Explaining variation in the degree of internalisation of political conditionality: The cases of France and the United Kingdom

Damiano de Felice

A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics and Political Science for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, October 2014
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ABSTRACT

This dissertation shows that and explains why two European Union (EU) Member States, namely France and the United Kingdom (UK), differ in the degree of internalisation of political conditionality.

The dissertation is divided into two parts. The first part assesses the degree of internalisation of political conditionality. Following a three-fold measurement framework, the thesis examines French and British policies, legal documents and behaviour. The analysis of behaviour concentrates on four cases of EU aid sanctions: Madagascar 2009, Mozambique 2009, Nicaragua 2008 and Zimbabwe 2002. France and the UK differ significantly. France has not officially endorsed political conditionality, generally does not insert human rights clauses in its developing agreements, and is recurrently among the donors which take a soft stance in response to recipient governments’ abuses. The UK has adopted a fully-fledged policy requiring partner governments to respect human rights and basic democratic principles, has consistently included human rights clauses in its development agreements and often belongs to the group of hardliners in favour of the application of aid sanctions.

The second part of the dissertation explains these differences. Given the complexities of aid decision-making, the thesis adopts an “analytic eclectic” approach and tests four alternative hypotheses derived from realism, international constructivism, liberalism and sociological institutionalism. The examination of the cases studies and more than 100 interviews with diplomats, aid officials and representatives from non-governmental organisations show that the higher accountability of aid decision-makers and social pressure by like-minded donors (in particular Nordic countries) have played the most significant role in generating deeper internalisation of political conditionality by the UK. While organisational cultures cannot explain the extent of internalisation of political conditionality, their differences are helpful to understand the characteristics of the cases when political conditionality is applied more reluctantly. Evidence is not sufficient to confirm the hypotheses based on material interests, Commonwealth influence and aid modalities.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................................. 8

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ................................................................. 9

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 12
   1.1. Current relevance of political conditionality ......................................................... 13
   1.2. Existing variation in the internalisation of political conditionality ................. 21
   1.3. Internalisation of political conditionality, not ethical foreign policy .......... 29
   1.4. Outline of the thesis .............................................................................................. 36

CHAPTER 2: EXPLAINING WHAT? THE ACADEMIC RELEVANCE OF
POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY .......................................................................................... 38
   2.1. Foreign aid .............................................................................................................. 38
   2.2. Political conditionality .......................................................................................... 40
      2.2.1. Aid conditionality as a norm ......................................................................... 40
      2.2.2. Aid conditionality as a foreign policy tool .................................................... 42
      2.2.3. The complexities of aid conditionality and the focus on negative measures ......................................................................................................................... 44
      2.2.4. Different purposes of aid conditionality and the focus on human rights
             and democracy ........................................................................................................ 47
      2.2.5. Political conditionality: conflating human rights and democracy? .......... 49
   2.3. Why is variation in the degree of internalization of political conditionality a
       puzzle? ....................................................................................................................... 50
      2.3.1. The recognition of the effectiveness and appropriateness of the promotion
             of human rights ....................................................................................................... 51
      2.3.2. From development as a prerequisite of human rights respect to respect
             for human rights as a prerequisite for economic development and aid effectiveness ......................................................................................................................... 52
      2.3.3. The end of the Cold War and the power readjustments in the international
             arena ......................................................................................................................... 54
      2.3.4. The financial problems of donor states ............................................................ 56
      2.3.5. The expectation of automatic convergence ....................................................... 57
      2.3.6. Political conditionality: an emerging international norm .......................... 58
      2.3.7. The particular strength of these reasons with respect to EU Member States ................................................................................................................................. 59
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Total Official Development Assistance between 1989 and 2010 ………..78
Table 2. Findings of past quantitative studies on determinants of aid allocation by France and the United Kingdom………………………………………………129
Table 3. Scores of top 30 recipients of French and British aid on political rights and civil liberties (Freedom in the World Survey) between 2000 and 2011………..211
Table 4. Scores of top 30 recipients of French and British aid on personal integrity rights (Political Terror Scale) between 2000 and 2011………………………..213
# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAA</td>
<td>Accra Agenda for Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>AECID</td>
<td>Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean and Pacific countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<td>AFD</td>
<td>French Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALBA</td>
<td>Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>AusAID</td>
<td>Australian Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>CICID</td>
<td>Inter-ministerial Committee on International Development</td>
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<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<td>CFP</td>
<td>Permanent Council of La Francophonie</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>CMAG</td>
<td>Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group</td>
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<td>CMN</td>
<td><em>Constructions Mecaniques de Normandie</em></td>
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<td>CPLP</td>
<td>Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee (OECD)</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
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<td>EIB</td>
<td>European Investment Bank</td>
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<td>EIDHR</td>
<td>European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights</td>
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<td>EMATUM</td>
<td><em>Empresa Moçambicana de Atum</em></td>
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<td>EOM</td>
<td>Election Observation Missions</td>
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<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
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<td>EPA</td>
<td>Economic Partnership Agreement</td>
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<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Cooperation</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIDH</td>
<td>International Federation of Human Rights</td>
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<td>FSLN</td>
<td>Sandinista National Liberation Front</td>
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<td>FPA</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Front for the Liberation of Mozambique</td>
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<td>G19</td>
<td>Group of 19 Budget Support Donors to Mozambique</td>
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<td>GBS</td>
<td>General Budget Support</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GIZ</td>
<td>German Federal Enterprise for International Cooperation</td>
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<td>GOVNET</td>
<td>Network on Governance (DAC)</td>
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<td>GNU</td>
<td>Government of National Unity</td>
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<td>HAT</td>
<td>High Authority for the Transition (Madagascar)</td>
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<td>HoM</td>
<td>Head of Mission</td>
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<td>HIPC</td>
<td>Heavily Indebted Poor Countries</td>
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<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Agency</td>
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<td>IFC</td>
<td>International Finance Corporation</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGBT</td>
<td>Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender</td>
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<td>LDC</td>
<td>Least Developed Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCC</td>
<td>Millennium Challenge Corporation</td>
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<td>MDC</td>
<td>Movement for Democratic Change (Zimbabwe)</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
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<td>MDM</td>
<td>Democratic Movement of Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEP</td>
<td>Member of the European Parliament</td>
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<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norad</td>
<td>Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation</td>
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<td>NZAID</td>
<td>New Zealand Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organisation of American States</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<td>ODI</td>
<td>Overseas Development Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIF</td>
<td>International Organisation of La Francophonie</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAM</td>
<td>Performance Assessment Matrix</td>
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<td>PAPs</td>
<td>Programme Aid Partners</td>
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<td>PTS</td>
<td>Political Terror Scale</td>
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<td>RENAMO</td>
<td>Mozambican National Resistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sida</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNOMOZ</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
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<td>ZDERA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act</td>
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION

This dissertation shows that and explains why France and the United Kingdom (UK) differ in the degree of internalisation of political conditionality, that is, the norm by which aid donors should make the allocation of development assistance dependent on respect for human rights and democratic principles by recipient governments. The dissertation concentrates on France and the UK because, notwithstanding their similar status in world politics (as big donors, members of the European Union, former colonial empires, nuclear powers and permanent members of the United Nations Security Council), and notwithstanding a formal attempt to coordinate their development policies in Africa (sanctioned by a joint declaration in 1998), the two countries have starkly different approaches to applying aid sanctions against human rights abusers. This situation offers a unique vantage point to explore those factors that can explain the different attitude towards political conditionality by influential European Union (EU) Member States.¹

This introductory chapter is structured as follows. The first section argues against a few scholars who have suggested the demise of political conditionality, and shows that suspending, redirecting, cutting, and/or withdrawing aid is still widely used as a foreign policy tool to respond to political crises in recipient countries. In order to prove this claim, the section presents a few cases of recent application of aid sanctions, and summarises the findings of the latest quantitative studies on the determinants of aid allocation. The second section offers a quick overview of cases of variation in the application of political conditionality by OECD donors. The purpose is to highlight that, as far as political conditionality is concerned, the puzzling question is not whether aid sanctions are still used (or not) as a foreign policy tool, but why bilateral donors differ so much in their perspectives on the appropriateness of this instrument (and thus often fail to coordinate their responses to human rights violations or electoral frauds by recipient governments). The third

¹ In addition to common membership in the EU, both France and the UK belong to the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). This means that the dissertation offers also potential suggestions with respect to the determinants of variation among OECD donors (provided that the confounding effects of EU membership are given adequate consideration).
section clarifies that the thesis focuses on the empirical aspects of political conditionality, and does not take any side in the normative debate regarding the appropriateness or inappropriateness of aid sanctions. If the thesis shows that either France or the UK has internalized political conditionality to a larger extent than the other donor, this does not necessarily mean that its foreign policy is more ethical than that of the other country. The chapter concludes with a brief outline of the thesis structure.

1.1. Current relevance of political conditionality

A few researchers recently expressed their doubts about the present and future significance of political conditionality. Richard Youngs offered the latest and most vocal analysis. In a 2010 working paper entitled *The end of democratic conditionality: Good Riddance?* the author argued that

in practice, democratic conditionality has not been deployed in a significant or consistent fashion. In recent years, its use has almost disappeared from Western foreign policies. As the international context has become more turbulent and uncertain, Western governments have reverted to attaching a high priority to deepening political engagement with autocratic regimes. Western governments’ use of sanctions as a means of prompting democratic reform is now extremely sparing. The rewards and incentives they offer for democratic reform remain partial and unevenly distributed. Democratic conditionality has been superseded and undermined by other types of conditionalities attached to more immediate, short-term security goals.3

The fact that rewards and incentives offered by OECD donors remain partial and unevenly distributed cannot be questioned. Yet, there is strong evidence that political


conditionality has not been superseded as a foreign policy tool, and that Western
governments’ use of sanctions as a means of promoting democratic reform (and,
more generally, respect for human rights) is not sparing.

At the policy level, the commitment to link aid to human rights improvements is still
forceful. In 2007, Gunilla Carlson, the then Swedish Minister for Development
Cooperation, regretted that, in previous administrations, “the implementation of both
negative and positive conditionality has been weak”, and stated that “if democratic
development is to take place, we must dare to implement the tools we have at hand”.
While the need to recognize the diversity of democratic practices at country level is
acknowledged, “firmness on principles is still necessary. Sweden should be and will
be a voice for democratic principles and practices, and will play this role in
multilateral forums as well as in bilateral development cooperation”. ⁴ In April 2014,
Jim Murphy delivered his first speech as British Shadow Secretary of State for
International Development. ⁵ He committed to create a new Human Rights unit within
the Department for International Development (DFID), headed by a senior official,
and to tougher aid conditions based on human rights performance. In a passage
which is worth quoting, Murphy clarified his thoughts:

Labour is looking at new tough rules for the granting of UK aid. Under these
plans governments in receipt of direct UK aid would face an annual audit. As
well as firm rules on transparency and corruption, we would monitor respect for
human rights. A new unit at the heart of DFID would assess states against
internationally agreed standards. Governments that fail to meet those standards
− that break international law or breach the United Nations (UN) Charter or
globally agreed covenants for example − and show no sign of progression
would face consequences. Labour is developing a system of graduated
withdrawal through which transgressors would see direct support reduced and

⁴ Gunilla Carlsson, Supporting Democracy: Highlighting the Political Dimension of International
Development Cooperation, Opening address by the Swedish Minister for Development Cooperation,
⁵ Katy Wright, “What Would DFID Look like under Labour?,” Oxfam Policy & Practice, April 9,
eventually suspended if respect for human rights is not reinstalled. And in extreme cases we would of course reserve the right to act immediately.\(^6\)

The situation is not different at the European level. Following the publication of a Green Paper which stimulated over 100 responses and a heated debate, in October 2011 the European Commission adopted a new Communication titled *The Future Approach to EU Budget Support to Third Countries*. The basic idea is that “EU budget support is not a blank cheque, nor is it provided to every country”.\(^7\) Rather, “commitment to the fundamental values of human rights, democracy and rule of law is essential for the establishment of any partnership and cooperation between the EU and third countries”.\(^8\) This commitment is important both at the stage of eligibility of budget support and in case of deterioration of the political situation. On the one hand, the Communication states that “eligibility criteria have to be met before and during the programme and conditions need to be fulfilled before payments are made”.\(^9\) On the other hand, “in cases where the partner country’s commitment to fundamental values shows a significant deteriorating trend an adequate and coordinated response strategy at EU and Member States level needs to be defined and implemented. Unless there is a clear cut-situation where EU financial interests and reputation need to be protected, in which case general budget support can be suspended immediately, the response to deterioration should be progressive and proportionate”.\(^10\)

On 14 May 2012, the Council of the European Union unanimously endorsed the proposals contained in the Communication. The Council expressly argued that “the commitment and record of partner countries to democracy, human rights and the rule of law is one of the key determinants of EU development cooperation”. As a consequence, “general budget support – in the form of Good Governance and Development Contracts – shall only be provided when and where it is assessed that there is trust that it will contribute to effective development impact and will be spent in accordance with shared objectives and values, in particular human rights,


\(^8\) Ibid., 4.

\(^9\) Ibid., 2.

\(^10\) Ibid., 4.
democracy and the rule of law”. Where governance has severely deteriorated, “the EU should reassess its budget support cooperation with the partner country, in parallel to an assessment of its overall development cooperation, within existing procedures and decision-making processes”.\(^\text{11}\) Importantly, these developments took place notwithstanding Youngs’ argument that, while the EU includes a human rights and democracy clause in all its international agreements that explicitly provides for punitive measures, “many European diplomats would now like to see the clause removed; they argue that it has no impact, merely complicates security and economic objectives, and persists simply as a sop to the European Parliament”.\(^\text{12}\)

The most up-to-date statistical analyses on aid allocation seem to confirm that these statements of policy are not just cheap talk but that, at least since the end of the Cold War, human rights considerations have actually informed aid decision-making by bilateral donors. Neumayer obtained “some indication that respect for human rights plays a role in the bilateral allocation of aid. Countries with higher respect for political/civil rights receive statistically significantly more aid”. This is not totally true as regards respect for personal integrity rights: “countries with a higher level of respect do not receive more aid”. However, “countries that improve their respect for personal integrity rights over time do”.\(^\text{13}\) Bandyopadhyay and Wall analyzed data from 1995, 2000 and 2003 and found that aid “generally responded positively to … civil and political rights”\(^\text{14}\). Wright and Winters highlighted the differences between pre- and post-Cold War periods. According to the authors, “the aid reward for increased contestation is increasing over the sample period, to the 5%–10% range by the mid-1990s. Donors’ response to increases in contestation appears to be slightly negative for the 20 years preceding 1990 and strongly negative in the 1960s – suggesting that donors actually punished recipient countries for increased contestation during this decade. Overall, though, the reward for improved

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contestation appears to be increasing over time”. Nielsen specifically focused on aid sanctions, and offered the most advanced analysis of donors’ responses to democratic irregularities and human rights abuses. His findings indicate that foreign aid donors do impose aid sanctions, “but that they do so selectively. Countries that violate human rights are typically sanctioned under three circumstances: When the violating countries do not have close political ties to aid donors, when rights violations have negative consequences for donors, and when violations are widely publicized to donors”.

Anecdotal evidence also suggests that political conditionality is far from being abandoned by OECD donors and international organisation. In July 2011, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) – a United States (US) development agency formally based on the principle of ex post rewards for proven achievements – suspended $350 million allocated to Malawi after deadly anti-government protests and the arrests of opposition and human rights leaders. The MCC Board expressed “very serious concerns about the economic and political situation in Malawi, and emphasized the need for the Government of Malawi to respect the rights of its citizens and civil society organisations to assemble and speak freely”. In March 2012, a group of renegade Malian looted the presidential palace and eventually overthrew the elected government of President Amadou Toumani Touré. The day after the coup, European Commissioner Andris Piebalgs speedily declared the temporary suspension of European development operations in the country. According to Piebalgs, “Mali has achieved steady development progress in recent years which can only be preserved in a stable and democratic environment”.

Even in cases of donor resistance to apply aid sanctions, calls for the application of political conditionality have become a recurrent feature of political debates. Even

though Rwanda is often praised as one of the most successful development stories on the African continent, the authoritarian grip of Kagame’s power is worryingly worsening. Since 2009, the Economist has strongly supported the application of sanctions to respond to the human rights abuses of the Rwandan government. The influential magazine recognizes that “withdrawing aid would be a blunt tool and, at any rate in the short run, would hamper the battle against poverty. But in the longer run, material development will suffer if authoritarian habits turn into tyranny. Those in the West who rightly praise Mr Kagame for his achievements in development must also loudly lambast him for his loathsome and needless tendency to intolerance”. The magazine continues by arguing that

the Rwandan government’s human-rights record is so bad that donors should start withdrawing aid ... The American and British governments have sent warning signals to Mr Kagame by suspending or delaying aid disbursements, so far only in symbolic amounts. Other Western governments have done the same. They should be more drastic. A big chunk of aid goes directly to supporting the budget rather than to specific projects. It should be withheld until Mr Kagame proves a real willingness to rein in his proxies abroad and give his opponents at home more space. ... There is a risk that he will ignore such complaints; and if aid is withdrawn, some of Rwanda's poorest will get hurt. But that is for him to decide. Western donors must not allow themselves to be blackmailed by him.

The recent revolutionary wave of demonstrations and protests in the Arab World offered a similar picture. According to Jan Vanheukelom, “there can be little doubt that the Arab Spring has pushed human rights and political governance higher on the policy agenda in the EU and elsewhere. This has resulted in tougher talk about political conditionality in the aid component of the EU’s foreign relations”. For instance, in November 2012 the EU together with its 28 Member States promised

22 “Efficiency versus Freedom; Rwanda and Other Aid Darlings,” The Economist, August 7, 2010.
23 “A Painful Dilemma; Rwanda,” The Economist, August 4, 2012.
Egypt a total of €5bn in grants and loans for a series of initiatives and projects on condition that democratic reform was implemented. In August 2013, the Financial Times reported that, as international concern mounted about recurrent crackdowns on Islamist protesters, the EU “urgently reviewed” relations with Egypt and “considered suspending aid to the country”. An EU official explicitly commented: “the current situation is not making it possible for Egyptian authorities to fulfil many of those conditions so they cannot get the money that was put at their potential disposal in November”. Even though the EU eventually disbursed the money, Denmark suspended two projects amounting to around 4 million Euros. Christian Friis Bach, the development aid Minister, said that the decision was a response to “the bloody events and the very regrettable turn the development of democracy has taken” and clarified that the two projects were “in direct collaboration with the Egyptian government and public institutions”. Andris Piebalgs, European Commissioner for Development, recently commented that, “given the lessons learnt from recent events in North Africa and the Middle East, human rights, democracy and good governance trends will be given greater weight”.

Interest in political conditionality is higher on the agenda also outside of policy-making circles. The most recent results from the Eurobarometer surveys show that European citizens are strongly in favour of political conditionality. At the beginning of 2011, Europeans were asked whether development aid should be offered with conditions attached in a specific area. A large majority of 84% believe that the EU should require developing countries to follow certain rules regarding democracy,

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human rights and governance as a condition for receiving EU development aid. A renewed attention to political conditionality can also be detected in the academic community. A Special Issue on “Political Conditionality” is scheduled to be published in *World Development* at the beginning of 2015.

The starting point of this dissertation is that political conditionality still is a topical issue in world politics. The OECD and the World Bank recently published a review of donor approaches, experiences and challenges in integrating human rights into aid programmes. One of the conclusions is that “most bilateral agencies have explicit political conditionality policies”. This result is consistent with the view that, even though in donor terminology ‘conditionality’ is often avoided and replaced by a ‘dialogue’, “policy dialogue is just another donor conditionality”.

Some researchers have even suggested that the use of conditionality is increasing. According to Rachel Hayman, what seem to be emerging are “more signs that donors are willing to pull back from unconditional budget support where political governance seems to be going in the ‘wrong’ direction, or are putting in place stronger mechanisms for scrutinising democratic practice”. Jonathan Glennie agrees that “the use of aid to pressure recipient governments to respect human rights appears to be on the increase. Whereas once donors sent aid to the most despotic of regimes to secure strategic national interests, now they appear to want to use their aid power to stand up for the rights of citizens in other countries”.

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1.2. Existing variation in the internalisation of political conditionality

The fact that political conditionality is still considered to be an appropriate tool of foreign policy does not mean that all donors consistently apply the norm. Numerous are the frauds and abuses that go unpunished; numerous are also the cases in which donors do not offer a coordinated response. For instance, in 2008 the Netherlands and Sweden cut budget support to the Rwandan government, but other donors did not.\(^{35}\) In Kenya, many donors are reluctant to provide budget support, even though the European Commission does.\(^{36}\)

In some circumstances, a different reaction by donors can be explained by the contextual factors of the case at stake. As mentioned above, Nielsen found that the adoption of aid sanctions is more likely for donors that have no close political ties to recalcitrant recipient governments and that suffer from negative “externalities” caused by human rights violations. This is understandable, and much of the variation among donors is usually explained in these terms. For instance, in 1999 Portugal resisted the application of aid sanctions against Guinea-Bissau because of the strong links with its former colony.\(^{37}\) In 1991, the Japanese government distanced itself from other bilateral donors and decided not to impose negative measures against Indonesia because of regional strategic interests.\(^{38}\)

But what if variation among donors could not be explained exclusively through the specificities of their bilateral relations with the recipient government, but can be considered also the consequence of differences in the importance assigned to human rights and/or in the perception of the value of aid sanctions? In other words, what if some donors actually consider political conditionality more appropriate than other donors? This would imply a variation in the “internalisation” of the norm. All other things being equal (including colonial legacy, economic interests, strategic

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\(^{36}\) Hayman, “Budget Support and Democracy,” 684.


significance, etc.), some donors would be more willing than others to apply aid sanctions in response to human rights violations, coups d’état and electoral frauds.

The issue of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights offers a good example of variation in the internalisation of political conditionality. In November 2007, the Netherlands was the first among the major donors of development assistance to state that it would lobby developing countries to legalize homosexuality and fight discrimination. Since then, numerous donors (including Germany, the US and the UK) expressed their support to the idea of using aid as a tool to press African government not to criminalize homosexuality. For instance, in October 2011 David Cameron, the UK Prime Minster, affirmed: “We are not just talking about it. We are also saying that British aid should have more strings attached. This is an issue where we are pushing for movement, we are prepared to put some money behind what we believe”.

Notwithstanding a discernible trend, a few donors have not embraced the idea. Japan, France and Italy never released any statement in support of LGBT rights conditionality. The consequences are evident if one looks at specific cases. In February 2014, three European countries (the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark) announced the withdrawal of millions of dollars in direct support to Uganda’s government (but will continue supporting nongovernmental groups). Sweden suspended part of its aid cooperation in March, while the U.S. followed suit in

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Other donors showed unwillingness to use aid as a weapon to induce policy changes. The Japanese ambassador to Uganda, Junzo Fujita, said his government will not abandon Ugandans even as some donor countries threaten to withdraw aid. According to the ambassador, what matters is helping people in need, not the legislation: “This issue (anti-gay law) and aid are different. In my own view, people are affected and they need safe water. We cannot close our eyes because of that issue (anti-gay legislation)”. An advisor to the French Minister of Development Cooperation took a similar stance and diplomatically affirmed that France was “not necessarily in favour of temporary suspension of aid”.

The issue of LGBT rights is only one example of variation in the internalisation of more general political conditionality among donors agencies. Hints suggesting the existence of this variation are diffuse. Among academic works using qualitative approaches, Uvin examined the application of political conditionality by the US, Japan, the European Commission and France until mid-1992. The conclusion of his research was that, compared to other donors, “the French policy change in favour of political conditionality is much more modest”. Stokke edited a volume on specific instances of political conditionality by Norway, the UK, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland between 1992 and 1994. He stressed that “the objectives associated with [political] conditionality and the strategy to attain these objectives vary from one donor country to another”; as a matter of fact, “donor countries have not been identical in their approach”. Crawford scrutinized the behaviour of the UK, the US, Sweden and the EC/EU in 29 cases of political conditionality during the first half of the 1990s. He found large inconsistencies: “31 per cent [of the cases] are characterised by … significant difference in donor

practices, where punitive measures taken by at least one of the donors contrast with the lack of action taken by others”.50 More recently, Barratt compared the incorporation of human rights by the aid agencies of the UK, Australia and Canada from the 1970s to the first decade of the new millennium. Her research “demonstrates variation in the extent to which democratic donors maintain a commitment to human rights in making aid decisions”.51 Nadia Molenaers focused on donors’ policies regarding budget support and political conditionality. The results of her research indicate that “large differences exist between donors where budget support policies and practices are concerned. These differences are grounded in fundamentally different visions and expectations regarding budget support and give rise to very different interpretations on what the role of donors is in the field when leveraging reform”.52

Academic works using quantitative methods confirm these findings. Svensson answered the question whether between 1970 and 1995 certain donors (among Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the UK and the US) were more prone to reward democratic countries. He concluded that “there are large differences across donors with respect to the allocation of foreign aid”.53 Alesina and Dollar assessed aid determinants for the US, the UK, France, Japan, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Australia, Austria, the Netherlands, Canada, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway in the period from 1970 to 1994. They proved that “democracy is an area in which there are clear differences among major donors”;54 in fact, “certain donors … respond more to the ‘correct’ incentives, namely … good institutions of the receiving countries … Other countries … give to former colonies tied by political alliances, without much regard to other factors, including poverty

levels or choice of politico-economic regimes”.

Zanger analysed whether foreign aid from Germany, France, the UK and the EC/EU rewarded good governance in developing countries between 1980 and 1995. She concluded that “more democratic countries received more aid only from Germany during the period 1986 to 1990. Countries that moved towards democracy benefited from more aid only from the UK between 1991 and 1995. Human rights violations had no effect on either France or the EC/EU. Both Germany and the UK showed rather mixed results in their aid allocation in respect to repression in the recipient countries”.

Neumayer studied the bilateral aid allocation by all 21 countries that form the OECD DAC from 1985 to 1997. He found that “as concerns human rights, there is no consistent pattern across donors”; in fact, “respect for civil/political rights and respect for personal integrity rights exert a positive influence on the pattern of aid giving of only few donors”.

Berthélemy provided an overall empirical assessment of the motivations of foreign aid granted by Switzerland, Norway, Austria, Ireland, Netherlands, Denmark, New Zealand, Germany, Canada, Belgium, Japan, Finland, USA, UK, France, Italy and Australia in the period between 1980 and 2000. He found “a lot of heterogeneity in donor behaviour”. On average, “donors target recipients with better governance indicators, such as democracy or absence of violent conflicts … in spite of the egoism of their policies, bilateral donors also implement some sort of selectivity rules based on recipient needs and merits”. However, “there are significant differences of parameters among donors, for virtually all donors”. As far as democracy is concerned, for instance, “Austria behaves … differently from other [altruistic] donors … the Austrian aid is the only one to be significantly and negatively correlated with democracy”.

Carey investigated the aid decisions of the European Commission, Germany, France, and the UK from 1978 to 2003. Controlling for various donor interests and recipient needs, “the results show that, despite donors’ emphasis on human rights in official documents, the human rights situation in developing countries does not consistently shape European aid commitments”. She concluded that “levels of human rights violations do not

55 Ibid., 33–34.
influence the decision of European donors on whether or not to give aid to a country – apart from the UK, which gave more aid to the most repressive countries”. Moreover, there “was a general trend in the findings: when deciding how to allocate aid, Germany paid more attention to the human rights situation in developing countries than the other donors analyzed in this study”.59

Variation among EU member states is acknowledged not only by academics but also by European institutions. In the occasion of the public consultation on the future of EU budget support held in 2011, the European Commission highlighted that “when underlying principles [of human rights, good governance and rule of law] deteriorate, some donors suspend disbursements, while others continue”. Indeed, European donors disagree with respect to the most appropriate forum for dialogue on political governance: “some have advocated using all possible avenues, including budget support dialogue processes … Others have favoured a more political forum, separate from but informing and informed by budget support dialogue processes”.60

EU member states confirmed this view as well. The Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID) stressed that “in the past there have been differences between states, and between states and the European Commission, that have resulted in mixed messages being sent”.61 Germany emphasised that “at present, the Commission and the Member States occasionally disagree as to whether the underlying principles [of human rights respect] are met, which is often hard for our partners to understand”.62 Sweden agrees that “the Commission and the Member States sometimes come to diverging conclusions regarding the suitability of budget support in specific countries”.63

62 Germany, “German Response,” 2011, Public consultation on the future of EU budget support to third countries.
The consultation itself represented a blatant manifestation of large differences. The objective of the consultation was to collect views and evidence that would improve the provision of budget support. The Commission welcomed contributions from all EU Member States on the most critical topics, including political conditionality. At issue was whether budget support should be explicitly conditional on a country’s respect of the principles of human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law or not. As the Commission acknowledged, “experience has shown that political sensitivities are likely to be more intense in the case of budget support, mainly in the context of general budget support (GBS), since it is widely seen as providing an endorsement of the partner country’s overall policy stance”. The questions put forward by the Commission included: should budget support programmes make more use of political governance conditionality? How can donors meaningfully respond to any deterioration in the underlying principles while protecting the development benefits and predictability of budget support?

The result of the consultation was that EU member states were patently divided into three distinct groups. First, there were the strong supporters of political conditionality. The Netherlands made it clear that “budget support will not be provided where there is evidence of corruption or human rights violations, or insufficient evidence of good governance”. The Dutch government “believes that memorandums of understanding (MoU) on budget support between donors and the recipient government should include clear underlying principles. These must reflect the principles that serve as the basis for the budget support relationship, in particular principles on anticorruption, human rights and good governance”. Germany agreed that budget support should be granted “only to a few select countries” and “on the basis of minimum standards, which must include governance criteria”. Germany “regards it as absolutely essential that the (general) budget support provided by the EU Commission be tied to fulfilment of the underlying principles (in most cases peace and security, the rule of law, human rights, a focus on poverty reduction, efforts to tackle corruption, reform of public financial management/administrative reform, macroeconomic stability). That makes it very important to assess whether

64 European Commission, The Future of EU Budget Support to Third Countries, 8.
these principles are being observed before granting budget support for the first time. They constitute the eligibility criteria. It is then equally important to continually monitor observance of these principles during the course of budget support programmes”.

Ireland was on the same line: “Where GBS is being provided it must be strongly linked to standards and performance on progressing the Underlying Principles of rule of law, human rights, democracy and good governance. Commitments to the Underlying Principles should be included in transparent and unambiguous MoU between partners”.

Second, there were those countries whose position on the issue was not well-defined. Italy, for instance, emphasised that it “believes that the action of the EU should be inspired at all stages by those principles which are the fundament of the dialogue with partner Countries”. However, Italy also warned that “we should pay attention not to overcharge this tool with an excessive political emphasis, thus creating new conditionalities”. In ambiguous terms, Italy concluded that “the Underlying Principles of human rights, protection of religious minorities, democracy, rule of law and good governance – which are, for instance, present in the budget support MoU with Mozambique – could be included in all budget support MoUs, provided that they are not used as political conditionality leverage”.

Spain maintained a similar position. It affirmed that when it comes to designing budget support operations, “it is important to set out a number of underlying principles regarding respect for human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law and governance [...] Therefore, we believe that these principles should be contained in the MoU as principles that inform the entire programme”. Nevertheless, these principles “should not be automatically transferred to the Performance Assessment Frameworks” and “must be previously agreed with the partner government, in accordance with its cultural and socio-political context and specific historical perspective”.

Third, there were the staunch critics of political conditionality. Portugal affirmed that it “does not support the use of budget support as a means to increase leverage or

66 Germany, “German Response.”
68 Italy, “Italian Response,” 2011, Public consultation on the future of EU budget support to third countries.
69 AECID, “Spanish Response.”
political control, or as a means to micro-manage policies and politics. This instrument is a financing tool for development and not a tool for political pressure”. According to Portugal, “this does not mean granting budget support a blank check but it should also not imply a whole new layer of human rights conditionality. Conditionality associated to GBS should be exclusively related to good use of budget support, which is why financial management analysis is so important, and the underlying principles identified in the MoU shall not be transformed into “Terms of Reference” for political dialogue”.70

This cursory sample of academic findings, policy statements and anecdotes proves that OECD donors and EU Member States, have internalized political conditionality with different strengths: some donors deem political conditionality as the appropriate behaviour in development assistance, others do not. The consequence is that for some donors the threshold to apply political conditionality is higher than for others, and that some donors apply political conditionality more consistently than others. The aim of this dissertation is to demonstrate the existence of this variation between France and the UK, and then explain it.

1.3. Internalisation of political conditionality, not ethical foreign policy

The argument of this dissertation is that the UK has internalized political conditionality to a larger extent than France. There are several reasons why this does not necessarily mean that British foreign policy is more ethical than the French one, or that British decision-makers care more about human rights than their French counterparts.

First, democracy and human rights can be promoted through aid sanctions, but also in numerous other ways. Remaining in the field of development cooperation, most Western donors directly support local civil society organisations.71 Beyond development cooperation, Luard proposed the following list of types of action which

70 Portugal, “Portuguese Response” (The future of EU budget support to third countries, 2011).
a government can take to influence the domestic behaviour of other states. In ascending order of urgency:

- confidential representations to the government concerned;
- joint representations made with other governments;
- public statements of concern in parliament or elsewhere;
- support for calls in such bodies as the United Nations Human Rights Council;
- direct initiation of such action in international bodies;
- cancellation or postponement of ministerial visits;
- restraints on cultural and sporting contracts;
- embargoes on arms sales;
- reduction in aid programmes;
- withdrawal of an ambassador;
- a cessation of all aid;
- the breaking of diplomatic relations;
- trading sanction.\(^2\)

Even though France does not use political conditionality as consistently as the UK, it might promote human rights through other actions, such as diplomatic demarches or trade agreements.\(^3\) Vice versa, even though the UK is more willing to apply aid sanctions than France, it might undermine the efficacy of its efforts through contrasting policies in other areas. For instance, British policy-makers have often been blamed because of sizeable arms exports to repressive regimes.\(^4\) If a comprehensive analysis of French and British foreign policies is outside the scope of this dissertation, it is nonetheless important to remember that policy coherence is

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\(^3\) For instance, Marta Foresti argues that “diplomatic efforts, trade rules and other forms of international pressure carefully tailored to the individual countries circumstances are more effective mechanisms than aid conditionality alone”: Marta Foresti, “Human Rights as Conditions for Aid: How Long Is a Piece of String?,” *Left Foot Forward*, January 5, 2012, http://www.leftfootforward.org/2012/01/debate-on-human-rights-as-conditions-for-aid/.

widely acknowledged as one of the main problems behind the lack of effective integration of human rights into the foreign policy of many donors.\textsuperscript{75}

The second reason why internalisation of political conditionality does not amount to ethical foreign policy is that there is no general consensus on the appropriateness and/or effectiveness of aid sanctions in promoting respect for human rights and democratic principles by recipient governments under all circumstances (and this is where variation steps in: some countries believe in the norm while others do not).

The arguments in favour of conditionality are numerous. In response to those who argue to shift from suspension and cuts to earmarking assistance to specific sectors, for instance, supporters of political conditionality recall the problems associated with aid fungibility.\textsuperscript{76} The \textit{Economist} offers a lucid description of the issue:

Aid-givers often finance specific projects, such as irrigation and the building of schools. Since the schools are usually built and the ditches dug, donors are satisfied that their money has served its intended purpose. But has it? Probably not. Most evidence suggests that aid money is fungible – that is, that it goes into the pot of public funds and is spent on whatever the recipient wants to spend it on. If donors earmark money for education, it may cause the recipient government to spend more on education, or it may make available for something else the money that it would otherwise have spent on education. If the government is benign, the alternative may be agriculture or tax cuts. If the government is crooked, donors’ funds may be spent on shopping trips to London for the president's wife or fighter planes to strafe unpopular minorities.\textsuperscript{77}

Aid fungibility entails that, even if political conditionality is not effective in triggering policy changes, at least it saves donors from complicity with abuses.\textsuperscript{78}

\textsuperscript{78} Vanheukelom, \textit{Political Conditionality in the EU’s Development Cooperation – Pointers for a Broader Debate}, 11.
The latest trends in the selection of aid modalities offer additional weight in favour of political conditionality. Since the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, donors have been strongly encouraged to abide by the principle of country ownership and disburse funds through recipient governments’ public financial systems. The expansion of general budget support, that is, un-earmarked contributions to the recipient government’s budget, is the most evident sign of this new tendency. The weakness of this approach is that “it risks strengthening the state without reforming it, perpetuating political elites and their rent-seeking bureaucracies, and marginalizing those elements in society with the greatest energy and motivation to effect positive transformation”. In other words, aid dependence can intervene in the democratic balance of power and “tip it toward the executive branch”. For instance, past research showed that Kenyan governments have consistently influenced the aid allocation process in favour of co-partisan and co-ethnic voters, and that this bias has increased incumbent vote share.

If donors want to maintain government-to-government funding, political conditionality can mitigate the risk mentioned above by promoting higher transparency and encouraging public participation. This is important because alternative strategies have little leverage. For instance, support to civil society can be constructive. However, “it is clear that the potential of a human rights-based

approach is limited where the overarching political context is authoritarian or autocratic and rule of law is absent”.

Even though these arguments are powerful, they do not prove that political conditionality is always the appropriate response to human rights violations, coups d’état and electoral fraud. Critics recall that political conditionality is often ineffective. Tertius Zongo, Former Prime Minister and Former Minister of Finance of Burkina Faso, recently warned donors that they “cannot buy reform with money. The recipients will pretend they have changed. But genuine change is a bottom up process. We must ensure that the European institutions understand that a suitcase of money will not build democracy”. Stephen Brown confirms that political conditionality, as currently applied, can be evaded. Many African governments quickly learned how to make the minimum necessary reforms to retain their levels of aid: allowing opposition parties to compete, but not win; permitting an independent press to operate, but not freely; allowing civic groups to function, but not effectively; and consenting that elections be held, but not replace the ruling party.

Political conditionality can even produce unintended side-effects. Sanctions sometimes provoke a hardening of attitude by the recipient government, or a “rally behind the flag” dynamic within the recipient country.

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An additional argument against political conditionality is that disengagement is not always helpful. Through the application of aid sanctions, donors lose (at least part of) their leverage over the recipient government. On the contrary, maintaining aid programs “may provide a means, however marginal, of influencing the situation through the many direct contacts with result: once it is cut off, all chance of influence is lost and the direct contacts with the population are destroyed”. Commentators suggest that this “doesn’t mean donors should not seek to influence events for the better, using the tools they have available. While pulling out may appear safer in terms of risk management, staying involved may be the best way to make a change for the better”. The underlying idea is to attempt to influence the situation directly through cooperation relations with the regime, and where feasible also through ensuing contacts with local people. Through mere presence, continued interest and active involvement in developing activities, a donor may build up trust and acquire a position as legitimate and accepted partner in a development, human rights and/or democracy dialogue.

The application of political conditionality has also been accused of neo-colonialism. According to John Jean Barya, “conditionalities are unrelated to any desire by Western donors to promote democracy in Africa, but rather should be viewed as part of a broader scheme to promote a new world order in the aftermath of the Cold War”. The neo-colonial claim is based on the argument that power imbalances between donor and recipient governments have not fundamentally changed. A statement signed by over 50 African organisations working on sexual health, women’s rights and gender issues – including ActionAid Liberia, Women Working with Women (Kenya), Coalition Against Homophobia in Ghana, Engender (South

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92 Glennie, “Should Donors Give Money to Countries with Poor Human Rights?”
Africa), and House of Rainbow Fellowship (Nigeria) – argued against aid sanctions in response to anti-gay legislation because they “are by their nature coercive and reinforce the disproportionate power dynamics between donor countries and recipients”.

Paul Kagame, President of Rwanda, regularly lambasts the donors’ attitude in the following terms: “What is this blackmail about? Aid? .. They give you aid so that forever you glorify them and depend on them. And they keep using it as a tool of control and management”.

These are only some of the arguments offered by the critics of political conditionality. Aid sanctions, in particular when linked to budget support operations, can also undermine the predictability of aid flows and the efforts at improved donor harmonization around country systems and priorities. This can impact on the effectiveness of aid in contributing to positive development outcomes. Moreover, there is a high risk that suspending or cutting aid actually double-punishes the poor population, without affecting those responsible for the abuses. This is the reason why the European Parliament recommended that before any such measures are imposed a proper assessment of their negative consequences should be undertaken by way of a human rights impact assessment.

In sum, aid conditionality represents only one aspect of the general foreign policy of France and the UK, and these countries can adopt contrasting behaviour in other areas. In addition, there is no simple answer to the question whether political conditionality is an appropriate and effective tool of foreign policy or not. Assessments should be conducted on a country by country basis.

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97 Interview with Paolo de Renzio, Overseas Development Institute.
even though this dissertation shows that the UK is more willing than France to apply aid sanctions, the author does not praise or blame any EU Member State for its policy decisions, and does not take any position in the normative debate on good versus bad sanctions. The assessment of ethical or unethical foreign policies is outside the boundaries of this research.

1.4. Outline of the thesis

This dissertation is divided into eight chapters. The second chapter clarifies the object of analysis, and proves the academic relevance and originality of the thesis. The third chapter justifies the selection of France and the United Kingdom as case studies and defends the methodological decision to adopt a three-fold measurement framework: in order to assess internalisation of political conditionality, the dissertation looks at policy agendas, legal documents and state behaviour. The fourth chapter shows that the laws, international agreements and policies regulating French and British development cooperation place a significantly different emphasis on the principles of political conditionality. France avoids any reference to political conditionality in both policy documents and international agreements. The UK strongly supports the idea of conditioning aid to respect for human rights by recipient governments and has included a human rights clause in the great majority of its cooperation agreements with developing countries. The fifth chapter extracts the findings on the two countries from previous quantitative studies on aid allocation and qualitative studies on aid sanctions, and offers a detailed comparison of the responses of the two donors to a small number of instances of human rights violations in recipient countries. The chapter shows that France is often the most opposed to the application of political conditionality, while the UK frequently takes the lead in the imposition of aid sanctions, together with like-minded Nordic donors. The sixth chapter defends the endorsement of “analytic eclecticism” and introduces four alternative hypotheses derived from realism, international constructivism, liberalism and sociological institutionalism. The seventh chapter shows that the higher accountability of aid decision-makers and social pressure by like-minded donors (in particular Nordic countries) are the most important factors which generated deeper internalisation of political conditionality by the UK. The eight chapter concludes the dissertation by summarising its main findings, discussing its most important
contributions to the academic literature, and offering a few suggestions in terms of potential avenues for future research.

A final caveat is in order before proceeding further. The objective of the dissertation is not to demonstrate that the UK has consistently applied political conditionality. No EU Member State or OECD donor can claim this record. Rather, the thesis aims to show that it is possible to detect important differences between those donors who believe that political conditionality is appropriate under certain circumstances and those donors who tend to avoid the application of aid sanctions altogether. In sum, the thesis is interested in variation between countries, not adherence to or divergence from an ideal situation of perfect compliance with the norm of political conditionality.
CHAPTER 2
EXPLAINING WHAT?
THE ACADEMIC RELEVANCE OF POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY

This chapter has three objectives:

- to clarify the object of analysis of the dissertation,
- to explain why it addresses a fascinating puzzle, and
- to show its academic relevance and originality.

The first two sections offer a working definition of foreign aid and political conditionality respectively. The aim is to make the topic of the dissertation as clear as possible. The third section lists a number of reasons why similarity, and not variation, should be expected in terms of internalisation of political conditionality by France and the UK (as well as EU Member States more in general).

This list of reasons is what makes variation between the two donors a puzzle and research aimed at explaining it worth conducting. The fourth section makes the “academic case” for the thesis. It shows that this puzzle has not been explained yet by the academic literature on foreign aid and human rights; rather, it represents one of its major gaps. In addition, it suggests that the solution of this puzzle can contribute to the advancement of the literatures on Europeanisation and norm internalisation.

2.1. Foreign aid

This thesis focuses on the internalisation of political conditionality in bilateral foreign aid. The standard definition of bilateral foreign aid (also referred to as bilateral development assistance or bilateral development cooperation) is provided by the OECD DAC, an international forum where donor governments come together to coordinate their activities in development assistance. According to the DAC, bilateral Official Development Assistance (ODA) is defined as those “grants or loans to ... developing countries ... which are: (a) undertaken by the official sector; (b) with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective; (c) at

101 A detailed discussion on the concept of “internalisation” and how to measure it is offered in Chapter 3.
concessional financial terms (if a loan, having a grant element of at least 25 per cent). In addition to financial flows, technical co-operation is included in aid”.

Four elements of bilateral ODA – the focus of this dissertation – can be stressed here for the sake of clarity. First, ODA is a form of concessional financing. This dissertation does not deal with international loans at market terms, or with the activity of export credit agencies. Second, ODA is provided by official state agencies. This dissertation does not deal with private aid, that is, the concessional transfer of resources by non-government organisations, religious groups, charities, foundations or private companies. Third, ODA has the objective of the social and economic development of the recipient country. This dissertation does not deal with military assistance (which involves the transfer of resources with the objective to assist an ally in its defence or in maintaining control over its own territory) or humanitarian assistance (which involves the transfer of resources in response to humanitarian crises and whose primary objective is to save lives and alleviate suffering, not to address structural socioeconomic factors which hamper development). Fourth, this dissertation focuses on bilateral ODA, which is directly delivered from donor agencies to recipient countries. This dissertation does not deal with multilateral ODA, when donor countries channel their development assistance through international financial institutions (such as the World Bank), United Nations agencies (such as the United Nations Development Programme), or regional organisations (such as the European Union).

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104 Inevitably, there are grey areas regarding what should be included in bilateral ODA. In any judgment, I will follow the DAC.
2.2. Political conditionality

2.2.1. Aid conditionality as a norm

In plain English, a ‘condition’ is “something demanded or required as a prerequisite to the granting or performance of something else”, and ‘conditionality’ is “the state of being subject to one or more conditions being met” (emphasis added). While it is possible to conceptualize aid conditionality as the situation in which the allocation or disbursement of foreign aid is subject to one or more conditions being met by the recipient state, this dissertation takes a step further and follows other scholars claiming that aid conditionality, in particular political conditionality, is not only a “state of being”, but also a “norm”. In International Relations (IR), a norm is usually defined as a “standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity”. The defining attributes of a norm are therefore three: moral character (norms include a prescriptive quality of “oughtness” and “appropriateness”), behavioural focus (norms call for specific forms of action) and social origin (norms are the result of inter-subjective evaluation). Political conditionality presents all these characteristics: donors should condition aid to promote social values such as human rights. James Fearon argues that norms take the generic form “Good people do (or do not do) X in situations A, B, C . . . ”. Political conditionality takes the specific form “Good donors avoid government-to-government aid when the recipient government violates human rights”. More

106 Karen E. Smith, “The Use of Political Conditionality in the EU’s Relations with Third Countries: How Effective?,” *European Foreign Affairs Review* 3, no. 2 (1998): 257. The idea that political conditionality represents a “norm” can be found also outside IR circles and jargon. In 1993, Moore wrote that “it is little more than three years since the Berlin Wall began to crumble. In that time, the political context and content of development aid to the Third World has changed rather dramatically. ‘Political conditionality’ - the tying of official aid disbursements to the quality of government (or ‘governance’) that recipients provide - has become the norm”: Mick Moore, “Introduction,” *IDS Bulletin* 24, no. 1 (1993): 1.
109 James D. Fearon, “What Is Identity (as We Now Use the Word)” (manuscript, Stanford University, 1999), 27.
generally, “good donors make the allocation of development assistance dependent on respect for human rights and democratic principles by recipient governments”.

Being a norm, political conditionality is neither an institution nor a practice. Political conditionality is not an “institution” because, as defined by March and Olsen, an institution is “a relatively stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behaviour for specific groups of actors in specific situations”.110 Political conditionality lacks the aggregated character of institutions (“collection of …”). It is a single standard of appropriate behaviour, not a structured and interrelated group of behavioural rules.111 Political conditionality is not a practice because, as clarified by Pouliot, a practice “is learned from experience and can hardly be expressed apart from practice. It is ‘thoughtless’ – what popular parlance calls commonsense, experience, intuition, knack, skill, or practical mastery”.112 Political conditionality is never implemented without intentionality. The application of sanctions is always preceded by (often) heated debates between donors and recipient governments, closed sessions among ambassadors, calls by civil society organisations, ministerial statements of condemnation, etc. Even in the case of the US after a coup d’état, when the suspension of aid is automatic given the provisions contained in Section 7008 of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, the local ambassador and the Department of State always discuss whether a waiver may be appropriate or not.113

A potential factor against the categorization of political conditionality as a norm is the observation that donors often violate it. For instance, donors almost never take negative measures when abuses are committed by strategically important

113 Interview 63.
recipients. Against this argument, IR scholars have already suggested that norm violation cannot be equated with norm inexistence. According to McFaul,

norm can long exist, perhaps even indefinitely, while being violated. In international affairs, antislavery norms enjoyed widespread recognition hundreds of years before the practice of slavery finally ended. Likewise, norms on self-determination and decolonization garnered international legitimacy well before the last great empire collapsed.

The fact that norms continue to exist even when they are violated represents a necessary precondition for the puzzle addressed by this dissertation. Why do some actors ignore certain norms more than others? Specifically, why do some donors refuse to comply with political conditionality more than others?

