Rage, Rancour and Revenge
Existentialist Motives in International Relations

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Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

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Abstract

Emotions are gaining an increasingly prominent role in the study of International Relations. As a relatively new frontier, there is still considerable work to be done in streamlining various efforts into a systematic study. These efforts have largely circled on describing the cognitive and action potential of specific emotions, such as anger, fear and trust. This thesis is concerned with an extreme emotion, the emotion of rage. I stress the action potential of revenge, as well as the cognitive elements at play here, most specifically the issue of abrupt changes to morality. I use both Greek and Nietzschean philosophy to construct a binary approach to rage that acknowledges both the violent and bloody manifestation - we still witness today - as well as the silent, non-violent rancour that searches for an opportune moment before exploding into action.
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The fire is in the minds of men and not in the roofs of houses.

Fyodor Dostoyevsky
A particularly interesting myth found in the plays of Ancient Greece tells of the dreaded *Erinyes*, a gang of three sisters dressed in tattered black robes. Their faces are covered in blood with discharge seeping from their eyes. They prefer dark places hiding their shrivelled faces and featherless wings. They do not speak but shriek and hiss and feast on human flesh. Modern culture would describe them as ghoulish vampires, half animal, half something once human. In the Greek myths in which they feature, the Erinyes show up after a terrible crime is committed. They lust for the blood of the criminal, besieging others, hissing and howling, incessantly screeching: “Get Him, Get Him, Get Him”. Their names are *Alecta*, the angry; *Megaera*, the grudging; and *Tisiphone*, the vengeful, and they are the personification of rage and revenge impulses in Ancient Greece. They are known as harbingers of disorder and civil war. Their lust for revenge is insatiable; every crime committed demands total punishment. But tragically every punishment becomes a crime in its own right, leading to endless cycles of violence. Their reputation is so fearsome that kings will dare not touch individuals, if they are rumoured to court the presence of these demons.

It is hard to believe, but the Erinyes have an indispensable role in society; they are the ultimate guardians of order and fierce defenders of the rule of Zeus. Their unsightly presence is not accidental or the product of some curse but a clear and causal reaction to a breach of law and dismissal of Zeus’ order. The Erinyes appear and demand blood whenever subjects break the most sacred laws by murdering a fellow citizen. Their presence, in other words, is a natural reaction to acts of great wrongdoing and injustice. But despite such noble calling, their distorted and ghoulish appearances belie the very sense of civic duty and wisdom their presence implies. On the contrary, they resemble the uncivilized impulsiveness and carnal desires attributed to all those who undermine civil order by giving in to unthinking passions and private concerns. The raging Erinyes are at once *cause and consequence*, as well as *judge and executioner*.

In today’s culture, the Erinyes are a mere shadow of their former self; they survive as vampires, witches or demons in scary movies preying on innocent teenagers. Their ghoulish and repulsive appearances still inspire fear but they have lost their political and judicial mandate. The underworld they represent no longer bares resemblance to ideas of political
injustice and civil disorder. This thesis in many ways aims to rehabilitate the myth of the Erinyes and return rage and revenge to their rightful place as reactions to injustice and wrongdoing. In Ancient Greece the connection between injustice and revenge was understood and gravely lamented. Playwrights tried to warn, explain, educate and ultimately resolve the inevitable curse of revenge cycles that would plunge entire communities into prolonged warfare, ending in death and devastation. Today’s world shares too many similarities to ignore the lessons of this ancient emotional economy.

At the time of writing, the South China Sea is measuring up to become a critical boiling point in regional South East Asian relations and a litmus test for how Asian countries deal with China’s inevitable rise and concomitant hegemonic privileges and rights. Ukraine continues to be a battleground for separatist ambitions, fuelled by old rivalries reminiscent of the darkest days of the Cold War. The Middle East remains a timeless kaleidoscope of violence, grievance, bloodshed and uncompromising religious and moral fervour. The traditional view of warfare as a continuation of politics loses much of its appeal when those involved are fighting against their own nation or desire to see their opponent suffer rather than achieve long-lasting strategic aims. The discipline of International Relations has been slow to adopt a more modern psychological understanding of violence, instead only gradually weaning itself off a disastrous dependence on rational actor models and a far too narrow view on motivations in international affairs.

The last decade has seen a rise in scholarship concerned with emotions in International Relations. Early explorations into neuroscientific research introduced the role of emotions into the field of cognition, making important qualifications on how nations – or specifically their leaders – make decisions, discount risk and select information. The events of 9/11 provoked renewed interest in the motivational aspect of emotions, constructing linear causalities regarding how event X causes emotion Y, and in turn how emotion Y leads to response Z. Under the headwind of the terrorist attacks, scholars began researching concepts like humiliation, slights and ontological displacement to understand why groups engage in terrorist activities and seek such terrible results. These two streams have come together in the last few years and carried emotions into the mainstream of International Relations scholarship. The traditional study of interest-based politics was not supplanted but certainly forced to accommodate new insights and new modes of analysis. Emotions have become a
serious and dynamic new field of study, with an explanatory power quickly outstripping any rational actor model-based analysis.

The aim of this thesis is to contribute to our understanding of violence by exploring two distinct philosophical treatments of the “revenge” emotion. I pay homage to the causal view of emotion that some serious injustice or mistreatment leads to a desire for revenge; however the core of this research concerns itself with the cognitive and moral aspect. The peculiarity, I wish to highlight, is the total moral certainty found to operate in even the greatest acts of brutality and punishment. All acts of revenge found in literature or history are gilded by a sense of moral righteousness. The Erinyes enjoyed total moral certainty in their bloodlust because they took their judicial mandate from Zeus, the highest and most absolute source of authority. Transgressions invariably lead to just punishment, because the law of Zeus was absolute and every citizen knew this. The specific act of the revenge act becomes less interesting than the justification for it. Along with the Greek reading of revenge, however, I also wish to posit a reading of Nietzsche’s *Ressentiment*. Nietzsche’s investigation of revenge stressed even more the cognitive dimension and “inner life” of the revenge emotion. He argued that in light of inaction, the revenge impulse could be deflected into moral debasement alone. When an injustice is committed, the victim, now unable to act, would seek revenge by absorbing the rage into an act of moral transvaluation; like the lambs in Nietzsche’s famous story, who derided the values and virtues of their tormentors, instead of physically punishing them.

The reason I chose the Greeks, specifically the myth of Erinyes, and Nietzsche as theoretical cornerstones and ignored the remaining canon of Western philosophers and theorists is straightforward: With the Greeks we get a beautifully constructed analysis that sets rage apart from anger and other negative emotions. The Erinyes were not angry or disappointed or resentful; they were raging - meaning they were geared for action, demanding total results. The Greek emotional economy allowed for anger and resentment to be felt and expressed within the civic order (*nomos*); however the revenge emotion lay outside the scope of civic order, and as such this emotion was immediately seen as animalistic and brutal, void of any social concern. For analytical purposes the flip from social emotions to asocial impulse is extremely enlightening. In the Greek myths, all raging heroes took on animalistic forms: disrobing, walking on all fours, and demanding the raw flesh of their enemies. The Greeks stressed that the framing of a negative emotion was a function of social standards, and that in
rage alone the subject was seen as isolated in norms and values from her community. In other words, she became an asocial animal governed by inaccessible private concerns. To my knowledge there is no equal in the elegance of the Greek playwrights in expressing such a complex idea in such a simple form.

So while one choice came down to a matter of aesthetic preference, the other was one of theoretical innovation. Nietzsche’s *Genealogy of Morals* provided the theoretical building blocks for *Ressentiment*, a dynamic emotion that could irreparably alter the subject’s identity. This became an interesting supplement. What the Greeks described as a transformation of the outward bodily appearance, Nietzsche began describing as an inward process. In many ways, the inaccessible private concerns of the raging Greek hero became the starting point of Nietzsche’s psychological investigation. Nevertheless, the Greeks and Nietzsche shared in equal measure in the condemnation of the rage emotion; the Greeks showed their disgust by having heroes regress to feral animals, while Nietzsche spoke enigmatically of a poisoning of the mind. But Nietzsche could do something the Greeks, and indeed any thinker before him, except for maybe Shakespeare and the likes of Gogol and Dostoyevsky, could not: Nietzsche no longer required any “tragic” proof for his analysis - in fact values and morality sufficed. His genealogical investigation could tease out the existence of rage, without having actors commit grotesque acts of violence and bloodshed. And how could they? Nietzsche’s subjects were the “weak” and incompetent. And so *Ressentiment* became a true innovation by describing how rage metastasized into a stiff rancour, ostensibly docile but in fact no less vicious and demanding than the Greek alternative.

Nietzsche of course lamented this psychological mechanism and urged his readers to return to the pure behaviour of his beloved Greeks. Heroes like Achilles gave in to their emotions without second-guessing or moral deliberation; if they were angry, they punished; if they were sad, they wept. Arguably, however this noble behaviour is the product of an overly stylized literary prose and slightly out-dated psychological understanding. We now know that emotions and moral judgement occur simultaneously, with many scholars from diverse disciplines successfully arguing that they are in fact inseparable from one another.¹ This thesis

will explore this complex interaction, and argue that the willingness to kill and instrumentalize others rests on moral exclusion and a withdrawal of compassion and mercy towards the target. This state of affairs will be shown to have an emotional foundation. However at the same time, I also wish to show that Nietzsche’s insight allows us to construct a scenario where the same rage can exist in moral valuation alone, provided the subject feels herself unable to act. This should raise serious questions regarding the issue of legitimacy and order in the face of a perceived lack of violence and bloody revolt.

These efforts will lead to a construction of a *Rage Binary*: Following an injustice or mistreatment, actors will give in to the *Erinyes'* demands and either engage in violence and open revenge or, hobbled by strategic incompetence and inaction, internalize the cries of the *Erinyes* through the Nietzschean mechanism of *Ressentiment*. The causal mechanism either way posits an injustice or grave mistreatment as the cause of the revenge impulse, and aligns with the existing literature on humiliation and slights in International Relations. From the view of the offender the ensuing violence is always justified and morally righteous; this moral absoluteness is what unites the *Rage Binaries* in revenge and *Ressentiment*, despite the obvious differences in manifestation.

The Greek understanding of rage, borne from the actions of tragic figures, such as Achilles, Ajax and Hecuba, and Nietzsche’s theory of *Ressentiment*, which, despite its claim of cultural expertise, is, too, an individual-centred theory, cannot be transposed onto state-conduct without necessary explanation; in other words the move from individual psychology to international relations cannot be taken for granted. In the field of emotion, IR scholars have constructed diverse approaches regarding how to bridge the gap between individually felt emotions and their resonance on state conduct. Richard Ned Lebow for instance argues that the emotions of key decision-makers matter, because their decisions and preferences ultimately decide inter-state conduct.\textsuperscript{2} The German sociologist Axel Honneth takes a similar view, but does not ignore the “masses”, because their preferences and decisions necessarily feed through the democratic process - provided there is one.\textsuperscript{3} The German-American IR theorist Alexander Wendt looks at the precise mechanism of state emotionality and explains

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that we readily impose personhood on states, especially when it concerns emotional reactions.\(^4\) But the emotionality of the state is not some semantic trick; it is simply a reference-shortcut to the shared emotionality of the people, who register the same emotional trigger and consequently portray a similar if not uniform reaction. IR scholarship has consequently turned to social psychology and the study of groups to bolster their understanding of shared emotionality.

For the emotion of rage, as understood through a reading of the Greeks, certain provisions exist that facilitate the move from individual to group psychology. The rule of Zeus, or \textit{nomos}, remains the guiding principle for an understanding of Greek rage. As we will discover in Chapter 1, nomos holds ontological importance for the individual; without nomos the individual is unable to relate to the world and to others. Rage, however, arises when nomos is \textit{intentionally} breached. For the Greeks, a breach of nomos was extremely dangerous because it could set off a chain reaction, where one breach leads to another, until the very idea of civil order is forgotten. This lawlessness and disorder was the very state of affairs inhabited by the Erinyes, so vividly mirrored by their horrendous appearance. The importance of nomos for social identity and ontological security, along with its clear connection to the Erinyes, provides a strong foundation for the move into social psychology and group relations, allowing the wisdom of the Greeks to take on a modern social-scientific form. The issue then simply is how to translate the concept of nomos without loss.

In the thesis I make the leap from individual psychology to group psychology and International Relations by taking a democratic stance on state emotionality. This is not to argue that elite leadership is not influential, or that there exists no political divorce between the “masses” and the appointed state leaders, but rather that rage affords a natural pathway that is essentially inclusive. Implicit to the Greek concept of nomos is the need for group membership; nomos exists between individuals and as more individuals acknowledge nomos, the group grows in numbers, yet it always remains a function of the nomos recognition. Individuals who threaten nomos are immediately chastised and exiled from the community; they have forfeited their citizenship by ignoring the rule of nomos and are no longer considered a good fit for the community. In Greek psychology, group membership was vital for a sense of self, more specifically the procurement of honour and standing, which Plato

believed to be so fundamental to Greek life that it must constitute a dominant psychological drive, i.e. the *thymos*. In other words, Greeks needed the community in order to satisfy their psychological need for distinction and praise, and without nomos there could be no community. A modern psychological understanding of group membership has shifted the focus away from honour and standing towards a more existentially informed understanding of membership. For group theorists, individuals require group membership in order to create a sense of identity and belonging, warding off so-called “mortality salience” – a frightful realization of our own inevitable death and meaninglessness. The point however is not that Greek psychology was wrong in believing that individuals seek honour, because what they really seek is existential meaning, but rather to understand that the role of the group has not much changed since the days of the Greeks; whether for honour or existential security, we need to belong. The mechanism that unites individuals for their personal needs - forcing groups into existence - remains intact. The raison d’être might again be more refined for some later age, but the reliance on others remains engrained for all individuals alike.

Rage is an “easy” emotion to analyse because it lends itself readily to absolutes. There are no half-measures in rage. For the Greeks, there are no half-breaches of nomos, no misunderstandings, no personal justification – a breach is a breach. The key point, however, is that such measures do not arise from some draconian legal system but rather from the independent and natural emotional capacity of individuals. The Erinyes could ultimately be banished by the Athenian judicial system, but they existed long before and indeed long after. The informal law of nomos and its centrality for the psychological health of the Greek individual meant that a dismissal of nomos flipped the Greeks from normal, considerate social beings into vile, cannibalistic animals – kindred spirits of the Erinyes. This mechanism, I argue, exists in modern group theory also. The law of nomos has been diluted into a general principle of group survival: If the group is threatened in its fundamental existential foundation, members become enraged with the culprit. In other words, if an outside force undermines the existential pillars of a group, the group becomes enraged because the existential needs of group members are being ignored –or even intentionally challenged. This allows all members to register the same emotion of rage because all members, despite their individualistic diversity, share the same fundamental need for the survival of their group. Nomos, in other words, re-emerges as the sanctity of group existence. Again, just as with the Greeks, there exist no half-measures, no misunderstandings, no justification; challenging the fundamental pillars of groups’ existence sums the Erinyes.
Hence, the Greek and Nietzschean psychologies used in the thesis still operate individually, but are simply held to operate equally for all individuals that belong to the same group. This allows us to transpose these individual mechanisms to group level and supplement the theoretical standpoints found in the existing literature on group dynamics and in social psychology. Of course this approach is not perfect: even in groups sub-sections always exist and identities often overlap. But for the purpose of bringing Greek and Nietzschean psychologies to bear on International Relations, we may ignore these shortcomings and move forward. So with this foundation set, the thesis develops along the following lines:

In Chapter 1 I explore the Ancient Greek understanding of rage and revenge through an analysis of three plays that deal heavily with these themes: Euripides’ *Hecuba*, Homer’s *Iliad* and Aeschylus’ *Oresteia*. In order to approach the domain of the Erinyes, the concept of nomos, their judicial mandate, will be explored. In Euripides’ *Hecuba* and Homer’s *Iliad* I will argue that both characters suffered slights and injustices but only felt rage in one specific injustice; Hecuba suffered a series of tragedies but only engaged in revenge after her son Polydorus was found dead; equally Achilles famously withdraws from battle following a slight from Agamemnon, but only engages in his signature rage once Hector kills Patrocles. Through the insights of Classics scholars like Seaford, Nussbaum and Cartledge, I wish to show how an explicit breach of nomos is causally linked to these rage events, and that other insults and slights can be governed and indeed regulated by nomos, resulting in less severe emotional reactions. Following this, I will explore the world of the Erinyes and illustrate how breaches to nomos are regarded as polluting for individuals and communities alike, leading to socio-economic evils like droughts, plagues and civil war. I will probe into this interesting phenomenon and how the Greek playwrights were able to view rage as a socio-political malady rather than a human emotion and how this insight relates to our modern understanding of rage.

Chapter 2 explores rage from a modern psychological standpoint. I will introduce theories on emotional genesis and explore the differences in the key theories. Following the scientific consensus, *Cognitive Appraisal Theory* will be explored in relation to rage. Insights from neuroscience will highlight how the brain operates during anger and aggression. However, in line with the overall critique on the limits of MRI scans for the study of emotions, I will turn to the social sciences to construct a paradigm of the trigger elicitation and action tendency of
rage; the trigger will be social in nature and thus depend on a specific set of appraisals that determine that rage is indeed the correct emotional reaction. Here I return to the Greeks and their understanding that rage relates to a breach of the fundamental law of nomos. I will introduce the emotional theories of the English philosopher P.F. Strawson and his distinction of emotional appraisal being predicated on either an objective attitude or a moral attitude; the former will be aligned with nomos-voiding behaviour, where the subject suffers an injustice that undermines her moral worth and consequently reacts in a way that takes this moral disregard as a legitimate foundation of an objective attitude that sets no limits on punishment and treats the target without compassion or any moral regard. I will refer to Frantz Fanon’s concept of emancipatory violence to illustrate this further.

Chapter 3 elevates the discussion into the realm of inter-group relations. In accordance with social psychologist Marilynn Brewer’s Optimal Distinction Theory, I will elaborate a set of fundamental existential demands that each group must satisfy for their individual members. Following events that frustrate these demands, groups will experience the same register of moral mistreatment and injustice found in Fanon’s case but on a group-level scale. This leads to the creation of righteous group rage. I will explore prevalent theories on inter-group morality and emotions to understand how inter-group violence is understood. I will also make use of Gustav Ichheiser’s long forgotten, but very relevant, ideas on misunderstandings in International Relations and how groups labour under the illusion that all groups share the same conceptualization of justice and fairness, underlining the problem of false legitimacy in inter-group relations and hierarchies. Following this, I will argue that the mechanism outlined in Chapter 2 applies equally to inter-group relations, and illustrate how groups create moral mandates for action. Specifically, I will elaborate on two different moral mandates and how they relate to the sense of righteous rage and the moral certainty necessary for bloodshed and violence. I wish to show that the mandate of demonization follows the logic of righteous rage, explicated in the myth of the Erinyes, while the mandate of dehumanization, which has been found to coincide with guilt, problematizes the idea of moral certainty and righteous rage.

Building on this, Chapter 4 reframes the ensuing violence and argues that - following an injustice or mistreatment - groups exact not simply violence, but revenge. I will explore the meaning of revenge and illustrate differences to adjacent concepts like retribution, reprisal and deterrence. For this, I draw on numerous sources to crystallize the meaning and morality in revenge. I use insights from social psychology and moral philosophy as well as literary
criticism, drawing on revenge dramas both old and new, to show how revenge can often enough lead to an arrested state of being rather than satisfaction and release. This will ultimately lead to the Nietzschean interpretation of revenge that stresses the irredeemable past nature of injustices and that revenge is first and foremost a displacement, because of the underlining inability to move back time and undo the past injustice. With this in mind, I make a distinction between revenge and scapegoating.

Chapter 5 introduces Nietzsche’s concept of Ressentiment. I take this to be a binary to violent revenge described in Chapter 4. I begin by contrasting Ressentiment with scapegoating as well as the theories of the anthropologist James C. Scott whose theory of hidden transcripts describes a type of suspended revenge. Hidden transcripts, like Ressentiment, retain the rage, but explode into violence once the subject has gained strategic leverage. Ressentiment is different and denies violence, instead producing a type of satisfaction and revenge based on moral superiority, while permanently demonizing the virtues and values of the offender. Nietzsche’s two classic examples of The Lambs and Birds of Prey and Knight and Priests will be augmented with a reading of Aesop’s Fox and the Sour Grapes. Aesop’s fable will be used to illustrate an important element in Ressentiment that is echoed in Nietzsche’s Doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence and offers a solution to the problem of Ressentiment, and by extension, the entire problem of revenge. The solution will be sketched in basic terms.

The last chapter probes into the current literature on reconciliation. I explore different strategies, both old and new, and test whether any of them mistake Nietzschean Ressentiment for genuine forgiveness and a willingness to forego punishment. Practices found to operate in Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC) will be scrutinized and explored from the angle of moral exclusion, arguing that there is still a strong inclination to view rage only through its overt, violent revenge binary instead of its more covert and vindictive Ressentiment binary. I argue that true reconciliation must be predicated on an inclusive moral attitude infused with compassion and moral regard for the offender. I then explore the psychological mechanism found in Cultures of Defeat in International Relations and argue that the prevalent themes of collective narrative reconstruction, vilification of past military elites and tropes of victimhood can be represented as a Ressentiment, but one that is somehow past orientated and thus perfectly situated to reframe the past injustice, thus allowing nations to move on and establish new sources of esteem and entertain a morality free of rancour and the objective attitude towards others.
In the conclusion, I take the theoretical insights and construct five ideal-type scenarios, covering the entire spectrum of rage manifestations; three are inspired by the Greek manifestation, two by the Nietzschean one. I also provide historical examples that capture the essence of each rage strategy. This should set the stage for a more empirically minded follow-up project that leaves theory behind and instead focuses on real-life application, paving the way for a more nuanced understanding of violence and disorder in global affairs.
Chapter 1

Rage in Ancient Greece

The playwrights of Ancient Greece cultivated a rich understanding of rage that went beyond the emotional; rage was as much a reaction to a specific type of injustice as it was a disease that could pollute and erode the social foundation of entire communities. Almost all Greek tragedies played on some variation of these themes, and the list of characters and examples of awesome feats of destruction still resonate today; Achilles’ wrath is legendary and the *Iliad* remains the number one book for new recruits in the US army, while Ajax’s misguided rampage is often cited in debates on Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). But more than inspire, these Greek myths can tell us something about the nature and causes of extreme violence. In order to use these insights, one must strip away the notion that their behaviour is somehow irrational or divinely inspired, implying a lack of agency or rationale on behalf of the subject; even today too much violence is still dismissed as the product of some alleged psychological deficiency. Instead, the fate of such tragic figures as Achilles, Hecuba, Oedipus or Orestes, must be understood through a reading of Greek psychology and socio-political institutions. Any understanding of Greek rage and revenge, as encapsulated in the cult of the Erinyes, must be approached through the study of the role of *nomos* in Greek political life, as well as the psycho-political construct of the *thymos*. With the help of these two concepts it is possible to understand Greek rage and revenge.

Scholars debate the usefulness in studying the customs of Ancient Greece, especially in the field of emotions, such as anger. Muellner argues that “there is no reason to assume that the … emotion that they represent and that we tend to experience as inherent in human nature are actually universal,” while Konstan agrees that “there is reason to think that the ancient Greek

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concept (of anger) is in fact significantly different from the mode.”

Against this trend of over-exoticizing the Greeks, scholars such as Nussbaum and Lebow point out that Aristotle’s take on emotion is increasingly vindicated in the field of cognitive neurology. Neurologists such as Richard Lazarus, Richard Davidson and Antonio Damasio all make explicit reference to Aristotle’s *On Rhetoric* in their work. The current scientific consensus in the study of emotion, known as *Appraisal Theory*, undoubtedly has its debt to pay to Aristotle. The most recent treatment of Greek anger by Kostas Kalimtzis favours a middle ground. Kalimtzis believes that “a possibility for dialogue between ancient cultures and our own exists; we must attempt it in a way which avoids both the naïve assumption of shared humanity and unsuccessful strategies of alienation.”

A promising way to make good on these demands is to fully unpack the Greek ideas and concepts, making them accessible to us, while avoiding unnecessary excuses and post-rationalization in the process. There is no problem in admitting that the present economy of emotion no longer functions like that of the Greeks, while still admitting that there is something worth knowing or indeed instructive about these ancient practices.

This chapter will begin with an explanation of the Greek concept of nomos, before moving on to discuss the role of nomos in Euripides’s *Hecuba*, and specifically how a breach of nomos led the Trojan Queen Hecuba to construct a new set of moral values, allowing her to exact a most brutal revenge. I will then proceed to comment on Achilles’ rage in Homer’s *Iliad*, striking important parallels to Hecuba’s behaviour and motivation; the key is to show that anger and rage are two distinct emotions, and recognizable as such. After this, I will unpack the Greek psychology of the thymos and how it relates to rage and revenge. This will then lead to a discussion of the Erinyes and their role in Aeschylus *Oresteia*, one of the key foundation myths of Western jurisprudence. Following from this the Greek socio-psychological concept of miasma – or pollution - will be explored to show how a visitation of the Erinyes can lead to civil war and disaster. Lastly, I will comment on how the idea of pollution still resonates in today’s descriptions of violence and aggression, and how our

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understanding of rage remains – surprisingly – unchanged since the time of the great Greek playwrights.

**Nomos: A Divine Order of Man-made Laws**

According to Aeschylus’ *Oresteia*, nomos in ancient Greece is the domain of the Erinyes; they guard nomos and punish those who act against this social institution. Their merciless rage and revenge indicates that a breach of *nomos* is met with utmost fierceness and unmitigated severity. The literal translation of *nomos* is ‘law,’ ’custom,’ or ‘convention’. Nomos serves an important social function by regulating the behaviour of community members - much like laws and social conventions do today. However, nomos is invested with a different type of authority. Barry Sandywell argues that the emergence of *nomos* as a concept was intertwined with the increasing socialization of Greek life through the practice of myth making. Myths, Sandywell argues, “provided symbolic resources for the social construction of reflexive experience.”

It was only through the increasing telling and re-telling of myths that the world of the Greeks came to be. Myths, understood here as the practice of collective narrative and discourse formation, introduced ideas of agency and causality to the Greek mind, paving the way for an understanding of history that would value lessons (poetry) over facts (history).

Sandywell explains: “Myth socializes the word by sacralising the world.” The power principles and political order of Mount Olympus informed, and at the same time reproduced, the principles found in the model of Greek “kinship-ordered communities”. The patriarchy of the village became anchored in the patriarchy of Zeus. And the myths of Mount Olympus with their colourful intrigues, rampant jealousies and devastating angers, mirrored the communities they sought to educate and entertain. These divine schemas of behaviour and justice “became synonymous with the fundamental structure of the universe itself.” The social convention of nomos was taken from these myths invested with the awesome authority of Zeus, and thus became sacred. Those who lacked nomos were deemed savages. The Great

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13 Sandywell, *The Beginnings of European Theorizing*. p. 5
14 Ibid. p. 37
15 Ibid. p. 37
historian Herodotus, cites the Scythian tribe of the *Androphogoi*, whose name literally means “man-eaters’, as an example of such a people.\textsuperscript{16} In other words, *nomos* had a civilizing effect on people by providing a sense of moral order and civic experience.

Sandywell argues that an opposition to *nomos* developed in relation to *dike*. Although both concepts are the product of Zeus’ supreme order, dike began to stand in conflict with nomos – at least by the time of Hesiod and most prominently in Sophocles’ *Antigone*. Understood as “mankind’s sole protection and defence against conflict and strife”\textsuperscript{17} and a type of feminine natural justice that existed beyond man-made convention and laws, dike was often invoked by those excluded or mistreated by nomos. In Sophocles, Antigone famously invokes dike when she acts against the patriarchal order of King Creon by burying her brother, Polynices. She explains her reasoning thus:

> “For these laws were not ordained by Zeus, and she who sits enthroned with gods below, justice (dike) enacted not these human laws (nomos). Nor did I deem that thou, a mortal man, couldst by a breath annul and override the unwritten laws of heaven. They were not born to day nor yesterday, They die not; and none knoweth whence they sprang.”\textsuperscript{18}

Antigone in a way overrules the written law of *nomos* by claiming that the decree ordered by Creon is not just, and thus cannot be sanctioned by Zeus, effectively dissolving the authority of her king’s demand. As mentioned, *nomos* originated in the kinship-order; the most important nomos consequently is *moira*, the law governing family relations. Thus Antigone’s claim that Creon’s decree lacks authority because it undermines the natural justice (*dike*) of the family (*moira*) is extremely relevant. The Greek Historian Herodotus was equally concerned with the ‘tyranny of *nomos’*, elaborating on the distinction between *nomos* meaning custom and convention and *nomos* meaning law, the latter often being corrupted and lending itself too easily to despotic and arbitrary rule, infused with divine authority.\textsuperscript{19}

Regardless of whether a set of laws is deemed just or unjust from one point of view or another, *nomos* in Ancient Greece creates order, and an order directly linked to Mount

\textsuperscript{17} Sandywell, *The Beginnings of European Theorizing*. p. 202
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid. p. 203
\textsuperscript{19} Cartledge, *The Greeks*. p. 108
Olympus no less; its purpose transcends the gripes of individuals. Because *nomos* enables actors to invest their activity with certain expectations, it helps make sense of the world by aligning action with meaning. Consequently a breach of *nomos* is sacrilegious, because it questions the validity of the symbolic order. Expectations and actions misalign, paving the way for disorder. Breaches of *nomos* in all the Greek myths, without exception, lead to dire consequences. Even Antigone’s breach of *nomos*, which is clearly articulated and justified, not only ends in her tragic suicide but in the devastation of the entire city. There is a natural order expressed in *nomos* that demands obedience and reverence beyond personal feelings of mistreatment or injustice. Members of the community are expected to uphold *nomos*, and in turn can expect others do so.

Martha Nussbaum stresses a more enveloping interpretation of nomos. Her understanding takes on an almost existential mantel. She takes her cue from Aristotle, who judges that nomos “has no power towards obedience but that of habit”; Nussbaum proceeds to argue how “enforced changes in these habits may lead to a climate of rootlessness and upheaval.”20 She bases her interpretation on Euripides’s *Hecuba*; a play discussed at length in the next section.

Nussbaum believes that nomos holds ontological importance. This finds further support in Sandywell’s judgement that *nomos* as “the justice of Zeus became synonymous with the fundamental structure of the universe itself.”21 This way of thinking about nomos draws uncanny parallels to the concept of Ontological Security, and indeed the point has been made by Nussbaum and Lebow that *nomos* and ontological security share many important features.22 A breach of *nomos* then not only leads to violation of Zeus’ order but on a more practical level leads to a loss of identity as predicated on inter-subjective recognition of equality and distinction; if the oath between citizens is broken, there is no guarantee that citizens will recognize each other’s existential needs. If such a breach of *nomos* is one-sided, i.e. suffered by a single citizen at the hands of another, it amounts to an injustice of the highest order and a forced withdrawal from the nomos-order and civilization as a whole.

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In Euripides’ *Hecuba* the relationship between injustice and revenge is analysed from a subjective angle, notably through the subjectivity of Hecuba, the Trojan Queen. Among the three prevalent playwrights, Euripides is unique in his approach to the Greek myths. According to the classicist Moses Hadas, Euripides eschews the formalistic style of Aeschylus and Sophocles and makes his characters modern in the sense that he imagines the Greek characters “as contemporaries, subject to contemporary kinds of pressure, and examines their motivations, conduct, and fate in the light of contemporary problems, usage and ideals.”23 Euripides avoids the use of established protocol and democratizes his plays by turning the heroes into everyday people. Although Euripides honours the narrative arch of the myths, which ultimately end in death and murder, his narrative stresses that there can be another way. As Susan Jacoby, author of *Wild Justice*, writes, “Aeschylus and Sophocles ask under what circumstance is revenge ordained by the Gods as human fate. Euripides asks: Is revenge ordained. By whom? Why?”24 - Similar sentiment is echoed in Herodotus’ criticism of the despotic rule of *nomos*.

Euripides admonishes his audience to question their judgement and confront these myths not as pre-ordained moral manuals, but as moral dilemmas that can be resolved or at least questioned. Euripides believes that: “man needlessly adds to the burden by treating aspects of life which are in fact determined by convention as if they were determined by nature.”25 The fact that Euripides questions the deterministic moral universe also means that his plays have a subjective component that offers a rare glimpse into the psyche of those tragic heroes. With the help of Nussbaum’s interpretation of Euripides’ *Hecuba*, it is possible to show how a failure of nomos is regarded subjectively, instead of simply referring to the stylistic determinism in other plays such as Aeschylus’ *Oresteia*.

Hence, the problem of rage and revenge in Classical Greek mythology is augmented by an important account that offers motivation and justification for a breach of nomos. Hecuba’s revenge, as the Erinyes feared, creates its own justice and moral order, or what Martha Nussbaum calls the *Nomos of Revenge*. Initially, scholars were sceptical of the merit of

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25 Euripides, *Ten Plays by Euripides*. p. xiii
studying Euripides’ *Hecuba*, arguing that it was “poor and uninteresting” or defined by “two seemingly unrelated narratives,” held together only by a shared connection to the Hecuba figure. Hecuba’s act of revenge towards the end of the play was deemed grotesque and unhinged from Greek ideals of nobility and excellence. Only in recent decades has the debate shifted toward an appraisal of the overarching theme of nomos and how Hecuba struggles to relate to a sequence of personal tragedies. However, before looking at the role of nomos, it is probably wise to briefly outline the narrative in Euripides’ tragedy. The two tragedies that befall Hecuba are the murders of her two children, Polyxena and Polydorus, in the aftermath of the Trojan defeat. Her daughter Polyxena is sacrificed by Odysseus to honour the death of Achilles. Soon after, she discovers that her son Polydorus, who had been sent away into protection, had been brutally murdered by his guardian and Hecuba’s close friend, Polymester, for money and political expediency, despite his pledge to protect and raise the boy. Subsequently, Hecuba’s pleas to Agamemnon, the Commander of the Greek army and her de facto master, to bring Polymester to justice are ignored, leaving her no choice but to exact her own terrible revenge: She enters Polymester’s tent under the false pretence of sharing information about a hidden treasure and then proceeds to stab his eyes out and kill his children. Early scholars, like Schlegel and Norwood, argued that the tragedy was inconsistent, because Hecuba received the death of Polyxena in an almost contrary manner to the death of Polydorus. While she certainly displayed emotional bewilderment in both cases, her response to the death of her son was marked by “power-seeking vengefulness” instead of the mournful reservation displayed at the death of her daughter. However, rather than argue that the play is inconsistent, as these scholars argued, the key to understanding Hecuba’s behaviour lies in our willingness to acknowledge that we are dealing with two very different events; one is a terrible tragedy, the other an unforgivable crime.

Kirkwood and Nussbaum remain the two scholars most concerned with the effect of nomos on Hecuba’s conduct regarding the two successive tragedies. Kirkwood hypothesizes that Hecuba is inherently nomos-less throughout the play. The tragedy of her position is that there exist several competing nomoi but none of them provide coverage for her position. This

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27 For a literary review see chapter on Hecuba in Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness*.
30 Gordon M. Kirkwood, “Hecuba and Nomos,” 64.
interpretation however is fundamentally flawed. When Odysseus takes away Polyxena, Hecuba’s daughter, to be sacrificed at the tomb of Achilles, Hecuba does not contest the validity of the nomos: “If it is necessary that Peleus’ son be honoured and that you Greeks avoid censure, then do not kill this girl, Odysseus, but lead me off instead to Achilles pyre and stab me.”31 She pleads but ultimately resigns herself to the fact that the sacrifice must be made and that the victim must come from her own ranks. Scholars such as Norwood and Schlegel, who argue that the play is inherently inconsistent, stress the fact that Hecuba accepts her daughter’s fate with nobility and respect, supporting the notion that she deems the nomos as valid and applicable. Despite Kirkwood’s interest in nomos, his overall hypothesis on the existence of overlapping and excluding nomoi is weak. If he were correct in arguing that Hecuba encountered several nomoi, all of which excluded her, why did she react in such a noble and respectful manner to the nomos demanding the sacrifice of her daughter, while reacting differently to the alleged exclusion from other nomoi, i.e. the death of her son?

The real problem, as Nussbaum articulates it, lies not in the perception of exclusion but in the perception of a breach. Kirkwood argues that Polymester’s nomos of protecting the city leads him to the necessity of murdering Hecuba’s son.32 The stress would lie again on Hecuba’s frustration of being excluded from nomos; that Polymester’s priorities lay in serving his city, as is expected of a king, and not in honouring his bond with Hecuba. But this is incorrect. Firstly, Hecuba explores the possibility that Polymester might have acted to protect his city, which, we may hypothesize, would have resulted in a subdued reaction in Hecuba. However, she states: “For explain this: why, when Troy flourished and still had the protection of her circling walls, when Priam was alive and Hector carried all before him in battle, why, if you wanted to earn this man’s gratitude, did you not choose that time to kill the boy.” Hecuba concludes that Polymester’s true motivation was simple. “If your goodwill towards the Greeks were genuine, you should have taken the gold (…) and given it to the men who were experiencing hardship and not set eyes on their homeland for many a year (…) Why not even now can you bring yourself to let it out of your grasp; you stubbornly keep it in your home.”33 Polymester’s actions did not serve his city. Hecuba easily uncovers his ploy and shows him to be the wicked and greedy deserter he is. Had he acted the way Hecuba outlines, by allying early on with the Greeks and donating the gold to the war effort, her reaction would have

33 Euripides and Rutherford, *Electra and Other Plays*. 
likely been different; not least because such behaviour would have been risky and showed true adherence to nomos. But Polymester proved himself to be self-serving and a liar. When the war was over, fearing no reprisal from the Trojans, he killed Hecuba’s son, stole the gold and flattered the victor.

In her last confrontation with nomos, but before exacting her revenge on Polymester, she approaches Agamemnon, the Commander of the Greek Army. She pleads “be my champion against this man, this guest-friend who pollutes hospitality and has perpetrated so unholy deed, without fear of the Gods, whether below the earth or in heaven.” Agamemnon initially shares her outrage but refuses to help her, because in his line of thinking he would be aiding the enslaved Queen of Troy against an ally of the Greek Army. “There is a point you see, that causes me embarrassment: this man is an ally in the eyes of my troops but the dead man is an enemy” he informs Hecuba, effectively denying her any assistance. Hecuba is left without the means of obtaining justice and Polymester’s betrayal of nomos is met with impunity. Hecuba berates Agamemnon for his refusal to act, but seeks no other punishment against him.

Returning one last time to Kirkwood’s idea that Hecuba falls in-between competing nomoi, the question arises of why in her three encounters with such alleged exclusive nomoi she only reacts violently against Polymester. It is evident that Hecuba accepts Odysseus and Agamemmon’s behaviour; it aligns with her understanding of nomos. But she reacts violently against Polymester because he betrays nomos, both in his deceitful explanation of serving his city and more importantly in his reneging on his promise to protect and raise Polydorus. Again Kirkwood concludes the opposite, “Goaded by Odysseus’s inadequate conception of Nomos, and by Agamemnon’s disregard of nomos, she has been seduced from her own staunch belief in that principle. The appalling result to her personality is the tragedy of Hecuba.” Odysseus and Agamemnon both have robust understandings of nomos, contrary to what Kirkwood argues; it is Polymester who betrays the concept.

According to Nussbaum, the disregard of nomos, the breach of protocol and of the promise, alters Hecuba’s own relation to nomos. Holding the body of her son, she cries: “O child, child, now I begin my mourning, the wild newly-learned melody, from the spirit of

34 Ibid.
revenge.”\textsuperscript{35} This new melody will “prove a solitary song, for which no confidence in untrustworthy human things is required,”\textsuperscript{36} writes Nussbaum. By breaking nomos, Hecuba’s worldview is sabotaged. She is unable to situate herself within the increasingly dire situations presented to her. Because not even nomos is certain, Hecuba can entertain no hope for the future, not least because the plight of war-captives relies heavily on nomos.\textsuperscript{37} Her new found insight is reflected in her cynical response to Agamemnon, when she judges, “In all the world no man is free; either he is slave to money or circumstance, or else the majority of his fellow-citizens or a code of laws prevents him from acting as his better judgment dictates.”\textsuperscript{38} Nomos is no longer divine law, but simply the product of expedience and desire. This sobering realization then translates into Hecuba’s revenge against Polymester. Scholars deemed Hecuba’s act of blinding Polymester as well as killing his sons excessive and tasteless; Nussbaum, however, situates the act of blinding in relation to nomos. She argues that the act of blinding stresses Polymester’s failure to see the true value of nomos; he has always been blind to the binding nature of nomos and the importance it holds for social conduct. Hecuba believes blinding him explicates his failure. Nussbaum calls this mimetic revenge. “Untrustworthy, Untrustworthy” cries Hecuba, “new, new are the things I see!” And what she sees, according to Nussbaum, is “that the nomoi that structured her world never were, for this beloved other party, binding nomoi.”\textsuperscript{39}

Nussbaum and Kirkwood alter the entire meaning of the play. Rather than tell the story of a fallen Queen, it stresses the importance of nomos and what happens when this existentially informed concept of order is discarded. The danger, which the play explores so masterfully, lies in the fact that a failure to honour inter-subjective frameworks, such as agreed-upon notions of order and justice, liberates the victim to create a new ontology that serves her emotional needs unencumbered by the demands of civilized life. Nussbaum points out that Hecuba’s “eyes are said hereafter to shine with the ‘fiery glances’ of a dog, also a four footed beast.”\textsuperscript{40} Similarly, after he is blinded, Polymester emerges like a beast on all fours calling out for Hecuba: “I want to grab hold of her, tear her apart, and make her flesh run with blood (…) I implore you, let me go. Let me use my raging hands on her.”\textsuperscript{41} Leaving social

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{36} Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, p. 408.
\textsuperscript{37} Cartledge, The Greeks, p. 141.
\textsuperscript{38} Euripides and Rutherford, Electra and Other Plays.
\textsuperscript{39} Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, p. 408.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., p. 414.
\textsuperscript{41} Euripides and Rutherford, Electra and Other Plays.
convention behind means returning to a carnal stage in human development, void of reason and moderation. Both Hecuba, who takes a morbid pleasure in the fact that her resting place will read “tomb of the wretched bitch” and Polymester, who immediately gives in to these feral desires following his mutilation; “where should I lunge to gorge myself on their flesh and bone, as I feast like a wild beast, dealing out wounds in revenge for my own mutilation,” are reduced to brute beasts lacking social pedigree. The same behaviour is found in the descriptions of the dreaded Erinyes.

Arguably Polymester was always this beast, because his respect for nomos was only ever politically expedient and superficial; Hecuba merely revealed the beast behind the mask. Hecuba on the other hand entertained a fierce respect for nomos. Hence when Polymester broke his promise and undermined the validity of nomos, Hecuba was not merely insulted; she was threatened by the collapse of her entire worldview. Polymester’s betrayal revealed a nightmare where injustice reigned with impunity. Hecuba’s rage addressed this injustice. Her “excessive” revenge was tailored to explicate Polymester’s failure and mimetically return the lesson she had learned from the ordeal: Without nomos the world is a dark place.

A dismissal of nomos returns actors to a stage of uncivilized bestiality, permitting all kinds of excesses and justifications. But this rage needs to be contrasted with the milder experience of anger, which relies on a functioning of nomos, not a dismissal. Acts of disrespect remained a key driver for anger in Ancient Greece. Nowhere is this more evident than in the Iliad. However, anger, in contrast to the bestial fits of rage just encountered, remained governed by an inter-personal framework. According to Kalimtzis the regulatory mechanism is honour. Honour is the reason Greek actors become angry. Kalimtzis writes, “Anger is roused from slights that diminish someone’s honour. Honour as measure of worth refers to a socially recognized standard; damages to it can be evaluated so that the recompense may be proportionate to the offence”. Lebow agrees that regulatory mechanisms exist in the desire for social esteem but warns that “warriors often break the nomos” in fits of rage. While anger is contained within nomos and responds to slights, rage responds to woeful breaches of nomos. In other words, anger is still civilized while rage is uncivilized. To further stress this point between sanctioned anger and unsanctioned rage, we turn to Achilles and his epic performance in the Iliad.

42 Ibid.
43 Kalimtzis, Taming Anger, p. 148.
44 Ibid., 8.
45 Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations, p. 148.
Homer’s *Iliad* was an extremely stylized poem and more in line with the formalistic approach found in Aeschylus and Sophocles. However, despite the use of heroic ideals and the many references to gods and other divine imperatives, Achilles’ motivation and rationale behind his actions are extremely well documented, even rather modern. The *Iliad* famously begins with an overture expounding the anger of Achilles, which brought unimaginable ill and destruction on the Achaeans. Achilles suffers two insults in the *Iliad*. Agamemnon, the Greek General and Achilles’ superior, authors the first: While under the spell of Ate, the goddess of blind anger, he takes from Achilles his priced slave Briseis. Achilles reacts to this slight with a subdued anger; he takes no revenge, because he knows he cannot act against his military commander. But equally he refrains from participating in battle. This fateful decision precipitates the second insult: The death of his comrade Patrocles, whom the Trojan warrior Hector mistakenly kills after Patrocles dons Achilles’ armour. In response to this second insult, Achilles goes on a rampage, defeats his opponent Hector and butchers his body. Achilles suffers two mistreatments in the play but reacts differently to both, much like Hecuba. While Oliver Taplin argues, “anger displaces anger,” this assessment ignores the salient feature of difference in behaviour. The first insult leads to a type of withdrawal and sulking, while the other kindles feats of awesome destruction, and more importantly the carnal rage of the Erinyes, already witnessed in Hecuba. “I’ll hack your flesh away and eat you raw;” Achilles informs Hector.

The Greeks enjoyed a plethora of words denoting different forms of anger and intuitively this would be the first place to investigate to see whether the insults engender different emotional reactions. The most common words used to describe Achilles’ emotional state are *menis* and *kholos*. “The term menis,” writes Konstan, “has a solemn and perhaps religious register, and is often associated with divine anger” while *kholos* is a “violent fury, irrespective of whether it is provoked or not.” Kalimtzis slightly differs in his description, stating that menis is a form of awesome action-inducing anger, while kholos is a type of “bile, that occurs from

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humiliation.”48 Although there are evident differences between the two, these scholars seem to disagree on what they are; moreover as Konstan admits, *kholos* and *menis* are used interchangeably throughout the *Iliad*, making it difficult to align them causally to any of the insults. What can be deduced from Achilles’ anger response, the one responsible for the awesome destruction and fits of rage, and described as *menis*, at least in the first lines of the play, is that it is possibly divinely inspired.

A better approach is to look at the difference in behaviour and relay these differences back to Achilles’ perception of the insults, much like Nussbaum attempts in Euripides’ *Hecuba*. Achilles’ behaviour following Agamemnon’s initial slight is not particularly egregious; Achilles neither seeks revenge nor commits any other form of compensatory act; he just withdraws from battle. Following Patrocles’ death, Achilles, however, engages in activity that comes very close to the bestial portrayal of Hecuba and Polymester, possibly implicating a discard of nomos. Before he kills Hector, he exclaims, “I’ll hack your flesh away and eat you raw,”49 a clear indicator of the supremacy of carnal desires and the mark of a world without nomos. After he kills Hector, he violates nomos even further, denying Hector’s libation rites, and instead dragging his corpse through the city. This nomos-voiding behaviour again elicits an equal bestial response in Hector’s mother, Hecuba, who laments that the mutilated body of her son lies “in the house of that terrible man on whose liver I would fain fasten and devour.”50 Even the God Apollo remarks that Achilles is “going his own barbaric way, giving in to his power, his brute force and wild pride, as down the swoops on the flocks of men to seize his savage feat.”51 There is a strong case to be made that Achilles’ carnal rage begins with the death of Patrocles and not the insult suffered at the hands of Agamemnon.

There is a further qualification to be made in the Agamemnon insult. Although Agamemnon ultimately regrets his disrespectful treatment of Achilles as Commander in Chief, he remains Achilles’ superior and consequently enjoys greater standing than him. Standing is a function of honour; however it is not the only one. Achilles’ anger is explained by the fact that, as supreme warrior, he has earned immeasurable esteem from friends and foes alike. Esteem, then, is another function of honour. The tragedy in the confrontation between Agamemnon and Achilles is that both men feel entitled to special treatment due to their honour;

49 Homer, *The Iliad*, 22.
50 Ibid., 25.
51 Ibid., 24.
unfortunately they are on equal footing but in two separate categories. Agamemnon has high standing, while Achilles enjoys high esteem; neither wishes to submit to the other. On balance, Achilles’ anger is justified. But critically he refrains from allowing his anger to spill over into rage, half-heartedly keeping to nomos.

The consensus on Achilles’ rage – not his anger - is that the menis is divinely inspired, brought upon by misalignment of the destructive rage in his thymos (spirit/liver) and the thinking element in his phrenes (container of the spirit, rib cage). Scholars over the years have likened Achilles’ behaviour to uncontrollable “Berserker” rage or divine possession – but either way void of logic or rationale. Kalimtzis challenges this interpretation and writes, “such a divinely righteous anger that functions to fulfil some divine will is not to be found in any of the writings during this period.” Kalimtzis discounts divine intervention and instead opts for a psychological explanation pertaining to the misalignment of the thymos inside the phrenes, which is also what Achilles believes.

Oliver Taplin equally discounts the divine intervention and “Berserker” interpretation, but instead offers a different explanation, one related to an actual causal motif and echoing the Euripidean enterprise:

“It would be a mistake to regard him as a berserker, or a mindless butcher, or even to select a typical description ‘a force of sheer destructive energy’. Far from being mindless, there is a kind of terrifying reasoning behind Achilleus’ killing, a merciless ‘logic’, which finds its fullest expression in the reply to Lykaon.”

In his reply, Achilles indeed offers his rationale: “No, for all that you will die a vile death, until all of you have paid for the killing of Patrocles and the ravage of Achaians you slaughtered by the fast ships when I was not with them.” Taplin concludes: “These are words of terrifying ambition, yet they are not the spewing of an incomprehensible or

52 Ibid., p. 7.
54 Kalimtzis, Taming Anger, p. 8.
55 Taplin, Homeric Soundings, p. 220.
56 Homer, The Iliad, 21.
pathological blood-lust.”\textsuperscript{57} Achilles’ rage, as he himself states, is caused by the untimely death of Patrocles. Critically, this death is unexpected and unsanctioned, because it was Achilles who should have been wearing the armour not Patrocles. Achilles’ dismissal of nomos is thus explained by the fact that he finds the order of nomos invalidated by the way Patrocles dies.

