The London School of Economics and Political Science

*The United Nations Security Council’s Agenda on ‘Women, Peace and Security’:
Bureaucratic Pathologies and Unrealised Potential*

Jennifer F. Klot

Declaration of Authorship

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

The findings from parts of this thesis (chapters 2 and 3) have been published in the following article:


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Abstract

Considered the single greatest achievement in ‘engendering’ global security policy, UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (SCR 1325) is celebrated as a triumph of women’s peace movements and transnational feminist organizing. My central claim is that SCR 1325 has both over performed and under delivered. The remarkable achievements it catalysed in establishing new international standards have not been fully appreciated, explored, or understood, while its successful utilisation by women rights and peace activists in the context of 'informal peace building' has not fundamentally challenged the workings of the Security Council itself, as feminists had hoped. This has resulted in an overestimation of SCR 1325’s symbolic and practical importance, and an underestimation of the broader institutional and geopolitical factors that shaped SCR 1325’s genesis and continue to drive Security Council decision-making in relation to women and gender issues.

I suggest that SCR 1325’s perceived failures have less to do with its oft-criticized textual content than with the institutions, actors, strategies, and processes that have been most central to its implementation. Historically, the geopolitics of UN decision-making on gender issues demonstrate an extreme form of bureaucratic pathology that has circumscribed opportunities for bringing gender issues onto the UN’s peace and security agenda. I introduce the concept of ‘relegation’ to explain why decision-making on women has been extrinsic to the UN mechanisms and entities that have the greatest potential for autonomous action. SCR 1325’s implementation failures also reflect the absence of a collaborative feminist epistemic community of research and praxis in the nascent field of feminist security studies. This has further limited the UN’s ability to internalise, institutionalise, and implement actions that advance, rather than undermine feminist peace building agendas.
Acknowledgments

Outrage inspires many things; an academic thesis would seem to be among the least likely. This thesis is impelled by the still countless women that have been so deeply affected by the ravages of war and its injustices and for whom there are still only words. I can only hope that mine will eventually help bridge the chasms that continue to fragment feminist activism, policy, research, and practice so that we can, as a bolder and emboldened community, do more to effect meaningful change.

I believe that creativity can always find expression, even in the world’s biggest bureaucracy. There is no greater evidence of this than the indelible imprints of courageous leadership left by Rafeeuddin Ahmed, Kathleen Cravero, and Stephen Lewis. I am honoured to call them co-conspirators and grateful for their support, mentorship, and friendship over many years. Graça Machel and Charlotte Bunch are two remarkable freedom fighters whose force of brilliance and personality moved the UN in significant ways. You are inspired and inspiring; it was a privilege to learn from and work with you. I am so fortunate to have been inducted into the UN by two of the smartest and most creative political operators (in the very best sense): thank you Roxanna Carrillo and Kimberly Gamble Payne for pointing me in all of the right directions.

SCR 1325 would not have come into being without the incredible UNIFEM team with whom I had the privilege to work: Hodan Addou, Glenda Fick, Aina Iiyambo, Comfort Lamptey, Maarit Kohonen, Gaella Mortel, Maha Muna, Sumie Nakaya, Liliana Potenza, felicitous Felicity Ruby, and Sihaka Tsemo. Our extended family was indispensible to this process, and our sanity, including Carol Cohn, Pam Delargy, Hawaa El Tayeb, Nina Lahoud, Hocine Medilli, and Yasmine Sherif.

The SSRC provided an excellent home for treading these academic waters; thank you Craig Calhoun and Mary McDonnell for making this possible and Alex de Waal for more than ten years of some of the best intellectual activism I have encountered.

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My nearest and dearest; a category of appreciation that includes all others: Luz Mendez, Saudamini Siegrist, Rita Reddy, and Theo Sowa: we have travelled so many worlds together and I am a better person for it, with so much more still to learn. Sherazade Boualia, you were my witness from the beginning and a real-life barometer of integrity, friendship, and humanity. Thank you Rawwida Baksh for forcing a chapter out of me.

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<tr>
<td>ACABQ</td>
<td>Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFELL</td>
<td>Association of Female Lawyers of Liberia</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>AFL</td>
<td>Armed Forces of Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASG</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPFA</td>
<td>Beijing Platform for Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAC</td>
<td>Children and Armed Conflict</td>
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<td>Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women</td>
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<td>Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIVPOL</td>
<td>Civilian Police</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>CSW</td>
<td>Commission on the Status of Women</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D2</td>
<td>Director level 2</td>
<td></td>
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<td>DAW</td>
<td>Division for the Advancement of Women</td>
<td></td>
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<td>DDA</td>
<td>Department of Disarmament Affairs</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
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</tr>
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<td>UN Department of Information</td>
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<tr>
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<td>UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFS</td>
<td>UN Department of Field Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group</td>
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<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>UN Economic and Social Council</td>
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<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>FPU</td>
<td>Formed Police Unit</td>
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<td>all-female Formed Police Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>G-77</td>
<td>Group of 77</td>
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<td>Group of Eight</td>
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<td>GRULAC</td>
<td>Latin America and Caribbean Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICGL</td>
<td>International Contact Group on Liberia</td>
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<tr>
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<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<tr>
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<td>International organisation</td>
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<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIU</td>
<td>Joint Inspection Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>JMAC</td>
<td>Joint Military Action Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>LNP</td>
<td>Liberian National Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>LURD</td>
<td>Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>LWI</td>
<td>Liberian Women’s Initiative</td>
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<td>MARWOPNET</td>
<td>Mano River Union Women Peace Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTGL</td>
<td>National Transitional Government of Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>OGA</td>
<td>UNMIL Office of the Gender Adviser</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIOS</td>
<td>Office of Internal Oversight Services</td>
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<td>OSAGI</td>
<td>UN Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues</td>
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<tr>
<td>P-5</td>
<td>Permanent Five (members of the Security Council)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Professional level 5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAE</td>
<td>Pacific Architects and Engineers</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peacekeeping operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>POC</td>
<td>Protection of civilians</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCPKO</td>
<td>UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>SCR 1325</td>
<td>Security Council Resolution 1325</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>Sexual exploitation and abuse</td>
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<td>SGBV</td>
<td>Sexual and gender based violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPKO</td>
<td>Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRSR</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
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<td>SSCR</td>
<td>Social Science Research Council</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security sector reform</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>UN Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNDP/BCPR</td>
<td>UNDP’s Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery</td>
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<td>UN Fund for Population Activities</td>
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<td>UN Development Fund for Women</td>
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<td>UNMIL</td>
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<td>UNOL</td>
<td>UN Office in Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOMIL</td>
<td>UN Observer Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>UNPOL</td>
<td>UN Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNU</td>
<td>UN University</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN Women</td>
<td>United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>Under Secretary-General</td>
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<td>WEOG</td>
<td>Western Europe and Others Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>Women's International League for Peace and Freedom</td>
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<td>WIPNET</td>
<td>Women In Peace Network</td>
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Chapter 1

SCR 1325: Transformation, Co-optation, or Instrumentalisation?

Considered the single greatest achievement in ‘gendering’ global security policy, United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1325 (SCR 1325) is celebrated as a triumph of women’s peace movements and transnational feminist organising.¹ It had taken the Security Council more than fifty years to recognise the relevance of women and gender issues to the maintenance of international peace and security. Since its adoption in 2000, SCR 1325 has become the most widely cited international security policy to address gender issues. It bestowed unprecedented legitimacy on an international peace building agenda for women and created political space to leverage resources and develop new intellectual and policy agendas. Importantly, SCR 1325 also created new norms and standards for UN peace operations by mandating the considerations of gender issues in all international actions to build peace and resolve conflict.²

Alongside an expansive catalogue of achievements, however, scepticism and debate is growing about SCR 1325’s potential to advance feminist, antimilitarist, and international peace building agendas. Escalating violence and militarism around the world continues to reaffirm disappointment in SCR 1325’s ability to help channel women’s peace building achievements at the local level into the mainstream of military and political decision-making. Although SCR 1325’s genesis is still celebrated as a feminist accomplishment, it is also increasingly regarded as a legitimising instrument for western military powers to advance military agendas.³

In explaining SCR 1325’s trajectory, feminist scholars attribute the resolution’s failures to its conceptual framing and its textual content, and to its co-optation by mainstream security institutions. Although the resolution’s significance as a gateway into the UN’s peace and security architecture is broadly recognised, feminist scholarship on SCR 1325 offers little analysis of the UN actors, institutions and processes that are most relevant to the negotiation and implementation of Security Council resolutions. By locating SCR 1325 along the continuum of feminist peace activism instead of the UN’s

¹ For example (Cohn 2008; Cockburn 2007; Otto 2004; Shepherd 2008a).
² For example (UN DPKO/DFS and DPA, 2007; UN DPKO/DFS, 2008a, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c).
³ For example (Otto 2014; Cockburn 2012; Orford 2002; Pratt 2013; Willett 2010; Agathangelou and Ling 2009).
peace building agenda, only a partial view of the agenda setting process is revealed. Moreover, by decontextualizing SCR 1325 from the Security Council’s evolving repertoire of practice over the past fifty years, feminist discourse analyses misinterpret key provisions and overlook the resolution’s most important normative contributions. This has resulted in an overestimation of SCR 1325’s symbolic and practical importance, and an underestimation of the broader institutional and geopolitical factors that shaped SCR 1325’s genesis, and that continue to drive Security Council decision-making.

Across different levels of analysis, my research addresses the institutional, political and bureaucratic factors shaping SCR 1325’s genesis and their implications for how women’s security is conceptualised and made operational in UN peace building. As one of SCR 1325’s UN protagonists, I have a related personal interest in more fully understanding the mechanisms and policy frameworks that were most significant in facilitating and obstructing SCR 1325’s genesis and implementation pathways.

Understanding the actors, institutions, and processes that were engaged in SCR 1325’s creation is important for many reasons, not least for the insight it provides about the role of feminist mobilisation in their transformation. By distinguishing among the multiple spheres of influence that contributed to SCR 1325’s genesis, my goal is to clarify the distinct contributions of feminist activism. This in turn, can help advance debates about the challenges of engaging with international institutions and provide a basis for assessing the impact and potential of feminist strategies to implement SCR 1325. It can also help clarify the role of international institutions in dis/enabling feminist agendas:

International institutions universalise the norms proper to a structure of world power, and that structure of power maintains itself through [the] support of these institutions …international institutions may also become vehicles for the articulation of a coherent counter-hegemonic set of values. In this way, they may become mediators between one world order and another. (Cox, 1980, p. 377)

My central claim is that SCR 1325 has both over performed and under delivered. The remarkable achievements it catalysed in establishing new international standards have not been fully appreciated, explored, or understood, while its successful utilisation by women human rights and peace activists in the context of ‘informal peace building’ has not fundamentally challenged the workings of the Security Council itself, as feminists had hoped. Although SCR 1325 has effectively broadened the boundaries of political action

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4 For example (Cohn 2008; Cockburn 2007; Otto 2010; True 2013; Otto 2004; Shepherd 2008b; Porter 2007).
that the Security Council can authorise, and has expanded the range of actors considered legitimate participants, ensuing feminist peace building agendas and strategies have, paradoxically, focused more on informal and non-formal processes, than the Security Council’s non-military repertoire of practice.

I argue that SCR 1325’s perceived failures have less to do with its oft-criticised textual content than with the institutions, actors, strategies and processes that have been most central to its implementation. Historically, the geopolitics of UN decision-making on gender issues demonstrate an extreme form of bureaucratic pathology that has circumscribed opportunities for bringing gender issues onto the UN’s peace and security agenda. I introduce the concept of ‘relegation’ to explain why decision-making on women has been extrinsic to the UN mechanisms and entities that have the greatest potential for autonomous action. I suggest that the absence of a collaborative feminist epistemic community of research and praxis in the nascent field of women and peace building has limited the UN’s ability to take more constructive approach in this area.

Ultimately, I hope that my research will help bridge the divides across feminist research, policy, activism and practice. This will require a revision of the dominant narratives regarding SCR 1325’s genealogy and discursive meaning. It will also require a deeper understanding of the institutional, political, and bureaucratic factors that shape how SCR 1325 is understood and implemented. Understanding how gender as a variable is exercised in the UN’s gender, peace and security architectures will be central to this assessment.

In this chapter, I review the research context in which SCR 1325 is situated and summarise the central debates regarding its genesis, its potential, and its failures. Second, I introduce my research questions and approach, drawing from feminist theorising about women’s engagement with global institutions, and international relations (IR) approaches to the study of delegation and agency in international organisations (IOs). Third, I describe my research methods, and then conclude with a brief overview of subsequent chapters.

1.1 SCR 1325: Herstory and Expectations

In the fifteen years since the Security Council’s first resolution on women (SCR 1325), feminist scholarship about women and security has evolved into a new sub-field in international relations and feminist security studies. Although early feminist analyses of

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5 I use ‘herstory’ in place of ‘history’ when referring to SCR 1325’s narrative genealogy as presented in the feminist literature.
SCR 1325 were both celebratory and cautiously optimistic, the junctures between critical feminist theoretical analyses of SCR 1325, and empirical, policy-oriented assessments of its impact (particularly in peacekeeping environments) have become fully-fledged chasms. I share Judy El-Bushra’s concern that “differences of approach between different feminisms are in danger of confusing the women’s peace-building agenda, and hence of diluting the efforts of an incipient global women’s peace movement (El-Bushra 2007).

In their recent review of gender and peacekeeping research, Olsson and Gizelis point to “increasing tension between empirical research and feminist discourse”, describing the former as concerned with how gender is used to understand how peacekeeping is implemented, and the latter with how feminist understanding of gender “fundamentally challenge(s) our understanding of peacekeeping operations” (Olsson and Gizelis 2014, 520–521).

Through case studies, feminist scholars have studied how SCR 1325’s utilisation in peacekeeping environments can reinforce or undermines women’s struggles locally, nationally and regionally. Overall, the findings are not very promising. In their edited collection of case studies, ‘Funmi Olonisakin, Karen Barnes and Eka Ikpe identify a significant gap between ‘advocacy and substance’ and show how attempts to make SCR 1325 operational have failed to take into account both local (upward) and regional feedback loops (Olonisakin, Barnes & Ikpe, 2011, p. 3). They argue that this has limited the ability of peace operations to benefit from, and be more responsive to, women’s peace building contributions at local, national and regional levels (Ibid.).

In this thesis, I explore how the divisions that characterise feminist research on peace and security have impeded the creation of a collaborative feminist epistemic community of research and praxis. I argue that this, in turn, has contributed to the UN’s failure to internalise and institutionalise feminist approaches to implementing SCR 1325.

1.11 Research Context
Unlike recent critical scholarship about SCR 1325, earlier feminist tributes to SCR 1325 were both celebratory and cautiously optimistic. The role of feminist peace activists in SCR 1325’s genesis is a critical part of this feminist narrative herstory, conferring it with ‘feminist credibility’ as a subversive achievement. This early literature sought to establish a common framework for feminist activists and academics to appreciate the significance of the Security Council’s 50 year-late recognition of women’s relevance to the UN’s most powerful decision making body.
A small community of feminist scholars have written thoughtfully about SCR 1325’s origins in the broader context of feminist peace activism and engagement with mainstream security institutions. In particular, Carol Cohn’s influential writing about SCR 1325’s genesis has helped construct an appealing narrative that borders, at times, on ‘case-making’ to a highly (and understandably) sceptical feminist activist and academic community. For example, in The Women’s Review of Books, Cohn appeals to US feminists and women’s organisations:

If the terms “UN”, “Security Council” and “resolution number” all immediately set off your “irrelevant and uninteresting” alarm, you might want to pause and reconsider. For women in many war-torn regions, in many local, national and international non-governmental organisations, and in many multilateral institutions, what happens at the UN matters a lot. For those women, just saying “1325” evokes a host of new possibilities and the promise of a radical change from politics-as-usual. Whether that promise is realized or not, hinges, in large part, on women’s international mobilization…So why aren’t more US feminists and women’s organizations paying attention to 1325? The issues it addresses are literally matters of life and death for women across the globe. (Cohn 2004, 8–9)

In addressing feminist academics about the tensions between activist and academic approaches to thinking about 1325, she remarks:

I think that we need to be careful not to lose sight of just how extraordinary 1325 is. In fact, perhaps we academics and researchers should slow down, engage in the appreciative aspect of critique and see what we can learn from it, before focusing on its possible dangers or limitations. It is amazing that the world’s largest international security institution has now publicly declared that attention to gender is integral to ‘doing security’. Even if at this point the Security Council’s re-envisioning of security is more rhetorical than practical, it still puts the UN far ahead of any academic security studies or international relations program that I can think of. (Cohn, Kinsella, Gibbings & Muna, 2004, p. 139)

A common theme in the SCR 1325 literature is the expectation that it would become a vehicle for challenging militarism and the institutional and structural causes of gender inequality and conflict. SCR 1325’s transformative potential is associated with its ability to empower local women’s groups and peace initiatives, to increase women’s political leadership in peace building and also, most crucially, to catalyse non-military alternatives

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6 Especially Carol Cohn, Cynthia Cockburn, Cynthia Enloe, Dyan Mazurana, Sandra Whitworth, Funmi Olonisakin, Diane Otto and Felicity Hill.
7 This is taken from an ‘email roundtable’ dialogue with Felicity Hill and Maha Muna, former members of the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security who later joined UNIFEM, and two academic scholars, Helen Kinsella and Sheri Gibbings (former NGO working group and UNIFEM intern).
to armed conflict and non-military approaches to humanitarian action (Porter 2007; Otto 2006; Cohn et al. 2004; Cockburn 2007). Linked to this vision is the understanding that SCR 1325’s emancipatory potential rests with its ability to make women’s knowledge central to military and political decision-making:

Women and men must use the opportunities opened up by the resolution to empower those women who play such important roles and in their local communities by promoting feminist methods of building peace and security. This knowledge, if it can be brought into formal decision-making processes without being divested of its emancipatory content, will challenge the gendered moorings of militarism [emphasis added], ensuring that human rights and social justice priorities shape a new approach to international security and promote different calculations of the costs of resort to collective enforcement measures. If this occurs, the Resolution will have addressed the Security Council’s deficit in gender legitimacy in an emancipatory way, by challenging the injustices of militaristic “peace” and building women’s substantive equality, opening the real possibility of achieving a world in which succeeding generations can be saved from the scourge of war. (Otto 2004, 22)

These aspirations associate SCR 1325’s genesis with a long history of women’s peace organising. Critical feminist scholar Diane Otto locates SCR 1325’s historical origins in feminist support for the UN’s establishment in 1945, and the vision of “emancipatory possibilities that the UN Security Council might be stretched to, beyond its protective military mode” (Otto 2004, 1). Long before SCR 1325 was conceptualised, Cynthia Enloe conveyed a similar hope:

…the form of military force that is inspiring perhaps the greatest hope is the UN peacekeeping force …. it inspires optimism because it seems to perform military duties without being militaristic…its troops at first glance appear to escape the distorting dynamics of militarism because they may not depend so heavily on patriarchal masculinity. (Enloe 1993, 33)

In Men, Militarism and UN Peacekeeping, Sandra Whitworth explains, “peace groups and women’s groups looked to the UN peace operations as an important alternative to the more traditional ‘combat-capable’ emphases of most militaries” (Whitworth 2004, 12).

The sense of feminist propriety over SCR 1325 has been reinforced by its creative utilisation among women’s groups around the world in ways that far exceeded its statutory mandate. In Peacebuilding: Women in International Perspective, Elisabeth Porter catalogues a wide array of peace building initiatives by women’s grassroots movements and activists in conflict-affected areas around the world (Porter 2007). The Resolution’s translation into more than 100 languages, the creation of forty-six SCR 1325 National
Action Plans, and the burgeoning corpus of assessments about its implementation continue to assert a sense of feminist ‘ownership’ of the resolution.

In the years following SCR 1325’s adoption, however, growing insecurity among women affected by conflicts around the world - the vast majority not on the Security Council’s agenda - deepened feminist scepticism about SCR 1325’s transformative potential. Despite the significant achievements in informal peace-building arenas, there had been little impact on the UN’s actions to build peace or resolve conflicts. Dyan Mazurana, Angela Raven-Roberts, and Jane Parpart document the growing pressure on the UN to make gender more central to peace operations, and their inability to translate SCR 1325’s goals into political and tactical concepts of operation (D. E. Mazurana, Raven-Roberts, and Parpart 2005). Tracy Fitzsimmons explains:

At its core, peace building is first about establishing and maintaining security, and second about constituting and buttressing a democratic political system….security efforts cluster around the country of ethnically and politically motivated oppression and impunity. In oversimplified terms, governments and NGOs claim post-war victory when there is a reasonable degree of certainty that the war or conflict will not recur, when free and fair elections are held and when a person’s skin colour, religious persuasion, or political party affiliation is not likely to get him killed. (D. E. Mazurana, Raven-Roberts, and Parpart 2005, 185)

In other words, UN actions to ensure national, ‘public’ peace, through treaties, peace operations, and new civilian police forces, contributed little to building a security and justice system that could offer protection to women in public or private spaces.

After the September 11th attacks in 2001, US actions in Iraq and Afghanistan reinforced feminist diffidence about the potential of UN peace building to advance anything other than the prevailing power structures. Critical feminist scholars began to share more in common with critical security scholars like Michael Pugh, who described the explicit social and political goals of the UN’s new peace building agenda as nothing more than “humanitarian rhetoric and sophistry” (Pugh 2004, 49). For Pugh, peace building operations were a ‘management device’ of the post-industrialised, capitalist world that effectively “neutered the universal pretensions of the UN” (Ibid., p. 39).

The tenor of feminist literature gradually but inexorably shifted from one of cautious and celebratory optimism, to rage and betrayal. In 2007, Cynthia Cockburn described SCR 1325 as “the most remarkable institutional achievement of women’s anti-war movements to date” (Cockburn 2007, 138). Five years later, her disappointment was palpable:
[SCR 1325] was ‘our’ achievement. It was ‘our’ project and ‘our’ success. Yet the more energetically we push for its implementation the more we see its limitations. Worse, it can be used for ends quite contrary those we intended. In this respect, NATO is…an enraging example of how a good feminist work can be manipulated by a patriarchal and militarist institution. (Cockburn 2012, 49)

Similarly, for Diane Otto:

…when the Resolution is measured against the aspirations of the international women’s peace movement to demilitarise the way that security is understood, it is wanting in significant respects…Despite this apparent congruence of purpose, the UN’s collective system for securing the peace has remained tenaciously state-centred, militaristic and male-dominated, and frustratingly resistant to the anti-militaristic ways of thinking that have been at the heart of local and international women’s movements for peace. (Otto 2004, 12)

As disappointment and criticism continued to grow, SCR 1325’s narrative arc began to take a life of its own, further elevating expectations for the resolution that extended far beyond even the most expansive vision of multilateralism. In 2009, feminist scholar Jacque True suggests that implementing SCR 1325 (and its related resolutions) “will require UN peacekeeping and peace-building missions to alter aggressive constructions of masculinity in societal, state, and military institutions” (True, 2009, 48). Similarly, for Susan Willett, achieving the “transformatory implications of 1325” implied not only “a major restructuring of the structures of the UN to ensure greater gender equality, but [also] a major transformation of the highly militarised culture that currently permeates the UN and its peacekeeping structures” (Willett 2010, 143).

In taking stock of SCR 1325’s failures, both feminist theoretical and empirical literature agree that implementation strategies, namely through gender mainstreaming and UN peace operations, have yielded few positive results and, in some cases, have increased women’s insecurity. There is also broad consensus that the Resolution’s failures to advance a feminist, antimilitarist agenda are rooted in its conceptual framing and discursive reinforcement of essentialist and binary logics that assume an undifferentiated and oppositional distinction between national/international; male/female; victim/leader:8

…the framing of 1325, especially matters it failed to include, left the Resolution hostage to co-optation by militarist states and military institutions for military purposes...its wording and provisions leave it co-optable by militarism. (Cockburn 2012, 48–53)

8 See for example, (Selimovic 2012; H. Hudson 2009; Shepherd 2008b; Baines 2003; Puechguirbal 2010; Willett 2010; N. F. Hudson 2009; McLeod 2011; H. Hudson 2012; Cockburn 2012; Reeves 2012; Pratt 2013; Aoláin 2009; Tryggestad 2009; Shepherd 2007).
A growing genre of post-colonial feminist analysis of SCR 1325 share Pratt’s assessment that SCR 1325’s textual discourse and subsequent resolutions effectively “re-legitimize (“white”) masculinist protection of women and girls in conflict zones, pathologize men in conflict zones as perpetrators of sexual violence, and effectively silence the victims of sexual violence through the re-sex-ing of race” (Pratt 2013, 777).

More recently, SCR 1325 has become fodder in debates about the utility of engaging with mainstream security institutions, and the challenge of reconciling pacifist and antimilitarist ideals with the morality of humanitarian intervention. ‘Funmi Olonisakin captures both the tenor of these debates and the core challenge they elicit: “SCR 1325 does not explicitly address structural change but the results that it seeks require a fundamental shift in the prevailing systems” (Olonisakin, 2010, 3). She and Ikpe pose a central question that the literature has yet to answer, namely, “can SCR 1325 be used strategically to drive systemic change?” (F. Olonisakin and Ikpe 2011, 234). My research is motivated by the same question and ask not only if SCR 1325 can it be used to drive systematic change, but how this can be achieved, and what role the UN (including, but not limited to, the Security Council) can play in this process.

1.2 Worlds Apart: Feminist Theory and Praxis in Relation to SCR 1325
SCR 1325 gave (momentary) pause to critical feminist scholars because it signalled that feminist engagement could have an impact on the UN. However, by locating SCR 1325 along a continuum of feminist peace activism, we learn more about feminist agenda-setting strategies and less about the obstacles and opportunities for institutionalising and implementing a feminist peace building agenda within the UN. Although some of the actors, institutions, and processes are common to both processes, their relative importance and their interconnectedness varies considerably over time, place, and in response to shifting geopolitical alliances and bilateral agendas.

By privileging the role of women’s NGOs and peace activists in SCR 1325’s narrative herstory, relative to the diversity of actors, alliances with whom they collaborated within and outside of the UN, some of the most important lessons about feminist engagement with international institutions and transformation are lost. And without problematising the UN itself, both the expectations for SCR 1325 and the analyses of its limitations seemingly overlook the institutional and geopolitical factors that shape how ‘gender’ as a variable is exercised within international organisations. We therefore learn very little about the UN’s potential as an arena in which feminist agendas can be dis/enabled, or about the
institutional, political and bureaucratic factors that are most significant in shaping the opportunities for bringing women and gender issues onto the UN’s peace and security agenda.

Instead, a good portion of the theoretical and critical feminist analyses of SCR 1325 has focused on its discursive construction. With few exceptions, feminist discourse analyses of SCR 1325 rely on feminist concepts and theories to interpret the Resolution’s binary distinctions, essentialist references, and its overall framing in relation to the military aspects of UN actions. However, by analysing SCR 1325’s text using feminist concepts and terminology rather than the Security Council’s, feminist scholars project onto SCR 1325 a critical post-colonial feminist ideology that is wholly detached from the Resolution’s political and institutional context. Without understanding the specific meaning of SCR 1325 in relation to the Security Council’s discursive, historical and political context, both its content and the institutional and bureaucratic factors shaping its implementation are obscured.

By focusing on textual content, feminist discourse analysis of SCR 1325 ends up problematising the resolution, rather than institutional politics and processes in which it is embedded. Like all policies, resolutions are little more than statements of consensus. As a thematic resolution, 1325 is intended to guide the actions of the Security Council, its members, and the operations it authorises. At best, it reflects the lowest common denominator of political agreement among 15 member states. It is an aspirational statement of intent; and neither a biblical text, nor a legally binding instrument. Indeed, as Druckman explains, "mandates are political documents…that are meant to convey broad purposes while maximising …political support…they can be vague, with considerable room for disagreement over purpose and strategy" (Druckman, Stern, and Diehl 1997, 152).

However, if SCR 1325 is not itself responsible for implementation failures, then what is? My view is that feminist criticism of SCR 1325’s textual discourse and implementation failures mask a more fundamental ambivalence about the UN itself. By contextualising SCR 1325 in the discourse of gender equality rather than UN peace building, the fundamental feminist dilemma regarding the morality of humanitarian intervention is surfaced, but unresolved. Instead, the ‘uneasy silence’ that Gina Heathcote refers to, “in feminist debates about when, if ever, the use of military force to save women would be feminist” (Heathcote 2011, 41) becomes even quieter.
My question is not if SCR 1325 is being instrumentalised by the Security Council, but rather, how feminists use SCR 1325 to instrumentalise the Council on behalf of women?

1.21 Understanding SCR 1325: A Critical, Feminist Synthesis Approach

As one of SCR 1325’s UN protagonists, I want to understand if SCR 1325 is a proof-of-concept of the UN’s potential for enabling feminist agendas. My research therefore examined the political and institutional factors that were most significant in facilitating and obstructing SCR 1325’s genesis, and its implementation pathways. Specifically, I ask:

1. How did the historical development of the UN’s structure and organisation shape its institutional arrangements for women and the emergence of women on the (macro-level) international peace and security agenda? What role did nongovernmental actors play in these processes?
2. What were the institutional, geopolitical, and bureaucratic factors shaping SCR 1325’s (meso-level) implementation pathways?
3. How did the engendering of global security policy (through SCR 1325) influence the strategic and operational priorities of UN peacebuilding operations at the (micro) level of implementation?

In each of these questions, I also explore the role of individual agency. My interest is in understanding how an institution internalises new ideas and acts on them, rather than the impacts of specific policies or programmes or the feedback about these consequences that inform UN actions and the demands made upon it.9 I take an iterative, case-centric approach that uses outcome process tracing to explore the gendered and socio-spatial interactions across the ‘who, where and why’ of international relations.10

I begin with the actors and activism that inspired SCR 1325’s genesis. This is followed by an analysis of the meso-level arena in which UN implementation strategies were developed. I then examine how these strategies were made operational through the

9 Ernst Haas distinguishes five stages of organisational learning: “(1) demands; (2) organizational agenda formation; (3) organizational program; (4) organizational output, and (5) experience with results of the output or outcome.” While recognising that only the second and third steps can take place in the organisation, he emphasises that understanding the consequences of action or inaction and the nature of feedback about these consequences is essential for conceptualising changes of organisational form” (Haas 1990, 19–20).
10 In describing the academic debate about ‘where’ IR takes place, Laura Sjoberg applies geographical conceptions of scale to IR’s explorations of agent and structure in relation to analysing the complex interactions among the state, the international system and sub-state actors (Sjoberg 2008, 473).
deployment of an all-female formed police unit (FFPU) to the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). The unit’s deployment is a pivotal example of UN peace building in which gender issues were identified as an explicit aim of the mission mandate and, seemingly, acted upon in operational terms.\textsuperscript{11}

In the following section, I explain my research strategy and analytic framework drawing from feminist constructivist approaches in international relations (IR) and the study of international organisations (IOs). Taken together, I refer to this as a ‘critical feminist synthesis’ approach.

1.22 \textit{Research Strategy and Conceptual Framework}

In this section, I put forward a ‘critical, feminist synthesis’ approach. This approach resonates most closely with Locher and Prugl’s ‘middle ground’ between feminism and constructivism (Locher and Prügl 2001), while drawing from theories of organisational behaviour that have been applied to the study of international organisations (M. Barnett and Finnemore 2004; M. N. Barnett and Finnemore 1999).

As a construct, I use the term ‘feminism’ to refer to theories about transforming patriarchal and other relations of inequality, domination and power relations (Fonow and Cook 1991; Harding 1986; Jackson and Pearson 2005; Harding 2004). As an objective, I use the term ‘feminist’ to reflect my explicit aim of contributing to a global community of research, policy, and practice that seeks to redress the injustices and inequalities that are both causes and consequences of armed conflict and insecurity worldwide, taking women’s lives and social identities and relationships as a central focus. In this sense, I share the contention that, “a conceptual understanding of gender and the application of it to particular instances requires an intellectual disposition towards both the substance and process of these phenomena” (Meyers, 1999, p. 5).

My research focus and approach is informed by my professional experience as a feminist activist working within and outside of the United Nations and, most recently, within an academic research institution. As I elaborate the following sections, this

\textsuperscript{11} I use the term ‘peace operation’ to refer to the deployment ‘peace keeping’ or ‘peace making’ operations that support a broad range of activities by civilian and military personnel, including political mediation, elections, demobilisation and reintegration, police reform, and the protection and promotion of human rights. In some UN operations, security functions are performed by military forces under the command of regional organisations like NATO (in the case of Kosovo and Afghanistan) or the African Union (such as Darfur, Sudan and Somalia). I use ‘peace building’ to refer to the broader aim of these deployments, to provide the tools for building the foundations of peace that is more than just the absence of war. I also use the term to refer to a specific UN discourse, and to an emergent field of research and practice.
positionality informed all aspects of my research design: case selection, documentary evidence, interview selection criteria, and the UN institutions and mechanisms studied. Feminist theories consider experiential and reflexive knowledge-building as a political stance, in that, “the researcher is not posed as objective, value-free and neutral but as having a subjectivity and positionality, that is, a social, cultural, political and economic location” (Jackson 2006, 534).

Regarding the concept of gender, my perspective is ‘bio-social’ in that I understand the biology of sex as a physiological continuum with behavioural expressions (masculinities and femininities) that are co-constitutive along multiple axes of interpersonal, family, and social relations. These, in turn, mediate and are mediated by broader socio-cultural, economic, political, and bio-environmental factors, from global warming to pandemics. In studying gender and security, I understand violence as both physical and social, affecting men and women in different ways, with implications for gender and inter-generational relations. Analytically, I understand acts of violence as expressions of patriarchal power that are inseparable from the wider political, economic, and socio-cultural context. 12

My approach is ‘critical’ in that I do not take institutions, social, and power relations for granted, but look at the social and political complex as a whole, with an interest in possibilities for transformation (R. W. Cox 1981). I understand that different forms of power are exercised by specific groups in ways that can advance or obstruct ideas according to their institutional location and along the axes of sex, national identity, rank, functional responsibilities, and others. Following Locher and Prügl, I share a critical constructivist understanding of power that also reflects the insight of feminist critical theorists:

…all rules and institutions always entail rule, that is, they systematically distribute privilege to create patterns of subordination (Onuf, 1989, p. 75). In this understanding institutions exercise power in providing guides to practice, but these guides are always tainted, promoting formations of rule such as hierarchy, hegemony, or heteronomy (Onuf, 1989). Such a conceptualisation of power lends itself to showing systematic forces of subordination aligned along the axes of gender, race, and other statuses. It enables an investigation both of gendered power in institutions and of the way in which agents participate in reproducing or challenging it. (Locher and Prügl 2001, 117–118)

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12 I share Cynthia Enloe’s understanding of patriarchy as the systemic privileging of masculinity (Enloe 2004).
Prugl sees international organisations as sites of struggle around which actors mobilise to promote and oppose particular interests, including feminist agendas. By understanding how these goals, strategies and processes are ‘gendered’ in their construction, we can specify ways in which international organisations reproduce gendered hierarchies and create structural impediments to women’s advancement (Prugl 2004). Describing the constructivist research agenda as more than a descriptive undertaking, Prugl emphasises the need to understand how things develop:

For constructivists, understanding how things are put together and how they occur is not mere description...Just as understanding how the double-helix DNA molecule is constituted materially enables understandings of genetics and disease, so, too, an understanding of how sovereignty, human rights, laws of war, or bureaucracies are constituted socially allows us to hypothesize about their effects in world politics. Constitution in this sense is causal, since how things are put together makes possible, or even probable, certain kinds of political behavior and effects (Wendt, 1998, Barnett & Finnemore, 1999). Because they are permissive and probabilistic, however, such explanations are necessarily contingent and partial—they are small-t truth claims. (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, 394).

My interest is in how ideas about women and gender are connected with and shaped by geopolitical power relations, past and present. I examine how Cold War antagonisms and present day geopolitical rivalries contribute to the creation of gender ‘categories’ of debate in the UN (e.g. women’s leadership and participation, gender equality) that are considered ‘natural’ or the products of more contemporary social construction processes. This follows Finnemore and Sikkink’s observation that “many of the categories we treat as natural are in fact products of past social construction processes, processes in which power is often deeply implicated” (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, 398).

In this sense, I also draw from structuration theory and its emphasis on the dialectical nature of social action and structure. For example, Giddens’ structuration theory emphasises the importance of social practices and their ordering across time and space. For Giddens, a social system can be understood by its structure, modality and interaction; if agents can reproduce structure through action, they can also transform it (Giddens 1984). My research takes a synthesis approach that “…attempts to explain major parts of whole systems by combining abstract and concrete research findings with generalisations covering a wide range of constitutive structures, mechanisms and events” (Sayer 1992, 237).
These complex and non-linear social processes occur in “complex systems thrust amidst complex systems” (Pawson, 2004: iv). Keeley views implementation processes as “sites in the policy process in which policies are mediated, circumvented, refashioned and created” (Keeley 2001, 25). Keeley and Scoones emphasise the complexity and centrality of implementation for understanding the link between policy goals and outcomes (Keeley and Scoones 1999). In the field of peace building, many of these ‘sites’ are relatively unexplored. This is partly due to issues of access, ethics and security (Peter 2013; Lipson 2005; Henry, Higate, and Sanghera 2009; Paris 2014; Prügl 2011). It is also because they are changing rapidly with the currents of UN reform and because implementation varies significantly according to context and rarely involves the same actors. They are, as Keeley describes most policy processes, “distinctly non-linear, inherently political and contested and more incremental and haphazard” (Keeley 2001, 9).

Below, I briefly summarise my analytic framework as it relates to the study of international organisations, and the processes and mechanisms through which ideas are internationalised and institutionalised.

**International Organisations:** Since there is no widely accepted definition of international institutions, the IO literature treats specific entities as self-contained social systems that can be studied independently and comparatively. Moreover, IO literature also lacks a consistent way of explaining the ‘UN system’ as a whole. Rather, it tends to look at themes or ‘problems’, processes, or specific UN entities. Barnett and Finnemore refer to all IOs as bureaucracies, “a distinctive social form of authority with [their] own internal logic and behavioural proclivities” (M. Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 3).

My understanding of UN institutional structure and bureaucracy departs from these approaches in some significant respects. I understand the UN as a singular system such that an analysis of any specific United Nations entity must be contextualised within the totality of its interrelated organisational structures. Each of the UN’s organs, mechanisms and entities are interlinked components that cannot be broken down into independent, comparable parts, or as a system comparable to other inter-governmental, international

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13 For example (Büthe 2006; Oestreich 2012; M. Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Thomas G. Weiss et al. 2010; Karns and Mingst 2010; Duffield 2007).
14 The UN’s structure and organisation (and its rules and procedures) are continually evolving. The UN’s organisation chart, published by the UN Department of Information, includes the following disclaimer, “This is not an official document of the United Nations, nor is it intended to be all inclusive of the UN” (http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/structure/pdfs/UN%20system%20chart_lettercolor_2013.pdf).
organisations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Group of 8 (G-8).\textsuperscript{15} The UN is the only international organisation that includes every sovereign state, and has the distinct purpose of advancing relations among all its members, rather than advancing the strategic (political, economic, security) interests of a smaller group of members. In my understanding, the term ‘bureaucracy’ is not interchangeable with the ‘United Nations’, nor does it refer only to the UN Secretariat:

It is tempting to think of the Secretariat as a bureaucracy, with a relationship to the UN’s intergovernmental bodies much like the relationship between a national parliament or government and its civil service. Yet this would be wrong. For the Secretariat is, in many ways, a political institution, a place where the UN’s member states compete for power and influence and attempt to diminish the power and influence of others. The Secretariat’s standing at the nexus of competing and conflicting international agendas can often be the content as well as the context of its work (Myint-U and Scott 2007, x).

Instead, I use the term ‘bureaucratic’ to refer to the processes through which UN decisions are negotiated and the mechanisms through which power is exercised i.e. voting blocs, budget reviews, personnel placement, and knowledge generation.

Accordingly, I adapt my analysis of the UN’s institutional structure to conform with the UN’s own depiction of its three-tiered structure and organisation: (1) its main bodies (five of the UN’s six principal organs that are composed of UN member states and not subject to instruction by other organs); (2) the Secretariat, a principal organ that is headed by the Secretary General; and (3) the UN Funds and Programmes, and Specialised Agencies.\textsuperscript{16} In particular, I suggest that the UN Funds and Programmes are a distinct tier that have not been sufficiently problematised in the study of the international organisations (Karns and Mingst 2010; Smith 2006; Thomas G Weiss and Thakur 2010).\textsuperscript{17} I understand each of the three organisational tiers as inter-connected while having distinct membership,

\textsuperscript{15} NATO was founded by 12 members and now includes 28 countries; the G8 was originally formed by six leading industrialised economies, and grew to 8 members; after suspending Russia, is now the G7.

\textsuperscript{16} The UN states that “The Charter established six principal organs of the United Nations: the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat (The Trusteeship Council suspended operation on 1 November 1994). The United Nations family, however, is much larger, encompassing 15 agencies and several programmes and bodies” (http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/structure/). See also the UN Handbook, published annually since 1961 by the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (http://www.nzembassy.com/united-nations/united-nations-handbook/united-nations-handbook).

\textsuperscript{17} Robert Cox usefully distinguishes between ‘forum’ organisations and ‘service organizations’; the former provides a framework within which member state negotiates agreements, and the latter refers to those carrying out services that are not carried out by member states (Robert W Cox and Jacobson 1973, 8). Weiss and Carayannis describe the Funds and Programs as a part of the ‘Third UN’ in which they also include independent non-governmental entities and think tanks; they consider the First UN to consist of member states, the second UN as the Secretariat (Thomas G Weiss, Carayannis, and Jolly 2009).
agendas, mandates, decision-making structures and resources. By ‘institutional’, therefore, I refer to the way that both ideas and geo-political factors are expressed in the UN’s organizational structure along these three tiers.

I agree with Barnett and Finnemore that international organisations are best understood by “opening up the black box of international organisations and examining how they are constituted and use their authority and [only then]…can we begin to understand their power, their capacity for pathological behaviour and the way they evolve” (M. Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 9). In this sense, Barnett and Finnemore refer to the ‘pathologies of IOs’ as a way of understanding how they “become captives of their own rules and procedures in ways that make them repressive, ineffective or even counterproductive” (ibid). Fundamentally, my research addresses the UN’s pathologies in relation to women.

By geopolitical, therefore, I refer to state identities (national, regional, ideological) and their inter-relationships (hegemonic, counter-hegemonic, allies, enemies, etc.). I am interested in how national and regional identities and alignments influenced the emergence of ideas regarding women and gender on the UN’s peace and security agenda; and how the UN’s institutional arrangements and organisational practices and mechanisms influenced SCR 1325’s genesis and implementation pathways. The first emphasis is concerned with how state identities influence ideas and structure; the second asks how organisational structure influences the way ideas are internalised and institutionalised and acted upon. My research seeks to understand the UN’s role in shaping an international agenda for women, how has it served as a vehicle for advancing transnational policies and forms of global governance or gender ‘regimes’ and how has this influenced its own legitimacy.18

**Actors, Ideas, Power, and Transformation:** The evolution of IO structures is an especially important reflection of the triumph of the power of some ideas relative to others. According to Nicolas Onuf, this is why “there is no ‘agent-structure problem’….all rules regulate conduct by definition and, in doing so, constitute the social arrangements with which they function” (Onuf 2014, 4). For the same reason, my analysis of SCR 1325’s genesis and implementation is grounded in an analysis of the historical evolution of the UN’s gender, peace and security architectures.

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18 Kratochwil and Ruggie define ‘regimes’ as governing arrangements “constructed by states to coordinate their expectations and organise aspects of international behaviour in various issue-areas. They thus comprise a normative element, state practice and organization roles” (Kratochwil and Ruggie 2011, 759).
Recognising that institutional structure, rules and mechanisms are mutually co-constituted, my research looks at how decision-making on women and gender is influenced by particular expressions of organisational leadership (or the absence thereof), political identities and roles, and individual attributes. I understand ‘identities’ as inherited and constructed such that an individual may choose among a number of identities that may vary over time in relation to changing geo-political arrangements and ideologies; I am interested in what determines the calculation of these choices, especially in relation to women and gender.

By focusing on gender as a variable and a process in relation to different UN rules, norms, and structures, my aim is to understand how these linked sets of rules both advance and obstruct SCR 1325’s implementation. I am specifically interested in the structural configuration of status-order in relation to the positioning of feminist leaders within (non-feminist) organisations and institutions, and their expanded alliances across, within, and outside of the UN. To this end, I refer to SCR 1325’s lead protagonists, both within and outside of the UN, as ‘feminist norm entrepreneurs’.

In the social movement literature, organisational or norm entrepreneurs refer to those individuals and groups “who care enough about an issue to absorb the initial costs of mobilizing, bring with them a wealth of organizing experiences, are well connected, and have vision and charisma (Oliver and Marwell 1992,252)” in (J. M. Joachim 2007, 33). According to Joachim:

Organisational entrepreneurs can also facilitate contact with policymakers because they are what Organ (Organ 1971) refers to as ‘linking pins’ and Gordenker and Weiss (1996, 35) dub ‘boundary-role occupants. They mediate as ‘activist brokers’ between their own organisation and its environment, bridging the gap between the beliefs and goals of NGO members and policymakers (Gordenker and Weiss, 1996). (J. M. Joachim 2007, 33–34)

I introduce the concept of ‘door openers’ in contraposition to the emphasis given in feminist literature to the role of men as ‘gatekeepers’, described by RW Connell as:

…the very gender inequalities in economic assets, political power, and cultural authority, as well as the means of coercion, that gender reforms intend to change, currently mean that men (often specific groups of men) control most of the resources required to implement women’s claims for justice. Men and boys are thus in significant ways gatekeepers for gender equality. Whether they are willing to open the gates for major reforms is an important strategic question. (Connell et al. 2005, 1802)
In this specific sense, I use the term ‘door openers’ to refer to men and women who are willing to use their credibility and authority to legitimise a feminist agenda and create opportunities to advance it.

In reviewing the literature about SCR 1325’s genesis, I am especially interested in how social movement theories have been used to construct a shared narrative about the strategies, expectations, and interests that motivated the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security. Some analyses of SCR 1325’s genesis emphasise the importance of feminist collective identity as compared to the importance of strategic considerations. Instead, I use the concept of ‘framing’ to explain the strategic choices made in the process of negotiating SCR 1325:

…the conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action... Framing occurs not only through what movements say but also through what they do—through their choices of tactics and the connections between their actions and their rhetoric. (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996)

However, I distinguish between SCR 1325’s characterisation as an achievement in ‘issue framing’ and agenda setting, and the subsequent failures in institutionalising these ideas. SCR 1325 has not been successfully implemented or instilled within an institutional home so that it is understood as part of the institution’s purpose:

Differences in how new ideas fit existing institutions can help explain divergent policy responses (Skocpol & Weir, 1985; Hall 1993)….in order to be internalised, new ideas need not only to be institutionalised, but also to fit or be congruent with historically formed ideologies or the structure of political discourse of a nation (Hall, 1989). (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, 407)

Finally, I am interested in how feminist scholarship on SCR 1325 portrays the interactions and alliances among and within different NGO sectors and other actors in the UN, particularly within the UN’s gender mechanisms. I look at how the UN’s geopolitical history of development influenced these alliances over time and how their progressive diminution helps explain the absence of a feminist epistemic community capable of developing ‘consensual knowledge’ that brings together political, technical, practical, and conceptual understanding of the ‘women, peace and security agenda’ that can be internalised and institutionalised by the UN. In this sense, I apply the concept of ‘epistemic communities’ and ‘consensual knowledge’ to refer to shared processes by which knowledge:
… its nature debatable and debated, becomes sufficiently accepted to enter the decision-making process… In order to give an account of this process, it is not necessary that we also explain how the relevant information theories came into existence. We need not and do not deny that many terms and ideas that enter the process remain contentious and contested. Nor do we deny that the political interests experienced by actors are one determinant of which kind of knowledge will be preferred as a basis for a decision. I make no claim that consensual knowledge is absolutely different from political ideology; on the contrary, the line between the two is often barely visible. (Haas 1990, 20–21)

In sum, my research is motivated by a feminist concern about how structural and gender inequalities are both causes and consequences of conflict, violence, and insecurity. My approach is constructivist in its aim of understanding how institutional and bureaucratic practices in the UN are gendered and co-constituted in relation to different individual and geopolitical identities and agendas. I also explore how different forms of power are reproduced and challenged by different actors through linked set of rules, norms, and structures. Using a synthesis approach, I recognise the complexity and non-linearity of policy implementation as a fluid process throughout which policy goals are translated into outcomes.

In the following section, I describe my research methods, which draw from insights gained from my direct involvement in SCR 1325’s genesis, as well as in-depth interviews, policy tracing, and a pivotal case study of SCR 1325’s operationalisation in the UN Mission in Liberia.

1.3 Research Methods
In relation to SCR 1325, I am interested in understanding the constellation of institutional, bureaucratic, and political factors that have shaped how women and gender issues emerged onto the UN’s peace and security agenda. I use genealogy as a form of process tracing to highlight the ‘ruptures’ and ‘disjunctures’ identified in feminist literature, but remain under-explored. Instead, I offer a meta-narrative of SCR 1325’s genesis, that offers an insider perspective about the actors, institutions and mechanisms that were most significant in shaping the resolution’s content and implementation pathways. Genealogy, as a form of historical analysis:

… enriches or challenges previous interpretations, rather than producing one correct objective history…genealogy in particular sensitizes academics to the ways in which dominant discourses, including scholarly interpretations, can create artificial unity by appealing to certain elements of the past over others (Milliken 1999, 243). (Klotz and Lynch 2007, 35)
My focus begins with the actors and activism that inspired SCR 1325’s genesis. This is followed by an analysis of the meso-level arena in which UN implementation strategies were developed. Next, I examine their operational expression within the UN Mission in Liberia. The stages and levels of analysis I use correspond to the UN’s chain of command authority in peacekeeping: strategic decisions are made by the UN Secretary General, the Security Council, and the Secretariat; operational decisions are made by mission leadership and the substantive components of peace operations; and, tactical decisions are made by UN military and police (UN DPKO/DFS 2008b). The UN’s extensive documentation system provides large amounts of data to support process tracing as an analytical tool.

In particular, following Collier, I use process tracing to draw both descriptive and causal inferences about novel political and social phenomena, “Process tracing is defined as the systemic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analyzed in light of research questions posed. Process tracing looks at how events unfold over time and requires an analysis of key steps in a process (Collier 2011, 824). Collier argues that ‘good snapshots’ at a series of specific moments are essential for characterising the sequence of change and the unfolding of events over time, “To characterize a process, we must be able to characterize key steps in the process, which in turn permits good analysis of change and sequence” (Ibid.).

In the following sections, I describe my own positionality and how this has informed my research methods and data analysis.

1.31 Reflexive Praxis
My research approach, strategy, and methods are shaped by a critical and self-reflexive analysis of my direct involvement in SCR 1325’s genesis, and a thirty year history of feminist activism inside and outside of the UN. I realise that this contribution while unique, is not without limitations. To some extent, I am a character in the meta-narrative I present. Below, I provide a brief summary of the experiences that I draw from (and corollary documentation, where available).

help organise the first international women’s rights tribunal at the 1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights, in collaboration with the Global Center for Women’s Leadership, based at Rutgers University in New Jersey. At the time, UNIFEM used its comparatively meagre resources, approximately $23 million (US) a year, to provide funding and technical support to women’s organisations in developing and crisis countries, and to support women’s organising internationally, regionally and nationally. It viewed itself as an intermediary between women’s organisations and the UN’s human rights system (and to a lesser extent, the UN’s development mechanisms).

In 1994, after collaborating with UNICEF on a project to advance the complementarity of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, UNICEF asked me to ‘co-ordinate’ Graça Machel’s Independent Expert Study on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Children. This experience was formative; for the first time, I worked on an issue that engendered consensus rather than hostility, and that was supported by a well-resourced and influential institution. There, I gained exposure to the UN’s peace and security architecture and developed and led UNICEF’s strategy for advancing the first Security Council resolution on children. At UNICEF, I recall thinking – over and over again – how ‘easy’ it was to advance political and policy agendas in relation to children (and to include feminist positions), even on contentious issues or with resistant UN member states. This was largely due to UNICEF’s non threatening and unifying mandate, ‘the children!’; supported by a sizable budget, country offices, and US leadership (UNICEF’s Executive Director is an American political appointee and the US is UNICEF’s largest donor).

In 1999, while I was still at UNICEF, UNIFEM, on behalf of International Alert (one of the founding members of the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security), asked me to write the first white paper on women and security that would hopefully “do for women, what we had done for children”. This was the first, though unsuccessful, attempt to include women on the Security Council’s agenda. Months later, UNIFEM asked me to lead their work on ‘governance’ with the specific purpose of developing and leading the institution’s strategy to catalyse SCR 1325. In this role, I liaised with the NGO Working Group, facilitated the Arria Formula meeting, and provided technical support to the

19 Discussion with Joanne Sandler in 1999. I knew Joanne Sandler from my previous work at UNIFEM and the International Women’s Tribune Center. Her request was made on behalf of Eugenia Piza Lopez from International Alert.

20 A term popularised by the World Bank. We later changed the name of the section to ‘Governance, Peace and Security’.
Namibian Mission to the UN, the President of the Council in September and lead negotiator of SCR 1325. At the Mission’s request, I wrote a second concept note drawing from Security Council precedents on the protection of civilians, children, and conflicts in Africa. This was circulated as Namibia’s draft concept note, and the basis for the first draft of SCR 1325.