2.2.2. Aid conditionality as a foreign policy tool

As Stokke reminds us, aid conditionality “is not an aim in itself, but an instrument by which other objectives are pursued”. Scholars agree that the principal objective of aid conditionality is to influence the behaviour of the recipient government. For instance, aid conditionality can be used to induce the receiving party to undertake actions that it would not otherwise have taken or refrain from actions that it would otherwise have undertaken. Aid conditionality can also be used in view of other objectives, such as to avoid complicity with the concerned recipient country, punish

it, or deter similar behaviour of other recipient governments. In recent times, particularly in situations of economic and financial crisis, conditionality is increasingly seen as a way to ensure the value for money of aid programmes and justify them before the general public.\textsuperscript{118}

Aid conditionality is widely used as a foreign policy tool because of the attractiveness of foreign assistance in the eyes of the recipient government.\textsuperscript{119} Foreign aid is desired by recipient states for both material (financial) and social (reputational) reasons.\textsuperscript{120} On the one hand, foreign aid is the main source of external finance in an average low-income country.\textsuperscript{121} Between 1975 and 1995 foreign aid financed on average 53.8\% percent of central government expenditures in the fifty most aid-dependent countries.\textsuperscript{122} On the other hand, foreign aid “is a potent political symbol and signal. As a voluntary transfer, it suggests approbation by the donor of the recipient”.\textsuperscript{123} And international standing is particularly important for recipient countries both in international markets and in domestic political circles.\textsuperscript{124} For instance, Bartels confirms that aid recipients “frequently seek (or purport to seek) the legitimacy ... that can be conferred by such engagement”. In fact, EU action against Zimbabwe has failed, due to President Mugabe’s complete lack of interest in any rapprochement with the EU”.\textsuperscript{125}

\textsuperscript{120} Morgenthau famously argued that aid can be compared to a “bribe” - that is, “the transfer of money and services from one government to another performs here the function of a price pad for political services rendered or to be requested”. Hans Morgenthau, “A Political Theory of Foreign Aid,” \textit{The American Political Science Review} 56, no. 2 (1962): 302.
\textsuperscript{123} Lancaster, \textit{Foreign Aid}, 11.
\textsuperscript{124} Ian Clark, \textit{Legitimacy in International Society} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
\textsuperscript{125} Lorand Bartels, \textit{The Application of Political conditionality in the EU’s Bilateral Trade Agreements and Other Trade Arrangements with Third Countries} (European Parliament, Committee on International Trade, 2008), 12.
Those who highlight that aid conditionality is based on an asymmetric power relationship between the donor and the recipient make an important point with regard to the functioning of this foreign policy tool. However, they miss the full picture. It is true: the donor has something that the recipient wants (economic and political support) and the recipient is willing to fulfil certain conditions in order to receive it. However, the recipient too has something that the donor wants (the fulfilment of certain conditions) and the donor is willing to disburse aid in order to obtain it. For aid conditionality to exist, the desire by the recipient state alone is not enough. The basis of aid conditionality is that there is both something desired by the recipient state (foreign aid) and something desired by the donor (the fulfilment of certain conditions). Successful aid conditionality is the reciprocal satisfaction of these desires. Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel are clear on this point: any conditionality relationship, in order for it to exist and to develop, must be perceived by all actors involved as a mutually advantageous arrangement. The costs-and-benefits structure must be aligned to the interests of both the donor and the recipient.126

2.2.3. The complexities of aid conditionality and the focus on negative measures

This dissertation focuses on a specific aspect of aid conditionality: the adoption of negative measures (such as the suspension of aid delivery). Yet, it is important to acknowledge that aid conditionality is much more than this. First of all, aid conditionality can be negative, but also positive.127 In negative conditionality, recipient countries are penalized when they do not meet certain conditions (when they do not adopt “good” policies, or when they adopt “bad” policies).128 The

suspension, reduction or withdrawal of aid is used as a stick, as a sanction. Under a strategy of “reinforcement by punishment”, the donor state punishes the recipient state if conditions are not met, and avoid punishing it otherwise. The donor state “intervene[s] coercively … to change the cost–benefit assessment of the target government by inflicting extra costs”.\textsuperscript{129} In positive conditionality, recipient countries are rewarded when they meet certain conditions (for instance, when they adopt “good” policies).\textsuperscript{130} The allocation of aid (or more aid) is used as a carrot, as an inducement. Under a strategy of “reinforcement by reward”, the donor state distributes the rewards if the target government complies with its conditions, and “withholds the reward if the target government fails to comply with its conditions”.\textsuperscript{131}

Second, conditions can be imposed on recipient governments as a prerequisite for keeping up aid after an agreement has already been concluded, but also as a prerequisite for entering into an aid agreement in the first place.\textsuperscript{132} In contractual conditionality, conditions are attached to the continuation of aid disbursements under an agreement already into force. The most typical example of contractual conditionality is the presence of a specific clause in the body of an international agreement: the clause provides the legal ground for one party to suspend or terminate the agreement. A human rights clause would therefore provide the legal ground for the donor to suspend disbursements in case of political repression. In selective or allocative conditionality, it is the selection of the countries to which to allocate foreign aid which is subject to certain conditions. These conditions or criteria are usually found in documents which bear the hallmark of soft law, and are meant to be fulfilled before an agreement is concluded – this usually renders these conditions more political than legal.\textsuperscript{133}

\textsuperscript{129} Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel, “Costs, Commitment and Compliance,” 497.
\textsuperscript{130} Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs calls this approach “positive linkage”: Furuoka, “Political conditionality and Aid Allocation,” 130.
\textsuperscript{131} Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel, “Costs, Commitment and Compliance,” 497.
\textsuperscript{133} Fierro, The EU’s Approach to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice, 98. In the literature on foreign aid, these types of conditionality are usually called ex ante and ex post conditionality. However, this terminology is misleading. As a matter of fact, conditionality is always an ex post assessment: for conditionality to work, the recipient state has to be given the chance to comply or not to comply with the conditions set by the donor state. This led Stokke to affirm that “the distinction between ex ante and ex post conditionality … may indeed be blurred”: Stokke, “Aid and Political Conditionality: Core Issues and State of the Art,” 12, note 7. I disagree. What distinguishes ex ante
As can be seen, aid conditionality is a more complex phenomenon than the “essentially punitive strategy” which is often referred to when speaking about development assistance. Burnell is therefore right to highlight that:

the exercise of political conditionality itself offers various steps, some of them taken in private: offers and payment of rewards, threats to withhold, to suspend or to cut off aid, and action implementing the same. Conditionality can mean more than just the enforcement of sanctions, an act of last resort which in the past has been associated with gross abuses of human rights. Conditionality can infuse the regular decision-making process over aid allocations, whereby a country’s inflow is maintained, increased or reduced from previous years, and its annual request is acceded to by donors, or met wholly or only in part. Instances of punitive conditionality have attracted most attention, but positive conditionality is probably a more widespread feature of the landscape.

Why then does this thesis concentrate on the negative aspect of conditionality? First, because the decision to suspend, cut or withdraw aid is never an easy decision. Donor agencies have strong organisational incentives to disburse money whatever occurs in the recipient government. In addition, aid sanctions are not likely to be effective if implemented by one donor alone. According to Crawford, “unilateral action to suspend aid is unlikely ever to be effective even by a major donor”. This means that sanctions represent the most unlikely case of variation in terms of political conditionality. In the case of political crises, donor officials always have extensive discussions on how to proceed, and tend to coordinate as much as possible in order to be able to fully justify their decision and increase the leverage of their

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2.2.4. Different purposes of aid conditionality and the focus on human rights and democracy

According to Morgenthau, “a policy of foreign aid is no different from diplomatic or military policy or propaganda. They are all weapons in the political armoury of the nation”.\textsuperscript{139} As with most foreign policy tools – diplomatic talks can be used to prepare for war but also to adopt environmental treaties; military force can be used to occupy a weaker country but also to support a liberal opposition against an authoritarian government – aid conditionality can be used for different purposes. Indeed, scholars acknowledge that while “there have always been strings attached to development assistance… these have been of different kinds”.\textsuperscript{140} In general, aid conditionality has served three different purposes.

A first kind of conditionality aims at influencing the foreign policy of the recipient state. The purpose of conditionality is to establish a relationship of gratitude with recipient states and to exploit this relationship in international politics.\textsuperscript{141} Historically, donor countries have tried to use the leverage of aid conditionality in both security and commercial relations. On the security side, until 1989 aid conditions have been intimately related to the Cold War: recipient countries were

\textsuperscript{138} Interview 9; interview 73; interview 105.
\textsuperscript{139} Morgenthau, “A Political Theory of Foreign Aid,” 309.
expected to side with the donor country in the East-West struggle. On the commercial side, aid conditions have often been used to gain advantage in the international competition over raw materials: recipient countries are expected to concede raw materials at preferential conditions to their donor counterparts. As a recent example of this foreign-policy oriented conditionality, the U.S. administration threatened to cut all military aid to those countries which would have ratified the Statute of the International Criminal Court but which were unwilling to sign bilateral impunity agreements with the United States.

A second kind of conditionality aims at influencing the domestic economic behaviour and/or the domestic economic structure of the recipient state. The purpose of this type of conditionality is to protect the international system against weaknesses in recipient countries and/or to improve aid effectiveness. The major proponents of this type of conditionality have been the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

A third kind of conditionality aims at influencing the domestic political behaviour and/or the domestic political structure of the recipient state. As Doornbos puts it, the goal of this kind of conditionality is “to establish a grip on recipient developing countries’ handling of policy processes”, and “on the basic manner in which government and its constituent political processes . . . would be structured”. The final purpose of this form of conditionality can be two-fold: to safeguard the rights and freedoms of the individuals under the sovereign hand of recipient countries, and to improve aid effectiveness. This kind of conditionality has mainly concentrated on

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142 Crawford, *Foreign Aid and Political Reform*, 2; Sir William Ryrle, “Managing an Aid Programme,” *IDS Bulletin* 17, no. 2 (1986): 7; Antonio Tujan and Wim De Ceukelaire, “‘Conditionnalité’ et ‘Appropriation’ de L’aide : Quelles Contradictions?,” *Alternatives Sud* 15, no. 2 (2008): 100. Aid was used to press for specific foreign policy decisions not only by Western donors. For instance, even though Yemen condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, it also criticised American leadership of the anti-Iraq coalition, and called for a resolution of the affair in an Arab context. The Saudis were not pleased and cut aid to Yemen. Anonymous, “Yemen: A Discomforting Neighbour,” *The Economist*, June 26, 1993. Another example is offered by the Chinese condition not to recognize Taiwan: Chris Alden, “China in Africa,” *Survival* 47, no. 3 (2005): 155.

143 Lancaster, *Foreign Aid*, 15.


146 Martin Doornbos, “‘Good Governance’: The Rise and Decline of a Policy Metaphor?,” *Journal of Development Studies* 37, no. 6 (2001): 97. See also Uvin, “‘Do as I Say, Not as I Do,’” 67.
three different indicators: personal integrity rights (right to life, prohibition of torture, etc.), civil and political rights (right of assembly, political pluralism, fair and free elections, etc.), and an accountable and efficient public administration (transparency, the absence of corruption, low military expenditure, etc.).

This dissertation focuses on this last kind of conditionality, and concentrates exclusively on personal integrity rights (for instance, right to life, prohibition of torture, etc.), and civil and political rights (for instance, non-discrimination, freedom of the press, right to vote, etc.). Throughout the dissertation, I refer to this type of conditionality as “political conditionality”.

2.2.5. Political conditionality: conflating human rights and democracy?

The decision to combine abuses of personal integrity rights with violations of civil and political rights (including gross violations of basic democratic principles) is in line with past academic literature. This equivalence is important for the dissertation to build upon past findings, as well as to contribute effectively to a thriving research programme.

Mixing human rights with democracy is also consistent with existing State practice. For instance, the “human rights clause” included in EU cooperation agreements with development countries covers three essential elements: human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law. As highlighted by Youngs, EU Member States and EU institutions rarely clarify which elements of the clause warrant intervention under the


specific circumstances of each case: European donors strongly resist the idea of separating democracy from human rights.149 In a similar way, the Friends of Zimbabwe – the grouping of the country’s major aid donors – has never distinguished between the promotion of human rights and the push for free and fair election. For instance, the donors repeatedly declared that they “collectively stand ready to broaden, deepen and harmonise [their] engagement and support as the country moves further down the path of democracy and respect for human rights”.150 Gomes Porto confirms that the objective of the donors was to “pressure Robert Mugabe’s regime to negotiate with the Movement for Democratic Change, to respect human rights and fundamental liberties, to repeal draconian legislation and, finally, to implement transparent and free and fair elections”.151

Most interviewees have also confirmed that, notwithstanding the fact that coups d’état tend to lead to aid sanctions more recurrently than gross human rights abuses, the attitude of EU Member States does not change if one looks at abuses of personal integrity rights or violations of civil and political rights.152 The consequence is that the two types of cases can be included in the same set.

2.3. Why is variation in the degree of internalisation of political conditionality a puzzle?

There are numerous reasons to expect convergence rather than variation in the degree of internalisation of political conditionality by OECD donors since the end of the Cold War. All of these reasons are particularly strong for European donors. This explains the principled stance adopted by the European Union as a whole, and justifies the decision to concentrate this dissertation on EU Member States.

152 Interview 26; interview 111.
2.3.1. The recognition of the effectiveness and appropriateness of the promotion of human rights

The first reason to expect similarity rather than variation in the adoption of political conditionality by OECD donors is that, at the beginning of the 1990s, the promotion of human rights came to be seen as both an effective and an appropriate behaviour in international relations. This should have led all Western donors – both habitual human rights advocates and traditional laggards – to more actively promote human rights, and thus adopt political conditionality.

Changing beliefs on the effectiveness of human rights promotion were a consequence of the climate of hope and euphoria evoked by the perspectives of democratisation of Eastern Europe, the rapid advancement of the Latin American continent towards the rule of law, and the disappearance of the apartheid regime in South Africa. As a matter of fact, Eastern Europe, Latina America and South Africa had been the most prominent targets of human rights campaigns during the 1980s. Changing beliefs on the appropriateness of human rights promotion were mainly due to the endorsement of a pro-human rights re-orientation by regional organisations with representation of Southern governments, such as the Commonwealth, the Organisation of American States (OAS) and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Horng effectively summarises that this was a period “characterised by major political change and a rapidly shifting world scene leading to the emergence of more governments committed to democracy and auguring well in some ways for the development of human rights”. Burnell recalls that “increasingly the view [was] being expressed that the international community is entitled to insist on all states fulfilling certain basic responsibilities in regard to their own citizens”. The promotion of human rights was eventually recognised as a paramount goal of the world community by all United Nations Member States: “the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms at the national and

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international levels should be universal … the international community should support the strengthening and promoting of democracy, development and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the entire world” (as included in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 1993).

This new consensus should have had some impact on donors’ policies and behaviour because during the Cold War many OECD countries voluntarily ignored human rights as they represented a highly politicised issue. The aim of this strategy was to depart from the domineering practices of the superpowers: the promotion of human rights was perceived as only reflecting the military opposition between the West and the East (civil and political rights on the one side, economic, social and cultural rights on the other side), and ideological and strategic considerations were perceived to override more genuine human rights concerns.157 In contrast, “with the decline of East-West conflict, donors feel increasingly justified in promoting democracy and pluralism in their own right without being accused of neo-colonialism”.158 As Kevlihan confirms, “with Cold War rivalry removed from the equation, Western governments felt freer to pursue basic political concerns vis-à-vis governments of the South”.159

2.3.2. From development as a prerequisite of human rights respect to respect for human rights as a prerequisite for economic development and aid effectiveness

The second reason to expect similarity rather than variation in the adoption of political conditionality by OCED donors is that, after the failures of many development programmes in the 1980s a consensus developed within the foreign aid community on the causal belief that respect for human rights is a precondition for good economic performances by recipient countries, and thus enhances the

effectiveness of mainstream development programmes. This evolution should have led all Western states to adopt political conditionality and promote human rights, if not for their own sake, in pursuit of their development goals: donors eager to ensure the maximum impact of their aid programmes should target it towards countries with good track records on human rights or push laggards to adopt reformist agendas.

Scholars agree that one of the most important factors behind the diffusion of political conditionality was that respect for human rights was seen as a means to the end of economic development and liberalisation. Furuoka recalls that “there has been a growing awareness that foreign aid works less effectively in the recipient countries where political regimes suppress human rights and democracy”. As Wiseman commented, “the reasoning behind political conditionality was partly economic in that it was argued that economic failure … was in some measure due to the absence of democracy and political accountability and that without political change the imposition of economic conditionality … would not produce the desired economic results”.

This reasoning ran against the prevailing opinions that development and prosperity are preconditions for the respect of human rights, rather than vice versa, and that the successful implementation of economic adjustment requires the firm hand of

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160 Goldstein and Keohane distinguish between principled and causal beliefs. On the one hand, principled beliefs “consists of normative ideas that specify criteria for distinguishing rights from wrong and just from unjust”: Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, “Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework,” in Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change, ed. Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 9. On the other hand, causal beliefs “are beliefs about cause-effect relationships which derive from the shared consensus of recognised elites”: Ibid., 10. The idea that the promotion of human rights is an appropriate behaviour in international relations as well as the idea that the concept of development includes the advancement of human rights respect are normative beliefs: they distinguish what is right behaviour from wrong behaviour. In contrast, the idea that respect for human rights facilitates the economic development of a country is a causal belief: it links a cause to an effect.


162 Furuoka, “Political conditionality and Aid Allocation,” 126.


authoritarian rule.\textsuperscript{165} This new thinking initially emanated from the World Bank. In the context of the poor results of structural adjustment programmes, the Bank concluded that its economic policies were correct but not being implemented properly. Attention was drawn to the weaknesses of political institutions caused by the prevalence of unelected and unaccountable governments.\textsuperscript{166} Indeed, already in 1989 the World Bank “suspended disbursements of its structural adjustment loan to strike-torn Benin, informing the government that it could not continue its disbursements until it had ‘the consent of its people’ to continue its reform programmes”.\textsuperscript{167} This approach was later confirmed by the OECD. In 1996, the OECD DAC identified a set of qualitative foundations that are deemed to be essential for achieving developmental goals, including “capacity development for effective, democratic and accountable governance, the protection of human rights and respect for the rule of law”.\textsuperscript{168}

2.3.3. The end of the Cold War and the power readjustments in the international arena

The third reason to expect similarity rather than variation in the adoption of political conditionality by OECD donors is that the power readjustment that took place in the international arena after the collapse of the communist bloc both freed Western donors to pursue other goals than security maximisation and made them more powerful vis-à-vis recipient countries. OECD donors should have similarly adopted political conditionality because its application became less costly as well as more effective.


\textsuperscript{167} Lancaster, “Governance and Development,” 10.

First, the use of aid resources for geo-strategic purposes became less prominent. During the Cold War aid was primarily driven by security motives. Furuoka recalls that “during the Cold War era, Western aid donors often overlooked human rights abuses by repressive governments in aid-recipient countries, provided those governments were pro-Western”. With the end of the rivalry between the West and the East “the uses of aid need no longer be shaped by geo-political considerations and compromises. Stereotypically, it is no longer necessary or possible to support nasty authoritarian regimes on the grounds that they are the only feasible alternative to local Communists and/or Soviet, Cuban or Chinese influence.” Accordingly, all Western states have fewer reasons not to consistently adopt political conditionality. Second, “the appearance of the formerly communist East European countries on the list of recipient countries of OECD development assistance … ha[d] greatly increased the competition for available aid resources, strengthening the temptation for donor country policy-makers to attempt to dictate their ideological terms to recipients”. The competition for limited aid resources increased also because of worsening economic conditions in developing countries, and because of the abrupt disappearance of Soviet aid for many countries in the developing world. Moyo recalls that “the Soviet Union had, on average, disbursed US$300 million a year to Africa … but after the break-up of the union this amount would almost certainly have fallen considerably. Donors could now pick and choose, when, why and to whom they doled out aid – if at all”.


171 Furuoka, “Political conditionality and Aid Allocation,” 126; see also Moyo, Dead Aid, 23.

172 Moore, “Introduction,” 1; Moyo, Dead Aid, 24.

173 Uvin, “‘Do as I Say, Not as I Do,’” 64.


175 Moyo, Dead Aid, 24.
2.3.4. The financial problems of donor states

The fourth reason to expect convergence rather than variation in the adoption of political conditionality by OECD donors is that, since the beginning of the 1990s, all Western governments have recurrently faced a feeble economic situation and, as a consequence, strong domestic criticisms of spending large sums of aid on overseas development programmes. OECD countries should have similarly adopted political conditionality because this policy could easily be used either as a fake justification to withdraw foreign aid to less important recipients or as a legitimate end to protect development aid from excessive cuts. The two arguments are opposite in their motives; yet, they are concurring in their result: the adoption of behaviour consistent with the norm.

The 1990s experienced an evident donor fatigue with respect to foreign aid. The net ODA disbursements as a share of donor GNP fell from 0.38 per cent in 1982 to 0.22 per cent in 1997.\textsuperscript{176} Many scholars suggest that the new situation provided a rationale for cutting aid: the official justification was political conditionality, the real motives were budget problems.\textsuperscript{177} According to Tomaševski, “political conditionality coincides with decreased aid flows. Donors’ commitment to the promotion of human rights is thus suspect. Human rights appear to many as no more than a convenient excuse for decreasing aid: convenient because of the high degree of public support for whatever is labelled ‘human rights’. If at the same time money is actually saved, then such a policy is even more convenient”.\textsuperscript{178} Lancaster agrees that political considerations “were less compelling than in the past. Thus, aid was vulnerable to being cut in times of economic recession and budgetary stringency”.\textsuperscript{179} For instance, “in the United States, the end of the Cold War rationale caused a search for other, compelling purposes for foreign aid”.\textsuperscript{180}

Others support the opposite idea that the emphasis on human rights served to avoid more severe budget cuts. Human rights are principles unanimously agreed as

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{176} Ibid., 25.
\item \textsuperscript{177} Crawford, \textit{Foreign Aid and Political Reform}, 65.
\item \textsuperscript{178} Katharina Tomasevski, \textit{Development Aid and Human Rights Revisited} (London: Pinter Publishers, 1993), xiii–xiv.
\item \textsuperscript{179} Lancaster, \textit{Foreign Aid}, 45–46.
\item \textsuperscript{180} Ibid., 241, note 23.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
desirable in the foreign policy of Western countries. Kevilhan argues that “some donor governments may have felt pressured to adopt democracy and human rights as their new rationales for assistance in the absence of a cold war threat in order to justify continued large scale assistance to developing countries”. Carey agrees that “making aid conditional on respect for basic human rights helps donors justify the expense of aid to their taxpayers, as financing repressive regimes is unlikely to find support among voters in their own countries”.

Both explanations can have some truth in them. The important thing is that, either way, budget constraints should have triggered political conditionality.

2.3.5. The expectation of automatic convergence

The fifth reason to expect similarity rather than variation in the adoption of political conditionality by OECD donors is that this policy should automatically lean toward an equilibrium among donor states. The reason is simple. The effectiveness of political conditionality is heavily dependent on consistency among donors – the fact that all donors are united in punishing the repressive regime and rewarding its positive changes: if new donors step in when old donors withdraw aid out of human rights concerns, conditionality evidently loses any leverage on the recipient government. A report by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) made this point clear back in 1992: “a lack of consensus among donors over the appropriate conditions to apply may allow recipient governments to play donors off against one another, by complying with the least onerous conditions in order to resist pressures for more fundamental political changes”.

This being the case, supporters of political conditionality cannot go alone in its application: without the support of other donors their efforts are ineffective. This means that, after a trial period, donor countries should have settled on a conception

182 Kevlihan, “Becoming a ‘player,’” 76.
of political conditionality applicable by all of them. The impossibility for supporters of political conditionality to apply it more than recalcitrant donors should have levelled the adoption of the norm to similar standards.

2.3.6. Political conditionality: an emerging international norm

The combination of this list of reasons explains the rapid diffusion of political conditionality after the end of the Cold War. In 1993, Tomaševski acknowledged that “the previous practice of cutting off aid from countries whose governments violate human rights is today becoming institutionalised”.185 In the same year, Moore commented that “all major aid donors have begun to insist that ‘good government’ is important”;186 Gibbon wrote that political conditionality represented the core of the “new international aid regime”,187 and Robinson dubbed political conditionality the “new policy agenda”.188 According to Crawford, “similar policies were declared in rapid succession by almost all major bilateral aid donors from 1990 onwards, with a remarkable consensus in both the ends and means pronounced in the policy statements”.189 The consequence is that, among the tools of human rights foreign policy, “foreign aid has probably been the most significant instrument in the 1990s”.190 Arts confirms that “during the 1990s, the practice of linking development cooperation, human rights and democracy gained an enormous impetus”,191 and that many countries “stepped up their records of applying punitive measures”.192

A clear example of the social pressure created by the diffusion of political conditionality is offered by Kevlihan. He concludes his analysis of Irish development policy by saying that

185 Tomaševski, Development Aid and Human Rights, xv.
189 Crawford, Foreign Aid and Political Reform, 1.
190 Ibid.
191 Arts, Integrating Human Rights into Development Cooperation, 1.
considering Irish government policy towards first and second generation conditionality together, one can perceive a drift towards international norms, or perhaps more specifically, the agenda of the most developed states. It would appear that conformity with this agenda without any apparent independent policy is what is meant by becoming a ‘player’. In both cases, Irish policy has moved from a position of pragmatism to one of conformity.  

This situation is still true today. Writing about political conditionality, Carey recognises that “international norms and conventions legitimize and even encourage such donor behaviour”.  

2.3.7. The particular strength of these reasons with respect to EU Member States  

If the reasons listed above lead one to expect that OECD donors have converged towards a similar internalisation of political conditionality, this expectation is even stronger with respect to European countries. All of the reasons listed above are particularly strong for EU Member States.  

The lack of a proper human rights policy by the EC and its Member States in the 1970s is usually explained as a direct consequence of Cold War politics, neutrality being used by European donors to distinguish the Community from other superpowers. Yet, the first international agreement ever to endorse the idea that respect for human rights represents the cornerstone of the concept of development was the 1989 Fourth Lomé Convention, a trade and aid agreement between the European Community (EC) and 71 African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries. Article 5 of the Convention reads as follows:

Cooperation shall be directed towards development centred on man, the main protagonist and beneficiary of development, which thus entails respect for and promotion of all human rights. Cooperation operations shall thus be conceived

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193 Kevlihan, “Becoming a ‘player,’” 83.  
194 Carey, “European Aid,” 460.  
in accordance with the positive approach, where respect for human rights is recognized as a basic factor of real development and where cooperation is conceived as a contribution to the promotion of these rights. In this context development policy and cooperation are closely linked with the respect for and enjoyment of fundamental human rights.

In 1991, the European Council also endorsed the causal belief that respect for human rights is a pre-condition of development. It declared that “democracy, pluralism, respect for human rights, institutions working within a constitutional framework, and responsible governments appointed following periodic, fair elections, as well as the recognition of the legitimate importance of the individual in a society, are essential prerequisites of sustained social and economic development”.196

The financial problems deriving from the poor economic situation were particularly acute for EU Member States that had to comply with the parameters and budget constraints imposed by the Maastricht Treaty.197 According to Tarp, aid cuts during the 1990s were a direct consequence of the fact that, “among European countries, the decision to meet the Maastricht’s treaty’s criteria for entering the Euro-currency arrangement required substantial shrinking in budget deficits in the years leading up to January 1999”.198

The potential for coordination is nowhere higher than among EU Member States. In addition to repeated calls for stronger vertical coherence in general development policies,199 European institutions specifically supported the belief that effective human rights promotion requires uniform behaviour by all donors. In the 1995 “Communication on the European Union and the external dimension of human rights policy: from Rome to Maastricht and beyond”, the Commission acknowledged that “to improve the quality and impact of the Unions actions in this field, it is essential

196 European Council, Declaration on Human Rights (Luxembourg, June 29, 1991).
198 Finn Tarp, Foreign Aid and Development: Lessons Learnt and Directions For The Future (Routledge, 2003), 335.
199 See, for instance, the principles adopted in 2005: Council of the European Union, European Commission, and European Parliament, European Consensus on Development, 2005. Other initiatives, such as the EU Code of Conduct on Division of Labour in Development Policy, have less relevance in terms of vertical coherence and political conditionality.
to: … promote exchanges of information with the Member States to ensure that the action taken by the Union as a whole is consistent”.

In 2010, the Commission emphasised that “EU budget support should be provided in a way that improves coordination both within and beyond the EU, and enhances the coherence and credibility of the EU”.

As a recent study for the European Parliament puts it, “donor harmonisation is key … to achieve maximum impact. All donors should share the same understanding of underlying principles and democracy and use a common approach vis-à-vis the partner government. In many countries, however, some donors cut their budget support operation while others maintained [it] … This leads to a situation in which governments in partner countries face different and sometimes contradictory requirements from different donors which shows a lack of harmonisation”.

2.3.8. Deep internalisation of political conditionality by the EU

Against this background, it is no surprise that, in comparison with other Western donors, the EU has become one of the most enthusiastic supporters of political conditionality. Since the end of the Cold War, all European bodies issued statements in support of linking aid to respect for human rights. Just to offer one concrete example, in October 2011 the European Commission adopted its latest comprehensive policy document on European aid: a Communication titled “Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change”. The Commission stressed “the enhanced importance of human rights, democracy and good governance trends in determining the mix of instruments and aid modalities at country level” [emphasis added]. The consequence is that “the mix and level of aid


will depend on the country’s situation, including its ability to conduct reforms … EU
general budget support should be linked to the governance situation and political
dialogue with the partner country, in coordination with the Member States”. In
particular, “should a country loosen its commitment to human rights and democracy,
the EU should strengthen its cooperation with non-state actors and local authorities
and use forms of aid that provide the poor with the support they need. At the same
time, the EU should maintain dialogue with governments and non-state actors. In
some cases, stricter conditionality will be warranted”.

The Foreign Affairs Council welcomed the Communication: “European citizens must
be shown, now more than ever, that EU development cooperation … helps advance
human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance”. As such, the
Council confirmed that “relations between the EU and its Member States and partner
countries are based on and will promote shared values of human rights, democracy
and the rule of law” and that “support to partners will be adapted to their …
commitment and progress with regard to human rights, democracy, the rule of law
and good governance”.

Deep internalisation of political conditionality by the EU offers two additional
reasons why EU Member States should share a similar position on the issue. The first
one is the “upload” channel. The existing EU policy on political conditionality could
not exist without express support from all EU Member States. Hence, they should
agree on how much, and what kind of, political conditionality is appropriate in
foreign aid. To offer one example, the Fourth Lomé Convention, which revised the
legal framework for trade and development cooperation between the EC and ACP
countries in 1989, was the first development agreement ever to incorporate a human
rights clause which legally permits the suspension of development cooperation in
case of grave abuses. By 1995 the human rights clause became a standard for any
development agreement with third countries, and the European Parliament could
proudly announce that “the European Union has now evolved the most highly

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206 Ibid., para. 4.
developed form of human rights policy in third country agreements that exists, to be compared only with developments which have taken place in the U.S. since the adoption of the Foreign Assistance Act in 1966”\(^{207}\). This evolution would not have been possible without the support by EU Member States: all development agreements are signed by the European Commission (on behalf of the EU) \textit{and} by all EU Member States.

There is more. Since the end of the Cold War, the European Union has applied political conditionality vis-à-vis a large number of third countries: to name a few, Belarus, Burma, Burundi, Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kenya, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Sudan, Tajikistan, Togo, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Zimbabwe. Almost none of these measure would have been possible without the support by all EU Member States. In the great majority of these cases, decisions were taken by unanimity in the Council of the European Union (which comprises all EU Member States).

The second reason why EU Member States should share a similar position on political conditionality is the “download” channel. EU Member States should share a similar view on political conditionality because of equalling social pressure by EU institutions. Social pressure and resulting uniform behaviour within the EU is the object of enquiry of a still-growing strand of research named “Europeanisation”. This literature stresses the increasing adaptation of the national state systems, politics and policies of EU Member States to EU theory and practice\(^{208}\). Europeanisation studies have already showed (limited but existing) adaptation processes in many areas, including, but not confined to, foreign policy at large, refugee policies and


\(^{208}\) In representation of a much wider literature, see Maria Green Cowles, James A. Caporaso, and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds., \textit{Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change} (Syracuse, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001); Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli, eds., \textit{The Politics of Europeanization} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
immigration policies.\textsuperscript{209} There is no reason why foreign aid should be an exception.\textsuperscript{210}

Why then do we experience variation among EU Member States? This dissertation suggests how to solve this puzzle.

2.4. Advancing academic research on aid sanctions, Europeanisation and norm internalisation

2.4.1 International Relations literature on aid and human rights

The academic literature of International Relations has addressed three important questions with respect to political conditionality. From a normative point of view, is it a legitimate and appropriate tool of foreign policy?\textsuperscript{211} From a policy perspective, is it efficacious in bringing change within recipient countries?\textsuperscript{212} From an empirical standpoint, do states actually practice political conditionality as they claim? This dissertation builds upon the strand of research which addressed the last question.

Researchers have used both qualitative and quantitative methods to assess whether the human rights performance of recipient states determines the allocation of foreign aid by donor states. Signalling the absence of any human rights concern by donor states, or at least the lack of attention towards the issue from the wider aid


\textsuperscript{211} For an overview, Crawford, \textit{Foreign Aid and Political Reform}, 30–43. For an example, Tomasevski, \textit{Development Aid and Human Rights}.

community, until the 1990s there was no qualitative research on political conditionality. The path-breaking work was a 1995 volume, edited by Stokke, on the adoption of political conditionality by a wide range of donors, including Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Norway. Since then, several scholars have provided in-depth historical accounts of the application (and non-application) of political conditionality in specific historical circumstances. Thomas Carothers concentrated on US democracy assistance, Crawford focused on the EC/EU, Sweden, the UK and the US, Barratt gave attention to Australia, Canada and the UK.

In a similar vein, until the 1990s most of the quantitative studies on the determinants of aid allocation ignored any potential influence of the human rights performance of recipient countries, testing only for the economic needs of the recipients and the strategic and economic interests of the donors. The pioneering study on the relationship between foreign aid and human rights is an article by Schoultz, who was the first to operationalise the level of violations of fundamental human rights by governments receiving foreign aid. Schoultz concentrated on US foreign aid in Latin America, and, after him, for more than a decade scholars who studied the impact of human respect as a determinant of aid allocation focused only on US foreign aid. It is only very recently that, along with a few works that concentrated

213 Stokke, Aid and Political Conditionality.
215 Crawford, Foreign Aid and Political Reform.
on aggregate bilateral aid flows, the scope of analysis has expanded to simultaneously compare different individual donors and control for the human rights performance by recipient countries. The section of the introductory chapter which offered preliminary evidence of the existence of variation among Western donor states is based on this strand of research.

This literature offers invaluable insights with respect to the relevance of political conditionality in foreign aid. In particular, it shows that donors, and EU Member States in particular, differ in their approach towards political conditionality. What is missing from the picture is a related but different question: why have donor states internalized political conditionality to different extents? While variation is established, no effort is made to explain it.

The objective of this dissertation is to follow the path signalled by the only exception and make a step further in the study of human rights and foreign aid and to say why, not only that, states have differently adopted political conditionality.


222 Even a comprehensive and well-research book like Crawford’s Foreign Aid and Political Reform only focuses on showing variation (“consistency”) and assessing results (“effectiveness”).

223 The only researcher who embarked in explaining variation in the application of political conditionality by EU Member States is: Cumming, Aid to Africa. Cumming’s book was published in 2001, and covers only the first 5 years after the end of the Cold War. The objective of this dissertation is to expand the timeframe of analysis and explore whether his findings are still valid today.
The purpose is to explain, rather than only document, the variation in political conditionality. This is an important purpose. As Lancaster puts it, “if we are to understand the controversies over foreign aid, if we are to assess fairly aid’s past impact and ensure its future effectiveness, if we are to comprehend this important innovation in relations between state, we need to understand … how and why aid’s purposes have differed from country to country, and why and how they have changed over time”.224

Addressing this question is important not only for scholars working on foreign aid and human rights but also for scholars working on human rights at large, who are challenged by Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink to pay more attention to “the causal mechanisms and processes by which … [human rights] ideas spread”.225 As a matter of fact, in the literature on human rights little attention has been dedicated to theoretically-informed empirical studies on the processes by which states come to adopt the promotion of human rights as a desirable goal of foreign policy. IR has occasionally dealt with human rights and foreign policy, mainly producing historical accounts of instances when human rights were, or were not, actually promoted.226 The result of these exercises has been the acknowledgment that past and present international relations provide extensive evidence of variation in the importance of the promotion of human rights in the foreign policy of specific states. On the one side, there is variation over time: in a given state, the importance of human rights promotion is different in different periods. For instance, Sikkink argues that “before 1973 human rights were rarely explicitly considered in the United States’ foreign policy calculus; after 1976, legislation and executive policy led to the explicit inclusion of human rights criteria in foreign policy decision making”.227 On the other side, there is variation among states: at a given time, the importance of human rights promotion is different in different states. For instance, Sikkink writes that “human

224 Lancaster, Foreign Aid, 2.
rights ideas entered foreign policy debates in the United States and Europe at the same time … Nevertheless, the European and American approaches to human rights policy differ considerably”.228 However, little has been written on why variation exists.

Past research on the influence of human rights NGOs on foreign policy is one limited exception.229 Another important exception is Forsythe’s Human Rights and Comparative Foreign Policy.230 The book is unique in utilizing a common framework of analysis for the examination of a wide range of states’ foreign policies, and Forsythe was adamant that

one of the more important questions in contemporary international relations is the extent to which various states make the creation and consolidation of liberal democracy one of their salient foreign policy goals. By liberal democracy we refer to a polity manifesting free and fair elections for national office, on the basis of almost universal suffrage, with the winners actually governing the country; accompanied by the rule of law and constitutionalism (government limited by law); with protection of those civil and political rights that reasonably protect against the tyranny of the majority.231

228 Ibid., 139.
230 David P. Forsythe, ed., Human Rights and Comparative Foreign Policy (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2000). Forsythe was aware of the originality of the book he was editing: “given the lack of studies of human rights and foreign policy in comparative perspective to date, we are confident that the current project will provide a useful foundation on which others can build”. David P. Forsythe, “Introduction,” in Human Rights and Comparative Foreign Policy, ed. David P. Forsythe (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2000), 16.
231 Forsythe, “Introduction,” 11. Forsythe goes even further and explicitly endorses the objective of this dissertation: “it is important to continue to make a comparative analysis of the extent to which states seek to protect human rights through foreign assistance”. Ibid. 14.
However, as Donnelly argues in its last chapter, the volume offers nothing more than “preliminary conclusions about the state of human rights in post-Cold War foreign policy”.232

The result is that, as Schmitz and Sikkink concluded in their 2002 review of the academic contribution on human rights and international relations, “the degree to which human rights issues have influenced foreign policy decisions” is one of the “pressing issues [which] still need more systematic scholarly attention”.233 Unfortunately, this gap still exists. Suffice it here to mention that the new (2012) edition of Schmitz and Sikkink’s review does not mention any comparative work on foreign policy and human rights, and its section on human rights foreign policy only addresses the following questions: “Do human rights considerations affect foreign policy decisions?” and “Can foreign policy instruments improve human rights conditions abroad?”.234 Nothing is said about when human rights considerations affect foreign policy decisions, and why they do so with different degrees in different countries.235 This dissertation aims at filling this gap by explaining the variation in the degree to which political conditionality has influenced foreign aid decisions in two EU Member States, France and the UK.236

2.4.2. International Relations research on Europeanisation and norm internalisation

The solution to this puzzle can also contribute to the academic literature on Europeanisation and norm internalisation. The complementarity between these two strands of research have been confirmed by Börzel and Risse. According to the two

235 Some researchers partially address this questions, but not from a comparative perspective. For instance, Mertus focuses on US foreign policy: Julie A. Mertus, Bait and Switch: Human Rights and US Foreign Policy (New York: Routledge, 2008).
236 Another element of originality of the dissertation is related to the fact that past works on human rights and foreign policy have mainly concentrated either on the US or on “middle powers”. See, for instance, David P. Forsythe, The United States and Human Rights: Looking Inward and Outward (Lincoln: Univ of Nebraska Press, 2000); Cranford Pratt, Middle Power Internationalism: The North-South Dimension (Montreal: McGill/Queen’s Press, 1990).
To start with, it is important to highlight that this thesis is not a Europeanisation study per se. Without opening the Pandora’s box of what Europeanisation is and what it is not, researchers interested in Europeanisation processes generally focus on “the impact of the EU on its Member States”. In this dissertation, the European endorsement of political conditionality is taken as a useful starting point in the process of selecting hard cases of variation in the degree of internalisation of the norm (as described above, it is more puzzling to discover divergence among EU Member States than among OECD donors). However, the thesis compares France and the UK one against the other. It does not systematically explore the mechanisms and processes through which European institutions and other EU Member States may have influenced the evolution of French and British development programmes.

Nevertheless, the thesis will contribute to the infant literature on the Europeanisation of Member States’ development programmes. This strand of research is still very limited: its foundations are sketched in only two book chapters. Moreover, its findings are not encouraging. Researchers have concentrated the few existing empirical studies on the accession of new Member States in Central and Eastern Europe, and the Europeanisation of their development programmes has unanimously been described as “shallow”. Anecdotes from other works confirm the

unwillingness of EU Member States to change their aid priorities. For example, even though Alonso reported that EU membership prompted the movement of Spain from being an aid recipient in 1979 to ranking the 11th largest donor in 2003, Escribano and Lorca emphasized a persistent focus on Latin American countries notwithstanding significant pressure to deliver more aid to poorer African countries.

The lack of interest in the Europeanisation of aid programmes and the poor record of past findings are surprising because numerous scholars have studied similar fields where EU coordination is based on soft law instruments, such as foreign policy, and discovered significant EU impacts. In their review of Europeanisation research on foreign policy, Hill and Wong commented that “all national foreign policies have been meaningfully Europeanized to some degree, or in some particular form”. How to explain this resistance to Europeanize development policies? EU aid even presents a larger budget than EU foreign policy, and recent works have pointed at the limited but discernible role played by the European Commission in coordinating Member States’ development practices.

although admittedly one still with work to do”: Vittek and Lightfoot, “The Europeanisation of Slovak Development Cooperation?,” 32.


Europeanisation scholars have suggested a few key mediating factors that explain variation in the degree of domestic change adjusting to EU pressure. From a rational choice perspective, Europeanisation is facilitated by the absence of multiple veto players and the existence of mediating formal institutions. On the basis of sociological insights, Europeanisation is assisted by normative resonance with domestic understandings, strong norm entrepreneurs and consensus-oriented decision-making cultures.

This thesis is the first ever comparative study which directly tests the significance of some of these factors, such as the presence of multiple veto points and the normative fit with organisational cultures, in obstructing internalisation of an aid norm like political conditionality. Moreover, the thesis is the first study ever to discuss the Europeanisation of political conditionality, thus expanding the reach of existing research beyond the most traditional aspects of aid quantity, geographical focus, tied aid, use of budget support and reduction of number of countries.

Importantly, the contribution of this dissertation to the Europeanisation literature is significant, but not comprehensive. Europeanisation researchers have focused on different types of “variables” influenced by the EU (policies, polities and politics), different types of mechanisms producing domestic impacts (positive integration, liberalization and facilitated coordination), and different types of interactions both with European institutions and between EU Member States (downloading, cross-
loading and uploading). Given its comparative focus on a specific norm in an area of shared competence, this dissertation mainly contributes to past literature dealing with EU impact on (1) policies, thanks to (2) facilitated coordination, through (3) cross-loading and down-loading. In terms of the dynamics leading to change at the domestic level, the dissertation covers both constructivist processes (such as persuasion and imitation) and rational choice expectations (such as ex post rationalization of strategic interests).

Similar processes can also be found in the IR literature on norm internalisation. IR scholars define a norm as “a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity”. This dissertation treats political conditionality as a norm, and thus takes it as a “standard of appropriate behaviour for donor states” with the following form: a donor state should make the allocation of foreign aid dependent on the human rights performance of recipient countries.

The idea that norms matter in foreign policy and foreign aid is nothing new. Indeed, it is at least twenty years that constructivist scholars have demonstrated that both domestic and international norms influence state behaviour. Nonetheless, many have warned that explaining state behaviour by the use of norms as independent variables is a problematic enterprise. On the one side, the existence of a norm does not necessarily entail the adoption of the behaviour covered by the norm. In fact, “norms are counterfactually valid. No single counterfactual occurrence refutes a norm. Not even many such occurrences necessarily do”. On the other side, foreign policy decisions are often taken against the background of numerous overlapping


252 Robert Ladrech, Europeanization and National Politics (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 34–35.
254 For a similar perspective, see Smith, “The Use of Political Conditionality in the EU’s Relations with Third Countries”. For aid in general as an international norm, see Lancaster, Foreign Aid.
norms. If this is the case, “one can almost always identify, post hoc, a norm to explain a given behaviour”. Both these considerations reveal that, at present, the most relevant issue in the constructivist approach is no more whether norms exist and whether norms sometimes matter, but when specific norms matter.

In IR it is now considered to be normal that states differ in the internalisation of international norms: as Gurowitz puts it, “international norms and standards do not diffuse automatically or consistently across states”. Political conditionality is no exception in this respect: some EU Member States have internalized political conditionality to a larger extent than others (for instance, they apply conditionality when a lower threshold of human rights violations is reached, or notwithstanding a higher level of bilateral relationship). In the IR literature on norms there are now numerous terms to refer to this variable, including strength, degree of acceptance, and internalisation.

The literature on internalisation (and its related terms) has primarily focused on explaining state behaviour, with domestic salience of a norm being used as an independent variable. For instance, Klotz documented changing attitudes toward South African racial separateness in the United States, Britain, and Zimbabwe and explained the differences in the behaviour of these states on the basis of the ultimate domestic salience of the norm against apartheid. However, domestic salience has rarely been studied as a dependent variable. For instance, Gurowitz laments that the majority of scholars interested in the influence of transnational norms did “not examine … how … diffusion varies across time and place”.

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262 Klotz, Norms in International Relations.
The constructivist literature on norm diffusion has suggested a factor that can influence the domestic salience (or non-salience) of new international norms: complementarity with the pre-existing normative framework. Checkel refers to “cultural match” to describe “a situation where the prescriptions embodied in an international norm are convergent with domestic norms, as reflected in discourse, the legal system – constitutions, judicial codes, laws – and bureaucratic agencies – organisational ethos and administrative agencies”. He argues that norm diffusion is “more rapid when … a systemic norm … resonates with historically constructed domestic norms”. In contrast, when the international norms do not mirror domestic values, the literature provides a theory of rejection.

This insight is interesting. However, as argued by Cortell and Davies, “the conditions under which [norms] come to infuse domestic understandings [need to be] more systematically specified”. The step identified by the authors to overcome these shortcomings “is empirical research focusing on how specific … norms have and have not become salient in several national contexts”. This dissertation aims to make this step, and focuses on the extent to which political conditionality has been internalized by two EU Member States.

2.5. Conclusion

This chapter clarified the object of analysis of the dissertation, and showed its academic relevance and originality. The first two sections offered a working definition of the basic concepts of foreign aid and political conditionality. The central points are that:

- foreign aid is bilateral ODA as defined by the OECD DAC;

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• the dissertation predominantly focuses on negative conditionality (punishing bad behaviour), even though it is recognised that political conditionality includes positive action (rewarding positive behaviour);
• political conditionality addresses both human rights abuses and violations of basic democratic principles.

The third section argued that there are numerous reasons to expect convergence rather than variation in the internalisation of political conditionality by OECD donors since the end of the Cold War, including the recognition of the effectiveness and appropriateness of human rights promotion in foreign policy, the causal belief that respect for human rights is a precondition for lasting development and effective poverty reduction, the end of the Cold War and related power readjustments in the international arena, the financial problems of donors’ economies and the automatic coordination that should derive from reiterated application of any type of conditionality. As these reasons are particularly strong for European donors, it is no surprise that numerous researchers showed that the European Union quickly became one of the firmest supporters (in comparison with other donors) of political conditionality. This justified the decision to concentrate this thesis on EU Member States.

The fourth section introduced the academic literatures on aid sanctions, Europeanisation and norm internalisation, and showed that the dissertation addresses an existing gap at the crossroads of these strands of research. Past works on aid sanctions have showed but not explained variation among Western donors, Europeanisation scholars have produced limited research on EU Member States’ development policies, and constructivist researchers have called for new studies on the factors that facilitate or hinder domestic internalisation of international norms.

This chapter has left a few methodological issues unresolved:
• Select the case studies. Why France and the UK?
• Create a standard of measurement. What does it mean that two countries differ in the internalisation of political conditionality? How can the internalisation of political conditionality be compared?
- Produce alternative hypotheses. Why do France and the UK show different approaches to political conditionality? What can explain this variation?

The next chapter answers the first two questions. The last one will be dealt with in Chapter 6.
CHAPTER 3
SOME METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES:
CASE SELECTION AND ASSESSMENT STRATEGY

This dissertation aims to explain variation in the degree of internalisation of the norm of political conditionality across two EU member states, France and the UK. The first section of this chapter defends the selection of France and the UK as case studies. Notwithstanding numerous similarities, the two donors offer a different approach towards political conditionality. This makes them a perfect fit for a comparison under a most similar systems design.

As the internalisation of the norm of political conditionality is the dependent variable of this dissertation, a fundamental methodological question is: how to measure the degree of norm internalisation? The second part of the chapter defends the adoption of a three-fold measurement framework. First, the thesis looks at states’ policy agendas. Inclusion of the norm in ministerial statements and strategy papers is probably the most superficial form of internalisation, as it can easily represent a rhetorical move and not be a signal of credible commitment. However, it is a necessary (though not a sufficient) condition for a norm to be internalized. The reliability of the results of the analysis of policy agendas is confirmed by assessing the importance of political conditionality in states’ legal documents and behaviour. Legal documents encompass the laws regulating foreign aid and the bilateral development agreements concluded with third countries. Is human rights among the legal purposes of foreign aid? Are human rights clauses included in bilateral development agreements? The evaluation of states’ behaviour includes the collection and consolidation of 15 years of quantitative analysis of the application of political conditionality across the whole spectrum of recipient countries, as well as a closer examination of four cases of application of the norm by the EU.

3.1. The selection of case studies: France and the UK

This dissertation aims to explain why today, notwithstanding the impressive diffusion of the norm of political conditionality after the end of the Cold War, EU member states show different attitudes towards the idea of sanctioning repressive
regimes using aid suspensions and cuts. As Price observes, “a complete account of international norm change and resistance would require inter alia the empirical investigation of the domestic politics and culture of all states, as per the comparativist-inspired critique”. This is a demanding requirement. Only collaborative exercises can combine the depth of qualitative analysis with the breadth of cross-country comparison.

