Actorhood and Institutions
Three Studies of Social Intervention in the Sudan

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A thesis submitted to the Department of Management of the London School of Economics and Political Science, for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy; London, April 2015.
Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent if any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

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I declare that my thesis consists of 38,946 words (excluding references).

Statement of conjoint work

The third paper was co-authored with my colleague Akbar Saeed. I confirm that my contribution exceeded 50% of the work involved. Specifically, I undertook the initial conceptualization, literature review, collection and analysis of empirical materials, and the majority of writing. My coauthor contributed many hours of conversation on conceptual/methodological issues and related literatures, and undertook reviews of paper drafts. The paper was published in the June 2014 issue of International Political Sociology.
To my parents
A treasure of love, strength, and values
For all that you’ve endured
Abstract

This thesis consists of three studies of social intervention in Sudan.

The first offers a critique of institutional voids, a concept used to describe contexts lacking neoliberal market institutions, intermediaries, and practices. Notions of voids underpin much liberal peace thinking and justify postwar interventions that seek to build institutions to support peace and recovery. Similarly, the concept of voids is increasingly used in management and organization studies to describe emerging market and poverty contexts. The question ‘What institutional arrangements exist in institutional voids?’ motivates an in-depth examination of a state-led intervention to remobilize thousands of fighters through agricultural cooperatives in the Blue Nile. The analysis suggests settings conceptualized as ‘voids’ are in fact rich in state institutions, bureaucracy, and disinterested agency.

The second study employs the institutional theory notion of actorhood—templates of social identities, roles, and practices—in a thematic analysis of a postwar intervention to reintegrate thousands of fighters using agricultural cooperatives in the Blue Nile. The analysis points to a postwar professions narrative, where formerly warring actors adopt new roles as agents of development and former combatants are reclassified as beneficiaries. Postwar intervention resources, such as tractors, finance, and the cooperative enterprise model are theorized to be institutional anchors, or techniques for organizing specific practices. Findings also point to a postwar intervention paradox: though institutional anchors may be effective for promoting new social practices, they risk reproducing institutional inequalities in intervention settings.

The third study critically deconstructs how a simple domestic technology—fuel-efficient stoves—came to be promoted a global solution to sexual violence in conflict zones. Using the concept of problematization—the process linking problems with solutions—as an analytic tool in combination with a discourse analysis of humanitarian advocacy documents. The analysis reveals a set of racial, spatial, gendered, and interventionist frames that enable stoves to emerge a viable intervention to reduce sexual attacks against displaced women and girls, first in Darfur then globally. This study postulates a significant role for advocacy and discourse-infused technology in the emergence of humanitarian ‘solutions’ and the unintended consequences for beneficiaries.
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Many years ago I dreamt of new purpose and adventure, and in May 2003 I left a corporate career to volunteer as a teacher in Beirut's Palestinian refugee camps. This is the most important step I have taken in life, followed closely by the decision to continue my doctoral studies at the London School of Economics. As I reflect on more than a decade of travel, turmoil, fieldwork, friendships, reading, teaching, writing, and change, I remember the many wonderful people who along the way provided encouragement, support, and love; they are friends, loved ones, mentors and colleagues who helped make this path possible.

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Preface

“There is no DDR in Sudan” was the response of noted Sudan expert Alex de Waal upon my sharing with him the topic of this thesis at the LSE late 2011. Though the abruptness of his statement impressed me I knew it to be but partially true. From the perspective of international Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) conventions, de Waal’s declaration is certainly sayable. However, in reality a great deal of activity did take place in Sudan under the banner of ‘DDR’. The North Sudan DDR Commission invested a great deal of monetary and human resources to plan, coordinate, and launch agricultural cooperatives to support reintegration. Regardless of how we judge the interventions employed or their outcomes, they touched the lives of thousands of people and much remobilization occurred.

Policymakers, practitioners, and scholars conceptually bound to existing intervention frameworks sometimes make sense of unintended outcomes as failures instigated by the (assumed) interests of ‘spoilers’, policy-practice disjuncture, or a result of unrelenting institutional environments (such as institutional voids). These attributions push the responsibility for intervention failures away from the ideals and practices of the humanitarian industry and onto the shoulders of nation-state agencies, implementing partners, and beneficiaries. Such blame limits genuine critique of the scale and incongruity of universal templates of intervention to capture the complexity of social problems in context.

The three studies of this thesis explore two distinct cases of social intervention in the Sudan: initiatives to reintegrate fighters in the Blue Nile, and humanitarian technology interventions to quell sexual violence in Darfur. These studies are built on years of work. A sustaining motivation is that they may contribute to meaningful policy and theory debates in these areas.

I owe much to the generosity of many people in Sudan and Southern Sudan, and ask their patience in the institutional interpretation of processes that are unquestionably political. For limitations and omissions I offer the Sudanese proverb, ‘A little shrub may grow into a tree’.

Samer Abdelnour
Rotterdam, April 2015
1.0 Prologue

1.1 Introduction
In most instances, a theory or phenomenon of interest justifies the path a research project will take. This includes the research design, how empirical materials are collected and then selected for analysis, and the analysis itself. However, not all research projects begin in this way. My personal journey through this thesis has been a grounded, sometimes pragmatic, iterative, reflexive, and unexpected process of discovery. The conceptualization of the three studies became clear after much fieldwork, reflection, and reading into numerous organization (institutional) theory literatures. Taken as a whole, this thesis represents a journey involving years of fieldwork, reflection, reading, writing and revising.

The three studies that make up this thesis draw on institutional theories and concepts to investigate social interventions in the Sudan. The first and second use theories of actorhood and institutions in the study of an intervention to reintegration former fighters in the Blue Nile. The third draws on the advocacy network and humanitarian literatures to critically examine the institutionalization of a humanitarian technology intervention. In this short prologue I present my epistemological position, overarching theoretical themes, and an overview of the three studies.

1.2 Constructive realism
I gravitate to an epistemological position that combines both critical realism and social constructivism. A critical realist constructivism, or stated otherwise, constructive realism, would recognize the following: A. the world exists independent of our knowledge of it (Sayer, 2000), and B. what we understand the world to be and our knowledge of it are socially constructed (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). While critical realists problematize the relation between objects and knowledge of objects (Sayer, 2000), extreme social constructivists resolve this by suggesting that objects, knowledge, and the relation between these are socially construed. A constructive (critical) realist perspective approaches this problematic by holding the object as existing ‘out there’, but recognizing that any means through which to perceive and interpret that object—including knowledge of it and the relation between objects and knowledge—are socially construed (I believe the third study illustrates how this operates in the world). Moreover, this lends itself to the ontological position that empirical material (‘data’) is “an artifact of interpretations” whose production “are inextricably fused with theory” (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2007: 1265).
1.3 Themes and theoretical trajectories

The following themes and theoretical trajectories inform the conceptual and empirical basis of this thesis: actorhood, institutions, and social intervention.

1.3.1 Actorhood

Actorhood refers to institutional templates of identities, roles, and practices. Its underlying assumptions are both cultural and institutional. The theory of actorhood is built on the foundations of old institutionalism and advanced through the work of world society theorists. However, for this thesis I pull actorhood out of world society theory and apply it as a stand-alone institutional concept. In this way, I am able to draw on the strengths of actorhood—such as the expanding professions and disinterested agency—without embarking on a world society study, which by design are diffusion-oriented, fixed at the nation-state level of analysis, and hence are designed to tell an isomorphism story (Tröhler, 2009). Of course, pulling actorhood out of world society theory does not remove world society from actorhood; it thus retains its suitability for studying universal phenomena such as postwar interventions.

Conventionally, the concept of actorhood is used to theorize the self-perpetuation of professions and the ‘others’ whom they serve to construct (Drori, Jang, and Meyer, 2006; Meyer, 2009). Actorhood is thus an institutional concept with some semblance to Said’s (1978) notion that social ideals and action are cultural constructions. As Renate E. Meyer (2008) notes: “The reciprocity of the typified, scripted action and the type of actor who is expected to perform the script is central to the notion that institutions are constitutive for social actors and actorhood” (522). Rather than regard institutions as antecedents to or products of actor rational choice, the very process of institutionalization creates “social categories of actors, whose social identities, worldviews and interests make sense only within the sedimented body of knowledge that has given shape to them” (Meyer, 2008: 522). To define an actor and her agency simultaneously reveals the very nature of society itself. As Thomas notes, this process points to an institutional role for discourse and social action:

“Institutions, in the cultural sense used by world culture theory, constitute actor identities and agency. The mechanism is not primarily through internalization of cultural values or elements. Rather, identities are themselves institutionalized categories and thus embedded in the structured whole. An identity is associated with types of discourse and action, assumptions about nature, the purposes of society, and the sources and nature of authoritative knowledge (2007: 8).”

From a cultural and cognitive perspective, it is not difficult to see how the expansion of personhood is intimately connected to the construction or institutionalization of legitimate,
taken-for-granted actor categories. These expansions include the definitions and assumptions that characterize the very nature of actor-context realities. The same might be said for all individuals, communities, organizations, societies, and nations (mother-child, seller-consumer, state-citizen, and donor-beneficiary). As Thomas (2007: 8) notes, “To present an identity within a situation requires that one, often implicitly, establishes the assumptions about reality that make that identity legitimate: make it reasonable, natural, and moral”. The following passage by Meyer summarizes the cultural-institutional (and sometimes political) consequences associated with the global diffusion of models of actorhood:

“So models of organized actorhood expand, penetrate every social sector and country. All sorts of older social forms – bureaucracies, family structures, traditional professional arrangements – are transformed into organizations. The process is driven by a cultural system that is a putative substitute for traditional state-like political arrangements – realist analyses that root the process in powerful interested actors miss out on most of the important changes. The process spreads through the diffusion of models of actorhood, not principally via a power and incentive system. The changes transcend practicality, leaving great gaps between policy and practice essentially everywhere – almost any organization can be seen as a failure, now. And the changes diffuse at multiple levels – through central organizations and through their professionalized memberships and populations (2008: 804-5).”

A concept employed in this thesis associated with the theory of actorhood is disinterested agency. Disinterested agency suggests that actor interests and purposes are, at least in part, culturally-constructed and independent of intrinsic attributes or interests. These are ‘disinterested’ in the sense that they are enacted because they are legitimate (Buhari-Gulmez, 2010). A similar notion is the concept of ‘action at a distance’, or the observance that institutions influence organizing across time, space, and levels of analysis (Kallinikos, 1995).

I illustrate with a real-time example: I think, read and write about theory from an office in a university that employs me to think, read, write, and teach in very much a similar way other academics do everywhere. I produce a thesis, write papers, send to journals, attend conferences, review articles; and these professional activities take up a great deal, if not a majority of my time. They increasingly define not only what I do, but who I am. Of course, I am an ‘individual’ and express agency as a result of who I am today and where I came from: my DNA, upbringing, history, culture, education, and experiences. However, there is no denying that I also enact a role that at its agentic core is institutionally informed. Like it or not, we—academics, activists, fighters, and farmers—are “enactors of multiple dramas whose texts are written elsewhere” (Meyer, 1999: 137). Perhaps it is more accurate and appropriate to say, the chorus of dramas each of us enact are inscribed somewhere, and increasingly everywhere.
I explicitly employ the notion of actorhood in the second study, and disinterested agency emerges from the analysis in the first study, both of which undertake an investigation of interventions to reintegrate former fighters. Moreover, both concepts are implicit in the third study, which explores the expansion of a global humanitarian industry around taken-for-granted discourses of fuel-efficient stove interventions.

1.3.2 Institutions
In addition to using the theory of actorhood in this thesis, I employ the ideals, discourses, and techniques of control model of institutions, and the concept of institutional voids.

1.3.2.1 Ideals, discourses, and techniques of control
According to Hasselbladh and Kallinikos (2000: 704): “Institutions are conceived as consisting of basic ideals that are developed into distinctive ways of defining and acting upon reality (i.e. discourses), supported by elaborate systems of measurement and documentation for controlling action outcomes.” Rather than simply describe mechanisms or processes of diffusion or change, as with much institutional theorizing, the model seeks to understand the essence of an institutional arrangement and how it comes to enable specific forms of social action. As Hasselbladh and Kallinikos note: “It is by means of discourses, and the elaborate systems of operations and techniques associated with them, that organizational goals and tasks are constructed, while organizational roles are shaped in ways that constitute distinct forms of actorhood that transcend local contexts” (2000: 703).

I embrace the ideals, discourses, and techniques of control model of institutions for the analytical precision it offers in comparison with popular notions of institutions, such as the ‘three pillars’ model. For instance, the three pillars model of institutions is highly suited for studying diffusion-related mechanisms across regulatory, normative, and cultural-cognitive pillars (Scott, 2008). When using the three pillars model, analysts can dissect or catalogue each pillar into various institutional components, or focus on some aspects and study how these diffuse. Though Scott (2008) notes that the three pillars should be understood in a holistic way, few studies that use the pillars framework actually do so. In comparison, the ideals-discourses-techniques model understands institutions to be an intersection or ‘package’ of the three dimensions, with institutionalization a result of internal consistency and external alignment. I use the model in the second study to explore how the ideals of an intervention may or may not translate into appropriate techniques for controlling specific outcomes.
1.3.2.2 Institutional voids

Institutional voids is a concept used to describe contexts lacking neoliberal market institutions, intermediaries, and activities. Increasingly, institutional voids is used in management and organization studies to describe emerging market and poverty contexts (Khanna and Palepu, 1997). However, and relevant for this thesis, the notion of voids has long underpinned much liberal peace thinking that understands war-torn (postwar, conflict, post-conflict, or failed state) contexts as needing appropriate institutions necessary for stability and economic development (Turner and Pugh, 2006). A case in point is the ‘bottom billion’ analysis offered by Collier (2007).

I do not take institutional voids ‘as is’. Rather, I critique the concept in the first study through an in-depth exploration of postwar interventions, which at their core embody liberal peace ideals and attempt to create new institutional realities through techniques of intervention.

1.3.3 Social intervention

I define social intervention as a coordinated action (or set of actions) to alter a condition or advance a policy objective. They are often initiated by state or international agencies, but increasingly involve private sector actors. Two social interventions form the empirical heart of this thesis: a postwar intervention to reintegrate thousands of fighters in the Blue Nile region of Sudan (first and second studies), and a humanitarian technology intervention that seeks to reduce sexual violence, first in Darfur then elsewhere (third study). Conceptually, I draw on the liberal peace literature and work that critiques humanitarian and development intervention. Scholarship I use include the work of Said (1978), Ferguson (1990), Escobar (1995), Duffield (2001), and Calhoun (2004).

I introduce the first study with the liberal peace lens. Such thinking embodies neoliberal underpinnings and prescriptions. Generally speaking, according to liberal peace frameworks, postwar settings are voids that require appropriate institutions to support trade, investment, economic growth, and market activity. In the first and second studies I employ the critiques of Duffield (2001) with regards to the changing security-development nexus of intervention, and Ferguson (1990) on the de-politicization and resulting legitimization of nation-state actors in postwar reconstruction processes. This is an idea that fits very well with the actorhood notion that professions expand as actors embrace and enact new roles. The intervention literature is more prominent in the framing and analysis of the third study, which explicates how discourses legitimate social interventions and the forms they may take.
1.3.4 Actorhood, institutions, social intervention

How do the three theoretical trajectories—actorhood, institutions, and intervention—combine to form a cohesive thesis? They do so in the sense that each study embraces some aspect, explicitly or implicitly, of the theory of actorhood, notions of institutions in the tradition of organizational (sociological) institutionalism, and postwar or humanitarian technology intervention.

Each study is a distinct paper. As such, I do not claim that there exists a solid theoretical thread tightly binding the three studies in a neat scholarly package. Neither do the three studies build upon one another, though studies one and two are more closely aligned in terms of the context of study. My aspiration was not to write three tightly coupled papers. However, and as Table 1.1 summarizes, theoretical notions of actorhood and institutions explicitly inform the theorizing and analysis of studies one and two, and do so more implicitly in terms of the emergent themes in study three. That said, study three is more strongly grounded in the literature on humanitarian advocacy networks and the discursive dynamics of interventions, though studies one and two do incorporate these literatures and concepts, particularly to enrich the analysis of the prevalence of state institutions and the emergence of postwar professions.

Table 1.1: Theoretical trajectories in this thesis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Actorhood</th>
<th>Institutions</th>
<th>Social intervention</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First study</td>
<td>Emerges in the analysis (disinterested agency)</td>
<td>Explicit in the framing (liberal peace and institutional voids), as well as in the analysis (state institutions, bureaucracy)</td>
<td>Empirical context of the study (postwar reintegration in the Blue Nile), and in the analysis (state institutions)</td>
<td>In-depth exploratory case study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second study</td>
<td>Explicit in the literature review (actorhood), as well as the analysis and theorizing (institutional anchors)</td>
<td>Strong in terms of framing (war-to-peace transitions, intervention literature), and also theorizing (institutional anchors)</td>
<td>Empirical context of the study (postwar reintegration in the Blue Nile), and informs the analysis (emergence of the postwar professions)</td>
<td>Thematic analysis, analytical narrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third study</td>
<td>Implicit in terms of the way humanitarian networks/professions emerge and expression of disinterested roles (networks, Othering)</td>
<td>Implicit in terms of the institutionalization of intervention discourse (“stoves reduce rape”) and global diffusion of that discursive framing</td>
<td>Literature review (humanitarian advocacy networks, development discourses) and empirical context (fuel-efficient stoves for Darfur)</td>
<td>Corpus construction and discourse analysis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.4 Overview of the three studies

The first study offers a critique of institutional voids, a concept used to describe contexts lacking neoliberal market institutions, intermediaries, and practices. Notions of institutional voids underpin much liberal peace thinking and justify postwar interventions for building institutions that support peace and recovery. Similarly, the concept of voids is increasingly used in management and organization studies to describe emerging market and poverty contexts. The question ‘What institutional arrangements exist in institutional voids?’ motivates an in-depth exploratory case study of a state intervention to remobilize thousands of fighters through agricultural cooperatives in the Blue Nile. The analysis suggests settings conceptualized as ‘voids’ are rich in state institutions, bureaucracy, and disinterested agency.

The second study employs the institutional theory notion of actorhood—templates of social identities, roles, and practices—in a thematic analysis of a postwar intervention to reintegrate thousands of fighters in the Blue Nile through cooperative enterprises. The analysis points a postwar professions narrative, where formerly warring actors adopt new roles as legitimate agents of development, and former combatants are reclassified as beneficiaries of their interventions. Postwar intervention resources, such as tractors, finance, and the cooperative enterprise model are theorized to be institutional anchors, or techniques for organizing specific practices. Findings also reveal point to a postwar intervention paradox: though institutional anchors may be effective for promoting new social practices, they risk reproducing institutional inequalities in intervention settings.

The third study critically deconstructs how a simple domestic technology—fuel-efficient stoves—came to be promoted a global solution to sexual violence in conflict zones using the concept of problematization—the process linking problems with solutions. The notion of problematization is inspired by Foucault, who defines it to be “the totality of discursive or non-discursive practices that introduces something into the play of true and false and constitutes it as an object for thought (whether in the form of moral reflection, scientific knowledge, political analysis, etc.)” (1988:257). Using this as an analytical lens, a discourse analysis of humanitarian advocacy documents reveals that a set of overlapping racial, spatial, gendered, and interventionist frames enable stoves to first emerge a viable solution to the problem of sexual violence in Darfur, before being generalized to the global level. This study postulates a significant role for advocacy and discourse-infused technology in the emergence of humanitarian ‘solutions’ and the unintended consequences for user-beneficiaries.
References


Umda, cooperative member, and equipment at farm near Ed-Damazine, Blue Nile, August 2008.
2.0

Into the Abyss

Intervention and Institutions in Postwar Sudan

ABSTRACT

According to liberal peace worldviews, postwar contexts lack adequate institutions for stability and economic recovery. Postwar societies are thus considered to be institutional voids, a concept widely used in management and organization studies to describe contexts lacking dominant neoliberal market institutions, intermediaries and activity. However, little is known about the institutional arrangements in these so-called ‘peace voids’, and how these influence postwar social interventions. This paper seeks to critique our understanding of institutional voids through the case study of a state-led social intervention to remobilize thousands of fighters in postwar Sudan. The analysis suggests voids are contexts rich in state institutions, bureaucracy, and the disinterested agency postwar actors embody and enact.

Keywords:

institutional voids; postwar intervention; bureaucracy; disinterested agency; DDR; Sudan
INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Cold War international postwar reconstruction norms have largely evolved along a ‘liberal peace’ paradigm emphasizing trade, liberalization and economic growth as essential for peace and stability (Turner and Pugh, 2006). As some scholars note, the intensification of neoliberal ideals in postwar reconstruction policy has blurred the boundaries between international security and economic development discourse, which in turn has challenged conventional notions of social intervention\(^1\) and state sovereignty (Duffield, 2001; Chandler, 2004). As a result of these fundamental shifts, postwar reconstruction frameworks increasingly champion ‘private sector development’ alongside political and security reforms as necessary for postwar (or post-conflict) recovery and development (Duffield, 2001; Heathershaw, 2008). Pragmatically, these seek to provide political elites with greater peacetime incentives over wartime gains (Lipschutz, 1998), and provide everyday people with economic opportunities (Tobias and Boudreaux, 2011). In a sense, postwar interventions seek to encourage war-to-peace transitions by replacing wartime institutional arrangements with new institutions and practices at all levels of society (Stark, 1992, 1996).

Underpinning the liberal peace paradigm is a general view that war-affected societies lack the political and economic institutions necessary for stability and development. In institutional theory terms, the liberal peace view understands postwar settings as institutional voids, a concept widely used to describe contexts as lacking dominant neoliberal market institutions, intermediaries and activity.\(^2\) The notion of institutional voids is further implied by discourses that frame low income and conflict contexts as ‘failed’, ‘fragile’, ‘underdeveloped’, and ‘least developed’ (Escobar, 1995). According to Ferguson (1990), these encourage the imagination of intervention settings as empty of history, politics and context. At best, this permits international agencies, nation-states and political elites to emerge as development stakeholders without a serious or critical challenge to their power and authority (Ferguson, 1990). At worst, states are reduced to irrelevancy or criminality, which serves to heighten the importance of non-state actors and ‘the market’ in development and reconstruction processes, a point made clear in the ‘bottom billion’ analysis offered by Collier (2007). Such worldviews

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\(^1\) Social intervention is a coordinated action (or set of actions) to alter a particular social condition or advance a social welfare policy objective. Though social interventions are often initiated by state or public agencies and organizations, they increasingly involve private sector actors. For a historical and philosophical overview of the concept see McClelland (1996, chapter 21).

\(^2\) The implicit framing of intervention settings as institutional voids is not limited to postwar reconstruction frameworks; rather, it is broadly reflected in international development thinking and practice, particularly as these pertain to Africa (see Ferguson, 1990).
reduce development problems to technical issues that can be solved through humanitarian policies and techniques of intervention (Escobar, 1995; Calhoun, 2004; Abdelnour and Saeed, 2014).

A prevailing liberal peace intervention is Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (or ‘DDR’), a postwar reconstruction framework commonly ratified as the central security protocol in peace agreements. To date over sixty DDR protocols have been ratified globally, and many billions of dollars have been spent to support related interventions (Giustozzi, 2012). Its components are described as follows: disarmament involves the removal of weapons from combatants and civilians, demobilization involves the voluntary dismantling of military structures by parties to a conflict, and reintegration involves assistance to support former fighters in the transition civilian life (UN DPKO, 1999). From an institutional theory perspective, DDR interventions aim to deinstitutionalize organizations and practices that support war and to institutionalize those that support peace and development.

In parallel with liberal peace thinking more generally, DDR has evolved in recent decades and today is embodied by universal standards, technical documents, and operational guides developed by a coalition of United Nations (UN) agencies. These emphasize a need for DDR programming to adhere to international standards, be anchored in national ownership, and have clear guidelines for successful implementation. DDR interventions should also be capable of distinguishing fighters from civilians in an objective manner, and support the special requirements of fighters in comparison with war-affected peoples more broadly (Munive, 2013). With the commencement of a DDR programme, former fighters not reassigned to military or police services typically receive a ‘package’ involving cash, clothing, household items, and foodstuffs such as cooking oil and lentils. Most often they also receive some form of skills training, and participate in an income generating activity. These usually last four-years after which they are considered ‘reintegrated’. All of this activity is intended to aid with the transition to civilian life (UN DPKO, 1999).

In recent years, DDR experts and practitioners have begun to question the viability of top-down four-year programming and now call for longer-term and community-oriented approaches to reintegration (IAWG-DDR, 2006). This is partially a response to a recognition that DDR programmes often fail to appreciate the unique institutional dynamics of intervention settings, which is perhaps why so many DDR interventions fail to meet their intended objectives (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007; Giustozzi, 2012; Berdal and Ucko, 2013). Attempts to better understand intervention settings can also be understood as part of a
wider ‘local turn’ in liberal peace thinking. According to political scientists, the liberal peace local turn is a response to discordances between the neoliberal ideals embedded in postwar reconstruction frameworks—namely Western rationality, universalism, and modernity—and local cultural-institutional arrangements in postwar settings, particularly in Africa (Taylor, 2007; Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013). This local turn is also reflected in a number of international policy shifts, such as the engagement of local actors for security and development related programming, which has led to an increase in initiatives intended to foster community-level capacity building and self-reliance (Duffield, 2010).