I brought my UNICEF experience to the SCR 1325 process, and more importantly, the expertise and support of colleagues and mentors with whom I had worked on the Graça Machel study, including Stephen Lewis and Graça Machel. Rafeeuddin Ahmed, then Special Adviser to UNIFEM’s Executive Director and former UN Chef du Cabinet under Secretary General Waldheim, became an indispensable adviser to this process. Having worked in every type of UN entity, his procedural and institutional knowledge was encyclopaedic, and his expansive professional and personal networks proved crucial to SCR 1325 adoption.

Over ten years at the UN, I became fluent in, and socialised by, several discourses, including those of human rights, children, gender equality, and peace and security. Each discourse was replete with its own actors, mechanisms, and institutions. Each of these experiences deeply enriched my understanding of the challenges and limitations of ‘gender mainstreaming’ in IOs and about the role of individuals in advancing and/or obstructing feminist agendas. They also shaped my perspectives about agenda setting in the UN and the critical importance of gatekeepers, ‘door-openers’, and linking pins. I furthermore learned about the processes of consensus development, issue framing, intergovernmental drafting, political negotiations, and navigating the UN’s geopolitical divisions. Having worked in two different UN Funds of completely different stature, I also learned about the importance of institutional location, mandate, size, and status.

After leaving the UN in 2002, I joined the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), where I took on various UN-related projects that were directly relevant to my thesis. Research for the thesis began in 2006 and continued up until September 2014; projects are referenced where appropriate. The most relevant are three ‘gender mainstreaming’ assessments that I carried out for the UN Development Programme’s Bureau of Crisis

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21 Because the UN has no mechanism for meeting with experts or representatives that are not UN member states, the Arria Formula allows Council members to meet with the Council at a meeting outside of the chamber than is not chaired by the president, is voluntary, and no notes are taken. From 1993-2000, over 70 such meetings were held, only three were with NGO representatives, one in 1996 and two in 2000 (UN Security Council 2002c, 6). As I explain in Chapter 3, the idea of convening an Arria formula meeting was first proposed by Rafeeuddin Ahmed, then an adviser to UNIFEM Executive Director Noeleen Heyzer.
Prevention and Recovery (UNDP/BCPR). In total, I interviewed nearly 200 UN staff across two headquarter locations (New York and Geneva) and in the UN missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia and Darfur, Sudan. Also during this period, I was commissioned by the UN Peacebuilding Commission and UN Women to write their first concept note on gender and peace building. Each of these experiences gave me more insight into the range of factors that shape the way in which feminist agendas are developed and implemented in different institutional locations within the UN. My experience reaffirms much of the IO literature’s conclusions about the influential role of donor resources and the unique contributions that individual leadership can make.

In Chapter 7, I refer to my experience at the SSRC, of convening a UN-funded multi-year process to build a global centre and community of research, policy, practice and activism in the nascent field of gender and security. In my view, the challenges we encountered reflected the divides that continue to persist among feminist communities of research and practice. This experience sensitised me to the role that ‘epistemic’ shared-knowledge communities can play in shaping international agendas, and how the diversity that characterises the feminist ‘peace and security’ community of research, practice and activism has worked against the development of a more collaborative community.

1.32 Case Study: UNMIL and the First All-Female Formed Police Unit

A particularly well-known episode in the early history of SCR 1325 is the case of the first all-female formed police unit (FFPU), deployed to Liberia in 2007. Little is publically known about how or why the first all-female formed police unit (FFPU) came to be or, as I discovered, that its mandate had nothing to do with women’s security. On the surface, Liberia appeared to be a particularly appropriate mission for this deployment given the widely reported prevalence of sexual abuse, rape, and violence against women during Liberia’s conflict and its aftermath.

The UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), to which the FFPU was deployed, was one of the first generation of ‘integrated missions’ that brought humanitarian, development, human rights, political, and military components under the unified authority of a civilian Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), working in partnership with the national UN Country Team. Established in 2003, UNMIL was also among the first UN peace operations that the UN Security Council encouraged to mainstream gender throughout its activities, and for which it authorised the establishment of a gender unit. Notwithstanding the symbolic irony of an armed female unit becoming an icon of women’s
empowerment and peace building (in Liberia, where the national women’s movement was focused primarily on disarmament) I, like many others assumed the unit’s mandate was associated with women’s security.

However, unlike the unarmed civilian police that have responsibility for protecting civilians, the heavily armed formed police units are para-military units deployed primarily for riot control, to protect high profile political figures, and UN personnel and assets. Despite significant media interest in the FFPU, described in Chapter 6, there has been little empirical research about the unit or its impact on women’s security.

My research on Liberia covers the period beginning with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in August 2003, through to the end of the first year of the FFPU’s deployment in December, 2007. My interest is in understanding what kinds of ‘gender perspectives’ were associated with the deployment (e.g., in relation to increasing women’s security and women’s participation in peace operations), and how this in turn would influence UNMIL’s implementation of SCR 1325. By focusing on a specific ‘problem’ (women’s security), a specific policy (SCR 1325), and its application in a specific place (Liberia), through a pivotal, operational strategy (the deployment of an all-female formed police unit), my aim was to overcome the blind spots and biases that are often associated with more generalised theoretical analyses about global norms that can overlook the importance of variation or “downplay variation with respect to their implementation or feedback effects from local actors and agents” (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, 398). In doing so, I also take heed of Cox’s warning about research methods in relation to global power relations: “Above all, do not base theory on theory but rather on changing practice and empirical-historical study which are a proving ground for concepts and hypotheses” (R. W. Cox 1981, 128).

My focus on policy development at the UN in the areas of gender and security is an attempt to trace the broader shifts in the global normative fabric (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, 397–98). Although limited in their ability to make empirical generalisations, unique and pivotal cases illustrate a ‘leading edge of change’ by demonstrating both unusual and definable processes (Schofield 1993, 214). Theoretical generalisation is possible with critical cases (although ‘over-rated’ as a goal) and illustrate the crucial role of contextualised experience in generating practical knowledge (Flyvbjerg 2001). The case

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22 Another operational example is the establishment of ‘firewood brigades’ by the UN Mission in Sudan to provide security for women as they collected firewood.
study’s “unique strength is its ability to deal with a full variety of evidence – documents, artefacts, interviews, and observations – beyond what might be available in a conventional historical study (Yin 2003, 8). Case studies can also help “sharpen awareness of issues that may have been overlooked in other studies and heighten sensitivity towards what is taken to be ‘normal’ in other cases” (May 2001, 173).

To understand the political and bureaucratic factors shaping the process through which a UN peacekeeping mandate is constructed, my case study begins with an analysis of the UN’s (limited) role in the Liberia’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement. I then examine the processes, institutions and actors that were significant in determining the scope of UNMIL’s mandate and its operational capacity. I view these as spaces and places of negotiation and disagreement that constitute the ‘zones of discretion’ used by different actors to advance or obstruct feminist agendas. To provide context for the case study, I draw from academic and policy analyses of the history of conflict in Liberia, as well as publicly available UN documents, including wikileaks cables, and verbatim transcripts of relevant UN Security Council meetings on Liberia, regional organisations, and on the Manu River Region. I rely on Security Council resolutions and statements to reconstruct the official history of UN engagement in Liberia, in its own discursive formulation, and I rely on the UN Security Council’s ‘Repertoire of Practice’ to contextualise the significance of Security Council actions in relation to precedence.23

The Repertoire provides an analytic summary of the Security Council’s proceedings in relation to its rules of procedure and each Article of the UN Charter. It also includes case studies, including thematic debates on women, peace and security, and provides official analyses of the evolving discourse and institutional arrangements that govern the Security Council’s relationship with other UN organs. These documents were read together with relevant UN doctrine and policy guidance issued by the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Department of Field Services (DFS), the UN Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues (OSAGI), and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA).

1.33 The Interviews
I used purposive and snowball sampling rather than an empirically representative approach, to identify people according to their relevance to my research questions,

23 Mandated by the General Assembly, the ‘Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council’ was first published in 1957 and is based on official documents of the Security Council. Available online: http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/
theoretical propositions, and analytical framework. While a representative sample was not sought (and would not, in any case, be possible given the highly specific and variable composition of peace building operations), respondents were selected to maximise the variety and range of strata and functions represented within the command and control structure, and in less visible and indirect arenas of influence within and outside of the mission structure (Bauer and Gaskell 2000). Process tracing does not aim to “draw a representative sample of a larger population of political actors that can be used as the basis to make generalisations about the full population, but to draw a sample that includes the most important political players that have participated in the political events being studied” (Tansey 2007, 768).

My primary goal was to understand how gender issues and women’s security were understood in relation to UNMIL’s mandate at different levels within the mission; strategically, among mission leadership; operationally among mission leadership and substantive components; and tactically, among the civilian police and formed police units. Interviews explored how security risks and threats to women were conceptualised and assessed and reflected in the mission’s functional priorities (e.g. policing, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, small arms and light weapons, border control, trafficking, violence and crime, among others). Questions focused on related operational strategies (with respect to resources, troop deployments, and civilian-military cooperation); and logistical factors (e.g., equipment, funding, troop availability, and access). Standardised questions provided some structure for comparability and include variables such as nationality, age, rank, sex, previous deployments, duration of posting, training received (in-service and pre-deployment), and the human resource policies of respective contingents (e.g. allowances, housing, HIV/AIDS).

I carried out in-depth, semi-structured and open-ended interviews that were, ‘conversations with a purpose’ (Burgess 1988). I therefore approached each interview as an opportunity to identify the challenges and opportunities to improve women’s security from a range of perspectives and institutional standpoints. This interpretive process required active engagement, which helped me to iteratively reformulate and add nuance to subsequent interviews. Informal and flexible approaches to qualitative interviewing provide opportunities to engage interviewees, allowing them space to elaborate and give texture to their views. Allowing respondents to answer in their own terms and to diverge from posed questions can surface the influences that shape their understanding and actions (Bryman 2008). My goal was to capture how respondents think about women’s security,
as well as their ideas about, appropriate and effective tactical strategies and related operational obstacles. All interviews were confidential and, with few exceptions, the names of interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement.

My Liberia-based interviews were facilitated by the UN Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) and took place in and around Monrovia, Liberia over 14 days in November 2007. Interviews with eleven UN staff that worked in New York during the period of focus, took place intermittently over the course of the writing process, between September 2007 and September 2014. In Monrovia, I carried out 49 in-depth interviews in English lasting an average of one and half hours. With respect to operational leadership, I interviewed the interim Director of CIVPOL, the Deputy Police Commissioner, and six civilian police officers, the Director of the Joint Mission Analysis Centre and the Director of Public Information. Thirteen interviews took place with senior police officials across key command units: intelligence, operations and logistics. Senior commanders are responsible for interpreting mission mandates and concepts of operation. Interviews sought to better understand risk assessment and decision-making processes, to identify potential operational bottlenecks with respect to logistics and resources. In addition to the senior police to whom the FFPU reported, I also interviewed seven senior police officers from police contributing countries, Nigeria, India, Jordan, Sweden, Germany and Ghana, to learn how they viewed the FFPU and their own mandate in relation to women’s security, risks and needs.

I spent a total of seven hours with the all-female formed police unit, approximately four hours in formal interviews and three hours in social gatherings on their compound. Interviews sought to understand how the female contingent functioned; their conceptualisation of security risks to women; and their influence on decision-making within the mission. In order to learn about the challenges and opportunities of gender mainstreaming in peace operations, I interviewed UNMIL’s Senior Gender Adviser, her staff, and the designated UNMIL civilian police gender focal point. UNMIL was among the first missions to deploy HIV/AIDS and gender officers; both positions have responsibility for ‘mainstreaming’ their work throughout the mission’s operations. Medical officers and civilian affairs officers (who serve as liaisons with host communities) provided access to data about HIV prevalence, civil military relations and acts of violence committed within the units and the host community. For information about how these

24 All interviews took place in English, the primary language spoken in Liberia.
Other thematic issues were being mainstreamed and their relationship with the gender unit, I also interviewed the medical unit officer, the HIV/AIDS adviser and a civilian affairs officer.

Because I focused on the UN’s interpretation of its mandate, process and strategy, I did not focus extensively on ‘upward’ feedback effects. However, I did interview Liberian government officials and staff from both international and national NGOs that had close working relationships with UNMIL. My interest was in understanding their perceptions of, and responses to women’s security risks and needs, and also their engagement in relation to UNMIL’s operations. Interviews took place with 12 government officials including the Police Commissioner, the Assistant Minister of Gender, the Minister of Health, and the Deputy Minister of Planning and Economics.

Among the UN Funds and Programmes, I interviewed senior staff from UNCHR, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, UNFPA, and UNDP staff working on small arms, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration and economic planning. I interviewed six senior UN humanitarian staff engaged in mission planning (UNICEF, UNFPA, UNDP, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance) to explore how humanitarian and human rights objectives, particularly concerning gender, are addressed, compromised and/or addressed by the ‘integrated’ peace building structures.

International NGOs play a growing role in the delivery of transitional recovery and humanitarian assistance; I interviewed several international NGOs as well as four Liberian nongovernmental organisations to understand their perspectives of, and interpretations of, security risks faced by women and their perception of the mission’s priorities and engagement in relation to women’s security.

In New York, eleven interviews were carried out with UN headquarters staff located in UN Women, the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping, the UN Development Programme’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, the former chair of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budget Questions (ACABQ) and UNICEF. Interviews focused on their respective engagement in the various bureaucratic and political processes involved in the design and interpretation of mandates, and to assess strengths and limitations of current strategies to implement SCR 1325.

1.34 Documentary Evidence

I use the UN’s comprehensive official document system to trace how decision-making on gender and security evolves over time, key actors, institutions and processes, as well as
central controversies. I focus on the less visible UN bodies and processes that are often more consequential in determining outcomes than UN Security Council resolutions themselves. UN documents are read both literally and interpretively since they represent the normative policy framework that guide the conduct of UN peace operations. In reviewing this documentation, I am interested in recurring patterns of support for particular issue by individual member states, differences in opinion between the Secretariat and different inter-governmental bodies, and the UN’s gender mechanisms.

Each UN document includes references to all previous documentation relevant to the particular discussion; it is therefore possible to comprehensively trace policy evolution over time. In the case of INSTRAW, there are, on average, some five reports per year describing intergovernmental debates over its status from its beginning in 1979 until 2010. Voting patterns are documented, as are many aspects of bureaucratic manipulation in pursuit of consensus decision-making. Wikileaks cables provide colourful narrative from the perspective of US delegates about the political positioning of different voting blocs.

The handful of Security Council resolutions that form the basis of most feminist discourse analysis reveal very little about the political process and actors that are most significant for understanding SCR 1325’s origins, implementation and potential. Verbatim records contain the original text of speeches delivered to the Security Council (of Council and non-Council members that were invited to participate) and provide a much richer account of the views of individual members and areas of contention. I review the provisional verbatim records of each public meeting pertaining to the discussion of women, the protection of civilians and Liberia, between 2000-2007, including the reports of the Secretary General that provide an overview of the issue and the UN’s response, as well as corresponding policy responses from the secretariat.

The Secretary General’s reports to the Security Council prior to establishing a mission propose a concept of operation and mission priorities based on advance work, typically by the UN secretariat. This document is the first significant indication of how political, military, development, humanitarian, and human rights objectives of the mission are conceptualised and translated into operational terms (i.e., mandate, time frame, resource allocations, reporting structures and staffing). Comparing these reports with the Security...

25 The term ‘UN bodies’ is a general term that refers to any kind of entity, agency, fund, programme, organ and so on.
Council’s resolution authorising a mission reveals points of contention between the secretariat and the Council, often reflecting differences among Council members.

The inclusion or absence of gender issues in the Secretary General’s reports can reflect any number of political influences, from UN headquarters or an individual member state. Particularly important are the categories under which these references appear. For example, sexual violence may be included in a section about security, human rights, the humanitarian situation, or recovery and development. Placement is significant because each of these sections typically correspond to different components of the mission mandate and staffing and budget requirements.

The most crucial reports for understanding how geopolitical disagreements are reflected in UN decision-making are from the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly that reviews the Secretary General’s proposed budgets and reports on expenditure. The 16 members of the ACABQ are appointed by the General Assembly in their individual capacity. The ACABQ advises and reports to the UN General Assembly’s Fifth Committee on budgetary issues and has the power to obstruct or facilitate initiatives by the UN Secretary General, the Security Council, the secretariat, member states, and other parts of the UN. This power is wholly underestimated in feminist analyses of SCR 1325’s implementation.

ACABQ reports use results-based budgeting to monitor how UN mandates, expected outcomes, indicators and financial allocations change over time. UN missions are obliged to respond to each of the ACABQ’s stated concerns. In this way, it is possible to see how the Committee and the Mission interpret policies and institutional priorities. The Fifth Committee rarely disagrees with the ACABQ’s recommendations and is the only General Assembly committee for which verbatim records are kept, allowing for a rich analysis of the debates preceding and following controversial decisions. My analyses draw upon the ACABQ’s report and recommendations to the Fifth Committee regarding the Secretary General’s proposals and budgets for UNMIL from its inception in 2003 until December 2007.

The UN’s Office of Internal Oversight (OIOS) and Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) offer valuable and critical assessments of the UN’s performance in a wide range of areas; for example: gender mainstreaming, results-based budgeting, and the role of military observers for procurement in a particular peacekeeping mission. I reviewed all OIOS reports of UNMIL, and the UN’s gender architecture. Guidelines by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support (DPKO/DFS) are important for understanding the
evolution of doctrines within PKOs and I reviewed those developments in relation to SCR 1325, the protection of civilians, civilian police and formed police units.

1.35 Analysis

In bringing together all of the findings, I am interested in how type-identities (regional, economic, geopolitical) and role-identities (whether states are friends, rivals, enemies, donors or recipients) are gendered (e.g., with respect to negotiations that focus on sexual and reproductive health and rights, women’s political and social status, conceptions of the family), and how these shift according to the historical moment and the panoply of issues being negotiated at any one time. I am also interested in how relationships between and among different actors (male and female) are shaped by institutional hierarchies and rules, interpersonal relationships, when and how conflicting loyalties and identities are negotiated, and when, in relation to gender, a particular identity assumes greater legitimacy and importance other another.

I use an interpretive analysis method to review interview transcripts and documentary evidence with an interest in understanding how threats to women’s security are conceptualised and presented over time by different UN actors and mechanisms. I analysed findings to develop explanations about the distinctiveness, rather than common elements of peace building responses to women’s security. I triangulated the various data sources in order to approach my research questions from different angles. I used my empirical observations as evidence of underlying processes and causal mechanisms rather than as evidence in and of itself, to help interpret “intricately interwoven aspects of complex narratives and social processes” (Mason 2002, 166).

Policy evolution in the UN is largely incremental. The context in which the Security Council, or any authorising body, views an issue is typically reflected in the preambular references of resolutions and reports that narrate previous, related actions. In order to understand how gender issues evolved in UN security discourse, I therefore review all of the resolutions, statements, verbatim transcripts of Security Council debates and related UN policy documents between 1998 and 2007.

In an effort to employ different ways of reasoning, I moved back and forth between the general and the particular. Given that one of my aims is to understand connections between how problems are ‘framed’ by different actors in the policy process with the type of responses offered, I take into account everyday concepts and meanings, and ‘lay interpretations’ of concepts of gender and security (Apthorpe and Gasper 1996). I consider
my findings to be ‘unfinished resources’ rather than end products, with the goal of identifying areas for further analysis. For example, at the level of implementation, the decision to allow women and girls to participate in a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme without surrendering ammunition or weapons is often heralded as an example of effective gender mainstreaming. However, from a political perspective, the same decision was also used to justify why so few weapons were collected, masking the real failure of the disarmament process.

1.4 Conclusion
SCR 1325’s celebrated herstory is intimately inter-twined with that of feminist peace activism. I revisit this herstory to better understand feminist strategies of engaging with the UN. I trace the trajectory of expectation-disappointment-disillusionment described in the feminist literature about SCR 1325 and offer an alternative conceptual framework within which to understand the obstacles of institutionalising and implementation SCR 1325. I explain the methods used to carry out the research for this thesis and conclude with a brief summary of subsequent chapters.

Chapter 2 provides a critical analysis of SCR 1325’s narrative herstory, surfacing a number of anomalies and contradictions regarding the ‘identity and strategy’ debate among SCR 1325’s early protagonists, and feminist discourse analysis of the resolution. Chapter 3 situates SCR 1325 within the historical evolution of gender issues on the UN’s agenda and in relation to its institutional and organisational structure. Chapter 4 examines the UN’s process of internalising and institutionalising SCR 1325, and points to the challenges of translating the concept of gender mainstreaming into the UN’s peace and security policy discourse on the protection of civilians. In Chapter 5, I identify the opportunities and obstacles for bringing women and a gender perspective into Liberia’s peace negotiations and implementation, and examine the actors and processes that were most significant in determining how gender issues were ultimately incorporated in the design of UNMIL’s mandate. I present the case study of the all-female formed police unit in Chapter 6, and examine UNMIL’s strategies to make SCR 1325 operational. My conclusions, in Chapter 7, summarise my findings in relation to the research questions posed and their contribution to understanding the gender dimensions of IO decision-making, learning and organisational change.
Chapter 2

Great Expectations

UN Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1325 is celebrated as a triumph of feminist activism. Considered the single most important achievement in ‘gendering’ international security policy, the adoption of SCR 1325 in 2000 generated a corpus of feminist academic studies, policy analyses, dissertations, and case studies about the Resolution’s genesis and its impact in areas ranging from violence prevention and women’s political participation to post-conflict financing.26

Over the past 15 years, SCR 1325 has been translated into more than one hundred languages and become the most widely cited international security policy to address gender issues. More than forty-six governments around the world have established SCR 1325 National Action Plans to guide policy, programmes, and funding priorities in the areas of gender, security, and peace-building. Women peace activists and non-governmental organisations have utilised the resolution in ways that arguably extend beyond its statutory mandate; in the context of informal peace-building arenas, and in countries that are not on the Security Council’s agenda.

Increasingly, however, SCR 1325 has become a magnet for critical feminist scholarship regarding its instrumentalisation by western military powers to advance hegemonic, patriarchal, and military agendas.27 The growing documentation of sexual abuse and exploitation committed by military and civilian peacekeeping personnel has


27 For example (Hudson 2012; Hudson 2009; Orford 2013; Otto 2006; Pankhurst 2003; Pratt and Richter-Devroe 2011; Shepherd 2008; Sjoberg 2009; Tryggestad 2009).
generated further criticism about SCR 1325’s utilisation as a “managerialist and problem-solving approach to improving peace operation” (Väyrynen 2004, 126).

At the same time, a parallel stream of empirical, country-based case studies of SCR 1325’s operationalisation in peacekeeping environments offers increasingly critical assessments about the impact of strategies to improve women’s participation in peace processes and to advance gender mainstreaming in UN peace operations. Many of these case studies, despite being commissioned by the UN or donor governments, still offer fairly critical conclusions. Two notable independent collections of case studies offer the perspectives of local and national women’s peace-building groups. They provide an even harsher assessment of the disregard and marginalisation of women’s peace-building efforts at local level by peace operations (Seifert and Eifler 2009; F. Olonisakin, Barnes, and Ikpe 2011). More fundamentally, Olonisakan and Ikpe question the utility of UN peace operations as a mechanism for advancing SCR 1325 (Ibid.).

Despite the breadth of the literature, three common themes emerge. The first is the near universal expectation that SCR 1325 would become a vehicle for challenging the institutional and structural causes of gender inequality and armed conflict. This broadly anti-militarist vision is closely identifies SCR 1325 as the product of a concerted feminist anti-militarist strategy, led by the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security.

The second theme concerns SCR 1325’s implementation failures within and outside the UN. Both the theoretical and the empirical literature offer a critique of gender mainstreaming as the UN’s central strategy for implementing SCR 1325. They assess the limited impact of policies and processes that have, for example, sought to increase women’s participation in peace processes and operations, establish gender units and advisers, introduce codes of conduct alongside monitoring and reporting systems. Notwithstanding debates in the literature regarding women’s innate qualities as peace builders, there is broad agreement that SCR 1325’s transformational potential rests with its

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28 For example (Olsson 2009; Solhjell 2012; Karame; Boehme 2008; Flensburg 2007; Gya 2008)
29 The majority have been supported by the UK, Norway, Sweden, Canada, Finland, the EU and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.
30 Following the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, China, the UN endorsed gender mainstreaming as a central strategy for following up the Conference Platform for Action, with the ultimate goal of achieving gender equality. Gender mainstreaming refers to the process of assessing the implications for men and for women of any planned action, including, legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated (UN General Assembly 2000a).
ability to bring women’s peace-building achievements at the local level into mainstream military decision-making. Despite a significant catalogue of achievements, however, the common assessment is that these efforts have not succeeded.

The third dominant theme attributes SCR 1325’s failures to advance a more transformational agenda with its conceptual framing and textual content. On this basis, scholars conclude that either the Resolution’s conceptual framing left it open to co-option, or that the original premise of working ‘within the system’ was misguided (or, that its promise was always illusory, even if it was a risk worth taking).

Taken together, these common themes create a plot-based narrative of SCR 1325’s genesis and its critical failings. My aim in this chapter is to surface a number of contradictions and inconsistencies in these overlapping accounts of SCR 1325’s genesis. By focusing on key, unresolved ‘puzzles’, I suggest that the dominant discourse about SCR 1325, including both academic and policy interpretations, have created an “artificial unity by appealing to certain elements of the past over others” (Klotz and Lynch 2007, 35). I suggest that SCR 1325’s published narrative discourse is surprisingly ‘continuous’ without the “heterogeneous conditions of emergence and spaces for dissent” that one might expect to characterise genealogical investigations (Milliken 1999, 246).

In part one, I examine three somewhat overlapping and contradictory narratives regarding SCR 1325 genesis, its principal NGO protagonists, and the broader advocacy and policy frameworks that shaped its discursive construction. The first emphasises feminist anti-militarist peace activism; the second focuses on women’s leadership in peace building, and the third centres on women’s physical protection and access to humanitarian assistance. Common to each of these narratives, is the central role played by the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security in SCR 1325’s genesis. In part two, I apply the conceptual framework introduced in the previous chapter to provide a deeper analysis of feminist ‘identity versus strategy’ debates during SCR 1325’s genesis. I also offer an alternative analysis of SCR 1325’s discursive construction, and conclude with some thoughts about the challenges of engaging with mainstream institutions.

### 2.1 SCR 1325: A Feminist Transformative Agenda?

Although a small group of feminist anti-war NGOs are credited with SCR 1325’s genesis, a deeper look at their composition, motivations, and strategies suggests the influence of a more heterogeneous group of actors and interests. This section explores three different but overlapping accounts of SCR 1325’s herstory with the aim of understanding the
motivations and strategies used by feminists to gain access to and influence more conventional power structures.

2.11 SCR 1325: Challenging the Terms of the Debate or Legitimising Them?
The dominant narrative describing SCR 1325’s herstory associates its genesis with feminist anti-war activism and credits the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security with leading the campaign for a Security Council resolution on women. According to feminist scholar Laura Shepherd, the NGO Working Group “transformed decades of theorizing and activism into concrete achievements in the issue area of women, peace, and security” (Shepherd, 2008, 391–392). In a sentiment shared by many, Carol Cohn describes SCR 1325 as a “formidable testimony to the efforts and skills of the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) responsible for its existence” (Cohn et al. 2004, 130). She explains:

[w]hat makes 1325 unique is not only that it (finally) addresses women, war, and security, or that its scope is expansive and its implications radical; what makes 1325 unique is that it is both the product of and the armature for a massive mobilization of women’s political energies (Cohn 2004, 8).

In assessing SCR 1325 as a tool for gender mainstreaming in UN security policy, Cohn describes it as “the product of a sophisticated feminist initiative – launched by NGOs and later picked up by women’s advocates within the UN” and further, a “new, daring and ambitious strategy for anti-war feminists” (Ibid.).

In 2000, NGO Working Group members included Amnesty International, International Alert, the Hague Appeal for Peace, the Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children, and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF). Interestingly, however, in describing the founding members, Cohn notes that only one is explicitly feminist and anti-war: “Although all of the Working Group members were concerned about what was happening to women in wars, the majority of Working Group NGOs defined themselves neither as “anti-war,” per se, nor as feminist” (Cohn 2008, 186).

Indeed, the strategic focus on militarism was a major source of conflict among working group members. Of the five founding members, only WILPF and the Hague Appeal for Peace were explicitly anti-war and anti-militarist. While neither described their organisational mission or ideology as feminist, both had forceful and impressive feminist leaders (respectively, Australian peace activist Felicity Hill, and American peace activist Cora Weiss). Although the Women’s Refugee Commission (then called the Women’s
Commission for Refugee Women and Children) and International Alert had discrete women’s programs that supported women’s organisations in conflict affected areas, their primary organisational focus has, and continues to be, in the peace-building and humanitarian arenas. Both organisations were represented by strong feminist leadership in the negotiations.31

The Working Group was unable to reach consensus about anti-militarism as a guiding principle. Cohn observed that, “talking about the international arms trade, militarism, or even worse, militarism’s relation to masculinities (as WILPF wanted to do) was deemed by these groups to be in the “too political” category” (Ibid., 198). For Cohn, the coalition’s self-censorship foreclosed the possibility of raising these issues with member states. And, according to Diane Otto, “when measured against the aspirations of the international women’s peace movement, the resolution failed to ‘demilitarize the way that security was understood’” (Otto 2004, 12).

The Working Group did not address the causes of war and militarism, and because of this, Cohn argues that the scope of potential policy initiatives was significantly narrowed. In her view, a focus limited to concerns such as women’s participation in peace processes and the sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, would not fundamentally contest the rules and discursive practices of international peace and security institutions. In referring to examples of women’s participation and sexual exploitation and abuse (and others), she states:

[They] do not, in and of themselves, get at the gender constructs that underwrite war-making as a practice, nor the gendered inequalities that underlie women’s vulnerability in war and post-conflict settings; thus, they leave many significant rules and discursive practices of international peace and security institutions in place. (Cohn 2008, 198)

Because SCR 1325 does not challenge or seek to dismantle these practices, postcolonial feminist scholars suggest that it has enabled the international community to ‘harness women’s agency in reproducing racial–sexual hierarchies of power’ and, therefore, becomes part of what Anna Agathangelou and L.H.M. Ling refer to as the “neoliberal imperium…an over-arching hegemonic project [that] encompasses states, governments, classes, and sets of ideologies that work in tandem to validate one another” (Agathangelou and Ling 2009, 2–3).

31 Eugenia Piza Lopez, Sanam Anderlini, and Ancil Adrian-Paul from International Alert, and Maha Muna from the Women’s Commission. Both Piza Lopez and Muna later joined the UN.
Herein the first puzzle: on the one hand, the NGO Working Group is credited with “transform[ing] decades of theorizing and activism into concrete achievements in the issue area of women, peace, and security” (Shepherd, 2008, 391–392). On the other, the majority of Working Group members were neither anti-war nor feminist. How then, did a small, loose alliance of five NGOs that were neither feminist nor anti-militarist, launch and successfully bring about the Security Council’s first ever resolution on women, peace and security that most feminist scholars associate with an anti-militarist agenda? Second, what role can and should the Security Council play in advancing gender equality? What aspects of the Council’s mandate, rules of procedure, membership, and repertoire of practice are most relevant; how can they be catalysed, and by whom? Is the Security Council a strategic entry point for achieving these goals? If not, then why focus on the Security Council and what are the alternatives?

Although SCR 1325 is considered a watershed achievement, it does not address the causes of conflict and gender inequality, or militarism. This is said to limit its transformational potential and to leave it open for co-optation and to legitimise hegemonic, military agendas (Orford 1999; Otto 2010; Whitworth 2004). Otto explains:

On the one hand, the positioning of women’s peace activism outside the mainstream is a measure of the dominance of "male" thinking in military institutions. From this point of view, it would seem imperative that women’s peace activists find their way into the mainstream if ever the hegemony of the conventional wisdom that international security depends ultimately on military power is to be dislodged. On the other hand, a location on the outside can be viewed as a position of strength…The strategy of separatist organization is driven by the belief that the problems of male domination and armed conflict are so interconnected and mutually reinforcing that women’s participation in mainstream institutions of war (and peace) would have the effect of authorizing, rather than destabilizing militarism. (Otto 2006, 115–116)

Underexplored in these debates, however, is exactly what ‘inside’ means and how women’s peace activists could find their way into, and have an influence on ‘the mainstream’. The NGO Working Group’s leadership consisted of feminists working ‘inside’ non-feminist NGOs. However, the NGOs themselves were not UN insiders; nor were their advocacy strategies. Nor would I argue that the UN’s gender mechanisms were ‘insiders’ in that they have no institutional relationships with the UN Security Council. Rather, in the UN, ‘insider’ status would more likely refer to the Council members and the relevant intergovernmental mechanisms through which Security Council resolutions are negotiated.
For these reasons, the sense of ownership that feminist scholars and activists exert over SCR 1325 is surprising. It may have also inadvertently obscured the Council’s exercise of its own agency in adopting and implementing the resolution (in this sense, SCR 1325 could be seen as a feminist attempt to co-opt the Council, rather than the Council’s co-optation of feminism). As a result, much more feminist energy has been given to implementing SCR 1325 outside of formal peace processes and far less has been given to influencing the institutional, political and bureaucratic factors that shape UN decision-making on women, peace and security.

The Security Council is, has, and always will reflect the hegemonic and geopolitical power imbalances that the founding states imbued it with. Efforts to reform the Security Council began even before it was established and have continued over the last sixty years with only marginal changes to its rules of procedure and repertoire of practice. Contests between and among UN member states over the Security Council’s agenda, its resolutions, and their implementation are arguably the mainstay of multilateralism. For an agenda that seeks to challenge the formal systems of international peace and security, there is surprisingly little feminist analysis about the actors, processes, institutions, discourses, and geopolitics that are most central to decision-making in these arenas. This would include the Security Council itself, but also the various UN entities and external factors that determine how the Council works and how its actions are understood and implemented.

2.12 Women’s Leadership in Peace building
In a second variation of SCR 1325’s genesis, NGO Working Group member International Alert, states that the idea of a Security Council Resolution on women was drawn primarily from their work on women and peace-building in Burundi and Rwanda (Adrian-Pual et al. 2004, 95). The All-Party Burundi Women’s Peace Conference held in Arusha in April 2000 and supported by International Alert and UNIFEM (de Silva Burke, Klot, and Bunting 2001), was significant in SCR 1325’s evolution and widely referenced in statements made by delegations when the Resolution was adopted. As I discuss in Chapter 3, this Conference demonstrated the ‘utilitarian’ case for including women in peace processes; namely, that women bring a substantively different perspective to the table resulting in positive gains for all. Similarly, in the case of Liberia, described in Chapter 5, women in the Manu River region mobilised nationally and regionally on a peace agenda that focused on disarmament, rather than on women’s issues per se. They derived their credibility and moral high ground, in part, from the absence of any agenda that was
personal (individual), political (party), religious, ethnic, or nationalist, other than ending the war.

This narrative of SCR 1325’s herstory draws from a tradition of feminist peace activism that valorises women’s shared commitment to peace making and nurturing. For example, Australian feminist scholar Diane Otto contextualises SCR 1325’s origins along a continuum of feminist peace activism that began in 1915 with the Hague Congress of Women, and WILPF’s establishment in 1919 as the first international committee devoted exclusively to bringing about peace (Otto 2004, 9). For Otto,

…the remarkable longevity of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom…demonstrates the continuing power of the belief that women's shared identity, as women, provides a powerful foundation for mobilisation against armed conflict and in pursuit of nonviolent methods of securing the peace. (Otto, 2006, 115)

In her book, From where we stand: war, women’s activism and feminist analysis, Cynthia Cockburn discusses why so many women organise against militarism and why, very often, they are women-only groups (Cockburn 2007).

At the same time, critical feminist scholarship is also concerned that an emphasis on women’s innate qualities as peacemakers may reinforce essentialist views of women. For Natalie Hudson, the emphasis on women’s role as “peace builders, as mothers, nurturers and communal peacemakers” promotes an essentialist view of women that “has the potential to push post-conflict societies back to the status quo in terms of traditional gender roles…[In this sense], the security framework is not necessarily in line with the emancipatory vision of social change so central to the women’s movement” (Hudson 2010, 49–50). Similarly, Hilary Charlesworth argues that focusing on women’s unique contributions to peace-building undermines arguments that emphasise women’s legal entitlement to representation (Hilary Charlesworth 2008).

Moreover, critical and post-colonial feminist scholars argue that essentialist and utilitarian approaches also risk obscuring feminist concerns about “the relationship between insecurity and economic liberalization, or the ways in which the international division of labour is itself a violent process” (Orford 2002, 281–282). When women’s leadership in peace building refers to women’s participation in UN peace operations, women become what Anne Orford refers to as “gentle handmaidens and victims of war” (Orford 2002, 281–282). By emphasising the politics of identity and recognition, and the legacies of colonialism that have silenced what Gayatri Spivak refers to as the ‘sub-altern’
perspective (Spivak 1998), the very pursuit of developing universal, internationally accepted standards and policies is considered an act of legitimising and reproducing the ‘sexualised, racialised and class-ed’ discourses that represent the ‘hegemonic imperium’ (Agathangelou and Ling 2009). Both the power and the limitations of these arguments are well captured by Diane Otto:

> There has always been disagreement among feminists about how to theorize women's solidarity in the cause of peace and about what it is that women, as women, might bring to conflict resolution processes. At the heart of these debates has been disquiet about the reliance on essentialist and imperial representations of women as pacifying and civilizing influences because these representations, ironically, bear an unsettling resemblance to the gender stereotypes that sustain militarism and women's inequality. (Otto, 2006, 115)

International Alert’s campaign, launched in 1999, *Women Building Peace: From the Village Council to the Negotiating Table* focused on women’s participation in peace building and their protection in conflict. The campaign’s five goals were: including women in peace negotiations as decision-makers; putting women at the heart of reconstruction and reconciliation; strengthening the protection and representation of refugee and displaced women; ending impunity for crimes committed against women and ensuring redress; and, giving women and women's organisations the support and resources they need to build peace.32

International Alert hoped the campaign would reinvigorate support for the commitments made to women during the 1995 Fourth UN World Conference on Women, held in Beijing. International Alert member, Sanam Anderlini, suggests that the Beijing Conference was pivotal in re-energising women’s peace movements and “spawn[ed] a multitude of new NGOS, grass roots groups and regional international networks from Liberia to Jerusalem” (Anderlini 2000, 12). According to Anderlini, the global appeal for a Security Council resolution on women was launched by a group of NGOs at the fifth anniversary review conference of the Beijing Declaration in 2000 (Anderlini 2007, 6). Anderlini refers to the Conference as a “turning point – a call to action and an inspiration for many women experiencing violent conflict first hand” (Anderlini 2007, 6).

However, International Alert’s campaign and the Beijing Platform’s conclusions on armed conflict differ in significant ways. While Alert’s campaign shares the Platform’s emphasis on women’s participation in peace building, it leaves aside the Platform’s

objectives to reduce excessive military expenditure and control the availability of armaments. Also excluded from the Campaign were the Beijing Platform’s objectives to promote non-violent forms of conflict resolution, to promote women’s contribution to fostering a culture of peace, to protect women living under foreign occupation or other conflicts (besides armed conflicts) and to provide assistance to women of the colonies, and non-self-governing territories. The Beijing Platform’s conclusions on armed conflict also emphasise the importance of working towards general and complete disarmament and a universal, multilateral, effective and verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

The Platform’s different emphases have their origins in the historical geopolitical divisions between the Eastern Bloc and the United States (US) that shaped how women’s issues were inscribed on the UN’s agenda. Kristen Ghodsee explains that prior to the first UN Conference on Women in 1975, American politicians were concerned that “communist women would hijack the deliberation with an anti-capitalist agenda” and therefore became actively engaged in defining the positions that US delegates would represent (Ghodsee, 2010, 4). The American perspective focused on political rights and legal remedies to address discrimination while the Soviet position viewed these issues as symptoms rather than causes of women’s oppression. At the UN, the “peace perspective” was that women were obliged to become engaged in Cold War politics because they were inherently less violent. In Chapter 3 and throughout this thesis, I show how these geopolitical rivalries continued to influence UN decision-making on women and gender issues.

From a geopolitical perspective, the Beijing conference was the most contentious of all four UN Women’s conferences. One third of the delegations at the conference, 64 of 189 representatives, expressed reservations about the Beijing Platform For Action and half of these were placed on record (United Nations 1996a, 154–175). While the divisions were no longer easily defined along the East-West axis, the fierce disagreements over references to women’s sexual behaviour, orientation, sexual education, abortion, interpretations of the family, and reproductive health and rights reflected long standing and

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33 Chapter 5 of the Platform (pp. 154-175) notes that 64 representatives made general and interpretive statements of expressed reservations on the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action. These include: Peru, Kuwait, Egypt, Philippines, Holy See, Malaysia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Ecuador, Indonesia, Mauritania, Oman, Malta, Argentina, Brunei Darussalam, France, Yemen, Sudan, Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, Bahrain, Lebanon, Tunisia, Mali, Benin, Guatemala, India, Algeria, Iraq, Vanuatu, Ethiopia, Morocco, Djibouti, Qatar, Nicaragua, Togo, Liberia, Syrian Arab Republic, Pakistan, Nigeria, Comoros, Bolivia, Colombia, Bangladesh, Honduras, Jordan, Ghana, Central African Republic, Cambodia, Maldives, South Africa, United Republic of Tanzania, Brazil, Panama, El Salvador, Madagascar, Chad, Cameroon, Niger, Gabon, United States.
newly emerging geo-political alignments (see Bunch and Fried 1996; Baden and Goetz 1997; Meyer and Prügl 1999).

Moreover, although the conference may have provided an opportunity for women’s peace groups to reach consensus on seeking a Security Council resolution on women, this was not reflected in the Beijing Platform for Action (BPFA). All of the BPFA’s recommendations are directed to the UN General Assembly rather than the Security Council, even those concerning armed conflict. And despite the centrality of human rights to feminist arguments for a Security Council resolution, women’s rights activists were not themselves involved directly in SCR 1325’s genesis. Feminist human rights activist Charlotte Bunch distinguishes among what she refers to as “four somewhat separate, sometimes intersecting, tracks at the UN: human rights; development; security; and humanitarian assistance” (Bunch 2003, 2). According to Bunch, bringing these tracks together raised the concern for women’s rights activists that “human rights might fall out of the picture” (Ibid.). She explains that, “the peace and security people and human rights people are not the same groups, and do not work together very much … in the structures of the UN they tend to be separate” (Ibid.).

2.13 Are Women Civilians? The Impact of Armed Conflict on Women
A third variation of SCR 1325’s evolution and the least developed in the literature, places its genesis along the Security Council’s evolving discourse and practice on the protection of civilians and the UN’s rapidly expanding role in peace building. NGO Working Group members International Alert and the Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children both had programmes in countries where the largest and most complex UN peace operations were then deployed. Their advocacy exposed glaring gaps in international protection and humanitarian assistance and the absence of guidelines and strategies for addressing the gender dimensions of these crises. International Alert states that their campaign for SCR 1325 reflected a growing recognition of women’s experience of conflict and the need to address “the particular horrors of war that are suffered by women, including rape, sexual torture, prostitution, and slavery” (Adrian-Paul et al. 2004, 95).

Following its failures in Rwanda and Srebrenica, the UN recognised the need for new kinds of international engagement to stem the humanitarian crises and civil wars raging in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo, Timor-Leste and elsewhere. These ‘new wars’ were characterised as complex humanitarian and human rights emergencies that required more than diplomacy and ‘boots on the ground’ could
deliver. They also required humanitarian and human rights responses to protect the human security of civilian populations that became primary targets of war through forced recruitment, amputations, sexual and gender based violence, abduction, and sexual slavery.

Yet, it was only in 1999, one year before SCR 1325’s adoption, that the Security Council first articulated its responsibilities to protect civilians in conflict situations when their governments were unwilling or unable. In this context, protection refers to the Fourth Treaty of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, adopted in August 1949. The Council’s adoption of SCR 1265 in 1999 on the protection of civilians marked the beginning of a significant shift in the evolution of UN peace-building, described by scholars as “a much needed departure from the statist and militarist approach to security that dominated the field of international relations during and after the Cold War” (Bellamy and McDonald 2002). For Anne Walker of the International Women’s Tribune Centre, the heightened receptivity of UN policymakers to NGOs resulted from these new challenges: “The end of the cold war confronted UN policymakers with new problems, such as ethnic conflict in Rwanda and Somalia, refugees, problems to which they had no answers” (J. M. Joachim 2007, 24).

In the short span of two years between 1998 and 2000, the Security Council adopted precedent-setting resolutions on children; the protection of civilians; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; conflicts in Africa; and, HIV/AIDS. These thematic resolutions created the opportunity for peace-building mandates to include the most expansive range of collective enforcement measures ever authorised, including dedicated staff and resources to ensure child protection; human rights monitoring and reporting; election monitoring; refugee return; mine action; national institution building; the protection of humanitarian relief; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; and, human rights.

However, even as the protection of civilians became more central to peacekeeping mandates, the Security Council had yet to consider the gender dimensions of the conflicts under its purview or the gender implications of its actions. This concern was surfaced in the months preceding SCR 1325’s adoption in the Windhoek Declaration and Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations (UN Security Council 2000a). The Declaration was adopted at a meeting convened by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in Windhoek, Namibia, in May 2000, and circulated to the Security Council by Namibia; the country that presided over the Council’s debate on women. The Declaration, referenced in
SCR 1325, recognises that “women have been denied their full role in [multi-dimensional peace support operations], both nationally and internationally, and the gender dimension in peace processes has not been adequately addressed” (Ibid.).

In addition, women’s rights and gender equality issues were glaringly absent from the highly influential independent review of peacekeeping authored by Lakhdar Brahimi, and presented to the Council on August 21, 2000, two months before SCR 1325’s adoption. This ground-breaking review established new benchmarks for peacekeeping operations that emphasised conflict prevention; post-conflict reconstruction; the rule of law; and, humanitarian and human rights concerns. However, it neglected any analysis of the gendered nature of conflict, its differential impact on women and girls, men and boys, or the constraints on women’s participation in peace-building. Nor did it address the concerns raised in Graça Machel’s report on the impact of armed conflict on children, regarding the sexual exploitation and abuse of women and girls by peacekeeping personnel (United Nations 1996). Ultimately these deficits became opportunities—the lynchpins—on which the need for a gender perspective in UN peace building would be framed. UN Security Council Resolution 1325 became a diplomatic rejoinder to the Brahimi report, building on the Council’s recent thematic precedents, and particular, its actions on children (True-Frost 2007; Hudson 2010).

For many critical feminist scholars, however, focusing on women’s victimisation in conflict reinforces essentialist and stereotypical perspectives of women and simplifies the diversity of women’s experiences.34 These universal representations of women disregard the various hierarchical and intersecting power relations and strata of women in relation to other social categories, such as race, ethnicity, geography and sexual orientation35. Hilary Charlesworth uses the concept of ‘competitive vulnerability’ to eschew claims that women always suffer more in conflict and have more to gain from peace than men (Hilary Charlesworth 2008, 358).

The central puzzle in this narrative invokes what Cockburn refers to as the pacifist dilemma (Cockburn 2007); namely, how to reconcile feminist anti-militarist pacifism with the morality of humanitarian intervention. The UN Security Council’s inability to obviate unilateral and bilateral military actions, combined with the growing documentation of

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34 Many feminist analyses of SCR 1325 (e.g. Stamnes 2012; Shepherd 2008; Pratt 2013; Otto 2010; Cohn 2008a) use Cynthia Enloe’s ‘womenandchildren’ as a useful way of framing this issue (Enloe 1993).
35 For example (Pratt and Richter-Devroe 2011; Puechguirbal 2010; Hudson 2012; Väyrynen 2004; Reeves 2012).
sexual violence and exploitation committed by military and civilian peacekeeping personnel, intensified feminist soul-searching about the risks of engaging with mainstream institutions, as described above. Christine Chinkin and Hilary Charlesworth reflect the views of many feminists when they argue that the Security Council’s militaristic and state-centred approaches to peacekeeping are more likely to increase, rather than decrease, women’s insecurity (Chinkin and Charlesworth 2006).

While feminist scholars like Cynthia Enloe (Enloe 1990; Enloe 1993; Enloe 2007), V. Spike Peterson (Peterson and Anne 2010) and Cockburn (Cockburn 2010) have long focused on the inherently patriarchal structures and cultures of military institutions, the adoption of SCR 1325 has inspired similar questions about the Security Council and UN peace operations. For many feminist scholars and activists, the overt instrumentalisation of women by the US to justify the occupation of Afghanistan in 2002, reinforced the fear that feminism would “end up facilitating existing projects and priorities of militarized economic globalization in the name of protecting and promoting the interests of women” (Orford 2002, 283). For Natalie Hudson, “SCR 1325 does not allow for any fundamental challenge of the militarism embedded within the Security Council, thus maintaining the use of force as central to any conceptualization of international peace and security” (N. F. Hudson 2009, 61).

While pacifism is a central tenet of feminist orthodoxy, not all feminist peace activists consider the use of military force amoral. These debates have re-emerged recently in the context of critical security debates regarding humanitarian intervention. Building on feminist human rights strategies to hold states accountable for ensuring the protection of women’s human rights, UNIFEM viewed SCR 1325 as a vehicle for shifting the responsibility of women’s security from women themselves – to the state – and, when a state is absent – to the international community (J. F. Klot 2002; Rehn and Sirleaf 2002). By recognising the responsibility of all States and all parties to armed conflicts to respect international law applicable to the rights and protection of women and girls, especially as civilians and in the context of the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, as well as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, SCR 1325 reinforces the obligations of States to ensure respect for women’s rights in conflict situations according to human rights and international humanitarian law.

In doing so, SCR 1325 also establishes that when sovereign states are unwilling or unable to do so, or when a state may itself become a perpetrator of crimes against women, such violations may also be considered threats to international peace and security. In this sense, SCR 1325 redefines the concept of collective security so that widespread violations of women’s rights now constitute a threat to international peace and security. Lene Hansen points to the dilemmas inherent in this characterisation by showing three different ways in which international responsibility for responding to mass rapes in Bosnia was framed: (1) as ‘normal/Balkan warfare’ it would not be a collective security problem and therefore not the responsibility of the international community to intervene; (2) as ‘exceptional/Serbian warfare’ the international community should intervene militarily in defence of the Bosnian government; and, (3) in what emerged as a critical feminist security perspective of a ‘Balkan patriarchy’ - which involves women on one side and the patriarchal nationalistic leadership on other; the political response was ambiguous (Hansen 2001, 55).

In the first part of this chapter, I have brought to light a number of puzzles and contradictions that are embedded in SCR 1325’s narrative herstory. These concern the different motivations among the NGOs credited with SCR 1325’s genesis, their strategies and the different policy frameworks that were invoked to establish the relevance of ‘women’ to the Security Council’s agenda. To different degrees, these frames refer to women’s role in peace building, gender equality, and the protection of civilians. Each is somewhat aligned to UN policy discourses that have their origins in the vestiges of Cold War politics, and the UN’s failures in Rwanda and Srebrenica.

In the following section, I offer a critical analysis of these narratives by applying some of the conceptual and analytic frames outlined in Chapter 1. These concern the tensions among activists between identity and strategy; SCR 1325’s discursive construction, and the challenges of engaging with mainstream institutions.

2.2 SCR 1325: Lost in translation?
In this discussion, I look more deeply at the anomalies identified in the first part of this chapter regarding the NGO Working Group’s motivations and composition. I suggest that they reveal important tensions between the ‘identity and strategy’ debate described in Chapter 1, and are related to the effective engagement by the NGO Working Group of broadly diverse allies and networks within and outside of the UN. In the following subsections I offer a critical assessment of feminist discourse analyses of the Resolution, and
suggest that the dissonant interpretations of SCR 1325 by feminist scholars and UN policy makers have limited the potential for more constructive dialogue.

2.21 Feminist Norm Entrepreneurs: Balancing Identity and Strategy

The NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security is widely credited with SCR 1325’s genesis. The literature celebrates SCR 1325 as an achievement of feminist anti-war activism, but also tells us that the majority of SCR 1325’s NGO protagonists were neither feminist nor anti-militarist.

In my view, the compromises made by members, especially on core aspects of identity, suggest that the group’s collective interest in bringing about SCR 1325 triumphed over the need for any particular organisation to assert its own agenda. And the most significant compromises were made by feminist, anti-militarist activists:

Critiquing ‘militarism’ and the ‘arms trade’, let alone militarism’s reliance on a particular gender script, were considered ‘too political’ by most of the NGO Working Group, leading to the marginalisation of many feminist ideas before they even reached the Council. These omissions in the NGO draft foreclosed the pursuit of crucial aspects of feminist anti-war activism through the resolution. The NGOs were not only disagreeing among themselves, but making strategic calculations about what the Council would find palatable, accepting various limitations in the interest of moving along towards adoption and implementation. (Otto 2010, 108)

These tensions illustrate what is referred to in the social movement literature as the ‘strategy versus identity debate’ i.e. “a debate over whether social movement actors were mainly driven by a need to express their identity or mainly driven by more strategic concerns of where and when they could win” (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, 409). In other words, what Cohn refers to as self-censorship among the NGO Working Group could also be viewed as strategic calculation. Or, put another way, according to Deborah Stone, “the process of strategic portrayal must work for different actors in the network and also for target audiences” (Keck and Sikkink 1998b, 229). Felicity Hill, then Director of the UN Office of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, explains this calculation:

Whatever the code words, let us in! Peace-builder, decision-maker, whatever argument works, let us in! Let us in so we can wrestle with the discussion at least; contest the parameters, and react, in real time and not after the fact. Let us into the Security Council, into the decision-making fora, into the rooms of the elusive place, let women in. It is the horror experienced daily which is the reason we want to get hold of the steering wheel of the Security Council. It is because the Security Council sets the contours of political discussion on peace
and war on this planet and, significantly, because it mandates actual peace operations. (Cohn 2004, 138)

At the core of the NGO Working Group’s shared commitment, was concern about the atrocities committed against women in war, their neglect in the context of humanitarian action, and the need to increase the leverage and engagement of women’s peace organisations and initiatives.