The high number of European countries and the two-fold objective of estimation and explanation preclude from taking into consideration the development programmes of all EU member states and all instance of political conditionality. As Tomasevski effectively puts it, “the actual purpose of aid and its impact cannot be assessed for all aid by all donors”. A selection of case studies is thus necessary.

The Most Similar Systems Design (or Mill’s Method of Difference) suggests comparing donors that differ in the dependent variable (that is, the level of internalisation of political conditionality) and are as similar as possible on other factors. The assumption behind this strategy is that this would make it easier to find those elements that can explain the high/low level of internalisation of the norm that aid should be conditioned on respect for human rights by recipient governments.

For instance, Michalski justified the decision to compare the Europeanisation of Denmark’s and Sweden’s foreign policies towards China “because of the similarities in their general foreign policy orientation. … At the same time, Denmark and Sweden display important differences in terms of security policy and general attitude


to the EU".\textsuperscript{272} In addition to this methodological requirement, it would be interesting to focus on countries that play a meaningful role in the donor community. The size and importance of the aid programme is therefore taken into consideration too.

At the beginning of the 1990s – when the norm of political conditionality stated diffusing and the EC quickly became one of its strongest supporters – the Community was composed of 12 Member States: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the UK. As can be seen in Table 1, in the last twenty years the five major European donors have been, in order, France, Germany, the UK, the Netherlands and Italy.

\textbf{Table 1. Total Official Development Assistance between 1989 and 2010}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total (USD millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>$128,725.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>$121,769.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>$86,304.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>$55,791.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>$48,573.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>$29,341.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>$29,027.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>$19,200.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>$5,535.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>$5,171.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>$2,924.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>$2,089.78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\textit{Note:} The table is calculated at current prices (USD millions). Greece has no available data between 1989 and 1995.

These five donors can be divided on the basis of their approach to political conditionality. France seems to be the staunchest opponent of political conditionality (among the minor donors, Portugal mirrors its strong stance against political conditionality). Paris was against including any reference to human rights in the

Lomé Convention.273 Uvin concluded his brief analysis of political conditionality and major donors by stating that “the French policy towards political conditionality is much more modest … Generally speaking, its position continues to be one of silent support for the prevailing regimes in its former colonies, whatever their democratic or human rights record”.274 Alesina and Dollar found that France is the major donor that pays less attention to the democracy of the receiving country.275 In the recent consultation held by the European Commission on the future of budget support, the French government affirmed that “budget support cannot be conceived as an instrument to promote values and policy objectives, except if you want to divert the purpose”, that is, “to support the national strategies to fight against poverty, elaborated by partner countries”.276 The French intervention continued that “it does not comply with our commitments with respect to aid effectiveness to reserve aid a special treatment … Budget support cannot be a political tool except if you want to jeopardise its primary purpose”.277

On the opposite side, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK seems to be supportive of political conditionality. London was in favour of including some reference to human rights in the Lomé Convention.278 Alesina and Dollar found that, in comparison with other countries, it has one of the strongest positive responses to democratic institutions.279 Cumming concluded his lengthy comparison of French and British aid from the end of the Cold War to 1997 by highlighting that there was “a radical shift with the introduction of political conditionality”. While the shift has gradually been watered down in both countries, this happened more in France, and “to a lesser extent” in the UK.280

277 Ibid.
279 Alesina and Dollar, “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?”
The UK is preferred over the other donors because of its similarity with France. The two countries are middle-ranking powers with roughly similar military and economic might.\footnote{As an anonymous Socialist official put it in the 1980s: “France can never be Sweden. It cannot escape the fact that it is a global power, with worldwide strategic and economic interests, closely interwoven with those of the United States and of Great Britain” (quoted in Louis Wiznitzer, “France’s Africa Policies Begin to Look a Lot like Washington’s,” \textit{Christian Science Monitor}, February 28, 1983, http://www.csmonitor.com/1983/0228/022855.html).} Both France and the UK are former colonial empires and permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. They each have nuclear capabilities and high-level representation on the Executive Boards of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The two countries have also equal voting powers in the European Union and similar influence over the Paris Club, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Development Fund and the European Investment Bank. EU development cooperation can actually be considered to be equally driven by the two countries. The first cooperation agreement with development countries, the Yaoundé Convention, was evidently tailored on the interests of France and its former colonies. The new version of the Yaoundé Convention, the Lomé Convention, was expressly introduced in order to include the former UK colonies within the European preferential system.

In addition, at least since the end of the 1990s, the UK dedicated a dramatic increase of resources to parts of sub-Saharan Africa. Africa’s share of country aid rose from 40 per cent to 55 per cent (compared to some 33 per cent in 1990).\footnote{Oliver Morrissey, “British Aid Policy in the ‘Short-Blair’ Years,” in \textit{Perspectives on European Development Co-Operation: Policy and Performance of Individual Donor Countries and the EU}, ed. Paul Hoebink and Olav Stokke (New York: Routledge, 2005), 168.} As sub-Saharan Africa has always constituted the privileged territory of French development cooperation, comparison of the two countries should be easier in the last ten years. Not only. Variation between the two countries can be considered even more puzzling than that among other EU Member States because in 1998 the Heads of State and Government of the two countries met in Saint-Malo and agreed on a declaration putting an end to Anglo-French rivalry in Africa.\footnote{Tony Chafer and Gordon Cumming, “Beyond Fashoda: Anglo-French Security Cooperation in Africa since Saint-Malo,” \textit{International Affairs} 86, no. 5 (2010): 1129–47.} This initiative “established the basis for ... harmonizing policies and the overall approach” towards the continent,\footnote{Emyr Jones-Parry, “First Preface: A UK Perspective,” in \textit{From Rivalry to Partnership: New Approaches to the Challenges of Africa}, ed. Tony Chafer and Gordon Cumming (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), x.} and led to initiatives like cooperation between Heads of Mission in individual
countries, secondments between ministries and informal dialogue within European fora (including the Africa Working Group and the then General Affairs and External Relations Council, that is, where political conditionality is discussed).\textsuperscript{285} As Africa represents, by far, the most recurrent target of European aid sanctions, Saint-Malo should have led to enhanced understanding between the two sides of the Channel.

Lastly, both countries consider themselves the source of inspiration of human rights promotion (while the liberal tradition of human rights can be traced back to the Magna Carta and the Glorious Revolution, the egalitarian one is usually derived from the French Revolution and the Napoleonic period) and offer the opportunity to access relevant information in the form of official policy statements, aid statistics and interviews with responsible officials.

3.2. Assessing norm internalisation: a three-fold measurement

Marie Gibert argues that the decision to apply aid sanctions against a recipient government is a “mixture” of different factors, including “the general attitude of the donor to human rights conditionality (we know, for example, that the Nordic European countries are generally more in favour of a harsh stance on democratic and human rights conditionality) and the importance of the links between the two countries (for instance, former colonial power will be more eager to maintain links and defend former colonies)”.\textsuperscript{286} This thesis focuses on the first of these two factors. Following Koh, we name this general attitude “internalisation”, and define it as the situation “when political élites accept an international norm, and adopt it as a matter of government policy”\textsuperscript{287}

Koh’s definition is a good starting point. However, it offers little help for those who are interested in detecting variation in internalisation. How to assess élite acceptance of an international norm? As far as political conditionality is concerned, it is no


\textsuperscript{286} Interview with Marie Gibert, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Nottingham Trent University, 11 June 2013.

mystery that almost no donor applies aid sanctions against strategically important recipients. But what about second-order recipients? Some donors might be more willing than others to apply sanctions in this case. This would be the manifestation of a higher level of internalisation of the norm of political conditionality: for some donors sanctions are more appropriate than for others.

As Brysk notes, assessing the internalisation of any type of norm regarding human rights promotion is a difficult exercise: “how would we qualify a country as a ‘global Good Samaritan’? Some countries claim more than they produce, or label self-seeking behaviour as humanitarian, in order to gain international reputation. Conversely, principled promoters often under-assess their own efforts, discounting modest gains relative to unfulfilled aspirations”.\(^{288}\) This is generally true for any norm. As highlighted by Johnston, “the validity and reliability of measures for accessing the preferences of actors are problematic since the only way to observe is to look at some phenomenon external to their cognition (e.g., a speech act, a gesture, a decision that might itself be strategic)”\(^{289}\)

Existing IR literature is not particularly helpful in overcoming these challenges. In fact, in the discipline, norms and interests have been assumed, rather than empirically evaluated, for a long time, alleging measurement difficulties as the main reasons for this.\(^{290}\) The literature on norm salience is of little guidance too. As Cortell and Davis argued, “scholars repeatedly conclude that domestic salience is crucial to many cases of states compliance with international norms, but they rarely provide definitions or operational measures for the concept and, instead, merely assert that the norm in question was salient”.\(^{291}\)


If we accept the definition of a norm as a “standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity”, norm salience (when applied to states) arguably has three fundamental indicators. First, the policy agenda. Since a norm is a standard of appropriate behaviour, and appropriateness is communicatively shared, a salient norm is referred to by the state to justify its behaviour. Second, legal documents. Since a norm is a standard of appropriate behaviour, and states standardise their behaviour through legal texts, a salient norm is included in laws and international agreements. Third, state behaviour. Since a norm is a standard of appropriate behaviour, a salient norm is acted upon by the state.

Constructivist scholars are not the only researchers who adopted a similar three-pronged measurement framework to assess the salience of other domestic norms. Academics investigating the internalisation of EU norms by European states (a particular form of Europeanisation) have equally highlighted the importance of looking at the three levels of discourses, institutions and practices in order to recognise all possible reactions to Europeanisation such as absorption, accommodation of existing policies, or even their rejection. Ondřej Horký is adamant in stating that it is vital to recognize how deeply (or superficially) the norms are adopted. It matters indeed if a country only pledges to follow EU norms in its outward-oriented discourse, if it takes over the rules and integrates them in the domestic norms, or if it implements them in practice. In consequence, three levels of implementation can be differentiated:

- Discursive level: the actors refer to EU norms in their discourses;
- Institutional level: EU norms are institutionalised domestically by the member state;
- Behavioural level: the actors act in compliance with EU norms.


3.3. Policy agenda

Cortell and Davis argue that, although public discourse is often used as a measure of a norm’s domestic strength, “a focus on the state’s policy agenda provides a better measure”. There are two reasons why. First, a focus on public discourse raises “a number of difficult methodological questions, including what types of statements matter, how many statements are sufficient, and which domestic actors’ statements matter”. The state’s policy agenda is more easily operationalized in terms of government officials’ statements. Second, “it is the political elite who make the concrete decisions on how to interpret a norm in a given context, a focus on policy agenda provides a better indication of the norm’s ‘meaning’ in a particular political context than would the analysis of the broader societal discourse or policy choice more generally”.296

The salience of political conditionality in the policy agenda of EU member states can be measured by examining public statements at ministerial level as well as policy documents from development agencies, such as white papers, strategic plans, programmatic guidelines, etc. For instance, at the end of 1991 Germany introduced new aid policy guidelines in which it listed five criteria for granting development aid: respect for human rights, popular participation in the development process, guaranteeing certainty in law, a ‘market-friendly’ approach to economic development, and the recipient government’s own commitment to poverty alleviation, protecting the environment, and curbing population growth. Reduced military expenditure is also taken into account in assessing government commitment to poverty alleviation since additional resources may be released for this purpose as a

296 Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, “When Norms Clash: International Norms, Domestic Practices, and Japan’s Internalisation of the GATT/WTO,” *Review of International Studies* 31, no. 1 (2005): 9; for a different perspective, which takes into account the societal discourse, see Mary E. Pettenger, *The Social Construction of Climate Change: Power, Knowledge, Norms, Discourses* (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2007), 26. Koh distinguishes among “social, political, and legal internalization. Social internalization occurs when a norm acquires so much public legitimacy that there is widespread general obedience to it. Political internalization occurs when political elites accept an international norm, and adopt it as a matter of government policy. Legal internalization occurs when an international norm is incorporated into the domestic legal system through executive action, judicial interpretation, legislative action, or some combination of the three”: Koh, “Review: Why Do Nations Obey International Law?,” 2656. Using Koh’s terminology, this section covers political internalisation, while next section covers legal internalisation.
result. These criteria have been adopted with the explicit aim of facilitating the implementation of a poverty-oriented development strategy and now guide decisions on country aid allocations.297

In 2002 Danish Finance Minister Thor Pedersen announced cuts in a draft aid budget submitted to the Parliament which stated that Denmark wanted to be more efficient in the way it assisted the developing world and did not want to prop up dictators: “The government will pursue an assistance policy with a higher degree of consistency. Systematic, constant violations of human rights and democratic rules will no longer be accepted. Therefore, development cooperation with Zimbabwe, Malawi ... and their status as programme countries will cease”. In a review published on the foreign ministry’s website, the Danish government added that it “wishes to break with the habitual thinking of years which dictates that if only assistance increases everything will be good”.298

Arguably, there are three levels of discursive salience. Salience is high when “the norm’s objectives, prescriptions and proscriptions [are] largely uncontested and routinely invoked to justify policy choices”.299 In the case of political conditionality, ministerial speeches and policy documents would habitually refer to respect for human rights as a pre-condition for aid allocation and disbursement. Salience is moderate when “elites continue to debate the merits of the norm and raise reservations and arguments limiting its applicability across a range of issue areas”.300 This can be the case when the promotion of human rights is a prominent goal of foreign policy but doubts are raised about the effectiveness or appropriateness of political conditionality as a tool to achieve this objective. Political conditionality can be considered counterproductive: cutting off development aid to poor countries might only worsen the situation, inevitably punishing the population “for the sins of their rulers”.301 A donor state may also deem it more effective to strengthen its economic and political links with repressive regimes, thus engendering a process of

300 Ibid.
301 Tomasevski, Development Aid and Human Rights, xii.
internal change.\textsuperscript{302} The dilemma is between strategies of “asphyxiation” (blocking economic flows inhibits or halts bad behaviour) or strategies of “oxygen” (economic activity leads to positive political consequences).\textsuperscript{303} Many also make the point that, should one state suspend its aid, “its place would quickly be taken by another and it would have achieved nothing but damage to itself”.\textsuperscript{304} Finally, the salience of political conditionality is low when non-compliance is explicitly justified on the basis of the inappropriateness of human rights promotion. Moral relativists consider political conditionality an act of imperialism: donors claim to enlighten recipient countries but actually foster their own interests.\textsuperscript{305} Nationalists argue that national social contracts come before any obligation to some supposed universal community of right-bearing individuals: citizens’ interests should trump moral concerns towards foreigner peoples.\textsuperscript{306}

Official statements, in both bilateral and multilateral settings, will be analyzed to assess which of these arguments is most recurrent in French and British aid circles. A similar exercised was conducted by Koh with respect to the general promotion of human rights in the U.S. in the 1990s. He concluded that “the broader goal of the Clinton-Albright doctrine was to assert that promotion of democracy and human rights is always in our national interest. The goal of American foreign policy is thus to fuse power and principle, by promoting the globalization of freedom as the antidote to other global problems”.\textsuperscript{307} In fact, the Clinton administration refused to base its actions in Kosovo solely on humanitarian grounds: “Ending this tragedy is a moral imperative. It is also important to America's national interest”\textsuperscript{308}.

\textsuperscript{308} William J. Clinton, “Address to the Nation on Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro),” March 24, 1999, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57305#axzz11Y5zXi7P.
3.4. Legal documents

The legal salience of political conditionality will be measured by looking at both the laws and the international agreements governing the aid regime.

First of all, development agencies are not completely free in the selection of recipient countries or of aid delivery methods. Rather, they must abide by the laws that authorise and regulate development cooperation projects. The importance of the legal basis of development assistance should not be underestimated. In November 1994, after an application for judicial review brought by the World Development Movement (R v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs), the British High Court held that the then-Foreign Secretary had acted *ultra vires* (outside of his power and therefore illegally) by allocating £234 million towards the funding of the Pergau Dam, on the grounds that it was not of economic or humanitarian benefit to the Malaysian people. The inclusion of respect for human rights among the objectives of development assistance would have meant availability of judicial review in case of aid to dictators or repressive regimes.

As a consequence, a measurement of the institutional salience of political conditionality would first search for permissive (and/or even mandatory) statutory provisions linking foreign aid to respect for human rights. One of the most cited examples of law linking foreign aid to human rights is section 116 of the US Foreign Assistance Act. The first paragraph of the section reads:

> No assistance may be provided under this part to the government of any country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, including torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges, causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction and clandestine detention of those persons, or other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, and the security of person.

To offer another example, Section 7008 of the US Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act reads:

None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available pursuant to titles III through VI of this Act shall be obligated or expended to finance directly any assistance to the government of any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup d’état or decree or, after the date of enactment of this Act, a coup d’état or decree in which the military plays a decisive role.

Soft-law regulations and guidelines are also important in this respect. The Japanese government, for instance, expressed its commitment to impose political conditionality by introducing new aid guidelines. In 1992, the government issued the “ODA Charter”. The fourth principle of the “ODA Charter” instructs that “Full attention should be paid to efforts for promoting democratization and introduction of a market-oriented economy, and the situation regarding the securing of basic human rights and freedoms in the recipient countries”.

Second, development agreements with recipient countries offer the opportunity to define reciprocal obligations and thus establish the pre-requisites for the implementation of development projects. Do donors clarify that respect for human rights is a fundamental condition to avoid suspension or cancellation of aid programmes? The importance of clarifying reciprocal obligations in international agreements cannot be underestimated. In 1977, Uganda was a party to the Lomé Convention, the agreement between the EC and 71 ACP countries which entitled the latter to trade and aid benefits. Under the leadership of President Idi Amin Dada, Ugandan armed forces violently repressed popular protests against the regime. The

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310 Fumitaka Furuoka, “Human Rights Conditionality and Aid Allocation: Case Study of Japanese Foreign Aid Policy,” Perspectives on Global Development and Technology 4, no. 2 (2005): 126. Other aspects may be important too. For instance, the relevance of aid agencies’ managerial frameworks should not be underestimated. A recurrent challenge to the adoption of human rights conditionality is that contrasting policy frameworks dominate internal incentive structures. According to Piron, “managerial and financial accountability channels are amongst the most powerful in terms of governing day-to-day decisions. Introducing human rights within policy frameworks, resource allocation criteria, guidelines, procedures and monitoring and evaluation systems is thus key in serving as an entry point for human rights accountability”: Piron, Laure-Hélène, The Role of Human Rights in Promoting Donor Accountability (London: Overseas Development Council, 2006), 58.
EC found itself in an uncomfortable position: EC funds were evidently benefiting a government involved in atrocious human rights violations; yet, bound by the international law principle of *pacta sunt servanda*, the Community had no way of suspending the granted privileges. More recently, Trevor Wilson, former Australian Ambassador to Myanmar, argued that “in reality, it might be quite difficult legally for a donor agency to stop an assistance programme because of some such “political” problem when this problem had not been previously specified (in writing) to the program’s implementing organisation”.311

As an example, the standard format for programme support agreements signed by the Government of Denmark clearly affirms that “respect for human rights, democratic principles, including free and fair elections, the rule of law, independence of the judiciary, free, transparent and democratic processes ... constitute essential elements” of the instrument, and that in case of “violation of the essential elements ... the Government of Denmark reserves the right to suspend with immediate effect further disbursements to the implementing partners”.312

3.5. State behaviour

The history of political conditionality is full of examples of divergence between words and deeds. For instance, Arase strongly criticized the Japanese government because of the absence of changes in Japanese foreign aid allocation after the adoption of the “ODA Charter” in 1992.313 Rix concurred that Japan still gave priority to some of its strategic aid recipients, such as Indonesia and Myanmar. Human rights had not become a central element of the Japanese government’s decision-making process on aid allocation.314 Okuizumi summarises the point in the following terms: “despite its policy of linking its economic aid to the human rights practices of aid receiving countries, as articulated in the ODA Charter, the Japanese government in practice has not, thus far, fully implemented the Charter vis-à-vis all

311 Interview 110.
312 Government of Denmark, *Guidelines for Agreements on Development Cooperation* (Copenhagen, June 2010).
countries which receive Japanese aid”. Nuscheler and Warkentin agree that “in respect to basic human rights, the application of the charter was inconsequential”.  

A fundamental indicator to comprehensively assess the adoption of the norm of political conditionality by donor states is thus state behaviour. As Barratt succinctly puts it, “the preferences of policy-makers are revealed by the choices governments make about resource allocation”. Carey reiterates the point by emphasising that “major European donors emphasize the importance of human rights for the allocation of their development aid in various reports, official statements, and policy documents. But declaring human rights as a guiding principle for aid allocation is not sufficient for the promotion of such rights. Development aid as a tool to promote human rights works only if political conditionality is applied rigorously and consistently across countries and regions”. These arguments proceed from the assumption that governmental budgetary commitments represent the translation of “financial resources into human purposes” in any aspect of public policy, including aid policy. The scrutiny of spending behaviour thus provides a basis to evaluate the translation of espoused policy objectives into practice”.  

3.5.1. The problems of quantitative analyses  

Many scholars have used econometric techniques to investigate whether the human rights performance of potential recipient governments affects the decision by OECD donors on (a) who their recipient governments should be and (b) how much aid these governments should receive. While the findings of this strand of research offer a useful starting point to assess the application of political conditionality, Lancaster has a point when she asserts that

317 Barratt, Human Rights and Foreign Aid, 208.  
320 See, for instance, Alesina and Dollar, “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?”; Carey, “European Aid”. The first chapter of the dissertation offers a more comprehensive overview.
Quantitative exercises that produce correlations between the value of aid flows to particular countries […] and particular characteristics of these countries] can be quite misleading considered by themselves and in the absence of context … Thus the prolonged disputes on measurement and methodology in econometric studies of aid-giving, as the primary approach to understanding aid’s purposes, can often prove sterile.321

Lancaster does not elaborate on this point, but four weaknesses of statistical studies can be highlighted here.322

**Weakness 1: Annual figures**

Quantitative studies are based on figures that are reported to the OECD on an annual basis. This inevitably leads to overlook relevant information. For instance, what if a recipient government harshly represses the opposition in February, development grants are reduced or cancelled in April, the situation improves in September, and disbursements are restored in December? OECD figures could not be but silent with respect to this aid sanction.

**Weakness 2: Suspensions versus cuts**

Political conditionality usually entails the mere suspension of aid. This means that development assistance is neither cut or cancelled, but only “frozen” (as the journalistic jargon goes). The predominance of aid suspensions, together with the lack of proficient reporting by bilateral aid agencies, means that numerous cases of aid sanctions cannot be detected through the OECD dataset. Nielsen confirms that “[a]id donors can both suspend ongoing disbursements and cut off future funding, but virtually all prior scholarship has focused solely on cuts to future funding because they are easier to observe … This is because the OECD has collected detailed

322 The arguments offered here are about statistical analysis of aid sanctions, not statistical analysis of “selectivity”. Donors can respond to human rights abuses by recipient governments in two ways. In the short term, they usually suspend aid and condition its resumption on improvement on the situation. In the long term, they can cut the amount of aid given to a country. Most of the problems of quantitative studies are related to their inability to detect short-term suspensions. For a complementary argument, see Bolle, “La Conditionnalité Démocratique Dans La Politique Africaine de La France,” 8.
information on aid commitments since the 1970s but has not, until recently, asked donors to provide adequate information on how much aid is actually disbursed.” 323

This issue is particularly problematic because all aid agencies share a strong incentive to spend the funds allocated to a country, and thus suspensions are highly preferred in comparison with cuts or withdrawals. A confidential report on DfID sanctions in Africa offers numerous examples of this ‘pressure to spend’, including the efforts made by some country offices to disburse delayed funds within the original disbursement quarter or financial year as in June 2004 in Rwanda or leaving the possibility of general budget support to be disbursed in Uganda’s financial year in 2004. The result is that some delays or political negotiations are made administratively ‘invisible’, though partners’ budget cycles and trust might nonetheless have been affected.

**Weakness 3: Different aid modalities**

Previous studies have concentrated on total bilateral aid flows, implicitly assuming that all types of aid should be similarly object to suspensions and cuts. However, this does not take into adequate consideration the interrelationship (and mutual interference) with two others ways in which aid can be used to advance respect for human rights: (1) earmarking and (2) support to civil society.

In public finance, earmarking is defined as the practice of designating or dedicating specific revenues to the financing of specific public services. Human rights earmarking works as follows. Foreign aid is still given directly to recipient government. However, and in contrast with budget support, it is collected in separate budgets, to be spent in specific sectors or programmes. As such, through earmarking, donors bypass the normal procedure where tax revenue and foreign aid are pooled into a common, general fund before money is allocated across separate spending programmes. Donors tie foreign aid directly to its expected expenditure programme. Earmarked funds are alternatively referred to as “special funds,” “segregated accounts,” “segregated budgets,” or “dedicated revenues.” Through earmarking,

donors attempt to “segregate” human rights resources in separate pots: aid for HIV/AIDS is supposed to be kept separate from that for environment, and environment funds from that for girl’s education, for example. The ultimate purpose in doing so is to influence a government’s spending choices in favour of those programs and services deemed important by donors.

Direct support to human rights civil society organisations (CSOs) is another way in which aid can be used to advance respect for human rights. Direct support to CSOs voluntarily ignores the institutions (and budgets) of recipient governments and directly sustains human rights organisations and human rights projects within recipient countries. Aid can be channelled through private organisations whose purpose is the promotion of human rights (for instance, non-governmental organisations which work to eradicate child labour or female genital mutilation). Aid can also be given to commercial private actors whose programmes have positive human rights side-effects (for instance, the construction of schools). The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) alone spends more than $700 million annually on programmes dedicated to support civil and political rights abroad, including election support, the strengthening of parliaments, judiciaries and political parties, and fostering the growth and power of civil society organizations such as labour unions and women’s and human rights groups. The OECD DAC calls it “human rights projects”, Uvin names it “positive support”, others dub it micro-conditionality, or democracy assistance. I call it direct support to human rights CSOs.

The existence of different aid modalities creates significant validity problems for quantitative studies whose dependent variable is total aid flows. Earmarking and civil society support affect the modalities of disbursement (aid is earmarked for specific purposes or channelled through specific private organisations) but may not influence either the amount of aid or the selection of recipient countries. Actually, countries whose governments are bad human rights performers may even be allocated more aid

326 Peter Uvin, Human Rights and Development (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2004), 173.
(earmarked or channelled through human rights organisations) because support for human rights is needed more. Indeed, the large majority of donors try not to suspend or cut those aid programmes and projects that directly benefit the population. Rather, they modify only those money flows which end up directly into the hands of the recipient government. Thus, in addition, to humanitarian aid, aid programmes targeted at social sectors and channelled through NGOs are often left in place as well. This might include health and education programmes, food security, programmes in support of civil society, human rights and democracy, and rural development projects.

This aspect cannot but affect statistical results because donors are increasingly using different modalities of aid delivery. According to OECD figures, in 2008 donors delegated over 30% of their aid for implementation through non-state development actors, including NGOs, multilateral agencies and public-private partnerships. In addition, the selection of aid modalities is endogenous to the quality of recipient governments’ institutions. Bermeo showed that the type of aid donors distribute varies depending on whether or not the recipient country is relatively well-governed. Well-governed countries are more likely to receive development aid (e.g., for economic infrastructure), whereas poorly governed countries are more likely to get only emergency relief aid. Dietrich concluded that, all else equal, in poorly governed recipient countries donors bypass recipient governments and deliver more aid through non-state actors. In recipient countries with higher governance quality,

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327 Again, DfID exemplifies this situation: “If a partner government is not committed to the three partnership commitments, we do not use conditions to try to impose these commitments. Instead, we may choose to support poverty reduction by working with partners other than government and in ways that seek to build the government’s commitment”. DfID, How to Note: Implementing the UK’s Conditionality Policy (London, 2009), 4. The EU often takes this approach too. See Clara Portela, “Aid Suspensions as Coercive Tools? The European Union’s Experience in the African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) Context,” Review of European and Russian Affairs 3, no. 2 (2007): 41.

328 See, for instance, the position taken by DfID in its strategy paper on conditionality: “This policy does not deal with aid provided to non-government agencies such as NGOs or the private sector nor to humanitarian assistance”. DfID, How to Note: Implementing the UK’s Conditionality Policy. Similarly, when the U.S. prohibited economic aid to severe human rights violators, in every case it still provided assistance that would have “directly benefit[ed] the needy people in such a country” (quoted in Gordon Crawford, Promoting Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance Through Development Aid: A Comparative Study of the Policies of Four Northern Donors. [Leeds: Centre for Democratization Studies, University of Leeds, 1996]).

donors engage the government and give more aid through the government-to-government channel.330

By ignoring the distinction between different aid modalities, past quantitative studies inevitably offer a distorted picture of political conditionality. What if, after human rights abuses, a donor decides to change aid modality and deliver a large part of its aid through human rights NGOs? According to OECD data, the donor would not be applying conditionality. Yet, such country would in fact be doing so. A related point is that donors that channel most of their aid through NGOs have been penalised by past analyses. Direct assistance to local NGOs is a specific feature of Scandinavian donors, as well as of the US.331 In contrast, France does not offer democracy assistance, but focuses instead on more apolitical governance aid to strengthen state institutions.332

As highlighted by Barratt, when donors decide to “switch from less to more restrictive forms of aid, for instance, when human rights situations turn sour or governments fail to make adequate progress in meeting the needs of their citizens … this is something that is rather tricky to capture in aggregate analyses of the kind conducted here”.333 For instance, after Malawian judges dealing with corruption cases were fired in November 2001, the UK partly converted general budget support into humanitarian assistance to deal with the food crisis in 2002.334 This means that, in official data, aid is still classified as directed to Malawi. Yet, it is channelled through civil society organizations and never seen by government leaders.

After an increasing number of calls for more research on different types of aid,335 researchers have started to disaggregate aid data in different ways, such as technical

333 Barratt, Human Rights and Foreign Aid, 209.
versus non-technical assistance,³³⁶ budget support versus project aid,³³⁷ as well as by sector,³³⁸ or by general orientation (Economic aid, Social aid, and Human rights and Democracy aid).³³⁹ Yet, these studies make use of OECD data on aid commitments, instead of disbursements, and the use of commitments obviously does not reflect the actual amount of aid released in case of aid sanctions.³⁴⁰ As recognized by the OECD, available figures on disbursements by sector are highly unreliable: “the analysis on CRS disbursements … is not recommended for flows before 2002, because the annual coverage is below 60%”.³⁴¹ According to The Economist, the share of aid which is recorded accurately “has risen from 42% in 2005 to 48% in 2007 (i.e., only 48% of aid is properly accounted for)”. The magazine recognizes that this is “an improvement, but still a far cry from the target, which is 85% accuracy”.³⁴² Those researchers who have attempted to overcome these problems by creating their own datasets recognize the limitations of their work:

Many of the sources do not go into a great deal of detail on the specifics of the event and indeed, it is not unlikely that there may be a number of suspensions that we have not encoded because our search has not yet been exhaustive enough. Another important caveat related to the completeness and representativeness of our dataset is that since we only have been able to capture the actions of those donors that have publicly reported on their budget support

³³⁹ Nielsen, “Rewarding Human Rights?”
³⁴² “A Scramble in Africa: The Future of Aid,” The Economist, September 6, 2008. The problem of reporting inaccurate figures on aid disbursement is worsened by different interpretations from OECD donors. For instance, while for the Japanese Development Agency the construction of an airport in Burma is considered as “development assistance”, for the Europeans it is understood as “infrastructure building”, and thus falls in the scope of sanctions.
suspensions, our results might be biased towards the more transparent donors.  

Weakness 4: Threats versus cuts

Mere threats to suspend, cut or cancel foreign aid are occasionally sufficient to obtain policy concessions by recipient governments. In these cases, aid figures would remain unchanged although development financing is in fact conditioned on the respect of human rights. Any quantitative analysis that relies on this data is necessarily blind to this type of political conditionality. Only qualitative analysis can effectively study this process. This is particularly problematic because the most recurrent type of aid sanctions is the suspension of future aid, as opposed to the suspension of ongoing programmes.

3.5.2. A qualitative research design

The issues highlighted above are not the only ones affecting the validity of statistical analysis. For example, much has been written about the flaws of existing measures of government respect for human rights. Taken in the round, these weaknesses point in favour of the adoption of a qualitative research strategy. This is particularly true also in the light of the important insights that a qualitative analysis can provide into how norms shape both ‘events’ (donors may offer different reasons to suspend aid, such as human rights abuses or macro-economic imbalances) and ‘non-events’ (only some donors may justify the non-application of the norm, thus implicitly

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acknowledging its salience). Kratochwil and Ruggie convincingly argued a long time ago that norms serve as reasons for action, rather than causes, and that any explanation that seeks to invoke norms must do more than point to the existence of norms on the one hand, and of norm-consistent behaviour on the other. Discourse can provide insights into how norms shape ‘non-events’ (paths not taken). The invocation of a norm by relevant actors, for instance, is an important indicator in itself, even if not followed by consistent behaviour.

The advantages of a qualitative analysis of political conditionality are also defended by Crawford. In analysing the role of human rights in foreign aid, there is considerable reliance on quantitative material, especially in the investigation of political aid programmes. While it is maintained that this provides valuable indicators of the overall orientation and scope of donor programmes, it is acknowledged that there are limitations to analyses based only on quantitative data, especially given the complexity of objectives and the variety of political scenarios in recipient countries. Ideally, the investigation into the contribution of external agencies would be supplemented by the qualitative analysis that detailed country case-studies can provide (Crawford 2001, 8).

Indeed, qualitative analysis is needed to detect small but important variation in donor behaviour. Portela distinguishes different types of restrictive measures, in descending order of severity:

- full suspension (except humanitarian);
- suspension of programme aid or balance-of-payments support;
- suspension of new projects (including technical cooperation);
- redirection towards civil society;
- overall reduction of aid allocation;
- refusal to inform how much money will be delivered;

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• consultations, political statements and threats to take restrictive action.\textsuperscript{349}

A more sophisticated analysis of donors’ responses carried out by DfID consultants considered the decision not to increase aid at key moments as an alternative to the use of cuts/delays/suspension.\textsuperscript{350}

Having accounted for all the above arguments in favour and against the use of quantitative and qualitative approaches to assess political conditionality, this thesis will build on the findings of past quantitative studies, but will test their validity through an in-depth exploration of case studies. The focus will be on the negative aspect of conditionality, because coordination is more likely in these circumstances, and thus variation is more puzzling. According to a diplomat with extensive work experience in African countries, “suspension of aid is a very extreme measure and it is not adopted lightly as a method of putting pressure on the government. Usually, there has been months and months of deadlock between the government and the donors before suspension of aid is used as a final straw. These situations can be very sensitive and the donors generally speaking want to be cautious and act as a group rather than on their own.”\textsuperscript{351}

3.6. Conclusion

This chapter justified two fundamental methodological decisions. First, the selection of France and the UK as case studies. Among European donors, France and the UK are two strikingly similar large donors, middle-ranking powers, nuclear-weapon states, permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, former colonial empires, EU Member States and human rights ‘homelands’. Notwithstanding this resemblance (and a formal attempt to coordinate their policies towards Africa), the two countries seem to present a different approach towards political conditionality. This offers a unique vantage point to apply Mill’s method of difference and discover those factors that can explain variation in the internalisation of political conditionality by EU Member States.


\textsuperscript{350} Interview with Paolo de Renzio, Research Fellow at ODI, 12 March 2012.

\textsuperscript{351} Interview 1.
Second, the chapter clarified the choice to assess the level of internalisation of political conditionality by looking at three different factors: policies, legal documents (laws and international agreements) and state behaviour. The flaws of quantitative data on political conditionality led to the adoption of a qualitative research design, centred on the analysis of a few case studies of negative sanctions.

A three-fold measurement of the salience of political conditionality may be considered an excessive complication. Why should one not concentrate on legal basis, discourse, or behaviour alone? The answer is that each of the three indicators is imperfect if taken on its own. As far as discourse is concerned, it is true that political rhetoric provides a starting point for evaluating norm salience. Rhetorical norm affirmation provides early evidence of the acknowledgment of an emergent international norm. However, state discourse can easily be accused to be uncorrelated with actions. Political leaders “can cynically manipulate rhetorical norm affirmation to deflect political pressure and avoid concrete action”. As such, “the combination of behaviour and rhetoric provides greater evidence to evaluate the domestic salience of the emergent norm”. This is particularly true for aid conditionality. For instance, in his attempt to prove that conditions are often rhetorical moves and do not translate into practical actions, Svensson found “no link between a country’s reform effort, or fulfilment of conditionality, and the disbursement rate” of aid funds.

With respect to the analysis of behaviour, there is one main reason why this alone would be a deficient strategy. Johnston observed that behaviour can be consistent with a norm even without any influence from the norm itself. He created the idiom “pro-norm behaviour” to indicate “action that is consistent with the norm in question, whether done because the norm has been internalized or because some kind of consequentialist calculation makes it useful to follow”. The point made by Johnston clarifies that aid to a repressive government may be suspended not just because of sincere human rights concerns. In this case, an analysis of discourse is necessary to understand the real value of donor actions. Checkel justifies the analysis

352 For a similar argument, see Pettenger, The Social Construction of Climate Change, 24.
of discourse in the following terms: “to minimize reliance on correlational arguments, I consider not only the observable degree of compliance among agents but also the motives and attitudes that lead actors to abide by normative prescriptions”.

Like any coding, the exercise of measuring the level of internalisation of political conditionality is partly interpretive. Yet, the methodology proposed here improves on many studies that offer no way to evaluate norm strength at all (assuming rather than assessing the importance of certain norms) or are based on partial analyses limited to discourse or behaviour alone.

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CHAPTER 4
POLICIES, LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

This dissertation addresses two different questions: have France and the UK internalised political conditionality to different degrees? If so, why? This chapter offers a positive answer to the first question. Specifically, it shows that the laws, international agreements and policies regulating French and British development cooperation place significantly different emphasis on the principle that government-to-government development assistance should be conditioned on respect for human rights. The chapter is divided into two main sections, the first one focuses on France, the second one on the UK. Special attention is dedicated to the policies on general budget support, given the high fiduciary and political risks attached to this instrument. The conclusion presents the results of the analysis in a comparative fashion.

For the sake of concision, the chapter presents only a small sample of the most representative legal documents, strategy papers and international agreements of the two development actors. It is worth emphasizing that this selection is the result of the analysis of more than 90 documents, including laws, ministerial declarations, strategy papers, policy documents, and different types of international agreements.

4.1. France

4.1.1. Legal basis

The legal basis of French development cooperation lies in a plethora of stratified, inter-linked and intricate texts (laws, regulations, ordinances, edicts and inter-ministerial decrees). The result is chaotic, and final evidence is difficult to obtain. Nevertheless, none of these documents seem to include any reference to the

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promotion of human rights as an objective of development cooperation, or to respect for human rights as a pre-condition for aid disbursement.

As a matter of fact, most of the legal documents regulating French development assistance focus on its process, not on its content. Thus, the new Institutional Act on Financial Legislation, which came into effect in 2006, gave Parliament greater control over the budget, including development assistance: each year, during budget discussions, the Foreign Affairs and Finance, Economy and Planning Committees submit detailed and substantiated reports on the provisions of the Budget Act relating to ODA, and hold in-depth discussions and hear the ministers concerned. Yet, the Act does not provide any guidance on what the objectives of French development cooperation should be, and on what basis aid programmes should be evaluated.

The 2007 Act on the External Action of Local Authorities presents a similar situation. Article L1115-1 states that “local governments and their associations may, in compliance with international commitments of France, enter into agreements with foreign local authorities to carry out actions of cooperation or development assistance”. However, the Act does not specify what the objectives of these agreements should be. Actually, it leaves the question open to contextual negotiations: “these agreements specify the purpose of the proposed actions and the estimated amount of financial commitments”.

4.1.2. Policy documents and ministerial statements

After the end of the Cold War, France initially supported the principles of political conditionality in development assistance. On 20 June 1990, French President François Mitterrand concluded the Franco-African Summit at La Baule by saying that French aid would be “lukewarm” towards countries that did not strive to create institutions based on free elections, multiparty systems, the removal of censorship and an independent judiciary. The consequence would be a reduction in French aid to “regimes which would behave in an authoritarian fashion, without accepting any evolution towards democracy”, and that “France will bind all its contributions to the

358 OECD, France: Development Cooperation Peer Review (Paris: OECD, 2008), 27.
359 Translation by the author.
efforts that will be made to move towards more freedom”.\textsuperscript{360} This linkage was reasserted in what came to be called the ‘Balladur doctrine’, by the name of the then French Prime Minister. The doctrine was formulated in an article published by \textit{Le Monde} on 23 September 1993 and sought to reserve aid for countries that were correctly governed, democratic and at peace with themselves.\textsuperscript{361}

These openings were significant. However, they should not be overestimated. At a press conference organised on the day after the discourse in La Baule, Mitterand clarified that “each country should set the terms and pace of its own reform”.\textsuperscript{362} In 1992, Jacques Pelletier, the French Cooperation minister who had strongly supported democratisation, left office, apparently because of disagreements with the policy of the Elysée.\textsuperscript{363} Xavier Renou, a French political science researcher and human rights activists, reports that

at the 1992 Franco-African Summit, French Prime Minister Pierre Beregovoy privately explained that amongst potentially conflicting goals of promoting democracy, ensuring development and maintaining security, the last-mentioned ranked first. Development should be pursued second, and only then could democratisation be tackled.\textsuperscript{364}

In 1993, this concept was reiterated by Roland Daums. The then Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that “economic reform should have priority over democratization” and that “the pace of democratization should not be forced”.\textsuperscript{365}

In 1998, the reform of French aid system seemed to suggest the triumph of the new course over the old practices. The outline document issued in February stated that

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{360} François Mitterand, “Le Discours de La Baule” (Franco-African Summit, June 20, 1990), http://www1.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/037/article_20103.asp [translation by the author].
\end{flushleft}
“co-operating means working together in a free but demanding dialogue. In many cases this will mean abandoning the idea of assistance in order to forge a genuine partnership based on priorities expressed in terms of sustainable development and the promotion of human rights and democracy”. However, the analysis of successive strategy papers shows that the changes were neither profound nor durable. Actually, in the new millennium political conditionality has lost almost any appeal within French development policy circles.

A 2006 strategy paper titled “Governance strategy for French Development Assistance” represents the most compelling evidence in this respect. The document was approved by the Inter-ministerial Committee on International Cooperation and Development (CICID), the body in charge of signalling the direction of French aid. The CICID concedes that “governance has been at the heart of development for almost fifteen years now”, that the agenda has shifted “to a broader understanding of the term ... it is now recognized that not only the content of the policies themselves are important but also the way policies are drafted and implemented, notably with the participation of the stakeholders”, and that “this shift can be seen among bilateral donors, and at the level of the European Union”. Nevertheless (and notwithstanding explicit reference to the policies of the EU), according to French policy-makers ownership should take precedence over governance, and conditionality is expressly ruled out. Indicators “were originally simple tools for ranking countries and conditionality. [On the contrary, t]hey should primarily be thought of as a method for observing and evaluating ongoing processes in a given society. They constitute a helpful basis and a necessary signal for the reforms that are required for development assistance. They should also be used to evaluate France’s assistance system whenever possible”.

The argument behind the French approach is that “a “turnkey” democratic development model becomes contradictory if it means that local choices are pre-empted. This means that “the quality of cooperation should not be measured so much by its ability to lay down universal standards manipulated in the abstract through

366 OECD, France: Development Cooperation Peer Review (Paris: OECD, 2000), 73.
368 Ibid., 21–22.
conditionality as it should be assessed by its ability to provide each partner with specific experience and expertise to enable them to develop their own policies”. 369

The policy for the future is the following:

governance is an element used in aid allocation decision-making, but without being an automatic conditionality instrument. Measuring governance outcomes would not so much determine the level of assistance as it would clarify the types of instruments to be used in cooperation policies, thereby making it possible to identify the policies and tools that are best suited to any given situation. In this respect, the methodology that France has developed takes into consideration the following criteria: income level, governance quality, France’s political priorities and the fragility of the country in question. The results constitute a decision-making support for channelling aid and defining the relevant procedures. 370

The result is a strong preference for direct support to rule of law initiatives and civil society organisations over conditionality. 371

This position was confirmed by subsequent policy documents. In 2008, the cross-cutting policy document attached to the financial report on development assistance stated that, in the 55 countries in France’s priority solidarity zone, “the key aims of French development policy are to foster growth, reduce poverty and give easier access to global public goods, thus helping to achieve the Millennium Development Goals to 2015”. 372 No reference to human rights can be found.

Interestingly, human right conditionality is not considered appropriate even for budget support operations. French budget support is dispensed on the basis of two documents: a “Doctrine for the use of comprehensive budgetary aid in foreign States” adopted in February 2007, and a strategy of operational implementation laid down by the French Development Agency in March 2007. The doctrine for the use of budget support is based on principles of predictability, results-oriented management and alignment. Three eligibility conditions has to be satisfied for the planning and

369 Ibid., 16.
370 Ibid., 5.
371 Ibid., 8.
disbursement of budget support: a sound and sustainable macroeconomic policy, a
growth and poverty-reduction strategy in line with the Millennium Development
Goals, and a favourable assessment of the public financial management system.\(^{373}\)
No human rights requirement is included.

In 2011 the French government adopted its first long-term policy document, titled
*Development cooperation: A French Vision*. The document stresses that France
“must move from a development assistance policy, which implies an asymmetrical
donor-beneficiary relationship, over to a policy of cooperation with developing
countries”.\(^{374}\) This implies that, notwithstanding the fact that development
cooperation cannot sidestep governance issues,

the role of cooperation action depends primarily therefore on the country-specific
context and cannot be reduced to a one-size-fits-all model. The effectiveness of
cooperation actions demands a partnership approach adapted to the context, based on
equality between partners, a common analysis of needs and reciprocal contractual
commitments … Cooperation policy … should not use an unequal balance of power to
impose a particular form of governance on its partners.\(^{375}\)

This point is reiterated with additional strength:

France sets governance as a priority for its cooperation, while respecting its partners’
sovereignty. France makes the promotion of individual rights, the rule of law and
governance a core strand of its cooperation policy and considers them to be part and
parcel of the political dialogue on the formulation and implementation of development
strategies. This priority is grounded on the fact that governance is a critical dimension
of the political fate of societies and their economic emergence. However, support for
good governance comes up against the limits, encountered by any outside party, of non-
interference in the political and social balance of a sovereign country.\(^{376}\)

The French position on political conditionality is well exemplified also by an episode
which occurred at the beginning of Sarkozy’s presidency. In 2007, as part of its

\(^{375}\) Ibid., 33.
\(^{376}\) Ibid.
“ouverture au centre et à gauche”, Sarkozy nominated Jean-Marie Bockel as Secretary of State for Cooperation and La Francophonie. Bockel, considered a reformist, was the leader of a new centre-left political party, Modern Left (Gauche Moderne).

In January 2008, Bockel released an interview to Le Monde in which he pledged to sign the “death certificate of the Françafrique”, that is the “cronyish network of politicians and businessmen in France and Africa, which has defined relations between France and many of its French-speaking former colonies in the past, and whose mutually supportive nature resists all attempts to change it”. In particular, Bockel affirmed that “one of the main obstacles to development is bad governance” and that his response would have been to “review our conditionalities … it means to condition our aid to good governance”.

The interview to Le Monde was the consequence of a speech that Bockel delivered the day before in a traditional ceremony inaugurating the year at the Ministry of Cooperation. In this speech, Bockel expressed his ideas with greater clarity. Good governance should be intended in a large sense: “democracy, human rights, fight against corruption and business environment”. The aim is “a demanding friendship, and without complacency, exactly because it is a sincere friendship, a friendship directed to a people and not only to its leaders”. Again, the norm of conditionality is explicitly supported: “I suggest going beyond the ‘positive’ incentives and consider, where appropriate, real conditionality for granting our aid”.

The Economist, surprised by the strong words of the Secretary of State, dedicated a specific article to the French policy change. The magazine summarized Bockel’s thinking in the following terms: “French aid to Africa would be conditional on good governance, be monitored more rigorously, and cut off if African leaders were up to

no good. In other words, in line with best-practice policy on development aid in the West”. Professor Martial K. Frindéthié offered a similar interpretation:

Bockel was convinced that France’s distribution of aid in the Third World should be subordinated to democratic principles both in France and in the aid-recipient countries. Traditionally, this had not been the case, and the fact that over the decades, some French officials personalized their relationships with some African dictators, whom the propped up with tax payers’ money, reflected a crisis of morality in French political life.

The “syndicate” of African Heads of States immediately organized itself: Omar Bongo (President of Gabon), Denis Sassou Nguesso (President of Congo) and Paul Biya (President of Cameroon) called the French President and claimed the head of the Secretary of State. In March 2008, Bockel was reassigned as Secretary of State for Veterans Affairs in what was sold as a technical reshuffling. The political motive of the change was later confirmed by Bockel himself, by Robert Bourgi (who acted as intermediary between the African Presidents and the French political establishment), by another minister, questioned anonymously by Agence France-Presse, as well as by other sources at the Quai d’Orsay. They evoked “pressures, particularly from Omar Bongo, to let Bockel leave the Quai d’Orsay”.

380 “Death to Francafrique?”
The new Secretary of State for Cooperation and La Francophonie, Alain Joyandet, soon clarified the position of the French government:

It is not about reversing the demands of France in terms of good governance and democracy ... it is useless, if we want to achieve results, to declaim, ridicule or finger specific governments or individuals. It is necessary to accompany the changes, to respect the Heads of State and, if problems are there, treat them with diplomacy. 386

The point was reiterated a few years later. France speaks “to regimes that are not perfect democracies, because our diplomacy is intended to be universal. This is a diplomacy of ‘positive influence’: we want to talk with everyone to bring them to our values. The more we talk with these countries, the greater the possibilities of advancing these values”. 387

Constructivist scholars suggest that identities and norms “appear unconscious, when they have become deeply internalized”. However, they “surface when they are contested by external change or internal challengers”. 388 The case of Bockel offers strong evidence that the any call in favour of political conditionality unsettle contrasting identities and norms with deep roots in French policy-circles.