The liberal peace paradigm and its local turn mirrors two trends in management and organization studies. The first is the classification of non-western settings as institutional voids, particularly emerging market and poverty contexts (such as the ‘BOP’). The second is a growing interest in understanding the unique institutional characteristics of intervention settings, with a specific focus to social intermediaries and the market practices they seek to promote (Mair, Martí and Ventresca, 2012). Though there are parallels in these literatures, there are also notable differences. For instance, the local turn in liberal peace thinking has begun to recognize the incongruence between interventions infused with western-neoliberal values and local institutional dynamics. The answer to this tension is an adaptation of interventions to local institutional dynamics, including culturally-appropriate practices. In the field of management and organization studies, the growing use of institutional voids underscores the framing of non-western settings as market opportunities (Khanna and Palepu, 1997), or opportunities for new market practices (Mair and Martí, 2009).

This growing interest in the topic of voids has for the most part neglected to consider the types of institutional arrangements that do exist within these settings, and more importantly the practices these constrain or enable. Two exceptions are case studies of enterprise in extreme contexts of institutionalized exclusion and violence, both of which being their investigations from the viewpoint of actors in the geopolitical contexts of their lived experiences (Mair et al., 2012; Khoury and Prasad, 2015). The approach taken in this study follows this line of work. To critique our understanding of institutional voids, I analyze a postwar social intervention to remobilize thousands of fighters in Sudan to civilian livelihoods using agricultural cooperatives. I want to focus on two questions: What institutional arrangements actually exist in these so-called ‘peace voids’? And how do they influence social interventions? Before exploring the answers to these questions I present an overview of the methodology and case study specifics.
METHODOLOGY

Background

I first met Dr. Sulafeldeen Salih Mohammed, Commissioner General of the North Sudan DDR Commission (NSDDRC)\(^3\), at a three-day workshop held at Cairo University in November 2005 and remained in contact with him during my masters’ fieldwork in Sudan. In April 2007 I invited Dr. Mohammed to participate in a conference I coordinated on the topic of sustainable enterprise development, held at Ahfad University for Women in Omdurman. After the conference, Dr. Mohammed asked myself and colleagues to attend a presentation at the NSDDRC headquarters in Khartoum on pilot experiences and planned interventions to support Sudan’s DDR programme. The majority of interventions emphasized some form of enterprise, with the key initiative being agricultural cooperatives. The meeting concluded with an explicit invitation to engage NSDDRC in a research partnership to support an ongoing assessment of DDR initiatives, and in particular the DDR cooperatives that were to launch the following month. Due to political urgency the Blue Nile was selected as the location for the launch of the first DDR cooperatives.\(^4\)

After some contemplation I accepted the unique and rare opportunity to study an unfolding DDR programme, and in June 2008 I returned to Sudan to undertake an assessment of DDR cooperative activities, and between July and August 2008 I travelled to the Blue Nile to do so. My research approach was influenced by the tradition of Sudanese anthropology, which advocates the need for researchers to be curious while recognizing their own role in processes of social change and development; this is particularly important in areas overwhelmed by humanitarian industry activity (Ahmad, 2003). My intention was to capture a maximum diversity of representations pertaining to DDR experiences, thus upon arriving to the Blue Nile I sought to speak with as many stakeholders as possible, and I investigated any and all leads and surprises. I interviewed dozens of people engaged with DDR initiatives, as well as related humanitarian and peace building activities. Those interviewed included DDR

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\(^3\) The NSDDRC was mandated by Office of the Presidency of the Republic of Sudan to manage DDR programming for northern Sudan (now Sudan). The NSDDRC and its Southern Sudan counterpart were to jointly oversee DDR activities in the three politically contested ‘transitional areas’, including Blue Nile State. Sudan’s DDR framework was the central security protocol of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and is mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 1590.

\(^4\) Intense fighting during the long civil war devastated residents of the Blue Nile, who are amongst the most war-affected peoples of the Sudans. After the signing of the Sudan peace agreement in 2005, the Blue Nile remained a highly volatile area and host to large numbers of fighters of various affiliations as well as returnees from neighbouring countries displaced during the civil war. Abundant in mineral resources and agricultural lands, the Blue Nile is an area of economic and military importance. In the southern part of the state, Kurmuk is the traditional stronghold for southern forces. Damazine and the Rosaries Dam are historically a stronghold of the Government of Sudan (see Map, Figure 2.1).
cooperative members and executives, union officials, national and state government officials, community leaders and stakeholders, international non-governmental organization (NGO) and humanitarian agency officials, as well as the director of a major bank involved with cooperative loans.

After the 2008 visit to the Blue Nile, I was confident that I had uncovered an interesting story of how community based-enterprises were capable of supporting reintegration. In response I read into the literatures of cooperatives and peace (Emmanuel and MacPherson, 2007) as well as collective and community-based enterprise (Peredo, 2003; Peredo and Chrisman, 2006). These frameworks stayed with me until I returned to the field the following year. Between November and December 2009, conditions permitted greater access to field sites; I thus embarked upon extensive fieldwork throughout Blue Nile State. During this trip I visited familiar and previously unseen sites, which revealed much variation in terms of intervention practices and outcomes. I also experienced a number of surprises that disturbed some of the notions I developed through prior fieldwork.5

In addition to visiting field sites in the Blue Nile, in 2008 and 2009 I also travelled to Nyala in South Darfur to interview officials from the Popular Defense Forces (PDF), a government-affiliated militia, and members at two cooperative initiatives they had launched independent of the DDR process, located at Demo and Mirer. These site visits enabled me to triangulate what I observed in the Blue Nile, and informed my assessment of DDR cooperatives prior to the launch of DDR in Darfur.

As I spent more time in the field, I increasingly questioned the suitability of using entrepreneurship theories to theorize from what I was observing. Instead, I began to see a macro-sociological and institutional narrative. This line of thinking led me to theories of organizational institutionalism. I first read into institutional entrepreneurship and work, however these did not appear to fully capture tensions among international templates for DDR, NSDDRC’s strategy, and local institutional dynamics. These resonated more strongly with Meyer’s world society theory, which itself seemed to lack and appreciation for local

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5 Four examples of field surprise are as follows: i) though I received verbal and document-based assessments of cooperative farm productivity, during fieldwork I learned that I was the first person to have undertaken an assessment at a number of the rural cooperatives since they were launched; ii) arriving to cooperative farm sites to find no evidence of agriculture activity, equipment, nor ex-combatant members; iii, finding that some cooperative societies deployed provided resources in unintended and innovative ways; and iv) and discovering NSDDRC agricultural equipment at a private farm, and the hesitation of my colleagues to discuss the issue.
institutions. The absence of the local led me to consider the notion of institutional voids, which also resonates strongly with the conventional conceptualizations of postwar intervention settings in the liberal peace literature. Not only were these assumptions strongly contested by NSDDRC, but my experience in the field revealed an institutional complexity far beyond that embodied in the liberal peace worldview. This led me to consider this study as a critique of the concept of institutional voids though an investigation into the institutional richness of postwar settings.

**Fieldwork Logistics**

I was privy to rare access to stakeholders involved with NSDDRC cooperative interventions across the Blue Nile. I met with and interviewed high-level government officials and former combatants of various histories, political and organizational affiliations, ethnic and religious backgrounds, community membership, and geographies. In addition, I interviewed bank directors, community leaders, officials from UN agencies, as well as national and international NGO officials. NSDDRC arranged for security clearance and logistical support for travel to and within Blue Nile State. I was permitted to travel and ask questions freely; in return I agreed to undertake an assessment of DDR cooperative activities and provided programming recommendations for planned expansion of DDR to other areas of Sudan. Under this arrangement I retained control of all empirical materials collected so as to ensure participant confidentiality. I provided feedback to NSDDRC informally through ongoing discussions with NSDDRC officials, and formally through an interim field report and presentation at the NSDDRC headquarters in Khartoum.

Given the sensitivity associated with national security initiatives, in the Blue Nile I was almost always accompanied by a NSDDRC official. This was extremely helpful for a number of reasons. For one, it facilitated the negotiation of secure access to research sites and effectively provided me with real-time translator when needed. Moreover, during both field visits to the Blue Nile, I spent a great deal of time with NSDDRC officials intimately involved in conceptualization and launch of the DDR interventions. This created many opportunities for sharing invaluable knowledge and experience, creating a platform for the exchange of ideas and mutual sense making. This was particularly helpful in 2008 given the probing nature of the field research.
Figure 2.1: Map of Blue Nile, Sudan
The 2008 fieldwork was restricted to the urban areas surrounding Damazine, Blue Nile. At that time I was assisted by a NSDDRC Blue Nile field official who was involved in planning the DDR agricultural cooperative intervention approach. Assisting me with the 2009 field visits were a NSDDRC Blue Nile field official and DDR consultant, both with many years of experience in the Blue Nile. The fieldwork undertaken in 2009 was extensive, crossing 1356 km of mostly poor or seasonal roads as well as many political and ethnic boundaries. A total of fourteen out of thirty Blue Nile cooperative sites were visited, covering the six administrative localities and a number of towns. These included Damazine, Kurmuk, Chalet, Mayak, Dendero, Bulang, Bukori, Gissan, Fazugli, Abu Gumay, Roseries, Bau and Tadamun (see Figure 2.1).

The importance of the field research was continually reaffirmed by interviewees, and many respondents noted that it was the first opportunity for them to express the general condition of their work. In addition to the DDR cooperatives, a number of interesting cases of collective and informal enterprises were encountered during fieldwork, allowing me to better understand the experiences of economic cooperation in the state.

Those accompanying me during the 2009 field visits represented different ethnic-cultural groups and political factions. This diversity was intended to increase our ability to negotiate the crossing of political, ethnic and geographic fault lines. Inadvertently, a great deal of initial tensions revealed opportunities for shared learning. Tensions were expected and understandable, given that each team member held significant rank in opposing political-military factions. Within a few days of travelling, working, eating and sleeping in close quarters, a number of prejudices held by team members were exposed and discussed. This process helped me to better understand socio-political complexities in the Blue Nile, both historically and through personal experiences, and served as a means for addressing sensitive issues that arose during interviews. These incidents reaffirm an undeniable and influence of the field researcher who sometimes inadvertently influences what she studies (Van Maanen, 1979; Ahmad, 2003). Plans for further fieldwork were thwarted by a renewal of armed violence in the Blue Nile, which began just prior to the independence of Southern Sudan on July 9, 2011.

My presence initially raised tensions in the research team. By being there I provoked political and in-group out-group tensions, as each member made assumptions about my intentions and political allegiances in light of their own experiences and perspectives. However, as my colleagues came to know me as a person (separate from perceived national, ethnic, political, and religious affiliations), we were able to clarify our respective positions. We eventually overcame these tensions, which enabled us to better understand our positions and develop a shared purpose in the field visits.
Empirical Materials

Fieldwork involved in-depth interviews, semi-structured group interviews, and participant observation (see Table 2.1). Semi-structured group interviews were used to capture the experiences of DDR cooperative members. Topics of discussion focused on cooperative governance structures, farming practices and related activities, equipment, finance, market dynamics, family issues, relations among members and among communities, and personal issues pertaining to the transition from fighter to farmer. Before each period of fieldwork, interview topics and questions were translated from English to assure comprehension in Sudanese Arabic and local dialects where necessary.

Table 2.1: Overview of empirical material

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<tr>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>42 interviews with NSDDRC officials and field staff, militia officers, ex-combatant and community cooperative members, cooperative union officials, national and state ministers, bank director, NGO directors; 3 in-depth discussions by telephone with NSDDRC officials post-fieldwork</td>
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<td>Group interviews</td>
<td>26 semi-structured group interviews with cooperative executives, members, and officials from militia groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participant</td>
<td>Conferences/workshops; observations and discussions with staff at NSDDRC offices in Khartoum and Blue Nile; DDR cooperative farms; cooperative union meeting; markets and market activity</td>
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<td>observation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Documents</td>
<td>Conference/workshop documents; DDR proposals; meeting notes; presentations; government documents; legislation, cooperative registration and obligation; NGO literature; field notes; DDR reports, email exchanges with NSDDRC; UN/NGO reports</td>
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I took care to ensure interviews followed general protocols for ensuring quality and consideration to respondents (Gaskell, 2000; Gaskell and Bauer, 2000). After an interview it was common for conversations to continue on the topic of DDR and the concerns of ex-fighters. These post-hoc discussion were captured as notes and reflections. Topics of interest were discussed with multiple individuals in order to triangulate perspectives and reduce interview-related biases (Van Maanen, 1979; Gaskell and Bauer, 2000). Most interviews were between sixty and ninety minutes in length. I conducted and recorded all interviews, and
transcribed all those in English. Arabic and mixed interviews were professionally translated. Unique and mundane thoughts, reflections, events, and interactions were recorded as field notes. The use and condition of tractors and market activities were documented with photos and video. In addition to fieldwork in the Blue Nile, I undertook extensive participant observation and conducted interviews at NSDDRC headquarters in Khartoum. In fact, I spent many weeks 'hanging around' the Khartoum office speaking with NSDDRC officials while arranging logistics for field travel. This time provided me with an intimate glimpse into the organizational culture, structure, and work of the NSDDRC.

**Exploratory Case Study**

An in-depth single exploratory case study design guided the selection and organization of empirical materials collected during fieldwork. Single case study designs are suitable for exploring unique or extreme phenomena, especially those that involve rare access to informants or require longitudinal fieldwork (Weick, 1993; Siggelkow, 2007; Yin, 2008). Because postwar social interventions cut across international, national, state, community, enterprise and individual levels of analysis, I elected to consider the intervention as the unit of analysis. As such, I sought to incorporate the diversity of DDR experiences and perspectives associated with the planning, construction, launch, and outcomes of DDR interventions.

For the analysis I selected empirical materials relating to the negotiation, planning, construction, and implementation of DDR interventions, which is in line with organizational studies of state intervention (Kalev, Shenav and De Vries, 2008). I then developed the case study as an intervention narrative starting with the negotiation of the DDR protocol in the peace agreement, through the planning and launch of DDR interventions, and outcomes. In order to specifically explore differences in intervention outcomes I consider variance in intervention practices as embedded case units (Yin, 2008). I chose to present these in the case study as abstracted ‘ideal types’ in order to ensure confidentiality and anonymity of interviewees given the sensitive nature of the fieldwork. Finally, the case design and analysis were undertaken in accordance with quality principles for qualitative research to ensure confidence and relevance (Gaskell and Bauer, 2000).
The Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement ended the 21-year civil war between the Government of Sudan and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). According to senior NSDDRC officials, approximately 350,000 fighters were to undergo reintegration in Sudan including 90,000 combatants from each of the two main fighting institutions involved in the civil war, these being the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and SPLA. In order to achieve this goal, the two security chapters of the peace agreement (Chapter VI and Annexure I) outlined the creation of a National DDR Coordination Council, which was to oversee the activities of two DDR commissions: the NSDDRC and Southern Sudan DDR Commission. Additionally, Chapter V of the peace agreement, the Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Southern Kurdofan and Blue Nile States, provided special status to contested ‘transitional areas’.

Often at the frontlines of the civil war, these areas faced unique post-war challenges, including territorial claims from both the Government of Sudan and SPLM, an influx of returnees from neighbouring countries, extreme poverty, high levels of insecurity, various degrees and levels of ongoing violence, and poor infrastructure. For these reasons, the peace agreement envisioned these areas as opportunities for collaboration, co-existence, postwar reconstruction, and economic development, especially given their wealth in natural resources. Administratively, after the peace agreement was signed these areas were divided along a relatively equal mix of northern and southern-aligned political positions. In the transitional areas DDR was to be managed by a joint North-South DDR commission.

The negotiation of DDR and other security elements of the peace agreement was a contentious process for both signatories, their technical advisors, as well as third parties to the negotiations. While the rhetoric of DDR is present in the peace agreement, in reality neither party was willing to seriously accept significant reductions of their respective military capacity. This led to a peculiar and unconventional peace outcome: one state, two administrative systems, two armies, and no detailed DDR intervention roadmap. As expressed

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7 The Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement consists of 6 chapters (agreements/protocols) and 2 appendices that were signed between July 20 2002 and December 31 2004. The final agreement, signed January 9 2005, signalled the commencement of implementation. Though ‘comprehensive’ in title, the agreement was ratified by just two of many warring factions in Sudan’s conflicts. Related conflicts were addressed through the Darfur Peace Agreement signed May 5 2006, and the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement, signed October 14 2006.

8 Though the figure of 350,000 was repeatedly mentioned, UN agency literature often refer to 180,000 (90,000 from each of SAF and SPLA). A National Strategy Report noted that eventually over 780,000 fighters and their affiliates were to undergo reintegration in various stages (NDDRRC, 2007).
by Dr. Mohammed, Commissioner General of the NSDDRC:

“In Sudan we ended up with two very strong military institutions, whereas in most peace processes you end up with one. Could this have been avoided? I doubt it very much. DDR wasn’t really part of the agreement.” (Barltrop, 2008: 21)

This disjuncture was reaffirmed by a noted Sudan expert and observer to the peace negotiations who, upon learning the topic of this study, remarked: “There is no DDR in Sudan”. When seen from the perspective of DDR frameworks this declaration is certainly sayable; however, in reality a great deal of activity did take place in Sudan under the umbrella of DDR, though its materialization on the ground was very different than the concept embodied by international conventions and the agencies that promote them.

**Negotiating Global, National, and Local Tensions**

Within an institutional context rife with political fault lines the NSDDRC was torn among a number of pressures. These included appeasing the international community, gaining access to resources and implementation support, and the challenges coordinating activities with diverse DDR stakeholders including different militia and opposition forces. For instance, in the absence of a defined DDR implementation framework the UN pressured the DDR commissions to adopt the UN Integrated DDR Standards, a 770-page technical document that outlines universal standards, policies, guidelines, and procedures for DDR. The size and implementation requirements of the integrated standards were not only overwhelming, but NSDDRC officials frequently expressed that they failed to appreciate the local contextual challenges for DDR in Sudan. Along with political and logistical challenges, as unwillingness to adopt the integrated standards restricted the level of international funding available to NSDDRC. For instance, though the UN DDR Unit oversaw over 70 million USD of international funds for DDR-related activities in the Sudan, because of political tensions and challenges meeting UN guidelines only 6-7 million USD were made available to the DDR commissions. For programming and political reasons alike, NSDDRC sought to avoid dependence on international donors and standards by turning to national sources of support, including the national Ministry of Finance (Barltrop, 2008).

A mutual lack of trust between NSDDRC and international agencies reflected wider international-Sudan political and cultural fault lines. Multiple officials of NSDDRC and other national agencies reaffirmed the challenges of allowing international agencies control DDR implementation. As one senior NSDDRC official put it: “I cannot avoid this distance, avoid our
ideological distance.”

During interviews, significant geopolitical events such as 9/11 served as points of reference to place Sudan in the context of international isolation, condemnation and manipulation. This was as much cultural as it was political. Motivations and interpretations aside, NSDDRC sought to encourage local and national organizations to take responsibility for DDR implementation, as noted by a senior NSDDRC official:

“These [national] people are the key personnel or the key persons in their communities. If I give [responsibility] to the international NGOs, then I may make some distortion or something bad in my communities. So I want the nationals to go there to do that. It is a top priority for me to give the reintegration for the nationals and I’m striving for that.”

However, not everything ran smoothly at the national level. For instance, the respective DDR commissions had little authority over the activities of armed groups. The DDR protocol as negotiated in the peace agreement ensured that the various fighting forces would independently undertake their own registration and compilation of ex-combatant lists, which they would then pass onto the DDR commissions and relevant UN agencies. The DDR commissions thus had little say over the demobilization activities of SAF and SPLA, whom for the most part sought to avoid significant disarmament (Barltrop, 2008). The lack of appropriate control and coordination between the DDR commissions and various fighting groups is well-documented and particularly apparent in the case of Southern Sudan (Nichols, 2011).

Even the language of DDR was seen to be problematic. A senior NSDDRC official in Darfur explained to me that the term ‘disarmament’ was unacceptable for many in the DDR commissions as it seemed to imply defeat. Thus, though the NSDDRC kept the acronym ‘DDR’ in its English name, in Arabic it was referred to as the “Northern Sudan Commission for Arms Control and Reintegration of Combatants in Society” (Barltrop, 2008: 25).

**DDR Package versus ‘DDR-Plus’**

NSDDRC strongly questioned the potential effectiveness of the universal DDR package—multiple installments of cash, foodstuffs, household items, skills training, and income generating initiatives—typical of conventional 4-year universal DDR approaches. This was partly due to dismal outcomes of DDR initiatives elsewhere in Africa, but also due to the complexity of the postwar Sudan context, which included a large number of combatants,

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9 Interview with senior NSDDRC official, 2009.
10 Interview with senior NSDDRC official, 2009.
11 Fieldwork revealed minor regional differences to how ‘DDR’ was publically communicated.
heavy militarization of communities, challenges in distinguishing between combatant and civilian, and war-displaced Sudanese returning home from neighbouring countries (Abdelnour, 2012). From my fieldwork and reading of global DDR experiences, I have come to view the conventional 4-year DDR package plus skills training as a remnant of intervention approaches used to support the homecoming of those who had fought in the trenches of World War 2 (see Schutz, 1944, 1945). However, given the more complex nature of contemporary intra-state war and conflict contexts, particularly as is experienced in sub-Saharan Africa (Duffield, 2001; Newman, 2004), I understand why NSDDRC felt immense pressure to seek DDR alternatives.

In place of the universal 4-year DDR approach, Dr. Mohammed advocated a ‘generational’ and ‘development’ orientation for DDR in the Sudan. This strategy, which he termed ‘DDR-plus’, envisioned reintegration to be a long-term socio-economic development process (Mohammed, 2005). As one senior NSDDRC official put it: ‘‘DD’ is a logistic issue. ‘R’ is the actual development and the actual key.’12 As part of this approach NSDDRC would examine community-approaches to weapons collection and programming with the potential to include registered and non-registered ex-combatants along with people from war-affected communities. However, expanding the scope of reintegration to include longer-term development projects required sustained funding. Rather than accept the $800 to 1000 USD per ex-combatant conventionally allocated by the UN DDR Unit, NSDDRC pushed for $3000 per combatant. After a long negotiation process the amount of $1500 was settled upon.13

NSDDRC’s concerns over conventional DDR programming were reaffirmed during fieldwork. For example, I encountered large numbers of ex-combatants who, because they had not been registered on official DDR lists, were ineligible for support through UN DDR initiatives. In other cases, recipients of DDR packages expressed dismay at how little or irrelevant the support or training was. One respondent listed the contents of a DDR package installment as consisting of: “860 [Sudanese] pounds [approximately $50 USD at the time], 3 sacks of corn, 3 gallons of oil, salt and sugar, lentils, blankets, mosquito nets, sandals, sometimes clothes, a flashlight, radio, and tarp for ground cover.” When asked how the cash was used, he stated: “We bought some sheep, we used some money for transportation, we loaned friends some money—locals saw we had a large amount of money and some asked us to help them out with

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12 Interview with senior NSDRC official, 2009.
13 Interview with senior NSDDRC official, 2009.
loans—we spent money on our children and other things.”

Another former combatant made it clear that instead of the DDR package he would prefer “a small number of camels and a *Kalash* [Kalashnikov] [...] for protection from bandits.”

Tensions caused significant delays in the start of DDR. The consequences of delays included unrest and the threat of armed violence, particularly in the Blue Nile and other transitional areas. Having no oversight over the process of registering and producing lists of ex-combatants, and within the context of delays in the start of DDR, the NSDDRC turned to national and state partners to develop and advance a national DDR strategy: agricultural cooperative enterprises.

**A National DDR Strategy Emerges**

In 2006, a NSDDRC official working in the Blue Nile produced a Community Security Assessment Mission Report recommending agricultural cooperatives as a keystone DDR intervention in the Sudan. The author of the report expressed a number of motivating factors. For one, cooperatives in the Sudan have a long history originating in the colonial era. First established in Sudan under British colonial rule, agriculture cooperatives were used to reintegrate soldiers involved in the abolition of slavery in Sudan and Ethiopia during the 1920s. To support reintegration efforts the administration provided soldiers a small number of agricultural sites along the Blue Nile River, as well as seeds and other inputs as a reward for their service. However, it was not until the 1930s when cooperatives were increasingly present in the Sudan, though at this time they were regulated by commercial law until the passing of the Co-operative Ordinance of 1946. Later, cooperative approaches were adapted to include a diversity of models that ranged from self-help organizations to state-controlled cooperatives (Münkner, 2013), all of which remain in present day Sudan.

Sudan’s early cooperatives experience reflects a broader diffusion of regulated collective economic activity by British and French colonialists in Africa. For instance, the British were motivated by the positive experience with agricultural cooperatives in India, institutionalized through the Indian Credit Co-operative Societies Act of 1904 (Münkner, 2013). However, the cooperatives promoted by British colonial regimes differed from the Rochdale-inspired independent grassroots collectives that enabled struggling communities to better their

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14 Interview with former combatant, 2009.
15 Interview with former combatant, 2009.
16 Interview with NSDDRC official, Blue Nile Sector Office, 2008.
circumstances (Emmanuel and MacPherson, 2007). Rather, they were state-sponsored and in most cases at least partially state-managed.