The NGO Working Group members were neither feminist nor anti-militarist, although there were a small number of feminist anti-militarist activists within its member organisations. Why this point is glossed over, rather than analysed, is itself interesting. That a few feminist anti-militarist activists were able to create a narrative that was larger than the mandates of their respective organisations is itself, a significant achievement. Following the literature on norm entrepreneurs (Oliver and Marwell 1992, 252), I refer to this cadre of leaders as ‘feminist norm entrepreneurs’; individuals who brought their vision, charisma and wealth of organising experiences and relationships into a new institutional discourse replete with its own actors, institutions, policies and processes.

The most visible and influential members of the working group were impressive feminist anti-militarist activists (Felicity Hill, Eugenia Piza Lopez, Cora Weiss, Ancil Adrian-Paul and Sanam Anderlini). It was their feminist transnational advocacy networks, personal and professional relationships, including with feminist academic, which became significant in shaping the resolution’s (published) narrative herstory.

Understanding their constraints and opportunities is important for understanding the processes of agenda setting and organisational change. Drawing from Gordenker (1995, 19), Joachim argues, “bridging the interests of individuals, the larger collective, and policymakers is not an easy task”:

Organizational entrepreneurs may well get caught in the crossfire of divergent role expectations in their environment and the conceptions of their organizational constituents” (see also Marsh and Rhodes 1992). Whereas policymakers may expect compromise and concessions, constituents may demand confrontation and exposure. Moreover, given that entrepreneurs have to maintain links to different groups, they are also always at risk of losing their credibility. For example, constituents might question the legitimacy of an entrepreneur because of his or her connections to policymakers, while policymakers, in turn, may be skeptical of the entrepreneur because of his or her involvement with a particular group. (J. Joachim 2003, 8)

Feminists within NGOs with women’s programmes likely had more discretion to push the boundaries of their own organisation’s discourse, while international NGOs like
Amnesty International are tightly controlled with very little space for its representatives to creatively interpret their mandate, especially without the support of senior leadership within the organisation.

Although the Beijing Conference is identified as a catalytic touchstone for SCR 1325, I suggest that its importance was more likely as a venue for establishing relationships, common frameworks, and networks across different regions and political perspectives. Many of the networks and relationships drawn into SR 1325’s genesis, date back to the 1895 Nairobi Conference, the Hague Appeal for Peace, and the 1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights. Although the women’s human rights movement was not directly engaged in SCR 1325’s genesis, it shaped the relationships and networks that were formed around SCR 1325. These personal relationships were crucial in forming the NGO Working Group’s extended networks, especially as individual feminists began to work in other sectors within and outside of the UN, including with feminist scholars, policy makers. It was after Beijing that the presence of feminist norm entrepreneurs became far more visible within other organisational contexts, where they continued to project their feminist identity, perspectives and skills.

Institutionally, however, I argue in Chapter 4 that, as a policy framework, the Beijing Platform for Action became much more problematic as an implementation pathway for SCR 1325. To be clear, none of the Beijing Platform’s recommendations on armed conflict were addressed to the Security Council. Instead, the Platform it reaffirms the General Assembly’s primacy as the ‘highest level’ and principal policy-making and appraisal organ on matters relating to the Beijing Conference follow up. As I explain in Chapters 3 and 4, by associating SCR 1325 with the Beijing Conference rather than the Security Council’s work on the protection of civilians, gender mainstreaming became the primary policy pathway for SCR 1325’s institutionalisation with the UN. I suggest that this contributed significantly to conflicts within the UN about institutional responsibilities for implementing SCR 1325, and to related implementation failures.

2.22 Inside-outside and In-between

Several authors suggest that the communication channels between the NGO Working Group, Security Council members and the UN’s gender mechanisms played an important role in framing the ‘women, peace and security’ agenda (Cockburn 2007; N. F. Hudson 2010). According to Maha Muna, these communications “increased over time, and personnel at UNIFEM and OSAGI provided insight on the political strategy that was
adapted to support passage of the resolution" (Cohn et al. 2004, 131). For the most part, however, the nature of these engagements and the role of various ‘door openers’ remain underexplored, particularly regarding feminist allies in the UN system.

Felicity Hill, a feminist NGO leader in the Working Group cautions that it would be “dangerous to over emphasize the significance of NGO efforts during this small time period, and to not acknowledge the cumulative impact of decades of interaction between governments and NGOs around negotiation in almost all other UN fora on gender or nuclear disarmament issues” (Hill 2005, 31). She attributes the successful introduction of SCR 1325 to three aspects of the UN system: that the ideas and language were built on previous documents and treaties; that international and grassroots NGO efforts had historically provided information and analysis to the Security Council; and, cooperation between the Namibian presidency of the Security Council, the UN’s gender mechanisms and the NGOs (Ibid., also see Tryggestad, 2009).

Access to UN institutions is essential in the process of agenda setting; says Joachim, “Access to institutions and the agenda-setting process is pivotal for NGOs to enable them to introduce their pet problems and solutions and to convince policymakers of both their significance and their validity” (Joachim 2007, 7). Although the SCR 1325 literature recognises the role played by the UN’s gender mechanisms, it is often downplayed or vaguely referenced. This is partly because the role played by UN allies is far less visible, while visibility for NGOs is a crucial aspect of mobilisation. I make this point because insider procedural and technical knowledge is needed to translate new ideas into the specific dialects of different UN mechanisms. The NGO Working Group needed insider allies to help translate their agenda so that it was responsive to the Security Council’s political and technical needs. These alliances are therefore a crucial aspect of SCR 1325’s genesis. Similarly, Finnemore and Sikkink argue that:

Groups with specialized knowledge often have a common set of norms and world views … As they deploy their knowledge, these epistemic communities often disseminate new norms and understandings along with technical expertise. Consequently, they can act as powerful mechanisms of social construction … Expertise often resides inside formal organizations, so the two

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38 UN staff rarely, if ever claim individual or institutional ownership of an idea or text of a political document. In the UN bureaucracy, the status of the member state or political entity that adopts and advances an agenda or particular language becomes an indicator of achievement.
mechanisms can become intertwined in interesting ways. (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, 402)

Contrary to many accounts of the Working Group’s role, drafting the initial concept paper was not among them. However, longstanding networks of feminists within and outside of the NGO Working Group, UNIFEM and UNICEF did effectively co-conspire to produce the first non-paper presented to the Council in 1999, as discussed in Chapter 3. This, ultimately unsuccessful attempt to bring gender issues onto the Council’s agenda during Slovenia’s presidency of the Security Council, relied on the model used to advance a Security Council resolution on children. The aim, according to UNIFEM, was ‘to do for women what UNICEF had done for children.’

In this way, I suggest that feminists within the UN’s gender mechanisms acted as ‘influential allies’ (J. M. Joachim 2007), or what Dennis Organ (Organ 1971) refers to as ‘linking pins’, and Gordenker and Weiss dub ‘boundary-role occupants (Gordenker and Weiss 1996, 35). They were also 'norm entrepreneurs' and played an important role in providing substantive and procedural knowledge and in mobilising other ‘door openers’. UNIFEM convened meetings with the NGO working group and strategised together about how each organisation was best positioned to advance particular issues. In this sense, UNIFEM and its advisers helped to find common ground between the NGO Working Group and the Security Council:

Influential allies are important because they generally possess institutional resources that NGOs themselves lack, ranging from material power to institutional prerogatives and prestige ... [and] changes in political alignments or conflict can be facilitating factors. (J. M. Joachim 2007, 7)

However, even senior feminists in the UN system lacked direct access to the influential allies needed to advance the idea of a Security Council resolution on women. In Chapter 3, I suggest that some of the keys unlocking this access were held by door openers about whom very little has been written; well-placed and powerful male allies within the Secretariat, the UN Funds and Programmes, and member states. That several of these influential allies were men is a point that is hardly remarked upon in the literature about SCR 1325. Yet, as RW Connell observed:

Many of the historic gains by women’s advocates have been won in alliance with men who held organizational or political authority at the time. (Connell et al. 2005, 1809–10)
Men and boys are ‘gatekeepers for gender equality’; Connell’s strategic question is whether they are willing to open the gates for major reforms (Ibid., 1802). In Chapter 5, the same question arises in the context of women’s participation in Liberian peace process. Felicity Hill makes a similar point in her assessment of the obstacles women face in engaging with mainstream institutions:

… women and men are forced to rely on friendships and individuals of good will who are willing to compromise the perception of their authority and credibility to get gender issues and women in through the back door of peace negotiations, and they are forced to do this because institutions and procedures are not automatically or routinely accountable to women or sufficiently sensitized to gender issues.39

By asking “If institutions are gendered, then can they also be re-gendered?” Angela Mackay raises a question that is central to my research, namely, that “as we ask how institutions reproduce gendered power relations, we must also be asking how this can be changed” (Mackay, 2010, 6).

2.23 **SCR 1325: A Failure of Discourse or Praxis?**

Feminist discourse analyses of SCR 1325 suggest that its conceptual framing and textual content ultimately compromised its potential to bring about more radical ambitions. Sandra Whitworth explains that in order to be ‘heard’, arguments must be presented in a way that “adopts the language of the UN, accommodates itself to UN-produced understandings of peace and security, and is alert to the hierarchies, protocols, and “stories” by which UN personnel define themselves” (Whitworth 2004, 95). However this, she argues also “fix[es] gender as a pathological relationship based on sexed bodies, an external hierarchy in which men enjoy the privileges of their masculinity through their power over women and girls, an articulation that is deeply problematic” (Ibid.).

Similarly, Laura Shepherd’s widely cited discourse analysis of SCR 1325 acknowledges, “just how remarkable an achievement it was to successfully framed gendered violence as an issue of international security” (Shepherd 2008a, 394), while also asserting that its discursive construction “determined the failure of UNSCR 1325” and its “assumption of differentiated genders [does] ‘violence’ to the concepts of gender and the international” (Shepherd 2008b, 9–14). Post-colonial variations of these criticisms go even

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further in suggesting that SCR 1325 is in fact helping to advance militarised, hegemonic and patriarchal ideologies, rather than challenge them.

The critique of the language used in SCR 1325 reflects the hard-fought discursive battles by feminists in the academy and international arenas to strengthen international human rights norms, reaffirm women’s agency, and refute generalisations about women as passive victims in conflict situations. It also reflects feminist theoretical contributions such as intersectionality that rejects privileging one cause of oppression over another, and instead, advances a holistic understanding of security that takes into account political, economic, geographic, ethnic, and social causes and consequences (Crenshaw 1991; Yuval-Davis 2006; Butler 1999).

However, critical feminist discourse analyses of SCR 1325’s textual content relies on feminist theories and concepts of power relations and subjectivities, rather than the Security Council’s unique institutional dialect and evolving repertoire of practice. It does not provide any explanations regarding the conditions necessary for another discursive construction to have prevailed. We are given no clues about what parts of the system or its objects would need to be different for Shepherd’s assertion to be correct. David Mutimer suggests that counter-factual reasoning is one way of approaching discourse analysis in studies of international organisations, that ask “how, if the system and its objects had been different, a different outcome would have been possible” (Quoted in Milliken 1999, 237).

Moreover, most feminist analyses of SCR 1325 focus exclusively on a single resolution, or a handful of related resolutions. As Milliken and others point out, discourse reflects a social system and a single text, even if it is a key document, cannot be used to support arguments about their social significance (Milliken, 1999). Security Council Report makes the same point:

Interpreting Council resolutions is a complex art. In order to ascertain the Council's intent and the powers it may be using in a particular resolution, it is necessary to analyse the overall context, the precise terms used in the resolution and sometimes the discussions in the Council—both at the time of adoption and subsequently. (Security Council Report 2008, 1)

And although it would seem fairly obvious that “it is not discourse itself which performs actions or social practices, but rather social actors involved in different social fields and symbolic struggles” (Keller 2005, 16), critical feminist analysis focus almost entirely on the Resolution itself, as an object and actor.
Due to its focus on textual content, feminist scholarship ends up problematising the resolution itself, rather than institutional pathologies and processes in which it is embedded. Moreover, because feminist analysis is discursive, there is rarely any empirical justification for claims, either in substantiating the way in which the term ‘protection’ is used or regarding the women for whom they believe protection is harmful or essentialising, rather than life saving.

My point is that while there may be risks in adopting discursive frameworks that appear to reinforce essentialising, hegemonic, patriarchal and militarist agendas from the perspective of feminist theory, so too are potential risks in changing the terms of the debate without fully understanding how this would impact policy and practice. A realistic assessment of these implications requires a full understanding of the terms of the debate as they are understood by those who have defined them.

As scholars of norm change have emphasised, pre-existing frames exert an influence on norm entrepreneurs seeking to map new discourses upon the old (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Once ideas are configured institutionally, they “can have an impact even when no one genuinely believes in them as principled or causal statements” (Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 20). A particular concept may be so deeply embedded in an institution’s practices that introducing an alternative would more likely marginalise the proponent from the discussion and therefore stop any chance of reframing the issue. The term ‘protection’ is one such example. Since SCR 1325 advocates within and outside of the UN have sought to separate the agendas on women from those on children and protection, I argue that they have also been marginalised from the core doctrinal debates within the Council and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations about how best to define them.

In another scenario, a particular discursive framework can provide a context for developing more specific policy questions. For example, UNICEF’s significant investment in research and mobilisation about child soldiers allowed it to reframe its work in the area so that it would be more closely aligned with programmes, policies and resources for their disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. A third example is when frames are used because there is not enough information or understanding about an issue to provide a functional alternative. UNHCR first had to understand the risks women faced in camp settings before understanding how their physical design (e.g. the location of latrines) influenced women’s security.

Fourth, a particular framing of an issue in one area may inadvertently influence how it is interpreted in other institutional settings, for better or worse. In the case of sexual and
gender based violence, women’s rights activists had worked for decades to ensure the broadest possible definition of all forms of violence against women. However, in placing this issue on the Security Council’s agenda, a much more narrowly defined term, ‘conflict-related sexual violence’ was introduced. This may unintentionally make it more difficult to address forms of sexual and gender based violence before or after conflicts take place, or in countries that are not on the Security Council’s agenda.

Finally, there are situations in which discourse is distorted intentionally for strategic reasons, such as media attention or resource mobilisation. For example, increased media attention to sexual violence has increased reporting and resources in some situations while, in others, it may reduce reporting and access to services because it increases stigma and social marginalisation. So many factors will determine how different discourses play out across different cultural settings, that these implications would need to be rigorously assessed before determining that one frame was more appropriate than another.

I give these examples to explain that SCR 1325’s textual content evolved in relation to a specific UN discourse that assigns particular meaning to different phrases and concepts; these frames share little in common with feminist theory. Without attempting to understand the Council’s discursive framework, feminist analyses fail to take Haraway’s additional step of critically reflecting on the location from which their knowledge issues, of thinking through the political and ethical implications of their knowledge claims (Haraway 1988). And, by failing to problematize the partiality of their claims, they avoid responsibility for their political effects” (Locher and Prügl 2001, 121). This illustrates what Stern and Zaleswki characterise as the ‘performative failure’ of feminism within the discipline of international relations, and the ‘all too common misapplication’ of gender analysis (Stern and Zalewski 2009). It also reaffirms Hawkesworth’s contention that:

This central misunderstanding of how to use gender analysis happens when the effort to theorize gender involves a subtle shift, from an account of “how” gender operates under specific historical conditions, to a universal claim about “why” gender performs a particular social function. In this shift, gender is transformed from an analytic category to a causal force’ (Hawkesworth 2006, 174)

Given the growing community of research and practice in the area of women, peace and security, how can we explain the abundance of mis-framed issues?

In the following section, I examine the NGO Working Group’s strategy for providing information to the Council, and the extent to which it met their political and technical needs and decision-making frameworks.
2.24 What is in a Frame?

Social movement scholars suggest that early framing efforts tend to have an ‘emergent, inchoate quality’, and at this stage:

The outcome of the process is less predictable. The frames of NGOs might be ignored, ridiculed, or not taken seriously. In contrast, later framing efforts are much more strategic and self-conscious. However, they are not without problems either. The more skilled and the more knowledgeable NGOs become, the more opposition they may encounter, so that their "later framing efforts can be expected to devolve into intense 'framing contests' between different actors. (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996b, 17)

In the case of SCR 1325, Carol Cohn suggests that the simplification of feminist analysis about the causes and consequences of armed conflict during SCR 1325’s negotiations was due, in part to “the absence of any kind of real institutional awareness of women (much less gender analysis) in the parts of the UN specifically mandated to deal with armed conflict and security”. She explains, “this is why the Working Group’s key goals (and SCR 1325) refer to the “protection” (of women in war) and “participation” (of women in peace making and peace building, while “the method to achieve these was envisioned as “mainstreaming gender” in the work of the Security Council” (Cohn 2008, 198).

But what explains this absence of institutional awareness and knowledge? In his work on epistemic communities, IR scholar Ernst Haas believes that why problems are conceived in relatively simple or in very complex ways reflect how policy makers understand implicit or explicit theories of causation. This, he claims, is linked to their knowledge available about ‘the problem’. From this perspective, a knowledge-based epistemic community plays an important role in framing the problem such that “political objectives and technical knowledge are combined to arrive at the conception of what constitutes one’s interest” (Haas 1990, 22 9–10).

Haas’ ‘bet’ is that the knowledge available about the problem influences the way decision-makers define whose interests are at stake; “implicit or explicit theories of causation in the actors’ minds imply degrees of knowledge, not merely momentarily shared interests” (Ibid.,10). In his view, organisational learning takes place when political objectives and technical knowledge are combined to arrive at an understanding of the problem that fully reflects the interests and goals of those with responsibility for responding. To this end, he sees ‘epistemic communities’ as crucial in providing the knowledge needed to guide an organisation’s understanding about a challenge it has not been able to meet:
Organizational learning is when actors representing states and members of the secretariat working together in the organization in the search for solutions to problems on the agenda, have agreed on a new way of conceptualizing the problem. That is, it is not individuals, entire governments, blocs of governments or entire organizations that learn; it is clusters of bureaucratic units within governments and organizations. That of course suggests that there can be varying rates of learning and quite different incentives to learn depending on the context, professional ethos, type of problem, type of region [and, I would add, type of organization]. The unit that learns is a particular kind of collective actor defined by its place in the organization, in world politics, in a professional and knowledge culture. (Ibid., 9-10)

Following this analysis, it is possible that the Security Council’s adoption of SCR 1325 reflected only a ‘momentary shared interest’ in the context of its discussion on the protection of civilians, and in response to its failures in Rwanda and Srebrenica. Unlike the Council’s ‘learning’ in relation to the protection of civilians and children, similar processes did not occur in relation to women, peace and security. While Cohn describes the Working Group’s self-conscious decision to position itself as “helper” to the Council, rather than as confrontational adversaries, (Cohn 2008, 187–188), perhaps neither of these positions would have been effective in developing a ‘consensual understanding’ of the issues in a way that would meet both the political and technical interests that were guiding decision-making in the Council.

As I discuss in Chapter 3, SCR 1325’s adoption was remarkable in that it was not preceded by major research, policy or mobilisation exercise, as is often the case with the introduction of new items on the Council’s agenda, such as the protection of civilians, the children’s agenda and the peacekeeping reform process. Each of these agendas was introduced at the request of the UN; i.e. the UN Secretary General or an intergovernmental body, with the aim of supporting a process that would arrive at a common understanding of the problem and potential solutions. Typically, such requests identify an independent commission or expert, or the most relevant UN entity to support a process of research and mobilisation, in partnership with some ‘interested’ member states that are representative of relevant geopolitical constituencies. These may take several months or even years to produce, with the aim of developing ‘consensual knowledge’ so that all decision-makers

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40 Respectively, the Council’s initiatives on the protection of civilians were in response to the international commission on the responsibility to protect, and subsequent independent reports on the protection of civilians; and regarding children, UNICEF supported Graça Machel’s Study on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Children; and, in relation to peacekeeping reform, the Brahimi Report.
will be able to respond to a shared assessment of the problem. Typically, the relevant UN entity continues to invest significant resources in following up the agenda and developing an epistemic community, policies and programmes. The Security Council’s agenda on women, peace, and security evolved differently.

In Chapter 3, I suggest that SCR 1325’s framing and limitations are due in part to the institutional location of gender issues within the UN’s organisation and structure, and the absence of a well-resourced entity to provide appropriate leadership; in mobilising financial, intellectual, and political resources. Although collaboration between feminist scholars and female delegates in the UN was central in bringing both women and gender issues onto the world stage, these forms of collaboration weakened precipitously over succeeding generations. In Chapter 3, I examine why the UN’s International Training and Research Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW), established in 1975, never became fully operational. I suggest that INSTRAW’s dysfunctional nature was likely significant in shaping the history of collaboration between feminist researchers and policy makers in relation to SCR 1325 and the UN’s broader agenda. The absence of any research capacity on women within the UN limited the opportunities to advance a women-centred agenda across a range of issues, including those pertaining to peace and security.

2.3 Conclusion

In this chapter, I examine the motivations and strategies of non-governmental actors credited with SCR 1325’s evolution. I also identify several competing policy frames that the literature points to in narrating SCR 1325’s history. I suggest that a deeper exploration of the ‘unresolved’ contradictions and inconsistencies within and across these accounts may deepen our understanding of SCR 1325’s limitations and also its potential, and the factors that were most significant in shaping its evolution.

Strategically, the NGO Working Group’s most significant contribution was to focus feminist energy on the UN Security Council as an institutional site of engagement. Before this, the central venues for international feminist engagement with the UN were the UN’s conferences on women and human rights. These world conferences provided feminist

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41 For Haas, “consensual knowledge may originate as an ideology and differs only in that it is constantly challenged from within and without and must justify itself by submitting its claims to truth tests considered generally acceptable.” (Haas 1990, 20–21)

42 These included the 1975 World Conference in Mexico, 1980 in Copenhagen, 1985 in Nairobi, and 1995 in Beijing. The 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna was a turning point for women’s human rights activism.
activists with a venue for establishing relationships, common frameworks and networks across different regions and political perspectives. The relationships developed were enduring, even as individual feminists began to work in other sectors within and outside of the UN. They are also significantly under-represented in the literature about the genesis of SCR 1325, particularly with the UN’s gender architecture and key male allies.

In this chapter, I also show how the meaning and significance of words, phrases and key concepts in SCR 1325 have been misinterpreted. By decontextualising SCR 1325 from a fifty-year history of discursive evolution within the UN Security Council, feminist discourse fails to provide an analysis of the text as it is understood by, and in the context of, those who authorised it. This has resulted in a significant overestimation of SCR 1325’s importance, and an underestimation of the politics that drive Security Council decision-making.

As I discuss throughout this paper, these politics reflect the interests of hegemonic states that established the organisation and continue to wield a disproportionate level of influence through voting privileges across different institutional structures, financial power, staffing, leadership, and access to knowledge and information (Haas 1990, 57). Equally important, however, is the role of the counter-hegemonic coalitions e.g. the G-77 and other regional groups in shaping SCR 1325’s genesis and implementation pathways.

These factors are significantly underdeveloped in analyses of SCR 1325’s genesis, and of its implementation failures and successes. Carol Harrington remedies a significant gap in the SCR 1325 literature by pointing to the significance of post-Cold War superpower politics in “shaping the aims of women’s bureaucracies and non-governmental organizations in the UN system” (Harrington 2011, 557). While IO scholars take for granted that international organisations play a role as innovators and norm diffusers, how much credit they can be given remains a major focus of study and debate. I agree with Haas’ contention that, “The idealist takes for granted that such redefining is likely to occur; scholars who stress the predominance of bureaucracies and political forces at the national capital place the locus of change elsewhere” (Haas 1990, 14). Haas reminds us that multilateral actors and institutions only provide a limited channel for innovation and change, but that “much more may be going on in bilateral encounters and informal contacts outside the organizational forum” (Ibid., 14).

In the following chapters, I explore different aspects of these organisational dynamics: geopolitical, institutional and bureaucratic. In Chapter 3, I examine how the geopolitical historical development of the UN’s structure and organisation has shaped its institutional
arrangements for women and the way in which gender issues have come on to the international peace and security agenda.
Chapter 3

The UN and Women: A Case of Relegated Authority

Although the Charter of the United Nations reaffirms “faith in the equal rights of men and women” (United Nations 1945), UN strategies to advance gender equality have undermined any chance of realising this aspiration. In its first thirty years, the UN did little more to advance women’s rights than establish a Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) in 1946. Thereafter, the UN’s engagement on gender issues has been ad hoc, evolving incrementally, and only in response to demands made by women and their allies within and outside of the UN. Instead of creating the requisite institutional capacity within the UN for advancing a global women’s agenda (e.g. as it did for children, through UNICEF, and for refugees through UNHCR), a series of UN World Conferences on Women and Human Rights became the de facto arenas in which global decisions about women’s rights and status were made, even as a fragmented and under-resourced UN ‘gender-architecture’ began to emerge.43

In this chapter, I introduce the key UN institutional arenas in which women and gender issues were addressed before SCR 1325’s adoption. I suggest that the UN’s strategies to advance women’s rights demonstrate a form of ‘bureaucratic pathology’; a propensity towards dysfunctional behaviours “that are attributable to bureaucratic culture and internal bureaucratic processes and that lead the international organisation (IO) to act in a manner that subverts is self-professed goals” (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004, p. 3).

I use the analytic framework introduced in Chapter 1 to examine how the consideration of women and gender issues evolved in relation to the UN’s institutional and organisational structure. In part one, I examine the geo-political dynamics that initially informed the UN’s agenda on women. In part two, I examine how these dynamics were later expressed institutionally, through the creation of three UN ‘gender mechanisms’, the International Training and Research Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW), the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM, now UN Women), and

43The terms ‘gender architecture’, ‘gender mechanism’ and ‘gender entity’ are often used interchangeably. I refer to ‘gender architecture’ as the sum total of each ‘mechanism’. I use ‘mechanisms’ to refer to UN gender ‘bodies’ (the most generic reference for any UN entity) that are part of the UN’s institutional rather than inter-governmental structure; i.e. UNIFEM, INSTRAW and Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues (OSAGI) and the Division for the Advancement of Women. These are mechanisms that carry out different aspects of the UN’s institutional work, while CEDAW and the CSW are inter-governmental bodies. Interestingly, UNFPA was never considered part of the UN’s gender architecture even though its primary focus is women’s reproductive and sexual health and rights.
the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues (OSAGI). I am interested in how the
UN’s ‘institutional arrangements’ for women, shaped SCR 1325’s genesis and
implementation pathways.

In the previous chapter, I provided a critical assessment of SCR 1325’s herstory as
portrayed in the feminist literature, and its emphasis on the role of feminist, anti-militarist
NGOs. In this chapter, I complement this dominant narrative with an analysis of the UN’s
role in SCR 1325’s genesis. I examine how the UN’s core geopolitical dynamics informed
the conceptualisation of ‘ideas’ about women and security and their bureaucratic and
institutional expression. By geopolitical, I refer to state identities (national, regional,
ideological) and their inter-relationships (hegemonic, counter-hegemonic, allies, enemies,
etc.). By institutional, I refer to the UN’s organisational structure: its membership, the
mandate and functions of the primary inter-governmental bodies (the Security Council the
General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council), the role of the Secretary-General
and the Secretariat (and its departments), and the UN Funds and Programmes. By
bureaucratic, I refer to the mechanisms and processes through which power is exercised;
e.g. through voting blocs, budget reviews, personnel placement, and knowledge generation.
More generally, I’m interested in how gender, as a process and a variable, is exercised in
different expressions of hierarchy and hegemony.

I present a genealogy of developments leading up to SCR 1325’s adoption in 2000; the
‘agenda-setting’ phase of SCR 1325’s evolution. In the previous chapter, I referred to
three political frames through which SCR 1325’s genesis is recounted: feminist peace
activism; the Beijing Conference on Women, and the protection of civilians. In Chapter
two, I focused on the first frame; in this chapter, I focus on the World Conferences as a
venue for the expression of geopolitical rivalries; and in Chapter 4, I introduce the
protection of civilians frame.

3.1 Women in the UN: No Room or Money of their Own

The UN’s behaviour was more pathological than aspirational regarding its commitment to
women’s rights when the founding Charter was signed in San Francisco in 1945. The need
for a distinct UN entity for women was not considered among the other unanticipated
needs for which large, operational Funds and Programmes were established between 1945-
1948, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization; the World Food Programme, the UN

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44 The full text of the sentence with Virginia Woolf’s essay title, A Room of One’s Own, first published on 24
October 1929, is: “A woman must have money and a room of her own if she is to write fiction”.
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the UN Emergency Fund for Children (UNICEF), and the World Health Organization. Rather, women’s issues came onto the UN’s agenda only after demands by female delegates working in collaboration with women activists, practitioners, and scholars outside of the UN (Pietila, 2007).

The UN Charter organises the UN’s work in three main areas: peace and security, which is the primary responsibility of the 15 member Security Council; human rights, which is the responsibility of the Geneva-based Human Rights Council and ten treaty bodies; and economic, social and cultural issues (including development and humanitarian affairs), that are the responsibility of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and administered by an expansive UN family of 19 Specialised Agencies, nine functional commissions, five regional commissions, six ‘other bodies’, 14 Funds and Programmes, six Research and Training Institutes and three ‘other entities’. 45

Without any dedicated entity or mechanism for advancing women’s issues, an early debate ensued regarding a proposal to establish a separate commission for women’s rights. In 1945, the US and UK delegations argued that a separate commission would be discriminatory and unnecessary, while the Danish and Brazilian delegates argued in favour. Danish delegate Bodil Begtrup convinced ECOSOC of the need for a separate entity with responsibility for ‘half of the population’ by referencing women’s engagement in the resistance movement and arguing against its dependence on another Commission:

….it has been said also…that women’s problems should not be separate from those of men. But however idealistic, this point of view is purely unrealistic and academic…practice shows that …special problems that are connected with the status of women…have now for the first time in history to be studied internationally …and to be given the social importance they ought to have…Some situations can be changed by laws, education, and public opinion, and the time seems to have come for happy changes in conditions of women all over the world, first due the fact that the attitude of men toward women has changed tremendously during the war in the countries that have taken part in the war, because of the comradeship in the resistance movement and in the war activities, and in having signed the Charter, all the Governments of the UN

45 See: http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/structure/org_chart.shtml The Funds and Programmes were created by the United Nations to meet needs not envisaged at San Francisco, such as Palestinian refugees, development assistance, food aid and the environment: “They are subordinate to the United Nations, but since they are immediately controlled by distinct inter-governmental bodies and derive most of their financial resources from other sources than the United Nations budgets, they are somewhat more akin to specialised agencies than to ‘subsidiary organs’ such as UN commissions and committees. Moreover, as their activities are more operational and carried out at field level, they have needs dictated by an environment quite different from that of headquarter-centred administrations. The Programmes and Funds apply UN rules and regulations in the realm of administration and personnel. UNRWA reports only to the General Assembly.”
have pledged themselves, and have shown in interest in working for equality between men and women. Finally, this interest shown by the UN in the conditions of women has aroused hope and interest among women all over the world in this new world. …I can assure that women all over the world will give all their heart, mind and will to serve in the work of peace entrusted to the United Nations. (United Nations 1996b, 111–112)

Ultimately, a 15 member Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) was established as a sub-committee of the ‘fully functional’ Commission on Human Rights, reporting through the ECOSOC to the General Assembly.46 In other words, women’s issues were considered to fall within the UN’s human rights sphere, as compared to its work on development and peace and security. A small Section on the Status of Women was created in the Human Rights Division of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs to provide secretariat support to the CSW in preparing reports, providing conference services and other administrative and budgetary functions.

Figure 1: UN Organisational Chart

46 The initial members of the CSW were Denmark, Dominican Republic, Lebanon, India, Chile, France and China, Australia, USSR, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, Syria, Turkey, Byelorussian, Soviet Socialist Republic, UK, US, Venezuela.
Up until 1975, the CSW was the only UN entity with specific responsibilities for women. Although its mandate eventually expanded to include social and development issues, up until 1972, it remained in the Human Rights Division, as a separate sub-Commission. Not only did this separate women’s issues from the rest of the UN’s agenda, but it also separated women’s human rights from the UN’s overall consideration of human rights. The UN Human Rights Division’s first Director considered this separate track an advantage:

It allowed women delegates to work in ways that bypassed the formal procedures and staff of UN human rights bodies and with disturbing effect in their advocacy for a separate commission and other matters … More than perhaps any other United Nations body, the delegates to the Commission on the Status of Women were personally committed to its objectives ... (and) acted as a kind of lobby for the women of the world ... There was no more independent body in the UN. (Gaer 2009, 61)

Despite the CSW’s many impressive achievements, however, other observers have argued that its separation from the Commission on Human Rights worked against the broader mobilisation of UN resources - institutional, political, and financial- to advance a women’s agenda, “Being removed from the mainstream allowed the early CSW to be innovative…[while creating] a marginalised women’s ghetto with lesser resources, staff and institutional clout” (Ibid.). Former UN secretariat staff person Laura Reanda takes a harsher view:

In the highly sectorialized UN system, women and their concerns and perspectives have been just that: a sector. In the male world of inter-national politics and economics, that sector was easily marginalized. Until very recently, not much communication or cooperation existed between it and other parts of the system, with the exception of those that included similar women's sectors ... The near exclusion of women from procedures governing international recourse for human rights violations, developed under the auspices of the Commission on Human Rights over the past 20 years, is another case in point. (Reanda 1999, 51)

As the UN’s membership expanded rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s with newly independent countries, the UN became more centrally focused on economic and development issues. The CSW responded to these developments by adapting its scope of work to reflect concerns about women in developing countries, from land ownership, and family planning, to economic and social programmes. A 1966 ECOSOC survey on women’s roles in economic and social development indicated that: “women were faring so poorly at the national level that they would need special assistance for indefinite periods”
However, instead of developing a stronger institutional vehicle for supporting these areas, the CSW and ECOSOC called on UNICEF and UNDP to bring women into their respective programmatic frameworks and expand their technical assistance accordingly (Ibid., 169).

On the twentieth anniversary of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1968, Iran hosted the Tehran Human Rights Conference, which resulted in a far-reaching resolution to promote women's rights “in the modern world, through a unified long term UN programme for the advancement of women” (Ibid., 177). Although the Resolution addressed women’s political, social, economic and cultural rights, the General Assembly emphasised only the goals relating to social development, including education, training and employment, health and maternity protection and administration and public life (Ibid., 185) in the programme it adopted in 1970 to follow up the resolution; the first to identity measurable targets for women’s advancement. In other words, women’s human rights, as a central focus of the UN’s agenda for women, were becoming subverted to the broader economic and social development agenda.

In 1972, UN Secretary General Waldheim appointed Norwegian Helvi Sipila, the first female Assistant Secretary-General, to head a newly created Centre for Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs. The Centre included responsibility for women’s affairs and the CSW’s secretariat was therefore relocated to the Centre and upgraded into a ‘Branch for the Promotion of Equality of Men and Women’. After 1978, it was renamed the Branch for the Advancement of Women, and in 1988 it was further upgraded to a Division, the Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW). However, in 1973, the UN had relocated its human rights secretariat to Geneva and, because of the CSW’s growing orientation toward development, encouraged by Sipila, it remained in New York, now institutionally and geographically separated from the UN’s human rights system.

Gaer comments:

The original structures of the UN subordinated women's equal rights organizationally and politically to other and more general human rights concerns. In response, women activists pushed to separate, and thereby elevate the Commission on the Status of Women, establishing them as fully equivalent to the Commission on Human Rights. However, the consequences of this move not only left women's human rights of little interest to the CHR but, ironically, also left human rights concerns to social and economic development considerations within the CSW itself, with mechanisms for holding states and rights violators answerable for denials of these rights undeveloped and underutilized. (Gaer 2009, 65)
This development reorientation was also a reaction to the changing geopolitical climate in the UN and what Gaer describes as “an increasing anti-individual rights ideological emphasis of delegates from East European and Third World states” (Ibid.).

The CSW’s expanded focus was not, however, accompanied by a new mandate or additional resources. As a secretariat entity, its work was considered ‘normative’ and focused on the development of international norms and standards regarding women’s legal and political status. This is compared to the ‘operational’ work of the UN’s Funds and Programmes that deliver technical advisory support and other resources to developing countries. Without additional resources, however, the CSW’s new orientation both undermined its human rights work while minimising its opportunities to advance women’s issues in the economic and development arenas. While the CSW’s expanded focus was worthwhile, Reanda notes that it “resulted in a proliferation of separate projects for women added to existing programmes, without altering the underlying structures or the overall orientation of development planning” (Reanda 1999, 52).

It would take several decades before the UN recognised the need for a dedicated Fund with specialised expertise to provide meaningful and appropriate development assistance for women. In the meantime, as donor countries turned increasingly to the operational UN entities such as UNDP and UNICEF, their relationships with developing countries became more influential:

Ambiguity about sovereignty has all along characterised the aid relationship, especially aid through the UN system. In actuality, the agencies that determined and implemented the aid have a strong, even decisive, influence not only on who receives the assistance, but also on the purposes it serves and the principles that govern its implementation. (Browne 2011, 4–5)

As more developing countries joined the UN, they became more organised as a voting bloc to represent their interests and protect against policies that would be harmful to their economies or security. Formed in 1964 as the Group of 77 (G-77) because it was originally composed of 77 members, it currently has 134 members and represents the interests of developing countries or ‘programme’ countries, in relation to donor, or ‘industrialised countries’. In all UN fora, voting blocs cohere along these axes and in regional groups that put forward candidates for election to various UN General Assembly Bodies and Executive Boards.47

47 The UN’s five regional groups are: Africa; Asia-Pacific; Eastern Europe; Latin American and Caribbean (GRULAC), and Western Europe and Others (WEOG). The EU and other sub-regional groups often vote or
While individual countries from the ‘Global South’ will, in some cases abandon their solidarity, the G77 (and China) often negotiate as an indivisible bloc:

Dramatic and largely symbolic or theatrical confrontations, rather than a search for meaningful partners, has become the usual way to proceed. With a push toward consensus the operation principle – the preferred route for UN discussions – lowest common denominators are one way to have 193 states agree on a resolution, work program or budget. The other is for each country to interpret a resolution the way that it sees fit or to ignore programs that it dislikes. (Weiss 2012, 54)

As described below, these solidarity groups become significant for women’s issues in many different ways, through voting patterns, funding allocations, and broader geopolitical disputes. Both ‘type’ (regional, economic, ideological) and ‘role’ identities (donor, recipient) are gendered; in voting on substantive issue (women’s sexual and reproductive rights), the creation or support of a gender mechanism or entity, or how the particular representative uses their discretionary space. Which of these multiple identities prevail in different situations helps explain how gender as a variable and a process is exercised in international institutions. For example, to the extent that ‘women’ as an issue becomes associated with a particular identity (e.g. North-South), it also becomes a bargaining chip, as is the case with INSTRAW, described below.

In this section, I have examined how the tensions between the global North and South were significant in reorienting the CSW’s scope of work toward economic development issues and away from women’s human rights. Yet despite this expanded focus, no corollary institutional or financial resources were made available. Instead, for the UN’s first 30 years, the CSW, a small, intergovernmental entity without any operational mandate or capacity, became the default institutional home for women’s human rights and social and development issues. As an independent entity, it did not receive support from either the UN’s Human Rights system or the UN’s operational Funds and Programmes. Nor did its work forge a pathway for bringing women or gender issues onto the UN’s peace and security architecture:

The ‘ghettoization’ of women within the larger framework of the human rights and development arenas has been matched by their all but total absence from the peace and security sphere, the traditional power center of international
diplomacy. There are examples during the Cold War era when the situation of women in certain countries became part of the international debate, particularly in the context of liberation struggles. These, however, remained isolated instances with clearly political aims, and did nothing to transform theoretical or practical approaches to conflict situations. It should therefore come as no surprise that this pattern of isolation in specialized sectors and absence from the areas considered most important, in addition to general underrepresentation of women, continues to be reflected in the overall composition of UN organs and in the staffing of its secretariats. (Reanda 1999, 52)

To the extent that these institutional arrangements continued to undermine the advancement of the UN’s broader goals in relation to women, I refer to the UN’s strategies for advancing women’s rights as a form of bureaucratic pathology. In the next section, I show how the UN’s propensity towards dysfunctional behaviour in relation to women continued over several more decades, and was further inflamed by Cold War rivalries.

3.2 The Cold War and Hot Potatoes: the UN’s relegation of women and gender issues

In 1972, 25 years after the CSW’s inauguration, the Commission for Social Development and the CSW convened the first international expert group meeting on the role of women in development. In order to showcase its dual focus on development and equality, the CSW recommended that 1975 be designated International Women’s Year. By this time, however, women’s issues had become increasingly politicised along both of the UN’s existential axes of discontent: ‘East-West’ and ‘North-South’.

The East-West axis has its origins in the Cold War, the East represented the Soviet Union and its allies in Central and Eastern Europe, and the West included the United States and the industrialised countries in North America, Western Europe, Japan, Australia and New Zealand (Weiss 2012, 50–72). Because the Soviet Union and the United States would veto any potential member that was associated with the other camp, many newly independent countries seeking UN membership formed the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in the 1960s. With the Soviet Union’s dissolution, these East-West divisions moderated to some extent, while North-South rivalries intensified with the G-77 leading as the representative of the Global South in challenging the wealthy ‘developed’ donor countries of the global ‘North’.

The G-77 and other coalitions of less powerful, smaller, or poorer states (which, together, have the majority vote) often assert their power by paralysing decision-making in Committees, on Executive Boards, or in any intergovernmental fora. After the Security
Council, the second most important venue for these struggles is the General Assembly’s Fifth Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. Viewed as a ‘counter-balance’ to the Security Council’s authority to authorise peace operations (with decision-making power held by its Permanent five members, the P5), the Fifth Committee has the power to decide if and how they are funded, and makes decisions about the UN’s budget as well as UN assessments, management and reform processes (Swart and Lund 1995; Swart and Martinetti 2007; D. Malone 2004).

With respect to the UN’s agenda for women, these tensions were played out along both North-South and East-West axes. The first significant confrontation took place over the theme of the first International Year on Women, which was intended to reflect the CSW’s two significant areas of work: equality and development. In this sense, ‘equality’ represented the US agenda of individual political rights and legal equality, while ‘development’ represented the priorities of the global South. But neither of these categories reflected the Soviet concerns about US military intervention and capitalism. For the Soviets, women’s status was associated with their economic participation while the primary cause of women’s oppression was imperialism, colonialism, racism and capitalism. These debates were commonplace in the CSW, with the Russian and Polish delegates among the most active and vocal. According to the CSW’s former chairperson:

A constant topic of debate in the commission between those who came from the East and their Western counterparts was the superiority of women's status in the Socialist bloc as against the advantages of women in market-oriented economies. (Shahini, 2004, 28)

Entering the fray, the Eastern Bloc countries advanced what was referred to as the ‘peace’ perspective, such that “women were inherently less violent and war mongering than men, and as such; they had a duty to mediate Cold War conflicts” (Ghodsee 2010, 4). Ultimately, the General Assembly resolved these tensions temporarily by adding a third theme of ‘peace’:

The General Assembly proclaimed the themes of the year as “equality, development, and peace” reflecting the primary preoccupations of the three ideological blocs: the communist East, the Industrialized West (now the Global North) and the developing Third World (or now the Global South). (Fraser and Tinker 2004, xix)

Given the limited opportunities and resources for addressing the full panoply of women’s issues associated with this significantly emboldened agenda, the CSW later called for an international conference to coincide with International Women’s Year. But
the Soviet Union’s delegate strongly opposed the proposal (even though it was made by Communist Romania) out of concern that an international conference would “weaken its grip on the women’s issues among its allies and thus lose a powerful tool of control and propaganda” (Ibid., 30). Ghodsee explains:

The key tension was between the rival American “equality” and the Soviet “peace” agendas. The issue was whether the conferences should be used only to discuss women's issues or to allow women to discuss pressing international issues as women since the official UN bodies were still dominated by men. The American feminists believed that the meetings would be a venue to discuss specific topics such as legal barriers, employment discrimination, inequalities in educational attainment, or women's representation in political office. The women from the socialist countries, alternatively, argued that the international women's conferences should be a forum to allow women to have their own say about the same world issues that men debated in the UN (nuclear proliferation, peace in the Middle East, apartheid in South Africa, etc.). (Ghodsee 2010, 5)

Eventually, the Soviet Union conceded and the political tensions refocused on the agenda and conference representatives. As a strategy for maintaining their ideological edge, the Soviet Union announced a very high level delegation to the conference, led by cosmonaut Valentiana Nikolayeva-Tershkova, heroine of the Soviet Union and two time recipient of the Order of Lenin (Ghodsee, 2010, p. 5). This prompted the US to pay closer attention to the conference and significant political debate in Washington ensued, “the US government viewed women’s issues in the early 1970s as fronts for communist organizing and agitation” (Ibid.) The US National Security Council and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger disagreed about First Lady Betty Ford’s participation at the Conference as the head of delegation and, in the end, she did not participate. Ultimately, the threat of linking women’s issues to an anti-capitalist (and therefore anti-American) agenda outweighed the importance of those issues despite the insistence of American feminists at home” (Ibid.).

Most US fears about the first World Conference on Women, held in Mexico City in 1975, were realised. The Conference Declaration spared no ambiguity in its analysis of obstacles to gender equality, development and peace in all spheres, and the State’s responsibility for creating the necessary economic and social policies for achieving this. The Mexico City Declaration recognises the need to implement a New International Economic Order, referring to the UN Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, and reaffirming the principle of the “full and permanent sovereignty of every State over its natural resources, wealth and all economic activities” (United Nations 1975, 4). In its most significant political triumph over the US, the Declaration includes language that equates
Zionism with racism; the singularly most politicised question in international negotiations.

The Mexico Declaration was the first ever to include such text within a final document:

Men and women, together, should eliminate colonialism, neo-colonialism, imperialism, foreign domination and occupation, Zionism, apartheid, racial discrimination, the acquisition of land by force and the recognition of such acquisition, since such practices inflict incalculable suffering on women, men and children. (Ibid., 2)

The Declaration was adopted in the same year that the US withdrew from Vietnam in defeat, and its pointed-focus on sovereignty was considered a strong attack on US foreign policy and military interventions:

Peace requires that women as well as men should reject any type of intervention in the domestic affairs of States, whether it is openly or covertly carried on by other States or by transnational corporations. Peace also requires that women as well as men should also promote respect for the sovereign right of a State to establish its own economic, social and political system without undergoing political and economic pressures or coercion of any type. (Ibid., 5)

Moreover, according to Ghodsee, the Soviets used their propaganda to co-opt women’s peace activists, including WILPF:

While the feminists from the advanced capitalist countries wanted the conference to focus exclusively on women's equality with men, women from the Eastern Bloc countries and the developing world pushed the idea that women were inherently different from men, and that they had a biological predisposition to be less violent (see also Jahan, 1975). As a result, they considered things like neo-colonialism, apartheid, racism and Zionism to be uniquely male forces in the world that could, through women's increased participation in international affairs, be challenged and defeated. This was clearly a heavy dose of Soviet propaganda, but there were many women around the world (and in the U.S.) committed to the peace agenda (for instance, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom), and the communist countries were able to successfully co-opt this agenda to their own anti-capitalist purposes. (Ghodsee 2010, 6)

From the perspective of international diplomacy, the Mexico Conference Declaration was among the strongest assertions of political triumph over the US by the Global South and East. Of all Conference declarations, it had the greatest overall support with only three opposed (including the US and Israel), 89 in favour and 18 abstentions. It reflected far more cohesion than the Beijing Declaration, which one-third, or 64 of 189 representatives expressed reservations.

Potentially, the Mexico Conference could have made a significant impact in challenging the UN’s institutional deficiencies and neglect of women’s issues. It called for, and resulted in, the establishment of two UN gender mechanisms, UNIFEM and
INSTRAW, and eventually, the establishment of the Committee on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (an inter-governmental human rights treaty body that monitors implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women). After CEDAW’s establishment in 1979, however, the CSW abandoned its work in human rights and the social and economic arenas and focused more centrally on organizing the world conferences. And instead of institutionalizing the UN’s discussion about gender issues within the new gender mechanisms it had created, UNIFEM and INSTRAW (discussed in the following section), international conferences continued to serve as the primary venue for negotiating international agreements and targets for women.

After the Mexico Conference, the UN approved a Decade for Women, 1976-1985, and two additional conferences; the mid-decade conference in Copenhagen (1980), and the end-of-decade conference in Nairobi (1985). This was followed by the Fourth World Conference on Women, in Beijing, China ten years later (1995). After the Beijing Conference, two additional conferences were convened in New York: Beijing Plus 5 (2000) and then the Beijing Plus 10 (in 2005).

As was the case in Mexico, each of the subsequent conferences continued to be shaped by geopolitical rivalries. The US became increasingly engaged in these debates and, at the Second World Conference in Copenhagen, reasserted its own ideological vision on the outcome documents, ensuring that Zionism was never again equated with discrimination. UNIFEM’s first executive director Margaret Snyder recalls how UNIFEM became a scapegoat in this process:

[UNIFEM was] yanked into American politics as the scapegoat of those who disapproved of discussing such topics [apartheid and the Israeli-Palestinian issue] and who pressured by the US Congress to cease its voluntary contributions. The United States had initially been the fund’s largest donor. Although UNIFEM had no role in financing the conference, funding was cut (despite protestations from American NGO and political leaders), to be restored later on at a lower level. (Fraser and Tinker 2004, 48)

48 It is my contention that the conferences after Beijing are referred to as Beijing Plus 5 and Beijing Plus 10 rather than Mexico City Plus 20 and Mexico City Plus 25 as a way of resetting the starting point of women’s long struggle for equality, development and peace, back to the most conservative international outcome rather than the most visionary, albeit politically contentious for the US, while simultaneously erasing ten years of activism. Two World Conferences on Human Rights were also significant in the UN’s actions to advance gender equality; while the 1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights is well documented in feminist literature, the Ten Year anniversary Conference of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights held in Tehran (1967) barely receives a mention even though it resulted in the first programme of action for women with specific targets, and was endorsed by the UN General Assembly.
After the end of the International Decade for Women, many governments and UN officials wanted to dismantle the gender institutions it had created. Recalls Snyder:

‘high officials’ were determined either to control [UNIFEM’s] grants or to see it dismantled entirely at the end of the Decade for Women. Austria, the East-West buffer state was angered; it had never made a single contribution to the fund but was determined to fill its newly constructed Vienna international centre offices. As fund director… I came under fire. One bureaucratic tactic to annoy and occupy the time of dissidents like me to is to authorize audits and evaluations of their offices; I was seldom free from such time-consuming inspections. (Ibid., 45-47)

Sequentially, the outcome documents of each of the world conferences on women, evidence a precipitous diminution in the level of commitment made by the UN’s member states to women. While previous world conferences had iteratively and progressively strengthened normative standards for gender equality, the Beijing Conference was the first in which feminists faced organised opposition from politically conservative and resurgent authoritarian regimes, including the Vatican, Roman Catholic, Islamist, secularist-nationalist, and Western religious and fundamentalist groups (Bunch and Fried 1996; Baden and Goetz 1997; Meyer and Prügl 1999).

Moreover, while the Mexico Conference resulted in the creation of INSTRAW, UNIFEM and CEDAW, the UN’s response to the Fourth World Conference in Beijing, considered the largest and most significant international meeting on women, was the authorisation of a single new post: a Special Adviser on Gender Issues. Created at the Assistant Secretary-General level, the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues (OSAGI) became the most senior position on women in the UN, although still below the rank of all other heads of agencies (but higher than UNIFEM’s Executive Director who was, in practice, the head of agency). And OSAGI’s mandate was limited to monitoring the implementation of the Beijing outcome document. As an adviser to the Secretary-General and, therefore, the representative of the Secretariat, the position had no operational resources, no political autonomy, and no policy-making role.

The UN’s reliance on international conferences as decision-making fora is highly unusual for regular items on the UN’s agenda. More typically, world conferences are convened on topics that are not already on the UN’s agenda or that need some infusion of global attention and resources. Similar to the international negotiations on climate change, decisions at international conferences are made by senior government officials from the capital; the relevant ministry or even a head of state. In the case of women, however, it is a
regular practice to send the ‘First Lady’; a delegate without a political portfolio, and more limited discretionary space than a senior ministry official.

Conference delegates are the de facto representatives of the state, as compared to UN delegates (called ‘representatives’) to whom officials in capital cities ‘give instructions.’ At world conferences, the UN secretariat plays a support role; it shepherds, rather than leads, the process. Afterwards, the UN General Assembly becomes a ‘recipient’ of decisions that were made by world ‘leaders’ directly. This is why world conference outcomes typically reflect the lowest common denominator of agreement, and vary according to the geopolitical dynamics of the day.

International organisations are interesting to scholars because they are sites of struggle around which actors mobilize to advance and oppose particular interests. IO scholars therefore ask questions about the agency and autonomy of IOs relative to and as agents of powerful states. As I explain in Chapter 1, my interest is in how UN actions in relation to women have undermined or reinforced conventional conceptions about state interests, and how they are internalised and acted on across different socio-spatial and geo-political arenas (e.g. peacekeeping environments or regionally). In the case of women, however, the UN has not been the central arena in which decisions about women have been made. Instead, decision-making about women’s issues has been extrinsic to the UN; the UN is a passive recipient rather than a proactive agent for advancing gender equality, development and peace. As a result, the UN’s institutional and architectural void in relation to women and gender issues is further exacerbated and the global agenda for women remains hostage to prevailing political disputes.

