossibility. Remember that Marx, like Macmurray, is strongly anti-idealist i.e. against believing that ideas are supreme and real. Moreover, in following Stirner's method you are being excessively individualistic, another bete noire of both Marx and Macmurray. (See PC 28).

2) Suppose you do, or could, manage by this personal and private method to become free, or to think you were free. You would still be mistaken. You would not be free because of the prevalent ideas of society i.e. of everybody around you, manifested in law, conventions, customs, and by what in these days is called the conventional wisdom. All these are bound to limit and restrict your freedom.

3) And even if you had freed yourself, and society was free, you would still not be free (and here we are on real Marxist ground!) because, probably, economic circumstances would not allow you to be and do what you want to be, express, and live your freedom: so Marx concluded that the governing factor of the fight for freedom was the economic situation. That is the real meaning of the economic interpretation of history. It is not a dogma. It is an assertion of fact. Marx, then, took something essential from Stirner and qualified it. He accepted the principle that it is freedom we are after, and so took his stand firmly in the democratic tradition. He agreed also that ideas limit freedom and that it is necessary to get behind ideas to the personal reality which they represent. But he added that this personal reality is essentially social, that it is the reality of personal relationships in society, and further, that what determines the relation of persons in society is the economic reality which they face. The way to freedom lies through the control of economic necessity by the development of man's power over nature." (PC 30).

That Macmurray has drawn attention to Stirner's influence upon Marx, indirect and - as with Hegel - topsy-turvy though it may be, is a useful contribution to Marxian scholarship.

2) Theory and Practice Are One

So vital and paramount is this idea for Macmurray, as an innovation introduced by Marx, that it should be the first item in the first section of our review, instead of, as it is, the second in the second. Yet I must be honest and say that, in this context, I had never heard of it.

My subject for M.Sc. degree was Political Thought, Theory, and Philosophy Since 1815. Moreover, I specialised in the Socialist thought of that period. This does not make me an authority on anything, and certainly not on Marx and Marxist thinking. But you would have thought that I would at least have made a passing acquaintance with the idea. This was not so. Or if I did it impressed me so little, or seemed so marginal, at the time that I have forgotten it.

Only three alternatives can be drawn from this, my ignorance - according to choice - being either condemned or condoned apart. Firstly; that Macmurray became enthusiastic about something he already believed, was pleased to find it confirmed by such an authority as Marx, and therefore overplayed it. Secondly; he alone has recognised a profound truth invented by Marx, but not especially highly regarded by Marx, other ideas being more important. Or, thirdly; that Macmurray, being a philosopher, does find this very important in relation to other aspects of Marxism, which appear to Marx to be merely political, economic, or social. I tend to favour a mixture of the last two.

To illustrate that I am not exaggerating Macmurray's enthusiasm for this doctrine let me quote. "Thus there comes directly out of the rejection of idealism the first fundamental principle of Marxian

philosophy - that theory and practice are one. The principle is the revolutionary principle of communist philosophy. Everything else in communist thought dwindles into insignificance beside it. To accept it is to break with the whole tradition of European thought and to demand a completely new culture on a new social and economic basis. You may drop or refute all the particular theories of Marxian economics and even the interpretation of social history; but if you accept this theory of the unity of theory and practice you are still committed to a complete revolution both on the theoretical and on the practical sides of life". (PC 36). And again. "Of these principles there is only one which is absolutely essential and that is the principle of the unity of theory and practice. It is this principle which makes communist philosophy not so much a particular philosophical system amongst others, as a new type of philosophy altogether, involving a new conception of what theory is and of how any theory is to be judged." (PC 61). It could not be put more powerfully or clearly than that.

The irony is that, despite the pre-eminence Macmurray gives to this notion, surpassing all others in the Marxist scriptures, according to Macmurray, it is doubtful if one communist in a thousand has heard of it, or is conscious of practising it. Whereas they are all carrying out the class war, and regarding economics as paramount.

It ought to be noted at this point that although Macmurray chiefly calls this idea Theory and Practice, sometimes he identifies it with, or associates it with, Thought and Action, or even Ideas and Things. That these, in this context, convey almost the same thing is obvious, making slight allowance where relevant, and in particular

cases. It is not possible in the short compass of this thesis to be too precise on this matter. Sufficient if we understand the import of the major underlying idea.

Apart from the obvious what are:-

Some Thoughts of Macmurray's on Theory and Practice

1) By suggesting that Theory and Practice, Thought and Action, are one it is not meant that they are identical, or the same thing. It means that although to do, to practice, and to act, are primary - after all, we do not live by thinking but by things e.g. food - nevertheless thought and practice are inseparably bound together (see M 34). They both exist in their own right, but thought has validity only when it is used to consider things, and is not merely indwelling upon itself.

2) Whether we know it or not Theory and Practice are one. Neither this nor the next point are clearly explained by Macmurray (see PC 36/41) but by this he means that no matter what theories we profess, everybody observing us knows by our practices what our real theories are i.e. the standards, ideas, and beliefs we are actually living by. Thus real theory, as opposed to professed theory, must be one with our practices. (PC 36/40). This is a fact.

Macmurray summarises this "Here, then, is the first simple meaning of the principle of the unity of theory and practice in the communist philosophy. If you want to know what people really believe you must study their behaviour" (PC 38/39). He then becomes extremely partisan on the communists' behalf, illustrating how well they apply this principle. "Now, you may think that this is something quite obvious that everybody agrees with and that it has

nothing to do with communism. It sounds more like Christianity. But let me remind you that one of the most annoying things about communists is that they always refuse to take the professed ideas of political parties or business groups or churches or economists at their face value. They are a suspicious people. The reason is that they always will insist on comparing the theories professed by these groups with the way they behave. They think, in fact, that to know what a political party really stands for you must take to a patient study of the general lines of its action when it is in power (PC 39). How ironical in view of the real situation. And how blind can he be? As mentioned before, in Macmurray's day, Stalin was exercising power, presumably on behalf of the communists. When were professions ever more disproved by action? And from 1917 to this day, and no doubt into the future, professing Marxists will, by their actions, reveal their true beliefs - the assertion of force and oppression against anybody not submitting to their tyrannical lust for power and unfreedom.

True indeed is the point Macmurray is making. And instead of being the uncoverers, the Marxists are the prime examples of it!

3) Theory and practice ought to agree. Obviously here theory means professed theory, or it would not make sense with the last observation, nor with what he subsequently says.

The reason for this point is that a "theory which does not harmonise with practice is always dangerous". (PC 40). "Self-deception leads to disaster." (PC 40). To be otherwise is to be unaware of our own motives. "Ideas are the eyes of action." (PC 41). "It is therefore of supreme importance that we should have a social theory which can be the basis of social action, and that

theory should harmonize exactly with our social practice. Since in the unity of theory and practice it is practice that is the determining factor, it is much better that the theory should be an ugly theory than that it should be a beautiful deception. What is important is not that we should have high ideals but that our ideals and our practice should be in agreement. That may seem a hard saying, and it is certainly a revolutionary one. But the alternative is to stumble blindly in the dark to our own destruction." (PC 41).

This leads on to another sub-theme of Marx, which is also a favourite of Macmurray's as well. This is; an attack on utopianism. (See PC 41/5). Utopianism is condemned on several grounds. It is an example of separating theory and practice, thought from action. It floats the utopian up to worlds of unreality. With these reasons we may agree but not with the idea that utopians stand outside society and assume that it "is plastic in my hands as if I were God making the world afresh." (PC 43). Nor that utopianism is individualistic and egotistical. Whilst most find utopias stimulating and imaginative, only a madman would take them seriously to the point of renouncing and opting out of this world, and cease to strive for its immediate, piecemeal, betterment here and now.

Macmurray seems unaware of this. He unfortunately takes the either/or view. He cannot see that there is a place both for the imagining of a better condition for man and a bit of social engineering founded on the scientific approach advocated by Marx. "What, then, is the alternative to utopian theories? The alternative is scientific theory." (PC 44). Not much to the fore in Macmurray's heyday, would science fiction, with its combination of phantasy and

realism, bridge what seems for him the unbridgable?

4) Macmurray criticises practising Marxists, in relation to this principle that theory and practice are one, for not being Marxist. Even Marx himself recognised this failing amongst his early followers, and is reported to have said of himself "Thank God I am not a Marxist!" (PC 62).

The principle that theory and practice are one demands that society shall be experimental. It shall not be bound by dogmas. Yet Marxists are amongst the most dogmatic and rigid believers. Admittedly Lenin modified Marx's theory and practice, due to his immense prestige as initiator, architect, and leader of the Revolution, and justified by his supposed use of the dialectic. "It is often triumphantly pointed out that the Russian Revolution did not follow the lines mapped out by Marx for a communist revolution and that Lenin was compelled to develop a new theory which differs in important respects from that of Marx. That is, however, not an objection to Marxism, or to Leninism. To think it is, is simply to fail to understand Marxian theory and to relapse into idealism. The real question is this: "Is Leninism a true dialectical development of Marxism?" If Marxian theory is scientific then it must be capable of experimental development." (PC 62).

But, that example apart, no one has dared to deviate, at least not for long, from the oracle. Witness the dismissal of Hu Yaobang in China as recently as January 1987 for his advocacy of, or perhaps weakness in face of, a modest move towards a Western style of freedom of ideas, behaviour, and communication. "The principle of the unity of theory and practice must itself apply to communist philosophy. Marxism is necessarily subject to its own law of the development of

theory through experimental action. In other words, the philosophy of communism is not merely a philosophy of dialectical development, it is itself, if it is true to itself, a dialectically developing philosophy. To be a dogmatic Marxist, therefore, is to repudiate Marxism. The tendency to think of the body of Marx's writings as a new revelation which forms a standard of orthodoxy for communists developed early amongst Marx's disciples." (PC 61/2).

Why Do We Have This Principle?

Why do we have this principle that theory and practice are one? What are its sources and origin? Where does it stem from? I will be brief about these. 1) Because of the rejection of idealism. You will remember that Marx rejected Hegel's Idealism whilst retaining the dialectic. Such a rejection automatically leads to the view that action is primary, and such a conclusion requires, as we have seen, the unity of theory and practice, thought and action. (See PC 52).

2) Because of anti-dualism, of which as we saw here in the chapter on religion, Macmurray is a great advocate. "Now in contrasting the dualistic modes of thought with the religious mode we notice that dualism always has the effect of turning theory and practice, the reflective and the active aspects of experience, the spiritual and the natural worlds, into opposition to one another." (CH 85). See also SA 84.

To conclude this section on theory and practice two other points must be made.

1) The interest of Macmurray at this stage of his teaching, the thirties in thought and action, theory and practice, led to his later

major theory of Agency which we shall be discussing in the chapter on philosophy. This was expounded in his work "The Form of the Personal". (Two volumes), first given as the Gifford Lectures 1953/4.

2) Although not attributed directly to Marx, the very great and important change made by modern psychology from recognising itself as being the science of mind, to its self-recognition as the science of behaviour, may be due not a little to Marx's long-term influence. Macmurray remarks on this as follows. "We see why the emergence of psychological science depends on the weakening of the inhibition which maintained the separation of theory and practice throughout the first two stages of modern social development. So long as persons are thought of as minds the attention is confined to the theoretical aspects of human activity divorced from their setting in the objective world. What has made scientific psychology possible is a shift of interest from the theoretical to the practical, and therefore material, activities of human beings." (BS 117).

We now move on to the third point in the section on Marxist ideas initiated or rediscovered by Macmurray.

3) Materialism Redefined

This conception was anticipated on page 11, you will remember, following Macmurray's contention that the terms dialectical and materialism, although forming one idea in the Marxist orthodoxy, are - if rightly defined - incompatible. but instead of sitting down under his own criticism, and determined to accept and retain the Marxist concept, Macmurray up-dates the idea of materialism. Whether this is legitimate, astute, justified, or merely cheating, is to be

decided after considering his exposition of it. What is his line of argument?

With Marx there arrived a new form, a new style, of philosophy and philosophising, a form which lifts it to a new plane of awareness. Because of the recognition of the unity of thought and action, theory and practice, already discussed here, philosophy discovered, became conscious of, its social function." Philosophers hitherto have explained the world in different ways; the task is to change it". (PC 26; M 43; SA 97). Marx's famous phrase, already quoted earlier, summarises this new outlook.

Such a change as has occurred transforms all branches and aspects of philosophy, none more so, and the one relevant for us now, than in the meanings of familiar philosophical terms. One such term is materialism. This term, according to Macmurray, is one of the main obstacles to the acceptance of Marx (see M 44). Instead of recognising that it has changed as a result of the new way of philosophising, countless thinkers and others use it in the old mechanistic, souless, dualistic way. Dualistic is perhaps the key word. Not only was there, and still is amongst those who have yet to catch-up with the new unity arising out of the recognition that action is primary, not only was there the duality of thought and action, theory and practice, but also those of mind and matter, body and soul, heaven and earth, this life and the next. Indeed our whole life and way of thinking, feeling, and experiencing has been riddled by dualism. "The traditional distinction between materialism and idealism is itself a reflection of the disunity of thought and action. It is one aspect of the old dualism between mind and matter,

or between body and soul. As ideas these are opposites and defined as mutually exclusive." (M 44).

For three pages, M 44/6, Macmurray elaborates on the causes and effects of this dualism in all of us, and in society. Probably, as Macmurray says elsewhere (FMW 79/81), it stems from the Stoic tradition; or, perhaps, deeper still from a sort of innate schizophrenia in us which seems unable to blend or harmonise, let alone unite, thought and feeling, reason and emotion.

Whatever the reason, materialism has a bad "press". It is associated with the mechanistic and determinist view of life, and is even extended to include a moral connotation, referring to ways of living which are concerned with mammonism, instant physical gratification, and selfishness. It is seen as the opposite of living for the realisation of ideals and wider "higher" ends. See M 46/7.

But, and here is the crux of the matter, once you shift the focus of your consciousness away from traditional ways of seeing things and realise that life is action, and that action is primarily concerned with things and not with ideas, materialism is transformed and takes on a new aspect. "The moment you really recognize that life is action, and that human life is conscious action, it is no longer possible to keep this hard and fast distinction. Matter means something different, because it is no longer something incompatible with full human consciousness. As a result 'materialism' means something radically different. It means the recognition that the primary distinction to which the dualism of mind and matter crudely refers is between action which is blind and action which is fully conscious. The materialist is then the man who knows what he is doing, the man who acts with a full consciousness of why he acts in

that way and of what the consequences will be. His opposite, the idealist, is now the man who is not aware of the relation between his ideas and his way of acting, and whose behaviour and its consequences are hidden from himself. The Marxian attack upon idealism is fundamentally an attack upon our traditional form of consciousness which consists in being unaware of the real relation between what we think and what we do, and in a conscious inability, which rationalizes an instinctive refusal, to bring the two into explicit relation. The result of it is that when we honestly and sincerely wish to act upon our beliefs and ideals, we produce consequences very different from and sometimes the precise opposite of those we intended and expected to produce." (M 47/8).

What is the essence of the new outlook? We see that the material is the means to all that we would wish and desire. Science is materialistic. It has dropped all idealism, all the fantastic speculations of the pre-scientific era and discovered reality. "Why is it that scientific knowledge leads to our ability to control the processes of nature? It is because science is materialist in this sense. It puts aside prejudice and bias, and seeks to understand nothing but the way in which things behave in fact, and why they behave that way. It seeks to understand the real nature, the active nature of what it studies. It ruthlessly throws aside all theories which will not square with the results of acting upon them; that is, of experiment. And by submitting thus to the nature of things we discover what is possible, and so how far we can control them in practice. It is in this sense that dialectical materialism is materialistic." (M 49).

The new materialism, paradoxically, can realise all the "ideals" which idealism, detached from action, and living apart in an unreal world of its own, could never realise. "It is the idealist who now, while believing that these changes will somehow come about some day, refuses to consider them practical politics here and now. His belief in progress is divorced from his modes of social activity. It remains an "idea", a dream, not something to be accomplished by deliberate, planned, social and political action. He wishes to keep his vision free from the dust and grime of material conflict, as a private consolation." (M 51).

And in case, bearing in mind the old meaning of materialism, and by speaking of science, it is thought that Macmurray means only material benefits, nothing is further from his mind. For half a page (M 50/1) he eulogises on its meaning for improved human relations and on the regeneration of all human beings which must eventually result from seeing things anew in the light of redefined materialism. "The new materialism sustains the belief that it is possible to construct a universal society of men and women who shall all be free and equal, without distinction of race or nationality. It leads to the conviction that, given proper conditions of life, men and women everywhere will live in peace and justice and mutual sympathy throughout the world; that it is possible to put an end to the exploitation of men by men, of class by class, of nation by nation, of black man by white man, of female by the male". (M 50).

To close, a few summarising quotations.

The idealist "is to be defined as the man who wishes to cherish ideals without realising them by his own effort, while the

materialist has become the man who refuses to be content with ideals which are not meant to govern and determine his own social action." (M 52).

"However high our faith in human possibility, the primary consideration of what can be done here and now, and the occupation of doing it, necessarily narrows down the range of our imagination. Action is illuminated and enlarged by thought, but thought is at the same time checked and limited by action. Thought which aims at action increases the range of practical possibility enormously and progressively, but not to infinity, and the process distinguishes inexorably between the valid and the illusory vision." (M 52).

"Nothing is more characteristic of idealism than its fight against this process of disillusionment, nor more symptomatic of its inner unreality. For to be rid of our illusions is surely the first condition of discovering the truth. The promise of idealism is this. "Ye shall see visions, and be consoled thereby." But the promise of the new materialism is an older and surer promise." Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free." (M 52/3).

Assessment of the new theory of Materialism

How shall we assess all this? I think we can dismiss any idea that Macmurray is being arch or clever. He genuinely thinks that he believes in what he says; but perhaps in his enthusiasm he has gone a little too far.

That there needed to be a reorientation towards unity of thought and action; that we should be reminded of the paramountcy of action and of things, none can deny. But, however reinterpreted, can this

amount to materialism? Would Macmurray himself, in the last resort, like to be called a materialist; even if this were prefixed by "New"? A better term, I would have thought, would have been Actionism, Radical Realism, or Wholism (Smuts, you recall, had a philosophy of Holism). But although Macmurray does not suggest, let alone discuss, these alternative titles, he does dismiss modern realism. "To be a realist, therefore, means not merely to make ideas subordinate to things; it means to make thought subordinate to action, to make theory subordinate to practice. A realism which fails to do this is only the idea of realism. That would be the communist philosopher's criticism of modern realism." (PC 35). And again. Of modern realism, "It remains within the field of ideas and is, therefore, a kind of inverted idealism. Just as talking about action is not acting, so talking realistically is not being realistic." (PC 35/6).

An interesting point is where dualism arises. Is the man in the street, unconscious as he is of how his ideas and attitudes embodying the cultural and social ethos of the society of which he is a part, dualistic? I am sure that I was not dualistic as a boy. Life was whole, indivisible, and infinite. Only as I grew up and took to knowledge did I become dualistic. Is it only thinkers who experience this dualism, or imagine they do? And does it come about only as a result of thinking? Presumably, in reality, it does not exist. Where could it exist anyway? It is only in us. Or even if only in us, does it come about, as suggested earlier, by some natural irreconcilables in us?

Has the new materialism caught on? In a way, yes. People in general are less idealistic, less 'religious', less otherworldly, and

even less dualistic than they were fifty years ago. They want "something done about it" more urgently and realistically than then. They live - and this not with any disparaging intonation - more in and for the present now. We scan the heavens these days by space-ships, not by prayer.

Despite this, however, there is probably more unrealism about. Life was realistic enough for many people in the thirties, with unemployment and Hitler to contend with. But there is more escapism today - drugs, T.V., sport, soap operas, pop, rubbishy reading, and phoney cults by the thousand such as astrology, horoscopy, and pseudo religions. All very unrealistic.

But so far as thought is concerned the new materialism has few if any followers. But perhaps this is just how Macmurray - if he was true to his theory - ought to like it. The new materialism is certainly practised even if it is not thought!

We now turn to a whole new aspect of our subject:-

Macmurray's Criticism of Marxism

Needless to say, this means criticisms of a relatively major kind which have not already shown themselves, as some criticisms directly or by implication have done in the exposition as we have gone along.

But first we ought clearly to state where Macmurray stands in relation to Marxism, in so far as this was not made obvious in and by the foregoing. For this purpose we cannot do better than quote his own assessment. "Any serious criticism of communist philosophy must start by declaring openly how much of its theory is accepted by the critic. I must therefore preface my criticism by saying that I

accept the rejection of idealism and the principle of the unity of theory and practice in the sense in which I have expounded it. And since this is the truly revolutionary principle, such an acceptance involves taking one's stand within the tradition of thought which derives from Marx. The negative implication of accepting this fundamental principle goes very deep." Very much more follows on page 63 and must be read. It ends "It follows that any social or philosophical theory which we can then accept, must be either the Marxian theory or some development of the Marxian theory through a process of criticism which falls within the general principles upon which Marxian theory is based. This does not exclude a clearer statement of the fundamental principles than is to be found in Marx himself or in orthodox communist philosophy at the present time". (All the above is PC 62/4).

Before proceeding one other point needs to be mentioned. For a reason not clear Macmurray is rather touchy about criticising Marx, including both his own and others criticisms. Does this conceal - or reveal - a slightly unsure allegiance to Marx? Three times in the "Philosophy of Communism" (10/12; 59/61; 73), he warns us that any criticism should not detract from the Marxian position and teaching, nor that it is serious ground for questioning Marx, let alone for renouncing or rejecting him.

Would Macmurray be so defensively and protectively zealous on any other thinker's behalf? To quote one example. "But before proceeding to criticism it is wise to remind ourselves that in the criticism of communist philosophy there is more than the usual danger of prejudice. It is always easy to find points of objection to any

theory which human thought can construct. If we have a practical interest in the rejection of any theory, therefore, it is always possible to find grounds for rejecting it. This is, of course, a completely unscientific and unphilosophical method of procedure; and it is one from which communist thought in particular has suffered severely." (PC 59). As one example of this Macmurray gives the Labour Theory of Value, which many today find untenable, and therefore dismiss the whole of Marx's work because he held this theory. "But the labour theory of value was not even invented by Marx. It was the theory of the orthodox economists of Marx's time. If its rejection is a reason for dismissing Marx as a charlatan, it is a reason for dismissing Adam Smith as a charlatan also. But he, on the contrary, is honoured as the classical source of economic theory". (PC 60). Perhaps special warnings of this kind were necessary in the thirties when Russian communism was new and young.

And so to the criticisms.

1) That reality is more than an organic process

This Macmurray calls his "main criticism" (PC 64). This criticism could be seen in two ways. Firstly; that the case has not been made out for it. (PC 64). This Macmurray asserts is not the ground of his criticism. Indeed he is well satisfied with its justification. But, secondly, that it does not go far enough; and this is Macmurray's criticism.

Marx says that "society is persons in relation", but he only recognises two types of relationship; the mechanical, where one person is used by another; and the organic, where people relate to achieve a common purpose. (See PC 65). But, says Macmurray, there is

a third very important type of relationship, and the one which epitomises man, namely friendship. The essence of this is mutuality and equality. There is no question here of people using each other; nor of relating only to obtain a useful and necessary end. Friendship is enjoyed for its own sake. Macmurray calls this type of relationship, personal.

And one other feature of it needs to be recognised (see PC 66). It is outside of the dialectical process of history. Friendship was the same in Caesar's time as it is today. it has not improved or worsened. It is not of the order to do so. "This means, in turn, that personal reality is superorganic; and a universe that contains within it something which is superorganic cannot itself be merely organic. Thus, the principle that reality is an organic process must be inadequate to the facts of personal experience." (PC 67).

So, if accepted this proves two things in contradiction to Marxism. Firstly, that reality is at least superorganic for, logically, an entity (in this case the universe or reality) cannot be qualitatively less than its most developed and advanced part, however insignificant quantitatively that advanced part may be. A rose cannot be less than its colour and fragrance whatever else it is.

Secondly, that not only is reality not merely organic, but it cannot be understood dialectically; for the dialectic can only explain changing and organic things. Friendship and the personal, in essence, never change.

Further problems begin to appear concerning Marxist theory once we concede the above. There is social history which, for Marx, is solely governed by the dialectic working in and through the economic foundation and necessities of life. The economic is fundamental.

All else is superficial and secondary. But if we are not wholly organic, nor totally economic, how can this theory of social history be maintained? "If there is a superorganic element in all human life, obviously a merely organic explanation of all human history must be inadequate and misleading." (PC 67).

Here Macmurray seems to compromise. In so far as man is organic so will the dialectic apply to human society and its development. "On the other hand, there is certainly an aspect of history which is organic and to which the principle of dialectical interpretation must apply. To say that man is an animal or an organism is obviously true, even though it is not the whole truth. Human life has an organic aspect, and for that reason human history has an aspect in which it is an organic process. May it not be that the aspect of human history which Marx interprets dialectically and in terms of economics is, in fact, the organic aspect of human history and that, within the limits to which he applies it, his analysis is perfectly adequate and in principle trustworthy?" (PC 67/8).

I said just now that Macmurray 'appears to compromise' on this issue, but immediately he goes on (PC 68/72) to challenge this on several grounds. Firstly, that Marx's theory of social history implies that man is an inert element in the process. He merely adapts to the environment and is moulded solely by it. This, says Macmurray, is not the whole truth. Man increasingly moulds the environment, especially as his knowledge and understanding increases. Macmurray gives the example of flight. "It is by understanding the natural laws that make it impossible for human beings to fly, that we find ourselves able to construct machines in which we can fly. We

escape from the determination of natural laws by understanding natural law and accepting it as the rule of our own action." (PC 72).

Secondly, countless societies have failed in this adaptation process and have become either defunct or been absorbed in other societies. (See PC 70). Macmurray was writing this before the major, classical, work appeared on the subject, namely, Arnold Toynbee's "The Study of History" (1934/9). Macmurray makes this as a point of criticism of the Marxist social theory, but could it not also be interpreted as the working of the dialectic?

Thirdly, the dialectic cannot be an intrinsic element of the organic social process, but only a passing manifestation for, by Marx's own showing and forecast, it is predicted to end - when the social class struggle has worked itself through, and the last class come to the top. (See PC 72/3).

So Macmurray's contention that reality is more than an organic process, and that even the movement of the dialectic is not absolute in that process, brings many problems in its wake for the Marxists. Whether any Marxists have heeded, let alone tried to meet, these criticisms, requires further investigation, not possible or relevant here. Of course, they may not even have heard of them!

2) Marxism considers only the hunger motive

This criticism of Marxism is quite different from the last, but a moment's reflection and consideration reveals how it parallels it. It is of the same substance.

Macmurray says that there are two fundamental positive motives of human action - hunger and love (see CS 113). The negative motive is fear, which does not concern us here. As we have seen, it is

closely associated with, and relevant for, religion not Marxism.

Hunger is the basic natural reason why people cooperate. This they do to provide the essentials for surviving. This is the economic basis for the development and progress of human society, and it determines its form and its relational structure and pattern (see CS 114).

But, paradoxically, hunger too can be seen as a negative motive, in that it is concerned with the "defence of the human organism against death", (CS 114), rather than with the self-realisation of the essence of human life in its creativeness. This can be put even more basically and aggressively, "Hunger is the type of all motives which are concerned with the appropriation for its own use by the individual of that which is other than himself. It is thus hunger which lies at the basis of the whole conception of private property. If this motive were to govern man in his relation to his fellows it would result in the universalising of the idea of slavery in which other human beings are looked upon as objects to be appropriated for use." (CS 114). But this has its ironies. We cannot all be masters and enslave others. There would be no slaves! And vice versa. But so far as it is able to operate as the negative aspect of the hunger motive, it is the cause of classes and inequalities.

Strong as it is however, and seemingly ruthlessly and exclusively pursued by many, hunger can never be the sole motive. Bands of thieves and crooks, and we would say today boards of directors, companies, and even governments, act 'hungrily' against all, and against as many 'outsiders' as they can. But exploitation and injustice to others can only be achieved by "observing the

principles of justice amongst themselves". (CS 115).

The other motive is love. Its essence is self-transcendence. It is concerned with the world and creation, with something beyond oneself. "In love a man does not appropriate the world to himself. He spends himself upon the world". (CS 115). It is unconditional by nature. It is thus the positive and absolute condition of community. But in case we might be carried away into the realms of airy-fairy idealism by this conception, (see CS 120/1), Macmurray at once brings us down to earth, howbeit with a totally new conception, and one which he never attempts to explain. He leaves us to try and understand it, which we probably can with a bit of thought and effort. It is "superdialectical". (CS 116). How is that for a neologism! He says, "We can see here the superdialectical form of personal life in a conspicuously clear expression." (CS 116). This seems to mean that the love motive can work only if it includes, but dominates, the hunger motive. Once again we are splendidly reminded of Macmurray's realism, his "new" materialism, his non-dualism, and his earthiness, in every sense of the word. "Mere mutual affirmation of the existence of the other would be imaginary and ineffective, unless it included the recognition of the needs of the other and co-operation for their satisfaction. It is only the presence of the hunger-motives, individualizing and separating human beings by the necessity of appropriating material for their individual needs, that allows the love-motives to realize themselves in action. The separateness of individuals is the condition of their integration in a human unity. Yet the love-motives cannot achieve the integration of men unless by providing the grounds for their co-operation. In principle, hunger cannot provide the ground for co-operation at all

(CS 16). And again. "The integration of humanity is thus possible only through the presence of the negative principles within, and in subordination to, love. People who love one another will, if their love is real - that is to say, if it is a motive determining action - co-operative for the satisfaction of one another's distinct and individual needs. This is the absolute and basic law of personal nature." (CS 116/7).

What, you will be asking, has all this to do with Marxism? Or, more likely, have perspicaciously discerned the connection. Marxist interpretation of life, man, and society rests solely upon the hunger motive. "It is the exclusive concentration of Communism upon the temporal aspect of human life which leads to the view that life is completely determined by the economic factor and that the achievement of community is necessarily effected by a struggle between groups in terms of their own economic interests. The whole Communist interpretation rests upon the hunger-motives to the exclusion of the love-motives." (CS 117). The love motive is of no account. Where it is acknowledged it is relegated to the fourth division of life. "Communism fails to realize this wider setting of the temporal process and reduces the 'love-life of man' to the status of a 'private' life which is incidental to the 'species-life' of humanity" (CS 119).

Marx's main criticism of Feuerbach is that he deified the love-life of man. Macmurray says, "It would be legitimate to reply that Marx deified the hunger-life of man" (CS 117).

But, as we said before, Macmurray will not let go of Marx, despite his own criticisms of him. This is illustrated by the

following. "As we have seen, there is a relative truth in the Communist position. It is concerned purely with the changing form of human society through the historical process. It is true this is determined by hunger. It is true that it is a dialectical process. It is true also that it has been kept going very largely through the struggle between groups of persons whose economic interests are antithetical." (CS 117/8).

What are the consequences of Marx's limited view? A built-in defeat of its own purposes. The human society it purports to so desperately desire just cannot be achieved solely out of hunger and economics. (What an insightful contention for us today, all of us, communist or not, if we would only see it!) Man is more than these. "Man cannot live by bread alone" (Deuteronomy ch.8 v.3). "This treatment of the part as if it were the whole does at certain points distort the understanding of the part. The Communist fails to realize that the establishment of a Communist society is itself impossible if hunger is the only motive determining human behaviour; and this failure is reflected back into the interpretation of history as an economic process, because the Communist fails to realize that the process he studies is rendered possible only because the positive and direct impulse to community, at every point in human history and in all the individuals who are the bearers of the process, makes economic co-operation possible." (CS 118). And again elsewhere. "Communism is not ultimately a matter of economics, even though it carries as a consequence some approach to economic equality. It is a matter of the inherently social nature of human personality. It rests upon the need that men and women feel for living their lives in community. This, indeed, is the real need of all human nature." (PC

95). "The creation of a classless society through the destruction of economic privilege is, then, I repeat, the immediate, rational end of our social development. But its rationality and its necessity are not derived from any economic determinism. They are grounded in the essential nature of human personality, of which economic need is only one aspect, however important." ((PC 94).

3) Marxism can only arise in poor, not industrially advanced societies

There is nothing 'clever-dick' or arch, or being wise after the event, about this criticism by Macmurray. Indeed it is made more as a comment or observation. Moreover, what Macmurray says, might be heeded by Leftist agitators today. Perhaps it is! They seem to be beginning to use more subtle and insidious means to achieve their ends now that a number of open challenges and confrontations over the last forty years, in the Western industrial world, have failed to bear any fruit.

What is Macmurray's point? That Marx prophesised, or foresaw and calculated would be a fairer statement in view of his genuine if faulty attempt to look at society 'scientifically', that the economic and social revolution, when it came, would occur in the most advanced industrial societies. In fact it occurred in none of these but in the semi-feudal, quasi-peasant, Czarist Russia. "That the revolution which Marx foresaw happened in a largely feudal community, like Czarist Russia, while Marx himself was convinced that it must happen in a highly industrialized community, shows that there was a flaw in Marx's principles of interpretation. It cannot be a matter of chance. The immediate conclusion which we have to draw and interpret

dialectically is that the Marxian interpretation does work under feudal conditions in a world where industrialism has developed elsewhere." (PC 83). And countries where it has happened since have all been of the subsistence-level type.

How did Marx come to make this mistake? Because, says Macmurray, he overlooked the superorganic aspect of man and saw, and took account of, only the organic. The organic considers only mass action, because mass action is the blind, mindless, response to a given environmental stimulus natural to the organic. But in an industrial society, and especially as that society develops, compulsory education becomes necessary to introduce and maintain standards necessary to the industrial process and co-operation. And with education, whatever its limited utility intention, comes greater awareness, less social blindness, less conditioned response, less thick-headedness, and more individuality, more sense of opportunity and opportunism.

We talk of mass media and mass-mindedness under these more advanced conditions, but this seeming uniformity is far less impulsive, blind, instinctive, and widespread than in a peasant or less-industrialised society. Only by reducing this awareness to a less rational level, a very difficult thing to do, could a sufficient number of people be aroused and induced to change the social and economic pattern, radically and drastically, by revolution, peaceful or violent (see PC 84).

Moreover, in peasant societies the general will of millions can be mass-harnessed to revolt, and to throw-off their yokes in order to create a better economic condition i.e. industrialism. In advanced

industrial societies there is not this incentive.

Incidentally, there have been, according to Macmurray, examples of reversions; that is, surrendering of these new-found rights, freedom, and individuality, in order to save, or even improve, the industrialised, economic, condition. To do this is something Marx never envisaged, nor anybody else. "That people should abdicate all their political rights, and with them all that gives meaning to human life, in the interests of a successful functioning of the existing economic machinery simply could not have occurred to any European of the nineteenth century." (PC 92). Macmurray is, of course, referring to Fascism.

Fascism is not a popular doctrine today; not only because of World War Two and its total defeat, but also because the majority of people have become less nationalisticly minded and go for super-national co-operation, even if only on an area and limited scale. But when Macmurray was writing on Marxism, Fascism was rapidly succeeding Russian Communism as the focal point of the world's concern. So we can understand why he refers to it; and discusses it so fully. He even refers to it as the natural dialectical development of the first stages of Soviet Marxism (in the last chapter of PC). "In accordance with the dialectical law this thesis must now produce its antithesis. That antithesis is fascism. The development of fascism in Italy and Germany is quite obviously, to any dialectical thinker, the sign that bolshevism has produced its own negation and that beyond both thesis and antithesis lies the final accomplishment of the synthesis through which alone a classless society can be achieved." (PC 86). "Bolshevism and fascism are, therefore, thesis and antithesis in the dialectical development of

socialism. It is only through the interpenetration of these opposites that the final synthesis can be reached and it must be achieved as the reassertion of the thesis at a higher level when it has done justice to the essential truth upon which the antithesis was based." (PC 87).