Hecuba explains the same ruthless logic when she blinds and mutilates Polymester: “You would have in that son of mine a treasure to reckon with; but, as it is, you have forfeited that man’s goodwill, the gain you would have had from his gold is vanished, and this is the reward you and your children have reaped.”\textsuperscript{58} Despite her grotesque act of vengeance, one cannot deny that Hecuba operates under clear rationale; she offers a motif and even expounds on her thinking behind her distinct act of revenge. Hecuba’s rage is unquestionably caused by a breach of nomos. Unfortunately, none of the scholars have made this case about Achilles. And indeed Homer, as a playwright, might have been more concerned with the dynamics of personal ambition and strife.\textsuperscript{59} Nevertheless, there are uncanny parallels between Hecuba and Achilles in their behaviour following their tragic losses, which are instructive and stress the central role of nomos. The most pronounced similarity can be found in what Seaford refers to as the “liminality of death.”\textsuperscript{60}

Seaford argues that Achilles pursues a string of activities that amount to a withdrawal from social life and ultimately herald his own death. In other words a performative social death, captured by a dismissal of nomos, precedes Achilles’ actual death. The death of Patrocles is central in bringing about Achilles’ “death like state of mourning.”\textsuperscript{61} Seaford argues that Achilles’ relation to Patrocles is closer than kin and approaches notions of identity. Consequently, Patrocles’ death not only precipitates Achilles’ own demise, but also more importantly, results in an immediate existential withdrawal and loss of engagement with the social world. As nomos holds existential importance for social identity and notion of the self, the death-like mourning is expressed through nomos-voiding behaviour on Achilles’ part. As with Hecuba, the relationship to nomos has changed.

\textsuperscript{57} Taplin, \textit{Homeric Soundings}, 220.
\textsuperscript{58} Euripides and Rutherford, \textit{Electra and Other Plays}.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., p. 167.
We have already touched on the excessive, nomos-voiding expression of rage, when Achilles maltreats Hector’s body and denies libation rituals. However, other more nuanced behaviour makes the same point: When Achilles vows to his mother Thetis that he will kill Hector, she responds that his death will follow shortly after. Instead of contesting this prophecy, Achilles makes a strong symbolic gesture by cutting off a lock of his hair and placing it in Patrocles’ dead hand, reneging on a deal to offer his hair to the goddess Spercheios in exchange for a safe journey home. Seaford argues that this symbolic gesture carries even greater weight because “in general offerings of parts of the body or of clothes may represent the offerer himself.” In other words Achilles is placing himself in Patrocles’ tomb, sealing his own fate. Achilles then proceeds to withdrawal from social life by abstaining from food, sleep and sex. Thus Seaford concluded that Achilles’ liminality to death is expressed by these three key elements: (i) participation in the death of Patrocles (ii) carnal desire for flesh and blood (iii) and abstention from social practices. All of these elements amount to a social death and withdrawal from civilized life.

Hecuba’s behaviour follows Seaford’s idea of liminality. First of all she offers herself in exchange for her daughter Polyxena to be sacrificed at the tomb of Achilles; however, we need to be careful here, because Hecuba still subscribes to nomos and is not yet raging. Only after discovering the body of her son Polydorus does she begin to withdraw from the world: “Oh no, no! So I see my son dead before my eyes (…) This kills me. Oh what misery” I am alive no more, no more!” When Agamemnon ignores her pleas, she exclaims “My life has ended, Agamemnon; there is nothing left for me to suffer.” Lastly, the mutilated Polymester prophesises her death, but she simply responds: “I care nothing for that! Your punishment is what I wanted!” Hecuba’s liminality is expressed then by the following key elements: (i) her lamentation after discovering her son’s corpse (ii) her new solitary song of revenge and her act of disrobing before killing (robes are a sign of nomos according to Nussbaum) (iii) and her celebration of the prophecy about her tomb reading ‘fiery-eyed dog’.

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62 Ibid., p. 168.
63 Ibid., 176; Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness.
64 Again, we may suspect that Hecuba’s relationship to her son was closer than kin and approached a feeling of identity, in part because the fate of her son was so inextricably linked to her understanding of nomos
65 Euripides and Rutherford, Electra and Other Plays.
Nomos-voiding behaviour and social deaths, however, can be reversed. Achilles re-enters nomos after he makes peace with Hector’s father Priam. Priam, who arrives to claim the dead body of his son, shares his sorrow and desperation with Achilles, who in turn is moved towards compassion. After breaking bread with Priam, he engages in other social bonds by sharing a bed with Briseis. Despite Achilles’ return to nomos, which coincides with a diminution of his rage, his death remains sealed. Hecuba, although she puts on her robes and rejoins the chorus, understands that her fate, too, is sealed. Both figures are too polluted to remain in society. A dismissal of nomos must always carry terrible consequences for the transgressor.

The tragedies of Achilles and Hecuba share the following similarities. First, both establish a death wish. They exclaim their own death - or in the case of Achilles hear it from others - and in no way pursue actions to avoid it. In fact, they actively pursue their fated death, when normal social relations and conduct are curtailed or even ceased entirely. The second point is that neither Hecuba nor Achilles act without reason. Both suffer injustices with strong existential overtones. The third point is related and pertains to the excesses both figures exact on their victims. The perceived injustices and punitive excesses are subjectively aligned though not objectively. This should not be surprising, because the initial injustice voids any sense of a shared justice. According to Nussbaum, the punishment is thus not only retribution for the slight, but also much more a response to the dismissal of nomos, which in itself is the highest form of injustice imaginable. Unexpected slights warrant unexpected revenge. Lastly, each completed act of revenge is accompanied by overtures of re-socialization, which none-the-less cannot save the subject from the foregone conclusion of their fated death. Without any direct reference to the Erinyes, both Hecuba and Achilles subjectively illustrate the gradual dissolution of order, lamented by the three sisters. Their desire for revenge based on a legitimate injustice turns both figures into blood lusting animals with little or no regard for social order. But at the same time their motivation is ironclad and fully articulated. Achilles and Hecuba feel entitled to their own sense of justice, because what they suffered belies the idea that such a thing as universal justice or order exists.

The fractured Psychology of the Thymos

A desire for personal justice easily becomes rage because the means of obtaining such justice are unhinged from shared social norms. This is logical, because the very concept of shared
social norms has been proven ineffective and in many ways has led to the sense of betrayal in the first place. In Ancient Greece, this dismissal of shared social norms returned the actor to a bestial state of passion and desire, undeterred by social norms or propriety - brutes unable to think. The rage element is inexplicably linked to the notion of uncivilized bestiality, exemplified by an overt dismissal of social etiquette and a wilful disregard for the lives of others. In the self-diagnosis offered by Achilles, he states that his thymos (the spirit) is misaligned with his phrenes (the rib cage), resulting in a lack of thinking and overabundance of passion. The overreaction of the thymos was a natural occurrence in Ancient Greece and often heralded disaster and death for those involved. In recent years, Richard Ned Lebow has led the resurgence in the interest of thymos as a political concept and helped re-introduce the idea of the spirit into discussions on global strategy, warfare and violence.66

In Lebow’s explanation of the tri-partite psychology found in Plato’s Republic, the thymos (spirit) shares a precarious balance with logos (reason/fear) and eros (appetite). Eros, the desire for material gain, and thymos, the desire for esteem, battle for supremacy. However, they are contained by the thinking element of logos, tasked with maintaining a prudent strategy of survival and long-term security. For instance when Agamemnon first insults Achilles, the young hero almost draws his sword in rage but is assuaged by the sudden appearance of Athena, cautioning his passion. Athena, the goddess of wisdom, strategy and persuasion, operates in accordance with the logos. The rewarding and indeed life-saving relationship between logos and thymos would give rise to Aristotle’s dictum, and now famous precursor to Appraisal Theory, that “anger is not aroused by affronts from people who are more powerful than we are, because it is unlikely that we gain revenge.”67

Homeric thymos, the prototype so to speak, and reigning psychology in the Iliad, is in many ways less refined but paradoxically more flexible than the Platonic version. They both share the concept of a fractured psychology. While the Platonic thymos negotiates with logos and eros, the Homeric precursor negotiates solely with the phrenes. The relationship between thymos and phrenes is said to be one of “contained and container.”68 The phrenes is used to ponder over and reign in the thymos, much like when Athena intervenes to assuage Achilles’

66 Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations.
67 Ibid., 130.
68 Caroline P. Caswell, A Study of Thumos in Early Greek Epic (Mnemosyne, Bibliotheca Classica Batava Supplementum) (Brill Academic Pub, 1990), 5.
rising anger, making the *phrenes* an “agent of reflection.” However, in moments of intense passion, the *thmos* is said to operate outside the *phrenes*. Along with its dualistic nature, Homeric psychology departs from its Platonic successor in a more dramatic way. In the words of the classicist A.W.H. Adkins “Homeric man, then, not only has a psychology and a physiology in which the parts are more evident than the whole: he believes that the gods may act directly upon him or some aspect of him to affect his actions for good or ill.” Consequently, the gods play a vital role in the decision-making processes of their subjects through a wilful manipulation of the *thmos* and *phrenes*. For instance when Agamemnon slights Achilles, the young warrior explains that Zeus has taken away Agamemnon’s *phrenes*. And to assert that the gods have taken away one’s *phrenes* is tantamount to claiming that the individual is not thinking clearly, because the thinking element is obstructed, giving free reign to the unthinking passions of the *thmos*.

Besides obstructing the thinking element of the *phrenes* and allowing the *thmos* to go unchecked, the Gods can take a more active role in the fate of their subjects by actually inhabiting and controlling the *thmos*. This fundamentally alters the constitution of the *thmos* from a source of personal motivation to a vehicle of outside interference. Koziak believes the correct description of Homeric *thmos* to be “the neutral bearer of emotion,” because instead of only registering anger and insult, Homeric characters respond to all kinds of emotions in their *thmos*, ranging from sorrow in the case of Priam, fear in the case of Odysseus, anger of course in the case of Achilles, as well as a strong sense of compassion as in the case of Priam’ and Achilles’ reconciliation. But equally, the Gods often personify these sensations through their distinct personal characteristics. Specifically, the sensation of anger has been associated with Ate, the goddess of blinding anger. Agamemnon directly blames Ate for his foolish decision to insult Achilles.

Ate even makes an appearance in Shakespeare’s *Julius Caesar*. In Mark Anthony’s epic eulogy to Caesar and infamous rallying cry, he warns: “Caesar's spirit, raging for revenge, With Ate by his side come hot from hell, Shall in these confines with a monarch's

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70 Kalimtzis, *Taming Anger*, p. 11.
71 Quoted in Koziak, *Retrieving Political Emotion*, p.43.
72 Kalimtzis, *Taming Anger*, p. 11.
74 Ibid., p. 42–49.
voice Cry 'Havoc,' and let slip the dogs of war.'


76 Ibid.


80 Ibid.

They were ancient psychological truths that came to anchor the order of Zeus, borne from the desperate need to vanquish their presence from communal life.

Aeschylus utilizes the myth of the Erinyes in his exploration of cyclical revenge and communal strife. Unlike Euripides of course, who makes no mention of the Erinyes, Aeschylus stresses that injustices and breaches of nomos must always end in bloodshed and violence; it is how the universe works. The narrative he sets up begins with Agamemnon’s return from Troy. Soon after his homecoming, he is killed by his wife Clytemnestra in revenge for the death of their daughter Iphigenia, whom Agamemnon had sacrificed to appease the goddess Artemis. After Agamemnon’s death, his son Orestes is commanded by Apollo to avenge his father’s death by committing matricide. Orestes initially protests but then gives in and commits the murder; soon after, the Erinyes arrive demanding blood in revenge for the matricide. The point Aeschylus tackles is that vengeance begets vengeance; the Erinyes appear and re-appear with every new act of killing. And each act is expressed as a righteous demand for justice.

This has led the scholar A.L. Brown to conclude, “the Erinyes seem to take account of unlawful murders of any kind.” Their function, however, is much more pronounced than that. Rather than operate as a function of bloodshed and murder, they operate as necessary punishment for breaches of nomos; it just happens that murder is one of the most egregious breaches. Killings in war, for instance, do not trigger the appearance of the Erinyes, because a different type of nomos governs warfare. Consequently, in Aeschylus’ Eumenides, the Erinyes proclaim “We are honest witness (...) When family strife sheds kindred blood, we pursue the killer, however strong he is (...) now the standard of right and wrong shall be reversed, if the pernicious justice which this mother-murderer claims, is to prevail.” Orestes must pay for his breach of moira, the oldest and most sacred form of nomos. The Erinyes warn that a breach of moira cannot go unpunished, because it amounts to a sacrilegious breach of Zeus’ order, and it is from him they take their authority. In their own words: “This is justice – omnipotent, I warn you. Bend to the will of Zeus. No oath can match the power of the father.”

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83 Brown, “The Erinyes in the Oresteia.” p. 31
86 Aeschylus, The Oresteia.
According to Dodds and Padel, the Erinyes serve an important psychological function. In T.S. Eliot the Erinyes are portrayed as pangs of consciousness or internal daemons. According to Helen Bacon they represent “a universal psychological reality.” They emerge whenever a citizen commits a terrible crime. According to Ruth Padel “They work punitively in the inner world, in the mind of a person who has hurt someone else. They are activated from the external inner world, the underworld.” This underworld seeps through the cracks of communal order once the adhesive agent of nomos begins to dissolve. Their primary purpose is not to hunt murderers, but rather to punish those who undermine nomos by giving in to personal justice and revenge. And no nomos is as important as the “relationship between parent and child,” they claim. In other words, Orestes’ knowing breach of nomos, which today might be referred to as guilt, brings about the Erinyes. Even in Euripides’ Hecuba, the presence of the Erinyes is implied by the spectre of Hecuba’s son Polydorus at the beginning of the play, implying the existence of guilt on behalf of some evildoer. In contrast, Oedipus’ unknowing fratricide fails to elicit the appearance of the Erinyes, arguably because he is unaware of his crime.

The myth of the Erinyes crystallizes the foregone discussion on nomos. Both Hecuba and Achilles shed blood in response to unjust behaviour. They respond to breaches of nomos, but in doing so breach nomos in turn; for them at least, nomos no longer holds authority. Their behaviour with its strong carnal overtones directly mirrors the depiction of the Erinyes as wretched monsters, crawling and hissing, feasting on the flesh of their victims. They are personified rage, ostensibly decrying breaches of nomos, but ultimately undermining it completely by their unmitigated desire for revenge and justice, plunging the entire community into a state of civil war. In Aeschylus’ Oresteia each death is celebrated as a ‘homecoming’ and an end to violence, but in fact only portends new violence. Aeschylus’ Oresteia challenges this contradiction between justice and revenge cycles and offers a resolution, earning its place in the canon of Western foundation myths of justice.

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87 Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational.
89 Padel, In and Out of the Mind, 164.
After Apollo confronts the Erinyes and tells them to back off, the goddess Athena emerges to settle the dispute. In the ensuing proceedings, Apollo, acting council to Orestes, and the Erinyes make their case before Athena. Apollo successfully exculpates Orestes by claiming that the order to kill Clytemnestra comes from none other than Zeus, effectively undermining the Erinyes’ own claim to authority. Apollo also, rather less successfully, tries to reframe the relationship between Orestes and his mother as governed by *xenia*, the nomos of strangers, rather than *moira*, nomos of kinship. A breach of *xenia* is viewed as less egregious. The jury votes 6-6 and Athena breaks the tie by siding with Apollo. Athena clearly knows the consequences of her decision: “if they fail to win their day in court – how it will spread, the venom of their pride, plague everlasting blights our land, our future…” And as expected, the Erinyes immediately threaten Athens with plague and destruction. “Poison to match my grief comes pouring out my heart, cursing the land to burn it sterile (…) – cross the face of the earth the bloody tide come hurling, all mankind destroyed.”

Their desire for revenge is not assuaged by Apollo’s arguments or Athena’s judgement. As ancient psychological truths they operate a different mandate and idea of justice that cannot be defused by persuasion. And the dismissal of their justice, the Erinyes warn, leads to famine, plague and destruction. Without the unquestioned authority of nomos, subjects no longer have reason to regard each other as equals or fellow citizens. The dismissal of nomos brings an end to civilized life and leads to the reign of *phusis*, a type of despotic rule and the law of the strong. Consequently those who breach nomos, thus everyone from Hecuba and Achilles to Antigone, Ajax and Oedipus – but not Orestes – must withdraw from civilized life, either through exile or death, before they infect others with their uncivilized lack of faith in the rule of nomos. Before moving on to describe the psycho-dynamics of pollution, Athena’s ingenious strategy to rein in the wrath of the Erinyes will be briefly elaborated.

Fully understanding that the Erinyes have an important function, underlined by the fact that the jury’s decision ends in a tie, Athena claims, “From these fearful faces I see great gain for these citizens”. Athena offers the Erinyes their own temple and worship in exchange for their acquiescence. As Helen Bacon explains, the “establishment of a cult signifies their integration

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93 Aeschylus, *The Oresteia*.
into the sacrificial community of gods and mortals.” Nussbaum describes how Euripides inverts this process in *Hecuba*. Both Polymester and Hecuba take on bestial forms at the end of the play, crawling on all fours in tattered robes, indicating their descent into madness and rage; the Erinyes however, now renamed the *Eumenides*, the Well-wishers, begin to stand upright and wear clean robes, indicating their ascent into civility and reason.

Athena’s deal amounts to a restructuring of the Erinyes’ duties. They still protect nomos but act as portent to those who would break it. Athena explains the new role of the Erinyes thus, “Never waste our youth, inflaming them with burning wine of strife (…) as for the bird that fights at home – my curse on civil war.” Whereas the Erinyes used to actively punish those who committed a crime, leading to a cycle of revenge and pollution, they now act as fearful deterrent. In accordance with reason, the knowledge of their wrath must suffice. “But he who has never felt their weight or known the blows of life and how they fall, the crimes of his fathers hale him towards their bar, and there for all his boasts – destruction, silent, majestic anger, crushes him to dust.”

Their potential for destruction is no less, but their acceptance into the polis means that their domain is no longer private but public revenge. Athena, as the goddess of state authority, acknowledges the power of fear in maintaining social order. The Erinyes have changed their status but not their identity; they remain enforcers of the law. Seaford writes, “It is paradoxical, but for the polis essential, that the ancient agents of private violent revenge become, through public cult, a means of excluding it.” What the cult of Eumenides now communicates to the “bird that fights at home” is that he will be punished for risking pollution, for undermining communal order, and challenging the validity of the nomos oath.

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97 Aeschylus, *The Oresteia*.
each citizen makes towards one another. In the words of Seaford, “the furies extended their
deterrence of violence from kinship group to the whole polis.”

Risking pollution becomes the ultimate crime. Athena asks of the Erinyes, “Let our wars rage
on abroad, with all their force, to satisfy our powerful lust for fame.” But at home, the social
order must never be compromised. Athena believes that fear of the Erinyes’ wrath alone must
suffice. If successful, this new nomos will change the arithmetic of any crime, because it
posits the offender against the entire community, rather than only the victim and his kin. As a
consequence, the entire community seeks revenge and purges the polluting element without
risking counter-revenge, because the offender has waived his right to kinship through his
wilful challenge to communal order. However, from a Euripidean angle, the desire for
revenge is not really resolved. Individuals are coerced by the fear of earning the wrath of the
entire community; this does not solve the problem of revenge, it merely suppresses it – or
worse: exports it. The mandate of the courts is to maintain social order at the cost of personal
and self-righteous claims to justice. This decision comes with considerable cost and will be
explored throughout this thesis.

**Pollution in Ancient Greece**

The Erinyes threaten Athens with plague, disasters, famine and drought. Their threats are to
be understood as socio-economic disasters awaiting a city that has abandoned the rule of
nomos and has given itself over to personal justice and impulse. The order of Zeus is
exchanged for the rule of dike, a state of affairs where natural justice reigns over man-made
laws. The difference between a civil war-like state of lawlessness and an actual plague-like
disease is very small here, because once nomos is shown to be void of authority, the
realization spreads like a virus. In the words of Helen Bacon, “Miasma (pollution) literally
infects communities where the laws on which their survival depends have been violated.”
A civil war suggests that the shared communal foundation has been poisoned; the community
is sick. However, scholars disagree about the exact source of the sickness. One group believes
the source to be found in the breach of nomos. Without recourse to mythical explanations, a
breach of nomos sets a dangerous precedent and undermines the authority of the polis, such as
the monopoly on violence.

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99 Ibid., p. 132.
The other group believes the source of pollution to be the anger of the victim. Helen Bacon argues, “Pollution is the rage of victims of violations of these most sacred and fundamental ties – the rage of defied or disregarded gods, of abused or murdered blood relatives, of hosts and guests and accepters of oaths betrayed.” According to this group, the source then is not the offender but the victim. The desire for vengeance can provoke cycles of revenge that unhinge and ultimately destroy the community. The community must give in to these demands by sacrificing or exiling the offender; either way the offender becomes persona-non-grata and his presence sustains the pollution, because the rage of the victim will cause another breach of nomos by way of revenge.

According to the victim-orientated view, the community is thus charged with the delicate task of appeasing the demands of the victim while also avoiding the creation of cycles through yet another discard of nomos. Seaford describes how sacrificial rituals channel the anger of the victim away from the city. The cult of the Eumenides pits the offender not against the victim, but against the entire polis; his crime offends all. Consequently the entire community shares the burden of the victim. Not one citizen but the entire community commits the revenge; this way the victim avoids a fated visit from the Erinyes. In the victim-orientated view, social order is put at risk by the rage of the injured; cycles of revenge and civil war take over when the Erinyes demand blood for blood. Back in the Oresteia, they advise: “Appease the wrath of the avenging spirits by this man’s death, and so cleanse the whole city.” The cleansing is achieved and maintained by severing all communal ties to the criminal, effectively leaving no one to avenge his death.

The other view holds that pollution arises not from the rage of the victim but from the breach of social order. “Pollution, therefore, is not so much a rationalization as a vehicle through which social disruption is expressed,” writes Parker. “Since the disorder is the pollution, any action that restores the normal equilibrium of things becomes a purification.” The fear of pollution was so immense that some believed it could be communicated by touch alone. In Euripides’ Orestes, the Barbarian King for instance covers his head when Orestes passes him in fear of being infected by an “avenging spirit”. However, Parker finds, “there are, certainly, many passages were the pollution of murder is referred to and yet there is no suggestion that

102 Ibid.
103 Seaford, Reciprocity and Ritual.
104 Ibid., p. 121.
the avenging spirits of the victim are at work.”

Ruth Padel argues that the Erinyes work punitively in the mind of the offender and that they “are activated from the external inner world, the underworld.” This suggests that the crime must be intentional and known. However “pollution distinguishes in terms of social order as well as moral intention,” argues Parker. Lack of intentionality is not enough to avoid pollution; even lack of a victim is not enough, believes Parker. Pollution is concerned with social disorder, regardless of its source.

Oedipus remains one of the most polluted figures in Greek Tragedy and yet, although the Erinyes acknowledge his crime, they never pursue him, because Oedipus’ crime lacks intention. But despite his ignorance, Oedipus’s crime remains of the highest order. The pollution arises without the Erinyes, and without Oedipus knowledge of the crime, arguably even without a victim. Rather it is the breach of nomos that creates the pollution, not any anger of the victim. Parker maintains, “it is of course, the crucial importance of the father’s inviolability that causes the pollution to spill over even on to involuntary cases; the horror is even increased by the fact that the violation of fundamental order has occurred at random.” The Erinyes-pollution complex appears less robust than previously argued. And because Erinyes are manifestations of unsanctioned anger and pollution, it seems that ? cannot be traced exclusively to the victim’s felt injustice. Parker concludes, in disagreement with Bacon and Padel, “that pollution derives not from the wrong to the victim, but from the violation of the order of the family; there is expressed through it universal shock, not the particular anger of the victim and his kin.” This returns the Erinyes to their initial role of guardians rather than avengers, inducing reverence and fear not anger, exactly what Athena has in mind when she establishes their city-cult. Pollution is then related to the breakdown of social order; whether this is ultimately caused by anger or accident is irrelevant. This is the mainstream and deterministic interpretation of the relationship between nomos and revenge, a relationship Euripides attempted to question by stressing the personal and tragic choices leading up to these events.

105 Ibid., p. 107.
106 Padel, In and Out of the Mind, p. 164.
107 Parker, Miasma, p. 113.
108 Ibid., p. 124.
109 Ibid., p. 107.
110 Seaford, Reciprocity and Ritual, pp. 85–89.
Pollution is a powerful metaphor, and without doubt captures the infectiousness and dangers of disinvesting nomos of authority. But at the same time the use of such a metaphor obfuscates the real causes of the strife and literally clouds the issue. A breach of nomos must lead to pollution, but rather than discard the polluted, we would be better off to understand their motivation and why they risked pollution in the first place. In the case of Hecuba, the reader is led to understand that she glimpses something through the fog; the truth that nomos is not invested with binding properties but ultimately subject to personal whim and expedience. Equally, Antigone understands that nomos can easily lend itself to despotic rule; a point Herodotus was keen to stress.\textsuperscript{111} What these tragedies ultimately teach, however, is that the minority report is always swiftly silenced, because once the truth about nomos enters the public domain, the less than ideal rule of nomos is replaced by something much worse: A state of civil war and disorder; a point the Erinyes, as ancient demons, are always keen to make. Athena’s inspired solution notwithstanding, the tension between the need for social order and the desire for personal justice remains unresolved. Athena’s solution favours order by anchoring it in fear, coercion and displacement.

**Modern Use of Disease Metaphors**

In more recent times, the use of metaphor sustains the problem of obfuscation. In Susan Sontag’s studies (1979, 2009) of the cultural reception of diseases like cancer, tuberculosis and AIDS, she writes:

“Any important disease whose causality is murky, and for which treatment is ineffectual, tends to be awash in significance. First, the subjects of deepest dread (corruption, decay, pollution, anomie, weakness) are identified with the disease. The disease itself becomes a metaphor. Then, in the name of the disease (that is using it as a metaphor), that horror is imposed on other things. The disease becomes adjectival. Something is said to be disease-like, meaning that is disgusting or ugly. (…) “Illnesses have always been used as metaphors to enliven charges that a society was corrupt or unjust.”\textsuperscript{112}

\textsuperscript{111} Sandywell, *The Beginnings of European Theorizing*.
Cancer is this hardening of the body, the stiffening of the mind; it is the sign of depression and inaction. Tuberculosis turns the breath of life into mucus and phlegm; blood pours from the mouth; it is the sign of too much passion, too little self-control. “A disease of the lung is, metaphorically, a disease of the soul,”113 writes Sontag. AIDS stands for immoral and secretive behaviour, an affront to nature and perversion of God’s given order. The diseased are believed to be deranged or unfit; their foolish behaviour courts their illness; it is an outward manifestation of an inner rot. And so Sontag concludes that, for our day and age “the melodramatics of the diseases metaphor in modern political discourse assume a punitive notion: of the disease not as punishment but as a sign of evil, something to be punished.”114 Like pollution in Ancient Greece, tuberculosis, cancer and AIDS offer mandates for exclusion and chastisement.

And so even in modern descriptions of civil strife the same notions are at work. An inhabitant of Sarajevo during a BBC 3 interview in 1992 said of the violent polarization: “it’s a plague; that’s all you can call it.”115 Equally, the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, opined in response to the 2011 London riots: “I’m clear that they are in no way representative of the vast majority of young people in our country who despise them, frankly, as much as the rest of us do, but there are pockets of our society that are not just broken, but frankly, sick.”116 These descriptions along with other popular tropes like Bernard Lewis’ “Muslim Rage” or Malcolm X’s-inspired “Angry Black Man” all take the rage for granted; instead of looking at the causes and possible grievances, they articulate all the myriad dangers to the established order, in turn delegitimizing the grievances of individuals and groups.

The emotion of rage of course shares an etymological foundation with rabies. And it is here that the Greek notion of pollution and disease resonates most clearly. Wasik and Murphy write that the metaphorical properties of rage are

“Nowhere more present than with rabies, where the name itself in multiple languages – lyssa, rabies, rage, rabia – also describes a human emotion of fury, with the twinned meaning extending back indefinitely, neither the medical nor the

113 Ibid., 18.
114 Ibid.
115 Seaford, Reciprocity and Ritual, p. 103.
figurative sense taking clear precedence. Rabies was identical, with a visitation of animal rage; or, if it was not quite a true identity between the two, the link transcended mere metaphor to become intrinsic to both poles of comparison."\textsuperscript{117}

Thus we come full circle: The bestial behaviour of Polymester and Hecuba, the wretched display of the Erinyes with their blood covered faces and seeping eyes, conflate the dreaded disease rabies with the nomos-voiding behaviour of rage. Those who act against nomos are judged to be as mad as rabid dogs, consumed by animalistic passion and certainly short on life. Rage and rabies might enjoy the same etymology, but this should not blind us to the fact that one is a virally transmitted neurological disease and the other a human emotion.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has in many ways laid the theoretical foundation for the thesis and the exploration of rage. In Euripides’ *Hecuba*, Nussbaum and Kirkwood show how a breach of nomos leads Hecuba to commit an act of gruesome revenge that has even managed to alienate some Classics scholars. Hecuba’s account of her own motivation leads to invaluable insight into the importance of *nomos* and what portends when nomos is breached. Because, as Nussbaum and Sandywell argue, nomos structures the world in a meaningful way, a breach leaves the subject uprooted. This sensation, however, is quickly addressed by the construction of a new nomos that offers justification for brutal punishment. Hecuba’s “solitary song of revenge”, described by Nussbaum as the *Nomos of Revenge*, offers a new sense of justice. The other insight gained from Hecuba, which is equally stressed in Achilles, is that nomos-voiding behaviour automatically qualifies subjects as brutes and uncivilized beasts. The Greek playwrights continuously stress the connection between nomos-voiding behaviour and bestiality, as breaches almost categorically lead to some carnal desire to eat the opponent’s flesh. Rage in other words is not characterised by any specific act of violence, the Greek heroes never actually feasted on any flesh, but rather how the specific act relates to and undermines the communal order of *nomos* and civilization as a whole.

The myth of the Erinyes directly links the concept of *nomos* with the bestiality and excessive violence characteristically attributed to rage. The main concern of the Erinyes is to protect

and guard *nomos*; any failure to respect the law of Zeus leads to cycles of revenge and civil war, expressed in the metaphor of pollution. The solitary songs of justice that are constructed against the nomos undermine the reigning social order and threaten the inter-subjective framework necessary for healthy social interaction. Consequently those who espouse revenge and give in to their passions threaten the stability of the community and are thus punished and forced into exile. This leads to the second point about rage: Its inherent moral exclusivity. The fact that rage operates outside of *nomos* means that the subject is undeterred by social concerns and articulates a position that can be described as morally exclusive. This in turn helps explain the excess and brutality found in rage; there is no need to filter the punitiveness and impulse for action through socially sanctioned norms. The result is an unfettered violence, brought about by the uncivilized bestiality and unthinking passions of the *thymos* operating outside the *phrenes*.

The brutality and excess found in the behaviour of Achilles and Hecuba, and personified in the myth of the Erinyes, in many ways humanizes rage. As argued above, none of these characters act without cause; in fact they are motivated by deep-seated and almost existential acts of recognizable mistreatment; their behaviour amounts to extreme justice-seeking and after justice is obtained they attempt to rejoin society. Unfortunately, their behaviour, which today is chastised purely for its excesses and brutality, was chastised back then for the fact that *nomos* was discarded in favour of personal justice and private concerns. Again, the specific form the act takes is not what matters, but the underlining dismissal of nomos and willingness to give in to private passion is what courts the presence of the Erinyes. Rage, as established in this chapter, is first and foremost concerned with the withdrawal from the communal *nomos* and the establishment of a new private *Nomos of Revenge*. The possible justifications and motivations for this development are silenced or delegitimized. Society will not tolerate an attack on its foundational order, and portrays all those who discard *nomos* as dangerous and polluted. Punishment and justice unsanctioned by *nomos* instantly turns to uncivilized and animalistic rage.

Lastly, there is a point to be made about the different intellectual interests of Euripides and Aeschylus in their respective exploration of revenge in society. While Aeschylus portrays a relentless determinism, where breaches of nomos lead to cycles, Euripides is much more concerned with motivation; his characters are no longer wooden and stylized props and plot movers, but real human beings endowed with agency, social concerns and human emotions.
These are modern human portrayals that still resonate today. Aeschylus shows how revenge will undo order and proposes a solution that ignores the human element in all of this. The human element in turn is Euripides’ primary concern; specifically the question of what drives humans to kill other humans. Euripides admonishes his audience not to mistake man-made laws for natural laws, and challenges us to show compassion even for those who are forced to eschew nomos. It is beyond ironic that one of the myths surrounding Euripides’ death tells of how the king requested Euripides’ counsel as to the fate of some Thracian thieves. These thieves had killed and eaten one of the king’s hunting wolves. Euripides counselled the king to spare the thieves, because they were starving and acted out of desperation. As the myth goes, Euripides was later mauled to death by the offspring of the very wolf whom he had denied justice.\footnote{Jacoby, \textit{Wild Justice}. p. 22} With such a telling end in mind, this thesis continues the \textit{Euripidean} enterprise of understanding the causes and consequences of rage and revenge.
Chapter 2

Rage as Social Emotion

The last chapter approached rage through a reading of the Greek concept of nomos. Rage was uniquely characterized by its willingness to act against the social order. The myth of the Erinyes captured the Greeks’ fear about the consequences of a wholesale rejection of nomos and how the polis would succumb to plague and civil war. It was ultimately the inability to care about the survival of the polis that earned subjects the attributes of uncivilized bestiality and unthinking brutishness; they never actually committed cannibalistic acts, but regardless, their intentions were uncivil. Rage gave rise to an inside/outside dichotomy, where both sides enjoyed absolute moral certainty predicated on a disjointed sense of justice. The other known attributes of rage such as excess and limitlessness arose naturally from the Nomos of Revenge that demanded more punishment than social order could afford without risking counter-revenge. This chapter leaves Ancient Greece behind and approaches rage from a modern psychological angle. The Greeks readily equated rage with righteous and power-seeking vengefulness; however the highly formalized approach of the Greek tragedies makes it difficult to approach rage as an emotion. It is more of a stylistic device. This chapter avoids overly stylistic methods and attempts to construct rage as an emotion with specific causes.

Emotions have gained increasing importance in the field of International Relations. Early resistance based on the Cartesian distinction between emotion and reason has faded. Philosophical intuitions, such as David Hume’s quip that ‘reason is a slave to passion’ are now vindicated by relatively new insights gained from research in the neurosciences; the famous medical case of Phineas Gage paved the way for a new understanding of emotions. Gage lost the use of his prefrontal cortex - an area of the brain associated with emotional processing - in a freak accident and was left without the ability to make rational decisions, or any type of decisions for that matter. Building on this famous medical case, the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio’s seminal study Descartes’ Error showed how emotions are integral to the varied processes in decision-making such as information selection, risk-assessment, and
cognitive dissonance. This overhauled the idea that emotions were nothing but unthinking and irrational impulses that forced subjects to make decisions or engage in actions that would be later regretted, a view that is reminiscent of Achilles, and all the time his thymos overruled his phrenes.

**Emotions in International Relations scholarship**

Emotions have always played a role in the study of politics and International Relations. In the works of the Greeks, prevalent emotions such as fear and anger were prime political motifs. Thucydides spoke of fear as a shared disposition that could increase concerns for security and defence, while Homer’s epic the *Iliad* described in manifold ways all possible dimensions of anger, and how rulers would plunge their nations into wars for the pettiest of insults. A considerable break in this tradition of viewing emotions as integral to interstate conduct came about in the Enlightenment, where emotions were relegated to the ranks of primitive nuisance. With the dismissal of emotions arose the age of reason as a separate and superior mode of cognition that would improve humanity and lead to limitless progress. This familiar celebrity of reason still resonates through much of economic theory today; as the thought goes, emotions are irrational and lead to bad decisions and impinge on the sublime functioning of reason. In the words of Daniel Kahneman, emotions are not suited for *slow thinking*.

The inherent hierarchical outlook concerning the hot, motivational realm of emotions and her cold, cerebral counterpart of reason naturally gave rise to an endless tug-of-war. Are emotions in control of reason, or vice versa? For the Greeks there was of course a natural balance to things, and anger arising from the thymos could be reined in by the cool deliberation of the logos. In Homer’s *Iliad*, Achilles almost raises his sword against Agamemnon in violent rage but before he acts upon his impulse, Athena appears, cautioning his thymos and allowing cooler heads to prevail. Despite the stylistic portrayal of this psychological mechanism, these processes were uniform. The idea that passion and reason fought for supremacy or were indeed physiologically distinct from each other was an Enlightenment fiction -- just as much as it was used as a fictional device in the Greek myths. But nonetheless, what the

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Enlightenment thinkers feared and indeed tried to tame with reason was the short sightedness, inherent to emotions like fear and anger.

In more modern times, neuroscientists, with the help of MRI scans, have resolved many of the misunderstandings underlining these various takes on emotion. The view that emotions and reason are somehow separate has been debunked. Reason and emotion occur in tandem, with many neuroscientists arguing that they are in fact inseparable from one another. Moreover, according to the insightful work of the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio, rational deliberation and cognition, which Enlightenment scholars would refer to as reason, was shown to be totally inept and useless without the emotional impulse. Without the Orbito-frontal Cortex, the mainstay of emotions, Damasio argued, all other parts of the brain were worse off and failed to function properly. In International Relations, the use of emotions has undergone a considerable evolution. Gone are the days of Realist formulations of interest-based politics where emotions had no part to play, or worse, were viewed as irrational and counter-productive.

Today, International Relations scholars engaged in the study of emotion are moving towards a neuro-scientifically informed view of emotions that merges both the traditional motivational aspect of emotion with a new cognitive element. Along these lines, scholars such as Ned Lebow and Rose McDermott have explored specific emotions and their cognitive components, i.e. the interplay between emotion and reason. I will briefly elaborate on their approaches and situate my own research amongst them, while stressing the contribution I wish to make. However, at the same time it is necessary to state clearly that a considerable set of scholars working on emotions largely ignore the cognitive element and continue to stress the motivational element of emotion, by putting forth rigid causalities of action tendencies for specific emotions. These approaches build on the social psychology and group dynamics found in research of the 1970s and are likely liable for considerable overhaul. Amongst these scholars are Harkavy, Lindner, Scheff and Saurette; they all single out a specific emotion (usually a negative one) and construct a rigid causal mechanism, whereby rage leads to revenge, humiliation and slights to counter-humiliation, and shame to lashing-out.121 These

contributions are important, especially viewed within the wider field of International Relations where emotions are still somewhat of a new event; at the same time, however, they are limited by the scientific framework of the 1970s, which viewed emotions as endogenous stimuli for specific “action tendencies”, rather than central cognitive processes.

The cognitive aspect of emotion gained real traction once International Relations scholars began looking at modern science, specifically the neurosciences. The earliest serious treatment of how emotions inform cognition came by way of William Connolly’s *Neuropolitics*. Connolly lobbied for an understanding of perception that centred on the emotional processes. He explains how cognition of any sort rests on emotionally informed “somatic markers”, which he describes thusly:

“A culturally mobilized, corporeal disposition through which affect-imbued, preliminary orientations to perceptions and judgements scale-down the material factored into cost-benefit analysis, principled judgements, and reflective experiments.”

Connolly’s 2001 contribution aimed at our understanding of perception and how events are emotionally tinged and framed by existing memory and prejudices, and – more importantly – he stressed that this tends to be the norm, because that is how brains work. Connolly’s work illustrated how processes beyond our rational control influenced our basic cognitions. But Connolly had not yet approached the study of separate emotions; he simply restated the Humean dictum, already fully established in the post-Freudian literature, that passion, memory and the gut have more influence on our conduct than we care to admit.

A much more disciplined use of the neuro-scientific literature, and fiercely illuminating, could be found in Neta Crawford’s publication *The Passion of World Politics*. Not only did Crawford incorporate the same neuro-scientific literature as Connolly, but for the first time distinct emotions took center stage in the political arena. In this sense, Crawford pushed further than Connolly, sidestepping the dusty shelves of post-Freudian literature; instead, Crawford showed persuasively that the reigning political outlooks, namely Neo-

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Liberalism and Neo-Realism, rested on specific emotions that did not necessarily lead to action tendencies but rather to different perceptions and cognitive frames. The liberal outlook for instance, Crawford argued, rested on the emotional modality of trust and friendship, where alliances could easily be forged for some shared sense of a greater good. Realism, on the other hand, rested on the emotional modality of fear and insecurity, where suspicion and posturing were the norm. In a single flash Crawford’s analysis captured the long emotional shadow chasing these “rational” schools of political thought. The existence of fear was no longer aligned with the action tendency of flight or surrender, but rather with cognition, i.e. preferences, values and judgements that could go far beyond any perceivable act: Fearful actors behaved differently from trusting actors, because critically they saw the world in an entirely different light, perceiving the same stimuli but with different results. Crawford’s contribution turned specific emotions into starting points for vast analytical enterprises traversing fields as diverse as the Neuro-Sciences, Social Biology, Social Psychology and Genetics. Leading lights of recent years have focussed more and more on the cognitive element of emotions, paying mere lip service to the concept of action tendency. Before moving into the cognitive aspect of rage and revenge, I want to briefly discuss the research of two leading scholars in reference to two specific emotions, namely fear and anger, and their respective cognitive dimension and explanatory power for International Relations.

Richard Ned Lebow bases his *Cultural Theory of International Relations* on Platonic Psychology and its tripartite system, whereby the psyche is divided into *thymos*, *logos* and *eros*. Within this structure the *eros* and *thymos* battle for supremacy, while the *logos* reins in their excesses and provides moderation and long-sightedness. Both the *eros* and *thymos* thrive for different types of desires; the former seeks wealth and territory, while the latter requires standing and even supremacy vis-à-vis others. The emotional modality of the *eros* may be described as a mixture of greed, insecurity and gluttony, while the emotional modality of the *thymos* may be described as jealousy, anger and revenge. With the help of modern science, Lebow aligned the emotional modalities of the *eros* and *thymos* with *prospect theory*, allowing us to understand how the prevalence of either could lead to changes in the construction of risk perception. Groups defined by the *thymos* would be highly risk-accepting, often engaging in warfare against much stronger and blatantly superior enemies, while *eros*-defined groups would be risk averse, cutting their losses and consolidating their position. For instance, the United States was
extremely risk accepting after 9/11, easily stumbling into strategically ill-advised wars against largely unknown enemies. Lebow reasoned that the United States’ leadership felt humiliated by the spectacle of the 9/11 attacks. Washington’s standing and clear hegemonic position in the post-Cold War world was blatantly ignored and even ridiculed by these attacks. Consequently, the reaction was thymotic and the leadership prepared for a large-scale military engagement, largely ignoring prophetic and repeated warnings about the success of long-term military engagements in the Middle East.

Indeed, historically speaking, hegemonies and great powers have a strong tendency to react thymotically to challenges of their supremacy; they engage in high risk undertakings, both strategically short-sighted and economically unsound, leading to the fated “imperial overstretch”. However, returning to the issue of cognition, the fact that the United States’ leadership desired to punish those responsible becomes less interesting than the fact that unsound policy suddenly became sound policy almost overnight. The ability to discount known and agreed-upon risks in light of a suffered humiliation undoubtedly makes the case for the study of emotions, because they readily predict changes in cognition. In terms of anger, Lebow showed that this specific emotion will, amongst other things, introduce a propensity to favour short-term reward, i.e. seeing the culprit suffer, over long-term success and even survival. Returning to the Platonic foundation, the overwhelming passions of the thymos eclipse the moderating forces of the strategic logos - back in Athens as today in Washington, and eventually in Beijing.

What Lebow has done for anger and prospect theory, Rose McDermott has done for fear and out-group derogation. While Lebow seeks a classical foundation as the starting point for his enquiry, McDermott takes a more modern approach, framing fear as a genetic disposition with distinct cognitive characteristics. She calls fear a “genetically informed, stable, but malleable trait-based disposition” and judges that fearful groups and individuals are “more prone to being anxious of new people and novel situations that might threaten those relationships.”

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123 Oded Lowenheim, Predators and Parasites: Persistent Agents of Transnational Harm and Great Power Authority / (University of Michigan Press,, 2007).
recent research. The first is that fearful groups have a heightened propensity for in- and out-group differentiations; fear makes out-groups appear increasingly suspicious and threatening, and in turn increases in-group cohesion. Similar to Crawford’s earlier findings, fear dissolves any sense of trust and shared values between groups, and places everyone on guard. Even seemingly selfless or charitable acts are viewed with suspicion and discarded as chicanery.

By way of illustration, when Gorbachev introduced glasnost and perestroika, Reagan welcomed and recognized these efforts as earnest, despite clashing with decades of established Cold War dogma. His successor George W. H. Bush, on the other hand, distrusted Gorbachev, even after the evident success in negotiations, and felt compelled to reverse all the processes made under Reagan, instead standing by his conviction that Moscow was playing games and should not be trusted. Fear in other words makes groups discard evidence for change, especially if such change undermines preconceived ideas necessary for ontological security. But McDermott goes even further, arguing that such fear can be a type of permanent trait, and that base anxiety can help explain different political outlooks: she infers that conservatives are more fearful due to their propensity to blame outsiders and enemies in times of ontological upheaval and change. Pushing such simplification to the extreme, Reagan might have been a closeted democrat - at least in terms of his emotional disposition – evidenced by his willingness to embrace fundamental change and weather any potential ontological upheaval. He was not threatened by the winds of change but welcomed them. More research is obviously needed, but McDermott illustrates that the emotion of fear introduces a particular set of cognitive changes, such as increased out-group derogation and increased need for ontological stability; signals that should lead to changes in behaviour are muted by fear and outsiders that are non-threatening are invested with suspicion and prejudice.

In this thesis, I attempt to explore the cognitive element of rage, as well as allude to its action tendency of punishment, or revenge. I draw on both the Ancient Greeks and Nietzsche’s own existentialism in creating the intellectual foundation for this undertaking. Rage is of course closely aligned with anger, more so than with fear, so Lebow’s input is constructive, but at the same time I wish to show how rage differs from anger, and why the two must not be confused. The key component I wish to stress is how rage affects morality. The hitherto unexplored nexus between emotion and morality in
International Relations is perfectly suited for the emotion of rage, because the often grotesque and merciless violence exacted in rage necessitates an absolute and exclusive morality that robs the target of any sense of worth, and even frames the act of revenge as a moral imperative, i.e. a moral good. In other words, I am interested in how the emotion of rage affects the moral constitution of the subject and allows heinous acts to be committed with utter conviction and moral certainty. In order to begin, I will go back to the foundation of emotions, constructing a theory from first principle, in order to illustrate how morality comes into play, before setting out to describe the peculiar dynamics between the specific emotion of rage and moral extremism.

**Theories of Emotions**

This section will act as a build up towards the construction of an emotional paradigm for rage. The point is to understand how emotions rely on cognitive appraisals, which are gained by knowledge of social rules and implicit expectations. Therefore even the emotion of rage must rely on a distinct set of social cues that incorporate knowledge of social practices and expectations similar to those incorporated in the Ancient Greek concept of *nomos*. But in order to understand this, I wish to go back to the foundations of modern theories of emotions and show how scholars have tried to understand emotions and more importantly how these understandings have evolved to resemble the emotional economy of Ancient Greece.

“*Emotions,*” writes the neuroscientist Elaine Fox, “are discrete and consistent responses to an internal and external event which has a particular significance for the organism”.126 Emotions are caused by perceived changes in the environment with direct impact on our social and material wellbeing; emotions, in other words, help to confront and manage change. The noted neuroscientist Antonio Damasio refers to emotions as bio-regulatory devices, always “promoting the maintenance of life, and always poised to avoid the loss of integrity that is a harbinger of death or death itself.”127 These perceived changes to our social and material environment may arise from external events, like the sudden appearance of a grizzly bear, or

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127 Antonio Damasio in Richard D. Lane and Lynn Nadel, *Cognitive Neuroscience of Emotion* (Oxford University Press, 2002). p. 20
from internal representations through the triggered elicitation of a memory.\textsuperscript{128} There exist roughly three interpretations on how emotions arise in relation to perceived changes to the environment, and although these interpretations are not inherently mutually exclusive, they make different claims on the salience of the emotional process.\textsuperscript{129}

\textit{Biological Theory}

The American psychologist William James offered the first explanation for the genesis of emotion as early as the 1880s. James believed that emotions are biologically determined and inherited from generation to generation to maximise the possibility of gene selection. Consequently, emotions, rather than explain human feelings, are equated with so-called “action tendencies;” primed physiological reactions elicited by a biologically determined stimulus. In James’s famous example, the sudden appearance of a grizzly bear will lead to perceived physiological changes such as sweaty palms, beating heart and adrenaline rushes, gearing the body up for the action tendency of flight. The conscious perception of these physiological changes will register as fear. In other words, "we do not run because we are afraid, but rather we are afraid because we run.”\textsuperscript{130} Because the James-Lange theory pertains to all animals, the idea of innate emotional processes finds further support in zoological studies. For instance, young monkeys will fear snakes after a single display of fear by an adult monkey, while a similar single display of fear by an adult monkey at a flower will not elicit the same fear response in young monkeys. Equally, rats bred in laboratory settings without any experience of the dangers of the outside world immediately show signs of distress when cat urine is introduced to their habitat.\textsuperscript{131} The James-Lange theory, that emotional primers are inherited along with their respective action tendencies in humans has, however, come under severe scrutiny. By way of an illustration, the sight of a grizzly bear will not elicit the same emotion if the subject is heavily armed and trained to cope with the possibility of a grizzly bear; this is an example of cognition modulating the emotional response and altering the action tendency.

\textsuperscript{129} Interpretations taken from \textit{Introduction}, in Fox, \textit{Emotion Science}. \\
\textsuperscript{130} Paraphrased from A Ohman, A Flykt, and F Esteves, “Emotion Drives Attention: Detecting the Snake in the Grass,” \textit{Journal of Experimental Psychology. General} 130, no. 3 (September 2001): 466–78. \\
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid.
However, the psychologist Paul Ekman has shown somewhat conclusively that so-called base emotions such as joy, disgust, contempt, anger and surprise, have automatic and instant action tendencies expressed through facial cues, and that these cues are recognized across all cultures.\textsuperscript{132} The notion of biologically inherited primers leading to universal action tendencies still remains limited to so-called \textit{micro-expressions}, which register as very short-lived facial distortions, and arguably soon dissipate through cognitive appraisal processing.\textsuperscript{133} While Ekman acknowledges the role of cognitive appraisal, Jesse Prinz, another proponent of the biological account, denies the need for cognitive appraisal altogether, and instead argues that emotional appraisal can function through biological input alone.\textsuperscript{134} Prinz succeeds in proving that emotions and moral judgements can alone justify punitive desires without recourse to social rules and practices; in fact they overrule them. Positive emotions give rise to positive moral judgements, and negative emotions give rise to negative moral judgements. By way of illustration, when someone is slapped in the face, this event alone suffices to create anger and moral justification for punishment because we feel harmed.\textsuperscript{135} The \textit{Biological Theory}, however, fails to account for higher social emotions such as indignation, jealousy, resentment, hatred or hope, not to mention their social cues and origins. When people feel angry, for instance at being politically disenfranchised, there must be cognition and knowledge of the concept of a “vote”. Biological stimuli fail to extend into social practices. Consequently, the issue is not so much whether social practices and rules inhibit emotional reactions, but how they can trigger them.