This dynamic is not reflected in either of the two the paradigms of ‘IO autonomy’ that are studied in the literature: one in which the IO itself is considered an ‘autonomous actor’, and the other that looks at how ‘agents’ (or delegates, representatives) exercise their discretionary space (or authority) in relation to the interests of the ‘principal’. The UN’s pathologies about women represent a different relational dynamic that I refer to as ‘relegation’ and for which I propose the following definition: a form of self-direction in which UN representatives choose to relinquish their delegated authority and instead ‘re-delegate’ or ‘relegate’ decision-making back to their ‘principal’ authority. Relegation diminishes the possibility for autonomous or independent action by UN representatives, whose responsibilities shift to that of ‘recipient’, wherein they typically receive and endorse the decisions made externally, and offer mostly rhetorical commitments (i.e.
without budgetary implications) to follow up any relevant recommendations directed to its principal organs or main bodies.

Simply put, the notion of IO autonomy, or lack thereof, has not turned out well for women. The agreements reached at each of the four World Conferences on Women were successively less visionary and reflect a growing international conservatism about women’s rights. Meanwhile, the UN’s contribution to the global women’s agenda remains limited to the normative sphere, without the senior political leadership or operational capacity needed to assert influence across all of its spheres of responsibility.

Interestingly, the most positive and unexpected outcomes of the World Conferences – the strengthening of transnational women’s organising – further reduced UN ownership of the women’s agenda by bolstering women’s organisations and networks outside of the UN rather than within it. Each conference hosted a ‘parallel forum’ for nongovernmental organisations. More often than not, NGO delegates did not share their governments’ positions and challenged them from seats far outside of the formal arena; in the case of Beijing, the NGO meeting was forty miles away from the main conference venue (Karns and Mingst, 2010; Otto, 1996). This strengthened the autonomy of women’s movements and their global solidarity.

In this section, I have shown how East-West political rivalries continued to influence the UN’s agenda for women. Despite increased attention to women’s issues, and the creation of several new gender mechanisms, decision making about women continued to take place in international fora by member states, therefore limiting the potential for more autonomous action within the UN system. In the following section, I show how these political dynamics continued to work against the adoption of a security council resolution on women.

3.3 Women and Peace and Security: Whose Agenda? 49

Although NGOs associated SCR 1325’s genesis with the Beijing Platform for Action (BPFA), many UN delegations used the BPFA as a rationale for keeping women’s issues off of the Security Council’s agenda. As with all of the international conferences on women, the outcome document (in this case, the BPFA) was adopted by UN member states and then presented to the UN through ECOSOC and endorsed by the General Assembly.

49 Initially, the formal reference on the Council’s agenda was, ‘Women and Peace and Security’; this was to ensure that the discussion would be limited to ‘women and peace’, and ‘women and security’ rather than women and the entirety of the ‘peace and security’ agenda.
The BPFA reaffirms the General Assembly’s primacy as the ‘highest level’ and principal policy-making and appraisal organ on matters relating to the follow-up to the Beijing Conference (United Nations 1995). It calls on ECOSOC to oversee system-wide coordination, and the Commission on the Status of Women to play a central role in monitoring implementation within the UN system. In other words, there is no UN role given to the Security Council in relation to the Platform, in an implementing, advisory, or oversight role and, within the UN, there is little direct contact between ECOSOC and the Council.

The idea of a Security Council resolution on women brought up longstanding debates between ECOSOC and the Security over the constitutional powers of the UN’s principle organs. Some delegations, particularly among the G77, view the Security Council’s consideration of thematic issues as an imposition of its ‘norm-setting powers’ as established by the UN Charter. It was only in 2002 that ECOSOC’s president was even invited to brief the Security Council.

Moreover, since 1974, both ECOSOC and the General Assembly had addressed many aspects of the ‘women, peace, and security’ agenda through myriad declarations and resolutions. These included:

- The Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergencies and Armed Conflict (UN General Assembly 1974)
- Resolution on Women’s Participation in the Strengthening of International Peace and Security (UN General Assembly 1977)
- The Declaration on the Participation of Women in Promoting International Peace and Cooperation (UN General Assembly 1982)
- Resolution on the Rape and Abuse of Women in the Areas of Armed Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia (UN General Assembly 1995).

Taken together, these actions provide a rich and comprehensive agenda on ‘women, peace, and security’, and reaffirm the centrality of women and gender issues to ECOSOC’s agenda.

Through the 1990s, both human rights and humanitarian concerns were not considered to be within the Security Council’s competence. Even briefings by UN Human rights officials to the Security Council were controversial; “the three occasions on which the Council heard UN special rapporteurs on human rights in formal debates in 1992 remained the three sole such examples for the next decade” (D. Malone 2004, 303) and the

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51 The Security Council’s third ever invitation to the ECOSOC President to brief the Security Council was the 2002 Open Debate on Women, Peace and Security.
“perceived ‘encroachment’ of the Security Council into these areas was not welcomed by all States” (Bailey and Daws 1998, 22).

Moreover, at the Beijing Plus 5 Review meeting, held in 2000 in New York, female political leaders, both within and outside of the UN, were openly sceptical about the potential for UN peace operations to address women’s concerns. At the meeting, Ugandan Vice President Dr. Specioza Kazibwe stated that:

Like the majority of her African sisters, she knew little about the exact nature of peacekeeping operations. She viewed it as a new frontier for women activists in the region since this has been male dominated… [the] institutionalisation of women’s participation in peacekeeping and conflict resolution remains the biggest challenge given the recent acknowledgment of their critical role even by regional political organisations such as the OAU.52

Echoing a similar sentiment, Elizabeth Rehn, former Finnish Minister of Defence and former Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for Bosnia and Herzegovina, stated, “the Dayton Peace Accords may have ended war but did not create peace, and marginalised women and children’s concerns” (Ibid.).

A number of factors helped overcome this resistance; the most important being the leadership of the Council’s three non-permanent members from the global South: Jamaica, Namibia, and Bangladesh. Each were each well respected and represented different regional groups; Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa and Asia.

This is not to say that SCR 1325 would have been possible without support from ‘northern’ Council members. Support from Canada and the UK was still considered more palatable to the G-77 than from the US. In particular, Canada, a non-permanent member, had previously championed children, landmines, and the protection of civilians as Security Council agenda items, and provided both financial and political support to advance a Security Council resolution on women. Yet had there been serious opposition from among any of the five permanent members, the idea would not have been tabled. It is not likely that women’s issues would have been considered important enough to risk any political capital by putting the issue to a vote and exposing a delegation’s opposition.

It was also significant that two of the lead champions on the Council were female representatives. According to a former delegate that was close to the negotiations,53 the idea for a Security Council meeting had been discussed in Windhoek with the Honourable

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Nandi-Ndaitwah, Director-General of the department of Women Affairs, and previously, the Rapporteur General of the Fourth World Conference on Women. As Namibia was scheduled to be the President of the Security Council in October 2000 (there is a monthly rotation), they proposed hosting the Council’s first debate on women, peace, and security. Namibia’s delegates in New York, including two exception women leaders, Selma Ndeyapo Ashipala-Musavyi and first Secretary Aina Iiyambo, enthusiastically and skilfully shepherded the negotiations.

Bangladesh’s representative, Anruwal Chowdhury, is widely recognised in the literature as one of SCR 1325’s first champions. During Bangladesh’s presidency of the Council in March 2000, Chowdhury led negotiations that resulted in the Council’s first ever statement on women, thereby creating a precedent in establishing the relevance of women’s issues to the Council’s agenda (UN Security Council 2000b). Ambassador Chowdhury’s brought to the negotiations experience gained from his prior position with UNICEF, where he had been directly involved in the Graça Machel study and the first Security Council Resolution on children. Ian Quick suggests that cross-institutional experience is significant in shaping individual perspectives and skills in interagency collaboration (Quick 2009, 33–34). I argue that the same is true in relation to inter-governmental negotiations, and that delegates with cross-institutional and political experience are better equipped to navigate and utilise their ‘discretionary’ power.

Jamaica’s female delegate, Ambassador Patricia Durrant, another well-respected diplomat, was exceptionally supportive of women’s issues and the idea of advancing a resolution on women. Her support also helped mobilize member states from the regional groups representing Latin America and the Caribbean, while the UK and Canada solidified support from Western Europe and Other Group (WEOG). Earlier in the year, UNIFEM had raised the possibility of hosting the debate in July 2000, during Jamaica’s presidency, but Ambassador Durrant felt there was too much ‘fatigue’ among Council members regarding thematic resolutions. Instead, she lead a thematic debate on prevention, and ensured that women’s role in conflict prevention was recognised in the Presidential Statement that was adopted at the meeting (UN Security Council 2000c).

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54 This has a Ministerial Rank and was located in the Office of the President. She was Minister of Women Affairs and Child Welfare from 2000-2005 and “played a pivotal role in advocating for the protection of the rights of women and children”. In 2012, she became Minister of Foreign Affairs http://209.88.21.36/opencms/opencms/grmnet/MFAv2/The_Ministry/Minister/.
55 Personal conversation with author May 2000.
This political leadership by UN delegates, combined with NGO advocacy and UNIFEM and OSAGI’s ‘behind the scenes’ efforts (described below) created a powerful synergy that resulted in the adoption of SCR 1325. However, getting agreement among the Security Council’s 15 members did not mean that the broader political struggle between ECOSOC and the Security Council would be resolved. The on-going disputes over institutional mandate would continue to impede SCR 1325 implementation, as I discuss in Chapter 4. The ebb and flow of resistance would continue to depend on many factors, including individual, national, and regional identities, larger geopolitical debates, as well as institutional and organisational factors. These tensions are illustrated in the following statements made by two member states during the first Council debate on women in 2000:

Representative of Pakistan: The Council can focus on some aspects that fall within its domain…in fact, most of the issues covered in the background paper are currently being discussed in the ECOSOC and other relevant bodies of the General Assembly. So, instead of duplicating our efforts, we must focus our attention on strengthening the existing mechanisms. Each organ of the UN has its own defined sphere of responsibilities that must be respected. We all know that the Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action contain comprehensive recommendations on women and armed conflicts. Unfortunately, there is less enthusiasm about ensuring implementation of the relevant provisions of the Beijing Declaration. There is a need to ensure their early and effective implementation. It would not be prudent to start the process anew at a forum that does not have the mandate to deal with all the relevant issues in a comprehensive manner.56

Representative of Australia: We consider it valuable [to have a thematic debate in the Council] for several reasons. First, it contributes to the ongoing process of opening up the Council, not just to non-members, but to new ways of thinking about what constitute threats to international peace and security and, more important, how to deal with them. Secondly, it helps us to move forward our broad agenda for the advancement of women, raising awareness of gender factors, moving consider of so-called women’s issues out of the enclaves of the Third Committee and the CSW and into the central, vital organs of the UN. Thirdly, this thematic debate should assist the UN in dealing with a range of other major challenges that it is confronting. There are real practical linkages to be made with implementation of the Millennium Summit report and of the Brahimi report on peace operations; with the effort to establish the ICC; with the UN development agenda; and with efforts to reform the UN and make it more effective. This debate could inform our thinking on how to deal with all these major areas.57

In this section, I have examined how the UN’s structure and organisation influenced how women, as an agenda item, ultimately came on to the Council’s agenda. While NGOs played a significant role in this process, the proactive leadership and support of key Council members was the primary driving force in SCR 1325’s adoption. In the following section, I introduce a third set of actors in SCR 1325’s genesis, the UN’s three gender mechanisms, INSTRAW, OSAGI and UNIFEM. While many have written eloquently and analytically about the UN’s gender mechanisms, my aim is to highlight their role in shaping SCR 1325’s evolution and implementation pathways (I discuss implementation in Chapter 4).  

3.4 The UN’s Gender Mechanisms: Function Follows Form
Prior to SCR 1325’s adoption, none of the UN’s three gender mechanisms, INSTRAW, UNIFEM or OSAGI, had any direct mandate to engage on peace and security issues. Nor did they have operational capacity or political autonomy to lead a global agenda for women. Both UNIFEM and INSTRAW were established as Voluntary Funds, meaning that the UN absolved itself of responsibility for providing resources from its assessed contributions (i.e. the dues of Member States). Moreover, attempts to strengthen their coherence, in the context of UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali’s reform efforts, created a diplomatic incident in which INSTRAW, the smallest and most marginal of the mechanisms, became fodder in a 26-year proxy war between the global north and south. In this section, I introduce each of the three institutional mechanisms, beginning with INSTRAW. Although INSTRAW was the least engaged in SCR 1325’s evolution, it would end up having a significant impact on its implementation (discussed in Chapter 4).

3.4.1 International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW)
The vision for creating an International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW) was inspired by the close collaboration between feminist scholars and female delegates in the UN’s early history, beginning with the first surveys on women carried out by the CSW. These collaborations were central in bringing both women and gender issues into the development debates, beginning with Danish economist Ester Boserup’s pivotal publication, *Women’s Role in Economic Development* (Boserup 1970).

58 See for example (Jain 2005; Pietila 2007; Hilary Charlesworth and Chinkin 2013a; Bunch 2007).
Recognising the inadequacy of research, data, and information on women, the 1975 Mexico City Plan of Action, adopted at the First World Conference on Women, called for IN STRAW’s establishment. Although the UN General Assembly formally authorised IN STRAW’s creation in 1975, the Institute never became fully operational. Despite voluminous publicly available documentation of IN STRAW’s still birth, very little is captured in feminist UN herstory, which simply refers to ‘funding challenges’ encountered in the context of UN reform proposals that sought to merge IN STRAW with the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM).59

Created by the General Assembly as an independent voluntary fund, IN STRAW received no UN resources. It became operational in 1979 and was inaugurated in the Dominican Republic in 1983 after Iran withdrew its offer to host the institution (following the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution). What began as an inspiring vision to address gaps in data and research regarding all aspects of women’s lives, and especially in developing countries, quickly became instrumentalised in a proxy war between a handful of western donor countries (namely the US, Canada, Denmark, Finland, the UK, Japan and New Zealand) and the Dominican Republic ‘on behalf of all developing countries’ (UN General Assembly 1993, 6–7). In a prime example of bureaucratic pathology, this conflict would play out over 26 years in the General Assembly’s Fifth Committee, invoking increasingly convoluted, costly, time-consuming bureaucratic tactics to ensure IN STRAW’s sustained dysfunction, while at the same time, implicating the Secretary General’s office, the Office of Internal Oversight, the Joint Inspection Unit, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), UNIFEM, DAW and the CSW.

With little start-up capital and isolated from UN headquarters and the other gender mechanisms, IN STRAW was unable to mobilise sufficient resources on its own and establish its institutional niche (UN General Assembly 2002a). In 1993, after ten years of unsuccessful fundraising; little more than $1 million per year, UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali proposed merging UNIFEM and IN STRAW. Part of his reform agenda to restructure the organisation’s work in the social and economic sectors. The merger was also intended to improve coordination and collaboration between the organizations, challenges that were “indicative of a more general problem within the United Nations

59 Devaki Jain (2009) concludes that the diverging trajectories of IN STRAW and the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) i.e. UNIFEM’s growth as compared to IN STRAW’s demise, illustrates the importance of outside support for these small women’s spaces to succeed. I argue that they demonstrate the UN’s pathologies in relation to women; i.e. actions that undermine the achievement of organisation’s goals.
system. In this particular instance, it was doubtless exacerbated by the lack of financial and staff resources available to the two organizations and the physical distance between them. (UN Economic and Social Council 1993, 4). Such institutional challenges have persisted over the years:

The many studies and debates occasioned by the pressure for reform in recent years have shown time and again how highly compartmentalised, unmanageable and even sclerotic the system had grown during the first 50 years of the organisation, which spanned the entire period of the Cold War. (Reanda 1999, 50)

The structural problems arising from overlapping jurisdictions and the lack of coordination and centralized financings among UN agencies and bodies … productive clashes over institutional turf and competition for resources or paralysis. Both are less-than optimal outcomes resulting from the structure of decentralized silos instead of more integrated, mutually reinforcing and collaborative partnerships among the various moving parts of the UN. (Weiss, 2013, 14)

When ECOSOC subsequently approved the merger, subject to an analysis of legal, financial and administrative implications, the Dominican Republic’s Minister of Foreign Relations issued a harsh, eight-page rebuke:

There is a remarkable contrast between the attitude assumed by the Secretariat and the cautious approach taken by the [Economic and Social] Council. According to information that we have received, the Secretariat has been taking steps and measures leading to the removal of INSTRAW’s headquarters from its natural location. Thus the Secretariat has been taking for granted a decision which is of the sole competence of the General Assembly (UN General Assembly 1993, 5).

This diplomatic exchange set off a 26-year exercise of bureaucratic pathology, resulting in hundreds of UN documents that narrate an exhausting series of audits, inspections, working group configurations, meetings, and deliberations that only ended in 2009 when the UN agreed to consolidate INSTRAW, UNIFEM, DAW and OSAGI into a composite entity. Using technical, political and legal argumentation, the Dominican Republic framed the proposed merger between INSTRAW and UNIFEM as a diplomatic offensive against the entirety of the Latin American and Caribbean region and other developing countries around the world:

The relocation of INSTRAW’s headquarters is of particular importance to the Dominican Republic and Latin America and the Caribbean region. Other developing countries of other regions would be affected as well, since paragraph 1 of the ECOSOC resolution 1979/11 of 9 May 1979 recommended that INSTRW be located in the Dominican Republic, a developing country.
Moreover, several years earlier, at the General Assembly’s thirty-first session, various countries agreed that the Institute should be located in a developing country. The benefits thus derived by both the host country as well as by the Institute cannot be undermined … A merger with UNIFEM would deprive INSTAW of its autonomy and identity … It is most unfortunate and regrettable that the extraordinary efforts undertaken by the Dominican Republic have been ignored and that the relocation of the Institute is being contemplated and rushed without consideration or consultations with the host government. (UN General Assembly 1993, 6–7)

The following year, the Secretary General took a different tack, proposing that the two institutions be merged administratively, while maintaining their distinct identities and geographic locations. However, the proposed relocation of all but two staff to New York further inflamed the debate. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budget Questions (ACABQ) joined the majority view and rejected the Secretary General’s proposal for its lack of clarity regarding the purpose and advantages of the proposed merger and the financial benefits. The merger decision was then referred to the Beijing Conference in 1995, where no decision was reached.

The diplomatic struggle continued with a report by the UN’s Joint Inspection Unit in 1999 which prompted ECOSOC to propose an unusual ‘one-time’ request for a non-recurrent subvention (a financial contribution) (UN Joint Inspection Unit 1999). Although INSTRAW’s status as a voluntary fund prohibited it from receiving UN contributions, the ACABQ refrained from taking any position on the matter, claiming instead, that it was not technically able to ascertain the basis of the budget estimates provided by the Secretary General and referred the matter back to the General Assembly (UN General Assembly 2000b, 2).

The devotion and bureaucratic creativity of INSTRAW’s many supporters continued over the next seven years, without extending to the financial realm. Despite protestations from a small group of donor countries led by the US, the General Assembly ultimately changed INSTRAW’s mandate so that it could receive assistance. However, absent even minimal administrative capacity, INSTRAW was unable to even request or receive the funds for another two years.

Noting that INSTRAW did not have an executive director between 1999 and 2001, a 2002 UN audit pointed to a history of financial irregularities and the limited value added by its Board of Trustees (UN General Assembly 2002a). It attributed INSTRAW’s situation to the “inordinate delay” in determining its status, on going since 1993, and its inability to create an institutional and ‘product’ niche in relation to the international agenda.
for women. Pointing to management challenges internally and with respect to the UN secretariat, declining donor contributions, the inappropriate use of consultants, and achievements that were not primary to the Institute’s mandate, the auditors recommended liquidation (Ibid).

Instead, seeking a political outcome, the General Assembly recommended establishing a new working group that would be composed of two governmental representatives from each of the five regional groups of the UN and one representative of the host country (UN General Assembly 2002b). This would ensure a majority of members from the global south. After eight meetings, the group recommended that INSTRAW be revitalised through a series of ‘radical reforms’ that would include an annual allocation of $500K from the UN’s regular budget and replacing its board of trustees with UN member states (UN General Assembly 2002c).

Over the following six years, more than 100 member states would continue to find inventive bureaucratic solutions for keeping INSTRAW on the General Assembly’s agenda by reaffirming its importance in the most general terms, but without taking any real measures to ensure its meaningful contribution. A new statute was adopted and new resolutions approved each year appealing for emergency funding. Recorded votes in favour and against would continue to line up the majority of developing countries against a minority; between (5-10) donors from the global north voting against the majority from the global south. While any of the member states involved, from the global south or north, could have committed the minimal resources needed to stop the relentless subventions, audits, inspections, resolutions, committees and special procedures that constituted the bureaucratic war chest, sufficient funds were never forthcoming. The negotiations finally ended with the creation of UN Women.

This extreme example of bureaucratic pathology helps shed light on the challenges encountered in SCR 1325’s genesis and implementation. It shows that the instrumentalisation of women’s issues is not the unique provenance of the hegemonic western military powers, or limited to any single regional group. As UN scholar Thomas Weiss points out, “the United Nations is primarily an institutional framework through which member states may pursue or channel their foreign policies” (Weiss et al., 2010, lx). Second, the UN is also a medium through which various hierarchies and rivalries are

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played out, both personal and political, among and within states. Women’s issues have been primarily used as bargaining chips within the ordinary bureaucratic offensives between ‘principals and agents’, East-West, North-South, and so on. Manipulating intergovernmental processes through bloc voting is a central strategy by the ‘global south’ to rebalance the disproportionate power given to the P5 by the UN Charter. In the tragic case of IN Strauss, we learn that women’s issues are instrumentalised not because they are important, but because they are considered trivial.

Because the UN never developed any research capacity on women, there were fewer opportunities to advance a women-centred agenda across a range of agendas, including those pertaining to peace and security. This has limited the opportunity for a feminist ‘epistemic community’ of research and practice to emerge, which in turn, has limited the UN’s ability to understand, internalise and implement a range of policy agendas on women.

3.42 UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM)
The UN General Assembly established UNIFEM in 1976 as Voluntary Fund to support the International Decade for Women and, specifically, to provide technical assistance in support of women in developing countries.\(^6\) Its founding mandate was to act as a catalyst for increasing women’s involvement in development and to support innovative and experimental activities in line with national and regional priorities; i.e. demonstration projects that provided *ad hoc* programmatic support to women’s groups.\(^6\) This was in contrast to UN Funds like UNICEF and UNDP that had national country offices through which significant resources were channelled to advance their programmatic goals.

As a semi-autonomous department within the UN Development Programme (UNDP), UNIFEM’s influence was, for the most part, derived externally from its constituency and women’s movements. Its income in 1990 was $11 million (UN General Assembly 1991), reaching $23.65 in 1999 (UN Executive Board of UNDP and UNFPA 2000).\(^6\) These resources were minor in comparison with UNICEF or UNDP, organisations with an equivalent demographic constituency, and budgets that exceeded $1

\(^6\) Resolution 31/133 adopted on 16 December 1976.
\(^6\) General Assembly Resolution 31/133 of 16 December 1976.
\(^6\) Contributions to UNIFEM increased to $29.41 million in 2000, including additional funds for its work in the area of peace and security (Ibid.).
and $2 billion (respectively). Nevertheless, they represented riches for the small women’s organisations that UNIFEM supported in developing countries around the world. As a department, rather than an independent entity, UNIFEM’s (D2 level) executive director lacked the seniority to sign cheques, or participate in meetings with other UN heads of agency. She had no engagement whatsoever with the UN’s peace and security architecture. Without country offices or any political clout, UNIFEM was never considered an equal among the other UN Funds and Programmes.

Although all UN Funds and Programmes carry out their work through agreements with host governments, it took nearly ten years for UNIFEM to successfully negotiate with UNDP’s finance department for permission to sign agreements with NGOs directly. According to UNIFEM’s first executive director, Margaret Snyder, “reaching poor women in developing countries necessitated reaching their voluntary groups, but bureaucrats resisted…After many meetings we negotiated a policy compromise and, by 1985, 50 per cent of UNIFEM’s partners were NGOs of their own nations” (Fraser and Tinker 2004, 45).

Over time, UNIFEM became a conduit for feminist activists to engage with the UN’s human rights system (Bunch and Reilly 1994). It also supported women’s organisations and feminist networks nationally, regionally and internationally through grant making and by supporting women’s participation in the World Conferences on Women. In the 1990s, UNIFEM expanded its support from women’s income generating activities to humanitarian and peace building activities in conflicted affected situations, through its Nairobi-based African Women in Crisis Program (UN Executive Board of UNDP and UNFPA 2000).

UNIFEM actively supported the women’s human rights campaign at the 1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights and began its own human rights programme thereafter. In 1994, Noeleen Heyzer was appointed as UNIFEM’s first Executive Director from the ‘global south’ (Singapore). Dynamic and eager to transition UNIFEM to a larger global platform, Heyzer embraced the idea of advancing a Security Council resolution. Comfort Lamptey, UNIFEM’s governance adviser at the time (and later DPKO’s first gender adviser), had already begun to develop a portfolio of activities that supported women’s peace movements and organisations around the world. As a small catalytic fund within

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65 Heyzer was UNIFEM’s third Executive Director. The first was Margaret Snyder (American), followed by Canadian, Sharon Capeling-Alakaja.
UNDP, the UN’s largest development fund, UNIFEM had neither the operational presence nor resources needed to respond to the glaring gaps in women’s protection and access to humanitarian assistance. This also resulted in one of the UN’s first publications in this area, ‘Women at the Peace Table’ (Anderlini 2000). UNIFEM’s central interest in this agenda was to identify the operational gaps in the UN’s institutional arrangements for women’s protection in armed conflicts, to increase women’s access to humanitarian assistance and to support their leadership in peace building.66

The first attempt to bring gender issues onto the Security Council’s agenda was made by International Alert through UNIFEM in 1999 to Ambassador Danilo Türk, a human rights lawyer and activist who was the first Slovenian Permanent Representative to the UN and president of the UN Security Council in August 1998 and November 1999.67 But this first effort failed to generate the support needed among Council members. The second approach, in 2000, followed a number of Council precedents on the protection of civilians and children as described earlier.

UNIFEM’s strategy for advancing a Security Council resolution had five inter-related elements. The first was to draw attention to the gender specific impact of armed conflict on women and girls, as compared to men and boys, the violation of women’s rights and their humanitarian situation; this was consistent with the Council’s agenda on the protection of civilians. Second, UNIFEM emphasised its role in amplifying the voices and perspectives of conflict affected women – as leaders, survivors, peacemakers, family and community members. This frame appealed to the Cold War imaginary regarding women’s role in peace building and earlier East-West debates and the UN’s ‘peace argument’. Third, UNIFEM drew on its collaboration with UNICEF and close association with Graça Machel’s hugely popular report on the impact of armed conflict on children. Fourth, UNIFEM asserted its identity as a UN ‘Fund’, comparing its mandate to UNICEF’s as a way to elevate its stature and persuasive credibility. Fifth, and perhaps most significant, UNIFEM deployed two senior statesmen as ambassadors for the cause, Stephen Lewis and Rafeeuddin Ahmed. Earlier, I refer to them as ‘door openers’; influential allies who used their access, credibility and influence to advance a feminist agenda. All too often, the literature on gender mainstreaming emphasizes the role of gatekeepers, which helps us

understand why institutional transformation doesn’t take place. In this chapter, I explore when and how it does.

Gatekeepers and door openers: In the summer of 2000, UNIFEM’s Executive Director asked two high-level retired UN officials, Rafeeuddin Ahmed and Stephen Lewis, to act as her representative and meet individually with Council members and other relevant actors within and outside of the Secretariat to identify the best political pathway toward achieving a Security Council resolution on women. A combination of ‘gendered’ institutional factors were at play; Heyzer was on leave with her daughters at the time, and her relatively lower rank and institutional association would not have necessarily been an advantage in getting meetings with Ambassadors.68

Both Ahmed and Lewis were former Ambassadors, and well known and respected as from their previous positions as UN officials. Rafeeuddin Ahmed was the former Chef du Cabinet for UN Secretary-General Waldheim, former Associate Administrator of UNDP, former head of ESCAP and former Ambassador of Pakistan. Stephen Lewis, was the former Deputy Executive Director of UNICEF, former Canadian Ambassador to the UN, former SRSG on AIDS in Africa, and UNICEF’s most visible leader on children and war; Lewis had made the case for a Security Council resolution on children to the Council in its first debate on the subject in 1998. Lewis played a leadership role in Machel’s study and had worked closely with Anruwal Chowdhury, when they were both at UNICEF.

Both Ahmed and Lewis used their seniority, credibility, networks, and influence with individual members of the Security Council, the Secretariat and other influential leaders, including the facilitators of the Burundi peace process, to advance this agenda. In addition to their networks, their procedural knowledge about the UN’s bureaucratic and political machinery was indispensable in guiding UNIFEM’s strategy for advancing a Security Council resolution and bringing women’s voices to the UN; it was Ahmed’s idea to convene an Arria formula meeting. His relationships, vast knowledge about the UN secretariat and political inner-workings helped create a space for UNIFEM’s participation in the process and to generate consensus among Council members. Colleagues and friends of both Ambassadors were brought in at various points to provide advice and guidance, particularly in the formulation of the White Paper UNIFEM drafted and Namibia circulated as a basis for their negotiations.

68 Heyzer is one of few UN staff appointees to be promoted from a D2 to an Under-Secretary General (USG), head of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP); her leadership in advancing SCR 1325 is one of the reasons given for her promotion (UN Department of Public Information 2007).
As elder statesmen, they both demonstrated that women in this context were not a threat to the status quo. Ahmed’s approach with other Ambassadors was more procedural rather than ideological and, as a seasoned diplomat from the global south he helped legitimize the idea of a resolution as something other than a radical feminist or western liberal agenda. Ambassador Lewis was also well received but for different reasons; as one of the world’s greatest orators, he had also earned respect from the G-77 as a respected Africanist and feminist icon of progressive resistance in challenging western hegemonic agendas when he had served at the UN.

But Council members were not easily convinced. In lieu of a definitive text or report, some members asked for ‘evidence’ that could be used to make the case for a Security Council resolution. UNIFEM’s support for the first all-party Burundi Women’s Peace Conference in July 2000, organised in collaboration with International Alert, helped provide some ‘empirical’ albeit utilitarian evidence of the substantive impact of women’s contributions to peace building. Lewis introduced UNIFEM to the facilitator of the negotiations, Joseph Butiku, and Graça Machel mobilised her then husband, former President Nelson Mandela, to champion women’s participation in the Burundi peace process. UNIFEM brought women leaders from South Africa, Guatemala, and Uganda to meet with the Burundian parties to the negotiations. The Women’s conference influenced the resulting agreement in new articles dealing with HIV, women’s participation, and reconstruction (de Silva Burke, Klot, and Bunting 2001). The greatly celebrated outcome became one of the tangible references to the women’s unique contribution to the peace process and was referenced frequently during the Security Council’s debate.69 It provided what Joachim refers to as ‘empirical credibility’ (J. M. Joachim 2007).

Similar to the CSW’s early engagement at the UN, UNIFEM worked under the radar; its marginal status and the broader confusion about roles and responsibilities of actors within the UN’s gender architecture also gave it some license to barrel forward, using its ‘discretionary space’ and disregarding UN protocols and practices on occasion. For example, UNIFEM reached out directly to sympathetic high-level secretariat officials, like Carolyn McKaskie, then UN Humanitarian Coordinator. UNIFEM’s engagement in the Burundi process bypassed formal secretariat channels since it was not a member of any inter-agency working groups in the humanitarian, peace and security arenas. Instead,

UNIFEM staff worked with individual DPKO staff members that felt individually (personally and professionally) compelled to work on gender issues. In the case of Burundi, Hawaa El-Tayeb, an extraordinary and creative DPKO staff person and strong women’s advocate, was the liaison with the UN supported facilitation team. Hoddaan Addou and Laketch Dirasse took the lead from UNIFEM’s Nairobi office, supported by UNIFEM headquarters.

But UNIFEM’s actions also created tensions with the secretariat and OSAGI, the senior UN official representing women’s issues. As an Assistant Secretary General and Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General, OSAGI should have been the sole UN representative for women at the Security Council open debate and Arria Formula meetings on women, peace and security. However, Ambassadors Ahmed and Lewis helped negotiate UNIFEM’s seat at the table by engaging former colleagues in the secretariat and member states. They put forth UNIFEM’s status as an operational UN Fund and advocate on behalf of women from conflict-affected countries, an argument loosely analogous to the roles played by the SRSG for children and armed conflict (a secretariat function) and UNICEF (an operational Fund).

UNIFEM’s role as a broker between the Security Council and the NGO working group has been recognised in the literature but underemphasised (Cohn 2008; N. F. Hudson 2010; Cockburn 2007). It may well have been that the NGOs were not aware of the ‘behind the scenes’ work underway. However, unlike the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW), the Security Council has no formal mechanisms to engage NGOs, and feminists had little political access to the UN’s highly complex peace and security architecture. While NGO Working Group members approached individual Council members directly, in one interview, a former delegate suggested that they might have had less of an impact on Council decision-making than is currently perceived.\(^7\)

For the Namibian delegation, however, UNIFEM was considered a formal channel through which member states, and Namibia in its presidency, could work. The delegation called on UNIFEM to provide expertise and technical support where needed; in drafting the concept note that formed the basis of the resolution and in providing substantive expertise during the negotiation process.\(^7\) UNIFEM facilitated planning and strategy sessions with the NGO working group, and the Arria formula meeting that provided an

\(^7\) UN Delegate, F-SC1. Interviewed by author. 2008. New York, New York. 30 October.
\(^7\) Ibid.
opportunity for women from conflict-affected countries to speak directly to Council members.

3.43 **Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues (OSAGI)**

Angela King, formerly a senior director in the UN Office of Human Resources was promoted to UN Special Adviser on Gender Issues (OSAGI) in 1996; a new position proposed by ECOSOC to follow up the Beijing Platform for Action. King was one of the first two women appointed to Jamaica’s Mission to the UN shortly after the country joined the organisation. Subsequently, she held various positions at the UN, including as Chief of the UN Observer Mission in South Africa. However, unlike Special Representatives of the Secretary General (as had been established for Children and Armed Conflict and for Internally Displaced Persons),\(^{72}\) OSAGI was an adviser to, rather than a representative of, the Secretary General. Located within the Secretariat, OSAGI was fully funded by the UN’s general budget and therefore accountable to the competing political agendas of member states that approved her mandate.

Specifically, OSAGI’s mandate came from ECOSOC’s ‘Agreed Conclusions’ on gender mainstreaming which described her role in ‘demanding accountability from senior managers to include a gender perspective in their policies and programmes’ (UN Economic and Social Council 2004). The aim, according to OSAGI, was “not to "do" gender mainstreaming for other parts of the system but to stimulate all entities within the United Nations to take gender perspectives into account in their work programmes, as called for in the Platform for Action, ECOSOC Agreed Conclusions 1997/2 and all other intergovernmental mandates” (OSAGI, March 2001):\(^{73}\)

A strong, continued commitment to gender mainstreaming is one of the most effective means for the United Nations to support promotion of gender equality at all levels - in research, legislation, policy development and in activities on the ground, and to ensure that women as well as men can influence, participate in and benefit from development efforts. (OSAGI, 2001)

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\(^{72}\) Although the UN had created Special Representatives of the Secretary-General for children and internally displaced persons to address the conflict-related aspects of ‘development and human rights’ that were considered outside of the mandate of the UN’s Funds and Programmes, there was no such equivalent for women. When an SRSG was finally created in 2007, it was restricted to one narrowly defined aspect within the broader WPS agenda, ‘conflict-related sexual violence’.

\(^{73}\) UNIFEM’s efforts to establish itself as the lead entity for implementing SCR 1325 failed primarily due to its relatively lower status. OSAGI’s March 2001 description of its work does not even mention UNIFEM in the context of inter-agency collaboration.
In 1997, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan relocated OSAGI to the Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW), the secretariat to the CSW, giving her the additional responsibility for overseeing its activities. This gave OSAGI oversight responsibility for monitoring UN mandates on the representation of women at the UN and, after SCR 1325 was adopted, she also had responsibility for its implementation within the UN system. OSAGI’s rank (Assistant Secretary-General) allowed her to participate in senior meetings and to lead an Inter-Agency Committee on Women and Gender Equality; the only mechanism for strengthening inter-agency coordination on gender issues.

OSAGI used the Beijing Platform to advance two central claims, one relating to gender mainstreaming and other to women’s leadership. However, the substantive concerns raised in the Beijing Platform’s conclusions on armed conflict were rarely, if ever referenced by the UN in the context of SCR 1325, for reasons discussed earlier. The former Deputy Director of the UN Division for the Advancement of Women suggests that, after Beijing, the DAW actually undermined its own work in this area. He credits his office for the ‘success’ of the Beijing Conference, and he credits his successors with the subsequent failure of the UN to deliver for women:

In the 10 years since Beijing, the Secretariat seems to be losing its mojo and this has contributed to the slowing of progress. It became a victim of all of the factors noted, including fundamentalism, mainstreaming and seeing women as victims. While it has continued to hold expert group meetings, these were infrequently on new subjects, did not actively seek new approaches to issues and did not engage civil society or the academic community in defining them. There appear to be almost a sense of fear of generating controversy. Instead, the Secretariat has emphasised mainstreaming, with the attendant risk of disappearing in the stream.

In the area of peace and security, however, OSAGI used gender mainstreaming as a calling card to organise meetings with heads of UN departments, and she was the first to engage senior officials from both the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the UN secretariat departments with primary responsibility for advising and supporting UN peace making, preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and peace building.

74 This is why OSAGI is sometimes referred to as OSAG/DAW.
At the time, neither department had any policies, guidelines or expertise regarding women’s rights or gender equality issues. Despite growing evidence of sexual exploitation and abuse committed by UN peacekeeping personnel, there were no monitoring or reporting mechanisms to investigate and prosecute these crimes. Moreover, the UN’s humanitarian sector had yet to respond to ECOSOC’s 1998 request for the emergency relief coordinator to “ensure that a gender perspective is fully integrated into humanitarian activities and policies” (UN Economic and Social Council 1998).

OSAGI’s initiated meetings with DPKO to discuss human resource issues, gender mainstreaming, and ‘gender balance’ within DPKO field missions. Over several years, these discussions ultimately resulted in the Windhoek Expert Group Meeting on Gender and Peacekeeping that took place in May 2000 and became a pivotal event in SCR 1325’s genesis (UN Security Council 2000a). Consistent with the gender mainstreaming mandate, however, the Windhoek recommendations focus centrally on human resources issues and gender balance i.e. increasing women’s participation in peace operations, rather than on the role of peacekeeping operations in improving women’s security.

3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I suggest the need for a much deeper understanding of the institutional and bureaucratic pathologies that shaped SCR 1325’s trajectory. These ‘behaviours’; institutional, political and bureaucratic, have had specific consequences for the way in which gender issues evolved on the UN’s agenda and, consequently, for SCR 1325’s genesis and implementation pathways. Women’s activist engagement with the UN evolved along a distinct pathway of human rights, but were marginalised from the UN’s functional, institutional and substantive responsibilities in this area.

In its first thirty years, the UN did little more to advance a women’s agenda than establish the CSW and a small secretariat to service it within the UN’s human rights system. Thereafter, the UN’s engagement on gender issues was ad hoc, evolving incrementally, and only in response to demands made on it by women and their allies within and outside of the UN. The UN’s decision-making on women’s issues was extrinsic to UN processes. This made it far more difficult for women inside and outside of the organisation to shape a global agenda for women and to influence the UN’s strategies for realising it. Although the UN’s world conferences on women strengthened the global women’s movement, it did little to elevate women on the UN’s agenda or expand opportunities for advancing women’s global leadership. While the Beijing Platform for
Action was certainly significant in SCR 1325’s evolution, it had a far greater impact on the UN’s strategies to implement the resolution, than those used to negotiate its adoption.

The resistance among Security Council members to a Security Council Resolution on women had many dimensions. It was still early in the Security Council’s engagement with the protection of civilians’ agenda and ECOSOC members were not supportive. There was also insufficient evidence or prior consultation among Council members regarding the substance of the agenda and its implications for the UN’s institutional arrangements for women, which were already quite contentious. As discussed in the following section, the relevant secretariat departments (DPKO, DPA and OCHA) were not fully on board with the idea and were otherwise focused on the implementation of the Brahimi report.

Although UNIFEM and OSAGI/DAW were the strongest advocates inside the UN for advancing a Security Council resolution, they were poorly positioned to provide access to the various hierarchies of power within and among member states; the secretariat, the Funds and Programmes, or the Security Council, which was then among the most ‘hidden’ and inaccessible parts of the UN system. I suggest that the UN Funds and Programmes are among the most understudied tier of the organisational structure, representing a third tier, after the primary organs and the secretariat.76

One of UNIFEM’s most significant contributions to SCR 1325’s adoption was enlisting two senior male door-openers, Rafeeuddin Ahmed and Stephen Lewis. Both played indispensable roles in SCR 1325’s genesis and used their influence and access to advance a women’s agenda and open the gates for women’s participation. The political, institutional and bureaucratic challenges encountered in this process continued to plague SCR 1325’s implementation, which I discuss in the following chapter.

Resurrection, closure, or even merging INSTRAW with UNIFEM would have created the space to reshape a vision and strategy for developing a global agenda for research and training in relation to women’s priorities. Instead, any possibility for developing this capacity was put to rest; INSTRAW became a bargaining chip in a broader geopolitical struggle, with adverse consequences for women. Collaboration between feminist scholars and women inside the UN diminished over time, further limiting the potential to catalyse new agendas and influence others.

76 Tom Weiss identifies the first UN as “the member states and its arenas within which decisions are made; the second refers to the secretariat “who work for member states but who have a certain margin for maneuver” and the third UN, consists of NGOs, independent experts and other advocates that seek to influence its agenda (Thomas G Weiss 2012, 8–9).
Chapter 4

From Agenda Setting to Policy Making: Institutionalising SCR 1325

Security Council Resolution 1325 expanded the Security Council’s agenda and its understanding about the impact of war on women. It sensitised the Council to women’s roles as peace makers, peacekeepers, combatants, humanitarians, civilians, victims, survivors, leaders, activists, and policy makers. It enlarged the Security Council’s repertoire of practices, and its sphere of engagement to include women’s peace organisations and activists. As a result, the Security Council has included women and gender issues in mandates it authorises with respect to elections, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, peace processes, protection, reconstruction, and the rule of law. It has also authorised the deployment of gender advisers and gender units. It has called for new standards and training programmes to guide the conduct of peace operations, it has repeatedly called for more senior gender expertise in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), and for an end to impunity against war crimes against women. It has appealed for peace operations to increase women’s security, and improve their access to life-saving humanitarian support. These actions, however, have not destabilised militarism or patriarchy and, in some cases, have exacerbated risks to women.

In earlier chapters I have argued that these failings cannot be explained by SCR 1325’s conceptual framing or textual content. Instead, I suggest that SCR 1325’s implementation, like any other Security Council resolution, depends on the particular alignment of factors that influence, at any particular historical moment, the geopolitical dynamics within, among, and between members of the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Secretariat, the countries in crisis and in the region. It depends on the conflict itself: the actors, the stage, duration, the peace process, infrastructure, environment, economic interests, socio-cultural factors and regional actors. And it depends on the UN’s role and how this is defined, budgeted, funded, and staffed. Because this list of mediating factors is endless, being able to quantify the impact of any UN operation has itself generated significant discussion among researchers about how to measure impact and understand causality.77

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77 For example, (Diehl and Druckman 2010; Diehl 2014; Diehl and Druckman 2012; Farrall 2012; Paris 2014; Seibel and Goertz 2004)
Shortly after adopting SCR 1325, the Security Council asked the Secretary-General to strengthen DPKO’s capacity to implement SCR 1325; it called for a well-staffed unit with appropriate expertise. These requests were not heeded, although they were made repeatedly and underscored in a 2001 Presidential Statement (UN Security Council 2001a). The Secretary-General also saw the urgent need for gender expertise in the secretariat and had already requested funding for a Gender Unit in DPKO, in 2000, before SCR 1325 was adopted, as a part of his plan to implement the far-reaching reforms proposed in the Brahimi Report, and to help remedy its near-complete disregard of gender issues. He continued to appeal for staff and resources over three years. Some 15 years later, the Secretary-General’s requests for additional staff and resources remain unfulfilled.

In this chapter, I use ‘process-tracing’ to explain why and how the UN department with primary responsibility for supporting the design and deployment of peace operation mandates was never resourced appropriately to implement SCR 1325. In process-tracing, “good snapshots of a series of specific moments are essential for characterising the sequence of change and the unfolding of events over time” (Collier 2011, 824). Each of the three snapshots analysed here represents a key step in the meso-level policy process at the UN for implementing SCR 1325. The three snapshots presented take place between 2000, when SCR 1325 was being negotiated, and December 2007; the same time frame used in my case study presented in Chapter 6.\(^78\)

The first snapshot examines the dynamics behind the request in SCR 1325, for a comprehensive ‘Study on Women, Peace and Security’ that would form the basis for the UN’s implementation framework.\(^79\) The second is the adoption, in 2004, of the UN’s System wide Action Plan to implement SCR 1325, and the third is the controversy that unfolded between 2000-2004 over the establishment of a Gender Unit in DPKO. Each of these demonstrate the challenges of navigating the political discourses, institutional and bureaucratic pathologies that distinguished the UN’s gender architecture at the time, from those in which UN peacekeeping operations were negotiated, planned, resourced and supported.

\(^78\) The case presented in Chapters 5 and 6 of the first all-Female Formed Police Unit (FFPU), covers the timeline leading up to the deployment, in early 2007, and ends after its first year of service.

\(^79\) I recount much of this snapshot as a participant in the process, with a clear interest in a particular outcome. I was a key author of several documents referenced and UNIFEM’s lead representative in the negotiations.
4.1 Developing a Framework for Implementation: A Tale of Two Studies

Shortly after SCR 1325’s adoption, the Secretary-General appointed the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues (OSAGI) as the lead entity for carrying out the study requested by the Security Council on “the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, the role of women in peace-building, and the gender dimensions of peace processes and conflict resolution. He also assigned OSAGI the lead responsibility for developing the UN’s implementation strategy for SCR 1325.

As explained in Chapter 3, OSAGI was created in 1996 by the General Assembly to follow up the UN’s implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action, the outcome document of the 1995 World Conference on Women, held in Beijing. Specifically, her mandate was to advance gender mainstreaming throughout the UN system. As the most senior representative in the UN system on women’s issues, the Secretary-General used OSAGI’s appointment to consolidate two gender mechanisms, giving OSAGI responsibility for overseeing the Division for the Advancement of Women (the secretariat that supports the CSW) and the Focal Point for Women, a position that monitors the status of women’s employment in the UN, previously located in the Department of Human Resources.

Although seemingly innocuous, SCR 1325’s request for a study is one of its most important paragraphs and, in my view, reflects the single greatest missed opportunity for advancing a feminist transformative agenda. In extending an ‘invitation’ to the Secretary-General to carry out this report, as compared to a ‘request’ or ‘decision’, the Security Council effectively relegated responsibility to the secretariat for developing SCR 1325’s implementation framework.

The UN’s history of institutional and policy reform is replete with major independent studies, high level panels and commissions that have resulted in significant changes in the UN’s agenda, policies, processes and structure. The Security Council has itself been responsive to these approaches. Some independent expert and panel reports, like the Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations, chaired by the former Foreign Minister of Algeria, Lakhdar Brahimi and referred to as the ‘Brahimi Report’ (UN Security Council 2000d), have resulted in far reaching structural changes and the creation of new political or staff positions, new policies and doctrine. The UNICEF-supported Graça Machel Report on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Children (UN General Assembly 1996) resulted in the establishment, in 1997, of the first USG (Under-Secretary-General) level appointment of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRS) for Children in Armed Conflict.
Other notable and influential reports, the ‘Brundtland Commission on Sustainable Development’ (UN General Assembly 1987), and ‘In Larger Freedom’ (UN General Assembly 2005a), among others, have catalysed new working methods in the UN, new areas of work and the establishment of new international centres. The ‘protection of civilians’ was introduced as a new item on the Security Council’s agenda in 1998 following an evaluation of the UN’s role in Rwanda (UN Security Council 1999a), and the ‘High Level Panel and Report on the Responsibility to Protect’, supported by the Government of Canada (Evans and Sahnoun 2001).

Yet, in the unusual case of ‘Women, Peace and Security’, the Security Council adopted SCR 1325 without any prior institutional request for action on the issue. More commonly, according to Wood, “the Council requests the Secretary-General to submit a report, then considers and approves the report, with or without modifications, and requests the Secretary-General to implement that which it has approved” (Wood 1995, 8). The institution with responsibility for drafting the report clearly has the strongest influence on its content. The UN Secretary-General and the Secretariat often use these opportunities for framing issues for discussion, making recommendations for action or shaping new policy directions. Different Secretary-Generals have exercised these opportunities to different degrees; Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali is known to have used his reports to the Security Council as “a strategic tool to shape its debates and influence its decisions” (Bailey and Daws 1998).

Often, the goal of such pivotal reports is to identify gaps in the international legal, institutional, operational framework, or policy process, and recommend remedial actions to all relevant entities in the UN system. Depending on the topic’s relevance, the report may direct recommendations to different UN organs for distribution in the General Assembly, the Security Council, and ECOSOC. When issues are new to the UN’s agenda or controversial, independent experts, influential and respected political leaders or panels are typically convened, with attention given to regional or national composition, and their professional and political history e.g. former ministers or head of state or peace (sex, however, continues to be disregarded as a criterion).

National and regional identities are especially important (e.g. appointing a former American defence specialist to carry out an independent expert study on sanctions in Iraq

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80 When it is distributed to both organs, it is printed with different UN’s symbols; e.g. S for Security Council or A for General Assembly. Reports can also be published as books by the UN entity or by a commercial/academic publisher.
or humanitarian issues in Afghanistan would have little credibility). ‘Type’ identities are also taken into account in relation to the topic; e.g. whether the person is from a conflict affected country, or natural disaster. Institutional experience is also relevant, e.g. as the former head of a peace keeping mission, a legal background, or military training. Content expertise is often less relevant because most of the substantive work is carried out by consultants that are recruited for the specific study, while receiving broader institutional support from staff based in the most relevant UN entity where the study is housed.

Because ‘women’ was a new issue on the Security Council’s agenda, the Council’s initial draft resolution followed the model described above:

Invites the Secretary-General to appoint independent experts to carry out parallel assessments on: (a) The impact of armed conflict on women, with a focus on institutional arrangements for women's protection and humanitarian support; and (b) women's role in peace-building and the gender dimensions of peace processes and conflict resolution.

Requests UNIFEM to provide key support for their preparation, drawing upon the Division for the Advancement of Women, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Coalition on Women and International Peace and Security and other relevant bodies.  

The expectation was that both UN gender mechanisms, UNIFEM and OSAGI, would collaborate with each other and the broader UN and NGO community in supporting an independent process of assessment.

Yet four days before the open debate, Namibia circulated a fourth revision of the draft resolution that invitee the Secretary-General to carry out the study. Even at this point, there was still some political willingness on the part of Council members for UNIFEM to support an independent expert study. This willingness is signalled in the draft resolution by following clause in bold typeface and brackets (i.e. not yet agreed upon):

Further requests the Secretary-General to report to it by 30 September 2001 on the implementation of this resolution, consulting all relevant parts of the United Nations system and taking into account other relevant work, [including relevant studies undertaken within the United Nations system].

The Council’s original draft was based on Graça Machel’s recommendation made in a review document published by Canada in October 2000 on the implementation of the

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children and war agenda (J. Klot and Sowa 2000). Drawing from her own experience, Ms. Machel recommended an independent, comprehensive process of research and consultation in order to identify gaps in the UN’s institutional arrangements with respect to women, peace and security, as she had done in the case for children. She proposed two experts instead of one, recognising the UN’s distinctly different institutional arrangements for military and political actions authorised by the Security Council and the economic, social, cultural and humanitarian mandate that was ECOSOC’s responsibility and as a strategy for pre-empting any potential resistance from ECOSOC regarding interference from the Security Council (Ibid., 53).

As a non-permanent member of the Security Council between 1999 and 2000, Canada played a leadership role in bringing about the protection of civilians and children onto the Security Council’s agenda, and extended its support for a Security Council resolution on women. The Machel review document was circulated to Security Council members before SCR 1325 was adopted on 31 October 2000. All but three of the Security Council’s 15 members referred to Graça Machel’s study during the open debate, and endorsed her recommendation. The Representative of Croatia noted how little research existed on the topic, “Nevertheless, so far precious little serious social science research has focused on the issues addressed by the documents I have mentioned, mainly for a lack of recognition of their importance and, hence, of institutional funding”.83

Both UNIFEM and OSAGI lobbied Security Council members, the NGO working group and the Secretary-General’s office, each seeking different outcomes. UNIFEM supported Graça Machel’s recommended independent expert assessments, while OSAGI supported the study to be carried out by the Secretariat. Their competing interests reflected a history of institutional tensions; OSAGI was a higher-ranking official, but UNIFEM’s executive director had far greater visibility and flexibility in raising and allocating resources.

