
By John Collins

Word count: 97,389

Declaration:

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent.

I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party.

I declare that my thesis consists of 97,389 words.
Abstract:

This thesis examines the Anglo-American Relationship around international drug control and addresses two main questions: first, was there a ‘special relationship’ in the field of drug control? Second, what impact did their relationship have on international control efforts? It highlights that the relationship was far from ‘special’ and was frequently strained. Further, it argues that the outcomes of international drug control efforts, between the collapse of the League of Nations system during World War II and the coming into force of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs in 1964, derived from a triangulation of three international drug control blocs: control advocate states, led by the US; producing states and their non-interventionist allies, led by Turkey and the Soviet Union; and moderate manufacturing and consuming countries, led by the UK. In this triangulation process the UK and US remained the lead international actors and represented the two core policy strands within the system: regulation and prohibition respectively.

The Anglo-American drug relationship saw overlap and division in policy interests, resulting in both cooperation and competition. They overlapped around pursuing a global regulatory system managing the flows of ‘dangerous drugs’ internationally. They diverged around the peripheral or frontier aspects of this system: namely, where to draw the line between licit and illicit consumption; how tightly to restrict, regulate and prohibit global production; how much national oversight and interference to provide international organisations; and how to deal with existing drug consuming populations. Where their policy interests overlapped, and when the UK and US consciously worked together, international political progress was possible. Where the two diverged, around strict adherence to prohibitionist principles; overly restricting the manufacturing sector’s ability to procure raw materials; and assuming national obligations for a repressive ‘closed institutional’ model of dealing with ‘addiction’, political momentum generally stalled.

Finally, this thesis argues that the 1961 Single Convention evolved via Anglo-American ‘competitive cooperation’ and was ultimately a joint Anglo-American creation: a regulatory system with prohibitionist aspects. However, the 1961 Single Convention ultimately represented a victory for the regulatory strand and the UK over the US-led prohibitionist strand.
Table of Contents:

Introduction ........................................... 11

Chapter 1: Drug Diplomacy During World War II and Beyond – Part I, 1939-43. .......... 38

Chapter 2: Drug Diplomacy During World War II and Beyond: Part II, 1944-46. .......... 76

Chapter 3: Creating the Post-war Multilateral System. ............................................. 100

Chapter 4: Winning the Peace: the Anglo-American Battle for Post-war Prohibition and Regulation. ............................................. 129

Chapter 5: New Battles: The CND First Meetings, 1946-1948. ................................ 161

Chapter 6: Dividing up the Global Licit Market, 1948-1953. .................................. 191

Chapter 7: From the 1953 Protocol to the 1961 Single Convention, 1953-64. .......... 221

Conclusion: ............................................. 260

Bibliography: ............................................. 273
Acknowledgements:

I would first and foremost like to thank my Supervisor, Professor Nigel Ashton, for having faith in this research undertaking and providing absolutely invaluable guidance and insight. Further to my Advisor Dr. Piers Ludlow for his guidance and support throughout.

I would like to thank Professor Virginia Berridge and Professor James Mills for agreeing to serve as examiners for this project. I have learned tremendously from their work.

Further thanks and gratitude goes to the outstanding team at LSE IDEAS, but in particular Professor Arne Westad, Professor Michael Cox, Dr. Emilia Knight, Dr. Nicholas Kitchen and Dr. Luc André Brunet.

To Professor Danny Quah and all the members of the LSE Expert Group on the Economics of Drug Policy as well as the contributors to the Governing the Global Drug Wars Special Report. I have learned immeasurably from their work.

To Dr. Kasia Malinowska-Sempruch and the incredible people I have had the pleasure to work and interact with at Open Society Foundations. To Dr. Ethan Nadelmann and the entire Drug Policy Alliance.

To the many dedicated and incredible friends and colleagues in global drug policy who have had a substantial impact on my own work. In particular to Dr. Joanne Csete, Dr. William McAllister, Dr. Katherine Irene Pettus, Geoff Monaghan, Professor Joseph Spillane, Lisa Sanchez, Aram Barra, Emily Crick and many others too numerous to mention.

To the incredible academics I have had the pleasure to interact with and learn from at the LSE. In particular, thanks to Dr. Michael Shiner, Dr. Paul Keenan, Dr. Anthony Best, Dr. Svetozar Rajak, Professor Steven Casey and Dr. Tanya Harmer.
Dedicated to my father and mother, Brian and Miriam Collins.
**Abbreviations:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BO</td>
<td>Burma Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAB</td>
<td>British Cabinet Papers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CND</td>
<td>Commission on Narcotic Drugs, UN (1946 – present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Colonial Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DND</td>
<td>Division on Narcotic Drugs, UN (1946 – present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSB</td>
<td>Drug Supervisory Body (1933 – 1967)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>Economic and Social Council, UN (1946 – present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FO</td>
<td>Foreign Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HO</td>
<td>Home Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCB</td>
<td>International Narcotics Control Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>India Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LON</td>
<td>League of Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAC</td>
<td>Opium Advisory Committee (League of Nations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCOB</td>
<td>Permanent Central Opium Board (1928 1967)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNO</td>
<td>United Nations Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Historical Overview: The International Drug Control System: ¹

• **1907: Ten Year Agreement**
  o Britain, China and India agree trilateral framework for ending Indian opium exports to China within ten years.
  o Agreement becomes model for future supply control system.

• **1909: Shanghai Opium Commission**
  o Initiated under American leadership.
  o First truly international drug control meeting.
  o The Great Powers examine ways to suppress international opium traffic – particularly traffic bound for China.
  o Largely ends in discord but leads to 1912 Opium Convention.

• **1912: Opium Convention**
  o Beginning of international drug control system.
  o States encouraged to end drug abuse. Remains vague on mechanisms to achieve this.
  o Signatories must prevent shipment of opium to states which bar its entry.
  o Enters into force in 1919.
  o Co-opted into new League of Nations.
  o United States’ leadership undermined by its ambiguous relationship with League administered system.

• **1925: Geneva Opium Conventions**
  o Establish first mechanisms to enforce supply control framework.
  o Permanent Central Opium Board (PCOB) created to monitor international imports and exports of narcotics.
  o United States fails to secure end to all ‘non-medical and scientific’ drug use. Walks out of proceedings and never signs.
  o Treaty gains widespread adherence over time.

• **1931: Conventions**
  o United States cooperates with UK, Germany, and other industrialised states to fashion a workable control scheme.
  o First introduction of ‘schedules’ into international treaties.
  o Creation of system of estimates. Administered by Drug Supervisory Body (DSB).
  o Formalises international distinction between licit and illicit drug trades.
  o Both PCOB and DSB function as quasi-judicial bodies independent of League of Nations.

• **1936: Convention**
  o Aimed at suppressing growing illicit traffic.
  o United States again fails to successfully advocate for end to all ‘non-medical and scientific’ drug use. Its delegates withdraw active cooperation for remainder of treaty negotiations.
  o Eventually ratified only by Canada and a few other minor states. Never comes into force.

¹ This overview is reproduced from John Collins, “The International Drug Control System,” ed. John Collins, Governing the Global Drug Wars, LSE IDEAS Special Reports, October 2012.
• **1939-40:**
  o States consider negotiating international supply control agreement. Interrupted by WWII.
• **1939-1945: WWII**
  o Certain PCOB, DSB and League functions transfer from Geneva to Washington.
  o Continue to function (minimally) throughout war.
  o United States extracts commitments from Britain and the Netherlands to end opium monopolies in the Far East.
  o Exceptions remain. France follows suit in 1945.
• **1945-6:**
  o United Nations becomes new custodian for administration of existing treaties.
  o Continuity with pre-war system maintained.
• **1948: Convention**
  o Brings synthetic narcotics under international control.
• **1953: Opium Protocol**
  o Prescribes more severe limitation of agricultural production of opiates.
  o Forced through by the US, France and other allies.
  o Rejected by agricultural producing countries and had little hope for gaining widespread acceptance.
• **1961: Single Convention**
  o Unifies previous Conventions (except 1936) into one document.
  o United States works to thwart its ratification, and instead bring 1953 Protocol into force.
  o PCOB and DSB are merged into International Narcotics Control Board (INCB).
  o INCB retains a ‘quasi-judicial’ role.
• **1967: US ratifies Single Convention.**
• **1971: Convention**
  o Brings Psychotropic (psychoactive) substances under international control, but in a less stringent form than applied to opioids, coca and cannabis.
• **1972: Protocol Amending the Single Convention**
  o Product of US efforts to strengthen Single Convention and INCB.
  o Six decades after first Opium Convention, international system remains overwhelmingly focused on supply control issues.
• **1972: UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) created.**
  o Nominally independent but reliant on US patronage.
  o Heavily supply control focused.
• **1988: Convention**
  o Primarily aimed at tackling organised crime and trafficking.
  o Addresses demand issues by recommending criminalisation of personal consumption.
• **1998: United Nations General Assembly Special Session**
  o States commit to massive reductions in drug use and supply within ten years.
  o Slogan: ‘A drug free world. We can do it!’
2009: UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon claims criminalisation of injecting drug use is hampering HIV/AIDS fight. Calls for decriminalisation.
Introduction:
The period 1939 to 1964 was perhaps the most important in the history of the creation of the modern international drug control system. It began with the collapse of the League of Nations drug control system and culminated in the coming into force of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. The League of Nations system, which had its origins in the 1909 Shanghai Opium Commission, collapsed with the outbreak of war. Its normative and technocratic underpinnings, however, were to survive the war. The former remained in the hearts and minds of the ‘gentleman’s club’ of narcotics control advocates. This was a small community of individuals committed to a vision of a tightly regulated international trade underpinned by prohibitions around non-medical and non-scientific usage. For many the ultimate vision would be, as Harry Anslinger wrote for the US in 1965, ‘to abolish legal opium production entirely’. For others, such as the UK, it was about creating a well-regulated ‘ethical’ trade in a problematic international commodity. The latter aspect, the technocratic ‘system of estimates’ would survive via its guardians the Permanent Central Opium Board and Drug Supervisory Body, which escaped to Washington DC in 1940 and remained there for most of the duration of the war.

World War II heavily reshaped international narcotics control in many respects. It achieved what previous conferences and conventions could not: a tangible commitment by colonial powers to prohibit and eradicate most non-medical and non-scientific consumption of opium in their colonies and end the monopolies that supplied them. These had represented the key stumbling block to control in the 1930s and, with their removal, states looked towards the possibility of an all encompassing international commodity control arrangement which would tightly regulate drugs from production all the way through to consumption. The framework of manufacturing regulation, created under the 1931 convention, remained the most consensual aspect of the international system. Reverse integrating production controls would be a far

---

more complex aspect, while issues around consumption and managing drug ‘addiction’ remained unresolved into the 1960s and beyond.5

The 1961 Single Convention came into force in 1964 despite US efforts to kill it and secure the 1953 Opium Protocol in its stead. Behind this story lies complex and overlapping interests, processes, diplomatic struggles, Cold War politics and national idiosyncrasies. Nothing is more indicative and representative of these forces than the complicated and often contentious Anglo-American drug diplomatic relationship. This thesis examines the Anglo-American Relationship around international drug control and addresses two main questions: first, was there a ‘special relationship’ in the field of drug control? Second, what impact did their relationship have on international control efforts? It highlights that the relationship was far from ‘special’ and was frequently strained. Further, it argues that international drug control efforts between the collapse of the League of Nations system during World War II and the coming into force of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs in 1964 are best understood as a triangulation of three groups of international drug control blocs: control advocate states, led by the US; producing states and their non-interventionist allies, led by Turkey and the Soviet Union; and moderate manufacturing and consuming countries, led by the UK. In this triangulation process the US and UK remained the core actors in international drug diplomacy and represented the two main policy strands within the system: prohibition and regulation respectively.

The Anglo-American drug relationship saw overlap and division in policy interests resulting in both cooperation and competition. The overlap was around the pursuit of a global regulatory framework for managing the flows of licit ‘dangerous drugs’ internationally. Their division centred on the peripheral or frontier aspects of this: namely, where to draw the line between licit and illicit consumption; how tightly to restrict, regulate and prohibit global supplies; how much interference in national affairs to allow international organisations; and how to deal with existing drug consuming populations.

5 Evaluating social understandings of drugs and drug uses remain peripheral to this study and are conveyed through the lens of actors during this time period, hence the use of antiquated terms like ‘addict’. For an overview of drug use, dependence and addiction see: Mark A. R. Kleiman, Jonathan P. Caulkins, and Angela Hawken, Drugs and Drug Policy: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford University Press, USA, 2011), 5–9.
Where their policies overlapped and when the UK and US worked together, forward international political progress was possible. Where the two diverged, around strict adherence to prohibitionist principles, overly restricting the manufacturing sector’s ability to procure raw materials, and assuming domestic responsibilities for a repressive ‘closed institutional’ model of dealing with ‘addiction’, political momentum stalled. This thesis argues that the 1961 Single Convention evolved via Anglo-American ‘competitive cooperation’ since World War II and ultimately was a joint Anglo-American creation, a regulatory system with prohibitionist aspects. However, the thesis also argues that the 1961 Single Convention ultimately represented a victory for the UK and the regulatory strand over the US and the prohibitionist strand.

The UK, and other European powers such as the Netherlands, represented the deep regulatory strand of the control system. This strand sought to manage the global narcotics issues and the expectations of prohibitionist states by establishing a moderate international framework for managing commodity flows and gently encouraging states towards suppression and better domestic management of the issue. Its means to achieve this were consensus and multilateral decision-making, with the goal of utilising this issue to forward other international cooperative efforts.

The US represented the strong prohibitionist, control advocate, strand within the system. It utilised diplomatic pressure, bullying, sticks and carrots to achieve its goals. Since early in the 1900s US policy maintained an almost fanatic belief in prohibitionism as the key mechanism to resolve the global drug issue. This stemmed from a belief that the cause of drug ‘abuse’ was excess and unregulated supplies of ‘addictive’ drugs. By removing the supply; instituting harsh and mandatory penalties for transgressing laws; and ensuring compulsory ‘treatment’ for ‘addicts’ the US believed the issue to be fundamentally soluble.

Within this prohibitionist mentality, the core drug diplomat and key protagonist of this story, Harry Anslinger, looms large. He was, at base, a bureaucratic opportunist and key functionary in a broader US vision for international narcotics control based on the desire to pursue the ‘evil’ to all corners of the globe. Underpinning this approach was a self-interested

---

belief that prohibition, underpinned by police enforcement and political will, overseas was the best defence against increasing use in the US. Drug use, under this US vision, would disappear if states committed to eradicate it via strict regulation of medical use, prohibition of non-medical and non-scientific use and the diffusion of uniform police efforts globally.

Anslinger essentially channelled the US approach to narcotics. The same impulses would likely have been present in his absence but would have likely gained far less national and international traction. He held almost four decades at the helm of US drug control, a formidable personality, a strong domestic constituency (‘Anslinger’s Army’) and intense bureaucratic and political savvy.\(^7\) Anslinger’s ‘army’ was a mixture of domestic interests and lobby groups which supported stringent national and international controls. Part of the grassroots stemmed from traditional prohibitionist organisations such as the Women’s Christian Temperance Union. Others represented the domestic drug manufacturing sector which looked to Anslinger to protect their interests in international negotiations. Others emerged within sympathetic members of US press institutions, most importantly the Hearst Press. Others still represented elite Washington DC policy insiders, the most important of which was a small group of powerful members of the Foreign Policy Association (FPA) which had taken an early interest in drug control during the 1920s and 30s, likely as a means to encourage US cooperation with the League of Nations, and developed strong links with the global drug policy community.\(^8\)

The existence and continuity of these groups highlight that Anslinger steered what was a broader US vision of drug policy dating at least back to the turn of the twentieth century. However, his role in shaping domestic and international narratives and navigating the complicated national and international politics cannot be underestimated, as this thesis will demonstrate. Meanwhile, the UK, as we will see, had a far less important domestic drug control lobby with no clear indication that domestic opinion had a major impact on its national policies. Instead its policies were driven by technocratic impulses; intra-bureaucratic


\(^8\) Ultimately, although a number of existing works point to the importance of domestic interests in supporting Anslinger, a more systematic appraisal based on deep archival research of these groups and their interaction with national and international institutions is required. Nevertheless, the strong impact of these groups on national and international policy processes is clear at certain key junctures, as this thesis will highlight.
battles; national pharmaceutical and the medical interests which pushed back against invasive international regulations; concerns over international prestige; and desires for international cooperation.

Where the US and British approaches overlapped, around the creation of an international regulatory approach undergirded by certain prohibitions, forward political progress was possible. Where the two diverged, around the US relentless drive to shrink the global market, with little concern for manufacturer or consumer concerns, or the early British desire to accommodate opiate consumption in their colonies via ‘quasi-medical’ maintenance, momentum stalled. Further Britain favoured a less invasive free and open market with relatively minimal international oversight. Part of this derived from domestic economic concerns. For example, for the UK any increase in drug costs would be borne by the new National Health Service (NHS), created in 1946 and implemented in 1948, and could weaken the competitiveness of their pharmaceutical exports relative to new synthetic narcotics and those derived from new manufacturing processes on the continent of Europe.

The US favoured a closed economic system tending towards shrinking supplies and strong UN oversight of national policies and implementation. For the US the economic downside to stricter regulation were lower and could be borne by its established pharmaceutical sector, evidenced by the sector’s continued support for the US’ international policy positions. The goal was therefore to drastically raise regulatory standards around the globe and export strong a strong prohibitionist framework. Thereby, under this vision, they could minimise the impact of unregulated and illicit supplies on its domestic market while simultaneously ridding the world of the ‘slavery’ of ‘addiction’.

Throughout this story the US remained at the vanguard of control efforts, a number of times falling out entirely with the system when moderate states refused to go along with its designs. At the opposing end was a heterogeneous mix of recalcitrant states, centred largely around drug-producing countries which sought to avoid troublesome and invasive international regulations. Britain traditionally served as a middle-ground manufacturing state. During the inter-war years, however, Britain’s control of a number of key producing states (Burma and India for example) meant it frequently served as a recalcitrant to the US vision. After World War II, however, an ostensible end to the opium monopolies and decolonisation processes,
meant that Britain worked to carve out its middle-ground role as the head of a moderate coalition of producers, manufacturers and consumers. These had various economic interests in the system and a desire to see some international framework but reticent to follow the US vision.

The US and UK visions would continue to differ over whether the goal was to manage and contain the size of the global market (the UK vision) or to work to shrink the size of the market (the US vision). The US regulatory vision was ultimately prohibitionist around plant-based opiates, but the UK ensured the US failed to enshrine mechanisms to enforce this within the drug conventions’ regulatory framework. Supplementing this core regulated market were prohibitionist aspects, aimed at suppressing non-medical and non-scientific consumption. However, the implementation of these prohibitionist aspects were left purposely vague and ill-defined, seeking on the one hand to incorporate the US normative framework of repressive prohibitionism while preventing the imposition of concrete obligations on states, such as the UK, which had no desire to accept them.

The historiography of Anglo-American relations offers two concepts which are of use in analysing this field. David Reynolds’ concept of ‘competitive cooperation’. And Nigel Ashton's idea of the ‘irony of interdependence’. Both Britain and the US publicly proclaimed their desire for international drug cooperation and recognised the importance of one another for achieving their desired end. In certain respects their visions overlapped and allowed close cooperation and interdependence, but in others their visions differed sharply and ultimately resulted in them competing for different end points and prevented an alliance over the drug issue. Overall this resulted in a situation where international cooperation was most harmonious when the US and UK worked together but this was often prevented due to divergent visions and interests.

Historiography
International Control Historiography:

10 Nigel Ashton, Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War: The Irony of Interdependence (Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).
The history of drug control diplomacy has received limited attention from historians. There been little discussion of its interaction with other fields of historiography, such as Anglo-American relations. This is despite the fact that foreign policy practitioners have often regarded the field as one of fundamental importance. Former Secretary of State James A. Baker III once said of the illicit narcotics trade: “there is no foreign policy issue short of war or peace which has a more direct bearing on the well-being of the American People.”11 There are a number of detailed histories examining specific issues and commodities within the international drug control paradigm.12 There are also broader social histories which provide important contextual understanding regarding the interaction between these commodities and societies.13 In terms of diplomatic history, the field is quite sparse.

Perhaps the earliest historical account of the international system can be found in Bertil Renborg’s book on the League’s drug control apparatus.14 As a regime insider, his book can be read as an attempt to influence the outcomes of the post-war re-internationalisation of control and his pursuit of a job within the system. Arnold Taylor’s 1969 work provides the original historical account of the evolution of controls prior to World War II, describing it as an example of ‘humanitarian intervention’.15 Peter Lowes’ 1966 account of the genesis of control is another useful book.16 However, the foundational text is the book by Bruun et al.17 As William O. Walker III suggests, it is ‘less satisfactory as a broad, comprehensive study but of considerable value as an interpretive administrative history’.18 The narratives are

---

17 Bruun, Pan, and Rexed, The Gentlemen’s Club: International Control of Drugs and Alcohol.
derived from widely available published sources; oral history and an intimate (insider) knowledge of the system. One of the main problems with this book is its lack of coherence and weak archival base.\textsuperscript{19}

The core text, particularly for discussions of international opium regulation, remains William McAllister’s \textit{Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century}.\textsuperscript{21} It provides an extremely broad, nuanced and synthetic account of the international system. While serving the starting point for diplomatic histories it is ultimately an institutional history of the international control system and leaves significant scope for developing work examining the role of interstate relations outside League of Nations and United Nations forums. Further, it weakened by its lack of unifying explanatory frameworks. It does not fully break out of the ‘prohibition regime’ framework (see below) of explanation to develop its own. It is possible to derive from McAllister an array of explanatory frameworks, without a clear sense the author has chosen one. It is a work of great historical complexity and nuance but also very wide explanatory brush strokes - for example explaining the policy shift around the opium monopolies.\textsuperscript{22} This thesis aims to expand on McAllister’s work by providing a deeper evaluation of inter-state relations at a specific time period, more detailed reconstructions of specific key turning points within the system to develop new explanatory frameworks, and attempt to develop a new overarching frame of analysis which moves beyond the framing of international drug control as a teleological outcome of a US-led ‘global prohibition regime’.

David R. Bewley-Taylor is the main proponent of the ‘global prohibition regime’ historiography. This approach has its origins in Ethan Nadelmann’s ground-breaking article on ‘Global Prohibition Regimes’.\textsuperscript{23} Bewley-Taylor developed this school in his first book, \textit{the United States and International Drug Control, 1909-1997}, by attempting to tell the history of US engagement with the international drug control system through a hybrid of international


\textsuperscript{20} There was no archival material available when the book was written.


\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 151–2.

relations theory and international history. The core historical narrative is heavily drawn from Bruun et al.’s book *The Gentlemen’s Club*. Bewley-Taylor extends this narrative through a central thesis that the US created a ‘global prohibition regime’ via ‘hegemonic stability’ and other forces. Although the work develops a useful conceptual framework its historical coverage is weak and undermined by the fundamental lack of primary research, which results in a frequently inaccurate historical narrative being derived from the outcomes, rather than a reconstruction of processes.

Bewley-Taylor’s core argument has been strongly undermined by subsequent historical research, particularly that of William McAllister but also a recent historiographical trend highlighting the emergence of prohibition in the global peripheries of Asia and Latin America, rather than just the core of the US and Europe. Two good examples of this are Isaac Campos’ work on Mexico and James Windle’s ‘How the East Influenced Drug Prohibition’. Campos writes in his 2012 book: ‘the problem is that historians simply have not looked deeply at the origins of drug prohibition in Latin America’. Meanwhile Windle writes that the ‘concept of prohibition being a distinctly American construct is…flawed’. This thesis finds significant justification for these viewpoints, with a number of examples of seemingly spontaneous national efforts, in Iran and Peru in particular, to bring prohibitionist controls into their countries. Further there are visible efforts by indigenous elites in Asia, Latin America and the Middle East to demonstrate their nationalist and modernizing credentials through drug suppression efforts.

Bewley-Taylor, nevertheless, develops this US-created ‘global prohibition regime’ thesis in his later work, *International Drug Control: Consensus Fractured*, drawing on new secondary diplomatic historical material to argue that the consensus around the ‘core prohibitive norm’ of control ‘regime’ is ‘cracked’ and may break apart. He uses contemporary international

25 Bruun, Pan, and Rexed, *The Gentlemen’s Club: International Control of Drugs and Alcohol*.
relations theories around ‘regime defection’ to elaborate his claims.30 Earlier examples of ‘regime defection’ theories being applied to the field of drugs can be found in H. Richard Friman’s NarcoDiplomacy: Exporting the U.S. War on Drugs.31 Ultimately my thesis differs from Bewley-Taylor’s and other analyses that the core ‘norm’ of the system is prohibition. Instead I highlight that it is a system of commodity regulations underwritten (as all regulatory frameworks are) by prohibitionist aspects. Further it contests the notion that the US was the key driver of the system’s outcomes, but instead argues a more nuanced picture of interstate cooperation, beginning with Anglo-American relations, is required.

A further revisionist trend is emerging, led by James H. Mills, to re-examine Britain’s role in the genesis of international control efforts, by looking at the 1912 Hague Opium Conference from the perspective of cocaine. He suggests that Britain had a far more activist role in negotiations around cocaine, rather than taking the reluctant approach that William McAllister suggested previously. There is, he writes, an ‘importance of returning to the details of British participation in the emergence of the international drugs regulatory system…to get a clearer and more nuanced picture of what they sought to achieve and why’.32

My thesis draws overwhelmingly on archival sources and uses these to reconstruct the processes driving the evolution of international drug control. Rather than a legalistic interpretative focus on the international drug control treaties,33 it instead looks to the historical processes, goals and ideas that shaped them. It deviates from the practitioner-academic historiography of current policy discourse which utilises the conventions as a baseline for understanding state action and control efforts.34 My work eschews the teleological historical narratives these approaches tend to produce, one which writes history

---

30 Bruun, Pan, and Rexed, The Gentlemen’s Club: International Control of Drugs and Alcohol.
33 Syamal Kumar Chatterjee, Legal Aspects of International Drug Control (Nijhoff, 1981).
backwards from its outcomes. McAllister’s research highlights the problems with this approach but it is a conclusion he does not seem to pursue with any determination and he uses of the term ‘regime’ in the singular throughout, suggesting a relatively uniform international framework and one based on ‘prohibition’. Other historians have used regulatory terminology. For example James Mills refers to the control system as the ‘international drugs regulatory system’.35 This thesis points to what William McAllister has termed the policy ‘trajectories’ which surrounded the treaties and drove their development, interpretation and implementation.36 In so doing it aims to highlight the contingencies, evolutions, uncertainties and accommodations in the understanding and development of these documents and the system.

This thesis provides greater conceptual understanding of the forces that shaped international control. It does so by drawing out more extensively issues discussed in passing or at times overlooked by McAllister and others, for example the British decision-making process surrounding the ending of the opium monopolies in 1943; the role of the Judd Resolution in US post-war policy formulation; or the struggles to create a unified national narcotics control in Germany and, to a lesser extent, Japan. All of these receive only passing examination in existing historical accounts. Further the thesis draws out, far more extensively, the political economy of the 1953 Opium Protocol and the 1961 Single Convention. It does this via a more thorough examination of the reasons given by states for their support or rejection of certain provisions. It thus brings discussion in many cases down from large historical brush strokes to a detailed appraisal of specific state actions at specific times and highlights the ad-hoc evolution of policy via sequential decision processes.

By beginning its narrative in 1939 this represents a new historical perspective on the role of the World War II era in reshaping the trajectories of international control efforts. McAllister’s work is the only one at the time of writing to cover this era in depth and tells the story as one of strong continuity between the League of Nations and the United Nations. The analysis that emerges here highlights continuities with the pre-war system but also the existence of multiple competing conceptions and possible counterfactuals during 1944-6.

36 McAllister, Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An International History, 3.
This thesis focuses strongly on the creation of international production regulations which had completely stalled in 1939. After the war, constant reinvigoration efforts eventually came to fruition with the 1961 Single Convention coming into force. These were based strongly on the manufacturing regulations designed for the 1931 Convention. Other key questions intersect with this thesis – prohibitions around quasi-medical use; opium smoking; and defining medical-scientific consumption. Questions of cannabis and coca leaf are also touched on, but this thesis is first and foremost about production limitation of opium as this was the key issue over the period.

Anglo-American and Cold War Historiography:

The British-American wartime alliance and post-war alliance has been characterised as a ‘special relationship’. Mark Stoler argues that during World War II: ‘never before had two nations fused their military...forces to such an extent...or so collaborated in economic mobilization [and] the sharing of intelligence secrets...Nor had two heads of government ever before created such [a]...strong personal friendship, a friendship duplicated by many of their subordinates and citizens’. This relationship was built on complex layers of cooperation, some the result of geopolitical necessity, some created by personal relationships as well as a sense of shared history and culture. This is particularly relevant for a discussion of narcotics control, where individual diplomats played a significant (at times pivotal) role in determining the success of diplomatic efforts. Further, the relationship was underpinned by systemic conditions of declining British power and rising US power. The Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ has, nonetheless, proved a durable and recurring feature of the international post-war system.

Arguably the dominant analytic paradigm for the relationship is the ‘functionalist’ tradition. It suggests that the ‘special relationship’ arose from mutual utility where each power derived some benefit from cooperation with the other. An implication of this was that the relationship was not inevitable but was dependent on nurturing and negotiation to produce cooperation.\footnote{For a discussion of the Functionalist tradition within Anglo-American historiography see Danchev, “On Specialness,” 739.}

This thesis subscribes to this tradition. The US and UK had areas of overlapping interests in drug control during, but particularly after, World War II. However, in the 1950s ultimately they failed to cooperate. It was the result of diverging policy goals and interests but was heavily worsened by personal diplomacy. For the latter, Harry Anslinger lost control of US drug diplomacy in the 1950s and a splintering of the policy process in the Federal Government strongly undermined the US’ ability to pursue a coherent agenda.

The extensive Anglo-American historiography has a significant blind spot surrounding narcotics control. None of tomes associated with the mainstream historiography give any significant coverage to the role of the narcotics trade, despite the often-potent interaction of drug policy and diplomacy with Anglo-American relations more broadly, for example in the interaction with Anglo-US-Iranian relations as this thesis highlights.\footnote{Numerous broad historical tomes were consulted and found to have absolutely no reference to drugs.} Overall, this study aims to help correct this historiographical oversight.

**Regional Historiography:**

The Korean peninsula, Indochina, Burma and Middle East were regions of periodic tensions in the Anglo-American post-war relationship.\footnote{The Tobacco industry does earn a mention in David Dimbleby and David Reynolds, *An Ocean Apart: The Relationship between Britain and America in the Twentieth Century* (Random House, 1988), 42.} However, Cold War Historiography has largely overlooked the role of narcotics control in various regional and national politics.\footnote{John Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After* (Macmillan, 2001), 51.} This thesis helps overcome this deficiency. Christopher Thorne has argued that the wartime relationship in Asia was that of ‘allies of kind.’\footnote{Christopher G. Thorne, *Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War against Japan, 1941-1945* (Oxford University Press, 1978).} His characterisation is part of a broader Anglo-American historiographical trend that highlights the continuation of a power rivalry
between a declining Britain and a rising America.\textsuperscript{47} The issue of narcotics control holds particular relevance for relations over Asia. The narcotics trade was inextricable from much of Asia’s economic, social and political fabric.\textsuperscript{48}

In the interests of parsimony, one region to receive less attention is Latin America. Apart from aggressive British efforts to soak up pharmaceutical export market share in the region, Britain largely deferred to American interests and influence. Meanwhile, much of the Latin American discussions centred on coca, meaning it remained below the radar of the international system which focused primarily on opiates prior to the 1960s.\textsuperscript{49}

William O. Walker III produced a seminal study of British and American policy towards opium in Asia between 1912 and 1954.\textsuperscript{50} It represented a continuation from his earlier studies on drug diplomacy in Latin America.\textsuperscript{51} His conception of relations is one that highlights the functionalist underpinnings of the relationship where competition predominates over cooperation and leaves relations in significant ‘disrepair’ by the mid 1950s.\textsuperscript{52} There is a stronger emphasis on the interwar than post-war period, and little emphasis given to wartime changes. This thesis will provide far greater depth on episodes, such as the colonial issue and Anglo-American disagreement over Burma in 1946, which Walker discusses only in passing.

The modern relationship between war, political instability and the global illicit narcotics trade emerged during World War II. Peter Dale Scott argues that (although officially being supplied by India) the reliance on cheap, smuggled, Shan opium by the Siamese opium monopoly helps explain the Thai Northern Army’s invasion of the Shan States in 1942.\textsuperscript{53} Jonathan Marshall traces the origins of the American ‘government-gang symbiosis’ in Asia to World War II when the US sourced the important strategic material Tungsten through

\textsuperscript{47} Reynolds, “Rethinking Anglo-American Relations,” 91.

\textsuperscript{48} There exists some strong work examining the role of opium in Asia. See for example: “Appendix 1: The Literature of the Opium Trade” in Carl A. Trocki, Opium, Empire and the Global Political Economy: A Study of the Asian Opium Trade, 1750-1950 (Routledge, 1999), 174–8.

\textsuperscript{49} McAllister, Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An International History, 199.


\textsuperscript{51} William O. Walker III, Drug Control in the Americas (University of New Mexico Press, 1989).

\textsuperscript{52} Walker III, Opium and Foreign Policy: The Anglo-American Search for Order in Asia, 1912-1954, 269; 217.

Chinese criminal gangs, and paid for it with opium.\(^{54}\) So began a set of relationships as well as a set of US covert practices that would continue on into the Cold War and beyond. My two chapters looking at the World War II era draw out some of these relationships, and other unexplored linkages between opium and broader wartime regional political concerns and post-war planning discussions.

The role of the opium trade in colonial and Cold War politics is explored in the seminal work of Alfred McCoy.\(^ {55}\) He charts the continued role of the trade in enabling colonisers to establish client groups within Asian and Middle Eastern states.\(^ {56}\) It has since been expanded upon twice and in his ‘third and final edition’ he asserts closure on the ‘book’s controversial thesis about CIA complicity in the drug trade [which] has been corroborated by the agency’s own sources and, more importantly, by history itself’.\(^ {57}\)

Meyer and Parssinen provide an original account of the evolution of the international opium trade in Asia from 1907-1954. It is a work based heavily on primary research and serves as a conscious effort to explode the nationalist myths and cultural conspiracies that have accompanied the trade. Meyer and Parssinen show, as best they can for an under-documented trade, opium as an evolving international business structure that grew in symbiosis with local legal-political systems.\(^ {58}\)

They also highlight that the torch of international control was shuffled back and forth between the US and Britain in their period of study. British bureaucrat, Sir Malcolm Delevingne, an Undersecretary of State, led supply control efforts while representing Britain on the League’s Opium Committee until 1931. His believed smugglers would not be able to reverse-integrate complicated manufacturing processes, and once a controlled supply chain was created, the illicit market would shrink, potentially to the point of extinction.\(^ {59}\) After


\(^ {57}\) McCoy, The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, Colombia, xxvi.


\(^ {59}\) Ibid., 19.
Delevingne’s retirement the torch was passed to the US’ top drug diplomat Harry Anslinger who would look to extend and tighten Delevingne’s conception but also export the US prohibitionist model of eradicating all non-medical supply and demand through the global diffusion of police enforcement efforts.

Meyer and Parssinen also highlight the anti-opium drives in China as an expression of nascent nationalism and anti-imperialism that was appropriated by virtually all political movements following the Opium Wars. All political movements were nonetheless forced to engage with the trade (Mao’s communists included) to fund political and military activities.60 Once in power, the communists instituted one of the most effective anti-narcotics campaigns in world history.61 Overall, every side in China before, during and after World War II, as well as external actors such as the US, sought to co-opt the opium narrative for broader political ends, as this thesis will highlight.

A number of works have attempted to unpick the interaction between US drug diplomacy and broader relations with the Middle East. For example, in the case of Iran, Bradley Porter’s ‘Learning to Tax’ highlights US involvement in establishment of the Government Opium Monopoly during the inter-war period. However the work is fundamentally one of economic history and engaged in minimal diplomatic archival research.62 Some more recent historiography has elaborated on the role of drugs in Middle Eastern politics and their impact on interstate relations.63 Nevertheless this field remains extremely underdeveloped. This thesis aims to expand on the interaction between drugs and diplomacy in the Middle East and Asia via their interaction with Anglo-American diplomacy. This is particularly important given the role Britain and the US played in determining and driving drug policy in the regions.

Japan and Germany provide particularly interesting case studies. Japan has traditionally been viewed as committing narcotics war crimes against China during the 1930s and became a test

60 Ibid., 270–2.
case for US drug policies after World War II. Germany provides an illuminating case under Allied occupation after World War II and given its lynchpin status in Cold War politics. Both receive significant attention in this thesis. H. Richard Friman’s examination of Washington’s efforts to export its prohibitionist framework to Germany and Japan is the only significant account thus far.\textsuperscript{64} It is based on archival research in both countries.\textsuperscript{65} Ultimately the archival base is relatively shallow, and many assertions are based on politicised reports of the Foreign Policy Association about Germany and Japan which, as we shall see in this thesis, sought to support the domestic position of Harry Anslinger and the US Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN). This thesis provides the first archive-based historical account of Anglo-American drug control in Germany after World War II and the first extensive account of US drug control reconstruction efforts in Japan post-World War II.

**The US and UK Domestic Contexts:**

Virginia Berridge has stated that: ‘large areas of policy history, at both the national and international levels, remain untouched.’\textsuperscript{66} Some valuable primary research has been conducted on the evolution of British\textsuperscript{67} and (more extensively) American\textsuperscript{68} domestic control policies during the nineteenth and twentieth century. However, Virginia Berridge states that ‘little primary historical research’ has covered the period after 1926 in Britain in depth.\textsuperscript{69}

\textsuperscript{64} A useful account of German national regulations can be found in: Jonathan Lewy, “The Drug Policy of the Third Reich,” *Social History of Alcohol and Drugs* 22, no. 2 (2008): 144–67.

\textsuperscript{65} Friman, *NarcoDiplomacy: Exporting the U.S. War on Drugs*.

\textsuperscript{66} Berridge, *Opium and the People: Opiate Use and Drug Control Policy in Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century England*, xxix.


\textsuperscript{69} Berridge, *Opium and the People: Opiate Use and Drug Control Policy in Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century England*, 279.
Some more recent histories have attempted to discuss early drug policy history from a Foucauldian theoretical framework.\textsuperscript{70}

Britain and America are widely held to have taken substantially different approaches to the treatment of addiction prior to the early-to-mid 1960s. The approach of the ‘British System’ was seen as treating addiction via the prescription of opiates, thereby avoiding criminality and suffering inherent in the US repressive approach.\textsuperscript{71} In many ways it served as a useful foil for academics critical of the US’ repressive model.\textsuperscript{72} The philosophical basis has been traced to the 1926 report of the Rolleston Committee.\textsuperscript{73} The term continues to arouse controversy. Berridge argues that ‘there was in fact no ‘British System’ in the way this term is often used, rather…a system of masterly inactivity in the face of a non-existent problem.’\textsuperscript{74} My thesis tends to confirm this view by highlighting that UK Home Office officials, particularly in the 1950s, had no desire to accept new international obligations around a perceived non-existent domestic problem. Further Home Office officials had no desire to advocate for the ‘British System’ at the international level, merely to avoid a situation where they could be criticized at CND for domestic policies.

More recent writings have characterised it as based on fluidity and pragmatism. As two of the leading commentators put it: ‘the quintessential characteristic...[is] its lack of rigid form and hence its potentially greater capacity to be intuitively reactive to changed circumstances.’\textsuperscript{75} This thesis will highlight that this characterisation applies to Britain’s approach to international controls, particularly their strong desire to keep commitments minimal and

\textsuperscript{70} Toby Seddon, \textit{A History of Drugs: Drugs and Freedom in the Liberal Age} (Taylor & Francis Ltd., 2010); Melissa Bull, \textit{Governing the Heroin Trade: From Treaties to Treatment} (Ashgate, 2008); Geoffrey Harding, \textit{Opiate Addiction, Morality, and Medicine: From Moral Illness to Pathological Disease} (Macmillan, 1988).
\textsuperscript{72} Most notably the works by: Alfred R. Lindesmith, \textit{The Addict and the Law} (Indiana University Press, 1965); Edwin M. Schur, \textit{Narcotic Addiction in Britain and America The Impact of Public Policy} (Taylor & Francis, 1962); Arnold S. Trebach, \textit{The Heroin Solution} (Yale University Press, 1982).
\textsuperscript{74} Berridge, “The ‘British System’ and Its History, Myths and Reality,” 15.
adaptive. This thesis highlights the unwillingness, particularly after World War II, of Britain to challenge domestic medical interests or assume costly new obligations for their National Health Service, founded in 1948, out of a deference to US control efforts.

The period 1920 to 1965 has been characterised as the ‘Classic Era’ of US narcotics control when ‘policy was unprecedently strict and punitive’. A number of scholars have highlighted that the encroachment of US federal power into the field of narcotics control interacted with diplomatic motives, special interest pressures, constitutional issues around state-federal relations, and ‘ulterior political motives of disingenuous individuals, notably Dr. Hamilton Wright’. Wright was a moral crusader and one of the original US drug diplomats. He was instrumental in shaping the international control system during the genesis period around the Hague Opium Conference of 1911-12 and the passage of subsequent national control laws. His wife, Elizabeth Washburn Wright continued advocating his vision after his death. Her ham-fisted diplomatic forays feature occasionally in this thesis. She represented an at times important Washington DC insider component of ‘Anslinger’s Army’ - well connected to Executive, Congressional and news outlets.

During the 1960s, when this study ends, a convergence with Britain occurred. America began to institute methadone maintenance policies and Britain began to re-evaluate its own system in light of a growing drug consuming population.

Outline:
This thesis begins below with an overview of the creation of international drug control during the first half of the twentieth century, told through the lens of Anglo-American relations. Chapter One opens in 1939 with the onset of World War II and the efforts to salvage the technical aspects of the League of Nations system. It proceeds in a chronological manner. The first two chapters focus most heavily on the ‘era of bilateralism’ as the League Opium Advisory Committee (OAC) effectively collapsed. The following two chapters are focused on

---

77 Courtwright, Dark Paradise: Opiate Addiction in America before 1940, 4; Musto, The American Disease: Origins of Narcotic Control; Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, 1900-1939: A Study in International Humanitarian Reform.
the re-multilateralisation of control. Chapter Three focuses on the re-creation of control under the UN system while Chapter Four focuses on the recreation of control in war torn areas and the efforts to ensure adherence to the international system. Chapters Five, Six and Seven focus on the creation of new international drug controls and the march towards a production limitation agreement, first the 1953 Opium Protocol and ultimately the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. Let us now turn to the origins of the system around 1900.

A Long Prelude: Interests, Ideals and Precedents 1900-1939:

The American International Drug Paradigm and the Birth of International Controls:

The American paradigm for international drug control solidified around the turn of the twentieth century. It encapsulated both domestic concerns and economic interests. Regarding domestic concerns, there were two main strands. Firstly, it was fuelled by a changing perception of drug user ethnicity and demographics by the white protestant population. This was magnified by a nativist fear of immigrants, alien substances and cultural practices. Secondly, it was built on a latent progressivism that sought to use the state to remove social evils, particularly those believed bred by intoxicants. This progressivism was to develop a strong international footing under the administration of Theodore Roosevelt.

In the economic sphere the US sought to build relations with a Chinese population and state apparatus that saw opium as embodying all they detested about the European colonial powers. China was the epicentre of the world opium problem and the drug had come to represent a potent symbol of national disgrace inflicted during and after the Opium Wars. The US sought to utilise these sentiments to ameliorate their own (largely immigration related) tensions with the Chinese business community and help open the market to American commercial interests.

The interaction between these idiosyncratic strands of American domestic and foreign relations drove US efforts to export drug control.\textsuperscript{84} The first tangible manifestation occurred in the Philippines after the Spanish-American war. Washington ended the opium monopoly, begun by the Spanish administrators half a century earlier, and instituted a policy of strict prohibition, except for medical purposes.\textsuperscript{85} This was to serve as the American test case for prohibition and eventually the model it forcefully advocated for the European colonial powers.

The first US efforts to internationalise prohibition came with its calling the Shanghai Opium Commission in 1909. Delegates had no plenipotentiary powers, yet immediately clashed. The US and China pushed a strong prohibitionist agenda and the colonial powers dismissed it, defending ‘quasi-medical’ opium eating and smoking in their colonies. Meanwhile, drug-producing states argued that manufacturing states were being hypocritical by seeking to restrict opium production while leaving their own pharmaceuticals unhindered. These divisions represented the core battles over international drug control through World War II and beyond. The Shanghai Commission produced weak recommendations that were largely ignored. Britain, in the midst of a Ten Year Agreement for phasing out opium exports from India to China, signed in 1907, desired to be left alone to administer its own colonies as it saw fit.\textsuperscript{86}

Undeterred, the US threw their weight behind a plenipotentiary Convention.\textsuperscript{87} The resultant Hague Convention of 1912 was a relatively weak document that required universal ratification. The outbreak of World War I placed this treaty on hold until 1919 when its ratification was included in the Paris peace treaties at the behest of both Britain and the US. The accession of Sir Malcolm Delevingne as Under-Secretary for the drug issue at the Home Office in 1913 proved pivotal in bringing British policies closer into line with US policies. Taking a strong supply control stance he helped overcome Foreign Office reluctance to

\textsuperscript{85} McAllister, \textit{Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An International History}, 27.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., 24; 28–30.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., 30–1.; James H. Mills has in a revisionist reading of the 1912 Convention, suggests that Britain’s role in driving control efforts may be underestimated. Mills, “Cocaine and the British Empire: The Drug and the Diplomats at the Hague Opium Conference, 1911–12.”
engage with the issue.\textsuperscript{88} This forced Germany and Turkey to accede and the Treaty eventually came into force.\textsuperscript{89}

The 1912 Convention was a compromise document, with broad aspirations and no implementation mechanisms. It became the normative foundation for the international system and control efforts over the coming century. Its preamble stated that the international community was ‘determined to bring about the gradual suppression of the abuse of opium, morphine and cocaine’ and their derivatives.\textsuperscript{90} What remained was to agree the means to achieve this goal. This was rendered more difficult by the fact that the US was ostensibly ignoring the effective guardian of the system – the League of Nations. Further, anti-drug zealots in the US would sooner see negotiations fail than the US weaken its stance of complete prohibition save for ‘medical and scientific needs’.\textsuperscript{91} Eventually, however, the ground was set for two new plenipotentiary conferences to be held in 1924-5.

\textit{The British International Drug Paradigm:}

Alfred McCoy views 1773 as the beginning of Opium’s modern era, when the British East India Company imposed a monopoly over the sale and production of opium in northeast India.\textsuperscript{92} British policy represented an evolving mix of normative desires and practical concerns. In the end it was the practicalities that usually carried the day. Opium smoking was permitted within a number of British far eastern territories, and its sale through government monopolies provided substantial revenues. The result was a situation whereby Britain’s colonies continued a practice that London officially condemned.\textsuperscript{93}

Efforts by Malcolm Delevingne to win the abolition of ‘quasi-medical’ opium use in anticipation of the 1924 Conferences led to a nasty bureaucratic fight. This eventually pitted the Home Office and Foreign Office on the one side versus the Colonial Office and India

\textsuperscript{88} Berridge, \textit{Opium and the People: Opiate Use and Drug Control Policy in Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century England}, 258–9.
\textsuperscript{89} Taylor, \textit{American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, 1900-1939: A Study in International Humanitarian Reform}, 141–44.
\textsuperscript{90} Treaty Preamble quoted in: Bruun, Pan, and Rexed, \textit{The Gentlemen’s Club: International Control of Drugs and Alcohol}, 38.
\textsuperscript{91} McAllister, \textit{Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An International History}, 37; 50–3.
\textsuperscript{92} McCoy, \textit{The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, Colombia}, 5.
\textsuperscript{93} Meyer and Parssinen, \textit{Webs of Smoke: Smugglers, Warlords, Spies, and the History of the International Drug Trade}, 68.
Office on the other. Delevingne argued London ‘was being continually pressed by public opinion in the United States, which has the support of the American Government.’ He was supported by the Foreign Office, which was uncomfortable with maintaining an apparent hypocrisy on the international stage.

The Colonial Office was concerned with practical problems around prohibition. China would likely serve as a hub for a reinvigorated illicit trade, one that would be politically destabilising for British colonies. Further, there would be fiscal ramifications. Between 1858 and 1947 about one seventh of the revenue of British authorities in India came from taxes levied on the production and export of opium, although this remained in steady decline since 1906. Finally, they worried opium consumers being pushed towards heroin, cocaine and other substitutes. Eventually the Cabinet sided with the Colonial Office, with the Prime Minister deciding, ‘Although we wish to see an end to the [opium] traffic, we cannot ignore practical difficulties which Americans, in particular, must be made to understand’.

They chose a policy of gradual suppression over a fifteen-year period (on course to coincide with the outbreak of the next world war). A wide loophole, however, made full prohibition contingent on effective suppression in China. The policy challenged America’s uncompromising stance. Meanwhile, the two 1924 Conferences met. The first focused on Asia (and to which the US was not invited) and almost immediately became deadlocked. The second began in November 1924 and saw the US launch a hard line offensive, throwing proceedings into near disarray. Beneath the tempest the subcommittees successfully pulled together a number of bureaucratic proposals. Most notable was a system for states to estimate their drug requirements, and a means for reporting these statistics to a new (semi-autonomous) administrative body - the Permanent Central Opium Board (PCOB; or ‘the Board’).

---

98 Quoted in: Ibid., 71.
99 Meyer and Parssinen describe the policy as a ‘masterpiece of hypocrisy.’ Ibid.
100 McAllister, Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An International History, 67–74.
The first conference concluded in early February 1925, but achieved little owing to the instability in China. One week later the second conference wrapped up. The US delegation, unwilling to make concessions, had walked out of proceedings and refused to sign. The resulting 1925 Convention instituted the first significant bureaucratic mechanisms to implement the normative goals outlined in the 1912 Convention. It also brought other drugs like coca and marijuana (at Egypt’s request) into the control framework. It did not, however, restrict supply and states were free to continue producing and consuming whatever quantities they desired, provided they reported statistics to the PCOB. Meanwhile, the US had been completely alienated from the drug apparatus and would remain so for the next half-decade.

**Harry J. Anslinger:**

Harry Anslinger was appointed as head of the newly created Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) in 1930. He would remain Commissioner of the FBN (a branch of the Treasury Department) in September 1930 where he would stay until his retirement in 1962 (although remaining on as US international drug representative until 1970). Anslinger was a committed alcohol prohibitionist and was determined not to repeat the failures of the Volstead act in the field of drugs. One of these failures, as he saw it, was an unwillingness to institute harsh penalties for individual consumption. As late as 1928 he submitted a plan to a national competition offering his ‘better ideas’ on how to administer alcohol prohibition more effectively. Anslinger’s feelings for Britain were, at best, ambivalent. He had cut his diplomatic teeth with the State Department negotiating the ‘Anslinger Accord’ with British officials administering the Bahamas in the 1920s. It established a certificate system for shipping, to counteract the overt alcohol bootlegging into the United States from the port of Nassau. This success led to his being poached by the Treasury department.

Anslinger would dominate American (and international) drug control efforts for the next four decades. A young and extremely capable bureaucrat, he had a shrewd political instinct, a willingness to massage and fabricate data, and an ability to cultivate the media and loyal domestic constituencies (‘Anslinger’s Army’) and leverage them to forward his control

---

agenda. More pragmatic than his legion domestic detractors gave him credit for his
overarching priority remained to build and maintain the FBN as the US’ lead drug agency.
His single-mindedness on the drug issue betrayed a certain moral zealotry, but this was
usually outweighed by a desire to protect the FBN and his suzerainty over it. He was in this
sense more of a bureaucratic entrepreneur than a moral entrepreneur.

Prelude to the War:
By 1930 conditions in America had sufficiently changed to allow a re-engagement with the
nascent drug control system. An internationalist constituency argued for engagement with the
League on this issue as a means towards broader cooperation; the drug manufacturing
industry feared an agreement imposing unfair conditions; and the State Department wished to
cleanse the spectre of the 1925 Conference from its relations with the League. Moreover, the
recently appointed Harry Anslinger together with his State Department ally Stuart Fuller
(the two would remain a close and formidable team until Fuller’s retirement in 1941), quickly
showed themselves determined to re-internationalise US drug control efforts.

Within the League, a sense of collective responsibility to vindicate international cooperation
(particularly regarding arms control) led delegates to surmount the large obstacles to
agreement. The result was a compromise treaty, but one that imbued the drug control
system with a new coherence, and created a tangible distinction between the global licit and
illicit traffic. It also added some oversight teeth to the work of the PCOB through the creation
of the Drug Supervisory Body (DSB) to administer the ‘system of estimates’ (see below).
Meanwhile it served to further enshrine supply control as the underlying principle of the

103 See for example: McWilliams, The Protectors: Harry J. Anslinger and the Federal Bureau of
104 Douglas Kinder was the first to apply the term ‘Bureaucratic Entrepreneur’ to Anslinger. Douglas
Historical Review 50, no. 2 (1 May 1981): 169–91. The term ‘Moral Entrepreneur’ was coined by
Howard Becker. Howard Saul Becker, Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance (Free Press,
1997).
106 Walker III, Opium and Foreign Policy: The Anglo-American Search for Order in Asia, 1912-1954,
57.
107 McAllister, Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An International History, 110.
108 Ibid., 95–6.
international control framework, with little consideration given to demand issues or addiction.\textsuperscript{109}

The cooperation proved short lived. Soon afterwards, Malcolm Delevingne retired from the Home Office (albeit remaining active within the international control apparatus until 1948).\textsuperscript{110} London quietly continued to work to square its colonial interests with its international commitments.\textsuperscript{111} Meanwhile, the US quickly wearied of compromise. Taking up the reins of supply control from Britain, Anslinger and Fuller forged ahead with an American vision for immediate prohibition of non-medical and non-scientific consumption in an uncompromising and divisive manner.\textsuperscript{112}

In 1931 the US had warned that:

\begin{quote}
There is but one real method by which to suppress the evil of opium smoking in the Far East...is complete statutory prohibition of the importation, manufacture, sale, possession or use of prepared opium, coupled with active enforcement of such prohibition.\textsuperscript{113}
\end{quote}

Britain and other European colonial powers agreed in principle but refused to prematurely commit. Meanwhile, a growing illicit market accompanied the implementation of the 1931 Convention.\textsuperscript{114} States doubled down and looked to cross border anti-smuggling cooperation while broader security issues in Europe and Asia threatened to engulf the League. The last major act on the control front was the 1936 Illicit Trafficking Conference. During this, Anslinger and Fuller attempted, but failed to win criminalisation of all non-medical production and distribution. Unwilling to compromise they sought to walk out but were

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{109} Ibid., 101.
\bibitem{110} Ibid., 100.
\end{thebibliography}
prevented by a State Department anxious to avoid a repeat of 1925. Remaining on at the talks, the pair mocked the proceedings and eventually refused to sign the 1936 Convention. The treaty did not come into force until October 1939 by which stage war had intervened.\footnote{McAllister, \textit{Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An International History}, 123.}

As the decade drew to a close the League Opium Advisory Committee (OAC) became consumed with the goal of designing a production limitation treaty. A conference was tentatively scheduled for 1940, by which time war resulted in indefinite postponement. In the meantime Britain had ignored American efforts to impose a specific timeline for eliminating both its opium monopolies and the practice of opium smoking in its colonies.\footnote{Ibid., 127.} Seeing this as a major domino in ending the colonial trade, Anslinger would look to the confusion of wartime as a means to secure his desired end. This issue, so symbolic of the divide between the prohibitionist United States and the old colonial regulatory system, was soon to come to a head.
Chapter 1: Drug Diplomacy During World War II and Beyond – Part I, 1939-43:

Introduction:
At the outbreak of War in 1939 the drug control system stood as a mixture of contradictions and uncertainty. On the one side were the strict control advocates, led by the United States.\textsuperscript{117} Having exploited League insecurities to push their hard-line conception of control, they struggled to encourage compliance with and widespread acceptance of their approach. On the other side were producing states, agrarian countries whose economic, cultural and political systems were entwined with - and often in some ways dependent upon - the very drugs the system sought to limit. Success for control advocates was often a function of how much leverage could be brought to bear on these producer states. In the middle were the old colonial powers, of which Britain was the most prominent example. Britain recognised the role that addiction and the opium economy played within many of its colonies. It sought to balance its desire for international cooperation (which required US interest in this issue to be encouraged) with the realities of imperial governance and commercial interests.

The outbreak of war would fundamentally reshape international drug control and set the basis for the system that was to be enshrined in the 1961 Single Convention and which endures to this day. For the first and only time in its history the evolution of the system would be determined by specifically bilateral efforts rather than multilateral efforts. Moreover, it was US-led bilateral efforts, driven by its wartime leverage, while other states were confined to a rear-guard defensive action. The US was to emerge after the war as the dominant world power and the lead nation in international drug control efforts. Instead of recreating the previous ambiguous association with the League drug apparatus, the US would take centre stage in the new United Nations (UN) control system. None of this was predetermined. The rising US geopolitical star facilitated it, but the reshaping control efforts during wartime and the emergence of a new post-war system was in many ways the result of aggressive wartime diplomatic manoeuvrings on the part of the US FBN Chief Harry Anslinger and key members of the Washington drug control lobby.

\textsuperscript{117} The typology of control advocates, producer states, manufacturing states and consumer states is derived from: McAllister, \textit{Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An International History}. 38
In many ways this group fundamentally altered the set of interests underpinning the system and changed the arithmetic for post-war control. In so doing they helped set the international community on the path towards the 1961 Single Convention. The most radical departure occurred in 1943 when Britain and Holland promised to adopt a policy of total prohibition of opium smoking and monopolies in their Far Eastern Territories upon repossessing. This shift was the direct outcome of an aggressive and risky strategy of bluff by Anslinger and his allies. Neither country believed their colonial interests were best served by immediate prohibition. Nevertheless, owing directly to US pressure both Britain and the Netherlands eventually caved in. Their acquiescence helped ensure the post-war control system would not revert to the deadlock of the interwar years. Instead it could witness the emergence of a reinvigorated supply control framework underwritten by traditional hard line advocates and newly supply focused colonial powers. It would also ensure that America could bring new pressure to bear on the traditional system recalcitrants such as Iran and Afghanistan, which had traditionally rejected new international obligations around opium control, and set the stage for a post-war production limitation treaty.

**Part 1: The Early War – September 1939 – 1943:**

*Salvaging the Apparatus: America Steps up*:118

The international control framework was underpinned by a number of multilateral treaties, implemented via national legislation. The League Opium Advisory Committee (OAC) was established by a General Assembly resolution and acted as the policy organ of the control system. The PCOB and DSB had independent treaty bases – although depended on the League Secretariat for administrative functions. The PCOB was empowered by the 1925 and 1931 Conventions with supervising and reporting upon the movement of opium, coca leaves and other narcotic drugs throughout the world, and to ‘sound the alarm’ when excesses accumulated in any territory. The DSB was the product of the 1931 Convention and oversaw ‘system of estimates’ for Governments’ ‘medical and scientific needs’ and to determine what quantities each country could manufacture, import and export. The 1931 Convention had achieved almost universal adherence by 1933 and applied to 177 territories. Most complied, and the PCOB retained the power to request States Parties to impose an embargo on further

---

exports to those that did not.\(^{119}\) In practice this option was avoided and quiet diplomatic pressure was preferred. For those states that did not, or could not, supply statistics (including those that had not ratified the 1931 Convention), the DSB was empowered to establish estimates on their behalf, which were legally binding on States Parties.\(^{120}\)

The US maintained official relations with the PCOB and DSB but not the League OAC. The US and its control advocate allies such as Canada and China believed the encroachment of national economic interests into the OAC and the League drug secretariat had fatally weakened the interwar system. The PCOB and DSB were perceived as having remained aloof of the politicisation of the OAC.\(^{121}\) When war broke out, the League drug apparatus hoped to remain aloof. The PCOB requested all governments to continue sending statistics and the vast majority complied.\(^{122}\) Britain remained strongly supportive of maintaining the entire League system.\(^{123}\) The US focused on saving the DSB and PCOB. In October 1939 the State Department publicly affirmed that:

\[\text{It is upon the operation of these two boards...supplementing and coordinating the efforts of independent nations, that the entire fabric of international drug control ultimately rests and the American Government regards it of the highest importance...to the entire world, that they should be enabled to function adequately, effectively and without interruption and should enjoy the cooperation of all nations.}\(^{124}\)

By the close of the OAC meeting in Geneva in May 1940 the Netherlands had surrendered to Germany and soon France would sign an armistice. Thereafter the pretence of normalcy ended, and attention shifted to a salvage operation.\(^{125}\) As Harry Anslinger described it: staff

\(^{119}\) Felkin Memo, October 1939; Memorandum: ‘Activities of the [PCOB],’ 15 March 1941, FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box171/File1230-2, PCOB (1939-48).

\(^{120}\) Bertil Renborg memo: ‘Note on the Importance of the Estimate System...’ 6 July 1942, FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box171/File1230-8, DSB (1940-67).

\(^{121}\) FPA Memo: ‘Control of Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs...’, December 1944; Numerous references to perceived politicization of OAC in: FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1, [UNO] #1 (1939-45).

\(^{122}\) Extract from: Acting Sec-Gen Report on the Work of the league 1941-1942, FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box171/File 1230-8, PCOB (1940-67);

\(^{123}\) Makins to Chatterjee, 11 September 1940, PRO, FO371/24749.

\(^{124}\) Quoted in Renborg memo: ‘Note on the Importance of the Estimate System...,’ 6 July 1942, FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box171/File1230-8, DSB (1940-67).

\(^{125}\) McAllister, \textit{Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century}, 136.
suddenly began ‘jumping around in Geneva like chickens before a hurricane’.\textsuperscript{126} Evacuation of the PCOB and DSB to the US soon appeared to offer the best hope for the system’s survival. This PCOB and DSB were perceived as independent of the League and oversaw the technical aspects of the system, while avoiding the political issues which could jeopardise its continued functioning.

In 1940, President Roosevelt had approved the transfer of ‘non-political’ League services to the Institute of International Study at Princeton. The goal was to preserve the League’s technical apparatus and gain intelligence about Germany’s economic situation.\textsuperscript{127} The PCOB and DSB were not invited because the distinction between their work and the League Secretariat was not grasped in the State Department.\textsuperscript{128} Nevertheless, Anslinger and other system advocates like Helen Howell Moorhead and Herbert May for the Foreign Policy Association (FPA), conducted a quiet campaign to overcome State Department opposition - the most determined coming from Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long.\textsuperscript{129}

Britain evolved a general wartime policy of ‘keeping alive the organs of the League which are able to do useful work.’ In 1940 they were already ‘strongly in favour of the transfer of as many officials as possible concerned with narcotics to the US’.\textsuperscript{130} At the same time, wartime conditions fostered the emergence of a new London-based relationship between top League drug system personnel stationed in Britain, the Foreign Office and the Home Office. The Chairman of the PCOB (and India Office official) Sir Atul Chatterjee had, in July 1940, opened a four-way correspondence with Roger Makins, Deputy Head of the Foreign Office Central Europe Department, Sydney Harris, Under Secretary of State at the Home Office and DSB Chairman Sir Malcolm Delevingne. Hereafter the group is referred to as ‘the London Four’. Chatterjee’s initial motive was to gauge State Department opposition to the transfer.\textsuperscript{131}

The four-way correspondence quickly blossomed into a relationship of strong mutual utility. The PCOB and DSB officials provided timely expertise to the British government who were

\textsuperscript{126} Anslinger to Sharman, 6 August 1940, FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box152/File0660 Canada I (1929-1941).

\textsuperscript{127} McAllister, \textit{Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century}, 137–40.

\textsuperscript{128} Ibid., 137; Draft Makins to Chatterjee, August 1940, BNA-FO371/24749.

\textsuperscript{129} to May, 10 October 1940, FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box171/File1230-2, PCOB (1939-48).

\textsuperscript{130} FO to Kelly (Berne), 7 August 1940, BNA-FO371/24749; File Minutes, 3 April 1942, Proposed Meeting of the PCOB, BNA-FO371/28075.