So much for Macmurray's criticisms of Marx.

We now turn to one last brief point in this exposition:-

Marx and Religion

Can Marxism and religion be reconciled? This is a very interesting and important question for, as we have seen, Macmurray is in both camps. Moreover they are very major interests for him, as we know from his writing at great length on both. Yet a third factor is that, according to Macmurray, Marxism's four leading contentions spring directly from Christianity; indeed were part of the teaching, message, and intention of Jesus Christ. (See CS chapter 5. Also CS 91 and 149).

Even following Macmurray's argument on this unusual association and assertion, whether we are prepared to go all the way with it or not, shows just how these two seeming opposite doctrines can be seen to be related. Yet Marxism is renowned not only for its atheism, but for its implacable hostility to religion. It even forecasts its complete disappearance when man and society have become mature, and moved beyond the present pre-human stage. "The Communist view of religion concludes that with the establishment of the true community of humanity, religion will necessarily disappear." (CS 137).

Further, neither Marxism or religion have the least respect or tolerance for each other, save amongst a very few way-out priests, mainly in the Third World; and I mean a few. And this fifty years after Macmurray was writing on these matters. This could mean, of course, not that the problem is intractable but that nobody with any interest in the matter has read or heeded Macmurray. But is there anybody today trying to reconcile the two - practically, creatively, and constructively? I know of no one.

That they ought to be reconciled Macmurray never doubts. They both have the same end in view, even if they have different terminology for it. Christianity wants the Kingdom of Heaven on earth. Marxism the creation of a human, free, classless, unexploiting society. The communist "feels himself to be an instrument through which this power is here and now achieving its purpose of creating a true and universal society in the world. The Christian would call it 'The Kingdom of God on Earth'; the Communist, of course, would not. But what he means is a real, universal, brotherhood of mankind based on equality and freedom". (CS 23).

Two things, one by each, can, says Macmurray, promote reconciliation; or, to use Macmurray's term, synthesis. "The problem that faces us is the synthesis of the two, not in theory merely but in practice. A synthesis is not the same thing as a combination. It necessarily involves a change in the forms of both the elements which are united. Christianity in its unreal form, and Communism in its purely material form cannot be combined. They are necessarily antagonistic." (CS 144).

What are these necessary respective changes? Firstly; Marxism must fully recognise - not merely relegate it to the side lines - the

personal aspect of human nature. The economic and all its effects may be important; but it is not the essence of man. Man is something more, as Macmurray proved earlier here.

Secondly; religion, especially Christianity, must become real and renounce its otherworldliness, its idealism, its indifference to the social and economic well-being of everybody on this earth. Marx, understandably, is mistaken about religion. Everywhere around him what passes as religion ignores the real problems of practical living. But this is not religion, nor Christianity, says Macmurray. It is pseudo-religion. At best it is merely consolatory; at worst a phoney escapism and unreality.

Can Marxists, entrenched in and conditioned to, as they are, the official line, ever realise that religion is about community and love here and now; and that love is a vital and more elemental characteristic of men than the mere material and economic?

Can Christianity throw off its image of otherworldliness and actively get down to the creation of brotherhood, which means the sharing of goods, and seeing that nobody is in need, on this earth? There are not the least signs of either doing any of these respective things at present.

All this, and other relevant points, are developed in chapters 5 to 8 inclusive of "Creative Society".

Appraisalment

1) This is by far the most difficult subject of Macmurray's to appraise. Although one can appreciate and generally understand what he says, and often accept his reasoning, how can we know, short of

being advanced Marxist scholars - and even they might find things difficult, knowledgeable as they might be - if his facts, and the interpretations and summaries based on those facts, are correct when he gives no sources, no footnotes, no references, and the barest of quotations, to support these? We are completely in the dark assessment-wise. We have to take on trust what is said. And never once does he discuss, based on the original text, different possible interpretations of the original. He merely asserts, unquestioningly, that this is the Marxian doctrine.

All Macmurray's other works are concerned with what Macmurray thinks and discerns in various fields and areas of life. They are not based on any one doctrine, unless it is, as in some cases, Christianity - where we can look up the references in a Bible concordance, if not given in Macmurray's text. But his writing on Marxism is different. Only twice does he mention books, those of Feuerbach and Stirner, which as we have seen are, although influential, relatively subsidiary to the main issues. Altogether there are three brief quotations, but these are put in such a way, sometimes without quotation marks, that we are not sure whether this is what Marx actually said; whether this is what Macmurray is making him say; or if Macmurray is merely paraphrasing him.

Certainly this almost total unsubstantiation, and consequent difficulty for the reader to even occasionally refer to, and check, the source from which all Macmurray's subsequent argument, contentions, and innovations spring, reduces the value of what Macmurray is saying, and makes more than perfunctory appraisal difficult. One may be appraising something which is not true. Or

should we say, not real?

Allowing for this very limiting factor, we now turn to ask:-

2) Is Marxism a new type of philosophy - in so far as it puts action before thought, living before thinking, wanting things done rather than endlessly arguing and reasoning about them? Over all, Yes. The whole trend of Western philosophy - and Indian, if not Chinese, is a thousand times worse - has been on trying to think reality (an impossible task) rather than live it.

But there have been exceptions. Is not Stoicism a form of action philosophy, despite its slightly negative and avoiding nature? And Epicureanism is another philosophy concerned primarily with pursuing a way of life rather than thinking about it.

And over the last century has not a philosophy emerged, almost parallel with Marxism, namely Existentialism which has the same motive? Surely its insistence upon Existence before Essence, of being before thinking and evaluating, of experiencing as prior to formulating and categorizing, must be an example of the type of philosophising Macmurray regards as novel and peculiar to Marxism, and which is possible only through Marxism. If not absolutely a philosophy of action it is certainly one which puts personal feeling before thought. The self, not the thought, is in the front line. So perhaps although Marx clearly contended that philosophy must be concerned with change and not merely reflection, some other philosophies, at least implicitly, have this intention.

3) Why, except for Macmurray, has Marx no philosophical disciples concerning the above radical change and outlook? Marx of course has plenty of political followers but no philosophical

adherents outside of standard Marxist philosophy. If it were as marked a change as Macmurray thinks it is, and indeed as I think it is, and there must be others too, why do philosophers in general still philosophise in the same old traditional way, spending whole ages of their lives pondering over and rehashing the old unsolvable problems?

Why are they not philosophising about the real, active, practical, urgent, world here and now, with all its problems? Not solving them, of course, which would not be their task, but unearthing and questioning publically the underlying values and assumptions on which those problems rest; and which is the only ultimate way of solving them. Why are there not philosophical advisers to governments, companies, education authorities, public boards and bodies, the church, and trade unions? Why is philosophy not a recognised profession like accountancy, architecture, economics, and countless other occupations? And why is it not regarded as practical - and consequently made use of by all? These are vital questions prompted by Marx's assertion that the task of philosophy is to change the world, not to endlessly, fruitlessly, and futilely think about it. With most of Marx I would quite happily and readily argue against. But with the idea of philosophy being for action, for changing the world, I do absolutely agree and endorse.

But we are here to appraise Macmurray not Marx. So to conclude. In general, Macmurray seems, as countless others have done, to have swallowed Marx wholesale - and then find criticisms afterwards.

Some comments have been made as we have gone along. For example, Macmurray's confusing of Marxism with communism; and the

notion that theory and practice are one. Some assessment, too, has been made of Macmurray's new materialism.

Over all I think that Macmurray overstated the case when he says that Marxism is to be found in the teaching and practices of Jesus. I am sure, for example, that not only did Jesus never articulate the dialectic, but he never even thought of it, worked it out, or consciously effected it in action. He was not the sort of person capable of doing this. All he did was to choose, quite naturally, the poor and humble as his followers. Marxism and Macmurray have theorised the rest.

On the whole, at this period of his life, the 1930s, Macmurray seems to have been, perhaps understandably, carried away by, and engrossed in, Marxism. The fact that in the later works he hardly ever mentions it would seem to endorse this. However, at the time, he did make some very perspicacious and valuable observations on Marxist philosophy and psychology, especially that it totally ignores the personal. Unfortunately these observations have been wholly overlooked both in thought and practice. Yet they could be the key to the reconciliation of Marxism and religion, Soviet communism and the West. One cherishes economic security; the other personal freedom.

PHILOSOPHY

Relevant Books

Freedom in the Modern World. (FMW)

The Boundaries of Science. (BS)

Interpreting the Universe. (IU)

The Self as Agent. (SA)

Persons in Relation. (PR)

The Clue to History. (CH)

Reason and Emotion. (RE)

Marxism (M)

Quotations From Macmurray

To begin; to indicate what philosophy might be for Macmurray,
here are a few quotations.

Philosophy is the attempt to understand the meaning of
human experience in the world. (FM 105)

Philosophy is largely concerned with the criticism and
examination of prejudice. (BS 25)

Philosophy becomes dry and barren and meaningless when most
people are not interested in it. (FMW 105)

Philosophy deals with the whole in its wholeness and unity;
science and art are fragmentary and deal with fragments of
reality. (RE 162)

Philosophy is the attempt to express the infinite in
immediate experience through reflection. (IU 33)

Philosophy is the effort to represent reality in words.
(IU 35)

Philosophy becomes real only when its problems are forced upon it by the immediate life of its time and environment. (FMW 15)

Philosophy is essential when religion fails. (FMW 109)

It is the inner life of the spirit which philosophy is trying to understand. (FMW 110)

Philosophy cannot be mere knowledge, but is always an action upon oneself and society. (M 44)

The substance of a living philosophy can always be stated and applied to ordinary experience in simple language, if one is not concerned to defend it in detail against its rivals and to demonstrate its truth point by point in the terms of set logic. (FMW 71)

A living philosophy is always contemporary. Its roots are in the life of its own time, and its problems are the living problems of the world in which it is born. (FMW 73)

A living philosophy must think out again, in terms of our contemporary life, the problems of reality and freedom. (FMW 92)

Introduction

Compared with other chapters this one may seem to be piecemeal, discursive, and lacking cohesion. So it is. But the reason for this is necessary and simple. Macmurray is a philosopher and, therefore, all his work is imbued with philosophical ideas. This applies to all the chapters produced here so far. They embody and exemplify various aspects of his philosophy.

There still remains, however, various and important philosophical ideas which, for one reason or another, cannot satisfactorily be included under these other headings. This chapter deals with some of these - hence its rather unstructured, disjointed, and discontinuous arrangement and presentation.

Of course, with a different arrangement and classification they could all have been included elsewhere. But for ease of understanding I have chosen the present chapter pattern, feeling it to be the most satisfactory, interesting, and beneficial under the circumstances - which are, mainly, that this may be the first time you have encountered Macmurray and his ideas.

Philosophy Itself

What is Macmurray's view of philosophy? What are his ideas on philosophy itself?

Macmurray recognises that philosophy has two aspects or divisions, the theoretical and the practical. (See FMW 111/4). Theoretical philosophy asks, and tries to solve, the question "What is real and how can we know it?" Practical philosophy asks "What is good and how can we achieve it?" (See FMW 95/6). The first is related to the problem of knowing. "If, then, we are going to give a philosophical account of our experience of the world, it will be an expression of what we have come to think is real. But that is only the first step. We shall want to know whether our account of the inner reality of life is not mistaken. It will probably disagree with the accounts that other people give. We shall require to criticise it and test it, to compare it with others; because we can easily think we have got hold of something real when it is merely counterfeit. This testing and criticising of the expressions of reality which people have put forward in their accounts of what is real is the second important part of theoretical philosophy. That is why so much philosophy is concerned with the problem of knowledge.

We want to know how we can test our beliefs about reality, how we can discover whether they are really true." (FMW 113/4).

The second is related to freedom. "The problem of practical philosophy is the problem of freedom. 'How can we be free?' is one way of stating the general question. That is because all activities which are really significant for us are spontaneous. It is the feeling of constraint and bondage in our activities that makes them seem unsatisfactory to us. The sense of freedom is our guarantee that we are making the best of life. When it is lacking we are thwarted and forced to live in a way that does not express our sense of the meaning of life If we are not free, then life has no practical significance for us, however much theoretical significance it may have. All the questions of practical philosophy, all the problems of how we ought to act and use our lives, have the problem of freedom at the root of them. Indeed practical philosophy has as its task nothing but the discovery of the conditions of free living". (FMW 114).

Not necessarily coincident with the foregoing but certainly allied to each is Macmurray's classification or dividing-up of philosophy - into academic and living philosophy. (See FMW 105/6).

The first, academic philosophy, is like a game; an enjoyable, thrilling, and absorbing game, but of little consequential and practical value. It is, indeed, adequately summed-up in the word 'academic'. The second is for real. In the life of the individual, and of societies, there come times of immense problems which are basically philosophical in nature. Macmurray does not explicitly say why they are philosophical, but it is obvious that they are this because of their concern with values. Such a time, says Macmurray,

is with us now. He wrote this forty years ago. Nothing has happened since to modify or ease this situation; in fact, few could contend that things are not considerably worse! At such times everybody should be interested in philosophy. "I am convinced that it is important that we should begin to be interested in philosophy. Not in the dry and learned disputes of the academic philosophies; not at all! But in living, contemporary philosophy, the philosophy of our own post-war twentieth century life. Philosophy, just like art, religion or politics, becomes dry and barren and meaningless when most people are not interested in it. It really comes to life when the mass of men begin to feel the need of it, to call for it, to support the struggling intelligence of the philosopher with sympathy and the sense that what he does matters to men". (FMW 105).

It is not relevant to enlarge upon this here, but the whole of the first part of FMW - "The Modern Dilemma" - is an attempt to analyse our present malaise and overall problem situation in terms of philosophy.

But why is it only sometimes that such demanding personal and social problems arise? Why is it, consequently, only sometimes that everybody should be concerned with philosophy? Because for periods we live optimistically, triumphantly, and outgoingly; and in such times reflection is not necessary. At such times, says Macmurray, we are living by faith (See FMW pp. 107/9). Presumably, to give an example, the nineteenth century, from 1815 onwards, was such an age. "So long as its soul is alive in this spontaneous way its problems are never very deep. It is too strong to be forced to stop and think and understand its inner life." (FMW 108).

Then comes the crisis "when a man's soul or the soul of a civilisation goes sick, and the flame of faith burns very low. Spontaneity and vitality begin to disappear. This is when disillusionment sets in and life begins to seem meaningless. When that happens we can no longer face up to the problems that life sets us; we grow afraid and timid. In such a crisis reflection and understanding are essential. The vital necessity of understanding our own bodily mechanism comes from the fact of disease; and the science of medicine is forced upon us by the necessity of dealing with the diseases of the body not with its health. So, in the current of our social history, understanding is a luxury when the energy of faith is in full tide; but when faith is at the ebb it is an urgent necessity. Philosophy is essential when religion fails." (FMW 108/9).

In the list of quoted phrases given earlier one especially may have seemed a little odd. Now we can understand its full meaning. As just quoted, philosophy becomes essential when religion fails. Reflection becomes necessary when confidence and elan fade. It was said just now that the crises were always ones of value. We could have said with equal pointedness and depth that they were crises of choices and of significance. "You see, then, that philosophical problems are problems of the inner significance of life, individual or social life. That is the core of philosophy. It is from that particular angle that the philosopher looks upon the world and all its furniture and movement. He must look outwards for his answers. Because we can only understand the meaning of life in terms of the meaning of the world in which we live.

"After all, we are part of the world, it is built into us, it dictates to us the terms on which we can live at all. If we want to live significantly, we must live somehow, and we must then discover what kind of significance life can have in a world like this. And so a great deal of philosophy is very much concerned with the nature of the world we live in. But for all that it is always in relation to the inner meaning of human life that the philosopher undertakes these elaborate investigations into the nature of the material world or into the origins of life." (FMW 111).

I need hardly say, in the light of the foregoing, and of all that has been expounded and argued in all the other chapters of this thesis, that Macmurray's sympathies, interests, and advocacies, lie entirely with live and practical philosophy. The following says it all. "When philosophy is alive it grows straight out of human life. However high in the air its branches may stretch themselves, its roots are deep in the soil of common human experience. If it is cut off from its roots, it becomes a dead tree which merely cumbers the ground and blocks the pathway. There is always plenty of dead philosophy about, just as there is plenty of dead art and dead religion. Academic philosophy, like academic art, is nearly always dead. It consists either of a scholarly acquaintance with the philosophy of other people or of argument about traditional problems for the sake of argument, full of very acute and learned subtlety of thought. It has great value, no doubt, as an intellectual exercise, and in the decoration of the temple of culture. But it has no vital significance whatsoever. A living philosophy is creative; it is something drawn from the heart of living experience and something that we can live by." (FMW 72/3).

You will remember that contemporary art is the art which has most meaning and significance for Macmurray, brilliant as past art may have been. Only contemporary art can reflect how we feel today. The same with philosophy. Enlightening and profound as past philosophy may have been, only contemporary philosophy can - or ought to be undertaking if it is doing its job properly, which today it is not - unearth, and make explicit, and - hopefully - resolve, the value, significance, and radical problems which underlie any contemporary time, whenever that may be. "For this reason, a living philosophy is always contemporary. Its roots are in the life of its own time, and its problems are the living problems of the world in which it is born." (FMW 73 - and very much more to the end of this page).

And more than this. Not only have contemporary philosophers the task of dissecting and analysing. They must create a new philosophy appropriate to the needs of an age. This equally applies today. "Our social forms, our political organizations, our religion, our economic devices are all too small for us. They cramp our freedom and make us inwardly a little ashamed of ourselves. We have to make new ones before we can be at ease. In these conditions we badly need a new philosophy to define some significant thought, in terms of our own peculiar difficulties, which could serve to unite and direct our efforts at reconstruction." (FMW 74).

Broadly, in early modern times, philosophy was materialistic, mechanical, and mathematical reflecting the newly developing interest in the physical and numerically based sciences. Beginning in the nineteenth century, when biology and history were to the fore,

philosophers from Hegel to Whitehead developed organically-based philosophical theories. Our age has yet to produce a philosopher capable of conceiving a philosophy reflecting our times, the essential of which is psychological or, as Macmurray prefers to call it, the personal. He himself, as we shall see, has at least paved the way for this coming and necessary - and presumably inevitable - achievement.

Incidentally; along with each of these phases there has been an accompanying logic, relevant and peculiar to it. A new philosophical age will thus require a new logic, for analytical and methodological purposes.

Whilst living and practical philosophy, relevant to any contemporary circumstance and conditions, can be created only by philosophers, such a philosophy can be effected only through its popularisation and acceptance by a majority of the people not immediately concerned with philosophy. "Nor must we forget that the great changes in society which are the result of a growing knowledge of society are the result not of the brilliant thought of a single genius, however eminent, but of a multitude of similar, and in themselves seemingly insignificant changes in the minds of millions of ordinary people. The great thinker is only effective socially because of the thought that he sets going in multitudes of other minds." (Marxism 37). But, nevertheless, he must get the relevant "thinking going".

So the question and problem arises - Can such ordinary people and minds comprehend and understand philosophy? Surely it is too technical, abstract, and erudite, for it ever to become popular, however necessary that might be? No, says Macmurray. At least, not

at these crucial, critical, and essential times.

And, of course, he set out to prove this by giving several series of broadcast talks in 1930 and 1932; talks which seem to have been exceptionally well and widely received. Whether they had any, or the desired, effect will be considered later. But philosophy can be made available in terms and language people understand. "There exists in some quarters a prejudice against the attempt to 'popularize' philosophy - a prejudice which I myself formerly shared, at least to the extent of fearing that the attempt would prove impossible without a cheapening and falsification of the issues. The result of my broadcasting experience has been to convince me that, however unsuccessful my own attempts may have been, the prejudice is quite groundless. There is no inherent impossibility in the effort to expound the central issues of philosophy in a fashion which will render them comprehensible to the uninitiated. Simplification there must be and a strenuous avoidance of abstractions and technicalities. But this is not a defect, since philosophy is the most concrete of all sciences, and its major effort is the simplification of complex issues." (FMW 15/6). There is much more of this; and it must be read at least to page 17.

The surprising phrase in the above quotation, as you would have noticed, is that "philosophy is the most concrete of all sciences". Ignore, of course, the reference to the sciences. This is only a general expression and is meant to be regarded in this context as meaning branches of knowledge or fields of study. But that philosophy is concrete, let alone most concrete, will astonish many, not least many philosophers themselves. Unfortunately Macmurray,

nowhere in the whole of his writings, repeats this nor elaborates upon it. Yet I feel that it is a vital point and wholeheartedly support it.

What it means, I venture to suggest, is that live, practical, philosophy is concerned with values. Values are nothing more than crystalised, regularised, habitualised, choices and preferences - and choosing and preferring are the essence and foundation of human life, of being human. Not a second passes when we are not either choosing or living on past choices. Thus values are the most real and essential part of our lives and living. And as values are the essence of live and practical philosophy, philosophy is the most concrete, the most real, of all our branches of knowledge, and the source of all our actions and being. This, I believe, is the import of Macmurray's phrase. And it is without doubt a fact.

Why then, to move on, has Macmurray this vital interest, and concern for, living and practical philosophy - against almost all the philosophical odds of his time? Why is it so important to him that we feel the insistence with which he tries to pass it on to us? What is its source and origin?

The source is Marxism. As we saw earlier in the biographical note Macmurray came upon Marxism quite by chance; but once encountered he embraced it warmly and wholeheartedly, because of the association which he, rightly or wrongly, discerned it to have with Christianity. What his attitude to philosophy was before this we do not know. Perhaps he had no interest in philosophy but only in religion, science, and classics.

But however Macmurray tied-up Christianity with Marxism - and we discussed this in an earlier chapter - one important idea Macmurray did get from Marx, and it is this idea which pervades his whole philosophical outlook. It is, of course, that which is contained in the famous and oft-quoted phrase, "Philosophers hitherto have explained the world in different ways; the task is to change it." (M 30).

By this Macmurray has been transformed. It is beyond understanding why, almost alone amongst philosophers - ignoring the already committed and biased communist thinkers - Macmurray has recognised the importance and profundity of this insight, and incorporated it in his own philosophy and way of philosophising. Even Bertrand Russell, who more than most philosophers involved himself in practical living and social movements, never understood it; or if he did, never accepted it. For in the "Problems of Philosophy" he says, "If the study of philosophy has any value it must be indirectly". (P of P. 238). - which I take to be a mild and polite way of saying that philosophy is essentially academic and remote, with little relevance to everyday life. Sartre and Marcuse come to mind as perhaps, to some extent, intentionally or not (except the latter of course), acting out philosophical ideas in the real and practical world. But here again; both were firmly entrenched in Marxism.

Correct as I believe this explanation concerning Macmurray to be, we cannot be absolutely sure of it. Macmurray may have been a unique person by constitution whereby thought and action were more related and coupled than in most human lives. Discovering Marx's

famous dictum might have only confirmed, or indeed been a rationalisation, of what was already there by nature. How else could we explain the fact that so many other thinkers, equally aware of and knowledgeable about Marx, are predominantly thought-bound and still immersed in academic and dead philosophy?

This insight of Marx must be properly understood. It has not altered the function of philosophy. As we have seen, philosophers have always been involved - thought-wise - with the current state and outlook of the world and of the period in which they find themselves thinking. "The history of our philosophy is our social history at its most serious, its most reflective and its most logical." (SA 19). "The philosophy of any historical period reflects the life of the period even more evidently than does its art." (SA 25). And in relation to this, philosophers have not merely reflected the current trend, but tried to deal with its problems, even if they have not seen these problems in a total context. At least some of them have. But - and here is the crux of Macmurray's contention - the post-Marxian difference is that this reflection is now done in the full consciousness of what philosophy exists to do and must do. "The recognition of the unity of thought and action in philosophy, which we have considered in the previous chapter, has the effect of lifting philosophical thought on to a new plane of consciousness. The philosophies of the past have always been related to the social movements of the times in which they were produced. But this relation was never clearly present to the minds of the philosophers who produced them. The real motivation of their philosophical activity remained concealed from themselves. The discovery of the social function which his philosophizing fulfils makes the thinker

conscious, in a new and significant fashion, of what he is doing and of why he is doing it." (M. 43).

What this all amounts to is that all the ideas of a philosopher, in his new consciousness of intent, are related to action instead of, as in pre-aware days, to knowledge and to the attaining and hoarding thereof. "Earlier philosophers were acting on society and changing it without knowing what they were doing. They thought they were achieving a pure knowledge of reality which did not commit them in action at all. They were not conscious of the nature of their own task. Now if you do not know what you are doing, you cannot do it rationally and deliberately; your action remains unconscious." (M 40).

Macmurray then comes up with an extraordinarily telling phrase which sums-up and encapsulates the import of this whole concept. This phrase embodies all that living and practical philosophy is and should be. It is that - Philosophy is always an action upon oneself and society. To show that I have not taken this out of context, and interpreted it idiosyncratically here is the full quote. "A philosopher who is unconscious of the reference of his thought to the development of society, will find the meaning of all his crucial ideas in a world of ideas which has no reference beyond knowledge. The reference to action will remain unrecognized. To recognize that philosophy cannot be mere knowledge, but is always an action upon oneself and society, involves of necessity a re-interpretation of all, or nearly all, of our important ideas and terms." (M 43/4).

It is a pity that Macmurray did not make more of this one phrase which so perfectly, epigrammatically, and totally captures ideas

which would otherwise take a book to expound and elaborate upon. In its economy, if not in its rhythm and imagery, the phrase is the essence of poetry.

Arising yet again out of Marx's famous dictum Macmurray produces another startling conclusion; a conclusion which no other philosopher has asserted however much he may have vaguely suspected himself of being so, a suspicion inconceivable by most philosophers anyway. Philosophers are always so sure that they are proclaiming the one and only truth.

What is this further insight of Macmurray's? That philosophers are prejudiced, propagandist, partisan, and biased. Perhaps they ought not to be, but in the nature of things they can be nothing else. If philosophers are to be the cause of change in the world, then they cannot be the objective, impartial, non-committed, enquirer they are by tradition thought to be. They are not scientists, whose very essence is to be neutral. But then scientists never act. Of themselves they change nothing. Whatever action occurs there can be no neutrality.

Or to express this in reverse; can you imagine how neutrality can ever produce action? Its very nature is non-action, non-participation. This whole matter is discussed by Macmurray in Marxism pp. 36/42. But to give a couple of relevant quotes. "In philosophy this situation, in which thought and action are united, is always present. In science we are concerned with a world which is assumed to exist in itself and to stand over against the investigator, and not to include the observer as an essential part of what he is investigating. But for philosophy the world to be known is the world which includes man as an essential part of itself, and

which includes the thinker in the world he is thinking about. Philosophy cannot exclude the philosopher from the object of his knowledge. Philosophy is always personal knowledge, with the thinker at its centre." (M 37/8). "Philosophical knowledge is necessarily partisan and propagandist, and the greater the truth of a philosophy the more partisan and propagandist it is. 'But', you say, 'the thinker must be unbiased, he must not take sides, his business is to know things clearly and without prejudice. The moment he descends to propaganda he is no more concerned with pure truth. He has sold himself and betrayed his trust'. The answer is that your statement itself is propaganda. It is partisan. It is propaganda for the party that wishes to prevent knowledge being made effective. It aligns you with the reactionaries against progress. What I have said, and what Marx said, is not that people should choose their philosophical beliefs for their propaganda value; not that philosophy ought not to be neutral in the social struggle, but simply that it is not and cannot be. In this field knowledge is action, and neutrality is impossible - literally impossible. To hold a certain philosophical belief is to choose a side in the social process There is no choice. A man's philosophy ranges him on one side or the other." (M 39/40).

We now turn to the last general philosophical idea of Macmurray's that we shall consider here. And once again it is a very unusual one. It is - the verification of philosophy.

Whoever thought, or heard of, philosophy being verified? If any philosopher mentioned or discussed it before it has never been taken-up; nor become part of philosophy's and the philosopher's required

technique without which his purported teachings would not be taken seriously.

Yet verification is a big thing with Macmurray (See IU 74/83). All thought and reflection, as we have seen, is for action, for living. It has no meaning or value otherwise. Consequently, once an idea has been determined it cannot be proved by another idea but only by reference back to reality i.e. to the real world. This, simply, is what is meant by verification. It is the process of checking ideas against what really is. "Verification is primarily a return from thought to action, in order to find in the immediate experience of concrete activity a justification for accepting the conclusions which have been reached through the manipulation of ideas in the thought-processes. The implications of this are far-reaching. In the first place it implies a distrust of speculative thought. To accept the necessity of verification means more than to recognize the possibility of mistakes in thinking. These, after all, could be discovered and avoided by better thinking. It involves rather the belief that thought alone, however correct it may be, cannot guarantee its own conclusions. It means that all conclusions must be regarded as hypothetical." (IU 74/5).

Science is almost alone in the various fields of knowledge and of learning which recognises the need for verification. "The necessity for the verification of all conclusions is now completely recognised in the scientific field. In other fields it is still unrecognized or even denied." (IU 74). Yet, continues Macmurray later, "I am concerned to insist that there can be no such limitation; that no process of thinking has any claim upon our belief unless it is supported by, and appeals to, verification in action."

(IU 80).

But how can a philosophy be verified? Science verifies by subsequent experiment. Can we have experimental philosophy? There are two ways of verifying philosophy. Whether we are prepared to accept the first way as verification, as we would like to understand it, or whether it is rather stretching a point to call it this, is an open question. However, Macmurray calls it verification.

He says then, firstly, that a philosophy is always being verified, howbeit unconsciously, in the process of individual and social history.

Needless to say, this means living, practical philosophy. "It is, of course, possible to speculate philosophically for the sake of speculating, and to prevent our conclusions from affecting practical activity. Such philosophy is not serious. It is a kind of game which certain people play. We are not concerned with sport, but with the serious business of thought. When philosophy is taken seriously it is bound to affect our immediate experience of living and to verify itself in the satisfactoriness of the life-experience which it helps to produce. In the social field, too, philosophy undergoes a constant process of verification. The way in which a society organizes and conducts its social life is always the unconscious expression of a philosophical conception of the world." (IU 81).

Macmurray then gives a number of brief examples of this, mostly examples of failure for reasons best known to himself, and ends "And the collapse of our own time is another instance of an unsuccessful experiment in philosophy." (IU 82). But this first type of verification he does admit is not wholly satisfactory as it is

unintentional. "But such experiments are not deliberate. They produce no satisfactory judgment upon philosophical theory, because the theories themselves which they unconsciously test are not explicitly recognized." (IU 82).

In contrast, the second type of verification is intentional and deliberate; and consequently has much greater validity. "It is only when an experiment is deliberately undertaken on a basis of theory for the purpose of discovering what that theory will enable us to do that we could not do before, or not so successfully, that it fulfils the function of verification in the life of deliberate reflection." (IU 82).

How can this be done? Unfortunately, having said that there are many possible answers to this, Macmurray gives only one of them, and then only one example of that. We should very much like to know of the others. The solitary example provided is, as one might expect, the Soviet experiment which Macmurray takes to be an attempted verification of Hegel's dialectic. He says, "That experiment is consciously and explicitly based upon a philosophical theory, and the phases of its development are deliberately guided by the philosophical theory upon which it is based. We have here, therefore, the first attempt that man has made on a large scale in the deliberate verification of a philosophical conclusion. The thing is possible because it is being done. If it is possible to verify the Hegelian dialectic in this way, it must be possible to verify other philosophical conclusions in a similar way." (IU 82/3).

Whether we should accept and agree that it is an attempt to verify Hegel, without detailed argument for this, is difficult to say. Perhaps, however, we could agree that it is, widely seen, a

philosophical experiment of some sort.

To verify, in whatever form, is for Macmurray crucial for philosophy. Remember Macmurray is a great empiricist. Speculation and philosophical rationalism have little place, if any, in his thought and philosophy. "But, in any case, I think we may conclude that until something of this kind becomes possible and is carried out, we cannot expect the beginnings of a developing body of philosophical theory which is more than speculative and, therefore more than guesswork or phantasy." (IU 83). Moreover, he reminds us, that if he is right in this idea of verification, it is going on anyway so why not make "the effort to control this verification in a rational fashion."? (IU 83).

In conclusion of his advocacy of philosophical verification he says, "It would seem as if history were driving us, under pressure of necessity to attempt the deliberate planning of our social life. The theoretical basis of such an effort at social reconstruction must be philosophical. If the philosophy which guides it is unconscious, we shall be at the mercy of unconscious forces, which, because they are unconscious, are controllable." (IU 83).

So ends this short account of some of Macmurray's ideas on philosophy itself.

Appraisement (1)

From my own experience I agree with Macmurray that philosophy is, or should be, practical and that it is for living. For some of my early years I studied philosophy academically, and very interesting it was too. Macmurray calls such interest a game; but it

was more than that. It was a serious endeavour. But necessary as it is to be knowledgeable about supposedly ultimate things, beyond mental enhancement it did nothing.

But living and practical philosophy changes one's life. By being, to give but one example, fully conscious of one's value structure and pattern, and the relation of this to one's feelings, attitudes, relationships, and actions, enables a movement to be made towards more satisfactory living. For normal people i.e. those without recognisable or severe neurotic or psychotic disorders, philosophy is the one field of human interest and study most beneficial to one's living.

And the reason for this is obvious. The area of living which practical philosophy deals with - the value and choice area - is the most fundamental of all. Or to use Macmurray's phrase, even if there is an element of metaphor about it, it is the most concrete i.e. the most real, the most basic.

One thing about this, however, I must disagree with Macmurray; but only because he does not go far enough. He says the time and need to concern ourselves with philosophical thought and reflection is when life goes awry: when urgent problems disclose themselves; when the joy of spontaneous living and optimism begins, for an intangible, elusive, reason to fade; when crises, private or public, engulf and enshadow the day. On the contrary, I think that we should always be philosophising, and not merely at times of doubt, crisis, and lost elan. Indeed, I believe that if philosophy were a normal, habitual, and integral part of our lives crises, of the personal, social, national, and international kind Macmurray is talking about,

would not occur. Or if they did, would be immediately and adequately dealt with by established philosophical techniques.

This does not mean that we should be continuously philosophically reflecting. Far from it. Life is for living, and the very essence of this is spontaneity. To lose this is the prime cause or symptom of a life short-falling. But it would be most valuable to spend, say, one-twelfth of one's waking life on philosophical, value, seminal, reflection. And, like everything else in life, the more regularly this was done, the more habitual and automatic it would become, and therefore even less time would have to be spent on it.

In the past people prayed, often privately, at the end of the day. Ignoring, if we can, any immediate religious intention and significance concerning this act, and of any self-deception either as to what one was really doing or what one chose to speak of, this practice seems to have been of immense value as a time of conscious and deliberate withdrawal into a reflection upon the actions, problems, doubts, failures, and relationships of that day. People, and the world, are poorer and certainly less able to cope and manage for the loss of this daily review and self-examination, and possible subsequent reorganisation and reorientation.