If the Security Council directed their request to the Secretary-General, OSAGI would likely have responsibility for the study’s preparation. On the other hand, if the Security Council requested an independent assessment, UNIFEM would have been better placed to provide support its preparation because Funds and Programmes have more flexible funding arrangements. Each felt their position would be enhanced. Ultimately however, the

Security Council invited the Secretary-General to carry out a study, leaving to him the decision about how this should be done; appointing an independent expert or a panel of experts or delegating the task to the Secretariat.

As a new issue on the Security Council’s agenda, the decision was not clear-cut and there was no single UN entity with the requisite substantive, normative or programmatic experience or mandate in the areas outlined in the request. OSAGI campaigned for a report that would be prepared under her guidance and would focused on the normative concerns relevant to the Secretariat, while drawing contributions from the wider UN system. Whereas UNIFEM campaigned for an independent expert that would assess the entirety of the UN system, with a focus on the lives of women in conflict situations. UNIFEM also offered to provide financial and secretariat support for the process.

Although Council members were willing to support the request for independent experts, in the end, they deferred to the Secretary-General using an elegant rationale i.e. not wishing to tell the Secretary-General how to do his job, it was clear that this approach would result in a secretariat-led study. Sources close to the negotiating process suggest that there was an implicit expectation of alignment between OSAGI, a Jamaican national and former UN delegate, and Jamaica’s highly respected female representative on the Security Council. Although UN staff are under oath to represent the UN rather than their national government, an individual’s nationality (as well as ‘sex’ and ‘regional’ identity) are always an implicit and often explicit factor in networks, hiring decisions and in how an issue is received by particular delegations or regional groups. These various identities were likely significant in Jamaica’s shift from supporting the independent studies to supporting OSAGI’s position.84

Ultimately, the Secretary-General delegated responsibility for the study’s preparation to OSAGI. To carry this out, OSAGI established an Inter-Agency Task Force, under the auspices of the Inter-Agency Network on Women and Gender Equality, a mechanism for ensuring coordination and cooperation on the promotion of gender equality throughout the United Nations system (UN Inter-Agency Network on Gender Equality 2005). Between 2000-2003, the main work of the Task Force was two-fold: to develop a system-wide action plan for implementing the Resolution, based on contributions from all UN entities in their respective areas of activity and in all areas identified in the resolution, and to implement and finalize the Secretary-General’s Study on Women, Peace and Security.

84 (F-UNF1). Interviewed by author. 2014. New York, New York. 30 October.
OSAGI hired two feminist academics to draft the report based on secondary sources and information received from Task Force members.

UNIFEM opposed this strategy for three reasons. First, it considered an inter-agency process inappropriate for preparing a study that would, in effect, be self-administered and unable to challenge the status quo. It assumed that UN departments without gender capacity would be able to identify their own weaknesses and identify appropriate remedies. Second, because members of the Task Force had responsibility for gender issues rather than peace and security, while there was already an inter-agency standing committee of higher stature tasked with humanitarian issues and that also include NGO members. And third, because there was no plan to include perspectives from women in conflict-affected areas, or to address operational gaps in the UN’s institutional arrangements for humanitarian action, peace and security.

A source close to OSAGI’s drafting process described the guidance received:

The Secretary-General report was not to include information about why wars are going on (nothing on historical or contemporary causal factors) and how they are different than wars during the Cold War, nothing on root causes, nothing on how they are sustaining themselves and linked globally and into global economies, and nothing on how any of that is gendered. The only place analysis that could come in was specifically on what was happening to women and girls in particular areas of focus in the report. The material that was critical in terms of gaps in law enforcement for women and girls was completely rejected and DAW's legal expert rewrote that section claiming that protections under IHL and HR are sufficient (in essence) and that better enforcement is needed.85

Although the two gender entities pledged to collaborate, Noeleen Heyzer, UNIFEM’s Executive Director, initiated a separate but ‘complementary’ study. She appointed two independent experts to lead the study, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, a Liberian activist and former staff member of the World Band and UNDP, and Elisabeth Rehn, former Minister of Defence of Finland. The vision for this ‘independent expert assessment’ was significantly different from the OSAGI supported study. An internal memo to the experts describing these differences put it this way:

First, theirs will be a desk study. Your Assessment is grounded in field experience...Yours is an independent study that will expose the untouchable issues and take positions that will go beyond those that any UN commissioned report could take. Trafficking in a peacekeeping environment. HIV/AIDS. Gender mainstreaming. The strengths and weaknesses of gender units. The failure of humanitarian protection. We know the internal workings of the

85 (F-EX1. 25 September 2014. E-mail message to author)
system and can explain the policy and political issues that exacerbate the problems. We know how the consolidated appeals are made. We know how the Council functions. And we know where the weaknesses are and how to address them. For understandable reasons, their report will be sanitized and protective. At best, it will be academic. The reports will address the same issues – that’s a good thing. We didn’t part ways because we saw a different universe of issues, but different strategies to address them. The reasons we are doing this and you are leading the process is because we are remaining true to our constituency and the truth. Not the institutions in which we are housed. 86

Both studies were carried out between 2000 and 2002 as separate and somewhat competing processes. UNIFEM embarked on a ‘field oriented’ strategy that focused on women’s movements and organisations in conflict-affected areas – including those that were not on the Security Council’s agenda. It used Resolution 1325 to increase the legitimacy of women’s participation in peace-building processes, mostly informal and non-formal, and to symbolise the power of women’s movements in having penetrated the pinnacle of military and political decision-making. 87 OSAGI, on the other hand, situated Resolution 1325 within the UN’s agenda for the advancement of women, which is ECOSOC’s mandate, rather than the Security Council’s, and used the Inter-Agency Network on Gender Equality as the primary implementation mechanism. Although this may have ameliorated (to some extent) ECOSOC’s concerns about the Security Council’s encroachment on its mandate, inadvertently, it may have also diminished the Security Council’s sense of ownership for implementation.

Both reports went through extensive processes of consultation and, inevitably, took heed of external and internal concerns. Although UNIFEM’s report attracted more public attention (Rehn and Sirleaf 2002), it was never formally considered by the Security Council or the General Assembly. OSAGI’s findings (UN Security Council 2002a) were presented to the Security Council in 2002 but did not address the Security Council’s primary functional responsibilities. Neither were organised in a way that reflected the Security Council’s repertoire of practice or addressed the complexity of UN peace operations as they were identified in the Brahimi Report. Both lacked specificity regarding

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86 Internal UNIFEM memo to the Experts. 16 November 2001.
87 Most of the success claimed by women’s movements in utilising 1325 were in the context of non-formal/informal processes. For example, see (Porter 2007).
the gender dimensions of the normative and operational challenges that peace operations were confronting as demands for UN engagement were growing.\(^{88}\)

In other words, even though the Security Council had introduced ‘women’ as a new item on its agenda, it still lacked the information it needed to identify how its work could take women and gender into account, in ways that were distinct from other UN organs dealing with economic, social and human rights issues. Although the Council had initially associated SCR 1325 with its actions on the protection of civilians, both OSAGI and UNIFEM proposed implementation strategies that avoided this terminology and any association with the Security Council’s agenda on the protection of civilians or children.

Instead, SCR 1325’s implementation pathways evolved in parallel to the Security Council’s actions to implement its related thematic resolutions on the protection of civilians and children in armed conflict. In my view, OSAGI’s reliance on gender mainstreaming and gender balance as central strategies for implementing SCR 1325 limited its impact on the Security Council’s repertoire of practice and on UN peace operations’ responsiveness to women and gender issues.

4.2 SCR 1325’s Strategic Framework for Implementation: Inchoate or Incognizant?

As the two studies were underway, OSAGI continued to work through the Inter-Agency Task Force to develop a ‘System-wide Action Plan’ to implement SCR 1325. As the designated task leader, OSAGI led a broadly all-encompassing, consultative process of ‘gender mainstreaming’ to develop 1325 action plans within all relevant UN entities. By 2003, Task Force members had grown to include 18 UN entities.\(^{89}\) The Task Force also included two observers, the International Organization on Migration, and the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security.\(^{90}\)

Because OSAGI’s work over the next four years focused on UN agencies rather than the Security Council, the subsequent reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council

\(^{88}\) ‘Repertoire of practice’ refers to the Security Council’s interpretation and application of the UN Charter and the Provisional Rules of Procedure established in 1946. Comprehensive coverage of these practices was mandated by the General Assembly in 1952 and is available online at [http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/](http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/)

\(^{89}\) These included: DAW, Department for Disarmament Affairs, Department of Political Affairs, DPKO, Department of Public Information, International Labour Organization, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Office of Human Resource Management, OSAGI, the SRSG for Children and Armed Conflict, UNDP, the UN Fund for Population Activities, UNICEF, UNIFEM, UN University, and the World Food Programme.

\(^{90}\) By then, the NGO Working Group had grown to include the Hague Appeal for Peace, International Alert, International Women’s Tribute Centre, the Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice, the Women’s Committee on Refugee Women and Children and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom.
Council had very little impact on the Security Council’s actions. Commenting on the 2005-07 Action Plan to Implement SCR 1325, the Secretary General described it as “a compilation of ongoing activities by UN entities” that failed to provide any links between the actions reported and undertaken and their impact on the lives of women in conflict and post-conflict situations:

The second report (in 2004) highlighted the range of UN entities responsible for implementing 1325 and challenges to ensure coordination. The next three reports focused entirely on the design and execution of a series of UN action plans to implement resolution 1325 across the UN system. The informative, and for some revelatory, nature of the first Secretary-General Report seemed to become lost in a bureaucratic exercise. As a result, it would be easy to see how Council members, not to mention those in the GA and Secretariat, not well-versed in the impact of conflict on women might have questions why women, peace and security was on the Council's agenda. (UN Security Council 2012, 23)

With very little analysis given to gender issues that would fall within the Security Council’s remit, G-77 members used the annual open debates on women, peace and security to reassert the General Assembly’s primacy for all issues regarding women, and particularly those associated with the Beijing Platform. For example, in the 2002 Open Debate, Singapore, Egypt, Pakistan, France, Ukraine and Egypt emphasised the need to ensure that ‘women, peace and security’ were not the exclusive responsibility of the Security Council. Indonesia went as far as suggesting that the issue of women and peace has been “more than adequately considered in UN forums, such as the annual meetings of CSW and of the Third Committee of the General Assembly, and also by various UN bodies such as UNIFEM and UNESCO”. Explain Baily and Daws:

There has always been tension between the Security Council, with its unprecedented powers and limited membership plus the right of five permanent members to veto substantive proposals, and the General Assembly, comprising all UN Members and with the right to recommend. In order to limit rivalry between the Security Council and the General Assembly, the founders included in the Charter a provision stating that when the Security Council is exercising in respect of any matter the functions assigned to it in the Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to the matter ‘unless the Security Council so requests’ (Article 12 (1)). In practice, this Article has been interpreted with flexibility (Bailey and Daws 1998, 3).

The statement of Pakistan’s Representative to the Council in 2002 is a striking contrast with Pakistan’s Representative in 2000, quoted in Chapter 3. Whereas the statement in 2000 raised concerns about the Council’s encroachment on ECOSOC’s agenda, the 2002 statement used the opportunity to criticise the Council’s selectivity and draw attention to
violence against women in Jammu and Kashmir, a conflict that was not on the Council’s agenda:

We believe that the Council must not only ensure prompt and effective responses to crisis situations, irrespective of their geographical location, but also avoid selectivity in the implementation of its resolutions. The Charter contains provisions, including those in Chapter VI, which can be utilized to promote implementation of Council resolutions.

Because UNIFEM’s independent expert assessment included countries that were not on the Council’s agenda, the Pakistani representative made reference to the assessment and reaffirmed a number of its recommendations.91

Other delegates emphasised the relevance of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda to Security Council discussions on children and armed conflict, the Brahimi Report and the protection of civilians. For example, while Egypt used their platform to raise concerns about the situation of Palestinian women, it also stressed its “firm position…stated time and again…with regard to the need to place the protection of women and children in armed conflict in the broader context of the protection of civilians”.92

Between 2003 and 2007, the strategic framework for addressing SCR 1325 in the context of UN peace operations continued to evolve in parallel with the Security Council’s actions on the protection of civilians and children in conflict. During this time, although the Security Council adopted six presidential statements on women, it made far more significant progress on children, by adopting six resolutions and two presidential statements. Relatively greater progress was also made on the protection of civilians, with the adoption of three resolutions and six presidential statements (see Figure 2).93

The adoption of resolutions and statements reflect the engagement of the Council and the secretariat in developing doctrine and operational learning about their work in each of these areas. As Figure 2 illustrates, the Security Council’s actions on children (and related Secretary-General reports) reference Council actions on women and the protection of

92 Ibid., 5.
93 In 2008, the UN Security Council adopted its second resolution on women, peace and security, addressing sexual violence (UN Security Council 2008). Between 2008 and 2010, there was a second wave of doctrinal development in the Security Council on women and in DPKO. This chapter and dissertation focuses primarily on guidance that was available from 2003-2007 and therefore does not reflect new developments; many of which address concerns raised. Between 2008 and 2010, the DPKO issued six new directives in relation to women: Standard operating procedure on quarterly reporting by DPKO gender advisers in Integrated UNPKOs (15 April 2008), DPKO/DFS Guidelines of Gender Advisers and Gender Focal Points in UNPKOs (15 April 2008); Guidelines for Integrating Gender Perspectives in the work of UN Police in PKOs (DPKO/ROL SI/2008) (17 June 2008); DPKO/DFS Guidelines on Integrating a gender perspective into the work of UN Military in PKOs (March 2010); DPKO/DFS Guidelines, Operational Guidance to assist civilian, military and police components of peacekeeping missions to implement Security Council Resolutions 1820 & 1888 (April 2010); and an updated Policy on Gender Equality in UN Peacekeeping Operations (26 July 2010).
Figure 2: Security Council Actions on Children and Armed Conflict (CAC), the Protection of Civilians (POC) and Women, Peace and Security (WPS) 1998 - 2007
civilians. Similarly, the Council’s actions and the Secretary-General’s reports on the protection of civilians, reference both women and children. However, the same is not true for the Council’s actions on women. Although both children and the protection of civilians are referenced in SCR 1325, none of the subsequent (seven) presidential statements on women adopted between 2000 and 2007 include any references to Security Council actions on the protection of civilians or on children and armed conflict.\(^{94}\) This suggests that although the Security Council and the Secretariat were doing everything possible to bring a gender perspective into the Security Council’s work on the protection of civilians and children, the Council’s work on women was not similarly reciprocal.

These different trajectories and outcomes are partly related to the different strategies taken to advance SCR 1325 as compared to those used to advance Security Council thematic resolutions on children and armed conflict (CAC) and the protection of civilians (POC). In the case of POC and CAC, individual Security Council members formed working groups within the Council, working in partnership with relevant UN entities (respectively, UNICEF and the SRSG for Children and Armed Conflict in relation to CAC, and with OCHA and DPKO with respect to POC). The aim was to develop new methods for advancing its commitments in these areas. For example, the CAC working group established guidelines for Secretary-General reporting on CAC and prepared an ‘informal toolbox’ of some 26 tools for the working group to use in identifying types of actions the Security Council could take within its mandate. These included démarches, assistance, enhanced monitoring and the improvement of mandates (UN Security Council 2006a).

In 2002, the Security Council asked the Secretary-General and the secretariat to help establish a road map and aide memoire to advance a more collaborative process for helping the Council implement its commitments on POC. The aide memoire was adopted by the Security Council in 2003 to guide Security Council actions on POC (UN Security Council 2003a). It also included separate sections on children and women, identifying relevant Security Council actions that had already been authorised in various thematic and country

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\(^{94}\) In its PRSTs on women, the Security Council continued to urge more attention on gender issues in peacekeeping operations, in conflict prevention and DDR (S/PRST/2000/10) (S/PRST/2004/40); women’s role in peacebuilding; (S/PRST/2004/46); sexual and gender based violence as a weapon of war (S/PRST/2005/52); integrating gender perspectives into post-conflict institutional reform (S/PRST/2006/42), DDR (S/PRST/2007/5); and, humanitarian aspects of issues before the Security Council PRST/2000/7 (13 March 2000) and reporting on progress (S/PRST/2007/40).
situations.\textsuperscript{95} In fact, all of the Secretary-General’s reports on CAC and POC included references to women’s issues and SCR 1325.

In contrast, OSAGI’s approach to SCR 1325 continued to rely on gender mainstreaming and Beijing as the primary rationale and strategy for advancing SCR 1325, steering clear of any association with, or reference to, the Security Council’s related actions to CAC or POC. Unlike the working groups on CAC and POC that were limited to Security Council members, the Group of Friends of SCR 1325 established by Canada in 2001 had, at any one time, between 13-38 members. Informal and voluntary, the Friends of SCR 1325 actively sought to expand its membership and took the broadest possible view of implementation, extending their focus far beyond issues within the Security Council’s exclusive purview and countries on its agenda. Instead, the Group emphasised the need for national and regional initiatives and action plans. Importantly, these actions generated ownership at the national level and helped reinvigorate feminist activist campaigns in countries that were not on the Council’s agenda.

At the same time, some Security Council members (e.g. Chile, Mexico, UK and France) recognised the need for a greater focus on Security Council actions. During the Security Council's 2003 debate, the idea of naming a Security Council member to be responsible for tracking implementation was proposed but never followed up:

Chile: Approximately a year has elapsed since the Secretary-General submitted to us his report containing a large number of recommendations, which we firmly supported, but it seems that progress towards their implementation has not been as positive as we expected. I wish to raise one of the proposals made last year by the representative of the United Kingdom, which was to request one member of the Council each year to oversee the implementation of our decisions on including the gender perspective, working with the relevant Secretariat bodies to achieve that objective. Perhaps this is the time to explore that type of initiative…Consideration could also be given to a specific chapter devoted to gender-related items connected with resolution 1325 (2000) being included in the reports submitted by the Secretariat on peacekeeping operations. One concerned developing regional perspectives to identify implementation strategies for the resolution. In that regard, appropriate regional bodies, inside as well as outside the United Nations system, could help with implementation. Another proposal at the seminar was that mechanisms be developed for systematic linkage between the Security Council and civil society.\textsuperscript{96}

\textsuperscript{95} The earlier 2002 Draft Aide Memoire does not reference women or children (UN Security Council 2002d).
Mexico: First, it is important for the Security Council to consider the appropriateness of setting up a mechanism to follow up the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) and the recommendations contained in the study carried out on women, peace and security, by the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), and in the study on women, war and peace commissioned by the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM). Regarding the work of the Security Council, much still remains to be done to ensure that the question of gender is considered systematically when framing resolutions and that it is dealt with as a central matter in questions of international peace and security, and not as a marginal issue.97

Given OSAGI’s strategic focus on gender mainstreaming, many of the achievements in implementing SCR 1325 took the form of new processes and mechanisms e.g. the establishment of gender units, focal points and inter-agency committees; and the development of policies, guidance and training materials. In his 2004 report to the Security Council on SCR 1325’s implementation, the Secretary-General reported on these accomplishments, emphasising SCR 1325’s utilisation by civil society and a ‘broad range of actors’, but not the Security Council:

Initiatives have been taken by a broad range of actors to implement resolution 1325 (2000), inter alia, by developing policies, action plans, guidelines and indicators; increasing access to gender expertise; providing training; promoting consultation with and participation of women; increasing attention to human rights; and supporting the initiative of women’s groups. Resolution 1325 (2000) has been effectively utilized by civil society organizations as an advocacy and monitoring tool (UN Security Council 2004a, 1–2).

The Secretary-General subsequently acknowledged the UN’s ‘failure to provide adequate protection’ and the ‘increased incidence of sexual and gender-based violence.’ He identified ‘major gaps and challenges’ in all areas of implementing SCR 1325, including “in particular, in relation to women’s participation in conflict prevention and peace processes; the integration of gender perspectives in peace agreements; attention to the contributions and needs of women in humanitarian and reconstruction processes; and representation of women in decision-making positions (Ibid., 2):

Faced with massive incidents of gender-based violence during armed conflicts, Member States, entities of the United Nations system and civil society have focused on addressing the consequences of violence against women and girls. Thus far, the international community has not been able to prevent acts of violence against women from occurring during armed conflict. Early warning mechanisms either do not exist, or we have not been able to respond effectively to indications of impending hostilities. (Ibid., 6)

97 Ibid., p.19
As regional meetings and Security Council working groups were being established to help advance the Security Council’s repertoire of practices on children in armed conflict and the protection of civilians, Security Council members continued to urge that they do more than meet informally as ‘Friends of SCR 1325’. In 2004, two meetings were convened off-site under the auspices of the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security and the permanent missions of Canada, Chile and the UK. The goal was to identify strategies for fully integrating the Security Council’s work on the ‘three Ps’, referring to the Council’s thematic resolutions on prevention (UN Security Council 2001b), protection (UN Security Council 1999b; UN Security Council 2000e; UN Security Council 2003b) and participation, as set out in SCR 1325. Following the meeting, the NGO Working Group refocused its advocacy around these points and issued corollary guidelines and papers with more explicit guidance. Council members referred to the proposals developed at these meetings during the open debates on women, peace and security. At the 2004 debate for example, France proposed convening expert level meetings of Security Council members on a periodic basis, and Romania, Angola, Sweden and the Philippines proposed establishing a Security Council monitoring system.

However, these proposals were not embraced by all Security Council members and member states. Knowingly or not, OSAGI’s continued reliance on the Beijing commitments as the primary rationale for implementing 1325 added support to dissenters. Invoking the General Assembly’s commitments to the advancement of women and gender mainstreaming as central rationale for implementing SCR 1325 further reinforced OSAGI’s leadership role in SCR’s 1325 implementation, which might otherwise have been broadened to include UNIFEM or DPKO. The Russian Federation, Algeria, Colombia, China and others consistently argued against creating any new Security Council mechanisms to monitor SCR 1325 that would risk “duplicating the efforts of other UN bodies”, or “…eventually result in the creation of a mechanism whereby the Security Council would single out countries on the basis of thematic issues that should, according the UN charter, be discussed and dealt with in the General Assembly”.

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98 At the first meeting in February 2004, all Security Council members participated except Algeria, Romania and Spain. Non-council members included Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, Guinea, Mexico, Norway, Sweden and the Syrian Arab Republic.
101 Ibid., (pp. 10-11).
In elaborating SCR 1325’s ‘policy framework’, OSAGI also invoked a number of other General Assembly commitments, in addition to the Beijing Declaration. The Secretary General’s 2005 report to the Security Council on 1325 (UN Security Council 2005b), refers to three landmark General Assembly reports: The report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (UN General Assembly 2004) calling for the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission; *In larger Freedom* (UN General Assembly 2005a); and the 2005 World Summit Outcome (UN General Assembly 2005b). Although these important and high-level commitments provided affirmation of the UN’s commitment to implementing SCR 1325, they would also be used time and again to limit the Security Council’s authority in this area.102

As Security Council deliberations about the protection of civilians became increasingly focused on operational and tactical strategies, its actions on women became increasingly mechanistic, bureaucratic, and discursive. Compared to his reports on women, the Secretary-General’s reports to the Security Council on country situations and on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, and children and armed conflict, continued to provide far more graphic depictions of the “stark and disturbing evidence of gender-based violence and of the fact that compliance of parties to conflict with international humanitarian, human rights, refugee and criminal law remains woefully inadequate” (UN Security Council 2004b, 1). It was in his report on the Protection of Civilians, and not Women, Peace and Security, that he called for protection measures:

…we are failing in our collective responsibility to protect women and children from the increasing horrors of sexual and gender-based violence. Extraordinary protection measures are needed… According to recent reports, in numerous villages and displacement camps in Darfur, women and children are being systematically raped. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, tens of thousands of women and children, ranging in age from babies to women in their eighties, have been subjected to unspeakable forms of sexual violence. Such actions are all the worse for their long-term impact on society and reconciliation processes. Many of the women and children who miraculously survived the genocide in Rwanda are now dying of HIV/AIDS, a horrific legacy of the sexual violence to which they were subjected 10 years ago. Their plight today remains largely unacknowledged and they are receiving inadequate assistance. In the planning and implementation of all peace support operations, the need to respond to sexual and gender-based violence, _including through more effective physical protection and monitoring and reporting_

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102 The Secretary General for the newly established Peacebuilding Support Office said that “resolution 1325 (2000) was one of the underpinnings of the Commission’s architecture” UN Security Council. 2006. *Text of Speeches Delivered to the Security Council’s Open Debate on Women and Peace and Security.* (S/PV.5556) 26 October 2006. New York. (pp. 7-10).
(emphasis added) must be factored in and ways must be sought to enhance the overall participation of women in all aspects of the mission’s mandate. (Ibid., p.9)

By far, the Secretary-General makes his most forceful recommendations on women in his reports on POC, as compared to his reports on women.\(^{103}\) His recommendations in the context of POC call for a wide range of measures to improve women’s physical protection, to strengthen their role in peace-building, to incorporate gender perspectives into disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and rehabilitation programmes, and to assist the survivors of sexual violence.\(^{104}\) In his fifth report on the protection of civilians, he identified gaps in the protection framework and called for the Security Council to adopt a resolution to specifically address the protection needs related to sexual violence. He identified protection from physical and sexual violence as “one of the major challenges to civilian protection”(UN Security Council 2005a, 16).\(^{105}\)

Meanwhile, the Security Council’s work on children was advancing even more rapidly. After adopting its first resolution in 1999, the Security Council adopted resolutions every subsequent year (except for 2001). By 2005, empowered by six Security Council resolutions, UNICEF and the SRSG for Children and Armed Conflict worked closely with the Security Council and DPKO to deploy child protection advisers, child rights monitors, to fund the demobilisation of children from peacekeeping budgets, to increase children’s access to humanitarian assistance, to bring child rights into the rule of law and justice initiatives, into peace negotiations, the work of regional organisations, and in UN peace building and recovery.

In contrast, OSAGI continued to approach SCR 1325 as an inter-agency exercise in gender mainstreaming, focusing on new policies, guidance, assessments, awareness raising, technical advice, reporting, capacity building and training. OSAGI and the NGO Working Group monitored implementation of SCR 1325 by counting the frequency with which the words ‘gender’ or ‘women’ were included in Secretary-General Reports to the Council and the numbers of women participating in peace negotiations, elected into office, or newly adopted legislation. Neither physical security nor access to humanitarian assistance was given attention despite growing bias in allocating humanitarian assistance.

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103 Just as OSAGI is responsible for drafting the Secretary-General’s reports on women, OCHA takes the lead, together with DPKO, in drafting his reports on POC.
104 Notably, it was in the POC report that the pivotal role of the Women in Peace-building Network in Liberia was recognised.
In 2005, OSAGI introduced a ‘System-wide Action Plan’ for the period 2005-2007 to implement SCR 1325 (UN Security Council 2005b). The culmination of a five-year effort to ‘mainstream’ SCR 1325 into the UN system through the Inter-Agency Network on Gender Equality, the Strategy put forward nearly 300 commitments made by 37 UN entities detailed over a 50-page log frame matrix. So significant was the aversion to the CAC and POC agendas, that ‘protection’ was not one of the 12 areas around which the plan was organised; nor was women’s physical security identified as an ‘output’ in any of the 275 commitments listed. Even DPKO pledged only to create processes and mechanisms, develop policies and operational tools; integrate gender perspectives into mandates; include gender components in field operations; provide gender training for PKO personnel and develop and maintain a knowledge base of learning, research and best practices for gender mainstreaming in peace operations (Ibid.). In the Action Plan, the Security Council itself is not considered a primary actor with implementation responsibilities. Rather, it is only referred to as one of a number of ‘competent intergovernmental and expert bodies’, including the General Assembly, ECOSOC and the CSW that:

Play a critical role in providing oversight and ensuring accountability of UN entities…and setting policies, standards and norms for gender mainstreaming and empowerment of women for Member states, international organizations and civil society and provide resources, monitor progress and identify gaps and challenges. (UN Security Council 2005b, 16)

However, the Security Council has no role in providing oversight of any of the 37 entities listed in the matrix, most of which report to ECOSOC or the Human Rights Council. Nor is it within the Security Council’s remit to set policies, standards or norms for gender mainstreaming and women’s empowerment.

Despite the Secretary-General’s recommendation in 2006 to reconceptualise the Action Plan, it was only in 2007 that OSAGI finally recognised the need to reassess its approach. The 2007 Report of the Secretary-General on women conceded that the 12-point action plan was not consistent with the Security Council’s approach of reintegrating its thematic resolutions into its country specific work (UN Security Council 2007a). For the first time in seven years, OSAGI recognised the relevance of CAC and POC to the women, peace and security agenda. The 2007 report reorganised the action plan around the three themes that the Security Council had itself identified as common to the implementation frameworks of its core thematic resolutions: prevention, participation and protection:
A key lesson learned from the first and second implementation reviews of the Action Plan is that the 12 areas of action contained in the 2005-2007 Action Plan are too broad and need to be sharpened in the updated Action Plan … In January and July 2004, two Security Council working round-table discussions addressing the integration of the thematic resolutions of the Council into the country-specific work of the Council, identified prevention, participation and protection as thematic areas common to the implementation frameworks of core thematic resolutions of the Council, namely resolutions 1265 (1999) and 1296 (2000) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, resolution 1366 (2001) on the role of the Security Council in the prevention of armed conflict, resolution 1460 (2003) on children in armed conflict and resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security, and core themes for preventing conflict and building and maintaining peace and security. They are cross-cutting and interlinked, and provide Member States, the United Nations system and other stakeholders with the basis for cross-theme synergies to effectively implement and monitor activities under resolution 1325. (UN Security Council 2007a, 13)

OSAGI also added two additional themes, ‘relief and recovery’ and ‘normative’. However, unlike the other thematic resolutions, an implementation framework was not proposed and, instead, the new action plan identified the need to “strengthen and amplify to secure the safety and physical health of women, and to promote women’s equal access to aid distribution mechanisms” (UN Security Council 2007a, 14). Although the plan recognised threats to women’s physical security, it contained no operational or tactical strategies. Instead, with only one exception, the proposed strategies were limited to the standard gender mainstreaming repertoire of: (a) Policy development; (b) Advocacy; (c) Capacity-building; and, (d) Partnership and networking. The single exception was the (e) Provision of goods and services: to ensure equal access by women and their associations and networks to goods and services. The goods and services were not specified (nor their providers), although they were distinguished from relief and recovery assistance.

Significantly, the Action Plan sets out the Secretary-General’s first request to the Security Council to establish a monitoring mechanism. He limited the request, however, to monitoring violence against women and girls, rather than the entirety of issues addressed in 1325. Surprisingly, the Security Council went further than the Secretary-General and, in a Presidential Statement, requests that the Secretary-General include in his reporting to the Council on situations of armed conflict, information on (inter alia) “special measures proposed and taken to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict” (UN Security Council 2007b).
In this section, I have shown how the UN’s institutional arrangements for women and the strategies used to advance agreed upon policy goals shaped SCR 1325’s implementation pathways. The role of national and regional identities continue to shape the engagement of member states and UN mechanisms in the women, peace and security agenda. I have shown various ways in which gender, as a variable, is exercised as both a quantity and a process within the broader geopolitical dynamics of UN decision-making.

4.3 The Policy: Coherence or Compromise?
OSAGI used SCR 1325 to bolster efforts already underway to establish a Gender Unit in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. This idea was first proposed in the Windhoek Declaration and Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Peacekeeping Operations, the outcome of a meeting convened by OSAGI and the DPKO’s Lessons Learned Unit in March 2000 (UN Security Council 2000f). In February of that year, DPKO’s senior management had already agreed to establish a Gender Advisory Unit and a Gender Advisory Panel, one of 13 action steps that resulted from a process initiated in 1999 by the Office of Human Resources Management in the UN Secretariat, to identify relevant areas in the Department’s work. Although both agreements emphasised human resource concerns, they also referred to the operational implications of DPKO’s work at Headquarters and in the field.

Just one week before the Security Council’s first debate on women, peace and security, the UN Secretary-General included the proposed gender unit in his plan to implement the far-reaching recommendations made by the UN High-level Panel on Peace Operations (the ‘Brahimi Report’), chaired by Lakdar Brahimi, former Foreign Minister of Algeria (UN Security Council 2000g, 26). This was, in part, the Secretary-General’s response to the Report’s near absence of gender analysis; its most widely criticised aspect.

The Brahimi Report’s 56 recommendations called for doctrinal shifts in the use of civilian police and other rule of law elements, and the incorporation of DDR programmes into the assessed budgets of complex peace operations. It recommended a new and permanent capacity at the UN to develop peace-building strategies, and it offered detailed recommendations to strengthen the Secretariat’s role in information gathering, analysis,

106 The collaboration between OSAGI, DAW and DPKO is consistent with OSAGI’s mandate, established by ECOSOC to support gender-mainstreaming efforts in the UN Secretariat. Two years earlier, in 1998, OSAGI held its first ‘exchanges of view’ with, among others, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Peacekeeping Operations, Disarmament Affairs and their staff to discuss steps to be taken in order to mainstream a gender perspective in the work of their departments/offices (UN ECOSOC 1998, 9).
strategic planning, and in supporting transitional civil administrations. The Panel recommended improvements to the UN’s capacity to deploy operations rapidly, and to increase the effectiveness of mission leadership, the role of military personnel, civilian police, civilian specialists and logistics support. In total, the report called for the establishment of more than 400 new posts and a significantly reorganised DPKO. Outside of DPKO, it also recommended far-reaching structural adjustments to the UN's operational support for public information, peace-building support in the Department of Political Affairs and peace operations support in the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). The report’s final section addressed the role of information technology in peace operations, tools for knowledge management and internet-based public information.

In keeping with the strengthened mandate for integrating gender perspectives into peacekeeping support operations provided by the General Assembly in its twenty-third special session entitled "Women 2000: gender equality, development and peace for the twenty-first century" (June 2000), the report of the Panel raised two important gender perspectives relating to gender balance in appointments to senior management positions and the need for gender sensitivity among personnel in their interactions with local communities. However, integrating gender perspectives into peace-support operations requires much more, as the outcome document adopted by the Assembly at its special session in June 2000 (UN General Assembly 2000a) and the Windhoek Declaration (UN Security Council 2000f) clearly illustrate.

Building on the Brahimi Report’s recommendations, the creation of a Gender Unit in the Office of the Under-Secretary-General of DPKO, was one of five proposals made by the Secretary-General for restructuring the Department. In an Addendum specifying the corollary resource requirements, presented on 27 October, just three days before Resolution 1325 was adopted, the Secretary-General provided a more elaborate rationale for creating a three person Unit:

Attention needs to be given to gender perspectives in all phases of the peace support operations, beginning with needs assessment missions through post-conflict peace-building. Gender perspectives should be considered in analyses, policy and strategy development and planning of peace support operations, as well as training programmes and instruments developed to support effective implementation of those operations, such as guidelines, handbooks and codes

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107 The posts were to include a D-1 level senior gender adviser, a P-4 level general adviser, and an administrative assistant.
of conduct. All aspects and all levels of peace support operations require attention to gender perspectives, including political analysis, military operations, civilian police activities, electoral assistance, human rights support, humanitarian assistance, including for refugees and displaced persons, development and reconstruction activities and public information. Training of troops and civilian police on gender issues is critical. In the context of complex missions where interim governments will be established, gender balance in interim bodies and development of capacity within those bodies to work with gender perspectives need to be considered. Experience has shown that it is important to ensure attention to gender perspectives from the very outset of peace-building and peacekeeping missions, including through incorporation in the initial mandates. All reports on individual missions to the Security Council should include explicit routine reporting on progress in integrating gender perspectives as well as information on the number and levels of women involved in all aspects of the mission. (UN Secretary General 2000, 27)

By this time, Resolution 1325 had already been adopted and similarly underscored the urgent need for gender mainstreaming. Subsequently, the Secretary-General’s proposals were reviewed by two UN Committees responsible for making recommendations regarding budget allocations from the UN’s general support account for financing UN peacekeeping operations. In its report of 4 December 2000, the 147 members of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (SPKO), the only UN body mandated to review all issues relating to the management and operation of peacekeeping missions,\(^{108}\) added its imprimatur to the Secretary-General’s proposals (UN General Assembly 2000c).

However, four days later, the UN's Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), a 16 member ‘independent’ Advisory Committee composed of individuals selected on the broad basis of expertise and geographic representation, rejected the Secretary-General's proposal in its entirety (UN General Assembly 2000d). Of the 249 positions and resource requirements proposed by the Secretary-General to implement the Brahimi Panel's recommendations, totalling $22,202,900, the ACABQ rejected only four posts. Three of these constituted the proposed Gender Unit.\(^{109}\)

In the following June of 2001, the Secretary-General made a second request for dedicated resources on gender issues within DPKO, this time in the context of a report, requested by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations on "the findings of the

\(^{108}\) The Security Council PKO also provides supervisory oversight of the DPKO. Its members are mostly past or current troop contributors.

\(^{109}\) Although both the Secretary-General and the Panel recommended that headquarters support for peacekeeping should be funded primarily through the regular United Nations budget, funding for these posts was requested from the Support Account, which has to be justified on a post-by-post basis every year.
first in-depth and comprehensive managerial examination of the way in which the organisation deploys, conducts and supports peacekeeping operations" (UN General Assembly 2001a, 45–46). In the report, he reiterated his conviction about the need for additional resources in DPKO to carry forward the recommendations made by external review board members, SCR 1325, the SCPKO, the Windhoek Declaration and Namibia Plan of Action. In a concession, the Secretary-General significantly reduced his request, from a three person Unit in the Office of the Under Secretary-General, and headed by a D1, to ‘a few gender experts’ in DPKO’s strategic planning unit; his argument was that DPKO had no dedicated resources for addressing gender issues and that OSAGI could not provide this support because her role is not operational.

After receiving the SCPKO’s endorsement for his new proposal (UN General Assembly 2001b, 12), the Secretary-General resubmitted his request to the ACABQ, asking for a P-5 Senior Gender Adviser in the Best Practices Unit, a P-3 professional post and one General Service position. His rationale was that the Senior Gender adviser would provide technical advice and expertise to the Under-Secretary General, and develop guidelines and gender mainstreaming tools. The Unit would help ensure more effective interaction and cooperation with OSAGI and UNIFEM (this was the first time that UNIFEM was referenced). The requested support officer would undertake research and data collection and disseminate best practices (UN General Assembly 2001c, 13–14).

Consistent with the Brahimi recommendations, the goal was to provide gender expertise in areas where the Department of Peacekeeping Operations did not have primary responsibility or dedicated units, such as humanitarian affairs; peace-building activities; public information; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; human rights; and, security and safety of personnel (UN Security Council 2000d).

The following year, the ACABQ rejected the Secretary-General's proposal for a second time, and called for the development of a coherent policy in the Secretariat regarding the role of departments and organisational units on gender issues:

…The Committee has already questioned the rationale for establishing another gender unit in the Secretariat (see A/55/676, para. 44), stressing the need for better collaboration and coordination with the existing Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women and the Division for the Advancement of Women. The Committee is therefore not in a position to recommend the establishment of additional posts for this purpose…The Committee urges the development of a coherent policy and, in that context, it would consider a request for additional resources either in the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues or elsewhere. (UN General Assembly 2001d, para. 33)
The ACABQ was not able to understand why a unit in DPKO was needed when OSAGI provided overall policy guidance.

Throughout 2001, the political support for creating a gender unit in DPKO intensified. The Security Councilʼs presidential statement adopted on SCR 1325ʼs first anniversary went as far as welcoming the Secretary-General’s specific proposals aimed at strengthening the Best Practices Unit of DPKO with the appointment of gender advisers at sufficiently senior levels (UN Security Council 2001a). Almost every statement made at the Security Council meeting reaffirmed the need for this capacity and expressed concern about the absence of staffing and support for gender mainstreaming at headquarters and in the field. Four months later, the SCPKO echoed this concern and provided its third and most specific endorsement of the Secretary-General's proposals, highlighting DPKO's need for greater gender capacity (UN General Assembly 2002d).

Six months later, the Secretary-General made his third request for DPKO staff support, this time reducing his proposal even further, from three positions to a single gender adviser at a mid-professional level. He clarified that OSAGIʼs role was to provide advice and support, but that it did not have responsibility for gender mainstreaming in DPKO. Rather, he stated that DPKO needed to develop its own capacity to support its missions and provide technical support for gender advisers and units working within peace operations (UN General Assembly 2002e, 11–13).

Just as the ACABQ continued to challenge the merits of gender expertise within the secretariat, it also challenged the deployment of gender advisers in UN peace operations. In February 2002, the ACABQ rejected a request for a six-person gender unit in the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo headed by a D-1 (it approved a P-5 and P-3), while it accepted a proposed Child Protection unit with 18 posts, headed by a D-1. In explaining its position, the Committee notes:

the [Gender] Unit would provide guidance on “mainstreaming gender issues into the mandate and activities of the various components of the Mission; and to design and monitor “implementation of policies and programmes on those issues” and act as “the primary focal point for gender. In the Committee’s opinion, the proposed functions of the Unit are too vague and appear not to be directly related to the substantive mandate of the Mission and its administrative support structure requirements. In paragraph 33 of its report on the implementation of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/56/478), the Committee inter alia urged the development of a coherent policy with respect to the role of departments and organizational units on gender issues. (UN General Assembly 2002f, 7–8)

In contrast, the child protection adviser mandate was considered acceptable: “to monitor
and report systematically the conduct of the parties to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo” (Ibid.,). The Committee only requested that cooperation between UNICEF and MONUC be better explained in its subsequent report.

Several months later, in May 2002, the ACABQ rejected the Secretary-General’s greatly neutered proposal for a third time, despite having ’exchanged views with the representatives of the Secretary-General’: According to a source briefed on the discussion:

Apparently DPKO said in their briefing to ACABQ they didn't really know what they wanted which is a pity because the Special Committee is sending clear policy direction, squandered for the moment it would seem. The 5th apparently does see why a Gender Unit is needed but needs to be convinced of WHAT it would do. ACABQ now understand the difference between gender equality and mainstreaming, but need a lot more work done on them. ACABQ is apparently fearful that the DPKO is recreating a mini-UN, with a variety of capacities, including information etc, and that this Gender Unit is absorbing the role of the [OSAGI] office ….US and Japan both have direction from capitals that the gender unit should be in OSAGI.110

DPKO’s perspective was likely one of genuine confusion and scepticism about the concept of ‘gender mainstreaming’. In a personal prequel delivered to the Security Council, Jean-Marie Guehenno, the Under Secretary-General of the DPKO, appointed only one month prior to the adoption of Resolution 1325, explained:

…when I first arrived as the Head of the DPKO almost two years ago, I sensed from various quarters some scepticism about the dialogue about gender mainstreaming. Many appeared to misperceive it as a superficial exercise in political correctness. I should confess that I was not always immune from this misperception. …Put simply, the adoption of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) has precipitated a change in preconceptions and it is natural that his process of change can sometimes be slow, face setbacks and scepticism. Inevitably, however misguided cynicism will be overtaken by the facts. It is only a matter of time.111

The ACABQ remained unconvinced by the rationale offered for the Unit and reiterated the need for a more coherent policy. It rejected the Secretary General’s proposal for fourth time (UN General Assembly 2002i, para. 24).

By this time, a number of Fifth Committee delegates began to express their disappointment publicly but stopped short of rejecting the ACABQ’s advice. Spain (on behalf of the European Union and associated States), while expressing support for the post’s establishment, also expressed disappointment that “the Secretariat had been unable

110 (F-NG1), email message to author, 12 May 2002)
to properly describe the role and activities of the proposed P-5 Senior Gender Adviser”. Canada expressed its frustration that the issue was “going from committee to committee” and agreed that it was time to “clarify the purpose and function of such capacity and to outline exactly how the UN was going to implement it” (Ibid).

Following the Fifth Committee’s report (UN General Assembly 2002g), the General Assembly adopted a resolution asking the Secretary-General to develop a coherent policy on gender mainstreaming in all of the Organization’s peacekeeping activities. It would take seven months before the Secretary-General would submit this report, which was carried out by a consultant recruited by OSAGI and funded by Canada. In the meantime, the Security Council had marked two ‘anniversaries’ of Resolution 1325, devoting an entire presidential statement to the importance of gender mainstreaming and the need for sufficiently senior staff at headquarters and in the field:

The Security Council, reaffirming the importance of gender mainstreaming in peacekeeping operations and post-conflict reconstruction, undertakes to integrate gender perspectives into the mandates of all peacekeeping missions, and reiterates its request to the Secretary-General to ensure that all reports submitted to the Security Council in accordance with such mandates systematically address gender perspectives. The Council also requests the Secretary-General to provide systematic training of all staff in peacekeeping operations on gender perspectives, and to integrate gender perspectives into all standard operating procedures, manuals and other guidance materials for peacekeeping operations. The Security Council considers that the appointment of gender advisers at sufficiently senior levels at Headquarters is necessary. The Council notes that some progress has been made in gender mainstreaming at mission level, specifically through the establishment of gender units and gender advisers, but that more remains to be done in order to ensure that gender mainstreaming in peacekeeping operations and post-conflict reconstruction is thorough and effective, and applied systematically. The Security Council undertakes to integrate gender perspectives into the terms of reference of its visits and Missions to countries and regions in conflict. To that end, the Council requests the Secretary-General to establish a database of gender specialists as well as women’s groups and networks in countries and regions in conflict, and to include gender specialists in the teams where relevant. (UN Security Council 2002b, 1)

It was not until February of the following year that the Secretary-General submitted his proposed policy on gender mainstreaming in peacekeeping activities (UN General Assembly 2003a). The 17-page report addressed a broad range of issues from disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration to mine action, but provided no substantive references or context relating the functions of the unit to the goals of the Brahimi Panel or

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the Security Council's related work on CAC or POC. Instead, it refers only to the Security Council’s resolutions and statements on women and the reports of the Secretary-General and the SCPKO that had already identified the need for stronger gender mainstreaming capacity in peace operations.

The report calls for policies, strategies and approaches that will help achieve the policy’s central objective, which is defined as gender equality, rather than peace and security. The policy calls for gender analysis and identifies, in conceptual terms, how conflict shapes women’s security risks and needs. Its recommendations call for various DPKO initiatives, such as public information programmes, to address the needs of women as well as men, for example by “understanding the gender-specific norms and customs within the host society”, proposing that this can be facilitated by “regular contact with local women and their organizations.” The policy also identifies opportunities to establish principles of equality, for example, in constitutional reform processes or in the conduct of elections (Ibid.).

Although the Secretary-General’s original proposal sought to establish a gender unit, this final policy request prepared by OSAGI requests funding for a single post at a P-5 level. In 2003, the ACABQ finally accepted the Secretary-General’s request for a post, but demoted it to the P-4 level. The Committee restated its objection in establishing "yet another gender unit in the Secretariat" and, instead of creating a new unit, recommended better collaboration and coordination between DPKO and OSAGI (UN General Assembly 2000d, 7).

4.4 Conclusion

While it (only) required agreement among 15 member states to adopt SCR 1325, institutionalising the resolution requires far more than agreement among far more than the UN’s 163 member states. Even the UN’s two gender mechanisms could not agree on a common framework for implementation. The lack of a coherent gender policy was an insurmountable obstacle, and the strategy of gender mainstreaming had no resonance with the ambitious peacekeeping reform strategy that the UN adopted only a month before SCR 1325, and for which some $22 million was committed and more than 400 new posts created.

A central challenge was, and continues to be how to ‘translate’ the concept of gender mainstreaming and a ‘gender perspective’ into the kind of political and technical language and policy that guides the UN’s actions in peace building. The most central actors in the
process, DPKO, and ACABQ, were focused on operational, strategic and tactical priorities ranging from strategic planning and logistics support, to the role of civilian police, civilian specialists and mission support for civil administration. Meanwhile, case making for a small gender unit in DPKO emphasised the need for a ‘gender perspective’ in the UN’s work and the goal of gender equality. The misunderstanding on both sides of this discursive dissonance continues to plague implementation efforts and may explain why ‘counting’ the number of women in a resolution or at the peace table becomes the single indicator that both languages understand. This is problematic for many reasons including the absence of any empirical evidence that equates women’s participation in peace building with gender equality outcomes (Seckinelgin and Klot 2013).

The UN’s gender mechanisms had no institutional mandate to engage in the fora in which peacekeeping and humanitarian policies and doctrine are debated; nor did they have the operational capacity, resources, or experience to identify gaps in the UN’s institutional arrangements. The opportunity to do this was not optimised; OSAGI’s vision for implementing SCR 1325 was created by the key entities that have failed women. Although UNIFEM’s approach reflected the perspectives of women in conflict situations, it did not map onto the UN’s peace and security architecture.

The UN’s strategy for implementing SCR 1325 evolved from an inter-agency process that focused inwards rather than on the working methods at the Security Council's disposal or the various entities the Resolution calls upon. Although this approach may, to some extent, have ameliorated General Assembly concerns about the Security Council’s encroachment on its mandate, it also may have diminished the Security Council’s ownership of its responsibility for implementation. By contextualising the implementation of Resolution 1325 within the UN’s agenda for the advancement of women (ECOSOC’s responsibility) instead of the Security Council’s mandate, the ACABQ continued to question the relevance of these issues to the Security Council and DPKO.

Even with demonstrable political support from the Council, the Secretary-General, DPKO leadership and many member states, the UN’s gender mechanisms had no obvious – i.e. bureaucratic or political channel through which they could engage with the entirety of the UN’s peace and security architecture and fashion a shared understanding about a vision for SCR 1325 that recognises the opportunities and constraints within which UN peace operations function. The Secretary-General’s early strategy to incorporate SCR 1325’s implementation into the Brahimi reform process sought to weave a new political commitment into an existing and widely supported process. By associating SCR 1325 with
Brahimi’s agenda, the modest request for a three person Unit, out of a proposed 400, might have been celebrated, welcomed or even gone unnoticed. The Brahimi Panel recommendations provided a policy and funding pathway through the UN’s peace and security architecture, directly into the heart of the design, policy and planning for UN peace operations. Yet this approach was abandoned, and ‘gender mainstreaming’ once again failed to deliver much more than process.

While the ACABQ’s resistance to gender mainstreaming may have reflected their insensitivity, incomprehension or even resistance to gender issues, it also reflected the longstanding concerns over policy coherence within the Secretariat, and the broader debates between ECOSOC and the Security Council over the constitutional powers of the UN’s principal organs. DPKO’s resistance also reflected scepticism about the concept and its practical application to the all-consuming reform efforts that were already underway. The absence of gender analysis in the Brahimi Report and the lack of support for the proposed gender unit may have also reflected the relative scarcity of gender expertise, ‘knowledge’ and feminist engagement with the military and operational dimensions of peacekeeping that were evolving in real time. As discussed in Chapter 2, the field of ‘gender and peace building’ was relatively new with little in the way of gender expertise, knowledge or feminist engagement in the very specific operational, structural, political and military aspects addressed in the Panel’s report.

Ultimately, the considerable challenges associated with a gender mainstreaming strategy for institutionalising SCR 1325 raise important questions about the role of structure and agency in seeking to advance gender issues within the UN. I agree fully with the conclusions of the UN's Office of Internal Oversight regarding the shortfalls in gender mainstreaming as a strategy for achieving gender equality. The report concludes that the missing or weak links between structures and processes and their results are so significant that gender mainstreaming itself poses a risk to the UN's reputation:

The shortfall identified by OIOS were in practice rather than policy, and the Office is of the opinion that the lack of alignment between policy and practice poses a risk to the reputation of the United Nations, which has committed to and has promoted gender mainstreaming as a strategy for achieving gender equality. OIOS concludes that, if commitment to gender mainstreaming is to be reinforced and action is to be more visible and effective, the focus needs to shift from processes to results. Reinvigoration of the Secretariat’s approach will be needed if it is to deliver on its commitment and generate visible results. The formation of the new gender entity is an opportunity for such reinvigoration. (UN General Assembly 2010, 2)
The obstacles to implementing SCR 1325 have been significant. However scant attention has been given to understanding and navigating the institutional, political and bureaucratic challenges within the UN that are central in determining how resources are allocated, policies developed, and made operational. Without this, SCR 1325’s potential to catalyse meaningful change remains under explored.
Chapter 5

From Peace Agreement to Mandate: Whither gender?

Despite the conspicuous absence of attention given to gender issues in Liberia’s peace process and in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed on 17 August 2003, the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was the first in which the UN Secretary-General proposed gender issues as a discrete component.\textsuperscript{114} Although the Security Council’s mandate for the Mission did not specify the need for dedicated gender capacity (UN Security Council 2003c), a Gender Advisory Unit was approved by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ); the same committee (discussed in Chapter 4) that refused to approve a single senior gender advisor in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, despite repeated requests by the Security Council and the UN Secretary-General.

While the UN played only a tertiary role in Liberia’s peace process, none of the key actors involved, including the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL) ever acknowledged SCR 1325’s existence, or its explicit call to all parties involved in negotiating peace agreements to adopt a gender perspective.\textsuperscript{115} The sole reference to SCR 1325 during the Accra negotiations was made in the context of a Liberian women’s conference convened by UNIFEM at the margins of the meeting, in the Golden Tulip Hotel in Accra, Ghana, just days before the CPA was signed.\textsuperscript{116}

However, neither the Liberian women’s peace movement nor the UN’s gender architecture were significant actors in shaping how gender issues would be reflected in the CPA. Although women’s peace movements in the region and in Liberia were very active in the peace process, SCR 1325 was not their calling card, nor did they organise around a ‘women’s agenda’. Rather, Liberian women influenced the negotiations, not as delegates,

\textsuperscript{114} The Security-General included the establishment of a gender unit in his proposed concept of operation, outlined in his Report to the Security Council (S/2003/875), 11 September 2003.

\textsuperscript{115} The ten member ICGL was established in New York in 2002, co-chaired by ECOWAS and the EU, as a vehicle for engaging the international community. Its members include the UN, ECOWAS, the African Union, the World Bank, the US, Ghana, Nigeria, the UK, Germany, and Sweden.