\textsuperscript{131} See files ‘Position of the [PCOB]’, July-November 1940, BNA-FO371/24749.
both bewildered by the issue's wartime potency and struggling to prevent it poisoning other areas of Anglo-American relations. In return, the British Government provided these officials with valuable access to the now Washington-based League apparatus. Both functions became increasingly important as US influence and internal machinations became more apparent. By 1943 the DSB Chairman Sir Malcolm Delevingne was acting as the main Foreign Office advisor on the opium issue.

In 1940 the State Department appeared likely to refuse the PCOB and DSB move to Washington. They suggested League officials look to Portugal, Cuba or South America as alternatives. Chatterjee, trying to mollify State Department concerns, promised a minimalist role – ‘reception, collection and publication of statistics’. His sense of urgency increased as his correspondence with League headquarters in Switzerland was cut off. A quiet Washington lobbying campaign for allowing the PCOB and DSB to move to the US continued under the leadership of Herbert May and the Foreign Policy Association (FPA).

May was Vice President of the PCOB; the Acting Chairman of the DSB; and Board member of the FPA. He represented a core member of Anslinger’s wartime ‘inner circle’ of control advocates but also a true old hand of the system, with broad international respect and admiration. May had served on the PCOB since its founding in 1928 and served on both the PCOB and DSB before, during and after the war. Since the early League days the FPA had served as a surrogate for the US government on the opium issue. It undertook public relations work; lobbied US elites; and became an incubator for policy ideas. It was a central plank of the wartime ‘inner circle’. It had three main actors one of whom was Herbert May. Helen Howell Moorhead chaired the FPA Opium Research Committee and was perhaps the most important non-state actor in the formation of international drug control. As William McAllister describes, for over a quarter of a century ‘she provided social lubrication, acted as a go-between among governmental representatives, floated policy options, and served as a backchannel communications conduit’.132 Joseph P. Chamberlain served as President of the FPA and law professor at Columbia University. He took a less activist role in the day-to-day workings of the ‘inner circle’ initiatives, but served as an extremely effective figurehead for FPA activities particularly by utilising his high profile international contacts to engage

---

governments in opium control discussions during the war. All three frequently acted in a personal capacity, as the charter of the FPA prohibited policy advocacy.\textsuperscript{133}

The 'inner circle', a term originated by William McAllister, was a group based around Harry Anslinger and Washington DC-based control advocates and lobbyists during the war. It played an instrumental role in securing the survival of the system, worked to circumvent more conservative elements of the old League system, advocated an end to the opium monopolies and drove discussions around the post-war drug control system. It included the FPA team as a core component. Further it included a number of Anslinger’s chief international allies. Most important was Col. Clem Sharman of Canada (see below). At times it included Dr. Victor Hoo, China’s Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1942-5. Hoo had served as China’s lead representative to the League of Nations from 1931 until 1942 when the opium issue was a chief foreign policy and domestic concern. He worked closely with the US to drive this issue in international discussions, as we shall see.\textsuperscript{134}

George Morlock from the Division of Far Eastern Affairs was Anslinger’s chief ally and counterpart at the US State Department. Morlock and Anslinger worked closely although Morlock had less determination on this issue and was more deferential to broader State Department concerns than his predecessor Stuart Fuller with whom Anslinger had formed an extremely tight bureaucratic alliance during the 1930s until his death in 1941.\textsuperscript{135} The ‘inner circle’ also came to include Arthur Elliott Felkin the diligent and earnest PCOB Secretary and former British bureaucrat. While in Washington Felkin, came strongly under Anslinger’s influence and became highly disillusioned with old League Secretariat members who he worked with Anslinger and other ‘inner circle’ members to circumvent. Further it included Leon Steinig an exiled Jewish Austrian who had escaped Nazi occupation to the US, eventually becoming a US citizen. He had served a key role in drafting the international drug treaties during the 1930s and was the main secretariat figure in the DSB.\textsuperscript{136}

\textsuperscript{133} Moorhead to Gavrilovitch, 6 March 1946, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1 [UNO] #3 (1946).
\textsuperscript{135} McAllister, \textit{Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An International History}, 90.
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid., 138 & 149.
Eventually Herbert May secured State Department consent for the PCOB and DSB move.\textsuperscript{137} Opposition folded when it became apparent that Secretary of State Cordell Hull held a ‘strong interest’ in the drug issue. Logistical barriers remained. For example, the Spanish Government initially refused a travel visa for Arthur Elliott Felkin. Anslinger eventually extorted one by threatening to withhold future narcotic supplies from Spain.\textsuperscript{138} It was an early example of the powerful leverage his opium stockpile afforded him (see below).

Political and logistical constraints ensured minimalist functioning of the PCOB and DSB. Reports were reduced to bare bones statistics, removing all commentary not mandated by the conventions. They were officially ‘branch offices’ of Geneva Headquarters. With increased US patronage came increased US influence. The PCOB and DSB were dependent on the goodwill of their hosts and the assistance of Anslinger. As Herbert May described it when Anslinger helped solve a complicated issue regarding their office lease: ‘Good old Harry, always to the rescue!’ Reciprocating, members of the apparatus provided statistics and political intelligence to Anslinger and became a core part of the ‘Inner Circle’.\textsuperscript{139}

Anslinger also used the situation to inculcate the American approach to addiction ‘treatment’ to the officials stationed in the US. This involved arranging extensive tours of prisons, federal narcotics farms (detoxification hospitals) and various regional FBN bureaus.\textsuperscript{140} As PCOB Secretary Elliott Felkin described one visit to a New York penitentiary to Anslinger: ‘As you know, I am a child in these matters, but I want to tell you how strong a general impression of keenness and efficiency I got.’\textsuperscript{141}

By 1943 Anslinger commented that it was ‘gratifying to know that the structure we have helped to erect over the past years has not toppled’.\textsuperscript{142} Herbert May later recollected ‘that the [PCOB] and the [DSB] w[ere] among the very few international institutions which continued

\textsuperscript{137} Lothian to FO, 5 September 1940; Chatterjee to Makins, 3 September 1940; Makins to Chatterjee, 11 September 1940; Makins to Chatterjee, 25 September 1940, BNA-FO371/24749.

\textsuperscript{138} Gaston to Morgenthau, 19 September 1940; Hart to Weddell, November 1940; further correspondence: FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box171/File1230-2 PCOB (1939-48).

\textsuperscript{139} Memorandum: ‘Activities of the [PCOB],’ 15 March 1941; Herbert May to Anslinger 26 June 1941; numerous files in FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box171/File1230-2 PCOB (1939-48).

\textsuperscript{140} See extensive documentation in FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box171/File1230-8 DSB (1940-67); FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box171/File1230-2 PCOB (1939-48).

\textsuperscript{141} Felkin to Anslinger, 28 August 1941, FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box171/File1230-2 PCOB (1939-48).

\textsuperscript{142} Anslinger to Felkin, 12 February 1943, FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box171/File1230-2 PCOB (1939-48).
to operate fully all through the war...nearly all League activities had stopped too and the Opium Advisory Committee...was not able to operate’.  143 Although May overstated their functioning it was, nonetheless, a good example of continuity between the League and the UN. In 1941 88 per cent of the 177 states and territories covered by the 1931 Convention submitted statistics.  144 Further, officials, expertise and technical frameworks would be available for re-institutionalisation after the war. Other organisations collapsed or became tainted by their presence in occupied territories. The International Health Organisation was viewed as coming under ‘German and Vichy influence’ and would need a complete remoulding after the war.  145

With the technical apparatus saved, but the OAC and the League drug secretariat placed into limbo the system’s political momentum ground to a halt. Anslinger and his allies continued vital behind the scenes efforts to circumvent and make redundant these latter aspects of the League system they so hated. Political evolution had shifted to bilateral interactions, largely independent of the multilateral framework. America would take the lead on these efforts, thoroughly exploiting its wartime position, whilst the old colonial powers fought a stumbling rear-guard action. The war would completely reshape the international control system, but traditional stumbling blocks continued, particularly between the UK and US. It is towards some of these issues that we now turn.

*The US and Recurrent Wartime Narcotic Concerns:*

Wartime conditions caused widespread disruption to the licit and illicit markets. Conflict increased the demand for painkillers and other medicines. This fuelled expanded production – eventually leaving new excesses that could leak into the illicit market, particularly when the war ended.  146 Narcotics were also indispensible to each nation’s war efforts. A tenet of economic warfare became preventing enemy access to drugs or their precursor raw materials. For example, throughout hostilities states engaged in practices of ‘preclusive buying’ while

---

144 Report on the Work of the League 1941-1942, FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box171/File1230-8, PCOB (1940-67);
145 Delevingne to Renborg, 16 February 1942, FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box171/File1230-8, DSB (1940-67)
146 Treasury Dept. to State Dept., 14 June 1940; Report on the Work of the League 1941-1942, FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box171/File1230-8, PCOB (1940-67).
seeking to destroy the drug manufacturing capacities of their opponents through bombing of factories.\textsuperscript{147}

Opium was also viewed as a direct weapon of war, particularly in the US. After Pearl Harbor, Anslinger seized the opportunity to further link the drug issue with national security concerns. Japan was already believed to be conducting a ‘narcotization’ campaign against China’s population - a charge levelled at many Japanese officials during the Tokyo War Crimes Trials.\textsuperscript{148} Meyer and Parssinen argue that the ‘narcotization’ charge was part of a broader ‘myth of conspiracy’ surrounding the drug issue. Regarding Japan and China they argue that ‘what looked like genocide and conspiracy at the highest levels…in fact was political compromise in pursuit of larger goals’.\textsuperscript{149} Nevertheless, soon after war broke out Treasury Secretary Morgenthau publicly claimed that ‘Japan’s war on Western Civilization started ten years ago, an offensive in which the weapons were narcotic drugs’. Anslinger claimed that America ‘experienced Pearl Harbors many times in the past in the nature of dangerous drugs from Japan which were meant to poison the blood of the American people’.\textsuperscript{150}

Another pervasive fear, particularly for the US, was that wartime conditions bred addiction among soldiers. They could then bring their habit back home to infect the general population. It was a recurring US wartime fear stretching back to the Civil War when morphine addiction earned the name the ‘army disease’. It had been particularly potent during and after World War I. In Britain WWI press hysteria contributed to the passage of the Dangerous Drugs Act in 1920. The historiography of wartime addiction epidemics suggests that they were more imagined than real, but proved an enduring public perception of the dangers of war.\textsuperscript{151} Anslinger carefully monitored all reports of addiction among US soldiers and their interactions with local drug trades. He received a stream of reports from commanders on the


\textsuperscript{148} State Department Aide Memoire, 21 September 1943, PRO, FO371/34545; numerous documents in FBNA/ACC170-71-A-3554/Box20/File0660, Japan (1934-1946) & Japan Postwar (1945).

\textsuperscript{149} Meyer and Parssinen, Webs of Smoke: Smugglers, Warlords, Spies, and the History of the International Drug Trade, 280.

\textsuperscript{150} US Treasury Dept. Press Release, 26 January 1942, FBNA/ACC170-75-17/Box86, Miscellaneous File 1910 Hiscok #1.

\textsuperscript{151} Morgan, Drugs in America: A Social History, 1800-1980, 108–9; Berridge, Opium and the People: Opiate Use and Drug Control Policy in Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century England, 262.
ground and his own sources within the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Many were forwarded to the War Department for remedial action. Britain was acutely aware of US fears around proximity for their troops to the opium monopolies during joint operations in Asia, as we shall see later.

Anslinger also grasped opium’s potential as a weapon of economic warfare. He had spent the late 1930s building up America’s reserves and by 1940 was sitting on roughly six hundred thousand pounds of opium - a four-year supply. This afforded him tremendous strategic leverage and apotheosized him to a ‘de facto global drug czar’. For example, in August 1940 the Netherlands East Indies sought emergency supplies of manufactured drugs equivalent to one ton of opium. Anslinger insisted that they provide one ton of raw opium they were holding ready to be processed into smoking opium. Only Britain, meanwhile, with its large pharmaceutical industry, remained in a position to challenge US drug hegemony.

**Britain Alone – Ensuring Supplies:**

For Britain war raised immediate practical concerns. Unlike the US, Britain had no stockpile and had to battle to ensure adequate supplies for its factories, colonies, and pre-existing export markets (Canada being one of the largest). This was all before additional wartime demands. This required a delicate balancing act: meeting wartime needs; protecting pre-existing export markets; preventing currency outflows; and making inroads into the traditionally German and American dominated pharmaceutical export markets of Latin America.

Britain’s concerns for its colonies centred on ensuring supplies for their monopolies. Absent these they faced growing black markets; collapses in government revenues and consuming populations suddenly deprived of legitimate supplies, all at a time when they could least

---

152 For example see: George White to Anslinger, 6 January 1943; numerous documents, FBN/A/ACC170-71-A-3554/Box18/File0660, Iran (1941-45).
153 Wright to Clarke, 6 October 1943, BNA-FO371/34545.
155 Anslinger to Sharman, 6 August 1940, FBN/A/ACC170-74-12/Box152/File0660 Canada I (1929-1941).
157 For example see Sharman Memorandum: Re. Supply of Narcotics from Great Britain to Canada, 28 June 1944, FBN/A/ACC170-74-12/Box152/File0660, Canada II (1942-1945).
afford civil unrest. By 1940 London was sufficiently worried about its international bargaining position vis-à-vis producer countries such as Iran that it considered joining forces with France, and possibly the Netherlands. Teheran’s Monopoly appeared to be reneging on part of a 1939 contract for one thousand chests of opium (each chest weighed roughly 72 kilograms).158 Fears about their reliability only increased as the Monopoly talked of price hikes and began demanding payment in dollars - something the Treasury flatly refused.159

The Colonial Office soon became alarmed over the Straits Settlements’ dwindling stockpiles. Meanwhile the Hong Kong monopoly pushed for permission to source alternative supplies through a disreputable private firm trading operating under the family name Nemazi. The firm had been blacklisted after causing a minor opium scandal for British shipping interests in Hong Kong in 1927.160 The Colonial Office was told to sit tight and an arrangement was sought for a purchase that would cover both colonies.

After some further false starts with negotiations, the situation in Malaya and Hong Kong grew urgent and the Colonial Office began looking to Turkey and Afghanistan as potential substitutes.161 The Foreign Office offered no objections, and instead noted that Kabul was anxious to sell for fiscal reasons and that Indian was anxious to help them sell. Some in the Foreign Office suggested purchases from Turkey would help the Turkish pay for tin and rubber and so recycle some of the money back to UK colonies.162

As 1940 drew to a close both Afghanistan and Turkey were prepared to offer supplies of opium, in exchange for sterling and on relatively favourable terms.163 Meanwhile the drawn-out affair surrounding the non-completion of Iran’s contract had reached all the way to the desk of British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, who was marked to receive a full report in early 1941.164 This early wartime experience as a hostage consumer nation left an indelible

159 Blaxter to Thornton, 27 April 1940; Letter to Thornton, 15 May 1940, BNA-FO371/24748.
160 Note on Nemazi Family, 18 June 1940, FO371/24748.
161 Ronson to Henniker, 23 September 1940, BNA-FO371/24748.
162 Talbot’s Minute, 9 October 1940; Minutes, 14 October 1940, File: Purchase of Opium from Iran, BNA-FO371/24748.
163 Singapore to Loyd, 10 August 1940; CO to Straits Settlements, 23 November 1940, BNA-FO371/24749.
mark on Britain. As we shall see in later chapters, London would vigorously oppose US attempts to restrict the global supply prerogative to a ‘closed list’ group of nations.

_The US-Canadian Special Narcotic Relationship:_
Canada was perhaps Britain’s largest pre-war export market for manufactured drugs. Canada was also United States’ closest drug diplomacy ally. Canada’s top drug official, Colonel Clem Sharman began representing Canada at the League’s OAC in 1934. From then until his final retirement from the control system in 1958 he and Anslinger were virtual alter egos on the international stage. The two engaged in a prolific correspondence. Both firmly believed in controlling supply at the source as well as the pursuit of strict criminal penalties (Britain would later characterise Sharman as ‘obsessed with the purely police aspect of the [narcotics] problem’). Both also shared a latent disdain for the colonial opium policies of Britain, the Netherlands, France and others. Sharman’s wartime position was reinforced by the fact that the Prime Minister had previously served on the Canadian Delegation to the first international opium conference and retained a strong interest in the issue. Overall the hard-line position Canada took in drug diplomacy arose from Sharman’s strong domestic suzerainty over the issue and his skill at manipulating international forums without risking Canadian prestige. As we shall see, the Canadian position moderated sharply once Sharman retired from government service in 1954.

The personal relationship resulted in a de facto regional framework and strategy for control. For example, the two occasionally cooperated to secure cross-border market access for their best behaving drug-manufacturing firms. This then strengthened their domestic positions as gatekeepers of the industry. They could then use these non-statutory powers to dole out benefits and punishments to firms depending on how tightly they controlled supplies. No similar agreement was reached with the UK throughout the war. Sharman’s relationship with London was largely fraught and interactions centred on supply.

Early on in the war Canada took quick action to curtail domestic consumption with the 1939 War Measures Act. Under this all non-prescribed opiate use was banned. With the fall of

---

165 Quote in IOC (54)84, 19 June 1954, BNA-CAB134/958.; McAllister, _Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An International History_, 94.
166 Sharman to Anslinger, 3 May 1943, FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box152/File0660, Canada II (1942-1945).
167 Sharman to Anslinger, 29 July 1940, FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box152/File0660, Canada I (1929-1941).
Holland and Belgium in mid-1940 Canada lost half its supply of Codeine (its main opiate) and a significant portion of its supplies of Morphine and Heroin. They were now completely dependent on Britain at a time when the Atlantic was an increasingly perilous supply line and Britain’s own survival was in doubt. Canada’s supply situation was a source of concern but never became acute. Ottawa had, with Anslinger’s assistance, secured a US promise to act as its supplier of last resort.\textsuperscript{168}

\textit{North American Ambivalence to Britain:}  
Aside from economic competition Anslinger quickly became critical of perceived British inaction over wartime smuggling. He had begun the war on reasonable terms with the British drug apparatus. He and the Chief Inspector of the Home Office Drug Branch, Major William H. Coles, enjoyed a mutual respect at the League OAC. When war broke out Coles was reassigned and his role fell to Deputy Chief Inspector Francis Thornton. Anslinger’s overt response was concern. He expressed hope that Coles had not severed his connection with the issue.\textsuperscript{169} This initial response set the tone for the relationship until Coles’ return in 1945, during which time Thornton would inspire a lack of faith in Anslinger (and Sharman) that would eventually become disdain.

In 1940 Anslinger praised signs that the UK was toughening its police response to domestic drug use. He was particularly glad to see addicted members of the medical profession being prosecuted. In early 1941, however, Liverpool began drawing press attention as a trans-shipment port for the illicit traffic into North America. Liverpool became an increasing annoyance as reports about it came to the State Department during 1942. His initial response was to quietly reach out to Thornton and the Home Office ‘to work out something’.\textsuperscript{170} Anslinger remained relatively muted on the issue until after 1943, when he came back to it aggressively.

\textsuperscript{168} Col. Sharman’s Circular to Licensed Narcotic Wholesales, 14 September 1939; Sharman to Anslinger, 20 July 1940; Anslinger to Sharman, 6 August 1940, FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box152/File0660, Canada I (1929-1941).  
\textsuperscript{169} Anslinger to Coles, 21 June 1939; Coles to Anslinger, 11 July 1939; Thornton to Anslinger, 19 October 1939; Anslinger to Thornton, 4 November 1939, FBNA/ACC170-71-A-3554/Box18/File0660, England (1928-1942).  
\textsuperscript{170} Note attached to: ‘Drug Prescription Betrays Doctor as an Addict’, The Daily Express, 12 January 1940; numerous press clippings; US Consulate to Secretary of State, Subject: “Liverpool as a Port of Transfer for Opium Smuggling”, 26 May 1942; Anslinger to Thornton, 21 October 1942, FBNA/ACC170-71-A-3554/Box18/File0660, England (1928-1942).
Another source of Anglo-North American wartime tension was Britain’s interactions with Latin America, as we shall see in Chapter Two. These Anglo-American drug disagreements strengthened Anslinger’s resolve to use wartime confusions to secure an end to the British opium monopolies in the Far East.

**Part 2: Drug Control in Asia**

Article 6 of the Hague Opium Convention of 1912 committed states parties to the gradual ‘suppression of the manufacture, the internal traffic in and the use of prepared opium in so far as the difference conditions peculiar to each nation shall allow’. The United States continued to push for immediate suppression similar to that enacted in the Philippines. The European colonial powers’ response was to establish government monopolies and gradual measures to suppress prepared opium use. Many argued consumption was diminishing as a direct result of the monopoly system. Further they claimed it was an effective mechanism to prevent the illicit traffic ‘which stimulates consumption’.\(^{171}\)

At the outbreak of war opium smoking, under proscribed conditions, was legal in the Netherlands Indies, British Malaya, the Unfederated Malay States, Brunei, Sarawak, Burma, India, Ceylon, British North Borneo, Hong Kong, French Indochina, and Thailand. States with monopolies maintained that they were in line with the 1912 Convention and were preferable to total prohibition. The US and China demanded that large and mandatory annual reductions in these supplies be included in any production limitation agreement. The British and Dutch maintained that a production limitation agreement was first needed to reduce the leakages into the illicit market from China and Persia and then abolition of opium smoking and eating might be possible, ‘provided that a reasonable transitional period is allowed’.\(^{172}\)

For the US, China and to a lesser degree Canada, the causality was reversed: the monopoly system sustained the illicit market, addiction and non medical-scientific usage while stalling

---


production limitation. By solving this question, forward momentum on a production limitation convention could thus be enabled.\textsuperscript{173}

\textbf{China:}

During the 1920s and 30s China disintegrated into warlordism, civil war and then war with Japan. Political and economic fuelled a process whereby local politics and the black market grew in symbiosis, as all sides used the illicit trade to finance military operations.\textsuperscript{174} By the beginning of the 1930s China remained the epicentre of the global trade and the key to control in the region. Meanwhile, a League Commission of Enquiry reported in 1930: ‘Contact with Chinese Immigrants has in other Far-Eastern territories usually been the cause of the indigenous population acquiring the opium-smoking habit’.\textsuperscript{175}

In 1935 the nationalists began the most vigorous anti-opium campaign they would ever undertake. This Six-Year Opium Prohibition Plan aimed for total suppression by 1940 but was largely unsuccessful.\textsuperscript{176} Nevertheless the Government began declaring victory in areas it controlled, while claiming areas under Japanese control were getting worse and that China’s successes were being undermined by ‘places where opium is openly sold by the local governments’.\textsuperscript{177}

The situation in China caused a division between Britain and the US. Britain was deeply sceptical of Chiang’s claims while the US privately recognised that facts on the ground were more complex and that Generals and local politicians loyal to Chiang were likely complicit in the trade. Nevertheless, US public statements remained effusive in their support of Chiang.\textsuperscript{178} For the US, the narrative served a useful tool to bludgeon the Japanese, while also building

\textsuperscript{173} Sharman to Asnlinger, 5 September 1942, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box124/File1230-A, Postwar Narcotics Problems #1.
\textsuperscript{174} For a discussion of this phenomenon see: Meyer and Parssinen, \textit{Webs of Smoke: Smugglers, Warlords, Spies, and the History of the International Drug Trade}, 12.
\textsuperscript{178} See extensive US FBN files: FBNA/ACC170-71-A-3554/Box16/File0660, China Folders 14-18 (1936-46); For British accounts see: BNA-FO371/34546.
Chinese goodwill. Such statements became harder to sustain as the war went on (see Chapter Two).

Ending the Colonial Issue:

By 1942 the ‘inner circle’, led by Helen Moorhead and Herbert May, were examining principles for post-war control (see Chapter Three) and the ending of colonial opium monopolies. On the other side were, what Sharman described as, the ‘“wait and see” army’ led by Malcolm Delevingne and Bertil Renborg of the League Secretariat. They suggested first examining the ideas of consolidating the existing conventions into ‘a single instrument’. Second, to evaluate the efficacy of specific convention provisions. Third, to plan re-establishing international controls when hostilities ceased. Both Sharman and Anslinger despised Renborg, viewing him as emblematic of the old League of Nations apparatus which they wanted to kill off, and had no intention of engaging with him. George Morlock, Anslinger’s counterpart in the State Department, also agreed that the US should not become embroiled until US broader post-war policies were clear.179

Anslinger viewed ‘Sir Malcolm’s ideas’ as ‘typical of British Imperial policy’ and suggested to Sharman that the US and Canadian governments ‘march along together on a concrete plan involving the abolition of smoking opium after the war and limitation of production’. He went on, ‘if we do not get agreement with the British Government before the war is over, we might as well give up the idea of progress as they will fall back to the pre-war tempo’. Sharman agreed but argued that mid-1942 was ‘the worst possible time to take the initiative’ as ‘the dice would be loaded more heavily’ against them. He suggested bringing Russia on board as he and Anslinger meet to chart a path forward.180 Anslinger let the matter stall, but in September 1942 developed a plan. As he wrote to Sharman:

> I have been asked to instruct naval officers who are being trained to take over administration in occupied territories in the South Pacific, on narcotic administration. The thought occurred to me that it would be a good thing to indoctrinate them well with the idea of abolishing the monopolies immediately after

---

179 Renborg to Sharman, 29 July 1942; Sharman to Renborg, 1 August 1942; Morlock to Anslinger, 6 August 1942, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box124/File1230-A, Postwar Narcotics Problems #2.

180 Sharman to Anslinger, 6 July 1942; Delevingne to May, 25 April, 1942; Anslinger to Sharman, 1 July 1942, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box124/File1230-A, Postwar Narcotics Problems #1.
they take over. Victor Hoo called the same day with the same idea, stating that the Chinese intended to take similar action and that if we also took this action and the monopolies were out during the armistice period, one, two, or three years, the British could hardly re-establish these institutions if, as, and when they regain possession.  

Sharman quickly agreed ‘whole-heartedly’. However, Anslinger’s strategy involved a great deal of bluff. The US would have the right to establish any form of government in areas of which they had unilateral control. In areas of joint control, the US could not act unilaterally. Morlock was dissuaded from further pursuit of the issue within the State Department, but privately suggested that Anslinger pursue it with the War and Navy Departments by suggesting that closing opium dens was a US legal obligation.

**The League Old Guard:**

In the meantime Bertil Renborg had drafted two memos outlining post-war planning options. These arose from meetings of the PCOB and DSB in London during 1942, which the ‘inner circle’ had largely boycotted. Renborg sought to circumvent the ‘inner circle’ by gaining the support of the Acting Secretary General of the League, Sean Lester. The latter had expressed an interest but intended to reserve his decision until he received the final plans. Renborg set to work consolidating them and finally forwarded them on to Anslinger and Sharman on December 28th, two full months after the London meeting. By this stage Anslinger and the ‘inner circle’ had their own plans in motion and had little intention of supporting Renborg.

Renborg’s vision focused on consolidating the treaties, continuity of function of the system of estimates, and the wholesale transfer of the League apparatus. Regarding the monopolies and quasi-medical consumption, he dismissed radical action, suggesting ‘prohibition could not be expected by itself to bring about the desired result’ and suggesting further study. Upon receipt of the documents Anslinger wrote back angrily:

---

182 Sharman to Anslinger, 5 September 1942; Morlock to Anslinger, 11 September 1942; Anslinger to Chamberlain, 3 October 1942, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box124/File1230-A, Postwar Narcotics Problems #1.
the two most important subjects in a post-war world, namely, limitation of opium production and abolition of smoking opium monopolies, were given the same treatment which they have had in the past—the old political run around. It is my opinion that if any progress is to be made...the approach will have to be entirely different from that set forth in the vague program.\textsuperscript{185}

Sharman responded with similar criticisms. Renborg moved quickly to assuage doubts claiming that the informal ‘consensus’ was that opium smoking would be abolished and that effective measures would be included in any peace settlement. Sharman and Anslinger remained unimpressed.\textsuperscript{186}

\textit{Towards an ‘Inner Circle’ Strategy.}\textsuperscript{187}

Over a series of three meetings, between December 1942 and March 1943 Anslinger and the ‘inner circle’ pushed ahead. The meetings were held unofficially, under the independent and unthreatening banner of the FPA, but choreographed to suggest US government backing – for example being held in Anslinger’s office, ostensibly because FPA conditions were too cramped. In December 1942, Anslinger (FBN), Helen Moorhead (FPA); Professor Chamberlain (FPA); Herbert May (PCOB; DSB; FPA); Dr. Victor Hoo (China); Dr. Liu Chieh, Minister Counsellor of the Chinese Embassy; and George Morlock (US State Department) met to strategize.

All meetings would need to remain unofficial since the US government had not reached consensus policies on post war planning, let alone the drug issue. The FPA could convene them and eventually work to offer ‘independent’ recommendations to the State Department and thereby drive US policy. Given the proximity of the expected allied drive on Burma it was agreed that this should represent the focus of discussions. Dr. Hoo suggested that, although the British would argue it was a civilian health issue, it was arguably ‘a military

\textsuperscript{185} Anslinger to Renborg, 21 December 1942, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box124/File1230-A, Postwar Narcotics Problems #1.

\textsuperscript{186} Sharman to Renborg, 4 January 1943; Renborg to Anslinger, 18 January 1943; Renborg to Sharman, 18 January 1943; Sharman to Anslinger, 21 January 1943, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box124/File1230-A, Postwar Narcotics Problems #1.

\textsuperscript{187} This section is drawn from memo: ‘Meeting in the Office of the Commissioner of Narcotics’, 4 December 1942, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box124/File1230-A, Postwar Narcotics Problems #1.
necessity for the safety and welfare of troops’. This became the core of the argument for both the US and China. It was agreed to hold another meeting in early January 1943.

The ‘inner circle’ then worked to develop a Pacific consensus and thereby isolate the British and the Dutch. Sharman, given the political complication and afraid to step too far ahead of Canadian government policy, sat out the second meeting. The FPA secured the involvement of the ‘obviously unaware’ Australia and New Zealand. At the meeting Anslinger and Morlock sounded-out the two governments and suggested the US government was merely deciding how to approach relevant governments. With little substantive progress it was agreed to convene another meeting on March 17th and include representatives from Britain, the Netherlands, China, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.188

The Dutch quickly agreed to send an ‘observer’ from their Washington Embassy to the third meeting.189 On receipt of the invitation, the UK Foreign Office solicited the Home Office’s thoughts in a somewhat routine manner.190 The London four relationship (see above), between Harris (HO), Chatterjee (PCOB), Delevingne (DSB) and now a Mr M. S. Williams (FO), came into its own as a counterweight to the ‘inner circle’. Delevingne, by this stage the Foreign Office’s main opium advisor, immediately rang alarm bells. He read it as a bureaucratic flanking manoeuvre intended to bypass the old League structures and warned it was ‘certain’ that opium smoking would be raised. He pointed out that the Government of Burma was already looking at this question, and Malaya and Hong Kong would have to examine it closely before Britain could formulate a coherent position, let alone have a lay Washington Embassy official discuss it.191

Consequently, London refused to be represented but gave the Ambassador discretion to send ‘an observer’. The Foreign Office expressed curiosity as to the official attitude of the US Government to the unofficial meeting and quickly opened what was to prove a long and

188 Memo: Meeting in the Office of the Commissioner of Narcotics, 13 January 1943; Sharman to Anslinger, 24 December 1942; Chamberlain to Dixon, 7 January 1943; Anslinger to Sharman, 8 February 1943, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box124/File1230-A, Postwar Narcotics Problems #1.
190 Williams (FO) to Harris (HO), 18 February 1943, BNA-FO371/34545.
191 Delevingne to Harris (HO), 28 February 1943, BNA-FO371/34545.
vigorous inter-departmental discussion by soliciting the Colonial Office’s views.\(^{192}\) The latter called the question ‘premature’ given wartime uncertainties. They expected Japan was ‘fostering’ opium smoking and preferred a regional solution, based on a convention with surrounding territories.\(^{193}\)

Lord Halifax, anxious to oblige the request and unaware he was wading into a flammable area of the US-UK relationship, opted to send an observer. It was a decision he came to regret. In reporting back to London he sent a stern pre-emptive defence of his decision, citing the Washington culture of ‘unofficial’ and ‘exploratory’ conferences at a time of ‘great and growing importance of the United States in International Affairs’. He also requested a full statement of policy for his future reference.\(^{194}\)

His representative had been blindsided at a meeting that was clearly choreographed to force the colonial issue.\(^{195}\) Choosing his words carefully, Anslinger said that ‘one cannot have the Four Freedoms and still sell opium’. He then attacked past British colonial opium policies while Herbert May suggested Britain had the worst international reputation regarding opium. Moreover, they warned that the US press was snooping around the issue and viewed it as linked with other international problems.

Anslinger pointed to China’s supposedly enormous successes and claimed that in the event of an occupation of Burma, China would enact strict prohibition on its sale. Sharman and Chamberlain, closed ranks also praising China’s domestic control efforts. Sharman, however, was careful to make explicit that the views expressed were his own and that a formal Canadian policy had not yet been discussed. Anslinger then argued that China’s policy could lead to a clash with the British. Vouching his own opinion he said the American forces would follow a similar policy of immediate suppression in the areas that they occupied.\(^{196}\)

\(^{192}\) FO to Halifax, 4 March 1943, BNA-FO371/34545.

\(^{193}\) Gater (CO) to Harris (HO), 6 April 1943, BNA-FO371/34545.

\(^{194}\) Halifax to Anthony Eden (FO), 26 April 1943, BNA-FO371/34545.

\(^{195}\) Williams’ minute, File: Minutes of Informal Meeting of the [FPA], 25 May 1943, BNA-FO371/34545.

\(^{196}\) Minutes of Meeting in the Office of the Commissioner of Narcotics, 17 March 1943, BNA-FO371/34545.
Anslinger was bluffing. The State, Treasury, War and Navy Departments had not yet expressed a specific policy, let alone suggested that they would override their uniform occupation policies (already agreed with the Combined Chiefs of Staff). Initial official responses had suggested strong caution. The US government would try to ‘persuade’ their allies to follow US policy but unilateral measures were not envisaged.\textsuperscript{197} Further, a precedent had already been set in North Africa where the French had reopened their hashish monopoly, while the US could merely forbid its occupation forces from using its shops.\textsuperscript{198} In a broader sense, the Roosevelt administration, and Secretary Hull in particular, were careful to avoid airing alliance politics publicly at this time.\textsuperscript{199} George Morlock sat in silence at the meeting as Anslinger set the US up for a potentially embarrassing climb down should the colonial powers refuse to fold. His silence, however, helped create a perception within the Foreign Office that Anslinger spoke for a unified US Government.\textsuperscript{200}

Anslinger’s portrayal of China was labelled the work of ‘foreign and Chinese propagandists’ back in London. They maintained the main obstacle to total prohibition in colonies adjacent to China remained ‘smuggling by and on behalf of the Chinese communities resident therein’. London saw itself as at least being honest in refusing to enact a policy it could not enforce. One Foreign Office official, unaware that the American drug apparatus was staffed with many unreconstructed alcohol prohibitionists and highlighting the Foreign Office’s lack of institutional knowledge around the politics of the drug issue, made the point that: ‘Americans’ with their experience of prohibition should be the first to appreciate the importance of avoiding a situation where the law itself is brought into contempt.’ China, on the other hand, was seen as publicly enacting broad laws of suppression while privately allowing profitable monopolies to function under the name of an ‘Opium Suppression Bureau’, marketing the drug as ‘anti-opium medicine.’\textsuperscript{201}

\textsuperscript{197} Draft: Hamilton to Dr. Thompson, 8 March 1943; Morlock to Anslinger, 25 March 1943; Hamilton to Dr. Thomson, 20 March 1943, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box124/File1230-A, Postwar Narcotics Problems #1.
\textsuperscript{198} McAllister, \textit{Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An International History}, 150–1.
\textsuperscript{199} Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley, \textit{Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the Creation of the U.N.} (Yale University Press, 1997), 65–7.
\textsuperscript{200} Halifax to Anthony Eden (FO), 26 April 1943, BNA-FO371/34545.
\textsuperscript{201} Scott’s Minute; Minute, File: Minutes of Informal Meeting of the [FPA], 26 May 1943, BNA-FO371/34545.
The Dutch Observer took a conciliatory attitude at the meeting but soon after requested the minutes be changed to express his defence for the monopoly system as the best means to prevent smuggling. Further he sent on an article by the former Dutch OAC member, DeKat Angelino, which justified the Dutch position. It claimed the results of prohibition in the Philippines were not ‘encouraging’, and criticised those arguing for immediate prohibition as misguided. It argued that the current Dutch policy prevented the growth of the illicit traffic, corruption and opium consumers from turning to cocaine and heroin.202

Anslinger dismissed it as ‘the old opium bloc argument’. By June 1943 the ‘inner circle’ had no idea whether their strategy was a success. They were awaiting further communication from Victor Hoo; had no sense of official Australian or New Zealand policy, nor whether the official Canadian policy would echo the US; further British and Dutch reactions to the meeting suggested ‘a repetition of their former position’. Anticipating little progress they began to examine ‘further avenues’.203

**British Policy Shifts:**

Foreign policy goals quickly outweighed practical administrative concerns for the Foreign Office. Anthony Eden accepted the difficulties but hoped to avoid ‘unfriendly criticism’ by accommodating Sino-US goals. The Foreign Office recognised the political capital China would draw from British intransigence and ‘disproportionate importance’ placed on the issue in the US.204 Aware this was an issue that they ‘clearly are not very well informed on’ the Foreign Office solicited views from the Home, Colonial, Dominions, Burma and India Offices.205 Those involved in discussions soon decided more concrete measures were necessary.

**The Reasons for the Shift:**

A core reason for the shift in British policy was a change in costs and benefits around opium policies in the colonies. After the 1925 Conventions the colonial governments in Borneo and

204 Roberts to Under-Secretary of State, 15 June 1943, BNA-FO371/34545.
205 Roberts’ minute, File: Minutes of Informal Meeting of the [FPA], 25 May 1943; Paskin (CO) to FO, 16 June 1943, BNA-FO371/34545.
Malaya had imposed a system of registration and rationing for smokers. Gradually rations were reduced, while efforts were made to improve social conditions. Registration for the Malayan monopoly was effectively closed in 1934 and the expectation was that the existing addiction would shrink while usage would not spread to a new generation.\textsuperscript{206}

Hong Kong was unable to adopt a similar course due to its proximity to Mainland China.\textsuperscript{207} During the 1920s civil disorder in China caused an influx of black market opium. Rather than suppression, the goal of government policy became merely to coerce consumers into buying monopoly opium. Further, fiscal benefits of the monopoly militated against efforts to change the system.\textsuperscript{208} However, with these fiscal benefits and the concerns about administrative practicalities muted by Japanese occupation, the desire to appease American demands in 1943 outweighed these former obstacles. This wartime logic applied across the various British territories occupied by Japan.

The Dutch unilaterally decided to acquiesce to US demands in August 1943, but postponed an announcement to allow Britain to make a simultaneous announcement.\textsuperscript{209} This Dutch decision, the Secretary of State for India and Burma said later, made it ‘difficult to resist American proposals’.\textsuperscript{210} Britain was at risk of becoming a regional pariah on this issue. In September 1943 the Interdepartmental Opium Committee convened at the Home Office.\textsuperscript{211} A broad policy of suppression was agreed along with a draft public statement (after subsequent tweaking) that the UK:

\begin{quote}
‘has decided to adopt the policy of total prohibition of opium smoking in the British and British protected territories in the Far East which are now in enemy occupation and, in accordance with this policy, the prepared opium monopolies
\end{quote}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{206} FO to Washington Embassy, 2 November 1943, BNA-FO371/34546. \\
\textsuperscript{207} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{209} Minutes of the Thirty-Third Meeting of the Inter-Departmental Opium Committee, 7 September 1943, BNA-FO371/34545; It is unclear from the archival material how much coordination took place between the British and Dutch governments. The lack of official correspondences coupled with the strong coordination suggests informal discussions between the British government and the Dutch government in exile likely took place. \\
\textsuperscript{210} Secretary of State to Government of India, 25 October 1943, BNA-FO371/34546. \\
\textsuperscript{211} For example see, Delevingne to Reynolds, 25 October 1943, BNA-FO371/34546.
\end{flushright}
formerly in operation…will not be re-established on their reoccupation [emphasis added].’

London no longer felt in a position to say ‘no’ to the US on this question. They were acutely aware of the US public fears of opium and the US Government’s desire to protect their troops. Moreover, Britain feared a public relations disaster should the American public blame the opium monopolies for infecting their soldiers with addiction. Further, they expected public relations windfall in the US following the announcement, which could help alleviate broader colonial policy tensions. Simultaneously, the administrative costs of prohibition were viewed as significantly less than they had been in the decades prior, particularly as the Japanese occupation removed the administrative benefits. Finally, sacrificing the monopolies in British territories occupied by Japan would help appease American demands before they could be extended to cover the more problematic case of India.

The policy shift would not apply to India, where the traditional method of opium consumption was by eating not smoking. Mainland India was also not ‘in enemy occupation’. Burma proved the most complicated case and would drag on into the post-war era (see Chapter Two). Consequently, reiterating previous reservations, the 1943 statement explicitly warned that success would ‘depend on the steps taken to limit and control the production of opium in other countries’ (i.e. China).

Crossed Cables:
Anslinger was uncertain of the outcomes of the FPA meetings and initiated a public relations offensive in the US, stoking fears of a resurgent heroin trade after the war if the monopoly system was re-established and was allowed to infect US troops. Congressman Carroll Reece gave a widely publicised speech in the House of Representatives mimicking Anslinger’s talking points about the monopoly system being incompatible with the ‘Four Freedoms’ and

212 Parliamentary Question and Answer, 10 November 1943, BNA-FO371/34546.
213 See Chapters 2 & 3 for examples of the public rhetoric around opium emanating from Congress, the Hearst Press and the Women’s Christian Temperance Union.
214 Wright to Clarke, 6 October 1943, BNA-FO371/34545.
215 Tomkins to Williams, 12 April 1944, BNA-FO371/39366.
216 Tomkins to Williams, October 1943, BNA-FO371/34546.
217 Minutes of the Thirty-Fourth Meeting of [IOC], 27 October 1943; Minutes of the Thirty-Third Meeting of [IOC], 7 September 1943, BNA-FO371/34545.
highlighting the dangers of a resurgent trade. Anslinger also worked with his international allies, particularly Dr. Hoo to forge a Sino-US response to expected Anglo-Dutch intransigence. Simultaneously, Anslinger’s domestic allies exerted political pressure in both the US and UK. The FPA reached out to the British Council of Churches, fishing for intelligence on Whitehall inter-departmental discussions. Even if successful, Helen Moorhead, wanted a change in policy to seem ‘the result of British opinion, not American pressure,’ to help ‘save their face’. Ultimately this overture seemed to go nowhere and there is no indication that British public opinion and domestic lobby groups played a significant role in determining government policy around opium.

The Federal Government eventually formed a consensus policy that the US would do everything possible to effect suppression, but that it was not something that could technically be forced upon the colonial powers. Anslinger and his domestic allies focused only on the first part of the statement and declared victory. Helen Moorhead congratulated Anslinger that his actions had ‘proved sound and wise both in timing and strategy’ and that he had accomplished ‘steady forward movement’. The State Department issued a polite aide-memoire to London, the Netherlands, China and Portugal restating US views and suggesting they limit opium use to strictly medical and scientific purposes. They also asked the British Government to consider ‘a common policy’ for forces under allied command, while reserving the right to take any independent measures ‘deemed necessary for the protection of the health’ of US forces.

The receipt of this document sparked confusion in London and mild panic in the Washington Embassy. The Embassy, (unaware of the policy shift already agreed in London) read it as a ‘threat…which the Americans might easily put into effect, with the full support of their public opinion’. Furthermore, the Embassy feared it could ‘compromise the position which is

218 Remarks by Congressman Carroll Reece’, 7 July 1943; Carroll Reece to Anslinger, 4 September 1943; Anslinger to Carroll Reece, 16 September 1943; Telegram from American Embassy, Chungking to State Department, 10 August 1943; FPA to Mr. Paton, 19 August 1943; Moorhead to Anslinger, 18 August 1943, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box124/File1230-A, [LON] Postwar Narcotics Problem #2 (1942-3).
219 War Secretary Stimson to Treasury Secretary Morgenthau, 11 August 1943, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box124/File1230-A, [LON] Postwar Narcotics Problem #2 (1942-3).
220 Helen Howell Moorhead to Anslinger, 18 August 1943; Anslinger to Dr. Hoo, 13 August 1943, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box124/File1230-A, [LON] Postwar Narcotics Problem #2 (1942-3).
221 State Department Aide-memoire, 21 September 1943, BNA-FO371/34545.
being slowly built up, of leaving control of civil affairs in British territory to British authorities.’ The Embassy asked that it be ‘considered urgently’ warning that ‘the people interested here are fairly unscrupulous in their methods’ and ‘if there is what seems to them undue delay they may start some kind of propaganda campaign which might be damaging to us.’

The Embassy’s reaction must be read in the context of the aftermath of the Institute of Pacific Relations Conference which took place at Mont Tremblant in December 1942. Colonial issues emerged as a major point of contention and William Roger Louis argues ‘American anti-colonial sentiment reached its wartime peak’. Emerging from the hostility of this conference as a respected voice of British Colonial interests was Lord Hailey (a retired Governor of the Punjab and the United Provinces of India). He offered a stern but pragmatic defence of British policies. He went on a public relations offensive in the US during the winter of 1942-3, becoming one of the most effective propagandists for British Colonial policies. It seems his progress was part of the ‘position’ that the Embassy feared would be undone by the opium issue. Back in London, the reference to strict ‘medical and scientific’ usage was read by many as an escalation of US demands. Initially it sparked mild bureaucratic confusion. Departments worked to ensure that the public relations offensive would address the concerns highlighted, but on points of substance, it was eventually ignored.

The Embassy’s fears were the most alarmist expressed by British officials on paper. Moreover, the policy shift had already been decided upon and even with the misinterpretation of the aide-memoire, London was still not willing to restrict to ‘medical and scientific needs’. Given these points, it is hard to conclude that fears of losing control of colonial civil affairs drove British policy from the start. The concerns were likely present, and consciously

---

222 Wright (Washington Embassy) to Clarke (FO), 6 October 1943, BNA-FO371/34545.
224 See BNA-FO371/34546.
225 William McAllister argues that Britain and the Netherlands feared that the US ‘might delay or terminate plans for returning civil administration to the previous colonial masters.’ McAllister, Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An International History, 151. This may be true in a broader sense, but at no time was it made explicit as a reason for the policy shift on opium. William O. Walker plausibly suggests that a fear of being pushed out of Asia weighed on the British policy makers regarding this matter. He does, however, incorrectly suggest that the policy shift was not decided
fanned by Anslinger (for example, his carefully chosen use of the ‘four freedoms’ phrase). However, this concern existed in a broader context of British weakness - given that it would be bargaining over territories currently out of its possession – and the existence of strong anti-colonial sentiments within the US. At no point (other than the later panic within the Washington embassy) did there appear an imminent fear that opium would be the trigger for America to thwart British repossessing of its colonies.

Overall, it was a decision largely based on a cost-benefit analysis. The British government had not been a long way from enacting some form of suppression prior to the 1924 Conferences. At that time the administrative costs of prohibition outweighed the public relations benefits and the Colonial Office’s concerns held more weight than the Foreign Office’s desire to win international credibility. By 1943 the equation had reversed. Negative publicity and the alienation of powerful figures in the US government could adversely affect broader foreign policy goals. This was at a time when none of the administrative benefits of the monopolies were being felt. Anslinger had pushed hard while the British were at a weak point, and their resistance quickly gave way. Had Anslinger not forced this issue, it seems unlikely that Britain would have embarked on such a broad and coherent policy shift upon retaking its possessions. The situation on the ground would more than likely have called for a recreation of the monopoly system and the pre-war status quo, in the short term at least.

**Announcements and Outcomes:**

London began choreographing its statement to obtain ‘the fullest possible publicity value, especially in the US.’\(^{226}\) The Colonial Office wanted to hold off informing the State Department in case it tried to pre-empt the British announcement and steal the public relations coup.\(^{227}\) The Foreign Office, professing little faith in the Colonial Office’s publicity skills, cautioned over the ‘inflammable nature of this question’. It feared that attempting to ‘jump’ the State Department would lead to criticism of the announcement as inadequate, ‘irritate them…and incidentally undo some of the patient work… [of] the last year and half at getting the Far Eastern Division of the State Department to consult and act with us whenever

---

\(^{226}\) Dudley Minute, File: Control of opium in Far Eastern Territories freed from Japanese occupation, 18 October 1943, BNA-FO371/34545. Also numerous documents in BNA-FO371/34546.

\(^{227}\) Paskin to Williams, 21 October 1943, BNA-FO371/34546.
we can.” In the end the Foreign Office decided to inform the State Department, but explicitly ask it not to pre-empt London’s announcement.

By 16 September, both Anslinger and Sharman were celebrating. As Sharman described it:

*This is the most happy solution to what might well have proved...a major conflict of policy between the United States and Great Britain at or before the Peace Conference...I am abundantly satisfied that your personal influence, as also your action in having the unofficial show down meeting in Washington last March, was by far the most influential factor.*

Anslinger labelled it ‘the first concrete post-war agreement for which Treasury is responsible’.

On November 10 1943, in response to a prepared question in the House of Commons, the Secretary of State for the Colonies recited a prepared statement two paragraphs in length. It was accompanied, on the same day, by the Netherlands’ announcement. The Acting Secretary of State noted the announcements ‘with satisfaction’ and gushed that: ‘the problem of smoking opium should now be susceptible of solution’. Drug control advocates went to work drawing press attention in the US. The story was initially overlooked; a fact that was decried as ‘outrageous’ by long-time system insider Elizabeth Washburn Wright. A month later the Washington Post concurred, writing in an editorial that it had not ‘received the attention it deserves’.

Chiang’s government responded to Britain’s poke at ‘other countries’ by publicly welcoming the announcements and painting China alongside the US as the ‘principal advocates’ for total

---


229 FO to Washington Embassy, 30 October 1943, BNA-FO371/34546.


232 Opium smoking, Far Eastern Territories, 10 November 1943; Statement by Acting Secretary of State, 10 November 1943, BNA-FO371/34546.

prohibition. Britain was infuriated at being placed ‘on the defensive’ and the Foreign Office privately cursed the Chinese as ‘hypocrites’ who ‘cleverly…conceal their hypocrisy!’ Sir Malcolm Delevingne wrote an opinion piece in the Times of London claiming that it would ‘make a not unimportant contribution to the cause of Anglo-American cooperation particularly in the Far East’. Congressman Carroll Reece, in a speech on the House floor, described how Anslinger, through his informal negotiations, was ‘largely responsible for this diplomatic triumph’.

Behind the backslapping, voices of dissent surfaced in Britain. For example, Mr. Clifford Bellairs wrote in a letter to the Times of London:

I have had some 30 years’ experience of the opium trade and this I can prophesy with certainty: if the Government merely prohibits the import and sale of smoking opium in the Far East the illicit traders, smugglers and dope peddlers will return en masse to make enormous profits to spread the vice, and it will not end the comparatively innocuous smoking of opium...but will open up further fields for the illicit consumption of morphine and cocaine, each a hundred times more deadly.

Another major domino would fall in 1945 when the French announced a policy of prohibition in their colonies. The paradigm for the post-war world was being shaped. Successful prohibition in one country depended on successful prohibition in all countries and Britain now had a vested interest in securing universal and effective supply controls throughout Asia. It seemed that much of the deadlock of the inter-war years could be headed for extinction. Having won this wartime coup, Anslinger had earned significant leverage both at home and abroad. He quickly turned his sights towards the Middle East and Iran in particular.

238 McAllister, Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An International History, 152.
Part 3: Iran:

Iran was one of the world’s major opium producers. Its support for international controls had traditionally been weak, drawing scorn from control circles, particularly the US. It had signed the original 1912 Convention with a major reservation, rejecting one of its central principles: that an exporting country was responsible for preventing the shipment of opium to countries that prohibited its entry (article 3(a)). Iran's motives appeared purely economic: this would close the lucrative Chinese market. Iran further refused to adopt an international import/export certificate system – as per the 1925 Convention - thereby undermining the efficacy of international control efforts. Shifting Iran’s international policies became a central plank of US wartime drug diplomacy. Britain, on the other hand, was unwilling to undermine relations with Iran out of deference to the drug issue.

During the interwar years India had ceased opium exports to China. Iran quickly took up the slack. Its crop peaked in 1936 at forty per cent of the world’s morphine supply, and fifteen per cent of Iran’s foreign exchange earnings. By the outbreak of war it was also viewed as a main source for the global illicit market, particularly for Japanese forces in China in the midst of their wartime ‘narcotization’ campaign. The invasion of Iran by Britain and Russia in 1941 disrupted the Iranian-Japanese-Chinese trade. Britain ceased issuing navicerts allowing neutral ships to pass through wartime blockades. This cut off shipments to Japanese firms, and in so doing won plaudits from the US press and political establishment. The American Consul in Tehran noted that through ‘the British contraband control, Iran [was] cut off from its former profitable Far Eastern Market’. Around this time the new regime of Mohamed Reza Pahlavi expressed a desire to curtail opium production and consumption. Washington remained sceptical, particularly after an Iranian Treasury Official stated in December 1941 that their Monopoly would treat opium sales as a purely commercial transaction, regardless of the consequences for the countries it was selling to. In this, the

241 Friman, *NarcoDiplomacy: Exporting the U.S. War on Drugs*, 43.
242 “Opium trade is Hit”, St Louis Post Dispatch, 3 September 1941; Secretary of State to Customs Agency Service, 21 Oct 1941; American Consul Tehran, 27 February 1942, FBNA/ACC170-71-A-3554/Box18/File0660 Iran (1941-45); Hansen, "Learning to Tax: The Political Economy of the Opium Trade in Iran, 1921-1941," 107.
Americans heard a clear restatement of the original Iranian reservation to article 3(a) of the 1912 Convention.

An Iranian-American Drug Détente:
In 1942 Anslinger was forced by the State Department to temporarily lift the ban on Iranian opium imports to improve relations.\textsuperscript{243} A drawn-out US-Iranian opium engagement ensued. The latter periodically promised adherence to the drug conventions, the former promised access to its domestic market after the war. Anslinger then tentatively welcomed an olive branch from the Chief of the New York-based Iranian Trade and Economic Commission, Allah Yar Saleh to try to regularise the US-Iranian opium trade. For Iran it was part of a broader trade rapprochement with the US in 1942-43. For Anslinger it was an opportunity to press Iran to improve domestic controls.\textsuperscript{244}

In 1942 the State Department began negotiating a free trade agreement with Allah Yar Saleh. It would cover sixty commodities - one of which was opium. Both Anslinger and George Morlock opposed opium’s inclusion, preferring deference to the drug conventions and warning the US could not legally buy Iranian opium after the war unless Tehran adhered to drug conventions. Further they suggested it would be a perverse reward given Iran’s record, and would ignore the good behaviour of convention adherents like Yugoslavia and Turkey.\textsuperscript{245}

Elizabeth Washburn Wright suggested tying the trade agreement to American drug control demands, thereby adding new pressure on the Iranian government to adhere to the drug conventions. It is not clear how Anslinger viewed her proposal but George Morlock was unequivocal that ‘the trade agreement was too important to be tied up with the small matter’

\textsuperscript{243} McAllister, \textit{Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An International History}, 148.
\textsuperscript{244} Saleh to Anslinger, 27 March 1942; Opium Prices in Iran, Quarter ended 31 December 1942, Berle to Dreyfus, 6 March 1943; Draft Memorandum (undated), FBNA/ACC170-71-A-3554/Box18/File0660, Iran (1941-45);
\textsuperscript{245} Memorandum: Trade Agreement with Iran, by George Morlock, 1 April 1942, FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box142/File0480-172, Opium Reserves, Iranian Opium (1941-45).
of opium and the suggestion should be ‘thrown out’. He preferred instead a ‘voluntary’ exchange of notes between the two countries on the opium issue.\textsuperscript{246}

\textit{Britain Steers Clear:}

Bertil Renborg, the increasingly side-lined League drug Secretariat old hand, (see Chapter 3) viewed it as an opportunity to show the League Secretariat’s continued relevance and contacted the British Home Office. He asked Britain to use ‘its influence’ in Tehran to obtain some progress on control. The Foreign Office believed it was not a ‘specifically British interest’ and that they already had ‘enough more important matters’ on their hands. Further ‘a pipe of opium is one of the few consolations a Persian can enjoy in these days and any attempt by us to interfere would only add to our unpopularity’.\textsuperscript{247} Their flat refusal highlighted the place of opium within the hierarchy of Britain’s foreign policy concerns at the time.

\textit{Anslinger Bides his Time:}

Just as Renborg’s efforts were falling flat, the US and Iran concluded their 1943 Free Trade deal. It was the twenty-seventh deal America had signed under the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934; the sixth since the outbreak of war; yet only the second with a country in the Near East (Turkey was the first). The 1934 act had been passed to provide Presidential authority to conclude agricultural trade agreements without congressional approval as a means towards alleviating the economic depression of the 1930s. Iran received concessions on ninety-five per cent of products exported to the US as of 1939. Opium was still to be strictly controlled by the FBN and the change in the tariff rate was not expected to strongly impact the volume traded. It did however lessen Iran’s comparative disadvantage in morphine, given the relatively low morphine content of its opium vis-a-vis other suppliers (e.g. Afghanistan). In order to activate the trade concessions in opium, Iran first needed to

\textsuperscript{246} For example see Memorandum of Conversation: Importation of Iranian Opium, 14 September 1942; Draft note to Secretary of State, September 26 1942; Morlock to Anslinger, 5 October 1942, FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box142/File0480-172, Opium Reserves, Iranian Opium (1941-45).

\textsuperscript{247} Thornton to Williams, 6 April 1943; Minutes, 13 & 15 April 1943, File: Traffic in Persian Opium; Williams to Thornton, 17 April 1943, BNA-FO371/34541.
enact a system of import/export certification as per the 1925 Convention, and ensure domestic laws were sufficient to confine opium to legitimate channels.\textsuperscript{248}

By the end of the year it was apparent that Iran was making no progress towards stricter controls.\textsuperscript{249} Britain, having made a tangible contribution to control through shutting off Iranian exports to Japan for broader geopolitical reasons, had no desire to interfere in Iranian domestic politics regarding opium. The risks of rural destabilisation, corruption, public alienation and others such issues were too much of an immediate concern, while the returns from increased control, assuming it was even feasible, were too distant. Anslinger on the other hand, undeterred and flush with success after the Anglo-Dutch announcement of November 1943, entered 1944 ready to refight his battle with Iran. His position was considerably strengthened by a change in Afghan drug policy during 1943.

\textbf{Part 4: Afghanistan:}

The US had previously refused to supply Afghanistan with manufactured opiates due to its non-ratification of the 1912 Convention (it had ratified the 1931 Convention). By 1941 Kabul appealed to the State Department to reconsider. Initially they refused, claiming the Commissioner could not legally authorise supplies to non-adherents of the 1912 Convention. Afghanistan promised to take ‘any steps’ necessary ‘to comply with American laws’ and the State Department privately acknowledged that in 1912 Afghanistan’s foreign affairs were conducted by Britain. The Treasury Department agreed to issue export authorisations on a temporary basis. In October 1943, the US received word that Kabul had ratified the 1912 Convention. Although this did not solve the Afghan drug problem, it did represent another feather in Anslinger’s wartime cap. It also augmented his credibility when pressing other recalcitrant states, not least Iran. The US, meanwhile, continued to press Kabul to tighten domestic controls throughout 1944 by politely threatening to cut off its market access when the war ended (see Chapter Two).\textsuperscript{250}

\textsuperscript{248} Trade Agreement between the US and Iran Signed 8 April 1943 (Press release), FBNA/ACC170-71-A-3554/Box18/File0660 Iran (1941-45); http://history.house.gov/HistoricalHighlight/Detail/36918.

\textsuperscript{249} Cordell Hull to Mohammed Shayesteh, 8 April 1943; Herbert Gaston to Henry Stimson, 21 December 1943, FBNA/ACC170-71-A-3554/Box18/File0660 Iran (1941-45).

\textsuperscript{250} Paraphrase of telegram from US Legation, Tehran, 14 October 1941; State Department to FBN, 20 October 1941; Engert to Secretary of State, 19 December 1942; State to Legation Kabul, 21 January 1943; Note of telephone call, 12 October 1943; State to American Minister Kabul, 22 January 1944, FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box151/File0660, Afghanistan (1929-1968).
Part 5: Egypt:

Sir Thomas Russell Pasha was a colourful British bureaucrat who had served the British police apparatus in Egypt since 1902. Perhaps best described as the Anslinger of the Middle East he was the closest thing the region had to a drug czar. He served as the Commandant of the Cairo City Police and Chief of the Central Narcotics Intelligence Bureau (CNIB) for the duration of the war.\(^{251}\) Like Anslinger, Russell Pasha was a remarkable bureaucrat, a shrewd media operator and occasionally an informal regional drug diplomat. Like Anslinger he was a strong advocate for control of narcotics at the source, and he ably stirred up local and international press coverage to further his strategic ends. In these pursuits, any loyalty to the British government often appeared secondary to his ‘drug habit’ and bureaucratic suzerainty.\(^{252}\) This latter attribute was perhaps his greatest similarity with Anslinger. For both men, their bureaucratic survival was synonymous with the survival of drug control efforts.

The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 further drove Russell Pasha towards his US allies. With the fulfilment of its European Police Clause he expected that the drug issue would be handed over to an incapable, Egyptian-run, apparatus and his decades of work would be undone. He increasingly sought US patronage and cultivated a strong personal relationship with a number of the US drug control lobby particularly Mrs. Corinna Lindon Smith - an advisor on narcotics to the American General Federation of Women’s Clubs. Anslinger described her as one of Russell Pasha’s ‘very sincere friends and a great admirer’.\(^{253}\)

Wartime Drug Trends:

With the outbreak of war the flow of ‘white drugs’ (namely Heroin) into Egypt dried up while ‘black drugs’ (namely Hashish) poured in from the surrounding Levant states. In 1941 the Egyptian Mail attributed the drought to ‘war conditions and the strict supervision exercised on shipping in the Mediterranean by the British Fleet’. Russell Pasha described the war as ‘a golden opportunity which must not be missed’ before the ‘British police

---


\(^{252}\) Compilation of news clippings; use of term ‘drug habit’ in Russell Pasha to Anslinger, 23 June 1943, FBNA/ACC170-71-A-3554/Box16/File0660, Egypt (1940-1945).

\(^{253}\) Russell Pasha to Anslinger, 7 September 1941; Anslinger to Russell Pasha, 23 June 1941, FBNA/ACC170-71-A-3554/Box16/File0660, Egypt (1940-45). Correspondence in FBNA/ACC170-73-1/Box45/File0145, Mrs. Corinna Lindon Smith (1940–1958).
disappear[ed]’ and CNIB became subsumed into the Ministry of Interior. He advocated a post-war Arab front against the illicit drug trade, one based on sustained Western support. In September 1941, he began a new diplomatic campaign against hashish cultivation in the Levant states. He wrote that anti-hashish efforts required ‘a certain ruthlessness for the feelings and pockets of the big landlords, notables and Ministers of Syria’, as well as ‘efficient organisation of police, Gendarmerie, Law courts, etc.’. He argued that by getting the Syrian Administration to kill cultivation for a few years it was be far ‘harder for an independent Syria…to start…again’.

To Russell Pasha’s frustration, Britain was unwilling to intervene militarily in the drug trade in the Levant in 1941. He believed this encouraged a French ‘attitude of laisser-faire’ and gave ‘the impression that the British authorities were not interested in the matter’. As with the case of Iran in 1943, it was a correct impression to draw. British Military forces were far more absorbed with other matters in 1941 and had no desire to complicate relations with regional groups and generate new military entanglements in pursuit of long-term hashish control.