Socrates said, "The unexamined life is not worth living". This is not always true. A few older, unreflecting, people, often brought up simply and honestly, or perhaps it is a natural feature of their character, seem to have an ability to live satisfactorily. And they certainly find life worth living! "One still finds people who possess a peculiarly rich knowledge which has developed unconsciously through a long, vivid and varied experience of life and in whom the

capacity for reflection has remained untrained and undeveloped, in whom even the capacity for speech or expression has remained meagre and difficult. These, of course, are exceptional cases." (IU 20/1). But that the unexamined life is not worth, or barely worth, living - save as life for all but the most suicidal - is true for 99% of the people. More philosophical reflection, properly undertaken, should become - as private prayer was - a normal part of everyday living. For enlargement of this point see my "Practical Philosophy" (1982).

But the problem and question remains - "Why is philosophy so difficult to popularise?" Macmurray seems never to have been aware of this problem, and certainly did not address himself to it. He merely contends, as we have seen, that philosophy can be understood and used by everybody. All it needs for this to be achieved is that philosophers forget their technical language and jargon, and talk and write in the vernacular. He goes so far as to say that to do this, as he himself found, is even more valuable for the philosopher than for the common man and the philosophically uninitiated, for whom the exercise has been undertaken! "When I undertook the task of expressing my own philosophy in non-philosophical language, I found, with considerable astonishment, how vague was my own apprehension of the real meaning of technical terms which I habitually used with considerable precision. The attempt to discover their meaning proved to be the finest philosophical discipline to which I have ever submitted, and of more value for the understanding of philosophy than any scholarly study of classical texts. Whatever may be the value of 'popularizing' philosophy to the general public, it certainly holds a rich harvest for the philosophy. It forces him to an activity from

which he customarily shrinks because it recalls him from the tenuous abstractions of concentrated logical processes - to an activity parallel to that which has proved the life-blood of progress in the natural sciences, the verification of results by reference to concrete fact. Where the effort to popularize philosophy is a sincere effort of self-expression the philosopher will find himself forced, not into superficiality, but into a deeper realization of his own meaning." (FMW 16/7).

Clear, however, as Macmurray's broadcasts of the early 30s were, and the equal clarity of their subsequent publication as FMW, one must conclude that the reception they received was no more than a 'nine-day wonder'. If they had any influence at the time it was momentary and ephemeral. Philosophy did not enter the common life as a result of Macmurray's exercises. Nor has it entered since.

A little later, in 1941, another philosophical popularist came suddenly and vividly on to the stage of common esteem - C.E.M. Joad. And his reign and popularity endured, more or less at a constantly high level until his death in 1953. And he is still remembered by countless people both for his vibrant and amusing personality and for his still oft-quoted phrase 'It all depends on what you mean by ...'.

But although millions heard him weekly, and millions of copies of his very numerous and readable books sold, a few of them genuinely dealing with philosophy and not, as so many did, absorbingly admittedly, with the Joad ego, philosophy never caught on from him or from his advocacy and persuasion. Of course, following in the English and classical tradition, philosophy to Joad was only an intellectual 'subject'. Never a living, personal, instrument of growth and psychological and social development as seen and

experienced by Macmurray.

The third exponent of popular philosophy in our time has been Jean-Paul Sartre. In contrast to the two foregoing philosophers Sartre has been extremely successful in making philosophy meaningful, if not to the masses, then at least to the intelligentsia and to other not unintelligent people. And I think we can see why Sartre succeeded where others have failed. Macmurray, genuinely simple and real as his language and presentation are, lacked the authority. He delivers his message and philosophy in too soft a manner and tone so that we, unless long-standing students of his work, and deliberately determined to listen and understand, are deceived by our own ease of literal understanding, and thus miss the profundity of his teaching, completely contemporary and urgent as this is. We read his work and say, "Oh yes; very good. That's that", instead of, "Here are exciting new insights of great depth and worth. We must act upon them for our own and everybody else's good". So it is lack of authority and force of character which has kept Macmurray's work ever on the side-lines, instead of at the centre where, content-wise, it should be.

Joad was never a profound and original thinker and philosopher. It is probable that he never had one original philosophical thought or judgement. He wrote only one book with any sign of breaking new ground. That was "Philosophical Aspects of Modern Science". His philosophy and philosophising were as dead as the dodo. It was, whilst admittedly extremely lucidly and interestingly put, nothing but a rehash of old, effete, philosophical stuff, principally that of Ancient Greece. On thousands of contemporary questions and problems

he wrote vividly but not philosophically. Thus although ostensibly a philosopher, as a philosopher he had nothing to say of philosophical relevance to the problems of his time. Hence for all his popularisation of knowledge, learning, culture, and wit it was quite beyond his capability to popularise meaningful philosophy.

Jean-Paul Sartre, on the other hand, created and was at the centre of a living philosophy which was meaningful to millions of followers. And what was the reason for this? It spoke not only in the contemporary idiom but its very substance; the problems it dealt with; the feelings it diagnosed, analysed, and made conscious and articulate; were all known and experienced by everybody of the age. It could, of course, be argued that as a philosophy it imposed its concepts and ideas upon its hearers. They were not there before. But is this not happening all the time in philosophy and elsewhere? Moreover, why was it able to do this unless people were ready for it - waiting, as it were, for a philosophy to meet their dormant, latent, and as yet unarticulated needs?

It has been necessary to say all this to prove Macmurray right. Philosophy, if it is contemporary and deals with the problems of its age; if it speaks in a language, not necessarily simple, but in terms and concepts evocative and reflective of the lives and feelings of the people to whom it is addressed, it will spring to life, be hailed, acclaimed, and welcomed; and be a very relevant instrument for understanding in the minds of millions who will inevitably and gratefully embrace it. Only thus can philosophy be anything but dead, and an academic, irrelevant, unheeded exercise.

So we could sum-up this section by saying that Macmurray was right about the necessity for philosophy to be living and practical.

But such philosophy is not merely for times of crises and lack of confidence, but for an whole age, as Jean-Paul Sartre proved with a philosophy acceptable to, and accepted by, millions of his own time.

Of the other three important aspects of Macmurray's ideas on philosophy itself, namely:-

- 1) That philosophy is always action upon oneself and society.
- 2) That philosophers, by the very nature of what they are doing, must be prejudiced; and that this is not something to be deplored, but merely to be surprised that this has not been recognised and asserted before.
- 3) That philosophy, to be of any value, needs verification. - I have commented upon in the text or agree with Macmurray for the reasons he has contended.

End of Appraisalment (1)

Moral Philosophy

To illustrate Macmurray's depth and breadth of interest in moral philosophy, here are a few quotations.

Morality expresses the necessary and universal intention to maintain community, as the condition of freedom. (PR 189).

The moral rightness of an action rises from the fact that the actions of one person affect, either by way of help or hindrance, the action of others. (PR 116).

Morality refers to the structure of personal relations which unites the members of a community of agents, and personal relations are necessarily reciprocal. (PR 121).

A morally right action is an action which intends community. (PR 119).

Justice is only the negative aspect of morality. (PR 205).

The moral struggle is primarily a struggle between persons. It is only secondarily, though also necessarily, a struggle within the individual. (PR 98).

Morality means faith in human life and human freedom, or it is a mere sham. (FMW 212).

Morality means friendship. (FMW 215).

Morality presupposes freedom. (SA 54).

Friendship, therefore, is the essence of morality. (FMW 209).

Our idea of morality is simply our idea of the kind of behaviour that makes a man a good man. (FMW 185).

Morality is the expression of personal freedom. (FMW 209).

Morality is merely a demand for rational behaviour. (RE 23).

Morality demands that we should act 'in the light of eternity', that is, in terms of things as they really are and of people as they really are, and not in terms of our subjective inclinations and private sympathies. (RE 23).

Some parts of Macmurray's moral philosophy are very clear and coherent. Others are scattered, and not particularly easy to understand. It may be that there is some contradiction, or at best incompatibility, which a lengthy and exhaustive study and analysis would reveal. But this is not the place for such an undertaking which would need a thesis longer than this to do it justice. We will consider the more direct and straightforward aspects. Certainly a grasp of Macmurray's moral teaching can be gained by giving an outline of the most lucid and coherent parts of his moral philosophy.

However, a word of interest first. Earlier we spoke of popular and erudite philosophy and of how, in Macmurray's view, the latter could and should be expressed in everyday language for the benefit of all. In all Macmurray's wide range of interests nothing more vividly illustrates how this should be done than in his writings on morality. In three chapters of PR (chapters V-VII) we have moral philosophy discussed in the most academic and erudite terms. A layman, if educated, could just about read them. But only a person with philosophical training could grasp and understand them.

But; in parallel chapters in FMW (chapters IX-XI), we have more or less the same things being said in the most limpid language, the content of which a bright school-boy could comprehend. Of course there is, and must be, a difference; but the fundamental substance, the meat, is the same. It is just that one is in the vernacular and the other in highly technical language and concepts. A good example this of Macmurray's contention.

Morality and Community

What then, basically, - to move on - is Macmurray's view of morality? It is, as we would expect, related to the personal, that state which man is, or ought to be. Only thus can we be truly human and not merely matter or organism, a thing or animal. "A morally right action is the action which intends community" (PR 119). Or again. "Morality expresses the necessary and universal intention to maintain community." (PR 189). As mentioned before, intention is a great thing with Macmurray. We may not always be successful but our heart must be in the right place, or we can achieve nothing human.

"It is to be noted that the moral rightness or wrongness of an action resides in its intention. This has two important consequences. The first is that it is independent of success or failure. The man who attempts to kill his neighbour and fails is morally guilty of murder, though not legally." (PR 120 and more immediately following).

As they stand i.e. the quotes on morality just given and those listed earlier on in the chapter, the definitions they embody of what morality is, may not be too meaningful to those unfamiliar with Macmurray's ideas and terminology. So let us try to explain. Obviously, the word community has the key role and it has a deeper meaning than it might be ordinarily understood to have. Community is "the self-realization of persons in relation." (PR 158). In several of his works, for example, "Creative Society" and "Persons in Relation", Macmurray goes to great lengths to distinguish between society and community (See PR 157/9). A society, from the smallest group to a world-wide association, is a collection of people coming, living, working or playing, and cooperating, together for a common purpose, conscious or unconscious. Or they might just find themselves together. Their being together in this way can concern anything from the pleasure of playing games together to a being together for their mutual protection and the reduction of fear. In intent they come and are together for anything but the mere recognition and enjoyment of their own personhood. Sometimes, in the conditions of society, this may develop between individuals. Indeed, it often does. But it is not the essence of, the reason for, being together at all.

Community, on the other hand, is the condition of people being together for nothing but the joy and mutuality of their personal selves. They have no reason for being and coming together. It is merely the essence of being human that they are together thus.

And the exemplification of community is friendship and love. These are the manifestation of the personal. "Any community of persons, as distinct from a mere society, is a group of individuals united in a common life, the motivation of which is positive. Like a society, a community is a group which acts together; but unlike a mere society its members are in communion with one another; they constitute a fellowship. A society whose members act together without forming a fellowship can only be constituted by a common purpose. They cooperate to achieve a purpose which each of them, in his own interest, desires to achieve, and which can only be achieved by cooperation. The relations of its members are functional; each plays his allotted part in the achievement of the common end. The society then has an organic form: it is an organization of functions: and each member is a function of the group. A community, however, is a unity of persons as persons." (PR 157).

How are two people related in community? "If then, we isolate one pair, as the unit of personal community, we can discover the basic structure of community as such. The relation between them is positively motivated in each. Each, then, is heterocentric; the centre of interest and attention is in the other, not in himself. For each, therefore, it is the other who is important, not himself. The other is the centre of value. For himself he has no value in himself, but only for the other; consequently he cares for himself

only for the sake of the other. But this is mutual; the other cares for him disinterestedly in return. Each, that is to say, acts, and therefore thinks and feels for the other, and not for himself. But because the positive motive contains and subordinates its negative, their unity is no fusion of selves, neither is it a functional unity of differences - neither an organic nor a mechanical unity - it is a unity of persons. Each remains a distinct individual; the other remains really other. Each realizes himself in and through the other." (PR 158). The essence of the relationship is equality and freedom (See PR 158). Macmurray says, "Liberty, equality, and fraternity is an adequate definition of community - of the self-realization of persons in relation" (PR 158). Incidentally, elsewhere, Macmurray says that this famous slogan, as a political rallying cry, was, from the start, mistaken. For community can never be realised politically, only religiously.

Now for a slight retraction. For convenience of exposition and explanation I have - and indeed Macmurray does this too - used the word community in the above context. But to use it thus is not quite a true or exact description. What happens between any two people is best described as communion. It is where more and more people live in communion that community is created. Two such people do indeed form a community; but to intend merely this is not enough. Nothing short of the inclusion of the whole of mankind is meant by Macmurray's intended community. "We must remember, however, that to obtain this analysis (given above) we isolated two persons from their relation to all others. If their relation to one another is exclusive of the others, then its motivation in relation to the others is negative; the two friends must defend themselves against

the intrusion of the rest. Their friendship becomes a positive element in a motivation which is dominantly negative and this will destroy the realization of the inclusive relation itself. To be fully positive, therefore, the relation must be in principle inclusive, and without limits. Only thus can it constitute a community of persons. The self-realization of any individual person is only fully achieved if he is positively motivated towards every other person with whom he is in relation." (PR 159). So morality is the intention to create communion between all men on earth.

To come to this conclusion after all that effort - and there is far more than I have given or been able to convey - Macmurray admits is trite, hackneyed, and old hat. But, he says, it is none the less true and valid for all that. And if you say that this is what religions have been preaching and advocating for centuries, you are right. Which only stresses a point made by Macmurray in an earlier chapter here. Religion is about relating. It is about the attaining of the personal. It is about communion and human community. "But this is noting new, you may say, even if it is expressed in oddly abstract and new-fangled verbiage. It is just what all the universal religions have always said in simpler and more comprehensible terms. If that is so, and I see no reason to deny it - since it is not novelty but truth which we are seeking - it so far supports our hypothesis that religion is about community." (PR 159).

The Three Modes of Morality

To be intending and acting to advance and promote communion and community is the morality we should all be living. Contrary to what you may be thinking this is no idealism, no pie-in-the-sky. Indeed, it is the most realistic of all ways of life, for only thus can we live as we are created to live. And nothing could be more realistic, more down to earth, more practical than that. Everything in the universe is happy, satisfied, and fulfilled only when it is performing the role for which it was made and intended.

But the special problem of man is that he exists in three orders; the material, the organic, and the personal; and each order has its own morality, its 'natural' way of behaving, of being at its best. Thus Macmurray's identification of three orders or modes of morality.

Now; instead of having their sights fixed upon, and living out, the morality most appropriate for man i.e. personal morality as we described it in the last section, countless people are living the morality of the lesser orders. And, moreover, it is not individuals alone which are manifesting this error, but whole societies have inferior or mistaken moralities and a defective, sub-human, social ethos.

What is the morality related to each of these orders? The first is:-

Mechanical Morality

(See FMW pp. 101/2, 185/192).

This is morality by prescription. According to this way of living, moral laws are seen as being either an intrinsic part of the

universe, or as the decrees of God; and that the only way to live satisfactorily is to obey them. Everything is already laid down. The classical example of this is the Decalogue. Just obey this and all will be well.

As is easily recognised, the sense of this type of morality is mechanical. To follow it is to act as if a human being was merely a piece of matter, for this is exactly how matter behaves. "Any morality which talks of human behaviour in terms of obedience to law is a false morality. It is false because it is mechanical, because it thinks about human behaviour in terms, not of human nature, but of the nature of matter". (FMW 188). "There is no such thing as moral law, and the idea of obedience is not a moral conception. So far as my behaviour consists in obedience, I am not free; I am in fact a slave to whomever and whatever I obey. Someone or something, not myself, decides what I shall do, and I do it because it has been so decided. In that case I cannot be responsible for my behaviour. It isn't really mine. I am merely an instrument of someone else's purpose. That is why slavery, in all its forms, is immoral. A slave is in the position of having to do what he is told. He must not think for himself or feel for himself, and so he cannot decide for himself what he ought to do. His master does that for him. But that deprives him of all responsibility. He is not allowed to be real, and his actions are not really his." (FMW 188).

But why is obedience to some real or imagined external entity or prescription the idea of morality held by countless people? Because such a morality makes it so easy for everybody, not least those, from state rulers to parents and teacher, who have some authority over

others. Properly acted out it makes for conformity and uniformity, both of intention and act. Everybody knows exactly where they stand. It is just like some huge social machine, and if it worked totally and everywhere we would be like a colony of ants. "So we want everybody to be consistent. We want them to recognize all sorts of fixed duties, to pledge themselves to do things in a way that will bind them for the future. We even go so far as to require people to promise that they will love and honour us all their lives. Why? So that we can be secure, and certain of the future, and lay our own plans for the future with safety. The real reason for wanting people to be consistent is just that we may be able to count on them, to calculate their behaviour beforehand. That is why we tell people that there is a moral law and they ought to obey it. It is really for our own supposed advantage. And you will notice that this making of laws to govern people's conduct is really an attempt to turn people into machines, to make them behave like material bodies, like the sun and the stars. And to do that is to attempt to destroy their freedom, to deny their human nature; and - to put it in another way - it is to refuse to trust them. If you trust people you don't try to bind them". (FMW 190).

Human beings are not machines - nor ants. Their freedom, their essence, is not bound-up with mere obedience. As some part of us is material, Macmurray wisely adds, there is a place in life for law, and for obedience to that law; but this has nothing to do with morality. To give but one example; we obey the mechanical, material, laws of health, and would be foolish not to. But this has very little to do with us as persons. It is merely instrumental to this end.

Social Morality

(See FMW 102. 103/202).

Social morality is that morality which is related to life, when that term is used to refer to the biological, or the organic. From this point of view the species is all. The individual exists only as the current instance of that species, and to the fulfilment of the species' end which is survival, adaptation, ascendancy, progress, a bigger share, mastery and hold on and over things. "Every living creature, every organism, has an environment. The environment stimulates it and the organism reacts to the stimulus. As a result, its behaviour is a continuous effort to adapt itself to its environment. This produces the characteristic growth of the organism. It develops, or varies in a definite direction." (FMW 194). "When we look at the world of life from the evolutionary standpoint we find that it is not the individual that counts (for the individual is very limited in his development, grows unadaptable, gets stuck, and dies) but the species, the group, the community of living beings. Life seems to be a great community of living things, of all sorts and kinds, all of which contribute something to the gradual development of a harmony which moves slowly forward from generation to generation, to the accomplishment of a great evolutionary purpose - the purpose of life." (FMW 194/5).

In human terms the essence of morality resulting from making the organic aspect paramount is social morality; that is, service to the community, duty, and self-sacrifice. Not so much today, but very much in the recent past, this was very much the predominant morality from 1850 onwards, and especially in this century, with the two World

Wars, up until about 1950.

This is a good example of philosophy, in this case moral philosophy, unconsciously reflecting the main thought of its age; for was this not the great time of biological evolution, a doctrine wholly organic in conception?

Taken to its limit, as indeed it has been at times, it makes the state and organisation the be-all and end-all of human existence. (See FMW 199/201). But it does not have to go this far to be, nevertheless, the moral philosophy of countless people.

Here once more, it must be asked, what is wrong with such a seemingly noble way of life? One reason Macmurray gives is slightly suspect.

If we all give who is to receive? Obviously, on this point, the answer is that we mutualise - I give one thing, and you give another, to our mutual benefit.

But Macmurray's other reasons are more cogent. Firstly; "It is false because it thinks of human life in biological terms, as if we were animals, not persons." (FMW 198). Secondly; one of its aims is to contribute to the production of a better species, often after each individual has died. If every generation after generation does this i.e. is always sacrificing itself in service to the future, who benefits? What is the use of it in human terms? Thirdly; social morality is erroneous because it treats men as means, as instruments. Consequently it is degrading, both metaphorically and literally. "A morality of service and self-sacrifice to the community is a denial of human reality. It treats everybody as a means to an end. That is what comes of thinking about human life in terms of purposes. If you are going to judge a man's goodness by what he contributes to the

life of the community, then you make him merely an instrument, a tool for doing something. If men are at their best when they are servants, then slavery is the proper condition of human life. And if this purpose is not their own, but the purpose of society or the purpose of life, then it is worse still. Something or someone is using them, as you might use a sixpence to buy sweets or a bus ticket. That is to degrade human life to an animal." (FMW 199). And again. "Unless a man think for himself and feels for himself and determines for himself what he shall do with his life, he is less than human. If you tell him that he ought to serve society, work for the betterment of conditions in the future, identify himself with the cause of progress; in fact if you tell him that he ought to sacrifice himself or devote himself to anything, and that his goodness consists in that self-sacrifice and devotion; then you are denying his right to be a person, to be himself, to be real." (FMW 119).

Even as in the first kind of morality, mechanical morality, Macmurray is not attacking law as such, so with social morality he is not attacking social service and social contribution. All he is against is the irrelevance and recognition as morality. "I am not attacking what we know as the social services or all the unselfish devotion that so many people show to the helpless and the needy. I am as anxious as anyone to clear up the miserable social mess that we have got ourselves into. Let that be clear. What I am repudiating is the attempt to turn the idea of serving humanity or society or the state into a substitute for morality. And I repudiate it because I think that it is precisely the thing that has got us into the mess. Because in practice it means serving organizations. Humanity is a

vague, indefinite word that means very little. In practice it means the people you live amongst. If you must serve, or use the word service, then I will not object to you serving the people you know - your friends and acquaintances. But serving people in general usually means serving nobody in particular. You can't be human if you live by statistics. That is why I insist that morality means friendship. If you are anxious to do your duty by the unemployed, then you have got to do something for the family you know about in the next street. If you mean by social service, doing good to definite, living, suffering people, that is all right. I have only this to say, that you will find that the only way you can really serve people in a way that really matters is to enter into friendship with them". (FMW 214/5).

This closing phrase leads us on to the third mode of morality.

Personal Morality

(See FMW 103/4. 203/219).

Needless to say, this is the true morality. This is the morality all human beings should be intending. And as we saw earlier it can arise and exist only in a state of community, the foundation of which is friendship.

Why is this the proper morality? Because it is the only one where we can be free. Mechanical morality binds and enslaves us to law, or to any sort of prescription external to ourselves; social morality enchains us to duty and self-sacrifice. Personal morality alone enables us to be ourselves in freedom.

Does this mean we can spontaneously do what we like? You remember in an earlier chapter we discussed freedom, and learned that

Macmurray had a very unusual view of human freedom. We are free only when we know and live in terms of reality. We may think we are free otherwise, but we are not. I will not repeat the arguments but refer you back to that chapter. But here is a short quote to remind us of some of the ideas discussed there. "We are free just so far as we think and feel for ourselves, and keep thought and feeling in harmony by acting upon our own thoughts and feelings. In other words, we are personally free in proportion as we are personally real. But there is a second main point which must not be dissociated from this one. We can only be free in so far as we think and feel and act in terms of what is not ourselves. People who are self-centred and egoistic cannot be free." (FMW 206). And again "We are real only if our personal relations are real. We are free only in and through the reality of our friendships. Morality, or human goodness, is essentially a matter of friendship. Friendship - not friendliness." (FMW 207). "The core of human freedom lies therefore in our capacity to be ourselves for other people." (FMW 207. A good summary of Macmurray's position is given in FMW 209/210).

Macmurray ends with two warnings or qualifications. Necessary as it is for all of us to be real "the man who really achieved it would find himself, I doubt not, as so many of the real people of other ages have found themselves, at war with the whole massed forces of his civilization. (FMW 210). This is not very encouraging. In fact it is discouraging to anybody not already trying to live by personal reality. But his second qualification is more encouraging. "Some people might take my distinction between real and unreal people to be a hard and fast distinction. I didn't mean it like that.

Nobody is just real or just unreal. Personal reality is a matter of degree. We are not endowed with reality at birth; we have to create our own reality by a continuous effort and struggle. We are all more or less unreal. Our business is to make ourselves a little more real than we are (FMW 210).

So ends what must be a cursory review of Macmurray's moral philosophy. But as mentioned earlier it does, I believe, contain the essence of his moral teaching.

Appraisement (2)

Being a Christian, and deeply concerned with religion, this is the moral conclusion we would expect Macmurray to reach. How true is it? How valid?

Once again, as we observed before in another context, Macmurray has managed to fit things neatly into a pattern of three. We are, however, more or less convinced by the relating of the three modes of morality to the three orders of our human existence. Or rather, we recognise the moralities plainly enough, but whether they ought to be so closely allied with the orders is less certain. Whatever their moral attitude and behaviour at any particular time people are not consciously relating it to a particular natural order; they are just doing it.

It is questionable, too, whether the three modes of morality between them exhaust the moral possibilities. There may be others. For one thing, the area of hedonism, which might be said to be a moral motive i.e. its aspect of being seen as what is, and of how to live, the 'good' life, seems not to be included in Macmurray's

considerations and possibilities.

Regarding his disparagement of the second morality, the social, one wonders how Macmurray ties this up with Jesus' pronouncement that "Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends". (St. John 15. 13).

But criticism, analysis, theory, and logic apart one must, and ought, in fairness to judge all Macmurray's ideas, especially his moral ones because they are so involved with action, by the criterion Macmurray invariably and unwaveringly throughout his works prescribes. Thought is not, indeed cannot, be judged by thought. It is to be tested and tried in action, in practice, in life. On this count to be personal, which one can only be in this situation - although observation may contribute something too - I have found Macmurray's moral discernment, and especially his ultimate advocacy of the third mode, the personal, to be the most satisfactory and propitious - both to intend and, wherever possible to practice; remembering that unfree and unreal other people limit our freedom, and our ability to act personally. Only thus can we even begin to be ourselves and, at the same time, allow others to be theirs.

End of Appraisement (2)

Agency

The essence, the very task, of the philosopher is to think. So it is of many other specialists - scientists, historians, inventors, and writers, to name but some. But whereas all these thinkers have something tangible and specific to work on, thus keeping their feet

firmly on the ground, the philosopher's lot and plot, because of its breadth, comprehensiveness, abstraction, and lack of concrete material to work on, tends to make him conclude that thinking is the core of reality, the centre of existence. Even as for the cobbler there is nothing like leather; so for the philosopher there is nothing like thought, says Macmurray. (PC 22).

And as philosophy, whether openly recognised or not, is the basic key subject, virtually containing or at least recognising, heeding, and utilising the findings and conclusions of all other disciplines and fields of life, it has, at least in Western tradition, made thinking more important than action. Plato initiated this tradition. Descartes endorsed and compounded it with his "I think, therefore I am." And all philosophies and philosophers have worked, and still work, on this assumption.

Macmurray alone - at least in Britain - and still almost alone anywhere, has broken this strongly-engrained philosophical tradition. The only philosophers who have moved slightly away from thought-centred philosophy, Macmurray says, are the linguistic philosophers. "This conclusion has clearly a positive relation to the current linguistic philosophy. Both are concerned to stress the centrality of language for philosophy. To transfer the task of logic from the analysis of thought to the analysis of language is to take a step towards the recognition of the mutuality of the personal and its implication, the primacy of action. But to rest here, to conceive philosophy as simply the logical analysis of language, is to fail to see the implications of this step, and to remain stuck in the presuppositions of the philosophical tradition from which it could release us". (PR 12).

Action, not thinking, says Macmurray is the essence of reality. Everything of ultimate meaning and significance is to be found in our moving into, and in, the world of action, relating, and feeling. This is the root of Macmurray's doctrine of AGENCY.

Let it at once be said that Macmurray is no despiser of thought and thinking. Admire him as he did, Macmurray is not another D.H. Lawrence. Reflection has a very important role to play in Macmurray's philosophy, and he has many chapters, indeed a book - "Interpreting the Universe" - devoted to it. And all he asks is that when we think, we think from the point of view of action. "What is proposed is that we substitute the 'I do' for the 'I think' as our starting-point and centre of reference." (SA 84. The rest of this page, and the next, are very relevant and should be read).

Moreover, thought is not something ultimate. It can never discover, reveal, or disclose reality, to do which by thought is the essence and intention of Western philosophy. Obviously its a mistake to search, via thought, for truth. The task is abortive from the outset. That this is so is evidenced by the paramount position given to epistemology and metaphysics, with ethics and social philosophy trailing, and aesthetics even lower down the scale.

Reality can be found and experienced only in action. Thought exists only to enable us better to deal with our prime task, our foremost purpose, which is to act.

People who do most of the thinking in our society, whether it be philosophical thinking or not, fall into this error. The classical example is that of many of our ancient and pre-war universalities, where the emphasis of teaching, and thus of its overt or implied

ethos, was a renouncing, almost a despising, of the real and practical world - by which they alone survived in their ivory towers - of business, manufacturing, industry, commerce, trade, and other worldly occupations and professions. Plato has a lot to account for! Talking of reason as the distinguishing feature of man Macmurray says, "The empirical determination of the differentia is naturally derivative and variable in principle; and it has in fact varied considerably during the history of philosophy. If it has tended on the whole to have a predominantly theoretical reference, this is because Plato and Aristotle determined the tradition in this direction at the start by their conviction that the good life for man is the "theoretical" life." (PR 27).

It is not clear how far the man in the street manifests this radical and fatal error. If you are not a thinker such an idea is never entertained, so its truth or falsity is never considered let alone questioned. Therefore its effect is never known.

But if we are agents, what are we agents for? We are agents, says Macmurray, of the Other. Let it at once be said that an understanding of Macmurray's conception of all these matters is not easy. It cannot be so obvious and simple as it seems. But an attempt will be made here at least to introduce such an understanding, however over-simplified it might have to be.

The Other is everything external to the self, yet it includes the self if only because any one self (you, for example) is part of the other for somebody else. The Other covers the whole gamut of things, creatures, and persons, - the material, organic, and personal.

Now a self can only be a self because of its awareness of, and relationship to, the Other. And this awareness is produced by sense-experience. But, contrary to what would seem to be the situation, the most important sense-experience is the tactile, not vision. The self can exist and thrive without sight, but nobody has existed, or could survive, without the tactile - as a moment's reflection on the matter will convince. Macmurray stresses this difference because in vision the self is almost totally receptive i.e. non-active. Whereas in tactual perception, because of direct contact, we have to be active. This is where we are really and livingly in contact with the Other i.e. reality. The whole of this is discussed in SA 107/8 from "But from the standpoint (to)..... be a practical solipsism". And again, "Tactile perception is our only means of having a direct and immediate awareness of the Other as existent. Visual experience does not provide this. For vision is not essentially active; it is characteristically passive." (SA 111).

Incidentally, this priority of vision which we experience, causing us mistakenly to fail to recognise the absolute essentiality of the tactile, probably accounts for the predominance we give to thinking. "Now this concentration of attention on vision has had very important effects upon philosophy in general. From the time of the Greeks, and especially through the influence of Plato, 'vision' has tended to be the model upon which all knowledge is construed. Thought is taken to be an inner vision. Reflection is 'contemplation'. The basis of science is 'observation', and the scientist himself is 'the observer'". Here again, there is much more of this which must be read ending ' "In consequence, the visual model tends to instigate a strong contrast between knowing and

acting, which in abstract theory passes easily into a conceptual dualism" (SA 105/6).

What is the core of tactual experience? resistance. And resistance is, or causes, frustration. Thus it evokes knowledge and awareness of the self; knowledge of the Other; the beginnings of will - to overcome the resistance; and, to go back to the original and basic point of all this, demonstrates the primacy of action over thinking as the essential factor of being. "Resistance, therefore, is a frustration of the will. The experience occurs only when I am prevented from doing something that I am trying to do. If, for example, I set about walking straight forward in the dark, and collide with a wall, I become aware of the wall as an obstacle to my progress. The harder I press forward, the stronger the resistance. Yet if I had stopped walking before I reached the obstacle, I should never have known that it was there." (SA 108). Other relevant references are SA 108/9 and SA 110.

So if you read Macmurray fully - this short summary affords no proof - he has established the existence of the Other, and the existence of the self as discovered in relation to it. He has also established that the self, because of this situation, is basically and acting self. Thought is only a secondary and contributory activity. But, to turn to a further point, why has this self to be called an agent?

The Other, as we have seen, is an all-inclusive, and all-including, entity. It is a hierarchy or pyramid of three elements - materials, organisms, and persons - and we encounter and have to deal with all three.

But the ultimate of these three is the personal. It is, as it were, both immanent and transcendent. Indeed, the lower orders exist only so that they may produce and serve the personal. And the personal, the total Other is, for Macmurray, God. God, he says, is the ground of the personal. "God is the universal Other." (SRE 80). Even as when we speak in a general sense of matter we mean every bit of matter in the universe, so Macmurray conceives of God, by analogy, as the sum total of bits of the existing personal.

"Religious reflection universalizes its problems through the idea of a universal Person to whom all particular agents stand in an identical relation. This is the idea of God, and religious knowledge is rightly described as the knowledge of God. Such knowledge will apply universally to all instances of personal relationship." (PR 168/9). "It is this whole situation which is generalized in religious reflection as the community of persons in active relation to the universal Other, that is, to God." (PR 179). "By shifting our standpoint from the 'I think' to the 'I do', we have restored the reference of thought to action, and in the result have found that we are driven to conceive a personal universe in which God is the ultimate reality". (PR 224).

In case the thought has crossed your mind that this is a form of pantheism Macmurray says, "The conception of God at which we have arrived is not pantheistic. Pantheism results from the attempt to give a religious colour to an organic conception of the world. A personal conception alone is fully theistic and fully religious. For there can be no action without an agent, and an agent, whether finite or infinite, though he is immanent in existence, necessarily transcends it God, therefore, as the infinite Agent is

immanent in the world which is his act, but transcendent of it." (PR 223).

Now God has an intention. He would not be personal if he had not. To intend is a vital element in both Macmurray's theory of action and of the personal, as we shall see later. And, as is quite a common idea with Christian followers of most denominations and sects, this intention of God is being worked-out in the creation we know and of which we are a part. In technical terms this is demonstrated in the climax of, and in the last chapter to, the 'Self as Agent' called 'The Personal Universe.' "The argument which starts from the primacy of the practical moves steadily in the direction of a belief in God. To think the world in practical terms is ultimately to think the unity of the world as one action, and therefore as informed by a unifying intention." (SA 221). It is because we are part of this intention, in action, that we are called agents; and the reason why we must regard ourselves essentially as such and not as thinkers, as so far Western philosophy has erroneously done.

Now here a paradox arises. As persons we are free. We would not be persons if we were not. It would seem therefore that we can create any future we will. "Freedom is the capacity to determine the future by action." (PR 212). And again. Freedom is "my capacity to determine the future in accordance with my intention." (PR 210). Although these are quotes from Macmurray they do not, at their face value, mean exactly what he would wish them to mean. We can, he says, do what we will. But if this act is not in keeping with the intention of the Other frustration will inevitably result and continue until we realign ourselves or revise our own intention.

"Now it is the fundamental postulate of religious rationality that the purpose of God must inevitably be achieved. Thus, the discovery of the essence of humanity is the discovery, not merely of what human life ought to be, but of what human life will be when the work of God in history is complete." (CH 58). "If Man has discovered the intention which is involved in his own existence, he may refuse to adopt that intention as his own. He may avoid the light, knowing it is there. But the consequence of this refusal is necessarily disastrous. It leaves Man not merely denying his own nature, and so divided against himself, but at heart conscious that he is doing so. If he refuses the intention which defines his own nature, and so refuses to be himself, he must necessarily define an intention for himself in opposition to his own nature. This process of self-frustration must inevitably prove self-destructive". (CH 59). Much other relevant analysis is to be found around these pages. "To conceive the world thus is to conceive it as the act of God, the Creator of the world, and ourselves as created agents, with a limited and dependent freedom to determine the future, which can be realized only on the condition that our intentions are in harmony with his intention, and which must frustrate itself if they are not" (PR 222).