\textit{Social Constructivist Theory}

Against this shortcoming in the \textit{Biological Theory} arose the idea that emotions are socially constructed. According to this theory, “Emotions are learned behaviour that can only be acquired if people are exposed to them within a particular culture.”\textsuperscript{136} Anthropologists like Clifford Geertz believe that emotions are “social artefacts.” According to this view, cultural


\textsuperscript{135} Prinz in many ways echoes the Greek mythical wisdom that posited the reign of the Erinyes as predating the rise of divine order and laws

\textsuperscript{136} Fox, \textit{Emotion Science}, p. 4.
values and practices, rather than innate biological processes, determine them. Because emotions are expressed differently from culture to culture, it should stand to reason that they are the product of social learning rather than universal processes. Social constructivists like to point out that certain emotional practices can be entirely unique to one culture. For instance, the Japanese emotion of *Amae* is a feeling of happiness, arising from a sense of togetherness and dependence; the Russian feeling of *Toska*, according to Vladimir Nabokov, is the deepest and most painful sensation of spiritual anguish; *Litost*, a personal favourite of the Czech author Milan Kundera, describes the torment and anguish created by the sudden sight of one’s own misery; *Wabi Sabi* in Japanese is the sensation of finding beauty in the world’s imperfections; *Fremdschämen* occurs when Germans are forced to watch others humiliate themselves. Another example is the ‘state of being a wild pig’ experienced by the Gururamba people of New Guinea. This sensation, typically befalling young men aged 25-35, leads to reckless financial and social behaviour.

The problem with all these fascinating cultural practices is that even as emotionally subdued Westerners, we know more or less what they are talking about. Social Constructivists argue that we fail to experience the Japanese sense of togetherness or the abyss of the Russian soul, because our own cultural machine values things like social autonomy and enlightened rationality. And indeed culture plays a role in triggering emotions. But as Damasio writes, “the fact that culture plays a role in the shaping of some inducers of the emotions, does not deny their fundamental stereotypicity, automaticity, and regulatory purpose.” In other words, culture can manipulate the objects of emotion, but culture cannot create new emotions out of thin air. And even though the role of culture is vital in determining emotional triggers, Social Constructivists cannot show that emotions themselves vary significantly from culture to culture; only social practices do. This, however, creates another problem, which offers a clear contrast to Ekman’s research on universal micro-expression. Emotional practices can be heavily culturally encoded and misinterpreted. By way of example, a culture may express anger by avoiding eye contact with the offender, while another culture may express anger by direct staring. Although Ekman’s research shows that anger can be universally recognized through facial cues such as poised lips and downward-sloping eyebrows, such micro-

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139 Damasio in *Cognitive Neuroscience of Emotion*, 19.
expressions are extremely short-lived and tell us little about sustained practices. Without precise knowledge of the culturally encoded practice, confusion can easily arise. This is why I propose to establish the existence of rage as predicated on an objective attitude, which makes no claim on the specific activity in rage but rather on the underlining desire for instrumentalization and exclusion.

Appraisal Theory

In contrast to the biological and social constructivist theories, psychologists have returned to the Greeks. Aristotle believed that emotions are not primarily caused by external events per se, but rather by the relation between event and subject. Emotions always have a “double reference; first to the object or situation being evaluated and second to the person experiencing the object or situation.” This understanding has given rise to the third, and presently reigning, theory of emotion, known as Cognitive Appraisal Theory. The introduction of a cognitive element was sought to explain how the same event could elicit different emotional responses; for instance the destruction of the Twin Towers caused global displays of grievance and sorrow, save for those pockets of inflamed radical Anti-Americanism where the reigning emotion was joy and Rachelust. As Aristotle already knew, events are appraised in accordance with personal factors, and as such lend themselves to different emotional responses. The psychologist Richard Lazarus explains the process thus: “The appraisal task for the person is to evaluate perceived circumstances in terms of a relatively small number of categories of adaptational significance, corresponding to different types of benefit or harm, each with different implications for coping.” An event becomes relevant because it is deemed to be important for the subject’s sense of flourishing and wellbeing, other minor strategic goals notwithstanding.

Cognitive Appraisal Theory leans more heavily on the biological theory of emotion than on the constructivist, in part because the latter has failed to construct a theory of its own. Antonio Damasio, a leading proponent of Appraisal Theory, bases his own theory of somatic markers on James-Lange’s theory of physiological change. However, while James thought that emotions register underlining physiological processes, like sweaty palms and racing hearts, Damasio widens the roster of perceptions beyond James’ physiological changes to take

141 Damasio, Everitt, and Bishop, “The Somatic Marker Hypothesis and the Possible Functions of the Prefrontal Cortex [and Discussion].” p. 1415
account of other non-biological factors. The cognition element is portrayed as inseparable from the overall emotional experience. The neuroscientist Richard Davidson has studied the neural imaging of emotions and concludes in agreement, “It is simply not possible to identify regions of the brain devoted exclusively to affect or exclusively to cognition. This fact should dispel claims about their independence.” The *somatic marker* takes into account all kinds of factors, including issues like culture, memory, social rules and personal preferences, and tallies the emotional response to offer the best understanding of the eliciting event and the relevant action tendency.

Prinz remains an outspoken critic of Damasio and *Cognitive Appraisal Theory* and maintains that cognition is irrelevant and that emotions can operate in accordance with what he terms “embedded appraisals”, which is a re-reading of the James-Lange theory. According to Prinz emotions are “change detectors”; an emotion like sadness searches for the sensation of loss, while an emotion like anger searches for the sensation of insult. These experiences, according to Prinz, are naturally given and do not rely on appraisal, but rather fall under the domain of moral awareness. It follows that individuals are naturally aware of the specific meaning of changes to their environment. Even if a slap to the face is not socially prohibited, the experience of the slap will still cause anger, regardless of the existence of a social taboo; instead the social taboo arises because of the ensuing anger. As in Ancient Greece, the vindictive and retaliatory urges of the Erinies were believed to predate the existence of laws and social order, and it was precisely the need to banish these ancient demons that urged the creation of civil order and custom. Prinz’s arguments are valid but Damasio and other cognitive appraisal theorists are more concerned with how the brain relates to and appraises emotional triggers and cues. Again, Prinz cannot explain any type of anger that arises from the denial of certain social rights or non-biological cues, like the “vote”. Such a non-biological trigger requires detailed knowledge of social practices, rules and expectations, i.e. embedded cognition.

Concerning the physiological aspect of emotional genesis, the information processing necessary for cognitive appraisals occurs in the neocortex, part of the brain unique in size to

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144 Richard Davidson quoted in Fox, *Emotion Science*. p. 5
humans. Known for its wrinkly demeanour, the neocortex exploded in size as humans began their unique evolutionary trajectory; it houses functions vital for social survival, like memory, language and imagination.\textsuperscript{146} While the basic emotions are still housed in the subcortex, part of the brain proportionate in size to other animals, scientists believe that the gravity of emotional processing has shifted upwards towards the neocortex in humans.\textsuperscript{147} In other words, the introduction of cognitive appraisal, with its vital centres housed in the neocortex, makes human emotions unique from other animals. Emotions are no longer simply governed by external biological stimuli but much more by social awareness and cultural knowledge.

This notion is further supported by the findings that the neocortex can be successfully removed in rats without impeding normal emotional reactions like fear or anger, while the same removal, famously chronicled in the life of Phineas Gage, inhibits normal social relations in humans.\textsuperscript{148} This has led scientists to conclude that the human neocortex, specifically the pre-frontal region, is vital in processing emotional responses, especially social ones, like indignation, jealousy, resentment, hatred or hope. This view suggests then, simplistically, that emotions are first registered in the subcortex and travel up through the neocortex, where they are refined through processes of cognitive appraisals. However, all this happens in a split second or may even occur simultaneously. MRI scans still grapple with a considerable time lag in representation; all relevant regions light up at once.\textsuperscript{149} Phineas Gage, lacking a large chunk of the neocortex, was prone to fits of mercurial rage; his judgements of life-important events and decisions proved very ineffective, leading him to live a socially impoverished life.\textsuperscript{150} I now turn to the neurological findings on human aggression and discuss what MRI scans can tell us about the emotion of anger, or possibly even rage.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{146} Fox, \textit{Emotion Science}, p. 11.
\item \textsuperscript{147} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{148} Andrea Caria et al., “Regulation of Anterior Insular Cortex Activity Using Real-time fMRI,” \textit{NeuroImage} 35, no. 3 (April 15, 2007): 1238–46.; Bechara and Damasio, “The Somatic Marker Hypothesis.”
\item \textsuperscript{149} A point raised in the criticism of contentious findings linking emotions and moral judgments, see Jorge Moll and Ricardo de Oliveira-Souza, “Moral Judgments, Emotions and the Utilitarian Brain,” \textit{Trends in Cognitive Sciences} 11, no. 8 (August 2007): 319–21.
\end{itemize}
Neurology of Human Aggression

The picture we have of the phenomenon of human aggression and indeed negative emotions as a whole are extremely fragmented. There is nothing close to a consensus on how aggression and violence operate in the brain. Nevertheless, neurologists have arrived at many – and indeed sometimes instructively overlapping – findings. Some of these findings indeed pose interesting questions for the study of aggression and violence in the social sciences, while also stressing that the social sciences are ultimately much better equipped to handle these issues because they can explain the causes. I will highlight some of the most interesting findings here, while also pressing forward to arrive at a motivational understanding of violence and human aggression in the next section.

Following the medical case of Phineas Gage, scientists have concluded that aggression and hostility are processed in the Ventromedial and Orbitofrontal Cortices of the brain; i.e. the neocortex. According to neuroscientists Stemmler and Potegal these areas may “mediate the effect of anger on the calculation of the potential payoffs and punishment for aggressive responding.” In normal social relations the OFC may regulate aggressive behaviour in accordance with learned rules of social conduct. The OFC may even inhibit aggression altogether by communicating with other parts of the brain to select non-aggressive solutions to anger-inducing problems. In accordance with Aristotle’s intuition, Potegal and Stemmler conclude that the “OFC may guide angry individuals to approach and confront an offender who is subordinate to them, but to retreat from and avoid an offender who is superior.”

Aggression in other words relies on a strategic appraisal, stressing the connection between emotion and violence and punitiveness.

According to Harmon-Jones, human aggression registers in the same part of the brain as reward and hope. This is a dramatic departure from the political and philosophical interpretation of anger, which insists that that anger is a sign of discomfort and pain. Harmon-Jones claims that anger motivates us to engage the object rather than flee from it. Following this insight, neuroscientists have made a crucial distinction between defensive and offensive aggression. According to Bushman and Anderson, offensive aggression is instrumental and

152 Caria et al., “Regulation of Anterior Insular Cortex Activity Using Real-Time fMRI.”
154 Ibid.
seeks to address affronts that are social in nature. This is of course fundamentally different to defensive anger found primarily in animal behaviour when the animal flees to avoid further harm. Offensive aggression discounts the fear of further harm against the possibility of resolution. Research by Litvak and Lerner has found that “the experience of anger (...) involves a sense of certainty and control of or responsibility for a negative event (...) And because anger has unique associations with certainty, control, and responsibility, its effects on judgements relevant to the dimensions will be distinct from other negative emotions.” Anger blocks out contravening signals and arguably maintains a stance of absolute moral certainty. This is the same moral certainty and absoluteness the Erinyes portrayed in their relentless pursuit of their victim, or Achilles and Hecuba in theirs.

Offensive aggression is registered in the left frontal lobe. According to Richard Davidson right frontal activity is associated with withdrawal or fear, while left frontal activity registers reward and motivation. Building on this insight, Harmon-Jones shows that individuals able to address an anger-arousing problem presented to them by removing the source of discomfort, evidenced greater left frontal activity than individuals unable to remove the source of discomfort. Incidentally those reporting greater anger also showed greater left-frontal activity. Harmon-Jones concludes, “When individuals believed that there was something they could do to resolve the anger-arousing situation, they responded with increased left frontal activity. In contrast, when they believed there was nothing they could do to resolve the situation, they did not respond with increased left frontal activity.” This had led researchers to further hypothesize that an initial appraisal of the anger-inducing event decides whether the event elicits left-frontal activity (reward) or right frontal activity (withdrawal); the activation of the left-frontal area suggests an evolutionary association with anger, hope and reward stimuli. A right-frontal activation, on the other hand, hypothesized in subjects faced with an inability to resolve the anger-inducing stimuli, leads to emotional perceptions of sadness, defeat and depression, suggesting another evolutionary co-association. In other words, human aggression already indicates a willingness to act and an action tendency towards some type of engagement-based resolution, such as punishment.

159 Ibid., p. 20.
Neuroscientists De Quervain and Stroblet have further researched the connection between punishment and reward sensations. They find that punishment of a crime triggers activation of the reward center of the brain, and the closer the punisher feels to the crime, the greater the activation.\textsuperscript{160} In this sense, punishment is not only viewed as a plausible solution to anger-inducing events, but leads to a sense of reward and satisfaction as well. This has led to further hypotheses that anger is necessarily linked to concepts like justice and morality, as the act of punishment and removal of discomfort leads to the feeling of satisfaction and vindication in the administration of suffering in offenders.\textsuperscript{161}

Other research shows that angry people find angry messages more convincing than non-angry people; MRI scans reveal that already angry individuals react more strongly to anger-inducing stimuli than to non anger-inducing stimuli, in effect sustaining their anger through signal selection.\textsuperscript{162} Already suffering from an injustice, individuals will be more acutely aware of other slights and insults and filter out contravening information. Under the influence of anger, individuals reduce their estimates of risk and are more willing to engage in dangerous and reckless behaviour. Individuals become less sensitive to life threatening situations. This insight has led to the formulation of a theory of affective associate network. This theory suggests that an elicitation of anger can trigger the activation of dormant sets of memories of past injuries and injustices that exist in the cultural memory of a people. Strong emotionally resonant memories are stored close to each other in the brain; consequently nodes of appraisal may be interlinked with each other. “Mood-congruent attention, priming, and retrieval effects”, write Litvak and Lerner, “should occur not just between an emotional state and stimuli connected to that emotional state, but between an emotional state and stimuli connected to its central appraisal.”\textsuperscript{163} This offers a useful explanation for the persistence of extreme violence as experienced intermittently over a long time period; as an injury or injustice is incurred, the emotional reaction of anger immediately triggers other anger primed memories, leading to larger-than emotional reactions and further entrenchment of anger-prone moods.


\textsuperscript{161} Litvak et al., “Fuel in the Fire.”

\textsuperscript{162} Potegal, Stemmler, and Spielberger, \textit{International Handbook of Anger}.

\textsuperscript{163} Litvak, Lerner et al. in Ibid. p. 300
In Out of Control Anger (OOC) witnessed in some cultures in South America, finds Michael Potegal, individuals give themselves to uncontrollable bouts of crying, screaming, trembling and aggression, triggered by the experience of huge personal loss. This emotional state is described as coming from “within”. The activation of a network of cognitive appraisals elicited by the loss of a central figure in the lives of the subject shifts the mind into “automatic processing.” In road rage, subjects, even in the exact moment of succumbing to the rage, believe it is in their interest to attack the other driver. In both cases, the individual is not operating normally but subject to “automatic processing”; insulated from new or contravening information. Because such behaviour is usually the sum of different memories all activated at once, the response to the eliciting event seems excessive and disproportionate – almost possessed. But technically this is simply a combination of different processes in the brain occurring at once.

These neurological insights stress that human aggression ultimately favours an action tendency. As the emotion of anger is linked with the activation of the reward center of the brain, engaging the target offers relief and satisfaction. Critically, the brain makes no distinction between social anger and anti-social rage. However, the issue of trigger remains problematic; affective associate networks help illustrate how aggression can seem disproportionate and even possessed, but even here there needs to be an initial trigger, which returns the exploration back to the social sciences. Neuro-scientific insights can help explain cognitive processes within action tendencies, but only the social sciences can explain their triggers.

Moral Foundation of Negative Emotions

We know from appraisal theory that emotions arise not from an event per se, but more specifically from how the event impacts us. As Nussbaum writes: “Emotions view the world from the point of view of my own scheme of goals and projects, the things to which I attach value in a conception of what it is for me to live well.” Implicit in Nussbaum’s assessment is the assumption that all people feel a sense of entitlement towards a good life, or at least one free of pain and discomfort. Consequently every human being is imbued with a sense of moral

166 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, p. 49.
worth, which engenders a basic entitlement towards just and fair treatment.\textsuperscript{167} This is why most scholars refer to justice not as a set of rules and regulations, but as a sense of emotional awareness or feeling. Jon Mercer explains to this end that justice “is more than an abstract set of principles about how one should organize society; justice involves a perspective that depends on emotion. What one cares about, what is a concern to an actor, is part of one's understanding of justice.”\textsuperscript{168} Justice, in other words, is freedom from mistreatment, and requires the recognition of moral worth and all the myriad ways this worth is expressed in social practices. Emotions, because they promote “the maintenance of life, always poised to avoid the loss of integrity”\textsuperscript{169} operate as important warning signs, that moral entitlements are being compromised.

It is logical to assume, as Robert C. Solomon does, that knowledge of justice and correct treatment only comes about through the sensation of injustice and mistreatment. The knowledge of just treatment is borne from the experience of unwarranted and undeserved discomfort and pain. Solomon explains, “The heart of justice may be compassion for others, but its origins and its passion are to be found in the more violent, even hostile emotions.”\textsuperscript{170} These hostile emotions occur because the fundamental sense of entitlement towards recognition of one’s moral worth is compromised. This sense of moral worth can become invested in all kinds of material and social expectations. For instance, a person might feel angry at not having the “vote” because her moral worth is experienced through social comparison and the desire to be treated equally and no less than others. The ability to tick a box on a piece of paper is instantly invested with existential meaning. Disenfranchisement leads to the assessment that one’s intrinsic worth is discarded or compromised.

Because negative emotions depend on a “complex set of social expectations in which judgment plays a crucial role,”\textsuperscript{171} failure to comply with these social expectations may give rise to anger, like in Aristotle’s theory. However, because moral worth is dependent on so many social and material expectations being fulfilled at any moment, any failure of these various expectations can translate into a failure of entitlement. The slightest act of disrespect,  

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{167} This point is stressed in Nussbaum, Prinz, Solomon and can also be found in literature on honour and respect such as in Fukuyama (2006), Honneth (1996), Stewart (1994), Appiah (2011), Lebow (2009).
\textsuperscript{168} Mercer, “Emotional Beliefs,” p. 7.
\textsuperscript{169} Antonio Damasio in Lane and Nadel, \textit{Cognitive Neuroscience of Emotion}. p. 20
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid, p. 247.
\end{footnotesize}
such as a wrong look, an unacknowledged act of covetousness or a failure to acknowledge a local custom of any sort, can snowball into violence and even lead to death, depending on how the offended deals with the situation and frames the act. Consequently, extreme acts of violence need not necessarily be caused by corresponding and preceding acts of violence; the trigger can be minuscule in comparison and still lead to extreme violence because the specific mistreatment somehow threatens the subject’s sense of moral worth. It all comes down to appraisal. In Euripides’s *Hecuba*, the death of her children inspires different reactions, because Hecuba appraises each death differently; only the death of her son directly challenges her sense of worth because of the inscribed breach of *nomos*.

**Appraisal in Negative Emotions**

There exist countless processes in any appraisal; they range from knowledge of social rules and expectations, inter-personal comparisons and personal histories, to religious imperatives like forgiveness and mercy, among countless others.\(^{172}\) The overriding appraisal I want to stress, however, is the appraisal of *perceived intentionality*: Whether an act is believed to have been intentionally committed to undermine the moral worth of the subject. Because any act, even a minuscule one, can potentially undermine our sense of moral worth, the overriding appraisal must be predicated on whether the offender actually intends to offend, and whether the subject indeed considers her sense of entitlement to be compromised. Although other types of appraisal are vital for negative emotions, they can be overruled by the idea that the mistreatment, even a minuscule one, suggests a moral disregard and act of deep disrespect. A focus on this single appraisal can re-frame existing attempts at emotional rosters, and strengthen the case for political rage. Existing attempts usually argue for rigid causal alignments of specific social cues with specific emotional reactions. However, by focusing on the appraisal of intended challenges to moral worth and entitlement, rage can be clearly distinguished from other negative emotions. In order to substantiate the importance of perceived intentionality as appraisal factor, I turn to the theoretical writings on emotions of P.F. Strawson.

The British philosopher P.F. Strawson, a logician and pioneer in analytical philosophy, wrote a seminal essay on *Freedom and Resentment*, in which he made a critical distinction between

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\(^{172}\) Damasio, *The Feeling of What Happens.*
negative emotions as either predicated on moral attitudes or objective attitudes towards the offender. These attitudes work as implicit appraisals. On the moral attitude, Strawson writes:

“The partial withdrawal of goodwill which these attitudes entail, the modification they entail of the general demand that another should, if possible, be spared suffering, is, rather, the consequence of continuing to view him as a member of the moral community; only as one who has offended against its demands.”173

Here negative emotions are contained by the assessment that the transgressor will atone for and continue to respect the moral worth of the offended; the offender’s intentions are not to undermine the moral worth of the victim. However, the objective attitude, explains Strawson,

“Cannot include the range of reactive feelings and attitudes which belong to the involvement or participation with others in inter-personal human relationships; it cannot include resentment, gratitude, forgiveness, or anger.”174

In the objective attitude, the offender is no longer held to enjoy moral equality with the victim. A withdrawal of the moral attitude comes about because the offender intentionally mistreats the victim, and in doing so dissolves the basis of inter-personal human relationships. The objective attitude, in other words, lends itself to emotions that are unencumbered by any type of moral recognition towards the offender.

I choose this approach because it best mirrors the stylistic role of nomos in the emotional economy of Ancient Greece. Within nomos, all kinds of emotions can be experienced without sacrificing the order of the community; however, if a citizen gives into passion and reckless impulse and breaches nomos, for instance by committing revenge, the offender forfeits his membership in the community and earns either death or exile; furthermore he is believed to be polluted by the vengeful and raging spirits of the Erinyes. Without referring too much to Ancient Greece, it suffices to say that some emotions can be experienced without sacrificing the implicit norm of mutual moral recognition and entitlement, and these emotions are experienced through Strawson’s moral attitude. The other set of emotions, however, which in Ancient Greece are the domain of the Erinyes, are predicated on a breach of nomos, and these

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173 Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, and Other Essays, p. 22.
174 Ibid., p. 9.
emotions are experienced through Strawson’s *objective attitude*; the relevant appraisal generates the belief that the moral worth of the subject is intentionally violated. Naturally, there is an implicit assessment here that moral recognition is the natural state of relations between subjects, borne from the simple fact that subjects need to be mistreated first before they register any challenge to their felt entitlement. Individuals, in other words, are not naturally in a state of potentially murderous rage towards others.

Emotions operating within the *moral attitude* set limits on how much punishment or misgiving can be levied against the transgressor. Rage is unique because it is predicated on an *objective attitude* towards the offender, meaning that inflicted suffering is unbound by moral concerns. This is an important point because each attitude requires an implicit appraisal of whether the transgressor seems willing to atone for their crime and remain part of the “moral community” and whether the offense constituted a grave mistreatment or a mild one. In rage the result is absolute, suggesting in turn that the mistreatment is more severe if not absolute. This is then the crux; rage not only responds to a set of social triggers, but more importantly to an implied moral disregard, something the *moral attitude* emotions by definition do not.

Another way of explaining this would be to argue that the *moral attitude* contains and limits action tendencies, while the *objective attitude* gives them full rein. In Nussbaum’s exploration of emotions, which relies heavily on a reading of classical philosophy, she stresses the two-faced nature in anger. Anger can be constructive but equally destructive. “In circumstances where evil prevails,” she writes, “anger is an assertion of concern for human well-being and human dignity; and the failure to become angry seems at best “slavish” (as Aristotle put it), at worst a collaboration with evil.” However, anger also creates dehumanizing impulses and creates moral distance between subjects, which brings it closer to our understanding of rage: “Seeing others as anger sees them – as people who ought to suffer – is a way of distancing oneself from their humanity.” In many ways rage can be described as the *objective attitude* counterpart to anger, distinguished simply by whether there exists any moral recognition between subjects. Nussbaum refers to this moderating force in anger as compassion, which sets strong limits on how we treat others and whether we can forgive them or not. Consequently Nussbaum’s notion of compassion informs Strawson’s *moral attitude*.

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176 Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought*. P. 403
177 Ibid., 403.
The catastrophic consequences of the *objective attitude* resonate clearly in Thomas Scheff’s sociological study of European continental wars in the late 19th and 20th century in *Bloody Revenge: Emotions, Nationalism and War*. Scheff argues that people who understand each other are “emotionally and cognitively attuned.”\(^\text{178}\) Even in conflict and competitions *attunement* sets clear limits and boundaries on violence. This is essentially comparable to the *moral attitude*. However, unlimited destruction, as witnessed in the 20th century, Scheff argues, was the product of “broken bonds”. He quotes the German sociologist Georg Simmel: “The deepest hatred grows out of broken love… Here separation does not follow from conflict, but, on the contrary, conflict from separation.”\(^\text{179}\) Scheff believes that emotional alienation is the reason why leaders failed to comprehend the Kaiser’s paranoia or Hitler’s ambition. When existing *attunement* is damaged, individuals and groups risk not only leading others to feel wronged but – more importantly – lack the necessary emotional and moral understanding to comprehend what others are doing and why. In the worst-case scenario, there is no sense of shared values and perception of events, leading to a disjointed sense of justice and cycles of violence.

Relationships that move from the *moral attitude* into the *objective attitude* lose their sense of *attunement*, their sense of communality and mutuality, which the Ancient Greeks of course referred to as nomos. The loss of this inter-subjective framework means that actions are no longer filtered through communal concerns, and that appraisals are no longer predicated on a communal “us”, but rather on a “we” versus “them”. This is the inherent moral exclusion that makes rage possible. It aligns with the Ancient Greek understanding of rage, when Greek heroes took on bestial and dog-like forms as soon as they engaged in brutality and vengeance, indicating that they had veered off the path of nomos and into the domain of the feral and uncivilized Erinyes. But critically, the *objective attitude* only arises from a perceived act of mistreatment that undermines the moral worth of the subject.

**Typology of Negative Emotions**

The distinction between an *objective attitude* and a *moral attitude* can give rise to a typology of three/four ideal-type emotions: Resentment, anger and rage. I will also make a brief

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\(^{179}\) Ibid.
mention of Ressentiment to make the picture more complete and somewhat symmetrical. I have chosen these three/four ideal type emotions to stress two elements in negative emotions: the first is the distinction between moral attitude and objective attitude appraisal; the other is the distinction between the action tendencies of action-based punishment and non-action based judgements. This, I believe, is the most economical way of covering negative emotions, by streamlining according to categorical differences in action tendency and appraisal of moral regard. Of course within the categories, many more, finer distinctions of emotions can be made.\textsuperscript{180}

Resentment and anger differ primarily because resentment does not demand punishment, while anger does; similarly Ressentiment and rage differ because rage exacts extreme punishment, while Ressentiment is unable to do so. The apparent asymmetry in the motivations of non-action emotions makes it easy to confuse the attitude in Ressentiment, which will be explored at length in this thesis. The point is that resentment chooses not to act, while Ressentiment would ideally lead to action-based rage but cannot because it is unable to act. However, I want to stress that the emotional responses are not sequential; resentment does not lead to anger and Ressentiment does not lead to rage. Instead they are self-contained emotions committed to very different trajectories because of different appraisals. The two trajectories operating within the objective attitude, i.e. rage and Ressentiment, in turn inform the Rage Binary explored later on in this thesis.

In the table below, we have the moral attitude emotions of resentment and anger on one side, and the objective attitude emotions of rage and Ressentiment on the other. Another contextualization could construct the pro-action responses of anger and rage on one side, and non-action responses of resentment and Ressentiment on the other. There is no given preference in aligning the responses in accordance with either a “moral/objective attitude matrix” or an “action/non-action matrix.”

\textsuperscript{180} I do not cover such finer distinctions in negative emotions like contempt, disgust, hatred, indignation or fury, for the sole reason that they offer no added insight into the salient differences in action tendencies.
What follows is a description of the social cues and respective action tendencies, with the notion of intentionality held as implicit. In the moral attitude, both offender and offended acknowledge that the moral worth is never questioned. Such typology of emotions has been attempted before in International Relations. Roger D. Petersen offers a roster distinguishing between a large array of emotions, as varied as anger, fear, resentment, contempt, hatred and rage.\(^{181}\) Another roster can be found in Jon Elster’s contribution on transitional justice in Closing the Books.\(^{182}\) Elster refers to hatred, contempt, anger and two types of indignation in his formulation. I will briefly expound these rosters and their respective emotions, before streamlining them into the new roster shown above.

Jon Elster’s typology offers an analysis on the cues and action tendencies of negative emotions. Anger, writes Elster, is a second-party response that A feels towards B, for having caused A harm for no good reason; the action tendency is to make B suffer. Cartesian Indignation is a third-party emotion, according to Elster, that A feels toward B because he believes B has harmed C for no good reason; the action tendency is to make B suffer, though it is much weaker than in the second-party emotion. Hatred is the emotion that A feels toward B if he believes B has an evil character; the action tendency is to cause B to cease to exist or otherwise be rendered harmless by permanent expulsion. Contempt is the emotion that A feels

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towards B when B has a weak or inferior character; the action tendency is avoidance or ostracism. *Aristotelian Indignation* is the emotion that A feels towards B when A believes B enjoys “*undeserved good fortune;*” the action tendency is to confiscate that fortune. Following the distinction between *moral attitude* and *objective attitude* emotions, we can streamline Elster responses: *Cartesian Indignation* and *Aristotelian Indignation* are based on the *moral attitude*, while *hatred* and *contempt* are clearly based on the *objective attitude*; *anger* can go either way.

In Petersen’s roster, he distinguishes his emotions as *event-based, object-based or without cognition*. Event-based emotions are *anger, fear* and *resentment*. *Anger* is the cognition that that an individual or group has committed a bad action against one’s self or one’s group with an action tendency towards punishment. *Fear* is the cognition of a situation of danger caused by indiscriminate violence with an action tendency towards fight or flight. *Resentment* is the cognition that one’s group is located in an unwarranted subordinate position in a status hierarchy; the action tendency is to reduce the status differential.

Object-based emotions are *contempt* and *hatred*. *Contempt* is the cognition that a group or object is inherently inferior or defective; the action tendency is towards avoidance. *Contempt* is usually expressed through racial or cultural stigmas. *Hatred*, on the other hand, is the cognition that a group is both inherently defective and dangerous; the action tendency is to physically eliminate the presence of that group. Such perceptions are usually historically informed via cultural schemas, such as *schemas of hatred*. Petersen holds that “the innate negative features of a group may persist within a cultural schema, but the emotive force of that schema is only seldom activated.” In other words *hatred* can lay dormant and take on the form of *contempt*.

An emotion without a cognitive appraisal is *rage*, according to Petersen. Rage is cognition without precedent. This makes it non-instrumental, according to Petersen. The action tendency of rage is to lash out indiscriminately, because “if the group that is the source of the frustration is unavailable for attack, another group will be found to substitute for it.” This effectively means that stimulus and action tendencies are misaligned. All other emotions follow a social logic; the event-stimulus caused by B creates an action tendency in A. In *rage*

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184 Petersen, *Western Intervention in the Balkans*, 43.
185 Ibid., p. 48.
however the event-stimulus caused by B creates an action tendency in A directed at C, or D, or E… Petersen concludes that what matters in rage is:

“People’s wish to lash out, and elites shape the direction of that desire towards specific targets of the groups. Because rage generates powerful distortions in belief formation, political elites may help to employ the emotional flexibly towards different ends and various targets.”

Petersen’s distinction between event- and object-based emotions is an interesting one, and representative of Strawson’s distinctions. Event-based cognitions can be represented as operating moral attitudes, because the offender has done something that registers as violation but the overall cognition remains one of moral reverence, as the incident is singular and does not make any claims in relation to a changing moral regard between offender and victim. Object-based emotions, however, are different and operate according to the objective attitude. The transgressor’s character is seen as evil or harmful, reflected in the fact that the offender constantly seeks to eradicate or harm the victim. Although Petersen argues that rage is different, in part because he argues that rage is a displacement, it too operates an objective attitude because it seeks to lash out and destroy. Petersen does not offer a cause for rage, which underlines his point that the emotion is illegitimate, as it fails to follow a social logic. This view is incorrect however. I now proceed to construct my own typology, beginning with resentment, before briefly moving on to Ressentiment, then anger and finally rage. There is no such thing as an illegitimate emotion. Emotions do not lie, in the sense that they always require a corresponding trigger event.

Resentment

Resentment operates within the social framework; it sets limits on punishment and most, if not all, moral privileges of the transgressor are retained. Strawson’s moral attitude still makes excuses for the offender. However, a repeat offense or lack of atonement can lead to a withdrawal of the moral attitude. In this case, the transgressor would no longer enjoy the limitation on punishment privileged to recognizable moral equals. He becomes a threat and possibly a traitor and his acts are no longer filtered through appraisal networks tempered by recognition of his intrinsic worth. According to Petersen, “Resentment stems from the

186 Ibid., p. 48
perception that one’s group is located in an unwarranted subordinate position on a status hierarchy.”

Petersen correctly points out that such mistreatment can turn to violence, but this equally implies that resentment no longer adequately describes the emotional reaction.

According to the moral philosopher Jean Hampton, “Resentment is an emotion which reflects their judgement that the harmful treatment they experienced should not have been intentionally inflicted on them by their assailants insofar as it is not appropriate given their value and rank.” Margaret Walker qualifies this assessment by inserting that “Resentment is an accusing anger, it registers a violation that might threaten the authority of norms.”

Resentment operates like a warning signal; a specific mistreatment is registered as violation of shared social norms viewed to be the foundation of mutual moral recognition. In healthy communal relations, each member can make demands on the behaviour of other members, leading to a shared sense of values and expectations. Similar to the Greek concept of nomos, healthy social relations indicate a sense of communal reverence for the social order. When one member, however, mistreats another member, the offender violates this order and communicates that the prevailing norms are no longer applicable. All members might resent this attack on shared norms, leading to indignation.

The emergence of resentment and indignation communicates to the transgressor that his actions are perceived as unjust and wrong, and if he desires to continue to be a member of the moral community, he must recant and re-invest in the correct treatment of others.

When Petersen talks of violent resentment he is probably referring to a conflict that began as a minor transgression against shared values and norms but soon spiralled out of control, giving rise to brutal violence. The examples he lists, such as colonial violence in India in the early 20th century, or North American colonial violence centuries earlier, or the civil strife erupting from sudden status reversal, as in post-war Iraq or possibly Syria, have little to do with resentment. Members of opposing communities charge each other with homicidal intent - the greater the suffering of the others, the greater the triumph of one’s own community. Petersen is certainly correct in establishing resentment as mistreatment of rank but he ignores that

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190 The difference between resentment and indignation is one of second-party and third-party reactions, see Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, and Other Essays; Murphy and Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy.
resentment indicates that the mistreatment is felt as benign and does not merit punishment. The fact that mistreatment of rank engenders acts of violence must shift the focus towards the breakdown of shared moral recognition and the emergence of harmful intentions. In these cases the mistreatment of rank indeed communicates an intentional attack on the group’s sense of worth.

Examples of real resentment in International Relations are far more benign. For instance, German resentment over NSA phone spying is a valid example, because as German newspapers asked rhetorically: *Is this how one treats one’s friends?*191 The recent quarrel over visa issues for Indian diplomats entering the US is another example.192 A more instructive example can be found in the decision of the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to visit the WWII War shrine in 2014, commemorating, amongst others, Japanese war criminals. Abe’s visit seriously questions his commitment to good relations with his Chinese and South Korean neighbours.193 Along with the territorial disputes over islands in the South China Sea, such disrespect may easily give rise to other emotions if the lack of commitment in the survival of this fragile moral community continues.

Resentment is an important emotion and ubiquitous in international affairs; however it remains a community-driven emotion because the stimulus remains the perceived mistreatment or violation of an established norm, such as the agreed-upon recognition of moral worth. Resentment occurs when normative expectations have not been met. When normative expectations are consistently shown to be void, another emotion takes over, as we saw in Euripides’ *Hecuba*, or might see in the future of East-Asian relations. The point in resentment, however, is that it constitutes an appraisal of a mild form of mistreatment, which is either brushed off as inconsequential or contained through a quick and sincere act of atonement on behalf of the offender. I have referred to resentment as a judgement-based or non-action based emotion, because the offended deems the mistreatment too mild to be worthy of punishment, and instead opts for a publicly or privately communicated judgement.

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that the treatment was wrong and should not be repeated. In resentment the offender chooses not to act.

Ressentiment

As mentioned earlier, Ressentiment will be treated at length in Chapter 5; however for the sake of consistency, a brief outline is necessary. Nietzsche stresses that Ressentiment is borne from an inability to react adequately against grave and existential mistreatment. Compared to resentment, however, the inaction is predicated not on choice but on weakness. It follows the objective attitude by constructing a value system predicated on absolute moral derogation and exclusion of the offender. Unlike resentment, however, Ressentiment responds to an existential injury and not some banal mistreatment; there is no appraisal that the offender will atone or admit wrongdoing. But at the same, Ressentiment differs from its actionable counterpart of rage because the victim is unable to act and must therefore invest her rage in moral debasement instead. Ressentiment and resentment have the same action tendency of judgement, but Ressentiment’s judgement makes no excuses for the offender and maintains that the mistreatment disqualifies the offender as a member of the moral community and removes any claim to moral worth. In Nietzsche’s analysis, Ressentiment ultimately gives rise to revenge fantasies like the concept of hell, where offenders are damned to eternal suffering. Examples of Ressentiment would be identities or ideologies predicated on “anti”, such as Anti-Americanism, Anti-Modernism or Anti-Enlightenment.

Anger

Anger, writes Petersen, is “the cognition that an individual or group has committed a bad action against one’s self or group; action tendency toward punishing that group.” Anger is a step up from resentment but differs from the excluding competence of rage. Nussbaum writes that anger arises from the belief, “that some damage has occurred to me or to something or someone close to me; that the damage is not trivial but significant; that it was done by someone; probably, that is done willingly.” The difference to resentment is that the mistreatment has actually caused severe damage or a sense of grave mistreatment or loss, rather than simply a perceived sense of rank displacement or confusion about expectations.

194 Petersen, Western Intervention in the Balkans, p. 35
195 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, p. 29.
Resentment only demands that a certain mistreatment not be repeated and that recognition of standing and worth be respected. Anger, however, demands payment for a perceived loss. Consequently anger engenders the desire for punishment and retribution.

Retribution is markedly different from revenge or reprisals, and this will be covered in Chapter 4. While retribution is the domain of the courts and serves a social function, revenge and reprisals are types of personal justice that are not sanctioned by the court or any shared community. We already witnessed the same distinction in Aeschylus’ *Oresteia*. Athena, sensing the destructive potential of revenge cycles, domesticates the Erinyes and places their punishment in the service of the greater good, turning all justice over to the courts, effectively exchanging revenge for retribution and enforcing communal limits on the extent of suffering.

In anger, the desire to punish the offender is filtered through the *moral attitude*. The sense of loss is assuaged by communally administered punishment in the form of penalties like a loss of liberties or material possession. This punishment symbolically equals the crime and thus re-establishes a sense of balance and equality. As with resentment, both parties retain their sense of moral worth and equality. But equally, anger can swiftly turn to rage if the subject dismisses sanctioned justice and instead opts for revenge, disregarding the moral worth of the offender and illustrating a switch to the *objective attitude*. On the other hand, the social cue for anger might in some cases be the same as in resentment; it depends on how far the victim feels aggrieved and to what extent they begin to harbour punitive impulses. In some cases a mistreatment of rank might engender anger, if the subject feels that she has genuinely suffered a loss and deserves compensation.

In International Relations the desire to penalize the conduct of other states is ever-present. For instance, Putin’s territorial assimilation of Crimea has angered many Western leaders and resulted in penalties such as sanctions, travel restrictions and an expulsion from the G8.\(^\text{196}\) It remains to be seen whether these punishments suffice and whether Putin remains bound by the demands of the international community. Further transgression on Putin’s behalf may indicate normative expectations to be unfounded, splitting Putin and his agenda from that of the West. Divergent agendas then lead to the spectre of opposing notions of order. Another famous example that fits this paradigm follows the political manoeuvrings after the

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assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Austria-Hungary’s increasingly demanding ultimatums, designed to punish and ultimately humiliate Serbia, were finally rebuked. Serbia and her backers were unwilling to give in any further, dissolving the basis of any shared sense of justice and setting the stage for World War I. Although there were of course underlying dynamics at play, World War I began with Austria-Hungary’s desire to punish Serbia. The Serbs initially accepted the punishment, but further demands indicated that Austria-Hungary was less interested in repairing the broken bonds than making Serbia suffer, which indicated a desire for revenge rather than restitution, the mark of an objective attitude and a loss of what Scheff calls “attunement.”

Rage

According to Petersen, rage is a “non-instrumental emotion” and serves no social function; it lashes out indiscriminately. “The target of rage can be somewhat of a living inkblot,” explains Petersen, “the rage emotion can usually generate a reason for attacking or discriminating against the target.”\(^1\) Andrew Ross writes in agreement, “the description of rage underscores the illegitimacy of the emotion by revealing its failure to sustain a coherent object. Precisely because the emotion is so erratic.”\(^2\) Both Petersen and Ross have in mind a violent and undisciplined mob, fitting the description in Elias Canetti’s *Crowds and Power*, when the sting of authority suddenly awakens a dormant mass of violent and irate followers. There exists considerable research on the manipulation of public sentiment in the field of social psychology. Theories like “Displaced Aggression”\(^3\) or “Elite Persuasion”\(^4\) support the idea that political elites whip their people into a frenzy by channelling their legitimate frustrations towards politically calculated targets. Targets, previously agreed upon in existing schemas of hatred, become victims, even though they are completely unrelated to the cause of suffering.

Ruthless manipulators like Adolf Hitler, Stalin, Mao Ze-Dong, or Pol Pot, armed with the promise of progress and purity, convinced their people that mass killings of these moral

\(^{197}\) Petersen, *Western Intervention in the Balkans*, p. 48


outsiders were necessary. These outsiders were not only political outliers, but specifically moral ones as well; in many cases they were described as sub-human. Objective attitudes based on existing schemas of hatred provide the moral certainty necessary to eradicate these scapegoats, already beset by moral disregard. But activation in turn requires what Staub refers to as a fertile “affective background,” able to align a sense of existential threat with the proposed solution. This sense of felt hardship and mistreatment always needs to be real. This hardship can come from multiple sources, including a loss of collective esteem, economic upheaval, or natural disaster. They all challenge the inherent sense entitlement of the group towards freedom from mistreatment and suffering, and consequently appear as unjust and undeserved.

An inherent desire to control events and gain a sense of comprehension places subjects in a position where a culprit is worth more than a rational explanation. “A cause is found, and life problems become comprehensible,” explains Staub, “finding a scapegoat makes people believe their problems can be predicted and controlled; and it eliminates one’s own responsibility, thereby diminishing guilt and enhancing esteem.” The ability to deal with hard times is then predicated on the successful creation of a responsible out-group, regardless of culpability. However, even schemas of hatred refer to some unresolved ancient mistreatment and injustice.

Rage certainly suffers from the problem of displacement, but there is another side to rage that needs to be stressed. Even in the case of displacement the sense of suffering is real and subjects respond emotionally to a set of grievances and problems that threaten their sense of moral worth and entitlement towards a life free of mistreatment and suffering. Despite the existence of elite manipulation, the emotional register cannot be simulated. In this sense, the notion of righteous rage, the ideal-type so to speak, deserves to be fully explored. Even if manipulation occurs, the legitimacy of the rage trigger stands apart from the illegitimate manipulation of the action tendency.

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The connection between serious mistreatment and the *objective attitude* I believe is always causal. Even strangers are regarded initially in a *moral attitude* and with a modicum of human compassion. As argued before, even minuscule acts of disrespect can lead to an *objective attitude*, but can be easily contained if the offender communicates his guilt and atones, or refrains from a repeat offense. In this way the *moral attitude* of mutual moral recognition is maintained. However, acts like a terrorist bombing, territorial annexation or overt aggression leave little room for interpretation; should the offender wish to atone or apologize, it would be satirical. These acts are unequivocal signs of a moral disregard and trigger *righteous rage*.

In the mind of the raging subject, the connection between the action tendency of extreme punishment and sense of suffered injustice is always real. A prototypical example of such *righteous rage* can be found in Jean Paul-Sartre’s introduction to Frantz Fanon’s *Wretched of the Earth*. Sartre writes,

> “Irrepressible violence is neither sound and fury, nor the resurrection of savage instincts, nor even the effect of resentment: it is man re-creating himself. I think we understood this truth at one time, but we have forgotten it – that no gentleness can efface the marks of violence; only violence itself can destroy them. The native cures himself of colonial neurosis by thrusting out to the settler through force of arms. When his rage boils over, he discovers his lost innocence and he comes to known himself in that he creates his self.”

One might dislike the display of violence, for all its excesses and brutality, but for those acting, the rationale is clear. In the case of Fanon’s anti-colonialism, rage liberates the subject not only from material oppression but existential oppression; the act of violent rebellion not only removes the oppressor but also gives rise to a new sense of identity unencumbered by the demands of colonial vestige. In the words of the French sociologist Michel Wieviorka, “The negation of the subjectivity of the other becomes a form of self-assertion”. Rage in that sense is the only emotion that can provide subjects with enough moral certainty to treat others

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205 This is highly contest issue in literature on group morality; see chapter 3 On Dynamics of Group Rage.
as mere things, but at the same time rage responds to a mistreatment that mirrors this exact act of dehumanization.

This substantially shifts the focus away from what Petersen and Ross believe to be the indiscriminate and erratic nature of rage. Achilles’ behaviour was neither erratic nor divinely inspired; there was a merciless logic and ritualistic importance to his activity. Euripides’ *Hecuba* or *Medea* illuminate the subjectivity of these tragic Greek heroes and stress how little choice they have in eschewing *nomos* and embracing revenge. And although the political manipulation of rage is real, much more so is the underlining sense of mistreatment and injustice. The key difference to resentment and anger is the lack of social bonds to contain the action tendency; there is no shared sense of values or any compassion or mercy - no limits to be imposed. Even if they once existed, the sensation of existential injustice and overt moral disregard instantly dissolves them.

**Conclusion**

The Ancient Greek understanding of rage was highly formalized and stylized. This chapter attempted to make rage accessible as a social emotion. Current understanding postulates that emotions require cognition, i.e. informed appraisal of how an event affects our specific way of life and our desires. Cognitive appraisals constantly evaluate the meaningfulness and impact of events. Debates on emotionalgenesis are far from settled. However, there is a growing consensus that knowledge of social rules and legitimate expectations, all predicated on an entitlement toward moral recognition, are key to understanding emotions in a social setting. Disenfranchised people for instance require knowledge of the “vote” and its socio-political meaning, before they can get angry about not having it. Scholars like Solomon and Nussbaum argue that emotions are basically types of felt cognition that something is not right.

Violations of these social expectations, experienced inherently as an injustice, manifest emotionally. With the help of the philosophical intuitions of P.F. Strawson, I introduced two streams of emotional cognition with very different moral stances towards the offender. Strawson believed that people respond to offenses and transgressions through either of two moral modalities. In the *moral attitude*, the transgressor is treated compassionately, punishment is mild and the moral worth of both offender and victim is never questioned. Both subjects make concessions to remain within the moral community. In the *objective attitude*,
however, offenders enjoy no special privileges and punishment remains unbound by communal concerns; here offenders can be totally mistreated and mercilessly punished.

Within these two modalities, I positioned four ideal-type emotional reactions; two action-based emotions and two non action-based emotions, which in turn could also be listed as two *moral attitude* emotions and two *objective attitude* emotions. Resentment and anger respond to very different triggers; while resentment responds to mistreatment of rank and a possible violation of norms, the emotional reaction remains mild and hedges on the belief that the moral worth of the victim is never questioned. Anger responds to a different appraisal; here the offender causes the victim some great loss or personal damage. The victim demands retribution from the offender, but critically there is a limit to the suffering and payment that can be imposed. Both parties are encumbered by demands to maintain moral equality and reverence towards each other, and thus retributive anger cannot undermine the offender’s entitlement to just and moral treatment.

*Objective attitude* emotions, I argue, depend on a social trigger that implicitly communicates a total moral disregard towards the victim. *Ressentiment* and rage respond to offenses that undermine the moral worth of the subject. While resentment and anger could be described as sequential, responding to differing severities of mistreatment within the confines of moral recognition. Both *Ressentiment* and rage respond to the same offense, however *Ressentiment* internalizes the rage due to an inability to adequately confront the offender. What makes *Ressentiment* and rage excessive and brutal is the fact that the offender lacks any moral worth. However, in order to stress the righteous aspect in *Ressentiment* and rage, it must be shown that the initial offense communicates this very notion of moral disregard. Fanon’s emancipatory violence remains an excellent example of *righteous rage*, where sustained oppression engenders a brutal response designed to instrumentalize the offender for the very purpose of re-instating the victim’s lost moral worth.

In the cult of the Erinyes, their noble calling as guardians of *nomos* is somewhat offset by their cannibalistic and feral appearance and behaviour. They function like a necessary evil that guards against breaches but at the same time places a mirror in front of the face of the offender, revealing an uncivilized and impulsive animal, governed by the desire for revenge. Strawson’s insight into *objective* and *moral attitudes* mirrors the dichotomy represented in the myth of the Erinyes, but at the same time makes the dichotomy more accessible. Those
eschewing the *moral attitude* are no longer uncivilized and bestial but respond to an offense that makes such strong statements on the relationship between offender and victim that mutual moral recognition is impossible. This insight flows naturally from the *Euripidean* enterprise to explore subjectivities and understand why actors engage in brutal aggression and violence and discard the value and worth of others. The *objective attitude* translates the domain of the Erinyes into an emotional cognition of a felt sense of severe mistreatment and moral disregard.
Chapter 3

Dynamics of Group Rage

The last chapter continued the exploration that began in Ancient Greece; however following the ideas of P.F. Strawson, the domain of the blood-lusting Erinyes was slightly reconfigured. Instead of portraying carnal and animalistic impulses, rage was shown to operate in accordance with an *objective attitude*, which disinvested targets of any moral worth. Critically though, the *objective attitude* depends on some mistreatment or injustice that communicates this very moral disregard in the first place; even if these experiences are born from accident or circumstance, targets are found, and usually in accordance with pre-existing stigmas and cultural narratives, known as *schemas of hatred*. However, none of these insights matter for International Relations as long as these dynamics cannot be shown to operate on the international level, where states and groups are the relevant actors and not individuals.

The practice of emotionalizing International Relations must contend with some obvious and very basic questions. The last chapter explored definitive causes of specific emotions but focussed predominantly on the appraisal processes in individuals. Emotions in individuals are self-evident and increasingly understood, but how do emotions factor in International Relations? The basic contention arises from the fact that International Relations is primarily concerned with state behaviour and motivation. Questions of order and interest do not easily lend themselves to questions of emotion, let alone rage. In its very basic formulation still echoed in Realpolitik today, states are concerned with their calculated self-interest, and negotiate outcomes with others in accordance with power relations predicated on military and economic strength. Emotions, even if they are accepted as integral to decision-making and belief structures, only feed into the bottom-line of interest formulation and pursuit. Even Wendt’s important intervention about the constructivist genesis of Realpolitik can only stress that once the institution of self-help is accepted as valid, behaviour arises accordingly.208 Even Wendt’s important intervention about the constructivist genesis of Realpolitik can only stress that once the institution of self-help is accepted as valid, behaviour arises accordingly.209


Lebow’s introduction of Platonic notions of the spirit naturally widened the scope to incorporate non-material concerns such as honour and esteem into state pursuits. Relying on findings in Social Psychology as well as earlier intuitions from Plato’s Republic, Lebow dissolves the state into a collection of individuals, who of course feel, desire and fear. This deconstruction of the state goes hand in hand with a new mandate to explore group psychology and sociology to understand how groups operate in relation to each other and to the demands of their members. Axel Honneth’s work on disrespect and grammars of recognition places the individual center stage and stresses how group leaders and elites are often encumbered by the emotional needs of their democratic constituency.210

Against this bottom up approach, Wendt questions the propensity in International Relations to refer to states as unitary beings. Wendt states, “We often refer casually to states 'as if they have emotions and are therefore conscious. States are routinely characterised as angry, greedy, guilty, humiliated, and so on - all conditions that, in individuals at least, are associated with subjective experience.”211 Wendt’s exploration of these “as if” persons yields interesting results but ultimately fails to locate a center of feeling and reflective state consciousness without referring back to the subjective capacities of individuals. Wendt concludes that states protect their self-styled narratives but that ultimately individuals who are invested in these narratives register the failures.212 Consequently the state can be a source of emotion but cannot experience emotion itself.