This lack of British interest drove Russell Pasha further towards the US. In a bizarre moment of candour he wrote to Anslinger in March 1942 that ‘our American Colony here is growing greater daily!’ It was a statement that both Anslinger and Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Gaston described as ‘interesting’. In the meantime Egypt announced its intention to ratify the 1912 Hague Convention. This promise, coupled with a request by George Morlock that Egypt be given ‘sympathetic consideration’, led the Treasury to approve shipments of US manufactured opiates to Egypt. Their speedy ratification - by June 1942 – was then happily touted by the US later that year when Iran questioned the feasibility of wartime ratifications.

254 ‘War Deals Death Blow at Drug Traffickers,’ Egyptian Mail, 12 February 1941; Russell Pasha to Renborg, 24 March 1942, FBNA; Russell Pasha to Anslinger, 7 September 1941; Russell Pasha to H.E. Hussein Sirry Pasha, 16 November 1941; FBNA/ACC170-71-A-3554/Box16/File0660, Egypt (1940-1945).

255 Ibid.

256 Anslinger and Gaston Notes attached to Russell Pasha to Anslinger, 24 March 1942; Gaston to Morlock, 30 April 1942; Memorandum of Conversation between Morlock and Saleh, 19 September 1942, FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box142/File0480-172, Opium Reserves, Iranian Opium (1941-1945).
Despite their convention ratification, Russell Pasha quickly became impatient with the Egyptian Government. He complained to Anslinger that his ‘masters…have had a wonderful opportunity of inserting non-growing of hashish into the treaties they have been discussing with Independent Syria and Lebanon, but they’ve done nothing’. He also expressed dismay at the lack of a suitable Egyptian candidate to replace him as head of the CNIB, lamenting that ‘no Egyptian has ever taken up the anti-drug traffic as a hobby’.  

He warned that Egypt would ‘go down like a pack of cards before the narcotic attack that is coming’. Demand remained high and once international communications reopened ‘white drugs’ would pour in from the Balkans and Far East. He wanted to stay on in the role, but overtly expressed a lack of personal interest and warned that advocacy by the British embassy for him doing so would be misinterpreted. He suggested a multi-state effort involving Britain, the US, Canada and League of Nations. The UK Foreign Office and Home Office thought his fears ‘fully justified’ but preferred it be taken up ‘on an international basis’ so Britain was not ‘saddled with the job’. As 1943 drew to a close the future of Egyptian control remained uncertain. With Egypt’s ratification of the 1912 Convention Anslinger re-focused his limited regional attention on Iran and Afghanistan. His attention would not fully return to Egypt until the beginning of 1944.

The cases of Iran and Egypt, and to a lesser extent Afghanistan, highlighted a sharp divide in Anglo-American policy. British attention to the issue throughout the war only became live when direct interests were at stake. In the Far East this issue touched on important questions of colonial governance. In the Middle East it was a battle fought over abstract international control efforts and obligations. When faced with a choice of expending even minor political capital in pursuit of control efforts, every time Britain chose to ignore the issue. The US, although subsuming the issue when broader interests were at stake, for example trade agreements, nevertheless proved willing, time and again, to expend significant diplomatic leverage on it.

Conclusion:

---

258 Russell Pasha to Shone, 26 December 1943, BNA-FO371/39364.  
259 Williams (FO) to Harris (HO), 19 January 1944; Reynolds (HO) to Williams (FO), 3 February 1944, BNA-FO371/39364.
With much of the system’s technical core hiding out in Washington and the political arm – the League OAC – held in stasis: the locus of drug diplomacy politics shifted to bilateral interactions. Latin America remained (for the most part) an American sphere of drug policy influence. It was the wartime bilateral interaction between Britain and the US over the Far East that drove the evolution of the international system during this time period. Yet, there were many other important bilateral and multilateral engagements such as the Middle East and Anglo-Canadian interactions (see Chapter Two).

The years 1939-1943 had witnessed major shifts in the international drug control system. With London’s blessing, the technical arm of the League drug apparatus had fled to Washington and came under increased US influence. Simultaneously, a set of relationships had developed in London that would serve as an information exchange and counter-weight to this new US influence. Nevertheless, the rapid realignment in the Anglo-US power balance, coupled with changes in British strategy, allowed the US to heavily influence British drug policy. The colonial opium issue was the clearest example of this. Anslinger successfully bluffed Britain claiming a high level of resolve within the US government on the issue. Britain came to view its options in rather stark terms. The first option was to fight to sustain colonial monopolies it did not currently hold, and whose benefits it did not currently feel, while swimming against the tide of international commitments. The consequences of this would be to potentially seriously alienate US public opinion and anger their key ally, upon whose future cooperation they were growing ever more dependent.

The second option was to agree to US demands as far as possible; to ignore the administrative problems until after the colonies were firmly back in their hands; and finally to reap what public relations victories the change in policy would afford - both within the US and within China. Faced with this choice it is unsurprising that the British chose the latter option. Nevertheless, had Anslinger not used his wartime leverage and pushed the issue it is unlikely that such a resolution would have occurred. By the close of 1943 the Commissioner could justifiably feel that he had gambled and won. He then quickly pivoted to using his strategic opium reserve to try to force recalcitrant producing states into joining the control system.
At the outbreak of war the core question dividing states regarding the control system was how to deal with the existence of colonial opium monopolies and opium smoking.\(^{260}\) This saw states divide into three camps. On the one side were the US and its allies who advocated strict adherence to scientific and medical usage. On the other were producing states, many of who were economically dependent on the very opiates these control advocates sought to eradicate. In the middle were the old colonial powers. These states were torn by their desire to fulfil the normative goal of eradicating opium abuse and the recognition of the practical difficulties of immediate prohibitions. Arguably, it was the existence of this old colonial buffer which had blunted the leverage the production control efforts in the interwar years. With the resolution of this issue, the stage was set for a more coherent system, divided between two groups: supply control advocates and producing states. With the power relations heavily weighted in favour of the former the system could take on a new forward momentum.

Although a number of derivatives of the colonial issue remained to be resolved, Britain had reduced its economic interests in opium and gained a new stake in a supply-centric system. Controlling non-medical and non-scientific use in its colonies would require illicit supplies to be suppressed in other territories. The potential for a drug détente between the US and Britain appeared altogether possible after 1943, particularly as drug manufacturing states. Despite this convergence of interests, however, their approaches to international control remained quite different. For the British, pragmatism, self-interest and consensus would remain the default setting for drug diplomacy. For the US, it would be a single-minded commitment to strict controls in all parts of the globe. These differing approaches, the US favouring immediate and strict prohibition and the UK favouring incrementalism and various forms of regulation, would determine not just their own relationship, but also the shape of the international drug control system going forward.

Chapter 2: Drug Diplomacy During World War II and Beyond – Part II, 1944-46.

Introduction:

Britain and the US entered 1944 with very different policy focuses. The US focused intensely on a broader global push that would pave the way for a reconstituted international system and a new production limitation convention. Their immediate goal in 1944 was to push Iran to ratify the existing conventions. From this position they could then use their post-war leverage to push for a new international poppy limitation convention that would finally restrict opium production to strictly scientific and medical purposes. Under this agreement India and other producer states could finally be forced massively to curtail opium production and use. Without the acquiescence of traditionally recalcitrant states like as Iran and Afghanistan, however, the illegitimate international trade would render efforts to limit ‘legitimate’ production worthless.

Britain’s prime concern in 1944 was Burma given the intense military drive underway in 1944 and 1945 and the need to decide civilian government policies along with the precedents these would set for other liberated territories. Enforcing immediate prohibition on smoking and opium eating was viewed as a practical impossibility, particularly in frontier regions. It would result in smuggling; undermine government power and potentially spark social unrest. Britain sought a way to square their practical concerns with their awareness of US anti-opium sentiments, particularly since American forces would be operating in Burma. The result was a drawn out policy process that revealed a strong British belief that US opium policy was naïve and impractical but also a continued fear that the Washington anti-opium lobby were a dangerous and unscrupulous collection of people.

As 1944 progressed a consensus hardened within the US government that they could use their wartime leverage to force the issue when needed. It was not until late in 1945 that the extent of their disagreement over Burma became apparent to both the US and Britain. By this time the United States had hardened its views and interpreted the British policy as reneging on its November 1943 commitments. This then combined with Britain offering only qualified support for a new production limitation convention and resulted in a large diplomatic blow-up. All of this was occurring in a context where control system politics were once again
coming to the fore and various actors began jockeying for leverage within the emerging United Nations framework. Meanwhile, existing issues continued to smoulder and complicate drug diplomacy.

**Part 1: Old Problems Continued:**

*Liverpool as Smuggling hub:*

Towards the end of 1943 opium smuggling via Liverpool to North America re-emerged as a ‘common interest’ for Canada and the US. Throughout 1944 the two continued to report seizures of Indian Monopoly opium. Anslinger and Sharman sent angry letters to Thornton at the Home Office calling Liverpool ‘neck and neck’ with Basra as a centre of illicit traffic. They claimed that opium, was ‘freely available;’ the prices ‘extremely low’ and penalties ‘negligible’. Both men attributed the problem to a lack of will or capacity on the part of Britain.\(^{261}\)

Requests from the UK and other branches of the US and Canadian governments to Anslinger and Sharman to turn a blind eye to the trade and leave offending crew members aboard ships in furtherance of the war effort only fuelled their anger. Thornton’s responses did not alleviate the tension. Anslinger had dispatched Arthur Elliott Felkin, PCOB Secretary and Washington ‘inner circle’ confidant, to London to ‘vigorously’ press the issue. Thornton claimed ignorance and vowed to look into any reports forwarded. This response infuriated Anslinger who wrote to Sharman: ‘it isn’t any wonder that the traffic thrives. It doesn’t need to be organized’.\(^{262}\) The Commissioner was quietly compiling these complaints, particularly those against the Indian opium monopoly, into a dossier that could be used at a post-war production limitation conference. Nevertheless, with the monopolies issue out of the way, Anslinger decided the time was opportune to make his feelings known to Thornton.

In August 1944 Anslinger wrote ‘we understand each other well enough to use plain language.’ He claimed that he had initially mistaken the statistics regarding British penalties

---

\(^{261}\) Sharman to Anslinger, 10 October 1943, FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box152/File0660, Canada II (1942-1945); Anslinger to Thornton, 2 March 1944; Sharman to Thornton, April 1944; Anslinger to Sharman, 18 April 1944, FBNA/ACC170-71-A-3554/Box18/File0660, England (1943-1950). Sharman to Anslinger, 5 April 1944, FBNA/ACC170-71-A-3554/Box18/File0660, England (1928-1942).

\(^{262}\) Sharman to Anslinger, 15 April 1944; Anslinger to Sharman, 18 April 1944; Sharman to Anslinger, 5 April 1944; Anslinger to Sharman, 18 April 1944; Anslinger to Sharman, 9 August 1944; FBNA/ACC170-71-A-3554/Box18/File0660, England (1943-1950).
for smuggling for those handed out by Japanese courts before the war (The US Treasury had in 1942 publicly characterised the Japanese penalties as ‘an open scandal’). He went on to say that these ‘pointless and ineffective fines’ were not a deterrent ‘but actually encourage the traffickers.’ Unmoved, Thornton simply dismissed Anslinger’s complaints for the remainder of his tenure.

In October 1945 Major Coles (see Chapter One) informed Anslinger he had resumed control of the Home Office Drugs Branch and looked ‘forward to a renewal of…collaboration’. He immediately picked up on a pending correspondence with Thornton, welcoming Anslinger’s suggestion for an arrangement with India to station a US representative to flag up illicit shipments headed for the US and UK. Anslinger’s wrote to Coles that ‘it is with a great deal of pleasure that I read your note’. The two had not always seen eye to eye during the League days, but had a sufficiently amicable working relationship and Anslinger hoped they could move beyond the stonewalling of the Thornton era.

**Britain, Canada and Latin America:**

Between 1943 and 1944 Britain squeezed opiate supplies to Canada while quietly increasing exports to Latin America. Their goal was to increase market share in Latin America and improve dollar earnings. By December 1943 they were providing only 50% of the minimum Canadian requirements. Britain blamed a 1943 supply disruption from Turkey causing ‘severe shortages’ of opium. In early 1944 supplies tightened further and the High Commissioner in London was asked to make ‘strong’ representations on Canada’s behalf. This time, he was permitted to include incriminating intelligence that Anslinger had privately supplied to Sharman. This showed that manufacturing firms in Britain had been exporting narcotics to Chile while an Indian supply mission had recently offered US firms one hundred thousand pounds of raw opium cake.

---


265 Col. Sharman’s Memorandum: Re. Supply of Narcotics from Great Britain to Canada, 28 June 1944, FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box152/File0660, Canada II (1942-1945);
By supplying Chile, Britain was undermining Anslinger’s regional strategy. Anslinger offered to supply Chile’s narcotic needs in return for an end to their domestic production and manufacturing. Further, he believed Chile was self-sufficient and simply re-exporting all narcotics imports to other countries - including Argentina and Brazil. Argentina had not ratified the 1912 Convention and the US refused to supply it with narcotics. Both Anslinger and Sharman believed Thornton was knowingly permitting excess supplies to be sent to Chile as he had done for Cuba and Mexico in 1941-1942. At that time Anslinger was pressuring both Cuba and Mexico to reduce consumption, production and smuggling.266

In May 1944 Sharman sent on a stern cable to London, which he described to Anslinger as ‘pretty hot stuff’.267 Anslinger continued to feed Sharman intelligence and in July 1944 forwarded a Brazilian government acknowledgment that Britain had replaced Germany as its main supplier. Meanwhile, in another regional victory for Anslinger Brazil promised to prohibit post-war cultivation ‘in compliance with [his] wishes’.268 This set the stage for Brazil emerging as a key US regional ally during the 1950s.

For Sharman these cases highlighted that Britain was lying, claiming supply shortages to one of its largest pre-war markets, while diverting supplies to capture Latin American markets. When the evidence was presented to London it suddenly claimed a ‘marked improvement in supply’. It then began to argue that ‘manufacturing capacity’ was now the main obstacle to supply. Neither Sharman nor Anslinger believed it. The Home Office would later offer the unconvincing explanation privately to the State Department that the supply shortages arose from the accumulation of stocks for use in liberated areas. The ‘sufficiently improved’ situation facilitated increased exports to Canada. Although welcome, it did not fulfil Canada’s yearly requirements, nor compensate for their drained stocks.269

266 Anslinger to Sharman, 1 September 1943; Anslinger to Sharman, 23 July 1942; Sharman to Anslinger, 28 July 1942, FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box152/File0660, Canada II (1942-1945).
267 Sharman to Anslinger, 3 June 1944, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1 [UNO] #1 (1939-45).
268 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Quoted in: Anslinger to Sharman, 27 July 1944, FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box152/File0660, Canada II (1942-1945).
269 Sharman to Anslinger, 28 July 1942; Col. Sharman’s Memorandum: Re. Supply of Narcotics from Great Britain to Canada, 28 June 1944, FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box152/File0660, Canada II (1942-1945); Morlock to Anslinger, 14 April 1944; Sharman to Anslinger 27 May 1944, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1 [UNO] #1 (1939-45).
In the meantime, the PCOB provided Sharman with further ammunition releasing an analysis of ‘Trends in Trade’ in narcotics for 1938-42. This claimed that ‘the markets lost by Continental Europe [were] now largely supplied by the United Kingdom’ which ‘undoubtedly…had become the principal exporter in the world’. Germany’s loss had been Britain’s gain. The vast majority of this shift was in Latin America where Britain’s market share grew from one per cent in 1938 to seventy-seven per cent in 1942.270

The Dominions Office offered a complicated and unconvincing series of explanations. In reality the PCOB report hit on the core issue: London wanted to snap up Germany’s market share in Latin America thereby securing Britain’s pharmaceutical export industry and paving the way for new dollar earnings which would strengthen their balance of payments situation. Wishing to leave the affair behind them, and undoubtedly regretting a July 1943 suggestion that Canada seek some of her supplies from the US, London reiterated their commitment to meet Canada’s needs. Sharman described this as ‘an attempt to justify a situation that cannot be justified.’ Nevertheless, careful not to overplay his hand, he acknowledged the situation had ‘largely been ameliorated’ thanks to the ‘force with which the facts were communicated’. The severe shortages Canada had faced in 1944, where some hospitals reported being unable to obtain codeine, were not repeated in 1945 and a more sustainable Anglo-Canadian arrangement gradually emerged.271 Further, by the close of 1944, the US and Britain had reached an arrangement regarding Latin American whereby both would be limited to exporting half of any country’s annual estimates. This meant countries could not double up on purchases. Thornton’s subsequent efforts to spin this agreement as evidence of British shortages were unsurprisingly met with scepticism by his North American counterparts.272

_Egypt: Russell Pasha’s Offensives_: 273

270 PCOB quote in: Col. Sharman’s Memorandum: Re. Supply of Narcotics from Great Britain to Canada, 28 June 1944, FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box152/File0660, Canada II (1942-1945).
271 Clutterbuck to Hudd, 18 November 1944; Sharman Memorandum: Re. Narcotic Supplies…, London, 3 December 1944, FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box152/File0660, Canada II (1942-1945).
273 See clippings in: Drug Traffic in Egypt, 24 April 1944, BNA-FO371/39364; Russell Pasha to Anslinger, 25 July 1942; Anslinger to Russell Pasha, 3 March 1944, FBNA/ACC170-71-A-3554/Box16/File0660, Egypt (1940-1945); Russell Pasha to H.E. Faud Serag El Din Pasha, 22 April 1944, BNA-FO371/39364.
Russell Pasha had, by the close of 1944, reached out to a number of actors regarding his post-war role in Egypt. Anslinger was non-responsive either because the letter was misplaced or because he was focused on other issues, such as Iran and the post-war international organisation. The British government, meanwhile, sought to internationalise the problem. Russell Pasha continued a broad press offensive and undertook a diplomatic mission to Lebanon and Syria in March 1944, where he found conditions disheartening. Neither was free from French control and could avoid a difficult suppression campaign by claiming a lack of autonomy. Notables were ‘a law unto themselves in their own district’, ignoring the central Government and frequently stipulated fellahin tenants cultivate cannabis. High prices were further driving cultivation into North Syria where Government control was even weaker than in Lebanon. Russell Pasha secured the support of General Holmes (British Commander of the IXth Army) who provided material assistance for suppression efforts. General Holmes, a convert to the opium cause, assured him that tackling the traffic was, in his view, part of the war effort and a high priority.

Russell Pasha argued Turkey remained the main threat for heroin. He had received an angry rebuke from the Turkish officials for suggesting Turkish opium was being smuggled into Egypt via Syria but maintained seizures in Aleppo suggested Anatolia was the origin. He attributed the angry Turkish response to the poor relationship between the French Authorities in Syria and the Turkish Authorities. Overall, he claimed the Lebanese and Syrian ‘problem’ could only be completely solved ‘after the war when something similar to the League of Nations takes shape.’ States could then be pressured through the international system to ensure they met obligations.

Anslinger finally responded to Russell Pasha in March 1944 (five months after his initial contact). Offering platitudes Anslinger remained non-committal. He said that ‘no greater calamity could befall…narcotic control in the Middle East,’ than Russell Pasha leaving and predicted ‘a very speedy recrudescence of the “white” drug traffic.’ He promised that he was pushing the State Department ‘to make some move’ but warned that ‘the time is not far distant when the curtain will fall on the stage for you, Sharman, and myself’. He also intimated that he was focusing on ‘the limitation of production project and our chief attack is on Iran’. Despite this focus on Iran Anslinger was to have his attention drawn back to Burma.
Part 2: The Burma Dilemma:

Britain’s Burma dilemma centred on placating American wishes while accommodating local logistical barriers. Britain remained sceptical of US paranoia over troops becoming addicted to opium. There were no recorded cases for British troops operating in the region.\(^{274}\) London had warned in a memo to Washington that their November 10\(^{th}\) announcement would ‘not immediately be so sweeping’ regarding Burma. Nevertheless, since Burma was an area where US troops would be operating, the Federal Government, undertaking some selective cognitive dissonance, read the announcement to include Burma.\(^{275}\)

The practice of smoking prepared opium was not widespread, but the so-called, ‘quasi-medical’, eating of opium was. Further, it was sold through a system of government run shops – many interacting untidily with local political conditions. Further, London had concluded in October 1943 that complete suppression was unattainable until cultivation in the neighbouring Yunnan Province of China could be halted.\(^{276}\) Britain therefore included the reference to prohibition’s success being dependent on ‘other countries’ in the November 10\(^{th}\) Statement to inoculate against US accusations of backtracking. Highlighting the British goal to reframe the control debate as one of regulation, London believed that they had restricted drugs, via ‘stringent regulations, to medicinal and scientific purposes’.\(^{277}\) The key would be to convince, or secure US acquiescence in this vision.

Short term vs. Long Term.\(^{278}\)

Sounding out a way to proceed, London began to reframe the Burma opium question as a long-term reconstruction and development problem. The Government of Burma convened an Expert Committee in late November 1943. It quickly adopted a conservative approach building on the existing policy legacy rather than advocating any radical changes. They re-examined the high profile 1931 ‘League of Nations Commission of Enquiry Report’ that had triggered the 1932 commitment to total suppression of eating and smoking. Towards this

\(^{274}\) Hudson Minute, File: Suppression of opium smoking, 13 March 1944, BNA-FO371/39366.


\(^{276}\) Minutes of the Thirty-Fourth Meeting of IOC, 27 October 1943, BNA-FO371/34545.

\(^{277}\) FO to Washington Embassy, 30 October 1943, BNA-FO371/34546.

\(^{278}\) Drawn from: Report…opium problem in Burma, 30 November 1943, BNA-FO370/39366.
eventual end the Government had taken steps to minimise opium’s availability, mostly by tweaking state-controlled supply channels and regulations.

The Committee praised the Government for being ‘most scrupulous in observing its commitments’ and argued the 1931 Report had been overlooked by ‘recent discussions in America’. They suggested that long-term policy work towards amplifying existing trends based on the twin pillars of increasing control of opium consumption and accelerating progress on suppression. Conscious of international opinion, they recommended avoiding any actions that appeared driven by monetary concerns. Government policy had to appear to be driven by public health and safety concerns, not economic exploitation.

Turning to the short-term the Committee simply noted, in what became know as ‘Paragraph 28’, that policy fell to the Chief Civil Affairs Officer in Burma. He had drawn up policies, with the Governor’s approval, and had already enacted them in areas under British control. These short-term policies aimed to balance strictness with flexibility. It committed the Military administration not to reopen opium shops unless forced by circumstance. If reopened, their goal was to ensure opium was obtained through licit channels, with stiff penalties to discourage the illicit market. British forces could also use opium as currency to procure goods and labour from locals if necessary. Perhaps most controversially, it allowed the extension of cultivation to areas where it was hitherto prohibited until normal civil government could be restored and regular supply channels reopened.

Second Guessing Paragraph 28 and Dissent:
Despite this self-assured report, the Burma Office, in January 1944, questioned whether the US would accept the short-term policy. They were adamant that US demands for immediate prohibition were ‘out of the question’ and fraught with ‘positive dangers’. Further, they wanted to use the issue to draw a red line between civil and military command and make clear that ‘actual administration will be in the hands of the British Civil Affairs officers’.

Nevertheless, they reopened discussions on ‘Paragraph 28’.

At the same time dissent within the Expert Committee surfaced. Emerging as a strong contrarian voice was Lt. Col. K. Lindsay, a medical officer with first-hand experience of the

---

279 LBO to Taylor, January 1944, BNA-FO371/39366.
issue. His views had been suppressed, as they would have been inflammatory to US opinion. Bypassing the Committee, he pushed his views up the bureaucratic chain. He criticized the ‘pre-arranged policy of the League of Nations’ and the ‘well meaning but misinformed bodies in Europe and America trying to force their ideas on oriental people’. He referred to the former as ‘an international ring of statistics-bound opiophobes’ and ‘anti-opium propagandists’. He wrote that he originally viewed opium as a pure vice, but had come to appreciate its benefit, particularly for the coolie class whose work ‘is about the hardest in the world.’ Offering his ‘medical and social view’ he said that total prohibition ‘would be foolish as well as wrong’. 280

The Foreign Office remained on the side-lines as the Burma and Colonial Offices thrashed out these questions. However, their private comments proved sympathetic to Col. Lindsay’s assertions. Mr. M. S. Williams of the Foreign Office remarked that ‘no doubt there is truth in what he says but it won’t affect our policy.’ Mr. A. L. Scott of the Foreign Office wrote:

\[ I \text{ cannot say how whole heartedly I endorse Col. Lindsay’s views. Most unfortunately it will not affect HMG’s policy. One only wishes the voice of moderation and common sense could sometimes be heard}. \] 281

By February 1944 the State Department began making enquiries about the implementation of the November 1943 Statement and the Foreign Office prodded their colleagues for a preliminary response. 282

\textit{The View from the US}: 283

After the apparent success over the Colonial powers US drug policy formulation splintered somewhat. Immediate efforts focused largely on pressuring Iran. Anslinger and the ‘inner circle’ opened numerous diplomatic fronts. Meanwhile, League old hand, Elizabeth Washburn Wright, both invigorated by and jealous of Anslinger’s achievement over Britain

---

280 Lindsay Minute, Notes on Policy of Opium Prohibition in Burma, January 1944; Letter, Lindsay to McGuire, 27 November 1943, BNA-FO371/39366.
281 Williams’ Minute, 7 February 1944; Scott Minute, 14 February 1944, BNA-FO371/39366.
282 Williams to Taylor, 8 March 1944, BNA-FO371/39366
283 Drawn from: Congressional Record No. 33, 21 February 1944, BNA-FO371/39366.
and the Netherlands, clumsily orchestrated her own campaign.\textsuperscript{284} Out of the friction between these various manoeuvres a US drug diplomatic doctrine was given a new legislative basis. This legislation merged the traditional US drug policy ideological goals with wartime outcomes, creating a clear strategic reference point for US officials going forward into peacetime.

Congressman Walter Judd was a stalwart supporter of China and had spent many years in the country as a medical missionary in the 1920s and 30s.\textsuperscript{285} In February 1944 he began championing legislation (apparently at the behest of Elizabeth Washburn Wright and independent of Anslinger’s manoeuvres\textsuperscript{286}) that would eventually come to be known as ‘the Judd Resolution’ with a speech in the House of Representatives.

In words that would become the language of the ‘Judd Resolution,’ he argued that the war risked an explosion in the illicit opium traffic, but also an ‘unprecedented opportunity’ for eliminating it. The British and Dutch November 1943 announcements meant the US had ‘for the first time the support of certain western empires without whose support our efforts have been doomed to failure’. Outcomes would now depend on opium growing countries. Iran as the world’s ‘greatest producer’ could reignite the supply line to US opium ‘addicts’. Now that lend-lease money and materials was making countries like Iran newly ‘dependent’ on the US, they could use this ‘special influence’ to encourage production limitation to the world’s legitimate needs – less than 400 tons a year.

China had largely suppressed cultivation; Japan was ‘going to be smashed’; the Russians had ‘controlled opium very rigidly in their own land’. The US now had the opportunity to ‘eliminate it from the world as we eliminated it from the Philippines.’ He claimed ‘the Asiatic peoples trust us on this’ and that ‘such a unique opportunity may not come again in years.’ Like the Civil War, he suggested, ‘it would seem that it is taking another war to bring about

\textsuperscript{284} Wright to Anslinger, 17 November 1943, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box124/File1230-A, [LON] Postwar Narcotics Problem #2 (1942-3).
the abolition of another form of slavery even more destructive of the dignity of and well being of man’.

It was a speech that pulled together decades of US policy and moulded it to the changed circumstances the war had produced. The eventual ‘Judd Resolution,’ would lift entire sections verbatim from the speech and became the basis for US Federal drug diplomacy going forward. With major US bilateral victories largely absent for the rest of the war, the Judd Resolution would set the trajectory for American international drug policy for the coming post-war era.

Britain and the Grey Area of Empire:
The Burma Office and War Office were awaiting the final decision from Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, the Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia.287 He had been briefed to keep in mind a number of complicating factors, including the potential hardship to native growers; political difficulties in districts where the habit was endemic; negative side effects of increased smuggling; and the impact of Chinese supplies nullifying prohibition.288 The Foreign Office and the Washington Embassy were told to sit tight.289

This sparked an agitated response from Ambassador Halifax. He was ‘not very happy about the attitude of the Civil Affairs Authorities in Burma’ and warned their ‘insistence on…compromising with local customs and conditions, is likely to meet with strong opposition from the Americans, whose penchant for drastic measures is illustrated in the…State Department’s Aide Memoire’. He warned of ramifications for broader Anglo-American relations: ‘if the people interested in this opium question get excited and go out to attack our policy they will mobilise pretty substantial public support’.290

The Foreign Office asked that the War Office give ‘full weight’ to his warning.291 The latter bucked against the interference. They considered the short-term policy decided, and Halifax’s concerns relating to ‘a far wider issue’. They also reiterated that allowing ‘uninformed American public sentiment to interfere’ would ‘open the door to similar interference in any

287 Taylor to Williams, 12 March 1944, BNA-FO371/39366.
288 WO to SACEA, 21 February 1944, BNA-FO371/39366.
289 Roberts to Wright, 23 March 1944, BNA-FO371/39366.
290 Halifax to Sir. Cadogan, 17 April 1944, BNA-FO371/39366.
291 Harrison to Taylor, 1 May 1944, BNA-FO371/39366.
other sphere of imperial domestic policy’. They initially tried to avoid forwarding the Ambassador’s letter to Mountbatten, but succumbed to Foreign Office insistence.²⁹²

Around this time a frank meeting took place between the Home Office and the State Department about opium. The former pointed out that the government was still considering the Burma question. George Morlock angrily concluded they were ‘hesitant to permit the military to close the monopolies and suppress opium’ and were trying to delay. He suggested to Anslinger that the US consider unilateral action.²⁹³ The stage was set for a potential diplomatic blow up.


Both the House and Senate passed HR 241, the Judd Resolution, unanimously in June 1944. It stated ‘this World War ought to be not an occasion for permitting expansion and spreading of illicit traffic in opium, but rather an opportunity for completely eliminating it’. The President was ‘to approach the Governments of all opium-producing countries’ urging ‘they take immediate steps to limit and control the growth of the opium poppy and the production of opium and its derivatives to the amount actually required for strictly medicinal and scientific purposes’.²⁹⁵

Soon, the State Department served international notice they would be pursuing it as official US policy.²⁹⁶ This had major implications for Britain. A central tenet of British opium strategy was to deflect attention from India. This had been part of the motivation behind making the November 10th announcement.²⁹⁷ The Judd Resolution brought new US attention

---

²⁹² Taylor to Harrison, 10 May 1944; Reay Minutes, 14 & 21 May 1944, File: Control of Opium Smoking in Burma, BNA-FO371/39366.
²⁹³ Morlock to Anslinger, 14 April 1944, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1 [UNO] #1 (1939-45).
²⁹⁴ The impact of the Judd Resolution has been drastically understated in existing historiography. Most have largely overlooked it. William O. Walker mentions it in passing and that the UK found it an annoyance, William O. Walker III, ed., *Drug Control Policy: Essays in Historical and Comparative Perspective* (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 163. William McAllister, in an early work, acknowledges it as an example of Congressional action then utilised by the State Department, McAllister, “A Limited Enterprise: The History of International Efforts to Control Drugs in the Twentieth Century,” 270. He omits mention of the resolution in his later text McAllister, *Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An International History*.
²⁹⁵ HR 241, June 8 1944, BNA-FO371/40503.
²⁹⁶ Press Statement by Secretary of State, July 3 1944, BNA-FO, 371/40503.
²⁹⁷ See File: Suppression of opium smoking…., C 4781, April 1944, BNA-FO371/39366.
to India (along with Iran and Afghanistan). Acting Treasury Secretary Gaston wrote an open letter to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs highlighting the centrality of India to the post-war system. He claimed that five thousand shops in the Indian States sold opium which was showing up in US seizures. He argued that India was growing 200-300 tons annually for domestic non-medical purposes which served as a ‘reservoir’ for the illicit traffic.\textsuperscript{298} Secretary of War Stimson wrote a public letter painting production control efforts ‘both as a war measure and as a part of the permanent program for peace’.\textsuperscript{299}

The Resolution also represented a strong shift in the locus away from the FBN towards the State Department. Anslinger had filled a power vacuum created by exceptional wartime conditions. The State Department was always likely to reassert control once these conditions ended. The Judd Resolution accelerated this and formalised the bureaucratic realignment. Anslinger would retain a potent role in the international sphere, often through private channels (see Chapter Three). However, the State Department once again became the overseer of US drug diplomacy.

The US had moved from having no unified strategy to having a unanimous congressional resolution urging the President to pursue Anslinger’s framework on a bilateral and multilateral basis. It largely represented a reiteration of traditional US goals. Nevertheless it married these broad ideological aspirations with the changed geopolitical circumstances and Anslinger’s strategic vision and established them as Executive policy.

The Judd Resolution served as a vital focal point over an era of increasingly fractured and uncertain policies. The Resolution represented a coherent and tangible rallying point for US diplomats wondering what US overseas policy was. In so doing it provided a vital sense of overarching direction for US bureaucrats and set the stage for a new diplomatic offensive, a significant portion of which would be directed towards Iran but also Afghanistan and India.

\textbf{Part 4: China Prepares for Post-war:}

Britain remained deeply sceptical about claims of opium progress in China. They believed that if a strong central government emerged there was hope for control. If China slipped back

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{298} Gaston to Bloom, 13 May 1944, BNA-FO371/40503.
\item \textsuperscript{299} Stimson to Bloom, May 1944, BNA-FO371/40503.
\end{itemize}
into civil war production limitation would collapse, particularly with levels of addiction expected to be left in the wake of the Japanese occupation. Under these circumstances Britain believed the trade would simply be ‘continued by Chinese enterprise’. The political outcome in China would have enormous practical implications for British colonial opium policy. For the US China remained its key ally in multilateral settings. Having a strong and stable China would be key to US drug diplomacy going forward.

The nationalist – communist divide re-emerged sharply as the new locus for the opium issue in China in 1944. The Kuomintang had worked to weaken communist support during 1943 by accusing them of planting poppies. The US Embassy at Chungking believed the claims false and part of a ‘propaganda campaign’ to discredit the Communists and lay the public relations groundwork for a military campaign in the northwest. Further, the Embassy was receiving numerous reports that Chiang’s officials were actively engaged in the trade, particularly transporting opium from occupied areas into the unoccupied ones. Anslinger, aware of these complications but also the pro-Chiang Washington climate, remained silent.

Chiang continued to burnish his anti-opium credentials. His annual Opium Suppression Day message in June 1944 claimed huge successes while outlining new eradication and anti-smuggling efforts. The validity of his narrative came under increasing scrutiny from the Western press. A New York Times reporter, embedded with the Communists, wrote that there was no evidence that they were cultivating opium. The article led Assistant Treasury Secretary Gaston to describe Kuomintang accusations as ‘another pretty little Chungking invention’.

In March 1945 London forwarded an internal memo on China to their US counterparts. Although Chiang’s resolve was ‘undoubted’, the nationalists were outmatched. Illicit profits were ‘fantastic’ and the main sources of supply were areas under warlord control and/or inhabited by non-Chinese tribes people with local potentates strong enough to ignore Central

---

300 Hudson Minute, File: Suppression of opium smoking, 13 March 1944, BNA-FO371/39366.
301 Excerpt, Chungking to State Department, 8 July 1943; Memo: Rice to Gauss, 23 February 1944; Report, Chungking, 30 October 1943; Excerpt from Report, re. Chungking Embassy official's trip…, 18 January 1944, FBNA/ACC170-71-A-3554/Box16/File0660, China #18 (1942-46).
Government fiats. Further, the British argued there was no evidence to support the ‘frequent rumours, believed to have been put out by Chungking propaganda sources,’ that the Communists were growing opium.\(^{303}\)

By the close of war it was undeniable the problem remained acute in both occupied and unoccupied areas. Moreover the core political and ideological underpinnings remained unchanged. Opium loomed so large in the Chinese national consciousness that all sides fought for the moral high ground. Chiang had little real control over the trade, but sought the anti-opium mantle to counteract the communists’ wartime public relations gains. Furthermore, anti-opium efforts (synonymous with anti-imperialism in China) would inoculate against his appearing too close to his Western allies. However, by trying to paint the communists as the perpetrators of a trade his own generals were complicit in, Chiang undermined his credibility within US Government agencies. Publicly, however, US support remained unwavering. Moreover, Chiang’s image as an anti-opium crusader had assisted with broader US regional drug control strategy – particularly regarding the monopoly system.

Britain assumed the role of dispassionate observer of China. Nevertheless, the implications for its regional opium policies remained. Britain had agreed to prohibition but warned it would depend on success in surrounding countries. Whether Britain wanted to play this card, particularly regarding Burma, remained uncertain. The US, meanwhile, was in the midst of implementing the Judd Resolution and looking towards a post-war control system. It is towards the former aspect we now turn.

**Part 5: Pressuring Britain, India, Iran and Afghanistan:**

*Implementing the Judd Resolution:*

The State Department produced a framework for implementing the Judd Resolution. States were asked to: (1) strictly limit production to medical and scientific purposes; (2) adhere to a system of estimates equivalent to the 1925 Convention; (3) commit to take part in a post-war production limitation conference. These were then transmitted via memoranda to the various states. The British Foreign Office received two memoranda in September 1944. The first

urged Britain to consider taking steps to limit production in Burma and India.\textsuperscript{304} The second was a copy of the memorandum sent to the Iranian Government. The US asked that Britain help by making representations to the Iranians and said a similar request was being made to the Soviet Government.\textsuperscript{305}

These memoranda called for restricting cultivation to a closed list of countries; establishing a control body with ‘absolute and complete independence’ to enforce compliance; mechanisms to ensure fair pricing, product standardization and a fair system of distributing the costs of administering the system; and limitation to annual world medical requirements as they stood in 1944 – around 400 tons. The US estimate for actual world production in 1944 was 2400 tons, leaving an excess production of around 2000 tons.\textsuperscript{306}

\textit{India:}

India had traditionally bucked against all US pressure. Opium eating was far more prevalent in India than smoking. In 1939 they had pre-emptively rejected new production limitation obligations. They warned the League in 1939: ‘No such obligation could be taken until the organization of medical services throughout the country has been greatly advanced’.\textsuperscript{307} The Indian position was unchanged but in 1944 the State Department pushed on two indirect pressure points. The first related to export legacies. India had largely stopped exporting opium after 1935. However, it continued to export for medical purposes to the UK and minor amounts of raw opium to French and Portuguese Settlements in India, Nepal, Zanzibar and Pemba. All were technically legitimate under international law as they were exported at the request of the recipient state. Nevertheless the US argued that the British November 10th Statement militated against export of raw opium for use in the manufacture of smoking opium.\textsuperscript{308}

The second pressure point was the Indian States, for which the Government of India was not in a position to enter into binding obligations. The Government claimed it had maintained their cooperation through persuasion not injunction. The State Department now wished to impose concrete obligations on these 570 States, which contained over one-fifth of the

\textsuperscript{304} State Department Memorandum for British Government, September 1944, BNA-FO371/40503.  
\textsuperscript{305} Gallman to Sterndale-Bennett, 8 September 1944, BNA-FO371/40503.  
\textsuperscript{306} State Department Memorandum for British Government, September 1944, BNA-FO371/40503.  
\textsuperscript{307} Quoted in Pethick-Lawrence to Noel Baker, 25 January 1946, BNA-FO371/57108.  
\textsuperscript{308} State Department Memorandum for British Government, September 1944, BNA-FO371/40503.
population of India. It claimed they produced 185 tons of opium (or almost half of world medical requirements in 1944) sold through thousands of shops. As such, they wanted these states either ‘directly’ or ‘indirectly’ represented at future conferences.\textsuperscript{309}

Past experience suggested long odds. Nevertheless, by late 1944 the US believed their best option was to focus on negative publicity and hope that they ‘could work the same game on the India Office Policy that we did on the Colonial Office on Smoking opium’.\textsuperscript{310}

\textit{Iran:}

Anslinger’s 1943-4 diplomatic ‘attack’ in relation to Iran had failed. Iran had introduced no new legislation, reneged on a promise to establish an import/export certificate system, and cultivation and consumption patterns were unchanged. Many in the US concluded government control was too limited while Anslinger received OSS reports that government stores were flouting basic domestic controls and reselling opium stocks to U.S. Merchant Mariners and Indian troops.\textsuperscript{311} With his efforts stalled and following the passage of the Judd Resolution the Anslinger appeared content to step aside and watch the State Department lead the charge.

Yet internal pressure for reform was stirring in Iran. In June 1944 a vocal anti-opium movement emerged, led by the Iranian Anti-Opium and Alcohol Society. It began publishing statistics, often contradicting official ones, and reached out to the US Government for help. Simultaneously, the Iranian Majlis (Parliament) witnessed visceral speeches, which US officials acknowledged were ‘grossly exaggerated’ and had ‘little basis in fact’. Domestic conspiracies that ‘other foreign powers with more imperialistic designs than the United States might be interested in preventing’ the abolition of opium also emerged. Partly in response to this stirring, the Foreign Minister began to sound out US willingness to provide crop substitution assistance.\textsuperscript{312}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{309} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{310} Moorhead to Anslinger, 10 November 1944, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1 [UNO] #1 (1945).
\textsuperscript{311} Opium Prices in Iran – Quarter Ended March 31, 1944; White to Anslinger, 29 June 1944, FBNA/ACC170-71-A-3554/Box18/File0660, Iran (1941-45).
\textsuperscript{312} Opium Prices in Iran – Quarter Ended June 30, 1944, FBNA/ACC170-71-A-3554/Box18/File0660, Iran (1941-45).
\end{flushleft}
The US eventually offered an economic package to incentivise control. Iran would receive a 125-ton share of the post-war licit market - perhaps ‘guaranteed’ through a tripartite successor to the Turkish-Yugoslav agreement (see below). This would mean drastic reductions from their estimated average annual production of 750 tons. To mitigate this, the US promised extensive technical assistance; to continue US purchases of Iranian opium; to refrain from growing poppies; and to discourage opium production in the American Hemisphere.\textsuperscript{313}

These efforts, once again, came to naught. Practical cooperation actually deteriorated when the new Director of the Opium Monopoly ceased his predecessor’s ‘habit of furnishing the consulate informally with information’, leaving the US dependent on unreliable Anti-Opium and Alcohol society statistics. Further there remained no movement on the legislative front.\textsuperscript{314} The failures in Iran were made all the more visible in comparison with Afghanistan.

\textit{Success in Afghanistan?}

Early in 1944 the US engaged in a delicate balancing act of trying to prod Afghanistan towards suppression, without alienating them. The US had temporarily suspended their practice of not purchasing opium from countries without an import-export certificate system. In January 1944 the US Ambassador warned the Afghan Foreign Minister, ‘in a friendly spirit’ that unless such a system was established the US would have to cease importing Afghan opium after the war. He also offered the incentive of a slice of the licit post-war market and pointed out the comparative advantage of Afghan opium, given its relatively high morphine content. He also pointed out there would be no legitimate market for smoking opium in the Far East after the war.\textsuperscript{315} With no particular sticks available to wield the State Department left the Afghan Government to examine their options.

In November 1944 the Afghan government shocked observers by announcing the complete prohibition of \textit{all} opium cultivation after March 1945. This went far beyond US requests and was quickly touted by Representative Judd as the first successful outcome of the Judd

\textsuperscript{313} Memorandum to Government of Iran, September 1944, BNA-FO371/40503; State Department to Morris, 23 October 1944, FBNA/ACC170-71-A-3554/Box18/File0660, Iran (1941-45).
\textsuperscript{314} Opium Prices in Iran – Quarter ended September 30, 1944, FBNA/ACC170-71-A-3554/Box18/File0660, Iran (1941-45).
\textsuperscript{315} State Department to American Minister Kabul, 22 January 1944, FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box151/File0660, Afghanistan (1929-1968).
Resolution. The State Department praised the decision as driven by ‘humanitarian sentiments’ in the face of ‘financial sacrifices’ and expressed the hope that other producers would follow suit. The reasons for the far-reaching decision were not clear. The Council of Ministers claimed that despite its profitability they lacked the necessary controlling organisations to regulate the trade. As a result, the social costs (both moral and material) of continued cultivation were claimed to outweigh the benefits.\footnote{Rep. Judd Remarks, House of Representatives, 5 December 1944; Department of State press Release, 20 November 1944; Afghan MFA to US Minister Kabul, 11 November 1944, FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box151/File0660, Afghanistan (1929-1968).}

Representative Judd tried to use the decision to pressure Iran. He gave a press interview claiming Iranian lend-lease ports had become a ‘seat of opium infection threatening the United States directly’.\footnote{‘Judd Fearful of Iran as Center for Narcotics,’ \textit{The Evening Star}, Washington, 26 November 1944, FBNA/ACC170-71-A-3554/Box18/File0660, Iran (1941-45).} Iran remained unmoved and the State Department avoided applying tangible pressure. With the lack of traction over Iran the overall US strategy once again appeared to stall. Soon the Burma issue would also re-emerge and undermine the very successes the US had touted regarding the old Colonial powers.

**Part 6 – Britain Responding on Burma and the Judd Resolution:**

\textit{Towards a Response on Burma:}

In August 1944, the War Office maintained that, despite ‘American anxiety’, complete prohibition in Burma was impractical and the goal was to minimise the illicit market: ‘in one word, the Military Administration aims at control’. Lord Mountbatten reframed the problem as one of socio-economic development and suggested a twofold response: ‘gradual restriction of availability of opium with a gradual improvement in standards of living and education.’ The War Office went further and reinterpreted the Judd Resolution as referring only to the ‘spread of illicit traffic’.\footnote{Statement from SACSEA, May 6 1944, Enclosed in Letter Taylor to Marrison, 14 August 1944, BNA-FO371/40510.}

Other Far East commands had been ‘holding back’ waiting to see if Burma’s directive would resemble that expected for Malaya. It was now apparent that Burma would not be able to give a ‘clear-cut directive,’ leading the Colonial Office to change tack. Britain could issue substantially similar directives for Malaya, Borneo and Hong Kong and so decided to move...
ahead with these three independent of any Burma directive.\textsuperscript{319} The question remained, then, whether and how to coordinate a Burma directive with the US.

By this stage the decision on whether to consult the Americans was informed by three main factors. First, the State Department Aide-Memoire had reserved the right to take unilateral action to protect their troops. Second, Britain had promised to consult with the Americans over the implementation of their policy. Third, and conversely, the recent Charter of the Colonial Civil Affairs Committee now explicitly gave Britain the right to unilaterally prescribe civil affairs policies on liberated territories. This technically removed the obligation to consult. However, Lord Halifax’s fears coupled with the threat of American unilateral action drove a decision to consult the US first via an explanatory statement of policy.\textsuperscript{320}

Lord Mountbatten, meanwhile, began to second-guess his own government’s policies – possibly due to private contact from Ambassador Halifax in Washington. He feared the long-term policy had been made explicit enough to the US. Further he warned he could not ‘deplore too strongly a solicitude for the native growers of opium which I detect’ in the arguments assigning blame to Siam and China and that opium profits should be ‘the very last consideration we should allow ourselves to be influenced by’ – particularly given US perceptions. He feared Britain would be accused of protecting opium producers in Burma from foreign competition and these would become harder to dislodge. He further suggested that ‘if we do not intend to come into line with the rigid American point-of-view we should say so as soon as possible.’\textsuperscript{321}

The Burma Office sought to quell Mountbatten’s misgivings. They argued that the long-term policy of ‘ultimate suppression’ had long been clear and the UK was being ‘quite frank’ with the US over short-term accommodations. Further, they sought to quell Lord Mountbatten’s concerns surrounding the extension of cultivation:

\textit{The tribesmen of the various Kachin Hill tracts use opium in their tribal religious ceremonies and also attach considerable importance to its medicinal properties. Prior to the Japanese Invasion cultivation was prohibited in most areas and}

\textsuperscript{319} Paskin to Hone, 21 September 1944, BNA-FO371/40510.
\textsuperscript{320} Annan to Taylor, 13 October 1944, BNA-FO371/40510.
\textsuperscript{321} Mountbatten to Amery, 21 August 1944, BNA-FO371/40510.
Government provided a limited supply for these purposes. When Government officers retired from the hills the tribesmen were informed that the prohibition against cultivation was withdrawn; as Government could not meet the tribesmen’s requirements it was only reasonable to allow them to grow what they needed. This will be the situation on our return and an immediate renewal of the prohibition orders would cause unrest. Opium production in these areas is very small and the quality is so bad that no-one outside the hill tracts would use it.322

They admitted US criticism seemed ‘unavoidable.’323 Mountbatten nevertheless feared the ‘policy may be misrepresented by ill-disposed critics’ and his military administration was being used for ‘economic and sociological experiments’ with ‘little regard for either the truth or for my good name!’324 In January 1945, the Secretary of State promised that the note for the US Government would be re-examined in light of Mountbatten’s observations.325

Dealing with American “Idealism”:
In February 1945 the Burma Office completed a revised note regarding control measures. The Foreign Office agreed to frame it as a series of ‘positive’ proposals so the US would have to find reasons to object.326 Ambassador Halifax was told to transmit it along with an explanation that: ‘although it does not follow verbatim’ the State Department September 1943 memo’s suggestions it covered ‘precisely the same ground’. Privately, the Foreign Office expected the US would ‘welcome it’. When, towards the end of March 1945, the State Department had not replied, the Foreign Office became ‘disturbed’ and urged the Embassy to make enquiries.327 In the meantime the US State and Treasury departments expressed full satisfaction with the separate policy directive for Borneo, Malaya and Hong Kong.328 Also, some potentially useful information came to light. Two young officers serving with the Burma rifles reported to the Burma Office that:

322 Munster to Mountbatten, 13 September 1944, BNA-FO371/40510.
323 Ibid.
324 Mountbatten to Under Secretary of State, 12 October 1944, BNA-FO371/40510.
325 Amery to Mountbatten, 1 January 1945, BNA-FO371/40510.
326 Annan to Logan, 12 February 1945; Memo re. Opium in Burma, BNA-FO371/50654.
328 Halifax to FO, 31 March 1945, BNA-FO371/50654.
The American forces operating in Burma have caused rather an awkward situation, since the British Forces were prohibited from supplying opium to the populace as payment for goods and services, except in very exceptional circumstances, but the American Forces made payment with opium freely and in large quantities, and consequently, secured labour, etc. which the British Forces were unable to secure.

One Burma Office official wrote: ‘This fact, if true, would be a useful card to have up our sleeve if the Americans should try to take any high moral line about our proposed policy in regard to opium’.³²⁹ London adopted a wait and see approach, with the added confidence that they had the potential counter to ‘United States idealism’ in unofficial negotiations.³³⁰

Responding to the Judd Resolution Memorandum:
After acknowledging receipt of the two US Judd Resolution memoranda in September 1944, an administrative blunder at the Foreign Office saw them misplaced until December. In a quick flurry of activity the Foreign Office sought the advice of Britain’s embassy in Iran and other departments.³³¹ In August 1945 Britain finally responded. They promised ‘sympathetic consideration’ to furthering US goals and promised both HMG and the Government of India would participate in a post-war production limitation conference. However, Britain preferred to leave specific provisions to the conference when producing states would be present and a consensus could be built. It was exactly the kind of consensus-oriented approach that the US was trying to head off. As for the suggestion Burma and India prohibit production and export for other than medical and scientific purposes, London simply refused, restating old arguments. Further, regarding the US request to lobby Iran on production limitation, Britain reiterated that it was best left to the production limitation conference, but that Britain would advocate that Iran participate.³³²

The US Responds over Burma:
One week later, on August 8th 1945, the State Department responded to British opium policy in Burma. They acknowledged the difficulties but argued the short-term policy was ‘not consistent with established United States policy’ and therefore they could not agree. In

³²⁹ Annan to Logan, 11 April 1945, BNA-FO371/50654.
³³⁰ Mabbott Minute, 22 May 1945, File: Opium Policy in Burma, BNA-FO371/50654.
³³² Memorandum on the Opium Traffic, 2 August 1945, BNA-FO371/50654.
particular they took exception to shops potentially being reopened, given the presence of US troops. They also pre-empted and neutralised the British trump card regarding US troops trading opium. The Note claimed that Narcotics authorities in the US had only recently learned about the practice and that the War Office, having been notified that it was a violation of US policy, immediately instructed Theatre Commanders to prohibit further use.

The State Department memo tore into British policy. They presumed that the reopened shops would dispense opium for smoking as well as eating. This, they pointed out, was not ‘at all in consonance’ with Britain’s November 1943 Declaration and claimed that the experience in Hong Kong showed that government licensed shops had failed to undermine the inflow of illicit opium from the Chinese mainland during the 1930s. They argued that the only effective policy was prohibition together with enforcement and Britain’s policy would worsen the regional and global situation. They explicitly urged the British Government ‘to reconsider’.333

The response threw London into a tailspin. They quickly convened a meeting of the inter-departmental opium committee.334 The question of opium in Burma, it seemed was destined to drag into the post-war era and potentially represent a significant sticking point in Anglo-American drug diplomacy for the foreseeable future. While this was playing out questions regarding occupied Europe and the future of the control system within the new United Nations organisation were being decided. These will be considered in the next chapter.

Conclusion:
The final years of wartime bilateralism and the Anglo-US division over Burma highlighted the deeper Anglo-American policy divide. Britain, while paying lip service to US prohibitionist impulses, sought to reframe the issue as one of regulation and socio-economic development. Being successful in these latter points could lead to ultimate success in the former. Yet Britain remained committed to a policy of gradualism which it saw as necessary on the way to the end point of eradication. The British approach to opium control in Burma and the Far East more broadly remained one driven by regulatory impulses, not a commitment to immediate prohibition. The quiet move towards a new form of opium

333 State Department Note from the United States Government on Opium Policy in Burma, 8 August 1945, BNA-FO371/50654.
334 Mabbott to Reynolds, 31 August 1946, BNA-FO371/50654.
maintenance, in the more sanitised form of opium pills would highlight this point strongly as we shall see.

In these final years of the era of bilateralism the UK focused most closely on Asia while the US focused on the Middle East. The UK maintained no ostensible interest in the latter region despite efforts by the US and by regional actors, such as Russell Pasha, to pressure it to take a more active role. This era was drawing to a close and the world tilted towards a new international governing system. All efforts would become focused on the shape of the post-war control system rather than regional, national or local battles. Britain, as became apparent in its response to the Judd Resolution, merely had to stall on other issues of contention, such as Burma, India and production limitation, claiming that resolution on these issues were best kept for a multilateral meeting. The broader Anglo-American divide would thereby become co-opted into the post-war institutional processes and become new and deep fissures within the system – the goals of pragmatism and suppression via regulations vs. outright prohibition; and consensus-based policy making over hard nosed diplomacy. On all the former points Britain remained the core protagonist, on the latter it was the US. Issues of the Anglo-American drug relationship left unresolved during the wartime era were to become a core determinant of the shape of the post-war control system and its political cleavages.

Meanwhile, these final wartime years witnessed major domestic changes, particularly in the US. The Judd Resolution shifted drug diplomacy back to the State Department, thereby diminishing Anslinger’s international role. He had made highly effective use of the American strategic opium reserve, the hiatus of the PCOB and DSB in Washington and the general confusion of wartime to instigate his own diplomatic initiatives abroad. Now, the construction of the post-war system would become the explicit remit of the State Department, and one which they would be extremely reluctant to relinquish back to Anslinger’s hands (see Chapter 3). The State Department generally proved more measured in approach and tone and sought to balance the issue with other US interests. Nevertheless, their strategy, enshrined in the Judd Resolution, was largely that developed by Anslinger and his allies throughout the war.
Chapter 3: Creating the Post-war Multilateral System:

Introduction:

This thesis has dealt with the exceptional wartime situation for drug control. As we have seen the technical remnants of the League system had been hiding in Washington. Anslinger and his Washington based ‘inner circle’ allies used the confusion of the era to push an aggressive bilateral agenda of control. Now, the transition to the post-war era offered a tantalising opportunity to reshape the international system. However, many states (including Britain) initially aimed for conservatism and continuity with the League drug apparatus. Britain’s broader policy focused on maintaining its great power status by building the great power alliance into the post-war international order. Broader foreign policy concerns produced dangerous pitfalls. Against these broader issues, narcotics control appeared extremely low on this list of concerns and remained a functional issue. Britain was willing to engage with and support narcotics control efforts provided there was no direct threat to UK interests.

How the US would cooperate with the League to transfer the drug apparatus to a new international organisation; how far the State Department would engage in aggressive drug diplomacy; and whether the US could work with its wartime allies to construct a post-war system remained open questions. The transition period represented a time of immense opportunity but also risk. Should the ‘inner circle’ lose the political initiative an impotent or even retrograde system could emerge. Neither of these prospects was particularly worrisome to the British who favoured consensus and continuity while building an ‘honest broker’ role for themselves.

The Judd Resolution in 1944 helped the State Department re-exert control over US drug diplomacy, thereby ending Anslinger’s wartime ‘cowboy diplomacy’. Now, as the Allies edged closer to a new ‘United Nations Organisation’ (UNO) alliance politics and a widening gulf between the West and the Soviet Union saw Anslinger almost entirely pushed out of the decision-making process. Despite this he continued to utilise every means to inject himself back into the policy process. Britain also witnessed a change in domestic leadership as Major

Coles took up the reins at the Home Office drugs branch once again. He was keen to re-exert Home Office suzerainty over this issue and wrest influence back from the Foreign Office.

Washington’s relationship with Britain on this issue, lacking the animosity of the past, turned increasingly on questions of personnel and administrative matters. The broad strategic questions dividing the two nations had narrowed considerably and a new era of relative harmony seemed to prevail. Britain viewed itself as close to the vanguard of the new post-war drug control order. Pragmatism and self-interest remained the core of their policy, but they felt increasingly comfortable evangelising the merits of the control system while quietly directing it in ways congruent to their broader economic and political goals. The key question, therefore, was whether the allies could agree a framework to reconstitute the League system within the new UNO and how far they were willing to go in promoting this outcome.

**Part I: The Remnants of the League System:**

*The Policy Body:*

The Opium Advisory Committee (OAC) was the pre-war system’s ‘principal organ’ and policymaking arm, comprised of government representatives. It was a creation of the League General Assembly and was a committee of the League Council. The Council selected the countries represented, which had traditionally been open to all that had expressed an interest. It began with eight members but by 1939 twenty-four governments were represented. Germany, Italy and Japan had withdrawn cooperation and the Soviet Union had never been a member. The OAC had ceased operation during the war and how to reconstitute it remained the most highly contested question.

*The Technical Bodies:*

The Drug Supervisory Body (DSB) was a creation of the 1931 Convention. It oversaw the creation of a set of estimates for international manufactured drug requirements (including those countries that could not or would not provide their own). It would then issue, through the Secretary General of the League, estimates of world requirements for manufactured...
narcotics. In this way supply could be matched to demand and thereby, in theory, eventually eliminate excess global supplies and starve the illicit market.

The Permanent Central Opium Board (PCOB) was a creation of the 1925 Convention. It provided a general supervision of the international trade, trying to ensure that excess quantities were not building up in certain jurisdictions. It compared national estimates provided to the DSB and the eventual national statistical returns to ensure governments were remaining within their estimates. It then had the power to embargo exports to a given country if it determined to be consistently exceeding its estimates.

The Controlling Authority was a proposed organ of the system envisioned by the draft production limitation convention in 1939. It would be tasked with managing the international production of narcotics. It would be comprised of the Chair of the DSB and four independent experts chosen from producing and consuming countries. It was expected to function in the same manner as the DSB but would focus on estimates of requirements of raw opium and poppy straw (from which morphine could be extracted). It could then establish the yearly quantity of global production and assign export quantities to each producing country.

**The Secretariat:**

Within the League Secretariat, a specialised staff dealt with drug issues. Originally the Social Section had handled drugs, but they had been separated in 1931 with the establishment of an Opium Traffic Section – albeit sharing a chief with the Social Section. In 1940, a drug control service, with its own chief, Bertil Renborg, was set up. Where to situate the drug secretariat within the broader UNO secretariat became a hotly contested question during negotiations.

**Part 2: Towards a Production Limitation Convention?**

As Bertil Renborg wrote, the 1931 Convention had created:

> a planned economy on a world-wide scale. It regulates a whole industry throughout the world, from the point at which the raw materials enter the factory to the point at
which they finally reach the legitimate consumer. The only missing link was at the time the limitation of the production of the raw materials.\(^3\)

Controlling production became the defining issue of the post-war multilateral framework.

*The Pre-War Global Opium Market:*\(^3\)

Prior to the outbreak of war twelve countries produced raw opium. Of these only India, Yugoslavia, the USSR and Japan manufactured morphine and other opiate medicines. Iran, India, Turkey, Yugoslavia, the USSR, Korea, Afghanistan and Bulgaria produced raw opium for export. China and Indo-China produced for domestic consumption alone and not for licit export. According to rough PCOB estimates, between 1934-1937 a world total of 18,504 tons of raw opium had been produced. Of that roughly 65% had been produced in China, 17% in Iran, 6% in Turkey; 2% in the USSR; 1.5% in Yugoslavia and roughly 1.5% in Afghanistan, Korea, Japan, Indo-China and Bulgaria combined. Chile meanwhile accounted for an insignificant 45 kg over the four years.

Of the estimated 18,504 tons, 83% was unaccounted for. Further, only 1,350 tons (7%) was used to for legitimate medical morphine. 800 tons was exported to opium smoking territories (Thailand, British Malaya, Indo-China, Formosa, Kwantung, the Netherlands Indies, Macao and Manchukuo) and 1,100 tons was used for domestic consumption by ‘addict’ populations - neither use was considered legitimate by the US and its control advocate allies. Although lacking official statistics from China it was estimated that all 12,000 tons produced was domestically consumed.

*Poppy Straw & Opium Substitutes:*\(^3\)

The 1925 Convention came into operation around the same time that Hungary had discovered a new method for extracting morphine from the whole dried poppy plant (known as poppy straw). This eliminated the intermediate ‘opium’ stage and thereby minimised the risk of


\(^3\) PCOB Report, ‘Pre-War Production and Distribution of Narcotic Drugs and Their Raw Materials,’ *Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, XI.1* ([ILON], 1944), 7, FBNAC/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1, UN 1st Session (Jan 1946 - Dec 1946).

\(^3\) PCOB Report, ‘Pre-War Production and Distribution of Narcotic Drugs and Their Raw Materials,’ *Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, XI.1* ([ILON], 1944), 7, FBNAC/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1, UN 1st Session (Jan 1946 - Dec 1946).
leakage into the illicit market. The process was soon adopted by Australia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands and Poland. It was viewed as an economic threat by traditional producer countries, many of who called for an outright ban as a precondition for negotiating a production limitation convention. Since it was not covered by any conventions, statistics regarding scale of production, trade or stocks were unavailable.

The question of how to control this industry remained open. Further, the emergence of synthetic drugs such as Dolantine offered the tantalising prospect of a world without the need for opium poppy. This was viewed positively or negatively depending on a state’s economic and policy vantage point. Control advocates welcomed it. Producer states feared it.

**The Producer Bloc:**
Turkey, which had worked during the 1930s to corner the global licit market and cultivate its image as the tightly regulated global good citizen producer, favoured levelling the playing field through a production limitation convention. Yugoslavia, representing the broad concerns of the producer bloc, was in ‘principle’ supportive but highlighted ‘essential’ prerequisites. Poppy straw production should be forbidden; A clear distinction should be drawn between opium for smoking and opium for manufacture of drugs; alternative development provisions should be included, to assist producing countries and share the costs of regulation globally; minimum prices for producers should be assured as well as the destruction of confiscated drugs.

Yugoslavia had successfully worked in the 1938 OAC meeting to establish these as the bedrock principles of the Producer bloc, and won significant support from a number of consuming nations.\(^{340}\) It was expected that these principles would become the basis for any post war discussions on a production limitation convention.