After Sudan’s independence in 1956, various national policies were put in place to support cooperative activity. For instance, over sugared tea the Director of the Department of Cooperatives in South Darfur told me the story of the first registered cooperative in Darfur, which happened to be a Prisoner’s Cooperative Society. Formed by the Government of Sudan and located in El Fashir, the prisoner’s cooperative was member controlled and traded consumer goods.17 Successive governments elevated cooperative activity in Sudan, and from 1966 onwards there were national and state-level ministries for cooperatives (Awad, 1998). This continued to the golden era of cooperatives in the Sudan, a time when cooperatives received unprecedented political support and economic subsidy under the government of Gaafar Nimeiry (1969-1985). Once Nimeiry was ousted, new commercial regulation in 1991 effectively ended large-scale subsidies for cooperative activity. This coincided with the implementation of structural adjustment policies and use of state expenditures towards renewed civil war in the 1990s.18

Though they no longer benefit from excessive government support, since their inception cooperatives remained a legitimate institutional template for collective economic activity. This experience is not only specific to the Sudan. As Schneiberg (2002, 2013) notes, though cooperatives may have fallen out of favour in comparison with dominant neoliberal models of enterprise in the American context, they were able to remain a legitimate (albeit somewhat dormant) template for economic development and social change.

Second, agricultural interventions have also long been employed as a policy for socio-economic transformation in the Sudan, including the Blue Nile State. For example, Sudan’s most famous agricultural experiment is the Gezira Scheme, which was started in 1925 by the British colonial administration. A massive agricultural project and at one time the largest centrally-managed irrigation project in the world, the Gezira Scheme continues to operate today under the management of the Government of Sudan (Bernal, 1997). In addition, since independence numerous government-led large-scale agricultural interventions (including cooperatives) have been launched to foster economic and industrial development across the Sudan (Kontos, 1990; Bernal, 1997).

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17 Interview with official of the Department of Cooperatives, 2008.
18 Interview with NSDDRC official, Blue Nile Sector Office, 2008.
A third factor for the selection of agricultural cooperatives relates to the large proportion of employment in agriculture-oriented activities, including farming and livestock; in fact, it is widely believed that agriculture employs upwards of 80 percent of the Sudan labour force. Further, agriculture-related activities account for a majority of rural economic activity. In the Blue Nile, for instance, smallholder farming and livestock are common activities that traditionally engage entire families.¹⁹

Smallholder family farms are the most common of these, and villagers either work on small farms or run their own traditional farms. Livestock complement farming as a livelihood practice. Three main forms of village-based farming include: *mauora*, a small individually-managed farm or large plot located around a house; *jubarik*, a larger farm still located around a house but requiring more labour; and *bildet*, a larger farm. Planting occurs during the rainy season and family or hired labourers are involved in weeding activities. A villager can cover a large area using traditional, local hand tools such as the *gerraia* for sowing and *mutabab* for weeding. Traditional and smallholder farming in the Blue Nile consistently reap higher crop yields per *feddan* (in Sudan, 1 feddan equals 1.038 acres or 4200 square metres) in comparison to mechanized farming.

Additionally, during the inter-war period (between 1972-1983), the periphery states of Sudan including the Blue Nile attracted investment in large mechanized private farms, some of which were owned by wealthy Sudanese families. It also attracted investment from large commercial agricultural companies from the Gulf countries, the Government of Sudan, and bi-lateral donors. Though these investments created employment, infrastructure, and generated economic growth, not all of this activity was seen to be positive by residents of the Blue Nile. Large mechanized farms use pesticides that degrade the environment, and competition over ideal farmland and water resources heightens conflict between pastoral and nomadic tribes.

A fourth factor supporting the use of cooperatives is the cultural tradition known as *nafeer*, or collective work (*'Abd al-Halim, 2007). Communities in the Blue Nile express nafeer to be a means of many people working together for the purpose of providing help or assistance. Nafeer is thus a cultural expression of communal (primarily voluntary) collective social action. Indeed, in Sudan there is a rich history of cultural-institutional expressions of collective action, particularly relating to community farming. For instance, in the 1918 inaugural edition of the scholarly journal *Sudan Notes and Records*, the Sakia tribe in Dongola

¹⁹ Interview with NSDDRC official, Blue Nile Sector Office, 2008.
was reported as having “a highly organised system of cooperative farming” (EC, 1918: 49). This theme was very present during fieldwork, and it was common for NSDDRC officials and cooperative members alike to mention to nafeer. In one interview, a teacher and community leader involved with a DDR cooperative presented nafeer and cooperative activity in an almost interchangeable way:

“We realize that most people are formed into organizations—the family, nafeer—so they are familiar with working in organizations. [...] As simple farmers, if we wait till we organize ourselves then nothing will happen but if people get together and really join powers we notice that things work better.”

Finally, the 2006 Community Security Assessment Mission Report suggested cooperatives to be an appropriate model of intervention because they continue to exist as a legal form of collective economic activity under numerous laws and Cooperative Acts. As such, cooperatives have well-defined parameters for membership, governance structures and procedures, and often receive material support from state ministries. Cooperatives are registered in each respective state by a Department of Cooperatives; one a stand-alone ministry, the department now operates as part of the Ministry of Finance and National Economy. The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry also frequently supports cooperatives and cooperative unions, especially those involved with the production of export crops.

Further, as a legal model of economic activity, agricultural cooperatives seen as a ‘fundable’ and ‘scalable’ model that might easily receive support from various Sudanese national institutions, such as ministries, banks, national corporations, and other implementing partners such as international and national NGOs. The fundability of cooperative enterprises for reintegration was reaffirmed to me by a senior NSDDRC official:

“I try to make the reintegration package smart and something attractive by encouraging the other government institutions to contribute to this programme. You know, the areas of conflict need much support and many players to come on board so as to make reintegration successful, smart and ongoing. The other challenge for me is to find actual actors to implement the reintegration programme.”

NSDDRC Launches DDR Cooperatives in the Blue Nile

NSDDRC’s agricultural cooperative interventions in the Blue Nile began in May 2006 with a community-based organization experiment. Almost a year later NSDDRC launched 25 Community Security Cooperatives designed for former fighters and community members. In

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20 Interview with non-combatant cooperative member, 2008.
21 Interview with Director of Cooperatives Department, Blue Nile, 2008.
22 Interview with senior NSDDRC official, 2009.
April 2008 five cooperatives were launched exclusively for members of SAF (see Figure 2.2).

**Figure 2.2**: Chronology of Agricultural Activity in the Blue Nile
The first cooperative. NSDDRC’s first cooperative society was established in May 2006 by the Sudanese national NGO Mubadaroon as a community security project. The society was initially formed as a “conflict resolution committee” involving “consideration of the tribes, leaders, policemen, teachers, and peace activities”.\(^{23}\) It was not registered as a for-profit cooperative, but as a community-based organization under the Sudan Voluntary Act and according to the Humanitarian Aid Commission, a national agency that regulates humanitarian activity in the Sudan.\(^{24}\) Registration as a community organization enabled the society to benefit from socially-oriented activities, such as peace culture workshops and related public campaigns, and still receive inputs (such as seeds and fishing nets) as well as training (in agriculture, fishing, administration, and finance) provided by international and national NGOs. NSDDRC initially saw this model as a “platform for peace-building and ex-combatant reintegration and reconciliation”, one that would “enhance the peace process and to make some reconciliations of conflict resolution”.\(^{25}\)

The structure of the group consisted of 350 voting members, of which 20 were democratically elected to a leadership assembly that discusses group strategies and takes decisions. From the leadership assembly an executive body were elected, including 3 executive members (vice-president, secretary, and treasurer) and 1 president. At the time of the initial fieldwork, some members of this cooperative were considering the launch of another society of 500 members, though the ability to manage such a large society was strongly debated. In addition to a cumbersome size, registration as a community-based organization registration limited the society's ability to secure financing for investment. Though the community-based status easily facilitated peace culture and peace-building activities, it limited the society's ability to seriously engage with income generation projects; subsistence income generating activities were permitted but for-profit activities were not. For these reasons, NSDDRC chose a for-profit cooperative model as the keystone DDR intervention.

Community Security Cooperatives. In February 2007, NSDDRC facilitated the launch of 25 ‘Community Security Cooperatives’ across the six localities of the Blue Nile State. The initial society was also restructured and included in the launch. As the keystone DDR cooperative intervention, the Community Security Cooperatives were designed to include ex-combatants

\(^{23}\) Interview with Mubadaroon official, 2008.

\(^{24}\) The Humanitarian Aid Commission was formally founded in 1995 as a merger of two agencies: the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, established in 1985 as a disaster management agency, and the Commission of Voluntary Agencies Commission, established in 1993. Prior to his appointment as Commissioner of the NSDDRC, Dr. Mohammed directed the Humanitarian Aid Commission.

\(^{25}\) Interview with NSDDRC official, 2008.
(both registered and non-registered) from key armed groups, namely the PDF and SPLA, together with community members. According to the author of the 2006 Community Security Assessment Mission Report, the vision for these cooperatives was not reintegration per se, but community security; they were intended to help reduce small-scale conflict through the collection of small arms and promotion of livelihood opportunities in the contested transitional areas.

**Structure.** A standard cooperative structure was adopted with technical assistance from the Cooperatives Department in Blue Nile State. Each cooperative was to consist of 100 voting members, from which 3 were elected to serve as executive members (president, vice-president, and treasurer). As per cooperative regulations, members would vote annually for the executive member positions. Further, NSDDRC arranged for each cooperative to be allocated land, receive a tractor complete with associated implements on credit, financing to support seasonal agricultural activities, as well as seeds and fuel. According to NSDDRC documents and corroborated through fieldwork, the percentage of ex-combatants in each cooperative varied between 10 and 100 percent. Community participants, meaning those not designated as ‘ex-combatants’ and not affiliated with a fighting group, were selected from the areas that were to host the DDR cooperatives. Some cooperative members had been displaced but returned to their homes after the war:

“DDR came to us and spoke to us about reintegration. Some of us had been IDPs [internally displaced persons] and now are reintegrating back in the community.”

The cooperatives were spread relatively evenly through the various localities in the Blue Nile. However, even after much fieldwork the exact process by which community members were selected for participation remains unclear to me. One non-combatant cooperative member reflected on his engagement, saying: “They [DDR] gave us a tractor and asked us to find anyone who would like to participate – whoever can – no particular skills required.”

**Enterprise enablers.** To support the financial viability of the cooperative, NSDDRC arranged for each cooperative to receive tractors and agricultural implements as well as financing. The provision of tractors are seen by NSDDRC as one of its key accomplishments. GIAD Tractors and Agricultural Equipment Company Limited, a government-affiliated corporation, produced

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26 Not all NSDDRC statistics matched what I found in the field. For instance, there were (sometimes great) divergences between NSDDRC records and what I encountered through fieldwork in terms of total number of cooperative members, official registration date, and size of allocated land.

27 Interview with cooperative executive member, 2009.

28 Interview with cooperative member, 2008.
the tractors. From GIAD, NSDDRC procured Landini and New Holland model, 83 horsepower tractors and implements, including planters and disc harrows suitable for the variety of soil conditions in the Blue Nile. Sixty representatives from the DDR cooperatives received ten days of training from NSDDRC on the appropriate use and maintenance of the tractors. Additionally, NSDDRC hired an agricultural engineer to support the ongoing maintenance and training needs of the cooperatives. The tractors and equipment were not provided free of charge; rather, each cooperative was required to pay regular installments over a seven-year period to cover its cost.

Finance was arranged through the Agriculture Bank of Sudan, a government-owned bank established in 1957. The specific form of finance provided is salam, a model of Islamic finance that is tied to seasonal agricultural practices, namely tilling, planning, weeding, and harvesting. It is a model where farmers and banks theoretically share risk; money is lent on perceived market returns for crops, and after harvest the loan is repaid in cash or crops. Although salam is sometimes disputed due to unpredictability in crop yield and market prices at harvest, it has long been used in the Blue Nile and thus selected as the most suitable option for the DDR cooperatives.

A cooperative union. With the support of NSDDRC, community leaders and cooperative executives formed a cooperative union to provide oversight and facilitate coordination among the 25 cooperatives. During the time of the fieldwork, the DDR agricultural cooperatives union was housed in the offices of the Gum Arabic Union in the Blue Nile. Many of those who joined the DDR cooperatives union brought with them valuable experience: “Some of the members of this union are members of the Blue Nile Farmers Trade Union, some are also members of the Gum Arabic Union, and we benefit from their involvement in these unions and have some facilitation from these other unions.”

Serving as president of the union is the Umda, a prominent Blue Nile leader in what is known as the ‘Native Administration’, a legal and political system connecting various levels of

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30 Islamic finance prohibits riba (acceptance of interest or fees) or investment in businesses that provide goods or services considered contrary to Islamic principles.
31 Discussion with NSDDRC official, Blue Nile Sector Office, 2008.
32 Interview with DDR cooperatives union member, 2008.
traditional authority into a hierarchy connected to the Sudanese judicial system. In the Blue Nile, Sheikhs or Nazirs reside at the village level, above which are Umdas, with the Mak being the highest rank. This hierarchy has proven highly effective for resolving low levels of conflict. For instance, when a dispute cannot be resolved at a particular level they are elevated up the chain of authority. In addition to preventing the escalation of conflict, the Native Administration has the authority to sentence perpetrators of a crime to prison and award damages to victims. Umdas are thus seen as having an important role in promoting stability within and among various ethnic groups and communities (Fruzzetti and Östör 1990).

The Umda not only served as the president of the DDR cooperative union, but also assisted NSDDRC with the facilitation and organization of the intervention among the various national, state, and militia stakeholders:

“All of the cooperatives were set up by DDR in cooperation with the parliament, NCP [National Congress Party], and administration from the Blue Nile and Khartoum. They [NSDDRC] made a survey of all the village and got people and organised them into cooperatives. When they were registered we sat to discuss with the DDR office in order to facilitate the process. They needed to set up popular committees to get the various organizations to support. We then started telling people what the work was about, we got the military groups—PDF, SPLA, and other fighters—to abandon their weapons and seek means of income generation. DDR, at the union level, sponsored us with 30 tractors. This encouraged people to start working. Then it was a matter of how to organize people; rules and codes of conduct, particularly handling machinery so that work goes properly, God willing. We then started thinking about investment. They organized committees from all groups and we were able to work to get seeds for the agricultural season and contacted banks and the government which were able to fundraise for all these cooperatives.”

The Umda is able to do so as a result of widespread and longstanding legitimacy at state and grassroots levels. Building upon earlier forms of rule, including chiefs or councils of elders, native administration gained prominence during the Funji Kingdom (1504-1820) and into Turko-Egyptian colonial rule (1820-1885). Under the rule of the revolutionary Mahdi (1885-98), however, native authorities were reduced to the status of citizens without a formal government. With the defeat of the Mahdi by the British and establishment of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium (1898-1956), native authority was revitalized as part of the British policy of indirect rule. The British colonial authority issued numerous laws providing executive, judicial and financial powers to local sheikhs and leaders. Under British supervision they oversaw control of markets, land tenure rights, and maintained law and order (Elhussien, 1989).

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33 Interview with the Umda and DDR Cooperatives Union, 2008.
Successive waves of Sudanese governments have attempted to either dismantle or resurrect aspects of the native administration. The current version of native administration intended to revive longstanding patrimonial structures within a democratic framework, where local chiefs are elected from among leading families instead of by appointment. Moreover, today positions with the native administration are salaried, and hence employed by the government. While the modified system is thought to have benefits for managing local conflicts over land and water tenure, as well as for collecting taxes, critics point to the tension between decision making power and democratic processes at local and national levels (Elhussien, 1989).

**SAF Cooperatives.** Although the Community Security Cooperatives were intended to involve SAF-affiliated ex-combatants, this proved difficult for political and logistical reasons. According to one NSDDRC official working in the Blue Nile:

“When we tried to inject SAF in those twenty-five cooperatives we met a problem; all SAF target groups are concentrating in the Damazine area. This is mainly because they don’t want to go out of Damazine because they want to be around to follow-up their pensions. So we formed five new cooperatives, and we registered all those numbers of SAF here at Damazine.”

In April 2008, NSDDRC launched an additional five cooperatives specifically targeting SAF ex-combatants, without the involvement of non-combatant community members. Structurally speaking, these cooperatives were intended to be similar to the Community Security Cooperative; they were to have 100 members each and also benefit from the provision of land, food supplies, tractors, equipment, and arrangement of financing. According to NSDDRC officials, the program was created with a strategic objective for decreasing tensions by disgruntled fighters:

“One of the objectives for the formation of this five new SAF coops is we want to decrease the degree of protest between those SAF ex-combatants, because till now they have not been paid for their pensions. And they make so many problems in Khartoum in other towns where they concentrate. This is a strategic policy to decrease tensions between ex-combatants.”

Although all members of these cooperatives are verified registered combatants and are officially demobilized and disarmed, during fieldwork it was evident that they maintained a strong connection with their military-organizational identities. For instance, each time I met with SAF cooperative members I sensed a military hierarchy, structure and efficiency akin to my interviews with military officials. Maintaining an affiliation to their prior organizational

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34 Interview with NSDDRC official, 2008.
35 Interview with NSDDRC official, 2008.
roles and identities was suggested to be a motivation for demanding SAF-only cooperatives. In the words of one cooperative executive member, it was important to work “separately as SAF ex-combatants and have the opportunity to work together without going to the PDF or community.”

As I will describe later, this arrangement resulted in unique outcomes for SAF members in comparison with the other DDR cooperatives.

“Renaissance” of Agricultural Cooperative Activity

The planning, coordination and launch of agricultural cooperatives, along with investments in agriculture equipment and inputs by NSDDRC and state actors inspired local officials and NGOs to follow suit with their own initiatives. According to the Director of the Department of Cooperatives in the Blue Nile, “the DDR tractors encouraged cooperatives in the state into this agricultural renaissance.”

Further, and in a direct response to NSDDRC’s activities, in late 2007 the Blue Nile State Commissioner began to investigate cooperatives for women in the state, particularly those involved in fighting, and in February 2008 she and a teacher of agricultural skills facilitated the launch of 53 cooperatives for women. These cooperatives were registered with support from the Ministry of Agriculture and consisted of between forty and 98 members. Noting the support NSDDRC provided to the DDR cooperatives, particularly tractors and training, the Commissioner stated:

“I need DDR in this way. When you train somebody, you are also supposed to help them practice what they have done, but this has not taken place. For the men, maybe they have a tractor for cultivating and they have also been trained here, but for the women this had not taken place.”

One cooperative visited contained two women members. The necessity to be more inclusive of women was substantiated by a NSDDRC officer, who noted, “Technically there is a problem if we don’t register all those women associated with armed forces [...] to organize them and to be demobilized from the armed forces.”

In addition to the efforts of the state commissioner and her staff, a number of international and national NGOs established offices in the Blue Nile, many launching agricultural initiatives, including cooperatives. Some, like the commissioner, likened their activities to DDR:

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36 Interview with SAF cooperative executive member, 2008.
37 Interview with Director of Department of Cooperatives, Blue Nile, 2008.
38 Interview with Commissioner, Blue Nile State, 2008.
39 Interview with NSDDRC official, 2008.
“Because the DDR have their cooperative structures, and then the NGOs working in the area they have their own structures. People should sit together and coordinate all these issues, because the benefits will be for the community and we are working with the community, and we want to improve the situation and the condition of the community. For example, DDR provides them with tractors, and the machine is good for all farmers to use, so if there is good cooperation and coordination with communities, they can benefit from these tractors, and even the cooperatives can benefit from the community by doing the work with them.”

**DDR Cooperative Outcomes**

Though the DDR cooperatives were launched along the two main approaches, a variety of outcomes were realized in terms of tractors, finance, and governance.

**Condition of ‘enablers’.** The condition of tractors and finance varied across the cooperatives. Though widely hailed as enterprise enablers, for many these proved a liability. A large number of tractors broke down as a result of an apparent manufacturing defect in the gear (crown wheel and pinion), and many cooperative did not receive the appropriate implements (such as discs) in time for their first seasons. Many of the cooperatives were thus unable to plough their lands at the appropriate time and thus lost the opportunity to cultivate in a given season. Further, some cooperative members seemed unaware that the cost of the tractors should be repaid, and many were quite surprised to learn that they would need to start repayment of the tractors. This was distressing for members whose tractors were inoperable, in disarray, or not used in a way that generated income.

With regards to financing, fluctuations in agricultural commodity prices, changes in farming conditions, and tractor challenges left many cooperative members unable to repay their loans. The bank director also expressed that finance was sometimes seen as charity, contributing to loan default. Further, because cooperative executive members signed for loans on behalf of their membership, cooperative members were left vulnerable to corruption and often unaware of the consequences for non-repayment. In many cooperatives two to three percent of members faced a few months in prison for non-repayment; in the worst case 25 percent of members of one cooperative were imprisoned. Moreover, volatile markets, political shocks, and infrastructure constraints are known to promote agricultural vulnerability in the Blue Nile and contribute to food insecurity in the region. The challenges are so great a senior official from the Ministry of Agriculture in the Blue Nile said to me, “Agriculture in Sudan is

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40 Interview with an international NGO official, 2008.
like gambling”. Challenges associated with finance, tractors, and market volatility led some cooperatives to cease their activities, at least for a season. Still, the membership of other cooperatives forged ahead even without tractors or finance.

**Governance modalities.** According to NSDDRC’s official documentation, the thirty DDR cooperatives were relatively similar to one another in terms of structure, membership numbers, and equipment provided, though on paper the SAF cooperatives were allocated twice as much land. Further, while some cooperatives did indeed contain 100 members, most had fewer numbers while some had greater. Further, some cooperatives were composed entirely of community members, others entirely of former combatants registered for DDR. Most interestingly, though the cooperatives were registered on the same legal model of economic cooperation, a variety of governance modalities emerged. I illustrate these as five governance ideal types: non-active, executive-managed, traditional, collaborative, and village-based.

**Non-active.** Two cooperative sites visited were non-active; members either attempted to operate but failed to continue, or never started to farm. This was particularly apparent in the southern regions of the Blue Nile. In the most extreme case, members and equipment were neither found at the cooperative location nor at the nearby village where some members were said to reside. The majority of ex-combatant members were said to be living in Damazine, far from the site of the cooperative, waiting to collect their pensions. The community leaders at the site expressed a wish to take ownership of the equipment and farm if possible. In the other case, farming was briefly attempted until the tractor malfunctioned.

**Executive-managed.** Some of the cooperatives were managed by the efforts of the executives alone, without ongoing engagement of the other members. In at least one case this appeared to be in line with the desires of the membership, whom for the most part resided far from where the cooperative land was allocated. In another case it seemed that the executive, who had signed for the finance and maintained control of the tractor and equipment, were not responsive to attempts by the membership to engage with the activities of the cooperative. In one case, the executives hoped to mobilize the membership, who were apparently disillusioned from initial failure:

“Two times we failed, so motivation is low. The majority maybe will say that they will not continue with this cooperative. But some of them still insist that we have to do

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41 Interview with senior official of the Ministry of Agriculture, Blue Nile, 2008.
something. I think there is a small group of members that have courage now to continue; we are the ones who can mobilize them and encourage them. This is the only way we can do it.”

However, the director of an international agency working in the Blue Nile expressed that the exclusive participation of executive-managed cooperatives is a more fundamental issue of how top-down cooperatives are established and launched:

“Now I think DDR is working with cooperatives and they have, in each village or cooperative, three officers who look after the work. And I think also they did some training for those people. But I am going to say that in their work they are not working with the whole community.”

Traditional. The majority of cooperatives visited are classified as ‘traditional’, meaning they: adhere to the intended governance structure and decision processes; function on member, hired, or family labour; have low member access to information; and operate primarily by top-down planning (Wittman, 2007). The category of traditional had the largest number of cooperatives as well as the greatest variance in terms of cooperative outcomes. For instance, in some cases some or all members actively work together on allocated land, in other cases, members work on individually allocated parcels. Moreover, some cooperatives rely more on hired labour, which is often enabled by access to finance for labour-intensive activities (such as weeding) or a consequence of the skills present among members (such as operating a tractor). Some cooperatives experienced tensions between ex-combatant and community members, while others did not. The following exemplary quotes capture these positions:

“There is a feeling among the ex-combatants that this project is targeting them rather than the community. Their position was that it is commercial activity for them; however, we will try to appropriate these understandings with time.”

“We have good relations, no conflicts. When time to work comes we are all the same. We received support to do work to feed ourselves together. We didn’t have a tractor before. They gave us this tractor and said it is for the whole cooperative. No one has special rights among us. And after all, we are one tribe, one family.”

Collaborative. The five SAF cooperatives operated collaboratively amongst themselves, instilling a healthy competitive spirit in their membership. Moreover, they developed a joint vision for the future, which included plans for a shared mechanic with parts supply (to service their tractors as well as others in the Blue Nile), shops, and a residential settlement for members and their families. Members provide their labour, and people from surrounding areas are hired for seasonal labour-intensive activities when required. Members

42 Interview with cooperative executive member, 2009.
43 Interview with an international NGO official, 2008.
44 Interview with cooperative member, 2008.
45 Interview with cooperative member, 2009.
demonstrated close ties, strong management capability, and an open sharing of information. Drawing on their military training, the members of the SAF cooperatives also promoted a form of friendly competition for the purpose of improving productivity. Their SAF affiliation, shared history, and training were noted to be an asset in their ongoing work:

“We’ve taken many training courses together as combatants, and now in the civil life we’re working in the same organization together. That will naturally build on our sense of being able to work with each other for long years. That will help us in our work now. We learned to work with much solidarity.”