4.1.3. International agreements

France has concluded three types of development agreements with recipient countries: Partnership Framework Documents, Debt Reduction and Development Contracts and general cooperation or friendship treaties.

General cooperation or friendship treaties

Sometimes France includes provisions on foreign aid in general cooperation or friendship treaties. Numerous agreements concentrate on cultural cooperation. While some of these texts refer to development cooperation projects (with special focus on the diffusion of the French language), they never touch on human rights or democracy. For instance, on 19 April 2004 France and Libya signed an Agreement on Cultural, Scientific and Technical Cooperation. The document encourages the development of the French Cultural Institute in Tripoli and the conclusion of scholarship programmes for Libyan students who want to study in France. However, human rights and democracy do not feature in the document.\(^{389}\)

Other treaties are dedicated to specific issues or projects. On 10 January 2009, France and Burkina Faso concluded an Agreement on the Joint Management of Migration Flows and Common Development. The document covers projects on student scholarships, policy cooperation and financial help. Most of the projects are funded by French development assistance. Human rights are only touched upon in the preamble, through a brief reference to the fundamental rights of migrant workers.\(^{390}\) On 21 February 2008, the French Development Agency (\textit{Agence française de développement}, AFD) and Lebanon signed a Line of Credit Agreement. Disbursement of the money was divided in separate tranches, each of which was subordinated to a set of conditions. The conditions included, inter alia, the submission to Parliament of the 2007 annual budget law, the privatization of mobile telecommunications and the structural reform of \textit{Electricité du Liban}, the state-owned company responsible for the generation, transmission, and distribution of electrical energy in Lebanon. No condition was dedicated to human rights or democratic issues.

The absence of any reference to human rights in these agreements can be justified because of their sectoral or project-specific focus. However, France does not insert human rights clauses even in more generic treaties. The latest Friendship and Cooperation Treaty between France and a developing country was signed on 27

\(^{389}\) See also, as an example of a similar treaty, the Partnership Convention signed by France and Algeria on 4 December 2007.

\(^{390}\) A similar agreement was signed between France and Cape Verde on 24 November 2008.
January 2012 with Afghanistan. The treaty covers cooperation in many areas, including development assistance. The objective of the treaty is to develop “a balanced partnership that contributes to the independence, security and economic and social development of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan” and France commits, *inter alia*, to “strengthen its cooperation in the sectors of agriculture, education, health, archaeology and cultural exchanges” (Article 1). Afghan authorities will facilitate the activities of AFD (Article 11).

Human rights are only mentioned in the preamble of the treaty: the Parties conclude the agreement “reaffirming their commitment to the principles of national sovereignty, democracy, human rights and equality between men and women enrolled in their Constitution”. In addition to the marginal place of the reference to human rights, this is weakened by the inclusion of the concept of national sovereignty. Democratic governance and rule of law are considered, but only as a field to be supported, not as conditions of the agreement. Article 8 is titled “Democratic Governance and the Rule of Law” and states that “the French Party supports the strengthening of the rule of law and the effectiveness of institutions of the Republic Islamic Republic of Afghanistan … Particular attention is dedicated to the protection of women and their access to justice”. The lack of any political conditionality is confirmed by the scant termination clause included in Article 13, on “Final Dispositions”, which states that “Any dispute concerning the interpretation or execution of this Treaty shall be settled between the Parties through diplomatic channels. This treaty may be terminated in writing by either of Parties with three months’ notice through diplomatic channels”.

The treaty includes an Annex specifically dedicated to development cooperation, titled “Cooperation Programme for period 2012-2016”. The Programme never mentions human rights. Section 3.5 is dedicated to detailed analysis of the projects on democratic governance and rule of law. Most of these projects are dedicated to the formation of administrative cadres and judges.

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391 Translation by the author.
392 Translation by the author.
393 Translation by the author.
Partnership Framework Documents

As part of the long process of reform of French development assistance, in July 2004 the CICID decided to create a pluri-annual framework instrument – the Partnership Framework Document (Document Cadre de Partenariat, DCP) – for French assistance in countries included in the Priority Solidarity Zone (Zone de solidarité prioritaire, ZSP). DCPs are signed by both parties for a five-year term, set out the priorities for French aid in the partner country and are drafted in accordance with the partner country’s development strategy, enhancing ownership and predictability.

DCPs never include anything similar to a human rights clause, linking financial disbursement or programme continuation to respect for human rights or adherence to democratic principles. When reference to human rights can be found, this is for projects related to the enhancement of the rule of law. For instance, in 2005 France and Cameroon signed a DCP with “the objective to identify the priority intervention areas and modalities of Franco-Cameroon cooperation over the next five years (2006-2010)”. The document, which was explicitly “based on the Strategic Framework for the Fight against Poverty adopted by Cameroon in 2003” and was “consistent with the new directions in French aid decided by the CICID in 2004 and 2005”, does not mention any condition, prerequisite or qualification for the initiation or continuation of development cooperation. Human rights or democracy are mentioned only three times. First, “in consultation with other partners, specifically multilateral organisations, French cooperation proposes to contribute to the improvement of public governance, in those areas where it can offer specific expertise and strengths (financial governance, administrative reform, decentralization, justice and security, human rights)”. Second, in the field of policy and security, two government-to-government projects will be accompanied by “human rights actions ... channelled through specialized Cameroonian and French NGOs, in consultation with other partners”. Third, France will support the Pluri-actors Concerted Programme (Programme Concerté Pluri-acteurs, PCPA), “an innovative program designed to increase the involvement of non-state actors in the

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394 Translation by the author.
395 Translation by the author.
democratic debate, the monitoring of public policies and the implementation of development projects”.

Other DCPs follow the approach taken by France and Cameroon. The DCP signed with Ethiopia in 2006 does not mention conditions but includes a section (4.2.1.1) titled “Support to the judiciary and law reforms”, under which France commits to “contribute to the following activities to strengthening of democracy, the private sector and access to justice ... Good governance, human rights: to support the training institute for judges and prosecutors”. Even the DCP signed with Benin in 2006, where France commits to continue the budget support programme initiated in 2005, does not declare common values or list a set of prerequisites.

**Contrats de désendettement et de développement**

Debt Reduction and Development Contracts (*Contrats de désendettement et de développement*, C2Ds) are France’s bilateral instrument for reducing debt incurred as part of development assistance. They are signed and implemented after the completion point of the multilateral Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative and are added to the debt cancellations granted through the Paris Club. C2Ds use grants to refinance aid debts: the countries continue to service their debt, but as soon as a repayment is made, France hands the same sum back to the country for use in poverty reduction programmes that have been selected through mutual agreement between France and the partner country.

Since 2000, many countries have signed C2Ds with France. A short list of the first ones include Mozambique (2001 and 2004), Uganda (2002), Bolivia (2003), Tanzania (2003), Mauritania (2003 and 2006), Ghana (2004), Madagascar (2005), Nicaragua (2005) and Cameroon (2006). None of these contracts, as well as none of the Presentation Reports that informs the National Assembly of the conclusion of the agreements, ever mention the presence of political conditionality. This is true notwithstanding the fact that many C2Ds set up significant budget support programmes. The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs actually impose some

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396 Translation by the author.
397 See, for instance, the C2Ds signed with Nicaragua in June 2004.
conditions to the conclusion of C2Ds. The contract can be signed only “when public financial management is reliable, and when poverty reduction strategies are appropriate and credible, the appropriations can take the form of global budget assistance to support poverty reduction strategies or harmonized financing for sector programmes”. Human rights are patently out of the picture.

4.1.4. Conclusions on French policies and legal documents

France does not support the idea that allocation and disbursement of development assistance should depend on respect for human rights and democratic principles by recipient governments. Notwithstanding initial endorsement of the norm, France has reversed its position and now prefers ‘engagement’ (such as direct support to rule of law programmes) to conditionality. This policy stance is confirmed by two additional elements: the laws that regulate French development cooperation do not include any reference to human rights, and French development agreements with recipient government generally do not contain human rights clauses.

4.2. United Kingdom

4.2.1. Legal basis

The legal basis of British development assistance is the International Development Act 2002, which replaced the Overseas Development and Cooperation Act 1980. Neither of the two acts contains any reference to human rights. The first article of the 2002 Act, which sets down the objectives of British development assistance, reads as follows:

(1) The Secretary of State may provide any person or body with development assistance if he is satisfied that the provision of the assistance is likely to contribute to a reduction in poverty.

(2) In this Act “development assistance” means assistance provided for the purpose of—

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398 French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, Governance Strategy for French Development Assistance, 34.
(a) furthering sustainable development in one or more countries outside the United Kingdom, or
(b) improving the welfare of the population of one or more such countries.

The Secretary of State can thus provide assistance to foreign countries only if two conditions are concurrently satisfied: (1) assistance furthers their sustainable development or improve the welfare of their population; and (2) it is likely to contribute to a reduction in poverty. No human rights requirement is mentioned.

4.2.2. Policy documents and ministerial statements

The UK was the first European country to speak in favour of political conditionality after the end of the Cold War. On 6 June 1990, the British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Douglas Hurd, affirmed that “countries which tend towards pluralism, public accountability, respect for the rule of law, human rights, market principles, should be encouraged. Governments which persist with repressive policies, corrupt management, wasteful and discredited economic systems should not expect us to support their folly with scarce aid resources which could be used better elsewhere”.399

Since then, British governments of whatever colour have consistently argued in favour of the application of human rights selectivity and/or conditionality in government-to-government cooperation. In 1997, the newly-elected Labour government created the Department of International Development (DFID), separating the management of development assistance from the handling of foreign affairs. In the same year, the first DFID white paper called for the establishment of a new type of partnership with recipient countries, a partnership which “moves beyond the old conditionalities of development assistance and will require political commitment to poverty elimination on both sides”.400 The idea is to shift from donor-imposed conditions (contractual conditionality) to mutually-agreed commitments (selective/allocative conditionality). In this respect, partner government are expected, inter alia, to “pursue policies which promote responsive and accountable

government, recognising that governments have obligations to all their people [and] promote the enjoyment of civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights.401

On 2 March 2005, DFID, Her Majesty’s Treasury and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office jointly adopted a document titled *Partnerships for poverty reduction: rethinking conditionality*, which “sets out the circumstances in which [the UK] will consider modifying or withdrawing existing aid commitments”.402 The UK government affirms that “an effective aid partnership should be based on a shared commitment to three objectives:

1. reducing poverty and achieving the Millennium Development Goals;
2. respecting human rights and other international obligations; and
3. strengthening financial management and accountability, and reducing the risk of funds being misused through weak administration or corruption”.403

Notwithstanding the reiteration of the importance of an approach based on selectivity rather than conditionality (as selectivity assures policy ownership by partner countries), DFID, the FCO and the Treasury agree that “the UK will consider reducing or interrupting aid if:

- countries veer significantly away from agreed poverty reduction objectives or outcomes or the agreed objectives of a particular aid commitment (e.g. through an unjustifiable rise in military spending, or a substantial deviation from the agreed poverty reduction programme); or
- countries are in significant violation of human rights or other international obligations; or
- there is a significant breakdown in partner government financial management and accountability, leading to the risk of funds being misused through weak administration or corruption”.404

According to the policy document, one of the reasons why political conditions have been ineffective in the past is that donors have “failed to fulfil their part of the bargain. Aid has been withdrawn in response to domestic financial pressures in donor countries or external political events, with limited notice or consultation. There are

401 Ibid., 39.
403 Ibid., 1, 8.
404 Ibid., 3, 9.
also frequent examples of donors continuing to provide assistance even when countries have not kept to their agreement” (DFID 2005, 6). The UK will seek to make aid more “predictable and transparent by being clear in advance about the process of decision-making on conditions, the conditions themselves, and the process for deciding to reduce or interrupt aid”. 405

Since 2005, this conditionality policy has been reaffirmed numerous times, such as by the Labour government in the 2006 White Paper Eliminating world poverty: making governance work for the poor,406 and by the Coalition government in the 2014 Guidance note: The Partnership Principles.407 In 2008, DfID also released a strategy document specifically dedicated to budget support, titled Poverty Reduction Budget Support: A DFID Policy Paper. DFID argues that the provision of poverty reduction budget support (PRBS) will require two stages of analysis. First, the UK will use PRBS and encourage other donors also to use budget support, when it assesses that governments are sincerely committed to the three objectives already suggested in the 2005 paper on conditionality, that is:

- reducing poverty;
- upholding human rights and international obligations;
- improving public financial management, promoting good governance and transparency and fighting corruption.

Second, the UK will need to determine the most effective way of delivering its aid to support the government – this might be through PRBS or through other aid instruments.408 To decide whether PRBS is appropriate or not, the UK will assess four elements: the government’s strategy, budget and capacity, fiduciary risk, political risk, the expected benefits of PRBS. The political risk assessment is expressly centred on human rights. The commitment by DFID reads as follows:

We will assess political risks, drawing on the assessment of the government’s commitment to human rights, to promoting good governance, and to fighting

405 Ibid., 16.
We will assess the impact that any of these risks might have on the aid relationship and on the budget support programme in particular.\textsuperscript{409}

Importantly, this policy has been confirmed by the new Coalition government too. In July 2011, DFID published a *Technical Note on Implementing DFID’s strengthened approach to budget support*, which affirms that, in considering whether to give budget support or not, it will continue to assess governments against the three commitments mentioned above. In addition, it "will place more emphasis on domestic accountability by making partner country commitment to strengthening domestic accountability a specific commitment, separating it out from the other commitments, so the commitments will be to:

1. poverty reduction and the Millennium Development Goals;
2. respecting human rights and other international obligations;
3. improving public financial management, promoting good governance and transparency and fighting corruption; and
4. strengthening domestic accountability".\textsuperscript{410}

4.2.3. International agreements

International agreements between the UK and developing countries can take different forms: multi-donor Memoranda of Understanding (MoU), Joint Assistance Strategies, overarching bilateral partnership arrangements, individual aid agreements (DFID MoU with partner governments required when giving governments Financial Aid or Technical Cooperation) and even joint minutes of aid talks. At least since the adoption of the 2005 paper on policy paper on conditionality, the UK has inserted reference to the existence of a shared commitment to respect human rights in almost every of these international documents.

Development Partnership Arrangements (DPAs) set out the annual volume of aid that DFID expects to allocate to a partner country over a ten-year period, supporting medium-term planning and signalling a certain degree of trust. So far, the UK limited its use of ten-year DPAs to nine countries, among which Afghanistan (2005),

\textsuperscript{409} Ibid., 13.
includes an article titled “Basis of the Partnership”, which reads as follows:

Our development partnership in [Country X] is based on commitment to the
following three objectives:

i. Reducing poverty and achieving the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs) in [Country X];

ii. Respecting human rights and other relevant international obligations;

iii. Strengthening financial management and accountability and reducing the
risk of funds being misused through weak administration or corruption.

Bilateral MoU with developing countries do not include a standard human rights
clause as DPAs do. However, they very often contain reference to the existence of a
shared commitment to respect human rights. For instance, in 2006 the Governments
of the UK and Rwanda jointly committed themselves to, inter alia, “the promotion
and protection of the full range of human rights of all Rwandans, especially the poor,
including through the promotion and observance of relevant international agreements
to which our countries are signatories” (Article 6). These commitments form the
basis for the high-level dialogue between the two Government throughout the year,
and progress against the commitments “will be reviewed annually by the two
Governments and by a team of independent consultants, using as a framework the
agreed annual indicators of progress” Article 7). In case of alleged human rights
violations, Article 8 and 9 regulate the potential termination of the agreement in
further details:

Should either Government believe that the other has taken or plans to take
action incompatible with a commitment within the MoU, then the parties will
meet to formally record the concern, draw attention to the potential implications
of a failure to honour a commitment, and discuss what remedial action might be
taken.

If after substantive discussions either party continues to have significant
concerns, then the UK’s programme of assistance to the Government of
Rwanda may be reconfigured or, in extreme circumstances, terminated.
4.2.4. Conclusions on British policies and legal documents

The UK presents a firm stance in favour of political conditionality. Even though human rights promotion is not an objective of British development assistance under the International Development Act 2002, the UK has adopted a fully-fledged policy requiring partner governments to respect human rights and basic democratic principles, and consistently include human rights clauses in development agreements with recipient countries.

4.3. Conclusion: policy and institutional variation

This chapter showed that France and the UK differ significantly in their approach to political conditionality. France opposes the idea that allocation and disbursement of development assistance should depend on the human rights practices of recipient governments. The laws that regulate French development cooperation do not include any reference to human rights and development agreements with recipient government do not contain any human rights clause. In addition, notwithstanding initial (and partial) endorsement of the norm (immediately after the end of the Cold War), France has reversed its position and now prefers ‘engagement’ (such as direct support to rule of law programmes) to conditionality.

In comparison with the French attitude, the UK is a stronger supporter of the norm. It is true that the International Development Act 2002 does not include human rights promotion among the objectives of British development assistance. However, British policy-makers have repeatedly stated their support to political conditionality and consistently include human rights clauses in development agreements with recipient countries.

This finding is in line with the scant comments on political conditionality offered by researchers on British aid and African policies. Cumming agrees that Blair “introduced a policy of political conditionality whereby British aid [was] linked to political reforms by African governments”. Porteous identifies four key elements...

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of the UK’s Africa policies. The first one is the idea of ‘enhanced partnership’ with African governments committed to good governance, conflict prevention and poverty reduction. Zoe Marriage argues that the official rhetoric under New Labour had it that DFID exemplified the “moral aspect of the UK government, claiming a relationship of partnership between the UK and developing countries based on a common concern for poverty reduction and respect for human rights”.

This chapter has demonstrated that France and the UK vary significantly with respect to the internalisation of political conditionality in their policies, laws and international agreements. The next chapter assesses whether this finding can be further validated by the existence of similar differences in the behaviour of the two donors.

CHAPTER 5
A QUALITATIVE COMPARISON OF AID SANCTIONS

The previous chapter assessed the discursive and legal elements of the internalisation of political conditionality by France and the UK. This chapter concentrates on the behavioural component. The analysis builds upon the findings of past qualitative and quantitative studies, and expands existing research by comparing the two donors’ responses to four instances of human rights violations in recipient countries. The chapter shows that France is often the most opposed to the application of political conditionality, while the UK frequently takes the lead in the imposition of aid sanctions, together with like-minded Nordic donors.

The chapter is structured as follows. The first section offers a collection of anecdotal evidence on French and British behaviour from past qualitative research. In addition, it presents the findings of previous quantitative studies on aid allocation by the two countries. These results offer a good starting point to assess the internalisation of political conditionality by different donors. However, as explained in Chapter 3, they also present serious weaknesses and cannot therefore be considered the last word on the subject. The second section presents the universe of cases of EU aid sanctions and defends the selection of four case studies: Madagascar, Mozambique, Nicaragua and Zimbabwe. The third section contrasts French and British responses to the human rights abuses occurring in these countries, both in their bilateral policies and in their attempts to influence EU decisions. The analysis compares France and the UK, where possible, with each other, and, where this is not possible, with the behaviour of other donors. The conclusion summarises the main findings of the chapter.

It is important to stress from the outset that, notwithstanding the selection of “hard” and “least-likely” cases, there is no way to demonstrate that the following qualitative

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414 As highlighted by Forsythe, both aspects are important. In today’s interconnected world, “it is frequently not possible fully to separate multilateral from bilateral foreign policy ... Nevertheless, states do pursue some foreign policy objectives largely on a bilateral basis, even if at some point these national initiatives may become entangled in multilateral developments or take place against the background of multilateral standards and organizations”: David P. Forsythe, “Introduction,” in Human Rights and Comparative Foreign Policy, ed. David P. Forsythe (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2000), 10.
analysis has any external validity beyond the case studies that are included in the chapter. Each recipient country is different from the others, as is each donor-recipient relationship. Nevertheless, this problem should not worry the reader too much. The external validity of the case studies will be inferred from the results of past statistical works (which takes into account all potential aid recipients, in the whole 20-year period since the end of the Cold War). The objective is to show that, notwithstanding their weaknesses, the findings of past quantitative studies are not the result of measurement errors, missing data or limitations in the operationalization of relevant concepts. Rather, they are confirmed by the in-depth analysis of a limited number of case studies.

5.1. Past research

5.1.1. Qualitative studies

Past qualitative research suggests that France is less willing than the UK to apply political conditionality. Uvin, for instance, found that, in comparison with other major donors, “the French policy towards political conditionality is much more modest … Generally speaking, its position continues to be one of silent support for the prevailing regimes in its former colonies, whatever their democratic or human rights record.” Cumming concluded his lengthy comparison of French and British aid from the end of the Cold War to 1997 by highlighting that there was “a radical shift with the introduction of political conditionality”. While the shift has gradually been watered down in both countries, this happened more in France, and “to a lesser extent” in the UK.

Numerous case studies confirm these findings. During the negotiation for the Lomé III Convention, France expressly stated its opposition to the inclusion of references to human rights in the main text of the agreement. Emmanuel uses the behaviour

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415 External validity is the extent to which the results of a study can be generalized to other situations.  
417 Gordon Cumming, Aid to Africa: French and British Policies from the Cold War to the New Millennium (Ashgate, 2001), 340.  
of France in Cameroon as a flagship example of what he called donor-patrons, that is, critical aid providers that refuse to exercise their leverage and force the recipient to undergo political change.\textsuperscript{419} Ebolo confirms that, in the wake of the 1992 Cameroonian presidential elections, which were denounced by the opposition and the international community, including the EU, France in fact increased aid to the government.\textsuperscript{420} In 1996, only two months after the military coup which took place in Niger on 27 January, France broke the ranks of the EU by unilaterally resuming its bilateral aid co-operation. In addition, in defiance of the unanimous international rejection of the results of the July election, “France announced that … Paris would continue its bilateral aid to Niger. … The French unilateral step was strongly criticized by other EU partners such as Germany and Denmark. The Danes among others stood firm on the principles of democracy in European development co-operation and they further argued that if the EU accepted the military takeover in Niger and if the European countries resumed their aid, this would be the wrong signal to convey to other African countries and potential dictators”.\textsuperscript{421} In 1999-2000, when Britain and the US pushed for the imposition of sanctions – which included an aid component – on the regime of warlord-turned president Charles Taylor in Liberia, France argued against such measures.\textsuperscript{422} Brown and Raddatz reports that, after the crisis that followed the 2007 Kenyan elections, “divisions among donors were … an impediment to influence. … Some donors, including the UK but not France, had shifted much of their assistance to the non-governmental organisation sector as a means of keeping the aid flowing without directly supporting a government that they did not trust”.\textsuperscript{423}

5.1.2. Quantitative studies

Since the 1970s, there has been protracted academic debate as to whether donor countries use aid allocation strategies to reward or punish the human rights performance of potential recipient governments. The large majority of the studies on the topic have concentrated on US aid allocation, with a few researchers looking at other donors individually, such as France, the UK and the Netherlands, or at aggregate bilateral levels.

Comparative analyses of aid allocation by different donors have long excluded good governance factors, including respect for human rights. By answering the question whether between 1970 and 1995 certain donors (among which Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the UK and the US) have been more prone to reward democratic countries, Svensson was the first researcher to offer a comparison of the impact of human rights (in particular, political rights) on aid allocation from a significant number of OECD countries. With this move, he started a thread of research that has used econometric techniques to investigate whether the human rights performance of potential recipient governments have influenced the decisions of bilateral donors, including France and the United

424 The precursor of this literature is considered to be Robert D. McKinlay and Richard Little, “A Foreign Policy Model of US Bilateral Aid Allocation,” World Politics 20, no. 2 (1977): 58–86.
Kingdom, on (a) who their recipient governments should be and (b) how much aid these governments should receive.430

Table 2 offers a comprehensive overview of their findings with respect to political conditionality/selectivity.

### Table 2. Findings of past quantitative studies on determinants of aid allocation by France and the United Kingdom

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article</th>
<th>Scope</th>
<th>Relevant variable(s)</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jakob Svensson, “Aid, Growth and Democracy,” <em>Economics &amp; Politics</em> 11, no. 3 (1999): 275–97.</td>
<td>Sample restricted to the 1990s</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>“[T]he relationship between aid flows and democracy is … significantly negative for France”</td>
<td>“Only bilateral aid from Sweden and the UK … are positively and significantly correlated with democracy”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberto Alesina and David Dollar, “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?,” <em>Journal of Economic Growth</em> 5, no. 1 (2000): 33–63.</td>
<td>From 1970 to 1994</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>“Of the major donors, France is the one that seems to pay no attention to the democracy of the receiving country”</td>
<td>“The strongest positive response to democratic institutions is for the U.S., the Dutch, the U.K., the Nordics, and Canada”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Period</td>
<td>Rights</td>
<td>Analysis</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eric Neumayer, “Do Human Rights Matter in Bilateral Aid Allocation? A Quantitative Analysis of 21 Donor Countries,” <em>Social Science Quarterly</em> 84, no. 3 (2003): 650–66.</td>
<td>From 1985 to 1997</td>
<td>Personal integrity rights, and civil and political rights</td>
<td>“With respect to personal integrity rights, France, the United Kingdom … provide a higher share of aid to countries with a good record”; yet, “as concerns civil and political rights, … the United Kingdom … give[s] more aid to countries with a good record. The opposite is true for France”</td>
<td>“With respect to personal integrity rights, France, the United Kingdom … provide a higher share of aid to countries with a good record”; in addition, “as concerns civil and political rights, the United Kingdom … give[s] more aid to countries with a good record” .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Claude Berthélemy and Ariane Tichit, “Bilateral Donors’ Aid Allocation Decisions: A Three-Dimensional Panel Analysis,” <em>International Review of Economics &amp; Finance</em> 13, no. 3 (2004):</td>
<td>From 1980 to 1999</td>
<td>Civil and political rights</td>
<td>“Comforting results are obtained with respect to the dummy variables for civil liberty and political freedom, which have significantly positive parameters for most of the donors. Two donors - France and Belgium – go in</td>
<td>“Comforting results are obtained with respect to the dummy variables for civil liberty and political freedom, which have significantly positive parameters for most of the donors [including the UK]”.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the other direction with negative (although most of the time nonsignificant) parameters for the democracy dummies. These two donors have consistently given large amounts of aid to several African nondemocratic recipients whom they have financially supported for most of the period under review, although such biases have receded in the 1990s.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Findings</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sabine C. Carey, “European Aid: Human Rights Versus</td>
<td>From 1978 to 2003</td>
<td>Absolute levels and improvements of personal</td>
<td>“A country that substantially improved its respect for</td>
<td>“The UK is ... twice as likely to give aid to a country with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>From 1992 to 2003</td>
<td>Civil and political rights</td>
<td>Not significant</td>
<td>Only country for which the variable is significant at 5% level</td>
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<tr>
<td>Javed Younas, “Motivation for Bilateral Aid Allocation: Altruism or Trade Benefits,” <em>European Journal of</em></td>
<td><strong>Human rights</strong></td>
<td>Bureaucratic Inertia?,” <em>Journal of Peace Research</em> 44, no. 4 (2007): 447–64.</td>
<td>... four times more likely to receive aid from France. A worsening of the human rights situation, however, goes unpunished at this stage”; in addition, France “do[es] not reward improvement in the amount allocation stage”; lastly, “all donors are more likely to choose more democratic countries as recipients, but none of the donors considered democracy when deciding how much aid to commit to recipients”.</td>
<td>widespread repression compared with a country with no life integrity violations”; in addition, “all donors, apart from the UK, are more likely to choose a recipient that has recently improved its human rights record”; lastly, “all donors are more likely to choose more democratic countries as recipients, but none of the donors considered democracy when deciding how much aid to commit to recipients”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Time Period</td>
<td>Criteria</td>
<td>Quote</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paul Clist, “25 Years of Aid Allocation Practice: Whither Selectivity?,” <em>World Development</em> 39, no. 10 (Ottobre 2011): 1724–34.</td>
<td>From 1982 to 2006</td>
<td>Personal integrity rights, and civil and political rights</td>
<td>“The level of recipient governance does not appear to be a major determinant for any donor, with very little evidence for recent changes in this”</td>
<td>“The level of recipient governance does not appear to be a major determinant for any donor, with very little evidence for recent changes in this”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anke Hoeffler and Verity Outram, “Need, Merit, or Self-Interest—What Determines the Allocation of Aid?,” <em>Review of Development Economics</em> 15, no. 2 (2011): 237–50.</td>
<td>From 1980 to 2004</td>
<td>Personal integrity rights, and civil and political rights</td>
<td>“[M]ost bilateral donors seem to place little importance on recipient merit. The UK and Japan are exceptions”</td>
<td>“[M]ost bilateral donors seem to place little importance on recipient merit. The UK and Japan are exceptions: they allocate more aid to countries with higher growth, higher democracy scores, and fewer human rights abuses”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As can be seen from the table, there is almost unanimous consensus that France is less willing than the UK to allocate aid in order to promote respect for human rights and/or avoid being complicit with abuses.

The picture offered by the table is even more remarkable because similar results have been obtained notwithstanding the selection of different indicators for human rights protection, and the choice of different estimation models for the quantitative analysis of aid allocation. On the one hand, researchers have used three different datasets to measure respect for human right by recipient countries: the Political Terror Scale for personal integrity rights, Freedom House figures for civil and political rights, and Polity IV results for democracy in general terms.\textsuperscript{431} On the other hand, most scholars recognised the need to take into account the fact that some recipients do not receive foreign aid from specific donors, and thus Ordinary Least Squares may lead to problem of selection bias. This compelled the adoption of at least three alternative methods, the two-staged analysis (Probit + Ordinary Least Squares), the Standard maximum-likelihood Heckman procedure and the Heckman’s two-step estimator. To complicate things further, Hoeffler and Outram recently argued that those who have used two-stage models or the Heckman estimator “have found little correlation between the residuals in the allocation and selection equations. This indicates that the allocation equation is independent of the selection equation. Our two-stage results also confirm this”. In the end, they “chose to estimate the allocation equation without correcting for selection, since it does not seem to result in a significant bias”.\textsuperscript{432}

5.2. The universe of cases of EU aid sanctions and the selection of case studies

As shown in Chapter 3, quantitative analyses of aid allocation may rely upon imperfect measures of human rights abuses and aid sanctions. This weakness suggests that


\textsuperscript{432} Hoeffler and Outram, “Need, Merit, or Self-Interest—What Determines the Allocation of Aid?,” 240.
in an area as complex as aid, it is very possible that considerations can have important effects that are not easily captured in aggregate analyses, as most analyses of aid tend to be. ... Perhaps the most direct way of looking at the nuanced ways that a consideration such as human rights can have an effect is by looking at individual decisions themselves.\textsuperscript{433}

If one follows this recommendation, the rigorousness in the selection process of these “individual decisions” takes centre stage.

European aid consists of two separate components. On the one hand, EU Member States still administer their own bilateral programmes. On the other hand, EU institutions (primarily the European Commission) manage common funds which are resourced from either the EU budget or a specific instrument called the European Development Fund (EDF). I will hereafter refer to this type of aid as “EU aid” (in contrast with “European aid”, which includes both EU aid and the bilateral programmes of the Member States).

The starting point of this dissertation was that, given (1) the intergovernmental character of EU aid sanctions and (2) the strong coordination mechanisms at the EU level, it would be puzzling to discover variation in the internalisation of political conditionality by EU Member States. The two elements of inter-governmentalism and coordination are particularly important in the case of EU aid sanctions. First, the decision to suspend or cut EU aid is generally adopted by unanimity within the Council of the EU. When this is not the case, the Commission is reported to consult with all relevant Member States before taking any decisive step.\textsuperscript{434} This means that when EU aid is suspended or cut, all Member States have agreed (or at least conceded) that the situation on the ground justifies a response affecting development cooperation. Second, Member States have signed several documents recommending the harmonization of their behaviour with the actions taken at the EU level.\textsuperscript{435} This

\textsuperscript{434} Interview 21; interview 40.
\textsuperscript{435} The most important one is undoubtedly: Council of the European Union, European Commission, and European Parliament, \textit{European Consensus on Development}, 2005.
means that, even though this framework is not binding, European aid presents unprecedented levels of coordination among participating agencies.

Against this background, it becomes obvious that this chapter should focus on cases of EU aid sanctions. It is when all Member States have agreed that suspension or reduction of development cooperation is the appropriate instrument to respond to human rights abuses, and when all Member States are under the expectation to coordinate their own bilateral policies, that variation between France and the UK should be most difficult to be found.

The universe of cases of EU aid sanctions is composed of all instances of application of political conditionality by the EU between 1991 and 2012. As seen in Chapter 4, since 1995 the EU has included a human rights clause in all its development agreements. Tacit decision-making rules envisage that the clause can be activated only by unanimous decision of the Council. This means that several cases of political conditionality are reported in EU official documents. After vetting all decisions of the Council of the EU between 1996 and December 2012, it can be concluded that human rights clauses have been used to suspend development cooperation with recipient governments in the following instances:

- Central African Republic (2003);
- Federal Islamic Republic of the Comoros (1999);
- Republic of Côte d'Ivoire (2000 and 2001);
- Republic of the Fiji Islands (2000 and 2007);
- Republic of Guinea (2004 and 2009);
- Republic of Guinea-Bissau (1999, 2003, 2011);
- Republic of Haiti (2000);
- Republic of Liberia (2001);
- Republic of Madagascar (2009);
- Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2005 and 2008);
- Republic of Niger (1996, 1999, 2009);
- Republic of Togo (1998 and 2004);
Some scholars assume that Council decisions on human rights clauses represent the complete universe of cases of EU aid sanctions. However, this assumption is fallacious. First of all, the above list does not take into account aid sanctions before 1996, that is, before the advent of the human rights clause policy. From 1991 to 1996 the suspension of EU aid was usually a *de facto* measure without any formal decision by EU institutions. For instance, in October 1993 the assassination of Melchior Ndadaye, the Head of State of Burundi, led the country into an armed conflict lasting until 2005. As the Lomé III Convention, which regulated cooperation between the EU and Burundi, did not include any human rights clause, the European Commission could not but *de facto* fully suspend cooperation from October 1993.

In addition, even after 1996, when human rights abuse take place, the first decision to suspend EU aid is usually taken by the Commission, in the person of the Development Commissioner, and this is not always reflected in Council decisions. Thus, for instance, on 22 March 2012 a group of Malian renegade soldiers looted the presidential palace and then overthrew the elected government of President Amadou Toumani Touré. The day after the coup, European Commissioner Andris Piebalgs stated: “Following yesterday’s coup d’état in Mali, I decided to suspend temporarily European Commission’s development operations in the country until the situation clarifies”. Commission-led suspensions of foreign aid are usually confirmed, later on, by a formal decision of the Council. However, this does not always occur.

Accordingly, the list of 23 cases listed above should be complemented with (a) pre-1996 cases of EU aid suspension and (b) cases of EU aid suspension decided by the Commission but not sanctioned by the Council. From 1991 to 2012, the EU suspended development aid without reference to any human rights clause in the following countries:

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438 Andris Piebalgs, *Press release: Coup d’état in Mali*, MEMO/12/214
- Belarus (1996);
- Burma/Myanmar (1991);
- Burundi (1993, 1996);
- the Central African Republic (1991 and 1996);
- Congo (1997);
- Côte d'Ivoire (2010);
- Djibouti (1991);
- DRC (1992);
- Equatorial Guinea (1992 and 1994);
- Gambia (1994);
- Guatemala (1993);
- Haiti (1991);
- Honduras (2009);
- Kenya (1991);
- Liberia (1990);
- Malawi (1992);
- Mali (2012);
- Mozambique (2010);
- Nicaragua (2008);
- Nigeria (1993 and 1995);
- Peru (1992 and 2000);
- Rwanda (1994);
- Russia (1999);
- Somalia (1991);
- Syria (2011);
- Sudan (1990);
- Tajikistan (1998);
- Togo (1993);
- Uzbekistan (2005);
- Zanzibar (1997).\textsuperscript{439}

\textsuperscript{439} The EU also suspended aid to Kenya in 2004 and Malawi in 2002, but this was related to problems of corruption rather than human rights violations or democratic setbacks.
The total number of cases of EU aid sanctions from 1991 to 2012 is thus 57 (an average of three cases per year).

Selecting a few case studies out of 57 is not a straightforward exercise. This is complicated by the fact that it is almost impossible to find recipient countries which have a similar donor-recipient relationship with both France and the UK. Most developing countries are former colonies of one of the two Member States. Most developing countries offer different economic or security opportunities to each of them. The result is that most recipient countries enjoy a special relationship with one of the two donors, but not with the other. Finding at least one case study in which the two donors can be directly compared with each other would be particularly important.

According to research design rules, the objective should also be to identify the cases where variation among EU Member States is expected to be the most difficult. Observing variation in cases where it is unlikely to occur would offer the strongest evidence in support of its existence. The findings from Chapter 4 suggest that the UK has internalized the norm of political conditionality to a larger extent than France. This means that least-likely cases are represented by those human rights violations that occur in recipient countries which have a special relationship with the UK. If the UK applies political conditionality in these cases, the adoption of the norm can be considered strong. In addition, if France is against the application of political conditionality in these cases (where it should not have particular interests to defend), the adoption of the norm can be considered to be particularly weak. The opposite is true for human rights abuses which occur in recipient countries which have a special relationship with France. The expectation here is that France will be against the application of political conditionality, but it will be difficult to distinguish low degree of norm internalisation from fundamental material interests.

440 This strategy follows the general suggestion to select least-likely cases: A. Bennett and C. Elman, “Case Study Methods in the International Relations Subfield,” Comparative Political Studies 40, no. 2 (2007): 173. The least-likely case study relies on what Levy has dubbed the “Sinatra inference”: “If the theory can make it here, it can make it anywhere”. See Jack S. Levy, “Qualitative Methods in International Relations,” in Evaluating Methodology in International Studies, ed. Michael Brecher and Frank P. Harvey (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 144.
Following this line of reasoning, the chapter will focus on two “fundamental” case studies (one in which France and Britain can be compared directly with each other and one with a special relationship with Britain) and two “additional” ones (including at least one with a special relationship with France).

The first fundamental case study is Mozambique. There are at last four reasons why the analysis of European donors’ reaction to human rights abuses in Mozambique is important for this chapter. First, Mozambique was not a former colony either of France or of the Britain. Second, Mozambique is of little strategic political or economic importance for France or the UK. According to Howard, “Mozambique was never high on the priority list for any of the major world powers”. 441 Indeed, France and the UK do not feature among the most important donors in the country, such as Portugal, the former colonial power, the Scandinavian countries, which felt sympathetic with the left-wing regime since the Cold War, and Italy, which maintains a high profile in the country as a result of its key role during the peace negotiation process. Yet, France and the UK are often included in the lists of “key” donor countries, in a comparable position. 442 Third, Mozambique is one of the countries with the highest number of donors, all roughly equivalent to each other. Major donors include Canada, Denmark, the EU, France, Ireland, Italy, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, the US and the UK. Not only Mozambique is also a donor darling which entertains one of the most elaborate budget support partnerships in the world, with direct government-to-government flows accounting for almost half its budget. 443 Mozambique is often cited as an example of the effective use of direct budget support to further the Paris Declaration goal of donor coordination and harmonization. 444 Since 2004, a group of 19 donors (G19) have joined forces and provided budget support to the government for

441 Lise Morjé Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 188.
443 Isabelle Ramdoo, “Mozambique, Aid and Foreign Investment: Trapped between Scylla and Charybdis?,” *GREAT Insights* 1, no. 10 (December 2012): 7–8.
implementation of the Mozambican Poverty Reduction Strategy. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) at the basis of the budget support programme explicitly includes political conditionality. In addition, “although the G19 have reserved the power to cut off funding, individually or collectively, in the event of major corruption or where the “underlying principles” of the agreement are violated, they have made an important concession to stop donors acting unilaterally. The new agreement forces donors to work through the G19, even when there is disagreement within the group, before taking any unilateral action”. Molenaers, Cepinskas and Jacobs even reported that some donors “felt that the level of harmonization in Mozambique creates a peer pressure that is in some circumstances unhealthy: it restraints a smaller or weaker donor from taking another position. Taking a different stand then all of a sudden is seen as if one is deviating from the collectively established norm”. Lastly, the EU, that is, the Commission and its Member States, represents by far the largest donor of aid to Mozambique, providing 80% of total assistance. This means that coordinated efforts among EU Member States could produce significant pressure on the government.

The second “fundamental” case study is Zimbabwe. The only former British colonies which have been subject to EU aid sanctions decided within the Council are Fiji and Zimbabwe. As France is a modest donor in Zimbabwe, while it is insignificant in Fiji, the decision fell on the African country. Other reasons behind the selection of

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445 Budget support donors, known as the G19 or Programme Aid Partners (PAPs), are the African Development Bank, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the World Bank (the US is not part of the group because its policy is not to provide general budget support). The G19 is governed by what it calls the “troika plus”. Three donors serve for three years, with one new member being elected each year and serving as chair in the second year. The “plus” are the European Commission and World Bank, who deserve permanent seats because, as they are described in the MoU, they are the “two most influential PAP donors”.


449 Numerous commentators agree that things are changing. Mozambique is rapidly reducing its dependence on Western donors, mainly due to squeezed aid budgets, increasing mining and hydrocarbon royalties and new donors (such as China, Brazil and South Africa): Francesca Bruschi, “Mozambique at a Turning Point: From Aid Dependence to Development Effectiveness?,” GREAT Insights 1, no. 10 (December 2012): 9–10.
Zimbabwe include the following. First, at the end of the 1990s Zimbabwe was wealthier than most of the other recipient countries under EU aid sanctions. This made it particularly resilient to pressure through aid suspension. The relatively low probability of success of external pressure entails that the application of political conditionality towards the Zimbabwean government should derive from strong adoption of the norm. Even with a high risk of failure, aid sanctions were perceived as the appropriate thing to do. Second, numerous EU Member States had missions and aid programmes in the country: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. This offers an interesting field to be compared with French and British behaviour. Third, Zimbabwe is the first case in which EU aid suspension were complemented by “restrictive measures” (that is, smart sanctions) under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Since restrictive measures are considered tougher than appropriate measures, the adoption of CFSP sanctions signals the existence of strong consensus among EU Member States. This adds another point to the fact that Zimbabwe represents a least-likely case for variation of policy responses. Lastly, Zimbabwe is the only example in which Article 96 consultations were started even though the level of freedom of participation was better than in an average ACP country, and had even improved from the previous year. This makes it a good complement to other case studies which are mainly centred on electoral politics.

The first “additional” case study is Madagascar. Among the numerous cases of former French colonies under EU aid sanctions decided within the Council, this chapter will concentrate on Madagascar. The 2009 coup is one of the most recent cases of appropriate measures under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement, and this leads to higher expectations of convergence with other Member States (almost 15

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452 It is also interesting to note that the unsound economic policies of the Zimbabwean government triggered a humanitarian crisis that compelled the EU to hugely increase the amount of humanitarian aid. Even though EU bilateral cooperation declined after the adoption of aid sanctions in 2002, the surge in humanitarian assistance meant that the total aid disbursement has augmented since the beginning of the 1990s.
years had passed since the EU started to adopt common positions on political conditionality). The fact that the events are recent also makes it easier to identify and interview relevant people since most of them are still in the same professional position or have moved only once (staff tend to stay 3 to 4 years in a country and then move on to another country or headquarters). Importantly, the case also offers the opportunity to compare French behaviour with a varied set of Western donors, including an EU Member State (Germany), a European country which is not an EU Member State (Norway) and the US.\textsuperscript{453}

Lastly, the chapter analyses the case of Nicaragua in order to expand the scope of the dissertation outside of the African boundaries. Among the cases of EU aid sanctions decided within the Council, Haiti was too far away in time (2000), and Fiji would be problematic given the minimal aid contribution by both France and the UK. Among the cases of EU aid sanctions decided by the Commission, Honduras represented a credible alternative. However, preliminary interviews with diplomats in both countries suggested the existence of larger variation among European donors in Nicaragua. This made it a more interesting case for the purposes of this dissertation.

A final point concerns the methodology of comparison. As mentioned above, it is almost impossible to meaningfully compare France and the UK in any specific recipient country (with the possible exception of Mozambique). The strategy adopted by this chapter is thus to compare the behaviour of France and the UK with other relevant donors in the country. Does the UK usually take the side of the hardliners? Does France often try to encourage engagement? This method also allows me to solve the problems related to the feasibility of aid sanctions. It would be unfair to judge France and Britain for not adopting aid sanctions when no other country adopted them. Instead, it is interesting to discover whether, in those cases when sanctions are possible (as demonstrated by the behaviour of other donors), the two country apply them or not.

\textsuperscript{453} In this respect, the selection of Madagascar is equivalent to the potential selection of Guinea-Conakry, Mauritania, Niger and Togo.
5.3. The case studies of Mozambique and Zimbabwe

5.3.1. Mozambique

Mozambique gained independence from Portugal in 1975. After only two years of independence, the country descended into an intense and protracted civil war between the Marxist ruling party, Front of Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), and the opposition forces of the anti-Communist Mozambique Resistance Movement (RENAMO), lasting from 1977 to 1992. In 1994, Mozambique held its first multiparty elections and, since then, has remained relatively stable, with an annual average GDP growth which is among the world’s highest. Since 1994 Mozambican elections have always been won by the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) and Mozambican Presidents (Joaquim Chissano from 1994 to 2004 and Armando Guebuza from 2004 onwards) have both come from the same party.

Despite its economic successes, in recent times Mozambique’s democratic credentials have been tarnished by FRELIMO’s growing monopoly on power at all levels and by serious problems in the administration of local and national elections. Political researchers have categorized Mozambique as a ‘managed

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454 For a comprehensive history of Mozambique, see Malyn Newitt, A History of Mozambique (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995).
democracy’, comparing it to the authoritarian regimes in Indonesia under Suharto, the South Korean developmental state, and South Africa under the African National Congress. Apparently, democratization reinforced FRELIMO’s territorial control, and the replacement of Joaquim Alberto Chissano by Armando Guebuza lead to a return to party precedence over the state.

The 2009 presidential, legislative and first ever provincial assembly elections triggered a crisis between donors and the government. Two events prompted the reaction by international actors. First, a new political party, the Democratic Movement of Mozambique (Movimento Democrático de Moçambique, MDM), was barred from running in nine of the 13 parliamentary regions because of an alleged failure to comply with administrative regulations. The move was considered politically motivated, as both FRELIMO and RENAMO had a vested interest in ensuring that MDM did not emerge strongly in the elections. Second, independent observers documented widespread irregularities on the day of the elections, including ballot stuffing and tabulation fraud at some polling stations. Hanlon argued that the ballot “was tainted by misconduct, unfairness, and secrecy”. Manning commented that FRELIMO’s victory came “in the wake of an election in which the ruling party manipulated the legal institutions of election administration and used its

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extensive influence over access to economic resources to tilt the playing field dramatically against the opposition”.  

In response to this event, the EU suspended general budget support to Mozambique in 2010. EU action was part of the so-called “donor strike”, a concerted move by all budget support donors (G19) which included the freeze of budget support for 2010 and the exclusion of any form of increase in budget support for 2011. In December 2009 Kari Alanko, Finnish Ambassador and Chair of the G19, sent a letter to the Mozambican government, demanding rapid moves on electoral law reforms, corruption, conflict of interest, and the overlap between FRELIMO and the state. Relevant parts of the letters read as follows:

I wish to formally advise the Government of Mozambique of the G19’s serious concerns on governance and electoral issues. … They relate to serious governance shortcomings, essentially those identified in the previous political dialogues, and also in the reports of the EU Elections Observation Mission and the African Peer Review Mechanism. … Based on this, there is a view, for many, that a breach may have occurred of the Underlying Principles of the MoU. To address these concerns, we wish to initiate an early dialogue with the Government of Mozambique. … There is a strong desire on the part of the partners we represent to sustain the heretofore excellent relationship with the Government of Mozambique. … There are a large number of concerns which were both technocratic and democratic in nature”: Molenaers, Cepinskas, and Jacobs, Budget Support and Policy/political Dialogue. Donor Practices in Handling (political) Crises, 25.

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464 This is the interpretation of most commentators and official assessment reports. For instance, the assessment report of Irish aid refers to the “donor strike” as the case “when donors reacted strongly to the exclusion of an opposition party from many constituencies”: Stephen Lister et al., Evaluation of the Irish Aid Mozambique Country Strategy 2007-2010 (Oxford: Mokoro Ltd, August 28, 2011), 10.


466 Wikileaks, Goverment of Mozambique Responds Harshly to Donor Concerns on Governance (Maputo: Embassy of the United States, January 13, 2010), §9.
The letter was accompanied by the news that budget support was suspended. As the funds normally start flowing in January, the donors informed the government that new disbursements were made contingent on the successful conclusion of political dialogue. After a month and a half of “crispação” (“political tension”), on 5 February 2010 Aiuba Cuereneia, Minister for Planning and Development and the main government negotiator with the donors, sent a reply to the G19, offering a few concessions. Negotiations in early March led to an agreement announced 24 March and to the resumption of the flow of money. The Governance Action Plan that was set up to guide future donor disbursement decisions confirmed the relevance of political issues for the donors. In addition to aspects related to economic governance, corruption and land redistribution, the points of agreement included reforms in the country’s electoral legislation and changes in the parliamentary rules (in order to allow MDM to create an official parliamentary group).

Even though all G19 countries signed the December letter, heated discussions took place on whether the MoU was violated. Lawson concluded a multi-donor joint

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468 The aid strike started to produce effects on public finances only in February because big donors such as the World Bank and European Union had made substantial disbursements before the strike started in December: “If Donor Strike Continues, Government May Alter Budget,” Club of Mozambique, March 8, 2010, http://www.clubofmozambique.com/solutions1/sectionnews.php?secao=mozambique&id=17682&tipo=one.