**The Sceptics:**
Prior to the war, Canada articulated the sceptics’ position and also its interests as a key consuming nation, worried about the effect of restricting supply on the price and access to opium. ‘Sympathetic’ towards the goal it questioned whether there was a sufficient

foundation of facts and co-operation and claimed statistics were insufficient. Statistics were almost completely lacking from Afghanistan, China, Manchuria and Jehol. In other cases, like Iran, they were approximate; in others still vital information was lacking, such as the case of the prepared opium monopoly in Peru. Meanwhile, India would be obliged to make formal treaty reservations for the Indian States. The latter’s stocks, Canada pointed out, exceeded legitimate medical and scientific needs of the entire world, thereby creating a huge gap in monitoring world production.\footnote{Ibid.}

\textit{The Moderates:}
Other states downplayed these obstacles. British India claimed to control the only routes through which opium could leave India and that leakage into the illicit traffic had been minimal. France, Poland and Belgium argued these obstacles were not insurmountable and reminded the conference that the 1931 Convention limiting manufacture had been concluded with similarly insufficient data yet produced ‘excellent results’. Switzerland was similarly supportive but wanted to ensure guaranteed access to necessary supplies of opium for manufacturing purposes.\footnote{Ibid.}

\textit{Questions of Regulatory Design:}\footnote{Drawn from: Ibid.}
An essential question centred on how to design a production limitation system. The two alternatives proposed were: a quota system or a free order system. Producing-exporting countries (Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia) largely preferred a quota system. They argued it would ensure supply and price stability and guarantee market allocations to compensate for increased regulatory costs. Iran favoured a free order system, presumably to minimise regulatory constraints and recognising it would need to shrink production under a quota system.

Consuming states also advocated a free order system to maintain market competition and lower prices. A compromise was reached in 1939 for a quota system allowing for a preference in orders to provide some consumer choice. A suggested way to administer it was to establish an international selling office based on the centralised model of the Turko-Yugoslav opium combine export office of the 1930s. This had formed an effective monopoly
for the two countries and was something the US sought to recreate and expand after the war (see below). Success, however, still depended on reaching agreement between the various producer countries on allocating quotas (see Chapter 6).

Most states agreed that an internal monopoly was the best way to regulate production, although some objected. Bulgaria claimed a monopoly would place too heavy a regulatory burden on small producers and advocated merely a ‘special organisation’.

*The US Takes the Initiative:* 344

Following passage of the Judd Resolution (see Chapter 2) in 1944 the State Department began requesting producing countries to prohibit non-medical or scientific production and export and to suppress illicit activity. The responses from governments were mixed and highlighted the remaining political and economic barriers to agreement.

Afghanistan had declared in November 1944 that it would prohibit all cultivation from March 1945. Mexico and China reiterated their commitments to suppressing illicit cultivation. The USSR said that it was studying the issue. The Turkish Government promised to engage with any production limitation conference that would ensure ‘equal conditions for all producers’. The UK (and India) expressed interest in a production limitation conference but refused to commit to strict medical and scientific use immediately in all its colonies (see Chapter Two). Iran and Yugoslavia gave no response. A number of others, including Bulgaria, Indochina and Siam were unable to engage given wartime conditions.

Production limitation, however, represented just one strand of a process to create a new international drug control system, one we shall return to in later chapters. The most immediate and pressing problem was how to recreate a multilateral framework to govern and facilitate interstate cooperation as well as adopt treaties and pass resolutions in pursuit of control. It is towards this battle that we turn to next.

**Part 3: The Technical Bodies: From League to UNO:**

---

The immediate question was how much of the League apparatus would survive into the post-war system. The system had evolved organically over two decades and was almost inextricably tied to the League, but had its foundation in separate, overlapping treaties. Unlike the OAC, the PCOB and DSB had their own treaty basis and would not dissolve with the League. Nevertheless, their continued functioning depended on a facilitating international organisation.

The PCOB and DSB had maintained some continuity for the ‘system of estimates’ throughout the war from their branch office in Washington (see Chapter One). The haphazard growth produced overlapping functions and complex bureaucratic arrangements.\(^{345}\) They also represented an area of international consensus. Whatever the desire to see the PCOB and DSB rationalised or unified, states agreed that continuity was essential.\(^{346}\) Far from being bystanders in the UNO creation process the members of the PCOB and DSB assumed a new global political role and even began advocating policies for specific countries as in the case of Germany. The PCOB in particular pursued a greater political role. This was facilitated by the ‘inner circle’ which viewed greater policy activism by the PCOB as an effective tool in pushing the control agenda on reluctant countries.

**Part 4: Personnel Questions and Personal Diplomacy:**

*Early ‘Inner Circle’ Moves:*

As 1941 progressed Sharman and Anslinger began to contemplate the shape of international control in the event of a Peace Conference being called. Anslinger had, in May 1941, reached out to his German counterparts, Werner Thomas, head of the Rauschgiftzentrale of the German Kriminalpolizeiant in Berlin, to hedge his bets in case of a British loss, or a peace agreement. He wrote that he hoped ‘that your Government will return you to this work in due course, and that after the war we shall be able to see each other again and to collaborate as we did in the past’.\(^ {347}\) By November 1941 both Anslinger and Sharman were tilting towards having ‘an all-inclusive treaty’ ready to place on the table of a peace conference. They were also aiming to do it ‘outside the orbit’ of the politically tainted League Secretariat and its


\(^{346}\) Bertil Renborg: Note on the post-war organization of international drug control, September 1944, BNA-HO 45/23162.

\(^{347}\) Anslinger to Werner Thomas, 15 May 1941, FBNA/ACC/170-74-12/Box152/File0660 Germany #12 (1932-1959).
Swedish head Bertil Renborg. The two men were already contemplating the radical opportunities a new post-war order would provide to remould the system. This impulse only grew stronger over time.

Circumventing ‘The Big Swede’: The ‘inner circle’ had been highly reticent to see Bertil Renborg come to Washington during the War. Helen Moorhead described him as ‘stupid’, while even the British Foreign Office described him as a ‘clumsy ass’. He had faced no danger in Geneva and was seen as having good relations with the German government. Further, his role as head of the drug section of the League Secretariat would raise complications for the PCOB and DSB ‘branch offices’. Ignoring these political difficulties he descended on Washington and almost immediately created new problems. As Helen Howell Moorhead wrote: ‘he wanted everything to carry on in the most correct foreign office style…he could not realize that it was better not to raise certain questions…to have certain letters go unanswered’.

An angry correspondence between Renborg and the Canadian government in 1942 convinced the ‘inner circle’ to push him out of Washington, especially as it became apparent there was a divergence between his post-war vision and that of the ‘inner circle’. Renborg favoured a conservative approach of ‘strict codification of existing engagements’. The ‘inner circle’ wanted an activist agenda pushing for a new production limitation convention and a radically redesigned OAC.

Matters worsened when Renborg blocked the Chinese ‘inner circle’ ally, Dr. Victor Hoo, from appointment to the PCOB in 1942. Anslinger and Sharman assumed this was because ‘he realized that Hoo would go along with both the United States and Canada in all policies’. Renborg secured the nomination of another Chinese national, Dr. Woo. The action,

---

348 Sharman to Anslinger, 4 November 1941, FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box 152/File0660, Canada I (1929-1941).
350 Moorhead to Delevingne, 16 August 1942, FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box171/File1230-2, PCOB (1939-48); Makins Minute, File: United States Censorship of Opium Returns, 10 July 1942, BNA-FO371/31066.
351 Moorhead to Delevingne, 16 August 1942, FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box171/File1230-2, PCOB (1939-48).
352 Ibid.
orchestrated from London, led Anslinger to conclude that it had ‘all the earmarks of the Renborg-Delevingne combine’. Robbed of this opportunity to strengthen their grip on the PCOB Anslinger and the ‘inner circle’ accelerated efforts to marginalise the London-based remnants of the League system. The first step was pushing Renborg back out of Washington to London or Geneva, where he could cause fewer problems. As early as 1942 the Foreign Policy Association (FPA) took the lead in advocating his removal from Washington.353

**Part 5: Renborg’s Recipe for Continuity:** 354

As early as February 1942 Renborg moved to control the post-war planning process. He pushed for a meeting of the OAC to discuss various business including post-war control. Anslinger and his State Department ally George Morlock, successfully worked to ‘drop something on it from a great height’ and his plan died.355 Undeterred, in March 1944 Renborg drafted a plan for the post-war international organisation. Once again it received no support from the US.356 He reworked it in September 1944 and this time pursued international support. He noted that his views were ‘entirely unofficial’ but declared himself ‘in favour of the status quo’ since it ‘worked reasonably well’ and hoped to see the League system moved and adapted to the UN.357

*The Secretariat:*

Renborg favoured a distinct secretariat section because drugs represented ‘a very special problem’ with ‘no or few similarities to other questions’. Unlike most of the League’s technical activities it dealt with international treaties and therefore both law and administration. It also affected many different areas of human activity - agriculture; trade; manufacturing; commerce; and treatment. He feared that lumping drugs in with other issues like social or health questions could result in irrelevant aspects becoming ‘overemphasized’ and non-experts addressing highly technical questions.

---

353 Memorandum of Conversation between Anslinger and Sharman, 27 July 1942; Moorhead to Delevingne, 16 August 1942, FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box171/File1230-2 PCOB (1939-48).
354 Drawn from: Bertil Renborg: Note on the post-war organization of international drug control, September 1944, BNA-HO 45/23162.
355 Morlock note to Anslinger, 6 February 1942; Sharman to Anslinger, 13 February 1942; Anslinger to Sharman, 17 February 1942, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box124/File1230-A, Postwar Narcotics Problems #1.
356 Paraphrase of telegram from American Embassy to State Department, 19 April 1944, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1 [UNO] #1 (1939-45).
357 Renborg to Reynolds, 6 February 1945, BNA-HO 45/23162.
**Technical vs. Policy Bodies:**
Renborg argued that simplification was ‘an urgent necessity’, but rejected amalgamating the PCOB and DSB with the OAC. The former were ‘expert bodies with specific functions and powers of criticism and sanctions’. The latter was a policy making body. He also argued that amalgamating the PCOB and DSB would be difficult. The resulting body would ‘be the judge in its own case’, i.e. estimating requirements and then judging government compliance. He suggested a potential compromise of amalgamation with separate sections and members. Further, Secretariat functions could be merged.

Renborg also pushed to clarify the precise competence of the expert organs. He wrote: ‘they should not intervene with Governments with regard to their administrative systems or to their drug policy’. If they had concerns they should report them to the OAC’s replacement which could then make investigations and recommendations. He argued for a continuation of the past arrangement in which all countries who desired membership were allowed to join. By 1944 there were nineteen countries producing raw materials and as many as twenty-five countries manufacturing drugs. This was all in total opposition to the ‘inner circle’ conception which, as we shall see, favoured a small, handpicked OAC replacement and a more politically potent PCOB. While Renborg’s efforts represented the League old guard's continuity efforts, Helen Howell Moorhead via the Foreign Policy Association was also quietly leading ‘inner circle’ efforts to circumvent and remove the old guard as we shall see.

**Part 6: The ‘Inner Circle’ Plan:**

*Helen Howell Moorhead and the FPA:*

By 1943 the FPA was taking the lead role in crafting the ‘inner circle’ post-war settlement framework. Acting as a public face, they left Anslinger freer to operate below the radar. Their goal was to salvage the DSB and PCOB and destroy the remnants of the OAC. This, they hoped, would result in a new, leaner and more activist committee being built. Producing a clear ‘independent’ organisational blueprint ready for adoption became central to their strategy.³⁵⁸

*Anslinger and Sharman: Driving from the Back Seat:*

By 1944 it became clear that the US State Department and the Canadian Department of External Affairs would handle all international organisational questions ‘from top to bottom,’ including opium control. This meant Anslinger and Sharman had to inject themselves through backchannels while appearing to remain distant. For example, US officials in charge of post-war international organisation planning were barred from consulting outside the State Department. However, George Morlock was able to informally consult Anslinger and relay his views to his State Department colleagues.359

_Early Anglo-American Divergence:_

During a frosty April 1944 London meeting between George Morlock and British drug officials, divisions began to emerge. Sydney Harris for the Home Office made clear his preference for continuity with the League system. He argued that any new production limitation agreement should be left to the OAC after the war. The ‘inner circle’ believed he and ‘the Home Office pundits’ hoped to deflect ‘criticism or publicity’ by insisting on a return to the toothless OAC framework of consensual policy making. Morlock, refused to commit the US to cooperation with a re-established OAC. He suggested ten to twelve experts meet and discuss the situation. The US, he warned, was interested in ‘practical steps to combat the illicit traffic but…not interested in meetings dominated by obstructionists’.360

_Canada follows the ‘Inner Circle’:_

Sharman, meanwhile, was asked by Hume Wrong at the Canadian Department of External Affairs to give his opinion. He viewed his relations with Wrong as ‘extremely close and cordial’. Sharman strongly advocated the emerging American/‘Inner circle’ conception: a much smaller OAC consisting of 8-12 members, not the previous 24; and a ‘technical’ committee consisting of country experts not political appointees who at OAC had ‘nothing to contribute except defence of their own countries’ interests.’361

---

359 Sharman to Anslinger, 3 June 1944; Anslinger to Sharman, 14 June 1944, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1 [UNO] #1 (1945).
360 Sharman to Anslinger, 27 May 1944; Memorandum of Conversations, 13 April 1944, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1 [UNO] #1 (1945).
361 Sharman to Anslinger, 24 October 1944; Sharman to Anslinger, 3 June 1944, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1 [UNO] #1 (1945).
Building a ‘Technical’ Committee:362

Advocating a ‘technical’ committee comprising national drug administrators was attractive for several reasons. Firstly it framed the ‘inner circle’ conception as technocratic as opposed to political. Secondly, it would foster the development of supply focused and police enforcement oriented national control agencies and expertise. Sharman and Anslinger had hated health professionals attending OAC. They claimed they were unfamiliar with the policing issues, the illicit traffic and tended to ‘complicate matters, as so much of what they say…sounds like “expert material”, which it very definitely is not’. Thirdly, it would ensure Anslinger drove US drug diplomacy rather than the State Department. This would simultaneously strengthen his position in Washington against potential reorganizational attempts.

Anslinger’s more radical hope was that government representatives would appear before experts to argue against resolutions they did not approve of. Thereby the burden of proof would lie with political representatives, and the experts could decide whether to accept, modify or reject the case. The ‘inner circle’ aimed to keep broader health and social questions out of discussions, and argued the new drug control system should not placed under a health of social welfare section of the new international organisation. Herbert May anticipated ‘considerable opposition from some “Foreign Offices”’. Further there was a grudging recognition that some level of politicisation was inevitable. Ensuring government buy-in ‘without letting technical questions be affected by…political considerations’ was the key.

Membership:
The ‘inner circle’ aimed for an OAC of eight ‘technical experts’ with the option to expand as countries developed expertise. Sharman argued to the Canadian Department of External Affairs that the ‘most efficient and result-producing body’ had functioned for ten years prior to the war. This was an unofficial gathering of six to eight national administrators in a hotel room in Geneva (and continuing correspondence throughout the year). They would exchange intelligence and coordinate cross-border police efforts. Even when Germany had ceased cooperation with the League, the German Narcotics Chief, ‘an exceedingly efficient man’ continued to attend, although using a fictitious name and national affiliation. This

362 Sharman to Hume Wrong, 28 July 1944; Moorhead Memo, undated; May to Anslinger, 24 June 1944, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1 [UNO] #1 (1945).
cooperation continued to bear fruit even after the Anschluss when, for example, Germany imprisoned an Austrian Trafficker.\(^{363}\)

**The Secretariat:**

Similar to Renborg, the ‘inner circle’ wanted to see the drug secretariat remain independent of other UNO secretarial functions, such as Health or Social Welfare. This would prevent the medicalization or social welfarisation of the issue, with the potential that the opium secretariat could come under the leadership of health experts with no understanding of the supply and enforcement issues.\(^{364}\) These represented the core of ‘inner circle’ hopes and aspirations. Converting them into political reality was the next step.

**Part 7: Forward Momentum:**\(^{365}\)

Movement was initially stalled by uncertainty about the post-war organisation. In October 1944, proposals for the UN began to emerge and the ‘inner circle’ quickly moved to action. The State Department soon concluded that opium would be subsumed into the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Remaining non-committal, they welcomed FPA proposals and permitted George Morlock to begin building a coalition of overseas supporters by disseminating proposals through US diplomatic missions.

Both the US State Department and the Canadian Department of External Affairs were sceptical about producing an apolitical successor to the OAC. Nevertheless, Anslinger and Sharman seeing matters as ‘starting off on the right foot’ pressed ahead. Representative Judd’s vocal support and legislation helped solidify the US position while Sharman ensured the Judd Resolution received favourable attention within the Canadian Government.

**Part 8: OAC Resurrected or Reborn?**

As the OAC would officially dissolve with the League Renborg aimed to hold a final wartime meeting to draft an agenda and proposals for the new organisation thereby ensuring a fait accompli of continuity. In Washington, Helen Moorhead wrote that she ‘would very much

\(^{363}\) Anslinger to Sharman, 14 June 1944; Sharman to Hume Wrong, 28 July 1944, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1 [UNO] #1 (1945).

\(^{364}\) Sharman to Wrong, 22 June 1944, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1 [UNO] #1 (1945).

\(^{365}\) Memorandum of Conversation, 18 October 1944; Wrong to Sharman, 26 July 1944; Sharman to Anslinger, 24 October 1944, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1 [UNO] #1 (1945).
regret the calling of a meeting of the old O.A.C. That is now pretty completely dead. It would be too bad to revive it...and then shortly afterward wipe it out altogether by the new set-up.366

Renborg received the support of the London Four (HO, FO, PCOB and DSB) and was awaiting approval from the Acting Secretary General of the League. The American position was to formally abstain, given that it was not a member of the League, but to attend as an observer. Anslinger, Morlock and Sharman meanwhile once again set about circumventing Renborg’s efforts.367 As Sharman wrote:

we should let the dead past bury itself, if they can be convinced that death has actually taken place and that mortification is due to set in, and...we should not aid in any attempt at resurgence.368

They should aim instead for:

a new born child in the narcotic world which will grow up and develop into something which will be well worthwhile, unfettered by the ideas and activities of grandparents or great grandparents of a bygone age.369

Morlock Proposes a Successor:

Sensing a policy vacuum George Morlock took the initiative within the US government and began to advocate for a ‘Narcotics Advisory Committee’ (NAC) to replace the OAC. It would be composed of all parties to one or more of the Conventions. The real work would be done by a Standing Committee of the NAC composed of representatives designated by ECOSOC chosen from: the US; UK; USSR; China; France; Netherlands; India; Canada; Egypt; Turkey; Yugoslavia and Mexico. Representatives would be heads of their domestic narcotics administrations. Voting would be on a majority basis and the UN Secretary General would establish a Narcotic Drugs Section (NDS), separate to any other division of the UN Secretariat. The ‘inner circle’ met informally in Anslinger’s office to strategize and quickly

367 Renborg to Morlock, 3 October 1944; Anslinger to Sharman, 19 October 1944, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1 [UNO] #1 (1945).
368 Sharman to Anslinger, 24 October 1944, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1 [UNO] #1 (1945).
369 Ibid.
solidified around Morlock’s criteria. They also looked forward to the prospect of unifying the conventions into a single ‘all inclusive’ convention and central committee with unified executive, administrative and judicial functions, but recognised it may take years.370

**Part 9: After Dumbarton Oaks:**371

After the Dumbarton Oaks agreement it became clear that the League would voluntarily dissolve. The State Department then began to formulate a coherent strategy for the new UNO. Since the US was not a member of the League it had no official say in its dissolution. Nevertheless, for drug control, the State Department asked Helen Moorhead to draft ‘the very best plan’ she could, and they would ‘give it every consideration.’ During preliminary discussions with the State Department Moorhead urged that it be considered an independent subject under ECOSOC. She strongly argued against considering it a social issue and sought to reframe it as an economic problem. It centred on controlling a commodity from growth through to its sale and creating measures to prevent leakage into the illicit traffic. It was also, she argued, not a health issue:

> the international control apparatus...efforts are directed to keeping a commodity, the production of which is restricted, in legitimate channels. And while it has social as well as public health implications, the control, with its special enforcement and prevention machinery lose its effectiveness...if associated with a social welfare or public health agency...The opium problem is at present, and will continue to be for a foreseeable period, largely a restrictive economic and policing problem.372

Soon the Foreign Policy Association memo became the de facto, albeit unofficial, US framework for the post-war system. Meanwhile, the dissolution of League functions and the drafting of the UN charter were to be decided at the upcoming San Francisco Conference. With the State Department now firmly in control of the process all eyes turned to San Francisco.

370 Morlock Memo: Integration…Narcotics into the [UNO], undated; Moorhead to Morlock, 2 November 1944; Memorandum of Conversation: Integration of Opium Work in the [UNO], 15 November 1944, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1 [UNO] #1 (1945).
372 Ibid.
In Britain, Dumbarton Oaks saw the elaboration of their post war foreign policy strategy based on Anthony Eden’s ‘three pillars’. First among these was the creation of a ‘World Organisation embracing the bulk of the nations and eventually, perhaps, all nations’.\textsuperscript{373} This policy became clearly applied in the field of drug policy and led to divisions with the ‘inner circle’. The UK saw narcotics control as a consensus ‘technical’ issue, ostensibly above politics and therefore a useful tool towards strengthening international representation and involvement in the new ‘World Organisation’ and which could be used to trumpet its efficacy and provide a beacon to other areas of international cooperation. The details of that cooperation were, from the start, secondary to the goals of consensus and relative harmony.

**Part 10: San Francisco and Beyond:**

The San Francisco Conference proved highly unsatisfactory to the ‘inner circle’. Drug control received comparatively little attention and Anslinger was almost completely shut out by the State Department. This was unsurprising given broader tensions within the ‘big three’ alliance between Britain, the US and Russia and the genuine risk the entire endeavour could collapse in discord. Further, as Hoopes and Brinkley point out, smaller states were increasingly wary of the level of power concentrated in these three states. With these fundamental issues and deep divisions over major foreign policy concerns, such as Poland and fundamental questions around international security, the structure of the United Nations and its General Assembly, the US took a strong activist role in guiding the conference through to conclusion.\textsuperscript{374} This inevitably drove a depreciation of avoidable issues, such as drugs, lest they cause unforeseen hiccups.

The US Delegation made a ‘declaration of principles’ on drugs but took no tangible leadership. These principles advocated that:

\begin{quote}
the [UNO] will be entrusted with supervision over…international agreements…and that there shall be established an advisory body to advice directly [ECOSOC]
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{374} Hoopes and Brinkley, *Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the Creation of the U.N.*, 185.
that the existing agencies be regarded as autonomous agencies to be brought into relationships with [ECOSOC].

Soon ‘newcomers’ in the State Department began advocating a complete merging of the PCOB, DSB and OAC successor into one body composed of non-governmental experts. Anslinger was appalled, privately pointing out that he could not think of one potential ‘expert’ whose advice he would wish to follow. Further, he expected it would ‘meet with hearty British disapproval’. Sharman described this ‘complete divorce, without alimony, between narcotic control in the domestic governmental and international fields respectively’ either ‘amusing or pathetic, depending on the point of view.’ DSB President, Malcolm Delevingne agreed ‘it would be a great mistake’ and expected a cold reception from the UK, who would likely push back against excluding government representation. Elliott Felkin, Secretary of the PCOB, was similarly vocal in his opposition.

Overall the San Francisco conference was viewed as a defeat by the ‘inner circle’ and they were forced to launch another offensive to ensure drug policy was not lost in the post-war agenda. They quickly focused all their attention on London, where UN Preparatory Commission negotiations would take place. Anslinger began orchestrating a national press campaign. In October 1945 the Women’s Christian Temperance Union claimed the San Francisco Charter left ‘the world open to traffic…of the scourging drug’ opium and that opium control was ‘left out of the Charter in deference to the profit motive of ‘certain nations’’. Hearst Newspapers supported this view with a string of editorials.

Undermining Renborg:

Footnotes:

379 Felkin to Anslinger, 8 October 1945, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box17/File0660, Post War Germany (1945).
Bertil Renborg appeared the favourite to head any new drug secretariat. Anslinger and Sharman worked feverishly to prevent it and ensure Leon Steinig, ‘in whom everyone has confidence’, assumed the role.\footnote{Anslinger to Hoo, 19 September 1945, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1 [UNO] #1 (1945).} In August 1945 he wrote to the US UNO Preparatory Commission delegation decrying Renborg’s ‘absence of impartiality, inability for straightforward action, excessive ambition and lack of judgement’. This, he claimed, surely disqualified Renborg from the role given the competence requirement outlined in Article 101 of the UNO Charter.\footnote{Anslinger: Draft Memo to US Rep., August 1945; Sharman to Anslinger, 18 August 1945, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1 [UNO] #2 (1945).}

Renborg’s machination’s further provoked their ire. On November 1945 he circulated a memo suggesting that narcotics control could be viewed as a ‘means of preventing international aggression’. Sharman described the suggestion as ‘tripe’ and ‘extraordinary that mental excrescences of this kind should emanate…from the holder of a position which would normally imply the necessity for brains and judgement’.\footnote{Renborg to Morlock, 7 November 1945; Sharman to Anslinger, 1 December 1945, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1 [UNO] #2 (1945).} He and Anslinger worked to portray Renborg as incompetent and therefore unsuitable. When this did not work they painted Renborg as a Nazi sympathiser.\footnote{For discussions of Renborg’s suspected ‘pro-Nazi’ attitude see: File U3718, 12 March 1946, BNA-FO371/57108.}

Slowly increasing its engagement in the process Britain was unsure how to proceed. Canada was strongly against Renborg but did not wish to appear to block his nomination because he was not a national of the United Nations nor did they wish to be on the opposing side to the British. Major Coles of the Home Office Drugs Branch remained a staunch advocate for Renborg. He correctly surmised that the Canadian opposition stemmed from a personal quarrel between Sharman and Renborg and maintained that Renborg was the best person for the position. Regarding alleged Nazi sympathies, Coles claimed to have no knowledge other than rumours that Renborg had visited Finland during the Russo-Finnish war and become involved in ‘undesirable activities’. The British decided to try clear up the allegations. The US threw their weight strongly behind Leon Steinig but the British felt he was not ‘big enough for the job’, labelling him an ‘intellectual’ who ‘does not make a formidable impression’. Although finding no evidence of Nazi sympathies, the British recognised that
Renborg had lost the confidence of the US, Canada and a number of others. In the end they accepted Steinig.\(^{385}\)

**Part 11: The British Position – The Home Office Reasserts Control:**

Britain was re-establishing a locus of policy. The Home Office had moved its main expert, Major Coles away from the issue during the war. Thornton took over and relations with Anslinger and the US deteriorated quickly. The Foreign Office stepped some way into the breach to ensure no broader rupture occurred with their US ally. The Colonial, India and Burma Offices were forced to take a back seat due to their relative wartime weakness in Whitehall and their influence was largely channelled through sporadic meetings of the Interdepartmental Opium Committee. Lastly Malcolm Delevingne, officially a member of the DSB, provided some much needed advisory capacity. The result was a British wartime policy confused by bureaucratic rivalry; broader foreign policy concerns; wartime exigencies and pre-existing League rivalries.

When Major Coles returned to the Drugs Branch he was determined to reassert his agency’s suzerainty. Soon a clearer British strategy emerged under Coles based on two central tenets: continuity and conservatism. As Sharman had remarked in mid-1944, ‘I note with interest the British attitude, which I have long prophesied, that they want the limitation problem to continue to be handled through the [OAC]’.\(^{386}\) Further, the British sought a cosmetic change in their international reputation and consistently sought to portray themselves at the vanguard of international control efforts whenever possible.

London’s main disagreement with the ‘inner circle’ was over how much to leave to the new UNO to decide and how much to try alter the system before multilaterism took root once again. There was some agreement with the ‘inner circle’ on general points. The Home Office agreed that the OAC successor should be made up of government representatives, not merely a body of experts. This could be smaller with ‘more carefully selected members’ since some OAC members had only been there ‘for reasons of prestige’. The PCOB and DSB could not


\(^{386}\) Sharman to Anslinger, 27 May 1944, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1 [UNO] #1 (1945).
be allowed to lapse and should maintain their ‘special position’ as ‘impartial non-political organs’. London was willing to consider amalgamation of the PCOB and DSB, but only after the UNO became fully operational and after broad consultations.\(^{387}\) Overall, Britain was aiming for minimal activism before the UN met, merely a stable transfer of League functions. Once reconvened difficult questions could then be tackled.

Soon, Phillip Noel Baker, the British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, who had a long engagement with the drug issue, began to advocate more radical proposals. He suggested all questions be left to the General Assembly of the UNO. This was completely contrary to ‘inner circle’ goals to have Preparatory Commission recommendations ready for the first General Assembly. Further, he wanted all the existing machinery, including the PCOB and DSB to be ‘integrated’ into the UNO. Lastly he wanted to see the creation of two or three international factories supplying all global medical requirements of drugs. The Home Office flatly refused to establish this latter point as a tenet of British policy given expected controversy.\(^{388}\)

He quickly alienated the India, Colonial and Burma Offices by failing to consult them and the Home Office soon sought to quell his enthusiasm. They called a meeting of the Inter-departmental Opium Committee to clarify British Policy. At the meeting a consensus-oriented resolution was drafted. It called on the UN Preparatory Commission to recommend that the UN assume responsibility for this issue. Members of the PCOB and DSB would temporarily remain in their positions. The General Assembly would ask ECOSOC to appoint a committee to advise on the adaptation of the system. ECOSOC would then seek international agreement to appoint new members of the PCOB and DSB, pending revision of the conventions, and the secretariat question would be left to the Secretary General. The British Delegation was ready to introduce this resolution in the Preparatory Commission meeting but eventually deferred to the Chinese Delegation’s resolution (see below).\(^{389}\)

\(^{387}\) HO Memo: International Control of the Drug Traffic, 26 October 1945, BNA-CO 323-1885-6.
\(^{388}\) File Minute, 19 November 1945; Noel Baker to Chuter, 15 October 1945; Minutes of the Thirty-Ninth Meeting of [IOC], 21 November 1945, BNA-CO 323-1885-6.
\(^{389}\) File Minute 2, 19\'November 1945; Chuter Ede to Noel-Baker, 31 October 1945; Minutes of the Thirty-Ninth Meeting of [IOC], 21 November 1945; Draft Recommendation for Submission to Committee 7 ([LON]), 21 November 1945; Logan to Acheson, 14 December 1945, BNA-CO 323-1885-6.
Noel-Baker refused to give up and in January 1946 sought the support of the Secretary of State for India, Lord Pethick-Lawrence, in pushing more radical proposals. The Home Office responded angrily and resolved to clearly reassert suzerainty. The Interdepartmental committee was again convened and the various departments closed ranks with the Home Office. The Foreign Office was left awkwardly defending Noel-Baker’s behaviour as mere bureaucratic crossed wires. The Home Office claimed that Noel-Baker ‘underestimated’ the success of the pre-war system and that the present issue was taking up from where the League had left off, rather than rebuilding the system from scratch.390

Despite a difficult few months, by January 1946 Britain had finally outlined its conception of and strategy for the post-war system. Part of this represented the reassertion of control by the Home Office over the Foreign Office. Soon, the complexity of the UN process saw other agencies happily divest responsibility. The Colonial Office was glad to see the Home Office take the lead and admitted their interest only became ‘live’ over ‘methods of control’.391 Nevertheless, Noel-Baker was not finished and would take his efforts to the Preparatory Commission.

**Part 12: The UN Preparatory Commission:**

After the San Francisco conference the ‘inner circle’ rushed to regain some control. Helen Moorhead left for the Preparatory Commission in London to try and influence events behind the scenes in an unofficial capacity. The Preparatory Commission would be preparing the Agenda for the first Assembly of the UN. As she departed, Moorhead wrote to Anslinger that she would ‘try to think each time what you would have done’. She worked her way into important Preparatory Commission meetings, to many of which even the former Acting Secretary General of the League was not invited. Some access was gained ‘irregularly and must be kept quiet’ and she was careful to direct communications privately to Anslinger avoiding regular Treasury Department channels. As she watched events proceed she was soon lamenting to Anslinger that it reminded her of San Francisco with the ‘inner circle’ being cut out by the State Department.392

---

390 Minutes of the Fortieth Meeting of [IOC], 18 January 1946; File Minute, 19 January 1946, BNA-CO 323-1885-6.
392 Moorhead to Anslinger, 28 August 1945; Moorhead Memo, December, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1 [UNO] #2 (1945).
The State Department promised Anslinger the US delegation would support Preparatory Commission proposals for an independent commission reporting directly to ECOSOC. Soon it became apparent that no such instructions had been sent and the delegation was avoiding leadership. Morlock wrote to Anslinger on November 5th that ‘All our efforts have been in vain’. Anslinger thought it ‘discouraging’ and believed his efforts since San Francisco ‘nullified’. The Chinese delegation, expecting the US delegation to propose a new independent commission, soon stepped in to take the lead with their own resolution. The US delegation remained silent on this and Anslinger privately fumed that they appeared to have ‘laryngitis’.

Anslinger had written to the Chinese official Victor Hoo in October, saying that his ‘splendid’ views were entirely in line with the US. Now he asked Hoo to be his eyes in London. Events, he said, needed ‘very close watching’. He feared that ‘we have been thrown together with and subordinated to “social welfare”’. Anslinger continued, ‘how often must the same error be repeated within one generation?’ He also hoped to bring about a parallel attitude with the Canadian delegation.

Anslinger soon learned the US Delegation had instructions to leave the matter to the General Assembly in January, without Preparatory Commission recommendations. The reason given was that it would raise difficult questions for other matters, such as the Fiscal Commission. The State Department did not want to come out in favour of a special commission for opium with direct contact to ECOSOC (i.e. a decentralised opium commission) and thereby tie the US to this course more broadly. Morlock learned from within the State Department that the US delegation were hoping another country would take the lead and were generally sceptical of the issue’s relative importance.

In London, Adlai Stevenson, the head of the US delegation, took little interest and his staff warned Helen Moorhead to keep a ‘sense of proportion’. She lamented to Anslinger that if

---

393 Morlock to Anslinger, 5 November 1945; Anslinger to hoo, 9 November 1945; Anslinger note attached to US London Embassy to Secretary of State, 10 November 1945, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1 [UNO] #2 (1945).
394 Anslinger to Hoo, 10 October 1945, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1 [UNO] #1 (1945).
only they could get instructions sent to the delegation, the Chinese resolution would pass. She wrote, ‘Other countries are waiting [for] our lead’. Anslinger worked to prod the State Department from Washington. He arranged a General Federation of Womens’ Clubs resolution calling on the State Department ‘to take prompt action to bring about the creation of an [OAC] not related to health, welfare or other section but to report directly’ to ECOSOC. In the meantime, Anslinger demanded a ‘show down’ with the State Department. 397

Victor Hoo and the Chinese delegation pressed ahead with their Resolution proposal recommending the creation of a new OAC reporting directly to ECOSOC and sought Moorhead’s advice in drafting it. On 30 November Anslinger’s efforts bore fruit. The State Department telegrammed their London delegation to support the Chinese resolution, although the precise terms were to be left for ECOSOC determination. The State Department were also aware that Britain had a similar resolution ready to be tabled. They asked their delegation to ascertain British intentions and the content of their resolution and potentially outsource the diplomatic heavy lifting. Victor Hoo, meanwhile, secured the support of a number of delegations, including the USSR. 398

On the same day, Anslinger and the State Department met for their ‘showdown’. State blamed a clerical error for the instructions not being sent. Anslinger claimed that the US was not taking the lead and asked whether the US would push for a separate narcotics section within the UN Secretariat, independent of health or social welfare. The State Department refused to be drawn, preferring (like the British) to defer secretariat issues to the Secretary General. Anslinger lamented that the recent US record ‘did not look well’ but the State Department retorted that it was ‘a question of timing, not of substance’. 399

The Chinese resolution was introduced on December 6th and passed unanimously. It recommended that a Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) be established at the first session of ECOSOC. It was the only one of its kind, with every other suggestion by the Preparatory

397 Moorhead to Anslinger, 22 November 1945; General Federation of Womens’ Clubs Resolution, 1 December 1945; Anslinger to Moorhead, 28 November 1945, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1 [UNO] #2 (1945).
Commission labelled ‘possible’ or ‘for consideration’. Back in the US, Anslinger went to
work promoting the achievement through the Hearst press, and made sure to credit Victor
Hoo as the man who ‘formulated it and steered it to unanimous adoption’ and privately
thanked Hoo for his ‘magnificent work’.400

Membership and Staffing:
An important key question was size and membership of the new CND. China suggested
fifteen members. Anslinger suggested ten to start, plus the Presidents of the PCOB and DSB
as voting members. He suggested: the US; UK; China; France; India; Canada; Egypt; Turkey;
Mexico; and the USSR. Each had a central narcotic administration implying that the head of
each narcotic administration would be the country representative. For the US this would be
Harry Anslinger. In Canada it would be Col. Sharman. Further, it promised a reliable bloc of
‘inner circle’ (US, Canada and China) and allied states (Egypt and potentially Turkey,
Mexico and the USSR) who could outvote more conservative states like the UK, France and
India. The Netherlands and Switzerland were left off the list likely for this reason, but
ostensibly because they did not have narcotic ‘problems of sufficient importance’.401

Shifting Sands:
Moorhead concluded that the ‘inner circle’ had been pushed out of the negotiations as ‘the
result of not having a top ranking official in the State Dept. to support Anslinger’. She met
with Adlai Stevenson before departing London and warned the US ‘had won a battle, but not
the war’. She told him that the US delegation at ECOSOC should have a drugs expert and
that Anslinger was the most competent. Stevenson remained non-committal. Moorhead,
pointed to a changed British dynamic. Delevingne was unwell and had been pushed out by
Major Coles. Noel-Baker remained unpredictable. Delevingne said the Home Office would
try to control him in the Assembly, but there was a risk he would ‘go off on his own and
make a “rousing speech”’. For Moorhead this was just another reason for Anslinger to attend.
She had witnessed their ‘new born child’ coming into being. It now required a ‘guardian’
within the US Delegation, not an ‘outsider’ like herself.402

400 Steinig to Anslinger, December 1945; Moorhead memo, 8 December 1945; ‘Narcotic Control Plan
Praised’, New York City Journal, by Ray Richards, 14 December 1945; Anslinger to Hoo, 17
401 Anslinger to Hoo, 3 December 1945, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1 [UNO] #2 (1945).
Outcomes:
Overall, the ‘inner circle’ had mixed results from the first round of political battles. They had not radically reshaped international control. The State Department deprecated the issue and minimised US involvement. Through a mixture of bureaucratic ‘oversight’ and machinations Anslinger had been excluded from the official process. The wartime situation of Anslinger driving US narcotics diplomacy appeared largely at an end. Meanwhile, Delevingne was pushed back out of the British policy process and the Home Office had fully re-exerted control under Major Coles. However, part of the ‘inner circle’ agenda, of securing a solid institutional basis for the new CND, had been salvaged by the work of Victor Hoo and the Chinese Delegation. A significant question now was whether Anslinger and Sharman could inject themselves into the UN process.

Part 13: The UN First Session:
During the plenary of the General Assembly in January 1946 the UK delegate, Mr. Henderson made a statement in support for the Chinese proposal and lauded the international control system as ‘an object lesson in international cooperation’.\(^{403}\) His speech set the tone for the session. The British and Chinese delegations proceeded to take a clear lead while the State Department quietly advocated long-standing US goals. They instructed the US delegation to support a 10-15 member commission. Further (thanks to lobbying by Anslinger and Moorhead) the US delegation would push to secure Leon Steinig as head of the drugs Secretariat and ensure its independence from any health or social unit.\(^{404}\)

The US, British and Chinese delegations had largely coalesced around a general framework. They now worked to hammer out details like the number of members. The UK favoured fifteen members, plus the two presidents. China favoured fifteen maximum. Anslinger and Morlock eventually yielded on giving voting rights for the Presidents of the PCOB and DSB.

\(^{404}\) Anslinger to Hoo, 24 January 1946, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1 [UNO] #3 (1946)
in the face of determined opposition, yet maintained the CND should be composed of no more than thirteen members.405

In the end they agreed on 15 state members. The PCOB and DSB Presidents could act in a consultative capacity but would not be members, nor have voting rights. On US recommendation it was stipulated that representatives should be directors of narcotics administration or similarly qualified persons. China, the UK, USA, USSR, France, India, Netherlands, Canada, Mexico, Turkey, Egypt, Iran, Yugoslavia, Peru and Poland would be represented. The question of amalgamating the PCOB and DSB was postponed until the first session.406

Anslinger described progress as ‘almost too good to be true’. Helen Moorhead described herself as ‘very satisfied’. Thanking her old friend Arthur Henderson for his opening speech Helen Moorhead called for CND to become ‘A group of law-enforcement officers, getting together to bring more effective pressures on the illicit world’.407

**Part 14: Transfer:**

On 18 April 1946, the Assembly of the League asked Member States and League officials to facilitate the UN’s assumption of the League’s roles on the issue. By August the UN Secretary General had established an independent Division on Narcotic Drugs (DND) within the Department of Social Affairs of the Secretariat of the UN. Further, the UN Secretariat assumed provisional responsibility for administrative and financial support for the PCOB and DSB and their secretariats. Leon Steinig was named Director of DND.408 Arthur Elliott Felkin became Secretary of a new combined PCOB/DSB Secretariat. With these actions the UN had assumed political and secretarial functions of drug control system. The League era had

405 US Delegation to Secretary of State, 23 January 1946; Record of Phone Conversation, 30 January 1946; Morlock to Mulliken, 1 February 1946, FBN\A/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1 [UNO] #3 (1946).
406 US Delegation to Secretary of State, 5\textsuperscript{th}, 12 & 19 February 1946; Moorhead to May and Chamberlain, February 1946, FBN\A/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1 [UNO] #3 (1946).
408 League of Nation: Transfer to UN of League Activities, 26 August 1946, In FBN\A/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1, UN 1st Session (1946).
officially ended and the UN era had begun. The First Session of the CND was fixed for 27 November 1946.

**Conclusion:**
As Sharman wrote later, ‘the Narcotic Commission was one of the first bodies, if not the first body, created by the Assembly’. The ‘inner circle’ and the League Officials had successfully salvaged the system’s key apparatus during the war, overseen its transfer to the new UNO and ensured it was highlighted as a priority for post-war international cooperation. Far from a clear ‘inner circle’ success, however, the battles around the creation of the UNO represented a mixed outcome. The ‘inner circle’ had spent most of their time fighting a rear-guard action. What emerged was a moderate coalition centred on China, the UK and the US State Department. The ‘inner circle’ had done much of the heavy lifting on designing the institutional framework. However, none of the delegations proved willing to push the envelope and the result was a consensus-oriented system that would await the return to multilateralism before making any major forward momentum on the great questions of controls and goals.

In one sense the outcome represented a failure by the ‘inner circle’ to utilise a moment of tremendous uncertainty to remake the system. Nevertheless, this underplays the changed dynamic. The massive bilateral shifts in policy, particularly surrounding the opium monopolies, and the occupation of a number of important states, had begun a new trajectory towards control and had changed the governing arithmetic within the system. True, they had not resolved the key questions of control prior to the UN meeting as they had hoped. However, their work during the war and in preparation for the UN General Assembly helped set the trajectory of policy towards realisation of many of their goals. It would simply take time, patience, normative and interpretive shaping, precedence and perseverance. As time progressed it become clear that some issues which had deadlocked the interwar years had been left behind. However it also became clear that key policy, political and economic divisions remained.

Meanwhile, the episode highlighted the innate possibilities for closer Anglo-American relations. Part of this stemmed from the radically changed situation around the colonial

---

opium monopolies. Despite Anslinger’s role in pushing Britain towards the policy shift, with Anslinger and the hardliners marginalised from the process, the State Department sought a path of least diplomatic resistance – at times even trying to outsource efforts to the UK. The UK on the other hand was anxious to demonstrate its commitment to drug control efforts, while avoiding any major forward momentum or radical changes before the CND properly emerged. They relished the opportunity to cooperate with the moderate US delegation which would only serve to strengthen broader Anglo-US relations at this critical juncture. It was for these reasons, and the low political costs of the issues at stake for the UK, that a functionalist US-UK relationship emerged over the creation of CND and supported or at times driven by consensual Chinese and Canadian attitudes.
Chapter 4: Winning the peace: the Anglo-American Battle for Post-war Prohibition and Regulation:

Introduction:
As peace arrived, and the creation of the CND looked certain, questions of national and regional control loomed large. Whoever could win the peace in rebuilding models of control would drive international drug efforts. National precedent would drive international reform. First was the question of re-establishing regulatory frameworks in post-war Europe. Germany was the key to this given its historical centrality to the global licit drug market but also its political lynchpin status in post-war geopolitics. If national controls could be re-established in Germany, then the international regulatory framework, based on the ‘system of estimates’, would likely be preserved and potentially strengthened. The Allies had minimal ideological differences about how to implement controls and the administrative tenets were clearly mapped out under existing treaty law and German domestic legislation. The key was whether the Allies could subsume relevant national interests and grievances in order to work together to achieve this.

For Britain, reeling from a post-war economic crisis, hard economic issues, such as protecting their successful drug export industry from a resurgent European market was perhaps key. For the US the FBN and Anslinger saw the re-emergence of European narcotics controls as being underpinned by success in Germany. In Germany broader questions of national strategy crossed paths, but ultimately its formulation operated in something of a silo while its outcomes were completely dependent of European political and security outcomes. In the case of Japan the US had a potential beacon for the rest of Asia. He and his agents spent huge efforts and political capital on this issue. With the strong support of the MacArthur Administration, a culture with a minimal history of opiate consumption and a unified US control of territories, success would be far more straightforward to achieve in Japan than in Germany.

Next was the question of the frontiers of international drug policy reform. Momentum towards a production limitation convention had stalled prior to the outbreak of war. Division of this market had to begin to be settled before moves towards completing the global planned opium economy via a production limitation convention could be made. The actual shape and dynamic of that market was unclear by 1945-6. The US hoped for the creation of a tripartite
Turkish-Yugoslav-Iranian producer framework that would prevent the proliferation of small opium producers in Latin America and the Balkans. Whether it was politically possible remained to be seen. Further, whether Britain and the US could undertake an orderly carving up of the post-war market remained another open question.

Further, the question of ‘quasi-medical’ and other non-medical and scientific consumption remained. Here there was a clear Anglo-American divide. If Britain could continue a form of opiate maintenance that fit its new obligations to end opium smoking in many of its Asian colonies, it would provide an alternative to the US model of outright prohibition. On the other hand, if the US could demonstrate in Japan that the strict implementation of its prohibitionist framework was practicable and achieved its desired goals, then it would claim its approach vindicated.

This chapter highlights a general Anglo-American drug rapprochement over this period that would percolate up towards the United Nations. Further, it focuses on a number of regional actors. In Europe the key battleground was Germany. In Asia, China was soon overrun by internal strife, but a number of centres of activity emerged – the most instructive were Japan, Malaya, Burma and India. In the Middle East, Iran continued to cast an enormous shadow over control efforts. Meanwhile, on the economic stage, the road to a stable global licit market ran through Turkey and Yugoslavia. At the heart of all these narratives remained the division between Anglo-American drug diplomacy. Germany provided the archetypal example of cooperation over the expansion of regulatory policies while Asia provided the archetypal example of Anglo-American division over the expansion of prohibitionist policies.

**Part 1: Re-establishing the System of Estimates:**

*The PCOB:*\(^{410}\)

In its May 1946 memorandum the PCOB pushed for headquarters in Europe to allow ‘close contact’ and ‘technical advice’ to governments rebuilding narcotics control on the war-torn continent. Prior to the war ten countries had ceased cooperation. Germany, which remained a special case; Austria and Luxemburg, which had quickly re-established post-war cooperation; Danzig, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which were no longer independent entities; the USSR,
Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Siam, none of which had, as of 1946, resumed full cooperation. As a result there remained an extensive area in East and South East Europe, including important producing countries, not sending statistical returns. To plug this gap the PCOB would focus the thrust of its political efforts on the European continent.

In South and Central America, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Uruguay and others had continued to provide ‘excellent’ returns. None were received from Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua or Paraguay, which made estimating the size of the global cocaine market difficult but immediate progress seemed unlikely. In Asia missing returns all centred on former Japanese possessions but the PCOB were confident the US would drive towards a speedy return to reporting. Many quickly began sending statistical returns in 1946.

The PCOB Extends its Role:
As national controls were being re-established, the PCOB tried to fill a political vacuum left by the cessation of the OAC. By November 1945 Elliott Felkin worked to cajole and encourage governments to re-establish national controls. He was often assisted by Anslinger and his agents, who for example, helped ensure Italy was ‘on the way back’ by November 1945. Meanwhile, in Holland and Norway efforts were weakened as records had been destroyed but both proved ‘anxious’ to re-establish cooperation. Greece was slow while Bulgaria and Romania proved ‘very difficult’. Yugoslavia seemed ‘easier’ and likely to restart cooperation quickly.411

With the OAC successor situation in flux, the PCOB secretariat sought to fill the void by coordinating across countries and advocating a vision for national control administrations. This was particularly evident regarding Germany, as we shall see. Anslinger wrote in December 1945, ‘the Board is taking a very particular interest in the narcotic controls set up in the four zones’.412 This political interference soon backfired on the PCOB, however, as Russia refused to work with them. A somewhat chastened PCOB was soon ready to cede this authority back to the OAC successor and once again confined itself to number crunching.413

---

411 Felkin to Anslinger, 8 November 1945, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box20/File0660, Japan Postwar 1945.
412 Anslinger to Turner, 28 December 1945, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box17/File0660, Post War Germany (1945).
The Drug Supervisory Body (DSB) Continues:
The DSB maintained a strictly statistical role but struggled to build an accurate picture of the post-war market. It had to provide ‘estimates of requirements’ for states which did not provide any. In 1945, 51 countries and 80 territories provided estimates. To plug these gaps, DSB had to provide estimates for 20 countries and 26 territories. In its 1945 estimates it warned that for some countries it had not received estimates for years and were forced to establish estimates based on normal peacetime requirements. It highlighted that as National Governments were restored, they should try to ascertain actual requirements as soon as possible. Further it had to base its estimates on the territorial situation in 1939 and would need to readjust for any post-war settlement.\footnote{DSB, \textit{Estimated World Requirements of Dangerous Drugs in 1945} ([LON], 1944) in BNA-FO371/50649.}

Part 2: Europe - The Case of Germany:
Allied, and particularly US, goals for European narcotics control were twofold. First, ensure the supply of narcotics in legitimate trade. Second, keep the illicit traffic and addiction to a minimum. The division of Germany into zones rendered it the most complicated case for re-establishing a system of control. It also represented the clearest example of emerging Cold War politics impacting drug diplomacy. Further it highlighted the difficulties of expanding the influence of the PCOB into national controls. Despite an Allied rhetorical emphasis on developing a national framework, zone-based systems quickly emerged. Under these, enforcement varied and the distribution of drugs was highly unequal with shortages in some areas and surpluses in others.\footnote{CND Statement by Harry Anslinger, regarding the narcotic situation in the US Zone in Germany, December 1946, FBN\textbackslash ACC170-74-5\textbackslash Box120\textbackslash File1230-1 United Nations First Session \#1 (1946).}

Britain welcomed narcotics regulation in Germany. One possible reason was that it could be used to prevent a resurgence of the German drug industry. Certainly certain domestic interests would favour the use of international regulations to protect British industries. If these interests successfully permeated diplomacy and policy circles, then Britain’s economic self-interest could be argued to have played a strong role in its enthusiasm for using the international control system to diffuse regulatory frameworks around the globe.\footnote{The notion of British economic self-interest driving British policy is contested. This study found little documentary evidence for or against the idea that economic self-interest drove British policy. It was, however,}
Nevertheless, they retained a clearly watchful eye for threats to their national manufactured drug sector and prohibitionist interference in their colonial territories from international regulations.

Germany was an area where Anglo-American policy interests sufficiently overlapped to allow unified action. Further, by highlighting their commitment to narcotics control in Germany, Britain could deflect attention from its policies in Asia. As the US expended significant political capital on enacting cross-zonal control in Germany, and saw this capital being devoured by emerging Cold War tensions, the US was in less of a position to challenge Britain and other Western allies on their colonial policies in Asia. Given this calculation, the emergence of functional Anglo-American cooperation on narcotics control in Germany, and Europe more broadly, was logical and understandable.

_The German Basis for Control & Cooperation:_

International perception of Reich drug policy implementation in 1938 and 1939 was positive. Anslinger wrote in November 1945 that ‘German laws are more strict and have a better constitutional basis than our own’.\(^{417}\) Re-operationalizing these laws and re-establishing international cooperation would be the key challenge. With its withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933 Germany had relinquished its membership of the OAC and its member of the PCOB resigned. Nevertheless, it continued close unofficial correspondence with these control bodies and to submit statistics as per the 1925 and 1931 Conventions. In September 1939 the German government re-committed to the conventions regarding tackling illicit trafficking and collecting statistical information. However, it would begin withholding this information from the international bodies until the cessation of hostilities.\(^{418}\) A key Allied goal would be to obtain these statistics and reinstate full international cooperation and reporting.

_Situation in 1945:_

---

\(^{417}\) Renborg: Note on the Organization of Drug Control in Germany During Occupation; Anslinger to Breidenbach, 21 November 1945, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box17/File0660, Post War Germany (1945).

\(^{418}\) This information included annual reports, seizure reports, updates on laws, reports on factories as well as statistics and estimates of supply and demand. Lewy, “‘The Drug Policy of the Third Reich.””
The immediate concern for the US was to secure existing stockpiles, re-establish a control apparatus and ensure adequate medical supplies. The threat of a resurgent illicit traffic loomed large, as one US narcotics official wrote:

_The opportunities are not lacking. Milling thousands are without sufficiently gainful occupations; the highways are thronged with homeless seeking shelter and means of profit and support; the general chaos of German economic life; a surplus of currency in the hands of Allied soldiers which they cannot send home and are anxious to spend; adequate chemical knowledge to produce the drugs; thousands of acres of poppies to furnish the raw materials; all these are invitations to the narcotics trafficker._

The collapse of Germany had scattered statistical information and there was no clear authority to meet international obligations. Anslinger raised the matter with the War Department and soon Lt. General Lucius Clay, General Eisenhower’s Deputy on the Control Council, promised to uncover all available information and forward it on to Anslinger. It was soon evident that these records and personnel were located in the Soviet Zone. The US decided to use the PCOB, with whom the Soviet Union had previously maintained relations. They asked Soviet officials to provide access to these records in order to comply with the request of the PCOB for a report on Germany.\(^{420}\) Time would show the approach misjudged.

_America Alone – Advocating Centralised Control:_

US officials viewed zonal controls as ‘extremely unsatisfactory and ineffective’ and decided to bring a narcotic control officer from the US to their zone. Highlighting the perceived importance the role was initially offered to Anslinger who turned it down citing his focus on the creation of the UN. He nominated FBN Agent Samuel Breidenbach instead. Short-term fixes were soon instituted to try to bring order to the licit market, while press stories stoked fears of a burgeoning black market. Imports and exports were blocked and Military

---

\(^{419}\) Breidenbach memo: Narcotics Control in Germany, September 1945, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box17/File0660, Post War Germany (1945).

\(^{420}\) Anslinger to Director, Civil Affairs Division, War Department, 13 June 1945; Hilldring to Anslinger, 18 June 1945; Hilldring to Anslinger, 3 July 1945; Memo: Location of Personnel and Records of Reichsopiumstelle, 29 July 1945, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box17/File0660, Post War Germany (1945).
Government officials sought to oversee the trade, from manufacturing through to physician prescriptions and ascertain the situation in other zones.421

The US and PCOB, through quasi-formal cooperation, began pushing towards a unification of German narcotics control. Elliott Felkin sought an official PCOB visit. Fearing political complications, he met with Captain William Weatherwax an official from the US Forces Headquarters, European Theatre, in Paris instead. They decided to work towards a unified Western Zone policy, and eventually approach the Soviet authorities. On 3 September 1945, Felkin held another meeting in Paris, this time with Breidenbach and Weatherwax. They quickly agreed on the basic tenets of policy and met the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Gaston Bourgeois and the Director of the French Bureau of Narcotics, Mr. Razet. The minutes of the meeting were sent to the British government and eventually found their way to the Home Office.422

Anslinger was encouraged.423 He expected Soviet stonewalling since ‘they must submit everything to higher levels’ but he also expected ‘that traffickers will have poor pickings in the Russian zone’. He believed the prospect for coordination with the British and French zones was strong. By September, however, progress had ground to a halt. Weatherwax was trying to get ‘out of the mess’ and back to the US, while Breidenbach tried to ‘break’ the deadlock but claimed the Army was simply ‘passing the buck’. He feared an acceptance of a zone set up but and warned nothing ‘short of a centralized national administration’ would prevent a resurgent illicit traffic, which would eventually threaten the US.424

Anslinger, agreed but worried it ran afoul of State Department policy of avoiding centralised government in Germany. He worked to secure their support and counselled patience:

---

422 Weatherwax to Anslinger, 26 July 1945; Felkin memo on Paris Meeting, 6 September 1945, Weatherwax to Anslinger, 23 August 1945; Memo: Narcotic Control – Germany, 13 September 1945, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box17/File0660, Post War Germany (1945).
423 Anslinger note attached to Felkin memo on Paris Meeting, 6 September 1945, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box17/File0660, Post War Germany (1945).
424 Anslinger to Breidenbach, 3 October 1945; Breidenbach to Anslinger, 20 September 1945; Breidenbach memo: Narcotics Control in Germany, September 1945, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box17/File0660, Post War Germany (1945).
Even some control in the American, British, and French zones with proper uniformity and coordinated effort would be acceptable in lieu of the centralized idea. You should be prepared to accept as much. However, keep hammering away…we can retreat to still relatively safe ground.\textsuperscript{425}

The US Group of the Allied Control Council immediately cleared Breidenbach’s proposed controls in the US zone and sought to pass it through the Allied Control Council. However, on 1 October, the French Delegate objected to any central administration before French demands for the internationalisation of the Ruhr had been met. The Soviet Delegate argued that the central administration outlined in the Potsdam agreement should be set up before any others. General Clay temporarily withdrew the proposal rather than have it rejected. The French position soon hardened when De Gaulle publicly rejected any discussion of a central administration before the internationalisation of the Ruhr and Rhineland.\textsuperscript{426}

Meanwhile, the minutes of the September meeting with Elliott Felkin in Paris circulated in Whitehall. London initially advocated ‘examination’ but ‘not implementation’. They deprecated US concerns about troops and viewed the risk as being confined to Germans and therefore German responsibility. They wrote:

\textit{The Americans have always been anxious about illicit traffic in drugs and attempted, during the S.H.A.E.F. days, to establish strict Br/US controls and travelling investigators in most of the liberated countries.}\textsuperscript{427}

The US was therefore initially alone in urging a unified allied response - which initially also included a call for investigators with the capacity to cross zones. Britain offered only platitudes; France was concerned with power politics while Russia was enigmatic and impossible to pin down.

\textsuperscript{425} Anslinger to Breidenbach, 3 October 1945, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box17/File0660, Post War Germany (1945).
\textsuperscript{426} Col. Howard Hansen to Public Health Branch, USFET, 27 September 1945; Breidenbach to Anslinger, 21 October 1945; ‘De Gaulle Set Against Plans for Central Rule in Germany’, \textit{The Stars and Stripes}, 14 October 1945, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box17/File0660, Post War Germany (1945).
\textsuperscript{427} Memo: Brief for the British Representative on Item 11 of the Agenda, 1 October 1945, BNA-FO 1032/696.
**Britain: From Apathy to Activism:**

In response to the minutes of the September Paris meeting, the Home Office began forcefully advocating ‘concerting action’ and echoing US concerns.\(^{428}\) Sydney Harris, Under Secretary of State at the Home Office, warned the War Office that there was ‘a real risk that…control may break down’ and that it was ‘important that the British military authorities should keep in step not only with the French but also with the Americans who…attach the greatest importance to this particular subject’.\(^{429}\)

Without this Home Office advocacy, the issue could easily have been overlooked. Lt. Col. H. N. Fryer, from the Military Attaché’s Office, had initially described the PCOB enquiry as ‘a secondary matter’ and passed it off to colleagues to mollify Felkin and the PCOB.\(^{430}\) After Harris’ intervention UK military officials quickly concluded that ‘effective control can only be taken through central agreement’.\(^{431}\) Thus began an Anglo-American convergence on a unified narcotics control policy in Germany.

**US Unilateralism and the Shifting Western Tide:**

Breidenbach pushed ahead with US zonal efforts. The German Opium Law of 1929 was re-established with some minor changes. Police enforcement was provided and control was exercised through opium offices established in each of the Zone’s three Lander. Administration was in the hands of the German Officials, with supervision by the US narcotics official. The eventual goal was to channel all information through the headquarters in Berlin which would also eventually absorb the three offices. The manufacture and sale of heroin was abolished, as were imports of narcotics into the zone from outside Germany. Exports had to be approved by the Chief of the Public Health Branch.\(^{432}\)

The US directives did not live up to Breidenbach’s hopes, but he viewed them as ‘a basis’ for improvement. Meanwhile the PCOB made new enquiries as to the situation in Germany but the Soviet authorities requested extra time to clarify the relationship between the PCOB and the League. Breidenbach wrote in frustration, ‘the Russians hang back for one reason – the

---

\(^{428}\) Memo: Control of Narcotics in Germany, 12 October 1945, BNA-FO 1049/266.

\(^{429}\) Harris to Lambert, 25 September 1945, BNA-FO 1032/696.

\(^{430}\) Fryer to Strang, 6 November 1945, BNA-FO 1049/266.

\(^{431}\) Memo: Control of Narcotics in Germany, 20 November 1945, BNA-FO 1032/696.

\(^{432}\) Memo, re. ‘Narcotic Situation in Germany’, August 1946, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box17/File0660 Germany Postwar #2 (1946).
French for another’. Nevertheless, progress was discernable, albeit painfully slow for concerned US officials.

_The Battle of the PCOB:_

After numerous delays, in January 1946 the Allied Public Health Committee informed Felkin and the PCOB that they were studying the question. The Soviet delegate refused a formal response. They now associated the PCOB with the League and viewed it as therefore defunct. Shortly thereafter, a greatly disheartened Breidenbach returned to the US. He believed he had left a ‘legacy of possibilities’ but he was not optimistic for real results. His replacement, Arthur Giuliani, arrived in Berlin on 8 April 1946. He wrote to Anslinger that he was immediately informed by General Stayer, of the Public Health and Welfare Section, that:

> protocols of the League, or the PCOB are not to be mentioned at all, particularly in quadripartite circles…he stated that Mr. Breidenbach ignored his wishes in that regard, a matter which caused him some embarrassment vis-à-vis the Russians.

Giuliani and Anslinger believed the matter to be ‘a tempest in a teapot’. Nevertheless, until the PCOB could be explicitly brought within the UNO, the Soviet Union would veto any German cooperation. The general mood, Giuliani found, was hope that the UN could take the lead in facilitating the centralisation of control. In the meantime, he adopted a minimalist role, sticking to the letter of his mandate and working ‘to establish good will throughout the organization’.

By May 1946 the position of the PCOB began to be clarified and the Soviet delegates stopped viewing it as ‘League of Nations Business’. Anslinger further expected that CND would

---

433 Breidenbach to Anslinger, 10 December 1945, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box17/File0660, Post War Germany (1945).
434 Memo: Enquiries from the PCOB, 11 January 1946, BNA-FO 1032/696.
435 Memo: Reply to the PCOB, 24 January 1946, BNA-FO 1032/696.
436 Breidenbach to Anslinger, 2 January 1946, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box17/File0660 Germany Postwar #2 (1946).
437 Giuliani to Anslinger, 11 April 1946, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/File0660 Germany Postwar #2 (1946).
438 Ibid.
make clear recommendations that Germany carry out its obligations under the various conventions when it finally met in 1946.\(^{439}\)

**Refocusing on Zonal Efforts:**

Arthur Giuliani described the situation in the US Zone in May 1946 as ‘bad, but not so bad as any other Zones, where no attention whatever has been given to’ the issue. The black market had created ‘a mentality of law breaking similar to that which existed in the U.S. following [alcohol] prohibition’ but it could be tackled through ‘more efficient policing’. He worked to organise a system of reporting and control which the other zones could emulate and thereby pave the way for unified control.\(^{440}\)

Giuliani believed that the British had ‘considerably more’ control than the French. He spent a tremendous effort trying to ‘pierce the Iron curtain’ but many US officials believed their secrecy stemmed from ‘fear of embarrassing their own people, many of whom are involved in the black market’. Reports suggested there was no active control and no production, with shortages being filled from Russia. The situation in Berlin, meanwhile, was ‘ludicrous’.\(^{441}\) In August 1946 the US made its first shipment from the US zone to Berlin to relieve an acute shortage there.\(^{442}\)

Washington hoped the UN could advocate a centralized system. Giuliani was sceptical and felt it would merely result in ‘a modification’ of the diverse zonal systems. In July 1946 he advocated a Working Party to achieve some uniformity, even if centralization remained political ’dynamite’. The 1929 German Opium Law was the law of the land in each zone, but implementation and enforcement varied. His goal was to make some minor adjustments to the law and then draft a directive through the Working Party that would apply to all zones.