What this means is that emotions in International Relations can only be located at the micro-level in individuals. This solves one problem then; emotions are real and they are located within the individual. The next problem concerns how they are elicited in a manner relevant for International Relations. An individual might be aggrieved at losing a loved one, or be angry at some undue harm, but this hardly resonates on the international level. The strength of resonance then lies in harmony. By creating a stimulus that affects all members of a group equally, group emotions are ensured to resonate harmoniously. Nationalism for instance is a

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212 Lindemann and Ringmar, *The International Politics of Recognition*.
type of pride that exists only on a group level. Group membership creates side pockets for emotional experience in individuals that only register state-level events and produce joint emotional responses such as anger or pride. Such emotions exist purely on the group level and may be described as *sui generis*. Friendly inter-state competitions such as the World Cup explicate this process, as individuals experience the sensations of a victory or defeat through their sense of national membership.

However, in order to ensure an equal emotional resonance within the group – some people obviously do not care about soccer and how their 11 compatriots perform – the event stimulus must target the foundation of the individual’s existential investment in the group. Individuals, in other words, must implicitly agree on the severity of the event and share the relevant cognitive appraisal to engender the same emotional response. An event like 9/11 was so encompassing that all members of the in-group felt aggrieved and angry at the mistreatment. Lebow has used sociological concepts like Terror Management Theory (TMT) and Mortality Salience Theory (MST), which can explain how such collective events occur, and why group members react the way they do. The basic premise of TMT is that individuals join groups for specific existential demands. These demands are part of the human condition. It follows that when group existence is threatened, these existential demands are threatened, and give rise to all kinds of defensive processes that can include violence, punitiveness and extreme “othering.” And it is within this process that I want to position the Greek-inspired reading of rage and explore how groups behave following an existential act mistreatment or injustice. Following the previous chapter’s typology, rage reacts to a mistreatment that threatens the subject’s entitlement towards moral recognition, which is both cause of the emotional response as well as the implicit acknowledgment that the *moral attitude* no longer applies.

This chapter will first explore the individual existential demands towards group membership and establish why individuals join groups and how these groups must perform in order to satisfy these existential demands. Second, group threats will be elaborated. Building on Marilynn Brewer’s *Optimal Distinction Theory*, specific ideal threats will be explored to

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215 Strawson, *Freedom and Resentment, and Other Essays*. 
illustrate how group existence can be threatened. Last, following the perception of such threats, groups undergo processes of identity hardening and moral certification, which provide the necessary justification for violence. These so-called “moral mandates” will be explored from a subjective angle to understand how groups channel their sense of mistreatment into justifications for violence. It will be shown that the study of moral mandates is not yet aligned with studies on group emotions. The key is to show that the Erinyes/rage complex of Ancient Greece still applies, but is now supplemented by an explicit reference to the previously held implicit moral certainties operating in the *Nomos of Revenge.*

**Social Identity and the Need for Community**

“Man is a creature that can get used to anything and I think that is the best definition of him”, writes Dostoyevsky in *House of the Dead*, a semi-biographical take on 19th century prison life in Siberia. Dostoyevsky describes how even in the harshest environment, human interaction would flourish and take on a semblance of normality. Emotions such as kindness and honour existed even at near-death subsistence. The microcosm of the gulag afforded its inmates all the specificities needed to sustain human interactions and establish their own identities, which were partly imported from outside and partly forged anew by the demands of gulag life. These identities, as they became invested with expectations and acknowledgments from other inmates, took on existential significance. Although all of the inmates were de facto prisoners and equally worthless to the society that had abandoned them, within the prison, the perception of mistreatment, injustice and insults, and even the desire for revenge, became predicated on hierarchies, based on intrinsic notions of worth and distinction.

Identity formation depends on the acknowledgment and actions of others. Alexander Wendt writes in his seminal article on *Anarchy* that “the principle of identity-formation is captured by the symbolic interactionist notion of the ‘looking-glass self’ which asserts that the self is a reflection of an actor’s socialization.” Social identity becomes impossible without the consideration of others. The concept of *Identitätssproblematik* captures the growing interest in International Relations of the importance and problems of identity. In a fitting metaphor, Erik Ringmar writes that identity formation is akin to a theatrical process; the audience accepts and

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217 Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It.” p. 404
applauds the self-styled narrative or hisses and boos. “To be denied recognition is a traumatic experience” writes Ringmar; “we feel slighted, insulted, and brought low; our pride is injured, we have lost our status and our face.”218 The stress lies on the audience, without which the notion of self cannot be articulated. Identity formation becomes a communal experience and necessitates the existence of others. Identity routinization is performative, and as in Dostoyevsky’s House of the Dead, provides individuals with a sense of worth and distinction.

In joining groups, individuals express fundamental existential desires which inform their sense of moral worth. These existential desires amount to a creation of a recognized social identity, expressing a sense of self. Honneth argues that such social recognition remains an inter-subjective phenomenon, which relies on group solidarity for its existence. He argues that “the self is gained through continuous approval and acceptance of others” and a failure to recognize the other “robs the subject in question of every opportunity to attribute social value to his or her own abilities.”219 However, Lebow also stresses how individuals, in order to create a social identity, require esteem and standing.220 He argues that esteem is granted and recognized only if the subject adheres to social rules, curbing excesses. Honneth and Lebow complement each other in their analyses, as much as Honneth describes the responsibility of society towards the subject, while Lebow covers the opposite angle, illustrating the obligation of the subject toward her society. Merging both angles shows that esteem and recognition are born from the acceptance of certain demands which both society and subject make towards each other. Society sets certain qualifications for recognition of the social self and the subject fulfils them. In Ancient Greece, this was the implicit oath citizens made in joining nomos.

Consequently once these qualifications are met, group solidarity is ensured and recognition is established as a social value. Individuals are thus motivated to honour the social obligations in order to ensure that their existential demands are met. This was touched upon in Chapter 1 in the discussion on pollution. According to the cult of the Erinyes, those who undermine group solidarity by pursuing revenge court the rage of the entire community because the spectre of pollution, expressed in the breakdown of nomos, threatens all community members equally; it

218 Lindemann and Ringmar, The International Politics of Recognition. P. 7
220 For more on the individual desire for esteem, see, Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Honor Code: How Moral Revolutions Happen, Reprint (W. W. Norton & Company, 2011); Frank Henderson Stewart, Honor, 1st ed. (University Of Chicago Press, 1994); Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (Free Press, 2006). All of these writers stress the difference between, and equal importance of, recognition of equality and recognition of distinction in human nature.
threatens their ability to maintain a social identity. This explains why the idea of rage and revenge was so castigated; it selfishly risked destroying the social bonds (nomos) everyone else relied upon. As a result polluted individuals were chastised and exiled by their community. The role of the individual in the breakdown of social order is no longer regarded as relevant and indeed strong in-group biases make such conduct as portrayed in the plays of Ancient Greece unlikely.²²¹ Today sociologists and social psychologists have taken the route of predicking such a breakdown on exogenous factors.²²² Groups are now threatened by the conduct of other groups, or by acts of nature.

The importance of group membership for individuals can be described as the following: Individuals need other individuals to generate what Wendt called “mirroring;” Ringmar describes the process as a theatre play where the audience validates the subject’s identity performance. Within society individuals demand recognition from others for their self-styled identity, hence members must agree that recognition is a social value, which in itself creates a basic norm strong enough to support group existence. Once group membership is established, individuals gain new appraisal mechanisms. “When social identity is salient, group members perceive themselves as exemplars of the group, rather than unique individuals (...) they experience emotions because their group may be helped or hurt by it.”²²³ This means individuals literally lose themselves in their in-group, filtering key events entirely through group appraisal.

The correct position of individuals in International Relations is thus ensured; they demand group existence in order to satisfy their basic human demands for social recognition. The existential importance of group membership for the individual aligns group existence with individual existence, as individuals base their moral worth on whether they are functioning social actors within their community. Within the group the moral attitude becomes encased in norms, as members need to respect and recognize each other’s accomplishments and by extension moral worth. However, once the group is elevated into inter-state existence, the

question of attitude becomes more pressing. Intuitively, there is no reason why groups should regard each other in the *moral attitude*, and indeed for a long time hostility and moral disregard was believed to be the norm.

**Inter-Group Dynamics**

Earliest research on inter-group relations by William Sumner, author of *Folkways: A study of Mores, Manners, Customs and Morals*, hypothesized that groups always stand in Manichean opposition to each other:

“A differentiation arises between ourselves, the we-group, or in-group, and everybody else, or the others-group, out-groups. The insiders in a we-group are in relation of peace, order, law, government, and industry, to each other. Their relation to all outsiders, to other-group, is one of war and plunder (...) Loyalty to the in-group, sacrifice for it, hatred and contempt for outsiders, brotherhood within, warlikeness without – all group together, common products of the same situation.”

This assumption found further support in the works of the political philosopher Carl Schmitt, who argued that all politics – whether group or individual based - is inherently predicated on friend-enemy distinctions. Sumner’s early assumption that the in-group always stands in Manichean opposition to the out-group, as could be expected in extreme cases of violence and bloodshed, has been rejected. Brewer writes, “Any relationship between in group identification and out group hostility is progressive and contingent rather than necessary or inevitable.”

In the previous chapter, it was proposed that strangers have no reason *not* to regard each other in the *moral attitude*, as long as they have not suffered a mistreatment. On the group level this can be expanded. Instead of being laden with negative connotation, out-groups may become

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226 Brewer in Ashmore et al., *Social Identity, Intergroup Conflict, and Conflict Reduction*. p. 35
integral to the in-group’s wellbeing and enjoy preferential treatment. This creates a symbiotic relationship where differences are maintained and respected. This plays into theories that postulate that groups need each other for inter-group comparisons and the elaboration of distinction, but do so in a friendly and constructive manner.\textsuperscript{227} However, as Allport and Neumann argue, in-group identity formation can occur even without any reference, negative or positive, to out-group existence.\textsuperscript{228} Consequently, the exact role of strangers or out-groups in identity formations remains unclear. Still, there is a growing consensus that previous beliefs about the inherent negative reception of out-groups is false and that negative views of out-groups, along with moral pronouncements of evil, are contingent and rely on the experience of mistreatment.

Nussbaum and Sen have independently researched the impact of nationalism and group identity on inter-group relations, and arrive at the same conclusion: that compassion and moral regard remain the overruling condition between groups, as long as these groups do not feel threatened.\textsuperscript{229} Following Nussbaum’s arguments on compassion, moral regard for others instantly dissolves when groups and individuals experience negative emotions such as jealousy, fear or contempt - and of course rage. These emotions easily lend themselves to the \textit{objective attitude}. However, because they are emotions, they require a preceding trigger event. In order for groups to regard each other in the \textit{moral attitude}, they must not only refrain from mistreating one another but also from falling prey to natural disasters or systemic upheavals. The ensuing emotions of fear and jealousy can lead to a withdrawal of compassion and mercy and enable displacement. Echoing Athena’s solution to the problems posed by the Erinyes, in-group biases strongly lend themselves to the prospect of displacing grievances and aggression outwards.

It is important to stress that such displacement can overrule the judicial mandate of laws and legal conventions; in fact they easily dissolve them. The sense of existential mistreatment, informing the \textit{objective attitude}, makes the validity of laws and treatises irrelevant, because they in turn rely on mutual recognition. Consequently, laws and treatises are ill placed to guard against violence, because strong negative emotions, predicated on an \textit{objective attitude}, operate overruling mandates. “Relationships between people that are mediated only by rule

\textsuperscript{227} Turner, Brown, and Tajfel, “Social Comparison and Group Interest in Ingroup Favouritism.”
\textsuperscript{228} Allport, \textit{The Nature Of Prejudice}, 25th Anniversary e. edition (Reading, Mass: Basic Books, 1979); Iver B. Neumann, “Self and Other in International Relations,” \textit{European Journal of International Relations} 2, no. 2 (June 1, 1996): 139–74.,
\textsuperscript{229} Nussbaum, \textit{Upheavals of Thought}; Sen, \textit{Identity and Violence}. 
and not by empathy frequently prove more fragile in time of hostility, more prone to a
dehumanizing type of brutality,” warns Nussbaum.\textsuperscript{230} In the end individuals do not require
the existence of out-groups for their own existential needs and indeed favour the survival of
their in-group over all else. There is little incentive to act compassionately towards others in
the face of injustice and threat, a point stressed in TMT and MST. When push comes to
shove, individuals will defend the moral worth of their in-group members over that of out-
group members.

Still, in times of peace the \textit{moral attitude} can be argued to naturally extend beyond the
borders of the in-group. Sumner’s and Schmidt’s initial belief in a given hostile inter-group
morality seems premature. The withdrawal of compassion and the \textit{moral attitude} depends on
the experience of mistreatment or the perception of threat. But at the same time these threats
are not simply given but arise from appraisals; out-groups are not per se a source of
discomfort or hostility.\textsuperscript{231} Sumner was of course not entirely off the mark when he concluded
that out-groups are invested with negative traits; however, this remains a result of cultural
stigmas from pre-existing schemas, rather than something naturally given to in-group
identities. In order to introduce the concept of moral disregard and the possibility of violence
into inter-group relations, without referring back to some innate properties as proposed by
Sumner, the appraisal of threat must be fully articulated, and in a way that directly affects the
emotional economy of group members.

According to \textit{Optimal Distinction Theory}, humans join groups because they seek both a sense
of inclusion and belonging, but also an available source of greatness and esteem.\textsuperscript{232} These two
fundamental drives, if frustrated, threaten the individual’s existential investment in the group
and by extension their own moral worth. Within the group these drives are guaranteed by a
sense of mutual obligation. In-built mechanisms dissuade the manifestation of violence; no
such mechanism, however, inherently exists in inter-group relations. And even norms and
values that exist can be justifiably discarded in times of “supreme emergency” according to
Just War theorists.\textsuperscript{233} In order for group members to feel threatened on behalf of their in-

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{230} Nussbaum, \textit{Upheavals of Thought}. p. 395
  \item \textsuperscript{231} See Brewer in Ashmore et al., \textit{Social Identity, Intergroup Conflict, and Conflict Reduction}; Mackie,
    Devos, and Smith, “Intergroup Emotions.”
  \item \textsuperscript{232} Brewer in Ashmore et al., \textit{Social Identity, Intergroup Conflict, and Conflict Reduction}.
  \item \textsuperscript{233} see for example debate on "supreme emergency" in C. A. J. Coady, “Terrorism, Morality, and
group, the sense of threat must be predicated on challenges aimed right at the heart of group existence. Once a threat is registered, the sense of existential emergency arises naturally. Building on Brewer’s *Optimal Distinction Theory* group threats arise in three ways: threat to group inclusion, threat to group integrity, and threat to group esteem.\(^2^3^4\)

**Existential Group Threats**

The first threat has to do with internal dynamics and refers to a loss of inclusion suffered by some members of the group. This is not technically dependent on the existence of a threatening out-group; however, because groups operate strong in-group biases and favouritism, they quickly repackage the internal threat as outward projection. The second threat occurs through a direct attack on the in-group’s integrity and esteem. This occurs in two ways: the first is a straightforward invasion, either perceived materialistically or ideationally – or both. The second is more complicated and depends on an attack of a group’s sense of esteem and distinction which, however, equally leads to a perception of grave injustice. We will run through each of these threats before moving on to establish how groups respond.

**Threat of Group Inclusion**

Members of a group may experience a loss of inclusion: Their connection to the in-group’s core values becomes taut, and they experience a sense of isolation; their ability to perform their social identity is compromised. According to Brewer, the subject counters this by reaffirming her connection to the in-group by way of inflated out-group differentiation. As a consequence of this hyper-valuation of the in-group, the distance between the isolated member and her in-group is artificially compressed. Brewer suggests that a persistent derogation of the out-group acts as compensation; it increases the contrast between in-group and out-group and thus the similarity between the self and the in-group are reaffirmed.\(^2^3^5\) In other words the derogation of the out-group is used to reconnect the self to the in-group. “Threats to inclusion,” writes Brewer, “are predicated to heighten feelings of moral superiority, intolerance of difference, and concomitant emotions of contempt and disgust.

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toward relevant out groups." Brewer argues that the emotional component arises from the disgust and contempt registered towards the out-group.

The sense of threat from marginalization is not technically an out-group threat, but rather appropriated as one. Marginalization creates mortality salience and qualifies as an existential threat; however, because members are unable - or unwilling - to leave their in-group, the threat is repackaged and rechanneled towards a non-descript out-group. Brewer locates the emotional component in the derogation of the out-group, yet it seems more appropriate to refer to such derogation as displacement, and return the emotional genesis to its source, i.e. the failure of group solidarity. The member’s inability to address her failing sense of group membership - and here the Erinyes’ fearful faces do their duty - creates the need for a targeted out-group. The out-group on the other hand, will view this derogation as irrational and inexplicable. They become proto-typical scapegoats, sacrificed for the greater good of in-group cohesion.

According to Social Psychology, there exist strong forces within the group to favour out-group derogation over in-group distancing. Dechesne et al. argue, “whether one engages in derogation or distancing depends on the willingness or necessity to maintain the identification. Maintenance is associated with derogation, and neglect is associated with distancing.” Provided that maintenance of social identity is paramount, the in-group bias leads to a construction of threat that is entirely predicated on the desire to maintain membership. The purification rituals in Ancient Greece served a similar function; internal strife was externalized through the spontaneous creation of a non-insider or scapegoat and burdened with all the responsibility and felt anger before being sacrificed in a communal act of purification.

A more applicable example of Brewer’s idea can be found in Snyder’s concept of elite persuasion. Snyder argues that newly emerging democracies often exact violence against ethnic minorities under the guise of strong nationalistic fervour. Snyder explains that elites, fearing a loss of power and influence based on uncontested leadership, will try to ward off democratic developments by creating threats and instigating violence against helpless

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236 Ashmore et al., *Social Identity, Intergroup Conflict, and Conflict Reduction*, 32.
238 Snyder, *From Voting to Violence*. 
scapegoats which are intentionally excluded from the national dialogue via inflated ethnic differences. This out-group derogation ultimately prevents the feeling of marginalization felt by elites whose foundation of power cannot survive democratization. Staub, however, highlights how such elite persuasion also necessitates a “psychology hard times”, i.e. some extreme hardship felt by the population that can provide the “affective background” for the displaced out-group aggression.\(^\text{239}\) In all of these examples the breakdown of group solidarity informs the need for out-group derogation while the out-group, ignoring the possibility of historically informed animosities, must be considered innocent in all of this.

**Threat to Group Integrity**

The second scenario Brewer identifies is a direct attack on an in-group’s sense of integrity. This occurs largely through physical invasion. Historically, this has been the clearest articulation of group threat. The right to sovereignty and non-intervention remains the intellectual foundation for international law and concepts like just war theory.\(^\text{240}\) However, because Brewer recognizes groups over states, there is an added complexity here, as many political groups fail to qualify as states, but still operate with the same mentality and sense of entitlement. Cosmopolitan arguments attempt to extend abstract benefits of statehood to individual groups, such as terrorist groups or NGOs.\(^\text{241}\) Viewed from a social identity theory stance, such attempts are long overdue as these groups, by nature, readily operate like internationally sanctioned states; seeing that their influence is much greater now, however, these actors are of course given greater attention.

This point notwithstanding, groups, whether they are states or other entities, feel a sense of threat when their territorial entitlements are compromised. Terrorism scholars like Salter and Crenshaw stress that religious terrorist groups – as well as their previous three ideological manifestations according to Rapoport – are always motivated by demands for national sovereignty and national self-determination.\(^\text{242}\) Regardless of their employed tactics, they all

\(^{239}\) Staub, *The Roots of Evil*.


\(^{241}\) Coady, ““Terrorism, Morality, and Supreme Emergency.”

react to a continued sense of injustice predicated on territorial oppression or displacement, or foreign meddling in internal affairs. This has provided the strongest incentive for violence and the clearest sense of threat. In the words of Frank Salter, “threats to group identity and autonomy make the work of preparing terrorists, and soldiers, so much easier than indoctrination from a cold start. Indeed when the homeland is in peril people, especially young men seek indoctrination into fighting units."243 Vamik Volkan writes in a similar vein “any break in physical border may translate into a break in the whole group’s psychological “border” of identity.”244 The sense of territorial integrity and historically informed notions of Heimat provides groups with a sense of timelessness and consistency invaluable to their members’ ability to ward off fears of vulnerability and meaninglessness. Imagined Communities demand physical anchoring.245 When this anchor comes under attack, group members feel a sense of existential threat. The desire for Heimat is universal but can easily be derailed into tragedy, such as in the case of Palestinian and Israeli claims on Jerusalem, or Indian and Pakistani claims on the Kashmir.

**Threat to Group Esteem**

Against this clearly articulated attack on territorial integrity comes the second, more abstract attack on a group’s sense of esteem and distinction. Lebow has taken the concept of standing and shown how, historically, states and nations have gone to war as much for material reasons as for reasons of honour and esteem.246 Groups seek distinction and glory for their members; or rather members demand such feats for their own psychological need of esteem and mortality defiance.247 Athena asks of the Erinyes, after they are given a home underneath Athens, to help wage war against other cities “to satisfy our powerful lust for fame”; the displacement of anger serves a clear and important purpose. The need for greatness is inscribed in the genome of the group, exactly because it is inscribed in the existential makeup

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of the individual. The need for some groups to be greater, better, stronger can produce zero sum scenarios and lead to inevitable clashes between groups with uncompromising entitlements.

The increasing focus in International Relations scholarship on the importance of humiliation as a motivator for violence indicates that the concept of esteem is gaining greater attention. An innate sense of superiority as based on ethnographic properties can be universal and groups can be extremely sensitive towards issues like slights and insults. According to Paul Saurette’s research on humiliation cycles, the West and some parts of the Middle East are locked in “a deadly serious duel of humiliation and counter-humiliation.” The importance of answering slights takes precedence over other strategic imperatives, according to Saurette. In agreement, Lindner finds that globalization and the unceasing march of modernity has left large parts of the Middle East without a sense of cultural heritage and utterly humiliated, seeking either to ignore globalization or attack those held responsible.

According to social psychologists, “an uncritical endorsement of the cultural value of high self-esteem may therefore be counterproductive and even dangerous. In principle it might become possible to inflate everyone’s self-esteem, but it will almost certainly be impossible to insulate everyone against ego threats.” However, such uncritical pursuit of high self-esteem seems to be the norm, and indeed inscribed by Optimal Distinction Theory. In Aeschylus’ Oresteia, the problem is ostensibly resolved by retrenching the importance of nomos and allowing personal strife and ambition to be channelled outward. Unfortunately, this solution leads to the current predicament in international affairs. The order of nomos is the sine qua non for honour societies; without the limitations and rules inscribed there can be no established hierarchy based on distinction and performance. The key then is to reproduce nomos on the international stage, which is difficult because individuals entertain existential expectations towards their own group, not towards others. Consequently nomos is not as vital at the inter-group level as it is at the inter-personal one. More damaging, however, is the

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248 Saurette, “Humiliation and the Global War on Terror.” p.50
249 Evelin Lindner, Making Enemies: Humiliation And International Conflict (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006).
251 Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations.
252 This point is made in Rengger, Just War and International Order and phrased as a conflict between a teleocratic style government and nomocratic style of government.
fact that groups often believe that they are operating according to some accepted nomos, when really they are not. This simple misunderstanding can ignore the existence of an objective attitude, and mistake a lack of violence as acquiescence and tacit submission to an imposed order, or even worse, delegitimize aggression as irrational and criminal. So although esteem is the most complex source of threat it is equally the source most easily mired in misunderstanding and false assumptions.

**False Legitimacy in Inter-Group Relations**

One of the benefits of group membership is that subjects are attuned to each other. Group members cultivate a shared cultural repertoire of language, symbols and values. Groups cultivate these tools to ensure in-group cohesion and a sense of mortality-voiding permanence. However, when such symbols are used uncritically, it can lead to confusion and dangerous misunderstandings between groups, with direct consequences for concepts like esteem and hierarchy-based order. To highlight this point I want to introduce the works of Gustav Ichheiser, a phenomenologist and International Relations scholar, and forgotten influence on early Chicago School theorists, notably Hans Morgenthau in his earlier, pre-Realist thinking found in *Scientific Man versus Power Politics*. Ichheiser was obsessed with the problem of misunderstandings inherent in inter-group relations and how groups and nations interpret “social facts.” In his book, *Appearances and Reality*, Ichheiser argues that nations suffer from illusions in that they believe other groups and nations share their interpretation of social reality. He explains:

“We can, of course, communicate adequately only with those people whose symbols, that is, whose “language,” in the broadest meaning of this term, we understand (…) This state of affairs is aggravated by the fact that, in order to overcome their perplexity, people who are confronted by disagreements arising from misunderstandings tend to develop certain forms of pseudo-understanding in order to maintain the belief that it is the others and not they themselves who are responsible for all those disagreements, irritations, and disappointments.”

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253 Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.
Ichheiser distinguishes between conscious and unconscious nationalism. The conscious nationalist fights for his country, his values and his justice; he is clear about the supremacy of his culture and disavows those opposed. The unconscious nationalist, however, “remains completely blinded to the fact that the way he defines these ideas and ideals is determined by his unconscious nationalistic frame of reference.” Consequently, the unconscious nationalist believes he fights for “humanity”, “justice” or the “good”, unable to understand that he operates an inherent bias and that those opposed to his quest, oppose not those very concepts, but the way they are misconstrued in accordance with the in-group bias.

From the point of esteem and ethnographic distinction, Ichheiser’s arguments are extremely relevant. Superiority and distinction based on comparison are social facts; consequently the frame of reference necessary for such comparison must be warped. Scholars working within the sociological tradition in International Relations have taken up the issue of false legitimacy. Mervyn Davies in her genealogical exploration of Western racism describes how confrontations between the West and the rest of the world were predicated on “loaded” comparisons, which enabled the West to support their inherent and ethnographic sense of superiority against those who were inherently different. Davies explains:

“It was self-identity that generated the essential points of comparison, the points at which variety becomes something other, not us. The very techniques of comparison, as they have been used by Western scholars since Columbus, are a process of translation, with all the potential of distortion that this includes (…) the beliefs and manners of Other people become comprehensible when read off against the practices of the describing civilization, the very civilization that does not share them.”

In a similar vein, Erik Ringmar argues that the West, historically, kept a trademark on what it meant to be civilized and developed. Non-Western states were forced to develop according to Western lines and adopt Western positions, especially in regard to governance and trade. Imposing Western ideals of progress readily introduced the notion of superiority and a mandate to control and chastise; non-Western countries were absorbed into the Western in-

256 Ibid., 127.
258 Ringmar in Lindemann and Ringmar, The International Politics of Recognition. pp. 1-32
group because it guaranteed that they were in a position of much lower standing. This practice masked a deeper unwillingness to recognize non-Western people as equal and afford them the moral regard to which they sooner or later felt entitled. According to the humiliation scholar Evelyn Linder the same practice is still in existence; she argues that the West’s double standard in regard to Human Rights and arms proliferation has infuriated non-Western countries, leading to a rejection of these very norms.\textsuperscript{259} Fanon’s point on the need for extreme violence to overturn not only the physical oppression but also the underlining normative one explicates the issue.

This urgent intervention in the legitimacy of hierarchies, based on uncritically accepted notions of superiority, remains heavily understudied. G. John Ikenberry’s \textit{After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraints, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars} is the classic account of Liberal hegemony and makes the same implicit assumption about hegemonic legitimacy. Ikenberry argues that if hegemonies restrain their military power, they are entitled to preferential treatment. He explains the success of post war order through the implicit contract between the US and her “allies”, exchanging protection for economic benefits in a bottom-line mutually beneficial arrangement. In a recent article in \textit{Foreign Affairs}, published in May of 2014, Ikenberry has reiterated his point and argues that not even China, Iran or Russia are willing to overturn the current global order, because they remain too heavily invested in its profitable arrangement. Current turmoil in the South China Sea, Ukraine and the Levant are to be dismissed as noise.\textsuperscript{260}

Against Ikenberry’s arguments, Ichheiser answers, “it is factual as well as moral illusion to exaggerate the evil of using one particular type of power, namely, military force, in international relations as compared with the evil of using other, nonviolent types of power, such as political, economic, or psychological means of pressure.”\textsuperscript{261} Ikenberry forgets that coercion not only arises from the use of force, but other implicit and non-violent sources as well, which can all compromise a group’s demand for esteem and integrity, and a desire to be free from meddling and coercion. Oden Löwenheim and his take on Persistent Agents of

\textsuperscript{259} Lindner, “Humiliation as the Source of Terrorism.” p.64
\textsuperscript{261} Ichheiser, \textit{Appearances and Realities}, 218.
Transnational Harm (PATH) further challenge the *illusion* in Ikenberry’s formulation. Löwenheim writes:

“Realists contend that hegemonic power bestows preferential rights on its bearers, but they also acknowledge this power is bound to be contested and envied by other aspiring states. Thus, despite the physical security of their superior power and status, hegemonies may fear losing their special status and thus develop a mistrustful worldview and a strong emotional insecurity.”

If the Realist formulation were true and accepted by all sides, envy and resentment should not occur, and yet they do. Löwenheim distinguishes between two types of PATHs that challenge hegemonic power based on implicit coercion; he calls these two types *parasites* and *predators*.

Parasites offer *security predicaments* to Great Powers. They seek to obtain some denied rights through socially un-sanctioned channels, which make them criminal. However, they do not seek to overthrow the overall order. In other words their violence is motivated by denied recognition rather than hegemonic ambition. Once they gain their denied rights the violence ceases. Predators, on the other hand, offer *authority predicaments*. They reject the entire order. Like Parasites they ignore sanctioned channels of resistance and protest, but they become more than simple criminals, because, unlike Parasites, they also defy the legitimacy of the Great Power’s position. Predators actively undermine and challenge the Great Power’s position. According to Ikenberry then, China, Iran and Russia are parasites that attempt to gain some leverage or fulfil some irredentist ambitions without undermining the entire system.

Löwenheim’s distinctions are indeed important and helpful, but fail to explain how hegemonies decide whether a threat constitutes a parasitic or predatory one. Whereas Great Powers often punish, humiliate and shame Parasites, the punishment for predators, writes

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<sup>262</sup> Löwenheim, *Predators and Parasites*.


<sup>264</sup> However, in the same recent issue of *Foreign Affairs*, Walter Russell Mead argues the exact opposite from Ikenberry; he judges that China, Iran and Russia indeed wish to overturn the reigning order and that the current respective turmoil are symptomatic of a greater underlining legitimacy problem for the West. For Russell, these nations are motivated by predatory desires.
Löwenheim “goes beyond the preventive/incapacitating/deterring considerations: it also provides a theatrical setting in which authority roles are acted out (…) it projects spectacular images of authority, deviance, and cost for deviance.”

9/11 was clearly acknowledged as a predatory attack; not only did the terrorists defy the United States’ military supremacy but also launched an attack aimed right at the heart of the American Heimat. However, other instances are less clear and could theoretically be interpreted either way. The stubborn resistance of the Benghazi trope is a case in point. While the White House frames the issue as a parasitic attack, a mixture of grievances brought to boiling point by a video tape, the opposition remains convinced that the Benghazi attack was predatory in nature and that the White House made a strategic mistake by refusing to “provide a theatrical setting in which authority roles are acted out.”

Löwenheim brings the problem of perception back to some inherent hegemonic bias; the hegemony decides whether an attack is predatory in nature or parasitic but without actually referring to the PATHS’ own motivations or intentions. Ichheiser’s own explanation is more encapsulating and levels the playing field by shifting the focus away from the hegemony:

“It is utterly naïve to assume that what we (whoever “we” are) define as aggression will be always considered likewise as aggression by those who, according to our definition, are committing it. Very often, from their point of view their action does not constitute any act of aggression but let us say self-defence or revolt.”

There is undoubtedly a tragic component present, in that inter-group aggression suffers from an inherent translation problem. While Löwenheim argues that hegemonies or Great Powers become inherently jealous of their security and status, and punish those who challenge them, the specific act of defiance is not per se constitutive of a relative or absolute challenge; the hegemony decides arbitrarily whether to make a spectacle of the offender or not. This makes Ichheiser’s point much more urgent. Predators and parasites share the same motivation and operate with the same legitimacy and righteousness as the hegemony; there is no distinction in motivation between predators, parasites or even hegemony. Returning to Optimal Distinction

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265 Löwenheim, Predators and Parasites, p. 71.
267 Ichheiser, Appearances and Realities. p. 216
Theory, groups share universal aspirations; violence and aggression respond to a denial of these aspirations. Ichheiser writes presciently, “wars, as a rule, do not result from certain people “wanting war,” but from different people, who are in conflict with each other, wanting different kinds of peace which are incompatible.”

It is certainly useful to understand how order can be challenged, and Löwenheim’s theory is instructive; however, in the end the distinction between parasites and predators is arbitrary and informed solely by the hegemony’s social reality. Whether the hegemony decides to label the violent aggressor as predator or parasite depends on her own reading of the social facts. The willingness to accommodate and even excuse violence is in itself a function of the uncompromising desire for esteem and distinction, which allows groups to delegitimize and downplay the serious concerns and grievances of others – like in the plays of Ancient Greece where nomos-voiding behaviour instantly leads to uncivilized bestiality and pollution.

Out-group derogation in Inter-group Violence

Predators and Parasites are clearly defamatory labels that portray groups as illegitimate vermin or uncompromising attackers; these labels are designed to delegitimize a group’s cause. From the viewpoint of the victim group, their basic sense of entitlement towards integrity and esteem automatically means that the attacker, violating these fundamental aspirations, must hold the group in moral disregard. There has been considerable research done on the labels found in inter-group violence, and scholars differ on the reasoning and importance of these labels. Bar-Tal finds that in prolonged conflict warring sides foster delegitimizing beliefs towards each other, in that they undermine and reject claims of mistreatment and injustice and righteous calls for redress.

Leyens finds that groups infra-humanize or dehumanize each other, using labels like sub-human, animal, uncivilized or parasites, in order to sanction and legitimate behaviour and treatment that cannot be morally justified in regard to human beings. In a similar vein, Bandura coined the term “moral disengagement” to describe how terrorists shield themselves from any information about their

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268 Ibid. p. 216
targets before committing acts of extreme violence.\textsuperscript{271} The consensus is that extreme violence goes hand in hand with practices of moral derogation and exclusion. These practices describe precisely the inner workings of the \textit{objective attitude}.

The implicit assumption in these findings, however, is that acts of violence are a priori unjust and wrong. These moral valuations, enabling extreme violence and aggression, are understood as psychological practices necessary to exonerate subjects, who are indoctrinated into committing acts of aggression against others. Giner-Sorrola and Leidner refer to this practice as \textit{morality shifting} and write, “along with de-sensitization and habituation, morality shifting may be an important mechanism to indoctrinate those who are to commit violence against out-group members.”\textsuperscript{272} This assessment finds support in battlefield psychology, where soldiers often begin harbouring fellow feelings towards their fellow (enemy) soldiers, or indeed find it impossible to fire a gun at other soldiers.\textsuperscript{273} However, such assessment imports an unwarranted moral vantage point into the equation. This is not to say that the phenomenon described is not real and urgent, but that there is a fine line between exonerating practices and self-generated moral imperatives. When groups generate an \textit{objective attitude} towards an offender, they do not require exoneration to justify reactive violence; such violence comes in response to a severe injustice and mistreatment, like in the case of Fanon. Consequently, this unwarranted moral viewpoint, stressing the aspect of exoneration, must occur either from viewing any act of aggression as inherently unnatural, which is a point stressed in some of the literature;\textsuperscript{274} or rather from decontextualizing acts of aggression, i.e. viewing them as insulated events without causal precedent.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{273} Dave Grossman stresses in his study \textit{On Killing} (2009) that “as men draw this near it becomes extremely difficult to deny their humanity. Looking in a man’s face, seeing his eyes and his fear, eliminate denial. Instead of shooting at a uniform and killing a generalized enemy, now the killer must shoot at a person and kill a specific individual. Most simply cannot or will not do it.” In a similar vein, Omar Bartov describes the problem of fellow-feelings amongst enemy-soldiers in his \textit{Mirror of Destruction} (2002): “If the foreign enemy had become one’s comrade in suffering, if the glorious war for which one had sacrificed so much had been in vain, and if patriotism had been whipped up by a lying propaganda machine run by gutless intellectuals safely closeted in the rear, then how was one to make sense of it all” Both Grossmann and Bartov describe the tension and indeed strategic danger of viewing one’s enemy as a fellow human and even fellow sufferer. To resolve this problem, social psychologists argue, in-groups create moral imperatives that stress the mission at hand and dehumanize the opponent.
\item \textsuperscript{274} Giner-Sorolla, Leidner, and Castano, “Dehumanization, Demonization, and Morality Shifting.”
\end{itemize}

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In Chapter 2, I argued that the *objective attitude* arose from mistreatment that undermined the victim’s sense of moral worth and equality; the action tendency responded to this moral disregard by in turn exacting punishment that no longer corresponded to moral restraint or compassion found to operate in the *moral attitude*. Rage is therefore a unique emotion because it is inseparable from moral exclusion. While the *moral attitude* emotions communicate a normative wrong, rage communicates a moral and existential disregard. This was most clearly evidenced in Fanon’s emancipatory violence. Consequently, the moral issue, which informs much of the social psychologists’ research, can be resolved by an emotional reading of violence. When we feel anger, we also feel that we should not give in to our punitive desires, because it would be wrong. In *righteous rage* however, we feel absolute certainty in our belief that the reaction is just and necessary.

The point is that rage operates a mandate of total moral exclusion, mirrored in the very act of the experienced mistreatment and injustice. The implicit moral exclusion, also found in the various practices described by the social psychologists, is not built around the need to avoid the moral reality of the wrongdoing, because the moral compass has shifted in response to the injustice. The raging group is entirely committed to the righteousness of her reaction, because the emotional appraisal is predicated on the belief that the aggressor desires to wipe out or severely damage the group in question. In fighting for group survival and existence, all actions become morally right and necessary, because the group bases her sense of right and wrong on her moral right to exist and flourish and honour the existential demands of her members.

The connection between emotions and moral judgement is increasingly seen as robust.\(^{275}\) According to Jonathan Haidt and *Social Intuitionist Theory*, moral beliefs “come from sentiments which give us an immediate feeling of right and wrong.”\(^{276}\) Haidt further explains that “moral judgements are therefore defined as evaluations (good vs. bad) of the actions or character of a person that are made with respect to a set of virtues held to be obligatory by a culture or subculture.” These signals reach our brain so quickly, argues Haidt, that we are aware of whether we like something even before we know what it is. This leads to the


conclusion of an “affective primacy” embedded in all moral judgements; “the brain has a kind of gauge (sometimes called a “like-ometer”) that is constantly moving back and forth, and these movements, these quick judgements, influence whatever comes next.”

In other words, once we feel rage and a desire to brutally punish an offender, we already make an implicit moral judgement about our conduct and the target’s conduct. We operate under the sentiment that what we are doing is just and necessary. This is precisely the problem portrayed in the cult of the Erinyes; once rage and revenge are introduced into communal life, the supporting moral certainty is absolute and overrules any concern for social order. The ensuing Nomos of Revenge is as legitimate as any other nomos. Linda J. Skitka, who has coined the term “moral mandates” and describes moral certainty in violence but without recourse to notions of exoneration, makes the same point: “People at times judge moral and immoral, right and wrong, on the basis of deeply visceral and intuitive, rather than deliberate, cognitive processes that they support with post hoc rather than a priori reasoning.” It follows, however, that such emotional appraisal, like any other emotion, must respond to some preceding trigger event.

Moral exoneration and moral indoctrination play an important role in violence, but the existence of righteous rage as a response to legitimate mistreatment and injustice is equally valid and instructive in explaining moral judgements enabling violence. This point is nowhere made clearer than in Nietzsche’s treatment of morality, which will be covered at length in the remaining chapters. Nietzsche explains the existence of moral certainty without recourse to violence, severely undermining the position that moral exclusion exists primarily to exonerate violent and aggressive behaviour. On the contrary, Nietzsche argues that a suffered

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278 Nussbaum makes a similar claim but translates Haidt’s “like-ometer” as “eudaimonistic evaluations” which means they intuitively tell us whether an event is good or not good for us. These sentiments are then acknowledged as moral judgements. It follows that these judgements are then simply another form of appraisal and, according to Nussbaum, indistinguishable from emotion.
280 Skitka and Muller write in their piece on the Twin Tower bombings: “The terrorists, no doubt, were also responding to perceived threat to their core moral values (e.g., encroaching secularism and Western values that were threatening their extreme fundamentalist beliefs) when they developed the action potentials, or moral mandates, that led to their terrorist attacks.” The Dark Side of Moral Conviction, p. 37
mistreatment and injustice provides the impetus for a change in morality and the espousal of moral certainty precisely because of lack of violence.

In the *Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche argues that ideas of good and evil are not imposed or designed to assuage guilt (at least not yet), but instead are fluid and functional and directly predicated on the perception of a threat to either esteem (in the example of the Priests) or directly to group material survival (in the example of the lambs). Because both lambs and priests are made to suffer deeply through the actions of the knights and birds of prey, they respond by immediately investing their offenders with evil properties and constructing a morality based on punitiveness and exclusion. In Nietzsche’s account the connection between threat and moral derogation is as linear as could be, and avoids conflating motivation with exoneration. In fact, as a reader one may even sympathize with the plight of the lambs and priests.

Nietzsche’s point about moral convictions occurring in lieu of action raises another important point. By keeping moral judgements separate from emotions, as the social psychologists do, they make it difficult to explain the actionability behind these moral judgements. Emotions come equipped with clear action tendencies, and these tendencies in turn demand a moral judgement that the action is just and possibly life saving. Unfortunately, social psychologists and sociologists have laboured to uncouple moral judgements from their emotional vehicle, save for the efforts of Haidt, Greene and Nussbaum described above. Problematically, this has left moral judgements detached from actionability, and not in the Nietzschean sense, because he explains the lack of action through weakness and strategic incompetence. To account for the action element, Skitka has developed the idea that moral mandates entail a strong “action potential.”

Because they are “nonnegotiable, terminal, and fundamental psychological truths,” subjects feel a sense of righteousness, possibly even duty, to pursue these mandates. This ad hoc amendment to moral judgement is unnecessary. Arguing for the traditional route of positing emotions at the root of moral judgement makes more sense, as emotions already come equipped with an action tendency.

It appears entirely reasonable to argue that moral mandates allow groups to rationalize their rage into a respectable cause, even if this constitutes a displacement. But it seems more

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282 Ibid.
cumbersome to argue that strong moral convictions lead to action. In this regard the role of emotion, specifically rage, seems unnecessarily sidelined, not least because rage and moral certainty coincide and can be described as constitutive of each other. However, in order to substantiate this point, close attention must be paid to the specific mandate of moral exclusion. Moral exclusion based on a suffered injustice looks different from moral exclusion predicated on exonerating impulses, as diagnosed by the social psychologists. The difference is important, because it raises questions about the concept of righteous rage and the notion of displaced aggression or illegitimate rage. There exist two primary moral mandates operating in extreme violence: demonization and dehumanization. The former describes the Nietzschean judgment of evil borne from suffering and injustice, while the latter describes a different moral mechanism, which indeed will be shown to align with a need for exoneration for the simple fact that there is no genuine injustice suffered, and that the violence cannot be justified in moral terms, necessitating the need to turn the target into a non-human. Nevertheless, each mandate has an emotional foundation; it is only dehumanization that indicates a displacement.

**Moral Certainty in Violence: Demonization versus Dehumanization**

Demonization responds to a grave injustice where the offender is deemed evil and malicious; he has proven his willingness to harm and morally discard the victim. This corresponds to the previous chapter’s description of the objective attitude as caused by a preceding mistreatment, and provides the moral certainty necessary to exact punishment unbound by compassion and moral regard. Giner-Sorrola and Leidner point out that demonization allows for punishment that is often disproportionate to the offense, seemingly ridiculing the very notion of justice. “The ideal punishment of demons knows no restrictions, either practical or moral, and in fact is a positive moral good.” This is precisely the point made by the Erinyes, who hunt those who have embraced their vengeance and operate a new Nomos of Revenge. The offender is imbued with full mental and rational capabilities and has chosen to harm the in-group; the intentionality is clear. Responding to such behaviour is an act of justice and born of the existential desire to survive.

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283 Giner-Sorolla, Leidner, and Castano, “Dehumanization, Demonization, and Morality Shifting.”
Demonization creates in-group legitimacy for extreme punishment, but as Grossman stresses, “the enemy is still a human, and killing him is an act of justice.”284 The evocation of a label such as evil can often be substituted by importing historically informed labels like fascist, infidel or communist, which all imply that the struggle at hand is a clear-cut battle between good and evil, right and wrong, just and unjust. In the current conflict in Ukraine, the separatists believe to be fighting the “Fascist” forces of Kiev, lending legitimacy and historic mission to their cause.285 In a literary sense the subject is confronting a big evil, proven to be powerful and merciless, an archetypal spirit. Groups operating the mandate of demonization invariably believe themselves to be good and righteous; they believe to be operating a timeless and universal morality. The fact that demonization cannot exist without explicit mention of some preceding injustice or mistreatment as qualification suggests that there is indeed a recognizable justice at work.

Against the properties of demonization arises the second type of mandate, referred to as either infra-humanization or dehumanization. According to Castano and Giner-Sorrolla, “infra-humanization refers to the denial to individual or group of some of the characteristics that make us human, rendering the target less than human, if not wholly non human.”286 Labels such as cockroaches, rats, vermin or parasites are used to describe members of the out-group. This returns us to the debate on exoneration. Bandura explains, “Dehumanization fosters different self-exonerative patterns of thought. People seldom condemn punitive conduct – in fact, they create justification for it – when they are directing their aggression at persons who have been divested of their humanness.”287 Dehumanization occurs mainly in acts of terrorism and state-organized violence, such as genocides.288

Dehumanization, unlike demonization, gives rise to an emotion that was already alluded to by Bartov and Grossman in their studies of battlefield violence. Dehumanization arises from the

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same consideration that gives rise to guilt. The mandate of dehumanization exonerates perpetrators by tackling the guilt arising from the suppression of compassion and the moral attitude. These are signs that the administered treatment is considered immoral. The German sociologist Gisela Schwan stresses the connection between guilt and the dehumanizing process in her study of Germans involved in the Nazi concentration camps. Among other things, she chronicles the staggering levels of depression, suicide and alcoholism of Germans who operated these camps. Dehumanization becomes less of a mandate than a psychological prophylactic. One of the guards recalled: “I rarely saw them as individuals. It was always a huge mass. I sometimes stood on the wall and saw them in the tube. But how can I explain it—they were spanked, packed together, running, being driven with whips like…” Cattle are not held in the same regard as humans. “Evil” humans may be mistreated because they have forfeited their right to compassion and moral regard; they deserve the punishment. But this mandate should be enough. The reason for dehumanization is that these mistreated subjects are not regarded as “evil”; they have not committed a grave mistreatment or injustice, and they do not deserve the treatment they suffer, and so they must become non-humans to resolve the underlying moral dilemma. Two more accounts explicate Schwan’s findings.

Bartov explains that dehumanization in warfare occurs because soldiers are suppressing fellow feelings for their enemy, “if the foreign enemy had become one’s comrade in suffering, if the glorious war for which one had sacrificed so much had been in vain, and if patriotism had been whipped up by a lying propaganda machine run by gutless intellectuals safely closeted n the rear, then how was one to make sense of it all.” The tension is resolved by suppressing the human qualities of the enemy. Consequently, acts of extreme violence and merciless killing evoke the spectre of dehumanization precisely because they cannot be justified. The need to treat the victim like cattle illustrates that the moral mandate can only support justifiable violence; once demonization no longer applies, the violence is mandated by dehumanization, which, along with the sensation of guilt, indicates a lack of moral certainty. In other words, there appears to be a self-regulating mechanism in rage to

distinguish between righteous moral acts of violence and wrongful immoral ones, without the need to refer back to some objective external standard.

The Auschwitz survivor and philosopher Primo Levi explores the notion of “senseless violence” and offers invaluable and costly insight into the psychological underpinnings in dehumanization. Levi already understood the connection between guilt and the need for dehumanization. “Before dying the victim must be degraded, so that the murderer will be less burdened by guilt. This is an explanation not devoid of logic but which shouts to heaven: it is the sole usefulness of useless violence,”\(^ {292}\) he writes. Levi’s harrowing descriptions of life in the concentration camps portrayed a daily struggle to resist German acts of dehumanization. Fundamental things like clothes or even a spoon became weapons to oppose German acts of dehumanization. They were recognizable tokens of civility and humanness, which conflicted with the underlying psychological need to see the inmates as animals and non-human.

Wieviorka, building on Levi’s insight, explains that dehumanized out-groups become anti-subjects. Out-groups “must be treated inhumanely in order to make the violence acceptable (...) Cruelty makes it possible to see oneself as part of humanity by making the other non or anti human - violence only works when the aggressor makes the victim up to be from a different species.”\(^ {293}\) Senseless violence and cruelty predicated on dehumanization mutes the growing sensation of guilt and immorality by turning the out-group into non-humans. These qualifications would be unnecessary if the in-group truly felt herself mistreated or threatened. Dehumanization must therefore be argued to compensate for a lack of moral certainty and the failure to articulate a clear and present danger emanating from the target.

At first glance, it would appear inconsequential whether extreme violence is exacted against animals or “fascists”. The end result is often the same: prolonged bloodshed, warfare and death. However, there is a difference, and it relays back to moral certainty necessary for violence and aggression. If the international community intervene to end violence, which they invariably do, the existence of demonization suggests a scenario where the group has actually suffered a real injustice and that this injustice has not been addressed. This desire for justice, kept alive by the memory of the mistreatment, will bleed into the present and stain all further conduct. However, in the case of dehumanization, the scenario is markedly different and the

\(^ {293}\) Wieviorka, \textit{Evil}. 
group is indeed creating exonerating patterns of psychological shielding, because there is no injustice that can support the rage necessary to induce moral certainty. Demonization, as a moral mandate, is the stuff of righteous rage and the domain of the Erinyes. Dehumanization, on the other hand, no longer relates to this basic mechanism.