471 The MoU sets out the principles underlying the partnership between donors and government, and stipulates that a breach of any of these principles constitutes a legitimate ground for suspension of budget support. The underlying principles were: (1) safeguarding peace and promoting free, credible and democratic political processes, independence of the judiciary, rule of law, respect for human
assessment of development cooperation with Mozambique by saying that “the shortfalls in disbursements in the first two quarters of 2010 … were the results of deliberate delays in disbursements by some bilateral Budget Support providers, due to concerns over the ‘underlying principles’ for Budget Support having been potentially breached, through electoral irregularities in the national elections of October 2009”\textsuperscript{472}. According to Rasmussen, “a majority of the G19 froze their pledges for 2010 due to disappointment with the ruling FRELIMO party’s poor performance on transparent governance, anti-corruption, mixing party and state, fighting conflict of interest and the exclusion of parties at last year’s elections”.\textsuperscript{473}

Who where these “some” donors, this majority?

According to a cable from the US Ambassador in Maputo, the G19 Heads of Mission reviewed three options: 1) do nothing but request a deeper dialogue with the government on democracy and governance issues; 2) suspend but not cancel budget support payments pending government commitments on governance issues; and 3) declare an immediate breach of the underlying principles and reduce direct budget support, and launch a negotiation with the government on next steps to restore budget support. The US Ambassador reported that

The United Kingdom, Canada, Switzerland, and Sweden were all prepared to declare an immediate breach of the democratic principles and reduce budget support. The UK High Commissioner, along with the DFID representative, were firm in supporting the immediate declaration of a breach, an announcement of a reallocation of some amount of budget support to other projects, and the commencement of negotiations with the government of Mozambique to reach an agreement on steps which must be taken to restore the totality of budget support. The DFID representative said “we (the donors) have lost our credibility because we've been too patient for too long”. The Nordic, the Irish, the German, and the Dutch Ambassadors also are considering reductions, but preferred first rights, good governance and probity in public life, including the fight against corruption; (2) prioritising fighting poverty through its policies and plans and in its patterns of public expenditure; and (3) pursuing sound macro-economic policies and public financial management systems. Government of the Republic of Mozambique and Programme Aid Partners, Memorandum of Understanding, Section 2.


to suspend temporarily budget support to provide a “shock effect” to the
government of Mozambique in anticipation of negotiations.\textsuperscript{474}

The Southern Europeans (Portugal, Spain, and Italy) resisted any tough message and
argued for the status quo.\textsuperscript{475} On December 4, the G19 Heads of Mission met again to
debate the issues. The EC Representative reiterated his opposition to a strong course
of action, noting that political dialogue should take place within the Cotonou
Agreement framework.\textsuperscript{476} The UK High Commissioner responded that the EC has to
respect its Cotonou commitments, but “the rest of us, as independent sovereign
nations, have every right and intention to determine how best to administer our
assistance to Mozambique”.\textsuperscript{477} Frustrated by the procedural manoeuvrings of the EC
and Portugal, the “like-minded” countries (Nordics, Dutch, Germans, Swiss, British,
Canadians and the United States) said that they were prepared to raise concerns
jointly with the Mozambican government should the G19 mechanism fail to produce
any real pressure.\textsuperscript{478}

Political commentators confirm the narrative from the US Ambassador. According to
Joseph Hanlon, “Ireland led the strike. It received more support initially from
Northern countries, including the UK, which was supportive at the beginning of the
strike”.\textsuperscript{479} Marc de Tollenaere argued that “the most progressive group was
composed by the like-minded: Nordics, Netherlands, UK, Ireland, Switzerland,
Canada. On the other end of the spectrum were Spain, Italy and certainly Portugal. In
the middle is a group that goes with the flow (Germany, Belgium, France,
Austria)”.\textsuperscript{480} The most important news agency in Maputo reported that

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\textsuperscript{474} Wikileaks, Europeans and Canadians Consider Response to Mozambique’s Flawed Elections
(Maputo: Embassy of the United States, December 4, 2009), §4.
\textsuperscript{475} Ibid., §5.
\textsuperscript{476} Interestingly, the mediation attempt by the European Commission led to a bureaucratic battle with
the most vocal Member States. Under the leadership of EU Head of Delegation Glauco Calzuola, the
EU Commission tried to use the newly-approved Lisbon Treaty to obstruct the most vocal European
country missions wishing to engage the Mozambican government more fully on democracy and
governance concerns: Wikileaks, Donor Coordination Mechanisms: Increasing Unites States
Government Influence in Multi-Lateral Political Dialogue (Maputo: Embassy of the United States,
February 19, 2010), §11.
\textsuperscript{477} Wikileaks, Europeans and Canadians Consider Response to Mozambique’s Flawed Elections, §8.
\textsuperscript{478} Ibid., §9.
\textsuperscript{479} Interview with Joseph Hanlon, Senior Lecturer in Development Policy and Practice at the Open
University, 6 May 2013.
\textsuperscript{480} Interview 25.
the donor strike … was far from complete. One of the largest contributors to the state budget is the World Bank and, according to Finance Minister Manuel Chang, the World Bank budget contribution (110 million US dollars for this year) has come through as promised. Some of the smaller budget support contributors (such as Portugal, Italy and France) have made it clear that they are not in favour of withholding funds.481

The French position was later confirmed by a trip of the French Secretary of State for Foreign Trade, Anne-Marie Idrac, at the beginning of March 2010. Local commentators interpreted the visit as “an indication that France, like Portugal and Italy, does not regard the donor strike as a useful tactic”.482

The strike not only meant the temporary suspension of disbursements.483 At the ceremony delivering the aid commitments, the G19 Chair, Irish Ambassador Frank Sheridan, announced that several donors could have increased their budget support but chose not to do so because of poor performance by the Mozambican government. Newspaper singled out Britain and the Netherlands.484 During the negotiations for the donor strike, the UK already noted its willingness to reduce direct budget support assistance by at least 10 percent in 2010.485 In addition, the donors which were more in favour of the strike (including Denmark, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK) decided to attach a variable tranche mechanism to their decisions on GBS disbursements.486

485 Wikileaks, Goverment of Mozambique Responds Harshly to Donor Concerns on Governance, §2.
486 Lawson, Independent Evaluation of Budget Support in Mozambique: Final Report - Volume I, 81; Bruschi, “Mozambique at a Turning Point: From Aid Dependence to Development Effectiveness?,” 10. Interviewees reported that these performance tranches were not linked to any democratic advancement because democracy already constitutes one of the essential elements of the partnership. If democracy worsens, “the whole package is at risk”: Interview 97.
More recent events confirm the differences among donors. In September 2013 a new private (but effectively state-owned) company, the Empresa Moçambicana de Atum (Ematum), signed a $200 million contract with Constructions Mecaniques de Normandie (CMN), a French shipbuilder, to refurbish the tiny Mozambican Navy, whose ships were all donated by other countries, and buy 24 trawlers, three interceptors and three patrol vessels. The contract was financed through a $850 million bond yielding 8.5% and maturing in 2020. There was no public discussion that the government was about to establish a major fishing fleet and a navy overnight. Mozambique officials eventually confirmed it, and commented that the ships will help fight illegal trafficking and piracy, and protect fishery operations as well as offshore oil and gas drilling platforms. As the patrol ships will need naval guns and other military equipment, there are also negotiations under way about buying the needed weaponry from France.

By the time the revelations of the $850 million Eurobond came, the issue was immediately inserted at the top of the agenda of the G19. Divergences soon appeared. Diplomats report a similar pattern to the donor strike. The World Bank, the EU and smaller donors, including Italy, France and Portugal, were content to continue providing the funds. In contrast, Britain, Sweden and Denmark were “the most in favour of withholding payment” and eventually (together with Germany) did not disburse the money as planned. These donors were also disappointed when the IMF produced a report in January effectively recommending that donors make

491 “Aid Row Escalates.”
their disbursements as planned. One senior diplomatic source in Maputo said: “The IMF now want us to disburse. But that is not going to happen … if they get away with Ematum, then there is no hope for accountability in general”.492 The Nordics, the UK and the US also lobbied the World Bank and the EU to delay their final disbursement of 2013.493

Importantly, the main rationale for suspensions after the Ematum scandal were transparency and public financial management.494 However, numerous interviewees suggested that the motives are more complex, and includes anxieties on the democratic direction of the country. Some of them compared the situation to the donor strike: “Some donors are tired of fighting for small bits of the big problem. The problem is a problem of trust and accountability. It involves corruption, transparency and democracy”. Another diplomat commented that “the lack of progress in the democratic environment certainly played a role in the decision to suspend aid. It was not the only concern. It might not have been the primary concern. But it influenced the donors. And the message was made clear to the government”.495 Other sources confirm that “donors were worried that the extensive electoral frauds which FRELIMO activists committed during the previous local elections might be repeated on a grander scale in the 2014 October general elections. Corruption, secretive arms purchases and a rise in poverty indices under President Armando Guebuza are other worries”.496 In addition, there are also specific suspicions that “the contract may help finance the presidential election campaign of the governing Frelimo in 2014”.497 Roberto Vellano, the Italian Ambassador and G19 Chair, confirmed the identity of two countries which had delayed pledges, Britain and

492 “Donors up in Arms.”
494 According to Africa Confidential, there are at least five concerns about the deal: 1. EMATUM, the company which is to operate the fleet, was established in August and is borrowing some $850 mn. for its operations, with a state guarantee; 2. The effect of these extraordinary financial arrangements, given that Mozambique already has an enormous public debt; 3. There was no international tendering on the deal despite the state guaranteeing the loan; 4. There is no indication which organisation, private or state, is going to pay for the cost of training the civilian and military sailors; 5. There is no information about what will happen to existing maritime patrols (arranged with South Africa) and medium-term commercial agreements on tuna-fishing rights. See “The Mystery Ship Deal,” Africa Confidential, November 1, 2013, http://www.africa-confidential.com.libproxy.kcl.ac.uk/article/id/5098/The_mystery_ship_deal.
495 Interview 53.
496 “Donors up in Arms.”
497 “The Mystery Ship Deal.”
Germany, and suggested that they did so “partly because of preoccupations relating to Ematum”.498

The consequences of the events covered above seem to be long-lasting. According to Vellano, “concerns over fiscal transparency, fighting corruption and other outstanding issues” had led “some partners to think they could no longer confirm their participation in this kind of support”.499 Four donors have already ceased their budget support programmes: Norway and the Netherlands over concerns about transparency and democracy, Belgium and Spain because of the fiscal crisis.500 On 13 June 2014 Britain announced that DfID will not disburse general budget support to Mozambique any more. The new British High Commissioner, Joanna Kuenssberg, said financing “will be clearly linked to the delivery of the policies and actions necessary for inclusive economic growth: for example, strengthening public financial management, the fight against corruption and improving the investment climate”.501 Kuenssberg also said that the decision to end budget support did not mean that Britain is “abandoning Mozambique”. There would instead be new forms of aid, tied to indicators on good governance.502 Interviews with DfID and FCO representatives highlighted that one of the main reasons behind the new programme is the aspiration to conduct independent assessments of progress in good governance, including democratic advancements.503 In this respect, prolonged discussions among donors on what to include and what not to include in the new MoU with the government influenced the British decision.

The previous MoU was supposed to end at the beginning of 2014. However, it was prolonged for one year in order to wait for the October elections. Debates among donors revolved around numerous issues, including the role of political dialogue and the potential consequences of breaches of the essential elements. Allegedly, the

501 “Aid Row Escalates.”
503 The new name of the modality seems to be “economic development policy grant”.

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inability to obtain a strengthened performance framework have prompted the UK to leave the budget support group and conduct its own assessment process.

5.3.2. Zimbabwe

The current Zimbabwean President, Robert Mugabe, has held office since Zimbabwe’s internationally recognised independence in 1980. Widely renowned across the African continent as a champion of the anti-colonial cause, Mugabe was initially praised by Western donors for the achievement of good results in poverty reduction. Yet, since the end of the 1990s, a grave political and economic crisis affected the country. As a brief and general introduction, suffice it here to mention that the crisis had historical roots centred on intricate interactions between land grievances, the constructions of nationhood and state formation. In a post-colonial context where the great majority of fertile land was owned by a small minority of white people, Mugabe’s position shifted from prosecuting illegal farm settlers to actively encouraging the violent seizure of white-owned commercial farms. The key turning point in this transition occurred in 1997, when the state agreed to meet long-neglected demands for financial compensation and land allocation from war veterans of Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle. This created a strong alliance between the State, peasants and war veterans, an alliance which repeatedly mobilized every

504 For a general overview of the history of Zimbabwean, see Brian Raftopoulos and Alois Mlambo, eds., Becoming Zimbabwe. A History from the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008 (Harare: Weaver Press, 2009).


time that Mugabe was at risk of losing the handles of power. The diffusion of a narrative called ‘patriotic history’ was simultaneously used to marginalize opposition supporters.

In this context, two series of events triggered the adoption of EU aid sanctions. First of all, Zimbabwe intervened in the Congo War in 1998. Second, in 2000 Mugabe proposed a referendum to change the constitution. The proposed amendments would have granted Mugabe the chance to stand as President for another two terms, and would have permitted the confiscation of white-owned land without compensation. The failure in the constitutional referendum was a watershed moment for future human rights abuses and electoral irregularities. Since then, Mugabe fastened the process of land acquisition and worsened human rights abuses against his opponents. Some commentators even wrote about the beginning of a

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511 Almost all scholars agree that the reaction by European donors is a consequence of multiple concerns, including regional stability, protection of the white minority, and human rights protection. The most critical observers emphasize material interests over normative objectives. For instance, Mamdani argued that “the normative language of sanctions focuses less on the issues that prompted them in the first place — Zimbabwe’s intervention in the Congo war and the introduction of fast-track reform — than on the need for ‘good governance’. In citing the absence of this as a reason for its imposition of sanctions in 2002, the EU violated Article 98 of the Cotonou Agreement, which requires that disputes between African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and the EU be resolved by the joint EU-ACP Council of Ministers”; Mahmood Mamdani, “Lessons of Zimbabwe,” London Review of Books, December 4, 2008, 20.


In addition, Mugabe blatantly rigged the subsequent parliamentary and presidential elections, in 2000 and 2002 respectively. Bush and Sfetzel summarized the situation in the following terms:

About the general nature of the events that occurred during the last two or more years, there can be little dispute. Although information is patchy and not always reliable, and there has been much exaggeration and hysteria on both sides, the sheer volume of reports of widespread, calculated and brutal electoral corruption and thuggery – overwhelmingly perpetrated by the government and its supporters – is such that there can be no question but that the election campaign was a stain on the country's political history and that it has added substantially to Africa’s disgraceful record of abuses of human and political rights.

Responses by international donors started at the end of the 1990s, when numerous agencies shifted their programmes from government collaboration to NGO channels. Mainly due to debt mismanagement and the failure to service debt obligations, the World Bank stopped funding in October 2000 and the IMF suspended cooperation at the end of 2001. An unfavourable report on the 2002 elections by the Commonwealth Observer Group led to the decision to suspend Zimbabwe from participation in Commonwealth affairs for a year. At the end of the 2003, the

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Commonwealth confirmed the suspension, and Zimbabwe withdrew from the organisation.\textsuperscript{518}

As far as the EU is concerned, the Council of the EU called for consultations under Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement in February 2001 and the parties began a political dialogue one month later. Lack of significant cooperation by the Zimbabwean government prompted the Commission to increase the pressure by invoking Zimbabwe’s breach of the essential elements of the Agreement and recommending both the beginning of consultations under Article 96 and the scaling down of development cooperation. Consultations started in January 2002, on the eve of the 2002 Presidential elections. The increase in political violence, the continuation of the fast-track land reform programme and, perhaps as important, the obstacles to the deployment of the EU election observation team were considered sufficient proof of the unwillingness of Mugabe to improve the situation.\textsuperscript{519} On 18 February, consultations were brought to a halt and the Council announced the adoption of “appropriate measures”, including the suspension of budgetary support under Zimbabwe’s 7th and 8th European Development Fund National Indicative Programmes, the suspension of the signature of the whole Zimbabwe’s 9th EDF NIP, and the suspension of all projects except those in direct support of the population, particularly in the social sectors, democratization, respect for human rights and the rule of law.\textsuperscript{520} On the same day, the Council also adopted “restrictive measures” (including an arms embargo, visa bans and the freezing of assets).\textsuperscript{521}

The whole EU decision-making process leading to the adoption of sanctions presented a surprising situation. The UK, the former colonial power with vested


\textsuperscript{520} Council of European Union, Concluding Consultations with Zimbabwe Under Article 96 of the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, Brussels, February 18, 2002.

\textsuperscript{521} Common Position 2002/145/CFSP, 18 February 2002.
interests in the country, lobbied in favour of both appropriate and restrictive measures. On the contrary, France (which has never been a large donor in Zimbabwe) adopted a welcoming approach. Taylor and Williams recall that Britain played an important role in the EU’s decision to put increasing pressure against the government of Zimbabwe.522 According to Youde, “within the Council, and its preparatory meetings, the UK, the Nordic countries, the Netherlands and Germany took a ‘hard line’. France, Belgium, Italy and Spain were more moderate. France, in particular, opposed invoking Article 96”.523 Compagnon agrees and adds that “the differences between member states were both ideological (France, Spain and Italy were more reluctant to apply political conditionality) and tactical (originally they argued that this political pressure on Mugabe would fail to mollify him and provide him with a powerful propaganda asset)”.524 The International Crisis Group confirms that “the UK was the first and, for a while, only champion among EU member states for tough action against Mugabe in the first half of 2001”.525 Even later in the year, the EU “has had difficulty speaking with one voice on Zimbabwe”: some Member States (the Scandinavians, the Dutch, and the UK) wanted to act quickly and increase pressure on Mugabe; others, like France and Belgium, insisted that time for action was not yet ripe.526

The position of the Labour Government was expressly confronted with the soft approach adopted by the Thatcher government during the 1980s. Robin Cook reminded that, at the time of the ‘Matabeleland massacres’,

there was not a word of criticism from any Minister. There was no cut in overseas aid – on the contrary, Lady Thatcher increased aid by £10 million at the time of the massacres. No attempt was made to use the Commonwealth

522 Ian Taylor and Paul Williams, “The Limits of Engagement: British Foreign Policy and the Crisis in Zimbabwe,” International Affairs 78, no. 3 (2002): 555. Williams also reports that the UK was behind the suspension of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth: Paul Williams, “Who’s Making UK Foreign Policy?,” International Affairs 80, no. 5 (2004): 916. Jack Straw, the then British Foreign Secretary, affirmed that the British government would “continue to work in close cooperation with the US and through the EU and Commonwealth to oppose Zimbabwe’s access to international financial resources until a more representative government is in place”: Taylor and Williams, “The Limits of Engagement,” 556.
523 Interview with Jeremy Youde, Head and Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota Duluth, 25 April 2013.
524 Interview with Daniel Compagnon, Professor at the Centre Emile Durkheim, 13 May 2013
526 Ibid.
against Zimbabwe at the time. It is no wonder that President Mugabe let it be known that he was grateful for the British Government’s restraint.\textsuperscript{527} In contrast with the British attitude, Cilliers recalls that at the beginning of 2001, “to the dismay of the British, who were at the forefront of condemning Harare for its derogation of the rule of law, President Robert Mugabe … was given a warm Gallic reception by President Jacques Chirac in Paris”.\textsuperscript{528} In the end, however, France left the EU-Zimbabwe policy largely to the British. This was in line with its agreement with the UK in Saint Malo in 1998, which stipulated that both countries should respect each other’s Africa policy.\textsuperscript{529}

Variation between France and the UK is blatant not only at the multilateral level, but also if one looks at bilateral relationships. According to Addison and Laakso, the UK “has been most active in applying diplomatic pressure” against Mugabe.\textsuperscript{530} In May 2000, the UK had already halted the provision of 450 Land Rovers to the Zimbabwe police force, withdrew the British Military Advisory Training Team, and cut aid to Zimbabwe by one-third.\textsuperscript{531} Since 2001, DfID stopped all operations with the government and channelled all aid through multilateral organisations or NGOs.\textsuperscript{532} Together with the UK, hardliners included Sweden, Denmark and the US. Sweden suspended aid at the end of 2001.\textsuperscript{533} In December 2001, President George W. Bush signed into law the \textit{Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001} (ZDERA). Among other things, the law instructed American officials in international financial institutions to “oppose and vote against any extension by the respective

\textsuperscript{527} \textit{Hansard} (Commons), 27 March 2001, col. 799. \\
\textsuperscript{528} Cilliers, “Still...France versus the Rest in Africa?,” 124. See also Tony Chafer, “Franco-African Relations: No Longer so Exceptional?,” \textit{African Affairs} 101, no. 404 (2002): 351. \\
\textsuperscript{529} Laakso, Kivimäki, and Seppänen, \textit{Evaluation of Coordination and Coherence in the Application of Article 96 of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement}, 70. \\
\textsuperscript{530} Addison and Laakso, “The Political Economy of Zimbabwe’s Descent into Conflict,” 468. \\
\textsuperscript{531} Taylor and Williams, “The Limits of Engagement,” 555. Certain programmes, such as those tackling the AIDS pandemic and those supporting basic sanitation in rural Zimbabwe, were continued. \\
\textsuperscript{532} For a comprehensive overview of DfID programmes in Zimbabwe, see International Development Committee, \textit{DfID’s Assistance to Zimbabwe}, Eighth Report of Session 2009-10 (London: House, March 16, 2010), Chapter 4. \\
institution of any loan, credit, or guarantee to the government of Zimbabwe”, and to vote against any reduction or cancellation of “indebtedness owed by the government of Zimbabwe”. In January 2002, Thor Pedersen, the then Danish Finance Minister, announced that “the government will pursue an assistance policy with a higher degree of consistency. Systematic, constant violations of human rights and democratic rules will no longer be accepted. Therefore, development cooperation with Zimbabwe … [and its] status as programme countr[y] will cease”. Hansen commented that, “even though the initial response may have not been as strict and consequent as the British and Danish ones”, other Western donors acted “on the same premises. In 2001 most donors … made cuts in aid and loans and strongly criticized the deterioration of law and order and the violations of human rights in Zimbabwe”. France represents an exception.

According to Masiya, “while the UK restricted development support both at bilateral and EU levels, France maintained bilateral support. … Countries like France were torn between following EU collective principles and seizing the opportunity created by UK’s retreat for it (France) to make new political and economic gains in Zimbabwe”. Grebe confirms that in 2001 France “extended bilateral development cooperation with Zimbabwe at the same time most of the other EU countries were drastically reducing cooperation”. Given the situation, the European Parliament found it justified to take the uncommon step to single out a single Member State. In its resolution of 6 September 2001, it criticized the French government, stating that “whereas most [EU] Member States have substantially cut or suspended their financial support and development aid to Zimbabwe, … France had significantly increased its engagement”, and called on Paris “to adhere to the line taken by the

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537 Interview with Tyanai Masiya, former consultant to the EU development programme in Zimbabwe, 5 May 2013.
The soft stance adopted by France is confirmed by other researchers:

EU Member States and the EC delegation have coordinated their positions through Heads of Missions (HOMs) meetings. The UK, for example, organized regular meetings during its Presidency. A group of like-minded countries regularly communicates to form a common view. Direct informal contacts are important and extend to non-EU states as well, including the United States, Canada and Australia. Such cooperation excludes some Member States: most importantly France, which today is one of the largest creditors to Zimbabwe. The different position at the bilateral level is also showed by the repeated attempts from France (as well as Italy and Belgium) to find exemptions to Mugabe’s travel bans. After the adoption of the restrictive measures, the different attitude of the two countries was evident from a few contrasting episodes. If one looks at the French side, in May 2002, just three months after the travel ban took effect, Robert Mugabe travelled via Paris to the United Nations in New York. In August of the same year, police commissioner Augustine Chihuri, who was on the sanction list, was granted a visa to attend an Interpol conference in Lyon. If one looks at the British side, in July 2002, Deputy Secretary for the Disabled and Disadvantaged Joshua Malinga was prevented from continuing his trip to New York by British authorities in London. Under British pressure, a planned meeting of EU and Southern African ministers in Copenhagen was switched to Maputo, in Mozambique.

540 Laakso, Kivimäki, and Seppänen, Evaluation of Coordination and Coherence in the Application of Article 96 of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, 71.
541 Mikael Eriksson, Targeting the Leadership of Zimbabwe: A Path to Democracy and Normalization? (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 2007), 71.
In one of the most blatant representations of the different attitude between the two countries, French President Jacques Chirac granted Mugabe a travel permit in February 2003 to attend a Franco-African summit meeting. The UK, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden immediately protested against the exemption. However, they “were concerned that if they formally opposed [it], France and Portugal (perhaps joined by Italy and Greece) would refuse to extend the sanctions regime when it came up for renewal” the day before the event. Indeed, France allegedly threatened to veto the renewal of the sanctions if it was not allowed to host Mugabe in Paris. Townsend and Copson commented that France is generally seen as favouring more engagement with the Mugabe regime than Britain or other EU members … Chirac justified the move by arguing that the inclusion of Mugabe rather than isolation would provide a quicker path to easing the Zimbabwe crisis … Chirac is reportedly sympathetic to the quiet diplomacy initiative of President Mbeki.

At the Summit, France also supported President Mbeki’s pursuit of a government of national unity, against the firm refusal of any compromise with Mugabe by other European donors.

This situation apparently changed in 2004, “when London and Paris effectively struck a deal whereby France backs UK efforts on Zimbabwe, particularly within the EU, while the British support France on Cote d’Ivoire”.

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closed the gap between the two donors at the bilateral level, France continued to press to re-engage with Mugabe and relax the appropriate and restrictive measures at the EU level. Even though the situation on the ground had not improved—the government of Zimbabwe continued to pass repressive bills (such as the NGO bill) and conduct repressive actions (such as Operation Murambatsvina)—at the end of 2006 France’s new ambassador to Harare, Gabriel Jugnet, said, “of course we want dialogue between France and Zimbabwe. We want to help facilitate an improved dialogue between Zimbabwe and the EU”. At the beginning of 2007, the French did not invite Mugabe to the Franco-African summit in Cannes, but the trade-off was, allegedly, that Tony Blair agreed not to block the Zimbabwean leader’s attendance at the May 2007 Africa-EU summit in Lisbon. Indeed, Portugal invited Mugabe to attend the EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon. Britain did not oppose but decided to be represented by Baroness Amos, a life peer with no ministerial portfolio. The Portuguese president of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, criticized the UK for its solitary boycott. Gegout commented that “this event shows continuing disagreements within the EU over how to deal with African states that contravene democracy and human rights values”. British newspapers reported that France and Portugal were even against the renewal of the sanctions regime.

According to Grebe, “it is important to consider that any violation of the travel ban is undermining the legitimacy, and hence the credibility, of the sanction regime … Even though these visits fall in the category of exemptions, one can assume that Mugabe used these meetings to react to the increasing isolation of his country”.

Indeed, Mugabe often claimed victory over the British isolation strategy when he was allowed to participate in international meetings. After receiving the invitation to the 2007 EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon, he commented that “the sinister campaign led by Britain to isolate us … continues to disintegrate. I wish to thank the European Union and African countries for their support and the Portuguese government who are hosting the European Union-Africa summit for their correct reading of the situation”.

The situation has not changed with the political evolutions of 2008. In March 2008, the opposition won the parliamentary elections. However, the spark of hope was short-lived. A few months later, during the presidential elections, violent intimidations and voting irregularities allegedly prevented the opposition’s candidate, Morgan Tsvangirai, from being credited with the necessary 50 percent of the vote to be directly nominated President of the country. The period until the runoff was plagued by so much violence and persecution that Tsvangirai pulled out shortly before the poll, which took place with only one candidate, Robert Mugabe. External pressure convinced Mugabe and Tsvangirai to close a power-sharing agreement at the end of 2008. A Government of National Unity (with Mugabe as President and Tsvangirai as Prime Minister) was formed in February 2009.

Donors’ reactions to the Government of National Unity (GNU) were coordinated. Yet, the different positions of the UK and France were still evident – and the British stance is more surprising than before, given the conciliatory attitude eventually adopted by Nordic countries. The dilemma faced by the donors was whether to engage with the GNU or abide by the Hague Principles, a 2005 policy statement.

559 Grebe, “And They Are Still Targeting,” 15.
which expressly requested a significant amelioration of the political situation on the
ground before even considering the move from humanitarian to development
assistance.\textsuperscript{562} Erratic statements suggest the presence of disagreements among
donors. High-ranking officials from leading Western donors maintained the
principled position in a meeting in Washington in March 2009: “provided positive
developments in regards to … political and economic reforms, the donor community
is ready to support Zimbabwe’s rebuilding with development assistance”.\textsuperscript{563} However, during a meeting in Berlin in October 2009, almost the same group of
donors issued a statement that seemed to revise their position. The group renamed
itself “the Friends of Zimbabwe” and endorsed the idea of “gradually shifting from
measures aimed at purely humanitarian relief to substantial longer term assistance in
a number of sectors which are crucial for the rapid improvement of living conditions
for the people”.\textsuperscript{564}

What is interesting is that the debate between hard-liners and soft-liners once again
saw the UK and France on opposite sides. According to cables leaked from the US
Embassy in Paris,

at a April 21 meeting, French Deputy National Security Advisor Bruno Joubert,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Eric Chevallier, and Foreign Minister
Kouchner’s African Affairs Advisor Charlotte Montel all “pressed hard” on UK
Foreign Office Minister for Africa Lord Malloch-Brown to support lifting EU
sanctions on Zimbabwe … According to French, Montel said that the EU will
begin considering lifting sanctions “with or without the UK”, but would prefer
the UK to lead the process. Malloch-Brown replied by saying, “Yes, it was time

\textsuperscript{562} The reforms specified in the Hague Principles included: full and equal access to humanitarian assistance; commitment to macro-economic stabilisation; restoration of the Rule of Law, including enforcement of contracts, an independent judiciary, and respect for property rights; commitment to the democratic process and respect for internationally accepted human rights standards, including a commitment to freedom of expression, freedom of print and broadcast media, freedom of assembly, and freedom of association; and commitment to timely elections held in accordance with international standards, and in the presence of international election observers: International Development Committee, \textit{DFID’s Assistance to Zimbabwe}, para. 64. A good summary of the arguments in favour of engagement can be found in International Crisis Group, \textit{Zimbabwe: Engaging the Inclusive Government}, Africa Briefing, (April 20, 2009), 11.


to begin looking at Zimbabwe as a glass half-full”, but that the Zimbabwe GNU had not done enough yet to merit lifting sanctions … Indicating that many senior UK Government figures remain hard-line on Zimbabwe, French said UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown had recently told Italian Prime Minister Prodi that the UK “will not support the (Government of Zimbabwe) until Mugabe is gone”.565

In a later cable, the Ambassador qualified, but did not change, its perspective on the French position: “speaking carefully, Montel said that the French did not press the UK to ease sanctions on April 21 but rather hoped that the UK would acknowledge potentially positive changes that could make a less aggressive EU sanctions policy warranted at some point”.566

In sum, Laakso, Kivimäki, Seppänen summarizes the situation in the following terms:

The EU is divided into three groups over the case of Zimbabwe. There is a group that is deeply involved, a group that has adopted a softer stance and a third group that is indifferent. … The Northern Member States are close to the UK position, although at least some of them show a tendency towards softer viewpoints at the level of the missions in Harare than in their capitals. France is openly pursuing very different bilateral relations, but does not oppose the UK view as far as the common EU policy is concerned, viewing the dominant role of the UK as legitimate. There are Southern Member States, like Greece, which at the mission level are known to be critical of the EU policy.567

Importantly, these differences have significantly contributed to the ineffectiveness of international pressure against Mugabe. Professor Youde commented that “the efficacy of the EU stance was questionable because certain Member States (I’m

thinking in particular of France) have shown a willingness to circumvent sanctions.  

5.4. The case studies of Madagascar and Nicaragua

5.4.1. Madagascar

The 2009 Malagasy crisis started at the end of 2008. Notwithstanding the adoption of sound economic and political policies in previous years, three affaires strained the relationship between President Marc Ravalomanana and both the local population and the international community. First, Ravalomanana bought a very expensive new presidential jet. Second, he promised South-Korean Daewoo Logistics to lease a huge amount of Malagasy land in order to produce corn and palm oil for the South Korean market. Third, he granted an import duty moratorium, thus favouring his personal dairy conglomerate, Tiko, but also reducing State revenues. These events provoked the suspension of budget support from the IMF in December 2008, and gave the opportunity to the major of Antananarivo (the capital of Madagascar), Andry Rajoelina, to challenge the legitimacy of the incumbent president.

568 Interview with Jeremy Youde, Head and Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota Duluth, 25 April 2013.
574 The suspension of the IMF programme caused the automatic suspension of budget support from all other Western donors, including the EU, France, Germany and the World Bank.
At the end of January, after the forced closure of Rajoelina’s television and radio channels, tension escalated. Harsh suppression of demonstrations outside the presidential palace caused more than 100 deaths. At a big rally on 31 January Rajoelina announced the creation of the High Authority of the Transition (Haute Autorité de la Transition, HAT) and declared himself Head of State. After the failure of mediation attempts by local churches and the UN, on 17 March 2009 Ravalomanana handed power to the highest-ranking officers in the armed forces, with the hope to take power back after a short military parenthesis. A few days later, as Rajoelina managed to garner the support of key figures in the military establishment, the officers handed power to him as the leader of the HAT. The coup was finalized.

The reaction of Western donors to these events was divided. As a foreign diplomat in Madagascar summarized the responses, “there were two sides: France and all other donors”. Norway was the first country to adopt aid sanctions. On 16 March 2009, even before the coup was actually completed, it froze its development aid. Germany, the only EU Member State in addition to France with a significant presence in Madagascar, suspended all project and programme activities at ministerial level immediately after the coup, on 19 March 2009. The US

580 Interview 72.
suspended all development assistance on 20 March 2009, when the State Department named the events unfolding in Antananarivo a “coup”. Under Section 7008 of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act the US government is legally required to suspend non-humanitarian assistance to countries where a democratically elected government is toppled by unconstitutional means. On the same day, the US MCC put a hold on its five-year, $110 million poverty reduction grant programme with Madagascar as well. The programme was then officially terminated in August 2009.

Even though France formally joined the chorus of censure against Rajoelina, it decided not to suspend development cooperation and continued aid disbursement. On the day after the coup, France expressly pledged that “it will keep aid flows going”. The spokesman of French Foreign Ministry, Eric Chevallier, commented that “there is no question” of suspending bilateral aid. A French representative added that aid projects were maintained “because we think that the guilt is shared”. The website of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs published the official “France’s Position Regarding the Malagasy Political Crisis”. The relevant parts of the document read as follows:

The country’s number one partner, France has favoured a realistic and pragmatic approach and has sought to convince Madagascar’s other partners (AU/SADC, US, EU) of the need to reconcile principles and take into account the realities in the field … Also keen to minimize the impact of the political

586 Lough, “Norway Says Aid to Madagascar Remains Frozen.”

French decision-makers also tried to justify the continuation of development assistance using the argument of ineffectiveness. At a meeting with the US political officer in Paris, Beatrice Lederle, Desk Officer for Zimbabwe at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Remi Marechaux, African Advisor to the French President, said that “France was considering what carrots and sticks were available, but admitted that options were limited … According to both Marechaux and Lederle, France did not have a very robust assistance program in place (and no budget support) and had already diminished its military assistance, due to budget cuts”.\footnote{Wikileaks, \textit{Madagascar/France: The U.S. and France “Share the Same Objectives”} (Paris: Embassy of the United States, January 22, 2010).}

The limits of this argument are evident if one realizes that the Norwegian and the US programmes were, by far, smaller than the French ones. Other donors took a principled decision, which France was reluctant to follow.

The French position is surprising not only because of the differences with other donors, but also given the strong reaction by regional organisations. The AU Peace and Security Council suspended Madagascar’s membership of the organisation on 20 March 2009. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) followed suit on 30 March.\footnote{For a detailed analysis of the reaction by different regional actors, see Antonia Witt, “Convergence on Whose Terms? Reacting to Coups d’État in Guinea and Madagascar,” \textit{African Security} 6, no. 3–4 (2013): 257–75.}

Some SADC members even talked of taking military action to restore democracy in Madagascar (although this never became a serious option).\footnote{Gavin Cawthra, \textit{The Role of SADC in Managing Political Crisis and Conflict} (Maputo: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Mozambique, 2010), 20.}

France not only avoided bilateral aid sanctions, but also “strongly encouraged the international community to take account of realities on the ground” and “called for the continuation of some development aid to address the declining socio-economic

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\footnote{Gavin Cawthra, \textit{The Role of SADC in Managing Political Crisis and Conflict} (Maputo: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Mozambique, 2010), 20.}
In particular, France tried to mitigate the position of the EU. First of all, French officials resisted to name the change of government a “coup d’état”. This was evident not only at the ministerial level, when the French Minister of Foreign Affairs avoided condemning the events in Madagascar during a Brussels event when the Czech EU presidency expressly denounced the unconstitutional deposition, but also at the local level. Many diplomats reported difficulties talking with French officials given their resistance to use the word “coup”. The explanation is that “using the word ‘coup’ would have inevitably led to the adoption of appropriate measures (that is, aid sanctions) under article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement, and France was against this option”.

The International Crisis Group also reported that the EU “experienced serious difficulties in adopting a common position, divided between the legalistic views of some countries and those of France”. The result was a belated and soft response to the coup. On 31 March (much later than any other donor), the European Union representative to Madagascar, Jean Claude Boidin, said that no suspension of aid to the Indian Ocean island State had been taken by the European bloc because of its recent political development. However, he added that the EU had no plan for new aid contract with the country.

The situation changed with the opening of consultation under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement in May 2009. Cooperation activities were limited to humanitarian measures. The EU officially suspended budgetary aid, existing programmes involving the government and its agencies, and all new contracts. The

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595 Timothy Smart, UK High Commissioner, 8 September 2014.
596 International Crisis Group, Madagascar, 6 [translation of the author].
598 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council on the opening of consultations with Madagascar under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement, (Brussels, 6 May 2009, COM/2009/0219 final); Council of the European Union, Opening of Consultations with the Republic
principled position by other EU Member States played a fundamental role in the adoption of appropriate measures. For instance, the UK is known to have “adopted a robust stance, with Lord Malloch-Brown the only European minister publicly to condemn the coup from the outset”.599

Diplomatic cables from the US embassy in Antananarivo shine further light on the negotiations among EU Member States before the start of EU political dialogue. A few weeks after the coup, US Ambassador Marquandt reported that the new French Ambassador Jean-Marc Châtaigner “made clear that the French have no intention to suspend any aid or other program here; he implied privately that they will seek to delay and/or mitigate any EU actions in this regard … In this regard, the French are outliers, as most of the resident diplomatic community sees this crisis, as we do, as far from over”.600 The US Ambassador showed significant preoccupation regarding the consequences for the EU political dialogue: “with France leading the upcoming EU ‘political dialogue’ launching April 16 with the Rajoelina regime, the EU will likely be under pressure to follow the French lead. We understand the French are trying to include the Swiss and Norwegians in the EU ‘political dialogue’ but the Norwegians have some real hesitation about being dragged along by the French”.601

The beginning of the EU’s political dialogue was eventually pushed back to May 2009. One of the reasons behind the postponement was that the UK had serious questions about the terms of reference that France had proposed. According to US cables,

Foreign Office Southern Africa Team leader Sarah Riley said the UK is uncomfortable with how quickly the French are moving to legitimize the Rajoelina regime and supports Cotonou Agreement Article 96 consultations rather than enhanced Article 8 consultations, which would “essentially mean

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business as usual”, as opposed to the Article 96 consultations that could result in the suspension of all EU assistance programs. According to Riley, the UK sees France's push for the enhanced Article 8 consultations as a delaying tactic and an excuse to avoid Article 96 consultations. Riley said the UK is “pushing back hard” and is doing a lot of “heavy lifting in the EU” to change the terms of reference for the political dialogue.\(^{602}\)

The conclusion offered by the US Ambassador just a few days before the consultations was the following: “the EU clearly is divided on how to approach Madagascar, with the French opposed by most members who favour strengthening the EU backbone vis-à-vis the HAT”.\(^{603}\)

Variation between France and other donors is confirmed also by the different responses to the failure of the Maputo power-sharing deal at the end of 2009.\(^{604}\) The United States and the European Union used again the threat of sanctions against Malagasy leaders if they did not share power before the organisation of the polls. A US diplomat explicitly commented that “if the carrot does not work, we need to use the stick. We must send the signal that things may get worse”.\(^{605}\) In contrast with this idea, France considered that the Maputo process was deadlocked, and supported the unilateral organisation of elections by Rajoelina as soon as possible, provided that the vote was free and fair. The US Ambassador in Antananarivo commented that the French

continue to support the idea of early elections, even if imperfect, as the French are extremely pessimistic about the ability of sanctions, the Maputo/Addis Accords, and/or further negotiations led by Chissano to solve the political crisis. The French government has reduced its military aid to Madagascar, but does not plan to make further cuts to bilateral aid programs, even if EU funds are cut

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\(^{605}\) International Crisis Group, *Madagascar*, 26 [translation by the author].
following the closure of discussions under the Cotonou Accord, now expected in March.\footnote{Wikileaks, \textit{Local French Views on Malagasy Crisis} (Antananarivo: Embassy of the United States, February 25, 2010).}

Incidentally, it is important to note that the continuation of French government-to-government aid to Madagascar was directly blamed as one of the main reasons behind the inability of the international community to solve the Malagasy crisis. If support from the SADC meant that Ravalomanana was not willing to compromise (in the hope of coming back to Madagascar as powerful as before the coup),\footnote{David Lanz and Rachel Gasser, \textit{A Crowded Field: Competition and Coordination in International Peace Mediation}, Mediation Argument (Pretoria, South Africa: Centre for Mediation in Africa, February 2013), 11.} Rajoelina seemed to count on French assistance (including development cooperation) when he decided to avoid consensual solutions to the crisis.\footnote{Interview 63.}

Before concluding, it is worth addressing the point, suggested by some commentators, that the conciliatory French attitude in Madagascar can be explained by reference to fundamental strategic goals, and thus is not particularly relevant in terms of application of political conditionality (even other donors would have behaved in the same way if they had the same interests).\footnote{Interview with Adrien Ratsimbaharison, Professor of Political Science at Benedict College, 26 May 2013.} In economic terms, “France has traditionally had the largest foreign interests in Madagascar, with nearly 25,000 citizens and 700 companies in the country”.\footnote{Dewar, Massey, and Baker, \textit{Madagascar: Time to Make a Fresh Start}, 13. See also Vivier, \textit{Madagascar une île à la dérive}, 91.} Cawthra suggested that, in order to protect the economic interests of the French and the Franco-Malagasy community, the French “are interested above all in maintaining stability in Madagascar and preventing any slide towards civil conflict”.\footnote{Cawthra, \textit{The Role of SADC in Managing Political Crisis and Conflict}, 19.}

In addition, the relationship between France and Ravalomanana (the ousted President) was not cordial. Lanz and Gasser reports that “Paris’ position was ‘ambiguous’ given that it had had strained relations with Ravalomanana, who was described as a ‘Francophobe’”.\footnote{Lanz and Gasser, \textit{A Crowded Field}, 11.} Indeed, Ravalomanana proposed English as the
third official language of the country, expelled the French Ambassador in Antananarivo and three key figure of the French expat community in Madagascar (Olivier Peguy, foreign correspondent for Radio France Internationale, Chirstian Chadeaux, foreign correspondent for Libération and editor-in-chief of the newspaper Les Nouvelles, and Sylvain Urfer, a Jesuit priest), and joined the SADC, “which some took as indication of an intention by Ravalomanana to move away from the traditional French post-colonial influence”. In the eyes of the French, a quick resolution of the crisis in favour of Rajoelina was the best of the possible outcomes.

However, this narration of the facts offers a partial picture of the French response to the Malagasy crisis. First, French interests in Madagascar are often exaggerated. On 14 January 2010, French Ambassador Jean-Marc Châtaigner spoke to the American Chamber of Commerce regarding French commercial and political relations with Madagascar. Châtaigner noted that “there are 650 French companies in Madagascar with more than 50 employees each, … and that France was the primary importer of Malagasy products in 2009”. However, he also pointed out that “Madagascar is not of strategic interest for France in general trade terms, as commerce with the island only accounts for less than 0.1 percent of overall French trade”.

Second, it is not self-evident that government-to-government interaction was desperately needed to avoid an economic crisis in the country, or at least that the balance should have been totally skewed in favour of stability at the expenses of human rights. The US, for instance, adopted a different approach: “from our perspective, it is important to maintain as much as possible of our assistance, in order not to contribute to instability, while sending a clear message to the High Transitional Authority that we can have no direct involvement with or through them

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615 Connolly, The Troubled Road to Peace: Reflections on the Complexities of Resolving the Political Impasse in Madagascar, 6.
on the programs we will continue until there are free and fair presidential elections, as soon as possible”.

617 Last but not least, it is not true that the relationship with Ravalomanana was so unfriendly to dictate uncompromising preference for Rajoelina. Ravalomanana had always demonstrated to maintain strong links with the OIF, as confirmed by hard (and successful) lobbying to host the 2010 Francophonie Summit in Antananarivo, and Total signed a large contract for investing in Madagascar’s oil sector way before the political crisis in 2009.

618 The lack of application of sanctions in this circumstance suggests that, in Paris, human rights concerns lose against strategic interests which are not fundamental. As commented by one interviewee, “Madagascar is not Côte d’Ivoire or Cameroon, two of the former colonies with the strongest links to Paris, and is not Niger or Gabon (where France sources almost all its uranium)”.

619 Whenever there is something to be gained, the human rights component is lost during aid decision-making.

5.4.2. Nicaragua

Nicaragua, the largest of the Central American countries, is a former Spanish colony. In the years leading to 2008, the largest Western bilateral donors in Managua were, by far, the European Commission, Spain and the US. Apart from yearly fluctuations, other important donors included Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Germany, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

620 In 2005, seven bilateral donors (Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and UK) and two multilateral donors (EU, WB) entered into a long-term general and sectoral budget support programme with the Nicaraguan

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619 International Crisis Group, Madagascar, 7.

620 Interview 72.

621 Intermón Oxfam, La realidad de la ayuda 2009: Una evaluación independiente de la ayuda y las políticas de desarrollo en tiempos de crisis (Madrid: Intermón Oxfam Editorial, 2010), 187. France is not included in the analysis because it has not been a significant Nicaraguan donor in the last 10 years. The section compares the UK with other bilateral donors, in order to test whether Britain was among those adopting a principled stance or those using a pragmatic approach.
The Joint Financing Agreement included some ‘fundamental principles’ that both donors and government had to abide by. These principles were formulated as follows:

- commitments to international law and conflict prevention, respect for human rights, democratic principles including free and fair elections, the rule of law, independence of the judiciary, free, transparent and democratic processes, accountability and the fight against corruption, sound macroeconomic policies and commitment to poverty reduction.

Up to the mid-2000s, Nicaragua was considered a model of international cooperation. Good relations prevailed between the government and the donor community, and the country was used as a pilot for the application of the Paris Declaration principles of ownership and harmonization. The situation changed in 2006 when Daniel Ortega and the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) came back to power after 16 years of conservative rule. While the new government maintained macroeconomic performance in line with the expectations of international financial institutions and did not antagonize the private sector, it adopted several policies that alienated the sympathy of the donors. For instance, it endorsed a strict law banning all abortions in Nicaragua, started harassing NGOs that it perceived as opponents, adopted an assertive attitude focused on restoring a Sandinist social programme, and built a new alliance with Venezuela and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA).

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622 Venezuela has also been a fundamental supported of Nicaraguan budget since 2006. Chavez’ contributions have been estimated at about US$500 million annually, thus almost doubling the total aid flow by other donors. However, there has been no transparency at all in the management of Venezuelan assistance; Benedict Mander, “Critics Question Flow of Venezuelan Aid,” Financial Times, August 28, 2012, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/03ba7206-eab5-11e1-984b-00144feab49a.html.


Donors, in particular those contributing to the budget of the government, began to worry about human rights issues. Their initial response was coordinated. The 2007 *Joint Assessment of Budget Support to Nicaragua* concluded, *inter alia*, that there had been no progress in political independence and judiciary independence, and that there had been a set-back with respect to human rights (in particular, regarding the penalization of abortion). The consequence was the explicit inclusion of an area on governance focusing on justice, human rights and citizen participation in the Performance Assessment Matrix (PAM).

The crisis of the relationship between Ortega and the donor community reached its climax with the 2008 local election. In June 2008, a few months before the vote, the Nicaraguan Supreme Electoral Council disqualified two opposition parties from participation. Then, for the first time since 1990, the Council decided not to allow national or international observers to witness the election. Finally, opposition political party members and NGO representatives claimed numerous instances of intimidation, violence, and harassment. Amidst international criticism, the Supreme Electoral Council agreed to review results for Managua only, while the opposition demanded a nationwide review.

The firm position of the Nicaraguan government, the low level of violence, and the slow pace of repressive practices led to significant variation in the behaviour of Western donors. According to foreign diplomats, two groups could be distinguished: the hardliners, which included Finland, Germany, Sweden, the UK and the US, versus those adopting a softer stance, such as Spain, and to a lesser extent Norway and Switzerland. The division among EU Member States is confirmed by the

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630 Interview 5; interview 60.
cables of the US Embassy in Managua. After the local elections, “Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs Deputy Chief for Central American Affairs Laetitia van Asch Pieters … reported that the EU agrees the Nicaraguan elections were flawed … but the EU representatives in Managua are divided on whether to take a more confrontational approach with the GON”.

The evaluation report of Norwegian development cooperation also corroborates the fact that, after the first round of suspensions, donors did not agree on the demands to be forwarded to government nor on what exactly the government of Nicaragua would have to do to unfreeze disbursements.