\(^{439}\) Memo: Status of [PCOB], 24 May 1946, BNA-FO 1032/696; Breidenbach to Anslinger, 10 September 1946; Anslinger to Giuliani, 23 April 1946, Giuliani to Anslinger, 11 April 1946, FBNA/ACC71-A-3554/Box17/File0660, Germany Postwar #2 (1946).

\(^{440}\) Giuliani to Anslinger, May 1946, FBNA/ACC71-A-3554/Box17/File0660, Germany Postwar #2 (1946).

\(^{441}\) Giuliani to Anslinger, 18 June 1946; Giuliani memo, 26 June 1946, FBNA/ACC71-A-3554/Box17/File0660, Germany Postwar #2 (1946).

\(^{442}\) Statement by Harry Anslinger, US Rep to CND, regarding the narcotic situation in the US Zone in Germany, December 1946, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1 [UN] 1 Session #1 (1946).
Further, since he was the only person trying to begin compiling statistics, he could try to use the working party to ensure some uniformity of statistical collection across all zones.\textsuperscript{443}

\textit{The British Zone:}

In June 1946 the British Zone’s Military Government issued instruction 95, ‘Regulations governing the control of narcotic drugs’. This recognised the German Opium Law of 1929 and later amending decrees. It differed in some ways from the US Zone: there was no restriction placed on the manufacture of Heroin (Diacetylmorphine) and no restrictions on imports. British officials believed they had made ‘a good beginning’. Violations seemed minimal; narcotic supplies were controlled with the Army retaining those captured and little evidence of illicit imports. Effective policing was credited with lower lawlessness than the other zones. Giuliani even concluded British Zone law enforcement was superior to the US Zone. Giuliani’s overarching fear nevertheless remained accepting divergence between zonal regulations preventing eventual unification of control.\textsuperscript{444}

\textit{Towards a Western Unified Approach:}

Giuliani entered August 1946 with renewed British and French support and found the prospects for a Working Party ‘more encouraging now than ever’. The Soviet delegate, while agreeing in principle, soon proved obstructive. Giuliani described how the British delegate ‘argued at least as vehemently as we did…showing extreme annoyance at the illogical way in which we were being stymied’ on easily manageable technicalities with the Soviet delegate claiming ‘that the Americans were using “secrecy” in their “personal project”’.\textsuperscript{445}

The matter was postponed until September when the Soviet Delegate unexpectedly withdrew his objections and the measure passed. Giuliani found the shift ‘inexplicable’. One hypothesis derived from his discussions with a member of the Allied Control Committee:

\textsuperscript{443} Giuliani to Anslinger, 18 June; 9 July; 13 July 1946, FBNA/ACC71-A-3554/Box17/File0660, Germany Postwar #2 (1946).

\textsuperscript{444} Giuliani Memo re. ‘Narcotic Control in British Zone of Occupation’, 27 June 1946, FBNA/ACC71-A-3554/Box17/File0660, Germany Postwar #2 (1946).

\textsuperscript{445} Giuliani to Williams, 12 August 1946; Giuliani to Anslinger, 28 August 1946, FBNA/ACC71-A-3554/Box17/File0660, Germany Postwar #2 (1946).
This business of fighting up to the last minute is typical, and is followed by capitulation as complete as this...It may be that the delegates cannot make decisions, but must get them from upstairs.\textsuperscript{446}

Regardless, Giuliani wrote to Anslinger, ‘we did the most we could do and…[w]e are now on the table’.\textsuperscript{447} Publicly, Anslinger maintained pressure, stating at the CND that ‘the division of the country into zones and Berlin into sectors, all contribute to making impossible the fulfilment of the international drug conventions’.\textsuperscript{448}

Offering solace to the PCOB, Giuliani wrote to Anslinger:

\textit{Mr. Felkin should not feel too bad about rebuffs he may have received, for his efforts…have been the starting point of this whole business. This, of course, excepting your own efforts, which people seem to take for granted.}\textsuperscript{449}

Giuliani promised to make US Zone returns to the PCOB and to try to get German officials back in the ‘habit’.\textsuperscript{450} In the meantime the DSB would produce estimates for Germany.\textsuperscript{451}

\textit{The Working Party on Narcotics Control:}\n
The first meeting of the Working Party took place in Berlin in September 1946. Giuliani was asked to draft proposals for amending the 1929 law and the group met again in November to discuss Giuliani’s draft law. The British and French delegates approved the proposals with minor suggested changes. The Soviet delegate immediately took issue with technicalities and Giuliani concluded they had ‘every intention of blocking the general proposal’. He held individual meetings with his French and British counterparts. He found expertise and interest

\textsuperscript{446} Giuliani to Anslinger, 11 September 1946, FBNA/ACC71-A-3554/Box17/File0660, Germany Postwar #2 (1946).
\textsuperscript{447} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{448} CND Statement by Harry Anslinger, December 1946, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1 [UN] First Session #1 (1946).
\textsuperscript{449} Giuliani to Anslinger, 11 September 1946, FBNA/ACC71-A-3554/Box17/File0660, Germany Postwar #2 (1946).
\textsuperscript{450} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{451} Felkin to US Secretary of State, 28 September 1946, FBNA/ACC71-A-3554/Box17/File0660, Germany Postwar #2 (1946).
extremely lacking in the French Zone, and that they ‘show interest only when the productive capacity of the area is threatened’. 452

In contrast he found himself ‘in complete accord’ with his British counterpart with only two exceptions: forbidding the manufacture of heroin, which the British Zone would not pursue (see Chapter Six); and that no application be denied on the basis of need. Giuliani recognised that heroin was unlikely to be banned, given that its manufacture and sale was permitted everywhere else in Europe. The latter point, however, highlighted a deeper Anglo-US ideological division with Giuliani pushing for a decentralised provision mechanism based on the approval of order forms and import certificates, and the establishment of a quota system, if necessary. The British delegate pushed for a command economy based on a centralised system of control. Giuliani ‘pointed out that this was quasi-socialization of medicine, a system which is generally regarded with disfavour at the moment in the States’. The two failed to reach agreement and decided to leave the matter to the Working Group. 453

Towards a Tripartite Framework?
By December Giuliani concluded that accord was impossible and ‘from the very first, the Russians sabotaged my whole proposal’. The French delegate suggested moving ahead with a tripartite agreement. Giuliani wanted to continue ‘until all hope of reaching agreement is gone’ and hoping that the UN would manage to ‘force the issue in the meantime’. 454 In December 1946 Anslinger and the US Delegation introduced a resolution that was unanimously adopted urging the Allied Government to ‘establish…effective narcotic control for all Germany’. 455

Giuliani called it ‘gratifying’ but shortly thereafter, the Soviets attacked the Working Party for failing to achieve anything. Finally, at their fifth meeting in January 1946 the Soviet delegate stated that no revision of the 1929 Opium Law was required. It was deemed impossible for the Working Party to continue. 456 Efforts to effect a unified control in Germany appeared dead, a victim of emerging Cold War politics. At no time did deeper

452 Giuliani to Anslinger, 13 October 1946; Giuliani to Anslinger, 7 November 1946, FBNA/ACC71-A-3554/Box17/File0660, Germany Postwar #2 (1946).
453 Ibid.
454 Ibid.
455 UN Resolution, December 1946, FBNA/ACC71-A-3554/Box17/File0660, Germany Postwar #2 (1946).
British, French or US national interests appear to drive their early cross-zonal drug control efforts. Instead it was a determined US technocratic pursuit of control coupled with their success at rallying Anglo-French support – made easier by the latters’ self-interest in having effective narcotics controls in Germany. It would militate against a resurgent illicit traffic on the continent and prevent an unregulated narcotics industry challenging theirs. Further, Britain had evolved a policy of building up the economic strength of their zone as a bulwark against communism.\footnote{Greenwood, Britain and the Cold War, 1945-1991, 22.} The Soviets on the other hand remained cool to drug control concerns and sought to torpedo a potential precedent for inter-zonal cooperation.

The US, Britain and France would continue to work together on narcotics control, while the Soviets would pursue their own course. Meanwhile, Giuliani wrote in January 1947 that the ‘PCOB is a long way from getting the statistics!’\footnote{Giuliani to Anslinger, 15 January 1947, FBNA/ACC71-A-3554/Box17/File0660, Germany Postwar #2 (1946).} Giuliani refocused his efforts on building narcotics squads in the US zone and ensuring that narcotics stayed on the agenda of the Allied Health Committee even if no forward progress could be made.

The US had expended large amounts of political capital trying to establish a centralised system of narcotics control in Germany. The British, in consonance with broader economic and foreign policy goals, as well as recognising it would place them alongside the US on this issue and distract from British control efforts in Asia, readily offered support. France, recognising the likely futility of the effort and the negligible political cost, similarly offered support. Nevertheless, absent an initial British push of support, US efforts would never have gotten off the ground. Further the issue fitted within a broader trend of moving towards a Western zonal framework of cooperation. When the Soviets reneged on all drug cooperation a sufficient level of agreement had been reached by the Western Allies to allow a tripartite framework of control to emerge. The PCOB, despite being burned for its political overreach, had also played a key role in facilitating this Western coalescence on German narcotics policy. The PCOB and DSB would remain wary of running afoul of emerging Cold War politics going forward and consciously avoided any potential regulatory overreach.

Part 3: The Divided Anglo-American Asian Paradigm:
The divergence between US and British policies came into relief in Asia. Whereas Britain and the US were able to work together around re-establishing narcotics control in Germany, an essentially conservative and technocratic endeavour, they diverged once again when it came to the frontiers of narcotics control: the implementation of complete prohibitions in Asia. Britain maintained an essentially pragmatic attitude to its colonies underpinned by a willingness to compromise with local needs. The US saw Japan as the perfect opportunity to implement its strict prohibitionist model. Further, the US prosecuted Japan’s violations of the narcotics conventions as war crimes and thereby as a precedent to dissuade other countries from flouting international narcotics laws. US control advocates also found an important ally in Japan with General MacArthur.

**The US in Asia: Japan:**

Unlike Germany, the US had unified control of Japan and its territories. The American commanders had little notion of what to expect when they took control. The received wisdom was that Japanese forces pushed opium onto their Chinese enemies to sap their will to fight but Japan was a country with a minimal history of domestic opiate use, and this had changed little during the war. It was a signatory of the main international drug treaties, the 1912, 1925 and 1931 Conventions. It had passed a series of domestic regulations beginning with the 1898 Opium Law. All raw opium and coca leaves produced were subject to licence mandating they be sold to the Government. Only government opium could then go to market. Permits and authorisations for use and possession were granted to physicians, dentists, veterinarians, pharmacists and drug manufacturers, while all wholesaling operations were kept under strict government and police supervision.\(^{459}\) Imports and exports were subject to a system of certification.

Drugs could be purchased with a medical prescription and drug addiction was a matter to be reported to the police by physicians. By the end of 1938 there were 3,600 registered ‘addicts’, the majority of who were supposedly Korean. Treatment and ‘cure’ was provided by charity organisations, which claimed high success rates. For example, in 1938 310 out of the 316 ‘addicts’ in treatment were reported as being ‘fully cured’. Opium smoking was strictly forbidden, with severe penalties. There also existed an Advisory Opium Commission, created

---

by an Imperial Ordinance in 1931, tasked with examining control in all Japanese territories. The Tokyo Metropolitan Police Bureau was responsible for the illicit traffic and maintaining contact with control authorities in other countries. By 1939 27 tons of raw opium was produced in Japan proper while 26 tons was produced in Korea.460

In August 1945 Harry Anslinger announced that hundreds of civil affairs officers would follow US troops into liberated territories in East Asia, expressly trained to suppress the illicit traffic in narcotics. He told reporters how the ‘officers and their aides will start back on the road to health the peoples who fell victim to drug addiction through Japanese connivance to rule them by weakening their wills with narcotics’. Portraying the British, Dutch, French and Chinese policies as being in lock-step he claimed ‘it should take only three to four months to get most of those addicts back to normal once the process starts…but it will be a matter of putting them on cold turkey to get them back.’461

Re-establishing Control:
China wanted the US to ensure the total de-narcotisation of Japanese policy by complete prohibitions on production and manufacture being written into any peace treaty. George Morlock for the US State Department was non-committal and suggested that the Chinese CND representative Dr. Sze, take up the matter at the proposed production limitation conference.462 General MacArthur pressed ahead with control efforts. It is possible that he was influenced by his personal lineage with the Philippines and had internalised the US prohibitionist policy implemented there around the turn of the century.463 He moved quickly to establish a five-point program of control, with reports to be made to him within thirty days. Within fifteen days an itemised statement of all stocks of narcotics, including location and owner had been compiled.464

460 Ibid.
462 Memorandum of Conversation between Morlock and Dr. Sze, 29 August 1946, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1,[UNO] #4.
463 I am indebted to Peter Reuter for suggesting this as a possible reason in private discussions.
By October 1945 efforts were underway within the US to use the violation of international narcotic conventions to indict members of the Japanese government for war crimes. Anslinger took a leading role on this. An FBN Agent was appointed to uncover information to be furnished to the War Crimes Office. This was viewed as an important precedent by the ‘inner circle’. Sharman wrote in 1946:

> It is, I think, good policy to establish in practice the principle that a deliberate Government policy involving the use of narcotics in direct defiance of international conventions previously subscribed to is an international offence.

In October 1945 General MacArthur issued a directive to the Imperial Government. All new cultivation was prohibited and existing crops were to be destroyed. All stocks were frozen and all trade, without approval of the Supreme Commander, was prohibited. All imports, absent his approval, were prohibited, and exports were completely prohibited. It received a wave of positive press in the US, with some claiming it would knock out ninety per cent of the world’s illicit supply. Others contrasted US policy and British imperial policy. The latter, they claimed had used the trade to finance its empire while the US took every opportunity to extinguish it. In General MacArthur’s statement the policy was justified in light of ‘well-documented evidence of Japanese use of opiates in attaining their quest for an empire and as a means of subjugating conquered peoples’.

Days later General MacArthur issued similar instructions to forces in Korea. Within two weeks reports were publicised of an illicit cache valued at fifty million US Dollars seized by US forces. Anslinger also worked with Elliott Felkin to ensure that the government of Japan properly filled out PCOB forms. General MacArthur appeared to take a strong personal

465 Memo of Conversation: ‘War Crimes Office desire to obtain evidence…’, 11 October 1945; Speer to Anslinger, 29 November 1945; Anslinger to Bransky, 28 December 1945; Mulliken to Col. Hornaday, 26 December 1945, FBN/ACC170-74-5/Box20/File0660, Japan Postwar 1945.


468 General MacArthur Memorandum to Commanding General, XXIB Corps, 14 October 1945; ‘$50,000,000 in Opium Seized by MacArthur in Narcotics Drive’, Associated Press, 30 October 1945; Anslinger to Oyler, 26 November 1945, FBN/ACC170-74-5/Box20/File0660, Japan Postwar 1945.
interest. A former FBN Agent Lt. W. L. Speer, related a story about a meeting between himself, an FBN agent Mr. Oyler and General MacArthur, to Anslinger:

Mr. Oyler had walked out to the elevators ahead of me, and when I came out he was talking to General MacArthur. All I heard of that part of the conversation was the “Bureau of Narcotics”, after Ralph introduced me to the General as “the narcotic control officer, a former agent in the Bureau of Narcotics”, the General asked, “How am I doing with narcotics”, Ralph replied, “pretty good, General”. The conversation lasted about three minutes much to the astonishment of everyone as I have never seen the General stop to talk to anyone before.469

Speer reported ‘good cooperation’ from Japanese officials who were ‘eager for suggestions’. He argued that the main problems stemmed from insecure stocks and poor record keeping.470 By December 1945 US officials were assisting the Imperial Government in drafting a new directive. It was largely modelled after US domestic legislation, the 1914 Harrison Act, at the suggestion of Mr. Oyler, although he was careful that the FBN not be seen to be playing a role. Anslinger wrote that ‘the results speak for themselves’ and that he was ‘greatly pleased with the intelligent approach’ taken by Speer and Oyler.471

Efforts continued apace and by late 1946 Japan was held up as an international exemplar in post-war control. The October 1946 PCOB report both condemned Japanese actions during the war and praised the US military occupiers for their efforts. Anslinger suggested bringing the report to the attention of General MacArthur, whom he was ‘sure’ would ‘be as pleased as we are about this’.472 International control advocates believed they had effected a de-narcotisation of Japan’s foreign policy.

How much the reinstitution of controls in Japan would impact on the global illicit market remained to be seen. As with the Philippines four decades previously, the US brought an

469 Speer to Anslinger, 20 November 1945, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box20/File0660, Japan Postwar 1945.
470 Ibid.
471 Memorandum: ‘Statements of Drug and Pharmacy Section Official…’, 26 November 1945; Oyler to Anslinger, 21 December 1945; Anslinger to Speer, 30 November 1945, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box20/File0660, Japan Postwar 1945.
ideologically pre-fabricated policy to an area it occupied and was determined to implement it. Like the Philippines, the US press was quick to highlight all indications of success and attribute them global significance. Success implementing the US vision was conflated with success in outcomes. Japan, like the Philippines before it, became a poster-child for US anti-opium efforts and a counter to the supposed half-measures of the old colonial powers, particularly Britain.

**Part 4: Britain in Asia - Malaya, Hong Kong & Borneo:**

Malaya, Hong Kong and Borneo highlighted the difficulties faced by Britain as it sought to implement bans on opium smoking. The ban had been agreed to in 1943 when the political considerations favoured avoiding a clash with the US and ignoring any expected policy costs until after the war. In 1945 these administrative costs had to be paid. The British colonial dilemma continued to be driven by competing needs. On the one side were the local realities of existing ‘addicted’ populations, for whom there was no ‘cure’, and even if there was, no medical infrastructure to implement it. On the other was the political necessity of deferring to the US concerns, even if they were viewed as irrational and unworkable.

The Colonial Office hosted a meeting in April 1945 to discuss Malaya given its relatively high level of ‘addiction’. Administrative difficulties quickly came into relief. There was little success in obtaining staff for the Civil Affairs Administration, with only three doctors filling eighty places. This, the Colonial Office decided, necessitated maintenance of consumers on a prepared form of opium until a longer-term solution could be found. It was agreed to issue a form of ‘prepared opium on medical certificates’ but this raised a question of supply. One option was to re-establish their factory in Singapore ‘in a modified form’, but they feared accusations of reintroducing the opium monopoly in a disguised form.  

It was decided that ‘opium tablets’ would be supplied to ‘satisfy the genuine needs of confirmed addicts’, and avoid the necessity for re-establishing the factory in Singapore. Certificates would be issued by Medical Officers or authorised practitioners. To pre-empt US criticisms it would be made explicit that ‘addicts’ would ‘as soon as practicable’ be provided treatment in government institutions. Further, to demonstrate resolve, enforcement of the ban

---

473 Minutes of Meeting held at Colonial Office, 6 April 1945, BNA-CO 852/666/3.
on opium smoking was to be made the responsibility of the Police, with ex-Malayan Customs Officers drafted in to assist.474

Because the question ‘was solely one of medical treatment’ the Colonial Office decided that tablets would not be denied even if consumers were not already registered to receive smoking opium. As a ‘political gesture’ to the US to prevent the perception they were switching one form of sustaining opiate addiction for another, vague instructions on ‘the desirability’ of diminishing provision would be issued. Medical officers bucked at the idea of being ‘restricted’ in treating their patients and overall it was agreed that the officers ‘could be relied upon to exercise discretion’.475

Malcolm Delevingne argued that no revenue should be seen to derive from sale given past US ‘suspicions’. The Colonial Office rejected this on the basis that medicine was normally charged for in government hospitals and issuing free opium could encourage increased consumption. The US State Department had requested that all seized stocks be destroyed but this was also rejected due to supply shortages and transport difficulties.476

The Colonial Office also paid lip service to treatment options, such as examining the methods used by Chinese doctors, and social antidotes to drug consumption such as the provision of ‘recreational facilities as a counter attraction to opium smoking’.477 Forty five million tablets would be provided for the post-military phase, at a cost of £45,000 to be met by ‘Malayan funds’478 Some provision was also made for supplying tablets to Borneo and Hong Kong, however, neither was viewed as being as ‘greatly troubled with the opium problem’ as Malaya.479

Overall, British policy aimed for as much continuity as possible, while trying to defer to US wishes. Opium smoking was to be abolished, although the success of implementation remained to be seen. The US perception was that the problem was one of political will. Governments needed to resolve to eradicate non-medical opium supplies and force ‘addicted’ populations into treatment. The British viewed this approach as impractical for many regions

474 Ibid.
475 Ibid.
476 Ibid.
477 Ibid.
478 Walsh to James, 18 June 1945, BNA-CO 852/666/3.
479 Walkingshaw to Campbell, 31 May 1945, BNA-CO 852/666/3.
in Asia. Medical infrastructure, assuming effective treatment even existed, was largely absent in many colonies. The medicalization of maintenance was a middle ground between outright prohibition and the continuation of quasi-medical usage. The former was seen as practically unworkable while the latter was seen as politically unsustainable. Burma and India, however, which had never committed to the immediate eradication of non-medical and non-scientific consumption remained a different story and highlighted that the response in Malaya, Hong Kong and Borneo was driven largely out of a desire to satisfy American wishes.

**Burma:**
In February 1946 the State Department, under renewed pressure from Congressman Judd, pushed for a response to their note on opium policy in Burma. Judd intended to publish the note and the British reply as soon as it was received. By June the Foreign Office continued to ‘stall’ as the Burma Office had not responded. Initially the Foreign Office believed that the postponement of the first meeting of CND in mid-1946 made the issue less urgent. However, they soon concluded otherwise ‘since Congressman Judd is setting the pace’. The Foreign Office believed that ‘the State Dept. clearly do not wish us to have our tails twisted over this opium question but it may be difficult to avoid unless we state our position over it clearly soon’.

By August 1946 the Foreign Office was still awaiting a reply. The political costs of inaction on Burma had decreased drastically and this was reflected in the slow British response. With the first CND approaching, the soft State Department attitude suggested the issue had fallen right down the international and US agenda. Anslinger also figured little in discussions. In September the Burma Office provided a reply. Although ‘not perhaps quite as full as we may have wished’ it was agreeable to the relevant Foreign Office officials and Major Coles as UK Representative to the CND.

Stalling by the Burma Office had allowed the situation on the ground to change. US forces had withdrawn, thereby neutralising their immediate cause for concern. Further there were no reported cases of US troops acquiring the opium habit in Burma. This confirmed British

---

480 Goodwin to Walsh Atkins, 13 June 1946, FO371/59608.
483 Goodwin to Walsh Atkins, 15 August 1946, FO371/59608.
484 Goodwin Minute, UN 2446, 18 October 1946, BNA-FO371/59609.
assertions about the past experience with their troops. The practice of opium smoking, meanwhile, was to be made illegal. In direct response to US concerns, they would abolish the system of licenced shops supplying registered ‘addicts’ with opium for eating.\textsuperscript{485} Opium eating for ‘religious and ceremonial purposes and for “quasimedical” and scientific uses’ was exempted and an, as yet undetermined, form of opium maintenance was to be provided.\textsuperscript{486}

The US Government was cautioned that the ban would take time to become effective.\textsuperscript{487} The State Department proved willing to declare victory and move on and the Secretary of State politely noted ‘with satisfaction the decision’ to prohibit smoking and abolish the system of licensed shops’. Other details were glossed over.\textsuperscript{488}

\textit{The Trans-Salween Shan and the Wa States:}\n
Prior to the war the questions of limitation of production of opium within the nominally sovereign Shan States in the border regions of Burma and the Wa States, located to the northeast of the Shan States, were largely avoided in formal international discussions. Further the Governor omitted discussion of these areas from the formal reply to the US. Most of the trans-Salween Shan and the Wa States only came under some form of administration following agreement with China as to the frontier in 1941. These areas produced surplus quantities of low-grade opium which tended to enter the illicit market either via ‘Ministerial’ Burma, China or Siam. Just prior to the war the Government of Burma began to admit to its position as a producing country. This fact was now solidified by the inclusion of the Shan and Wa States even though administration in those areas was extremely light. With the CND first meeting looming and discussions turning to a production limitation agreement the Burma Office expected the issue to draw attention.\textsuperscript{489}

It was decided that the Government should highlight their commitment to a long-term strategy, that first aimed at controlling production in the area, then limiting production and

\textsuperscript{485} Draft Reply to State Department’s Note of 8 August 1945, October 1946, BNA-FO371/59609.  
\textsuperscript{486} Morley to Government of Burma, 8 November 1946, BNA-FO371/59611.  
\textsuperscript{487} Draft Reply to State Department’s Note of 8 August 1945, October 1946, BNA-FO371/59609.  
\textsuperscript{488} Department of State to British Embassy, 27 December 1946, BNA-FO371/67641.  
\textsuperscript{489} Morley to Coles, 17 October 1946, BNA-FO371/59611.
consumption in the Shan States and eventually a total prohibition on production. London believed, with this long-term strategy in place, it would be defensible for the Government to purchase surplus opium stocks in these areas and use them partly to meet local demand for opium eating.\footnote{Ibid.}\footnote{Goodwin to Morley, 8 November 1946, BNA-FO371/59611.}\footnote{Coles to Morley, 4 November 1946, BNA-FO371/59611.} Prior to the first meeting of CND extensive details remained ‘to be filled in’ but the Foreign Office warned that a production limitation convention may necessitate ‘the ultimate elimination of opium production in the trans-Salween areas as soon as may be practicable’.\footnote{Lord Pethick Lawrence to Noel Baker, 25 January 1946, BNA-FO371/57108.} Major Coles seemed less concerned and defended the Burma Office proposals as ‘a very satisfactory scheme for dealing with a very troublesome subject’. Thus began a strong UK protectionist policy around Burma, as we shall see later. Further, Major Coles suggested there may actually be an international market for surplus Burmese opium and suggested determinations be made over whether it really was ‘low grade’ or whether it could be ‘workable commercially’.\footnote{Quoted in Lord Pethick Lawrence to Noel Baker, 25 January 1946, FO371/57108.}

\textbf{India:}

India remained steadfast in response to the Judd Resolution inquiries in protecting ‘quasi-medical’ opium eating ‘until medical facilities in India are very much more extensive than they are at present’.\footnote{Lord Pethick Lawrence to Noel Baker, 25 January 1946, BNA-FO371/57108.} They supported the proposed production limitation convention in principle but refused to ‘undertake any fresh obligations’.\footnote{Quoted in Lord Pethick Lawrence to Noel Baker, 25 January 1946, FO371/57108.} Although sporadic bursts of interest in pressuring India arose within US control circles, few thought serious diplomatic leverage was an option or that Indian intransigence could be overcome. Movement towards a production limitation convention appeared the best hope to bring new pressure to bear on India.

\textit{Towards a Post-War Asian Opium Stalemate:}

Overall the situation in Asia remained divided along Anglo-American lines. On the one side was Britain, representing the old colonial attitude. They had made tremendous efforts during the war to accommodate US concerns and enacted significant reforms. The US, meanwhile, continued to express a singular approach. Nothing short of outright prohibition, rigorously enforced, would resolve the colonial opium issue. As peace descended, positions began to re-
settle on pre-war lines. The US, consciously replaying its experience in the Philippines (albeit with a drastically smaller opium using population and no monopoly) successfully inculcated its vision of control in Japan.

Britain, grappling with the administrative issues it had ignored when it issued its November 1943 statement, sought ways around complete implementation of prohibitions. Opium consumption was easier to prohibit in law than in reality. They were forced into changing the style of opium maintenance, but not the underlying continuance. Without a ‘cure’ or medical infrastructure, opium consumption would have to be provided for, lest an expansive black market take root in certain colonies. In Burma and India little had changed and greater issues of colonial control would soon push the opium issue right down the agenda. With the window for bilateral US pressure now closed, the UN would become the key forum for keeping this issue alive as states moved towards a production limitation convention.

**Part 5: Iran – The Key Recalcitrant:**

The question of member state representation on CND began to loom large in 1945-6. In 1945 the Iranian Desk at the State Department inquired whether Iran could be represented on the Commission, arguing it would be preferable to have them ‘in’ than ‘out’ and that it could be used as a diplomatic ‘lever’ to pressure them to increase controls. Anslinger responded angrily. Repeatedly frustrated by Iranian promises, he lacked any faith in their ability to change and pointed out that during the League OAC meetings it had been represented by the ‘head sales manager for the Iranian Opium Monopoly, and who not only tried to sell opium to the representatives of the other countries but opposed everything of a constructive nature’. Anslinger wanted only one representative from opium producing countries on the Commission: Turkey.495

The State Department had yet to receive a reply to their official note of September 20th 1944. A bill introduced into the Majlis in September 1945, for the ratification of the 1925 Geneva Convention, was still pending. No bill had yet been introduced ratifying the 1912 Hague

---

Convention without the much-maligned reservation to Article 3(A). In a final Judd Resolution push, the US Tehran Embassy was asked to try to ‘persuade’ the Government to limit production, suppress the illicit traffic and consider joining a reconstituted Turkish-Yugoslav opium agreement. The Embassy made little effort and warned that ‘patent instability’ was of such a ‘critical’ nature that little progress could be expected.496

Within Iran, however, a new domestic movement for prohibition had emerged. The Anti-Opium and Alcohol Association published a brochure titled, ‘Prohibition of the Cultivation of the Poppy and the Advantages of this Measure for Iran’, written by Mahmoud Fateh, a former Minister of Agriculture. It argued for complete prohibition of cultivation and for poppy to be replaced by cereals.497 Despite these stirrings, little tangible appeared to be forthcoming.

The US Embassy pointed out that the government was preoccupied with the situation in Azerbaijan but promised to ‘keep pressing…pointing out [the] particular desirability at this time of publicity favorable to Iran’. On 21 March 1946 the Prime Minister created a commission to study how ‘to stop production of opium and smoking of this deadly poison’. On 10 April, he issued instructions to the Governors of all Provinces that all cultivation should cease within the year. The Ministries of Agriculture and Finance were told to draw up the necessary enforcement measures. Further the sale of opium in shops as well as its eating and smoking was prohibited. The State Department doubted the decree was being enforced. The Embassy wrote that the ‘Degree of compliance will depend in part on the development of the present government towards totalitarianism’ and warned it ‘will be extremely difficult to enforce the Prime Minister’s orders’.498

However, the US noted the action was ‘In consonance with his General Program to do away with elements of [the] economic and social structure…that make Iran open to foreign criticism that it is reactionary or backward’. The US press and political circles responded

---

496 Acting Secretary of State to American Embassy, Tehran, 26 July 1945; American Embassy Tehran to Secretary of State, 31 July 1945, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box171/File1230-14, Control in Various Countries (1944-5).
497 ‘Prohibition of the Cultivation of the Poppy and the Advantages of this Measure for Iran,’ by M. Mahmoud Fateh in Journal of Tehran, 1-8 October 1945, FBNA/ACC71-A-3554/Box19/File0660, Iran (Persia) #3 (1946).
498 Murray to Secretary of State, 3 January, 1946; Translation of Prime Minister’s Radio Address, 21 March, 1946; Memo: ‘Iran’, April 1946; Tehran Embassy to Secretary of State, 7 May 1946, FBNA/ACC71-A-3554/Box19/File0660, Iran (Persia) #3 (1946).
jubilantly. Representative Judd, speaking on the floor of the House of Representatives, claimed it as the second success of the Judd Resolution after Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{499}

Initial indications suggested the effort was genuine. In June the Prime Minister, Ahmad Qavam, announced that all government officials had 15 days ‘for total cure’ and stated that the order would have ‘secret agents’ carrying it out. In July the Council of Ministers made clear that the Opium Monopoly had to be disbanded with complete prohibition of cultivation and use. Government efforts at suppressing the 1946-7 crop appeared to cause an increase in illicit activity, as well as prices. Anslinger and the Treasury Department believed there to be ‘every indication’ Iran was sincere and pushed again for Iran to ratify the drug conventions without reservation.\textsuperscript{500}

The State Department remained sceptical. Analysts at the US Embassy questioned whether the goals were achievable and warned that no crop substitution had been outlined to mitigate economic hardship to growers. They suggested the Iranian Government seek US government assistance. The Ministry of Finance made clear that they would seek American financial assistance. Reports emerged that the Anti-Opium Commission had placed an order for 100 million ‘anti-opium tablets’ with the USSR. Black market prices continued to rise and the Embassy expected that less accessible parts of the country would disregard the decree and that years of more intensive government activity would be needed to eliminate the cultivation.\textsuperscript{501}

Elizabeth Washburn Wright argued that complete prohibition was premature and would result in continued cultivation in ‘inaccessible regions’. Further she claimed that Iran was needed to balance against the Turkish-Yugoslav duopoly. She questioned, ‘where would America and the manufacturers of medicinal opium in other countries turn?’ US efforts had been to develop a tripartite licit supply system, which aimed to prevent smaller countries becoming

\textsuperscript{499} Paraphrase of Telegram from Tehran, 7 May 1946; various news clippings in file; Copy of Remarks by Hon. Walter H. Judd, 29 May 1946, FBNA/ACC71-A-3554/Box19/File0660, Iran (Persia) #3 (1946).


\textsuperscript{501} Memo by J Forrest Crawford, 1 August 1946; Memo: ‘Opium prices in Iran – Quarter ended September 19th, 1946’, 31 October 1946, FBNA/ACC71-A-3554/Box19/File0660, Iran (Persia) #3 (1946).
exporters. This, she claimed, would be undone, with a proliferation of smaller exporters in the Balkans, Europe and South America and ‘the world would be flooded with the uncontrolled drug’. ⁵⁰²

Wright lobbied in Washington to build support for this view. Anslinger was non-committal, warning that ‘until we know what the real situation is in Iran, we should proceed very cautiously’. The State Department also sought to quell her interest, requested that she leave the matter to Anslinger and the upcoming CND. ⁵⁰³ As the CND met, the question of Iranian national control remained unresolved. The difficulty the US experienced in articulating a clear strategy for Iran highlighted the complications surrounding this issue and the central place Iran had in ensuring the efficacy of a global production control system.

Iran presented an example of US policy being driven by pragmatism over policy orthodoxy. The State Department pushed back against over-zealous Iranian moves to shift towards total prohibition, without effective economic alleviation and alternative development measures. Unlike Japan, there were real obstacles to diminishing opium consumption and production. Like Malaya, Burma and other British possessions, Iran had no adequate medical or enforcement infrastructure and in areas outside government control, little capacity to enforce anti-opium decrees. The US press had been quick to highlight the difference between the US and the British Empire in Asia given US policy in Japan. When it came to Iran the US acted more like the old colonial powers - willing to subsume a strict anti-opium policy orthodoxy to pragmatic geopolitical and local concerns.

**Part 6: Re-building the global licit market:**

*The Remnants of the Turkish-Yugoslav Opium Agreement:*

The Turkish-Yugoslav Opium Agreement was concluded on 17 December 1934. It gave the Central Opium Bureau at Istanbul the exclusive right to sell opium grown in either Turkey or Yugoslavia. The agreement divided markets, with Yugoslav opium supplied to the US and Turkish opium supplied to Europe and others. By 1938 ‘perpetual difficulties’ had undermined the agreement. Iranian opium, which had traditionally found a home in Asia,

---

⁵⁰² Wright to Anslinger, 22 October 1946; Wright Memo: the opium Situation in Iran, October 1946, FBNA/ACC71-A-3554/Box19/File0660, Iran (Persia) #3 (1946).

⁵⁰³ Anslinger to Wright, 6 November 1946; Henderson to Wright, 6 November 1946, FBNA/ACC71-A-3554/Box19/File0660, Iran (Persia) #3 (1946).
increasingly competed for the European market. Prices became depressed relative to the US - which prohibited Iranian opium imports. Yugoslavia offered compensation, but Turkey demanded a repartition of the markets and a levelling of prices.\textsuperscript{504} By 1939 the agreement became increasingly difficult to sustain as the two sides sought to carve up the international market against a backdrop of deteriorating European politics.

In 1940 the monopoly raised its prices when it learned US manufacturers would not be permitted to buy Iranian opium under any circumstances. Anslinger warned Ankara that the US would re-evaluate its policy if US importers continued to be ‘subject [to] unfair price disadvantage’. After some discussion he promised to support the monopoly for ‘the time being’, but would explore options.\textsuperscript{505} Eventually broader geopolitical concerns drove the US to temporarily lift bans on the import of Iranian and Afghan opium (see Chapter One). Both were warned, however, that this was a temporary wartime measure and that after the war; the Turkish-Yugoslav opium would again become preferred.

In July 1945 the US approached Turkey and Yugoslavia to suggest a revival of the agreement, with the goal of including Iran. Yugoslavia suggested it was premature and Turkey declared that political stability needed to return to Yugoslavia and Iran first.\textsuperscript{506} Eventually, with the political deterioration in Yugoslavia, the declarations by Iran and Afghanistan that they would prohibit all cultivation, and the relatively low morphine content of Indian opium, Turkey quickly emerged as the key to the post-war licit market.

\textit{Turkey:}

During the war the Allies purchased Turkish opium to supply their war efforts, but also to deny the crop to the enemy. This latter act was known as ‘preclusive buying’.\textsuperscript{507} By the close of 1943 Britain and the US had come to different conclusions about its efficacy. Bertil Renborg claimed it was ineffective, demonstrated by the apparently large stocks in Belgium, Norway and other German occupied countries. The State Department agreed and wanted to

\textsuperscript{504} Markovic to Anslinger, 15 May, 1939, FBNA/ACC71-A-3554/Box25/File0660, Turkish-Yugoslavia Agreement (1932-46).
\textsuperscript{505} Anslinger to Fuller, 14 November 1940; Anslinger to Sarhan, 13 December, 1940, FBNA/ACC71-A-3554/Box25/File0660, Turkish-Yugoslavia Agreement (1932-46).
\textsuperscript{506} Morlock to Anslinger, November 1945, FBNA/ACC71-A-3554/Box25/File0660, Turkish-Yugoslavia Agreement (1932-46).
cease efforts. The British Home Office rejected Renborg’s analysis and insisted it be continued.\textsuperscript{508} Eventually British persistence overcame the opposition and the practice continued.\textsuperscript{509}

The Allied wartime opium relationship with Turkey therefore developed along exceptional lines and would eventually need to be recalibrated for peacetime. For Britain the key was ensuring availability without price gouging, something they felt they had so far achieved through good relations with Turkey.\textsuperscript{510} Perceptions of Turkey in US control circles remained overwhelmingly positive and were helped when Turkey expressed full agreement with the Judd Resolution in July 1945.\textsuperscript{511}

As the war drew to a close Britain and the US were increasingly in competition for Turkish opium. The British Directorate of Medical Supplies called this situation ‘undesirable’ and called for a clear ‘apportionment’ of supplies and prices so that Britain could resume sales to their traditional markets.\textsuperscript{512} The two initially agreed to divide the 1945 crop equally.\textsuperscript{513} However, Britain came to believe the US had bought up a significant portion of the 1944 crop, while having major reserve stocks on hand, and British was thereby entitled to a larger portion of the 1945 crop. Thus began US and British ‘competitive buying’ of Turkish opium crops.\textsuperscript{514}

By May 1945 the British had secured 30 of the 50 tons deemed ‘urgently required’. They requested that the US allow them to purchase the additional 20 tons.\textsuperscript{515} Eventually Anslinger agreed Britain could purchase 75\% of the 1945 crop.\textsuperscript{516} Despite this agreement, Turkish supply quickly deteriorated and prices doubled. The monopoly claimed large quantities were being diverted to illicit markets and smuggled through Syria, reducing the 1945 crop by roughly half, to 100 tons. Further, demand was increasing with the French, Swiss and Belgian

\textsuperscript{508} Meeting minutes: ‘Axis Europe and Morphine Supplies’, 24h December 1943, BNA-FO371/44095.
\textsuperscript{509} Memo: Economic Warfare Division, American Embassy, 15 April 1944, BNA-FO371/44095.
\textsuperscript{510} Peterson to Foreign Office, 7 December 1945, BNA-FO371/48731.
\textsuperscript{512} Dawson-Hutchinson to Gedes, 5 January 1945, BNA-FO371/48731.
\textsuperscript{513} British Embassy, Washington, to Foreign Office, 10 April 1945, BNA-FO371/48731.
\textsuperscript{514} Warburton to Lomax, 23 May, 1945, BNA-FO371/48731.
\textsuperscript{515} Howard to Lord Halifax, 31 May 1945, BNA-FO371/48731.
\textsuperscript{516} Halifax to Foreign Office, 6 July 1945, BNA-FO371/48731.
governments all now seeking Turkish opium. They could assure Britain only of 35 tons for the coming year. Britain had foreseen this issue and had advocated that one single source should buy all opium on behalf of the Allies to prevent Turkish price gouging. Britain had already purchased opium on behalf of the Dutch Government in 1945 and was examining the possibility for the Belgian Government.

The goal for the British in particular, was to keep downward pressure on prices until a more predictable post-war market emerged. For this to happen, conditions in Yugoslavia would need to become clearer along with the outcome of enforcement efforts around Iranian and Afghan prohibitions. Lastly the general trajectory towards a production limitation convention would need to become clear. For the US, sitting on large domestic stockpiles, these issues were less pressing than broader drug diplomacy goals of global supply reduction. Overall great uncertainties hung over the licit market. Anglo-American cooperation or competition would no longer act as the predominant determinant of global demand, supply and prices. The emergence of post-war competition in an imperfect and partly planned global licit market presaged difficult negotiations ahead for the new UNO, as we shall see.

**Conclusion:**
The German and Asian narcotics cases strongly correlated to broader geopolitical trends. They also highlighted the alignment of interests in the international drug control system. When discussions centred on questions of European-style regulation of a narcotics industry, as the German situation did, Anglo-American cooperation was possible. Where questions centred on difficult issues of total prohibition, as the Asian colonial questions did, agreement was not possible. How large an issue the US wished to make out of divergences depended on internal US politics and external geopolitical calculus. As the world moved to a post-war framework, narcotics loomed relatively small for broader State Department regional policies and, in most cases, Anslinger failed to place it on the agenda. The State Department had no desire to hold British feet to the fire on this issue in Asia in the face of serious governing concerns and Anslinger had lost his wartime leverage.

---

517 Angora to Foreign Office, 15 October 1945, BNA-FO371/48731.
518 Lomax to Warburton, 18 April 1945, BNA-FO371/48731.
A battle for the narcotics peace had quietly raged in Asia along the traditional Anglo-American divide. On the one side were the British trying to find national regulatory frameworks that fitted within the international cooperative environment and satisfied US demands as far as possible, while working to accommodate local obstacles rather than run rough shod over them. On the other side was the US advocating the absolutist vision for prohibition, but increasingly unwilling to exert political leverage on its allies to achieve that vision. How far Britain could make its incremental regulatory approach work would have a major impact on Anglo-American drug relations and international control efforts more broadly. Similarly, how well the US could adhere to its own absolutist vision as it encountered new governing and geopolitical exigencies in Asia and the Middle East, would determine the direction of international efforts.

As the immediate crises around the occupation of Germany and Japan settled down and the two powers faced a plethora of post-war issues, neither had any appetite to re-fight old Anglo-American battles over narcotics. The crux of Anglo-American narcotics relations, and thereby the global approach, increasingly centred on the division of a global licit market and negotiating a production limitation convention. Britain and the US would have to work together to unite the various social, economic and political interests around the world behind a new convention process and throw all their efforts into producing consensus. This would involve deploying a mixture of sticks and carrots, which only a joint Anglo-American effort could effectively wield. Both appeared to recognise their role in this process, saw the desirability of a production limitation convention and implicitly acknowledged their reliance on one another to produce it. These factors became only more apparent against a backdrop of a deteriorating global political environment. By 1947, with the battle for the narcotics peace largely secured, and a UN framework in place, a new era of narcotics multilateralism was underway, now based at the United Nations. It is towards these multilateral processes we now turn.
Chapter 5: New Battles: The CND First Meetings, 1946-1948:

Introduction:
Emerging from the tense post-war negotiations the key uncertainties for CND were how it would operate in practice, how it would fit into broader geopolitics and whether it would function as a talking-shop or a tool to enforce a specific vision for the system. The most coherent vision came from Anslinger and Sharman. They sought an enforcement body advocating prohibitionist and repressive responses. The first three meetings of CND in 1946-8 would be pivotal. The first two meetings served to sound out the political context within which CND would operate and how the structures would function in practice. Following this a major political push would occur around the Third Session towards concluding a new Protocol and then advancing discussions around a new production limitation convention and even advocating a new ‘single convention’ unifying all previous agreements.

Most immediately, however, states sought to ensure a sound legal basis for the system of control. On this Britain took the lead, offering legal expertise and driving a consensual process around ensuring the continued functioning of DSB, PCOB and the existing conventions structure. Once this was secured states began to look towards enforcing the existing conventions and extending the prohibitions on opium smoking to all territories of the globe. Once they had enshrined this as a universal legal norm, control advocates planned to redirect global efforts towards enforcing the prohibitionist framework. On this the US ostensibly took the lead – although its ability to act as bilateral enforcer, utilising the UN as a bully pulpit, became increasingly dependent on State Department willingness to risk broader diplomatic ripples. As time passed between 1946-8 the State Department became increasingly risk averse, to the point where lead US Delegate Harry Anslinger was muzzled in the 1948 CND discussions and even forced to make a positive statement regarding Mexican efforts, which was diametrically opposed to his actual views. Overall the two approaches indicated the emerging Anglo-American roles as the two key pillars of the post-war system. The UK led the consensual-codification approach, and the US led the political activist, enforcement oriented, prohibitionist approach.
The immediate forward political direction was around extending the control of manufacture to synthetic drugs not previously covered by the 1931 Convention. The international community was able to speedily conclude negotiations around this issue, highlighting the relative consensus around dealing with the drug issue at the manufacturing point on the commodity chain. Part of this stemmed from the fact the burden of control fell on wealthier manufacturing states with greater regulatory capacity and a desire to carve up the market among existing firms and create new barriers to entry.

Next was the question of production limitation. It became clear that PCOB would be the lead agency in overseeing any future control arrangements. Control advocates hoped a single oversight/enforcement body would enable more aggressive control efforts at the international level. Around opium it was unclear what the means to achieve this were. Should states aim for an interim agreement, as the Chinese delegation would suggest, or towards a long-term agreement, encapsulated within a new ‘single convention’ as the US suggested? In the middle remained states like the UK, which privately professed scepticism as to the political feasibility or practicality of a production limitation convention. Their chief interest remained to protect their own economic interests, including cheap sources of opium. Meanwhile, the question of whether new controls over the coca leaf and cannabis were practical or even required remained an open discussion. Sceptical states, such as the UK, saw no reason to oppose further study on these issues. Control advocates, such as the US, pushed these studies as a means towards setting the trajectory towards stricter control.

The UK’s new legal expertise role gelled with their self-conception as the moderating force and honest broker within the system, untethered to the control advocate or producer blocs. It was no longer fighting a rear-guard defence of the colonial monopoly system. Meanwhile, its core drug control interests focused on shielding broader colonial practices from damaging political precedents and protecting domestic drug manufacturers. British colonies were largely in compliance, or seen to be moving towards compliance, with the international system. As time progressed towards the all-important Third Session of CND in 1948 this British role only strengthened, particularly as their delegation came under the leadership of Mr. Thornton of the Home Office and Major Coles departed the scene.
Overall the system moved towards a solidification of political cleavages. The spectrum of post-war drug policy had begun to emerge. On the one side remained the control advocates, led by the US and supported by Canada and, to a lessening practical degree due to the Civil War and eventual revolution, China. On the other side would remain the producer states. The key question being whether a clearly cohesive producer states voting bloc would emerge. Occupying the middle ground once again were European powers, represented most strongly by Britain. Britain settled comfortably into this role and was happy to watch the shape of debates take form before engaging its political capital to resolve potential choke points and conflicts. Britain self-consciously adopted the role as pragmatist-in-chief while the US under Anslinger continued its role as aggressive prohibitionist, while being increasingly muzzled by the State Department. Beginning with the first CND the battle for the shape of the post-war system began to emerge. Beneath the initial consensus discussions around synthetics and a production limitation convention lay a deeper struggle over whether CND would become an enforcement body or a cooperative environment aimed at facilitating control. The 1946-8 period would be pivotal in answering this question.

**Part 1: The First and Second Session of CND:**

*Drafting the Protocol & Resolution:*

The Drafting Committee appointed to consider the Secretariat’s draft protocol and resolutions met in September 1946. It consisted of representatives of China, Yugoslavia, France, Peru, the UK, the US and USSR. The UK delegation concluded that the Draft Protocol was ‘inadequate’ from a legal viewpoint. It was soon broadly agreed that the Secretariat’s draft was ‘defective’ and that the UK’s observations should form the basis of an alternative draft protocol. By late September 1946 a unanimously agreed draft protocol, together with two draft resolutions were submitted to ECOSOC. This was almost entirely the work of the UK delegation.

One major issue of disagreement arose when the Soviet Union, China and Czechoslovakia strongly opposed inviting Franco’s Government in Spain to become a party to the Protocol. Others, particularly Britain, disagreed and the matter was left to ECOSOC to work out. At ECOSOC the Soviet Delegate argued that cooperation on drugs would represent an ‘opening

---

519 UK Del to FO, 24 September 1946, BNA-FO371/59609.
520 Minutes, UN 2828, 5 October 1946, BNA-FO371/59609.
wedge to more extensive relations’. The US State Department took the view that purchasing Spanish cooperation on the system of narcotics control was too costly if bought at the price of losing the ‘Eastern group’ of states.521 Phillip Noel Baker, representing the UK, reiterated that they deplored General Franco’s Government. He argued that the Soviet delegation wanted ‘to exclude General Franco from the Convention’ while Britain wanted ‘to exclude him from the illicit traffic’. With the UK the sole dissenter, and the US abstaining, a Soviet Amendment to exclude the Franco Government from the Protocol passed and the issue was temporarily resolved.522 The UK’s policy fitted within their broader aspirations, first outlined by Anthony Eden after the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, of ensuring the UN embraced ‘the bulk of the nations and eventually, perhaps, all nations.523

The CND First Session:
CND officially met on November 28th 1946 in New York. Initial discussion centred on procedure. A questionnaire was approved to bring information on raw materials up to date, while also including questions on synthetic drugs. Anslinger tried to set the initial tone of the session by giving a speech on drug addiction in the US. He claimed that the US had witnessed a large decrease in addiction during 1917-38 due to effective international controls matched by strict domestic enforcement.524 He then took every opportunity to impress the US approach on the visiting delegates. As a colleague wrote to Anslinger:

you are doing a marvelous job as far as educating the boys from the other side as to how to handle narcotics. The two members from Holland...were amazed...and Mr. Delgorge, in particularly, hoped that they might some day control things as they are done in this country.525

Iran:
The laws in Iran appeared to be moving towards outright prohibition (see Chapter Four). Whether these laws were being implemented at a statutory or a practical level remained to be

521 Winant to Secretary of State, 19 September 1946, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1 United Nations Protocol First Session #14 (1946-9).
522 Minute, UN 2633, 2 October 1946, BNA-FO371/59610.
524 Memo, December 1946, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1, UN 1st Session (1946).
525 Reid to Anslinger, 13 December 1946, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1, UN 1st Session (1946).
seen. A law prohibiting all use and cultivation had been introduced into the Majlis in 1945 but stalled when the parliamentary session ended. The Prime Minister and Council of Ministers had issued a number of decrees around the issue and on September 9th, the Council of Ministers issued a decree making opium possession and transactions illegal. November 22nd was set as the date when prohibition would come in effect – exempting medical use and Government exports.\textsuperscript{526}

At CND Iran sought to roll back on its commitment to prohibition thereby sparking a diplomatic ruckus. Their delegate claimed the decree only applied to 1946. Anslinger sent frantic cables back to the State Department urging he be sent copies of their initial decree so he could pressure the Iranian delegation.\textsuperscript{527} By mid-1947, the Majlis had still not met, preventing it making the program legally permanent. The US officially maintained ‘every indication points to its being a permanent policy’. They claimed that ‘competent observers’ believed that the crop had been drastically curtailed and in 1947 was not more than 15% of the previous year.\textsuperscript{528}

By early 1948 Anslinger was receiving new intelligence. Political changes had pushed out the Chief of the Opium Monopoly Mr. Nikpay. He began providing US agents with extensive information and claimed that the 1948 opium harvest could be the greatest in history because of a favourable illicit market. He further claimed the government decrees were the direct result of a political revolt in Azerbaijan Province in 1946, where the Soviet-inspired rebel government decided to issue a prohibition decree, despite the fact that no opium was grown in the region. He claimed it was explicitly meant as a propaganda ploy to embarrass the central government. The central government countered by issuing its own national decree. Nikpay argued the decree was completely ineffective given the scale of agricultural and economic reforms that would be needed to make it effective and that the monopoly continued

\textsuperscript{527} Johnson to Secretary of State, 30 November 1946, FBNA/ACC71-A-3554/Box19/File0660, Iran (Persia) #3 (1946).
as before, although renamed as the Department of Prohibition. Further Nikpay claimed that parliament would not ratify the decree.\textsuperscript{529}

Anslinger privately wrote early in 1948 that:

\textit{Iran has been behaving very badly during 1947. She sold 9 tons of opium to Iraq, which that government did not receive; 18 tons to Syria, which is not reported as having been authorized there; 22 tons to Siam where there is still opium smoking; and one item which gives us great concern, 56 tons to Indochina to be used for “disintoxication” of smokers.}\textsuperscript{530}

He went on:

\textit{We have now prohibited all imports of opium from Iran for medicinal purposes because of her actions in supplying the illicit traffic in 1947. Accordingly, Iran is not to be trusted in any sense and should be completely outlawed. I have no sympathy whatever for Iran since her reentry into the illicit traffic after the war.}\textsuperscript{531}

Once again the US felt burned by Iranian claims to be working towards controlling opium. This would present enormous complications as the US sought to move towards a production limitation convention. Nevertheless political considerations prevented Anslinger from publicly castigating Iran, as we shall see.

\textbf{Opium and the Japanese Peace Treaty:}

By the end of 1947 the outlines of peace treaty provisions began to emerge. Japan would be prohibited from cultivating and exporting narcotics. It would further be prohibited from importing except for strict medical and scientific purposes. The question was how to oversee this legitimate import trade. The US initially favoured PCOB oversight, but realised this would require treaty amendments. It was then suggested that CND appoint a ‘supervisor’. Col. Sharman thought this ‘an excellent opportunity’ for CND especially if the

\textsuperscript{529} White to Anslinger, 9 May 1948, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box121/File1230-1, UN 3\textsuperscript{rd} Session #1 (1947-8).

\textsuperscript{530} Anslinger to Wright, 29 April 1948, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box121/File1230-1, UN 3\textsuperscript{rd} Session #1 (1947-8).

\textsuperscript{531} Ibid.
recommendations were binding. He and Anslinger sought to carve out the most severe
negotiating position to allow a retreat to a more minimal position of insisting that, if
manufacturing was to be allowed in Japan, it mimic US controls. Both men worried that
Foreign Office officials in the US and Canada would be ‘anxious to adopt the least penal
line’. 532

Economic experts in the State Department objected to the prohibition of manufacture and
export. Maxwell Hamilton, in charge of the Japanese Treaty at the US State Department,
worried that singling Japan out for ‘punitive treatment’ might breed national resentment
towards the drug treaty system. Anslinger (an old friend of Hamilton) argued that Japan’s
historical record necessitated harsh restrictions.533 States struggled to find a compromise at
ECOSOC level. China advocated direct UN control of supplies and a prohibition of Japanese
exports. The USSR objected to ‘special provision’ for Japan. The US suggested a separate
oversight body be designated by ECOSOC but balked at the idea of a UN style corporation
overseeing the trade particularly given all the expense and logistics that would entail.534

Eventually ECOSOC passed a compromise hammered out by New Zealand, with input from
the US and UK. Governments negotiating peace treaties would make the ‘most stringent’
national controls while UN bodies would ‘be available to give such information and advice as
may be requested’. This ensured a clear distinction between international and national
controls. China’s goal to internationalise control of the Japanese drug market via the UN
went unrealised, out of deference to state sovereignty. A core question of post-war narcotics
control had been answered: UN control of narcotics could not supersede state control.
Overcoming Soviet objections the UK amendment was adopted, allowing for information and
advice to be supplied by UN experts when requested. This meant that the UN would have an
advisory role, but only on the request of member states.535

532 Draft: Treaty of Peace with Japan, Control of Narcotic Drugs, February 1948; Memo of
Conversation, 19 January 1948; Sharman to Anslinger, 21 November 1947; Sharman to Anslinger, 18
533 Sharman to Anslinger, 7 November 1947; Memo of Conversation, 19 January 1948,
FBN/A/ACC170-74-5/Box121/File1230-1, UN CND 2nd Session (1947).
Box120/File1230-1, ECOSOC Position Papers (1947).
535 US Delegation to Secretary of States, 12 March 1947, NA, ACC170-74-5, Box 120, File 1230-1,
UN 1 Session #2 (1947-50).
Awakening the Peruvian Ally – Beginning the post-war coca push:

Control advocates, particularly the US and Canada found a new and welcome ally in the Peruvian delegate Dr. Jorge A. Lazarte. After the first session, Sharman wrote to Anslinger to remind him of:

_The desirability of conveying privately to the Peruvian authorities the fact that their delegate not only made a most excellent impression and put his country right on the map in so far as the Narcotic Commission in concerned but that his attendance as an expert in the field of psychiatry did much to round out the all-round competence of the Commission from practically every angle._ 536

The US sought Peru’s support in utilising the UN to suppress indigenous coca consumption:

_It is clear that Indians of South America consume huge quantities of coca leaves and that the effects are distinctly harmful to the Indians and to the economy of the countries that coca-chewing is widely prevalent. The Individual countries will need strong support from the United Nations to enable them to put into effect repressive legislation, as the Indians will make great resistance._ 537

At the Second Session of CND Peru requested the UN help create visiting expert commissions to investigate coca chewing in Latin America and determine whether it was harmful. Other countries, the UK among them as we will see, were sceptical of these supposed harmful effects or that control was even feasible. 538

Abolition of Opium Smoking:

---

536 Sharman to Anslinger, 3 January 1947, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1, UN 1st Session #2 (Jan 1947-June 1950).
538 UN CND, 2nd Session, ‘Summary Record of the Fifteenth Meeting’, 4 August 1947; Sharman to Anslinger, 21 May 1947, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box121/File1230-1, UN CND 2nd Session (1947).
At its First Session CND unanimously adopted a US Resolution recommending that ECOSOC urge all remaining countries to prohibit opium smoking. By 1947 the only country where it was not prohibited was Siam and a number of Indian States.\footnote{US Delegation ECOSOC Position Paper, 17 February 1947, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1, ECOSOC Position Papers (1947).} Siam claimed it had instituted a ban among its Chinese population, and considered rigorous measures to enforce it including publicly threatening deportation to China where their offences would be tried under Chinese law. Anslinger raised the issue at the Second Session of CND, highlighting that the Government derived almost fifteen per cent of its revenue from the opium monopoly. The US would continue to use the UN bully pulpit to pressure them to follow the British, Dutch and French lead.\footnote{Stanton to Secretary of State, 31 January 1947; UN CND, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Session, ‘Summary Record of the Fourteenth Meeting’, 1 August 1947, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box121/File1230-1, UN CND 2\textsuperscript{nd} Session (1947).}

Britain, France and the Netherlands professed adherence to goals of abolition, but were clearly struggling in a number of cases with implementation. Major Coles spoke vaguely of mixed outcomes in British territories, but overall portrayed a trend towards successful implementation. In Malaya, he claimed there had been hundreds of admissions to hospital for opium addiction, but none had experienced serious symptoms from deprivation and only minor smuggling from Siam. North Borneo reported no cases of smoking or patients suffering withdrawal symptoms. In Sarawak there existed a large illicit traffic, believed to stem from supplies left by the Japanese, and smuggling from the Dutch territory, while few addicts had received treatment. In Hong Kong the quantity of opium smoked had decreased although the number of addicts remained the same. There had been a slight increase in smuggling from Yunnan, China into Hong Kong, but this remained well below pre-war levels. Singapore reported 14,000 ‘addicts’. Government stocks had been looted before the Japanese invasion and there remained a fear that these stocks were still hidden somewhere.\footnote{UN CND, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Session, ‘Summary Record of the Fourteenth Meeting’, 1 August 1947, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box121/File1230-1, UN CND 2\textsuperscript{nd} Session (1947).}

In French territories the monopolies had officially ceased selling non-medical smoking opium. Public smoking was prohibited and only medical needs could be supplied. ‘Dis-intoxication centres’ were established, and opium for ‘progressive dis-intoxication’ could be obtained through prescription. Due to enforcement and anti-smuggling efforts, the price of
opium was claimed to have risen five-fold in the space of two years. In 1947 they expected the sale of opium to be fifteen tons compared to fifty tons in 1939 and 120 tons in 1920. Anslinger was privately highly critical of these ‘Dis-intoxication centres’. He highlighted that in 1947 Iran had supplied fifty-six tons to Indochina for these and by 1948 he privately insisted the French Government close the centres and cease purchasing opium for them overseas or he would ‘expose this situation’.\textsuperscript{542} Despite his threats and frustrations Anslinger would again be forced to mute his concerns out of deference to broader US foreign policy concerns, as we shall see.

The Dutch delegate reiterated his government’s support for prohibition. He claimed that some hardship had been caused through a lack of provision of ‘dis-intoxication centres’. Further illicit opium was still available and police control was weak. In areas where the Netherlands exercised little authority, opium was sold openly and Chinese inhabitants continued to request the re-establishment of the monopoly. India had, In November 1946, decreed the total prohibition of opium smoking. They professed to have similar problems to the Netherlands but despite these great administrative difficulties, claimed to be seeing success. Anslinger requested that the question of ‘legal opium smoking’ remain on the agenda until it had been completely suppressed across the globe. Then the question could shift to the abolition of all opium smoking.\textsuperscript{543} For the moment, the question centred on the creation of a global prohibited activity before attention shifted to the entire suppression of that activity.

**Suppressing opium eating:**

The US maintained that in India and Burma opium eating was prevalent and ‘deleterious to health and should be suppressed in the same manner that the smoking of opium’ was. The Government of India had traditionally opposed suppression as we have seen. Their reasoning included the lack of medical facilities existing and the problems with implementation of restrictions rendering it ‘not humane’. By the second session of CND, however, the Government of India announced ‘in view of the world opinion, the Government had changed

\textsuperscript{542} Anslinger to Wright, 29 April 1948, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box121/File1230-1, UN 3\textsuperscript{rd} Session #1 (1947-8).

\textsuperscript{543} UN CND, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Session, ‘Summary Record of the Fourteenth Meeting’, 1 August 1947, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box121/File1230-1, UN CND 2\textsuperscript{nd} Session (1947).
its attitude’ and aimed to discourage eating. This marked a broader shift in India’s attitude towards the control system and presaged its emergence as a moderate producer state.

Production Limitation:
At its first meeting CND unanimously approved a questionnaire to further preparatory work around a production limitation convention. The US, strongly supported this questionnaire as ‘urgent and important’:

During the last six years Afghanistan, Iran, Japan and Korea have prohibited the production of opium; Argentina, Denmark, Austria, France, Czechoslovakia and the Netherlands have begun to cultivate the opium poppy for the direct extraction of morphine; Germany, Hungary and Poland have increased their production of poppy straw; and a new synthetic drug, Demerol, is rapidly replacing morphine.