The occurrence of guilt suggests that the mechanism is broken. Because the objective attitude, as explained in Chapter 2, is predicated on a sense of threat and grave mistreatment, the emergence of guilt and uncertainty strongly suggests that even from the standpoint of the in-group the threat is inflated or simply false. Assuming this is correct, it is possible to carefully dislodge dehumanization from the other moral mandate and argue that the excesses are not predicated on a justifiable sense of threat but indeed form some gross act of unqualified mistreatment. This is not to suggest that violence predicated on demonization is permissible, only that intervention might led to an antagonism encased in group identity; a type of arrested development and permanent demonization that can easily give rise to so-called schemas of hatred.294

**Conclusion**

This chapter introduced rage into inter-group dynamics. The emotional processes described in Chapter 2 were elevated to group level by ensuring that individuals perceived a joint emotional trigger. The fact that individuals join groups for the basic psychological drives of belonging and esteem, as outlined in Brewer’s *Optimal Distinction Theory*, means that existential threats can be jointly experienced through events that threaten the existence of the group. Following this insight, threats were elaborated and analysed; of these threats the concept of esteem was the most interesting because it relied on inter-group comparison and order, which were shown to suffer from strong unconscious biases and even *illusions*, according to the International Relations scholar Gustav Ichheiser. Groups still tend to justify their status through implicit coercion, which only feeds the rage of those groups denied their claims to territorial and ideational freedom and self-expression. In turn, groups that revolt are immediately seen as evil and not playing by the rules, necessitating harsh and uncompromising punishment, and dramatically widening the moral chasm between groups.

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294 A point made in Edward Luttwak’s contentious essay, “Give War a Chance,” *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 4 (1999): 36,
Mirroring the practices found in the plays of Ancient Greece, once threatened, groups engage in out-group derogation and labelling intended to delegitimize the offender’s cause and possibly even right to existence. In the plays of Ancient Greece criminals and offenders take on bestial forms after they begin undermining the social order of nomos, on which the social identity of citizenship depends. However, social psychologists engaged in this field of study ignore that such labels can be produced naturally through an emotional appraisal that responds to grave acts of mistreatment and moral disregard. Instead, they opt to portray such labels as necessary psychological mechanisms to sustain in-group righteousness and cultivate “exonerating patterns”. However, following the scholarship engaged in the nexus on emotion and moral judgements, it is evident that emotions and moral judgements are mutually constitutive. This questions the overall idea, implicit in the works of the social psychologists, that groups somehow need to be tricked or indoctrinated into violence. Negative Emotions, especially rage, create natural action tendency to punish those who have harmed us. The moral certainty is, as it was in Ancient Greece, implicit.

The final segment of the chapter probed deeply into the inner workings of two primary moral mandates utilized in violence. Demonization and dehumanization, which are usually combined, largely uncritically, were shown to operate very different scenarios. While demonization aligns with the idea of the Nietzschean punitive morality, and remains in tune with the concept of righteous rage explained in the last chapter, dehumanization is shown to operate when natural compassion and moral concerns are pushing back. In righteous rage, the emotion inoculates and indeed compels groups to punish; dehumanization however attempts to strangle the guilt by making the target out to be part of a different species and void of any human concern. Dehumanization is found to operate especially in genocidal processes, where targets are systematically killed off without any motivation or urgency arising from a suffered act of injustice or mistreatment. The idea that inter-group and intra-group violence must be stopped, and that third-party interventions can always be justified on some humanitarian grounds, can now carefully be supplemented by the fact that groups engaged in dehumanization register moral uncertainty; an uncertainty that should not exist if the violence is in response to a genuine injustice or mistreatment.
Chapter 4

Justice in Revenge

Groups that feel threatened or mistreated desire to punish those held responsible. In Chapter 2, I distinguished between two emotional modalities, the *objective attitude* and the *moral attitude*. Within these modalities, I distinguished further between action-based emotions and non-action-based emotions. Anger operates within the *moral attitude*, in that overarching moral concerns and a willingness to repair and maintain social bonds with the offender modulate the extent and severity of punishment. The *objective attitude* counterpart to anger is rage. In the case of rage, the moral worth of the offender is discarded and punishment follows a frame of reference that instrumentalizes the offender and ignores the extent of suffering. The same distinction that works in the differentiation between rage and anger, applies equally to the administration of punishment in the name of justice. *Moral attitude* punishment is described as retribution, while the *objective attitude* counterpart is described as revenge. Both types of punishment stem from the same concern for justice, but of course because the injustice suffered differs, the punishment follows different rationales.

Today, the idea that violence and even warfare is framed as a response to a wrongdoing or an injustice is increasingly regarded as fact. However, few scholars openly refer to such violence as revenge; revenge and justice, according to every literary tradition, are in fact synonymous. The language used to describe acts of violence is crouched in legal and humanitarian terms that provide a façade of control, limitation, and procedure. The ongoing debate on what constitutes a *supreme emergency* and how to reckon with the countless acts of unsanctioned immoral acts of violence pushes the question of motivation to the forefront. Why do groups continue to act “immorally”, especially if there is no sense of imminent danger? The Dresden Bombing or the dropping of the nuclear bombs all occurred after the war had been decided. These acts are deemed immoral according to Just War theory because

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they breach established rules of conduct permissible in war. There was little strategic advantage in committing these acts. The need for condemnation is understood; however, it would be far more interesting to understand why such acts happen in the first place, especially if the concern is to ensure they are not repeated. In order for this to happen, such acts need to be presumed as moral and just from the point of view of the perpetrator, if only to ensure that the perpetrator is regarded as possessing full mental and rational capabilities, rather than being deemed evil, possessed or irrational. The next step is to understand the inner workings of this morality. Approaching violence through the prism of some established moral compass and condemning the excesses, I posit, is less analytically sound than establishing the subjective morality and then viewing the “excesses” as internally consistent. The former method, moreover, would likely attribute a false morality to the perpetrator’s motivation, especially when there is no discernible act of excess. The key to understanding revenge hinges on whether the subject harbours any moral regard for the target. Acts of revenge can often be inconspicuous or, following the next chapter on Ressentiment, entirely manifest in subjective valuations and cultural fantasy.

The concept of revenge is gaining increasing prominence in International Relations. Heimann and Löwenheim, in an essay published in 2008, write,

“It is not easy to rule out the role of revenge in several notable cases of international wars and conflicts during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries—World War II, the Balkans conflict, the Indo-Pakistani conflict, the 1973 October-Yom Kippur War, the 1980–88 Iran-Iraq War, the 1998 Eritrean-Ethiopian War, and the 2003 Iraq War.”

The political scientist Robert E. Harkavy agrees that revenge is an extremely relevant and understudied theme in International Relations; Harkavy offers a set of causes for revenge and argues that it responds to a narcissistic injury. Harkavy bases much of his analysis on outdated psychological research, mainly Heinz Kohut’s study on narcissistic rage, published in the early 1970’s. Ned Lebow’s Cultural Theory understands revenge as a response to an

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298 Löwenheim and Heimann, “Revenge in International Politics,” 686.
299 Harkavy R.E., “Defeat, National Humiliation, and the Revenge Motif in International Politics.”
insult and the violation of a nation’s sense of standing and esteem.\textsuperscript{300} The Sociologist Thomas Scheff, in his study \textit{Bloody Revenge}, uses the concept of revenge to describe the quick succession of increasingly devastating wars witnessed in the first half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. According to Scheff, European powers suffered from emotional alienation and a loss of \textit{attunement} from 1870 onwards.\textsuperscript{301} European powers and their elite decision-makers regarded each other as moral enemies and gained enjoyment from exacting punishment unbound by any regard for the entitlements and needs of others.\textsuperscript{302}

However, there exists considerable confusion about the exact nature of revenge, and for this purpose I want to briefly run through some basic misunderstandings. The first misunderstanding concerns the notion of reciprocity. Scholars refer to revenge as a type of “negative reciprocity.”\textsuperscript{303} Unfortunately, the term negative reciprocity can also describe “retribution”, “retaliation” and even “deterrence”, relevant concepts in International Relations that need to be contrasted and distinguished from revenge. The key to understanding revenge begins with the distinctions made in Chapter 2 between \textit{moral attitudes} and \textit{objective attitudes}; revenge operates within \textit{objective attitude} and capitalizes on the rage of the victim. Because the preceding injustice undermines the moral worth of the victim, the revenge is unbound by communal restraint. In Euripides’ \textit{Hecuba}, Agamemnon lectured Hecuba, before her act of revenge against Polymester, that only strangers, i.e. people unbound by \textit{nomos}, commit acts of revenge. Consequently, the concept of revenge must grapple with the loss of recognition of moral equality. Reciprocity suggests that there is some balance to be regained between parties. Revenge, however, only entrenches the \textit{objective attitude} and leads to cycles, seriously questioning whether parties can ever regain a sense of mutual moral regard; this is the exact reason why vengeful individuals were banished from the polis in Ancient Greece, and why revenge remains such a taboo today. The second misunderstanding concerns the notion of satisfaction.

Heimann and Löwenheim specifically argue that revenge is primarily informed by the emotional satisfaction at seeing others suffer.\textsuperscript{304} Borrowing a phrase from Nietzsche, they

\textsuperscript{300} Lebow, \textit{A Cultural Theory of International Relations}.
\textsuperscript{301} For related arguments on the evolution of extreme warfare, see John U. Nef, \textit{War And Human Progress: An Essay On The Rise Of Industrial Civilisation} (Norton, n.d.).
\textsuperscript{303} Löwenheim and Heimann, “Revenge in International Politics,” p. 686.
\textsuperscript{304} Saurette, “You Dissin Me?”; Löwenheim and Heimann, “Revenge in International Politics.”
write, “the emotional suffering of the target is for the revenger a ‘true feast’.” In a series of experiments, neuroscientists have indeed discovered that administering punishment activates the reward centre of the brain. De Quervain et al. also find that the closer the subject feels to the crime, the greater the reward gained by administering punishment. However, these findings do not establish such a reward sensation as predicated on a feeling of revenge, but rather on a feeling of administered justice. In other words, any type of punishment, following a mistreatment or mistake, no matter how severe, leads to a reward sensation. These findings consequently problematize the attempt to single out revenge as constituted by emotional satisfaction alone. Such an interpretation cannot offer sufficient distinction from other types of negative reciprocity. Punishment of any sort, even administered within communal sanction, can lead to an emotional reward. The key issue in revenge is not satisfaction – any type of punishment satisfies - but the fact the punishment leads to excessive and undue suffering. Punishments administered by the community towards a member are limited by the underlining desire to keep the community healthy and to regard each member as a moral equal. Revenge operates differently, and corresponds to Strawson’s objective attitude, in that the offender is held in no moral regard and thus punishment suffers from no communal restraint and operates an exclusive sense of justice. The question of revenge is not why is there such satisfaction from punishment but rather why is there such suffering from punishment. The enjoyment or reward variable is independent, and occurs in all administration of justice.

The third issue is concerned with the idea that revenge somehow serves some forward-looking strategy. There is still a propensity to rationalize revenge and bring it under the aegis of measure and strategy. Löwenheim and Heimann write, “One could argue that revenge nonetheless serves a forward-looking and utilitarian goal of creating a reputation for brutality and toughness that will dissuade the original harm-doer or other actors from inflicting further injuries on the revenger.” This is incorrect and falsifies the motivation and outlook in revenge. The key characteristic in revenge – and this will be thoroughly explained in this chapter – is its past-orientation. Consequently, the point I wish to stress takes on an existential mantel: revenge is not only preoccupied with an injustice, but with the past as a whole. It does not allow the subject to move on – arguably even if they exact punishment. This throws up important questions about the durability of the objective attitude and whether groups that

305 Löwenheim and Heimann, “Revenge in International Politics,” 691.
307 Löwenheim and Heimann, “Revenge in International Politics,” 691.
commit grave injustices can even be readmitted into the moral attitude. This point is implicitly made in the Greek tragedies, because subjects that act against nomos are deemed polluted and exiled; they cannot be readmitted into society. The same point is made in more modern revenge dramas, where revenge plots always end in someone’s demise.308

Along with this past-orientation, revenge must be described as suffering from a type of moral parallax. Following the discussion in Chapter 3 on moral mandates, revenge can be said to co-opt concepts like “justice”, “fairness” or “universal” and biases them in accordance with Ichheiser’s notions of unconscious nationalism. The desire to punish can lead to insular and private notions of justice in accordance with in-group values and symbols. The frame of reference for punishment is fiercely subjective and exclusive, so treatments that might appear necessary and just are viewed as excessive and brutal from the vantage point of an outsider, including the target. In revenge, the moral coordinates of the in-group are dislodged from the communal norm. This leads to two problems, which have resonated throughout time. The first is the problem of cycles already lamented at the time of the Greek playwrights. Because each act of revenge leads to excess, the revenge act in itself provides the foundation for yet another act of counter-revenge. The objective attitude leads to a spiralling of ever more creative violence.

This then leads to the second problem: goal satisfaction no longer follows some long-term strategic rationale but in fact boils down to seeing the other suffer and be humiliated. Once rage is introduced into inter-group dynamics, judgements are skewed towards exacting punishment. Löwenheim and Heimann stress how nations discount material costs in their pursuit of revenge.309 In line with this, Paul Saurette argues that the West and Terrorist Groups are locked in “a deadly serious duel of humiliation and counter-humiliation.”310 Saurette frames events like the Abu Ghraib torture incidents not as blunders and missteps but as motivated actions designed to humiliate the other side. Saurette argues that long-term strategic imperatives in the region, such as stability and good relations, are less important than enacting counter-humiliation. Revenge introduces a strategic short sightedness by ignoring the fact that emotional satisfaction through instrumentalization carries heavy long-term consequences, not least because it makes counter-revenge extremely likely and entrenches the

309 Löwenheim and Heimann, “Revenge in International Politics.” P. 686
310 Saurette, “Humiliation and the Global War on Terror.” p.50
objective attitude. In many ways once revenge becomes desirable, the suffered injustice gains paramount importance in the self-narrative of the group.

This chapter will begin by aligning revenge with a notion of justice that may be private and exclusive but which still functions like any other type of justice. Second, this chapter will explain how exactly revenge differs from its moral attitude counterpart, retribution, and how this means that revenge harbours an entirely different moral regard towards the victim. Third, the objective of revenge will be analysed to understand exactly what it is the avenger seeks from her act. Fourth, the experience of revenge will be questioned along the lines of the Nietzschean intervention on the temporal nature of a perceived injustice, introducing key ideas on existentialist philosophy into the debate. Lastly, I will continue my analysis of the two moral mandates from Chapter 3, and align them with respective revenge strategies.

**Justifying Revenge or Avenging Justice**

The desire for revenge is the desire for justice. Robert C. Solomon calls vengeance the “original passion for justice.”\(^{311}\) The dreaded Erinyes and their calls for vengeance, according to Cioran, predated the justice of Zeus, and necessitated a political order built around the need to vanquish these ancient demons.\(^{312}\) Following the discussion in Chapter 2 on the embedded appraisal of moral entitlement, the knowledge of justice demands the felt cognition that one lacks it. Engaging in violence is about setting things right. In the Old Testament, as well as in Greek tragedies, justice virtually always refers to the idea of ‘getting even’, rather than seeking the equitable distribution of goods and service. Seeing that the emotional cognition of injustice is borne from the feeling that one deserves to be treated in accordance with one’s sense of just entitlement, there is little point in arguing that revenge and a feeling of obtained justice are different; the level of felt mistreatment precisely determines the correct action tendency and level of punishment. From an outside view the revenge act might appear excessive, but equally from an outside view the suffered injustice is not experienced and thus neither is the emotional register. Hecuba and Achilles executed acts of personal justice, but these acts were referred to as revenge because they portrayed a misalignment to communal justice and the order of nomos. Revenge, in other words, is a discouraged form of justice because it undermines community and shared ideals. But a justice it is, nonetheless.

\(^{312}\) Cioran, *History and Utopia.*
In Individuals, the desire for revenge originates in the feeling of being mistreated to such an extent that the possibility of social identity becomes threatened and the feeling of moral worth is undermined. The French-German philosopher Jean Amery writes how he lost faith in a just and moral world, when an SS officer slapped him in the face solely for being Jewish. Bloom explains, “in the mind of the vengeful person who believes he or she has been abused, disrespected, or treated unfairly, the world is unjust and the punishment he or she receives is, therefore, undeserved.” This is why punishment sought in revenge is always just; it reacts to an undeserved mistreatment. In other words, the target has earned the right to be punished and is demonized. But at the same time, the ensuing sense of justice is unrecognizable to all those who have not suffered this mistreatment.

The cult of the Erinyes warns against the boycott of nomos because the result is dike, a type of natural justice where man-made customs are ignored. Against this, Euripides explores the inner workings and motivations of the topic and finds that revenge is predicated on a rejection of life and important social rules and follows an unmitigated and highly personal impulse for justice, but only once communal forms of justice are shown to be inept. In Euripides’ Hecuba, the Trojan Queen begs Agamemnon for help, and it is here that Euripides locates his critique; revenge is the consequence of human failure to show compassion when it is most needed. Tragically determined, the ensuing Nomos of Revenge is exclusive and incompatible with social order, paving the way for cycles of violence. The act of injustice changes the moral co-ordinates of right and wrong, because a suffered mistreatment is always experienced as morally wrong, and addressing such mistreatment is consequently always experienced as morally right. If communal forms of justice fail to absorb this sensation, then private forms of justice must arise naturally, and such justice must necessarily oppose or at least undermine the communal order that fails to condemn the injustice.

It is part of human nature to oppose acts of mistreatment and injustice and feel empathy towards those treated unjustly. The ability to align revenge with justice is not limited to those who have suffered an injustice. Critically, the same mechanism functions in those individuals who cultivate emotional attachments or empathy towards the victim, and thus come to view

313 Jean Amery, At the Mind’s Limits: Contemplations by a Survivor on Auschwitz and Its Realities (Indiana University Press, 2009).
the victim as member of their moral community. This is in part guaranteed by viewing the act of revenge as the avenger does, i.e. as a type of just response to an unwarranted act of aggression or disrespect. In her study of *English Revenge Drama* Linda Woodbridge writes: “Many revengers are disempowered people, unjustly treated, who step up and take control. Such figures suffer “malice, injustice, treachery, grief, unstable values, and deprivations of power or status.”316 Fascinations with popular revenge stories in film and literature like *The Count of Monte Cristo, The Godfather* or *House of Cards* are in part so pleasing because they are framed as stories about an underdog coming up and beating the odds. Revenge is not castigated but is seen as just and in response to unfair treatment or undue injustice. Woodbridge, however, asks poignantly: “But once victims turn vengeful, do they (the audience) forfeit sympathy, as many assert? Some do become monsters of cruelty. But even if audiences condemn vengefulness, they are led to recognize it as a victim’s response.”317

We as the audience, whether at the movies or back in the Greek theatre, are in a perfect position to be judge and jury, but we still end up cheering for the underdog and hero, to whom we have cultivated an emotional attachment or “understanding”. Even after revenge has shown its ugly side, we still create excuses and align revenge with the notion of a just response.318 Euripides’ critique of this mechanism is relentless; even if we harbour emotional attachment, we must at the same time show compassion towards the evildoer. His fateful decision to pardon the thieves in his council to the king stresses the need to overcome this bias and see the motivation and suffering that exists on all sides. Concerning Euripides’ *Trojan Women*, Nussbaum writes, “A spectator who had seen Euripides’ Trojan Women, right at the time of the decision to kill all of the male citizens of Melos and enslave all of the women and children, would become less likely to support such a policy – for she would see the revenge from the point of view of those suffering.”319 Euripides stresses the compassionate element in avoiding revenge, rather than the coercive structural one stressed in Aeschylus’ *Oresteia*; a much more informed position, because it aims right at the heart of the problem of the *objective attitude*, which by definition is devoid of compassion.320 As the audience we experience first-hand the lure of viewing acts of revenge as just and necessary, especially after we have cultivated an emotional attachment to the avenger and must regard

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316 Woodbridge, *English Revenge Drama*. P. 6
317 Ibid., 42.
320 Rather than chastise and outlaw vindictive impulses, as Athena proposes by using the fearful faces of the Erinyes.
the wrongdoer in the objective attitude. Overcoming such bias necessarily means siding with both sides and transcending any notion of justice and moral certainty, a difficult position in light of the odious nature of most of these acts. In the end, all this leads to the uncomfortable realization that our sense of justice is nothing but a dangerous and easily manipulated passion.

The lack of compassion inscribed in objective attitude stresses another more urgent problem: the lack of shared evaluative frameworks. In revenge, the punishment is reason for counter-punishment, which gives rise to inexorable cycles. The problem, then, is that the punishment sought by aggrieved victims seldom fits the crime. Stillwell, Baumeister and Del Prior find,

“In numerous instances of revenge, the victim’s suffering as a result of the initial transgression pales by comparison to the suffering inflicted when he or she seeks revenge. The enactment of revenge and the calculations of equity can be severely compromised by the biases inherent in the interpersonal roles of the avenger (the initial victim who then sought revenge) and the recipient of revenge (the initial perpetrator and now victim).”

The legal scholar Martha Minow writes in agreement, arguing that, “Recompense, getting satisfaction, matching like with like, giving what’s coming to the wrongdoer, equalizing crime and punishment, an eye for an eye; each of these synonyms for revenge implies the proportionality of the scales of justice.” However, the scales of justice are unhinged; they act like an increasingly uneven see-saw, where each turn adds more weight to the other side. And while revenge might be about “getting even”, there is no return to pre-injustice relations; each act only entrenches the moral disregard felt. Hence, the act of revenge cannot bridge the moral gap, which enabled the excessive punishment in the first place. Revenge, in other words, settles a specific debt, but this debt suffers from systemic inflation. This urgent and timeless problem has led to a dubious solution.

Starting with the Oresteia and extending into the modern legal system, retribution is now seen as the correct way to address injury and injustice, as if exchanging revenge for retribution can somehow stimulate the moral attitude. Jacoby writes dismissively that the “advocates of

322 Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence (Beacon Press, 1999), 10.
draconian punishment for crime invariably prefer “retribution” – a word that affords the comfort of euphemism although it is virtually the same.”323 There are, however, distinctions worth noting. Martha Minow writes, “Retribution can be explained as vengeance committed by someone else than the victim.”324 It is primarily a social response of the community to address a mistreatment and punish the offender in direct proportion to the harm inflicted. The victim has no say over the punishment. Woodbridge argues that a cultural distain for revenge, popularized in English literature during the Elizabethan age, “was an ideological move, promoting a state monopoly of violence.”325 As the argument goes, the subjective experience of harm might skew the idea of proportionality and undermine the notion of balance, and lead to cycles of violence that undermine state authority, a point equally made by the playwrights of Ancient Greece.

The role of community-based justice is to stave off the more existential damages by guaranteeing that the victim remains invested in the idea of a just world and the authority of nomos, which inherently favours the polis. The victim will be less inclined to take the law into her own hands. Had Agamemnon offered his help to the pleading Hecuba, Polyphemus might have enjoyed a less gruesome fate. Similarly, in the Oresteia, it was Athena who recognized the potential trouble that would befall Athens if the Erinyes and their desire for ‘getting even’ were not respected. Consequently, the tension between ‘getting even’ and ‘social order’ is resolved by pitting the offender not against the victim, but against the entire community, making the desire for “getting even” a social concern. This pre-empts the emergence of private justice. However, there is a difference between collective revenge and communal retribution. Jacoby’s comment on draconian punishment masquerading as retribution, when it is really communal revenge, is correct. The problem, however, arises when the community chastises revenge and forces the victim to censor her punitive desires by imposing considerations befitting a moral attitude. This is the criticism found to operate in Athena’s decision to use coercion and the fearful faces of the Erinyes to dissuade citizens from engaging in revenge.

323 Jacoby, Wild Justice, 4.
325 Woodbridge, English Revenge Drama. p. 17
Margaret Walker calls a refusal of the community to acknowledge a crime, a second-rate injury. It compounds the initial loss of faith by undermining the victim’s claim for moral support and denying the wrongdoing. The French philosopher Jean Amery lamented that post-war Germany refused to give him peace by refusing to confront its Nazi past and the suffering it caused him, instead preferring to act as if it had not happened. Again, by addressing the suffering of the victim, the community repairs the victim’s damaged belief in an equitable world, which in turn may resolve one of the biases described by social psychologists. However, the community must then still act in support of the punitive desires of the victim, or else risk alienation once more. In other words, the group must channel the desire for revenge and uncritically adopt the stance of the injured and mistreated members.

This is the underlying critique in modern state-sponsored justice and reconciliation efforts collectively known as Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC). Story-telling and collective acknowledgments of crimes are supposed to help victims regain a sense of worth and standing without demanding that their offender suffer. TRC practices explicitly deny recourse to punishment and violence. However, in many reported cases, victims during these hearings actually gain some satisfaction by seeing their abusers wrangle with their own conscience, undoubtedly a form of punishment in its own right. This suggests the existence of deep punitive desires, which, however, TRC forums do not sanction. Consequently, there is a difference between whether a community stands behind the avenger and sanctions the will of the avenger, and whether the community stands between avenger and target, mitigating the response. Muldoon has criticized TRC practices exactly on these grounds, arguing that a TRC qualifies what type of anger response is acceptable. The Commission is tasked with the mandate of maintaining a moral foundation between avenger and offender, a foundation, however, which in all honesty and likelihood is non-existent.

326 Walker, Moral Repair, p. 20
327 Amery, At the Mind’s Limits.
331 Muldoon, “The Moral Legitimacy of Anger.”
Avengers operate a very different mandate; they need to punish the offender in response to the injustice they suffer. They address their felt injustice in all the complexity afforded by the experience of existential shock and moral disregard. Reducing revenge to retribution makes this impossible. Consequently, a denial of revenge is troublesome and should be regarded as cause for concern; a point that Aeschylus’s solution in the Oresteia glosses over by having the Erinyes use fear and coercion to rein in punitive impulses within the community. “From these fearful faces I see great gain for these citizens”, ruminates Athena. This compounds rather than resolves the problem.

“A wholesale denial of vengeance as a legitimate motif may be a psychological disaster,” warns Solomon. In equal measure, Seneca argues that frustration of vengeful longings ‘leaves a person incomplete, as if he were maimed’. Nietzsche argues that injustices can poison and lead to Ressentiment. And in line with this, Dostoyevsky sketches the psychology of a man riddled by frustrated desires for vengeance and justice in his Notes from the Underground. As could be expected many participants in the Truth and Reconciliation process in South Africa remain dissatisfied at what amounts to policies of state-ordered amnesia. Instead of forgetting and moving on, they want to see their offenders atone. The tension between social order, masquerading as communal justice, and private justice at seeing the offender suffer, is always decided in favour of social order. It is done so in the Oresteia, as in all the Greek plays dealing with pollution and blood-murder. And equally in TRC practices, justice becomes synonymous with peaceful transition; the desire for personal satisfaction is castigated. Revenge is seen as being aligned too much with the desire for suffering and the continuation of violence; it stands in opposition to order. But simply ignoring this tension will not make it go away. If justice and revenge is the same thing, denying revenge means denying justice; by exchanging revenge for retribution, the denial is no less.

Retribution versus Revenge

Revenge is very different from its communal counterpart. The idea that retribution can answer the demands of revenge must be scrutinized and relayed back to the point made in Chapter 1

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333 Solomon, A Passion for Justice, 275.
on the differing views of the motivation in revenge offered by Euripides and Aeschylus. Aeschylus’ *Oresteia* pioneered the idea of retribution taking the place of revenge; however, this mechanism will be shown to leave the experienced injustice unaddressed, which may be more damaging in the long run, not least because revenge impulses, echoing Chapter 5 on *Ressentiment*, might go underground and exist in valuation and morality only. Robert Nozick has explored the distinction between revenge and retribution in his *Philosophical Explanations* and has come up with four key points to distinguish revenge from retribution, which echo the difference between an *objective attitude* and *moral attitude* response.335

Nozick’s first point is that “retribution is done for a wrong, while revenge may be done for an injury or harm or slight and need not be done for a wrong.”336 One of Nozick’s critics maintains that the distinction between a wrong and an injury or harm can only be defended when the former is a legally sanctified criminal offence, while the latter is a subjectively perceived one, and not necessarily legally established.337 With the remaining points in mind, which all highlight the personal and subjective component in revenge, it is safe to assume that Nozick would agree with this qualification. Returning to the typology presented in Chapter 2, a wrong can be represented in norms and rules, and consequently the emotional reaction follows the *moral attitude*, because the victim does not feel her moral worth has been questioned or even discarded, but rather communicates the violation in a way that stresses the infraction, implicitly acknowledging that these governing norms are still valid.

Nozick refers to this in his second point, “retribution sets an internal limit to the amount of punishment, according to the seriousness of the wrong, whereas revenge internally need not set a limit to what is inflicted.”338 One of Nozick’s critics charges that some forms of revenge may rightfully be condemned as grotesque, implying that limits must exist.339 However, this argument fails to acknowledge that the avenger no longer shares the same moral coordinates, let alone notion of justice. The *objective attitude* exists precisely because the bare minimum of inter-subjective regard, the mutual recognition of moral worth, has been dismissed. Consequently, the punishment in revenge, unlike retribution, is no longer limited by the need to pay moral recognition to the target. As far as the avenger is concerned the target deserves to be destroyed.

336 Ibid. P. 364
338 Nozick, *Philosophical Explanations*. P. 365
339 Zaibert, Leo - *Punishment and Revenge* (Jan., 2006), p. 96
Nozick’s penultimate point is that “revenge is personal ‘this is because of what you did to my ____ (self, father, group and so on)”\(^\text{340}\). Whereas the agent of retribution need have no special or personal tie to the victim of the wrong for which he exacts retribution.” This point was raised in the critique of communal retribution; there is something that remains unaddressed when the “agent of retribution” exacts punishment, because his sense of injustice and correct punishment can never capture the emotional depth of the actual mistreatment. Only revenge, exceeding the effects of retribution and thus moral regard, can ensure that the depth of the injury is addressed. Similarly, Hecuba exceeds retribution by not only killing Polymester’s children but by blinding him as well, proclaiming, ‘his debt is paid, I have my revenge’. Nozick’s demand for personal ties guarantees that the affront is perceived on an existential level, creating this deep wound; consequently, only creative revenge, not limited retribution, can be satisfactory to the subject.

Lastly, Nozick suggests, “that revenge involves a particular emotional tone, pleasure in the suffering of another, while retribution need involve no emotional tone (…) the thirster for revenge will often want to experience (see, be present at) the situation in which the revenged is suffering.”\(^\text{341}\) This point is contestable. According to insights from neuroscience, there is always enjoyment in punishment; however, it is true that the thirster for revenge must be the author of the punishment in order feel satisfaction. The experience of revenge, as will be discussed below, demands authorship of punishment, rather than simply witnessing the suffering, which could be accidental and therefore unrelated to the initial crime. As the moral philosopher and proponent of retributive justice Jean Hampton claims, “the objective injury may not, to an observer’s eye, correspond to a victims subjective experience of injury,”\(^\text{342}\) and thus revenge is always subjectively motivated and informed. Nozick’s distinction between retribution and revenge makes the distinction unequivocally clear. Nussbaum’s *Nomos of Revenge* stresses this as well. Hecuba’s new song of revenge, writes Nussbaum, “will prove a solitary song.”\(^\text{343}\) It is now time to turn towards the content of this solitary song and understand what exactly it is that avengers seek from their actions.

\(^{340}\) Nozick, *Philosophical Explanations*. P. 366
\(^{341}\) Ibid. p. 368
\(^{342}\) Murphy and Hampton, *Forgiveness and Mercy*, p. 45.
\(^{343}\) Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness*. p. 410
Mimetic Revenge in Euripides’ *Hecuba*

Nozick states that revenge “need not set a limit to what is inflicted” and that excessiveness and cruelty are the norm. Nussbaum, however, suggests that revenge not only follows a punitive logic of inflicting suffering, but a mimetic one as well. The punishment, in other words, rather than fitting the crime, must resemble it. This provides invaluable insight into the moral economy of revenge. In Euripides’ *Hecuba*, Hecuba makes the xeniatic gesture and kills Polymester and his children while in a hospice, returning the initial crime in kind. However, the betrayal of nomos cannot be returned, because Polymester never believed in nomos in the first place. Instead, Hecuba finds a more fitting punishment: she blinds him. Hecuba sees the world through nomos, while Polymester sees the world only through his eyes. The act of blinding corresponds to a mimetic form of reciprocity but is only accessible from a highly subjective or somewhat poetic point of view. And so Nussbaum argues, “the logic of revenge sets the world to rights, most of all by making it reveal the hidden nature of its former crimes.”\(^\text{344}\) The mimetic aspect is vital because it corresponds directly to the symbolic contextualization of the crime. Only by allowing the victim to exact her revenge can we fully appreciate the mimetic quality of the punishment. This allows us to understand the subjective impact of the initial injustice.

This problematizes the established truism that “revenge purposively involves excesses.” If revenge is a type of justice, than there must be logic to the punishment. Polymester exclaims, “Hecuba destroyed me, she and the women taken prisoner – no, not “destroyed” but something worse.” There are those who believe that Hecuba acted excessively, but when she retorts: “Never will you restore the brightness of sight to your eyes, never see alive your children killed by this hand of mine,” there is a symbolic rationale, a poetic justice, rather than “purposive excess” to her actions. In reference to today’s terrorists, Jürgensmeyer writes, “Although it may appear as if these acts were meant to win respect of opponents, they also signified something else: the movements were attempting to establish themselves as their opponents equals (...) they were not only imitating their rivals but also showing their superiority in terms that they believe their rivals would understand.”\(^\text{345}\) As long as there is no impetus to explore the symbolic meaning of the crime, the mimetic aspect of the revenge, and

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\(^{344}\) Ibid. p. 411

the idea of an underlining justice, will be lost. More importantly, the offender will mistakenly
deem himself a victim of excess rather than a recipient of a finely tuned act of justice. There
is no loss of irony in the fact that the 9/11 attacks targeted the financial and military symbols
of American power - the very foundation of American influence in the Middle East. These
acts were imbued with strong mimetic components, something only acknowledged by those
who were already attuned to the connection between American foreign policy and regional
grievances. Others only saw an irrational act of violence and unqualified terror.

According to the social psychologists, Stillwell, Baumeister and Del Priore, it is highly likely
that in revenge “both parties see themselves as victims (...) they may downplay their own
role in causing the conflict and instead see themselves as the relatively innocent party
victimized by the malevolent other.”346 A ‘precisely calibrated revenge’, as the social
psychologists postulate, would then depend on a ‘precisely calibrated knowledge of the
exacted injury’ on behalf of the offender. If these two very subjective impressions fail to
align, as they most certainly will, the impression of excessiveness is inevitable. Nussbaum’s
point about the mimetic aspect in revenge allows us to probe into the morality of revenge and
understand that an act of revenge first and foremost must return the sense of moral disregard
felt in the initial injustice. This is the basic act of communication in revenge. But more
importantly, this message can be expressed in any possible way and neede to be tit for tat. For
instance, if a hegemony feels mistreated and attacked in its sense of esteem and entitlement
through an act of disrespect, mirrored in Polymester’s breach of nomos towards Hecuba,
then the chosen response, mimetically returning this mistreatment, might take a violent form
through extreme physical punishment, again mirrored in Hecuba’s act of blinding Polymester,
and found in Löwenheim’s exploration of PATHs. The expression of the objective attitude
injustice may take different forms, both in how it is experienced and how it is returned, but
the underlying experience of moral disregard must be the same.

Sanctioned Revenge

There exists considerable research on so-called revenge societies found in the Mediterranean.
These societies practice a type of sanctioned “blood revenge” that differs markedly from the
understanding of revenge outlined above. Yet scholars maintain that these societies have
somehow institutionalized revenge and made it socially acceptable, even desirable. Most

346 Stillwell, Baumeister, and Del Priore, “We're All Victims Here.” p. 255
notable among these scholars is Jon Elster, who has explored this issue in *Norms of Revenge*. Elster defines revenge as “the attempt, at some cost or risk to oneself, to impose suffering upon those who made one suffer, because they have one suffer.” Elster deduces from this that, because revenge is done “at some cost or risk to oneself,” it must yield no benefits and must be described as irrational. However, he then goes on to conclude that revenge is undertaken for a “deep-rooted urge to show oneself to be superior to others” and to assert one’s honour. Obviously, this is a benefit in itself, which outweighs the costs of revenge. However, Elster stresses the fact that “actual revenge would occur only if someone acted irrationally.” The establishment of socially sanctioned ‘norms of revenge’ makes it doubtful whether any act of revenge, governed by these norms, can be described as irrational. A subject, consciously adhering to social norms, should be judged as acting rationally, because he aims for social approval or honour. A large section of Elster’s exploration is dedicated to the case studies of feuds, where he makes exactly the same argument, suggesting that acts of revenge are demanded by social codes and that failure leads to a loss of honour and social chastisement. In other words, these acts of so-called revenge are expected.

Punitive acts that are regulated by social norm, expected by peer and foe alike and done for an advancement of one’s honour, do not correspond to the idea of revenge found in the analysis of Euripides’ *Hecuba* or mirrored in Nozick’s philosophical reflections. Elster’s notion of revenge rather corresponds to what Frank Steward terms *reflexive honour*. Here a subject is intentionally insulted and expected to retaliate in order to prove his honour. However, the subject is not expected to retaliate in an excessive manner, but simply to offer a token response as proof of good character. This already postulates a *moral attitude* and sets limits on the mimetic potential. A similar dynamic is described in Nisbett and Cohen’s *Culture of Honour*. In their analysis of Mediterranean herding communities, they describe a mechanism, where an older member of the herding community intentionally insults a new shepherd. These insults “may occur,” they write, “in a coffee shop, the village square, or most frequently on a grazing boundary when a curse or a stone aimed at one of his straying sheep by another shepherd is an insult, which inevitably requires a violent response.” The young shepherd’s

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347 Elster, Jon - *Norms of Revenge*; Ethics, Vol. 100, No. 4 (Jul., 1990), p. 862
349 Ibid.
350 Ibid., p. 875
351 Stewart; Frank Henderson – *Honor* (1994)
act of retaliation is seen as a rite of passage, proving his ability to uphold and honour the herding community’s values.

Similarly, Christopher Boehm in his exploration of Montenegrin blood feuds finds an extremely complex set of regulations and rules in regard to revenge killings. He writes, “Causes for blood revenge lay in a complicated mixture of religious and fraternal feelings and also in the highly developed retaliatory responses that could be expected in a warrior society, all combined with a keen and compelling sense of honour.” In lieu of a centralized authority, it would first appear that revenge killing is this endless and uncontrollable display of barbarism. This is, however, not the case. Boehm finds a highly developed and self-regulated mechanism operating with key restrictions. For instance, the killing of women is prohibited. Only the killing of men can repay the blood debt; the killing of women is in fact a cause of great shame for the family. Furthermore, if a guest comes to the house of a feuding family, the feuding will temporarily stop. Harvest or threats from the Ottoman Empire equally lead to temporary truces, which are honoured by all sides. However, even if these truces are broken, norms exist to regulate these breaches. Boehm writes, “Montenegrins recognized “boiling blood” as a very special and all-consuming psychological condition; as a moral justification, boiling blood went far in exonerating a person if he broke a truce.” Even a breach of norms is regulated by norms. There is nothing subjective or symbolic in these acts of revenge; they are socially sanctioned and normatively expected.

Elster’s Norms of Revenge and Nussbaum’s mimetic revenge, however, share interesting potential for overlap. If both parties can agree to hear each other out and gain insight into the subjective and symbolic meaning of the crime, there is no reason why the mimetic aspect of revenge should not be assimilated into a collective framework. Indeed, in the case of the Mediterranean shepherds, the act of throwing a stone at a sheep is already invested with symbolic meaning and understood by both sides. The stone represents much more, and so the retribution must address the symbolic crime; throwing a stone in return is not enough. But the difference between Elster and Nussbaum is that the injustice – even the symbolic aspect of it – is culturally sanctioned. Nussbaum’s Nomos of Revenge rests on the fact that the injustice defies expectations and moral acceptability, which sets off a solitary song of justice. This introduces the desire for extreme and excessive punishment, because the injustice resolves

353 Christopher Boehm, Blood Revenge: The Anthropology of Feuding in Montenegro and Other Tribal Societies / (University Press of Kansas,, 1984), 103.
354 Ibid., 119.
any concept of a mutual moral regard. This type of withdrawal from communal forms of justice and morality cannot be guaranteed if the act of mimetic revenge is expected.

Hence, one must conclude that Elster’s idea of revenge, as explored by Nisbett and Boehm, describes a specific social nomos where (blood) equality is established and maintained through socially sanctioned retribution. All acts of “revenge” are expected. If one applies Nozick’s descriptions to the Norms of Revenge, one finds that Elster is referring to retribution not revenge, and that the salient characteristics of revenge, such as alleged excessiveness, the avoidance of social approval or the mimetic aspect of moral disregard are obstructed in Elster’s Norms. In the words of Milovan Djilas, “revenge is an overpowering and consuming fire. It flares up and burns away every other thought and emotion… (It is the) wildest and sweetest drunkenness.” Revenge is born from a radically subjective idea of justice, rejected by others for its excesses, but necessary for the injured to obtain justice.

The objective of Revenge

What does revenge seek? Nussbaum speaks of a mimetic component; moral philosophers speak of justice. At the beginning of this chapter it was argued that revenge is a form of reciprocity, but one that is entirely past-orientated. Revenge’s cousin, retribution corrects a wrong that is experienced as a normative breach and consequently sets limits on the act of punishment, because the moral attitude is still in operation. Revenge, on the other hand, as the action tendency of rage, responds to a mistreatment that challenges the existential rights and moral worth of the victim. Within group dynamics this is tantamount to threatening group dissolution, by disrupting the existential investments of group membership, i.e. recognition and esteem. Social psychologists argue for the existence of two distinct but not necessarily exclusive objectives in revenge. Both offer different types of obtained justice for the victim. There is, however, another objective I wish to stress, which I refer to as the Salted Earth hypothesis, and which relates directly to the notion of the past-orientation found in revenge.

Comparative Suffering Hypothesis

The first objective is known as the Comparative Suffering Hypothesis and is described thus, “the offense caused an affective imbalance between the offender and the victim, and so the

355 Milovan Djilas, quoted in Elster, Jon – Norms of Revenge (Juli, 1990), p. 871
victim seeks to reduce this imbalance. This goal is fulfilled when the offender experiences an appropriate amount of harm or loss.” 356 This is part of the story, as we know from Chapter 1; Hecuba sought to return the offense, mimetically, to claim her revenge by making Polymester suffer. However, the social psychologists continue and postulate that if revenge is impossible, “seeing the offender suffer from fate should also be satisfactory for the victim (because) it is merely the “suffering score” that needs to be balanced” However, relying on earlier research, Gollwitzer et al. judge that “in studies where participants were victims, the offender’s fate did not diminish their retributive reactions.” 357 This suggests that suffering in itself is not enough. Seeing the perpetrator worse off does not satisfy victims; they need to feel somehow relevant to the suffering - if not causal. This is a strong argument against the institutionalization of punishment because it denies satisfaction to the victim even though the perpetrator is punished, a point made in the distinction between a normative wrong and an existential injury.

*Understanding Hypothesis*

The second Hypothesis is known as the *Understanding Hypothesis*: “Victims seek to deliver a message to the offender and the message has the general form of ‘You will be punished for what you did before.’” 358 According to this approach, the offender needs to know that revenge or punishment is imposed because and of her prior behaviour. According to findings by Gollwitzer, Meder and Schmidt, “revenge can only be satisfactory when the offender knows why revenge has been taken.” 359 This is then the other side of the story, as we know it; Hecuba waits for Polymester to emerge mutilated from his tent to charge him with his crimes. This also explains why terrorist groups take responsibility for suicide bombings; they need their victim to make the connection.

According to the *Understanding Hypothesis* the act of revenge tries to amend the offender’s “belief-attitude structure,” as it communicates: *Never do this to me again!* 360 The act of revenge in this sense hedges on the offender’s willingness to acknowledge the wrongdoing, atone and change. Unfortunately this aligns too much with retribution and the *moral attitude*.

358 Ibid., 372.
359 Ibid.
360 Gollwitzer, Meder, and Schmitt, “What Gives Victims Satisfaction When They Seek Revenge?” p. 370-74
In Chapter 2, negative social emotions were shown to operate between equals to maintain, repair and strengthen social bonds; transgressions are reported and sometimes even penalized but the underlying assumption is that both offender and victim will not sacrifice their moral equality in the pursuit of personal justice. It is correct that the offender might change and acknowledge the mistreatment, following the act of revenge, but it would be incorrect to assume that this is what motivates or even justifies revenge. Revenge is a solitary song and it seeks to return the subjectively felt sense of mistreatment and injustice to its source. But more importantly it seeks to communicate to the offender: How dare you!

A relatively recent study explores whether the assassination of Osama Bin Laden in 2011 led to an enjoyment in revenge for members of the American in-group, aggrieved by the events of 9/11. The results find that “those who harboured vengeful desires in 2003 were more likely to feel a sense of justice after his death, those who were highest in their needs for vengeance indicated that they still “wanted more.” The team of social psychologists conclude that, “victims want revenge for the sake of delivering a message and taking revenge can bring justice on one hand, but also elicit more “blood lust” on the other.”361 This is an interesting finding. As one might be lead to believe, the act of revenge and obtained justice should lead to a reduction in revenge impulses; however, in some cases, the result seems to be the exact opposite. Even when both hypotheses are met, i.e. the offender group suffers and is informed why they suffer, the blood lust continues.

Salted Earth Hypothesis

In the plays of Ancient Greece, revenge is a social taboo because it violates nomos. Even if the revenge act is in response to an initial injustice, those engaged in nomos-voiding behaviour are deemed to be polluted and exorcised from society. This social death in many ways mimics actual death. Woodbridge’s study of 16th and 17th century English Revenge Dramas makes a similar claim; revenge is always tantamount to death. The avenger only rests if the target is killed, or in a state of persistent misery and humiliation. The ancient practice of spreading salt over defeated cities symbolized a curse on its re-inhabitation. These cities were destined to remain barren and the inhabitants forced to find a new home. This ancient practice is precisely the ill will captured in revenge, and is rumoured to have befallen the city of

Carthage following the Third Punic War, although this account is now largely contested.\textsuperscript{362} The desire to reduce the victim to a sense of permanent suffering is still found today, and explains how revenge aims to leave a permanent mark on the victim.

By way of an example of such \textit{salted earth} revenge: after the defeat of Nazi Germany, the Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau believed that Germany should be levelled to pastureland and that Germans should toil away with nothing but their bare hands for the next 50 years.\textsuperscript{363} Equally, General Curtis LeMay wished to bomb Cuba back to the Stone Age after the Bay of Pigs fiasco.\textsuperscript{364} And more recently, the conservative Commentator P.J. Rourke captured the American line on Iraq: “Iraq is a mess, but it’s a mess with a message: Don’t mess with us!”\textsuperscript{365} Rather than provide a cul-de-sac, this insight shifts the investigation towards the existential nature of revenge. By leaving the offender with a permanent mark, the avenger mimetically returns the same felt sense of permanence. This is so, because the experience of the injustice, by virtue of its crass nature, has gained a permanent place in the narrative of the group; more than an unforgivable crime, it is an \textit{unforgettable} one.

The \textit{Comparative Suffering and Understanding Hypothesis} all veer dangerously close to retribution, a point that needs to be addressed. The middle path, that the offender must suffer and understand why he suffers, is equally represented in \textit{moral attitude} justice and retribution - of course there are limits on how much suffering can be tolerated. Revenge, either because of its excessiveness or because of the way it righteously instrumentalizes the target, allows for unlimited suffering. However, extreme suffering alone is a poor definition of revenge because it fails to illuminate the rich mimetic dimension of the subjective justice. The most salient objective found in revenge is its desire to leave the victim with a permanent mark: a piece of incontrovertible evidence that the avenger holds the target in total moral disregard and is committed to the \textit{objective attitude}. Revenge, it must be argued, seeks to impose a temporal arrest on the relationship between avenger and target.

\textsuperscript{363} Henry Morgenthau, \textit{Germany Is Our Problem} (Harper & brothers,, 1945).
\textsuperscript{364} Warren Kozak, \textit{LeMay: The Life and Wars of General Curtis LeMay} (Regnery Publishing, 2011).
Nietzsche and the temporal nature of Revenge

For Plato, vengeance ‘is senseless and bestial because it looks backward to strike at a past deed’. Francis Bacon argues that revenge is foolish, because it amounts to ‘labour in past matters’, and Woodbridge concludes from her literary explorations that revenge is “dedicated to restoring the past; it aims to de-create a former tainted deed.”

Nietzsche’s take on revenge brings this to a point. In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* he writes:

“It was”: that is what the will’s teeth-gnashing and most lonely affliction is called. Powerless against that which has been done, the will is an angry spectator of all things past. The will cannot will backwards; that it cannot break time and time’s desire – that is the will’s most lonely affliction (...) This, yes, this alone is revenge itself: the will’s antipathy towards time and time’s ‘it was.’

The real essence of revenge then is the inability to change the flow of time, and redress the actual act of injustice. In the now, the injustice is forever stowed away, blocked from redress by a wall of impenetrable temporality but bleeding into the present through memory. Revenge aims to stop the bleeding. But if the injustice is, as Nietzsche argues, forever stowed away in memory, revenge attempts to do the next best thing by eradicating the strongest connection the injustice has to the present, namely the offender. This explains why revenge as a literary plot usually ends with either the avenger or the offender dead, encapsulated by the saying that those who seek revenge must ‘dig two graves’. The connection between revenge and death is especially borne out by Seaford’s analysis of Achilles’ “liminality to death”. The exchange in revenge, in its purest form, amounts to a rebirth through the death of the offender, a point not unlike Fanon’s emancipatory violence. In order to remove the desire for revenge, the initial injustice must be removed; however, the next best thing is to kill off the offender in an attempt to remove the permanent mark, kept alive and resonant in the form of a *flash bulb* memory of the experienced injustice.

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366 Woodbridge, *English Revenge Drama*. p. 51
In Herman Melville’s classic tale, *Moby Dick*, Captain Ahab swears revenge on the White Whale. The tale ends with Ahab plunging at the White Whale in desperation, but not before Melville delivers one of the finest sermons of bristling vengeance in Western literature:

"All that most maddens and torments; all that stirs up the lees of things; all truth with malice in it; all that cracks the sinews and cakes the brain; all the subtle demonisms of life and thought; all evil, to crazy Ahab, were visibly personified, and made practically assailable in Moby Dick. He piled upon the whale’s white hump the sum of all the general rage and hate felt by his whole race from Adam down; and then, as if his chest had been a mortar, he burst his hot heart’s shell upon it."369

Ahab is forever linked to the White Whale for having left him with a pegged leg. Ahab’s monomania consumes his life, leaving him with nothing but his vengeance. It is no surprise that Ahab dies in his attempt to kill the Whale; *Moby Dick* is a force of nature. The white Whale comes to symbolize Ahab’s madness and towering aspirations. But Melville obviously also believes that a life dedicated to revenge can never lead to peace and happiness. Jean Amery, the French Existentialist, brings this to a point when he writes how vengeance “nails everyone one of us into the cross that is his ruined past (...) it blocks the exit to the genuine human condition, the future.”370 Yet with every thump of his wooden leg, Ahab is bitterly reminded of the injustice done to him.