Sweden announced that the end of its foreign assistance programmes Nicaragua in August 2007. The position of Sweden is interesting not only because of the timing of the response, but also because it is often equated to the British one. Officially, the decision was justified as a result of a general policy to shift focus on countries in Africa and Eastern Europe. However, subsequent actions suggest that the Swedish behaviour was at least partially linked to the human rights practices of the Nicaraguan government. In addition to phasing out its programmes, in fact, Sweden decided to discontinue its general budget support programme, maintaining only its budget support contribution to the health sector. The official Outcome Assessment of Swedish development cooperation in Nicaragua acknowledges that this decision “was motivated by non-fulfilment by Nicaragua of several fundamental principles for general budget support included in the agreement. These principles include respect for human rights, democratic principles, rule of law and independence of the judiciary, macroeconomic stability, and commitment to combating poverty and corruption”.

A former Swedish diplomat analyzed the decision-making process in the following terms:

I am very critical about the way in which the Swedish government operated. The phasing out started with a clear purpose: to limit the number of countries of operation. This was the message we were supposed to deliver. … The problem

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633 Interview 39; interview 60.
is that the Nicaraguan government never believed us. And the fact that, a few months later, the government decided to diminish budget support on the basis of political considerations made our job almost impossible. To the Nicaraguan government, it was clear that both decision were politically based.\textsuperscript{636}

Other diplomats confirm that the Swedish decision to continue only budget support to the health sector was, not only but at least significantly, based on concerns about electoral and human rights issues.\textsuperscript{637}

The second donor to leave the country was the UK. In December 2007, DFID announced that it would close its offices in April 2009. According to DFID officials, this decision was made independently from the political developments in the country. The reason was that “Nicaragua moved into the ‘middle income country’ bracket and so no longer benefited from our bilateral assistance”.\textsuperscript{638} The strategy was to invest in more economically vulnerable regions such as Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. However, the problems created by the 2008 local elections entailed that DFID could not comply with the planned phase-out strategy, which included the disbursement of the last tranches of budget support to the Nicaraguan government.\textsuperscript{639} Thus, in September 2008, the British government sent a letter to the Nicaraguan Ministry of Finance, informing it that budget support was discontinued and that DFID will only continue its other projects in the country.\textsuperscript{640} The result is that, when the DFID Nicaragua closed its office in May 2009 and DFID Latin America assumed responsibility for the country programme, there was no Budget Support Programme for Nicaragua.\textsuperscript{641}

According to an insider of the General Budget Support Group, the decision by the UK should be understood in a similar fashion to the Swedish one: “the context is important. It is true that the donor justified it through the realignment of their aid programmes. However, there was already mistrust. All donors were worried about the elections. Before, during and after the actual voting. And the UK was very clear

\textsuperscript{636} Interview 111.
\textsuperscript{637} Interview 112.
\textsuperscript{638} Interview 16.
\textsuperscript{639} Interview 111; interview 112.
\textsuperscript{640} Interview 49.
\textsuperscript{641} Interview 18.
about the lack of confidence”. This view is confirmed by a joint evaluation of donor programmes which reported that “the UK stopped budget support disbursement in 2008 but still spoke critically in the budget support group meetings (allegedly to the resentment of others)”. A foreign diplomat recalls that “at the time the UK diplomats were very happy that they were closing their programmes because this meant that they did not have to take inevitable political decisions”.

After Sweden and the UK, other donors followed suit. Germany announced the suspension of budget support and the closure of its offices in April 2008. Finland withdrew its commitment to the general budget of Nicaragua in October 2008. The European Commission suspended budget support in December 2008. Marc Litvine, EuropeAid’s head of operations for Central America, stated that “there is a political problem between the European Union and Nicaragua. Last November 2008, there was proof of widespread fraud. So the European Union suspended money for budget support for the free disposal [of the Nicaraguan government]”. The Netherlands did not discontinue budget support, but reduced it from 12 million Euros to 6 million Euros for 2008, and froze it for 2009. On December 18, Minister for Development Cooperation Koenders justified the decision in the following terms: “I find it irresponsible to give direct help to the Sandinista government, which has thwarted free and fair elections in all possible manners”. Denmark announced their intended departure from Nicaragua in April 2010.

The two exceptions within the Budget Support Group were Norway and Switzerland. As far as Norway is concerned, a US cable from the US embassy in Managua

642 Interview 39.
644 Interview 60.
reported that “Kjersti Rodsmoen, head of the Latin America section of the MFA … expressed official concern over developments in Nicaragua but little interest in actually reducing Norway’s budget support. At the same time, Rodsmoen said that Norway would limit its 2009 budget support to 2008’s figure of 20 million kroner (approx $3.2 million) rather than the 25 million kroner it had pledged for 2009 at a budget support group meeting this fall”.652 In October 2010 Norway eventually joined the group of donors which announced a plan to close their diplomatic mission to Nicaragua to free resources for missions elsewhere.653 According to Dijkstra, “Norway was willing to continue but did not want to be the sole remaining bilateral donor”.654 Regarding Switzerland, it actually stepped in when other donors decided to leave the country. In 2007, it announced that it would have tripled its annual foreign aid to Nicaragua, from about $5 million to over $17 million annually for the next five years. This partially offset the $21 million annual loss from Sweden’s pullout.655 Moreover, at the time of the local elections, Nora Kronig, Regional Coordinator for Central and South America at the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs turned down the US request to suspend aid “noting that the Swiss government prefers to address such problems through direct dialogue with the recipient country”.656 Switzerland eventually ended budget support in late 2009.657

The last two big donors to be considered are Spain and the US. Their comparison is particularly interesting because neither of the two countries was providing budget support to the Nicaraguan government. The difference between the two donors shows that there can be variation of behaviour also between countries who channel assistance mainly through discrete projects (like France). Spain resisted cutting aid. In November 2008, Spanish MFA Sub-Direct General for Mexican, Caribbean, and Central American Affairs Jorge Romeu Gonzalez-Barros informed the US Embassy

652 Wikileaks, Norwegians Reluctant to Cut Aid for Nicaragua (Oslo: Embassy of the United States, December 23, 2008).
654 Dijkstra, “Governance or Poverty Reduction?,” 122.
656 Wikileaks, Swiss Reaction to Call for Freezing Non-Humanitarian Assistance to Nicaragua Following Fraudulent Elections (Bern: Embassy of the United States, December 23, 2008).
657 Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Budget Support: Conditional Results, 15.
in Managua that, “though Spain had been considering reducing its support to the Nicaraguan police, … the government had decided to maintain said contributions because the police project was well run and not overly politicized”. He also said that he would have tried “to moderate the EU position toward Nicaragua. At this point, he explained, there was no longer much daylight between the Spanish and broader European positions”.

On the contrary, the U.S. not only suspended its Millennium Development Cooperation programme in November 2008 (the programme was eventually cancelled in 2009). Washington also took the leadership with other Western donors, and encouraged them to suspend their contributions. According to the US Ambassador in Nicaragua:

> the international community should send a clear message to the government of Nicaragua that violations of democratic norms have a cost. Actions by multiple countries will be more effective in making this point than unilateral actions by a single country. We believe suspension of assistance programs, except for humanitarian help channelled through non-governmental sources, is an appropriate response to the government’s actions. Since external assistance accounts for approximately 25 percent of the Nicaraguan budgetary inflows, the government of Nicaragua will feel the impact quickly.

5.5. Conclusion

This chapter confirmed that policies, legal documents and behaviour go hand in hand. France is often the most opposed to the application of political conditionality, while the UK frequently takes the lead in the imposition of aid sanctions, together with like-minded Nordic donors.

The chapter thoroughly examined four cases of aid sanctions: Madagascar 2009, Mozambique 2009, Nicaragua 2008 and Zimbabwe 2002. In line with the results of past statistical studies, the UK was usually more willing than France to apply aid sanctions. After the 2009 coup in Madagascar, France was the only Western donor

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660 Wikileaks, Demarche on Assistance to Nicaragua Following Fraudulent Elections (Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department, December 17, 2008), para. 3.
(in contrast with the EU, Germany, Norway and the US) to continue some bilateral government-to-government programmes. During the 2009 donor strike in Mozambique, France adopted a soft stance and avoided a confrontational position against the Mozambican government. The UK was among the leaders of the strike and one of the most vocal critics of the political situation. After the contested 2008 local elections in Nicaragua, the UK was the second donor (after Sweden) to announce the suspension of its budget support programme. When the Zimbabwean government resorted to widespread human rights abuses in connection with its fast-track land reform at the beginning of the 2000s, the UK pushed for the adoption of aid sanctions. France tried to profit from the retrenchment of other bilateral donors.
CHAPTER 6
VARIATION IN THE INTERNALISATION OF POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY: FOUR HYPOTHESES

The previous two chapters have shown that France and the UK present significant variation in the degree of internalisation of political conditionality. The remaining part of the dissertation explains why the two donors have not been affected by this norm in the same way. The purpose of this chapter is twofold: to justify the decision to adopt an “analytic eclectic” framework, and to introduce four hypotheses that can explain variation across the Channel. The validity of these hypotheses will be tested in the next chapter.

6.1. Analytic eclecticism

Variation in the degree of internalisation of political conditionality defies simple explanations. Interviewees who were asked to agree or disagree with a set of pre-determined hypotheses derived from the main theories of International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis offered responses as revealing as “the situation is much way too complex to point you in the direction of one or another hypothesis”, “it is not as black and white as you describe; interests, instruments, cultures, they all play a role, they concur in the result”, and “it is difficult to say, I do believe that it is an interaction of all these factors”.661

This finding is not surprising for scholars working on foreign policy, development aid and human rights. Already in 1962, Morgenthau argued that, “of the seeming and real innovations which the modern age has introduced into the practice of foreign policy, none has proven more baffling to both understanding and action than foreign aid”.662 In one of the most acclaimed overviews of contemporary aid, Lancaster denied the possibility of creating an overarching framework to explain development assistance, explicitly because “there are too many interacting variables to justify a

661 Interview 58; interview 25; interview 105.
model that would be both parsimonious and insightful".663 Brysk asks: “Why does a particular state construct a particular identity, in this case, as a global good citizen? The answer lies partly in history, partly in structure, partly in the agency of meaning and myth makers, and partly in relations to Others”.664

French and British decision-making processes in foreign policy and development aid are no exceptions to the complexities suggested above. Paul Williams described UK foreign policy making in the following terms:

Foreign policy is not made in a political vacuum but is shaped by domestic factors (such as public opinion), globalizing pressures (such as communication technologies), integrative tendencies (especially within the European Union) and transnational forces (such as lobbying from NGOs) ... First, while the same goals and commitments can persist for long periods, foreign policy-making is best conceptualized as a dynamic process that exists in a dialectical relationship with the outside world. Second, at times, the process is wide-ranging, involving officials from all areas of government and a (growing) number of outsiders from both foreign governments and NGOs.665

Chafer and Cumming argued that British and French “bilateral cooperation cannot be understood without disaggregating the state[s] and including strong focus on the perceptions, interest and ideas of elite policy-makers, not to mention institutional constraints and other domestic variables”.666

The intricacy of foreign policy and development assistance decision-making has pushed me to go beyond paradigmatic boundaries and endorse “analytic eclecticism”.667 As a problem-driven (not theory-driven) methodology, analytic

eclecticism acknowledges the messiness of everyday politics and “explores how diverse mechanisms posited in competing paradigm-bound theories might interact with each other, and how, under certain conditions, they can combine to affect outcomes”.

Importantly, analytic eclecticism “neither suggests that ‘anything goes’, nor seeks to create endless laundry lists of potentially relevant factors”. As any other scholarly enterprise, eclectic work is assessed against available evidence and alternative arguments. However, analytic eclecticism avoids the risk that the lack of integration among multiple paradigms becomes a “hindrance to understanding”.

The adoption of an (at least partially) “eclectic” stance is, nowadays, rather common in IR studies. Neorealist scholars have acknowledged that the influence of international material constraints is significantly filtered by “transmission belts” such as different domestic structures and political groups. Some constructivist academics have explicitly recommended the use of rationalism and constructivism as complements rather than competitors; others have recognised that the diffusion of international norms is extensively conditioned by domestic culture, institutions and actors. Liberal researchers have emphasised that foreign policy decisions are the result of a two-level game in which the government should manage pressures not only from the domestic arena but also from the international environment. Europeanization scholars have derived the mechanisms through which European policies produce impact at the national level (including micro-processes as different


as coercion and imitation) from both rationalistic and sociological institutionalisms.\textsuperscript{675}

In the end, this is not a surprising evolution if one thinks that IR theories “intentionally oversimplify” the world in order to highlight those forces that are considered to be “typically”, but not constantly, central to explain state behaviour.\textsuperscript{676}

To offer one example, hard-headed realists recognise that domestic politics exists. Yet, they argue that material pressures at the international level are generally so strong that domestic politics is unimportant to determine the foreign policy of a country. The starting point of this dissertation is that variation in internalisation of political conditionality is one of those aspects of European donors’ foreign policies that remains too complex to be explained by reference to one theory alone. Theories are meant to create opportunities for, not constraints on, empirical research.

6.2. Realism

A plausible hypothesis to explain variation in the internalisation of political conditionality by France and the UK can be derived from a rational-material theory such as realism. Realism starts with three assumptions. First, states behave as rational and unitary actors. Second, even if survival is not the only goal for states, it is certainly the paramount one (if a state no longer exists, the pursuit of any other objective is evidently impossible). Third, self-help is the only way for States to protect themselves in an anarchical international system (at the international level there is no world-state that can enforce rights and duties as states do in the domestic sphere). From these assumptions, realists conclude that it is sensible for States to share a uniform, constant and overriding quest for military and economic power before the pursuit of any other interest and against the loyalty to any existing alliance (today’s friend may be tomorrow’s enemy and nobody will defend misguided states).


\textsuperscript{676} Jack Donnelly, “Realism,” in \textit{Theories of International Relations}, ed. Scott Burchill et al. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 39.
As those countries that do not follow these rational prescriptions are doomed to disappear, natural selection explains the persistence of realist “laws” over history.\footnote{See Kenneth N. Waltz, \textit{Theory of International Politics} (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979); John J. Mearsheimer, \textit{The Tragedy of Great Power Politics} (New York: WW Norton & Company, 2003). Classical realists offer the same bleak picture of world politics. However, in comparison with more recent manifestations of the realist tradition, they attributed greater importance to the human nature than to rational choice assumptions. See Hans Morgenthau, \textit{Politics Among Nations} (New York: Knops, 1948).}

Realism has been frequently used to explain the foreign policy of great powers.\footnote{Two examples are Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, “Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy,” \textit{International Security} 22, no. 4 (1998): 171–203; Allen C. Lynch, “The Realism of Russia’s Foreign Policy,” \textit{Europe-Asia Studies} 53, no. 1 (2001): 7–31.} In addition, even though neo-realism (that is, the most rationalist and structural version of realism) was initially crafted to explain not specific foreign policy decisions but international political outcomes (such as the balance of power),\footnote{K. N. Waltz, “International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy,” \textit{Security Studies} 6, no. 1 (1996): 54–57.} Elman has made a strong case for the possibility of a “neorealist theory of foreign policy”. In brief, this maintains that foreign policy is dictated by international material constraints and that ethical considerations are almost always overridden by strategic considerations.\footnote{C. Elman, “Horses for Courses: Why No Neorealism Theories of Foreign Policy?,” \textit{Security Studies} 6, no. 1 (1996): 7–53. For an application of neo-realism to foreign policy explanation, see Woosoon Choi, “Structural Realism and Dulles’s China Policy,” \textit{Review of International Studies} 38, no. 01 (2012): 119–40.}

Foreign aid, as one of the multiple representations of a country’s foreign policy, is no exception to the rational and material expectations depicted by realists. Several Cold War scholars argued that aid policies were primarily driven by strategic concerns, and any attention to normative values was simply a cloak for geopolitical and economic considerations.\footnote{Lloyd D. Black, \textit{The Strategy of Foreign Aid} (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1968); Nick Eberstadt, \textit{Foreign Aid and American Purpose} (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1989).} George Liska is one of the early realists who argued that aid was a tool for enhancing national security. He articulated the view that foreign aid “is today and will remain for some time an instrument of political power”.\footnote{George Liska, \textit{The New Statecraft: Foreign Aid in American Foreign Policy} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 14.} Morgenthau famously stated that it was pointless even to raise the question whether the United States ought to have a policy of foreign aid – as much so as to ask whether the United States ought to have a foreign political or military policy. For the United States has interests


\footnote{George Liska, \textit{The New Statecraft: Foreign Aid in American Foreign Policy} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 14.}
abroad which cannot be secured by military means and for the support of which the traditional methods of diplomacy are only in part appropriate. If foreign aid is not available they will not be supported at all.\textsuperscript{683}

Gilpin supported this view and argued that even though humanitarian concerns played an important role in foreign assistance the “primary motives for official aid by governments have been political, military and commercial”.\textsuperscript{684} In 1995, Hook compared the aid policies of four donors (France, Japan, U.S. and Sweden). He concluded that, despite the differences, the common thread is that decisions on development assistance reflect the national interest of the different countries, and, importantly, this national interest is primarily determined by the international context.\textsuperscript{685}

The validity of these impressionistic statements from several fathers of the realist tradition has been confirmed by outspoken politicians, more liberal scholars and subsequent empirical tests. Sir William Ryrie, the former Permanent Secretary of the British Overseas Development Agency – the precursor of DfID – characterized the political objectives of the British aid programme as “making friends, buying and keeping influence”.\textsuperscript{686} Olav Stokke, one of the most renowned experts on political conditionality and European aid, concedes that “most government, particularly those aspiring to a hegemonic position globally or regionally, will rank security interests high, along with predominant economic interests”.\textsuperscript{687} Most empirical models of aid allocation have highlighted the significance of variables representing strategic and economic motives, such as levels of militarization, alliance ties and level of trade.

\begin{enumerate}
\item[Morgenthau, “A Political Theory of Foreign Aid,” 301.]
\item[Steven W. Hook, \textit{National Interest and Foreign Aid} (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), 162. World System theorists offer a similar conceptualization of foreign aid, notwithstanding their different perspective. Foreign aid represents just another manifestation of the economic domination and exploitation by core industrial states over the peripheral ones. The real effect of foreign aid is to constrain the development path of recipient countries, promoting the unequal accumulation of capital in the world. See, for instance, Robert E. Wood, \textit{From Marshall Plan to Debt Crisis: Foreign Aid and Development Choices in the World Economy} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).]
\item[Sir William Ryrie, “Managing an Aid Programme,” \textit{IDS Bulletin} 17, no. 2 (1986): 8.]
\end{enumerate}
thus confirming that donors frequently use their economic assistance in return for support on critical UN votes, trade issues, security links, etc. 688

What, then, is the role of norms in a realist account of foreign aid? Norms are only “epiphenomenal” occurrences, ex post rationalizations of strategic interests such as security and/or wealth.689 Following this line of reasoning, a country’s approach to political conditionality would be the consequence of predetermined priorities in terms of (1) favourite recipients and/or (2) sanction decisions. The first leg of the hypothesis says that donors whose material interests happen to suggest the allocation of development assistance to repressive regimes will avoid human rights language, while donors whose material interests happen to suggest the allocation of development assistance to respectful government will pay lip service to political conditionality. In other words, a donor would appear to internalize political conditionality (realists resist the terminology of norms and internalisation) if the recipient countries which are dictated by its material concerns are in the majority good human rights performers. A donor would oppose political conditionality if the recipient countries dictated by its security concerns are in the majority repressive regimes. The second leg of the hypothesis says that donors whose material interests happen to suggest the application of aid sanctions to repressive regimes will be more likely to pay lip service to political conditionality. In other words, a donor would appear to internalize political conditionality if sanction decisions which are in reality dictated by its material interests can be masked under normative language. In both cases, political conditionality merely represents window-dressing.

Europeanization scholars have already suggested the plausibility of this hypothesis for other aspects of EU Member States’ aid policies. For instance, Bretherton has showed that one of the reasons behind the shallow harmonization of European development cooperation in terms of policy coherence and horizontal coordination is


that EU Member States policies “have continued to be formulated according to
national priorities and principles and, hence, to reflect traditional ties or particular
interests”.

The hypotheses deriving from realism are the following: the UK has internalized
human rights to a larger extent than France (1) because traditional recipients of
British aid are better human rights performers than traditional recipients of French
aid, and/or (2) because the application of political conditionality could be used by
British decision-makers to mask the pursuit of strategic interests in specific
countries.

6.3. International constructivism

In contrast with the realist focus on materiality and rationality, international
constructivism argues that states’ behaviour is heavily influenced by the (active as
well as involuntary) ideational and social pressures exercised by other international
actors (mainly states, international organisations and transnational movements).

The behaviour of states is norm-driven (not goal-oriented), and norms are
constructed (as well as deconstructed) through social interaction at the international
level. As highlighted by Brysk, foreign policy can be “constructed outward. The
identities that shape interests are constructed in relation to others”.

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Charlotte Bretherton and Michael L. Mannin (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 172.
691 I call this approach “international” constructivism in order to distinguish it from “unit-level”
constructivism, whose focus lies on the relationship between local/domestic norms and the identities,
interests and actions of states. The distinction was first proposed by C. Reus–Smit, “Imagining
Society: Constructivism and the English School,” The British Journal of Politics & International
Relations 4, no. 3 (2002): 487–509. For an example, see Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of
National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press,
1996).
692 See, in general, Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999); Martha Finnemore, “Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from
Sociology’s Institutionalism,” International Organization 50, no. 2 (1996): 325–47; John G. Ruggie,
Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization (Routledge, 1998);
Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal
Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
693 Brysk, Global Good Samaritans, 33. In a similar fashion, but talking about human rights and
domestic politics, Adler argues that “it would be very difficult for a European state to consistently
abuse human rights and still be deemed to belong to contemporary ‘Europe’”: E. Adler, “‘Seizing the
Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics’,” European Journal of International Relations 3,
no. 3 (1997): 345.
Finnemore and Sikkink best exemplified this approach through a model of norms’ cascade. Once a critical mass of states adopt an international norm, other states begin to adopt this norm “more rapidly, even without domestic pressure for such change”. At this stage of the life cycle, “the primary mechanism for promoting norm cascades is an active process of international socialisation intended to induce norm breakers to become norm followers ... In the context of international politics [this process] involves diplomatic praise or censure, either bilateral or multilateral, which is reinforced by material sanctions and incentives”. In fact, “states and state élites fashion a political self or identity in relation to the international community”, and seek “legitimation, conformity and esteem”.

On the basis of these insights, international constructivist scholars explain similarities and differences between foreign policies through social processes at the international level: foreign policies are similar when states construct their identities (and therefore adopt the norms dictated by these identities) together with each other; foreign policies are dissimilar when states construct their identities without, or even against, each other. For example, Rittberger suggests that norms “emerge in, and are restricted in their validity to, particular regional contexts, producing cross-regional variation in state behaviour”.

Importantly, even though international constructivism stresses the influence of social pressures at the international level, a distinctive characteristic of this approach is its agnosticism over which social pressures matter most in influencing a specific state’s

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696 V. Rittberger, *Approaches to the Study of Foreign Policy Derived from International Relations Theories* (Tübingen, 2004), 25.
identities, norms and actions. This is a question for empirical research.\textsuperscript{697} A plausible explanation for variation in the extent of internalisation of political conditionality by France and the UK can therefore be that the two donors belong to different groups of states, inside or outside the EU.

France and the UK equally belong to numerous international groups and organisations, including ‘Western liberal democracies’, nuclear powers, permanent members of the UN Security Council, NATO, G7, OECD, Council of Europe, etc. Common participation excludes these groups and organizations from the set of potential explanatory variables behind varied internalisation of political conditionality. Two options are relevant for this dissertation: the like-minded donors or Nordic plus group (which includes the UK but not France), and the distinction between the Commonwealth (UK) and the International Organization of La Francophonie (\textit{Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie}, OIF).\textsuperscript{698} The importance of these two groupings has already been recognized by past research on sanctions and human rights. For instance, Klotz explained British application of sanctions against South Africa during the 1980s in the following terms: “in the face of Commonwealth and European Community (especially Nordic) pressures for sanctions, Thatcher tried to forestall escalating international demands by making incremental compromises”\textsuperscript{699}

A constructivist explanation has strong plausibility in the field on foreign aid and human rights promotion. Several scholars have already explained the diffusion of development cooperation programmes by the force of ideational and social processes.\textsuperscript{700} In the most comprehensive survey of European donors, Hoebink and


\textsuperscript{698} At the beginning of the 2000s, the four Nordic donors (Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Norway) plus Ireland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom formally joined forces under the heading of the “Nordic Plus Group”. Since then, the groups has gained in importance. In 2006, Selbervik and Nygaard argued that “the Nordic Plus group appears as a more important point of reference than the Nordic countries per se”: Selbervik and Nygaard, \textit{Nordic Exceptionalism in Development Assistance? Aid Policies and the Major Donors: The Nordic Countries}, 51.


Stokke reported the existence of a “strong mutual influence among donors”, which may be explained “with reference to the existence of a transnational aid policy community that has many of the same characteristics as national policy communities”.\(^\text{701}\) Van der Veen documented the role that reputation and mimicry play in the specific features of aid departments. His suggestion to aid activists is to exploit this opportunity:

If obligation or reputation are prominent frames, it may make sense to try to change the set of States that are considered peer States. For Belgium, for example, whether France or the Netherlands is seen as the more logical referent makes a considerable difference. Or, to offer a more extreme example, imagine if Italy felt obliged to do as least as much as the Nordic countries!\(^\text{702}\)

Even specifically on political conditionality, researchers reported the emergence on “common features” in the methodology of country-level human rights assessments evaluation.\(^\text{703}\) Del Biondo and Orbie reported that, in the case of Ethiopia, coordination after the 2005 human rights violations was driven by “peer pressure and the hope of having some effect through coordinated action”.\(^\text{704}\)

These socialization processes take place both within the capitals and on the ground. On the one hand, Lancaster recalls that, after the adoption of the first development programme by Norway, “given the close contacts among the publics, organisations, and officials of the Nordic countries, Norway’s action was observed and soon imitated by Sweden and Denmark”.\(^\text{705}\) On the other hand, Baylies reminds us that, “while some bilaterals set general conditions of a political nature in their individual agreements with recipient countries, the exercise of political conditionality is


\(^{702}\) A. Maurits van der Veen, Ideas, Interests and Foreign Aid, 1st ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 221.


\(^{705}\) Lancaster, Foreign Aid, 30.
particularly dramatically enacted at consultative group meetings. The outcome of these meetings ostensibly represents collectively imposed conditions.\textsuperscript{706}

In terms of the specific mechanisms through which international socialization takes place, the academic literature has suggested three micro-processes: instrumental adaptation, normative persuasion and emulation.\textsuperscript{707} While instrumental adaptation is not relevant for this specific hypothesis (neither France nor the UK has any material incentive at the international level to apply conditionality),\textsuperscript{708} the other two micro-processes are worth exploring.

Under the name of “normative persuasion”, donors’ norms are changed through communicative argumentation. If rationalism views language as a tool to exchange information or signal intentions, constructivism envisages a “thicker” role for it, as constitutive of actors and their interests. According to the “logic of arguing”, actors communicate to convince each other: they present arguments and are open to redefining their preferences.\textsuperscript{709} Checkel exemplifies the process in the following terms: “If asked about the source of compliance, agents – after conscious thought – might answer, ‘Well, this is the right thing to do even though I didn’t used to think so’”.\textsuperscript{710} The socializing agents are often assumed to be transnational advocacy networks.\textsuperscript{711} However, they can also be other states or international organisations. In a study on the diffusion of international science norms, Martha Finnemore found that “states were socialized by international organizations and an international community of experts – in this case scientists – to accept the promotion and direction of science as a necessary and appropriate role”.\textsuperscript{712}

\textsuperscript{708} Instrumental adaptation is relevant for the liberal hypothesis described below.
\textsuperscript{711} See, for instance, Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, \textit{Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics} (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).
\textsuperscript{712} Finnemore, “International Organizations as Teachers of Norms,” 593.
As far as emulation is concerned, Waltz conceded that, along with praise (for conformation) and ridicule (for deviation), socialization – of strategies, not norms (Waltz is a realist, after all) – may occur through emulation. In this case, which can also be referred to as mimesis, or imitation, actors adopt certain norms because “good” actors have adopted them. Later on, these norms may become taken-for-granted habits. Imitation is a recurrent theme in the constructivist literature on norms. Florini has argued that “prominent” norms, which are norms held by states widely viewed as successful and desirable models, are likely to become widespread. Finnemore and Sikkink consider imitation one of the most important mechanism of socialization during the norm cascade.

The hypotheses deriving from international constructivism are the following: the UK has internalized human rights to a larger extent than France because it is the object of social pressure (through persuasion and/or imitation) within (1) the Nordic Plus Group and/or (2) the Commonwealth of Nations, which both value political conditionality more than the groups of states whom France belongs to (such as the OIF).

6.4. Liberalism

Unlike realism and international constructivism (and against long-lasting assumptions dismissing the influence of political accountability on foreign policy decisions), liberalism proposes that states are ‘autistic’ (that is, they badly relate with the material and social international environment), and their foreign policies are therefore mainly determined by the interests of dominant domestic actors. For

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713 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 75–76.
714 For some examples, see Klaus Dingwerth and Philipp Pattberg, “World Politics and Organizational Fields: The Case of Transnational Sustainability Governance,” European Journal of International Relations 15, no. 4 (2009): 728.
716 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.”
718 Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” International Organization 51, no. 04 (1997): 513–53. The version of liberalism proposed by Moravcsik is different from the strand of research which goes under the name of “neo-liberalism”. Neo-liberalism is similar to neo-realism (it is a rational and material theory), but emphasizes the role played by international regimes and institutions in facilitating cooperation in an anarchic environment.
liberals, foreign policy decision-makers are not outward-looking: they are neither concerned about what other foreign actors can do against them (as realists assert) nor preoccupied about what other foreign actors think of them (as international constructivists suggest). Rather, they are inward-looking: they are worried about their own survival as incumbent politicians. As a consequence, their foreign policy decisions are mainly influenced by powerful domestic political constituencies.

Dismissing the assumption that sees states as unitary actors, liberal researchers explain foreign policy decisions by assessing the preferences of domestic political actors, such as voters, interest groups, businesses, political parties, bureaucrats, etc., and exploring which actors are likely to dominate the decision-making process. The interests of these actors will be reflected in the state’s foreign policy. In the case of human rights, for instance, a special role has been recognised for domestic civil society organizations. Independent activists with prominent transnational connections act as “nodes for an increasingly transnational process of normative transformation that is reshaping notions of political legitimacy and national identity – and, through these, national foreign policies”.

In recent years, domestic politics have been recognised to play an important role in aid decision-making as well. The academic literature on development assistance

For an example of neo-liberal work, see Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984). Since neo-liberalism is mainly focused on cooperation failures in a goal-oriented world, it is not considered to be relevant to explain variation in the internalisation of political conditionality.


For an example of liberal work, see Mearsheimer and Walt, *The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy*.


has shown that aid allocation can be influenced by national media,\textsuperscript{724} political parties,\textsuperscript{725} government leaders,\textsuperscript{726} civil society organizations,\textsuperscript{727} business actors,\textsuperscript{728} parliamentary committees,\textsuperscript{729} Diaspora groups,\textsuperscript{730} the quality of domestic institutions\textsuperscript{731} and the strength of welfare policies.\textsuperscript{732} Ruttan provided what is considered to be the most comprehensive and authoritative study of the domestic sources of foreign aid. His detailed analysis of the actors, issues, and processes involved in the evolution of U.S. aid policies is based upon the premise that “domestic sources have been more important in determining the size and direction of assistance than has the international economic and political environment”.\textsuperscript{733} Europeanization researchers confirm the potential validity of a “domestic politics” hypothesis. According to Bretherton, recent shifts in attitudes towards closer or looser European coordination “indicate the importance of internal changes within the Member states, which can promote or impede progress toward Europeanization”.

The specific issue of aid sanctions is no exception to the influence of domestic-level factors. According to Vanheukelom, “domestic considerations in donor countries (the pressures from public opinion, or special interest groups, etc.) influence decisions


\textsuperscript{726} van der Veen, \textit{Ideas, Interests and Foreign Aid}, 214.


\textsuperscript{729} Lancaster, \textit{Foreign Aid}, 219.


and assessments”. Several scholars have emphasized the fact that bilateral donors are more willing to apply conditionality because of domestic constraints from which multilateral donors are exempted. The core of the argument seems to be the following: higher domestic accountability means higher internalisation of political conditionality. The case of Rwanda is informative in this respect. Hayman reported that one donor representative said that “political concerns only came into the equation when they affected the bigger picture of donor attention, such as the MDGs, or if they triggered domestic pressure in the donor country”. Zorbas confirmed that the diplomats and aid officials whom she interviewed insisted that their support to Rwanda was not unconditional, for one simple reason: “We are accountable to our Parliament and to our public. Our assistance is based on a shared set of principles: democracy, respect for human rights, aid being channelled to the poorest”.

The recognition of the validity of these insights has led researchers to focus on the role of specific actors. Barratt concentrates on the media industry: “states will become especially sensitive to their obligation to protect these rights elsewhere when violations are widely publicized”. Faust, Leiderer and Schmitt focused on political parties: “when more conservative governments came to power in countries including Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom in 2009 and 2010, these newly elected governments soon began to assign more importance to political conditionality and the democracy objectives of the instrument”. The idea that right-wing governments are more willing to apply conditionality is confirmed by quantitative studies as well. A potential explanation is that conservative governments tend to be more active in foreign policy and less willing to disburse aid

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735 Baylies, “‘Political Conditionality’ and Democratisation,” 327; Randall W. Stone, *Buying Influence: Development Aid between the Cold War and the War on Terror* (unpublished manuscript, 2010), 5.
to autocratic regimes that implement pro-poor policies. The influence of powerful parliamentary commissions was also explored.

Human rights NGOs played the role of the usual suspects. Spence argued that “NGOs often publicly criticize or shame policymakers for supplying aid to governments that commit human rights abuses. This criticism matters for policymakers because it can strengthen domestic opponents of the foreign aid programme and may even jeopardise the political survival of elected officials.” Baehr offers the specific example of the relationship between the Netherlands and Indonesia. The Dutch government faced considerable pressure from domestic human rights organisations prior to its decision to impose sanctions on Indonesia. Groups such as the non-governmental Indonesia Committee published up-to-date reports of the regime’s human rights violations and lobbied policymakers in favour of sanctions.

Similarly, Apodaca suggests that the Carter administration’s decision to link aid policy to human rights was due in part to the lobbying efforts of NGOs. These groups encouraged the administration to use sanctions to punish human rights abusers and were supported in their efforts by a broad coalition in Congress which included legislators who sought to promote human rights abroad as well those who were more interested in reducing overall levels of foreign aid spending.

In sum, the hypothesis offered by the liberal tradition is that the more aid policymakers are accountable to the Parliament, to human rights NGOs and to the general public for their decisions, the more they can be expected to adopt and internalize the norm of political conditionality. Western politicians are well aware that aid sanctions represent not only an instrument to press for political reform in recipient countries,

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but also a device to avoid complicity with human rights abuses and dissipation of taxpayers’ money into the hands of repressive regimes.\textsuperscript{746} 

In terms of the specific mechanisms through which norm internalisation can take place, the previous section showed that international constructivism focuses on persuasion and/or imitation. The liberal hypothesis is based on the third micro-process: instrumental adaptation. Under the logic of consequences, political actors with fixed goals and interests purposefully adapt to incentives and constraints. When this logic operates alone, there can be no normative change or strengthening: actors know what they want and interaction does not influence their preferences.\textsuperscript{747} However, decision-makers “may end up ‘buying into’ their own rhetoric”.\textsuperscript{748} Checkel offers the following example:

\begin{quote}
[C]onsider individuals who, for purely strategic, incentive-based reasons, begin to act in a certain manner; at some point, they will likely need to justify these acts to themselves and others. As a result, a cognitive dissonance may arise between what is justified and argued for, and what is – secretly, privately – believed. Laboratory and experimental work suggests that human beings have a tendency to resolve such dissonance by adapting their preferences to the behaviour; that is, they internalize the justification.\textsuperscript{749}
\end{quote}

Snyder named this process “blowback”;\textsuperscript{750} Risse called it “self-entrapment” in instrumental adaptation.\textsuperscript{751}

Incentives and constraints can be international, such as conditional trade agreements and punitive sanctions.\textsuperscript{752} Incentives and constraints can also be domestic. McElroy

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{748}{Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, \textit{The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology} (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 8.}
\footnotetext{749}{Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe,” 814.}
\footnotetext{750}{Jack L. Snyder, \textit{Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition} (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 49.}
\footnotetext{751}{Risse, “Let’s Argue!,” 32.}
\footnotetext{752}{For an interesting account of human rights self-entrapment because of international pressure, see most of the chapters in Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds., \textit{The Persistent Power of Human Rights: From Commitment to Compliance} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).}
\end{footnotes}
suggests that “it is possible for domestic groups to mobilize around an international moral norm and thereby put pressure on a president or Congress to change American foreign policy.... The desire of presidents and congressional representatives for re-election and popularity creates a ‘pathway’ from international moral norms to norm-observant state behaviour”. 753

The hypothesis deriving from liberalism is the following: the UK has internalized human rights to a larger extent than France because British aid decision-makers are under stricter domestic scrutiny than their French counterparts.

6.5. Sociological institutionalism

At the end of the 1970s a group of researchers at Stanford University began to argue that, in contrast with the Weberian view of bureaucracies as the epitome of rationality and technicality, many of the institutional forms and procedures used by contemporary organizations have not been adopted because they are most functional and efficient for the performance of the assigned task, but because they are transmitted from the West to the rest of the world as culturally-bound practices (akin to rituals and ceremonies of pre-modern societies). The main piece of evidence in support of this argument was that bureaucratic organizations had spread even more quickly than the markets and technology that were supposed to have triggered the need for them. 754 This powerful insight generated a strand of research, known as new institutionalism or sociological institutionalism, which emphasized the role of culture in explaining the behaviour of large organizations. 755

While sociological institutionalism was initially interested in explaining isomorphism (the similar features of large organizations in different parts of the

754 The first outputs of the research group gravitating around John W. Meyer were the following: John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, “Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony,” American Journal of Sociology 83, no. 2 (1977): 340–63; John W. Meyer and W. Richard Scott, Organizational Environments: Ritual and Rationality (Beverly Hills, California: SAGE, 1985).
world), \(^{756}\) those working on international relations exploited this research tradition to explore the puzzling differences between similar organizations in similar countries. \(^{757}\) The first studies focused on the armed forces. The conventional view of militaries, as found in Allison’s and Posen’s works, is that similar units within the context of similar structure should exhibit similar behaviour. \(^{758}\) Numerous scholars have challenged this view by using cultural variation as the most important explanatory variable.

Jeffrey W. Legro, for example, has shown that “organizational cultures” usually mediate between international norms and state policy preferences. \(^{759}\) During World War II, warring factions ignored the submarine warfare restrictions almost immediately, respected strategic bombing rules for months and then violated them, but upheld limitations on chemical weapons, despite expectations and preparations, throughout the war. Why were some norms apparently influential and not others? According to Legro, “the dominant beliefs in military organizations about the appropriate ways to right wars shaped how soldiers thought about and prepared for war, which in turn shaped the varying impact of norms on state aims”. \(^{760}\) Applied to military bureaucracies,

an organizational culture perspective highlights how government agencies tasked with vague formal purposes (“provide security”) concentrate on modes of warfare that subsequently condition organizational thinking and behaviour.

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Their dominant way of war tends to become such a locus of activity that, in effect, means become ends. Culture shapes how organizations understand their environment.  

Numerous researchers have followed Legro’s footsteps. Elizabeth Kier, for instance, examined the doctrinal developments in the two countries analyzed in this dissertation, France and the UK, and used a cultural approach to take issue with the conventional wisdom that military organizations inherently prefer offensive doctrines. Barnett and Finnemore concentrated on the role of international organizations, such as the IMF (but with arguments that can be transposed to the EU), in diffusing ideologies, norms and appropriate standards of behaviour.

The IR tradition of sociological institutionalism recently received new lifeblood as a number of scholars have called for greater use of ethnographic methods. While feminist scholars have been at the forefront of this trend, social constructivists have quickly adopted the new methodology. Iver Neumann, for example, focused on the experience of being a diplomat.

The adoption of an ethnographic methodology has also been used to study the human rights and development field. Mertus surveyed around eighty mid-level soldiers from all of the U.S. armed forces in order to gauge their attitude toward the protection of

761 Ibid., 36.
human rights.\textsuperscript{768} Van Gastel and Nuijten analyzed the workings of the Dutch Ministry of Development Cooperation to reconstruct the processes of policy formulation around the idea of “good governance”.\textsuperscript{769} The most interesting piece of research for this dissertation is Galit Sarfaty’s ethnography of the World Bank and the resistance against the adoption of a human rights policy.\textsuperscript{770}

Sarfaty showed that organizational culture represents one of the main obstacles to the integration of human rights into the World Bank. Extensive ethnographic research brought to surface a dominant subculture of economists, normatively and practically reluctant to integrate political and/or legal conceptions into the Bank’s operations. The general conclusion is that “the ways norms become adopted and ultimately internalized in an institution largely depend on their fit with the organizational culture”.\textsuperscript{771}

\textit{The hypothesis deriving from sociological institutionalism is the following: the UK has internalized the norm of political conditionality to a larger extent than France because the organizational culture of DfID presents a better fit than the organizations cultures of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and/or the French Development Agency.}

\textsuperscript{768} Julie A. Mertus, \textit{Bait and Switch: Human Rights and US Foreign Policy} (New York: Routledge, 2008).
6.6. Conclusion

The first section of this chapter justified the decision to adopt an “analytic eclectic” framework in answering the following question: which hypotheses can explain variation in the extent of internalisation of political conditionality by France and the UK? Analytic eclecticism is best positioned to address complex issues like aid decision-making and human rights internalisation. In addition, it has already been applied by researchers working on both Europeanization and comparative foreign policy.

The remaining part of the chapter presented four different hypotheses that can explain variation in the degree of internalisation of political conditionality by France and the UK. A realist perspective leads to expect that the UK has internalized human rights to a larger extent than France (1) because traditional recipients of British aid are better human rights performers than traditional recipients of French aid, and/or (2) because the application of political conditionality could be used by British decision-makers to mask the pursuit of strategic interests in specific countries. International constructivist scholars would suggest that the UK has internalized human rights to a larger extent than France because it is the object of social pressure (through persuasion and/or imitation) within (1) the Nordic Plus Group and/or (2) the Commonwealth of Nations, which both value political conditionality more than the groups of states which France belongs to (such as the OIF). According to the version of liberalism proposed by Moravcsik, the UK should have internalized human rights to a larger extent than France because British aid decision-makers are under stricter domestic scrutiny than their French counterparts. If one follows the most recent research in sociological institutionalism, the expectation is that the UK has internalized the norm of political conditionality to a larger extent than France because the organizational culture of DfID presents a better fit than the organizational culture of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and/or the French Development Agency.

It is the purpose of the next chapter to test the validity of these hypotheses.
CHAPTER 7
FRANCE AND BRITAIN: EXPLAINING VARIATION

The previous chapter introduced four different hypotheses to explain variation in the degree of internalisation of political conditionality between France and the UK. In brief, a realist would expect variation to be the consequence of different military and economic interests. The British façade of deeper internalisation is just an ex-post rationalisation of the fact that aid recipients suggested by its strategic concerns are better human rights performers, and/or of the fact that aid sanctions actually further material objectives. According to international constructivism, variation exists because France and the UK belong to groups of states which attach different importance to political conditionality. Paris and London are therefore objects of different social pressures at the international level. The groups considered to be relevant are the Nordic Plus Group, to which only the UK belongs, and/or the Commonwealth of Nations, in comparison with the OIF. A liberal à la Moravcsik would explain variation between France and the UK by reference to different levels of accountability at the domestic level. British policy-makers have internalized political conditionality to a larger degree than their French counterparts because their aid decisions are subject to higher domestic scrutiny. From the perspective of sociological institutionalism, variation exists because, notwithstanding performing similar functions, DfID, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and AFD present different organisational cultures. In particular, DfID’s organisational culture is expected to offer a better fit to political conditionality than that in French institutions.

The purpose of this Chapter is to test these hypotheses. Each section, from section 1 to section 4, assesses whether supporting evidence is strong enough not to falsify them. Section 5 suggests the inclusion of an additional explanatory factor. The sections are based on semi-structured interviews with more than 100 individuals who are working or have worked for French and British institutions, and who are working or have worked for other donors or for development/human rights NGOs.\(^{772}\) The validity of most of the information suggested by the interviewees has been corroborated through the examination of publicly available documents from French

\(^{772}\) When potential interviewees were not available in person or by phone, a standard questionnaire was sent by email.
and British institutions, and the analysis of secondary literature on the activities of DfID, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and AFD.

Importantly, given the interest of the dissertation in exploring internalisation of political conditionality at the general level (that is, not only on the ground but also in the capitals), the chapter mainly but not only refers to the four case studies analyzed in chapter 4. The analysis also builds on interviews with diplomats and officials in Paris and London, as well as with a few individuals working in other recipient countries and/or for other donors.

7.1. Realism

The realist hypothesis is unambiguous and parsimonious. However, it is not convincing to explain variation between France and the UK. It is the UK, not France, that delivers the larger part of its assistance within countries with repressive regimes, and should therefore be expected to be more reluctant to embrace political conditionality. Norm internalisation cannot be an ex-post rationalization of material interests.

Table 3 displays the country ratings of the top 15 and top 30 recipients of British and French aid from Freedom House’s Freedom in the World surveys between 2000 and 2011. Freedom in the World is an annual report on political rights and civil liberties that includes numerical ratings for each country in the world. A country is assigned two ratings (1 to 7, with 1 representing the greatest degree of freedom and 7 the smallest degree of freedom), one for political rights and one for civil liberties. The ratings are based on 10 political rights indicators and 15 civil liberties indicators. The political rights indicators are grouped into three subcategories: Electoral Process; Political Pluralism and Participation; and Functioning of Government. The civil liberties indicators are grouped into four subcategories: Freedom of Expression and Belief; Associational and Organisational Rights; Rule of Law; and Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights.773

One of the main criticisms of the Freedom House ratings is that the scores are based on strong Western assumptions: the starting point of the analysis is that freedom for all peoples is best achieved in liberal democratic societies. However, country rankings from the *Freedom in the World* report have regularly been used in the academic literature on aid and human rights. The main justification is that this interpretation of freedom resonates well with the human rights norms promoted by donor countries. As such, it can safely be assumed that the scores of the report adequately reflect the understanding of the situation on the ground by Western diplomats and aid officials. The US Millennium Challenge Corporation, one of the most authoritative performance-based Western aid organisations, has even formally included Freedom House’s indicators among those measures that are used to assess the human rights and democracy record of potential recipient countries.

### Table 3. Scores of top 30 recipients of French and British aid on political rights and civil liberties (*Freedom in the World Survey*) 2000-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Average score 2000-2011</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Average score 2000-2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>4,17</td>
<td></td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>4,63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>2,5</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire</td>
<td>5,79</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>6,08</td>
<td></td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>4,17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>3,5</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>6,04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>3,83</td>
<td></td>
<td>Congo, Rep.</td>
<td>5,13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>5,83</td>
<td></td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>5,96</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>5,17</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>5,5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 4 displays the Political Terror Scale (PTS) scores of the top 15 and top 30 recipients of British and French aid between 2001 and 2011. If Freedom House’s report concentrates on civil and political rights, the PTS focuses on measuring physical integrity rights violations. The PTS measures the levels of political violence and terror that a country experiences in a particular year based on a 5-level “terror scale” (1 being the best score – low levels of political violence – and 5 being the worst score – high levels of political violence). The data used in compiling the PTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>PTS Score</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>PTS Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>5,17</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>2,83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>1,83</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>6,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>4,71</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>6,08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>5,96</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>5,63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>6,21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>6,5</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>5,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>3,67</td>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>3,67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>3,79</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2,92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1,75</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>4,83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>3,75</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>3,33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>3,42</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>3,75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>5,71</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>2,33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>3,5</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
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<td>Serbia</td>
<td>2,25</td>
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<td>4,25</td>
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<td>6,17</td>
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<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>6,21</td>
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<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2,92</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1,75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>6,75</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>3,42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>6,04</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>5,54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>5,33</td>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>1,42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>6,96</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2,29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>5,54</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>1,83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average Top15: 4.65  Average Top15: 5.10  
Average Top30: 4.68  Average Top30: 4.24

Source: Freedom in the World Comparative and Historical Data
(http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world)
comes from two different sources: the yearly country reports of Amnesty International and the US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.  

The PTS is an appropriate measure to assess donors’ perceptions of political violence in recipient countries because coders are expressly instructed that, even thought they should not turn a blind eye towards violence by non-state actors, their primary goal is to measure levels of violence by the State. As explained by Wood and Gibney (the managers of the PTS), the index “focuses on state behaviour. As such, domestic (family) or societal (mob, clan) violence, which are of epidemic proportions in many countries, are not included in a country’s annual score”.  

For example, female genital mutilation remains an enormous problem in a number of countries in the world. Although this is “violence”, it is not the kind of violence that is captured by the PTS.

Table 4. Scores of top 30 recipients of French and British aid on personal integrity rights (Political Terror Scale) 2000-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Average score 2000-2011</th>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Average score 2000-2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>3.88</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>2.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>3.88</td>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire</td>
<td>3.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>3.88</td>
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<td>Afghanistan</td>
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*Source: Political Terror Scale Ratings*  
(http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/download.php)

As can be seen from Table 3 and Table 4, recipients of British aid generally present higher scores than recipients of French aid, according to both the Freedom in the World surveys and the Political Terror Scale. This means that recipients of British aid are worse human rights performers than recipients of French aid. The realist hypothesis is seriously hampered: there is no material justification for British decision-makers to pay lip service to political conditionality and pretend consistent application of aid sanctions.