In addition to regular mentions of nafeer, various forms of cooperation were observed and expressed, often with the caveat of isolation from the other DDR cooperatives. For example, the five SAF cooperatives chose to form their own exclusive union. Members also planned to form their own resident community:

“We will submit an application and apply for land for common residence for all the [SAF cooperative] group members. There will be a village quarter, there is a strong sense of community.”

In some ways a DDR paradox emerged. SAF cooperative members maintained elements of the prior military-organizational identities while embarking on new ‘reintegrated’ livelihoods. This contradiction is captured in the following quote:

“The five cooperatives are the ex-combatants of the fourth battalion of the ground forces of the Blue Nile State.”

Village-based. Two cooperatives could be classified as village-based, meaning the members operated along village socioeconomic structures, with resources allocated accordingly. In one case, cooperative members lived across six villages, and each village was equally represented in the cooperative assembly with two members. During seasonal activities entire villages would engaged with agricultural tasks:

“150 is the number of registered [cooperative] members, but when we cultivate we don’t discriminate between registered members and non-registered members; we work the fields of the entire village. We serve around 3000 people in the total six villages, and they all work. In every village there are areas located for cooperative work. In each village there is also a mini-committee that manages the cooperative work of that village. Because we are one tribe we don’t discriminate among each other. We all benefit the same.”

Cooperative lands were shared among the six villages, and farming activities integrated with

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46 Interview with SAF cooperative member, 2009.
47 Interview with SAF cooperative executive member, 2008.
48 Interview with SAF cooperative member, 2009.
49 Interview with cooperative member, 2009.
traditional rain-fed and irrigated agriculture practices. The tractor was not operational and in need of repair at the time of the visit, but members noted it had been shared among the villages without issue. The memory of this visit remains particularly strong with me. I recall being in awe walking through the fields of one of the villages. Dusk was approaching, the farms consisted of larger mechanized farming plots and smaller-scale rain-fed areas for growing vegetables was a wonderful experience. After our tour through the fields we were served a bowl of raw heated cow milk, and spoke with the members of the cooperatives by firelight.

The blending of cooperative resources within village structures resonates with the concept of community-based enterprise (Peredo, 2003; Peredo and Chrisman, 2006), or ‘alternative’ cooperatives. According to Wittman (2007), alternative cooperatives: are organized to produce for subsistence as well as sale; operate using member and family labour, inclusive of members and non-members; have high member access to information and collective decision making; and are planned in a bottom-up manner according to the specific needs of members and their communities (Wittman, 2007). In another case, cooperative executives were split between two villages. Though there were issues associated with the allocation of the tractor use and tensions between members and executives, members of both villages worked together to ensure the viability of the cooperative.

**DISCUSSION**

The stated purpose of this study was to critique our understanding of institutional voids, a concept that underpins liberal peace thinking and is increasingly used in management and organization studies to describe institutional deficiencies in non-western contexts. An exploratory investigation of postwar social intervention is pursued along the following two questions: What institutional arrangements exist in ‘peace voids’? And how do they influence social interventions? The case of DDR interventions in the Blue Nile reveals a wealth of intuitional arrangements; these enable particular practices, constrain others, and shape the various forms postwar interventions come to take. NSDDRC’s cooperative interventions also raise questions about the notion of institutional voids, and the need to reconsider the important role of states, bureaucracy, agency, and the associated roles these encourage.

**Postwar Institutional Voids?**

According to liberal peace theories and frameworks the context of postwar Sudan is an institutional void, and it is not difficult to understand why. As Ferguson (1990) and Escobar
(1995) note, there is an institutionalized worldview that holds ‘underdeveloped’ countries as lacking appropriate modern institutions and markets, meaning they require large-scale investments in state-building and economic development. Because liberal peace thinking embraces similar notions, political, security, and market reforms are seen as integral to postwar recovery and socioeconomic development (Duffield, 2001; Heathershaw, 2008). Yet as the case study of DDR in the Blue Nile reveals, a plethora of institutional arrangements exist in postwar contexts and actively shape the form postwar interventions inevitably take.

Since the introduction of institutional voids to the field of management and organization studies by Khanna and Palepu (1997), research has explored how voids can be entered, filled, overcome, navigated, or challenged (Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Miller, Lee, Chang and Breton-Miller, 2009; Mair and Martí, 2009). Recently, scholars have undertaken in-depth explorations of the essence of voids in challenging cultural and geopolitical contexts. For instance, Mair et al. (2012) examine voids as a cultural-institutional order enabling gendered and ethnic social exclusion in rural Bangladesh. Though longstanding, this discriminating regime is malleable to the efforts of legitimate social intermediaries such as BRAC, who find means to create space for inclusive market participation. Further, Khoury and Prasad (2015) examine voids in the context of occupied Palestine. They draw on the literature of formal/informal institutions as a means to elucidate the multiplicity of institutional constraints—complex, contradictory, and violent—that enterprising social intermediaries seek to navigate. In contradiction to the majority of institutional voids literature, Khoury and Prasad (2015) illustrate very clearly the integrate role of the state and state bureaucracies in maintaining and manipulating institutional environments.

**Pervasive State Institutions**

As a mandate of the Office of the Presidency, NSDDRC was able to draw from a treasure of institutional variety to construct and launch large-scale postwar social interventions. These include: the ideals embedded in DDR protocols, cooperative templates, national and state-level ministries, state banks and corporations, the Native Administration, and agricultural unions. At a deeper level, the DDR cooperative interventions evoked nafeer among some ex-combatants and community members, stirring a commitment to collective economic activity.

According to some, the attempts of NSDDRC to remobilize thousands of former fighters and community members through agricultural cooperatives sparked a “renaissance” of agricultural activities in the Blue Nile. In order to do so, NSDDRC acted as an intermediary
among a diversity of DDR stakeholders. This intermediation role sought to forge new market relationships with the hopes that these would support postwar recovery and development. Such necessitates the recognition of the state and state agencies as focal actors for the diffusion of economic models and associated practices (Kalev et al., 2008). This is a far cry from the bulk of literature on institutional voids, which too often dismisses the significant institutional role of states in enabling or disabling the institutional realities that govern everyday lived experiences. Recent work in the field is beginning to take into consideration the complex and pervasive role of the state in contexts otherwise referred to as voids (Khoury and Prasad, 2015; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2015).

In other fields, scholars have long recognized that the organization of development and postwar social interventions are themselves processes that allow purveyors of violence the opportunity to façade as depoliticized agents of positive social change (Ferguson, 1990; Duffield, 2001; Calhoun, 2004). Liberal peace interventions grant formerly warring factions a chance to suddenly shed illegitimate roles for those deemed legitimate to the postwar institutional order. Theatres of war are transformed into empty spaces wanting the institutions of development and progress; fighters become beneficiary-civilians, their firearms replaced by tractors.

**Bureaucracy Reconsidered**

The case of DDR interventions in the Sudan refocuses attention away from the role of UN and international agencies in governing the postwar activities of nation-states and NGOs. Instead, this study illuminates the important role of national and local institutional arrangements in war-to-peace transitions, particularly in Africa (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2015). That community and administrative leaders found their way into cooperative executive positions and involvement of the Umda as the president of the DDR cooperatives union points to a need to examine how modes of governance influence postwar social intervention. In recent years scholars of political science, development and African studies have begun to examine various systems of governance as relevant for understanding the dynamics of regimes in developing and emerging country contexts. Of particular relevance to this study are *patrimonial* and *neopatrimonial* forms of bureaucracy.

Simply stated, *patrimonialism* it is a form of political authority in which ultimate power formally rests with a leaders who use their authority to exercise power for personal and bureaucratic ends. Those in authority expect a level of compliance to their command by
subjects, even though subjects may retain the ability to resist those in authority. Patrimonial systems are a form of authority and source of legitimacy, found in different varieties depending on the socioeconomic context, history, and environment in which they emerge. Patrimonialism exists not only in low income or developing contexts, but also in those considered ‘modern’ or ‘developed’ (Weber, 1922).

Hardly mentioned in organization and management studies, sociologists and political scientists have long considered patrimonialism an important authority structure and regime type in low income contexts (Roth, 1978; Theobald, 1982). Patrimonialism thrives in Sudan, reflecting historical interactions between traditional and state authorities forged by struggles for and against various colonial and national regimes. According to Mamdani (1996), patrimonialism may emerge in the form of decentralized despotism. In such systems, traditional leaders gain formal power requiring upward accountability to the state apparatus at the expense of downward forms of accountability demanded by traditional forms of authority. Such trade-offs recognize that patrimonial systems are not simply built upon the enforced power relations, instead they bound by a complex set of reciprocities between authority and subject which are “personal, densely interwoven, often lopsided, and based on intangible and symbolic dynamics of status, loyalty, and deference as much as on material exchange” (Pitcher, Moran and Johnston, 2009: 127). A case in point is the resurgence of personal, familial and cultural networks for informing human resource hiring practices in response to the delegitimizing of university qualifications, a consequence of the neoliberal expansion and Arabization of universities in the Sudan (Mann, 2014).

The institution of Native Administration in Sudan, however, can be classified as neopatrimonial. Neopatrimonialism is theorized to exist between patrimonial and bureaucratic systems of authority. It is commonly understood as a hybrid regime of modern bureaucratic structures operating through or within patrimonial systems of authority (Bratton and van de Walle, 1994, 1997). As a system of authority, neopatrimonialism can exist

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50 Weber, in presenting his theory of bureaucracy, outlined three overarching forms of authority: traditional (gerontocracy and patriarchy), patrimonialism (in pure and estate form), and bureaucracy (modern legal-rational systems). When seen as a continuum, patrimonialism exists as a hybrid between traditional systems and modern bureaucracy. Many scholars, in particular those with western-centric or modernist leanings, interpret these forms as stages of development. However, Weber rejects such evolutionary tendencies, and rather presents these typologies as frameworks for understanding differing models of relational power. Thus for Weber, patrimonialism was not simply a progression from traditional forms of authority or precursor to bureaucracy; indeed, early scholars of administration have noted the decline of bureaucracy and re-emergence of patrimonialism (Delany, 1963).
under western neoliberal regimes, in low income countries, and without undermining democracy and economic development (Erdman and Engel, 2007). Overlooked thus far by management and organizational scholars, neopatrimonialism is at present the subject of intense focus and debate among scholars in the political sciences and in African studies in terms of its definition, applicability, and usefulness for understanding African regimes (Erdmann and Engel, 2007; deGrassi, 2008; Pitcher et al., 2009).

Some scholars use neopatrimonialism as a regime typology indicative of many African states, particularly those with the appearance of modern structures yet function through patrimonial authority. An alternative debate uses neopatrimonialism to substantiate accusations of corruption, cronyism and aid ineffectiveness (Cammack, 2007). My own preference, like that of deGrassi (2008), is to understand neopatrimonial institutions, such as the Native Administration, as living artefacts shaped by traditional authority, sociocultural practices, historical struggles with colonial rule, and post-colonial nation-state building projects.

**Enacting Disinterested Agency**

The very notion of DDR—the attempt to transition wartime institutions and practices to those that support peace and development—necessitates that people across levels of society embrace new postwar roles and practices. As this study shows, NSDDRC emerged a focal postwar actor able to coalesce a diversity of stakeholders and draw from institutional artefacts in order to remobilize thousands of fighters in the Blue Nile. Yet not everyone easily embraced new roles and practices. For instance, SAF ex-combatants sought to maintain some aspect of their ‘former’ organizational identities and roles even within the context of new political and economic realities. Similarly, the village-based cooperative members essentially absorbed DDR cooperative resources into their existing institutional arrangements and modes of life and work. These observations can be explained by the notion of *disinterested agency*. Disinterested agency implies actor scripts, objectives, mandates, and interests are culturally-constructed independent of an actor’s intrinsic attributes or interests; they are considered ‘disinterested’ precisely because they are enacted for purposes of legitimacy rather than the maximization of personal preferences (Buhari-Gulmez, 2010). The spread of new roles and practices thus involves, at least in part, the enactment of legitimate modes of agency derived from institutional templates of social action.

Disinterested agency can be seen to manifest at multiple levels. For instance, NSDDRC turns to the Native Administration and other government stakeholders because this was the
appropriate protocol, and they the appropriate actors to play their roles. It may also explain why members of SAF sought so strongly to maintain a sense of organizational affiliation, even though their entire lives were now changed. This stubborn, institutional expression of agency can also be seen elsewhere in the case study of DDR in the Sudan, in the work and worldviews of staff from various ministries, the agricultural bank, international and national NGOs, and those whose village-based roles prevailed over the roles and practices associated with membership in the institution of the cooperative. That actors can come to embrace new institutionally-embedded roles relates to the notion of ‘action at a distance’, whereby rationalized institutions influence social organization across time, space, and levels of analysis (Kallinikos, 1995). As Meyer notes, actors are “enactors of multiple dramas whose texts are written elsewhere” (1999:137). Disinterested agency can thus be seen to influence modes of thought as well as individual preferences and tastes (Frank and Meyer, 2002; Hasselbladh and Bejerot, 2007). According to Meyer, “the most rapidly expanding individual occupations, worldwide, are the nominally disinterested professions: they may partly serve particular interests, but they are in good part agents for the collective” (2008: 797).

**Concluding Remarks**

After decades of advocating top-down institution-building prescriptions, liberal peace frameworks are bending to the recognition that local postwar settings are institutionally rich and complex. To plan and launch postwar social interventions without out appreciation of national and local context is akin to walking through an institutional minefield. Universal institutional packages such as DDR indeed diffuse globally, yet the ratification of peace agreements alone does not equate diffusion, nor does implementation simply transfer agency-embedded categorizes that shape societies and practices (Meyer et al., 1997). Some scholars writing on institutional voids have similarly begin to take notice. A Sudanese proverb captures this aptly, “If you are wearing shoes, you don’t fear the thorns.” Similarly, the theories and frameworks we wear may tempt the substitution of unseen with clear categories that portray a singular story. Institutional labels embodied by DDR frameworks, like those associated with voids, sometimes dissolve when feet touch the ground. This was reaffirmed by a SAF ex-combatant, who responded to a question about how cooperative members spend their time during the off-season:

“Some have small shops, and some have artisan shops, such as blacksmiths. Also, others practice animal husbandry. They just go about their private businesses, some are artisans, contractors, and some are traders and so on.”

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51 Interview with SAF cooperative members, 2008.
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Actorhood and Postwar Intervention

The Role of Institutional Anchors

ABSTRACT

War-to-peace transitions require the dismantling of wartime institutional orders and the assertion of institutions that support peace and economic recovery. For this reason, interventions to remobilize fighters towards productive civilian livelihoods are integral for successful postwar reconstruction. This study analyzes a postwar intervention to reintegrate thousands of fighters in Sudan into agricultural cooperatives. A thematic analysis using the institutional theory notion of actorhood—institutional templates of social identities, roles and practices—points to the emergence of a postwar professions, where formerly warring parties adopt new roles and practices as agents of development, and fighters become beneficiaries.

Postwar intervention resources such as equipment, enterprise models, and finance are theorized to be institutional anchors, or techniques for organizing specific social practices. Findings also reveal point to an intervention paradox: though institutional anchors may be effective for promoting new social practices, they risk reproducing institutional inequalities in intervention settings.

Keywords:
actorhood, institutional theory, postwar intervention, thematic analysis, DDR, Sudan
INTRODUCTION

Social theorists have long noted that war produces social disequilibria, leaving societies in state of anomie (Durkheim, 1897). As societies emerge from war, they remain absent of the institutions necessary for genuine, lasting peace. Some scholars suggest such contexts lack institutional rules for defining the boundaries of legitimate norms and activities (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). Others suggest that in times of transition, actors are able to build new institutional orders by recombining elements of obsolete institutions (Stark, 1996). However, when old institutional orders collapse, a great deal of ambiguity may exist before new institutions stabilize (Beckert, 1999). Postwar societies thus require interventions to foster collective moral understanding, and to guide social norms and practices (Cosier, 1977). Hence, though the signing of a peace accord creates immense hope and expectations for stability and recovery, societies remain vulnerable to competing regimes vying for dominance.

Postwar societies are especially susceptible to disarray immediately after the end of civil war; almost half of civil wars emerge as a relapse of prior conflict (Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom, 2003). Hence, key postwar challenges include reducing the risk of conflict alongside economic recovery initiatives (Coller et al., 2003; Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom, 2008). Postwar reconstruction interventions thus require the dismantling of institutions that support war and the assertion social practices that support peace and development. While the dual goals of conflict risk reduction and economic development may appear intuitively complimentary and reinforcing, interventions that seek to realize these may lead to distinct and contradictory outcomes (Collier et al., 2008). War-to-peace transitions require effective coordination of actors operating in multiple domains, with differing worldviews, varying sources of legitimacy, degrees of influence, interests and power. They typically include international agencies, national government and opposition groups (both political and military), as well as community, ethnic and religious leadership (Lederach, 1997). More than an issue of coordination, postwar reconstruction frameworks demand these actors embrace new roles and practices in order to support stability and economic recovery.

An estimated 1.5 billion people live in conflict-affected countries (OECD, 2011). Given the tremendous global significance of war and peace, research on the topics of postwar interventions and war-to-peace transition proliferate across the political and social sciences. That said, the study of these topics remains surprisingly absent from the field of management and organization studies, though powerful ideas have emerged from research in contexts of
violence. Examples include the theories of: proto-institutions, developed through the study of collaboration among development organizations working in occupied Palestine (Lawrence, Hardy and Phillips, 2002); concurrent institutional constraints, relating to the complex interaction of formal and informal institutional arrangements facing entrepreneurs, also in occupied Palestine (Khoury and Prasad, 2015); community-based enterprise, developed through the study of collective resilience strategies adopted by villagers in the Peruvian Andes under the threat of political violence and guerrilla insurgency (Peredo and Chrisman, 2006); and more recently, entrepreneuring, which explores the self-efficacy of entrepreneurs and perceptions of stability in the context of ethnic violence in Rwanda (Tobias, Mair and Barbosa-Leiker, 2013).

A common thread among all these studies is the important role of extreme contexts in shaping the practices people adopt. At the same time, these studies take a relatively agency-centric view of actors, meaning that actors are seen to express agency in response to challenging environments. In this way, context loses its theoretical potency. In an attempt to theorize context as well as practices, I employ a more institutional notion of agency in the study of postwar transition. Specifically, this study uses the institutional theory notion of actorhood—institutional templates of social identities, roles and practices—in a thematic analysis of a postwar intervention to remobilize thousands of fighters to civilian livelihoods in the Sudan. From the analysis, I theorize intervention resources such as equipment, enterprise models, and finance to be institutional anchors, or techniques for organizing specific practices. Findings also point to a postwar intervention paradox: though institutional anchors may be effective for promoting new social practices, they risk reproducing institutional inequalities in intervention settings and as a result may impede social change. The paper proceeds with an overview of the theory of actorhood, the postwar intervention framework and study context, the thematic analysis, and presentation of the analytical narrative.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Actorhood: Between Institutions and Social Practices
Advanced by John W. Meyer and colleagues, the notion of actorhood embodies universal patterns of identities, purposive action, social roles, and practices (Meyer and Jepperson, 2000). They are akin to ‘institutional packages’ of rational scripts, roles, routines, normative classifications, and cognitive schemes that actors come to personify (Hasselbladh and Kallinikos, 2000; Meyer, 2009). The ratification of universal protocols by nation-states encourages the expansion of universal models of actorhood, and is thus an antecedent for
cultural-institutional diffusion and associated changes in social practices (Meyer, 2002). Moreover, actorhood is intimately connected to the study of the professions. For instance, the global spread of professional roles often occurs in conjunction with the simultaneous emergence of related networks, organizations, and governance bodies (Drori, 2008). Thus, as models of actorhood diffuse, they do so with related regulatory structures, organizational forms, and professional practices. Hence, defining actors and their agency simultaneously reveals the very institutional contexts in which they function and thrive (Thomas, 2007). Seen in this way, actorhood represents a conceptual bridge between institutional norms and social practices (Meyer, 2008). Table 3.1 presents various perspectives on actorhood as advanced in the literature.

As institutions diffuse, associated models of actorhood cut across socio-cultural boundaries by taking notions of agency and purpose into new settings; in doing so, universal models of actorhood embody normative classifications of actors and influence the cognitive schemes actors come to hold (Hasselbladh and Kallinikos, 2000; Meyer, 2009). With these processes “comes profound standardization of what it means to become a modern legitimate actor” (Drori and Krücken, 2009, p. 22). However, the notion of actorhood does not take actor interests, identities, and practices for granted; rather, tensions among agency, structure, identities, and practices are considered part of the process of institutional diffusion and institutionalization. This differs from emergent trends in institutional theory (for example, institutional work) that consider actors to have an inherent capability (agency) to exert influence over their institutional environments (see Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence, Suddaby and Leca, 2009). Actorhood further differs from concepts that postulate actors as simple carriers of universal institutional packages from setting to setting (such as in the notion of translation, Boxenbaum and Battilana, 2005), or as implementers of institutional packages in local settings (for instance, Zbaracki, 1998).

Though profound in its ability to bridge institutions with social practices, the notion of actorhood is limited in terms of empirical application and thus remains an abstract and understudied concept (Tröhler, 2009; Hwang and Colyvas, 2011). This paper thus seeks to expands the theory of actorhood through an empirical investigation of postwar intervention, and at the same time contribute to the understanding of postwar reintegration processes using social (institutional) theory.
### Table 3.1: Perspectives on Actorhood

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspective</th>
<th>Representative Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actor types; Scripted action</td>
<td>“The reciprocity of the typified, scripted action and the type of actor who is expected to perform the script is central to the notion that institutions are constitutive for social actors and actorhood.” (Meyer, 2008, p. 522)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional environment; Structuration</td>
<td>“The institutionalist answer is that actor structures, forms, and policies reflect institutional prescriptions and models in the wider environment. Such institutional models make it possible to build great organizations in situations where little actual control is likely or possible – school systems, for instance; or in developing countries national–states.” (Meyer, 2008, p. 802)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Categorization; Identities; Institutional agency; Social norms</td>
<td>“Institutions, in the cultural sense used by world culture theory, constitute actor identities and agency. The mechanism is not primarily through internalization of cultural values or elements. Rather, identities are themselves institutionalized categories and thus embedded in the structured whole. An identity is associated with types of discourse and action, assumptions about nature, the purposes of society, and the sources and nature of authoritative knowledge.” (Thomas, 2007, p. 8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance; Rationalization; Social order</td>
<td>“The structuring of everyday life within standardized impersonal rules that constitute social organization as a means to collective purpose. Denotatively, through rationalization, authority is structured as a formal legal order increasingly bureaucratized; exchange is governed by rules of rational calculation and bookkeeping, rules constituting a market, and includes related processes as monetarization, commercialization, and bureaucratic planning; cultural accounts increasingly reduce society to the smallest rational units—the individual, but also to genes and quarks.” (Meyer, Boli and Thomas, 1987, p. 23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural systems; Diffusion; Embeddedness; Modernization; Organizing</td>
<td>“So models of organized actorhood expand, penetrate every social sector and country. All sorts of older social forms – bureaucracies, family structures, traditional professional arrangements – are transformed into organizations. The process is driven by a cultural system that is a putative substitute for traditional state-like political arrangements – realist analyses that root the process in powerful interested actors miss out on most of the important changes. The process spreads through the diffusion of models of actorhood, not principally via a power and incentive system. The changes transcend practicality, leaving great gaps between policy and practice essentially everywhere – almost any organization can be seen as a failure, now. And the changes diffuse at multiple levels – through central organizations and through their professionalized memberships and populations.” (Meyer, 2008, p. 804-5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expanded agency; Professional associations; Professions</td>
<td>“Scientific and rationalistic professionals and associations generate highly rationalized and universalized pictures of natural and social environments calling for expanded rational actorhood of states, organizations, and individuals. Legal and social scientific professionals generate greatly expanded conceptions of the rights and capabilities of all human persons, transcending national citizenship. Universities and other educational arrangements expand, worldwide, installing newly rationalized knowledge in newly empowered persons.” (Meyer, 2008, p. 804)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Actorhood is an ideal theory with which to study postwar interventions given they seek simultaneous changes in both institutional contexts (war-to-peace) as well as actors (combatants to civilians). Moreover, postwar reconstruction frameworks embody modernist assumptions of society, which the notion of actorhood takes into critical consideration (even though it can also be seen to be modernist in orientation, particularly when used in a typical...
world society analysis). Finally, as much actorhood research suggests, postwar interventions seek to spread universal ideals on market liberalization. The diffusion of modern neoliberal ideals struck me during an interview with an officer of the Popular Defense Forces, a government-affiliated paramilitary/militia group, who stated ". . . if we make factories and production, these will help the citizen, the combatant, to settle in the region; that is, there will be development and there will be settlement."52

**DDR: A Postwar Intervention**

Demobilization, Demilitarization, and Reintegration (or ‘DDR’) is an international framework for dismantling military or militia institutions and reorienting former combatants to civilian life (Knight and Özerdem, 2004). DDR policy and programming are projected as the “single most important factor determining the success of peace operations” and desired societal outcomes, including “democratization, justice and development” (UN General Assembly, 2004, p. 61). To date over sixty DDR protocols have been ratified to date and billions of US dollars spent to support reintegration interventions globally (Giustozzi, 2012). A significant component of nearly all on-going large-scale peacekeeping missions, DDR is an important security protocol in most peace agreements, and receives technical and financial support from international organizations including various agencies of the United Nations (UN).