Melville anchored Ahab’s injustice in a discernable physiological marker, thus making the memory ever-present. Political Scientists speak of *schemas of hatred*: scripts and knowledge structures that allow injustices to be culturally embedded and survive the passage of time. Vamik Volkan coined the term “chosen traumas” and explains, “Chosen traumas bring with them powerful experiences of loss and feelings of humiliation, vengeance, and hatred that trigger a variety of unconscious defence mechanisms that attempt to reverse those experiences and feelings.”371 These past injustices are constitutive of the present-based identity, but at great cost. In accordance with Amery’s intuition, time itself becomes warped in places. Ignatieff explains how he entered a realm of “pure memory” on his visit to the Balkans:

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370 Amery, *At the Mind’s Limits*, p. 68.
371 Volkan, *Bloodlines*. p. 82
“What seems apparent in the former Yugoslavia is that the past continues to torment because it is not the past. These places are not living in a serial order to time but in a simultaneous one, in which the past and present are continuous, agglutinated mass of fantasies, distortions, myths, and lies. Reporters in the Balkan wars often observed that when they were told atrocity stories they were occasionally uncertain whether these stories had occurred yesterday or in 1914, or 1841, or 1441.”

Unfortunately, the point about “chosen traumas” is that these episodes are politically useful for elites. Current hardship is much more easily ascribed to evildoers, than to actual causes, which might lead to a loss of power for corrupt and inept leaders. But at the same time, the past injustice remains unresolved, because the current revenge act cannot turn back time and remove the act of injustice engrained in the cultural narrative of a people. Scholars already acknowledge schemas of hatred as a type displacement. However, according to Nietzsche’s intervention, all acts of revenge are a type of displacement, because they are fed by the emotional unpleasantness of a memory that cannot be erased. Such memories feed rage and a desire for revenge because the victim allows her experience to still undermine her sense of worth, even now.

Returning to Euripides and Aeschylus and their grim view on revenge, Nietzsche’s intervention is encapsulating. Euripides argues for the human motivations in revenge, but in line with the overarching moral narrative; once a subject engages in revenge, they are polluted and no longer valuable to society. Aeschylus makes the same diagnosis but attempts to salvage the situation by sacrificing the human motivations and, indeed, claims to personal justice, which Euripides holds so dear. But in both cases the revenge act is the final arbiter: once nomos is breached, pollution ensues. Nietzsche’s intervention is a step ahead. It is not the breach of nomos that pollutes, but the suffering of injustice. In Chapter 1 on *Rage in Ancient Greece*, this was established as the victim-focussed view of pollution; however, due to the order-centric solution to pollution, this victim-orientated view is in the minority. Nietzsche, then, leads the resurgence in its validity. Once a grave injustice is experienced, rage is a foregone conclusion; but critically not even the action tendency of punishment and

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372 Ignatieff quoted in Minow, *Between Vengeance and Forgiveness*. P. 14
revenge can undo the past. Hence, those who commit revenge and eradicate the offender are polluted just as much as those who fail to commit revenge. The objective attitude persists either way; subjects are beholden to their memory. Nietzsche calls such pre-occupation with the past Ressentiment; it is marked by an inability to move on. Salted Earth might aid the process of moving on by destroying the offender or leaving a permanent mark, but ultimately it depends on how the subject or group deals with the memory of the injustice. Schemas of hatred are proof that once an injustice is assimilated into the collective narrative, it never fades.

**Displaced Revenge**

Nietzsche’s intervention invariably puts a damper on the idea that revenge can offer resolution. If Nietzsche is correct then we must conclude that any act of revenge is fundamentally an act of displacement, because the past cannot be undone; even if we argue for group entitativity bridging time and generations. However, this has not stopped groups from engaging in revenge. I want to explore two types of revenge displacements that look similar at first glance but ultimately utilize different mandates. In Chapter 3, I explored the difference between dehumanization and demonization. The first mandate is argued to co-exist with guilt and belies a firm connection between aggression and a suffered injustice; the second mandate is more robust and expresses a causal connection between suffered injustice and violence. These two mandates can be accommodated within differing revenge strategies. For this, I want to stress the differences between two models of Displaced Revenge: Scapegoating and Triggered Displaced Aggression. I wish to align these models with the overall point raised by social psychologists that rage can turn from righteous to illegitimate. But importantly, it can be argued that illegitimacy registers internally within the morality of the subject, and not through some external judgement.

Aristotle believes that, “pleasure follows all experience of anger from the hope of getting retaliation.” The key, according to Aristotle, is to be “angry at the right things and with the right people.” Scapegoats are the wrong people for the right thing. The concept of

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scapegoating finds its greatest proponent in the works of French Anthropologist Rene Girard, who in turn bases his analysis on the myth of Agamemnon, which forms part of the *Oresteia*. The use of scapegoats, it will be argued, serves a social function that belies any culpability for a suffered mistreatment; this will be related back to the point that scapegoats are usually dehumanized, because even the morality of the avenger cannot justify the mistreatment. *Triggered Displaced Aggression*, a concept found in social psychology, however, does not, and will be shown to function like revenge, by referring to an unrelated but still felt injustice.

In the *Oresteia*, Agamemnon is confronted by the terrible prospect of either not returning home or sacrificing his daughter Iphigenia to appease the goddess Artemis. The reason for this is that Agamemnon’s soldiers foolishly killed some of Artemis’ deer without proper sacrificial ritual, and now Agamemnon is asked to undo the damage by sacrificing his daughter “like a goat.” Agamemnon accepts this and, as implied by the ritual, Iphigenia is entirely dehumanized, and her pleas are totally ignored. Girard refers to this phenomenon as *sacrificial semblance*. In order to avoid cycles of revenge, Girard explains that subjects sever the blood links between victims and murderers. He writes,

“So by killing, not the murderer himself, but someone close to him, an act of perfect reciprocity is avoided and the necessity for revenge by-passed. If the counter violence were inflicted on the aggressor himself, it would by this very act participate in, and become indistinguishable from, the original act of violence. In short it would become an act of pure vengeance, requiring yet another act of vengeance and transforming itself into the very thing it was designed to prevent.”

Scapegoating serves some overall social function, but equally turns the scapegoated victim into a non-human. There are obviously two different kinds of relationships operating here: the relationship between offender and offended, and the relationship between offender/offended and scapegoat. The first relationship, describing the relation between offenders and offended, no longer relates to a proper study of revenge because there is obviously a moral attitude at work here. There is a desire to maintain the social bonds and sense of community, thus necessitating the need for a scapegoat on whom to unload the strife. The key to the success of

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sacrificial semblance is that Agamemnon acts as the author of his own punishment, thus voiding any possibility of excess or undue harm.

The very fact that Artemis accepts the sacrifice tells us that she is more interested in order than in revenge. In other words, the validity of the order, or nomos, is never questioned. Agamemnon also indicates his willingness to remain part of the ruling order by accepting his punishment. Aeschylus, of course, uses the device of the sacrifice to set up his tragedy, which culminates in the trial of Agamemnon’s son Orestes and the domestication of the Erinyes. Girard does not mention that Agamemnon’s sacrificial semblance can only temporarily arrest his own demise. Aeschylus’ deterministic view of revenge means that once an injustice is committed the Erinyes do not fail. However, this should be considered a literary point rather than a critique of Girard’s mechanism.

Concerning the fate of Iphigenia, she is entirely dehumanized and treated like the object she resembles: a goat. Her function is to purge the strife experienced by Artemis and Agamemnon and repair their communal bonds. She is entirely unrelated to the initial crime and this, I believe, is borne out in the need to dehumanize her. Her innocence demands some form of psychological shielding, because Agamemnon would be unable to tolerate the guilt of sacrificing a human being, let alone his own daughter. Agamemnon’s wife of course, unencumbered by Agamemnon’s debt to Artemis, views the scapegoating as the inherent injustice and crime that it is; the same crime that Agamemnon tries to ignore.

In modern times, scapegoating occurs especially when there is no clear culprit at work. Staub argues that groups engaging in systematic violence operate a “psychology of hard times” and are desperate to understand the reason for their suffering and hold someone responsible. Events like socio-economic upheaval, natural disasters or cultural displacement, according to TMT and MST, lead to ontological insecurity, punitiveness and extreme othering. Political elites offer pragmatic solutions for deep-seated structural problems or naturally occurring disasters, and often this involves punishing and blaming scapegoats, who usually come in the form of socially disenfranchised targets such as immigrants and minorities. Like Iphigenia, these targets are dehumanized and utilized for communal purposes. However, the objective attitude at work does not come from an appraisal that the “hard times” are directly caused by

379 Staub, “Moral Exclusion, Personal Goal Theory, and Extreme Destructiveness.”
the scapegoat. The in-group has no claim to some intentional mistreatment, otherwise the target group could be demonized rather than dehumanized; they would be targeted for their evil intentions, and their malicious character, rather than discarded for their alleged inability to be civilized and their lack of “human” qualities. It would be an issue of justice rather than aesthetics.

The alternative, known in social psychology as Triggered Displaced Aggression, differs most notably because it still maintains a strong causal connection between the victim and injustice, even if the connection is inflated. Here some “minor transgression” acts as primer and allows groups to align the “hard times” with an unrelated mistreatment. Social psychologists Schütte and Kessler explain,

“Triggered Displaced Aggression is conceptualized to result when the aggressor, prior to the interaction with the aggression target, experienced a provocation that precluded an aggressive response. The aggressive response is displaced in the sense that it is not directed toward the original source of the provocation that instigated an aggressive behavioural tendency in the first place. The aggressive response is triggered in the sense that it is not invariably directed towards any target (as displaced aggression) but only towards such a target that subsequently provides a minor provocation. Triggered displaced aggression hence denotes a disproportionately aggressive response towards a target that committed a minor transgression.”

Again, the “hard times” are technically unrelated, but rather than dehumanize the target, the target is demonized for committing a minor transgression. In John Dollard and Neal Miller’s original example a businessman returns home after a hard day at the office; the businessman is stressed and agitated because his clients have voiced frustration over his performance to his boss. Once at home, his dog is happy to see him and greets him. The businessman, however, reacts violently and kicks the dog away because he is messing up his suit. The disproportionately violent response at a mildly irritating occurrence at best, is explained by the preceding and far greater provocation that acts as an emotional primer. The businessman, unable to act against the original source of his anger, unloads the entire

382 Dollard et al., *Frustration and Aggression*. 
frustration onto the source of a minor nuisance. However, the point is that the businessman justifies the kick because the dog has sullied his suit; the dog has authored a mistreatment and deserves punishment. To unpack this mechanism and make it more relevant to political science, two accounts of the immediate aftermath of World War II explain how violence was redirected towards women for the sole reason that they had fraternized with the enemy soldiers. Their treatment corresponds to a Triggered Displaced Aggression.

In Lottman’s book on post-Vichy France, *The People’s Anger*, he describes how immediately following the German surrender, the French people began murdering “in the spirit of battlefield justice.” However, instead of attacking Germans, who were retreating or under military observation, they targeted the next best thing. According to Lottman, the people’s anger was directed at French collaborators of the Nazi occupation, specifically women. “Some women appeared well fed, well dressed, flaunting and occasionally boasting of their liaison with occupation soldiers or privileged collaborators”, writes Lottman. “When liberation came, revenge was on the cards.” What followed was cruel and sadistic treatment of women, sought as proxies for Germans. One witness describes an incident when a woman was directly forced to answer for German crimes: “Her hair is sheared of all the same; she is stripped naked and forced to run to the pedestal which supported the statue of the first duke Decazes, a statue which the Germans removed to melt down the bronze. She is raised to the duke’s place, to be jeered by assembled townspeople.” The policy of shearing women’s heads was also prevalent in occupied Germany at roughly the same time; however, it was orchestrated by surviving SS fringe groups, threatening and punishing women for fraternizing with American GIs. In both cases qualified targets were used to satisfy the demand for revenge, because the real target was impossible to reach. However, the point is that these targets were demonized, they were all seen evil and at fault for what they had done; they were held responsible for the suffering they represented. Their punishment was believed to be just and the avengers suffered no sense of guilt.

In schemas of hatred, group members are directly responsible for mistreatments and injustices committed many centuries earlier, and they are sought out directly as a form of displacement

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384 Ibid., 67.
385 Ibid., 68.
in “hard times”. Their “minor transgression” is borne out of their group membership. In social psychology this phenomenon is referred to as group entitativity.\textsuperscript{387} However, although they are technically unrelated to the “hard times,” these groups are not dehumanized but demonized. Somehow the ancient injustice has a direct impact on in-group perceptions of their current hardship. The displacement is morally justified on the grounds of this old memory, which still influences the moral relationship between in-group and out-group today. The memory of the unresolved injustice and the current “hard times” becomes linked.\textsuperscript{388} The ability to demonize these groups, rather than dehumanize them, suggests that some righteousness is still being felt. The true nature of revenge, as Nietzsche understood it, is that it forces actors to relive their past, even if their current frustration is caused by other factors; they frame the suffering through this prism. It follows that the objective attitude cannot be resolved through revenge and aggression, because the foundation of the attitude remains the injustice, which is encased in the cultural narrative of the group. As long as the injustice and suffered mistreatment is kept alive through memory, the desire for revenge continues. The key is then to avoid any type of mistreatment and suffering that might make this specific memory relevant once more and rehabilitate the objective attitude, which is difficult seeing that natural disasters, such as droughts, floods or economic shocks, may always occur.

Returning to the basic difference between scapegoating and Triggered Displaced Aggression, and ignoring the added complexity of “hard times,” Triggered Displaced Aggression differs because the target is directly aligned with the suffered injustice and becomes as culpable as the actual offender. This is the key difference to scapegoating, where the target remains unrelated to the injustice. These different revenge strategies correspond directly to whether the group practices dehumanization or demonization. Only the latter corresponds to righteous rage, even if outsiders judge that the punishment is irrational. This, however, is as irrelevant to the avenger as the Nietzschean warning that no act of revenge can ultimately succeed in undoing the past. The only silver lining is that even within the extreme morality of revenge, it can be argued that the group differentiates between righteous and illegitimate. The need to dehumanize the target suggests that the avenger’s morality registers an abnormality (guilt), which in turn provides a strong mandate for outsiders to intervene and aid the group in confronting the pushback of compassion and moral regard towards the victim. Intervening in demonization, however, will not result in anything constructive, as the mandate is ironclad.

\textsuperscript{387} Lickel et al., “Varieties of Groups and the Perception of Group Entitativity.”
\textsuperscript{388} For various descriptions of this, see Staub, The Roots of Evil; Kaufman, Modern Hatreds; Volkan, Bloodlines; Petersen, Understanding Ethnic Violence.
Groups might even align intervening outsiders with the demonized out-group, because any action designed to prevent revenge will invariably entrench the sense of injustice.

**Conclusion**

After a state visit to Finland in 2005, the Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, insulted Finnish cuisine and joked that all he was given to eat was reindeer meat. Three years later, Finland won first prize at *America's Plate International Pizza Contest* in New York, beating Italy to second place. The name of the winning pizza was “Pizza Berlusconi” and the key topping was smoked reindeer meat.\(^{389}\) This describes a mild case of retribution. The Finnish response returned the insult in a greater and more elaborate manner, in accordance with what they deemed just; the Finns could have simply insulted Italian cuisine in return, but instead they opted to humiliate Italy. However, this incident failed to spiral into an international emergency so it is safe to assume that the *moral attitude* was not lost in all of this.

Löwenheim and Heimann argue in their piece that revenge is first and foremost described by the emotional satisfaction of seeing the offender suffer. However, following insights from the field of neuroscience, emotional satisfaction cannot be seen as being salient if it is equally present in retribution or any other type of obtained justice. Following Nozick and Nussbaum, in this chapter revenge has been described as stemming from a private sense of injury that gives rise to a “solitary song,” the so-called *Nomos of Revenge*. In the *Nomos of Revenge* the offender is considered with Strawson’s *objective attitude*, meaning that the offender has no moral rights and can be readily instrumentalized. This helps explain why punishment in revenge is so excessive and believed to be limitless. Nussbaum challenges the notion of limitlessness, however, and provides a subjectively informed idea of revenge being mimetic, in the sense of returning the symbolic meaning of the crime in the revenge act. This is beautifully illustrated by Hecuba’s decision to blind Polymester in order to explicate the fact that he has always been blind to the laws of nomos.

Following the insights from social psychology on how avengers obtain justice in revenge, known as the *Understanding Hypothesis* and *Comparative Suffering Hypothesis*, the issue of satisfaction was problematized. The most recent study on the assassination of Bin Laden has suggested that revenge could lead to even greater bloodlust rather than a diminution.

Following the plot lines in revenge dramas, the offender - or the avenger - ends up dead or permanently maimed and humiliated; either through exile or murder. Death is the only way a good revenge story can find a satisfactory ending, not only for the cheering audience but also for the protagonist. The idea that offender and avenger can share the world without somehow resolving injustice is tasteless and perverse. Nietzsche’s understanding of revenge questioned this, however, echoing the problematic findings on the assassination of Bin Laden, by arguing that revenge is motivated by a monomaniacal focus on the past. Following from this, acts of revenge try to de-create the past injustices, but ultimately fail because memory alone keeps them alive. Acts of revenge must then be described as doing the next best thing: they try to eliminate the living proof, by killing or exiling the offender. In this sense, the obtained justice of salted earth was found to explain how revenge seeks to leave the victim with a permanent mark, mimetically returning the permanent mark of injustice felt by the avenger. Revenge, in other words, does not seek resolution; it seeks to spread an arrested state of being.

The two modes of displaced revenge continued the debate in Chapter 3 on the differences in moral mandates. Dehumanization, which belies a connection between victim and injustice, gives rise to scapegoating, and echoes many of the concerns made by social psychologists on the existence of exonerating patterns in violence. Triggered Displaced Aggression similarly acts as a displacement; however, the mandate in operation is demonization because related mistreatments are inflated and somehow linked to the new mistreatment. It must be the case that there is still a sense of righteousness at work and that victims are demonized for their group membership, as postulated in schemas of hatred. Both revenge strategies rest on the fact that the actual source of mistreatment is out of reach, and provide a valuable insight into both the fluidity of rage as well as the futility of revenge. The next chapter will probe another strategy that is entirely predicated on powerlessness and an inability to engage even in displacement.
The last chapter ended with the assessment that the desire for revenge hinges on how the subject deals with the perceived injustice. Following Nietzsche’s urgent intervention, and supported by the alignment of numerous insights ranging from social psychology, literature and philosophy, revenge is doomed to fail because it aims to de-create the past, a feat that is virtually impossible. Revenge then aims to do the next best thing by targeting the closest connection between the present and the past injustice: the offender. Nietzsche stressed that revenge must always be a type of displacement because it is memory ultimately that keeps the injustice alive, not the offender. The inability to change the past becomes the source of all frustration and levels the playing field between the weak and the strong; even those who exact revenge need to confront the truth that the past cannot be erased, only reframed. However, it is probably true that a successful act of revenge aids the process – at least from what we gather in the literary explorations of revenge.

However, Nietzsche’s insistence on the temporal immutability of experienced injustices leads him to formulate a type of revenge that is predicated on the inability to move on and the inability to avenge. Nietzsche of course claims they are both the same, but it is probably fairer to argue that the inability to avenge confounds the inability to move on. Hence, Nietzsche’s revenge strategy, known as Ressentiment, attempts to gain revenge without forcing the subject to risk further injustice or humiliation. It is a revenge strategy that exists purely within the subjective valuation of the victim, and mirrors the moral certainty found in the Nomos of Revenge. The salient point, and indeed the reason why this is so important to understand, is that Ressentiment can exist within any given order without appearing to upset or sabotage this order through the use of violence. In many ways, Nietzsche’s Ressentiment continues the Euripidean enterprise of understanding revenge subjectivities, while extending the site of exploration deep into the realm of the imposed Aeschyan order. Nietzsche found a way to prove that inaction, in the aftermath of an experienced injustice, can lead to the blossoming of “subterranean” rage.
This opens up new avenues of exploration for key themes in International Relations scholarship, notably the problem of oppression and post-war settlements. The American psychologist and pioneer in the study of narcissistic rage, Heinz Kohut, believed that “in a situation where an overwhelming defeat had been absorbed, the presence of reasonable hope for a comeback and reversal means vengefulness is likely to be a normal psychological response.” Even as groups face overwhelming odds, the idea of revenge and justice is never dismissed, but simply stored away until an opportune moment arises. All groups share a sense of entitlement towards just treatment and moral recognition, and this means they should harbour punitive impulses regardless of their strategic situation.

**Suspended Revenge**

The American Anthropologist James C. Scott describes a type of rage suspension in his books *Weapons of the Weak* and his more theoretical *Domination and the Art of Resistance*. Scott argues that groups suffering from mistreatment and oppression but unable to rebel create independent cultural narratives and value systems, which survive hidden from the scrutiny of the colonizers, and are ready to take over once the colonial system shows its first cracks. Scott explains,

“The obstacles to resistance, which are many, are simply not attributable to the inability of subordinate groups to imagine a counterfactual social order. They do imagine both the reversal and negation of their domination, and, most important, they have acted on the values in desperation and on those rare occasions when the circumstances allowed”.  

Revenge is simply suspended until an opportune moment arises, and in some cases this can take decades. The rancour is then kept alive through cultural practices embedded in so-called hidden transcripts.

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Social psychologists refer to the *Aggression-Frustration Hypothesis* to explain how frustration can survive and even increase over time. According to Miller, rumination, which can be hypothesized to function in Scott’s hidden transcripts, increases:

“The average level of activation of an aggression-related thoughts, memories, and emotions more accessible. Without additional inputs, however, the network should return to baseline levels. If, instead, situational (or personality) factors make an individual more likely to continue thinking about the provocation, new surges that activate the network are likely to be generate. That is, each time a person thinks about or re-lives a provoking incident, a new activation spreads through the network making its components more accessible and subsequent aggressive action more likely.”\(^{393}\)

The initial injustice is thus continuously fed and kept alive until an *opportune moment* arises for rebellion. In the meantime hidden transcripts allow groups to vent and joke about their situation, making it bearable without losing the underlining emotional tension. In cases of severe mistreatment and oppression met with a conspicuous lack of violence and revolt, it is “more important to understand (...) the ordinary weapons of the relatively powerless groups, foot dragging, dissimulation, desertion, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage.”\(^{394}\) Because a full-blown act of vengeance is not possible, the rancour is expressed through these minor and often undetectable acts of rebellion.

The idea of a suspended revenge is extremely useful, because it takes the idea of powerlessness as its starting point. As long as groups feel powerless against their offenders or oppressors, they opt for ostensible conciliation and submission. It is only when the power hierarchies dissolve that revenge finally manifests itself.\(^{395}\) The same underlying issue of powerlessness also functions in both cases of *Displaced Revenge* described in Chapter 4. Here the ensuing out-group derogation, predicated on a minor transgression, provides an experience of obtained justice despite falsifying the source of the underlying frustration. So instead of waiting and biding their time a sensible scapegoat is chosen. Both mechanisms

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393 Miller et al., “A Theoretical Model of Triggered Displaced Aggression,” 82.
suggest that rage can become dislodged from the initial injustice and become fluid; they also suggest that semblances of defeat and submission belie the underlying rage and demands for revenge. Powerlessness, in other words, does not affect a group’s sense of entitlement towards justice and freedom from oppression.

The theory put forth in this chapter is Nietzsche’s *Ressentiment*. The concept takes the notion of powerlessness as its theoretical starting point. This gives it a similar foundation to *Displaced Revenge*; however, *Ressentiment* critically differs by denying the possibility of third party involvement. *Displaced Revenge* demands the availability of a scapegoat or some culprit to function; the strategy of *Ressentiment* does not. Consequently, *Ressentiment* is better equipped to explore the dynamics of sustained oppression and injustice prevalent in dyadic power structures. *Ressentiment* also makes claims on identity formation, which can help explain how the injured remain docile and avoid rebellion. Scott explicitly denies the existence of *Ressentiment* in the hidden transcripts. He explains by way of a footnote:

“The psychological dynamics of “Ressentiment” depend on the emotions having literally no possible outlet (…) In our case, it is the social site of the hidden transcripts that provides the opportunity for these emotions to take a collective, cultural form and be acted out.”[^396]

Scott argues that the ability to vent through foot-dragging and jokes frustrates the development of *Ressentiment*, which is fundamentally correct. But more interestingly, *Ressentiment* denies the possibility of a belated violent revenge, which Scott’s account presupposes; the revenge of the *weak* obtains justice through different means.

*Ressentiment* is peculiar because it allows for a sense of justice without recourse to violence and revolt. Therefore, violence only occurs once *Ressentiment* is resolved; however, for this to happen the ideational foundation of *Ressentiment* must dissolve first, which is defined by a falsification of strength predicated on transvaluation. What must follow then is a thorough investigation of the properties of *Ressentiment* with a special focus on the claims made for the identity formation of the victim in the aftermath of an injustice. *Ressentiment*, it will be argued, is better equipped to explain order and peace following massive defeat, without the need to resort to displaced aggression and, critically, ensuring that a sense group entitlement,

[^396]: Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, p. 38.
as postulated by *Optimal Distinction Theory*, remains intact. For these reasons we can frame *Ressentiment* as another rage strategy.

**Ressentiment as Displacement**

The term *Ressentiment* has gained increasing currency over the years, featuring in important works on nationalism, identity, electoral politics and social unrest, not to mention in the literature on values and ethics.\(^{397}\) The heir apparent to Nietzsche’s *Ressentiment* appears to be the German sociologist Max Scheler, who explored, and possibly even improved, the concept in his 1912 treatise *Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moral*. In much of the recent publications on *Ressentiment* in the political and social sciences, not Nietzsche but Scheler’s understanding of *Ressentiment* provides the sole theoretical basis, with the occasional Nietzsche quote thrown in for good measure. However, notwithstanding Scheler’s accomplishments, many more philosophers have grappled with the concept, highlighting and unpacking different aspects of the theory, leading to a large but still fragmented picture.

To date three major works exist on *Ressentiment*. Along with Max Scheler’s 1912 treatise, there is also the 1981 publication by the philosopher and historian of religion, Richard Ira Sugarman, titled *Rancor against time: The Phenomenology of Ressentiment*, as well as a long essay by the noted moral philosopher, and self-described recovering Nietzschean, Robert C. Solomon, published in an anthology by Richard Schacht in 1994, and titled *One Hundred Years of Ressentiment*. Lastly, there is also Bernard Reginster’s 1997 journal publication, entitled *Nietzsche on Ressentiment and Valuation*. These remain the key texts dealing with the pure theory of the *Ressentiment*, and avoid rushed application to historical or political case studies.

The problem with the political application of *Ressentiment* to real world scenarios is that most of the time the authors in fact mean resentment, and not *Ressentiment*. These two concepts are fundamentally very different, despite Robert C. Solomon’s curious and somewhat frustrating

assertion that they are not.\(398\) Ironically, Solomon attempted to rid philosophy of another superfluous and “flowery” term, but only succeeded in making *Ressentiment* the preferred choice for writers keen on having their prose sound more distinguished. Unfortunately, most of these writers indeed mean resentment and their use of the term *Ressentiment* is technically incorrect. I argue that with the help of these key publications, along with Reginster’s shorter contribution, the concept of *Ressentiment* may be fully unearthed, and returned to its correct usage.

In part the problem of misunderstanding can be traced to Scheler’s treatment of the concept, which, though not without merit, glosses over some important factors and arguably waters down the features of *Ressentiment* to resemble the mechanism of *Displaced Revenge*. In a passage from his 1912 treatise he writes:

> “Impulses of revenge lead to Ressentiment the more they change into actual vindictiveness, the more their direction shifts toward indeterminate groups of objects which need only share one common characteristic, and the less they are satisfied by vengeance taken on a specific object.”\(399\)

This passage reads as an endorsement of Girard’s mechanism. As with the malicious treatment of women accused of fraternizing with the enemy during the occupations of post-war Germany and Vichy France, Scheler argues that the repressed *impulse* for revenge develops into a more encompassing *lust* for revenge, which no longer discriminates and latches onto any object resembling the initial target. There is no mention here of Nietzsche’s characteristic *Spiritual Revenge*. Scheler simply argues that if the desired object of revenge is out of reach, after some time, the desire becomes so great that a substitute is sought. Again, this insight is not without merit, because it suggests that the moral debasement can be detached from the initial object and gain a “free-floating” characteristic, while also illustrating that the connection between the initial injustice and present-based revenge is false. However, Scheler’s treatment falls short by ignoring that *Ressentiment* can offer satisfaction without recourse to third parties. In another passage Scheler writes:


“When it is repressed, vindictiveness leads to Ressentiment, a process, which is intensified when the imagination of vengeance too, is repressed - and finally the very emotion of revenge itself.”

This is a more disciplined reading of Ressentiment and highlights what Nietzsche calls the “anaesthetic” property of Ressentiment. Sugarman in his treatment of the concept has taken Scheler’s description and expressed it in a flow chart, which he refers to as the “Hermeneutic Circle of Ressentiment” - a linear version would look like this:

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\text{Suffering (sadness, sorrow)} \rightarrow \text{Anger} \rightarrow \text{Desire for Revenge} \rightarrow \text{Rancor (desire for revenge blocked, postponed, and/or sublimated)} \rightarrow \text{Ressentiment (denial of desire for revenge and anger)} \rightarrow \text{Denial of injury}\]

Scheler’s mechanism, made highly accessible by Sugarman, highlights the creation of new values necessary to mute the initial sense of suffering. The denial of anger, caused by the inability to exact revenge, changes the direction of the affect. Satisfaction is gained by eliminating the need for it. But doing so requires an entirely new ontology with a new set of values and expectations – even identity. Nietzsche, however, has more to say on the construction of these values than Scheler does. While Scheler would argue that the new values are somehow founded in opposition to the initial suffering, which is correct, Nietzsche, as will be pointed out, offers a much more nuanced picture of the properties of the identity reconstruction formed under the duress of powerlessness. Nietzsche’s interpretation remains important because it explains the ability to obtain justice without denying one’s impulses and desires, i.e. entitlement, which Scheler’s account cannot rule out. The problem with Scheler’s interpretation is that it is not concerned with guaranteeing satisfaction but simply with muting the sense of suffering. The genius of Ressentiment, on the other hand, holds that it can offer satisfaction through the establishment and internalization of moral superiority. The denial of injury is not the same, and far less satisfying, than turning the injury into evidence of hidden greatness, which in turn can satisfy a group’s demand for esteem and distinction.

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400 Ibid. p. 8
401 Richard Ira Sugarman, Rancor against Time: The Phenomenology of Ressentiment (Humanities Press, 1979). p. 32
The Lambs and Birds of Prey

Nietzsche alludes to some of the components of *Ressentiment*, such as slave morality, in some of his other works; however, the most systematic and complete treatment is to be found in the *Genealogy of Morals*. Separated into three essays, this book sets out a psychological history of values and morality. The first essay, which is the focus of this chapter, talks about the creation of the basic polar valuation of “good and bad” and “good and evil.” Nietzsche insists here that such valuations have an emotional basis rather than some objective rational one, a point discussed in Chapter 3 and largely vindicated by research in neuroscience. The second essay sketches a theory on the creation of “guilt”, “memory” and “bad conscience” and highlights their relevance in the maintenance of social norms and civilization as a whole; a point that can be construed in itself as a damning critique of communal restraint and imposed order, echoing later works such as Freud’s classic *Civilization and its Discontents*. The last essay is aimed squarely at the Christian faith and describes how metaphysical systems of justice and truth, such as heaven and hell, are mere flights from reality and informed by a frustrated desire for revenge. For the purpose of understanding the mechanism of *Ressentiment* the first essay suffices.

Nietzsche utilizes two interesting illustrations. One is a fable about anthropomorphised animals enjoying different positions on the food chain; the other is a highly fictionalized account of the clash between the Jewish and Roman peoples, framed as a contest between the priestly and knightly caste, respectively. These two illustrations are not equal in insight, though. They both describe different aspects of the *Ressentiment* phenomenon; one needs to read one through the other in order to gain a full picture.

In Nietzsche’s first illustration the lambs are happily frolicking in the grass when suddenly a bird of prey comes swooping down and snatches one of the lambs and flies off. This happens many more times and the lambs fear a continued threat to their existence, but more importantly, a threat they are powerless to do anything against. Nietzsche writes:

“It is not surprising that the lambs should bear a grudge against the great birds of prey, but that is no reason for blaming the great birds of prey for taking the little

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lambs. And when the lambs say among themselves, "These birds of prey are evil, and he who least resembles a bird of prey, who is rather its opposite, a lamb — should he not be good?" Then there is nothing to carp with in this ideal's establishment, though the birds of prey may regard it a little mockingly, and maybe say to themselves, "We bear no grudge against them, these good lambs, we even love them: nothing is tastier than a tender lamb."\footnote{403}

Nietzsche offers a simple psychological analysis of the creation of a basic polar value system, and not based on an objective, external moral compass, but borne from a begrudging sense of powerlessness. The lambs are physiologically unable to neither avenge their comrades nor ward off future attacks. This desire for revenge, likely aimed at physical punishment first, is re-aimed on the level of values. Instead of harming the birds, the lambs target their right to existence, their way of life.

Initially, this is a similar devaluation to the one found in the moral mandate of demonization, paving the way for righteous rage; however, what happens next is different. The lambs derive from the devalued qualities of the birds what it is to be good and valuable. Consequently, everything the birds represent is evil, and everything they do not is good. The devaluation now enters the level of identity structures of the victim and transcends the simple devaluation found in demonization. As the lambs claim, “who least resembles a bird of prey, who is rather its opposite, a lamb – should he not be good?” The lambs think themselves good, not due to some inherent qualities they possess and celebrate, but simply because they are different from the birds, which now represent the baseline value of evil. In other words, the lambs believe themselves to be good not because of their wool or their hooves, but because they lack claws. Nietzsche writes mockingly in Thus Spoke Zarathustra:

“Of all evil I deem you capable: therefore I want the good from you. Verily, I have often laughed at the weaklings who thought themselves good because they had no claws.”\footnote{404}

\footnote{403 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic. By Way of Clarification and Supplement to My Last Book Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Douglas Smith (Oxford University Press, USA, 2009). 1; 13}

\footnote{404 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. R. J. Hollingdale, Reprint edition (Harmondsworth, England; New York: Penguin Classics, 1974). 2; 13}
Nietzsche criticizes this *slave morality* because the concept of good is not derived from an inherent sense of pride or accomplishment but from an opposition to what is evil, to what is deemed threatening. The repressed sense of revenge resurfaces and claims its satisfaction in a new permanent morality. The lambs might die at the hands of the birds but at least they are superior in nature and virtue. The notion of heaven and hell as final judgment beckons on the horizon here. The *Ressentiment* of the lambs allows for a revenge that exists entirely subjectively and seeks its satisfaction not through equalization of damage and suffering but by claiming *moral superiority* through a process of systematic revaluation and identity restructuring. The birds, incidentally, are never made aware of this, nor are they interviewed as to whether their intentions are indeed evil and malicious as envisioned by the lambs. Nietzsche offers a caustic remark when he lets the birds claim: "We bear no grudge against them, these good lambs, we even love them: nothing is tastier than a tender lamb." We must probably conclude that the birds have no reason to give any second thought to the plight of the lambs, in part because they stand for uncorrupted master morality, which Nietzsche took from his beloved Greeks, who often acted first and thought later. He describes such morality as the following in *Beyond Good and Evil*:

> “The noble type of man experiences itself as determining values; it does not need approval; it judges “what is harmful to me is harmful in itself”; it knows itself to be that which first accords honour to things; it is value-creating.”

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When we look at the other options the lambs might entertain, we could suggest that the devaluation becomes free-floating, along the lines of Scheler’s analysis, and moves away from the impossible target of the birds and latches onto something new. A type of *Displaced Revenge* is possible and so is a type of hidden transcript with a platform for venting; however, neither strategy resolves the actual injustice, leaving the subject still enraged.

The only viable option the lambs might entertain is to devalue the initial desire sabotaged by the birds - their desire to live. The lambs might become ascetic and devalue life entirely. Nietzsche opposes this, of course, because it is tantamount to Schopenhauer’s position, which Nietzsche dismisses as *negative nihilism*.406 The same imperative can also be found in the

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406 For a good discussion on the differences between Nietzsche and Schopenhauer see Collingwood, *The Idea of History*; Dienstag, *Dancing in Chains*. 

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Stoic’s call to empty all attachment of personal significance, a point Nussbaum correctly, and in line with Nietzsche’s philosophy, dismisses as self-negating and dehumanizing.\footnote{Nussbaum, \textit{Upheavals of Thought}.} Nietzsche is adamant that the desire to live remains uncorrupted in the lambs; the new edifice of values, albeit corrupted, honours and supports the desire to live. This is important because it translates into a continued and uncorrupted sense of entitlement. \textit{Ressentiment}, one must tentatively conclude, acts in service of a continued sense of worth and desire for recognition. Even the desire for revenge is afforded satisfaction through the creation of a sense of \textit{moral superiority}. The lambs are intrinsically \textit{better} than the birds. In many ways it seems difficult to argue that the lambs are not opting for the best possible strategy in light of their situation.

Nietzsche’s depiction of the fable is instrumental but obscures one important point. The lambs and birds are scaled differently on the ladder of power due to \textit{inherent physiological differences}. The characteristics of strong and weak appear settled, while the real point, as Robert Solomon argues, is that such qualities are always contingent.\footnote{Robert C. Solomon in Schacht, \textit{Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality}. p. 112} With such concrete determinants of power there is no way the lambs can ever avoid the use of \textit{Ressentiment}; for the sake of maximizing satisfaction and maintaining their sense of entitlement, a transvaluation of their virtues appears unavoidable. The disequilibrium created by differing physiological attributes demands an offset by disequilibrium of spiritual levels, finally leading to the competition of non-physical (moral) superiority versus physical superiority. The important point, though not advanced in the fable, is that any type of weakness is not physiologically determined but \textit{self-referential}. As Nietzsche writes, it is the “weak as weak” that begin the revolt; and the “weak suffer from themselves” he writes at another point.\footnote{Nietzsche, \textit{On the Genealogy of Morals}.}

The sense of weakness in the lambs is predicated on physiological inadequacy and then becomes fact. The lambs have no way to contest their weakness and thus \textit{Ressentiment} becomes a foregone conclusion. What is implicit here is that the victim \textit{accepts} this weakness and works around it. This point is easily missed because Nietzsche equates physiological strength with power and physiological weakness with powerlessness, while strength and weakness are highly contingent and only take root once the subject becomes convinced of their factual validity. In \textit{Suspended} and \textit{Displaced Revenge}, weakness is never seen as absolute, because it never is; violence always finds an outlet. Any sense of absolute weakness and defeat consequently must be self-imposed. Again, Nietzsche does not make this clear.
because in the fable nature appears as the final arbiter in proscribing strength and weakness in the world. Nietzsche’s second illustration makes this much clearer.

**The Priests and Knights**

In the second illustration, Nietzsche sketches a fictionalized account of a power struggle between a priestly and knightly caste of a bygone age. Each caste represents a virtuous archetype; the knights are warriors and strategists, while the priests are intellectuals and scholars. At first both castes share a precarious balance of power in their dominion over the commons. However, somewhere along the line, the knights utilize their strength against the priests, overpowering them and forcing them from rule. Consequently the priests are placed in a difficult position. They are torn between their desire to rule and their inability to compete against the physical power of the knights, without which, they believe, they cannot reclaim their coveted throne. What occurs is *Ressentiment*. Nietzsche explains:

> “When the oppressed, downtrodden, outraged exhort one another with the vengeful cunning of impotence: “let us be different from the evil, namely good! And he is good who does not outrage, who harms nobody, who does not attack, (...)” – this listened to calmly and without previous bias, really amounts to no more than: “we weak ones are, after all, weak; it would be good if we did nothing for which we are not strong enough”410

The priests refuse to contend with the physical power of the knights and aim their revenge precisely against these unobtainable virtues; all that is good about the knight is devalued and seen as oppositional to true virtue.

> “In opposing their enemies and conquerors they were ultimately satisfied with nothing less than a radical revaluation of their enemies’ values, that is to say, an act of the most spiritual revenge.”411

But in the process, the priests seem to do more. By devaluing the virtues of their enemies they also apparently devalue the desire to rule, because the knightly virtues are seen as qualifiers to rule in the first place. Briefly going back the fable of the lambs, this would be the same as

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410 Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*. 1; 13
411 Ibid. 1; 7
having the lambs devalue the birds of prey as well as their own desire to live, because the bird’s way of existence is seen as the only way to live, which the lambs, unable to imitate, are then forced to debase according to the logic of Ressentiment. This is not what happens though; the lambs continue to exercise their desire to live, and consequently the priests continue to exercise their desire to rule. According to Nietzsche, the priests simply change constituency:

“He has to defend his herd, but against whom? - Against the healthy people undoubtedly, but also against their envy of the healthy. He has to be the natural opponent and critic of all rough, stormy, unchecked, hard, violent predatory health and power. The priest is the first form of the more refined animal, which despises more easily than it hates. He will not be spared having to conduct wars with predatory animals, wars of cunning (of the spirit) rather than of force, as it is obvious.”

The priests do not abandon their desire to rule but proselytize new values that are oppositional to the evils of the knights. It is, however, unbelievably fortunate that the priests finds such a constituency. Nietzsche pays no attention to the possibility that the priests might have wandered the lands without ever finding anyone willing to submit to their rule. But unlike the lambs, there is a true critique to be levied against the priests, which explains Nietzsche overall derision of Ressentiment, and it has to do with his ideas on self-imposed weakness.

In their analysis of the phenomenon, writers have offered differing judgements on what it is exactly that Nietzsche dismisses about Ressentiment. Giles Deleuze in his book Nietzsche and Philosophy argues, “Ressentiment designates a type in which reactive forces prevail over active forces.” He argues that reaction (to a slight or any larger misfortune of any kind) needs to be acted out before it leaves “mnemonic traces” and becomes something “felt (senti).”

The man of Ressentiment then suffers from a misalignment of the will to act and the will to forget. Consequently the Priest, rather than acting out his anger, sulks and ruminates; he neither forgets nor acts. The choice besides Ressentiment is then to forget the injustice and move on. But Deleuze nonetheless makes it easy for himself; he ignores sustained attacks, as the ones suffered by the lambs, or sustained humiliation as the one suffered by the exiled

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412 Ibid. 3; 15
priest. For this to work one would need to substitute forgetting with ignoring; a single event can be forgotten but a reoccurrence can only be ignored - which is exactly what the lambs and priests attempt. But in order to do so, the salience of the event must be downplayed, which demands some fundamental transformation of the relationship between the event (or the object) and the subject, hence returning to a re-valuation. In many ways, this mechanism can be found to operate between Agamemnon and Artemis; they downplay the salience of injustice in favour of continued friendly relations and a reverence for order.

Deleuze’s take on the “will to forget”, however, is important, because he ties in elements from the *Abuse and Use of History* as well as some key tenets of Nietzsche’s own resolution of *Ressentiment* known as the *Doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence*. Both works argue heavily for the merits of, and indeed psychological need for, forgetting and reframing.\(^{414}\) However, forgetting and reframing are not the same, and so it is no surprise that Deleuze does not offer an origin for *Ressentiment*. It appears for him to be a pre-existing condition, much like the physiological one suffered by the lambs. Those who suffer from *Ressentiment* are weak because their faculty to forget is impaired, and because their faculty to forget is impaired they are weak. Although Nietzsche is a staunch advocate of the “will to forget,” his quarrel with *Ressentiment* remains a different one.

A more instructive view is offered by Solomon who judges that “what Nietzsche despises about resentment (sic) is not the emotion but its presupposition of impotence.”\(^{415}\) This stresses the question of whether weakness arises from any fixed physiological determinants or remains in fact self-referential and in some ways self-imposed. He goes on to say,

“Ressentiment(…) is based on an original perception of oneself, not (…) on any natural or socially objective criterion. And so too the weakness he so despises is neither the natural vulnerability of the lamb nor the social inferiority of the slave, but rather a kind of self-contempt – a refusal to acknowledge oneself.”\(^{416}\)


\(^{415}\) Robert C. Solomon – *Hundred Years of Ressentiment* in Schacht, *Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality*, p. 108

\(^{416}\) Ibid. p. 114
It cannot be a refusal to acknowledge one’s weakness because the entire construct of strong and weak is arbitrary. Solomon’s question on self-acknowledgment is interestingly reframed by Bernard Reginster and posed as a question of integrity. He develops his argument by first agreeing with Solomon on the arbitrariness of strength and weakness as fixed determinants,

“There is no reason to think that, in different circumstances, the feeling of impotence would not be created by intellectual, rather than physical, weakness (...) the salience of physical strengths and weakness is a purely contingent aspect of Nietzsche’s example.”

The priests refuse to acknowledge their own strengths and virtue as formidable but fall into the trap of Ressentiment where “the agent sees himself as irredeemably weak, instead of temporarily lacking the strength he customarily has.” Here lies the crux of Nietzsche’s pronouncements of the “weak as weak” or that “the weak suffer from themselves”. The ultimate failure of the priests is that they commit an implicit devaluation of their own virtues the moment they lose the throne; they are no longer committed to their own glorious archetype but look at the knights as a cause of their failure, and in doing so acknowledge their inadequacy and weakness by tragic comparison. Suddenly the injustice becomes fused into identity and committed to permanent memory, like Ahab’s pegged leg; the priests carry their injustice with them. Virtuous priests would bide their time and use their intellect to force the balance; they would wait for the right moment to exact their revenge and reclaim the throne. And here Reginster argues quite rightly that the priests lack integrity because they seek to rule not because of their own greatness, but because of their inherent opposition to the virtues of the knights. Reginster suggests that integrity is kept by:

“An internal critique, i.e. one that relies exclusively upon the perspective (and therefore the affects, needs, desires and beliefs which constitute it) of the agent who accepts those views.”

This is not something the priests can boast off, because increasingly their perspective is derived from the activity and characteristics of the knights. However, Reginster takes the issue of weakness further, which seems incorrect. Reginster believes that the priests not only

418 Ibid. p. 286
419 Ibid. p. 301
abandon the validity of their own archetype, but also their desire to rule, “As a last ditch effort to gain it.”\textsuperscript{420} The priests fool themselves into believing that only the knights are qualified to rule, and because all knightly virtues are evil, the throne is an expression of this evil. Consequently the priests abandon their desire to rule, and ultimately their will to power and offer us another source of character weakness in Ressentiment. I believe this is incorrect - after all, the priests express their desire to rule by shepherding the weak and sick. Their desire to rule remains intact, and by extension so does their sense of entitlement. This is extremely important to stress, because it maintains the connection between group entitlement towards things like integrity and esteem and Nietzsche’s mechanism. It simply changes the object of these group demands, i.e. esteem and integrity are expressed through different values or objects than before. For instance, instead of celebrating distinction through hegemonic standing, groups now celebrate distinction and esteem through opposition to hegemonic standing, and instead of celebrating integrity through material claims over territory, groups celebrate integrity through anti-material claims. The desire remains intact, the expression does not.

Moreover, the idea that the priests forfeit their desires conflicts with Nietzsche’s celebration of the ascetic will, when he claims that the priests are “among the greatest conserving and yes-creating forces of life.”\textsuperscript{421} In accordance with this view, Henry Staten in his book Nietzsche’s Voice writes:

“In his description of the ascetic priest as bear, tiger, and fox, Nietzsche admits the very power of a type of man his dogmatic typology classes as “weak” (…) the terms of Nietzsche’s descriptions suggest that whatever contempt Nietzsche might feel for weakness, it is certainly not in place here.”\textsuperscript{422}

The desire to rule is then not abandoned, as much as the lambs’ desire to live is not abandoned in the face of existential threat. The weakness is established solely by an abandonment of one’s own strength and virtue following a self-imposed view of absolute weakness. Once this self-imposed weakness takes hold in the mind of the victim, the apparent powerlessness appears almost as physiological fact and makes the strategy of Ressentiment favourable, as evidenced by the lambs. Nietzsche’s disgust then is not directed at the priestly will; their

\textsuperscript{420} Ibid. p. 291

\textsuperscript{421} Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals. 3, 13

desire to rule is intact and strong - something Nietzsche definitely admires. It is their self-referential weakness, their easy abandonment of their own qualities and virtues that causes him to judge them as weak. And when they finally rule again they do so, not as strong and virtuous types but as reactive types with their true qualities forgotten.

What does this say about the spiritual revenge? For one, revenge is not abandoned; the desire exists and in some cases grows stronger, but what is salient is that the victims of Ressentiment will not think themselves able to exact physical revenge, or at least compete on equal terms. There is a self-imposed censorship that cannot be undone and furthermore becomes internalized through new values and identity structures. Consequently the satisfaction gained from revenge is established primarily on a moral level. The claim of moral superiority, which comes with the judgements of good and evil, allows for a satisfaction, which is purely subjective and does not demand the visibility of the suffering and damage of the assailant. This makes the perceived legitimacy of accepted order, evidenced by a lack of rebellion or violence, as problematic as in Scott’s account. However, contrary to Scott, the logic of Ressentiment, brought to its conclusion, suggests that once the lambs are in possession of claws or the priests in possession of physical strength, they will have no use for these attributes, as they are deemed morally repulsive, and thus worthless or even sacrilegious. However, critically, they will still pursue the same goals and desires but through an espousal and celebration of negation values, i.e. clawlessness and feebleness. In other words, those in possession of claws and strength are not directly targeted, but indirectly through an exclusion from the moral economy: a permanent objective attitude imbued with the same moral certainty necessary for violence and revenge but, critically, no longer related to a specific culprit or wrongdoer but to representative values and virtues.

**The Fox and the Sour Grapes**

There is another fable often brought up in discussions on Ressentiment. Aesop’s *Fox and the Sour Grapes* deals with similar themes of devaluation, desire and satisfaction, but makes an interesting point on the issue of reframing. In Aesop’s fable a cunning fox discovers a bundle of juicy grapes. After much effort he fails to secure the high hanging fruits and decides that they are in fact sour and hardly worth his time. In a version by Aphra Behn, an English dramatist and writer, published in 1687, one reads:

The fox who longed for grapes, beholds with pain
The tempting clusters were too high to gain.
Grieved in his heart he forced a careless smile,
And cried, ‘they’re sharp and hardly worth my while.

This appears a one-off face saving valuation to avert cognitive dissonance and maintain a sense of honour and pride in light of apparent failure. According to Deleuze, the clever fox should simply forget the incident and move on. Another version however, published in 1887 by Walter Crane, an English Artist and Book’s illustrator, reads:

This Fox has a longing for grapes:
He jumps, but the bunch still escapes.

So he goes away sour.
And, ’tis said, to this hour
Declares that he's no taste for grapes.

Here the devaluation appears permanent; rather than devalue these specific grapes, the fox devalues all grapes and commits to a new value system that denies the pleasure of grapes, operating as a veiled risk aversion strategy against further failure. It is interesting that the fox opts for such a different strategy. In this version, which is a true example of Ressentiment, the re-valuation is permanent, while in the former it is merely expedient.

The fable has earned considerable coverage in political philosophy. In his book Sour Grapes, Elster argues, “Sour grapes (devaluation) is a mechanism for dissonance reduction that operates on the preferences by which options are graded.”423 These preferences are (i) misperception of a situation, i.e. the fox could convince himself that he could die snatching these grapes (ii) mis-formation of preference, i.e. the grapes are sour and not worth his times anyway, and lastly (iii) character planning, i.e. the fox decides to go for another type of food, which is possibly healthier for him. Elster provides a clear utilitarian model of social choice here. All of these preferences comprise strategies to rationalize away failure by justifying a devaluation of the grapes and offering a legitimate reason to abandon their pursuit. Although Elster refers to this as a “subversion of rationality,” it in fact appears to be one of the finest examples of applied rationality, designed to protect the subject’s self-esteem.