\textsuperscript{116} SCR 1325/OP8 specifies the special needs of women and girls during repatriation, resettlement and rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction; to support local women's peace initiatives; to involve women in all implementation mechanisms and to ensure the protection and respect for human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the judiciary.
but primarily from outside of the meeting halls through their highly visible appeals to the 
warring factions to reach an agreement.

Despite the strength of women’s peace movements in the Manu River Region, and the 
UN’s visible commitment to implement SCR 1325, I argue that the strategic interests of 
ECOWAS and the US were more significant in determining how, when and which women 
and gender issues would be considered in the peace process. By the same token, the UN's 
leading role in designing UNMIL's mandate also provided new opportunities to redress 
their earlier inaction. I conclude that the distinct lack of interconnectedness between these 
two processes (the peace negotiations and the design of UNMIL’s mandate) as well as the 
UN’s limited engagement in the region more generally, both negatively impacted and 
limited the potential for the CPA and UNMIL’s mandate to be more responsive and 
supportive of Liberian women’s peace initiatives and interests.

In this chapter, I identify some of the key opportunities and obstacles for bringing 
women and a gender perspective into Liberia’s peace negotiations, and the design and 
implementation of UNMIL's mandate. Although my case analysis in Chapter 6 focuses on 
the deployment of the -female formed police unit (FFPU) in 2007, I use this Chapter to 
provide a framework for the case analysis, focusing on key actors and processes that were 
significant in shaping UNMIL’s mandate and responsiveness to SCR1325. I therefore rely 
primarily on UN documents and secondary sources, drawing from a rich body of literature 
regarding the role of regional organisations in UN peacekeeping;\textsuperscript{117} as well as a 
considerable body of policy-oriented literature about the implementation of SCR 1325 in 
Liberia in relation to sexual violence, sexual exploitation and abuse, disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration.\textsuperscript{118}

The first section provides a brief analysis of the contextual factors shaping the UN’s 
engagement in Liberia, focusing on the role of ECOWAS and individual Security Council 
members. My aim is to understand how external factors shape the overall potential for UN 
leadership in implementing SCR 1325. Section two examines the disconnects between the 
UN’s approach in implementing SCR 1325 during the peace negotiations, and the 
strategies advanced by Liberian women peace activists. In section three, I critically assess 

\textsuperscript{117} For example, (Adebajo 2002b; Adebajo 2003; 'Funmi Olonisakin 1996; Jaye 2003; Nichols 2005; 
Kihunah 2005; Tardy 2011; Malan 2005; Boås 2009; Johnstone et al. 2003; Breakey and Dekker 2014)
\textsuperscript{118} For example, (Gizelis, Theodora-Ismene; Joseph 2013; Abramowitz and Moran 2012; Amnesty 
Caesar et al. 2010; Bacon 2013; Sanghera, Henry, and Higate 2008; Massaquoi 2007; Gizelis 2013; Ekiyor 
and Wanyeki 2008)
how the CPA shaped opportunities to advance SCR 1325 in its designation of areas where
the UN’s assistance was and was not requested. Section four looks at the processes and
actors that were most significant in determining how gender issues were ultimately
incorporated into the design of UNMIL’s mandate, the concept of operation,
implementation plan and first year budget. Chapter 6 looks at how these early
commitments were made operational in what became one of the largest UN peace missions
in history, and the factors leading to the deployment of the first all-female Indian formed
police unit.

5.1 Delegation, Relegation, and Ambivalence: The UN’s Approach to Liberia’s
Civil War
Up until Liberia’s 14th ceasefire and peace agreement was negotiated in Accra, Ghana in
2003, the UN’s involvement in Liberia has been described (by most accounts), as
“minimalist at best and ambivalent at worst” (Aboagye and Bah 2005, 99). Despite
appeals from many countries in West Africa for Security Council intervention as early as
1989, Liberia became a formal item on the Security Council's agenda in January 1991,
more than a year after Charles Taylor's attack on Sierra Leone and the uprising against
Samuel Doe’s regime. This marked the beginning of a mass exodus of Liberians to
neighbouring countries and more than two decades of civil war throughout the region.
Absent international engagement, and deeply concerned about the security risks and
humanitarian crisis that threatened the entire sub-region, ECOWAS authorised its first
regional peacekeeping operation in 1990, the ECOWAS Monitoring and Observer Group
(ECOMOG). Under Nigerian leadership, ECOMOG's mandate was to monitor Liberia's
first ceasefire, restore law and order, and create the conditions necessary for elections.
It would take another two years before the UN Security Council did anything more
than issue statements and resolutions that would go unheeded. The Security Council’s first
meaningful action on Liberia took place in 1993, with the establishment of the UN
Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL).119 Much has been written about UNOMIL,
although not for its impact, but rather its distinction as the first UN co-deployment with a
regional peace operation. This marked the beginning of a significant increase in the

119 Security Council Resolution (S/RES/866) established UNOMIL. Very little has been written about the
UN’s Peace building office in Liberia (UNOL) established in 1998. UNOL was tasked with helping deliver
post-war reconstruction and assistance but was considered an apologist for the regime (Hayner 2007). ICG
describes the UN office as a part of broader (and ineffective) strategy of engagement that sought to
incentivise accountability through development aid and humanitarian support. In time, donors pulled their
funds due to the atrocities being committed (International Crisis Group 2002b, 5).
Security Council’s cooperation with regional organisations. At the time, the Security Council was likely energised by the debates surrounding UN Secretary-General Boutros Ghali’s Report and Supplement, ‘An Agenda for Peace: preventive diplomacy, peace making and peacekeeping’ (UN Security Council 1992):

Boutros Boutros Ghali used his reports to the Security Council as a strategic tool to shape its debates and influence its decisions. Many of his reports were also clearly designed to speak to the relevant parties involved. More public was Boutros-Ghali’s attempt to shape the broader debate on the Security Council and its work, through his report ‘An Agenda for Peace’. Following its first-ever summit at the level of Heads of State or Government in January 1992, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to report and expand upon the analyses and recommendations raised at the summit to strengthen the capacity of the UN for preventive diplomacy, peace-making, and peace-keeping. Boutros-Ghali not only added a fourth concept to this request—that of post-conflict peace-building; he also elevated the status of the entire document from report to agenda, launching an ongoing process of internal debate and reflection, rather new to the UN. (Bailey and Daws 1998)

After the 1997 elections in Liberia that brought Charles Taylor to power, ECOMOG extended its mandate to neighbouring Sierra Leone and ousted Taylor supported rebels, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). Shortly after this, in 1998, Taylor rejected a provision of the peace accord calling for ECOMOG to train a new national army and the conflict resumed again in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Months later in January 1999, Taylor and the RUF led a searing attack on ECOMOG troops in Sierra Leone, after which Nigeria threatened to withdraw its forces. It was only then that the UN established its first Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in November 1999 (Adebajo 2002a). In May 2000, UN forces were attacked and several hundred UN troops were abducted by the RUF. It took a dramatic intervention by 800 British paratroopers in May 2000 to capture Foday Sankoh, RUF’s founding leader, and several more years before peace was restored (Connolly 2012).

The UN’s next most consequential initiative, in 2001, was to impose sanctions on Liberia. Characterised by the International Crisis Group (ICG) as a ‘US and British diplomatic offensive’, they significantly weakened Taylor’s finances, access to weapons and, consequently, his hold on power (International Crisis Group 2002a, 5). Without a

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120 Taylor considered Nigerian led ECOMOG to be partial given its previous attack on Taylor’s leadership (Adebajo 2002c).
121 The ICG is a private international organisation of political analysts and field researchers. ICG participated as observers in the Accra negotiations and their analysis draws from first hand interviews with key actors in the negotiations, including the various parties in the conflict.
monitoring mechanism and sensitive to the longstanding economic interests of some Security Council members, however, the sanctions were only selectively enforced. Arms continued to flow within the region and timber exports and maritime interests were not significantly affected.\footnote{For example, the US had established the Liberian Maritime Registry in 1948 - the 2\textsuperscript{nd} largest in the world - and, as a wholly US owned and operated company (headquartered in the US), was responsible for 1/3 of oil shipments to the US. In 2002, the French had some 40\% of the timber contracts and were supporters of Taylor’s francophone West African allies. Similarly, a British company, Sandline violated UN Security Council sanctions on Sierra Leone in 1997, to provide weapons and logistical support to oust president Kabbah’s allies. All figures cited in (International Crisis Group 2002a)}

A number of reasons explain the UN’s reticence. These range from its already over extended commitments, such as some 14 deployments already underway, to concerns on the part of some Security Council members over Liberia’s sovereignty. However, most analysts point to the failures of US leadership. Many Liberians, its neighbouring countries, and ECOWAS looked to the US for leadership since Liberia was the one African country with which it has deep, historical ties.

The only African country that was ‘colonised' by the US, by former African American slaves and captives freed from British and American slave ships, the US response to Liberia’s unfolding tragedy was considered far too little and too late. Liberia's Americo-Liberian minority, dominated the indigenous populations for more than 130 years through a governance system modelled on the US and supported by US economic and strategic interests. This small ruling class institutionalised its economic, social and political domination through the disenfranchisement of indigenous Liberians, discriminatory property laws, and forced labour (Ellis 2006; Woodson and Maugham 1921; Adebajo 2002a). According to Abiodun Alao, “Liberians who identified with Americans more than they did with their West African neighbours were traumatized by the United States’ apparent lack of interest in the conflict in the initial stages” (Alao, 1999 p.25-26 1999).

From 1941 to 1989, the US provided most of the training and materiel for the Armed Forces of Liberia and was a strategic partner during the Cold War, hosting US intelligence and satellite networks, a Voice of America relay station and the Omega Navigational System (International Crisis Group 2002a, 33). Heavily dependent on US investment and aid, Liberia's growing economic crisis in the 1970s was influenced directly by the US depression and declining exports of rubber and iron ore. It was also fuelling social unrest and poverty and, ultimately, the overthrow of the Tolbert regime by US backed Samuel...
Doe.\textsuperscript{123} Over time, and in the aftermath of the 1985 attempted coup against him, Doe’s repressive regime further intensified divisions among more than 18 ethnic groups and became increasingly brutal in its exercise of power and violent attacks against civilians. However, US strategic interests in Liberia dropped precipitously after the Cold War, and US economic investments in West Africa began to shift to Guinea where American firms had the majority of foreign contracts. Although Guinea’s repressive leadership had even less democratic legitimacy than Taylor, it did have the world’s second large reserves of bauxite and more diamonds than Sierra Leone and Liberia combined (Ibid.).

US unwillingness to play a leadership role in ending the carnage in Liberia has also been explained as a residual reaction to US failures in Somalia and to its growing commitment in Iraq and Afghanistan (International Crisis Group 2003). In an interview, Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs under the Reagan administration, commented:

The debate raging within the administration on what to do in Liberia is occurring against the background of recent U.S. history in Africa. Since the deaths of 18 U.S. soldiers in Somalia in 1993, he says, “the United States has turned away from African crises. We have used some of our diplomacy, but we haven’t been willing to use any of our muscle; even, in some cases, we have been unwilling to authorize others to use their muscle. It explains the catastrophe that occurred in Rwanda in 1994 and the debacle in the Congo since 1996.” U.S. allies, and most Africans, he says, are now looking to the United States for leadership on the Liberia crisis. (CFR 2003 p.1)

Divisions within the US over Liberia created a political vacuum within the Security Council. Absent US and (therefore) UN leadership and a growing regional crisis, a ten member International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL) was established in 2002 outside of the Council, co-chaired by ECOWAS and the EU. Its members included the UN, ECOWAS, the African Union (AU) as well as the World Bank, the US, Ghana, Nigeria, the UK, Germany, and Sweden. According to the ICG:

The deepest underlying currents of the Mano River War are competitions between Libya and France and US and the British agenda for West Africa. A sustainable solution will require the buy in of all these powers into a common vision for long-term stability in Liberia … The search for that common position must begin in Paris, London and Washington, with a way a found to bring Tripoli along as well (International Crisis Group 2002a, 27).

The ICG explain further:

\textsuperscript{123} Between 1980-1985, the US Government had provided close to $500 million to the Doe regime (International Crisis Group 2002a).
Even from a narrow definition of its national interests, the US missed an opportunity. It had a chance to demonstrate, at a time when Liberia was receiving unprecedented media attention, that it could help restore peace and transform the political outlook in a corner of the world where “Uncle Sam” remains highly popular. Even Liberia’s warring factions revere the U.S. As former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Walter Kansteiner acknowledged, “U.S. actions would...represent for [the] U.S. a memorable foreign policy success story”. The Pentagon, however, viewed Liberia in the light of its distressing experience in Somalia in 1993 and misjudged the situation. Washington should have taken a leaf from the British script in Sierra Leone, where a highly theatrical (but militarily limited) intervention in the capital and its environs, including a demonstration of airpower and an ‘over the horizon’ strike force, gave an impression of readiness to fight, served as a powerful psychological tool, and thus transformed the political situation. Like the British rapid deployment, U.S. boots on the ground would have had a massive psychological effect. (International Crisis Group 2003, 13)

US indecisiveness would end up becoming the most significant factor in determining the trajectory of Liberia’s conflict and the international community's response. As UNMIL’s lead donor and Liberia’s most significant aid partner, US inaction would become the primary determinant of the timing and scope of deployment, humanitarian assistance, and Liberia’s governance capacity. Although the US played an increasingly supportive role later on, even demonstrating leadership in advancing SCR 1325 at the UN and in its own foreign policy, the disagreements between the Pentagon and the US State Department regarding Liberia's strategic priority, created a more complicated pathway for advancing SCR 1325 in the context of the Liberia’s peace process. More specifically, the lead role of the US in implementing the CPA and in reforming/restructuring the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) would become consequential for the broader process of security sector reform (SSR) and therefore directly influence how the UN would carry out its mandate with respect to policing and the protection of civilians.

ECOWAS was the primary driver of Liberia’s peace process and it was only in 2003, just before the Accra negotiations, that the Security Council held its first thematic debate on its cooperation with regional organisations. Remarkably, however, none of the Security Council's discussions on this topic mention SCR 1325’s relevance; and neither does SCR 1325 or the UN’s SCR 1325 implementation plan refer to regional organisations. Each of these factors would have a direct bearing on UNMIL’s ability to carry out its protection mandate and develop strategies for implementing SCR 1325.

In sum, the UN’s engagement in particular country situations is shaped significantly by its permanent members and especially those with historical ties to the country or region.
in question, or strategic and economic interests. In the case of Liberia, the Security Council deferred to the US and, absent US leadership, supported the creation of a separate entity, the ICGL – a group of ‘interested states’ (including the UN and ECOWAS) to lead the UN’s strategy. Although the General Assembly and the UN Secretary-General had previously attempted to introduce Liberia onto the Security Council’s agenda, the UN was not a lead actor in the peace process from a humanitarian, political, or human rights perspective.

The independent initiative of the SRSG for Children and Armed Conflict to raise children’s issues in Liberia and Sierra Leone attracted independent donors and political support for this agenda. Meanwhile, there were no such political actors representing women’s interests, and it was only in 2004 that UNIFEM opened an office in Monrovia, staffed by one senior adviser. Absent any political support for their efforts, Liberian women peacemakers forged their own way into the peace process. In the next section, I look at Liberian women’s strategies for engaging in the peace process.

5.2 Liberian Women Peacemakers and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement

Liberian women’s participation in the peace process is heralded for helping bring the negotiating parties to an agreement in Accra, in August 2003 (Cooper 2012; Fuest 2008; Moran 2007; Gizelis, Theodora-Ismene; Joseph 2013). The iconic image of Liberian women in white t-shirts emblazoned with 'PEACE', forming a human barricade outside of the conference hall to prevent warring parties from leaving before reaching an agreement came to symbolise the obstacles women face in peace processes: getting in the door; having a seat at the table; and, using their moral authority as mothers and victims. The portrayal of Liberian men was equally iconic: warlords negotiating their plunder over cell phones by wreaking havoc from the safety of their hotel rooms, protected by UN security, and watching what Liberians refer to as World War I, II and III on CNN (Hayner 2007).

Although much has been written about the dangers of reinscribing these stereotypical imaginaries, much less has been written about how often women’s peace movements do not advance gender-specific demands. This was the case in Liberia.

Shortly after the CPA was signed, in November 2003 the UN’s Division for the Advancement of Women convened an Expert Group Meeting on ‘Peace agreements as a means for promoting gender equality and ensuring participation of women - A framework of model provisions’ in Canada. The issues discussed at the meeting, in areas ranging from mediation to security and human rights, were not considered in the context of the
Both the substantive and implementation articles of the CPA lacked sufficient attention to gender issues and there were no specific references to women associated with armed groups or gender-specific crimes. With respect to children, however, the CPA drew attention to child soldiers and named both the SRSG and UNICEF as implementation actors, solidifying their political mandate to engage in the process and to raise funds.

In principle, thematic Security Council resolutions such as SCR 1325 and those on children and the protection of civilians, are expected to inform the actions of all UN member states. Yet although SCR 1325 was adopted three years before the Liberian Comprehensive Peace agreement, it was never referred to by the mediators and negotiators, the funders, the parties to the conflict, and virtually none of its provisions were taken into account in the content, conduct of the negotiations or in the agreement itself. Many would attribute the CPA's failure to include gender issues and women in its substantive and implementation articles to the absence of gender expertise and women’s participation in the peace process. To be clear, Liberian women did not advocate for an agenda that focused on their own interests as a specific constituency. Instead, they derived their moral authority from their neutrality as peace advocates, unaligned with any political party or warring faction. The former director of the Association of Female Lawyers of Liberia (AFELL), Lois Bruthus, contends that women who were at the Accra negotiations did not:

Represent or incorporate the views of the majority of the women's organizations either individually or collectively. No conclusive strategy for highlighting women's concern nor the assumption of a leadership role was formulated. The organization's strategy if any, was only to lobby and pacify the belligerent parties to bring an end to the war. (Bruthus 2003, 6)

Massa Washington, a journalist and humanitarian worker, who had appealed to ECOWAS to invite women to the 1994 Accra Clarification Conference, attributes this strategy as central to women’s success:

... my position was clear: I wanted unconditional peace for Liberia...I projected myself as a true mother and a stabilizer, using faith, discipline, courage, patience and tolerance. Those women who maintained political and or factional allegiances caused tension among the peace activists fearing accusations of partiality...women’s organizations [desired] to be seen and treated as politically neutral in their pursuit of peace. (African Women and Peace Support Group 2004, 16)

After the Federation of Liberian Women’s Organisations was banned in the 1980s, it was not until 1994 that Liberian women organised the Liberian Women’s Initiative (LWI) with the aim of engaging the political process directly. Their early contacts with donors
and other women’s groups and activists from the US, the UK and Sweden were forged in the context of the African Preparatory Conference for the UN World Conference on Women that took place in Dakar, Senegal in 1994 (Ibid.). However, in the context of the Accra negotiations, neither the Beijing Platform for Action nor SCR 1325 was invoked. Rather, women’s peace activism came directly out of their experiences in the conflict (Alaga 2011). In a needs assessment in the National Implementation of SCR 1325 in Africa, Liberia’s Minister of Gender recalled, “SCR 1325 (2000) was far from women’s minds when the war broke out in 2003. The driving force for women’s activism was the belief that something needed to be done” (Ekiyor and Wanyeki 2008). Similar views were expressed by the Liberian Women’s Initiative (LWI) and the Association of Female Lawyers of Liberia. The LWI united women through faith in a civic disarmament campaign that was convened by the Inter-Faith Mediation Council and included the Security Council of Chiefs and the Justice and Peace Commission of the Catholic Church.

Given the interconnectedness of the conflicts in the Mano River region and the widespread displacement of Liberians in all border countries, women’s activism also drew from and reflected the concerns of the significant numbers of displaced and refugee women. In 2000, working through networks of diaspora, Liberians and community relief organisations in refugee communities in Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia, women activists from three countries formed the Mano River Union Women Peace Network (MARWOPNET).124 Advocacy focused initially on the conflict between Guinea and Liberia at the level of heads of state and, on Liberia, MARWOPNET worked through ECOWAS. Again, without SCR 1325 in hand or the support of any UN interlocutors, LWI delegations met directly with US officials and Nigerian Ambassadors, the Organisation of African Unity, the UN’s Special Representative and the ECOMOG field commander (African Women and Peace Support Group 2004).

Sharing much in common with the women's peace movements involved in 1325's genesis, women peace activists in Liberia and the region focused primarily on disarmament and ending the brutal conflict. Disarmament was always a central priority, even over repatriation and resettlement, “All of the demonstrations organized by LWI, the Women’s Development Association of Liberia and other women’s organizations…were based on the

124 I have not attempted to provide a full account of Liberian women’s activism or the history of women’s status and roles in Liberia; my limited aim in this chapter is to compare their strategies with those of the UN. For much more comprehensive assessments regarding the contributions of LWI, MARWOPNET and WIPNET, see for example (Mccarthy 2011; Moran 2007; Johnson 2011; Neill and Ward 2005; Diop 2005; Kindervater 2013; Alaga 2011; Njoki Wamai et al. 2011; F. Olonisakin, Barnes, and Ikpe 2011).
shared demand for peace, disarmament and good governance” (Bruthus 2003 4). Although more than one third of the participants in the 2002 Regional Conference on Security Reconciliation and Peace in Liberia were female, the conference Position Statement made no mention of any gender issues or a women’s platform.125 Interestingly, the Security Council’s first recognition of women’s roles in peace building in the region was made in the context of these regional activities.126

Without any formal UN interlocutors, Liberian women used their own ways and means of engaging with the parties directly. MARWOPNET was invited to participate in the negotiations by the mediator himself; there had been no UN intermediaries (Nilsson 2009). Their early involvement in formal negotiations took place through factional delegations, and personal access. A number of Liberian women peacemakers refer specifically to the under-recognised role of men – including in parties and the private sector – as critical allies and, in some cases, providing finance for their travel (African Women and Peace Support Group 2004). Their strategies were similar in some respects to those advanced by ‘feminist norm entrepreneurs’ described in Chapter 3, that worked within humanitarian and peace organisations without a women’s or feminist agenda and whose access to the Security Council and its processes were largely facilitated by sympathetic male ‘door openers.’

More than one hundred women spent 75 days lobbying, advocating on the margins of the Accra negotiations, and only seven were eventually given the right to vote for the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Transitional Government. Other women’s organisations, such as the Women In Peace Network (WIPNET) and those from a nearby refugee camp, were a constant presence at the negotiations, albeit outside of the negotiating hall. Women’s organising was more closely associated with, and representative of, civil society, rather than women as an interest group:

Women were marginalized in the Accra peace negotiations, despite their physical presence...It is difficult not to agree with an early conclusion that the participation of women in the negotiation was not on the agenda of ECOWAS and the ICGL. The objective was simply to bring to an end 14 years of civil

125 Participants included four prominent activists, Mary Brownell, Founding Executive, Liberian Women’s Initiative, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, representing the Unity Party, Theresa Leigh Sherman, Executive Director of MARWOPNET, and Ruth Sando Perry, Former Chairman Collective Presidency of Liberia (15 March 2002).
126 It was in this context that the Security Council paid tribute to MARWOPNET’s contributions to regional peace efforts in Resolution1408 of 2002 extending sanctions on the Government of Liberia. Despite the awareness of MARWOPNET, Security Council members failed to include gender issues in its terms of reference for their field missions to West Africa and the Great Lakes region, in the months leading up to the negotiations.
war in Liberia. If peace for Liberia depended in the participation of Liberian women in the pourparley in Accra, the result I am convinced, from my personal standpoint would have been completely different. (Bruthus 2003, 9)

It was also a concern for the safety of their families that Liberian women peace activists focused their advocacy on the broader peace agenda. They did not want to risk possible retaliation by delegates for disagreeing with them:

Women did not seem to be free to express their views publicly to make changes to the draft agreement. This could be partly attributed to fear for their lives and those of their families that were back in Liberia. The warring factions and women at the talks often knew each other, or came from the same villages or towns in Liberia. The women could therefore talk to delegates to the Peace Talks individually in advocating for gender issues and making suggestions and recommendations on the provisions of the peace agreement. But they could not air the same views publicly in the negotiations due to fear based on a saying that “the boys can’t be humiliated in public. (UNIFEM 2003, 7)

Thus, although women were not satisfied with the Peace Agreement as it failed to address many of their concerns, they did not risk disagreeing in public.

The argument is often made by women activists in (and scholars of) the Liberian peace process, in that a more sustained and substantive engagement by women in the formal negotiations, structures and mechanisms would have resulted in substantively better outcomes for the process itself - and not only for women (Beteta et al. 2012; Chinkin 2003; Anderlini 2007; Porter 2003). Certainly, greater support for the movement might have helped sustain their momentum and clarify a vision for post-war Liberia, and to help consolidate their strategy at the negotiation:

“The participation of women at the Accra Peace negotiations was not spectacular with regard to decision making. The process leading towards the talks was spontaneous. There was no preparation in order to evolve an effective strategy to ensure the participation of women in the negotiations”(Bruthus 2003, 5).

The only formal support extended to Liberian women’s organisations during the Accra negotiations was by UNIFEM, also a marginal entity within the UN and with no operational presence in Liberia. In addition to receiving very modest support from the US Embassy, UNIFEM supported a strategic planning meeting on the margins of the Accra conference at the Golden Tulip Hotel, two days before the CPA was signed. Ruth Sando Perry chaired the meeting and the ‘Golden Tulip Declaration’ was adopted by representatives of the various Liberian Women’s Organizations at the Accra Peace Talks on Liberia on 15 August 2003 (The Golden Tulip Declaration of Liberian Women
Attending the Peace Talks in Accra 2003). The Declaration focused on women’s participation within all existing and proposed institutions including all components of the current and in-coming Liberian Government (Executive, Legislative and Judiciary) and within all structures to lead the post-conflict peace building processes.

The Golden Tulip Declaration was not recognised in the CPA and is at best a footnote in a well-chronicled history of the Accra negotiations (as compared to women’s demonstrations, their blockade and their threats to disrobe, all of which received far more media attention). The Declaration invoked the broader agenda of SCR 1325 and, significantly, marked a turning point in the emergence of an agenda focused on Liberian women. While disarmament had been the primary focus of the Liberian women’s peace movements, eight out of eleven resolutions in the Declaration called for increased women’s participation - as candidates, in peace operations, in the peace process, in implementing HIV/AIDS activities and in the context of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration processes. A ninth element called for ‘awareness and sensitisation meetings by rural and urban women, youth and combatants to lay down their arms.’ A tenth calls for ‘contacts with existing donor agencies to support skills training and micro credit programme to address humanitarian concerns.

None of the participating Liberian women’s organisations are named in the Declaration. Rather, it states the unanimous agreement of participants that ‘UNIFEM be mandated to empower and support the efforts and results arising out of the meeting’ (Ibid.). UNAIDS is the only other organisation mentioned in the declaration which calls for Liberian women’s organisations to be “supported and empowered by the Government of Liberia, UNAIDS, and UNIFEM to actively participate in the implementation of all activities involving the prevention and control of HIV/AIDS during the post-conflict process (Ibid.). UNIFEM’s support for Liberian women could also be viewed as a strategy to elevate its own status in the political process.

In sum, all of the parties to the conflict in Liberia, including those negotiating peace, failed to include Liberian women or their perspectives in the process of negotiating and to the conflict and a vision for the future. The singular focus given to disarmament strengthened the movement’s legitimacy and proved a unifying message. The last minute arrival of women’s advocates from the UN diverted this message and introduced a platform that emphasised women’s political participation and UNIFEM’s role. This opportunistic intervention may well have created new opportunities for women and for UNIFEM to engage in the peace process. Had Liberian women maintained their focus on
disarmament, how might peace have evolved differently? I don’t attempt to answer this question, but I do examine how delays and inefficiencies in the disarmament process, particularly of the military groups, increased women’s security risks in the aftermath of the peace agreement.

In the following section, I look at the opportunities created by the CPA for UN engagement more generally, to see how these were utilised to advance SCR 1325’s implementation.

5.3 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)\textsuperscript{127}

Even though women and gender issues received little attention in the CPA, I argue that the CPA’s request for UN support in a number of areas created the opportunity for UNMIL to engage proactively – how, when, and if it did engage, is the focus of Chapter 6.\textsuperscript{128} While most gender analyses of the CPA focus on specific references to ‘women’, I identify three areas where gender issues are notably absent and where the UN is generally excluded, or plays a secondary role. Because the CPA is the document on which the UN’s mandate is based, I am interested in how requests made of the UN are interpreted and made operational. This process involves a wide range of actors whose interests play a role in determining the mission mandate. The governments that pay for the mission invariably have more influence than those whose troops are deployed to carry it out.

By comparing four principal documents that catalyse the process, the CPA, the Secretary-General’s proposed concept of operation, the Security Council’s mandate and the ACABQ’s approved budget, I trace where and how gender issues were both introduced and disregarded. My aim is to identify places and spaces within the policy process where individual and institutional ‘agency’ is exercised in relation to gender issues. I begin this section with the CPA; the document of principles that informs the Security Council’s mandate for the mission.


\textsuperscript{128} The CPA consists of ten chapters and four annexes. Women are referred to in articles on the membership of the governance and electoral reform commissions and state that their “membership shall include women”, without specifying any quotas or other criteria. Women’s organisations are considered part of civil society and special interest groups in the National Transitional Legislative Assembly; together, they are allocated 18 out of 76 seats. The CPA states that AFELL can nominate judicial appointees, and that all elective and non-elective appointments within the national transitional government shall ‘reflect national and gender balance.’ The only article to include a more substantive reference to women is in relation to their ‘rehabilitation’ as vulnerable groups or war victims.
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed by the representatives of the three warring parties (the Government of Liberia, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia) on the 17th August 2003. It calls on the UN to play a meaningful role in all of the substantive and monitoring components: in relation to the ceasefire, Comprehensive Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Rehabilitation programme, security sector reform (SSR), the release of prisoners and abductees, human rights and humanitarian issues, elections and post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction. The UN’s requested roles varied from providing oversight, technical and financial support, to helping restructure the Liberian National Police (LNP) and other security services, and in assisting in the maintenance of law and order throughout Liberia. In this chapter, I examine the two areas in which a more limited request is made of the UN: political issues, and security sector reform and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration.

Now, more than ten years after the CPA was signed, history is still being written about the UN’s engagement in Liberia. I am interested in understanding how the UN’s engagement as both a primary and as a secondary actor shaped its opportunities for addressing gender issues. In Chapter 6, I revisit these questions in my analysis of the deployment of the all-female formed police unit.

5.31 Political Issues and the National Transitional Government of Liberia
The CPA’s largest chapter (Chapter 8) on Political Issues is the one in which the UN plays the least significant role. It is also the only chapter that calls on parties to reflect a national and gender balance in all elective and non-elective appointments within the National Transitional Government of Liberia. The CPA does not establish any role for the UN in relation to the Contract and Monopolies commission, the interim period of governance, or the establishment of a Transitional Government, including the National Transitional Legislative Assembly, the Executive and the Judiciary.

In its 13 clauses, the UN’s role is limited to organising elections and providing financial, logistic and technical support to establish a Governance Reform Commission. The request does not mention the UN in general, but UNDP specifically, together with ‘relevant international organizations and the ICGL’. When particular UN agencies are named in any official document, it enhances their authority, their leadership claims, and ability to assert their agenda, and mobilise resources, as was the case with UNIFEM and
UNAIDS in the Golden Tulip Declaration. Agency recognition in political agreements is considered an ‘outcome’ and achievement that bolster the agency’s profile.

Although UNDP is the major implementing body for UN electoral support, the UN secretariat’s Department of Political Affairs is the UN’s official focal point for electoral assistance and formally receives all requests from Member States.\(^{129}\) While it is not likely that the warring parties were fully cognizant of the distinction, UNDP was likely aware and better positioned to proactively engage in the negotiations, drawing on its field presence and extensive networks.

With respect to gender issues, UN support for elections has historically neglected women’s roles as voters and candidates, and in vetting candidates that have committed crimes against women during the conflict. In an interview with the DPA’s Electoral Office, I was told that the positions that are most likely to benefit women often remain unfilled, such as voter education and outreach.\(^{130}\) Moreover, electoral reform and the use of quotas has been heralded as a strategy for increasing women’s leadership, but in conflict-affected countries there is no evidence linking women’s political participation with gender equality outcomes (Seckinelgin and Klot 2013). Also, the UN has yet to develop a policy on this issue; in some cases it has demonstrated support for women’s quotas, in others it has not (Rehn, Sirleaf & Ellen Johnson, 2002). The DPA is one of the few secretariat departments that has not yet developed internal policies and capacities on gender issues or in relation to SCR 1325.

Chapter 8 of the CPA also refers to Annex 4, the centrepiece of the agreement and the primary focus of negotiations: the spoils. Annex 4 lists the allocation of Cabinet Positions, Public Corporations and Autonomous Agencies/Commission Under the NTGL among the warring parties. ICG explains:

The agreement effectively divided the Liberian state between military formations, political parties and civil society. Indeed, the peace process in Accra was about jobs: generals wanted to know how many positions they could command...MODEL, for example, got the Forestry Development Authority and the Bureau of Maritime Affairs. With a foothold in key timber ports in Harper, Greenville and Buchanan, its leaders stand to make lucrative logging deals, some of which will be used to maintain their fighting capacity. LURD leadership is pleased to have the management of the Port Authority, a position formerly held by one of their senior advisers, and the General Service Agency, a body originally created by Charles Taylor allegedly to service government procurement requirements but in fact designed to enable its directors to provide


\(^{130}\) DPA Official. 2006. Interviewed by author. September 8.
cars and other gifts to friends and allies. Appointees of the former government will control the strategic Liberian Petroleum Refining Corporation, a body that Taylor used to generate income by charging consumers excessive prices for petrol refined from low-cost oil imports. (International Crisis Group 2003, 7–8)

This approach was a stark contrast to with the 'neo-trusteeship' arrangements that characterised other UN missions, for example in Kosovo and East Timor, where the UN asserted much greater control, and some cases, had executive authority.

These arrangements, however, did not last very long. By 2005, the ICGL and donor community pressured the Transitional Government to agree to an anti-corruption law that co-located international experts in key administrative positions for at least three years, requiring their sign off on operational and financial matters:

Thus, what is generally assumed to be the best and most legitimate government that Liberia has ever experienced is nonetheless subject to stronger external control than any of its predecessors. This is a paradox, but it also shows the power of labelling a country as a ‘failed state’, since it drastically increases the number of policy options available to the international community. (Boås 2009, 1330)

Only six of the 21 ministries were assigned to the political parties (that were also under the control of the factions) and civil society. Among these was the Ministry of Gender and Development. Bruthus attributes the inclusion of this Ministry to the effective advocacy made by UNIFEM’s Regional Adviser, Liberian women’s organisations, and the Ghanaian Minister of Women and Children Affairs:

It was only due to pressure from the women that the ministry of gender came to be added to the list of ministries selected. UNIFEM went further to sensitise all actors including the SRSG for Liberia, the current Head of State of Liberia, and leaders of warring factions. (Bruthus 2003, 7)

The literature regarding 'gender machineries' and their various configurations offers little evidence that a separate entity - disassociated with the executive leadership - is an effective strategy for advancing gender issues throughout government. Typically under-resourced and with little authority to ensure a gender perspective into the work of other ministries, the experience of separate women’s ministries is mixed, absent senior gender expertise in the executive and other key organs of government (Sainsbury and Bergqvist 2009; Shirin Rai 2004; Westendorf 2013; Walby 2005). In Liberia, the Women’s

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131 The others are Ministry of National Security; Ministry of Education; Ministry of Information; Ministry of Rural Development; Ministry of Youth and Sports.
Ministry’s allocation to the political parties and civil society does become important for UNMIL’s engagement on gender issues and the main counterpart with which UNMIL’s Gender Adviser Unit will interact. I discuss this further in Chapter 6.

5.32 Security Sector Reform

The second area of the CPA in which both gender issues and the UN are given only a marginal role is the restructuring of the Armed Forces of Liberia. In Liberia, as in other UN operations, the UN took lead responsibility for the reform and restructuring of police forces while a bilateral donor or ‘interested state’ took the lead responsibility for the Armed Forces; for example in Sierra Leone, the UK led the reform of the army in collaboration with UNAMSIL and Nigeria. In many post-colonial contexts, vestiges of the colonial, administrative, socio-cultural, political and economic systems may still be functional, often in parallel with other local or customary practices. In the UK’s experience in Sierra Leone, these common reference points may have provided a helpful basis for collaboration; Sierra Leone’s parliament appointed a British Police Officer to temporarily head the national service. This was a sensitive appointment at a time in which the government needed to demonstrate that no particular party interests would threaten others (F. Olonisakin 2008, 36–37).

Similarly in Liberia, the UN was asked to lead the restructuring of the police and other security services (including the Immigration Force, Special Security Services, Customs, security guards). Article VIII of the CPA calls for the UN Civilian Police Components to monitor an interim police force, to assist in the maintenance of law and order and – together with other relevant International Agencies – to assist in the development and implementation of training programmes. It is in response to this request, that the UN ultimately deployed the first ever, all-female formed police unit that forms the focus of Chapter 6.

Additionally, the CPA specifically requests that the United States of America play a lead role in organising the restructuring of the Armed Forces of Liberia. The US agreed to assume the responsibility for restructuring what was still a volatile, well-armed and well-organised warring faction. However, with US troops committed in Afghanistan and Iraq, and disagreements about Liberia’s strategic priority, it took three years before the process even began. This stalled the DDR process, and led to the re-engagement of many armed factions that continued to operate throughout the country.
Moreover, the US employed private military contractors, DynCorp and Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE), rather than government officers. According to US Marine Ryan Welken, these contracting arrangements undermined the goals by reducing transparency and host-nation buy-in, and by failing to develop the leadership and tactical capacities that were needed (Welken 2010, 33). For example, instead of using standard military training guidelines (the Small Wars Manual) that prioritises unit leadership by using a ‘top-down’ training approach, the contractors focused instead on a ‘bottom-up’ approach that emphasised the development of tactical, combat skills in small units. This left the Armed Forces without officer capacity at squad, platoon and company levels; precisely the senior leadership needed to create a cohesive unified army with a shared sense of vision and purpose. Instead, the contractors themselves played these roles in their training exercises and only evaluated participants on tactical skills:

The contractor decision to train only at the NCO-level and below failed to develop unit cohesion and soldiers’ confidence in their leadership…which prevented the bonds between soldiers and their leaders that can only be created by training and mutual sacrifice from forming, and thus contributing to consistently poor performance in the ARTEP exercise itself. (Welken 2010, 29

According to Welken, the only logical explanation was a profit motive; to avoid absorbing the additional costs that would have resulted from the additional time needed to both recruit and train senior leadership. However, this strategy failed to develop even minimally acceptable tactical combat skills:

Only one company (C/1/23) evaluated as “needs practice” in all areas, indicating consistently less than satisfactory performance, but better than other companies, which were all evaluated as “untrained” in at least one area. The after action report notes that C/1/23 was uniquely able to overcome tactical shortfalls during the ARTEP because of more unit cohesion and unity. The only thing that distinguished this company’s training from that of the others was its participation in six months of jungle training conducted by the Nigerian military in Nigeria, during which its members lived and trained together as a unit. This undoubtedly played a major role in its higher than average unit cohesion. (Welken 2010, 29–30)

The contractors failed to adapt and adequately assess local capacities or account for different training systems that were used throughout the region. Nor did they consider the financial and technical consequences of investing in equipment and infrastructure that Liberia could not afford to maintain, and did not need:

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U.S. doctrine and operational systems...were vastly different from British-modeled systems that many ECOWAS officers were familiar with, and those that some current AFL officers training within the region are being exposed to. These issues highlight the inherent difficulty of trying to apply U.S. models (elsewhere)... without adaptation to the local context...including among other things...engineer equipment, medical equipment, communication gear, weapons, generators and vehicles. Contractors spent over $12 million on vehicles, including sixty-two five-ton trucks, giving the AFL three times the lift capability of the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces which is seven times the size of the AFL. Although the equipment was provided “gratis” to Liberia as part of the restructuring of its armed forces, the costs of repairing, maintaining, and using the vehicles is not included, and is substantial...[and] far surpassed its needs and financial resources. (Welken 2010, 29)

The CPA included an article calling for vetting military and police candidates to ensure that the new security forces would not include those with a prior history of human rights abuses. It is not clear if crimes against women, including sexual violence and exploitation, where taken into account. The extent to which both the UN and the US used these opportunities to screen and vet candidates would have significant implications for women’s security.

In sum, US leadership in Liberia had a significant impact on the broader process of security sector reform and, consequently, on how the UN was able to carry out its responsibilities with respect to policing and the protection of civilians. UNMIL’s initial concept of operation assumed that the restructuring and reform of the Liberian armed forces would be given priority. Yet the disarmament programme failed to disarm many of the combatants who, without other alternatives or employment, continued to wreak havoc and violence, both among civilian populations and with respect to Liberia’s economic assets: the rubber plantations, the ports and the mines. Had this been anticipated, the UN may have reached different conclusions about how it assess and respond to women’s security risks and needs that were UNMIL’s primary responsibility.

5.33 Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration
The CPA names the UN and ECOWAS as members of an inter-departmental National Commission on DDRR that also includes relevant NTGL agencies, the warring parties, the AU and the ICGL. Special attention to the issue of child combatants is included in the chapter on rehabilitation, reconstruction and development in a separate article (XXXI) on vulnerable groups - the only article where women's special needs are also identified together with children, the elderly and the disabled. This article also contains the second
of two references in the CPA where gender balance, as a principle, is to be maintained in apportioning responsibility for programme implementation. The other, mentioned above, refers to "national and gender balance in all elective and non-elective appointments within the NTGL" (Article XXVIII in Part Eight).

UNMIL’s failures to consider women and gender issues in the DDR programme are as well documented as its achievements in relation to children. Children were also given far more attention in the Accra negotiations and the peace agreement, resulting largely from the advocacy of the UN’s SRSG for Children and Armed Conflict, Olara Otunnu. As discussed in previous chapters, the use of children as combatants became a Security Council agenda item in 1998 following the appointment of the first SRSG for Children, Olara Otunnu. Just weeks before the CPA was signed, Otunnu participated in an ECOWAS meeting of defence ministers and negotiated the first agreement to include child protection advisers ECOWAS (UN General Assembly 2002h). This proposal was also supported by the Government of Canada, a major donor and backer of Graça Machel’s study and lead protagonist during its membership of the Security Council between 1999 and 2000 for advancing the protection of civilians, children and women.

The specific reference to the SRSG for Children and Armed Conflict in the peace agreement, and to UNICEF, is testimony to the impact of an effective advocate with the stature, political access and institutional association, as well as the backing of UNICEF; a multi-billion dollar fund. It also demonstrates the important role of ECOWAS and other regional organisations and arrangements that can play in advancing Security Council actions pertaining to the protection of civilians. As early as 2000, UNICEF helped to establish an Eminent Persons Group in Liberia to advocate for children (UN General Assembly and ECOSOC 2000, 4). Also, in 2001, the Canadian government initiated plans to establish a Child Protection Unit within ECOWAS, and to assist in establishing an NGO network within the ECOWAS community to feed information into its four "listening posts".

The attention given to children's special needs in the CPA with respect to DDR helped to ensure that child-focused DDR would be funded from the assessed contributions of the UN, rather than voluntary contributions. This established a precedent for invoking a similar rationale to include special provisions for women associated with armed forces.

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133 The article also refers to the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and “other relevant agencies.”
134 (Wikileaks 01ABUJA1383, 19 June 2001)
However, the Security Council’s actions in Liberia in relation to children as compared to women, reflect significantly different levels of priority and resource commitments. I suggest that this is due in part to the significant role played by UNICEF, one of the largest UN funds, and the SRSG for Children and Armed Conflict, an Under Secretary-General with a full-time mandate and reporting responsibility to both the Security Council and the General Assembly.

The SRSG’s reports to the Security Council substantiate his considerable effort to engage the UN’s peace and security architecture: the SRSG was a core member of various Integrated Mission Task Forces (e.g. Afghanistan, Angola), and worked directly with UN missions and peace processes, including the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea and the UN Peace-building Support Office in Liberia, and the (then) newly established Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa. The attention and resources given to children in the Liberian peace process, as compared to women, partly reflect these asymmetric institutional capacities and mandates. While UNICEF engages at the country level, the SRSG has the mandate to engage directly in the political process and collaborates directly with all relevant actors, including Security Council members. Yet without an equivalent political advocate or well-resourced institution, similar strategies were not pursued on behalf of women.

5.4 UNMIL’s Mandate and Concept of Operation

In this section, I look at how the understanding and reflection of gender issues and women’s security evolved during the period between the signing of the CPA on 17 August 2003 and the approval of UNMIL’s first budget and implementation plan on 29 October 2003 (UN General Assembly 2003b). UNMIL’s mandate developed iteratively through a complex political process involving ECOWAS and different parts of the UN system, including the Secretary-General, the secretariat, the Funds and Programmes, the ACABQ, the Security Council, the ICGL, and the newly appointed head of UNMIL’s mission, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Jacques Klein, the former American SRSG in Kosovo. The US role in this process was especially crucial given the expectation that it would provide significant financial support and political leadership.
This highly iterative and complex political policy process involved many actors at different stages.\textsuperscript{135}

The assessment process is considered the first stage of mission planning and among the most important in determining a coherent, sustainable, and effective mission strategy. It provides the basis for estimating the Mission’s resources – human, financial and political – and for identifying specific results and indicators of achievement. It is also among the most criticised phases of mission planning for an over-reliance on UN Headquarters processes, and for the lack of consultation among, and coordination with other UN entities in the humanitarian, development and human rights arenas, as well as with in-country government and non-governmental stakeholders and with troop-contributing countries and regional organisations (Wiharta 2008, 98).

Within one month of the signing of the CPA, and at the request of the UN Security Council, the UN Secretary-General dispatched a multidisciplinary assessment mission to Liberia, led by his newly appointed Special Representative for Liberia, Jacques Klein, to assess the situation on the ground and consult with Liberian parties and other stakeholders. Following the High Level Panel recommendations, the mission included staff from several UN secretariat departments and UN agencies, Funds and Programmes and the World Bank. It is not clear if gender expertise was included in the mission, or if women’s groups were consulted and their security risks and needs assessed, but OSAGI did prepare a lengthy, nine page ‘gender checklist’ for the assessment mission setting out more than 500 open-ended questions about the differences in how women, men, boys and girls experience conflict, and probing women’s roles in economic, social, cultural and political life.\textsuperscript{136}

Although OSAGI’s questionnaire was organised around relevant clauses of SCR 1325 and UNMIL’s mandate, such as elections and security sector reform, they were more conceptual than operational. Similar to the material used in DPKO’s gender mainstreaming strategy and PKO, planners could not easily discern why (and how) they would differentiate the relevance of socio-cultural household and gender relations to their tactical aims.\textsuperscript{137}

\textsuperscript{135} These processes, and the interests that influence them, have been misinterpreted by feminist discourse analysts where, for example, Secretary-General Reports to the Security Council (that reflect the views of the UN Secretariat and the UN Mission) are confused with Security Council Resolutions (which reflect the views of Council Members); each representing very different interests. For example (Shepherd 2008b).


\textsuperscript{137} Former DPKO consultant in the Best Practices Unit. 2014. Interviewed by author. August 12.
Security Council members also played a role in the assessment process. Increasingly, Security Council members began taking field visits to the countries on their agenda. In SCR 1325, the Security Council expressed willingness to ensure that its missions took into account gender considerations and the rights of women, including through consultations with local and international women’s groups. Despite this commitment, however, nothing on women or gender was included in the Security Council’s itinerary for its mission to West Africa from 26 June to 5 July 2003 (UN Security Council). This is another example of the Security Council’s call for actions on SCR 1325 that were not followed up by the secretariat for reasons of capacity and attitude described in the previous chapter. The Canadian Ambassador at the open debate on SCR 1325 in October 2003 makes this clear:

We again call for explicit reference to gender considerations in all Security Council mandates. The lack of information in the reports to the Security Council, noted this morning, should not be an excuse for inaction. Council members can seek information from the Secretariat and take advantage of the presence of Special Representatives of the Secretary-General in the Council to hold them accountable and ask them for information on the situation of women and girls and on ways of enhancing the protection of civilians…With regard to West Africa and the Great Lakes region, we, like other speakers, are disheartened that their reports are silent on gender equality issues and give no indication of whether meetings were held with women or with ministries and organizations dealing with gender. Such missions should systematically include this item in their mandates.138

After the assessment mission, the Secretary-General presented his report and proposed a concept of operation to the Security Council on 11 September 2003 (UN Security Council 2003d). Assessment reports are prepared by the UN secretariat and reflect the findings of the assessment mission, as well as informal consultations with interested members of the Security Council, regional actors, the SRSG, and some headquarters-based entities, including humanitarian actors. UNIFEM successfully appealed to participate in a few of DPKO’s assessment missions (not Liberia, however) but was never a member of the planning team that continues to follow the mission, i.e. the Integrated Mission Task Force, as the SRSG for Children and Armed Conflict had negotiated.

However, despite the neglect of gender issues in the assessment itself, the Secretary-General’s report includes reference to a significant number of issues regarding women and gender mainstreaming, including issues that were not identified in the CPA; with respect to women’s political participation; sexual and gender based violence; reproductive health

care; and, women associated with armed forces and girl soldiers. Most significantly, the Secretary-General recommends that gender be included as a distinct component of UNMIL’s structure and concept of operations, together with “political, military, civilian police, criminal justice, civil affairs, human rights…child protection, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, public information and support components, as well as an electoral component in due course” (Ibid., p. 14). Gender is one of 16 elements included in the Secretary-General’s proposed mandate where he recommends that it is led by a senior gender adviser with staff, in the Office of the SRSG. Its purpose is to “undertake and support gender mainstreaming within the various pillars of the Office and with civil society and other external partners” (Ibid., p. 15).139

Interestingly, the report refers to women’s participation in the Accra peace talks in its discussion of political and military developments in Liberia, rather than in its sections dealing with human rights and humanitarian affairs, where gender issues are typically referenced. Placement is an important signal about how an issue is understood and, therefore, made operational and budgeted. As a political issue, this could have implied the need for a political adviser or civil affairs officer with gender expertise; as an observation about humanitarian or human rights issues, it might signal the need for different kinds of resources. However, these signals are only meaningful if there is someone to place them, interpret them, and translate them into a budget line or recommendation.

In this case, the Secretary-General’s commentary refers to the inadequate representation of women in the delegations, rather than the near total disregard of gender issues in the CPA. His report offers no specific recommendations about how to redress this or improve women’s participation in the CPA’s implementation mechanisms. Instead, the report simply acknowledges women’s commitment to follow up their own recommendations:

Liberian women participated in the peace talks in Accra. Some were concerned, however, at the inadequate representation in the delegations. A strategic planning meeting was held on 15 August 2003 to analyse lessons learned at the talks and to form strategies for the inclusion of women in decision-making during and after the transitional period, including all components of the Government of Liberia and in all structures leading to the post-conflict peace-building phase. As a result of the deliberations, they

139 Interestingly, in the same paragraph, the Secretary-General also recommends establishing an HIV/AIDS policy adviser, with supporting staff, to be attached to the Office of the Special Representative, with responsibility for coordinating activities in the Mission area for the prevention of HIV transmission among civilian and military personnel and host communities. The Gender Unit’s mandate is not explicit about host communities or civilian and military personnel.
prepared the Golden Tulip Declaration, which sets out their priorities for the peace process and reconstruction period, and decided to establish a follow-up committee to ensure women’s full participation in post-conflict reconstruction and nation-building. (Ibid., p. 5)

In responding to the Secretary-General’s report, the UN Security Council’s resolution that authorised UNMIL’s mandate differed in emphasis, content, size and scope (UN Security Council 2003c). It reduced the Secretary-General’s 16-point mandate to ten elements and removed gender mainstreaming as a distinct component, therein diminishing its political significance, and minimising any associated operational implications. Instead, in a ‘non-operational’ paragraph, the Security Council offers a more expansive ‘reaffirmation’ of the importance of a gender perspective in peacekeeping and post-conflict peace building, and SCR 1325’s call to address violence against women and girls as a tool of warfare. The Security Council also ‘encouraged’ UNMIL and the Liberian parties to actively address these issues. In this example, the Security Council diluted the Secretary-General’s efforts to strengthen gender in the mandate.

By comparison, the Security Council’s references to children were much stronger than the Secretary-General’s report. In authorising the deployment of a multinational Force to Liberia on 1 August, the second preambular paragraph (also non-operational and typically contextual) refers to the well-being and rehabilitation of children, civilians and the mission of humanitarian workers (Ibid.). In the Security Council’s discussion prior to adopting the resolution, the German representative to the Council inferred that this was a political compromise:

We would have liked to have not only the very welcome second preambular paragraph, which pertains to the well-being and rehabilitation of children, but also a stronger operational paragraph calling on all Liberian parties to ensure the protection, well-being and rehabilitation of children in accordance with international obligations of the provisions of SCRs 1261 (1999), 1314 (2000), 1379 (2001) and 1460 (2003).140

After the Security Council considered the Secretary-General’s proposals and adopted the resolution authorising UNMIL’s mandate, the secretariat was tasked with interpreting the mandate into a first year budget and implementation plan (UN Security Council 2003c). This next iteration was presented by the Secretary-General to the ACABQ for review, and then to the General Assembly for approval. Peacekeeping budget proposals

140 France, Germany, and Mexico abstained from voting in protest against the US refusal to sign and ratify the International Criminal Court (SC/7836) 1 August 2003.
ACABQ commentary and performance reports are the most tangible reflection of how rhetorical commitments are translated into empirical realities and, when read with their often colourful commentaries, become a diagnostic tool for understanding how gender issues are internalised and institutionalised.