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779 This statement may seem in contradiction with the general argument of the thesis. However, it has to be remembered that the list of top recipients does not take into account the way in which aid is disbursed (for instance, through NGO channels when the recipient country has a repressive government). The list is used only to give a rough indication of favourite recipients.
The results of this simple test are also in line with the findings of almost all past statistical studies.\textsuperscript{780} Past quantitative analysis shows that France has applied political conditionality to a smaller extent than the UK, even if one controls for economic, strategic and post-colonial interests. In other words, France has applied political conditionality to a smaller extent than the UK even if one eliminates the confounding effects of the (independent) human rights performance of those recipients which would be suggested by their economic, military or neo-colonial interests. As Alesina and Dollar clarify regarding colonial past (with a reasoning which is valid for all other variables, including strategic and economic ones)

Democracy is an area in which there are clear differences among major donors. The strongest positive response to democratic institutions is for the U.S., the Dutch, the U.K., the Nordics, and Canada. Of the major donors, France is the one that seems to pay no attention to the democracy of the receiving country, while Germany and Japan put a small weight on this factor. Once again, these results are obtained holding “colonial past” constant. Therefore they cannot be explained by the fact that different colonizers have more or less democratic regimes in former colonies.\textsuperscript{781}

A close analysis of the case studies described in Chapter 5 confirms the weaknesses of the realist hypothesis. To being with, the UK was among the most assertive supporters of aid sanctions in Zimbabwe. Can this attitude be explained by reference to strategic interests? President Mugabe has claimed time and again that the hidden objective of British sanctions is to protect the interests of the minority of white farmers present in Zimbabwe. For instance, after the adoption of EU sanctions in 2002, the government-controlled \textit{Herald} newspaper published a lengthy ‘opinion’ piece arguing that Britain wanted “to maintain [its] stranglehold on Harare”. The newspaper continued as follows:

The imperial intentions began to manifest themselves when the Government [of Zimbabwe] decided to embark on a fast track land resettlement programme. …

\textsuperscript{780} See the first section of Chapter 5 for a more detailed discussion of these findings.  
In order to safeguard the interests of their kith and kin in the country, the British and Scandinavian countries rallied behind the formation of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change. Their intention was to install a puppet government willing to bend to their colonial designs and adventures ... It is not surprising to note that Tanzania, Malawi, Namibia, Mozambique, Nigeria and South Africa have all refused to succumb to bullying tactics by Britain because they are all aware of its hidden agenda to topple the present Zimbabwean government.\footnote{Quoted in Ian Phimister and Brian Raftopoulos, “Mugabe, Mbeki & the Politics of Anti-Imperialism,” \textit{Review of African Political Economy} 31, no. 101 (2004): 387.}

Interviewees recognized that the UK had material interests in the country. However, they also emphasized two aspects that show that a realist explanation of British actions in Zimbabwe offers, at best, a partial interpretation of the events, and that principles and norms played a role in British decision-making.\footnote{Interview 84; interview 85; interview 92.} First, there was general consensus among international NGOs and Western donors that violations of human rights and democratic principles warranted international reaction. Amnesty International, for example, explicitly stated that it was “concerned at the widespread human rights violations carried out against dozens of commercial farmers and thousands of farm labourers in the context of redistribution of land in Zimbabwe”, and that “government trucks donated by foreign donors were used to transport the abducted victims”.\footnote{Amnesty International, \textit{Zimbabwe: The Toll of Impunity}, June 2002, Chapter 2.} As shown in Chapter 5, all “like-minded” donors (including Sweden and Denmark) applied sanctions in coordination with Britain.

In addition, British behaviour has to be interpreted within the broader orientation of New Labour’s foreign policy. For instance, Taylor and Williams acknowledge that “since Zimbabwe’s independence, Britain has traditionally been protective of white farming interests and insisted on a land reform policy based on market mechanisms and the ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ principle”. However, “from 1997 Britain’s involvement in Zimbabwe’s crisis needs to be understood within the context of New Labour’s efforts to promote its version of the ‘third way’ in Africa”, which meant that “it has encouraged adherence to the accepted tenets of contemporary development discourse, namely good governance, human rights and sound …
economic policies”. Julia Gallagher clarified that for Blair, Africa was a “noble cause” and “the commitment of his country had a moral purpose”. For most British decision-makers, “Mugabe is only a crazy dictator. They do not conceive Zimbabwe – and Africa in general – as a place where political logics clash one against the other”. In other words, Zimbabwe is a place where norms apply, not interests. 

Laakso, Kivimäki and Seppänen confirm, in the clearest possible formulation, that “while the UK had a larger concentration of interests in Zimbabwe than any other EU Member State, its approach did not stem from those interests but rather from principles and values of the Cotonou Agreement. The British business in the country, for instance, has not benefited from the ‘smart sanction’.”

Anyway, the most important piece of evidence against a realist explanation of the different behaviour by Paris and London in Zimbabwe revolves around French actions. As already highlighted in Chapter 5, the EU found it difficult to express a common position against Mugabe because some countries, including France and Belgium, resisted the quick imposition of sanctions. Some researchers were puzzled by the actions of France, which became one of the largest creditors to Zimbabwe: “Zimbabwe, however, is not a priority for France, which does not have important economic interests there. Yet, France wants to have better bilateral relations with Zimbabwe than the EU has. This is not well understood by the other Member States and appears as poor coordination”.

The International Crisis Group reports that the official reason given for the French position “was that the EU should tread softly while there was still a decent chance of negotiating deployment of its election observers. A more sceptical interpretation was that the French and Belgians, with their particular interests in the Congo, did not wish to antagonize Mugabe because his support was important for the Kabila government in Kinshasa”. Some critics also suggested that France’s significant new commercial deals with Zimbabwe, such

785 Ian Taylor and Paul Williams, “The Limits of Engagement: British Foreign Policy and the Crisis in Zimbabwe,” International Affairs 78, no. 3 (2002): 552.
788 Ibid., 71.
as the lease of aircraft to Air Zimbabwe, were not unrelated to the soft stance adopted by French institutions.790

In sum, the modest interests of “better relations with” and “not antagonizing” Mugabe were sufficient for France to resist the application of sanctions. On the opposite, the strong interests of protecting white farmers and avoiding the economic collapse of one of its most successful former colonies were not sufficient for the UK to avoid pushing for the application of sanctions. There is evidently something that a realist explanation is missing.

A strong case against the explanatory power of the realist hypothesis is offered by Mozambique too. In 2010, the Economist wrote that,

At the end of the civil war in 1992, Mozambique was arguably the world’s poorest country. Its transport, education and health systems were in ruins. Many Mozambicans with marketable skills had fled. But now its economy is one of the fastest-growing in the world. In the past 15 years it has swelled by an average of 8% a year, … with nearly 7% expected this year, well above the 4% the World Bank forecast for southern Africa as a whole.791

New discoveries in natural resources, in particular coal and gas, are driving the boom of the Mozambican economy.792

Donors are well aware of the economic potential of Mozambique. Political commentators argue that “the natural gas bounty, coupled with the country’s massive coal deposits, are set to transform the previously impoverished nation, and the


region, in ways few can predict”.\(^{793}\) However, it is certain that “the reduction of aid
dependence and the geopolitical changes associated to the mining boom pose new
challenges to the Government, as much as to Mozambique’s development and
commercial partners”.\(^{794}\)

If Mozambique has become an interesting market for its commercial partners, this is
equally true for France and the UK. France, for example, was directly involved in the
EMATUM case. One of the arrangers of EMATUM’s seven-year, $500 million
Eurobond was French bank BNP Paribas.\(^{795}\) The money raised with the bond was
used to finance a €200 million deal with Constructions Mecaniques de Normandie
(CMN), a French shipbuilder.\(^{796}\) The contract has provided two years of work for
around 400 French employees.\(^{797}\) Moreover, the patrol ships built by CMN need
naval guns and other military equipment, and so there have been also negotiations
about buying the needed weaponry from France.\(^{798}\)

In addition to direct economic advantages, the EMATUM deal was viewed “as
revealing French interest in Mozambican natural resources and in consolidating its

\(^{793}\) Jinty Jackson, “With Discoveries in Mozambique, Come New Threats,” *Business Day*, June 17,
come-new-threats.

\(^{794}\) Francesca Bruschi, “Mozambique at a Turning Point: From Aid Dependence to Development
Effectiveness?,” *GREAT Insights* 1, no. 10 (December 2012): 9. For an overview of the challenges
and opportunities, see Aurélio Bucuane and Peter Mulder, *Exploring Natural Resources in
Mozambique, Will It Be a Blessing or a Curse?* (Lisbon: Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Economicos,
September 2007). As far as political conditionality is concerned, the economic boom will have serious
repercussion on the leverage of bugets support donor. Given the new revenues from the natural
resources, the percentage of budget support over the total government budget “decreased significantly,
to reach 39.6% in 2012 and that trend is likely to accelerate as of 2017 when revenues from
hydrocarbon sector will start to flow in”: Isabelle Ramdoo, “Mozambique, Aid and Foreign
Investment: Trapped between Scylla and Charybdis?,” *GREAT Insights* 1, no. 10 (December 2012): 8.

\(^{795}\) Sudip Roy, “Mozambique Agency Ematum Hires BNP Paribas and Credit Suisse,” *Reuters*,
September 3, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/03/ mozambique-
bonds-idUSL6N0GZ2DU20130903.

\(^{796}\) Boris Korby, Paul Burkhardt, and Lyubov Pronina, “Mozambique Tuna Bonds Fund Anti-Pirate

\(^{797}\) “Mozambique: Hollande, Guebuza See Work Start On Big Mozambique Ship Order,” *Radio

\(^{798}\) Sylvie Corbet and Angela Charlton, “France-Mozambique Ship Deal Raises Questions,” *Contra
mozambique-raises-questions.
influence in Africa”. That the boats deal came during Guebuza’s state visit to France has prompted political commentators to speculate that higher-level strategic concerns are involved, possibly regarding the long-term protection of Mozambique’s gigantic offshore hydrocarbon assets in the Rovuma field. France has a number of overseas territories in the Indian Ocean, including Réunion and Mayotte, and some in the Mozambique channel in the vicinity of the Rovuma basin. … Analysts have said that the area could hold huge, untapped potential for oil and gas. It would be a logical step for France to offer to extend to Mozambique the protection it gives its own strategic assets in the region, especially if it involves lucrative deals for French shipbuilders and secures dockside jobs at home.800

In September 2013 South Africa, Mozambique and France conducted a joint anti-piracy in the Mozambique Channel, based out of the Port of Maputo.801

If France has showed growing interest in Mozambican economy, the UK did not stand idly by. Exactly during the months of the donor strike, British-Australian Rio Tinto “ha[d] been buying up a lot of assets in Mozambique, and they stand to be one of the significant beneficiaries there”802 In July 2011 Rio Tinto completed the takeover of Sydney-based Riversdale Mining for an impressive $3.4 billion and added 25 million tons of Mozambican coal to its annual output.803 The result was that in 2013, at the time of the EMATUM case, Rio Tinto was the second-biggest mining company operating in the Tete region after the Brazilian Vale de Rio Doce (Vale).

Rio Tinto held “mining concessions of 290 000 hectares for the Benga and Zambezi projects. These two sites are estimated to hold 4 billion and 9 billion tonnes of coal reserves respectively, and might oblige Rio Tinto to relocate the current provincial airport”.

The UK has commercial and investment interests not only in the coal industry. Just to offer another example, in 2010 British multinational British Petroleum (BP) decided to pull out of five countries in Southern Africa (namely, Namibia, Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia and Botswana) but still invested to grow its market share in Mozambique and South Africa. BP Africa’s Chief Executive Sipho Maseko said that BP had significant operations Mozambique and that the country “offered better synergies with its supply portfolio”.

In conclusion, notwithstanding the fact that neither France nor the UK is a former colonial power in Mozambique, and notwithstanding the fact that both countries have similar interests in exploiting the ongoing boom of the Mozambican economy, France adopted a soft stance during the donor strike, while the UK took the leadership of it. A realist hypothesis is of little help in explaining this situation.

7.2. International constructivism

Variation in the degree of internalisation of political conditionality by France and the UK is puzzling because of significant coordination and support in favour of the norm at the EU level, and related expectations of Europeanisation processes. However, France and the UK are subject to social pressures not only at the European level. A first hypothesis that can explain variation across the Channel is that the UK (and not France) has been “socialized” to give higher attention to human rights problems by Nordic countries. A second hypothesis revolves around the different social pressures


deriving from participation in the Commonwealth of Nations and the International Organisation of la Francophonie (OIF) respectively.

7.2.1. Nordic countries

The credibility of an hypothesis of British “socialization” from Nordic countries is based on two elements. Nordic countries should have internalized political conditionality to a larger extent than other EU Member States. Moreover, the UK should have been more amenable than France to social pressure from the Nordic group.

Regarding the first point, there is little doubt that the group of Nordic donors which includes Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden has always set the highest standards in terms of value-based development policies, including the integration of human rights into development programmes and the adoption of aid sanctions against repressive regimes. According to Selbervik, the Nordic countries “were among the pioneers in linking development aid and human rights”. Sweden made human rights one of the objectives of its development cooperation back in the 1970s. Norway added respect for human rights to the list of criteria used to select development partners in 1976. Employing a dataset covering the period 1980 to 1999 and as many as 91 recipient countries, Gates and Hoeffler found that “unlike

the average donor, Nordic donors allocate aid according to democracy and human rights records but not to political allies.”

Interviewees corroborate the fact that “in the case of the Nordic countries, respect for human rights is a paramount value. There is lower tolerance for any kind of abuse in comparison with other EU Member States”. The four case studies confirm that Nordic countries are very often among the hardliners against repressive regimes. Sweden was the first country to suspend budget support in Nicaragua and strongly argued in favour of aid sanctions against Mugabe at the beginning of the 2000s. Norway immediately suspended development cooperation after Rajoelina toppled Ravalomanana in Madagascar. Other cases offer additional evidence. Just to give two more examples, Denmark and the Netherlands have always been among the strongest supporters of sanctions against the Burmese regime. Sweden was among the hardliners after the 2005 elections in Ethiopia.

Regarding the second point, almost all interviewees validated the hypothesis that Nordic countries put lower social pressure on France than Britain. Regarding France, a former diplomat in numerous African countries highlighted the general unwillingness of France to coordinate and, above all, to “be coordinated” (which can be equated to “be persuaded”). A foreign diplomat in Antananarivo shared his surprise when the new French Ambassador in Madagascar, who arrived in the middle of the political crisis, showed no interest in knowing what other local diplomats thought about the crisis and how they would have reacted to the unilateral French decision to continue development assistance to Rajoelina. When asked about French development cooperation in their countries of competence, almost all development officers from Nordic countries confessed that they knew very little about the programmes of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and AFD. An aid

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811 Interview 65.  
813 Interview 51.  
814 Interview 21. Other research already suggested that “France is never happy to copy others, it takes inspiration and then adapts itself”: Tony Chafer and Gordon Cumming, “Cinquante ans de politique africaine de la France,” Afrique contemporaine 235, no. 3 (2010): 59 [translation by the author].  
815 Interview 63.  
816 Interview 13; interview 46.  

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official emphasized that “it is very difficult to coordinate with the French. They are not too transparent about their activities, and when we discuss about political issues it seem that they come to listen rather than to talk.”

Loose cooperation between France and Nordic countries is confirmed by the 2006 Donor Atlas published by the European Commission and the OECD. At that time, nine donors (including Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, the UK and Sweden) claimed that their coordination with other EU Member States was “strong”. Italy, Portugal and Greece reported weak coordination, while France and Spain failed to respond to the question altogether. When these results were pointed at a Nordic diplomat commented: “You can see by yourself who coordinates more and who coordinates less among Member States”.

Lack of persuasion through close coordination is accompanied by limited chances for imitation. The French diplomats who have been interviewed have never demonstrated any deference to the Nordic approach. They talked about the Nordic Plus donors as “a group of donors who believe they are the best in class”. Even when they acknowledge that Nordic donors score better than anybody else in most rankings of aid quality, they differentiate France on the basis of the argument that “we are a much greater power, with larger interests. In the end, the only interest of Nordic countries is to be at the top of these rankings. It is not a fair comparison”. In addition, AFD representatives often argued that “AFD is not a development agency like Sida and Norad”. Institutional differences therefore seem to further limit the possibility of imitation. According to Naudet, this attitude may also derive from scepticism regarding international norms. The priorities of French aid

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817 Interview 97.
819 Interview 56.
820 Interview 37.
822 Interview 100.
823 Interview 106.
“have been somewhat removed from the constantly changing international priorities ... there is a widespread feeling of mistrust within the French system with regard to the new priorities ... these are sometimes considered as “fashions” which are likely to falter or disappear as new ideas emerge”.825

Regarding the UK, almost all interviewees emphasized a good level of harmonization with Nordic countries. To start with, there is high resonance in terms of values and principles. A UK diplomat highlighted that, “even though the UK and the Nordics might disagree on the appropriate response to specific abuses, I always trust them to share our own values and objectives. This is why I pay attention to what they say”.826 A Nordic diplomat confessed that “sometimes we are worried by the way in which a large organisation like DfID works, and I can give you examples of situations when we thought that it operated too close with the government. However, I have never questioned their values. In that respect, we are very similar”.827

According to a DfID official, similar values are not the only feature that makes UK-Nordic harmonization easy.

Between UK and Nordics, not only is there agreement on the principles of development programmes, there are also frequent high level meetings between the heads of the development aid departments from the countries involved. There are joint visits to countries receiving aid from Britain and the Nordics as well as joint programming in these countries.828

In terms of joint programming and coordination, the Nordic Plus Group takes centre stage. The Group, which promotes the “Joint Action Plan of Effective Aid Delivery through Harmonisation and Alignment of Donor Practices”, has mainly concentrated on aid coordination and delegated cooperation.829 For instance, in Zambia the Nordic Plus countries developed a joint plan of action in 2003. The plan included joint programming and evaluation as well as the pooling of technical assistance. In

826 Interview 45.
827 Interview 51.
828 Interview 90.
addition, it sets very specific targets to promote donor co-ordination at all levels, including in international fora.\textsuperscript{830} However, the Group has also covered human rights and conditionality. Human rights were perceived as a natural element for cooperation among the countries. In 2006, the seven countries carried out a joint assessment of policies and administrative practices in order to identify possible barriers for delegated cooperation among the Nordic Plus partners. One of the main findings was that “certain cross-cutting issues and themes are common to all the donors. These include Governance (Human Rights and Democratisation)”\textsuperscript{831} The Nordic Plus Group also actively worked to harmonize (and thus reduce) the conditions in the programmes they supported.\textsuperscript{832}

Close coordination within the Nordic Plus group offers ample opportunities for both persuasion and imitation. As far as persuasion is concerned, Ingebritsen has already suggested that Scandinavian countries deliberately act as “norm entrepreneurs” in foreign aid: they have “consistently and actively sought to influence more powerful states in establishing and strengthening global norms of cooperation”.\textsuperscript{833} Herman spoke of the Netherlands as a \textit{gidsland}, a “mentor state”.\textsuperscript{834} Dahl interpreted categorized Sweden as a “moral superpower”, a country that sees “itself as a natural role model in the international community” and takes “it upon itself to act as a guide to other actors in the system”.\textsuperscript{835} When introduced to these concepts, a diplomat from a Nordic country commented that “it is normal that we try to influence the behaviour of larger donors, especially those with which we often coordinate, such as DfID. We

\textsuperscript{830} OECD, \textit{Norway: Development Cooperation Peer Review} (Paris: OECD, 2004), 69.
\textsuperscript{831} COWI, \textit{Barriers to Delegated Cooperation: Joint Assessment of Policies and Administrative Practices of the Nordic Plus Donors} (Oslo: Norad, September 2006), 23.
are not large players in many countries, and combined action is necessary if we want to have an impact”\(^\text{836}\).

The attempts of Nordic countries to persuade the UK to adopt joint sanctions make perfect sense from the perspective of small states.\(^\text{837}\) Small states do not possess numerous sources of influence over large organisations like the EU. However, sometimes they are able to punch above their weight. As recognized by Panke, “small states are neither per se political dwarfs nor power-brokers”.\(^\text{838}\) Two common mechanisms of influence help explain their behaviour in cases of political conditionality. First, small states often try to influence larger players by putting forward arguments that appeal to shared ideas, a strategy which Björkdahl referred to as “normative framing”.\(^\text{839}\) Jakobsen agrees that, in order to be successful, small States’ initiatives “should appeal to fundamental norms and values shared by EU Member States in order to maximize its appeal and make it difficult to reject”.\(^\text{840}\) Second, small states need to cultivate “network capital”.\(^\text{841}\) According to Thorhallsson and Wivel, “when small states have succeeded in influencing EU policy, coalition-building has been decisive”.\(^\text{842}\) The UK is the ideal candidate for coalition-building with powerful actors on the basis of norms and values.

As far as imitation is concerned, Lumsdaine already argued that “some countries, such as the Dutch and the Swedes, … consciously see their role in the aid process as one of seeking to set higher standards, to reform and correct the aid process by

\(^{836}\) Interview 112.


\(^{838}\) Diana Panke, “Small States in EU Negotiations Political Dwarfs or Power-Brokers?,” Cooperation and Conflict 46, no. 2 (2011): 137.


example”. A UK diplomat confirmed that “if human rights violations take place, if a coup is staged, it is very likely that the first diplomat I would contact would be a Nordic diplomat”. A DFID representative commented that contacts with officials from Nordic development agencies are more “constructive” and “productive”, partnership with Nordic officials is “natural” and “obvious”.

British adoption of advanced policy documents on political conditionality is linked to emulation of Nordic countries as well. Interviews suggested that Nordic-UK synchronization goes back to the end of the 1990s, when the Ministers for Development Cooperation in the Netherlands, Germany, Norway and the UK (Eveline Herfkens, Ms Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, Clare Short and Hilde Johnson respectively) were all women. Named the ‘Utstein Group’, and later enlarged to Canada and Sweden, this forum assumed a coordinating function and a proactive role in the international donor community (in particular on poverty reduction, anti-corruption and donor coherence). A former Nordic diplomat commented that, at the time of the creation of DFID, the affinity between Clare Short and the other Development Minister meant that the new-born British Department, eager to position itself as a leader in the development sector, recurrently looked at the policies of the Nordic countries to draw inspiration.

Even at the level of international arrangements, the UK found itself under pressure to mainstream the inclusion of human rights provisions. The Joint Financing Arrangement promoted by the Nordic Plus Group explicitly includes a human rights

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844 Interview 94.
845 Interview 36.
846 Olsen already suggested the potential influence of the Nordic countries over UK policy decisions. For instance, he reported that the 2005 EU consensus on development assistance “may be interpreted as an illustration of Nordicization”, because “the three Nordic countries were able to convince not only the UK but also Ireland and the Netherlands to support the changes of the common European policy guidelines on aid delivery”: Gorm Rye Olsen, “The European Union’s Africa Policy: The Result of Nordicization or Europeanization?,” Journal of European Integration 35, no. 4 (2012): 420.
847 In 2009, the donors themselves describe the Nordic Plus Group as a product of “long-lasting cooperation”: Norad, Strengthening Nordic Development Cooperation in and with Afghanistan, Norad Report Discussion (Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 2009), 5.
849 Interview 47.
The Nordic Plus Group also drafted a template for arrangements on delegated cooperation. This document reveals the important role played by other countries (in this case the Netherlands) in pressing for the inclusion of human rights clause: “The Programme Arrangement will be based on the principle of national ownership, and will cover at least the following issues: … if the Netherlands is Co-Donor: A provision on respect for human rights and adherence to democratic principles, rule of law and good governance”.

Pressure from Nordic donors on British decisions was detected in several case studies. In Nicaragua, all donors were included in a general coordination group called *Mesa de Cooperantes*. In addition, budget support donors participated in a specific Budget Support Group. However, interviewees reported the existence of an informal group of Nordic Plus donors, where closer interaction took place. The evaluation report of Finnish development assistance confirms that the embassy “has its own coordination mechanisms for bilateral negotiations and implementation of specific projects and programmes, and participates in meetings of heads of cooperation of EU Member States and the ‘Nordic Plus’ group”. A former aid official suggested that local coordination created limited but existing peer pressure within the Nordic Plus Group.

Sweden was the first country to suspend aid to Nicaragua in August 2007. Britain was the second one, just a few months later. Apparently, there was no direct attempt to persuade the UK to follow the Swedish decision. Actually, Sweden was criticized for the absence of any coordination with other EU Member States (as recommended by the EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour). However, a Nordic official supports the idea that the Swedish behaviour paved the way for DFID decisions, both in terms of closure of the office and suspension of budget

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854 Interview 39; interview 111.
856 Interview 5.
support: “I am pretty sure that DfID looked at Sweden and followed suit. Indeed, several other donors (including the Netherlands and Finland) took inspiration from the Swedish decision. Once the door was opened, many donors lined up to exit the country”.

This pattern was also anticipated by Schultz immediately after the Swedish decision in 2007: “the Swedish withdrawal has relevance for the future dynamics of the harmonisation and alignment agenda, especially at a time of alarm over the meaning and ramifications of the ownership agenda pursued by the Nicaraguan government”.

The case of Mozambique confirms the findings of the Nicaraguan crisis, and offers additional evidence through direct comparison with French actions. In Maputo, the main donor group for coordination was the G19. However, smaller informal groups “are not a secret to anyone in Mozambique”. The EU is one of these groups, even though “EU coordination is weak”. The reason is that “it reproduces the European North/South distinction which is already present within the G19”.

The more cohesive group is, again, the informal coordination among Nordic Plus (or “like-minded”) countries. The four Scandinavian countries share the same building, and their coordination is therefore “logistically” easy. However, they often reach out “similar agencies, like DfID”. This is perceived to be “spontaneous” because “we share the same value”. The diplomat continued:

It is true. The donors which participate in the Nordic Plus Group adopted a similar stance both during the donor strike and in response to the EMATUM

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858 Nils-Sjard Schulz, Nicaragua: A Rude Awakening for the Paris Declaration (Madrid: FRIDE, November 2007), 6. Interestingly, the Nicaraguan case also suggests the existence of peer pressure at the European level (that is, what Europeanisation scholars would expect). Norway and Switzerland showed significant reluctance to suspend aid to Nicaragua. The fact that the two countries are European donors but non-EU Member States offers an interesting quasi-natural experiment which could be worth researching in more details. At the same time, it is fair to acknowledge that the importance of material interests in hampering Europeanisation processes (and explaining variation among EU Member States) was also confirmed by the continuation of Spanish assistance.

859 Interview 105.
Anyway, influence is a two-way street: “DfID is influenced, but also heavily
influences what others do”.  

Evidence of Nordic Plus coordination on good governance and human rights issues
can be found in other programmes as well. Shortly before 2011, the Nordic Plus
donors launched an initiative to strengthen partnerships between donors and civil
society organisations. The objective was “to establish a set of principles for donors to
follow to increase civil society capacity at the local level, as well as to improve
donor effectiveness and co-ordination between civil society organisations and Nordic
Plus donors”. A foreign diplomat reported that, in a rather unusual step for a
highly coordinated environment like the Mozambican one, in March 2013 Nordic
Plus donors unilaterally (that is, without consultation with other Western donors)
sent a letter to the Prime Minister asking for explanation about governance in the
forestry sector.

The absence of any “natural partnership” between France and Nordic countries in the
application of political conditionality is confirmed by researchers who have analyzed
other cases. In the 2009 political crisis in Niger, France made it clear that it was very
interested in maintaining Danish involvement in the country. However, Denmark
decided to postpone a new phase of its cooperation in the water sector and to
consider adjustments in the overall country programme. According to Olsen,

The Swedish experience from holding the EU Presidency in the second half of
2009 confirms the existence of the North–South divide within the Union when
it comes to other policy issues linked to Africa. During the Swedish Presidency,
a number of Francophone countries were on the agenda. France considered
Mauritius, Guinea Conakry, Niger and Madagascar as its genuine interests;

860 Interview 65.
861 Interview 30.
862 Carrie Manning and Monica Malbrough, *The Changing Dynamics of Foreign Aid and Democracy in Mozambique* (UNU-WIDER, February 2012), 14.
therefore, it was very difficult for the Presidency to find common ground among the member states for policy initiatives directed towards these four countries. Based on the experiences during the Presidency and other examples, Swedish decision-makers in general consider France as a difficult partner to work with in an African context.\textsuperscript{864}

In sum, today British representatives feel much closer to their like-minded counterparts than French officials do,\textsuperscript{865} and both journalists and researchers have already suggested that, because of participation in the Nordic Plus Group, UK policies are therefore becoming “increasingly” similar to those of Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands and Norway.\textsuperscript{866} Importantly, close coordination between Nordic Plus donors sometimes takes place at the expenses of European coordination. As reported by Delputte and Orbie,

Some Nordic Plus interviewees … suggested that more intense EU coordination conflicts with their identity, which corresponds more with ‘supporting the principle of multilateralism’ than ‘being an EU donor’. This opinion also rests on a perception that through EU coordination, the EU Delegations aim to strengthen a common European identity rather than making EU aid more effective.\textsuperscript{867}

Delputte and Söderbaum reported that in Zambia and Tanzania the Commission suffers from administrative delays and a burdensome hierarchy. Hence, it is the complete opposite of some Nordic Plus donors, who are considered as more flexible

\textsuperscript{864} Olsen, “The European Union’s Africa Policy,” 416.
\textsuperscript{865} Past research already suggested the existence of “a natural partnership between the UK and the Nordics … and a less fruitful alliance between France and the Scandinavian States”: Tony Chafer and Gordon D. Cumming, “Introduction,” in From Rivalry to Partnership: New Approaches to the Challenges of Africa, ed. Tony Chafer and Gordon Cumming (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 10.
\textsuperscript{866} “Leaders: Missing the Point; Foreign Aid,” The Economist, March 16, 2002; Stephen Knack, “Aid and Donor Trust in Recipient Country Systems,” Journal of Development Economics 101 (2013): 348. Some researchers speak about a more generic distinction between Northern and Southern Member States. For instance, Olsen argued that “there seems to be a considerable difference between the motives for giving development aid. One group of European countries is mainly motivated by donor interests, and another group is mainly motivated by recipient needs”: Gorm Rye Olsen, “Europe and the Promotion of Democracy in Post Cold War Africa: How Serious Is Europe and for What Reason?,” African Affairs 97, no. 388 (1998): 348. This chapter explicitly focus on the Nordic Plus group because of clearer boundaries and tangible coordination.
\textsuperscript{867} Sarah Delputte and Jan Orbie, “The EU and Donor Coordination on the Ground: Perspectives from Tanzania and Zambia,” European Journal of Development Research, 2014, 11. Another interviewee commented that “like-mindedness is a much stronger basis for doing joint work than belonging to the EU” (11).
agencies: “by the time the Commission gives the green light, its ideas are already superseded by what we have already agreed in the sectors”.

Others suggested that, in this interplay of identities, “Nordicization” of the UK might have also meant “Europeanisation”: “in the case of the UK, there have been considerable shifts in stance toward coordination of EU development policy, from the extreme negativity expressed by Secretary of State Clare Short, who declared that the Commission was ‘the worst development agency in the world’, through a period of adaptation to EU norms and practices in the context of the Nordic Plus group”.

Fraser confirms that in Zambia “the way towards coordination was paved by the Nordic Plus countries before the European Consensus and the succeeding Council Conclusions were adopted”.

In any case, there is strong evidence that, through persuasion and/or emulation, British decision-makers have been more willing than their French counterparts to follow the leadership of Nordic donors on political conditionality.

7.2.2. The International Organisation of La Francophonie versus the Commonwealth

France and the UK manage their relationship with former colonies (and a few additional recipient countries) through separate international organisations: the Organisation international de la Francophonie (OIF) and the Commonwealth of Nations respectively. The OIF is an international organisation representing countries and regions that share a notable affiliation with French culture. The organisation comprises 57 member States and governments, three associate members and twenty observers. The Commonwealth consists of 53 member States that were mostly territories of the former British Empire.

The two organisations are interesting because, in case of gross human rights abuses and grave violations of democratic principles, both have the power to apply aid sanctions and, more generally, suspend repressive regimes from membership. In 2000, OIF Member States adopted the Bamako Declaration, where they declared their adherence to the following fundamental principles:

1. Democracy is a system of universal values based on recognition of the inalienable dignity and the equal value of all human beings; everyone has the right to play an active role in social, professional and political life and to enjoy the right to development;
2. The essential elements of any democratic regime must include the constitutional rule of law, which implies submission of all institutions to the law, the separation of powers, the free exercise of human rights and fundamental liberties, and equality before the law for all citizens, men and women.\(^{871}\)

Chapter 5 of the Bamako Declaration describes the potential actions that the Permanent Council of La Francophonie (Conseil Permanent de la Francophonie, CFP) can take “in the case of a breakdown of democracy, or massive human rights violations”. Among other things, the CFP is allowed to “suspend multilateral cooperation of the Francophonie, with the exception of programs of direct benefit to the civilian population and those that might support a return to democracy”. In addition, it “may propose suspension of the country concerned from the Francophonie. In the case of a military coup against a democratically elected government, such suspension is decided”.\(^{872}\)

In 1991, the Commonwealth adopted the Harare Declaration, in which its Member States committed to numerous principles, including “democracy, democratic processes and institutions which reflect national circumstances, the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary, just and honest government” and “fundamental human rights, including equal rights and opportunities for all citizens regardless of

\(^{871}\) Organisation Internationale de La Francophonie, Bamako Declaration, November 3, 2000, Chapter 1.

\(^{872}\) Ibid., Chapter 5. The suspension in case of coup d’état seems to be automatic. However, it has not been interpreted in this way: Marion Julia, “La Démocratie Dans Le Projet Politique de l’Organisation Internationale de La Francophonie,” The Round Table 97, no. 399 (2008): 833.
race, colour, creed or political belief”. In 1995, Commonwealth Heads of Government agreed the Millbrook Commonwealth Action Plan on the Harare Declaration. The Action Plan established the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group on the Harare Declaration (CMAG), comprising the Foreign Ministers of eight countries, to deal with serious or persistent violations of the Harare principles. The task of the CMAG is “to assess the nature of the infringement and recommend measures for collective Commonwealth action”. Among these measures, the CMAG can decide for the “suspension of participation at all Commonwealth meetings and of Commonwealth technical assistance if acceptable progress is not recorded by the government concerned after a period of two years”.

While the provisions of the two organisations appear strikingly similar, three different factors make socialization in favour of political conditionality more likely for the UK within the Commonwealth than for France within the OIF. To begin with, while both organisations officially support human rights and democratic institutions among their members, there is no doubt that the Commonwealth has a much stricter policy in this respect. According to Srinivasan, the Commonwealth’s principles “are, by and large, unexceptionable and its references to democracy, human rights and the rule of law can be considered a powerful point of advocacy for Commonwealth members”. In contrast, the Bamako Declaration expressly allowed for individual exceptions. For instance, Vietnam and Laos attached a reservation against multipartism, arguing that each population should be able to chose another path in function of its own “cultural, historic, economic and social specificities”.

In addition, OIF sanctions can affect only multilateral aid. On the contrary, in certain circumstances (namely, “to reinforce the need for change in the event that the government concerned chooses to leave the Commonwealth and/or persists in violating the principles of the Harare Commonwealth Declaration even after two years”), the CMAG can considerate “appropriate further bilateral and multilateral sanctions”. 

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measures by all member states (e.g. limitation of government-to-government contacts; people-to-people measures; trade restrictions; and, in exceptional cases, suspension from the association). 877

The different degree of importance given to democracy and human rights issues is confirmed by the way in which the two organisations reacted when Cameroon applied for membership in both of them in 1989. The country’s democratic transition was monitored far more closely and critically by the Commonwealth than by the Francophonie. Membership of La Francophonie was granted in 1991, even before the multiparty presidential elections took place; membership of the Commonwealth was granted four years later, and a number of political and civil society actors still protested that stronger constitutional guarantees should have been required. 878

The second difference is that the Commonwealth offers a specific institution, the CMAG, where socialization over aid sanctions can take place. Even though limited only to eight members, in practice the most powerful states (including the UK) always participate (at least by proxy). 879 Many researchers have highlighted the unique opportunities offered by this body in terms of information sharing and consensus building. 880

Finally, the OIF is a France-centred organisation (Paris is, by large, the largest contributor to the budget). The Commonwealth is more balanced: the budget is evenly distributed, and the organisation includes other relevant players (including Australia, Canada and New Zealand). 881 In addition, as highlighted above, “there are no ‘permanent members’ in the Commonwealth of Nations leadership. In the

879 Interview 11.
CMAG, created to be a kind of executive for the Commonwealth, no nation is assured of a place, not even the United Kingdom”. 882

The behaviour of Canada offers an interesting example of variation between the organisations because of its dual membership. Potter reports that Canada has been able to take a much more proactive role in the Commonwealth than in the OIF. 883 David Kilgour, a former Canadian Secretary of State, characterized CMAG as a “flexible instrument” of Canadian foreign policy to help promote change in non-democratic countries. 884 On the contrary, the Canadian proposal for an OIF Charter that would have allowed the French-based organisations to sanction member states that are known to have poor human rights records was proposed at least twice, but never approved. 885

In sum, according to Bourne, “the Commonwealth is making a contribution in human rights. This is not an area of significant activity for la Francophonie, the post-colonial French body which is now numerically larger but less coherent than the Commonwealth”. 886 This situation can offer a significant factor to explain varied degrees of internalisation of political conditionality by France and the UK.

The expectations regarding the limited influence of the OIF on France are met. In the case of Madagascar – the only OIF Member State among the four cases analyzed in Chapter 5 (Mozambique is an Observer State) – the CFP suspended the country on 2 April 2009. The CFP expressly implemented all measures described in paragraph 3 of Chapter 5 of the Bamako Declaration, “including suspension of the multilateral Francophone cooperation, with the exception of those programs that benefit the civilian population and that can contribute to the restoration of democracy”. 887

884 Ibid., 450.
Notwithstanding this decision, France continued some government-to-government development programmes in Madagascar. The US Ambassador hinted at the almost non-existence influence from the OIF, when he called it a “French proxy organisation”. Indeed, after a few months the OIF policy became strikingly similar to the French one. The OIF “called for prompt presidential and legislative elections as a solution to the political impasse” and “offered material assistance to facilitate such polls”. At one stage it also “envisaged a rapid timetable although the UN considered that updating the electoral roll, the essential prerequisite for fair polls, would take a minimum of 10 months”.

The problem with the “OIF versus Commonwealth” hypothesis is that the Commonwealth does not seem to play a significant influence over British aid policies and decisions. In the case of Zimbabwe, for example, the Commonwealth suspended the country from the organisation in 2002. However, it was Britain who pushed for the imposition of sanctions against Mugabe, not vice versa.

In September 2001, the CMAG met a Zimbabwean delegation in Abuja. Mugabe’s government promised to halt the violence, but repression continued unabated. As a consequence, the UK, together with Australia and New Zealand, pushed for the suspension of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth before the 2002 elections. Other countries, mostly African ones, resisted any action until the elections were completed. A compromise inspired by Canada created a troika of the previous, current and next Chairpersons-in-Office (Australia, Nigeria and South Africa) with the task of deciding any suitable action after the issuance of the election report by the Commonwealth Observer Group.

The UK continued to press. Prime Minister Tony Blair said that “if the observers’ report does indeed find widespread evidence of intimidation and violence then the fudging will have to stop … The credibility of the Commonwealth itself is at stake.

888 See Chapter 5 for a more detailed description of French behaviour.
The procedures laid down … are clear and action must follow, up to and including suspension”.893 In the end, the observers’ report was highly critical, and South Africa, Australia and Nigeria decided to suspend Zimbabwe from the organisations.894

Taylor reports that British policy “was hugely frustrated by the persistent reluctance of African elites to criticize Mugabe’s behaviour”.895 Porteous confirms that UK leverage within the Commonwealth was reduced by the “reluctance of African elites to take a hard line against a veteran of the struggle for independence”.896 For instance, Mbeki claimed that attempts to ostracize Mugabe in the British Commonwealth were “inspired by notions of white supremacy”.897 In addition, he “fought for Zimbabwe’s suspension to be ended, only to be defeated on that by a similar margin, with only the countries of southern Africa (and not all of them) lined up against the rest”.898

Even other cases that seem to support the Commonwealth hypothesis in reality do not offer substantial evidence in favour of it. In 2006, Commodore Bainimarama staged the third coup in the recent history of Fiji. The Fijian coup is interesting because the only two European donors with high-level diplomats/officers in Suva are France and the UK (together with a Representative of the European Commission). In addition, Fiji is a former British colony, raising the expectation of a softer approach by Britain than by France.

The reality was different. The positions of France and the UK within the Council were similar. French and British officials agreed on a new round of EU consultations

and all aid, except from humanitarian support, was suspended.\textsuperscript{899} Gradual resumption was, and still is, conditioned on holding free and fair elections.\textsuperscript{900} However, at the bilateral level, the UK acted much more quickly than France. On the day of the coup, a spokesman of the British government told reporters: “We are suspending immediately bilateral and military assistance to Fiji and considering further measures with our international and Commonwealth partners. We will urge all parties to recognise the sovereign authority of the elected government”.\textsuperscript{901} Just three days after the coup, the CMAG (which included Britain) decided the suspension of Fiji’s membership on the Councils of the Commonwealth (full suspension was decided on 1 September 2009). As a result, all Commonwealth’s technical assistance programmes were suspended.\textsuperscript{902} Several interviewees suggested that the quick and firm reaction by the UK was due to the urgency of the matter within the Commonwealth.\textsuperscript{903}

The approach taken by France was different. As reported by Graham Davis, an Australian journalist,

in stark contrast with Australia and New Zealand – which have shunned Fiji since Bainimarama’s coup in 2006 – France has continued to engage with the regime ... the French attitude to the repeated coups in Fiji over the years has been vastly at odds with the tough stance of Australia and New Zealand ... The French ambassador in Suva is a regular visitor to the Prime Minister’s office, in stark contrast to the Aussies. France has also enhanced its aid and cultural programs in Fiji.\textsuperscript{904}

\textsuperscript{901} Ray Lilley, “Fiji’s Military Takes Control of Nation,” \textit{Washington Post}, December 5, 2006, \url{http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/05/AR2006120500182_pf.html}.
\textsuperscript{903} Interview 19; interview 44; interview 55.
\textsuperscript{904} Graham Davis, “French Aid in Fiji Floods Shows Way to Pacific Neighbours,” \url{http://pacific.scoop.co.nz}, February 12, 2012, \url{http://pacific.scoop.co.nz/2012/02/french-aid-in-fiji-flooding-shows-way-to-pacific-neighbours/}. Graham Davis is allegedly very close to the Fijian government. As a consequence, his reports need to be taken with a grain of salt. The quotation above has been confirmed by two diplomats who were in Fiji at the time of the coup.
The continuation of development aid is acknowledged by the French Development Agency as well. According to its website, in 2006 “France condemned the December 5th coup and immediately suspended military cooperation and training of senior officials, including diplomats. Nevertheless, its cooperation has been maintained in culture, science, and technology (especially for public health and humanitarian aid). Fijian projects are still eligible for the French Fund for Cooperation in the Pacific, in conjunction with the three French Pacific collectivities”.

At a first glance, the Fijian case seems to support the idea that, at least occasionally, the Commonwealth can influence the position of the UK on aid sanctions. However, most interviewees pointed to the fact that it was mainly due to the willingness to follow Australia, rather than to follow the Commonwealth, that Britain acted so quickly. According to a foreign diplomat in the country, “Britain followed Australia, which in turn was leading the Commonwealth. There was no ‘Commonwealth’ effect on British aid. There was an ‘Australia’ effect”. Another diplomat confirmed that “the UK leaves the leadership on Pacific matters to Australia and New Zealand. The British reaction to the coup was driven by Australian foreign policy, and only indirectly by pressure within the Commonwealth”.

The weaknesses of the Commonwealth hypothesis are exposed not only by the Zimbabwean and Fijian cases. It is often Britain which leads the human rights activities of the organisation. It is true that there are a few circumstances in which the UK has followed the guidance of Australia, as in the case of Fiji, and the guidance of Canada, as in the recent case of Sri Lanka and the absence of accountability for alleged violations of human rights and international humanitarian standards by government forces during the repression of separatist Tamil Tiger rebels. Yet, it was the UK that lobbied for the expansion of the CMAG remit to address human

906 Interview 55.
907 Interview 67.
908 Interview 81.
rights abuses beyond the unconstitutional overthrow of governments.\textsuperscript{910} And it was the UK that put the issue of gay rights on the agenda of the organisation in 2011.\textsuperscript{911}

In sum, even though the potential for differentiated socialization is evident, the analysis of the case studies and the interviews with their protagonists do not warrant the conclusion that France and the UK differ in the internalisation of political conditionality because the former belongs to OIF and the latter to the Commonwealth.

7.3. Liberalism

When interviewees were asked their opinion regarding the main factor behind the different attitude to political conditionality by France and the UK, there was almost unanimous consensus (from both capitals and local offices) in favour of domestic politics. Interviewees pointed to several reasons why British aid policy-makers are subject to stricter scrutiny for their decisions and, consequently, they are more accountable to their domestic constituencies than their French counterparts.

To begin with, at least since 1997, British aid responsibilities squarely fall on one single individual, the Secretary of State for International Development, and a few senior officials within one single department, the Department for International Development.\textsuperscript{912} Fisher describes the consequences of this situation in the following terms:

> Being held personally responsible, by superiors, journalists or voters, for continuing to provide aid to a corrupt or dictatorial regime is potentially devastating to an individual’s career prospects in the era of austerity and intense scrutiny of public spending and it is therefore logical that donor officials might be inclined to recommend the swift suspension of aid programmes to such


\textsuperscript{912} Barrie Ireton, \textit{Britain’s International Development Policies: A History of DFID and Overseas Aid} (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 50.
regimes when governance crises hit, with little clear idea of how such cuts may or may not help to resolve the crisis.\textsuperscript{913}

It is perhaps recognition of this “blame risk” that led former UK International Development Secretary Andrew Mitchell to wait until his last day in office to restore £16m of aid to Rwanda in September \textsuperscript{914}.

In France, the absence of a high-level political figure as Minister of Development Cooperation, joint management of the aid budget by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and AFD, and the significant (but often hidden role) played by the President make it extremely difficult to assign clear-cut political responsibilities.\textsuperscript{915} Naudet argues that “French aid lacks transparency, partly as a result of the dispersal of the administrative structures involved”. Assessment of French aid strategy in general is difficult “because the interventions are spread between agencies according to their own specific objectives and there are insufficient overviews available to the public which attempt to place overall activities within a coherent framework.\textsuperscript{916}

A second factor that affects aid accountability is the form of government. The UK is a parliamentary democracy where decision-makers are directly accountable to the Parliament. Institutional accountability adds up to political accountability. Even though Barratt argues that “Parliament’s role falls short of what might be expected”,\textsuperscript{917} DfID decisions are examined by the House of Common’s International Development Committee, a serious discussion over the aid budget takes place every year, and Members of the Parliament (MPs) often conducted in-depth review of specific aid programs.\textsuperscript{918} For instance, in 2012 Andrew Mitchell was “grilled” by

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{915} Interview 9.
\item \textsuperscript{918} See, for instance, House of Commons, \textit{Sessional Returns} (London, September 13, 2013), 219–227.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
MPs over his decision to restore British aid to Rwanda notwithstanding fears about the human rights record of the country’s government.\(^{919}\)

In contrast with British parliamentary form of government, France is a semi-presidential system where those in charge of foreign policy and high-level aid decisions respond to the President, not to the Parliament. According to Médard,

> The Parliament has never played any important role in African policy. Moreover, there has never been a real public debate in Parliament on French policy. The budget of the Ministry of cooperation was voted on without any serious discussion. This notorious absence of parliamentary involvement reflected in part its diminished position within the Fifth Republic institutions.\(^{920}\)

The absence of formal accountability channels is exacerbated by the low level of interest shown by MPs, as confirmed by the absence of a specific committee dedicated to aid issues (development assistance is discussed within the more general foreign policy committee).\(^{921}\) To date there have been no examples of parliamentary initiatives having a significant influence on French aid policy.\(^{922}\)

Third, as highlighted by Hoebink and Stokke, “in some countries development co-operation is a high-profiled issue, while in others this policy attracts little attention from policy-makers and the general public alike”.\(^{923}\) This difference is stark in the case of the UK and France. National media dedicate much more attention to aid in the UK than in France.\(^{924}\) British newspapers (including popular tabloids) frequently

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\(^{924}\) Douglas A. Van Belle, Jean-Sébastien Rioux, and David M. Potter, Media, Bureaucracies, and Foreign Aid: A Comparative Analysis of United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France and Japan (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 73.
cover scandals of money disbursed to repressive regimes, and recurrently call for aid cuts at times of austerity or national disasters. According to Coles, “the potential for a strong domestic reaction to an overseas development is always there and policymakers must factor that potential into their thinking”. This is also the consequence of a different culture of watchdog journalism:

Beyond shared norms of media freedom and mutually accepted standards for the gathering information, media outlets in both Britain and the United States share business imperatives and norms that motivate them to leap upon the story of a bureaucrat shown to be significantly out of step with the desires or demands of the public or its elected leaders. … Of all democratic bureaucracies, it is easiest to believe that British civil servants would wish to avoid public scrutiny in the media.

The British government’s attempts to sell its foreign policies (both at home and abroad) have also opened the policy process up to new levels of scrutiny. The greater significance afforded to human rights by policy announcements at the beginning of the first Labour government meant that this issue attracted far more publicity, and therefore expectation. Human rights did become a more openly discussed issue.