Except that Macmurray wishes to believe this, it is not clear why this should be so. Even if God does exist as the ground and sum total of the personal - although Macmurray says we ought not to ask 'Does God exist?' but 'Is what exists personal?' (PR 215) - that he has this inexorable intention, overriding ours, does not logically, or even reasonably follow. But remembering that Macmurray is a Christian such a contention is reminiscent, put in philosophical language and abstract form, of two well known Christian concepts.

Firstly; that God has made us free, but that we can live satisfactorily only if we do his will i.e. obey him. Secondly; - and this is the more liberal exhortation stated by St. Augustine - "Love God and do what you like". In modern terminology this means that if we already have the right attitude, and only if we have, may we do that which, in our freedom, we want to do. This will coincide with God's intention. This will be God's intention.

Incidentally; to refer this important matter to another interpretation; this seems to tie-up with Macmurray's idea, earlier fully discussed here in the chapter on "Freedom", that only real people can be free.

What would seem to be the benefit of adopting Macmurray's idea of action as being the recognised focal point of human existence, and of reality, and its allied concept of man as agent? Action, it need hardly be noted, is the focal point whether we recognise it to be so or not; for thinking of itself can produce, move, or achieve nothing. If we only thought and did not act we would not survive.

Firstly, then, to put the focus on thinking gives priority to theory over practice. This is not to say that theorising is not necessary, but it is not paramount. On this point Macmurray seems to waver, but he pulls back from the brink of relapsing into the Western traditional attitude just in time. Having said "The theoretical question is posed by the practical situation; for that very reason the significance and the verification of the theoretical conclusion lie in the practical field. Indeed the theoretical result, if it is meaningful at all, is the solution of a practical problem. If then, as seems indubitable, all theoretical problems have their ultimate,

if not their immediate, origin in our practical experience it seems reasonable to expect that all must find their ultimate meaning in a reference to the practical." (SA 22), - which is clear enough - he goes on to say, "It may turn out otherwise. There may be generated, by the instigation of practical experience, a set of theoretical activities which have their meaning in themselves and require no practical reference to sustain or to validate them. But it would be a methodological error to assume this from the start." (SA 22. The following paragraph is also very relevant and must be read). Then with relief - we do not want our newly acquired mental orientation disturbed so soon, and it is the only time Macmurray does it - "All that is contended is this, that there is a necessary relation between our theory and our practice; that the activities of reflection can never be totally unrelated to practical life; that it is always legitimate to ask, of any theory which claims to be true, what practical difference it would make if we believed it. It may often be difficult to answer this question; but if the correct answer were that it would make no difference at all, then the theory would be a mere exercise of phantasy, neither true nor false, but meaningless." (SA 23). Practice and action, however badly done, must always be more important than theory.

Secondly; to make thinking the centre of life and activity, isolates and individualises the thinker. To think is to withdraw into the self. Throughout his work Macmurray makes a strong point about withdrawal and action. A whole chapter in "Persons in Relation" is called "The Rhythm of Withdrawal and Return". Withdrawal is vital, but when thinking becomes the prior activity over actual acting then thinking is to be condemned. Withdrawal to

this degree, and as a philosophical position, cannot help but promote, and indeed be, subjectivist and egocentricity. "We were driven to recognize another defect of modern philosophy, its egocentricity". (PR 16). "Since the Self in reflection is withdrawn from action, withdrawn into itself, withdrawn from participation in the life of the world into contemplation, this point of view is also egocentric. The Self in reflection is self-isolated from the world which it knows. This theoretical and egocentric character of our philosophy is not doctrinal. It is a presupposition, generally unconscious, implicit in philosophical procedures." (SA 11).

The upshot of this is that to be truly human we must be relating, in action, with the Other which of course includes our fellows. To make thinking i.e. withdrawal the focus, to make it the real thing, is thus to condemn us all to sub-personalism. Indeed, this is what has happened, and is happening, to western man over the last centuries. As thought has become increasingly and ever more central, as endorsed by science and the prominence given to it, so has relating declined and forced to move ever further away from the centre of human consideration, concern, and action - as exemplified by the "decline" of religion. So too has our capacity to be human, caring, loving and mutual - all aspects of the personal - receded. We have become more organic, ever more material, and less personal. This is exactly what we would expect to occur when thought, instead of action, theory instead of practice, become the focus and *raison d'etre* of philosophy.

Let it again be repeated. Thinking for Macmurray has an essential place in life. What Macmurray is against here is the fact

that thinking has become in Western philosophy, and subsequently pervaded all Western attitudes, the supposed way to reality and right existence. Thinking can only be instrumental, a means. It can never cause reality and the right way of living to be experienced. This can be done only through action in its various forms - doing, relating, responding, feeling, mutualising, and knowing directly and immediately.

Thirdly; to give priority to thinking and theorising is to be dualistic. And dualism and pluralism are, as we have seen in the introduction, anathema to Macmurray. He is an absolute monist. Nowhere, in any field of reflection or action, will he get himself into a dualist situation, or concede anything to it. His argument concerning the present problem is that if we primarily regard ourselves as thinkers we still have to act. Therefore we are, as it were, either two selves or one self divided; both of which would be cases of dualism. If, on the other hand, we recognise the priority of action, thought exists only to further action. It does not exist in its own right. Therefore the situation is one of monism. Moreover, the very fact of action makes us one and undivided. It is impossible to act in a state of two minds. Action is absolute, whole and single; it cannot be otherwise.

The concept of positive and negative figures largely in much of Macmurray's later work. Nearly everything has a positive and negative aspect both of which must be recognised as being quite acceptable and proper, and used as such. And concerning our present problem he uses this concept to effect. Action he proclaims is the positive; thought is merely the negative underside of action. It exists only to serve action.

Action, agency, the personal are right and good because they alone are monist and banish dualism. "The particular unreality which concerns us is the disruption of the integrity of the Self through a dualism of practical and theoretical activity. We are asked to embark upon a purely theoretical activity which isolates itself from the influence of all 'practical' elements - since these must introduce bias and prejudice - in the hope of attaining a knowledge which will take precedence over the beliefs by which, in practice, we live. This, I say, is impossible in practice, and in conception self-contradictory. If we could so isolate our theoretical activities from practical influences - from the emotional motive, for example, and the intentional valuations which determine our behaviour - we should have destroyed our own integrity. We should need to become two selves, neither of which would be a complete self. There would be a 'practical' or 'bodily' self which acts without thinking, and a 'theoretical', 'spiritual', 'mental' self, which thinks without acting. This is the genesis of the 'mind-body' problem." (SA 78/9). "When we start from the 'I do', the possibility of reflection is no mystery; and the dualism of mind and matter is overcome." (SA 183). Fourthly; we have been using the traditional term 'self'. This is inevitable under the old understanding. The self is the subjective side and aspect of thinking. But with the transfer to action, as the locus of perceiving and living, the self is replaced by the person. This is a very important transference as we shall see in our next section. "It will be clear from this discussion that the term 'person' fulfils the same function from the standpoint of the agent as the term 'self' does in traditional philosophy, which thinks from

the standpoint of the subject. And since the effect of transferring our point of view from the 'I think' to the 'I do' is to overcome the dualism which is inseparable from the theoretical standpoint, the dualism of a rational and an empirical self disappears." (PR 27).

We have now seen, so far as is possible in so short a compass, why for Macmurray action must supplant thinking as the focal point of philosophy and of all philosophising; and why as a result of this the self must be seen as agent and not as subject, as it is under the old order.

But this exposition has been only for convenience. It is only the first step, although it has taken Macmurray a whole book - "The Self as Agent" - to expound. The really vital and important aspect, of which agency is only the beginning, is given in Macmurray's second book of 'The Form of the Personal' - "Persons in Relation".

Where the first book falls short, and Macmurray frequently reminds us of this, is that the agent, as so far understood, is a single, isolated, individual. As already said, this has had to be so for purposes of exposition. But now we are in a position to move on into the final and end-product of all this provisional realignment and reorientation to what is one of Macmurray's major contributions to thought and philosophy, namely, the recognition, the preliminary and tentative surveying and mapping out of, and an early assessment of its value and necessity, of:-

The Personal

What is the personal? What is meant by the term 'the personal'?

It is simply the essence of the sum total of things which make man man, and which distinguish and differentiate him from every other kind of thing or being. "Properly speaking personality i.e. the personal, is a term which denotes the general character which distinguishes human life from all other forms of life." (CH 56). Indeed, we might go further than this; we ought to distinguish the personal from life, if life is considered to be exclusively the organic. "To say that human life is personal is primarily to deny that human life is organic, or that it can be treated as differing from animal life only in degree and not in kind. It is to assert that the essence of human life is radically different from the essence of the organic life, and that the relations which constitute the totality of human life are radically different from those which make a unity of the organic world. It is this essential character of human life that constitutes its humanness". (CH 56). But we will not be too precise on this point, as Macmurray himself is not.

You may think the term 'the personal' to be a little remote and formal, both in tone and connotation. So does Macmurray. But it is impracticable to use the term he would prefer and which, if it had not been distorted in usage, is much more apt, pertinent, and descriptive - namely personality. The reason is obvious. Personality has come to mean that which individualises and distinguishes one person from another. Increasingly it is used even more extremely than this to denote some exceptional, usually extrovert, characteristics of a few people more attractive,

charismatic, or assertive, than the average majority.

But the personal, as understood and expounded by Macmurray, has nothing of this about it. In fact it is just the opposite. It is, as we have seen, that which is common and characteristic of all men, and has nothing to do with their attractiveness, appeal, or individuality. Twice at least Macmurray makes this point very clearly. Speaking of the personal he says, "In the first place, I have used the term 'the persona;' where it might have seemed more natural to employ the word 'personality'. This is partly because we need a word which is more inclusive and wider in denotation than 'personality' could reasonably be made. But more important is the fact that the term has been diverted from its natural meaning. We should expect it to refer to that quality or set of characteristics in virtue of which a person is a person; a property therefore which all persons share, and which distinguishes a person from all beings which are not personal. In fact, it has been specialized to mean the quality or set of characteristics which distinguishes one person from another. This would more properly be referred to as 'personal individuality'. It is hardly possible to use the term 'personality' now without suggesting the specialized meaning, and so stressing the element of difference between persons instead of what they have in common. It will be advisable, therefore, to avoid the use of this term as much as possible." (PR 25). Similar remarks are made in CH 55/6. Occasionally, however, through inadvertence, oversight, or for convenience, Macmurray does use the term 'personality' with reference to the personal, as in IU 105, 124, 132, 154, 156. But we should understand, both in context and by the explanation just made, what he

means.

However, to say that the personal is that which distinguishes man may be a useful summarising phrase but we need the conception to be much more detailed and explicit than that if we are to understand and evaluate it adequately; and to this we now turn.

Much as we would like to relate them - and it may be pertinent to do this later - at this stage, if only for ease of exposition and for clarity of comprehending, we must see the personal, as expounded by Macmurray, as having two major facets or branches. Macmurray, let it be clear, does not make such distinction formally. The dichotomy comes to light only in an analysis of his exposition.

These two marked aspects of the personal we might call 1) The formal or the mental; and 2) the relational or communal. Very roughly we might describe the above as 1) the means or instrument of the personal - perhaps even the machinery; whereas 2) is the end, or the reason, for 1) being at all. Let us deal with the formal or means aspect first.

There are two of these which define man or the personal - reason and intention. Reason, "in the first place, is that which distinguishes us from the world of organic life; which makes us men and women - super-organic. It is the characteristic of personal life." (RE 18). "Human action is intentional activity. The activities of human beings, when they are not intentional, lack the essential mark of humanness". (CH 6). "Now, Jesus' discovery is that human life is intentional, and that there is an intention which expresses the real nature of persons." (CH 76). Man is a rational and intending entity; or should be if he is living as man, and not as a mere creature or organism. In any case, these features are in us

whether we recognise, accept, and use them or not.

To deal with reason first. It has two aspects. 1) The unique faculties and activities we possess as man. And 2) Objectivity. Of these unique activities Macmurray says, "We want to know what are the particular ways in which reason reveals itself in human behaviour. One of the most obvious is the power of speech. Another is the capacity to invent and use tools. Another is the power to organize social life. Behind all these lies the capacity to make a choice of purposes and to discover and apply the means of realizing our chosen ends. We might go on to draw up a list of such peculiarly personal activities; though it would probably not reveal immediately the root from which they all spring. There are, however, certain persistent cultural expressions of human life which are in a special sense characteristic of our rational nature at its best. These are science, art, and religion. This calls attention to one point at least which is highly significant. Whatever is a characteristic and essential expression of human nature must be an expression of reason." (RE 18/9). For more on this read RE 223 (bottom)/225.

One very important conclusion, and one revealed with some novelty by Macmurray alone is that, "We must recognize, then, that if we wish to discover what reason is we must examine religion and art just as much as science. A conception of reason which is applicable to science but not to religion or art must be a false conception, or at least an inadequate one". (RE 19).

The outcome of this is that, contrary to the tradition and ethos of our society, emotion besides thinking can be subject to reason and rationality; emotion can be reasonable or unreasonable, rational or

irrational. As we saw in the Introduction the revealing recognition and advocacy of reason in the emotional life is probably Macmurray's major contribution to the possibility and hope of human development, and more will be said about it in the chapter on Macmurray's psychological ideas. "Thinking", he reminds us, "is obviously not the only capacity which is characteristically human and personal". (RE 19).

Regarding the second aspect of reason, objectivity. This means living in terms of what is not ourselves. In other words, living in terms of reality. "The definition of reason which seems to me most satisfactory is this. Reason is the capacity to behave consciously in terms of the nature of what is not ourselves. We can express this briefly by saying that reason is the capacity to behave in terms of the nature of the object, that is to say, to behave objectively. Reason is thus our capacity for objectivity." (RE 19). And again. "Reason is the capacity for objectivity, and it is the possession of this capacity which distinguishes persons from whatever is sub-personal. By the capacity for objectivity, I mean the capacity to stand in conscious relation to what is not ourselves. Everything, of course, stands in relation to what is not itself, and everything that is capable of consciousness stands in conscious relation to what is not itself. This, however, is not sufficient to constitute rationality. We must add that that to which we stand in conscious relation is recognized, is consciously apprehended, as not ourselves." (IU 127/8). "To say that personal consciousness is objective is to say that we are persons because we live in and through a knowledge of what is not ourselves. This is the essence of rationality. The difficulty of grasping it arises simply from the

fact that it is almost impossible to be explicitly aware of it. There is nothing to contrast it with. But if we consider the familiar statement that 'we live in the world' we shall discover that it is paradoxical. It asserts that we have our conscious being not in ourselves but in what is not ourselves. We live in the other, in that which we recognize to be other. It is only when we withdraw into ourselves and find ourselves in a dream-life of phantasy and imagination that we discover the possibility of consciousness which has no objectivity, and we discover it precisely because we are now living not in the world but in ourselves, in a world where we are not dependent on reality but masters of the unreal. Our dependence on what is not ourselves - or rather, since we are always dependent, whether we recognize it or not, our recognition of dependence and our living in terms of this recognition - is the core of our reality." (RE 219).

Only as we are objective can we act. And to act is the prerogative of the personal. Macmurray contrasts acts with events. Events merely happen and have causes; acts are intended and have reasons. "We may define an act as the realizing of an intention". (SA 189). "For every event there is a cause; for every act there is a reason." (SA 149). We cannot go into detail nor substantiate it here, but this is fully and widely discussed throughout SA especially in chapter VII, Causality and the Continuant. Of objectivity Macmurray says, "It is thus the nature of an agent to act not in terms of his own nature but in terms of the nature of the object, that is, of the Other." (SA 168). A glimpse of what objectivity means and entails is given in PR 61. "A true judgment is one which

is made by one individual - as every judgment must be - but is valid for all others. Objective thought presupposes this by the assumption that there is a common object about which a communication may be made." (PR 61). Read also FMW 182/3, from "Our nature is not (to) other things and other persons".

The opposite of objectivity is subjectivity and egocentricity. To live thus is to be existing sub-personally. This is how creatures and organisms live when they, being non-objective, manage only by chance, to survive at all.

So reason has two aspects according to Macmurray. Reason is the manifestation of a number of attitudes and activities peculiar to man. And it is objectivity - living in the awareness of, and in terms of, what is not ourselves.

What of intention, the second aspect of the formal side of the personal? Already we have had occasion to mention it six or seven sentences back when speaking of objectivity. If we do not intend we are merely part of an unfree chain of events or happenings. This is approximately the position of the behaviourists and determinists. But Macmurray will have none of it. "The purpose of God is the creation of Man as a personal community of free and equal persons". (CH 96). Thus to be free, to be persons, we must intend. We must be creating and building into a future which is open. "The form of human society is determined by the intentions of its members, not by natural facts such as blood-relationship which are not intended by them but merely happen to them. Man lives by intention; that is his nature." (CH 82).

Clear as this may be it confronts us with a paradox, as we saw when discussing agency a few pages back. "Yet his intentions are

continually frustrated. This means that he intends wrongly." (CH 82). Macmurray answers this rather astutely. "His salvation (i.e. becoming right-intentioned) can lie only in discovering and willing that intention which is inherent in his own nature, as part of the world, and which therefore brings him into harmony with the reality in which he has his being." (CH 82).

But is Macmurray having it both ways? It would seem that he is, although his stress on our own - presumably true - nature may afford him an outlet. Nevertheless, is not this supposed innate goodness of human nature - for what is meant can be nothing else although not explicitly stated (unless God's purpose is evil) - only an echo of Rousseau, to whom in other contexts, but not in this, Macmurray often refers and dismisses? One example of this is, "The State will then vanish away and leave the completely organic society of Rousseau's romantic phantasy." PR 156). Such words cannot be interpreted as favourable.

But has Macmurray fallen into the same trap? Perhaps he just avoids the abyss when he says, "They i.e. the frustrates, must live by the intention of community which defines their own human nature. They must intend love, equality, and freedom as the structural principles of their practical relations with one another. If they will only accept their own reality and live by it they will find the kingdom of heaven has come on earth." (CH 83). What evidence is there to show, except for Macmurray's concept of the Other and that this is good, that man ultimately wants to, or even can, go along with the Good - intention or no intention?

Let us now turn to the other and major half of Macmurray's idea of the personal - that of relating and community. This is rather nearer to the everyday idea of the personal than the preceding aspects of it.

Essentially, the personal we are now considering might be summed-up, at its most commonplace, graspable, and minimal level, in the phrase - HUMAN relating. But over the last seventy years since, due to modern psychology, human relations as a focal point of research, study, and interest - now changed, for no valid reason I can see, to the remote and abstract term "interpersonal relations" - has emphasised the negative aspect of the personal. It is inclined, if only by implication, to say - We all find ourselves here; we are all in the same boat; we may as well try, difficult as it is, to get on together; how can we do this. This is not the personal or human relating Macmurray knows and espouses. His attitude is totally positive. Only in human relating, only in the personal, only in community - as he understands and explains this term - can we not only find ourselves but be ourselves, and live as we are intended to live. "Our awareness of other persons as persons awakens a complete consciousness in ourselves, so that we function fully as persons, and so are capable of a full consciousness of ourselves." (IU 125/6). "The impulse to do this i.e. be personal, is simply the impulse to be ourselves completely; not to gain anything, not to achieve anything, or to do anything in particular, but simply to be ourselves as fully and completely as possible. Now we have only to state this and grasp it to realize that the whole significance of human life is to be found here. What other significance can our existence have than to be ourselves fully and completely? Obviously none. In the nature of

things this must include in some way everything else." (RE 101/2).

The personal - to be personal - is the summum bonum, not only of our existence but probably of all existence. The essence of this is epitomised in St. Paul's phrase, "Then shall I know even as also I am known". (RE 63 and of course, COR 1 - ch13.v.12). Only in the personal can we both find freedom and be free. To know and experience the personal is the highest, the most satisfactory, thing we can know and experience as man. Moreover, we can conceive of nothing being higher. The personal life "is the life which we live as persons, and we can live it only by entering into relationships with other people on a fully personal basis, in which we give ourselves to one another; or, to put the same thing the other way round, in which we accept one another freely for what we are, and in which therefore there is and can be no purpose other than the sharing of our lives in fellowship." (RE 101).

What are the vital elements, the ingredients, of the personal? How do we recognise it? What must be there in us, in our intentions and in our relationships, for the personal to be manifested? There are five constituents - equality, freedom, friendship, mutuality, and community. To exemplify and amplify these with relevant quotations:-

"When two people become friends they establish between themselves a relation of equality. They meet as equals, as man to man. There is and can be no functional subservience of one to the other. One cannot be the superior and the other the inferior. If the relation is one of inequality, then it is just not a personal relationship. But once a personal relationship is established the differences between the persons concerned are the stuff out of which

the texture of their fellowship is woven. And provided the equal relationship is maintained, it is precisely the differences that enrich the relationship. The greater the differences the more there is to share. The greater the fundamental differences between two persons are the more difficult it is to establish a fully personal relation between them, but also the more worth while the relation will be if it can be established and maintained. All great things are difficult, and this is the greatest of all" (RE 104/5).

"The personal life is the field of freedom. That means more than that people ought to be free in their personal lives. It means that without freedom there is and can be no personal life at all. It means that the measure of our freedom and the measure of our personal life are one and the same." (RE 105).

Many other relevant quotes must be read to illustrate the nature of the personal. They are:-

RE 105/6; RE 111; RE 205; IU 125/6; IU 134. And innumerable other quotations of this kind could be given illustrating and endorsing what the elements of the personal are.

In the above however one, so far, has not been illustrated or elaborated upon - community; which of its nature, and especially in this context, is allied to communion. Two points must be mentioned. Firstly; community is not to be identified with society; nor with the social. People may "mix" and belong to societies, but the essence and substance of such activity is not community. Equally people may be highly social, i.e. gregarious, by nature and be very "sociable", but they are not necessarily living in community, or in communion, or pursuing and experiencing the personal life. Often just the opposite. The keywords are intention and attitudes. "The intention

to enter into community with others beyond the limits of the "natural community" is the basis for the enlargement of human community" (CH 67). Following the St. Paul quote given a while back Macmurray says, "It expresses the perfect and complete mutuality of communion, of mutual emotional awareness." (RE 63). "It is the difference between personal life and social life that we must get clear. They are obviously not the same thing, because it would seem that a certain degree of impersonality, a willingness to overlook and to suppress the peculiarly personal elements in our relationships with one another is essential to social life. The satisfactory working of social life depends upon entering into relationships with other people, not with the whole of ourselves but only with part of ourselves. It depends on suppressing, for the time being at least, the fullness and wholeness of our natures" (RE 96/7).

Secondly; friendship between two people may reveal the personal to them and between them, but this is not enough for living the personal life. We must intend, and actually seek to realise, the inclusion of everybody in the attaining of the personal. "We must remember, however, that to obtain this analysis we isolated two persons from their relation to all others. If their relation to one another is exclusive of the others, then its motivation in relation to the others is negative; the two friends must defend themselves against the intrusion of the rest. Their friendship becomes a positive element in a motivation which is dominantly negative and this will destroy the realization of the exclusive relation itself. To be fully positive, therefore, the relation must be in principle inclusive, and without limits. Only so can it constitute a community

of persons. The self-realization of any individual person is only fully achieved if he is positively motivated towards every other person with whom he is in relation. We can therefore formulate the inherent ideal of the personal. It is a universal community of persons in which each cares for all the others and no one for himself. The ideal of the personal is also the condition of freedom - that is, of a full realization of his capacity to act - for every person". (PR 159).

One other possible fault must be noted and avoided. It is an illusion to think that we are most ourselves, most personal, when alone. Because social life is not personal we may find it unsatisfying. And if we mistakenly identify the two i.e. the social with the personal, we may resort to private and individual life in order to try and find ourselves. Solitariness can never disclose the personal. "We often feel that only when we are free from any necessity of co-operation, or even of relationship, with other people, can we be wholly ourselves. But this is an illusion, because to be ourselves at all we need other people. When we are alone we haven't even the opportunity of expressing ourselves in speech. And that, with all that it implies, is a very essential part of our whole selves." (RE 97).

Anything material, even life and men when looked at materially, instrumentally, and mathematically i.e. as by formal, experimental, psychology, is "discovered" and spoken for by science. Anything organic and living, and even things when observed individually, are the province and concern of art. In what does the personal find its realm and apotheosis? In religion.

Religion is the area, the manifestation, the aspect of human and universal life, concerned with the personal. There is no need to enlarge on this here. The role and place of religion, as discerned by Macmurray, has been expounded and discussed in the relevant chapter earlier. Sufficient, however, to remind ourselves of this in the present context. Religion "is the expression of our capacity as persons to know the reality of personality that is not our own, and to be known by persons in our own personal reality. It is the expression of our need to live in that knowledge; to live in the mutuality of communion. Religion, therefore, is reason in human nature creating the community of persons - recognizing and achieving the unity of all personal life. It is the force which creates friendship, society, community, co-operation in living. That is why I am wont to say that friendship is the fundamental religious fact in human life. The capacity for communion, that capacity for entering into free and equal personal relations, is the thing that makes us human; it is the rock on which personality is built. If it were not for this we would not be human beings". (RE 62/3). "The field in which all the capacities of personality are expressed in a mutual, objective, relationship with that which is not itself, is the field of religion. There is, then, a definite field of empirical experience which is the field of religion. It is the field of personal life". (RE 225). Religion sums-up, embodies, and is the personal; and the discovery, the recognition, and the disclosing of this to men, was the work of Jesus. "The discovery which Jesus made was the discovery that human life is personal". (CH 55). "Jesus also defines the discovery positively by determining the structure of relationships between human beings which would constitute a human

community or a community of persons." (CH 65).

The importance of this interpretation by Macmurray has never been fully appreciated and honoured, although it has been known for fifty years. We have had thousands of divine, incarnated, and holy Jesus'. We have had hundreds of human, secular, and earthy Jesus' e.g. Renan's. But have we, before Macmurray, had a credible Jesus who so easily yet so satisfactorily and convincingly linked the two? I know of none. And what an illustration, to have discerned this, of Macmurray's monism!

Needless to say, when we come to religion, even when seen as the manifestation of the personal, God must be included relevantly. "God," says Macmurray, "is the term which symbolizes the infinite apprehended as personal, and it derives, as indeed it must, from our immediate experience of the infinite in finite persons. The idea of incarnation, which in one form or another appears in all immediate religions, merely expresses the fact that our awareness of the personal infinite comes to us, and can only come, in and through our awareness of finite personality." (IU 124). "God is the infinite ground of all finite phenomena in the personal field - and, therefore, ultimately, of all phenomena whatever - but the knowledge of God is possible only through the empirical phenomena of personal relationship. In any particular relationship of persons, if it is truly personal, God is known, as that which is partially, but never completely, realized in it. Thus, like the true scientist, the truly religious man will talk little about God - he will leave that to the speculative philosopher and theologian - and much about the empirical life of personal relationships." (RE 209/10).

The importance and paramountcy of the personal can now be recognised and accepted - if, that is, you agree with Macmurray. But the fact that two whole volumes - collectively entitled "The Form of the Personal" - plus countless references to, and exposition of, it in many other works of Macmurray's have had to be written on it; plus the honest recognition, unless we are very unusual and rare people, of the true position in ourselves; plus a look at society in general; illustrates beyond doubt that the personal is not a matter regarded with much importance today. And it is even less intended and practised. The decline of religion, however stuffy, absurd, and unrealistic much of its external manifestations and dogmas may have been, endorses this. For no doubt we have thrown the baby out with the bath-water.

It is not surprising, therefore, that a major part of Macmurray's interest in the personal, besides revealing it to us at all, is concerned with the crisis of the personal. He devotes a whole chapter (SA chapter 1) to explaining what crisis is and why we have it - as, of course, few people recognise it as such. And two whole books are devoted to analysing it, and suggesting what is required to resolve it. Macmurray also speaks of the personal as "the emergent problem of contemporary philosophy" (SA 17, 20, 21, 26; IU 141).

This crisis of the personal naturally manifests itself in society; in other words in life and action. Macmurray does not enlarge on this, rather regarding it as self-evident; but he does say, "That we are living through a period of revolutionary change is already a commonplace. We are all aware of this, though we may differ in our estimate of the depth and extent of the transformation

that has already occurred or that is inevitable as we go forward. To me it seems certain that the scale of change must dwarf that of the transformation of medieval into modern Europe." (SA 26). Much more of this follows on the same page and should be read.

But apart from what he believes to be obvious, Macmurray does give two notable indicators. Firstly; the one already mentioned above, namely, the decline of religion. Secondly; especially in authoritarian nations, the enlargement of the functions and the increasing dependence and leaning upon the state. Of this he says, "One of these is the tendency towards an apotheosis of the state; the other the decline of religion. The two are intimately connected; since both express a growing tendency to look for salvation to political rather than to religious authority. The increasing appeal to authority itself reflects a growing inability or unwillingness to assume personal responsibility. The apotheosis of political authority involves the subordination of the personal aspect of human life to its functional aspect." (SA 29). This is followed by a condemnation of communist states - by which, of course he means Marxist states. (See SA 29/30). In earlier works - see CH - he, of course, condemned the Fascist states as well, but by now - the mid-1950s - the leading offenders had been eliminated.

Of the recession in religion he says, "The decline of religious influence and of religious practice in our civilization bears the same significance. Such a decline betrays, and in turn intensifies, a growing insensitiveness to the personal aspect of life, and a growing indifference to personal values. Christianity, in particular, is the exponent and the guardian of the personal, and the

function of organized Christianity in our history has been to foster and maintain the personal life and to bear continuous witness, in symbol and doctrine, to the ultimacy of personal values. If this influence is removed or ceases to be effective, the awareness of personal issues will tend to be lost, in the pressure of functional pre-occupations, by all except those who are by nature specially sensitive to them. The sense of personal dignity as well as of personal unworthiness will atrophy, with the decline of the habits of self-examination. Ideals of sanctity or holiness will begin to seem incomprehensible or even comical. Success will tend to become the criterion of rightness, and there will spread through society a temper which is extraverted, pragmatic and merely objective, for which all problems are soluble by better organization." (SA 30/1).

Written thirty years ago what could be a truer picture of the situation today? And its worsening! Needless to say, there is the international aspect as well. "If we remember that history has brought us to a point where we must think of human society as a whole, and not limit our outlook to the confines of our own nation, there must be few who will fail to recognize, whether they welcome it or recoil from it, that we are involved in such a crisis." (SA 31).

Being concerned with philosophy - "I must treat this theme as a philosopher, for that is my only competence." (SA 17) - but strenuously denying that philosophy does not serve practical living (See SA 23/4), Macmurray then proceeds to discuss the crisis from the philosophical point of view. But not before he has made very clear what the relationship of philosophy to society and social history is. In fact they are highly related. Philosophy follows and reflects the social pattern and its problems. Therefore to be concerned with the

philosophical aspect of the crisis, as Macmurray is, is not to be remote, removed, and abstract, but to be working in the very heart of it. "That there is such an interrelation, indirect enough and largely unconscious, between philosophical theory and social processes of a more empirical kind, is evident from any study of the history of philosophy ... very much more follows and must be read He must find a new starting-point; and his success depends on the discovery of the emergent problem for philosophy in his own time." (SA 25/6). "I have said enough to suggest a prima facie case for the view that there is a necessary relation between philosophy and social practice." (SA 26).

Always reflecting the society of which it is a part, philosophy - in modern times - has tended to mirror and create thought structures and forms to satisfy one of society's main activities; science. (See SA 37). To meet the emergence of physics and mathematics, philosophy produced a philosophy of substance - even regarding the self as a substance - and a logic of static and fixed identical units.

Later, reflecting the coming of the biological sciences, it created the philosophy of organism - from Hegel to Whitehead and Alexander - and the logic of the dialectic and synthesis.

More recently, and today, but as yet unaccomplished - hence the crisis - we are, or ought to be, creating a philosophy and logical form based on psychology. I say "ought" because except for a couple of attempts, Macmurray's apart, we are hardly aware of the need to be doing this and, both in thought and in practice are trying to meet and solve our problems within the old philosophical and logical

forms; an impossible task. Without giving specific quotations all this is stated and elaborated upon in SA 30/36 - as is also what follows.

Kierkegaard was the first to become conscious of the new problem; but he, although very cognizant of it, shirked a philosophical solution by dodging off into the need for "faith" as an answer. "Kierkegaard discovered that the Hegelian philosophy was ludicrously incapable of solving - even, indeed, of formulating - the problem of 'the Existing individual'. (SA 36). "He concluded that we must abandon philosophy for religion, reason for faith." (SA 36).

About the same time as Kierkegaard, Auguste Comte too became aware of the emerging problem. But he resolved it, to his satisfaction, in the opposite way. He abandoned philosophy to science, believing that all would be resolved in, and by, a science of society. Thus was sociology founded; but not a solution to the problem of the personal. (See SA 36). Why both Kierkegaard and Comte failed is astutely diagnosed by Macmurray. They mistook one type of philosophy, then admittedly almost universally the philosophy, as the only possible kind of philosophy. They had not the imagination or ability to see that other types could exist, let alone create such a new form. "For Comte, as for Kierkegaard, we must remember, philosophy is identified with a particular type of philosophy; that type which constructs itself on the form of the organic. If they discover that philosophy is incapable of formulating, either in its individual or its social aspect, the nature of personal experience, this need not mean that philosophy is invalid, but only that an organic conception of the personal is inadequate to the facts. Since philosophy must include the personal

in its field of enquiry, this can only mean that we must abandon the organic form as inadequate for the philosophical purpose, and initiate a search for the form of the personal." (SA 37).

In our own day, according to Macmurray, two schools of philosophy have recognised the problem and tried to meet it. These are the logical empiricists and the existentialists. (SA 26/7). Both have failed in Macmurray's opinion. The logical empiricists, in order to retain the form, have banished all the problems and substance of philosophy to the ragbag. Metaphysics is out. What cannot be verified - verifiable being interpreted in a very limited and strictly scientific way - is not real. It does not exist. It is fanciful; a figment of man's groping imagination.

The existentialists, on the other hand, recognise the substance - they are extremely aware of the contemporary problem of the personal - but meet it with a total disregard and absence of philosophical form. In many cases they are quite happy to ostensibly substantiate their position not by philosophy but by drama, novels, and other literary forms. Ipsa facto this is not philosophy, and therefore does not, and cannot, solve the crisis. (SA 28/9). Finally Macmurray sums this up by saying "Existentialism has discovered, with sensitiveness of feeling, that the philosophical problem of the present lies in a crisis of the personal: logical empiricism recognizes it as a crisis of logical form and method. Both are correct, and both are onesided. The cultural crisis of the present is indeed a crisis of the personal." (SA 29).

And then, immediately following, we have Macmurray's answer, which we know already of course. It is "to discover or to construct

the intellectual form of the personal." (SA 29). The difficulty of doing this cannot be over-stated. "The transition from an organic to a personal conception of unity, however, cannot be so simple as that from a physical to an organic conception. The transformation involved is much more fundamental. The difficulties are of the same type as those which beset the effort to establish psychology on a sure scientific basis. There are two major difficulties. Firstly, so long as psychology is conceived as a science of mind, consciousness, or the subjective, it fails. To establish itself it must think of itself as a science of human behaviour. Similarly in the philosophical transition, we can no longer conceive the Self as the subject in experience, and so as the knower. The Self must be conceived, not theoretically as subject, but practically, as agent. Secondly, human behaviour is comprehensible only in terms of a dynamic social reference; the isolated, purely individual, self, is a fiction" (SA 37/8).