In a more dismissive tone, the political philosopher Rüdiger Bittner argues against the possibility of successful devaluation because the ‘imagined revenge’ or ‘imagined sour grapes’ are not anchored in reality. About the priest he writes,

“As before, one of the two has to go - the compensation or the invention (...) they can imagine revenge and invent a story of how to sneak into heaven. But they cannot expect relief through the revenge they imagine, and they cannot expect happiness in the invented heaven.”

The fox, in other words, can imagine the grapes to be sour and compensate for his failure but he cannot at the same gain satisfaction from this flight from reality. Bittner’s treatment of Ressentiment is hostile to say the least. He defends the position “that to be happy and to figure in a story in which one is happy are two things.”

Granted, the devaluation is subjectively held and untested in a shared objective framework but still, there is no apparent reason to believe that the satisfaction gained from a sense of moral superiority is any less felt than the satisfaction gained from physical revenge. We have simply shifted the arena of competition. The fox averts an attack on his sense of self by making the grapes out to be sour; he is able to walk away with his head held high. The fact that an outside observer might laugh at the sight of such vain self-delusion is beside the point. Applying Bittner’s critique to the problem of in-group biases and moral mandates in violence would explicate the futility of his point.

However, there are some valid criticisms with the sour grapes devaluation, which must give pause before adding it to the roster of Ressentiment illustrations. The grapes, at first glance, appear to be the object of the fox’s desires - like the priests’ desire to rule, an expression of entitlement. When the fox devalues the grapes, he appears to be devaluing his desire. We know already that Ressentiment leaves the desire intact. In contrast, Reginster believes that the Priest devalues his desire and “condemns all the attitudes that help to secure and sustain it, namely the rule to rule. Arrogance, hatred, envy, revengefulness, and the like.”

Consequently, Reginster argues in his treatment of Aesop’s fable that should the fox do the

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424 Rüdiger Bittner, Ressentiment in Schacht, Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality. p. 132
425 Ibid. p. 130
426 Reginster, “Nietzsche on Ressentiment and Valuation.” p. 290
same, he would declare “not that the grapes are sour but rather that sweetness itself is evil.”

Reginster equates the virtues of the grapes with the virtues of the knights; both must be devalued and opposed. However, what new value system arises exactly from devaluation of sweetness?

Following Reginster’s logic all grapes that are not sweet but sour must be virtuous and desirable. But what about the sour grapes he cannot reach? And if sweetness is evil then why desire grapes in the first place? The defining attribute of the grapes is not sweet or sour but ultimately the question of obtainability. The clever fox maintains a sense of self-esteem that demands that all desirable grapes are obtainable to him. Therefore, all unobtainable grapes are devalued as undesirable, i.e. sour. And thus, contrary to Reginster, it is not sweetness that is evil but unobtainability, because it challenges the fox’s sense of standing and integrity. He desires the grapes as an expression and evidence of his own greatness and strength. Ressentiment allows him to entertain the notion that he did not fail at snatching the grapes; it allows him to entertain the notion that his standing remains intact. The grapes should be viewed as a vehicle for the realization of this identity component. The priestly fox simply devalues the vehicle and attributes a negative value in order to uphold his desire. In other words, he desires grapes as an expression of his ability to obtain them, and obtainable grapes will always be sweet. One can thus judge that the fable of The Fox and the Sour Grapes follows the logic of Ressentiment while applying a physiological cause of weakness to the fox, in a similar way to the other animal story. However, one must remain alert to the issue that the fox never really claims any moral superiority in his ordeal, he merely avoids injury, which is a problem encountered in Scheler’s appraisal of Ressentiment. Nonetheless, Sour Grapes Ressentiment can prove extremely useful. It is by far the most promising strategy to overcome a past injustice, exactly because the example avoids the use of an offender, and thus already pre-empts the problem of revenge by focusing instead directly on the framing of the injustice.

Before moving on to variances of Ressentiment and how political scientists and philosophers have approached the use of Ressentiment, these are the salient points of the previous discussion. Nietzsche’s mechanism relies on a series of movements. The first is a growing sense of inadequacy, despite a persistent sense of entitlement. This is the true source of Nietzsche’s quarrel with the victim of Ressentiment; the priest lacks belief in his naturally

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427 Ibid. p. 291
given abilities and assumes a defeatist position. Nietzsche maintains that feelings of inadequacy are always self-referential, even though some of his examples suggest that they may be physiological. Ressentiment then creates a new value system, where notions of good and desirable are created out of a negation of the virtues that represent the assailant or malefactor. These so-called negation values are not representative of the subject’s own ability or qualities but are based solely on the diametrical opposition to the assailant’s existence and way of life. The spiritual revenge is finalized when the subject gains a sense of satisfaction by celebrating a feeling of moral superiority vis-à-vis the assailant. The initial attack or action, engendering feelings of weakness and inadequacy, is then avenged in the mind of the victim, because the offender must forever suffer from his own wickedness. So even if the victims, the lambs and the priests, gain power, they will not be interested in exacting physical revenge – just as the Fox is no longer interested in even low-hanging grapes. Instead, Ressentiment creates a world where the moral devaluation of the offender is echoed in every decision taken. All morally good actions resonate with the moral certainty found in violent revenge. The justice comes from being unlike the offender and in fact morally superior. The evil virtues, values and practices of the offender, including the use of violence, are permanently chastised. As in the act of successful revenge, there is a temporal arrest, but in Ressentiment the avenger alone experiences this arrest.

**Variances of Ressentiment**

Moving out of pure theory, it is time to operationalize Ressentiment. There are roughly four interpretations or variances on Ressentiment to be found in the political and social sciences. Some of these are close to the interpretation outlined above, while others go as far as actively confusing Ressentiment with resentment or physical revenge. These variances are the following (i) ideational Ressentiment (ii) revolutionary Ressentiment (iii) nihilistic Ressentiment (iv) anaesthetic Ressentiment – the last one being the closest to the interpretation above and concerned entirely with satisfaction.

(i) Ideational Ressentiment is not primarily concerned with revenge; it takes its cue from an interpretation by Max Scheler and establishes Ressentiment as existential envy. He writes,

“Envy does not strengthen the acquisitive urge, it weakens it. It leads to Ressentiment when the coveted values are such as cannot be acquired and lie in
the sphere in which we compare ourselves to others (...) Therefore existential envy, which is directed against the other person’s very nature, is the strongest source of Ressentiment. It is as if it whispers continually: “I can forgive everything, but not that you are – that you are what you are – that I am not what you are – indeed that I am not you.”

If a subject cannot get something she desires, she might delude herself into thinking that the object of her desire is not worth having; and, more importantly, whoever does obtain the object, is tainted by it. This is covered in the debate on Aesop’s Fable. The clever fox dismisses the grapes because he cannot get to them. They are unobtainable and all unobtainable grapes are not worth pursuing and hence, they are sour. Now if the fox were to encounter another, more able fox, and witness him snatching those unobtainable grapes, he would very likely conclude, disparagingly, that this fox is odd for pursuing and enjoying sour grapes. The fox’s envy at the success of the other fox is repackaged in order to ward off realizations of lesser value and failure.

Existential envy has featured prominently in historical studies on nationalism and culture. The noted philosopher and historian of Ideas, Isaiah Berlin, believes that much of the German counter-enlightenment, pioneered by such writers as Herder, Schelling and Fichte, is a reaction to the failure of German culture to produce anything comparable to French and British high culture in the 17th and 18th century. The Counter-Enlightenment that would later give rise to German Romanticism took as its genealogical basis the accomplishments and beliefs of the French and British enlightenment and turned them upside down. Rationality gave way to Fichte’s Sentimentalism, Universalism to Herder’s Regionalism etc. In a similar vein, Leah Greenfeld, the nationalism scholar, believes that the concept of the Russian soul, featuring so prominently in the works of great Russian writers, such as Pushkin, Dostoyevsky and Tolstoy, is equally a reaction to the failure of not measuring up to Western success. Poignantly, she judges that the Russian Soul, with all its ostentatious mysticism and celebrated contradictions, “was a transvaluation of Western values, the creation of a new model, this time imaginary in every sense, and comforting, able to serve as a basis for

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428 Scheler, Ressentiment.
individual self-esteem.” The Slavophile movement of the 18th century championed the notion of Russian exceptionalism and vehemently opposed all cultural imports from Europe, fearing the spread of moral decadence and cultural rot allegedly befalling the continent.

Yet even this ideational antagonism, concludes Iver Neumann, was an “adaptation of ideas whose genesis was inextricably linked to the very same double revolution which the Slavophiles so heartily despised.” Their diametrical opposition to Western culture, in other words, was a continuation of the very Counter-Enlightenment Isaiah Berlin diagnosed in 17th century Germany. Ironically, despite the Slavophiles insistence on being wholly different to all of Europe, their philosophical similarity to Romantic thought stresses the point that ideational Ressentiment cannot escape the narrow confines of negation values. In this line of thinking, the success of the Enlightenment’s materialism inevitably gave rise to German and Russian idealism, because a full-frontal rejection of these unobtainable Western virtues remained the only thing available in order to guarantee much desired equality and esteem.

In more recent cases, ideational Ressentiment has been used to illustrate continued emotional opposition to certain groups. Again, there is no sense of satisfaction here, the envy is alive and the ensuing tension remains palpable. Wendy Brown in an article titled Wounded Attachments, published in 2004, argues that all political identity is established against the failure of measuring up to the idealized liberal archetype of the white, middle-class family-man propagated in film and literature. Brown explains,

“In its emergence as a protest against marginalization or subordination, politicized identity thus becomes attached to its own exclusion both because it is premised on this exclusion for its very existence as identity and because the formation of identity at the site of exclusion, as exclusion, augments or “alters the direction of suffering” entailed in subordination or marginalization by finding a site of blame for it.”

431 Hans Rogger, National Consciousness in Eighteenth Century Russia, Russian Research Center Studies; (Harvard University Press, 1960).
433 Brown, “Wounded Attachments.”
The very feeling of exclusion becomes an end in its self and the basis of a new identity. The inability to measure up to the ideal type of politicized identity engenders a sense of frustration and failure, which, anchored in an oppositional identity, finds expression in a resentment against the political ideal. Brown however, reintroduces revenge. She believes that ideational Ressentiment is “a will that makes not only a psychological but a political practice of revenge, a practice that reiterates the existence of an identity whose present past is one of insistently unredeemable injury.”434 The culprit is the idealized identity, inherently unobtainable. The clever fox is faced with a similar culprit in the form of unobtainable grapes; however, he gains satisfaction by devaluing them. In Brown’s example the same mechanism is at play, but she insists that the tension remains. The rage caused by the suffered injustice turns to a permanent rancour. One must conclude that the Ressentiment process is arrested; as indeed it should have been in the case of the priests, if they had been unable to find a new constituency. The priests luckily escape the fate of an ideational Ressentiment; they gain a new dominion over the commons, and so the suffered injustice loses its existential importance, despite still resonating in negation values.

(ii) Revolutionary Ressentiment takes the ideational antagonism further into violence and physical revenge. I have already argued that this is a grave misreading of Ressentiment. First of all, it ignores the fact that Ressentiment is a strategy of revenge; if complete, the satisfaction is equal to physical revenge, and thus rules out violence entirely. Secondly, revolutionary Ressentiment describes an anger that lashes out after years of rumination; strictly speaking, revolutionary Ressentiment is a clear and simple case of Suspended Revenge as described by Scott and his hidden transcripts. Max Scheler writes adamantly that “there will be no Ressentiment if he who thirsts for revenge really acts out and avenges himself, if he who is consumed by hatred harms his enemy, gives him a ‘piece of his mind’ or even merely vents his spleen in the presence of others.”435 There is no evidence of negation values or a permanent change in identity.

Still many writers argue otherwise. Meltzer and Musolf write “Ressentiment-related passivity may at times become a lengthy, dynamic, transitional stage between treatment defined as wrongful and retaliation or rectification.”436 At other times they collapse the difference

434 Ibid. p. 405
435 Scheler, Ressentiment.
between physical and spiritual revenge completely, “Ressentiment may issue in action when the conditions from which it derives become defined as mutable and feasible, that is, when corrective action is perceived to be practical.” However, Ressentiment is primarily concerned with the problem of absolute weakness. Hence, Ressentiment starts from the premise that the victim suffers from an absolute and self-imposed weakness, and so it makes no sense to claim that Ressentiment one day “may issue in action”. Musolf and Meltzer try to have it both ways.

The French historian Marc Ferro makes a similar claim, “in history, resentment has been the matrix of ideologies of protest, on the left and on the right. The frustrations that produce it – broken promises, disillusionment, and wounds – provoke an impotent anger that lends it substance.” Ressentiment supposedly is the stuff of revolutions. In a similar vein, Peter Sloterdijk provides the German version of Ferro’s analysis and claims that the Muslim World offers a refuge for all those plagued by Ressentiment against the West. Rather colourfully, he speaks of Rage Deposits that, once accumulated, offer enough currency for action. Other writers such as Greenfeld and Solomon also maintain that Ressentiment is actionable. Solomon writes, “if resentment has a desire, it is in its extreme form the total annihilation, prefaced by the utter humiliation, of its target.” Greenfeld writes in agreement: “Ressentiment not only makes a nation more aggressive, but represents an unusually powerful stimulant of national sentiment and collective action.” These views can probably be resolved by looking at the specific genealogy of the moral mandate; drumming up hatred and disgust at an offender, in order to demonize and legitimize violence and brutality might necessitate the same diametrical opposition found in Ressentiment’s negation values, but the genealogy is a different one. These groups target a specific offender, not a specific virtue. And of course those who favour action do not suffer from self-imposed weakness. Their inaction has different causes.

Revolutionary Ressentiment, in order to differ from Suspended Revenge, would need to continue the Ressentiment negation long after the violence has ended. Even after freedom from oppression is restored, a residual grudge and negation morality would still be in

437 Ibid. p. 251
440 Schacht, Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality.
existence. This goes back to Nietzsche’s critique of revenge as being past orientated. Revolutionary *Ressentiment*, in order to be theoretically consistent, would need to automatically be a form of displacement, because the initial injustice and self-imposed weakness are still felt and are still integral to the ideational foundation of the subject. But the problem is that *Ressentiment* targets a virtue and not an offender, so the prospect of a revolutionary *Ressentiment* aimed at a specific offender, who is responsible for the injustice, is problematic and should be regarded as a reading of *Suspended Revenge*.

(iii) *Nihilistic Ressentiment* is the most dangerous variant. It values nothing and subjects can easily be expected to bring down the temple over their heads. Greenfeld writes of post WWI Germany:

> “It fuelled and directed, rather than defined, nationalism defined by indigenous cultural tradition. It allowed goal-orientated expression of the aimless Romantic spirit. Blended with the Romantic Weltanschauung, Ressentiment focussed its passionate but diffuse bitterness and hatred of the world.”

Max Scheler writes warningly, “impulses lead to Ressentiment the more they change into actual vindictiveness, the more their direction shifts toward indeterminate groups of objects which need only share one common characteristic.” One can easily discern the motivations of a nuclear terrorist in these writings, but not one motivated by notions of an afterlife; rather a person who holds nothing dear and seeks revenge on the world for a terrible mistreatment. The sense of entitlement is still in operation but every form of expression is instantly devalued.

Nihilistic Ressentiment is the culmination of a long process, where no virtue is regarded as morally virtuous. Nowhere is this made clearer than in the prose of the Russian writer Fyodor Dostoyevsky. In his *Notes from the Underground*, he sketches the psychological profile of the quintessential *Man of Ressentiment*. What follows is a lengthy self-analysis undertaken by the protagonist, explaining his problem through the application of a telling analogy:

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442 Ibid.
443 Scheler, *Ressentiment*.
444 A Classic example of such a person is Ted Kaczynski
“And the point is that he looks on himself as a mouse of his own accord; nobody asks him to do so; that is the important thing. Let us now look at this mouse in action. Suppose, for example that it too has been insulted (and it will almost always be subjected to slights) and desires revenge. Perhaps even more fury will accumulate inside it than inside l’homme de la nature et de la verite. The nasty means little desire to pay back the offender, in his own count may gnaw more viciously inside it than inside l’homme de la nature et de le verite because l’homme de la nature et de la verite, which is innate stupidity, considers his revenge to be no more than justice, which the mouse, with its heightened awareness, denies that is any justice about it. At last comes the act itself, the revenge. The wretched mouse has by this time accumulated, in addition to the original nastiness, so many other nastinesses in the shape of questions and doubts, and so many other unresolved problems in addition to the original problem, that it has involuntarily collected round itself a fatal morass, a stinking bog, consisting of its own doubts and agitation (…) of course, nothing remains for it to do but shrug the whole thing off and creep shamefacedly into its hole with a smile of presented contempt in which it doesn’t even believe itself.”

Dostoyevsky’s *Man from the Underground* resents all and everybody. He cannot help himself; crippled by doubt and self-loathing, he sees ridicule and disrespect in very act. Yet he cannot act himself. He takes it, and funnels it into the “fatal morass (…) consisting of its own doubts and agitation.” Max Scheler writes of such psychological disposition that “if the desire for revenge remains permanently unsatisfied and the especially if the feeling of “being right” (…) is intensified into the idea of a “duty”, the individual may actually wither away and die.” Again, despite the dangerous notions inherent to *Nihilistic Ressentiment*, the crass vindictiveness is not a prelude to action but rather compensation for the lack thereof. As Dostoyevsky stresses, the *Man from the Underground* thinks himself a mouse, even though he is a very capable man – and not only capable but wholly superior in every way. But he cannot prove it, because he is unable to espouse any value or virtue for long, except for a perverted sense of *amour propre*. But even this is shown to be hollow. When Liza, the young prostitute, admits her unconditional love to him, he mockingly rejects her. The psychological profile

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446 Scheler, *Ressentiment*. p. 49
Dostoyevsky sketches for us is a sense of entitlement in constant flux; as it challenges and underminds every form of expression, it ultimately ends up rejecting everything and everyone – except itself.

(iv) Anaesthetic Ressentiment is the final variance, and the one most closely aligned with the original texts. To bring this out, we will not reiterate the points above; instead, we will take a different path. Perfectly functioning Ressentiment will look very much like Nietzsche’s high morality, meaning that the subject will be free from vindictiveness and speak with pride about her actions and values. The noble spirit, writes Nietzsche, “experiences itself as determining values; it does not need approval; it judges ‘what is harmful to me is harmful in itself.’ Successful Ressentiment must look very similar to this, because through the newly created sense of moral superiority, the psychology of Ressentiment “experiences itself as determining values” - at least it believes so. Max Scheler writes:

“Ressentiment man (...) feels ‘good’, ‘pure’ and ‘human’ – a least in the conscious layers of his mind. He is delivered from hatred from the tormenting desire of an impossible revenge, though deep down his poisoned sense of life and the true values may still shine though the illusionary ones.”

The real problem of Ressentiment is of course that subjects suffer from self-referential weakness and this problem is resolved by simply viewing the weakness as strength; yet a self-referential one nonetheless. The noted philosopher and Nietzsche translator Walter Kaufmann, who began the slow but gradual process of disenthralling Nietzsche’s philosophy from the grip of Fascist ideology, describes the man of Ressentiment thus:

“To be kindly when one is merely too weak and timid to act otherwise, to be humble when any other course would have unpleasant repercussions, and to be obliging when a less amicable gesture would provoke the master’s kick or switch – that is the slave’s morality, making a virtue of necessity.”

Ressentiment believes that those who do not use their claws are good, but in fact they only try to hide the fact that they have none. Nietzsche’s true nobility, however, believes that those

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447 Ibid.
who do not use their claws are good, despite the fact that they have their own. This noble morality demands no recourse to evil in this formulation. We remember how the lambs needed knowledge of evil before they could establish good, i.e. non-evil. Both Ressentiment and moral nobility end with the same moral dictum but the genealogy is widely different. One is designed to cover up a weakness; the other has no such weakness and is thus possibly motivated by a greater concern than simple self-preservation. The weakness in Ressentiment is introduced by focussing on something that is lacking; in an ideal world of only noble morality, the lambs would claim: All those with hooves are good, to which the birds reply: Aye, and equally all those with claws. In such an ideal world, the lambs, however, would deal with their fate differently.

We can illustrate the point by looking at a statement made by Mahatma Gandhi in 1947. Gandhi is, of course, known as the champion of peaceful resistance; his marches, hunger strikes and awareness campaigns are widely accredited with bringing down the colonial machine in India. Invariably portrayed as a saint of colonial protest for avoiding the use of violence and bloodshed, he is a noble figure and hailed for his progressive values and ideals. Unfortunately, a genealogical investigation illustrates that his higher ideals and values are borne from strategic limitation, coupled with an unwavering sense of entitlement. Gandhi did not avoid violence because he was strong; he did so because he believed he was weak:

“Had we adopted non-violence as the weapon of the strong, because we realized that it was more effective than any other weapon - in fact the mightiest force in the world - we would have made use of its full potency and not have discarded it as soon as the fight against the British was over or we were in a position to wield conventional weapons. But as I have already said, we adopted it out of our helplessness. If we had the atom bomb, we would have used it against the British.”

Gandhi confesses that his espousal of non-violence was reactive. He might very well believe that non-violence is the way forward; however, this was not taken for granted back then. As Nelson Mandela rightly states, “for me non-violence was not a moral principle but a strategy;
there is no moral goodness in using an ineffective weapon.” A noble espousal of non-violence would have admitted the availability of guns, armies and nuclear weapons and still opted for non-violence as the dominant tactic. To bring this to a close, anaesthetic Ressentiment works because it somehow manages to resolve the existential severity of initial injustice. Nietzsche’s priests, along with Gandhi, are fortunate in that their Ressentiment proves a successful tactic. Equally, German and Russian thinkers were fortunate that their rejection of British and French enlightenment philosophy gave birth to a fruitful philosophical tradition that became so much more than a simple anti-Enlightenment. These successes are in no way given to the formulation of negation values, and so ideational Ressentiment remains the most likely variant.

**Ressentiment as past-orientated Revenge**

Ressentiment and Scott’s hidden transcripts share much interesting overlap; both stem from an injustice, which is most easily approached through the notion of permanent oppression. Both strategies create problems for the idea that a lack of violence translates into acceptance of and submission to order and oppression. They both deny the possibility of scapegoating, because in both cases powerlessness and strategic ineptitude is defining. However, when the order breaks down and the offender loses his grip on power, Scott’s hidden transcripts lead to violence; the revenge act is simply suspended and the rage is kept alive through hidden cultural practices. Ressentiment is different. When things change, Ressentiment does not lead to violence and bloodshed as dictated by a desire for revenge; instead, Ressentiment does something far more damaging. Ressentiment already offers revenge by changing the ideational constitution of the victim; the offender is deemed morally repulsive and unworthy. The victim internalizes this moral stance and in turn claims a type of superiority that can afford satisfaction by allowing the belief that the offender leads a morally worthless life. However, in exchange for such satisfaction, the moral position is engrained. In other words, the objective attitude towards the offender is imbued with moral totality. What this means is that once the victim gains strength and power – and also before, of course - all their decisions, informed by negation values, express this subterranean rage. Compassion and moral regard are forever out of the question; so rather than seek revenge directly, Ressentiment actions punish the offender indirectly by always maintaining a moral disregard of actions or events that benefit the offender - a type of permanent Schadenfreude.

However, I believe that the tale of the *Fox and the Sour Grapes* provides another reading of *Ressentiment* that transcends the confines of Nietzsche’s *Ressentiment* theory and in fact echoes key tenants of Nietzsche’s other important theory known as *The Doctrine of The Eternal Recurrence of the Same*, which Nietzsche maintained to be the key to resolving “the will’s inability to will backwards.” The *Doctrine*, to paraphrase, demands that subjects constantly evaluate whether an event or incident should be deemed significant or insignificant for the purpose of the subject’s self-styled narrative. In this sense Nietzsche allows the will to actually will backwards, by censoring events according to whether they are deemed constitutive of identity, as self-defined by the subject, or are merely accidents, irrelevant in the grand scheme of things. Nietzsche’s take on identity must be described as extremely fluid. Acting becomes as important as forgetting. He makes the same claim in the *Use and Abuse of History*, when he argues that an inability to forget leads to “dyspepsia” and that nations must always maintain a critical stance towards their history, culling and rewriting the past as demanded by present circumstance. It is likely that Nietzsche would approve of the fox’s decision to move on and instantly devalue the grapes, which, because of their unobtainability, appear damaging to the fox’ self-styled narrative. But he would equally admonish the fox for not attempting to snatch other grapes, if grapes are truly what he desires. However, as argued earlier, the fox desires grapes as an expression of pride and self-esteem, which can be sought from other sources. However, the fox is not free from rage; he simply hides it better.

In Nietzsche’s two examples, *Ressentiment* is aimed at the values of the offender, i.e. the birds and priests, evidenced through the ideational foundation of the negation values. The fox, on the other hand, appears to have no offender, or so it seems. In order to move on and admit that the grapes are sour, the fox must at the same grapple with his initial decision to pursue these grapes, as well as his stubbornness to attempt to snatch them despite repeated failure. If the fox decides to devalue the grapes, he must also critically devalue his past decision to snatch them, as both elements are constitutive of each other. If snatching sour grapes is hardly worth the fox’s time, then his past self surely should not have wasted all this time engaged in such a futile endeavour. This leads to the inevitable conclusion that the fox must orchestrate a *Ressentiment* against the very decision, and constitutive values that led him to attempt to snatch unobtainable grapes in the first place. In other words, the fox’s success in disinvesting his injustice of emotional attachment relies on disinvesting himself from this episode. This then explains why the fox cannot snatch any other grapes; his new identity is based on the
negation of his former grape snatching self. This irony is not lost on Nietzsche, who of course chose a well-known Persian moralist to teach *The Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence* as amorality. But it equally suggests that the moral devaluation in *Ressentiment* can be self-contained and successfully avenge the injustice through self-directed moral derogation. This ultimately leads to a moral distancing towards the defining virtues and values of the past self, as it would in regular *Ressentiment* towards the defining virtues and values of the offender. The offender simply turns out to be the past self.

**Conclusion**

This chapter set out to address Nietzsche’s urgent intervention that no existential injustice can ever be fully addressed, because no act of revenge can rewind time. However, despite this, revenge is still sought as the next best thing and indeed *salted earth* revenge has historically been understood to aid the healing process, as the offender remains in a persistent state of misery and humiliation. However, Nietzsche’s own fascination with the temporal immutability of injustice places him on a different trajectory of exploration that goes deep in to the heart of concepts like order and stability. James C. Scott’s fascination with the *Weapons of the Weak*, and how oppressed people and groups create counter-ideologies to vent and ultimately overturn the hierarchical structure, proved an invaluable starting point. Scott’s point that relatively innocuous practices such as “foot dragging, dissimulation, desertion, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage” can belie gaping moral rifts and suggest pent-up rage and rancour, remains invaluable. *Ressentiment* turns out to be yet another weapon of the weak which, however, operates in a markedly different manner. While Scott’s hidden transcripts keep the desire for revenge alive and suspended until an opportune moment arises, *Ressentiment* is predicated on a self-imposed absolute weakness and offers satisfaction right away.

Without recourse to regular revenge and justice, and as part of the devil’s bargain, victims permanently change the foundation of their moral universe. Whatever is now deemed good and virtuous is a direct negation of the values and virtues of the offender. Nothing about the victim’s value system is borne from any celebration of his or her own specific values and virtues. The lambs are no longer good because they have hooves and wool, but simply

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452 Scott, *Weapons of the Weak*. xvi
because they lack claws. The entire arena of competition shifts from the devalued physical realm onto the elevated moral realm. But at the same time, in order to claim moral superiority, the devaluation needs to be permanent. Consequently, and this is where *Ressentiment* differs so markedly from any *Suspended Revenge* or any type of *Displaced Revenge*, the moral derogation of the offender informs all decisions and judgements the victim makes, and not just in regard to the offender. So even though physical revenge is never pursued, the offender’s virtues and values are forever encased in the *objective attitude*. Even if the victim then gains power, their revenge will be this indirect moral disregard, slowly building a world where there is no place for the offender, or anyone resembling him. This is a certainly sombre prospect; however, following the short assessment on *Sour Grapes Ressentiment*, the same mechanism can be used to create a world where the past self can be held in moral disregard; a point Nietzsche made clear when he chose a renowned Persian moralist to teach freedom from morality. In this sense, *Ressentiment* is potentially much more than a revenge strategy of the weak or the other half of the so-called *Rage Binary*. While a type of *obtained* justice can be afforded in moral debasement and identity reconstruction, the mechanism can do much more than just offer justice through *Schadenfreude*. It can alter the very perception of the suffered injustice.
Chapter 6

Reconciliation Strategies: A Critique

Literature on inter-group reconciliation has moved away from a stubborn emphasis on economic growth and security and broadened the investigation to include emotional factors as well. In fact, these emotional factors have slowly been etched into the foreground. Issues such as moral inclusion and social recognition are seen as vital in state sponsored reconciliation efforts. This thesis has argued that the problem at the heart of violence and aggression is not the desire to punish or even the enjoyment of punishment, but whether punishment is restrained by concerns for the moral recognition of the offender as equal. This boiled down to P.F. Strawson’s distinction between moral attitudes and objective attitudes governing the treatment of offenders. This distinction was found to dictate the difference between compassion and instrumentalization; anger and rage; retribution and revenge. Efforts at reconciliation must grapple with this distinction and ensure that objective attitude is resolved before committing to post-conflict settlement. In particular, the occurrence of hard times can reawaken dormant antagonisms and return groups to their ancient opposition, resulting in disorder and bloodshed.

The last chapter found James C. Scott’s ideas on Suspended Revenge and so-called hidden transcripts to be invaluable for the study of false acquiescence and the idea of disorder existing within order. In his latest book, Seeing like a State, he stresses the need for state-sponsored projects to cultivate and utilize metis, a type of knowledge predicated on insight.

into local customs, values and motivations. The same argument for the need of such knowledge can be made in the case of reconciliation and state-ordered assimilation of various groups into the overarching order. Historically, and in line with Scott’s arguments about the existence of hidden transcripts, it has been the failure to recognize local customs and entitlements in hierarchical structures that has ultimately given rise to resistance and alienation. With the help of local engagement and commitments, individual groups share in the success and esteem that comes with the survival of an order in which they become emotionally and ideationally invested. Scott translates metis as type of cunning or wisdom, and seems to offer an antidote against the problem of disinterest and rancour sustaining the hidden transcripts. However, in order to understand the irony in Scott’s use of the term, we need to briefly return to Ancient Greece, where the ideal of metis was invariably linked to state power and the Goddess Athena. Metis indeed stood for cunning and wisdom, but was heavily influenced by how it was used and for what.

According to one of Athena’s genesis myths, she was created in the union between Zeus and his first consort, the female Titan Metis. However before Metis could give birth, Zeus swallowed her, fearing a similar fate to his father Cronos, who was slain by his offspring, namely Zeus. The act of swallowing Metis meant Zeus was able to internalize her cunning and wisdom. Since then he has been the source of prudence and knowledge, ultimately justifying his claim to be the source of nomos. But more importantly, Zeus was now able to neutralize the other side of metis, which was a Promethean cunning and propensity for revolt and renewal, exactly what Zeus feared would happen if Metis gave birth to his offspring. As the myth goes, Athena sprung from Zeus’s head, exemplifying her connection to his cerebral wisdom and knowledge. However, in line with Zeus’ plan, Athena felt no desire to challenge him. Consequently, metis was no longer aligned with revolt, rebellion or renewal, but with order, state power and stability.

In the myths in which she features, Athena takes a more active role in the day-to-day governing of human affairs, exemplified by her active participation in fate of Orestes. "Casting her strong shield over both sides, and letting neither win unjust advantage," Athena uses metis in the service of the polis and ensures harmony through the use of reason and

456 ibid: 139.
persuasion.\textsuperscript{457} It is especially her ability to foresee troubles borne from injustices that stresses the constructive role of her metis. Returning back to Scott’s use of the term, the connection between Athena and metis invariably approaches the concept of order and favours the survival of the state over revolution and revolt, and Athena, as the "pure and terrifying symbol of state power,"\textsuperscript{458} knows how to persuade warring sides to come together for the greater good. But at the same time, she will not refrain from using force and fear should subjects decide to oppose her order. In arguing for the role of metis, Scott unwittingly unleashes Athena’s mandate to maintain order and stability and crush local knowledge and custom, should their metis prove too rebellious for the good of the state. In other words, local custom is ostensibly honoured and celebrated but ultimately devalued and instrumentalized for the good of the state. It is the satin glove hiding the iron fist.

Precisely in this light reconciliation literature has turned towards the use of persuasion and reason to bring warring sides together, barely hiding the bias towards imposed order and state power. This strategy has centred on the importance of emotions and moralities, rather than laws and infrastructure. Bleiker and Hutchison write:

"Successful reconciliation requires opening up political spaces through which feelings of injustice can be worked through collaboratively. Key here is a social environment through which fear and anger can be recognized in ways that allow divided societies to overcome ideas about justice that centre on retribution or revenge."\textsuperscript{459}

The problem is, however, that if groups are committed to their type of justice, expressed in revenge, halting this punishment means undermining their claim to justice. A collaborative social environment, as the one envisioned, sets limits on the punishment that may be exacted or even demanded. Daniel Bar-Tal, whose research centres on entrenched and prolonged conflicts, approaches the same phenomenon. He refers to the moral mandate as a “conflictive ethos”, and explains:

\textsuperscript{457} ibid: 130–43, 9.  
\textsuperscript{458} Ibid., 135.  
\textsuperscript{459} Emma Hutchison and Roland Bleiker, “Emotional Reconciliation Reconstituting Identity and Community after Trauma,” \textit{European Journal of Social Theory} 11, no. 3 (August 1, 2008): 386,
“It is not surprising that they are viewed as validated truth and thus constitute a reality for group members during the intractable conflict. Alternative beliefs are blocked, censored, rejected, or perceived with mistrust and suspicion. However, despite these difficulties, the process of reconciliation demands changes of the conflictive ethos.”

Bar-Tal also stresses the need for open spaces and dialogue between warring sides in order to create the possibility of a shared narrative that can slowly resolve historic injustices scattered throughout the past. Both approaches diagnose the right problem but they fail to elaborate a working prognosis. Bleiker and Hutchison and Bar-Tal start from the premise that groups already acknowledge each other’s claims. Undoubtedly there is considerably headway made when both sides sit together and are willing to listen to the each other, or even acknowledge the other side as recognizable equals. **Objective attitudes**, which sustain rage and endless violence, the very problems that are being addressed, do not permit this; consequently such rushed negotiations may be disingenuous and doomed from the very start.

Muldoon offers a critique of reconciliation literature through the prism of the **objective attitude**. He writes quite correctly, that “the central question is not how justice should be understood, but whether it is legitimate to ‘sacrifice justice’ for the sake of other goals such as historical truth and social reconciliation.” The question amounts to whether reconciliation can succeed without a sense of **obtained** justice. The answer should be a resounding No. Following the ideas on **Suspended Revenge** and **Ressentiment**, the desire to obtain justice can go “underground” or remain suspended, kept alive by the memory of the injustice. Without tackling this problem, even in times of stability and peace, the challenges of “hard times” may reawaken these antagonisms and return reconciliation efforts to square one.

This chapter will take a brief look at reconciliation efforts both old and new. With the help of Nietzsche’s **Ressentiment** and the knowledge of moral mandates, these efforts will be tested to reveal whether a lack of violence truly stems from a genuine resolution of the **objective attitude** and an ability to move on. The first two policies are historically informed and date back to the time of the Greeks. **Lustration** and the creation of a **Common Enemy** have proven

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politically useful strategies to overcome past injustices and forge new alliances borne from necessity. The next set of strategies is more modern and found in TRC practise around the world. These are storytelling, remembrance and acknowledgment, along with the Christian imperatives of forgiveness and apology. Finally, the last set of reconciliation practises are not really covered in any literature and are born from a historical investigation of the *Culture of Defeat*. The analysis will revive the Nietzschean mechanism of Ressentiment and seek to probe into the possibility of a past-orientated revenge act, reframing the very perception of an experienced injustice, and thus resolving the issue before it becomes a problem. This will be put forth under the heading of Nietzschean *Vindication* and rest on a use of Sour Grapes *Ressentiment*, described in Chapter 5.

**Lustration**

Lustration is a common historical practice found in the aftermath of defeat. It fosters a sense of communality borne from a joint vilification and sacrifice of the losing side’s leaders. The military and political elite are punished, executed or exiled. These men shoulder the entire fault and responsibility for the war; this in turn creates new moral imperatives and a sense of shared identity between victors and defeated. The Nuremberg trials served such a function in post-war Germany, and in post-war Iraq, it was the public execution of Saddam Hussein. Displacing all responsibility and fault onto scapegoats and then sacrificing or exiling these scapegoats purges the community of its anger and strengthens group cohesion through a joint act of purifying violence.

The practice was already evident in the time of the Greeks, and covered in Chapter 1 on pollution and in Chapter 4 on scapegoats. The practice of ritualized sacrifice purifies the community and channels disparate negative emotions towards a common target. Girard explains:

“The old pattern of each against another gives way to unified antagonism of all against one (...)“There now appears true community, united in its hatred for one alone of its number. All the rancour scattered at random among the divergent

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462 Schivelbusch, *The Culture of Defeat*. 

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individuals, all the differing antagonisms, now converge on an isolated and unique figure, the surrogate victim.” 463

A peaceful new community is created by the communal act of agreeing upon the culprit and brandishing them. However, these scapegoats are not dehumanized but demonized, because they are held responsible, and for good reason, for the present suffering and defeat. To facilitate this, newly defeated countries are always described as liberated rather than defeated.

For the defeated citizens, lustration invites a type of spontaneous amnesia, as past identity tropes and allegiances are suddenly suppressed or rationalized away. Herf and other scholars on post-war Germany have remarked on the uncanny ability of Germans to distance themselves from their Nazi involvement and even claim the mantle of victimhood. 464 A similar process was evident in Japan in the aftermath of Second World War. In both countries, the criminal cliques around Hitler and Tojo were accused of having led good and honest Germans and Japanese astray. 465 The strategy of lustration makes no moral claims; it does not seek to educate, but merely to return to business as usual. Lustration is fundamentally a forward-looking strategy with little care for the past. It allows for the total exoneration of remaining group members.

The symbolic act of sacrificing military or political leaders exoneration the common citizen, whose failure to stop the leaders nevertheless implies serious culpability. For instance, in the case of post-war Germany, Henry Morgenthau, Secretary of the Treasury under Roosevelt, favoured a much stronger approach that amounted to nothing short of a salted earth revenge; Germany was to be stripped of all industry and returned to state of agricultural subsistence toiling away while the world watched. In his words, “if the German people are to make the best use of their soil, they are going to have to substitute the work of human hands for machinery for several years to come.” 466 Morgenthau believed that Germany’s crimes could not simply be ignored, but that all Germans needed to atone for the failure of not having

463 Fleming, René Girard, p. 82.
466 Morgenthau, Germany Is Our Problem. p. 50
stopped their government. In the words Morgenthau’s contemporary, Secretary of War Henry Stimson, “such methods do not prevent war, they breed it.”\(^{467}\) Lustration and amnesty hardly satisfies the desire for justice in the light of an unprecedented crime; however, the desire to concentrate on the past and deny a move towards a future makes reconciliation virtually impossible, as the objective attitude remains entrenched.

Lustration also necessitates a type of Ressentiment explored in the last chapter. The defeated develop Sour Grapes Ressentiment by distancing themselves from their initial support of these national goals and policies. There is an evident devaluation and derogation that manifests itself through a shared scapegoating of those leaders once lionized and respected. This change in valuation must be Ressentiment-based, because the new identity stands in diametric opposition to the past value, i.e. the new identity is based on negation values. Although much more research is needed, one might hypothesize that the sense of victimhood and powerlessness is displaced away from the victors towards the past military leaders to enable a sense of communality with the victors. For this to occur, first and foremost, the victors must be friendly and welcoming to the defeated in order to encourage mutual solidarity. The possibility of hidden transcripts remains a possibility. This scenario will be further explored later on, in the section on Nietzschean Vindication.

Common Enemy

A well-known Arabic proverb reads ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’. A more Realist influenced reading of this proverb would suggest that ‘in the face of a bigger enemy, my enemy becomes my friend.’ Briefly returning to the illustration of post-war Germany, the Truman administration quickly dropped the previous administration’s punitive stance, instead opting for an economically and politically vibrant Germany that could act as a buffer against Soviet expansion. Some scholars argue that the prospect of a Soviet threat was decisive in setting the foundation for US-German reconciliation.\(^{468}\) Germans and Americans could easily agree that the real question of the day was how to contain Soviet expansion and ensure that

\(^{467}\) Stimson quoted in Donald W. Shriver, \textit{An Ethic for Enemies: Forgiveness in Politics} (Oxford University Press,, 1995). p. 79

Communists would not infiltrate the nascent political community. Discredited Nazis morphed into experienced *Russenkämpfer*. According to American political advisors stationed in West Germany and writing at the time, this was seen as a gamble; they feared that such careless treatment of Nazi criminals would lead to an inevitable surge in Nazi ideology somewhere in the near future.469

The notion of a common threat has great purchase in social identity theory. In Wendt’s seminal essay *Anarchy Is What States Make Of It*, he postulates that rising interdependence and the emergence of a ‘common other’, personified in a shared enemy aggressor or something more abstract like nuclear war or climate change, may facilitate collective identity formation. Forced to confront a joint threat, new behavioural routines emerge that shape identity and lead to greater synchronization of interests and values; prolonged exposure to a common enemy welds disparate identities into a common one. According to the moral philosopher Amartya Sen the problem of violence is then simply a question of identity prioritization. The justification for violence according to Sen, “operates through prioritizing some identities and downgrading the relevance of other identities, including our broadest identity of a shared humanity, but also identities linked to economic, political and other social commonalities”470 Wendt and Sen tackle the same problem from different angles; while Wendt argues that disparate identities can *evolve* into a common, Sen argues that disparate identities must *devolve* into a common one.

On closer inspection, Wendt’s insistence on increased ideational interdependence cannot guarantee a lack of violence by actively suppressing difference, pre-empting Sen’s argument. Neumann writes that “any difference no matter how miniscule may be inscribed by political importance and serve to delineate identities.”471 Awareness refines practices of exclusion and inclusion but it does not favour one of the other. Threats can overshadow differences but they can equally inflate them. If the *objective attitude* already exists, displaced aggression is more likely than an alliance in the face of hardship. And even in the case of alliances borne from necessity, when such hardship ends, there is no guarantee that old mistreatments and


471 Neumann, “Self and Other in International Relations.” p. 172
injustices, if they are of an existential nature and engrained in the collective narrative of a people, might not regain centre stage.

**Story Telling**

A relatively recent contribution to reconciliation practices, storytelling is considered a key part in Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC) and is used in the aftermath of civil war and prolonged civil strife. Victims are encouraged to speak of their mistreatment in a communal setting; other members of the community listen and validate the victim’s claims. Alleta Norval, a critic of TRC-type reconciliation, writes that the practice of storytelling “does not bring the dead back to life, but it brings them out of silence; for their families, it means the end to an agonizing, endless search.”

The practice of letting individuals tell their own story, Norval argues, de-sacralises the nation-state and democratizes memory. In a similar vein, Walker explores the importance of communal validation in the problem of second-injury mistreatments, when the victim is denied communal support by way of joint condemnation of the act. The policy of storytelling rests on the notion that individual stories must be heard and remembered and never silenced by some grand state-sponsored narrative. These forums, however, are also open to the offender. Those responsible for the crimes and suffering are equally encouraged to partake and tell their story without fear of reprisal or censure. The point is to nurture new social bonds and allow the other to become human once more through the acknowledgment of personal narratives.

The legal scholar Martha Minow explains, “to try to understand those beliefs is not a capitulation to evil nor merely a pragmatic effort to avoid laying the ground for further group conflicts. It is a recognition of the filters of meaning and memory that lead people to view their own conduct and beliefs as justifiable”

The process of re-humanization can help bridge the moral chasm and lead to new practices of inclusion. This is precisely the Euripidean enterprise that tries to educate the audience. Instead of vilifying those who commit murder and breach nomos, they should be regarded as fellow humans, motivated by familiar concerns and fears; understanding their motivations makes them much more relatable. This

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474 Minow, *Between Vengeance and Forgiveness*, p. 122
can break the cycles of vengeance by dissolving the exclusionary position harboured towards them.

The act of getting offenders involved, however, comes at great cost, because offenders are usually lured by the promise of amnesty. Hayner argues that “the political discourse of reconciliation is profoundly immoral, because it denies the reality of what people have experienced.”475 One participant in Argentina’s TRC states poignantly: “We are being asked to reconcile with our torturers, and they’re being asked to do nothing.”476 Writers such as Minow and Walker stress, however, that many victims do not seek payback. 477 Instead, many victims seek to forgive their torturers as a token of agency, but more importantly, as a sign of moral superiority. The desire to withhold revenge can be a sign of Strawson’s *objective attitude*, meaning that the criminal is excluded and not even worth the act of revenge. This is anything but reconciliation - this is *Ressentiment*.

Another issue with storytelling and victim-centred restorative justice is that the audience ultimately judges and validates the victim’s emotions; hence, anger that seems excessive is automatically chastised, leaving the victim feeling excluded. Muldoon writes, “it is entirely possible, for instance, that the audience will refuse to recognize the legitimacy of certain emotions (the anger of the black activist, the grief of the white widow) and in doing so force the story-teller to re-evaluate her self-understanding.”478 Consequently, in order to “win” recognition, victims must self-censor and abide by public norms; this, Muldoon concludes, means “those who have suffered abuse will be asked to sacrifice themselves for the sake of social harmony.”479 Storytelling and recognition of abuse, in other words, are modulated by social concerns and in the worst case scenario chastise and alienate victims whose punitive desires undermine the goal of social harmony.

In the TRC of Columbia, however, the idea that offenders should avoid punishment was quickly scrapped in light of repeat offenses.480 Rather than seek meaningful reconciliation, militarists understood the policy of amnesty as a licence to act with impunity. Colombian political leaders departed from South African practices by postulating that reconciliation

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475 Hayner, *Unspeakable Truths*. p. 160
476 Ibid.
479 Ibid., p. 311.
480 Hayner, *Unspeakable Truths*. 
without a punitive element is a farce. The short-lived policy of amnesty with impunity only lead to vengeance killings and escalation, feared already in the time of the Oresteia. So instead of hoping for reconciliation on good faith, offenders earned prison time, allowing both the victim time to cool off, and the offender to realize that actions carry heavy consequences. The Colombian departure from common TRC practices mirrors an older wisdom predicated on the Greek concept of pollution. The victim is expected to seek revenge and so the offender must abdicate his position in society in order to allow the bloodlust to subside. Although ancient practices of exiling the offender are overhauled, the practice of imprisonment satisfies the desire of the victim to see the offender suffer, and makes no undue demands on the victim’s moral integrity. In some ways Columbia’s TRC practices are more democratic; they recognize that victims will express their rage through vengeance killings and consequently they deal with this reality rather than deny the emotional reaction by qualifying the idea of legitimate victimhood.

**Public Remembrance**

Restorative Justice scholars argue that the act of recording the testimony of victims and the offenders makes a greater point for the ideational foundation of a society. The practice confronts what Hayner calls the “conspiracy of silence” by lending authority to hitherto denied events. 481 “The alteration of forgetting and remembering itself etches the path of power,” 482 writes Martha Minow. According to Catalina Cruz, collective narratives not only have *descriptive* but also *proscriptive* properties, in as much as they frame the limits of imagined possibilities for a nation. 483 According to Spinner-Halev, “to decide that some past injustices but not others should be remembered and that some past injustices have normative force (…) assumes a certain interpretation of history and a certain view of the present and the future.” 484 The act of remembering not only vindicates the victims but makes the crimes part of the national heritage. As Norval puts it, “when the past is redesigned so as to explain (and thus legitimate) the present, what is at stake is more than the here and now.” 485 Remembering attempts to construct a future where the past can never be repeated by placing a moral censor on the event.

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482 Minow, *Between Vengeance and Forgiveness*, p. 119
484 Spinner-Halev, *Enduring Injustice*, p. 27.
485 Norval, “Memory, Identity and the (Im)possibility of Reconciliation,” p. 251.
The act of official remembrance of an injustice certainly validates the victims and creates normative markers in the history of the nation. However, without the necessary emotional and moral reconciliation, it may also give rise to revenge identities, as the sense of injustice remains alive and continuously bleeds into the present. Acknowledgments validate the moral mandate of the injured. Without sustained efforts to address the emotional trauma, any acknowledgment will only entrench the sense of righteousness felt by the victim. The fact that history is continuously reworked should give pause and raise the point whether the remembrance of an injustice might not one day provide moral justification for some gruesome and belated revenge. Norval argues “the continuous reworking and re-elaboration of the past point towards a fundamental impossibility: the impossibility of completion as such.” The importance is to ensure that whatever future develops is based on a sense of shared norms and justice; any remaining traces of moral exclusion can have dire consequences. The concepts of schemas of hatred and the prospect of Suspended Revenge become extremely relevant at this point.

**Apologies**

Apologies are seen as an integral part in the reconciliation process. States have adopted the practice of official apology to address past injustices. When offenders apologize, the desire for revenge and levels of punishment are said to diminish. Critically, apologies shift the burden of blame from the victim to the offender. An admission of guilt can be deemed to offer a token of damage and compensation. In this sense an apology can be seen to partly rectify the imbalance caused by the initial injustice. It also stresses the offender’s willingness to re-join the moral community and acknowledge their moral obligations towards others. An apology, in other words, brings the incident within the moral domain and re-enforces the notion that all members, victim and offender, must invest each other with moral regard. Revenge cannot operate between subjects that no longer regard each other only as means.

When family members of some of the victims confronted the South African police colonel and assassin, Eugene de Kock, during the South African TRC he showed no remorse and

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486 Norval, “Memory, Identity and the (Im)possibility of Reconciliation.” p. 261
refused to apologise for his crimes. Similarly, Adolf Eichmann showed little genuine remorse for his involvement in Nazi crimes. The notorious Nazi politician and military leader Herman Goering, during the Nuremberg trials, made a spectacle of the proceedings and even managed to garner a rise in popularity amongst ordinary Germans, whom he valiantly defended in court – but equally, he showed no sign of remorse. These notorious killers, when put on the spot, defended their actions as necessary, entrenching their beliefs even further. None of them saw the need to apologise because none of them believed they had done anything wrong. Apologies play an important role in reconciliation, but only if they are genuine.