This is not the case on the other side of the Channel. Aid is rarely mentioned in newspapers’ headlines and the general public “is largely ignorant about who does


928 Van Belle, Rioux, and Potter, Media, Bureaucracies, and Foreign Aid, 55.

929 Williams, “Who’s Making UK Foreign Policy?,” 910.

and who takes what”.931 The opacity of the system is widely recognized by commentators.932 Renou laments “a lack of transparency and democratic control” in the aid decision-making process: “the French parliament and most of the ministers have been kept out of the game, as has public opinion, the media and NGOs”.933 Bovcon reports that “most decisions concerning these events have been taken in an old-fashioned way: namely, in a non-transparent manner at the highest level of the French State, bypassing the French parliament and public debate”.934

Lastly, French development and human rights NGOs are significantly less influential than their British counterparts. According to Lundsgaarde, this is the result of a combination of different factors: smaller size, tighter budgets and larger focus on service-delivery than on advocacy.935 Lancaster defines French development NGOs as “weak” and “lacking in access”.936 In the UK, most development NGOs have a close relationship with DfID, and regularly interact with the International Development Secretary of State and DfID senior officials on the steps to take in case of democratic setbacks or human rights problems.937 According to Porteous, “the ‘growing clout’ within the Labour Party establishment of a variety of development and humanitarian NGOs like Oxfam and Christian Aid, and media and public opinion concerns that something needed to be done to alleviate Africa’s appalling predicament” are among the “chief” reasons behind Blair’s foreign policy in Africa.938

All case studies explored in Chapter 5 provide evidence in support of the liberal hypothesis. In Nicaragua, foreign diplomats reported that the main preoccupation within the Budget Support Group (but not outside) was how to justify direct assistance to a Sandinista government which rigged elections, banned therapeutic

931 Interview 113.
936 Lancaster, Foreign Aid, 220.
937 Interview 69.
abortion and harassed local NGOs. An interviewee from the Nordic Plus Group commented that “we were all worried about the future of the Nicaraguan aid programmes. We knew that it became increasingly difficult to defend assistance before our domestic public”.  

As far as Zimbabwe is concerned, Vines argued that, from a purely strategic point of view, what happens in Zimbabwe is of limited interest to the UK, yet domestic pressures forced the government to take action proactively against the regime of President Mugabe. Taylor and Williams commented that “few events in Africa in recent years have so excited British opinion on foreign affairs as the downward spiral of Zimbabwe under President Mugabe”. Williams confirms that “compared with most African States, Zimbabwe’s crisis has consistently generated a significant degree of coverage in the UK press, despite the fact that most journalists working for British organisations have been expelled from the country since 2001. Zimbabwe’s crisis has also been a regular feature of parliamentary debate in both the Lords and Commons, with the Conservative party consistently criticizing Labour for not taking decisive action”.  

The relevance of the “domestic accountability” hypothesis is confirmed also by those cases where the UK took a softer stance in terms of aid sanctions. In Rwanda, the Netherlands cut budget support twice – during the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2003 and after the publication of a UN report detailing Rwandan support for a Congolese rebel group in 2008. According to Zorbas, “both times, the suspension of aid was not so much a reaction to developments on the ground in Rwanda as it was a response to political pressure from the Dutch Parliament resulting from vocal media and civil society groups”. The explanation of the soft position from the UK, which did not cut aid in these circumstances (but which did cut aid in

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939 Interview 96.
941 Taylor and Williams, “The Limits of Engagement,” 547.
942 Williams, “Blair’s Britain and the Commonwealth,” 387.
is suggested by a Western diplomat: “Rwanda has support across the UK Parliament. This is not the case with the Dutch or Belgians. Also, the UK doesn’t have a large Rwandan Diaspora community which itself exerts pressures on Parliaments and is often quite critical of the government in Kigali”.  

The conclusions of two overviews of French and British aid respectively aptly summarize the differences we have highlighted in this section. Sue Wheat wraps up her analysis of British aid by saying that it “has taken a much higher and often controversial profile and government is far more open to consulting with and listening to advocates in the development sector”. Lancaster describes a different situation in Paris: “Much of the answer has to do with widely shared ideas about France’s rightful role in world politics, together with a highly centralised and not very transparent government (the National Assembly had little involvement in or even knowledge of the details of French aid, and development-oriented NGOs had little access to government decision-making)”.  

Before moving to sociological institutionalism, a last comment is warranted on obstruction points and personal relationships. The second factor mentioned above (dispersal of authority over aid decisions) not only affects French transparency and accountability, but also produces several “veto points” before any decision on aid sanctions can be made and executed. The concept of “veto points” (or “veto players”) – that is, the number of actors necessary to take and implement decisions – has been recurrently used to explain differentiated impacts of EU policies over EU Member States in the Europeanisation literature. According to Börzel and Risse “multiple veto points in a country’s institutional structure can effectively empower actors with diverse interests to resist adaptational pressures emanating from  

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944 Ibid.  
946 Lancaster, Foreign Aid, 217.  
Europeanisation”. Bursens and Deforche clarify that “when the political power in the political system is shared among many actors, it will be more difficult to mobilize enough actors to pull through changes. The less institutional or de facto veto players are involved in a policy case, the easier it is to foster the domestic ‘winning coalition’, which is a necessary condition for smooth shaping and taking of EU policy, i.e. for adaptation”.

Importantly, the high number of French veto players is not only due to the complexity of the formal administration of aid. Several interviewees suggested that it is also a detrimental consequence of la Françafrique, that is, the informal network of dubious connections between French and African politicians and businessmen which has lasted since decolonization. La Françafrique has often been used to explain French reluctance to apply political conditionality. In 2001 Gordon Cumming published an extremely detailed comparison of how France and the United Kingdom responded to the “new development nostrum” that required tying assistance to political reforms in developing countries. According to the author, who focused on the period from the end of the Cold War to 1997, there was “a radical shift with the introduction of political conditionality, but this has gradually been watered down by France, and, to a lesser extent, the UK”. Variation between the two donors was mainly explained through the existence of strong personal and affective ties between French decision-makers and African leaders, compared to the strong emphasis that Britain placed on the formal institutions involved in the formulation of development policy.

949 Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse, “Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe,” in The Politics of Europeanization, ed. Kevin Featherstone and Claudio Maria Radaelli (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 59. Börzel and Risse listed other important factors (deriving from both rational choice and sociological theories), including supporting formal institutions, norm entrepreneurs and cooperative informal institutions.


953 Gordon Cumming, Aid to Africa: French and British Policies from the Cold War to the New Millennium (Ashgate, 2001), 340.

954 Cumming, Aid to Africa, Chapter 9.
The main argument here is that, as suggested by several interviewees and recent research, the “emotional” factor emphasized by Cumming has possessed weaker explanatory power since the beginning of the 2000s. According to Gounin,

whether the critics of Françafrique like it or not, France’s Africa policy is not permanently frozen in “Foccartism” [Jacques Foccart was Chief of Staff for African Affairs under President Charles de Gaulle and Georges Pompidous, and is since then considered the epitome of the Françafrique] … France’s policies toward Africa today are led by a new generation of officials whose ethos is that of IMF and EU technocracy, not that of “l’Afrique de Papa” and who have had increasing success in normalizing the France-Africa relationship.

Bovcon lists numerous factors that have undermined the Françafrique: budgetary constraints; public criticism of corruption, supported by numerous legal investigations into the affairs of some leading figures of African networks; the increasing fragmentation of these networks into various individual business lobbies; the death of some pivotal figures, such as Foccart, Mitterrand and Houphouët-Boigny (former President of Côte d’Ivoire); and France’s implication in the Rwanda genocide in 1994.

Notwithstanding the decline of the Françafrique regime, its consequences in terms of veto players are still significant. The case of Madagascar is interesting in this

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955 Interview 20; interview 58. According to Machet, the Françafrique is, “despite all, shaken as a result of persistent work by civil society and by a handful of elected officials, judges and policemen”: Luc Machet, Quelle Politique Pour La France En Afrique En 2012? (Paris: Terra Nova, 2012), 4. Moncrieff concluded its recent analysis of French relations with Sub-Saharan Africa by saying that, “in any event, it is clear that the core area of influence of the Françafrique networks has shrunk to Central African states such as Gabon, Cameroon, Central African Republic and Congo-Brazzaville. Even there it is more fragile than the highly protocolaire relations with France may suggest”: Richard Moncrieff, French Relations with Sub-Saharan Africa Under President Sarkozy, SAIIA Occasional Paper (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2012), 15.


957 Bovcon, “Françafrique and Regime Theory,” 11.

958 This finding is in line with recent research at the crossroads between Europeanisation and diffusion theory, which has found that “informal institutions and practices of rent-seeking and clientelism provide domestic actors with powerful possibilities to block domestic institutional change”: Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse, “When Europeanisation Meets Diffusion: Exploring New Territory,” West European Politics 35, no. 1 (2011): 197. For specific examples, see Aneta B. Spendzharova and Milada Anna Vachudova, “Catching Up? Consolidating Liberal Democracy in Bulgaria and Romania after EU Accession,” West European Politics 35, no. 1 (2011): 39–58; Gergana Noutcheva and Senem
respect. After the March 2009 coup by Rajoelina against Ravalomanana, French policy-makers were divided. The official diplomatic service of the Presidency and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would have opted for a more principled decision. Yet, the Africa Cell of the French Presidency (that is, the personal advisor to President Sarkozy, Claude Guéant) and the Secretary of State for Cooperation, Alain Joyandet, were in favour of quick elections to legitimize Rajoelina. According to Laurent d’Ersu, private interests enmeshed with public diplomacy:

Following a scenario that has become a classic since the accession to power of Nicolas Sarkozy, one of the leading missi dominici of the President in Africa, business lawyer Robert Bourgi, intervened on behalf of private interests, namely those of a giant food exporter to Africa. He orchestrated then – especially with the Secretary General of the Elysée Claude Guéant and the Secretary of State for Cooperation Alain Joyandet, who both have secretly received Andry Rajoelina – French support to the candidature of the young acting president, an option vigorously opposed by the Quai d’Orsay and the diplomatic team of the Elysée.

This narrative, which is confirmed by the cables from the US Embassy in Antananarivo and is in line with new research produced by Cumming, has already been generalized to other countries and human rights crises. According to Dewar, Massey and Baker, the French position in many situations was “confused by the management of foreign policy under President Nicolas Sarkozy, in which political dealings with some African countries were largely entrusted to the president’s own Africa team at the Elysée palace, marginalizing the foreign ministry (which was more closely aligned with mainstream EU policy)”.

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In sum, if *la Françafrique* has lost its emotional character and its significant explanatory power, it has left behind numerous veto points obstructing the principled application of political conditionality. This adds up to a decision-making system which is far less accountable than the British one.

7.4. Sociological institutionalism

Exploring the organisational culture of bureaucracies like DfID, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the French Development Agency would require the adoption of an ethnographic methodology in order to make sense of how officials at the three institutions make sense of the world. The problem is that ethnographic research is challenging in foreign policy and foreign aid settings. To start with, if all bureaucracies are designed to guard information, foreign policy institutions do so more than others, with little allowance made to transparency or public engagement. Roy’s book on microfinance, based in part on interviews at the United States Agency for International Development, expressly mentions the author’s substantial difficulties with access to information and engagement with officials.\(^{963}\) In addition, participant observation is almost impossible. The traditional ethnographic practice of “deep hanging out” – to recall James Clifford’s iconic phrase – is evidently precluded when studying foreign policy decision-makers. How can one imagine a researcher shadowing the head of cabinet of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs at work? Neumann frankly acknowledges the importance of his personal contacts at the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.\(^{964}\)

The consequence of these difficulties is that, in the field of international politics and foreign policy, even “the best accounts of elite policy bureaucracies draw by and large on textual material or interviews, sometimes complemented by a small participant observation component”.\(^{965}\) This dissertation is no exception in this


\(^{965}\) Merje Kuus, “Foreign Policy and Ethnography: A Sceptical Intervention,” *Geopolitics* 18, no. 1 (2013): 119. Lee is more critical on this point. According to the author, “most research has been undertaken from an IR perspective, with any ‘ethnographic’ twist limited to sporadic interviews in addition to the analysis of official discourses, formal self-representations, documents and texts”: Jon
respect. Research was mainly based on the analysis of policy documents and personal interviews. Even though a definite answer cannot be reach through these means, the aim is to explore whether a preliminary case can be made in favour of a cultural explanation of variation in the adoption of political conditionality.

Notwithstanding the similar functions, the institutions managing British and French development assistance are starkly different from each other. French development assistance is dominated by economists and diplomats. The “pivot” actor of the French aid system is the French Development Agency (Agence Française de Développement, AFD). The staff of AFD is mainly composed of economists who eagerly repeat that “AFD is a bank and operates as a bank”.966 When asked for which other institutions AFD look like, the unanimous response was the World Bank. If a few officials also signalled the German Federal Enterprise for International Cooperation (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, GIZ), nobody ever mentioned DfID or the development agency of a Nordic country.967 Meimon explains that, notwithstanding its prominent role, AFD “is not a political organ”. Rather, it almost always takes a “banking approach” to development issues.968 Raffinot confirms that, for AFD staff, “development is a technical process, depending heavily on the creation of a solid infrastructure, not on protection the poor”.969 In addition to the predominance of a banking culture, one of the two “co-tutors” of AFD is the Ministry of Economics and Finance, which is also directly in charge of the most significant size of French aid budget. To describe the inner working of the Ministry, Gabas explicitly refer to a “culture based on macroeconomic balancing and the extension of commerce”.970

As the French government lacks a dedicated Ministry for Development Cooperation, the remaining part of French bilateral aid is managed by diplomats within the


966 Interview 86.

967 Interview 2; interview 23; interview 106.


Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The 1998 reform of French development cooperation assigned a stronger role to the local ambassador in comparison with embedded development officers.\textsuperscript{971} This change has had important repercussions. Before the reform,

the two functions of ambassador and chief of French development cooperation mission were carried out by the two different people. The ambassador had the diplomacy function and the chief of the French cooperation mission had the responsibility for development cooperation. Now, it is the ambassador with his primary diplomatic function who will implement the projects and programmes financed by France; development will be introduced as a second priority.\textsuperscript{972}

In theory, this situation might have elevated the importance of human rights in aid decision-making: diplomats might be more inclined than economists to give due consideration to political issues, such as respect for human rights and democratic norms. Yet, several interviewees suggested that this is not the case. French diplomats value “continuity over disruption, partnership over imposition”.\textsuperscript{973} Diplomats themselves acknowledged that “French diplomacy is based on supporting change rather than punishing mistakes”.\textsuperscript{974} As clarified by Alain Joyandet, France speaks “to regimes that are not perfect democracies, because our diplomacy is intended to be universal. This is a diplomacy of “positive influence”: we want to talk with everyone to bring them to our values. The more we talk with these countries, the greater the possibilities of advancing these values”.\textsuperscript{975} A diplomat referred to a policy named “reconciliation diplomacy”, whereby rather than promoting human rights and democracy, France will promote diversity, cited as a common value for all that will not block communication efforts.\textsuperscript{976}

\textsuperscript{972} Gabas, “French Development Co-Operation Policy,” 253.
\textsuperscript{973} Interview 29.
\textsuperscript{974} Interview 4.
\textsuperscript{976} Interview 52.
In addition to a “conciliatory” and not “divisive” culture, French understanding of good government and democracy support has been known to “take a very state-centric approach. Most projects continue to require State support from local governments since technical assistants are delegated to consult and assist in the reform, reorganisation and modernisation of judicial systems, police, parliaments and civil services”. This almost inevitably excluded any political dimension from French development cooperation. As highlighted by Rahimi, the idea that “all that is politics belongs with the State” has had a significant influence, meaning that any attempts to engender political change would not be the work of the development departments. This again plays a role in France’s opposition to American style democratisation, which has been more political and short-term”.

Other researchers have even suggested that French model of development actually is “stable authoritarianism”. According to Moncrieff, “France offered only tepid support to democratization movements, and was sometimes downright hostile. Whether because of a sincere belief in stability before democracy or through self-interest … many Francophone African leaders successfully exerted a stability blackmail (if I go it will be chaos) to retain French support as they used and abused incumbency to hang onto power”. Melly and Darracq argue that this situation created unexpected synergies between French and Chinese policies in Africa:

> France and China share a common concern for stability in Africa, and China has at times partnered with France in this regard. The most striking example has been in Sudan where, thanks to its privileged relations with the regime of Omar al-Bashir, China was instrumental in persuading it to accept the deployment of the UN mission in Darfur. … France discovered that in this instance its position on Sudan is closer to China’s than to its usual partner, the United States, which is more critical.

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978 Ibid., 8.
979 Moncrieff, French Relations with Sub-Saharan Africa Under President Sarkozy, 8.
Lastly, Bourmaud recalls that diplomats are educated under a “Gaullist consensus”, which supports the ideas of French *grandeur* and exceptionalism. In this worldview, Africa acts as the guarantor of French standing in world politics (together with the permanent seat in the UN Security Council and the *force de frappe* of the nuclear weapons). Rupture of any significant relationship with African countries is almost not contemplated.⁹⁸¹

As far as the UK is concerned, two factors might make DfID a more favourable terrain for the integration of human rights concerns. First, the existence of a dedicated Department in charge of development assistance insulates it from political pressures to downplay human rights in favour of strategic and economic interests.⁹⁸² It is true that the dilemma between long-term development objectives and short-term human rights protection has blatantly manifested in the ‘soft’ stance of donors, including DfID, towards pro-poor but semi-authoritarian government in Ethiopia and Rwanda.⁹⁸³ Yet, former DfID officials argue that things have changed since when “the Department tented to the view that the Foreign Office were better at understanding short-term political event”. DfID joined with the Overseas Development Institute to develop a methodology for understanding the ‘drivers of change’ and today “has a substantial cadre of governance professionals and stronger capacity for political analysis”.⁹⁸⁴

Second, DfID is increasingly staffed with individuals sharing a strong ethical purpose at the roots of their job decisions (as confirmed by the popularity of the Department in voluntary application for entries to the Civil Service, and the large number of recruitments of people with previous work experience in NGOs).⁹⁸⁵ One immediate effect of this shift in ‘institutional orientation’ was an increase in the

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⁹⁸⁴ Ireton, Britain’s International Development Policies, 78.
number of young professionals employed in DFID, especially but not exclusively economists. In addition, DFID engaged with academics and NGOs. This took time to implement, but finally became a defining feature of the Department.\textsuperscript{986} The close relationship with NGOs and value-based external organisations is important because “independent aid agencies create bureaucratic incentives for higher aid budgets” and “are less conducive to principled conditionality and often more entangled with domestic clients of tied aid and recipient governments than integrated aid programs. Domestic NGO circulation into the aid bureaucracy … can be correctives to these tendencies”;\textsuperscript{987}

While France and the UK show two different organisational cultures, and this might well represent a decisive factor in explaining stronger internalisation of political conditionality, a cultural explanation faces two main weaknesses. First, decisions over aid sanctions are taken at ministerial level, not by DFID staff. Dodd therefore suggests that, while aid suspensions and cuts are inevitably informed by the interpretation given by bureaucrats within DFID and the FCO, “culture can be a factor to explain a strict approach to political conditionality. Yet, it is not the most important”.\textsuperscript{988} Simon Maxwell partially confirms this interpretation by distinguishing “between fundamentalists and gradualists”. Politicians are immediately tempted to cut aid when faced with serious human rights abuses. DFID staff usually takes a “more nuanced” approach, trying to understand the “direction of travel” of the recipient country.\textsuperscript{989}

Second, historical accounts of decision-making over aid sanctions indicate that the department which often takes the hardest stance on human rights is the FCO, not DFID. For example, “the FCO (with its new injection of human rights advisers from the NGO world) came to feel that Short was not paying enough attention to human rights and democratization in countries like Rwanda and Uganda”. In addition, according to Bronwen Manby, former deputy Africa director of Human Rights Watch, the organisation had increasing difficulty in getting its views heard on Africa


\textsuperscript{987} Brysk, Global Good Samaritans, 227.

\textsuperscript{988} Interview 27.

\textsuperscript{989} Interview 66.
in DFID, particularly on Rwanda”. Rwanda fomented strife also several years later. When Mitchell reinstated aid to the country, “most people in the Foreign Office [thought] the time [had] come to take a really tough stand”. The result is that most interviewees agree that a cultural explanation is more useful to explain which are the “hard cases” for aid sanctions (that is, those recipient countries to which a donor find more difficult to apply political conditionality) rather than the general attitude towards the norm itself. An interviewee suggested: “Look at the countries where France has not applied sanctions: Madagascar, Niger, etc. Then, look at the countries where the UK has been reluctant to apply sanctions: Ethiopia, Rwanda, etc. In the case of France, strategic interests overcome human rights; in the case of the UK, development successes overcome human rights”.

7.5. A neglected but important detail: aid modalities

One of the advantages of semi-structured interviews is that they leave open the possibility for respondents to raise issues not contemplated in the initial questionnaire. All interviews with aid decision-makers included a question about potential missing variables, and a few interviewees raised an interesting point about the facilitating role played by the fact of delivering aid through different modalities.

For instance, according to some aid officials, legal, economic and psychological reasons make loans more difficult to suspend or cancel than grants. First, a loan is often based on a contract with a third party. As human rights clauses are rarely included in project-level agreements, aid sanctions would lead to controversial breaches of contractual obligations. Second, discontinuing a loan inevitably entails an unforeseen loss for the development agency. Third, as repayment plans are often longer than 10 or even 20 years, loans nurture the idea of a long-term partnership between donor and recipient. This makes it thornier to break the relationship apart for short-term objectives.

992 Interview 47.
993 Interview 77; interview 87.
In France, the degree of concessionality has steadily decreased since the 1970s. Grants, which represented 80% of French ODA to sub-Saharan Africa in 1975, only accounted for 65% in 1985. The creation of the AFD exacerbated this trend. The Agency has a predominant “banking culture and a strong emphasis on loans”. Today, loans account for 40% of French bilateral aid. On the contrary, the vast majority of UK bilateral aid is provided in grant form.

A strong preference for loans or grants is not the only difference between French and British development institutions. Since the late 1990s, DfID has been among the leading advocates of programme modalities (such as direct budget support, but also sector-wide programmes), as against projects. In 2000, Claire Short sanctioned this change of perspective: “Too much of development in the past has been about isolated development projects. The new agenda is increasingly about sector-wide approaches, helping governments to provide key services, such as health and education”. The most recent DAC peer review openly recognizes “UK’s willingness to lead in the use of direct budget support”.

In contrast with the UK, France has always experienced a strong predominance of technical assistance, and showed particular resistance to embrace the new instrument. Even though the size of their bilateral development programme is comparable, in 2008/2009 DfID provided USD 1.1 billion in budget support, France only USD 259 million. The last few years have been particularly

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996 Cumming, Aid to Africa, 63.
1000 Wheat, “UK Development Aid.”
1001 OECD, UK: Development Cooperation Peer Review (Paris, 2010), 73.
1002 Cumming, Aid to Africa, 67.
1003 OECD, UK: Development Cooperation Peer Review, 75.
1004 OECD, France: Development Cooperation Peer Review, 110.
innovative in this respect. Yet, the Hollande administration “still takes a cautious approach to general budget aid; only a few countries receive such support from France – generally in the form of highly concessional loans, on terms similar to World Bank IDA credits. Recipients in 2013 include Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire (€300 million), Senegal (€140 million), Niger (€50 million) and Mauritania. The government sees France’s tradition of funding long-term infrastructure as a strength”.

General budget support and political conditionality are intimately linked for two main reasons. First, the instrument is easy to suspend. In contrast with project aid, it does not entail the presence of workers on the ground or contractual obligations with third parties. In addition, the fact that money is disbursed directly in the hands of the recipient government calls for stricter fiduciary safeguards. In case of human rights abuses, project aid can still be justified on the basis of its direct benefits to vulnerable individuals (who risk to be punished twice in case of aid suspensions). General budget support cannot but be seen as a sign of support and/or complicity with the repressive regime.

The British approach hold some support to the hypothesis that the adoption of some sort of conditionality is seen as a price to pay for an “enhanced” version of aid programmes. Partnership became a guiding theme in the second DfID annual report. Where governments were prepared to commit themselves to sustainable pro-poor development programmes, the department was prepared “in principle to embark on a deeper, long-term partnership, involving all forms of assistance”. While stressing the avoidance of “crude conditionality”, the department could nonetheless warn that

1006 Melly and Darracl, A New Way to Engage?, 14.
partnership might “involve intense dialogue and hard choices”\textsuperscript{1009}. The advantages for recipient governments are aptly described by the \textit{Economist}:

DFID is quite choosy about which poor governments it lends to. But when it has picked what it sees as a winner, it stands back, letting the government govern, without too many intrusive conditions or requests for thank-you notes (otherwise known as progress reports). In some countries, such as Uganda, Tanzania and Mozambique, as much as half of the money DFID provides is not earmarked for any particular scheme or project at all. It is simply added to the nation's budget.\textsuperscript{1010}

Notwithstanding their plausibility, it is difficult to draw general conclusions from the arguments presented above. First, there does not seem to be a perfect correlation between the provision of grants or loans and the application of aid sanctions. France, for instance, adopted sanctions in cases where it was mainly operating through loans. The UK still provides a large part of its bilateral aid budget in specific projects. For instance, Joseph Croft, Executive Director at Stakeholder Democracy Network, argued that “even if it was more proactive on conditionality, the UK would have problems to adopt aid sanctions against Nigeria because of the way in which aid is disbursed. DFID outsources its programs to consultancies. This means that it is in a contractual relationship to deliver the project”.\textsuperscript{1011} Second, it is true that general budget support is easy to suspend. Yet, it usually takes years to prepare a budget support agreements, and there is often resistance to blow up such a long-term investment.\textsuperscript{1012} Third, the all idea of budget support is to offer predictability to aid flows. Suspensions and cancellations because of political problems obviously run against this idea.

7.6. Conclusion

Avoiding paradigmatic boundaries, this chapter tested four different hypotheses to explain variation in the extent of internalisation of political conditionality across the

\textsuperscript{1011} Interview, 5 July 2013.
\textsuperscript{1012} Interview 27.
Channel. The realist hypothesis was rejected because top recipients of British aid are not better human rights performers than recipients of French aid.\textsuperscript{1013} As such, deeper internalisation of political conditionality by British policy-makers cannot be considered an \textit{ex post} rationalization of strategically-induced aid allocation. In addition, the cases of Zimbabwe and Mozambique showed that aid sanctions have not been used by British decision-makers to conceal the pursuit of material interests.

An hypothesis derived from international constructivism suggested that the UK has internalized human rights to a larger extent than France because it is the object of social pressure (through persuasion and/or imitation) within (1) the Nordic Plus Group and/or (2) the Commonwealth of Nations. The first leg of the hypothesis has found significant supporting evidence. Nordic countries apply aid conditionality more than other EU Member States, and put pressure on British decision-makers to follow their leadership. Closer coordination within the Nordic Plus Group was found both in Nicaragua and Mozambique. The second leg of the hypothesis showed strong potential at the policy level, but was not convincing after the analysis of the case studies. In Zimbabwe, it was the UK to press for the application of sanctions. In Fiji, the UK followed the leadership of Australia and New Zealand, and found itself under pressure from the Commonwealth only indirectly.

According to the version of liberalism proposed by Moravcsik, the UK should have internalized human rights to a larger extent than France because British aid decision-makers are under stricter domestic scrutiny than their French counterparts. Interviewees almost unanimously endorsed this hypothesis, pointing to numerous factors that explain higher accountability in London than in Paris. The most important ones include: clear allocation of responsibility for aid management, stronger role for the Parliament, and more stringent investigations by newspapers and NGOs. The higher number of domestic veto players caused by the remnants of \textit{la Françafrique} also plays a role in obstructing normative change within French policy circles.

\textsuperscript{1013} It is important to stress once again that the list of top aid recipients was produced not taking into consideration the way in which aid is disbursed (for instance, through NGO channels when the recipient country has a repressive regime). The list is used only to give a rough indication of favourite recipients.
The hypothesis which was drawn from sociological institutionalism suggested that the UK has internalized the norm of political conditionality to a larger extent than France because the organisational culture of DfID offered a better fit than the organisations cultures of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and/or the French Development Agency. The analysis confirmed that the “diplomatic” culture of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the “banking” culture of the AFD do not offer fertile ground for political conditionality to diffuse. DfID seems to be better positioned, in particular because of the type of “professions” working for the Department and because of the close relationship with human rights and development NGOs. However, most decisions on aid sanctions are not taken within the organisation, but by top-level bureaucrats or even politicians. In addition, historical accounts of sanction decisions show that it was more often the FCO than DfID to be in favour of suspending cooperation. Interviewees proposed that the DfID organisation culture is less helpful for explaining the degree of internalisation of political conditionality than for understanding the “hard cases” for the application of aid sanctions. If France finds it difficult to balance human rights with strategic interests, DfID finds it complicated to balance human rights with development objectives. The cases of Ethiopia and Rwanda exemplify this situation at best.

The last section of the chapter took advantage of the opportunities offered by semi-structured interviews and explored an additional factor that can influence the level of internalisation of political conditionality: aid modalities. While France prefers loans and project aid, the UK mainly uses grants and budget support. Theoretically, the hypothesis makes sense. Loans create legal, financial, and psychological obstacles to prompt suspensions and cuts. When human rights problems arise, budget support is easier to stop and more difficult to justify. However, it seems that the realities on the ground (such as the still high number of projects and the long time needed to prepare budget support programmes) preclude aid modalities from playing a decisive role in decisions over aid sanctions.

In conclusion, the higher accountability of aid decision-makers and social pressure by like-minded donors (in particular Nordic countries) have been found to play the major role in explaining deeper internalisation of political conditionality by the UK. In contrast, evidence was not sufficient to support the plausibility of explanations
based on material interests, Commonwealth influence and aid modalities. Different organisational cultures, if not capable of explaining the extent of internalisation of political conditionality, can help understand those cases when political conditionality is not applied.
CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation addressed a puzzling question: why do France and the UK differ in their attitude towards political conditionality (that is, the norm by which aid donors should make the allocation of development assistance dependent on respect for human rights and democratic principles by recipient governments)? The question is puzzling because there are numerous reasons to expect convergence rather than variation in the internalisation of political conditionality by EU Member States, at least since the beginning of the 1990s. These reasons include, but are not limited to, the window of opportunity created by the end of Cold War rivalry, the causal belief that respect for human rights is a precondition for effective poverty reduction, the financial problems in donors’ economies, the automatic coordination that should derive from the reiterated application of any type of conditionality, and strong support for the norm by EU institutions.

This final chapter summarises the main findings of the dissertation, discusses its most important contributions to the academic literature on foreign aid, human rights and Europeanisation, and offers a few suggestions in terms of potential avenues for future research.

8.1. Main findings

This dissertation is divided into two parts. The first part (Chapters 3, 4 and 5) assessed the degree of internalisation of political conditionality by France and the UK. The second part (Chapters 6 and 7) tested several hypotheses to explain variation between the two donors.

In order to assess internalisation of political conditionality, the first part adopted a three-fold measurement framework, and examined French and British policies, legal documents and behaviour. Chapter 4 concentrated on policies and legal documents. France and the UK differ significantly. France does not support the idea that allocation and disbursement of development assistance should depend on respect for human rights by recipient governments. Notwithstanding initial endorsement of the
norm, France has reversed its position and now prefers ‘engagement’ (such as direct support to rule of law programmes) to conditionality. The laws that regulate French development cooperation do not include any reference to human rights. French development agreements with recipient governments generally do not contain human rights clauses. The UK presents a firmer stance in favour of political conditionality. Even though human rights promotion is not an objective of British development assistance under the International Development Act 2002, the UK has adopted a fully-fledged policy requiring partner governments to respect human rights and basic democratic principles, and consistently include human rights clauses in development agreements with recipient countries.

Serious weaknesses in data availability prevented from conducting a quantitative analysis of aid allocation patterns. As a consequence, Chapter 5 thoroughly examined four cases of aid sanctions: Madagascar 2009, Mozambique 2009, Nicaragua 2008 and Zimbabwe 2002. The selection of cases followed a “least-likely case” or “hard case” research design. To begin with, the EU suspended aid in all four circumstances. This makes the four cases a difficult scenario for variation among EU Member States. In addition, given the preliminary results from the analysis of policies and legal documents, the cases included political crises where France was least likely not to apply aid sanctions (because of high levels of coordination within the donor community or because of little strategic interests in comparison with other former colonies) and where the UK was least likely to apply political conditionality (because of strong post-colonial links). The case of the suspension of EU aid to Nicaragua was included to extend the reach of the dissertation outside of the African continent.

In line with the results of past statistical studies, the UK was usually more willing than France to apply aid sanctions. After the 2009 coup in Madagascar, France was the only Western donor (in contrast with the EU, Germany, Norway and the US) to continue some bilateral government-to-government programmes. During the 2009 donor strike in Mozambique, France avoided a confrontational position against the Mozambican government. The UK was among the leaders of the strike and one of the most vocal critics of the political situation. After the contested 2008 local elections in Nicaragua, the UK was the second donor (after Sweden) to announce the
suspension of its budget support programme. When the Zimbabwean government resorted to widespread human rights abuses in connection with its fast-track land reform at the beginning of the 2000s, the UK pushed for the adoption of aid sanctions. France tried to profit from the retrenchment of other bilateral donors.

How to explain these differences? Given the complexities of aid decision-making, Chapter 6 justified the adoption of “analytic eclecticism”, a problem-driven approach which explores how diverse mechanisms posited in competing paradigm-bound theories can interact with each other. The chapter introduced four hypotheses to explain variation in the degree of internalisation of political conditionality by EU Member States. The hypotheses reflected four of the most traditional theories in the study of International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis: realism, international constructivism, liberalism and sociological institutionalism. Chapter 7 tested these hypotheses not only against the behaviour of the two donors in the four case studies, but also against the responses of more than 100 interviewees who are working or have worked for French and British institutions, and who are working or have worked for other donors or for development/human rights NGOs.

The realist hypothesis posited that what appears as deeper internalisation of political conditionality by British policy-makers is only the ex post rationalization of strategically-induced aid decisions. The realist hypothesis was rejected because the top recipients of British aid are not better human rights performers than the top recipients of French aid (it should be France to pay lip service to political conditionality in order to maintain its favourite relationships). In addition, the cases of Mozambique and Zimbabwe showed that British decision-makers did not use aid sanctions to conceal the pursuit of economic and post-colonial interests.

An international constructivist scholar would suggest that the UK has internalized political conditionality to a larger extent than France because of social pressure (through persuasion and/or imitation) within (1) the Nordic Plus Group and/or (2) the Commonwealth of Nations (in comparison with its French counterpart, the International Organisation of La Francophonie). The first leg of this hypothesis was supported by significant evidence. Nordic countries are the strongest supporters of political conditionality, and often put pressure on British decision-makers to follow
their leadership. Closer coordination within the Nordic Plus Group was found both in Mozambique and Nicaragua. The second leg of the hypothesis was not equally convincing. Even though the Commonwealth takes political conditionality more seriously than the OIF, it was the UK to press for the application of aid sanctions against Zimbabwe. In the additional case of the 2006 Fiji coup, the UK followed the leadership of Australia and New Zealand. The Commonwealth exerted only indirect pressure.

According to the version of liberalism proposed by Moravcsik, the UK should have internalized human rights to a larger degree than France because British aid decision-makers are under stricter domestic scrutiny than their French counterparts. Interviewees almost unanimously endorsed this hypotheses, pointing at numerous factors that explain higher accountability in London than in Paris. The most important ones include: clear allocation of responsibility for aid management, stronger role for the Parliament, and more stringent investigations by newspapers and NGOs. The presence of strong domestic veto players caused by the remnants of *la Françafrique* was also found to play a role in obstructing normative change within French policy circles.

Sociological institutionalism hinted at the potential role played by a better fit between the norm of political conditionality and DfID organisational culture, in comparison with the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and/or the French Development Agency. While the analysis confirmed that the “cooperative” culture of French diplomats and the “banking” culture of the AFD do not offer fertile ground for a norm that encourages disengagement because of political concerns, the hypothesis did not survive the British test. Aid sanctions are not bureaucratic but political decisions, and it was more often the FCO than DfID to support the suspension of cooperation. Nevertheless, interviewees suggested that DfID organisational culture can help understand which are the “hard cases” for the application of British aid sanctions. If France finds it difficult to balance human rights with strategic interests, DfID find it complicated to balance human rights with development objectives.
As a synthesis of these findings, and knowingly running the risk of oversimplification, one can conclude that while in France foreign aid is framed as development cooperation (as the Minister in charge of development assistance was called until a few years ago), in the UK it is perceived as development assistance. In the former case, the relationship with developing countries cannot be jeopardized by idiosyncratic problems (such as human rights abuses) that are best addressed through long-term engagement. In the latter case, disbursement of taxpayers’ money must be suspended or withdrawn to respond significant misbehaviour by recipient governments.

In addition, while both countries undeniably use aid also as an instrument to foster their national interests (in addition to the flagship goal of reducing poverty), their objectives are different: local/bilateral influence for Paris, global/multilateral influence for London. While France aims at becoming a trusted partner to politicians and businessmen in recipient countries in order to play a significant role in local, regional and international fora, the British objective is to be perceived as a principled actor that follows value-based standards in order to assume a leadership role in global debates. A strict application of human rights conditionality obviously endangers the goal of the former and supports the ambition of the latter.

8.2. Most important contributions to the academic literature on foreign aid, human rights and Europeanisation

As shown in Chapter 2, the academic literature of International Relations (IR) has addressed three important questions with respect to political conditionality. From a normative point of view, is it an appropriate tool of foreign policy? From a policy perspective, is it efficacious in bringing change within recipient countries? From an empirical standpoint, do states actually practice political conditionality as they claim? The most important contribution of this dissertation is to the research strand which addressed the last question.

To begin with, this dissertation improved the way in which past researchers have assessed internalisation of political conditionality by Western donors. Quantitative analyses are based on limited datasets, and only focuses on behaviour. Qualitative
studies, like Crawford’s *Foreign Aid and Political Reform* and Barratt’s *Human Rights and Foreign Aid: For Love or Money?*, added the policy component. However, to the knowledge of the author, this dissertation is the first ever study to offer a fully-fledged analysis of behaviour, policies and legal documents, including international agreements with developing countries. Since most researchers recognize the importance of the human rights clause included in all EU development agreements, it is surprising that nobody has studied this aspect at the level of bilateral donors yet.

The dissertation also represents the second comparative work ever to *explain* variation in the degree of internalisation of political conditionality between two Western donors. Cumming’s *Aid to Africa: French and British Policies from the Cold War to the New Millennium* was published in 2001. The volume concentrated on the same two donors of this thesis, France and the UK, and asked whether the development programmes of these former colonial powers had undergone radical changes since the appearance of the new norm of political conditionality after the end of the Cold War. This dissertation advanced Cumming’s book in at least three ways. First, it tested new hypotheses, in line with the latest developments in Foreign Policy Analysis and Europeanisation research. For instance, Cumming almost overlooked the potential influence of international social pressures from like-minded donors and international organisations, including the Commonwealth and the OIF. Second, it expanded the time frame until 2012. In addition to the obvious advantages of an updated analysis, this move was instrumental to show the decreasing importance of one the most important explanatory factors highlighted by Cumming, namely the personal and emotional *Françafrique* network, and to test the importance of the “organisational culture” hypothesis. DfID was created in 1997, when Cumming ended his analysis. Lastly, Cumming focused only on two former colonies, Togo and Kenya. This limits the external validity of his findings. This dissertation built on the results of past statistical studies and corroborated them through the rigorous examination of four cases, including two countries which are no former colonies of either France or UK.

Besides the literature on political conditionality, this thesis contributes to comparative research on human rights foreign policies. It is surprising how little
comparative work has been produced to explain different levels of integration of human rights into the foreign policy of Western states. The most important books so far, Forsythe’s *Human Rights and Comparative Foreign Policy* and Brysk’s *Global Good Samaritans: Human Rights as Foreign Policy*, offered a fascinating snapshot of the place of human rights in world politics. However, both of them analyze a very wide range of states’ foreign policies (from Sweden to Costa Rica, from Russia to Japan). The result is that their findings are not sufficiently fine-grained to help understand differences between European countries (the variables highlighted in the two books include level of democracy, degree of trade openness and stage of development). This dissertation scrupulously applied the Most Similar Systems Design (or Mill’s Method of Difference). This offered the opportunity to delve into the details of British and French foreign policy decision-making and explore the relevance of specific factors such as organisational cultures and aid modalities.

As far as Europeanisation is concerned, the dissertation built on the most recent works on EU Member State’s foreign policies and development programmes, and tested the significance of two factors widely recognized as mediating between EU pressure and national implementation: existence of veto points and resonance with domestic cultures. Both factors helped explain variation in the degree of internalisation of political conditionality between France and the UK. The *Françafrique* has lost its emotional appeal to French decision-makers. Yet, it has produced a legacy of individuals and informal networks that block any change when their interests are threatened, such as when Bockel announced the introduction of political conditionality in 2007 or when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was in favour of suspending government-to-government development cooperation in Madagascar in 2009.

Cultural resonance has also played an important role, specifically at the level of aid-managing institutions. The diplomats working at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs prefer engagement and support than disengagement and conditionality. The economists working at AFD do not see themselves as political actors, and reject the idea of introducing political considerations into the operation of an institution which is perceived more like a bank than like a development agency. In the British case, cultural resonance did not explain the level of internalisation of political
conditionality, but was found to be the most important factor behind the reluctance to apply aid sanctions to developmental state like Ethiopia and Rwanda.

The most important contribution to the Europeanisation literature, however, comes from the findings related to the Nordic Plus Group. In their attempt to explain why European pressures – which on the face of it are the same for all Member States – result in different impacts at the national level, Europeanisation researchers have concentrated on *domestic* mediating factors, overlooking the potential role of *international* mediating factors. EU Member States participate in different international organisations and informal networks. The social pressures exerted within these groupings can significantly affect their willingness to comply with European “ways of doing things”. As shown in the cases of Mozambique and Nicaragua, Nordic donors took the leadership in the application of aid sanction, thus encouraging other donors to follow their example and weakening the coordinating role of the EU Delegation.

**8.3. Potential avenues for future research**

The most straightforward way to advance the research presented in this dissertation is to update its findings in a few years time. The potential of this strategy lies in significant recent developments, both in Brussels and in Paris. On the one hand, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009 has significantly strengthened the EU’s external action, raising the profile of the principles of democracy and human rights and reinforcing the coordinating role of the newborn European External Action Service. On the other hand, the Presidency of François Hollande has shaken the foundations of French development assistance. From November 2012 to March 2013, Pascal Canfin, then Minister of State for Development (not any more “for Cooperation”!), organized an extensive consultation process – the French Consultations on Development Aid (*les Assises du Développement et de la Solidarité Internationale*) – with all development actors, including recipient government and French civil society. Moreover, in February 2014 the National Assembly adopted a historic bill which has made French aid more transparent and has created significant opportunities to publicly debate aid decisions within the Parliament. Evidently, these evolutions offer the first important test to
explore the reliability of the findings of this dissertation. France is expected to deepen its internalisation of political conditionality in the coming years.

IR researchers could also look at additional factors that can explain variation in the degree of internalisation of political conditionality between EU Member States. One suggestion is the selection of aid modalities. As seen in Chapter 7, several interviewees commented that loans (and not grants) create legal, financial and psychological obstacles to the prompt suspension of development assistance. While this hypothesis makes theoretical sense, it was not confirmed in the four cases studies analysed in this dissertation. It would be interesting to explore whether other cases shed further light on this issue.

The level of decentralization of foreign policy decision-making can also play a significant role in donors’ willingness to apply aid sanctions. Almost all interviewees in Mozambique and Zimbabwe emphasized that the capitals usually take a stricter positions than the embassies. Politicians at home are afraid of being accused of throwing taxpayers’ money into the hand of repressive governments in far away countries. On the opposite, donor officials on the ground have a strong vested interest in keeping the money flowing. In addition, they often have a better understanding of the potential ineffectiveness of aid sanctions in producing change, as well as a closer perceptions of the needs of the poorest people, which are the first to suffer in case of changes in the ways in which aid is disbursed. Do similar donors with different levels of decentralization of their foreign policy structure usually take different positions when political crises arise in developing countries?

A last comment is dedicated to the recent literature on the Europeanisation of EU Member States’ development policies. Numerous researchers have suggested that, given the absence of any material power of the Commission to coerce or incentivize European coordination of aid programmes, development cooperation is a policy area amenable only to socialization processes à la constructivism. This is not true. There are at least two reasons why rational EU Member States may decide to coordinate their decisions on aid sanctions. First, a common foreign policy is an instrument that allows EU Member States to pursue their national interests more effectively. The EU offers all Member States, even the largest ones, a means to increase their voice at the
global level. This “politics of scale effect” provides a discernible incentive for EU Member States to strategically harmonise their policies at the EU level. Secondly, Member States can use the “shield” offered by the joint EU decision-making process to avoid the bilateral costs of suspending or withdrawing cooperation to important partners.

8.4. Conclusion

This dissertation explored the factors that assist or obstruct the influence of human rights norms on the foreign policies of EU Member States. Focusing on the specific case of political conditionality, it suggested that the adoption of principled foreign policy decisions is facilitated by strong accountability to domestic constituencies and social pressure from leading states. One can interpret this finding as evidence in favour of the rationalist insights that politicians want to maintain their job and that states strategically learn how to perform their functions in the most efficient way, and/or as a confirmation of the constructivist claims that political leaders and officials are enmeshed in their national culture and that states are subject to strong social pressures at the international level. In either case, the dissertation confirms that aid decision-makers are not blind to external pressure, and can be encouraged and/or persuaded to take human rights more seriously when considering aid sanctions.
# APPENDIX 1

## LIST OF INTERVIEWS

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<tr>
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| 94  | Diplomat in Guinea | British Foreign and Commonwealth Office | 11/09/2013 | Interview |
| 95  | Research Fellow | Overseas Development Institute | 22/05/2012 | Interview |
| 96  | Senior official in Nicaragua | Swedish International Development Agency | 12/09/2014 | Email exchange |
| 97  | Diplomat in Mozambique | German Federal Foreign Office | 28/08/2014 | Interview |
| 98  | Senior management position | Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat | 21/08/2014 | Interview |
| 99  | Senior management position | International Law and Policy Institute | 11/09/2014 | Email exchange |
| 100 | Senior management position | French Ministry of Foreign Affairs | 21/03/2014 | Interview |
| 101 | Senior official in Burma/Myanmar | Action Aid | 22/06/2014 | Email exchange |
| 102 | Diplomat in Madagascar | European External Action Service | 01/09/2014 | Interview |
| 103 | Senior Advisor | European Centre for Development Policy Management | 29/07/2014 | Interview |
| 104 | Former diplomat in Fiji | European External Action Service | 05/09/2014 | Interview |
| 105 | Diplomat in Mozambique | Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs | 22/08/2014 | Interview |
| 106 | Senior management position | French Development Agency (AFD) | 25/03/2014 | Email exchange |
| 107 | Diplomat in Nicaragua | Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs | 03/09/2014 | Email exchange |</p>
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APPENDIX 2
SAMPLE OF QUESTIONNAIRE ON POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY

My dissertation focuses on political conditionality in foreign aid, that is, the norm by which the allocation and disbursement of government-to-government development assistance should depend on respect for human rights and democratic principles by recipient governments.

Political conditionality is not only a punitive measure of aid suspension. It is a multi-faceted instrument. Examples of positive conditionality include, among others:

- suspension, postponement or even cancellation of government-to-government assistance;
- threats of suspension, postponement or even cancellation of government-to-government assistance;
- redirection of assistance from un-earmarked government-to-government contributions to specific social sectors (such as health and education) or NGO channels;
- promises of new or increased government-to-government assistance if specific conditions are met (positive conditionality).

The dissertation does not take any side in the normative debate between supporters and critics of political conditionality. Its purpose is to measure and explain – empirically – potential variation in the degree of internalization of the norm by the European Union (EU) and its Member States (in particular, France and the United Kingdom). The research questions are the following:

- Do EU Member States differ in the internalization of political conditionality?
- If so, why?

The dissertation focuses on the period between 1997 and 2012.

The thesis measures internalization of political conditionality by looking at different indicators, including the application (or non-application) of aid sanctions (suspension, redirection, threats, promises, etc.) in specific cases of human rights abuses and/or democratic setbacks.
This questionnaire focuses on the application of political conditionality by bilateral donors against Zimbabwe.

**Questionnaire**

1. Are there big differences among bilateral donors in their willingness to apply political conditionality (suspending aid, threatening suspension, redirecting aid through NGOs, promising increased cooperation if certain conditions are met, etc.)? How would you rank bilateral donors in terms of willingness to apply political conditionality (as well as advocating its application from other donors)? Do you have specific examples?

***

2. Is there any group of donors which usually behave in the same way?

***

3. In February 2002, the EU suspended and partially redirected its development assistance. Which EU Member State were more in favour of/against this decision? Are you aware of the positions of France and/or the UK? According to Laakso *et al*., Member States’ views on political conditionality diverged, with Nordic countries, the Netherlands, Germany and the UK taking a hard line. France, Belgium and Spain were more moderate (Laakso, Liisa, Timo Kivimäki, and Maaria Seppänen. 2007. *Evaluation of Coordination and Coherence in the Application of Article 96 of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement*. Aksant Academic Publishers). Would you agree with this statement?
4. The decision by the EU is not binding on Member States’ bilateral development assistance. Have all EU Member States suspended/redirected their bilateral government-to-government aid? Who was first? Who was reluctant? Is there any outlier (any donor which disburses government-to-government aid)?

5. In August 2012 the EU decided to suspend the application of the appropriate measures adopted under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement for a period of 12 months. Was there any EU Member State more in favour of/against this decision? Are you aware of the positions of France and/or the UK?

6. Denmark is set to become the first country to once again give aid to Zimbabwe. Will Denmark give government-to-government aid? Is there any other bilateral donor which is willing to lift aid sanctions?

7. How would you explain differences among European donors in the application of political conditionality? Why are some European donors more willing to apply political conditionality than others?
8. Do bilateral donors formally or informally coordinate among themselves? Do some bilateral donors coordinate more than others (for instance, European countries, Nordic countries, Commonwealth countries, etc.)? Do some bilateral donors actually constitute a separate couple/group (they coordinate more than other, they take collective decisions, etc.)?

9. The purpose of my thesis is to explain variation in the adoption (and application) of political conditionality by European donors. Are you aware of any additional information which I would profit from for this objective? Do you think that Zimbabwe is as a good case to show that European donors apply political conditionality with different consistency and strength?

10. I know that your specific expertise focuses on Zimbabwe. However, are you aware of any other aid recipient which I can use a good case to show that European donors apply political conditionality with different consistency and strength?
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311


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