But here already we have the clues. Psychology now sees itself not as the science of mind but of behaviour i.e. action. The self is no longer regarded as an isolated unit but dynamically, socially, active. Such observations, insights, and change of basic direction must lead to Macmurray's re-orientated philosophy of Action and Agency, discussed earlier in this chapter.

So we have come, as it were, full circle. Macmurray admits frequently that his work on the personal is only a preliminary survey and reconnaissance. A tremendous amount still needs to be done by subsequent philosophers. But he obviously believes, with considerable force, that the direction he has signposted is the one which both mankind and philosophy must take if they are to have a

future.

Appraisement (3)

1) Can we be free if we are agents? We, admittedly, are agents of the total Other which includes ourselves. But our 'bit' is a minute part of the Other and of the whole. And if we must, to be satisfactory, act as the Other would have us act, part though we may be of it, can this be called freedom? We have no real i.e. effective, choice. Moreover; if the Ultimate Other, God, has made up his mind as to what the eventual must be, and must in the logic and nature of things, according to Macmurray, achieve that fore-ordained end, whatever we do meanwhile adversely - or he would not be God, by definition - it is difficult to see how we can be free. This is especially difficult to take as throughout FMW Macmurray insists that when he says we must be free he means it and with no qualifications. If we are not free we cannot act, and therefore we are not persons.

Freedom, of course, can never be absolute. It is obvious that we live in a natural context the 'laws' of which we are unfreely obeying whether we are conscious of this or not. We cannot get outside of this. We are physically and biologically trapped.

But within this enforced, acceptable, limit, we can visualise a limited freedom. However, the question remains; Does Macmurray's theory of agency allow us any freedom? Is there a contradiction at the very core of this aspect of his philosophy?

2) Ignoring or accepting the doubts raised above, what are the advantages and disadvantages of accepting Macmurray's theory of agency? There can be no doubt that if accepted and acted upon it

does totally reorientate us and shoot us out into a new world, or our conception of it. It is as if we were emerging on the first spring morning after months of winter. Bugged down, as so many of us are, due to conditioning, tradition, and the ethos of our society, by the priority and predominance of thought, endorsed by I.Qism as the focal point of existence, to accept Macmurray's viewpoint is to be as Keat's "Then felt I like some watcher of the skies when a new planet swims into his ken", or, Wordsworth's "Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive. But to be young was very heaven".

Moreover, as never before, we do come to feel ourselves to be participants and co-creators in this immense process, instead of mere describers, analysts, and stand-asiders if not outsiders. This must be self-evidently good. And good for us all i.e. all together and all mankind, for it must make us realise that we cannot ever 'think' solutions to our problems but only live solutions; or to be more precise, discover their solution in action.

The disadvantage might be that of over-reacting on the obverse. Action, as the paramount thing, needs to be reasserted. But, as we have seen, thinking is not thereby to be discarded. It must be seen as merely instrumental. But to think must not be overlooked, or we should sink back into a state of non-reflection and de-personalisation. We must not become emotionalists, intuitionists, or believers in "the blood".

3) How are we to live objectively i.e. in terms of what is not ourselves yet at the same time be, as Macmurray insists, ourselves? One can see that in a very advanced self these two worlds would not contradict each other, at least not often. One could become, as it

were, bigger than either.

Except for his doctrine of personal reality in FMW - and there rather abstractly - Macmurray seems never to meet this problem of what we are and of being ourselves. Countless people of all ages, never more so than in our own, are essentially subjective, egotistical, self-seeking, and selfish, even within the acceptable limits of society let alone the thousands who are positively evil and criminal, and those who would be but for fear. What are such people essentially and of themselves? Surely, they are only what they manifest? There is no beautiful, good, appreciating, self hidden and waiting to be revealed. Are, and ought, these people to be absolutely free? That Macmurray says they are not free, because of their desire to act adversely, seems to be asking us to accept something too far-fetched to believe. And even if he is right, how are we to proceed meanwhile i.e. until such persons do become real? We cannot have freedom during this period or they would either enslave or kill us!

And to raise an allied point. Nothing is more beneficial to personal - not worldly - success, health, and happiness, if you have tried it, than objectivity. But how many people can and would attempt to do this; or even understand it? Our whole social and educational ethos is geared to egocentricity and individualism - even if that individualism extends to include favourable and favoured groups. Except for the old unpropitious religious method, now defunct, of exhortation, not one element of our society is countering this, or even trying to. No major school of thought is advocating it. In fact, to moralise, publically or privately, is the surest and quickest way to be completely discounted and ostracised.

Can there then, within the bounds of our society - so wrapt up in technology, science, finance, and materialism - and here one cannot help being something of an economic determinist - be envisaged any major change such as Macmurray advocates? I find it difficult to see its possibility, much as it is desirable. But we must not despair; although examples of such a major change of psyche are difficult to find, or perhaps they are non-existent, in history.

4) There is no evidence to show that even if the will of the Absolute Other must ultimately prevail, and its purpose achieved, however obstructive and destructive human behaviour may be, that this will and purpose is good or propitious. That it is is a mere assumption by Macmurray for which he produces no evidence of a philosophical kind. We would not expect proof or anything like it. But we would expect, on such an important matter, something more than mere assertion and belief. Are there shades of Kierkegaard here? That Macmurray does believe this is proved in the following quotation. "We might say - to use a form of words with which we are familiar - that the reality of the world is a personal God, who is the Creator of the world and the Father of all men. His work in history is the redemption of the world from evil and the setting up of the Kingdom of Heaven on earth." (PR 174/5).

5) Macmurray says the personal can never be found in the social or the private, in society or the individual, in socialising or withdrawal. I would not question that it cannot be found in society; or, at least, is certainly not to be mistakenly identified with it. But what about individuality and withdrawal? Macmurray himself recognises the need for withdrawal. He speaks frequently of it, and

even has a whole chapter in PR called "The Rhythm of Withdrawal and Return. And did not Jesus himself withdraw, the most famous and proverbial occasion being his solitary reflections in the wilderness?

Perhaps, however, on this point we are being a little too precise and exacting. In withdrawal, maybe, one cannot be personal; but it is an essential element or procedure to the attainment of that end.

6) It may seem unrealistic and querulous to raise this point but - Are we in a crisis? So many times and ages in the past have seen themselves as being in a state of upheaval and urgency. But how many, seen in historical perspective, really were? And, on the other hand, there can be no doubt that great changes and upheavals occurred where the happenings, let alone the significance of them, passed unnoticed. Did anybody really notice what was going on during the first hundred years of the Industrial Revolution, let alone give it the name we so glibly lip today? Yet that was transitional enough.

Might not the present seeming disruption, stress, and supposed crisis be less real than it actually appears to be due to the intensity and ubiquity of the media, which has never before existed on such a scale and with such immediacy and power?

This is not to say that the personal is not the emerging problem for man. I am convinced that it is. Our greatest need, both as individuals and as man, is to become more personal, less material, less organic, less 'natural'. The most common, widespread, and manifestly hopeless and despairing excuse we hear is "Oh well, that's human nature." And this so frequently both privately and publically. This is indicative enough of the need for widespread education in the personal, and in its philosophy of freedom, action, and

responsibility. However; whether it has yet reached crisis proportions is an open question, and may at this stage be expressing it too strongly - especially when Macmurray wrote it in the 1950s.

End of Appraisement (3)

PSYCHOLOGY

Relevant Books

Reason and Emotion. (RE)

Freedom in the Modern World. (FMW)

Interpreting the Universe. (IU)

The Self as Agent. (SA)

Persons in Relation. (PR)

The Clue to History. (CH)

Creative Society. (CS)

Introduction

Philosophers tend to fall into two categories - psychological and logical. Neither, let it at once be said, is exclusive. No philosopher would be a philosopher without reason and logic. And in most areas of philosophy what is actually happening in the human mind and experience cannot be totally and deliberately overlooked merely to satisfy logic and perfect reasoning. The difference is a question of approach and method. The first category puts emphasis on life and living, on spontaneity of expression, and live argument. The second hold themselves back, and consider, state, and concede only that which is totally certain and logically consistent and water-tight. The first are primarily intuitionists and feelers. The second, formalists and exponents of abstraction. An obvious example of the first is Plato; of the second Spinoza.

Increasingly, especially in British philosophy, only the second, the rigidly formalist and logical, has come to be considered and accepted as philosophy at all. Imagination and creativity there can, and ought to be, in philosophy; but this must always be strictly subject to, and under the control of, formalism. Unfortunately, the result is almost always aridity and loss of contact with real life, people, and living. Philosophy becomes barren and sterile.

When this stage is reached nobody heeds it, believes in it, nor considers it has anything to contribute. This is not to say, not to hope, that its opposite - psychological, intuitive, 'feeling' philosophy - will then, to redress the balance, come into its own. But there is no reason why it should not; and, provided it is realistic and rational, has no less value than formalistic philosophy.

Macmurray belongs to the psychological category. And this is self-confessed, even if it were not obviously so. "It may be objected that in raising the question of motive I am abandoning philosophy for psychology, and falling into one of the fallacies which even a beginner should know how to avoid. To this I shall reply, first, that the motive of this objection is to defend the illusion by forbidding us to bring the question of motive to attention; second, that philosophy does not constitute itself, as science does by isolating a field of study, but by refusing all such exclusions and abstractions. A philosophy which excludes certain questions on the ground that they belong to the field of psychology is giving itself the form of science, and so becoming a pseudo-science. The questions it does raise will show themselves sooner or

later to be 'nonsense questions', till in the end it finds itself with no content at all. What I am doing is to remove the limitation which results from adopting a purely theoretical standpoint and to reassert the inclusiveness of philosophy by thinking from the standpoint of action. If thinking is one of the things we do, then the question, "What motive have we for doing it?" becomes an essential element in any philosophical account of thought." (PR 132).

And this might well be the reason why Macmurray has gone unconsidered for over forty years. When I visited him at his home in Edinburgh in September 1971, and asked why he thought his work had not received the acclaim it would seem to deserve, he gave this very reason, "Because they think I am more of a psychologist than a philosopher," he said.

Bearing this in mind - not that it alters one iota the value, or lack of it, concerning what is said - we now move on to a few of Macmurray's psychological ideas. And by far the most important of these is:-

Emotional Reason

In considering this, or rather before we consider it at all, the first thing we must do is to revise and upgrade our idea of emotion. It is usual, as an inbuilt and conditioned part of our Western mental categorising and conceptualisation, to regard ourselves and our minds as having two major aspects or ways of functioning, namely thinking and feeling, thought and emotion. Other factors are obviously recognised - imagination, will, intuition, and memory, to name but some - but these do not hold and divide the field as do the major

two.

Macmurray never challenges this classification. He agrees and endorses it. "We distinguish two aspects of our consciousness - thought and feeling. These are two ways in which we make contact with the world." (FMW 135/6). He does recognise however that their difference is not total and absolute. They can and do overlap. "Though they are never completely separable, they do have a relative independence." (FMW 136).

How does he distinguish and describe, but not necessarily perfectly define, them - both in themselves and in their function? "In thinking I include all the ways in which we know what things are and try to understand what they are." (FMW 136). Feeling, he says, "... includes the whole range of our emotional experience, from simple feelings of pleasure and pain to the most complicated emotional states of love and reverence and the loftiest reaches of desire." (FMW 145).

This is not the place to discuss thinking. Here we will concern ourselves with emotion.

Emotion is Prior to Thinking

Before we proceed further with our examination of emotion, the important, key, and paramount point, the crux of Macmurray's position and advocacy, must be stated. It is this. That in our society, in the Western world at least, thinking is not merely seen to be, but is automatically assumed to be, prior, superior, more valuable, more reliable, more intrinsically the aspect of what man is or should be, than is emotion.

Emotion is the underdog. It is the cause of all our tribulations. The sooner it is controlled by thought - if that distantly receding day can ever come - the better. In the 18th and 19th centuries, before Freud arrived, it was thought to be imminent. Thinking, especially when imbued with reason, is good. Emotion is bad. This has been both the stated and the implicit psychological and moral philosophy of Western man. And, says Macmurray, it is completely false and untrue. "We are inclined to think of feeling as something a little ignominious, something that ought to be subordinated to reason and treated as blind and chaotic, in need of the bridle and the whip. I am convinced that this is a mistake. It is in the hands of feeling, not of thought, that the government of life should rest. And in this I have the teaching of the founder of Christianity on my side, for he wished to make love - and emotion, not an idea - the basis of the good life." (FMW 146).

Emotion is not the enfant terrible. It is not of itself the source of all our troubles, something to be regrettably deplored for existing at all. On the contrary. Emotion is the fount of all we are and can be. It is thinking which is contributory and relatively inconsequential, a minor function of our existence, a truly unflowered plant in a garden full of the exotic blossoms and gloriously coloured shrubs of emotion. Far from being the Cinderella, emotion is not only the Prince, but the whole palace, court, celebrations, and romance as well. Emotion is life. Thought, if anything, is its hand maiden and general factotum. "The emotional life is not simply a part or an aspect of human life. It is not, as we so often think, subordinate, or subsidiary to the mind. It is the

core and essence of human life. The intellect arises out of it, is rooted in it, draws its nourishment and sustenance from it, and is the subordinate partner in the human economy. This is because the intellect is essentially instrumental. Thinking is not living. At its worst it is a substitute for living; at its best a means of living better. As we have seen, the emotional life is our life, both as awareness of the world and as action in the world, so far as it is lived for its own sake. Its value lies in itself, not in anything beyond it which it is a means of achieving." (RE 75).

"The first point that I want to insist on is the primary importance of feeling in human life. What we feel and how we feel is far more important than what we think and how we think. Feeling is the stuff of which our consciousness is made, the atmosphere in which all our thinking and all our conduct is bathed." (FMW 145/6). And again. "Scientific thought may give us power over the forces of nature, but it is feeling that determines whether we shall use that power for the increase of human happiness or for forging weapons of destruction to tear human happiness to pieces. Thought may construct the machinery of civilisation, but it is feeling that drives the machine; and the more powerful the machine is, the more dangerous it is if the feelings which drive it are at fault. Feeling is more important than thought." (FMW 146).

There is no proof of any of this; or perhaps it is truer to say that Macmurray does not give any. This is a good example of the different approaches of philosophers earlier mentioned. A formalist would demand, or self-discipline himself to produce, a book-length treatise to prove that this is so. But hard as it may be for us to

reorientate our conceiving, conditioned as we are and have been to Western thought forms and categories, the attempt to do so gradually brings us round to Macmurray's way of seeing this important matter, and to accept it.

Once again, as so often with Macmurray, the proof of the pudding is in the eating - or, more exactly, in the experiencing. as we know, from previous chapters in this thesis, Macmurray goes even further than this. Action is the prime thing for us as man. And is not action far closer allied to emotion than to thought? Let us continue then with emotion.

The Function of Emotion

What is emotion? As with most other questions of this kind, and there are millions of them, it cannot be answered essentially. By experience, by acquaintance, we know. By description we may know. But we can never know essentially. And in most cases we cannot visualise what an essential answer would be like in form, let alone know if a particular answer would satisfy.

But we can say, as with emotion at present, something about it which marks it off from all other things, and from all similar things, by and with which it might be confused.

What then is necessary to emotion? What are its main features and functions? Firstly; there is the range and breadth of feeling and feelings, from the most mind-bending and consuming to the hardly perceptible just on the threshold of consciousness. And not only is there a range of intensity but a spectrum of kind, from hate and revulsion to love and bliss; from ugliness to beauty; from pain and

distress to beatitude and serenity. All this is summed-up in the earlier quoted sentences from FMW 145, and others on that page.

Secondly; emotion is the motivator, or appears in consciousness to be so. The real, fundamental, cause of action is need. Emotion is, as it were, the essential accompaniment of this, the concomitant, obverse, side of the one coin. The body needs food, so the accompanying emotion, the motivator to get sustenance, is the feeling or emotion of hunger. Sex stirs within at puberty, and this arousal is accompanied by the emotions of love and tenderness - or of possessiveness, aggression, or jealousy. Emotions are the motivators. In more ways than one they 'move' us. "The intellect itself cannot be a source of action. All motives of action are necessarily emotional." (RE 45). "All the motives which govern and drive our lives are emotional. Love and hate, anger and fear, curiosity and joy are the springs of all that is most noble and most detestable in the history of men and nations." (FMW 146). "Now, every activity must have an adequate motive, and all motives are emotional. They belong to our feelings, not to our thoughts." (RE 23). "We can insist that all our activities, whether practical or theoretical, have their motives as well as their intentions, and are sustained by an emotional attitude." (PR 33). "Even his emotions, instead of disturbances to the placidity of thought, take their place as necessary motives which sustain his activities, including the activity of thinking." (PR 12) So it is not ideas which motivate and move, as much as this would appear to be the situation, but feelings. And feelings alone continue to keep us motivated and moving. Never ideas. It is a wonder we have never learned this, for it was known in Greek times. "Thinking, however, is non-causal; it 'moves

nothing' as Aristotle said." (SA 80). See also CH 208 for a similar version of this.

Thirdly, and very importantly, and almost totally unrealised or understood in our society, emotions, emotional life, is the source of all our valuing. Values, at root, are nothing more than the pattern, priority, or scale of our choices. And we are constantly choosing either anew or according to earlier - established value patterns.

But whilst choosing anew, now or at any time in the past, or in the future, values will always arise in the emotions, never in the intellect. "Value is emotionally apprehended." (FMW 50). "Feeling, when it is real feeling, is that in us which enables us to grasp the worth of things. Good and evil, beauty and ugliness, significance and value of all kinds are apprehended by feeling, not by thought. Without feeling we could know neither satisfaction nor dissatisfaction; nothing would be more worthwhile to us than anything else. In that case we could not choose to do one thing rather than another; and we could not even think, because we could not choose anything to think about, nor feel that one thought was more significant than another". (FMW 147). "Feeling, then, when referred to an object, is valuation; and the most general discrimination in valuation is the acceptance or rejection of a possibility in action." (SA 190).

Despite this you may still insist that your values are thought and not emotion determined. Macmurray has two answers to this. Firstly; this may seem to be so, but in fact you have taken over formally and mentally the values and judgements of society, or of a famous critic, without bothering to feel and evaluate for yourself.

"How many people would maintain stoutly that Milton's Paradise Lost is a very beautiful poem, who have never read it, or have been bored by it when they did!" (RE 37).

But, and here is the relevant point, the original valuation was, and could only have been, conceived in emotion. This divorce, by the way, of thought and emotion is another aspect of our lives, of which the foregoing is a good example, but only one of countless which could be given, of which Macmurray is highly critical.

Secondly; and similarly you may originally have created the valuation out of, as you must have done, your own emotional life and experience, but for convenience have consolidated and mentally encapsulated it into a 'thought' for ease of use and for psychic economy. "It often seems as though we use our intellectual judgment to decide that something is good or bad, even when our emotions disagree with our judgment.

But in that case what we are doing is to apply a standard of judgment which is itself derived from other emotions, perhaps our own earlier ones, perhaps those of other people, and very often the emotions of people long since dead which have become traditionally standardized. A judgment of value can never be intellectual in its origin, though of course the intellect can formulate as standards of judgment the types of action which have in the past been recognized emotionally as good or bad. (RE 36/7). "'But surely', you say, 'we can think that something is worth while doing and do it because we think it is worth while, even when our desires and feelings would prevent us from doing it.' Yes! we can very nearly do that, though even then it is only with the help of feeling - a feeling of self-respect or reverence for the ideas which guide our judgment." (FMW

147).

These then are some of the aspects and important functionings of emotion.

Reasons for Emotional Disparagement

If Macmurray is right, and I have no doubt he is, why have we this mistaken and disparaging view of emotion? Why do we so highly value thought and undervalue emotion? Before we proceed, however, a slight qualification must be made. Since Macmurray wrote and diagnosed all this thirty or more years ago, a seeming revaluation has occurred in this area of living. Emotional life is freer and there is a general atmosphere of released feeling. I say seeming, because it is much too early yet to assess the effect of so-called permissiveness. For one thing it may be only a nine days wonder. Whilst not perhaps so widespread, because of the lack of modern instant communication and publicity, and therefore of widespread human imitation and mass world-wide conformity, who can say that the Restoration or the Naughty Nineties were not periods of temporary permissiveness and freeing of the emotions?

And both soon faded. The releasing of emotions had no permanent effect. It only caused a reversion to set in. So whether the current spell of emotional freedom is a final and permanent reorganisation of the place and role of emotion in living cannot at this stage be discerned.

Two further points must be noted, but only very briefly in passing, important as they are. Firstly; is the present release of emotion as Macmurray would wish it to be? There can be only one

answer; certainly it is not, as we shall see when we come to the main reason for concerning ourselves with emotions at all - from Macmurray's point of view, that is.

But in justification or qualification it could be said that the current excesses accompanying the recognition and unfreezing of emotions should be seen as an expected reaction to the thought-dominated repression of the past. Once this initial phase has passed we may enter into a period not of reaction but of steady growth and progress towards a true, real, and satisfactory recognition, philosophy, and expression of the emotions. That is the state Macmurray would have us achieve and be.

Secondly; non-openly recognised as Macmurray may appear to be, how far has he contributed to the current freedom and permissiveness? Others may be more frank, direct, and seemingly influential, but are these not, D.H. Lawrence apart, of the second generation who originally learned from Macmurray, silent and unacknowledging as they remain about the source of their inspiration? And will Macmurray yet be influential enough to complete and eventually satisfactorily close the opening-up of emotional freedom he may have started, in the realisation of his vision of full and mature life? We have broken emotional rigidity. Are we capable of leading it forward into the richness it is possible to attain emotionally for ourselves and for all mankind?

After this temporary but necessary and relevant review of the contemporary emotional scene, let us return to our main theme and ask, even if it is not immediately the situation at the moment, why has emotion been, if not unrecognised, then relegated to the basement

and scrapheap of human concern and valuation?

There are several reasons, but all stem from the prime reason. And that is because, irrespective of what we believe about ourselves, our historical development, and our fundamental attitudes, we are still living out the Roman philosophy, especially the aspect of Stoicism. Essentially, we are certainly not Greeks. Nor with our slighting and perfunctory attitude to art would we ever think we were. At least we are honest about that.

But, equally, we are not Hebrews, with their single and unified view of the world and life; nor of their even greater successors the Christians - although this is something we do, quite mistakenly, whether morally, religiously, philosophically, or actively, pride ourselves on being. "To this day our culture has remained in the Roman mould. It is essentially imperialist; that is to say, its governing ideal is the maintenance and perfecting of an efficient organization of social life, depending on law, industrial management, and the maintenance of power for the defence of law and property. Art and religion have been harnessed to the service of this ideal of administrative and organizational efficiency and subordinated to it. We are proud of Shakespeare and our artistic achievements - especially when they are a century or more in the past - but we look upon the artist and his artistic temperament as queer and disorderly and a little contemptible. We are annoyed with anyone who dares to deny that we are Christians, but at the same time we are inclined to look upon the pious saint as a nuisance and a mollycoddle. Such is the immense power of persistence of the tradition of the Roman Empire! We are Romans at heart, though like the Romans we are willing to use art and religion so long as they agree to play the part of

menials to our ideal of social efficiency". (FMW 75/6).

The revealing and exposure of this error is very important, of course, and relevant for emotional life. For the essence of stoicism, adopted by the Romans from Asia Minor - from whence, we must remind ourselves, came St. Paul, another person very much of the same mould and temperament - is a denying and repressive philosophy. (See FMW 79/81 for a development of this).

It regards reason, better described and understood in this context as rational thought and thinking, as patently and absolutely good, whilst emotion is the source of evil and unhappiness, and must be denied. The agent of its mastery and overcoming is will. Seen as the agent of rationality. Without further elaboration it will be seen that this is identical, as enlarged upon earlier, to the traditional view of emotion in our culture. "The philosophy of the Roman tradition is Stoic. It insists on the distinction between reason and emotion. Its ideal makes reason dominant and emotion subservient, or even in itself the source of all evil; and therefore glorifies the rational life, the life of will, with its emphasis on law and principle, plan and policy. For this ideal of life emotion is the real enemy, though it may be used in the service of will and reason so far as it will submit and accept the yoke." (FMW 82).

But how do we come to hold this view? Surely not directly from the Romans who ruled, when seen in historical perspective, for only a relative short period - at least in Britain. Yet ironically Britain, in the Western and ex-Roman world, is one of the sternest promoters of emotional disparagement and suppression.

It comes through the Church. "With the break-up of the Roman Empire, the Church fell heir to the Roman spirit and the Roman authority and transformed the Roman Empire into a religious imperialism that aimed at and largely achieved a universal dominion over the spirit of civilized humanity. This religious imperialism, under the pseudonym of Christianity, gathered to itself and subjected to its purpose all the powers of the human spirit and made itself the arbiter of truth in theology, philosophy and science, of beauty in art, of social and individual right in morals, manners and politics, until it had blotted personal freedom from the earth, or bound it in chains." (RE 171/2).

Two major attempts have been made to throw off this tyranny of emotional suppression. But, unfortunately, one at least caused indirectly even greater suppression. St. Francis of Assisi probably sowed the seeds of the first attempt. He was, in his simplicity of heart and feeling, the obvious precursor of the Renaissance and the Reformation which together contributed to the attempted overthrow of both the Roman and Church rigidity. For a full summary of this see RE 172.

But although this freed art, it did not wholly free the other aspect of emotion, religion. Many branches of the new Protestantism, now able and allowed to read and interpret the Bible, especially the writings of St. Paul, directly for themselves, fell into a denial of emotion - except as expressed in emotive oratory - greater and more severe than that of the traditional and orthodox Church, now supposedly superseded. We have only to think of the Puritans to confirm this. (See FMW 83/7).

But there have been countless austere and emotion-denying sects - never failing of course to be extremely emotional themselves. And new ones are still appearing. Ironically, according to Macmurray, the only positive thing to come out of this first attempt to free the emotions, was an intellectual one - science. "The one creative achievement of the Reformation was science and the scientific spirit." (RE 172). (Also FMW 85/6).

The second revolt of the emotions, as Macmurray calls it, came with the Romantic Revival of the late 18th and early 19th centuries. "Though notably an artistic and literary phenomenon, it had profound effects in every department of European life and thought and worked a vast revolution in our tradition. In politics it produced Rousseau and the modern democratic state. In social life it produced the educational and humanitarian movements. In philosophy it produced Hegel and modern idealism. In science it produced Darwin and evolutionary biology. In religion it produced the higher criticism and undermined the authority of the Bible. In economics it produced Karl Marx and socialism. This complete transformation of life had its roots in an outburst of emotional spontaneity. Its high priest were the Romantic poets with their pure emotional lyricism." (FMW 87).

And this second revolt was mainly abortive too. It may have produced liberalism and political democracy as formal and outward exemplifications of freedom, and many other signs of emotional liberation. But whatever initial reality it may have genuinely enjoyed was short lived. Very soon it gave way to sentimentality, pretence, and hypocrisy. And if the last might sometimes seem to be

too strong a term, then call it self-deception. Rome reasserted itself, but cunningly returned in a disguised, but no less, effective, form. "It granted the demands of emotion in theory and then proceeded to make its concessions ineffective in practice. And in doing this it introduced a pretence into the life of Europe which has poisoned it to this day. Our emotional life was set free in word, but not in fact. This is the origin of sentimentality. The second revolt of the Greek-Christian elements against the dominance of the Roman sentimentalized the moral and social life of Europe." (FMW 88).

As evidence of this Macmurray gives the following as examples. Under democratic rule we pretend that we govern ourselves. The whole panoply of political parties, voting, free speech, and secret ballot is established but virtually we are still governed by the few who get what they have already determined. Who the few are Macmurray does not say. At the same time he suggests, perhaps rather incongruously, that what finally happens is determined by 'rational necessity'. (See FMW 88/9).

Another big area of sentimentality and pretence is that of romantic love. In the 19th century especially the outward expression of the freedom to love between two people was carefully guarded by the hypocrisy of Mrs Grundy. Sentimentalised love and salvation for our fellow men saw to it that they were not loved when it came to the needs of toil, industry, and proper housing.

Love of colonial peoples and their 'Christian and cultural advancement' was the pretence of nations bent on exploiting such peoples and the raw materials and products of their lands. (See FMW

88/9).

And if Macmurray were writing today he would not lack for examples. He would be able to quote the hypocrisy of 'caring', where thousands of old people, deserted by their materialistic and mammonistic nucleated family, are living in loneliness, or been hived off into institutions. Even Victorians did not do this. 'Care' for youth is belied by the widespread and profitable drug trade. And there is the pretence of 'caring' for one's children whilst they are emotionally, if not materially, neglected while mothers needlessly - by any emotionally mature standards - go to work. Dozens of other examples could be given. We sentimentalise over one murder, whilst 6000 people are being slaughtered on the roads annually.

A little optimistically Macmurray, writing in the thirties of course, felt that a new revolt was afoot. "There is an equally marked tendency towards a new revolt of the Greek and Christian tradition. Europe seems to be gathering her forces together for a third great attack on rationalism, for another bid for real freedom, for another reassertion of emotional reality against organization and efficiency. If history is any guide to prophecy we may expect that this tendency will grow and prevail; and we may expect also that this time its victory will be a final one. It will be, in any case, another battle for freedom; and at least for the Greek and the Christian elements in our tradition freedom is the very reality of life." (FMW 92).

But apart from permissiveness, discussed here earlier, and which so far has produced licence rather than freedom, there seems to be no evidence of this yet, especially as man at this time seems totally absorbed by intellect, science, and technology, materialism and

economics, and I.Qism to the neglect of all the aspects of life, emotion, and real religion Macmurray has so strongly urged us to heed.

As I said earlier, further examples of why we have this disparaging attitude to emotions, is bound up with, and stems from this prime, basic, reason. We are, at heart and by tradition, Romans and Stoics. But to mention two others briefly.

Firstly; we are afraid of emotional life; at least beyond a certain point. And this point has a very low threshold. We may envisage the richness of a full emotional life, but we envisage also the pains, which are a possible, if not inevitable, accompaniment. Therefore we shy off such a life, preferring the narrow path of limited feeling for fear of pain. "The reason why emotional life is so undeveloped, is that we habitually suppress a great deal of our sensitiveness and train our children from their earliest years to suppress much of their own. It might seem strange that we should cripple ourselves so heavily in this way. But there is a simple reason for it which I want to mention in closing. We are afraid of what would be revealed to us if we did not. In imagination we feel sure that it would be lovely to live with a full awareness of the world. But in practice sensitiveness hurts." (RE 46. There is more of this essential reading on this and the next page.). "On the whole we seem to have chosen to seek the absence of pain, and as a result we have produced stagnation and crudity." (RE 47).

Secondly; the last point concerned pain; this one concerns an allied feeling, disillusionment. If we would learn or seek to feel really, to feel genuinely and appropriately, we must shed our

illusions. Most people, endorsing the aforementioned analysis and recognition of sentimentality and pretence, would prefer to keep their illusions, especially the illusion they have of themselves.

"The real struggle centres in the emotional field, because reason is the impulse to overcome bias and prejudice in our own favour, and to allow our feelings and desires to be fashioned by things outside us, often by things over which we have no control. The effort to achieve this can rarely be pleasant or flattering to our self-esteem. Our natural tendency is to feel and to believe in the way that satisfies our impulses. We all like to feel that we are the central figure in the picture, and that our own fate ought to be different from that of everybody else. We feel that life should make an exception in our favour." (RE 22/3).

So these are Macmurray's main views as to why emotions are, mistakenly, regarded so disparagingly in our culture.

Reason in the Emotions

So far, we have dealt with one side of Macmurray's analysis and teaching concerning the emotions. The emotions must be openly recognised, accepted, given their place, seen as the major and the most important part of our lives; and at the same time seeing thought and intellect in their proper place, which is one of mere instrumentality and subordination to the emotions. This is the situation. We merely do not see it as such. Any wonder then that our living, both collectively and individually, is so awry, so bankrupt, so groping, so dangerously and destructively near the abyss, so much the cause of pain and suffering both within our own

selves and in our relationships. No wonder our values are unbelievably puerile, stunted, stupid, unsatisfactory and unsatisfying. No wonder we live from one crisis to another, socially and personally. Failure to recognise emotion, and persisting in the promotion of intellect, is a root cause of our problems.

But it is not the only one. To recognise emotion and establish it as the prime realm of our being and consciousness is vital. But alone it is not enough. We could still be in serious trouble. What then is needed? We must bring reason into the emotional life.

Now Macmurray admits the difficulty of even believing this, let alone accepting and executing it. We are so used, here again by our long tradition and by conditioning, to regard reason as applicable only to thinking and the intellect that to associate it with the emotions seems absurd. "Reason means to us thinking and planning, scheming and calculating. It carries our thoughts to science and philosophy, to the counting-house or the battle-field, but not to music and laughter and love. It does not make us think of religion or loyalty or beauty, but rather of the state of tension which knits our brows when we apply our minds to some knotty problem or devise schemes to cope with a difficult situation. We associate reason with a state of mind which is cold, detached and unemotional. When our emotions are stirred we feel that reason is left behind and we enter another world - more colourful, more full of warmth and delight, but also more dangerous." (RE 15/6).

We might even go so far as to hold the view that "reason is just thinking; that emotion is just feeling; and that these two aspects of our lives are in the eternal nature of things distinct and opposite; very apt to come into conflict and requiring to be kept sternly

apart." (RE 16). Or that, "Emotion belongs to the animal nature in us, and reason to the divine; that our emotions are unruly and fleshy, the source of evil and disaster, while reason belongs to the divine essence of the thinking mind which raises us above the level of the brutes into communion with the eternal." (RE 16).

But Macmurray will have none of this. Reason can, and must be, as much a part of our emotional life as it is of our intellectual. "Rationality is not a peculiar characteristic of the intellect. It is equally characteristic of the emotional life. We can put this in terms of the expressions of personality by saying that art and religion are just as rational as science or philosophy." (IU 131).

What is reason or rationality? We are inclined to think of reason as something in ourselves; something to do with the structure of our mind; something we do or do not possess, like a gift or talent, and which by nature some people have more of it than do others. We regard it on a par with a good memory or a patient nature; or even an innate logicity.

Macmurray reminds us firmly that it is nothing of the sort. And he illustrates this by reference to the reasoning process we do understand, namely thinking. He says, "The rationality of thought does not lie in the thought itself, as a quality of it, but depends upon its reference to the external world as known in immediate experience." (IU 131). How then can thoughts be either "true or false? About that we have no difficulty. Yet if we think carefully, we shall realise that there is no special difference between feelings and thoughts in this respect. Our thoughts are just what we think. We just think them, and they are what they are. How then can they be

either true or false? The answer is that their truth or falsity does not lie in them but in a relation between them and the things to which they refer" (RE 24). "What makes a thought rational or logical is the purpose which governs it - the purpose of expressing symbolically some aspect of the world we know." (IU 131/2).

Elsewhere he says, "Reason is the capacity to behave in terms of the nature of the object, that is to say, to behave objectively". (RE 19). "Reason is the capacity to behave consciously in terms of the nature of what is not ourselves." (RE 19).