UNMIL’s first budget was developed in 2003; the first year in which results-based budgeting was adopted by the GA for peacekeeping. In doing so, UNMIL’s mandate was reorganised (again) into five ‘standard components’, setting out financial, human and substantive resource requirements for the first year of operation: ceasefire (including DDR); Humanitarian and Human rights; security reform; the peace process; and, support (effective and efficient logistical and administrative support to the mission): ‘These categories intended to reflect, rather than determine, the common programmatic nature of the expected accomplishments and outputs, and specify the requisite financial and human resource requirements’ (UN General Assembly 2003b, 4).

Even though the Security Council removed ‘gender’ from the Resolution’s operational components, the Secretary-General’s proposed first year budget included a gender unit in the office of the SRSG. Although the Secretary-General had originally envisioned the placement of a senior gender adviser with staff in the Office of the SRSG, in the final approved budget, a “Gender Adviser Unit” was established. A total of 9 staff were proposed; a P5, a P3, two UN Volunteers (P2), two national officers and five national officers, with three deployed in the field. The Unit’s functions are defined very broadly in relation to gender mainstreaming within UNMIL and in relation to the transitional government and Liberian civil society:

The Unit would be headed by a senior gender adviser who would monitor and advise the Transitional Government and civil society on the integration of a gender perspective in the peace process and conduct workshops on gender issues; integrate the gender perspective into all aspects of the Mission’s activities and conduct regular orientation programmes on gender sensitization and mainstreaming for the Mission’s military and civilian police personnel, collect information, provide analysis and maintain a database on sexual violence against women in Liberia. (Ibid., p. 19)

Despite the breadth of this mandate, the Gender Unit’s expected accomplishments were limited to only two components of UNMIL’s five-part mandate: the DDR programme (within Component 1 on the ceasefire), and the promotion and protection of human rights, fundamental freedoms and national reconciliation (within Component 2 on humanitarian and human rights). Unlike other units – such as the policy unit – there is no expectation of
engagement in security sector reform, the peace process, or the mission’s support functions. This limits the potential scope of the Gender Unit to engage in areas outside of its expected accomplishments, despite its broadly defined mandate. Additionally, the Unit is tasked with maintaining a database on sexual violence against women in Liberia; a function the unit is clearly ill-equipped to carry out, given its placement, staffing, and resources; a function that would much more appropriately located within the security sector and policing.

In comparison with the Secretary-General’s initial recommendations, the indicators of achievement and proposed outputs in UNMIL’s budget reflect none of the previously expressed concerns for special measures and programmes to address the needs of women among the fighting forces, dependents of combatants, camp followers and abductees, female ex-combatants, or the wives and widows of former combatants. For example, in the Secretary-General’s initial recommendations, he proposed that:

Briefing, counselling and training in programmes for the eventual reintegration of ex-combatants should take into consideration the differences in the experiences during conflict of women and girls, as compared to men and boys. Because of the high rates of sexual violence perpetrated in the conflict, reintegration programmes must include prevention of sexual violence. (UN Security Council 2003d, 12)

Other significant differences among the Secretary-General’s initial proposal, the Security Council’s mandate, and ACABQ’s recommended budget, also had implications for UNMIL’s role in addressing gender issues. The first is that the Secretary-General’s requested force strength was not approved. A threshold of 15,000 UN military personnel was authorised, including up to 250 military observers and 160 staff officers. However, only 1,115 civilian police officers were approved, including formed units; 360 fewer officers than the Secretary-General had requested.

The Secretary-General’s original recommendation specified a total of 1,475 police officers, including 875 unarmed civilian police (including senior advisers, trainers, planners, police experts on human rights, and serious crimes and human trafficking investors) in addition to five armed formed police units, each comprising 120 officers. Negotiations over force strength and composition take place between countries that contribute troops, and those that pay for them. Considerations ranging from language ability to skill sets were taken into account, but not meaningfully; I discuss these issues in the next chapter. Although there are no well-developed guidelines and little expertise about strategic and tactical strategies for reducing gender-specific threats to individual
security, the role of civilian advisers and civilian police are considered important, particularly in relation to investigations and criminal justice.

There were significant deployment delays, particularly among the formed police units (FPUs) that are far less expensive to deploy but also more difficult to find; they constitute a fully equipped armed, paramilitary unit that has worked cohesively together for at least two years. As I explain in Chapter 6, it would end up taking four years before the fourth FPU requested by the Secretary-General was deployed, which (coincidentally), was the all-female unit and the focus of this case study.

However, even though the level of troop authority was lower than requested, the Security Council’s mandate was decidedly more ‘robust’ than the Secretary-General’s initial proposal. It also asserts a stronger role for UNMIL in supporting the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and in developing the proposed DDR programme. Although the Security Council added provisions to the mandate regarding the special needs of child combatants and women, as well as a voluntary disarmament programme and the collection and destruction of weapons and ammunition, these special needs were not referenced in the final budget and it is not clear if resources for these special programmes would come from assessed or voluntary contributions. While this may be less of an issue for children given UNICEF’s ability to mobilise resources, it certainly was an issue for UNIFEM and those working with women and girls and on sexual violence. Only UNFPA had field presence in Liberia at the time, and UNIFEM was never an ‘operational’ entity.

As compared to the Secretary-General’s proposal, the Security Council also strengthened UNMIL’s mandate to protect UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment. The Council’s mandate also goes far beyond the CPA’s request of the UN by including in UNMIL’s mandate, the monitoring and restructuring of the police force and military and in relation to support for elections. Significantly, it also added a new clause mandating UNMIL to assist the transitional government in “restoring proper administration of natural resources” (UN Security Council 2003c).

On the other hand, the Security Council’s mandate significantly qualified the Secretary-General’s proposal’s that were most relevant to women’s security, namely, regarding the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. To this proposal, the Security Council added two caveats: ‘without prejudice to the efforts of the government’ and ‘within its capabilities’; instead of “in the areas of immediate deployment of UN formed military units” (Ibid.). In other words, while the Secretary-
General had initially identified the protection of civilians as a distinct component of the mandate, the Security Council combined this function with UNMIL’s role protecting United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, and ensuring their security and freedom of movement.

Moreover, the Security Council disregarded both the CPA’s request and the Secretary-General’s proposal to support the establishment and operation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. More generally, it weakened the human rights monitoring mandate and UNMIL’s role in supporting the safe and sustainable return of Liberian refugees and internally displaced persons, eliminating any reference to UNMIL’s role in supporting the provision of assistance and protection for the safe return of Sierra Leonean and Ivorian refugees.

Among the many gender issues introduced in the Secretary-General’s report, very few were included in the approved budget. With respect to human rights and protection, the Secretary-General recognised the widespread violations against children and sexual and gender based violence calling for priority attention to be given to the Human Rights and Protection Component in improving the human rights situation and the protection of civilians, including women and children. To this end, he called for the establishment of a human rights and protection unit, “staffed by experts on human rights, the protection of civilians, national institutions, transitional justice, child rights and gender” (UN Security Council 2003d, para. 81). In the proposed Coordination Component, these recommendations were reaffirmed, and the Secretary-General called for special efforts to ensure that women and girls were involved in the early establishment of a functional national capacity.

With respect to criminal justice, which encompasses civilian police, criminal law, justice and corrections, the Secretary-General stated incorrectly that:

Under the Agreement the United Nations is also requested, among other things, to monitor the activities of the interim police force, assist in the maintenance of law and order, and help to develop and implement police training programmes, including gender training. (Ibid., para 62)

Accordingly, he added additional gender training components that had not been specified in the CPA. Additionally, the Secretary-General recommended

the establishment of a crime investigation capacity within UNMIL, including officers trained in gathering testimony from children and women, mandated to support investigations and to turn collected evidence over to Liberian or other authorities, including to prosecutors of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. (Ibid., para 64)
Yet no gender officers are identified in the budget. Finally, although the Secretary-General called for the inclusion of women in the preliminary planning for elections and in reforming and restructuring the local police, neither the Security Council’s mandate nor ACABQ’s approved budget reflects either of these concerns.

5.5 Conclusions
Although the UN’s strategies for implementing SCR 1325 had an impact on how UNMIL’s mandate and concept of operation incorporated a gender perspective, many other actors and processes were far more influential. The Accra peace process - the 14th attempt to negotiate an end to more than two decades of brutal war - was at best marginally responsive to SCR 1325’s call on all actors involved in negotiating and implementing peace agreements to adopt a gender perspective. US leadership on Liberia, through the ICGL and the Security Council, further defined the parameters of the UN’s engagement in Liberia.

By all accounts, women were marginalised from the formal negotiations of Liberia’s peace agreement. Liberian women peacemakers clearly lacked institutional support, technical, and financial resources, depending instead on their allies within the parties and negotiating teams. Women peacemakers were focused mainly on engaging in the peace process as mediators – their agenda emphasised the principal points on the negotiation table: the ceasefire agreement, dialogue, disarmament, and implementation. The CPA’s failure to include commitments on social and economic policies, and to address women’s concrete needs during post-conflict reconstruction; including, health care, housing, transportation, income and energy, is therefore not surprising.

The agenda advanced by Liberian women peacemakers was ‘selfless’ and focused on the public good rather than individual self-interest. It is therefore not at all clear that had women been represented in sufficient numbers and at decision-making levels, space would have been created for a more substantive gender agenda to emerge. Moreover, their agenda shared little in common with the agenda proposed by UNIFEM and with what was ultimately reflected in UNMIL’s mandate. According to UNIFEM:

The final decision for the management of the country was at the end left in the hands of warring factions with key ministries such as Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs and Education going to the warring factions, while civil society activists, women’s organizations and intellectuals where left behind in the process. (UNIFEM 2003, 7)
The need for gender expertise, financial and technical support for women was never made specific at any point of the negotiation process, and UNIFEM was never called upon to support the CPA’s implementation, while the UNDP, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the SRSG for Children and Armed Conflict, and UNICEF are specifically named. This made it even more difficult for UNIFEM to participate in, or be invited, to donor conferences, to support operational activities in Liberia and to become recipients of humanitarian and donor appeals. There is no advocate for women in these processes and women’s issues inevitably fall from the agenda.

In sum, I have highlighted the significant gaps, contradictions and inconsistencies that emerge throughout the peace process – from peace agreements to UN mandates – and the various challenges for amplifying women’s voices and identifying appropriate strategic and operational responses. ECOWAS, the ICGL, and the US were the most significant players in the process, and each failed spectacularly in fulfilling their responsibility to address gender issues and support women’s participation at decision-making levels. Given the UN’s marginal role in the trajectory of Liberia’s peace process, how could it have been a more effective champion of SCR 1325?

In this chapter, I point to the many actors and processes that determine outcomes for women in a peace process and I have identified opportunities to advance SCR 1325 that were taken, missed or undermined. The most significant factors shaping the development and implementation of UNMIL’s mandate - its timing and scope - were the competing political agendas within the Security Council, the absence of US leadership, and the deeply interconnected regional dimensions of the conflict that limited the UN’s ability to engage holistically. The UN’s uneven and uncoordinated engagements in the region would also limit its ability to respond to regional threats to women’s security, in relation to cross-border arms flows, trafficking and displacement. Liberian women’s organising was responsive to these dynamics and even recognised by the Security Council and other actors, but regrettably given very little recognition, beyond observer status, in the CPA or UNMIL’s mandate.
Chapter 6

Peace building in Practice:
The Deployment of the First all-Female Formed Police Unit

In an historic precedent, India, the third largest troop contributor to UN peacekeeping missions, deployed in January 2007, the first all-female formed police unit to the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). Unlike civilian police, formed police units (FPUs) are the only UN police units drawn from a single country and deployed in self-sustaining groups of between 120-140 well-armed officers equipped with their own vehicles, weapons, generators, water treatment plants and hospitals, in addition to engineering, medical, administrative and support staff. FPUs are deployed in situations that are considered too dangerous for individual civilian police who require specialised training in riot and crowd control, the use of non-lethal force, conflict negotiation, and de-escalation. Their narrowly defined mandates include riot control, protecting UN personnel and assets, and providing security for senior government and UN officials (UN DPKO/DFS 2009).

The all-female Indian FPU (FFPU) that deployed to Liberia was hailed as a novel strategy to advance SCR 1325’s call for increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in international mechanisms for conflict prevention, management, and resolution. Commander Seema Dhundia’s all-female unit was drawn from one of two Mahila (women’s) Battalions of India’s Central Reserve Police Force, a paramilitary formation functioning under aegis of India’s Ministry of Home Affairs. The first Women’s battalion in India’s Central Reserve Police Force, formed in 1986, and was created to respond to the increasing participation of women in ‘politics, agitation and crime’. The Mahila units were established because male police felt “handicapped in handling women agitations” and that even ‘a small, real or alleged misdemeanour on their part in dealing with any matter related to women has the potential of turning into a serious law and order problem’. In an interview, Commander Dhundia, a 39-year-old veteran of anti-insurgency operations, offered a slightly different explanation: historically the female

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141 http://crpf.nic.in/crp_l.htm (accessed 17-07-08 at 10:30 pm). According to the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), the first Mahila Battalion was created to “cope with such eventualities…The successful experiment of the Battalion and the ever increasing requirement of a Mahila component in dealing with emerging law and order situation necessitated the raising of the second Mahila Battalion, the 135 Mahila Battalion with HQ in Gujarat in 1995.

142 Ibid.
battalions were deployed next to male units in situations where “excessive use of force is not wanted toward local population….to deal with the ‘weaker segments of society’.”

The units’ deployment was widely publicised and attracted international media attention, including documentaries by the BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation 2007), the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Pacha 2013), as a featured story in the UN flagship publications, UN Police Magazine,144 (December 2006, June 2007, January 2010, July 2010, January 2011, January 2012), and UN Focus (December 2006-January 2007) as well as in the mainstream, local and national media. In addition to increasing the number of women serving in the mission, the deployment is generally considered to be a pivotal example of UN peace building in which women’s security was identified as an explicit aim of the mission mandate.145 The visually striking image of the 105 female uniformed officers carrying weapons to enforce peace is used widely by the UN and women’s groups to symbolise women as empowered leaders in peace building, rather than as victims of war.

In this chapter, I continue to examine the role of individual agency as well as the institutional, political, and bureaucratic factors that were significant in shaping UNMIL’s strategies to implement SCR 1325. I use a case study of the FFPU’s deployment as an empirical example of peace-building in which SCR 1325 was made operational at strategic and tactical levels in a field operation. Through interviews with UNMIL staff and the FFPU, as well as representatives of the Government of Liberia, NGOs, and international NGOs, my research explores how the FFPU shaped the mission’s strategic priorities and responsiveness to women’s security risks and needs. I begin by examining the institutional factors that were significant in the development and implementation of UNMIL’s SCR 1325 strategy, and the FFPU’s role in these processes.

I present my findings in two, distinct policy ‘frames’ introduced in chapter 4: I refer to one as ‘gender mainstreaming’ and the other, as the ‘protection of civilians’.146 Efforts to institutionalise SCR 1325 have largely been in the context of ‘gender mainstreaming’ while the UN’s work in this arena is more commonly referred to in the context of its work on the protection of civilians. However, these terms are intended to represent the discursive frame in the most general sense, rather than the specific policy doctrine that DPKO is developing, e.g. (UN DPKO/DFS 2012; UN DPKO/DFS 2010c; Breakey et al. 2012; Security Council Report 2013) or the widely divergent theories about gender mainstreaming in the feminist literature as discussed in Chapter 4.

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146 These terms are intended to represent the discursive frame in the most general sense, rather than the specific policy doctrine that DPKO is developing, e.g. (UN DPKO/DFS 2012; UN DPKO/DFS 2010c; Breakey et al. 2012; Security Council Report 2013) or the widely divergent theories about gender mainstreaming in the feminist literature as discussed in Chapter 4.
on the ‘protection of civilians’. Each frame is associated with different institutional actors; the gender mainstreaming frame, with UN’s gender mechanisms, and the protection of civilians frame, in relation to the UN’s peace and security architecture.

Regarding the FFPU’s deployment, I use the GM frame to refer to the perception of the FFPU’s deployment as a strategy for implementing SCR 1325 and increasing women’s leadership in peace building. In this frame, as represented in UN reporting and academic research about gender mainstreaming in peace operations, the FFPU is considered a best practice for improving gender balance in peace operations, and as ‘an operational imperative’ that increases women’s sense of security and reduces sexual and gender based violence.147

The second frame locates the FFPU’s deployment in the evolving role of police and formed police units in UN peace operations that have ‘the protection of civilians’ as a discrete element of their mandate. In this context, the FFPU is not significant because its personnel are female, but because of its distinct, tactical role within the mission.148 First used by NATO in Bosnia in 1998 and referred to as ‘police stability units,’ FPUs are deployed to respond to situations characterised by an ‘enforcement’ or ‘security gap’, i.e. public security challenges that neither military forces nor civilian police officers were adequately trained or equipped to respond to (Perito, Dziedzic, and DeGrasse 2004). UNMIL is especially significant in this historical context as the first UN operation to include FPUs in the initial mandate:

The establishment of UNMIL marks the final turning point in DPKO’s routine response to a particular kind of public security challenge in peace operations. Subsequently, the deployment of constabulary police alongside military forces and “civilian” (armed or unarmed) police monitors, advisers and trainers became standard practice for large peace operations charged with interim public security provision. The number of FPUs deployed more than doubled, and the number of missions that deployed constabulary police tripled in the 18 months between September 2003 and April 2005. (Benner 200814)

In other words, Formed Police Units (FPUs) function mainly in place of infantry battalions and are deployed to deal with civil disturbances, public security, and threats against UN personnel, assets, and high-level officials. FPUs are tactical, self-contained units that do not have responsibility for activities that are most closely associated with

147 For example (Karim and Beardsley 2013; Herwig 2007; Cordell 2011b; Popovic 2009; Anderholt 2012; Bertolazzi 2010; Bacon 2013; Beri 2008; Marks and Denham 2007; UN DPKO 2009b; UNMIL 2010; Gray 2012).

148 For example (Greener 2009; Durch and Ker 2013; Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units 2011; Benner, Mergenthaler, and Rotmann 2008; International Crisis Group 2009; Malan 2008; Hunt 2009).
In the third section, I compare the two policy frames as they concern the FFPU’s role in relation to UNMIL’s strategies to implement SCR 1325. I then conclude with some reflections about areas of convergence and divergence between the two policy frames. I conclude that although the deployment of the first-ever all female FPU drew attention to the potential for FPUs to increase women’s protection, it also exposed significant operational and strategic gaps in knowledge about how to utilise these assets to protect women from physical violence as compared to protection through the political process or in establishing a protective environment. These questions are central to the ongoing debates about the failure of UN peace operations to protect civilians; a debate that until recently, evolved in parallel with those concerning the UN’s strategies to implement SCR 1325.

I refer to ‘SCR 1325’ rather than to ‘women’s security,’ recognising that one is not a proxy for the other. Initially, my focus was on how SCR 1325 had influenced peace-building strategies to respond to women’s security risks and needs. However, among the gender advisers and experts I interviewed, SCR 1325 became shorthand for referring to a wider range of issues concerning women and gender, from sexual violence to DDR and the elections. UNMIL’s gender adviser, women’s groups and the government, invoked SCR 1325 creatively, and as a way to establish the authority and legitimacy needed to engage the mission and mobilise resources. Yet among the police, military and civilian mission personnel that I interviewed, references to SCR 1325 were more likely to engender defensiveness, or disregard, for reasons described later. SCR 1325 was viewed as yet another set of formal ‘rules’ and recommendations that originated at UN HQ, both distant and unresponsive to the realities of a peacekeeping environment or the capacities and resources of the mission. At the strategic level however, among mission leadership, including the SRSG and the Chief of Police, there was greater awareness about the expectations of donors and the Security Council to appear responsive to SCR 1325’s various calls for action.

149 These three tiers of protection were only elaborated by DPKO in 2010 in its (still) draft Operational Guidelines on the Protection of Civilians in Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO/DFS 2010c).
150 The UN Office of Internal Oversight (UN Office of Internal Oversight Services 2007) provides an excellent assessment of challenges facing peace operations with the mandates to protect civilians; some of these are addressed in this chapter.
6.1 UNMIL’s Strategies to Implement SCR 1325
In most accounts of gender mainstreaming in peace operations, UNMIL’s achievements in implementing SCR 1325 are well regarded. UNMIL was among the first generation of ‘integrated missions’ that brought humanitarian, development, human rights, political, and military components under the unified authority of a civilian SRSG in partnership with the UN Country Team. UNMIL was also among the first UN peace operations that the UN Security Council encouraged to mainstream gender throughout its activities, and for which it authorized the establishment of a gender unit. The FFPU’s deployment is often recognised in this context. From a policy perspective, a study by the German Institute of Human Rights reflects a common view of UNMIL by the UN and donors as a “particular(ly) impressive and successful example with respect to the implementation of Resolution 1325, with proven impact on the ground” (Boehme 2008 34).

Joana Foster, a UK and Ghanaian national, feminist, and lawyer with a long history of experience working in Africa on gender issues, was the first senior gender adviser recruited in 2004, one year after UNMIL was established. By this time, the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in the UN secretariat had finally recruited its own gender adviser, as detailed in the previous chapter. It had also placed senior gender advisers in each of its ten multidimensional, or integrated missions.

This new capacity within DPKO, at headquarters, and within the various missions, iteratively shaped a repertoire of practice in mainstreaming SCR 1325 at all three levels of UN authority and command in peacekeeping: the strategic level, involving the Security Council and the secretariat; the operational or mission level involving the SRSG and substantive unit leaders; and the tactical level, carried out by civilian, military and police personnel. With little in the way of guidance, the first generation of gender advisers used whatever resources they had or could mobilise from sympathetic donors and began to experiment with different models of engagement. DPKO’s first survey of practice (UN DPKO/DFS 2007) of nine gender units, identified very different staffing and support arrangements, as well as common challenges and obstacles regarding reporting relationships, budgets and in balancing their contributions within and outside of the mission.

UNMIL’s Office of the Gender Adviser (OGA) was considered to be well placed within the SRSG’s office. The donor evaluation of UNMIL’s implementation of SCR 1325 (van Woersem et al. 2006) highlighted this proximity as a recommended practice for other UN missions as a signal of the importance given to the position by the SRSG and because
it facilitated more frequent consultations between the gender adviser and UNMIL’s leadership. Access is crucially important in a bureaucracy where an individual’s ability to navigate is shaped by rank, influence and proximity to power (among other factors discussed earlier, including nationality, experience, personality and institutional location).

Despite these advantages, however, the gender adviser’s rank was still lower than other heads of substantive departments and she had relatively fewer staff. As a P5 with a total of nine junior staff and UN volunteers, the OGA’s office was minuscule in comparison with the human rights and protection sections, that averaged 47 staff (during the period of study – from 2003-2007). The legal and judicial sections averaged 44 staff, and civil affairs had as many as 105 staff in 4 sectors and 15 districts.

Based on my discussions with a range of UN staff and government officials and NGOs, my impression was that the Senior Gender Adviser had used her informal influence creatively and received positive external validation (and resources) through her engagement with high-level government officials and bilateral donors. She referred to her unit as the ‘Office of the Gender Adviser’, a title that suggests a much higher rank than her actual status. In the UN secretariat, ‘Offices’ (as compared to divisions, departments, programmes, funds, units, or sections) are headed by Under Secretary Generals, the highest UN rank after the UN Secretary General. But the senior gender adviser was neither a political appointee nor even a director-level post (D1 or D2). Rather, as a P5, she was a senior professional staff person with seniority to lead a section or even a small country office.

The Gender Adviser’s practice of referring to her unit as an Office remained unchallenged and was used by the Liberian government, the UN donor mission and other external actors, although UNMIL’s official reports continued to refer to the office as a ‘gender unit.’ Consistent with Nicholas Onuf’s (Onuf 2014) discussion about the significance of hierarchy, rank and rules within bureaucracies, this demonstrates an interesting strategy by a small, marginal unit to assert a status commensurate with its perception of importance and actual responsibilities, rather than the UN’s designation. I concur with the donor evaluation of SCR 1325’s implementation in UNMIL regarding Joana Foster’s unique leadership qualities, and that her familiarity with the region, and her expertise on gender issues were factors that distinguished her contributions (van Woersem et al. 2006).

Relatedly, the absence of a fully operational women’s fund in Liberia, further limited the OGA’s reach both geographically and financially. As an integrated, multidimensional
mission, UNMIL worked closely with the UN funds and programs that had offices in the country and provided services and operational support funded through special appeals and, in some cases, through UNMIL’s budget directly (see, for example, Harvey et al. 2007). Each of UNMIL’s substantive sections worked in collaboration with a UN system counterpart. As with most UN missions, UNDP was the lead operational counterpart to the civil affairs office, and UNICEF to the child protection unit. In the case of women’s rights, the UN Division for the Advancement of Women sought to establish a direct relationship with Government of Liberia to support its implementation of CEDAW, bypassing both the OGA and UNMIL (UN Division for the Advancement of Women 2006). Meanwhile, UNIFEM only opened an office in Monrovia in 2004, staffed by one senior adviser and a very limited budget.

I also concur with the donor assessment’s findings that the OGA’s two most significant and related challenges were a weak relationship with the UN country team – and UNIFEM in particular – and the inability to balance her responsibilities and the demands placed on her office within the mission, by various UNMIL departments, and outside of the mission, in support of women’s NGOs and the Women’s Ministry (Ibid.). Both of these challenges reflect the broader weaknesses identified in previous chapters regarding the UNs fractured gender architecture, and both would have been significantly ameliorated by a robust UNIFEM country office.

UNMIL’s strategy for implementing SCR 1325 was largely consistent with strategies being developed by other gender units in field missions and supported by DPKOs gender adviser at UN headquarters in New York. According to the OGA’s progress report, her strategies emphasised training and capacity building of UNMIL personnel on gender analysis and gender mainstreaming (UNMIL 2010). Her focus within the mission was to ensure that gender mainstreaming objectives were reflected in evaluations and terms of references for consultants and projects; that reports had sex disaggregated data, and that progress was made in achieving gender balance; i.e. increase the numbers of women in the Mission, especially at the decision making level (UNMIL 2010). The OGA also provided technical advice in substantive areas, such as the rule of law, in relation to Quick Impact Projects, and the rule of law. Her concerns about meeting the multiple demands on her office with such limited staff capacity were echoed by an NGO working on gender issues that would have benefited from more specialist expertise (Herwig 2007).  

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The gender training provided was not entirely well received. Several civilian UNMIL staff, including civilian police, described the training as ‘very limited’. One senior police officer suggested that if the training were “better focused it would help prevent cynicism about gender issues”.\(^{152}\)

Among the OGA’s self-reported accomplishments, a strong emphasis is placed on supporting women’s participation across a range of UNMIL’s expected accomplishments, including disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, by including women associated with fighting forces; security sector reform, through the recruitment of women into the Liberia National Police; and in peacekeeping, through role modelling and support for women as candidates and voters in the elections (UNMIL 2010). It is in this context that the FFPU’s deployment is considered one of six “evidence-based best practices” in mainstreaming gender within UNMIL (Ibid.)\(^{153}\).

In the following sub-sections, I look at the two related claims regarding the FFPU’s contribution to women’s leadership in peace-building and as an operational imperative. The first emphasises the principle of women’s right to participate, and equality of opportunity. Research and policy in this area tends to emphasise the obstacles to women’s participation, the enabling environment, and other human resource related issues. The second concerns the substantive impact of women’s participation on the operational effectiveness of peace operations. This perspective draws from the essentialist debates in the feminist literature, outlined in Chapter 2, regarding the distinct contributions that women make as a result of their more ‘feminine’ attributes in relation to community engagement, approachability, and conflict resolution.

### 6.11 The Female Formed Police Unit: Role Models, Gender Balance

Two UNMIL civilian police advisers interviewed in Monrovia, stated that the proposal to deploy an all-female FPU emerged from a series of meetings organised by DPKO in New York with troop and police contributing countries to develop strategies for increasing

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\(^{152}\) Civilian Police Officer, M-CP5. 2007. Interview by author. Monrovia, Liberia. 24 October.

\(^{153}\) The criteria used to identify best practices: significance of impact; effectiveness and efficiency to achieve gender-related objectives; repeatable procedures that have proven themselves as effective over time; innovation, creativity and originality; partnership for successful learning and capacity development; and informing the experience from the beginning” (UNMIL 2010, vii). Two additional areas of achievement were in advocacy and policy-making, through enhanced institutional capacities of the government and national women’s organisations, and in addressing sexual and gender based violence through nationwide initiatives and coordinated responses.
gender balance among uniformed personnel in peacekeeping missions. As discussed in Chapter 4, increasing the number of women in peace operations is one component of gender mainstreaming which seeks to bring a gender perspective and analysis into all policy and programmatic interventions. The NY meetings were a response to SCR 1325’s call to increase women’s leadership in peace-building and consistent with the Windhoek Declaration’s emphasis on women’s participation as a strategy for improving ‘gender balance’ in peace operations (UN DPKO 2006; Conaway 2006). The idea has been attributed to Ms. Kiran Bedi, the first female senior police adviser at UN DPKO. According to a 2006 article in the UN Women’s Newsletter, Ms. Bedi initiated the plan because “she believes that women police are seen to be much less threatening, although they can be just as tough as men. In conflict situations, they are seen to be more approachable by other women and children” (Mehrota 2006, 12–13).

Although, at the time, India was the UN’s third largest troop contributing country, it had never before deployed an all-female unit. Ms. Bedi, an Indian national and former police officer, was familiar with the female battalion. In her newly created position in New York, Bedi was responsible for helping lead the reform process recommended in the Brahimi report to strengthen the role of UN police in peacekeeping operations. In other words, there were a constellation of factors that aligned: the UN’s dramatically increased need for highly trained paramilitary police; growing pressure on DPKO to increase the representation of women in peace operations; senior level ‘champions’ of SCR 1325; and the availability of a highly trained, well equipped all-female battalion from a country whose leadership as a troop contributor would be further enhanced.

The FFPU’s deployment did contribute significantly towards increasing the numbers of women in UNMIL, albeit in tactical, rather than strategic leadership positions. Before the FFPU’s arrival in Monrovia, there were 1,099 UN police personnel, of whom 76, or 6% were female. Among the formed police units, there were 478 personnel from three countries, Jordan, Nepal and Nigeria; 97% were male and 3% were female. Nigeria accounted for 13 of the women, and one woman was a member of the Nepal’s FPU. Additionally, the FFPU’s presence in Liberia is also associated with increasing the enrolment of Liberian women in the Liberia National Police from 12% in 2004/5 to 15% in 2005/6 (UN General Assembly 2007, 14). The FFPU were considered role models not

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154 Civilian Police Officer, M-CP8 and MCP2. 2007. Interview by author. Monrovia, Liberia. 18 October.
155 Unpublished Survey of UN police-women in UNMIL (2007), carried out by UNMIL’s UN Police Division in Monrovia, Liberia.
only because they occupied highly visible, non-traditional female roles, but also because of their achievements. While Liberia’s President referred to them as an ‘inspiration’, Lesley Pruitt’s discourse analysis of the FFPU’s media coverage, describes three classic but consistent portrayals of the unit as ‘strong, competent, and professional’ (Pruitt 2013). UNMIL’s senior gender adviser referred to the FFPU as “new and important best practice” demonstrating “the capacity of a women-only force to effectively implement formal security provision tasks while providing positive role modelling to citizens” (UNMIL, 2010, p. 40-41). According to UNDPKO’s annual publication, Year in Review:

The first deployment of an all-female police contingent to a peacekeeping mission was widely considered one of peace-keeping’s biggest innovations in 2007. The contingent’s success in demonstrating professionalism, cultivating warm relations with the local community, and inspiring Liberian women to serve in their national police force demonstrate the potential effect future deployments of all-female contingents could have in other UN peacekeeping contexts in the years ahead. (UN DPKO 2009a, 24–25)

The Unit felt pressure to prove their competence. In an interview, the unit commander stated, “We need to prove that we are trained and we don’t want concessions; we can perform as well if not better; there has been a lot of media hype and they feel pressure to prove themselves – we can’t make any errors”. And they did not. According to DPKO, the FFPU demonstrated women’s capacity to take on armed police functions as well as their male peers, and was also acknowledged by the [Liberian] President as “proving that women can effectively perform roles traditionally reserved for men (UN DPKO/DFS 2010a, 27). Commander Dhundia viewed their assigned deployment to guarding the presidential palace as evidence of respect for their competence: “We were deployed to executive mansion because we were better equipped and trained to manage demonstrations and fire fighting (we have our own water cannon); cordon and search operations, and deterrent raids”.

In both the media and academic analyses, however, the FFPU’s contribution’s as role models received far more attention than its operational mandate. Although the media frequently associated the FFPU’s deployment with the UN’s response to preventing sexual and gender based violence and exploitation, their mandate did not include the responsibility to protect civilians, male or female, and contact with civilian populations was very limited. I explore these issues in the following section.


157 Ibid.
6.12 Women’s Participation in Peacekeeping: An Operational Imperative

The FFPU’s deployment has become an emblematic and much celebrated indicator of the UN’s commitment to implementing Resolution 1325. It coincided with UNMIL’s campaigns to increase women’s participation within the Liberian National Police and to create awareness about preventing sexual and gender based violence. In 2007, although criminal activities, including armed robbery, had decreased significantly in Monrovia, the numbers of reported cases of rape were increasing (United Nations Security Council 2007, 3). President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the first elected female president of an African country, had long declared sexual and gender based violence and exploitation to be a central priority for the country’s recovery. Months before the FFPU’s arrival in Monrovia, President Johnson Sirleaf and UNMIL launched a major crime reduction initiative dubbed ‘Operation Sweeping Wave’.

UNMIL’s Gender Adviser credited the FFPU’s contribution to the UN’s efforts to prevent sexual violence, while recognising that their primary responsibility was to protect the security of UN staff and the President, “the all-female FP has proven to be a resource in the UN-coordinated response to sexual violence, and is cited by the community as a deterrent and response mechanism…by keeping the area secure and educating community members, acting as a reporting resource” (UNMIL 42-43).

But did the female unit improve women’s security? And why is the deployment of female peacekeepers considered an operational imperative? Despite limited empirical research, several reasons have been offered. UN DPKO states:

….In all peacekeeping operations where significant interaction with host communities is required the deployment of female peacekeepers has become not just desirable, but an operational imperative….while the presence of women does not provide a guarantee against continued violence and return to conflict, their absence virtually ensures it. (UN DPKO 2006, 3)

Bridges and Horsfall refer to the ‘wide and somewhat surprising consensus on the positive effects of women’s presence in peacekeeping’ (Bridges and Horsfall 2009). Three reasons emerge from the literature - their approachability, their rapport with women and communities and, relatedly, their ability to accessing ‘intelligence’ from female community members.158

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158 (D. Mazurana 2003; DeGroot 2001; Marks and Denham 2007; Carreiras 2014; Bridges and Horsfall 2009; Harris and Goldsmith 2010; Sanghera, Henry, and Higate 2008; Kleiven 2012)
The UN’s first feature about the FFPU’s deployment, in UNMIL’s flagship publication, UNMIL Focus, refers to the “unique strengths women can bring to the police components of peacekeeping operations”:

That female police officers often respond more effectively to incidents of violence against women because they are better equipped to deal with the victims of violence with confidence, compassion and respect. Female police officers rely more on communication skills and less on physical force than their male counterparts. As a result, women officers are often better at defusing potentially violent confrontations and are less likely to be involved in the use of excessive force. (UNMIL Focus, December 2006-2007 12-13)

In the UN Observer Mission in South Africa, Anu Pillay reiterates these strengths, pointing to the role of feminine traits, such as sharing information, intuitive decision (Meintjes, Pillay, and Turshen 2001). Similarly, UN DPKO’s head of Peacekeeping told the Security Council that “deploying a greater number of women peacekeepers would be an operational imperative” because they could “engage more effectively with the local population”. A UN meeting report on women in policing concludes:

Female police reportedly had a better rapport with the community – both men and women – and women were more effective as such tasks as crowd control, where the techniques of women were more effective at calming large groups than the often more aggressive tactics of their male counterparts” (Stanley Foundation 2006).

The OGA explains that mission and unit leadership encouraged the female units to develop their outreach activities and to ‘cultivate a greater sense of contribution’ (UNMIL 2010, 45). These included the provision of free medical services, clean drinking water, and instruction in dance and self-defence. Because of this, the OGA notes that female patients provide ‘valuable tactical information’ and are more likely to report crimes and share intelligence with female police (UNMIL 2010). Commander Dhundia echoed this point and, in speaking of the advantages of sex segregated police units, she said, “women have a sixth sense – a better sense of environment and intelligence”. The OGA report notes this was also the case with Muslim women in Liberia who felt more comfortable approaching a female authority, where Ghana’s female peacekeepers were deployed (Ibid.).

In 2010, an OGA commissioned consultant, Kristen Cordell, pointed to the Units’ deterrent impact, its unique approach to community outreach and its impact on intelligence

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The OGA’s review of best practices concludes that, “the all-female FPU has proven to be a resource in the UN-coordinated response to sexual violence, and is cited by the community as a deterrent and response mechanism...by keeping the area secure and educating community members, acting as a reporting resource” (UNMIL 2010, 42–43).

Drawing from focus group interviews carried out among host communities in each of the five areas where different FPUs were deployed, (in 2010, three years of sequential deployment), Cordell (Cordell 2011b) associates the FFPU’s presence with lower crime rates, and especially “home-based crimes’ such as domestic violence. A Danish Broadcasting Corporation documentary about the FFPU, was even more explicit about the FPU’s role in protecting women:

But there is also another very important reason why the UN has sent in an entirely female unit in Liberia. For many years, the UN has had a big problem with UN personal abusing women. And in Liberia there have been a lot of cases – last year 30 cases, and the year before, 45. And this among other things is where the Indian women will help to make a change. (Bendixen 2007)

Cordell reports that women living in close proximity to the Unit’s base felt safer and reported fewer incidents of sexual exploitation and abuse (i.e. sexual abuse and exploitation committed by UN personnel) than women in other areas near a PKO deployment. “According to community members, the presence of the female police and peacekeepers in UNMIL has led to enhanced physical safety and security - through night patrols, lighting and armed presence” (UNMIL 2010, 40). Cordell states:

The all-female FPU have provided a crucial resource in the UN coordinated response to sexual violence....as a deterrent for SGBV by keeping the area secure and establishing strong communication networks with community members...secondly, they provide sensitisation mechanisms for education community members through increased discussions about preventing rape. Finally, the Unit is a resource for women in the community to report experienced assault. This prevention and response approach is very conducive to lessening the effects of SGBV in the community. (Cordell 2011a, 8)

In distinguishing between the female FPU and the predominately male FPUs from Jordan, Nepal and Nigeria, the OGA claims that the all-female units “had a clear idea of
their mission and purpose” whereas the four predominantly male units “view their mission in a more narrow way…The all-male FPU, discussed their impact in terms of crime rates for armed robbery and assault, with little attention to the wider provision of human security” (UNMIL 2010, 44). The OGA further concludes:

The FPU contributed to a “positive and sustainable change in women’s and girls’ empowerment and rights…women live in a somewhat safer and more secure Liberia as a product of novel awareness and protection mechanisms, improvement in outlets for seeking redress, and presence of women in national Security Sector bodies and international peacekeeping community” (Ibid., 56).

Thus far, I have shown how the female FPU has been viewed as a strategy for implementing SCR 1325 by increasing gender balance in peace operations and by improving women’s security. The additional emphasis given to the FPU’s particular contribution as women and as role models, draws on their innate feminine qualities illustrates what Marsha Henry characterises as:

..an implicit dichotomy between the idea that women are as militarily capable as men yet distinctly different in their gendered disposition and character…Thus, although women can be ‘trained’ like traditional male soldiers, there are still aspects of their embodied gender ‘character’ that cannot be ‘erased’ for the purpose of militarised duty. (Henry 2012 24-25)

In the next section, I examine the second, ‘protection of civilians’ narrative about the female FPU’s deployment.

6.13 An FPU Like Any Other FPU? The Protection of Civilians Frame

In the literature on policing in UN peace operations, UNMIL’s deployment of formed police units marks a significant turning point in the way UN peace operations responded to the ‘rule of law vacuum’. In his pivotal 2004 report on the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan described gaps in the UN’s military, civilian and policing mandates and capacities to respond to situations without any criminal justice mechanisms:

In such situations, peacekeepers have encountered wrongdoers in the midst of committing serious criminal acts of a direct threat to civilians and to the operation itself. Military components typically lack the training, skills and resources to address such situations. At the same time, civilian components of peace operations, including police, are often too slowly deployed and are seldom mandated to undertake executive functions, such as arrest…. (UN Security Council 2004c, 9)
The report also underscored the absence of tools and mechanisms to promote gender justice. Liberia was among the countries referred to in the report and embodied all of these challenges. In addition, the false start of the demobilisation programme led to riots in the first few months of the mission’s deployment.

Absent a functioning criminal justice system – including correction facilities, investigative capacity, basic equipment, and qualified judicial and legal officers, UNMIL had few tools at its disposal to respond to these challenges. For these reasons, Kofi Annan’s report emphasised the need for a broader set of policing interventions that would also help build a countries governance and institutional capacity to establish the rule of law and a functional justice system. Specifically, the report noted:

Policing interventions in post-conflict environments...must be linked to parallel support to the other institutions and functions of the justice system. Enhancing the capacity of police (or United Nations Civilian Police) to make arrests cannot be seen as a contribution to the rule of law if there are no modern laws to be applied, no humane and properly resourced and supervised detention facilities in which to hold those arrested, no functioning judiciary to try them lawfully and expeditiously, and no defence lawyers to represent them. (UN Security Council 2004c, 9)

The Secretary-General’s report was a response to the Brahimi Panel’s call for a doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police and in rule of law components. And although this call was not heeded entirely, it did mark a significant shift in the UN’s use of civilian police to protect civilians and support the rule of law and transitional justice. The UN Secretary General’s first proposed concept of operation for the UN Mission in Liberia reflected this new emphasis in proposing the deployment of a robust civilian police component that would “comprise up to 875 unarmed civilian police, including senior advisers, trainers, planners and police experts on human rights, serious crimes and human trafficking investigators” (UN Security Council 2003d). This was in addition to the phased deployment of five armed formed police units, each with 120 officers, in the first six months to “provide tactical, operational capacity building support to the interim police force in addressing threats to law and order, and to act in support of the protection of civilian lives and property in areas of deployment” (Ibid., p.18-19).

The argument also took into account the time it would take to establish a new Liberian police service - anticipated at 2 years, but still on going at the time of writing - more than 11.
units were to deploy initially in and around Monrovia, the capital city, and then in three regional headquarters, by which time it was assumed that the second phase of disarmament would have commenced.

But the Security Council only approved only 755 of the requested 875 civilian police officers, and only three of the five FPUs (UN General Assembly 2003b). It took some ten months to deploy all three, despite the human rights crisis that characterized the country, and the growing number of areas plagued by violent crimes and mob violence, serial rapes and multiple murders:

While the security situation has improved nationwide with the on going deployment of peacekeepers, serious problems remain owing to the widespread absence of civil authority. There have been isolated cases of attacks on civilians, including killings, torture, rape, harassment, looting, extortion, forced labour and restrictions on freedom of movement and personal liberty by elements associated with the armed factions. Most of the abuses and violations have taken place in isolated areas where peacekeepers have not been deployed. However, dealing with perpetrators in areas of military deployment also remains a serious challenge in the absence of police or other civil authorities. (UN Security Council 2004d, 7–9)

Although UNMIL was operating at nearly 90% of the approved force strength in 2004, violent demonstrations continued to overwhelm the capital city, Monrovia, where many ex-combatants had relocated. In the interior of the country, increased criminal activity and violence was rampant at dockyards and plantations. This led UNMIL to reduce the number of unarmed civilian police and add a fourth FPU to carry out ‘robust joint patrols’ with the Liberia National Police.165 In the interior of the country, FPUs were already providing tactical support to the civilian police teams in response to the growing frequency of criminal activity, looting, and violent incidents at dockyards and plantations. This unrest was linked to the growing frustration among combatants who were still waiting for the disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration programmes to begin. Thousands of ex-combatants were said to have regrouped in and around in diamond and gold mining areas as well as on rubber plantations, to illegally exploit Liberia’s abundant natural resources.

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165 There is no record of the Secretary-General ever requesting the fourth unit. UNMIL budgets and progress reports refer to the Secretary-General’s overall discretion in deploying different kinds of components while keeping within the maximum authorized level of troops. But the performance and budget reports both indicate an anticipated reduction in the number of FPUs; this is are oddly inconsistent with the Secretary General’s narrative appeals made in his progress reports requesting additional FPUs.
It would ultimately take five requests over four years for the Security Council to approve a fifth formed police unit that had been requested by the Secretary General in his first proposal made in 2003. This fifth unit was the all-female formed police unit on which my research focused. In other words, from the perspective of mission planning, the units’ nationality and composition were incidental; the urgent need was for a highly trained armed unit to respond to the specific public security threats plaguing the country: mob violence and armed incidents in and around the plantations, ports, prisons, and UN and government facilities.

Although UNMIL’s reports to the Security Council also documented high rates of sexual and gender based violence, as well as other human rights violations against women, including violent crime, murder, and displacement, these were not among the threats that FPUs are deployed to address. Rather, the Secretary-General’s appeals for a fifth unit continued to emphasise the ‘fragile security situation’ and “alarming incidents of mob violence in January 2005, ritual killings and the destruction of police and UN property” (UN Security Council 2005c). In other words, despite growing threats to women’s security, UNMIL’s rationale for deploying an additional formed police unit was completely unrelated. Rather, these gender-related security threats were considered the responsibility of the UNMIL’s civilian components, namely, the civilian police, gender, human rights, and protection units, despite the limited impact of tools and resources available to these units. UNMIL’s report to the Security Council noted that:

Sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) programs are having limited impact despite collaborative efforts. Numerous collaborative approaches to tackling alarmingly high SGBV rates have been implemented including: a new rape law introduced in 2006; a dedicated court for sexual violence; a joint programme between UNMIL and the Government of Liberia aimed at improving the criminal justice system approach to SGBV; community-level initiatives; and case tracking. Incidence of sexual violence, nonetheless, remains high. (Ibid., 9)

These post-conflict capacity challenges were precisely the challenges referred to in Kofi Annan’s rule of law report, which called for increased capacity, resources, and better mandates for peace operations to help meet these gaps. In Liberia, although some progress had been made in amending a ‘rape law’ and in providing training about the Juvenile Justice Procedure code, there were few prosecutions and investigations of rape and sexual assault, even against young children. UNMIL attributed this to poor case-management, the
absences of skilled investigators and prosecutors, and the lack of public understanding (Ibid).

Prior to the elections scheduled for October and November 2005, the Secretary General made two additional appeals to the Security Council to approve the fifth FPU. Neither invoked a rationale that considered women’s security or gender issues of any kind. Instead, the Secretary-General’s request focused on the need to “enhance the Mission’s response capability to emerging security challenges” that were anticipated during the elections. These involved leadership disputes within one of the armed factions (Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD)) and the slow progress in reintegrating loyalists of former President Charles Taylor were rapidly taking on ethnic and religious dimensions. In explaining the need for the FFPU, he stated:

This additional unit will be expected to be mobile and flexible, allowing for a swift response to problems in outlying areas, without diminishing the civil disturbance control capabilities of the other four formed police units located in the densely-populated areas of Monrovia, Buchanan and Gbarnga. The need for a well-equipped specialist unit, which can use non-lethal tactics to control crowds, cannot be satisfied by the newly restructured Liberian National Police, who will be relatively inexperienced and ill-equipped by the time of the elections, or by UNMIL troops who are not the best suited for such operations. (UN Security Council 2005d)

The Secretary-General’s fourth appeal for the additional FPU emphasised the “potential for increased public disorder, given the heightened expectations of the population following the inauguration of the new Government”:

The additional unit, to be deployed in a major population centre, would enable UNMIL to respond effectively and promptly to situations of public unrest, bearing in mind the potential and current threats to stability…and the security risks that will inevitably arise from the implementation of the far-reaching reforms of the President. The deployment of that unit will also provide the Liberian Police Support Unit with additional time to develop the practical experience it requires to eventually take over those responsibilities from UNMIL. (UN Security Council 2006b, 13)

In reviewing UNMIL’s proposed request, the ACABQ noted its willingness to approve the budget for the additional unit, but the Security Council did not approve.

166 Although the ‘gender’ literature on UNMIL and peace building have documented women’s role in various political parties and peace movements, it is remarkably silent on the fascinating power struggle between Aisha Conneh and her husband. Aisha’s connections to the Guinean President – as his ‘spiritual adviser’ – ensured funding and arms for LURD. But when Conneh appointed the brother of his former wife to a post in the transitional government, Aisha split ranks and ultimately succeeded in ousting Conneh from his position. This drama is well documented in UNMIL reports, without any gender commentary.
After the elections, the Secretary General made his fifth appeal for the FPU, based on a DPKO led interdepartmental assessment mission. Although a number of participating agencies are cited, there are no references to the inclusion of gender expertise, and the recommendations contain no attention to gender issues or women’s security. Concluding that there was no longer an ‘immediate armed threat within Liberia’ the mission proposed a seven-stage drawdown plan for UNMIL.

On this basis, the Secretary-General proposed reducing UNMIL’s military component by one infantry battalion in mid-2006 and another infantry battalion in early 2007, while strengthening the Mission’s police component. The Secretary-General also proposed that the military component be tasked with protecting civilians, key government installations and UN personnel and assets, while UNMIL’s civilian police shift from policing and operations to supporting institutional development, advising and mentoring. The need for specialised strategies and personnel to respond to the specific threats facing women were never included in these proposals, despite the call for specialist United Nations police personnel in areas such as administration, police budgeting, forensics, diamond policing, immigration and border security, and Interpol operations (Ibid., p.13).

It was only after the Secretary General’s fifth appeal for the FPU, made in his 11th progress report, that the Security Council provided authorisation. Again, the request contained no references to specific security threats facing women. Rather, it specified UNMIL’s need to:

- Respond effectively and promptly to situations of public unrest that could arise from the various retrenchment exercises currently under way, as well as the Government reform initiatives, the increase in localised criminal activities and the planned reduction in the military component later in the year. [The FPU] would also provide an opportunity for the Liberian Police Support Unit to acquire the practical experience it requires to eventually take over those responsibilities from UNMIL. (UN Security Council 2006c)

The Secretary General was finally able to announce the planned arrival of the fifth unit in his 12th progress report of 12 September 2006. Expected to arrive in January 2007, the Secretary General reiterated its primary task, to ‘support the efforts of the Liberian National Police in containing threats to public order in Monrovia and other urban centres, as well as on rubber plantations’ (UN Security Council 2006d).

In other words, the all-female FPU that would deploy in January 2007, had no responsibility for protecting civilians or security sector reform or any aspect of UNMIL’s mission that would be concerned with women’s security. It is not surprising, therefore,
that the Secretary General’s first account of the unit’s deployment, after three months in Monrovia, contained none of the celebratory exclamation that characterized the media frenzy regarding the all-female unit’s arrival. Instead, the report states:

The fifth formed police unit, from India, comprising 105 women and 20 men, arrived in the Mission on 30 January. This unit is the first predominantly female police unit deployed in the history of the United Nations. During the reporting period, the UNMIL police component continued to mentor, monitor, advise, train and support the Liberian National Police. It supported the efforts of the Liberian National Police to contain threats to public order in Monrovia and other urban centres, as well as on rubber plantations. It also provided basic and specialised training for Liberian National Police personnel and immigration and naturalisation officers. (UN Security Council 2007c, 4)

The interim gender adviser in DPKO’s Best Practice Unit reiterated the division of responsibility within UN peacekeeping for gender issues in an interview just after the FFPU deployed. She stated, “the Gender Adviser in UNMIL is responsible for strategy and policy development on gender issues and in responding to SGBV, not the FPUs.”\(^\text{167}\) This echoed the response of another DPKO police adviser that I interviewed in Monrovia, who said “the gender focal point is responsible for strategy and policy development….the FFPU is just another FPU…they are not police advisers.”\(^\text{168}\) Although UNMIL’s OGA had been credited with coordinating the female squad’s tour of duty (Henry 2009), the unit had no reporting relationship to the OGA’s office.

In summary, the UN Security Council, DPKO, the UN Secretary General, and the ACABQ, did not deploy the fifth FPU as a strategy for implementing SCR 1325. Rather, in this section, I presented an alternative policy rationale focusing on the need for specialised capacities within peace operations to respond to public security threats that fall outside of the skills and mandate of civilian and military personnel. According to this policy construct, the all-female FPU was deployed to protect UN personnel and assets, to control riots, and to provide operational backup to the LNP. These tactical functions do not overlap with UN civilian police responsibilities that emphasise the reform, restructuring, and rebuilding of national forces. Nor do they overlap with the longer term need for institutional capacity to provide security and justice.

In the following section, I compare the two policy narratives regarding the FFPU’s deployment.

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\(^{168}\) Civilian Police Adviser (M-CP8). 2007. Interviewed by author. 20 October.
6.2 Analysis: Is the FFPU like any FPU?