Before controls could be instituted, there was a need to quantify the problem. The pre-War League Secretariat estimated total legitimate world raw opium requirements at 350-400 tons - not including prepared opium. By 1947 the figure for prepared opium had decreased, while the medical needs or derivatives of raw opium had increased, for example the use of codeine had doubled in some countries. The US even openly worried if it would be able to purchase enough raw opium for medical purposes in 1947. The Secretariat was requested to develop a new figure for world medical needs. This could then determine the need for raw opium, and illuminate the actual influence of poppy straw and new synthetic drugs on the global market.

The US, at the Second CND, developed a strategy based on dividing the issue. The goal was to first look at opium poppies, then coca leaves, then ‘Indian hemp’ and develop each subject

---

546 UN CND, 2nd Session, ‘Summary Record of the Fourteenth Meeting’, 1 August 1947, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box121/File1230-1, UN CND 2nd Session (1947).
separately. The preference was for a unified production limitation convention covering all three. Absent this a convention covering opium was seen as the most urgent.547 The Third Session would be pivotal in working to generate political momentum towards a production limitation convention and the broader goal of a ‘single convention’ as we shall see.

Internationalising the Criminalisation of Consumption:
The Second CND solidified the trajectory for dealing with domestic drug consumption. The normative framework was established by a questionnaire circulated by ECOSOC in March 1947. Questions were designed to suggest repressive and strict measures as the natural response, such as asking whether provision had been made to isolate drug ‘addicts’ from the rest of the population.548 States began vying to outdo each other at CND in highlighting the severity of control and punishment. Soon the arrest of ‘addicts’, doctors, illicit traffickers and other narcotics laws violators were viewed as metrics of success in international control.

Turkey pointed out they had apprehended 142 ‘addicts’ in 1946, with 2 addicted to morphine, 15 to hashish, 9 to opium and the rest to heroin. They further highlighted that convicted ‘addicts’ were placed in ‘mental institutions’ for at least six months or until ‘cured’. Harsh prison terms and fines were prescribed for those violating narcotics laws, including increased sentences for those whose actions were deemed to have increased addiction, with their terms of imprisonment increased for each newly addicted person.549

Iran pointed out that police had been authorised to enter private houses and confiscate any narcotics found while the Ministry of Health was taking measures to cure addicts with ‘favourable results’ so far. Further, a Bill pending before Parliament contained a provision for the death penalty for anyone found smoking opium in the future. In response to this statement, the US requested and received approval that the CND report note with satisfaction the measures taken by Iran to suppress the opium traffic.550

548 Secretary General to US Secretary of State, 23 April 1947, BNA-ACC170-74-5, Box 120, File 1230-1, UN 1st Session #2 (1947-50).
550 Ibid.
In this area, the UK and North America diverged. Canada and the US criticised UK penalties as inadequate to deter smuggling. Sharman advocated for minimum prison sentences. Major Coles shot back that there was no legislative basis for these and pursuing them would be construed as interference with the judicial process. Anslinger pointed out the US judiciary were not so ‘sacrosanct’. His corrective method was to highlight the damage of the illicit traffic to ensure severe sentences. If his advice was not followed, ‘the press was notified and things took a turn for the better’. Colonel Sharman highlighted a Canadian case of a man receiving a five-year prison sentence for possessing fewer than three grams of opium, because he had a criminal record. The divergence between British and North American approaches in this area remained a consistent theme over the coming decades, as will be seen.

The Commission, in order to move towards a standardisation of national laws, had the Secretariat undertake major, multi-year studies examining the various national responses. Further, as other UN agencies sought to engage with this issue, CND fought to maintain its monopoly of understanding. In January 1947 the Social Commission produced a document perceived by Anslinger and colleagues as portraying ‘drug addicts being sick persons’. This conception, at variance with the criminal conception held by control advocates within CND, was deleted once discovered and led to an apology by Leon Steinig and the drug Secretariat. Anslinger and Sharman were furious. Sharman wrote that:

*I am beginning to gather the impression that the germ of the old Genevese complaint has been firmly implanted and is flourishing in the administrative body politic of the U.N. Secretariat.*

Anslinger agreed, writing that ‘we have to be just as much on the alert with the UN as we were with the League crowd’. Sharman and Anslinger were particularly aghast at statements that ‘the prevailing opinion is that effective methods are those of re-education rather than repression’, that ‘drug addicts should be cured rather than punished’ and that addiction should be viewed in the context of eliminating other ‘vices’ and ‘social scourges’ through ‘re-

---

551 Ibid.
552 UN CND 2nd Session, ‘Record of the Fifth Meeting’, 26 July 1947; Morlock to Anslinger, 15 January 1947, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box121/File1230-1, UN CND 2nd Session (1947).
553 Sharman to Anslinger, 29 January 1947, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1, UN 1st Session #2 (1947-50).
education and re-adaptation’. Further he and Sharman rejected the notion that ‘the drug addict who is not re-educated when the drug is taken from him will instinctively seek to find relief…in other vices’. As Sharman wrote, ‘one would almost think that the Narcotic Commission had not discussed this very subject in public two months previously’. He argued that the CND:

*With our well established machinery…would be well advised to keep thoroughly clear of everything except possibly the most tenuous connection with these impractical social uplifters, and that the most we should agree to would be for them to come and listen in at our meetings.*

They held their ‘fire’ and left it to Steinig to undo in the short term but they intended to raise it at the next session and determine which section of the UN Secretariat prepared the document so that the could ‘give them “the works”’.  

Peru closely parroted US and Canadian conceptions. Their delegate spoke of ‘criminal addicts’ who sought to ‘induce others’, often giving away drugs for the purpose. Given this situation he argued that ‘such individuals should be confined to institutions’ and kept in isolation. Colonel Sharman, exercising the Chair’s prerogative, agreed with the Peruvian delegate and claimed that ‘such addicts derived real pleasure from inducing others to follow the same vice: in this way they increased the number of their potential sources of supply’. The implications were clear: dissenting views from the prohibitionist and repressive approach to reducing consumption would not be tolerated. The UN would be used as a forum to expand, standardise and advocate repressive responses not only to trafficking but also consumption and addiction.

Mexico:

---

555 Sharman to Anslinger, 29 January 1947, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1, UN 1st Session #2 (1947-50).
Whether CND would evolve as an enforcement body in line with the original ‘inner circle’ conception would in many ways be determined by the early test case of Mexico. Anslinger chose to single out Mexico given political considerations affecting other potential targets; the direct US interest in Mexican illicit production given their proximity; and the strong bilateral leverage potential the US held. Britain, meanwhile, viewed the Mexico question as ‘one which almost exclusively affects the U.S.A. and in a secondary way Canada’. 558

At the Second CND Session Anslinger claimed that Mexico had nearly 10,000 poppy fields and hosted at least a dozen clandestine laboratories, altogether producing 30-40 tons of opium for the illicit traffic in 1947. He proposed a resolution highlighting these reports and asking ECOSOC to recommend Mexico take measures to fulfil its international obligations. The Mexican delegate protested that the army and air force had been working to eradicate poppy fields and suppress the illicit traffic. Anslinger and Sharman claimed that this had applied to a small number of fields. After some discussion the Resolution passed CND. 559

Regrouping in early 1948 the Representative of Mexico to the UN, Dr. Padilla Nervo protested to the US Ambassador while the Mexican ECOSOC Representative warned of ‘political repercussions’ of the passage of the resolution. Further they highlighted the problems of control: small farmers received ‘easy cash’ for poppy crops; eradication was ‘regarded as the acts of a totalitarian government’; and, alluding to US citizens’ involvement, the illicit traffic involved people that were ‘very hard to touch’. Despite these difficulties Mexico claimed to be working vigorously against the illicit traffic. Dr. Padilla claimed that an ECOSOC resolution would be utilised by government opponents and warned that there was a ‘hysterical attitude’ within the Mexican government towards it. 560

Seeing clear potential for escalating diplomatic damage the State Department stepped in to defuse the issue. Dr. Padilla was warned that the US attitude would be determined by Mexican rhetoric and actions. Should the Mexican delegation seek to displace the blame to

US citizens the US delegate would have ‘no recourse but to set the record straight at some length, with names, dates, and places’. On the other hand, the US government claimed to be sympathetic to Mexican difficulties and was ‘disposed to be cooperative’.

Relieved, Dr. Padilla promised that he would use ECOSOC to highlight the ‘numerous steps’ Mexico was taking to stamp out illicit production and that he had no intention of referring to the US or US citizens in any way. In response the US promised to withdraw support for the resolution and send the issue back to CND to keep ‘under review’. Dr. Padilla agreed, on condition that Mexico not be treated as ‘a country on parole’ at CND level. The State Department nevertheless reserved the right for their representative on CND to be ‘completely free to be insistent in the examination of the progress that Mexico was making in stamping out this trade’.

The US was unwilling to expend broader political leverage on this issue and thereby the implications for the CND-ECOSOC relationship became clear. The State Department pulled back quickly from any brinksmanship with Mexico over this issue. They would allow CND to serve as a bully pulpit from which states could be pressured and criticised over the technicalities of their control efforts. Meanwhile ECOSOC would provide a cooling venue where diplomatic processes could play out and political resolutions sought. CND could be used to hold states’ feet to the fire by sending resolutions to ECOSOC. These could spark domestic action, or at least a favourable rhetorical outcome and resolve the issue without requiring ECOSOC action. If matters continued at ECOSOC level the State Department and other Foreign Offices could work to cool issues and return them to CND without the need for a politically damaging Resolution. Most importantly, this provided the State Department a veto over all Anslinger’s initiatives. Mexico, for the moment, remained a key agenda item for the Third Session of CND and it was the only country singled out for specific attention.

In March, however, leading Mexican newspapers published excerpts of a statement made by Harry Anslinger to the Appropriations Committee of the US House of Representatives in which he parroted his claims made at CND. This provoked a furious response from the

561 Ibid.
562 Ibid.
563 CND, Provisional Agenda of the Third Session, 10 March 1948, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box121/File1230-1, UN 3rd Session #1 (1947-48).
Ministry of Foreign Relations. They demanded evidence for the assertions and argued that a ‘spirit of cooperation’ should define Mexico-US relations, not criticism. The State Department responded that Anslinger’s statement was made at CND, a forum where ‘any country may be called upon publicly to account for’ its control efforts.564

Anslinger initially remained determined to use the Third Session of CND to reiterate his complaints but Mexican fury saw him quickly overruled by the State Department. They requested a number of paragraphs to be cut from his draft statement and the addition of a paragraph highlighting Mexico’s successes in the face of great difficulty. As they pointed out:

There are just at this time other negotiations being carried on between the United States and Mexican Governments in several matters of considerable importance, one of which is of great importance to us from the viewpoint of hemisphere defense. It is therefore the hope of this Division and of our Embassy in Mexico City that the statement will be made in such a manner as not to arouse lasting resentment.565

In the end Anslinger’s statement praised Mexico prompting CND to express satisfaction over Mexican suppression efforts.566 By the end of the Third Session, the Mexico outcomes had significantly weakened Anslinger’s ability to use the UN as a bully pulpit on drug policy. He had overplayed his hand in utilising the UN to challenge other states and had witnessed the narcotics issue being clearly subsumed to broader US foreign policy goals.

Afghanistan:
Afghanistan had announced the total prohibition of cultivation in 1945, but its opium continued to show up on the global market in 1947. The US remained convinced of Afghan sincerity. However, the Afghan Foreign Office informed the British Foreign Office in 1947 that their Government had never intended to stop cultivation completely, merely restrict it to medical and scientific requirements and that cultivation would continue much as before. As

565 Reveley to Morlock, 20 April 1946, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box121/File1230-1, UN 3rd Session #1 (1947-8).
Major Coles wrote to Anslinger: ‘This is not unexpected, but it is not often so frankly admitted’. Anslinger felt deceived, responding that ‘I could not help but think that this is the same story put up by the Iranian Representative’. Seeking UK support, Anslinger warned Coles the US and UK should be prepared to ‘confront’ the Afghan delegate to the production limitation conference with evidence of their broken promises and head off potential damage to production limitation efforts.\textsuperscript{567}

Similar to Iran, Afghanistan’s pursuit of short-term political goals had resulted in their government making long-term promises they could not keep. When the hard economic and political obstacles became apparent, the goals were merely dropped. The US, UK and UN lacked the diplomatic or political leverage to prevent this backsliding.

\textbf{Part 2: The Protocol on Synthetics:}

Discussions of synthetic drugs loomed large at the First and Second Session of the CND and represented one area of relatively clear agreement. As the UK delegation wrote: ‘modern chemistry has produced synthetic drugs, capable of producing and maintaining addiction, but not susceptible to the control imposed by the earlier Conventions, as they are not products of opium or coca leaf’. Anslinger wrote to Malcolm Delevingne in November 1947, ‘we are virtually undergoing a drug revolution’:

\begin{quote}
\emph{Little did we think in 1931, in drafting the Limitation Convention, that we would be confronted with a whole raft of synthetic drugs, which are coming to the front with such lightning speed that we are almost unable to keep track of them.}\textsuperscript{568}
\end{quote}

Productions similar to opium alkaloids were increasingly being derived synthetically from coal-tar. The two most visible drugs during these early discussions were Demerol and Amidone.\textsuperscript{569} A synthetic form had not replaced the opiate codeine and for countries like Britain it was the main opium product. This meant there remained a large demand for opium as a raw material. Britain acknowledged, however, ‘if a synthetic coal-tar substitute for codeine is invented, opium as a raw material for the legitimate alkaloid trade might virtually

\textsuperscript{567} Coles to Anslinger, 27 October 1947; Anslinger to Coles, 17 November 1947, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box121/File1230-1, UN 3\textsuperscript{rd} Session #1 (1947-8).

\textsuperscript{568} Anslinger to Delevingne, 25 November 1947, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1, UN 1\textsuperscript{st} Session #2 (1947-50).

\textsuperscript{569} Amidone was later to become more widely known as Methadone.
disappear’.\textsuperscript{570} The US similarly viewed that ‘The use of synthetics is growing so rapidly that there is a strong possibility of their replacing completely the derivatives of opium’.\textsuperscript{571} This possibility, that poppy-based medicines could be entirely replaced by synthetics, was to become a consistent theme in negotiations over the coming decades. Producer states viewed them as a direct economic threat, while control advocates used their spectre to simultaneously demand stricter productions controls and lower prices, as we shall see.

Amending existing conventions was viewed as too complicated so states opted for a new Protocol covering all synthetic drugs not included in the 1931 Convention. At the 1947 CND, Anslinger proposed language and was seconded by Major Coles of the UK, followed by unanimous adoption.\textsuperscript{572} The goal was to expedite passage at the 1948 CND. Anslinger optimistically predicted that the proposed protocol would ‘serve the purposes for all time’.\textsuperscript{573}

The Protocol would supplement, rather than replace, the 1931 Convention and apply its system of control to synthetics. The US pushed for ‘a temporary but general limitation’ of any new drug pending a definitive decision by WHO on its efficacy and addiction potential. This became a core negotiating point heading into the 1948 CND. Anslinger claimed to have the support of the WHO, PCOB and DSB. The US were eventually forced, however, to soften the language due to a clear lack of support from the UK, USSR and the Netherlands who feared stifling innovation. CND could simply recommend to governments, pending a WHO decision whether a particular drug was liable to produce addiction, that they apply controls provisionally.\textsuperscript{574}

The overall success of the draft protocol represented the intersection of various factors, including the strong normative uniformity underpinning the system at the time. Problems with the global regulatory approach to drugs were as yet unclear and states agreed on the core

\textsuperscript{570} Draft Brief for UK Delegation, ECOSOC VII, 1948, BNA-CAB134/390.
\textsuperscript{572} CND, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Session, ‘Summary Record of Second Meeting’, 24 July 1947, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box121/File1230-1, UN CND 2\textsuperscript{nd} Session (1947).
\textsuperscript{573} Anslinger to Delevingne, 25 November 1947, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1, UN 1\textsuperscript{st} Session #2 (1947-50).
\textsuperscript{574} ‘Draft Protocol to Bring under International Control Drugs Not Covered by the 1931 Convention’, 16 December 1947; Foley to Secretary of State, 17 February 1948; Anslinger to Tennyson, 7 May 1948, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1, UN 1\textsuperscript{st} Session #2 (1947-50).
tenets of a control policy based on regulation underpinned by prohibitions. The new Protocol would represent an extension of the existing normative and regulatory framework rather than an innovation. Further, given the lack of entrenched economic interests around the new drugs, carving up the market among existing players ensured minimal opposition. More broadly the Protocol offered the international community a beacon of success upon which they could point other areas of international cooperation then foundering on the rocks of the early Cold War.

**Part 3: Third CND Session, 1948:***

**Preparing for The Third Session:**
The Third Session would prove pivotal in shaping the direction of international drug policy for the coming decades. The mixed results in the first two CND sessions paved the way for a major political push. In March 1948 the US began planning for a new ‘single convention’ which could consolidate the existing conventions and potentially create a single international control body. The US aimed to turn to it once a production limitation agreement had been concluded. Major Coles of the UK, meanwhile, retired just prior to the Third Session. This would have major implications for Anglo-American drug relations.575

**The Indochina Flashpoint:**
In 1948 FBN Agent Tollinger reported from French Indochina about the growing sale of opium. Anslinger intended to highlight the issue at CND but was again overruled by the State Department. In his extensive draft Anslinger pointed out that their Federal Ordinance of June 1946 outlawed the sale of opium for smoking, but US intelligence suggested that:

> the French Government did not close the opium monopoly dens when it announced the adoption of its policy of prohibition, but transformed them into “clinics” where addicts could smoke without molestation. The present policy of the French Government is strictly that of taking all possible measures to supply the demand for opium in order to obtain as much revenue as possible at the expense of the addicts.576

---

Many in the State Department supported the statement ‘in principle’. As Mr. Landon wrote privately:

_The report of the Treasury agent…reveals a picture of colonial exploitation which reads like Radio Moscow at its worst. Approximately one-third…of the…Indochinese budget for 1947 was raised through the government opium monopoly._\(^{577}\)

They nevertheless argued that ‘the political situation in that part of the world and in France’ prevented the US raising the issue. The State Department suggested Anslinger instead take ‘non-public corrective action’.\(^{578}\) Once again Anslinger had been rolled back on his efforts to use the UN as a bully pulpit to advocate for a strengthening of control measures.

**Tackling Global Illicit Traffic – The Secretariat Looks to Expand its Role:**

In preparation for the Third Session, Leon Steinig sought to ramp up the UN Secretariat’s role in monitoring the global illicit traffic. He privately sought Anslinger’s advice, pointing out that only ten governments sent reports in accordance with the 1931 Convention. Anslinger suggested the production of a simple table highlighting compliance and passing a CND resolution reminding governments to furnish reports. Further, he pushed for the Secretariat to make recommendations about improving seizure reporting and for including: names of persons arrested; place of birth; origins of drugs seized and the result of the case. Anslinger also warned of the ‘great and expensive burden’ and that the Secretariat should aim for a ‘simple report in narrative form’. The Secretariat prepared a memorandum on States’ compliance with Article 23 of the 1931 Convention, concluding that these reports often contained little ‘of value to other governments, and most of the reports contain significant omissions’.\(^{579}\)

Overall this represented an attempt to extend the DND’s role and lay the basis for increased operations under a future convention framework. DND aimed to become the centre of activity

---

\(^{577}\) Landon to Butterworth, 23 April 1948, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box121/File1230-1, UN 3rd Session #1 (1947-48).

\(^{578}\) Benninghoff to Morlock, 27 April, 1948, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box121/File1230-1, UN 3rd Session #1 (1947-48).

\(^{579}\) Steinig to Anslinger, 9 April 1948; Anslinger to Steinig, 20 April 1948; Memo re. Article 23 of the 1931 Convention, undated, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box121/File1230-1, UN 3rd Session #1 (1947-48).
for illicit market reduction.\textsuperscript{580} It also represented an effort by the UN machinery to prevent the splintering of control efforts into other regional and bilateral frameworks and institutions, as we shall see. The genesis of the modern, UN-centred, illicit market enforcement system had begun. Nevertheless, with the US forced to tailor its criticisms and enforcement to broader geopolitical concerns the question of enforcing the global normative and legal framework against the illicit traffic appeared uncertain.

The British Strategy:

The Third Session of CND represented a relatively unique example of consensus in policy and process at CND. One of the only real points of contention from the UK perspective was how to incorporate a ‘colonial clause’ accounting for Metropolitan ratification of agreements on behalf of their colonies, with particular pushback coming from the Soviet Delegation. Another issue arose around renewing membership of the Commission. In this case the only question arose over whether Iran would be re-elected. As UK Delegate Thornton wrote:

\textit{There are two considerations here. The first that hardened lying on the part of a Government contributes nothing and ought to be visited with some consequences, e.g. exclusion from the Commission – yet the same could be said in a minor way concerning France (Indo China). The other that it is well to have an offending country on the Commission where its delegate can…be put “in the dock”. I should incline to keep Iran. The U.S.A. delegate is in doubt but I think there are reasons why the U.S. Government is inclined to treat Iran tenderly and that may determine the matter.}\textsuperscript{581}

Regarding opium smoking certain criticisms were aired but not in an overly aggressive manner. The Dutch East Indies were criticised for, although seemingly diminishing smoking, having ‘not yet gone the whole hog’. Egypt in particular was critical of allowing any continuation of licenced opium smoking. Similarly Indochina and Macao were criticised for continuing to allow smoking. The British delegate, Thornton, privately acknowledged that for Macao ‘the opium traffic remains a large part of the raison d’etre of the colony’.\textsuperscript{582}

\textsuperscript{580} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{581} CND: Third Session – Report of the UK Delegate, 2 June 1948, BNA-FO371/72915.
\textsuperscript{582} Ibid.
Overall the US delegation, under a State Department muzzle, held its guns on recalcitrant states. Thornton, representing Britain, found Anslinger ‘friendly’ and ‘always helpful’ but ‘very quiet this meeting’. Privately, he highlighted how Anslinger and Sharman represented ‘the two countries which par excellence look to international co-operation to mitigate drug consumption in their own countries’. Meanwhile, the momentum towards a new production control agreement and new Single Convention accelerated. Despite US enthusiasm however, Britain remained cautious about rushing headlong into a new production limitation convention or a Single Convention. As Thornton wrote:

**But for the white drug problem in the U.S.A., and the fact that white drugs were exclusively produced from eastern opium…**suppression of the production of raw materials and their indigenous consumption in a relatively harmless form would have been carried as far as it has. So far as indigenous consumption in a relatively harmless form would have been carried as far as it has. So far as indigenous consumption is concerned there is a fait accompli; but there is a room for caution as regards the chewing of the coca leaf, the essential viciousness of which has yet to be conclusively established.\(^{583}\)

The UK first wanted to see the 1948 Protocol prove itself effective:

**It will be interesting to see what the U.S.A. can do to suppress the illicit manufacture of new synthetics. They failed totally to check illicit liquor stills during Prohibition, although, of course, public opinion was with the distillers. If they fail here, there might even be a reversal of the past, with the East as Accuser and the U.S.A., as the producer of the illicit supplies, in the dock.**\(^{584}\)

He went on, highlighting the new British position:

**The whole situation serves to re-emphasise the importance of the United Kingdom. It occupies an intermediate position. It has more sympathy with the position of the raw**

\(^{583}\) Ibid.  
\(^{584}\) Ibid.
material producing countries than the U.S.A. has; and it has virtually no domestic consumption to worry about.\textsuperscript{585}

But cautioned against ‘being drawn too closely into the orbit of the U.S.A., however friendly our relations are’. Instead he suggested the UK ‘redevelop the flow of secret information which we used to enjoy instead of leaving it a virtual monopoly of the U.S.A.’. In essence Thornton sought to carve the UK CND role out as a counterweight to the US. Viewing himself as a relative newcomer he took ‘a relatively small part in proceedings except in the discussion and drafting of the new protocol’.\textsuperscript{586} Thornton’s views set the general tone for UK drug diplomacy in the coming years. It saw its role as the moderating force within CND and the coalition builder mediating between producer states and strict control advocates such as the US.

\textit{Siam & Iran:}

Anslinger had not been muzzled over Siam at the 1948 CND. He publicly highlighted their opium traffic as being in ‘full swing’ and claimed the northern hill tribes produced 80-110 tons of raw opium annually. Only thirty per cent was distributed legally and the remainder was smuggled into Bangkok, Burma and China. The Chinese Consul General at Bangkok claimed in 1947 that there were 200 smoking dens and 30,000 smokers in Bangkok. Government estimates meanwhile placed total revenue from opium sales in 1947 at fourteen per cent of total government revenue. Anslinger was also furious to learn that in early 1948 the Deputy Minister of Finance announced that the Siamese Government would make its future purchases of opium from Iran.\textsuperscript{587}

The UK were similarly distrustful of Iran’s opium dealings and was quick to paint the opium issue as another example of Iran’s duplicitous methods in pursuit of economic gains. Not far beneath the UK’s anger lay their on-going difficulties with Iran over the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the renewal of Anglo-Iranian oil concessions.\textsuperscript{588} Thornton wrote that Iran’s representative to the 1948 Session, Mr Ardalan:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{585} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{586} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{587} Statement by US Rep. regarding the Opium Situation in Siam, Third Session CND, 1948, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box121/File1230-1, UN 3\textsuperscript{rd} Session #1 (1947-48).
\item \textsuperscript{588} I am indebted to Nigel Ashton for highlighting the broader context of Anglo-Iranian relations underpinning narcotics controls discussions.
\end{itemize}
Lies abroad for the good of his country and with astonishing effrontery. Ready to multiply or divide Iran statistics by ten to meet criticisms and equally ready to restore original figures for the same reason; referred cheerfully to new Iran laws and their present and prospective effect as if all believed him, although he knew no one did.589

Nevertheless, in the interest of consensus and stability for the still new CND, criticism was generally reserved. The focus of this session remained the Synthetics Protocol and building forward momentum towards production limitation and a single convention. Although the international commitment to abolishing opium smoking and enforcing the existing convention framework was highlighted, Anslinger had been limited to mild criticisms of Mexico, Indochina and Iran. He had used his leeway on Siam to fire a warning shot to other states about the potential of the US to utilise CND as a forum for criticism. This, however, would be contingent on the State Department allowing the narcotics issue to complicate relations with Siam.

Control advocates in the US viewed the CND as failing in its enforcement roles. As Helen Howell Moorhead wrote:

There has been much accomplished by the technique of the Protocol in bringing the old Treaties up to date, but grave weakness has been displayed in handling the illicit traffic cases…We need a “Prosecutor for the defense of public interest”, some one free to urge forward the main object of the Commission—to control the movement of the legal traffic, and to attack un-remittingly the illicit traffic.590

Whether CND could be moulded into this kind of enforcement environment, in-line with long-standing ‘inner circle’ goals remained to be seen. The experience of Anslinger thus far suggested a resounding ‘no’.

Production Limitation:

590 Moorhead to Anslinger, 6 August 1948, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box121/File1230-1, UN 3rd Session #1 (1947 - 1948).
The 1948 session produced three different resolutions on production limitation. A US resolution called for a new Single Convention, which would include a production limitation provision. A Chinese resolution, viewing the Single Convention as a longer-term goal, pushed for an ‘interim commodity agreement’ to control the opium until the Single Convention could be agreed. Finally, the Soviet delegation proposed to control the global production of hashish.591

The British delegate, Thornton, viewed opium limitation as extremely complex, particularly with the proliferation of synthetic narcotics. Regarding coca leaf, he privately highlighted the uncertainties over its danger and the enormity of socio-economic obstacles to control in Latin America. He pointed out that ‘Columbia found this when after a year of attempted prohibition of cultivation, they had to rescind their decrees’. More formidable, he argued, would be efforts to control ‘Indian Hemp’ which grew wild over vast areas of India, Africa and elsewhere. He pointed out that ‘an onslaught on the growth of this plant would be an undertaking of the first magnitude’ and would prove ‘nearly impracticable’.592

The UK Delegation was deeply sceptical of the US proposal. Consolidating past treaties was seen as ‘a minor affair’ compared to production limitation, which may never be attained and at a minimum would require years of work. Further, until this was overcome, a Single Convention would prove premature and unnecessary. They sought to postpone discussions through extensive studies. Thornton also doubted the utility of the Chinese proposal and abstained - not wanting to be seen as opposing it. Again he supported further study to have ‘something specific to discuss’ at the next session of CND.593 The Russian proposal was ‘meaningless’ but since ‘it only involved studies…which will disclose its absurdity, no harm was done by its adoption’.594

The secretariat would undertake a study of coca chewing in Peru. Initially no other Latin American country sought involvement and Bolivia remained actively hostile to controlling the coca leaf. The UK remained deeply sceptical but again figured little harm would result

592 Ibid.
593 Draft Brief for the General Assembly: Item 4(D): Narcotic Drugs, 20 September 1948, BNA-FO371/72915
from further study. 595 Also Thornton wished to support the ‘brilliant young psychiatrist’ representing Peru with whom he had ‘established excellent personal relations, which have already proved useful’. Further the UK concluded that:

The Peruvian Government is, overtly at least, “showing willing”, whereas the Government of Bolivia, where the habit is equally prevalent, is indifferent to the point of intransigence. It would be unfortunate if Peru’s forthcomingness were met by a niggardly response. 596

Outcomes:
Overall there was a general view that the Third Session was relatively amicable. The UK delegation wrote that it was ‘up to best standards for business and atmosphere’. Further CND was highlighted as a venue ‘almost clear of ideologies; and as such an enduring example of what can be done internationally if goodwill can be achieved’. 597 It also represented the solidification of the post-war coalitions and alignments. India, concerned with broader issues of international legitimacy and highlighting the ‘new era’ domestically, played a far less obstructionist role on the Commission than previously; France sought to play a quietly assertive role while deflecting attention from the issue of opium smoking in Indochina; Egypt remained the standard bearer for anti-trafficking efforts in the Middle East, despite the personal weaknesses, and reputation for inebriety, of its delegate Mr. Zaky; China retained an ideological uniformity on drugs, aligning closely with strict control advocates, despite the weakness and lack of knowledge of its delegate Mr. Hsia and the worsening domestic situation; Turkey focused on defending its interests rather than seeking to engage in broader system politics; Russia, remained erratic, unpredictable and yet relatively quiescent in the Third Session. Their delegate Mr. Zakusov was a drug professional with little understanding of international affairs and a lack of interest in the rival international ideologies. This, coupled with his ‘pleasant and courteous’ nature proved a tremendous boost to the 1948 session fuelled the narrative of CND being a UN framework where broader geopolitical issues were checked at the door. 598

595 Ibid.
596 Draft Brief for the General Assembly: Item 4(D): Narcotic Drugs, 20 September 1948, BNA-FO371/72915
597 Ibid.
598 Ibid.
CND recommended that ECOSOC authorise the Secretariat begin to draft a Single Convention to replace all the existing conventions including a new production limitation convention. In the meantime the Secretariat would study an interim production limitation convention and the Commission of Inquiry on Coca would undertake its study. Then, in a coup for the old ‘inner circle’, Col. Sharman was elected as a new member of the DSB, following his nomination by Anslinger. Lastly, of particular long-term significance was the creation of a UN periodical on narcotic drugs – eventually to be called the Bulletin on Narcotics.599

Looking to its immediate future, CND outlined three core priorities. First to implement and apply the existing international conventions; second, to finalise the Protocol bringing drugs outside the scope of the 1931 Convention under control; third, limiting the production of raw materials and the eventual drafting of a single convention encompassing this. This latter goal was to be fulfilled through an interim agreement and the negotiation of the Single Conventions, to be pursued concurrently.600

ECOSOC quickly passed all measures suggested by CND and an official signing ceremony for the 1948 Synthetics Protocol took place on the 19th of November 1948 at the Palais de Chailliot.601 Meanwhile, In July 1948 it was announced that the PCOB and DSB would be moving to the United Nations Office at Geneva. One of the most consensual periods in international drug control had brought significant forward political movement. Whether the momentum could be sustained into future years remained an open question, but the direction of travel was clear and the political end point of a ‘single convention’ lay on the horizon. Navigating to this end point remained the key question of international drug policy for the next two decades.

**Conclusion:**
The 1946-8 period was highly consensual when viewed against the backdrop of the previous four decades. It nevertheless produced mixed outcomes. The League system had been fully

601 Steinig to Anslinger, 19 August 1948; Steinig to Anslinger, 25 November 1948, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box121/File1230-1, UN 3rd Session #1 (1947-48).
salvaged and given a stronger institutional footing within the UN. Once again it was manufacturing states, which took the political lead, which accounted for the success of the 1948 Synthetics Protocol. However, the UN had not emerged along the lines the ‘inner circle’ had hoped for. It remained largely toothless, and members like the USSR pushed back against any efforts to give it the power of interference in national controls. Attempts by the US and its allies to utilise the system as an enforcement mechanism fell flat in the face of practical difficulties in recalcitrant states, and the necessity of deferring to broader geopolitical goals. The US continued to place its hope in an ever-strengthened PCOB as an enforcement body and looked towards a unified convention as a means to toughen controls and build a stringent production limitation framework. As US influence in the world grew, along with the necessities to accommodate local concerns, the American willingness to endlessly push an uncompromising control agenda became undermined. Similar to the British government in decades previous, the expansion of US power meant that the US had to compromise its anti-opium principles in pursuit of broader political and foreign policy objectives.

The UK remained self-consciously pragmatic, steering towards the middle ground. The colonial question appeared largely resolved, and the British only expended political capital on core interests – for example when questions touched on issues of international law and colonial governments or Britain’s drug manufacturing interests. The UN framework had been established and member states began to settle into a set of coherent interest-related voting blocs. What was yet to emerge was a coherent producer nation voting bloc. This, as we shall see in the coming chapters, was to emerge under Turkish leadership.

Meanwhile, the importance of individual diplomats continued to manifest itself. The extent to which core representatives worked towards achieving their agendas remained a key determinant of outcomes. This would be particularly apparent as Anslinger was muzzled by the State Department resulting in more consensual negotiations. Meanwhile, the change in leadership for the UK away from the old hand Coles towards the new leadership of Thornton would have significant implication for British and Anglo-American drug diplomacy. Lastly, the relative lack of desire of the Soviet Delegate in fighting the broader ideological battles of the emerging Cold War within the confines of CND facilitated consensual negotiations and contributed to the narrative of CND as a successful example of international cooperation during this period.
As Anslinger fought to enshrine the ‘inner circle’ conception within the new CND, through a mixture of normative framework building and enforcement via US diplomatic leverage, his strength would be determined by State Department support. By 1948 the latter had made clear the secondary importance of this issue relative to broader US diplomatic interests. The division of power within the UN framework, CND serving as a venue for highlighting ‘technical’ concerns and ECOSOC serving as a venue determining political outcomes under State Department control, came into view over the period 1946-48. Meanwhile, as FBN efforts in CND were seen to influence broader diplomatic relations, the State Department took an expanded role in blunting ‘technical’ criticisms of states like Mexico and French Indochina. Nevertheless, the ‘inner circle’, under US, Canadian and UN Secretariat leadership, had begun to enshrine a strongly repressive approach to domestic consumption and addiction within the international normative framework.

The shape of the post-war system cleavages had emerged. Britain and the US represented the two core threads in a polarised system. On the one side remained the US with a commitment to prohibitionist policies and an ostensible desire to utilise available diplomatic leverage to advance them. On the other side remained producer states which bucked against excessive interference, a diminished market and new burdensome regulations. For the UK, in the middle, regulation and respect for middle ground policies remained predominant. The success of the US in driving through its prohibitionist and strict enforcement vision or the success of the UK in moderating US demands and coalescing states around a moderate regulatory vision would determine the direction of international controls over the coming decades.
Chapter 6: Dividing up the Global Licit Market, 1948-1953:

Introduction:
By 1948 the trajectory of drug control was by no means clear. Iran and Afghanistan rolled back their commitments; colonial administrations struggled to implement prohibitions; and the general international security situation deteriorated. Meanwhile multilateral efforts became almost entirely side-tracked by efforts to create an interim production limitation agreement that would serve until the Single Convention could be agreed. On this latter front the US remained far more optimistic than states like the UK who saw only roadblocks.

The ‘serene atmosphere’ of the 1947 and 1948 CND Sessions quickly slipped into the rear-view mirror. As the 1940s came to a close the UK had assumed a conservative and defensive posture. Its delegation actively shied from controversial issues and was deeply reticent to provide any sort of expansion of powers for CND, the World Health Organisation (WHO), PCOB or other bodies. The UK maintained a strong vigilance against anything which could damage its vital narcotics trade and further worsen its economic situation. Similarly, anything potentially complicating colonial matters was to be strenuously avoided.

The UK policy was to run CND silent and deep as broader geopolitical conflagrations pushed drug policy down the international agenda. In certain areas, functional relationships were carved out – for example Anglo-American cooperation over Germany. In other areas unspoken accords emerged, such as the US going lightly on British colonial possessions and overlooking issues regarding opium smoking or smuggling activities. The UK politely dug in its heels and sought to slow the US-generated momentum towards new accords, while maintaining amicable relations with the US delegation.

Anslinger, successfully avoided a domestic reorganisation attempt, and soon aimed to secure an international accord that would reaffirm the independent position of his agency under treaty law. In so doing he worked to lessen the State Department’s grip of the strategic tiller and reassert his influence over international processes. He eventually saw the 1953 Opium Protocol as an, admittedly imperfect, means to effect forward momentum on production.

control. Further by declaring victory on the ‘interim agreement’ he dug multilateral processes out of the mud and enabled attention to be switched back to his pet project, the Single Convention.

The UK, on the other hand, seeing the Home Office reins of policy change hands a number of times, maintained a pragmatic but essentially conservative approach. The issues around medicinal heroin use and outside criticism of UK prison sentences heightened London’s awareness that the UN drug framework, despite initially circumscribed goals, had a tendency towards ‘mission creep’ and regulatory capture by states advocating the most repressive and control-oriented approaches. Eventually, as states like the US and France pushed ahead with accords in the face of doubts, irrationalities and hard economic logic, the UK approach became characterised by stern opposition. This resulted in the UK pushing back against the 1953 Protocol and its drafts in an occasionally incoherent but resolute manner.

The UK initially sat quietly on the side-lines, not appearing to obstruct negotiations but confidently expecting production limitation to collapse under the weight of its own contradictions. This approach became untenable when France, under the determined leadership and vision of its CND delegate Charles Vaille, assumed the lead negotiator role and became a key Anslinger ally. 1950 marked the beginning of a new Franco-US drug diplomacy, with the strident and abrasive Vaille making a strong and positive impression on Anslinger.603 Both Anslinger and Vaille worked to hammer through a negotiated outcome even if it alienated many states and was unlikely to achieve consensus and adoption. This Franco-US drug alliance became all the more important as the US-Canadian relationship lost its core strength when Col. Sharman was pushed out of the Canadian policy process and his successors moderated their approach sharply. They moved to ally with Britain viewing the British regulatory approach as more conducive to protecting their economic interests as a consumer state (see Chapter Seven).604

The period 1948 to 1953 was underpinned by a general lack of bilateral enforcement efforts. Certain states received the occasional ire of and dressing down by the US via the UN

603 Anslinger to Vaille, 4 January 1951, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box121/File1230-1, UN 5th Session #4 (1950-1); The importance of Vaille to the Franco-US alliance would be demonstrated later when his removal from CND in 1958 saw France quickly shake off its leadership role and work to deprecate the importance of international drug control efforts.

604 McAllister, Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century, p. 178.
framework but these were generally reserved. By 1952, however, Anslinger had found the issue that would help him retake the initiative on US drug diplomacy. Just as he had done a decade previously with Japan, he launched a full frontal assault on the People’s Republic of China (PRC), painting them as the source of an enormous conspiracy to flood the West with illicit opium to earn foreign exchange and sap the US will to fight wars.

As the international security situation worsened, the drug control framework began to strain at the seams. States moved towards quiet bilateral cooperation on issues of overlap, such as Western Germany. Meanwhile on complex issues crossing deep geopolitical fissures, states were careful to avoid publicly stressing drug policy issues for fear of a rupture pulling the system apart. This became harder as the supply framework of the system began to break down in the face of a spike in wartime demand and pre-emptive stockpiling. The market which control advocates had been working to shrink and restrict suddenly became a suppliers market with consumer countries vying for stocks of opium. Claims that synthetics were doing away with the need for opium became harder to sustain and producer states sought to cash in on their position. As CND continued to push towards a production limitation agreement states like Turkey and Iran became more confident and vocal in the defence of their interests, but also increasingly willing to draw outside the lines of the ‘licit’ system when it suited their economic interests.

Against this background CND’s secretariat, the Division on Narcotic Drugs (DND) became bogged down in efforts by its head, Leon Steinig, to push through an international opium monopoly against all diplomatic and economic barriers, to the detriment of all other work, such as the Coca Leaf Commission and the draft ‘single convention’. Eventually Secretariat overreach alienated key Member States and created a breakdown in relations between CND and its secretariat. Messy discussions around the Opium Monopoly became an embarrassment to the entire UN and all were keen to salvage some agreement.

**Part 1: Anslinger’s Domestic Threat - Reorganisation:**

In 1949 the Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government began advocating that the FBN be transferred from the Treasury Department to the Department of Justice and consolidated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). They argued that the FBN was now more concerned with the enforcement of regulations to prevent
illegal sale and use rather than with the collection of revenue. Anslinger quickly mobilised his political base to generate opposition at all levels of the US government. The drug industry was quick to throw its weight behind Anslinger. Senators received letters from angry State regulators. The Woman’s Christian Temperance Union sent letters to the Secretary of the Treasury urging that the FBN ‘remain a separate Bureau’ within the Treasury Department. Eventually the threat was defused, leaving Anslinger once again safe for the foreseeable future and free to refocus on national and international efforts. In the meantime issues of international control had taken a backseat to the overarching concern for his bureaucratic survival.

**Part 2: Control in Germany:**

At the 1947 CND, the US delegation called the situation in Germany ‘unsatisfactory’. Soviet intransigence had postponed unified control indefinitely. Within the US Zone, a strong policy transfer had been effected via US officials working with the German Government and police. The US trumpeted this in UN forums, but the British Zone soon attracted negative attention. The Netherlands, bordering the British Zone, raised serious concerns about smuggling. London acted quickly and by 1949 had appointed a Zone Narcotics Officer mandated to establish ‘close liaison’ with his US & French counterparts, as well as with authorities in Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands. Further, specified Dutch officers could pass freely into the zone to co-operate with British authorities. The Netherlands professed themselves satisfied and the situation was defused. Meanwhile, the British Government pushed blame onto the East German authorities. They claimed all Western efforts to establish cooperation were ignored, along with all police enquiries into illicit trafficking cases.

Work on a tri-zonal approach continued and negotiations began on a Western Germany Narcotics Bureau. In early 1950 the US recommended creating a German Central Narcotics Office covering the Federal Republic. Further, they suggested integrating the Allied Narcotics Officers into one Allied Narcotics Board to supervise the work of the Central

---


606 Giuliani to Anslinger, 20 May 1947; Statement by Anslinger to UN CND, July 1947, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box121/File1230-1, UN CND 2nd Session (1947).

607 German Political Department to Cadogan, 19 May 1950, BNA-FO371/88824.

608 Draft Brief for UK Rep, 4 Session CND, May 1949, IOC (49)84, BNA-CAB134/397.
Narcotics Office. A West German response to narcotics control was emerging which would take pressure off occupying governments.

**Part 3: Limitation of Coca Leaf:**

Coca control was given an initial impetus when the Government of Peru advocated independent expert reviews of the impact of coca chewing. The UN Commission of Inquiry on the Coca Leaf conducted its field research in Peru and Bolivia over the period September to December 1949. Its controversial report concluded that the practice of coca chewing was harmful and should be suppressed. Militating against immediate prohibition it claimed there was a general need to improve socioeconomic conditions in areas where it was prevalent and that Governments should work to prohibit the practice within fifteen years. The march towards the global prohibition of the coca leaf had begun.

In the meantime the Peruvian CND delegate, Dr. Jorge A. Lazarte, with whom many delegations including the US and Canada had formed extremely close relations, had fallen out of favour with his home government for domestic political reasons. Peru then sided with Bolivia to strongly challenge the Coca Commission’s findings. CND sought to defuse tensions by encouraging dialogue. Sharman and Anslinger were impatient with the 15-year timeline and Sharman hoped they would ‘cut the Gordian knot immediately’. The UK sought ‘a solution which disposes of the matter as soon as possible with the least possible conflict, complication and expense’. By 1951 Bolivia and Peru hardened their stance and sought to bury the report in UN processes. The Secretariat, having spent UN resources on the Commission, was keen to see some conclusion reached. Control advocates maintained their original strategy that the Coca Commission should serve as the springboard to incorporating coca production limitation into the ‘single convention’.

---

612 Ibid.
613 Sharman to Anslinger, 21 July 1950, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box121/File1230-1, UN 5th Session #2 (1950).
614 Draft Brief for UK Rep, 7th Session CND, 29 March 1952, IOC (52)12, BNA-CAB134/944.
615 Draft Brief for UK Rep, ECOSOC XII, 6 February 1951, IOC (51)14, BNA-CAB134/410.
616 See Fonda correspondence, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box121/File1230-1, UN 5th Session #2 (1950).
Part 4: Suppressing Opium Smoking - Colonial Territories:

The 1948 CND referred, after a UK amendment, to ‘some Far Eastern Territories’ failing to meet their obligations around suppressing opium smoking. The UK interpreted this as making a clear distinction between their colonies and others, namely Indo-China, Macao and the Dutch East Indies. The UK was extremely vigilant against any reports which reflected poorly on their colonies. In 1949, Malaya struggled to enforce a prohibition on opium smoking due to political unrest. Singapore, with its estimated 14,000 habitual smokers, reported that the opium situation was ‘disturbing’ but they avoided enforcing anti-opium laws until the security situation had stabilised. In the meantime the UK sought to displace part of the blame to producer countries like China, Siam and Iran for their lack of control.\(^{617}\)

In August 1950 Mr. Thornton of the Home Office requested that Consular Officers in South East Asia send secret reports on the opium smoking situation. The Foreign Office torpedoed the idea concluding that if the CND delegate divulged the information he could prove ‘a liability’ given ‘the present inflammable state of the Far East’. They argued that the UK should trust that setting a good example of convention compliance would encourage stricter adherence by other signatories.\(^{618}\) Far from satisfied, Thornton responded that he hoped this ‘trust…may prove not to be misplaced’.\(^{619}\)

As the political situation in Burma worsened it fell entirely off the opium radar as states struggled to find a political resolution. With the shift of nationalist Chinese (KMT) troops into the mountain regions the seeds of an invigorated illicit opium industry were laid. The UK was concerned to protect their relationship with Burma while the US aimed to stabilise the security situation in the region. Neither had an interest in kicking the Hornets' nest of regional opium policy. Meanwhile, the KMT forces began to utilise the ungoverned spaces and opium trade to fund anti-communist insurgency efforts.\(^{620}\) The KMT quickly gained control of the opium trade in the Shan States, shipping rapidly increasing supplies via Thailand.\(^{621}\)

---

\(^{617}\) Draft Brief for UK Rep, 4\(^{th}\) Session CND, May 1949, IOC (49)84, BNA-CAB134/397.

\(^{618}\) Murray to Thornton, 18 September 1950, BNA-FO371/88825.

\(^{619}\) Thornton to Murray, 23 September 1950, BNA-FO371/88825.

\(^{620}\) See BNA-FO371/106691.

\(^{621}\) McCoy, The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, Colombia, 162.
Opium began to take a particular prominence in the Indochina conflict by 1953. As the UK Legation to Saigon wrote in 1953:

> Opium is the most important product of the regions of Laos through which the Vietminh launched their offensive last April and May, and it is in terms of this commodity that the offensive is now being explained on every side. ... If the Sam Neua region remains in their hands they will retain an assured source of income and further sallies southwards at harvest time, even if no major offensive is launched, will have obvious attractions. 622

British intelligence also suggested that ‘the Vietminh are using some of the raw opium captured in the Laotian campaign’ to fund their activities. 623

**Part 5: The Emergence of the Red China Conspiracy:**

The emergence of the PRC regime had enormous implications for the international system. Control advocates quickly lost their traditional CND ally to increasing irrelevance. Initial political difficulties centred on having a nationalist Chinese delegate represent China at CND, something the Soviet and Polish delegates raised every year. Soon, a much larger issue arose.

In 1950 the Chinese communist regime appeared to re-enter the global export market offering 500 tons of raw opium to a British firm in Hong Kong. Initially little was known about the opium but eventually the UK privately concluded it was collected and warehoused under the previous regime. The PRC appeared to be trying to offload existing stocks and earn some foreign currency in the process. 624

CND, at the 1950 Session, urged caution against China rushing back into production given its troublesome history with opium. Control advocates feared it would upend a production limitation agreement. 625 The Board of Trade in the UK concluded that the opium was unsuitable given that it was double the price of Indian opium. The UK hoped this economic

---

622 Memo, British Legation, Saigon, 10 June 1953, BNA-FO371/106801.
623 British Legation, Saigon, 3 July 1953, FO371/106801.
624 Draft Brief for UK Rep, ECOSOC XII, 6 February 1951, IOC (51)14, BNA-CAB134/410.
625 See press clippings in FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box121/File1230-1, UN 5th Session #1 (1949-50).
The argument would ‘avoid any suggestion of political bias’ but feared the entire crop would be diverted into the illicit market.626

The UK was walking a fine line. It feared a larger spotlight being thrown on Hong Kong, thereby fuelling anti-colonial sentiments. On the other hand they were concerned not to further weaken relations with the PRC Government. Although it was their ‘duty’ to inform CND, the UK delegates were instructed to ‘discourage any unnecessary publicity’.627 As one member of the Foreign Office wrote: ‘[t]he U.S. Press will be only too pleased to take full advantage of this’.628 The issue caused the Foreign Office to refocus their sights on drug diplomacy after years of deferring to the Home Office. They highlighted wider ‘political repercussions’ of unchecked Home Office reports on opium in the Far East and therefore requested greater oversight.629 The Home Office agreed to forward anything ‘liable to have potentially serious political repercussions’.630

The US and Anslinger in particular (fresh from the domestic reorganisation battle) seized on these reports to castigate the communists and highlight a new international conspiracy that his agency, through the UN, could help thwart. He drew heavily and uncritically on Nationalist propaganda, with one report claiming that:

Opium production and trade have formed an essential part of the Chinese Communists economic program. Thus during the early 30’s…poppy cultivation and opium smoking were encouraged…On the other hand, the Chinese Nationalist Government made strenuous efforts for the suppression of opium traffic and smoking.631

Anslinger used the 1952 CND Session to castigate the PRC, prompting a furious response from the Soviet Delegate, who described Anslinger’s statement as ‘a planned slander and completely unfounded’. The Soviet Delegate then raised US ‘aggression’ in Korea. Anslinger

---

626 Thornton to Seopes 19 December 1950, BNA-FO371/88826.
627 Foreign Office to UK Delegation, 9 November 1950, BNA-FO371/88826.
629 Seopes to Thorton, 11 December 1950, BNA-FO371/88826.
630 Thornton to Seopes 19 December 1950, BNA-FO371/88826.
threatening to call a ‘point of order’ and the session descended into bickering.\textsuperscript{632} Afterwards the USSR delegate circulated a PRC statement refuting Anslinger’s claims and arguing the PRC had pursued strict prohibition. Infuriated, Anslinger spent the next ten months planning a detailed rebuttal for the 1953 CND Session (see below).

By 1953 the spectre of a Chinese opium conspiracy loomed largest in US drug diplomacy circles, much as the Japanese spectre had in the 1930s and 40s. Anslinger utilized it once again to raise the drug issue as a national security issue. He testified to the US Congress that ‘efforts to control addiction within Communist China have been feeble and ineffectual’ and that they had been carrying on ‘Heroin Warfare’ against the US. He claimed their goals were ‘monetary gain, financing political activities in various countries, and sabotage’. Further, raising the opium danger to US troops in Korea, he told the Senate: ‘the communists have planned well and know a well trained soldier becomes a liability and a security risk from the moment he takes a shot of heroin’.\textsuperscript{633} The UK remained deeply sceptical of Anslinger’s claims and wanted the issue to die quietly. However, they said little to contest the US claims and instead sought to keep their heads as far below the parapet as possible.\textsuperscript{634}

\textbf{Part 6: The CND and Multilateralism - ‘Steady as She Goes’}:

At the 1949 CND session the US pursued a policy of ‘steady as she goes’ with the aim of ensuring a speedy passage of the Single Convention later. It sought to tee up the 1950 session for extensive ‘study and action’ and in 1951 ‘the Commission could whip the draft convention into its final form’ and begin its passage to ECOSOC and the General Assembly. In the meantime Anslinger was allowed some leeway to criticise recalcitrant states. He was ‘not to criticize publicly…French Indochina’ despite ‘retrograde measures’ and the re-establishment of the opium monopoly and shops where opium was openly sold to registered ‘addicts’. He was, however, allowed to draw attention to the situations in Siam, where ‘little improvement’ had occurred, and Yunnan as well as to Iran ‘where approximately 1,300,000 persons are smoking opium daily’.\textsuperscript{635}

\textsuperscript{632} Remarks of Soviet Representative on CND, 5 May 1952, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box122/File1230-1, UN 7\textsuperscript{th} Session #1 (1952).

\textsuperscript{633} See press clippings; Anslinger Remarks, 8\textsuperscript{th} Session CND, April 1953, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box122/File1230-1, UN 8\textsuperscript{th} Session (1953).

\textsuperscript{634} Draft Brief for UK Del, ECOSOC 16\textsuperscript{th} Session, 16 June 1953, IOC (53)90, BNA-CAB134/950.

\textsuperscript{635} US Delegation Position Paper, CND 4\textsuperscript{th} Session, 9 May 1949, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box121/File1230-1, UN 4\textsuperscript{th} Session #4 (1949-50).
The UK Delegate, Thornton, enjoyed a relatively subdued 1949 session and focused on alliance building. He found relations with the US and Anslinger ‘remained altogether friendly’ but ‘as before’ he found Sharman ‘rather a handful’. Thornton expressed concerns that ‘Anslinger and Sharman…and others, including the Egyptian, are heads of…narcotics police forces and see all questions in a single minded way’. This, he noted, was translating into efforts to control all precursors to narcotics: ‘it is almost already a struggle to make them keep their clutches off coal tar’. 636

The UK was also angry that it continued to be criticised for the supposed lack of severity of domestic penalties, by Sharman in particular. Nevertheless Thornton expected that British public opinion, ‘little excited by a drugs menace, would not favour extravagant local penalties to meet a world problem’. 637 This issue pointed to a broader problem which the UK had recognised on several fronts: CND was being used by control advocates to criticise states pursuing different approaches. On the issue of criminal penalties the UK could handily ignore the complaints of Sharman. In the areas of synthetic drugs and heroin, which touched on strong economic interests, ignoring the pressure was more difficult.

**Synthetic Drugs:**

The US and its allies continued to push for strengthening pre-emptive controls on new synthetic drugs. The precedents established around Amidone and Dolatin assisted them, The Expert Committee on Habit-forming drugs of the WHO recommended that any future convention should elaborate pre-emptive controls for compounds similar to Amidone and Dolantin. The US then passed a CND resolution suggesting all members apply pre-emptive controls on drugs suggested by the Expert Committee. 638

The UK was deeply suspicious of these efforts. They viewed the 1948 Protocol provisions as sufficient and maintained ‘strong reserve’ against placing pre-emptive WHO controls in the new ‘single convention’. UK legislation only allowed control of drugs likely to produce ill effects and British law was ‘strongly suspicious’ of a presumption of guilt. UK ‘realism’

---

636 Report by British Delegate, CND 4th Session, 20 June 1949, IOC (49)123, BNA-CAB134/398.
637 Report by British Delegate, CND 4th Session, 20 June 1949, IOC (49)123, BNA-CAB134/398.
sought to balance the danger of an influx of new synthetic drugs ‘mostly of American proprietary’, fuelling addiction against the administrative ‘nightmare’ of scheduling these drugs through Orders in Council.\textsuperscript{639}

Highlighting the balancing act the UK faced, Thornton wrote:

\begin{quote}
If new drugs, devised by our chemical manufacturers, and exported, prove later to be powerful drugs of addiction – as heroin proved to be, although called “God’s own medicine”, when invented – our reputation would suffer greatly.\textsuperscript{640}
\end{quote}

Mitigating against this:

\begin{quote}
It is a valuable export trade and if we are to cease exports until ample time has been allowed for a drug to display its vicious characteristics the trade would suffer.\textsuperscript{641}
\end{quote}

The UK sought to generate an informal response to head-off this issue by working directly with the Association of British Chemical Manufacturers. Under this approach, scepticism of international interference would remain central.\textsuperscript{642}

\textbf{Heroin:}

A similar scepticism around international interference arose regarding heroin. Following a supplementary recommendation to the 1931 Convention, every government was requested to examine the possibility of abolishing or restricting its heroin use. After the War the PCOB prioritised this, much to the dismay of the UK and others who argued it was ‘irreplaceable’ for certain uses. By 1949, the UK wrote:

\begin{quote}
The [PCOB] made in its this year’s report to E.C.O.S.O.C. a considerable song and dance over the countries which had not abolished its use, and notably over two, Finland and Italy, which have greatly increased it.\textsuperscript{643}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{639} Draft Brief for UK Rep, 4\textsuperscript{th} Session CND, May 1949, IOC (49)84, BNA-CAB134/397.
\textsuperscript{640} Report by British Delegate, CND 4\textsuperscript{th} Session, 20 June 1949, IOC (49)123, BNA-CAB134/398.
\textsuperscript{641} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{642} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{643} Draft Brief for UK Rep, 4\textsuperscript{th} Session CND, May 1949, IOC (49)84, BNA-CAB134/397.
The UK maintained that the recommendations were ‘based on little reality’, although acknowledging that over 90 per cent of the heroin in UK was used for cough mixtures and that it could be replaced, therefore their position was ‘not invulnerable’. Their response was to work with ‘non-suppressing countries’ including France, Canada and Australia to maintain that Heroin was ‘irreplaceable’. They were further ill disposed to accept a visit from a WHO expert: ‘the United Kingdom Government has made its enquiry and is not in the habit of having its word questioned’. Further, as Thornton wrote, ‘I should not anticipate a very hearty welcome from medical authorities in this country’.

By 1951 the UK had concluded that the PCOB and WHO desired heroin ‘dispensed with altogether’. At CND opinions remained divided with the UK, Canada and France on the one side and the US on the other leading the charge to eradicate it. The heroin issue highlighted the tendency towards mission creep within CND and made the UK increasingly sceptical of accepting any new commitments under the interim protocol and eventual Single Convention negotiations.

**Part 7: Interim Production Control:**

An ad hoc committee was created in 1949 to study an interim production control agreement. It was composed of representatives of the principal opium producing countries, India, Iran, Turkey, the USSR and Yugoslavia. The USSR refused to take part while work on the Single Convention was in progress. Key questions for Producing Countries were: how to carve up the export market; whether to establish complete government monopolies; and the advisability of creating an international purchasing and selling agency. If these could be agreed, control advocates believed that tackling global overproduction was possible, thereby choking off the illicit market. As Anslinger highlighted to CND in 1949:

---

644 Ibid.  
645 Report by British Delegate, CND 4th Session, 20 June 1949, IOC (49)123, BNA-CAB134/398.  
646 Draft Brief for UK Rep to ECOSOC XII, 8 February 1951, IOC (51)12, BNA-CAB134/410.  
For this year the Iranian Government figures the production will be about 1,500 tons. In Turkey the estimate is 439 tons. In one year two countries have approximately between four and five times the medical needs of the world.\textsuperscript{649}

Iran and India expressed early support. Turkey quickly set about establishing itself as the heir apparent of the licit global market. They compiled extensive statistics for the previous fifteen years and recommended all attendees do likewise, fully aware most would struggle. Yugoslavia professed an interest in the equitable distribution of the market based on ‘a long-term annual average of production’.\textsuperscript{650}

Producer states had an economic incentive to try to lock in current market conditions via a global agreement. New synthetics, although vastly oversold by Anslinger, did represent a competitive threat.\textsuperscript{651} Similarly production from poppy straw meant that manufacturers would potentially become far less reliant on traditional producers for raw opium. Lastly, the deterioration of international security had led to opium stockpiling and a spike in demand. This had combined with a number of bad harvests to drive the price up to artificially high levels. A restrictive trade agreement would potentially maintain these high prices and protect against the new threats.

Meanwhile, recalcitrant states like Iran became increasingly dependent on the US for economic aid, which would be jeopardised by continued leakages of their opium into the illicit market. With the death of the Far East monopoly system Iran had three options: try to lock in a share of the licit market; allow their opium to pile up in warehouses and farmers turn to the illicit market; ignore the trade and watch a deterioration of international relations as they were castigated as a global narcostate. Their initial effort was towards the first approach.

The impetus came from the DND and Leon Steinig who viewed this as his legacy issue. The US was unable to formulate a coherent position. Anslinger doubted a successful outcome was

\textsuperscript{649} Anslinger Statement, CND, 19 May 1949, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box121/File1230-1, UN 4\textsuperscript{th} Session #2 (1949).

\textsuperscript{650} Memorandum by the Secretary General on the ad-hoc Committee, 30 September 1949, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box121/File1230-1, UN 4\textsuperscript{th} Session #3 (1949).

\textsuperscript{651} Anslinger Statement, CND, 19 May 1949, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box121/File1230-1, UN 4\textsuperscript{th} Session #2 (1949).
possible but could not afford to be seen to interfere with the process given his domestic weakness arising from the reorganisation effort. The State Department supported the overall process while avoiding damaging relations with any of the producer states by exerting pressure or tipping the scales in favour of one over the other. This incoherence between the FBN and State Department, lack of official role for the US in negotiations and State Department desire to allow the process to play out independently saw the US assume the position of interested observer. It offered encouragement when possible and in general professed willingness to accept the economic costs a successful agreement would bring if it ensured global supply reductions.

The UK immediately took a reticent stance. Doubting an agreement could even be reached, in the event that one was, the British expected it to run aground on the rocks of Iranian overproduction. Feasibility aside, the UK’s core focus was on economic self-interest. They firstly wanted to protect their role as world's leading exporter of opium products. Secondly they wanted to protect their interest as a major consumer through sustaining low prices for NHS medicines. Seeing a restrictive trade agreement as retrograde to their interests, British officials, from the outset, adopted a negative attitude. Mitigating this, they did not want to be seen as subverting the international good out of deference to their economic interests. They maintained a low profile and assumed that the agreement would be torn apart by the traditional fault lines underpinning it.

The Ankara Meeting:
The Committee met in Ankara from 21 November to 7 December 1949. Turkish officials immediately argued that past good performance and the quality of their opium entitled them to the bulk of the licit market. Opium was an important cash crop for their balance of payments with the US and they intended to yield little except to avoid antagonising Iran if possible as they sought better broader relations.\textsuperscript{652} Iran maintained government budgets would be difficult to sustain without opium revenue and was unwilling to cede the bulk of the global market to Turkey. They demanded a 40 per cent global market share and to offload all

\textsuperscript{652} Memo of Conversation: Steinig and Morlock, 25 Jan 1950, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box121/File1230-1, UN 4\textsuperscript{th} Session #4 (1949-50).
existing stocks - multiples of annual global requirements - preferably to the US for dollars. They also warned of peasant push back and the need for economic assistance.653

The Indian delegate defended Indian sovereignty and ‘quasi-medical’ use. An accommodation with India was reached to count only medical and scientific exports.654 Yugoslavia was represented by their CND delegate Mr. Krasevec who went out of his way to be cooperative. They sought to maintain their market share at sixty-three tons per year and publicly support Turkey as part of broader foreign policy to improve relations. Steinig and US observer Mr. Merrill concluded early that the producers did not really want to hammer out an agreement, but instead a means to shift blame to consumers by agreeing unsatisfactory provisions. Steinig used ‘every club in the bag’ to pressure states and warned of dangers of failure. Merrill despite not having an official role, wielded quiet US leverage, writing: ‘I think they were always watching me out of the corner of their eyes, thoroughly aware which side of their bread their opium is spread on’.655

States quickly agreed on establishing an international purchasing and selling agency and negotiations turned on the division of market. In the end the percentage division for the first 450 tons was: Turkey, 54 per cent; Iran, 26 per cent; Yugoslavia, 14 per cent; India, 7 per cent; others (i.e. the USSR) 4%. An additional excess of 5 per cent would be divided equitably and be used for the stocks of the international agency. For amounts in excess of the 450 tons, Turkey would receive a quota of 59 per cent; Iran would receive 30 per cent; India, 7 per cent; others 4 per cent and none for Yugoslavia which relinquished its claim as a gesture to Turkey.656

With this outcome the conference exceeded all expectations. Merrill attributed this to the work of Leon Steinig. He suggested the US quickly throw its weight behind the agreement to prevent backsliding. Problems remained however. It was unlikely the Soviet Union would join, despite provisions made for them. Further, the global licit market was in turmoil

653 Merrill to Anslinger, 9 December 1949, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box121/File1230-1, UN 4th Session #4 (1949-50).
655 Merrill to Anslinger, 9 December 1949, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box121/File1230-1, UN 4th Session #4 (1949-50).
656 Merrill to Secretary of State, 8 December 1949, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box121/File1230-1, UN 4th Session #4 (1949-50).
following a series of bad harvests. As Merrill pointed out, ‘The [Yugoslavians] are now trying to buy opium (!) and the Turks have only stocks of 152 tons and an estimated production for 1949 of 20 or 25 tons! That’s only 172’. Nevertheless, member states and Leon Steinig in particular, pressed on.