So reason is the capacity to live in terms of what is not ourselves. To live in terms of reality. And this applies as much to our feeling life as to our thinking. "Our emotions have the same characteristic of referring to that which is recognized as not ourselves. That they are often subjective is beyond doubt; but then, so are our thoughts. We recognize that thought may be false as well as true and that only when it is true is it appropriately related to the world to which it refers. Equally we recognize that our feelings and emotions refer to real things and that they may be appropriate or inappropriate to the situation to which they refer. I may feel angry with someone and recognize at the same time that I have no reason to feel angry. In that case I recognize that my anger is unreasonable. In recognizing that, I recognize that my emotions are capable of exhibiting the quality of reason, that they may or may not fit the objective world to which they consciously refer." (IU 132). "Why should our feelings be in any different case? It is true that they are felt and that they are what they are felt to be, just like our thoughts. But they also refer to things outside us. If I am angry I am angry at something or somebody, though I may not always be able to

say precisely what it is..... Since our feelings, then, refer to what is outside them, to some object about which they are felt, why should they not refer rightly or wrongly to their object, just like thoughts?" (RE 24/5). Examples of reason and unreason are given in RE pp. 20/1 and 27/8.

One problem of recognising reason, or lack of it, in our feelings is that, unlike in our thinking where at least we do sometimes recognise that it can be right or wrong, good or bad - we are inclined to believe that with emotions we just feel something or we do not. Feeling is regarded as set and homogenous. It is or it is not. "What can it mean, then, to distinguish between rational and irrational feelings? We are in the habit of saying that our feelings are just felt. They can't be either true or false; they just are what they are. Our thoughts, on the other hand, can be true or false. About that we have no difficulty. Yet, if we think carefully, we shall realize that there is no special difference between feelings and thoughts in this respect." (RE 24). "... We are very apt to take the view that one feels what one feels, and that's all there is about it. If one is jealous, for instance, one is just jealous, and it can't be helped. One must just make the best one can of the situation. Now that isn't so. There is in the emotional life itself a capacity for growth and development." (RE 35).

Thus, as we have already seen, if we would progress in our emotional life we must alter the way we see feeling, and realise its capacity for intentional change and growth.

Emotional Unreason

Where and how are we irrational, or non-rational, in our feelings? Where, in particular, are we shortfalling in our exercise and practice of emotional reason?

There are four ways. We have feelings we ought not to feel. We fail to feel when we ought to be feeling something. We mistake our feelings. And we suppress our feelings. Some of these, especially the first and third, may slightly overlap, or be confused in recognition. All illustrate, of course, Macmurray's basic principle that our feelings can be unreal, whereas they ought always to be real.

An example of the first, is the person who is proud of having done something of which he ought to be ashamed. The proud and cynical property dealer who boasts he has made a slick profit by harassing old, long-standing, tenants until they were forced to leave what had been their home for forty years. Most 'big deals' illustrate having feelings which ought not to be felt. Being sorry for, or even exulting in, the dodging abroad of crooks, cunningly escaping the law e.g. the Great Train robber. Wallowing in sentimental, escapist, trash e.g. soap operas on television.

Of the second, failing to feel, a good example of this is the Good Samaritan, or rather of those who passed by. How often do we fail to feel compassion and sympathy with a person or cause because they, or it, are outside of our group, or nation, or sphere of our interest?

On mistaken feelings; we express criticism or feel hostility, often self-rightously, when all the time our real feeling is that of jealousy. We are irritable or angry with somebody at breakfast when we feel rough after a bad night.

Suppressed feelings are illustrated by unconscious hypocrisy as is the case when "the man whose passion for power takes the form of unselfishness and benevolence. it is so easy to feel that you are acting out of pure unselfish desire for another person's good, when you really are satisfying an unconscious passion for ordering about." (FMW 150).

All the above are discussed in FMW 145/154. Macmurray sums-up emotional unreason as follows, "Perhaps these examples are sufficient to make the main point clear. When we feel in an unreal way, our feelings are turned in upon themselves. We enjoy or dislike our feelings, not the object or person who arouses them in us. When we feel in a real way, it is the object or person that we realize and appreciate. So I repeat - feeling is unreal when it is divorced from the world outside us and turned in upon itself." (FMW 153).

Signs of Emotional Reason

By now we should have gathered and understood what the features of unreason, and of reason, in emotional living are. But very briefly let us list a few of the signs of the emotionally mature, or emotionally rational, person.

He will obviously be objective; that is, not be subjective and see and feel everything in terms of himself or of his in-groups. He will be liberated, have freedom and creativity of person, especially in himself and in his relationships i.e. not merely be creative in an artistic sense. Openness will be a feature, with no energy being wasted on suppression, or on the need to hide anything. He will be free of hang-ups, obsessions, chips on shoulder, addictions, compulsions, and undue prejudices. Wholeness will be a feature, and even if an outsider cannot observe this, he will feel it within himself. If you are not aware of wholeness, but feel divided or restrained or inhibited, you have not yet achieved emotional reason.

The last point to be mentioned, amongst many which could be given, is that the emotionally mature person will be empirical in all things. He will not be dogmatic. But empiricism is not to be confused with temporising, with sitting on the fence, with expediency. Empiricism is not a disguise for opportunism and absence of firm values, feelings, and right action. These the emotionally mature person will always manifest. Macmurray gives his portrait of the emotionally reasonable and satisfactory person in FMW 155/166.

Emotional Training and Education

Emotional training, as with all training, is bound up with discipline. "... the training of the emotions is a disciplining of the instinctive reactions of the human animal." (RE 68). But as Macmurray instantly recognizes the key word is discipline, or rather what we mean by it.

There are two forms of discipline - repression and imposed, and, discovered and self-imposed. To illustrate the difference Macmurray examples discipline of thought. The Medieval world imposed ideas. Men were told what the truth was, and everybody was disciplined to think this way. With the coming of the modern world this no longer obtained. Thought was freed.

But, and here is the vital and relevant point, this did not mean, or result in, indiscipline. On the contrary; greater self-discipline had and has to be imposed to arrive at any truth at all. Science, and the self-discipline, thought-wise, of the scientist, is the prime example of this. For a full account of this see RE 68/9. All would agree that the first, the Medieval way, is really a repression of thought. In fact, it destroys real thinking, which is to seen only in the second way, that of the modern world." The result is a multiplicity of theories and conclusions, a continuous struggle between rival thinkers, a very Babel of intellectual strife. Yet we all agree that such freedom is the very life-blood of thought; and in theory, at least, we stand for the liberty of the individual to think for himself." (RE 68/9).

In the emotional field "The discipline of authority aims at securing the repression of types of emotion that are considered improper, and fostering emotional tendencies that are laudable and good." (RE 69). Such discipline is possible; and its effects and advantages are uniformity. Everybody knows where they stand, what they must feel, how they must react, how they must relate. It makes for "frictionless social relationships; for the maintaining of tradition. But it succeeds only by destroying the free spontaneity of emotional life." (RE 69)

But real, permanent, worthwhile discipline of emotions is of the other kind, equivalent to the second kind of thought. "Against this dogmatic authority we must set our faith in the freedom of the individual to feel for himself, to develop his own emotional gifts and graces, and to reach out towards the discovery of the value of life, not through the acceptance of standards of good feeling, nor through the imposition of intellectual conceptions of goodness upon his emotional life, but through the exercise of his own emotional capacities. That this involves discipline is certain; but it is a discipline of a very different kind. It is the discipline which comes through the continuous effort to discover the real values in life for oneself" (RE 69).

Emotional training and education therefore must be of a kind which teaches people to feel for themselves. To stress the point, but with much greater humility than is necessary I feel, Macmurray goes on to say, "We have to realize how feeble and ineffective our own emotional life is, and to realize that for that very reason our

notions of what is good feeling and what is not are also feeble and probably false. Then we shall perhaps begin to discover what we can do to develop in children the rich capacity for a spontaneous emotional life which has been so stunted in ourselves." (RE 70). Maybe this was true fifty years ago. And perhaps due to Macmurray's training, howbeit indirectly, I do not feel that my emotional life is poor, barren, and inadequate. However; I do of course agree with the empirical and open approach, with living discovery and illumination, as opposed to imposition and authority, as the right way for the training of the emotions.

Having reached this point, what, according to Macmurray, must be the features and the guide-lines - even if not imposed - of this emotional training? What are the focal points, the relevant areas, for such education? There are two.

The first, is found in the senses. "The fundamental element in the development of the emotional life is the training of the capacity to live in the senses, to become more and more delicately and completely aware of the world around us, because it is a good half of the meaning of life to be so." (RE 44). This is the area of our living and experiencing where emotional training must begin. "We shall then have to notice that the emotional life is inherently sensuous, and that the training of emotion is primarily an education of the senses", (RE 70). It could not be stated more directly than that.

However, Macmurray does appreciate the difficulty of terminology (see RE 37/9), which we cannot go into here. Needless to say, he does not mean crude sensuality but a "refined sensuality" - a phrase which Macmurray laudatorily quotes from William Blake (see RE 71), -

and an awareness which becomes more complex, rich, and satisfying as we learn to grow into it. "Sensibility is an integral part of human nature, and must be developed for its own sake. We have to train children to make their sensuous life rich and fine; to see for the sake of seeing, to hear for the sake of hearing, to smell and taste and touch for the joy of living in and through the fundamental capacities of apprehension with which we are endowed." (RE 71). And again. "What makes us afraid of the manifestations of sensuous life is its crudeness and vulgarity; and that is merely the mark of its primitive, undeveloped nature." (RE 71, and what follows to the middle of 72).

In this teaching and training two things must be avoided. We must honestly educate our sensual awareness for its own sake. We must not have half an eye on its pragmatic and practical benefits e.g. scientific observation, or functionalism. "As we have seen, the emotional life is our life, both as awareness of the world and as action in the world, so far as it is lived for its own sake. Its value lies in itself, not in anything beyond it which it is a means of achieving. Now, any education which is fully conscious of its function must refuse to treat human life as a means to an end. It must insist that its sole duty is to develop the inherent capacity for a fully human life. All true education is education in living." (RE 75/6). "What is of fundamental importance to keep in the centre of our consciousness is that the education of the emotional life, whether on the side of sensuous apprehension or of activities of expression, must have no ulterior or utilitarian motive. It is an education in spontaneity, and therefore both the awareness and the

activity which it seeks to refine and cultivate are ends in themselves. We are seeking in this field to make children exquisitely aware of the world in which they live, purely for its own sake, because this constitutes an increase in the quality of life in them. We are seeking to develop a fineness of expressive activity because it is good in itself, not in any sense because of what may be achieved through it." (RE 73/4).

Secondly; there must be nothing of the intellect about it. Real emotional education is embodied in, and arises out of, art; art widely interpreted of course, and not limited to the productions of great and natural artists. But too much art teaching in our schools is taken up with talking about, listening, seeing, reading, and criticising works of art already existent instead of art experiencing and producing. "... what is wrong with such aesthetic education as is normally included in the ordinary school curriculum is that it turns education in art into an intellectual or scientific activity, and becomes not a training in artistry but a training of the mind in the analysis and understanding of the artistry of others." (RE 74).

This leads on to Macmurray's second vital element in emotional training. The first was the training and growth of sense experience. The second is spontaneous expression.

The essence of human life, as we have discussed before, is action not thought, intellect, or reflection. Therefore to be complete, to complete itself, the sharpening of sensuous experience achieved in the earlier stages of emotional training, must complete and fulfil itself - or rather the human being as the experiencer and promoter of emotions must fulfil himself in action. "The reason is that awareness is directly related to action and that our modes of

awareness determine our modes of action. If we limit awareness so that it merely feeds the intellect with the material for thought, our actions will be intellectually determined. They will be mechanical, planned, thought-out. Our sensitiveness is being limited to a part of ourselves. - the brain in particular - and, therefore, we will act with only part of ourselves, at least so far as our actions are consciously and rationally determined. If, on the other hand, we live in awareness, seeking the full development of our sensibility to the world, we shall soak ourselves in the life of the world around us; with the result that we shall act with the whole of ourselves." (RE 44).

"The second field, therefore, in the education of the emotional life is the field of spontaneous expression". (RE 72). These are activities which are performed for their own sake, and not for any end beyond. They are not performed for ulterior motives. We call this - joy of expression, and it naturally manifests itself in dance, song, music, and love. Indeed in anything done not by decision or reflection, but by instant emotion. And again, the purpose of emotional education is to refine not to thwart, inhibit, or destroy, which is what so much of our education does. In how many people has the joy and spontaneity been destroyed by so-called education? Macmurray's ideas seem to resemble those practised by A.S. Neil at "Summerhill", and by Homer Lane, and it is strange that Macmurray does not mention these as evidence of the propitiousness of such education.

For convenience Macmurray has discussed these two aspects of emotional training separately, but in fact they are, and must be seen

as, counterparts and as mutually essential. "Other things being equal, fineness of expression and fineness of sensory discrimination go hand in hand, so that there are not two separate trainings requisite, but only one, in which the development of fine sensory discrimination is achieved through the effort to express what is sensuously apprehended; and the effort to develop the sensory discrimination is undertaken through the effort to express it in activity of some kind." (RE 73).

How exactly, and in detail, is this training to be done? On this question Macmurray opts out. "It is not my part to determine the methods through which this is to be done. Those whose business it is to experiment with teaching methods will be able to devise such methods without much difficulty, provided they are clear in their minds what it is that they wish to develop." (RE 73). As said, a couple of paragraphs back, perhaps Neil's "Summerhill" would provide a good model for Macmurray's emotional training ideas.

What of the failure to educate? What will be, or is, the effect of our obsession for education of the intellect, with its constant selection of intelligent students for higher education, and for lower gradings right down the scale, with no thought for emotional and value considerations unless these impede, disturb, or distort the workings of, and the insatiable appetite for, the ubiquitous intelligence?

The effects are twofold. Firstly; obsession with power. Secondly; the destruction of wholeness. Regarding the first, "but the effect of concentrating upon the education of the intellect to the exclusion of the education of the emotional life is precisely to frustrate this purpose i.e. education for living. Because the

intellect is concerned with the means of living, the exclusive concentration upon its training, and the relegation of the emotional life to a subordinate position, can only result in making our pupils capable of determining the means to human life and very little of living it. It will inevitably create an instrumental conception of life, in which all human activity will be valued as a means to an end, never for itself. When it is the persistent and universal tendency in any society to concentrate upon the intellect and its training, the result will be a society which amasses power, and with power the means to the good life, but which has no correspondingly developed capacity for living the good life for which it has amassed the means. This is, to my mind, very obviously the state in which we now find ourselves. We have immense power, and immense resources; we worship efficiency and success; and we do not know how to live finally. I should trace this condition of affairs almost wholly to our failure to educate our emotional life." (RE 76). Who would deny that that does not say it all?

As for the second, the loss of wholeness, Macmurray says, "The intellect, because it is instrumental, can only deal with life piecemeal. It must divide and it must abstract. It is in the emotional life that the unity of personality, both its individual and its social unity, is realized and maintained. It is in emotional activity that this unity is expressed. Emotion is the unifying factor in life. The failure to develop the emotional life will therefore result in abstraction and division; in a failure to see life steadily and as a whole. When the intellect takes charge, the inevitable result is specialization, the erection of particular

aspects of human activity into complete conceptions of life, the substitution of the part for the whole. A practical disintegration of life, a disjointedness in conception and in practice is the consequence. Both the individual and society will be infected with the narrow vision of the specialist, which makes balance and rhythm and wholeness unrealizable and even inconceivable. Here again our own failure to educate the emotional life shows itself in the competition of desires within us which we cannot coordinate; and in the competition of rival claims and interests, factions and nations, within our society. Though circumstances have forced upon us the intellectual realization of the necessity for achieving unity and wholeness in the social life, national and international, we find ourselves incapable of achieving the unity which we so urgently and consciously need." (RE 77).

Earlier I mentioned wholeness as a sign of emotional reason and maturity. The above paragraph obviously endorses what was said there. Everywhere we look, from international to personal relations, from those in society who are apparently sane and normal to those obviously adversely affected by drugs, addictions, alcoholism, mental illness, relational problems, and numerous other anti-social tendencies, evidence is there for all to see - who will see.

Appraisement (1)

1) It must be mentioned, and the blame cannot be put at the door of Macmurray, although it does interfere with the full appreciation, understanding, and a right evaluation of his work, that despite modern psychology having existed for at least ninety years

there is an unbelievable imprecision about its terminology and the very loose usage thereof. Reason is but one example of this. Sometimes it seems to mean an inbuilt mental structure within each and every human mind; sometimes it is mere ratiocination; at another time it is nothing of itself, but the process or attitude of seeing all things external to ourselves as they really are and not as we would wish them to be.

Feeling is another variable term. Macmurray would have done a great service if he had attempted, as perhaps he might have done as a philosopher, to stabilize such terms and give them a single meaning, at least within his own works.

2) Following, and to illustrate especially the last point, mention must be made of thinking. In life and everyday use, thinking is, as we all recognise, utterly chaotic. Thinking may be used to indicate anything going on in our heads to the most precise and exact form of logic, reasoning, and ratiocination. And of course, every other type of mental activity between these extremes.

But, and this particularly applies as a comment upon Macmurray, that whilst he mainly uses and understands thinking not in the very limited sense of ratiocination, nor in the sense of everything going on in our heads, but in a sort of inbetween sense, he seems always to contrast it with emotion and feeling. Common and universal as this analysis may be it seems to me to be fundamentally wrong. Save where thought is pure ratiocination and exercised upon a totally objective matter, as say in mathematics, it must always contain an element of emotion, however small.

And, needless to say, most of our thinking contains, even if unknown to ourselves, or even strenuously denied by us, a large

proportion of emotion. And the further we move from thinking about mathematical and scientific to political, social, religious, and moral matters the more emotion it contains. For a fuller account of this see my "Practical Philosophy" (Gateway 1982). This, i.e. the separation of thought and emotion, is a very common error; but once made - as Macmurray undoubtedly makes it - how far does it, being erroneous, vitiate all the subsequent contentions based upon it?

(3) It seems to me that a very big problem surrounds Macmurray's idea of free thinking and free feeling. Let me say at once that of course they are good, essential and right. Only in this free situation can we be, or rather have an opportunity of becoming, fully human, fully personal, and what it is in us to become.

But the situation is not as simple as Macmurray makes out. To illustrate again from thinking. The Renaissance did free thought, and enable science as its foremost example, to be created. But we did not, as a result, all become scientists each discovering and thinking out the truth for himself. Far from it. Even today, when education is widespread, knowledge is discovered by about one thinker in a million, whilst the other 999,999 of us accept what the one discoverer says. And he says this in a similar, if not identical, way to the Medievals. Most of us have no idea how we could ever discover anything for ourselves.

About other things, such as politics, morals, and education, we do 'choose', but only within a very narrow band; and no ideas of this kind have been discovered for ourselves.

The upshot of this is twofold. One; if left to our own devices could we discover real feelings and values without being told what

these are, or at least what the alternatives are, and what we should be looking for? I doubt it. Secondly; and here I think Macmurray might - I do not want to be dogmatic about this as the whole question deserves a treatise to itself - have made a mistake in his analogy. Thought can discover the facts and the truth about the world. For example, it can discern that water is H₂O. That is how it is out there; and the same with millions of other facts. But are values and right emotional responses anywhere, whether external or internal to ourselves, and waiting to be discovered? I very much doubt it.

They are obviously different from material facts, which is freely admitted, but are they not also of a different kind and order, such that they are, and cannot be, discovered just by the exercise in freedom, of anybody's search for emotional truth? It may be that in real freedom, and with the right intent (itself a value), we can grow into right emotional and value attitudes, although this might be doubted. But that they already exist and are waiting only to be discovered seems to me improbable.

Is Macmurray, unconsciously, merely reverting to the old Greek value trilogy of Goodness, Beauty, and Truth - with their perfect 'forms' laid-up in heaven, waiting only to be discovered and recognised?

4) Bearing in mind Macmurray's wide-ranging ideas on religion and psychology, nothing is more surprising - and this is no sudden surprise for me; I have been baffled by it for several decades - than Macmurray's main, indeed almost only, discernment regarding emotional education and training.

He advises, you will remember, the sharpening of our sensuous experience, and the expression of this as, and in, art - very widely

understood, of course. Admittedly this is a very essential and wise advice. It will help to counter balance excessive intellectualism. But is emotion no more than this? And can other aspects be left to themselves provided this one step is adequately and satisfactorily taken? One would think not.

A very major part of emotional life, as Macmurray would be the first to admit, concerns relationships and relating. And what of religion? Has he not said, "The roots of religion are in the emotional life". (FMW 57). Surely then it is not illogical to conclude the converse, namely that our emotional life is grounded in religion? What training has Macmurray offered for this vital field?

And ignoring whether we are sensuous and need to emotionally express ourselves, what of the whole vast area and experience - and problems - of our own insides, our inner private life and feelings? Surely both relational and inner training, properly devised, would be the biggest step in our society which we could make towards providing satisfactory, happy, and unharming persons.

Whilst, as we have seen, Macmurray opted out of giving advice in training details, he could have indicated, more than he has done, the broad conspectus necessary for full emotional growth and development. His pointers seem much too narrow, important as they admittedly are.

5) Teachers are a popular target for emotional immaturity and Macmurray does not fail to add his slap. "One of the first results of such a fundamental change of attitude would be, I doubt not, that we should recognize that it is as ridiculous to put the emotional training of children in the hands of teachers whose emotional life is of a low grade or poorly developed, as it is to commit their

intellectual education to teachers who are intellectually unintelligent and stupid." (RE 70). But it should be recognised - and I am a little sorry that Macmurray does not do this - that many more people, especially in these days of the mass media and communications, are influencing children's and adult's emotional life, and to a far greater degree than teachers are.

Journalists, writers, pop stars, politicians, entertainers, exhibitionists of all kinds, criminals, so-called artists, and parents immediately come to mind. Of course we want mature teachers. But more than this we want mature and emotionally developed people, with satisfactory values, in influential and responsible positions of all kinds, and at all levels. And these we are certainly not getting. It is these who are creating the social setting and ethos; and it is they who are to blame, if anybody, for failing to become emotionally mature themselves, and induce society at large so to become.

6) One last comment. On page 88 of FMW. Macmurray; as we have seen here earlier, gives his views on pretence, hypocrisy, and sentimentality. One major point here was our pretence concerning democracy. Whilst accepting that democracy, as we practice it, is not the pure, chaste, and perfect god we so complacently and self-satisfyingly pride ourselves on it being, it does not, nevertheless seem to justify quite the cynicism and scorn Macmurray seems to heap upon it.

We all ought to see, which few do, that democracy is not complete, finished, and satisfactory yet. It is still rather limited, blunt, and unrefined. Moreover, it has yet to move out into many more areas of our living. But in decrying it, in the way

Macmurray does, democrat as he is, seems to be over-stepping the boundary of emotional reason.

End of appraisalment (1)

Fear

A Major Concern

Whilst Macmurray never devotes a whole chapter to fear, reference to it occurs frequently throughout his works, often covering many consecutive pages - sufficient indication that fear is an important thing in Macmurray's thought. Why this is so is not easy to discern. It may be an objectively recognised and relevant theme of his. But one feels that it is rather more than this. Yet, on the other hand, it does not amount to obsession or eccentricity. Perhaps, as with all writers and thinkers, what they choose to concern themselves with is deeply rooted, and often obscure. Even they may not be aware of their own psychological source or motive.

Fear for Macmurray is a wholly bad thing, and something to be removed or overcome. "Fear is the disease, the one root-disease, of human life" (FMW 61).

Nowhere does Macmurray appear to appreciate its value as a necessary factor in human survival. When he does distinguish between animal and human fear this is not, as we shall see, a distinction between essential and inessential fear, but of kind and origin. He does not recognise the place, let alone the necessity, of animal fear in man; or, if he does, never refers to it. Yet one feels that he is

not automatically assuming this and therefore finds it not worth mentioning. Man presumably has no animal fear.

Be that as it may, what is the difference between:-

Animal and Human Fear

Animal fear is instinctive, and is felt instantly and immediately, and is only felt in response to physical threat and danger. It occurs solely for survival, and produces the effect of flight or petrification. It is purely biological and natural; a stimulus-response situation. When the danger is over fear passes and attention focused upon the next current biological need and activity. ".... animal fear is confined to the perception of the immediate here and now. The immediate recognition of a present danger arouses the instinct of fear and produces the activity, or the paralysis of activity, which is naturally adapted to meet the needs of self-preservation. (CS 45). "Animal fear comes and goes with the appearance and disappearance of immediate danger." (CS 46).

Human fear is totally different, both in origin and response. Human beings have much wider and far-ranging mental faculties, which include a much fuller awareness, self-consciousness, imagination, reasoning, wide knowledge, foresight, together with the capacity to be 'living now' in the past, present, and future. Because of this human fear does not appear only at times of immediate physical danger, but - because of the range and scope of both visual and emotional, mental life - pervades the human consciousness, sometimes to the extent of excluding all other thoughts and emotions. No threat of any perceptible or tangible kind is, or need be, present.

"But with the appearance of reason this limitation to the immediate present is broken. Consciousness becomes prophetic, and knowledge gains capacity to see past, present, and future at once. This has an immediate effect upon the instinctive emotions. They appear in consciousness as determinants of action not merely in relation to the immediate situation, but in reference to the whole range of possible situations which foresight reveals. Fear, therefore, in human consciousness, is not an instinctive emotion which appears with the immediate threat of danger, but a pervasive attitude, referring to the whole range of possible danger which the foresight of rational knowledge reveals to consciousness." (CS 45/6). "Human fear is a pervasive element in all human consciousness, because it is the response of consciousness to the recognition of the pervasiveness of danger to the self in all situations, or in the nature of life as a whole" (CS 46). "The fear which reason produces is inherent in human life. Human activity is action in the light of knowledge, and it is this knowledge that is the source of human fear." (CS 47). See also CS 98/9.

The Effects of Human Fear

Human fear does psychologically and socially, as it were, all the things animal fear does physically and biologically. It either thwarts action, or causes running away. And essentially, in human terms, this means a refusal to cooperate, commune, or participate with, one's fellows. It means a defensive attitude to life and to people, a withdrawal; it means isolation, and is the cause of individualism and egocentricity. As we saw earlier, the great human

thing for Macmurray is communion; union and harmony with, and throughout, all humanity. "Life is, in its nature, spontaneous activity. To be alive is to express, in an unembarrassed commerce with the world outside us, the life that is in us in action. Fear freezes the spontaneity of life. The more fear there is in us, the less alive we are. Fear accomplishes this destruction of life by turning us in upon ourselves and so isolating us from the outside world. That sense of individual isolation which is so common in the modern world, which is often called 'individualism', is one of the inevitable expressions of fear. I should like to call it 'egocentricity'. Selfishness and self-consciousness are expressions of the same thing. A life which is fear-determined is a life which is fundamentally on the defensive. It is permeated by the feeling of being alone in an hostile world; with the result that all its energies are directed towards building up a defence - what the psychologists nowadays call a system of defence-mechanisms - against the world. In this condition our heart's demand is for security, for protection, for some kind of salvation from the hostility of the world." (FMW 59). "The root problem of human action lies here. Fear is unlike all other emotions because it is negative. It is not a positive motive for action, but a motive for the inhibition of action. The permanent pervasion of consciousness by fear signifies the continuous presence of an impulse to refrain from action and to suppress it." (CS 46).

Fear also destroys freedom. We cannot be free if we are in the grip of so strong an emotion, requiring and compelling us to be both conscious of only one thing and to escape from one thing. "... fear inhibits action and destroys freedom." (PR 159) It is easy to see,

therefore, why Macmurray regards fear as mankind's major self-inflicted enemy, and why we must be rid of it at all costs.

Fear and Death

Macmurray sees death involved in this in two ways. Firstly; the prime fear is that of death. Macmurray, if we ferret out his meaning aright, seems not to mean that we are afraid of dying itself, but that death is the ultimate and personal condition to which fear is ever driving us i.e. isolation and complete lack of human contact. This would seem to argue - which Macmurray does not either see nor does for us - that really we do not want to be afraid. If we were so afraid of the fear of death, we would very soon see, for our own comfort and ease of mind, that we did not experience fear for any other, less extreme cause or reason. "... fear of death is the symbol of all human fear." (CS 46). "What religion has called spiritual death, or eternal death, is a continuous dominance of a rational consciousness by fear, the perversion of the mind by the death principle in life itself." (CS 46/7). See also CS 37.38.

Secondly; death is that condition, even if we are still living, where fear has taken over. Perhaps the classification is too sharp, but Macmurray divides men into those who are fear-ridden and those who are fear-free; those who are life-denying and those who are life-affirming; those who are alive and those who are dead. Too sharp or not, we all recognise and know people who fall into these categories. Never more so, perhaps, than today, when countless people cannot do anything without a tablet, drink, or 'fix'! "Now there are two, and I think only two, emotional attitudes through which life can be

radically determined. They are love and fear. Love is the positive principle, fear the negative. Love is the principle of life, while fear is the death principle in us. I mean that literally." (FMW 58. There is very much more of this, relevant to, and endorsing, the above paragraph; and should be read). "There is only one secure defence against life, and that is death. The person who lives on the defensive is really seeking death, seeking to escape from life. And most of us succeed only too well, and wake up late in life to discover we have never really lived at all." (FMW 60). "There is thus a close psychological connexion between fear and death in human behaviour. Life is activity, and depends upon the continuous presence of positive motive for action. Death is the natural suppression of the activity in which life consists. Fear is the presence in a living consciousness of the suppression of the life-activity." (CS 45).

But here we must add an anomalous note. Despite the fact that Macmurray refers to death a number of times as our major fear, it must be recorded that once elsewhere he, rather incongruously, proposes something else as our prime fear, ".... the most fundamental fear in human life is the fear of changing the structural habits of society". (BS 53). I cannot account for this anomaly, although it must be conceded that this is a very pronounced and common fear in most human beings, even if it is mainly unconscious and less openly acknowledged.

Returning to the main point. This adverse effect of fear applies not only to individuals but to to societies. Most societies are fear-ridden and fear-determined. When a society is positively

and life-affirmingly motivated we notice it at once. Macmurray gives the first Elizabethans as an example. "Now most of us, and therefore our societies in general, are fear-determined in this way. There are a few great periods in our history, like the Elizabethan Age, for example, when the fear-principle seems to have been temporarily relaxed, and when the spontaneity of life reasserted itself. Then men and women did great things and lived naturally and creatively. it is worth noting that it is only rarely in individuals and more rarely in societies that human life exhibits itself in its proper nature, when it is not mastered and inhibited by fear." (FMW 59/60).

The Increase of Fear

It is knowledge, reason, and imagination which brings to us as human beings fear of a special kind. But it does not stop there. As man progresses in knowledge, technology, and mutual dependence, fear inevitably increases. This is contrary to what we would conventionally think. More knowledge, we believe, will help us to overcome fear. Not so, says Macmurray. More knowledge increases fear.

Whereas in the past, to give but one example of countless which could be given, a man with his own plot had only to fear the arrival, or non-arrival, of rain at the right time. Now society, and the supply of our needs, are so complex that a failure of one small part of the chain can cause widespread havoc. "The full significance of this can only become apparent when we take into account the development of human life. That development increases fear by increasing knowledge of Nature and of man. It also increases the

interdependence of man and the dependence of man on Nature. A highly industrialized society is far more dependent upon the inter-relation of human activities, and upon the natural stores of material for human life, than a primitive agricultural community. The knowledge of this intricate interdependence is in itself a knowledge of the increase of the individual's helplessness in the face of threats to his life." (CS 40).

However what we have discussed so far is only, as it were, the physical aspect. There is the overall psychological aspect as well which adds another dimension. "But there is more than this involved. For in the course of development, the mere fear of physical death becomes the symbolic centre of the fear for the self. What is threatened by life is the whole delicate nexus of possessions and interests and values with which the individual has identified himself. Self-preservation for the human individual means much more than the preservation of physical existence. It comes to mean the guarding and defence of all that is dear and significant to him, of all that gives meaning to his existence. The more extensive and subtle the self-hood becomes, the more numerous and subtle become the threats of its destruction from other individuals and from the changes of natural conditions." (CS 40/1). Other relevant references which should be read are CS 51/2 and CS 99.

Fear seems to be our lot whatever we do! Is there no way to overcome it?

Overcoming Fear

Before discussing real ways of mastering fear we must mention the mistaken ways. These include trying to renounce or forget the ways of knowledge, and attempting to return to the state of supposed innocence. This is impossible because once we know we cannot unknow. Moreover, the essence of our humanity, the heart of the personal, is to know and to be aware in a special way. All attempts at reversions are but illusions, unrealities; as too is another false way we meet fear, namely the very widespread idea that we will not, or do not, die.

Presumably this means die permanently, for the most starry-eyed person cannot help but see that everybody goes through the physical process of departing. "If the fear of death is the universal symbol of all human fear, one way of dealing with that fear and its effects must be to deny the reality of that which is feared. To do this is to substitute falsehood for truth. So long as a religious doctrine of immortality is taken to signify the unreality of death, it is a devil's doctrine. For to deny the reality of death is to deny the reality of knowledge which is the expression of human reason. It implies the denial of the reality of all human knowledge; the assertion that the world which we know is illusion. This can only be achieved by constructing an imaginary world of illusion and asserting that it is reality. The escape from fear which is achieved in this way is an illusory escape. While it seems to deliver man from the fear of death, what it actually does is to deliver man from the reality of life." (CS 50). Subsequent pages should also be read. "The desire of man to escape from fear through the way of illusion

expresses itself in a desire to return to the pre-rational, or sub-rational, state of animal existence. The worship of the primitive, the deification of childhood, the craving to get back to Nature, are all expressions of this desire to escape from the reality of developing knowledge." (CS 52).

But even if we accept new knowledge, fear still so often prevails. We then cling to the old values which, in relation to the new knowledge, creates chaos. Surely this is something we are experiencing today i.e. over the last thirty years. "Nearly all important advances in human life are met by a reactionary movement which finds the supreme values and achievements of human life in the past. The reason for this is simple. The solution of the problem of fear at any stage of human development establishes the present as the familiar and the known. The development of knowledge demands an advance in the forms of human life which involves a step into the unknown. Fear reasserts itself as the fear of the unknown and is met, in pseudo-religion, by the assertion of the reality of the familiar and the established." (CS 52/3).

Fear, to turn to the more positive side, can according to Macmurray be overcome in three ways, although they are very closely related.

The first way is by faith. In Macmurray's thinking this means an attitude of, and life-direction in, trusting and confidence, not a belief or dogma; although these may, of course, indirectly create confidence within you. Needless to say, Macmurray regards Jesus as the exemplification of such a faith. "What is the solution which Jesus discovered for the problem of fear? There can be no doubt that

he was throughout concerned with it. There are numerous expressions which show that he looked upon fear and the isolation and self-defence to which it gives rise, as unnatural. He expresses amazement at the lack of faith which he finds among men. It leads him into expressions of an almost exaggerated intensity. 'If you have faith,' he says, 'as a grain of mustard seed ye shall say to the mountain, Be thou removed and be thou cast into the depths of the sea; and it shall be done'. Faith is his name for that attitude of consciousness which is completely triumphant over fear, for which the world is home and there is no sense of isolation or helplessness. Faith is for him the natural condition of human consciousness and it expresses itself in the control of the material world." (CS 109).

As an example of faith in the self-belief sense helping to provide this we may quote, "Perhaps the fundamental component of a belief in God is the expression in action of an attitude of faith or trust. Its opposite is an attitude of fear. A man who is on the defensive in his attitude to life does not believe in God, whatever his professions may be. Belief in God necessarily delivers a man from fear and from self-centredness, because it is his consciousness that he is not responsible for himself nor for the world in which he lives. It involves the recognition that his own life is a small, yet an essential part of the history of mankind, and that the life of mankind is a small but essential part of the universe to which it belongs. It involves the recognition that the control and the determination of all that happens in the world lies in the hands of a power that is irresistible and yet friendly. It is more than the recognition of this; it is the capacity to live as if this were so. It is the habit of living in the light of this faith." (CS 20/1).