Genuine apologies demand an admission of guilt. The subject acknowledges she has committed a wrong and feels a sense of remorse at her actions. The act of apology communicates to the victim that her mistreatment was wrong - and more importantly - will not occur again. An apology goes hand in hand with a change in values and perspective. In other words, an apology is a sign of moral change. The legal and civil rights scholar, Roy L. Brooks, writes, “apology, most importantly, is an acknowledgment of guilt rather than a punishment for guilt.” Speaking in relation to the problem of American slavery, where Brooks is trying to make the case for an official apology to Black Americans, he argues that an apology comes in stages; (i) Government confesses the deed (ii) Government admits the deed was an injustice (iii) Government repents (iv) Government asks for forgiveness (v) Government avoids repetition of the act. Whether the victim is still alive or not is relevant, because “the atrocities’ moral stain does not perish with the victim.” Melissa Nobles, author of The Politics of Official Apology, qualifies Brooks’ argument about the need to apologize for past injustices:

“If the past has no bearing on their present status, it follows logically, although not inevitably, that an apology has no place, especially if that apology – in

492 Ibid. p. 144
493 Ibid. p. 145
acknowledging group identity, land loss, and political and cultural autonomy – implies that such lands and autonomy should be somehow restored.”

This is certainly logical - apologies are not meant to rid the criminal of his guilt; they are meant to communicate to the victim that their mistreatment was wrong. “At bottom”, writes Nobles, “an apology is an acknowledgment and moral evaluation of wrongdoing.”

An apology is much more than an admission of wrongdoing though. It is an admission of moral failure and responsibility. Somewhere the transgressor went wrong in his thinking and lived his life according to a warped moral compass. For the men in the docks, such as de Kock or Goering, showing remorse or even apologizing brings with it an implicit acknowledgment that their life, their entire way of existence and understanding the world, is wrong and morally worthless. Such self-directed Ressentiment necessitates the assimilation of a new sense of right and wrong, a new moral compass. In other words, an apology is an application for membership to a new moral community and proof of the moral attitude. Evidently, this was something for which neither de Kock nor Goering saw need.

Many writers warn against partial apologies. Apologies, to be complete, must be more than simply words; they must inform action. Melissa Nobles argues that “partial apologies can actually aggravate matters when the evidence clearly points to liability on the apologizer’s part. Here, a partial apology is viewed as an attempt to evade full responsibility, not accept it.” In other words, a partial apology avoids the necessary change in the moral compass; it is not an application form but a letter of deniability. This kind of half-hearted apology was evident in the aftermath of the Abu Ghraib torture pictures. Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld apologized for the incident but ultimately laid the blame on “a few bad apples.” This was a problematic strategy because he could not guarantee that the incident would not occur again. The metaphor of bad apples suggests that moral rot occurs naturally and is part of the business.

By refusing to take responsibility, Rumsfeld furthermore implied that he did not have his own military under control, which was equally damaging. Either through his incompetence or warped moral compass, Rumsfeld had to go. This example shows, however, that certain

495 Ibid. p. 28-29
496 Ibid. p. 30
crimes are morally so reprehensible that certain members are required to re-apply to the moral community. They are temporarily suspended due to their action, and become situated on the borderlands between the moral and objective attitude. Rumsfeld felt no need for this, however, and his rotten apple excuse suggested that things would go on.497 A much more cynical person would suggest that Rumsfeld simply apologized for getting caught. Gibney and Steiner bring this to the point when they write, “powerful states have used apology as a means of acknowledging certain truths – which has proven to be a very useful way of ignoring other, larger truths.”498 Hence apologies need to be more than just words; the application needs to be submitted with a resume showing a change in attitude and action.

**Acknowledgment**

According to the Ethics Scholar, Jeff Spinner-Halev, apologies come last. They do not initiate but rather complete the long and arduous process of reconciliation. “It is better that an apology come at the end of a process of political reconstitution, not at the beginning, where it may simply be a false promise.”499 This needs to be directly contrasted with Roy Brook’s argument that “focusing on compensation before apology is the moral equivalent of playing the cart before the horse”500 Brooks believes that an apology must come first; then one makes good on it. Spinner-Halev, on the other hand, suggests that one must first show a change of heart in order to prove that the apology is meant. Brooks sets himself up for the possibility of a partial of false apology – one that is meaningless. An apology for an injustice or mistreatment might be made for the wrong reasons, and only a careful analysis of genuine behaviour and values-in-action can illustrate whether the original mistreatment is truly no longer possible because of a newly required moral attitude.

Acknowledgments can be superior to apologies by being more realistic about the nature of past injustices, echoing Nietzsche’s intervention. “Unlike apology”, writes Spinner-Halev, “acknowledgment does not presume anyone is responsible for the past, but acknowledgment does presume responsibility for the present and the future.”501 At first glance this appears to

498 Ibid. p. 297
499 Spinner-Halev, *Enduring Injustice*. P. 91
500 Brooks, *Atonement and Forgiveness*. P. 142
be an evasion of responsibility, similar to what Rumsfeld did; however, Spinner-Halev qualifies his argument:

“Justice does not mean that people or communities take responsibility for the past, but rather that political communities take responsibility for the present and future. Injustices that occurred in the past cannot be undone, as the sceptics claim. Political communities can and should work to undo current injustice.”

This needs to be contextualized within Spinner-Halev’s greater point about the tragedy of history, and indeed foreshadows Nietzsche’s own solution. Slavery, colonialism, exploitation are known injustices but without them certain Western nations would be far less well off. Apologizing for these crimes necessarily implies that, given the chance, the West would do things differently and sacrifice its current benefits. Spinner-Halev dismisses such fuzzy hypothesizing in favour of a concrete dedication to present injustice. Rather than apologize for its past crimes, the West illustrates its change of heart by actively undoing current injustices and warding off future ones. This change of heart, however, rests on the acknowledgment that the past crimes are indeed regrettable. In other words, the West atones for its past crimes by taking a greater responsibility for current ones and thus indicates her moral acknowledgment of the past ones.

Acknowledgment implies total knowledge of the moral, ethical and inter-subjective implications of the act without placing the victim in the difficult position of accepting the offender back into the moral community, as is most always the case with apologies and any of the state-sponsored reconciliation efforts in TRC. Accepting an apology can act like a forced closure by removing the right to be angry with the offender. Moreover, acknowledgment cannot be faked, because it always depends on genuine moral reflection. Consequently, according to Jennifer Lind, “all over the world, countries fear their neighbours who fail to acknowledge past violence.”

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502 Ibid. p. 82
503 This is known as the Resentment Paradox or Forgiveness Paradox, see for instance Trudy Govier, Forgiveness and Revenge (London; New York: Routledge, 2002). p. 53 or Murphy and Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy. p. 42
If a nation glorifies past atrocities, as with Japan’s overtly provocative insistence on honouring war criminals, it may suggest that such atrocities are viewed as legitimate state practice. On the other hand, if nations totally ignore atrocities and chose to forget, as with China’s insistence on the non-occurrence of the Tiananmen Square massacres, it may equally suggest that they believe such atrocities to be legitimate as long as they are kept off the books. Either way, by not taking responsibility for known atrocities and by not showing moral acknowledgment or explicit condemnation, states legitimize such atrocities as possible state practice. It also dishonours the victims. In this vein, the TRC’s main mandate of recording the stories of past atrocities and etching them into the country’s national consciousness serves a dual purpose; it vindicates the victims but also ensures that such atrocities become part of the national story and enjoy universal condemnation. In contrast, groups who refuse the practice of acknowledgment, atonement or contrition, but still offer an apology, cannot be expected to have undergone a change of moral values, because such change makes the need for atonement and contrition indispensable.505 One might hypothesize that the old attitude is still in place.

In the case of post-war reconciliation in Europe, West Germany had to make many acts of contrition before her former enemies, most notably France, began to trust her and view her as part of the European community rather than an inevitable threat. For instance, the ten-year anniversary of the end of the Second World War went without any recognition in West Germany. The only early official mention of the war was a designated holiday to honour German resistance against the Nazi regime. Putting men like von Stauffenberg on international display showed the world that Bonn chose to honour a set of victims of which the whole world could feel proud.506

In the infamous knee-fall incident, when Willy Brandt stood in front of the war memorial in Warsaw in 1970, he later recalled: “Under the weight of recent history, I did what people do when words fail them. In this way I commemorated millions of murdered people.”507 Such genuine and spontaneous gesture of atonement from a head of state is a remarkable display of character, both personal and national. But it is no apology and for good reasons. An apology is best viewed as a letter of application for membership in a moral community. In contrast to Brooks, Spinner-Halev suggests that such application will have a better chance if it includes a

505 Ibid. p. 12
506 Ibid. p. 12
507 http://www.willy-brandt.org/speeches/
resume and character references. Acknowledgment and atonement provide such references and show that the candidate has earned the right to be considered for membership.

However, the application in the end will only be successful if the community makes the formal gesture of accepting the apology. In this sense, Spinner-Halev suggests that the act of apology is mere formality, that by the time the transgressor applies for membership, he has already proven his compatibility. An apology is without doubt a grand gesture that can do much more harm than good when it is an empty one. The main problem with apologies is that they make emotional demands on the victims; they imply that the transgressor should be forgiven. A change in values and identity are essential but such change takes time. An apology acts as the finalization of a long and arduous process, because it is up to the victim to sign off on the development by letting go of her vindictive impulses. By accepting an apology the victim no longer harbours an **objective attitude** towards the transgressor and believes the sense of moral recognition to be reciprocal.

Acknowledgment of past crimes and displays of atonement and contrition suggest that the transgressor no longer perceives past actions the same way. The moral regard has changed, and so has the value system and responsible ideational structure of the assailant. The chasm between victim and criminal is bridged by the sole efforts of the criminal. Moreover, as already stated elsewhere, acts of acknowledgement and atonement place no demands on the victim. There is no implicit command to accept such overtures, no ulterior motive of moral blackmail. Acknowledgment simply puts on displays the transgressor’s new sense of morality. In ancient Greece, the criminal was still liable to be exiled from the polis, because, regardless of intentionality or contrition, he remained polluted and the victim was expected to seek revenge. The only thing acknowledgment and contrition can achieve is the genuine appreciation that the crime will never occur again. The initial injustice, however, remains, and so it remains up to the victim whether they seek to forgive the offender or remain invested in a position of moral exclusion.

**Forgiveness**

Forgiveness is the epitome of reconciliation. More than accepting an apology, forgiveness indicates that the past injustice or mistreatment no longer carries weight for the relationship between victim and offender. Forgiveness between groups is often practiced after the initial
offender generation has passed on; thus, forgiveness tends to be limited to forgiving the group rather than the offender. In many ways, this practice indicates a sober assessment of the nature of injustice. Rather than persuade and negotiate, the emotionally charged generation is allowed to pass away, before states “officiate” normal relations. Opting for immediate forgiveness after a severe injustice or mistreatment might mask a deeper problem, where a reluctance to punish is predicated on Ressentiment.

Unwillingness to seek revenge against a criminal might stem from the notion of moral superiority, i.e. the belief that a criminal is not worth even the revenge. This might seem superficially agreeable; however, such an attitude hides a deep-seated antagonism that cannot lead to true reconciliation. In essence the victim still holds onto the belief that she is better than the offender by not giving in to her retributive urges; however, in reality her celebration of difference merely hides the same moral mandate, which enables violence in the first place. The objective attitude is still in operation. Avoiding physical revenge in some cases can lead further away from reconciliation and entrench the moral chasm. Forgiveness must be predicated on a genuine willingness to accept the offender as a moral equal.

“Foriveness”, writes Paul Laritzen, "acknowledges that the civic relationship is worthy of respect and restoration." It is the willingness to respond positively to the perpetrator’s efforts at atonement. One the one hand, this indicates a remission of negative emotions towards the criminal, while on the other hand, it also implies that the victim will make an effort to re-establish the broken relationship. Walker, however, argues that “victims are deeply sensitive to the ways provided or denied them in coming to terms with the wrongful harm others have done.” The act of forgiveness is a grand gesture and, like an apology, must come at the end of a long and tested process of reconciliation. Forgiveness, however, for all practical purposes needs to be contrasted with the act of forgetting.

In her analysis of TRC practices in Mozambique, Priscilla Hayner found that the policy of forgiveness was complicated. In the words of one participant: “Would you really be able to kill all the people who had committed atrocities? If you did, how many people would be left?” The general amnesty laws passed in Mozambique were a blanket case exempting all

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508 Staub et al., “Genocide, Mass Killing and Intractable Conflict.”
509 Quoted in Brooks, Atonement and Forgiveness. p. 168
510 Walker, Moral Repair. p. 6
511 Hayner, Unspeakable Truths. p. 189
parties from responsibility. Although the laws acknowledged the crimes they also suggested that they be forgiven, and that no party had to admit to them. In this case at least, Hayner comes to the conclusion that “the word reconciliation is a word used to mean forget the past and be tolerant.” However, in the case of Mozambique the conclusion was that the policy of forgetting and moving on, politically, was favoured at a state-level and seen as necessary for avoiding further cycles of violence. In this sense, the community understood the endless devastation wrought by the Erinyes and favoured the health of the polis over individual claims of revenge and justice. This was not fundamentally different from South African policies. However, Mozambique supplemented this state-sponsored amnesia with traditional forms of reconciliation. Mozambique initiated healing mechanisms that resolved personal claims, allowing victims to claim justice by choosing how they dealt with the crime from an array of tribal practices, without impinging on state affairs.

Hayner discovered some fascinating ancient rituals, which allowed criminals, i.e. soldiers, who had murdered, to re-join their community and be forgiven. According to tribal belief, the ghost of the victim sits on the criminal’s shoulders and the community must organize a special ritual to purge the ghost and re-humanize the criminal. Once completed the criminal re-joins the community without question - even from the family members of the murdered. Another traditional ritual allows the family members of the victim to take the criminal to a river and submerge him under water; it is then up to the family members to allow him to resurface or drown. Unsurprisingly, the criminal is always allowed to resurface and by doing so is re-born, often taking the place of the lost family member in the community, i.e. the place of the victim. These are examples of genuine and freely determined decisions. Although the state-sponsored line is ‘forget and move on!’ traditional practices ensure that victims and criminals reconcile in a meaningful way. This is in many ways superior to the victim-centred restorative justice found in South Africa, which makes demands on the validity of the victim’s emotion. Recognition and agency are not qualified by TRC courts but experienced through ritualistic acts that force victims to engage directly with their vindictive urges. The decision to forego revenge and forgive is up to the victim.

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512 Ibid. p. 192
513 Ibid. p. 192
Forgiveness & Punishment

Forgiveness, according to Martha Minow, is not about forgiving the crime but rather the underlying intention, going back to Chapter 2 on the appraisal of intentionality in the construction of either an *objective attitude* or *moral attitude* emotion. Forgiveness,

“recognizes wrongdoers as human beings, fallible and limited, capable of choice and worth, neither monstrous nor beneath contempt; in forgiving one needs to humanize, rather than to idealize or to demonize, the wrongdoer, because that puts the wrongdoer back into a world or moral relations that morally valuable forgiveness affirms.”

In other words punishment and forgiveness can go hand in hand. Punishment after forgiveness is still considered reasonable and just, but predicated on a *moral attitude* not an *objective attitude*, turning revenge into retribution. Minow argues that the “one forgiving must give up a right to revenge, but one might forgive and not give up the belief that it is right for the wrongdoer to accept his or her punishment.” In other words forgiveness and punishment are not mutually exclusive, only forgiveness and revenge are. What Minow is describing is the movement from the *objective attitude* to the *moral attitude*. She advocates an absence of revenge, but not of retribution. *Moral attitude* emotions are necessary for justice, as denying any of these emotions under the guise of forgiveness undermines the notion of justice and the moral worth of the victim. Forgiveness must not lead to a repression of natural urges for just punishment, but simply lead to a change in the moral regard of the transgressor.

Opting for immediate and unqualified forgiveness fails to honour the normative constraints of inter-subjective behaviour. Without such rudimentary communication no shared concept of justice can arise and no moral community can coagulate. Following Nietzsche’s intuition about the Christian notion of unqualified forgiveness, denying the offender the punishment he deserves means regarding him as not equal. This is similar to Strawson’s *objective attitude* and its implicit exclusion of equal membership in the community. In other words, forgiving because someone does not know better implies that the offender is different and possibly sub-human. To be afforded equal rights, actors must enjoy full accountability for their actions. For

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514 Minow, *Between Vengeance and Forgiveness*. p. 168
515 Ibid. p. 156
this to occur, forgiveness, as inherent to the moral attitude, and justice, need to coexist. In other words, forgiveness must be limited to turning a desire for an objective attitude punishment into desire for a moral attitude punishment.

Martha Minow makes this point: “In theory, forgiveness does not and should not take the place of justice or punishment. Forgiveness marks a change in how the offended feels about the person who committed the injury, not a change in the actions to be taken by a justice system.”\textsuperscript{516} Continuing with Nietzsche’s intuition about Christian morality, unqualified forgiveness only stalls the inevitable punishment, because the Christian God determines that ‘revenge shall be mine in heaven.’ Rather than genuinely preach forgiveness and peace, mistreated Christians secretly take solace in the fact that their god will punish the wicked – and for eternity no less. Nietzsche is fundamentally correct when he deems this type of forgiveness to be disingenuous and hollow, and representative of a deep-seated vindictiveness.

Another important criticism of unqualified forgiveness stresses the moral intentions of the offender. Jean Hampton points out that, “one who is charged for behaviour which she does not believe was wrong tends to regard the forgiveness as an affront, a patronizing and insulting gesture, just as an innocent person will take offense at being granted a pardon for a crime she didn’t commit.”\textsuperscript{517} This sheds a different light on the forgiveness versus punishment problem, and is equally instructive. By forgiving the offender the victim is imposing a moral regard on the offender, which the offender might reject. Consequently, overtures of reconciliation and forgiveness, which rest upon the belief that an injustice has occurred, take on a very different meaning should the offender believe his own actions to be informed by a sense of justice and righteousness, albeit a subjective and disjointed one. In an almost Kafkaesque fashion, the offender is forgiven for a righteous deed. Hence, one-sidedness in forgiveness can be as useless and misleading as one-sidedness in apologies.

These points on the merit of punishment notwithstanding, genuine forgiveness at the end of a long process of reconciliation is favourable and allows for closure and the same must be said about an apology. Without transformation though, neither forgiving nor apologizing is very effective; they just white wash the offense. Although there is an awareness of right and

\textsuperscript{516} Ibid. p. 15
\textsuperscript{517} Murphy and Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy. P. 41
wrong, there is little suggestion that the breach might not be repeated. Scholars like Lind fear that the practice of official apology has become a stay-out-of-jail-free card, lacking the emotional gravitas necessary to suggest a true change of heart. Unfortunately, atonement and reconciliation are lengthy processes though and sidestep the generation most affected by the injustice. Revenge on the other hand may offer immediate emotional satisfaction to the victim; equally, the exact opposite, a lack of punitive desires, though for the wrong reasons, might give equal satisfaction because the offender is viewed as morally inferior and not even worth an act of revenge, a clear sign of Ressentiment. Neither type of strategy aimed at giving back to the victim is particularly attractive. The victim, through action, can become like the maligned offender or, through inaction, become unlike the offender. Either way, moral inclusion is denied.

**Nietzschean Vindication**

Because the victim ends up detracting value from the offender in response to the value taken from her, revenge strategies are always framed by the injustice suffered. As covered in Chapter 4, for Nietzsche, revenge is always a tragic consequence of the inability to address and change the past. In *On Redemption*, Nietzsche states,

'It was': that is what the will’s teeth-gnashing and most lonely affliction is called.
Powerless against that which has been done, the will is any angry spectator of all things past."\(^{518}\)

Nietzsche dismisses practices of reconciliation because they ultimately all fail to undo the past injustice. In accordance with the discussion on revenge in Chapter 4, the felt powerlessness in addressing past injustices commits international actors to an identity informed entirely by the past, like Ahab who is reminded of his own injustice with every thump of his wooden leg. The Auschwitz survivor, Jean Amery, shares Nietzsche’s concern on what amounts to powerlessness towards the past, “absurdly, it demands that the irreversible be turned around, that the event be undone. Resentment blocks the exit to the genuine human dimension, the future.”\(^{519}\)

\(^{518}\) Nietzsche, *Nietzsche*. § On Redemption

\(^{519}\) Amery, *At the Mind’s Limits*. 


In order to address the problem of vindictiveness, Nietzsche offers an important practical insight. He admonishes victims to view their offender as someone who has done them a great favour rather than an injustice. “When, however, you have an enemy, do not requite him good for evil: for that would make him ashamed. But prove that he has done something good to you.”

Nietzsche stresses that injustices are the product of framing and that the victim has full control over whether she decides that the mistreatment constitutes an injustice or not. Nietzsche explains, in the *Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence of the Same*, that any past event is either termed significant or insignificant depending on the present context and whether the event is deemed relevant for the subject’s chosen future. If a past event proves relevant it will be absorbed into the self-styled narrative regardless of the severity of mistreatment. Nietzsche is adamant that such personal philosophy demands *amor fati* – a love of one’s fate. If an event, however, is deemed unimportant for the self-styled narrative, it is relegated to the ranks of accident and *forgotten*. In other words no act of injustice or mistreatment is allowed to leave a permanent existential mark, except in a positive and life-reaffirming way. This is Nietzsche’s way of allowing the will to control even the past, by qualifying each event along the lines of present-based *signification*.

There are some immediate issues with this. Nietzsche’s admonishment to accept one’s enemy as a friend, for the reasons given, denies the enemy’s subjectivity. To play this out with Hecuba and Polymester, Nietzsche’s suggestion amounts to Polymester emerging from his tent, mutilated and childless, thanking Hecuba for making him face his crime and teaching him the importance of nomos; hardly the emotional response Hecuba desires. And yet this is what Nietzsche implies. In this scenario Polymester welcomes Hecuba into his moral circle and avoids any notion of rage or revenge or the sense of having been mistreated. This strange scenario echoes Hampton’s point on patronizing forgiveness. Polymester’s sense of identity is so immensely fluid that all the pieces of his self can be re-arranged at will, thus muting the sense of injustice to his person, because his “person” forever changes with the whims of fate. Hecuba on the other hand is left wanting; Polymester pre-empts her revenge by denying her the satisfaction of his suffering and the possibility of a permanent mark. Nietzsche writes,

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520 Nietzsche, *Nietzsche*. See the ‘Bite of Nadder’

“To be incapable of taking one’s enemies, one’s accidents, even one’s misdeeds seriously for very long – that is the sign of strong, full natures in whom there is an excess of the power to form, to mould, to recuperate and to forget … Such a man shakes off with a single shrug many vermin that eats deep into others.”

This is the same dehumanizing language witnessed in the objective attitude as well as in witness accounts in TRC, thus suggesting that Nietzsche’s take on the enemy is one of moral disregard because their subjective position and desires are discounted and deemed irrelevant.

Concerning the possibility of signification, Nietzsche scholars like John Richards and Alexander Nehamas would go as far as suggest that the Eternal Recurrence allows any past event to be deemed insignificant and forgotten. This seems incorrect and moreover belies Nietzsche’s choice of protagonist. Zarathustra was a historical figure; a famous Persian preacher alive sometime in the 6th or 7th century. Nietzsche believed that the figure of Zarathustra deserved redemption, and thus gave him a rebirth as the teacher of the Doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence. The tragedy of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra lies in the fact that his future is governed by a desire to redeem his past mistake, to make good on the fact that he taught a morality which would imprison man. All of the encounters in Thus Spoke Zarathustra are, in one way or another, disciples of Zarathustra’s Persian morality; and confronted with his own mistakes, in so many varying forms, Zarathustra’s only recourse is to try to correct his mistake by teaching liberation from his youthful folly in the form of the Eternal Recurrence. The ultimate lesson in Thus Spoke Zarathustra is really that the past cannot be avoided, and that neither suffered injustices nor committed crimes can be fully ignored. But it remains open to the subject to decide how to incorporate these events into a narrative that affirms the past rather than deny it.

Jean Amery went around Germany for decades seeking a release from his rancour. “No one wants to relieve me of it, except the organs of public opinion-making, which buy it. What dehumanized me has become a commodity, which I offer for sale.” Thomas Brudholm in an essay comparing Jean Amery’s and Primo Levi’s legacy, argues that Amery’s

522 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals.  
523 Jarrett, Jung’s Seminar on Nietzsche’s Zarathustra.  
524 Amery, At the Mind’s Limits. p. 80
“Ressentiment could and should (have been) pacified if German society came to join the resentful victim’s wish for an undoing of the past.”

In Amery’s words:

“All recognizable signs suggest that natural time will reject the moral demands of our resentment and finally extinguish them. The great revolution? Germany will not make it good, and our rancour will have been for nothing. Hitler’s Reich will, for the time being, continue to be regarded as an operational accident in history. Finally, however, it will be purely and simply history, no better and no worse than dramatic historical epochs just happen to be, blood-stained perhaps, but after all a Reich that also had its everyday family life.”

His offenders never properly atoned for what he had suffered; the injustice remained with him until his suicide.

Applying Nietzsche’s *Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence* to Amery’s case would be misguided; the limits of the Doctrine are evident. Some injustices are so encompassing that they cannot possibly be deemed insignificant just for the sake of whitewashing the past and supporting a chosen narrative. Both Nietzsche’s fictional account of Zarathustra and Amery’s own account are proof of this. Although Amery carved a purpose out of the unspeakable things done to him, his rancour never truly faded away. Moreover, no one in their right mind would claim that such crimes are necessary for the sake of *amor fati*. A true resolution of rancour might never have been possible, even if Amery harboured a *moral attitude* towards Germany and Germans.

However, vindication, by way of carving purpose out of the unspeakable, can mitigate the desire for revenge by changing the nature of the suffered injustice, and thus reducing its existential importance. Susan Jacoby, author of *Wild Justice*, writes that

“Vindication suggests the process of clearing oneself of a false charge or of overcoming injury and humiliation by proving oneself to the world… some men

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525 Brudholm, “Revisiting Resentments.” p. 21
526 Amery, *At the Mind’s Limits*.
and women aim at vindication by attempting to build themselves up, others by tearing down their enemy.”

A favourite example is the story of Samuel Pisar. Samuel Pisar suffered a similar fate to Amery. However, after his release he travelled to Australia and studied law, and much later he would gain post-graduate degrees from Harvard and the Sorbonne. Pisar became an activist and human rights lawyer. He travelled on both sides of the Iron Curtain and worked tirelessly to ameliorate the suffering caused by the Cold War tensions. Despite Pisar’s past, he never sought revenge against Germany, nor was he limited in his growth by his internment in the concentration camps. “His victory against Hitler, his vengeance, would be the undoing of Hitler’s work,” writes Jacoby. “The best revenge is a life well-lived.”

_Pisarian_ Vindication is the most promising strategy for resolving the existential severity of the past injustice. It accepts the crime but severs the ties between victim and criminal; the victim no longer must choose between becoming _like_ the offender and becoming forever _unlike_ the offender. _Ressentiment_ and revenge rely on mandates founded on moral opposition; in both cases the victim is beholden to the offender for satisfaction. Vindication makes a different claim: the victim chooses a path that independently affirms her worth. The initial loss of moral worth is not returned as in revenge, but simply neutralized. “Samuel Pisar’s life was his own self-justification or upholding of his own honour against the brutal challenge of Nazi wrongdoing”, writes Govier. Vindication turns the crime from a moral wrong into an evaluative mistake, meaning that the offender was always mistaken in his moral devaluation of the victim. The proof lies in the success the victim has enjoyed despite the suffered injustice and mistreatment. In Nietzschean parlance, the victim creates her own moral value; the vengeful victim on the other hand cannot create value and must take it by detracting from the offender. In creating a valuable and meaningful life, the initial injustice is downplayed and gradually reduced to existential insignificance.

In International Relations, nations always reinvent themselves through a constant process of _signification_; salient historical episodes are either downplayed or highlighted depending on the present day context. Historical memory is as pragmatic and slippery as the politicians who

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527 Jacoby, _Wild Justice_.
528 Pisar’s remarkable life is in Govier, _Taking Wrongs Seriously_; and Walker, _Moral Repair_, and Jacoby, _Wild Justic_.
529 Jacoby, _Wild Justice_. p. 360
530 Govier, _Taking Wrongs Seriously_. P. 20
use it. Nations that suffer a great defeat overcome their grudge by espousing new foundation myths that make reconciliation easier. They also search for historical episodes, untainted by the discredited regime, that allow a new sense of pride and meaning - a new destiny. John Dower\textsuperscript{531}, Wolfgang Schivelbush\textsuperscript{532}, Jeffrey Olick\textsuperscript{533}, Heinz Kohut\textsuperscript{534}, Richard Ned Lebow\textsuperscript{535} and many others have looked at the collective memories and values of nations after defeat. All agree in some way or form that changes occur very quickly; that tainted identity structures are swiftly replaced with untainted ones; that nations steadfastly look to re-establish a sense of pride and standing, usually in spheres of economics and technology; that old mistakes, if not entirely ignored, are deemed ill-judged and regretted as mistakes, but also not worth pondering.

Nations, more than their citizens, ignore episodes in the past that undermine claims to greatness and distinction. Groups, of course, have a mandate to provide their members with esteem and a sense of belonging. In this sense even injustices and mistreatments can be reframed according to this overruling imperative. In Aeschylus’ *Oresteia*, Athena of course played into the Erinyes’ vanity and desire for recognition when she offered them a cult of worship and a temple beneath Athens. In his book *Cultures of Defeat*, the German historian Wolfgang Schivelbusch captures this phenomenon from an interesting angle, he writes,

“The future promised (…) a new role for the nation in the international community. It is a short step from understanding defeat as an act of purification, humility and sacrifice – a crucifixion of sorts – to laying claim to spiritual and moral leadership in the world.”\textsuperscript{536}

Moral and spiritual superiority is the mark of Ressentiment, but a Ressentiment against whom? At first glance this could be Ressentiment aimed at the military superiority of the

\begin{itemize}
\item Schivelbusch, *The Culture of Defeat*.
\item Ibid. p. 31
\end{itemize}
oppressor and victor, because defeated groups obviously lack the military power to fight or rebel. However, in the long run such Ressentiment and value opposition should sustain a continued grudge, which cannot be argued to have existed for instance in occupied West Germany. On the contrary, the occupation cost not a single life and cultural relations only grew in strength and depth over the years. This automatically disqualifies hidden transcripts then. The most likely scenario must be Sour Grapes Ressentiment where the past identity tropes are dislodged and derogated in favour of new ones that promise a sense of continued esteem.

The moral superiority trope is then constructed as negation value to the dismissed values of military strength and global ambition. Again, the diametric opposition of values is key to proving the existence of Ressentiment. Ressentiment cannot create new values; it simply negates the values of those responsible for the suffering. In relation to post war Germany, Bartov explains that the “Nazi” became an elusive enemy, a type of archetypal evil providing the ideational contrast to the good German.\textsuperscript{537} It is worth stressing that such type of Sour Grapes Ressentiment can only function if the Nazi identity trope is totally disinvested and Germans are permitted to distance themselves from their past involvement and even culpability.\textsuperscript{538} Although the research is slim, many scholars point out that America’s stringent and punitive stance towards post-war Germany between 1945-46, exemplified by the Morgenthau Plan, led to a resurgence in Nazi ideology and shifted the blame for current suffering onto American occupation policies, especially because of the felt vindictiveness in denazification and anti-fraternization decrees.\textsuperscript{539} This would have side-tracked the Sour Grapes Ressentiment development into a Suspended Revenge development against the American occupiers, with a continued trickling of rage through innocuous practices such as foot-dragging, sabotage or jokes – not unlike what happened in the East.

\textsuperscript{537} Bartov, Mirrors of Destruction.
\textsuperscript{538} This feeds into the issue of the long German silence post 1945. See for instance Barbara Heimannsberg and Christoph J Schmidt, eds., The Collective Silence: German Identity and the Legacy of Shame (Gestalt Press, 1997); Dan Bar-On, Legacy of Silence : Encounters with Children of the Third Reich. (Harvard University Press., 1989)
In those few instances when defeat is accepted, occupations welcomed and peace and stability established the reason is not a lack vindictive impulses or a lack of spirit. Group Rage can engage in Displaced Revenge, Suspended Revenge or Ressentiment in order to express an entitlement for justice and revenge. In the few instances, however, of peaceful occupations, the rage is redirected towards a different target, one that is shared by occupier and occupied alike, leading to type of communal purification, explored earlier in the practice of lustration. The delicate process of Sour Grapes Ressentiment can only succeed if those engaged in rage manipulation are not prevented from adopting a new identity based on negation values. Further mistreatment felt in the present might sabotage such a delicate process and lead to an adoption of different negation values, preventing a past self-directed Ressentiment.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has explored some of the most prevalent strategies of political and emotional reconciliation, ranging from lustration, common enemy creation, storytelling, public remembrance, moral acknowledgment, apologies and forgiveness to Nietzschan vindication. Each one of these strategies enjoys practical advantages and disadvantages. Storytelling, for instance, despite claiming to be victim-centred, makes strong demands on the emotional qualification for victimhood, possibly harbouring deeper, more anti-democratic impulses and ultimately favouring social order over personal justice. In addition, often the desire to forego revenge masks a deep-seated Ressentiment and moral disregard for the victim. Traditional forms of reconciliation such as lustration prove to be a type of Displaced Revenge that demands the existence of a commonly agreed-upon scapegoat, taken from the ranks of the offender. Common enemy creation similarly demands the existence of an evil other, while even more dangerously basing the alliance on fear and anxiety, emotions easily prone to manipulation. Forgiveness and apologies are final acts after a long, arduous and often generation-bridging process of atonement and moral acknowledgment. Arguably, they are the most promising and deepest forms of reconciliation, but equally the ones that take the longest and are the most vulnerable to setbacks and misunderstandings.

The most interesting and promising strategy for reconciliation comes through a type of Ressentiment, which in itself constitutes a revenge strategy. Building on existing literature on cultures of defeat and how groups often reinvent themselves immediately after defeat and espouse new narratives imbued with pride and a sense of greatness and
distinction, the act of revenge is found to operate in a peculiar way that neither suggests repression of vengeance impulses nor some hidden rancour. Instead, a type of *Sour Grapes Ressentiment* creates a new identity diametrically opposed in value to the foregone “evil” identity trope. The rancour and rage are not aimed at the source of the injustice, i.e. the military victors, but attached to those seen responsible for the defeat, i.e. the old political and military elite. The purification found in such acts of lustration can be explained through a type of past self-orientated *Ressentiment*. The evidence lies in the fact that the post-defeat identity is based on a negation of the values of the pre-defeat self, which logically align with the values of the military victor.

Nietzschean vindication, explained in *the Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence*, is thus similarly a form of *Ressentiment*, because Zarathustra is forced to establish an identity and a set of doctrines that stand in opposition to his past days of moralizing. Instead of teaching morality, he teaches freedom from morality, embracing his negation values. In this sense, even Zarathustra cannot escape the will’s loneliest melancholy, i.e. the inability to will backwards. In the larger picture of things, this insight is instructive. Even Nietzsche’s inspired solution cannot eradicate the rage. Like others he can only manipulate it - placing him on equal terms with Athena and her own solution of domesticating the Erinyes. Rage, if it cannot be prevented, must be managed. The question then is how to channel rage without risking cycles, not only within the polis but also within International Relations, where communal imperatives cannot easily be reproduced. Nietzsche’s *Ressentiment*, ironically, provides an answer.
Conclusion

Rage Strategies: An Outline

This thesis has explored the phenomenon of rage in International Relations. It was argued from the start that extreme violence and brutally in inter-group relations can be explained with the help of emotions. But as with every emotion, whether on the individual or the group level, there exists a trigger. Despite the potential for extreme violence and devastation, the rage emotion first and foremost responds to an injustice that fundamentally undermines the existential rights of the group. It is a reaction that is borne from a fundamental and incorruptible sense of entitlement toward group survival and flourishing, both ideationally and materialistically. Rage flows from a sense of compassion and belonging, which members harbour towards each other and their group. But this very sense of compassion and belonging translates into merciless violence and brutality against those who threaten the group. In Aeschylus’ *Oresteia,* Athena’s domestication of the Erinyes cemented these in-group dynamics; unfortunately, despite claiming otherwise, this was never a solution to the problem of rage; it merely succeeded in displacing the aggression outwards. Rage was not something that could be extinguished - only managed.

One of the problems in rage was found to be the element of self-righteousness. Those engaged in violence and devastation operate moral mandates that justify mistreatment and violence. The moral mandates, according to social psychologists, become *psychological truths*; they warp perceptions and motivate groups to engage and act out their punitive desires. Scholarship on inter-group relations is still relatively new, and there remains little to no consensus on the interaction between morality, emotion and violence between groups. We are only now acknowledging that inter-group hostility depends on appraisal and process. The overarching problem that is found to operate in inter-group aggression, and one that was diagnosed by Gustav Ichheiser some 65 years ago, is the propensity of groups and nations to interpret universal concepts like justice, peace and fairness through “unconscious” national biases. Failure of groups to respect each other’s claims to universal ideals immediately disqualifies them as barbarian, evil or sub-human. This underlying problem in inter-group dynamics is elevated to new heights, as groups qualify their revenge as a type of justice. However, the problem is that there is no shared sense of justice in operation here; and so what
justice means, and how it is obtained, is disjointed and subjective. Consequently, what appears to be justice for one group is revenge and excess for another. But at the same it is impossible to convince groups of their unjust behaviour without acknowledging that justice is a function of perspective, and that ultimately an imposition of one universal idea of justice (and order) runs at the cost of silencing all those distinct and unique perspectives that exist in a world populated by myriad groups and nations.

The desire to impose a universal order to deal with the problem of revenge, undermining the possibility of private justice and moral mandates for action, is certainly attractive but is also misguided. Arguably, it worked in the Oresteia because individuals need their community for fundamental and existential reasons. When nations have attempted to assimilate other groups into some overruling order or normative community, sooner or later cracks begin to show. Scott’s theory of hidden transcripts and Löwenheim’s theory of PATHs, along with Fanon’s classic example of emancipatory violence, all suggest that an imposition of order ultimately backfires, as groups resist such oppression and sooner or later revolt. The problem is that any legitimacy in an imposition of order is inherently contested, and must rely on some form of coercion. Unfortunately groups often bid their time and submit strategically before revolting, providing hegemonies with a false sense of legitimacy and stability.

Chapters 4 and 5 explored a binary pathway in revenge. The traditional view of revenge as merciless and violent was one of two pathways; the other pathway was approached through a reading of Nietzsche’s Ressentiment: It appears to be like acquiescence and submission but equally maintains a continued moral exclusion, which, however, does not lead to open violence and bloodshed, because the subject engages in a permanent identity reconstruction, trans valuating and permanently degrading ideas like violence and the use of force. What unites both pathways is the objective attitude and inability to harbour compassion and moral recognition towards the target. Either revenge pathway can offer a type of obtained justice, but neither can lead to a renewed moral attitude of compassion. Nietzsche, who frames injustices as temporal problems of existence rather than problems of strength and competence, best understood this tragic insight. Nietzsche’s contribution then shifts the focus of the discussion away from present-based revenge and focuses on a resolution that aims straight at the heart of the problem: the will’s inability to will backwards.
Despite this damning verdict on the futility of revenge, groups and nations still engage in this practice. Punishment remains an emotionally informed and legally sanctioned response to injustice. Following the analysis in Chapters 4 and 5, I have constructed five distinct revenge strategies that follow the binary of either traditional revenge, expressed as the *Nomos of Revenge*, or as spiritual revenge, expressed as *Ressentiment*. I will outline each of them and provide *rage markers*, i.e. objective indicators of their existence and operation, as well as a few famous examples.

**Rage Strategies**

*Hegemonic Revenge*

Open and violent revenge is the most detectable form of rage. It seeks to openly punish and humiliate the offender. Following the hypotheses explored in Chapter 4, revenge seeks to make the offender suffer and have him understand why he is suffering. However, following further points about the need to distinguish revenge from retribution, the salience of revenge lies in its desire for permanence. Because of the existential dimension of the suffered injustice, which is ruminated upon and encased in collective memory, revenge seeks to mimetically return this permanence by leaving the offender with a mark. In Quentin Tarantino’s first instalment of his revenge fantasy trilogy, Lt. Aldo Raine, the leader of the *Inglourious Basterds*, a fictional group of renegade American GIs in World War 2, favours the punishment of carving swastikas on the foreheads of captured Nazis, leaving them with a visible marker of their crime, and preventing the possibility of forgetting or moving on. It is precisely this forced arrest that best captures the desire in revenge. Explained as the *salted earth hypothesis* the act of revenge tries to eradicate or permanently humiliate and maim the offender. Because the act of revenge returns the initial felt injustice, the *objective attitude* is further entrenched, making reconciliation or a return to normality impossible, and leading instead to cycles of revenge.

Groups that have been mistreated view the offender as evil or unjust. Punishment in this sense must be argued to be in line with a sense of justice. All groups operate the same sense of entitlement towards recognition of their drives for integrity and esteem. This is what makes revenge so damaging for notions of order or shared morality. The act of injustice sets the injured apart from the rest of the group and the ensuing mandate overrules laws, treatises and
even regard for others. But at the same time, denying punishment for an injustice is tantamount to denying the sense of entitlement to just treatment. Historically, it has been powerful states or hegemonies, unencumbered by the demands or constraints of power relations, that have exacted revenge against weaker states, often enough eradicating their culture and sense of self by assimilation. In the righteous mandate of rage, the only determinant is strength and military competence. It returns groups to a state of anarchy, where each group operates its own sense of justice and morality.

*Rage markers: Demonization*, e.g. labels such as evil or predator, historically informed tropes like Fascist, Communist, Nazi or Terrorist; strong cultural focus on the committed injustice or felt mistreatment; disinterest in long-term strategic goals.

*Examples:* US Middle-East strategy post 9/11; Nazi Germany’s global strategy; US allied occupation strategy under FDR and Morgenthau (1945-1946).

**Displaced Revenge**

Displaced Aggression is equally a type of open and violent rage; however, the subject is limited by the fact that the initial offender is out of reach, either due to power relations or because the culprit is an inanimate object. Following the discussion in Chapter 4, two modes of *Displaced Revenge* are found to operate in this scenario: *Scapegoating* and *Triggered Displaced Aggression*. Each type corresponds to a different mandate and suggests a different relation to the suffered mistreatment. Scapegoats are largely *dehumanized* because they remain unrelated to the initial mistreatment; consequently, aggressors opt for psychological strategies of exoneration to combat the guilt arising from self-acknowledgment of immoral behaviour. There is no moral certainty or righteousness at work here. The other mode, referred to as *Triggered Displaced Aggression*, is closely related to *schemas of hatred*, when past injustices are invoked to justify violence in the face of present-based but technically unrelated hardship. The operating mandate is *demonization* and it indicates that the violence is still portrayed as righteous and in response to a suffered injustice.

*Displaced Revenge* tackles the problem of powerlessness by simulating moral certainty through *schemas of hatred* or scapegoating. Either way, however, someone or something other has committed the actual mistreatment. One might hypothesize that the moral mandate
in Displaced Revenge is predominantly predicated on dehumanization rather than demonization, as the connection between suffered injustice and victim must be based on manipulation of evidence and inflation of culpability. In Girard’s seminal example, Agamemnon treats his daughter Iphigenia like a goat, ostensibly to offer an “equal value” sacrifice in response to the loss incurred by Artemis. However, a deeper point is that scapegoats must inherently be disinvested of human qualities in order to shield the community from the fact that they are unable to morally justify their behaviour even against the backdrop of a suffered hardship. Dehumanization occurs in displacement, when the actual offender is out of reach, and is the mark of illegitimate rage.

Rage markers: Brutal and open violence, likely to be a greater use of dehumanization labels to indicate the terse relationship between injustice and target, preceded by severe socio-economic or natural upheaval leading to hardship and insecurity.

Examples: Nazi Germany’s persecution of Jews; American derogation of foreigners and Muslims post 9/11.

Suspended Revenge

Hidden Transcripts indicate hidden rage and rancour. Scott’s discovery of these independently operating counter-cultures and narratives seriously questions the idea that a lack of violence and ostensible submission translate into endorsements and acknowledgments of hierarchical order based on domination and strength. Scott is able to show how groups entertain ideas of counter-orders and continuously vent their rage through culturally codified practices that elude agents of domination. Once the hegemonic structure begins to crack, however, these hidden transcripts are formalized and inform a new order based on a reversal and rejection of the previous hierarchy and domination. The revolutionary movements in Eastern Europe following the downfall of the Soviet Empire in part vindicate Scott’s thesis and illustrate how even long-term established power structures can suddenly be swept away by the explosion of suspended rage. Social psychologists have offered further evidence that time lags and ruminations can strengthen the emotional register. The revenge pursued in these instances is no less bloody than in actual revenge. In many cases the act of revenge can appear even more excessive because of the contrast to previous decades of relative peace and stability.
In *Suspended Revenge*, rage continuously trickles through the cracks of the ostensible order. In the Soviet Union jokes provided a platform for a veiled venting of rage, allowing subjects to criticize and berate their government without risking punishment. The sense of strategic inadequacy is evident in hidden transcripts, but subjects simply bide their time and wait until the hierarchical structure shows its first cracks. Foot-dragging, indirect boycotts and disinterestedness in the political survival of the regime all provide a form of venting while also precipitating the ultimate demise of the order. *Suspended Revenge* is a type of cold and calculated punishment that waits until the offender is too weak to react. Decades of pent-up aggression and rage can lead to a spectacle of epic violence and bloodshed. *Suspended Revenge*, more than any other strategy, honours the old dictum that *revenge is a dish best served cold*.

*Rage markers*: foot-dragging, sabotage, culturally encoded counter-ideologies; unwillingness to support and continue existing hierarchies and social order, veiled *demonization*.

*Examples*: European Soviet states, post 1970’s; Arab Spring, 2012 onwards.

*Ideational Ressentiment*

Ideational *Ressentiment* shares a similar foundation with *Displaced Revenge* and *Suspended Revenge*, but here the powerlessness transforms the ideational foundation of the victim. Rather than vent and bide their time, subjects engage in a moral revenge by devaluing the offender’s way of life. But in order for such *spiritual* revenge to succeed, the victim must forego any generic sense of virtue and espouse *negation values* as the foundation of identity. In Nietzsche’s essay in the GOM, the lambs exclaim, “*All those are good who have no claws.*” The lambs no longer base their sense of good on the fact that they have hooves or wool, but that they lack the salient characteristics of the birds. Political theorists, engaging with the concept of *Ressentiment*, argue that *Ressentiment* leads to irresolvable tension, as the initial injustice is expressed through a grudge and rancour towards the offender. This is similar to the venting process in the hidden transcripts; however, *Ressentiment* is different.

*Ressentiment* establishes a moral superiority by sabotaging the offender’s sense of good and virtue. The victim creates a morality where the virtues of the offender are revaluated as evil
and bad, and the offender’s negated attributes then become the source of a new set of virtues and morality. The tell-tale sign of Ressentiment is that it cannot create independently new values, but simply espouses the negation of existing ones. Consequently, Slavophiles and Romantics developed the concept of anti-enlightenment, Gandhi created the doctrine of non-violence, and Nietzsche’s priests celebrated a lack of strength and power as virtues. All these examples illustrate that the revenge in Ressentiment leaves the victim chained to the identity and salient values of their offender. The satisfaction of berating the offender comes at the cost of a permanent falsification of the self. For political scientists, however, the existence of diametric-oppositional values means that Ressentiment can be detected. Ressentiment means that the victim remains unable to create culture, orders or values that are not in some way or form reliant on the culture, virtues and successes of the offender - but now simply expressed as negation.

*Rage markers:* negation values, inability to produce new ideas and virtues, permanent desire to stress superiority in niche cultural and moral terms, virtues prefixed by the term “anti;” overt and moral disgust at concepts like power and use of force, i.e. attributes seen lacking.

*Examples:* Russian and German Anti-Enlightenment of the 18th and 19th century; post-1970’s Arab Anti-Americanism

*Sour Grapes Ressentiment*

This variance of Ressentiment remains the only rage strategy that can offer lasting peace and inclusion through a cunning manipulation of the rage dynamic. In Aesop’s The Fox and the Sour Grapes, the fox, unable to snatch delicious grapes, avoids a sense of failure and powerlessness by judging the unobtainable grapes to be sour and not worth his while. To avoid further possibility of failure, he discounts all grapes as sour and effectively shelves his desire for grapes. The lie about the grapes serves a similar function of falsification found in Ressentiment, and like ideational Ressentiment it allows for a continued sense of esteem and even superiority, because no grapes truly worthwhile - i.e. sweet – can be beyond the fox’s reach. But in order to maintain the sense of self, the fox must also berate his earlier efforts to snatch those grapes and waste his time. In other words, the failure to recognize that the grapes were sour from the start becomes the offense, along with the failure to snatch them.
Cultures of defeat that assimilate culturally and emotionally into new orders are said to undergo a change in narrative and identity. Old identity structures and narratives are exchanged for new ones that can support a sense of pride and esteem and offer promises of future greatness and hope. The identity tropes responsible for the defeat and failure are immediately divested and demonized. This process occurs naturally as long as the victor does not insist on further punishment, needlessly prolonging the moral exclusion and providing new mistreatment. This interesting rage manipulation occurs when the defeated nation establishes itself as a victim of the criminal activity of its previous regime, thus demonizing their previous leaders and siding with the victors. This mechanism has been the underlying wisdom in post-violence strategies of lustrations as well as communal purification practices found in Ancient Greece. But rather than lead to Displaced Revenge, Suspended Revenge or Ideational Ressentiment, Sour Grapes Ressentiment devalues the past identity trope held responsible for the defeat and the ensuing suffering.

*Rage markers:* establishment of new identity tropes based on negation values of past regime, *demonization* of past leadership; strong cultural focus on future and renewal, conspicuous silence about involvement in past regime; willingness to engage in lasting peace with the victor.

*Examples:* West Germany, post 1947; Japan, post 1945; US Confederate States, post Reconstruction.

**Erinyes beneath Turtle Bay**

Rage in International Relations can be blamed on Athena’s ingenious solution to domesticate the Erinyes. Unfortunately, although she saves the polis, she simply outsources the problem. The Erinyes are tasked with directing internal anger and strife outwards, favoured by Athena nonetheless because war increases the fame and glory of Athens. The three distinct types of existential threat experienced by groups, and outlined in Brewers’ *Optimal Distinction Theory*, more or less correspond with Athena’s *metis* on how communal integrity and esteem can be guaranteed. The Erinyes, in other words, are alive and well in International Relations. Because their domain is extended from personal justice to group justice, the exact same problem of cycles and revenge must necessarily manifest on the international stage. Current conflicts in Ukraine, the Middle East and the South China Sea are testimony to this.
Athena’s solution, however, only succeeds because subjects are invested in the survival of their community; they are willing to exchange personal justice for social harmony. The fear of pollution and exile suffices to create discipline and reverence for the polis. Attempts to extend the sense of citizenship through notions of cosmopolitanism have tried to emulate this mechanism. However, the concept of a global community still fails, because individuals fail to develop a sense of belonging beyond their group identity; in other words, they do not require some “world nation” for their own existential needs. Misguidedly, international bodies like the UN or the ICC have tried to broaden the scope of nomos beyond the Westphalian emphasis on non-intervention, and with limited success. Powerful nations like the United States, China or Russia remain unwilling to subscribe to international laws that negatively affect their sense of entitlement. Moral mandates are still experienced predominantly at the group level, and manage to overrule global morality and established laws. Sooner or later, the psychology of hard times, through global warming, natural disaster or resource shortage, will force exclusions predicated on group membership into the open and rationalize acts of violence as necessary and righteous. Before the Erinyes ever move into their new home beneath Turtle Bay, human nature will evolve beyond its dependence on group identities.
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