*The Purchasing and Selling Agency – The International Monopoly*: Under the agreement Government Monopolies would sell their opium to the international Purchasing and Selling Agency operated by the UN – effectively creating an international monopoly. Steinig adamantly maintained the indispensability of this agency, but also its role as a ‘precedent’ for other dangerous commodities. It was meant as ‘an experiment in economic planning’ and would be incorporated in the ‘single convention’ if successful and potentially other fields.

*A Mood of Quiet Scepticism*: Major obstacles remained and Steinig risked overstepping his Secretariat role and even overreaching CND’s role relative to ECOSOC. Anslinger remained privately cool to the monopoly idea. The State Department was open to it but suggested that the commercial work of the authority be handled by a ‘corporation’, with interested governments buying shares, and the appointment of a Board of Directors which could then be tied in to the UN via a coordinating authority. Sharman hated the idea, joking at one point that the quota aggregated to ‘only 107%’. The UK openly questioned the ‘reality’ of the agreement, given the unpredictable impact of synthetics but also the unreliability of producers’ statistical returns. After the Ankara meeting, UK CND delegate, Mr. Hutson, quoted Bismarck’s question: ‘who is being cheated here?’ He went on: ‘I approach a subject, on which there has been so much hard lying, with caution’. He wanted to make sure there was no ‘hocus-pocus’, pointed out it implied economic assistance to Iran but with no authority to do so and reiterated that the Iranian

---

657 Merrill to Anslinger, 9 December 1949, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box121/File1230-1, UN 4th Session #4 (1949-50).


660 Draft Brief for UK Rep, 4th Session CND, May 1949, IOC (49)84, BNA-CAB134/397.
situation could ‘blow the whole thing’. Lastly, he remained unconvinced that the impact of manufacturing from poppy straw had been taken into account. Britain was ‘experimenting’ with it, and although initially unsuccessful, it could potentially erase a large demand for raw opium. He wrote to Steinig they would need ‘to face the difficulties’ head on. Steinig claimed Hutson’s criticisms not at all ‘discouraging, but rather a helpful criticism and commentary’ but tried to refute each one. Meanwhile, the principal manufacturing and producing countries would meet in Geneva in August 1950 to agree next steps.661

*The UK Position:*

In 1950 the UK underwent another change in leadership at the Home Office. Mr. Hutson, who had replaced Thornton, left the scene and Mr. Samuel Hoare took his place as the lead CND delegate. Sharman wrote to Anslinger:

> Even if Hoare knows little...he is likely to eventually prove a valuable addition to the Commission—a probability which one could never associate with his predecessor.

By mid-1950 Hoare had concluded that the Monopoly could be a good idea in theory, but that its machinery did not seem to have been worked out in detail. He maintained he would wait until the Geneva meetings in August before passing judgment.662

The hard economic realities for the UK were that it:

> imports about a quarter of the world requirements of opium, [and] exports about half of this in the form of drugs. This is a valuable export trade, amounting to about £5,000,000 per annum, of which some £50,000 to £70,000 is estimated to be dollar-earning. This trade is conducted not only in competition with other European countries which manufacture drugs from opium, but also...with countries such as Hungary, and to some extent Poland, which manufacture drugs, not from opium, but from poppy straw, and can do at far less cost (estimated at 54% less).663

---

663 Draft Brief for UK Rep. for Joint Committee of Producers and Manufacturers, 3 November 1950, IOC (50)206, BNA-CAB134/408.
Any increase in the price of opium would place British manufacturers at a further disadvantage. Meanwhile, ‘A rise of 1% in the cost of raw opium is estimated to increase the cost of the National Health Service [NHS] by $5,000’. The NHS had already witnessed ‘unexpectedly high’ costs from drugs and the Treasury had instituted spending controls. There would have to be very compelling reasons for accepting a rise in costs and a clear sense (not believed justifiable given past failures of Iran) that it would achieve the desired objective of controlling illicit supply. Further under the system the UK would become more dependent on Iranian opium despite its significantly higher cost relative to Indian opium. The UK position quickly hardened on this point and although they acknowledged ‘re-opening of the Ankara quotas would completely wreck’ the agreement, they would attempt it.664

A further disincentive was that manufacturers would potentially be forced to cover a 10 per cent monopoly overhead cost. They believed that France and the US had more ability to absorb cost increases and might press the UK to sacrifice its commercial interests through appeals to ‘the general interests of humanity’. The UK concluded they:

cannot afford, at a time when it is still engaged in the effort to bring about a balance between its exports and the imports...to agree anything which might imperil, over the next five years, a substantial element in that trade, as well as increase the already heavy cost of the National Health Service.665

The Monopoly Wheels Come off:
At the Geneva meetings major obstacles became apparent. States agreed that inspections by the international Agency would be required, but there was no agreement on their form. More importantly, there was no consensus on how to fix prices. Producers wanted averages of 1947-9, while manufacturers wanted 1937 prices, indexed to staple commodities. The logic was that opium prices in 1947-9 were irregularly high. Other questions on which there was no agreement were: currency options; how to cover operating costs; how to assess the opium; how to manage the export of alkaloids by producing countries and how to manage competition from poppy straw.

664 Ibid.
665 Ibid.
The Geneva meetings wrapped up unsuccessfully, and one member of the US delegation, Charles Dyer, promised ‘Never again!’ to attend one. The Committee would meet in November 1950 for another attempt at overcoming these obstacles. Despite the deadlock and Leon Steinig ‘trying to proceed with this whole scheme in a very stubborn manner’ Anslinger warned Sharman not to ‘go too far in raising objections, as we do not wish to give the producing countries a way out now that they have agreed on quotas’. Anslinger wanted to appear supportive in principle and was conscious of the State Department policy to keep the US position ‘reserved’.666

The Joint Committee of Producers and Manufacturers met again in November 1950. Price remained the key dividing question. To resolve it a subcommittee consisting of Turkey, Yugoslavia, the US and UK was formed, but quickly became deadlocked. The British delegate wrote: ‘The rest of the session was devoted to putting the best face possible upon the failure to agree about anything’. With the Joint Committee having once again failed CND was forced to take up the matter directly but there appeared little hope for a changed outcome.667

The 1951 CND Session and the Alkaloid Monopoly Proposal:
The US entered the 1951 Session of CND conservatively. They produced a backup plan in case the Monopoly negotiations failed, ignored issues around opium smoking in South East Asia and generally sought to avoid controversy.668 Privately they were working to augment their opium stockpiles to cope with the wartime situation. The UK commented that US stockpiling ‘has left the other manufacturing countries unable to obtain’ supplies and ‘sent the prices of Iranian opium, the only source left, rocketing’.669 The French, meanwhile, proposed a global alkaloid monopoly which would divide up the market along current shares. The UK noted that was a ‘transparent’ effort to establish a cartel of manufacturers and exclude poppy straw alkaloids, to the detriment of consumers facing higher prices and

666 Dyar to State Department, 25 August 1950; Anslinger to Sharman, 12 September 1950; US Delegation to Secretary of State, 15 August 1950, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box121/File1230-1, UN 5th Session #3 (1950-1).
667 Report by UK Rep, Joint Committee of Producers and Manufacturers, 30 January 1951, IOC (51)9, BNA-CAB134/410.
countries like Hungary, which would have to abandon production or turn to the illicit market.\footnote{670}

Despite an ‘exceptionally long’ Sixth Session, CND failed to break the deadlock and the monopoly idea was abandoned. To salvage something, States agreed to a French proposal that the principles of the 1931 Convention be applied to opium production as an interim agreement.\footnote{671} Steinig, who had been distracted by his role as Acting Secretary General, re-joined discussions and fought back. Steinig’s effort:

\begin{quote}
\textit{to bring the Commission back to a proposal which it had dropped infuriated those delegates who wanted to get on with the French scheme, of whom the most vocal were the French representative, M. Vaille, and the representative of the United States.}\footnote{672}
\end{quote}

The situation escalated to the point where a rupture between the Commission and the Secretariat seemed likely ‘unless there is a change either in the representation of certain countries (notably, France, Canada and the United States) or in the directorate of the Division’. The issue was put to a vote and eight members voted to end discussion of the monopoly. Iran and India voted to resume discussions, while three members abstained. Meanwhile, consumer states largely opposed it out of price concerns, with Canada remaining the most militant exponent of free trade.\footnote{673}

Peru had fretted over the extension of controls to coca production. Mexico opposed any notion of international inspection as an incursion on national sovereignty. So too did the Soviet and Polish delegates who also opposed this out of deference to a ‘single convention’ first policy as well as opposition to the UN undertaking a commercial activity. The UK delegate wrote that US lack of support was ‘all important’. The State Department had been largely in favour while Anslinger had remained personally opposed and had brought them around to his view.\footnote{674}

\begin{footnotes}
\item\footnote{670}{Ibid.}
\item\footnote{671}{Report by UK Rep, 6th Session CND, 29 June 1951, IOC (51)69, BNA-CAB134/411.}
\item\footnote{672}{Ibid.}
\item\footnote{673}{Ibid.}
\item\footnote{674}{Ibid.}
\end{footnotes}
The Draft Protocol and UK Dissent:
The UK viewed the Draft French proposal as containing ‘many inconsistencies and unworkable provisions’ and successfully worked to water it down. The UK pointed out it was not more than a step towards limiting production to medical-scientific needs, ‘since the maintenance of free competition in the opium trade must involve over-production’. They argued that:

The system of estimates and statistics of the 1931 Convention cannot be applied to the production of opium…drug manufacture can readily be adjusted to meet…changes in demand, whereas production of opium is inelastic; it depends on harvest and cannot be adjusted after sowing…

Recognising this distinction, limitation of production was to be achieved by an ‘indirect method of limitation of stocks’. A maximum limit of stocks would be set. If a country produced a quantity greater than its export demand, the excess would go into stocks until the maximum was reached. At this point, the PCOB could impose an embargo on exports to deter further overproduction. Even with this compromise, the UK raised objections. Control would merely be a ‘statistical control’ with the PCOB having no way of determining actual stocks. If a country was accumulating excessive stocks, it could give false statistics, or simply cease buying up domestic opium, thereby leaving it for farmers to ‘dispose of’ through illicit channels, thus inadvertently fuelling the illicit trade. Further, the UK warned that imposing an embargo on a major producer could have ‘disastrous effects’ on importers via price spikes and supply shortages.

A ‘further objectionable feature’ for the UK was that limiting the trade to the four producers risked the formation of cartels. The UK pushed for an even more watered down agreement of statistical reporting, with no attempt to set maximum stocks or provision for an embargo. This received no support ‘no doubt because it would not have had even the appearance of a scheme for limiting production’:

---

675 Report by UK Rep, 6th Session CND, 29 June 1951, IOC (51)69, BNA-CAB134/411.
676 Ibid.
The Commission preferred a scheme which has that appearance, even though no one believes that it will in fact have any important effect upon the present over-production of opium. 677

The UK delegate abstained from the provisions relating to stocks, the embargo and the four producers, but supported the proposal ‘in general’. It passed eight to two, with strong US and French support. 678

**Determining Global Supply and Demand:**

As 1952 progressed the global market became even more confused but remained a seller’s one. The UK believed the Iranian Government were purposely understating their stocks in order to keep global prices high. This perception was fuelled by wider UK-Iranian tensions following the nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company by Prime Minister Mossadegh in May 1951. This had major implications for Britain’s economic position, causing severe disruptions to their balance of payments in 1951 and highlighting deeper structural weakness in Britain’s international position. 679

Iran was increasingly desperate for foreign currency and sought to offload supplies at the highest price possible. The US government was in the process of stockpiling and was openly willing to purchase all available opium. 680 The UK were furious that the Iranians had reneged on an agreement to sell opium to a UK firm, Bellairs Atkinson the previous Autumn, presumably, they guessed, out of a desire to sell the opium to the US ‘for dollars’. 681

As matters progressed Iranian Monopoly’s duplicity caused major headaches for the US in particular and led to an array of unfulfilled arrangements entangling the US Government, British firms, courts and even Swiss Banks. The UK wrote that Iran had shown its ‘opportunism and disdain of contractual obligations’, as they sought to exploit high international demand for their opium they promised it to numerous buyers:

---

677 Ibid.
678 Ibid.
681 Logan to Pilgrim, 2 April 1952, BNA-FO371/98721.
The next move in this ridiculous, but very Persian game was that the Americans tried to get delivery of the opium they had purchased.682

The monopoly began to prevaricate. The UK wrote that ‘[a]nyone with experience of this country would have expected such tactics from the Monopoly, but the Americans seem determined to learn the hard way’. As for the opium situation in Iran one UK official wrote: ‘It is almost impossible to obtain reliable information’. Moreover Government crops were not believed to represent more than half of the total production – the excess seemed destined for the illicit market for smoking opium either at home or abroad.683

For the US and UK, the Iranian saga in 1952 highlighted the continued market volatility. The UN system sought to expand its control of the market at a time when states were struggling to ensure that supply met demand for the licit market, made only worse by the distortions of geopolitics. Bluff as they may regarding the impending take-over of synthetics, manufacturing and consumer countries remained dependent on producer countries. This was apparent to all involved as states moved towards an interim agreement and would help delay of the Single Convention for another decade.

Part 8: The 1953 CND Session:

The UK delegation found the 1953 CND Session ‘much more peaceful and good-humoured than in 1952’. Steinig’s political self-immolation and ignominious removal as head of DND following the collapse of the Monopoly negotiations drastically improved Secretariat-CND relations. Gilbert Yates, a former member of the UK Civil Service, had replaced him. Although the CND committed itself at this session to moving forward with the Single Convention, a Joint UK - French memorandum confined the session to ‘questions of principle and [to] not get involved in detailed drafting’. 684

The US viewed as ‘a very surprising development’ the addition of a new Canadian Delegate, Mr. Kenneth Hossick, ‘who was not too well regarded in narcotic circles’. It seemed that Sharman would be replaced at the next Session, to the great dismay of Anslinger and old

---

682 Walker to Logan, 20 May 1952, BNA-FO371/98721.
683 Ibid.
control advocates. The US warned that Sharman was a vital link given his dual role on the CND and DSB and his loss to the Commission would ‘break the continuity’ in relations between the two bodies. Nevertheless, domestic bureaucratic politics in Canada indicated Sharman’s days were numbered.685

Discussions on illicit traffic were the highlight of the Session, and as the UK described it: ‘as usual…largely sterile’. Anslinger’s goals were bilateral. He wanted to defuse tensions with Mexico following ‘unkind things said in California…by highly placed officials’ and ‘show that our relations with Mexico are still on a high level’. He also maintained pressure on Italy’s illicit trade, but his real focus was ‘to take a very healthy swing at Red China’.686 The nationalist Chinese delegate produced a report that infuriated the USSR delegate who demanded it and reports from Hong Kong and Japan be stricken from the record. The UK sought to mediate, particularly as the Chinese report ‘contained many inaccurate statements about Hong Kong and Singapore’. They criticised the Chinese delegate for inaccurate reporting and assured the CND that the Hong Kong report did not in any way reflect on the PRC.687 Mollified the USSR withdrew its complaint and tensions ‘deflated’. Then Anslinger stepped in, as the UK Delegate described it, repeating ‘in a desultory and wholly unconvincing manner’ the nationalist allegations. Much to Britain’s relief, he took pains to praise British Authorities in Hong Kong as ‘making diligent efforts’ to suppress the traffic from the Chinese mainland. Anslinger labelled the PRC statement of the previous year ‘a diatribe of abuse’ and claimed:

the United States is a target of Communist China to be regularly supplied with dollar-earning, health and morale-devastating heroin…According to reliable information…financial and economic organs of Red China’s Central Regime met behind closed doors in Peiping in early December and decided to expand sales activities abroad this year, primarily in Japan, Southeast countries and the United States.688

686 Anslinger to Sharman, 2 March 1953, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box122/File1230-1, UN 8th Session #3 (1953).
688 Anslinger Remarks, 8th Session CND, April 1953, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box122/File1230-1, UN 8th Session (1953).
The UK delegate pointed out that the claims were badly undermined by a recent London Times article ‘alleging that Chinese Nationalist troops are escorting opium caravans…estimated to carry 500 kilograms of illicit opium into Thailand every week’. The UK Delegate claimed Anslinger’s speech was ‘answered temperately and effectively’ by the USSR delegate and no further action was taken. Meanwhile, Britain was relieved when fears that the Egyptian delegate would utilise CND to accuse their forces of impeding narcotics control in the Suez Canal zone proved unfounded. All of these issues merely served to highlight the encroachment of geopolitics into illicit traffic discussions and undermine CND’s image as a technical and apolitical forum.

**Part 9: The 1953 Opium Protocol:**

*The Anglo–US Split:*

Anslinger received word that certain sections, including members of the PCOB and DSB were advocating that the protocol idea be dropped and relevant parts be folded into the Single Convention. He worked quickly to shore up support and ensure the protocol conference went ahead on time. He found the draft protocol ‘on the whole acceptable’ and ‘a realistic approach to an urgent problem’. With the Monopoly idea dead, the Protocol would be based on a ‘free order system’ allowing market forces to determine prices and manufacturers to choose their opium source. As the UK had pointed out, this would result in continued oversupply, but the US argued the protocol would finally determine annual global opium requirements, and allow some coordination (albeit imperfect) between supply and demand. The PCOB would be key to giving it teeth, by requesting explanations for excessive stocks and imposing embargoes.

Samuel Hoare made clear to Anslinger the UK ‘never had much enthusiasm’ for the protocol and in a number of key areas the UK and US remained ‘at variance’. The US favoured limiting the number of exporters to four, thereby halting poppy proliferation in the future.

---

The UK, strongly supported by Canada, feared a ‘trade monopoly’ and demanded an open list. The US suggested a compromise of allowing the PCOB to alter the list in response to market changes but the UK rejected giving the Board such ‘unprecedented power’. 692

The UK further opposed limiting government stocks as ‘a question of principle’ and argued it would have no effect on global overproduction. Instead it would place unnecessary limits on the sovereign right of governments to determine necessary stocks (‘e.g. for national defence’). Further he reiterated UK concerns that utilising the embargo provision could produce supply shortfalls and price spikes. Anslinger became exasperated and pushed the UK to offer ‘suggestions’ rather than broad criticisms. Hoare responded that ‘I very much wish that we could be more constructive’ but ‘I have no useful suggestions to make’. He argued setting maximum stocks was ‘fallacious, and the fact that we have not been able to suggest a better method does not render us any the less critical of this one’. 693

The UK delegation entered the 1953 Conference hoping to obtain US and French support to remove the maximum stocks framework. They recognised this would leave the draft Protocol looking ‘even more bare’ and that some replacement provisions would be needed. The UK suggested improving controls within producer countries by ‘international inspections’. Countries in Latin America objected to these on grounds of sovereignty. The UK did not expect producer countries to go beyond inspection with consent but this would be ‘better than nothing’. 694 The US sought to draw a red line, demanding that denial of a PCOB request would begin an automatic embargo process. 695

The US Turns to France:

Morlock in the State Department concluded ‘that the British Government desires to save its opium and opium alkaloids trade and will use the protocol to that end’. He and Anslinger agreed the US should avoid a preliminary conference with the British and instead turn to France and Charles Vaille. Vaille and Anslinger did not believe that the maximum stocks

proposal would solve global overproduction, but their goal was to institute systems of national monitoring and control in producer countries and then springboard from this towards reducing production. The key was to ‘give power to’ the PCOB ‘and allow it also to certify (verify) the adequacy of national control’. Vaille agreed that ‘the British government will not be of much help to us with this protocol’ and would simply throw up new complaints ‘ad infinitum’. They decided to forcibly override UK concerns and push through an agreement.\textsuperscript{696}

\textit{The Divisive Protocol:}
The Opium Protocol Conference met in May 1953 in New York. Following Vaille’s lead, the US and its allies drove through a divisive agreement over all opposition from key manufacturing and producing states.\textsuperscript{697} Despite softening many of the provisions they disliked, the UK maintained that the agreement provided no ‘means by which any substantial limitation of production can be effected’. It also retained a closed list of producers. Instead of four, seven specific countries – Bulgaria, Greece, India, Iran, the Soviet Union, Turkey and Yugoslavia – would have the right to export opium. A generous maximum stocks provision set at two years’ worth of supplies was included. The UK maintained it was an unnecessary infringement on national sovereignty and that the PCOB would be unable to uncover excesses.\textsuperscript{698}

Producers were mandated to submit estimates of areas to be cultivated and the amount of opium harvested, as well as all other relevant statistics around opium produced, traded and seized. The DSB provided oversight of these estimates and could amend them with the consent of governments concerned, and in the case of non-provision, generating estimates. The Board had a right to request an inspection, but only with the consent and collaboration of the government concerned. It could also impose either recommended embargoes or mandatory embargoes on the import and export of opium for countries to implement. These embargoes could be imposed on states not parties to the protocol. In the case of embargos,

\textsuperscript{696} Morlock to Anslinger, 24 December 1953; Anslinger to Vaille, 9 February 1953; Vaille to Anslinger, 6 March 1953, FBN\textsuperscript{A}/ACC170-74-5/Box125/File0355, Loose Files 1953 Opium Conference (1953).
\textsuperscript{698} UN Opium Conference, Protocol and Final Act, 23 June 1953; New York Times, ‘UN Pact Limits Opium Production’, 28 June 1953, FBN\textsuperscript{A}/ACC170-74-5/Box122/File1230-1, UN 8\textsuperscript{th} Session (1953).
states could appeal to an Appeals Committee appointed by the President of the International Court of Justice. 699

The Protocol included provisions for international inspection. The UK regarded these as the aspect with the most impact but producers and other states had already rejected them in the form outlined by the Protocol, and they featured in the final draft only thanks to Vaille’s political railroading. The UK argued that altering them to ‘any form in which they would meet the objections which have been raised by these countries’ would mean losing ‘their effectiveness’. The Protocol was acknowledged as an ‘interim agreement’, administered by the PCOB until the Single Convention could be agreed. Anslinger was quick to highlight that the Protocol finally mandated states to limit all opium use to ‘exclusively medical and scientific purposes’, which he portrayed as a seismic shift in international control and, as the President of the Conference called it, ‘the culmination of 44 years of international effort’. Temporary reservations for ‘quasi-medical’ use for up to fifteen years were made by India and Pakistan. Producers committed to establishing government monopolies and strictly controlling areas of production. The Protocol also extended controls to the ‘inflammatory’ issue of poppy straw, mandating that states control production and supply statistics for the first time. 700

Initially it received nineteen signatories but required twenty-five ratifications, including three producers and three manufacturers. The Soviet Bloc boycotted the conference and refused to sign out of deference to the Single Convention. This was spun in the US press as being motivated by deference to the PRC. Whether it would be ratified by a sufficient number of states remained an open question. The key would be securing ratification by producing states and Anslinger quickly turned to the State Department to pressure Turkey and Iran to sign as we shall see in the next chapter. 701

701 See press clippings; Anslinger to Morlock, 29 October 1953, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box122/File1230-1, UN 9th Session #1 (1953-4).
Conclusion:
The rocky road to the 1953 Opium Protocol highlighted the underlying economic and political forces preventing accord. The US and France had expended enormous political capital pushing the agreement through and had alienated many states, many of whom seemed set to reject it. The UK had successfully sat on the side-lines and watched early iterations collapse under their own weight, before becoming a gradually more active opponent of the Protocol. The US and France would now be forced into the background in the coming decade while the UK took a new invigorated lead as the chief moderate state, pushing through a consensus agreement for the Single Convention as a replacement and successor to the divisive 1953 Opium Protocol.

The Steinig affair had a long lasting impact on the UN and ushered a ‘coming of age’ in CND-Secretariat relations. The naturalised US citizen of Jewish Austrian origins who, with the help of Anslinger and the ‘inner circle’, had escaped Nazi occupied Europe and contributed to the survival of the PCOB and DSB in Washington, had drastically overreached in his position as DND Director and destroyed his career. Member states would remain vigilant against future technocratic overreach and to ensure that CND remained the driver of policy, not its secretariat.

The UK and US had worked well to quietly kill the monopoly idea. However, the unsupportive attitude of the UK towards the Protocol convinced the State Department to turn away from the UK and towards France in order to salvage some international agreement. This coincided with the return of Anslinger to the helm of international control after his focus on domestic survival. The moderate approach taken by the State Department towards the monopoly soon gave way to a re-assertive approach by Anslinger. In a repeat of the 1930s, the US took an increasingly aggressive role at CND and was willing to alienate other states to ensure the 1953 Protocol prevailed. This, however, was contingent on maintaining their core ally in France, something which, as we shall see, was unsustainable.

The UK, always distrustful of Vaille’s goals and diplomatic methods, were happy to place themselves in opposition to his work. Nevertheless, had the UK taken a less obscure position regarding the Protocol, resulting in the US concluding they were thwarting any agreement out of deference to pure economic interest, the two may have formed a governing coalition
within CND which could have replaced the old Anslinger-Sharman alliance. With Sharman out of the picture and the UK carving out a pragmatic self-interested role, the US turned to Vaille and continued to press ahead with its own prerogatives, ignoring consensus opinion. The opportunity for continued Anglo-US cooperation on this issue was apparent during this time. The eventual failure to realise it would mark a split in relations between the two that would continue over the coming decade culminating in the US rejecting its own brainchild, the Single Convention, and going to diplomatic war with the UK.

Ultimately the 1953 Protocol would rise and fall on Anglo-American support. The US as the single largest market for opium had killed the opium monopoly by withdrawing its support. Similarly the 1953 Protocol made it through the conference on the back of the US and guided by French diplomatic manoeuvring. Whether the Protocol would achieve international assent remained an open question. Producers hated the document, moderate states disliked the process that resulted in its creation and the world’s largest exporter of opium products, the UK, remained fundamentally unsupportive. Whether states would unify behind the Protocol or let it die in lieu of the Single Convention would largely be determined by the actions of Britain and America above all else. It is towards the Single Convention we now turn.
Chapter 7: From the 1953 Protocol to the 1961 Single Convention, 1953-64:

Introduction:
1953-64 represented a period when the international drug system became more polarised.\(^{702}\) It was also a time when Britain’s loss of great power status became increasingly clear.\(^{703}\) Efforts around the 1961 Single Convention ran alongside continuing issues in Anglo-American relations including: Sino-US relations in the aftermath of the Korean War; the changing relationship between the British Empire and South-East Asian opium producers; and Anglo-US concerns over the Middle East, particularly Britain’s relationship with opium producers in the Baghdad pact before and after the Suez crisis. These issues did not play out in isolation from drug diplomacy, instead saw much overlap. Furthermore the role of agency and intra-bureaucratic interaction continued to be a significant determinant of outcomes.

It was also a time when one can discern clear signs of close US-UK co-operation in fields of nuclear deterrence and intelligence.\(^{704}\) Such co-operation, however, was not to be replicated in drug diplomacy. Minor cooperation in the aftermath of the 1953 Opium Conference gave way to divisions leading to an eventual rupture over the Single Convention. This breakdown was ultimately the result of failures of US leadership but also deep divisions of policy and economic interests around the international control system.

There is no overarching economic systemic case for why a 'pax-manufacturica' or a 'pax-anti-producerica' did not arise. London certainly would have welcomed it as would many in the US foreign policy establishment. The explanation, nevertheless lies with US-UK policy differences – the US pursuing a highly restrictive commodity control agreement underpinned by expansive prohibitionist provisions; the UK pursuing a consensual and mildly restrictive agreement. Further, the breakdown of the US domestic drug consensus and fracturing into

\(^{702}\) William McAllister’s classification of states into: manufacturers, producers, control advocates and neutrals will be utilised in this study. McAllister, Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century, p. xv – 3.
\(^{704}\) These two areas formed what John Dumbrell termed ‘the essence and beating heart of the Cold War ‘special relationship’”, quoted in John Dumbrell, A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations from the Cold War to Iraq, (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) p. 160.
different power centres further weakened Anslinger’s leadership, while he struggled against a backdrop of collapsing personal circumstances and caring for his dying wife.

The US found itself increasingly alone in negotiations. State Department leadership saw a more conciliatory approach towards producers like Iran and Afghanistan. Nevertheless, with Anslinger absent and a lack of institutional knowledge on the issue the State Department struggled to understand US grand strategy in this field; elaborate their own strategy or enforce anything resembling a coherent set of policies. Anslinger did not help them. He refused to relinquish control and worked to ensure divided US delegations. Often Anslinger quietly worked to circumvent the State Department through allies, particularly France’s Charles Vaille. Nevertheless, Anslinger’s own hand was weakened by the new DND Director Gilbert Yates who drove his own vision for the UN system away from the traditionalist power centre around Anslinger, the soon to be absent Sharman, and the highly divisive Charles Vaille. The UK, continuing to carve out a role of quiet, consensual and self-interested diplomacy, found the new environment more conducive to their style of diplomacy and became increasingly assertive over the period.

All of this was cemented by the personal decline of Anslinger. His domestic position within the US government never recovered fully from the 1951 reorganisation attempt. The Customs bureau worked assiduously to highlight the flaws in his communist China bashing and repair relations with Britain and other counterparts. The US domestic addiction terrain shifted beneath his feet also. His traditional constituencies withered, while new, critical, public health constituencies emerged and relished any opportunity to challenge the FBN, its chief and their repressive approach to addiction. A new Executive Committee would force new levels of oversight of his agency and the UN process became so fractured and complex that he could no longer simply run events via back channel levers. Absent Anslinger, and eventually Vaille, control advocates had no one capable to act as a counterweight to the loud, relentless and disruptive Turkish delegate Dr. Majhar Ozkol.705 In this environment, moderates and consensus-based policy reigned supreme. The real alternate to US leadership remained the UK. London worked with shifting coalitions as required, but building a moderate bloc of manufacturing states in Europe to help protect domestic interests.

Part 1: Beyond the 1953 Protocol:

The tumultuous 1953 Conference left drug diplomacy in mild disarray. The US, fearing backsliding, continued to push for signatures of the 1953 Protocol. Their Embassies in Tehran and Ankara were asked to pressure the Iranian and Turkish governments there to sign it. The UK were unhappy with the Opium Protocol and saw it as a product of Vaille’s bullying and noted in the 1954 that ‘some delegations had neither forgotten nor forgiven his performance at the Opium conference.’ Others viewed the process as dead in the water. Sharman privately remarked that if the Single Convention was not discussed at all during the 1954 CND session his ‘heart would not be broken’. Sharman also thought memories of Vaille’s involvement in railroading through the 1953 Protocol could undermine their efforts, and hoping ‘that Vaille demotes himself from Sergeant Major to Corporal…in his arbitrary manner of running things as happened at the Opium Conference.’

Further, the goals for the Single Convention remained unclear. Members of the PCOB and DSB had mixed feelings. They admitted complexity was a downside to the system, but doubted the timing given uncertainties over the impact of synthetic drugs. It was agreed the PCOB and DSB should be merged into one body - the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) – but there was no consensus on functions. Most expected that its role and powers would not be greatly enlarged. Herbert May also pushed back against expansive controls. He warned the ‘mandatory embargo as applied to opium in the 1953 Protocol would be likely to reduce rather than strengthen the Board's real power, by investing it with an authority which it is unlikely to be able to use effectively’. Regarding production control he advocated for flexibility, rather than formulae, in determining ‘where it considers stocks excessive’ and that in ‘twenty-six years of the existence of the Board, this power has never been abused’.

The INCB secretariat remained a controversial issue. The UN DND pushed

---

707 IOC (54)84, 19 June, BNA-CAB134/958.
710 Report by UK Rep, 7th Session CND, 28 June 1952, IOC (52)88, BNA-CAB134/945.
for control, but some member states, with the monopoly debacle still fresh, demanded absolute independence. 712

The US had clear goals for the Single Convention: incorporate the 1953 Protocol provisions around opium; extend strong production controls to coca and cannabis; expand the mandate of the proposed INCB and to advocate for a strict ‘closed institutional’ model for treating drug addiction. 713 The UK wanted none of those things and doubted the feasibility of the entire Single Convention project. However, faced with the 1953 Protocol as their alternative the UK threw its weight behind driving the Single Convention forward in a manner commensurate with their interests and goals.

The US maintained their push for a quick drive towards coca control and the prohibition of coca chewing. On this latter point they met a continued absence of interest from the Peruvian delegate who failed to show up for the entire 1953 Session. 714 Neither Peru nor Bolivia submitted any statistics to PCOB regarding coca production in 1952. 715 Late in 1953, however, the Government of Peru signalled it could ‘revise’ its position on the Coca Commission report. 716 By 1955 both Bolivia and Peru accepted the Coca Commission’s findings that coca chewing was injurious to health and were willing to gradually suppress production and consumption. As states approached the 1955 CND session, the US over-optimistically noted that ‘astonishing progress’ had been made over the previous few session with ‘no deadlock’ on key issues. 717 This statement highlighted the increasing tin ear within US policy circles around actual events in CND.

Part 2: Shifting Power & The New Producers Bloc:

In 1954 the Turkish CND Delegation underwent a change in leadership with the death of the moderate Dr. Cemalettin Or. 718 Soon producing states emerged in a more forceful and

712 Report by UK Rep, 5th Session of CND, 6 February 1951, IOC (51)13, BNA-CAB134/410.
715 Draft Brief for UK Del, ECOSOC 16th Session, 16 June 1953, IOC (53)90, BNA-CAB134/950.
716 Yates to Fonda, 24 September 1953, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box122/File1230-1, UN 9th Session #1 (1953).
coherent bloc led by the outspoken Turkish Delegate Dr. Ozkol who the UK described as a ‘singularly tenacious nuisance’. He hounded manufacturing states about the dangers of synthetic narcotics, and pushed for strict controls. Manufacturer bloc disunity increasingly worried the UK delegation which argued in 1954 that it was ‘uncomfortably easy’ for producer states to gain a majority through a reliable nucleus of India, Iran, Turkey, Yugoslavia, and on occasion Egypt and France (The manufacture of all synthetic drugs was prohibited in France with the exception of pethadine).\(^{719}\)

UK overtures to the US centred on precursor chemicals. Previous US CND policy was for strong pre-emptive controls of precursors. But the US increasingly sought to block controls due to global licit opium shortages, increased military demand and pressure from domestic manufacturers not to stifle innovation.\(^{720}\) London similarly feared pre-emptive controls would stifle innovation, new markets, and even the prospect of a more controllable form of pain medicine replacing opium. The Home Office sought Anslinger’s support:

\[
\text{we think that the time has come to take a firm stand against the opium producers’ campaign against synthetic drugs and to make it clear that we will not tolerate attempts to draw distinctions which have no medical or scientific foundation.}\(^{721}\)
\]

The Home Office also pointed out that Turkey and Yugoslavia would not have been able to cause such ‘mischief’ without the support of Vaille. They suggested Anslinger approach Vaille and highlight the dangers to success of the Single Convention if manufacturing countries became alienated by anti-synthetic provisions, noting Vaille was ‘far more likely to listen to you than to us’.\(^{722}\)

Anslinger professed to being ‘unalterably opposed’ to ‘discrimination’ in favour of natural opium. He also rolled back on US calls for precursor chemical control, questioning the practicability of available proposals, ‘including our own’. The UK concurred, arguing they ‘would be wholly impractical and we could not accept it’. Anslinger sought to maintain UK

\(^{719}\) IOC (54)84, 19 June 1954, BNA-CAB134/958.


\(^{721}\) Walker to Anslinger, 2 March 1955, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box122/File1230-1, UN 10\(^{th}\) Session #2 (1955).

\(^{722}\) Ibid.
support and keep his ally Vaille out of discussions. He promised the UK ‘we are substantially in accord with your position on synthetics’ and privately remarked that the US should ‘go along with [the UK] as far as possible.’

Eventually the issue lost steam. The Commission became desensitised to the Turkish sensationalism, particularly as evidence suggested synthetics made up only a fraction of the illicit trade. As the UK delegate put it, ‘the heat which this subject used to generate gradually seems to be dying down.’

The Decline of Anslinger’s Alliances:

Soon after the 1953 Conference Anslinger’s decades-long alliance with Sharman ended. Sharman retired following a steady decline in his domestic position and was replaced by Kenneth Hossick, a less substantive delegate who appeared more interested in his personal prestige leading Anslinger to refer to him to as ‘That silly Hossick’. Few in the UK would miss Sharman. One UK delegate described him as having ‘the biased rigidity of a closed mind obsessed with the purely police aspect of the problem’. His ousting was a significant blow to Anslinger, who wrote in 1954 that US efforts were ‘injured...deeply by your decision to retire’. With the full decline of Sharman, Canadian policies moderated sharply and Ottawa quickly moved towards the UK’s moderate bloc. Anslinger would continue to work with Vaille to push a strict control framework and maintain their ‘good custom of being in agreement on everything’.

The UK saw Vaille as ‘brilliant, dynamic and utterly unscrupulous’ due to his diplomatic ability and deviousness in driving unpopular provisions through CND. Worsening domestic positions undermined both Anslinger and Vaille’s freedom of action at the UN and bilateral levels and would eventually knock Vaille out

---

724 IOC (59)47, 2 June 1959, BNA-CAB134/2073.
725 Anslinger to Tennyson, 13 May 1958, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box123/File1230-1, UN 13th Session #2 (1958-9); McAllister, Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An International History, 178.
726 IOC (54)84, 19 June, BNA-CAB134/958.
730 IOC (54)84, 19 June, BNA-CAB134/958.
altogether. Nevertheless a more nuanced picture of co-operation emerges when we look to the interactions between the UK and the US in other areas of geopolitics that overlapped with drug diplomacy. It is towards some of these areas which we shall now turn.

**Part 3: Control in Asia: China Continues:**

After a positive domestic response to his speech at CND in 1953 Anslinger decided to use the issue again at the 1954 CND. He outlined details of ‘a 20-year plan to finance political activities and spread addiction among free peoples.’ The speech was repeated on the floor of the House of Representatives by James E. Van Zandt of Pennsylvania. FBI Director John Edgar Hoover privately dismissed Anslinger’s claims saying ‘no evidence has been found to confirm them’.” Anslinger nevertheless sought Japanese support. FBN agent Wayland Speer criticised Japan’s 1953 report for failing to sufficiently highlight communist China as the source of heroin which ‘has literally flooded Japan’. The US offered to support Japan’s Narcotics Section sending an observer to the CND session in 1954, but only ‘if he will blast communist China’. Speer had other reasons for the invitation. He wanted to protect the FBN linkage to the Ministry of welfare and ‘prevent other Ministries from gaining a tight hold on narcotics control and narcotic reporting in Japan—as they had before World War II’. Simultaneously, policy transfer from the US continued as the Japanese Narcotic Section sought to emulate US domestic enforcement techniques and judicial practices around drug law enforcement.\(^731\)

Many of the seizures that Anslinger attributed to the PRC transhipped through Hong Kong. The UK was anxious to deflect attention from this. Prior to the 1954 Session the UK’s Washington embassy asked if Anslinger would refer to US-Hong Kong cooperation in suppressing the illicit traffic. Anslinger obliged and in his 1954 statement praised Hong Kong authorities for having ‘acted vigorously’ resulting in ‘a noticeable trend towards bypassing

this area whenever possible with shipments to other free countries.\textsuperscript{732} The UK was grateful particularly as a recent Interpol report had been critical of Hong Kong. Furthermore, there had been chatter on the Commission about the ‘large number of British ships involved’ in recent seizures.\textsuperscript{733} The delegate speculated that the ‘friendly support’ from Anslinger who was ‘more cooperative than previously’ was ‘no doubt because of our [own] co-operation.’\textsuperscript{734}

UK concerns over this time centred on Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaya primarily, while Burma remained in their field of vision. Relations with the nationalist Chinese delegation were strained as they continued to draw unwanted attention to Hong Kong. The nationalists’ 1954 report was described as ‘mischief-making’ by the UK briefing which instructed delegates that it be ‘sharply refuted’\textsuperscript{735} The UK steered clear of the conspiracy debate where possible, stating: ‘we have no information on the question of complicity of the People’s Republic in traffic which is known to be large, though we know that Nationalist forces were engaged in it some time ago.’\textsuperscript{736}

The PRC maintained Anslinger’s claims were ‘slanderous’ and ‘a fabrication from start to finish’. The State Department became increasingly uneasy. Initially many ‘assumed that he has the necessary evidence’ but soon internal opposition strengthened. Many questioned whether it would serve ‘any constructive purpose’ or merely cause ‘offense to certain friendly governments’, particularly when there was ‘no corrobatory information available’. They left it to Anslinger’s discretion and at the 1955 session he reiterated claims that communist Chinese was the ‘uncontrolled reservoir supplying the world-wide illicit narcotics traffic’.\textsuperscript{737}

At the 1956 CND session the State Department rolled back support for the Republic of China. They recognised Formosa’s report was ‘propagandistic in tone and contains assertions which


\textsuperscript{733} IOC (54)84, 19 June, BNA-CAB134/958.

\textsuperscript{734} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{735} IOC (56)29, 13 April, BNA-CAB134/1268.

\textsuperscript{736} IOC (55)26, 30 March, BNA-CAB134/964.

\textsuperscript{737} Statement by PRC Foreign Ministry, 2 July 1954; Martin comments on Anslinger’s Proposed Statement, 4 April 1955; Statement by US Rep Anslinger, 10th Session CND, 18 April to 13 May 1955, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box122/File1230-1, UN 10th Session #1 (1955); Gamson to Speer, 8 March 1955; State Department memo, ‘Proposed Statement…by H. J. Anslinger’, 26 April 1955, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box122/File1230-1, UN 10th Session #2 (1955);
[are] obviously untrue’. Even Anslinger was critical. The US delegate was authorised to publically query its factual basis, while maintaining the assertion that the centre of the global illicit traffic remained communist China and ensuring not ‘discredit’ past US statements. The UK believed the principle source of smuggling to be the Chinese nationalists, particularly the remnants of Chiang Kai-Shek’s army around Siam. The US noted that the UK, Canada and others were clearly ‘relieved’ that the US only gave ‘perfunctory support’ to the nationalist Chinese in the 1956 session. Further he recognised a growing sympathy for inviting a Peking government official as an Observer to the CND.\textsuperscript{738} The rollback of US support for the nationalist delegation at CND saw a reciprocal cooling of nationalist support for US interests and thereby weakened another pillar of Anslinger’s support at CND. Another key component of Anslinger’s control advocate alliance was spinning away from his orbit and the Soviet Union was quickly becoming the swing vote on the Commission.

\textit{UK Interests:}

The UK had significant intelligence on the illicit traffic in Burma, Cambodia, Thailand and Laos but was unwilling to share it with the UN Illicit Traffic Committee for fear of compromising their sources.\textsuperscript{739} This traffic passed through Thailand and on to Hong Kong, Malaya and Singapore, causing considerable embarrassment for authorities. Worse, the UK’s own intelligence confirmed Thai assertions that the significant portion originated in the Burmese Shan States.\textsuperscript{740} These, the UK admitted privately, might ‘be the largest source of illicit opium in the world.’\textsuperscript{741}

Despite the evidence the UK maintained strong sympathy for the Burmese authorities.\textsuperscript{742} Burma, offered no co-operation to CND, refusing even to send an observer until 1960 when one ‘put in an appearance’ in what the UK regarded as an ‘encouraging sign’.\textsuperscript{743} Nevertheless, the UK representatives protected them from criticism. For example, even as cannabis seizures

\textsuperscript{738} US Del Position Paper, 11\textsuperscript{th} Session CND, 13 April 1956; Confidential Report of the Acting US Rep, 11\textsuperscript{th} Session CND, 5 July 1956, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box122/File1230-1, UN 11\textsuperscript{th} Session (1955-6).
\textsuperscript{739} Reports on illicit traffic 1957, UNS1815/5, 16 March; UNS1815/11, 1 April; UNS1815/12, 30 March; UNS1815/13, 10 April, BNA-FO371/129981.
\textsuperscript{740} Green to Errock, 15 April, UNS1815/14, BNA-FO371/129981.
\textsuperscript{741} British Embassy Rangoon to UN department FO, 1 April 1957, UNS1815/11, BNA FO371/129981.
\textsuperscript{742} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{743} IOC(60) 53, 31 May 1960, BNA-CAB134/2078.
on British vessels (originating in Rangoon) began to throw unwanted light on British shipping interests, the UK remained concerned with deflecting some of Thailand’s accusations against Burma.\textsuperscript{744} Luckily for the UK, the US was caught up in a broader narrative of a PRC conspiracy. This left Britain quite free to plead ignorance as to the origin but to displace blame onto Thailand as a transhipment point, while the US pointed to communist China as the origin.\textsuperscript{745} The UK repeatedly castigated Thailand as endemically corrupt and incapable of living up to its obligations.\textsuperscript{746}

Due to reports of large illicit smuggling activities in Thailand they were requested to send an observer to the 1956 session. The UK sought US support for its criticisms of Thailand but the US refused. The US delegate was authorised to ask questions but was warned:

\begin{quote}
However serious the opium situation in Thailand appears to be…the U.S. Representative should bear in mind that Thailand is friendly to the United States. It is desirable to avoid unduly strong charges of laxness on the part of the Thai Government…which might affect that friendly relationship.\textsuperscript{747}
\end{quote}

Nevertheless, the UK and US had something of a functional relationship over East and South-East Asia in the early half of the 1950s. The US would help overlook the difficulties Britain faced in some of its territories and ex-colonies while the British acquiesced to a degree in the US propaganda campaign.

**Part 4: Anglo-American drug diplomacy and the Middle East:**

*Iran & Technical Assistance:*

In 1955 Iran adopted legislation completely banning opium cultivation and member states viewed questions of economic and technical assistance questions as ‘certain to arise’ in the 1956 CND. The US tried to be supportive noting that the FBN and spent roughly $130,000 a year on overseas illicit traffic operations giving the US a ‘direct financial interest’ in efforts to ban production.\textsuperscript{748} The issue raised broader complications for US policy but also embarked

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{744} UN Department to UK Embassy Rangoon, 3 July 1957, UNS1815/13, BNA-FO371/129981.

\textsuperscript{745} IOC (60)53, 31 May, BNA-CAB134/2978.

\textsuperscript{746} IOC (58)32, 11 April, BNA-CAB134/2067.


\textsuperscript{748} Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
the UN on a new trajectory of technical assistance in the field. Many delegations were sceptical, but the US argued Iran was serious this time and that the Shah supported the efforts. Further, they warned that an absence of support would ‘play into the hands’ of economic beneficiaries of the opium trade in Iran.\textsuperscript{749} The US had frequently pushed back against the idea that countries should be paid to follow their commitments, but on other occasions proved willing to dangle technical assistance as a potential reward for policy changes. Now, the State Department saw it as a means to increase influence and encourage control in Iran, but also potentially Thailand and other areas. Balancing against this they wished to avoid creating new technical assistance programs within the UN and pushed instead for earmarked drug funding within existing programs.

To postpone and deflate the issue in 1956 the US ensured CND pushed it up to ECOSOC. ECOSOC then advocated that assistance be extended from existing UN technical assistance programs. The US hoped this would place them on record in support and avoid alienating governments concerned with additional expense and the proliferation of UN activities, such as the UK. The US delegate noted after the 1956 CND session that: ‘These efforts to bring United Nations technical assistance concepts to bear in the field of narcotics control constituted perhaps the most useful work’ of the session.\textsuperscript{750}

\textit{Enter Afghanistan:}

As we have seen, the UK strongly resisted attempts to limit the number of recognised opium producers at the 1953 Opium Conference. They feared medical supplies could become subject to monopoly power by a small number of producer states.\textsuperscript{751} The US, and particularly Anslinger, was strongly in favour of a small closed list. The ‘compromise’ expanded the list from four to seven but maintained a cap: it included Yugoslavia, Iran, Turkey, India, Bulgaria, Greece and the USSR.

The Iranian prohibition decree coincided with an Afghan policy shift. By 1954 Afghanistan was looking to expand its role in the global licit opium market. The US Embassy in Kabul reported the government encouraging cultivation and successfully marketed crops to

\textsuperscript{749} Confidential Report of the Acting US Rep, 11\textsuperscript{th} Session CND, 5 July 1956, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box122/File1230-1, UN 11\textsuperscript{th} Session (1955-6).
\textsuperscript{750} US Del Position Paper, 11\textsuperscript{th} Session CND, 13 April 1956; US Del Report, 11\textsuperscript{th} Session CND, 5 July 1956, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box122/File1230-1, UN 11\textsuperscript{th} Session (1955-6).
\textsuperscript{751} IOC (59)47, 2 June, BNA-CAB134/2073.
Germany and Italy, along with ‘reports of substantial shipments to Russia’. In 1955 Afghanistan asked to join the 1953 Protocol as an official producer - despite having ignored the 1953 Opium Conference and not being a party to the 1925 Opium Convention. Anslinger informed the Afghan delegate that it was too late but that they should join the Protocol, look towards eventual addition to the list and seek technical assistance in the meantime.

The UK foresaw major political complications and hoped to thwart a vote on procedural grounds – there was no way to amend the list before 1953 protocol before it came into force. Should they fail Mr. Green (the UK CND delegate and Home Office bureaucrat) felt the UK should abstain in order to maintain consistency of policy and a sense of equity. The UK had, after all, railed against the closed list and Afghanistan had ‘at least as good a claim to be included in the list...as Greece.’ The Foreign Office took a sharply broader perspective and sought ‘the cavalry’ (ministerial assistance) in reining in the intransigent Mr. Green.

Iran was increasingly acknowledged to be making a serious and expensive effort to eradicate the opium trade. Afghan opium ‘flooding’ in would undermine these efforts. For the UK Foreign Office, the consequences of anything less than full throtled support for Iran became clear in the aftermath of the 1956 CND session when the US and UK were viewed to have voted in favour of Afghanistan. The US delegation had brokered a compromise resolution, with UK support and French abstention, recognising the justice of the Afghan claim and looking towards including Afghanistan in the list of recognised producers in the Single Convention. Iranian fury soon came to the attention of the UK’s Secretary of State who instructed the UK’s ECOSOC delegation to try to rehabilitate UK Iranian relation.

---

753 Tabibi Statement, 10th Session CND, undated; Anslinger to Morlock, 28 April 1955, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box122/File1230-1, UN 10th Session #2 (1955).
754 IOC (56)29, 13 April, BNA-CAB134/1268.
755 XII Session: Minutes, 16 April 1957, UNS1815/16, BNA-FO371/129981.
756 Draft Letter to Parliamentary Under Secretary, 23 April 1957, UNS1815/23, BNA-FO371/129981.
757 IOC (56)47, 16 June, BNA-CAB134/1269.
759 Draft Letter to Parliamentary Under Secretary, 23 April 1957, UNS1815/23, BNA-FO371/129981.
The Foreign Office now worried that a UK abstention would be interpreted as ‘support for Afghanistan and her friends...the Soviet Union’.\textsuperscript{760} Above all the Foreign Office feared that it would cause embarrassment to the Secretary of State at the upcoming Baghdad Pact Council and ‘might even have a generally adverse effect on the proceedings’.\textsuperscript{761} The Baghdad Pact represented the foundation of the UK’s Middle East strategy at the time and anything which threatened it was to be avoided.\textsuperscript{762} Furthermore, they thought it ‘most important, particularly at the present time [emphasis added], to stand loyally by one of our associates in the Bagdad Pact’.\textsuperscript{763} This, however, did not sway the Home Office which refused to change the instructions to Mr. Green.\textsuperscript{764} They were concerned that a loss of UK credibility would weaken their ability to withstand efforts by France and others to impose stricter controls on synthetic narcotics.\textsuperscript{765}

The episode highlighted the importance of UK-Iranian relations. Further, with the context of Suez in the background, some of their statements suggest a sense of UK vulnerability in the region. It also serves to highlight some of continued tensions between maintaining consistency on narcotics control and broader foreign policies for the UK. As with the opium monopolies issue, the Home Office determined policy on an issue with international ramifications, and as this issue highlighted, cause occasional blow-ups between the two departments.

\textit{Towards an Anglo-US Response:}

Anslinger was implacably opposed to Afghanistan’s claim, arguing that there was no need for another producer given global overproduction. Further he pointed to Afghanistan’s non-compliance with past agreements and the potential impact on the Iranian illicit market. The State Department sought a middle ground: Afghanistan was free to produce opium under the current system and could continue ‘so long as the 1953 Protocol is not operative’. They offered five reasons for US support: to prevent the adverse effects of prohibition on Afghanistan’s economy; the amount produced in Afghanistan was limited and viewed as high

\textsuperscript{760} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{761} Summary of the Points at issue, 25 April 1957, UNS1815/23, BNA-FO371/129981.
\textsuperscript{762} Private correspondence with Nigel Ashton.
\textsuperscript{763} Commander Noble to PUS Mr. Simon, 29 April 1957, UNS1815/23, BNA-FO371/129981.
\textsuperscript{764} Mr. Simon (PUS) to Mr. Noble, 1 May 1957, UNS1815/24, BNA-FO371/129981.
\textsuperscript{765} Green to Errock, 15 April 1957, UNS1815/16, BNA-FO371/129981.
quality; the absence of evidence that it was leaking into the illicit traffic; Afghanistan’s right to equal treatment; and crop substitution in Afghanistan was ‘not immediately practicable’.

The State Department overruled Anslinger and maintained US policy was to support Afghanistan, but would reconsider if evidence ‘demonstrated incontrovertibly’ negative impacts on Iran. Anslinger set to work uncovering the evidence and raising it at CND. Charles Vaille was similarly opposed, although was unable to throw full French diplomatic weight behind the opposition. He wrote Anslinger that he was ‘desolated by the lamentable attitude’ of the State Department and argued it could ‘torpedo Iranian resolve’ and was capable of ‘destroying all that we have difficultly obtained’. He and Anslinger postponed work on the Single Convention and redoubled ratification efforts around the 1953 Protocol by Turkey, Iran and Greece.

Anslinger privately encouraged Vaille to challenge US policy at the 1956 CND session. The session took place in Geneva and Anslinger failed to attend, attempting instead to control events via proxies. Vaille led arguments against Afghanistan’s admission, while India – seeking a wedge issue between Pakistan and its neighbour - led arguments in favour. Vaille launched a tirade against the US delegation, accusing them of working to increase global overproduction. The US delegate concluded that Vaille and Iran ‘had come to some tacit agreement’. When Vaille left, the US delegate demanded correction of the summary record and the remaining French delegate, apparently embarrassed by Vaille’s behaviour, quickly agreed.

In the meantime, the UK Foreign Office had gained the upper hand on Green and the Home Office. They discovered the US delegation remained ambivalent into the 1957 session and contacted the State Department to express the hope that ‘in no circumstances’ should the US

---

768 Anslinger to Vaille, 28 May 1956; Vaille to Anslinger, 17 May 1956, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box122/File1230-1, UN 11th Session (1955-6).
vote against Iran. The latter agreed to follow the UK’s lead in postponing the issue until the 1958 session. In the end they were helped by a counterproductive lobbying effort by the Afghan observer to CND which alienated a number of delegations. Anslinger, meanwhile, had ensured new information on the Afghan illicit trade to Iran emerged, causing many to question the accuracy of the Afghan delegate’s information.

By 1958 the Afghan issue was resolved through US and DND actions. The head of UN DND, Gilbert Yates, made a visit to the country prior to the 1958 CND session and was expected to recommend technical assistance. Afghanistan had agreed to withdraw its request to be considered a producer and the US agreed to introduce a CND resolution favouring UN technical assistance. Further, if the 1953 Protocol went into effect, the US promised to give careful consideration to an application by Afghanistan to be included. With this key stumbling block out of the way, forward momentum on the Single Convention once again became possible. The episode nevertheless highlighted the volatility around the ‘closed list’ of producers issue and the danger that the 1953 Protocol and Single Convention could collapse in the face of national interests.

Part 5: Anglo-American Fault Lines:
As suggested by the early co-operation over Asia an Anglo-US alliance was possible during this period, even if it would require substantial negotiation, compromise and coordination. As time progressed it became less likely as the UK lost faith in the US CND delegation’s competence. Fault lines that had opened up between the two states at CND only exacerbated this. Ultimately these divisions were to widen as the erratic US performances at the 1957 and 1958 conferences marked a dividing point in the Anglo-US post-war drug diplomacy relationship.

---

770 Gauntlett to Sam Hoare, 6 May 1957, UNS1815/17, BNA-FO371/129981.
771 Draft letter to PUS, April 23 1957, UNS1815/23, BNA-FO371/129981.
772 IOC (57)55, 21 June, BNA-CAB134/2063.
The DND Issue:

One of the most noticeable divisions between the US and UK delegations was over the relocation of the UN drugs secretariat, DND. A broad UN decentralisation program planned to move DND to Geneva where the secretariat of the DSB and PCOB was already set up.\textsuperscript{775} Part of the impetus came from DND efforts to absorb the DSB and PCOB secretariats.\textsuperscript{776} Anslinger had opposed it but the program received the unanimous consent from the General Assembly, where the US delegation had remained silent, believing the arguments provided by Anslinger against the move were too weak.\textsuperscript{777} In 1955 the UK sensed ‘agitation’ by US domestic groups against the move.\textsuperscript{778} They UK entered the 1955 CND prepared to reverse their support should the US raise objections. The US delegation appeared ‘divided amongst themselves’ and Anslinger failed to raise the matter.\textsuperscript{779} Consequently the move was accepted and the UK considered the issue settled. Further, the UK sought a reputation for thrift at CND and became extremely supportive of the measure once adopted.\textsuperscript{780}

Anslinger remained deeply opposed. He feared it would lead to the integration of the secretariats under DND and remove drug control from the New York media spotlight. He mobilised his traditional domestic constituencies and the issue quickly assumed a narrative of international communist conspiracy. Soon the British labour party became implicated. Clement Atlee’s visit to China was portrayed as part of a joint British and French ‘plot’ to encourage Turkey to introduce a resolution recognising communist China into the UN General Assembly. Soon newspapers reported a conspiracy to remove ‘Red China’s depravity and its dope running’ from the watchful eyes of US politicians and press in New York. The ultimate goal, they argued, was ‘a psychological build-up for the recognition and entry of China to the UN.’ Anslinger bragged that the New York Press had hammered away at the communist Chinese ‘to the point where Chou-En-Lai found it necessary to discuss the situation with Mr. Atlee’. Britain had introduced a resolution to transfer the UN Narcotics

\textsuperscript{775} Memorandum of conversation between Anslinger and Secretary General Hammarskjold, 30 March, NA, RG 170-74-12, Box 170, File 1230, Folder: Transfer of Narcotic Commission to Geneva, 1955.
\textsuperscript{776} McAllister,\textit{ Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century}, p. 189.
\textsuperscript{777} State Department Memorandum, Jan 25\textsuperscript{th}, NA, RG 170-74-12, Box 170, File 1230, Folder: Transfer of Narcotic Commission to Geneva, 1955.
\textsuperscript{778} IOC (55)26, 30 March, BNA-CAB134/964.
\textsuperscript{779} IOC (55)88, 30 June, BNA-CAB134/965.
\textsuperscript{780} Interim report on happenings of Commission, May 16\textsuperscript{th}, UNS1815/32, BNA-FO371/129981.
Laboratory to Geneva soon after Atlee had come out of that meeting, claiming ‘China had clean hands in the narcotic trade’. This played right into Anslinger’s narrative.  

Ultimately the State Department refused to push the matter at ECOSOC or the General Assembly, believing that it was not ‘important enough to involve US prestige in’ either body. Anslinger then failed in his last ditch appeal to the UN Secretary General in 1955 to stop the move. Anslinger maintained his anti-Geneva stance. In 1956 he failed to show up to CND session in Geneva. The UK privately lamented the loss of the ‘firmness’ he brought to debates. The State Department told a Foreign Office delegate that the administration was under strong pressure from domestic groups to host the CND in New York in 1957 and they had a ‘very real need of UK help on this question.’ Anslinger got his way and served as Chairman for the session but appalled the UK delegation with an incompetent and aggressive performance. He then failed to turn up in Geneva in 1958 where he should have served his second year as Chairman. This time, however, his absence was not lamented.

The US then shocked the British by tabling a resolution to hold the 1959 Commission in New York. Their justification was a loophole allowing for ‘exceptional circumstances.’ London called the US resolution ‘outrageous’ and instructing that it ‘be opposed vigorously.’ Other CND delegations, however, did not share UK cost concerns and they voted for New York. ECOSOC ultimately rejected the recommendation and the 1959 Commission met in Geneva. Anslinger failed to attend and the US again tabled a resolution which saw the UK as the sole dissenter and went on to fail in ECOSOC. By 1960 the matter appeared to have been dropped. However, by this stage it had become one of a number of divisions that had emerged between the UK and the US delegations. The issue of addiction treatment was another.


782 UN Narcotics Division to Secretary of State, March 10, 1955; Memorandum of conversation between Anslinger and Secretary General Hammarskjold, FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box170/File1230, Transfer of Narcotic Commission to Geneva (1955).

783 IOC (56)47, 16 June; IOC (56)39, 4 June, BNA-CAB134/1269.

784 IOC (57)55, 21 June, BNA-CAB134/2063.

785 IOC (58)46, 12 June, BNA-CAB134/2069; Foreign Office to Green, 7 May 1958, UNS1815/28, BNA-FO371/137059.

786 IOC (59)47, 2 June, BNA-CAB134/2073.
The British System vs. Anslinger:

As the 1950s progressed, Anslinger’s ‘closed institution’ approach to addiction came under increasing domestic attack. Mounting evidence pointed to the failure of the federal narcotic farms in Lexington and Fort Worth.\(^{787}\) A new understanding of addiction was emerging among mental health professionals in the US. Many had served in the narcotic farms and watched with dismay as supposed treatment centres were effectively transformed into prisons.\(^{788}\) His domestic ‘enemies’ looked overseas for counterexamples to the US model. Front and centre was the ‘British system’.\(^{789}\) Continually prodded by US sources on this approach Anslinger sent a furious letter to his UK counterpart at the Home Office. He chastised the UK for sending encouraging letters to ‘eggheads and crackpots in the United States’:

*I have tried a number of times to get your people to restrain their remarks to our enemies, and I hope you will see that, in the future, visiting Americans will not be given information which encourages them to attack my Government.*\(^{790}\)

Other Anslinger allies in the US called discussions around the ‘British system’ ‘reminiscent of the Hitler “Big-Lie”’. It was claimed that the British System was not different from the US, except that the UK law allowed for ambulatory maintenance in exceptional cases.\(^{791}\) The culmination of pushback against Anslinger in the 1950s came with the publication of an interim report by the Joint Committee of the American Bar Association and the American Medical Association. The report called for ‘ambulatory treatment’. Anslinger waged a domestic war with its authors and findings.\(^{792}\) Further, Anslinger sought to muster treaty law to the defence of the ‘closed institution’ model by enshrining it in the new Single Convention.

---

\(^{787}\) William McAllister cites ‘dismal results’ and a high relapse rate at the US institutions in Lexington and Fort Worth, *Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century*, p. 191;


\(^{790}\) Anslinger to Green, 8 May 1958, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box123/File1230-1, UN 13\(^{\text{th}}\) Session #1 (1958).