But although faith may be the answer Macmurray does not end on an encouraging note. "But how does one begin to grow faith? I must confess that if there is an answer to that question, I do not know it. I do not think there is one". (FMW 67).

The second way to reduce or eradicate fear is by human integration. "The continuous increase in the sense of individual isolation must be offset by a continuous increase in the sense of integration with man and with nature." (CS 41). But it must be real and personal integration. The negativism of Hobbes - which Macmurray discusses at length in PR 134/140 - will not do. The so-called society created out of fear is no society at all. Only community, which alone must of its nature, be founded on love, can banish fear.

But equally, such a community cannot be founded on backslapping and Christian name calling - so typical of our society today! "Now, there is one kind of defence to which I must draw your attention, because of its importance and its peculiar deadliness. It is the provision of what the psychologists call escape-mechanisms, but which is more simply called pretence or make-believe. We resort to imaginary activities and pretend they are real ones. For example, we pretend that we are enjoying life by working ourselves into a state of excitement. We slap one another on the back and call one another by our Christian names to pretend that we are really in touch with one another, and to cheat the feeling of emptiness and isolation that gnaws at our vitals. And the sociability, the energy and activity that we create in this way is spurious. It commits us to unreality. It is the expression of our fear of being alone, not of our love of being together. It is the activity of death, not of life, and to

anyone who has eyes to see it gives itself away by its mechanical nature. Every real expression of life is an expression of positive spontaneity and works from within outwards." (FMW 61).

And here, arising out of the last point of human integration and community, we reach the third and major way of overcoming fear - religion. "All religion is grappling with fear." (FMW 62). "The function of religion is then to mobilize and strengthen the positive element in the motivation of its members, to overcome the negative motives where they exist, to prevent the outbreak of enmity and strife, to dominate the fear of the Other, and subordinate the centrifugal to the centripetal tendencies in the community. If then we take into account the development of society from the small, primitive family or kinship group to an ever greater inclusiveness, which in our own time is approaching universality, we may define the function of religion as being to create, maintain, and deepen the community of persons and to extend it without limit, by the transformation of negative motives and by eliminating the dominance of fear in human relations." (PR 163). "The development of religion is the condition of the development of humanity." (CS 41). "Religion is the effort of human consciousness to deal with the knowledge of death and to overcome the fear of it. It is the expression of man's quest for eternal life, for a life that has overcome the fear of death finally and for ever." (CS 37/8). "Salvation from the fear of death must thus include the reintegration of the individual with his fellows and the reintegration of man with Nature, in the light of the full consciousness of death. This is the task of religion." (CS 39).

But, warns Macmurray, there is true and false or pseudo religion. Most of it to date has been of the latter kind. Religion, the instrument of release from fear, has become based on fear. Not only have we the expression - one of dozens which could be relevantly quoted - "To live in the fear of the Lord", but most Victorian religion and its long aftermath, is based on fear. Together with its inevitable accompaniment, feelings of guilt. Equally religion can be regarded as a "comforting illusion, an escape mechanism. It helps us to imagine that the world is not hostile; it promises us help and comfort and recompense for what we suffer. Others will say that religion is a dope. It drugs our sense of the evil and suffering of our lives with illusions - of free-will, immortality, happiness and so forth - and so makes us resigned to the evils which are our natural portion. What are we to say of this? The honest answer seems to me to be that it is true of nearly all the religion that the world has known." (FMW 62).

True religion, Macmurray asserts, will not protect you. But it will rid you of fear. "We can distinguish real religion from unreal by contrasting their formulae for dealing negative motivation. The maxim of illusory religion runs: 'Fear not; trust in God and He will see that none of the things you fear will happen to you'; that of real religion, on the contrary, is 'Fear not; the things that you are afraid of are quite likely to happen to you, but they are nothing to be afraid of'." (PR 171). For a full account of this unusual interpretation see FMW 63/4.

As stated earlier Macmurray has much to say on fear. Whilst not being one of his major themes, it finds a considerable place in his secondary considerations.

Appraisalment (2)

1) Is all animal fear only immediate? This we cannot know. Scientific investigation may have something to say about it. But from ordinary observation and knowledge it would not seem to be true, especially amongst higher animals. Not only do they instinctively prepare and protect themselves from danger and attacks yet unseen, but can seem to be danger-conscious and ill-at-ease when not immediately threatened. Some creatures seem to ooze anticipated trouble, and are obviously apprehensive.

2) And as complementary to the last point, as it were, have humans no animal fears? Much of our fear is anticipatory and mental, but surely we can be filled by animal fear; for example, when suddenly confronted and surprised by a car rushing towards us, or a burglar standing over us in bed with a raised club, in the middle of the night. Admittedly, all phobias, and even knowledge of the effects of disease in us, are rightly seen as human fear. Animals would not have them.

3) Most, if not all, of Macmurray's human fear, seems to stem from our fellows and relationships - or lack of them. Get these right, through community and religion, and fear will banish. Now; important as other human beings are in this respect, they are not the sole source of our fears. As already mentioned, we may fear chronic illness, disablement, or other incapacities. It seems to me that these are of a different order from fear of loss of work, love, money, and friends. With a developed resilience we can meet these, but the former are more difficult, especially in dealing with their accompanying fear.

Moreover, the main fear we have in connection with these is that of pain. Whatever therefore is the use of Macmurray saying that your attitude to these things should be not that it will happen to you - it will! - but when it does happen there is nothing to fear? Tell that to a cancer victim!

And regarding fear of our fellows. Surely we ought to fear them for our own security. Ought we not to fear the terrorist or the mugger? And fear for our children's safety in face of the sexual pervert?

Once again, as we have seen before in other contexts, language distinctions come into it. This so often happens and ought to be much more recognised than it is. Perhaps, in the last example, fearfulness for our children is not quite the right term. Better, for example, to call it rational watchfulness or reasonable wariness. But in all his writings Macmurray makes not one attempt to either define fear or, if not to define it, then tell us how he is using the term. This is definitely a failing on his part. Nor can we be sure that he uses fear always in the same sense, whatever that may be. Until this happens i.e. until there is some definition or meaning given, all we can do is to take his teachings and interpret them as we will. We may even benefit from them. But we can never be sure we have understood them aright.

4) Is fear of death our biggest fear? And is it, as Macmurray suggests, the epitome, the symbolic embodiment and exemplification of all fear? Personally, I am aggrieved that by death I shall cease to be experiencing, cease to be relating, cease to be feeling, cease to be knowing, and ceasing to be a part of "all this" - whatever "this"

is. But I do not think I fear death. I much more fear the possible horrors leading to it.

On this point of death we must say that concerning this supposed fear associated with it, our understanding of Macmurray's view may be less exact than he intended. Either it may be his usage of language which is ambiguous and inexact, or, something which may be peculiar to Macmurray; and, of course, to millions like him who do fear death. But this is not necessarily common to all mankind, as he is so obviously pronouncing it to be.

End of Appraisement (2)

HISTORY

Relevant Books

Clue to History (CH)

The Self as Agent (SA)

Persons in Relation (PR)

Interpreting the Universe (IU)

Introduction

In studying Macmurray, reading his books, and discerning his thought, you would get the impression that religion, psychology, science, Marxism, and freedom are his major interests. And so they are. These things permeate the whole of his work.

But although he does not emphasise it, a deeper study reveals that history commands a considerable place in Macmurray's thought, a place probably equal to or greater than does art, another theme holding only a secondary place for him. This first impression, of relative unconcern for history, may be due to the fact that only one book, "The Clue to History" has been devoted to it; and then, despite the title, this could really be seen as a major work on religion rather than on history. And reference to history elsewhere - except for the Marxist interpretation of history - is limited to part of two other chapters, and these without 'history' in the title.

Yet from his own mouth the importance of history is proclaimed, and to our surprise, when we read, "Historical reflection is the matrix of all modes of reflection. They arise from it and return to it again". (SA 214). And again. "... if we first consider one of the unreflective disciplines which we have hitherto left unexamined, and which, in its own way, underlies and encloses all others. I refer to history." (SA 204). Having been conditioned by Macmurray's own thinking to believe in the paramountcy of religion, science, and art as the prime forms of reflection, this comes indeed as a shock.

There have been philosophies based on, and highly related to, history, especially those of the Italians Croce and Gentile, the German Dilthey, and in England Rosanquet. And there is, of course a very notable branch of speculative thinking, the philosophy of history. But there are very few philosophers, apart from the above, and Marx, who take history too seriously or entwine it with their basic notions. And although, as we have seen, Macmurray is, or was at one time, a Marxist, his interpretation of history is wholly different. Yet to incorporate history into his philosophy is what Macmurray has done. Indeed; although not totally or absolutely so, perhaps it is probable that his philosophy, especially his religious philosophy, could be seen as dependent upon, or even arising out of, his interpretation of history.

But although his interpretation of history is important, this is not the only thing he has to say about history and allied matters. He speaks, for example, of the relationship of philosophy to the actual social historical process; and of the study, origin, purpose, role, and function of history, and of its ecology in the realm of reflecting in general. It is this aspect with which we will begin.

What History Is

As we would expect of Macmurray, and which applies to all thinkers on any subject, no one thing, sentence, or notion can summarise Macmurray's idea of what history is. Only a number of statements and explanations can do this. And included in these are:-

History is action.

History is a mode of reflection; it is a reflective discipline.

History partakes of both art and science.

History is the construction of a public memory.

History is the comprehending and understanding of the continuity of human intention.

History is all-inclusive.

History signifies that the world is one action.

There can be no definitive history.

Let us consider some of these, either separately, or together as relevant.

That history, looked at in one way, is a mode of reflection is self-evident. It is something we mentally visualise and create. As a reflective activity history does not exist 'out there' but in us. It is an imaginative reconstruction and interpretation of what we take to be happening, or to have happened, in that part of existence which is external to ourselves, but of which at the same time, and perhaps ambiguously or paradoxically, we are a part. What we are reflecting upon may be something which we have immediately experienced of externality; but usually, because of its extensiveness, we can only know of it indirectly and at secondhand.

Even if we were involved e.g. drove a tank in the Libyan Desert during World War Two, our direct experience historically is so limited that most of our knowledge of this event in which we had so participated, would be reflective and secondhand, an imaginative reconstruction.

But, and here we come to the first point in the list above, history may, in one sense, be a reflective discipline, but this reflection is based on action. History, the subject matter, or that which is reflected upon, is action. "History, then, is concerned with action, in the sense that the subject matter of the historian's reflection is the doings of men in the world." (SA 205). " ... history is concerned with action, and any attempt to determine its place among the reflective disciplines from a purely theoretical point of view involves itself in insuperable difficulties." (SA 205).

Now action, as we have seen previously, has a special meaning for Macmurray. Action, you will remember from the section on Agency, is a human act based on intention. Action is contrasted with events, which are just happenings. Events are caused. Actions have reasons and motives. Events are impersonal. Actions are personal. History is, and can only be, about action. To illustrate this difference in historical terms Macmurray refers to the Battle of Waterloo.. "If I say that the Battle of Waterloo happened in 1815, I may be tempted to ask what caused it; and in my answer to treat human decisions and intentions as mere matter of fact. It will be safer to say that the battle was fought in 1815, for then language will itself suggest the proper historical questions, "Who fought it?", and, "What were they fighting about?" (SA 206).

Where occasionally events do have relevance for history e.g. a major earthquake, it is because of their significance for men. They have no historical relevance or meaning of themselves. "Here the distinction between 'action' and 'process', between 'what is done' and 'what happens', is of primary significance. What merely happens lies outside the historian's province. He is concerned with natural events and organic processes only in so far as they enter into the activities of human beings and play their part in setting the field for human decisions". (SA 205). And again. "Natural events, as such, do not enter into history. But the knowledge of them does; and even our speculations about the unknown add their quota to the determination of our intentions in action. Nature itself, we have seen, with all her events and processes, organic or inorganic, is an ideal abstraction. So far as natural events enter into human experience they modify human action, and so come within the scope of history." (SA 206).

History and Evolution

Not only is the foregoing a fact in itself but it cannot be over-emphasised in relation to a mistaken development which has occurred in historical understanding over the last one hundred and thirty years; and it probably goes back further, to stem from Hegel. History is not, nor ought to be seen and paralleled with, evolution. Nor with the counterpart of evolution, the organic. "To affirm the organic conception in the personal field is implicitly to deny the possibility of action; yet the meaning of the conception of the personal lies in its reference to action.". (PR 46. This is but the

briefest quotation. pp. 45 to 47 should be read.)

Once this is drawn to our attention we immediately realise how widespread, even if unconscious, this mistake is. Evolution, and the organic, stimulated historical studies in the 19th century, and are to be commended for so doing. But, properly understood, evolution and history are miles apart, and are certainly not to be identified. Nor are they interchangeable conceptions.

The reason why they cannot be identified we have just noted. History is a human, personal, and intentional activity. "History is, then essentially personal; and it exhibits the form of the personal". (SA 211). It is not an adaptation to environment, which is the prerogative of the evolutionary and organic, but an intended act conceived in freedom, however misused that freedom may be. "The general result of these convergent cultural activities - the Romantic movement, the organic philosophies (idealist or realist), and evolutionary science - was that contemporary thought about human behaviour, individual and social, became saturated with biological metaphors, and moulded itself to the requirements of an organic analogy. It became the common idiom to talk of ourselves as organisms and of our societies as organic structures; to refer to the history of society as an evolutionary process and to account for all human action as an adaptation to environment." (PR45). "The use of organic categories in general, and of the concept of evolution in particular, had a double effect. It stimulated a new interest in the study of history; and at the same time confused history with organic development." (SA 205). "... We tend to apply organic categories, and particularly the idea of evolution, in the field of history proper, and so to think of our human past as a determinate natural

continuance which could not have been otherwise." (SA 205).

This has unfortunately produced several philosophies which have been very influential. This confusion has been responsible "for a crop of philosophies of history and interpretations of history which have had important practical results, of which the most portentous is the communist movement. It is not the only one, however. The liberal faith in an inevitable progress has the same confusion at its source." (SA 206).

Incidentally, this mistake of identifying history with evolution and the organic has a reverse side. We sometimes speak in historical terms of natural and inanimate things, things which have evolved e.g. the 'history' of the earth and geological development. This too is wrong. "We tend to describe any attempt to understand things by reference to their origin as 'historical', and talk of the 'history' of the earth or the 'history' of a biological species." (SA 205). But, surprisingly, on the next page, Macmurray contradicts this, or seems to do so. Why, is not clear. "There is no serious objection to using the term 'history' with reference to natural processes; and we have seen that action necessarily contains natural processes in its negative aspect, so that an abstraction of these for relevant purposes is justifiable." (SA 206). I would not purport to explain this inconsistency.

Memory

We have seen that the term history has two allied and mutual, but totally different, aspects. One is action - that which has been, and is, going on humanly in the world. The second is our idea, or mental conception, of what that going on and action is, or has been. Let us now turn to this second aspect, the unreflective. What is its essence? Upon what is it founded, without which it would not be? Quite obviously, memory. "... history is concerned with the human past in its pastness. It makes no reference to the future; it does not seek to derive from the past anything that can be referred to the future. This can best be expressed by reference to memory; for memory provides the archetypal form of all historical reflection." (SA 211).

In dealing with this Macmurray first speaks of the difficulties and problems of memory in general. There is its incompleteness. It is not, nor ever can be, total. What is remembered is always selective or selected. It is always relevant to memoriser's intentions. There is a double twist about this. For whilst the memoriser was memorising - mostly unconsciously of course - he was acting. Therefore he memorised only what is or was relevant to his purpose at the time, that is whilst he was engaged in that action. "What represents the past for the Subject is the content of memory. Memory is the present representation of what has been known in action, as a contemporary whole. But though it is given as a whole, its representation is incomplete and inadequate. For memory contains only what was noticed by the agent; and this noticing has been determined selectively by a practical intention. Until the end is

attained, until the moment of withdrawal, the Other is known only as means to an end, and what is noticed is therefore only as much as is relevant to its use as means. The immediate content of memory, therefore, is only so much as was adequate to the particular intention of an action." (SA 208).

But allowing for the foregoing being an accurate description of how memory functions, it has inbuilt difficulties. Memories are notoriously inaccurate and unreliable. Memory is an imaginative reconstruction i.e. not a created and original fantasy, but nevertheless a re-visualising on the mental screen. And this process can so obviously be open to mis-imagining in relation to the actual event it is supposed to recall.

Moreover, in the process of recall and reconstruction the least failure, hesitancy, or doubt may be supplemented by invention, however unintentional. For a fuller account of this read SA 208.

A further difficulty about memory arises from the fact that that which it recalls was originally based on observation, and this may have been inaccurate. At the time, an impression of a happening is a synthesis of messages from the five senses, which have to be mentally coordinated. Here (see SA 209) Macmurray makes rather a lot of the time taken, howbeit only a fraction of a second, to receive and register visual and auditory signals in this process. This does not seem to me to be especially significant to the point. The possibility of an observation being at fault, and thus recalled erroneously, may not be regarded as a problem peculiar to memory. But is obviously very relevant to the accuracy or inaccuracy of history.

Memory is always the memory of a person i.e. one little brain. In relation to all that has, and could be, experienced, and needs to be remembered - especially when we are considering history, the memory of the whole past - the memory of each person is infinitesimal. Macmurray says that allowing for the failings of memory earlier mentioned, "even if these difficulties could be overcome, even if a particular agent could remember all he had ever experienced, and could be sure that his memory was completely trustworthy, the content of his memory would constitute only a tiny fragment of what there has been to experience. As a knowledge of the past it would amount to very little". (SA 209).

But despite all these possible shortcomings memory is memory and its all we have got. However, like all other aspects of reflective activity memory, as knowledge of the past, is incomplete until it has been expressed, communicated, and shared. In the present case this takes the form of encapsulating memories in records, diaries, and memoirs. Already we see this is the stuff of history. "The inadequacy of memory as a knowledge of the past comes from the fact that no reflective activity is complete until it is expressed; and this expression must itself be independent of the continuing activity of the self." (SA 209/210). There is much more of this around these pages and must be read.)

But other disciplines record. Scientists, whilst experimenting, record in detail their experiments as they go along. Artists record that which they have brooded over. "The scientist must record his observations and experiments with meticulous exactness, and he must have access to the records made by others." (SA 210). For the artist "the making of his final expression is itself the recording of a

continuity of contemplative experience." (SA 210). How then is the making of history different? History treads a middle path between extremes. Science captures and records generality. The artist records only to capture one single object or experience. History records to construct a public memory." There is need for a reflective discipline, the intention of which is neither to generalize nor to particularize but to record. This discipline is history, the business of which is to construct an adequate and reliable public memory." (SA 211).

At this point it is relevant to discuss, as Macmurray does, the age-old question as to whether history is an art or a science. "Philosophers have found it difficult to determine whether history should be classed as one or the other; and historians themselves have wavered between the two ideals, sometimes treating the writing of history as a form of imaginative literature and sometimes using a scientific procedure, so far as their subject matter would allow." (SA 204/5). However one looks at it, history is a bit of both - or neither. Like science it is concerned with facts, but not with the generality which distinguishes science. History particularises. In this it mirrors art; but unlike art (to complete the circle) it does not exist to evaluate but to factualise. "It is this refusal of generalization, this effort to represent the particularity of temporal sequence, which makes history seem, in some respects, to be art rather than science. Yet it does not, as an art does, express a reflective valuation: for it is concerned to express matter of fact, and in this it stands closer to science. Unlike science, however, it does not seek to discover recurrent patterns which could form a basis

for prediction. History, then, is neither an art nor a science, though it has certain affinities with both." (SA 207). This seems to be a rather satisfactory analysis by Macmurray.

Just now we spoke of history existing to create a public memory. But this, although strangely enough Macmurray never uses the term, can only be relative and never absolute. The ideal, according to Macmurray, " ... is to represent the whole human past as if it were the memory-content of a single agent who had experienced it all, and whose memory was completely adequate and reliable." (SA 211). But even within this ideal there cannot be completeness because of the inevitability of selectivity. This is evidenced by "the way in which representation of a past epoch varies from historian to historian and from one generation of historians to the next". (SA 211). This only endorses, in the context of history, what is already known about memory. It recalls and remembers only what is relevant for its present purpose, and for the immediately practical i.e. action and current intention. The element of memory "recalled is always a present and practical interest. For what is actively remembered is ipso facto brought into a determining relation to present intentions and preoccupations. What is actually recalled is selected for its relevance to the present; and the accounts that we give of the same experience of our own from time to time necessarily vary with the occasion for their production. Nor does this variation necessarily affect their validity. Just as there can be no definitive memory, so there can be no definitive history." (SA 212).

The Task of History

We have probably realised by now that although history exists to be, or to create, a public memory, to say this does not describe adequately history nor its function, however satisfactorily or perfectly this is done.

Nor does history exist, as many would think, to 'memorise' events. General summaries of history in reference books are often headed, "Events in Tudor Britain", or, "Historical Events from Ancient Times to the Present Day". Macmurray says "It would be wrong, or at least misleading, to say that the historian is concerned to construct the record of past events. For he is not concerned with events as such, in the scientist's sense. He does not abstract from experience a purely objective world of events". (SA 211). And again. "History is not mere chronicle." (SA 212). What is it then?

Because history is personal i.e. an activity only humans do, it is concerned not with events but with understanding, an understanding of human continuity and - and here is the important idea, as we have learned - of human intention. And, to complete the circle, human intention manifests itself in action. Thus to unearth in historical studies the intentions of the past, and relate these to the intentions of the continuing present, is the essential task of the historian i.e. that which he is doing, or endeavouring to do, whether he is conscious of this or not. In fulfilling this task the historian has two things to do. "He must discover and express the unity of intention which combines the contemporary doings of many agents into the action of one society of agents; and also the continuity of this common intention from generation to generation."

(SA 213).

Biography has the same intention except that it is concerned principally with the intention of a single individual, whereas history "... so far as it succeeds, exhibits a multitude of individual acts as constituting a single section, in virtue of a community of intention." (SA 213).

Once again Macmurray emphasises the importance of the present for history. For history the "fixed point of reference is the present; its effort is to exhibit the continuity of the past with the present, and the present as continuing the past. But this past is a human past; its elements are the doings of agents. Consequently, its continuity with the present can only be a continuity of action; and action is constituted by intention." (SA 212/3).

History is All-inclusive

History is all-inclusive because nothing is outside of its ambit. Even natural events, when affecting human beings, must be included in history. And although reflection is not action it, too, must be included because reflection produces knowledge and this always modifies action. "We must notice (next) the essential inclusiveness of history. Since knowledge is a dimension of action, no extension of knowledge can be without a practical consequence. Natural events, as such, do not enter into history. But the knowledge of them does; and even our speculations about the unknown add their quota to the determination of our intentions in action. Nature itself, we have seen, with all her events and processes, organic or inorganic, is an ideal abstraction. So far as natural

events enter into human experience they modify human action, and so come within the scope of history." (SA 206). Even the unknown, at any particular past time, is within history! What is now known to have been unknown must effect the idea of the past. "If it be urged that very much happens in the world of which we are ignorant, and that the world itself exists independently of us and of our knowledge, it must be admitted that this is the case, and that we know it to be the case. Yet our very ignorance is a negative element in the determination of our intentions; and the historian can only understand the actions of men in the past by recognizing their ignorance of much that is familiar today. History, therefore, is in this sense all-inclusive. The whole human past, with all the knowledge that informed it, with all the errors and illusions and misjudgements which distorted it, is matter of history; and there is no event, however seemingly remote from our practical interests, which may not turn out to be relevant to the historian's task.." (SA 206/7).

And naturally all subsidiary histories should be seen as part of the one, all-inclusive, history. "The sciences and the arts, philosophy and religion all have their histories, and these histories are not separate histories but parts of one history which is the story of the doings of man on earth." (SA 207).

What conclusions does Macmurray draw from this all-inclusiveness of history? Very wide ones indeed. He contends, with other evidence of course, that the world, as he puts it, is one action, one inclusive action, of which every intention and action of every individual is, and must be, a part. All those with this in mind will live and act quite differently from the way they would if they did

not have this view. "If we act as if the world, in its unity, is intentional; that is, if we believe in practice that the world is one action - and our consideration of history has shown us what this signifies - we shall act differently from anyone who does not believe this. We shall act as though our own actions were our contributions to the one inclusive action which is the history of the world. If, on the other hand, we believe that the world is a mere process of events which happen as they happen, we shall act differently. Our conception of the unity of the world determines a way of life; and the satisfactoriness or unsatisfactoriness of that way of life is its verification." (SA 221). And again, incidentally, we have another example of Macmurray's criterion for both living and philosophical judgement and evaluation; the criterion, not of truth - the usual and almost exclusive criterion of western philosophers since Descartes - but satisfactory living. And another example of Macmurray's empiricism.

What The Historian Must Do

We have seen what the role of history, in its reflective aspect, is. How do historians work? They collate records and documents and other relevant evidence e.g. from relics and sites, and create "histories". These histories are then collated by other historians. Once recognised, gaps in historical memory are filled, or attempted to be filled, by positive search or, failing success here, by tentative imaginative guesswork, reconstruction, and suggestion, pending the discovery of further evidence. (See SA 212, "As in all forms of reflection.....available to every one").

The importance of the historian's function cannot be overstated, for as Macmurray says, in what might be regarded as a summary of his historical thinking. "Without a common memory there can be no common action; without a public memory no public life. And without the systematic and methodical investigation of the historian, determining the record of the past..... there can be no reliable public memory, but only a legendary tradition." (SA 214). And again, to finalise. "Historical reflection is the matrix of all modes of reflection. They arise from it and return to it again. Without the record of past activity they are impossible; and if the record is unreliable, they are led astray." (SA 214).

History and Philosophy

The relating of philosophy with history, in almost a total sense, as with, for example, Hegel, Marx, and Croce has already been referred to. But that is not what we are concerned with here. Macmurray, in a way rarely perceived observes their closeness and interdependence without going the whole hog and regarding them as almost identical or at least wholly interdependent. What are Macmurray's views on their relationship and similarities?

Firstly; just now we spoke of history's inclusiveness. In this it is very like philosophy. Both are concerned with the whole - history with the whole of the past, philosophy with the whole of experience. Any new manifestation of each, however seemingly partial, is in fact a contribution to the whole. There can be no disparateness in history or philosophy. This is in contrast to all other studies and disciplines, except religion, which do, quite

legitimately and happily, attend exclusively to a mere aspect of their general field. Science is a prime example of this. "This inclusive character history shares with philosophy. These two disciplines have, as it were, a common starting point; it is the whole of the past as entering into the determination of action. The history of philosophy is a part of history; but it is also a part of philosophy in a way that the history of science is not a part of that science. For philosophy, like history, is one, and every new philosophy is a continuation of the one philosophy just as every new history of an age is a rewriting of the one history." (SA 207). History and philosophy are alike in that they are both stretches of seamless fabric.

Secondly; and perhaps more importantly, for whilst the foregoing point might be seen as one of coincidence, this point very much concerns the mutuality and inter-relationship of philosophy and history. And although it is so obvious as to be common-place, nobody in contemporary life, whether influential or not, whether at the top of the tree or man in the street, seems to be in the least aware of it.

It is that in history, especially in social history according to Macmurray, a philosophy is implicit and working itself out. "The history of our philosophy is our social history at it most serious, its most reflective and its most logical." (SA 19). And this means too, of course, that there is an implied philosophy in our society, living, and actions today, if we could only unearth and discover it. For the chances are it is not the philosophy or ethos we profess, either as individuals or as a society. A foremost characteristic of

human beings is their immense capacity for self-deception. We believe we believe something whereas we believe something quite different and - more to the point - act according to this unconscious belief.

Another point concerning the relationship of history and philosophy, and one which may seem to contradict the above but actually does not, is that looking back i.e. seen historically, philosophy always reflects the condition of a society, or that with which society is essentially concerned. Philosophies in the age of the discovery and exploring of physics were mechanistic and materialistic. In the 19th century, the age of biology, philosophies were organic. Today, the age of psychology, we have yet to create an adequate philosophy which, tentatively, Macmurray has proposed as the personal. "That there is such an interrelation, indirect enough and largely unconscious, between philosophical theory and social processes of a more empirical kind, is evident from any study of the history of philosophy which looks for it". (SA 25. There is much more of this around this page. Too much to need quoting, but very relevant). "The decisive questions of serious philosophy are never determined at random. They have their origins in a historical necessity, not in the chance interests of a particular thinker." (SA 21). "I have referred to the form of the personal as the emergent problem of contemporary philosophy." (SA 21).

But even now we have not referred to all that Macmurray has to say about history and philosophy. An even more innovative and daring point has yet to be made. It is usual to think that philosophy, unlike science, cannot be verified. It is more than mere belief, on which most religion rests. It is supported and buttressed, or is

supposed to be, by rational thinking, subjecting it to a severe scrutiny of critical appraisal. But Macmurray goes further. He says that philosophy is verified - or proved wanting - by, in and through, history. Such a verification may for various reasons (see IU 81) not always be satisfactory, but nevertheless it is an attempted verification.

"But how, you might ask, can there be experiment and verification of our reflective conclusions outside science? How, for instance, is a philosophical theory to be verified? I shall answer in the first place that philosophy is always verified, even if unconsciously, in the process of individual and social history. It is, of course, possible to speculate philosophically for the sake of speculating, and to prevent conclusions from affecting practical activity. Such philosophy is not serious. It is a kind of game which certain people play. We are not concerned with sport, but with the serious business of thought. When philosophy is taken seriously it is bound to affect our immediate experience of living and to verify itself in the satisfactoriness of the life-experience which it helps to produce. In the social field, too, philosophy undergoes a constant process of verification. The way in which a society organizes and conducts its social life is always the unconscious expression of a philosophical conception of the world. The breakdown of European life in the eighteenth century, as illustrated, for example, by the fury of the French Revolution, by the scepticism of Hume and Voltaire, or by the cynicism of Gulliver's Travels, is itself the discovery of the practical failure of the philosophy by which Europe had lived since the Reformation. And the collapse in our own

time is another instance of an unsuccessful experiment in philosophy." (IU 81/2). "It is in the historic process of human development that life and logic interpenetrate, and that philosophy is continuously, if unconsciously, submitted to the processes of verification." (IU 160).

Rightly or wrongly, Macmurray believes the Soviet Marxist state to be the first deliberate and intentional experiment undertaken on the basis of a conscious philosophy and is thus "the first attempt that man has made on a large scale in the deliberate verification of a philosophical conclusion." (IU 82).

Here we conclude Macmurray's ideas of what history is, and make a brief:-

Appraisement (1)

As suggested in the introduction to this chapter, history is a much bigger, comprehensive, and important thing for Macmurray than would appear from the general trend of his writings. And we have not finished yet! As a general assessment it would seem that as with many other aspects of Macmurray's work, philosophers of history have not acknowledged him with quite the attention he deserves. Even if not fully worked out, he has some very innovative ideas on history especially where, as we would expect of him, he lifts it out of the organic into the personal. Indeed it would seem that nobody, whether general philosopher or historical specialist, has caught on to Macmurray's thinking on these matters. But arising out of this I come to my first particular comment.

- 1) What is the effect of seeing history as personal and

intentional and not as organic and evolutionary? Macmurray says such a change of outlook will make us look for reasons and not for causes. But even amongst specialists, let alone the millions who indirectly or unconsciously use history in their thinking i.e. the man in the street and especially journalists and writers, is anyone so discerning as to distinguish between cause and reason? And are not cause and reason more or less the same from a working and practical point of view? And are they not often interlocked anyway?

To give an example. A reason for World War Two would be Hitler's paranoia. A cause of it would be the economic and social condition of Germany in the late 1920s. But within this analysis could Hitler's attitude be said to be intentional? Was that not also more of a cause than an intention? Obviously there is much scope here for both clarification and refinement of terms and their meanings, and a more extensive analysis by Macmurray - with illustrations. The above is my own.

Merely to have stated this gives not enough material to be convincing. This is not to say that further and deeper examination would not be worth doing. I believe it would.

2) All history is relative. It can never be definitive. It is written, and constantly rewritten, in the light of the present, both for its need as a public memory for use today, and as a store of actual knowledge as more of the past comes to light. So says Macmurray; and I believe this to be so.

But one problem concerning this is never raised, nor seems to have occurred to Macmurray. What constitutes what might be called real history, however biased unintentionally, from propagandist history, rewritten with a deliberate bias to suit a particular nation

or current ideology, usually of a rampant, subversive, and disruptive kind? Both presumably serve the present and the needs of a particular society. Yet if present need is the criterion, who is to say that either is right - or wrong, as I am sure we would be inclined to say the latter was?

Nowhere does Macmurray talk of historical standards and criteria of judgements. Nor of what constitutes historical truth or validity. To be fair in this we must remember he is not an historical philosopher. But they are questions evoked by his writing on history.

3) Is history the matrix of all reflection, as Macmurray says it is? I do not think so. But I can understand how Macmurray has made this mistake. History includes the history of everything to do with man, or which man has come to use or make-over for himself. Of every man-concerned thing there is a history.

But this ubiquity of time, permeating every intention and thing, does not imply that it is the general thing from which all else has sprung - this springing being, as I understand it, the meaning of the term matrix in this context. Just the contrary. History is the record of things once they have sprung. It is not the source but the story.

And if we take history as reflection i.e. the mental side of the process, as described earlier, it is still, for the same reason, not the matrix of all reflection. To illustrate the point and to hazard a conjecture. What might primitively be called economical or physical survival or even, on the other hand, a vague and incipient sense of questioning, wonder, and attempted orientation and

explanation, are more likely to have been the matrix of reflective activity; certainly not history.

And the same could be said at any contemporary time. I do not think that people today have their reflective ability first formed in the historical mould, however subjective. Indeed I am sure they do not. As a matter of fact, elsewhere several times, Macmurray states that religion is, or was, the basic, seminal, form of human reflection from which all other aspects of thought and activity have sprung, emerged, and broken away from. And in this history itself, so far as it has been interpreted for a very considerable time now, proves him to be right. Ancient and primitive peoples know only religion. Our multifarious specialisms developed later.

4) Is history one, all-inclusive action? Or, to put it more exactly, does history reveal that reality is one, all-inclusive process? It is not clear how Macmurray justifies this assertion. Perhaps he does not. If observation and discussion is anything to go by, few people if any feel that they are part of one, all-comprehensive, time scheme, and that what they feel, think, and do contributes to this process. They may vaguely feel part of the particular society to which they belong, but very few would regard their work, let alone their personal and relating selves, as contributing to an ultimate, universal, ordained process or end. Perhaps we are as yet too parochial, too insular, in our consciousness to be aware of this. We are not developed enough.

But if we were, could not this knitted nexus of which we are a supposed part be very nearly bordering on the socially and politically organic, a situation which, as we have seen, Macmurray deplores and regards as inferior because non-personal?

There is perhaps only one solution to the above. In the nature of things we tend, I will say no more, both as individuals and as the human race, to become what we intend or think we can become. This is reminiscent of Browning's soaring fancy:-

"Ah, but a man's reach should exceed his grasp,
Or what's a heaven for?"

So whether history is one comprehensive action or not, it can become so as we think and live for it so to be. Of course, Macmurray does not make this last point. He is content with his statement that history is one, inclusive, action.