When ex-combatants are enrolled in a DDR programme they receive a ‘DDR package’ that includes cash, foodstuffs, household items, skills training, and inclusion in an income generating initiative. These are intended to support the socioeconomic reintegration of combatants as productive civilians. Conventional DDR approaches typically last for four-years and include three phases: disarmament, demobilization of fighting units, and commencement of an income generating activity, at which time a former combatant is considered ‘reintegrated’ (UN DPKO, 1999). In contrast to the four-year DDR window, recent developments in reintegration thinking suggest DDR needs to be a long-term, open-ended, and community-level process (IAWG-DDR, 2006). DDR process are supported by a variety of postwar security sector reform and economic development initiatives, all of which aim to reconstruct postwar countries as peaceful societies (Özerdem, 2002). In the language of institutional theory, it can be said that DDR initiatives seek to deinstitutionalize war-supportive institutions and institutionalize those that support peace and stability.

Given the complexities associated with war-to-peace transitions across levels of society, it is

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perhaps not surprising that many DDR initiatives fall short of their explicit policy objectives (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007). As a result, ongoing debates question the effectiveness and value of DDR interventions, including the appropriate role for nation-states in reintegration processes (Giustozzi, 2012). Policy-oriented literatures often attribute these ‘failures’ to poor programming or political spoilers; such conclusions may stem from the overly technocratic and prescriptive essence of policy literature, which are often more focused on the mechanics of intervention delivery rather than societal outcomes (Berdal and Ucko, 2013).

In reality, little is known about the mechanisms through which a reintegration processes successfully unfolds. Moreover, there is an absence of rigorous longitudinal research and assessment of DDR interventions (Muggah, 2005). According to postwar reconstruction experts, DDR research lacks grounding in social theory concepts and indicators capable of explicating processes associated with war-to-peace transitions (Özerdem, 2012; Boyd and Özerdem, 2013). As a result, the majority of DDR-related research remains practitioner-oriented and void of any explicit theory of social change. Consequently, and but for a few notable exceptions (see Theidon, 2003, 2009), DDR research has thus far failed to appreciate the unique institutional dynamics of intervention processes and contexts (Berdal and Ucko, 2013). Scholars of organization studies, well-aware of the deeply stubborn nature of institutions, will note the challenge of designing postwar interventions that essentially seek to fundamentally alter societies and encourage new social practices.

EMPIRICAL SETTING

Research Context: Blue Nile State, Sudan

The Blue Nile is located in eastern Sudan and borders Southern Sudan and Ethiopia, and has an area of 45,844 km². Though a 2008 census placed the Blue Nile population at 832,000 people, current estimates suggest the number of inhabitants is more likely to be at 1.2 million, twelve percent of whom belong to nomadic groups. The region is wealthy in agricultural land, precious metals, and animal resources, and is home to Rosaries Dam, which is of economic and military importance. The inhabitants are mostly rural with political affiliations generally split along the north-south divide. Intense fighting during the long civil war devastated the Blue Nile, particularly in its southern and rural areas. As a result, the people of the Blue Nile are among the poorest and most war affected in the Sudan. Abundant in agricultural and mineral resources, the Blue Nile remains an area of economic and military importance (ICG, 2013).
Given its geopolitical importance, the Blue Nile was one of the first areas selected for Sudan’s DDR programme. Yet volatility in the Blue Nile posed many challenges for reintegration. For instance, given the presence of large numbers of ex-combatants, small-scale conflicts often escalated beyond levels manageable by local officials. More seriously, the Blue Nile served as a proxy for ongoing resource and border conflicts between what are now Sudan and Southern Sudan. Ongoing border and resource violence relates to issues inappropriately addressed in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which was signed on January 9 2005 to end the 21-year civil war between the Government of Sudan and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army. Further, though the peace agreement stipulated that the Sudan Armed Forces and Sudan People’s Liberation Army would downsize forces in the Blue Nile both parties continued to maintain troops and weapons. The Governor of Blue Nile State, also Chairman of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army-North, was reported to have formed his own militia. By September 2011, within months of Southern Sudan’s independence, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army-North and Sudan Armed Forces engaged in armed clashes. This led to the displacement of thousands of Blue Nile residents and negatively impacted reconstruction efforts in the region, including DDR.

**DDR Cooperatives in Sudan: An Overview**

Negotiation of DDR and other security elements of the 2005 peace agreement was a contentious process for signatories, their technical advisors, as well as third parties to the peace talks (Barltrop, 2008). The North Sudan DDR Commission (NSDDRC)—a special commission of the Office of the Presidency of the Republic of Sudan, established to oversee DDR in northern (what is today) Sudan—strongly questioned the potential effectiveness of the standard approach to reintegration. The universal standard consists of individual-oriented programming, involving the provision of multiple instalments of cash, foodstuffs, household items, skills training, and inclusion in an income generating activity. In the end, NSDDRC opted to forgo the universal DDR approach for a national reintegration strategy based on agricultural cooperative enterprises. The purpose of this strategy was summarized during an interview with a former soldier from the Sudan Armed Forces and cooperative executive member:

“The motto of DDR is to get people [ex-combatants] to join together, get them on their feet and make them self-sufficient. This gives them alternative activities for generating income. The idea of the DDR cooperatives is that they have to be grouped into cooperatives for this season, and be provided with the essential agricultural inputs and other assets. Although it is difficult for a military ex-combatant to be integrated into civilian life, the ultimate objective of the state’s strategy is to provide some
opportunities in agriculture as a way of living for those ex-combatants.”

The NSDDRC official who first proposed the cooperative reintegration strategy expressed four key factors motivating this approach. First, conventional approaches to DDR in Africa often results in dismal outcomes as a result of contextual challenges ignored by international DDR conventions. In Sudan, these relate to large number of ex-combatants requiring reintegration, heavy militarization of communities, challenges in distinguishing between combatant and civilian, and the return of refugees from neighbouring countries (Abdelnour, 2012). In fact, Sudan’s DDR programme was set to be one of the world’s largest, as noted by a DDR official: “I expect that more than 300,000 of this number will go into group projects, because individual projects do not work well—and we tried them—with the Sudanese nature, the Sudanese reality, and the Sudanese economy.”

Second, as a result of political and logistic issues, international support for the commencement of DDR initiatives in Sudan were drastically delayed causing tensions and ambiguities among military and militia organizations and their affiliated ex-combatants. This prompted NSDDRC to consider reintegration approaches using national agencies and resources. Third, the peoples of the Sudan, including the Blue Nile, have a cultural tradition of nafeer, which is an expression of voluntary or collective work where community members join together for a common purpose (Abd al-Halim, 2007; Komey, 2007). NSDDRC believed they could harness this as a cultural resource to support a collective reintegration initiative. During a group interview, an ex-combatant cooperative executive member summarized nafeer in his own words: “The objective of this interaction is consolidation and unity, to work with the society because everyone needs a helping hand; in Sudanese community, we have a saying which emphasizes the idea of consolidation: *yad fi yad tajda’ baaed* [hand in hand we can achieve great things].” This phrase is similar to the English expression, ‘the whole is greater than the sum of its parts’.

Fourth, cooperatives have long history as a postwar stabilization and economic development intervention in the Sudan. For instance, in the 1920s the colonial British Administration used agricultural cooperatives to reintegrate Sudanese forces involved with the abolition of the slave trade in Ethiopia and Sudan; some of these farms were reportedly located in the Blue

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53 Interview with Sudan Armed Forces cooperative member, 2008.
54 Interview with senior NSDDRC official, 2008.
55 Interview with Sudan Armed Forces cooperative member, 2008.
Cooperative activity increased during colonial rule in the 1930s, was institutionalized by the 1948 Cooperatives Societies Ordinance, and flourished under the regime of Gaafar Nimeiry, between 1969 and 1985, when national and state-level cooperative ministries and banks were established to support cooperative activity across the Sudan. Extensive state support for cooperatives diminished after the 1990s as a result of Sudan’s structural adjustment policies (Musa, 2001; Mahdi, 2011).

In total, NSDDRC launched 30 agricultural cooperatives. The first 25 were launched in February 2007 as ‘Community Security Cooperatives’, and designed to include both community members and ex-combatants (both registered and non-registered) from key armed groups, namely the Popular Defence Forces and Sudan People’s Liberation Army. Each cooperative was to have 100 voting members, of which three were elected executive members (president, vice-president, and treasurer). This standard cooperative structure was adopted with technical assistance from the Department of Cooperatives of the Blue Nile according to the 2003 Sudan Cooperative Societies Act.

The provision of tractors, equipment, and financing were facilitated by NSDDRC through national and state-level ministries and corporations. The provision of a tractor to each cooperative served as a focal point of NSDDRC’s approach, and is seen by many stakeholders as a key accomplishment of DDR in the Sudan. The tractors and equipment were not provided free of charge. Each cooperative was required to pay regular installments to repay its cost. To aid with coordination and support among the cooperatives, the NSDDRC supported the creation of a DDR Cooperatives Union in the Blue Nile. At the time of the fieldwork, the president of the union was a community leader holding the respected position of Umda, which is part of the system of Native Administration and related to the Sudan Judicial System (Elhussein, 1989).

In April 2008, NSDDRC launched a further five cooperatives for ex-combatants from the Sudan Armed Forces. Like the initial 25, these cooperatives were to have 100 members each, and benefit from tractors, equipment, and financing. According to NSDDRC officials, the program was created to decrease local tensions among Sudan Armed Forces members, who were frustrated as a result of not having received their pensions and other forms of compensation. Although all members of the Sudan Armed Forces cooperatives are registered ex-combatants, during fieldwork many expressed a connection to their military-organizational identities.
The DDR cooperatives realized diverse outcomes in terms of governance, equipment, and finance. Though the 30 cooperatives launched were similar from a regulatory and resource perspective, Abdelnour (2015) notes five different governance type outcomes: non-active, executive-managed, traditional, collaborative, and village-based. Non-active cooperatives began to operate and failed, or never operated at all. Executive-managed operated by the efforts or direction of the three executive members only, without the participation of the cooperative membership. Traditional cooperatives adhered to the intended governance structure, engaged the majority of members in farming, and were generally managed in a top-down manner at the discretion of the executives. The five Sudan Armed Forces cooperatives operated in a coordinated manner apart from the other 25 cooperatives. They engaged all membership in farming activities, encouraged healthy competition among cooperatives, created a union for their own cooperatives, and even planned a residential settlement for their members and families. Village-based cooperatives operated along traditional socioeconomic structures, engaged large numbers of people in farming, and shared resources among participating villages (for a more detailed overview see Abdelnour, 2015).

**METHODOLOGY**

**Fieldwork**

Empirical materials were collected during three waves of fieldwork between April 2007 and December 2009, and consisted of in-depth interviews and semi-structured group interviews, and participant observations. The field approach was influenced by Sudanese anthropological traditions, which ask researchers to take a curious position to postwar intervention while recognizing their own role in these processes; this is particularly relevant when conducting fieldwork in regions targeted by humanitarian industry activity (Ahmad, 2003).

With logistical support from NSDDRC, I was provided rare access to undertake extensive fieldwork on DDR initiatives across the Blue Nile State. Over sixty semi-structured and group interviews were conducted with DDR cooperative members and executives, union officials, directors of banks involved with financing DDR activities, national and state government officials, community leaders and stakeholders, international non-governmental organizations, and humanitarian agency officials. My intention during the fieldwork was to capture a maximum diversity of representations pertaining to DDR perspectives and experiences (Bauer and Aarts, 2000). Questions asked of cooperative members covered a variety of topics as listed in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Semi-structured group interview topics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General topic</th>
<th>Specific items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cooperative</td>
<td>Name, location, number and background of members, date founded, governance structure and function, voting patterns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity</td>
<td>Main activities and crops, external work or additional activities of members, farming patterns, crop storage, activity during idle months, employment and enterprise trends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td>State of tractor and implements, allocation (i.e. order of ploughing), challenges, needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>Member finance, management, record-keeping, lender relations, finance experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>Crop prices, market participation, opportunities and constraints, marketable skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>Location, participation in farm activities, urgent vs. long-term needs, concerns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations</td>
<td>Relations between members and executive, among members and surrounding community, tensions and reconciliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition</td>
<td>Ex-combatant: Self-identification/description prior to involvement with DDR and current, war skills/experiences useful in current daily life/activities, past issues that hinder current daily life/activities, experience with DDR transitions; Community: Perspectives on combatants before and after DDR, views on ex-combatant engagement in cooperatives, relations among community/cooperatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open</td>
<td>Follow-up questions/discussion on any topic of interest or relevance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While planning and executing the fieldwork, I consciously reflected on the tensions inherent in undertaking research in postwar contexts, particularly my relationship with NSDDRC officials and interactions with military/militia members (Ahmed, 2003; Özerdem and Bowd, 2010). General methodological protocols for conducting qualitative interviews were followed (Gaskell and Bauer, 2000). DDR-related topics were discussed with multiple individuals in order to triangulate perspectives and reduce interview-related biases (Van Maanen, 1979). Most interviews lasted between sixty and ninety minutes, and all interviews were digitally recorded. I participated in all interviews and personally transcribed English-only interviews, while Arabic-only and mixed language interviews were professionally translated by native speakers of Sudanese Arabic. Moreover, I captured unique and mundane thoughts, reflections, events, and interactions using extensive field notes. The use and condition of tractors and agricultural implements, as well as farming and marketplace activities were further documented using photos.

Selecting Empirical Materials

Three revelations directed the selection of empirical materials for the analysis. The first relates to efforts by NSDDRC to enrol national/state actors and institutional templates in the planning, construction and implementation of DDR interventions in the Blue Nile. The second involves marked shifts in the DDR template during implementation. For example, NSDDRC
contested the standard four-year individual-oriented reintegration approach promoted by international agencies and instead planned for the launch of agricultural cooperatives as a collective and long-term project; in total three models of cooperatives were launched, and these differed in terms of governance, operations, and degrees of success/failure. Third, rhetorical justifications were frequently expressed as motivations for chosen intervention models and variations in practices. Organizational research supports the examination of these elements in the study of state interventions (Kalev, Shenhav and De Vries, 2008).

**Thematic Analysis**

I undertook an abductive thematic analysis on the selected empirical materials with the purpose of theorizing actorhood in the context of a postwar intervention. Thematic analysis is an analytically flexible method that permits both theoretical and empirical-motivated explorations. The goal of thematic analysis is to identify, organize, analyze, interpret, and report patterns or themes found in the empirical material (Boyatzis, 1998). I followed the phases of thematic analysis outlined by Braun and Clarke (2006), which include familiarization with empirical materials, generating initial codes, theme development (searching, reviewing, defining, naming), reporting and analysis. Throughout the analysis I adhered to quality principles for qualitative research (Gaskell and Bauer, 2000).

I first uploaded all empirical materials into Dedoose, an online platform for qualitative coding and analysis, and carefully read all interviews and notes. I then selected broad sections of text relating to the desired case elements of DDR intervention construction, implementation, and rhetorical justification, and created a category for miscellaneous items of interest. These constituted the empirical materials within which coding took place. Given the novelty of exploring the concept of actorhood through an in-depth qualitative study, I followed thematic analysis procedures for coding themes at the latent level. Latent coding “goes beyond the semantic content of the data, and starts to identify or examine the underlying ideas, assumptions, and conceptualization—and ideologies—that are theorized as shaping or informing the semantic content of the data” (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p. 84, *italics* original).

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56 These include reliability, validity, representativeness, confidence, and relevance. Reliability generally relates to consistency of measurement. Validity relates to the interpretation of an instrument, and seeks to ensure that it captures what it is in fact designed to measure. Representativeness is an alignment of the selected sample with the wider context of population it seeks to typify. Confidence holds that research is representative of reality and the imagination of the researcher. Relevance relates to internal (theoretical) and external (surprise) viability, as well as utility and importance (Gaskell and Bauer, 2000).
Next, I coded for theory-motivated perspectives on actorhood as presented in Table 3.1, and continued with latent empirical-motivated themes deemed relevant to the concept of actorhood. The platform permitted the creation of memos, which I used to capture thoughts, reflections, inconsistencies and surprises (Emerson, Fretz and Shaw, 2011). Further, and following Van Maanen (1979), while coding I was careful to separate operational facts (descriptions of contexts, conversations, activities and events), presentational facts (legitimate interpretations), and theory (explanations).

Once coding was complete, themes were grouped and checked for emerging patterns and consistency. I collated and carefully reviewed all coded extracts for each theme, rearranging codes and recoding where necessary. Using various analytic techniques, such as code co-occurrence, I reworked codes and themes for within and across-group consistency. This process consisted of reviewing coded excerpts, splitting and deleting codes, recoding, and rearranging themes. The final list of codes was grouped into 15 first-order and six second-order themes (see Figure 3.1 and Table 3.3).

Of the six second-order themes, two consist primarily of theory-motivated codes (institutional order, institutional agency), two combine both theory and empirical-motivated codes, one being classificatory (actors) and the other explanatory (practices) in essence, while the remaining two consist of empirical-motivated codes (resources, context).

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57 Code co-occurrence is a feature of Dedoose that presents all codes as rows and columns, exposing in aggregate the number of excerpts that two or more codes are applied to. By clicking on any cell (for example, where 'Governance' and 'Tractor, finance' overlap) the user is presented with all excerpts that are linked to both codes. I used this feature to split codes in order to delineate boundaries between them, and to group similar codes.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>First Order Themes</th>
<th>Second Order Themes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Agency</td>
<td>Categorization Identity</td>
<td>Expanded Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Processes</td>
<td>Institutional Context</td>
<td>Differentiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Order</td>
<td>Context</td>
<td>Marketing/Institutional Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actors</td>
<td>Intermediaries</td>
<td>Context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>Resource/Issues: Skills/Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Benefits</td>
<td>Sustainability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resources: Donor Funding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practices</td>
<td>Relational Activities</td>
<td>DDR Activity: Formalization, Organizing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Community relation: Education, Dependence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Institutional Practices</td>
<td>Cooperation/Collaboration, Institutional practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Traditional practice</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.3: Theme Descriptions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of Second and First-Order Themes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Practices</strong> are recurrent actor activities and behaviours enacted in context.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>Governance</strong> relates strongly to the allocation and administration of intervention resources and activities, including leadership and coordinating roles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>Relational practices</strong> are interactions between and among actors and their communities, as well as socioeconomic networks and related dependencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>Institutional templates</strong> are cultural models of action, and include historical/traditional practices (for example, collective work).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>Facilitating activities</strong> involve actions that support the implementation of new models of actorhood, such as organizing and official registrations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resources</strong> are tangible inputs for structuring purposive action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>Capital</strong> includes finance, equipment, skills and training, which are deployed to support new forms of actorhood.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>Benefactors</strong> are actors with resources to allocate or invest (such as donor agencies).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>Beneficiaries</strong> are intended recipients of funding and other forms of material support; they are often presented as vulnerable, living in insecure circumstances, lacking capital, having problematic or unproductive livelihoods, and in need of new or expanded social roles, activities and purposes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actors</strong> are organizations, agencies, associations, and people that enact purposive roles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>Situated actors</strong> are closely connected and integral to ongoing intervention activities in a local setting; they tend to live or work within a defined geopolitical boundary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>Intermediaries</strong> are carriers of intervention ideas and resources; they facilitate the diffusion of institutional of social action from one context to another.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Context</strong> is the unique characteristics of an intervention setting, and its influences on social roles and practices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>Geopolitical trends</strong> are macro influences that involve structural impositions (such as development industry activity) and historical-institutional factors (such as the long experience of war); these extend into world polity and collective memory, and also interact with the unique characteristics of a context.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>Local settings</strong> are bounded geopolitical contexts of intervention, and include the socioeconomic features of a locale.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional order</strong> refers to taken-for-granted sociocultural structures (institutions).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>Institutional processes</strong> are macro, temporally expansive, institutional movements that infuse more immediate geopolitical trends and their related ideologies (such as neoliberalism and interventionism).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>Institutional context</strong> are the situated institutional structures within which institutional processes expand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional agency</strong> is agency enabled by taken-for-granted norms, values, and social structures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>Categories</strong> are classifications of agentic actors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>Agency</strong> represents the expression of enactment of cultural scripts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANALYTICAL NARRATIVE

The Emergence of Postwar Professions

Frequentative iteration between themes and empirical materials points to a postwar intervention narrative with two dependent categories of actorhood—beneficiaries and the postwar professions—each with very different agentic attributes. On the one hand ex-combatant beneficiaries can be seen as disempowered and under immense social and political pressure to disassociate from their (now illegitimate) fighter roles and political identities. However, on the other hand beneficiaries are much more than socially marginalized subjects of postwar intervention; rather, they are the very justification for a tremendous explosion of postwar models of actorhood. Using DDR programming as the central mobilizing factor, a host of actors embrace new (legitimate) social roles and activities (postwar professions) as agents of progress predicated on the transition of fighter to farmer.

For instance, though the legitimacy of their mandate NSDDRC were crucial in fostering national humanitarian capacity for supporting DDR interventions. With an interest to secure resources while maintaining national control and ownership of intervention activities, senior NSDDRC officials began to negotiate with various UN agencies for the adoption of a simple request for proposal (RFP) process to enable national Sudanese development meet UN guidelines for funding. During fieldwork a handful of Sudanese organizations had been successfully registered with two UN agencies and receiving funds to support DDR initiatives. As one senior NSDDRC official stated:

“We have three NGOs now passed the RFP for the Blue Nile, three national NGOs are doing the reintegration there. And also I have three national NGOs doing the reintegration who have succeed and passed the RFP in South Kurdofan. And we have four NGOs doing the reintegration for ex-combatants through the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN. You see my priority is to give the national NGOs a chance, although the RFP procedures have a long list of requirements through the UNDP system. It is a very tough system, and always very tough. Be sure these NGOs here have exerted a lot of effort, negotiations and struggling, so that they can get through this bag of UNDP procedures. It’s very tough. It’s very tough. And I’ve made many efforts with UNDP in North Sudan here, including many bidding conference for our NGOs to discuss with them how they can apply for funding at the state level and at the UN level. [...] It is difficult to get international NGOs to go with our people on the ground, and we want to get the experience for our own NGOs, our national NGOs.”

In addition to facilitating national humanitarian capacity, NSDDRC staff themselves began to embrace more development-oriented thinking and tasks, so much so that I began to wonder if NSDDRC was transforming from a temporary commission into a development agency. One of

58 Interview with senior NSDDRC official, 2009.
my travel companions repeatedly spoke about his desire for NSDDRC to become micro-
financers themselves, so as to avoid the problems associated with conventional financing. The
following are some exemplary quotes from senior NSDDRC officials involved with planning
various DDR-related interventions:

"Sudan possesses great resources in agricultural, forestry, animal, and metals. We
want, through these mechanisms, to create work for the most possible number of the
population."59

"A microfinance DDR unit, or unit of DDR, has been approved and in the coming
months we will establish this unit. [...] This is for sustainability, because we want
these people [ex-combatants] to take care of themselves and to enhance their
reintegration project. And, I'm sure, this project if it succeeds it will increase the
number of people working in it, and it will increase the level of standard of life, of
health, and education and so on. The unit it will not belong, unfortunately, to the
DDR."60

[Planned for Darfur] "We now proposed the digging of about 150 wells in the areas
where the herders spend autumn, and to store water next to the wells so that we delay
the start of their journey back south for about four months. During this time the
farmers will cultivate their crops, and then the herders move south. [...] There is no
education among the animal herders. We want to design a curricula for the children of
the animal herders so that they can have formal education in the mentioned four
months."61

These quotes suggest that beneficiaries, as a generalized category, emerge a ‘social object’
around which postwar professions organize, complete with related roles, resources, and
interventions. This is by no means a novel occurrence; Sudan has been the site of the world's
largest humanitarian undertakings, notably Operation Lifeline Sudan (Minear et al., 1991) and
more recently Darfur (Abdelnour and Saeed, 2014). Moreover, scholars of humanitarian
intervention suggest interventions are, at least in part, construed by “the underlying social
and cultural dynamics that shape both the production of emergencies and the production of
responses” (2004:375).

This supports literature that suggests the expansion of actorhood entails institutional change,
expansion of the professions, and the diffusion of legitimate social practices (Hasselbladh and
Bejerot, 2007; Drori, 2008). The case of DDR in postwar Sudan further provides qualitative
evidence to support the idea that the ratification of international protocols is a catalyst for the
diffusion of new models of actorhood at all levels of society, particularly at the level of the
nation-state (Meyer and Jepperson, 2000; Drori and Krücken, 2009; Meyer, 2010). It also

59 Interview with NSDDRC official, 2009.
60 Interview with senior NSDDRC official, 2009.
61 Interview with NSDDRC official, 2009.
reaffirms scholarship examining the important role of socio-political movements in re-legitimating institutional templates (such as cooperative models and finance) as appropriate models for economic development and social change (Schneiberg, 2002, 2013). However, the question remains, how do postwar professions and beneficiaries relate to one another? One answer can be found in the various elements of an intervention, and how these seek to enable specific practices.

**Tanks, Tractors, and Techniques of Control**

As noted, DDR interventions rarely materialize in practice as intended (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007; Giustozzi, 2012; Berdal and Ucko, 2013). Much popular and policy literature attributes intervention failures to political spoilers, a lack institutional capacity on the part of implementing agencies, or weak/ineffective nation-states (Collier, 2007). However, given the immense resources and efforts involved in the planning and implementing of DDR interventions, the importance of reintegration efforts to war-to-peace transitions, and the seriousness with which the DDR stakeholders I met with engage their work, I cannot wholly accept DDR policy-practice discrepancies as a simple case of decoupling, government mismanagement, corruption, or spoilers. Rather, during the analysis I began to understand various aspects of DDR interventions as techniques for enabling context-specific practices, circumstances permitting (see Kallinikos, 2004).

This line of thinking led to a decisive point in the analysis, which was to examine NSDDRC’s interventions through the ideals, discourses, and techniques of control model of institutions, which understands institutionalization as the alignment of ideals (logics), discourses (systems of codified knowledge), and techniques of control (for structuring social action) (Hasselbladh and Kallinikos, 2000). Management and organizational scholars may find the elements of the model familiar. For instance, theories pertaining to ideals and discourses relate closely to institutional notions of logics (Friedland and Alford, 1991), discourse (Phillips, Lawrence and Hardy, 2004), rhetoric (Green, 2004), and materiality (Hardy and Thomas, 2014). Techniques of control is a powerful yet underrepresented concept in organization studies (see Hasselbladh and Kallinikos, 2000, p. 703-6).

A strength of the ideals, discourses, and techniques of control model of institutions is that it offers a more precise framework for institutional analysis in comparison with Scott’s (2008) popular ‘three pillars’ model. The three pillars model of institutions is of course highly suited for studying diffusion-related mechanisms across regulatory, normative, and cultural-
cognitive pillars. However, rather than dissect or catalogue institutional components, which the three pillars framework does well, the ideals, discourses, and techniques model of institutions understands institutions to be an intersection or ‘package’ of the three dimensions.

A relevant application is by Hasselbladh and Bejerot (2007), who combine actorhood with Foucault’s notion of governmentality to explore the construction of culturally legitimate forms of rational actorhood as being fundamental to the transformation of Swedish healthcare. The model is also applied by Brandl and Bullinger (2009), who examine the societal preconditions that propelled ‘entrepreneurship’ to become a dominant institution in modern Western societies; these include dominant capitalist ideals associated with modernity (cultural individualism, change, and economic wealth), discourses (strategic acting, risk taking, and the perceived individual and societal benefits of entrepreneurial action), and techniques of control (governmental programmes, entrepreneurship education, and venture capitalists). This particular application of the model enables a holistic examination of the institution of entrepreneurship at the level of logics, the state, society, organization, family, and individual (Brandl and Bullinger, 2009).

Using the model as an analytic lens, it can be said that NSDDRC rejected the ideals associated with the four-year individual approach to DDR, having found their associated protocols (discourses) and conventional DDR packages (techniques of control) incompatible with Sudan’s postwar institutional context. NSDDRC instead turned to alternative ideals, discourses and techniques—historical, national, and cultural—when planning the DDR cooperative intervention. These included the formation and registration of cooperative enterprises and a cooperative union, the provision of tractors and finance to structure specific agricultural practices, support from national and state ministries for the provision of training and inputs, and the involvement of community leaders including the Umda to foster social obligation, cohesion, and legitimacy. The explicit purpose for engaging all of these elements was to reorganize the work and lives of former fighters onto new postwar templates of social action. Of course, the simple deployment of resources and engagement of key actors will not alone result in a desired social change; the very mode of intervention also determines how “objects or patterns of formal organizing are stabilized” and how they may or may not “constitute action and actors” (Hasselbladh and Kallinikos, 2000, p. 701). The dimensions of the ideals, discourses, and techniques of control model of institutions with respect to DDR interventions in Sudan are described in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: DDR and the Ideals, Discourses, and Techniques Model of Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Definitions</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Application to DDR interventions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideals</td>
<td>Abstract ideas; institutional logics</td>
<td>Expressed vaguely, in a whole sale fashion; exist at multiple levels (global,</td>
<td>Nafeer, a culture of collective work; nationalist intervention approaches; macro institutional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>field/industry, community, personal)</td>
<td>logics (interventionism, neoliberal peace); historical templates of reintegration, cooperative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourses</td>
<td>Ways of defining and acting upon reality</td>
<td>Embodies normative aspects of ideals and legitimates particular techniques of</td>
<td>Cooperative enterprise as a legal model for organizing economic activity; traditional cultural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>control; specifies relationships; exist as global, national, and local systems</td>
<td>systems and forms of governance in the Sudan; the capacities of national institutions (ministries,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>of knowledge (protocols/regulations), and legal systems (regulatory)</td>
<td>corporations, and development agencies), to support registration of cooperatives, land allocation,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>provision of machineries, and allocation of seeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Techniques of control</td>
<td>Elaborate systems of governance, documentation, and</td>
<td>Hard (alphanumeric) and soft (tradition, ceremonial) forms of codification;</td>
<td>Tractors/implements to foster mechanized farming activities; finance tied to seasonal agricultural;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>measurement; controlling social action and outcomes</td>
<td>technology-associated practices; business models, monitoring systems, and social</td>
<td>cooperative regulations to ensure member participation; seeds/training to support agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>rules; connect intervention to action outcomes; enacted at situated levels</td>
<td>practices; cooperative union to foster information sharing and problem solving; DDR state-level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>offices to support cooperatives activities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Anchoring Social Practices

NSDDRC facilitated capital (notably tractors and finance) and other resources (such as land and seeds) as techniques for structuring new models of postwar actorhood. The explicit deployment of resources and institutional templates as a means to encourage specific social practices is under-theorized in both the literature on actorhood and DDR. For instance, in the case of DDR forms of capital such as tractors, equipment and finance, as well as institutional templates such as the cooperative enterprise model were deployed as a means to ‘anchor’ former combatants into a specific form of postwar actorhood: collective mechanized farming.

I theorize that these purposeful resources and templates were deployed as institutional anchors, which are techniques for organizing specific social practices. The concept of institutional anchors helps to elucidate the relationship between capital and institutional templates and the practices they are intended to promote.
The deployment of resources as a means to structure new social practices resonates with organizational scholars who theorize “how the embeddedness of instrumental ideas and orientations shape organizational tasks to help create distinctive forms of actorhood” (Hasselbladh and Kallinikos, 2000, p. 699). It further support the notion that “the practices which might lead to institutional innovations are themselves institutionally embedded and so rely on sets of resources and skills that are specific to the field or fields in which they occur” (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006, p. 220).

To foster specific social practices, NSDDRC sought to embed capital and institutional templates within a network of supportive institutional relations at the local, state, and national levels. These include various national and state agencies, banks, corporations, and development organizations. The inclusion of the Umda as head of the cooperative union also suggests NSDDRC embraced a socio-cultural understanding of embeddedness, one that resonates with the work of Zukin and DiMaggio (1990) over the popular economic relations approach (Granovetter, 1973, 1985; Uzzi, 1996, 1997). The institutional anchors that form the DDR cooperative intervention are presented in Table 3.5.

The concept of institutional anchors offers novel insights for understanding the institutionalization of new social practices. For instance, the ‘NSDDRC tractor’ emerged a celebrated and powerful symbol of national efforts to promote postwar recovery and development. However, the implementation of the tractor and other resources as techniques of intervention led to a variety of unintended intervention outcomes. In some cases outcomes were highly unfavourable to supporting new livelihoods. Still, the organization and registration of cooperatives and deployment of tractors did encourage much remobilization towards mechanized agricultural farming.

Recent institutional research in trying contexts further suggests that the simple deployment of finance or business models cannot be taken as a proxy for social change (Martí and Mair, 2009; Mair, Martí and Ventresca, 2012). Moreover, variance in DDR cooperative outcomes reaffirms the possibility for significant disjuncture between the technical features of an institutional anchor and the practices they are thought to foster. That the ideals associated with interventions may materialize differently in practice is of course well documented in various literatures (for example, rhetoric and reality, Zbaracki, 1998; decoupling, Bromley and Powell, 2012; humanitarian action, Abdelnour and Saeed, 2014).
Table 3.5: Institutional Anchors in DDR Cooperative Interventions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anchor</th>
<th>Intended Role</th>
<th>Empirical Exemplars</th>
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| Cooperative enterprise model   | • Provide a legal structure for private sector economic cooperation;  
• Enable the democratic governance of shared agricultural equipment, inputs, training, and other support services;  
• Engage diverse skills and experiences of members;  
• Reinforce collective work culture;  
• Collective sharing of benefits as well as risks | “The cooperatives model is more appropriate since it is a collaborative effort. You have to collect the savings of different people and different groups; this is the most effective way of improving the situation of a specific community, I think. But this also depends on their administrative skills and quality of efforts they invest in the cooperatives.”  
“...”                                                                 |                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| Cooperative union              | • Coordinate activities among DDR cooperatives, and with other cooperative societies;  
• Facilitate information, communication, resources, training and other forms of support among DDR cooperatives;  
• Represent cooperative interests by appointing cooperative executive members to the union | “We encourage the unions to form within each state. Around six localities formed sub-cooperatives, and they all together make up the unions at the state level. [...] A coordinating body to help coordinate between the different bodies in the state. It exists to strengthen the position of the cooperatives which the department is looking after.”  
“DDR, at the union level, sponsored us with 30 tractors. This encouraged people to start working. Then it was a matter of how to organize people: rules and codes of conduct, particularly handling the machinery so that work goes properly, God willing.” |                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| Tractors and equipment         | • Enable mechanized farming tasks with specific implements for tillage and seeding;  
• A significant shared resource for the use and benefit of all cooperative members | “We used the tractor as an investment. We rented the tractor for our farming neighbours in the area, and with that tractor rending we were able to pay the rent for our own land. We were also able to buy seeds. When we came to the weeding, we talked to the DDR office to help us with money, but they couldn’t help us.” |                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| Finance                        | • Salam, an islamic mode of finance structured to support seasonal agricultural practices such as tillage, sowing, weeding, and harvesting;  
• Finance dependent on price and production estimates, and allow risk to be shared between bank and farmer | “Salam is a good model for the smaller farmers, including the contract between the farmer and the bank. There are a lot of guarantees in support of the farmers, and it is an accepted model by the state, the bank, and the farmers. The three phases are set to help the farmers organize their farming. We visit the fields to ensure that they plant well, clean them and ensure that they cultivate and produce well. The contract states that in the occasion of price fluctuations, we give them particular assistance.” |                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |

62 Interview with Director, Cooperatives Department, Blue Nile, 2008.  
63 Interview with cooperative member, teacher and farmer, 2008.  
64 Interview with Director, Cooperatives Department, Blue Nile, 2008.  
65 Interview with DDR cooperative union executive member, 2008.  
66 Interview with cooperative member, 2009.  
67 Interview with Director, Sudan Agriculture Bank, 2008.
Because the existing scholarship on actorhood is diffusion-centric it has yet to appropriately specify the mechanisms by which institutional anchors may be successfully serve to foster the practices they seek to promote (Hasselbladh and Kallinikos, 2000; Tröhler, 2009). The question remains, what are the means through which institutional anchors successfully structure specific social practices?

Example: Salam—Islamic Financing

I illustrate the notion of institutional anchors through the example of salam, the model of Islamic financing arranged for cooperative members by NSDDRC. Salam is a ‘forward’ form of financing, where a lender (in this case the Sudan Agriculture Bank) agrees to buy a specific asset in advance, and where the recipient (cooperatives, members) receives funds on the agreement to supply the given asset on a given date. In this way it is conceived as a shared-risk contract rather than a loan. In the case of the DDR cooperatives, as is the case for much agricultural financing in the Sudan, the bank provides financing to support specific seasonal activities (preparing fields, sowing, weeding, harvesting) on the expectation of a particular size and value of harvest, and receives the harvest itself or funds from the sale of the harvest.

Using the ideals-discourse-techniques model as an analytic lens, the ideals of the salam model relate to the structuring of specific practices (in this case, seasonal agricultural activities) that and sanctioned by Islamic principles. Discourses relate to the contract itself, which embody and attempt to encourage practice-specific ideals. Techniques of control seek to structure the particular seasonal agriculture practices, by providing financing at particular times, as well as monitoring, evaluation, repayment, and in some cases, disciplinary measures. From my fieldwork, it appeared that salam as an institutional anchor is potentially internally inconsistent, and also in many ways disconnected from the contextual reality facing some farmers in the Blue Nile. From the perspective of internal consistency, or congruence of ideals-discourses-techniques, the ideals and discourses of salam were well-defined and closely aligned, yet lacked appropriate techniques for structuring specific practices. As a result, in many cases the application of salam led to dire outcomes for recipient-farmers.

Financing proved a particularly complicated anchor for a number of reasons. First, fluctuations in commodity prices and problems with tractors and equipment rendered many cooperative members unable to pay their loans. Second, some cooperative members understood loans as charity, which contributed to non-repayment. Third, if financing was
delayed for any reason, it sometimes restricted rather than enabled agriculture-specific practices. Fourth, it was common practice for cooperative executives to sign and manage loans on behalf of their membership, which left members vulnerable to exploitation. Finally, it was not uncommon for cooperative members to spend a few months in prison for not meeting their loan obligations. The following empirical exemplars capture the complexities of financing for anchoring specific agricultural practices:

[General misunderstanding] “People in these areas, particularly conflict affected areas, have a general misunderstanding that they don’t really need to return the funds to the bank. This damages their chances for the future. They think loans are like relief aid, or donations but that is not the case. […] It’s a general perception. They don’t understand that it is to be paid back.”

[Enabler] “Last year we got a system of finance from the agricultural bank in Damazine. We divided it, some of it according to our schedule and our systems. For the field that we are doing [cultivating] especially for the cooperative, we give them an amount of the money, and for the members we give them according to their needs.”

[Enabler] “The bank gave each cooperative ten million [Sudanese] pounds. They gave us in our hands 8.4 million, and kept 1.6 million as commission. We took our fuel and seeds and went to the field and farmed.”

[Timing, consequences] “Al salam works very impractically, they grant funds too late and then near November or end of year ask for repayment. When you fail to repay you get into trouble, farmers aren’t able to pay because the funding was received too late. The problems associated with this method has led to some of the smaller scale farmers going to prison.”

[Timing, seasonal misalignment] “We differ from the rest of Sudan in that we cultivate by the rain, and our rainy season starts early in May. And when they tell you there is funding coming from the Agricultural Bank that funding takes two or three months to chase after, and the funding itself comes out in September. By that time our cultivating season is over. This problem of funding is the largest obstacle; some have lost their entire seasons because of it.”

[Bank withdrawal] “Last year we had problems so we didn’t take financing. This year we wanted to take finance but the bank said to us ‘we don’t have any for you’. They also told us they had problems with cooperatives who received financing last year and did not pay their loan instalments this year, so this is why the bank is hesitant to pay new people.”

68 Interview with Director, Sudan Agricultural Bank, 2008.
69 Interview with cooperative executive member, 2009.
70 Interview with Sudan Armed Forces cooperative executive member, 2008.
71 Interview with cooperative union executive member, 2008.
72 Interview with cooperative executive member, 2009.
73 Interview with cooperative executive member, 2009.
[Interaction with other resources] “I refused the financing for this season because we would have gotten into trouble with the bank if we took it, because we have repair costs for the tractor that are almost 4 million [Sudanese pounds], which won’t leave us with much to use for actual farming, and then we will be unable to repay the bank. This is why I took to the members of my cooperative this year and told them that, because of the circumstances, we should finance ourselves this season. So we just farmed the area we are able to farm this year.”

[Non-obstacle] “We haven’t received any funding for our seasons this year and last year. We are operating the cooperative entirely off our own pockets.”

[Non-obstacle] “We are not going to stop anyway, because this cooperative project helps us and our children, even if we don’t have good funding.”

These exemplars illustrate the complexity of institutional anchors; particularly how concise ideals and standard discourses, if not coupled with context-appropriate techniques of control, can result in a variety of intended and unintended consequences. How institutional anchors overlap and interact with one another, or not at all, is an important area for future exploration.

**Postwar intervention Paradox**

Efforts by NSDDRC to embed institutional anchors points to a potential postwar intervention paradox. As noted above, new models of actorhood emerged as part of a postwar reconstruction industry in the Sudan. Much of this activity was intended to be supported by international donors as well as national funding, and through the efforts of national agencies. NSDDRC specifically sought to launch agricultural cooperatives as a foundation for reintegration efforts in the Sudan. The cooperatives approach to reintegration was selected due to a number of familiar and contextually-relevant institutional templates, with the involvement of key situated actors, and supported by resources and enterprise models that were deployed as institutional anchors. As a result, these institutional anchors were constituted by wartime institutional elements, and promoted by and for key wartime actors, namely government actors, opposition political entities, and fighters with various affiliations. Institutional anchors were thus influenced by wartime institutional inequalities, and risked reproducing these in intervention settings.

Evidence of this postwar intervention paradox is supported empirically in two ways. First, NSDDRC overwhelmingly chose to partner with actors within their bureaucratic sphere of
relations and influence. This included developing partnerships with Government of Sudan-affiliated ministries and organizations, even in areas (including the Blue Nile) where the Government of Sudan and Southern People's Liberation Movement shared administrative responsibility. In many cases this served to exaggerate and embed wartime political fault lines within the DDR cooperative intervention. For instance, fieldwork revealed that the cooperatives populated by former members of the Sudan Armed Forces were in far better shape than those of the Sudan People's Liberation Army. There are certainly organizational, skill-based, geographic, and infrastructure-related factors to support this discrepancy, yet the role played by north-south political scepticism and distrust was widely apparent. Fault lines were also present at the office of the NSDDRC in the Blue Nile among staff with opposing political affiliations; some DDR officials expressed a great deal of frustration at the extent to which fault lines interfered with their ability to monitor and support the cooperatives and related initiatives (including political, cultural, ethnic, familial, and patrimonial affiliations). Political divides were certainly present in a few cooperatives. As one cooperative executive noted, “the political divide between the SPLM and National Congress is reflected in the cooperative membership; although that specific conflict is resolved, still the shadow remains.”

Institutional entrepreneurs build new regimes in times of transition by recombining elements of existing institutions (Stark, 1996). This suggests that postwar interventions involving institutional anchors may face risks associated with the paradox of embedded agency, with specific reference to the capability for institutional actors to evoke institutional change in the very contexts within which they are embedded (Battilana and D'Aunno, 2009). Proponents of the concept of actorhood already recognize that the ratification of universal protocols by nation-states does not guarantee congruence between universal ideals and patterns of actorhood in practice (Meyer, 2010). The paradox of postwar intervention provides one explanation for evidence of policy-practice, or in this case intervention-outcome decoupling. Another is provided by the ideal-discourses-techniques model of institutions, which suggests a need for institutional alignment if intervention anchors are to successfully enable the institutionalization of new social practices. Of course, these perspectives do not exclude the role postwar interventions play in depoliticizing formerly warring actors, allowing them to be reborn as legitimate agents for postwar reconstruction (Ferguson, 1990). Institutions, by their very definition, embody memory and the politics of past orders. Hence, as much as institutions enable they too discriminate and marginalize. This is true for contexts of war and

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77 Interview with cooperative executive member, 2008.
peace.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This paper makes a number of contributions. First, this study uncovers the important role of resources, institutional templates, and context for understanding the diffusion of new social practices and fostering social change. This is a significant contribution to the theory of actorhood, which has thus far emphasized processes of diffusion over structuration, and has yet to appropriately consider the potential role of capital as a technique for anchoring institutional change. Conceptualizing a role for resources in the mutual expansion (benefactors) and retraction (beneficiaries) of agentic actorhood suggests that resource dependencies may be important for the diffusion of new social practices across and between levels of analysis, including individual-local, local-national, and national-global.

Second, by advancing the notion of institutional anchors, this study reveals an important antecedent for the structuring of social practices. The concept of institutional anchors also reinforces the analytic potential of the ideals, discourses and techniques of control model of institutions, which explicates one means through which postwar interventions may or may not lead to institutionalization. Policymakers and implementing actors might consider that successful social change in complex institutional contexts require much more than the promotion of standardized protocols and the universal ideals they represent. Successful postwar interventions require effective techniques for anchoring new social practices institutionally aligned, both intrinsically within the intervention itself, and in congruence with the specific peculiarities of an intervention setting.

The success or failure of interventions seeking large-scale institutional change will not depend on the negotiation and ratification of international protocols; rather, social change occurs through the institutionalization of new social practices in context. Hence, policymakers and practitioners working in the field of postwar reconstruction must begin to think further along the ‘institutional’ intervention value chain. For example, a shift in focus from planned intervention outcomes (for instance, completion of reintegration-related skills training) to the implementation and monitoring of techniques of control (such as tractor maintenance and use, finance schedules, and cooperative procedures) is integral for ensuring the effective materialization of new models of actorhood. These demand the appropriate deployment of institutional anchors in ways that stabilize intended social practices. For example, the delivery of training, equipment and related resources is futile if these are not to be used appropriately
over the long term. To reiterate, the range of intervention outcomes suggests that policymakers should pay close attention to how local institutional settings moderate the deployment of institutional anchors, how beneficiaries come to immediately accept and engage with these resources, and how they are used over time.

The ideas advanced in this paper also contribute to an increasing body of management and organization research focused on conflict contexts, particularly those that explicate mechanisms associated with agency and institutions (Peredo and Chrisman, 2006; Tobias et al., 2013; Bullough, Renko and Mayatt, 2014). Taken together, these studies imply that institutional anchors (such as enterprise models) may act as a platform for transformative activities whereby 'ordinary' people come to embrace new roles and express agency that contributes to new social realities for themselves and others (Tobias et al., 2013). A note of caution: it would be an illusion to assume institutional anchors are inherently emancipatory, be they technologies or business models (Kallinikos, 2004; Abdelnour and Saeed, 2014). Mair and Martí (2009) reiterate this point in their study of BRAC and ultra-poor women in Bangladesh; though BRAC employed intervention techniques capable of facilitating market access for poor women, it is questionable whether and how such practices challenge the discriminating and repressive cultural-political institutional climate.

More generally, this study adds to the following knowledge areas in the field of management, entrepreneurship and organization studies: business, organizations and poverty (London and Hart, 2004; Kolk, Rivera-Santos and Rufin, 2013; Blowfield and Dolan, 2014), cooperatives and community enterprise (Carroll, Goodstein and Gyenes, 1988; Peredo, 2003; Emmanuel and MacPherson, 2007), micro-franchising (Kistruck, Webb, Sutter and Ireland, 2011), social intermediation (Mair and Martí, 2009; Mair et al., 2012; Kistruck, Beamish, Qureshi and Sutter, 2012), state interventions (Hasselbladh and Bejerot, 2007; Kalev et al., 2008) and subsistence markets (Viswanathan, Sridharan, Ritchie, 2010; Lindeman, 2012). Further research is needed to explore, challenge, refine, and expand upon the various components of actorhood as advanced in this study, as well as the mechanisms through which institutional anchors are coupled with the specific social practices they are intended to foster.
References


UNHCR Special Envoy Angelina Jolie and UK Foreign Secretary William Hague visit Nzolo camp, Democratic Republic of Congo, March 2013. [Crown Copyright/MOD/LA(Phot) Iggy Roberts]
4.0

Technologizing Humanitarian Space
Darfur Advocacy and “Stoves Reduce Rape”

Abstract
We examine how an unassuming domestic technology—the fuel-efficient stove—came to be construed as an effective tool for reducing sexual violence globally. Highlighting the process of problematization, the linking of problems with actionable solutions, we show how US-based humanitarian advocacy organizations drew upon spatial, gender, perpetrator, racial, and interventionist representations to advance the notion that ‘stoves reduce rape’ in Darfur. Though their effectiveness in Darfur remains questionable, efficient stoves were consequently adopted as a universal technical panacea for sexual violence in any conflict or refugee camp context. By examining the emergence and global diffusion of the rape-stove problematization, our study documents an important example of the technologizing of humanitarian space. We postulate fuel-efficient stoves to be a technology of Othering able to simplify, combine, decontextualize, and transform problematizations from their originating contexts elsewhere. When humanitarian advocates construe immensely complex crises as ‘manageable problems’, the promotion of simple technical panaceas may inadvertently increase the burden of poverty for user-beneficiaries and silence the voices of those they claim to champion and serve.

Keywords:
humanitarian advocacy, technology, problematization, sexual violence, fuel-efficient stoves

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Material things have magic powers only in the contexts of the narratives in which they are embedded. (Harré 2002: 25)

INTRODUCTION

On September 21, 2010, United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced the launch of the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves. The initiative aims to "foster a thriving global market for fuel-efficient stoves" to mitigate health and environmental consequences of cooking and reduce personal security risks facing conflict-affected women and girls (U.S. Department of State 2010). The logic that posits stoves to be a panacea for these crises is relatively straight-forward: requiring less fuelwood for cooking impedes deforestation, less exposure to smoke and fire limits the negative health consequences of cooking, and finally, fewer fuelwood collection trips reduces exposure to sexual violence in areas of insecurity.

Though efficient stoves have long been considered in relation to deforestation and health\(^{80}\), the rhetoric that establishes stoves as capable of reducing the risk of sexual violence emerged prominently with the Darfur humanitarian response.\(^{82}\) On the issue of Darfur, humanitarian advocacy organizations were known for political partiality and the ability to influence aid policy (ODI 2007). US-based Darfur advocacy organizations were particularly energized by instrumental, normative, moral, and religious motivations (Mamdani 2009; Hicks 2010). They were also motivated by potential access to donors and public fundraising.\(^{83}\) As our study shows, Darfur-focused advocacy organizations were quite influential in positioning the stove as a viable solution to sexual violence.

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\(^{80}\) The use of fuel-efficient stoves as opposed to more basic modes of cooking (such as the three-stone fire) is thought to deliver benefits such as fuel and time savings and reduce exposure to smoke and fire.

\(^{81}\) Spread to East Africa in the early 1900s by Indian laborers, fuel-efficient stoves have been promoted in global campaigns since the 1970s energy crisis as a means to mitigate deforestation and the negative health effects of cooking (Eckholm, Foley, Barnard, and Timberlake 1984; Hyman 1987; Bailis, Cowan, Berrueta and Masera 2009). Responding to these concerns, governments, development agencies, researchers, engineers, and entrepreneurs have actively engaged in the design, dissemination, and marketing of various stove technologies. These campaigns brought efficient stoves to Sudan, where they have been promoted as a panacea for three major crises: energy, health, and sexual violence (Abdelnour 2011).

\(^{82}\) The escalation of large-scale armed conflict in Darfur from 2003 onwards displaced over two million Darfuris, many of whom remain warehoused in camps in Darfur and refugee camps in eastern Chad (Abdelnour, Badri, El Jack, Wheeler, McGrath and Branzei 2008). By late 2004, an immense global response focused its political attention and humanitarian resources to Darfur. Between 2003 and 2011, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) alone—one of the largest donors to the Darfur response—channeled over $2.7 billion USD toward humanitarian efforts in Darfur (Stephens 2011).

\(^{83}\) As indicated by several interviewees involved in the promotion of efficient stoves in Darfur.
Within a few years of their initial promotion, humanitarian agencies working in Darfur realized that in practice efficient stoves did little to deter firewood collection and hence did not reduce the risk of sexual violence.\footnote{Common reasons reported include: ineffective usage or a complete disregard of efficient stoves by beneficiaries, poor construction of some stove models thus limiting potential fuel savings, continued collection of wood and grasses for non-cooking purposes such as construction or market sale, and the absence of appropriate monitoring and evaluation of stove usage or protection outcomes (Martin 2007; AED/USAID 2008; Stone, Cole, and Wroe-Street 2008).} Despite this recognition, US-based advocacy organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) continued to promote them as a viable protection tool in Darfur. Subsequently, efficient stoves emerged as a definitive technological intervention for any conflict and refugee camp context. To investigate how an unassuming domestic technology was construed to be a universal panacea for reducing sexual violence, we sought to answer the following questions: How is sexual violence understood such that efficient stoves are thought to be a logical solution? How did fuel-efficient stoves emerge as a panacea for the risk of sexual violence globally? What are the implications of promoting universal technical panaceas for humanitarian thinking and practice?

This paper proceeds as follows. First, we discuss the role of advocacy in the discursive construction of problems and technological solutions. We then present an overview of our empirical method and discourse analysis, followed by the presentation of the case narrative. Our findings suggest that humanitarian (political) advocacy is integral in technologizing the humanitarian space. More specifically, we suggest that the ‘stoves reduce rape’ rhetoric results in a subtle yet profound shift in humanitarian activity: the struggle to understand and prevent sexual violence is replaced by the quest to design, produce, promote, and deliver the most fuel-efficient stoves. We conclude with a discussion of the significant implications of our study, and suggest directions for future research.

**Advocacy, Problematization and Technology**

Advocacy organizations and networks—political interest groups, domestic non-profit and social movement organizations, and international NGOs—form around political ideals, interests, and values; they do so with the purpose of mobilizing resources and their constituents to influence policy and public agendas (Andrews and Edwards 2004; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Barker 2000). Advocacy work is increasingly transnational, influencing issues of global significance through “intense domestic and international struggles over meaning and policy” (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 211). Sexual violence is one significant issue around which advocacy coalitions mobilize to influence global policy and action (Jordan and van Tuijl 2000;
Carpenter 2007a, 2007b). Despite increasing interest in the work and influence of advocacy organizations and networks, little is known about the processes by which advocacy issues emerge, how they are defined, or in what ways they are adopted (Carpenter 2007a).

We advance the concept of problematization, the process of linking problems with actionable solutions, as significant for understanding issue emergence. By bridging problems with actionable solutions, advocates facilitate the mobilization of actors and resources into common interest networks (Callon 1986; Latour 1999). Moreover, in this paper we particularly emphasize the discursive aspects of problematization.85 Problematization is particularly relevant to humanitarianism; for example, Calhoun (2004) notes that the increasing incidences of ‘complex humanitarian emergencies’ are in part construed by the rhetorical definition and organized intervention of crises. According to Calhoun, the global humanitarian order is enabled by “the underlying social and cultural dynamics that shape both the production of emergencies and the production of responses” (2004:375). Another example is provided by Holland (2009), who examines the discursive construction of ‘9-11’ from an event initially void of meaning into a crisis demanding appropriate responses. Similarly, Escobar proposes that the power to influence “what is included as legitimate development issues may depend on specific relations established in the midst of the discourse; relations, for instance, between what experts say and what international politics allows as feasible” (1995:44). Escobar (1995) further suggests that the problematization of poverty constructs underdevelopment as a crisis, thus governing poverty-alleviating policy and practices including western-led technological interventions.

Our study suggests that problematization is central to the technologizing of humanitarian space.86 Technology can be understood as a means of truth-making (Heidegger 1977); technologies are thus able to construct and reinforce particular ‘regimes of truth’ (Foucault 1988:257).

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85 Our approach is informed by Foucault, who defines problematization as “the totality of discursive or non-discursive practices that introduces something into the play of true and false and constitutes it as an object for thought (whether in the form of moral reflection, scientific knowledge, political analysis, etc.)” (1988:257).

86 *Humanitarian space* can be thought of as the totality of humanitarian actors, policies and interventions. The humanitarian space is ‘expanding’ to include new actors (i.e. military) and intervention contexts (i.e. conflict areas). Current debates about humanitarian space are overwhelming dominated by western agencies and actors (i.e. UN, international NGOs, donor governments, and militaries), with discussions focusing on ‘global’ technical standards and issues such as ‘agency access’. These prioritize the needs of (mainly western) humanitarian agencies over those of beneficiaries, especially conflict-affected peoples, and disregard the potential role of local actors in the humanitarian process (Collinson and Elhawary 2012).
Such ‘truths’ are often reinforced by narratives that enable technology to serve as carriers of meanings, construe them as being important to particular contexts, provide them practical roles that differ from their original specifications, allow them to change designated categories, and impede social action (Harré 2002: 25-26). Drawing on the work of Luhmann (1993), Kallinikos (2005) further suggests that through discursive means technology permits functional simplification, “the demarcation of an operational domain, within which the complexity of the world is reconstructed as a simplified set of causal or instrumental relations” (189) and functional closure, “the construction of a protective cocoon that is placed around the selected causal sequences or processes to safeguard undesired interference and ensure their recurrent unfolding” (190). In this way, technology is able to embody, retain, and renew associated problematizations; as a result, technology-oriented policies and interventions are favored while alternative options marginalized.

**Discourse Analysis**

To unpack the conditions that enable a relatively unassuming domestic technology to emerge as an extraordinarily simple protection tool, we question how the declaration ‘stoves reduce rape’ is first sayable (Foucault 1991) then accepted as matter of fact (Latour 2004). We thus focus our investigation on the role of discourse in global processes, and in particular the objectification of peoples, material artefacts, and events in ways that maintain systems of knowledge and power (Fairclough 1989; Fairclough 2006). For example, representations of ‘Africa’ and ‘Africans’ in western media are known to reflect taken-for-granted perceptions and practices reflective of global power asymmetries (van Dijk 1993; Andreasson 2005). Often appearing uniform and natural, such language is in fact part of a stable matter-of-fact discursive reality that masks alternative debates and local voices (Brookes 1995:448). Discourses are fundamental to advocacy work: infused with systems of belief they are invoked to shape the nature of organizing and action globally (Said 1978; Fairclough 2006; Alcadipani and Hassard 2010). Just as Hasselbladh and Kallinikos note: “It is by means of discourses, and the elaborate systems of operations and techniques associated with them, that organisational goals and tasks are constructed, while organizational roles are shaped in ways that constitute distinct forms of actorhood that transcend local contexts” (2000:703).

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87 A “regime of truth is the institutional infrastructure for the production and circulation of truth claims” and is “constituted through a set of mechanisms and discursive practices that legitimises claims and is itself dependent on the legitimacy of those claims” (Introna 2003:237).
Informing our discourse analysis are dozens of public documents and press releases produced by humanitarian advocacy organizations, NGOs, and donor agencies that relate fuelwood and fuel-efficient stoves with sexual and gender-based violence. To ensure relevance in the collection of empirical material we followed the corpus construction approach advanced by Bauer and Aarts (2000), a systematic method for selecting (and disregarding) qualitative empirical material along two thematically informed dimensions: known strata/functions and unknown varieties of representations. Following corpus construction procedures, we undertook an iterative re-examination of empirical materials, investigating relevant problematizations and their related contexts (unknown strata), as well as discursive presentations of fuelwood, stove technologies, and sexual violence (known representations within each strata). To ensure consistency of materials in the analysis, interviews with people involved with stove interventions in Darfur guided our investigation but were excluded from the corpus.

Our analysis reveals three significant and nested discursive cases: Dadaab, Darfur, and Global. The first attributes the activity of fuelwood collection as being the definitive setting of rape rather than only one context for its occurrence. The second presents the Darfur conflict as a crisis in which Arabs engage in the ‘genocidal rape’ of displaced Africans. When Darfuri women and girls are construed as vulnerable to violence during firewood collection, efficient stoves are consequently promoted as the logical solution. The third case examines the globalizing of the ‘stoves reduce rape’ problematization and the emergence of a generalized efficient stove panacea. We present these three cases in the following section along with some intricacies that tie them together.

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88 We collected empirical materials online via the ReliefWeb database <http://reliefweb.int/>, the International Network on Household Energy in Humanitarian Settings website <http://www.fuelnetwork.org/>, and through systematic Internet searches. Materials were also collected during visits to NGO offices in Khartoum, El-Fashir, and Nyala, Sudan.

89 The first step in corpus construction is to decide on the topic area and consider the following rules: proceed stepwise (select, analyze, select), strata/function variety should precede variety of representations, characterizing the variety of representations should have priority over existing categories, and maximize representations by extending strata/functions. The second step is to consider the two-dimensions of strata/functions and representations of the topic, and list as many strata/functions as possible. The third step is to explore representations of the topic starting with one or two strata/functions. The fourth step is to consider adding additional strata, if needed, so as to maximize the variety of representations. The fifth step is to extend the corpus accordingly until the variety of representations is saturated. Next is the analysis and reporting of findings, and if necessary, a return to the forth step to select more empirical material. In some cases a revision of the strata/function and variety of representations may also be necessary (Bauer and Aarts 2000).

90 Interviews were conducted by the lead author during multiple trips to Khartoum, El-Fashir, and Nyala, Sudan between 2006 and 2009, and New Delhi, India in 2008.
Constructing ‘Stoves Reduce Rape’: Dadaab, Darfur, and Global

Violence and Firewood at Dadaab Refugee Camps, Kenya

In 1991, three refugee camps were established at Dadaab, Kenya, to accommodate the influx of refugees from Somalia, Uganda, Sudan, and Ethiopia (UNHCR 2012). In response to reports of high levels of sexual violence at Dadaab, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) launched the Women Victims of Violence Project; a series of anti-violence activities consisting of social services, gender-sensitive training, and community mobilizing. The aim of the project was to address sexual violence both inside and outside the camps. After a 1997 UNHCR assessment of the project, the US funded a $1.5 million USD initiative focused on the provision of firewood to vulnerable groups in the Dadaab camps, environmental solutions to reduce resource conflicts between local communities and refugees, and ways to rehabilitate foliage surrounding the camps. The implementing NGO for the project was selected for its experience with energy-related initiatives in Dadaab, including fuel-efficient stoves (CASA Consulting 2001).

In January 1998, Mary Anne Fitzgerald, a senior member of Washington-based Refugees International (RI), wrote an article titled Firewood, violence against women and hard choices in Kenya. Fitzgerald affirms the magnitude of violence facing refugee women and girls at the Dadaab camps by quoting Saynab Haleys Bu-ul, chair of the Anti-Rape Committee in Ifo camp, as stating:

If you go out of the camp very near, there is a man standing there with a gun. If you go to run, he shoots you. If you stay, he rapes you. Some of us are taken from our houses at night. Some of us are taken in the bush when we look for firewood. We are not safe, night or day. If we don’t get security, we won’t survive. (Fitzgerald 1998:2)

Bu-ul emphasizes a pervasive crisis of sexual violence. In her view, the endemic problem of violence demands a comprehensive security solution. However, Fitzgerald marginalizes Bu-ul’s violence-security problematization by emphasizing the high number of attacks that occur during firewood collection:

Refugees International disagrees with the proposed policy of providing only “vulnerables“ with firewood, All women and young girls in the refugee camps are equally vulnerable and should receive firewood. All share the same risk of being brutally attacked if they must gather firewood. (Fitzgerald 1998:3, italics and bold original)

A second article written by Fitzgerald and RI colleague Shep Lowman, titled Protect Refugee Women as They Gather Firewood, was published in the International Herald Tribune in August 1998. In it, Fitzgerald and Lowman advance the violence-firewood problematization as a
global moral imperative:

One is left with the sense that international agencies still do not really know how to deal with the relationship between firewood and rape. Women are 58 percent of the world's adult refugee population. They do not shirk from their responsibility to gather firewood for their families. The international community should protect them. (Fitzgerald and Lowman 1998:2)

Through the Dadaab camps experience, RI relegates sexual violence to one space and activity; once the risk of rape is presented as a problem of fuelwood collection firewood is construed as the logical solution. One assessment of firewood interventions in Kenya points to the selective-reductionist tendencies of humanitarian advocacy:

Banditry and acts of sexual violence, especially rape, were known to occur frequently in the camps. Considerable publicity highlighted the rape of women while collecting firewood outside the camps. (WCWRC 2002:73)

Another indicates the consequences of selective attention pertaining to sexual violence, enhanced by the tendency of humanitarian agencies to focus on technical solutions:

While the project has reduced the incidence of rape during periods when households are fully stocked with firewood, we see a concomitant increase in non-firewood related rape during the same period. This implies a strategy that focuses on the broader context of rape, violence, and insecurity of women and girls, rather than simply addressing one location and opportunity for rape. [...] UNHCR staff, in various documents and discussions, shy away from this problem giving priority to ‘technical fixes’ and dismissing social/cultural change as impracticable because it is a ‘long-term’ solution. (CASA Consulting 2001:7)

Further complicating the humanitarian response at Dadaab was the complex notion of ‘bandit’, a theme highly relevant for Darfur. Already vested in the firewood-rape problematization, organizations working with Dadaab residents came to characterize bandits as criminals operating outside the camps. Upon deeper investigation, however, bandits who committed sexual crimes included unknown and known locals, armed and unarmed men, as well as camp residents. In one recorded instance, the label of bandit was applied to a victim’s neighbor only after he had assaulted her (CASA Consulting 2001:95).

Similarly, understandings of ‘rape’, ‘rape risk’, ‘sexual violence’, and ‘gender-based violence’ are in no way standardized in humanitarian programming and literatures. This lack of agreement in definitions and measures has significant consequences for humanitarian work, including indiscriminate categorizations, multiple counting, and misrepresentations of security risks (Baker 2007). Humanitarian agencies will often present a wide variety of abuses—including rape, domestic abuse, forced marriage, and harassment—under the
The Dadaab case demonstrates the role of humanitarian advocacy in construing pervasive violence as a problem manageable with a technical solution. Consequently, the rape-firewood problematization that emerges at Dadaab limits a more comprehensive understanding of the pervasive reality of gender-based violence elsewhere, including Darfur.

**US Darfur Advocacy**

Though US news outlets were significantly late in providing substantial coverage of Darfur compared with global media (Mody and Hofschire 2010:341), a coalition of powerful lobbyists eventually formed to engage in Darfur-related advocacy. By April 2004, Washington-based US Holocaust Memorial Museum issued their first ever ‘genocide alert’ to motivate action on Darfur. On July 14 of that same year, the American Jewish World Service and the US Holocaust Memorial Museum convened the ‘Darfur Emergency Summit in New York City’. From this event, the Save Darfur Coalition (SDC) was established to raise awareness of the Darfur conflict and influence policy by lobbying the US government and United Nations (Aidi 2005).

The SDC became a hub for a major US Darfur advocacy network, one with little or no Darfur experience (Mamdani 2009). This is similar to ‘experts’ who write about the Orient without ever having travelled there themselves (Said 1978). Enabled by imagination, the SDC demonstrated an incredible ability to mobilize media, Hollywood personalities, constituents of religious and community organizations, student groups, politicians, academics, advocacy groups and development agencies. In the US, the work of SDC helped to translate ‘Darfur’ from a distant conflict into an intense domestic political issue.

Discursive representations of Darfur in the US political imagination were intertwined with prior depictions of the Sudanese civil war, orientalist notions of ‘Arabs’ and ‘Muslims’, and rhetoric associated with the ‘War on Terror’ (Said 2008, Mamdani 2009). According to Hicks (2010), US advocates interpreted Darfur’s discourses along dichotomous racial, perpetrator, gender, spatial, and interventionist themes. The racial dichotomy construes Darfur along two distinct and homogeneous ethnic categories: ‘Arab’ and ‘African’. Embedded within this binary construction are clear perpetrator roles, leaving Arabs the victimizers of innocent Africans (Mamdani 2009). Taken together, racial and perpetrator presumptions make clear the case

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91 We suggest that the act of aggregating so many crimes under one term may serve to mask realities of sexual violence; this is especially true for domestic violence, which often remains outside the scope of humanitarian programming.
for genocide: Arab government and affiliated *janjaweed* militias are committing crimes against helpless African victims in Darfur (Reeves 2005). Such an understanding disregards the diversity and complexities of culture, ethnicity, and violence in Darfur; it also constructs a scenario where ‘Arabs’ are never victims nor displaced and ‘Africans’ do not participate in violence. This scenario, when combined with interventionist inclinations, presents a clear moral imperative for the US to ‘save Darfur’. Consequently, actionable solutions are advocated, including: calls for military intervention, international sanctions, and charge of war crimes against Sudanese President Omar El-Bashir (Mamdani 2007; Hicks 2010). The intensity of US advocacy on the issue of Darfur enabled the formation of broad coalitions capable of spawning transnational action through de-contextualized and de-historicized meanings:

For the Save Darfur Coalition, advocacy has turned into a series of advertisements. The campaign was organized by a full-time ad agency. The more advocacy turned into a sales pitch, the less the ads corresponded to the reality on the ground. Yet the mobilization continued with increasing success. Save Darfur seemed to have no reality check, either from its board or from the consumers of its product. (Mamdani 2009:51)

Specific racial and ethnic distinctions were in part initiated through the ‘genocide alert’ and reproduced for Darfur advocates, the US public, and policy circles. Hicks (2010) reveals how RI, together with (and at times on behalf of) SDC, brought gendered, racial, and religious assumptions into their advocacy campaigns:

SDC and Refugees International relied on multiple interwoven constructs of religion and race and a series of overlapping binaries that specified gendered norms of citizenship, simplified dynamics in Darfur into genocidal rape, and defined American pluralist practice in terms of human rights. (Hicks 2010:267)

The generalized criminality of ‘Arabs’ and ‘Muslims’ are made clear in RI’s August 2004 report, titled *Rape, Islam, and Darfur’s women refugees and war-displaced*, wherein RI advocate Fidele Lumeya writes:

The fate of a raped woman in an Islamic fundamentalist society such as that in Sudan is already sealed. [...] The women of Darfur report feeling betrayed by their Islamic government, which has formed an alliance with Muslim and Arab rapists rather than protecting its own civilians. (Lumeya 2004)

As Hicks (2010) notes, these perspectives deeply informed the ways SDC and RI reproduced the Darfur crisis for their constituents. Ethnic rape became a central lens through which to understand violence in Darfur. Advocate Eric Reeves succinctly presents the emerging narrative during a congressional briefing held on July 21, 2005:

Rape does not simply occur in Darfur; it is used as a weapon. And it is used not on a random basis, but systematically. And it is not a phenomenon of the past; [...] systematic
rape is being deployed today, in ongoing genocidal war against the non-Arab or African tribal populations of Darfur. (Reeves 2005)

Discourses associated with Darfur point to a substantial advocacy network mediating the interdependent relationships, patterns of understanding, and activities of donors and humanitarian industry actors. RI and SDC chose to base their advocacy on the simple ‘Arab genocidal rape’ scenario despite the wealth of available expertise pointing to the complex history and multiple layers of violence in Darfur, and in disregard of any debate concerning the case for genocide.\(^{92}\) Void of genuine analysis, Darfur advocates drew from gendered cultural myths surrounding incidences of rape and Arab-Muslim stereotypes (Burt 1980; Ahmed 1982). We do not wish to belittle the nature of these representations nor why they emerge. They are built in part by communities with complex identities and struggles for redemption, using prejudiced domestic discourses that imagine life and violence in Darfur (Eichler-Levine and Hicks 2007). As Said (1978) aptly shows, taken-for-granted discursive arrangements constitute ‘facts’ that construct the Other regardless of available (or lack of) evidence. The reproduction of simple and actionable reductions may reflect wider trends in US-based humanitarian (political) advocacy.\(^ {93}\) As Willems (2004) notes, polarized representations prevent a more subtle and sophisticated exploration of significant political issues.

Feminist scholars have long understood local political dynamics to fuel cultural constructions of the female Other as having distinct and static disparities (Nader 1989). This is particularly true of women who face oppression by their very nature of being from the ‘uncivilized’ Arab-Islamic world (Ahmed 1982). Binary constructions, like those influencing the imagining of Darfur, facilitate the representation of westerners as being ‘liberated’ when contrasted with victims of sexual violence (Wade 2009). Moreover, and as Butler notes, “the category of ‘women’ [... is produced and restrained by the very structures of power through which emancipation is sought” (1990:2). Ironically, for Darfuri women and girls, rescue was to come in the form of a simple domestic technology.

**The ‘Call to Stoves’ for Darfur, Sudan**

In a widely publicized call to action, RI brought the firewood theme from Dadaab to the crisis of rape in Darfur. Instead of advocating for the provision of firewood, RI presents a modified

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\(^{92}\) See the writings of Martin W. Daly, Alex de Waal, Mahmood Mamdani, Rex Sean O’Fahey, Gérard Prunier, and others.

\(^{93}\) A similar case in point is the hysteria, controversy, and suggested irresponsibility of the *Kony 2012* advocacy campaign launched by San Diego-based Invisible Children (Branch 2012).
problematization in a bulletin titled *Rapidly Expand the Use of Fuel-Efficient Stoves in Darfur*:

By reducing the need for wood and emission of smoke, a switch to simple, more fuel-efficient stoves could reduce the time women spend collecting wood, a task that exposes them to the risk of rape and other forms of gender-based violence. (Wolf 2005:1)

An examination of situation reports suggests that humanitarian agencies initially hesitated to elucidate a clear relationship between fuelwood and violence in Darfur. However, once stabilized the rape-stove problematization justified large-scale efficient stove programming.\(^94\) In October 2004, a number of US-based NGOs began to launch humanitarian initiatives to serve the millions of displaced Darfuris warehoused in large urban camps. At the time, fuel-efficient stove interventions were already present in Sudan to address environmental and health crises; yet, with the crisis of rape looming, humanitarian advocates and NGOs had a more concise and urgent purpose for disseminating stoves (Abdelnour 2011). The US-based Darfur advocacy network adopted the primary message of the call and aligned their constituents to serve it. As a result, varying stove technologies came to be promoted in Darfur and Chad with questionable results in terms of technological suitability, implementation effectiveness, and impact (AED/USAID 2008; Stone, Cole, and Wroe-Street 2008).

Once construed as a means to protect Darfuri women and girls, fuel-efficient stove interventions mustered significant interest from donors, agencies of the United Nations, and international NGOs responding to the Darfur crisis. In Sudan, NGOs competed with different technologies, claiming superiority of their respective stoves in terms of fuel-efficiency, cultural appropriateness, and cost. The ensuing competition was so intense some referred to it as Darfur’s “stove wars”.\(^95\) Signifying the importance of stoves to US humanitarian efforts, on July 21, 2005—the same day of the mentioned congressional briefing—then US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited a stove project in Darfur (CHF International 2005).

Reminiscent of the Dadaab camps, RI and other US Darfur advocates promoted a selective and actionable understanding of the crisis of sexual violence in Darfur. The call to disseminate

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\(^94\) USAID was a key donor to the Darfur response and stove interventions. NGOs such as CHF International and International Lifeline Fund, as well as research institutes such as Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory—founders of the Darfur Stoves Project, now Potential Energy—were key players in developing and promoting efficient stove technologies to address the humanitarian crisis in Darfur.

Jewish World Watch also entered into the stoves market through solar initiatives targeting Darfuri refugees in Chad along with Sacramento-based Solar Cookers International and others. Women’s Refugee Commission, formerly known as the Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children, was also actively engaged in promoting stoves as part of a broader protection agenda in Darfur (Abdelnour and Branzei 2010).

\(^95\) As described by an international fuel-efficient stoves expert.
fuel-efficient stoves served to co-locate fuelwood collection with ‘Arab genocidal rape’. Such a conjecture suggests perpetrators and associated risks of violence to be ‘out there’, rendering the stove a feasible solution to violence. Jewish World Watch—created specifically to advocate on the issue of genocide in Darfur—conveys the narrative in a factsheet titled Help the Women of Darfur:

Women and girls who have fled the genocide in Darfur, Sudan, are particularly vulnerable to rape while performing the critical task of collecting firewood for cooking. **The Solar Cooker Project’s mission is to reduce the frequency of these crimes by providing refugee women with an alternative cooking option: the solar cooker.** Solar cookers enable women to reduce their dependency on wood and remain within the safety of the camp. The Solar Cooker Project not only protects women, but provides them with income opportunities through manufacturing cookers and training others to use the cookers. (JWW 2011:1, bold original)

In the same factsheet the tragedy of genocide, a discursive enabler for the emergence of the rape-stove problematization, is emphasized by the heading ‘The Genocide in Darfur’ and an emotive representation of violence:

Black Africans have been terrorized, driven out of their villages, and decimated by Arab militias, the janjaweed and the Sudan government since 2003. (JWW 2011:1, italics original)

Advocacy organizations and stove promoters marketed a misleading representation of the lives and pervasive insecurity facing Darfuri women and girls. Displaced peoples in Darfur engage in a diversity of activities and livelihood options. Travel outside of camps may be required for work as domestic servants in urban centers, for trade and market activity, or for collection of water and grasses. Moreover, it is widely known that wood is regularly collected for purposes other than cooking (Abdelnour et al. 2008). To promote efficient stoves as a panacea for rape risk is to relegate the lives of Darfuri women to two domestic activities: firewood collection and cooking.

Several reports illustrate these reductive tendencies. One is the *Inter-Agency Evaluation of the Humanitarian Response to the Darfur Crisis* (Broughton and Maguire 2006), which reaffirms the pervasive nature of sexual violence facing internally displaced peoples (IDPs) in Darfur; the report recognizes “rape of women in and around IDP camps” (33-34, 86), that “IDPs are not necessarily safe in camps” (58), and sexual violence “including the rape of women and children—continue on a widespread and systematic scale with impunity” (58). In an apparent disregard of noted violence in and around camps, the report repeatedly indicates support for the local production of stoves on a ‘massive scale’ (Broughton and Maguire 2006). This conclusion provided strong support for RI’s call to promote the widespread use of efficient
stoves. A 2009 report by Amnesty International, titled ‘No place for us here’: Violence against refugee women in Eastern Chad, is much more explicit in presenting the pervasiveness of sexual violence in the camps:

Amnesty International's recent research demonstrates that refugee women and girls in eastern Chad continue to be raped and attacked when they venture outside refugee camps. The attacks are carried out by organized groups, bandits and even by members of the Chadian National Army. Refugee camps are not always safer. Amnesty International has also documented cases of personnel working with international humanitarian NGOs operational in the refugee camps committing acts of rape and other violence against women and girls inside the camps. Additionally, refugee women and girls experience rape and other violence at the hands of their spouses, family members and other refugees within the camps. (Amnesty International 2009:11)

The complexity of risks facing the displaced in Darfur may be more serious than for those in Chad given international conventions that govern obligations to persons classified as refugees. Further, large numbers of displaced Darfuris live in rural areas where NGOs have little or no programming; some NGOs have also faced political pressures that impeded their work and in some cases led to expulsion from Sudan.

Sustaining ‘Stoves Reduce Rape’

In 2007, just two years after the initial ‘call to stoves’, RI retracted the claim that stoves are able to prevent sexual violence in Darfur in a report titled Ending Sexual Violence in Darfur: An Advocacy Agenda. Accompanying the retraction was a reaffirmation of the importance of stove interventions:

While there is little evidence that producing fuel-efficient stoves reduces violence against women […] the international community should continue to promote them but not solely or even principally as a protection measure against sexual violence but as a vital part of a holistic response to the urgent environmental and humanitarian issues confronting the conflict-affected peoples of Darfur (Martin 2007:18).

For humanitarian organizations, the above statement contains a subtle continuation of purpose permitting efficient stove commitments to remain intact. At the same time, it threatens Darfur advocates who depend on the strength of the rape-stove problematization. A clear conflict emerges when the reality of sexual violence in Darfur is recognized to be far too pervasive for a simple stove solution. Rather than addressing this contradiction, the reality facing Darfuris was marginalized in favor of the highly marketable ‘stoves reduce rape’. Even more, some NGOs began to shift the imagined lives of Darfuri women in ways that rendered efficient stoves even more indispensable. A case in point is the Darfur Stoves Project 2011 Mother's Day fundraising campaign, titled Honor your mother by supporting a woman in Darfur:
For the women in Darfur, cooking on simple stoves in crowded camps for displaced people can bring untold hardship. The daily searches for firewood expose them to attacks and sexual assault, and looking for work to earn money for fuel takes up much of their time and energy. (Neichin 2011)

Such questionable generalizations reveal the extent to which Darfur advocates and stove promoters are dependent on the rape-stove problematization; challenges to it are resolved by sidelining alternative understandings that might jeopardize ‘stoves reduce rape’. Jordan and van Tuijul (2000) suggest that members of transnational advocacy networks negotiate conflicting notions and values. In the case of Darfur, new meanings are incorporated into the rape-stove problematization. These further simplify the complex reality of victimization and preclude and honest assessment of stove interventions. Efforts to stabilize the rape-stove problematization hastened its adoption by a global stoves network.

_A Global Panacea_

Past campaigns to address the crises of deforestation and health foreshadowed the globalizing of the rape-stove problematization. Priming the emergence of ‘stoves reduce rape’ globally, Erin Patrick of the Women’s Refugee Commission opens her article, titled _Sexual violence and firewood collection in Darfur_, with the following:

“In hundreds of refugee and IDP settings throughout the world, women and girls are made more vulnerable to sexual violence because of the almost daily need to leave camps in search of firewood. More can and must be done to reduce the risk. (Patrick 2007:40)

Patrick, in addition to raising awareness about sexual violence in Darfur, was a key coordinator for the international conference, _Beyond Firewood: Exploring Alternative Fuels and Technologies in Humanitarian Settings_, held December 11-12, 2008 at New Delhi, India.96 Organized by the Women’s Refugee Commission, the conference was supported by USAID and the American Jewish World Service, a founding partner of the SDC, and intended to facilitate the global dissemination of efficient stoves for humanitarian purposes.

The US-initiated Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves has garnered tremendous attention for the development of fuel-efficient stove markets and initiatives globally. Alliance affiliates include multinational corporations, representative agencies of the United Nations and governments from around the world, humanitarian advocacy groups and international NGOs. Organizations involved with stove interventions in Darfur are also involved, including Solar Cookers International, USAID, Women’s Refugee Commission, and the Darfur Stoves

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96 The lead author attended the conference as a sponsored participant.
Project/Potential Energy. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s participation in the global alliance reflects how significant US political morality and instrumentality are in shaping humanitarian meaning and action. Joining Clinton as ambassador of the initiative is actor Julia Roberts; as politically powerful and recognized women, Clinton and Roberts have a tremendous capacity to elevate global awareness for the stove panacea.

The adoption of the rape-stove problematization by the emergent global network demonstrates the incredible resilience of discourse-infused technologies; questionable at best with regards to preventing rape in Darfur, stoves are amazingly promoted as a global protection tool:

Women and girls face severe personal security risks as they collect fuel, especially those living in communities of instability, including refugee camps and conflict zones. (U.S. Department of State 2010)

Responding to global opportunity, Darfur Stoves Project was rebranded 'Potential Energy'. To assure suitability of their stoves for any refugee context, Potential Energy illustrates a simple generalized (and disingenuous) narrative:

Women and girls must walk many hours, several times a week, just to find a single tree with usable wood to fuel their fires. Outside the relative safety of refugee camps, they are vulnerable to acts of violence. (Potential Energy 2012)

This detachment of the rape-stove problematization from the originating Darfur context renders it useable elsewhere. During a visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UK Foreign Secretary William Hague, alongside UNHCR special envoy and actor Angelina Jolie, highlighted the crisis of sexual violence as a key theme for the UK 2013 Presidency of the G8. An article capturing their visit to a camp serviced by International Rescue Committee reveals both the global pervasiveness of the sexual violence problem as well as the resilience and adaptability of rape-related problematizations. Advanced alongside the notion ‘stoves reduce rape’ is a new problematization: ‘clothes reduce rape’. The logic underpinning the clothes-rape problematization reaffirms domestic and spatial associations of sexual violence, and again abridges the lives and livelihoods of victims:

The women here are forced to venture out of the camp to collect firewood or water. Both make them vulnerable to rape and many of the women and girls have been assaulted. All the International Rescue Committee, which runs the camp, can offer to mitigate the threat are “dignity kits” that contain efficient stoves that require less firewood and extra clothes so the women have to look for washing water less often. (Borger 2013)

In addition to highlighting the visit of Hague and Jolie, who was coincidentally photographed holding a fuel-efficient stove, the International Rescue Committee press release reports the
pervasive violence women face in the camps:

Women reported to the IRC rape, physical assault, forced marriage and other forms of abuse. The teams discovered that while there was an increase in cases perpetrated by a stranger, in 45 per cent of the cases the perpetrator was someone known to the woman, typically a family member, partner or someone from the local community. (International Rescue Committee 2013)

The contradictions inherent in the above quotes point to the ability of problematizations and technological panaceas to blind humanitarian practice. Sexual violence is known to be prevalent inside camps yet NGOs continue to promote technical interventions to reduce the time women spend outside of them. Next, we discuss the potential sources of such discrepancies along with the wider implications of our study below.

**Technologizing Humanitarian Space**

Humanitarian advocates, by construing complex socio-political challenges as ‘manageable problems’, are fundamental in shaping humanitarian policy and practice. While the problematizations that advocates promote do enable effective action, they also entail significant opportunity costs for humanitarian intervention. Simple problematizations preclude comprehensive context-specific understandings of the sheer violence conflict-affected women and girls may face inside camps or elsewhere. Rather than engage with the complexity of problems in context, technical panaceas legitimate the delivery of universal ‘solutions’. As our study demonstrates, this amounts to a subtle yet profound shift in humanitarian agendas and the technologizing of humanitarian space: *the struggle to understand and prevent sexual violence is replaced by the quest to design, produce, promote, and deliver the most fuel-efficient stoves*. We postulate two significant mechanisms for understanding humanitarian advocacy, problematization, and technical panaceas: *technologies of Othering and the panacea effect*.

**Technologies of Othering**

Like Smirl (2008), our case implies humanitarianism to be both a reflection of ‘us’ and a spatial-material construction of ‘them’. Yet our case differs in that the globalizing of the rape-stove problematization renders efficient stoves increasingly distant from local experiences; in fact, stove narratives were construed by political and humanitarian advocates with little knowledge of the actual lives of proposed beneficiaries. Moreover, stove interventions silence local voices, eliminating possibilities for a serious understanding of and dialogue with the Other (Saïd 1978). We thus theorize fuel-efficient stoves to be a *technology of Othering* able to simplify, combine, decontextualize, and transfer problematizations from their originating
contexts elsewhere. Although it became evident that the complexity of sexual violence in Darfur rendered efficient stoves an imprudent solution, the process of Othering served to generalize the problematization for wider dissemination. As a technology of Othering, efficient stoves are an inherent part of a system of exclusion, wherein the voices of local women and girls are silenced by those who claim to know, speak, and act on their behalf (Butler 1990). Seen from this perspective, the discursive constructing of ‘stoves reduce rape’ is a reductive and violent process. It is perhaps for this very reason that alternative narratives of rape in conflict zones remain relatively invisible in the work of US-based advocates and the consciousness of their constituents.97

How does a technology ‘Other’? When a technology is associated with a specific problematization, explicit acceptance of that technology involves an implicit (unquestioned) acceptance of underlying (taken-for-granted) discourses. While ‘fixed’ to the technology, the problematization is somewhat vulnerable to discursive flexibility, as indicated by the transformation of the rape-stove problematization from Darfur to the global stage. Through functional simplification and closure (Kallinikos 2005), meaning-infused technologies move easily from one context to another (Bapuji, Hora, and Saeed 2012). Advocates are thus able to advance an increasingly generalized stove ‘solution’ suitable for wider (eventually global) consumption. Freed from the discursive restraints of ‘Darfur’, stove legitimacy draws from the simple myth: ‘stoves reduce rape’. Consequently, as the rape-stove problematization is distanced from its originating context, efficient stoves become a solution independent of any problem (Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972).

The Panacea Effect

The stove panacea is a myth: fuel-efficient stoves are deemed effective not because of empirical evidence, but from the powerful narratives that promote claims of what they are able to accomplish (i.e. ‘stoves reduce rape’). As stove promoters become increasingly dependent on the legitimacy of these claims, the actual effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of stove interventions becomes inconsequential. Regimes of truth are thus construed in ways that render them increasingly unquestionable (Introna 2003). The myth of the technical panacea enables its diffusion from an originating context to ‘everywhere’, or more accurately

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97 We remember the premeditated rape and murder of 14 year-old Abeer Qassim Hamza al-Janabi by US soldiers in Iraq (Knickmeyer 2006), as well as the widespread rape of US servicewomen and men by their fellow soldiers (Broadbent 2011; Twine 2013). The underlying narratives that purport stoves to reduce sexual violence in conflict zones cannot accommodate these and many other realities of conflict-related violence.
to ‘no-where’. We define this *panacea effect* as the propensity for a technical intervention to transform from a context-dependent response into a universal solution.

The consequence of the panacea effect is an increase in the burden of poverty whenever user-beneficiaries are thought to self-emancipate through participation. According to stove advocates, through the simple act of cooking the global poor will decelerate deforestation, impede global warming, reduce sexual violence, improve family health, develop ‘sustainable’ markets, and produce an enduring stream of carbon offsets. On this latter point, through the intermediating efforts of carbon-certified stove initiatives, women across the developing world may soon—unknowingly and through utter necessity—subsidize the polluting activities of global industry. From a neoliberal perspective, technical panaceas justify the expansion of global industry and the conversion of poor beneficiaries into mass consumers of rescuing (western) technologies, techniques, and business models. This too is a gendered process: inherent in the global concern for women’s welfare is the belief that poor women will progress through the technologies of the liberated and developed west (Nader 1989; Wade 2009). The stove panacea inadvertently (and very subtly) transfers the world’s most serious problems into the private lives of the most vulnerable.

**Concluding Remarks**

Our study leaves much room for exploration. Network analysis may reveal interesting dynamics for understanding problematization diffusion, particularly among transnational advocacy networks and their affiliated organizations, donors, and NGOs. Multi-sited field studies may also reveal how problematizations influence movements of humanitarian resources and attention. Though our case focuses on the Dadaab, Darfur and global accounts, there may be other spaces where ‘stoves reduce rape’ influenced humanitarian thinking and practice in important ways. Non-technological factors may also influence the discursive construction and manipulation of problematizations. Moreover, we suspect problematization is a significant antecedent of policy-practice decoupling. Global industrial and market mechanisms underpinning the production and allocation of efficient stoves may reveal the political, financial, and mobilizing power of the rape-stove problematization. Fuel-efficient stove fundraising campaigns may serve to explicate links between access to resources and the spread of political worldviews (i.e. ‘donate the cost of a stove and prevent genocidal rape in Darfur’). Similarly, and though we allude to the intensity of US Darfur advocacy, we do not consider how the worldviews of constituents shape the resilience and diffusion of a given problematization. Finally, and because marketing materials produced by humanitarian and
advocacy organizations often represent beneficiaries as needy victims or grateful recipients, field studies may better capture expressions of beneficiary agency in the intervention process (Smirl 2008).

By advancing the notion of problematization we respond to calls for better theories on the emergence of issues and action in advocacy work (Calhoun 2004; Carpenter 2007a; Holland 2009). As our study shows, ‘stoves reduce rape’ brings conceptual order to complex tragedies; by masking the lived experiences of intended beneficiaries simple problematizations inevitably make their realities more chaotic (Law 2004). We do not deny that conceptual boundaries are important for enacting an effective response; however, these must be conceived with due consideration to beneficiary voices over humanitarian-industrial agendas. We belabor the critique of Escobar who suggests, “instead of searching for grand alternative models or strategies, what is needed is the investigation of alternative representations and practices in concrete local settings” (1995:19). Dialogic spaces may be better suited for representing concerned voices and negotiating paths to understanding complex problems (Saeed 2010). Importantly, humanitarian advocates must recognize that many intolerable problems have no simple solution (French 1986), lest they continue to blindly foster the crises they claim to avert (Duffield 1996).

We have shown advocacy and problematization to be fundamental to the technologizing of humanitarian space. The themes we explore in this paper have important implications for humanitarian policy, practice, and scholarship. We conclude with a call for more research into humanitarian advocacy, the construction and diffusion of problematizations, the emergence of global panaceas, and technologies of Othering.
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5.0 Epilogue

5.1 Overview

The three studies that make up this thesis draw on institutional theories and concepts to investigate social interventions in the Sudan. The first and second adopt institutional theory concepts in the study of an intervention to reintegrate former fighters in the Blue Nile. The third draws on the advocacy network and humanitarian literatures to critically examine the institutionalization of a humanitarian technology intervention. As a totality, this thesis points the important role of actorhood, not only as it pertains to social interventions that seek some form of institutional change, but in the very way actor roles, traits, interests, and practices are imagined, categorized, and institutionally embedded through intervention processes.

5.1 Critical themes

Though each study is a unique paper, as a whole this thesis can be seen to encompass two overarching themes: actorhood and intervention, and technologies and techniques of control.

5.1.1 Actorhood and social intervention

The notion of actorhood—relating to universal templates of social action and agency—is a significant theme that cuts across this thesis. Empirically, I extend the notion of actorhood through an abductive thematic analysis of DDR interventions in the Blue Nile. Findings reveal an important role for ‘resources’, specifically ‘capital’, and for emergent categories of ‘beneficiaries’ and ‘benefactors’. These suggest that institutional anchors and categories are imperative for the structuring of institutional transformations across levels of society, including individual, organizational, field and nation-state. This understanding of actorhood suggests institutionalization cannot be captured by simple bottom-up, top-down, and diffusion narratives. Rather, the idea that disinterested agency involves the embracing of identity-infused categories and enactment of associated roles and practices points to a process which is very individual, yet also extremely collective. As noted in the prologue, they are the inscribed dramas that each of us enact in chorus.

Humanitarianism infuses haves with a consciousness, concern, sense and agency to intervene into the lives of have-nots. As Moyo (2009) fittingly suggests: “We live in a culture of aid” (xviii), and “Aid has become a cultural commodity” (xix). This commoditization of culture and its relation to liberal peace and development discourses has become a mainstay of the global humanitarian order. The construction of beneficiaries and benefactors is addressed in this
thesis agenetically (second study) and discursively (third study); both relate strongly to the materialization of social interventions.

Some elements pertaining to the construction of actorhood categorizations can be explicated using Said’s critical cultural theory of Orientalism. According to Said (1978), the images of the East (Orient) and West (Occident) were defined by and for the West through generations of intellectual and political imagination. Drawing on Foucault’s notion of discourse, which can be understood as constituting systems of knowledge and power, Said reveals how Orientalist discourses infuse the institutions, language, scholarship, imagery, principles, policies, interests, interventions, as well as the colonial and imperial practices of the West. Part culture and part ideology, Orientalism construes ‘them’—the exotic, romantic, thoughtless, savage Oriental—as necessitating specific modes of engagement by an enlightened ‘us’. This unequal dichotomy justifies the West to imagine, define, impose, engage, exploit, and govern the East (Said, 1978).

Following Said, much scholarship argues that the global humanitarian order is predicated on the cultural and spatial-material construction of two unequal classes (Smirl, 2008). At an abstract level each class embodies stark contrasts; rich versus poor, have and have-nots, first and third worlds, North versus global South, West versus East, experts and unknowing, empowered and empowerable poor, donors and beneficiaries, saviours and damned. These social and cultural dynamics embody the discursive inequalities that infuse global humanitarian action. Stripped of history and context, the simplified poor find themselves subject to such value-laden labels as underdevelopment, poverty, emergencies, and crises; though often implied as being innate to the character of the developing world, these labels both describe and serve as the pretext for the sustained reproduction of the humanitarian order (Escobar, 1995; Calhoun, 2004).

Returning to the third study, the construction of actors and the scene of violence—Black-African women and girls attacked by Arab-Islamic militias when collecting fuelwood—impose imagined categories of actorhood and in doing so define the imagined Other (victims, aggressors, and the theatre of violence) and their saviours (advocacy and humanitarian organizations and their constituents). This mutual construction of beneficiary and benefactor simultaneously justifies an impressive array of Western-centric humanitarian actorhood in the form of transnational and domestic advocacy work, fundraising, and humanitarian technology interventions. It also serves as the basis for the institutionalization of the rape-
stove problematization, which ascribes to cookstoves the incredible ability to prevent conflict-related sexual violence, first in Darfur then everywhere.

It is worth noting that there are significant consequences that arise as a result of social intervention, especially when they involve the imposition of Western-centric cultural ideals. This is captured beautifully in Philip Caputo's novel Acts of Faith (2005); together, the far-away cultural construction of slavery in Sudan in the imagination of the American religious right spawns the organization of interventions to purchase the freedom of Black slaves. Actors playing various roles make such interventions possible. They include thrill-seeking pilots, savvy businesswomen, Evangelical Christian saviours, weapon traders, and rebels. Representing a variety of backgrounds and conflicting interests, they become entangled in a narrative where the boundaries that separate noble purpose, profiteering, love and war-making melt away in human tragedy.

Additionally, this thesis suggests significant consequences for the interventions studied. In the case of DDR, ineffective or misaligned techniques of control (defective tractors, finance) threaten the viability of the cooperatives. And as theorized in the case of fuel-efficient stoves, the generalization of a dis-embedded technical panacea masks the complex reality of violence and places the burden of poverty into the private lives of the most vulnerable.

5.1.2 Technologies and techniques of control

Technologies and techniques of control emerged as the most unexpected theme, and also the most underdeveloped. Technology is of course central to study on fuel-efficient stoves. As with the opening quote of the third paper, fuel-efficient stoves gained "magic powers" based on the "contexts of the narratives" in which it they are embedded (Harré, 2002: 25). The fascinating aspect of this study, for me, relates to the narratives that posit a simple domestic cookstove as capable of addressing a plethora of extremely complex problems: deforestation, climate change, smoke inhalation, and sexual violence. For one, neither fuelwood nor cooking are significant contributors to these problems; of course, smoke inhalation is related to stove use, but most efficient stoves do not address this problem unless they are provided with an appropriate chute through which to remove smoke from the cooking area. Moreover, stoves are simply not designed to address these problems; simply stated, efficient stoves are designed to burn fuel, produce heat, and cook. How then are stoves thought capable of solving some of the world's most pressing complex problems?
In reality, there is no causal link that relates the burning of fuel, production of heat, and act of cooking to the above-mentioned problems; rather, the link exists through the narratives, myths, or memes that attribute to stoves magic powers.

Discourses embody meanings that grant technologies perceived capabilities far beyond their technical affordances. When models of actorhood are incorporated as part of these discursive constructions, technologies are thought capable of structuring associated social practices. In this way technologies are considered techniques of control. This is evidenced in the case of reintegration, where the ‘DDR tractor’ emerged an important technique of intervention. Together with the cooperative enterprise model and finance, the tractor was intended to structure a very specific practice: collective mechanized farming. In practice, however, the primary value of the tractors was in many ways measured at their point of delivery; they served a ceremonial/symbolic purpose by representing national efforts to support reintegration and recovery. From a theoretical perspective, this empirical example—along with the ideals-discourses-techniques model, and particularly the notion of techniques of control (Hasselbladh and Kallinikos, 2000)—motivated the conceptualization of institutional anchors—intervention techniques for structuring specific social practices. It is my hope that future research on institutional anchors as a social intervention technique will prove theoretically fruitful and practically relevant.

5.2 Concluding remarks

The above-mentioned overarching themes capture threads that run through this thesis. They also offer directions for future work. In particular, I believe there is much room to advance new approaches for multi-level and spatial theorizing in organization studies using social interventions as a unit of analysis. For instance, some international NGOs operate in more countries than the largest multinational corporations. And DDR protocols have been included in over sixty peace agreements with a variety of outcomes. They social interventions they engage, like those studied in this thesis, involve actors and activities that cut across levels of analysis, from global to local. How might we better understand the tensions between universal ideals, discourses, and context-specific interventions? Moreover, I hope to push more deeply into the role institutional anchors may play in enabling specific practices, and in turn how the adoption of new practices may or may not lead to social (institutional) change.

Needless to say, all errors or omissions are my own.
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