In this chapter, I have explored two different policy constructs that explain the rationale for the deploying the FFPU to the UN Mission in Liberia, and its contributions to implementing SCR 1325. According to the ‘gender mainstreaming’ narrative, the unit was deployed to increase women’s participation in peacekeeping, and, in so doing, served as role models for Liberian women and brought a unique female perspective into their work that had a meaningful operational impact in increasing women’s security. When viewed from the perspective of the UN peacekeeping reforms and the protection of civilians, however, the FFPUs significance has more to do with the UN’s growing utilisation of formed police units in peace operations than with the sex of its members. In this section, I compare both of these policy narratives, focusing on two central themes that emerged from my research and interviews with UNMIL and UN staff: gender balance and role modelling, and operational impacts.

6.2.1 Gender Balance and Role Modelling

The UN is currently addressing a number of challenges to improving the section, recruitment, and deployment of police in UN peacekeeping. In addition to gender balance, these include the challenge of finding “enough of the right sorts of expertise; adapting police from partly democratic or autocratic states to the needs of democratic policing; and maintaining quality control in selection and recruitment” (Durch and Ker 2013, 9). In 2009, the UN began publishing gender statistics for military and police deployments with the launch of ‘Global Effort’, a campaign to increase the participation of female police officers in UN peacekeeping missions. Despite an overall target of 20%, UNMIL at its highest had 15% in 2009 and only 13% in 2013. The challenges are even greater among military and FPU recruits and have as much to do with obstacles at the national level as they do with the peacekeeping environment itself.

In one of the few studies about female participation in formed police units, Charlotte Anderholt notes:

Because FPUs are recruited from member State police forces, the obstacles to integration in contributing nations are the first-level obstacles to increasing female participation FPU or other UN police units. (Anderholt 2012, 43)

By extension, the all-female model is only replicable in in places where such teams are sex segregated; a policy approach that many states would consider discriminatory. Currently, Bangladesh, India, and Nigeria contribute 84% of female FPU personnel
Bangladesh and India are the only countries to have deployed all-female units.

As described earlier, India’s use of all-female units reflect cultural concerns about men and women working together and about the potential risks associated with male police engaging with female members of the population. Arguably, the very basis of the unit’s creation reflects values that are incompatible with SCR 1325. Because FPUs must be self-sustaining drawn from a single country and require at least six months of experience working together as a unit, women’s participation in FPUs will depend on their participation in similar structures at the national level.\(^{169}\)

Further compounding these challenges, is the lack of clarity regarding the locus of responsibility for ensuring gender balance. An Office of Internal Oversight Services audit of UNMIL police found that “the mission did not have any control over the nationalities and gender of UN Police Officers sent to them” while, at the same time, they are still expected to “ensure that postings are occurring with due regard to gender and national balance and to submit regular reports on nationality and gender composition (UN Office of Internal Oversight Services 2008, 14)”: There thus appeared to be a contradiction in that the mission is asked to ensure and report on equitable geographic and gender composition although they have no authority to ensure the achievement of the desired nationality and gender balance take place...[DPKO] stated that UNMIL recognised that it has a core, mandated responsibility to foster both gender awareness and the participation of women within each aspect of daily operations, whether internal or external, and in the contacts with its stakeholders. The Police Division noted that the responsibility for recruiting police personnel rests with Headquarters and field missions. While the authority for balanced recruitment remains in the Police Division, the distribution of assignments in peacekeeping operations is the field mission's Chief of Police Component's responsibility. The missions should ensure balance (nationality and gender) in senior post assignments in the field. (Ibid., 9)

Although the frequent rotations of FPUs are considered to be operationally limiting and, according to DPKO one of the reasons that capacity-building is not a core FPU task, the relatively shorter deployments of FPUs as compared to civilian police or military contingents is an enabling factor when it comes to recruiting women, especially those with children and dependents (UN DPKO/DFS 2009, 5). The FFPU had agreed to a six-month tour of duty but this was extended to a year without consulting the contingent. This was a

\(^{169}\) This requirement was added after a review of FPUs in 2007 identified significant capacity weaknesses, although none were specifically associated with the FFPU.
significant drain on many of the troops, 70% of whom were married with families. Said one of the FFPU officers:

All FPUs are supposed to have six-month contracts – especially for women with families; we were never asked if we wanted to extend. The first precedent – a one-year tour for an Indian FPU was in DRC and Kosovo – but this was with an all male FPU. You can’t treat them the same.

Dhundia explained that although her personnel were entitled to 15 days leave every six months, none could take leave because they hadn’t received their mission allowance, $1.28 a day, and because there were no concessions for airfare which cost approximately $1400 round trip from Liberia to India. For Dhundia, this affected staff morale, “The most stressful part of my job is taking care of their emotional status; I am a counsellor and should be able to add a counsellor to the team.”

Henry portrays this issue as a gendered form of emotional labour (Henry 2012); yet both male and female troops are affected by emotional stress; an issues that is rarely discussed in the literature.

Other obstacles for recruiting and retaining women in peacekeeping operations include the absence of mechanisms to ensure the protection of female personnel from sexual exploitation and abuse by other UN civilian and military staff or from the host community. While there has been no incidence of sexual exploitation or abuse committed by female formed police, female officers may become targets of sexual exploitation or abuse or other public violence. Interestingly, the single disciplinary issue encountered by the FFPU was from a male logistics officer and driver who threatened to kill one of the FFPU’s senior officers. Although the Unit was concerned that reporting the incident could put India’s reputation at risk, they were supported by their director general who argued that it would be worse if he had killed someone. Statements were taken and reports filed, but there was no inquiry or investigation into the matter in the three months since the incident had taken place. According to a source close to the incident, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York rejected the claim and recommended an internal investigation.

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172 The ACABQ (UN General Assembly 2005c, 14) reported that 32 deaths had occurred since the inception of the Mission, including 19 cases of serious psychological stress disorders, including suicides. The Committee expressed its concern regarding overall staff morale and recommended that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations take preventive measures to address these concerns.
173 The UN uses the term ‘sexual exploitation and abuse’ to refer to acts of sexual and gender based violence committed by peacekeeping personnel or other humanitarian or aid workers while ‘sexual and gender based violence’ is used in relation to all other perpetrators.
investigation. Although the perpetrator had been disarmed, he was not repatriated and continued to receive full salary while having a disturbing impact on morale.

With such a narrowly defined mandate, the FFPU had no formal relationship with the Women and Child Protection Units that had been established by UNMIL’s civilian police unit. Apart from some ‘pep talks’ to female Liberian recruits to the LNP, the FFPU played no role in UNMIL’s campaign to increase Liberian women’s enrolment in the LNP. Rather, the campaign was assisted by the OGA and sought to increase women’s participation to 15% of recruits. Although the number of female applicants increased, enrolment was not sustained and there were significant challenges regarding retention and promotion.

Considerable efforts were made to address obstacles such as housing and childcare, and women’s educational deficits. Because most female applicants did not meet the minimum educational requirements, a supplementary high school equivalency Educational Support Program (ESP) was introduced. This affirmative action was not without controversy. According to UN policing expert William Durch, educational standards were lowered so significantly that some of the female recruits “were incapable of performing basic police functions even after training” (Durch, England, and Mangan 2012, 38–39). This resulted in higher rates of attrition or, if the recruits stayed on, negative impacts on the morale of the officers that met the education requirements.

The enrolment of female officers in the LNP was a major focus of media attention and UN reporting. And the OGA claimed that women’s increased participation in the LNP enhanced its validity in the community and “improved trust and buy-in of the Liberian National Police by the community, especially women” (UNMIL 2010, 24). However, most media interest centered on the numbers of women recruited rather than their mandates or women’s security. The ESP recruitment effort was considered more of a benefit to the women it employed by providing a stable salary and education, than to the civilians they were supposed to protect. According to the OGA, “the ESP recruitment effort has promoted equality for women and girls in Liberia - by providing education, sustainable income improved security, and new sense of women’s rights.”

6.22 Operational and Tactical Dimensions of Women’s Security

Within the gender mainstreaming narrative of the FFPU’s deployment, the distinction between formed and civilian police units is rarely made, despite their significant differences. For example, it is not remarkable, as Pruitt suggests, that the discourse surrounding the FFPU appears to be ‘overly militarised’ (Pruitt 2013). Instead, I argue, the discourse reflects the fact that the FFPUs functions were more militarised than those of civilian police. As an FPU, the Indian contingent’s main responsibilities in Liberia included joint patrolling, asset maintenance (e.g., guarding the presidential palace and Ministry of Foreign Affairs), crowd, and riot control. To carry out these functions, the FFPU came equipped with INSAS rifles, AK-47s, light machine guns, teargas shells, pistols, and batons in addition to bullet proof and riot control vehicles, and night vision devices and their own water cannon.

The unit’s six weeks of pre-deployment training was designed to meet these expectations and focused on civil disorder management, crowd control, the appropriate use of force, and weapons management. Perhaps more remarkable is that the FFPU neither received nor came with any specialised training on gender issues. Nor did their in-service training include information about Liberia’s formal and customary legal and criminal standards with respect to sexual and gender based violence. They also did not know how to handle prostitution; not only had they not been briefed on the national laws regarding rape and prostitution, but they also had no powers of arrest. One member of the FFPU described a street interaction between a man and woman that, in India, would have been considered a “criminal act of indecency”. While on patrol with their Liberian counterparts, however, they were told not to intervene.

In this context, FFPU personnel explained that they had attempted to impart what they considered professional standards of conduct – by way of example – during their joint patrols with the Liberian National Police. Initially, ten rapid action female officers in the FFPU platoon were assigned to work with and backstop their Liberian National Police counterparts. But according to one FFPU member, it took some effort to ‘balance the numbers’ (Ibid). Initially they assigned five to six women to patrol jointly with equal numbers of their Liberian counterparts. However, due to high levels of absenteeism, they ultimately ended up pairing two FFPU officers with two Liberian officers. The FFPU

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member interviewed estimated approximately 65% absenteeism, mainly because they hadn’t been paid in the previous two-three months but also because they wouldn’t patrol during the rainy season and weren’t provided with flashlights, batteries, or raincoats. According to FFPU leaders, these joint patrols with the Liberian National Police provided their most direct engagement with local communities.

Although the FFPU did take part in the mobile patrols among civilian populations for a brief period, unit leadership considered foot patrols to be a more operationally efficient way to assess and respond to women’s security risks and needs, and to build confidence within local communities. Foot patrols were limited, however, because UNMIL considered mobile patrols “operationally more efficient mode of patrolling, from the perspective of ground coverage (UN General Assembly 2007, 5). UNMIL’s acting Police Commissioner, Ibrahim Idris, explained that UNMIL “changed from foot to vehicle patrols because the military can cover larger areas and have a stronger deterrent capacity.” The head of UNMIL’s Joint Mission Analysis Centre, Colonel Watts, further explained that UNPOL did not have sufficient vehicle mounted communications equipment nor enough military force to carry out foot patrols. An OIOS evaluation of peacekeeping operations makes a similar point:

In some missions, a lack of permanently based staff in remote communities, or in patrols in which soldiers do not leave their vehicles, hamper information gathering. Interviewees felt that opportunities existed for improvement, and that getting information and building community trust required long-term presence. (UN Office of Internal Oversight Services 2014, 18)

More typically, Commander Dhundia explained, the FFPU was deployed at night in mobile units, dressed in full combat gear and therefore indistinguishable from their male colleagues.

FPU’s serve operational rather than advisory functions. Even at the level of commander, they are not consulted in the development of operational strategies that are the responsibility of the UNPOL Commissioner. Although the gender mainstreaming narrative offers an implicit, and sometimes explicit correlation between the FFPU and the design of policing strategies to improve women’s security, there are no institutional mechanisms for engaging FPU in these processes. Dhundia herself and the contingent...
thought they would more involved in the local community, but, she said, “It's not there in the mandate - there is no differentiation among FPUs or in what they are supposed to do. We were deployed to executive mansion because we were better”.  

Beyond this, the FFPU’s contact with local communities was limited to the voluntary services it provided in their surrounding locale. These informal contributions to the community were similar to those of other FPUs – all of which are required to bring Level 1 hospitals (i.e. primary health and emergency care) and water treatment facilities. Similarly, the FFPU opened up their level one hospital to provide limited services to local communities despite their own limited stocks and staff.  

In addition to providing some community support, the gender mainstreaming narrative also refers to the FFPU’s role in information collection and reporting from the community. But interviews with UNMIL’s acting Police Commissioner, Ibrahim Idris, Colonel Watts, head of the Joint Mission Analysis Center and Asatu Bah, Kenneth, Deputy Inspector General of the LNAP and Head of the Women and Children Protection unit, reported that there were no specialised information collection protocols or analysis regarding women’s security risks and needs.  

No specific information was available at the time, regarding trends in sexual violence about victims or perpetrators (although UNMIL was reportedly establishing such a database). In an interview, Deputy Inspector General Bah Kenneth referred, en passant, to reports of rape under the tables in the market place and in the cemetery where former combatants and drug addicts were living. Their response was to demolish the market tables. At no point had other options been considered – e.g. lighting, special patrol groups.  

The acting Police Commissioner said that he did not receive any such intelligence from the Joint Military Action Centre (JMAC), his primary source of information, while the head of the JMAC said that no one had ever asked him for any specific information on gender issues but that anyone could make a request for information as long as they are working at the behest of the SRSG:

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185 Ibid.
186 Due to the growing numbers of female staff deployed in peace operations, a gynaecology module was introduced as a part of the reimbursable expenses of troop contributing countries only in 2010. A/C.5/65/16, annex 7.8.
Purely from a military perspective, gender is not part of my requirements. I only give him [the Police Commissioner] what he asks me for…priorities are given by the Force Commander and the Gender Adviser.” He further explained, “Human security has never been high on the priorities and slow to get onto the military agenda. The Military are not turned on by gender issues, and tend to paternalistic, old fashioned, and chauvinist and increasingly so, on mission. [They are focused on] primary evils – death is worse than being raped and maimed because at least you survive ‘intact’.

I spent over an hour with the Colonel asking specific questions about the various threats facing women, for example, regarding geographic hot spots in relation to markets, border cross, plantations or in the context of the local division of labour e.g. women’s roles within charcoal production, fisheries or agriculture. By asking these questions, I sought to establish a more specific, operational, and tangible way of understanding how security threats may differ for men as compared to women. These questions elicited a very different response and the discussion moved to ways in which intelligence collection could help identify these trends and pinpoint hotspot areas or develop other forms of security. I was invited to submit a draft intelligence collection protocol (which I circulated to the gender theme group for follow-up) and the Colonel introduced the possibility of recruiting an expert on sexual crimes.

My experience with the Colonel was similar to many interviews that I have carried out with UN military personnel in the twenty years I have been working on UN related security issues. As illustrated in Chapter 4, the discourse of ‘gender mainstreaming’ has not resonated in this sector and it has been difficult for a range of different actors – from the ACABQ and DPKO to member states – to translate these concepts into the political and technical discourse with which they work. It is also true that there is far more gender expertise in the area of human rights and law, than in defence or security; areas in which generalist ‘gender focal points and advisers’ may have less to offer in developing tactical, operational, and strategic security policies and strategies that take women’s security risks and needs into account.

The absence of mechanisms for the FFPU to engage at the policy level is a missed opportunity for improving the responsiveness of tactical units in peacekeeping operations. Moreover, the FFPU’s achievements in UNMIL were, in great part, due to their specialised training in India as counter-insurgency specialists. This suggests that their successes may

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have less to do with their sex and more to do with their security background and training rather than any innate feminine qualities or ‘gender expertise’.

6.3 Conclusion

The arrival of the well-armed and equipped female unit projected an image of protective strength rather than aggressive force. This helped reinforce the public perception of the UN’s commitment to enforce peace and protect civilians, despite the FFPU’s very narrow mandate that was limited to riot control, the protection of UN personnel and buildings, the presidential palace, and backstopping the Liberia National Police. Of all UN components – military, civilian, and police, an FFPU’s mandate is the least relevant to developing strategies for improving women’s security. As tactical units, FPUs do not play a policy-setting role, and they are rarely consulted by security planners about their experiences.

The media immediately seized upon the novelty and provocative imagery of the FFPU, creating a sensation that the unit or UNMIL did not anticipate\textsuperscript{190}. The unit’s projected strength had everything to do with their impressive display of weapons, and the irony of drawing this strength from weapons - the primary source of violence and insecurity in Liberia - is often lost. In some respects, the FFPU represent a ‘feminised’ version of the ‘militarised masculinities’ that feminist peace activists and scholars repudiate. Given that most outside observers – be they media, the host community – assume that every peacekeeper has the responsibility for protecting civilians – the UN had to find a way to represent the FFPU’s tasks accurately while still benefiting from the positive public reception to them. This may help explain why almost all formal UN reports emphasise the FFPU’s contribution as role models.

The FFPU’s physical presence also had a deterrent impact in relation to violence prevention as do all FPUs; this is one of the reasons that FPUs are deployed strategically to areas where their physical presence can have a deterrent impact. That the male FPUs were more focused on ‘crime prevention’ while the FFPU was reportedly more focused on their social impact’ might well be a concern and risk to women’s security, rather than a positive enhancement as the OGA suggests. The positive impact of the FFPU’s medical staff may also be related to their experience in responding to women’s health needs; I don’t know of any female medical professionals deployed with male or mixed FPUs.

\textsuperscript{190} The SRSG had declined a request from DPKO to carry out a case study of the FFPU and suggested that they come after a year – knowing that the deployment was planned for six months (F-UN2, 2007. Interview by author. October 1).
Although claims are made that female units (and this FFPU in particular) are less likely to use violence, it is not clear if this is because they are female or because of their specific training. In 2004, long before the unit deployed, Thakur and Wiggen characterise the Indian Army as especially relevant for UN PKOs:

The Indian Army's experience in conducting counter-insurgency operations within the country with great understanding and compassion for the locals of the areas affected by insurgency, enables it to put into practice techniques and approaches in UN peacekeeping operations that are unmatched by most other contingents. (Thakur and Wiggen 2004, 113)

Moreover, questions on the use of force by FFPUs have been central in the development of new guidance, doctrine, and training given the growing variability in the quality of deployment and the policing approaches and styles of police contributing countries that may have less-than democratic policing systems.

Although violence against women and girls became increasingly widespread in Liberia throughout UNMIL’s deployment, the mission’s response emphasised its role in relation to the rule of law, human rights, and gender. Despite UNMIL’s commitment to preventing sexual and gender-based violence, these concerns were not addressed in relation to the role of FPUs, intelligence collection, or the protection of civilians. Instead, UNMIL’s strategies to implement SCR 1325 were developed in parallel to strategies for protecting civilians, emphasising gender mainstreaming and the rule of law.

The global division of labour that characterises UN peacekeeping, and UN police in particular, continues to generate debates between the wealthy countries that fund the operations and develop the mandates, and the police contributing countries from the global south that provide the boots on the ground:

Rich countries have largely chosen not to send their soldiers to the missions; instead, they fund operations and set their mandates. Filling the gap are soldiers from poor countries, largely in Asia and Africa. Their diplomats fume privately that their soldiers are treated like cannon fodder. Donor countries fume privately that the peacekeepers aren’t doing what they’re supposed to: save lives. “One side says, ‘you bleed more.’ The other side says, ‘you pay more’” is how one United Nations official described the divide. Bangladesh, India and Pakistan are the top three troop contributors, while the United States, Japan and France are the top three funders. As a result, the fights over peacekeeping often line up between the global south and north, with emerging world powers like
India and Brazil demanding to sit at the Security Council, where decisions about peacekeeping are made.  

These debates get to the heart of UN reform and Security Council membership. They also reinforce the arguments of those claiming that UN peace operations have become vehicles for advancing western neo-liberal agendas. Marsha Henry (2012) situates the FFPU within this international division of labour and characterises their ‘instrumentalisation’ in PKOs as ‘vehicles for legitimate intervention’ in the ‘rescue industry.’ For feminist peace activists and scholars, the discursive ‘protection’ dilemma is compounded by a far greater moral and ethical dilemma regarding the use of military force to ensure women’s security. On the one hand, feminists have made great strides in establishing the relevance of international human rights and humanitarian law to conflict-related sexual and gender based violence. On the other, there is growing concern about the UN’s use of force to protect civilians in situations where their governments are unwilling or unable. As protection of civilian mandates expand to cover a broader range of mission activities, where will gender based security threats be situated?  

In a review of the UN’s implementation of the POC mandate, the UN’s Office of Internal Oversight concluded that the risk and opportunities of this expansion will depend on the ability of UN missions to “enhance operational control over contingents; improving clarity of peacekeepers’ tasks at the tactical level, and improving the working-level relationship between peacekeeping operations and humanitarian entities.” (UN Office of Internal Oversight Services 2014, 2).  

If peace operations are to improve the protection of women by responding to gender specific security threats, the same assessment holds true. Much greater effort will be needed to specify the operational and tactical functions necessary for improving women’s security. Within this, much greater attention should be given to the role of civilian and formed police units. The absence of a fully operational women’s fund in conflict situations will continue to undermine the potential to strengthen working-level relationships between peacekeeping operations and humanitarian entities. Above all, much greater synergy is needed between the development and implementation of strategies to implement Security Council resolutions on women and on the protection of civilians.  

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Chapter 7
Conclusion

UN Security Council Resolution 1325 bestowed unprecedented legitimacy on an international peace-building agenda for women, and established new norms and standards for UN peace operations by mandating the consideration of gender equality in all Security Council actions to build peace and resolve conflicts. Although SCR 1325 marks a pivotal turning point in legitimising a long history of feminist and peace activism, a growing body of critical feminist scholarship is concerned that SCR 1325 is being instrumentalised by “militarist states and military institutions for military purposes” (Cockburn 2012, 48). According to these analyses, SCR 1325’s failings rest primarily on its conceptual frame and essentialist, discursive content.

My research proposes an alternative way of understanding SCR 1325’s genesis and implementation pathways. Instead of locating SCR 1325 within a narrative herstory of women’s peace activism, I recontextualise SCR 1325 as an evolutionary step in the Security Council’s repertoire of practice and the UN’s peace building discourse and reform efforts. My focus is on the UN actors, institutions, and mechanisms through which the resolution was negotiated, adopted, and made operational, as well as their interactions with feminist activists. By problematising the UN itself, my goal is to understand the political, bureaucratic, and institutional obstacles to, and opportunities for, fully realising SCR 1325’s potential. The current emphasis in feminist literature about SCR 1325 on the role of feminist activism in influencing international agendas, rather than on the challenges of implementation, leaves questions unaddressed about the UN’s potential for enabling feminist agendas. However, without assessing how gender, as a variable, is exercised in international organisations, feminist strategies of engaging with them may be misdirected.

My research examined the institutional, political, and bureaucratic factors shaping SCR 1325’s genesis and their implications for how women’s security was conceptualised and made operational in UN peacekeeping operations. Specifically, my research responds to the following questions:

• How did the historical development of the UN’s structure and organisation shape its institutional arrangements for women and the emergence of women on the (macro-level) international peace and security agenda? What role did nongovernmental actors play in these processes?
• What were the institutional, geopolitical and bureaucratic factors shaping SCR
1325’s (meso-level) implementation pathways? What is the role of individual, agency in these contexts?

- How did the engendering of global security policy (through SCR 1325) influence the strategic and operational priorities of UN peace-building operations at the (micro-level) of implementation?

Fundamentally, my research is about the UN’s role in shaping an international agenda for women. Drawing on my experience as one of SCR 1325’s UN protagonists, I use insights gained from my direct involvement in SCR 1325’s genesis, as well as in-depth interviews, an empirical case study, documentary and narrative analysis to identify the political, institutional and bureaucratic factors that were most significant in SCR 1325’s adoption and implementation. I recontextualise SCR 1325 within the discursive and institutional terrain of UN peace building. Using feminist, constructivist and rationalist approaches to studying international organisations (IOs), I look simultaneously at the issues, the actors, and the institutional context that shaped SCR 1325’s evolution and implementation pathways. Following the arc of the policy process, I examine these aspects in relation to three stages: agenda setting, strategy and policy development, and implementation.

Below, I describe my study’s limitations and then summarise my key findings in relation to each of these questions posed.

7.1 Limitations

My research covers a seven year period between 2000-2007, beginning with the lead-up to SCR 1325’s adoption in 2000 and ending with the first year of deployment of the Indian female formed police unit (FFPU) to the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). My findings do not take into account the significant doctrinal developments that took place in 2008 and then again in 2010, both in relation to the UN Security Council’s actions on women, and on the protection of civilians, the role of formed police units, or the creation of the new UN gender entity, known as UN Women. I therefore do not discuss how these developments have reshaped UN strategies to institutionalise and implement SCR 1325 after 2007.

I use a pivotal case study: the first deployment of an all female formed police unit (FFPU). Although the FFPU’s deployment was a novelty in 2007, the practice of deploying all-female units in peacekeeping operations has continued to evolve and is now a central strategy in the UN’s goal of increasing women’s participation in peace operations.
Although the experiences of those creating the precedent may not be generalisable to subsequent generations of FFPUs, the questions posed regarding the obstacles and opportunities for improving women’s security in conflict situations continue to be relevant.

My focus is primarily on how UN structures and processes responded to local specificities and broader externalities, rather than on the specificities and externalities themselves; I focus on policy and process, structure and agency; not the impact on actual outcomes in relation to women’s security. Instead, I offer an assessment of SCR 1325’s impact on UN decision-making, strategy, policy, and process, and of the mediating role of institutional structure, national, regional, and role identities, and individual agency. In this sense, my research does not capture the upward feedback loops (local, national and regional) or specific contextual factors that are unique to each peace operation and therefore limit the generalisability of my findings.

Finally, I recognise that my interpretation of the events analysed draws from my role as UNIFEM’s Chief of Governance, Peace and Security between 2000-2002 where I was responsible for leading the institutions’ support for the establishment, and then implementation, of SCR 1325. Although I left the UN in 2002, I continued to collaborate with various UN entities from my position at the Social Science Research Council, an academic research organisation, in their efforts to internalise, institutionalise and implement SCR 1325. I describe these engagements in Chapter 1 and have made every effort to substantiate, contextualise and clarify my individual standpoint and institutional, ethnographic positionality in relation to the extant literature and in presenting the viewpoints of colleagues as expressed to me informally. Given what is a small community of feminists working in and engaged with the UN, all interviews were confidential and the names of interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement.

In the following sections, I summarise my findings in relation to the research questions posed.

7.2 How did the Historical Development of the UN’s Structure and Organisation Shape its Institutional Arrangements for Women and the Emergence of Women on the International Peace and Security Agenda?

In relation to the first question, I conclude that the dysfunctions associated with the UN’s bureaucratic culture were expressed in behaviours that undermined its self-proclaimed
goals of advancing gender equality. Although the institutional isolation of the UN’s gender mechanisms provided some opportunities to creatively bypass bureaucratic constraints, their marginalisation from the mainstay of UN operational activities and the UN’s peace and security architecture limited their ability to challenge and transform institutional agendas or practices, especially in conflict situations. The geopolitics of UN decision-making on gender issues has circumscribed opportunities for bringing gender issues onto the UN’s peace and security agenda. Because UN decision-making on women has been extrinsic to the UN mechanisms and entities that have the greatest potential for autonomous action, there have been fewer opportunities to bring gender issues onto the UN’s peace and security agenda and make them operational in the context of peace operations.

7.21 The UN and Women: A Case of Relegated Authority
In its first thirty years, the UN had no institutional capacities to address any aspect of women’s lives in relation to the UN’s primary spheres of influence in human rights, development, and peace and security. Since then, UN engagement on gender issues has been ad hoc, evolving incrementally, and only in response to demands made by women and their allies within and outside of the UN. Instead of creating the requisite institutional capacity within the UN for advancing a global women’s agenda (e.g., as it did for children, through UNICEF), a series of UN World Conferences on Women and Human Rights became the de facto arenas in which global decisions about women’s rights and status were made, even as a fragmented and under-resourced UN ‘gender-architecture’ began to emerge.

This demonstrates a dynamic that I refer to as ‘relegation’ wherein UN representatives choose to relinquish their delegated authority and instead ‘re-delegate’ or ‘relegate’ decision-making back to their ‘principal’ authority. Relegation diminishes the possibility for autonomous or independent action by the UN representatives, whose responsibilities shift to that of ‘recipient’, wherein they typically receive and endorse the decisions made externally, and offer mostly rhetorical commitments (i.e. without budgetary implications) to follow up any relevant recommendations directed to its principal organs or main bodies.

192 By pathology, Barnett and Finnemore refer to “those dysfunctions that are attributable to bureaucratic culture and internal bureaucratic processes and that lead the IO to act in a manner that subverts its self-professed goals” (M. Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 8).
Consequently, the UN becomes a passive recipient rather than a proactive agent for advancing gender equality, development and peace. This exacerbated the UN’s institutional and architectural void in relation to women and gender issues and, up until the mid-1980s, these conferences became central fora for Cold-War antagonisms, pitting the rival American ‘equality’ perspective against the Soviet ‘peace’ agenda.

Over time, the increasing participation of women’s NGO’s in these world fora strengthened feminist solidarity across different geo-political axes of discontent, while increasing tensions between women and their state representatives. This further eroded the perception of the UN as an arena in which feminist agendas could be enabled. Paradoxically and inadvertently, these conferences strengthened women’s global leadership outside of the UN rather than within it.

7.22 The UN’s Gender Architecture: Function Follows Form
The institutional marginalisation of the UN’s gender mechanisms limited their ability to engage in any of the UN’s three spheres of work: peace and security, human rights, and development. Moreover, by creating UNIFEM and INSTRAW as ‘Voluntary Funds’, the UN absolved its responsibility to provide them with financial and human resources. Attempts in the early 1990s to strengthen their coherence created a diplomatic incident in which INSTRAW, the smallest and most marginal of the mechanisms, became fodder in a 26-year proxy war between the global north and south.

This extreme example of bureaucratic pathology has several important implications for understanding SCR 1325’s genesis and implementation. First, it demonstrates that the instrumentalisation of the women’s agenda is not the unique provenance of hegemonic military powers, or limited to any single regional group. Rather, it shows how the UN is essentially a venue through which various hierarchies and rivalries, personal and political, are played out, among and within states, between ‘principals and agents’, regional groups and the various geographic associations and agendas, including donor countries, programme countries, East-West, North-South, and so on. Manipulating intergovernmental processes through bloc voting and bureaucratic offensives is the ordinary activity of international diplomacy, in which women have been little more than bargaining chips. In the case of INSTRAW, we learn that women’s issues are instrumentalised, not because they are important, but because they are considered trivial.

The fragmentation of the UN’s gender mechanisms, into different UN spheres of activity and discourse, limited the opportunity for a feminist ‘epistemic community’ of
research and practice to emerge, which in turn, has limited the UN’s ability to understand, internalise, and effectively implement SCR 1325. The absence of empirical data and research on the gender dimensions of armed conflict was a central obstacle in advancing a holistic agenda on women, peace and security in the UN, and may also help explain the ever-widening divisions across feminist research, practice and activism.

The absence of a fully operational UN Fund for Women was among the primary factors shaping SCR 1325’s evolution and implementation. Without field presence, women had no sufficiently senior institutional advocates on UN country teams, the primary vehicles for channelling development and humanitarian resources and technical support, and that serve as operational partners to UN peace operations.

7.23 Women’s Peace Activism and the UN’s Peace and Security Agenda
SCR 1325’s documented herstory is embedded with a number of contradictions regarding the motivations of the NGOs credited with SCR 1325’s genesis, and the risks associated with the strategy of engaging a mainstream security institution. The organisational members of the feminist, anti-militarist, NGO Working Group on Women Peace and Security that is credited with SCR 1325’s genesis were, with one exception, neither feminist nor anti-militarist. This anomaly, while noted in some of the early literature about SCR 1325’s genesis, is often glossed over, seemingly in order not to diminish SCR 1325 as a distinctly feminist anti-war achievement.

Instead, I suggest that these contradictions reflect a far more significant achievement of feminist norm entrepreneurs whose strategic leadership resulted in a feminist narrative that was larger than the mandates of their respective organisations. Drawing from international relations and social movement theory, I refer to these activists as ‘feminist norm or organizational entrepreneurs’. Their achievements show how and where different generations of feminist activists have landed, institutionally and organizationally, and how they have used their positions – even in ‘non-feminist’ institutions – to advance feminist agendas. Their personal and professional networks were crucial in forming the NGO Working Group’s extended networks, with feminists and other allies within and outside of the UN. It is not clear if their accomplishments would have been possible working within feminist, anti-war organisations.

My findings suggest that their association with peace-building and humanitarian NGOs facilitated their engagement with the Security Council’s agenda and the larger discourse of UN peace-building because they had common reference points and ‘empirical
credibility.’ I suggest that their ‘compromises’ in proposing SCR 1325’s textual content did not undermine the Resolution’s potential, but were calculated decisions that enabled the ‘win’, which was ultimately more important than asserting and maintaining a unvarnished feminist anti-militarist textual position. However, key questions remain unanswered: to what extent were these feminist leaders able to catalyse institutional and organisational change within their own organisations? Was this sustained after they left, and what were the enabling factors and obstacles? How did their experiences shape their future professional engagements and become a stepping-stone for returning to feminist organising or for leaving it?

7.3 What were the Institutional, Political, and Bureaucratic Factors Shaping SCR 1325’s Implementation Pathways?

My findings illustrate the gendered nature of national and regional identity, as well as other individual attributes that became significant in shaping SCR 1325’s genesis and implementation pathways. They also show how gender is both a process and a currency that is ‘traded’ in the exercise of individual, national, and regional interests, and often used as a bargaining chip in the broader geo-political processes that ultimately determine how the UN’s political and substantive agenda is developed, who participates in these processes, and the type of decisions that can be made.

Although the role of ‘linking pins’ and ‘influential allies’ has been explored in the context of UN agenda setting, my findings suggest that they are also important in the context of implementation. A better understanding of why and how those with power are willing to open doors and use their influence to legitimise feminist agendas can increase understanding about the challenges of institutional transformation, and how individual and institutional transformation are interlinked.

7.3.1 Institutional Factors

In 1993, Cynthia Enloe noted that there weren’t any feminist-informed studies of male-dominated institutions like the UN Security Council or the Central Intelligence Agency (Enloe 1993, 21); more than twenty years later, this is still the case. Apart from a handful of studies and narratives about women’s engagement with the UN more generally, and in relation to specific UN entities, there is very little analysis of how gender is scripted

193 For example, (Prügl 1999; H Charlesworth 2005; Hilary Charlesworth and Chinkin 2013b; Moser, Tornqvist, and Van Bronkhorst 1999; Moser and Moser 2005; Jain 2005; Pietila 2007)
onto and into the UN’s principal components or their relationships with the Secretariat, the specialised agencies, and the UN’s funds and programmes.

My approach to understanding the ‘black box’ of international organisations departs in key respects from the mainstream of feminist research about SCR1325 and international organisations. I view the UN as a distinct and inter-related system whose component parts cannot be understood in isolation of one another. My analysis follows the three institutional tiers that the UN itself distinguishes: (1) its main intergovernmental bodies; (2) the secretariat and its chief executive officer, the Secretary-General; and (3) the heterogeneous family of UN Specialised Agencies, Funds and Programmes. Each of these tiers exhibits dysfunctional behaviours, often interlinked and mutually reinforcing, in relation to women and gender issues.

Among these tiers, the least studied are the Funds and Programme. This is surprising because their massive budgets and widespread geographic presence give them significant power to shape international agendas. The distinctions among the Specialised Agencies and the Funds and Programmes are rarely understood and often conflated; yet their mandates, executive boards, and resource base make them a growing arena of influence and power. Because member states’ financial contributions to the Funds and Programmes bypass the UN’s general accounting system, they have become a much more flexible instrument for exercising bilateral agendas; contribution size is often commensurate with influence. Despite this, the Funds and Programmes still have far more discretionary power than Secretariat entities, including peacekeeping operations, whose budgets are approved and monitored by the General Assembly, the primary arena through which counter-hegemonic agendas are asserted by the majority from the Global South.

As discussed in Chapter 1, Locher and Prugl suggest that power, when measured as a quantity, has little to offer feminist analysis:

Constructivists have dealt with power in various ways, but only a few have taken the analysis of power as far as feminists have...First are those who have not put power in the center of their analysis but have implied two conventional understandings: domestically, power means legitimate authority; internationally, power is a material resource. In both cases, power is treated as a quantity that actors (states, militaries, interest groups) have and that they use differently depending on political cultures or identities...Understanding power as a quantity would take feminists no further than to say that women don’t have it. It tells little about how power is constructed and reproduced. (Locher and Prügl 2001, 117)
However, my research shows that in the UN, power is expressed as both a process and a quantity, and that understanding how gender is exercised along both axes can help us understand the exercise of hegemonic power and resistance. The UN is an arena in which power is bought, sold, traded or ‘gifted’ in the name of the nation state, although personal interests, corruption, and or other motivations often mediate how individual discretion is exercised. By the same token, the institutional location of the UN’s gender ‘architecture’ determines the scope for women to exercise power within the broader system. Apart from this limited arena, women as an issue are more often bargaining chips in the broader interplay of power as it is exercised within the UN’s primary organs, the Secretariat, and the Funds and Programmes, as further described below.

7.32 Political Factors
A growing concern in feminist literature about SCR 1325, is its instrumentalisation by western military powers to advance patriarchal, hegemonic and military agendas. However, because feminism and gender equality issues have historically been associated with ‘western’ values (more often with western European, Nordic and Scandinavian countries, and not always the United States), my findings suggest that the Global South (through the G77 and non-aligned movement) was even more likely to use gender issues as fodder in the UN’s most enduring geo-political divide, the ‘North-South Theater’ (Thomas G Weiss 2012, 50–72).

The issue is not that the Security Council or western military powers used women and gender to legitimize their actions, but the opposite. I conclude that gender equality, feminism, and women’s issues were considered so trivial to the majority of member states, that they were used primarily as leverage along the North-South divides by further entrenching the association of gender issues with cultural imperialism and western hegemony. These rivalries were significant in ensuring INSTRAW’s still-birth and obstructing the creation of gender capacity within DPKO.

However in other fora, these political alignments were also significant in ensuring SCR 1325’s adoption and demonstrate how different political, institutional and social arrangements regulate conduct along the axes of gender, national and other identities and statuses. Among Security Council members, support from the ‘Global South’ was essential in overcoming resistance from G-77 countries. This resistance had less to do with the Resolution’s content and more with their concerns about the Security Council’s encroachment on ECOSOC’s agenda and, in the case of China and Russia, about new
opportunities for the US, the UK, and France to carry out an interventionist agenda. Although the US would later become a more visible champion of the ‘Women, Peace and Security’ agenda, particularly in relation to sexual violence, it was not among the early champions of SCR 1325.

Without the leadership of respected governments from the G-77, in particular, Namibia, Bangladesh, and Jamaica, SCR 1325 would have encountered much stronger resistance for its perception as a ‘western’ initiative. At the same time, SCR 1325 would not have been adopted without support from western countries. To this end, SCR 1325’s association with the agendas championed by Canada, Norway, the UK and France in relation to children and war, and the protection of civilians, were central to the resolution’s framing.

7.33  **Bureaucratic Factors**

My research suggests that SCR 1325 did not challenge mainstream approaches to security partly because the UN’s strategies to implement the Resolution took place in different arenas. Evolving from an inter-agency process that focused inwards rather than on the Security Council’s working methods, UN strategies to implement SCR 1325 may have ameliorated General Assembly concerns about the Security Council’s encroachment on its mandate, but they also diminished the Security Council’s sense of responsibility for implementation. By situating SCR 1325’s implementation within the UN’s agenda on ‘the advancement of women’ (an ECOSOC responsibility) instead of the Security Council’s, there was little engagement with the UN’s peacekeeping reform efforts that focused on the protection of civilians.

This raised concerns about policy coherence and relevance within DPKO, the Secretariat department with central responsibility for planning and supporting UN peace operations, and the UN’s Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ). On the one hand, the Secretary-General proposed to improve coherence on gender (and reduce costs) by withdrawing support for INSTRAW, the only gender mechanism in the Global South, while, on the other, he requested additional (larger) resources to create a new and completely unrelated gender capacity in the Secretariat department most beholden to the Security Council.

In addition to this political contest over resources and institutional control, there was also genuine confusion about the concept of gender mainstreaming, how it would be made operational, and under whose leadership. Even if the ACABQ’s rejection of the repeated
requests to strengthen gender capacity in DPKO reflected insensitivity, incomprehension and resistance to gender issues, they were also well founded. The UN’s institutional arrangements for women and its central strategy for advancing gender equality – gender mainstreaming – is incoherent and it is riddled with gaps and inconsistencies.

From this snapshot, we see that the will of the Security Council, the Secretary General, and other intergovernmental bodies is necessary but insufficient for advancing SCR 1325’s implementation. The most important and understudied bureaucratic arena within the UN on all issues, including women, is where budgets are approved, dues assessed, and reforms approved: the General Assembly’s Fifth Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and its Advisory Committee (ACABQ). Even now, 15 years after SCR 1325’s adoption, the resolution has not been translated in ways that can be understood and acted on within the existing frameworks that are used to allocate resources and shape policy and operations. Any assessment of obstacles to implementing SCR 1325 must therefore contend with these ‘instruments’ of institutional change.

Finally, and most importantly, the UN’s dogged pursuit of gender mainstreaming over twenty years despite its failures continues to undermine the UN Charter’s ambitions and, according to the UN itself, poses a reputational risk (UN Office of Internal Oversight Services 2010, 2). My findings reaffirm the overwhelming evidence about the limits of gender mainstreaming as a means or an end; if SCR 1325’s vision is to be realised, then the UN’s primary strategy for realising SCR 1325 must be re-examined.

7.4 How did the engendering of global security policy (through SCR 1325) influence the strategic and operational priorities of UN peace building operations?

The institutional and political factors that influenced UNMIL’s operational strategies to improve women’s security draw from my analysis of Liberian women’s participation in the Accra peace process, from UNMIL’s mandate and strategy for implementing SCR 1325, and the deployment of the all-female formed police unit.

7.41 Strategic Priorities

Just as the UN’s fractured and under-resourced gender architecture limited the UN’s ability to institutionalise SCR 1325 at headquarters, it also negatively impacted SCR 1325’s operationalisation at the country level, in UNMIL. Absent senior political leadership and gender expertise in conceptualising the UN’s role in the peace process, and without
institutional and operational resources at the country level, the UN did not sufficiently bring SCR 1325 into UNMIL’s strategic and operational priorities.

Although UNMIL is well regarded for its efforts to implement SCR 1325, there is very little empirical evidence to suggest that its strategic or operational strategies increased women’s security or resulted in gender equality outcomes. Rather, they drew from a standard repertoire of practice of deploying gender advisers, supporting women’s political leadership, gender training, and rights-based legal reform. A general observation about the ‘tyranny’ of best practice approaches in the UN, is that there has been far too limited investment in understanding the contextual factors that shape impact across different socio-cultural, political and geographic areas. Nor did the UN’s strategies for implementing SCR 1325 reflect Liberian women’s priorities that had been focused on disarmament.

The most decisive impact on UNMIL’s strategies for responding to women’s security risks and needs were extrinsic to the mission itself. More specifically, the US’ lead role in implementing the Liberian Comprehensive Peace Agreement and in reforming the Armed Forces of Liberia had a significant impact on the broader process of security sector reform and therefore, on the UN’s approach to its mandate with respect to policing and the protection of civilians. Because the most crucial aspects regarding security in Liberia were the primary responsibility of the US Government, UNMIL’s scope of engagement was itself limited. And because gender issues were only a small subset of concerns within UNMIL’s mandate, the possibilities for more transformative change were further diminished.

The delays and missteps in the demobilisation and restructuring of the Armed Forces of Liberia created threats to women’s security that the UN’s repertoire of SCR 1325 practices could not ameliorate. In Liberia, because the UN’s engagement in this area was itself limited, the potential scope for implementing SCR 1325 was similarly prescribed. Because the Gender Adviser’s mandate was limited to only two of its five areas of work, there was even less scope for strategic engagement.

Moreover, the absence of a fully operational women’s fund undermined the gender adviser’s potential to strengthen working-level relationships between peacekeeping operation and humanitarian entities. Without a fully resourced operational counterpart like UNICEF or UNDP, UNMIL’s gender unit was unable to meet the demands for gender

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194 For example, supporting women’s political participation, establishing gender units, and women’s machinery, rule of law and sexual violence prevention. See for example (Bell and O’Rourke 2010; UN Women 2010; F. Olonisakin, Barnes, and Ikpe 2011; Seifert and Eifler 2009; Day 2008; Kandiyoti 2007).
mainstreaming within or outside of the mission. This also limited the opportunities for ensuring that sufficient priority was given to women and gender issues in the context of humanitarian and emergency appeals and the UN country team’s overall strategy, or in strengthening women’s organisations in Liberia and regionally. By comparison, the SRSG for Children and Armed Conflict demonstrated enormous ingenuity and resourcefulness in engaging a much wider range of actors within and outside of the UN, including ECOWAS, the parties themselves, the ICGL, the National Transitional Government of Liberia, civil society, UNMIL and the UN Funds and Programmes. The SRSG brought unique individual strengths and political stature to the position that were also supported institutionally and operationally. The UN’s gender mechanisms had none of these factors in their favour.

How SCR 1325 is understood in the context of peace processes and the UN’s engagement therein is likely to vary across different contexts. However, unless and until the UN creates a sufficiently senior political and robust operational capacity within the UN for women and within the UN’s peace and security architecture, small, marginal gender units within peace operations will not be able to provide the strategic or operational leadership needed. Additionally, it might be worth considering how the remarkable commitments made by individual states to champion SCR 1325 nationally, regionally, and through their bilateral cooperation, rather than through the UN, could provide external sources of support for strengthening women’s leadership within and outside of the UN.

7.42 Operational and Tactical Strategies
Because UNMIL’s gender mandate was defined in relation to only two of the mission’s five components, the potential for fully integrating or ‘mainstreaming’ a gender perspective into all of the mission components was never a significant possibility. Women or gender were not specified in UNMIL’s operational and tactical strategies that were located within its expected outcomes on protecting civilians. Separate reporting on gender outcomes resulted in two divergent discourses about women, using different indicators, and strategies: one focused on the implementation of SCR 1325, and the other on the protection of civilians. Gender mainstreaming discourse provided a far more optimistic assessment of the mission’s efforts in relation to women, while the protection of civilians frame portrayed growing risks to women’s security.

For these reasons, the mission’s strategies to address violence against women and girls were developed in parallel to its strategies for protecting civilians. They emphasised
gender mainstreaming and the rule of law rather than intelligence collection, security risk assessment, foot patrols, or other operational and tactical preventive and protective actions. The absence of operational and tactical strategies for responding to women’s security risks and needs appeared due more to a lack of understanding, capacity and expertise rather than an innate resistance to finding ways to improve women’s security. Moreover, the needed expertise, especially in relation to the local context, was limited among the ‘generalist’ gender adviser community.

If peace operations are to improve the protection of women by responding to gender specific security threats, much greater effort will be needed to specify the operational and tactical functions necessary for improving women’s security. Within this, much greater attention should be given to the role of civilian and formed police units. Although the FFPU’s deployment was heralded as a triumph of gender mainstreaming, its mandate had nothing to do with women’s protection and was distinct from UNMIL’s gender strategy. The arrival of the well-armed and equipped female unit projected an image of protective strength rather than aggressive force. This helped reinforce the public perception of the UN’s commitment to enforce peace and protect civilians, despite the FFPU’s very narrow mandate. Of all UN components, military, civilian personnel and police, the FFPU’s mandate is the least relevant in developing strategies for improving women’s security. That said, this particular FFPU was heralded for its competence and its limited use of force. My research suggests that this is more likely a result of their specialised counter-insurgency training, which further emphasises the need to identify the requisite skills needed for improving women’s security, creating new capacities where they do not exist, and ensuring an appropriate fit between operational capabilities and security risks and needs.

7.5 Conclusion
These findings contribute to our understanding about the gender dimensions of three, interrelated questions that are central to the study of international organisations. The first concerns the agency of international organisations and the way that institutional structures, rules and decision-making processes shape IO behaviour (as agents of) and relative to the interests of powerful states. The second is about ideas and power: how international norms can challenge or reinforce hegemonic and patriarchal state interests across different socio-spatial arenas. Bringing these two questions together, relating to institutions and ideas, my findings also introduce new ways of thinking about the role of feminist ‘norm
entrepreneurs’ and epistemic communities. In particular, their role in shaping new agendas, and influencing how international institutions understand particular problems, and internalise, institutionalise, and act on new solutions.

As one of the UN policy activists involved centrally with SCR 1325’s genesis, I can attest to the frustrating and uphill battle that J. Ann Tickner describes of getting feminist issues on the security agenda of international organisations. In her essay that welcomed the emergence of feminist security studies as a new sub-field, Tickner looks to SCR 1325 as an important framework for bridging the divides among feminist researchers, policy makers, and activists:

SCR 1325 provides an important framework for feminists and women activists seeking to bridge the policy/activist/academic divide....It is vitally important that we support the work of those in policy and activist communities who are trying to get feminist issues on the security agenda of states and international organisations. It is often a frustrating and uphill battle (Tickner, 2011, 579–580)

As a still nascent community of research and practice, far more progress has been made in identifying what is at issue for women in the context of armed conflict than in translating this understanding into actionable change. A related observation is that, if SCR 1325’s potential is to be realised, then a much deeper understanding of and engagement with the UN is also needed. Without locating SCR 1325 in its discursive, institutional context, feminist mis-readings of the resolution have, perhaps unintentionally, misdirected implementation strategies and debates regarding the UN's potential for dis/enabling feminist agendas.

Although collaboration between feminist scholars and female UN delegates was central in bringing both women and gender issues onto the world stage, these forms of collaboration weakened precipitously over succeeding generations. The absence of UN research capacity on women resulted in even fewer opportunities to advance a women-centred agenda across a range of issues, including those pertaining to peace and security. This has limited the opportunity for a feminist ‘epistemic community’ of research and practice to emerge, which in turn, has limited the UN’s ability to understand, internalise and implement SCR 1325’s vision as it is understood by those associated with its creation.

An important, related question is if aspirations for Resolution 1325 are vested in its potential to become a vehicle for advancing feminist, anti-militarist and peace agendas, then to what extent has it established a 'proof of concept' that the UN is an arena in which hegemonic agendas can be challenged rather than reproduced? In other words, how
meaningful is a policy without the capacity and resources to implement it? What conclusions can be drawn about the extent to which its emancipatory potential has, can, or cannot be realised?

SCR 1325’s potential to catalyse more transformative change will depend on how it is utilised and by whom, and not simply its textual context. I have argued throughout this dissertation that SCR 1325’s ‘failures’ are not rooted in its textual discourse, but reflect the limitations of the peace building project itself. Without fully understanding the limits and potential of feminist strategies for engaging UN actors or the UN’s gender and peace and security architecture, the UN’s potential as a “mediator” is obscured, and insights about the processes of institutional change are lost. A deeper understanding of these mechanisms should inform strategic choices regarding feminist engagement, whether it be from the inside, outside, or in-between—and what each of these would actually mean in practice.

Ultimately, I argue that 1325’s emancipatory potential, whether or not realisable, rests with its ability to enable feminist transformative agendas within the context of UN peace building as well as outside of it. As a thematic resolution, SCR 1325 is intended to guide the actions of the Security Council, its members, and the operations it authorizes. It is neither an organising framework nor a reflection of feminist peace ideals; rather, it is a potential gateway for bringing both women and a feminist perspective into the UN’s highest political and military authority. At its most transformative, bringing women and gender perspectives into this arena would introduce new ways of thinking about the causes and consequences of armed conflict, and the role of UN peace building. While some of these might give priority to non-violent peace building and demilitarisation, others may focus on women’s physical protection and access to life saving humanitarian support.

The UN’s failures to provide a space for global feminist leadership will not be redeemed without a significant commitment to creating a viable institutional leader for women in the UN that has the operational capacity and political independence to assert a vision that is not beholden to the various interests that will inevitably assert themselves. It will also require an active, feminist epistemic community of research and praxis that can engage with the UN on its terms while helping to create a ‘consensual’ understanding of the issues that can be reframed and translated into meaningful policies that can add value to women’s lives.

This is not simply a rhetorical conclusion. After leaving the UN, I convened a multi-year process, funded by the UN, with the goal of building a global centre and community of research, policy, practice, and activism in the field of gender and security. Yet the
challenges we encountered were ultimately insurmountable. Although the project supported many important convenings, discussions, and exciting pilot initiatives, in the end, conflicts among the various constituencies over institutional leadership, autonomy, mission, funding, and collaboration with mainstream institutions, ultimately weakened the partnership. There was not enough common ground, too few resources, and little in the way of institutional will, particularly on the part of the UN partners, but also among the institutions in which our members were located.

As feminists committed to strengthening solidarity, research capacity, and transformation, we asked how feminist research agendas would be determined, who would be involved and whether they would be needs-based, problem-driven, demand-oriented or policy relevant. We questioned how to be responsive to demand-driven agendas when there is little demand (and sometimes active resistance) to feminist work on gender and security. Recognising the significant disparities and inequalities in research funding, and access to research training and higher education, we asked how to identify and prioritise research capacity needs, and support opportunities to maximise and strengthen individual and institutional research capacity absent an enabling environment. We asked how to balance asymmetric power relationships between northern and southern partners.

The diversity that characterises the feminist ‘peace and security’ community of research, practice and activism is a strength, but it has also worked against the creation of shared learning and knowledge. The UN cannot advance a feminist vision without a community with whom it can engage in an active dialogue of learning so that feminist knowledge in its many forms can also meet the political and technical needs of the institution. Building this community will mean letting go of dearly-held theories and concepts that privilege academic integrity and other scholastic indicators of achievement, over a commitment to a long and likely arduous process involving intellectual compromises that would be necessary to advance organisational learning, transformation, and social change. Such a shared research-praxis community would need to answer, or at least address, the many big questions that our collective effort managed to ask, but never resolved.
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