5) Whether exactly and wholly satisfactorily true or not, Macmurray's notion of philosophical ideas being verified in social history is both a trenchant and valuable one. Instead of continuing to be so myopically concerned with logical exactitudes and verbal reasoning and niceties, it is a pity more philosophers do not come out into the real world and test their ideas in action. For this is the ultimate upshot of Macmurray's contentions. He may, at this stage of his presentation, appear to see history as the only verification or negation of an idea. But by implication, and indeed as he states explicitly in relation at least to the marxist philosophy, even deliberate social attempts and experiments can be made to verify a theory - and should be made.

Increasingly, once man reaches out beyond his immediate stage of inlooking and anthropocentric concern with the natural and the economic, such intentional and experimental proof or disproof of philosophical, political, and social ideas will become a normal part of human practice.

End of Appraisement (1)

The Clue to History

Introduction

So far we have been trying to understand what Macmurray's idea of history is as a discipline, a subject, a mode of human reflection, a branch of knowledge. We have, as it were, looked into it's methodology, and its *raison d'etre*. It could be said we have been looking at its form.

We now turn completely - to the other side of the picture, to Macmurray's interpretation of history as it appears with its whole vast panoply of human activity and intentions. We now look, in other words, at its content. Macmurray calls this the clue; but he could have called it, perhaps with even more precision, the key. Interpretations of history purport to unlock the door and reveal to us the meaning of our being and of the human pilgrimage. But we will not quibble over words and, whatever terms are used, Macmurray has no doubt or hesitancy. All is clear to him.

And as you would expect from all we have so far learned, his interpretation of history can be summed up in one word - Christianity. To say this in so forthright a manner may quite understandably cause you to throw a fit of impatience and exasperation, or slump into a mood of despondency and despair. Not another! - you exclaim. And I fully sympathise with you. If nothing else, familiarity has bred contempt. We are rightly fed up with such interpretations of history, of which there have been thousands; and hundreds more come out annually. They are, if nothing worse, hackneyed, trite, and boring.

But in Macmurray, if you will bear a while, we see a glimmer of light. I say this to encourage you to read on. It could be that there is more than this. But you must, of course, form your own conclusion. For Macmurray has, if not a totally new interpretation, then certainly a number of new lines and insights, which may cause you to think again, and at least be prepared to reconsider the position.

Of course, he has much to say of a familiar kind. For me to repeat this, or use it to substantiate and reinforce Macmurray's contentions would be puerile and time wasting. It is all too well-known. So here I shall be doing two things. Firstly; noting, expanding upon, and analysing the matters upon which, so far as they can be, are peculiar to Macmurray. Secondly; where relevant, I shall be doing this at the same time as the first - but unfortunately it is a more difficult task - namely, stating and displaying Macmurray's substantiations of these new contentions. I say difficult because, as we have learned by now, substantiation is not Macmurray's strong point. But if he has something original to say, and I believe he has, this shortcoming should not unduly deter us. He will have paved the way for further new thinking and interpretation.

Hebrew Roots

Macmurray's Christian interpretation of history is firmly rooted in the Old Testament and the ways and outlook of the ancient Hebrews. Jesus brought new insights but these he could not have had had he not been part of, and brought up in, the Jewish tradition. "Christianity is essentially Jewish. The intention which defines it has its source

completely within the experience of the Hebrew people. The Old Testament, which is the first part of the Christian Scriptures, is the classical literature of the Jewish people. The New Testament is based upon it; was written mainly, if not entirely, by Jews; and its central figure is a Jew. The real continuity of the Old and New Testaments has never been seriously denied, and the first disputes in the primitive church turned on the question whether it was possible for a Gentile to join the Church without submitting to the rites demanded by the Jewish law. The fact that Christianity is rooted in Jewish experience cannot be denied." (CH 17).

The most important thing about early Jewish history is that it was religious. We may infer from Macmurray that this is still the situation today, but not being an authority on religious history or comparative religion, I cannot confirm if this is so, but would very much like to know. From observation it could very well be so.

But to start with we must be very clear as to what Macmurray means by being religious in this context. The best way to understand this is to go back to primitive tribes. As earlier mentioned, to such tribes everything was, and is, religious and interpreted as such. There is no economics, politics, art, or even work and leisure. All is one fabric concerned, enacted, lived, even if unnamed, as religion.

There is only one slight schism in this primitive conception - which Macmurray does not mention - and that is, there may be various gods, which suggests that the seeming wholeness of outlook may not be total. But the fact that there are gods, still supports the contention that the societies were wholly and exclusively religiously orientated.

Now of all primitive peoples, even as they all began to grow away from the primitive, the Jews alone remained religious in this sense. All other societies developed secular aspects, and fractured and fragmented their conception and experience of life and living. Only the Jews continued, or at least continued so in the times we are referring to, to see, do, and speak of everything religiously. Jewish society "resembles other human societies in the religious form of its primitive tribal life. It differs from them because it develops an elaborate civilization and culture without breaking loose from the religious form in which it originates. This is only possible through a development of religion, and the inner history of the Hebrew people is the history of the development of religion." (CH 28). And to be religious means to be seeing and interpreting everything and every happening in terms of God. " Where our historians say, 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon', or 'Nelson won the battle of Trafalgar', the Jewish historian says, 'God brought the people up out of the Land of Egypt'. This is no mere concession to religious prejudice, but the continuous form which all Hebrew reflection takes. It means that Hebrew thought is at once religious and empirical. It is religious in that it thinks history as the act of God. It is empirical in that it reflect upon history in order to discover the nature of God and the laws of divine agency." (CH 38).

Another important aspect of this for Macmurray is that to be religious is to be monist. Peculiarly, much as he talks about this throughout his works, I never recall him mentioning the term monism once. He always expresses it through his anti-dualism. He never makes clear why the essence of religion is, and must be, moist; but

see CH 93 for what is perhaps a hint. But this is his assertion.

And the Jews, unlike all other peoples, never divided their lives into the secular and the religious, nor into any other of the countless ways e.g. class, heaven and earth, this life and the next, rich and poor, which make ours and all other societies dualistic, or even pluralist. "This totalitarian character of the religious consciousness seems paradoxical to any other form of consciousness. The paradox can be stated in this form. If a society (or an individual) has a religion it is not religious. If it is religious it cannot have a religion. The reason is that to 'have' a religion, religion must be conceived and experienced as a particular aspect of life which is contrasted with others which are not religious. The religious mode of consciousness is precisely a habit of mind which prevents such an atomizing of life. For any other form of consciousness religion is a particular and limited set of activities or a particular and distinguishable set of beliefs. But for the religious form of consciousness, religion is a way of living the whole of life, and consequently, as part of this, a way of thinking and understanding the world." (CH 29).

Pages 16/41 of CH have very much more to say concerning this unique character of Jewish society, especially in relation to religion. But I hope enough has been said to illustrate how, more than is usually conceived, or at least with a very different emphasis, they had to be the forebears of Christianity. Many have stressed the importance of the Jews in discovering one God, but only Macmurray has interpreted this in such a profound, penetrating, ubiquitous, and all-pervasive, social way.

Jesus

If the Old Testament Jews paved the way, Jesus embodies it. Or at least in his teaching and actions he shows and demonstrates the clue to history; that is, the interpretation of history as Macmurray discerns it.

Earlier, in the chapter on religion, we discussed the general contribution of Jesus, and will not repeat it in detail. It might be useful to re-read that section before continuing. You will remember that four main points were made.

Jesus:- 1) Universalised Judaism.

2) Developed the idea of God from Lord to father, thus banishing fear.

3) Discovered the Personal.

4) Discovered the common people.

Here, however, we will speak of the contribution of Jesus as it specifically applies, according to Macmurray, to history, bearing in mind that all the foregoing points have some relevance.

At this juncture Macmurray is eager to draw attention to a feature of Jesus, Christianity, and the New Testament which apart from what seems to be the bizarre ravings and interpretations of dubious and suspect religious sects, mainly fundamentalists, is ignored or quietly but intentionally overlooked by most orthodox Christians, churches, and religious exponents and authorities. This is the apocalyptic element.

Macmurray dividing, for ease of understanding, the teaching into the ethical and the apocalyptic says, quite rightly, that in our dualism we have taken up, almost exclusively, the ethical aspect of

Jesus and Christianity, and banished the apocalyptic. Yet this is the vital and important part of the message, and very relevant for complete historical understanding. "In the teaching of Jesus two elements are customarily distinguished. The first is his exposition of the conception of human life in the world which is implied in the whole religious tradition of his people. The second is apocalyptic. It is concerned with the future, and is, therefore, prophetic in the narrow sense which we are apt to give to that word. It is the first of these elements which we usually refer to as the teaching of Jesus, and which we tend to see as the revelation of a new religious ethic. The apocalyptic element we find rather difficult and uncongenial, and we tend to treat it as much less important, and almost as a kind of excrescence which has no fundamental significance for our time. If we do try to take it seriously we tend to treat it as a spiritual symbolism." (CH 49). "But this contrast of 'ethic' and 'apocalyptic' is itself the expression of a dualistic apprehension, and examination of it provides perhaps the clearest and simplest means of discovering the significance of the distinction between the form of religious thought and of dualist thought. I should beg of my readers therefore to concentrate their attention on this issue, which alone seems to me to be of prime importance; because the failure to grasp it makes the understanding of Jesus or of Christianity impossible." (CH 83).

Moreover, Macmurray will not - except for purposes of exposition - recognise the ethical and the apocalyptic as two and different aspects. "The point which seems to me the essential one in this connexion is not that we must take the apocalyptic element in the teaching of Jesus seriously, as well as his moral and 'religious'

teaching, but that the fact that we find it difficult to relate the two aspects reveals the dualistic and non-religious character of our own minds. These two aspects are fundamentally one; and to understand Jesus, or indeed the religious mode of consciousness of which he is the supreme expression, is to realize their essential and necessary unity." (CH 49).

So we accept the ethical and abhor the apocalyptic, especially in its horror and ferocity which seems contrary to the newly discovered God of Love. "It prophesies a catastrophic exercise of power which will destroy the wicked and reward the righteous and establish by force the kingdom of God upon earth. This at once introduces difficulties. The 'spiritual' character of the 'ethic' has vanished, and its place is taken by a vision of ultimate violence which is its opposite. The God of Love in the ideal world becomes a God of vengeance and terror in the material world. The apocalyptic is the negation of the ethic. The ethic is the repudiation of the apocalyptic. The apocalyptic represents the kingdom as coming precisely in the way that the ethic teaches that it cannot come. It shows God acting in a way that repudiates the nature assigned to him in the 'ethic'. It is no wonder that those of us who accept the teaching of Jesus as the revelation of the divine character and of the ideal of conduct for man find ourselves constrained to gloss over or explain away the other aspect of the teaching ascribed to Jesus in the Gospels." (CH 84).

How are these reconcilable? Or rather, how does Macmurray as an affirmed non-dualist, reconcile them? He starts by telling us that our conventional idea of the ethic is wrong. We think, and I am sure

that this is true, that the ethic is founded on 'ought' and idealism. We must strive, hard as it may be, to live the 'good' life as prescribed by Jesus. We shall fail. But this, to live satisfactorily, is how we ought to be behaving.

Macmurray will have none of this. Jesus was never idealistic or spiritual. "Anyone who thinks this ought to read the Gospels, and attend to the form of Jesus' teaching, for it is certainly not the form that moralists employ. Jesus speaks usually in the indicative mood, not in the imperative, the term 'ought' and its equivalents scarcely occur in his teaching." (CH 88). "But it is not merely the absence of the ethical form, with its characteristic words and phrases, that is noteworthy in Jesus' teaching. There is evidence of a deliberate avoidance of it. There are occasions recorded upon which Jesus was invited to enunciate ethical principles, and we find that he does not respond," (Macmurray then gives examples of this. CH 89/90).

Jesus never suggested how we ought to be living. The tone in all his pronouncements is assertive, authoritative, absolute, positive, and factual. What he teaches is what is; and only as we live thus can we be entitled to remain alive at all. "To call any doctrine 'ethical' is to assert that it consists of statements about value and not about fact; that it is concerned not with what is, but with what ought to be. If we call the teaching of Jesus an ethic we imply that Jesus was a moralist, concerned to determine the nature of the good life - which is not the life that men actually live - and to determine the rules by which men ought to act. We imply that his effort was to construct an 'ideal' of life, by which actual life is condemned, and which perhaps, others might use as a pattern, which

they should try to 'live up to'." (CH 88).

Unfortunately, to illustrate this, Macmurray gives a rather muddled version and interpretation of the well-known "He that saveth his life shall lose it". (CH 88/9). But I am sure better examples could be given, as indeed Macmurray does much later. (See CH 97).

What is the upshot of this for our present purpose? Simply, that if you do not live the way of life prescribed as a fact not as an ideal or a value, by the so-called ethic, the apocalyptic thread will inevitably and inexorably come upon you and the world. It is as elementary and straightforward as that. God has prescribed how his creation shall be, and of how you shall behave. His wishes are for mankind to be one, undivided, community of which every member is equal and free. "But we can achieve an understanding of the religious thought of Jesus provided that we intend the disappearance of dualism in practice; if we will the end of our claim to superiority and the achievement of equality and freedom." (CH 85. And, of course, many other references to this intention are given throughout Macmurray's works.). If we fail in this, Armageddon will come upon us. This is in the nature of things. Or, expressed religiously, the will of God.

By the long, foregoing, argument, much more detailed as Macmurray expounds it, we perceive how the dualism of the ethic and the apocalyptic are resolved and banished. They are part of one chain of events. "Thus the spiritual understanding of the will of God for man (which is what we represent as an 'ethic') is ipso facto an understanding of what will happen to man in the future - our 'apocalyptic'. The two are one and the same, necessarily." (CH 94).

Thus can Western man become, as the Jews were, religious again. For, as we have seen earlier, the essence of religion for Macmurray is a total and absolute non-dualistic attitude to all life and experience. More; it is a totally undivided consciousness, both in man collectively and in each one of us.

The Clue to History

What then is the clue, or clues, to history emerging from all the foregoing? As this by now should be very obvious and implicit in all that has been expounded, I shall content myself with a few pertinent quotations to explicate and confirm.

"This then is the principle by which Jesus understands the nature of human freedom and its relation to the intention of God in history, which is the nature of reality. God acts in history as creator of Man. The intention of his creation is known - a universal community of persons, with freedom and equality as its structural principles of relationship. Clearly such a relation is not possible unless Man wills it, because the structure of human relationship is the expression of human intentions. If God is to create a free and equal humanity, then Man must intend a free and equal humanity. God's action in history must then be the creation in Man of the effective intention to realize universal freedom and equality and since God cannot fail to realize his own intention, this will to community is necessitated.". (CH 100).

"History is the process by which the intention of God for human life is being carried out." (CH 37).

"Thus Jesus marks the point in history at which it becomes

possible for man to adopt consciously as his own purpose the purpose which is already inherent in his own nature." (CH 55).

"The end of the process of history is known. But the achievement of that inevitable end depends upon its acceptance by Man." (CH 58).

"So the discovery that Jesus made does not merely determine what the intention of God for Man is, and what the fulfilment of the process of history will achieve. It also provides in the individual a sufficient motive for making that intention his own." (CH 59/60).

"The gradual deepening of the Hebrew insight into the nature of history as the act of God found its complete expression in Jesus. This expression is complete, not in the sense that there is nothing to add to it - Jesus himself repudiated this notion - but in the sense that it has reached the stage at which the question 'What is the intention of God in history?' can be answered with complete universality and objectivity. Jesus has discovered the structural law of the action of reality in human experience. He has brought into human consciousness, in the form of rational knowledge, the real nature of human life, and the law of its relation to the nature of reality as a whole. The result of this is that it is now possible for men to adopt as their own intention, universally, the intention of God for man, and to seek to realize it. Further, since the intention of God for man is necessarily man's real intention - the intention which expresses his real nature as part of the world - its acceptance unifies human action and integrates human nature. Its rejection, on the other hand, sets man in opposition to himself, and leads to self destruction." (CH 116/117).

An Uneasy Conclusion

Except for some minor reservations and queries we cannot fail to have understood what Macmurray means. It is all clear enough. But it is this which we find so puzzling and disconcerting. Macmurray has succeeded in creating what is very rare these days, I imagine, namely a sense of unease. At least he has for me.

From modern, especially British, philosophers, we do not expect a religious interpretation of this kind, especially when it holds such a central place in a total philosophy.

From religious thinkers, biased and partisan from the start, we do expect and get such interpretations. And, unless we are already of their proclivity and persuasion, we rightly dismiss them as propagandist; even the few at their best, let alone the thousands of repetitive and turgid offerings.

But Macmurray has our respect, or at least mine. He is a man of philosophical calibre, with a wide compass of knowledge, understanding, and experience. Is his very religious interpretation a mere lapse on his part? Is it an ingrained streak from a childhood and childish conditioning from which he has been unable to escape and throw-off? Is it a mental and emotional blind spot or aberration?

Or, on the other hand, is Macmurray almost alone in trying, as a philosopher, to really interpret and satisfactorily incorporate religion into the structure of human thought and feeling, in a way acceptable to our reasoning and developing rationality?

Obviously, in raising this question, we cannot automatically accept Macmurray's answer, but at least we know what it would be. It is stated in the first chapter of CH, and several times after. It is

that; we cannot perceive things religiously because we are dualists.

Rid ourselves of this division and all would become as he sees it.

If this was how Macmurray felt, i.e. totally monist, then he was a very exceptional person. But one vaguely suspects that this contention, even if right, was an intellectual perception of his. How not to feel and be dualistic is the problem.

Nevertheless, one has a slight feeling, no more, that Macmurray could be right, a situation which, for me at least, would require a considerable upheaval of thought, feeling, and shift of basic position. But as I have known of Macmurray for over forty-five years, I do not think that, unless I waver and compromise in my third age, as did Joad, I am not likely to be convinced enough to accept it now.

Perhaps, strong as some of our minds may be, we are reflections of society more than we think, and only if society turned to monism, would we become monist and interpret history with as strong a religious thread as Macmurray has done.

Actual History

We have concerned ourselves with two aspects of Macmurray's historical thought. Firstly; with his theory of history i.e. what it is and its role in the pantheon of human reflection. Secondly; with Macmurray's interpretation of history and his discernment of the clues to its meaning. There is a third aspect, taking up over half of his "Clue to History", which is a review, interpretation, analysis, and critical appraisal of Western European history from Roman times to the mid-nineteen thirties, the age of the onset of

Communism and Fascism. This section is called "The Progress of Europe", indicating by its title something of Macmurray's response to these areas, which is cautiously optimistic.

But to expound and elaborate upon all that Macmurray has said here is beyond our need or concern for the immediate purpose, and must be left for a further thesis.

We end with a brief:-

Appraisalment (2)

1) We have divided ourselves into specialisms. We are dualistic, even pluralistic. Our pristine monism and wholeness have gone. But have no benefits resulted? Could we without it have had not merely a better standard of living, comfort, and security, but such a knowledgeable, interesting, and diversified existence?

Although things still seem to be going the other way at the moment i.e into more specialisation and fragmentation, might not this be seen as merely a necessary phase and that when we, as a species, have mastered and controlled through it all material things, we can return to wholeness? And even such divisive human dualisms as class, inequalities, and unfreedoms of various kinds, might eventually be banished through it.

Were we, to use Macmurray's preferred religious terminology, 'wrong in God's sight and intention', to specialise and extend our nomenclature and classification of things and the world, and thus our perception and management of things? Have we, in our actual or supposed freedom, so contradicted God's intention by using the brains He, presumably gave us? Admittedly in all this we have become unduly

obsessed by specialism and its immediate benefits. There is no doubt that we have gone too far too quickly. We have given ourselves no time to absorb and consolidate. But this is not Macmurray's point. We, it seems, should not have made any distinguishments at all. That is, if we were, or desired, to retain our religious outlook.

If we, as seems fair to do, approximate most, if not all, of this diversification with science, it is ironical and paradoxical that Macmurray himself proclaims several times that science is the only true manifestation and expression of Christianity to appear so far.

As always, it is a pity that Macmurray, as a philosopher, does not use the very effective, indeed essential, rhetorical device of Hypobole i.e. to raise, meet, and answer questions in his own mind and writings in reply to anticipated criticisms which he surely must envisage will be made of his contentions. We expect ignorance of this device in religious and other writers, but not in philosophers.

2) Do the clues to history reveal what history is about? In fairness, if we accept the clues, then the interpretation Macmurray has made might seem to be satisfactory. But how relevant are the clues he has selected? In a mighty, huge, universe our relevance, let alone importance, seems non-existent, or at most insignificant, especially as Macmurray's main contention is that we are here to be friends, create community, and be personal. If, say, Macmurray saw man as the instrument and vehicle of God's intention to master and control the universe, there might be some relevance in our existence. But Macmurray, whilst never denigrating knowledge and science, seems unable to entertain, let alone nurture, these sort of ideas,

imaginings, and reaching-outs.

Yet, though he was writing before the era of science fiction, he must have been acquainted with the works of Verne, Wells, and Stapledon, and with modern physics and astronomy. Why was his imagination not aroused, or if it was, why had it so little, if any, effect on his philosophy, which is not a limited philosophy of arid analysing of half an acre of thought, but one which purports to be broadly encompassing?

3) Whilst understanding Macmurray's idea of the 'ethic' of Jesus, can we accept it? Is the ethic not value permeated; not an exhortation to be relationally and morally better; not an ideal to be prized and made manifest in our living?

Certainly Macmurray's is a novel interpretation, and on this occasion he does give some evidence with his comment that Jesus rarely, if ever, used the term 'ought'.

Moreover, to accept Macmurray's view does alter the whole picture. If to live thus is not a choice to be grown into as we increase in love and care, but an imperative command similar to a law of nature, not to do which automatically and inevitably ensures our suffering or death, then we had best get on with it - fast!

The difficulty is to know if he is right or not. How can we tell? Although he does not in this case suggest it, the test always with Macmurray is to try it. In some ways, even if we do occasionally have better relational spells - but these may be economically based - man seems not to have improved all that much under two thousand years of Christian moralising and exhortation, so perhaps a change of interpretation, with its accompanying change of outlook and emphasis in action, may help to lead mankind forward.

But I have yet to hear of a thinker, philosopher, statesman, politician, or publicist - one would hardly expect it of a cleric - ever mentioning this view of Macmurray's, let alone taking up and advocating its introduction and trial. However, this may be no criticism. As in many things, Macmurray seems to be a voice crying in the wilderness.

End of Appraisement (2)

A SHORT EVALUATION

Non-recognition - and the causes of this.

In any book of reference, or of specialism in religion, philosophy, psychology or anything else, Macmurray hardly gets a mention. You will have difficulty in finding his name and doings anywhere - except in old "Who's Who's"; and who isn't in them! Apart from this he might well have not existed. Even Kierkegaard, most well-known example of a thinker whose work and contribution took at least a hundred years to be acknowledged, did have some standing in his own day, if only in the country of his birth and for reasons now superseded. Macmurray has none.

As we have seen, he shone for a brief spell on the then novel radio in the early thirties, but otherwise had an unsung life. Except for academic work, seemingly of a very routine kind broken only by the giving of several named lectures and lecture series e.g. Gifford, he was obviously regarded by his contemporaries as unexceptional and mundane, with nothing original to say or contribute. Even as a co-founder of Commonwealth during the Second World War there is a suggestion - perhaps out of pique by another co-founder - that his role in this new political venture was no more than marginal.

But was his only failing that of being different from the general trend of his time? Was he, and has he been, ignored because his way of thinking, both in content and advocacy, were merely out of

fashion? I believe this to be so. And on two counts.

Firstly; because in his day, and increasingly since - one might almost say exclusively so - thought, especially philosophical thought, and no more so than in Britain, was considered to have value only if it dug into and analysed minute areas of relevant interest, and this only in a linguistic and logical manner. No other ways of thinking and interpreting were recognised, nor considered to be acceptable. And on this the philosophical establishment ruled, and still does, absolutely. Metaphysics; wider relationships and associations, and the examination thereof; were entirely out and taboo. To even mention them was anathema, and branded you for life.

Thus was Macmurray, not being of this way of thinking, ostracised and treated as of no importance. He sees, as we have noted and discussed, the role of philosophy, indeed of all thought, to be practical and have relevance for living. Thought, and its probings, are never to be regarded as ends in themselves. In this he is even outside of the old, wider, Western philosophical mainstream and tradition, which regards thought as paramount, and action of no consequence or relevance for philosophy.

Secondly; Macmurray is highly moral. Could anybody thus be more out of touch with life from the twenties onwards, except perhaps for a short period during World War II. And briefly afterwards? Nobody today cares a damn about morality, let alone considering what it is or might be. Moral is the current taboo word and attitude.

But, and here is the irony of the misjudgement, Macmurray is not a moral traditionalist, which might justify suspicion and neglect. Only to the superficial and dismissive would he appear so - especially in his advocacy of Christianity, and despite the fact that

he interprets this in a new way ignored by his detractors.

Indeed, nothing is farther from his mind than traditionalism. No writer, not even J.S. Mill, has been so earnest an advocate of freedom. And none but Macmurray has, to such a degree, analysed, justified, and promoted freedom. Moreover, Macmurray alone has demonstrated how freedom is related to, and is indeed a part of, true morality.

So instead of being regarded as "old hat" Macmurray is, in numerous ways ahead of his time. The most urgent and necessary requirement of today is a book called "The Morality of Freedom", and I am not sure if Macmurray has not already written it, howbeit by another name. It is just that it has gone unheeded.

These are but two of the reasons for Macmurray's oblivion. Others can be as easily discerned. But enough for the present to give these possible reasons for Macmurray's isolation.

What is Macmurray Doing?

What is he doing? A number of very important things - important, that is, for the whole human race and its future.

Firstly; he is extending reason and the concept thereof. Hitherto it has been understood that reason is a quality of thought and of thinking. Occasionally we refer it to a person's actions. We say, "He is unreasonable". But we understand this to be a very loose use of the term.

But with great innovative insight Macmurray says reason can and should apply to the emotional side of life, both in ourselves and in society at large. And, as with reason of thought, its discernment

and task is exactly the same; to bring objectivity and reality into our feelings. That is, to feel and respond in terms of "what is", and not subjectively i.e. in terms of our own unexamined and immature feelings and values. It is, and requires, a total shift of emphasis and focus of living from "in here" to "out there". If this became part of the world ethos society and human behaviour would be transformed overnight, as has our power of rational thinking by the adoption of reason there.

Secondly; Macmurray has, or hopes to induce us to, shift the whole emphasis of our living from thought and reflection to action. This especially applies to philosophising, but also more widely. Important as thinking is admitted by Macmurray to be, thought is not an end in itself. Thinking can never give us the truth about existence and reality, much as it has sought to do so in 2500 years of Western tradition. Only life and living i.e. action, can reveal truth. The world is one action. We are the current, living, "agents", and exemplification, of that action. Our task, individually and collectively, is to discern our role in that one act, and perform it.

Thirdly; Macmurray is re-establishing religion. He is re-establishing it to its former and rightful role as the key and vital essence of human living. We are persons. We are not merely matter or organisms - essential as these dimensions may be to our continued existence. Relating to each other, mutuality, and the creation of community - and an ever-widening and including community at that - are our prime conditions and endeavours as persons. If we are not living thus, intentionally, we have downgraded and demeaned ourselves

to mere organisms, or even to things. And religion is both the state and instrument of this personhood. Religion humanises.

Unfortunately formal religion, by clinging out of fear to old forms, ceremonies, traditions, dogmas, imagery, practices, and rites - all very relevant and valid in their time - has ceased to be religious in the real and necessary sense. Only a revised, contemporary-orientated, mature, non-dogmatic, empirical religion can be of any value today and fulfil its vital role, as outlined above.

The revealing of this situation, and the advocacy of the urgent recognition and implementation of such a renewed and acceptable religion in all our lives is one of Macmurray's major ideas and contributions to the contemporary, malfunctioning, sick, and diseased situation of man and of human malaise.

His Description and Place

How best can we describe and place Macmurray?

Two ways can best show these - the second following reasonably from the first.

Firstly; there can be no doubt that Macmurray enables us to see, - and, if we will, accept - old, long-standing, and intrinsic elements and basic conceptions of Western man in a new way. And not merely in a new way, but one which is acceptable to contemporary man, with all his modern knowledge and scepticism. Examples of these are God, Christianity, religion, human relating, and the uniqueness of man and his being.

After Darwin, Freud, Science, and Technology - and their immensely wider and philosophical influence, each tending to

diminish, belittle, dwarf, demoralise, materialise, and debase man - Macmurray demonstrates that we are of a different order from that which we have, mistakenly and erroneously, by the foregoing events, been pressurised into thinking we are - with all its adverse moral and social consequences.

And he does this rationally and acceptably i.e. we can quite comfortably take the necessary steps to cross the divide and not have to believe and take things on faith, a way totally out of keeping with contemporary methods, and one of the principal causes of our problems today. We have got into a mess. Macmurray shows us the way back to the last crossroads acceptably so that we can take once again, if we will, the right road forward. In this Macmurray is unique.

Secondly; because of the foregoing Macmurray must be regarded as a bridge. Unlike with Kierkegaard and all the other religious teachers and apologists - great and small - we are not asked to "leap" by faith across a gaping chasm, or be damned.

Nor is Macmurray the kind to persuasively and gently lead us across the lower but nevertheless safer and solid stepping stones.

Well in keeping with philosophy - and this is why he must be, and can only be, regarded as a philosopher, despite cries to the contrary - he constructs a bridge. We cross it if we will, and if we see the rationality of so doing.

This bridge can be seen in many forms.

It is a bridge from thought and the armchair to real living and action. Thought at last has relevance!

It is a bridge from the old religion of dogmas, beliefs, tradition, and demanded and compulsory conformity, to the new

religion of openness, empiricism, and creativity.

It is a bridge from the cul-de-sac of niggling over-concern with words, logic, and proof to a wider conspectus of what philosophy really exists for.

It is a bridge from an excessive analysis of everything, so inhibiting and stultifying, to action, to a synthetical attitude encompassing more and more of wholeness, life, and relationships.

It is a bridge from the arid, soulless, intellect and excessive IQism, to the richer life of emotion and genuinely caring.

It is a bridge from self-centredness, subjectivity, fear, and insecurity - and all the psychosomatic disorders these bring - to maturity, health, and freedom.

And Macmurray is able to build this bridge because he is uniquely placed in both camps; or should we say, both sides of the river. Most people know only one side, even those who profess to be universalists in one form or another - if universalism can be so qualified!

His failings

What are Macmurray's failings, shortcomings, and shortfallings? He has, of course, many.

For a philosopher he lacks argument. He does not lack rationality. Far from it. His attitude to all the aspects of life he tackles, and these are more than with most philosophers, is far more rational than that of most highly acclaimed philosophers.

But at least you expect some reasons to be given to substantiate a contention. These Macmurray rarely, if ever, gives. Absolute

proof of anything there never can be. Logic is not quite so important in life as some would have us believe. But from a philosopher, or even a professional thinker on anything, we expect some indication of the ways a conception has been reached. This is better for the contender. It would show he had worked through his thinking, foreseen possible difficulties, and not merely jumped to conclusions.

Although an avowed empiricist - to turn to another shortcoming - even extending empiricism to fields not usually regarded as particularly favourable to this approach, Macmurray often fails to live up to this, his proclaimed intention, in his own discussions and analysis. To give but one example. He believes in God. This comes out very affirmatively in his writings. But where is the empirical evidence for such an entity? Admittedly Macmurray does try to place God as the sum total, the ground, of all relationships. But is this not either an arbitrary conception or merely a begging of the question, or a circular and unprovable contention?

A further failing is that of not showing us how. Surely as a professional, practical, philosopher i.e. all thought is for action, that is, effect on living; surely as a philosopher, "living out" over the years his own philosophy - as he must have done to be sincere - he must have learned a lot about the practice and effecting of his ideas.

Yet on one occasion when the practical aspects, and the implementation thereof, a very important matter in the education of the emotions is specifically referred to he passes the buck and says that, once accepted in principle, trained professional

educationalists could soon work out ways of effecting that particular idea. This for me, and no doubt for countless others, is not good enough. As I have proved, in my own living, Macmurray's philosophy is something which, once accepted, we begin to work out for ourselves. But this task would be much easier if, at least sometimes, Macmurray had indicated "how". Many people would not have a clue as to how to begin, let alone do it.

The Last Word

Despite failings, unheedings, neglect, and thinking and philosophising in a manner unfashionable with the present pundits and self-appointed philosophical establishment, I believe Macmurray has a vital, rational, message for mankind. He has shown us a way - back or forward, whichever way you look at it - into a full, rich, whole emotional life of community and relating, from the attainment of which we have strayed, temporarily let it be hoped, by our excessive concern with science, technology, the intellect and thought, all of which are merely instrumental. Today, ever-increasingly and mistakenly, we regard them as ends.

Until more of us heed Macmurray and what he is saying, the world and man must drift more and more into a rigid and arid cul-de-sac from which it may eventually not be able to free itself. We shall be done.

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MACMURRAY'S SOURCES AND POSSIBLE SOURCES

Macmurray makes no acknowledgements, direct or indirect, to other thinkers or sources as sources. But two of these are obvious. They are:-

- 1) The New Testament
- 2) Marx

It comes through also that Macmurray is a great admirer of Plato and Kant. But as these were both dualists and Macmurray is an avowed monist, it cannot be said that these are a source of his essential ideas.

J.B. Coates (Ten Modern Prophets - 1944) suggests that Macmurray got much from Bergson - although Bergson is mentioned only once in all Macmurray's works. But although both are extra-materialist, Bergson makes life or the organic paramount, whereas for Macmurray the personal is the ultimate essence. However Macmurray no doubt got something of importance from Bergson's moral and religious thinking.

Except in passing, Macmurray hardly refers to anybody. From this we may infer that his sources are merely unacknowledged or that he is a profoundly original thinker. As no thinker exists, not even Plato, much as he is hailed as the father of Western thought, who received nothing from either predecessors or the general trends of thought of his age and society somewhere, however difficult to trace exactly, it is improbable that Macmurray is wholly original.

Macmurray's Sources (Continued)

Therefore I suggest the following as possible additional sources. All, in some way or another, put something other than thought and intelligence as the essence of man, and as the proper end and procedure of philosophy.

B.P. Bowne (1847-1910) - an early personalist. One idea of his is especially relevant for Macmurray; God is a Worker

James Ward (1843-1910)

E.S. Brightman (1884-1953)

M. Blondel (1861-1949) - perhaps the most avowed of all Actionists.

M. Buber (1878-1965)

M. de Unamuno (1864-1936)

J. Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955)

N. Berdyaev (1874-1948)

For reasons not entirely convincing Macmurray several times denounces, and denies any association with, Pragmatism. But can we fail to see, even if he didn't, the influence of the Pragmatists upon his thinking?

C.S. Peirce (1839-1914)

W. James (1842-1910)

J. Dewey (1859-1952)

Pierce says, "The whole function of thought is to produce habits of action". If not identical, Macmurray's ideas shine through here.

Macmurray's Sources (Continued)

Whilst having much in common with the Existentialists, Macmurray was just too early to be influenced by the mid-twentieth century Existentialists (e.g. Sartre); although from the earlier Heidegger (1889-1976) he may have got some of his ideas, especially those on death. Kierkegaard's 'leap of faith' has no place in his staunch empiricism. There is not much sign of the Phenomenology of Husserl in Macmurray's works.

Footnote

Despite his very different vocabulary, imagery, and conceptions - and his bizarre neologisms - it is interesting to compare Teilhard de Chardin with Macmurray. Both are of the same time; both have very strong scientific backgrounds, both are totally Christian; and both foretell the inevitable coming of the World of God, through man, irrespective of man's compliance, indifference, or defiance.