\(^{792}\) Anslinger to Lande, 11 June 1958, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box123/File1230-1, UN 13\(^{\text{th}}\) Session #2 (1958-9).
The UK viewed themselves as having no real ‘addiction problem’ and sought to avoid internationally imposed responsibilities which would be ‘unpalatable’ to UK medical professionals. Sometimes this involved the UK just acting uninterested. On one day off from the 1957 Commission, Anslinger organised a trip to an institution for juvenile drug addicts. Instead of attending, UK delegate, Mr. Green spent the day letter writing. By 1959 the US and UK remained divided and the issue was to come to a head at the Single Convention plenipotentiary conference as we shall see.

**Part 6: Towards the Single Convention:**

As the US entered the 1956 session some in the State Department believed the Single Convention drafting process was ‘approaching completion’. By the end of the session, it had ground to a ‘snail’s pace’ and became ‘so hopelessly snarled in draft’ that deferring to a plenipotentiary conference seemed the only way forward. Anslinger felt the session became ‘badly tangled’ in his absence and sought to repair some of the damage. He and Vaille agreed to stall the Single Convention in order to resolve issues around Afghanistan and push for ratification of the 1953 Protocol, writing: ‘the Afghan and other situations dictate postponing the Single Convention to a more propitious time. Politics and narcotics should not mix’. He argued against holding an extended CND session in 1957 in New York, Anslinger argued against it on grounds of cost and because ‘special consideration of the Single Convention at this time is useless’.

**Realignment:**

The US traditional CND alliance structure had largely collapsed. The UK attributed the weakness of the manufacturer bloc to the absence of Anslinger, when in reality changes within the system had created the need for a strategic realignment. The system, by the late 1950s was working against manufacturer interests, a situation never envisaged by Anslinger and other post-war framers. Pragmatic states would now fall in behind UK leadership.

---

793 IOC (54)84, 18 June; IOC (54)104, 29 June, BNA-CAB134/958.
795 IOC (59)47, 2 June, BNA-CAB134/2073.
Canada had aligned away from the US towards a pragmatic self-interested position, which placed them as a firm ally of the UK. Vaille continued to buttress Anslinger through French support and Brazil emerged as a regional pillar for Anslinger and the FBN. However, the US State Department rolled back support for the nationalist Chinese delegation and sought to repair relations with the UK over Hong Kong. In 1956 they wrote to the Consulate General in Hong Kong offering ‘regrets that erroneous reporting of the United States position at the Commission may have caused embarrassment to Hong Kong Enforcement authorities’. This alienated the nationalist delegation and weakened their previously unquestioned support for US positions.

Anslinger based the core of his strategy on a strong alignment with Vaille, while simultaneously working with the UK to undermine Vaille’s efforts on synthetics. However, with Anslinger largely absent from CND sessions during the 1950s moderate states were increasingly happy to let the 1953 Protocol languish and look towards a watered-down Single Convention. Entering the 1957 session both the UK and Canada sought to radically change track. Hossick suggested a UK-Canadian idea to Anslinger that the Secretariat should prepare a ‘simplified Draft’ of principles which could then be refined by a small drafting committee. Anslinger sharply refused, claiming it involved ‘a completely new start under a new theory’ and would ‘lose the value of discussion and decisions on principles of control, over the past several years’.

The DSB and the End of the US-French Alliance:

DSB elections were set for 1957. The State Department hoped for Herbert May to be re-elected, with indications that Canada would nominate him and the UK would second him. Anslinger had other ideas and quietly worked to secure Vaille’s appointment. Anslinger later claimed Herbert May had privately stepped aside at his request, but ‘the stupid Canadians put forward his name much to his embarrassment’.

---

797 Draft Instruction – American Consulate General at Hong Kong, undated, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box122/File1230-1, UN 11th Session (1955-6).
798 Hossick to Anslinger, 1 April 1957; Anslinger to Hossick, 10 April 1957, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box123/File1230-1, UN 13th Session (1958).
800 Anslinger to Vaille, 8 April 1959, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box123/File1230-1, UN 14th Session (1959).
The action triggered an enormous diplomatic ruckus and talk of high-level resignations.\textsuperscript{801} The UK noted angrily that the US delegation stayed silent during the CND discussions ‘no doubt due to the influence of Anslinger who [was] known to be personally in favour of Vaille’s election’.\textsuperscript{802} Tensions continued into ECOSOC. The UK and Canada sought an ECOSOC resolution of censure directed at CND. The US State Department agreed with the UK that it was in ‘disregard of [an] ECOSOC recommendation’ and privately intimated they were ‘upset’ by the outcome.\textsuperscript{803} Brazil’s delegate Mr. Pentaedo, secretly prompted by Anslinger, made a strong speech in support of Vaille and CND more broadly.\textsuperscript{804} The UK concluded that the speech must have ‘been written for him by Mr. Anslinger’.\textsuperscript{805} Anslinger’s involvement with the scheme, coupled with the increasing incoherence of US policy, contributed significantly to the UK losing faith in the US during 1957 to 1958. After this point, they lost interest in working with the US at CND.

Anslinger later wrote to Pentaedo:

\begin{quote}
It was evident to us that the Ottawa-London axis would try to pull others into its orbit to attack the Narcotic Commission for the election of Vaille...I want you to know that the members of the Commission are grateful for the statement that you made.\textsuperscript{806}
\end{quote}

The victory was short lived as Vaille was soon removed from the French CND delegation, thereby removing Anslinger’s last key CND ally.\textsuperscript{807} Ostensibly Vaille’s removal was the result of a promotion to Inspector General for Health following the collapse of the Fourth Republic in 1958. Some have suggested it was partly a rebuke for his role in international

\textsuperscript{801} See discussion between Sir S Hoare and Mr. Greenfield, 14 May 1958, UNS1815/34, BNA-FO371/137060.
\textsuperscript{802} IOC (58)46: 12 June, BNA-CAB134/2068.
\textsuperscript{803} State Department telegram to US embassy in Ottawa, 13 June 1958, NA RG 59 File 340.19 #4; Conversation of ECOSOC XXVI Agenda w/ Mrs. Bell of State Department of Narcotics, 28 May 1958, UNS1815/38, FO371/137060.
\textsuperscript{804} Anslinger to Penteado, 4 June 1958, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box123/File1230-1, UN 13\textsuperscript{th} Session #2 (1958-9).
\textsuperscript{805} Report by UK delegation, 25 July 1958, UNS1815/54, BNA-FO371/137060.
\textsuperscript{806} Anslinger to Penteado, 7 July 1958, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box123/File1230-1, UN 13\textsuperscript{th} Session #2 (1958-9).
\textsuperscript{807} Anslinger to Vaille, 8 April 1959, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box123/File1230-1, UN 14\textsuperscript{th} Session (1959).
drug policies and particularly his support of the 1953 Protocol.\textsuperscript{808} Thereafter, despite vigorous efforts to steer French drug diplomacy Vaille failed to convince his superiors or CND replacement of its importance. The French delegation began to deprecate the problem of addiction in France as an issue of ‘secondary importance’. For example, they claimed that there were only 295 ‘addicts’, 252 of which used cannabis and were of Algerian-Moroccan descent.\textsuperscript{809}

\textit{Anglo-American Relations Collapse:}

The UK continued to hope for a closer relationship with the US right up to 1957 when they made a final overture to Anslinger. The 1954 Session had provided hope, proving ‘the best of the three attended by the present UK representative’. Vaille’s chairmanship ‘although marred by dishonesty...was extremely competent’ and ‘relations with Mr. Anslinger, which have always been friendly at the personal level, were much improved as regards practical co-operation’.\textsuperscript{810} The 1955 session turned ‘disastrous’ for the UK. It was characterised by the emergence of Dr. Ozkol of Turkey as ‘as the energetic, ruthless, unscrupulous and triumphant leader of the opium bloc’. The session ‘could have been much worse’ but for the UK rallying a moderate bloc which avoided more objectionable proposals. Increasingly the UK viewed CND as being ‘heavily weighted with an unscrupulous commercial bloc supported by doctrinaire extremists’.\textsuperscript{811} The 1956 session was ‘appallingly wearisome’ for the UK and the absence of Anslinger resulting in a ‘weak and ineffective’ US delegation meaning that attacks by producers often went unanswered.\textsuperscript{812} The UK ended with a ‘bad row’ with Ozkol. India, meanwhile, emerged as a potent moderating force, sponsoring watered-down resolutions on synthetics despite resistance from Vaille. The Soviet delegate spoke only Russian and ‘took little part in the debates’. The US pointed out that Ozkol fought, ‘sometimes to the point of absurdity’ and appeared to throw his weight behind the Single Convention as a means to deflect attention from illicit traffic leakages from Turkey.\textsuperscript{813}

\textsuperscript{808} McAllister, \textit{Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An International History}, 204.\textsuperscript{809} McAllister, \textit{Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century}, p. 204.\textsuperscript{810} IOC (54)84, 19 June, BNA-CAB134/958.\textsuperscript{811} IOC (55)88, 30 June, BNA-CAB134/965.\textsuperscript{812} IOC (56)47, 16 June, BNA-CAB134/1269.\textsuperscript{813} Confidential Report of the Acting US Rep, 11\textsuperscript{th} Session CND, 5 July 1956, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box122/File1230-1, UN 11\textsuperscript{th} Session (1955-6).
UK Delegate, Mr. Walker, lamented Anslinger’s absence from the 1956 CND, while Canada’s representative, Kenneth Hossick, was furious, interpreting it as an overt protest at the removal of CND from New York to Geneva. The UK still held out hopes for closer Anglo-American co-operation but these were thoroughly dashed during 1957 and 1958. In 1957 the UK Foreign Office sent an overture, forwarding comments on the Draft Single Convention to remind the State Department and Anslinger that US and UK interests ‘should be fairly close’ on synthetics, despite UK views that the US had ‘wobbled in the past’. They hoped the letter would help keep Anslinger ‘on the straight path’ with the moderate coalition centred on the Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland, and Canada. Anslinger was ‘always very much a law unto himself and...the State Department either cannot, or does not attempt to keep control of him’ but London hoped he could be reined in.

The initial response claimed US positions were being re-examined and London concluded it did ‘not seem to have been a complete waste of time’. The optimism proved short lived as the 1957 CND assembled in New York under Anslinger’s Chairmanship. The UK delegation viewed his performance as erratic and incompetent: he ‘could never refrain from commenting on the remarks of each speaker’ and ‘invariably omitted to say whether he was speaking as Chairman or as the US representative.’ Furthermore he made it clear he had not read certain important documents, or grasped important issues and ‘frequently disregarded the rules of procedure.’ The result was ‘superficial’ and ‘confused’ discussions topped by his inexplicable disruption of Canadian attempts to forward work on the Second Draft Single Convention.

**Concluding the Final Draft:**

With the Afghan issue resolved by 1958 and a keen desire for a new international agreement to strengthen the constitutional basis for the ‘closed institution’ model in the US, Anslinger worked to put the Single Convention back on track. Further, Iran had acceded to the 1953 Protocol. Vaille and Anslinger now sought to bring in Greece next and had the expectation

---


815 Hoare to Gauntlett, 6 March, UNS1816/5; Hoare to Anslinger, 11 March, UNS1816/5, BNA-FO371/129982.

816 Gauntlett to Hoare, 6 May, UNS1815/17, BNA-FO371/129981.

817 IOC (57)55, 21 June, BNA-CAB134/2063.
that Yugoslavia would follow.\textsuperscript{818} It looked as if a final draft of the Single Convention could be completed at the 1958 session, ready for a Plenipotentiary Conference. Anslinger hoped to secure the ratification of the 1953 Protocol in time to be followed by the ratification of a more extensive and similarly strict Single Convention.

The moderate bloc thwarted these goals at the 1958 session. His wife’s deteriorating health, coupled with numerous domestic challenges, and an unwillingness to lend credibility to the Geneva home for CND meant Anslinger was again absent.\textsuperscript{819} The US delegation proved disorganised and erratic. The UK described it as a ‘heterogeneous’ bunch of FBN bureaucrats and State department officials who were ‘clearly under [his] remote control’. The delegation ‘seldom spoke unless it had to’ and was at a loss when voting on unforeseen matters. Each delegate was ‘watching the others and...no one dares do anything constructive lest [they]...incur the wrath of Mr. Anslinger.’ The result was that it ‘took little or no part in helping frustrate moves clearly contrary to its interests, and several times abstained or even voted on the wrong side’. Mr. Green of the UK initially feared it was ‘likely to go down in history as one of the worst sessions on record’ if the Americans did not ‘get off their fat bottoms and face their responsibilities’. At one point, France passed a resolution (7-5) to censure West Germany for not controlling the synthetic narcotic normethadone. Worse: ‘the USA abstained!’ - the State Department representative later apologised privately for their error.\textsuperscript{820} The Foreign Office labelled it ‘something of a shambles’ and sought contact with the State Department to see if anything could be done before the session ended.\textsuperscript{821}

Anslinger attributed tensions at the session to Mr. Green being ‘new and sticky’ and a ’31 year old, uncured ham’ who did not belong in the CND. As Anslinger wrote: ‘Green (UK), the green delegate who has been giving us trouble throughout the meeting, picking up little details and pieces of lint’. The head of the US delegation Mr. Tennyson reported back that the

\textsuperscript{818} Vaille to Anslinger, 12 May 1958, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box123/File1230-1, UN 13\textsuperscript{th} Session #2 (1958-9).
\textsuperscript{819} Anslinger to Yates, 11 April 1958, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box123/File1230-1, UN 13\textsuperscript{th} Session #1 (1958).
\textsuperscript{820} IOC (58)46, 12 June, BNA-CAB134/2068; Green to Hoare, 2 May, UNS1815/31, BNA-FO371/137060.
\textsuperscript{821} Report on the first week of the Commission: Minutes, 14 May, UNS1815/31, BNA-FO371/137060.
Canadians and British were giving him a rough time and Anslinger set to work ‘preparing some counter measures in cooperation with the Department of State’. 822

A ‘battle’ developed over the inclusion of a ‘closed institution’ provision in the draft Single Convention. The US argued that it was not binding but merely ‘a principle’. The UK and Canada pushed back strongly. UK opposition was expected, but the US delegation was ‘astonished’ with the change in Canadian attitude, which had traditionally ‘been similar to ours, that no drug addict could be cured by the ambulatory treatment’. Hossick highlighted sources ‘emanating’ from the US, suggesting alternatives to the ‘closed institution’ approach. The US managed to sustain the inclusion of a weak provision when it came to a vote, but the issue appeared set to be re-addressed in the Plenipotentiary Conference. 823

The US were also furious about the UK being the only objector to an including a provision from the 1912 Convention to cater to other US constitutional concerns. Indicative of the worsening relations, the US delegation held a lunch and dinner for friendly delegations, including France, India, Yugoslavia and Turkey. The US delegation refused to invite the UK or Canadian delegations claiming Anslinger ‘would not have approved any invitation to these groups who had certainly not been helpful to us in any way’. 824

A ‘relatively clean’ draft of the Single Convention was finally agreed at the 1958 session, by including many unresolved minority opinions in footnotes. Deep divisions were merely postponed until the Plenipotentiary Conference. The core disagreements remained between producer and transit countries and ‘between different juridical systems’. Whether these issues could be ironed out remained an open question. 825

The 1959 Session:

823 Delegate to Anslinger, 22 May 1958, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box123/File1230-1, UN 13th Session #2 (1958-9).
824 Ibid.
The 1959 session proved ‘shorter and less eventful’ and Anslinger was again absent.\(^\text{826}\) The UK noted that the US delegation was led by a State Department official and proved more competent but ‘still failed to show any signs of giving leadership’.\(^\text{827}\) Meanwhile, presaging a key feature of the Plenipotentiary Conference, the US delegation noted that on issues pitting manufacturing states against producing states, the Soviet delegation ‘usually voted with the latter…to curry their favour’.\(^\text{828}\)

Vaille, now removed from the process, professed himself ‘extremely pessimistic’ and worried that the UK-led bloc, believing ‘that the Commerce is too constricted’ would push to water down the draft. Anslinger similarly worried ‘the old European block will get together and we may lose many of our gains’. Anslinger was infuriated by the outcomes of the 1959 session. Without himself or Vaille present to steer the ‘rudder’ he viewed it as descending into backslapping and lowest common denominator agreements. The US delegation was ‘anything but satisfactory’ and played an increasingly ‘defensive’ role. He was outraged by a Resolution providing implicit support to ambulatory treatment and labelled it ‘one of the most unfortunate statements’ by CND. He claimed the US delegation ‘must have been absent on that day’ and that he would ‘be unable to distribute it in this country because it provides a lever for those people who want to create free drug areas’. Anslinger determined to reignite his alliance with Vaille and looked to ‘brighter days ahead’.\(^\text{829}\)

\textit{The 1960 Session:}

The 1960 session proved wholly uneventful. The UK had no expectations from the US and their preparation for the 1961 Plenipotentiaries Conference was based on a desire to fundamentally re-examine the third draft of the Single Convention. They were determined to achieve broad consensus, weaken control provisions and remove elements they found objectionable. The UK were not discriminatory in means, and were willing to rely on Western European, Asiatic and even Soviet support on areas of overlapping interest. They were even open to reaching out to the Latin American countries which they had previously

\footnotesize{826} Merrill to Herter, July 1959, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box123/File1230-1, UN 14\textsuperscript{th} Session (1959).
\footnotesize{827} IOC (59)47, 2 June, BNA-CAB134/2073.
\footnotesize{828} Tennyson to Anslinger, 14 April 1959, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box123/File1230-1, UN 14\textsuperscript{th} Session (1959).
\footnotesize{829} Vaille to Anslinger, 16 April 1959; Anslinger to Vaille, 8 April 1959; Tennyson to Anslinger, 14 April 1959; Quoted in Anslinger to Yates, 4 June 1959, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box123/File1230-1, UN 14\textsuperscript{th} Session (1959).}
avoided out of deference to the US sphere of interest. The UK had given up on an Anglo-US cooperative effort and were instead focused on making ‘every effort to secure a treaty that the great majority of countries’ could accept.\textsuperscript{830}

\textit{Illicit Traffic:}

Seeking to regain some initiative at CND Anslinger and his agent Siragusa planned to make an extensive statement on the illicit traffic. The UK, continued to downplay it, particularly in the Far East, lest it cause further complications for their colonies. Anslinger wished to be invited to send FBN agents to assist the UK in policing the illicit traffic in Hong Kong.\textsuperscript{831} Anslinger’s chief CND informant, Siragusa, who again served on the Illicit Traffic Committee, felt that UK representative Green (Chair of the Committee) was ‘avoiding him’. He believed Green, ‘a real, sly one’ apparently knew Siragusa wanted ‘to button-hole him about Hong Kong’. Green focused on the State Department side of the US delegation. Siragusa believed that the was ‘a conspiracy to foul’ the US statement on Hong Kong up and that there was a ‘Secretariat-Green-Hossick effort designed to suppress my truthful but perhaps offensive remarks against certain countries – my spotlighting of Hong Kong situation’. Siragusa was determined to try to include the remarks regardless of the conspiracy, but felt he lacked State Department support, writing to Anslinger:

\begin{quote}
I work only for you and the Bureau and I couldn’t care less about these State Department men but I am afraid that if I try to double-cross Meyer and slip in some remarks...I am certain Chase and Rowell would hit the ceiling and blast you and the Bureau.\textsuperscript{832}
\end{quote}

When this became apparent, Anslinger and his agents began to look to Japan as a base of operations in the region, claiming ‘The UK’s attitude contradicted their obligations under international treaties respecting the question of cooperation...they talk out of both sides of

\textsuperscript{830} IOC (61)3, 11 Jan, BNA-CAB134/2082.

\textsuperscript{831} Siragusa to Anslinger, 21 April 1960, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box123/File1230-1, UN 15\textsuperscript{th} Session #1 (1960).

\textsuperscript{832} Siragusa to Anslinger, 29 April 1960, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box123/File1230-1, UN 15\textsuperscript{th} Session #1 (1960).
their mouth’. The US, however, remained concerned to deflect attention from potential nationalist involvement in the illicit trade. It avoided criticism of France given the US ‘promise not to put them on the spot’.

Similar outcomes occurred for the Middle East, where Syria and Turkey came to blows over the allocation of blame on the origins of the illicit traffic in the region, while the US described continued Iranian suppression efforts as ‘heroic’. It was representative of the session which became a musical chairs of states shifting blame around for the source and transit points of the illicit traffic and no real outcomes produced. Anslinger failed to regain the initiative at CND and instead had to look towards Single Convention negotiations.

**Part 7: The Single Convention:**

The 1961 Plenipotentiaries Conference took place from January 24th to March 26th. It received representatives from seventy countries but meaningful participation was largely restricted to CND members. Novice delegations were surprised to find CND countries appeared to spend their time tearing up the third draft which had been the culmination of ten years of their own work. The UK noted the US delegation was ‘very indifferently represented’ while still under the ‘remote control’ of Anslinger. He himself was putting in only brief appearances as his wife’s terminal illness meant that he had to commute daily from Washington DC. In the end, the UK saw this as the reason for the US’ failure to get the modifications they desired or retain provisions they hoped for. Had they ‘been able to adopt a more flexible attitude’ they ‘might at least have succeeded in salvaging something from the wreckage’. Despite this the US signed the convention. The UK, on the other hand, saw it as the consolidation they had hoped for with the ‘more controversial elements watered down into a generally acceptable form’. They had, further, successfully removed article 32 dealing with the closed list of producers which had also proved widely unacceptable to other

---

836 IOC (61)61, 9 May, BNA-CAB134/2084.
delegates. They seemed to have achieved a kind of broad consensus with their interests remaining secure. Vaille, meanwhile, had been unable to rally French delegation support for the 1953 Protocol. Anslinger, however, was far from finished with the Single Convention.

**The Single Convention – Key Provisions:**

The producer bloc entered the Single Convention Plenipotentiary Conference in January 1961 as the main revisionist force, hoping to weaken many of the main control provisions. Led by the Soviets and facilitated by the moderate bloc, states picked apart the Single Convention. The issue of Cannabis produced mixed results. There was unanimous agreement to prohibit cultivation except for industrial purposes, as well as an acknowledgement that small amounts would be allowed for scientific purposes. Given that the plant grew wild and many nations relied on it for industrial purposes, these were to be explicitly exempted from prohibition. Hungary and other nations pushed back strongly against control of poppy straw, arguing it was an agricultural waste product and ‘cannot be regarded as a narcotic’. In the end however, producer states won passage of control thereby diminishing its economic threat to traditional opium cultivation.

The Soviet bloc worked with manufacturing states, including Switzerland, Canada and the UK, to remove the ‘closed list’ amendment. The new INCB was expanded to eleven members and some move towards fusing the CND and INCB secretariats was made, although it remained purposely vague. INCB maintained the right to recommend an embargo which the US pointed out was ‘considerably weaker’ than the mandatory embargo provision in the 1953 Opium Protocol. Parties were required to furnish estimates for requirements and exports, and remain within these estimates. INCB could establish estimates for any state which failed to supply them, including non-parties. The US noted that the provisions around

---

838 IOC (61)61, 9 May, BNA-CAB134/2084.
estimates and statistics were ‘virtually the same as the requirements in the existing treaties’ although wide reservation provisions threatened to undermine these (see below). The scheduling system, initially running to two schedules under the 1931 Convention, was expanded to four. These attempted to link degrees of control to ‘varying degree of addicting liability’. 844

Parties were permitted reservations around maintaining existing opium smokers in their territories, with no new registration allowed after 1964. Opium eating, or quasi-medical use, was to be abolished within fifteen years of the Convention coming into force. Parties were to establish national agencies to collect the opium crop and cultivation would be restricted to those licensed by the agency. All countries which produced opium for 10 years prior to January 1961 could continue to produce opium. Further, any country could produce and export up to 5 tons annually simply by notifying the Board. A country wishing to export more than five tons had to notify ECOSOC which could either approve or simply recommend against it. The US pointed out that this was a ‘an entirely different concept’ of production limitation than in the 1953 Protocol but was:

\[\text{a compromise provision resulting from the insistence of the Soviet Bloc, countries in the British Commonwealth, and some African countries that the new countries be permitted to produce and export opium if they so desire.}^845\]

The Convention stipulated that parties prohibit cultivation if they considered it the most adequate method to prevent diversions into the illicit traffic. The US viewed this as providing a ‘constitutional basis’ for the Opium Poppy Control Act enacted by the US Congress in 1942. 846 The 1936 Convention which dealt with the illicit traffic, but which was poorly subscribed, was the only Convention not incorporated into the Single Convention. Instead, weak and a ‘tenuous recommendatory type provision’ regarding penalties for traffickers and extradition was included. It was due to the weakness of this provision, that many states already parties to the 1936 Convention demanded the convention be kept in force. 847


\[^845\] Ibid.

\[^846\] Ibid.

\[^847\] Ibid.
Coca cultivation was to be controlled under the same mechanisms as opium cultivation, while a special provision to protect the Coca Cola Company’s access to non-alkaloid coca leaves for flavouring was included. Meanwhile, those states permitting chewing of coca leaf agreed to abolish the practice within twenty-five years of the Convention coming into force. Virtually identical provisions applied to Cannabis, with the exception of cannabis for industrial purposes (fiber and seed) or horticultural purposes.  

Driven by Soviet demands, reservations were permitted to specified articles around the application of the system of estimates and statistics. Reservations to other articles could be made with the support of two-thirds of ratified states. The US noted that no reservations were permitted to the 1953 Protocol, barring provisional reservations around opium smoking and eating as well as coca leaf chewing.  

The US had squeezed language around compulsory treatment in a ‘closed institution’ into the third draft. In negotiations this was strongly watered down to recommend, for those with serious problems, to provide adequate treatment facilities, if they had the economic means to do so. The US viewed this as having ‘no value’. In particular they blamed the Holy See, which raised objection to the words ‘civil commitment’. As Anslinger commented, it was ‘due to their fears that this would be used against the Cardinals and Bishops in the Iron Curtain countries’. He continued: ‘I don’t think the Communist need anything like this if they want to throw somebody in jail’. He was also furious that the ‘Holy See Delegation sat there for nine weeks not uttering a word and when they had something to say didn’t have the common decency to consult us’.  

Anslinger wrote to Vaille on March 3rd, ‘the Soviet bloc has just about destroyed the Single Convention. They have won on nearly every point’. The closed list would be supplanted by an amendment, ‘peddled by Canada’, allowing any country to export up to five tons without notifying the Board. Vaille described it as a ‘disaster’. Both argued the open list of producers would create an open global market, drive up supplies, down prices and potentially flood the

---

848 Ibid.
849 Ibid.
850 Ibid.
illicit market. Overall they believed it ‘set back international control of narcotics fifty years’. 852

**US Opposition:**

Gilbert Yates and the DND secretariat argued that ‘“something” is better than “nothing”’. Anslinger argued that ‘The something may even be worse than the nothing’. 853 As the Conference drew to a close the US dug in its heels around reservations, but had not yet come to the point of open intransigence. Anslinger publicly professed willingness to allow some reservations, to satisfy the Soviets, provided they did not ‘open the floodgates’. He even professed some propaganda benefit in having the Soviets on record as opposing certain provisions via reservations. By the 18th of March Anslinger left the plenipotentiary conference giving the impression he would push the US towards signature. He argued he needed to place the final document before the President’s Committee on Narcotics and secure their ascent before it could be sent on to Congress. 854 In reality Anslinger had already turned on the convention:

> *We worked twelve years to consolidate all the treaties and protocols. Unfortunately the political situation was not such as to create an atmosphere for objective negotiation. Consequently, the Single Convention, although adopted, was in my opinion laid to rest by the Soviet bloc, the British Commonwealth, and the Holy See.* 855

The US gave two key reasons for opposition: the provisions around the limitation of the production and raw opium and the permissible reservations around the system of estimates. 856

---

856 William McAllister speculates that a key reason for Anslinger’s rejection of the Single Convention was the absence of a provision similar to that in the 1931 Convention mandating a separate
The US argued the reservations, if applied to various aspects of the new Board’s work, would result in the Board not having any authority to regulate the market.\textsuperscript{857} They went on, ‘the estimates and statistics system of the 1931 Convention had been destroyed. Any party…could by reservation prevent examination of its statistics’.\textsuperscript{858}

Anslinger set to work securing the support of Senators and pharmaceutical interests. Senator Homer Copehart agreed with Anslinger’s reading and promised to reject it if Anslinger signed it and offered it to the Senate for confirmation:

\begin{quote}
far from strengthening international control…[it] could become the means of flooding countries…with large amounts of addicting drugs. I am particularly concerned…because I am informed that it was at the insistence of the Soviet bloc…that certain fundamental controls...have been weakened and can be destroyed…[A]s is well recognized, traffic in addicting drugs has been an insidious tool in the cold war for weakening the moral fiber and physical well-being of people throughout the world.\textsuperscript{859}
\end{quote}

The pharmaceutical sector warned the new INCB ‘could be ignored and flouted with impunity’. Despite his domestic lobbying efforts, Anslinger found the US ECOSOC delegation ‘solidly against me and want the treaty’.\textsuperscript{860} Holding the domestic line while caring for his dying wife his efforts received a major boost when Senate Foreign Relations Committee member Senator Alexander Wiley pushed the State Department to pressure Turkey and Greece and ensure no encouragement was given to the Single Convention\textsuperscript{861}.

\textsuperscript{857} The United States Views of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, undated, FBN\slash A/ACC170-74-12/Box170/File1230, UN Single Convention.
\textsuperscript{858} US Del Report, 17\textsuperscript{th} Session CND, 15 August 1962, FBN\slash A/ACC170-74-12/Box170/File1230, Single Convention #6 (1962).
\textsuperscript{860} Beesley to Anslinger, 26 July 1961; Anslinger to Vaille, 10 July 1961, FBN\slash A/ACC170-74-12/Box170/File1230, Single Convention #4 (1961).
\textsuperscript{861} Carroll to Anslinger, undated, FBN\slash A/ACC170-74-12/Box170/File1230, Single Convention #5 (1961-2).
The State Department proved hard to keep in line with US policy. As one Treasury Official wrote, despite a clear US position ‘the Department of State people at the working level were not cooperating in the maintenance of that position’. The State department responded that the Treasury wanted to play the policy in ‘high key’ while the State Department wanted to play it in ‘low key’ on the assumption that the Single Convention would fail on its own. Further the State Department criticised the handling of the 1961 Plenipotentiary Conference, complaining that the US delegation had ‘completely lost control of the situation’ and ‘failed to line up the necessary votes’. Further, they made clear that the matter would not receive major attention at the General Assembly level where they privileged ‘political’ over ‘technical’ issues.  

The UK Embassy in Washington had gained the impression that the State Department agreed with the UK but that it had been side-lined by the FBN. The UK could not understand how Anslinger expected the Protocol to function given the widespread disapproval. Even if he succeeded it would simply become a ‘lame duck’ and they could not understand why Anslinger would want to ‘bring discredit’ on the international machinery ‘which up to now had worked very well.’ They soon viewed their role as not only salvaging the Single Convention but also the international control system itself.

Of key importance to Anslinger was the recognition that he could receive significant blowback from his traditional domestic constituencies. Even before the Conference had closed Hearst Papers wrote editorials blasting the outcome as a Soviet plot to flood the world with opium and pointing out that the lead Soviet delegate had a history of espionage. Other constituencies, such as the Women’s Christian Temperance Movement, would soon follow suit. Anslinger had lost control of the international negotiating process. He was now unhappy with the provisions of the agreement and felt he had little choice but to try to torpedo it. Green for the UK, with the US views now clearly elaborated found little to be gained by

---

863 British Embassy Washington to horn, 19 September 1962, UNS18112/68, BNA-FO371/161050.
864 Green to Key, 6 September 1962, UNS18112/66, BNA-FO371/161050.
further arguing.\textsuperscript{866} He sought to downplay US dismay as far as possible to allow time for the Convention to come into force.

\textit{The Rushes to Ratify:}

Anslinger gambled that ratification by another producer would bring the 1953 Protocol into force and indefinitely postpone the Single Convention process. He began to secretly lobby the Greek and Turkish governments, sending a mission to both countries in 1962.\textsuperscript{867} In 1962 the US finally made public their opposition and asking that the 1953 Protocol should be given ‘at least five years’ to prove itself effective. They were willing to make some amendments, for example eliminating local inquiry and mandatory embargo provisions but maintained the ‘closed list’ was ‘the very essence of the Protocol’ despite criticisms. They admitted that only one country might become the sole source of exportable opium, but this ‘might not be a bad thing’ or that no opium might be available at all and therefore steps should be made available to ensure a supply in such a situation.\textsuperscript{868}

Turkey and traditional US ‘stumbling block’ Dr. Ozkol sought to delay US action on pushing ratification of the 1953 Protocol until after the next CND meeting. The US ignored this and turned to Greece for ‘possible quicker action’.\textsuperscript{869} Greece was sternly reminded that the international community had included them in the 1953 Protocol ‘closed list’ yet Greece did nothing to ratify. Confronted with direct US pressure Greece professed displeasure with the Single Convention and promised to look again at ratifying the 1953 Protocol. As one US team member wrote of the new Greek representative:

\textit{Prof. Tsatsas, in our opinion, represents a breaking up of the so-called “Balkan Bloc.”… Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia have worked closely together over the past few years. We have seen undue influence exerted by Mr. Ozkol of Turkey…and to a lesser extent, Nicolic of Yugoslavia.}\textsuperscript{870}

\textsuperscript{866} Green to Anslinger, 26 February 1962, FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box170/File1230, Single Convention #5 (1961-2).
\textsuperscript{867} Mission to Greece and Turkey on Narcotic Treaties, 3 May 1962, NA, RG 170-74-12, Box 170, File 1230, Folder: Single Convention.
\textsuperscript{868} For use in discussion with Curran, 1962, NA, RG 170-74-12, Box 170, File 1230, Folder: Single Convention.
\textsuperscript{869} Flues to Secretary of the Treasury, 3 May 1962, FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box170/File1230, UN Single Convention.
\textsuperscript{870} Ibid.
Soon after leaving Greece the US team were ‘confident’ of a quick ratification despite the political difficulties which had ‘paralyzed’ the Greek Parliament. Soon thereafter they received word the Greek government had taken action to ratify the 1953 Protocol. One of the members signed off: ‘Even if the Greek Parliament has not yet acted, I believe I can say…“Mission Accomplished”’.

At the 1962 CND Greece announced its intention to ratify the 1953 Opium Protocol. The US delegation reported that the UK and Canada responded with ‘an angry and unremitting attack’ on Greece. With only the US and Egypt offering support, the Greek delegate buckled under the Anglo-Canadian onslaught and also vaguely committed to eventual ratification of the Single Convention. Soon after Greece asked for US support in becoming a member of ECOSOC, something ‘obviously asked as a return favour for ratification of the [Opium Protocol]’. Anslinger immediately began work to secure US support in favour of Greece’s request. The US continued a massive diplomatic offensive through 1962 with extensive shuttle diplomacy and utilising embassies to advocate their position on the Single Convention. Many professed sympathy but few expressed willingness to change their position and the US seemed unlikely to arrest the trend. India summed up the views of many, claiming support for stricter provisions in the 1961 Convention, but attaching greater importance to securing universal adherence.

The 1953 Opium Protocol came into force on March 8th 1963. Anslinger recognised this would force Turkey into ratification ‘as they have enormous stocks and the only manufacturing customer able to buy will be the UK’. Soon after Turkey moved towards ratification citing ‘disappointing’ opium sales as the main driver and the hope that it would

---

871 Ibid.
872 Postscript, Flues to Treasury, 3 May 1962, FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box170/File1230, UN Single Convention.
874 See FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box170/File1230, Single Convention #7 (1962-3); US Embassy New Delhi to Secretary of State, 1 May 1962, FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box170/File1230, Single Convention #6 (1962).
result in preferential access of exports to the US market. On July 15th Turkey ratified the Protocol. Nevertheless, the Greek announcement had accelerated efforts to bring the Single Convention into force. It became apparent that if the 1953 Protocol coming into force, India would enjoy a monopoly on licit opium production to parties of the Protocol. The UK and Canada both stated their intent to ratify the Singe Convention as soon as requisite domestic legislation could be passed. The Netherland, Yugoslavia, India, Switzerland, Morocco and Poland all spoke in favour of the agreement and the Afghan observer described it as an achievement for the broader United Nations. CND passed a resolution urging ECOSOC to invite governments to ratify the Single Convention. On November 13th 1964 Kenya became the fortieth signatory to accede thereby bringing it into force one month later.

Conclusion:
Anslinger’s strategy had failed. The 1953 Protocol came into force but had failed to stop the Single Convention. The US would continue to boycott the Convention for several years – eventually ratifying in 1967. A decade since the 1953 Opium Conference the US was strongly isolated in the field of international narcotics control. The UK on the other hand was firmly nestled within the new system while the Anglo-US drug relationship was, by this stage, severely weakened, tense and distant.

The UK was hoping for broad accord and to protect their interests. They initially looked towards an American led anti-producer front. When this failed to emerge, the UK began building its own coalition, encompassing Western European states but also the moderate Indian delegation. The UK and India eventually worked closely to find a middle ground between hard line producers, manufacturers and stringent control advocates.

Anslinger was hoping to sustain US hard-line goals in the face of collapsing alliances and shifting systemic power structures. His leadership undermined the formulation of a coherent US policy, prevented a moderation in the face of changed circumstances and stopped the

---

877 Ratification by Turkey, 9 August, UNS18110/24, BNA-FO371/172756.
878 US Del Report, 17th Session CND, 15 August 1962, FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box170/File1230, Single Convention #6 (1962); For examples of UK’s ratification efforts see: BNA-FO371/172756.

257
emergence of a new level of cooperation with the malleable UK delegation on this issue, much to the dismay of the State Department. US and UK interests diverged somewhat but some degree of negotiation and nurturing could have potentially produced a governing alliance, instead of a breakdown in relations between the two. As a result, Anslinger failed to utilise the potential for co-operation that existed and consigned the US to a unilateral approach followed by a period of isolation. Further, Anslinger failed to achieve most of his goals during this period.

The battle between the 1953 Protocol and the 1961 Single Convention became a proxy for Anglo-American relations in the field. On the one side was the US, using all diplomatic levers possible and advocating for a strict document which would squeeze licit supplies while furthering a prohibitionist model internationally. On the other side were producer states, whose economic interests were tied to avoiding new domestic control obligations, levelling the international regulatory structure, maintaining relatively open markets and shifting the regulatory burden towards synthetics and poppy straw manufacturing processes. They allied with hard-line non-interventionist states such as the Soviet Bloc and Latin American countries such as Mexico, and postcolonial states in Africa which desired the freedom to pursue self-sufficiency in pain medicines and potentially develop export markets later. The UK remained in the middle, conducting a quiet diplomatic campaign based on national political and economic self-interest for a moderate international agreement, broader goals of international accord and avoiding any negative spill-over into other areas of international relations. The UK vision eventually won given the relatively easy sell of the Single Convention over the 1953 Protocol to the vast majority of states.

The battle highlighted the internal rifts within the US government between pragmatists in the State Department and hard-line control advocates in the Treasury Department. The latter were able to mobilise powerful congressional actors and arouse strong public opinion and force the State Department to take an active stand against a consensus international approach. The State Department reluctantly acquiesced; provided it did not seep into General Assembly politics. Driving the US hard-liners was a variety of interests, including bureaucratic self-interest, a desire to maintain prohibitionist domestic constituencies, a genuine belief in the importance of their efforts. Further, personal and diplomatic prestige played an important
part, particularly in the case of Harry Anslinger. Coming to the end of his career Anslinger had no desire to see control efforts fizzle out on his watch.

However, none of these factors could mitigate against the fact that Anslinger had lost control of domestic and international processes. He proved unable to dictate the direction of negotiations. When they failed to progress according to his wishes, he spent the last of his political capital in a last ditch effort to railroad through a tough agreement. His failure reflected a broader shift in international drug diplomacy. The ‘Gentlemen’s club’ of old had been replaced by a complex international framework with multiple power centres and an array of national interests expressed in a more complex manner. Traditional actors had lost the initiative, and the British approach, based on consensus documents and a belief in relatively light-touch global regulation won the day.

As throughout the previous five decades the US and UK took different approaches to international drug control. The UK represented a pragmatic strand that sought to make accommodations with local conditions and hurdles to control. The US maintained an aggressive diplomatic stance based on a firm believe in prohibition surmounting all obstacles. Increasingly, local and regional accommodations showed the US consistently willing to subvert the narcotics control agenda when national interests demanded, but the outward expression of US policy never deviated. The US favoured prohibition as a ‘one-size-fits-all’ global policy. The UK sought a regulatory compromise that maintained this issue below the radar, highlighted the UK as a good global citizen and prevented an unchecked drug commodity market. Within these approaches there was much overlap. When the two worked to exploit these overlaps, namely around the creation of international regulations, forward political progress was possible. When the two focused on their differences, namely around the severity of regulation and the inculcation of the prohibitionist model at the international level, competition and political breakdown often ensued. The battle over the Single Convention was the clearest example of this.
Conclusion:

Anglo-American Drug Diplomacy:
The core of the Anglo-American drug relationship saw overlap and division. The overlap was around the pursuit of a global regulatory framework for ‘dangerous drugs’ internationally. The division was around the frontier and peripheral aspects of this: namely, where to draw the line between licit and illicit consumption; how tightly to restrict, regulate and prohibit global supplies; how much interference in national affairs to allow international organisations; and how to deal with existing drug consuming populations. In a broader sense, however, it was a question of expectations.

The UK viewed the end point of the international control system as facilitating better international management of drugs but also serving as a beacon towards broader international cooperation. It would inevitably provide an imperfect response to an insoluble issue. Nevertheless, it could help states mitigate the problems associated with drugs; minimise cross border disagreements as states dealt with licit and illicit commodity flows; breed new areas of international cooperation; and minimise the risks for their own bilateral and colonial relations deriving from the drug issue. More broadly, it allowed for discussion and action around the most poignant drug issues while establishing a normative framework and international direction of travel towards a world without drug ‘abuse’. In this latter sense Britain had minimal expectations that the international community would ever reach that destination, but it was the defusing of potential international tensions that was key. John Strang and Michael Gossop’s description of the ‘British System’ of domestic control seems apt for British international drug policy: ‘the quintessential characteristic...[is] its lack of rigid form and hence its potentially greater capacity to be intuitively reactive to changed circumstances.’

For the US the system appeared to represent a possible framework for genuinely achieving a world without drug ‘abuse’. Time and again public expressions and policy formulations were based on this principle. Whether it was speeches in the Houses of Congress highlighting that the struggle for drug control was akin to the efforts to end slavery, or the State Department repeatedly stating in public that a solution to the global drug problem was within reach. Under the US approach, the problem was soluble if all states pursued the US formula of strict

regulations, prohibitions and repression. What was required was political will, a mechanism to chastise recalcitrant or failing states and a forum to disseminate their one-size-fits-all model based on policing, enforcement and the ‘closed institution’ approach to addiction.

Where the Anglo-American visions overlapped, cooperation and forward political progress for the international system was possible. When the two were unable to overcome their divisions, competition and international political breakdowns emerged. The battle over the Single Convention represented the greatest example of this and highlighted the core interests underpinning their drug diplomatic endeavours but also the role of agency, social forces, and deeper economic and political interests in sustaining cooperation. The breakdown arose from a divergence of interests that had their origins in the two countries’ historical approach to narcotics control. This, however, was fatally worsened by poor US leadership under Harry Anslinger.

The historical approaches of the UK and US to narcotics control solidified and developed around the turn of the twentieth century. The US was driven by a moralistic and self-interested belief in prohibition and ‘control at the source’. This was, under the US conception, to be effected by suppression at all points on the supply chain via regulation of medical and scientific usage, strict prohibitions around non-medical and non-scientific consumption enforced by the diffusion of uniform legislation and police enforcement globally, and the mandatory ‘closed institution’ approach to drug ‘addiction’.

The UK on the other hand was driven by more practical and similarly self-interested concerns. Initially they walked a balancing act between protecting their colonial interests by maintaining the opium monopolies and avoiding the imposition of strict prohibition in these colonies given the practical and monetary difficulties this would raise. Militating against this was the desire to encourage US interest in international cooperation around drugs. The UK believed that the US involvement with the League of Nations drug control system could spill over into other areas of international cooperation. The convergence of these goals with US moderation in the 1930s witnessed the creation of international manufacturing regulations via the system of estimates.
The divergence between the US and UK over the continuation of opium smoking and the opium monopolies sustained a bilateral rift which fuelled serious tensions within the League system and helped prevent the emergence of a production limitation agreement. World War II undermined this previous obstacle. Further it highlighted the central role of agency in driving the drug issue forward. Without Anslinger’s leadership the change in UK policy outlined in Chapter One was unforeseeable. With the shift, the UK furthered its commitment to end the opium monopolies, albeit imperfectly, and the move towards decolonisation removed this as an issue of division with the Anglo-American division.

The post-war period offered the prospect of a new Anglo-American drug alliance. The UK toughened its supply-centric stance against certain Asian powers, notably Thailand, and sought to demonstrate its commitment to regulatory control efforts via cooperation with the US over Germany. Nevertheless both cases further demonstrated that the UK was willing to support US control interventionism only when it gelled with broader geopolitical interests. Further, with its domestic economic and balance of payments situation worsening, the UK was increasingly vigilant against regulations and prohibitions that might adversely affect its domestic drug manufacturing sector or raise costs for the National Health Service. Meanwhile, witnessing the tendency towards mission creep within the UN CND, as seemingly innocuous and intangible commitments generated new international criticisms of domestic policies, the UK tried to dig in its heels and prevent CND, PCOB, WHO or other bodies appropriating new powers of oversight over national policies.

The US, meanwhile, emerging from the war with a new international leadership role was forced to temper some of its drug policy goals to broader geopolitical interests. Nevertheless their public narrative, driven by Anslinger but increasingly softened by the State Department, remained one of strict global drug controls via the diffusions of political will, uniform legislation, police enforcement and a desire to strengthen CND’s oversight of national policy implementation. The drug control lobby in the US, represented by prohibitionist groups such as the Women’s Christian Temperance Union, retained an extremely important role in policy formulation and a formidable ‘army’ for Anslinger as demonstrated by the failed reorganisation efforts against the FBN in the 1940s and 50s. No such lobby emerged in the UK and policy remained fundamentally driven by technocratic concerns, bureaucratic turf battles and tempered by some domestic medical and economic constituencies.
The relationship between the FBN and the State Department would ultimately determine the shape of US post-war drug diplomacy. Anslinger’s relatively close relationship with George Morlock, the State Department’s lead on narcotics and core ‘inner circle’ ally, resulted in a relatively harmonious federal policy process. Nevertheless, the State Department after expending significant leverage pursuing the Judd Resolution pushed drug control down their priority list in the immediate post-war UNO agenda, cutting Anslinger out of the process and trying to outsource diplomatic heavy lifting on the issue to the UK and China. This facilitated a relatively consensual multilateral period beginning with the creation of CND and culminating in the rapid passage of the 1948 Protocol. The loss of Morlock in the 1950s resulted in the State Department losing institutional knowledge and interest. Anslinger initially utilised this to place the narcotics issue within the ‘red-bating’ of the McCarthy Era by portraying the opium trade as a global conspiracy by Communist China to destroy the west with opium and earn foreign exchange. The State Department soon tired of this narrative and pushed back on Anslinger’s efforts to use UN institutions as a forum to criticise foreign governments, even communist ones.

Anslinger’s overreach laid bare his failure to make CND an enforcement body where Member States would be openly chastised. The State Department, initially reliant on ECOSOC to defuse CND-generated tensions, withdrew support at CND the moment US statements were seen to impede broader US foreign relations. Anslinger had used Iran, Mexico, Indochina, Thailand, India and China among others at various times as test cases for the interventionist capability of CND. The State Department torpedoed each of these in turn.

CND had become far more activist and interventionist than may have been the case without Anslinger’s sustained leadership efforts. Ultimately, however, reticence of key member states such as the UK and a lack of State Department support prevented it attaining the enforcement body status Anslinger and US drug control lobbyists desired. By the end of the 1950s it appeared to have adopted the previous League OAC tendency towards backslapping and serving as a talking shop. The State Department eventually supported the Single Convention as a moderate international agreement which would prevent a weakening of relations in other fields. They were overruled, however, as Anslinger secured the support of his traditional constituencies and from key US Senators in opposing the document.
In the 1950s and 1960s the US and UK had differing visions for international production limitation and the expansion of prohibitionist obligations. US CND delegations, when led by Anslinger, continued the World War II ‘inner circle’ agenda and generally sought to strengthen CND into the 1950s. They continued to push for mandatory inspections; trade embargo provisions; internationally driven decisions around which drugs would be permitted and prohibited (most notably around heroin) and mandating exactly how states should deal with addiction (the ‘closed institution’ model) and drug traffickers (severe sentences). At the other end of the spectrum were Soviet Bloc states which tended towards a strong framework of non-interference. Many Latin American and newly emergent nations agreed and sought to prevent excessive interference in their affairs. Further, new states were unwilling to lock in an agreement that forever barred them from involvement in the licit trade and make them dependent on a small number of producer and manufacturing countries for their medicines.

By the 1950s the UK was on alert against further encroachment on national sovereignty, whether commercial or criminal. Further they wished to maintain good relations with soon-to-be or already former colonies and professed sympathy with demands for equality of national opportunity in the field around opium production and even manufacture. Further, allowing an open list of producer states meshed extremely well with the UK’s economic interests of ensuring cheap opium supplies for their manufacturing sector and thereby helping the overall UK balance of payments position. It would have further positive fiscal effects by ensuring continued cheap supplies for the NHS. They continued to flatly reject US calls for a ‘closed institutional’ model of treatment. On the other hand the UK sought a moderate accommodation with interventionism. They were willing to subsume certain national prerogatives and interests to produce some international controls and were willing to play down their differences with the US over their national approaches to addiction and prevent coverage of the ‘British System’ in the US press.

The two nevertheless had important overlapping interests, namely their large pharmaceutical sectors and a desire to ensure equality of treatment of synthetic narcotics relative to natural opiates. Had the US and UK worked to overcome their differences via close cooperation and discussion a more harmonious diplomatic process might have ensued. Ultimately this was made impossible by the leadership of Harry Anslinger. His attempt to retain control of international processes, despite absenteeism, a weakened domestic position and personal
complications, ensured divided and incompetent US delegations which failed to elaborate and advocate for US interests. Ultimately the UK would not accept an agreement which risked raising costs for their National Health Service and domestic drug manufacturers or impose obligations which would prove unpopular with domestic medical constituencies. The US ultimately failed to secure a strict agreement and sought to roll control efforts back to the 1953 Protocol, something completely undesirable to the majority of states including the UK.

This highlights that the breakdown was ultimately the result of interests and leadership. It is not the first study to highlight the large foreign policy impacts of Harry Anslinger’s leadership but in doing so it highlights the broader role of agency in creating and sustaining Anglo-American co-operation in specific issue areas.581 Had a more effective leadership reigned within the FBN during the 1950s or had policy been more clearly in the hands of the State Department, the outcome around the Single Convention might have been significantly different. On the other hand, without the US pushing the envelope on the issue over the previous six decades it is unlikely that the CND would have emerged in the form that it did, even if that did not reflect ultimate US desires for an international enforcement body with strong oversight of national policies. The US would spend the next half-century utilising and evolving CND into an enforcement body via treaty reforms, funding initiatives and aggressive bilateral diplomacy, but this was a far from inevitable outgrowth of the 1961 Convention.

The 1961 Convention created a mixed system, based on strong normative goals and trajectories but underpinned by relatively weak enforcement mechanisms and production controls. The US had sought an agreement to squeeze the global opium market. The UK sought one to regulate it. In the end the UK won and this victory became enshrined in the Single Convention. Ultimately the UK had relied on various coalitions of states to achieve this, highlighting their central role as pragmatist-in-chief within the system, which can be traced back to its origins at the turn of the twentieth century. The UK consistently charted a middle course between the hard-line prohibitionism and control advocacy of the US on the

one hand and the economic self-interest of producer states and non-interventionist impulses of other groups such as the Soviet bloc on the other hand.

Had Anslinger, at times been able to adopt a more moderate and engaged approach the US would not have become isolated to the extent that it did, nor perhaps would it have failed so extensively to achieve its desired ends around the 1961 Convention. Part of this unwillingness, this thesis has argued, derived from his fear of alienating his core domestic constituencies and Congressional support base in Washington by advocating for a retrograde document. When he failed to secure his desired ends in the Single Convention he ultimately chose to sacrifice it, portraying it as part communist conspiracy and part economic self-interest in the face of US control efforts. Ultimately he felt that the 1953 Protocol would serve as a better opium control arrangement which could then be extended to cannabis and coca controls.

The UK had by the mid-1950s given up on accommodating the erratic, often incompetent and unpredictable US delegations and sought, quite successfully, to protect its own interests. It had been reticent to see the production limitation agreement reach fruition under the 1953 Opium Protocol given the opium market fluctuations and other economic concerns during that period. When faced with that unsatisfactory document and producer states’ efforts to undermine synthetic narcotics, the UK forged ahead with the Single Convention, driving it in a more moderate and acceptable direction with the aim of replacing the 1953 Protocol. Initially they sought US support with this vision, but ultimately turned to a coalition of moderate states. Furthermore, evidence suggests that the US’ own State Department retained a closer affinity to the UK’s approach than to Anslinger’s, but ultimately, through a mixture of bureaucratic outmanoeuvring and a need to placate domestic anti-opium concerns, were forced to tow Anslinger’s line, albeit reluctantly.

**Overview:**

At the outbreak of war in 1939 the survival of international drug control efforts were by no means assured. Through a mixture of Anglo-American cooperation, underpinned by US leadership, the technical aspects of the system survived by shifting the Washington, ready to be co-opted into a post-war framework. The shape of this framework would be determined by a continuation of the normative, economic and political battles that had frequently stalled
control efforts over the previous decades. These battles, placed control advocate states on the one side and producer states on the other. In the middle were manufacturing and, to a lesser degree, consuming states. The US epitomised the control advocate perspective, seeking to create a strong international framework for shrinking global drug markets, both licit and illicit. The UK represented the regulatory strand which sought to protect economic and political interests while supporting international cooperative efforts around the core normative goals of the system: reducing the ‘abuse’ of ‘dangerous drugs’. This thesis has argued, that the system which emerged under the 1961 Single Convention was ultimately an accommodation between the US and UK approaches: a relatively weak regulatory system, underpinned by prohibitionist aspects. How these prohibitionist aspects would be implemented would be a key question for the control system over the coming decades.

Through extensive archival research this thesis postulates a revised perspective on the role of Anglo-American relations in the development of the international drug control system. It is by no means an attempt to offer a conclusive explanation for international control efforts, merely an attempt to stimulate new debate and discussion of the role of Anglo-American relations in their development. It draws out overarching themes for British and US drug diplomacy and argues that, due to both states’ centrality to the control system, these forces represented the key determinants of international control. It may, in time and as further archives are opened, become apparent that the British and even American role in control efforts has been overstated by the existing literature being so heavily derived from archives in the US and UK.

This thesis also hopes to move beyond simplistic renderings of international control system which read history backwards from current policies. This thesis begins that work by consciously avoiding a teleological approach to the topic and instead following the archives in building a detailed picture of decision-making as it evolved in its contemporary context. The ‘war on drugs’ was not a creation of any UN framework or treaty. It was certainly facilitated by the UN and the international drug control system but it represented a far more complex phenomenon, driven by a mixture of national, bilateral, regional and international efforts. Rolling them back will be far more complex than reforming a treaty framework. This thesis contributes to current debates by highlighting the role of competing strategic visions in driving international efforts and the evolution of Member States’ engagement with and
understanding of the system’s mission. It demonstrates that interpretation and implementation of the system’s mission, goals, metrics and outcomes have shifted in the past, within the same treaty framework. Meanwhile, this thesis highlights routes to effecting these changes by pointing to the role of individual agency, economic interests, political narrative and social forces in driving the international control system and shaping its sense of mission and, eventually, reforms.

**Epilogue: Commodity Control and Loose Ends:**

The Single Convention essentially created an economic regulatory framework for a global licit commodity market in certain essential pain medicines. To enforce this market it mandated certain action around controlling and prohibiting non-medical production and manufacturing. Key questions around dealing with ‘addiction’ and suppressing non-medical consumption were left largely unanswered out of deference to political difficulties. It was believed that effective regulation of the licit market would squeeze out illicit supplies leaving a minimal role for prohibitionist aspects and police enforcement. Time would prove this belief misjudged. When the failures of the regulatory approach to quell the illicit market became apparent international policy path determinacy fuelled an exponential growth in enforcement efforts, thereby creating the modern ‘war on drugs’.

The US may have lost the battle around the Single Convention and control of the system in the 1960s but they would enter the 1970s ready to refight many of these battles, beginning with the declaration of the ‘war of drugs’ and an aggressive new round of bilateral drug diplomacy. Ultimately the ‘war on drugs’ was not an inevitable outgrowth of these documents, but instead represented a specific set of interpretations, bureaucratic and normative trajectories and Member State implementations. For example, there was no strict legal basis for the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) assuming a highly politicised and at times militant pursuit of repressive and prohibitionist policies as it did in the coming decades. At many times architects of control pushed back strongly against the idea that its predecessors (the PCOB and DSB) should do anything but collect and organise statistics. It is through the flexible evolution and interpretation of such terms as ‘quasi-judicial’ (something originally meant to highlight its independence from the League of
Nations and particularly highlighted during World War II to ensure its survival) that the modern INCB self-conception as the ‘guardian’ of the international conventions emerged.\textsuperscript{882}

International control was as much a battle fought at the local, national and regional levels.\textsuperscript{883} While battles over sense of ‘mission’ and other grand narratives of control were shaped in the halls of the UN, member states pursued wildly differing implementations. Some, such as the US, sought to export their visions to other states. Others, such as Britain, had blamed their inability to institute effective commodity controls in their colonies on weaknesses in neighbouring territories. Others still, saw the international system as a mechanism to outsource control efforts to producer and transit countries. The effective pursuit of this latter strategy in Latin America by the United States would have major implications for regional hemispheric security and development.\textsuperscript{884} The inability of control advocates to secure effective cooperation from states like Afghanistan, Burma and (initially) Iran presaged the deeper battles that were to follow around implementation. It was one thing to make broad international commitments. It was quite another to implement them in the face of hard economic, political, social and other governing realities.

The 1939-64 period also highlighted the extent to which perceptions and politics mattered more than facts within the control system. Further it highlighted the consistent utilisation by key members to utilise the drug issue as a stick to beat a foreign policy opponent, despite facts on the ground. The case of wartime Japan remains debatable, but in the case of communist China Anslinger fabricated a global communist opium conspiracy exactly when the PRC was undertaking one of the most successful opium eradication campaigns in human history – at an incalculable human cost. Latin America was a case of the US turning its frustration on its regional neighbour when efforts to interfere with countries further overseas stalled. The Middle East represented a veritable game of musical chairs of blame displacement for the region’s illicit traffic. The UK was guilty of this also, as in the cases of Thailand and Iran. Asia meanwhile saw Britain and other colonial powers pursue essentially


\textsuperscript{883} In many ways reflective of the broader Cold War: Odd Arne Westad, \textit{The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times} (Cambridge University Press, 2005).


269
pragmatic policies in the last decades of the opium monopolies, only to be castigated as protecting naked economic self-interest. The monopoly system had enabled effective management of the issue from their perspective. When it was removed, governance became more difficult and saw countries like Britain displace blame onto their neighbours, as in the case of Thailand.

Drug policy and drug diplomacy fitted within a broader framework of international relations. Foreign policy concerns complicated drug diplomacy substantially and vice versa. Each was a determining factor of the other. For example within UK policy formulation we have seen that struggles between the Home Office and Foreign Office over suzerainty of the issue occasionally resulted in mild blow-ups. These were often quickly defused but highlighted the complications that pursuing ostensibly technocratic control objectives could produce for broader foreign policy concerns – for example when Afghanistan sought to join the 1953 Protocol’s list of recognised producers. The US meanwhile saw a similar process play out between Anslinger and the State Department. Anslinger’s penchant for ‘cowboy diplomacy’ was strongly displayed during World War II. He continued his bilateral efforts into peacetime via his overseas agents and attempted use of the UN bully pulpit. Nevertheless, the State Department wielded an effective means of oversight via ECOSOC and eventually weakened Anslinger’s control of CND.

Meanwhile Anslinger had a tremendous knack for blending drug policy into foreign policy concerns (for example his use of Japan; the Four Freedoms; anti-colonialism; communist China; and the Soviet Union) and using them to his advantage, circumventing State Department concerns at a number of junctures. The latter had no desire to see the Single Convention torpedoed but watched as the domestic ground shifted and forced them into pursuing Anslinger’s revisionist stance. The UK had an almost continual desire to keep drug policy separated from broader foreign policy issues. It relished highlighting drug control as a shining example of international cooperation in the face of other political struggles and the insipid hollowing out of other international institutions by Cold War and regional politics. Nevertheless it tried to throw up the sandbags any time drug policy risked encroaching on colonial, regional or economic interests. Anslinger was well aware of these UK concerns and was more than happy to exploit or accommodate them depending on how it would support his
domestic and international agenda, for example overlooking the illicit trade in Hong Kong in the 1950s.

Regarding production control, the US attitude remained: the lower the number of producers and the lower the global quantity of licit opium, the better. Issues that concerned the US generally stemmed from perceived global overproduction and the need to suppress it at all costs via regulation, prohibition and strict police enforcement. All control efforts were therefore to be geared towards producing less. This was the prohibitionist strand of the system. The UK was more concerned with consensus, market protection and a minimisation of regulatory costs. They sought a regulated framework that could point towards abuses and inadequate controls. They were less concerned about the scale of the market. They were happy to highlight regulatory weaknesses provided the costs of correcting those weaknesses were born by other states. This was the regulatory strand of the system. Opium and to a lesser extent cocaine were the main focuses. The controls created for these substances were extended onto synthetics and other drugs, but the thrust of international efforts remained against these two substances. Meanwhile cannabis and coca leaf were of strong interest to the US and the control system but expendable in the short-term out of deference to broader opium control – for example the US preferring the 1953 Protocol to the 1961 Convention.

With their victory over the US the British vision for regulation can also be said to have won. Nevertheless, the prohibitionist aspects built into the system as an accommodation with hard-line states would be strengthened, via aggressive US drug diplomacy, funding initiatives and the solidification of international prohibitionist norms within the system and utilised by the United States and other allies to create the modern ‘war on drugs’. Despite this implementation the system remained fundamentally one of regulation underpinned by prohibitionist aspects. It was a regulatory system with prohibitionist aspects. The core remained focused on regulating the flow of ‘licit’ or ‘ethical’ narcotics and minimising their leakage into the illicit market.885

Later the US would re-engage and ratify the Single Convention in 1967 and use the framework provided under the Single Convention rally states back towards a global

---

prohibitionist model. Yet, the system was ultimately one that had many possible alternative outcomes and directions. When the Single Convention came into force it could have continued down the path towards regulation and heavy subjugation to other economic and foreign policy concerns, or it could become oriented towards eradicating certain types of substances and practices via the proliferation of repressive prohibitionist models around the globe and the diffusion of police enforcement efforts. The policy and bureaucratic trajectories pushed towards the prohibitionist aspects particularly when the US provided leadership, but the system itself was malleable.
Bibliography:

Archival Sources:

Official Documents:
Great Britain
  • British National Archives, Kew:
    o Cabinet Records
      ▪ CAB 134: Steering Committee on International Organisation
    o Foreign Office
      ▪ FO 371: General Correspondence, Political
      ▪ FO 938
      ▪ FO 1014
      ▪ FO 1032
      ▪ FO 1049
      ▪ FO 1050
    o Home Office
      ▪ HO 45: Dangerous Drugs
    o Colonial Office
      ▪ CO 323
      ▪ CO 554
      ▪ CO 852
      ▪ CO 859

United States
  • NARA II, College Park Maryland
    o Washington National Records Centre
      ▪ Record Group 170: Records of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics
      ▪ Record Group 59: General Records, Department of State

Published Official Documents:
United Nations
  • Bulletin on Narcotics, New York, United Nations.

Private Collections:
Books and Journal Articles:


