The London School of Economics and Political Science

In Pursuit of Development:
The United Nations, Decolonization and Development Aid,
1949-1961

Aaron Dean Rietkerk

Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

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Abstract

This thesis examines a number of specific efforts by the United Nations to offer and administer development aid to newly independent and ‘underdeveloped’ countries from the Global South during the decades following World War Two. Broadly, this thesis casts light on the competitive nature of postwar international development. In doing so, it examines development as a contest, whereby, the United Nations sought to stake out a claim to its share of the global development process during the 1950s and early 1960s. Crucially, this thesis sets this struggle against the backdrop of the increasing demand for development aid that accompanied the advent of mass decolonization in Africa by 1960. Consequently, this gave rise to a heightened competition over what type of aid best suited newly independent countries and who should administer it. Here, this study demonstrates how the UN contended with both bilateral and multilateral aid options outside the Organization, as well as, the challenges associated with providing development aid to countries that requested non-colonial assistance yet jealously guarded their newly acquired sovereignty.

Finally, it was through the UN’s belief in its development directive, its unique ‘brand’ of aid and the value of its operational pursuits that it added a crucial dimension to the development discourse of the period. At the UN, this resulted in the expansion of the UN’s development reach and development becoming a primary, if not the chief focus of the Organization during the First UN Development Decade of the 1960s. At the same time, it was during the postwar decades that the Organization helped to give development a global quality through a concerted effort towards the internationalization of development aid. Altogether, this thesis extends the boundaries of the study of postwar development by demonstrating how the UN functioned as an important autonomous institution and actor as it promoted economic and social development through multilateral development aid. Furthermore, this study challenges traditional interpretations of the UN that depict the Organization as solely a foreign policy tool of its member states or as an Organization predominantly concerned with peace and security issues during this era.
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### List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>Administrative Committee on Co-ordination</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFEA</td>
<td>American Farm Economic Association</td>
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>Armée Nationale Congolaise</td>
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<td>APP</td>
<td>American Presidency Project</td>
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<td>CDF</td>
<td>UN Capital Development Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENIS</td>
<td>Center for International Studies at MIT</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAG</td>
<td>Development Assistance Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDEL</td>
<td>Dwight D. Eisenhower Library</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEA</td>
<td>UN Department of Economic Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DLF</td>
<td>Development Loan Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>UN Economic Commission for Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECLA</td>
<td>UN Economic Commission for Latin America</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>Economic and Social Council of the United Nations</td>
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<td>EPTA</td>
<td>Expanded Program of Technical Assistance</td>
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<td>Exim</td>
<td>Export-Import Bank</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
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<td>FFHC</td>
<td>Freedom from Hunger Campaign</td>
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<td>FO</td>
<td>Foreign Office of the United Kingdom</td>
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<td>FRUS</td>
<td>Foreign Relations of the United States</td>
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<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<td>IBRD</td>
<td>International Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<td>ICAO</td>
<td>International Civil Aviation Organization</td>
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<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Authority</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labor Organization</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>INEAC</td>
<td>Institut National pour l’Etude d’Agronomie du Congo Belge</td>
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<tr>
<td>ITU</td>
<td>International Telecommunication Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAMCO</td>
<td>Liberia-American-Swedish Minerals Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>MESC</td>
<td>Middle East Supply Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>MHS</td>
<td>Massachusetts Historical Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNC</td>
<td>Mouvement National Congolais</td>
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<td>MONUC</td>
<td>UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>MSP</td>
<td>Mutual Security Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>NARA</td>
<td>National Archives and Records Administration of the United States</td>
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<td>NIEO</td>
<td>New International Economic Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSL</td>
<td>National Swedish Library</td>
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<td>ODS</td>
<td>Official Document System of the United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OEEC</td>
<td>Organization for European Economic Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPEX</td>
<td>Operational and Executive Program of the United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>PL 480</td>
<td>Public Law 480</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSC</td>
<td>Roosevelt Study Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUNFED</td>
<td>Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAA</td>
<td>Technical Assistance Administration</td>
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<td>TAB</td>
<td>Technical Assistance Board</td>
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<td>TAC</td>
<td>Technical Assistance Committee</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAR</td>
<td>United Arab Republic</td>
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<td>UKNA</td>
<td>United Kingdom National Archives</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNARMS</td>
<td>United Nations Archives and Records Management Section</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>UN Conference on Trade and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNEDA</td>
<td>UN Economic Development Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNEF</td>
<td>United Nations Emergency Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOGIL</td>
<td>UN Observation Group in Lebanon</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNRRA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Program of the United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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<td>WMO</td>
<td>World Meteorological Organization</td>
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INTRODUCTION

Nearly a year into his tenure as Secretary-General of the United Nations, during a 10 February 1954 press conference, Dag Hammarskjold responded to a question about sizeable staff reductions at the Organization by launching into his vision for the ‘proper direction’ of the international institution going forward. He explained that one main directive was the UN’s role in the economic, political and cultural development of underdeveloped countries. He continued:

The reason why I feel that this is properly a United Nations activity and something which is quite essential is that I do not see any instrument other than the United Nations which can channel the things that can be provided—know-how, and so forth—by the more highly developed countries. In the long run, that operation cannot be pursued by any national Government as well as it can be pursued by the United Nations. There is no other international organization or group of organizations which can do exactly the same job.¹

Hammarskjold’s statement signaled developments already taking place at the UN, but even more so foreshadowed future changes and pursuits of the Organization. In many ways, this thesis is an examination of the extent to which the UN attempted to live up to the standard and execute the strategy expressed by Hammarskjold.² In doing so, it offers a UN-centered analysis of the Organization’s thinking and practices by exploring various means, or case studies, by which the UN attempted to offer or channel development aid to newly independent and so-called ‘underdeveloped’ countries during the decades following World War Two. The aim of this study is to investigate the following questions: what factors motivated the UN to exert its development directive? To what extent did the UN attempt to frame and direct the debate on economic development aid to underdeveloped countries? By

² As a point of clarification, the term ‘United Nations’ has been used to refer to the member states that make up the Organization, its major forums like the General Assembly and Security Council or the institution itself—the Secretariat and the Office of the Secretary-General. Unless otherwise stated, when referencing the UN Organization this thesis is referring to the UN Secretariat and the Office of the Secretary-General. Member states and forums will be referred to by name. Additionally, in recognition of the dominant vernacular of the period under review, the phrase ‘underdeveloped countries’ will be used to refer to states from the Global South, which are now referred to as ‘developing countries’, ‘emerging economies’ or ‘least developed countries’.
what means did the UN try to offer development aid to newly independent countries of the Global South? Similarly, to what extent did the coming of mass decolonization, which swelled the ranks of the UN with member states from the Global South, affect the Organization’s development agenda? What was the reaction and role played by the United States, which from the UN’s founding held sway over the Organization and dictated much of its agenda? What were the steps taken by and at the UN to ultimately make development the Organization’s primary focus? In answering these questions this thesis contributes to the discussion of the unique nature of UN development aid during the postwar decades.

Crucially, this thesis makes a number of specific arguments as well as contains several new interpretations and findings. It makes clear just how important the UN was as an autonomous institution and actor, from the late 1940s onwards, as it promoted its brand of development aid. This thesis explores the myriad of factors that motivated those within the Organization to exert the UN’s development aid mandate. These range widely and include more altruistic factors like the desire to live up to the principles found in the UN Charter, which pledged the Organization’s services for ‘the economic and social advancement of all peoples’. More specifically the Charter also foresaw the UN as a means to promote ‘higher standards of living, full employment and conditions of economic progress and development’ and find solutions to ‘international economic, social, health, and related problems’.3 Yet, what also comes through is a desire at the UN to prove its own worth coupled with a perspective that UN aid programs were better than alternative aid options. Speaking more to the latter two motives, this thesis specifically casts light on the competitive nature of postwar international development. However, it does not reduce development to strictly a Cold War competition set alongside the space race or arms race, nor strictly as a competition between the haves and the have-nots—although these perspectives certainly have merit. Instead, the

thesis examines development as a contest, whereby, the United Nations sought to stake out a claim to its share of the global development process during the 1950s and early 1960s.

This contest is set against the backdrop of—and further motivated by—an increased demand for development aid that accompanied the advent of mass decolonization in Africa in 1960. This, consequently, gave rise to a vigorous debate over what type of aid best suited newly independent countries and who should administer it. Here, this study demonstrates how the UN contended with both bilateral and multilateral aid options outside the Organization, as well as, the challenges associated with providing development aid to countries that requested assistance yet jealously guarded their newly acquired sovereignty. However, that is not to say there were no instances of cooperation between the UN and key member states over the issues relating to multilateral development aid. In fact, this thesis highlights many of those instances where the common, albeit wide-ranging goal of developing underdeveloped countries resulted in a confluence of interests and undertakings at the international level.

It was through the UN’s belief in its development directive, its unique ‘brand’ of aid and the value of its operational pursuits that the UN added a crucial dimension to the development discourse of the period. It also utilized various existing doctrines of development, like modernization theory, to pursue its goal of gaining and maintaining relevance in the development arena. At the UN, this resulted in the expansion of the Organization’s development reach and development becoming a primary, if not the chief focus of the international institution heading into the First UN Development Decade of the 1960s. At the same time, it was during the postwar decades that the Organization helped to give development a global quality through a concerted effort towards the internationalization of development aid. In doing so, this thesis extends the boundaries of the study of postwar development.
Historiography

Histories of development efforts undertaken during the second half of the twentieth century have, by and large, failed to extend the study of development to include the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies. Since historians have taken up the task of re-examining postwar economic and social development, much of the resulting scholarship has predominantly focused on the influence of both American foreign policy and social science on this process. The earliest of these studies took a wide look at development from a theoretical or policymaking framework while the most recent have started to examine development at an operational level. Likewise, when tracing development aid’s pre-history scholars have chosen to study postwar development as a derivative of any number of Western antecedents—colonialism, the culmination of Enlightenment ideals, turn-of-the-century progressivism or New Deal activism applied globally. From this perspective, postwar modernization appears to have been primarily an American or Western undertaking.

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7 There are several important recent studies that look at development as a joint effort of Third World states and the US. For example, in many ways Bradley Simpson’s, Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and US–Indonesian Relations, 1960–1968 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008) is as much about the Indonesians ‘doing development’ as about American efforts to develop Indonesia. See also, Gregg A. Brazinsky, Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of a Democracy (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007) and Edward Miller, Misalliance: Ngo Dinh
According to development historian Corinna Unger, this has led to an incomplete depiction of postwar modernization that neglects international and transnational approaches to this process. She contends that development thinking was less insular than current studies suggest since, after 1945, the United Nations and its related organizations in particular, ‘provided important forums for the evolution of development thinking as well as for the discussion and transfer of modernization discourses and practices.’

Recently, efforts by historians to broaden the boundaries of postwar modernization studies have made way for new histories of development. These works look beyond the state and to international institutions as ideal case studies for analyzing transnational debates and development discourses. Representing the vanguard of this turn was Akira Iriye’s *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World*. Iriye makes the case that since the late nineteenth-century international organizations were more effective than nation-states in reflecting transnational concerns and fostering human interdependence. Another seminal piece of scholarship dedicated to examining the *longue durée* of international organizations ability to design and implement development practices is Richard Jolly’s, et. al. *UN Contributions to Development Thinking and Practice*. This study provides the first comprehensive effort to chart the impact the UN had on improving human standards of living during the second half of the twentieth century. Craig N. Murphy in *The United Nations Development Programme: A Better Way?*, takes a similarly positive view that when it came to development practices, the UN took the lead. Equally

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important is Amy Staples’ *The Birth of Development: How the World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization, and World Health Organization Changed the World, 1945-1965.* Staples tracks the pre-history of these UN Specialized Agencies, examining how each played a substantial role in defining development throughout the twentieth century. Staples is, however, less inclined to label the development efforts of these institutions as successes or failures. Other international histories of development have likewise broken new ground—most notably studies on the World Bank and its role in postwar development.

Altogether, the study of the economic and social impact of the UN is a relatively recent trend in UN historiography. Classic studies tended to focus on the Organization’s founding and its institutional developments thereafter, while operationally, the emphasis has

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been predominately on the peace and security functions of the UN or its political diplomacy.\textsuperscript{13} (The historiographical section on the Congo Crisis from Chapter Four will also bear this out). Meanwhile, historians have long viewed the UN as a component of the Cold War narrative—if not a tool of the Great Powers.\textsuperscript{14} Histories of the UN’s second Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold—a central figure in this study—similarly focus on Hammarskjold’s landmark activities in the peace and security fields namely during the Suez, the Lebanese and Congo crises.\textsuperscript{15}


Yet as UN histories continue to diversify, the possibilities for research remain plentiful since, as Glenda Sluga has argued, looking beyond the state through the study of international institutions allows global historians to revisit and resuscitate established topics while examining them from new perspectives. Elsewhere, she and Sunil Amrith note how the UN has the ability to ‘enrich diverse historiographies’ as recently demonstrated in the arena of the historical study of human rights. Crucially therefore, they place the UN and its various sub-organs firmly at the center of both the international and transnational themes of new historical scholarship. Moreover, they specifically see the Organization’s interventions to deal with the problem of social and economic development as an area in which UN sources have opened up broad new questions regarding the role of the UN and relations between North and South. This thesis aims to address these issues further by examining various interlocking episodes, described below, that highlight the UN’s effort to intervene and take up the challenge of social and economic development on a global scale.


Outline

This thesis is organized chronologically, from the creation of the first development aid program at the UN in 1949 to the culmination of the UN’s largest aid program that took place in the midst of the Congo Crisis during the early 1960s. This approach has the advantage of accentuating the evolution of UN development aid in the decade leading up to the so-called ‘First UN Development Decade’ of the 1960s. However, each chapter can also stand alone as a case study on a specific facet or method of UN development aid as the summaries below will show. Given that this thesis centers on the UN competing for its share of the global development effort, it gives more weight to periods of more intense competition. Therefore, Chapter One spans an entire decade, from 1949 to 1959, whereas the rest of the thesis narrows in on the period from 1959 to 1961. The latter period is a pivotal juncture where the UN sought to reach out and meet the needs of newly independent states during an era of mass decolonization as it transitioned to ultimately making development its primary focus.

The goal of my first chapter is to explore the UN’s development directive that stemmed in part from the UN Charter, which promised the Organization would undertake the promotion of ‘higher standards of living, full employment and conditions of economic progress and development.’ This mandate became more of a focus as the Organization’s attention shifted from the global North to the Global South during the course of the 1950s. More directly, this chapter analyzes the two earliest branches of UN development aid. The first is the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance (EPTA). Created in 1949, it served as the flagship technical assistance program for the UN and the most fully multilateral source of economic aid available to underdeveloped countries through the 1950s. Complementing the work of the EPTA, the UN Special Fund, which came into existence in January 1959, centered on the concept of ‘pre-investment’ aid. The aim of both programs was to spur long-

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term economic growth by either transferring knowledge to underdeveloped areas by way of EPTA experts or to make investment more attractive, feasible and effective in underdeveloped countries by helping with the ‘spadework’ of larger investment projects through the Special Fund.

In examining how these two programs were ‘sold’ to both donor and recipient countries—and as a way to avoid the pit-falls of writing a dry institutional history—this thesis discusses the roles played by significant personalities within the UN Secretariat who were instrumental in developing and expanding the EPTA and the Special Fund. This list includes Secretary-General Hammarskjold, along with David Owen, Executive-Director of the EPTA and Managing Director of the Special Fund, Paul Hoffman. Much of this chapter examines how these individuals viewed and attempted to promote these programs as a distinct and ideal type of development aid. This was all the more necessary since both programs obtained their respective operational budgets completely through voluntary donations from UN member states and could only operate in a given country at the request of the recipient government. In this way, these programs offered an alternative to bilateral postwar aid programs, whose creation was sparked, in large part, by President Harry S. Truman’s famous 1949 Point Four speech that called on America to aid underdeveloped countries.

Finally, perhaps the most important contribution that Chapter One makes to the growing scholarship on postwar development efforts is its analysis of how architects of UN aid framed certain UN development schemes, in particular the Special Fund, within a wider debate on development taking place. More specifically, this chapter examines the extent to which Paul Hoffman utilized rhetoric from a development discourse known as modernization theory. Two MIT economists, Walt W. Rostow and Max Millikan, popularized this theory during the mid to late 1950s. In short, modernization theory glorified scientific, industrial,
and technological progress, as the means to achieve economic, social and political (i.e. democratic) transformation within a society. The theory enjoyed widespread favor during the early 1960s, (Rostow even became a top adviser to President John F. Kennedy), yet historians have depicted the theory nearly exclusively as an American foreign policy tool. In short, this thesis will argue that in this case, the UN successfully made use of modernization principles to appeal to potential donor and recipient countries interested in investigating the benefits of pre-investment aid offered by the Special Fund. In this way, it shows how the modernization impulse not only predated the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations but also was not exclusively a US foreign policy tool. Altogether then, the two branches of UN grant aid, the EPTA and the Special Fund, displayed the Organization’s ability to navigate conflicting interests, expand beyond its peace and security functions and lay the foundation for its brand of development aid, all the while contributing to the development discourse of the era.

Chapter Two begins with the emergence of an effort led by Secretary-General Hammarskjold to assess and respond to the tide of newly independent and underdeveloped African countries, sixteen of which gained their independence and joined the UN in 1960 alone. The reality of political independence for these African states overlapped with the desire that de facto sovereignty should rightly and swiftly follow de jure. Hammarskjold witnessed this desire firsthand during his six-week continent-wide tour of Africa in early 1960. Thus, the first half of this chapter examines the central role the Secretary-General played in shifting the Organization’s attention towards Africa and the economic and social development of the continent through much of the rest of 1960. In an effort to fulfill the needs expressed to him by various African leaders, Hammarskjold paid increasing attention

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towards what he classified as ‘a case for [the] internationalization of aid.’ Nevertheless, this effort did not occur in a vacuum. Competing interests arose in what would become, during the course of 1960, a scramble to control development aid to newly independent Africa. Hammarskjold responded to the scramble by successfully promoting the expansion of the existing development aid machinery of the United Nations, namely the aforementioned EPTA and the UN Special Fund. By doing so, Hammarskjold was motivated by a hope to win over the continent by establishing a precedent for multilateral aid in the region.

For all the supposed benefits of technical assistance and pre-investment aid, what newly independent African states really sought in 1960 was capital—a type of Marshall Plan for Africa. Thus, much of the second half of this chapter highlights the intense competition between the UN, plus the majority of its member states and a small group of powerful donor states who squared off over the question of creating a multilateral capital development fund. This section specifically focuses on a passionate debate that took place at the UN during the summer and fall of 1960 over the call to establish a billion dollar global finance facility that could provide major capital financing for underdeveloped countries on easier terms compared to those offered through the World Bank. This lending method is known as soft loan financing. By 1960, the debate matched a proposed soft financing agency attached to the World Bank, known as the International Development Association (IDA), against a comparable program proposed by the UN known as the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED). Most Western governments including Washington backed the IDA, while the Afro-Asian bloc at the UN supported the creation of SUNFED. Scholarship on this topic tends to write-off SUNFED as a failed enterprise as early as 1957 to the neglect of the rigorous and renewed debate that took place on the eve of mass decolonization in Africa. For his part, Hammarskjold sought to carve out a role for himself in

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either program, yet ultimately believed the billions allocated by any new financing agency would be ‘better billions’ if administered by an organization like the UN. In the end, the culmination of the debate showed how the growth of the competition over development assistance to Africa was due to the hothouse atmosphere of the United Nations forums and the policies pursued by Secretary-General Hammarskjold. Altogether, it was the surest sign yet of the Organization’s pivot towards making development the primary function of the UN.

Chapter Three highlights one additional area where the UN sought to compete for an expanded share in global development aid—namely in the area of food aid. More specifically, this chapter begins by examining a growing debate over the nature and purpose of food aid. It then concentrates on how, through the establishment of the UN World Food Program (WFP) in 1961, key international institutions like the UN and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), redefined and redirected food assistance by transforming food aid into development capital for underdeveloped countries. Simply put, the UN’s goal was to emphasize a more recipient-centered utilization of food aid for economic development. Crucially, this approach challenged two prevailing impulses of the first half of the twentieth century—and especially the 1950s. First, that the primary purpose of food aid for donor countries was to dispose of, or dump, surplus agricultural stock. Second, that the primary function of food aid for recipient countries was hunger alleviation. Reinforcing these principles was an enormous American food aid program developed in 1954 called Public Law 480 (PL 480) that dominated the food aid landscape from its inception until the coming of the World Food Program.

As with previous chapters, this chapter highlights key figures who shaped the evolving transnational debate taking place over food aid in the early 1960s—a debate that included members of the UN Secretariat, the FAO, agricultural economists and

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modernization theorists alike. Through this process, the foremost development economist at
the UN, Hans W. Singer, joined with the FAO Director–General B.R. Sen and Secretary-
General Hammarskjold in an attempt to re-conceptualize food aid and de–emphasize specific
national interests in favor of more reciprocity between donor and recipient countries. For
Singer especially, food aid fitted into what he called the ‘new look’ of development aid.24
Much like with the EPTA, the Special Fund and SUNFED, Singer argued food aid was an
arena in which the UN served as a far better mechanism for brokering negotiations over
development assistance than any one country by itself and, therefore, where the UN deserved
a larger share of coordinating the work. This chapter will focus on Singer’s efforts in early
1961, when he headed an expert committee asked to construct a report that explicitly made
the connection between food aid and economic development and the UN’s future role in the
process. Perhaps surprisingly, Singer, like Hoffman, relied on many hallmarks of
modernization theory as a justification and means to expand food aid even though he is
credited with being the intellectual founder of the theory’s antithesis—dependency theory.
Nevertheless, Singer pursued a strategy of using elements of modernization theory as a means
to advance and justify the cause of pursuing food aid at the UN.

Perhaps more than in the other chapters of this thesis, this study on the nature and
purpose of postwar food aid highlights the crucial role played by Washington—namely the
Kennedy Administration. In this case, instead of competing with each other over the
allocation of development aid, the aims of the Administration and the UN coalesced. Over the
course of 1961, this ultimately resulted in a shift in thinking for the Kennedy Administration,
away from PL 480’s focus on surplus disposal of US agricultural commodities and towards
the use of its surpluses as a means to promote economic development. Ultimately, this

coincided with the establishment of the UN World Food Program later in 1961, which was in large part championed by the US.

Finally, my last two chapters together provide one of the best case studies available to examine what UN historian Christopher O’Sullivan has called the ‘first test’ the UN faced over decolonization—the Congo Crisis of 1960-65. These chapters show more of the operational arm of the UN and the challenges it faced in administering the UN brand of development aid established during the previous decade. The complex and multifaceted nature of the Congo Crisis and the UN aid mission made it necessary to divide this topic into two chapters while also focusing on the first eighteen months of the crisis. Chapter Four covers the first six months, from just before Congo’s independence in June 1960 until the end of the year. Chapter Five examines the period from January 1961 until the end of that year. The decision to end the in-depth analysis of the UN Civilian Mission at the end of 1961 is partly due to the space constraints of the thesis. Nevertheless, the UN civilian aid mission faced the vast majority of its challenges during the eighteen-month period from June 1960 to December 1961, at which point civilian aid between the UN and the Congo normalized and stabilized.

The narrative of the first eighteen-months of the crisis is highly complicated. However, it is enough to say here, without going into exhaustive detail, that a series of major political, economic, administrative and humanitarian crises quickly followed the independence of the former Belgian colony of the Congo on 30 June 1960. Into the void left by the fleeing Belgians and the general mayhem that ensued stepped the United Nations and thousands of peacekeepers and aid workers. Together they formed the UN Operation to the Congo, identified by its French acronym ONUC.

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Crucially, these chapters examine an important but overwhelmingly neglected part of ONUC and the anatomy of the Congo Crisis—namely the work of the UN Civilian Operation to the Congo. Totaling over 400 aid workers by 1961, the Civilian Mission attempted to administer the UN brand of economic and social development aid that purported to be multilateral, impartial and development-focused. This took place in multiple sectors of the Congo—mostly notably in the essential services of public administration, health, education and finance. Thus, these chapters will argue that the UN Civilian Mission was an integral part of the overall ONUC mission and a vital part of what the UN was trying to accomplish in the Congo. Nevertheless, this study will show how the Congo presented a myriad of new challenges for UN aid workers and members of the UN Secretariat who now found themselves effectively trying to administer aid to a near failed state through much of 1960 and 1961. With the Belgians having fled, much of the Congolese civil service severely under-trained, the economy in shock and high government positions left vacant, these chapters will show how, at the level of implementation, the UN tried to account for the local realities. It will make apparent how the seemingly innocuous brand of UN development aid developed over the previous decade wound up being far more provocative than ever imagined in the context of the Congo Crisis. Thus, these chapters will examine how the UN struggled to adhere to its previous standards as it attempted to serve as a guarantor of Congolese development, while trying to avoid becoming an inheritor of European colonialism.

**Sources and Methodology**

The strength of any historical argument centers on its sources. Therefore, this thesis relies heavily on a number of key archives as well as other primary source material. These sources are found predominately in institutional, government and private archives in the United States, Britain and Sweden. Firstly, this thesis makes use of the collection of the Dag

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26 See Chapter Four for an exhaustive historiographical analysis of the Congo Crisis and the UN’s role.
Hammarskjold Papers—dispersed among three separate archives.\textsuperscript{27} The vast majority of the Hammarskjold Papers are at the National Library of Sweden in Stockholm. Due to the size and scope of this collection, it contains the best material for a serious study of the Secretary-General. The collection is divided into two parts, one containing more personal papers taken from Hammarskjold’s residences in New York and Sweden, while the other more political in nature and obtained from the Secretary-General’s New York office filing cabinets upon his death. As expected, much of the political material relates to various peace and security issues like the Suez Crisis, the formation of the UN Emergency Force in the Sinai, the Lebanese and Jordanian crises of 1958 and the Congo Crisis. Yet also among these resources, one can discover Hammarskjold’s increasing interest in expanding the UN’s role in economic and social development in newly independent and often underdeveloped countries. Next, the Andrew W. Cordier Papers held at the Columbia University Rare Book and Manuscripts Library in New York are the second main source of Hammarskjold-related material. This collection yielded a few useful sources but unfortunately, much of the material remains closed.\textsuperscript{28} Finally, the last few boxes of Hammarskjold’s Papers are contained at the UN Archives (UNARMS) in New York. The collection consists of a very small portion of records left over after transferring the bulk of his material to Sweden or Columbia.

Nevertheless, the latter two archives contain a wealth of information in other areas relating to the topic of this thesis. Specifically, this thesis makes use of Andrew Cordier’s own papers—apart from Hammarskjold’s. Cordier served as Hammarskjold’s executive assistant and trusted adviser. His position within the Secretariat made him privy to most of the key political decisions and the originator of a great deal of policy himself. For these

\textsuperscript{27} Please refer to the author’s post on the Dag Hammarskjold Papers here: \url{http://unhistoryproject.org/research/research_experiences-Rietkerk.html}.

\textsuperscript{28} Despite requesting full de-classification of the Cordier Papers in November of 2013, and following up repeatedly, the author’s petition still awaits approval. The delay may have to do with the fact that the corresponding UN departments of origin make the decisions on de-classification, not the Columbia University Libraries.
reasons, Cordier is often described as the most important behind-the-scenes figure during Hammarskjöld's tenure in office. The remaining papers that are accessible offer a crucial and altogether unique window into the UN and Hammarskjöld during the 1950s and early 60s. Moreover, this thesis makes wide use of the Arthur David Kemp Owen Papers held at the Columbia University Rare Book and Manuscripts Library. David Owen, the longtime head of the EPTA, was important due to the central role he played in shaping UN development aid from its outset. Additionally, Owen corresponded with many of the top UN aid agents and administrators in the field, while also communicating regularly with the UN’s stable of development economists—including Hans Singer.

Despite the fact that the official UN archive, UNARMS, has a minimal amount of material on Hammarskjöld and is characterized by similar restrictions on other individuals or topics related to this thesis, it contains numerous untapped records on the UN Civilian Mission to the Congo. These mostly come in the form of cables to and from New York and Leopoldville, the Congo’s capital, as well as regular ‘Progress Reports’ updating those at the Secretariat as to the implementation of civilian aid on the ground. These files were critical in piecing together a full picture of the UN Civilian Mission as a component of the overall UN operation to the Congo. Supplementing these files was the UN Careers Records Project collection at the Oxford Bodleian Library. In particular, the papers of George Ivan Smith offered a personal account of some of the UN’s early development efforts with African leaders. Additionally, a large collection of oral history transcripts collected by the UN itself or through the UN Intellectual History Project offer many outspoken reflections from UN personnel that serve to provide even more of a human element to an institutional history.

Next, this thesis makes use of the national archives of the UK and US. The goal in using these archives was to gain access to files relating to each country’s UN Mission to New York. Both Britain and the US had large UN Missions and their respective Ambassadors to
the UN had many significant and candid conversations with top UN officials including Secretary-General Hammarskjold. For this reason, it was also helpful to consult the papers of Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., the US Ambassador to the UN from 1953-1960. Lodge’s papers reveal a top US official who served as the strongest advocate for channeling aid through the UN within the Eisenhower Administration. To supplement these sources this thesis make use of files contained at the Eisenhower and Kennedy Presidential Libraries and the published volumes of the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series. These US sources were also helpful in examining a number of alternative schemes to UN development offered or supported by the US—like PL 480 food aid or IDA finance aid to name two. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning here that this thesis does not offer comprehensive coverage of every alternative to UN development aid devised by state or non-state actors during the period under review. For example, it mostly avoids analysis on any specific non-American development schemes devised in the postwar decades by various European metropoles (except for Belgian aid to the Congo, which is addressed) or the British Commonwealth.29 Furthermore, it mentions only briefly the bilateral Soviet economic offensive of the 1950s and Soviet aid to the Congo. Certainly, these aid options were present and offered viable alternatives to UN or US development aid schemes, but ultimately go beyond the scope of this thesis.

Finally, this thesis makes wide use of two other main published primary sources. The first are the Dag Hammarskjold volumes of the Public Papers of the Secretaries-General series. Spanning Hammarskjold’s entire UN tenure over four volumes, this series includes an impressive array of sources including speeches, press conference transcripts and official

29 In 1950, the British Commonwealth established the Colombo Plan a cooperative venture for the economic and social advancement of the peoples of South and Southeast Asia. The group originally included seven Commonwealth nations—Australia, Britain, Canada, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), India, New Zealand and Pakistan. See, Daniel Oakman, Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan (Canberra, Australia: Pandanus, 2011). Additionally, the European Economic Community established in 1959 the European Investment Bank and the Development Fund for the Overseas Countries and Territories for the purpose of allocating and administering development aid.
papers composed by Hammarskjold. The other main published primary sources utilized by this thesis are the Official Records of the United Nations volumes. These abundant sources are essential to accessing verbatim Assembly and Council debates, in addition to retrieving UN reports and directives. Importantly, one can only access these records in physical form at UN depository libraries, since the majority of UN records during the period under review are not yet available online through the Official Document System of the UN (ODS). Often overlooked by UN and international historians alike, these records offer an insight into the conference diplomacy that took place in various UN forums. This is especially significant during the period of mass decolonization since a country’s UN Mission was often the only major diplomatic mission a newly independent underdeveloped country sent out to transmit its message to a global audience. UN reports, on the other hand, were where members of the UN Secretariat were able to exert their executive function by interpreting and augmenting often vague UN Resolutions. Altogether, the use of this combination of critical sources, while not without gaps, does offer a more-than-adequate picture of the UN’s role with regard to development and development aid from 1949 to 1961.
CHAPTER ONE

The Spadework of Development: Technical Assistance and Pre-Investment Aid at the UN, 1949-1959

On 20 January 1949, US President Harry S. Truman famously included as the fourth point in his inaugural address the call for ‘a bold new program for making the benefits of our [American] scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.’ Truman then went on to indicate America’s ‘pre-eminent’ position especially in its ability to offer its seeming inexhaustible resources in a form of aid known as technical assistance.\(^3^0\) In short, technical assistance sought to address an issue believed to be a major restraint to development, the general lack of know-how in underdeveloped countries. Expert personnel and technical organizations could fill these knowledge and skill gaps by advising and training underdeveloped countries on nearly any aspect of economic or social development.

Point Four, as the US program would come to be known, has garnered perhaps as legendary a reputation as the Marshall Plan, especially among development historians who credit it for ushering in the dawn of the postwar international development project.\(^3^1\) To be sure, Truman’s Point Four program did kick-start the development mandate in the US and beyond but should be viewed as part of a process already underway. As stated in the Introduction, historians have studied postwar development, in a broad sense, as the outgrowth of multiple forerunners. More specifically, technical assistance too was not a completely new idea unveiled by the Truman Administration in 1949. For example, the International Labor Organization (ILO), established in 1919 in conjunction with the League of Nations, sent out

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experts at the request of member states during the interwar period. Other Specialized Agencies, as they came to be known, like the FAO, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), each allocated some of their resources to sending out technical advisers in their respective fields of expertise soon after their founding during the mid-1940s.\(^{32}\)

Moreover, member states of the United Nations took up the issue of technical assistance as a means for development already in 1946—a year removed from the founding of the Organization. Specifically the Chinese and Lebanese delegates, two states that had made use of technical assistance through the League of Nations, proposed that the UN ought to administer its own technical assistance program. Invoking the language of the UN Charter, the Lebanese delegate, Charles Malik, referenced the UN’s expressed purpose ‘to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples.’ Malik concluded with a warning, already in 1946, of the need for a multilateral option that underdeveloped countries could utilize citing the drawbacks of strictly relying on bilateral aid from either the US or the Soviet Union.\(^{33}\) After studying the matter further, the General Assembly adopted resolution 200 (III) on 4 December 1948. Sponsored by Burma, Chile, Peru and Egypt, the resolution addressed technical aid as a way for member states to live up to the principles of the UN Charter. The resolution stated that a modest sum ($288,000 for the first year) be set aside each year for technical assistance as a means to economic development. This program, known as the Regular Program for Technical Assistance, came six weeks prior to Truman’s Point Four speech, which also included language that foresaw the UN and its Specialized Agencies as at least one of the conduits to

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make available the storehouse of Western technical expertise to underdeveloped countries. However, the expansion of the UN’s foray into development aid arena was by no means inevitable, especially in light of the growing Cold War tensions and the temptation by the US and Soviet Union to emphasis unilateral action or bloc aid. Certainly, the Marshall Plan and the Soviet equivalent, COMECON, are two indications of the latter trend.

This chapter examines how the United Nations fought to establish and lay claim to its development mandate during the first postwar decade. It this way this chapter depicts development as a collective goal but also a competition, whereby the UN sought to offer what it believed was a unique and more acceptable form of international aid to underdeveloped countries. The motivation behind this effort initially came from a desire to respond to the principles spelled out in the UN Charter. It had pledged the Organization’s services for ‘the economic and social advancement of all peoples’ and more specifically as a means to promote ‘higher standards of living, full employment and conditions of economic progress and development’ and find solutions to ‘international economic, social, health, and related problems’. However, further igniting the UN was a desire to keep pace with the advent of development aid options outside the Organization. More specifically, the goal of this chapter is to examine the two branches of grant-based aid offered through the UN during 1950s—technical assistance and pre-investment aid. It was through these activities that the UN added a crucial dimension to the development discourse of the period and helped to give postwar development its global quality through its earliest attempts at the internationalizing development aid.

Moreover, the role of significant personalities crucial to the formation, justification and evolution of the UN’s development mandate will come into focus. These include Secretary-General Hammarskjold, along with David Owen, Executive-Director of the UN’s technical assistance program, and Paul Hoffman, the Managing Director of the UN’s pre-investment scheme. Juxtaposing UN aid to its bilateral alternatives, these individuals and others framed development aid offered by or channeled through the UN as a distinct, and altogether better, form of aid compared to strictly bilateral aid options. Moreover, this chapter addresses the challenges the UN faced in trying to live up to what it claimed was its singularly favored position in offering or administering development aid. The chapter, therefore, examines the formative debates over the ability of UN aid to de-emphasize specific national interests, balance conceptions of development from Western donor states and recipient states from the Global South, and finally, establish more reciprocity between aid recipient and donor countries. Lastly, looking into the origins of the development directive at the UN during the 1950s will provide much of the context needed for the further examination of UN aid discussed in later chapters.

**UN and Development: The Establishment of the EPTA**

In his study of UN development aid, David Webster argues that during the 1950s the UN ‘found a global mission’ in a form of aid known as technical assistance. Webster uses the UN-run Technical Assistance Administration (TAA) to highlight how the UN Secretariat generally, and the TAA specifically, served as independent diplomatic actors in administering ‘highly multilateral’ technical assistance to Indonesia and its State Planning Bureau. This section will draw on some of Webster’s broad arguments but extend the narrative to include additional actors while contextualizing UN technical assistance as one branch of UN aid that later spurred the creation of others.

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36 David Webster, ‘Development Advisors in a Time of Cold War and Decolonization,’ 249-272.
As stated, modernizers justified the need for technical assistance on the premise that one major bottleneck to development was a general lack of know-how in underdeveloped countries. Expert personnel and technical organizations could fill these knowledge, skill and structural gaps by advising and training underdeveloped countries thus providing the foundation for future social development and economic growth. In this way, modernizers envisioned technical assistance as a form of aid that included not the transfer of wealth directly but the transfer of the capacity to generate wealth. One UN publication described the range of this type of intellectual capital offered by the Organization during the 1950s to include everything from, ‘the basic problem of how to produce better pencils to the more sophisticated art of using radioisotopes in industry and medicine; from child care and maternity training, to surveys of industrial potential.’

Crucial to the establishment of the first branch of grant aid administered by the UN were two British-run wartime alliance programs—the Middle East Supply Centre (MESC) and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). Both served as models of international instruments that specifically provided multilateral technical assistance aid.

In the case of the MESC, it utilized Western advisers to plan and expand harbor and inland transportation networks in the Middle East during the Second World War not only to prosecute the war more effectively but also to use logistical know-how to improve the lives of those peoples damaged by war. The MESC also served as a breeding ground for future key leaders at the UN. Similarly the UNRRA, established in 1943, provided food and equipment to areas liberated by the Allies during the war through the use of the same logistical acumen employed by the MESC. After its de-commissioning in 1947-48—when it was essentially

38 Murphy, The United Nations Development Programme, 37-41.
39 This included, Sir Robert Jackson, who headed the MESC and held numerous senior appointments at the UN. It also included the aforementioned David Owen and Charles Malik, an early president of the UN Economic and Social Council and, as stated, the first to propose the creation of a UN technical assistance program with a UN forum.
replaced by the Marshall Plan—many of the UNRRA personnel, as with the MESC, took up posts at the UN or within its Specialized Agencies. Thus as MESC alumnus and UN official Robert Jackson has noted, ‘the intellectual seeds of technical assistance were sown throughout the United Nations system very early in its existence.’

Others, namely David Owen, the then Assistant Secretary-General in charge of Economic Affairs at the UN and the future Executive Director of the UN’s first technical assistance program, acknowledged another stimulus for the establishment of a UN technical assistance program came from the fact that some vital aspects of economic and social development were not covered by any Specialized Agency. Owen was referring to a number of mostly autonomous Specialized Agencies within the UN system, like the aforementioned ILO, WHO and UNESCO that had each made technical assistance part of their mission in their respective fields of competence. This had resulted in member states appealing to Owen’s own office at the UN headquarters for technical assistance in the fields of public administration and social welfare services, economic planning and the upgrading of transport and communication networks.

A month after Truman’s Point Four speech, the vision for an expanded UN program for technical assistance began to crystallize. The US delegate Willard L. Thorp, opened the discussion at the first UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) meeting of 1949 by submitting a draft resolution to enlarge the technical assistance activities of the UN and its Specialized Agencies. While having no objections to Thorp’s proposal, the Indian delegate, B.R. Sen (the future Director-General of the FAO whose role is discussed in Chapter Three), believed the proposal was a step backwards from the ‘higher plane’ on which he believed President Truman placed the problem of economic development. Foreshadowing a debate that would envelope the UN for the next decade, Sen acknowledged the need for more

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technical assistance yet wished Thorp’s proposal would have addressed the bigger desire among underdeveloped countries for investment capital (the focus of Chapter Two). Thus, Sen thought Thorp had intentionally, ‘rob[bed] President Truman’s daring programme of all its substance.’

The technical assistance proposal, however circumscribed, did pass easily setting up the UN Expanded Program of Technical Assistance later in 1949. For the next decade, the EPTA served as the backbone of UN technical cooperation as one of two main branches of grant aid offered by the UN—along with the UN Special Fund discussed below. From its inception, the EPTA was the most completely multilateral source of economic aid available to underdeveloped countries through the 1950s. The aforementioned David Owen headed the EPTA and remained its only director until it merged with the Special Fund in 1965 to form the UN Development Program (UNDP).

Soon after its launching the EPTA established field offices, which according to Jolly, et. al., crucially ‘served as experimental stations where the new principles of technical assistance were tested in order to identify good practices.’ Starting in 1951, UN Resident Representatives headed these field offices. Each Resident Representative functioned as a type of developmental diplomat, acting as the point of contact between the experts and the

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42 ECOSOC OR, 8th Session, 251-253rd meetings, 25-28 February 1949.
43 The administrative framework of the EPTA included a Technical Assistance Committee (TAC) that surveyed and approved applications for technical assistance and apportioned EPTA resources obtained through voluntary contributions by UN member states. A Technical Assistance Board (TAB), made up of executive heads of the UN and its agencies, served to coordinate technical assistance activities administered by the Specialized Agencies. This group included the agencies mentioned above, the ILO, the FAO, UNESCO, and the WHO, in addition to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Additionally, the aforementioned TAA, run by the UN Secretariat itself, also operated under the EPTA. The TAA is also sometimes referred to as the UN Technical Assistance (UNTA) program. See Jolly, et. al., 70-71. In terms of distribution among participating agencies, the FAO received the largest share of funds, just over 25% of the total yearly contributions over the first decade of operations. The Secretariat’s own TAA, filling the gap in providing technical assistance not covered by any Specialized Agency, consistently received just over 20% of EPTA funds during the same period. The WHO received the next largest at about 18%. The TAB directed the bulk of EPTA field program costs towards projects in Asia, the Middle East and Latin America—that is until the advent of mass decolonization in Africa when technical assistance to Africa would dominate the geographic distribution of EPTA resources. See, Bhouraskar, 140-141.
44 Jolly, et. al., 70.
recipient government and as an in-country deputy to Owen. In fulfilling this role, Henry L. Spence Jr., a Resident Representative to Afghanistan, Libya and Pakistan during the 1950s and 60s, described his duties as trying to be, ‘at one and the same time—an executive, an administrator, a diplomat, an economist, and a public relations officer.’ In special cases, Secretary-General Hammarskjold appointed his own handpicked Resident Representative, a telling sign of the value of such a position. For example, Hammarskjold chose fellow Swede Sture Linner to serve as the Resident Representative to the Congo in mid-July 1960 at the outset of the Congo Crisis. Chapters Four and Five will highlight Linner’s role extensively but it is worth mentioning here that as a UN official he played an invaluable role in steering the Congo’s economic and social development endeavors over the first eighteen months of the crisis.

Most Resident Representatives did not head a ‘mission’ in the traditional diplomatic sense. However, a few in addition to Linner, managed to develop extraordinary governmental contacts. Such was the case for Margaret Joan Anstee, the Resident Representative for Bolivia from early 1961—the first women promoted to such a posting within the UN system. As a Resident Representative of Latin America’s largest UN program, Anstee enjoyed a close working relationship with Bolivia’s President, Victor Paz Estenssoro. Anstee described Estenssoro as a, ‘wily political bird’ who ‘constantly played the United Nations against the United States. Being the only other major actors we [the UN] acquired a political significance far beyond our monetary importance.’ Operationally, Anstee’s major responsibility was to support the Bolivian government in designing a ‘development plan’ that would attract external investors, make use of its natural resources and ultimately improve the lives of the population. According to Anstee, development planning was still a novel concept among underdeveloped countries and the West even in the early 1960s. Thus, Bolivia served as a

‘guinea-pig’ as it attempted to implement on an operational level the development theories of the day. In this way, she acknowledges the UN’s early significance in the field of development aid.46

The main task of most UN Resident Representatives was to help recipient countries decide on and submit their annual requests for technical assistance. In this capacity, the Resident Representative was to serve as an impartial referee, balancing the partisan interests of Specialized Agency representatives and government departments—a quality the EPTA would use to highlight its deserving place in the global development process. As more countries gained independence, requests for Resident Representatives increased. In 1952, there were Resident Representatives in fifteen countries, by 1958 forty-five countries had UN Resident Representatives, and by 1966, their numbers totaled seventy-two.47 Resident Representatives received most of their technical assistance experts or fellowship recipients through a specific Specialized Agency depending on the need, as the EPTA itself was far from having its own stable of experts on retainer. In other cases, individuals petitioned the EPTA directly, inquiring if their particular skill might be of use. Most EPTA experts early on were Westerners and the majority from colonial powers. From 1950 to 1964, 4,811 EPTA

46 In this respect, Anstee specifically recognized the impact of Argentine economist Raúl Prebisch—then the new director of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). Owen had originally sought out Prebisch to head the Secretariat’s branch of the EPTA, the TAA. Instead, UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie, chose to keep Prebisch in Latin America. A favorite of Owen, Prebisch argued in the 1950 Introduction to the first Economic Survey of Latin America commissioned by the ECLA that along with improved terms of trade and financial assistance, underdeveloped countries needed skills or technical assistance from the developed world. Moreover, these three components to development ought to have been, according to Prebisch, the focus of the UN Secretariat. In this way, Prebisch’s report identified the three ‘development solutions’ that would come to dominate the development debate at the UN over the ensuing years. Margaret Joan Anstee, Never Learn to Type: A Women at the United Nations (Cichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2003), 177-181, 190-191; See also, Transcript of Interview with Margaret Joan Anstee, 14 December 2000, UN Intellectual History Project. For Prebisch’s report see, David Pollok, Daniel Kerner and Joseph Love, ‘Raul Prebisch on ECLAC’s Achievements and Deficiencies: An Unpublished Interview,’ CEPAL Review 75 (December 2001): 12, as cited in Murphy, The United Nations Development Programme, 56-57.

experts came from the United Kingdom, 3,966 from the US, 3,215 from France and 1,675 from the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{48}

**Promoting UN Exceptionalism in Technical Assistance in a Changing UN**

Despite the colonial and Western pedigree of these technical experts, the EPTA held steadfast to the claim that their aid was new and exceptional as it sought to carve out a place in an increasingly competitive development aid market. EPTA officials made a point to enumerate why the program was best suited to offer technical assistance and underscored the unique nature of UN technical aid, which also served as a motivating factor behind the call to expand the EPTA further. Hugh Keenleyside, a Canadian who headed the TAA from 1950-58 was one such energetic advocate. Assistance from a central UN mechanism, according to Keenleyside, was distinct because it was divorced from the political and military undertones associated with bilateral aid—most certainly from either Cold War superpower. Instead, Keenleyside argued, technical assistance through the UN provided an ideal instrument to initiate global development due to its singularly favored position to respond to the needs of underdeveloped countries with the necessary sensitivity. This was especially true of aid targeted towards a recipient country’s financial policy and public administration where, according to Keenleyside, the UN could be inclusive of the recipient country’s objectives—a quality of the UN-brand of aid tested to its limits during the Congo Crisis as Chapters Four and Five will show. Moreover, the UN only provided aid upon request and came from an organization of which the recipient country was a full and equal member alongside donor states. Finally, the UN alone could boast that it drew upon a worldwide network of scientific and technical knowledge.\textsuperscript{49} To bolster the claim that it offered multilateral aid inoculated from colonial stigmatism or as a potential hostage to Cold War superpowers, the EPTA sought experts from non-colonial and non-American extraction. For example, from 1950-64,

\textsuperscript{48} Murphy, *The United Nations Development Programme*, 78.
India contributed 1,336 experts, Canada 1,157, Denmark 856, Switzerland 821, Australia 803 and Sweden 791.\(^{50}\)

From the start of his tenure as Secretary-General, Hammarskjold also acknowledged the value of technical assistance work. He was the most high-profile salesman of UN technical assistance. In most cases, however, Hammarskjold attempting to place UN technical assistance on a higher plane, much like Truman had in his Point Four speech. He, therefore, publicized technical assistance as a vital international element for cooperation in human progress and for the preservation of peace.\(^{51}\) Speaking at a National Press Club luncheon in April of 1954, he stated:

> When I speak of the United Nations as an instrument of realistic construction for a permanently peaceful world, I am thinking of all that undramatic work of international cooperation for economic and social progress and for the advancement of dependent peoples which so seldom makes news for you gentlemen of the press. And I suppose that it is not news in the sense that it is preventing war from happening to us today. But it would be news for your children, because these activities are directed at anticipating tensions and preventing conflicts tomorrow and the day after tomorrow, and thereafter at preventing future wars.\(^{52}\)

In fact, he lamented more than once how the world media under-represented the work of the EPTA. Hammarskjold postulated this might be due to its work in ‘unattractive situations’—namely among what he called the underfed, underemployed and the illiterate two-thirds of humanity.\(^{53}\)

Nevertheless, Hammarskjold continued to tout, along with Owen and Keenleyside, UN exceptionalism when it came to administering international aid. He was careful to draw attention to the fact that UN technical assistance was not simply ‘one-way traffic’, but instead noted that countries that received one way often gave in another. He highlighted EPTA’s

\(^{50}\) Murphy, *The United Nations Development Programme*, 78.

\(^{51}\) Draft Speech on UN Technical Assistance, 1 October 1953, National Swedish Library, Stockholm, Sweden (hereafter, NSL), Hammarskjold Papers, L179:39.


pilot ventures including Haitian coffee specialists working in Ethiopia, Bolivian doctors serving the Philippines, Rhodesian statisticians assisting in Libya, in addition to, Icelandic marine engineers working in Ceylon and Finnish aviation experts assisting El Salvadorians on airport improvements.\textsuperscript{54} For Hammarskjold, the role of the UN in this enterprise was as an outstretched arm serving to channel the flow of know-how where needed, a task the Secretary-General called an ‘A-1 priority’ in what he branded as an ‘age of anti-colonialism.’\textsuperscript{55}

Thus, early on Hammarskjold associated development with the process of and fallout from decolonization. Later he would qualify this statement by describing the UN as a ‘bridge’ where colonial powers and newly independent countries alike could safely transition through the decolonization process. In Hammarskjold’s estimation, the UN Charter provided the mandate in its call for, ‘the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.’ This included the desire among newly independent countries for de facto independence alongside de jure. The failure to meet this request had led to suspicion that any economic aid offered nearly always came with political strings. What Hammarskjold believed these countries preferred was not charity or manipulation but mainly two forms of postwar aid. One demand was for a ‘hardheaded system of technical assistance, carried out mainly through the United Nations family of agencies.’ The other was capital investment in economic development discussed in the following chapter.\textsuperscript{56}

In fact, as the mid-1950s approached, global and institutional changes as a result of decolonization seemed to inform Hammarskjold’s position further. In April 1955, the governments of Indonesia, India, China, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon co-sponsored a

\textsuperscript{55} Speech to Swedish Chamber of Commerce in the USA, 30 March 1954, NSL, Hammarskjold Papers, L179:40.
conference in Bandung, Indonesia attended by representatives from twenty-nine Asian and African countries in total. The Bandung Conference had as its primary focus on the problems of colonialism, economic development and the maintenance of peace in the midst of the Cold War as it sought to build solidarity among countries, many of which had only recently emerged from colonial rule. Asked at a press conference to evaluate the Bandung Conference in relation to the UN, Hammarskjold remarked that he believed the delegates based their final communique largely on principles expressed by the UN Charter. Therefore, Bandung would most likely come to buttress the efforts of the UN. With more time to reflect, Hammarskjold would state that Bandung served to enhance the consciousness of Bandung countries towards the UN and a desire among them to work with the UN. Craig Murphy draws on this notion when explaining how the UN system provided a variety of supports to anti-colonial movements during this era. Specifically, Murphy notes the ability of the UN to act as a forum for nationalists to demand independence while serving as a rallying point for small nations. As for UN Secretariat, it hardly shied away from producing reports that supported the view that ‘colonialism was a holdover of a less progressive past.’ Murphy concludes that by the 1950s a ‘broad, international, anti-colonial coalition had formed and simultaneously became a force promoting “development”’.

Strengthening this coalition were a number of countries that joined the UN the same year as the Bandung Conference. Their addition ended a moratorium on new UN member states starting in 1950 and imposed by Soviet obstructionism and the effects of McCarthyism. Sixteen new countries joined the UN in 1955 alone, among them a number of underdeveloped states from the Third World including Cambodia, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka).

57 Transcript of Press Conference, 5 May 1955, in Cordier and Foote, Volume II, 482.
59 Craig N. Murphy, Global Institutions, Marginalization, and Development (London: Routledge, 2005), 96-97.
Jordan, Laos, Libya, and Nepal. Then in the following year Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, along with Japan, joined. These states widened the circle of underdeveloped states in the Organization while acting as a significant factor in what Mark Mazower has called ‘the rise of the General Assembly.’

Promoting development also meant the UN showing how its technical assistance had a real measureable appeal in underdeveloped countries. UN publications touted the accomplishments of the EPTA from the start. In its first five years, EPTA experts had located fifty oil well sites in Iran. With the help of WHO, the UN established Asia’s first penicillin factory. Guided by FAO experts, farmers in Thailand were able to grow pineapples for export as a year-around crop. In Libya, UN supported surveys helped to uncover that country’s great oil wealth. The EPTA’s ostensive ability to find solutions to problems and spark growth in underdeveloped countries, at least during the 1950s, might have trumped perceptions and criticism that UN aid derived from a colonial pedigree.

The EPTA’s adoption of a ‘country programming’ approach in 1955 also helped to reinforce the idea that UN development aid was distinctly different from a civilizing mission. Country programming did away with the previous EPTA practice of allocating a fixed amount of funds to each participating Specialized Agency annually. Instead, recipient governments, still in consultation with a Resident Representatives, became the sole determinant of the type of EPTA aid they needed based on their own plans for development. Jolly, et. al. in particular states that country programming gave force to the idea of country ownership and control—a development principle only rediscovered in the 1990s. It also heralded a new recognition of the integrated nature of development aid as it evolved through

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60 Additionally, Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungry, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Romania and Spain joined as member states in 1955.


the 1950s.⁶³ Fredrick Cooper and Randall Packard in *International Development and the Social Sciences* also pick up on this point when stating that,

Unlike earlier claims of Europe to inherent superiority or a “civilizing mission,” the notion of development appealed as much to leaders of “underdeveloped” societies as to the people of developed countries…This community shared a conviction that the alleviation of poverty would not occur simply by self-regulating processes of economic growth or social change. It required a concerted intervention by the national governments both of poor and wealthy countries in cooperation with an emerging body of international aid and development organizations.⁶⁴

For Owen, this ‘partnership approach to development’ was what made the UN ‘a “most acceptable”—frequently the most acceptable—form of outside assistance.’⁶⁵

The first systemic review of the activities and value of the EPTA took place in 1956 in a report entitled, *The EPTA: A Look Forward*. By this time, the EPTA had administered operations in 133 countries and territories, employed the services of some 5,000 experts and awarded over 10,000 fellowships since 1950. Overall contributions from its inception totaled $142 million from 77 member states. Not surprisingly, *A Look Forward* promoted the cardinal principles of the EPTA that set it apart from other forms of aid and its concrete results. The report claimed the EPTA was especially proud of its perception among recipient countries that its aid served as a ‘valuable reinforcement – particularly in certain critical sectors – of their own efforts to raise the economic and social standards of their people.’

Although, the report acknowledged that not enough time had elapsed to judge fully the impact of many technical assistance projects—a verdict made all the more difficult, if not impossible, due to the impact of other variables and the hurdle of finding an appropriate yardstick.

Speaking more to its title, the report then enumerated goals for the years ahead. The first was to alleviate the limitations on its financial resources, far too modest compared with

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similar bilateral programs. Another was to take on larger development tasks and a larger share of the global development effort to meet an increasing demand as more underdeveloped countries gained independence. It specifically noted a growing emphasis in technical assistance relating to two fields crucial to states emerging from colonialism—namely public administration and training activities. This had been true of Libya, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and the Sudan and was sure to be the case for the soon-to-be-independent states of Morocco, Tunisia, Malaya and Ghana. Although, unbeknownst to the UN it was the Congo that demanded the most assistance in these areas as will be discussed later.

Altogether, *A Look Forward* would serve as a guidepost for the rest of the decade for one branch of grant aid administered through the UN while suggesting it should work to enlarge its share of responsibility for global development. It also served to put a positive spin on UN aid much like Hammarskjold, Keenleyside and Owen had done. Nevertheless, for all the touting of its exceptionalism, accomplishments and aspirations, UN technical assistance had some serious constraints and shortcomings.

**Limitations & Challenges to UN Technical Assistance**

As stated, one major limitation for the EPTA from its inception was a general scarcity of funding. Keenleyside, Hammarskjold and Owen readily admitted this shortcoming. In fact, all mitigated their claims to the value of UN aid by acknowledging that, despite its supposed superiority, the program was continually constrained by a meager budget that had spread its resources thin. It is important to recall that the EPTA obtained its entire operational budget from voluntary contributions from member states. This took place at a funding conference held annually—usually each October. During its inaugural funding drive in 1950,

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contributions totaled $20 million from fifty-four countries, with the US as the largest donor. By 1955, seventy-one countries pledged funds yet the total only rose to $28 million. Overall, voluntary contributions to the EPTA averaged just over $26 million per year from 1950-59. These figures were extremely modest compared to America’s own bilateral technical assistance aid that averaged nearly $730 million per year from 1953-56. This was after the $13 bilion in Marshall Plan aid allocated from 1948-1952. Those at the UN who still clung to the general belief that technical assistance yielded the greatest return on investment, however, were no doubt disheartened when a rising demand for technical assistance through the UN did not equate to a comparable increase in pledges.

Additionally, the EPTA faced challenges to its claim of UN exceptionalism. David Belleoch, a longtime Resident Representative for the UN in Columbia and technical assistance expert to South and Central America, the Caribbean and across Asia offered an especially stinging criticism. In 1958, Belleoch published a pamphlet through the Fabian Society entitled, Aid for Development. Belleoch intended the pamphlet to serve as a synopsis of all avenues of development aid but when it came to describing UN aid, it included an especially harsh critique of the work of the EPTA. First, Belleoch challenged the concept of collective responsibility that UN aid promoters so often touted. Belleoch questioned the theory that recipient governments—if they even represented the needs of the people—were competent enough to plan their own development program and make requests for assistance from various Specialized Agencies. It was his experience that underdeveloped countries were only rarely capable of the immense technical task involved in planning a development program. Instead, in Belleoch’s estimation, requests amounted to nothing but pet-projects.

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68 Bhouraskar, 140.
69 W.W. Rostow, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Foreign Aid (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1985), 86-87. Rostow provided these mid-1950s figures in 1978 dollars amounts. Therefore, the author used a standard inflation calculator to equate the figures into their dollar amount for the years 1953-1956, respectively.
71 Perhaps serving as evidence that Belleoch’s criticism were one-sided but not completely without cause, a TAB report from 1957 showed that twenty-three out of thirty-eight countries studied had an ‘organized
pursued in the self-serving interest of a particular minister, official or government department. Sometimes this resulted in, according to Belleoch, the allocation of free technical assistance by a foreigner when a national of the recipient government could have done it just as well or better. Secondly, when the UN and its Specialized Agencies did get involved in prompting governments to request technical assistance, a ‘keen competition’ ensued, in what amounted to UN agencies all chasing after the development dollar. To retain this funding year after year, Belleoch argued many EPTA projects tended to perpetuate themselves even if results were disappointing.

Finally, Belleoch questioned the impartiality of UN aid. He noted that there were serious drawbacks to having experts who invariably pushed only the institutions and methods of their own countries. In recruiting these experts, it was often the case that the aid worker had no knowledge of the recipient country and no prior experience in international work. Therefore, for Belleoch, the notion of impartial international assistance was a farce. He stated: ‘the briefest of conversations with anybody who had had a direct experience of United Nations’ technical assistance in the field will reveal how much waste and frustration these haphazard arrangements involve.’ In Belleoch’s own experience working for the ILO, he once came across a report drawn up by a fellow technical adviser. The recipient government, who Belleoch kept anonymous, had pigeonholed the report which concluded that the problem with country X’s factory policy was that it did not match that of the expert’s home country. Belleoch wondered how many other recipient countries shelved other useless reports for this very reason. Any other grant-based aid agency was, in Belleoch’s opinion, a far better option than the UN. Elsewhere in the pamphlet, he especially promoted the ‘business-like’ model approach’ to channeling technical assistance requests from the EPTA into a central planning unit of the recipient countries’ government. See, ECOSOC OR, 25th Session, Annex, 1957, Annual Report of the Technical Assistance Board for 1957, E/3080.
offered by the World Bank and reserved a fair amount of praise for a number of bilateral
development aid programs like those of the US and British Commonwealth.\textsuperscript{72}

Testimony from one EPTA aid worker seems to support some of Belleoch’s
criticisms. Inspired by a \textit{Reader’s Digest} article describing the work of the EPTA, James
Scott Davidson—of South African and British nationality—wrote to the UN and offered his
services in management accounting. Davidson then served in two posts, as a technical
assistance expert in management accounting with the TAA in Egypt from 1960-64 and as a
financial management expert with the ILO in South Korea and Turkey from 1964-68.

Davidson’s first appointment left him undertrained and underwhelmed. After a less-than-
adequate four-day training in Geneva, the TAA sent Davidson to Egypt to advise twelve
Egyptian accountants working for the Egyptian General Industrial Organization. He admitted
that their project fell well short of expectations. Specifically, Davidson faulted what he
considered the failure of the Egyptian government to contribute to the inputs expected of
them and the ‘indifference’ and ‘indolence’ of the Egyptian accountants. Both spoke to a
wider problem, according to Davidson, of ‘the inability and/or disinclination of national staff
to accept the transfer of competence from international staff and use it to promote the
economic development of their country.’ Nevertheless, Davidson’s second appointment with
the ILO in South Korea and Turkey resulted in a glowing reflection on his experiences.\textsuperscript{73}

Moreover, subsequent chapters will also highlight the mixed experiences of UN aid workers
ranging from technical advisers to Resident Representatives—a point mentioned, but not
emphasized, in \textit{A Look Forward}.\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{72} David Belleoch, \textit{Aid for Development}, Fabian Research Series No.195, 1958, Columbia University Libraries

\textsuperscript{73} Questionnaire for James Scott Davidson, Oxford Bodleian Library, UN Career Records Project, MS Eng. c

\textsuperscript{74} United Nations, \textit{A Look Forward}, 11 May 1956, ODS, E/2885, 26, 29-31.
Owen, Belleoch’s boss while at the EPTA, wrote to his former employee soon after
the release of *Aid for Development*. Interestingly, Owen accepted many of the criticisms,
while assuring Belleoch those at the EPTA already recognized these shortcomings.
Altogether, however, Owen felt Belleoch’s critique was unbalanced. Owen argued that at
worst, ‘the record is uneven, steady improvement in most places with poor showing
elsewhere.’ Owen believed Belleoch’s critiques amounted to sweeping generalizations of the
EPTA, based on his own dismal experience in Colombia alone, while ignoring relative
successes in places like Bolivia. Owen also questioned why Belleoch did not extend the same
criticism to the development aid offered by the World Bank or the US. Other top UN aid
officials also weighed in, having received a copy of Belleoch’s pamphlet from Owen. Eric E.
Ward, the then current Resident Representative to Israel and formerly to the Philippines, also
admitted that much of what Belleoch stated was correct in certain cases. Overall, however,
his scrutiny was one-sided and unduly critical. Ward highlighted a number of UN-led
programs that had led to useful and productive work by quality recruits, which was why the
recipient governments continued to use the UN. Margaret Joan Anstee, serving in Uruguay at
the time, echoed Ward’s analysis.

The exchange between these individuals heavily invested in the international
development aid process of the 1950s is telling. Certainly, it draws attention to the fact that
UN development aid was a growing priority for the UN during this period but also that it was
not without its shortcomings. Indeed, later chapters will highlight more key deficiencies
associated with UN development aid and the challenges the Organization faced in attempting
to gain and maintain relevancy in the development arena. Yet, the nature of UN technical
assistance outlined above also provides a vignette for what Fredrick Cooper recognizes as
two development dialogues that rarely speak to one another—development as oppressive or

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76 Letter from Ward to Owen, undated, Columbia University Libraries, Owen Papers, Box 24; Letter from
disingenuous, and conversely, development as liberating. For the former, Cooper notes that critics often argue how development was part of an agenda that simply reinforced existing power structures—presumably in donor and recipient countries alike. On the other hand, there are those that laud development efforts because of their tangible results—feeding the hungry, piping water to the thirsty, fighting diseases, etc., in many cases with the use of experts and aid.\textsuperscript{77} In this case, and in subsequent chapters, one sees the confluence of these development dialogues as it applied to UN aid and its alternatives. In other words, some viewed UN aid as less than effective, impartial or genuine. Meanwhile, others responded with a competing view that promoted UN development aid as both exceptional and helpful—freeing underdeveloped states from the political strings attached to bilateral aid while transferring valuable skills and raising standards of living.

More directly, the exchange also brings light to the fact that the work of the EPTA, important but ‘undramatic’ in the words of Hammarskjold,\textsuperscript{78} and ineffective according to Belleoch, could in either case get lost alongside big development projects that produced newsworthy results. It also could easily get overlooked next to the vast amount of bilateral aid flowing from countries like the US and USSR. To stay relevant, and in some ways answer critics like Belleoch, the UN needed another means of offering development aid to underdeveloped countries—besides that of the EPTA. Thus, the remainder of this chapter will examine the second branch of UN grant-based aid through the establishment of the UN Special Fund. Crucial to its creation was the role of the Organization’s most powerful and influential member state—the United States.

\textbf{The Evolution of US Foreign Economic Policy through the 1950s}

Hammarskjold’s appointment as UN Secretary-General in early 1953 coincided with two other significant shifts in global leadership. First, in January 1953, Dwight D.

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\textsuperscript{78} Speech at National Press Club Luncheon, 14 April 1954, in Cordier and Foote, eds., Volume II, 284-85.
Eisenhower replaced Harry Truman as the new President of the United States. Then in March 1953, the death of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin created a power vacuum in the Kremlin filled soon afterward by Nikita Khrushchev. From the start, the shake-up in Washington and Moscow had a significant effect on the foreign economic policies towards the Third World of the two superpowers. Departing from Truman, Eisenhower held true to a campaign promise to pursue ‘trade not aid’ by promoting trade liberalization and private investment with the Third World.\(^79\) Therefore, early on in Eisenhower’s presidency, backing multilateral development assistance through the UN was hardly a priority. The Administration did provide 40% of the EPTA’s total funds but because of the EPTA small budget, this amount hovered around $11 million per year for most of the 1950s.\(^80\) Eisenhower’s only indication of the possibility of supporting any larger aid program came in an April 1953 speech in which he suggested that if the Soviets and Americans could devise a comprehensive disarmament plan, each country could then reallocate funds normally spent on weapons and defense towards global development. The suggestion might have only been wishful thinking on Eisenhower’s part but nonetheless served to whet the appetite for Third World states pushing for the establishment of some type of capacious aid program.\(^81\) Meanwhile, starting in 1954, the new leadership in Moscow unleashed what it considered a new economic offensive. Moscow’s strategy was to offer generous amounts of development aid, namely technical assistance, along with trade and finance aid, to underdeveloped countries in the Global South as a means to promote development along socialist lines in these areas. The new economic offensive included Soviet contributions, for the first time, to the UN technical assistance


\(^80\) Bhouraskar, 140; Webster, ‘Development Advisors in a Time of Cold War and Decolonization,’ 252.

program. Overall, Moscow’s aggressive foreign economic policy was substantial. Whereas, Soviet aid totaled $1.4 billion from 1945-53, it grew to $1.9 billion from 1954-58.\textsuperscript{82}

Historians have rightly described a shift in Eisenhower’s foreign economic policy starting in the spring of 1955 as a response, albeit delayed, to the inability of ‘trade not aid’ to keep pace with the Soviet economic offensive. Kaufman cites the Administration’s concern of the recent loss of Indochina by the French and the susceptibility of other Asian nationalist movements to communist aggression. Thus, during Eisenhower’s second term, ‘trade and aid’ replaced ‘trade not aid’.\textsuperscript{83} Scholar Michael Adamson argues this policy modification was a change in strategy but not in purpose since the primary aim of the Administration’s foreign economic policy was still to protect national security interests and only secondarily to modernize economies of the developing world.\textsuperscript{84} As Chapter Three will fully delineate, domestic factors like finding additional markets for American surplus agricultural commodities also played an important role in justifying the expansion of US aid abroad—specifically food aid. Nevertheless, as was the case with food aid, the Eisenhower Administration’s ‘trade and aid’ policy did awaken some top policymakers to the benefits of multilateral development aid channeled through international institutions as a viable response to the ever-loudening demands from the Global South. In other words, just as Truman’s Point Four kick-started the development mandate in the UN in the early 1950s, Eisenhower’s shift to ‘trade and aid’ opened the door for a number of multilateral development aid schemes through international institutions by the second half of the 1950s—including the UN and the World Bank.


\textsuperscript{83} Kaufman, 49, 63-68. See also, Gabriel Kolko, Confronting the Third World: United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1980 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988); Rostow, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Foreign Aid, 121-138.

\textsuperscript{84} Adamson, “‘The Most Important Single Aspect of Our Foreign Policy’” in Statler and Johns, eds., 56.
Initially the belief that the Soviet economic offensive was something less than genuine or sustainable, especially at the State Department, limited the Eisenhower Administration’s shift towards the allocation of more development aid. In a February 1955 assessment, the State Department acknowledged that some significant economic penetration had taken place by the Soviets. It cited a sixteen-man technical mission sent from the Soviet Union to India to advise on the construction of a large steel mill and another mission to Indonesia to offer technical assistance in the building of a sugar mill. Meanwhile, the State Department recognized the high level of Soviet economic penetration taking place in Afghanistan. Yet, it doubted the capability of the Soviet bloc to initiate more large-scale projects or maintain its global technical assistance offensive over the long haul. Moreover, it advised that the Administration should not place itself in a position to bargain against the Soviets.  

Considerable opposition to a program of long-term economic development aid also came from Treasury Secretary George Humphrey. Thus, it was not until 1957 that the moratorium on economic, non-military aid ended with the launching of the US Development Loan Fund (DLF)—proposed in Eisenhower’s second inaugural address. The DLF would serve as the lending arm of the International Cooperation Administration, the predecessor to the US Agency for International Development (USAID). The DLF offered bilateral soft loans to underdeveloped countries seeking development assistance. The intellectual backing for the DLF had come from a report written by two economists working at the MIT Center for International Studies (CENIS), Walt Rostow and Max Millikan. They highlighted the value of diversifying US foreign economic commitments by creating a bilateral loan fund. Thus, Washington foresaw the DLF as an attractive alternative to not only Soviet aid, but also to hard loan lending institutions like the World Bank and the Export-Import Bank (Exim).  

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85 Current Economic Developments, 1 February 1955, US National Archives and Records Administration II, College Park, Maryland (hereafter, NARA II), RG 59, Lot 70D467, Current Economic Developments, Box 6.  
86 From Rostow to Jackson, 28 August 1958, Dwight D Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas (hereafter, DDEL), C.D. Jackson Papers, Box 91. See also, Kaufman, 49-50, 103; Rostow, Eisenhower,
The DLF might have officially ended ‘trade not aid’ but its appeal among potential recipient countries was less than enthusiastic for the simple fact that, by offering decidedly bilateral aid, it failed to address the demand from undeveloped countries for a multilateral approach. Joining this chorus was Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., Eisenhower’s UN Ambassador. Presidential historian H.W. Brands describes Lodge as the Eisenhower Administration’s answer to Joseph McCarthy, except that, ‘Lodge went after real communists.’ This took place primarily in various UN forums where it was Lodge’s goal to respond to and immediately contest every attack or challenge spouted by a representative from a communist member state. By doing so, Lodge hoped to ‘break up their headlines, interfere with their news stories, and, actually take the news away from them.’ As a leading cold warrior within the Administration, and someone who enjoyed Cabinet rank, Lodge was just what Eisenhower was looking for in contrast to the previous US Ambassador to the UN, Warren Austin, who he claimed had been far too slow in countering Soviet verbal volleys at the UN.87

To be sure, Lodge’s primary role during his tenure as UN Ambassador was as a point scorer against the Soviets, yet this was far from his exclusive function. Lodge witnessed firsthand the effects of the influx of newly independent states joining the UN starting in the mid-1950s. He was also regularly exposed to anti-American sentiment stemming from the Eisenhower Administration’s fondness for bilateral aid programs and subsequent demands by Third World member states for a viable multilateral aid option.88 In March 1956, he wrote to Eisenhower acknowledging that the international community had readily welcomed the President’s ‘Atoms for Peace’ and ‘Open Sky’ initiatives—two hallmarks of the Administration’s Cold War policy. However, the President now needed to take action on an

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87 From Lodge to Eisenhower, 27 April 1953, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, Massachusetts (hereafter, MHS), Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. Papers (hereafter, Lodge Papers), as cited in Brands, 164, 167.
88 Pruden, 208.
issue that would impact people and countries more directly—namely aiding the underdeveloped through some type of multilateral assistance program. Crucially, Lodge justified this type of action both as a means to out-pace the Soviets and as a mechanism to develop underdeveloped countries.89

By the spring of 1956, Lodge began to make a public case for the advantages of US participation in a multilateral aid program. First, Lodge pointed to the ability of multilateral aid to mitigate the so-called ‘auction’ effect where the US and the Soviets tried to out-bid each other. Instead, multilateral aid allowed more countries to share the cost of development. Moreover, recipient countries were less likely to misunderstand multilateral aid, according to Lodge, since it eliminated any attempt at disguised political penetration.90 It was this last point where Lodge’s thinking really seemed to evolve beyond viewing aid through a Cold War lens and aligned with much of the thinking of aid advocates at the UN. Max Finger, a senior adviser to Lodge at the UN, acknowledged that by the mid-1950s many within the US mission to the UN came to adopt a ‘please the customer’ mentality. Lodge and others did this initially as a way for the US to garner more favorable votes in a UN forum where the US had once enjoyed widespread favor bolstered by a built-in majority, but whose power was in danger of waning as the Organization’s make-up and agenda changed. Secondly, Lodge claimed his position had evolved as he came to understand better the problems of the Third World.91 This perspective challenges historians’ claims, namely those of Brand and Caroline Pruden, who argue that Lodge always viewed multilateral aid through a Cold War lens.92

The clearest detailed proposal for a multilateral aid program marketed by the UN Ambassador came in November 1956. In a speech to the President’s Citizen Advisers in

89 Memorandum for the President from Lodge, 15 March 1956, DDEL, Ann Whitman Files, Administration Series, Box 24.
90 Press Release from the US Mission to the UN, 30 April 1956, DDEL, Ann Whitman Files, Administration Series, Box 24.
91 Transcript of Interview with Seymour Maxwell Finger, 30 November 1999, UN Intellectual History Project, 9; Finger, 79.
92 Brands, 167-74; Pruden, 208-211.
November 1956. Specifically, Lodge called for a ‘bold initiative in the field of economic development’ including a grant-based fund for capital development to aid in the development of dams, roads, agricultural improvements, water transport systems, etc. in underdeveloped countries. According the Lodge, donors could pay into the fund with their own currency and contributors would retain a considerable amount of control through weighted voting. Lodge believed the US could then challenge the Soviet Union to match its own contributions, yet argued his proposed economic development fund should not be viewed as a Cold War move, ‘but as a sincere effort to help meet the needs of the under-developed countries.’ Therefore, Lodge proposed to set up an inter-governmental committee, under UN auspices, that would make the final decisions on projects—a stipulation strongly urged by underdeveloped aid recipient states and now endorsed by Lodge. Operationally, it would also work closely with the administrations of the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation and the EPTA. He continued by stating that America’s position towards newly independent countries over issues relating to self-determination and economic development ‘is of paramount importance to our world leadership. These countries want multilateral help very much. Such an offer on our part would show our interest in their problems and a willingness to forego political strings for the aid we extend.’ Crucially, Lodge made clear that he, in fact, was not advocating the establishment of SUNFED—a proposed soft loan financing institution under the direction of the UN discussed below. He opposed any program where the US supplied all the money and the rest of the world spent it—the criticism attached to SUNFED by most Americans. Yet, he also contested the use of strictly bilateral aid subject to accusations of disguised imperialism and a policy that only gave rise to Soviet bilateral aid in-kind. Instead, Lodge adopted a compromise position where he believed the US could get credit for its substantial contribution to multilateral development aid—much like it already received from
its contributions to the UN’s technical assistance program—and thus acclaim it would never expect to receive from bilateral aid.93

Finally, Lodge stressed the need for the US to act urgently. Just weeks after the Suez and Hungary crises, Lodge claimed it was essential for the US to make the most of the new prestige it had acquired among the nations of Africa and Asia in its stance against overt imperialism. Specifically, the US now had the chance to respond to demands by Afro-Asian countries at the current UN General Assembly session by stepping out from underneath Eisenhower’s previous policy of making contributions towards Third World economic development contingent on disarmament. Instead, Lodge quoted from Secretary-General Hammarskjold’s 1956 Annual Report that stated, “‘To make adequate progress in economic development dependent upon disarmament is to put the cart before the horse. We need a wider understanding and acceptance of the fact that a successful program of economic development is one of the most important elements in building up the conditions of stability and confidence which will make possible real progress toward disarmament.”’94

Lodge’s major opponent in the establishment of a multilateral aid program was Treasury Secretary George Humphrey who charged Lodge with advocating a multilateral program that would result in, ‘everybody getting into the act to help us distribute our money.’95 Some at the State Department even accused Lodge of acting too much like the ‘natives’ at the UN as a result of serving too long at his UN post.96 Nevertheless, Lodge seemed to have gained at least nominal support from Eisenhower, who according to Pruden,

93 Statement by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. to the President’s Citizen Advisers on the Mutual Security Program, 30 November 1956, MHS, Lodge Papers, Box 17.
94 Statement by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. to the President’s Citizen Advisers on the Mutual Security Program, 30 November 1956, MHS, Lodge Papers, Box 17. Lodge’s quote from Hammarskjold’s Annual Report coincided with a growing relationship between the two diplomats. In fact, correspondence between Lodge and Hammarskjold suggests that the Secretary-General even spent a weekend at the home of Lodge and his family. See, Letter from Hammarskjold to Lodge, 13 August 1954, MHS, Lodge Papers, Reel 6.
95 Statement by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. to the President’s Citizen Advisers on the Mutual Security Program, 30 November 1956, MHS, Lodge Papers, Box 17.
advised Lodge to see if Humphrey might relent and support more than an exclusively bilateral aid option. Humphrey never acquiesced, yet Lodge’s bold efforts seemed to gain momentum, aided in part by another influential internationalist who turned his attention on the UN in 1956.

**The Second Branch of UN Grant Aid: Pre-investment Aid and the UN Special Fund**

Paul G. Hoffman had formerly served as the president of Studebaker automobiles from 1935-1948 and then President of the Ford Foundation from 1950-1953. However, he is best known as President Truman’s appointee as director of the Economic Cooperation Administration—the organization established to administer Marshall Plan aid. Like Lodge, Hoffman had a strong personal relationship with the President Eisenhower and served as his chief fundraiser during his 1952 campaign. Having worked himself out of a job as Administrator of Marshall Plan aid, Hoffman joined the US delegation to the eleventh session of the UN General Assembly in 1956. When the State Department first suggested Hoffman as a potential delegate to Lodge, he appeared on the roster as ‘Paul Hoffman, Ind.’ Lodge wondered if this meant someone from Indiana, an Independent or, ‘my Paul Hoffman who administered the Marshall Plan? If so, I would vote an enthusiastic “yes” in favor of having him here. Of course, he is controversial. But he would also be a big producer if we could get him.’ Apparently, ‘Ind.’ meant Industrialist, an adequate classification given Hoffman’s background, yet, Clarence B. Randall, chairman of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy from 1956-61 and special consultant to the President, described Hoffman as a special kind of businessman. According to Randall, Hoffman was a type of visionary—albeit one who was given to tunnel vision. By the mid-1950s, Hoffman’s new passion was for the UN. Hoffman

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97 Pruden, 211.
99 Letter from Lodge to Christopher H. Phillips (Deputy Assistant Secretary of State), 21 March 1956, MHS, Lodge Papers, Box 24.
even confided to Randall that in the months following his term as UN delegate, Hoffman’s friends badgered him for talking of nothing else but his new obsession.100

Speaking to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the US Congress, Hoffman elaborated on his newfound interest in the international organization. Hoffman’s testimony, coming in the midst of the 1956 General Assembly session, was a mixture of Cold War idioms and the same ‘please the customer’ mentality adopted by Lodge. On the one hand, Hoffman emphasized the ineffectiveness of the current US foreign economic policy in light of the Kremlin’s new approach for ‘communizing the world’ by subverting Asia’s new democracies with further plans to target Africa and South America. On the other hand, Hoffman pointed out the need to respond to the pressing demands by underdeveloped and uncommitted countries of the Global South for improved living conditions, health services and educational and economic opportunities. Employing Marshall Plan logic, he linked American prosperity to the economic health of underdeveloped countries and thus highlighted the need for the US to take action on a new program that included more than just trade. Touting the Marshall Plan’s ability to turn $13 billion of US foreign aid into an investment, Hoffman continued: ‘I am not suggesting there should be a Marshall Plan for Asia or South America. Conditions are entirely different in these areas than they were in Europe.’ Cognizant of the differences between reconstruction and development, Hoffman nonetheless believed some lessons were applicable. He noted that the success of the Marshall Plan stemmed from America’s role as an investment banker—choosing ventures that fitted its criteria, placing a large onus of the responsible on the recipient country and insisting on programs of a limited duration. No doubt drawing from Lodge’s proposal unfurled just days earlier, Hoffman suggested that a

100 Journal Entry, 4 January 1957, DDEL, Clarence B. Randall Journals, Box 4.
new multilateral program might be drawn up along these lines, specifically mentioning the UN as a viable option for its implementation.  

Hoffman elaborated on his ideas for a new direction in American’s foreign economic policy in a February 1957 article in *New York Times Magazine* entitled, ‘Blueprint for Foreign Aid’. The article specifically called for a pilot program to fund raw material surveys and other investment projects. Hoffman’s recommendations, as noted by Craig Murphy, were curiously similar to an Argentine proposal from 1956 and the aforementioned *A Forward Look*—the EPTA study that called for an expansion of UN development aid. Although seemingly far from original, Hoffman’s article did further recognize the need for an additional development fund offered through the UN to address issues the EPTA could not and simultaneously provided another aid option for the US to support. Specifically, Hoffman’s proposal echoed an idea previously expressed at the UN Secretariat—the concept of ‘pre-investment’.

UN development economist, Hans Singer—a major focus of Chapter Three—claims to have ‘invented’ the phrase ‘pre-investment’ and certainly helped to shape its intellectual formation as a viable form of development aid. The premise of pre-investment aid was that economic and social development would not follow the unknown. Thus, latent investment opportunities in underdeveloped countries, according to Singer, had to be sought out and brought to a stage where productive investment could take place. This required spadework to make investment more attractive, feasible and effective. In particular, pre-investment aid would come to include projects in three categories: 1) surveys of natural resources, 2) vocational and technical skills training to develop human

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101 Copy of testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee from Hoffman to Jackson, 3 December 1956, DDEL, C.D. Jackson Papers, Box 60.  
103 Transcript of Interview with Hans W. Singer, 2 January 2000, UN Intellectual History Project, 122-23.
resources and 3) applied research to find new uses for local materials and products.\textsuperscript{104} For recipient countries, pre-investment aid was meant to elucidate with more authority the needs and resources of underdeveloped countries. For donors, it proposed to serve as a means to attract investors to projects that had less of a ‘start-up’ feel and risk.\textsuperscript{105}

Additionally, Singer asserted that from the UN’s perspective, pre-investment came from the effort to solve the dilemma whereby the UN desired to expand beyond the work of the EPTA but had no power or means to invest capital into development—the domain of the World Bank and donor states. A pre-investment aid program through the UN would allow it to project itself into another arena of economic development, while responding to critics like David Belleoch, since pre-investment aid involved more than just sending individual advisors for visits to write reports but could lead to sizeable investments and meaningful development.\textsuperscript{106} Thus, Lodge, Hoffman and Singer represented a confluence of interests that would soon give birth to the second branch of grant-based aid through the UN system. The impetus for this came, in part, from Lodge and Hoffman who desired to respond to Soviet economic advances as well as meet the demands of Third World states. Meanwhile, Singer provided the intellectual backing for this method of aid while emphasizing the UN’s centrality to any future pre-investment aid program. Finally, developments within the UN forum served as another important stimulus.

**SUNFED, the Special Fund and the Birth of a UN Pre-Investment Aid Program**

The UN debate surrounding the establishment of SUNFED is a major focus of Chapter Two, however, it is worth stating here that SUNFED was a proposed billion dollar lending agency administered by the UN and controlled by UN member states collectively.


\textsuperscript{106} Transcript of Interview with Hans W. Singer, 2 January 2000, UN Intellectual History Project, 122-23.
Moreover, a UN economist within the UN Secretariat had originally proposed this type of multilateral lending agency back in 1949. Initially, its only major supporters were potential recipient states mostly from the Global South. Throughout the 1950s, these states debated the merits of establishing SUNFED with its potential donor states. Then in 1956, three potential donor states joined the so-called SUNFED bloc, including the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and the Netherlands. The move was significant since, in the case of the Netherlands, it actually switched from opposing SUNFED to being one of the few Western industrial countries that now supported it. The decision of two communist bloc countries to back SUNFED meant that the US could no longer defer to Eisenhower’s decision to make Third World development a condition of disarmament as he had done back in 1953. Finger notes that the Soviet decision to support the establishment of SUNFED while the US remained in opposition especially disturbed Lodge. Finger claims it was at this point that he had the idea to create a UN program that focused on pre-investment as an alternative to SUNFED. Although, clearly the historical record suggests this idea was already present for some time.

The need was made all the more urgent when, at the July 1957 meeting of the UN Economic and Social Council, member states adopted, by a vote of 15-3, a resolution to recommend to the upcoming General Assembly the establishment of SUNFED. The US, Canada and Great Britain were the only members to vote against the measure—the first formal split in ECOSOC between developed and underdeveloped countries.

In the light of these developments, the Eisenhower Administration made the decision to support the establishment of a new multilateral aid program at the 1957 General Assembly session, much to the delight of Lodge and Hoffman, as well as those in the Administration they had managed to persuade. For instance, Council on Foreign Economic Policy chairman,

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108 Transcript of Interview with Seymour Maxwell Finger, 30 November 1999, UN Intellectual History Project, 14.
Clarence Randall, now joined Lodge and Hoffman in acknowledging the futility of US opposition to multilateral development aid in the face of the increased demand, since voting against these measures in the General Assembly put the US in an increasingly shrinking minority. For Randall, Hoffman’s ideas offered an attractive option to offset this problem by assuaging Third World leaders while still avoiding a major financial commitment by the US toward multilateral development.\textsuperscript{110} Others in the Eisenhower Administration joined in and called for ‘a comprehensive, upbeat, and sense-making answer to SUNFED.’\textsuperscript{111}

Aided by a combination of Third World demands, Soviet economic threats and intellectual backing from the UN, the Eisenhower Administration led a successful effort at the 1957 General Assembly to call for the establishment of a new fund to ‘facilitate new capital investments of all types—private and public, national and international—by creating conditions which would make such investments either feasible or more effective’—in other words a pre-investment fund. The resolution espoused confidence in the UN to manage such a program based on the work of the EPTA as an instrument ‘of proven effectiveness’.\textsuperscript{112} The UN Special Fund, as it would come to be known, did expand the UN’s development reach by creating a new mechanism aimed at providing pre-investment aid. It did not, however, end the bid by underdeveloped countries to establish SUNFED—an effort further explored in the next chapter. However, it did stunt, if only temporarily, the momentum the supporters of SUNFED had acquired.

Member states commissioned a preparatory committee made up of their representatives to work out the details of the UN Special Fund, although the committee seems to have been highly influenced by recommendations from Hammarskjold and Singer as to the

\textsuperscript{110} Journal Entry, 7 April 1957, DDEL, Clarence B. Randall Journals, Box 4.
\textsuperscript{111} From Jack Jessup to Jackson, 5 February 1957, DDEL, C.D. Jackson Papers, Box 112.
\textsuperscript{112} UN General Assembly Resolution 1219 (XII), 14 December 1957.
details of the Fund.\footnote{113} According to David Owen, drawing up the details was no easy task due to the ambiguity of the Special Fund resolution. Owen noted the many ‘contradictions and obscurities in the text’ that filled the wording of the resolution reflecting that, although overwhelmingly approved, it far from reconciled two divergent positions. Specifically, the US along with all the major contributors to the EPTA, except the Netherlands and the USSR, viewed the new program as an extension of technical assistance as outlined in *A Forward Look*, produced eighteen months prior. The other side, essentially the main backers of SUNFED, regarded the Special Fund as an embryonic SUNFED.

Owen noticed how this division had indeed led to an especially sharp exchange between the US and Indian delegates during the previous General Assembly.\footnote{114} In particular, the Indian delegate, Ali Yavar Jung made clear to his American counterpart, Walter H. Judd, that proponents of SUNFED would not tolerate the closing of the door to the evolution of the SUNFED proposal at the expense of establishing the Special Fund. India would back the Special Fund resolution, but Jung made a point of reiterating a common sentiment among member states from the Global South: that ‘under-developed countries did not see themselves as beggars holding out their bowls. They were not prepared to take whatever was offered simply because it was offered. The manner of giving was as important to them as the gift itself.’\footnote{115} US State Department assessments confirm Owen’s evaluation and the view expressed by India and other SUNFED backers. It viewed the UN Special Fund as a means to counteract support for SUNFED, in addition to answering the mounting demands for more

\footnote{113} See, *ECOSOC OR*, 26th Session, 1958, Annexes, Report and recommendations of the Preparatory Committee for the Special Fund in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1219 (XII), 22 April 1958, E/3098.
\footnote{114} Letter from Owen to David A. Morse (Director-General of the ILO), 31 December 1957, Columbia University Libraries, Owen Papers, Box 28.
\footnote{115} *GAOR*, 12th Session, Second Committee, 492nd meeting, 18 November 1957; *GAOR*, 12th Session, Second Committee, 502nd meeting, 5 December 1957; *GAOR*, 12th Session, Second Committee, 508th meeting, 12 December 1957.
multilateral aid by offering more technical assistance. Nevertheless, it further acknowledged that, once established, the Special Fund did not leave the question of SUNFED dormant.\footnote{Current Economic Developments, 18 March 1958 & 6 January 1959, NARA II, RG 59, Master File 1945-1957, Current Economic Development, Box 8.}

Member states officially established the UN Special Fund with General Assembly resolution 1240 (XIII) on 14 October 1958. As an indication that its aim was to widen the UN’s participation in the global development process, its initial funding goal was set to $100 million annually. To re-enforce the message that the Special Fund was not meant to be a viable replacement for SUNFED, member states also passed, later in 1958, resolution 1317 (XIII). It urged member states to continue working for the establishment of a version of SUNFED. That vote saw 70 out of 83 members support the resolution, again with the US and other major potential donors in opposition.\footnote{UN General Assembly Resolution 1240 (XIII), 14 October 1958; UN General Assembly Resolution 1317 (XIII), 12 December 1958.}

The establishment of the Special Fund also represented the first real effort by the Eisenhower Administration to back a multilateral aid program indicating that the shift to ‘trade and aid’ in 1955 was later accompanied by another policy adjustment. Namely, that multilateral aid was a necessary supplement to bilateral aid, a detail so far neglected in the scholarly literature. For Lodge, the value of multilateral aid over bilateral aid was clear. He reminded the President in February 1958, that programs like the Special Fund took the US ‘off the spot’ from having to say no to the seemingly unlimited demands for aid. Even if the answer remained no, Lodge concluded that it would be better for any bad news to come from a multilateral source, like the UN, rather than directly and primarily from the US.\footnote{Memorandum from Lodge to Eisenhower, 21 February 1958, DDEL, Ann Whitman Files, Administration Series, Box 24.}

As promised, the Fund granted pre-investment aid to underdeveloped countries. Although not a lending agency, it intended to serve any organization or state that had significant funds to invest in Third World development. As envisioned by Singer, Hoffman
and others, it primarily aimed to assist in survey projects to explore ‘wealth-producing potentialities’ in land and marine resources with the hope that they would be followed up by larger-scale investment. Secondarily, it sought to develop human resources in underdeveloped countries through training and technical education schemes. Finally, the Fund planned to invest in the development of applied research institutes in underdeveloped countries to find new uses for local material and products.119

Owen’s initial concern that the Fund would do no more than duplicate the work of his own EPTA120 were somewhat justified, especially since the Special Fund would eventually combine with the EPTA in 1965 to form the UN Development Program. In reality, the two were complementary in nature. For example, the Fund did not usually partake in field operations itself but delegated the execution of approved projects to the EPTA and the Specialized Agencies. Yet the Special Fund, which launched in January 1959, did have some unique qualities since it undertook larger-scale and longer-term projects averaging almost $1 million, double that of the EPTA. Functionally, a Managing Director oversaw the activities of the Fund, a position taken up by Paul Hoffman—to the surprise of few. A Consultative Board, made up of Secretary-General Hammarskjold, David Owen and the President of the World Bank, Eugene Black, advised the Managing Director. However, Hoffman alone retained the authority to recommend specific projects to an eighteen-member Governing Council made up of delegates from donor and recipient governments. Requests for pre-investment aid came from governments themselves, usually working in consultation with their in-country UN Resident Representative. Altogether, the Special Fund was to operate on a highly selective project-by-project basis and include substantial contributions by recipient governments to the cost of the project.121

120 Letter from Owen to David A. Morse, 31 December 1957, Columbia University Libraries, Owen Papers, Box 28.
Selling the UN Special Fund: Modernization and Development Economics

Part of Hoffman’s initial task as Managing Director was to sell the Fund to its major budget contributors—member states from the Western industrialized world—since, like the EPTA, it obtained its operational budget completely through voluntary giving. Hoffman’s lobbying efforts indicate that just because member states voted to create an additional development fund through the UN, did not automatically mean they intended to support it financially. Likewise, it was still up to Hoffman to drum up business among underdeveloped countries in a field of development—pre-investment—that he and others like Singer had only theorized. In selling the Fund, Hoffman would rely on the many of the same arguments used to promote UN aid through the EPTA. However, he would also add another crucial dimension to UN aid by marrying it to an evolving development discourse still coalescing in the mid to late 1950s.

In ‘The Eisenhower Administration, Foreign Aid, and the Third World’, Michael R. Adamson makes a distinction between modernization theory and development economics. Adamson points out that while both glorified scientific, industrial and technological progress, modernization theory aimed at social transformation, including the notion that other societies could become more American and more democratic through the means of economic aid. Alternatively, development economics focused on the building of physical infrastructure to spur rapid economic growth. When it came to describing the Special Fund, Hoffman merged these components to appeal to aid donors and recipients. In this respect, the Special Fund served not only as a response to a renewed attempt to establish SUNFED but also as a derivative of a development discourse.

Key to Hoffman’s strategy to garner financial support for the Fund from its primary donor, the United States, was to frame the program as part of an American modernization effort. In his Congressional testimony from late 1956, Hoffman had already shown he was

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aware of the main arguments of the two economists who had popularized modernization theory—W.W. Rostow and Max Millikan. In short, modernization theory alleged that all nations passed through fundamental stages of development on a linear trajectory from traditional societies to take-off to maturity. The United States, along with a handful of other Western states, had reached the pinnacle of this development process. These states, therefore, ought to serve as the model for other less developed countries while helping them make use of their under-utilized physical and human resources. Modernization theory relied on scientific, industrial, and technological advancements as a means to achieve economic, social and political (ie. democratic) progress. By the mid-1950s, the theory was still in its formative stage but would come to enjoy widespread favor in the years ahead—especially once Rostow joined the Kennedy Administration in 1961. For this and other reasons, historians have nearly exclusively depicted modernization theory as an American foreign policy tool as stated earlier. Certainly, Rostow and Millikan promoted this use, believing that the application of their theory could offset the Communist threat among underdeveloped countries.123

However, in this case, the UN successfully made use of modernization principles to appeal to potential donor and recipient countries interested in investigating the benefits of pre-investment aid offered by the Special Fund. Hoffman was already drawing parallels between his idea for a new branch of UN aid and the ideas of Rostow and Millikan during his December 1956 testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee described above. Hoffman cited a specific study of theirs to argue economic aid to the underdeveloped world would only take an investment of roughly $10-14 billion from the US—with further contributions from other states and regional organizations that would bring the total to between $12.5 and $16.5 billion over a five-year period. Similar to the cost of the Marshall Plan, and far less than the estimated $150-200 billion in US military expenditures over the

next five years, Hoffman used the Rostow and Millikan study to argue a US investment in economic aid to underdeveloped countries was easily justifiable.

He concluded: ‘[w]hat is of infinitely more importance, the program, if it succeeds, would in the words of Messrs. Millikan and Rostow achieve for us the two-fold result of increasing the awareness elsewhere in the world that the goals, aspirations, and values of the American people are in large part the same as those peoples in other countries; and of developing viable, energetic, and confident democratic societies throughout the free world.’\(^{124}\) Now as Managing Director of the UN Special Fund, Hoffman wanted to make sure part of the US commitment to Third World development included a substantial investment in his own multilateral development scheme. Thus, Hoffman spent some of his early months at the Special Fund effectively lobbying Washington to keep its contributions to the Special Fund at 40% of the total—the same percentage as US contributions to the EPTA and the maximum amount allowable.\(^{125}\)

Additionally, Hoffman relied on his Marshall Plan credentials to argue that Europe had largely accomplished the reconstruction of its war-torn economies. Now a much more difficult task lay ahead—speeding development of underdeveloped countries. One that Hoffman quickly learned was not as analogous to the Marshall Plan as he initially perceived. Comparing the two, Hoffman described Marshall Plan aid as restoring an old painting to a pristine condition while the Special Fund was attempting to aid in creating on canvas a completely new picture. Moral, political and economic reasons should incentivize, according to Hoffman, developed countries to participate in this artistic endeavor preferably through what Hoffman considered the ‘link which had been missing in the chain of UN assistance to

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\(^{124}\) Copy of testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee from Hoffman to Jackson, 3 December 1956, DDEL, C.D. Jackson Papers, Box 60. Raucher goes as far as to say that Hoffman was ‘[e]ssentially a popularizer and conduit for expert opinions’ especially those of ‘[s]ophisticated anti-communists’ like Millikan and Rostow. See, Raucher, 120.

the less developed countries.’ It functioned not as a give-away, nor as a paternalistic gesture but as a multilateral partnership where the developed world might transfer its advancements to the underdeveloped via the UN.\textsuperscript{126}

When it came to selling the Special Fund to an international audience, Hoffman blended modernization rhetoric with development economics. A year into the start of the Fund, Hoffman described his program as engaging with a ‘great new economic frontier’ in desperate need of making use of its so far under-utilized physical and human resources.\textsuperscript{127} In Southeast Asia, the Special Fund could play its part in taming the Mekong River, harnessing it for irrigation, electric power and transportation much like America had done for Arizona and California by subduing the Colorado River. According to Hoffman, ‘the people of South East Asia…don’t even know how thirsty their land –and they – are.’ The same opportunity existed for Chile with its un-mined mineral resources. Likewise, once India came to make full use of its soil and water through mechanization, fertilizers, insecticides and seeds it was sure to produce enough food to feed its population, much like America already was with only 6-7 million families farming enough food to feed nearly 180 million Americans with an abundant surplus. Speaking of human resources, Hoffman foresaw the Fund elevating underdeveloped peoples ‘to a position above that of straw boss’ through education and training programs, as was his firsthand experience working for the Economic Cooperation Administration in South Korea. Through these endeavors, less developed countries should focus on one goal—economic development, which according to Hoffman was impervious to political, military, ideological or commercial strings and unaffected by Cold War intrigues if pursued through multilateral channels.\textsuperscript{128}


\textsuperscript{127} Paul Hoffman, Preface to \textit{The United Nations Special Fund, 1960}, 8.

\textsuperscript{128} Paul Hoffman Speech, ‘Operation Breakthrough’ given at Princeton University, 14 April 1960, Columbia University Libraries, Cordier Papers, Box 68
Of course, for donor and recipient countries the real value of the Fund hinged on its results. Therefore, from its inception, aid through the Special Fund targeted projects that would have a real measureable appeal in underdeveloped countries with more immediate results than the work of the EPTA. Thus, Special Fund aid gave preference to projects that it expected would lead to new capital investment. One of its initial projects was a survey of the Niger River at the request of the Nigerian government. The pre-investment survey investigated the most suitable location for a dam for the purposes of power generation, navigation, flood control and irrigation. The Special Fund contributed $735,000 toward the survey while the Nigerian government covering the remaining cost of $1.6 million.

Meanwhile, the World Bank oversaw the survey itself and used a private firm to perform the actual study adding the UN to a string of international developers. The Special Fund invested in similar water and soil surveys in roughly twenty other underdeveloped countries from January 1959 to May 1960. It also assisted in three regional surveys including a four-year study of the Mekong River Basin.\(^\text{129}\)

The Fund’s clear desire to associate its funding with larger capital investment projects would allow the UN to participate, for the first time, in what development historians have called ‘high-modernist’ projects. High-modernism of the 1950s and 60s, as described by development historian Nick Cullather, placed an emphasis on development of a given state or region by means of a comprehensive plan, often aimed at mastery of the physical environment.\(^\text{130}\) Thus, high-modernism is frequently associated with the dam-building boom and other major infrastructural projects pursued by underdeveloped countries, to go alongside ‘low-modernist’ pursuits like technical training and community development.\(^\text{131}\) Thus by


\(^{130}\) Nick Cullather, ‘Development? It’s History,’ 651.

\(^{131}\) In his very recent study, Daniel Immerwahr argues that community development was an important component of development aid and the primary *rural* development strategy of the UN during the 1950s. However, he also notes that during the course of the 1960s community development programs were systematically ‘abolished, defunded, or folded into an agricultural ministry.’ Therefore, Immerwahr analysis supports the shift towards the high-modernist approach that the Special Fund foreshadowed. See, Daniel
linking the Fund to large-scale capital investment projects, like the building of dams, the UN was also affixing itself to the high-modernist trend of the period.

Moreover, the Special Fund invested in thirty-five training projects and research institutions in its first year and a half—seven in India alone. Illustrative of one such training project was the Central Training Institute in Calcutta started with $1 million in Special Fund assistance, $2 million from the Indian government and executed by the ILO. The Institute was set up to train 2,400 craft instructors over a four-year period in fifteen trades (ie. carpentry, mechanics, plumbing, etc.). These instructors’ trainees would then be used to train a substantial portion of craftsmen required under India’s current Five-Year Plan. Similarly, the Special Fund helped to finance a number of institutions for applied research aim at facilitating greater production and investment. As an example, the Fund contributed $935,000 to the Central American Research Institute for Industry to higher more experts and provide scientific equipment. The governments of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua made counterpart contributions of a further $1.3 million to the Institute, which was started and overseen by the United Nations own technical assistance program.132

Hammarskjold praised the Fund for adding a new dimension to the existing UN technical assistance activities and for bringing the UN ‘closer to the public authorities and private enterprises engaged in the financing of investment in the under-developed areas, thereby underlining the potentialities of the Organization as an Executing Agency for action.’133 He also hoped the program reflected a growing recognition that the multilateral approach to aid through the UN was a better alternative to bilateral programs complicated by political tensions.134 Meanwhile, Eugene Black believed the Fund could now put developing

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countries in a better position to carry out their own development goals and expected a number of Fund surveys to lead to Bank investments.135

Interest in Fund aid was substantial from the start. In its first two years, from 1959 to 1960, the Special Fund had received 219 formal requests for projects. Hoffman and the Governing Council approved 74 of these in 49 countries while allocating $55 million in Special Fund resources. Of the remaining projects, 54 were still under review as of December 1960, 83 had been denied and eight withdrawn. Despite these figures, a shortfall in funding plagued the Special Fund as it had the EPTA. It took three cycles of pledging conferences held in 1958, 1959 and 1960 to provide the Fund with its first $100 million.136 In one instance, Hoffman even made a personal appeal to the Prime Minister of Australia. Hoffman drew his attention to the fact that Australia was one of a few countries in the world that had not contributed to the Special Fund in any of its first three pledging conferences held each fall. He pointed out that back in 1957, the General Assembly had set a target of $100 million a year for the EPTA and Special Fund. For 1959, voluntary contributions totaled just $55.5 million for the two programs, for 1960, $71.2 million. Given the need for 1961 with the addition of so many newly independent underdeveloped states, Hoffman hoped Menzies would reconsider. Additionally, Hoffman enclosed a booklet for Prime Minister Menzies he had published earlier in 1960, verbosely entitled, *One hundred countries one and one quarter billion people: how to speed their economic growth and ours – in the 1960’s*.137

The sixty-two page booklet was Hoffman’s most comprehensive justification to date for how aiding undeveloped countries was not only ‘good morals’ but also ‘good business’.

Again, blending modernization discourse with development economics, it divided

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underdeveloped countries into three ‘groups’ based on their average per capita annual income. The pamphlet further provided a target growth rate for these groups of 1-2% each year for the decade of the 1960s. According to Hoffman, non-charitable, non-paternalistic and non-spasmodic development assistance ought to come via the UN—the only donor that could get ‘tough’ with underdeveloped countries without being accused of seeking any political or commercial advantages. Of course, Hoffman dedicated a number of pages to the latest member of the UN development family—the Special Fund, and its potential to make use of the ‘underutilization of physical and human resources’ in underdeveloped countries. He concluded, that if underdeveloped peoples could partner with those of the industrialized countries, ‘the two, working together in a common program in the common interest, can create a steadily expanding world economy in which all can find increasing satisfaction and opportunity.’

Overall then, selling the Special Fund as a partnership was crucial to its success. For this reason, Hoffman took every opportunity to highlight figures that showed that over its first two years, underdeveloped governments contributed nearly 60% of the total cost to Special Fund projects. According to Hammarskjold, the Special Fund’s ability to share the development burden was Hoffman’s favorite argument for UN-channeled aid. Both believed this fact had not been lost on donor governments, who appreciated the commitment made by the recipient countries to the long-term success of a project. Like Hoffman, Hammarskjold also saw its potential to act as the crucial link connecting international machinery like the EPTA and the Specialized Agencies to large-scale investments from the likes of the World Bank, governments and private financing intuitions. Now, the Special Fund could add its

stamp, and a neutral one at that, to projects with a high likelihood of substantial investment of capital in the future.¹⁴⁰

**Conclusion**

From its inception until it merged with the EPTA in 1965, the Special Fund sent out more than 1,500 international experts to work with more than 17,000 national project staffs, trained 56,000 people under 124 projects, carried out 31 natural resource surveys and established 2 applied research institutions.¹⁴¹ By the mid-1960s it was actively engaged in 522 on-going projects in 130 countries and territories. The total cost of the program neared $1.2 billion, of which just over $670 million came from recipient governments and the rest from pledges to the Special Fund. Meanwhile, the EPTA continued to expand its services throughout the first half of the 1960s. In 1963-64, when it adopted biannual programming, its total expenditures in field programs totaled $93.3 million, a $15.4 million increase over the previous two years. For 1965-66, the UN expected EPTA expenditures to reach $134 million. In 1964, it sent out 3,292 experts from eighty-six countries.¹⁴²

Altogether, the EPTA and the Special Fund were important conduits to the internationalization of development during the postwar decades. This came only through the motivation at the UN to stake out a claim and carve out a niche in this process. Spearheaded by Owen and Hoffman, and to a lesser extent Hammarskjold, the UN juxtaposed its aid to bilateral alternatives during much of the 1950s. In doing so, it framed development aid offered by or channeled through the UN as a distinct, and altogether better, form of assistance compared to strictly bilateral aid options. To highlight this distinction those at the UN promoted the use of the EPTA and then the Special Fund, which both allowed the

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Organization to expand beyond its peace and security functions and enlarge its share of the global development burden. Cautiously facilitating the expansion of the UN’s development mandate was the US—still the most powerful, influential and wealth UN member state. Meanwhile UN member states from the Global South deserve much of the credit for focusing the attention of the General Assembly on the urgent needs of underdeveloped countries while demanding that the UN play a greater role. Finally, looking into the origins of the development directive at the UN provides much of the context needed for each of the subsequent chapters in which the further expansion of UN development aid into areas including capital finance aid and food aid continued to be hotly contested issues among member states. Furthermore, the coming of mass decolonization in Africa only exacerbated these debates.
CHAPTER TWO

‘Better Billions’: Financing Mass Decolonization at the UN, 1959-60

George Ivan Smith joined the United Nations in 1947, spending a little more than the three subsequent decades in various high-ranking positions within the UN Secretariat. Recognized as an adept political adviser and skillful press spokesman, Secretary-General Hammarskjöld selected Smith to represent the UN on a trip through much of central and east Africa during the summer and fall of 1960. This included a stopover in the Congo to assist with a newly initiated UN operation. It was there that Smith proclaimed to Hammarskjöld that he, much like the Organization, ‘had become Africanised.’ Also, high on Smith’s agenda was a meeting with Julius Nyerere, the future President of the soon-to-be independent state of Tanganyika—then a UN Trust Territory. Earlier in the year, Nyerere had written to the UN Secretariat informing Heins Wieschoff, the top UN official on Africa, of his country’s imminent independence. Nyerere wanted to make certain that the UN was prepared to make available sufficient channels of development aid for Tanganyika immediately following its independence, expected in 1961. Believing his country would require substantial amounts of aid, Nyerere recommended opening a regional UN aid office in Tanganyika. His appeal received the personal attention of Hammarskjöld, who sent Smith to make preliminary arrangements in response to the African leader’s proposal, among his other tasks. Smith recounted their initial meeting in October 1960 where Nyerere greeted the UN representative, ‘smiling from all creases saying “We’ve been waiting for you for a long time.”’

The above episode is telling for a number of reasons. First, it was indicative of the increased attention shown to Africa in the 1960s as many of the continent’s countries made

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144 In 1964, Tanganyika joined with the Zanzibar to form Tanzania.
145 Letter from Nyerere to Heins Wieschoff (Permanent Secretary and Director of the UN Department of Political and Security Council Affairs), 20 June 1960, Oxford Bodleian Library, Smith Papers, MS Eng. c 6470; Letter from Wieschoff to Nyerere, 30 June 1960, Smith Papers, MS Eng. c 6470.
146 Diary entry, 19 October 1960, Oxford Bodleian Library, Smith Papers, MS Eng. c. 6518.
the transition from colonial dependence to political independence. What also comes across in Nyerere’s greeting is a heightened sense of urgency and expectation among African leaders as to the value of development aid—specifically through the UN. As this chapter will show, this urgency also gave rise to a competition over what type of aid best suited newly independent countries and who should administer the aid. Yet, more than the competition described in the previous chapter, the advent of mass decolonization in Africa amplified this contest. The growth of this debate by 1960 was no more apparent than in the hothouse-like atmosphere of the main UN forums. There, a scramble ensued where each side—aid recipient countries, potential donor states and the UN Secretariat—at times haggled and at other times harmonized over the best method of administrating and allocating development aid.

Leading the UN effort was Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, who had travelled extensively throughout Africa in early 1960. Upon his return, Hammarskjold matched the activism he had so often displayed with regard to political and security issues during his UN tenure. Through much of 1960, he played a central role in shifting the Organization’s attention towards Africa and the economic and social development of the continent. In an effort to fulfil the needs expressed to him by the various African leaders, Hammarskjold also paid increasing attention towards what he classified as the proper ‘internationalization of aid’.147 This amounted to a renewed effort to change the nature of development aid—from bilateral, paternalistic and potentially a hostage of the Cold War, to a multilateral collaboration where more reciprocity existed between donor and recipient countries.

Although, the UN did manage to increase its development-presence in Africa in 1960 and certainly thereafter, it competed directly with alternative development schemes that challenged the UN-model envisioned by Hammarskjold. The most direct challenge came from the culmination of a decade-long attempt to set up a billion dollar soft loan financing agency. Again, decolonization in Africa exacerbated a debate that pitted the Special United

Nations Fund for Economic Development, or SUNFED, against a rival agency known as the International Development Association, or the IDA. Whereas most of the UN Secretariat and member states from the Global South—including the sixteen newly independent Africa countries that joined the UN in 1960—backed SUNFED, the major Western industrial states supported the IDA. From the perspective of its backers, SUNFED would have been the truest and most meaningful way to internationalize development aid. Meanwhile, most Western states felt the IDA best protected their interests while still offering a multilateral aid option. Although the competition between SUNFED and the IDA was more contested than depicted by scholars, the IDA did outpace SUNFED in 1960 and beyond. However, the clash itself showed the important role played by international institutions like the UN in shaping the predominant development thinking of the day. Together with Hammarskjold’s efforts, it laid the groundwork for the Organization’s pivot towards making development its primary function.

**The Secretary-Generalship of Dag Hammarskjold and the Turn Toward Africa**

Hammarskjold had been a relative unknown outside Sweden prior to taking up his post as Secretary-General on 31 March 1953. Raised in Uppsala, Sweden, Hammarskjold was the youngest of four sons to Hjalmar and Agnes Hammarskjold. His austere and conservative father served as the unpopular Prime Minister of Sweden from 1914 to 1917. Sweden’s public tagged the Prime Minister with the moniker ‘Hungerskjold’ after he imposed food rationing during World War One. His own Cabinet resigned in 1917 after he refused to sign a trade agreement with Britain. Dag Hammarskjold was not close to his ascetic father but later revealed that he did learn a great deal about public service from him. Hammarskjold’s mother Agnes was the antithesis of Hjalmar. She was warm, nurturing and passed on to her youngest son a personal and intimate Christian faith. Dag Hammarskjold studied law and economics at the University of Uppsala and received a PhD in economics from the University of
Stockholm. Preferring the government to academia, he joined the Swedish Finance Ministry as an Under-Secretary at the age of thirty while simultaneously serving as a chairman of the Bank of Sweden. Early on Hammarskjold worked under Ernst Wigforss, Sweden’s most recognized Fabian socialist economist. Wigforss saw in Hammarskjold, a “man of action” who was “little tempted by an academic career.” Hammarskjold’s first major international mission was as a delegate to the 1947 Paris Conference that launched the Marshall Plan. He then oversaw Sweden’s participation in the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), created to administer Marshall Plan aid and was a key player in negotiating Sweden’s accession into in the Bretton Woods institutions in 1951. It was at the OEEC, claimed Wigfross, that Hammarskjold gained an international reputation as a dutiful civil servant and as a sharp-minded practical diplomat. Hammarskjold reinforced this reputation when he served as Sweden’s top delegate at the 1951 and 1952 UN General Assembly sessions. Concurrently, he carried out his duties as a member of the Swedish Cabinet from 1951-53, despite never having joined a political party, dealing with issues relating to trade and economics.

Hammarskjold was anything but a frontrunner to replace the outgoing UN Secretary-General, Trygve Lie. His appointment as UN Secretary-General came as a result of a compromise following the inability of alternative candidates, including Lester Pearson of Canada, Stanislaw Skreszewski of Poland and General Carlos Romulo of the Philippines, to garner the necessary votes and approval by the Great Powers. Member states then supposedly settled on Hammarskjold for his prosaic qualities and administrative experience. The hope was that Hammarskjold would be more discreet and less political than Secretary-General Lie—a fellow Scandinavian who had held the office from 1946 to 1953. Hammarskjold accepted the position of Secretary-General of the UN after the Soviet Union had effectively

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excommunicated Lie for the pro-Western position he took on the Korean War.

Hammarskjold’s posting also took place towards the end of the McCarthy Era that had seen numerous Americans working at the UN investigated and accused of communist treachery. Altogether, this meant that Hammarskjold joined the UN at a low ebb, and thus critical juncture, for the Organization and his Office. Caution and circumspection marked Hammarskjold’s early tenure. He spent most of his first term carefully choosing his staff, reorganizing the Secretariat and then only dabbling in political and diplomatic matters.

Taking into account his academic and administrative background, some forecasted that he would most likely make his mark as an economist. Fellow Swede Tor Gjesdal, personal adviser to the outgoing Trygve Lie, remarked to George Ivan Smith that many of Gjesdal’s Swedish friends believed Hammarskjold’s, ‘personal qualifications in field of economic cooperation may be an interesting component in the picture of the future when we think of the very great importance of the UN technical assistance activities and other work in the economic and social field as a part also of the political future of the Organization.’

Oscar Schachter, director of the General Legal Division of the UN from 1953-66, recognized Hammarskjold’s propensity to emphasize economic matters. He commented that Hammarskjold, ‘had a kind of stake’ in wanting, ‘to be seen as an economist.’ He cited Hammarskjold as being the only Secretary-General who was attentive to the work of economists within the Secretariat and having a vested interest in their major annual publication, the World Economic Report. Just two months after taking up his post, Hammarskjold publically affirmed that as the ‘dark horse entering the race’ much guesswork had gone into figuring out just what might be his focus. He then validated commentators who speculated he might give added emphasis to the economic aspects of UN work due to his

152 Luard, 108. For Hammarskjold early tenure as Secretary-General see, Urquhart, Hammarskjold, 46-131.
153 Letter from Tor Gjesdal to Smith, (undated), Bodleian Library, Smith Papers, MS Eng. c 6488.
154 Transcript of Interview with Oscar Schachter, 6 September 2001, UN Intellectual History Project, 21.
background. He cautioned, however, that this would not come at the expense of his attention towards the political activities of the organization as some had predicted. In fact, he viewed the economic aspects of the world’s troubles as inherently wedded to the political.155

There is no doubt that Hammarskjold promoted the economic aspects of the Organization rhetorically through his support for two UN economic aid programs, the EPTA and the Special Fund as seen in Chapter One. It is also apparent that by the mid-1950s Hammarskjold was astutely aware that a shift was taking place, or would take place, at the UN towards Asia and Africa—two continents where UN economic aid could have a significant impact. In the light of six countries from the Global South joining the UN in 1955, Hammarskjold, in his tenth annual report, stated that the ‘peoples of Asia today, of Africa tomorrow’ were forging, through the UN, a new relationship with the rest of the world.156 Elsewhere during that year, he commented that the rise of Asia and Africa was the great historical development of our times but also the greatest challenge and task facing the UN due to those regions’ economic and social underdevelopment.157 While interviewing Philippe de Seynes in 1955, for the position of UN Under-Secretary of Economic and Social Affairs, Hammarskjold remarked that ‘From now on, the two main problems occupying the United Nations will be Africa and the atom.’158 Nevertheless, the historical record suggests that this might have been an unequal marriage for much of Hammarskjold’s early UN tenure as Secretary-General. For all his oratory on the importance of UN action in the field of development aid and specifically technical assistance, Schachter, the same UN official who had recognized Hammarskjold’s expressed interest in economics, also confessed he could not recall one initiative where the Secretary-General ‘really pushed the economic role as a big

155 From Statement at the Opening of the Merrill Center of Economics, 28 June 1953, in Cordier and Foote, eds., Volume II, 55.
issue.’ In fact, by 1958 Hammarskjold was even referring to himself as an \textit{économiste manqué} (lacking/ex-economist).\textsuperscript{159}

Schachter did recall Hammarskjold taking an interest in developing countries for the valuable political support they could offer by way of votes at the UN. Additionally, he believed Hammarskjold came to identify with their movement in principle, as is also seen in the Secretary-General’s above statements, but seemed to have stopped short in initiating action from rhetoric. Schachter’s explanation for this amounts to Hammarskjold identifying with the cause but not the culture of the Third World. He cites the fact that the Secretary-General ‘had very much an upper-class European view of people’ and could be, especially during the Congo Crisis, ‘quite patronizing about Congolese figures and others from the Third World.’\textsuperscript{160} Scholars too disagree over just how much Hammarskjold prioritized development and its manifestations. Nick Cullather recently claimed that the UN, ‘under the secretary-generalship of economist Dag Hammarskjold, claimed international development as a primary function.’\textsuperscript{161} Conversely, David Webster concluded that Hammarskjold’s preoccupation with bolstering the UN’s peace and security functions resulted in the downgrading of the Organization’s development agenda towards underdeveloped countries.\textsuperscript{162}

Jeff King and A.J. Hobbins in ‘Hammarskjold and Human Rights: the Deflation of the UN Human Rights Programme 1953-1961,’ offer more insight into some of the reasons for Hammarskjold’s torpid approach to two issues closely related to economic development and decolonization—namely self-determination and human rights. They argue that overall, he preferred and even relished the diplomatic and political elements of his job to the neglect of social matters. On self-determination, King and Hobbins argue Hammarskjold advocated

\textsuperscript{159} Transcript of Interview with Brian Urquhart, 6 January 2000, UN Intellectual History Project, 19.
\textsuperscript{160} Transcript of Interview with Oscar Schachter, 6 September 2001, UN Intellectual History Project, 21.
\textsuperscript{161} Cullather, \textit{The Hungry World}, 146.
\textsuperscript{162} Webster, ‘Development Advisors in a Time of Cold War and Decolonization,’ 268.
gradual change, citing the Secretary-General’s position that an ‘unrealistic impatience in the movement towards self-determination and wasteful resistance to it would contradict [the] philosophy of the Charter by leading to conflicts which might threaten peace.’\textsuperscript{163} Furthermore, they suggest Hammarskjold systematically downgraded the Human Rights Division within the UN, viewing it too as an avenue for potential and needless conflict that might hinder his efforts to secure peace.\textsuperscript{164} The authors also cite evidence that Hammarskjold ultimately viewed self-determination and human rights, certainly in much of the Third World, as the domain of the UN Trusteeship Council, not his Office directly. Finally, the authors recognize that any strong stance by Hammarskjold on either self-determination or human rights might have seriously jeopardized the reservoir of good will and political influence he had built up with the Great Powers. King and Hobbins conclude that change only really came for Hammarskjold in 1960 when the outbreak of the Congo Crisis led to his embrace of human rights and self-determination. They argue that this was not because of a genuine change of heart but as a means to justify a highly contentious UN intervention in that central African country.\textsuperscript{165}

The merit of King and Hobbins’ argument lies in its description of Hammarskjold as an enigmatic figure, but ultimately someone who had a ‘desire to run things his way’—albeit


\textsuperscript{164} Touting the famed Declaration on Human Rights as amply sufficient in the short-term, Hammarskjold drastically reduced the size of the Human Rights Division staff by 30\% from 1954-56, eliminated \textit{The Yearbook on Human Rights} and even opposed a resolution to create a technical assistance program in the field of human rights in 1955. Although he later reserved his position on the latter.

\textsuperscript{165} King and Hobbins, 347-371. In many ways, King and Hobbins’ assertion that Hammarskjold deflated human rights during his tenure as Secretary-General supports Samuel Moyn’s claim in \textit{The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History} that even the UN ‘left behind’ human rights soon after the Organization adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. Instead, as Moyn argues in Chapter Three, entitled ‘Why Anticolonialism Wasn’t a Human Rights Movement’, newly independent states at the UN largely equated and relegated human rights issues to those of self-determination and ‘collective economic development’ during the early postwar decades. This perspective also seems to have aligned with that of Hammarskjold during the course of his Secretary-Generalship. See, Samuel Moyn, \textit{The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History} (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), 6-7, 84-100.
with impressive patience at times. They are also correct in surmising that circumstances, more than ideology, had a profound effect on Hammarskjöld’s perception on matters—political, social or economic. This study would argue that in the realm of economic development, Hammarskjöld was not as torpid as with human rights issues but was unhurried. The difference being, Hammarskjöld never shelved or neglected economic development to the extent he sidelined human rights. In fact, rhetorically Hammarskjöld never downplayed the value of a UN-centered model for economic development assistance channeled from donor to recipient countries. In other words, he did not push everything to the background at the expense of reclaiming the Organization’s peace and security functions as claimed by Webster and emphasized by most of the historical scholarship discussed in the introduction to this thesis.

What is apparent is that Hammarskjöld had a strong vision for the role of the UN and his Office in many areas including economic development. Overall, his motivations certainly stemmed in part from an innate sense of duty to humanity that he derived from his religious beliefs. One of the very few public windows into Hammarskjöld’s religious life was an address he gave on *This I Believe*, a radio program of famed journalist Edward R. Murrow. There, Hammarskjöld spoke of a deep-seated belief ‘that no life was more satisfactory than one of selfless service to your country—to humanity.’ It was from comments like this that Hammarskjöld likely acquired the moniker of, ‘the Pope on the East River’. For this secular pontiff his sense of duty clearly extend to the peacekeeping functions of his Office. Moreover, later evidence in this chapter will show the increasing sense of responsibility Hammarskjöld felt towards the underdeveloped segment of humanity and especially his role, as an executive who believed strongly in executive power, in this process. Nevertheless,

166 King and Hobbins, 384.
167 For the text and original audio of the entire address see: Dag Hammarskjöld, *Old Creeds for a New World* [http://thisibelieve.org/essay/16608/].
operationally he seemed to wait for changing international circumstances to animate his ideas.

For much of his early tenure, for example, there seemed to be a number of practical reasons why Hammarskjold did not push any specific initiatives relating to economic development and development aid. One partial motive may lie in Hammarskjold’s failed attempt to corral and make use of the Specialized Agencies through a UN body called the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination (ACC)—a point addressed below. He and others at the Secretariat might have also realized that any petition for a substantial increase in economic assistance to underdeveloped countries would have certainly fallen on barren soil during the early to mid-1950s as European countries were still rebuilding their own economies. Africa specifically was still under the rule of the colonial powers or under the purview of a colonial state as a UN Trust Territory during much of 1950s. In fact, Smith recalled a long period when the British Colonial Office balked at the suggestion of utilizing UN technical aid in British Africa. It was only in 1960 that he perceived a new attitude among these officials who now seemed to welcome UN technical aid in their African territories, so long as the local government agreed.168

Figures on aid to African member states through the EPTA and Special Fund support Smith’s analysis. From 1950 to 1956, field program costs for Africa averaged 7.5% of the total global funds distribution by the EPTA. Meanwhile, Asia and the Far East received an average of 27.6% of the total funds, Latin America 24.7% and the Middle East 18.4% over the same period. From 1957 to 1960, Africa’s percentage of EPTA funding rose only slightly, averaging 13.2% of the total.169 Similarly, over the first year-and-a-half of Special Fund operations, from January 1959 through May 1960, Africa’s share amounted to roughly 12.8% of the total funds allocated by the Fund. Of the ten Special Fund projects that took place in

168 Diary entry, 13 October 1960, Oxford Bodleian Library, Smith Papers, MS Eng. c 6518.
Africa over this period, only two occurred in colonial dependencies—the survey of a dam site in Nigeria mentioned in Chapter One and an aerial geophysical survey in Uganda—both being British dependences at the time.  

What is clear is that changing circumstances, starting in the mid-1950s and certainly mushrooming by 1960, resulted in UN economic development assistance to underdeveloped countries becoming a top priority for Secretary-General Hammarskjold and the UN. Once determined to act, he moved with impressive vigor as much of the rest of this chapter, as well as Chapters Four and Five, will highlight. For example, by 1959 with much of the world’s attention drawn to a growing Berlin crisis, Hammarskjold reminded his audience in a speech at the University of Lund, Sweden that: ‘[n]o matter how overwhelming other world problems may appear to us because of their proximity, it is possible that the future will attach greater importance to the rebirth of Asia and Africa in the historical evolution of the present epoch, than to questions now uppermost in the news.’ Hammarskjold went on to stress his desire that Asia and Africa’s ‘rebirth’ might progress in solidarity with the West, where no party claimed supremacy. He believed the UN was working towards this goal as a matter of principle by providing modest amounts of knowledge and resources through the EPTA and the Special Fund, which gave underdeveloped nations an equal chance at development. Yet Hammarskjold envisioned a greater, but at this point still undefined, role for the UN in the process. He argued that the UN ought to respond to the demands placed before it, regardless of its perceived limitations. His eagerness showed through when he remarked at a press conference in April 1959 that, ‘[i]t did take the very steep hill of Suez; it may take other and even steeper hills’ to understand the full capacity of the Organization.

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170 United Nations, The United Nations Special Fund, 1960, 23-47. If Special Fund projects that took place in the UAR are included in the Africa total, its percentage would increase to 16.8%.
Overall, Hammarskjold presaged the changes the UN would soon go through but did not precipitate them. New UN member states from the Global South deserve much of the credit for pushing the UN into new terrain by focusing the attention of the General Assembly on the urgent needs of underdeveloped countries while demanding that the UN play a greater role. At the 1959 General Assembly session, there was no shortage of this type of language and demand for action. The delegate from Brazil, Eurico Penteado, noted that the world’s poor were no longer reserved to the nineteenth century dictum of being resigned to their life of poverty. He continued, education and mass communication had resulted in a revolutionary psychological change and the world must heed this change or all would be lost. Africa, in particular, demanded more attention since once independent and separated from colonialism, new African member states had no source of support to look to other than the UN, which, according to Penteado, was obliged to respond. Other delegates echoed these sentiments especially delegates from African countries. Ernest Eastman, from Liberia called the UN the ideal instrument for ‘mutual assistance’ among nations. Ghanaian representative, W.A.C. Essibrah, emphasized that newly independent countries would expect the UN to provide ‘disinterested assistance’ to help them fulfill their Charter obligations. Abdel Hamid Abdel-Ghani, of the United Arab Republic (UAR) lamented the small share Africa had so far received in development assistance and asserted that the UN had an obligation to give all the aid it could to newly independent countries. Finally, Guinean representative, Conte Seydou, remarked that recipient countries viewed UN assistance as a ‘co-operative effort’ meant for rapid development and should not be mistaken for merely charity.174

No less than twenty-seven resolutions passed during the course of the 1959 Assembly dealing with either UN Trust Territories or colonial dependencies (classified by the UN as Non-Self-Governing Countries) and economic development aid. Many of them called for action from the Secretary-General to give his urgent and sympathetic attention to all requests

174 *GAOR*, 14th Session, Second Committee, 594th-611th meetings, 14 October-4 November 1959.
for economic aid. Hammarskjold responded almost immediately. Desiring to get a deeper sense of just what soon to be independent countries needed from the UN, Hammarskjold embarked on a tour across Africa, immediately following the conclusion of the 1959 General Assembly, a trip that lasted from 21 December 1959 to 31 January 1960.

**Hammarskjold’s African Tour: December 1959-January 1960**

Secretary-General Hammarskjold’s African tour took him to twenty-three countries and territories over a six-week period. An article from the *Egyptian Gazette* entitled, ‘Mr H.’s Tour Puts Accent On Africa’s Growing Influence’ summarized the trip in one sense, stating how the tour was indicative of just how much dedicated attention Hammarskjold believed Africa deserved at this point in its historical development.\(^{175}\) According to Hammarskjold himself, the trip was primarily a reconnaissance mission to get a fuller picture of the views of African governments and peoples—their aspirations, problems and needs. Hammarskjold was also motivated by the chance to form personal acquaintances with African leaders—essential for a Secretary-General who preferred private diplomacy. Finally, it was a chance for Hammarskjold to express his own views to African leaders, providing a taste of what the UN could offer newly independent states. Overall, the trip left Hammarskjold as impressed as he was troubled, but nonetheless eager for an expanded role in Africa for the UN generally and his Office specifically.

The most repeated declaration of Hammarskjold’s trip was his great impression of the new generation of African leaders and their ‘highest seriousness, devotion, and intelligence.’\(^{176}\) It is fair to say he was taken and motivated by African leaders who expressed their clear desire to involve the UN in the future development of their respective countries.

Topping the list was Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika who struck a chord with Hammarskjold


when he stated that if given the chance, Tanganyika would even choose less aid through the UN compared to more through a bilateral channel. Nyerere’s proclamation also puts in context Hammarskjold’s eagerness to send Smith to Tanganyika later that year and the President’s response. Nigeria was a bright spot for Hammarskjold as well. There, the US Consul observed that Hammarskjold received more attention in thirty-six hours than any other foreign envoy in recent years, less a royal visit from the Duke and Duchess of Gloucester. Hammarskjold was particularly pleased with what he called the ‘puritan spirit’ of West African leaders—including Abubakar Balewa of Nigeria, Sekou Toure of Guinea and Sylvanus Olympio of Togoland (now Togo). In the case of the Balewa and Olympio, both expressed to Hammarskjold the desire for UN-channeled aid. For Balewa, he feared the loss of administrators and private investment upon independence from Britain at a time when Nigeria needed both for economic expansion and for development. In fact, the anticipated shortage of qualified administrative personnel was a reoccurring concern raised by most of the African leaders Hammarskjold met.

Hammarskjold too, was aware of the shock of independence no matter how orderly and peaceful. During a speech at the second session of the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) in Tangier, Morocco, Hammarskjold provided probably the best summary assessment of what he believed Africa now faced. Echoing the development discourse of the day, Hammarskjold spoke of the ‘scarcity of skills’ and the ‘magnitude of adjustments’ required at a time when a country lacked a defined economic and financial identity or full knowledge of its own resources and needs. Moreover, he recognized Africa’s ongoing battles with disease, illiteracy, mono-cultural economies, subsistence farming and isolation from world markets. Yet, he reminded his African audience that the continent’s awakening was

178 Telegram from Dixon to Foreign Office (FO), 18 February 1960, UK National Archives, Kew Gardens, UK (hereafter, UKNA), FO 371/153646; Telegram from the US Consul in Nigeria (Clifford J. Quinlan) to the Department of State, 5 January 1960, NARA II, RG 59, 1960-1963 Central Decimal File, Box 486.
taking place at a time of growing interdependence among all nations. According to Hammarskjold, the UN best exemplified this reality. Thus, new countries could avoid isolation by making use of the diplomatic and economic machinery of the UN. Moreover, the UN could do its part in ‘putting its weight on the scales’ to make Africa’s transition as smooth as possible, not only politically but also economically and socially. For Hammarskjold this included expanding the UN aid programs on the continent, not to create a dependency on outside expertise but where the international community might help in creating a ‘favorable climate’ for long-term growth and development.179 As a signal of Hammarskjold’s next move, he directed Heinz Wieschoff, the top UN official on Africa, to initiate plans upon his return to New York for a ‘massive’ African program.180

It would seem that Hammarskjold had a realistic sense of the problems facing Africa on the verge of independence and was equally confident that the UN was a crucial part of the solution. Some, however, believed that the Secretary-General’s optimism amounted to a rather simplistic and one-size-fits-all view of the solutions to Africa’s problems. At a press conference in Tanganyika, Hammarskjold argued that there should be no distinction made between underdeveloped countries moving towards independence and those who had achieved it four or five years ago.181 The British Colonial Office in Tanganyika similarly observed that Hammarskjold was far more concerned with economic and social conditions than the date of independence.182 Brian Urquhart, the longtime UN official and Hammarskjold’s biographer, affirmed there was a naïve belief at the UN during this period.

180 Telegram from US Consul General in Nairobi (Charles D. Withers) to Secretary of State Herter, 13 January 1960, NARA II, RG 59, 1960-1963 Central Decimal File, Box 486.
181 Summary of Hammarskjold’s Press Conference in Tanganyika, 10 January 1960, UKNA, FO 371/153646.
182 Telegram from the British Colonial Office to UK Mission to the UN, 29 January 1960, UKNA, FO 371/153646.
that if the UN could take care of the economic and social needs of Africa, any political problem would work itself out.\textsuperscript{183}

Pierson Dixon, the UK Ambassador to the UN, offered another insightful analysis. In light of a conversation with Hammarskjold upon his return from Africa, Dixon recognized that, ‘the Secretary-General has been fired by [the] prospect of [the] decisive and benevolent impact by the United Nations on a complex new situation which is clearly of very first importance.’ Nevertheless, Dixon warned that Hammarskjold was prone to try to fit many complicated problems into one matrix and one broad solution with himself acting as the linchpin, in this case between the African states and the UN machinery. Dixon attributed some of Hammarskjold’s eagerness to act to perhaps feeling over-extended in the Middle East over the past years and where his plans for economic development in 1957-58 fizzled. Africa, according to Dixon, could prove more rewarding for the Secretary-General.\textsuperscript{184}

However, there is also evidence that points to some strong and less naïve reservations Hammarskjold had with regard to Africa’s impending decolonization and the future of its leadership. Privately, he expressed his reservations at the speed of independence in the Belgian Congo and was similarly troubled by the situation in what was then known as Ruanda-Urundi. Apparently, he was so concerned over the conditions in this region of Africa that he considered sending a follow-up envoy of ‘Ambassador-level’ diplomats in order to provide a more extensive assessment. He was also less than impressed by the leadership in Cameroon, the French Congo and British Cameroon.\textsuperscript{185} In these cases, Hammarskjold acknowledged that the demand for independence rarely bore relation to those countries’ health.\textsuperscript{186} Prime Minister Nkrumah of Ghana alarmed Hammarskjold more than any other

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\item \textsuperscript{183} Ibid.; Transcript of Interview with Brian Urquhart, 6 January 1960, UN Intellectual History Project, 3-4.
\item \textsuperscript{184} Telegram from Dixon to FO, 18 February 1960, UKNA, FO 371/153646.
\item \textsuperscript{185} The French Congo included the present-day area of the Republic of the Congo, Gabon and the Central African Republic. British Cameroon included parts of Nigeria and present-day Cameroon.
\item \textsuperscript{186} Telegram from the British Resident Representative of Zanzibar to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 22 January 1960, UKNA, FO371/153646; Telegram from Dar-es-Salaam (Duggan) to Secretary of State Herter, 11 January 1960, NARA II, RG 59, 1960-1963 Central Decimal File, Box 486.
\end{itemize}
leader he met. He had no misgivings in describing Nkrumah as self-seeking and personally ambitious. He was particularly distressed over Nkrumah’s imperialistic interests in Togoland as well as Nkrumah’s calling of a special session of the legislature during his visit where he castigated Olympio, Togoland’s President. Within Ghana, Hammarskjold believed Nkrumah had built a ‘cult of personality’ despite his inferior leadership. Finally, he deplored Nkrumah’s efforts at development that Hammarskjold likened to ‘building pyramids’. He cited the Tema Harbor development project—an effort to transform a small fishing village into an ultra-modern seaport—as one such ‘pyramid’. 187

No doubt also informing Hammarskjold’s impression of Nkrumah was the UN’s previous experience with the Prime Minister. In October 1957, just seven months after Ghana became the first sub-Saharan African country to declare its independence, UN economist Arthur Lewis arrived to take up a two-year post as the UN economic adviser to Nkrumah. Born in Saint Lucia in the British West Indies, Lewis had previously served as a lecturer at the London School of Economics and full professor at the University of Manchester. Lewis had a UN connection when, in 1950, David Owen utilized his services for a UN study that would become a classic in the field of development economics. 188 Nkrumah had made two previous attempts to involve Lewis in his nation’s economic development. In 1953, he asked Lewis to advise him on the then British-planned Volta River Project. Lewis turned down Nkrumah at the time and the task instead fell to another UN top consultant, Robert Jackson. Lewis did acquiesce in 1955 to a request to provide an impartial evaluation of Jackson’s report.

187 Telegram from the US Consul in Nigeria (Clifford J. Quinlan) to the Department of State, 5 January 1960, NARA II, RG 59, 1960-1963 Central Decimal File, Box 486; Telegram from Dixon to FO, 18 February 1960, UKNA, FO 371/153646; Telegram from US Consul General in Nairobi (Charles D. Withers) to Secretary of State Herter, 13 January 1960, NARA II, RG 59, 1960-1963 Central Decimal File, Box 486.

Now in 1957, Lewis—paid through the EPTA for his services—was finally at the disposal of Nkrumah. Nevertheless, as UN historian Craig Murphy explains, the two were at odds from the start over what Lewis perceived as the Prime Minister’s excessive and imprudent spending.\textsuperscript{189} At one point, Lewis wrote to Nkrumah imploring him:

> as a fellow socialist, to whom the idea of spending money on embassies, airforces, yachts, “making Ghana’s voice heard all over the world” and other such boastfulness is downright sinful, so long as 80 per cent of the people still have no water, and so long as one baby in every three still dies before it is five years old. You belong to the class of great world leaders of small nations, like Masaryk, Ben Gurion, Munoz, Marin, Cardenas or UNu, none of whom for one moment consider spending £80 million on such baubles.\textsuperscript{190}

Lewis especially advised against pouring in funds or making large concessions to chase after the Volta River Project. Nkrumah rejected Lewis’ advice on all fronts, prompting Lewis to seek another assignment before his time was up in Ghana. Lewis quickly transferred to a position, in early 1959, as Deputy Managing Director of the new UN Special Fund under Paul Hoffman.\textsuperscript{191} Ironically, one of the first projects undertaken by the Special Fund was a three-year survey of the Volta River flood plain in conjunction with Nkrumah’s government.\textsuperscript{192}

Following Hammarskjold’s encounter with Nkrumah, where he made many similar observations as Lewis, the Secretary-General concluded that the UN should refrain from any further development programs in Ghana. (Presumably the Special Fund survey was, by this time, already underway). The feeling might have been mutual, as Ghana also showed little interest in a future role for the UN in its region, turning down an offer for a UN Resident Representative.\textsuperscript{193} Hammarskjold’s hesitancy and unease over Ghana and other African countries, and conversely his enthusiasm towards an extensive UN role in others, shows that

\textsuperscript{189} Murphy, \textit{The United Nation Development Programme}, 126-129.
\textsuperscript{190} As quoted by Murphy, \textit{The United Nations Development Programme}, 127.
\textsuperscript{191} Ibid., 114-129; Gerald M. Meier and Dudley Seers, eds., \textit{Pioneers in Development} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 119.
\textsuperscript{193} Telegram from Dixon to FO, 18 February 1960, UKNA, FO 371/153646; Telegram from US Consul General in Nairobi (Charles D. Withers) to Secretary of State Herter, 13 January 1960, NARA II, RG 59, 1960-1963 Central Decimal File, Box 486.
he might have had a one-size-fits-all approach to Africa’s problems, but that did not mean he was not selective in its application.

**Western Approaches to Development Assistance for Africa**

Overall, as Christopher O’Sullivan has argued in ‘The United Nations, Decolonization, and Self-Determination in Cold War Sub-Saharan Africa, 1960-1994’ the UN’s involvement in Africa grew in parallel to the process of decolonization. Yet, so did much of the rest of the world’s interest in the continent. As argued in Chapter One, the US and the Soviet Union both had a growing interest in aiding the underdeveloped world as the 1950s progressed. Each subsequently bolstered their aid to this region as a result. The US and Soviet Union, like the UN, directed most of their economic aid to Asia and Latin America since much of Africa remained the domain of various colonial powers. However, by the beginning of the 1960s Western leaders also joined Hammarskjold in paying increasing attention to Africa. Easily the most famous example of this is British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan’s proclamation that a ‘wind of change’ was blowing through the continent. Macmillan’s declaration came during the Prime Minister’s own tour of Africa that coincided nearly exactly with that of Hammarskjold’s. Upon his return, Hammarskjold commented that it seemed that the major commonality for him and Macmillan was the recognition of ‘the strength of the awakening of national consciousness on the continent.’ Similarly, President Eisenhower dedicated much of his 1960 State of the Union speech, delivered on 7 January 1960, to newly emerging nations, their urgent development needs and the possibility of a cooperative response by the West.

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Both Macmillan’s trip and Eisenhower’s speech came on the heels of a Paris Summit meeting, held from 19-22 December 1959, where these leaders along with President Charles de Gaulle of France and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of Germany met to reevaluate the economic relationship between the West and the entire underdeveloped world. At the summit, one proposal dominated the discussion over how the West should approach economic aid to underdeveloped countries. The proposal, pitched by the Eisenhower Administration, was to transform and revitalize the OEEC, the institution responsible for managing Marshall Plan funds, into an organization that could coordinate the policies on aid and trade from Western donor countries to recipient countries of the Global South. For the Administration, this idea was built on the premise that the US alone could not provide all the capital needed to facilitate development throughout the Global South. Moreover, Western Europe, plus Japan, was now financially capable of sharing this burden. According to Secretary of State Christian Herter, the US did not mean for this proposal to be mistaken for a Marshall Plan for the Third World, since the envisioned reorganized OEEC would not have any lending functions. Instead, the purpose of a reconstituted and renamed organization would be to provide a platform for the US to spur other financially strong, but otherwise reluctant, industrialized countries of the ‘Free World’ to direct their monetary reserves towards development-hungry countries.\(^{198}\)

Under-Secretary of State Douglas Dillon laid the groundwork for the US strategy in visits to London, Brussels, Bonn and Paris from 7-14 December 1959. Then at the Paris Summit, Eisenhower raised the issue of increased Western cooperation over development aid, receiving a positive response from all but de Gaulle. The French President instead advocated the formation of a ‘directorate of four’ made up of France, Great Britain, the US and the Soviet Union, as a joint Soviet-Western effort to coordinate aid to the underdeveloped world.

Having tabled de Gaulle’s suggestion, Western Powers again met from 12-14 January where they reached an agreement to begin the transformation of the OEEC into a twenty-member Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Alongside the OECD, which would not officially launch until December 1960, a smaller group of eight (later ten) leading capital-exporting countries formed more immediately. The goal of this group was to serve as a forum where major donor countries could consider together the particular problems and techniques of development aid while designing and monitoring procedures for assisting undeveloped countries. 199 Dillon established and led this smaller Development Assistance Group (DAG), for a time referred to as the Dillon Group or Plan. DAG held its first meeting in Washington from 9-11 March 1960. 200

Ultimately, the OECD and DAG are both examples of how the US and its allies sought to respond to the pressing call for development aid. The so-called Dillon Plan, as well as De Gaulle’s ‘directorate of four’, both figured prominently in discussions over development aid well into 1960. However, both bred a considerable amount of contempt by those who believed neither the West nor the Great Powers should have a monopoly on planning and providing for the needs of underdeveloped countries. Included in this list of critics was Secretary-General Hammarskjold whose trip to Africa overlapped with the development of these alternatives to UN-channeled aid.

**UN Aid Exceptionalism: ‘Better Billions’**

Clearly inspired by his tour of Africa, Hammarskjold used the weeks and months following his trip to sell UN development aid with a focus and passion not yet seen during his tenure. In a press conference just days after his return, Hammarskjold remarked that it was

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200 Current Economic Developments, 15 March 1960, NARA II, RG 59, Entry 1579, Master File 1945-1957, Current Economic Developments, Box 9. The original DAG members included Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, the UK and the US.
his impression that all across Africa there had been ‘one standing demand, one standing hope.’ More than money or technical assistance, which African leaders already knew the UN could directly supply in modest amounts, these leaders wanted ‘moral support’. By moral support, he meant more than congenial encouragement but a sympathetic understanding of the problems facing African countries and a willingness to respond to their requests. For African leaders, this amounted to the proper ‘internationalization of aid’. Crucially, Hammarskjold remarked that switching from a system of bilateral aid to a system where a group of countries offered aid to a single country was not a true expression of the internationalization of aid. In this case, according to Hammarskjold, the bilateral nature of giving aid remained intact. Conversely, Hammarskjold believed recipient countries found it far easier to accept financial and technical assistance through an international body of which they were full and equal members alongside donor countries. Thus, he unequivocally stated that, as much as possible, states should channel development assistance through the UN.201

Questioned later about the apparent trend of superpower subversion of the UN in the field of economic aid, Hammarskjold’s response was to add an exclamation mark to his earlier statement. He began by stating that he was aware of the Soviet Union’s preference for bilateral aid and the current US pursuit of multilateral aid specifically outside the UN. Yet he saw these as a threat to the recipient countries more than the Organization. He concluded, that ‘the billions put up would be better billions in terms of peace and world progress if they were put up in a forum which was more adjusted to the real political needs of the receiving countries.’ Overall, Hammarskjold remained positive. Aid through the UN would probably always be a fraction of bilateral aid through the Great Powers but it could carry greater weight to African countries since its donor was ultimately their Organization, which had no colonial past or future ambitions.202 In another press conference two weeks later, a reporter

202 Ibid., 534-35.
asked Hammarskjold to comment on a statement from President Eisenhower the previous day regarding the establishment of a free world aid bloc\textsuperscript{203} while at the same time Khrushchev promoted Soviet bloc aid in New Delhi. Hammarskjold surmised the situation was still fluid, hoping each superpower would come to realize the benefits of UN-channeled aid and be made aware of the concerns of countries at the receiving end of being taken hostage by bloc aid.\textsuperscript{204} Moreover, keeping problems outside the Cold War obit was a role Hammarskjold believed was specifically and uniquely his as Secretary-General.\textsuperscript{205} Since the issue of development aid to Africa was, at least for the first half of 1960, still beyond the boundaries of the Cold War, the task now was to keep it out of range.

In what Andrew Cordier, Hammarskjold’s executive-assistant, describes as his best exposition on the UN, the Secretary-General ruminated during a speech at the University of Chicago in May 1960 on higher forms of international society. He concluded:

\begin{quote}
It is obvious that we cannot regard the line of approach represented by the United Nations as intrinsically more valuable or more promising than other lines, in spite of the fact that, through its universality, it lies closer to or points more directly toward the ideal of a true constitutional framework for worldwide international cooperation, and notwithstanding the obvious weaknesses of regional approaches to such cooperation. However, if one cannot a priori give it higher value, it is, on the other hand, equally impermissible to regard it as less promising than experiments at present pursued on other lines.\textsuperscript{206}
\end{quote}

Seen in the light of the discussion of the day, and his other statements it would seem Hammarskjold was pragmatic enough to realize that the UN would never replace the metropolitan powers, the US or other forms of bloc aid. Nor was its goal to weaken the relationship between African states and other countries. However, the UN still had an equally valuable role to play.

\textsuperscript{203} The ‘free world aid bloc’ was probably in reference to the OECD, DAG or the IDA (to be disused at length below), or all three.
\textsuperscript{204} Transcript of Press Conference, 18 February 1960, in Cordier and Foote eds., Volume IV, 542-43.
\textsuperscript{205} Transcript of Press Conference, 5 February 1959, in Cordier and Foote eds., Volume IV, 326.
The above statements by Hammarskjold evoked some candid and expositive responses from an individual who carefully measured any public remark. Yet perhaps the best source on Hammarskjold’s uncensored opinion toward UN development aid and its alternatives is found in a private letter to his friend Hans Engen, Norway’s Ambassador to the UN from 1952-1958. Again, Hammarskjold made clear to Engen his belief in a strong preference among Africans for UN-channeled aid, citing his conversation in Africa with Nyerere. On the alternatives, Hammarskjold admitted he lamented the ‘so-called Dillon plan’ (officially, DAG). He viewed bloc aid as a poor substitute for bilateral aid and the Dillon group—made up of five ex-colonial powers sprinkled with a few other NATO members—as simply bilateralism in disguise. He reasoned that African states would treat group or bloc aid from an institution they did not belong to as the same as bilateral aid, since neither brought them beyond colonial or Cold War influences. He also regretted no DAG country, less Italy, had made any contact with his Office to coordinate strategies. Hammarskjold attributed this to the West’s pathological effort to avoid ‘mixed company’, even with an organization that had considerable experience in the aid arena. The other unwelcomed alternative, which kept the UN on the periphery of the development aid game, was President’s de Gaulle’s ‘directorate of four’. Hammarskjold considered it a ridiculous idea—‘substantially dangerous and tactically poor.’²⁰⁷ Hammarskjold also confided to Ambassador Dixon that he was far from sympathetic to the idea of a new international group dealing with aid to underdeveloped countries that operated outside the UN. Other members of the UN Secretariat echoed Hammarskjold’s resentment and suspicion over DAG, as did a number of governments from the Global South. The fact that their first meeting had been a closed-door affair only reinforced the perception it was a ‘donor’s club’.²⁰⁸

Promoting UN Aid Machinery

²⁰⁸ Memorandum from Geoffrey M. Wilson to Denis Rickett (Treasury), 14 April 1960, UKNA, FO 371/150043; Memorandum from Alan A. Dudley to J.G. Tahourdin, 25 April 1960, UKNA, FO 371/150043.
Determined not to let any bloc hijack what he believed to be the UN’s central position in providing economic development assistance to African countries, Hammarskjold spent the spring of 1960 promoting specific ways the UN could keep pace and compete alongside alternative schemes. This amounted to initiating plans for a massive push to increase aid provided by or channeled through the UN—aimed especially at Africa. Hammarskjold keyed in on the expansion of a number of UN aid programs including the EPTA and the Special Fund. These programs presented two pressing problems for Hammarskjold in early 1960. First, as mentioned, the geographic distribution of their current projects heavily favored Asia and Latin America over Africa. More urgent was the slumping contributions to the EPTA and the Special Fund from member states.

Specifically, the 1959 total contributions to the EPTA amounted to $32.8 million, one million less than the previous year and the first time that donations fell from one year to the next. Worse still, projected totals by mid-1960 for the EPTA were less than expected. The Special Fund did see an increase in pledges from 1959 to 1960—from $26 million to a projected $37 million for 1960, yet expectations had been higher. In fact, Hammarskjold had even complained to various leaders while in Africa about the insufficient funds available to the UN for technical assistance and economic aid, promising he would push for the expansion of these programs in the year ahead.

Beyond those programs, Hammarskjold advocated the use of several other initiatives. He sought to make a pilot UN program known as OPEX permanent. Launched in 1959, OPEX, short for ‘operational and executive,’ provided technical assistance specifically tailored to newly independent countries by providing public administration aid to help remedy the lack of trained personnel needed to run large national services like railways.

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211 Telegram from Dar-es-Salaam (Duggan) to Secretary of State Herter, 11 January 1960, NARA II, RG 59, 1960-1963 Central Decimal File, Box 486.
public health programs, the post office, etc. Unlike EPTA experts, OPEX officers temporarily entered the services of the requesting government to perform any number of specific executive or operational assignments. Hammarskjold now pushed for the growth of this scheme in light of the inevitable and imminent independence of so many African countries lacking administrative experience at the governmental level. OPEX was a favorite of Hammarskjold, due in part to the fact that the Secretariat directly supervised the scheme, while only using the recruiting services of the EPTA. Chapters Four and Five will show how Hammarskjold and the Secretariat used a oversized version of OPEX in an attempt to administer impartial public administrative aid to the highest echelons of the Congolese government—ultimately showing how operational execution of a development aid theory could prove exceedingly difficult.

Similarly, by 1960, Hammarskjold became far more active in the selection of UN Resident Representatives. Recall from Chapter One, that Resident Representatives served as the point of contact between the UN, its aid workers and recipient governments—coordinating EPTA functions from their field offices. While in Africa, Hammarskjold raised the issue of installing Resident Representatives in all the areas he toured. Furthermore, he seemed to envision any future Representatives to Africa as personal delegations of his Office alone. Soon after his return he got to work recruiting Resident Representatives for Africa. He petitioned the Canadian Secretary of State, Howard C. Green, asking for Canadian official Dr. George Davidson to serve as his Resident Representative to Nigeria. Similarly, Hammarskjold personally appealed to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, asking for Indians

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216 Letter from Hammarskjold to Howard C. Green (Canadian Secretary of State), 22 April 1960, NSL, Hammarskjold Papers, L179:177.
with considerable diplomatic experience in handling economic development problems in
addition to having sound political sense.217

Finally, Hammarskjold pressed the expansion of the Regular Program for Technical
Assistance. Established in 1948, it operated separately from the EPTA formed a year later.
Now in 1960, Hammarskjold asked Hans Singer, recently placed in charge of drafting a
White Paper containing all the Secretary-General’s recommendations for the upcoming
session of the UN Economic and Social Council, to add a request for an additional $2 million
for the Regular Program on top of its current budget of $780,000 for 1960. The principle
motive, according to Singer, was to secure an increase in technical assistance funds
controlled solely by Hammarskjold and not the Specialized Agencies who garner the
majority of EPTA funding.218

The fact that Hammarskjold was especially keen on expanding programs controlled
by his Office highlights yet another competing interest. To some extent, the UN Charter itself
gave rise to a rivalry within the UN family over development assistance. ECOSOC contained
two main institutions, the Specialized Agencies as well as Programs and Funds. The
Specialized Agencies were constitutionally and financially self-contained—thus not subject
to direct control from the UN Secretariat. As mentioned, the UN Programs and Funds (ie. the
Regular Program for Technical Assistance, the TAA component of the EPTA, the Special
Fund and OPEX) fell under the supervision of the Secretariat and member states. Thus,
Assembly resolutions could modify their provisions often on recommendations from the
Secretariat.219 Urquhart noted that early on, Hammarskjold naively believed that with serious
leadership he could get the Specialized Agencies to work in closer cooperation with his

217 Letter from Hammarskjold to Nehru, 20 May 1960, NSL, Hammarskjold Papers, L179:177; Letter from
Hammarskjold to Nehru, 18 June 1960, NSL, Hammarskjold Papers, L179:177.
218 Letter from Alan A. Dudley to J.G. Tahourdin, 12 May 1960, UKNA, FO 371/153654; Letter from Alan A.
Dudley to J.G. Tahourdin, 18 May 1960, UKNA, FO 371/153654. ECOSOC met twice a year, once it the spring
and again in the summer. The summer ECOSOC was the main forum for the body.
Continuum, 2000), 100.
Office. However, he quickly grew frustrated with a relationship Urquhart described as analogous to the feudal barons under King John—whereas the Specialized Agencies were adept at jealously protecting their autonomy. Hammarskjold made a formal attempt in 1955 to coordinate planning between himself and the heads of the Specialized Agencies with the creation of the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination, or ACC. He hoped the ACC would prompt the main organs of the UN—the General Assembly and Security Council—‘to put on the shoulders of the administrations and of the Secretariat an increasing responsibility.’ But over time, resentment and antagonisms caused the ACC to meet less and less frequently. Now on the eve of mass decolonization in Africa, the Secretariat had a heightened sense of the tendency of Specialized Agencies to press their particular development plans on governments of underdeveloped countries. This was one of the main reasons why Hammarskjold pressed for his own Resident Representatives in soon-to-be independent countries and why he delineated between UN programs he specifically endorsed while leaving the promotion of others with the UN family to their respective heads.

The only idea that Hammarskjold completely scrapped in the months after his trip to Africa was a so-called ‘Emergency Fund for Africa’. He had raised the possibility of creating a $5 million reserve fund with several African leaders. Philippe de Seynes, the Under-Secretary of Economic and Social Affairs, recognized the funds could be a very effective instrument in the hands of the Secretary-General who would have near exclusivity in apportioning the emergency aid. However, the scheme never gained traction since

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220 Transcript of Interview with Brian Urquhart, 6 January 2000, UN Intellectual History Project, 7. According to Urquhart, the original building plans for the UN headquarters included a skyscraper with all the agencies under one roof—a real system in Urquhart’s estimation. In reality, none of the Specialized Agencies are headquartered in New York. The WHO and the ILO are headquartered in Geneva, the FAO in Rome, UNESCO in Paris, the Bretton Woods Institutions, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in Washington DC, etc.
222 Urquhart, Hammarskjold, 371-72.
224 Telegram from Dixon to FO, 18 February 1960, UKNA, FO 371/153646.
underdeveloped countries outside Africa opposed it, ex-colonial nations feared the program would have too many political features and the UN Specialized Agencies were wary of another competing plan.\textsuperscript{225}

Hammarskjold also seemed to have thought better of the idea. During the April ECOSOC session of 1960, Hammarskjold’s first direct appeal to UN member states to increase aid to Africa via UN channels, the Secretary-General announced there would be no special African program. He reasoned any regional or territorial approach to development would undermine the UN principle of universality, as would placing countries in certain categories of development. He continued:

I think, on the whole, we should leave aside an idea of the possibility to class countries as to the degree of underdevelopment or, rather, as the degree in which they have lagged behind historically in their general economic development. There is a universal problem of underdevelopment in the technical sense, and this problem should not be complicated or twisted in some kind of false political direction by the introduction of classifications or differences among those countries to which it does refer.\textsuperscript{226}

The statement can be interpreted a number of ways. In one sense, it confronted the status quo at the UN—and the League of Nations before it—which categorized both peoples and states by stages of political development. The League accomplished this under the Mandate System. The two main categories for the UN were UN Trust Territories and Non-Self Governing States. Hammarskjold seemed to recognize this system’s expiration date was quickly approaching. From another perspective, Hammarskjold could have been distinguishing UN aid once again from other bilateral options. His references to ‘categories of development’ could have also been a subtle reference to Walt Rostow’s ‘stages of development’. In fact, Rostow first published his seminal work, \textit{The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto}, in March of 1960 a month before Hammarskjold’s ECOSOC statement, although his theory had been in circulation for some time. \textit{Stages

\textsuperscript{225} Memorandum from Philippe de Seynes to Hammarskjold, 4 March 1960, NSL, Hammarskjold Papers, L179:177.

\textsuperscript{226} Statement in the Economic and Social Council, 14 April 1960, in Cordier and Foote, eds., Volume IV, 556.
certainly had a political or Cold War bent not welcomed by Hammarskjold who believed he was taking a far less dogmatic approach to development.

Overall, Hammarskjold desired to place the UN near the epicenter of the new wave of development aid likely to hit Africa. Evidence suggests that at this point Hammarskjold not only joined the likes of Owen, Singer and Hoffman as a key figure in the Organization’s development aid efforts, but was now the spokesperson, policy formulator and visionary in this respect, a point so far neglected by UN development scholarship. A November 1959 article in *The Observer* astutely described Hammarskjold as clearly the ‘Headmaster’ at the UN. The author affirmed, it was Hammarskjold who was the topic of conversation among other UN workers and agencies, even spoken of with awe by senior Under-Secretaries.227 Now upon his return from Africa, the ‘Headmaster’ was schooling anyone who would listen on the inherent value of UN development aid directed toward African countries on the verge of statehood. Specifically, Hammarskjold promoted the expanded use of existing UN aid machinery—the EPTA, the Special Fund, OPEX, Resident Representatives, the Regular Program for Technical Assistance and his agency within each of these programs—motivated by the demand for UN aid among African leaders and a sense of proving its worth.

Finally, this evaluation of Hammarskjold’s preference for UN executive action is in keeping with a recent study by Anne Orford. Orford contends that the Secretary-General’s advocacy for UN executive action—which for her included UN efforts in preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and technical assistance—acted as the means for Hammarskjold to ‘manage decolonization’. She includes in her analysis a link between this thinking and the formation of Hammarskjold’s economic philosophy prior to taking office. Specifically, she points to the influence of the German Ordoliberal School of economics had on Hammarskjold. It argued that economic decision-making suffered when left to parliaments

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and thus promoted executive and expert rule over democratic interest-based politics.

According to Orford, Hammarskjöld then applied this broad way of thinking to the UN’s responsibility to act as a neutral executive administrator of development aid on the cusp of African decolonization. Although for Orford focuses on Hammarskjöld’s actions in the Congo as the true testing ground for this strategy, it’s clear from the above evidence that he sought to implement this policy prior to the Congo Crisis and to Africa as a whole.228

**SUNFED and the IDA: The Debate over a Capital Development Fund**

However, the aforementioned aid programs only encapsulated part of what many underdeveloped countries really sought and expected from the UN in terms of development assistance. In fact, throughout the 1950s, member states from the entire Global South had made increasingly louder appeals for the UN to play a major role in what they considered the most critical constraint on development—the lack of financial capital. As mentioned in Chapter One, the UN hosted a passionate debate over the creation of a multilateral finance agency administered by the UN known as SUNFED throughout the 1950s. The proposed agency would have allocated large development loans at below market rates—a concept known as soft lending—to aid development among underdeveloped countries. This idea originated with Indian economist V.K.R.V. Rao—apparently known as ‘Alphabet Rao’. In 1949, as the chair of a UN Sub-Commission for Economic Development, Rao produced a report for ECOSOC where he identified the need for a financing agency that could operate outside the strict lending principles of private lenders or the World Bank.229

Created in 1944 as a cornerstone of the Bretton Woods conference, the World Bank—officially the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), but also known as just ‘the Bank’—operated under the status of a UN Specialized Agency. Upon its

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inception, its foremost mission was the reconstruction of war-torn Europe. However, focusing on the ‘R’ in its title proved untenable due to a lack of funding and the coming of the Marshall Plan. Under the leadership of its first two presidents, John McCloy (1947-49) and Eugene Black (1949-1962), it pivoted toward financing development to survive. Its new clients became underdeveloped or developing countries mostly from the Global South. Ultimately, it sought safe revenue producing investment projects among relatively stable countries that posed less of a financing risk and could afford to borrow Bank funds at market rates. These parameters were necessary, according to McCloy and Black, to convince the Bank’s major financers, namely US financial markets, that its bonds were creditable, secure and profitable.

Rao’s recommendation sought to fill a gap, by creating a facility that could lend development funds to countries on easier terms than the Bank. Others in the UN Secretariat kept Rao’s proposal alive during the early 1950s, including Arthur Lewis, Philippe de Seynes and especially Hans Singer. The proposal itself went through a number of name changes but finally came to be known as the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development, or SUNFED. Through the rest of the 1950s, SUNFED’s other major supporters were member states led by India, Chile and Yugoslavia. Working from the premise that the primary constraint facing underdeveloped countries was a scarcity of access...
to financial capital, these states voiced their displeasure with the IBRD’s apparent lack of interest in offering soft-loans while its voting structure exclusively favored donor states. Equally important was this group’s desire to construct a lending agency where recipient and donor countries were full and equal members in selecting projects and allocating funds, even if these funds came almost entirely from developed countries.234

SUNFED’s initial detractors were McCarthyites who called the proposed fund a communist world conspiracy meant to steal money from American taxpayers, assuming any future program would require the US government to provide the majority of the funds. Meanwhile, these critics were certain its funds would be used ‘for the benefit of left-leaning characters in the Third World.’ Operating from offices within the UN building at the height of their power, the McCarthy committee especially targeted Singer in scathing personal attacks.235 The World Bank also reacted negatively, believing that it was already preforming the functions of the proposed SUNFED. Moreover, the Bank’s President starting in 1949, Eugene Black, operated by conservative lending principles and thought soft-financing was an unsound practice—although he would later do an about-face on this position.236 Recall also from Chapter One, that in 1953 Eisenhower deflected the growing demand to establish SUNFED by suggesting that Third World development ought to be a condition of disarmament—a view shared at the time by many of the other potential donor states of the industrialized West. Thus, early on, the Administration’s public strategy was to defer or delay SUNFED’s establishment if only by getting the scheme lost in endless preparatory committees with the various UN organs.237

Opposition to SUNFED from within the Administration was less tactful. Secretary of Treasury, George Humphrey, was against all multilateral aid programs, especially one in

235 Transcript of Interview with Hans W. Singer, UN Intellectual History Project, 74-76, 87; Singer recalled that one of Hammarskjold’s first acts as Secretary-General was to remove this group from the UN building.
237 Pruden, Conditional Partners, 205-207.
which he believed the US would pay the majority of the bill while other states spent recklessly.\(^{238}\) Then by the mid-1950s, the decision by three potential donor states to join the so-called SUNFED bloc, including the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and the Netherlands, rejuvenated the stagnating debate. Meanwhile, another group of industrialized countries, including Denmark, Italy, Norway and France, also seriously reconsidered their previous aversion toward SUNFED.\(^{239}\) The fact that wealthy industrialized countries were now contemplating supporting SUNFED was no small development. For SUNFED to work, it needed large donors to provide the capital to lend—none bigger than the non-committal United States. Whereas, if SUNFED backers could convince the US to support its cause, other big donors like Great Britain and Canada would likely follow suit.

Thus at the 1957 UN General Assembly, SUNFED proponents attempted to force the US to take a firm position when they called for a vote, for the first time, on the drafting of statutes for SUNFED. The US voted against the measure, arguing that the establishment of a SUNFED program might soothe some consciences but had little chance of doing its job. Ironically, the task of outlining the US position in 1957 fell to Paul Hoffman, at the time part of the US delegation to the Assembly. A *New York Times* editorial from 1 February 1957 reported Hoffman might have delivered the US position through gritted teeth since he had no rebuttal for why the US was unwilling to contribute $80 million towards a fund of $250 million when its defense budget stood at $40 billion.\(^{240}\)

The dissenting vote cast by the US for the 1957 SUNFED resolution left it in opposition to every member state from the Global South for the first time in a UN vote. The vulnerable US position, nevertheless, opened the door for multilateral aid advocates like

\(^{238}\) Memorandum from Francis Wilcox (International Organizations Department) to Secretary of State Dulles, 6 April 1956, MHS, Lodge Papers, Box 28; Memorandum regarding Secretary Humphrey’s and Lodge’s letters to the President, 7 May 1956, MHS, Lodge Papers, Box 28.


Lodge and Hoffman to respond by advocating the immediate establishment of the Special Fund. They believed pre-investment aid to be a viable alternative to SUNFED and a counter-proposal that could put that scheme to rest. In fact, some scholars have made the same conclusion to the effect of dismissing SUNFED as early as 1957. Jolly, et. al. concludes that the birth of the Special Fund in 1958, ‘brought to a close the nine years of highly contentious and often-tortuous debate on the question of UN funding for the economic development of developing countries.’

Likewise, Olav Stokke in *The UN and Development: From Aid to Cooperation*, argues that the unfulfilled idea of SUNFED stalled and ended sometime in 1957. Even Singer called the Special Fund a type of consolation prize for SUNFED that ceased being a workable option by the late 1950s. Yet, these conclusions amount to a post-facto analysis and are partially misleading in that they neglect the fact that SUNFED supporters always viewed the Special Fund as an initial step towards the establishment of SUNFED—not as a substitute. In fact, the hope that the Special Fund would at least keep dormant the question of SUNFED for a few years was misplaced. Already during the first meeting of the Special Fund Governing Council, set up for member states to approve the Fund’s aid requests, the delegate from Argentina reminded those present that the Special Fund was a short-term fix to the eventual establishment of SUNFED.

Realizing almost immediately that the idea of the Special Fund was an untenable surrogate for SUNFED, others within the US government moved simultaneously to come up with a more sustainable counter-proposal. In February 1958, the Democratic Senator from Oklahoma, Mike Monroney, announced his intension to introduce to the US Senate a resolution calling for the establishment of an International Development Association, or IDA, as an affiliate of the World Bank. Like the Bank, Monroney’s proposed IDA could offer

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241 Jolly, et. al., 80.
242 Stokke, 98-99.
243 Singer, ‘The Terms of Trade Controversy’ in Meier and Seers, eds., 297-299; Transcript of Interview with Hans W. Singer, 2 January 2000, UN Intellectual History Project, 123.
244 First Meeting of the Special Fund Governing Council, February 1959, UNARMS, S-045000310018.
loans for development projects in underdeveloped countries, yet with two key differences. First, it planned to offer loans on terms more flexible than the Bank. Additionally, the IDA could finance projects regardless of their profitability. Monroney couched his argument solely in terms of American interests. He told Under-Secretary of State Herter that the IDA was a viable replacement for the bilateral Mutual Security Program (MSP) that Congress believed was now outmoded. Moreover, Mason and Asher associate the IDA with the American desire to find an outlet for its massive holdings of inconvertible foreign currencies. They track the pre-history of the IDA back to the passage of the PL 480 program in 1954—a major focus of the next chapter. In short, PL 480 allowed the US to sell surplus agricultural commodities to food deficient countries, paid for in the currencies of the recipient countries. As the popular PL 480 program expanded during the mid-1950s, the US holdings of foreign currencies grew congruently. Yet, the US hardly ever drew upon these reserves since the existing US aid programs, like the bilateral Development Loan Fund, paid out in US dollars. Under Monroney’s IDA, the US could transfer its large reserves of foreign currencies to the IDA, which could in turn make long-term loans at low interest rates to facilitate development in underdeveloped countries.

The Eisenhower Administration thought Monroney’s proposal would benefit from a discussion at the international level but nevertheless backed the creation of IDA almost from the start. First, it recognized the demand among underdeveloped countries for capital to come from a multilateral source. This was in keeping with the Administration’s decision, in 1958 and discussed in Chapter One, to add a multilateral component to its foreign economic policy of trade and aid. Thus, the IDA actually leapfrogged other aid options in importance like the recently established DLF.

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As a clear indication of the effect decolonization had on this process, Joseph Satterthwaite, Eisenhower’s Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, flatly asserted the DLF was not what Africa needed. Meanwhile, the value of the IDA over that of SUNFED was also readily apparent to the Administration. Under the IDA proposal, underdeveloped countries could join the program as benefactors but did not have voting power, which would remain in the hands of its principle financial subscribers led by the US. Whereas with SUNFED, member states would share voting power equally. Moreover, only countries affiliated to the World Bank could apply for IDA membership, thus excluding the Soviet bloc. Conversely, with SUNFED, the Administration surmised that the Soviet influence would far exceed its financial contributions. Finally, the IDA was clearly a far better plan than de Gaulle’s ‘directorate of four’ in the eyes of the Administration.247

However, one should not only view the IDA proposal as a manifestation of American will—just as with the creation of the Special Fund. The purpose and timing of the IDA clearly meant it was also a direct response to the continued attempt to establish SUNFED, despite the creation of the Special Fund. In fact, Singer claims that the IDA’s true antecedents go back to Rao’s original appeal for a soft-financing agency.248 Eugene Black, who endorsed the IDA proposal in a *New York Times* article from February 1958, admitted years later that the purpose of the IDA was to offset SUNFED.249 This might partially explain Black’s conversion from his previous belief in the unsoundness of soft-financing. Additionally, in a meeting with Clarence B. Randall, the chairman of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy and special consultant to President Eisenhower, Black confided that during his past trips to Africa, the latest coming in March 1958, he had been ‘taken to task’ by African

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249 Mason and Asher, 386; Murphy, *The United Nations Development Programme*, 65.
representatives he met. According to Black, it was their belief that the Bank was essentially an extension of the metropole to the neglect of the needs of African peoples. Certainly the IDA, as an affiliate of the World Bank, could combat this stigma. Although, interestingly Black also informed Randall he foresaw a partial remedy in offering individual loans to Africans. For example, $50 to a farmer to buy a plow. The suggestion presages the micro-financing movement of later decades. It also indicates that Black might have been willing to jump at the chance to create the IDA as a response to demands of African countries come the late 1950s.250

Bolstered by the anticipation of mass decolonization in Africa, battle lines over the issue of multilateral soft-finance aid formed during the 1959 General Assembly where SUNFED and the IDA both sought further endorsement by member states. A handful of African delegations welcomed the IDA as a means to address the ‘grossly inadequate’ capital available to them and future independent states. However, they stood resolute in affirming that SUNFED represented a genuine international capital development fund and the soundest and surest means of promoting economic and social advancement.251 Member states from the Soviet bloc joined African states in supporting SUNFED, but went further in accusing the US and its allies of limiting the full implementation of SUNFED, while describing the IDA as a dangerous rival and puppet of the US government.252

The biggest IDA backers, including the US, the UK, France and Canada, also made their case. US delegate, George Meany, pointed out that the IDA proposed similar lending terms to those of SUNFED but with four times as many funds at its disposal. The US estimated funds available at start-up to be near $1 billion—an estimate questioned by more than one delegate. (When the IDA did launch in September 1960, it had a total subscription

250 Journal Entry, 28 June 1958, DDEL, Clarence B. Randall Journals, Box 5.
251 Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Morocco and the UAR more or less expressed these sentiments. GAOR, 14th Session, Second Committee, 617-625th meetings, 11-18 November 1959.
252 Czechoslovakia representative, Jaroslav Pscolka, offered probably the most developed argument on the Soviet bloc side. See GAOR, 14th Session, Second Committee, 587th meeting, 9 October 1959.
of $625 million from fifteen countries). Meany and the UK delegate, David Ormsby-Gore, argued that linking a capital loan fund with the IBRD was only logical since loans were a banking function better administered by a financing institution than the United Nations. Ultimately, an IDA resolution did pass the General Assembly, receiving a full endorsement less eleven abstentions from the Soviet bloc. Nevertheless, a SUNFED resolution also passed with an overwhelming majority, less abstentions from twelve Western states including the US. The difference between the two resolutions was in the language and timing. The IDA resolution welcomed the decision already made by the IBRD to create the program, which would sign its charter in January 1960. The SUNFED resolution called on the UN to study how to make further progress toward the early establishment of a UN capital development fund. Even as the IDA seemed to outpace SUNFED, the lack of unanimity ensured that the debate would continue well into 1960.

The creation of the IDA in January 1960 coincided with the simultaneous formation of the OECD and DAG—two other Western dominated institutions aimed at facilitating aid toward underdeveloped countries. Yet, it also took place as Hammarskjold toured Africa, who returned, of course, motivated by the prospect of answering the demands of African leaders by using the UN aid to accelerate development on the continent. However, Hammarskjold remained publically silent during the course of the SUNFED and IDA debates taking place at the UN throughout 1959 and 1960. Although this may seem like a curious decision, it had been Hammarskjold’s customary practice to stay above the fray on hotly debated issues in the Assembly or Councils. It was one of the reasons why he never held press conferences when the main UN organs were in session. Nevertheless, Hammarskjold

254 For the IDA resolution, see General Assembly Resolution 1420 (XIV), 5 December 1959. For the SUNFED resolution see, General Assembly Resolution 1424 (XIV), 5 December 1959.
255 As stated by Philippe de Seynes, GAOR, 15th Session, Second Committee, 671st meeting, 8 November 1960.
was a passionate defender of the intrinsic value of UN-channeled aid and was equally adamant about keeping aid to Africa outside of the Cold War orbit, or likewise, dominated by a bloc or group.

In terms of SUNFED specifically, Hammarskjold stated back in 1956 that he hoped for a ‘more forceful implementation and action’ on a program like SUNFED because of the great need. Yet, he advocated the use of any number of international channels to ultimately fulfill this need, naming at the time SUNFED, the EPTA, or the International Finance Corporation.\textsuperscript{256} In July 1959, he made an appeal for something innovative, to address the imbalance between rich and poor countries and a ‘widespread feeling in the under-developed countries of the need for some new break-through on the road to economic development’ yet did not mention SUNFED by name.\textsuperscript{257} At the same time, Hammarskjold’s top officials kept the Secretary-General informed on their deliberate efforts to defend SUNFED against false accusations. De Seynes in one instance wrote to the executive editor of the \textit{New York Daily News} in response to an article from 21 October 1956 entitled, ‘Watch out for Sunfed’. De Seynes pointed out a number of the article’s ‘untruths’ including that SUNFED supporters expected the US to contribute $35 billion to the program’s projected budget of $50 billion, two bloated figures according to de Seynes.\textsuperscript{258}

Still, private conversations reveal a more definitive position by Hammarskjold towards the IDA. On 8 October 1959, just as member states prepared to debate the IDA and SUNFED draft resolutions in the General Assembly, Hammarskjold and de Seynes met in New York with Under-Secretary Dillon. There, Hammarskjold proposed setting up a Consultative Board for the IDA that would include himself, Paul Hoffman and David Owen—thus similar to the Special Fund’s Consultative Board. His justification was that he

\textsuperscript{257} \textit{ECOSOC OR}, 28th Session, 1068th meeting, 6 July 1959.
\textsuperscript{258} Letter from de Seynes to Richard M. Clarks (Executive Editor of the \textit{New York Daily News}), 2 November 1956, UNARMS, S-0450031014.
had noticed a desire among underdeveloped countries for an avenue to express their views, should the IDA form. Since aid recipient countries forecasted they would not be full or equal members of the IDA, a gesture like a Consultative Board may cultivate a feeling that the Secretary-General was providing this service on their behalf. He added that Western states vacillating between supporting SUNFED or the IDA, like the Netherlands for example, might be more in favor of the IDA option if there were some symbolic tie between it and the UN. Hammarskjöld seemed to have persuaded Dillon, who nevertheless thought that Eugene Black should have the final say. Lodge concurred, a Consultative Board that met regularly with Black on the IDA would, ‘lay to rest any important SUNFED agitation.’

Black’s response was less enthusiastic. He opposed the Board, believing it would create the appearance the IDA was subject to political influences. A lack of confidence in the IBRD would then jeopardize the marketability of the Bank’s bonds. The best he could offer was to form a non-advisory liaison committee with Hammarskjöld, Hoffman and Owen to inform one another of current and future plans. Overall, the episode does not necessarily mean Hammarskjöld advocated the establishment of the IDA over SUNFED. What is more likely is that he was hedging his bets. No doubt expecting the imminent formation of the IDA, the Secretary-General wanted to influence it through his participation in a Consultative Board. Moreover, Black’s refusal to involve the Secretariat in the IDA in any meaningful way underscores the turf wars, discussed above, within the broader UN family. A situation that Urquhart equated to ‘a bunch of single-issued organizations paddling their own canoes.’

The 30th ECOSOC and 15th General Assembly, 1960

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260 Murphy, The United Nations Development Programme, 60.
261 Letter from the President of the IBRD (Black) to Secretary of the Treasury Anderson, 7 July 1960, in FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume IV, No. 203.
262 Transcript of Interview with Brian Urquhart, 6 January 2000, UN Intellectual History Project, 16.
The proposed Consultative Board may have been a non-starter for injecting the UN into an advisory role for the IDA, but Hammarskjöld’s other recommendation during his meeting with Dillon did gain more traction. Hammarskjöld noted with regret to Dillon the sagging image and waning influence of the UN Economic and Social Council—a UN organ envisioned by the UN Charter to operate with as much authority as the Security Council. Therefore, he suggested transforming the upcoming ECOSOC, set to meet during the summer of 1960, into a type of economic summit attended by cabinet ranking ministers. He argued that by raising the caliber of ECOSOC’s attendees, he hoped to raise the Council’s profile.\textsuperscript{263} Curiously, as Hammarskjöld worked to promote this ECOSOC economic summit during the course of 1960, he may have shrewdly been trying to compete with the likes of DAG and the OECD by offering an alternative forum to coordinate international development policies. He was likely interested in redirecting the development aid debate to an arena where his Office played a more prominent role in comparison to the General Assembly.

As the events of 1960 unfolded, he used the summer ECOSOC for another key purpose. Having spent the majority of the spring of 1960 formulating and promoting an expanded role for the UN in terms of channeling aid to Africa, Hammarskjöld used the summer ECOSOC meeting to unveil his most concrete policy recommendations. These came in the form of two official statements issued by Hammarskjöld in early June 1960, about a month prior to the start of the 30\textsuperscript{th} ECOSOC to give member states time to consider his proposals. This included proposing to set EPTA and Special Fund contributions for the coming year at $100 million—nearly doubling the 1959 total for the two programs. Next, he recommended that the UN consultant service, OPEX, be made permanent to help countries emerging from colonial rule with administrative needs. In addition, he advised that the budget for the Regular Program for Technical Assistance increase by at least $2.5 million a year for the next few years to keep pace with the demands and expectations from these same

\textsuperscript{263} Memorandum of Conversation, 8 October 1959, in \textit{FRUS, 1958-1960}, Volume IV, No. 183.
countries. Lastly, he drew attention to the need to increase Africa’s share in all of these programs moving forward.\textsuperscript{264}

At least one ECOSOC delegate, Hector Bernardo from Argentina, later voiced his regret that Hammarskjold had backed off from a full endorsement of SUNFED in these statements.\textsuperscript{265} Considering that Hammarskjold was still awaiting a reply from Eugene Black on his potential role within the IDA, Hammarskjold might have still been simply hedging his bets. However, he never backed too far away from promoting the UN as an indispensable agent for development assistance. He did not mince-words when he wrote in his June policy recommendations of the problems and challenges posed to the UN by the effort to form intergovernmental organizations outside the UN—namely the remodeled OECD.

Hammarskjold believed the OECD was ‘of great historic importance’ and was likely to play a big role going forward. However, he reminded member states that the UN ‘remains the only universal agency in which countries with widely differing political institutions and at different stages of economic development may exchange views, share their problems and experiences, probe each other’s reactions to policies of mutual interest, and initiate collective action.’ He warned that unless member states took action within the UN, a danger existed that regional economic organs outside the Organization may divide as much as unite.\textsuperscript{266}

The strongest response to Hammarskjold’s policy recommendations and general counsel came from Under-Secretary Dillon. He served as the US representative to the ECOSOC ministerial meeting that started on 11 July 1960, which Hammarskjold had proposed the previous October. Dillon’s remarks blunted many of the Secretary-General’s sharper demands. He described the pending OECD and currently operational DAG not as a

\begin{footnotes}
\item[265] GAOR, 15\textsuperscript{th} Session, Second Committee, 671\textsuperscript{st} meeting, 8 November 1960.
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threat but as complimentary to existing organizations. He went as far as to invite the UN Secretariat to participate in the upcoming DAG meeting in October, where pre-investment and technical assistance were on the agenda—an invitation privately sought by several members of the UN Secretariat. Addressing SUNFED directly, Dillon estimated that the program could not adequately control the flow of capital funds to a continent like Africa that had ‘limited absorptive capacities’ for such funds—the newest in a long line of reasons why the US was not willing to support the program. The UN would serve newly independent nations best by focusing on its pre-investment endeavors while letting the West finance larger investment projects—presumably through the IDA.\(^{267}\) Altogether, the summer ECOSOC managed to keep the debate on the proper internationalization of development aid within the UN forum. It also set the stage for the already drama-filled General Assembly session that began on 20 September 1960.

There was no shortage of excitement and theatre at the 15\(^{th}\) Session of the UN General Assembly. In one way or another issues like the increased tension over Berlin, the question of Chinese representation, the ongoing crises in Laos, Algeria and the Congo all found their way to the 1960 General Assembly. Adding to the spectacle was Khrushchev’s shoe pounding incident (for which Prime Minster Macmillan requested a translation), a scarcely supported, but nonetheless shocking demand for Hammarskjold’s resignation also by Khrushchev, Cuban President Fidel Castro’s four-and-a-half hour Assembly speech and a US Presidential election. Perhaps less dramatic, but nonetheless significant, was the ongoing debate over UN development aid. In light of its demands to increase contributions to existing UN development aid programs, the UN Secretariat and Hammarskjold scored a number of

\(^{267}\) ECOSOC OR, 30\(^{th}\) Session, 1117\(^{th}\) meeting, 11 July 1960; Summary Record of the Second Meeting of the Development Assistance Group, Bonn, Germany, 7 July 1960, UKNA, FO 371/150046. Due to of the geographic make-up of ECOSOC, in which non-permanent membership rotated much like the Secretary Council, the only African nation represented in the 1960 ECOSOC was Sudan. Therefore, hardly represented were the states most affected by the topic of debate. In a letter to Hammarskjold, de Seynes lamented the lack of ministers from underdeveloped countries and specifically the ungracious nature of the US delegation. See, Letter from de Seynes to Hammarskjold, 18 July 1960, NSL, Hammarskjold Papers, L179:145.
clear victories. In particular, Owen expressed his relief that the anticipated budgetary cut to
the EPTA had fortunately proven unjustified since by the end of 1960, contributions to the
EPTA exceeded that of 1959 by over 12%. Meanwhile, pledges for 1961 had jumped to $42
million, the largest increase ever in the program’s existence to date. Owen anticipated
Africa’s share of UN aid to grow to 29% in the coming year, compared to about 16% for
1960. This figure included aid to all the newly independent African countries beyond that of
the vast amount of UN aid now going to the Congo.268 The General Assembly also took
action by passing a resolution (1527 XV) based on Hammarskjold’s recommendations from
the previous June. It raised the level of funding for technical assistance specifically for newly
independent states through the EPTA and the Special Fund. It also provided an additional
$3.5 million for financing technical assistance under the Regular Program, exceeding the
amount requested by the Secretary-General. Resolution 1529 (XV) specifically urged
member states to increase their contributions to the Special Fund—this after pledges for 1961
increased to $46.3 million, up $7.8 million from 1960. Additionally, Resolution 1530 (XV)
made OPEX permanent.269

These trends set a precedent for the rest of the 1960s. Prior to the merger of the EPTA
and Special Fund in 1965, EPTA funding resources reached just over $54 million while the
Special Fund contributions totaled $91.6 million. Shares of EPTA aid to Africa, compared to
other regions, reached 35.2% by 1964-65.270 Moreover, while bilateral aid in 1960 amounted
to 90% of total international economic assistance worldwide, by 1962, multilateral aid had
increased significantly and was now about five-times as large as in 1954-56. The share of all

37.
270 Bhouraskar, 140-141; Hammarskjold, Annual Report, 16 June 1964—15 June 1965, ODS, Supplement No. 1
(A/6001), 116.
forms of multilateral assistance to Africa, compared to underdeveloped countries as a whole, increased from 18% in the mid-1950s to 40% in 1960.271

Meanwhile, under the power of his own executive authority, Hammarskjold appointed Resident Representatives to a number of newly independent African states—including Nigeria, Togoland and Somalia. Besides coordinating UN development programs, these Representatives also served in other ways. For example, in April 1960 Hammarskjold sent Piero Spinelli to Togoland to act as a UN ‘presence’ as a response to what Hammarskjold believed to be Prime Minister Nkrumah’s imperial designs on its neighbor to the east.272 Signaling his trepidation over the Congo’s independence, Hammarskjold sent the high ranking and well-seasoned Ralph Bunche, then the UN Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs. Sture Linner, a key figure in Chapters Four and Five, accompanied Bunche and served as Hammarskjold’s eyes on the ground throughout the Congo Crisis. Of course, it was also at this point that George Ivan Smith was so warmly welcomed as a UN representative by future Tanganyikan President Julius Nyerere. After serving briefly as a UN Representative to Katanga, the wayward Congolese province, Smith served as the Regional Director of the UN Technical Assistant Program in Central Africa under Secretary-General U Thant.

With regard to the Assembly resolutions and increased funding, Hammarskjold seemed satisfied and welcomed the progress made in following through on the UN’s responsibility to newly independent states.273 The US, for its part, endorsed the expansion of the EPTA and the Special Fund by contributing the maximum amount allowable to each program.274 Nevertheless, the Eisenhower Administration’s eagerness to support the

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272 Urquhart, Hammarskjold, 388.
273 ECOSOC OR, 32nd Session, Annex, 1961, Assistance to former Trust Territories and other newly independent States: Report by the Secretary-General (E/3500).
274 United Nations, The United Nations Special Fund, 1960, 21. For 1960, the US gave $14,655 in contributions to the EPTA, whose funds totaled $34,165. For 1961, the US gave $17,812 of $41,382 total funds. Figures
channeling of aid through the UN stopped there. With the launching of the IDA on 26 September 1960, the Administration seemed unlikely to budge on SUNFED.

Regardless, with the addition of sixteen new UN member states from Africa alone, the now built-in majority for the Global South at the General Assembly was an even more powerful force. During the course of the 1960 Assembly—defined in large part by the issue of decolonization—African states couched their support of SUNFED in anti-colonial terms by tying the adverse effects of colonialism to the prospect of future economic development. The Ghanaian representative, Alhaji Yakubu Tali, argued that Africa had a right to economic restitution for providing the natural resources used for western industrialization.275 The Guinean delegate, Camara Maurice, similarly remarked that, ‘industrial countries, which were in many cases responsible for the backwardness of the less developed countries, were in [sic] duty bound to furnish such assistance and could do so more effectively through a United Nations capital development fund.’276 Meanwhile, Mahmoud Fawzi from the UAR described how developed countries continued to prosper by exploiting the poverty of others—thus colonialism, in all its forms, must be wiped out. Other states chose to criticize alternatives to UN aid, including SUNFED’s direct rival—the IDA. The Nigerian delegate, Alhaji Maitama Sule, warned of how bilateral aid might jeopardize a nation’s sovereignty, whereas no such fear existed about UN aid.277 Other states from the Global South joined the chorus. B.K. Nehru of India voiced his disappointment at what he viewed as the IDA’s meager funds; totaling $750 million over a five-year period to meet the soft-loan needs of countries whose populations totaled 1.2 billion. He called for a doubling of IDA funding and the establishment of SUNFED.278

276 GAOR, 15th Session, Second Committee, 693rd meeting, 26 November 1960.
278 GAOR, 15th Session, Second Committee, 661st meeting, 28 October 1960.
The US delegate, Fredrick Payne, attempted to snuff out and stale the debate with what had become standard responses. According to Payne, SUNFED depended on superpower disarmament not yet achieved. Next, SUNFED as a new agency was unlikely to supply significant aid since it would be so underfunded. Finally, the IDA fulfilled the same functions that the proponents of SUNFED ultimately wanted. Rebuttals came from all sides. Hector Bernardo, from Argentina, said the issue was a ‘matter of financing the economic development of under-developed countries in a satisfactory manner.’ The Iraqi delegate, Ismat Kittani, took exception to Payne referring to SUNFED as a ‘new agency’ since it was, in fact, the full realization of the Special Fund. Moreover, its potential lack of funding was not a natural defect but the conscious effort by the US to apportion development aid elsewhere.279 B.K. Nehru again highlighted the non-universal nature of IDA membership and its weighted voting, depriving underdeveloped countries of an effective voice in the organization. In a final plea or demand, Camara Sikhe from Guinea requested all who opposed SUNFED to stand down as the dissenting minority and accede to the wishes of the large majority.280

The vote on a 44-power draft resolution to establish SUNFED once and for all took place within the General Assembly Second Committee on 6 December 1960. It passed 68 to 4 to 8. The US, the UK, Australia and South Africa were the only four dissenting votes while a handful of other states abstained.281 The resolution passed the full Assembly on 15 December 1960 as Resolution 1521 (XV), the same day as the famous ‘Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries’ (Resolution 1513 (XV)). Together the resolutions mark one of the more definitive shifts at the UN towards an agenda now increasingly influenced by the Global South and an effort by these same states to pursue de facto independence.

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280 GAOR, 15th Session, Second Committee, 693rd meeting, 26 November 1960. This request is reminiscent of the marathon debate of the mid-1970s and the demands of the New International Economic Order (NIEO).
281 GAOR, 15th Session, Second Committee, 705th meeting, 6 December 1960. Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand and Sweden abstained.
alongside de jure through the international institution. In some ways, these votes presaged future actions by member states from the Global South, including the formation of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964 as the primary General Assembly body meant to deal with issues of trade, investment and development opportunities among developing states. Both resolutions also left the US and a number of its allies isolated from the very group they hoped to win over at the UN. Meanwhile the Soviet bloc joined member states from Asia, Africa and Latin America in voting for both measures.

Of course, this was not the first SUNFED resolution to have passed the Assembly. However, it was the first to call for member states to ‘decide in principle’ to establish the program and the first to request the formation of a 25-member committee to draw up its statutes. Unfortunately, for SUNFED backers, the victory was fleeting. The details of the program’s implementation were again exhaustively debated by the 25-member committee in the months ahead where underdeveloped states once again tried to get the likes of the US and Great Britain to acquiesce and buttress the program with sufficient funding. The debate continued for the next half-decade until the scheme was finally launched in 1966 as part of the newly created UN Development Program, or UNDP. However, major donors still refused to contribute to what was now called the UN Capital Development Fund (CDF) until the mid-1970s. Influenced by the debates started by the New International Economic Order and the chronic problems facing the least-developed countries, the Netherlands became the first Western state to pledge a sizable contribution to the CDF in 1974, later followed by other developed countries including the US in 1978. Once underway CDF operations remained modest, offering small-scale capital grants to least-developed countries.282 Meanwhile, the IDA became, and still is, a staple of financing and development aid offered through the

World Bank, dramatically increasing the number of client states it serves over the past five-and-a-half decades.²⁸³

**Conclusion**

As UN historian Olav Stokke points out, in one sense the SUNFED episode highlighted the Organization’s impotency. At the same time, it also provided an indication of the predominant development thinking of the day and signaled the mood of the majority in the UN. Still, he and others argue the unfulfilled idea of SUNFED stalled and ended sometime in 1957 or 1958.²⁸⁴ As argued here, this analysis does not take into account the revitalization of the intense discussion over SUNFED on the eve of mass decolonization in Africa in 1960 or the emergence of the IDA on the UN agenda in 1959. Crucially these developments, in addition to the emergence of the OECD, DAG and the promotion of existing UN aid programs, show development aid as a competition defined by varying interpretations of the internationalization of aid. A competition that saw the UN involved as an autonomous institution and actor largely spurred on by its impassioned Secretary-General, key member states and the coming of mass decolonization in Africa.

In the end, the UN did manage to increase its development-presence in Africa during 1960 and beyond. It also laid the foundation for the expansion of UNDP, its flagship development aid program by the mid-1960s, now counted as a co-equal alongside other regional bloc aid schemes. In this way, this episode offers an important look at how Hammarskjold and key member states managed to lay the groundwork for the Organization’s pivot towards making development its primary function. Yet clearly, the UN did not meet all of its lofty expectations for 1960, nor the aspirations of its member states from the Global South. In terms of the debate over soft financing, the IDA clearly out-paced the UN and SUNFED. Nevertheless, if one treats the IDA as a response to, or derivative of, the debate


²⁸⁴ Stokke, 98-99.
over the internationalization of development aid started at the UN, nurtured by UN personnel and spurred on by new member states within UN forums, then conceivably one could still credit the UN for providing much of the impetus for the IDA’s existence. Perhaps this is what Hammarskjold had in mind when speaking at a Kenyan Rotary Club in January 1960, where he defined the UN as neither the creator of history nor the guide, but ‘it may be the instrument through which the body politic of mankind knows how to respond to its own development.’ Once more, a subsequent development did come from the debate over multilateral development aid highlighted in this chapter. Therefore, Chapter Three will focus on how food aid and the establishment in of the UN World Food Program in 1961 was, in part, a direct outgrowth of the continuing effort to expand the UN’s role in coordinating multilateral development aid.

CHAPTER THREE

‘The Constructive Use of Abundance’: the UN World Food Program and the evolution of the international food aid system during the postwar decades

In early June 1961, the Democratic Senator from Iowa, Roswell Garst, confidently declared to fellow Senator Hubert Humphrey (D, Minnesota):

We [Americans/Iowans] know exactly how to raise chickens—and in immense numbers. We know that it takes three weeks after setting an egg to hatch the chicken and nine weeks more to make it into the finest broiler anyone ever ate. We can have broilers three months after the egg is set…They are the most efficient converters of free grain into the meat type of protein for human consumption that has ever been devised. They (the chickens) are not dependent upon the weather. They are not dependent upon the fertility of the soil… Furthermore, we have the technicians—we have the models—we know exactly how to do it.286

Senator Garst went on to stress the need to send US chicken-raising techniques abroad as a way to show poor countries the benefits of American know-how and encourage long-term development. Writing as a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and former member of the Agricultural Committee, Garst seemed to connect poultry production to the ongoing Cold War contest over which political and economic system could provide the best standard of living. In fact, Senator Garst envisioned that at least half of the poultry and eggs be used for school lunch programs as a means to promote human development among underdeveloped peoples. Just as important, he argued that by providing large quantities of chickenfeed, the US could simultaneously and conveniently dispose of its surplus grain. Finally, Garst suggested that the US should pursue any such endeavor through international channels. Garst, who was also a close friend of the new US Ambassador to the UN, Adlai Stevenson stated, ‘I cannot think of any one thing that would improve our prestige on a worldwide basis as much as to have Adlai Stevenson get up in the United Nations and

just point out that we are able and willing to be helpful.’\textsuperscript{287} Humphrey forwarded the letter to Secretary of State Dean Rusk who welcomed the idea while cautioning that the overall success of any such endeavor depended on the recipient country’s stage of development.\textsuperscript{288}

The above correspondence is telling on a number of levels. Beyond an examination of how chickens could help the US win the Cold War, it highlighted several prevailing and significant trends of the early 1960s. First, it suggested that modern farming techniques could lead to more than just increased consumption but further development. Additionally, it expressed the idea that poor countries could use food assistance by way of technical assistance for development purposes. It also alluded to some of the development thinking of that era and how policymakers attempted to apply the principles of progress accepted in rich countries to less developed countries. Finally, Garst’s letter also emphasized the need to address issues like surplus disposal and agricultural aid for underdeveloped countries at a multilateral level. It is with this latter qualification that Garst’s recommendation presaged the establishment of the UN World Food Program, or WFP, later in 1961.

However, the creation of the WFP is also rooted in the important role played by the UN as an autonomous institution and actor within the context of postwar development and development aid. In the introduction to this thesis it was argued that while scholars have extensively chronicled much of the history of food aid, even food aid administered through the UN, they have paid far less attention to the broader historical impact development thinking had on food aid during the postwar decades and vice versa. Conversely, development histories tend to focus on political and industrial development to the neglect of

\textsuperscript{287} Letter forwarded from Humphrey to Rusk from Roswell Garst, 12 June 1961, in FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume IX microfiche supplement, No. 382.

agricultural development. Therefore, this chapter aims to examine the postwar link between food aid, development thinking and the part played by the United Nations—the Secretariat and the member states. It will show how, through the establishment of the UN World Food Program in the early 1960s, food aid joined the development discourse, ultimately leading to a significant change over the nature and purpose of food aid.

Certainly, progress towards re-routing the purpose of food aid came in fits and starts during this period as the food aid debate highlighted both the common goals and competing interests of state and non-state actors. Yet ultimately, what began in the 1950s as a bilateral method to feed the hungry through the disposal of surplus agricultural commodities, evolved into an international food aid system centered on the utilization of surplus agriculture to spur economic growth. Thus, food aid transformed into investment capital. This transformation challenged two prevailing impulses of the first half of the twentieth century—and especially the 1950s. The first was that, for donor countries, the primary purpose of food aid was to dispose of or ‘dump’ surplus agricultural stock. The second was that, for recipient countries, food aid’s primary function was hunger alleviation. What resulted from the change, in large part overseen by the UN, was a more recipient-centered utilization of food aid for economic development. Crucially then, this study provides a functional example of how, through the internationalization of food aid, postwar development aid took on a global quality.

Central to understanding the context and advancement of food aid for development purposes is an examination of key figures at the UN Secretariat, the Food and Agriculture Organization and an evolving transnational debate over food aid in the early 1960s. Through this process, UN development economist Hans Singer joined with FAO Director–General B.R. Sen and Secretary-General Hammarskold in an attempt to make the benefits of food aid a shared goal among donor and recipient countries. The aim was to de-emphasize specific

national interests in favor of more reciprocity between donor and recipient countries. To this end, these individuals proved their institutions were not handmaidens of national strategic interests but the midwives to a developmental and transnational approach to food aid.

Additionally, both affecting, as well as, affected by these changes was the United States. Thus, this chapter will highlight the role played by the US as the largest provider of food aid, the most powerful of UN member states and the important role it played in framing and directing the debate on multilateral food aid. It will specifically focus on the Kennedy Administration, which from the start adhered to the notion that foreign aid and multilateral action should be mainstays in US foreign policy to the underdeveloped world. Ultimately, Kennedy doubled-down on aid as a foreign policy tool to help the US keep pace with the Soviet economic offensive. Additionally, he viewed foreign aid as a mechanism to cast a new image of America throughout the Global South and with the Afro–Asian bloc at the UN General Assembly. In doing so, the Administration saw a multilateral food aid initiative as a means to cut across the tri-sectional divide at the UN—between the West, the East and the Global South—and instead delineate a Free World versus Communist bloc division. Shaping the implementation of this strategy, the Administration embraced the latest trends in development thinking while relying on the skills of development economists, much like the UN Secretariat and FAO, to make development theories a reality. This ultimately led to a shift in thinking for the Administration, away from surplus disposal of US agricultural commodities and towards food aid as both a valuable foreign policy tool and one to promote economic development in underdeveloped countries.290

Food Science and Early Postwar Bilateral and Multilateral Food Aid Schemes

Although not the focus of this study, certain antecedents to the transformation agriculture generally, and food aid specifically, presaged the changes that took place in the early 1960s. Undergirding the effort to alleviate hunger and poverty during the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century was a growing understanding of nutritional science that made food requirements for whole societies calculable. Additionally, technical advances in hybrid seed development, artificial fertilizers and harvesting methods aided production for many developed countries. High on the list of innovations was the famed Haber-Bosch process that synthesized ammonia from nitrogen and hydrogen on an industrial level.

Developed by German chemists Fritz Haber and Carl Bosch between 1909 and 1913, the mass production of ammonia served as a highly utilized crop fertilizer worldwide soon after its development. The Great Depression and subsequent New Deal reforms acted as another catalyst transforming the US, in particular, into a development laboratory and testing-ground for new agricultural methods later used overseas in an attempt to show how science could triumph over hunger. These breakthroughs helped usher in the so-called ‘Green Revolution’—a term not coined until 1968 but which generally references a global agricultural development boom that took place between the 1940s and late 1960s. The resulting record harvests, in combination with humanitarian concerns and the view that hunger and poverty were causes of regional and global instability, vaulted the concept of food aid to national and international prominence by the mid-twentieth century.291

By the mid-1950s, the world’s major food aid donor, the United States, was again seeking additional outlets for its mounting agricultural surpluses following the end of the Korean War and the winding down of Marshall Plan aid. Therefore, in July 1954, the US Congress approved the Agriculture Trade Development and Assistance Act, better known as Public Law 480, or simply PL 480. As briefly mentioned in Chapter Two, from its inception,

the primary purpose of food aid allocated through PL 480 was to provide a safety valve for US domestic agricultural surpluses. For this reason, the primary backers of PL 480 through the 1950s were US farming interests. Crucially, PL 480 food aid promoted ‘agricultural trade development’ of American surplus in recipient countries, not development by recipient countries. The US disposed of the majority of its surplus stock under Title I of the program. Title I facilitated the sale of food on concessional terms in the domestic markets of recipient countries, most of which were newly independent and underdeveloped states. Aid recipients used the sale proceeds, or counterpart funds, for a variety of purposes but above all the program promoted market expansion for the flow of additional future US commodities. PL 480 aid also had an altruistic component—to alleviate hunger and malnutrition, often as an emergency measure. Namely under Title II, PL 480 allocated food aid for humanitarian and development purposes, but this seems to have been a secondary consideration at best through the 1950s.

American farmers benefited tremendously from the program and US agriculture exports climbed 33% in its first year of operation. From the start, India was the main recipient of PL 480 aid, including a May 1960 arrangement that provided $1.3 billion in wheat and rice aid over a four-year period—the largest arrangement in the history of PL 480. This and other arrangements meant that PL 480 aid quickly became the predominant option for bilateral food aid for the rest of the 1950s, while also reinforcing the practice of surplus disposal to feed the hungry.

There were a few modest postwar multilateral food aid schemes that sprang from the modest and tempered efforts of the United Nations and one of its Specialized Agencies, the FAO. Food relief had been a component of some early ad hoc UN programs of limited duration focused on emergency aid for the victims of war such as the UN Relief and

294 Ibid., 132.
Rehabilitation Administration and the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency. As for the FAO, it too facilitated measured progress in multilateral food aid. The FAO came into existence in 1943 as a result of an international conference in Hot Springs, Virginia. Its first Director—General, Sir John Boyd Orr, unsuccessfully tried to create an organization with wide ranging international responsibilities. His 1946 proposal, to transform the International Emergency Food Council from the War into a World Food Board meant to monitor and control global food production and distribution, failed to materialize as it clashed with American and British domestic agricultural policies. Therefore, member states relegated the FAO to the collection and dissemination of agricultural data as well as providing technical assistance, on its own or through the EPTA, during its first decade-and-a-half of existence. Reserved to a role far more limited than envisioned by Boyd, the FAO still managed to use its vast and respected statistical analysis capabilities to stress that food poverty existed in large part because of a lack of food production. The FAO thus promoted increased agricultural production as the means of alleviating hunger and malnutrition. Altogether, surplus disposal under PL 480 food aid underscored a donor-centric approach, meanwhile early multilateral efforts of the UN and FAO focused on emergency food aid and increasing production to reduce hunger.

However, two programs devised in the late 1950s and launched in 1960, foreshadowed a change in the conceptualization of food aid. The first came as a result of the efforts of Democratic Senators Hubert Humphrey and George McGovern. They argued that with such a strong focus on surplus disposal, PL 480 had overlooked or ignored food aid’s potential as a legitimate development resource. In April 1959, Humphrey introduced a bill to use PL 480 agriculture commodities to cultivate conditions for peace, relieve human hunger.

and promote economic and social development in underdeveloped countries. The Food for Peace bill passed in 1959 and became operational as a new White House office program in April 1960.\footnote{297 Vernon W. Ruttan, ‘The Politics of U.S. Food Aid Policy: A Historical Review’ in Vernon W. Ruttan, ed., Why Food Aid? (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 9-12; Shaw, The World’s Largest Humanitarian Agency, 4. See also, George S. McGovern, War Against Want: America’s Food for Peace Program (New York: Walker and Company, 1964).} The US Food for Peace Program was a turning point in the orientation of US food aid by broadening PL 480’s purpose. It also served to assuage officials like Humphrey who disdained the phrase ‘surplus disposal’ which sounded to him as if America was getting rid of old boots.\footnote{298 As cited in, ‘American Survey, Challenge of the Cornucopia,’ The Economist, 1 August 1959.} Certainly, US domestic economic concerns, which still advocated surplus disposal, had not vanished. However, PL 480 now additionally advocated a more benevolent rationale going forward.

At the international level, B.R. Sen, an Indian diplomat and the first Director-General of the FAO from the Third World, simultaneously sought to propose a program that represented more adequately the victims of hunger in underdeveloped countries. Many of these countries had joined the FAO as non-voting associate members in 1955. Before his tenure at the FAO, which lasted from 1956-1967, Sen studied at Oxford, worked as a relief commissioner during the 1943 Bengal famine, was the director general of food for all of India (1943-1946) and briefly served as India’s Ambassador to the US (1951-52).\footnote{299 See, B.R. Sen, Towards a Newer World (Dublin: Tycooly International Publishing, Ltd., 1982).} In July 1958, Sen used the summer ECOSOC meeting to announce a new campaign against hunger. Making use of the FAO’s skills in data gathering and analysis, he laid out the facts on global hunger and malnutrition in the hopes of arousing world public opinion, more than nation-states, towards action. Sen’s crusade, which would come to be known as the FAO Freedom from Hunger Campaign (FFHC), targeted NGOs, churches, business associations, and local community groups to focus the world’s attention on combating hunger through agricultural and human development schemes. Finally established in July 1960, the FFHC remained
handcuffed by its meager budget. Crucially, it lacked the support of the Eisenhower Administration, which still preferred to draw down its domestic surplus through the Food for Peace Program and wished to abstain from an international aid scheme aimed at increasing agricultural production within food deficient countries.\(^{300}\) Although originally designed to address hunger issues, the FFHC in fact came to focus on human, social and institutional development in rural areas.\(^{301}\) The Campaign also signaled an expanding international interest over the growing question of food aid and its purpose, a topic additionally taken up by the UN General Assembly in the fall of 1960.

As mentioned, the 1960 General Assembly session marked the entry of sixteen newly independent African nations into the UN. They joined other member states in the Global South in placing issues like decolonization and economic development aid at the center of the discussion. Hoping to seize on this development in a General Assembly otherwise marked by divisions between the West and member states from the Global South as shown in the previous chapter, the US joined Canada, Haiti, Liberia, Pakistan and Venezuela to sponsor a resolution that called on the UN and the FAO to undertake a study on the feasibility and acceptability of a multilateral option for ‘food surplus utilization.’\(^{302}\) Choosing ‘utilization’ over ‘disposal’ in the initial draft resolution was just the initial signifier that aid recipient countries desired to alter the intent of food aid going forward. What also became clear during the ensuing debate was the existence of broad support among underdeveloped and developed countries for involving the international community in the process of food distribution. To this end, the draft resolution specifically associated the UN and its affiliated agencies more closely with the practice of solving, not just alleviating, the problem of hunger and malnutrition. However, it also revealed a wariness espoused by countries such as Argentina,

\(^{300}\) Staples, 105–110.


\(^{302}\) *GAOR*, Second Committee, 15th Session, 649th meeting, 18 October 1960.
Burma and Thailand whose economic well-being depended primarily on the export of food commodities. They foresaw the danger that an expansion and increase of food aid posed to the normal trade patterns of agricultural commodities. Others, namely India, the UAR and the USSR were unsure if recipient states could in fact use food aid for economic development in all cases.\textsuperscript{303}

Despite these reservations the proposal passed unanimously, no easy feat in a General Assembly marked by contentious votes on a myriad of issues. Specifically, the operative clauses of UN Resolution 1496 (XV) invited the FAO Director-General and the UN Secretary-General to report back to member states in eight months on the possible role for the UN and its agencies in the process of surplus utilization of agricultural commodities. The unanimity was in no way indicative of universal approval for the unconditional expansion of food aid. It did, however, reflect a willingness by member states to examine the use of food aid at a multilateral level, all the more important after the curtailment of the FFHC budget early in the year.

**The Maturation of the Food Aid Debate: Transnational Contributions**

The question of the distribution and use of food aid not only sparked a debate among nation-states at the UN, but was also symptomatic of an existing transnational debate among development and agricultural economists of the day. In fact, the discussion over UN Resolution 1496 in October 1960, took place just months after the annual meeting of the American Farm Economic Association (AFEA) held in Iowa from 10-13 August. The 1960 AFEA meeting saw leading social scientists from donor and recipient countries meet to dissect the impact and implications of food aid on underdeveloped economies. Cumulatively the conference papers, published in the December 1960 issue of the *Journal of Farm Economics*, represented an important intellectual contribution to the food aid debate and further indicated the transnational nature of the discussion.

\textsuperscript{303} *GAOR*, Second Committee, 15\textsuperscript{th} Session, 655–656\textsuperscript{th} meetings, 24–25 October 1960.
A leading opponent of food aid generally at the conference was Theodore W. Schultz, a development economist from the University of Chicago and future Nobel Laureate in economics who had worked with Arthur Lewis of the UN back in the early 1950s. At the AFEA conference, Schultz took issue with both the motives and the results of US farm surpluses sent to underdeveloped countries like India under PL 480. For Schultz, powerful groups and government agencies within the US used food aid to pursue their interests exclusively. Schultz cited the Democratic Congressmen from North Carolina, Harold D. Cooley (D), the House chairman of the Committee on Agriculture, who at a recent hearing had instructed a State Department official that, “We are primarily interested in getting rid of these surpluses and we don’t care how you do it and under what authority. We have told you we want the commodities sold for dollars first and then foreign currencies or then donate them.”

Schultz claimed to see through Cooley and other US officials who had tried to make, ‘a virtue out of the transfer of US farm surpluses,’ and the hollowness behind their empty praise of PL 480 as a means to economic growth in underdeveloped countries. Schultz argued that no studies had yet shown that PL 480 assistance had definitively led to increased economic growth in recipient countries and further speculated that PL 480 imports had the opposite effect.

S.R. Sen, a Planning Commission official within the Indian government, affirmed some of Schultz’s criticisms but mitigated others. Sen described the dominant Third World impressions of American offers of food aid as, ‘a combination of that of a kind-hearted humanitarian, an anxious salesman and a hard-headed negotiator.’

According to Sen, recipient countries were wary of three characteristics of US aid offers under PL 480. First, PL

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305 Schultz, ‘Value of U.S. Farm Surpluses to Underdeveloped Countries,’ 1019–1029.

306 One should not confuse the S.R. Sen referenced here with B.R. Sen the Director–General of the FAO.

480’s stated goal to increase foreign markets for US agricultural goods alarmed many aid recipients. Sen explained that creating a demand for grant-based American milk powder could easily sour if supplies unexpectedly dried up because of insufficient US stock, or before an underdeveloped country had the ability to produce its own. Secondly, the need for the US to justify PL 480 assistance domestically often resulted in the effort to direct aid towards specific projects, which over a short period, could tangibly demonstrate the value of US food aid or the counterpart funds they produced. This so-called ‘project approach’ conflicted with the desire of underdeveloped countries who wished to direct all aid into their countries’ overall plan for economic development, deemed the ‘program approach’ by Sen. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, underdeveloped countries worried that food aid would replace dollar aid, which underdeveloped countries also desperately sought.308

With these reservations in mind, Sen noted that India had made its own demands when taking on PL 480 aid. It stressed that all assistance should be on a program basis, integrated into India’s Second Five Year Plan and should target long-term generalized economic development. Moreover, no program established on PL 480 assistance would be created that could not later be maintained by India’s own resources. Under these stipulations the results for India, according to Sen, had been very encouraging. India consumed a record-setting ten million tons of wheat and 0.4 million tons of rice during its Second Five Year Plan period—much of which came from four PL 480 aid agreements over this period. Challenging Schultz’s analysis, Sen estimated India’s sale of the food commodities obtained through PL 480 garnered $927 million in counterpart funds. Of this total, India was expected to apportion $686 million towards economic development, including constructing irrigation and power facilities, improving transportation and communication networks and funding research. Indirectly, Sen believed the use of these counterpart funds manifested an, ‘urge in people for

308 Sen, ‘Impact and Implications of Foreign Surplus Disposal on Underdeveloped Economies,’ 1031–42.
change thus creating favorable material and psychological conditions for further progress.\textsuperscript{309}

Overall, Sen’s analysis echoed the developmental approach to food aid delineated by others at the conference but emphasized a food aid system that was altogether more recipient-centered.

The AFEA meeting also included what it considered an ‘international perspective’ offered by Mordecai Ezekiel, the soon-to-be Assistant Director-General in the FAO Economics Department. A further basis for Ezekiel’s authority stemmed from his work as the drafter of President Roosevelt’s New Deal Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933. More recently, Ezekiel had led a 1953-54 pilot study in India on the use of surpluses to help finance economic development. Working in consultation with MIT professor Paul Rodan-Rosenstein, formerly of the World Bank, and several Indian economists, the study concluded that surplus agriculture commodities could be properly used to feed otherwise idle men now engaged in ‘capital-formation projects’ like the building of roads, schools, etc. In this way, the injection of food surplus did not reduce demand for domestically produced foods or for imported commercial foodstuffs, both prevailing criticisms of food aid. Instead, according to Ezekiel, the surplus all went towards additional consumption. Another significant part of the study was that it perceived food assistance as primarily a tool for underdeveloped countries seeking to promote economic development and not from the traditional viewpoint of assisting developed countries stuck with ‘burdensome surpluses’.\textsuperscript{310} Like Sen, Ezekiel used his study to refute Schultz’s claim that one could use surpluses \textit{either} to increase consumption \textit{or} to finance economic development, not both. Still, Ezekiel admitted that few studies existed beyond his own, and where a country ignored or neglected the safeguards for surplus disposal, adverse effects were likely. Ezekiel’s word of caution specifically targeted the US.

\textsuperscript{309} Sen, ‘Impact and Implications of Foreign Surplus Disposal on Underdeveloped Economies,’ 1031–42.

which he claimed disposed of its surplus too capriciously for recipient countries increasingly
dependent on food aid. According to Ezekiel, thoughtless surplus disposal, or dumping, also
posed difficulties for food exporting countries including Argentina, Australia, Burma,
Canada, Mexico, New Zealand and Thailand, all of which depended on the fair market sale of
agricultural exports far more than the US.311

Canada, for example, had expressed in the fall of 1955 its strong dissatisfaction with
US agricultural disposal procedures during the preceding six-month period. It protested the
disposal of some fifty million bushels of wheat under PL 480, some of which had gone to
traditional Canadian markets thus displacing Canadian wheat.312 Additionally, in early
January 1961, the US was scheduled to meet in Bangkok with representatives from Thailand
and Vietnam to clear-the-air with two major rice exporters and respond to accusations of rice
dumping.313 No doubt aware of these and other instances, Ezekiel concluded: ‘In this
connection, may I make a plea that American agricultural economists give more attention to
what American policies mean for the rest of the world. In the recent marathon hearings on
American farm policy, very few of the distinguished economists who testified gave any real
attention to the possible effect on the world markets and on other agricultural countries of the
policies they were proposing.'314

Further indicative of a change in the debate over food aid, a number of participants at
the 1960 AFEA conference echoed the argument of the previous year’s presidential address

311 Mordecai Ezekiel, ‘Impact and Implications of Foreign Surplus Disposal on Developed Economies and
Foreign Competitors: The International Perspective,’ Journal of Farm Economics, 42, no. 5 (December 1960),
1063–73. One other study Ezekiel might have been aware of was Gerda Blau’s 1954 work, Disposal of
Agricultural Surpluses, found in FAO, Food for Development, 3-90. Blau’s study focused on establishing a type
of ‘best practice’ approach for surplus disposal through intergovernmental consultations after the post-Korean
War agricultural surplus boom.
312 Current Economic Developments, 11 October 1955, NARA II, RG 59, Lot 70D467, Box 6.
314 Ezekiel, ‘Impact and Implications of Foreign Surplus Disposal on Developed Economies and Foreign
Competitors,’ 1075.
by Willard Cochrane. Cochrane was a leading agricultural economist at the University of Minnesota, who at the time was serving as a campaign adviser for Senator John Kennedy and would soon become the head agricultural economist for the Department of Agriculture under Secretary Orville Freeman. In his 1959 address, Cochrane advocated the use of surplus disposal exclusively for economic development rather than strictly feeding the hungry, except in cases of famine. The key for Cochrane was the transformation that took place when countries relegated food aid entirely for economic development. He argued that agricultural commodities committed toward development ceased being merely food aid and became development capital at the point of transfer. The way forward, for Cochrane and others, was for food exporting countries to join the ranks of donor countries and together participate in a multinational food development program under the auspices of the United Nations.

Overall, the US Food for Peace Program, the FFHC, the passage of UN Resolution 1496 and the debate at the 1960 AFEA conference were all indicative of the growing complexity of the food aid question come 1960 and a challenge to the status quo. Each, in some way, heralded a further internationalization of the questions relating to food aid. Altogether, these efforts provided the stimuli for the year ahead when center stage in the food aid debate would shift once again. This time the UN Secretariat would seize the opportunity to explore a multilateral option for food aid and, at the same time, advance the food aid debate.

**Hans Singer and February Report on Food Aid for Development**

This process got underway early in 1961 when, in response to the passage of General Assembly Resolution 1496, Director-General Sen selected a group of experts to study and give shape to the idea of multilateral food aid. Sen wrote to Hammarskjold, expressing his

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wish for a group of independent experts, ‘of the ablest economic minds available who are familiar with the economic development of underdeveloped countries, and have some acquaintance with surpluses and their use.’\textsuperscript{317} Sen’s desire to use economists—as opposed to policymakers, diplomats or politicians—was emblematic of the emerging thinking of the period. As Gerald M. Meier and Dudley Seer point out in \textit{Pioneers in Development}, economic development could not be legislated like political independence, nor willed like nationalism. Instead, what was crucial was an understanding of the forces of development and the policies needed to support these forces—a task perfectly suited for the creative capabilities of a development economist.\textsuperscript{318} For Sen and Hammarskjold, one such economist stood out as the best candidate to chair the committee—Hans W. Singer.

Singer left Germany for Britain in 1933 just as the Nazi Party took control. He obtained his Ph.D. from Cambridge while studying secular trends in land values. He joined the UN in 1947 at the request of David Owen, who was then the new head of the UN Department of Economic Affairs (DEA). Singer had worked with Owen before the war and the two continued their close working and personal relationship while at the UN. To Singer’s surprise, his first UN appointment was to the subdivision of the DEA assigned to study developing countries—a topic in which Singer lacked any qualifications or experience. According to Singer, the post was based on his early work on ‘countryside planning’ in Britain which was misunderstood as ‘country planning’ to those at the UN.\textsuperscript{319} Despite the inadvertent placement, Singer’s work as a development economist did not disappoint. One of his early studies argued that the terms of global trade between suppliers and manufacturers drastically favored the latter, sought to reverse the classical interpretation that the benefits of

\textsuperscript{317} Letter from Sen to Hammarskjold, 1 November 1960, UNARMS, Folder S–045004670004.
\textsuperscript{318} Meier and Seers, eds., 6.
global productivity were generally equitable. The so-called ‘Singer-Prebisch thesis’ became the axiomatic battle-cry of underdeveloped countries well into the 1970s. By the end of his first decade with the UN, Singer had become the foremost development economist at the UN Secretariat. His theories often challenged conventional wisdom, but also acknowledged existing realities and the limitations of governments acting in their own narrow interests. Singer’s role in developing the concept of pre-investment aid, culminating in the establishment of the UN Special Fund, and his role in keeping SUNFED alive through the 1950s were discussed earlier. In 1960 Secretary-General Hammarskjold used Singer to prepare specific policy proposals for increasing the UN’s aid-presence in Africa. These endeavors showed his development acumen, as well as his accommodating nature. In early 1961, Singer was given the chance to display his skills in the arena of multilateral food aid.

For Singer, food aid fitted into what he called the ‘new look’ of development aid, one in which the UN served as a far better mechanism for brokering negotiations over development assistance than any one country by itself and, therefore, where the UN deserved a larger share of coordinating the work. In this way, he echoed the perspectives of Owen, Hoffman and Hammarskjold with regard to the unique place of UN aid generally. In Singer’s estimation, the value of the UN in these matters was its sensitivity to all interests. He described a typical scenario as it related to food aid whereby the US would transfer some 2 million tons of food to a state to sell in its domestic market. A year later, a US official would arrive to instruct the recipient country how best to use the proceeds from the sale of the donated commodities. Acting in its self-interest, the US could too easily disregard the

national development plans of the recipient country, the impact on commercial competitors and the well-being of farmers. Making allowances for these varying and intricate needs, according to Singer, created a great opportunity for international organizations.322

As the chair of the expert group, Singer was now in a position not only to advance the role of the UN and the FAO in administering food aid, but also make recommendations on what he saw as the real benefit of commodity assistance—economic development. UN Resolution 1496 included a clause that stated, ‘the ultimate solution to the problem of hunger lies in an effective acceleration of economic development’, but the resolution was ambiguous on any direct connection between food aid and economic development.323 Singer and six other experts crafted a report which made these links explicit.324 The report, presented to Sen in February 1961, is worth a closer look since it offers the most comprehensive case for the establishment of a multilateral system to mobilize available food surpluses for development. Moreover, it provides the clearest evidence yet for the shift in the food aid discourse.

The report first outlined the paradoxical nature of the global food situation where half of the world’s population was either undernourished or malnourished while food stockpiles in developed countries grew annually. For the experts, the solution was clear. ‘The task of our generation is to apply the principles of social progress accepted within the rich countries to the world as a whole. Only if this is done can we talk of an international community.’325 How could this be achieved? Progress would rely, largely, on the transfer of capital and commodities resources from the developed world to the underdeveloped over the next five years. Food aid was a crucial component of this transfer and should amount to between one-

324 This group included: M.R. Benedict, a Professor of Agricultural Economics at UC Berkeley, J. Figueres, the former President Costa Rica, plus the aforementioned V.K.R.V. Rao, the former Vice Chancellor of the University of Delhi and the Director of the New Delhi Institute of Economic Growth and Paul Rosenstein–Rodan.
fifth and one-sixth of the total external assistance. But instead of food assistance going
towards feeding the hungry as its main purpose, the committee underscored the value of food
aid as capital in its original sense—as an investment mechanism to promote increased
productivity. Singer and the experts worked from the premise that, ‘[s]urplus food is a most
important part of capital aid—and economic development is the most important and largest
part of a productive use of surplus foods.’\footnote{Singer, et. al., \textit{Report by the Expert Group to
the Director–General of FAO}, in FAO, \textit{Food for Development}, 286.} Therefore, food aid could provide hungry people
the necessary time either to increase their own agricultural production or provide the required
sustenance to spur the production of some other product used to buy food. Thus, freedom
from poverty was only ultimately the best way to achieve freedom from hunger. The report
also outlined essential parameters for food aid. It was essential that ‘surplus food utilization
programs’—as the committee now called them—must last for longer than five years, must be
incorporated into a country’s overall economic development program and should not divert
the recipient country away from their own food production. Additionally, food aid should not
interrupt the fair market sales of food commodities especially among the rice, coffee and
cocoa exporting countries in the underdeveloped world who the developed world should not
ask to carry the same burden of surpluses.\footnote{Ibid., 280–87.} Moreover, the experts linked economic
development to social development as it related to the use of food aid, lauding its use in land
reform schemes, school feeding programs and domestic livestock production.\footnote{Ibid., 297–302.} Assured of
the unquestionable demand for food aid by countries yearning for development, the group
concluded that the supply of food surplus was plentiful, estimating that the US alone had
between $12-13 billion worth of surplus food available over the next five years.\footnote{Hans
Singer, et. al., \textit{Assumptions of the Expert Group regarding the availability of surplus foods in
the United States of America}, in FAO, \textit{Food for Development}, 312–14.}
Altogether, the report was steeped in the development thinking of the period and engaged with many aspects of the debate taking place among social scientists described above. It started with the notion that a segment of the world had unlocked the door to modernity and these duty-driven individuals or societies could direct others towards the same end. Similarly, the report spoke of the opportunity for underdeveloped states to leave behind traditional methods of production for modern processes. Singer’s report was scientifically driven, relying on empirical evidence from FAO data that provided the substantiated proof so coveted by modernizers of this era. Moreover, it outlined the basic parameters needed to stimulate and guide economic development. Finally, it referenced case studies, or models, to replicate on a wider scale, another favorite approach of postwar modernity efforts.  

Admittedly, many of the recommendations within the report were not original ideas. The United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund, supported by FAO experts, promoted feeding programs in the mid-1950s to improve the long-term health of mothers and children vulnerable to malnutrition. School lunch programs, aided by the use of new nutritional science, originated in the United States in the early twentieth century and exploded during the Great Depression era. Nevertheless, the Singer report was distinct. It served as the first comprehensive synthesis of all the possibilities of food aid for economic and social development. It recommended the establishment of more than just a narrow, limited program but one that could move out on all fronts by making food aid the linchpin of a myriad of development activities. Moreover, the report argued that food aid through a multilateral program was its most effective use of food aid, envisioning a new and expanded role where international agencies played a greater role in pulling the levels of progress, none more

330 For another recent example of how modernization discourse impacted international organizations see, Maul, “‘Help Them Move the ILO Way’?: The International Labor Organization and the Modernization Discourse in the Era of Decolonization and the Cold War,” 387-404.
331 Staples, 101.
important than the FAO and the UN. In this way, the report extended the strategy pursued by the UN during the previous decade by carving out another avenue for the UN in the global development process. The report gained the immediate praise of B.R. Sen who used it extensively in constructing his own report to present to UN member states later that year. The report also garnered the attention and support of the new US Ambassador to the UN, Adlai Stevenson, who hailed it as, ‘[o]ne of the most remarkable documents on the subject.’ The aforementioned Willard Cochrane, now the chief agricultural economist at the US Department of Agriculture, celebrated its unmatched skill in analyzing the role of food in economic development.334

**The Kennedy Administration: A New Foreign Economic Policy & UN Policy**

The fact that Stevenson and Cochrane held the expert report in such high esteem was indicative of a further change in tack within the US government towards a multilateral approach to international cooperation, including food aid. Throughout 1961, the Kennedy Administration would play an important role in converting the changing discourse on food aid into an actual policy and finally a functional program. To be sure, Kennedy's approach was similar to President Truman’s 1949 Point Four program, which had kick-started the development mandate and crucially foresaw the UN and its Specialized Agencies as a conduit for development.335 The Kennedy Administration was also following the general trajectory of the Eisenhower Administration to internationalize US foreign aid as seen by that Administration’s decision to back the UN Special Fund and the IDA. As indicated earlier, although it supported the Special Fund, the Eisenhower Administration favored the World Bank as the preferred international mechanism to administer US aid, due in large part to the

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Bank’s structure of weighted voting based on contributions from its member states—of which the US was peerless. However, from the start, the Kennedy Administration sought to differentiate itself by pursuing an international development aid initiative specifically outside the World Bank. The Kennedy Administration’s new foreign economic and UN strategies both helped to facilitate this change.

During the 1960 campaign, advisers encouraged Kennedy to characterize the Eisenhower Administration’s foreign aid program as inert, reactionary, dependent on military aid and generally lacking imagination. One such advisor, William A. Dymsza, formerly an assistant economic commissioner with the US State Department and by 1958 a business faculty member at Rutgers University, pointed out that the real foreign policy initiatives of the 1950s, Point Four and the Marshall Plan, were both Truman’s. Likewise, the aforementioned IDA and DLF had both started as US Senatorial initiatives. Thus, soon after taking up his new position, Secretary of State Dean Rusk advised a change from the, ‘holding operations of the past,’ and a more intelligent use of foreign assistance to underdeveloped countries. For Rusk, even without the Soviet threat, a new initiative-driven policy was in order.

For the Kennedy Administration, the UN seemed to be an important conduit for the implementation of its new policies. It simultaneously served as another method used to differentiate Kennedy from Eisenhower. As a Senator and presidential candidate, Kennedy enumerated strong views towards the UN and the role of the US within the Organization. In a 1958 speech, he voiced his fear that the US was not using the UN imaginatively in the great economic and social challenges facing the newer and poorer nations of the world. He acknowledged that one could not funnel all aid through the UN, but likewise believed

336 Criticisms of Foreign Aid Programs of Eisenhower Administration, by William A. Dymsza, undated, Middelburg, the Netherlands, Roosevelt Study Center (hereafter RSC), JFK Campaign Files microfilm.
unilateral action alone could not meet the test of economic development in places like India and the rest of the underdeveloped world.\textsuperscript{338} In the midst of the 1960 presidential election, Kennedy commented:

> the United Nations can be no stronger and no more imaginative than the nations which make it up—and of these, the United States is one of the most important. Unless we are willing to exercise initiative in that body, rather than awaiting its thoughts and decisions—unless we are willing to channel our positive programs through the United Nations as well as giving it all of our negative problems—and unless we are willing, as a nation proud of its sovereign power, to join with other nations, to make it a truly effective body—then we may expect to see that one last hope for peace swallowed up in the oceans of hate.\textsuperscript{339}

Kennedy’s UN-team reinforced these views. Ambassador Stevenson described his main job as altering the trend of new UN member states aligning with the USSR, as was the case in the 1960 UN General Assembly votes on decolonization and SUNFED. For Stevenson, the UN was not simply valuable as an arena for doing battle against the USSR and its allies, as he claimed Ambassador Lodge had too often made it. Instead, he saw it as the primary forum for casting a new image of the US among the so-called Afro-Asia group—a caucus and increasingly powerful voting bloc at the UN.\textsuperscript{340} According to the State Department, the error of the Eisenhower Administration had been its willingness to, ‘sit out every second dance’ at the UN. This had been a crucial misstep since the UN was the only medium where the western world and the Global South could unite in its common interests, thus leaving less room on the dance floor for the Cold War tango.\textsuperscript{341}

Further directing Kennedy’s new UN policy were two ambitious ‘frontiersmen’ who led the effort at the State Department. From the start, Harlan Cleveland and Richard Gardner, 

\textsuperscript{338} Kennedy speech at the United Nations Association of Maryland Dinner, Baltimore, Maryland, 27 February 1958, RSC, JFK Campaign Files microfilm.

\textsuperscript{339} Kennedy Campaign Speech, 10 September 1960, RSC, JFK Campaign Files microfilm.


the Assistant and Deputy Assistant Secretaries of States for International Organization Affairs respectively, resisted the prevalent notion that the UN was a hopelessly lost or confused platform for pursuing US interests. Cleveland explained to Rusk, that the UN had not proven ineffectual in light of the so-called ‘swirling majorities’ of the General Assembly, supposedly entrapped under the leadership of the Soviet Union or by the will of its majority of underdeveloped states. Since there was, ‘hardly a major subject in international politics which does not have a United Nations angle, presently or prospectively’, Cleveland argued that disengagement was scarcely the proper policy. Pointing to the highly competent executive operations going on in the Middle East with the UN Emergency Force and the functional efforts of the UN in the Congo—especially the overlooked and underappreciated UN civilian mission (the topic of Chapters Four and Five)—Cleveland believed developing the UN’s operational capability ought to be the new central target of American foreign policy at the UN. Moreover, if the Soviet Union desired a UN limited to debate, the US should support the majority of states outside the Communist bloc who craved UN action, including multilateral development assistance. In the ensuing months, Cleveland, along with Gardner, would come to realize that a food aid initiative could simultaneously promote executive action through the UN while responding to the call by underdeveloped member states for multilateral development assistance.

Additionally, one other individual—a development economist made top policymaker—helped shape the Kennedy Administration’s foreign aid policy. Crucially, his theories not only influenced many within his own administration but also those within the UN Secretariat. Walt W. Rostow first met Senator Kennedy in 1958, working with him on issues which included foreign aid to India. According to Rostow, it was Kennedy who encouraged

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342 Memorandum from Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to Secretary of State Rusk, 2 May 1961, in FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume XXV, No. 169.
343 Ibid.
him to publish his thesis on the stages of economic growth as a way to advance the objective that the task of the 1960s was to move towards ‘great goals’ in global development. Rostow’s, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non—Communist Manifesto*, published in 1960, attempted to explain the process of economic growth, so far experienced to the greatest degree in the West, while latent in much of the rest of the world. As indicated in Chapter One, according to Rostow, all nations passed through fundamental stages of development on a linear trajectory from traditional societies, to take-off, to maturity. In Rostow’s estimation, the United States along with a handful of other Western states had reached the pinnacle of the development process and ought to serve as the model for other less developed countries. In this way Rostow matched Marx’s deterministic understanding of modern history, but attributed the real impetus for progress to liberal culture and compounding economic growth, not class conflict. Moreover, underdeveloped countries could best execute development through planned capitalism and foreign aid, not social revolution.

Upon his election, Kennedy brought Rostow in to his Administration as the Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, thus infusing the highest echelons of the US government with his sweeping development theory known as modernization theory. One of Rostow’s early tasks was to help craft President Kennedy’s March 1961 message to Congress on foreign aid. It called for the consolidation of all US foreign aid programs, of which PL 480 was a large component, and envisioned a broad role for US foreign aid going forward. The speech provided the basis for the establishment of the US Agency for International Development, or USAID, later that year.

Others outside the Administration were also receptive to Rostow and modernization theory, including Hans Singer—although more selectively. Perhaps riding the wave of

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345 Walt Rostow Interview, 4 April 1988, RSC, JFK Oral Histories microfilm.
346 Latham, Modernization as Ideology, 44–5.
popularity the theory enjoyed immediately following the publication of *Stages*, Singer made a case in 1960 that Rostow’s concept of countries developing from one stage to another as a result of being spurred along by ‘pre-conditions’, did in fact substantiate the recent UN effort to promote what it called ‘pre-investment aid’ through the UN Special Fund launched in 1959.348 Hoffman had also utilized Rostow and modernization theory in promoting the Special Fund. Moreover, Singer welcomed Rostow’s view that aid was not an end into itself but its purpose was to manifest self-sustained economic growth.349 Yet as historians John and Richard Toye have argued, the two men diverged over who ought to control and manage the aid from its source through to its eventual use. On the one hand, Rostow seemed to advocate the exclusive use of various US-controlled mechanisms such as the World Bank—and on this point disagreed with the general trend of thinking in the Kennedy Administration outlined above. Meanwhile, Singer and those at the UN Secretariat encouraged not only a greater use of the UN but UN predominance over the administration and allocation of aid.350

These opposing views clashed throughout the 1950s and were, of course, at the heart of the SUNFED-IDA debate described in Chapter Two—a debate that seemingly culminated in 1960 when the major donor countries of the industrial West chose to finance the IDA over SUNFED. Out-paced by the World Bank and the creation of the IDA, Singer remained resolute. Believing in the UN’s vital role in administering aid, he now argued in 1961 that the UN and its Specialized Agencies still deserved an opportunity to coordinate the international effort for a project with as many varying interests as food aid. As further evidence will show, Singer believed an international food aid program could crucially serve to satisfy disillusioned SUNFED proponents by offering a consolidation prize in the form of a multilateral food aid program, a perspective he shared with the Kennedy Administration.

349 Ibid., 78.
Food Aid and Multilateral Forums: The Internationalization of the Debate

It was against this backdrop that the FAO Intergovernmental Advisory Committee on the Use of Food Surpluses for Deficient People met in Rome from 5-12 April 1961. The Committee included twelve nations split evenly between developed and developing countries. Also in attendance were B.R Sen, Hans Singer and Mordecai Ezekiel, representing the interests of the FAO and UN Secretariat respectively. B.R. Sen had asked the group to convene to gain its perspective on UN Resolution 1496 and the Director-General’s draft report carefully and purposefully entitled, Development Through Food: A Strategy for Surplus Utilization—which was in fact a near reproduction of the expert group’s report headed by Singer. Sen’s opening statement echoed the expert report by recognizing that the ultimate solution to the problem of hunger and malnutrition was economic development now recognized and endorsed by world opinion as the ‘guiding philosophy.’\textsuperscript{351} The debate by the government representatives, however, fell short of the enthusiastic approval Sen, Singer and others desired. Representatives from Argentina, Canada and France tempered Sen’s recommendations in Development Through Food to make food aid for economic development the main objective of any future multilateral program. Wary of diving headlong into this approach, they called for only modest experimental steps in this direction.\textsuperscript{352} The meeting was about to sputter to an uneventful and unproductive conclusion when the US delegate, George McGovern, rose to speak. McGovern had only hours earlier gained approval from Kennedy to propose the establishment of a multilateral food aid program. McGovern then hastily sounded the idea off Sen, who enthusiastically approved before pitching the plan to the other delegates.\textsuperscript{353} Specifically, McGovern proposed to establish a multilateral food aid

\textsuperscript{351} Intergovernmental Advisory Committee on the Utilization of Food Surpluses: Observations by the Committee, undated, UNARMS, Folder S–045004670005.
\textsuperscript{352} Ad Hoc Advisory Committee on the Utilization of Food Surpluses: Summary of Meetings, 5–12 April 1961, Rome, Italy, FAO (ACFS/SR/1–10).
\textsuperscript{353} Telegram From Horsey (Rome) to the Secretary of State, 7 April 1961, NARA II, RG 59, 1960-1963 Central Decimal File, Box 763.
fund backed by $100 million in commodities and cash contributions over the next three years. For its part, the US was prepared to contribute the first $40 million. McGovern’s proposal recognized Sen’s desire, ‘to make the widest possible use of commodities in alleviating malnutrition.’ But he sided with other delegations in arguing for a program whose primary aim was to meet emergency needs while secondarily supporting pilot activities aimed at economic and social development. McGovern’s proposal was nonetheless novel in that it called for a multilateral approach to food aid—undertaken jointly by the FAO and UN. In fact, McGovern used the word ‘multilateral’ four times in his short speech, which came on 10 April 1961.\textsuperscript{354}

Judging from statements following the April Intergovernmental Committee meeting, the UN Secretariat viewed the Committee’s broad endorsement of Sen’s draft report and McGovern’s proposal for a multilateral food aid program as more than a cautious step forward. Singer announced just after the meeting that the new concept of international aid, ‘though it may still carry the eggshells of older days’, was indeed ‘the manifestation of a new era in which for the first time, the idea of an international world economy begins to emerge from the mists of philosophy to become an operational economic concept.’\textsuperscript{355} In other words, in the golden age of developmental social science, the climate seemed ripe for theories, which had emerged from the minds of development economists like Singer, Rostow and others, to become functional realities.

For Singer, the ‘operational economic concept’ would no doubt still include bilateral aid, but now must also include a multilateral element, or what he called the ‘middle ground’. By this Singer meant bilateral aid administered in a multilateral framework.\textsuperscript{356} According to Singer, the Committee, in its final statement, also recognized this need by giving the FAO

\textsuperscript{354} Ad Hoc Advisory Committee on the Utilization of Food Surpluses: Summary of Meetings, 5–12 April 1961, Rome, Italy FAO (ACFS/SR/1–10).
\textsuperscript{355} Hans Singer, \textit{International Aid to Under–Developed Countries}, April 1962, 2, in Columbia University Libraries, Owen Papers, Box 24.
\textsuperscript{356} Ibid., 16, in Columbia University Libraries, Owen Papers, Box 24.
and UN a considerable role in the planning, reporting and technical assistance work connected with the expansion of the proposed multilateral food aid program. In fact, Singer estimated that due to the continued internationalization of the food aid debate, the discourse over the issue had now permanently changed. In a letter to Philippe de Seynes, Singer exclaimed, ‘The days of “surplus disposal” seem definitely to be over and the day of food aid or surplus utilization for development has begun.’ Singer even advised de Seynes against the use of the phrase ‘surplus disposal’ in his own writings and speeches since it was now considered a, ‘bad word not only in the FAO but by the current US Administration.’

The Kennedy Administration was clearly trying to demonstrate America’s good will towards underdeveloped countries at the UN at the international level by endorsing an aid initiative which appealed to recipients as much as donors. Kennedy himself had, in a 16 March 1961 message to Congress on the state of US agriculture, emphasized Third World development over surplus disposal. In his speech, Kennedy stated that the policy he outlined, ‘was designed to move the focus of the US food aid programme from the disposal of surpluses to the constructive use of abundance, both at home and abroad.’ A week later Kennedy, in another special message to Congress, called for a comprehensive overhaul of US foreign aid describing the current system as not only ‘largely unsatisfactory’ for US needs, but also ‘unsuited’ for the needs of underdeveloped countries in the decade ahead.

Kennedy then backed legislative amendments to the PL 480 program to allow for more long-term and development-focused aid agreements—a specific request of underdevelopment countries to make more apparent the link between US agricultural programs and US foreign

357 Letter from Singer to de Seynes, 14 April 1961, UNARMS, Folder S–045004670005.
Meanwhile, in a 21 April press conference, Kennedy endorsed McGovern’s plan as a complement to, rather than a competitor of, the existing US food aid programs. Finally, at the 34th session of the Committee on Commodity Problems of the FAO, which met in Rome from 30 May to 16 June 1961, the State Department instructed Cochrane to make use of data on US surplus production to highlight that American productivity should not be viewed as a liability internationally but instead as an avenue for emergent nations to achieve long-term economic growth.

To be sure, Kennedy, McGovern and Cochrane had not forgotten the domestic benefits of food aid. They were well aware that US agricultural production had reached record high numbers in 1960 resulting in a wheat and feed-grain surplus carry-over of 115.2 million metric tons for 1961. Moreover, finding outlets for US farm surpluses also matched Kennedy’s domestic agricultural policy of keeping food prices stable for an ever-increasing urban society. Yet in this instance, domestic and international interests for the US seemed to dovetail. As John Duncan, the Assistant Secretary at the Department of Agriculture, reminded Cleveland—what was really in order was a policy that advocated the expansion of US food aid on all fronts.

One remaining factor played into Kennedy’s backing of a multilateral food aid option. Key to his position was a belief that any future multilateral food aid program would assuage Third World member states at the UN who, along with Hans Singer, had spent the better part of a decade attempting to establish SUNFED. The Administration was never close to signing

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362 Instruction for Willard W. Cochrane (Director of Agricultural Economics for Department of Agriculture and Delegate to 34th Session of Committee on Commodity Problems of the FAO), 25 May 1961, NARA II, RG 59, 1960-1963 Central Decimal File, Box 763.
364 Letter from John P. Duncan, Jr. (Assistant Secretary at the Department of Agriculture) to Cleveland, 3 November 1961, NARA II, RG 59, 1960-63 Central Decimal File, Box 764.
on to what Harlan Cleveland called ‘a debtors special’ despite the fact that an Afro-Asia led UN resolution passed in December 1960 calling for its immediate establishment as described in Chapter Two.\textsuperscript{365} In fact, Singer was aware that the Administration and other potential donor states planned to take an intransigent position at the UN preparatory committee meetings meant to draw up SUNFED’s statutes during the spring of 1961. He therefore advised the Secretariat to have ready contingency plans that would break up the omnibus SUNFED proposal into various piecemeal, specialized and altogether concrete schemes in which donor countries would be willing to participate. First among Singer’s suggestions was a food aid program based on his recommendations from February. Singer believed this option reinforced the view from the Kennedy Administration that the SUNFED resolution, although undesirable in its current form, might be more than tolerable if its Third World crafters showed a certain flexibility in its implementation.\textsuperscript{366} Crucially then, both the Secretariat and the Kennedy Administration believed a multilateral food aid program could be sold to the Global South as a viable consolation prize for SUNFED.

Altogether the UN Secretariat, the FAO and the Kennedy Administration were moving in parallel directions over the question of food aid. On a theoretical level, development economists within each underscored the need to direct food aid for scientifically modeled, planned and state sponsored economic development in the decade ahead. On an operational level, each entity backed the internationalization of food aid by promoting a multilateral food aid initiative, ultimately to find its expression in and through the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies. Over the course of the summer of 1961, the UN and the FAO would utilize various forums to market further and defend the food aid for development

\textsuperscript{365} Personal Interview with Richard N. Gardner, 11 October 2013, Columbia University, New York.
\textsuperscript{366} Memorandum from Singer to de Seynes, 10 March 1961, UKNA, FO 371/160992; Foreign Office Minutes on Capital Development Fund, UK participation in the Prep Committee, 22 March 1961, UKNA, FO 371/160992.
approach while demonstrating that both of these international institutions were up to the task in administering any future program.

Sen’s first opportunity to challenge any dissenters came at the 35th Session of the FAO Council, which met in Rome from 19-29 June 1961. Sen cautioned certain delegations that proposed to limit an international food program to only emergency relief. While promising to start any future program on a modest scale, Sen reminded all in attendance that UN Resolution 1496, called for permanent solutions, not palliatives. Sen flatly stated economic development was the ultimate objective of food aid and ‘nothing less will do.’ As Singer had recently anticipated, ‘surplus disposal’ took on a pejorative quality during the Council debate, best exemplified by the Ghanaian delegate’s complaint that his country had been a victim of surplus dumping while carefully calling not for more food charity but ‘food aid for economic development.’ Meanwhile, the US delegate, Robert C. Tetro, joined the majority of states in embracing Sen’s proposals and further outlined US commitments to any future program.  

Then, at the 32nd Session of the UN Economic and Social Council, which met in July and August 1961, UN Secretary-General Hammarskjold finally weighed-in on this burgeoning topic, having been embroiled in the Congo Crisis for much of the previous year. Altogether, Hammarskjold’s statement was symptomatic of the Secretary-General’s mission to make economic development the primary focus of an organization increasingly made up of underdeveloped states. Crucially, Hammarskjold emphasized that underdevelopment was a problem that transcended national boundaries and was the responsibility of the international community. For Hammarskjold, the issue of food aid for underdeveloped countries was consistent with his view that, ‘to set aside a portion of one’s national resources in manpower,
materials, equipment, finance and technical knowledge to assist economic development of less developed had been accepted as axiomatic.368 He was glad that the international community asked the UN and its Specialized Agencies to investigate multilateral food aid as a means for economic development but was aware of the criticisms this methodology provoked. Entrenched divisions of labor between the UN and its Specialized Agencies, scattered and uncoordinated initiatives, the complexity of UN administrative procedures, were all arguments against strengthening the UN and the FAO’s participation in food aid in favor of more homogeneous activities outside the UN framework. Yet, the UN was too valuable an organization to allow this challenge to go unanswered according to Hammarskjold. A multilateral food aid program would show that the UN family could cooperate just as it was proving it could in the midst of the Congo Crisis where it was, according the Hammarskjold, preventing an absolute economic and social collapse in that failed state.369

Hammarskjold further explained in a report submitted along with his ECOSOC speech that the UN was now poised to act, alongside the FAO, to intensify its participation in administering food aid by invoking the talents of its development economists at the UN Headquarters, its regional economic commissions and the operations of its technical cooperation programs.370 Here, Hammarskjold was no doubt referencing the research of Singer and others at the UN Secretariat, but was also emphasizing the UN’s network of global field offices headed by UN Resident Representatives serving as ambassadorial-like development advisers and administrators to underdeveloped countries. In sum, Sen’s remarks were crucial in not allowing emergency aid to overshadow development aid as the primary purpose of any future food aid program. Meanwhile, Hammarskjold contributed to the

368 ECOSOC OR, 32nd Session, 1163rd meeting, 14 July 1961.
369 ECOSOC OR, 32nd Session, 1163rd meeting, 14 July 1961.
argument that the UN and FAO had the will, the organizational capacity and the necessary human resources within potential food aid recipient countries to meet the challenges that a multilateral food aid program might pose. Furthermore, Hammarskjold clearly placed food aid in context of the UN’s development aid efforts from the past decade-plus.

**The UN World Food Program: It’s Establishment, Impact and Evolution**

The 1961 UN General Assembly proved to be the last step in the creation of a viable multilateral food aid program. The Assembly started on a somber note just days after the tragic death of Secretary-General Hammarskjold. Kennedy remarked on the grief and the challenge accompanying the Secretary-General’s untimely passing, yet attempted to encourage a different atmosphere going forward when he stated the, ‘problem is not the death of one man—the problem is the life of this organization. It will either grow to meet the challenges of our age, or it will be gone with the wind, without influence, without force, without respect.’ Speech writers, among them Cleveland and Gardner, then littered the rest of the President’s message with initiatives meant to meet the challenges of the coming age and breathe new life into the UN, none more remembered than Kennedy’s call, ‘officially designating this decade of the 1960’s as the United Nations Decade of Development.’

The eventual approval of a UN Decade of Development resolution at the 1961 General Assembly, as food aid scholar D. John Shaw notes, also created an atmosphere favorable for further innovations including a resolution to establish a UN World Food Program. Indeed, the UN WFP would serve as one of the main schemes and lead initiatives included as a part of the Development Decade Proposals for Action drawn up by the UN Secretariat later in 1962. Still, the debate over a food aid resolution at the 1961 General Assembly...

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Assembly showed that, despite the positive environment, real concerns persisted among a number of UN member states about the role and purpose of any multilateral food aid endeavor. A group which included Argentina, Brazil, France and Japan took issue with the initial draft resolution arguing that the proposal differed too greatly from the one reached at the FAO Intergovernmental Advisory Committee that had met in Rome that past April. Whereas the FAO resolution treated food aid for emergency relief and food aid for economic and social development with equal importance, the current draft proposal that had fully incorporated and reflected the views of Sen and Hammarskjold, emphasized that the primary and foremost use of food aid was to promote economic development. Within the group of dissenters, made up of food exporting countries and thus competitors of those who engaged in surplus disposal, there was a concerted effort to stress the experimental nature of any proposed multilateral food aid program and for the inclusion of procedures that would protect their interests. Furthermore, the composition of this group of indicates that the debate over food aid did not divide into the ‘typical’ North-South or East-West schisms so often prevalent at the UN. Instead, Argentina and Brazil allying with France and Japan—not to mentioned Thailand, Burma and Canada—represented the uncommon coalitions and strange bedfellows that formed over food aid compared to more orthodox groupings typical at the UN.

In an effort to pass the resolution unanimously, the sponsors of the resolution adopted amendments that mitigated a strict ‘food aid for development’ approach. The final resolution passed on 19 December 1961 with no opposing votes and abstentions from only the Soviet bloc. The resolution officially established a World Food Program jointly undertaken by the UN and the FAO. The operative paragraphs contained tempered language which underscored

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374 GAOR, Second Committee, 16th Session, 782nd and 786th meetings, 9 and 12 December 1961. The same debate took place just weeks earlier at the eleventh session of the FAO annual conference. See FAO, Extract from the report of the Eleventh Session of the FAO Conference with Resolution 1/61, (undated) in FAO, Food for Development, 331.

the ‘experimental’ nature of the World Food Program and called for no more than ‘pilot projects’ involving the use of food as an aid to economic and social development. The initial WFP resolution was no doubt underwhelming for the likes of Sen, Singer and others and certainly fell short of the approach outlined in Development Through Food. Others within the UN Secretariat specifically remarked on the gap between aspirations and results. David Owen commented that the resolution had not given greater emphasis to economic development projects inherent in food surplus and instead accentuated emergency relief. He noted the modest budget of $90 million for its first year, would only be a small fraction of the resources of big bilateral food aid agreements. Still, according to Owen, the UN and the FAO had made a ‘significant step’. Similarly, Singer late reflected that the establishment of the World Food Program in 1961 was, ‘of momentous significance as a beginning.’

Evidence from the ensuing decades following the establishment of the WFP indicates that Owen and Singer were correct—that the changing discourse over food aid had given rise to a lasting functional change. What follows, is a brief examination of the effects of this change. One telling feature of the nature of WFP aid through its initial decade lies in the distribution of its resources. As Mitchell B. Wallerstein has shown, development-orientated food aid quickly became the focus for the WFP accounting for roughly 66% of the entire program’s available capital which totaled $1.4 billion from 1963-73. Over this period, the WFP allocated resources towards land development, land settlement, animal and dairy growth, community development, as well as mother and school feeding projects. Moreover, many of the projects involved food-for-work schemes that promoted domestic agricultural production by employing otherwise idle men in farm-to-market road construction and the digging of irrigation ditches and drainage facilities—as opposed to straight feeding.

376 UN General Assembly Resolution 1714 (XVI), 19 December 1961.
programs. As Singer has noted, the WFP during its first decade became a leading force in the ‘structural evolution of food aid’ and ‘was the only UN agency given a mandate to use food aid specifically as a development tool.’ In fact, by the late 1960s the WFP had taken over all of UNICEF’s child-feeding responsibilities.

Action taken by the WFP in its first decade and beyond also aligned with the prevailing desires among the countries of the Global South that any program ought to be truly multilateral. From its inception, the WFP placed a large onus of responsibility on recipient countries. An equal number of donor and recipient countries which all voted and approved specific projects made up the twenty-member governing board of the WFP, known as the Inter-governmental Committee. Unlike the World Bank, countries did not vote based on a weighted system but on a one-country-one-vote basis, tempering the voting influence of the US despite the fact that it often contributed over half of the total resources to the WFP. Then as a further means to combat the donor meddling that often plagued bilateral aid, as recognized by Singer and others, the delivery and management of WFP aid fell solely on the recipient countries. These distinguishing marks of the WFP, which are still in place, helped to support the idea that the program’s aid was not just bilateral aid in disguise.

Perhaps as indicative of the shift the nature of food aid, at least during the 1960s, was the effect it had on food aid donors outside the UN system. For example, by the end of the 1960s, NGOs like Oxfam concentrated over 90% of its budget on development-orientated projects rather than emergency aid. More telling was the restructuring of PL 480 throughout the 1960s, which continued to be the single largest food assistance program during this period and beyond. Initially working in conjunction with, and then fully under, the newly created USAID, the PL 480 Program started to reform some of its practices. Starting in

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379 Wallerstein, 94–97.
380 Singer, Wood and Jennings, Food Aid, 29-30.
381 Wallerstein, 94.
382 Singer, Wood and Jennings, Food Aid, 32.
fiscal year 1961-62, the Kennedy Administration drastically increased the amount of food assistance given under two provisions of PL 480 for the expressed purpose of economic development—namely Titles II and IV.\textsuperscript{383} Likewise, grants for economic development under section 104(e) of Title I increased to 32\% of total Title I aid in 1961-62, nearly triple the percentage allocated under the same provision from 1958-59.\textsuperscript{384} Similarly, the Johnson Administration continued to focus PL 480 on development objectives even as US agricultural surpluses declined through the 1960s.\textsuperscript{385} As historian Kristen Ahlberg affirms, the Johnson Administration’s motivation was to use food aid as a means to export the Great Society globally and as a bargaining tool for negotiations with countries like India. Specifically, it used food aid to compel India to further develop and modernize its agricultural sector with American know-how, suggesting that the change in how food aid was perceived did not always de-politicalize its use.\textsuperscript{386}

The World Food Crisis of 1973-74 further reinforced the developmental approach to food aid. Brought on by severe drought, production shortfalls, a spike in food prices and the first global oil crisis, the food emergency prompted the 1974 World Food Conference. Crucially, the final communiqué of the Conference called for a greater utilization of the WFP in ‘rendering development assistance to developing countries.’\textsuperscript{387} The Conference also led to revised food aid policies in many donor states including the US, which restructured PL 480 in 1975 and again in 1977. Both reforms continued to re-orientate US food aid toward broad-based development schemes.\textsuperscript{388} Altogether, multilateral food aid donations remained a focus

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{383} OECD, \textit{Food Aid: Its Role in Economic Development}, 22-23.
\item \textsuperscript{384} Ibid., 33.
\item \textsuperscript{385} Singer, Wood and Jennings, \textit{Food Aid}, 23.
\item \textsuperscript{386} Kristen L. Ahlberg, \textit{Transplanting the Great Society: Lyndon Johnson and Food for Peace} (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 2008), 110-112.
\item \textsuperscript{388} John Shaw and Edward Clay, eds., \textit{World Food Aid: Experiences of Recipients & Donors} Rome: World Food Program, 1993), 216-18; Singer, Wood and Jennings, \textit{Food Aid}, 24. Finally, the Conference led to the creation of a separate International Fund for Agricultural Development, which concentrated feeding and agricultural
\end{itemize}
during this period, increasing to nearly 25% of total contributions by the mid-1970s and remained at that level through the early 1990s.\textsuperscript{389} The push towards developmental food aid even prompted one scholar to forecast that the world food aid system was headed towards a ‘development-first regime.’\textsuperscript{390} By 1991, the WFP budget had ballooned to $1.6 billion, doling out the second largest amount of development aid within the UN system, after the World Bank.\textsuperscript{391}

Ultimately, another dramatic shift occurred in 1993 when Canada, the Netherlands and Norway released a study highly critical of the WFP’s performance in development efforts. The weighty report had a staggering effect for the WFP, challenging what had become the status quo. WFP operational expenditures for development projects fell sharply from just under $500 million in 1989-90 to $185 million in 2000. Over the same period, emergency operation funds increased to 86% of the WFP annual budget.\textsuperscript{392} The shift also coincided with a general trend, which started in the late 1970s, to direct food aid towards least developed and food-deficient countries as humanitarian aid.\textsuperscript{393} Meanwhile, the phrase ‘food security’—broadly defined as the effort to eliminate hunger and malnutrition—found its way into the food aid lexicon as well as the main operative clause of both the WFP and mission statements.\textsuperscript{394}

**Conclusion**

Thus, five decades removed from the birth of the UN World Food Program and food aid for development competes with and also works alongside, but generally is subservient to food aid as a tool to feed the hungry. Ultimately then, the shift that took place with the birth

\textsuperscript{389} Wallerstein, 230; Shaw and Clay, eds., \textit{World Food Aid}, 6.
\textsuperscript{390} Raymond F. Hopkins, ‘The Evolution of Food Aid: Towards a Development-First Regime’ in Ruttan, ed., 133.
\textsuperscript{391} Shaw and Clay, \textit{World Food Aid}, 1; Singer, Wood and Jennings, \textit{Food Aid}, 20.
\textsuperscript{392} Christopher B. Barnett and Daniel G. Maxwell, \textit{Food Aid After Fifty Years: Recasting its role} (London: Routledge, 2005), 62-63; Jolly, et. al., 99.
\textsuperscript{393} Shaw, \textit{The UN World Food Programme}, 86.
\textsuperscript{394} Barnett and Maxwell, 107. See also, Bryan L. McDonald, \textit{Food Security} (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2010).
of the WFP should not be overstated, but neither should it be undersold. What can be said is that the restructuring of food aid in the early 1960s matched the rise in the popularity of development thinking and practices during the same period. Furthermore, developmental food aid did manage to outlast other development-focused schemes—particularly American ones like the Alliance for Progress and the Strategic Hamlet Program—perhaps due to its attractiveness among both donors and recipients. In this way, this study challenges a prevailing notion among development historians who argue that all development plans from the 1960s were doomed to failure in a decade’s time. To be sure, food aid for development is no longer the primary focus of food assistance programs. Nevertheless, a historical evaluation of this topic does bring to light several important points.

Crucially then, this study provides a functional example of how through the internationalization of food aid, postwar development aid took on a global quality. In this way, various UN and international forums served as the principal arenas in which competing interests and common goals collided and coalesced among state and non-state actors over the issues related to multilateral food aid. Furthermore, the UN Secretariat and the Kennedy Administration proved to be an important source of ideas for the functional shift in food aid from a bilateral liquidation of unwanted surplus stock to an international food aid system with a growing multilateral component. Moreover, in the light of the previous chapters, the creation of the WFP should be viewed as a culmination of a process nurtured and advanced by earlier development aid endeavors pursued at the UN. As with the EPTA, the Special Fund and SUNFED, those at the UN ultimately sought to prove with the WFP that the Organization was not only up to the task of administrating a large multilateral food program but was in fact the preferred instrument to do so as a bridge between donor and recipient states. The final two chapters of this thesis will again take up the topic of development aid

and the question of the proper role for the UN in this process. Like the previous chapters, they will emphasize the formation and evolution of a specific, albeit wide ranging, aid program devised by and through the UN. However, the final chapters will focus especially on UN aid to a specific underdeveloped country and by doing so will offer a more intense look at UN development aid on the ground and in the direct context of decolonization.
CHAPTER FOUR

Decolonization and Development: The UN Civilian Mission to the Congo,
June 1960-December 1960

Writing to Secretary-General Hammarskjold a month into the Congo Crisis, Guinea
President Sekou Toure unequivocally stated that the UN intervention in the Congo would end
in triumph or failure and that the latter, ‘would seriously endanger the future of the
international Organization and the fate of world peace.’ Toure then concluded, ‘[a]ll the
African peoples are highly sensitive to the manner in which the United Nations fulfills the
historic role it is called upon to play in securing victory for freedom and the integrity of
nations.’\[397\] The message, which almost reads like a threat, underscores the high stakes facing
not only Hammarskjold but also those taking part in the UN Operation to the Congo—
identified by its French acronym ONUC.\[398\] Overall, the UN response to the combination of
political, constitutional, territorial, economic and social crises that constituted the Congo
Crisis of 1960 to 1965 was massive. At its height UN personnel totals included nearly 20,000
UN troops and some 2,000 civilian aid workers. These figures easily dwarf UN personnel
totals deployed in the Sinai as part of UN Emergency Force (UNEF) starting in 1956, which
totaled just over 6,000 military personnel supported by a small contingent of civilian staff. It
also far surpassed the just under 600 military personnel who served in 1958 as part of the UN
Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL).\[399\]

\[398\] It is worth noting that the Congo Crisis is usually dated from 1960-1965, while the ONUC Mission to the Congo lasted from July 1960 until June 1964.
\[399\] The UN devised UNEF in the course of Suez Crisis as a peacekeeping force stationed in the Sinai Peninsula following the brief Suez War fought between Israel and Egypt. Meanwhile, UNOGIL served to ensure there was no illegal infiltration of personnel or arms across the Lebanese and Syrian border. In fact, the ONUC mission was only matched in size and a scope by the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) that operated from 1992-93. UNTAC’s military component totaled 15,991 at its height while its international civilian staffed totaled 1,149. See, \url{http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unefi.htm}; \url{http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unogil.htm} and \url{http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untac.htm}.
Early scholarship on the UN’s role in the Congo Crisis was largely positive. Indicative of this view is the longstanding authoritative work of Catherine Hoskyns in, *The Congo Since Independence: January 1960-December 1961*. She and others emphasized the readiness, willingness and ability of the UN peacekeepers to keep the Congo from splitting completely and permanently, on the whole applauding the Organization’s efforts as the most successful of its peacekeeping enterprises to date.\(^{400}\) Later scholarship was far more critical of the UN, questioning its impartiality as it intervened in the domestic political affairs of the Congo while collaborating with US policymakers or serving Western interests.\(^{401}\) Moreover, these works depict an altogether doomed UN operation that fell victim to classic Cold War machinations.\(^{402}\) Most recently new international histories of the Congo Crisis have emerged, underscoring the Congo’s Cold War qualities but also the limits of superpower, especially Soviet, influence.\(^{403}\) Altogether, the existing scholarship has been overwhelmingly concerned

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with the military, security, and political aspects of the Congo Crisis. This is understandable in the light of the violence and political drama that dominates the Congo Crisis narrative. Nevertheless, largely ignored are the economic and social development dimensions of the conflict, especially as it relates to the role of the UN Civilian Operation to the Congo as a component of the total UN operation.

In fact, the UN Civilian Operation is absent as a factor in nearly all the major scholarly debates where historians have evaluated the success of the UN mission, questioned UN impartiality and framed the crisis as a Cold War battleground. The few older works that do address the Civilian Mission provide evidence that needs comparing with the larger, more recently released, archival record. A study of UN Civilian Mission to the Congo raises still other questions concerning the nature, purpose and limits of an international organization providing multilateral development assistance to a newly independent country emerging from eighty years of colonial domination, but nonetheless born into a state of dependence.

What is apparent over the first six months of the crisis, which this chapter covers, is that the UN Civilian Operation to the Congo was an integral part of the overall ONUC mission and a vital part of what the UN was trying to accomplish in the Congo. In this way, the UN is again shown to be an important autonomous institution—albeit constrained at


\[\text{405} \] Note, this thesis will use UN Civilian Mission, UN Civilian Operation(s) and the Civilian ONUC interchangeably.

times. Its tactics and methods show the extent to which the UN was able to provide aid in numerous sectors to the Congo state and within its population on an unprecedented scale for any non-state actor. Thus UN aid extended into areas relating to health, education, public administration, agriculture, communications, transportation, famine relief and much more. In almost all cases, this amounted to much more than just emergency relief as the UN’s development-minded aid architects drew on many of the Organization’s established development aid theories and practices in searching for long-term solutions for the Congo’s development needs.

What is equally apparent are the serious challenges facing UN development aid. In a newly independent country not only torn by violence but also saddled by acute economic and social woes, an injection of innocuous development aid proved impossible. Altogether, events on the ground challenged, changed and competed with established UN ideas about international development aid at the level of implementation. Specifically, delicate talks with the Congolese government over the control of UN aid quickly soured as deep divisions grew between Secretary-General Hammarskjold and Congolese Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba. As the Congo tumbled into a constitutional crisis in September 1960, the UN scrambled to keep the Cold War and the vestiges of colonialism out of what amounted to a near failed state—battling the Soviets and the Belgians over civilian aid exclusivity throughout the fall of 1960. In this way, UN civilian aid was one of the true testing grounds, and one of the toughest challenges, for the methods and practices of UN aid developed during the 1950s and discussed so far in this thesis. Having carved out its place in the global development process through the work of the EPTA and the Special Fund, while also turning its attention to the African continent on the verge of mass decolonization, the Organization now faced the culmination and confluence of these processes in the Congo Crisis.

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407 Bradley Simpson’s, *Economists with Guns*, in many ways centered on the struggle between theoretical verses on-the-ground development. Nick Cullather recognizes a similar tension in Cullather, ‘The Third Race,’ *Diplomatic History* 33, no. 3 (June 2009): 509.
Development and the Belgian Congo

Speaking to the Economic Club of New York on 8 March 1960, shortly after returning from a six-week tour of the African continent, Secretary-General Hammarskjold drew on his recent experience when asserting, ‘We all know the present scope and pace of the emergence of African countries and territories into political independence. It is essential that African economic growth acquire sufficient momentum to match the pace of political change. The early period of independence may in this respect prove decisive.’ Hoping to serve as the midwife to African independence, Hammarskjold and the UN Secretariat did their best to anticipate the political and economic consequences of Africa’s emergence into statehood in 1960 when sixteen African countries gained their sovereignty. Few countries caused more concern at the UN than the Belgian Congo whose pace, with regard to decolonization, quickened from a stroll to a sprint after the so-called Round Table negotiations between Belgian and Congolese leaders in January and February 1960. These talks ended with the stunning announcement that the Congo would become independent on 30 June 1960. Disturbed by the speed of the Belgian push towards decolonization, coupled with the Congo’s apparent lack of readiness, David Owen, Paul Hoffman and Philippe de Seynes met to discuss sending a high-level UN official alongside a permanent Resident Representative to monitor the Congo’s transition to independence. Ralph Bunche, UN Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs, seemed to be the top choice, not only for his diplomatic acumen but also for what Owen believed to be Bunche’s symbolic value for Africa and the UN as the highest-ranking African-American working at the UN. Hammarskjold agreed and sent Bunche to

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408 Address by UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold before the Economic Club of New York, 8 March 1960, NSL, Hammarskjold Papers, L179:177.
Leopoldville in late May 1960 as a witness to the closing stages of a unique colonial process started by King Leopold in the 1880s and bequeathed to the Belgian state in 1908.

Historians differ only slightly in describing the nature and qualities of Belgian colonialism in the Congo. Hoskyns and others note the horizontal rather than vertical system of development used by the Belgians, where the goal was to raise the standard of living and education of the Congolese population en masse, rather than cultivate the leadership qualities of an indigenous ruling elite. Believing that no African should hold a post until he or she was qualified, Belgium relied on immigration from the metropole to run the country. Hoskyns estimates there were nearly 10,000 Belgian civil servants alongside some 7,000 missionaries in the Belgian Congo by 1958. This solid presence of administrators left many at the time to conclude that Belgian paternalism was both enlightened and had resulted in balanced development as seen by the Congo’s high literacy rate, health provisions and elementary through high school education as compared to other colonial states in Africa.

Nevertheless, the basis for the Belgian presence in the Congo was ultimately economic exploitation. Seeking to exploit a country endowed with tremendous natural resources, Belgian mining, agricultural and other commercial interests dominated the Congo’s economy while directing any infrastructural investments in rail, water and roads towards maximizing exports. This in turn led to patchy infrastructural development and top-heavy industrial development. Thus, Crawford Young encapsulates Belgian colonialism’s fatal flaw as ‘not simply in the predominance of material objectives, but in the failure to involve the beneficiaries in any way other than as passive recipients of the largesse.’

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410 Again, in recognition of the vernacular of the period under review this thesis will used Leopoldville for present-day Kinshasa, Stanleyville for present-day Kisangani, Elizabethville for present-day Lubumbashi and Coquilhatville for present-day Mbandaka.


412 Hoskyns, 8-9, 13, 33-34; Young, 41; Dayal, 1-2.


414 Young, 6.
Therefore, at independence there were among the population no Congolese doctors, no judges, army officers, engineers, top administrators or secondary school teachers. To add to the complexity of these challenges, only sixteen Congolese had college degrees.415

One of the few Congolese university graduates, Thomas Kanza, the first Congolese representative to the United Nations, traced the impending crisis to the lack of any ‘mental decolonization’ among the colonizers and colonized alike. Kanza noted that even in the late 1950s, Belgians believed they still had at least a decade more to supervise development in the Congo. Meanwhile, among the Congolese, there appeared to be a ‘total lack of any leadership…capable of securing power effectively.’416 Here again, the Belgians subordinated political developments during most of their rule and it was not until October 1958 that the first national Congo political party formed—the Mouvement National Congolais (MNC).417

Certainly there was cause for hope among the Congolese who believed that the country’s economic potential could quickly wipe away any other developmental deficiencies. It had some of the world’s most sizable deposits of strategic minerals like copper, cobalt and uranium found mostly in its southern-most province of Katanga. It also boasted industrial diamond deposits in addition to timber, tin and zinc. By most estimates the Congo also had the best economic infrastructure of any country in Sub-Saharan Africa built in large part by the Société Générale de Belgique—Belgium’s largest financial group which controlled approximately 70% of the Congolese national economy including its mines. Upon independence, the Congolese government fully expected to levy taxes and export duties on this company and its affiliates, the revenue of which would form the basis of the Congolese economy.418

415 Urquhart, Hammarskjold, 390; Kalb, xxi; Hoskyns, 12.
418 Schmidt, 57.
Nevertheless, as the Congo approached independence the health of its economy was, to a large degree, gilded. According to a UN report, Congo’s independence ‘did not take place on the crest of a wave of economic expansion and prosperity.’ Instead, political uncertainties, a rapidly growing population and labor force and a subsequent rise in unemployment had resulted in lower productivity and stagnant growth from 1957 through the first half of 1960. Over this same period, the country lost roughly $300 million in gold and foreign exchange reserves despite borrowing $150 million and receiving a grant from Belgium totaling $10 million. During this period, its treasury went from the position of a creditor of over 5 billion francs to that of a debtor of 1.4 billion francs. Capital flight resulted in the loss of an estimated $200 million in 1959 alone and another $40 million in the six weeks following independence.\textsuperscript{419} The US State Department’s report from 10 May 1960 recognized the same dangerous economic signs. It concluded that ‘[w]hile it is true that the outlook for production and exportation of minerals and agricultural products is bright, it is the consensus of well-informed observers that there is a great danger, during the next two or three years, that the over-all economic situation in the Congo will deteriorate with a fall in per capita GNP.’\textsuperscript{420}

\textbf{Independence, Mayhem and the Initial UN Response, July-August 1960}

Despite the economic harbingers that urged prudence, political developments following the Round Table negotiations proceeded with extraordinary speed through the spring and summer of 1960. In May, the MNC managed to win a precarious majority during the Congo’s first parliamentary elections. At the same time, the Congolese ratified their constitution (or, \textit{Loi Fondamentale}), subsequently signed by King Baudouin of Belgium.

Finally, Belgian and Congolese leaders agreed to a Treaty of Friendship (the signing of which


was later disputed) on the cusp of independence which was meant to ensure a strong Belgian presence in the Congo—administratively and economically—as the means to cultivate the Congo’s development as an independent state while protecting the still enormous Belgian corporate investments in the country’s natural resources.

The events of the Congo’s oxymoronic ascent to statehood on 30 June 1960 are well-cataloged by historians. It began at the Congo’s independence ceremony where King Baudouin’s speech cataloged the benefits of a ‘civilizing mission’ started by King Leopold II. Then the Congo’s newly elected Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, in his own speech proceeded to lambast the Belgians for decades of exploitation. This was followed by the clueless gesture of Belgian General Émile Jassen who scribbled ‘before independence = after independence’ on the blackboard of a room filled with Belgian army officers, the news of which served as the fuse that sparked the mutiny by the Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC) against their Belgian superiors starting on 4 July 1960. The immediate consequences are equally well-documented. Starting on 5 July, attacks against Belgian citizens occurred throughout the Congo resulting in a general exodus of Europeans from the Congo starting on 7 July. Hoskyns estimates that of the 8,235 Belgian civil servants in the Congo, some 5,589 left in July and another 1,129 left in August. Then on 9 July, the Belgian government ordered the dispatch of thousands of Belgian troops to the Congo to protect Belgian citizens and interests.421 The rapid Belgian departure left executive, administrative and technical posts in the administration of the country either vacant or filled by lower level clerks. The same was true for other essential services including judiciary courts, customs services, airport control-towers, the port at Matadi, postal services and telecommunication. Overall, this produced an immediate emergency and set the stage for an unprecedented man-made disaster in need of an equally extraordinary response.422

421 Hoskyns, 88, 181.
422 Progress Report No. 1, 24 August 1960, ODS, (ST/ONUC/PR.5), 1; Dayal, 48-49.
Initially, the UN used its existing personnel in the Congo to assess the situation, to make contact with the Congolese government and initiate a preliminary response. Besides Bunche, who remained in the Congo through the tumult of early July, Hammarskjold and Owen had appointed Sture C. Linner as the UN Resident Representative for technical assistance in the Congo. Linner, a Swede, formerly served with the Swedish Red Cross in Greece during World War Two and had substantial experience in the mining industry as an executive vice-president and general manager of the Liberia-American-Swedish Minerals Company (LAMCO) in Monrovia. Linner noted that when asked by Hammarskjold to attend the Congo independence ceremony, the Secretary-General ominously joked that he ought to pack for a week or two or perhaps a year—in fact, Linner would remain in the Congo for the next eighteen months. Linner and Bunche first met with Congolese officials on 10 July where the Congo cabinet made its first official request for aid. Their initial appeal was for technical assistance generally and specifically military advisers to help pacify the ANC. The meeting was otherwise important because it resulted in one of the first interactions between UN officials and Prime Minister Lumumba. Linner’s impression of Lumumba generally fits into the majority of appraisals that show Lumumba to be an enigmatic figure. To Linner, Lumumba seemed intelligent and even well balanced but had, ‘something in his eye that worried him.’ At this first meeting, Lumumba also expressed what Linner described as a, ‘touchingly exaggerated faith in the United Nations’ in which ‘[h]e thought we would solve all the problems for him, that we had everything at our command.’ Bunche, who would later have major disagreements with Lumumba over this very issue, at the time, relayed the request to Hammarskjold who at once returned to New York from

424 Transcript of Interview with Sture Linner, 8 November 1990, United Nations Oral History Collection, 2-3.
425 Cordier and Foote, eds., Volume V, 18.
426 Transcript of Interview with Sture Linner, 8 November 1990, United Nations Oral History Collection, 10-11.
Geneva to meet on 12 July with the heads of the African delegations at the UN to discuss the nature of this first-response type of aid.\textsuperscript{427}

Over the next few weeks, aid requests flooded the UN headquarters. On 22 July, Bunche cabled Hammarskjold alerting him that existing food supplies in the Congo were low and the country would soon have to rely on its emergency reserves if the government did not act immediately.\textsuperscript{428} On 26 July, Bunche sent another set of cables requesting two meteorological experts and air traffic controllers for the Congo’s main airport—French speaking and preferably from Tunisia, Lebanon or Syria.\textsuperscript{429} Bunche and Linner made similar ad hoc requests with regard to the Congo’s health, educational, telecommunication and financial needs. On 25 July, Linner and Bunche reported on the development of a pressing financial crisis. Linner learned that the government of the Congo was in danger of failing to meet civil service salary payments for the month of August having virtually no cash balance at independence. Tax revenues from the provinces had ceased and the Belgians had reneged on a promise of financial assistance.\textsuperscript{430} Worse still, there was literally no one in the Congo Finance Ministry to stabilize matters. Of the 150 Belgians serving in the Congolese Finance Ministry at independence, all had left by the end of August.\textsuperscript{431} In the estimation of the US State Department, the Congo entered independence with the financial burden commensurate to a highly developed European state and now consisted of a government that lacked the administrative or financial experience to manage it. Tragically, the only nation best suited to help was now its ‘mortal enemy’ and the cause of its ills.\textsuperscript{432}

Meanwhile, developments in and outside the Congo deepened the crisis almost from the start. On 11 July, Katanga, the southern-most province of the Congo, declared its
independence wresting from the fledging state its vast mineral wealth and 60% of its tax revenue. The following day, the government of the Congo made its first formal request for UN military assistance specifically to extract Belgian soldiers from Katanga and elsewhere, many of whom the secessionist province had warmly welcomed. Hammarskjold then invoked, for the first time, Article 99 of the UN Charter summoning a meeting of the UN Security Council that met from 13-14 July. The Security Council then passed a resolution that requested the Belgian troops to withdraw, called for a restoration of order and finally authorized the Secretary-General to provide military and other technical assistance to the Congolese government. In response to the latter appeal, Hammarskjold sprang into action immediately, appealing to Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Guinea and Mali for troops and requesting airlift assistance from the US, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. The first UN troops arrived on 15 July, thus giving birth to the UN Operation to the Congo. At this point, an estimated 25,000 Belgians and other European civilians had fled the country and some 10,000 Belgians troops held twenty-three different strategic areas in the Congo including airports, shipping ports and key points within all of Congo’s major cities.

As stated, most histories of the conflict focus at this point on the security issues encountered by this unique force of international peacekeepers soon to number several thousand and growing. Nevertheless, mid-July also marked the official start of the UN Civilian Mission to the Congo as a component of the overall operation. Hammarskjold chose Sture Linner as Chief of Civilian Operations, according to Linner, because of his apparent ability to lead extemporaneously while not being fettered by bureaucratic prudence.

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433 Cable from President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba to the Secretary-General, 13 July 1960, ODS, (S/4382); Kanza, 206-07.
434 Resolution Adopted by the Security Council at its 873rd Meeting, 13 July 1960, ODS, (S/4387). The vote passed 8-3-0 with China, France and Great Britain abstaining. The Tunisian representative at the Security Council, Mongi Slim, led the way speaking for the Afro-Asia group and produced the eventual resolution.
435 Cordier and Foote, eds., Volume V, 27; Urquhart, Hammarskjold, 403-04.
436 Transcript of Interview with Sture Linner, 8 November 1990, United Nations Oral History Collection, 6-7. One example that Linner himself provides of his improvised leadership was a case where the UN needed trucks to deliver food to the province of Kasai in the midst of a famine. Lacking the vehicles, Linner claims to have
Joining Linner and Bunche in Leopoldville was Jean David, a Haitian, who would soon play a crucial, albeit controversial, role in securing connections with key Congolese ministers. Staying on as Financial Advisor to the UN Civilian Mission was Robert West, an American economist from MIT who happened to be doing research in the Congo when the crisis broke out. Other top advisors would also arrive soon in their respective official capacities forming what was known as the Consultative Group to the UN Civilian Operation. In New York, Hammarskjold requested the services of Henry Labouisse of the World Bank who took on the role as Special Adviser to the Secretary-General. Meanwhile, Hammarskjold’s chief adviser on African affairs, Heinz Wieschoff, served as a go-between for Hammarskjold and Brussels. Acting as Linner’s opposite number and point man in New York was, Sir Alexander MacFarquhar—officially the Special Adviser on Civil Affairs in the Congo. MacFarquhar was a British national but had been working with the UN Secretariat as a Technical Assistance Board Representative. He, therefore, claimed he could sympathize with the task set before Linner in the Congo.

As the personnel for the Civilian Operation in the Congo coalesced so did its rationale. Weighing in on the nature and scope of the nascent Civilian Mission was Henry S. Bloch, former deputy director of the financial branch of the UN who in 1944 co-authored, *Economics of Military Occupations: Selected Problems*. Bloch sent Hammarskjold a report on 20 July that urged the Secretary-General that while the UN could build short-term technical assistance aid around its military establishment, he should not delay in developing a

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437 Cable from Bunche to Hammarskjold, 16 July 1960, NSL, Hammarskjold Papers, L179:145.
439 Dayal, 23-34.
441 Letter from MacFarquhar to Linner, 31 July 1961, UNARMS, S-075200290002.
strong, comprehensive and separate civilian aid component to the UN presence in the Congo. Bloch recognized the uniqueness of the technical aid mission that lay ahead noting, ‘[n]ormally we plan for a developing economy. In Congo we must plan for a declining economy on a “stop loss” basis until, we hope, ascendency can resume.’ Therefore, the UN needed reconnaissance to determine the scope and character of services rendered but Bloch already recognized acute needs in transportation, health, food, public administration and unemployment. Still Bloch remained hopeful, arguing, ‘[r]apid action can save the patrimony of the state provided that technical help is injected with a proper order of priorities.’ This included a ‘crash programme’ which was adviser-light and manager-heavy since, as Bloch warned, the entire program would fail if UN actions resulted in resentment among the Congolese population—a portent of things to come.443 Overall, Bloch’s report highlighted the seriousness with which the UN Secretariat treated the Civilian Operation in the Congo from the outset. It also served as an important conceptual and practical model for the development of the UN Civilian Mission.

Yet for all its insights, Bloch’s recommendations seemed not to take into account certain political factors that Hammarskjold was simultaneously considering with regard to aid—one of the first indications that the UN was quickly realizing development aid theories did not always account for local realities. Hammarskjold voiced his concerns to Henry Cabot Lodge in a candid conversation on 18 July. Hammarskjold’s concern was that Congo’s—and specifically Lumumba’s—request for aid had not only gone out to the UN but was sent out in all directions.444 The Secretary-General’s preference was that the UN should move in with aid exclusivity, lest the Soviets offer their technicians unilaterally. However, Hammarskjold seemed aware of the danger in this approach since the UN would be administering aid to a

444 In fact, the Congolese government appealed to the US for 3,000 troops on 12 July. It made a similar request to Ghana the following day. See, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Herter and Secretary-General Hammarskjold, 12 July 1960, in *FRUS*, 1958-1960, Volume XIV, No. 118; Kanza, 142.
country with only the semblance of a civil administration in place, opening the Organization up to criticisms of ‘disguised imperialism’. To combat these charges Hammarskjöld hoped to rely heavily on aid from African states, channeled through the UN. Finally, Lodge noted Hammarskjöld did not seem daunted by the task ahead but ‘intrigued by the creative role thrust upon him.’

In another early indication of how events on the ground challenged development aid envisioned by Hammarskjöld, Prime Minister Lumumba, back in Leopoldville, issued an ultimatum to Bunche on 18 July. It stated that if the UN could not expel all Belgian forces within forty-eight hours the Congo would appeal for help elsewhere, specifically the USSR. According to F.T. Liu, Bunche’s Special Assistant in the Congo, the two also split over who had ultimate command over the growing number of UN forces entering the Congo—the UN or Lumumba himself, who also held the position of Defense Minister. Besides foreshadowing future hostilities between Lumumba and Hammarskjöld, one should view the urgency displayed by Lumumba in light of Katanga’s secession and the Prime Minister’s desire to secure his own position by handling the situation with the utmost speed. Undeterred, and seemingly unsatisfied with an additional Security Council resolution passed on 22 July, which marginally clarified the Security Council resolution from 14 July, Lumumba announced he would travel to North America to seek further assistance. This meant, for the time being, the UN’s effort to maximize its civilian aid effort would have to wait.

**Rummaging for More Aid: Lumumba in North America**

Linner described Lumumba’s appeal for aid during the Prime Minister’s trips to New York, Washington, and Ottawa, followed by visits to Tunisia, Morocco, Guinea, Ghana,
Liberia and Togo as ‘doing one about face after another.’

In fact, Lumumba’s aid sojourn—lasting from 24 July to 1 August 1960—underlines the political complications that accompanied the UN’s effort to stabilize aid to the Congo. Lumumba’s first stop was New York, where at a press conference he again expressed his desire to dictate the terms and length of the UN’s involvement in the Congo.

Lumumba then met with Hammarskjold on three separate occasions from 24-26 July. Despite fears to the contrary, the talks went well and the two managed to reach a preliminary understanding on the nature of UN civilian aid while prioritizing needs relating to communication and transport facilities, health services, schools and finances. Crucially, Lumumba agreed on the creation of a so-called ‘shadow cabinet’ made up of top UN advisors specifically in the financial, judiciary, health, education, agriculture and public security fields. The group would then advise Linner on further needs and recommend personnel to work directly in the various Congolese ministries.

Although UN and Congolese officials would work out the exact parameters regarding UN aid to the Congo later in Leopoldville, the initial understanding seemed to have solidified the UN as the primary, if not exclusive, aid agent in the Congo. The meeting also represented the high-point in the Hammarskjold-Lumumba relationship. From New York, Hammarskjold headed to the Congo, with a stopover in Brussels, while Lumumba traveled to Washington hoping for a parlay with President Eisenhower.

Views of the Congolese Prime Minister among the Eisenhower Administration varied. Lodge, after meeting Lumumba in New York, reported to Secretary of State Christian Herter

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450 Memorandum of Conversation between Henry Labouisse of the UN Secretariat and Woodruff Wallner, US Acting Assistant Secretary of International Organizations, 28 July 1960, NARA II, RG 59/150/71/26/6, Entry 3039D, Office of International Administration Records Relating to the Congo, Box 1.
that Lumumba might be, ‘a little flighty and erratic but knows what he’s doing.’

Meanwhile CIA Director, Allen Dulles, had just days earlier labeled Lumumba as ‘a Castro or worse.’ In either case, there was apparently no interest in letting Lumumba meet with Eisenhower and instead Herter ran interference for the Administration. The two met on 27 July where Lumumba sought a separate aid deal with the US. Herter rebuffed Lumumba, affirming the US policy, agreed to at the highest level, that it would channel all its aid efforts through the UN. Specifically, Washington recognized the danger in sanctioning ad hoc responses to the civilian aid effort in the Congo that would create space for Communist infiltration, thus transforming the Congo’s rehabilitation into a Cold War competition. Using the UN as the exclusive flagship agency for aid would also permit the US and other Western powers to work with the UN, instead of the Congo government directly. Thus, the Administration sought to avoid a scenario in which the Congo might try to leverage the West off the East, and vice-versa, over bilateral aid packages. An intelligence briefing from 10 August recognized the advantages mentioned above and additionally noted the value and efficiency of centralizing the aid effort to the Congo through the UN that could then tap into its worldwide resources. However, the report foresaw difficulties arising from UN aid exclusivity if Belgian technicians decided to return to the Congo unilaterally, if the US wanted to provide bilateral aid at some future date or if other international organizations desired to administer assistance. The State Department too urged caution, recognizing that the Congolese seemed aware of any limitations on their sovereignty, real or imagined, that might create a sense that any exclusive aid arrangement might lead to the Congo feeling

451 Telephone Conversation between Lodge and Herter, 26 July 1960, DDEL, Herter Papers, Box 13.
454 Intelligence Briefing Notes, 10 August 1960, DDEL, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject Series, Alphabetical Series, Box 14.
treated as a UN Trust Territory. In fact, the fear of disguised imperialism was an underlying issue the Congo government, the UN Secretariat and the US government all seemed to detect.\textsuperscript{455}

Additionally, the State Department had learned from the Guinean Ambassador that if Lumumba came back from his North American trip empty-handed, he was likely to accept Soviet aid.\textsuperscript{456} To hedge its bets, it proposed flooding the UN Civilian Operation to the Congo with Americans, Belgians or other allies as they worked in close cooperation with the various Congolese ministries. The proposal recommended using at least 200-300 US personnel as part of the US contingent within the UN. What the US should not permit was ‘an undue reliance on Bloc personnel. In effect, in any operation where Bloc personnel participate there should be US or allied persons involved in such a way as to inhibit the Bloc presence.’\textsuperscript{457} In reality, neither the US or its allies were able to dominate the UN Civilian Mission as later statistics reveal, due in part to the UN Secretariat’s insistence on using personnel from member states within the Afro-Asia group at the UN. It also severely minimized the use of Communist bloc personnel in the months ahead. Meanwhile, Lumumba also came up empty-handed after making appeals for aid to the World Bank and then Ottawa, both forewarned by Herter that the Congolese Prime Minister was trying to play the West off against the Soviets as he went shopping for aid.\textsuperscript{458} Therefore, Lumumba left North America, not empty handed, but with a message reinforcing the position that all aid, at least for now, would be channeled through the UN.

**Formalizing the UN-Congo Civilian Aid Contract, 11 August 1960**

\textsuperscript{456} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{457} Pre-empting Key Positions in Technical Assistance to the Congo Within a UN Framework, 29 July 1960, NARA II, RG 59/150/71/26/6, Entry 3039D Office of International Administration Records Relating to the Congo, Box 1.
\textsuperscript{458} Telephone Conversation Between Herter and President of the World Bank, Eugene Black, 28 July 1960, DDEL, Herter Papers, Box 13; Telephone Conversation Between Herter and the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Howard Green, 28 July, DDEL, Herter Papers, Box 13.
On 11 August, the UN and the Congolese government agreed on a formalized civilian aid package. The accord, although not specifically disallowing other entities from providing aid, revealed just how ubiquitous the UN civilian presence would be in the Congo and how unprecedented the control the UN headquarters would have over administering aid provided by the larger UN community—namely the Specialized Agencies. Finally, the agreement showed that the need for law and security, although important, did not trump all other Congolese needs. In describing the Civilian Mission and its role in providing development aid going forward, Hammarskjold asserted that it must ‘go beyond the time-honoured forms of technical assistance in order to do what is necessary, but it has to do it in forms which do not in any way infringe upon the sovereignty of the country or hamper the speedy development of the national administration.’\footnote{Memorandum by the Secretary-General on the organization of the United Nations Civilian Operation in the Republic of Congo, 11 August 1960, ODS, (S/4417 Add.5), 2.} In other words, in theory the UN was to provide maximum assistance while giving a minimum impression of domination or take-over—a tall task in the weeks and months ahead.\footnote{Urquhart, \textit{Hammarskjold}, 402.}

The aid formula approved by the Congo on 11 August, and in part already implemented, delineated two types of civilian aid. The first was traditional technical assistance as described in Chapter One, in which experts advised the national government just as they would in any other newly independent underdeveloped country where the UN operated. The second type of aid included activities where experts would have much higher administrative responsibilities—a new method of aid so far untried by the UN. The \textit{Loi Fondamentale}, the Congolese constitution, implied that a Belgian adviser would assist each new Congolese minister in managing the functions of his office. With the Belgian civil servants having fled the country, UN advisers would officially take on this responsibility. These senior experts, or ‘shadow cabinet’, were responsible for aid operations in various fields and together formed the aforementioned Consultative Group chaired by Sture Linner.
Linner’s rank and authority matched that of the Supreme Commander of the United Nations military force in the Congo—General Carl von Horn.461

Lastly, a critical component of the Civilian Operation were the UN Specialized Agencies.462 As indicated in early chapters, the UN Specialized Agencies all coveted their functional autonomy from the UN headquarters. In this case, Hammarskjold was careful to state publicly that the UN would not interfere with the administrative sovereignty of the Specialized Agencies, yet insisted on far greater consultation and coordination with the ONUC in the midst of unique circumstances. Therefore, in the Congo each representative of a Specialized Agency served in a corresponding role with Linner’s Consultative Group that ultimately answered to Hammarskjold.463

Hammarskjold seemed to have the backing of Washington on this matter as well. Earlier in July, Dr. M.G. Candau, Director-General of the WHO appealed to US Surgeon General Dr. Leroy Burney for $1 million to kick-start a special aid program in the Congo. The Administration reluctantly decided to inform Dr. Candau that it preferred the Secretary-General to handle the financing and coordinating of Congo aid who would apportion funding to the Specialized Agencies as needed. Again, the US worried that uncoordinated aid efforts might encourage the Soviets to send aid not channeled through the UN.464 Thus, as the civilian aid structure to the Congo coalesced, Hammarskjold formally reigned-in the normally autonomous Specialized Agencies. To reinforce its centralized structure, the ONUC ran its entire operation, military and civilian, out of a converted hotel, Le Royal, in what became a

461 See Appendix I on page 251 of the thesis for a chart on the organizational structure of the ONUC.
462 The second Security Council resolution on the Congo, passed on 22 July and was meant to clarify the first, it also included a clause inviting, ‘the specialized agencies of the United Nations to render to the Secretary-General such assistance as he may require.’ See, Resolution Adopted by the Security Council at its 879th Meeting, 22 July 1960, ODS, (S/4405).
464 Memorandum of Conversation, 28 July 1960, NARA II, RG 59/150/71/26/6, Entry 3039D Office of International Administration Records Relating to the Congo, Box 1.
miniature UN headquarters. In fact, it was the first time all the Specialized Agencies contributed to a UN operation under one flag.465

**Shaping the UN Civilian Mission: ‘Administrative Disneyland’, August 1960**

The day following the UN-Congolese civilian aid agreement, MacFarquhar suggested to Linner that his first “shopping list” might well contain some “impact” items, asking if the Civilian Chief could ‘use some American fellowships, some Canadians miners or some Russian transportation or tractors?’.466 The somewhat light-hearted cable veiled the coming turbulence but it did allow Linner to expound on his vision for UN civilian aid going forward. The Civilian Chief, who balked at selecting any items from the ‘shopping list’, believed that initially Congo’s emergency needs should be the focus of the Civilian Mission before it started on any long-term development schemes. Of central concern for Linner was forming a competent Consultative Group of ten to twelve international experts in each specific field who could establish channels with Congolese ministers. In a practical sense this involved members of the Consultative Group approaching various ministries and offering to help restore functionality in the various branches of the Congolese government. This proved difficult early on since some Congolese ministries lacked a central authority. In other words, the shadow government were without an in-the-flesh equivalent.467 Linner cabled MacFarquhar, ‘[w]e must, I am afraid, be prepared for many surprises: the cabinet members have simply not even the faintest idea of administration (and how could they have?). This in combination with the continuous political maneuvering in the Government and with the dichotomy at the very top makes this an administrative Disneyland. But we have at least arrived at something like organized confusion.’

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465 Dayal, 22-24, 50.
466 Cable from MacFarquhar to Linner, 12 August 1960, UNARMS, Folder S-075200290002. Linner turn down the American fellowships for risk of the Russians wanting the same privilege. He also balked on the Russian tractors and transport vehicles, informing MacFarquhar that the Congo was in far greater need of skilled workers to operate existing equipment. Cable from Linner to MacFarquhar, 16 August 1960, UNARMS, Folder S-075200300012.
467 Linner and Astrom, 24-24; Hoskyns, 184.
Working alongside Linner to try to make certain the Congolese would not regard the UN as an inheritor of Belgian colonialism was the Consultative Group expert in Public Administration, Robert Gardiner. Gardiner was a Ghanaian economist who was presently serving as Deputy Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa. Linner realized immediately how important it was to have an African working on this delicate form of aid. As argued in previous chapters, technical assistance in public administration was one area in which UN officials like Hammarskjold and Keenleyside believed the UN approach offered a unique level of sensitivity compared to bilateral options. Gardiner’s first task was to make a survey of all the government ministries in the Congo to determine their structure and salary scales in the hopes to fill vacant posts. Unfortunately, as later evidence will show, for the Civilian ONUC the nature of an amusement park-like administration meant some UN experts had to run the show while functioning as the de facto government, opening up claims that the ONUC was partaking in disguised colonialism.

The second major task of Linner and the Consultative Group was to form ‘field teams’ to engage in reconnaissance, initiate studies and administer emergency aid. In the field of education, the Acting Director-General of UNESCO visited Leopoldville from 13-19 August, met with the Minister of Education, Pierre Mulele and shockingly learned that the Congo required an estimated 1,500 teachers for the upcoming school year. From the start, health related aid remained the domain of the WHO and the International Red Cross, which by the end August deployed numerous medical teams across the Congo from eighteen countries. Surveys were underway to gauge the general public health situation. They

468 Cable from Linner to MacFarquhar, 16 August 1960, UNARMS, Folder S-075200300012.
469 Cable from Linner to MacFarquhar, 6 September 1960, UNARMS, Folder S-075200300012.
discovered that among other needs, the Congo required experienced pharmacists to staff the medical depot stores in the capital.471

Agricultural related aid was slower in its implementation. The FAO Director-General, B.R. Sen delayed in sending large numbers of agricultural technicians, desiring to wait until the political situation stabilized.472 Meanwhile, although a preliminary survey by the FAO revealed that food supplies in Congo were sufficient to meet the present demand, the Congolese Minister of Agriculture, Joseph Lutula, was not so optimistic. He approached Linner in early September pleading for UN assistance. He told Linner, ‘I don’t want to sign any paper that has not been approved by one of your men—frankly I feel incompetent and insecure.’473

Additionally, finance related aid remained a high priority for the Civilian Mission in the early months of the crisis. Swiss banker, Victor Umbricht, aided by the aforementioned Robert West, initiated studies on the various financial problems facing the Congo. Their initial focus was on the reorganization of the central banking system.474 West, in particular, lamented that in the financial field virtually everything required further attention. He especially blamed the Congolese leaders who failed to recognize the intricate structure of their economy, ‘capable of undergoing a severe financial crisis of modern description’, unlike most other African states.475

As for activities outside the capital Leopoldville, Linner recommended to the central government to send a commission to the provinces of Kasai, Kivu, the Orientale and Equateur which subsequently led to the establishment of permanent representatives placed in

471 Progress Report No. 1, 24 August 1960, ODS, (ST/ONUC/PR.1), 22-25; Cable from Linner to MacFarquhar, 6 September 1960, UNARMS Folder S-021700310003.
472 Memorandum of Conversation, 6 September 1960, NARA II, RG 59, 1960-1963 Central Decimal File, From 398.03-FAO/5-3160, Box 761.
473 Progress Report No. 1, 24 August 1960, ODS, (ST/ONUC/PR.1), 4-5; Cable from Linner to MacFarquhar, 4 September 1960, UNARMS, Folder S-075200300012.
each provincial capital that were directly linked to the Civilian Operation.\textsuperscript{476} Linner intended for these UN officials to advise the provincial leaders on economics, agriculture, health, etc., while treading lightly on political matters since, ‘no country likes the idea of having foreign political officers work in their midst, and the hypersensitive and ultra-chauvinistic Congolese least of all.’ In fact, the closer these advisers and the Civilian Operation worked together the better, since Linner believed his area of the overall ONUC mission represented, ‘the really constructive part of our activities’ with the longest ranging impact.\textsuperscript{477}

Linner’s show of confidence was reflective of a blossoming Civilian Mission of an unprecedented scale. In addition to the aid categories discussed above, the Mission pushed forward in other fields such as transportation, civil aviation, telecommunications, meteorology, postal services and labor. By mid-September, the ONUC civilian personnel totaled 144 individuals from 24 countries. As an indication of the effort to keep Cold War elements out of the conflict, 94 of the 114 civilian aid workers came from 15 non-NATO countries. French, Haitian, Swiss and Tunisians, along with Swedes, made up over 60% of the civilian staff, no doubt due in part to their native French language skills (with the exception of the Swedes). Six Americans served, meanwhile one sole civilian aid worker came from the Communist bloc, a Czechoslovakian.\textsuperscript{478} These and later statistics call into question the description of scholars like Elizabeth Schmidt who describe the UN Congo operation, and even the UN’s civilian mission as ‘largely an American affair.’\textsuperscript{479}

To educate this motley crew on what had been a relatively isolated Belgian colony, Linner ordered ten copies of a Congo tourism book for distribution among his staff.\textsuperscript{480} To promote their work he swiftly published and disseminated throughout the Congo a twenty-

\textsuperscript{476} Cable from Linner to MacFarquhar, 16 August 1960, UNARMS, Folder S-075200300012.
\textsuperscript{477} Cable from Linner to MacFarquhar, 4 September 1960, UNARMS, Folder S-075200300012.
\textsuperscript{478} Progress Report No. 3, 19 September 1960, ODS, (ST/ONUC/PR.3), Annex I and Appendix I.
\textsuperscript{479} See, Schmidt, 61.
\textsuperscript{480} Cable from Linner to MacFarquhar, 20 September 1960, UNARMS, Folder S-021700310004.
two page booklet with text and illustrations on the early efforts of the civilian operation. Meanwhile, ONUC sent copies of Linner’s bi-monthly reports to NGOs and the UN Information Centers for worldwide distribution. Finally, these ‘round-ups’ made their way back in New York where Hammarskjold referenced them repeatedly in Security Council debates.

**The Hammarskjold-Lumumba Split**

With the UN Civilian Operation to the Congo just underway political and security related elements of the Congo quagmire simultaneously arose establishing a precedent whereby these factors often stunted and undermined advancements in the civilian aid arena. In this case, a day after the civilian aid agreement, the Congolese government and in particular Lumumba, took issue with Hammarskjold’s trip to the secessionist province of Katanga. Escorting a contingent of 240 Swedish troops serving under UN auspices and acting on a third Security Council resolution from 9 August, Hammarskjold landed in the provincial capital Elizabethville on 12 August. Hammarskjold meant the gesture as a preliminary step to encourage the withdrawal of Belgian troops and specifically did not intend to be a party in or influence the outcome of the secessionist conflict. Lumumba and several others in the government resented the fact that Hammarskjold acted without consulting any Congolese authorities and despised the fact that the Secretary-General was taking an impartial stance in the Congolese civil war. Lumumba responded by canceling a meeting with Hammarskjold in Leopoldville on 15 August. At a later press conference, he accused Hammarskjold of illegally impersonating the central government by holding talks with the secessionist president of Katanga, Moise Tshombe, while ignoring what Lumumba saw as a conspiracy.

481 Cable from Linner to MacFarquhar, 24 September 1960, UNARMS, Folder S-075200300012.
482 Cable from MacFarquhar to Linner, 6 October 1960, UNARMS, Folder S-075200290002; Cable from MacFarquhar to Linner, 28 August 1960, UNARMS, Folder S-075200290002.
483 Kalb, 43-44, 47-48.
484 Cordier and Foote, eds., Volume V, 97-98.
between the Belgians and Tshombe. Moreover, Lumumba presaged his growing aversion to the UN in a 9 August press conference, two days prior to signing the aid deal with the UN, when he railed against those who said the Congolese were incapable of self-governance and deserving of a UN ‘guardianship-status’ for another fifteen years. He instead called for ‘radical Africanization’ and announced his government would secure aid from wherever it wished. Incensed, Hammarskjold returned to New York where he, according to Kanza, ‘swayed opinion strongly against Lumumba and his government.’

Following the split with Hammarskjold, Lumumba’s next move was to declare a state of emergency and appeal directly to Premier Khrushchev on 15 August for transport planes, trucks and weapons. As Moscow investigated the logistics of making good on Lumumba’s request, it also formulated a statement in opposition to the UN Civilian Operation. Scholars have made much of the split between the Soviet Union and Hammarskjold during the fall of 1960 in the context of the General Assembly debate, but so far the literature neglects Soviet disillusionment with UN civilian aid efforts and how this was used as another means to attack the Secretary-General specifically and ONUC generally. On 20 August, V.V. Kuznetsov, the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, visited Hammarskjold and announced the USSR found the 12 August agreement between the UN and the Congolese, ‘completely inadmissible’. He charged the Consultative Group with subverting the central government while relegating the Congo to the position of a Trust Territory in violation of the UN Charter. He also claimed the shadow cabinet, likely to be Americans or other Westerners, ‘will possess authorities of ministers and fix the policy of the Congo for the future and the trend of the country’s development.’ Kuznetsov lamented the lack of a single expert from the Eastern European countries among the 65 postings while 21 experts came from the US or its global

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485 Kanza, 265-66.
487 Kanza, 266.
488 Kalb, 56.
allies. Finally, according to Kuznetsov, a vast majority of the 28 advisers from Africa to the Congo held second-rate posts, altogether resulting in ‘a new form of colonial enslavement of the Congolese people under the disguise of the UN flag.’

The growing disillusionment with the UN among the Soviets and Lumumba led to a fourth Security Council meeting regard the Congo Crisis. There Hammarskjold, in response to some of the accusations from the Soviet and Lumumba camps, announced his interest in setting up an ‘Advisory Committee’ made up of countries contributing security and peacekeeping personnel to ONUC. However, although admitting the geographic distribution of the civilian activities were not entirely satisfactory, Hammarskjold rebuffed accusations that the Civilian Operation was intentionally biased in its personnel selection, finding it difficult to find technical experts fluent in French and at least proficient in English from the Eastern bloc. Citing a report he received just that day, he remarked that from all accounts the central government of the Congo welcomed the cooperation with UN advisers.

Despite his effort to deflect and stamp out his critics, the conclusion of the Security Council meeting brought more ire for Hammarskjold. Joining Lumumba and the Soviets in criticizing the Secretary-General were the Congo’s Deputy Prime Minister Antoine Gizenga and its UN Ambassador, Thomas Kanza. Gizenga stated, ‘[i]n all conscience, the government of the Republic of the Congo and the Congolese people cannot agree to being handed over to neo-colonialism in this way.’ For his part, Kanza recounts how his government took exception to a comment made by Hammarskjold during the opening the Security Council session on 21 August. Hammarskjold’s statement that the UN could help in, ‘the construction of the state and the laying of foundations for a balanced political, economic and social life for the people’ created a double-standard and smelled of colonialism according to Kanza. For the

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UN Ambassador, it appeared as if the UN was apparently not willing to aid the Congolese government in an impending civil war with Katanga, yet still wanted to show the way with regard to the Congo’s political, economic and social future.  

Meanwhile, back in the Congo, Lumumba’s declaration of a state of emergency coincided with renewed attacks on Westerners by mid-August that mimicked those of early July. The ANC arrested whites in the streets of Leopoldville not holding UN papers, creating a black market for UN armbands. Even so, other reports confirmed UN personnel did not escape persecution. Linner even remembers protesters outside his hotel chanting, ‘Bunche for lunch, and Linner for dinner!’ For the Civilian Operation in the Congo it all meant the UN would have to tread lightly as political and security issues engulfed the crisis. Just how did Hammarskjold and the UN operation in the Congo survive this early test? In short, Hammarskjold and the ONUC still had the backing of several key players. First, Mongi Slim of Tunisia and Sir Claude Corea of Ceylon, representing Africa and Asia respectively on the Security Council, were nearly unwavering in support of Hammarskjold and the UN mission, fashioning all the previous draft resolutions on the Congo so far passed by the Council.

Secondly, the aforementioned Advisory Committee did quickly form, made up of nearly all African or Asian representatives (plus some from Canada and Ireland). According to Urquhart, from its inception the Committee was reliable, confidential, consensus forming and a great asset for Hammarskjold. Finally, the US remained a stalwart supporter of the UN. A National Security Council report from 18 August concluded the US needed the UN in the

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492 Cable from Linner to MacFarquhar, 16 August 1960, UNARMS, Folder S-075200300012.
493 Transcript of Interview with Sture Linner, 8 November 1990, UN Oral History Collection, 13.
494 Cordier and Foote, eds., Volume V, 121.
495 Urquhart, Hammarskjold, 437. According to Hammarskjold, the Advisory Committee could form without a Security Council resolution since its establishment fell within the mandate of previous resolutions.
Congo despite opposition from its Prime Minister. Herter told Hammarskjold on 10 September that the US was behind him ‘1000%’. Still, many uncertainties remained. For one, the Soviets did manage to intervene bilaterally per Lumumba’s request in early September with transport planes, trucks and some technicians. Next, Lumumba continued to grumble about the fact that all aid, less the relatively modest amount from the Eastern bloc, came through the UN. Moreover, Lumumba now refused to talk with Bunche who the UN replaced temporarily on 30 August with Hammarskjold’s Special Assistant, Andrew Cordier. Hammarskjold meant for Cordier to serve until the new Congo Special Representative, Rajeshwar Dayal, arrived on 8 September.

Impediments to Civilian Aid: The Constitutional Crisis, Belgian Aid & Soviet Opposition, August-October 1960

In the midst of these developments, new political and financial questions challenged the mission, as did unilateral Belgian aid offers and finally acute opposition to the UN mission from the Soviet Union. First, however, a constitutional crisis within the Republic of the Congo fractured the central government, thus further complicating the UN’s aid efforts in public administration. The constitutional crisis started with a coup initiated on 5 September when Congolese President Joseph Kasavubu publicly announced Lumumba’s dismissal and the Prime Minister returned the favor. According to Linner’s oral testimony, Kasavubu approached him just days earlier and asked, as a matter of curiosity, how does one make a coup d’état? Linner, believing Kasavubu was joking, answered that one only needs to avoid

497 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between Secretary of State Herter and Secretary-General Hammarskjold, 10 September 1960, in FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XIV, No. 208.
498 Urquhart, Hammarskjold, 441; Kanza, 282.
499 Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State, 10 September 1960, in FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XIV, No. 207.
500 Cordier and Foote, eds., Volume V, 152-53.
violence, take over the radio station and treat the deposed leader well.\textsuperscript{501} Linner’s accidental, yet strangely coincidental advice aside, most historians have rightly focused on the part played by Andrew Cordier, Bunche’s replacement during the first week in September. Historians Carole J.L. Collins and David N. Gibbs are highly critical of Cordier in particular, who they claimed made a number of strategic administrative decisions that aided in propping up Kasavubu at the expense of Lumumba.\textsuperscript{502}

One other UN civilian official seems to have perhaps compromised his status as an impartial international civil servant during this same chaotic episode. The controversy surrounds the activities of Jean David, a Haitian, brought on-board as Linner’s assistant after Lumumba complained to Hammarskjöld, while in New York, of too many Europeans in top advisory roles within ONUC.\textsuperscript{503} During the constitutional crisis of early September, David was highly involved in sensitive political matters between Kasavubu and Lumumba, a place where Linner believed he had no business being. The exact nature of David’s involvement is unclear from the slim archival evidence but after David continued to ‘“play it” on his own’ Linner sent David away on a tour of the provinces to remove him from the temptation to ‘play politics’, later changing his posting entirely.\textsuperscript{504}

The fallout from the coup had perhaps even more of an impact on UN efforts to establish an advisory role with various Congolese Ministers. In an effort to neutralize both Kasavubu and Lumumba, their rival cabinets and Parliament, the Chief of Staff of the Congolese Army, Colonel Joseph Mobutu, initiated a successful coup of his own on 14 September. According to Mobutu, his actions were necessary to allow room for political reconciliation. Left without an effective government, Mobutu sought Linner’s advice on how

\textsuperscript{501} Transcript of Interview with Sture Linner, 8 November 1990, United Nations Oral History Collection, 22. 
\textsuperscript{503} Hoskyns, 156. 
\textsuperscript{504} Cable from Linner to MacFarquhar, 24 September 1960, UNARMS, Folder S-075200300012; Cable from Linner to MacFarquhar, 11 November 1960, UNARMS, Folder S-075200300012. One can also infer from Linner’s comment on David that the Haitian might have been trying to elevate his own role in the Congo in anticipation of a future run at the Haitian presidency.
to run the country. Linner rebuffed any thoughts of the UN doing any more than it already was administratively and instead suggested Mobutu seek out young educated Congolese, already in short demand, who might be able to run the government at least temporarily—more advice he would soon regret giving. Linner reasoned these individuals might be less concerned with holding onto power or not as connected to tribal conflicts. Kasavubu, who had fared better than Lumumba in the constitutional mayhem of early-September, officially installed Mobutu’s ‘College of Commissioners’ on 29 September. With Mobutu’s backing, the College used the police to take possession of administrative buildings in Leopoldville while asking any seasoned politicians that remained to vacate their posts.

Despite his advice, Linner doubted the College’s authority and impartiality from the start. The major issue he had was that the College was in fact mostly made up of Congolese students from Lovanium University—the largest of two universities in the Congo. Although it included some of the Congo’s brightest young minds, most within the College of Commissioners lacked administrative experience and thus turned to their former or even current Belgian professors, in Brussels or Lovanium, as policy advisers. Moreover, Linner believed the return of any Belgians should only take place circumspectly, not *en masse*. Thus, he bemoaned these developments since they might open the UN up to criticism of helping to re-instate the old colonial regime—especially if Lumumba regained power. Overall, Linner believed the relentless political crises considerably hampered the task of developing an independent and Africanized public administration in the Congo.

The use of Belgian advisors by the College was indicative of yet another crisis—namely between the Belgians and the UN over aid to the Congo. As early as 28 July, just weeks after thousands of Belgians fled the Congo, the Belgian Ambassador to the US, Louis Scheyven, informed Herter that his government had just ordered many Belgian civil servants

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505 Transcript of Interview with Sture Linner, 8 November 1990, United Nations Oral History Collection, 24.
506 Hoskyns, 238-39.
507 Cable from Linner to MacFarquhar, 24 September 1960, UNARMS, Folder S-075200300012.
back to their Congo posts, noting the futility of trying to replace all technicians with UN personnel.\textsuperscript{508} Even some within the Congolese government, including Justin Bomboko, the Foreign Minister, and Ambassador Kanza, also recognized the need for Belgian aid.\textsuperscript{509} Claude Carbonnelle, the Belgian Secretary for Economic and Financial Affairs of the Congo before independence, and briefly the Director of the Belgian Economic Aid Mission to the Congo after independence, ultimately saw the Congo’s lack of qualified personnel as its most pressing crisis. According to Carbonnelle the UN could not expect to fill all the gaps, whereas, ‘Belgium alone can furnish in a sufficient quantity the personnel acquainted with the languages and the local problems.’ Carbonnelle asserted these ‘veterans of good will’ should return, ‘to collaborate in the exalted task of the creation of a new country’, possibly under the charge of the UN to head off any charges of re-colonization.\textsuperscript{510}

By late August, Linner was receiving requests from Belgium for updates on security conditions and UN financial guarantees offered to Belgian teachers returning to the Congo.\textsuperscript{511} The problem for the UN, and for many in the international community was that Belgian aid, especially to Katanga, was in fact unilateral and had not conformed to the General Assembly resolution from 20 September which Hammarskjold believed gave the UN aid exclusivity. Hammarskjold reminded the Belgian UN representative of this fact on 8 October. In a strongly worded message, he asked the Belgian government to withdraw its military, para-military or civil personnel, which were all contributing to the continuing tensions and setting a precedent for the allowance of other unilateral aid. Instead, Hammarskjold urged the

\textsuperscript{508} Memorandum of Conversation, 28 July 1960, in \textit{FRUS}, 1958-1960, Volume XIV, No. 153. No doubt, the Belgians wanted to protect their huge financial investment in the Congo—particularly in Katanga. Moreover, Belgium could not come close to absorbing those workers who had fled the Congo in early July into its own workforce.


\textsuperscript{510} From the US Embassy in Brussels to the Department of State, 9 September 1960, NARA II, RG 59/250/4/21/5-6, Central Decimal Files 1960-1963, Box 2722.

\textsuperscript{511} Cable from Linner to MacFarquhar, 26 August 1960, UNARMS, Folder S-021700310003.
Belgians to channel all their aid to the Congo through the UN.\(^{512}\) On 19 October, Hammarskjold again wrote to Brussels to complain about a recruiting agency set up in the Belgian capital whose goal was to increase the number of Belgian officials taking up posts as advisers within Mobutu’s College of Commissioners.\(^{513}\) In fact, as Hoskyns notes, ‘an atmosphere of mutual hostility developed between these Belgians and their opposite numbers in the United Nations Civilian Operations.’\(^{514}\)

The Belgian response to Hammarskjold was defiant. The Belgian representative to the UN argued that the UN had no legal basis for removing the Belgians since such an act would interfere with Congo’s domestic affairs. Moreover, two-hundred or so UN civilian experts could hardly be expected to fill all the gaps in aid and any further Belgian withdrawal would surely ruin an already fragile state.\(^{515}\) Tshombe echoed the Belgian stance informing Hammarskjold that any departure of Europeans from Katanga, as a result of UN entry into the province, would cripple his ‘country’ much like it had the rest of the Congo.\(^{516}\) In reality, Hammarskjold privately acknowledged the need for Belgian technicians to remain in Katanga not least because *Union Minière*, the gigantic Belgian mining company operating in Katanga, threatened to shut down if the UN forced the Belgians out. Elsewhere in the Congo, Hammarskjold deemed the remaining or returning Belgian presence unavoidable so long as they operated under the purview of the Congolese, not the Belgian, government.\(^{517}\)

Unfortunately, this meant tremendous friction between the remaining Belgian civilian technicians and aid workers, plus those invited back by the College and their UN

\(^{512}\) *Note Verbale from the Secretary-General to the Representative of Belgium in Second Progress Report to the Secretary-General from his Special Representative in the Congo*, 8 October 1960, ODS, (S/4557), 44.

\(^{513}\) *Ibid.*, 45.

\(^{514}\) Hoskyns, 239.

\(^{515}\) *Note Verbale from the Representative of Belgium Addressed to the Secretary-General in Second Progress Report to the Secretary-General from his Special Representative in the Congo*, 28 October 1960, ODS, (S/4557), 45-47.

\(^{516}\) *Telegram from Tshombe to the Secretary-General in Second Progress Report to the Secretary-General from his Special Representative in the Congo*, 27 October 1960, ODS, (S/4557), 51-52.

counterparts. Whereas, the Belgians accused the UN civilian aid workers of ineptitude, UN personnel accused the Belgians of re-imposing a colonial status on the Congolese, which according to Hoskyns halved the potential aid provided to the Congo during this period and limited most endeavors to emergency aid. Based on the current archival evidence, Hoskyns’ estimation might have been too bleak, since by October, the UN Civilian Mission was in fact engaging in substantial long-term development aid, as described below. Still the UN was having tremendous difficulties going it alone in a country five times the size of France—particularly in financing the largest aid mission in UN history.

Serious appeals to finance UN operations in the Congo, beyond that which was normally budgeted for the EPTA and the Special Fund, came soon after the second Security Council meeting solidified the UN’s presence in the Congo for the foreseeable future. For his part, Hammarskjold inquired on 4 August if the US was willing to pledge $100 million to the Congo government, via the UN, towards its reconstruction. This request also came in light of Hammarskjold’s belief that Lumumba might make good on his promise to seek Soviet assistance if the US and Canada refused. Herter balked at the figure and the logistics of getting the permission of Congress. Eventually Washington approved the figure of $5 million in late August to serve as temporary stopgap funding. The aforementioned Soviet aid, at the request of Lumumba, caused Hammarskjold to push once again for direct funding for the Civilian Operation, this time from all UN member states. In his 7 September report to the Security Council on the Congo Crisis, Hammarskjold proposed establishing a ‘UN Congo Fund’. In some ways a miniature SUNFED for the Congo. Linking the need for the Fund to the dire economic situation in the Congo, Hammarskjold argued that providing international financial assistance to the Congo, via the UN, was necessary so as not to jeopardize or make

518 Hoskyns, 299-300.
519 Telephone Conversation between Herter and Labouisse, 4 August 1960, DDEL, Herter Papers, Box 13; Letter from James Barco (Deputy Representative on the Security Council) to Henry Labouisse, 31 August 1960, NARA II, RG 59/150/71/26/6, Entry 3039D Office of International Administration Records Relating to the Congo, Box 1.
void the actions previously administered. According to Hammarskjold, large-scale financial assistance would stabilize the public administration, revitalize the business community, combat unemployment and, ‘lay the foundation for the future growth of the Congo economy.’

The Security Council met to consider Hammarskjold’s report on 9 September. As before, political developments hampered progress and the debate quickly turned towards the UN’s role in the ousting of Lumumba just days earlier. By 12 September Deputy Foreign Minister Valerian Zorin replaced Kuznetsov and began a verbal barrage by the Soviets on the role of ONUC, and the Secretary-General in particular, lasting well into 1961.

The Security Council meeting on 16 September ended with a Soviet veto of a resolution that would have established a UN Congo Fund. Under UN Charter rules, the US proposed calling an Emergency Session of the General Assembly to consider the issue. The General Assembly emergency session, the fourth in the history of the UN, met from 17-20 September. It resulted in even sharper attacks by Zorin against the Secretary-General and the UN mission.

Conversely, it also produced a vote of confidence for Hammarskjold by the majority of UN member states through the passage of a resolution, sponsored by seventeen Afro-Asian states and based on the draft resolution vetoed by the Soviet Union just days earlier in the Security Council to establish a UN Congo Fund.

Nevertheless, funding the Congo Mission hardly mitigated the drama since the Emergency General Assembly vote coincided with the start of the 15th Regular Session of the General Assembly where Khrushchev continued to malign the UN Operation in the Congo,

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520 Fourth Report by the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 7 September 1960, ODS, (S/4482); Urquhart, Hammarskjold, 441.
521 Cordier and Foote, eds., Volume V, 174-175. The Soviet turn against the ONUC and Hammarskjold also coincided with Mobutu ordering the withdrawal of all Communist diplomatic missions from the Congo by 19 September 1960. Mazov, ‘Soviet Aid to the Gizenga Government in the Former Belgian Congo (1960-61),’ 428.
523 General Assembly Resolution 1474 (ES-IV), 20 September 1960. The Afro-Asian draft resolution was adopted 70-0 with 11 abstentions. Abstaining was the France, South Africa and the Soviet bloc. Nevertheless, Hammarskjold once again appealed to UN member states two months later, this time in the General Assembly Fifth Committee, to make good on their promise to fund the ONUC. It was not until 20 December, the last day before the Assembly recessed until March, that two resolutions passed (1583 (XV) and 1590 (XV)) funding the ONUC through March 1961.
called for Hammarskjold resignation and infamously unfurled his idea for a three-headed Secretary-Generalship or troika.\textsuperscript{524} Altogether, the obstacles the UN Civilian Mission faced from late August to mid-October were mostly beyond its control. Constrained as it was, the next section highlights some of the work the Civilian Mission did manage to accomplish as it moved from emergency to development aid all the while serving as one of the major means by which the UN justified its presence and proved its worth in the Congo.

**The UN Civilian Mission: Solutions and Problems (October-December, 1960)**

Referencing a General Assembly speech made by Sekou Toure, Hammarskjold quoted the President of Guinea who had earlier stated: ‘‘Let us regard the Congo as part of the life of our human race and consider the fate reserved for millions of men, women, and children. Let there be less discussion of Mr. Lumumba, Mr. Kasavubu, Mr. Mobutu, Mr. Ileo\textsuperscript{525} and others, and let there be serious efforts to find for this problem a just solution which will serve the cause of a people who desire only well-being, peace and progress.’’\textsuperscript{526} The Secretary-General used Toure’s words to introduce a General Assembly speech of his own on 17 October 1960, not on the political turmoil encompassing Leopoldville and New York, but on the many nameless individuals working to bring to fruition the aspirations enumerated by Toure. Included in this group were those of the UN Civilian Mission to the Congo whose work so far and in the future would be of ‘decisive importance’. These individuals, according to Hammarskjold, were not there as disguised imperialists but as impartial international civil servants. Through their assistance, the essential services of the Congo continued to function, thus preventing any foreign power so far from dominating the Congo while setting it on course for true independence.\textsuperscript{527}

\textsuperscript{524} See, Gaiduk, 258.
\textsuperscript{525} Joseph Ileo was the head of the Congolese Senate and Prime Minister in place of Lumumba.
\textsuperscript{526} Statement by the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in the Congo at the End of General Debate, 17 October 1960, in Cordier and Foote eds., Volume V, 203.
\textsuperscript{527} Ibid., 202-207.
Now three months into the conflict, Hammarskjold was relying on the Civilian Operation to justify a continued UN presence and again prove its worth. Moreover, he saw it as a crucial means by which the UN could keep the Cold War out of the region and as proof for UN impartiality in the whole matter—in other words as a vital part of what the UN was trying to accomplish in the Congo. On the ground, the Civilian Operation was a blend of compartmental, yet significant, achievements coupled with general uncertainty in less than ideal conditions. Here again its worth reviewing just what the Civilian Operation accomplished while constitutional crises, military coups, UN gavel pounding and troika proposals dominated the headlines of the Congo Crisis during the fall of 1960.

According to Linner, by November, the UN was engaged in much more than just emergency action but embarking upon operational assistance, long-range planning, provincial surveying, recruitment and professional and technical training. Linner believed his Operation’s work in eleven major fields (health, education, communications, etc.) allowed the UN to engage in every aspect of Congolese life.\(^\text{528}\) He touted, in particular, progress that took place in the fields of finance and economics. To start with, the $5 million grant from the US, channeled through the UN, arrived in October temporarily alleviating Congo’s treasury void that allowed it to pay the wages of teachers, compensate other public service personnel and finance various public works projects.\(^\text{529}\) Meanwhile, the UN and the Congolese government collaborated to create a ‘Monetary Council’ responsible for overseeing the monetary policy of the Congo until the future establishment of its Central Bank. Victor Umbricht and Robert West served as the Provisional President-Manager and member of a six-man Council respectively.\(^\text{530}\) MacFarquhar expected the Council’s presence, ‘to plug some of the leaks which must be running at the moment’ and provide a semblance of fiscal

\(^{528}\) *Progress Report No. 5, Cumulative Report from mid-July to the end of October, 5 November 1960, ODS, (ST/ONUC/PR.5), 1.*

\(^{529}\) *Cable from MacFarquhar to Linner, 1 October 1960, UNARMS, S-021700310004; Progress Report No. 5, Cumulative Report from mid-July to the end of October, 5 November 1960, ODS, (ST/ONUC/PR.5), 21.*

\(^{530}\) *Progress Report No. 4, 21 September-10 October 1960, (undated), ODS, (ST/ONUC/PR.44), 14.*
responsibility necessary to secure donations to the Congo Fund.\textsuperscript{531} Then as a part of the Civilian Operation, Linner established an economic unit soon to become a formidable multipurpose team of agricultural and research economists, as well as, business marketers who conducted research and wrote policy papers for use by the Congolese government—whereas no such policy formation unit existed within the current Congo administration. Anticipating any future respite in the Congo’s political system, the unit envisioned UN experts to sit on various Congolese governmental committees, to serve as consultants and take part in policy decisions. To start with, Linner pulled personnel from the Economic Commission for Africa and the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs to work in what he later officially called the Economic Analysis and Policy Branch of the Office of Civilian Operations.\textsuperscript{532} By the end of the year, according to West, the UN was able to ‘arrest the decline in economic activity and to establish emergency administrative machinery capable of exercising control until the fundamental problems of institutional reorganization could be undertaken.’\textsuperscript{533}

Education provided its own challenges. On 3 October, the date set for the opening of the school year, only a few Catholic schools had opened. It was not until 19 October that the ONUC reached a provisional agreement with Congolese authorities on the recruitment of 500 teachers by UNESCO. The ONUC education team simultaneously undertook a study of the structure of the Ministry of Education and school system, discovering that the educational problems within the Congo ran much deeper. Ultimately, they recommended the overhaul of the whole structure, from the curriculum to the training course for Congolese teachers.\textsuperscript{534}

Moreover, UNESCO aimed to unify the Congo’s fractured education system that, under

\textsuperscript{531} Cable from MacFarquhar to Linner, 6 October 1960, UNARMS, Folder S-02530050001.

\textsuperscript{532} Cable from Linner to MacFarquhar, 26 October 1960, UNARMS, Folder S-07520030012; Cable from MacFarquhar to Linner, 22 November 1960, UNARMS, Folder S-07520029002.

\textsuperscript{533} West, ‘The United Nations and the Congo Financial Crisis: Lessons of the First Year,’ 609.

Belgian administration, had often physically segregated Congolese and European students leading to divisions in curricula and levels of education. Despite these efforts, difficulties arose in recruiting French-speaking teachers to a hostile environment in mid-fall, at the same time that the UN was hesitant to allow Belgian teachers back *en masse*. Finally, further complicating the educational landscape of the Congo was the Congolese education commissioner who looked to his Belgian counterpart for counsel more than the UN.

As for the Congo’s higher education system, the Civilian Mission was eager to utilize the resources at Lovanium University. The private catholic university had formally opened in 1954. The 600 acre campus contained residential housing, sports facilities, numerous academic departments, a hospital and even an experimental atomic reactor—the only one in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Ford and Rockefeller Foundations had been instrumental previously in developing large research programs in medical science, sociology and economics. Despite its impressive facilities, only 485 students attended Lovanium during the 1959/60 academic year, 365 of whom were Congolese or African. Altogether, the juxtaposition of the modest enrollment of Congolese students at a university with state-of-art facilities reflected the often-bizarre nature of Belgian colonialism. However, it clearly offered a real opportunity to expand higher education among the Congolese. Still, as in primary and second education, the UN encountered administrative difficulties. L.P. Gillon, Lovanium’s Director, seemed to expect ONUC to fill and finance vacant university posts that the university would have to fill regardless of the UN presence in the Congo. Gillon appeared to be an opportunist especially when a report from Linner indicated that for the 331 current students enrolled for 1960/61 there were already 120 faculty.

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536 *Hoskyns, 296-99.*
538 *Cable from MacFarquhar to Linner, 29 November 1960, UNARMS, Folder S-025300050001.*
In the health field one major regional health crisis required immediate attention during the fall of 1960. Fighting between the Balubas and Luluas tribes commenced just after the Congo’s independence, although tribal tensions had deep roots in the region’s history. The strife caused the mass exodus of the Balubas to a notoriously infertile and water-scarce area of South Kasai resulting in estimated 250,000 refugees on the verge of famine. When UNICEF, WHO and FAO teams responded, several hundred people were dying each week. By mid-December, a food distribution program had been set up and agricultural and medical units were at work. According to Dr. Candau of the WHO, health teams were ready to move past emergency medical care outside of South Kasai. Candau wrote to inform the Secretary-General on 5 September that he was now prepared to focus on long-term public health development. Dr. Candau reported on a three-year program to send some 140 Congolese medical assistants to France for schooling to become fully qualified doctors. Candau also hoped to collaborate with Lovanium University to offer related medical training courses. Finally, he hoped to recruit 400 Congolese medical and technical personnel into service. Some within the UN Civilian Operation recoiled at Candau’s $1.5 million estimated expenditures for these long-term aid measures. In this respect, the Civilian Mission encountered one of its first difficulties in justifying development aid versus emergency aid. MacFarquhar commented to Linner, ‘[i]t is comparatively simple to justify our expenditures during the emergency, but now that we are trying, with some success, to move on to much longer-term planned expenditures, they [expenditure requests] should be based on some statement of case which can, if necessary, be made public.’

Outside in South Kasai, the Civilian ONUC now viewed agriculture aid as a long-term issue. In the Kivu Province, a UN study showed that large tea and coffee plantations were still operating at near capacity while small plantations were, on the whole, abandoned.

540 Cable from MacFarquhar to Linner, 11 October 1960, UNARMS, Folder S-025300050001.
541 Cable from MacFarquhar to Linner, 23 November 1960, UNARMS, Folder S-075200290002.
However, due to the departure of so many Europeans, there were constraints of an advisory and training nature.\footnote{Progress Report No. 4, 21 September to 10 October 1960, (undated), ODS, (ST/ONUC/PR.3), 6.} Efforts undertaken by the UN and the FAO included advisory support for the Central Ministry of Agriculture during this period and those of the provinces. Training and education included the creation of an Advanced School for Training in Tropical Agronomy at Lovanium University. The UN, working in conjunction with the FAO, also made progress towards transferring the function of the \textit{Institut National pour l’Etude d’Agronomie du Congo Belge} (INEAC) into Congolese hands.\footnote{Ibid., 10-11.} Meanwhile, toward the end of 1960, Congolese officials approved plans for the reorganization of the Ministry of Agriculture.\footnote{Progress Report No. 5, Cumulative Report from mid-July to the end of October, 5 November 1960, ODS, (ST/ONUC/PR.5), 10.}

Still problems arose. Agricultural stock meant for export in Equateur and Orientale Provinces bottlenecked due to a lack of security and funds for transport.\footnote{Ibid., 10-11.} The abandonment of small plantations added to the staggering unemployment totals in the provinces that reached 23,500, including Katanga.\footnote{Ibid., 11-12.} Additionally, Linner viewed urban unemployment among the youth as a particularly serious concern at the end of 1960. He feared that the large number of those 18 years and younger, 49\% of the population of Leopoldville Province and similar figures for the other provinces, might dramatically add to the social and political disturbances if they were unable to find work. As a solution, the Civilian Operation began seven public works projects by October to absorb a portion of the Congo’s unemployed.\footnote{Progress Report No. 7, 1-31 December 1960, 5 January 1960, ODS, (ST/ONUC/PR.7), 10.}

Finally, in the field of public administration Gardiner continued to aid in the reorganization of the Congolese civil service, creating the Ministry of Public Services before
his departure.\textsuperscript{548} In November 1960, 178 officials from 16 major governmental departments started an accelerated UN training course for senior civil servants.\textsuperscript{549} At the highest levels, the Civilian Operation dealt with two main constraints. First, because of the difficulty and danger related to the work, Linner’s Consultative Group experienced a high turnover rate. By early November, there were already Consultative Group vacancies in the fields of communications and natural resources. New consultants had already replaced former ones in education, foreign trade, labor and public administration.\textsuperscript{550} Secondly, the UN continued to encounter an absentee central government or one that nearly directly opposed them. Linner complained that from the beginning he had tried, ‘to disassociate Civilian Operations from the confusion of the political situation’ yet soon realized, ‘that a scrupulous neutrality cannot create an operational basis for a technical assistance programme where a genuinely effective central government is lacking.’\textsuperscript{551} By the time Mobutu’s College of Commissioners was in place, Linner’s statement applied more to a lack of cooperation with Congolese ministries than actual vacant chairs at top ministry posts. Belgian political advisors served to complicate this issue even further and even promoted Congolese intransigence towards the end of 1960 as alluded to earlier and also discussed below.

**Aid Politics and Personalities: Dayal’s Second Progress Report**

Weighing in on this and other controversial matters was Rajeshwar Dayal, Cordier’s replacement as the head of the entire ONUC operation as of 8 September. Hammarskjold handpicked Dayal in early August, having worked with him as India’s former Permanent Representative to the UN and as a top official within UNOGIL in 1958.\textsuperscript{552} Dayal’s second official progress report to the Secretary-General, submitted on 2 November 1960, was

\textsuperscript{549} Progress Report No. 6, 1-30 November 1960, 5 December 1960, ODS, (ST/ONUC/PR.6), 19.
\textsuperscript{550} Cable from Linner to MacFarquhar, 11 November 1960, UNARMS, Folder S-075200300012.
\textsuperscript{551} Progress Report No. 5, Cumulative Report from mid-July to the end of October, 5 November 1960, ODS, (ST/ONUC/PR.5), 1.
\textsuperscript{552} Dayal, 9-10.
perhaps the most antagonistic indictment of those believed to be responsible for exacerbating the Congo Crisis from any UN official. The report offered a scathing appraisal of Mobutu and his College of Commissioners, the ANC, Kasavubu, plus Katangan authorities. However, for Dayal, Belgian actions in the Congo seemed to be the linchpin for the UN’s difficulties there. Dayal noted that based on well-informed ONUC officers, ‘it may be concluded that a gradual but purposeful return is being staged by Belgian nationals, which has assumed serious significance in view of the key areas which they have penetrated in the public life of the country and the possible effect of their activities on all aspects of ONUC’s responsibilities. All too often these developments have coincided with anti-United Nations policies or feelings at the various point of impact.’ Belgians were also, according to Dayal, adding to the intransigence of the ANC and the Katangan secession. In particular, Mobutu’s College, in essence Belgian functionaries, had delayed UN technical aid applications or inhibited its full use, spread propaganda that the UN was attempting to set up a trusteeship and questioned the need for UN aid altogether.

The fallout from the report was widespread. Kasavubu called for Dayal’s removal. Mobutu broke off diplomatic relations with the UN, claiming he believed Dayal was treating him like a child. Foreign Minister Bomboko stated he believed the Congo, or at least the ANC, was now effectively at war with the UN by early December. Dayal’s report also made the West anxious since it not so subtly advocated the return of Lumumba who had been under UN house protection since the ANC tried to arrest him on 10 October. By the end of

553 Second Progress Report to the Secretary-General from his Special Representative in the Congo, 2 November 1960, ODS, (S/4557), 19. For corroborating views from other ONUC officials see, Cable from MacFarquhar to Linner, 6 October 1960, UNARMS, Folder S-075200290002.
554 Second Progress Report to the Secretary-General from his Special Representative in the Congo, 2 November 1960, ODS, (S/4557), 17, 33. In reality, the UN was prohibited under Article 78 of the Charter from applying the Trusteeship system to a UN member state without an amendment. The Republic of the Congo joined the UN as a full member on 20 September 1960.
556 Hoskyns, 253.
November, Lumumba had escaped from UN custody only to have the ANC capture him a few days later as he fled towards Stanleyville and his base of supporters in eastern Congo. More reports of Belgian interference added to Dayal’s indignation. In mid-November, the Director of the Technical Assistance Bureau of the International Civilian Aviation Organization, or ICAO, E.R. Marlin, voiced his fear that recent ICAO personnel assignments by the UN might become redundant by the return of top-level Belgian advisers to the Congo. Similarly, MacFarquhar reported to Bunche that the return of Belgian advisers to the Ministry of Agriculture made the FAO senior consultant and entire FAO mission ‘extremely uneasy’. Linner recommended limiting the role of the Belgian advisers as much as possible so as not to encourage the departure of any of the FAO officers. Finally, ONUC had to delay its plan to support an accelerated training course for Congolese magistrates and judges due to a strong Belgian advisory presence in the Justice Commissariat and the return of Belgian magistrates and judges.

Disagreements over the influx of unilateral Belgian aid only complicated a situation where the UN was now dealing with four governments in the Congo—with none of which it was on good terms. By mid-December, two regimes claim to be Congo’s ‘central’ authority. The first was Mobutu and the College working in cooperation with Kasavubu and based in Leopoldville. The other group claiming to be the central government was that of Antoine Gizenga, Lumumba’s Deputy Prime Minister, who, on 13 December, announced he now represented the lawful government of the Congo and made Stanleyville his capital. Then

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559 Letter from MacFarquhar to Marlin, 16 November 1960, UNARMS, Folder S-025300050001.
560 Cable from Linner to MacFarquhar and Bunche, 16 December 1960, UNARMS, Folder S-021700310005. An agreement was in fact struck between the Civilian Operation, the Congolese government and the Belgian officials that kept full leadership of agricultural policy programming and planning in the hands of the FAO and limited the role of the Belgians. See Cable from Linner to MacFarquhar, 23 December 1960, UNARMS, Folder S-021700310005.
561 Letter from Hammarskjold to MacFarquhar through Bunche, 21 November 1960, UNARMS, Folder S-025300050001.
there was the Katangan government of Tshombe in Elizabethville and for good measure that of Albert Kalonji in Bakwanga, South Kasai, which had orchestrated a Katanga-style succession just after independence.

In a sober set of end-of-the-year exchanges between Hammarskjold and Dayal, the head of the UN Operations suggested regrouping UN efforts by possibly withdrawing ONUC troops from certain provinces and re-deploying them in fewer areas, specifically to protect UN civilian aid personnel. Likewise, he recommended scaling down technical aid to the Congo to cover only vital services while asking the Congo to start paying some of the costs.\(^562\) For his part, Linner postponed a trip back to New York from December until January, recognizing the low morale among his aid workers who were suffering from harassment and security risks.\(^563\) He also suggested delaying the appointment of a UN Consultant in the Information and Interior Ministry, even if that selection might circumvent some of the misleading and abusive information dispensed by certain Congolese authorities, since it would most likely backfire and open the UN up to further accusations of meddling.\(^564\)

Hammarskjold remained resolute. He informed Dayal that he was not yet willing to consider withdrawing UN personnel and instead preferred a strategy of ‘diplomatic juggling’. This included reminding Congolese authorities of the UN’s vital work over the past months and in the months ahead. Hammarskjold’s strategy also involved keeping key member states like the UAR, India, the US and UK properly informed in the hopes of allowing them to see the UN’s worth and exert the necessary pressure on Congolese authorities whose opinion of the UN might have wavered.\(^565\) In his concluding statement during the Security Council debate over Lumumba’s arrest, the Secretary-General reminded the member states that if the UN left the Congo, he was convinced that a ‘Spanish-war situation’ would follow with

\(^{562}\) Dayal, 152-56.  
\(^{563}\) Cable from Linner to MacFarquhar, 10 December 1960, UNARMS, Folder S-075200300012.  
\(^{564}\) Ibid.  
\(^{565}\) Dayal, 156-57.
fighting taking place ‘all over the prostrate body of the Congo and pursued for nebulous and conflicting aims.’ He continued: ‘These, gentlemen, are the stakes for the people of the Congo, and for other nations—in Africa or outside, contributing to the Force or not. These are the stakes for the United Nations and what it represents.’ Therefore, for Hammarskjöld, it was clear that the UN operation must continue. He no doubt gained some affirmation when the General Assembly voted in late December to continue to fund the mission, recognizing, as Urquhart states, that the nearly 20,000 UN troops still acted as a minimum guarantee of security for the Congo while the UN Civilian Operation had done the same with regard to other vital services.⁵⁶⁶

Conclusion

The UN Secretariat pursued multilateral civilian aid to the Congo with as much vigor and determination as the military component of the mission during the first six months of the operation. They would continue to do so in the year ahead. Therefore, the Civilian Operation is an important factor in evaluating the role of the UN during the Congo Crisis. Altogether, the UN civilian effort was a juxtaposition of prevention and paralysis. On the one hand, it was during this period that the Civilian Operation began the process of preventing or mitigating certain financial, health, administrative and other such disasters through its on-the-ground actions. Through these measures, which would last well into 1961 as covered in Chapter Five, it believed it was living up to its mandate by laying the groundwork needed to prevent the Congo from becoming a fully fledged failed state. On the other hand, paralysis set in elsewhere. External opposition from powers like the USSR and Belgium handcuffed the full exercise of civilian aid as much as internal political and security issues undermined progress in the Congo during this period.

In this way, elements of the Cold War did affect the Civilian Operation. Moscow, for example, used the Civilian Mission as yet another area for it to criticize the Secretary-General

for his alleged partiality, accusing the UN of promoting a Western style of development while decrying the lack of civilian aid personnel from the Eastern bloc. Washington meanwhile, sought to promote UN aid exclusivity, albeit funded in large part by the US, as a way to keep out bilateral aid from Moscow. Still, in light of the factors affecting and affected by the Civilian Mission, the Cold War component of the crisis should not be oversold. In fact, UN action prevented each superpower from pursuing more aggressive measures, both militarily and with regard to bilateral civilian aid.

Lastly, it is probably unfair to apply to the civilian operation, Carole Collins’ accusation that UN leadership played the role of ‘manipulator’ and ‘kingmaker’, or David Gibbs’ claim that the UN was anything but impartial when it came to the Congo Crisis. Linner was no Cordier or Dayal, if only evidenced by the fact that he far outlasted the two at his post as Civilian Chief, pointing to the fact that he garnered respect from most Congolese officials. In other words, the cries of ‘Linner for dinner’ were not on the menu for long. Nevertheless, the exact and principled terms of ONUC’s mandate as spelled out in a number of Security Council resolutions amounted to a non-operational principle for the whole of the mission including the civilian side. Thus, promising noninterference in domestic affairs, a hallmark of UN aid during the 1950s, proved to be untenable. Clare Timberlake, the US Ambassador the Congo, recognized this fact when he remarked that despite the ‘scrupulous and patient’ quality of UN aid, it was by nature interfering. That being said, an examination of the on-the-ground aid efforts directed by Linner, MacFarquhar and others within the Secretariat, indicates that much of the UN aid was on the whole politically innocuous as it amounted to emergency relief, rehabilitation and some long-term development schemes during the period under review. It is also fair to say that the ability of

the UN Civilian Operation to provide technical aid in the areas of health, education, agriculture, communications, famine relief, etc., established the Organization’s credibility with a large numbers of Congolese.

However, where UN civilian aid faced its most daunting challenge was in the field of public administration—an area where its operation could hardly be sensitive enough as it intersected with the effects of decolonization. Here, despite taking the stance that ONUC officials would collaborate with whoever occupied the ministerial or administrative seat, these chairs were too often vacant requiring UN authorities to act on their own. This, of course, opened up the Civilian Operation and the Secretary-General to charges of re-colonization and disguised imperialism by Congolese authorities who now, in some ways, perceived the UN as the antagonist in the decolonization process. Ironically then, as Linner and others fought to keep the vestiges of Belgian colonialism out of the Congo’s government it made itself susceptible to the same accusations. As Chapter Five will show, this issue in particular did not dissipate with the coming of a new year which would bring forth a set of new crises and challenges for the UN Civilian Operation to the Congo.
CHAPTER FIVE

Decolonization and Development: The UN Civilian Mission to the Congo, 1961

Writing candidly to his friend and Foreign Secretary of Norway, Hans Engen, Hammarskjold observed that by late December 1960 his job had become

“‘a bit like fighting an avalanche; you know the rules—get rid of the skis, don’t try to resist but swim on the surface and hope for a rescuer. (Next morning historians will dig up the whole rotten mess and see how many were buried). A consolation is that avalanches, after all, automatically always come to a stop and that thereafter you can start behaving like an intelligent being again—provided you have managed to keep afloat.””569

To reference another analogy, Ralph Bunche, in a letter to his wife, compared the UN’s undertakings in the Congo to providing ‘first aid to a wounded rattlesnake.’570 Both comparisons do not exactly illicit a great deal of optimism in the task the UN was ultimately trying to accomplish through ONUC. Yet the parallels also elicit a dogged determination that kept ONUC pressing forward in the midst of changing and difficult circumstances.

Much of what was symptomatic about the first six months of the Civilian Mission to the Congo was also indicative of the events of 1961. The Civilian ONUC still played a key role in what the UN was trying to accomplish in the Congo—namely an effort to bring stability to the region by providing technical assistance, training and administrative assistance in addition to peacekeeping. It still had to contend with efforts by the Soviets to dismantle the whole UN operation while they amplified their call for the grand architect of the mission, Secretary-General Hammarskjold, to resign. The Civilian ONUC still had to compete with the Belgians for aid exclusivity in the midst of what UN officials viewed as a feigned attempt at decolonization by the metropole, especially as Belgium continued to seek out policy advisory roles within the Congolese government. The Civilian Mission still received crucial and sustained backing from Washington in 1961, albeit from a new administration. Finally, political forces at work and security concerns continued to suffocate the full exercise of UN

569 Urquhart, Hammarskjold, 492-93.
civilians aid, especially to Congo’s provinces during the first half of 1961. Specifically in the areas of health, education, communication and agriculture, UN aid envisioned and passed down from New York, encountered numerous impediments to its implementation.

Additionally, and perhaps more than at any other time, the Civilian Operation grew to be one of the epicenters of friction between the UN and the Congolese government. In this case, mounting tension over ONUC civilian aid in the field of public administration, which dated back to the start of the operation, came to a head in February 1961. Exacerbated by other factors, the result was the deepest schism between the UN and the Congolese government in Leopoldville at any point during the Congo Crisis. In short, Congolese authorities protested at what they viewed as UN mission-creep, coupled with a lack of consultation, leading to the impression that the UN’s aim was to transform the Congo into a UN Trust Territory. Candid negotiations during March and April 1961 with Congolese authorities in Leopoldville, Stanleyville, South Kasai and Katanga by a UN delegation made up of African members of the UN Secretariat, did finally lead to a UN-Congolese rapprochement (excluding Katanga). A show of greater sensitivity and awareness of Congolese concerns from the UN also resulted in a new civilian aid strategy from June 1961 onward. Thus, starting in the second half of 1961, UN and Congolese authorities agreed to concentrate civilian aid efforts on the training, institution building and the subsequent Africanization of the Congo’s civil administration. In fact, these activities remained the primary goals of the Civil Operation for the next several years as development aid between the UN and the Congo normalized. The now altered UN development aid program would still affect nearly every aspect of Congolese life on an unprecedented scale for any non-state actor but its new role amounted to the UN acting as a guarantor for Congolese development instead of an imperial interloper and a persona (or rather organization) non grata.

A New Strategy and a New Crisis
As of 1 January 1961, Civilian Operation personnel in the Congo totaled 176 individuals, 105 from non-NATO countries. Altogether, advisers and technicians came from 26 states. Similar to its earlier composition, French, Haitian, Swiss, Tunisians and Swedes made up about 60% of the UN civilian staff. Eastern bloc countries were only slightly better represented by the start of 1961—three aid workers from Poland and one from Yugoslavia. Meanwhile, five Americans served as part of the civilian mission. The strongest represented fields included communications (particularly civil aviation and telecommunication advisers), health, public works and finance.\footnote{571} During a visit from Hammarskjold at the start of the year, his first since August, the Secretary-General was amazed at the resilience of ONUC personnel. When Dayal asked of any differences he recognized compared to five months earlier, Hammarskjold replied: ‘‘then we were full of confidence in New York, but things here were panicky. Now, we are panicky in New York, but here in ONUC I find a mood of confidence.’’\footnote{572}

A US Intelligence Estimate from early January did not share Hammarskjold’s optimism. It stated that despite preventing unilateral interventions in the Congo the UN continually found itself in the ‘crossfire of both local and international political struggle, where either action or inaction provokes criticism by the participants and their foreign supporters.’ It further spelled out the UN’s precarious position by postulating that if the UN supported the return of Lumumba and Parliament, the West was sure to grow exceedingly anxious. If it opposed Lumumba, its critics would accuse the UN of abetting imperialism. A real possibility, according to the briefing, was a conceivable emptying of all civilian and military UN personnel from the Congo since, ‘[n]o clear direction of events can be discerned

\footnote{571 \textit{Progress Report No. 7, 1-31 December 1960}, 5 January 1960, ODS, (ST/ONUC/PR.7), Annex I, Appendix I. Comparably, a US Intelligence source estimated that by early January 1961, 3,000 Belgians had returned to the Congo while more than 2,000 Belgians were estimated to be currently working as employees of the Leopoldville government. See, Special National Intelligence Estimate, 10 January 1961, in \textit{FRUS}, 1961-1963, Volume XX, No. 2.  
\footnote{572} Dayal, 172.}
among the countervailing forces and capricious actions which characterize the Congo situation.\footnote{Special National Intelligence Estimate, 10 January 1961, in \textit{FRUS} 1961-1963, Volume XX, No. 2.}

Another blow came on 17 January—Lumumba’s murder. His assassination, more than any other political crisis, would seriously endanger the mere existence of ONUC. Examining the culpabilities of various parties involved in the plot to kill the controversial, but nonetheless esteemed, Congolese leader goes well beyond the scope of this study. However, it is apparent from the most recent declassified documents that Katangan troops and Belgian members of the Katangan gendarmerie were directly involved in the murder, while the CIA and the Mobutu regime were at least tacitly liable.\footnote{In particular see, Editorial Note, in \textit{FRUS}, 1960-1968, Volume XXIII, No. 45; Telegram from \underline{\text{____}}\text{ to CIA, 19 January 1961, in \textit{FRUS}, 1960-1968, Volume XXIII, No. 62; CIA Information Report, 7 February 1961, in \textit{FRUS}, 1960-1968,Volume XXIII, No. 68. For recent secondary accounts see, Emmanuel Gerard and Bruce Kuklick, \textit{Death in the Congo: Murdering Patrice Lumumba} (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2015); Lipsey, \textit{Hammarskjold}, 473-76.} Katangan authorities only made Lumumba’s death (which had occurred on 17 January) publically known on 13 February—and then only blamed revengeful ‘villagers’\footnote{Lipsey, \textit{Hammarskjold}, 475.}. Nevertheless, much of the liability at the time, or at least the suspicion of wrongdoing, fell on the UN and Hammarskjold in particular.

According to C.V. Narasimhan, UN Under-Secretary for Special Political Questions, the few weeks following the news of Lumumba’s death were the gloomiest for Hammarskjold.\footnote{ Transcript of Interview with C.V. Narasimhan, 1973, Columbia Center for Oral History, Dag Hammarskjold Project, 22.} A folder of newspaper clippings kept by Hammarskjold in a personal file cabinet in his New York office attest that he not only read but cataloged the accusations heaped upon him. From the \textit{New York Herald Tribune} he saved articles entitled: ‘Russians Insist Hammarskjold Must Go’, ‘Hammarskjold Rejects Soviet Demand He Quit’ and ‘Lumumba Specter Haunting UN: Afro-Asian Group Sees Racism Behind His Death.’\footnote{Folder entitled, ‘New York Herald Tribune, 1961’, NSL, Hammarskjold Papers, L179:223.} From the Russian broadsheet \textit{Izvestiia}, Hammarskjold retained an article highlighting the actions of protestors outside the UN holding signs that read, ‘UN HQ Is Seat of Murder Inc!’, ‘Murderer Hammarskjold!’ and
‘Lumumba’s Blood Stains Hammarskjold’s Hands’. He also kept a letter from Khrushchev to Nehru forwarded to him by the Soviet Permanent Mission to the UN dated 27 February 1961. In the letter, Khrushchev called Hammarskjold’s non-interference in Lumumba’s capture and murder ‘Pilate-esque’ and ‘tragically demonstrated how inadmissible is the situation when a stooge of the imperialists and colonialists heads the United Nations executive machinery.’ Publicly, Moscow called Hammarskjold a criminal, demanded his resignation and announced it would not recognize him as a UN official in any capacity. It also called for the liquidation of ONUC. Meanwhile, the fallout of Lumumba’s execution quickly overshadowed other positive political happenings, namely the formation of a provisional Congolese government on 9 February in Leopoldville that finally replaced the College of Commissioners. It included Joseph Ileo, who the College had earlier forced to give way but was now again made Prime Minister. It also included future Prime Minister, Cyrille Adoula as the Minister of the Interior. Meanwhile, Kasavubu and Bomboko retained their positions as President and Foreign Minister respectively. Nevertheless, the murder only entrenched Gizenga’s rebel regime in Stanleyville.

The Security Council met from 16-21 February to discuss Lumumba’s death. Guinea and Mali, among the Afro-Asian member states, joined the Soviets in demanding Hammarskjold’s resignation. This came after Guinea, Morocco and the UAR had earlier announced their intention to withdrawal their countries’ troops from the ONUC peacekeeping force. Still, at the conclusion of the session, in earlier hours of 21 February, Afro-Asian member states of the Security Council including Ceylon, Liberia and the UAR managed to

580 Letter From the Permanent Representative of the USSR Addressed to the President of the Security Council, 14 February 1961, ODS, (S/4704).
582 Higgins, 117-124. These countries’ announcements came in late January and early February, after Lumumba’s capture but before Katanga authorities made the news of his death public. Later Sudan and Indonesia would withdrawal battalions. Dayal, 242.
pass a resolution that in fact increased the UN’s responsibility in the Congo. The resolution, besides calling for an investigation of Lumumba’s death, also urged the UN to take immediate action, if necessary by force, ‘to prevent the occurrence of civil war’ now threatening the Congo perhaps more than any time over the past seven months. It once again urged the withdrawal of all Belgian and other foreign military personnel and political advisers not under UN command. Moreover, the resolution advocated the reorganization and discipline of the Congolese army units to prevent their interference in the political life of the Congo. The resolution passed 9-0-2 with French and Soviet abstentions. To assuage the USSR, the resolution made no specific reference to Hammarskjold’s responsibilities in carrying out its provisions.583

Just how did Hammarskjold and the ONUC manage to pass a Security Council resolution on the Congo when the standing of the international organization and its Secretary-General were at what seemed to be an all-time low? As with other resolutions, Hammarskjold and ONUC relied on support from key members of the Afro-Asian group who still believed that the UN represented the best option for settling the crisis. Prime Minister Nehru in particular, after appeals from Hammarskjold, decided to commit a substantial number of Indian troops to the UN Force to bring it back up to maximum strength following the withdrawal of contingents from Guinea, Morocco and the UAR.584

Support was also forthcoming from the new Kennedy Administration despite the fact that support from the Eisenhower Administration had teetered in early January. On 10 January 1961, US Ambassador to the Congo, Clare Timberlake, reported that recent action taken by the ONUC civilian representative to the Orientale province caused him alarm. Specifically, the UN province chief allegedly accepted without question the authority of Gizenga’s government in Stanleyville, Orientale’s major city and Gizenga’s capital, as well

583 Resolution Adopted by the Security Council at its 942nd Meeting, 21 February 1961, ODS, (S/4741); Cordier and Foote, eds., Volume V, 358.
584 Cordier and Foote, eds., Volume V, 329.
as his subsequent takeover of the neighboring province of Kivu. This came despite a substantial UN military force in the region.\textsuperscript{585} Thus, Timberlake seemed to advise against an extension of ONUC’s mandate that would only breed Congolese intransigence, especially over the maintenance of law and order as an ‘infringement on Congolese sovereignty and prelude to UN trusteeship.’\textsuperscript{586} Furthermore, outgoing Secretary of State Christian Herter left office expressing his belief that Hammarskjöld, Dayal and thus the UN operation had not always advanced US interests in the Congo.\textsuperscript{587}

Apparently, the Kennedy Administration did at least contemplate a substantial change to America’s Congo policy but ultimately decided to follow what had been the general policy of the Eisenhower Administration towards the UN since the start of the conflict—backing Hammarskjöld’s initiatives and his ability to cope with the ebbs and flow of the crisis.\textsuperscript{588} A series of talks between Hammarskjöld and Adlai Stevenson, the new US Ambassador to the UN, helped reconcile US and UN policy. At a 31 January meeting, Hammarskjöld and Stevenson agreed that the way forward in the Congo was to ‘neutralize’ the ANC and convene Parliament. These policies also made their way into the Security Council resolution from 21 February mentioned above.\textsuperscript{589} With regard to UN civilian aid, Secretary of State Rusk advised Kennedy that the US should, ‘seek a greater administrative role for the United Nations in the Congo. Our assumption is that, regardless of the government formed in the Congo, it will not be able to effectively govern and administer. A great deal of United

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{585} Telegram from the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State, 10 January 1961, in \textit{FRUS}, 1961-1963, Volume XX, No. 3.
\bibitem{586} Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State, 6 February 1961, in \textit{FRUS}, 1961-1963, Volume XX, No. 23
\bibitem{587} Editorial Note, in \textit{FRUS}, 1961-1963, Volume XX, No. 4.
\bibitem{589} Telegram from the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, 31 January 1961, in \textit{FRUS}, Volume XX, No. 15.
\end{thebibliography}
Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations, Harlan Cleveland, echoed this sentiment believing that the UN was essential in filling the gap between what decolonized people, like the Congolese, expected and what the government can provide. According to Cleveland, the UN was best suited to fill this gap. Cleveland believed the UN, if given the capacity to act, could effectively assist emerging nations to develop, while offering a type of international aid that could diffuse Cold War intrigues. Thus, the Kennedy Administration, like the UN Secretariat, used the Civilian Operation in large part to justify the UN’s predominance in the Congo.

**Arrested Aid: The Nadir of the UN Civilian Mission**

At the same time, on-the-ground aid work in early 1961 reflected the growing Congolese antipathy towards the UN and presaged future trouble. Perhaps more than at any other time during the crisis the political and security issues profoundly encumbered and even arrested the efforts of UN civilian aid workers. February’s *Civilian Operation Progress Report* described the difficulties. The situation in the eastern provinces of Kivu and Orientale was much worse now, stemming from the establishment of Antoine Gizenga’s rogue central government in Stanleyville. It had resulted in limited civilian aid work, widening security concerns and a renewed financial crisis. As a result, UNESCO curtailed plans to provide 500 teachers to the region—limiting their program to only areas where ONUC troops were present. The same was true for UN agricultural teams meant to work in the eastern provinces who now found it impossible to travel to their new posts. Health work in these provinces was

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590 Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy, 1 February 1961, in *FRUS*, Volume XX, No. 17
591 Talking Paper for Harland Cleveland, 12 April 1961, NARA II, RG 59/150/71/26/6, Entry 303D Office of International Administration Records Relating to the Congo, Box 1; Transcript of Interview with Harlan Cleveland, 22 April 1990, United Nations Oral History Collection, 24.
also at a standstill and by February, most of the doctors had fled Kivu and Orientale. Meanwhile, the International Red Cross recalled its team.592

In Leopoldville, despite warnings from ONUC’s civilian advisers, Linner reported that Congolese authorities had failed ‘to pay sufficient attention to the economic situation under their respective control’, while ‘no practical measures have been taken so far to check or alleviate the danger of further disintegration.’ The Progress Report blamed political expediency by Congolese politicians in Leopoldville who raised military salaries that abetted Congo’s inflationary woes, adding at least 1,000 million Congolese Francs to the public debt.593 Meanwhile, G. Parravicini, who replaced Umbricht in early January as the new President of the UN Monetary Council to the Congo, surveyed the provinces in February and reported that demands for higher salaries and indemnities, shorter working hours and free lodging nearly always followed the process of Africanization throughout the Congo.594 This took place while production suffered throughout the country, minus Katanga, due to the breakdown of transportation and the abandonment of many eastern plantations. In particular, Leopoldville blockaded the Congo River in an effort to thwart Gizenga. In fact, starting in early February, all exports from the Orientale and Kivu Provinces ceased, resulting in over a 50% decrease in foreign trade compared to December.595 In January, Gizenga authorities impounded all of the Central Bank branches in Kivu and Orientale Provinces adding to the financial turmoil.596

Prevented from implementing its development assistance goals, the UN focused on projects already underway or those that did not require protection by UN military forces. At the request of the ONUC Agricultural Mechanization Expert, the UN help to establish a

593 Ibid., 1.
594 Ibid., 22-24. While in Stanleyville, the Congolese army actually arrested Parravicini in order to requisite funds from the Central Bank. It took ONUC forces to finally free him.
595 Ibid., 8, 23.
training center at Lovanium University to instruct Congolese to operate heavy farming equipment abandoned by Belgians. In the field of public administration, ONUC organized an in-service training course for senior government employees. It also helped create, with support from the Ford Foundation, a National School of Law and Administration for training Congolese judges and legal advisers. The course ran from February to July 1961 and started with 165 participants. The UN also managed to bring the famine in South Kasai under control, slowing the death rate and distributing seed among the refugees to plant their own crops. ONUC also provided substantial amounts of gasoline and diesel oil to allow for the transport of food—avoiding a food crisis in the otherwise crippled eastern provinces.

Nevertheless, yet another controversy stemming from the interpretation of the Security Council resolution passed on 21 February served to overshadow the measured progress achieved by the UN Civilian Operation in January and February 1961. Apparently, a significant number of Leopoldville and Katanga authorities understood the resolution to mean that the UN had the right to use force in disarming both the ANC and Katangan forces. Dayal cited an ANC Military Bulletin that circulated the argument that the UN now considered the Congolese too irresponsible and childlike to possess arms and repeated the now common accusation that the UN planned to turn the Congo into a Trusteeship or colony. Because Congolese leaders like Mobutu and Kasavubu had by this time refused to work with Dayal, there were few opportunities to set the record straight. According to Kasavubu and others, they had come to despise Dayal’s ‘Brahmin haughtiness’, as Linner later described it.

As a campaign to oust Dayal intensified, anti-UN factions attacked or arbitrarily arrested UN civilian personnel throughout the country starting in late February. Since the UN

601 Dayal, 212-13.
602 Lipsey, Hammarskjold, 487.
had little presence in the regions controlled by Gizenga, Leopoldville officials even accused UN aid workers of being communist sympathizers. On 28 February in a shocking turn of events Tshombe, Ileo and Kalonji signed a military agreement in Elizabethville to pool their respective military resources against the UN should it try to disarm the Congolese and Katangan armies and a further agreement pledging support to fight Gizenga’s forces.603 In fact, fighting broke out between the entrenched ANC soldiers and ‘jumpy’ UN forces at the port city of Matadi in early March. Meanwhile the US Embassy in the Congo reported that Minister of the Interior Adoula had declared “‘UN Congo policy bankrupt’”.604

Next, Leopoldville, Elizabethville and South Kasai leaders met in Tananarive, Madagascar from 8-12 March, publicly condemned the February Resolution, and then proceeded effectively to lay the groundwork for the establishment of a loose confederation of Congolese states.605 The Tananarive Conference displayed just how far some Congolese leaders, previously erstwhile UN supporters, had turned against the Organization. In Kasavubu’s case, he had written to Hammarskjold at the outset of February’s Secretary Council meeting assuring the Secretary-General of the legal Congolese government’s commitment to the UN effort hoping, ‘that aid will continue and bring concrete results in perfect harmony of views with [the] authorities of [our] country.’ He continued, ‘[w]e also hope that you will continue for a long time yet, the action which has been so energetically begun and which the member countries as a whole also ratified on many occasions.’606 Then at Tananarive, Kasavubu, Ileo and Adoula joined Tshombe in making plans to frustrate any effort by the Secretariat to enforce the February Resolution. Tananarive also saw the

603 Hoskyns, 340-45.
604 Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State, 2 March 1961, in FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XX, No. 40; Editorial Note, in FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XX, No. 43.
605 Hoskyns, 340-45.
606 Telegram from the Embassy in Leopoldville to the Secretary of State, forwarding a telegram from President Kasavubu sent to Secretary-General Hammarskjold on 16 February, 14 March 1961, NARA II, RG 59, Central Decimal File 1960-1963, From 306-1-163, Box 486.
Leopoldville leaders agree to major concessions in the formation of a new Congo state, effectively granting Katanga independence while weakening their own position.

**The UN Delegation: Restoring Faith in the Organization**

Leopoldville seemed to regret its decisions at Tananarive almost immediately, especially in the light of Hammarskjöld’s decision to recall Dayal to UN headquarters effective 1 March 1961. Hammarskjöld then wrote to Kasavubu expressing his regret at the misinterpretation of the February Resolution and reaffirmed its expressed purpose of restoring public order and preserving Congolese independence. To ensure the resolution’s implementation, Hammarskjöld proposed sending a UN delegation to the Congo to meet with other Congolese authorities to clear the air. Hammarskjöld soon sent a three-person delegation made up of Africans recently recruited into the UN Secretariat. The delegation included the aforementioned Robert Gardiner of Ghana, Francis C. Nwokedi of Nigeria, a Permanent Secretary in the Nigerian Ministry of Labor and Mahmoud Khiari, a Tunisian politician, civil servant and current head of the Consultative Group on Public Administration.

From 22 March to 5 April, the delegation met not only with authorities in Leopoldville, but also with those in Katanga, South Kasai and Stanleyville.\(^{607}\)

Altogether, the talks underscored the delicate issue of administering aid to a former colony jealously seeking to protect its sovereignty, yet which was in desperate need of outside assistance to prevent its further disintegration. The underlying goal of the delegation was to re-establish confidence in the purpose of the UN’s role in aiding the Congo. The talks allowed the airing of grievances by Congolese leaders, many of whom viewed the UN as either an ineffectual spectator on the one hand or an interloper in Congo’s internal affairs on

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the other. They also aimed to dispel the various misunderstandings caused by the February Security Council resolution. Namely, the delegation made an effort to depict the resolution as a way for the UN to help the Congo reorganize the ANC, expel subversive foreign elements in Katanga and assist in reconvening Parliament. Thus, the delegation aimed to show the resolution was not an attempt by the UN, as it had been portrayed by some, to subvert Congolese sovereignty, drive out all foreign personnel from the civil and armed services and disarm the Congolese army by force. Crucial to the delegation’s success was the fact that all three members were from African countries. In fact, the phrase, ‘an African solution to what was an African problem’ was a recurring expression used by all parties.

The delegation’s first stop was a meeting with Prime Minister Ileo and Minister of Interior Adoula representing the central government in Leopoldville. Ileo and Adoula wasted no time in describing what they saw as a UN organization which had imposed its solutions for the Congo from a great distance without proper consultation and collaboration with the Congolese people or government. A major sticking point for Ileo and Adoula was the offer of bilateral aid from Belgium. Despite its colonial past, many Congolese saw Belgian aid as necessary and far more innocuous than the UN secretary perceived it to be. Meanwhile, the UN failed to confer with Congolese officials on the matter while blindly opposing it.608

Planning to circle back to Leopoldville to meet with President Kasavubu and Foreign Minister Bomboko, the delegation moved on to negotiations in Bakwanga with Albert Kalonji, the self-proclaimed President of South Kasai, were overall successful. They concluded with Kalonji specifically requesting increased UN technical assistance in a region where security risks had recently caused a general exodus of UN personnel.609 Things were not so cordial in Stanleyville where Gizenga’s Minister of the Interior, Christophe Gbenye,

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608 Notes of meeting with Central Congolese authorities at Leopoldville, 23 March 1961, UNARMS, Folder S-25300050001.
609 Notes on meeting with Mr. Albert Kalonji at Bakwanga, South Kasai, 27 March 1961, UNARMS, Folder S-25300050001.
scathingly commented ‘he could see no raison d’être for the Delegation except, apparently, to lead the Congo in the direction of UN trusteeship.’ Gbenye used as an example the aforementioned National School of Law and Administration which he believed ought to be under Congolese not UN control. Gardiner replied, asking if it was a crime to help establish a school to train Congolese without using public funds. Furthermore, General Lundula, commander of Gizenga’s forces in Orientale and Kivu, lamented the perceived double-standard over the UN’s attitude towards Leopoldville versus Stanleyville. He noted that the UN had done nothing to assist the 6 million Congolese affected by Leopoldville’s blockade of the Congo River while it spent millions of francs providing famine relief for Kalonji in South Kasai.

Nevertheless, in a perhaps surprising move the Gizenga government put these episodic grievances aside when discussing the implementation of the February Resolution. Altogether the delegation was again successful in getting Gizenga to recognize the importance of a unified and reorganized Congolese army that included his forces and those in Leopoldville. The two sides also found common ground over the withdrawal of Belgian forces from Katanga, the reconvening of Parliament and the importance of the UN’s role in restoring public services through the recruitment and training of new technical and administrative personnel. Where the two sides differed was the order of the above reforms. Whereas, Gizenga saw the reconvening of Parliament as paramount, as had Lumumba, the delegates stressed that the reorganization of the army should come first. Despite the difference of opinion on this matter, the meeting ended cordially with the real hope that Gizenga would participate in further actions to unify and aid the Congo.610

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610 Notes on meeting with ‘Central Government’, Provisional Government, and other political and military representatives at Stanleyville, 28 March 1961, UNARMS, Folder S-25300050001. Like Lumumba, whose party won the majority of seats in Congo’s first parliamentary election, Gizenga probably anticipated strong support for himself in any future national election and therefore pushed for the reconvening of parliament before any other reforms.
Next, the UN delegation met with Tshombe. Here, Gardiner and Nwokedi made a futile attempt to convince the authorities in Elizabethville that they were better off with UN rather than Belgian assistance. They made further ineffectual attempts to persuade Katanga that it ought to consider incorporating its forces into those of the ANC. Tshombe responded by arguing that the Katanga army was already organized. In fact, it was more organized than those of either Ghana or Nigeria. The meeting ended in an impasse.  

Finally, the delegation circled back to Leopoldville on 4 April to meet with Kasavubu and Bomboko. Bomboko highlighted two unsatisfactory phases of the UN presence in the Congo over the past nine months. The first he described as the overt non-interference by the UN after Lumumba tried to turn the UN mission into his own operation back in August 1960. Then in the second phase, the UN failed to recognize any lawful government, after the ousting of Lumumba, leaving Dayal free to employ the UN as a provisional government with apparent immunity. In the light of the second phase, Kasavubu urged for the transposition of UN and Congolese responsibilities, where the Congo must be in charge of its own country while the UN assisted, instead of visa-versa.

Nwokedi and Gardiner acknowledged the UN’s shortcomings in actually undercutting Congolese sovereignty in its attempt to uphold it. However, they also explained that it was still the express purpose of the UN to make certain that no foreign political influences compromised the independence of the Congo—essentially upholding the UN standard of aid development during the course of the 1950s. Instead, its aim was to help the Congo in the ‘Africanization’ of its public service going forward. With each side now understanding the other’s perspective, the UN and Leopoldville authorities stuck a compromise. Namely, Ileo agreed on the reorganization of the ANC. Moreover, the Leopoldville government agreed on a program for the Africanization of its government, separating itself from foreign—namely

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611 Report of meeting of 29 March with Tshombe and UN Delegation, UNARMS, Folder S-25300050001.
612 Notes of meeting with Chief of State and Congolese central authorities at Leopoldville, 4 April 1961, UNARMS, Folder S-25300050001.
Belgian—intrigue. Meanwhile, the UN delegation recognized the Congo’s right to choose its own technical personnel. Thus, the talks in Leopoldville made significant progress in restoring confidence in the UN in the crucial field of public administration aid. Gardiner and Nwokedi then set out to parlay with the other Congolese governments.613

Despite Katangan obduracy, Gardiner, Nwokedi and Khiari still managed to convince the other Congolese governments to acquiesce into the provisions of the February Resolution—reversing the policies agreed to at Tananarive. The mostly successful negotiations also made way for the Secretary-General Hammarskjold to kick-start the otherwise stalled UN Civilian Operation throughout the Congo, less Katanga. In fact, a draft agreement between the UN Secretariat and the Leopoldville government envisioned a ‘revised and expanded programme of UN technical assistance’ that emphasized the Africanization of Congo’s civil service while supplementing any gaps with the recruitment of new foreign personnel serving under the UN. The eventual hope was to convert the Civilian ONUC into a normal UN technical assistance arrangement similar to those in other newly independent countries in Africa. Under the new agreement, it was now clear to both sides that the UN could help the Congo obtain more aid workers, but the Congo could seek its own outside aid if preferable. Belgians working in the Congolese public service—estimated at some 2,300 individuals—could stay on. However, new UN recruits would replace Belgian political advisers, numbering around 40.614 Thus, the common goal of aiding the Congo trumped the UN’s desire for aid exclusivity.

The success of the UN delegation also overshadowed the continued attacks by the USSR at the resumed 15th General Assembly Session held in March and April of 1961. In

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613 Notes of meeting with Central Congolese authorities at Leopoldville, 23 March 1961, UNARMS, Folder S-25300050001; Notes of meeting with Central Congolese authorities at Leopoldville, 25 March 1961, UNARMS, Folder S-25300050001.

Hammarskjold’s estimation the battle started by, ‘Khrushchev’s haymaker’ the previous fall had been won by the Secretary-General as witnessed by the USSR now backing down on its previous two positions of demanding the UN to quit the Congo and for Hammarskjold to resign. Moreover, Hammarskjold surmised the Soviet’s ineffectualness stemmed from the collaboration between his own Office and the Afro-Asian group, along with the financial backing of the US.\textsuperscript{615} In addition, Russian historian Sergei Mazov has shown that multiple requests for Soviet aid from the Gizenga government never really materialized during the spring of 1961 owing to Khrushchev’s analysis of the international risks involved.\textsuperscript{616}

Hammarskjold specifically credited President Gamal Nasser’s influence on his ally Gizenga, since the UAR President had always viewed the unity of the Congo as an essential element of stability.\textsuperscript{617} Meanwhile, recently declassified documents reveal how the CIA managed to stall requests by Mobutu for military aid to fight Gizenga during the period, leaving open the chance for a Leopoldville and Stanleyville rapprochement.\textsuperscript{618}

Harland Cleveland from the US State Department summed up the UN achievements over this period as having convincingly shown the central Congolese Government ‘that the best way to get rid of the UN in the long run is to cooperate with it in the short run.’ Yet Cleveland did not short-change the value of the UN operation in the Congo, noting the ‘unnoticed and unsung’ heroes of the crisis were the UN Congo staff running one of the world’s largest civilian advisory operations. Cleveland continued: ‘In the Congo the presence of a field operation maintained by an international organization has enabled us to move forward (by fits and starts, to be sure) precisely because the world community can “intervene

\textsuperscript{615} Letter from Cleveland to Rusk, 10 April 1961, NARA II, RG 59, Central Decimal File 1960-1963, From 306-1-163, Box 486.
\textsuperscript{616} Mazov, ‘Soviet Aid to the Gizenga Government in the Former Belgian Congo (1960-61) as Reflected in Russian Archives,’ 429, 434.
\textsuperscript{617} Telegram from the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, 13 June 1961, in \textit{FRUS}, 1961-1963, Volume XX, No. 72.
in the name of non-intervention” while a single nation, however powerful, cannot.\textsuperscript{619} Cleveland might have overstated the perception of the UN considering that many Congolese authorities viewed its actions since the previous fall as an intervention. Still, Cleveland’s recognition of the value of the UN Civilian Operation was something that the US, the international community and Congolese government now embraced once again.

**Implementation of the February Resolution and Revived UN Aid to the Congo**

The implementation of the February Resolution began on 24 April when 200 Congolese political leaders met at the Equateur Province city of Coquilhatville. Aided once more by Gardiner and Nwokedi, Congolese authorities convened until 28 May, while passing twenty-one resolutions meant to construct a new federal state, later ratified by a newly elected Parliament. Gizenga chose not to attend holding to his stance that the re-opening of Parliament should precede any other action. However, Gizenga did send a delegation of soldiers to report back. Tshombe did attend, accompanied by a large delegation including soldiers and six European advisers. The conference was not without incident, namely Kasavubu placing Tshombe under house arrest for nearly two months. Kasavubu then only released Tshombe on the condition that he would later send Katangese representatives to the Leopoldville Parliament, which never took place.\textsuperscript{620} The actions taken at the Coquilhatville Conference were a further blow to Tshombe in that they reversed those agreed upon at Tananarive a month earlier.

Direct assistance by Gardiner and Nwokedi in writing a new Congolese constitution also signaled a turning point in the UN’s relationship with Congolese authorities. By late May, Linner, who now served under the new title ‘Officer-in-charge’, officially filling Dayal’s post, requested that UN civilian technical work resume in South Kasai.\textsuperscript{621}

\textsuperscript{619} Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to Secretary of State Rusk, 2 May 1961, in *FRUS*, 1961-1963, XXV, No. 169.
\textsuperscript{620} Urquhart, *Hamarskjöld*, 546-47; Hoskyns, 358-63.
\textsuperscript{621} Cable from Linner to the Secretary-General, 26 May 1961, UNARMS, Folder S-035700110004.
Meanwhile, Congolese and UN officials quickly settled an incident that included the arrest, beating and imprisonment of three WHO doctors by ‘excitable’ Congolese soldiers in Orientale Province. In this case, Linner—to his shock—was a first-hand witness to the denigration and beating of the implicated soldiers. Congolese authorities then spread news of the punishment throughout the region hoping to stamp-out any lingering anti-UN sentiment.622 Gizenga even called on Linner, expressing his full support for the UN and expressed his pleasure about the upcoming conference to reconvene Parliament—scheduled to take place in July 1961 under UN protection at Lovanium University.623

The mending of the rift between the UN and the Congo reinvigorated and revived other fields of civilian aid activities. Of highest priority was the Congo’s dire financial situation. A UN team headed by Philippe de Seynes, met with Leopoldville leaders during the first week of June for frank conversations on budgetary discipline, deficit reduction, bloated salaries of public sector workers and military personnel and the resumption of trade in the provinces. Kasavubu asked for more technical assistance from the UN to remedy these issues which the Hammarskjold agreed to provide, ‘with all due speed’. Then on 12 June, the two sides agreed to make available through the Congo Monetary Council the amount of $10 million for the economic benefit of the entire country so long as it accompanied financial discipline. This was the first such transfer of capital from the UN to the Congolese government since the previous fall—again a sign of a restored trust by both parties.624 The UN-Congo rapprochement also encouraged the US to bolster its aid commitment to the Congo. Kennedy agreed to a $5 million grant through the UN to assist in lessening the

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622 Cable from Maceoin to the Secretary-General, 31 May 1961, UNARMS, Folder S-035700110004; Cable from Linner to Bunche, 1 June 1961, UNARMS, Folder S-035700110004.
623 Cable from Linner to the Secretary-General, 1 June 1961, UNARMS, Folder S-035700110004.
scarcity of goods in the Congo.\textsuperscript{625} At this time, the US was also contemplating contributing an additional $50 million to the UN Fund for the Congo—$15 million to come from the PL 480 Food for Peace program. A State Department report argued that at this critical juncture, the prestige of the UN was on the line and any failure would not only weaken the Organization but compromise US interests.\textsuperscript{626} This policy was in keeping with the view of Secretary of State Rusk who informed the US Mission to the UN that, ‘our basic policy which, in nutshell, is not to “win” Congo in [the] Cold War sense but to create [a] viable independent nation.’\textsuperscript{627} The Congo took another significant step in this direction when on 1 August it elected Cyrille Adoula as ‘formateur’ of a new government. Crucially it included Gizenga as Deputy Prime Minister and Gbenye as the Minister of the Interior, while Kasavubu remained President. Gardiner and Khiari, played an active role in negotiations between Leopoldville and Stanleyville to form this coalition government. However, UN representatives were unsuccessful in convincing any Katangan leaders to join.\textsuperscript{628}

R.J.B. Rossborough, who replaced Linner as Chief of the Civilian Operation in mid-1961, expressed to David Owen the enormous relief he felt when the Congolese voted in a legal government, noting that over the first few weeks these ministers seemed well disposed to the UN. Consequently, Rossborough expected a more effective technical assistance program in the months ahead.\textsuperscript{629} The UN \textit{Civilian Operations Progress Report} for July and August reported that with the opening of Parliament, ‘it was now possible to regard the months ahead as a time to be spent not merely in preventing a worsening of the situation but

\textsuperscript{625} Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Bowles to President Kennedy, 20 May 1961, in \textit{FRUS}, 1961-1963, Volume XX, No. 66.

\textsuperscript{626} Briefing Memorandum for Assistant Secretary Cleveland, (undated), NARA II, RG 59/150/71/26/6, Entry 3039D, Office of International Administration Records Relating to the Congo, Box 1.


\textsuperscript{628} Urquhart, \textit{Hammarskjold}, 550-53.

\textsuperscript{629} Cable from R. Rossborough to Owen, 26 August 1961, Columbia University Libraries, Owen Papers, Box 13.
in further fostering development. The continuing co-operation between the Congolese authorities and the representatives of ONUC gives promise of good results.  

Meanwhile, reforms were in the works for what MacFarquhar termed the ‘new shape’ of the Civilian Operation in the Congo going forward. In reality, MacFarquhar’s recommendations, presented to Hammarskjold on 7 August, were a blend of longstanding aims mixed with a few key modifications. For example, the main purpose of the civilian operations still emphasized ‘“decolonization” in practical, unsentimental terms.’ For MacFarquhar this meant the rapid development of the Congolese administrative, political and technical workers while using UN technicians and advisers in the meantime. Moreover, the UN should remain willing to assist the Congo with what MacFarquhar saw as its ‘greater competence and goodwill’ compared to any bilateral aid. Indeed, all these goals existed from nearly the start of the UN’s involvement in the crisis.

Where MacFarquhar’s proposals differed from the past was a greater emphasis on extricating the UN from the Congo as soon as possible. Noting, ‘Congolese sensitivities’, MacFarquhar recommended the UN adopt a position of ‘reluctant buyer’. This was similar to the Organization’s approach when considering UN Special Fund appropriations. Overall, the Civilian Mission was to avoid any appearance of being a pushy salesmen. MacFarquhar recognized this might result in the abolishment of UN Civilian Consultants in exchange for what would in fact be a standard UN Technical Assistance Program over time—albeit larger than any other currently operating in the Global South. In keeping with this vision, MacFarquhar suggested a greater emphasis on training Congolese to take over the position currently held by UN or Belgian personnel.

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631 Report from MacFarquhar to the Secretary-General, 7 August 1961, UNARMS, Folder S-25300050001.
632 Ibid.
Operationally, MacFarquhar recommended the establishment of a ‘Congo Development Board’ made up of high level officials, perhaps still advised by UN consultants, meant to focus on reforming the Congo’s economy and foreign trade policies, as well as its agricultural, educational and communication policies with the overall goal to Africanize the Congo’s development. MacFarquhar noted this was already taking place as measures were underway to transfer the responsibilities of the UN Monetary Council to the Congo to the Congolese National Bank. Finally, the UN should move towards a more limited role of recruiter, whereas the Congolese should come to view foreign doctors, teachers or other aid workers as their own aid workers rather than agents operating under UN auspices.

MacFarquhar intended for the Congo Advisory Group to discuss his above recommendations and translate them into directives for debate within the Congo government. At the same time, Rossborough wrote to MacFarquhar making a contradictory appeal to take advantage of the openings that now existed in the new Congolese government for economic advisers. Rossborough was aware of rival advisers soon to be appointed to the Finance Minister and proposed instead trying to place UN personnel in these positions. Altogether, MacFarquhar and Rossborough’s somewhat divergent recommendations highlight the difficulty that still existed at the UN in finding a balance between the Organization’s role as mentor to the Congolese and the need to shift towards a role of guarantor or sponsor of Congolese development.

In fact, in the months and years ahead the UN Civilian Mission would move towards the latter. On Hammarskjold’s last and fateful trip to the Congo, one of the Secretary-General’s aims was to meet with Prime Minister Adoula and other Congolese authorities to discuss revisions to the Civilian Operation. His aim was to make the operation conform to the technical assistance programs in other countries by, among other things, integrating the

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633 Report from MacFarquhar to the Secretary-General, 7 August 1961, UNARMS, Folder S-25300050001.
634 Cable from Rossborough to MacFarquhar, 17 August 1961, UNARMS, Folder S-075200310002.
technical operational budget of the UN into that of the Congo’s budget. They also discussed the need to Africanize the Congo’s administration at all levels with all due haste by prioritizing and developing training programs and institutes.635

This had clearly been the goal of the UN since May 1961. For example, in finance, ONUC was now providing courses to train Congolese cadres in various economic fields. In agriculture, training programs commenced in veterinary care, farm mechanics and agricultural assistance. Training also started for Congolese air traffic controllers and aeronautical radio operators. In October 1961, a National Pedagogical Institute opened in Leopoldville with major UN assistance to train teachers. Meanwhile, a UN Special Fund backed program for a teacher training school moved into a further planning stage. Analogous schools, programs or institutes began during the fall of 1961 in the fields of meteorology, customs, labor, policing, public administration and social work. Additionally, numerous Congolese receive on-the-job training by ONUC experts—hundreds in the health care industry alone. Finally, various foreign governments granted a number of overseas fellowships to Congolese in the areas of foreign affairs, journalism, international trade, labor relations, agricultural cooperatives, rural planning, customs administration and finance.636

In total, the UN Civilian Operation grew to 426 workers by the end of 1961—up from 258 in mid-June. Meanwhile, 540 Congolese trainees completed their courses during the second half of 1961, additionally 1,098 Congolese were undergoing some type of training by the end of 1961.637 Altogether, by the end of 1961 the UN Civilian Operation to the Congo began to look more like a conventional UN technical assistance program, albeit with an

estimated total cost for 1962 of nearly $15 million, by far the largest ever undertaken by the UN in any one country.\footnote{Thant, Annual Report, 16 June 1961—15 June 1962, ODS, Supplement No. 1 (A/5201), 25.}

Commenting on these developments at a press conference in Denmark in early October 1961, Linner, reminded his audience,

Let us not forget that the main task for the UN in the long run is neither political nor military—which are temporary tasks; it is the reconstruction work in the civil, agricultural, health and educational fields. The action in Congo since July 1960 is the largest collective effort in these fields that the UN has ever attempted and organized. It does not get front-page headlines in the same way as the sensational problems, but I would be grateful if you would keep it in mind that a great reconstruction work has been going on since July last year.

Asked by a reporter specifically in which fields the reconstruction was taking place—a question perhaps indicative as to just how under-reported the UN civilian work in the Congo had been—Linner was unambiguous. He carefully pointed out that from the inception of the operation, the UN had trained several thousand Congolese in numerous fields while boasting,

‘We have kept the whole thing going.’

Problems would remain, including the well-chronicled Katanga saga that saw major military action between UN and Katangan forces from August 1961 to the end of year. Tragically, this phase of the crisis would claim the life of Secretary-General Hammarskjold.\footnote{Sometime during the night of 17-18 September 1961 a plane containing Hammarskjold and fifteen others en route from Leopoldville to Ndola, Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) crashed. Hammarskjold had been on his way to negotiate a ceasefire between UN forces and Katangan troops. Everyone on board perished. Sture Linner was on the plane until right before takeoff when he and Hammarskjold though it better that he stay behind in the Congo. Although many remained suspicious of the crash, preliminary investigations pointed to pilot error. However, recent scholarship, especially that of Susan Williams in Who Killed Hammarskjold? has used the testimonies of non-white witnesses to the crash, so far ignored, in suggesting a conspiracy existed to kill the Secretary-General. Roger Lipsey, a Hammarskjold biographer, has recently come to a similar conclusion. On 16 March 2015, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon announced the establishment of an independent panel of experts to investigate the crash once again. The report is expected to announce its finding no later than 30 June 2015. See, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=50337#.VT6uSk2BHct.} Apart from peace and security issues, a mid-November 1961 UN report lamented the continued influence of Belgian advisers who greatly outnumbered UN personnel in most ministries and retained a decisive voice in policy-making. The author of
the report blamed the high turnover rate of UN staff, the unmatched experience many Belgians had of the country and Congolese officials for what he called ‘only a partial success’ in preparing the Congo for true independence. The report concluded by recommending that it might perhaps be time, as the late-Secretary-General had alluded, to encourage bilateral aid on a multilateral basis. The alternative was for the UN to supply large sums of aid while much of the policy advice remained with the Belgians.⁶⁴⁰

Still, as the out-going Linner handed over the position of Officer-in-charge to Gardiner in February 1962, the member of the UN Secretariat engaged and entangled in the crisis as much as anyone, stated that at his departure UN-Congo relations had never been better. Asked for highlights of his eighteen-month term with the ONUC, Linner first mentioned his amazement at the speedy and generous response of member nations to answer the call for help in the early days of the crisis. Next, he commented on the extra-ordinary nature of the aid provided that would ‘have a large place in the history of UN action.’ Finally, Linner remarked on his admiration for the Congolese who faced up to their country’s post-colonial difficulties and eagerly pressed forward.⁶⁴¹

Moreover, Linner’s departure at the end of 1961 took place at a point when the majority of the key developments and reforms to the Civilian ONUC had already taken place under his leadership as Civilian Chief and Officer-in-charge. Thus, 1961 serves as a suitable thematic end date in examining the first major test case of the operationalization of the UN’s overall development mission. To be sure, joint UN-Congolese development efforts under ONUC would continue for the next several years. However, as mentioned, by the end of 1961 the Civilian Operation began taking on the attributes of a regular UN technical assistance program and starting in 1962, it increasingly fell under the guise of the EPTA and the Special Fund. In fact, this transfer was in full effect by 1963 when the EPTA took over many of the

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⁶⁴⁰ Cable from D. Dumontet to MacFarquhar, 15 November 1961, UNARMS, Folder S-075200310002.
administrative tasks from the ONUC Civilian Operation following the reintegration of Katanga. Altogether, UN aid allocated by the two main branches of development aid remained exceptionally high compared to any other country where the Organization operated. For example, in 1964 EPTA funding for the Congo alone reached over $1 million. Requested and approved Special Fund projects for the Congo totaled over $1.1 million for 1964 and over $1.5 million by 1966. It was also during the mid-1960s when the US became the predominant financer of civilian aid through the UN. For example, in 1966 the US paid $7.9 million of the $8.3 million in aid costs.642

Meanwhile, civilian aid worker numbers ballooned to over 1,100 by the end of 1962 and some 2,000 experts in 1963-64, including 400 Nigerian police officers and some 800 UNESCO schoolteachers. This increase occurred just as the UN military force began to depart, having completed their incremental withdrawal by the end of June 1964. The Civilian Mission still remained a highly international group, albeit one that prized French speaking aid workers. Similar to previous figures France, Haiti and Switzerland provided a large share of the civilian aid contingent.643

**Conclusion**

As Arne Westad has described in *The Global Cold War*, ‘the advent of new, independent Third World states began already in 1960 to change the role of the United Nations into a more diverse forum’. In particular, he has emphasized how the conflict stemming from the decolonization of the Congo transformed the UN ‘from being view by many as an arm of US intervention abroad to being an altogether different organization.’ Part of the change, according to Westad, was the ‘strengthened position’ enjoyed at the UN

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642 House, 201-04, 369-72.
among non-aligned states from the Global South.\textsuperscript{644} Certainly this was seen during the course of the Congo Crisis, in which UN resolutions drafted and proposed by Afro-Asian member states litter the conflict’s narrative and thus helped to steer the course of the UN’s role. Yet, UN executive action in the form of decisions and policies originating from the UN Secretariat or disseminating from ONUC, also indicated another change, or perhaps signaled a trend at the Organization. Thus, the past two chapters have shown how through the wide-ranging work of UN Civilian Mission to the Congo—either as a protagonist or even as a perceived antagonist at times—the UN’s role in the Congo Crisis should be firmly stationed at the intersection of decolonization and development.

As the UN heavily engaged with a country whose decolonization process left it abandoned by its metropole, at least initially, its enthusiastic response included not only a peacekeeping force but also a civilian mission that unreservedly carved out its place in Africa’s post-colonial development process. First came emergency relief and rehabilitation, quickly followed by a combination of technical assistance, long-term development planning, social development programs, education and training institutes and general institution building. Stepping back then, the UN effort in the Congo was to a large degree an experiment in modernization in the midst of crisis. Sture Linner would describe it as such in a report written decades after the Congo Crisis and commissioned by the Swedish Foreign Ministry and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). Linner’s report, entitled \textit{Disaster Relief for Development}, examined the connections between emergency aid and long-term development. The report concluded, ‘[t]o prevent disasters effectively, and to soften their impact, their causes and cure both need to be seen in a long-term development perspective.’\textsuperscript{645} Certainly this was an underlying goal of the Civilian Chief throughout his involvement with ONUC. The result of this effort in the Congo was what journalist Walter

\textsuperscript{644} See, Westad, 136.

Lippmann called ‘the most advanced and most sophisticated experiment in international cooperation ever attempted.’  

In fact, the mission’s international nature was one of its strengths. Paul Berthoud, legal adviser for ONUC, recalls his astonishment at the Operation’s ability ‘to live the concept of multilateralism in a very concrete situation’ by ‘working together as exponents of a community of nations’—not to mention a community of Specialized Agencies. Still, Berthoud is careful to mention both the advantages and disadvantages of managing a crisis at a multilateral level through an international organization. Clearly, the experiment was not without its flaws especially made apparent when, through its efforts to develop the Congo’s public administration and attempt to free it from the vestiges of Belgian colonialism, it opened itself up to accusations of disguised imperialism. This reached its low point in early 1961, when the Civilian Mission’s development aid efforts stalled—due in large part to the fallout of various other political crises. However, following hard-nosed negotiations with UN delegates, the UN and Congolese authorities were able to rectify the situation.

By mid-1961, the UN once again took up more development aid projects in the Congo, now with the expressed purpose of hastening Africanization. Nevertheless, the history of the Congo is hardly one of a post-crisis transition to a stable state. Instead, it is defined by the eccentric kleptocracy of Joseph Mobutu. After the Congo installed its civilian government in 1961, Mobutu remained on as the commander in chief of the ANC. Then in 1965, Mobutu, who later changed his name to Mobutu Sese Seko and the Congo’s name to Zaire, engineered another coup establishing an authoritarian regime that would last until 1997. During his more than three decades of rule, Mobutu amassed great personal wealth by pillaging his country, brutalizing dissidents, while enjoying significant support from the US

for his anti-communist stance. In many ways, he was the archetypical African dictator. In the end, his misrule laid the foundation for a Congolese civil war that raged during the mid-1990s and led to yet another UN intervention in the form of the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC).

What then can be said of the UN Mission to the Congo—its immediate and long-term effects? Richard Gardner, the US Under-Secretary of State for International Organizations for President Kennedy, provides a moderate but valuable analysis. He argues the UN did not ‘bequeath to the Congo a tranquil or easy existence—only a lease on life.’ In many ways, the UN Civilian Mission to the Congo was a vital component of this effort. However, this episode is also helpful in examining the first major test of UN development standards and practices, shaped and cultivated during the 1950s. In this case, the challenges associated with decolonization in Africa confronted the UN brand of aid at the level of implementation.

More broadly, much of the Civilian Mission’s efforts in the Congo are part of the Organization’s turn towards making development its primary purpose. In You, The People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building, Simon Chesterman defines what he calls ‘transitional administrations’ as state-building activities in which the United Nations attempted ‘to develop the institutions of government by assuming some or all of those sovereign powers on a temporary basis.’ He goes on to note that these arrangements often highlight the tension between the sovereign rights of governments juxtaposed to the responsibility of the international community to protect the inhabitants of a troubled state. Much of Chesterman’s research focuses on recent transitional administrations established by the UN in Kosovo, East Timor and Cambodia. Moreover, he touches on the similar, but

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altogether vaguer, UN responsibilities in Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet, he argues that these examples have roots in the UN’s response to decolonization and cites the UN Congo Mission as possibly the most complex of transitional administrations. Overall, he classifies the ONUC as a watershed in the history of UN peacekeeping with regard to the scale of the operation and its responsibilities. In this way, the previous two chapters have re-enforced how the UN Civilian Mission, as part of the overall ONUC, was a vital part of this turning point and legacy that reaches into the UN’s current activities.

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651 Chesterman, Preface, ix, 83-84.
CONCLUSION

In his 1966 book entitled, *The Arrogance of Power*, the well-known US Senator from Arkansas, J. William Fulbright, called for the internationalization of development aid to convert bilateral economic aid into a responsibility of the global community. Fulbright saw this as a means to end ‘the peculiar and corrosive tyranny which donor and recipient seem to exercise over each other in bilateral relationships.’ To be sure, Fulbright was correct in describing bilateral aid programs of the mid-1960s as often problematical, citing American aid to Vietnam as a prime example. Nevertheless, his appeal to internationalize development aid was also, if anything, slightly short-sighted since the two preceding decades of the postwar world had witnessed a number of significant examples of a global effort to internationalize economic and social development. In many ways, Fulbright’s naivety, or at least neglect, of efforts to pursue development through multilateral channels parallels that of the historical scholarship on postwar development.

It was the aim of this thesis to highlight the internationalization of development aid that took place through the United Nations from 1949 to 1961. This began with the establishment of the EPTA in 1949 and the Special Fund in 1958—representing the two main branches of grant-based development aid at the UN. This thesis has argued that it was through technical assistance and pre-investment aid that the Organization competed for its share of the global development effort and simultaneously established a UN-brand of aid. In doing so, architects of UN aid within the UN Secretariat justified their efforts by promoting the Organization’s will, capacity and responsibility to offer a unique form of aid. Why was UN aid distinct, if not preferred? This thesis has highlighted several key individuals including Secretary-General Hammarskjold, David Owen, Paul Hoffman and Hans Singer who packaged UN aid as distinct. Specifically, they made the argument that UN development aid was outside the orbit of the Cold War since it was divorced from the political and military

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overtones associated with bilateral aid. In this way, it operated with greater sensitivity to the needs of underdeveloped states. Moreover, they emphasized that UN aid was distinctly different from a ‘civilizing mission’ since the recipient country played a larger role in determining where to allocate the aid based on their own development plans. Additionally, they touted the fact that UN aid came from an organization of which the recipient countries were full and equal members alongside donor states. Finally, they drew upon a worldwide network of scientific and technical knowledge and in this way were not limited to the intellectual capital or technical expertise of one state.

However, the singularly favored position of the UN, according to those within the UN Secretariat, also came up against challenges through the 1950s. One substantial test was the preference of the two superpowers, the United States and Soviet Union, for bilateral or bloc aid. In this case, this thesis especially focuses on the effort to convince the US, namely those within the Eisenhower Administration, to the added benefits of multilateral aid through the UN. Therefore, the thesis reveals the ways in which the Organization continually had to jockey for relevancy throughout the 1950s as it competed with aid alternatives. The UN accomplished this initially, in large part, by riding the wave of postwar popularity for technical assistance through the work of the EPTA. Then, by the second half of the 1950s, it went as far as to invent a new sub-category of development aid, pre-investment, to ensure that high-modernist development efforts bore a UN stamp. Certainly member states played a large role in this process, as did the Specialized Agencies, but the Organization itself also showed how it could function as an autonomous institution and actor in its own right.

After surveying how the UN established standards for its brand of aid through the 1950s, the thesis then concentrated on a period during the late 1950s and early 60s when the tempo of decolonization increased concurrently with the demand by newly independent states for multilateral aid options. This paralleled a heightened sense of responsibility at the UN
headquarters to respond in kind. Prompted by Secretary-General Hammarskjold’s six-week tour of Africa, the UN embarked upon a concentrated program to bolster the Organization’s development aid to a continent on the verge of mass decolonization. Hammarskjold, in particular, responded to this situation by successfully promoting the expansion of the existing development aid machinery of the United Nations, namely the aforementioned EPTA and UN Special Fund as well as the use of UN Resident Representatives, OPEX and the Regular Program for Technical Assistance. By doing so, Hammarskjold hoped to win over the continent by establishing a precedent for UN aid in the region.

Moreover, the thesis shows how this effort coincided with the culmination of a debate within various UN forums over capital development aid and the establishment of a billion dollar finance facility designed to provide soft loans specifically for newly independent and underdeveloped countries of the Global South. Here, this thesis challenges the standard view that SUNFED faded to the background following the creation of the Special Fund in 1958. Instead, it examines the intense competition between SUNFED and its World Bank equivalent, the IDA, in 1959 and 1960. Although in the end, the IDA out-paced SUNFED, the thesis argues that this episode served as a marker for the Organization’s pivot towards making development its primary function. It also highlights an overlooked aspect of Secretary-General Hammarskjold’s tenure—namely his renewed and timely interest in the UN’s economic and social development mandate.

Furthermore, the thesis further extends the study of postwar international development by exploring another distinct form of assistance—food aid. Here, this study shows how the UN and its top development economist Hans Singer, played a significant role in changing the discourse on the nature and purpose of food aid during the early 1960s. As surplus disposal to feed the hungry became surplus utilization to spur development, the UN established a new aid standard that encouraged more reciprocity between donor and recipient
countries. In 1961, this led to the establishment of the UN World Food Program, which spearheaded the ‘food aid for development’ approach for the decades to come. Here, the UN’s effort to make food aid an additional mechanism to promote development not only dove-tailed with the Kennedy’s Administration approach, which led the effort among donor states to establish the WFP, but also changed the way in which the US allocated its bilateral food aid through PL 480.

Finally, the thesis concludes with two chapters that look more intensely at how the UN attempted to execute its brand of aid under the harshest of circumstances. Just as food aid, by the early 1960s, was meant to be more than just feeding the hungry but was also a means to sponsor development on all fronts within a society, so too, UN emergency aid at the outset of the Congo Crisis was meant to establish a foundation whereby assistance would lead to long-term development. At the same time, the pursuit and establishment of a UN-brand of aid during the 1950s certainly made possible the Organization’s massive response to the Congo Crisis. This amounted to UN personnel encouraging not only a greater use of the UN in response to the Congo Crisis but UN predominance over the administration and allocation of aid. In doing so, the thesis has examined, in the UN Civilian Operation to the Congo, a neglected component of the overall UN response to the crisis and a crucial part of its mission.

Nevertheless, much of the evidence in these chapters illustrates how accounting for local realities fundamentally challenged UN development aid theories, aspirations and standards. For the UN, this manifested itself in a competition over aid exclusivity, combatting accusations of carrying out disguised imperialism, all the while dealing with a wave of political and security crises. These challenges gave new meaning to a statement given by Hammarskjold on the eve of mass decolonization in which he indicated that decolonization and self-government, despite being principles upheld by the UN Charter, were ultimately
processes that newly independent countries and the global community had to ‘survive’. In the end, the UN operation did survive the first eighteen-months of the crisis but only by adapting its aid strategy and learning to become a guarantor, not an interloper, of the Congo’s development.

Overall, the thesis analyzed development and development aid through one of its prevailing postwar characteristics—development as a competition. This theme has served to highlight a predominant motive for why the UN chose to exert its development mandate from the Organization’s founding on through the second half of the twentieth century. Certainly the struggle to gain and maintain relevancy—if not achieve aid dominance—enveloped and drove the narratives of the EPTA, the Special Fund, SUNFED, the World Food Program and the Civilian Mission to the Congo to a large degree. UN action in these areas helped to prove its worth, especially among the growing number of member states from the Global South. In this way, the UN laid the groundwork for its focus in the field of development aid beginning with the First UN Development Decade of the 1960s.

In assessing the work of the UN and the value of UN development during the period under review, it is tempting to offer some kind of final and decisive evaluation for the UN’s various ideas and actions regarding development. This kind of assessment proves exceedingly difficult when taking into account the numerous external influences which affected UN development aid operations. Nevertheless, several studies are helpful in trying to think through this issue. By examining the origins and rise of various development efforts at the World Bank, the FAO and the WHO in *The Birth of Development*, Amy Staples surmises that the real importance of these international institutions lies in an analysis of their goals and the

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653 Transcript of Press Conference following an address to the Economic Club of New York, 22 March 1960, NSL, Hammarskjöld Papers, L179:177. A reporter then followed up by asking Hammarskjöld how long he thought the transition to true self-governance might take. Hammarskjöld responded by reflecting on a conversation he had had on his Africa trip. An individual, who Hammarskjöld kept anonymous, had said with a smile that independence in Africa would undoubtedly lead to setbacks and mistakes but, ‘after all the British kicked out the Romans once upon a time and it led to a kind of setback for 1,000 years and they never regretted it.’
means to achieve their goals. She concludes that, set against the target of fostering economic
development, agricultural reform and public health advances respectively, these institutions
failed to meet their lofty standards. Yet according to Staples, that does not negate the
historical value and impact of their efforts.\textsuperscript{654}

In fact, the approach taken by Staples is an example of a new shift in development
histories. In his 2000 article ‘Development? It’s History’ development historian Nick
Cullather acknowledged the growing trend and need that ‘treats development as history, as an
artifact of the political and intellectual context of the Cold War, and makes history the
methodology for studying modernization, instead of the other way around.’ Cullather then
placed this approach in the context of the study of US foreign relations, stating: ‘[t]his
historicist approach offers a way to write about development without accepting its clichés,
and to see the record of Americans’ cynical, heroic, disastrous, occasionally inspired, and
benevolent attempts at global humanitarianism in all of their moral and political
complexity.’\textsuperscript{655} The result, as mentioned in the opening pages of this thesis, was a re-
examination of postwar development by scholars from a historicist, albeit American-centered
perspective.

Moreover, this emerging school was also part of an effort, in the words of another
development historian—Daniel Immerwahr—to get beyond the ‘moral accounting’ analysis
of postwar development that followed the birth of the revisionist school of US diplomatic
history starting with William Appleman Williams.\textsuperscript{656} Here, historians and anthropologists,
mostly during the 1990s, took to task development aid efforts of various US Administrations
and exposed their less-than-righteous motivations and pharisaical hubris.\textsuperscript{657} James Ferguson’s

\textsuperscript{654} See especially the Series Editor’s Foreword by Mary Ann Heiss in Staples, ix.
\textsuperscript{655} Cullather, ‘Development? It’s History,’ 642. Cullather credits Michael Adas, \textit{Machines and the Measure of
Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western Dominance} (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press,
1989) and Scott, \textit{Seeing Like a State}, as pioneering studying in this shift.
\textsuperscript{657} For a fuller analysis see, Daniel Immerwahr, ‘Modernization and Development in U.S. Foreign Relations,’
analysis in *The Anti-Politics Machine* included international institutions in this critique since countries used these organizations to propagate bureaucratic state power. This school of thought paralleled other scholars who, during the same period, depicted international postwar development as an entirely futile, misconceived and debilitating exercise.

Instead of being predominantly motivated by condemning or upholding the moral qualities of postwar development, Fredrick Cooper has joined Cullather and others in historicizing postwar development and focusing on its complexities. Yet his approach, as an Africanist, has been far less American-centered. Moreover, Cooper’s method, again in the words of Immerwahr, ‘makes room for the larger contours of international history: decolonization, the rise of the international institutions, the multiplicity of developers and the rivalries among them.’ Crucially, this approach allows for the study of development as ‘a global phenomenon that was hotly contested.’

This has been the perspective adopted here. Thus, this thesis has tried to avoid depicting UN development in an ‘ironic tone’ by dwelling on the gap between the aspirations and results of UN development efforts. Similarly, it has tried not to idealize UN development as a ‘silver-bullet’ which, when applied correctly, could solve the world’s economic and social ills. In other words, the goal has not been to judge development aid through the UN from 1949 to 1961 as necessarily good or bad. Instead, the thesis has focused on the Organization’s motives, goals, the means to achieve its goals, the resulting competition and the subsequent internationalization of development aid. In doing so, it offers an

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662 Cooper, *Colonialism in Question*, 148-49.
alternative to the characterization of development as exclusively oppressive or predominately liberating and, in places, even provides a dialogue between the two views.663

Similarly, this thesis makes an important contribution to the growing UN scholarship that avoids depicting the UN as a victim of classic Cold War machinations. Too many histories of this period take this approach by arguing that, to understand the actions of the UN, one needs to look no further than Washington, London, Moscow or Paris—and certainly not New York. This misrepresents the Organization’s agency, particularly during the period under review. Instead, this thesis contributes to the study of the postwar decades by de-centering the nation-state and moving beyond examining both the UN and development aid as strictly the foreign policy tools of countries. As an alternative, this thesis shows the UN to be an autonomous institution and dynamic instrument for executive action as it promoted its brand of development aid while adding to the development discourse of the era. In doing so, it played a significant role in affecting and contributing to one of postwar development’s dominant qualities—namely, development as a competition. In this way, the UN proved to be not just a handmaiden of developed member states, but a type of midwife for the birth of newly independent underdeveloped countries. This form of midwifery certainly left the UN susceptible to being a party in any complications that arose, as witnessed in the Congo. Yet, its station was nonetheless indicative of its pivotal role in the process.

663 Cooper, ‘Writing the History of Development,’ 6.
Appendix I

United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC)

Organizational Chart

United Nations Headquarters, New York

SECRETARY-GENERAL

Under – Secretaries

Advisory Committee

Special Advisor on Civilian Operations
Sir Alexander MacFarquhar

Special Advisor on Military Operations
Brigadier I.J. Rikhye

THE CONGO

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE*
M. Abbas (Sudan) (Acting): March-May 1961
Sture Linner (Sweden): May 1961-Jan. 1962
R. Gardiner (Ghana): Feb. 1962-May 1963
*Office-in-Charge starting with Linner

CHIEF OF CIVILIAN OPERATIONS
S. Linner (Sw): July 1960-May 1961
M. Khiari (Tun): May 1960-Aug. 1961

SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE UN FORCES
Major-General C. von Horn (Sw): July-Dec. 1960

Consultative Group

Technical Advisory Groups

Contributors of Military Personnel: Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Denmark, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Liberia, Malaysia, Federation of Mali, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia

Major Fields of Operation: Agriculture, Communications, Education, Finance and Economy, Foreign Trade, Health, Judiciary, Labor, Military Instruction, National Recourses, Public Administration
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   Arthur David Kemp Owen Papers
   Andrew W. Cordier Papers (Including: the Dag Hammarskjold Collection)

Columbia University Center for Oral History, New York
   Andrew W. Cordier Oral History Transcripts
   Clarence Douglas Dillon Oral History Transcripts
   C.V. Narasimhan Oral History Transcripts

Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas
   Ann Whitman Files
      (Administration Series, Diary Series, Dulles-Herter Series)
   C.D. Jackson Papers
   Clarence B. Randall Journals
   Dennis A. Fitzgerald Papers
   Christian A. Herter Papers
   White House Office Files
      (Alpha Series, International Series, State Department Subseries)

Labour Movement Archive, Stockholm, Sweden
   Gunnar and Alva Myrdal Papers

Massachusetts History Society (MHS), Boston, Massachusetts
   Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. Papers

MIT Institute Archives & Special Collections, Cambridge, Massachusetts
   Max Millikan Papers

National Swedish Library, Stockholm, Sweden
   Dag Hammarskjold Papers

New York Public Library—Manuscripts and Archives Division, New York
   Arthur Hays Sulzberger Papers

Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, the Netherlands
   Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Ann Whitman Files
      (Administration Series, International Series)
   John F. Kennedy Papers
      (Campaign Files, Office Files, Oral History Files)
United Kingdom National Archives, Kew Gardens, UK
Foreign Office Files

United Nations Archives and Records Management System, New York
Secretary-Generals Files
Secretariat Department Files
Missions, Commissions & Related Files

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Dag Hammarskjold Address: *Old Creeds in the New World*

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Document Repository
FAO Annual Conferences
FAO Council Meetings

Harry S. Truman Presidential Library
Paul Hoffman Oral History Transcript:
[http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/hoffmanp.htm](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/hoffmanp.htm)


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Sir Richard Jolly
Conor Cruise O’Brien
Oscar Schachter
Hans W. Singer
Sir Brian Urquhart

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